“CONQUEST FROM WITHIN”:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES
AND UNITED STATES UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE DOCTRINE

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by

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“Conquest from Within”: A Comparative Analysis Between Soviet Active Measures and United States Unconventional Warfare Doctrine

Contemporary national security challenges demand the continued development of options to best understand and address irregular threats. Unconventional Warfare (UW), traditionally a Special Operations Forces core activity, has served U.S. strategic interests in a variety of operational environments. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet active measures campaign against the U.S. paralleled the U.S. doctrinal concept of UW in many ways, and provides a non-U.S.-centric case study in understanding a highly complex, long-term campaign approach to influence and subversion. This thesis presents a comparative analysis between active measures and the current U.S. doctrinal framework of UW in order to develop a better common understanding of an irregular strategy increasingly evident in the contemporary operational environment on the part of both state and non-state adversaries. This thesis also develops and presents an amended definition for the term active measures, terminology for assessing UW-like operations from a non-U.S.-centric perspective, and provides recommendations for further research and consideration.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

“CONQUEST FROM WITHIN”: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES AND UNITED STATES UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE DOCTRINE, by Major Stephanie K. Whittle, 112 pages.

Contemporary national security challenges demand the continued development of options to best understand and address irregular threats. Unconventional Warfare (UW), traditionally a Special Operations Forces core activity, has served U.S. strategic interests in a variety of operational environments. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet active measures campaign against the U.S. paralleled the U.S. doctrinal concept of UW in many ways, and provides a non-U.S.-centric case study in understanding a highly complex, long-term campaign approach to influence and subversion. This thesis presents a comparative analysis between active measures and the current U.S. doctrinal framework of UW in order to develop a better common understanding of an irregular strategy increasingly evident in the contemporary operational environment on the part of both state and non-state adversaries. This thesis also develops and presents an amended definition for the term active measures, terminology for assessing UW-like operations from a non-U.S.-centric perspective, and provides recommendations for further research and consideration.
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Thank you to my family, friends, and colleagues for your encouragement, counsel, and appreciation.

And—most importantly—I would like to express gratitude to all who have sacrificed for the cause of freedom. This work is dedicated to you.

“Evil is powerless if the good are unafraid.” – Ronald W. Reagan

Sine Pari
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Hence to fight and conquer in all our battles is not supreme excellence. Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.\(^1\)

—Sun Tzu Wu (500 BCE)

Fighting war on the battlefield is the most stupid and primitive way of fighting a war. The highest art of warfare is not to fight at all but to subvert anything of value in your enemy's country—be it moral traditions, religion, respect to your authority and leaders, cultural traditions—anything. Put white against black, old against young, wealthy against poor, and so on—doesn't matter—as long as it disturbs society—as long as it cuts the moral fiber of a nation it's good. And you just take this country—when everything is subverted, when the country is disoriented and confused, when it is demoralized and de-stabilized—then the crisis will come.\(^2\)

—Yuri Bezmenov, KGB defector

Purpose of Study

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, and for the twenty-five years since, many dismissed the Soviet Union and its KGB as obsolete relics of a Cold War era long past. However, amidst analogous new tensions with Russia, many wonder if another Cold War could be looming.

Upon its founding in 1919, Moscow’s Third Communist International (Comintern), established as its long-term vision “the goal of fighting, by every means, even by force of arms, for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie and the creation


\(^2\) Ibid.
of an international Soviet republic.”  

Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev later echoed a more subtle approach to imperialist strategy in 1967: “Marxists-Leninists have always understood that socialism cannot be implanted by one country into another by military force, that it is the product of the internal development of a given society.”

By this time, compared to Soviet espionage efforts, “aktivinyye meropriatia” (translated in English as “active measures”) comprised an estimated 85% of KGB activities—and yet received considerably less scrutiny from the international community. Even within Western intelligence and special operations organizations, the patient, persistent implementation of active measures as an instrument of Soviet strategy remains generally unappreciated, if not largely unknown. Of course, this in itself is a testament to its holistic effectiveness.


5 National Archives and Records Administration, KGB Connections.


7 National Archives and Records Administration, KGB Connections.
After World War II, the Soviets did not pursue communist expansion through traditional military invasions. Nor was the global atmosphere ideologically ripe for subjugation—according to historical estimates, at the time of Soviet takeover, the actual number of communists in any target country was usually less than 3 percent. In many cases, such as the Soviet Union itself, this estimate has been less than 1 percent of the total population.\(^8\)

Facing the insurmountable threat posed by Western conventional military capabilities, the Soviets sought to pursue global power and influence through non-military means.\(^9\) For this reason, active measures became a critical strategy for weakening, and eventually defeating, opponents of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) without the necessity of fighting.

Accordingly, the Soviets seized control of existing governments via internal terrorism, revolution, and subversion by operating through local underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla forces. They installed puppet communist regimes, such as those in Eastern Europe, the People’s Republic of China, North Korea, and Afghanistan; imposed political repressions; and established control through subordinated secret services in these countries.\(^10\)


\(^10\) LibertyInOurTime, “The Subversion Factor 1.”
Finding a concise definition of active measures is not a simple undertaking. The search usually yields little more than retrospective interpretations, sometimes too narrow in scope to be entirely valid. At best, attempts at defining active measures are descriptive, many are contradictory, and those that aren’t contradictory are rarely consistent. These are predominantly based on the recollections and historic accounts of Soviet intelligentsia defectors, CIA and FBI operatives (both past and present), congressional inquiries and investigations, and scholarly interpretations. A standard open source definition for active measures does not seem to exist.

In a 1998 CNN interview, retired KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin described active measures as

the heart and soul of Soviet intelligence. . . . Not intelligence collection, but subversion; active measures to weaken the West, to drive wedges in the Western community alliances of all sorts, particularly NATO; to sow discord among allies, to weaken the United States in the eyes of the people of Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America, and thus to prepare ground in case the war really occurs.  

Active measures also included the establishment and support of international front organizations; foreign communist, socialist and opposition parties; wars of “national liberation” in developing nations; and worldwide underground, revolutionary, insurgency, criminal, and terrorist groups. The intelligence agencies of Eastern Bloc and

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11 Jeffrey Hasler, “Defining War,” *Special Warfare Magazine* 24, no. 1 (January-February 2011): 14. Note: “To define is ‘to state the precise meaning.’ Whereas, to describe ‘is to give an account of; to convey an idea or impression of; to represent pictorially.’ Applied to doctrine, a definition focuses on what something is, while its description provides context and explains what it does within that context.”


13 National Archives and Records Administration, *KGB Connections*.  

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other communist states took a supporting role, training and equipping target groups and amplifying disinformation campaigns, among other covert shaping operations. Soviet leaders made no major distinction between diplomacy and subversion—all were “tightly orchestrated and controlled” by the Politburo and Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

U.S. joint doctrine defines subversion as “actions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing authority.”

The Soviets simply defined subversion as the strategy of “conquest from within.”

Within the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), a renewed focus on Unconventional Warfare (UW) as a viable means of achieving U.S. foreign and national security policy goals demands the agility to address unprecedented challenges. The

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14 LibertyInOurTime, “The Subversion Factor 1.”

15 Christopher J. Lamb and Fletcher Schoen, Perspectives 11, “Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference” (Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University, June 2012), 8. Note: Lamb and Schoen explain that the origins of active measures strategies precede Soviet innovation: “Activities encompassed by the term active measures—for example, influence operations, covert subversion, information manipulation, and paid agents of influence—have been a staple of statecraft for centuries. For greater effect, they often are integrated with penetration of enemy groups by agents, provocateurs, and occasional acts of violence.”

16 Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2013), Glossary-6.

17 LibertyInOurTime, “The Subversion Factor 1.”
common thread of UW—across all joint and interagency efforts—is the capacity to influence human populations.

For the purposes of this investigation it is necessary to synthesize the available opinions and perspectives of this aspect of Soviet foreign policy into one concise active measures definition. Additionally, examining active measures against a framework of U.S. doctrine will not only allow relevant communities to understand this instrument of Soviet national policy through more familiar concepts and language, but also to identify discrepancies that may illuminate shortcomings in either U.S. or Soviet paradigms.

What can be learned, and possibly applied, from historical examples of complex and persistent subversion operations? Examining the largely misunderstood Soviet active measures campaign against the U.S. during the Cold War is a critical case study to this end.

**Research Question**

Did Soviet “active measures” in the United States from 1959-1989 fit the current U.S. doctrinal definition of unconventional warfare?

**Assumptions**

The most significant assumption in this research is that the sources the author consults depict Soviet active measures correctly. Because this is a research-intensive subject, accurate, objective information is crucial to the integrity of any conclusions and their supporting evidence. The author must take extra care to examine the credibility of sources and ensure the information sample is adequate to warrant reasonable conclusions.
Additionally, the author is assuming that the open source information available about active measures is enough to develop a valid understanding and analysis of what the corresponding Soviet ways, ends, and means were.

**Limitations**

Because KGB archives are not accessible to the public, much information about Soviet active measures remains unknown. A variety of accounts from defectors, USG investigations, former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) operators, and various other Soviet network infiltrators are available for review. However, as Stanislav Levchenko, a former GRU case officer recounts, the operations and records of each bureaucratic group within the KGB were highly compartmented and therefore even first-hand accounts are based on a narrow and incomplete perspective.\(^\text{18}\) Despite the availability of open source accounts, the scope of this literature is limited in addressing the research questions in this study. It is also essential to the objectivity of this analysis to emphasize segregation of evidence from ideology in historical accounts. Additionally, some activities resembling Soviet active measures conducted on U.S. territory during the Cold War may not be clearly attributable. It is important to identify and articulate any such information gaps throughout the research process.

Language poses limitations of clarity and understanding in various forms. Without translator support, the author has only used source documents that have already been translated from Russian to English, and must presume sufficient integrity of these

translations in retaining the original meaning and intent. This also holds true for testimonials of defectors with limited English capacity who have relied upon interpreter support for documenting their accounts in English.

Language is also a limitation in the sense that no standard lexicon exists for many of the concepts described, and some words in many sources may erroneously have been used interchangeably. For example, the term “dezinformatsiya” (or disinformation) has often been used when the term active measures would be more accurate, even though these are not synonymous terms (the former being a subcomponent of the latter). In many cases, this is likely due to a limited understanding of these concepts on the part of many scholars and researchers. In other cases, the author believes the term “disinformation” may be used in lieu of “active measures” by more knowledgeable sources (for example, Czech intelligence defector Ladislav Bittman) for the sake of simplification; disinformation is a more self-explanatory term than active measures and conveys the gist of a convoluted topic for an unfamiliar audience. Regardless of reason, misuse of terminology occasionally obscures meaning, even for a researcher well versed in this subject matter.

For the purposes of extending distribution, the scope of this research, analysis, and discussion solely incorporates unclassified information. Publishing an unclassified study on active measures ensures greater accessibility to civilian policy makers with a role in oversight and support of UW campaign design and countering irregular threats. Though many U.S. sources regarding Soviet active measures have been declassified since their origination are available through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests (for example, some congressional records), there is likely an even greater selection of
resources that remain classified. Due to its inherently sensitive nature, some components of UW doctrine remain classified; the author will only incorporate the unclassified doctrine in this research. An investigation incorporating classified material would likely yield a more comprehensive product, and may prove a worthy endeavor for future investigation.

Scope and Delimitations

The intent of this research is to objectively examine ways, ends and means of the Soviet active measures campaign against the U.S. from 1959-1989, and to determine how these compared to the UW operational design, through developing a universal analytic framework for comparison. Additionally, the author will establish a comprehensive and concise definition of active measures as a derivation of this and other previous studies.

The author will limit the scope of discussion to strategic and some operational level programs on U.S. territory, after the revision of Soviet foreign policy and establishment of “Department D” in the late 1950s. In the interest of examining the key networks Soviets developed to support the Soviet active measures strategy, it will be necessary to at least consider and summarize the shaping and supporting activities conducted peripherally in other strategically significant locations, namely Cuba.

This thesis will not address KGB intelligence operations or U.S. counter-intelligence or counter-messaging operations, except where significant to the discussion of active measures operations.

Due to time constraints and limited availability of sources this research does not examine in-depth the organizational structure or role of the Soviet Ministry of Defense (namely the GRU or its subcomponent Spetsnaz) in active measures operations. Although
these organizations played a significant role in the implementation of active measures strategy, which the author will briefly summarize in the chapter 4 analysis, the main effort and primary responsibility for active measures belonged to the First Chief Directorate (FCD) under the KGB.

This thesis is not meant to examine the moral or ethical implications of these activities or to suggest advocacy of incorporating comparable activities into U.S. strategy.

The framework for U.S. doctrinal comparison in this research will be the most current doctrine. Development of UW doctrine is still a work in progress. The current U.S. Army doctrine on UW, specifically its definition of UW, is not unanimously accepted within the SOF community. In 2009 the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School conducted a working group to review the definition of unconventional warfare, and the resulting compromise “did not satisfy everyone in the Special Forces (SF) or wider Special Operations Forces (SOF) community.”19 At the time of this writing, joint UW doctrine is still in the process of development; for now ARSOF doctrine ATP 3-05.1 remains the authoritative UW reference for DOD. Future U.S. UW doctrinal developments would warrant a re-examination and possible refinement of this research.

