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Technical Report No. 637

AD882305

# **ARMY ROLES, MISSIONS, AND DOCTRINE IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (ARMLIC)**

## **PRECONFLICT CASE STUDY 3--IRAN**

2 FEBRUARY 1970

PREPARED BY OPERATIONS RESEARCH, INC.  
UNDER CONTRACT NO. DAAG 25-67-C-0702 FOR  
US ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND  
INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013



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Preconflict Case Study 3

Iran

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### PREFATORY NOTE

1. This case study of the preconflict period in Iran is one of a series undertaken by the Carlisle Research Office of Operations Research, Incorporated for the US Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Advanced Studies (USACDCIAS). The purpose of the case study is to develop a better understanding of the political, economic, social, psychological, public health, scientific-technological, and military factors conducive to low intensity conflict and change of indigenous governmental control. A total of seven such studies has been completed and placed on file at the Defense Documentation Center (DDC) for authorized users.

2. The seven case studies were used as basic research for the USACDCIAS study of Army Roles, Missions, and Doctrine in Low Intensity Conflict (ARMLIC). No assumptions are made as to whether Army actions are either desirable or necessary in connection with any given conflict. It is recognized that Army capabilities to give military or civilian assistance are among those that the US Government may use or not, in furtherance of US policy and national interests, and that they should be designed and maintained to best serve the purposes of national authorities with the greatest effectiveness at the least cost.

3. The data in this report were drawn from open sources, published and unpublished, available through public institutions and Government agencies. No field work is involved, and no policy recommendations are made. The data have been checked against selected classified sources and with knowledgeable individuals. Modified systems analysis methods, aimed at determining points of tension or dysfunction conducive to low intensity conflict, were used. Basic assumptions and study method for the ARMLIC study are on file at USACDCIAS.

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
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Figure 1. Physical and Political Map of Iran



1. AZARBAIJAN-E
2. AZARBAIJAN-E KHAVARI
3. BAKHTARI
4. GILAN
5. KORDESTAN
6. HAMADAN
7. KERMANSHAHAN
8. LORESTAN
9. TEHRAN
10. MAZANDARAN
11. SEMNAN
12. KHORASAN
13. ESFAHAN
14. BAKHTIARI VA CHAHAR MAHALL
15. KHUZESTAN
16. BOYER AHMADI-YE SARDSIR VA KOHKILUYEH
17. BANADER VA JAZAYER-E KHALIJ-E FARS
18. FARS
19. KERMAN
20. BANADER VA JAZAYER-E BAHR-E 'OMMAN
21. BALUCHESTAN VA SISTAN

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TABLE I. FACTORS CONDUCIVE TO VIOLENCE IN IRAN

## Separatist conflict

1. Soviet influence; wartime occupation
2. Regionalism encouraged by Soviet presence
3. Lack of integrated economy
4. Economic underdevelopment
5. Dislocations of World War II
6. Military weakness
7. Widespread malnutrition and disease

## Pre-Mossadeq era

1. British influence
2. Inadequate political system
3. Impact of modernization
4. Increased nationalist sentiment
5. Urbanization
6. Religious fervor
7. Cultural tendencies toward authoritarianism, individualism, and expediency



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TABLE II. CHRONOLOGY OF SALIENT PRECONFLICT EVENTS IN IRAN

## Preconflict

- 1921 Reza Khan coup d'etat; organizes a national Army.
- 1922-27 US adviser Millspaugh directs Persian finances.
- 1925 Reza Khan becomes Shah and pushes national development.
- 1930-32 First oil-royalty dispute with the United Kingdom.
- 1937 Trans-Iranian railway completed.
- 1941 Soviet and British forces occupy Iran; Shah abdicates; Mohammed Reza crowned Shah.
- 1942 US forces join Soviets and British. Creation of Tudeh Party.
- 1944 Soviets demand oil concessions; Tehran resists.

## First conflict period: 1945-46

- 1945 Azerbaijan and Mahabad (Kurdish) separatist movements.
- 1946 US augments support. Oil concession with Soviets; Soviets withdraw military support for separatists.

## Interconflict period: 1945-51

- 1947 Iranians reject Soviet oil concession; US military assistance begins; Tudeh reorganization.
- 1949 Attempted assassination of Shah; Tudeh forced underground. Plan organization law passed. Shah visits United States; IBRD refuses aid.
- 1950 US-Iranian mutual defense assistance agreement.
- 1951 Emergence of Mossadeq and national front. British oil nationalization crisis. Raznara assassinated. Tudeh reemerges.

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TABLE II (continued)

Second conflict period: 1951-53

1952	Mass strikes, general disorder to support Mossadeq.
1953	Shah attempts to replace Mossadeq; General Zahedi rallies Army against Mossadeq; Mossadeq forced to give up government.

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## SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS: FACTORS CONDUCTIVE TO CONFLICT

### 1. Overview.

a. Since World War II, Iran has experienced two upheavals of differing types: the attempted establishment of separatist regimes in the northern provinces of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, 1945-46, and the troubled era of oil nationalization and civil dissidence under Prime Minister Mossadeq, 1951-53. This study examines the preconflict situation in Iran during the period 1921-51 to determine what aspects were conducive to conflict.

b. With respect to the separatist conflict in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, Soviet influence was the primary factor. Regionalism and the lack of integrated Iranian economy were significant contributing elements, reinforced by the dislocations of World War II and the military weakness of Iran during the war years.

c. External influence, both British and Soviet, was an important factor contributing to the turmoil of the Mossadeq era. Other major factors, which were probably of even greater importance, included inadequacy of the Iranian political system, the impact of modernization, nationalist sentiment, urbanization, religious fervor, and Iranian cultural tendencies toward authoritarianism, individualism, and expediency. Many of these factors also lay behind the separatist conflict.

d. At the same time, there were factors in Iran which tended to dampen conflict and violence and which may account for the fact that the two conflict situations were no worse: a stable and security-engendering

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family system; a widespread communication network through informal social groupings and family ties; effective military and security organization; widely shared belief in the Shi'ite doctrine of Islam and in the greatness of Persian national tradition; the unifying (if conflicting) symbols of the Shah and the Constitution; and, the orderly succession of Reza Shah's son to the throne as a result of his father's foresight and his own ability. US influence and assistance were also significant stabilizing factors.

e. The Iranian preconflict situation was much too complex to be described by such a simple catalog of factors. Other aspects--for example, malnutrition and widespread disease--were probably conducive to tension and conflict, directly or indirectly, as is apparent from a reading of the detailed papers in this study. The factors singled out for discussion in the following paragraphs are those which, on the basis of the available sources, appear to have been primarily or largely responsible for a climate conducive to low intensity conflict.

### 2. Destabilizing factors preceding the separatist conflict.

a. Soviet influence. Both the USSR and United Kingdom had involved themselves in Iranian affairs for over a hundred years, for both strategic and economic reasons. Iran was too weak to do more than play one against the other and seek benefits from both, at costs which several times aroused popular nationalist and antiforeign feeling. The USSR, which had seized territory from Persia in the early 19th century, sought oil, mineral, fishing, and commercial rights and a "sphere of influence" in northern Iran. Following the revolution, the USSR continued the same policy in

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Communist terms, exerting its influence first through a small Communist Party, then (from 1941) through the Communist minority in the left-oriented Tudeh Party, as well as by diplomatic, economic, propaganda, and military pressures. From the vantage point of ostensibly defensive military occupations in both world wars, the USSR succeeded not only in promoting short-lived "republics" in the northern areas of interest to it, but also in playing a major role in the only really effective political party in Iran during and after World War II.

b. Regionalism. Traditionally, during periods of weak Iranian central Government, the major regions had asserted considerable autonomy in taxation and administration, although they had not, for the most part, attempted to assert complete independence. The same was true of the major tribes. Reza Shah had been able to reassert Government control through the army and gendarmerie in the 1920s, but regional and tribal consciousness remained, the result of historic ethnic differences, geographic separation, poor communications, and in some cases, cultural and language barriers. Both the Soviets and the British had sought to exploit regionalism to promote their national interests. In the case of the northern provinces, the USSR had the advantage of kindred peoples across the border and of traditional economic interrelationships. (Although there were few Kurds in Soviet territory, they were more culturally separated from other Iranians and were linked with Kurdish populations in Turkey and Iraq.) These conditions aided the USSR in its promotion of separatist regimes in both world wars, but once Soviet power was withdrawn, they proved insufficient to stand against traditional ties to Iran.

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c. Economic underdevelopment. Traditionally, the peripheral regions of Iran had closer economic ties with surrounding areas than with the center, and the various Iranian areas lacked both economic complementarity and adequate transport and communications. Reza Shah sought to overcome this decentralization and external dependence by such programs as building the Trans-Iranian Railway and the establishment of key industries, but the programs were hindered by inefficiency, lack of capital, and inadequate conception. Azerbaijan, in particular, had traditional trading ties with the USSR and considered that it had received less than its share of economic benefits under Reza Shah. The threat of economic cutoff from the center accordingly meant relatively little, while the Soviets could have been seen as an equally rewarding source of economic development. Somewhat the same situation prevailed in Kurdistan, which was even more isolated from the Iranian center.

d. Military weakness. The collapse of the Iranian Army at the time of the entry of Soviet and British forces demonstrated its unexpected weakness to a people accustomed and encouraged to respect its power (although they also detested the Army and security forces). Reza Shah was thus deprived both of the mainstay of his political power and of bargaining leverage with the Allies. His abdication and the ensuing power vacuum were in part the consequence, although other forces would very likely have produced political change at some time.

e. Other factors. Inadequacies of the Iranian political system, the disruptions of modernization, and World War II dislocations contributed to conflict in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan as well as in the Mossadeq period. They are summarized in chapter 1, paragraph 7.

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### 3. Destabilizing factors preceding the Mossadeq era.

a. British influence. The UK, like Russia, had been involved in Iran since the early 19th century, and had played a part in the mid-19th century secession of Afghanistan and part of Baluchistan from Iran. British commercial as well as strategic interest in Iran grew. The UK for years depended upon Iranian oil to supply its navy, and had erected a quasi-autonomous enclave around the oil wells and refinery operated by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in the southwest. In addition, the UK wanted to assure that India's western neighbor would remain friendly and secure against hostile influence. British influence in Iranian affairs, both economic and political, gave the UK a reputation for cleverness and ubiquity among Iranians which went considerably beyond the facts, especially after World War II, but which produced a strong nationalist reaction--exacerbated by heavy-handed dealings regarding the control of petroleum resources and the division of oil revenues.

b. Inadequacy of the political system. When Reza Khan seized political power in 1921, the political system under the Qajar Dynasty was weak, barely able to cope with centrifugal forces of regionalism and tribalism, and scarcely into the early stages of transition from a traditional Oriental despotism. Reza Khan (who made himself Shah in 1925) undertook a program of forced political and economic modernization; but his regime was over-centralized and inefficient, and his power was chiefly based on the Army and security forces, which he used to impose his reforms. He restored security throughout the country and achieved real successes, such as the mobilization of domestic resources for capital investment, but he grew

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increasingly autocratic and grasping. There was no opportunity for the emergence of creative leadership at lower levels. The Shah, however, trained his son to succeed him. When his vaunted Army, mainstay of his regime, collapsed in 1941, he was forced to abdicate. The ensuing vacuum and struggle for power produced political uncertainty for 8 years, coupled with reversion to the old attitude of temporizing with foreign influence. Government organization was procedure-bound, highly status conscious, without initiative or horizontal coordination, weakened by overstaffing and nepotism, corrupt, and unresponsive to the needs of the general public.

c. Impact of modernization. Iran's strategic position forced the nation into contact with more technically advanced nations. In consequence, the elite were impelled to catch up, both to maintain national security and to gain the advantages of Western civilization. The traditional political, economic, and social systems and a largely illiterate and religiously oriented population responded only slowly to the urgings of the elite, however, and even the elite were divided among regions and social groups. The consequent stresses and tensions exacerbated rivalries and contributed to feelings of insecurity, as traditional values and beliefs were eroded. In Azerbaijan, people believed themselves discriminated against in the allocation of benefits. Mohammed Mossadeq was able to direct the tensions and insecurity of modernization against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

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d. Nationalism. Iranians widely shared a proud imperial tradition. There was a general feeling, before and during the period here reviewed, of malaise and discouragement at the low estate to which Iran had fallen among nations and strong hostility toward the powers encroaching upon Iranian sovereignty. Such feelings manifested themselves as early as 1893, when the Shah was forced by popular outcry to revoke a tobacco monopoly granted to a British enterprise. Another example was opposition to the 1921 treaty with the United Kingdom, which would have put the Iranian Government under British tutelage. The nationalist fervor that Mossadeq was able to direct against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company beginning in 1949 was not a new phenomenon, but it gained force from the growing sophistication and influence of middle class and intellectual elements and from the traumatic series of events after 1941. It was reinforced, also, by skillful Communist organization and propaganda through the Tudeh Party and by the charismatic personality of Mossadeq himself.

e. Urbanization. The growth of Iranian cities was not spectacular, and the impact of urbanization was shared to some extent among regional centers as well as Tehran. Nevertheless, the cultural and social impact of modernization hit the new urban residents hardest. These were the people who were deprived of the security of their traditional agrarian society and surroundings; whose traditional value system was most severely challenged by their new environment; and who had to depend on a new set of relationships for their economic support. The cultural vacuum was partially filled by the labor unions and by the cell

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organization of the Tudeh Party, thus linking the proletariat to Communist and other left-leaning intellectuals and power-seekers. Communism had some factors in common with the traditional Muslim faith and, under these confused conditions, could therefore find ideological converts. Although exploitable tensions also existed in rural areas--especially between landlords, agents, tax collectors, and gendarmes on the one hand, and tenants and peasants on the other--the traditional culture there seems to have been largely proof against modernization and subversion through 1951.

f. Religious fervor. Despite Communist inroads, most people in both city and country remained firmly Muslim and were capable of being swayed by their spiritual leaders in favor of political and economic action, especially against unbelievers. It was a religiously-invoked tobacco boycott which forced cancellation of the 19th century British concession referred to above. It remained possible, therefore, for a political leader to gain support through connections with religious leaders, as Mossadeq did through the Mullah Kashani.

g. Iranian culture. Iranians were conditioned from childhood to a pattern of submission to authority and dominance over their own inferiors which impeded effective communication and understanding. At the same time, Iranians were strongly individualistic rather than cooperative, so that formally organized group action was all but impossible in any but a hierarchial structure executing the will of the top man. Rivalry, rather than cooperation, was the norm of political and social action. These impediments were only partially offset by the widespread patterns of

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informal social groupings of equals and of family ties among various sectors of political and social life. In addition, the culture did not foster attributes such as trust and honesty which are essential for a complex modern society; on the other hand, it permitted, if not encouraged, deceit and guile in the pursuit of family and personal advancement. There was religious sanction for lying. There was no strong sense of group responsibility or civic consciousness above local village level, although pride of belonging to the Iranian blood and tradition was strong.

h. Impact of World War II. Occupation of Iran by British and Soviet forces, together with the stringencies of wartime supply and transport shortages, caused national humiliation and--especially in the early years--such serious economic deprivation that there were bread riots in Tehran. Inflation caused deprivation for some and great profits for others. A new class of entrepreneurs emerged to handle contract services for the foreign forces; some of these men were ruined by postwar economic policies and joined the ranks of the discontented. The central Government, as a result of occupation, lost both its autocratic head and its effective jurisdiction over much of its territory and many areas of its national affairs for 4 years while rival politicians, released from prison at Allied initiative, vied for control of the largely empty shell of Government authority, and while each of the two occupying powers sought to increase its influence among the politicians by propaganda and other blandishments. The consequence was to augment all the strains already present in Iranian society and politics, while virtually suspending for 4 years any effective indigenous progress toward their resolution.

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## 4. Stabilizing factors.

a. Family system. Although the Iranian family was strongly authoritarian and even harsh, its ties were strong, and it was the principal source of security in a threatening and insecure world. Family ties to some extent survived urban migration and upward and downward mobility. The well-to-do consciously strove to place various family members in as many different sectors of politics and society as they could, as a form of insurance against the vicissitudes of existence; and the more wealthy felt some obligation to share with their poor relations.

b. National symbols and tradition. The age-old institution of the Shahanshah, King of Kings, was the one aspect of the Iranian state which was generally recognized and revered as the legitimate source of authority sanctioned both by religion and by lay tradition. Although Reza Shah was regarded as a usurper (as indeed he was) by many of the elite of the Qajar period until he died and to some extent his son after him) yet his son's status as hereditary and legitimate Shah was probably the principal source of his son's strength in the early years of his reign. The Iranian Constitution was also a unifying symbol, for it represented progress and modernity to the liberals and intellectuals, notwithstanding frequent disregard of it in both letter and spirit.

c. Military power. Despite their corruption and internal shortcomings and the popular dislike for them, the military and security forces built up by Reza Shah were strong and effective stabilizing elements. The Army and gendarmerie restored order and submission to central authority throughout the country early in Reza Shah's reign and maintained them thereafter.



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Mohammed Reza Shah moved promptly to reconstitute the Army as his major political power base after its collapse of 1941. Its reestablishment in this position was demonstrated by the coup de grace it administered to the Azerbaijania and Kurdish separatists in 1946, once they were deprived of Soviet military support.

d. Communications. In the "dowrahs" (informal social groups--see chapters 2 and 4) of the upper and middle classes, the "houses of strength" of the artisans and workers, and the innumerable teahouses of bazaars and villages, Iran had a pervasive set of communication channels which probably offset the otherwise rigidly vertical lines of political and social groups. These informal groupings, together with the important family ties, may well have remained the primary means of communication throughout the preconflict period in Iran, although they were increasingly supplemented by mass media and education.

e. Religious belief. Virtually the entire population of Iran was Muslim, and religious minorities were too small to be politically significant except in particular localities and social sectors. By far the majority of the Muslims were Shi'ites--the principal exceptions being the Arabs of Khuzistan (the area of the British oil fields) and the Kurds. With these exceptions, religion drew all the population together in a common faith and brotherhood. Despite the weakening effect of modernization and Reza Shah's policies, the clergy had positions of influence, especially in rural areas, which could be exerted in the cause of national unity. Their hierarchy, moreover, served as another channel of communication from the masses to the political elite; and the faith

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they preached did much to facilitate Iranian acceptance of a rather difficult lot in life, although its fatalism also may have militated against innovation and creativity.

f. Orderly succession. Notwithstanding Reza Shah's complete monopoly of leadership, he took great pains to educate and train his son to succeed him on the throne, in great contrast to the policies of most Oriental monarchs. In consequence, Mohammed Reza Shah was relatively well equipped to succeed his father. His own capacities and the wisdom of his father, reinforced by the continuing prestige of the Iranian throne and the desire of the occupying powers for stability, combined to produce one of the relatively few legitimate and constitutional leadership successions among developing countries in this century. Iran was thus spared an internal conflict.

g. US influence. At a time when most Iranians trusted neither British nor Soviets and disliked both, the United States was viewed as a friendly source of needed stability and support without aggressive intentions of its own. Thus the United States was able to back up the Iranian Government in opposing the Soviet venture into Azerbaijan and Kurdistan and subsequently to offer valuable financial, technical, and military assistance in strengthening the young Shah's government.

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### CHAPTER 1

#### INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

5. Nature of the study.

a. Iran is one of seven nations selected for analysis of the factors which lead to low intensity conflict and loss of Government control. Study of the preconflict period, defined for research purposes as 1921-51, was conducted on an interdisciplinary basis, examining political, economic, sociological, psychological, public health, scientific-technological, and military aspects of the period. Definitions, assumptions, and study method which are common to all the countries examined are on file at the Institute of Advanced Studies.

b. The data were drawn from an exhaustive perusal of published works on Iran and some unpublished sources, especially for statistical purposes. The Center for Research on Social Systems of the American University provided information for compiling the bibliography and furnished certain statistical information. The findings, where possible and appropriate, were checked against classified Government information as to their validity. The results are summarized in the following sections of this chapter and are presented at more length, by discipline, in the succeeding chapters on political, economic, sociological (including cultural and public health), and military factors.

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c. Descriptive information is included in this report only to the extent necessary for coherent analysis. Brief descriptive notes on Iran are given in paragraph 2 below for general background purposes. More complete data are available in the US Army Area Handbook for Iran and in other works cited in the bibliography.

## 6. Descriptive background.

### a. Geography.

(1) Iran, with an area of about 630,000 square miles (a little larger than Alaska), is bounded on the north by the Soviet Union and the Caspian Sea; on the west by Iraq and Turkey; on the east by Afghanistan and Pakistan; and on the south by the Persian Gulf. It is largely a semiarid plateau about 4,000 feet above sea level, with high mountain ranges and a considerable amount of barren desert in the east. The Caspian coastal region is semitropical and fertile. The Persian Gulf area is characterized by extreme heat and general aridity.

(2) The two chief mountain ranges (the Elburz in the north and the Zagros in the west) stamp a V on the plateau, with its apex in the northwest. Most of the drainage is from these two great ranges into the interior deserts, with limited drainage into the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. Only the Karun River, emptying into the Persian Gulf, is navigable for any distance; other rivers offer hydroelectric potential.



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(3) Iran has a continental climate with cold winters and hot summers. Over the plateau, annual rainfall does not exceed 12 inches; the deserts and Persian Gulf littoral receive less than 5 inches. Heavy snows on the mountain peaks are the principal source of water for irrigation in spring and early summer. The Caspian littoral is warm and humid throughout the year, with a rainfall of 40 to 60 inches. Less than one-tenth of the country is forested--chiefly on the northern slopes of the Elburz Mountains.

b. The people.

(1) The census of 1956 established the population of Iran at just under 19 million; as of 1968, it was estimated at 26 million. Over half the population is Iranian (or Persian)--direct descendants of the Aryans who moved into the country from the 10th century. Principal among these are the Azerbaijani in the northwest; others are in the east. Arab groups moved in from the 7th century and live in the southwest and in scattered colonies in the northeast.

(2) Tribal groups, originally seminomadic but gradually becoming settled, have been a conspicuous element in Iran for many centuries. In the Zagros range and its extensions are Kurds, Lurs, Bakhtiari, Qashqa'i, and Mamasanix; other groups include Kahmseh, Shahsevans, Arabs, Baluchi, and Turkoman. Some of these groups are ethnically related to the Persians.

(3) Over half the people of Iran speak Farsi (Persian), the Indo-European language of the majority ethnic group, which is the official national language. It is written in an adapted Arabic script. Turkic dialects are spoken by the Turkish peoples. Others have their own

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languages, several of Indo-European origin. The overwhelming majority of the population is Muslim, but a small proportion of these are of the Sunni sects, while most are Shi'ite. There were about 110,000 Christians in 1956, including Armenians and Assyrians (Nestorians), and smaller numbers of Jews, Zoroastrians, and others.

(4) Tehran, capitol and largest city, has a population of over two million. Other major cities with more than 100,000 population are Tabriz, Isfahan, Meshed, Abadan, Shiraz, Kermanshah, Ahvaz, Rasht, and Hamadan.

## c. History.

(1) The Iranians entered the already-inhabited Iranian plateau around 1500 B.C. There were two principal groups: the Medes, who settled around modern Hamadan in the west, and the Persians, who settled to the south of them. Cyrus combined the Medes and Persians under the Achaemenid Dynasty in 553 B.C., and his successors greatly extended the empire; but it fell to Alexander in 330 B.C. Parthians and then Sassanians succeeded to power but succumbed to the Arabs in the 7th century A.D. At this time the native religion, Zoroastrianism, was displaced by Islam. The Arabs were succeeded first by the indigenous Chaznevids, then by the Seljuk Turks.

(2) The Mongols invaded Iran in 1219, and a Mongol Dynasty ruled for over a hundred years. Tamurlane displaced the Mongols beginning in 1380, and his descendants ruled until their empire disintegrated into local principalities in the 16th century. One of these, the Safawids, reunified the Empire under the first Iranian rulers in centuries. They imposed the Shi'a form of Islam and reestablished Iranian power and

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prosperity. The zenith of this period came under Shah Abbas (1587-1628), who made Isfahan the capitol and erected splendid buildings there. Another period of decline saw conquest by the Afghans, a brief but bloody reign by Nadir Shah, and Zand hegemony in the south. The Qajar family, of Turkic origin, established control over all of Iran in the late 18th century, and the Qajar Dynasty continued until it was displaced by Reza Khan, an Iranian officer in the Russian-organized Cossack Division, in 1925.

(3) In the mid-19th century, the already weakening Qajar Dynasty was challenged by the impact of modernizing Russia on the north, and by the concerns of Great Britain for the protection of India and the expansion of trade. Western pressures reached a climax when Iran became a battlefield for British, Russian, and Turkish troops in World War I, and the Russians promoted separatist movements in northern Iran. In 1921, Reza Khan supported a coup d'etat by a young reforming aristocrat, then took power himself, and in 1925 established himself on the throne. In the course of 20 years, he started the country on the road to modernization; but after a second occupation of the country by Soviet and British forces in 1941, he abdicated in favor of his son, Mohammed Reza Shah, who is the present monarch.

(4) Despite the succession of foreign and indigenous rulers, the culture and traditions of Iran remained intact. The country was never subjugated to dominion by another power for any length of time, and its conquerors adopted the Iranian culture and institutions. The long history of Iranian greatness is a proud heritage of its population, including many of the minority groups.

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(5) After World War II, the Soviets backed Communist-inspired revolts in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in the northwest. Iranian Government action, backed by the United Nations and supported by the United States, forced the Soviets to abandon their venture and move out. The puppet regimes collapsed on the entry of Iranian forces. The ensuing period witnessed growth of Iranian nationalism that culminated in the nationalization of oil in March 1951.

(6) After a troubled period of 2 years, the government of Mohammed Mossadeq was overthrown in 1953 and General Fazlollah Zahedi was appointed by the Shah to take over. During the 16 years since that time, there has been steady and rapid economic development, including large-scale land reform and general political stability.

### d. Government and politics.

(1) Iran is a constitutional monarchy headed by the Shah, with an elected Majlis (lower House) and a Senate, which is one-half elected and one-half appointed by the Shah. The Prime Minister is named by the Shah with the approval of both houses. At times the Parliament, particularly the Majlis, has had a determining voice in the choice, and a major voice in the Government policy; at other times, particularly during Reza Shah's reign, it followed the monarch's desires. The formal system of government resembles European parliamentary systems, but the Shah has more power and a more active role than his European counterparts.

(2) The traditional absolute monarchy ended with a constitutional movement of 1906, which imposed the present constitution (since amended) upon the Shah. The politics of the country has since been

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concerned with the interrelated issues of foreign influence, national security, national unity, modernization, political freedom, and a growing spirit of nationalism. Until very recently, there were no mass movements or broadly based political parties; the nation's politics was primarily influenced by a relatively few national figures and their supporters, although national elections for the Parliament were held at intervals throughout the period reviewed. The Communist-dominated Tudeh Party was then first to achieve a mass base, which gave it considerable power. It was outlawed in 1949, in the aftermath of an attempt to assassinate the Shah.

### e. Economy.

(1) Iran is predominantly agricultural in its economy, with two-thirds of its population living in rural areas. About one-fourth of the country is suitable for cultivation; three-eighths of this area is actually farmed. About one-third of the cultivated land is irrigated, using a system of underground canals. The staple crops are wheat, barley, and rice. Other major products include fruits, especially citrus fruits, and dates. Cash crops include tobacco, cotton, sugar, beets, tea, and silkworm cocoons. The pasturelands support millions of sheep, goats, and cattle. Caviar from the Caspian Sea fisheries is an important export; it was a Soviet monopoly for many years and is still exported through the USSR.

