

Evolution of United States Army Deployment Operations: The Santiago Campaign

A Monograph

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Abstract

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This monograph examines the evolution of United States Army deployment operations through the failures during the 1898 Santiago Expedition's mobilization through Tampa, Florida. The failed experiences from the Spanish-American War provided the evolutionary foundation for successful deployment operations to France during World War I. The results from the experiences in Tampa have developed in current United States Army doctrine Field Manual 3-35, *Army Deployment and Redeployment*. In 1898, the United States Army failed to plan for basing, tempo, and operational reach, three elements of operational art, now foundational in current doctrine. Implications from this expedition are relevant in today's contemporary operating environments as United States global commitments require efficient and effective deployment support to project and sustain American combat power. Planners must consider basing needs with expandable and retractable capabilities to support operations. Commanders must understand deployment tempo operations in today's aggressive environment consisting of enemy Anti-Access / Anti-Denial measures. Finally, basing must provide operational reach capabilities able to support coalition and multi-national force partners. By successfully incorporating these three elements of operational art into deployment operations today, the United States military is able to link tactical action in time, space, and purpose toward the attainment of strategic objectives.

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Acronyms

ADRP	Army Doctrine Reference Publication
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
FM	Field Manual
RFID	Radio Frequency Identification
RSOI	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
TPFDD	Time Phased Force Deployment Data
TSC	Theater Sustainment Command
VISA	Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement

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The American entrance into World War I created one of the greatest military logistics problems the United States had ever faced. Sustainment planners successfully marshalled millions of tons of supply and mobilized almost two million men, solving a complex organizational and resource management problem. The United States required the movement of troops and equipment from countless locations within the country to a central port of embarkation for follow-on movement to the war zone. New York City was the hub for overseas transit to France. The United States established the Embarkation Service in 1917 as the central organization to oversee all ports of departure from the United States as a result. The New York Port of Embarkation employed twenty five hundred officers working in various roles at piers, embarkation camps, and hospitals. New York Harbor and its subports deployed 1,798,000 soldiers by the war's end with a peak of fifty-one thousand troops sent overseas in one day, which exceeded all previous one-port records.¹ In comparison to prior Army deployment operations, the ports of New York were a model of efficiency and control during World War I.

Regulating throughput was paramount to sustaining a continuous flow of movement. The United States government established the War Industries Board in 1917 to prevent inefficient competition in the private transportation sector and to effectively synchronize and regulate movement throughout the system. This board centralized control of railroads by the United States government and alleviated inbound shipment congestion.² Troops and equipment arrived via train, adhering to detailed schedules mandated by the Operations Division of the General Staff. Coordination occurred between the British Ministry of Shipping, the United States Navy, the Embarkation Service, and the Railroad Administration to maintain constant resource movement

¹ James A. Huston, *The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1997), 345-48.

² David Rutenberg and Jane Allen, eds., *The Logistics of Waging War: American Logistics 1774-1985, Emphasizing the Development of Air Power* (Gunter Air Force Station, AL: Air Force Logistics Management Center, 1985), 64-65.

and synchronize at all locations throughout the process. Soldiers arrived without having to transport organizational equipment, and they received stockpiled gear upon arrival at the embarkation center. The synchronized system prevented confusion in the shipping and locating of equipment. Soldiers briefly waited in embarkation camps capable of housing up to eighty thousand soldiers. Mobilization teams then methodically called men forward at thirty-minute intervals to load ferries destined for their seaward movement. Equipment travelled from industrial manufacturers with bills of lading matching War Industries Board movement timetables, alleviating port backlogs. Commanded by Major General Franklin Bell, the New York Port of Embarkation controlled movement operations as a single system, flowing a total of 5,130,000 tons of equipment through Armistice Day.³

The scale and scope of World War I logistics operations was unfathomable prior to the execution. The United States was able to mobilize massive numbers of troops and equipment throughout the Great War to contribute to Allied victory. However, two decades earlier another American expeditionary force met with very little success deploying overseas. In the Spanish-American War, the United States mobilized soldiers destined for Cuba from a seldom-used and little-known port in Florida named Tampa. The uncoordinated efforts of mobilizing a mere twenty-five hundred soldiers highlight the logistics evolution and improved methodology leading to successful World War I deployments through New York less than twenty years later.

The United States Army and Navy staged men and equipment in Tampa to prepare for the 1898 invasion of Cuba. They conducted what United States planners label today as the deployment process. This small-scale mobilization was the first expeditionary operation for the United States Army since the Mexican-American War in 1847. The experiences from the mobilization in Tampa provided the foundation for later successful deployment operations in World War I. Current United States Army deployment doctrine addresses similar challenges seen

³ Huston, *Sinews of War*, 345-48.

during the Tampa mobilization and contains the same principles to address these issues in contemporary actions. Critical to the Tampa operation was the application of what are known as three of today's elements of operational art: basing, tempo, and operational reach.

The evolution of the Army deployment process demonstrates the significance of the implications from the Tampa mobilization. The experience gained during the mobilization for the invasion of Cuba in the Spanish-American War improved future deployment operations and enabled the United States to move troops and equipment quickly and efficiently in expeditionary operations. The skills developed in Tampa laid the groundwork in establishing the four principles underpinning reception, staging, and onward movement and integration (RSOI): unity of command, synchronization, unit integrity, and balance. These principles are the same as the doctrinal foundation of reception, staging, and onward movement in United States Army Field Manual 3-35 *Army Deployment and Redeployment*, and evolved effectively during World War I. On the docks of Tampa, planners did not use what current doctrine calls the principles of deployment operations, because they did not exist. This Tampa experience required planners to address these issues in modern United States Army mobilization doctrine.

Operational art is the ability of a commander to use his creativity to pursue strategic objectives through tactical actions he makes on the ground.⁴ The commander must cognitively connect current conditions to a visualized end state and develop a plan to reach those objectives. The commander first encounters operational art in the deployment phase of any mission.⁵ Here he must lay the foundation for successful combat operations as the initial phases of any conflict stresses the importance of basing, tempo, and operational reach. Unfortunately, the Spanish-

⁴ Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0 defines operational art as “the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose.” Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 4-1.

⁵ Field Manual 3-35 defines deployment operations “composed of activities required to prepare and move forces, supplies, and equipment to a theater.” Field Manual (FM) 3-35, *Army Deployment and Redeployment* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 1-1.

American War was a conflict that erupted quickly, but allowed limited time to focus on these three factors.

History of the Santiago Expedition

Cuba had been a Spanish colony since the time that Christopher Columbus had claimed it in the names of Ferdinand and Isabella in 1492. By the late-nineteenth century, however, Cuban independence was on the minds of many of the island's inhabitants. The Cuban insurrection against its Spanish colonial master began on 28 February 1895, although there had been indicators of an impending insurgency as early as the 1850s. Numerous efforts by the Cubans to gain independence from Spanish authority had repeatedly failed. Nonetheless, Cuban political efforts drew in private American support for the insurrectionists.⁶ Spanish reaction, however, was through military power, and included establishing concentration camps for three hundred thousand Cubans beginning in 1896. With the insurgency growing larger, Spain attempted to solve the problem through agreeing to limited political autonomy in November 1897, but the revolutionaries did not accept this offer and sought complete independence. The result was famine and disease, which killed tens of thousands of Cubans. The United States, concerned with trade disruption, protested to Spain. They cited human rights violations, but with no respite for the Cuban people.⁷

A large riot that broke out on the streets of Havana on 12 January 1898 brought about American action. The instability concerned President William McKinley because of the thousands of Americans living on the island and the millions of dollars invested in the island's economy. The riot compelled the president to send the armored cruiser *Maine* to Havana Harbor

⁶ Walter Millis, *The Martial Spirit: A Study of Our War with Spain* (Boston: Riverside Press, 1931), 1-31.

⁷ G. J. A. O'Toole, *The Spanish American War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984), 20.

to project American power and protect American interests. This ship, one of two modern United States Navy armored cruisers, arrived in Havana on 25 January 1898. After three uneventful weeks, *Maine* suddenly exploded on 15 February, killing 260 sailors and marines.⁸ The investigation never linked Spanish action with the explosion. Nevertheless, America was now sailing toward a war with Spain.

President McKinley attempted to stem the public furor to go to war, but to no avail. After much consternation, the president requested a fifty million dollar appropriation, dubbed the “Fifty Million Bill,” for the purposes of national defense. The House of Representatives and the Senate unanimously passed the bill in early March with sixteen million dollars earmarked for the army in coastal defense.⁹ President McKinley negotiated with Spain, which agreed to multiple demands for resolving the conflict with the exception of evacuating Cuba. Political pressure for war was fierce. Senator John Thurston, a Republican from Nebraska, visited Spain and reported 210,000 Cubans dying after Spanish soldiers had driven them from their homes. Both houses of Congress encouraged intervention as Spain and insurrectionists reached a stalemate: the Spanish could not stop the revolution and the Cubans could not drive Spanish rule from the island. The people of the United States pressed the government for action.¹⁰

The United States’ preparations for war quickly escalated when, on 22 April, Congress gave the president the authority to call for volunteers to increase the regular United States Army from its current size of twenty-six thousand men. The following day, the president called for 125,000 volunteers from the male population between the ages eighteen to forty-five years old. Congress declared war on 25 April and passed an act the subsequent day to double the rank and

⁸ O'Toole, *The Spanish American War*, 20-21.

⁹ Millis, *Martial Spirit*, 116-17.

¹⁰ John M. Thurston, “Senate Speech March 21, 1898,” in *Patriotic Eloquence Relating to the Spanish-American War and Its Issues*, ed. Robert Fulton and Thomas Trueblood (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903), 304-08.

file of the existing regular army regiments.¹¹ Major General Merch Stewart, a second lieutenant in the Spanish-American War, described the mobilization as “out of seeming chaos, brigades and divisions began to take form and substance. Gradually, also, regiments began to migrate Tampa-ward in preparation for we knew not what. Incidentally, we began to receive recruits whom we had no time to train, various articles of winter clothing, for which we had no use, and other impedimenta which were chiefly impedimenta.”¹² Time was of the essence, with men and equipment headed toward Tampa for the invasion of Cuba. War planners decided Tampa would serve as the embarkation point for the Cuban Campaign, but the port lacked the infrastructure to execute the mission. War had begun in bungling earnest.