Irregular Warfare (IW) is defined in JP 1-02 as a “violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence and will.” Figure 1, “Contrasting Conventional and Irregular Warfare” depicts this indirect approach of IW compared with traditional military action.

The five principal IW activities to address irregular threats are: (1) counterterrorism, (2) UW, (3) foreign internal defense, (4) counterinsurgency, and (5)

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stability operations.\textsuperscript{21} IW is not synonymous with any of these activities. IW differs from conventional operations dramatically in two aspects: it is warfare among and within the people, waged for political power, rather than military supremacy. IW also differs from conventional warfare in its emphasis on its indirect operational approach.\textsuperscript{22}

UW is both a core Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) activity and a core IW activity. The USSOCOM definition of UW was approved in May 2009 and is presented in the authoritative doctrine for UW, ATP 3-05.1: “Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.” Contrary to common inference, “unconventional warfare” is not merely a term for warfare that is “not ‘conventional’” (which, in and of itself, is not technically a doctrinal term).

Throughout history, each application of UW is distinctive, though U.S.-sponsored UW efforts are generally consistent in progressing through seven distinct phases, either sequentially or non-sequentially, and in some cases simultaneously: (1) Preparation, (2) Initial contact, (3) Infiltration, (4) Organization, (5) Buildup, (6) Employment, and (7) Transition.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{21} Joint Chiefs of Staff, \textit{Irregular Warfare Joint Operational Concept Version 1.0} (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2007), 8. Note: “In addition to these five activities, there are a host of key related activities, including strategic communications, information operations, psychological operations (now MISO), civil-military operations and support to law-enforcement, intelligence and counterintelligence operations in which the joint force may engage to counter irregular threats. IW is also not synonymous with any of those activities.”

\textsuperscript{22} Maxwell, “Do We Really Understand Unconventional Warfare?”

\textsuperscript{23} Department of the Army, ATP 3-05.1, 2-8 to 2-15.
For those unfamiliar with UW, this SOF “core activity” can be difficult to conceptualize. It defies the more commonly understood norms of the traditional Western way of war.

**Significance of this Study**

Although Soviet active measures parallel UW in many ways, this concept is understood far less than UW, including within the U.S. SOF and intelligence communities. Consequently, the Soviets conducted large-scale active measures efforts throughout the Cold War with minimal resistance from the U.S. or its allies and partner nations.²⁴

Focus of UW discussion is often on the overt activities with general neglect of the clandestine shaping efforts. What are the possible reasons for this? Perhaps it is a result of too narrow a scope of understanding derived from the better-known historical case studies and perspectives. Additionally, clandestine shaping activities require a long-term commitment to conduct effectively (ideally generations to maximize impact and longevity of re-established ideological norms), at the highest levels of interagency integration. This may be beyond accepted norms and paradigms of both perceived and practical feasibility within the USG, especially considering funding and appropriations cycles, as well as the frequency of changeover in executive and legislative administrations.

The intent of this research is to fill a knowledge gap through examining aspects of a subject not commonly studied or widely known. Despite the collapse of the USSR, the themes in this study have significant modern-day implications in both protecting and advancing U.S. national security interests that encompass both offensive and defensive solutions.

According to Kalugin, “The Soviet intelligence was really unparalleled. . . . The KGB programs—which would run all sorts of congresses, peace congresses, youth congresses, festivals, women’s movements, trade union movements, campaigns against U.S. missiles in Europe, campaigns against neutron weapons . . . all sorts of forgeries and faked material—[were] targeted at politicians, the academic community, at the public at large.”

Through active measures, the Soviets effectively leveraged ideology, selected and developed operational networks, and postured for conflict over a long-term, multi-generational campaign focused on shaping cumulative effects.

The Soviets created what is likely the most formidable political influence machine in the modern world. Although they encountered many obstacles in trying to expand a largely unpopular ideology and system, they were effectively able to overcome resistance through effective manipulation and deception methods. Many state and non-state actors

25 Kalugin, “Inside the KGB.”


27 LibertyInOurTime, “The Subversion Factor 1.”
trained by the Soviets have also demonstrated the use of these tactics, including their own front group structures and the active dissemination of anti-Western disinformation.

A close examination of protracted Soviet active measures strategy presents important lessons for understanding how other totalitarian and extremist regimes might employ similar methods to achieve their strategic objectives.28

In 1987 the U.S. State Department assessed that Moscow’s active measures had become “more sophisticated and subtle,” noting that the personnel in charge of its implementation were “well-versed in Western culture and society”—a level of understanding sufficient to effectively influence Western audiences.29 Even during the impending collapse of the Soviet Union, the KGB called together its operators in September 1990 to reinforce the guidance that “work on active measures is to be considered one of the most important functions of the KGB’s foreign intelligence service.”30

Today, as the Kremlin seeks to project global influence, many believe active measures still constitute a significant component of Moscow’s foreign and domestic policy and could be even more aggressive than the original KGB campaigns. The most important reason that such measures can be expected to continue, is a long history


29 Ibid, 21.

30 Clizbe, 174.
substantiating that these efforts have proven successful.\textsuperscript{31} It is reasonable to expect this trend to continue.

As Kalugin cautioned in describing the continuity between Soviet and Russian active measures: “It’s a tradition, it’s not something new. That’s important to see the past projected onto the present—and the future.”\textsuperscript{32}

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\textsuperscript{32} Kalugin, “Inside the KGB.”
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The author has begun research with an emphasis on historical materials written and/or published during the Cold War era, also focusing on USG reports and analysis, and first-accounts from Soviet intelligence defectors. Next, the author will review post-Cold War sources to compare content with the aforementioned information. The author will also review U.S. doctrine and UW-related publications to identify important themes that overlap with the Soviet active measures lines of effort, and to assess which considerations are most applicable to the scope of this research.

A broad selection of books, magazines, scholarly journals, government documents, and transcripts of interviews that examine Soviet active measures and related themes are available. Though most of these sources were published during the Cold War years, many experts continue to revisit the topic of active measures—especially in light of contemporary world events. These sources cover an extensive chronology of events, and include a spectrum of perspectives—to include commentary on communist activity in the U.S. shortly following the Bolshevik revolution, to interviews with Soviet KGB operators who defected to the West, to U.S. Government publications and reports, to the modern-day politically-charged best-sellers that attempt to explain shifts in U.S. political, economic, social, and ideological dynamics in recent decades.

The study of active measures was of greater concern to researchers and writers during the Cold War; since the collapse of the Soviet Union the interest in this topic has faded significantly. Many notable works cover only a limited time period because they were produced while the Cold War was still in progress. Comprehensive post-USSR
works acknowledging active measures through the end of the Cold War are less common and tend to be mostly defector autobiographies.

There has recently been renewed interest in this subject due to in part to current political challenges domestically and internationally. It is important to consider that no source is entirely devoid of partiality, and to use due discretion when examining the facts and analysis presented. It is especially important to the value and contribution of this thesis that the author segregates opinions from facts during the research process. The academic objectivity of a contemporary examination of active measures will make this research unique and of even greater value to the community at large.

Methodology

For the purposes of this research the author has categorized resources by qualifications of source/author, rather than type of medium (books, journals, articles, etc.) This is an important distinction in this investigation and analysis because the emphasis on diversity of credible sources is critical to maximizing comprehensiveness and minimizing subjectivity. These source categories include: subject-matter experts, professional researchers, participants, official records, and doctrine. Consistent with the intelligence model of fusion, a good analyst exploits all viable (accurate, usable, complete, relevant, objective, and available) sources of information to derive the most complete assessment possible.33

Subject Matter Experts

Some of the most prominent and comprehensive sources that have materialized since the disintegration of the Soviet Union include the Mitrokhin archives, the Venona files, and the Vassiliev files. The focus of these sources is predominantly Soviet KGB intelligence collection operations, though there are occasional references to active measures.34 This does not diminish the value they offer in understanding the nature of Soviet policy, its tendencies and tensions, and in providing an important degree of context.

In writing *The Sword and the Shield* and *The World Was Going Our Way*, Christopher Andrew, a leading British intelligence historian, worked with the former KGB archivist, Vasili Mitrokhin to consolidate several volumes based on notes Mitrokhin had transcribed and smuggled out of KGB archives over the course of several decades. Though the material in these works is wide-ranging and provides insight into a narrow scope of a vastly compartmented Soviet intelligence archive, it includes limited references to active measures and its discussion focuses on operations against Great Britain. Mitrokhin’s original notes cannot be compared to the original KGB documents he copied, which remain classified in Moscow. Nevertheless, experts and historians seem confident that his material is genuine because it is “congruent” with other available Soviet intelligence information.35 Some released Mitrokhin literature is also available on

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34 Clizbe, 129.

the internet as part of the Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project’s Virtual Archive.36

Kent Clizbe, a former CIA agent, notes that, while the Mitrokhin volumes are extensive, Mitrokhin “was only one archivist, in an extensive bureaucracy, in one intelligence organization which kept tight compartmentation of its operations and records.” Mitrokhin himself acknowledges that he did not have access to the vast majority of files on KGB operations in the U.S., nor did he have access to any GRU, Comintern, or other non-KGB files.37 This is a common limitation in nearly all aspects of researching Soviet intelligence operations, especially active measures.

The National Security Agency’s Venona decryptions, a compilation of intercepted Soviet KGB and GRU cables between 1941 and 1945, mention KGB influence and disinformation operations but not active measures at large.38 These cables, finally released in the mid-1990s, are also a valuable source for understanding context, but represent only a few thousand cables out of possibly millions of total cables sent. As historians John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr note, “the subject of the deciphered messages ranged from the trivial to the important, and often they were only partially decrypted. Even when complete, they were messages boiled down for transmission by telegram—often short, terse and lacking detail.”39

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37 Clizbe, 134.
38 Ibid., 133.
Vassiliev, who had resigned from the KGB in 1990 to become a journalist, had unprecedented access to Russian archives of KGB activities in the U.S. from the 1930s to the early 1950s. He accepted a Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia (SVR)\textsuperscript{40} offer to work with American scholar Allen Weinstein on a project that partnered an active or retired KGB officer with a Western author to produce a series of books on selected intelligence topics.\textsuperscript{41}

While Vassiliev did not have access to all KGB files, he was allowed to examine and take handwritten notes on vast operational files from the KGB’s legal stations, “some personal files on both officers and sources, and the first volume of the file on ‘enormous,’ the KGB’s atomic intelligence project, that covered its assault on the Manhattan Project up to the end of 1945.” Additionally, in accordance with SVR stipulations, he was required to sanitize his notes before sharing them with his American co-author. Real names and identifying information about sources were therefore not disclosed, and certain topics were considered off-limits. An SVR committee reviewed all of Vassilev’s notes to ensure compliance.\textsuperscript{42} Despite this degree of censorship, Vassiliev’s notebooks are likely the closest researchers may get to the original Soviet documents.\textsuperscript{43} As valuable as this source is for understanding Soviet foreign policy and intelligence operations, the time period covered is beyond the scope of this thesis, and there is little to no discussion of active measures.

\textsuperscript{40} SVR is the KGB’s successor.

\textsuperscript{41} Haynes and Klehr, “Introduction, Alexander Vassiliev’s Notebooks,” 1.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 2.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 4.
In the early 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr were part of a Yale research team who gained access to Comintern Communist Party USA (CPUSA) files in Moscow. Haynes, now a Staff Fellow at the Library of Congress, is a Soviet KGB expert and has written several works about the files he examined, including *The Soviet World of American Communism, The Secret World of American Communism, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America, and In Denial: Historians, Communism, and Espionage*.

In his writings, Haynes notes that the Comintern files, which were open only during a short period for selected researchers to access selected files, were “immense” and adds that “most sensitive intelligence-related material was removed when the Comintern was dissolved or at some later date.”\(^4^4\) In *The Secret World of American Communism*, he and his co-authors were able to review about “a thousand files,” compromising several “score of thousands of documents” about CPUSA, its underground bureaucratic support and routine communist party activities.\(^4^5\) Haynes’s research team was only permitted a short time in the Comintern files, and when the Russian archivists realized Haynes and his colleagues were not from the CPUSA, as they had initially presumed, the research team’s access to the files was terminated.\(^4^6\) While the material they did gather offers valuable insight on some KGB and GRU affairs, the scope is narrow and does not focus on active measures operations.

\(^{4^4}\) Clizbe, 139.

\(^{4^5}\) Ibid., 139.

\(^{4^6}\) Ibid., 140.
Participants

Many former CIA and FBI members have written memoirs, autobiographies, and fiction. In general, these works lack insight into the questions addressed in this research. Many former Soviet intelligence operatives—mostly among those who have defected to the West—have written about their experiences in autobiographical accounts and have agreed to interviews. These sources illuminate the subject, and show the importance of active measures, however, they are limited to the operations that these officers participated in themselves, or may have been aware of. Many of them understandably avoid being too candid, and they are “as prone as autobiographers in other walks of life to romanticize their own importance, minimize their mistakes, and pass over unpleasant or sensitive events with silence, misdirection, or flat out lies.”47 Some of the most noteworthy Soviet intelligence defectors to have documented their experiences include: Ion Mihai Pacepa of Romanian intelligence, the highest-ranking intelligentsia officer to defect to the West; Oleg Kalugin and Yuri Bezmenov of the KGB; Stanislav Levchencko and Stanislav Lunev of the GRU; and Ladislav Bittman of Czech intelligence.

