

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

AD891312

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

FROM:

Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors;
Administrative/Operational Use; AUG 1971. Other requests shall be referred to Air Force Inst of Tech., Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433.

AUTHORITY

AFIT ltr 23 Nov 1973

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Technical Information Service**

AD-891 312

**MILITARY UNIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF UNIONI-
ZATION IN NORWAY AND GERMANY AS IT
RELATES TO THE UNITED STATES**

R. V. Grabler

August 1971

AD 891312

MILITARY UNIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF
UNIONIZATION IN NORWAY AND GERMANY
AS IT RELATES TO THE UNITED STATES

Major Ronald V. Grabler

SLSR-17-71B

Reproduced by
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
US Department of Commerce
Springfield, VA. 22151

PRICES SUBJECT TO CHANGE

MILITARY UNIONS:

AN ANALYSIS OF UNIONIZATION IN NORWAY AND
GERMANY AS IT RELATES TO THE UNITED STATES

A Thesis

Presented to the Faculty of the School of Systems and Logistics
of the Air Force Institute of Technology

Air University

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Science in Logistics Management

by

C.1

Ronald V. Grabler, B.S.
Major. USAF

August 1971

This document is subject to special export controls and each transmittal to foreign governments or foreign nationals may be made only with prior approval of the Dean, School of Systems and Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45433.


This thesis, written by

Major Ronald V. Grabler

Has been approved by the undersigned on behalf of the faculty
of the School of Systems and Logistics in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT

Date: 12 August 1971



Research Chairman

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Grateful appreciation is extended to Captain Asbjorn K. Stein of the Royal Norwegian Air Force who patiently explained the functions and organization of BEFALETS FELLEES ORGANISASJON, the Norwegian military union. His translation of both historical and current information contributed greatly to the completion of this research.

The service of Dr. Joseph W. Stock, in the translation of documents received from the German Embassy, was a greatly appreciated contribution that lent much to understanding current problems within West Germany.

Special appreciation is rendered to Lt. Colonel J. L. Quinn for his initial submission of the topic, his guidance, professional knowledge and constructive criticism during the development of the paper. His thorough reading and critique of the drafts and final paper was of great assistance.

Of course, special thanks must go to Mrs. Nancy Boggs, for her constant availability and reliability in typing both drafts and the final manuscript.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
1. INTRODUCTION	1
Problem Statement	1
Definition	1
Introduction	2
Scope	5
Objective	5
Research Questions	6
Research Methodology	7
Application of Data	8
Relation of Analysis to Research Questions	9
2. NORWEGIAN DEVELOPMENT	10
B.F.O.'s History	11
B.F.O.'s Limitations	14
B.F.O.'s Functions	16
Summary	17
3. GERMAN DEVELOPMENT	18
Development of the Bundeswehr	19
Background	19
Civilianization of the Force	21
Leadership Training	23
The Ombudsman	24
The O.T.V. and the Bundeswehr	25

Chapter	Page
Functions of the O.T.V.	26
Limitations of the O.T.V.	28
Summary	29
4. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES	31
Advantages in General	31
Wages	31
Benefits	32
Pension plans	32
Insurance and disability compensation . .	33
Prestige	33
Grievances	35
The Manager	36
Advantages	36
Disadvantages	37
The Union Member	38
Advantages	38
Disadvantages	39
Communication	39
The Manager	40
Advantages	40
Disadvantages	41
The Union Member	42
Advantages	42
Disadvantages	43
Discipline	43

Chapter	Page
Summary	44
5. LIMITATIONS	46
Limitations for a U.S. Military Union	47
Strikes	47
Peacetime Representation	49
Political Neutrality	50
Social Benefits	51
Noninterference	51
Summary	51
6. CONCLUSIONS	53
Findings	53
Conclusion	54
Recommendations	57
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	58

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

It is not known at this time if a military labor union could exist within the United States military organization. The existence of a military labor union within the United States could become a reality with the advent of an all volunteer armed force. At this time it is not known what the likelihood of such an event might be, or what impact unions would have upon the functioning of the United States military forces. In light of this situation, the advantages and disadvantages of a union within a military environment should be studied.

Definition

The definition of a labor union that was addressed in this paper has been; "an association of military persons, officer and enlisted, organized for the purpose of collective bargaining about their conditions of employment, wages, and benefits." This broad definition precludes the consideration of smaller trade unions within the military, but provides the concept of one large organization to represent the combined military force.

Introduction

The history of unionism within the United States can be traced back prior to the Declaration of Independence, to the early organization of printers, cobblers, and carpenters who formed local craft unions and benevolent societies. Although these early groups did not have the characteristics of modern labor unions, they did bring workers together to devise solutions to mutual problems. These craft unions were truly local in nature and did not have the support of all members of the trade. Growth at the local level continued until 1834 when an effort was made to federate local unions into a national trade union organization.¹

Union growth in the public sector has been more recent. Unions of public employees were first organized in the post office in the 1890s and were recognized by Congress in 1912.² Other public employees such as teachers, firemen and federal clerical employees have national organizations. The growth of unionism within the area of federal government employees has been slower. It is likely that many areas, such as hours and wages are already provided for by laws, and need not be bargained for collectively.

The enactment of the Wagner Act in 1935 was the introduction to collective bargaining in the private sector as

¹Selig Perlman (and others), "Labour (Trade) Union," Encyclopaedia Britannica, (1967), XIII, p. 555.

²Leonard D. White, "Civil Service," Encyclopaedia Britannica, (1967), V, p. 846.

we know it today.³ It has a history of three and a half decades. With the Wagner Act, passed for the benefit of private sector employees, little had been done at that time for public employees. In a 1965 Air Force Judge Advocate General Law Review, it had been argued that the rights enjoyed by private employees were simply not applicable to public employees.⁴ Since the primary basis of any government is permanence and continuity, then of necessity, the right to strike must be withheld from government employees. This restriction, of course, would preclude this group from being able to bargain effectively through a means of withholding their work or services. Bearing this in mind it would appear difficult to have an organization of public employees that had the right to strike, especially if this organization was extended to the military services.

Logically, for organizing government employees, the line is drawn at the military. Not only is discipline crucial to the function of the military, but to allow a member of the armed forces to strike would most certainly dilute our national security.

Ample precedents for the unionization of military personnel have been established in other countries.

³Robert D. Leiter, Labor Economics and Industrial Relations, (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1960), p. 212.

⁴Daniel P. Sullivan, "Soldiers in Unions—Protected First Amendment Right?", Labor Law Journal, 20:581, September 1969.

Labor organization of military personnel has occurred in West Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and in Austria.⁵ On the other hand, an attempt toward unionization by the Transport and General Workers Union in Great Britain, was turned down by the Minister of Defense in November 1969.⁶ A similar attempt at organization of the Canadian Armed Forces and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police was thwarted by the Canadian Government in late 1970.⁷

The attempts toward military unionization within the United States have been minimal and rather less than a success as evidenced by a futile organization attempt at Fort Sill, Oklahoma in 1968.⁸ First of all, an established union did not originate the plan, rather it was attempted by twenty young enlisted men. Organized labor showed no interest at all. The AFL-CIO felt that no employer-employee relationship existed.⁹ In contrast to viable European unions, some groups of servicemen have banded together to demand things additional to improvements in hours, wages, and other terms of employment. As an example, demands included the right to refuse an illegal order; abolition of the salute and election of officers.¹⁰ It was also against wars.¹¹

⁵The New York Times, August 26, 1966, p. 8, col. 4.

⁶The Times, (London), November 25, 1969, p. 2, col. a.

⁷The Guardian, Wright State University, January 7, 1971, p. 6, col. 1.

⁸R. Christgau, Esquire, 70:41, August, 1968.

⁹Ibid. ¹⁰Ibid. ¹¹Ibid.

With these militarily unrealistic demands, it is little wonder that the unionization attempt was futile. Possibly with more realistic demands, it might have met with some success as have many unions in the public sector.