(2) Iran has extensive mineral resources, by far the most important being petroleum. The first well was brought in by the British in 1908, and until oil was nationalized in 1951 the petroleum industry was an enclave controlled by the British, virtually independent of Iran. The Iranian share of the revenues was nonetheless an important element in

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the State budget. By 1965, the Iranian major oil fields, all in the southwest, produced a quarterly average of 22.1 million tons of crude oil, and revenues totalled \$514 million for the year. There was also a large natural gas production. Other materials mined include coal, chromite, iron ore, copper, lead, tin, antimony, sulphur, nickel, cobalt, and red oxide.

(3) Iran's industrial development dates essentially from the beginning of Reza Shah's program of State enterprise in 1930. Initial attention was concentrated on beet sugar plants, textile mills, match factories, a cigarette factory, and production of cement and glass. During the thirties, the Trans-Iranian Railway was constructed from capital raised by taxes on salt and tea. Development was slow before World War II and hindered by wartime supply shortages and inflation, but has moved ahead since then with growing speed. Industrial activities (both Government and private) have expanded to include plastic, machine repair and metalworking, bricks, soap, tires, automobile assembly, rubber goods, and food processing. Most manufacturing is for domestic consumption. One-third of the crude oil produced is refined in Iran.

(4) In 1949, a Plan Organization was established as an independent Government agency to further national economic development. The first development plan, drawn up with foreign advice (largely US), also appeared that year. Subsequent development plans have continued to guide economic development, with growing sophistication and success, despite a serious balance-of-payment problem and inflation in 1960-62. The Fourth Development Plan (1968-73) calls for \$6.4 billion in public expenditure and anticipates an average annual economic growth rate of at least 9 percent.

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### f. Foreign relations.

(1) From the mid-19th century, Iran's affairs were increasingly influenced by the European powers, particularly Great Britain and the USSR. Special foreign privileges, similar to the capitulations to Turkey, continued until 1931, and Belgian officials controlled Iranian customs until 1941. Reza Shah reasserted the nation's independence of action, but the German threat in World War II led to occupation by British and Soviet forces. Iran was a major supply route for lend-lease materials to the USSR during the war.

(2) After World War II, Iran received US military and economic assistance as a consequence of the Soviet promotion of separatist regimes in northern Iran and the cold war. Relations with the West were strained by the nationalization of the British-owned petroleum company. The petroleum issue was resolved through an international consortium in 1954. Iran joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955 (now the Central Treaty Organization) and has maintained this stand despite Soviet pressure. In 1962, Iran declared that it would not permit foreign missiles to be based on its soil. Since 1962, Iran has maintained normal relations with both East and West. In recent years, there have been problems in Middle Eastern relations. A special factor in these relations for Iran is the presence of Kurdish populations in Turkey and Iraq.

(3) The United States has extended to Iran such assistance as sales of surplus agricultural commodities as required by the Iranian supply situation, technical assistance for economic development, and military assistance. The US AID mission to Iran was closed on 30 November 1967.

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## 7. Political factors.

### a. Background.

(1) Iran has been drawn into great-power rivalries because of strategic locations and economic resources. In the 19th century, it became a focus of attention and influence for Great Britain, anxious to protect India and the USSR, looking for southward expansion. France and Germany exerted lesser influence, largely economic and cultural. Turkey at times threatened Iran, most recently in World War I. In the 20th century, both British and Soviet troops occupied Iran in the two world wars to keep the country out of German (or Turkish) hands. US involvement in Iran began in the late 1940s, when the United States took over from the United Kingdom in opposing Soviet penetration. British exploitation of Iranian oil reserves began in 1906; their importance to the UK is demonstrated by the conversion of the British Navy from coal to oil in 1913. Soviet appetite for oil in northern Iran was an element in Soviet policies toward the country, including the Soviet sponsorship of separatist Azerbaijan, and Soviet control of Caspian fisheries dates from the mid-19th century. Foreign control of oil and the Iranian reaction to it were the proximate cause of the Mossadeq period of unrest which began in 1951.

(2) As a consequence of these involvements of the great powers, and of the weakness of its own rulers in the 19th century, Iran was obliged to preserve its independence by playing off one against the other and seeking to derive maximum benefit from both, although popular revulsion prevented some proposed concessions. Reza Shah, who founded a new dynasty

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in 1925, sought to change this picture, and to a considerable extent succeeded; but the contending forces of the great powers in World War II were too much for him.

### b. Political culture.

(1) Nineteenth-century contacts brought Western political ideas to Iran and caused intellectual and social ferment among the elite, first demonstrated in the Constitutional movement of 1905-1906. Iranian students abroad, and missionary and other Western-oriented schools in Iran propagated the new ideas, and for a time business and religious interests supported reform as a weapon against the monarchy. Western concepts, however, were fundamentally different from Iranian tradition. Conflicts between the two led to constantly mounting tensions which were still unresolved in 1951.

(2) Despite strong regional differences, the Iranian people share a respect for the long Iranian tradition of independence and empire, known to all through song and story as well as through education, and respect for the institution of the Shah. Most people also share the belief in the Shi'a sect of Islam. These three elements promoted a sense of Iranian identity, but not--for most--the feelings of patriotism or identification with a Government structure necessary for a modern state. Many Iranians also shared an unarticulated awareness of Iran's decline in national power. This feeling led to assertiveness, on the one hand, and tendencies toward despondency and apathy, on the other.

(3) In the tension between old and new, the Shah symbolized tradition; and the Constitution and Majlis (National Assembly), the

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modernizing trend. Much of the Shah's support among the masses derived from this symbolic status. Moreover, to the extent that modernization was linked to sophisticated Western-style pluralism, it was at least partially self-defeating, because of the lower efficiency of pluralistic institutions in driving for rapid economic and social reform. Western-derived institutions thus lacked validation in terms either of cultural tradition or of pragmatic efficacy. Reza Shah sought to associate himself and his position (after an abortive try at establishing a republic) with the cause of modernization, while minimizing the role of the Constitution and Majlis. His son, for the first decade of rule, tended rather to follow constitutional processes--a policy which, after his father's autocratic rule, led to considerable confusion.

(4) Persian culture stressed individualism, coupled with relations of dominance and submission based partly on family and social position, but to a considerable extent also on personal characteristics such as age, courage, eloquence, shrewdness, and landed wealth. Individualism amounted to a lack of community or group responsibility, manifested in atomistic and often contentious behavior toward social equals. (Strong family loyalties were a conspicuous exception to this pattern, although they were beginning to break down. Another exception was traditional hospitality toward strangers.) In consequence, centralization of Government was extreme, and lateral coordination among agencies was rare. Religion served political ends as both opiate and stimulant of the people. Religiously involved mob violence had a long history. So did religiously sanctioned deception (taqiya).

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### c. Political socialization and recruitment.

(1) Not until Reza Shah's time had there been any organized political indoctrination aimed at instilling patriotism and nationalism. Even by 1950, although the franchise was widely held, there was little mass awareness of its significance; and the Shah complained in his 1961 book that "in many homes no effort is made to instill in the children a sense of personal and civic responsibility." Many intellectuals became disaffected and alienated by the tensions between old and new; these same tensions would have made such groups as the urban poor ready prey for demagoguery.

(2) In 1951, Iran was suffering from a lack of leadership talent, as a result of Reza Shah's thwarting of the development of a younger leadership cadre, of continued recruitment along traditional lines of social status and family ties irrespective of capacity, and lack of understanding of what leadership in modern society entailed. In consequence, after 1941, the main source of top leadership was the generation of leaders who had been pushed aside by Reza Shah--most in their sixties and seventies. National politics continued as a game played by a few elite players, little affected by elections except for a growing vocal opposition in the cities. Communication between rulers and people was poor; one of the traditional mediation channels, the resident landlords, had largely disappeared. Riots and demonstrations, either spontaneous or incited by religious leaders, appear frequently in Iranian history, some of them accompanied by much violence and cruelty; these were the only meaningful ways of mass political expression. Modern varieties of participation were largely unknown; instead,

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there were in. al pressures and connections through ties of family, origin, common experience, or vocational connection. The Tudeh (Communist) Party was one exception.

### d. Political attitudes and expectations.

(1) In political terms, Iranian society consisted of the following groups: landed aristocracy, modern businessmen, bazaar merchants and guild artisans, clergy, military, bureaucracy, professionals, intellectuals, urban workers, rural peasantry, and seminomadic tribes. Group consciousness was not highly developed, but groups nonetheless had similar views on modernization and change. There was no class conflict as such; tensions arose from differing views on major issues, from differing interests, from tensions and rivalries inherent in the culture, and from perceived deprivations--many of these arising from the uneven impact of modernization.

(2) The desire for modernization was generally manifested throughout Iranian society, although the implications were not clearly understood. The general public desired bread, and lightening of the burdern of everyday existence, as well as Iranian national dignity and prestige and an end to foreign influence. The more sophisticated wanted social reform, free elections, industrialization, land distribution, nationalization of petroleum, end to corruption, less religious influence, opening of careers to talent, universal literacy, and recovery of certain lost territories. The gap between these desires and their realization, plus the difficulties of group action in the Iranian political setting, were a major source of frustration and alienation for reform-minded intellectuals: no political party or group, except the Communists, had a program for integrating all the things desired or for action to achieve them.

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(3) The Iranian attitude toward foreigners was ambivalent: they were respected for their power, money, and (in the case of the British) cleverness; they were treated courteously, as Persian culture required; yet they were disliked for their strangeness, meddling (including foreign occupation in both world wars), and condescension. The USSR was feared more than the UK on the basis of demonstrated aggressiveness. The oil issue became a focus for growing xenophobia in the late forties, but there had been similar manifestations--with religious overtones--as early as the 19th century.

e. Political leadership. Reza Shah, through strong, autocratic leadership, did somewhat the same for his country as Ataturk did for Turkey, but he had a more limited vision and probably a more difficult problem. He arranged for an orderly succession by his son, but failed to encourage the development of subsidiary leadership levels. Mohammed Reza Shah attempted to govern as a constitutional monarch; the contrast with his father's methods was a factor in the political confusion of this period, but he gradually asserted stronger leadership. The intervening power vacuum was filled by several older leaders, of whom the most redoubtable were Ahmad Qavam, who was instrumental in frustrating Soviet ambitions, and Mohammed Mossadeq--a charismatic aristocrat, embittered by his long eclipse under Reza Shah but something of a hero for his long-sustained opposition to the Shah's autocracy and for his personal character. His political skill enabled him to build a nationalist coalition of landowners, clerics, liberals, and the urban poor and unemployed on the basis of opposition to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and to the possibility of renewed royal

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dictatorship. His platform, however, was largely a negative one, not primarily aimed at the nation's basic economic and social problems. Political leadership, never strongly innovative, was confined to a small group of men over a long period of time.

### f. Political parties.

(1) The Iranian political system prior to 1951 did not include political parties in the modern sense. Except for the Tudeh Party, which had the benefit of Communist tutelage, there were only small groups and factions surrounding individual personalities, constantly reforming and shifting. However, these groupings did serve a political purpose in the modernization process. The Nationalist movement of 1906, based on political discussion clubs of the progressive-minded elite, rallied support to the cause of constitutionalism and reform.

(2) In the new Parliament, groupings of members played a limited role in aggregating political demands and interests, although traditional informal channels of individual communication and interest were more important. During Reza Shah's reign, all political parties were eliminated, although a rubber-stamp assembly remained in existence. Following the Shah's abdication in 1941, and with some encouragement from the British and Soviets, several political "parties" reemerged, spanning the spectrum from left to right. In addition to the Communist-oriented Tudeh, one other--the National Will Party of Sayyid Zai u'd-din Tabatabai, with British backing--endeavored to develop a vertical mass organization, and had 37 votes in Parliament by 1945. The other political groupings were not directly represented in the Parliament and had no large following

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but played some part in focusing political thinking, especially in opposition to foreign influence. For a time in 1946, Qavam's Democratic Party developed a modern organizational framework with \$0.5 million collected to support it, and gained control of the Parliament. This organization made it possible to reject the oil agreement with the Soviet Union and to put through the beginnings of a national development plan. However, Qavam and his party could not withstand the pressure of the Shah, who was concerned at their challenge to his own position. The Party's effective life was therefore a short one.

(3) In the period 1947-51, when the immediate external threat receded, there was a radicalization of the political scene stimulated by the antiforeign sentiment. A National Front emerged, but it had little real organization or influence of its own; it rather reflected Mossadeq's own personal leadership and the climate of the times.

(4) Certain interest groups in Iran were of some importance in influencing political action. Most significant were the small informal discussion groups of the elite called "dowrah" which served as a major political communication and opinion-forming channel. These had a counterpart in the "House of Strength" among men in the bazaars. Traditional guilds played a role in Mossadeq's rise to power, 1949-51. The Chamber of Commerce influenced Government actions concerning business. Labor was an object of Tudeh Party organizing efforts, the success of which led to Government establishment of a Ministry of Labor in 1946 and some legislation benefiting labor; but the benefits were largely on paper. Among associations of Government employees, that of the teachers was most

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prominent; it carried out a successful strike in 1946. Religious leaders acted through the "ulema" or clerical council; their authority was recognized in the national constitution and was exercised both institutionally, through the Parliament, and informally, through personal contacts and various voluntary associations.

g. Communism.

(1) Shortly after they seized power, Soviet leaders exhibited anew, in their own terms, the traditional Russian interest in Iran. They may well have seen the country as a testing-ground for the spread of international communism; they had grounds for optimism, since there was growing nationalism, led by a restive middle class; there were the beginnings of social awareness among the masses; and a labor movement was emerging with activists and followers influenced by Communist ideas. The central government was weak; two separatist movements in areas bordering the USSR (Azerbaijan and Gilan) were thought to have chances of success. Accordingly, an intense campaign was aimed at Iran, combining propaganda, diplomatic pressure, subversive organizations, manipulation of the separatist movements, and military pressure. In this campaign, the Soviets were aided not only by their relative power and proximity, but by the pressure of kindred peoples on both sides of the frontier.

(2) The two separatist movements were eventually defeated, despite Soviet backing and military intervention; the Soviets then worked to establish cordial relations with Iran, while continuing to apply commercial pressures. The Communist Party was obliged to go underground in the northern areas. Communist organizers turned to the cities, supporting

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and directing the newly emergent trade unions and establishing propaganda organs. Party policy now emphasized awakening the proletariat as a base for the revolution and laying the groundwork for collaboration with nationalistic movements.

(3) Initially the Communists responded warmly to Reza Khan as a nationalist, anticolonial leader; but as he grew in power, they grew hostile. By 1930, they characterized him as a betrayer of the national revolution. The Iranian Government was increasingly repressive, and by 1937 most major leaders were in jail. In the opinion of one Communist leader, Pishevari, the jailing in this period of left-leaning intellectuals, professionals, and students worked to the Communists' eventual advantage, for it provided an excellent opportunity for indoctrination and training; but at the time, the Communist movement was effectively moribund, as a result not only of firm Iranian Government action but of Soviet disenchantment and the caution born of Stalinist purges.

(4) The occupation of Iran in 1941 by Soviet military forces provided a new opportunity to the USSR. It took over the administration of Azerbaijan and northern Iran and by 1943 had effectively sealed these areas off from the rest of the country. Meanwhile, the political power vacuum following Reza Shah's abdication permitted the reemergence of Communist leaders and their activities, along with other political leaders and movements.

(5) Communists were originally in the minority in the left-oriented Tudeh Party, organized in 1942 by intellectuals of the middle and upper classes; but its organization was strictly according to Soviet democratic

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centralism, and wholly controlled by its 10-man Central Committee.

The Party grew rapidly in influence, especially in the north where it had Soviet advice and protection. By 1944 it had eight members in the Majlis and was a major factor in national politics. There were several affiliated organizations. The Central United Council of Trade Unions was most important, but there were also associations for social causes, for women, youth, professionals, and the like. Tudeh claimed to be non-Communist and not connected with the USSR--a fiction not overtly abandoned until 1952. It stood for radical reform and opposed dictatorship, plus whatever lines would further its own influence and interests.

(6) In 1944, the USSR again sought to exploit the situation in Iran, taking the advantage of the weakness of successive governments. It demanded oil and mineral concessions. Frustrated by Iranian insistence on prior withdrawal of troops, it attacked the Iranian Government through propaganda and demonstrations by the Tudeh Party. In 1945, the Communist leader in Azerbaijan, Pishvari, declared an autonomous republic, with Soviet military support. Assisted by "refugees" from Soviet Azerbaijan and Soviet personnel, he launched a vigorous program of agrarian reform and public works, accompanied by organization of local security forces and the use of terror tactics against the political opposition. Pishvari also had the advantage of some remaining separatist sentiment, such as had been displayed 25 years before, and dissatisfaction with the economic policies of the Reza Shah regime. Concurrently, Soviet officers working with Kurdish leaders brought a Kurdish Republic of Mahabad into being.

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However, international pressures, Iranian Government firmness, Prime Minister Qavam's diplomatic skill, and lack of headway in gaining local popular support brought about the failure of the USSR's second attempt at dismembering Iran.

(7) Failure in Azerbaijan confirmed the Soviets in their suspicions of broadly based movements. The Tudeh Party then declined in influence and suffered internal schisms. The Iranian Government tolerated it, so as not to drive it underground when it was already weakening. However, no alternative organization could provide an adequate response to continuing nationalist favor, anti-Westernism, religious fanaticism, and economic dissatisfactions. By 1948, the Party had reconstituted its leadership and began to refurbish its organization and image. Moving toward the scheduled 1949 elections, it found its best response in the labor movement, where it regained and held its dominant position, while again attracting intellectual and middle-class elements. The attempted assassination of the Shah in 1949 and the Tudeh connections of the perpetrator resulted in the outlawing of the Party and jailing of its leaders, thus depriving it of an opportunity for legally increasing its power through the elections. It continued to function clandestinely, however, awaiting the opportunity which a change in the political situation might bring. By 1950, the restrictions were less severe, and it could increase its operations through its front groups. It was taken by surprise at Mossadeq's accession to power and initially opposed him and his National Front. It was not until 1952, when Mossadeq abandoned his attempts to get Western support by an anti-Communist position (during which he had permitted Tudeh operations as a

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specter of the Communist danger), that cooperation between the two forces was established.

(8) The Iranian environment, despite its strong Muslim orientation, was favorable to the growth of communism in some ways: the shared anti-Westernism; rising economic and social discontent; disintegration in the cities; the traditional social structure, for which the Communist cell provided a substitute; the shared tradition of authoritarianism; and the shared supranational and utopian ideological fervor. Communist successes in Iran were based in large measure on anti-Western appeal, plus the facile Communist response to situations of economic and social upheaval and discontent.

### 8. Economic factors.

#### a. Agriculture.

(1) During the period under review, the traditional agricultural sector was the largest element of the Iranian economy, accounting for around half of the national income in 1950. Part of agricultural production (fruits and nuts, cotton, tobacco) entered the market economy for export, as well as for urban food supplies; but techniques remained largely unmodernized and inefficient. The major crop was wheat, accounting for half the total area under cultivation. The great majority of agricultural workers were laborers, tenants, or nomadic tribesmen. The tribes numbered perhaps 20 to 25 percent of the population, and had over half of Iran's large number of sheep and goats.

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(2) Land tenure patterns varied among regions, but in 1949, 5 percent of all families owned 83 percent of all sampled village lands; the Crown, the State, and religious foundations owned vast tracts. Many landlords were absentees, depending upon local managers of their properties.

(3) Food supply was never abundant in relation to demand, although the amount of cultivated land grew roughly in proportion to population growth. Reasons were primarily political instability and lack of water as well as transport and marketing problems. Inadequacy of transport and marketing had led to recurring near-famines prior to 1940. World War II added greatly to the usual problems, as a result of Allied operations and wartime shipping restrictions. There were food riots in Tehran in 1942 and great inflation of prices in the cities. Following the war, crops on the average equalled prewar levels, but varied markedly from year to year.

### b. Industry.

(1) The two principal driving forces in Iranian industrialization were Reza Shah's state industrialization program of the 1930s (sugar, food-processing, cigarettes, cement, chemicals, textiles), energetic albeit inefficient; and the World War II activities of the Allies, which increased money incomes and promoted the growth of private entrepreneurs serving Allied requirements. Despite the depressing effect of liberal import policies after 1948, which hit heavily on private entrepreneurs, there was considerable growth in the private sector--textiles, handloom weaving, carpets, etc. However, State-owned factories--usually inefficient, overstaffed, and poorly run--still made up the largest part of Iran's modern manufacturing in 1950. Mining, also chiefly a State activity,

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was inefficient and of minor scale. Private business activity focused on trade more than industry, and profits tended to go into land, for prestige, rather than industrial development.

(2) Two activities--petroleum and the Caspian fisheries--were almost totally separate from Iran's national economy; their capital, management, and markets came from the UK and the USSR. Their scale, however, was large: their total employment and investment was more than equal to all other Iranian industry, and petroleum production from the Anglo-Iranian "enclave economy" made Iran the fourth largest petroleum producer in the world. Both industries involved outside powers in Iranian affairs and exacerbated nationalistic feelings. Oil and the rising tide of nationalist feeling that centered on it became the proximate cause of Mossadeq's rise to power and of the troubled era which followed; it was also a factor in Soviet support for a separate Azerbaijan.

(3) Industrial labor, aside from the important traditional craft-guilds, was largely unorganized until World War II, when allied spending and demands for labor increased the unskilled labor force and made organization easier. Legalization of Communist activity in 1941 provided leadership.

### c. Role of the State.

(1) Although Reza Shah deliberately launched a policy of State capitalism in the 1930s, which resulted in a quadrupling of State revenues from 1931 to 1938 and a nearly three-fold further increase by 1942, he did not achieve results comparable with those of the similar policy of Ataturk in Turkey, nor did his successor. The difference was due to the less

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effective Government bureaucracy in Iran, the lack of resources apart from oil, the continued foreign control of major segments of the economy, and continued reliance upon foreign influence and foreign advisers, dating from the mid-19th century (Belgian officials continued to supervise Iranian customs until 1941). Nevertheless, investment was chiefly from domestic sources--for example, the Trans-Iranian railway was financed by taxes on sugar and tea. Oil revenues made up Government deficits, particularly in later years. During World War II, State investment was curtailed. After the war, less of the State's resources were devoted to investment. A number of tax sources--especially land and large incomes--remained untapped in 1949.

(2) Iran's approach to economic planning had hardly advanced beyond the primitive Government-project approach by the end of the period reviewed. However, attempts at economic planning dated from 1945. A Plan Organization was established in 1949 to implement a comprehensive 7-year development plan worked out with foreign advice (largely US because US citizens were viewed as a disinterested foil to the traditional foreign influences). Notwithstanding the comprehensive nature and ambitious goals of this plan, to be financed largely from oil revenues, it succeeded during the pre-1951 period only in raising unfulfilled public expectations and exacerbating nationalist feelings at the prominent part played by foreign advisers.

(3) Despite stepped-up implementation efforts under Prime Minister Razmara, plan expenditures by March 1951 totalled 1.3 billion rials against projected expenditures of 5.8 billion rials, and the prospects for planned utilization of oil revenues were eclipsed by the

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growing issue of oil nationalization. Some observers have blamed inadequacy of outside support for Iranian economic development, but the problem was chiefly the incapacity of Iranian leadership and Iranian bureaucracy.

d. Monetary and fiscal issues. Iranian State banking operations and monetary policies were fairly sophisticated and autonomous, but conservative and passive; they were overrun by the impact of World War II, when inflation exceeded 100 percent annually despite Government controls. After the war, liberalized imports led to a decline in prices of 10 to 20 percent by 1948; but this decrease was largely erased by 1950. Private borrowing throughout the period largely depended on the bazaar. The Iranian balance of payments is complicated by the role of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) royalty payments--a lever for AIOC on the Iranian government--and by the exemption of petroleum and Soviet-canned caviar exports from customs and exchange restrictions, as well as AIOC imports and those of Government agencies. There were in effect two foreign trade and exchange systems (one for oil, the other for regular commerce), and differences between the two encouraged corruption as well as resentment of the foreign interests. The net effect of monetary and fiscal controls was hindrance of economic growth through tight money, import freedom, and failure to capitalize fully upon oil revenues.

e. Economic issues.

(1) General. Control of the modern sector of the economy was strongly centralized in Tehran, and economic policies of the central Government and central bank were more concerned with the prestige of the

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State and the interests of the elite than with promotion of the general welfare. The government and the elite "thousand families" also controlled a large proportion of the agricultural land. Private economic interests--merchant importers, the bazaar grouping, and the "thousand families"--were split among themselves; only the growing urban labor movement had developed a keen sense of common interest by 1950. The bulk of the nation--smallholders and the far more numerous tenants and landless laborers--were still politically inert and socially conservative, although the division of the traditional shares of agricultural product among landlord and tenant was becoming an issue, aggravated by general absentee ownership and the consequent disappearance of the traditional social counterpart of the landlord's economic role. The various regions of the country were economically separated and without great dependence on one another or on the center; some of them--especially the British-controlled area in the southwest, and Azerbaijan in the northwest--were more closely linked to foreign economies than to other Iranian regions.

(2) Azerbaijan. The separatist movement in Iran's northwest province was probably closely linked to Soviet desires for an oil concession in the area. The movement was facilitated by the largely self-contained economy of the area, with a large cereals surplus, a diversified crop pattern, and established patterns of trade with the USSR and other foreign countries. Moreover, Azerbaijan had not benefited equally from Reza Shah's industrialization program, and its landlord and religious foundation shares in land ownership were among Iran's highest. At the same time, the Azerbaijani peasants were more self-reliant and independent than in other Iranian regions.

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(3) Mossadeq and oil. The popular discontent which Mossadeq successfully harnessed by focusing it on the Anglo-Iranian Oil Corporation arose in part from traditional resentment of foreign economic exploitation and influence, exacerbated by the British refusal to renegotiate its arrangements with Iran to bring them into line with more favorable agreements enjoyed by other Middle Eastern nations.

(4) Other factors. Other economic factors may have been the lag between promise and performance in economic development; the residual effects of wartime inflation and urban food shortages; the liberal postwar import policies, which caused failures of many Iranian businessmen who got their start in the controlled economy of the 1930s or as contractors for the Allies during the war; and the reactionary character of postwar legislation regarding labor, land ownership, and foreign development assistance, against which the Shah and his government could do, or did do, very little. It may be that the contrast (between Reza Shah's self-sufficient, State-directed economic development policies and the renewal of foreign economic influence and penetration after the war) convinced significant areas of Iranian opinion that true economic growth, modernization, and social progress depended upon Iran's independent internal effort. By 1951, Mohammad Reza Shah had not identified himself, as had his father, with the cause of modernization and development. US advice during the post-war period, sincere and well-grounded though it was, may have contributed to discontent by encouraging the private sector and urging agricultural investment at a time when Reza Shah's model of state capitalism was still more relevant for Iran, especially for its most discontented urban population.

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### 9. Sociological factors.

#### a. Demography.

(1) With a population estimated at about 19 million in 1950, at an average density of 24 per square mile, Iran was not a thickly populated country, nor did its annual increase over the 1930-50 period, estimated at around 2 to 2.5 percent, put great pressure on the country's resources. The population was not evenly distributed, however, because of mountain and desert terrain; 60 percent of the people lived in the fertile and well-watered northern areas, and the population density per square mile of inhabited area was 106.

(2) There was, according to some sources, a considerable increase in city dwellers during the period. In 1956, when the first official census was taken, nearly a third (31.4 percent) of the population lived in 186 centers of 5,000 or more people. The remainder were distributed among about 45,000 rural villages of 500 population or more; 20 to 25 percent were members of seminomadic tribes. The median age of the Iranian population in 1956 was about 20. One-third were under 10 years and 4 percent over 65; both groups were largely dependent upon the working population.