Few of the original Comintern intelligence operatives who worked extensively in the U.S. survived past World War II, due to Stalin’s purges. Those who did never published their stories, and it is likely that archived accounts about their work do not exist.48

48 Clizbe, 131.
Quotes, speeches, and publications from Soviet and Cuban leaders during this time period also lend some limited insight into the goals, strategies, and policies that reflect active measures efforts.

Additionally, materials published by CPUSA, Soviet fronts, and other key organizations throughout the Cold War provide insight into Soviet interests—and are better understood when examined within the context of an active measures strategy.

Official Records

U.S. Congressional hearings and reports are some of the most important resources in studying active measures—especially by the early 1980s, after the intelligence community had identified and developed a more comprehensive understanding of Soviet ends, ways, and means.

Earlier congressional records during the decades preceding the 1950s McCarthy trials also present candid discussions of “subversive activities” against the U.S., indicating a general understanding of influence operations and the nature of the threat.

In the U.S., declassified FBI and CIA files, in addition to the aforementioned congressional transcripts, also provide extensive information that paints a picture of Soviet activities from a homeland security perspective. However, the majority of existing files likely remain classified or “subject to severe redaction.”

U.S. Doctrine

Review of both historical and contemporary UW-related U.S. doctrine and publications provide the context and prescriptive framework necessary to address the primary research question.

ATP 3-05.1, *Unconventional Warfare*, is the Army’s doctrinal foundation for UW and is the broadest and most comprehensive United States Government (USG) doctrinal publication on the subject of UW. Although UW is inherently a sensitive subject, ATP 3-05.1 is intentionally kept unclassified to make it accessible to civilian policy makers with a role in oversight and support of UW activities.\(^5^0\)

ATP 3-05.1 provides the current U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) concept of planning and conducting UW operations. This publication serves as the “doctrinal foundation for subordinate ARSOF UW doctrine, force integration, materiel acquisition, professional education, and individual and unit training.”\(^5^1\) It describes UW fundamentals, activities, and considerations involved in the planning and execution of UW throughout the full range of military operations, and emphasizes UW as a strategic policy option.

Gaps in the Record

As mentioned in the chapter 1 discussion of research limitations, most archived information about Soviet active measures remains highly compartmented and inaccessible to the outside world. Haynes notes that elements of Soviet bureaucracy,

\(^{5^0}\) Department of the Army, ATP 3-05.1, v.

\(^{5^1}\) Ibid., iv.
particularly its “still-strong communist faction,” have always been “hostile to any arrangement to publish Russian secrets, regarding it as a breach of security.”

With the archives essentially inaccessible, the small fragments of historical information released to “placate public curiosity” about Soviet intelligence operations are presumed misrepresentative. Perhaps these records will eventually become available for public distribution, but this is not likely for the foreseeable future.

Andrew blames the post-McCarthyism climate in the U.S. for an inhibited understanding of Soviet KGB operations in general. He notes that the alarmist tone and rhetoric in the public prosecution of alleged communists worked to the Soviets’ advantage, and repelled many Americans from this discourse:

Grasping the extent of the KGB’s ambitions . . . has been complicated by the legacy of McCarthyism. Just as the fraudulent inventions of Senator Joe McCarthy’s self-serving anti-Communist witch-hunt helped to blind liberal opinion to the reality of the unprecedented Soviet intelligence offensive against the United States, so simplistic conspiracy theories of Soviet plans for world conquest made most non-conspiracy theorists skeptical of even realistic assessments of Soviet designs. . . . McCarthy and America’s other anti-Communist conspiracy theorists were, albeit unconsciously, among the KGB’s most successful Cold War agents of influence. Reaction against their risible exaggerations helps to account for the remarkable degree to which the KGB has been left out of Cold War history.

The intent of this thesis is not to question the intentions or efforts of Senator McCarthy or his colleagues, however it is important to understand the inadvertent second and third-order effects of ensuing perceptions are self-evident. In many ways this has shaped, and even inhibited open dialogue about the USSR and its policies, especially

53 Ibid., 1.
within the U.S. This has perhaps constrained the depth and breadth of Soviet studies since the days of the “Second Red Scare” (1947-57), especially concerning topics that suggest conspiratorial themes, such as the covert nature of active measures.

Another key consideration in the discussion of information gaps is that it is difficult to search for information specific to active measures due to inaccurate naming conventions and ineffective categorization. Oftentimes, “active measures” is not a fruitful search term, it is rarely listed in book indexes, and the researcher needs to understand what it is in order to identify relevant themes in related publications.

**Significance of Thesis in Relation to Existing Literature**

It is possible that comparative studies between U.S. UW doctrine and Soviet active measures operations exist, though the author has not encountered any during this investigation. The closest to such a study was a 1961 journal article written by Slavko N. Bjelajac, comparing U.S. and Soviet “UW methods,” but it doesn’t refer to Soviet methods specifically as active measures. Historians who have studied this topic generally approach their research from an academic perspective, rather than a strategic or military special operations perspective. Most of their focus tends toward discussion of CPUSA activities, recruitment, and espionage.

Subversive efforts, such as Soviet active measures, have received much less attention, and do not seem well understood by most researchers in this field. Generally these scholars have a limited understanding of unconventional warfare and covert

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operations concepts, so it is not surprising to find that none of them have drawn a similar comparison or identified a potential for further investigation. This does not diminish their value or significance, but the post-Cold War historical perspective allows researchers to better sift the tactical details of agent recruitment from the larger and more important historical questions about the magnitude of such operations globally.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

JP 3-05, Special Operations, defines UW as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.” Historically, USG has conducted UW in order to achieve national objectives in an environment that it is unable or unwilling (due to political or military sensitivity) to overtly employ its instruments of national power.

UW and covert action are the two U.S. strategic concepts that seem to resemble active measures most closely. Like Soviet active measures, many U.S. approaches to IW require extensive interagency collaboration. In the case of UW, SOF is normally the lead DOD component. Additionally, throughout history, the CIA and its predecessors have contributed significantly to these efforts.

The CIA term “covert action” resembles active measures in many ways, though written from a U.S.-centric perspective:

Activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly. Covert action does not include activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational security of United States Government programs, or administrative activities.

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57 Department of the Army, ATP 3-05.1, 1-2.

58 Section 503e, National Security Act of 1947 [50 USC §413b]
The Soviet concept and practice of active measures are similar but broader than the range of activities subsumed under the U.S. intelligence term covert action. In the West, covert action is normally entrusted to the state’s regular intelligence service and kept separate from other spheres of governmental or private activity. In the Soviet case, many active measures were planned and executed by intelligence operatives, but such measures were also conducted by party and government officials and by many nominally unofficial persons such as journalists, academics, and representatives of “public” organizations. The common thread that runs through all active measures is a high degree of emphasis on concealing Soviet involvement and the real purpose behind an activity in which a Soviet threat was overtly involved.

The author has selected to analyze Soviet active measures using the framework of UW because unclassified analysis is more practical, it better serves the SOF community in the current emphasis of developing UW capacity, and the UW definition seems to fit active measures better than the covert action definition does, especially in the comparative consideration of ends, ways, and means.

As ATP 3-05.1 prescribes, studying the organization of insurgencies is one of the most fundamental approaches to understanding and evaluating the dynamics—the form, function and logic—of such movements. It outlines seven dynamics common to most insurgencies that succeed in transforming popular discontent into an organized and


60 Ibid., 1.

61 Department of the Army, ATP 3-05.1.
effective movement. The similarities between Soviet active measures and common characteristics of insurgencies offer this analytic approach additional consideration for further examination of Soviet strategy.\(^{62}\)

The study of active measures is broad and extensive, and remains relevant in the contemporary operational environment. The intent of this research is to examine active measures from the strategic-level campaign design perspective, focusing on the Cold War period that exemplifies the its most comprehensive and aggressive implementation.

**The Evolution of Soviet Active Measures**

Though the origin of Soviet active measures dates back to pre-Bolshevik Revolution, they were subsequently employed and refined by Lenin and later Stalin. This component of Soviet foreign policy has undergone various changes in structure and operational focus. From 1919 until 1930 active measures belonged to Comintern, the Soviet-based organization dedicated to advancing world communism. Under Stalin, active measures developed into a synchronized, whole-of-government effort across all Soviet agencies involved in foreign affairs. After 1945, the Soviet government continued to conceptually refine active measures, further developing the organizational mechanisms for planning, coordinating, and execution.\(^{63}\)

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\(^{62}\) Department of the Army, ATP 3-05.1, 2-4.

\(^{63}\) Godson and Shultz, 21.
Just as active measures evolved throughout the Cold War, so did the nature and structure of the state security apparatus, which became known as the KGB under Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in 1954.64

In 1959, Soviet leadership decided the KGB needed to shift its focus.65 In preceding years, the structure and operational scope of this military organization had adequately served Soviet interests; its mix of intelligence operations with its domestic role as a coercive instrument of social control proved largely successful.66 At the same time, the Soviets understood that—in order to realize its determined goal of global conquest—they could not subdue a diametrically opposed Western power like the U.S. through military confrontation.67

This was more than a volatile nuclear arms race; it was an exceptionally complex war of ideas. Because conventional military means weren’t a practical policy option, the Soviets concluded it was time to more aggressively pursue an indirect approach to defeating Western threats, using existing assets.68 Consequently, the KGB's new "Department D" (later rebranded “Service A”) and its renewed strategy of active measures emerged.69

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65 National Archives and Records Administration, *KGB Connections*.

66 Ibid.

67 Skousen, 152.

68 National Archives and Records Administration, *KGB Connections*.

69 Ibid.
To understand the evolution of Soviet active measures, one must also understand the context of Soviet influence and subversion operations in general. The use of “fraternal organizations” was essential to the initial network and establishment of momentum in support of Soviet influence operations abroad, and CPUSA was no exception.\textsuperscript{70} By most measures, CPUSA was considered the main effort of such operations.

Two of the most significant setbacks to CPUSA momentum were the Soviet alignment with Nazi Germany in the 1940s, and Khrushchev’s revelations about the atrocities committed under the Stalin regime. In a February 1956 speech before an open plenary session, Khrushchev denounced Stalin as “a dictator who had committed crimes on a massive scale against the Soviet people.”\textsuperscript{71} Because reverence for Stalin had been central to the ideological commitment of U.S. communists for nearly two generations, these revelations were exceptionally devastating upon reaching a U.S. audience. As a consequence, over the next two years, seventy-five percent of CPUSA members left the party.\textsuperscript{72}

But the facts disclosed were not revelations; they were not even new. For more than twenty years, both the mainstream press and scholarly books had carried hundreds of stories, refugee accounts, and exposés of the nature and horrors of Stalin’s regime. Yet although the insistence of American Communists that the news was a revelation was literally false, it was psychologically true.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{70} Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, \textit{The Sword and the Shield} (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 63.


\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 350.
In both cases, many CPUSA members became disenchanted with a system that they realized they had not fully understood and no longer wished to advocate. Ironically, by the time the McCarthy trials had begun, CPUSA membership was at its lowest and its activity was at its most ineffective and disjointed state in its history. Still, it received significant support and direction from CPSU and its funding doubled over the course of the eight-year span between 1958 and 1965.74

While CPUSA remained a viable means for supporting active measures efforts, it also had certain shortcomings and vulnerabilities. Following the 1956 Khrushchev revelations about Stalin and the mass exodus of its member base, the CPUSA began a campaign to distance itself from the new stigmas of Soviet communism. Under the leadership of John Gates, the CPUSA national committee issued a resolution in September 1956 calling for an “American road to socialism.” The resolution emphasized a new imperative to base American communism on the more authentic “Marxist-Leninist principles as interpreted by the Communist party of our country” rather than on those “which reflect exclusively certain unique features of the Russian revolution or of Soviet society.”75 As Anderson, Haynes, and Klehr assess of CPUSA’s ineffectual rebranding effort:

Gates’s attempt to reform American communism was, as he himself came to see, fundamentally impossible. By trying to put aside the Soviet myth, he was robbing the movement of its core identity. Their belief in Soviet perfection gave American Communists strength: their vision of the Soviet Union convinced them that it was possible to construct a utopian society and that by modeling themselves on the Soviet party, they could create a Soviet America. The CPUSA confronted the task of overthrowing the most powerful nation in the world. It was a daunting

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74 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 288.
challenge, but their belief in the Soviet system assured American Communists that they had as an ally a nation whose own power would eventually surpass that of the United States.76

Conflicts and disagreements between CPUSA leadership and Soviet authorities ensued. Additionally, the organization was becoming increasingly susceptible to informant infiltration by U.S. law enforcement.77 The concept of influence operations as an instrument of Soviet national power was becomingly increasingly important as Cold War tensions escalated, but the weaknesses of overt options such as those of CPUSA illuminated the ensuing necessity of an increased emphasis on clandestine and covert methods.

By 1950 the Soviets had established a new system for subsidizing foreign communist parties, to include CPUSA. Despite the new challenges CPUSA faced, not only did it continue to receive funding from the Soviet Central Committee, its funding nearly doubled within seven years.78 This suggests that CPUSA not only remained relevant to the Soviets, but also its importance to them was growing. Soviet support CPUSA continued, and increased through the end of the Cold War. By 1980, two FBI informants acting as CPUSA couriers reportedly had delivered more than $28 million to CPUSA from Moscow.79 This continued to expand even further throughout the following


77 Ibid., 148.

78 Ibid., 148. Note: “The first listing of a contribution to the CPUSA that we have located came in 1958, when $210,000 was sent. In 1959 the CPUSA received $250,000, and International Publishers was sent an additional $50,000. By 1962 the subsidy was $475,000. In 1963 the CPUSA asked for a million dollars and received $500,000. In 1965 the CPUSA received its first million-dollar subsidy.”