Considering the existence of military unions in Norway and West Germany and rejected attempts in Canada, England and the United States, it seems clear that as a practical matter, unionization of the military is possible. A co-existence would have to be based upon reasonable and limited demands, and in so doing would not curtail national security or military discipline.

Scope

This research paper has been limited to a descriptive analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of a military union within the armed forces of the United States. Peripheral descriptions of military unions operating within Norway and West Germany have been provided as background information. The limitations imposed upon those unions are analyzed with regard to the same type limitations being imposed upon a military union organization within the United States.

Objective

With the possibility of an all volunteer military force being formed sometime in the future, the necessity of a military union with limited powers may be a very real

requirement. Certain advantages and disadvantages to both the military manager and the military member may be accrued. A discussion of these advantages and disadvantages is the first objective of this paper.

The second objective is to look at limitations that are common to existing unions in other countries, with emphasis on the organizations within Norway and West Germany.. Limitations would be a very real requirement, of which the obvious one is the right to strike. A strike within the military would be not only disruptive to morale and obedience, but would be treasonable and an impairment to national security.

With a discussion of the bounds within which a military union could operate, the author hopes this paper will have laid a foundation for further research.

Research Questions

To accomplish the objectives of this research project, the following questions were addressed:

1. What would be the advantages and disadvantages of a military labor union to a military member?
2. What would be the advantages and disadvantages of a military labor union to a military manager?*

*The definition of a manager that was used for the second question is, any officer or non-commissioned officer that is charged with the responsibility to supervise others, in the fulfillment of a continuing task, e.g., an office manager or squadron commander. A supervisor of a cleanup detail would not be considered a manager in this context.

3. What limitations should be imposed upon a military union?

Research Methodology

The primary approach has been to accumulate background information on the history of military unions in Norway and West Germany. An examination of their successes and shortcomings was necessary to perform an analysis.

The primary data source for this research paper has been periodical literature from the time frame, 1966 to the present time in 1971. It was necessary to rely upon periodicals primarily because no books, to the author's knowledge, have been published on the subject. The use of both magazine and newspaper articles allowed the author to maintain a current view on military affairs in Norway, Germany and the United States during the period of this research.

Another source of information has been printed literature from the countries concerned. A number of informative articles were invaluable to the formation of historical development and the present status of the foreign organizations.

After receiving literature from foreign sources, unstructured interviews with both Norwegian and German Officers provided further insight in regard to their unions that was not apparent from a literature review. These interviews tended to shed some light on the personal feelings of officers who were both members and non-members of their respective country's military unions.

Four categories were established to file information obtained. The first category was used for all information that provided background or could be considered historical in nature. Category two encompassed current descriptive data, such as what was occurring in the 1966 to 1971 time frames within the respective unions. The third category was limited to the effectiveness of a military union in its ability to bargain for the members. Information in this category was used to establish advantages and disadvantages of a military union. The fourth and last category was assigned to limitations of the existing unions.

Application of Data

The history of unionization within the United States was treated in a more general manner, and was not limited to the military.

Category two and three information was used to describe the benefits and disadvantages of a military labor union in order to analyze both the good and bad points of other established organizations, and draw upon their experiences to show what benefits and problems the United States armed forces may face. The category four collection was analyzed to determine what limitations should be put upon a viable organization.

The application of the information collected was used to answer the research questions posed by this study. The methodology of data gathering and review was used to develop the descriptive analysis of this paper.

Relation of Analysis to Research Questions

What would be the advantages and disadvantages of a military labor union to military members and military managers? This question is a combination of Research Questions One and Two. The two questions are addressed by describing the background of military unions in Norway and Germany initially. Secondly, the purposes of the unions and what they have attempted to do for the military community in their respective countries are addressed in Chapters Two and Three. Chapter Four further addresses the questions of advantages and disadvantages of a military union to both its members and managers, but from the viewpoint of the organization existing in the United States military forces, not European nations.

What limitations should be placed upon military labor unions? This question is addressed in Chapter Five by reviewing limitations the Norwegian and German unions have placed upon their organizations, and then relating limitations that should be imposed upon a United States organization. Chapter Six contains the conclusion.

Chapter 2

NORWEGIAN DEVELOPMENT

The union development within the armed forces of Norway has evolved as a natural phenomenon of their society and form of government. As early as 1899, the National Federation of Trades Unions was founded as a central organization for artisans. Following a year later in 1900, the Norwegian Employers' Confederation was formed as an employers organization to bargain with the unions.¹ Further, Norway has been governed by a Labor Party since it came into power in 1935. The Labor Party remained in power until 1965 at which time a coalition government was restored.² During that three decade period, many laws reflecting the Labor Party attitude were enacted. As a result, the country is highly unionized. The only effective way that an organization has to take its problems to the government is through union representation. The Norwegian armed forces and the national police joined together to form a non-political union, BEFALETS FELLE ORGANISASJON, (B.F.O.). The B.F.O. is the

¹R.E. Lindgren and P. Boardman, "Norway," Collier's Encyclopedia (1970), XIV, p. 671.

²O.F.K., "Norway," Britannica Book of the Year (1970), 572.

armed forces and government employee organization that bargains for wages, hours, promotion, housing, retirement and other social benefits for its members. The B.F.O. was organized in Norway in response to the need for the military to be represented in a highly unionized nation.³

B.F.O.'s History

After the termination of World War II, many officers and non-commissioned officers in the Norwegian Defense Force realized the need for a unifying organization. The term, Defense Forces, is collective and encompasses all three service branches; the Norwegian Army, Navy and Air Force. The necessity of cooperation and coordination of the group as a unit was required to accomplish representation to the union sector of the nation. Until this time, the officers of the separate services were loosely organized into individual "social" clubs that were bound together through a bond of common interest, military background and education.* Many officers also wanted to avoid disagreement among these different groups. Fortunately, the leaders of the Defense Forces also recognized the situation and the need for organization.

³A.K. Stein, Captain, Royal Norwegian Air Force. From an interview conducted at Wright Patterson Air Force Base on 10 February 1971.

*Throughout the chapter, the use of the word "officers" will be referring to both commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the Norwegian Defense Forces.

In October 1946 the Minister of Defense wrote a letter to all officer's associations wherein he expressed the following:

During my work in DOD and during travel in the countryside, I have an impression that all officers within the Norwegian Defense System are missing a common organization that can represent the common interest of officers towards DOD and government officials everywhere, and also through which the DOD and government officials on their side can consult on matters of officers wages and working conditions.⁴

With this support now being given to military unionization, the stage was set for the many years of effort that were in the offing. More than a decade would pass before success would be achieved.

During the 1946-1947 time frame, several meetings were held with the different military organization's leaders. The objectives were to coordinate their negotiable demands and establish greater cooperation among themselves. As a result, in 1947 an Officers Association Common Board was formed. This consisted of all the officer's associations within the Norwegian Armed Forces with one exception, the Norges Befalslag. The Norges Befalslag is an older organization of non-commissioned officers that did not desire to join the Officers Association Common Board. The Norges Befalslag is a minority group and today represent only 4.5% of the non-commissioned officers. Unfortunately, this initial attempt at organization was not successful.

⁴A.K. Stein (trans.), "B.F.O.'s History," Befalets Organisasjonsforhold, (Oslo: Norsk Prent L.L., 1970), p. 16.

During this period, the service organizations were quite stratified, with lower ranking officers not being invited to join together with the field grade or executive level officers.

In 1947 the Army appointed a team of representatives from different organizations to examine the possibility of bringing the diverse Army associations together. This team recommended an "Army Officers Association" but nothing developed further. Again, in 1952 another attempt was made without success.

During the seven years from 1947 until 1954, the Officers Association Common Board had been ineffective with the efforts to bring together the scattered military associations. In 1954 the Board agreed to work with Norges Befalslag and appoint a team whose sole purpose would be to study the establishment of a common organization. Finally in January 1955, a proposal was worked out that was to be the beginning of B.F.O. An interim board was subsequently established with the main objective being to form one association for all commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers. It consolidated thoughts and plans to insure the interests of the members would be covered when the new union was formed and supporting laws were passed. With the Navy and Air Force fully supporting the objectives and plans of the board, by February 1957 the many years of frustration were almost over.