Carl von Clausewitz states, “No one starts a war... without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective.” The Prussian insists upon clear war planning “down to the smallest operational detail.”¹³ This argument permeates the logistics of supplying and transporting an army into theater to meet strategic objectives. Indeed, Clausewitz asserts that maintenance and supply are critical to sustaining an army. He contends that subsistence by means of depots is one of four ways to sustain an army, and the base of operations is critical to its survival. Planners, therefore, must consider the base of operations as a holistic approach to sustaining operational reach and tempo of the deployments. The flow of soldiers and equipment to the field of battle is paramount and “one must never forget that it is among those that take the time to produce a decisive effect.”¹⁴ Clausewitz understood the importance of sustainment to lay

¹¹ Richard Titherington, *A History of the Spanish American War of 1898* (New York: D Appleton, 1900), 105.


¹² Frank Freidel, *Splendid Little War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1958), 38.

¹³ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 579.

¹⁴ Clausewitz, *On War*, 337-44.

the foundation for the political end state. The mobilization through Tampa, Florida, demonstrates the importance of integrated logistics operations, even as seen through the lens of Clausewitz.

Tampa was a sleepy town on the Florida Gulf Coast with a population of ten thousand residents (see Map 1). Cigar making was the main economy. The town consisted of three banks, a movie theater, transportation networks of gravel and planked roads, with a handful of general stores and one telegraph office. The main attraction was the Tampa Bay Hotel that rested on six acres with a silver dome covering a small casino. Henry B. Plant owned the property, along with the small one-track railroad leading nine miles from Tampa to Port Tampa.¹⁵ Plant built Port Tampa to facilitate sea traffic flow from Key West and Cuba. In the port itself, a narrow channel allowed steamers to transport passengers.¹⁶ The twenty-one foot depth was adequate for large steamers, and the wharf allowed thirteen ships to dock simultaneously.¹⁷



Map 1. Tampa and Port Tampa, Florida.

¹⁵ A. C. M. Azoy, *CHARGE! The Story of the Battle of San Juan Hill* (New York: Longman's, Green, 1961), 38.

¹⁶ Freidel, *Splendid Little War*, 60.

¹⁷ Graham A. Cosmas, *Army for an Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish American War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri, 1971), 187.

The War Department selected Tampa and the adjacent bay for their strategic significance. Tampa Bay's geography was ideal to prevent Spanish cruisers from engaging transport ships during the loading process.¹⁸ Tampa possessed the minimum estimated railroad and shipping facilities for transportation support and was the closest port to Cuba with adequate naval capacity.¹⁹ With these considerations in mind, planners chose Tampa "almost by administrative gravitation," and the army began assembling on 15 April 1898 in what resembled a reconnaissance-in-force.²⁰ In retrospect, had the planners known the size to which the army force would grow, they would not have chosen Port Tampa as the Cuban port of embarkation.²¹ In the beginning, Russell Alger, the secretary of war, ordered five thousand regulars to arrive and prepare for quick movement into Cuba.²² Upon arrival, units made their temporary homes in the sandy terrain in preparation for imminent overseas movement.

Army deployment operations today consist of three phases: predeployment; movement; and reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. Planners developed Tampa to execute the phases of both movement and reception, staging, and onward movement responsibilities. In the case of Tampa, the expedition executed arrival activities of fort-to-port operations under movement (see Figure 1).

¹⁸ Edward J. McClermand, "The Santiago Campaign," in *The Santiago Campaign*, ed. Joseph T. Dickman (Richmond, VA: Williams Printing, 1927), 3.

¹⁹ Kenneth E. Hendrickson, *Spanish-American War* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2003), 10.

²⁰ Graham A. Cosmas, *Army for an Empire*, 187.

²¹ Russell A. Alger, *Spanish-American War* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1901), 65.

²² *Ibid.*, 69.

Army Deployment		
Predeployment	Movement	
	Fort-to-Port	Port-to-Port
Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration		

Figure 1: Phases of Army Deployment and Movement Activity

The deployment process at Tampa captured the essence of reception, staging, and onward movement designed to bring together equipment and supplies into one cohesive fighting force.²³ In effect, Tampa was both a port of embarkation and debarkation. This is in contrast to New York City during World War I where it was a port of embarkation and executed only the movement phase of deployment operations. Moreover, it stands in contrast with the port of debarkation in Kuwait during Operation Iraqi Freedom that executed solely the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration phase of army deployment operations. The multi-functionality of Tampa was a large reason it was chosen as the site for deployment.

Three factors during the planning process dictated the reasoning behind Tampa as the site of deployment. In today's doctrinal terms, they are called basing, tempo, and operational reach. The army established Tampa as a base camp designed to facilitate the flow of soldiers and equipment to Cuba. Planners selected this site to receive units, integrate them with their equipment, and facilitate movement into Cuba via ocean vessels. Modern doctrine calls these intermediate staging bases. These bases create operational depth and maintain tempo by

²³ FM 3-35 states reception, staging, and onward movement is designed "to rapidly combine and integrate arriving elements of personnel, equipment, and materiel into combat power that can be employed by the combatant commander." FM 3-35, 4-1.

employing land power across time and space.²⁴ Planners established Tampa with the purpose of expediting the employment of the United States expeditionary force.

Tempo was critical to the deployment through Tampa.²⁵ The United States Navy had sent a force to blockade the Port of Havana with additional assignments to destroy the Spanish fleet and set conditions for an army landing force. Tampa had to be able to quickly receive, stage, and move soldiers to Cuba following naval action. Tempo in the Cuba Campaign was critical to maintain the initiative gained by the destruction of the Spanish fleet. United States Army forces quickly needed to provide soldiers and supplies in support of the Cuban insurrection. The War Department believed that the rapid arrival of American ground forces would demoralize Spanish forces and boost the morale of Cuban insurrectionists. Military planners assumed a large degree of risk when they anticipated that the United States Army could build enough infrastructure capacity at Tampa to mobilize and deploy armed forces to retain the initiative.

Operational reach is the ability for a military force to project combat power and sustain mission effectiveness through supply lines. This element of operational art focuses on establishing, protecting, and maintaining the ability to fight over extended distances.²⁶ Operational reach relies on basing to sufficiently project military forces and sets the initial tempo of the operation. Deployment sites form the foundation of projecting an army's ability to fight any campaign, as in Tampa during the Spanish-American War. As Clausewitz theorizes, the

²⁴ ADRP 3-0 defines a base camp as “an evolving military facility that supports the operations of a deployed unit and provides the necessary support and services for sustained operations.” ADRP 3-0, 4-6.

²⁵ ADRP 3-0 defines tempo as “the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy.” Ibid., 4-7.

²⁶ ADRP 3-0 defines operational reach as “the distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities.” This element of operational art relates to the ability to “create, protect, and sustain a force. Ibid., 4-5.

larger an army becomes, the more dependent it is on the base, thus the flow of men and equipment to the field of battle creates a decisive effect.²⁷

And flow they did! Mustered volunteers began pouring in to the swelling army beginning with Chickamauga Park, Georgia, in early-May 1898 for initial assembly, training, and follow-on movement.²⁸ From assembly points such as this, volunteers generally moved to one of four sites: Camp Thomas, Tennessee; Tampa, Florida; Camp Alger, Virginia; and the Presidio, San Francisco, California.²⁹ By the end of May, 163,626 soldiers had enlisted.³⁰ While the government met the intent of increasing the fighting force, the army's organizational and institutional culture could only support a small, constabulary force. The army's entire allocated logistics strength was a mere twenty-two commissary officers, 179 medical officers, and fifty-seven quartermaster officers.³¹ This was simply not enough capability to support the increasing size of the army. Time was of the essence however, and the desire to maintain tempo overruled logistics support. The original plan called for five thousand soldiers to muster in Tampa. Sailing south, they would conduct a reconnaissance-in-force, gain valuable intelligence on Cuba, and aid the insurgents in whatever way they could.³² The order, dated 29 April 1898, from the Adjutant-General of the War Department, directed Brigadier General William R. Shafter to "assume command of all the troops assembled there (Tampa)."³³

²⁷ Clausewitz, *On War*, 343-44.

²⁸ Cosmas, *Army for an Empire*, 126.

²⁹ Hendrickson, *Spanish American War*, 28.

³⁰ Herbert H. Sargent, *The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba*, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: University Press, 1907), 108.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 89-90.

³² Sargent, *Campaign of Santiago*, 114.

³³ *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain*, Vol. 1 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1902), 9.

William Shafter was born in rural Michigan and had enlisted in the army prior to the Civil War. He earned the Medal of Honor as a Union soldier and continued his career across the plains in the 1870s Indian campaigns. In 1897, Shafter received his promotion to brigadier general and assumed command of the Department of California in San Francisco. When the Cuban conflict began, three top military leaders held a meeting to decide the leader of the campaign. Secretary of War Russell Alger; Adjutant General of the United States Army, Colonel Henry Corbin; and Commanding General of the United States Army, Major General Nelson A. Miles unanimously chose Shafter as the expeditionary commander. Shafter was a large, fat man who weighed over 250 pounds after having gained weight during his years of garrison command. The chief commissary stated Shafter "couldn't walk two miles in an hour, just beastly obese."³⁴ His peers described him as a brave soldier who contemplated decisions and did not make impulsive choices.³⁵ Shafter's one major detriment was his limited experience in the administration of large units, something he had in common with the rest of the general officer corps. In Tampa, Shafter failed to bring order to the port of embarkation, delineate command authority, or focus on the important details of unit departures.³⁶ While senior leaders chose a commander to conduct combat operations on the Island of Cuba, they did not consider a commander with the experience necessary to manage the vast sustainment challenge in Tampa. Unfortunately, they needed both.

³⁴ Cosmas, *Army for an Empire*, 194.

³⁵ Wayne H. Morgan, *America's Road to Empire: The War with Spain and Overseas Expansion* (1965; repr., New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), 71.

³⁶ Cosmas, *Army for an Empire*, 194.

Principles of Army Deployment Operations

An army relies on its ability to base supplies and equipment and the capability to transport them effectively. Army doctrine dedicates an entire field manual to deployment and redeployment operations. Specifically, it addresses reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of assets into an area of operations. This process provides the commander an integrated force of personnel, equipment, and material where needed. The four principles of deployment operations are unity of command, synchronization, unit integrity, and balance.³⁷ Applying these four principles, the commander can project effectively and rapidly his forces into austere environments.