79 Ibid., 148.
decade. By 1987, CPUSA was receiving annual subsidies totaling in $2 million.\textsuperscript{80} This represented a significant proportion of the total Soviet subsidies ($200 million) to seventy-three communist parties, workers parties, and revolutionary groups worldwide.\textsuperscript{81}

Andrew notes that recruitment of agents in the West during and after the 1964-1982 Brezhnev era became increasingly difficult as the ideological appeal of the Soviet Union drastically declined.\textsuperscript{82}

Instructions from the FCD in 1984 underscore a renewed emphasis on “continual improvement in the forms and methods of working on active measures.”\textsuperscript{83} This included “developing and carrying out large-scale operations” using existing capabilities and networks, and acquiring additional channels “for carrying out influence operations.”

We must, as previously, continue to rely on exploiting ideology and politics as a basic motive. . . . Further improvement in operational work with agents calls for fuller and wider utilization of confidential and special unofficial contacts. These should be acquired chiefly among prominent figures in politics and society, and important representatives of business interests and science, who are capable not only of supplying valuable information, but also of actively influencing the foreign and domestic policy of target-countries in a direction of advantage to the USSR.\textsuperscript{84}

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\textsuperscript{80} Anderson, Haynes, and Klehr, \textit{The Soviet World of American Communism}, 150. Note: In 1983, Gus Hall, head of CPUSA, wrote to Moscow “convinced that the potential of the mass upsurge can be turned into a reality if we can reach the eyes and ears of the millions with our message” and emphasized that “our single-most serious obstacle to doing this is the lack of financial means.” In addition to financial concerns, this suggests a strong emphasis on influence operations at the time.
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\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 148.
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\textsuperscript{82} Andrew and Godievsky, \textit{Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions}, 40.
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\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 19-20.
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\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 12.
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This also encompassed expanding “cooperation and mutual assistance” with “other sections, ministries and departments, and the security agencies of the socialist countries and some liberated countries.”\textsuperscript{85} Such guidance illuminates the importance of a worldwide network in shaping and supporting active measures efforts within the U.S.

Between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, KGB Service A nearly doubled from about to fifty to over eighty officers at its FCD headquarters in Moscow, and added between thirty and forty additional personnel to its disinformation arm in the Novosti Press Agency offices.\textsuperscript{86} Residencies abroad were instructed to allocate twenty-five percent of their resources to active measures.\textsuperscript{87}

**Reasoning for Time Period Selected: 1959-1989**

This is not meant to examine or assess the history of active measures beyond what the scope of the period in question. However, it is important to provide historical context of Soviet foreign policy and subversive methods in order to understand the significance of active measures as an instrument of national power. It is also critical to understand the intent and methodology behind targeting methods within the territorial U.S. leading up to and throughout the Cold War, and to understand the most significant driving factors behind Soviet policy decisions.

In the late 1950s the Central Committee made a policy decision to increase the use of active measures against the U.S. and NATO, and established Department D under

\textsuperscript{85} Andrew and Godievsky, *Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions*, 19-20.

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 3.

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
FCD for this exclusive purpose. A decade later, in 1968 under KGB chief Yuri Andropov Department D was renamed Department A; and in the early 1970s “upgraded” to a Service (Service A). This promotion and expansion indicates the “interest of Soviet leadership in active measures”, suggests an increase of resource allocation to this organization, and is consistent with an “escalation” of active measures efforts abroad.

The author has selected the window of 1959-1989 to focus this research, while still permitting an examination of Soviet active measures from a long-term campaign perspective. It is significant to note that the activities, and many of the successes of this period, did not occur in isolation—rather, they were shaped by the patient and persistent efforts of the preceding decades.

1959-1989 are especially important years from a UW perspective because of the new environmental challenges and opportunities the Soviets faced and the strategic and organizational adaptations they generated in response:

1. “Denied territory”. Up until the 1950s, the Soviets could take advantage of a relatively permissive environment in the U.S. using overt and clandestine methods. Even after World War II, when Stalin had aligned himself with Hitler, a significant U.S. base of ideological support for Stalin and the Soviet system remained. However, after the “Second Red Scare” and the McCarthy trials of the 1950s, as well as Khrushchev’s public testimonies about the Stalin era, ideological support for the USSR had diminished

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88 Godson and Shultz, 33.

89 Ibid., 33.
drastically.²⁹ Agent recruiting had become increasingly difficult. Americans were less receptive to utopian and “anti-fascist” narratives. U.S. counterintelligence had developed a better understanding of the threat, had begun infiltrating Soviet networks within the U.S., and had developed its own network of informants. Politburo was pressed to develop more discrete and indirect methods of influence to affect a less receptive American populace.

2. Domestic volatility. 1959-1989 also became arguably the most volatile period domestically for the U.S. during the Cold War. Many of the contributing dynamics were the results of Soviet actions (the Cuban Missile Crisis, Soviet-backed “wars of liberation” in the Third World, and increasingly aggressive influence operations). Other dynamics likely did not result from Soviet initiative but presented opportunities for various forms of exploitation (the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, the Civil Rights movement and assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., U.S. intervention in Vietnam, the emergence of popular culture during the 1960s, the women’s liberation movement, etc.) Various records and accounts present valuable insight into the Soviet assessments of these dynamics and their responses.

3. Cuban “Bridgehead”⁹¹: The revolution in Cuba and establishment of Castro’s regime provided a strategically essential foothold ninety miles south of the U.S. This provided the Soviets with unprecedented quality of access to the Western Hemisphere,

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⁹¹ Andrew and Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way, 10. Note: “Bridgehead” was the KGB codename for Castro’s Cuba, a nod to its significance as the first communist foothold secured in the Western Hemisphere.
which afforded critical leverage for active measures activities, especially after the KGB assumed control of the DGI in 1969.92

4. Soft power. The shift in Soviet strategic emphasis to non-military Cold War options against the U.S. is consistent demonstrates many of the same considerations and risk mitigation that decision-makers factor into selecting UW as a viable option.

**Army UW Doctrine as a Framework for Comparative Analysis?**

In campaign design, commanders must link ends, ways, and means to achieve the desired end state. This requires answering the following questions:

1. What is the end state that must be achieved, how is it related to the strategic end state, and what objectives must be achieved to enable that end state? (Ends)

2. What sequence of actions is most likely to achieve those objectives and the end state? (Ways)

3. What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions within given or requested resources? (Means)

The author poses that these same campaign design questions can be used to frame active measures in a way to better understand the Soviet ways, ends, and means within the doctrinal paradigm of UW applications.

Doctrinally, there are two fundamental criteria for an operation or campaign to be considered UW:

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92 National Archives and Records Administration, *KGB Connections*. Note: After 1969, Cuban intelligence “became and has remained totally financed and controlled by the KGB.” In the following decades, Soviet officers from KGB Department 11 (the allied services intelligence department under FCD) in Havana were directly responsible for “totally and absolutely” running DGI operations.
1. It is conducted through or with members of a resistance movement or insurgency.

2. It is conducted with the goal of coercing, disrupting or overthrowing a government or occupying power.93

In order to establish whether active measures fit the current U.S. doctrinal definition of UW, the author must determine whether or not the Soviet active measures campaign examined within the scope of this investigation meet both these criteria.

The ends, ways, and means of UW can be directly extracted from its doctrinal definition: “Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area,” whereas:

Ends = “coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power”

Ways = “operating through or with”

Means = “underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area”

For purpose of comparison with active measures, the ends of UW are fairly straightforward. The components of “ways” and “means” will require doctrinal elaboration for analytical purposes. ATP 3-05.1 provides further examination of the components of UW, which help to understand these concepts more subjectively and comprehensively.

It would be impossible to establish a perfect match between UW doctrinal prescription and active measures observations—no two U.S.-sponsored operations are

alike, so it is reasonable to expect some notable differences between how two distinctive 
world powers with contrasting values systems approach campaign design and 
implementation in any approach to warfare. These distinctions are just as valuable to 
identify and understand as the commonalities—if not more so. The intent of the author in 
assessing whether or not Soviet active measures against the U.S. from 1959-1989 fit the 
current U.S. doctrinal definition of UW is to identify a preponderance of parallels 
between the U.S. UW doctrinal framework and Soviet active measures, based on 
comparison of the aforementioned UW ends, ways, and means criteria.

When U.S. doctrine discusses UW, it is from a purely U.S. perspective. Though 
most of those familiar with UW are aware that the U.S. is not the only world power that 
effectively conducts UW-style operations, many are hard-pressed to identify examples of 
such foreign-sponsored activities. This narrow scope of understanding limits the 
appreciation of its potential and possibilities as a national security option. It also limits 
conciseness of discussion at times, due to a lack of a generic terminology for the “doer” 
(the party sponsoring the UW campaign), the “victim” government or occupying power, 
and the surrogate element(s) in a UW-like operation when applying these concepts to 
other actors.

For the purposes of analysis in this study, the author has developed the following 
universally applicable terminology:

**Sponsor:** The actor (i.e. government, occupying power) orchestrating and 
sponsoring the UW operation.

**Surrogate:** The auxiliary, underground, public, and/or guerilla force through 
which the sponsor executes the UW operation.
**Third Party Sponsor**: A partner government or occupying power that serves as a buffer between the sponsor and the surrogate in order to conceal the identity of, or permit plausible denial, by the sponsor. A third party sponsor directly enables, facilitates, advises, and supports surrogate efforts. Such employment is historically evident in Soviet active measures, especially through the utilization of Cuba post-1959.

**Terminus**: The target government or occupying power of the UW operation; the actor that the sponsor seeks to coerce, disrupt, and/or overthrow by means of the surrogate, and possibly a third party sponsor.

It is also important to note that the terms resistance movement and insurgency, though they both convey a strategy of insurrection, are not exactly interchangeable. Within DOD, the term “insurgency” describes the concept of “achieving aims through a strategy of armed conflict and subversion against an indigenous government or occupying power” while the term “resistance movement” describes a unique type of insurgency that “focuses on the removal of an occupying power.” The difference in terminology is important to UW campaign design because planners must understand the significant differences in dealing with a resistance movement that forms in response to an occupying power, and an insurgency that grows over time out of discontent for a current regime. For purposes of this study, the author considers insurgency and resistance movement generally synonymous within the context of ATP 3-05.1, but will use the term resistance movement except when quoting form doctrine.94

94 Department of the Army, ATP 3-05.1, 2-1.

95 Ibid.
Defining Active Measures

Existing Definitions of Active Measures

As discussed on chapter 1, if a Soviet doctrinal definition for active measures exists, the author has not yet discovered it. Although many sources and subject matter experts have each presented their own description of what the term active measures means, no two descriptions are entirely consistent, and some even contradict each other. However, all of them are valuable to consider in understanding active measures, and provide key supplementation to a review of the other sources available in this complex and largely misunderstood aspect of Soviet foreign policy.

The following are a compilation of the active measures definitions from the sources the author has consulted in this research. These serve to provide the reader with an overview of the various interpretations from both U.S. and Soviet perspectives. Additionally, these provide a starting point from which the author has derived a proposed active measures definition that will best serve future understanding, research, and analysis.

In the U.S. Congressional Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Soviet Active Measures in July 1982, the definition of active measures presented was as follows:

The Soviet term active measures is used (primarily in an intelligence context) to distinguish influence operations from espionage and counterintelligence, but this term is not limited to intelligence alone . . . involve activities from virtually every element of the Soviet party and state structure and are regarded as a valuable, regular supplement to, and are closely coordinated with, traditional diplomacy. Soviet active measures include:

- Manipulation or control of the media.
- Written or oral disinformation.
- Use of foreign Communist parties and front organizations.
Clandestine radiobroadcasting.
Economic activities.
Military operations.
Other political influence operations.96

Soviet active measures constitute a policy instrument systematically employed to discredit, isolate, and weaken the United States. These ultimate objectives are a key factor in active measures, even in many instances when the active measures are immediately directed at other countries, organizations, or individuals.97

The CIA’s *Studies in Intelligence* provides a taxonomy of the activities that the Soviets considered active measures:

The basic goal of Soviet active measures was to weaken the USSR’s opponents — first and foremost the “main enemy,” the United States — and to create a favorable environment for advancing Moscow’s views and international objectives worldwide.98

Retired KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin described active measures as “the heart and soul of Soviet intelligence”:

Not intelligence collection, but subversion: active measures to weaken the West, to drive wedges in the Western community alliances of all sorts, particularly NATO, to sow discord among allies, to weaken the United States in the eyes of the people of Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America, and thus to prepare ground in case the war really occurs.99

The *Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence* describes active measures as:

96 *Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Soviet Active Measures*, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., July 13 and 14, 1982, 1.

97 Ibid., 1. Note: Regarding “covert action” parallels, “The use of the Soviet term active measures, rather than the more familiar term covert action, is intentional. Active measures comprise a broader concept than covert action and include a full range of overt, as well as covert, activities undertaken by the Soviets, which thus are part of the discussion.”