The formal founding of B.F.O. was 11 September 1957. A single organization that covered all branches of the

services was now a reality. B.F.O.'s main objective was to be politically neutral in serving the member's interests and working for an understanding of defense among the Norwegian people.

Although success had finally been achieved in establishing a military union or association, only 5000 officers and NCO's joined the organization even though 16,000 were eligible for membership within the Defense System. In July 1958, the Official Service Agreement law was enacted, which required union membership for the military. Since then, the B.F.O. has grown into a fully mature representative union.

B.F.O.'s Limitations

The limitations placed upon the union logically derived from the stated objective of being politically neutral, serving the members interests, and working for an understanding of Defense Forces among the Norwegian people. The limitations of operation have in no way diluted the ability to function or to serve the membership.

Following is a list of militarily important constraints placed upon the union:

1. The union will not strike. Without a doubt in the mind of the military leader, this is a fundamental limitation to be placed upon any military union. The obvious reason that the right to strike must be withheld is that the security of the nation must not be jeopardized.

2. The union may not interfere with military law. Crimes against the nation's Defense System in either peace

or war will be tried by and governed by the military courts. The laws of the military must reign supreme in discharging military justice, and no redress may be made through the union.

3. The union has no control in battle. In the event of national emergencies or war, the union is not able to represent its members. No grievances may be filed, and no limitation may be imposed on hours of duty or overtime. Commanders are free to defend the homeland with all resources at their command, and the B.F.O. slips silently to the background.

4. The union will not interfere with the military mission. This is a rather broad restriction, but it applies widely to the acceptance of orders. As an example, if an order is received by an individual, and it is felt to be illegal, the first duty is to obey the order. Afterwards, the recipient may file a grievance with the union. Illegal orders under conflict are treated by military law or civil law, thus providing flexibility and protection to the members.

5. The union is basically limited to collective bargaining for social benefits. This restriction reflects the entire purpose of Befalets Felles Organisasjon, which is to strive for betterment of the military through direct representation with the government. Within this framework, the functions of B.F.O. are next presented.

B.F.O.'s Functions

A unique way of determining military pay is used in Norway, at least unique from the United States military point of view. Throughout the nation, almost all trade unions negotiate with the National Price Board for pay of the union's members. The wages are normally set in a two or three year contract, and in the case of the Defense Force it is a two year wage contract. Without the aid of the B.F.O., military personnel would have no representatives to the National Price Board. B.F.O. is presently performing several other functions related to wages. The union has negotiated an overtime limitation with the government. Military personnel may not work more than ten hours per week overtime, or 105 hours per year overtime without union approval. Exceptions are during catastrophies or national emergencies. Negotiations are also under way to provide additional pay for duty performed on Sunday.

Current information about new laws that are beneficial to members are published and distributed through seven union periodicals. Typical news has explained new housing rules of eligibility, how to build a house, how to rent a home and what a rent contract is. Also publications explaining rules for borrowing money, to include sources, procedures, interest rates and liability have been made available. It readily appears the welfare of the membership is well served through the efforts of the B.F.O.

Summary

Within a country that is so highly unionized as Norway, the formation of a military union was inevitable. With the impetus created by the Minister of Defense in suggesting the need for a common organization, work was begun in that direction. After eleven years, organization was complete. The primary objective of the union was political neutrality, to bargain for the member's interests, and create an understanding of defense among the public. The fine cooperation between B.F.O. and the military attest to the fact that unionization within the Norwegian Defense Force is a success.

Chapter 3

GERMAN DEVELOPMENT

The West German combined armed forces, known as the Bundeswehr, are partially unionized by the Public Service, Transport and Traffic Workers Union, (O.T.V.). The O.T.V. concentrates upon the organization of career officers and non-commissioned officers.¹ Union organization and recruitment in the Bundeswehr was originally authorized in 1958, but until August 1966, only 2,500 soldiers in the 450,000 man force were members.² By August 1966; increasing pressure placed upon the West German Defense Minister, Herr Kai-Uwe von Hassel, forced him to yield and allow the O.T.V. to begin recruiting actively in the barracks. Three months later the membership had grown to 3,500 professionals with hopes that 15,000 members could be recruited by 1968.³ The union has made a strong point of limiting its activities to social, economic and professional interests of the serviceman. No effort is made to enter into any military decisions or give

¹The New York Times, August 26, 1966, p. 8, col. 4.

²Ibid.

³"I'm All Right, Hans," Time, November 18, 1966, p. 42.

unsolicited advice.⁴ Although officers do belong to the union, it is strongly held by many Generals that membership in a union is not compatible with obedience to commands, and military discipline.⁵ This feeling is not surprising, considering the traditional harshness the pre-1945 army felt toward labor unions. Many of the Bundeswehr Generals were schooled in that organization.

The new Bundeswehr also allows its members to engage in politics and seek political office as was the case with a Navy Captain in 1969. The officer ran for an office as a representative of the right wing National Democratic Party. However, as a result, he was removed from his NATO post and assigned an obscure desk job in a small province.⁶ Thus it would appear that engaging in politics is likely to end an officer's career.

Development of the Bundeswehr

Background

The background of the Bundeswehr must be understood in order to follow the logical progression to unionism within the West German Military Defense Force.

⁴Heinz Kluncker, "Armed Might and Organized Labor." Dr. J.W. Stock (trans.), A speech delivered at Mosbach/Baden, Germany, 1970.

⁵The New York Times, op. cit.

⁶The New York Times, March 28, 1969, p. 12, col. 1.

In 1945 at the end of World War II, Germany had not only been defeated and had surrendered, but the country had been stripped of its armed force, disarmed, and occupied. The immediate emotional reaction in the postwar years was to never allow Germany to bear arms again or threaten her neighbor's borders. This feeling remained strong among the allies. When the constitution of the Federal Republic was drafted in 1949, West Germany was denied a defense function.⁷

During the following year the split between the U.S.S.R. and the Western nations widened. The Cold War was firmly established. Communist aggression in Korea spurred the acceptance within the West that Germany would have to be rearmed on a limited scale to aid in her defense, especially since the United States was becoming embroiled in Korea and was unable to commit as many resources to Europe.

A dilemma was developing. The defense of Germany could not forever be supported by the West, but it was not felt desirable to totally rearm her. The solution to the dilemma was finally negotiated in Paris and London in 1954 when Germany was invited into the NATO alliance.⁸

Upon the acceptance of Germany into NATO, the Bonn Constitution was amended in March 1954 to permit the re-establishment of armed forces and the re-introduction of

⁷Elmer Plischke, "West German Foreign and Defense Policy," Orbis, 12:1100, Winter, 1969.

⁸Ibid., p. 1102.

compulsory military service. When it had become clear that a defense system would again be established, politicians of all parties were determined that no rebirth of militarism would take place.⁹

Civilianization of the Force

The fear that prevailed during the initial organization of the Bundeswehr was that the army might be allowed to become politically powerful again, as it had been in the past. This fear still threads its way through German politics today. A quotation from *Political Studies*, volume twelve, portrays the picture clearly.

Mirabeau had coined the phrase that Prussia was not a country with an army but an army with a country, and this description remained to some extent true of the German Empire. In the Weimar Republic, on the other hand, the army tended to become a state within a state, neither master nor subordinate of the legitimate authority of the state but a rival to it. The politicians of the Bonn Republic were determined to assure the 'primacy of the political.'¹⁰

Therefore, the mold was cast. The armed forces were placed firmly in the hands of the government. Military policy was to reflect political aims determined by the government, not the military, as in the past days of the Wehrmacht. For these reasons, everything was directed toward civilianization of the force.

⁹F. Ridley, "Parliamentary Commissioner for Military Affairs," Political Studies, 12:2, 1964.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 1103.