(3) About half of the population in 1956 wasre considered to be in the labor force. Unemployment was estimated at 5 percent in summer, 15 percent in winter. Farm labor made up about 56 percent of the employed workers in 1961; these were mostly tenant farmers at bare subsistence. Industrial employment (industry, construction, and crafts) grew from an estimated 200,000 persons in 1940 to 1,142,000 in 1956; the latter figure

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represented 19 percent of the labor force. Productivity was low in both farm and industrial sectors; disease and use of opium were contributing causes, as well as lack of motivation and inefficient traditional agricultural techniques.

(4) More than two-thirds of the population were members of related Persian ethnic groups, speaking similar but not mutually intelligible languages; the remainder were of Turkic extraction (Azerbaijani and Turkoman) or Arabs. The Persian culture, with the modifications introduced by Islam, had nonetheless spread among most ethnic groups and served as a unifying force; many people spoke Persian as a second language.

b. Family.

(1) Reinforced by tradition and religion, the Iranian institution of the family remained strong and pervasive throughout the period reviewed; it constituted the major source of security in a changing and competitive social environment. Family ties based on common patrilineal ancestry largely survived the price of modernization even in the urban areas, linking individuals in various political and economic sectors in ties of communication and mutual responsibility. Brothers' families lived together under their father's roof or in adjoining houses.

(2) The father's patriarchal authority was almost absolute, affecting the conduct of his children even in their middle age. His discipline was harsh, and his own attitude toward his children critical, rather than loving. Women were trained to a submissive role, although relations of real intimacy sometimes existed between husband and wife in private, and strong women sometimes exerted great influence in family affairs.

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Although polygamy was sanctioned, it was not usually practiced. Arranged marriages, for the interests of the families rather than of the individual partners, were common. Considerable freedom of action was permitted to men in sexual relations, but very little to women, who remained legally in an inferior position despite some ill-enforced remedial legislation.

### c. Social classes.

(1) The elite upper class was fairly distinct in Iranian society; it comprised the royal family relations of the former Qajar Dynasty, the tribal nobility, large landowners, and a few individuals whose education had carried them into this class. There was strong rivalry for position and prestige, and considerable upward and downward mobility. Individuals or families gained wealth and position through such channels as Government, the religious hierarchy, or military career or lost their fortunes through division among heirs or otherwise.

(2) The 1921-51 period saw rapid growth of a middle class, comprised both of traditional roles like bazaar merchant and village headman, and of the modern business and professional men and bureaucrats; but the middle class had as yet no group consciousness.

(3) The lower class included both the numerous village peasantry and the urban laborers, aware of their lowly status and generally inclined to accept their lot with fatalism, although fascinated with rags-to-riches stories. However, the urban laborers were increasingly discontented. Displaced from their home villages and culture, they were impoverished, illiterate, without strong family ties, often from minority ethnic groups; many were unemployed. Rootless, aware of the great gap between them and

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the upper classes but without hope of advancement, these people were the raw material from which violence and mob action could be hired in the service of upper-class power struggles. However, they had developed no collective action in their own interests--partly for lack of leadership and political awareness; partly because the novelty and relative variety of city life, and such superficial public improvements as had been made, served to blunt their resentments.

(4) At the very bottom of the social scale were the tribal nomads, who had little political or social impact on the national scene except through their loyalty to the fights and factions of their hereditary leaders.

#### d. Education.

(1) Despite considerable advances, Iran remained a largely uneducated country in 1951. The traditional religiously oriented village schools had reached only around 10 percent of the population. A State education program and organization was set up in 1921, but by 1951 only about 28 percent of the elementary-school-age population was in school, and of these perhaps less than half completed the 6-year course. In 1956, about one in a hundred secondary-school-age children was attending school, but 24 percent of urban children was in secondary schools. The curriculum of the schools had been modernized, although religious instruction continued. Curriculum in general aimed at the requirements of Government service. The quality of education was handicapped by a shortage of properly trained teachers. There was some adult education, aimed at overcoming illiteracy; military conscription also led to some training.

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(2) The number of graduates of educational institutions was very small--on the order of a thousand a year; but jobs they considered appropriate were hard to get because of bureaucratic resistance and economic limitations. This group of "intellectual unemployed" was a fertile source of support for the political actions of the Tudeh and Iranian Parties which contributed to Mossadeq's rise in power.

(3) In sum, Iran's educational system was inadequate in both quantity and quality, if judged in terms of the needs for social change. To the extent that it reached the school-age population, it inculcated rote learning and deference to authority and reinforced cultural bias against working with one's hands. On the other hand, it could be said to be adequate for preservation of the status quo and, in this sense, was a factor making for shortrun social stability, except for the dissatisfaction of the university graduates, the conflicts of traditionally minded parents with those teachers oriented toward modernization, and the increasing education of women.

### e. Religion.

(1) Nine-tenths of Iran's people were Muslims. Of these, nine-tenths adhered to the Shi'a sect, which differed from the Sunni sect of most other Muslim countries in its belief that a "hidden imam" would return to earth as a messiah, and in its annual observance of a period of passion plays and self-flagellation.

(2) The Muslim clergy, most of whom were relatively uneducated, saw a reduction during Reza Shah's rule (1925-41) in their great influence among the populace; yet they were still, in 1951, a factor to

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be reckoned with particularly in rural villages and in the bazaars.

The smaller number of more highly trained clergy, although their traditional control of the judicial system had been largely surrendered to lay Government officials, still had influence. The clerical hierarchy was a channel of upward social mobility.

(3) The Muslim religion was still a powerful force, protecting tradition and the status quo, maintaining the promise of reward in another world, and preaching resignation to one's lot in the present one. Religious instruction was a part of the State educational curriculum, and the Constitution still provided that the law must be consistent with the Shi'a faith. Religion may have reinforced cultural tendencies toward expedient untruth in social relations. The belief that the "hidden imam" inspired the Shah in his rule is a factor reinforcing the Shah's authority.

(4) Minority religious groups were small, and generally tolerated, except for the Sunni Muslims and the Baha'i. The latter were of relatively little importance, but the hostility toward the Sunni added to feelings of separatism among the Kurds and the Arabs of the southwest--where the United Kingdom exercised de facto authority for many years in the vicinity of its oil facilities. Some authorities held that Islam conditioned people to accept communism because of elements common to both ideologies (see above).

### f. Rural sector.

(1) Iran's settled rural population was clustered into 45,000 villages, most containing from a few households up to a few hundred people, but some numbering up to 5,000. Fields and gardens surrounded the villages;

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the larger part of the fields were owned by landlords, most of them represented by agents. The villages were not accessible by automobile or bus; contacts with other villages or market towns came through shopping trips or the search for employment in winter months. The monotony of life was otherwise broken only by infrequent ceremonies and the visits of local officials.

(2) Each village had a headman; some also had shopkeepers, craftsmen, clergy (including a teacher), and perhaps a landlord or his agent. There were no formal voluntary organizations; informal contacts were in the public bath, teahouse, gatherings in the village square, or in the bazaars of larger places. Shopkeepers and village headmen were usually members of the small informal cliques (dowrah) already referred to.

(3) Landlord-tenant relations were of major social importance; but because of the increasing tendency toward absenteeism among the landlords, their relations with their tenants--conducted through frequently self-serving and harsh agents--were impersonal, reinforcing mutual suspicion and bitterness which derived also from the sense of insecurity on both sides. There were no written contracts, and although custom tended to mediate arbitrary acts by the landlords, the police usually supported landlords against tenants. Laws were passed to lighten the tenant's load, but they were not enforced.

(4) Yet in general, despite dissatisfaction and grumbling, the peasants accepted their lot, and acquiesced in new burdens such as compulsory conscription (1925), the tax on tea and sugar (1925), and others of Reza Shah's reforms which affected living costs. In part, those burdens

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were offset by the greater security of Reza Shah's reign and by such signs of progress as the peasants saw or heard of. Overall, the traditional pattern of village life and expectation seems to have changed very little from 1921 to 1951. The only exception to this statement was the growing exodus to urban areas, stimulated by military conscription and industrialization.

### g. Urban sector.

(1) Iranian urban areas (defined in the 1956 census as places of 5,000 or more population) developed as political, trading, or religious centers; politics was the principal occupation; they housed most of the elite. Industrial establishments were usually on the outskirts of cities, reflecting their recent arrival. Social life was considerably richer and more organized than in the villages. In addition to the teahouses and baths, there were "houses of strength" (athletic-social groups), plays, concerts, performances of traveling showmen and dervishes, and, for the middle and upper classes, the dowrah. Cities also had labor unions, craft guilds, and (though weak and faction ridden) professional associations. The bazaars were somewhat organized, and served as social as well as business centers. In social groups, such as dowrah and houses of strength, men enjoyed informal egalitarian interrelationships, which provided an escape from the rather rigid hierarchical relations of family, Government, guild, and modern factory.

(2) It was in the cities that social change, resulting chiefly from contacts with the West and a deliberate policy of modernization, had its effect from 1921 to 1951. Among the manifestations of change, apart

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from the growth of Western-style factories and the influx of foreign goods and ideas, were the diminution of the role of the bazaars and craft guilds, the growth of labor unions (largely as a result of Tudeh Party efforts), the switch to Western-style dress with its higher expense for the middle classes, the growing participation of women in activity outside the home, and the decline in the influence of religion and religious leaders. The insecurities introduced by these changes among the bazaar merchants, clergy, and economically pressed lower middle class groups provided a form of support for dissident movements such as that of Mossadeq.

### h. Communications.

(1) The most general method of communication in Iran during the period studied was word-of-mouth--the grapevine--not only because of very high illiteracy but also because the culture impelled group discussion of daily events and stressed interpersonal contact. Centers for such discussion were the dowrah (among the elite), teahouses, baths, houses of strength, and the bazaars. Traveling dervishes often passed on the messages of various interest groups. The Government communicated with most villages through the police and gendarmerie.

(2) Written communication exerted its influence chiefly among the small educated urban groups. In the 1950s the combined circulation of the 11 largest newspapers was 76,000; seven of the 11 were published in Tehran. Radio broadcasting began in 1937; as of 1953, 13 transmitters were in operation, 10 of them in Tehran, all Government-controlled. Radio receivers were found in the homes of the elite and in teahouse

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electricity was not available in many villages, and battery-operated receivers were too expensive. Soviet broadcasts were targeted on Azerbaijan; Voice of America was aimed at educated Iranians, stressing democracy and anticommunism. There was at least one motion picture theater in each of the larger cities; Tehran had 15. US movies were popular.

### 1. Public health.

(1) During the period 1921-51, death rates and the incidence of disease were high, and public health facilities reached only 10 to 15 percent of the population. In 1940, 80 percent of the children died before reaching the age of 5; the high infant mortality was attributed to ignorance; lack of proper care in childbirth; and diseases such as measles, whooping cough, scarlet fever, smallpox, and respiratory and gastrointestinal diseases; and malnutrition.

(2) Malaria was the principal public health problem, affecting a quarter of the population. Gastrointestinal diseases, resulting from poor sanitation, were a leading cause of death. Parasitic infestations were common: half the population had roundworms. Tuberculosis and other respiratory diseases were widespread, as were diseases susceptible to immunization; smallpox was still widespread in 1947, although vaccination had been introduced in 1910. Typhus was usually epidemic somewhere in the country. Typhoid affected 25 to 80 percent of the population in various regions, especially in the center and south. Venereal disease, spread by boys returning from compulsory Army service, was considered a major health problem by 1947.

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(3) The use of opium in Iran began around the mid-19th century. By 1940, addiction was common; it helped kill pain from disease and dulled hunger. It was even given to infants. In 1947 the number of addicts was estimated at 1.5 million. In the areas surrounding Meshed and Kerman, an estimated 50 to 80 percent of the people were users; on the other hand, there was little use of opium in Azerbaijan and none in Kurdistan.

(4) Both malnutrition and food shortages were serious problems. The average daily diet decreased in both quantity and quality from 1934 to 1955. There were regional differences, but almost all Iranians suffered from malnutrition to some degree, not only because of poverty and supply problems, but also because of ignorance and superstition. A 1953 survey showed that 60 percent of Tehran children had nutritional deficiencies. Rickets were common in urban areas; pellagra was widespread. There were great differences between the diets of wealthy classes and of peasants. Crops tended to be consumed where grown, and inadequacies of transport and of marketing led to regional variations in food supply. Nutritional studies indicated that Azerbaijan--the locus of two separatist movements--was the best-fed area of Iran. Storage facilities were lacking, so that there was considerable seasonal variation in food availability. Nationwide famine also occurred--the worst recent instances were the war-induced food shortages of 1941 and 1942, which led to bread riots in Tehran and isolated cases of death from starvation.

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### 10. Military factors.

a. Background. Up to 1921, there had been no national Army in Iran. There were provincial and tribal levies, the palace guard, the Cossack Division, the South Persian Rifles (SPR), and the Swedish-officered Gendarmerie. There was no organized chain of command, no unified system of recruitment, no national uniform, no regular scale of pay. The Cossack force was commanded by Tzarist Russian officers who submitted their reports to and received their orders from Russia. By 1920, however, several Persian officers had been integrated into the Cossack Division. The Palace Guard Division in Tehran, under control of the throne, had no significant combat capability. The SPR operated under British officers. Hence the military forces in Persia at the beginning of the 1920s were not only armed differently, but the officers of these forces were hostile toward each other.

#### b. Army.

(1) One of the first reforms instituted by Reza Khan was the modernization of the Army. He considered this urgently necessary as a condition of restoring the authority of the central Government. During 1921-23 all foreign advisers, including the British, were eliminated from the heterogeneous military formations. The Reza Khan then melded the various centrifugal and separatist groups into a closely knit, centrally controlled Army. He planned for a national Army of approximately 40,000 men.

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(2) During the period 1921-51, the Persian Army was used many times to reduce civil disturbances and to force settlement and pacification of the tribes. The Kurdish tribes in northwestern Iran repeatedly skirmished with the Army and other Government forces.

(3) In implementing the Shah's pacification programs, military governors were appointed to replace the khans, military garrisons were established about the country to maintain law and order.

(4) The Army organized by the Reza Shah had a good reputation during the 1930s, but its reputation suffered as a result of the Soviet and British invasion of Iran on 25 August 1941. Iranian Army opposition to Soviet forces advancing south and British forces advancing north was negligible. The 105,000-man Army crumbled. It was alleged that many officers deserted their units and that many units abandoned their arms and melted away. On 28 August 1941, all resistance ceased.

(5) The Army, since its formation in the 1920s, has not been called upon for aggressive action beyond Iran's borders.

(6) During the 1930s under German technical assistance, a light armament industry was developed in Iran. German-Iranian cooperation in the armament industry ceased following the Allied invasion.

(7) Military and security telecommunications during the period 1921-45 were primarily by messenger and landline telegraph. It was not until after WW II that these forces were extensively equipped with radios.

(8) One-third of the Army normally was made up of conscripts. Based on this, one could estimate that one-third of the Army was in the age group 20-24 years. The first census in 1956, however, did indicate

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that 699,358 males or approximately 3.7 percent of the population was in the 20-24 year age group.

(9) The Iranian defense budgets exceeded those of every other ministry, including health and education.

(10) The officers of Iranian security forces came, for the most part, from the better families who resided in or near the cities. Non-commissioned officers, who were recruited voluntarily, came largely from middleclass city dwellers. The enlisted men were mostly illiterate and of lowerclass origin, primarily of peasant and tribal stock.

(11) While there apparently was little or no rivalry within the Army, there was some antagonism between the Iranian Army and the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie (IIG) during the period 1921-51. Some antagonism also existed between the national police and the other security forces.

### c. Gendarmerie and police.

(1) During the period 1921-51, there was one paramilitary force in Iran: the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie. Other security forces, including a militia type National Resistance Organization (NRO) and a National Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK), were established subsequent to 1951.

(2) The IIG, under the Ministry of Interior, had responsibility for protection of the rural areas, small towns, and villages of fewer than 5,000 persons, except near the borders where the Army frontier guards had responsibility. During 1921-51, the Gendarmerie was noted for weak discipline, inefficiency, corruption, and dishonesty. In the eyes of some of the villagers, the Gendarmerie was little better than the thieves

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and gangs it fought. The dubious record and loyalty of the Gendarmerie would lead one to believe that it could have contributed as much to the causes of disturbances in Iran as it did to preventing them.

(3) The national police force, which reached a strength of 25,000 men by 1962, was responsible for public order in and around cities with a population of 5,000 or more.

d. External assistance. The United States has maintained a military mission in Iran since 27 September 1941, although initially it was concerned with lend-lease assistance in the Middle East. The Soviet Union did not provide Iran with military assistance during 1921-51 in the sense that the United States did. The US military assistance was designed to strengthen the Iranian central Government while negative Soviet military programs in Iran were designed to weaken the Iranian central Government. German military assistance to Iran ended with the Allied occupation of Iran in 1941. The United Kingdom provided very little military assistance to Iran during 1921-51.

e. Popular attitudes.

(1) Because of the methods of operation of the military and security forces under Reza Shah, the attitude of the Iranian populace toward them during the 1921-51 period was one of general detestation. Bitterness toward the military, especially among the middle and lower classes, continued even after abdication of Reza Shah in 1941. The officers who were largely of the aristocratic class received their basic education from private tutors supplemented sometimes by study abroad.

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The training tended to be in languages, literature, philosophy, and arts; practical application to current circumstances was virtually ignored.

(2) The individuality of the Iranian character was expressed in overriding concern for the welfare of families, relatives, and friends and indifference toward community interests. To the individual Iranian, life was a contest where both skill and chance were important. He stood alone in the world except for those to whom he was bound by kinship or by mutual self-interest. Adroitness and expediency were prized; truth and falsehood were valued only according to their effectiveness in achieving a desired goal. The behavior of the officers in the military and other security forces reflected this philosophy.

### f. Conclusions.

(1) There was no single military factor, by itself, which could have acted as a warning that low intensity conflict was imminent. The most apparent factor was habitual interference in Iranian internal affairs by major powers. A number of other factors were present: there were frequent internal clashes with dissenting groups which involved the use of the regular military organizations; the regular military establishment suffered demoralization as a result of the Allied occupation; corruption was widespread in the nation's security forces; dissenting groups were being armed and supported by outside major powers; the populace had a general detestation for the security forces; there were military officers with strong proforeign sentiments; many of the elite officers were foreign-trained; the Armed Forces were penetrated by political parties hostile to

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the central Government; imposed social reforms were enforced by national security forces; a wide culture and class gap existed between the officers and enlisted men and between the officers and the common people; there was rivalry and antagonism among the Police, Gendarmerie, and Armed Forces; communications, including telecommunications, were poor; suitable cover and redoubts for guerrilla operations existed in most of the Iranian mountain rimland; the populace was made up largely of rugged people who were accustomed to surviving under severe conditions; some 25 to 45 percent of the annual national expenditure went to support the military establishment.

(2) Nevertheless, in spite of abuses by some officers and public antipathy, the Army was a deterrent to insurgency and was the single most stabilizing factor in Iran.

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## CHAPTER 2

### POLITICAL FACTORS

#### Section I. The Political System.

by Donald S. Bloch

##### 11. Background.

###### a. Geopolitical setting.

(1) Iran, a nation of ancient tradition and high culture which was once the center of the world's first empire, has long been a cross-road of trade and conquest. When the Western powers--Britain, France, and Russia--began their eastward expansion, Iran assumed new importance because its control by any one power affected the position of the others. Post-Napoleonic France had largely abandoned its ambitions in this area, but Russia (on the north) and Britain (with its Indian dominion on the east) each sought to exclude the other and to prevent penetration by any other outside influence (such as that of Germany before and during both world wars). Each sought as well to extend its own influence in Iran for economic as well as political reasons. In the 20th century, Iranian oil became a new source of international contention. After World War II, the United States became increasingly involved in the Iranian situation to prevent Soviet expansion into the area. By the late forties, the United States had replaced Britain as the major challenger to Soviet hegemony.

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(2) Iran herself was powerless to do very much about the incursions of the foreigners, except to try to remain neutral and play one against the other--a policy which colored the Iranian view of the outside world, while giving her an exaggerated view of her importance in other countries' calculations.<sup>1</sup> It would seem that the full impact of the West was felt only gradually. At first, beginning as early as the 17th century, the Iranian elite welcomed foreigners as honored guests; later, they rather naively sought to discover the "Western secret," which explained European military and economic power. Since foreigners in the earlier time were not linked with any one of the contending individuals and groups in Iranian society, they were often given special trust and confidence.

(3) As foreign influence grew, however--both economic and political--and the impotence of traditional Iran to resist it was perceived more widely, xenophobia grew also; by the twenties, most of Iran's ills were generally blamed on the Soviets and the British; the latter, in particular, were credited with preternatural cunning, and their hand was seen or imagined behind every shift in the Iranian political scene, even after US influence largely replaced British after World War II. Such views were lent credence by the tendency of Iranian individuals and groups to try to use foreign power to further their own interests. Iran was occupied by the Russians and British during both world wars. The inability of Reza Shah and his vaunted military forces to stand against the occupiers led to his abdication in 1941.

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## b. British influence.

(1) Although the earliest British contacts with Persia (in the early 19th century) were primarily for trade, British policies were soon dominated by concern for the security of India, both from the Russians and from the depredations of tribal groups on the frontiers. In the mid-19th century, Britain once declared war on Iran because of the latter's offensive against Afghanistan; later, Britain seized a portion of Persian territory bordering on what is now Pakistan. Law and order in Iran were of continuing concern to British business. Although the British policy was not opposed to the central Iranian Government, when this Government was weak, the British dealt directly with local and tribal authorities to protect their interests.<sup>2</sup> For many years, oil-rich southwestern Iran--largely inhabited by people of Arab stock--was virtually a British protectorate, its security maintained by the British-led Persian Rifles (organized during World War II). Some British leaders appear, also, to have had a sense of mission regarding the improvement of Persia. British missionaries were active in southern Iran.

(2) The Shahs of the Qajar Dynasty (1795-1925) realized the dangers of foreign domination and consciously looked to the British as a foil against the Russians, while at the same time looking to both for help in maintaining their expensive living habits. They and their officers failed to realize, however, the depth of popular reaction against foreign penetration, which was viewed as infidel as well as foreign. So did the

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British themselves, who were fond of saying, even in recent years when events proved the contrary, that "there is no public opinion in Iran."

(3) The first major example of anti-British feeling was the religiously-supported national boycott against tobacco in the wake of a concession granted a British businessman in 1891, so effective as to force its revocation. There was much concern at the revelation of the Anglo-Russian Pact of 1907, which defined spheres of influence for the two countries in Iran. The Iranian Parliament in 1921 refused to ratify a proposed agreement with Britain negotiated 2 years earlier, which would have provided for British tutelage in many branches of Iranian Government and economy as conditions for financial assistance. A principal theme of Reza Shah's rule--like that of his contemporary and model, Ataturk, in Turkey--was to eliminate Western influence in Iranian politics and culture.

(4) The most spectacular case of anti-British feeling was, of course, the national outcry concerning the exploitation of Iranian petroleum by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, beginning in 1949; this issue was the proximate cause of Mossadeq's rise to power in 1951. The final sticking-point on which the negotiations foundered was the British refusal to accept an Iranian stipulation that no British technicians of the "former company" could be employed by the proposed new international concern. Iranian intransigence came both from a feeling that the national wealth was being taken by the British without proper recompense, and from the view (not wholly without foundation) that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had too much voice in the governance of southwestern Iran.

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(5) Despite the antipathy for foreign influence, it was to the British Legation compound that one of the two large groups of Constitutionalists went to take sanctuary from the wrath of the Shah in 1906 (the Charge d'Affaires being conveniently absent on vacation at the time). This incident can be taken as exemplifying the complex view of foreigners: respected for their economic and military power, admired for their modern political ideas, used by contending Iranian individuals and groups to further their own ends, respected as guests in accordance with traditional Iranian hospitality, yet hated for their intervention in local affairs, the extent of which was a reminder of Iranian impotence, and for their strangeness of religion and custom. British assumption of superiority in interpersonal relations contributed to ill feeling.<sup>3</sup>

### c. Russian influence.

(1) The formerly Persian Province of Georgia fell to Russia at the beginning of the 19th century; two attempts to recapture parts of it resulted in humiliating defeat for Persia and treaty concessions that included extraterritorial rights (subsequently extended to other foreigners). As Russia expanded eastward, she absorbed a number of tribal areas which previously had been nominally part of Persia. These developments, plus Russia's desire for warm-water access, set the stage for a continuing fear of that country which motivated, at times, alliances and friendships with other powers; at other times, efforts to placate the Russians. In both World Wars, the Soviets

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and British shared common concern to prevent German encroachment, and they acted more or less in concert; these were the periods of maximum Iranian impotence. Both wars have provided opportunity for the Soviet Union to sponsor separatist movements in the northern areas.

(2) At the same time, the Soviet Union has long been important to Iran in economic terms (and vice versa). Until Reza Shah's reign, Iran was so decentralized, geographically and administratively, that peripheral parts of the country were economically more closely related to other nations than to Iran itself; this was particularly true of Azerbaijan in the northwest, as well as of other northern regions adjoining the Soviet border.

#### d. American influence.

(1) US interests in Iran up to World War II were quite minor, although missionary work, in particular, contributed significantly to the impetus for modernization and laid the groundwork of good will which facilitated the US role in later years. An American, Morgan Shuster, labored for a year before World War I to bring order into Persian finances. His ejection at the demand of the Russians and the Conservatives ended the hopes of reformers of that period, but he and his work were long and favorably remembered. Another American, Millspaugh, twice (1922-27, 1942-44) was called to straighten out finances, but he was too blunt and uncompromising to master the Iranian political environment, although he accomplished considerable reform--particularly in the earlier mission. Reza Shah seems to have made no effort to use

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the United States as a trade alternative to Germany, so that the Americans reached third place in Iranian foreign trade in 1940; this, despite a misunderstanding over the Iranian Ambassador's arrest for speeding in Elkton, Maryland in 1936, which led to semisuspension of relations for 3 years. Yet in 1939, US capital investment in Iran, except for \$2.5 million in missionary properties, was negligible.<sup>4</sup>

(2) The United States provided a great deal of material and technical assistance to Iran during World War II (see g below); Americans were trusted more than the British or Russians because of the reservoir of good will and because the United States was believed to have no ulterior purposes in Iran. American firmness in 1946, together with Prime Minister Qavam's clever diplomacy, was instrumental in forcing the Soviets out of Azerbaijan. As American perception of the Soviet menace grew, so did American interest in the Middle East. Wartime advisory missions to the military and police forces were continued; \$10 million was loaned for purchase of war surplus, with special Congressional approval of funds for its transport. However, Iranian appeals for support for the Seven Year Plan in 1949, and during the Shah's trip to the United States in 1950, got no response. In Bayne's view, this failure to support "the one undertaking to which a majority of Iranian politicians had been able to give positive support" because the Iranians were potentially able to pay for it themselves from oil revenues "may emerge as a tragic paragraph of Iranian history."

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e. Other external forces.

(1) Germany sought to extend her influence into Iran, both economically and politically, before and during the two world wars. She sought not only trade, but to harass the British position in India and the Middle East. The Iranians had considerable sympathy with the Germans, not only as enemies of their enemy, but also because German political ideas had some appeal in Iran. Also, Germany had harbored some of the Iranian political exiles and their journals at the beginning of the 20th century. During the First World War, British Indian troops and the British-organized Persian Rifles were engaged in campaigns against German-inspired tribal forces, as well as against Turkish troops and the Swedish-controlled gendarmerie. Between the wars, Reza Shah actively fostered German relations.<sup>6</sup> In the Second World War, although the Germans managed to organize some subversive activity at the beginning, prompt allied occupation of Iran kept it from assuming really major proportions. Just prior to the Second World War, Germany was Iran's third best trading partner, and German expertise contributed to Iranian economic development.