98 Clizbe, 100.

99 Oleg Kalugin, “Inside the KGB.”
the Soviet term for strategies that in the West would be described as black propaganda. The purpose was to denigrate ‘the main adversary’ by using whatever disinformation channels were available to spread false stories, plant bogus reports into the media, spread untrue rumors, and support Soviet foreign policy objectives by undermining confidence in its opponents.100

The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West describes active measures as a form of “political warfare” conducted primarily by the KGB to “influence the course of world events”:

Active measures ranged ‘from media manipulations to special actions involving various degrees of violence’ and included disinformation, propaganda, counterfeiting official documents, assassinations, and political repression, such as penetration in churches, and persecution of political dissidents.101

In his book Willing Accomplices, Clizbe quotes an unnamed KGB general who had served as chief of the residency in Vienna in 1961 and later at KGB headquarters as follows:

Active Measures were clandestine actions designed on the one hand to affect foreign governments, groups and influential individuals in ways favoring the objectives of Soviet policy and, on the other hand, to weaken the opposition to it. Such actions might or might not involve misinforming an adversary by distortion, concealment or invention, but in practice we got better results by exposing truth—selectively. We usually made the distinction clear. When someone would propose a measure, for instance, we would frequently ask him, ‘How much deza [disinformation] is involved in it?’102

The active measures overview a CIA study presented to the U.S. Congressional Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Soviet Active Measures in July 1982 read:


101 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 224.

102 Clizbe, 99.
Active measures are regarded as a valuable regular supplement to the conduct of foreign policy by more conventional diplomatic methods. They are quintessentially an offensive instrument of Soviet policy. Used in an intelligence context, the term itself denotes the distinction the Soviets draw between activities intended to produce a political effect abroad and the collection of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information. Used to influence or subvert the policies of foreign governments, disrupt relations between other countries, undermine confidence in foreign governments and institutions, and discredit opponents of Soviet policy. Instruments include:

- foreign communist parties and international and national front organizations.
- written and oral disinformation, particularly forgeries.
- manipulation of foreign media through controlled assets and press placements.
- agents of influence.
- manipulation of mass organizations and demonstrations,
- covert political, financial, and arms support for insurgents, separatist movements, and oppositions groups and parties.
- ad hoc political influence operations often involving elements of deception, blackmail, or intimidation.103

The glossary definition of active measures in Roy Godson and Richard H. Shultz’s book, Dezinformatia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy is as follows:

A Soviet term that came into use in the 1950s to describe certain overt and covert techniques for influencing events and behavior in, and the actions of, foreign countries. Active measures may entail influencing the policies of another government, undermining confidence in its leaders and institutions, disrupting relations between other nations, and discrediting and weakening governmental and non-governmental opponents. This frequently involves attempts to deceive the target (foreign governmental and non-governmental elites or mass audiences), and to distort the target’s perceptions of reality. Active measures may be conducted overtly through officially sponsored foreign propaganda channels, diplomatic relations, and cultural diplomacy. Covert political techniques include the use of covert propaganda, oral and written disinformation, agents of influence, clandestine radios, and international front organizations. Although active measures principally are political in nature, military maneuvers and paramilitary assistance to insurgents and terrorists also may be involved.104

103 Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Soviet Active Measures, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., July 13 and 14, 1982, 20.

104 Godson and Shultz, 193.
Godson and Shultz also add: “Indeed, of twentieth century regimes, only Nazi Germany has rivaled Moscow and its allies in the appreciation, understanding, and utilization of these foreign policy tools.”

Proposed Definition of Active Measures

Based on the findings and analysis in this research the author has developed and proposes the following working definition for active measures: “A protracted whole-of-government approach to undermine, isolate, and incapacitate an adversary through influencing and mobilizing relevant populations in order to prepare the environment for decisive military action.”

Strengths and Weaknesses of Methodology

Studying Soviet active measures is a complex pursuit that requires a comprehensive examination of diverse resources to understand. The author was careful in considering all possible resources and perspectives available within the parameters of this program. Thoroughness is essential to the vetting of resources because it allows the researcher to establish a wider base of references to compare and assess information gaps.

Interviews would have provided an additional, valuable set of perspectives based on questions tailored to the UW-specific thesis topic. This could have helped compensate for the lacking perspective on UW in most sources about active measures. Due to resource constraints this was not feasible for this research but the author recommends incorporating interviews into future research while many of the subject matter experts, Soviet defectors, and other key personnel are still accessible.

105 Ibid., 15.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

UW Foundation

By doctrine, and using the author’s established terminology, the key aim of UW is to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a terminus. Supporting objectives of UW include activities conducted to enable the efforts of a surrogate (ideally indigenous actors) in conflict with a terminus and/or to establish control over a specific territory and/or population.\(^{106}\)

By doctrine, the focus of UW is on applying sponsor capabilities indirectly through the surrogate typically comprising an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force. Surrogates organize within the general constructs of these interrelated elements based on their environment (urban, rural, or mixed), capabilities of the terminus, and their own organic capabilities. UW enablers may operate with or through all elements of the surrogate organization, or develop any missing elements to ensure the survivability and success of the organization. Additionally, enablers may execute UW activities with, through, or in support of a third party or a friendly nation-state.\(^{107}\)

UW is conducted in a denied area, where the terminus has the capacity and will to deny overt freedom of action to the surrogate. Supporting activities may be conducted in artificial, physical, or virtual safe havens within or outside the area of operation.\(^{108}\)

\(^{106}\) Department of the Army, ATP 3-05.1, 1-1.

\(^{107}\) Ibid.

\(^{108}\) Ibid.
**UW Requirements**

Under certain circumstances, UW may provide the only feasible option by which the sponsor can achieve strategic objectives—“whether those objectives are to influence, coerce, disrupt, or replace a governing authority; shape attitudes and influence the behavior of a relevant population, group, or individual; or counter an irregular threat.”\(^\text{109}\)

It leverages the use of surrogates in opposition to a national government or other governing authority in support of the sponsor’s national objectives.\(^\text{110}\)

The most critical prerequisite conditions to conduct a successful campaign include: (1) a basic compatibility of the surrogate’s objectives and those of the sponsor, (2) vulnerability of the terminus’s legitimacy, assets, infrastructure, and ability to control its population and territory, (3) viable surrogate leadership (ideally indigenous, not transplanted personnel), (4) willingness of the surrogate to partner with the sponsor, or a third party sponsor, and an environment suitable for UW.\(^\text{111}\)

**Ends, Ways, and Means of UW**

As discussed in chapter 3, the ends ways, and means of UW can be directly extracted from the adapted doctrinal definition: Activities conducted to enable a surrogate to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a terminus by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.

UW Ends = “coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a terminus”

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\(^{109}\) Ibid., 1-2.

\(^{110}\) Ibid.

\(^{111}\) Ibid.
UW Ways = “operating through or with”

UW Means = “underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area”

ATP 3-05.1 provides further examination of the components of UW, which help to understand these concepts more subjectively and comprehensively in support of comparative analysis with Soviet active measures.

Figure 2. Taxonomy of U.S. Unconventional Warfare

Source: Created by Author.
Figure 3. Taxonomy of Soviet Active Measures

Source: Created by Author.

Ends, Ways, and Means of Soviet Active Measures

Ends

U.S. Congressional Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Soviet Active Measures in July 1982 provide an abridged summary of the basic Soviet active measures objectives: to weaken the opponents of the USSR, and to create a favorable environment for advancing Moscow’s views and international objectives worldwide. The first objective is relatively straightforward, but the

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112 Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Soviet Active Measures, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., July 13 and 14, 1982, 3.
qualifications of a “favorable environment for advancing Moscow’s views and international objectives” are less obvious.\textsuperscript{113}

Further elaboration in the corresponding intelligence reports presented included the following seven goals: (1) To influence both world and American public opinion against U.S. military, economic, and political programs which are perceived as threatening Soviet objectives; (2) To demonstrate that the U.S. is an aggressive, “colonialist,” and “imperialist” power; (3) To isolate the U.S. from its allies and friends and discredit those that cooperate with it; (4) To demonstrate that the policies and goals of the U.S. are incompatible with the ambitions of the underdeveloped world; (5) To discredit and weaken U.S. intelligence efforts—particularly those of the CIA—and expose U.S. intelligence personnel; (6) To create a favorable environment for the execution of Soviet foreign policy; and (7) To undermine the political resolve of the U.S. and other Western states to protect their interests against Soviet encroachments.\textsuperscript{114}

Christopher Andrew and Oleg Godievsky, in their book \textit{Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985}, describe three main active measures priorities as described by L.F. Stoskov, First Deputy Head of Service A in 1985: (1) Attacking all aspects of U.S. policy, (2) Promoting tensions

\textsuperscript{113} Godson and Shultz, 10. Note: To provide a broader context, the following is Godson and Shultz’s explanation of broad Soviet policy objectives: (1) Preserve, enhance, and expand security in those areas under the influence of the USSR; (2) Divide the Western opponents of the Soviet Union by driving wedges between them and disrupting alliance systems; (3) Retain the primacy of the USSR in the communist world; (4) Promote “proletarian internationalism” and those “national liberation movements” which are under Communist control or serve Soviet interests; and (5) Minimize risks and avoid serious involvements on more than one front at any given time.

\textsuperscript{114} \textit{Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Soviet Active Measures}, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., July 13 and 14, 1982, 3.
between the U.S. and its NATO allies, (3) Finding ways to encourage Western peace movements to “concentrate their fire on the United States.”

Although Soviet active measures efforts were ongoing, their tactics and emphasis frequently varied as the threats and opportunities within the operating environment changed. The three basic extractions of active measures objectives presented above do not precisely mirror each other, but they demonstrate general trends: isolating, undermining, and weakening the adversary while advancing their own interests of extending global influence. In consideration of the doctrinal definition of UW, these themes seem reasonably aligned with “coercion” and “disruption.”

Ways

The U.S. Congressional Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Soviet Active Measures in July 1982 divided Soviet active measures methods into two basic categories: “‘Classic’ Active Measures” and “Political Influence Operations.” The following is a comprehensive summary of this taxonomy.

Classic Active Measures:

Press Placements

In open societies covert press placements by the Soviets and their surrogates were usually difficult to identify, but sometimes the topic of a particular article or news story

115 Andrew and Godievsky, *Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions*, 103.

116 *Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Soviet Active Measures*, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., July 13 and 14, 1982, 6.
could provide clues that the talking points were consistent with active measures objectives.117

Forgeries

Soviet forgeries were typically altered versions of original documents, composed to influence foreign governments, media, and public opinion in favor of Soviet interests. According to U.S. counterintelligence reports, “the number of forged documents known to have surfaced in foreign countries” doubled between 1975 and 1976 alone. One example of such forgery was the fabricated “U.S. Army Field Manual 30-31B,” which was “leaked” to media outlets in foreign countries as part of a concerted Soviet effort to delegitimize the U.S by linking it with terrorist groups. This document also accused the United States of plotting to infiltrate friendly and allied governments.118

Disinformation

Disinformation “denotes a variety of techniques and activities to purvey false or misleading information, including rumors, insinuation, and altered facts.”119 It differs from basic propaganda because it is designed to conceal the creator, whereas the source of propaganda is generally overt.

Disinformation is often used interchangeably with the term active measures, which is inaccurate. As discussed in chapter 2, this often seems due to a conceptual

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117 Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Soviet Active Measures, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., July 13 and 14, 1982, 6.

118 Ibid., 7.

119 Ibid., 8.
misunderstanding on the part of researchers, but sometimes also may be an attempt at oversimplification for the purpose of audience comprehension because its wording is more familiar.

Moscow’s overall messaging themes during this period generally characterized U.S. military and political policy as “the cause of most international conflict; to demonstrate that the United States is an aggressive, militaristic, and imperial power; and to isolate Washington from its allies and friends.”

Service A’s disinformation efforts seemed to have the most success in the Third World, where “it was able to tap a rich vein of anti-Americanism and anti-imperialism, combined with a receptiveness to conspiracy theories about the West.” Among these efforts, probably the most famous was the 1983 press coverage that the U.S. had “manufactured” the AIDS virus during genetic engineering experiments at Fort Detrick, Maryland, for eugenics purposes. (See figure 4, “The ‘U.S. Germ Warfare’ story, in print”. As Andrew describes, “the story was slow to take off. But from late 1985 onwards it swept the Third World as well as taking in some of the Western media. In the first six months of 1987 alone, the AIDS fabrication received major news coverage in over forty Third World countries.”

120 Godson and Shultz, 188.
121 Andrew and Godievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions, 103.
122 Ibid., 103.
According to Congressional records from 1982, the existing Soviet outlets in direct support of active measures efforts included:

1. The Soviet news agencies TASS and Novosti (APN)

2. Some elements of the Soviet press, such as the literary weekly Literaturnya Gazeta
3. Propaganda publications in foreign languages, including the foreign affairs weekly New Times (published in 10 languages)

4. Radio Moscow (international broadcasts in over 60 languages)

5. Radio Peace and Progress, “which allegedly represents Soviet mass organizations, is based in the Soviet Union, and uses the transmitters of Radio Moscow. Its purpose is to disseminate Soviet propaganda in foreign languages under the pretense of being ‘independent’ of the Soviet Government view.”\textsuperscript{123}

The CIA’s estimate for the overall Soviet spending in 1978 for propaganda and covert action was approximately $3 billion. A subsequent 1982 estimate raised the approximate annual figure to $4 billion.\textsuperscript{124} In 1978 the head of Clandestine Operations at the CIA cited the following estimates of annual Soviet expenditures for key foreign propaganda outlets during the latter years of the 1970s:

- TASS: $550 million
- Novosti: $500 million
- Pravda: $250 million
- New Times: $200 million
- Radio Moscow foreign service: $700 million\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{123} Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Soviet Active Measures, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., July 13 and 14, 1982, 5.