By 1955 the Defense Ministry was created and the first 1500 volunteers were recruited early in 1956. The formation of the new Bundeswehr was proceeding rapidly with the first draftees being called to duty in April 1957 and by July 100,000 men were under arms.¹¹ Growth continued until a force of 430,000 men was attained in 1963. The tracing of further growth to 450,000 men is not so important as is the philosophy with which this force was treated.

Elmer Plischke in his article, "West German Foreign and Defense Policy" listed ten main policies the Federal Republic adopted to govern the military. Following are five of the policies from his list.

Maintain civilian control, i.e., under parliamentary supervision and civilian political leadership.

Keep the military force, as well as its individual members, apolitical, and not allow the military to become a government within a government.

Deem members of the military service to be "citizens in uniform," not comprising an elite class enjoying a special position in the political community, but nevertheless constituting an integral and respected element of the social order.

Create a new "inner structure," i.e., a reformed relationship between officers and men, founded on inherent principles of a democratic society.

Avoid the spirit of militarism.¹²

[Underlines added.]

An examination of the list indicates how very intent the government was in preventing a state within a state

¹¹Plischke, op. cit., p. 1109.

¹²Ibid., p. 1110.

to evolve once again. This deep desire for social democracy, the protection of the individual's rights and the recognition of the soldier as an accepted part of society are important factors that have led to the unionization of the Bundeswehr.

The creating of the feeling of "citizens in uniform" is a step to humanize the soldiers and let them realize they are not elite supermen, but rather ordinary citizens that are fulfilling one of the finest tasks possible, the service of their nation. The soldiers are to feel they are still part of society and they will soon return to their position as useful members.

Leadership Training

"Innure Führung" or "Inner Structure" is a difficult to translate concept that is taught to the officers and non-commissioned officers (NCO's) at a special army school at Koblenz. It envisages a regimen of leadership and character training based mainly on self-discipline.¹³ It is an effort to assure a better leader-soldier relationship whereby the soldier will understand the reason behind orders. It allows him to have a questioning mind and to not fall in line or obey with blind obedience. Although this philosophy is another step toward humanizing the military, it is not looked upon favorably by all the leaders as evidenced by

¹³"Grumbles, Not Mutiny," The Economist, 224:1084, September 23, 1967.

several generals who feel it has created problems in discipline and "produced an unsoldierly army."¹⁴

The Ombudsman

To further secure the soldiers feeling of democracy and to provide protection against injustices, he is represented by an Ombudsman appointed by Parliament.¹⁵ An amendment to the Bonn Constitution in 1956 provided for his appointment.¹⁶ The function of the Ombudsman, or Parliamentary Commissioner, is:

...to protect the 'citizen in uniform' and to act as the eyes and ears of parliament. He was not merely to be a 'complaints man,' but he was also to watch the developments in the armed forces and to inform parliament in good time if any undemocratic tendencies appeared. While at first the former aspect of his work appeared to predominate, in recent years importance has been attached to his more general duty of reporting on the state of the armed forces. Paradoxically it has been a need for greater discipline rather than the feared revival of militarism that he has discovered.¹⁷

Therefore, from the inception of the Bundeswehr, a direct open channel of communication upward has been established.

¹⁴"The Orphan Army," Time, June 20, 1969, p. 30, col. 2. See also an article by N. Brown, "Bonns Angry Brass Hats," New Statesman, 72:344, September 9, 1966.

¹⁵Norman Crossland, "General Quits Bundeswehr," Manchester Guardian, November 29, 1969, p. 4.

¹⁶Ridley, op. cit., p. 7.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 8.

With this great emphasis placed upon individual rights, it was no surprise that the Bonn Government allowed active unionization efforts to begin in August, 1966.

The O.T.V. and the Bundeswehr

Union recruitment in the barracks was not greeted with open arms by the German high command. When open membership canvassing was first allowed in August 1966, two generals resigned from the Bundeswehr in protest.¹⁸ The significance of the action can be understood when it is considered that one of the generals was the Inspector General, the senior military commander of the Bundeswehr, and the second general was the commander of the army's Third Military District. The union regarded the acceptance of the resignation as, "a mandate for broad organization of military personnel."¹⁹

Although the O.T.V. is optimistic about the future, military resistance to becoming union members is evident.

Even after the defeat of World War II, German officers retained their antilabor sentiment, labeled union organizing efforts 'contradictory to the principle of command and obedience.'²⁰

Five years later, this feeling is still common among career personnel. During an interview conducted with a German

¹⁸The New York Times, August 26, 1966, p. 8, col. 4.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Time, op. cit., November 18, 1966.

Air Force Major at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in January 1971, he clearly indicated that officers who join the union are looked down upon by their peers and their action is definitely "not the thing to do." Nevertheless, in November 1966, Time magazine reported that four generals were dues paying members of the soldiers union.²¹

The road toward unionization has been a long one, and the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Workers Union (Soldiers Section) is still active.

Functions of the O.T.V.

The O.T.V. is pledged to represent the soldier in a socio-political vein and create a better understanding of what the new military force really is; in short, create an acceptable image of the new citizen in uniform and dispel the distrust the German people hold toward the military. The O.T.V. is directing its efforts to allow the Bundeswehr to become an accepted part of the community instead of a social isolate.

In 1970 Heinz Kluncker, the president of O.T.V., spoke on the subject of "Armed Might and Organized Labor" in Mosbach/Baden, Germany.²² At this time he reaffirmed the role of the union and the problems it faces. He also defined the framework within which they work by saying:

²¹Ibid.

²²Kluncker, op. cit.

The Public Services, Transportation and Communications Trade's Union has knowingly limited itself in its union activity, to representing the social, economic and professional interests of the servicemen and civilian employees of the West German Army.

He continues to pronounce some limitations as:

We have no desire to mix into the activities of the service and certainly do not wish to give any unrequested advise on military problems. We shall maintain this same stand in the future.²³

In 1966, an O.T.V. union leader had outlined what they would do for the soldier.²⁴ Better pay was the first item. Easier promotion was a second point, but this author has been unable to determine what exactly was meant by the word, "easier." Promotions are necessary in any army especially to retain good young men, and Germany is faced with a retention problem.²⁵ Also listed were increased recreational facilities at the bases, increased health coverage and a pension plan equivalent to that of civil servants-- certainly valid points that any union should consider.

To further enhance coordination between the O.T.V. and the Defense Minister, in June 1970 O.T.V. proposed an integrated Socio-Political Department be established in the Ministry of Defense. The department would be equally active for military and civilian personnel. This proposal would

²³Ibid.

²⁴Time, November 18, 1971, loc. cit.

²⁵Time, June 20, 1969, op. cit.

aid the O.T.V. and Defense Ministry in solving the great socio-political problems, some of which have been identified as: Professional and technical training, salaries, housing and family care, plus social installations such as canteens, army social clubs and leisure hours.²⁶

A Socio-Political Department as proposed could certainly contribute toward improving the "lot" of the serviceman.

Limitations of the O.T.V.

The most important limitation that must be placed upon any military union is the right to strike. Within the Federal Republic of Germany, no civil servants union is allowed to strike. Since they are forbidden by law to strike, no problem has been foreseen by the Bundeswehr in that regard.

Further limitations outlined by the president of O.T.V. in the previous section, were logical and reasonable. The union has no desire to interfere with military orders.²⁷ The union would only overlap with the Soldiers' Law passed in 1956 that outlines the limits an officer must stay within

²⁶"The Public Services, Transportation and Communications Trades Union Takes Its Position," Dr. J.W. Stock (trans.), From a mimeographed paper from the German Embassy, Washington, D.C., 1970.

²⁷"Germany's New Army: No. 1 in Europe Again," U.S. News and World Report, September 12, 1966, p. 70.

in issuing orders.²⁸ The union will not enter into grievances on duty or interfere with discipline, as this is also adequately covered by law.²⁹

Thus O.T.V. remains dedicated to its socio-political responsibility of protecting the soldier, improving his life, and winning greater acceptance for him in the outside world with his new status as a, "citizen in uniform."