(2) Turkey has been both rival and exemplar for Iran for many centuries. The Ottoman Empire and traditional Iran were similar in governmental forms and had the Muslim religion in common, although Sunni and Shi'a sects of Islam differ considerably--perhaps as much as the Roman and Eastern Orthodox versions of Christianity. (The difference is reflected in the fact, among others, that the Ottoman Sultans were also

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Caliphs of Islam, while the Shahs of Persia have not held formal religious authority.) The Ottoman Constitution was used as a model for adapting Western practices to Iranian requirements. Ataturk and his reforms clearly impressed Reza Shah, who modelled some of his reforms on those of Turkey--e.g., the Phalavi hat, and perhaps the abortive attempt to establish a republic.

f. Western cultural influence.

(1) The material and military successes of the West and its resultant power, especially in the light of the decadence of Iran under the Qajars, stimulated interest in Western thought and culture. The Shahs themselves, in the 19th century, travelled and relaxed in Europe, as did many of the elite. Children of the aristocracy were sent to Europe to study. The resultant spread of Western ideas, at first somewhat imperfectly understood and hardly assimilated at all into the Persian cultural milieu, gave rise to intellectual and social ferment. The Constitutional movement of 1905-1906 was the first major signal. From then on, and even before, the unresolved conflicts between tradition and modernity in culture, politics, and economics led to constantly mounting tensions. In this respect, of course, Iran has much in common with other developing countries; but it is perhaps unique in the strength of its own tradition, which makes the assimilation of foreign ideas a greater source of stress.

(2) A significant channel of Western ideas was missionary activity, beginning early in the 19th century. American and British missions tacitly divided the country, the Americans taking the northern part.<sup>7</sup>

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They found that, except with the non-Moslem minorities, their proselytizing had little effect; they therefore emphasized the indirect appeal of educational and medical work. The American Presbyterian Alburz School of Tehran, and the Church of England's Stewart Memorial College in Isfahan, were the two best educational institutions below college level in the country; they were taken over by the Iranian Government in 1940.<sup>8</sup>

"Dissatisfaction with the methods and curricula of the mosque schools and private native schools was showing itself," and, without other alternatives, people went in ever-larger numbers to the mission schools. "The drawing influences were the sciences and the scientific methods and the high moral character of the teaching staffs."<sup>9</sup> A young American missionary named Baskerville was killed in an early Constitutionalist manifestation.

(3) Nonmissionaries also had a cultural impact. During Reza Shah's reign, various ministries used foreign experts in their technical institutes, and German teachers were instrumental in founding engineering schools. A by-product of British petroleum operations was its apprentice training, which enabled many Persians to open workshops of their own.<sup>10</sup>

g. The impact of World War II.

(1) Although Iran remained technically independent throughout World War II, she was in fact an occupied country. The impact of the period on her politics, economics, and culture was almost as drastic as

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if the two allies had overtly assumed governmental powers. Internationally, Iran virtually ceased to exist; domestically, although the Government continued to function in Teheran, it had little control over the provinces, over the economy, or over security. Yet the occupying powers, because of the legal circumstances, did not bear the responsibility.

(2) The situation was aggravated by the presence, not of one, but of three occupying powers, whose agreement among themselves was less than perfect, and one of whom (the United States) refused to formalize the status of its troops in Iran. Although British and Soviet objectives in Iran coincided in opposition to German penetration, they differed in other respects. "At times the Soviet-British competition in the public-relations field would appear as a mad scramble for the privilege of preaching to and feeding an even greater number of Iranians."<sup>11</sup> The British "realized that direct Soviet propaganda and infiltration must be counteracted by direct British action . . . . Despite the outwardly cordial cooperation on higher governmental levels, a local but very important 'cold war' was being waged in Iran . . . concurrently with British propaganda emphasizing Allied unity."<sup>12</sup> The Russians cynically manipulated short food supplies so as to appear as periodic saviors of Iran from starvation. The Americans appeared to one observer (Lenczowski, a then Polish diplomat in Teheran) to have no particular policy at all; he suggests that apparent American passivity encouraged subsequent Russian intervention.<sup>13</sup>

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(3) One authority describes the impact of the war in these terms:

World War II came to Iran in a form not unlike the effective partition of the country that had marked the first global conflict, when Iran had functioned chiefly by the permission of its British and Russian interventors . . . . This time the economy was more severely affected. Wartime inflation was extreme, and the Allied Powers . . . could do little to prevent it. Attempts to control inflation through the appointment of American economic administrators had unhappy results. The total experience left a residue of nationalist extremism, generated by resentment over the indignity of the occupation and the inevitable slowdown of the economic development that had been initiated by Reza Shah.<sup>14</sup>

(4) Among the socio-cultural effects of the occupation was the burgeoning of a new class of entrepreneurs, the contractors who serviced the Allied supply forces in their task of moving mountains of supplies to Russia. On the one hand, private enterprise was stimulated and the talents of entrepreneurs and skilled workers augmented. For example, the Shah of Iran proudly recounts that a "fleet of over 4000 lorries, owned and operated by Persians under the direction of a small staff of British civilians, carried a larger total of supplies than did any of the fleets operated by the three military forces."<sup>15</sup> The Middle East Supply Centre (a British agency, with Americans participating) provided both material aid and technical advice to the Iranians; Americans provided military, police, agricultural, health, finance, and other advisers.

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(5) On the other hand, the economic gains during the war "accrued to a small percentage--the ruling aristocracy and the new rich--while the masses bore the brunt of the inflation and the results of the economic dislocation."<sup>16</sup> Growth in corruption and cynicism was a consequence. Political and social progress was arrested. The British, in particular, wanted order and security for the flow of supplies, and therefore favored conservative elements. All the powers intervened heavily in international political affairs, and in the Shah's view, seemed intent on weakening his authority.<sup>17</sup> Military morale was low, as a result of Iran's capitulation before British and Soviet occupying forces and Reza Shah's abdication; civil service morale was low as a result of inflationary pressures and the general climate. At the same time, the people who came into contact with Allied personnel or with their propaganda could see, for better or for worse, the vivid contrast in methods, ideas, and living standards between the Europeans and themselves.

12. Evolution of the Iranian political system. During the entire period under review, 1921 to 1951, Iran had both traditional and modern political components. The latter began with the promulgation of the Constitution in 1906 but had little practical importance until the reign of Reza Shah. As modernization proceeded, tension between the two systems grew.

a. The traditional political system.

(1) The central elements of the traditional Persian kingdom were the Shah himself; his chief minister (vizier), and associated central government officials; the provincial governors-general; the clergy;

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the landowners; the traders of the bazaar; and the tribal leaders.

(2) The institution of the Shah, reaching back 2,500 years to Darius and Xerxes, was universally respected, and the Shah's power was in theory absolute, although in practice he had to work at it to use it. The later monarchs of the Qajar Dynasty were not gifted leaders, although judgment varies as to how bad they were.

(3) The power of the vizier tended to be inversely proportional to the strength and capacity of the Shah. Mohammed Reza Shah records that "in pre-revolutionary days, . . . the Grand Vizier . . . spent most of the time sitting on cushions at His Majesty's feet." Under him "were a few other ministers . . . the ministry would be the minister's own home, and his cook might become his chief secretary . . ."18 There was little separation, financial or administrative, between the Shah's household and the national government.

(4) The king appointed "governors-general to administer the provinces and governors who separately administered the major cities. The office of governor-general or governor was often hereditary, or the king might sell the office to the highest bidder." In late Qajar times, the crown prince was governor of Azertaijan. The governors were responsible for paying fixed amounts of taxes to Teheran, but could keep whatever surplus they could collect. In later Qajar times, expenditures for public works in the provinces were "almost unknown . . . often strong-arm squads would be organized to terrorize the common people and keep the revenues coming in."19 Unless the central government

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was strong, the provinces had more or less autonomy; yet, although conflict for control of the throne is frequent in Iranian history, and often started with a provincial governor-general's ambition, there seems little indication of separatism except when motivated from the outside.

(5) The "clergy" (strictly speaking, there are no specially anointed priests in Islam) had very great influence in the traditional kingdom. The Safavid Shahs (ca. 1500-1722) deliberately encouraged the Jafarite Shi's sect of Islam as an established religion, both as a basis for national unity in the face of geographic and ethnic diversity, and as a means of separating Iran from the Sunni Ottoman Empire, then a major competitor for power and territory. Since the Shiites await the return to earth of a Twelfth Iman descended from the Prophet, the temporal ruler did not have the spiritual authority of a Caliph (even though the Safavids claimed descent from the Prophet); instead, groups of qualified clergy interpreted the law. In addition to the ulema--groups of clergy in such centers as Qum, Meshed, and Teheran--the rural areas had both parish leaders and mutjahids--men learned in the ecclesiastical law who acted as notaries, lawyers, and judges. Since virtually all the population (except the Kurds) subscribed to the Shi'a faith, the clergy had a firm hold on them and served as one of the few channels of political communication between people and central and provincial governments.

(6) The landowners also were the political and social elite of the country. By late Qajar times, most of them lived in the cities

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and towns, rather than in the rural villages which they owned--often by the score. The Western commercial impact was partly accountable for the fact that these men sought greater profits and attractions as urban dwellers and traders in cash crops, leaving their lands in the hands of agents. This trend obstructed another channel of political communication and control, since traditionally the landlords had mediated between central government and people and to some degree looked out for the needs of the peasants.

(7) The traders and artisans of the cities were organized into guilds, according to their specialties, and their activities were concentrated in the bazaar areas. They and the political elite were interdependent in financial and economic matters. The heads of the guilds spoke for their groups, but in late Qajar times the guilds, like other political and social groupings, served more as bases for realizing the ambitions of the leaders than as political interest groups for the members.

(8) Traditionally, the great mass of the people--including those in the few cities--were politically inert, and fatalistically accepted their lot and station. They were economically at the mercy of the landlords and the weather; their only contact with Government was through the tax collectors, the security forces, and the military service levies enforced through the landlords. For guidance, justice, and the formalities of life, they looked to the clergy. For security and advancement, they depended on their families and relatives. Government performed no services for the people except the preservation of

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national and internal security. In the period just before 1921, centrifugal forces were rising: disorders were frequent; the Shah was in Europe; British and Russians were having their own way in substantial areas of the country; tribal leaders were asserting their power; and knowledge of the blessings of Western civilization was slowly spreading, usually against the stout resistance of the traditional-minded religious leaders.

b. The political system under Reza Shah.

(1) Modernization of the political system had advanced very little, except in some outward forms,\* until Reza Khan seized power on the basis of his command of the Cossack Division in 1921--originally in collaboration with a civilian reformer, Sayyid Zia u'd-Din Tabataba'i, who departed for exile within 3 months. In 4 years, this self-taught soldier of obscure origins had consolidated his control of the kingdom, so that in 1925--after toying with the idea of a Republic along the lines of Turkey--he could depose the Qajar Dynasty and crown himself Shah.

(2) Reza Shah's Government was a thorough autocracy, although constitutional forms were more or less observed. For example, the Majlis amended the Constitution in 1925 to substitute the new Pahlavi Dynasty for the previous Qajar Dynasty; elections to the Majlis were held, but the elections and the elected members were carefully controlled so that the legislature rubber-stamped the Shah's will.

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\*However, separation had been achieved between the state treasure and the privy purse.

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Reza Shah's goal was basically a simple one on conception: to reconstitute the greatness of Iran and stop foreign meddling--as well as his countrymen's "obsession with foreign influence"<sup>20</sup>--by means of rapid industrialization and secularization.

(3) As his main power base, the Shah built up Iran's first unified modern Army, incorporating the several forces previously existing; he used it, not only for political control and the maintenance of order, but as an example of modern efficiency and as a symbol of national prestige.<sup>21</sup> He finished the work, barely begun before his time, of building a highly centralized Government bureaucracy to carry out his program of modernization and control; he retained personal command, so that the Prime Minister and Cabinet had no independent authority. He named military officers as provincial governors subservient to him, but the individual ministries retained much of the responsibility for management of their specialized affairs in the provinces.

(4) Among other measures, the Shah downgraded the clergy by placing their traditional functions of education and justice under State control and by such measures as the "Pahlavi hat" (copied from Ataturk's similar move in Turkey), Western dress, and prohibition of the woman's veil. He used foreign experts to advance his program, but drove one of these--the American economist, Millspaugh--out of his job as de facto fiscal director of the kingdom after 5 years with the comment that there could be only one Shah in Iran. He used Army personnel to control and check on Government activity of all kinds. He "had the measure of the venal nobles," and managed to keep them at

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bay despite consistent opposition. He controlled the press first by bribery, later by terror. He was a master of political innuendo and rumor. As a result of his industrialization drive, a new class of bourgeoisie emerged who were personally beholden to his regime for their livelihood and therefore constituted a base of political support.<sup>22</sup> He reduced the power and status of the nomadic tribes both by aggressive action of his security forces and by a policy of forced permanent settlement. The latter action debilitated them, because they did not understand public health measures. Military officers were set to watch the tribes.

(5) Throughout Reza Shah's reign (1925-41), the mass of the people continued politically inert; the political system continued to function from the top down, with little reference to popular desires. A major weakness in the regime in its last years was that Reza Shah increasingly listened only to a sycophantic few around him, and was therefore increasingly cut off from the true state of affairs. The Shah also inclined more and more to personal collection of land and wealth toward the end of his reign, which in some observers' view encouraged his subjects to do likewise, especially after he had left the scene. Moreover, despite the increasing scope of the modernizing of government, a very large part of it continued to be regulated in traditional ways.

(6) In regard to the succession problem, Reza Shah differed sharply from the Persian tradition, under which the ruler often killed or blinded possible claimants to the throne for his own security. On the contrary, the Crown Prince was brought up with care by his father for his

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future responsibility; a military school was created for him and his kin; on completion of this schooling, Mohammed Reza was sent to school in Switzerland for 3 years, under the supervision of a Persian guardian and a Swiss tutor. Thus, when the old Shah abdicated under pressure of the Soviet and British invasion, his son was able to step into the leadership role with a minimum of confusion, although there were still some who did not regard the Pahlavi Dynasty as legitimate. Mohammed Reza Shah thought that his father may have planned to abdicate in his favor at a time not far removed from the one forced on the old Shah by circumstance.

c. The political system under Mohammed Reza Shah.

(1) When the young Shah came to the throne, his means for holding political power were weak; principal among them were the desires of the Allied Powers and their forces in the country to preserve stability and order. The Allies obliged him to release all political prisoners. They and other elite elements took full advantage of the new freedom to engage in factional in-fighting and individual rivalries but not to build modern institutions of expressing and aggregating public interests. The only exception was the Tudeh Party, controlled by the Communists; other parties, some modelled after it in order to compete with it, proved incapable of sustained existence (see section II below).

(2) During World War II, the impact of the loss of strong top leadership was cushioned by the continued momentum of the system Reza Shah had set in operation, and by the superposition of Allied controls

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over the economy and internal security. However, after the war, the lack of leadership combined with the accumulated economic deprivations of the war--which blighted the hopes for continued progress that Reza Shah had stimulated--and with the resentment over wartime foreign intervention, to create a climate of considerable political confusion.

(3) Mohammed Reza Shah, for the first 10 years of his reign, followed for the most part a policy of reigning rather than ruling. In doing so, he may have unconsciously sought to make a virtue out of the necessity of his difficult position; but he was consciously responding to his liberal European upbringing and to the professed desires of the educated Iranians, as well as to the preferences of the occupying powers. The principal exception to this policy was his solicitude for the Armed Forces, exercising his Constitutional authority as their commander in chief. With Allied--chiefly American--assistance, he restored their morale, shattered by their capitulation to the Soviet and British forces, and built up their capability to maintain order. An Iranian force under General Zahedi reoccupied Azerbaijan and the Kurdish areas after Soviet support was withdrawn in 1946; this move did much to reestablish the military as a force on the Iranian political scene, and at the same time to reinforce the power of the Shah. (General Razmara was commander of the Armed Forces until the Shah, perhaps fearing that he might be tempted to follow Reza Khan's example after the First World War, named him Prime Minister. Razmara's assassination in 1951 set the stage for the turmoil of the Mossadeq era.)

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(4) During much of the 1941-51 period, the focus of power shifted from the Shah to the Majlis, whose members were largely of the landowning elite and therefore conservative. Like the Constitutionalists at the turn of the century, their concern for political liberty was more to protect their own independence of action than to modernize the country; they were conservative in outlook, generally hostile to reform (although capable of being frightened into reform measures), individualistic in political action, motivated by personal or factional interest (either self-preservation or profit) rather than by ideology, and readily susceptible to bribery, threat, or intimidation by a mob. Since poverty and discontent in Teheran were widespread, mobilization of a mob was not difficult, and this became a principal weapon for Mohammed Mossadeq.

(5) In this period, with few exceptions, the custom developed whereby the Prime Minister would be chosen by informal poll of the Majlis in advance of the Shah's nomination--a procedure unheard of in previous Iranian politics, and which bore only faint resemblance to European practice, because no man had either a party majority or a true party coalition to support him when appointed. Since the Majlis had the Constitutional power to remove ministers, individually or collectively, there was no real stability or continuity in the leadership of the executive branch. There were exceptions: the Shah named Ahmad Qavam--generally regarded as the most capable Iranian political leader of the century--to conduct the difficult negotiations with the Soviet Union which ultimately rebuffed Soviet claims to northern oil and freed Azerbaijan; the Shah subsequently removed Qavam, because his

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resultant power rivalled that of the throne. Later, the Shah appointed General Razmara Prime Minister, and then in his place Hussein Ala--a man long close to the royal family; but Majlis pressure, mobilized through popular clamor, forced the latter's early replacement with Mossadeq.

(6) The vacuum after Reza Shah's departure also permitted the resurgence of the clergy, who had never been suppressed to the degree they were in Turkey and could rapidly reassert much of their former influence. Some of Reza Shah's superficial reforms, like clothing and abolition of the veil, were cast aside; there was an increase in religiously-sponsored education. Religious leaders regained political influence on the basis of their support from the faithful; notable among these was the Mallah Kashani, backed by many of the traditional bazaar merchants (as distinguished from the newer class of entrepreneurs), who was elected to the Majlis and eventually became its Speaker under Mossadeq. The clergy differed among themselves in their attitude toward reform, but except for a few enlightened men and the young graduates of the new School of Theology at the University of Teheran (founded in 1936), they generally stood for the maintenance of traditional institutions and behavior patterns.

(7) The most important move toward resuming economic and social progress in Iran during this period was the Seven Year Plan proposed in 1949 and enacted with quite general support by the Majlis in 1949. A foreign consortium (Overseas Consultants, Inc.) was called upon for expert advice on the plan and a Plan Organization, separate from the

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regular Government administration, was established under a Supreme Economic Committee to carry it out. Foreign capital was hoped for to support the scheme, but none was forthcoming--partly because the United States and other European powers believed that Iran's oil revenues should suffice (Reza Shah had built the Trans-Iranian Railway exclusively with domestically raised, non-oil capital), and partly perhaps because comprehensive economic planning at the time was strongly distrusted in American Government and financial circles as suggestive of communism. Lack of outside capital, plus the political and economic turmoil of the succeeding years, as well as planning and administrative inadequacies, severely limited what could be accomplished.

### 13. The Iranian Government in 1951.

#### a. Constitution.

(1) The Constitution forced on a reluctant Shah in 1906 and 1907 (see section II for background) remained in effect in 1951 and still does today with relatively few amendments. "Few criticize the document, but nearly everyone affirms that it does not determine current practice, even though it should."<sup>23</sup> In a half-century of "intermittent application, it has so far only provided a formal arena for contests between semiautonomous interest groups that have rivaled one another for advantage . . ."<sup>24</sup> It also serves as a symbol of the modern aspect of the Iranian political system. It is founded on "the three principles of Shiite Islam, the monarchy, and the separation of powers,"<sup>25</sup> and modelled largely on the Constitution of Belgium.

(2) Of the two basic component documents which make up the Constitution, the first--enacted in 1906 by the first legislative

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assembly--concerns itself almost exclusively with the legislature and its prerogatives, carving them out, in effect, from the previously absolute powers of the Shah. Aimed at the evils of the time, it shows much concern with financial matters, which--if concessions and public utilities be included--occupy eight of its articles. The requirement that three quarters of the members must be present for a valid vote opens the possibility of a "quorum veto" for any leader controlling a quarter of the seats (50 when membership is at the maximum of 200).

(3) The provisions are not otherwise unusual except in their recognition of religious supremacy--a committee of theologians has the power to determine whether legislation is in accord with Moslem law--and in their recognition of a somewhat special status for representatives from Teheran. The upper house (which was not actually constituted until 1950) has 60 members, of which half are from Teheran; half of each half are elected, the others appointed by the Shah. Terms are fixed by law at 2 years for the Majlis or National Assembly and 6 for the Senate or upper House. Both Houses can initiate legislation and both must consent to it, except for fiscal measures, but the lower House can override a negative vote in the upper.

(4) The second major component of the Constitution is the Constitutional Law of 1907, which prescribes the structure of government, and the rights of citizens. The latter are mostly not absolute, but "except as provided by law." The document is a curious and rather confusing compromise among themes of royal supremacy, parliamentary responsibility, and separation of powers. (The last-named is specifically

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prescribed.) "The Sovereign is absolved from all responsibility." Yet, "the laws and decrees will be executed by the ministers and government officials, in the name of His Imperial Majesty," while "the ministers of state are responsible in all matters" to both houses of the legislature. The Shah appoints and dismisses the ministers and major government officials; but either house of the legislature (in practice, only the lower house) can dismiss any or all ministers. Ministers, however, may not be members of the legislature. "The Ministers, besides being severally responsible for the particular affairs of their own ministry, are in matters of general policy conjointly responsible to the two assemblies and are guarantors of each others actions." The only mention made of the Cabinet as such is in article 67, which gives the legislature power to dismiss it.

(5) The 1907 law also clearly provides for an independent judiciary, but is somewhat unclear on the jurisdiction of the religious as opposed to the secular courts. Judges are supposed to continue in office unless they resign or are removed for bad conduct by court action, and may not be transferred without their consent. There is no judicial review; the Assembly is given explicit authority to interpret the laws. The public prosecutor is appointed by the Shah "with the consent of the chief Sheri'a [ecclesiastical] judge." Provincial and local legislative assemblies were provided for, but never established (until very recently).

(6) Up to 1951, the Constitution was amended twice. In 1925, the clauses on the reigning dynasty were changed to legitimize Reza Shah's Pahlavi Dynasty. In 1949, when the Shah sought to increase his

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power, he was authorized to dismiss the legislature; electoral arrangements were somewhat modified, and provision was made for future amendment by a specially elected body.<sup>26</sup>

b. The monarch.

(1) In 1951, Mohammed Reza Shah had proved himself a skilled practitioner of Iranian politics, had begun to identify himself with the forces of modernization for which he had professed support from the commencement of his reign. His attempted assassination in 1949 had showed that there was considerable continuing support for the institution of the Shah, if not for him personally; he had taken advantage of the incident to build his prestige and suppress the Tudeh Party. The armed forces and security forces supported him; so did part of the clergy. Yet, for some of the aristocracy, he was still a young upstart, and a continuing reminder of his father's indignities; and by some, he was viewed as a tool. For many intellectuals and young people, he symbolized a tradition and a style for which they felt only antipathy.<sup>27</sup> Included in the latter group were many of the Government bureaucracy.

(2) Thus, although the Shah's political leadership was growing, it was by no means assured; and "in the absence of full control of the machinery of government, he was powerless to pursue his father's goals. Rational policy had to be sacrificed to sheer survival."<sup>28</sup> He maintained his position by astute bargaining with key elite figures, including those in the Majlis, by the use of the continuing prestige of his office, through the support of the military and security forces, and by his continued playing of the role of constitutional monarch, in

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contrast to his father. Symbolic of the altered relationship between Shah and government was the creation in 1942 of a Court Minister, not a member of the Cabinet, to serve as liaison between court and government.<sup>29</sup>

## c. Executive branch and bureaucracy.

(1) The Prime Minister and his Cabinet were in a weak position, caught between the Shah who nominally and sometimes in reality named them (in the case of the War and Interior Ministers, almost always), and the Majlis to whom they were constitutionally responsible and which could force their dismissal. Under Reza Shah, no tradition of government responsibility separate from the Shah's control had developed; the Constitution made virtually no provision for it; little in Iranian political tradition supported it; and there was no political party organization worthy of the name (other than the Communist-oriented Tudeh) which could give Cabinet leadership any substance. Any Prime Minister who asserted strong leadership would have to contend with a Shah jealous of his position, on the one hand, and the political prima donnas in the Majlis, on the other. Actually, the Cabinet had no real existence as a corporate entity of government, notwithstanding its periodic meetings with and without the Shah. In particular, the Shah dealt directly with his War Minister, Interior Minister, and senior military officers.

(2) Ferrel Heady classifies the administrative system of Iran as "traditional-autocratic," together with those of other Middle Eastern states--including, among others, Yemen at the traditional

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extreme, "where major modifications have already taken place." The elite may want change, but not so much as to challenge the status quo; dependence for action is chiefly on the bureaucracy and the security forces; political activity is curtailed; there is no attempt to mobilize the mass of the population, and "little interest is shown in articulating a political ideology."<sup>30</sup>

(3) Modernization of the civil service began in 1922, shortly after Reza Shah's seizure of power; the civil service law of 1922 still governed in 1959.<sup>31</sup> According to Millspaugh, there were about 20 to 25 thousand civil servants in 1927; 100,000 in 1943. In 1959 there were 150 to 175 thousand. Avery renders harsh judgment on the bureaucracy: "Throughout the modern period the Civil Service has become an increasing burden on the State; a great bureaucracy of drones."<sup>32</sup> It suffered from continued nepotism; from the rot attendant of advancement by seniority restricted only by budgetary limitations; from the time-serving and alienated attitudes of many of the incumbents; and from continuing traditional modes of behavior and action--preoccupation with legalism and style, and referral of all responsibility to top levels. Gable cites an example from the late fifties: "A decision to allow the sewage from a public building in one of the provinces to flow into the cesspool of an adjoining building had to go to the Minister of Health in Teheran for approval."<sup>33</sup> For a number of years, there was a freeze on hiring of new permanent employees, with the result that nearly half the civil service was in the top three of the nine pay grades,

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including a number of senior officers without job responsibilities but receiving full pay.\*

(4) In an effort to circumvent the inaction and rigidity of the bureaucracy, a separate Plan Organization was set up in 1949, with its own administration, higher pay rates, and a personnel system based on individual merit and achievement. The result was a considerably more efficient organization, but at the price of rivalry and jealousy with the organizations of the regular ministries, some of whose normal functions the Plan Organization overlapped or preempted, and at the price of failure to inject new talent, enthusiasm, and challenge into the regular service. The same was true to some degree of the Rural Development Board.

(5) Nevertheless, it is possible to overcriticize the Iranian administration, which after all had had only one generation of experience in a modern setting by 1951. Binder suggests that "the increasing size of the bureaucracy and the increasing scope of bureaucratic competence have contributed toward the emergence of professional bureaucratic

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\* Apparently some of the old love for rhetoric lingered on in the government service and complicated its business. An example of flowery language of an earlier day is quoted by Gable from the Shah's 1807 acknowledgement of Napoleon's offer of guns and military instructors: "Every word in the noble lines is like a drop of amber on pure camphor or like the perfumed curls on the beloved with a bosom of lilies. . . The amber scent of the gracious document has embalmed the alcove of our soul so susceptible to friendship and has perfumed with musk the secret chamber of our hearts filled with justice and loyalty."