\textsuperscript{124} Godson and Shultz, 31.

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., 31.
Non-ruling Communist Parties

Dating back to the early Lenin years immediately following the Bolshevik Revolution, traditional active measures programs regularly used nonruling communist parties, international and local front organizations, and friendship societies to promote Soviet policies abroad. These organizations provided access in support of a variety of functions in the overall Soviet foreign policy scheme. By the 1980s there were more than 70 such parties in various degrees of interdependence with the CPSU apparatus, depending on the organizational strength, financial resources, and political maturity of the party concerned. The KGB played a significant function in serving as an intermediary between organizations, including for funding and communications purposes.

International and Local Front Organizations

The Soviets created and supported a wide range of major international front organizations to support foreign policy objectives abroad. Because they were not candid about promoting communist ideological objectives they were able to attract members from a broad political spectrum and proved more effectual than “admittedly pro-Soviet groups.”

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126 Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Sword and the Shield*, 63.

127 Ladislav Bittman, *The KGB and Soviet Disinformation* (New York: Pergamon Brassey’s, 1985), 44.

128 *Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Soviet Active Measures*, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., July 13 and 14, 1982, 8-9.

129 Ibid., 9-10.
According to Congressional reports, the four largest Soviet front organizations were: the World Peace Council, World Federation of Trade Unions, World Federation of Democratic Youth, Women’s International Democratic Federation.\textsuperscript{130} The effectiveness of the large well-established communist international front organizations waned when the “pro-Soviet bias on virtually every issue” became increasingly obvious to the public.\textsuperscript{131} In order to compensate for this hindrance and to take advantage of new opportunities as they presented themselves, the Soviets and supporting fraternal organizations began to make “greater use of ad hoc front groups . . . try to attract members from a broad cross section of the political spectrum . . . nevertheless dominated by pro-Soviet individuals and are covertly financed by the Soviet Union.”\textsuperscript{132}

Friendship Societies

Soviet “friendship societies” in target nations were used as a “bridge to people who may be reluctant to participate in organizations that are openly pro-Soviet or sponsored by the local communist parties,” and also provided a resource to the local KGB residency as a “spotting mechanism for potential active measures and espionage agents.”\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 9.

\textsuperscript{131} *Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Soviet Active Measures*, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., July 13 and 14, 1982, 10.

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.
Manipulation of Mass Organizations and Non-Communist Political Parties

Manipulation of mass organizations and non-communist political parties was considered “one of the most aggressive—and sometimes the most effective—of the techniques the Soviets use for active measures abroad.”\(^{134}\) Such efforts included the encouragement of anti-government or anti-U.S. protests and “demonstrations aimed at promoting or opposing any given cause, to work with labor and student organizations and efforts to protest and overthrow the democratically elected leadership of targeted organizations by subsidizing and supporting leftist or pro-Soviet forces or candidates, or even non-Communist political parties.”\(^{135}\)

The Vietnam Support Committee, a department of the Soviet-sponsored Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, helped to direct an anti-Vietnam War campaign on a worldwide basis. One of its initiatives included the use of U.S. military deserters for “international propaganda spectacles,” and complemented the WPC campaign in promoting popular opposition to U.S. involvement in Vietnam.\(^{136}\)

According to former KGB officer Stanislav Lunev, the GRU and KGB subsidized “just about every antiwar movement and organization in America and abroad. Funding was provided via undercover operatives or front organizations. These would fund another

\(^{134}\) Ibid., 10.

\(^{135}\) *Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Soviet Active Measures*, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., July 13 and 14, 1982, 10.

\(^{136}\) Godson and Shultz, 181-182.
group that in turn would fund student organizations.”\textsuperscript{137} He notes that the GRU and KGB also “had a larger budget for antiwar propaganda in the United States than it did for the economic and military support of the Vietnamese.” Funding the antiwar movement cost the GRU more than $1 billion.\textsuperscript{138} According to Lunev, the expenditure was considered “well worth the cost”:

\begin{quote}
The Vietnam War was considered a major GRU success. In fact, the GRU believes it won the war. The GRU funded every major antiwar group. Any antiwar activists who claim otherwise are sadly naïve. Of course the support often came through third parties or was otherwise disguised, but the Soviet Union pumped more than twice as much money into the antiwar campaign as it did to North Vietnamese military and economic support.\textsuperscript{139}
\end{quote}

The author would like to highlight that Andrew denies that the Soviets supported the anti-war effort: “Both Johnson and his successor, Richard Nixon, believed—wrongly—that an international Communist conspiracy lay behind American anti-war protest, particularly on university campuses.”\textsuperscript{140} Based on the understanding that the focus of Andrew’s research and resources was on KGB operations and not GRU operations (GRU being the main effort of Operation Ares, the Soviet anti-Vietnam mass-mobilization campaign), it is not surprising that this might be outside the scope of his knowledge. It is however, noteworthy that he would presume the non-existence of an operation simply on the basis of not having encountered any evidence of it himself. Many defector accounts, U.S. intelligence records, and U.S. Congressional documentation from

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\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
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\textsuperscript{139} Lunev, 170.
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\textsuperscript{140} Andrew and Mitrokhin, \textit{The World Was Going Our Way}, 12.
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decades prior challenge Andrew’s assertions. Still, he doesn’t refute the implications of
the U.S. defeat by Soviet-sponsored North Vietnamese surrogates:

The unprecedented humiliation of the United States at the end of a war which had
divided its society as no other conflict had done since the Civil War seemed to
demonstrate the ability of a Third World national liberation movement, inspired
by Marxist-Leninist ideology, to defeat even an imperialist superpower.141

Clandestine Radio Stations

Moscow never publicly acknowledged its sponsorship of National Voice of Iran
(NVOI) and Radio Ba Yi, but both were, according to U.S. intelligence reports,
clandestine broadcast stations supporting Soviet foreign policy goals.142 NVOI broadcasts
were “particularly inflammatory in the immediate aftermath of the seizure of the U.S.
Embassy in Tehran. The station broadcasts endorsed the actions of the militants in seizing
and holding the Embassy and its diplomatic personnel and encouraged other anti-U.S.
acts.”143

In 1978 the head of Clandestine Operations at the CIA estimated the annual
Soviet expenditures for key foreign broadcasting outlets during the latter years of the
1970s to be $700 million.144

Military Operations

According to U.S. intelligence reports, the emergence of “national liberation
movements” after World War II and Moscow’s “greater confidence in its own ability to

141 Ibid., 13.

142 Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Soviet
Active Measures, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., July 13 and 14, 1982, 10-11.

143 Ibid., 10-11.

144 Godson and Shultz, 31.
project power” yielded increasing Soviet involvement in both overt and covert military activities in the Third World. 145 After 1960, Cuba assumed an important role as a third party sponsor for advancing support from Moscow to emerging “liberation movements”. 146 The GRU played a major role in paramilitary training of third party sponsors and surrogates, and the KGB was also involved, mostly through funding and communications support. 147 Stanislav Lunev notes that the GRU was and remains one of the primary instructors of terrorists worldwide. The Communist Party Central Committee specifically authorized the GRU to train terrorists in order to further the USSR’s political goals and support its allies. After all, what could be better than to have other people commit terrorist actions that further your own goals? 148

Political Influence Operations

Political influence operations were arguably the most important but least understood aspect of Soviet active measures: “They are difficult to trace and to deal with because they fall in the gray area between a legitimate exchange of ideas and an active measures operation.” 149 They included exploitation of “agents of influence” and unwitting contacts in order to “insinuate the official voice of the Soviet Union into foreign governmental, political, journalistic, business, labor, artistic, and academic circles

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145 Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Soviet Active Measures, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., July 13 and 14, 1982, 11.

146 Ibid.

147 Ibid., 11-12.

148 Lunev, 80.

149 Godson and Shultz, 133.
in a non-attributable or at least seemingly unofficial matter.”\textsuperscript{150} KGB influence networks depended on developing strong personal relationships with political, economic, and media figures in the West and the Third World:\textsuperscript{151}

The main objective of an influence operation is the use of the agent’s position—be it in government, politics, labor, journalism, or some other field—to support and promote political conditions desired by the sponsoring foreign power. This operation is one element of a carefully orchestrated effort: “kombinatsia” = the skill of relating, linking, and combining various agents of influence (at various times in various places) with special operational undertakings, in such a way as to enhance effectiveness. The first phase entails development of strong covert personal relationships with important figures in foreign societies. Next step is to secure active collaboration of the individual on matters of mutual interest (money, assistance in achievement of political or personal goals).\textsuperscript{152}

Agents of Influence

The agent of influence aspect of active measures may have been the most complex and the least documented. Godson and Shultz note that “even skilled counterintelligence find it very difficult to follow and unravel orchestrated agent-of-influence operations.”\textsuperscript{153} An ideal agent of influence could be an established journalist, a government official, labor leader, academic, opinion leader, artist, or involved in one of a number of other professions—an authority with a credible reputation, whose opinions others would take “at face value.”\textsuperscript{154} The Soviets leveraged agents of influence as

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{152} Godson and Shultz, 133.

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., 132-133.

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., 133.
ideological contagion nodes to inculcate and spread beliefs favorable to Soviet interests, without clear evidence of attribution to Soviet instigation.

Use of Academicians

Soviet academicians (including some with high positions in the Soviet party and government hierarchy) were frequently used in political influence operations because their non-Soviet colleagues generally accepted them as credible counterparts.\textsuperscript{155} They frequently acted on the basis of instructions from interagency authorities for active measures even when expressing seemingly private or personal opinions.\textsuperscript{156} Academic conferences on current issues were an example of this aspect of agent of influence operations: “the Soviets take part in such a conference to influence its participants and the political line taken by the conference in directions favorable to Soviet policy interests.”\textsuperscript{157}

Use of the Media

Many KGB officers served abroad under “journalistic cover,” which was especially advantageous for influence purposes because these positions provided access to a “wider range of influential individuals than diplomats or other officials usually had.”\textsuperscript{158}

Ladislav Bittman, a former Czech intelligence officer, emphasized that news pieces produced in these cases did not underscore support for Soviet policy, but instead

\textsuperscript{155} Bezmenov and Griffin.

\textsuperscript{156} Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Soviet Active Measures, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., July 13 and 14, 1982, 13.

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.
concentrated on “undermining the United States and NATO, and on creating rifts between West Germany and France or between the United States and its allies.”

Oftentimes a KGB handler would provide guidelines for an agent of influence in the media to follow, typically “two or three pages outline of objectives and themes to be covered in a given article.” All agents, including journalists, were either wittingly or unwittingly used for intelligence collection purposes, as they often had access to strategically significant confidential information.

Lunev also summarized other political influence efforts through alternative channels, beginning in the early years of the Stalin regime:

Through my KGB and GRU contacts, I heard many stories of how Stalin and other leaders initiated many long-term efforts to undermine American society. Their main effort was to increase violence inside the United States, and their effort included paying selected Hollywood producers to produce violent and offensive films. The Soviet Union also provided financial support to the most aggressive and violent minority leaders. The Soviet Union always supported “agents of influence” who could either sway people to the Soviet point of view or cause general turmoil in the United States.

Phasing and Timing

Although the three-phase Maoist construct of how insurgencies mature (Latent/Incipient Phase, Guerilla Warfare, War of Movement) as described in ATP 3-05.1 could apply to the Soviet active measures progression, the KGB developed their own

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159 Godson and Shultz, 168.

160 Ibid., 169.

161 Ibid.

162 Lunev, 169-170.
four-phase campaign model, which they described as a “long-term brainwashing process”:\footnote{Bezmenov and Griffin.}

Demoralization (15-20 years)

The focus of the demoralization phase is on ideological conditioning: changing basic perceptions and logic of behavior. The estimated duration of this phase is based on how long it takes, on average, to educate one generation. Thus, reversal of demoralization would take at least another 15-20 years. In a 1984 interview, Bezmenov asserted that this phase of the Soviet active measures campaign was already complete in the U.S.\footnote{Ibid.}

Destabilization (2-5 years)

The destabilization phase focuses on adapting the economy, foreign relations, and defense systems to Soviet interests. Bezmenov emphasized the importance of exploiting organizations with the greatest credibility, influence, and reach: academia, the media, and activist movements, as catalysts to this phase; beyond this phase these groups would no longer be needed, and could even be harmful to the resistance movement.\footnote{Ibid.}

Crisis (up to six weeks)

The crisis phase consists of a violent change of power, structure, and economy.\footnote{Ibid.}
Normalization (indefinite)

Bezmenov described normalization as a “cynical expression borrowed from Soviet propaganda. When the Soviet tanks moved into Czechoslovakia in ’68, Comrade Brezhnev said, ‘Now the situation in brotherly Czechoslovakia is normalized’.”

Means

The Soviet active measures apparatus was comprised of, and depended upon, extensive whole-of-government coordination. (See figure 5: “Soviet Apparatus for Active Measures in the United States”). The Soviet active measures branch, Service A, fell under the KGB’s FCD and remained the main government component responsible for the overall management of active measures operations throughout the world.