Unity of command enables effective oversight by one commander of the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration process.³⁸ This was General Shafter's responsibility in Tampa, to either oversee operations himself or assign one leader to manage the process. A single commander can observe the larger picture, control movement, and organize flow while providing vital support. Synchronization is vital to arranging incoming forces in an ordered manner to expedite the flow of units and equipment through a staging area.³⁹ An implied task in Tampa was to synchronize and manage this flow from the arrival at Tampa through the seaward movement. To achieve this, unit integrity was important to leverage the strength of the chain of command with its unit and equipment located on a single transportation asset. Retaining unit cohesion creates simplicity when managing force flow.⁴⁰ In all amphibious assault landings,

³⁷ An expeditionary army depends on its ability to project combat power where needed. The process of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration is designed to "rapidly combine and integrate arriving elements of personnel, equipment, and materiel into combat power that can be employed by the combatant commander." FM 3-35, 4-1 - 4-2.

³⁸ FM 3-35, 4-1.

³⁹ FM 3-35 defines synchronization as arranging "units, equipment, supplies, and capabilities" in time and space to maintain tempo and integrity of movement. Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

matching units with equipment is critical to successful operations. Balance ensures the correct amount of logistics support on-hand to deploy units. This principle integrates flexibility in the plan to increase resources and clear backlogs to maintain tempo and operational reach.⁴¹ Port Tampa struggled with these principles from the day the first soldier arrived.

The original call for five thousand troops to be postured at Tampa occurred one week prior to the official declaration of war on 25 April.⁴² Brigadier General Shafter arrived in Tampa on 30 April where he received strategic guidance from the War Department. His orders were to maintain the tempo of operations and sail at the earliest date possible with infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineer forces. The American expeditionary force would land on the south coast of Cuba to establish contact with General Maximo Gomez, the Commander-in-Chief of the insurgent army. The expedition would provide the insurgency supplies, arms, and ammunition. Shafter, though, was to avoid becoming decisively engaged since his main effort was to improve insurgent morale. However, Shafter received orders the day he arrived in Tampa to delay any movement as there were Spanish warships spotted near Cuba. Preparation for deployment was to continue, and the expedition was to wait for follow-on orders to sail.⁴³

The plan for a rapidly deploying, small contingent of five thousand soldiers evolved into a lethargic force waiting in the Florida heat for orders. Moreover, the requirement for troops began to increase from the War Department, first to twelve thousand soldiers, and then to twenty-five thousand.⁴⁴ The War Department did not plan for the logistics to support this increase, and no one prepared Tampa for the challenges to come. On 10 May, Lieutenant Colonel Charles F. Humphrey assumed command of the Quartermaster Department at Tampa. His command

⁴¹ FM 3-35, 4-2.

⁴² Huston, *Sinews of War*, 280.

⁴³ John D. Miley, *In Cuba with Shafter* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899), 1-4.

⁴⁴ Huston, *Sinews of War*, 280.

included the ocean transportation and oversight duties of the Depot Quartermaster and Chief Quartermaster.⁴⁵ Working with his assistant, Captain James McKay, Colonel Humphrey focused his efforts on preparing the staging and movement process from Port Tampa to Cuba.⁴⁶ The newly promoted Major General Shafter delegated his logistics management on the docks, but failed to establish a concept of reception for the thousands of troops about to arrive in Tampa.

Reception Process

The reception process begins with receiving units that arrive at transportation nodes and assists in the transition to the next station. This includes welcoming and providing guidance upon arrival, unloading equipment, marshalling units in correct areas and providing sustenance and shelter for a temporary stay within the base.⁴⁷ This orderly process is able to coordinate incoming personnel and equipment while managing the flow and life support of transitioning units. Tampa had no plan in place to manage this process effectively. As historian Walter Millis described the scene, “For 6 weeks the Regular army had been assembled at Tampa, enjoying a scene rather curiously combining aspects of a professional men's reunion, a county fair, and, as the volunteer regiments began to arrive to augment the force, a major disaster.”⁴⁸

Planners had given very little thought about Tampa’s limited capabilities to transport, house, and store men and supplies. To add to the lack of living and storage space in the hot, Florida sun, there was no unity of command to facilitate an orderly flow and arrangement of

⁴⁵ Report of the Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department with Spain, 56th Cong., 1st sess., 1900, S. Doc. 221, Vol. 7, 3638.

⁴⁶ Miley, *In Cuba with Shafter*, 9-10.

⁴⁷ FM 3-35 defines the reception process as “unloading personnel and equipment from strategic transport assets, managing port marshalling areas, transporting personnel, equipment, and materiel to staging areas, and providing logistics support services to units transiting the port of debarkation.” FM 3-35, 4-1.

⁴⁸ Millis, *Martial Spirit*, 241.

incoming units. The War Department continued to push men and supplies into Tampa without assigning a commander to organize this complicated logistics effort. Additionally, Major General Shafter did not assign an identified leader to coordinate the logistics process from reception to embarkation.⁴⁹ The result was general confusion for troops arriving at Tampa. As one reporter wrote, "The United States troops who arrive in Tampa... are dumped out on a railway siding like so many emigrants. No staff officer prepares anything in advance for them. Regiments go off in any direction that suits them, looking for the nearest place where they may cook their pork and beans."⁵⁰ Private Charles Post of the Seventy-First New York Volunteer Infantry arrived by train at nearby Ybor City where he proceeded to walk three miles to the Tampa camp in the Florida heat. After his regiment suffered from numerous heat stroke casualties on its march in, it settled in a wide-open area and dug latrines near the camp.⁵¹ The intended plan was for units to arrive and report to the headquarters in the Tampa Bay Hotel and receive their billeting locations.⁵² However, General Shafter and his command gave few instructions to units upon arrival.

When Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, First United States Volunteer Cavalry, arrived, he described the conditions as "a perfect welter of confusion." The train arrived and disembarked the soldiers with no apparent reason behind it. There was no central authority to receive his Rough Riders, no guidance on where to camp, and no food for the first twenty-four hours. The future president stated that "everything connected with both military and railroad matters was in an almost inextricable tangle."⁵³ Roosevelt's commander, Colonel Leonard Wood,

⁴⁹ Cosmas, *Army for an Empire*, 195.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 170-71.

⁵¹ Charles Johnson Post, *Little War of Private Post* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), 68-69.

⁵² Dale L. Walker, *Boys of '98* (New York: Tom Doherty Associates, 1998), 143.

⁵³ Theodore Roosevelt, *Rough Riders* (1899; Repr., Williamstown, MA: Corner House, 1979), 53-54.

was in total agreement when he stated, “Confusion, confusion, confusion. War! Why it is an advertisement to foreigners of our absolutely unprepared condition. We are dumped into a grove of short stumpy ground in the dark and our animals on an adjoining place filled with 2100 loose animals.”⁵⁴ Major General Joseph Wheeler arrived in Tampa on 13 May to assume command of the Cavalry Division in Fifth Corps. After reporting to James Wade, Major General of Volunteers, Wheeler received no instructions for three days while waiting on orders from the command.⁵⁵

The War Department failed to plan for supply requirements as troops arrived in Tampa. Many of the units required four days of travel from their mobilization camps, but the supply system provided only two days of rations. The lucky units received food from local residents and churches upon arrival in Tampa.⁵⁶ The incoming units found limited camping grounds and an insufficient water supply.⁵⁷ Three to five regiments arrived in Tampa every day. By 25 May, the expanding soldier population of now seventeen thousand troops began to overcrowd the Florida port. Due to increased congestion and lack of facilities, Major General Shafter made the decision to open up additional camps in Lakeland and Jacksonville to alleviate the burden on the Tampa infrastructure.⁵⁸ The reception process was a failure due to the lack of unity of command, synchronization, and balance. No one was in charge to synchronize unit arrivals with land allocation, supplies, or leadership. There was never any plan to support this influx of personnel, nor visibility on number or timelines of unit arrivals. Unfortunately, however bad the troop reception was, the equipment reception was worse.

⁵⁴ David F. Trask, *War with Spain*, ed. Louis Morton (New York: Macmillan, 1981), 184.

⁵⁵ Joseph Wheeler, *The Santiago Campaign 1898* (Boston: Rockwell and Church, 1898), 5-6.

⁵⁶ Charles H. Brown, *The Correspondent's War* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), 212.

⁵⁷ Miley, *Cuba with Shafter*, 11.

⁵⁸ Cosmas, *Army for an Empire*, 130-31.

In accordance with the time honored American army tradition of “hurry up and wait,” the soldiers dashed to Tampa and followed it up by weeks of waiting. This was while quartermaster and commissary officers worked on the chaotic tasks of making order from the thousands of tons of arriving supplies.⁵⁹ The two main issues faced were the lack of railroad infrastructure and the privatized commercial transportation monopolized by Henry Plant, a local real estate developer and railroad builder. There were only two railroad lines leading to the City of Tampa. From there, one line proceeded nine miles to the Port of Tampa. Plant independently operated this line and refused to allow other rail companies to use it.⁶⁰ Complicating matters, Plant ran sightseeing trains on his line to allow citizens the opportunity to observe the army in action. He also allowed train and boat services to continue in Port Tampa.⁶¹ The backlog these two factors created was tremendous as equipment relentlessly poured into the small town.

By 18 May, there were over one thousand freight cars ready to be unloaded with a processing rate of only three per day. Trains were waiting as far north as Columbia, South Carolina due to the unexpected backlogs (See Map 2). Train cars that did make it to Tampa remained loaded due to the lack of warehousing and transportation.⁶² Only five government wagons and twelve hired civilian wagons were on hand to facilitate loading and unloading.⁶³ Incoming railroad companies feuded with both the government and Plant. The local developer refused to let competitors use his rail line and ordered his employees to transfer freight solely with Plant equipment. This only stopped when the army threatened to take over the Plant line.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ Huston, *Sinews of War*, 280.

⁶⁰ Alger, *Spanish American War*, 65.

⁶¹ Freidel, *Splendid Little War*, 60.

⁶² Cosmas, *Army for an Empire*, 195.