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values, among a great many civil servants. These values have been strengthened by the second major group upon which it is dependent, the military. . ."<sup>34</sup>

### d. Legislative branch.

(1) The Iranian Majlis in 1951 was perhaps the most dismal aspect of government. From its inception in 1906, it was not broadly representative of the people, but was filled chiefly with members of the elite landowners, businessmen, and clergy who were more concerned with advancing their individual fortunes than the good of the State, were more readily influenced by money, power, or the threat of a mob. Most of the voters were illiterate, and supported whichever of the elite they were told to; like the Turkish peasants in Lerner's Passing of Traditional Society, they could not conceive of any other order of things. An effort by the Shah in 1949 to restrict the electorate to the literate was strongly opposed by the elite for just this reason. Moreover, both because of Iranian cultural patterns and because of a general interest in preserving stability, no durable party groupings linked Majlis members with elements of the population; rather, through traditional family and clique connections, the linkages were informal.

(2) Thus, the Majlis was neither an instrument for modernization and reform nor a channel for expressing and combining public interests. At best, it served as a brake on autocratic excess; but it failed to perform even this mission under Reza Shah, whose policies prevented the accumulation of experience in constructive parliamentary

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politics.<sup>35</sup> Even in its factional strife and conservative obstructionism, the Majlis symbolized the Constitutional regime, and therefore the modern sector of Iranian politics.<sup>36</sup> But this symbol was regarded with much cynicism by many of the younger radicals for its irrelevance, as well as by the traditionalists who manipulated it to their own interests.<sup>37</sup>

(3) The Shah promoted the implementation of the Constitutional provisions for an Upper House, in an effort to better control the legislature. The Senate convened in 1950, but did not immediately produce the desired effect. The Lower House continued as the most powerful chamber.

e. Judicial branch. The question of justice does not seem to have been a major problem in Iranian affairs. Reza Shah's principal motives in pushing for reforms were to weaken the clergy and do away with the extraterritorial rights of foreigners. He moved deliberately: the first secular Justice Minister took office in 1928. Secularization of the judiciary did not come until 1936 nor the final version of the penal code until 1940. European models were used for the codes and for court organization. By 1959, Gable (a public administration expert) could write that "the administration of justice is constantly improving in Iran. Generally, justice is administered fairly and in an orderly procedure. The courts are impartial in rendering verdicts. . ."<sup>38</sup> As noted above, the Constitution provided adequately for judicial independence, although it was probably less in practice than in theory. It may

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be that the traditional connection with Islam supports the concept of judicial independence and impartiality.

f. Local government.

(1) Iran was divided, as of 1951, into 10 numbered provinces called "ostan," headed by governor-general appointed by the Shah and reporting to him through the Minister of the Interior. Another special osthan included the city of Teheran and its environs. There were two independent governorates in critical coastal areas, headed by governors but otherwise comparable to the ostans. These 13 divisions were subdivided into 49 counties "shahristans" with appointed governors, and 245 cities "shahr" of over 500 population.\* Shahristans were composed of "baksh" (urban districts) and "dihistan" (rural districts); the latter, in turn, were divided into villages. The entire structure, down through the baksh and dihistan, was part of a centralized bureaucracy based on the French model.<sup>39</sup> However, officials in charge of various activities at provincial level reported directly to their own ministries in Teheran, so that the governor-general was more of a coordinator than a commander. Although the Constitutional Law of 1907 provided for elected provincial and local councils, these had never been constituted up to 1951, except for the short-lived movement in Azerbaijan which utilized this provision as part of its legal rationale.

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\* Figures on shahr as of about 1958, taken from Gable (1959).

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(2) This central government structure met the mass of the citizens in 45,000 to 50,000 individual villages through the "kadhkoda," or village headman, who (according to Bayne in 1965) also "represents the landlord to the peasants, and vice versa, and in earlier days was a tax collector . . . . His authority stems from the landlord and from the state . . . . Occasionally, when a kadhkoda is to be replaced, the village is permitted to register a preference between two or three candidates, but the landlord has the final say. The kadhkoda's functions include supervision of crop divisions . . . . His modern functions as a civil official, in which he reports directly to the bakshtar . . . are informal but of long standing. As the village headman he is the contact point, whose responsibility it is to report breaches of the peace and draw up the list of villagers who are to be drafted into the army for the year . . . . His roles as the economic director and civil official are clear to the villagers, and even after . . . the landlord has been removed from the scene, villagers are content to continue the position . . . ."40

(3) Although the structure was thus strongly centralized, it did not result in any great mobilization of the peasantry because the rudimentary activities of government outside Teheran affected ordinary people very little except for the traditional areas of taxes, the military draft, and security. But there was no provincial autonomy, because of the risks of political secession in a country with so much diversity, size, and difficult communication. Even aside from the risk

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of secession, however, it is debatable whether administrative autonomy--giving the provincial governor-general full control over their personnel, and perhaps instituting the elected councils--would have actually improved administration in the local areas. Deprived of direct connections with the technical ministries in Teheran, local officials might have been more parasitic and less competent, notwithstanding the difficulties of the chain of command.

(4) The foregoing discussion has omitted reference to the tribes. These may have made up as many as 20 percent of the total population. However, the effect of Reza Shah's suppression of them, and of requiring tribal leaders to live in Teheran and assimilate into the larger culture, had been practically to eliminate them as a separatist force after World War II. Although the sedentary tribes apparently more or less fitted into the administrative structure above described, the nomadic ones preserved their traditional institutions.

#### 14. Political culture.

##### a. Nationalism.

(1) All the people of Iran, including to some extent the nomadic tribes and non-Iranian speakers like the Azerbaijani, share three fundamental cultural elements in common: respect for the great historical and cultural traditions passed on through folklore, poetry, and song; common belief of most of the Shi'a sect of Islam (specifically, the Jafari version); and, respect for the institution of the Shahanshah, the King of Kings. The Safavid Dynasty consciously cultivated the Shi'a

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faith as a basis for organizing national loyalty; Reza Shah similarly cultivated the ancient traditions (and in this respect he was more fortunate than Kemal Ataturk, who was forced to include considerable fiction in his lore of national glory). Several writers note, moreover, that Iranians manifested unity in the face of external threat; thus foreign intervention had provoked a reaction, and Mossadeq was able to harness this reaction against the British as a principal weapon in his rise to power after World War II.

(2) However, pride of belonging, whether the basis is cultural, religious, or ethnic, is a different thing from true civic consciousness. Perhaps the only group in Iran, as of 1951, which truly identified its destinies with those of the State of Iran was the Armed Forces. For others, self-interest and narrower loyalties to family, clique, or locality were far stronger than any nascent sentiments of patriotic responsibility to the nation as a whole. This seems to have been true even of the educated intellectuals, who were alienated from the traditional structure headed by the traditional institution of the Shah, but who had no alternative loyalty except for those who became indoctrinated Communists. As for the common people, they regarded Government as an incubus from which there was no escape, rather than as a source of support. As for the Government personnel themselves, they seem still to have been touched by the old tradition under which everything in the State belonged to the Shah and was subject to his pleasure

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and bidding. This tradition, plus their own status-seeking and self-interest, overshadowed feelings of responsibility for the general welfare. In short, Iran had been built into a nation by the end of Reza Shah's reign, if it was not already one when he began; but it had not yet been built into a modern State; and consensus among even educated citizens as to the legitimate ends of political action was lacking. One Persian commented, "The past is ours, but the country is not."<sup>41</sup>

(3) A negative aspect of national feeling, noted by Avery, is an underlying, inarticulated awareness of Iran's progressive diminution in importance, as her trade role was taken over by maritime routes from Europe and the East, and in consequence of Margot and Afghan depredations. This sense "has been reflected positively in the nation's increasingly loud insistence on its own high estimation of itself and negatively by an increasing tendency to despondency, irresponsibility and apathy."<sup>42</sup>

### b. Modernization.

(1) According to Binder, "the major ideological tension in the Iranian system is between traditional and conventional symbols, and this has tended to discredit both."<sup>43</sup> Despite his proclaimed devotion to modernization, the Shah still stood in 1951 as a symbol of the traditional order; as a matter of fact, this was a principal source of his strength among the masses. The Constitution and Majlis, even though originally the result of pressures for assertion of the rights of certain

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elite groups rather than for modern liberal democracy, nonetheless symbolized modernizing tendencies, as did the material evidences of Reza Shah's industrialization drive. Tensions were strongly intensified by World War II, when regard for traditions, reinforced by Reza Shah's appeal to them, clashed with the perceived material superiority and individual well-being of the West. A choice was necessary between "the barbarism necessary for successful competition with the West" and the wisdom of Iran's ancient civilization.

(2) Binder suggests that the efficient means to achieve rapid modernization--and thus the sought-for Iranian dignity and independence--would be what he terms a rationalized governmental structure, based on hierarchy and authority such as found in military organization. But the Iranian Constitution and European models impose a "conventional" or pluralistic political system, which is less efficient even in mature political systems, which the Iranians are not equipped to operate, and which therefore may be inappropriate to the circumstances.<sup>44</sup>

### c. Political behavior.

(1) In the political context, Persian individualism (see Chapter 4, para 40) has been described as "a kind of social anarchy which is best described as a lack of a sense of community. Outside the family or the tribe or in relation to Islam the average Iranian is not inclined to cooperate with his fellow men . . ."<sup>45</sup> At the same time, there is a pervasive pattern of dominance and submission, which is not inconsistent with individualism because the latter is expressed on a

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person's own social level, while he defers to those above and asserts himself over those below. "The only equality in Iranian society is before Allah. Men are acutely aware of the differences that separate them . . ." Deference in politics "destroys objectivity and confounds the administrator who seeks accurate information."<sup>46</sup> At the same time, many interpersonal relations are undisciplined; "vicious competition exists in many" of them and is especially noticeable in the public service. Thus, while "centralization of government is extreme, coordination (laterally among agencies) is rare."<sup>47</sup>

(2) Religion and politics are strongly intermingled in Iran, and religion has not infrequently been used as a political tool. The fatalism of Islam was a convenient way to rationalize the political status quo with its extreme inequalities. Moreover, "the efficacy of religion in the hands of political intriguers was due to the superstitions of the populace and the populace's need for an outlet. The rage and emotion that oppression and injustice had built up in people who were generally passive and easily overawed were ready tinder for the spark of clerical authority sanctioning an outburst . . ."<sup>48</sup> The murder of a Russian envoy in 1829 was an example; so was the almost incredible bloodletting in the persecution of the Babi heretics in 1852. A somewhat different manifestation--individual rather than mob action--is the tradition of assassination by religious fanatics--Nasiru'd-Din Shah in 1896, General Razmara in 1951. Another religious element of political importance is the tradition, which began under Sunni overlords, of

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sanctioned dissimulation to protect one's Shi'a faith. The custom of taqiya--religiously-sanctioned lying--was one of the elements in complex Iranian political behavior.

(3) Probably the various factors already noted--lack of consensus, individualism, fatalism--account for Avery's observation that "Persian dignitaries tend to show the utmost poltroonery when faced by a seething crowd," which means that a mob is a potent political weapon and can be readily recruited for "a few rials a head."<sup>49</sup> Religious motivation can also be the basis for mobilizing crowds, and as the horrible events of 1852 demonstrated, a religiously-aroused crowd can be brutal in the extreme.

(4) Most Persian aristocrats, again according to Avery, are gamblers. "Their poker games sometimes last for days on end. Before Mohammed Reza Shah's recent land reforms, villages were often the stakes. When a man could think of no more villages to play for, or perhaps had none left, he might throw down the keys of his Chevrolet or Buick."<sup>50</sup> The gambling urge, combined with a feeling of fatalism and an opportunity for self-advancement, could readily explain the rise and collapse of many a political scheme.

(5) Finally, the devotion of Iranians to their families must be noted. The extended family was traditionally the basic institution for social security, and ties of blood very important. Accordingly, the practice of preferring relatives for jobs, which to Americans is nepotism and immoral, is for Iranians entirely proper and moral. Moreover,

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because bonds of trust do not extend far beyond family lines, relatives can be trusted to do one's bidding or look out for one's interests. Hence, the tension between the traditional practice of staffing government offices with one's relatives and the modern concept of appointment and promotion by impersonal standards of merit and achievement.

### 15. Political socialization, participation, and recruitment.

#### a. Socialization.

(1) Until Reza Shah's time, socialization was wholly a family and religious responsibility and except for the instilling of ancient tradition and of reverence for the Shah, there was very little of it outside the elite families. By 1936, however, the change was perceptible. A Presbyterian missionary at Hamadan wrote:

Ten years ago the typical schoolboy oration extolled the glories of the golden age of Cyrus and Darius, lamented the low estate to which the country had fallen, and ended with an exhortation to observe the man of the West, learn of them and follow in their footsteps. Patriotism has changed much of this. Today the boys vie with one other in patriotic favor, praise the language and culture of old Persia (Iran) and point out the weaknesses of Western civilization with its attendant evils . . . "51

(2) The missionary's boys were probably offspring of middle class townsmen; education did not touch many of the masses for years afterward. Young notes that in 1950 "the franchise is widely held, but a large majority of the people are illiterate and are the easy prey of wealthy and powerful politicians." While a law for universal compulsory elementary education had long been on the books, it was not at that time thoroughly enforced, although considerable progress had been made.

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(3) The Shah of Iran has complained of inadequate socialization:

I find that in many Persian homes no effort is made to instil in the children a sense of personal and civic responsibility. The children are not taught to plan ahead, to develop their minds and hands, to cultivate hobbies, or to appreciate the wonders of nature. In the absence of a sense of mutual confidence between parents and children, the child may feel insecure . . . . Paradoxically, a peasant child, because of his sense of participation in responsible work in the fields, may fare better than a child of higher social and economic status.<sup>52</sup>

(4) The clash between traditional and modern values is surely a major source of tension in the socialization process, and it is perhaps little wonder that many of the intellectuals end up disaffected and alienated. Such tensions and insecurities among such groups as the urban poor would make them ready prey for a convincing demagogue who offered a reassuring panacea.

b. Political recruitment.

(1) Iran in 1951 was suffering from a lack of leadership and administrative talent. There were three causes. First, Reza Shah's dictatorship had thwarted development of a cadre of experienced and mature younger statesmen. His one-man rule permitted no other stars in the firmament. In consequence, few could be found to face the opportunities after World War II, and the older generation had to be called upon for leadership roles. Both Qavam and Mossadeq had been leaders of the Constitutionalist era of the turn of the century (both were also related to the former Qajar Dynasty). Up until that time, the young

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Shah had done no better at discovering new talent, but he was hardly in a position to do so.<sup>53</sup>

(2) Second, methods of recruitment into Government service and political leadership still functioned along very largely traditional lines. In consequence, the mere successful completion of a college course, either in Iran or abroad, was no guarantee of a job commensurate with talent and ability. This situation discouraged and embittered many promising young men. (There were exceptions, such as the Plan Organization.)

(3) Third, awareness of new demands and new responsibilities had not progressed far enough that many men were equipped for leadership under the changed circumstances. The young Shah himself was probably among the best-equipped, as a result of his father's careful education program for him.

### c. Political participation.

(1) It should be clear from previous sections that Iranian Government and politics in 1951 were a game played by a relatively small number of elite players, which neither greatly involved large groups of people nor invited their participation. Voting was not a thoughtful civic act for many people, although voters in urban areas--especially Teheran--tended to return more progressive numbers than the illiterate peasants. There was little intercommunication between rulers and people; one of the principal traditional channels, the landlords, had been largely cut off. The average person simply did not identify himself with the system.

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(2) Another form of political participation, apparently confined to the larger cities, was demonstrations and mob action. At times, such action was spontaneous, as in the Teheran bread riots of 1942. At other times, crowds were enlisted by political leaders. This was Mossadeq's technique; he was assisted by certain religious leaders, whose positions made them particularly able to recruit the masses.

(3) The modern type of political participation, through party organization and interest groups, was virtually absent because the institutions for it did not exist. (See section II.) Its place was taken by informal pressures and connections through ties of family, origin, or common experience, and to some extent of professional or vocational association. However, pressures applied through these channels tended to be for individual or family benefit, rather than for the interests of a wider group. The major exception was, of course, the Tudeh Party, with its Communist tutelage and organization; but the Tudeh was suppressed following the attempt on the Shah's life in 1949, and thereafter its capacity for political action was severely limited by its underground existence and the growing effectiveness of the Shah's security forces.

### 16. Political attitudes and expectations.

#### a. Major groups.

(1) From the standpoint of political attitudes and expectations, Iranian society in 1951 could be categorized in the following major groups (with the Shah and royal family at the social and political

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summit): the landed aristocracy, including members of the former Qajar Dynasty; the modern business sector, which overlapped with the landlords to some degree since the latter had diversified their interests and the former had acquired land as a prestige symbol; the traditional business sector of the bazaar and the guilds; the clergy; the military; the bureaucracy; the professions; the intellectuals, whose attitudes were more or less shared by the students; the urban workers, weakly organized into unions; the great mass of rural peasants, and the seminomadic tribes.

(2) Few of the people in these categories (except the tribes) had a developed group consciousness, but there was a tendency for attitudes within a given category to polarize one way or the other on the broad underlying issues of modernization, reform, and change versus tradition and stability, according to the group members' stake in the existing order or their hopes for benefit from changes. There was no class conflict as such among the categories, in view of Iranian social mobility; tensions derived from interfactional rivalries and from differing views on the underlying issues.

### b. The issue of modernization.

(1) Analysis of Iranian attitudes in available literature mostly dates from the postconflict era, but it is clear that the goal of modernization and development--how imperfectly understood--was quite generally held even before 1951, with the reservation that each individual or group expected to reap the benefits of change while others paid the price. Binder, writing in 1965, described the situation as follows:

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His analysis, with due consideration for the effects of the intervening years, is relevant to the 1951 situation:

The government of Iran is irrevocably bent on a policy of modernization and development . . . . There are some parts of Iran into which the hope for a new and better life has not penetrated, but most reports confirm that these are becoming fewer and less important. There are classes and groups which are hesitant about admitting the unqualified virtue of modernization, but none reject it in theory. There are, of course, different ideas about what modernization entails, ideas which are freighted with legitimacy preferences and rationalizations of interests, but all those who have an opinion opt for change.<sup>54</sup>

(2) Modernization, however, does not necessarily mean pluralistic democracy. As pointed out above, Binder implies that the principal Iranian institution of this type, the Majlis, was all but irrelevant to the nation's current problems. As for Western-style political liberty, it is not quite the same thing as Iranian-style individualism. After centuries of subjection to absolutism, "political freedom as a prize of constant democratic vigilance will be long in the learning." Yet at the same time, Bayne maintains that "the effort to achieve a more broadly based government is at the heart, if frequently unconsciously, of Iranian efforts to develop and justifies--or at least explains--the frenetic politics of the country as impatience for modernity."<sup>55</sup>

### c. Popular desires.

(1) At their simplest, popular desires have been summarized as "bread, and a lightening of the burden of everyday existence."<sup>56</sup> To this should be added an apparently widespread desire for Iranian national

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dignity and prestige, and an end to foreign influence and support. This much virtually all the Iranian people probably agree on. Among the more sophisticated wants are probably those listed by Binder in his explanation of what nationalism has come to mean in Iran: "social reform, free elections, industrialization, land distribution, the exclusion of foreign influence, and the nationalization of petroleum, perhaps even of other natural resources. It also means ending corruption, reducing religious influence, opening careers to talent, achieving universal literacy, and maybe even recovering some long lost irredenta."<sup>57</sup>

(2) Another indication of popular desires among the more sophisticated was the platform of Sayyid Zia u'd-Din Tabataba'i when, with British support, he returned from exile in 1943 to organize an anti-Communist political party, Eradeh-yi-Milli ("National Will"). Its program "reflected all the characteristics of liberal progressivism. It included equality and freedom for all Iranian citizens; a higher standard of living; reform of education; reform of administration and justice; improved health standards; advanced agrarian reform, including the division of State domains among the peasants and revision of the sharecropping system; agricultural improvements and irrigation, and establishment of a state agrarian bank; development of industry and natural resources; reform of the financial system; reform of the armed forces, and the like." These points were common to most of the political parties at the time. In addition, Eradeh-yi-Milli advocated "stronger defense of the political and economic independence of Iran; friendly treatment of the tribes;

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defense of Islam; introduction of religious teaching into the school program; and a foreign policy of eternal neutrality for Iran, following the Swiss pattern."<sup>58</sup> It appears, however, that none of the political parties had any clear program for integrating all these desiderata, let alone realizing them. One may speculate that this unbridged gap between desires and implementation, coupled with the difficulties of group action in the Iranian cultural setting, was a major source of frustration and alienation for reform-minded intellectuals. There was, of course, one group which did have definite goals and an action program: the Communist, through the Tudeh Party.

### d. Attitudes toward foreigners.

(1) Among both elite and masses, foreigners were viewed in Iran with a mixture of dislike and respect: dislike for their strangeness, their meddling, their condescension; respect for their power and their money. As a country, the Soviet Union was generally feared and hated (except for the Communist minority) as a result of over a century of Soviet aggressive designs; yet the Qajar rulers had been willing to make their peace with the Soviet Union, and to grant substantial concessions in return for Soviet money.

(2) On the whole, the United Kingdom was less feared than the Soviet Union if for no other reason than that she was further away. The British oil concession became a prime rallying point for xenophobia in the late forties, deliberately encouraged by Mohammed Mossadeq. As had been indicated, the Iranians credited the British with diabolical cunning,

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and a British hand was seen behind almost any political move in Iran (not always without reason). This irrational view continued well into the postwar years, into a time when the United States had largely replaced the United Kingdom as a factor in Iranian external relations.

(3) Although the Americans had built a reservoir of good will as a generously inclined, distant power without territorial ambitions, yet inevitably the increase in American influence in Iran caused some transfer of the onus which had previously attached to the British; this tendency was carefully encouraged by the Communists.

### 17. Political leadership.

a. For 20 years, Reza Shah provided Iran with strong and, on the whole, enlightened leadership of the traditional sort. He brooked no competition or opposition; made all the major decisions and set all the major policies himself, personally directed both civilian and military government activities. His conduct was quite within the traditional Iranian mold, but was considerably influenced by his intelligent grasp of 20th century realities. Self-taught and reared in a military and provincial atmosphere, he lacked the perception and imagination of his Turkish contemporary, Ataturk, from whom he drew many ideas; he also apparently lacked gifted advisers like Ziya Gokalp, the Turkish sociologist who guided many of Ataturk's ideas of modernization and secularization. Yet in some ways, Reza Shah faced a more difficult task. He accomplished much for his country's development. One of his main political achievements was to make possible an orderly succession to

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the throne. One of his chief deficiencies was his failure to encourage the development of modern leadership at subsidiary levels.

b. Mohammed Reza Shah had a very different style from his father, partly because of his liberal upbringing and partly, no doubt, from the difference in the circumstances of accession. Despite early misgivings and lack of support by the citizenry, Mohammed Reza Shah gradually built his power on the basis of the support of the Armed Forces, firm association with the goal of national development, accommodation with the clergy and with key elite and business figures, skillful political manipulation of others, and the continuing mystique of the Iranian throne. The relative weakness of his leadership in the early years of his reign, when he endeavored to act as a European-style constitutional monarch, was in vivid contrast to his father's autocratic style, and encouraged the surfacing of many contenders for political power--many of them in eclipse since the 1921 coup d'etat. Following an assassination attempt in 1949, he took advantage of enhanced public support to assert stronger leadership.

c. Mohammed Mossadeq (known during the Qajar Dynasty as Mussadequ's-Saltanah, a title of noble status) was related to the royal family, and was governor of the province of Fars at the time of Reza Khan's 1921 coup. He fled his post, but not long after was brought back into government as finance minister. Elected to the Majlis, he was one of a handful of Reza Khan's unofficial advisers; but he was also one of four deputies with the courage to vote against legitimation of the new dynasty. (His

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stated reason, not without validity, was that Reza Khan could better serve the State as a chief minister responsible to the legislature than as a monarch without responsibility.) In consequence, he remained "in the wilderness of opposition and mistrust, his zeal turning to hysteria in the years of frustration." But "he became a hero because of his long and lonely stand against the military, nondemocratic regime. His honesty and integrity were once by-words." His opportunity came in the struggle for political power with the Shah in the power vacuum after World War II, when he could rally landowners, clerics, liberals, and the urban poor and unemployed in a campaign against British oil and the specter of renewed royal dictatorship.

d. Mossadeq "understood, in surprisingly modern fashion, how to manipulate public opinion.

. . . He was politically impeccable, a masterful politician who built alliances with the right and left--with the right by virtue of his own high rank in the social pyramid and his piety . . .; with the left on the basis of a shared interest in defeating the Western countries in the contest for control of the petroleum industry. His rise to power in what had become a deteriorating political stalemate seems now to have been virtually inevitable. Both conservative and leftist forces threatened public order; the King was nearly assassinated; and the hungry rural peasantry flowed into the capital city at such a rate--at times more than a thousand a day in 1949--that many were forced to lodge in the entry porches of mosques and public buildings or in abandoned brick kilns. The country was receptive to strong leadership of a kind not offered by Mossadeq's predecessor, the earnest but politically inexperienced General Ali Razmare, who had been a desperate hope of Iranian and Western moderates in their search for some progressive reformulation of the frenetic forces that divided the political elements . . . In retrospect it seems that

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the dangers which followed might have been avoided  
by more courageous/external/ aid.<sup>59</sup>

Mossadeq's great fault--perhaps overemphasized by the Shah in his autobiography--was his negativism: he was against foreign influence, against renewal of royal rule like Reza Shah's, against sin, but he had very little positive program of his own.\* Indeed he opposed the Shah's land distribution program, begun in 1949 with the Crown lands, explicitly because it would not in itself assure the well-being of the new and inexperienced proprietors (which was true), but implicitly because he needed the support of the landowners, who saw in the Shah's action an ultimate threat to their own holdings. Yet he was--and still remains--a hero to the reforming nationalists; and some Western observers (e.g., Cottam) believe that with external sympathy and support instead of obstruction, he could have contributed greatly to Iran's development.<sup>60</sup>

e. Other notable figures on the Iranian scene during the period have included Ahmad Qavam (Qavamu's-Saltaneh), another Qajar and cousin of Mossadeq, who was Prime Minister in the early years after Reza Khan's coup, was again Prime Minister during the difficult days of negotiation with USSR in 1946, and is regarded as the ablest Iranian chief minister of the 20th century; Hussein Ala, intimate of the Court, first Court Minister, and subsequent Prime Minister; Sayyid Zia'u'd-Din Tabataba'i,

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\*Cottam maintains that Mossadeq had more of a program than he is usually given credit for. For instance, Mossadeq had his own program of long-term land lease.

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initially associated with Reza Khan and later an elder statesman and anti-Communist leader, an enthusiastic reformer who "fell from power in part because he was endeavoring to organize the people's private lives before he had gained their public confidence."<sup>61</sup> General Ali Razmar, who led Iranian troops in the reoccupation of Azerbaijan and (as above noted) was the hope of the moderates as Prime Minister in 1950-1951 but was assassinated; and such religious leaders as the demagogic and clever Mullah Kashani, allied for a time with Mossadeq. None of these people, however, had the individual impact on the Iranian political scene of the three described in the foregoing paragraphs. In particular, the conflict and the personal antipathy between Mohammed Reza Shah and Mohammed Mossadeq symbolized the struggle of traditional against modern political forms; yet it was Mossadeq who was related by blood and upbringing to the traditional elite, while the Shah was regarded as a youthful upstart--one of many examples of the complexities of the Iranian political scene.

f. Bayne comments that the post-World War II premiers were of varying ability, but that even the best of them--Qavam and Mohammed said, "who created a masterful parliamentary tranquillity without eradicating the turmoil of sector rivalry that lay beneath the surface," could not fill the power vacuum left by the withdrawal of the old Shah.<sup>62</sup>

Bayne also notes that the Iranian leaders were not social innovators; the best of them sought simply to "air-condition or streamline a traditional society." Even the xenophobic nationalism of the postwar era did not deny the usefulness of the monarchy, although the young monarch himself received little support.