Summary

The organization and development of trade unions and a military force in Germany after World War II has been slow and deliberate. Previous errors were not allowed to occur. The public was quite fearful of the strength and power of the pre-war military. As a result, the politicians insured that the Bundeswehr would be kept under very close civilian control. It will undoubtedly remain that way in the future. The social acceptance of the military is still questionable.

Stemming from this feeling, has been an urge to "civilianize" the force and accept the soldier as a part of society. With that changed social feeling today, organized labor and the armed services are an integral part of German society, although resistance is still evident. These traditional reservations effect both sides; that is, the distrust of the unions by the military, and the past fears

²⁸Ridley, op. cit., p. 5.

²⁹U.S. News and World Report, op. cit.

of the power of the military by the unions. Mutual trust can only be achieved with time.

With the continued use of both the Ombudsman and the union to represent the soldier in overlapping areas of welfare, it appears that neither one is doing all that is possible. Low pay, low morale, poor retention rates, the unattractiveness of a military career, undermanning of the forces, and questionable acceptance of the new Bundeswehr by society, all lead to questions about the effectiveness of the union.

In summary, the O.T.V. has not been a panacea to all socio-political problems within the Bundeswehr. Its effect is questionable in a country that still distrusts the military. The union certainly has not accomplished all it desires as yet.

Chapter 4

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

The benefits and gains or detriments and handicaps of a military union, to either members or managers, are so entwined that it is virtually impossible to express a single point as either all good for one individual and all bad for another. There is no separation between a union member and a military manager per se, since one may be in both roles at the same time. As a result, no dichotomy exists, and a union for the military will always have advantages and disadvantages depending upon which situation an individual is in at a particular point in time. Thus, to please everyone, is to please no one.

Advantages in General

Wages

Wages, pay, or salary equality have historically been a strong reason for the acceptance of unionization. One of the major factors in the growth of unions among civil service personnel has been the dissimilarity of pay scales between private sector employees and public employees. Although government employees generally enjoy greater job security than do their counterparts in the private domain, security is

not all to which man aspires. Additional funds generally increase a man's ability to seek higher plateaus on Maslow's hierarchy of needs.¹ With industrial salaries climbing steadily higher, concerted efforts of a strong union have been able to gain monetary benefits for public sector employees.

In Norway, the effectiveness of a union bargaining for wages is the accepted way for the military to obtain increases. Collective bargaining in Germany is also effective, but less so than in Norway. Union bargaining for wages in those two countries is apparently working, and there is nothing to indicate that it could not also be effective within the United States.

Benefits

Other benefits that are tied indirectly to wages are pension plans, insurance and disability compensation.

Pension plans. The thought of a contributory pension plan has been approached in the Hubbell Pay Plan proposal. The present military retirement system has been attacked as archaic and expensive to the nation. Plans for change have been proposed, but none settled upon as yet. Could a union not represent the needs of the military in developing a pension plan that could satisfy all parties concerned?

¹An illustration of Abraham Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs is described in, Max D. Richards and Paul S. Greenlaw, Management Decision Making, (Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966), p. 104.

The Norwegian Defense Forces have a pension plan that is monitored by the B.F.O. and negotiated with the government. Union success is apparent. The desire for a pension plan for the German military that was equally as good as the civil servant's plan, was a major point, which was stressed during the 1966 unionization of the Bundeswehr. Those two countries certainly have union influence in that area.

Insurance and disability compensation. Government life insurance is provided at a rate less than any individual can obtain in the private market. Disability compensation of a form is also provided for those injured on active duty. Benefits are gained upon retirement. For these two benefits a union may very well be able to negotiate for increased amounts of low rate insurance and higher percentages of disability declared to individuals that have suffered injury before retirement. Unions in the private sector have experienced great success in gaining important fringe benefits in these areas.

Prestige

An effective military union can provide a great service in increasing the prestige or status of a military career in the eyes of the public. Some may refer to this type activity as Public Relations, "P.R." work, and castigate the necessity of educating the private citizen. However, the Norwegian B.F.O. recognized this requirement very early during its birth as is illustrated by restating one of its objectives; "working for an understanding of Defense Forces among

the Norwegian people," as stated in Chapter 2. The O.T.V. in Germany also has a very large public relations mission in educating the citizens. The Bundeswehr is currently suffering from an inability to attract enough officers and NCO's. Presently there is a shortage of 12,000 officers.² The prestige of the soldier is low with many youths not desiring a military career.³ Raising the status of the German soldier is a point to which Heinz Kluncker, as the president of O.T.V., has committed his union. At this point in time, the United States armed forces are suffering from a low status syndrome. Less than desirable retention rates, our disengagement from Southeast Asia without a clear military victory, an increasing drug abuse problem within the services, and constant pressure from the legislative branch of government to reduce the defense budget, are easily discernable as symptoms of a lowered military status. With the future possibility of an all volunteer force, occupational prestige is a prerequisite to attracting young men.

Colonel Samuel H. Hays, while writing of the degree of social approval and recognition necessary to compensate a soldier for deprivation, risk or sacrifice he faces, has this to say about recognition by the public:

While this recognition can be expressed to some degree in terms of pay, housing and fringe benefits, it is

²Jac Weller, "Bundeswehr Organization and Tactics," Military Review, February, 1971, p. 83.

³Ibid.

more importantly a function of prestige, status and public recognition. The motivation and morale of our forces is not a constant which can be taken for granted as it stems from individual and group needs over time and under varying conditions. In many ways it is easier to procure and develop the technical equipment used by the forces than it is to procure the men needed to put it into battle.⁴

Consequently, a viable public relations and educational program supervised by a strong union could aid in lifting the social state of a military career.

Since a general discussion of advantages on the whole has been completed, a transition to specifics will follow. A general discourse on the topic subject will be presented, and will be viewed as applicable to the manager and the member.

Grievances

As defined in The American Heritage Dictionary of the English language, a grievance is, "An actual or supposed circumstance regarded as just cause for protest. A complaint or protestation based on such a circumstance."⁵ Certainly, from this definition it is accepted that grievances and their reasons have existed in military forces for centuries. It is a rare individual that cannot remember a time when he

⁴Colonel Samuel H. Hays, "A Military View of Selective Service," The Draft, ed. Sol Tax (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 11.

⁵William Morris. (Ed.). The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969).

had a justifiable grievance with no means of seeking redress. The grievance process most definitely has both advantages and disadvantages connected with it. It provides a means of upward and downward communications and feedback to managers.

The Manager

Today's military manager is far different from his counterpart of only two decades ago. He is more sophisticated in his approach to problems and has a broader base of knowledge from which to choose. The advent of computers, operations research, systems analysis, and an increased emphasis of human relations in management training, have all increased the number of ways to identify and solve problems. After all, the management process can often be reduced to a function of problem solving.

Advantages. To correct problems, a means of feedback is required, such as a radio station monitoring its own broadcasts. This feedback can provide clues to where a problem exists or may develop, if corrective action is not taken. The grievance process can act as the feedback loop for a manager. In examining a grievance with a trained union representative, it may be possible to get to the real root of a problem and apply corrective action. Since survivability of the organization is a prime objective of a manager, early identification of problem areas works to his advantage.

Good working relations between managers and unions not only solve grievances, but may often prevent them from occurring. Such has been the case in the private sector. As illustrated by Strauss and Sayles in their book, Personnel, The Human Problems of Management, management has learned that job and working conditions may be changed much more readily with fewer complaints, if the union is consulted beforehand and acts to smooth the way by clearing up potential trouble areas.⁶ This is a common use of unions in industry; it could be as effective in a military union. Union participation in military decisions could not be condoned, but their counsel could be accepted in non-military matters. For instance, German trade unions collaborate with industrial leaders through a philosophy of "co-determination," or joint management where labor consultation is reinforced by labor participation in top management.⁷

Disadvantages. Some managers may feel ill at ease with another organization watching their activities. The mere fact that another agency must be dealt with is an administrative burden. Additional paper work, use of a clerical staff that may already be less than adequate, and the

⁶George Strauss and Leonard Sayles, Personnel, The Human Problems of Management, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 120.