⁶³ Huston, *Sinews of War*, 281.

⁶⁴ Cosmas, *Army for an Empire*, 195.

To compound the issue, most freight cars arrived without proper bills of lading, leaving the contents of the railcars a mystery until opened.



Map 2. Grey's New Trunk Railway Map of the United States.

Source: Map from Charles P. Grey, 1898. Railroad Maps 1838-1900 Collection, Library of Congress Geography and Map Division, Washington DC. LCCN-gm71000844.

Lack of synchronization between Port Tampa and the War Department created confusion at reception. The War Department shipped supplies with such haste that it neglected to attach bills of lading to the railroad cars and identify the contents. In some instances, the bills of lading were weeks behind, and each container had to be hand inspected. Units attempting to find the equipment they shipped often took the supplies they first found, leading to further confusion.⁶⁵ With very limited warehousing, the troops unloaded the cars slowly to preserve precious storage locations, but failed to store them with any semblance of logic.⁶⁶ The reception process was a total failure, and backlogs grew. The loading parties could not keep up with the influx of equipment delaying the expedition's readiness to sail. In contrast, Major General Shafter required his expeditionary force staged and ready to react to a short notice order to Cuba.

⁶⁵ Rutenberg and Allen, *Logistics of Waging War*, 49.

⁶⁶ Huston, *Sinews of War*, 281.

Staging Process

The staging process organizes personnel and supplies into combat formations, ready to deploy as a cohesive, fighting force. It joins soldiers to their necessary combat equipment and places them in arranged locations to deploy in accordance with a planned timeline.

Simultaneously, the staging process provides logistics support as units flow through.⁶⁷ The conditions established at Tampa failed to lay the groundwork for successful staging operations. Author Thomas Vivian notes “The water supply was short; machinery broke down; siege guns had to be carried bodily for miles; supply trains were stalled; mules and horses that should have arrived had been left behind in some unknown locality; troops coming in from a dozen different camps in a dozen different stages of unpreparedness--such were the few of the tangles, drawbacks and difficulties that had to be met, unraveled, and conquered before the great transport fleet could get on her way.”⁶⁸ Yet, in anticipation of the navy destroying the Spanish fleet, the War Department expected the expeditionary force to load transports at a moment’s notice and move quickly to Cuba. The expedition simply was not ready to embark due to the lack of preparations.

Providing logistics support to incoming units was problematic, to say the least. The lack of sanitary requirements and water forced units to encamp in small towns several miles away from Tampa. The small post office could not identify packages destined for staged soldiers due to the lack of bills of lading. Units received supply and organizational equipment in an untimely manner, or not at all, and equipment shortages contributed to insufficient and incomplete training.⁶⁹ Animals such as officers’ and cavalry horses and mules to haul wagons required more

⁶⁷ FM 3-35 defines the staging process as “organizing personnel, equipment, and basic loads into movement units; preparing the units for onward movement; and providing logistics support for units transiting the staging area.” FM 3-35, 4-1.

⁶⁸ Thomas J. Vivian, *The Fall of Santiago* (New York: R. F. Fenno, 1898), 74.

⁶⁹ Sargent, *Campaign of Santiago de Cuba*, 112-23.

fodder than was available.⁷⁰ Ammunition was not in adequate supply; the War Department could not accurately predict when enough ammunition for the expedition would arrive.⁷¹

The artillery faced a unique problem with its field pieces, which lasted through arrival in Santiago. Manufacturers shipped artillery components piecemeal in different freight cars from different factories. Artillery batteries had to seek out separate shipments of caissons, carriages, field pieces, and ammunition to assemble and ready their guns.⁷² Many components remained on unidentified boxcars piled twenty-five miles outside of Tampa through the end of May.⁷³ The original plans had called for transitioning the artillery batteries to a war footing and creating larger six-gun batteries, but the supply issues were overwhelming.⁷⁴ The command and staff simply failed to arrange for the effective and timely synchronization of the shipping and receiving of artillery during the staging process.

The preparation of the transports was the final action necessary to facilitate staging. When the United States declared war, the army owned no transportation shipping for this mission. It managed to obtain four by the end of April and thirty by the end of May; however, none possessed the proper ventilation systems or facilities for soldiers. The War Department spent a large amount of manpower and resources to turn these freighters into transports with bunks, water storage tanks, and proper ventilation.⁷⁵ In total, the War Department purchased thirty-nine vessels at a cost of seven million dollars outside the "Fifty Million Bill." The government purchased

⁷⁰ Morgan, *America's Road to Empire*, 70.

⁷¹ Cosmas, *Army for an Empire*, 129.

⁷² Huston, *Sinews of War*, 283.

⁷³ Brown, *Correspondent's War*, 271.

⁷⁴ Dwight E. Aultman, "Personal Recollections of the Artillery at Santiago, 1898," in *The Santiago Campaign*, ed. Joseph T. Dickman (Richmond, VA: Williams Printing Company, 1927), 184.

⁷⁵ Huston, *Sinews of War*, 282.

these ships from privatized freightliners in the Gulf of Mexico.⁷⁶ When completed, the transports could support a thirty-hour voyage with minimal comfort to the troops.⁷⁷ The men would have to take turns sleeping on bunks, and, in the worst case, engineers only had enough room for one vessel to receive twelve toilets for a capacity of twelve hundred soldiers.⁷⁸ Workers converted *Miami* and *San Marcos* from a cattle boat and a freighter, respectively, into transport ships. However, as one soldier from the Sixth Infantry Regiment stated, “It was a misnomer to call these ships transports.”⁷⁹ The Quartermaster General originally estimated a carrying capacity of twenty-five thousand soldiers, but this quickly lowered to seventeen thousand due to space limitations.⁸⁰

From a soldier’s perspective, he spent much of May in the hot Florida sun focused on preparing for war and entertaining himself. Major General Miles issued orders on 30 May for units to “labor diligently and zealously to perfect himself and his subordinates in military drill, instruction, [and] discipline.”⁸¹ Soldiers considered drill commonplace during staging, but the commanders wanted additional training. New volunteers with little to no combat experience arrived daily with officers and noncommissioned officers largely unfamiliar with drill conducting the training. Correspondent Poultney Bigelow in the 28 May edition of *Harpers Weekly* pointed out that units were training, but the commanders rarely observed their commands.⁸² The

⁷⁶ Alger, *Spanish-American War*, 74.

⁷⁷ Cosmas, *Army for an Empire*, 197.

⁷⁸ C.D. Rhodes, “The Diary of a Lieutenant,” in *The Santiago Campaign*, ed. J.T. Dickman (Richmond, VA: Williams Printing, 1927), 335.

⁷⁹ B.T. Simmons and E.R. Chrisman, “The Sixth and Sixteenth Regiments of Infantry,” in *The Santiago Campaign*, ed. Joseph T. Dickman (Richmond, VA: Williams Printing, 1927), 68.

⁸⁰ Huston, *Sinews of War*, 282.

⁸¹ Harvey Rosenfeld, *The Diary of a Dirty Little War: The Spanish-American War of 1898* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 94.

⁸² Trask, *War with Spain*, 182.

oppressive heat shortened many drills due to soldier exhaustion, with a lack of water compounding the misery. Units completed drills early in the mornings and late evenings to mitigate the heat. In addition, the limited space to maneuver supported only small-scale training exercises.⁸³ Major General Shafter considered this a liability and even considered moving a portion of the command north to Jacksonville.⁸⁴ He did not, however, and daily drills continued in the limited training space.

Like the quartermasters, the commissary supply system was also inadequate at Tampa. Staging facilities should provide sufficient life support to transitioning soldiers.⁸⁵ However, the embarkation point experienced problems such as receiving rotten meat from the food contractors. Even when arriving on refrigerated train cars, soldiers opened spoiled food shipments at the port. The Department of Agriculture investigated and could find no evidence of tampering or wrongdoing.⁸⁶ Nonetheless, unloading parties wore handkerchiefs around their faces as they transferred the putrid meat into ditches for quick burial. The soldiers dubbed the shipments “Alger’s Embalmed Beef” to assign blame to the War Secretary and his perceived lack of support for the Tampa expedition.⁸⁷ The soldiers received their main supply of food from rations, which arrived via the Subsistence Department’s short notice purchases. Depot Commissaries purchased and shipped sixty days’ supply to Tampa and regulars received thirty days of rations. This

⁸³ John Black Atkins, *The War in Cuba: The Experiences of an Englishman with the United States Army* (London: Smith, Elder, 1899), 51.

⁸⁴ Rosenfeld, *Diary of a Dirty Little War*, 85.

⁸⁵ FM 3-35, 4-10.

⁸⁶ Huston, *Sinews of War*, 279.

⁸⁷ Rosenfeld, *Diary of a Dirty Little War*, 96.

system, once it caught up to the number of soldiers at Tampa, eventually stockpiled a ninety-day supply at Tampa for seventy thousand men consisting of over five thousand tons of food.⁸⁸

This meat issue contributed to the overall health concerns of the camp. While there were no deaths in Tampa, there was a constant threat of diarrhea and one outbreak of typhoid fever. Overcrowding, lack of supplies, animal refuse, kitchen waste, and rotten meat contributed to unhygienic health conditions. However, the exceptional discipline of the men combined with the short stay in Tampa compared to other camps prevented unnecessary deaths from disease. The Chief Surgeon of the Fifth Cavalry Division reported to Major General Wheeler the excellent Tampa camp conditions and satisfactory health of the troops with each unit possessing three to four weeks of medical supplies.⁸⁹ Meanwhile, at various camps across the United States, hundreds of soldiers died, to include 425 at Camp Thomas, Tennessee.⁹⁰

Most of the volunteer units arrived without proper equipment to embark on the Cuban expedition. Planners designed supply stations at Tampa to equip newly enlisted soldiers with the proper gear during staging. However, lack of warehousing facilities coupled with shipping backlogs prevented adequate on-hand supply. Availability of equipment drove distribution. At the quartermaster warehouse, a supply sergeant would guess the sizes of each soldier for uniforms, shoes, and hats. If incorrect, the exchange process could take as many as three days.⁹¹ The 28 May edition of *Harpers Weekly* mused that Congress declared war thirty days ago yet “not one regiment is yet equipped with uniforms suitable for hot weather. The Cuban Patriots and cigar-makers look happy in their big Panama hats and loose linen trousers, but the U.S. troops sit day

⁸⁸ Huston, *Sinews of War*, 279-82.