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g. Although the precise characteristics and influence of the individual Iranian leaders are not fully documented, it is clear that a relatively small number of men have controlled, over a fairly long period of time, the conduct of Iranian political affairs. This remains true despite fairly frequent changes of Cabinet. Between 1941 and 1952, 26 Cabinets and 400 Cabinet positions were filled; but these positions were held by a total of 144 persons. Eleven served as Prime Minister, 10 as Minister of War, and nine as Minister of Foreign Affairs. There is a core group of deputies in the Majlis who, reelected time after time (sometimes from different districts) provide a leadership cadre. Certain durable individuals are found over the years in one post after another. For instance, Dr. Manuchir Iqbal (born 1908) has been Prime Minister, a Deputy Minister, five times Minister of Health (five times), has held four other ministerial posts (two of them twice); he has also been Minister of Court, governor-general, university chancellor, senator, and deputy in the Majlis; in 1968, he was listed as holding 36 different jobs.<sup>63</sup>

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## Section II. Non-Communist Political Parties and Interest Groups.

by Eugene H. Miller, PhD

### 18. General.

a. The subject of this paper is the role of the non-Communist political parties in Iran, 1921-51. A search of pertinent writings in this field is, at first reading, somewhat discouraging. Academic specialists stress the negative:

In part there have been no political parties (with one or two exceptions) in our sense of the word at all. Such parties have existed, have always been so unstable and so short-lived as to be virtually without effect.<sup>64</sup>

Only the Leftist, almost Communist groups called Tudeh deserves the name "party."<sup>65</sup>

There have been no nation-wide political parties of duration . . . there have been periodic spawnings of so-called political parties, usually in preparation for elections, but with the exception of the communist-dominated Tudeh Party, they were without much substance and proved to be ephemeral.<sup>66</sup>

With the exception of the Tudeh, political parties in the Western sense do not exist, or at the very most are embryonic.<sup>67</sup>

b. Dr. Arthur C. Millspaugh, a distinguished economist, who spent 8 years as financial adviser to the Iranian Government, agrees with the judgment of his academic colleagues. At the end of his second term in Teheran he came to the conclusion:

In the strictly political sphere no party system or party division such as that which dominates American and British politics has ever evolved in Persia. The deputies of the Parliament join in groups and factions



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but these are numerous and begin to dissolve about as soon as they are formed.<sup>68</sup>

c. In view of his current attempt to establish and promote two political parties--one to govern and one to oppose--the Shah's opinion of their role in the past is of interest. He refers to "certain so-called parties" coming into being in 1906 when the National Assembly was established. He charges that they were ineffective because they concentrated on personalities rather than issues. Similarly, the attempt of his father, Reza Shah, to establish a single minority party failed because "the country still lacked the maturity needed for a working party system."<sup>69</sup>

d. In light of such negative reactions, is a discussion of political parties relevant? The answer would seem to be in the affirmative. Amorphous as they were, they performed a valuable function in Iran's transition from a "traditional" political culture to a "modern" one. The transition was far from complete by 1951 but as key points on the road, "parties," though unstructured, played a role in the evolution of Iran's political institutions.

### 19. Historical background.

#### a. The Constitutionalist period.

(1) The first such milestone was the adoption of the Constitution of 1906. The establishment of a written basic law, setting up a representative legislative body, marked a sharp break with the past. The Constitution did not bring instant 20th century political institutions to

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Iran. However, it limited in some degree the power of the Shah and opened the way to further development of a "modern" governmental structure.

(2) There were various reasons for the break with absolute monarchy: the weakness of the Qajar Dynasty, evidenced by capitulations, concessions to British and Soviet banks and dictation of Iranian boundaries by London and St. Petersburg; the poor performance of individual Shahs such as Nasir ed-Din who ignored domestic problems while he took extravagant trips to Europe; the corruption of administration; and the absence of security and control in the provinces.<sup>70</sup>

(3) The humiliations suffered at the hands of European powers inspired a Nationalist movement. Led by intellectuals, many of whom had studied and travelled in Europe, the Nationalists early came to the conclusion that to win their independence from Europe they had to adopt Western techniques and institutions. The first order of business was to organize political clubs<sup>71</sup> for discussion. Out of these dialogues came the decision to modernize the Government in Teheran as a prelude to regaining true Iranian sovereignty.

(4) The catalyst that turned the intellectuals from talk to action was the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905. Encouraged by the success of a modernizing Asian nation against the European power who had trampled most cavalierly on Iran's independence, the Nationalists, backed by some religious and business leaders, struck at the core of the ruler's power structure, the Grand Vizier. To enforce their demands for his

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dismissal they combined the traditional Iranian tactic of a "bast"--a passive resistance movement, in which protesters take refuge in mosques<sup>72</sup>--with the Western tactic of a general strike.

(5) At first the Shah yielded, dismissed the Grand Vizier and promised to set up a "House of Justice" in which the basti could express their views. When the Shah reneged on his promise of a "House of Justice," the Nationalists demanded and won the establishment of a representative National Consultative Assembly (Majlis) with power guaranteed by a Constitution.<sup>73</sup>

(6) Political "groups" rather than parties were responsible for this first step on the road to modern political institutions. It is true as E. A. Bayne observes that "protective nationalism" (provisions designed to safeguard the nation against the capitulation to foreign countries) was "the principal theme of the Constitution rather than promotion of popular democracy."<sup>74</sup> However, once a national assembly was established and there was an opportunity for parliamentary action, the politically conscious members evolved from informal groups into somewhat formally structured parties with articulated programs.<sup>75</sup>

(7) The popular Democrats, who represented a "liberal" point of view, stood for a separation of religion and politics, compulsory military service, distribution of land among the peasants, legislation to prevent hoarding, compulsory education, formation of an agricultural bank, preference for indirect over direct taxation, and opposition to an upper house as provided in the Constitution. In 1908 these planks constituted a

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revolutionary platform. The Democrats were accused by their opponents of heresy and atheism. They were a minority party but their goals, as advocated by the best contemporary newspapers, Iran-e (Now) of Teheran, Shafae, of Tabriz, and Now Bahar of Mashhad, attracted influential journalists and orators, young people, and the emerging middle class.<sup>76</sup>

(8) The majority party, the Moderate Socialists, was not socialist in a 20th century definition of the term. It was in favor of gradual and moderate reform and was supported by the aristocracy, the rich merchants, and a few liberal clergy.<sup>77</sup>

(9) Bayne grants the existence of two parties with distinct programs but maintains that in the final analysis what emerged "was a variety of clubhouse politics" and that "the domestic aspects of politicking were immediately sullied when there developed an open endorsement of the Moderate Socialists by the Soviet Union and of the Popular Democrats by the British." The fact that the parties presented different ideologies "may have been exciting business" for the "elite who participated in politics, but it was unproductive." The population of Iran as a whole, mostly illiterate devout Muslims, was not touched by revolutionary ideas debated by the tiny minority of wealthy, upper class people. There was some debate on internal matters but the members of the Majlis were mainly influenced by external pressures. As World War I developed, the Moderate Socialists favored the Allied while the Popular Democrats sought support from the Central Powers.<sup>78</sup>

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### b. Parties during the rule of Reza Shah.

(1) In the post-World War I period, the two parties<sup>79</sup> "partly merged but also produced splinter groups, ranging from the extreme Left, stimulated by the Russian Revolution, to varying shades of conservative opinion. The absence of leaders not suspect by their Soviet and British ties and of a truly Iranian-rooted political philosophy resulted in Majlis' delegates joining ad hoc pressure groups, chiefly representative of regional or sectional interests: rural versus urban; tribal against more settled populations; northern plateau versus the lowlands of the Persian Gulf; British 'agents' against Soviet infiltrators and adherents--all revolving in elaborate parliamentary choreography around an empty monarchical structure. The vacuum was obvious, ready-made for a dynamic nationalist leader."<sup>80</sup>

(2) Where would the leader be found, in the ranks of the newly formed Socialist party that favored communism and friendship with the Soviets<sup>81</sup> or among those who put defense of the State above reform? The Soviet proclamation of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Gilan dramatized the danger to Iranian independence posed in the first alternative. In face of the renewed threat from the North, Iranians in 1921 accepted the lead of a strong Nationalist, Colonel Reza Khan--who became Shah in 1925.

(3) Under Reza Shah, the question of whether political parties were true parties or "shifting groups of deputies supporting or opposing government measures"<sup>82</sup> became academic. His program to rid Iran of



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foreign influence, to centralize the Government, and to unite the people into a single nation did not have room for political parties. Practically all political activity ceased and the Majlis became a rubber stamp while Reza Shah vigorously pursued his goals of nationalism and modernization.

(4) Both the nationalist and modernization facets of Reza Shah's rule resembled in many respects the reforms of Mustafa Kemal in Turkey. However, unlike Ataturk, Reza Shah did not establish a political party to carry on after the termination of his reign. His deposition was engineered by those traditional despoilers of Iranian sovereignty, the British and the Soviets, who could not tolerate a German presence in Iran (Germans had played an influential role in Iran for the last decade) once Hitler had invaded the Soviet Union. Iranian neutrality that had been proclaimed by Reza Shah in February 1941 was not good enough. British and Soviet troops entered Iran in August 1941 to protect the vital supply route from the head of the Persian Gulf to the Soviet Union and the uncooperative ruler was deposed in September.

### c. Developments during World War II.

(1) Iran-watchers are united in testifying to the explosion of political activity that took place in the wake of Reza Shah's forced abdication. Although organized political activity had been dormant during his reign, the social forces characteristic of a 20th century developing nation--urbanization, nationalism, and an increasing educated class--had intensified. They had, in fact, been stimulated by his policies of national independence and modernization. With the removal of restraints

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on opposition, Iranians of various shades of opinion and representing different interests came on to the political stage. They organized groups that spanned the spectrum from the Tudeh Party on the Left to traditionalist religious groups on the Right.<sup>83</sup>

(2) The Tudeh Party, which is described in another paper, dominated the scene from 1941-44. To counteract its Communist program, supported by the Soviet Union, Sayyid Zia ed-Din returned from exile in September 1943 to create a new political organization, the Vatan ("Fatherland"). He was elected to the Majlis by a substantial majority, changed the name to Eradeh-yi-Melli (National Will) and officially inaugurated it as a political party in January 1945. Taking a leaf from the Tudeh book, the National Will Party was organized on a hierarchial basis, starting with a "circle" (halqah), nine men and a chief. Nine circles formed a "group" (rabet) headed by a higher chief. The chiefs of the groups were appointed by Sayyid Zia who had assumed the post of Security-General. Monthly conferences were held in each city where the Party had an organization and in March, the first national congress was convened in Teheran.<sup>84</sup>

(3) The program adopted by the convention was, for the most part, couched in generalities: equality and freedom for all, a higher standard of living, reform of education, administration, and justice, improved health, a revision of the share-cropping system, providing more irrigation, development of industry and national resources, and reform of the armed forces. It did specify what it meant by land reform, division of state domains among the peasants.

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(4) Outside the domestic economic area, the Party congress committed itself to friendly treatment of the tribes; to the defense of Islam--religious teaching was to be permitted in the schools; to a stronger defense of the political and economic independence of Iran; and to eternal neutrality on the Swiss model. The last named policy was interesting in view of the allegation that the inspiration for founding the National Will Party came from the British who wanted a counterweight to the Soviet Union's protege, the Tudeh.<sup>85</sup>

(5) The charge that Sayyid Zia was not a true Nationalist because of suspected British connections was counterbalanced by his strong stand in defense of Iranian sovereignty when the Soviets demanded extensive oil concessions and sponsored a Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. He vigorously protested the killings and expulsions of Iranians in Soviet-occupied territory, accused the Soviet Union of interfering in Iranian affairs and of seeking Lebensraum at Iran's expense. At the end of the war in Europe, he demanded speedy evacuation of Iran by foreign troops. In view of this record Lenczowski argues that those who allege that Zia's only strength was British support "ignore completely Iranian nationalism and the fear of Soviet domination prevailing in the country . . . Sayyid Zia derived his main strength from alliance with the clergy, merchants, landowners, and tribes."

(6) Additional evidence of the National Will Party leader's nationalism is found in his support of the second Millspaugh mission. It is true that Millspaugh's group involved foreigners in Iran's financial

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affairs. However, Zia believed that his country could only be really free if she had a strong economy and he regarded Dr. Millspaugh as a disinterested expert who was genuinely committed to helping Iran attain such independence. In addition, by getting the United States interested in Iran, there would be a counterweight to the stifling Soviet presence. These positions were far removed from Switzerland's neutrality but by balancing foreign powers against each other, Zia hoped to create a situation in which Iran could gradually free herself from foreign control. Zia's policies by 1945 had the support of 37 votes in the Majlis.<sup>86</sup>

(7) In addition to the Tudeh and National Will, there were five other World War II parties that deserve mention.

a. The Mihan Party was established in June 1944. It was hostile to any foreign influences in Iran. It was composed of younger, patriotic elements, including a number of students and of older Iranians who had been educated in Europe before Reza Shah and had supported his reform efforts, particularly in the field of education. It possessed two newspapers and had connections with the tribes of Luristan. However, it was not represented in the Majlis and its leadership split, thus negating its influence.<sup>87</sup>

b. The Iran Party was created in 1944. Members were recruited from educated men in Teheran, particularly engineers, many of whom had earned graduate degrees in Europe and the United States. They stood for "independence, social justice, increase of the standard of living, agrarian reform, promotion of education and hygiene, and

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development of trade and industry."<sup>88</sup> There was no fight over leadership. They accepted Dr. Mohammed Mossadeq, then in his 60s, an aristocrat, wealthy landowner, a professor at the university, and one of the five Majlis deputies who had opposed termination of the Qajar Dynasty in 1925. He had been a political prisoner under Reza Shah. During the early years of his party leadership he displayed "simultaneous qualities of stubbornness and unwillingness to compromise with the realities of power," characteristics that were to be significant at a later period.<sup>89</sup>

c. The Socialist Party emerged in 1944 as a result of the split in the Hamrahan Party. It manifested "some vitality," advocating limitations on private property and a planned government economy. It was said to cooperate with the Tudeh and to be friendly toward the Soviet Union and hostile toward the Millspaugh mission. Its membership was "uncertain but at any rate was not large."<sup>90</sup>

d. The Mardom Party was founded in 1944 by a group of distinguished cabinet ministers. It was composed of influential men associated directly or indirectly with the Government. It published a daily newspaper that adopted a neutral attitude toward Zia ed-Din and the Tudeh but displayed hostility toward the American financial mission."<sup>91</sup>

e. The Adalat Party also came into existence in 1944. Its program did not differ significantly from that of the other middle parties. Its leaders were Government officials and professional men, but of not quite so high stature as the organizers of Mardom. It claimed 11 sympathizers in the Majlis and branches in 40 towns. Neda-yi-Adalat was its



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official paper. The Party was hostile to the Tudeh and suffered assaults on its meetings by the Communists. Many members were alleged to be friendly to Sayyid Zia ed-Din and although opposed to the Millspaugh mission, were said to be more inclined toward the West than toward the Soviet Union.<sup>92</sup>

(8) An evaluation of the role of these five parties in political developments in the closing days of World War II and in the following year is difficult. At first glance it would seem that they were without influence. None possessed a regular faction in the Majlis (there were parliamentary groups but they were not tied in organizationally with the parties); none represented a real mass movement, and their programs, with the possible exception of the Socialists, were not differentiated ideologically. On the other side of the coin, although as individual groups they did not exercise any significant power, "combined they represented a significant political awakening." Their dedication to liberalism, social justice, and nationalism was reflected in the press and they served as a channel of dissent for the bureaucrats who were dissatisfied with existing conditions.<sup>93</sup>

(9) Certainly the opposition of the non-Tudeh parties to any form of foreign interference was a factor in rallying the Iranian people against USSR in the oil concession and Azerbaijan crisis in 1946-1947. Arasteh makes the point that each party had its own youth group, women's

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organization<sup>\*</sup>, athletic teams, debating society, and labor unit. There were regular meetings. University, high school, and even junior high school students were involved in politics. High school girls had their own discussion groups and joined demonstrations with the boys.<sup>94</sup>

d. Parties since World War II.

(1) Successful resistance to foreign intrusion required not only protesters, but a leader. The Shah provided such a man in the Prime Minister, Qavam as-Saltaneh, "a strong, independent-minded personality . . . the most skillful, courageous and imposing of Iran's prime ministers in the twentieth century."<sup>95</sup> When he took office in January 1946, the Soviet Union continued to occupy Azerbaijan, supported a separatist movement there, and demanded an oil concession. At first, Qavam bent with the wind. He negotiated a settlement with Moscow that provided for a joint Soviet (51 percent interest)-Iranian (49 percent interest) company to exploit oil in the north. The agreement was to be valid for 25 years and acknowledged Soviet interest in the welfare of Azerbaijan. Qavam also instructed Iran's delegate to the United Nations to withdraw her complaint against the Soviet Union for not evacuating her troops on 2 March 1946. (The Tripartite Treaty of 1942 required the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom to remove their troops 6 months after the end of the war. The United States and

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<sup>\*</sup>For an interesting account of the role of Persian women in public affairs, see Shuster, The Strangling of Persia.

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the United Kingdom did so.) Finally, Qavam gave three cabinet posts to Communists. It is alleged that this was the price paid for Soviet evacuation of her troops from Iran.<sup>96</sup>

(2) The question of why the Soviet Union withdrew her troops is still moot. The United Nations did not drop the question and supporters of that organization hail the publicity focused on Soviet actions in the world forum as responsible for Moscow backing down. On the other hand President Truman, in his Memoirs, reports that of 6 March 1946, Secretary Byrnes sent a diplomatically polite note to the Kremlin reminding them that they had not fulfilled their commitment to evacuate their troops on March 2. When the Soviet Union ignored this note and when intelligence reports indicated that Soviet forces were still moving inside Iran, Truman told Byrnes "to send a blunt message to Premier Stalin. On March 24 Moscow announced that all Russian troops would be withdrawn from Iran at once."<sup>97</sup>

(3) Without referring to President Truman's notes to the Kremlin, Lenczowski is inclined to give credence to the American effort: "rather stiff resistance by Secretary of State, James Byrnes, at Lake Success and the encouragement given Iran by the American ambassador, George V. Allen, may have been influential. In fact, this . . . factor may have been decisive."<sup>98</sup>

(4) Whatever the true reason for the withdrawal of Soviet forces (they finally departed 9 May 1946) their removal made it possible

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for Qavam to proceed without intimidation. He no longer felt it necessary to bend before the northern wind. A month after the Russian evacuation, he prepared the ground for the election of a Majlis that would not ratify the oil concession agreement by creating a new political party, the Iran Democratic Party. In a radio speech he told the nation that parties were necessary for a constitutional government, that everyone was free to form his own party. Qavam then proceeded to choose 52 founding fathers who elected nine handpicked members for the Central Committee and made Qavam party leader. In addition to the regular organization, the Democratic Party encompassed youth, women's, and workers' groups. It spoke through three journals, the "Democrat," representing the Party, the "Diplomat," the voice of the Central Committee, and "Bahram," the vehicle of the youth organizations. It was well financed. Half a million dollars were collected. The central community worked hard at picking ideal Majlis candidates--young, liberal, without foreign connections. A new group of younger politicians was brought in, many older ones were skipped over, Mossadeqh was elected as a bull in a China shop. Sayyid Zia was put in prison and two "notables," Jamal Imami and Ala Dashti, who had been influential in past parliaments, were passed over. The hard work involved in creating a "modern" political party paid off: the Democrats elected 85 of 136 deputies and got control of the Majlis.<sup>99</sup>

(5) Qavam had already scuttled two parts of the "deal" with the Soviet Union--in the summer of 1946 he had dismissed the Tudeh ministers from his cabinet and in December the Iranian troops he sent into Azerbaijan

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overthrew the separatist regime that had originally been approved by Moscow. With firm control of the Majlis, Qavam asked for and got an almost unanimous vote (with the exception of two Communist ballots) to refuse ratification of the Iran-Soviet oil agreement.<sup>100</sup> Having completed his Nationalist goal of renouncing the foreign concessions he had had to make under duress, Qavam turned to domestic matters. He introduced and pushed through the Majlis a progressive program which later became the basis of the first economic development plan.<sup>101</sup>

(6) When the Azerbaijan-Oil Concession Crisis came to head, parties, which Iranian watchers denigrated as without true existence and without influence, did play a role. Theirs was not the only part, and perhaps not the major one. However, the "explosion of liberty" in the wake of Reza Shah's abdication had given politically-minded Iranians their head. Feeble as their efforts at organization, development of programs, and party life expectancy might have been, they had created an atmosphere in which literate and articulate Iranians were not going to passively accept a further derogations of Iranian sovereignty. The nationalism of the leaders was transmitted to the masses. For a brief chronologically vital period, one leader did create and use a political party for national ends. Qavam might have been able to carry through his complete program of renunciation of the Soviet agreements without the Democratic Party. However, the fact is that it did exist, that it was well organized and led, that it successfully fought an election for



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control of the Majlis, and that it used that power to put the legal stamp of refusal on the oil concession agreement.

(7) Qavam and his Party had their finest hour in the Majlis' vote against the oil concession. Having won that battle, with the overwhelming backing of politicized Iranians, Qavam ran into another factor in the power equation, the Shah. The young ruler, who was struggling to maintain the Pahlavi Dynasty, feared that his brilliant Prime Minister was becoming too strong. He could not tolerate, in 1947, a rival power base. He succeeded in drawing off some of Qavam's support in the parliament; in December 1947, Qavam failed to maintain a majority in the Majlis and resigned.

(8) Between the fall of Qavam and the coming to power of Mossadeq, the Democratic Party declined, the Tudeh was outlawed, and extremist groups became more active. The radicalization of the political scene was due in part to the Shah's determination not to have another strong premier who might build up a rival power base. More important were economic developments that inevitably carried political implications. The successful outcome of the Azerbaijan crisis permitted attention to be turned once more to internal problems. The Shah and the Majlis agreed that if their nation were to avoid future foreign occupations, economic modernization was imperative.

(9) In 1949 the Majlis approved a Seven Year Plan for industrial and agricultural development that had been worked out by American financial advisers. This far-reaching program was to be financed in large

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part by revenues from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Under the agreement made between Reza Shah and the company in 1933, the latter paid more in taxes to the British Government than it remitted in royalties to Iran. The Nationalists were determined to secure a more equitable contract.<sup>102</sup>

(10) The none-too-strong premiers following Qavam were unable to negotiate a satisfactory new agreement with AIOC. In 1949, elections for the Majlis were fought on the oil issues and the newly elected parliament proceeded to reject the compromise that had been worked out by the Government. The Nationalist position was strengthened when Mohammed Mossadeq became chairman of the Majlis' committee on oil. The Shah responded by appointing a "strong" Prime Minister, General Ali Razmara. However, he, too, was unable to get any concessions from the company beyond those in the Majlis-rejected 1949 agreement. Mossadeq's parliamentary committee then called on the Prime Minister to report on the practicability of nationalizing the company. Four days after he recommended that nationalization was not in the best interests of Iran (7 March 1951), Razmara was assassinated by a religious fanatic. A week later the Majlis voted to take over the AIOC. The new Prime Minister, Hosein Ala, made no move to implement the legislation and the Shah, under Nationalist pressure, offered Mossadeq the post of head of government. He accepted and proceeded to put the law into effect.<sup>103</sup>

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## 20. Positions and roles of political parties, 1947-51.

### a. The Right.

(1) What role did political parties play in this preconflict situation, 1947-51? As noted above, there was a radicalization of the political scene stimulated by the antiforeign passions aroused by the oil-nationalization controversy. On the extreme Right were Fascist and religious fundamentalist groups.

(2) In the first category, the Sumka Party patterned itself after the Nazis, proclaimed the leadership principle, glorified racialism and the struggle for power, and attacked capitalism, imperialism and democracy. It claimed a membership of 15 university students, 500 secondary school students, and 2,000-5,000 workers and small shopkeepers. Also associated with the Party were the ice sellers, drivers of two bus lines, and non-Communist employees of the unfinished Chitsazi textile factory. Sumka had connections with the Court, a retired Army officers' group, especially Generals Muzayani and Zahedi, and with anti-Mossadeq members of the Majlis. It fought the Tudeh in the streets, criticized Mossadeq, and defied the police.

(3) Also in the Fascist classification was the Pan-Iranian Party. Its anti-Communist students fought in the streets and found support among the coffee sellers' guild, the fruit peddlers, painters, and petty merchants. On the whole it was without influence except to contribute to the growing tension in Teheran.<sup>104</sup>

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### b. Fundamentalist groups.

(1) Two parties were prominent in the fundamentalist religious category, the Fedayan Islam, and the Mojahadin Islam. The former was the most bitter opponent of the secular trend in mid-20th century Iran and wanted to return to a caliphate in which secular and sectarian blended. It sought a strict application of Shi'ite law and opposed Western social practices, which it identified with imperialism. Its Nationalist goals included elimination of Arabic and purification of the Persian language. Although Fedayan Islam had no more than a thousand members, one of them, a religious fanatic, made his mark on history by assassinating General Razmara.

(2) Mojahadin Islam competed with Fedayan Islam for religious followers. Its strength lay in the leadership of Ayatullah Kashani. When he later broke with the National Front, Mojahadin Islam was finished. Fedayan Islam likewise cooperated with the Front, at first, but after the secular trend of Mossadeq's government became clear, it broke off relations. In fact they tried to liquidate Mossadeq as they had murdered Razmara.<sup>105</sup>

### c. The National front.

(1) The extreme Right wing parties' effect on politics 1947-51, then, was the negative one of assassination and street violence. The extreme Left, Tudeh, likewise contributed to the development of a pre-conflict situation through opposition to the status quo and the stirring of Nationalist passions. The broadly-based National Front was a Center

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party in the sense that it was not committed to assassination as a tactic, as were the religious fanatics, nor bound to Moscow as was the Tudeh. Cottam says that it was a Centrist group "for the simple reason that its leader, Mossadeq belonged there." On the other hand, he concedes that the first defections from the Front were to come from the large merchants, landowners, and senior military officers.<sup>106</sup>

These Conservatives had not found it too difficult to ally themselves with Mossadeq, a member of the Qajar family and a man whose piety was recognized by the clergy. The non-Communist Left and members of the former Democratic and National Will Parties likewise were attracted to Mossadeq. They shared his zeal to defeat the Western countries in the contest for control of Iran's petroleum industry.<sup>107</sup>

(2) The Front was never a well organized group. Its very inception was informal. It got its start in the campaign for the Fifteenth Majlis. Mossadeq, protesting that the election was not being conducted fairly, took traditional refuge at the palace gate. A large crowd including a number of candidates and middle class leaders gathered. Mossadeq invited them to his nearby home and formed the National Front. The Front was never an integrated organization and Mossadeq, himself, "rarely" met with it and "never consulted it on policy." Nonetheless, it "worked on the streets and in the Majlis until Mossadeq was made Prime Minister." Once in power Mossadeq permitted the Front to "become gradually defunct."<sup>108</sup> In the final analysis it was Mossadeq's personality, rather than the working of a party system, that brought

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him to power. In the years 1947-51 he "satisfied the national spirit by the emotional negativism of his xenophobia."<sup>109</sup>

### 21. Interest groups.

#### a. Professional groups.

(1) Although Iranian parties had played some part in political developments before 1951, they had by no means evolved into mid-20th century, Western-type institutions. Binder thinks that interest groups, on the other hand, "were more than symbols; they were volatile political forces that could often be moved, but not controlled."<sup>110</sup> As in "modern" societies, Iranian organizations not only served the professional interests of their members but also interacted with the Government. The degree of this influence varied with the organization.