All Soviet field agencies and representatives abroad were considered possible agents or entities to support or participate in active measures. These included:

1. Embassies
2. KGB residencies
3. Representatives of the International Department (engaged in liaison with selected foreign Communist parties and major pro-Soviet front organizations.
4. Specialized Soviet missions abroad (correspondents, scholars, students, Aeroflot and shipping representatives, etc.)
5. Soviet delegations visiting foreign countries.

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167 Ibid.

168 *Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Soviet Active Measures*, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., July 13 and 14, 1982, 5.

169 Ibid., 6.
KGB “illegals,” who also provided support to network development and aspects of actives measures objectives fell under three categories: (1) ‘Strategic’ illegals lived as “sleepers” in the target country, “usually running small businesses or following a profession but doing little or no operational work. They were intended to become active only in time of East-West conflict”; (2) Active illegals living abroad, “recruiting and running agents, gathering political and/or scientific and technological intelligence”; and (3) Illegals based in Moscow who regularly conducted “shorter-term trips abroad (usually between one and ten months) to perform specific operational tasks such as meeting an agent or carrying out a ‘false flag’ recruitment.”\(^{170}\)

\(^{170}\) Andrew and Godievsky, *Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions*, 57.
Use of a Third Party Sponsor

Historically, insurgencies do not succeed without “external support” from governments that share mutually beneficial interests.\(^{171}\) This typically includes moral or political support, resources (money, weapons, advisors, training), and safe haven (secure training sites, bases, protection from extradition).\(^{172}\)

\(^{171}\) Department of the Army, ATP 3-05.1, 2-5.

\(^{172}\) Ibid., 2-6.
One of the Soviet’s most vital partners in its active measures campaign was Cuba.\textsuperscript{173} As the first Cuban DGI (“Dirección General de Inteligencia”) officer to defect to the U.S. remarked, by the late 1960s “the Russians totally and absolutely controlled Cuban intelligence.”\textsuperscript{174} This gave the KGB direct access to DGI-developed diplomatic and radical group networks.\textsuperscript{175}

The Weather Underground, a U.S.-based radical communist organization, had developed a symbiotic attachment to DGI.\textsuperscript{176} As an FBI informant serving as a Weatherman infiltrator Larry Grathwohl described:

When the Cubans viewed the revolutionary struggle in the United States, they recognized the fact that the left as it existed in 1969 and 70 was not capable of overthrowing the government by itself. Consequently, they had hoped that the group itself would be able to attack the system from within and provide assistance to the international movement, the international communist revolution.\textsuperscript{177}

Andrew describes the importance of Cuba as a third party sponsor after the decline of ideological support within the U.S. for the Soviet system and ideology:

Just as some of the Old Left of the 1930s, seduced by the myth-image of the Soviet Union as the world’s first worker-peasant state, had been blind to the savage reality of Stalin’s Russia, so a generation later many of the New Left of the 1960s shut their eyes to the increasingly authoritarian (though much less homicidal) nature of Castro’s rule and his sometimes brutal disregard of basic human rights. The heroic image of Castro as a revolutionary David in battle...
fatigues blockaded on his island by the Goliath of American imperialism had a
global appeal exploited by Soviet as well as Cuban propagandists.\textsuperscript{178}

Andrew continues, describing an important opportunity that Soviet intelligence
and their Cuban counterparts identified and were able to effectively leverage for over a
decade:

Among Castro’s most naively enthusiastic Western supporters were the
Americans of the Venceremos (“We Shall Overcome”) Brigade, who from 1969
onwards came to cut sugar cane in Cuba and show their solidarity with the Cuban
Revolution. Castro paid public tribute to the courage of the \textit{brigadistas} in
“defying the ire of the imperialists.”\textsuperscript{179}

In the late 1960s and 1970s, hundreds of young Americans eluded U.S. travel
restrictions and visited Cuba in waves to “experience the Cuban Revolution first-
hand.”\textsuperscript{180} The majority of their hosts and tour guides were DGI operatives, who seized
critical opportunities through the use of the Venceremos Brigades to provide a cover for
the Weathermen to get more young American radicals to Cuba for training.\textsuperscript{181} A former
DGI officer describes this program as an operational priority. “Every time that a
Venceremos Brigade contingent arrived in Cuba, all the operational \textit{[sic]} of the DGI had
to drop what they were doing and go to work on the Venceremos Brigade. We had to
investigate, collect backgrounds, to see who could be recruited, what information could

\textsuperscript{178} Andrew and Mitrokhin, \textit{The World Was Going Our Way}, 55.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid., 55.
\textsuperscript{180} National Archives and Records Administration, \textit{KGB Connections}.
\textsuperscript{181} Ibid.
be obtained.”¹⁸² (With respect to the actual sugarcane harvesting, the Cubans remarked that the Americans were “useless”.)¹⁸³

![Image](image_url)

Figure 6. Aspiring American revolutionaries in training

*Source: The Weather Underground, directed by Sam Green and Bill Siegel, DVD, Free History Project, 2002.*

According to Grathwohl, the Weathermen were unaware that they were being used by the Soviets through their Cuban sponsors.¹⁸⁴ They viewed the Cubans, not the

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¹⁸² National Archives and Records Administration, *KGB Connections.*

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.
Russians, as “the vanguard of the international communist revolution.”\textsuperscript{185} This is an important distinction that underscores the importance of leveraging a third party sponsor to overcome the recruiting setbacks the Soviets had experienced throughout this period.

Despite DGI complaints to the KGB that many of the New Left “brigadistas” were “homosexuals and drug addicts,” the “brigadistas” proved a “valuable source of U.S. identity documents for use in illegal intelligence operations” were also considered an invaluable anti-U.S. propaganda asset.\textsuperscript{186} But perhaps more importantly, the “brigadistas” provided a pool of candidates from which the Weathermen were able to train and possibly recruit members to conduct Cuban-sponsored paramilitary activities in the U.S.

DGI drove the Weathermen’s four-day “days of rage” attack (October 1969) on the City of Chicago and its police department, among thousands of other well-orchestrated, violent initiatives.\textsuperscript{187}

\textsuperscript{185} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{186} Andrew and Mitrokhin, \textit{The World Was Going Our Way}, 56.

\textsuperscript{187} LibertyInOurTime, “The Subversion Factor 1.”
Figure 7. Weather Underground “Bomb Factory” Explosion (New York City)


Bittman mentions the network of Cuban support for Weathermen operations that existed in the U.S.:

The American Weathermen, for example, received regular instructions from Cuban intelligence in the early 1970s through one of its officers attached to Cuba’s mission to the United Nations, and the Cuban mission was for some time a contact point for the Weathermen members.188

Grathwohl further elaborated on the collusions of the Weather Underground, which echoed a common normalization process realized in most communist takeovers:

188 Bittman, 29.
I brought up the subject of what’s going to happen after we take over the [U.S.] government. You know, we become responsible for administrating 250 million people. And there was no answer. No one had given any thought to economics. How are you going to clothe and feed these people? The only thing that I could get was that they expected that the Cubans, the North Vietnamese, the Chinese and the Russians would all want to occupy different portions of the United States. They also believed that their immediate responsibility would be to protect against what they called the counter-revolution. And they felt that this counter-revolution could best be guarded against by creating and establishing re-education in the Southwest where we would take all of the people who needed to be re-educated into the new way of thinking and teach them how things were going to be. I asked, “Well, what is going to happen to those people that we can’t re-educate, that are die-hard capitalists?” And the reply was that they’d have to be eliminated and when I pursued this further, they estimated that they’d have to eliminate 25 million people in these re-education centers. And when I say eliminate, I mean kill 25 million people. I want you to imagine sitting in a room with 25 people, most of whom have graduate degrees from Columbia and other well-known educational centers, and hear them figuring out the logistics for the elimination of 25 million people. And they were dead serious.189

However, the most significant efforts DGI conducted against the U.S. were not on North American soil–but instead in support of revolutionary movements throughout Central and South America hostile to the U.S. Financed by the Cubans, one by one, left-wing dictatorships replaced right-wing dictatorships.190 The Cubans have been known to carry out extensive active measures “on their own initiative and for their own specific purposes,” but they also performed an important particular role as third party sponsors in support of Soviet objectives.191


190 LibertyInOurTime, “The Subversion Factor 1.”

191 Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Soviet Active Measures, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., July 13 and 14, 1982, 5.
Impact and effectiveness

The size and growth of active measures resources, personnel, and operations from 1959-1989 strongly suggest that Moscow viewed this component of strategy as paramount. In addressing the question of active measures’ effectiveness, Godson and Shultz quote Bittman’s assessment:

Look at Soviet influence and presence in the world in 1980 as compared with 1955. Furthermore, my own study of Soviet military disinformation, economic games, use of refugee operations (recently Cubans), and influence operations leads me to the conclusion that these measures have played an important part in the overall Soviet effort directed against the United States and NATO.192

U.S. intelligence reports cautioned against deductions about correlation versus causation of some less-understood effects:

In their conduct of active measures abroad, the Soviets tend to capitalize on and manipulate existing sentiments that are parallel to or promote Soviet foreign policy objectives. Whenever a political movement supports policies that coincide with the goals or objectives of Soviet foreign policy, the exact contribution of Soviet active measures to that movement is difficult to determine objectively.193

At the same time, conclusions from U.S. intelligence assert that the overall effectiveness of active measures “is shown by indirect evidence”:

The fact that the Soviet leadership continues to use active measures on a large scale and apparently funds them generously suggests a positive assessment of their value as a foreign policy instrument. . . . techniques are effective in varying degrees, but, because they occur in tandem with other Soviet activities, it is difficult to judge the degree of effectiveness of any one of the available techniques in the abstract. . . . What we have seen indicates that Soviet active measures are conducted on a worldwide scale, are well integrated with other Soviet foreign policy actions, and appear frequently to be effective.194

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192 Godson and Shultz, 174.

193 Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Soviet Active Measures, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., July 13 and 14, 1982, 19.

194 Ibid., 19.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

Do active measures fit the definition of UW?

As discussed in chapter 3, in accordance with current U.S. doctrine, there are two fundamental criteria for an operation or campaign to be considered UW:

1. It is conducted through or with members of a resistance movement or insurgency.

2. It is conducted with the goal of coercing, disrupting or overthrowing a government or occupying power.\(^{195}\)

In order to establish whether Soviet active measures fit the current U.S. doctrinal definition of UW, the author must determine whether or not the strategic campaign examined within the scope of this investigation meet both these criteria.

The author believes it is reasonable to conclude from the evidence presented in this research that the Soviet active measures campaign against the U.S. from 1959-1989 fit the current U.S. doctrinal definition of UW.

The KGB and other supporting active measures proponents conducted active measures through and with a resistance movement. The Soviets relied heavily on influencing and mobilizing relevant populations to meet operational objective, both within the U.S. and elsewhere. The use of Cuba as a third party sponsor demonstrates the

\(^{195}\) “UW Planning Considerations.”
necessity of rapid adaptation to overcome potential obstacles to building and maintaining their networks within an accommodating human terrain.

Though the three basic lists of active measures objectives presented in chapter 4 do not precisely mirror the doctrinal “ends” of UW, they demonstrate general trends: isolating, undermining, and weakening the adversary while advancing their own interests of extending global influence. In consideration of the doctrinal definition of UW, these themes seem reasonably aligned with the criteria “coercion” and “disruption.”

From a ways perspective, it is also valuable to note, when comparing the U.S. UW and Soviet active measures taxonomies (see figures 1 and 2), every basic UW activity listed can also be found throughout the active measures activities in the works cited.

In comparing U.S. UW doctrine to Soviet active measures, clearly there are some key differences between these two approaches to IW. Some of these differences are evident in an examination of active measures’ strengths and weaknesses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Strengths vs. Weaknesses of Soviet Active Measures</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>STRENGTHS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of restraints</td>
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<tr>
<td>Command and control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Audacity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vulnerability of open societies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of colonial (“imperialist”) stigma</td>
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<tr>
<td>Common cause in the “workers movement”</td>
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<td>Assistance from satellite intelligence services</td>
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</table>

*Source: Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Soviet Active Measures, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., July 13 and 14 1982, 18-19.*
Recommendations for Future Research

Recommendations for future research include expanding the scope and depth of investigation. This deserves a more thorough evaluation of the parameters of this thesis program can accommodate.

It would also be of exceptional value to conduct interviews with knowledgeable sources (e.g. KGB defectors and former U.S. operatives) and focus on addressing the most relevant issues to the current concerns of national security strategy and long lasting design UW campaigns (covering the strategic, operational, and tactical levels).

Suggested Topics for Further Research

1. The leveraging of CPUSA and agents of influence throughout the early Stalin years through the beginning of the “Great Purge” in 1936. These operations and supporting networks are said to have been exceptionally effective, but documented accounts from preliminary sources may be scarce.

2. The role of Cuba as a third party sponsor in piloting leftist revolutionary movements throughout Latin America. This would include examining the strategic significance of Grenada, Puerto Rico, Venezuela, Panama, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Argentina, Paraguay, Peru, and Colombia (among others) from the Soviet perspective. It would also include an in-depth analysis of surrogate organizations such as FARC, ELN, FALN, and “Sendero Luminoso” (“Shining Path”), as well as linkages to relevant DGI-sponsored movements in North America, such as the Black Panther Party, Black Liberation Army, and the FLQ.

3. The role of Cuba as a third party sponsor in the active measures demoralization process. Two recurring themes in relevant U.S. intelligence reports were the use of agents
of influence in promoting agitation within the Black community and catalyzing the emergence of a drug abuse culture in the U.S.