⁸⁹ Valery Havard, "The Medical Corps at Santiago," in *The Santiago Campaign*, ed. Joseph T. Dickman (Richmond, VA: Williams Printing, 1927), 207.

⁹⁰ Trask, *War with Spain*, 160-61.

⁹¹ Rosenfeld, *Diary of a Dirty Little War*, 99.

and night in their cowhide boots, thick flannel shirts, and winter trousers.”⁹² Most soldiers received only one set of clothing to replace their cold weather uniforms. The weapons situation was even more abysmal with the depot commander refusing weapons requisitions for the units until they arrived at camp.⁹³ This delay further exacerbated the supply problem.

The problems of inadequate supply and poor training led to an inordinate amount of extra time for the soldiers. Naturally, soldiers found plenty to do in Tampa to keep themselves busy. Unfortunately, this also meant violating the second part of Major General Miles’ orders to “maintain the highest character, to foster and stimulate that truly soldierly spirit and patriotic devotion to duty which must characterize an effective army.”⁹⁴ Officers issued passes for soldiers to explore the local area, and the enlisted soldiers took advantage of this privilege. Some soldiers chose to walk peacefully around the Tampa Bay Hotel or visit the nearby towns. Others found ways to get into trouble, like Private Frank Brito who discovered an opium den in Ybor City.⁹⁵ Unscrupulous entrepreneurs took advantage of the young population, as “there were plenty of locations for alcohol, good times, gambling, and prostitution.”⁹⁶ A private with less than one month’s service received \$10.35 and could find plenty of ways to enjoy his paycheck. One night, Private Charles Post assisted in retrieving unruly soldiers from Tampa. He observed hundreds of detained soldiers from his First Infantry Regiment.⁹⁷

⁹² Walker, *Boys of ‘98*, 138.

⁹³ Cosmas, *Army for an Empire*, 169-72.

⁹⁴ Rosenfeld, *Diary of a Dirty Little War*, 94.

⁹⁵ Walker, *Boys of ‘98*, 140.

⁹⁶ A. B. Feuer, *The Santiago Campaign of 1898: A Soldier's View of the Spanish-American War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), 15-16.

⁹⁷ Post, *Little War of Private Post*, 71.

Soldiers through the last week of May saw no change to the waiting in Tampa. While the enlisted men occupied their time in the towns, the officers found time to lounge in the Tampa Bay Hotel, reuniting and sharing war stories with old colleagues.⁹⁸ Theodore Roosevelt spoke of the general-officer population milling about the hotel with their staffs, women in pretty dresses, newspaper correspondents, and foreign onlookers from Britain, Germany, Russia, France, and Japan.⁹⁹ Other notables seen around the hotel were Clara Barton, founder of the Red Cross; evangelist, Ira Sankey; Message to Garcia hero, Andrew Rowan; Kaiser Wilhelm II's observer, Count Gustav Adolf von Goetzen; and Theodore Roosevelt's wife, Edith Carow Roosevelt.¹⁰⁰ Soldiers played the piano in the background as the days ticked by.¹⁰¹ Major General Shafter set up his headquarters in the hotel and continued to wait for word of the Spanish fleet's destruction.

Onward Movement Process

Onward movement is the forward progress of units transitioning from staging areas to follow-on destinations. This applies to personnel and equipment through distribution centers and logistics nodes.¹⁰² Reception and staging lay the foundation for successful onward movement. Understanding the strategic goals of political leaders enables commanders to gain an understanding on how best to conduct the war through their tactical actions. In Tampa, the changing nature of the strategic situation prevented Major General Shafter from understanding how best to achieve the goals of the McKinley administration. While Shafter continued through

⁹⁸ Freidal, *Splendid Little War*, 40.

⁹⁹ Roosevelt, *Rough Riders*, 55.

¹⁰⁰ Walker, *Boys of '98*, 137.

¹⁰¹ Feuer, *Santiago Campaign*, 16.

¹⁰² FM 3-35 defines onward movement as "moving units from reception facilities and staging areas to tactical assembly areas or other theater destinations; moving non-unit personnel to gaining commands; and moving sustainment supplies to distribution sites." FM 3-35, 4-1.

all of May to prepare for a quick mission to provide moral and physical support to insurgents, the guidance from the president suddenly changed.

Lieutenant Colonel John Miley, aide-de-camp to Major General Shafter, stated that on 26 May, Shafter received an order via telegram to prepare twenty-five thousand soldiers for departure from Tampa. The War Department issued the warning of a changing mission. The expeditionary force would now directly engage Spanish soldiers, but with no definitive details with which to plan.¹⁰³ Correspondence the following day from the secretary of war John Long shed light on matters, somewhat, by emphasizing the Navy Department's urgency about mobilizing soldiers for preparation to invade Cuba.¹⁰⁴ Finally, on 30 May, Major General Miles issued orders to Shafter clarifying the exact mission of the expedition: "Go with your force to capture garrison at Santiago and assist in capturing the harbor and fleet.... Have your command embark as rapidly as possible and telegraph when your expedition will be ready to sail."¹⁰⁵ This order expedited Shafter's tempo of operations in loading supplies on the transports.

The army made all efforts to load the ships from 30 May through 6 June. Working well into the night, troops travelled forward from outlying camps. Supplies from warehouses in Tampa started movement toward the port, further congesting the single-track line. On 31 May, deck hands filled coal and water on the ships, and men began loading rations. The new order called for twenty-five thousand men supported for six months. This order was subsequently lowered to two months along with an additional one hundred thousand rations scattered throughout the ships in the event of separation. The work of loading artillery wagons, guns, and caissons began on 1 June. Artillerymen now sensed the urgency of finding disparate components and linking them to form complete gun systems. The men spent considerable time integrating commissary rations that

¹⁰³ Miley, *Cuba with Shafter*, 15-16.

¹⁰⁴ *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain*, 16.

¹⁰⁵ Miley, *Cuba with Shafter*, 18.

shipped in separate railcars.¹⁰⁶ The single-track line created and exacerbated delays in moving equipment to the port.

Simultaneous activities at the port caused a bottleneck. Once equipment finally arrived at the dock, contracted stevedores became the driving force to load the ships. This was no easy task, as the goal was to maintain unit integrity of equipment as they matched units with vessels. With limited berths, the ships continuously rotated within the narrow port to match arriving railroad shipments, which caused further delays.¹⁰⁷ The stevedores mostly hand carried equipment from the railcars across fifty feet of sandy terrain and then up steep ramps to the vessels. Once their shifts were over, many of these men fell asleep in the location they last stopped working due to their exhaustion.¹⁰⁸ All of this notwithstanding, the stevedores loaded over ten million pounds of rations, arms, and ammunition. The ration trains moved from one ship to the next to unload their cargoes before attempting to escape the single lane track. Soldiers assembled each artillery piece on the docks prior to loading. This check ensured the breech mechanisms, fuses, projectiles, and guns were complete, and ensured final and complete assembly of each gun. To add to the confusion, Henry Plant continued to send interested tourists up and down the line and kept the rail line open for civilian sightseers.¹⁰⁹ Congestion reached its peak of perfection.

Under continuous pressure from the secretary of war, Russell Alger, to maintain tempo and board ships, Major General Shafter relayed in his message on 4 June that he encountered unforeseen delays due to units arriving late, track congestion, and lack of facilities. He expressed his frustration at the small throughput capacity in Tampa and reaffirmed his efforts to sail as

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 19-23.

¹⁰⁷ Huston, *Sinews of War*, 282.

¹⁰⁸ Freidel, *Splendid Little War*, 60.

¹⁰⁹ Miley, *Cuba with Shafter*, 23-24.

“early as practical.”¹¹⁰ Finally, the stevedores completed loading at 1100 on 6 June and Major General Shafter ordered that soldier embarkation begin at 1200.¹¹¹

Both Colonel Humphrey and his assistant, Captain McKay recalled the loading of the ships as a smooth, coordinated process. Colonel Humphrey claimed that it was “carried on speedily and systematically, and continued to completion without regard to hours or fatigue.”¹¹² Captain McKay also recollected the process as orderly and proceeding with no issues.¹¹³ However, soldiers’ accounts of the process were vastly different from those in charge at the port. The plan called for an orderly procession of units called forward. Trains were to arrive with troops and baggage together and report to Humphrey for their assigned ship. This process would maintain unit integrity and place the assigned units on the proper ships in accordance with manifests.¹¹⁴ Reality, however, was much different. While the initial movement began in this orderly manner, it quickly deteriorated.

Soldiers initiated movement throughout the night of 6 June. Major General Shafter reported his hopes to sail by 8 June.¹¹⁵ On the night of 7 June, Shafter received a telegram that the navy had engaged the forts of Santiago and “If 10,000 men were here, city and fleet would be ours within forty-eight hours. Every consideration demands immediate army movement. If delayed, city will be defended more strongly by guns taken from fleet.”¹¹⁶ With that telegram, Shafter’s staff notified the commanders that those units not on ships by morning would remain

¹¹⁰ *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain*, 25.

¹¹¹ Huston, *Sinews of War*, 283.

¹¹² Charles F. Humphrey, “The Quartermaster’s Department at Santiago de Cuba,” in *The Santiago Campaign*, ed. Joseph T. Dickman (Richmond: Williams Printing Company, 1927), 196.

¹¹³ *Report of the Commission*, Vol. 6, 2655-78.

¹¹⁴ Miley, *Cuba with Shafter*, 25.