(2) Doctors and dentists, for example, had an association that published a journal and held an annual meeting which featured a lecture by a foreign specialist. The association had no set code of ethics and did not police the qualifications of those licensed to practice by the Ministry of Health. The latter held an annual conference in which papers were read by invitation. The program was evidence of the relative standing of individual doctors and dentists with the Ministry. However, the Government "[abstained] from thorough-going interference" in the affairs of the medical profession. For example, it did not compel the surplus of physicians in Teheran to practice in the understaffed provinces. On the other side of the coin, there was no massive lobby such as that maintained by the American Medical Association. The only

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pressure brought to bear on the Government was the occasional demand for salary improvements by an informal group of doctors employed by the Ministry of Health, the Army, and ministry or agency hospitals.<sup>111</sup>

(3) In contrast to the relatively apolitical stance of the physicians and dentists, the engineers were political activists. As noted above, the engineers' association developed into the reformist Iran Party.<sup>112</sup>

(4) Lawyers did not play the same public role in Iran as in colonial countries such as India where barristers were prominent in the Nationalist movement. Independent Iran's judicial system was based on code law, all judges were employees of the Ministry of Justice, and admission to the bar was strictly controlled by the Ministry, first directly and later through the Bar Association. Most law graduates took Government jobs, often outside the Ministry of Justice. Law was an honored and fairly lucrative profession so that "the stereotype of the starving lawyer agitator does not hold true for Iran."<sup>113</sup>

### b. Business groups.

(1) The Chamber of Commerce was alleged to be "the most important, influential, and broadly interested of all groups." According to Binder, the Chamber "actually functions as a branch of the Ministry of Commerce, but some of its members are so influential as to permit them to direct the policy of the ministry."<sup>114</sup>

(2) Guilds of craftsmen, small merchants, and sellers of services have a long history in Iran. In the past, guilds were the only

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type of economic interest organization. They developed in each town as the response to common needs, for example, determining location in the bazaar. Their formation was usually voluntary and the relations of each guild with the Government were based on tradition or a special ad hoc arrangement. There was little evidence of a Government policy, although regulation was usually entrusted to the market police and was based on general Islamic law. Guilds worked closely with the ulama (organizations of religious students) and in many cases the members were bound by special religious benefits, rites, or mysteries resembling those of a lodge.<sup>115</sup>

(3) During the first half of the 20th century, guild organization seemed to be breaking down in the face of new enterprises, foreign manufacturers, and the inadequacies of the bazaar. However guilds still presented their grievances to the Government and they played an active role in two political crises. They were very helpful in the Constitutional movement of 1905-1906 and were organized in support of Mossadeq, 1949-51.<sup>116</sup>

### c. Labor.

(1) Labor was an early object of Tudeh organization. Its success in manipulating workers led the Government to establish a Ministry of Labor in 1946. It was meant "to control labor organizations, to draw workers away from the Tudeh, and to deal with interested international parties." Labor laws providing for improved working conditions and Social Insurance legislation were passed and a Government-sponsored federation of labor was established. However, the

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Government tended to neglect labor. Labor laws were implemented in part only in Government establishments and private employers did not comply. Both Qavam and Mossadeq refused to admit labor to a top bargaining position. Almost no political support developed for a trade union congress that was given official sponsorship by the Government when it declared the Tudeh-controlled group illegal following an attempt on the Shah's life in 1949.<sup>117</sup>

(2) Associations of Government employees were "not as acceptable as guilds but not quite so unwelcome as labor unions." The Teheran teachers, the Teheran street sweepers, and the tobacco workers were the largest groups. The Teachers' Association (Mehregan) had been established in 1932 by the licensees of the Ecole Normale Superieure. It had able leadership and made steady gains in membership. After the abdication of Reza Shah, the Tudeh tried to take control and membership dwindled. In 1946, Mehregan called a strike to win pay increments for license degree holders and other civil servants. It won, and the organization began to grow again. Success brought renewed challenge from the Tudeh, and as the oil nationalization crisis came to a head, the teachers were divided into two groups with Mossadeq saying a plaque on both houses.<sup>118</sup>

d. Other secular groups.

Foreign university graduates were organized by countries in which they studied and were primarily interested in security recognition of the validity of their degrees. Fourteen different womens'

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organizations existed in Teheran. They represented a variety of interests--charity, social assistance, working women, sports, medicine, nursing, youth, human rights, and equal rights for women.<sup>119</sup>

e. Religious groups.

(1) Religion has traditionally played a significant role in Iran. There were three types of religious groups: the Fedayan-i-Islam and the Mojahidin-i-Islam already discussed in the section on political parties; the Dervish brotherhoods; and the Ulama. Binder does not agree with the "claim that Dervish brotherhoods have a great deal of influence in politics, citing the fact that most of the aristocratic politicians are members of one or another group and that the Murshids (guides) of certain orders sometimes visit the Court. It would seem, however, that common membership in an order is more a basis for forming cooperative cliques of the normal type rather than for some conspiratorial political control. The Murshids do not get deeply involved in day-to-day political affairs."<sup>120</sup>

(2) The Ulama have certainly carried greater weight. They have been "an institution, a class, and an interest group." Their organization has been informal but in the period under study, their "rigid tradition of recruitment, training, advancement, financing, and political orientation" maintained their key position in the traditional system and their status, wealth, and access to power.<sup>121</sup>



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### f. Traditional groupings.

(1) Since parties have not matured and since interest groups, with few exceptions, have not participated fully in the political process, some students of Iranian Government have turned to the traditional dowrahs for an explanation of political discussion and decision-making. William Green Miller says that the dowrah system is a "substitute (for political parties) used by Iranian politicians to discuss, organize, and communicate with their followers." He makes the point that dowrahs and the dowrah system are not identical. He defines the dowrah as an "upper class social habit" that involves regular meetings of upper and middle class groups for reasons of common interest.<sup>122</sup>

James A. Bill's description is similar, "A dowrah is an informal group of individuals who always meet periodically usually rotating the meeting place among the membership."<sup>123</sup>

(2) There are many kinds of dowrahs--professional, gambling, religious, student, political, former classmate. Some have names, others don't. Some are attended by both men and women--most are not, except for family dowrahs. Some meet weekly, others, fortnightly or monthly. Some have only one purpose. In some, membership is closed; others are open to friends. Some Iranians belong to only one, most to several. All members of the political elite have dowrahs and this includes the Shah.<sup>124</sup>

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(3) The average number of members is 12 to 16. Ideas are transmitted from one dowrah to another and on to the bazaar. Bazaar merchants, in turn, pass on the news and information to their customers--thus a bazaar "rumor" is born which "for all its shortcomings is still the most effective means of communication between the elite and the populace as a whole." There is also a reverse flow from the bazaar to the dowrahs of information on the attitudes of the workers.<sup>125</sup>

(4) In defining the dowrah system, Miller invokes a comparison with the ancient waterworks system: "Like those underground channels which bring water from remote sources to the villages and cities, dowrah system politics flow relatively unperceived. When a channel is blocked or a source dries up, new channels are dug. And like the qavat system which is being replaced by new, less costly and more efficient methods of irrigation, the dowrah system is gradually losing its central role."<sup>126</sup>

(5) The counterparts of the dowrah system of the elite are found in religious, fraternal, athletic, and social activities in the bazaar. Classes or study groups meet in mosques, parochial schools, or shrines to discuss religious questions. They are transformed into political action groups when the religious Establishment becomes involved in political affairs. The Dervishes meet in places called "Khanehgahs." Here the elite and the rank and file mingle "under the mantle of Sufi simplicity" (for political involvement of Dervishes, see above). The Free Masons' activities have taken place in

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Rhanehgahs (for political involvement of Masons, see above). During Moharvam and Ramazan (the major religious seasons), bazarri form miracle play groups which perform works based on the martyrdom of Ali, Hossein, and Hassan. If there is political activity at the time, the dramas stimulate the people to become political activists. "Razehs," neighborhood religious mourning groups, also become political on some occasions.<sup>127</sup>

(6) Another type of voluntary association found in the bazaar is the House of Strength. It is an athletic association made up of young and middle-aged men who stress physical culture--Indian clubs, weight lifting, wrestling. The members also engage in intellectual and aesthetic activities such as music and poetry. Though all of them are not of the same political affiliation, the House of Strength does at times take a political position and its leader may take an active part in street demonstrations.<sup>128</sup>

(7) Finally, there is tremendous social activity in the bazaar. Artisans and laborers meet regularly in caravansaries, tea houses, and restaurants that serve as the rendezvous for those in a particular craft or trade. They "discuss business, exchange rumor and news, and, inevitably, debate politics."<sup>129</sup>

(8) The dowrahs, the dowrah system, and the voluntary associations along with the interest groups certainly affected political developments and, in times of crisis, political action, 1905-51. It is difficult to measure the degree of their influence, but it is evident

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that such power existed and that it affected the course of events in the preconflict periods under study.

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## Section III. Communism.

by James E. Trinnaman

### 22. Introduction.

a. This section focuses on the development and phases of Soviet interests in Iran and in the Communist doctrines and applications utilized to pursue these interests at each phase in the preconflict period.

b. A study of Iran during this period is particularly enlightening regarding the development of Communist doctrine and organization, for Iran has been near the forefront of Soviet interests since the early days of the Soviet revolution. Moscow has regarded Iran as important not only as a point of geographic vulnerability to the heartland of the Soviet Union, but also as a gateway of opportunity to expand the revolution into the Middle East and South Asia.

c. Iran often appears to have played the role of an experimental station for new Soviet ideas on means of pursuing the world revolution. Moscow seems to have carefully catalogued its successes and failures in Iran and continually modified its approaches for use there and elsewhere. Soviet tactics have included efforts to:

- (1) attract religious, minority and separatist movements;
- (2) capture the developing force of nationalism and anti-Western imperialism;



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(3) develop indigenous Communist parties and, later, national and popular fronts controlled and manipulated by the Party;

(4) use carefully balanced combinations of diplomatic and propaganda pressures on the indigenous government;

(5) use military force to further Communist revolution.

d. All these strategies were developed during this period and used separately or in combination against Iran. The first part of this section summarized the historical events of the preconflict period. The second part discusses Iran as an environment conducive to exploitation and subversion by Soviet communism, the strengths and weaknesses of the situation as seen by the Communist movement. The third part deals with the Tudeh Party, the final mechanism developed by the Communist movement in the preconflict period. Annex I deals in greater detail with the historical events of the preconflict period, emphasizing the Soviet views and varying responses to these events.

## 23. Historical summary.

a. The early successes of the Bolshevik Revolution in USSR led the new Soviet leaders to believe that the revolution would gain impetus and spill over into neighboring countries. Tzarist Russia had pursued an aggressive policy toward Iran during the two preceding centuries, regarding it as the gateway for expansion to the East at the expense of the British empire. The Soviet leaders soon adopted the same outlook. The rise of a strong Nationalist movement in Iran, motivated by anti-Western, anticolonialist sentiment, and the evidence of growing awareness

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and resentment among the laboring classes were regarded as providing fertile ground for Soviet penetration. In addition, two separatist movements had emerged during World War I, in Gilan and Persian Azerbaijan, which appeared likely to succeed and to be amenable to Soviet influence.

b. During the period 1918-20, the Soviet Union launched an intense campaign of propaganda and diplomatic pressure, aimed at reducing British influence in Iran and intimidating the Persian government into accepting the paramouncy of Soviet commercial and political interests. The revolutionary "Adalta" Party, formed among the oil workers at Baku in Russian Azervaijan, was reorganized and named the Persian Communist Party (PCP). The PCP began a wide-ranging program of recruitment and indoctrination in support of the Soviet diplomatic efforts. Parallel efforts were made to subvert the separatist movements and capture control of the local popular sentiment.

c. As diplomatic initiatives toward Teheran seemed to be yielding little result, the Soviets decided in May 1920 to send military forces into Baku and the Iranian port of Enzeli to link up with the separatist movements and force Tehran to comply with Soviet demands. However, the Soviets began to loose ground in northern Iran; the widespread violence and disruption which accompanied their efforts to suppress dissidence, and a disastrous antireligious campaign rapidly alienated what local support had existed for the Soviets and the separatist regimes. Also, Soviet leaders were becoming increasingly preoccupied with the chaotic conditions within the Soviet Union and were reluctant to push forward

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in Iran when rapid successes were not forthcoming. In October 1920, Soviet troops in Northern Iran were substantially reduced and support for the separatist regimes was withdrawn. Tehran was able to restore order in the threatened areas in the succeeding months.

d. The period 1921-41 was largely a quiet interlude in Soviet-Iranian relations. The Soviets attempted to reduce the suspicions of Tehran by liberalizing trade and making other positive diplomatic overtures to the new Shah, Reza Khan. At the same time the newly-named Iranian Communist Party (ICP) was directed to reorganize itself, develop its clandestine apparatus, and seek to widen its popular base in the cities and among organized labor. Relations began to cool in the late 1920s as Reza Shah enlarged his autocratic control and began to suppress the ICP. By 1937, most Communist leaders were in jail and the Party's overt and covert organizations were in a shambles.

e. The advent of World War II gave the Soviet Union its next opportunity to make inroads into Iranian affairs. In the face of the Nazi German successes in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean in 1941, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union agreed to occupy southern and northern Iran, respectively, to protect supply lines and deny the Germans ready access to the area. By August, Soviet and British troops had moved into their positions. The Soviets rapidly took over all administration of northern Iran, especially Azerbaijan. They progressively denied Tehran officials access to it in contravention of their diplomatic agreements with the United Kingdom and Iran of January 1942.

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Official encouragement of separatist sentiments began to appear and the remains of the ICP began to be drawn together to form a shadow government under Soviet protection.

f. Elsewhere in Iran the political amnesty, which followed shortly after the abdication of Reza Shah, released the Communist leadership. They began the reconstruction of the Party in January 1942. Renamed the Tudeh Party, the organization was designed to conceal the control exercised by the Communist elements. Intensive efforts were directed at making the Tudeh a mass popular front party, appealing to liberal, nationalist, intellectual and working class elements regardless of individual feelings about Marxism or the Soviet Union. By 1943 the Tudeh had emerged as the principal political party throughout Iran, although it was particularly powerful in the north where it operated with the advice and protection of the Soviet Union.

g. In 1944, the Soviets began to exploit the Iranian situation by demanding of Tehran extensive economic concessions, which would have meant a virtual Soviet monopoly over all of northern Iran. These demands were accompanied by intensive propaganda and by Tudeh-sponsored strikes and demonstrations against the government. In December 1945, the Soviet-sponsored organization in Azerbaijan, under the leadership of Jafar Pishevari, declared the creation of the Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan. Under instructions from Soviet officers a similar movement got under way in the Kurdish areas, and the creation of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad was announced.

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h. By mid-1946, the initial momentum of the separatist movements began to slaken for lack of popular support. Firm diplomatic support for Tehran from the United States and the United Nations strengthened the hand of Prime Minister Qavam in his delicate diplomatic approaches to Moscow. Finally, the Soviets agreed to withdraw their troops from northern Iran in May, leaving the two separatist areas to negotiate with Tehran as to the extent of their future local autonomy. In December, Qavam felt strong enough to move his forces against Azerbaijan and Mahabad. Assisted by local uprisings against the Communist-supported regimes, the Iranian army was able to reoccupy these areas with only sporadic resistance. Next, Tehran moved against the Tudeh elsewhere in Iran. Party leaders were arrested and the Party structure was once again left in disarray. The remains of the Party offered no contest in the new elections of January 1947.

i. Nevertheless, the objective conditions which contributed to the original emergence of the Tudeh as the most powerful party in Iran remained essentially unchanged in 1947-48. A strong undercurrent of Nationalist fervor, anti-Westernism, religious fanaticism, and labor and peasant unrest continued, and none of these attitudes could find adequate expression under the official government party or among the other movements. In 1948, under the dynamic leadership of Ehsan Tabari, the new Tudeh reconstituted its leadership, adjusted its theoretical directives, and began to make substantial headway in recruiting and organizing these disaffected elements. By early 1949 the Party had

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reestablished its hold on the labor movement and was displaying militancy and Leftist radicalism more fully than ever before.

j. In February 1949, an attempt on the life of the Shah caused the government to outlaw the Tudeh, forcing the membership which escaped arrest to reform themselves once again in the underground apparatus. By 1950, the deteriorating strength of the government in the face of the emerging oil crisis and an increasingly determined Nationalist opposition caused the pressure on the outlawed Tudeh to abate. Clandestine Party recruitment once again began to pick up momentum.

k. The sudden emergence of Mossadeq and the National Front caught both the Tudeh and the Soviet Union by surprise, and Mossadeq's original anti-Communist line caused strong Party and Soviet diplomatic reaction. However, as relations with the United States became strained, the Party, in a swift reversal, began to proclaim Mossadeq a national hero. In turn, Mossadeq increasingly permitted the Tudeh to operate openly, seeming to use its radical actions as a tool to frighten the United States and other Iranian groups into supporting him. By 1952, the Tudeh had recovered its strength and began to undertake mass demonstrations and crippling strikes in support of Mossadeq. The final preparations for the 1953 crisis had been completed.

### 24. Iran as environment for revolution: the Soviet approach.

a. At first glance an observer may very well wonder how Communism would have any appeal in Iran, or how the Communists would be able to recruit and organize any sizeable body of Iranians sufficient to influence

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or jeopardize the social and political fabric of the country. Both the antireligious undertone of Communist ideology and at least the partial awareness that the Communist movement is somehow connected with the Soviet Union, the powerful and aggressive northern neighbor, would seem to preclude any possibility of success in Iran. Iran has a strong heritage in Islam, it also has a long history of threats, military and commercial aggression directed at it by both Tsarist and Soviet Russia. What then could be the Communist attraction in Iran? Several authors have attempted to answer this question; their observations are pertinent to an understanding of Soviet successes and failures in this period.

b. Bernard Lewis has isolated four general characteristics of the Islamic world which favor the development of Communism; all of them existed in Iran in this period. In brief they are:

(1) The underlying anti-Western motif. There has existed a general and growing attitude against the way of life, institutions, and ideas of Western origin. There has been a reaction against Western colonialism, along with the economic, social and political privilege and arrogance which accompanied it. There has also been reaction against the dislocation and upheavals resulting from the impact of the West, against the changes brought about by Western influence and activities. In Iran these feelings may have been reflected in popular reaction to the strong British influence, control of resources, and other commercial concessions and their impact. The presence of Western military forces during two world wars may have been a strong contributory factor.

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Communist ideology is also strongly anti-Western, and presumes to offer a more satisfactory alternative to Western influences.

(2) Rising social and economic discontent. Because of the introduction of Western commercial and financial techniques, the rich have gotten richer and the poor poorer. Populations have increased without corresponding increases in food supplies. In addition the disparity between rich few and poor masses became more visible. The callous irresponsibility and indifference of the possessing and ruling classes became more striking in view of the abject poverty of the masses. Communist ideology presented not only an explanation for this phenomenon, but also a formula for overcoming these social and economic discrepancies.

(3) Disintegration of traditional social structure. The peasants were still largely integrated in their traditional social units, and were sustained by the loyalty and cohesion of the family group. However, the semiskilled and skilled workers, those being drawn into the urban and industrialized environment, were being deprived the support of their traditional system of social relationships. In the Communist cell there was a substitute for the lost social support; there was encouragement for new ambitions and resentments; and there was the opportunity to learn and acquire new skills in the new environment.

(4) Authoritarianism in Islamic political tradition. The Islamic world has a history of authoritarian government, sanctioned by religious teaching. Islamic quietism, the belief that tyranny is better

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than anarchy, is a counterpart of this history. "He whose power is established, obedience to him is incumbent." Both Islamic tradition and communism offer the agreeable sense of belonging to a community of believers who are always right, as against the outer world of disbelievers who are always right, as against the outer world of disbelievers who are always wrong. Both offer a totalitarian doctrine; each has the correct answers to all questions. Each offers its members a sense of purpose, of mission, of being engaged in an historic drama which will one day witness the inevitable victory of the true faith over the infidel evil. Both oblige the members to undertake perpetual struggle, "Jihad," holy war, against the common enemy. The specific content of the two beliefs differ, but the operative form, the reforming zeal and aggressive fanaticism are like appeals.<sup>130</sup>

c. Nahib Amin Faris supports this view. He also isolates four characteristics held in common by Islam and Communism which would tend to facilitate the adoption of the latter: the anti-Western, anti-Christian appeal, the authoritarian character, the supranational, ideological overtones, and the search for and abiding belief in an attainable utopia.<sup>131</sup>

d. From the beginning the Soviets recognized the power of the anti-Western, anti-Colonial appeal in the Muslim world and the compatibility of the appeal with their desire to extend the Communist revolution into this area. The Congresses of Muslim Communists and the early Comintern Congresses were heavily preoccupied with developing doctrine and tactics

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to make use of rising anti-Western sentiment. In Iran, the Soviets made broad use of this sentiment in directing appeals to the government in Tehran, in seeking to capture and control separatist movements, in recruiting Party and front group membership, and in justifying occupation and use of military force in Iran. Communist successes in Iran are based in large measure on anti-Western appeal. In general, the Iranian Communist Party flourished at times when it could style itself as the champion of Iranian nationalism and anti-Western colonialism and when this was compatible with Soviet strategy. It withered when the Soviets attempted to use it in the pursuit of narrower Soviet self-interest or when the Soviets themselves posed a serious and direct political or military threat to Iran.

e. Rising social and economic discontent and the disintegration of traditional social structure are anticipated in classical Marxist-Leninist doctrine as the natural outcome of capitalist and colonialist enterprise, economic development and the creation of an awakened proletariat. It is the tide upon which the Communists have expected to sweep into power. Party recruitment has been most successful among Iranians who were most affected by these social and economic dislocations, and among the liberal educators and professionals who empathized with the plight of the emerging working class.

f. The authoritarianism of the Party and of Marxist doctrine also had its appeal in Iran, especially when working in concert with the factors noted above. Once again, the success of the Communist use of

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this factor was dependent upon the extent to which Iranians viewed it as a Soviet effort to gain political advantage. In the context of ideology alone it was largely acceptable to progressive, radical, and Leftist elements; on concert with Soviet aggressiveness, its appeal appeared to quickly fade.

### 25. The Tudeh Party.

a. Creation. After the abdication of Reza Shah his successor, Muhammad Reza, declared an amnesty for political prisoners in September 1941. The Communists and the Leftist followers of Dr. Erani were released from prison and immediately set about forming a new party. In January 1942, the "Hizb Tudeh Iran" (Iran Masses Party) was created.<sup>132</sup> It soon developed a comprehensive political program, tight organizational structure, and affiliates to appeal to major interest groups. Organization and recruitment took place most rapidly in the north under the protection of Soviet occupation forces, but great progress was also made in Tehran and in other urban and industrial centers in the south. By the end of World War II, the Tudeh had become the principal organized political force in Iran, the envied model of organization, discipline and program for all other parties.

b. Leadership. The formal Party leadership was vested among the associates of Dr. Erani, the Leftist intellectual elite of Iran. Head of the Party was Soleiman Mohsen Eskandari, a respectable, well-known Leftist with no apparent Soviet ties.<sup>133</sup> Also prominent in the Party were two other members of the Eskandari family, Abbas Mirza and Iraj. Former

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prisoners Dr. Reza Radmanesh, Dr. Morteza Yazdi, Dr. Feridun Keshavarz, Ali Bozorg Alavi and Dr. Muhammad Bahrami became members of the Central Committee of the Party.<sup>134</sup> Only a small group of Soviet-trained Communists held positions within the Party, and it did not become apparent for some time that these men wielded the real power. The hard-core Communists took secondary positions, usually where they could exercise control over the critical organizational elements of the Party. For example, the old Communist labor organizer, Reza Rusta, was head of the newly reorganized Central United Council of Trade Unions. Other well-known Communists remained overtly outside the Party and denied any connection with it, such as Jafar Pishevari.<sup>135</sup>

### c. Membership.

(1) The processes of urbanization and increased nationalism and education in the 1930s and 1940s had broadened the political spectrum and areas of potential recruitment for Tudeh. The Party succeeded in making great inroads into the new emerging classes. Tudeh strength was greatest among the university students and civil servants, and it enjoyed the sympathy of a large number of doctors, lawyers, educators and other professionals. In addition, the labor associations of the Party were almost unopposed in their organization and manipulation of the trade unions, which were estimated to have three million members in 1946. Although Tudeh lost many of its sympathizers among the intellectual elite as Soviet influence and control became more apparent, the Party still managed to hold captive many Leftist elite elements and to retain

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firm control of the trade unions and special-interest associations. The Party never made serious inroads into the guilds, the organizations of religious students or the "Ulama." Not until too late to help during the Mossadeq crisis of 1953 did the Party manage to infiltrate the Iranian Army, and these inroads were dealt with severely in 1954 after Tudeh was largely broken.<sup>136</sup> Also, not until late in the period were there efforts to organize the peasants and to prepare a comprehensive land reform program.<sup>137</sup>

(2) Although it will be discussed in greater detail in the paper dealing with the postconflict period, it is useful to note here the split which occurred in Tudeh after the 1953 crisis as reflecting the diversity of membership of the Party in the 1940s. After 1953, the Central United Council of Trade Unions became the principal front group of the Soviet-oriented Communists. Their policy by them was to give up on the intellectual Leftists and concentrate on the proletariat as the only trustworthy body to undertake the revolution. The second splinter body was made up of the Marxist Circles, loose associations of intellectuals and professionals which coalesced around one or another distinguished Leftist personality, and which claimed to be the true Tudeh, untainted by Soviet influence. The third body was made up of former Tudeh members who were regarded as too favorable to Mossadeq and thus denied entry into the Marxist Circles; and who did not possess proletarian origins and were therefore ineligible for the organizations under the Central United Council. These were generally the younger

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intellectuals, educators and civil servants; they were obliged to look elsewhere for association with like-minded radical-reform parties.

d. Organization. The Tudeh was organized in strict accordance with the Soviet concept of democratic centralism. The structure of the Party can be likened to a pyramid which narrows rapidly toward the apex.

(1) The basic building block of the pyramid is the local Party cell, called "Huzeh" or "Howzeh."<sup>138</sup> Every Party member belongs to a cell in his locality, and shares with other members of the cell responsibility for mutual indoctrination, guidance in interpreting Party directives for implementation, and criticism and correction of thought or action contrary to Party doctrines.

(2) Above the local cells was the local committee which acted as the executive organ of the Party in a city or village locality. In theory, the members of this committee were elected annually by representatives of the local cells. Above the local committees were regional committees, and above the regions were provincial committees, the membership of each, in theory, elected by the representatives of the next lower echelon. In practice the leaders of one level were the members of the next higher level, and so on up to the top of the pyramid. The membership at each level was dictated by the next higher level; elections were simply formal acknowledgments of executive Party decisions.

(3) At the apex of the pyramid stood the Party Congress, in theory the supreme organ of the Party. The principal responsibility of

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the Congress was the election of the Party Central Committee and the adoption of overall doctrinal guidance for the Central Committee which acted as the executive body of the Party between meetings of the Congress. In fact the real control of the Party resided with the 10 members of the Central Committee and a smaller coordinating group known as the Control Commission. This type of organization assured strict Party control down through the structure and maximum protection of the clandestine and subversive elements from discovery or betrayal.<sup>139</sup>

(4) In addition to the Party itself, numerous affiliated organizations were created to appeal to various interest, age, and sex groups. These included the powerful Central United Council of Trade Unions, the most important of the Party organs; "Jamia't Tarafdaran-e-solh" (Association for the Maintenance of Peace); "Jamia't Mobarezeh Ba Ista'amar" (Association for Combatting Imperialism); "Anjuman e Kumakba Dehqhanan Iran" (Association for Assisting the Villagers of Iran); and "Sazeman Zarane Iran" (Women's Organization of Iran). Similar bodies were organized for students, professionals and other groups.<sup>140</sup>

### e. Policies.

(1) From the beginning, the Tudeh Party announced itself as a radical-reform movement. It took great pains to show itself to be altogether unrelated to the Iranian Communist Party of the 1930s, to be non-Communist, and to be uninfluenced by the Soviet Union. This fiction was perpetuated until 1952, when Reza Radmanesh addressed the 19th Comintern Congress and said: "The Tudeh Party is the sole party of the

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workers of Iran; inspired by the ideology of Marxism and Lenin . . . [it] is based upon democracy and socialism, at the head of which are to be found the USSR and Josef Stalin, our great standard bearer."<sup>141</sup>

(2) In the early 1940s, Party policy was directed at the creation of a broad radical-reform front. It announced a strong anti-Fascist line early in the war when Axis defeat was by no means certain and the anti-Western and social reform aspects of Fascism had strong appeal among some intellectual and government elements. It strongly supported the allied cause in Iran and sought broad social and political reform in Tehran.