4. The role of GRU and Spetsnaz in the historical and contemporary capacity development of both state and non-state terrorist sponsors and actors.

5. A comprehensive analysis of DGI-sponsored U.S. radical and/or terrorist groups such as Students for a Democratic Society, Venceremos Brigade, and Weathermen. It would be valuable to examine these organizations from a social movement perspective, especially as a relatively complex network model. Both their successes (such as the mass mobilization efforts that contributed to the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam) and their failures (such as their struggle to recruit effective operatives and the counter-productive employment of orchestrated violence) underscore significant considerations for UW campaign design.


7. Implementation of active measures by other state actors, to include China and Iran, and non-state actors, such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Hezbollah, and Daesh (“ISIS”).

8. Further investigation of effective means to identify and counter active measures, especially from the perspective of the U.S. and its NATO allies.
Author’s Final Commentary

Moscow has always approached active measures from a remarkably patient, long-term perspective.\textsuperscript{196} They do not necessarily seek immediate gains and are not looking for a major impact from every effort; their focus is in shaping cumulative effects.\textsuperscript{197}

An equally long-term strategy is needed to expose active measures with as much credibility as possible.\textsuperscript{198} As former Under Secretary of State Eagleburger wrote, “sunlight is the best antiseptic.”\textsuperscript{199} When governments become aware of active measures or disinformation operations directed against them, they must address these issues publicly and directly.\textsuperscript{200}

Soviet active measures are a timely research topic of strategic importance with long-term national strategic implications. It is a common misconception that because the Cold War ended, and because the Soviet Union collapsed but the U.S. did not, that Russia is no longer a threat, and the KGB (FSV) subversion campaigns are no longer effective or relevant. This is a precariously incorrect assumption.

The study of active measures provides valuable case studies of both failures and successes to consider in future U.S. UW campaign design.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{196} Dennis Kux, “Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation,” \textit{Parameters} 15, no. 4 (2013): 27.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{197} Ibid.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{198} Ibid.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{199} Ibid.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{200} Ibid.}
Additionally, gaining a greater understanding of these philosophies and strategies helps USG, and its allies and partners, to better develop a collective awareness and defense posture against similar threats in the future.
GLOSSARY

Active Measures. A protracted whole-of-government approach to undermine, isolate, and incapacitate an adversary through influencing and mobilizing relevant populations in order to prepare the environment for decisive military action. (Author’s definition).

Agent of Influence. Soviet term for a person who uses his or her position, influence, power, and credibility to promote the objectives of a foreign power in ways unattributable to that power. Influence operations may be carried out by controlled agents, “trusted contacts,” and unwitting but manipulated individuals. (Godson and Shultz)

Auxiliary. For the purpose of unconventional warfare, the support element of the irregular organization whose organization and operations are clandestine in nature and whose members do not openly indicate their sympathy or involvement with the irregular movement. (ADRP 3-05)

Cache. A source of subsistence and supplies, typically containing items such as food, water, medical items, and/or communications equipment, packaged to prevent damage from exposure and hidden in isolated locations by such methods as burial, concealment, and/or submersion, to support isolated personnel. (JP 3-50)

Campaign. A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)

Clandestine Operation. An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of identity of the sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities. (JP 3-05.1)

Coerce. To compel, by means of force or intimidation, action by an unwilling actor. (Author’s definition.)

Comintern. Communist International, also known as Third Communist International. Soviet-sponsored organization that advocated world communism. Dissolved in 1943. (Golitsyn)

Compartmentation. The principle of controlling access to sensitive information so that it is available only to those individuals or organizational components with an official “need-to-know” and only to the extent required for the performance of assigned responsibilities. (Reagan)
Controlled Agent. Soviet term for a person who is recruited and advances the interest of a foreign power in response to specific orders. (Godson and Shultz)

Counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorists activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02)

Covert Operation. An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. (JP 3-05)

Covert Action. Activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly. Covert action does not include activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational security of United States Government programs, or administrative activities. (Section 503e, National Security Act of 1947 [50 USC §413b]). (Reagan)

Crisis. The third phase (up to 6 weeks) of the Soviet active measures subversion model. A violent change of power, structure, and economy that transitions the destabilization process to long-term normalization under a new regime. (Author’s definition.)

Demoralization. The first phase (15-20 years) of the Soviet active measures subversion model. The gradual process of ideological conditioning through changing basic perceptions and logic of behavior to shape the environment for permissive adaptation to paradigm change. (Author’s definition.)

Denied Area. An area under enemy or unfriendly control in which friendly forces cannot expect to operate successfully within existing operational constraints and force capabilities. (JP 1-02)

Destabilization. The second phase (2-5 years) of the Soviet active measures subversion model. Through the leverage of media, academia, and activist movements, terminus economy, foreign policy, and defense systems become adapted to sponsor interests. (Author’s definition.)

Disinformation. Information disseminated primarily by intelligence organizations or other covert agencies designed to distort information or deceive or influence U.S. decision makers, U.S. forces, coalition allies, key actors, or individuals via indirect or unconventional means. (FM 3-13)

Disrupt. To interrupt or destroy the status quo of a terminus through imposing disorder or turmoil. (Author’s definition.)
GRU. *(Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye).* Chief Intelligence Administration, the Soviet military intelligence service.

General War. Armed conflict between major powers in which the total resources of the belligerents are employed, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy. *(JP 1-02)*

Guerrilla. A combat participant in guerrilla warfare. An irregular, usually indigenous, actor that conducts paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory. *(TC 18-01)*

Guerrilla Warfare. Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. *(FM 1-02)*

Indigenous. Native, originating in, or intrinsic to an area or region. *(FM 3-05.20)*

Inform and Influence Activities. The integration of designated information-related capabilities in order to synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform United States and global audiences, influence foreign audiences, and affect adversary and enemy decision-making. *(ADRP 3-0)*

Information Operations. The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. *(JP 1-02)*

Intelligence Operations. The variety of intelligence and counterintelligence tasks that are carried out by various intelligence organizations and activities within the intelligence process. *(JP 2-01)*

Illegal Resident. *(Also: “Illegal”)* Intelligence representative operating abroad under nonofficial cover. *(Golitsyn)*

Interagency Coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged U.S. Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. *(JP 1-02)*

Insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. *(JP-3-05)*

Irregular Warfare. A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Also called IW. *(JP 1-02)*

KGB. *(Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopastnosti).* Committee of State Security, the Soviet foreign intelligence and internal security service, created in 1954.
Normalization. The fourth phase (indefinite duration) of the Soviet active measures subversion model. Establishment of new conditions and paradigms that succeed a crisis-induced regime change. (Author’s definition.)

Novosti. Soviet press agency, abbreviated as APN (Golitsyn)

Operation. A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1-02)

Operational Environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

Overt. Activities that are openly acknowledged by or are readily attributable to the United States Government, including those designated to acquire information through legal and open means without concealment. Overt information may be collected by observation, elicitation, or from knowledgeable human sources. (JP 1-02)

Overthrow. To forcibly remove a terminus from a position of power and influence. (Author’s definition.)

Paramilitary Forces. Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JP 1-02)

Permissive Environment. Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. (Upon approval of the JP 3-0 revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

Politburo. (Politicheskoye Byuro). Political Bureau. The leading organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Renamed the Presidium before Stalin’s death; reverted to Politburo under Brezhnev. (Golitsyn)

Preparation of the Environment. An umbrella term for operations and activities conducted by selectively trained special operations forces to develop an environment for potential future special operations. (JP 3-05)

Pravda. Daily newspaper, organ of the CPSU (Golitsyn) (means “truth” in Russian)

Residency. KGB secret intelligence apparatus in a non-communist country. The KGB itself uses the term Rezidentura. (Golitsyn)

Resident. Chief of KGB intelligence apparatus in a noncommunist country. The KGB term is Rezident. (Golitsyn)
Resistance Movement. An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability. (JP 1-02)

Revolution. The overthrow or renunciation of a government or ruler with a subsequent change of regime.

Sabotage. An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to inure or destroy, any national defense or war materiel, premises, or utilities, to include human an natural resources. (TC 18-01)

Shadow Government. Governmental elements and activities performed by the irregular organization that will eventually take the place of the existing government. Members of the shadow government can be in any element of the irregular organization (underground, auxiliary, or guerillas). (TC 18-01)

Special Operations. Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. (FM 1-02)

Special Operations Forces. Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 1-02)

Special Warfare. The execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment. (JP 3-24)

Spetsnaz. A Russian umbrella term in for special forces. In this thesis, this term refers specifically to the special military units under GRU.

Sponsor. The actor (i.e. government, occupying power) orchestrating and sponsoring the UW operation. (Author’s definition.)

Strategic Communication. Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (JP 5-0)

Subversion. Actions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing authority. (JP 1-02)
Subversive Political Action. A planned series of activities designed to accomplish political objectives by influencing, dominating, or displacing individuals or groups who are so placed as to affect the decisions and actions of another government. (JP 1-02)

Support to Insurgency. Support provided to an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

Surrogate. The auxiliary, underground, public, and/or guerrilla force through which the sponsor executes the UW operation. (Author’s definition).

Terminus. The target government or occupying power of the UW operation; the actor that the sponsor seeks to coerce, disrupt, and/or overthrow by means of the surrogate, and possibly a third-party, element. (Author’s definition).

Terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)

Third Party Sponsor. A partner government or occupying power that serves as a buffer between the sponsor and the surrogate in order to conceal the identity of, or permit plausible denial, by the sponsor. A third-party directly enables, facilitates, advises, and supports surrogate efforts. Such employment is historically evident in Soviet active measures, especially through the use of Cuba. (Author’s definition).

Trusted Contact. A Soviet term used to describe a person who may or may not be a formally recruited, paid, or controlled agent but who wittingly uses his/her influence to advance Soviet interests. (Hoffman)

Unconventional Warfare. Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. Also called UW. (JP 3-05)

Underground. A cellular covert element within unconventional warfare that is compartmented and conducts covert or clandestine activities in areas normally denied to the auxiliary and the guerrilla force. (ADRP 3-05)

Wet Affairs. A Soviet term for assassination and terror operations. Often used interchangeably with the terms “Wet Operations” and “Wet Work.” (Reagan)
APPENDIX A

SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES TAXONOMY

**ACTIVE MEASURES DEFINITION:** A protracted whole-of-government approach to undermine, isolate, and incapacitate an adversary through influencing and mobilizing relevant populations in order to prepare the environment for decisive military action.

(Source: Created by Author)

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**SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES TAXONOMY**

**ACTIVE MEASURES**

*CLASSIC* ACTIVE MEASURES

- DISINFORMATION
  - PRESS PLACEMENTS
  - FORGERIES
  - CLANDESTINE RADIO STATIONS

- FRONTS
  - FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS
  - FRIENDSHIP SOCIETIES
  - MASS ORGANIZATION

- MILITARY OPERATIONS
  - SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY/RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS
  - "WET OPERATIONS"

**POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS**

- AGENTS OF INFLUENCE
  - MEDIA
  - ACADEMIA
  - POLITICIANS

- AD HOC ACTIVITIES
  - DECEPTION
  - BLACKMAIL
  - INTIMIDATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGENT CATEGORIES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Unwitting Manipulated Individual</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. &quot;Trusted Contact&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Controlled Covert Agent</td>
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**PHASING AND TIMING**

**PHASE I** DEMORALIZATION

- 15 - 20 YEARS
- Ideological conditioning
- Change basic perceptions; logic of behavior
- Estimated duration based on education cycle of one generation

**PHASE II** DESTABILIZATION

- 2 - 5 YEARS
- Adapt economy, foreign policy, defense to Soviet interests
- Leverage media, academia, activist movements

**PHASE III** CRISIS

- < 6 WEEKS
- Violent change of power, structure, and economy

**PHASE IV** NORMALIZATION

- INDEFINITE
- New paradigms established
APPENDIX B

U.S. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE DOCTRINAL TAXONOMY

**UW DEFINITION:** Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.
(Source: ATP 3-05.1)

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**UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE (UW) DOCTRINAL TAXONOMY**

- **OVERT ACTIVITIES**
  - DIPLOMATIC
  - INFORMATION
  - MILITARY

- **CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES**
  - MAIN EFFORT
    - SUBVERSION
    - GUERRILLA WARFARE
  - SHAPING ACTIVITIES
    - INFORMATION OPERATIONS
    - MANIPULATION OF CROWDS, RIOTS, DEMONSTRATIONS
    - SABOTAGE
  - SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES
    - INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
    - PREPARATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT

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**PHASING AND TIMING**

- **PHASE I**
  - PREPARATION
  - Ensure resistance and population ready to conduct/support UW

- **PHASE II**
  - INITIAL CONTACT
  - Establish contact with resistance to assess compatibility

- **PHASE III**
  - INFILTRATION
  - Conduct link-up with resistance to confirm compatibility

- **PHASE IV**
  - ORGANIZATION
  - Develop plan for expanded operations

- **PHASE V**
  - BUILD UP
  - Develop clandestine supporting infrastructure

- **PHASE VI**
  - EMPLOYMENT
  - Initiate offensive operations to achieve desired effects

- **PHASE VII**
  - TRANSITION
  - Conduct UW until mission objectives achieved
BIBLIOGRAPHY