¹¹⁵ *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain*, 28.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 29-30.

behind. This order set off a frenzied rush to the ports. The headquarters staff evacuated the Tampa Bay Hotel to their train and found the rail lines congested and immobile.¹¹⁷

British war correspondent John Atkins heard the frantic order that “Those who are not aboard by daybreak will be left behind. Leave your tents standing.” He noted the contrast between the long wait in Tampa and the frenzied rush to the docks. Many units abandoned wagons and equipment that were never loaded.¹¹⁸ In the hurried rush, units competed with each other by stealing the abandoned wagons, commandeering train cars, and even hijacking trains.¹¹⁹ One account from Second Lieutenant Paul Malone of the Thirteenth United States Infantry recounts his unit finding cattle cars with an attached train engine. After finding and rousting the train engineer, they travelled to the port.¹²⁰ The Ninth Infantry seized abandoned wagons and unoccupied freight trains. They interpreted the order as you fight in Cuba only if you can get to the port and find a ship.¹²¹ A soldier from the Seventy First New York Volunteer Infantry noted “that no one knew what boat you were going on, what time the boats would come to the pier, or anything else which a little system and some management might have provide.”¹²²

Perhaps the most famous story comes from Theodore Roosevelt when he described the eventful night as a “scramble.” The Rough Riders followed Major General Shafter’s orders to proceed to the train station at midnight. When no train came for six hours, they seized an engine

¹¹⁷ Miley, *Cuba with Shafter*, 32.

¹¹⁸ Atkins, *War in Cuba*, 63-69.

¹¹⁹ Hendrickson, *Spanish-American War*, 30.

¹²⁰ Paul B. Malone, "The Thirteenth U. S. Infantry in the Santiago Campaign," in *The Santiago Campaign*, ed. Joseph T. Dickman (Richmond: Williams Printing, 1927), 92-93.

¹²¹ Edwin V. Bookmiller, "The Ninth U. S. Infantry," in *The Santiago Campaign*, ed. Joseph T. Dickman (Richmond: Williams Printing, 1927), 60.

¹²² George R. Van Dewater, "The Seventy First Regiment, New York Volunteers at Santiago de Cuba," in *The Santiago Campaign*, ed. Joseph T. Dickman (Richmond: Williams Printing, 1927), 129.

and some coal cars and backed down the track. Upon arrival to the port, the train dropped them off and the unit sought out Colonel Humphrey for vessel assignment.¹²³ When they finally did find the colonel, Humphrey seemingly haphazardly assigned them to *Yucatan*, previously allocated to the Second Infantry Division and the Seventy-First New York Infantry. Roosevelt rushed his men on board faster than the other units and confronted Captain Anthony Bleeker of the Seventy-First.¹²⁴ When asked to surrender the ship, Roosevelt reportedly replied, “Since we have the ship, I think we’ll keep it—much as I would like to oblige you.”¹²⁵ The Seventy-First spent the next two nights without a vessel, but Lieutenant Colonel Humphrey eventually assigned the unit to *Valencia*, a newer and more comfortable ship.¹²⁶ Observer George Musgrave noted, “With the capacity of each transport, and the roster of each regiment before him, the youngest officer could have made effective assignment and saved such dire confusion, which took two days to untangle, and entailed much sun-exposure and hardship on the soldiers.”¹²⁷

At this point, tactical actions on the ground were influencing the strategic objectives of the War Department. The confusion caused delays in the timeline of departure, and the War Department felt they were missing their opportunity to win the war quickly and decisively. Major General Shafter found out just prior to loading that there was not enough room for all of his twenty-five thousand soldiers and their equipment.¹²⁸ The newly converted freighters could not hold the anticipated capacity, even after exceeding the ships’ original capabilities. For example,

¹²³ Roosevelt, *Rough Riders*, 55-59.

¹²⁴ Freidel, *Splendid Little War*, 67-68.

¹²⁵ Feuer, *Santiago Campaign*, 16-17.

¹²⁶ Freidel, *Splendid Little War*, 67-68.

¹²⁷ George C. Musgrave, *Under Three Flags in Cuba: A Personal Account of the Cuban Insurrection and Spanish-American War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1899), 260.

¹²⁸ Cosmas, *Army for an Empire*, 196.

Cherokee was equipped for 570 men but carried 1,040 on-board.¹²⁹ Supplies remained on the docks in unopened freight cars. The Gatling Gun Detachment did not sail due to the limited space.¹³⁰ Upon assessing the capacity of the ships, Colonel Leonard Wood received orders he could only take two of his three cavalry squadrons and no horses.¹³¹ Not only did the lack of basing facilities slow the tempo of operations, but also the lack of supplies and horses limited the operational reach of the expedition. All of this notwithstanding, by 1400 on 8 June, most vessels departed the dock and were in position to leave the next morning.

Many authors have written about the army's failure to synchronize its movement in the mad dash to the port. This was mainly due to the lack of unity of command and balance. No one commander was in charge of calling forward troops or of the port's synchronization. A single leader was needed to arrange actions in time, space, and purpose to facilitate the continuous movement and order at the port. The lack of personnel and resources dedicated strictly to deployment management prevented a timely flow of troops and equipment. The single-track line to Tampa exacerbated the situation by the army's reliance on the transportation provided by the Plant Company. The continuous flow of supplies congested the railroad tracks and disrupted the flow of resources. Logistics planners still had not solved this problem forty days into the operation. The expedition required clear railroad tracks for the movement of troops, but none existed. This lack of transportation infrastructure affected the tempo of the operation creating a culmination point before the expedition was underway.

In the postwar investigation, Colonel Humphrey testified that he did not know if the train congestion problem was ever unraveled. The constant friction from the competing private rail companies created delays that inhibited the army's operational tempo. Humphrey also faulted the

¹²⁹ Rhodes, *Santiago Campaign*, 335.

¹³⁰ Azoy, *CHARGE!*, 55-57.

¹³¹ Walker, *Boys of '98*, 143.

lack of loading order for the supplies and troops. The process where Major General Shafter himself telephoned or telegraphed the departing unit from Tampa was a reactive, not planned, process. Colonel Humphrey ordered units to load on a first-come, first-serve basis disrupting unit integrity of troops and equipment.¹³² Shafter simply failed to plan for the movement of twenty-five thousand soldiers down a single rail line. This lack of planning had an operational impact on the mission in Cuba.

Once the expedition was loaded, Major General Shafter collapsed in exhaustion on his ship, *Seguranca*, around 1400 on 8 June after having been awake for forty straight hours.¹³³ Responding to the sudden change in timelines, Shafter managed to get the preponderance of his forces onto ships in a twenty-four hour period. However, an important message arrived from the Secretary of War in Washington around 1400 stating, “Wait until you get further orders before you sail.”¹³⁴ Major General Shafter’s aide awakened the commander, who groggily stated that he would fix it in the morning. After Colonel Edward McClernand awakened the general a second time to ask for compliance with the order, Shafter roused himself out of his sleep and stated, “God, I should say so,” and he recalled the vessels back to the port.¹³⁵ A Spanish armored cruiser and torpedo-boat destroyer reported near Nicolas Channel, a straight off the northwest coast of Cuba, was the reason for this delay.¹³⁶ Shafter immediately recalled his ships to the safety of the port under the watchful care of supporting field guns and escort vessels at the bay’s entrance.¹³⁷ The expeditionary force returned to its staging posture until further notice.

¹³² *Report of the Commission*, Vol. 7, 3639-52.

¹³³ McClernand, *Santiago Campaign*, 6.

¹³⁴ *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain*, 31.

¹³⁵ McClernand, *Santiago Campaign*, 6.

¹³⁶ *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain*, 31.

¹³⁷ Miley, *Cuba with Shafter*, 34-35.

Major General Shafter decided to house his men on board the ships in their hot, unventilated compartments to maintain tempo when finally ordered to depart. The nearest place to camp was back in Tampa, nine miles away. The units unloaded the animals and issued limited passes to the soldiers to debark the vessels. The soldiers were required to be aboard ship no later than 2100 every night. They also had the option of bathing in the bay.¹³⁸ However, construction teams did not build sufficient living facilities onboard the ships to survive more than a short journey to Cuba. Naturally, there were some problems.

From Private Post's perspective, the conditions were less than ideal. The beds contained only twenty-four inches width of sleeping space. The food on his ship, *Valencia*, consisted of corned beef with hardtack cooked on a steam pipe from the engine room. The drinking water was "sluggish fluid mixed with particles of charcoal for health's sake. It looked like muddy glycerine and tasted like bilgewater." Finally, the men were without purpose aboard the vessels. Units conducted some landing drills on empty beaches, but even these turned into an excuse to swim. Unit leadership issued a few passes, but very few soldiers wanted to risk missing the expedition. This kept alcohol consumption to a minimum for most soldiers, an unintended benefit.¹³⁹ The temporary pause, however, created two advantages. The long awaited medical supplies finally arrived and stevedores loaded them aboard the ships. More importantly, the expedition was ready to sail at a moment's notice.

After three days of waiting, the War Department on 12 June issued orders to sail the following day. This time, there was no transportation nightmare in loading the ships. The logistics party refueled the ships with coal and water, hoisted the animals on board, and continued loading supplies until the ships departed.¹⁴⁰ On 13 June, two months after the first units had arrived in

¹³⁸ Miley, *Cuba with Shafter*, 34-37.

¹³⁹ Post, *Little War of Private Post*, 77-93.

¹⁴⁰ Miley, *Cuba with Shafter*, 40.

Tampa, the ships steamed out of the bay heading for Cuba. Thomas Vivian summed up the entire logistics operation by an untested quartermaster department, that the deployment process “became a matter whose exactions can scarcely be measured.”¹⁴¹

After the Spanish-American War’s conclusion, public criticism erupted over the lack of medical support during the conflict. The press directed its outrage at what it deemed criminal neglect in camps, hospitals, and during transit. President McKinley, sensing political pressure, appointed Major General Grenville Dodge to chair *The Report of the Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain*. Major General Dodge conducted his findings between 26 September and 9 February 1899.¹⁴² This report, also known as the Dodge Report, provided valuable insight into the Tampa logistics process through first-hand interview accounts.

Conclusions from the report noted four major deficiencies related to the deployment operation. First, the army effectively staffed the quartermaster department to support a peacetime army, not a volunteer force over ten times its original size. Second, the congestion at Tampa was due to the lack of administrative oversight in the quartermaster and railroad sections. Third, there was a total failure of planning for ship transport capacity that decreased the fighting force by eight thousand soldiers and ambulance carrying capability. Finally, there needed to be a division of labor between the quartermaster and transportation departments instead of their working similar issues at the same time.¹⁴³ These four points outlined the crux of the problem relating to Tampa according to the Dodge Commission.

¹⁴¹ Vivian, *Fall of Santiago*, 72.

¹⁴² Vincent J. Cirillo, *Bullets and Bacilli: The Spanish-American War and Military Medicine* (Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004), 100-03.