⁷W.H. McPherson, "Labor Relations in Postwar Germany," University of Illinois Bulletin, June 1957, p. 60.

additional time that must be taken from a busy day appear as possible detriments. The possibility that bureaucracy and red tape could develop beyond workable bounds, if allowed to grow unchecked, could prove a hindrance. Proper planning, organizing and control can prevent these disadvantages from interfering with any grievance procedure.

Publicity of unsettled grievances by the union could easily be used as pressure for reform, and in so doing would certainly create an unfavorable circumstance for the inefficient manager that allowed that situation to develop--a detriment for one, but a benefit for another.

The Union Member

Again, it is difficult to separate a union member from a military manager since they can be one and the same.

Advantages. Placing a grievance with a union representative may not only get rapid results, but it could settle the problem at the local level without involving other echelons of command unless it becomes necessary. The time honored privilege of a serviceman to write a letter to his Congressman or visit the Inspector General will normally get results, but it does arouse inquiries at levels far higher than required, had it been placed with an interested party at base level.

Identifying injustices and solving them "in-house" can reap benefits for both the member as well as the manager. To the manager, advantages accrue because small irritants

can often be resolved before they grow into large problems involving many others. To the member, he has an interested party that can apply pressure for change when it is warranted. Unfair practices or treatment can be brought to light. In Norway, the first attempt at correcting the grievance will be at local level and, if satisfaction is not attained, it progressively moves up the chain to the national headquarters of B.F.O. where it may be settled at national level if it is serious enough to have gone that far. The German O.T.V. operates similarly and grievances may progress to the parliament as required. The soldiers are certain to be represented.

Disadvantages. On the other hand, once a complaint is filed with a union, that act can be detrimental to the individual. Military services have many ways to make life rather unpleasant for those that can be identified as complainers or problem makers. That fear alone may prevent some complaints from ever being submitted. Acceptance within a group may not be extended to a complainant, if the group does not feel the grievance is justified. This could result in another social isolate being created and foster possible further unhappiness and dissatisfaction.

Communication

Communication of itself is indispensable. There are few activities within the world that can successfully continue without it. Communication refers to the transmission or exchange of thoughts, messages or actions through a

connective system of routes by many means. Without it, no manager can exist. Planning, organizing and controlling would not be possible. Consequently, communication can be considered the keystone of management and, thus, organization.

There are many barriers to communications that can be cited from any good textbook of management.* Several are more prevalent in military services. The size of an organization is a barrier to effective communication, as are too many echelons or levels of management. A very real obstruction is fear or prejudice within an individual, as is the failure of individuals to understand the real interests of those they supervise. A military union may be able to dilute these barriers.

The Manager

Advantages. One of the greatest advantages a union can have for the manager is to act as a single point of contact. If a single man had to deal with all individuals that had a grievance, he would soon be inundated with single problems. Here, a union representative can prove most helpful. He represents a diverse group of people and problems, and

*For example, see: William G. Scott, Human Relations in Management, (Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.) 1962, or Kieth Davis (Ed.) Human Relations at Work, (New York: McGraw-Hill) 1967. Also Joseph L. Massie, Essentials of Management (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc) 1964, presents a concise discussion of barriers to communications.

has the power to bring them all together at once to aid the manager in identifying problems and reaching solutions.

A union can effectively relieve the barrier of communications overload for the manager. Due to the large size of the military organization, much management is done by the "exception principle." Very simply stated, this means that exceptions to the normal require attention of management; otherwise everything else is considered to be within tolerance and requires little or no attention. If management was not accomplished in this fashion, communication channels would be so overloaded that it would be virtually impossible for an individual to assimilate all the data, sort through it, and identify the problems that urgently need attention. As a consequence, many valid gripes never find movement upward to an echelon for solution. The union, again as a collator of problems, could consolidate problems and present them to management when action is warranted, thereby serving to keep channels of communications open, not overloaded.

Disadvantages. Regardless of these advantages just discussed, a union represents still another entity with which to deal. A general feeling gathered from interviews conducted with five field grade officers, all of whom have had managerial assignments, could be expressed as, "That's all I need, someone else to assist me. There are enough problems without a union." This reaction seems to closely parallel inferences obtained from the review of literature relating to German unionization. On the other hand, the

Norwegian union seems to be better accepted among the military. This is plausible since the Norwegian Defense Force actively sought union representation.

The Union Member

Advantages. The problem of upward communication is often approached by a young soldier with a certain amount of fear or apprehension. Relaying a grievance in a strange environment is awesome. A young man often has difficulty in being able to relate to a senior non-commissioned officer, who is often the senior supervisor and insulator for the officer in charge. It can not be refuted that soldiers have approached their supervisors with what they feel is a problem. The supervisor, drawing from his wealth of experience, is able to determine the soldier in fact does not have a problem, and tells him so. Unfortunately, the supervisor may not be able to relate to the soldier either, and the young man goes away still thinking he has a problem with no solution.

In the foregoing instance, a union grievance representative could help the soldier determine whether he has a problem or not. If it is valid, a grievance could be filed. If it is not valid, the union man could explain why it is not and the soldier's problem would often cease to exist. In this way, the union member would have had a place to go for satisfaction if he was not satisfied with the military answer. Indeed, even if the complaint was found not valid, the soldier would likely be satisfied, the officer would not have been

bothered, and the credence of the supervisor would have been reinforced.

Disadvantages. A concern tied indirectly to communications is the social status a person gains or loses with union membership. A person who has formerly enjoyed accepted status within a group may have it withdrawn, once he becomes a union member. This may be more true of an officer who becomes a union member than of an enlisted man. As previously stated by the German officer, joining a union as an officer is "just not the thing to do" and is frowned upon.

Discipline

The subject of discipline has been widely addressed by many military writers of the day. Easing discipline within the ranks has occurred for better or worse. The wisdom of this has been seriously questioned by many, including the author. Regardless of what is happening in this area, a strong union can aid a manager in enforcing discipline among the members. The context in which "union" is used must be made clear. The rampant banding together of discontented soldiers as has happened at Fort Sill, Oklahoma and other posts--making radical demands and calling themselves a "soldiers union"--is not the context in which "union" is used. Rather, a legally accepted and established body is the correct interpretation. Within that framework, consider that organized discipline is a key objective of labor unions in general--enforcement of contracts, conduct of members, and

strict control of the labor force to meet the standards expected by industry. With regards to military unions, one authority on the subject feels that a disciplined union can in turn demand and impose discipline upon its members, especially in the light that the union demands support from the members, not like the Air Force Reserve Officers Association, that does not require active military support.⁸ With it in mind that a union is as concerned with discipline as a military organization, it would be unlikely the two organizations would work at cross purposes. No evidence exists that a union has undermined military discipline in Norway or Germany. Thus, it would not appear that a union, kept within reasonable bounds, would interfere with military discipline.

Summary

It has been seen that Norwegian and German unions have effectively bargained for wages as well as for other benefits of insurance, disability payments and pension plans. In the United States, action on these items has historically been the responsibility of Congress. Foreign unions are involved in raising the prestige of military careers in their respective countries, while little is being done in the United States at this time to correct a growing problem in this area.

⁸Lt. Col. John E. Camealy, lecture, June 3, 1971.

In this chapter, operation of the grievance process with advantages and disadvantages to both managers and union members have been presented, as have communication processes, the removal of barriers to communications, and a short discussion on discipline. Thus, this chapter has addressed Research Questions One and Two which were concerned with the advantages and disadvantages of a military union to its members and to the military manager, respectively.

Chapter 5

LIMITATIONS

No organization may be allowed to operate unbounded in society without adverse consequences. Limitations on the scope and power of a military union should certainly be well conceived and written into law before a military union is accepted or sanctioned.

Review of German and Norwegian Limitations

Both Germany and Norway very specifically have withheld the power of strike from unions that operate in the public sector. The right for civil servants to strike is not permitted by law.