¹⁴³ *Report of the Commission*, Vol. 1, 147-48.

Implications on Contemporary Operations

The implications of this deployment affect today's contemporary operations. The War Department, using today's terms, failed to apply elements of operational art to the deployment process to meet strategic objectives. The three elements of operational art requiring improvement during the deployment process were basing, operational reach, and tempo. The leadership in Tampa overlooked these three factors. It is critical that planners in today's contemporary operations do not make the same mistakes as they create deployment options.

Base selection is critical to support contemporary deployments. The War Department chose Tampa because of its proximity to Cuba. Planners chose this location to meet the minimum requirements of logistics including two railroad tracks entering the town, a port that could hold a small number of ships, and a projected water supply for the soldiers. The War Department satisficed with these criteria in its decision to use Tampa as the port of embarkation.¹⁴⁴ The War Department, once it identified that Tampa met these minimum requirements, selected it without planning throughput requirements. Today's sustainment planners cannot choose basing simply by satisficing. World War I planners understood this and chose the Port of New York as the embarkation facility. This port was one of the largest in the world and possessed more than ample facilities to mobilize millions of soldiers. New York could expand as needed to meet increased requirements, unlike Tampa's inability to grow. Today's complex environment requires decision makers that select bases with the capability to expand to changing logistics requirements.

Basing in Kuwait during Operation Iraqi Freedom presents a good example of expandable capability. Kuwait Naval Base and Al-Shuaiba Kuwait Naval Base provided ample space for port reception operations augmented by Ali Al Salem Air Base for air movement.

¹⁴⁴ Satisficing is making a decision by finding an option that meets the minimum criteria and choosing it. James March, *A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 18.

Nearby facilities such as Camp Arifjan and Camp Buehring supported these reception areas for staging and onward movement for hundreds of thousands of soldiers over the last decade. *Unified Land Operations* notes that a favorable characteristic of a base camp is the ability to evolve.¹⁴⁵ Kuwait provided an almost unlimited expandable capability to support multiple aspects of the Iraq conflict to include the initial invasion, surge, drawdown, and sustaining operations. The natures of these facilities demonstrate basing with the flexibility to support strategic objectives as they change over time.

Basing in Iraq has reemerged as an operational planning factor for the United States. With the formation of the so-called Islamic State and the United States' commitment of fifteen hundred soldiers returning to Iraq in 2015, basing remains a consideration. This new requirement calls for American presence outside of Baghdad and Erbil, in the very same places American basing occupied prior to withdrawing in 2011.¹⁴⁶ The United States has to maintain expandable and retractable capabilities as a global presence to avoid building, withdrawing, and rebuilding established basing. Tampa demonstrated the inability to effectively expand and contract to support required capabilities as guidance changed. Today's sustainment planners should carefully consider basing to cover all contingencies over time to maintain tempo and operational reach.

Unity of command is the first of four principles in the reception, staging, and onward movement process. This principle is critical to the execution of basing operations. A single commander for the logistics aspect of deployment allows solitary focus on controlling and operating port deployments. This commander has the ability to adjust resources as necessary, control movements in the deployment area, and arrange life support for units in transition.¹⁴⁷ In

¹⁴⁵ ADRP 3-0, 4-6.

¹⁴⁶ Helene Cooper and Michael D. Shear, "Obama to Send 1,500 More Troops to Assist Iraq," *New York Times*, 9 November 2014, accessed 9 November 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/world/middleeast/us-to-send-1500-more-troops-to-iraq.html?_r=0.

¹⁴⁷ FM 3-35, 4-1.

Tampa, there was no single commander for the deployment operation. Major General Shafter was responsible for the overall operation, but at no time took control of the process to relieve the congestion faced over the forty-day period. Colonel Humphrey was responsible for the staging and loading of supplies along with the arrangement of soldiers on transports once called forward. However, his responsibility was limited to the port area. Second Infantry Division commander and future brigadier general Arthur Wagner stated in his memoirs that the expedition commander should have granted authority to a single officer and charged him with the loading process.¹⁴⁸ At no time was there a single point of contact for the deployment process to task and shift resources for alleviating congestion.

The Port of New York in World War I was vastly different. Unity of command was assigned to ports ensuring resources could be adequately allocated. Major General J. Franklin Bell commanded the New York Port of Embarkation and retained authority of all movement through the port.¹⁴⁹ American planners understood that “adequate and clear lines of communication were critical to organizing and sustaining large-unit operations.”¹⁵⁰ Bell used his command authority and robust staff to manage port flow through a single commander. This unity of command stands in contrast to Major General Shafter’s leadership. Shafter lacked the institutional knowledge to assign a deployment commander with a large enough staff to manage port operations. Modern doctrine assigns the combatant commander the responsibility to designate command and control during reception, staging, and onward movement. The United States Army assigns the Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) the responsibility to control port

¹⁴⁸ Arthur Wagner, *Santiago Campaign* (Kansas City, KS: Franklin Hudson Publishing, 1906), 23-24.

¹⁴⁹ Huston, *Sinews of War*, 345.

¹⁵⁰ Michael Matheny, *Carrying the War to the Enemy: American Operational Art to 1945* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), 29.

operations and manage the coordination and throughput rate at facilities.¹⁵¹ Together, this alleviates the burden of the deploying unit to manage the intricacies of logistics.

Carl von Clausewitz stresses the importance of basing. He defines the term camps as “essential parts of both strategy and tactics.” Camps establish a starting point for the march to the enemy. He describes bases as “so closely and inescapably linked with it (marches) as to be an integral part of what is considered an engagement.”¹⁵² These bases must provide proper support to project combat power. Basing for deploying units was poor on the docks of Tampa, and it drastically improved in New York City during World War I. Basing now embeds in modern army doctrine as an element of operational art and is the cornerstone of maintaining tempo.

Military planners traditionally associate tempo of operations to combat related activities. However, efficient and effective mobilization of units requires a steady tempo and rhythm to bring soldiers into combat at their optimal performance. Tampa demonstrated tempo with varying peaks and valleys. Initially, the War Department sent five thousand soldiers to Cuba to support the insurgency, followed by a forty-day lull while troops built combat power in Tampa. Major General Shafter ordered a mad dash to the transports simply to wait for three days in miserable conditions aboard hot, cramped vessels. This entire process contributed to a degraded fighting force due to the chaotic movement and the oppressive heat on the ships. The deployment process at Tampa degraded combat effectiveness upon arrival as opposed to the army arriving at an optimal state of readiness.

The War Department learned from the poor tempo on the docks of Tampa. During World War I, New York demonstrated an efficient model developing a continuous flow of troops and equipment. Unlike Tampa, New York’s robust infrastructure and timed movements for the call-up of troops created a manageable flow of soldiers and maintained a deployment tempo throughout

¹⁵¹ FM 3-35, 4-2.

¹⁵² Clausewitz, *On War*, 129-30.

the movement phase. Today's modern doctrine demonstrates this system where the reception, staging, and onward movement process is broken into six elements to facilitate transportation.¹⁵³ Four of these six elements establish and maintain tempo: in-place command and control forces, host nation and multinational elements, contractor support, and army pre-positioned stock. Major General Shafter did not establish a command network with a single commander regulating deployment operations. Moreover, Major General Shafter lacked the foresight to develop a transportation and warehousing system with robust contractor augmentation and prepositioned stockages. The results were a lack of tempo that increased friction with the political leaders and prevented timely combat action in Cuba.

Contemporary operations demand responsive mobilization and the quick movement of troops and equipment. This is particularly so with adversaries' Anti-Access / Anti-Denial methods, when it is imperative in forward basing to quickly receive, stage, and move combat power from the port of embarkation to forward areas. The sustainment infrastructure should be established and capable of supporting strategic supply goals throughout the theater. Operations through Kuwait beginning in 2003 have made the military reliant on existing support capabilities. However, new theaters of operation demand that sustainers quickly establish reception and staging operations with no previous infrastructure in place. In contrast to Tampa logisticians, sustainers must find a way to quickly overcome external limitations and ensure that units are moving toward objectives while maintaining operational tempo. Allied operational logistics planners on the beaches of Normandy demonstrated this effectively when they had to solve the problem of moving over one million soldiers and one hundred thousand vehicles to and off the beaches. They maintained tempo by creating artificial harbors and developing non-standard

¹⁵³ FM 3-35, 4-2.

solutions to ship-to-shore logistics.¹⁵⁴ Maintaining tempo in modern operations depends on rapidly establishing deployment areas from austere locations, a task the United States Army has not executed recently.

Deployment tempo is maintained through the army adage, “slow is smooth, and smooth is fast.” This can be assisted using synchronization, which is the second principle of reception, staging, and onward movement. Synchronization manages the timing of supply in the correct order and coordinates with supporting activities “to ensure the tempo of deployment is uninterrupted.”¹⁵⁵ The docks of Tampa saw unacceptable backlogs from supplies pushed to the port without coordinating timing or producing bills of lading. Distributors listed all supplies as important and congested the rail lines without any thought of managing the arrival of classes of supply or loading throughput on the docks. Tampa suffered due to limited supply and lack of storage space. Units and supplies continued to arrive without synchronizing movement timetables. The War Department further exacerbated the situation by the lack of knowledge of departure dates and changing strategic guidance.

Soldiers at the Port of New York performed synchronization activities admirably after recognizing a train congestion issue that clogged the ports. The decentralized system of railroad transportation created a backlog of rail cars leading into New York.¹⁵⁶ However, the government established the Shipping Control Committee in February 1918, which created a single system synchronizing flow from unit mobilization stations, the Port of New York, transport overseas, and the French ports. The Operations Division in Washington performed synchronization oversight coordinating with the Railroad Administration, the Port of New York, the United States Navy, the

¹⁵⁴ Paul Kennedy, *Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers who Turned the Tide in the Second World War* (New York: Random House, 2013), 263-76.

¹⁵⁵ FM 3-35, 4-1.

¹⁵⁶ Rutenberg and Allen, *Logistics of Waging War*, 65.

British Ministry of Shipping, and overseas coordination entities.¹⁵⁷ The detailed planning synchronized flow of movement in direct contrast to the activities in Tampa.