Neither union, the B.F.O. nor O.T.V., will interfere with the operation of military law. Norwegian military law is well established, with no collision between it and union representation. Germany has protected the rights of the soldier with the Soldiers' Law of 1956 and the Military Criminal Code of 1957. In both instances the unions have no intervention authority.

A third limitation is that the unions have no control in combat operations or in periods of national emergencies. The rationale is that national security is paramount and no restrictions should be imposed upon the defending force.

Neither union will impede the accomplishment of the military mission. No attempt to intervene in discipline or place restrictions upon the military that could curtail the effectiveness of the force is attempted.

Lastly, both unions bargain for social and economic benefits--and therein lie their strength.

Limitations for a U.S. Military Union

Strikes

To provide constant and continuing national security, the right for military union members to strike cannot be condoned. Strikes or even boycotts could not be allowed to take place on either a limited or unlimited scale. For example, employee unions in the public sector are not yet allowed to strike. However, this injunction has often been ignored.

In March of 1970 the postmen in the United States violated the federal law by going on strike. The strike was conducted nation-wide. By this complete withdrawal of services, the postmen effectively forced a cabinet level officer to sit down at the bargaining table with the union to discuss the non-negotiable item of wages.¹ The strike was eventually settled and the mail carriers returned to duty. Without an organized union, this blatant disregard of federal law may never have taken place.

¹Colonel J.E. Hearn. "Labor Management Relations in the Air Force." Air University Review. January-February 1971. p. 27.

In January 1971, policemen in New York City went on a 6-day strike, although some writers referred to it as a boycott or work slowdown. A skeleton force of police did remain on duty to respond to emergencies. This boycott had taken place within a group that was not allowed to "strike." Again, union organization had been able to form a cohesive group for strike activities.

E. Wight Bakke, Sterling Professor of Economics, Yale University, writing in the Monthly Labor Review, made eight predictions concerning bargaining in the public sector. First among these predictions was that, "unionization in the public sector will increase rapidly and extensively."² His second prediction was, "that unionism in the public sector in the foreseeable future is going to be militant,..." after which he stated his reasons.³ Professor Bakke made a further point regarding strikes and the public sector employee by saying:

The use of the strike by public servants is not going to be legitimized, but the strike or some other form of reduction or withdrawal of services having the same impact is going to be used extensively nevertheless.⁴

He concluded that:

The record of successes by public employees who have resorted to strikes encourages confidence that, notwithstanding its illegality, it is a method that gets results.⁵

²E. Wight Bakke, "Reflections on the Future of Bargaining in the Public Sector," Monthly Labor Review, July 1970, p. 21.

³Ibid, p. 22. ⁴Ibid, p. 23. ⁵Ibid.

Professor Bakke's remarks further illustrate the new found power of public sector employees in the use and application of the strike. The fact that strikes are prohibited by law has virtually no meaning.

With the preceding illustrations, it is evident that a military union should not only be prevented from striking, but some extraordinary controls would have to be placed upon it to insure no such illegal strike of the military could take place.

Peacetime Representation

A limitation as to when union representation ceases should be explicit. Therein lies the difficulty.

Military unions should have no control over members during war, combat support operations, or national emergencies. The commanders and managers must have free reign with which to operate with no incumbrances other than those imposed by national objectives.

Careful writing of a union charter would be requisite, for what if there were a police action as there was in Korea, or an undeclared war as in Vietnam? Where would the union powers be curtailed? A state of war declared by Congress such as occurred in World Wars I and II is certain and unmistakable. Support of a combat operation such as has occurred in Korea and Vietnam is less clear.

If a union is prohibited from taking any actions that hamper support of combat, determining where to establish the limit is the problem. Certainly the direct leading and

shipping of war supplies from ports are clearly support activities. But what of overtime maintenance of an aircraft that only might be used to airlift supplies, or the servicing of a warehouse that contains supplies that will be shipped to the front at some later time? And what of the office clerk that works overtime on reports and orders during protracted conflicts; is he supporting the operation?

To limit a union from such operations is a complex problem. Possibly only the commanders and managers can determine what should properly be called support and what should not. It appears that anytime U.S. military forces are engaged in or moving toward armed conflict, the union must cease all activities until a return to peace or a state of normalcy occurs.

Political Neutrality

As a professional army is apolitical, so should be the union that represents it. For a military union to declare for one party or the other, to throw its power, money and influence behind a particular political party, would be the first step toward establishing a government controlled by the military. A military force represents its nation and enforces foreign policy, regardless of the majority party. The United States military has always been subordinate to civilian control, as it should be. The development of a "state within a state" should not occur. As a consequence, a military union must also be without politics.

Social Benefits

By limiting a union to bargaining for social benefits, wages, promotions, insurance, fringe benefits and social status, many problems would be alleviated. Limitations would automatically be established. No doubt exists that a union is very effective in those areas, as many private industries can testify. Here too, a union for the military man could excel.

Noninterference

Noninterference applies to limiting any intervention with military decisions and the furnishing of any unsolicited advice. A union, acting as counsel for the military manager in the prevention, identification, and solution of problems, could well fill a meaningful role. Beyond this, the union should be restrained from any entry into the military decision process.

Summary

With a capsule review of five limitations on Norwegian and German military unions, the same general ideas were dealt with from an American viewpoint.

The limitation upon the right to strike is the most critical one. With trends toward growing militancy in public unions, it is not difficult to comprehend the seriousness of a strike by an armed force, should that point in time ever arise.

It may be easier to provide a very rigid framework within which a union must operate, than it would be to set specific limitations. Such would be the case for allowing a union to operate strictly within the area of social benefits.

Although the limitation on strikes must be identified, the other four limitations may not be as important if a union is only allowed to operate in the area of collective bargaining for wages and social benefits. Thus, this chapter has addressed Research Question Three which was concerned with what limitations should be imposed upon a military union.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSIONS

Findings

It has been shown that a union for military personnel can effectively operate within a military environment.

In a historically highly unionized nation such as Norway, union representation has an accepted place within their society. This acceptance is clearly shown by the two basic Federations within the country; one that represents employees and the other that represents employers. Consequently, the recognized need for a group to represent the Defense Force was not out of character for their society, rather it was a logical adjunct to it. Without a union, the Norwegian military lacked the ability to communicate with the government for social needs, wages and working conditions. Therefore a military union, as a single organization, has been able to bring together the previously diverse officer's societies into one single cohesive representative body. Thus, the union has a definite place within the Norwegian military and governmental structure.

The building of a German union to represent the military can be derived from far different circumstances.

The country had been basically reformed after total defeat in World War II. German society emerged from the war with a deep fear of military in general, that stemmed from not only their defeat, but from the days of Hitler's regime and the previous reign of the old Wehrmacht and Weimar Republic. When the new Federal Republic of Germany was accepted into NATO and was required to rebuild a military force, it was of major concern that the military not be allowed to again gain a position of political strength. Such were the fears that prompted the complete subordination of the Bundeswehr to civilian control. With the plan to "civilianize" the force, by letting the soldier know he was an accepted part of society, rather than an outcast, unionization was inevitable. To prove to the soldier that he truly was accepted in society, all the trappings of society had to be provided, including the right to be represented. Unfortunately, evidence is available that indicates the union has not been able to solve many of the problems and social ills that exist within the German military today. Compared to the success of the Norwegian union, Germany's union has a considerable distance to go before military unionization can be considered successful.

Conclusion

The United States armed forces do not fit neatly into either of the two previously described molds. The development of American unions and armed forces bears little

resemblance to that of Norway or Germany. Unions in the United States, in both the private and public sectors, lean more toward the use of strikes and work stoppages than do their European counterparts. The growing trend toward militancy in both sectors of American unions is counter to the peaceful coexistence of Norwegian unions and the practice of "codetermination" by German unions. The purposes of the union organizations are the same; the methods of achieving their goals are far different.