This synchronized process developed in today's doctrine uses the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD). The United States Transportation Command developed this tool to synchronize unit transportation schedules.¹⁵⁸ The document coordinates unit flow, directs timelines for deploying units, establishes routing information, and manages cargo and personnel movements that are moving simultaneously with deploying forces.¹⁵⁹ This process manages the tempo of deployment operations, which mitigates bottlenecks in the logistics process and ensures units arrive on time to conduct combat operations.

Operational reach and tempo are mutually supportive and stem from establishing proper basing at the beginning of operations. Operational reach provides endurance to combat units and establishes the culmination point for operations.¹⁶⁰ Proper basing establishes the operational reach for follow-on missions. Planners originally designated Tampa as a temporary port facility established for the rapid deployment of soldiers to Cuba. However, the mission evolved, and twenty-five thousand troops mobilized and reported to Tampa without the required sustainment resources for the duration of the mission. This created two single points of failure: rail capacity and sea transportation. Rail capacity disrupted momentum in loading the vessels. Congestion led to confusion with assembling rations and field guns for follow-on operations. The lack of vessels decreased the storage capacity and number of soldiers able to depart on the expedition. These shortages resulted in the inability to transport all combat power leaving eight thousand soldiers

¹⁵⁷ Huston, *Sinews of War*, 347-48.

¹⁵⁸ United States Transportation Command Handbook 10-20, *Joint Planner's Handbook for Deployment Operations* (Scott Air Force Base, IL: Government Printing Office, 2005), 1-4.

¹⁵⁹ FM 3-35, 2-2.

¹⁶⁰ ADRP 3-0, 4-5.

and supplies on the docks. The expedition did not take critical equipment such as ambulances and cavalry horses. These two assets were crucial to momentum on the objective.

The third and fourth principles of reception, staging, and onward movement are unit integrity and balance, both affecting operational reach. Unit integrity is the movement of soldiers and associated equipment together on a common platform to simplify the deployment process, leverage the chain of command, and increase training opportunities. While the intent of Tampa was to keep units together, they arrived at the ports with directions to load ships assigned to other units. The lack of understanding of vessel capacity and capability unnecessarily separated units from their equipment. Most notably, the cavalry sailed to Cuba without its horses and fought as infantrymen, and the medical soldiers sailed on different vessels than did their ambulances. The Port of New York eliminated unit integrity issues during their movement phase by issuing soldiers equipment in New York and having them carry the equipment directly aboard the ships. This eliminated the task of loading gear at home station and tracking it throughout the process. Supply activities consisted of 138 warehouses with ample supply of equipment to issue transitioning soldiers.¹⁶¹ Today's contemporary operations separate personnel and equipment between air and sea transportation modes. The Time Phased Force Deployment Data tracks movement to match personnel and equipment at the port of debarkation. Supercargoes, assigned to travel with unit equipment on sea vessels, ensure personnel and unit equipment link-up upon arrival and liaison during cargo reception.¹⁶²

The final principle of reception, staging, and onward movement is balance. Balance ensures the correct support system is in place to process deploying units,¹⁶³ thereby extending operational reach. An excess of sustainers creates confusion while a shortage creates backlogs in

¹⁶¹ Huston, *Sinews of War*, 146.

¹⁶² FM 3-35, 3-4.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 4-2.

the system. In Tampa, the deploying unit acted as the deployment team demonstrating poor balance. Colonel Humphrey was not only in charge of the quartermaster department at Tampa, but assigned as the chief quartermaster of the expedition. In his testimony, Humphrey stated, “I did not see how I could perform the duties, as I was there on other business.”¹⁶⁴ There was no dedicated manpower other than the hired stevedores to facilitate onward movement and extend operational reach. The result was that Tampa became a port of ineffectiveness once the ships sailed. The remaining supplies, food stocks, horses, and ambulances did not rejoin the expedition. The second compounding factor was privatized railroad eliminated all balance from military mobilization. Without control and synchronization of the railroads, the expedition relied on the Plant Company to transport freight and passengers the final nine miles to Port Tampa.

In 1918, the Port of New York solved these problems by dedicating support infrastructure solely to the deployment process. The port employed over twenty-five hundred officers with a mission to facilitate the movement of forces.¹⁶⁵ The United States government mitigated rail congestion by seizing the railroad infrastructure under the National Defense Act of 1916¹⁶⁶ along with seizing the North-German Lloyd and Hamburg-American Steamship companies.¹⁶⁷ Federalized control of transportation assets eliminated friction between civilian and government agencies.

United States military deployments today have Theater Sustainment Commands responsible for managing force projection at ports of debarkation and receiving support from the United States Army Transportation Corps. This transportation asset provides the capability for army and joint forces to project global combat power and to sustain operational reach. When transportation requirements exceed capacity, the United States Transportation Command, by

¹⁶⁴ *Report of the Commission*, Vol. 7, 3638-39.

¹⁶⁵ Huston, *Sinews of War*, 346.

¹⁶⁶ Rutenberg and Allen, *Logistics of Waging War*, 65.

¹⁶⁷ Huston, *Sinews of War*, 345.

means of commercial industry, provides air and sea assets through the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA).¹⁶⁸ These additional capabilities ensure the balance of the force to surge and decrease as required. Unit integrity and balance allow deployment forces to extend operational reach. By keeping units together with equipment and having support capabilities on hand as the driver of logistics, planners extend operational reach and prolong the culmination point of an operation.

Operational reach applies to more than just United States personnel and equipment. It encompasses multi-national and coalition forces along with humanitarian assistance. Planners in 1898 originally designed the expedition to provide weapons, supply, and support to Cuban insurgents to overthrow the Spanish government. Today's coalition and alliance partners are reliant on American transportation to move international combat power across the battlefield. The Iraq surge of 2006-2007 saw multi-national force units transported by United States Army Central. Basing should be prepared in the future to support global partners. This includes transportation infrastructure, language requirements, communication, and global tracking systems such as Radio Frequency Identification tags (RFID). Balancing support requirements with multi-national partners requires dedicated planning to support international transportation and basing needs.

Conclusion

The Spanish-American War required an immediate mobilization of men and equipment. The original plan of sending five thousand troops through Tampa escalated quickly to twenty-five thousand men as strategic objectives shifted from supporting insurgents to a full-fledged war against Spanish occupiers of Cuba. Unfortunately, the facilities at Tampa were not prepared to handle the size and scope of this operation. The United States government began changing

¹⁶⁸ Field Manual 4-01, *Army Transportation Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), iv.

objectives and unknowingly violating Clausewitz's contention of having a clear understanding of how to conduct a war. This lack of understanding contributed directly to the failures in Tampa by not being able to anticipate tactical actions. Clausewitz states that an army "remains dependent on its sources of supply and replenishment" and that bases "constitute the basis of its existence and survival." He further goes on to state that the "army and base must be conceived as a single whole."¹⁶⁹ Operations in Tampa failed to connect the strategic with the tactical actions of sustainment in three areas: basing, tempo, and operational reach.

Carl von Clausewitz posits, "No one starts a war...without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is the political purpose; the latter its operational objective." This principle establishes the course of the war in "scale of means and effort" that influences "down to the smallest operational detail."¹⁷⁰ Clausewitz argues for clear war plans. This argument permeates into the logistics of supplying and transporting an army into theater to meet political objectives through linking tactical actions. Clausewitz, in his book on military forces, asserts that maintenance and supply are critical to sustaining an army. He contends that subsistence by means of depots is one of four ways to sustain an army, and the base of operations is critical to its survival.¹⁷¹ The base of operations is a holistic approach to sustaining the operational reach and tempo. The flow of men and equipment to the field of battle is paramount and "one must never forget that it is among those that take the time to produce a decisive effect."¹⁷² Clausewitz understood the importance of sustainment as laying the foundation for the political and military end state.

¹⁶⁹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 341.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 579.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 332-38.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 344.

The War Department chose Tampa as the site to deploy combat power into Cuba. The failure to link strategic and tactical goals combined with changing guidance from the War Department and inadequate resources to maintain deployment momentum created unnecessary disruptions to operational capabilities. Planners selected Tampa without much thought, and it then became an inadequate hub for deployment operations to Cuba limiting operational momentum. This port clearly did not possess the rail or port capacity to support a large mobilization effort, nor did the expedition provide the necessary external support for deploying Major General Shafter's command to Cuba. Planners chose their basing poorly, and they neglected port facilities that contained adequate infrastructure to adapt to the needs of the deployment. These alternate sites came at a minimal cost of a slightly longer sea voyage. Tempo was abysmal due to the congestion of the rail and port system that did not have the capacity to keep up. Finally, operational reach suffered due to the lack of balance of support units maintaining the flow of personnel and equipment. The army did not adequately plan the mobilization process in Tampa resulting in operational failure.

Failures of basing, tempo, and operational reach in Tampa, notwithstanding, they provided the intellectual foundation and experience for the successful deployment operations in the Port of New York during World War I. Deployment operations were much improved and the evolution of planning and executing mobilizations saw great gains in synchronizing and integrating unit flow from home station to France. This was due to a single commander in New York and supporting forces with the sole mission of deploying units through the port. The War Department learned to oversee holistic transportation plans through rail, port, and sea, resulting in almost 6.5 million soldiers deployed along with all supporting supply.¹⁷³ Tampa deployment operations paved the way for successful World War I deployment.

¹⁷³ Rutenberg and Allen, *Logistics of Waging War*, 65.

Implications for today's deployment operations are clear. Operational planners consider basing as an expandable capability to react to changes in political and strategic guidance. Expeditionary forces establish tempo early in the mobilization process to reduce Anti-Access / Anti-Denial effectiveness. Maintaining tempo in the deployment process provides protection and sustainability for follow-on units. Finally, holistic planning considers operational reach to support not only American forces but also coalition and multi-national partners when anticipating basing requirements.

The knowledge gained during the Tampa mobilization created the underlying foundation for current United States Army deployment doctrine. Planners at the Port of Tampa did not have the benefit of the doctrinal principles of unity of command, synchronization, unit integrity, and balance; these principles remained to be developed in the future. Planners in World War I possessed the foresight to utilize these present-day principles during the movement phase of deployment in the harbors of New York. Today's army doctrine embeds these principles to support subsequent deployment operations. While the deployment from Tampa was by no means smooth and coordinated, the implications from this operation led to successful transportation operations in World War I and resulted in the foundation for United States Army deployment doctrine seen today.

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