While the Norwegian Defense Force is committed to defense of the homeland and the German Bundeswehr is a NATO defense force by design, the United States military may also be considered a defense force--but not in the same connotation. The American military may be considered defensive in nature, but on a global scale requiring massive power and complete mobility. Therefore, the union and military requirements of the United States are vastly different from those of European nations.

In particular, the avenues followed in seeking redress of problems are quite different between the armed forces of these countries. In the German military establishment, the Ombudsman is able to help individuals with their problems, as is the union--although the existence of the German grievance process and the Ombudsman procedures have not been particularly successful to date. Indeed, the German experience with military unionization provides little improvement upon the existing U.S. military system where a form of grievance

system does exist in the right of the U.S. serviceman to communicate with the Inspector General and to enlist Congressional aid in seeking solutions to his problems.

Since Congress is charged with the responsibility of raising and supporting the armed forces of the United States, that body has the responsibility for the care and welfare of military members. A paternal system has grown over a period of time of nearly two hundred years. The military services have enjoyed this Congressional interest in their total welfare. The United States government has historically provided for wages, housing, and rules for treatment of soldiers, and has taken an interest in the social welfare of its troops. Although the Norwegian and German unions provide designated points of communications for their respective military forces, "champions for the military" have long existed for the American fighting man. So long as this paternalistic support continues to exist, it is difficult to see how a military union could improve upon the benefits provided to the members of the U.S. military establishment.

With Congressional control of the armed forces, and the increasing trend toward militancy within public unions, it is unlikely that Congress would relinquish control to a union that could possibly become strong enough to force a strike of the armed forces. The acceptance of this chance presently seems remote, but time and circumstances may increase that possibility for the future.

In the final analysis, considering the differences in government, society, military needs, and public attitudes within Norway, Germany, and the United States, it is not believed that the existence of a military union in the United States would provide any tangible advantages to either a member or a manager of our military forces within the foreseeable future.

Recommendations

Since this paper sought to lay a foundation of information of two military unions, it was naturally limited in scope.

With regards to Germany, a White Paper on Defense was due to be published in July 1971. It is recommended that further research into the current problems of the Bundeswehr be conducted, with an analysis of the success the O.T.V. is having on the reduction of social problems.

Sweden and Austria have military unions. The historical development and effectiveness of those two unions within their respective military structures would provide a more complete background on military unions.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

- Beard, Mary Ritter. The American Labor Movement.
New York: Arno Press, 1969.
- "B.F.O.'s History," Befalets Organisasjonsforhold.
Captain Asbjorn K. Stein (trans.). Oslo: Norsk
Prent L. L. 1970.
- Dorpalen, Andres. "Germany," The Americana Annual 1970.
The Americana Corporation, p. 319.
- Dulles, Foster R. Labor in America, New York: Thomas Y.
Crowell Company, 1966.
- Knudsen, Ole F. "Norway," Britannica Book of the Year 1970.
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. 1970, p. 572.
- Leiter, Robert D. Labor Economics and Industrial Relations.
New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1960.
- Lindgren, R.E. & Boardman, Phillip. "Norway," Collier's
Encyclopedia (1970), XIV, 671.
- Marx, Herbert L. Jr. Collective Bargaining for Public
Employees. New York: The H.W. Wilson Co., 1969.
- Morris, William (Ed.). The American Heritage Dictionary of
the English Language. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969.
- Perlman, Selig (and others). "Labour (Trade) Union," Ency-
clopaedia Britannica. (1967), XIII, 555.
- Richards, Max D., and Greenlaw, Paul S. Management Decision
Making. Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966
- Strauss, G. and Sayles, L. Personnel, The Human Problems
of Management. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967.
- Tannenbaum, Frank. The Labor Movement. New York: Arno
Press, 1969.
- Tax, Sol (Ed.). The Draft, A Handbook of Facts and Alter-
natives. Hays, Col. Samuel H. "A Military View of
Selective Service." Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1966.
- White, Leonard D. "Civil Service," Encyclopaedia Britannica.
(1967). V. 846.

PERIODICALS

- "All This and NATO too," The Economist. 234:xvii.
January 10, 1970.
- "American Military Government and the Education of a New
German Leadership," Political Science Quarterly.
83:248-67, June 1968.
- Bakke, E. Wight. "Reflections on the Future of Bargaining
in the Public Sector," Monthly Labor Review. July 1970.
- Blum, Albert A. "Comparative Recruiting Systems," Military
Review. LI:18, March 1971.
- Brown, N. "Bonns Angry Brass Hats," New Statesman. 72:344.
September 9, 1966.
- Bussey, Ellen M. "Relations Between Management & Labor in
West Germany." Monthly Labor Review. 93:28, August 1970.
- Christgau, Robert. "Military Personnel Will Not Participate
in Any Activity Having to do With Creating a Union for
Enlisted Men," Esquire. 70:41, August 1968.
- Cimini, Micheal H. "American Federation of Government Em-
ployees." Monthly Labor Review. 93:33, October 1970.
- Crossland, Norman. "General Quits Bundeswehr," Manchester
Guardian Weekly. November 29, 1969, p. 22.
- "End of a Hagggle." The Economist. 223:558. May 6, 1967.
- "Germany's New Army: No. 1 in Europe Again." U.S. News and
World Report. September 12, 1966, p. 70.
- "Grumbles, Not Mutiny." The Economist. 224:1083, September
23, 1967.
- Hearn, Col. Joseph E. "Labor-Management Relations in the
Air Force," Air University Review. January-February 1971.
- Huddleston, J. "Trade Unions in the German Federal Republic,"
Political Quarterly. 38:165-76, April 1967.
- "I'm All Right, Hans." Time. 88:40. November 18, 1966.
- Lepinski, Franz. "The German Trade Union Movement," Inter-
national Labor Review. 79:11, January 1959.
- McPherson, William H. "Labor Relations in Postwar Germany."
University of Illinois Bulletin. June 1957, p. 60.

- O'Rourke, Major Lewis C. "How About Personnel Maintenance?" Military Review. September 1970.
- Plischke, Elmer. "West German Foreign and Defense Policy," Orbis. 12:1098, Winter 1969.
- Ridley, F. "The Parliamentary Commissioner for Military Affairs in the Federal Republic of Germany," Political Studies. London: Oxford University Press, Vol. 12, 1964.
- Rigg, Col. Robert B. "Future Military Discipline," Military Review. September 1970.
- Sample, J. "Regular Berths Revoked," Air Force Times. June 2, 1971, p. 1.
- "Soldiers Under the Microscope," The Economist. 234:38, March 14, 1970.
- Sullivan, Daniel P. "Soldiers in Unions—Protected First Amendment Right?" Labor Law Journal. 20:581, September 1969.
- "The Army They're Stuck With," The Economist. 230:34, March 15, 1969.
- "The Generals Fire from the Hip," The Economist. 220:804, August 27, 1966.
- "The Orphan Army," Time. 93:30, June 20, 1969.
- The New York Times. August 26, 1966, p. 1, col. 7, p. 8, col. 4.
- The New York Times, March 28, 1969, p. 12, col. 1.
- "Those German Generals," The Economist. 220:798, August 27, 1966.
- The Guardian. Wright State University. January 7, 1971.
- "Trade Unions Rejected," The Times (London). November 25, 1969, p. 2, col. a.
- Weller, Jac. "Bundeswehr Organization and Tactics," Military Review. LI:82, February 1971.

OTHER SOURCES

Camealy, Lt. Col. John B. Associate Professor, School of Systems and Logistics, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Personnel Interview. June 3, 1971.

Kluncker, Heinz. "Armed Might and Organized Labor." Dr. Joseph W. Stock (trans.). 1970. (Mimeographed paper received from the German Embassy).

Paper On A German Union. "The Public Services, Transportation and Communications Trades Union Takes Its Position." Dr. Joseph W. Stock (trans.). 1970. (Mimeographed paper received from the German Embassy).

Stein, Capt. Asbjorn K. Norwegian Air Force Liaison Officer to Air Force Logistics Command Headquarters. Personal Interview. February 10, 1971.