(3) By 1944, the Party undertook to create a political front to "secure constitutional liberties and prevent a return of dictatorship" in postwar Iran. The Party attempted to forestall the creation of, on the one hand, a new Reza Shah-style dictatorship, and on the other, a strong representative government capable of undertaking fundamental social and political reform. The former would undoubtedly lead to another outlawing and diminution of the Party; the latter could make the Party largely redundant, cause a gradual loss to the Party of the reform and progressive-oriented elements of the society.<sup>142</sup>

(4) After the 1946 fiasco in Azerbaijan, the Party sought to divorce itself from the actions taken there, but it was unavoidable that it be tainted in the public mind, and Party influence began to wane. Efforts at reconstruction were again brought to a halt in February 1949 when the Party was outlawed.<sup>143</sup> However, a gradual relaxation of the

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ban on the Party permitted it to begin operation again in 1950 through the machinery of its front groups. Policies of the Party in the early 1950s aimed at extending the organization of the front groups and infiltrating the Army and civil service. Principal front groups at this time included the Iranian Society of Peace Partisans, "Besoooye-Ayandeh," and the National Society for Struggle Against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The latter was renamed the National Society for Struggle Against Colonialism in the summer of 1951, and became the overt organization of the Party until the fall of Mossadeq and the National Front.<sup>144</sup>

### f. Propaganda organs.

(1) Among the first actions of the new Tudeh Party in 1942 was the reestablishment of its press and propaganda outlets. The principal Party newspaper was "Rahbar" (guide), which was edited by Ijan Iskandari. In the event that Rahbar was suspended by the government, the less overtly Marxist daily newspaper, "Razm," was to take over as the major party organ. Razam was edited by another Party Central Executive Committee member, Dr. Keshavarz. In addition, the Party line was carried by "Azhir," edited by Jafar Pischevari. "Zafar" (Victory) was the official newspaper of the Party's labor groups and was edited by Reza Rusta. "Mardom" (People), a journal edited by Dr. Reza Radmanesh, began as the organ of the "anti-Fascist organizations of Iran." By 1946, Mardom sought intellectual appeal; although along Marxist lines, it attempted serious analysis of economic, social, artistic, and literary aspects of life in Iran. "Rasti" (Truth) was the official newspaper of the Khorasan Tudeh

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Committee; it was edited by Parvin Gonabadi, the deputy director of the Central Executive Committee. "Damavand" was edited by Fatahi and claimed to represent the Azerbaijani Turks. "Khavar Now" (New East) was the official Party organ in Tabriz.<sup>145</sup>

(2) In addition to its own press organs, the Tudeh also sought to create a press front of Leftist, progressive and reform journals. By establishing control over paper and newsprint sources and providing services to cooperating journals, the Tudeh established a press front of 28 newspapers by mid-1944.<sup>146</sup> The combination of well-planned programs and extensive coordination of propaganda output was a considerable factor in the rapid emergence of the Tudeh as a powerful political force in the 1940s and again in the early 1950s.

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## CHAPTER 3

### ECONOMIC FACTORS

by Harley M. Roberts

#### 26. Introduction.

At the top, the King and his Court; at the bottom a nation of peasants; in between three grades of parasites: the merchant, the clerk and the aristocrat; and on one side, the nomad.--Victor Bernard, 1910.

a. Analysis of the Iranian economy must depend more heavily on cultural and social history than is true for other less-developed economies. Iran has had an imperial tradition and tribal history which extends far back to Darius and earlier. Modern economic analysis must start approximately with the 20th century, but the cultural heritage, especially where it defines legitimate roles for the State, limits to public morality and national loyalty, and the individual's economic goals, must be recognized as a major constraint. A recent observer of Iran has remarked upon this by singling out the "politicization of economic subjects" as Iran's pervasive weakness.<sup>1</sup>

b. Modern Iran may be dated from the concession of some 500,000 square miles for petroleum exploration to William D'Arcy in 1901. In 1906, the Qajar tribal Shah was forced to adopt a written Constitution and establish the Majlis, or National Assembly. In 1908, Iran's first major oil well was discovered, and an Abadan refinery was built in 1911. Thus, during this one decade, Iran leaped from a feudal empire to modern

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constitutionalism, from economic traditionalism into a share in the most modern industrial form of mineral exploitation. Despite the lack of comparative economic statistics, this period provides the starting point for analysis.

c. For a number of reasons, 1914 represents the first major economic turning point for modern Iran. In this year of World War I, the British Government became a half-share stockholder in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) and effected its 1913 decision to convert all British Naval vessels from coal to diesel oil. The wartime occupation of Iran by Soviet and Turkish troops followed. The next turning point falls in 1922 when Reza Khan became Prime Minister and the Majlis officially empowered Arthur Millspaugh to be foreign financial adviser to the Government. Subsequent events of major economic importance were the formal end in 1928 to foreign extraterritorial rights in law and commerce, usually referred to as "the Capitulations" and the end of the Millspaugh Mission in 1927. The Iranian Government bank of issue, the Bank Melli Iran (BMI) was established in 1930; and the cancellation of the D'Arcy and APOC concession followed in 1932.<sup>2</sup>

d. This date of 1932 represents a logical turning point for the economic development of the 1930s, which was carried out under the increasingly dictatorial and arbitrary personal direction of Reza Shah. Economic progress during the 1930s, like political and social modernization, was dramatic, even if narrow and limited to a few cities and sectors. The Trans-Iranian Railway was built by 1936, State factories

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erected, roads constructed, and the oil industry in Khuzistan expanded to a point where Iran ranked fifth in world crude production, with the Abadan refinery the largest single plant in the world.

e. In 1941, World War II and the German invasion of the USSR turned Iran into a crucial crossroads, strategic because of its oil and its access from the Persian Gulf to the supply routes into the Soviet Union's southern provinces. British forces occupied the south and Soviet forces the northern provinces, and the Allies assumed the job of directing the economy. In 1943 US troops were added as foreign protectors and Millspaugh's second "advisory" tour in Iran began. With Millspaugh's resignation in February 1945 and the end of war in Europe, Iran entered upon the difficult postwar period of a return to independent government.

f. The period from 1946, when the Separatist Movements in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan were ended, until 1951, when Iran's Majlis formally declared the oil industry to be nationalized is highly complicated in political terms. During this period, Iran took preliminary steps toward developing comprehensive economic plans. US private energy and initiative led to the Morrison-Knudson International Engineering report of mid-1947 and then to the Seven-Year Plan outline prepared by Overseas Consultants Inc. (OCI) in July 1949. But these blueprints for peaceful evolution and economic development, through "sowing oil revenues" and use of US private enterprise, were blocked by Iranian national intransigence. The British showed reluctance to amend the AIOC concession

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terms drastically, while US oil capital flooded into other Persian Gulf states. The Soviet Union's willingness to intervene to maintain its Iranian buffer-state was demonstrated repeatedly. The young Shah, Reza Pahlavi, accepted the inevitable in May 1951 and nominated Dr. Mossadeq as Prime Minister on his avowed platform of nationalizing Iranian oil and freeing Iran from all forms of foreign domination.

### 27. The over-all economy.

a. An effort to sketch Iran's economic history since 1901 has identified major turning points in the years of 1914, 1922, 1932, 1941, and 1951. There were selected primarily on politicoeconomic grounds, for available data on Iranian production (excluding oil) are insufficient to provide a more theoretical framework for economic history. Reliable statistics for agricultural production, or for the calculation of Iran's national product prior to World War II, are not available.

b. The first effort to calculate Iran's national income was made in 1946 by the US Bureau of the Budget, in response to the US decision to assess members according to their population and income levels. This first attempt represented little more than a conclusion that average per capita income was 70 percent of Turkish levels, or \$55 million, or Rls 38.3 billion in national income at Rls 40 per dollar.<sup>3</sup>

c. More refined calculations of the agricultural output of Iran were made by the US Departments of Agriculture and State in later years, and these tended to enlarge the early United Nations estimates of total national income. By 1950, it was accepted that 50 percent of Iran's

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national income (net national product) originated in agriculture, and that national income amounted to Rls 60 billion, or about \$1.4 billion. Such estimates must be treated with considerable caution; Iran's population, wholesale price levels, and physical output were very imprecisely estimated until the late 1950s, and it does not seem likely that improved data for the 1930s and 1940s will permit more careful estimates for these years.

d. A partial census in 1940 concluded that 77 percent of Iran's 16.5 million inhabitants were rural, with an above-average urban share concentrated in Tehran-Mazanderan, Tabriz, Isfahan and Shiraz-Fars. By 1956, the first full census showed a 69 percent of the population to be rural. While data on rural incomes must be called impressionistic, an informed agriculturalists estimated in 1948 that the average peasant family received only Rls 7.750 rials in yearly income, while an average landlord's family received 10 times as much.<sup>4</sup>

e. Urban incomes have not been estimated. However, in 1946 the Majlis passed minimum-wage legislation that set up a theoretical daily minimum, differing for each region and linked to official cost-of-living indexes. But these minimum wage rates were established only for Tehran and Khuzistan, where AIOC was the primary employer; they were probably meaningless in any practical way, except for foreign and official employers whose regular wages and salaries considerably exceeded the minimum. In 1949 the Tehran minimum was set at Rls 34 per day for an unskilled worker with a family unit of four. This represents an annual

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equivalent of Rls 10,600. Average yearly per capita national income in 1950 was calculated at Rls 2,353 (about \$83), or roughly 12 percent below the Tehran minimum wage.<sup>5</sup>

f. Any calculations of average national income or production are bound to give misleading impressions. Very major uncertainties are introduced by the scanty records on Iran's price levels and on the shifting foreign exchange rates in different years. Using a 1936 survey base, the government Bank Melli Iran produced Iran's only cost-of-living and wholesale indexes without any changes until 1953-55. Wartime inflation drove the retail index to a 1944-45 high of 1,100, while wholesale prices were much lower at only 670. Between 1945 and 1951, retail prices first fell, then rose in 1948-49, and again fell to about 780, while wholesale prices followed a roughly-opposite swing. But the real impact of inflation in wartime may well be understated considerably, and the postwar fall in prices may be minimized.<sup>6</sup>

g. Monetary and fiscal issues.

(1) Until 1930, the Rothschild-concession Imperial Bank of Persia was the official bank for note issue and Government. The Bank Melli Iran founded in 1928 then succeeded to the job of Government agent, and in 1932 BMI took over control of Iran's new currency, the pahlavi and rial. Essentially the BMI pursued a nonactive credit role throughout this period, however. In 1949, the Bank could claim that "... although in their budget estimates the Government have every year shown a deficit, in actual fact they could have not have had a deficit since

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March 1944."<sup>7</sup> All of these Iranian budget "deficits" were covered from extraordinary receipts due to oil royalties and exchange earnings before the war; in postwar years, planned budget deficits were met by postponing expenditures.

(2) This negative and conservative monetary policy was unable to accomodate heavy wartime spending by the Allied forces without rapid inflation. From 1937 to 1942 the Tehran cost of living expanded by some 10-15 percent yearly, a rate that seems probable for the earlier 1930s as well. But during 1941-42 and 1942-43, inflation was at 100 percent annually, although this index was artificially held down by Government price controls and poor coverage. From the price index peak of 920-1,100 in 1945, postwar policies (which favored imports and overvalued the rial) caused a decline of about 15-20 percent of the 1948 low point. By 1950, the price index had again risen from 700 to about 790.<sup>8</sup>

(3) An index of total money supply within Iran prepared by Moarefi shows a similar but steadier trend from its 1937-38 base. This index reached 130 in 1939, 636 in 1945 and 703 in 1948. His study further showed that currency expanded much faster during the war years than did "deposit money," or the banking system's demand deposits. However, after 1945, deposits began to grow again when the currency remained constant; by 1950, the two were near their 1937 proportions.<sup>9</sup>

(4) The major banking institutions of Iran in 1949 are reviewed thoroughly elsewhere.<sup>10</sup> Bank Melli Iran acted as central bank and State bank, with 189 branches in that year; by 1946 law, all other banks were

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required to keep 55 percent of their deposits with BMI. The most important State financial agencies in 1949 were the Agricultural and Industrial Bank (loans of Rls 515 million) which dated from 1929, and the Bank Sepah, or "Army Cooperative" Bank, founded in 1925. The Industrial and Mining Bank, founded in 1946, was merely a State agency for financing of the State's industrial companies, in a tradition established by Turkey's Sumer and Eti Banks.

(5) Bank Melli operations and Iran's credit system must be described as very complex and very conservative. The BMI handled all foreign exchange operations for the Government, including AIOC sterling payments, and established important quotas as well as a system of export certificates during the 1930s. The BMI had much independence from the State machinery; thus the BMI Governor, Ebte'aj, clashed often with Millspaugh during wartime. Despite the numerous financial agencies available during the postwar period, private borrowing still depended upon the bazaar, where effective interest rates reached 24-36 percent during the 1948-50 period in spite of Iran's unsury law.<sup>11</sup> Much of the confusion over BMI records and operations arises from this bank's foreign exchange practices and Iran's peculiar import-export structure of 1930-51.\*

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\*Details of the evolution of Iranian foreign trade can be found in a number of scattered sources, but interpretation is very difficult, since all imports by the AIOC/APOC were exempted from customs duties, as were other noncommercial imports by Government agencies. While exports of petroleum and of Soviet-canned caviar were totally exempt, other exporters were required until 1938 to exchange half their receipts at a low official rate. As a result, Iran's balance of trade and balance of payments and records require numerous special adjustments, and bore little relationship during this period to the actual State policies or trade decisions of the time. (See subparagraph (7).)

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(6) During the 1930s and the postwar World War II period, Iran ran consistent deficits on its trading balance. During the period 1947 through 1949, commercial imports averaged Rls4.2 billion, while exports ran some Rls2.4 billion.<sup>12</sup> But the importance of imports cannot be measured by such data; it is likely that noncommercial imports for Government and AIOC account were some 30 percent in addition to commercial imports. In 1949-50, total imports were some Rls9.3 billion or 15 percent of 1950s presumed national income.<sup>13</sup>

(7) The value of oil exports during any one year had little connection with the timing of oil royalty payments into BMI accounts in London. Nevertheless, AIOC officials felt that their payments of royalties

" . . . habitually advanced by the Company before due dates to ease the Government's successive financial crises, were essential to the maintenance of the Persian administration on any but the very lowest scale . . . ." <sup>14</sup>

(8) A more careful analysis of trade and BMI foreign exchange operations goes far to suggest that these "crises" were directly attributable to the Bank's highly conservative credit policies, to the willingness of Iran's top financial advisers to use every possible device to delay expenditures as long as possible, and to Iranian tendencies to press for AIOC advances at frequent intervals, since they were well aware that the oil in question had long since been shipped from Iran. But AIOC direct payments never reached above a 15 percent share in postwar State revenues.

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(9) In summary, the involved foreign trade and exchange system of Iran was split sharply into two systems--a commercial and an oil account. The large price difference, due to customs duties between the two systems undoubtedly encouraged corruption on the part of commercial importers and customs officials. The time gap and the value discrepancy between AIOC exports of crude oil, the resulting deposit of sterling royalties, and the Iranian Government's ability to draw on these foreign deposits for official imports provided another unstable fiscal factor and very apparent grounds for resentment towards the "foreign concessionaire."

(10) An outside observer would stress that most of these restrictions were self-imposed by the Iranians, he would stress the need for a less conservative credit policy to encourage rapid growth. However, such arguments clearly were not significant within Iran up to 1951, and Iran's foreign advisors did not propose any easy credit policies. Iran's oil income, although large and growing during 1945-51, therefore did not finance growth or significant amounts of State investment; the direct benefits were obscured by a tight-money policy, import freedom and conservative fiscal policies, and governmental corruption or favoritism.

h. In these circumstances, GNP/GDP data provide some explanatory help for the pre-1951 comparisons. In 1951, the first BMI study of gross product recorded some Rls260-280 billion total, with a gross investment share near 18 percent, and exports making up near 23 percent of total output. The output shares recorded by various sectors in 1959 were percent, agriculture, 30; industry, power, and mining, 28; commerce, 7; and

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all others 34. These figures describe a rather thoroughly modern economy and contrast very sharply with the output distribution believed to exist in 1948-50.<sup>15</sup>

i. Another major source of statistical difficulty during the 1940s arises from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (Anglo-Persian, APOC, until 1935) operations within Iran. This foreign industrial enclave in Khuzistan is discussed below; here it will suffice to record that UN estimates of the value of crude and refined oil exported during 1939-45 totalled L25.3 million sterling (UK£) with direct payments to the Government of L4.4 million in royalties/profits. During 1946 through June 1951, exports reached L131.6 million sterling, and Iran's royalties were L11 Million. But petroleum output was not recorded in Iranian official trade data, and it is not possible to compare overall economic conditions after 1954 directly to the limited pre-1951 statistics.<sup>16</sup>

### 28. Agriculture--the traditional sectors.

#### a. General.

(1) For an old culture such as Iran's, agriculture is the slowly-changing economic sector, where traditional methods continue and traditional patterns tend to slow down growth. Economic class antagonisms and poverty extremes in rural areas are believed to be the most active rural force contributing to national social tension and conflict.

(2) Iranian agriculture has experienced marked historical ups and downs but the land-use patterns of 1950 may apply to earlier years. Along with 50 percent in barren land, 11 percent was forested and

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largely unused; another 11 percent was cropland, including the three-fifths of annual farmland regularly left fallow. Between 6 and 12 percent was available for pasture, depending on current rainfall and run-offs from the previous winter's snows. The balance of 16-20 percent represents mountains, land in urban use, and potentially-cultivable lands.<sup>17</sup>

(3) In 1948-51, common belief held that some 20-25 percent of Iran's 18 million people were nomadic tribes, moving each season from mountain valleys to summer pasture. Another 65 percent were settled farmers, living in some 40,000-42,000 villages, and about 15-20 percent lived in towns. Eight cities with more than 100,000 persons made up about 2 million of these.<sup>18</sup>

### b. Land tenure and classes.

(1) A sample survey of Iranian villages in 1949 showed that some 60 percent of all families were landless, and 25 percent owned less than one hectare (2.5 acres). Only 5 percent of the families owned 83 percent of all sampled village lands, and Hadary estimated that large landlord families totaled some 100,000 throughout Iran and owned over half of all claimed land in Iran. These startling figures of concentrated land ownership suggest that economic and political power were also narrowly held, and that Iranian farmers have traditionally had little stake in the growth of the economy or their own productivity.

(2) These rough estimates provide only the broadest generalizations about land ownership in Iran and must be carefully qualified to



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stress striking differences that exist between various regions, caused both by natural conditions and local history. Miss Lambton's definitive study of Iranian land relationships over past centuries makes the major point that successive central Governments have struggled to assure themselves a steady land tax income and to regulate the system of land ownership, only to be frustrated by varying local conditions, local interests, and local officials. Successive waves of strong centralization and disastrous central breakdown have created widely-differing local rights and traditions and have overturned the landlord classes periodically but have never achieved a stable system.

Never, however, has a stable landed aristocracy, transmitting its estates in their entirety from generation to generation, emerged. The principal reasons for this are twofold. First, the nature of the society and the Islamic law of inheritance militates against it . . . . Secondly, conditions of recurrent anarchy and repeated dynasty changes have also prevented the emergence of a stable landed aristocracy.<sup>19</sup>

(3) During the half-century from 1900-50, these forces have continued, and the last feudal holders of large land grants (tuyuls) were eliminated only after 1906. While the power and privileges of the landowning groups have continued to be relatively constant, the actual composition of this class has been through many changes, incorporating new elements from city classes and losing others.<sup>20</sup>

(4) The Government's role in land ownership has been direct and indirect over past centuries. State owned or khaliseh lands by tradition belonged to the religious leader (imam). When the religious and

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political functions were separated under Seljuk and Mongol rule, these lands became the ruler's official and his personal charge. Their successful exploitation supported his Court directly; yet administration was difficult, and the sale or long-term lease of State lands has been a frequent policy. In 1907, the new "Constitutional" government abolished tuyul grants for tax-farming and set up laws encouraging sales of public land. Again in 1931 and 1937, land auctions were encouraged by law. Nevertheless, in the early 1950s, State lands were estimated at 4-5 million hectares and included 1,800 villages with some 750,000 persons.<sup>21</sup>

(5) A special subdivision of State land was created during Reza Shah's reign. These were Crown Lands (Amalak) owned personally by the ruler and held separately from the State. They were obtained by outright confiscation, purchase, or land exchange. Because of this origin and despite its partial sanction by historical tradition, the Majlis acted in 1941 to merge these Crown Lands with State lands, and to return them to previous owners or sell them.<sup>22</sup> But by 1949, this process was halted, and all remaining Crown lands were merged into a personal trust holding for the Shah and the Pahlavi family. In January 1951, Mohammed Reza Shah announced his intention to distribute his Crown Lands to peasant proprietors. Estimates of total Crown Lands in 1954 set total area at 800,000 hectares, including 2,167 villages, with 300,000 persons or 49,000 families.<sup>23</sup>

(6) Indirect governmental control over much Iranian farmland occurred through Islamic legal restrictions upon "waqf" or charitable

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and personal foundations. These waqf lands, originally established to support specific religious bequests, were regulated under "shariah" (religious) law, with a specific administrator often named. For example, large tracts in Khorasan were waqf lands to support the Meshed shrine of the Imam Reza--the legal administrator was the reigning monarch, but actual administration had been leased to managing companies from time to time. A specific Government agency exercised traditional administrative control over such charitable waqfs. By 1951, the Ministry of Education and Waqfs handled most waqf lands, roughly estimated to total 25 percent of all claimed land.<sup>24</sup> Only a small share of this total represented personal endowments or waqfs established for a family's own benefit and administered by the eldest member of the family. This category is believed not to be large, and there was no practical distinction between such estates and normally owned estates.<sup>25</sup>

(7) About one-half of all claimed land was believed to have belonged to individual landlords in Iran, while only 15 percent was owned by peasant proprietors or farm-operator families. Despite the difficulties of generalization, large landholdings were believed to be congregated in the more fertile areas of higher rainfall, while farmlands adjoining several larger cities were predominantly operator-owned.<sup>26</sup> However, these patterns and the size of landlord estates varied considerably between different provinces. The basic pattern of the landed estate was, however, that ownership frequently was divorced from the

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agricultural management of the estate. An estate might include some 10-15 villages in their entirety or it might also include several part-shares in nearby villages which were not wholly owned by landlords and included peasant proprietors. From a practical viewpoint, the farming unit became those estates which were under a single administrator, while the landlord was an absentee owner living in the nearest largest city.

(8) A usual administrator's fee was about 10 percent of the estate's revenues, which waqf law permitted to endowment administrators. However, an absentee landlord's interest was to fix his revenues so far as possible, and lands might often be leased to successive administrators for a fixed annual fee. Often the administrator was a local resident whose strict administration might enable him to accumulate wealth, purchase property, and become a small landlord in his own turn. His success was based primarily upon exploitation of land and the crop-sharing peasant, rather than on crop productivity and maximized revenues.

(9) The final form of land ownership was that of the peasant proprietor, a class identical to US concepts of the owner-operator farm. This group was estimated to own 15 percent of all claimed land in 1947-48; while such farms existed throughout Iran, they were believed to be more frequent in the Lank Wimia area, around the towns of Kermansha and the Persian Gulf, and in the vicinities of Yezd, Kerman, and Zahedan.<sup>27</sup> The lowest ratios of peasant proprietors were in Azerbaijan, North Khorasan,

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and the Caspian coastal districts. Owner-operators were particularly vulnerable in low-rainfall areas. Irrigation by qanat required heavy initial investments and maintenance costs, and local credit was mainly available for crop-failure years only from local landlords. Despite the social preference for this class evidenced by tradition and Islamic law, peasant proprietorship was not an important or typical form of landholding in Iran in 1951.<sup>28</sup>

(10) One last major rural class remains to be discussed briefly--the crop-sharing peasant who made up the bulk of the rural population. A long history of landlord dominance and political cycles of insecurity had bred into this class a strong spirit of localism and conservative practice. His security of tenure as a tenant depended heavily upon his landlord or the local administrator, limited only by local customs. While some regions had customs including actual land registration in the tenant's name, in other villages (Khorasan, Kerman) the land was redivided each year by lot, and a family's plot might vary each year. Village community customs also varied widely, regarding shared work at harvest time, rights to irrigation water, and the use of draft animals.<sup>29</sup>

(11) The essential determinations of crops to be grown, farming methods, and shares in production were made by local precedent and by the landlord's administrator. Crop shares were traditionally divided in five equal parts corresponding to the five inputs: land, water, seed, animals and tools, and farm labor. But actual divisions differed widely,



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according to local customs and such local conditions such as rainfall; a three-part sharing of the crop was common. Thus the landless Iranian peasant might receive anything from 20 to 66 percent of the annual crop. This variety of conditions made central reforms by the state extremely complex and dependent upon local official interpretation. A 1946 Majlis law giving 20 percent of "the landlord's share" to each crop-sharing peasant was passed, but was not enforced.

(12) Under these conditions, there was little except custom to bind the peasant to the land. In fact, areas such as Sistan, Kerman, and Yezd have seen much peasant flight from farming and apparently had a surplus of farm labor in 1951. In other areas, particularly Kerman-shah and near larger cities, surplus farm labor also was available. For these reasons and with the growth of alternative opportunities, the 1930s and 1940s saw marked increases in Iran's urban population and considerable migration.<sup>30</sup>

### c. Agricultural output and supplies.

(1) The major crops of Iran have probably not changed greatly in respective shares over the half-century to 1950, but reliable statistics are lacking to make careful comparison. The leading field crops were wheat, barley, and rice; major cash crops were fruits and nuts, cotton, sugar beets, and tobacco. Pasture land made up a large part of Iran's territory, so milk and meat were also major agricultural products. Irregular rainfall and the resulting cycles in farm output on the central plateau were the distinguishing features, continuing through Iran's

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history. A result was a high degree of regional specialization in crops, a tendency to local shortages, and wide differences in farm productivity.

(2) The major crop was wheat, accounting for about half of all area under crops; barley acreage was far behind, at 15 percent. Prewar output in the 1930s averaged about 1.87 million and 790,000 metric tons for these cereals plus 420,000 metric tons of rice grown along the Caspian shore. All three grains were exported in normal years, for transportation to nearby nations was as easy as to the capitol. The second largest crop by area in 1950 was from fruit and nut trees, covering about 15 percent of croplands and centered in Azerbaijan province. Cotton, also an export crop, covered some 5 percent of the farmland, with all other crops making up only 10 percent. These relative crop shares changed relatively slowly over the years.<sup>31</sup> Gross agricultural income in 1947 was valued at \$792 million equivalent; about equal to US the net estimate for 1950. Area cropped was 4.6 million in 1948-49 but up to 5.5 million hectares (ha) in 1952-53.

(3) The war years of 1941-45 brought confusion into Iran's marketing and food supply system. Allied operations during 1942 and 1943 rapidly increased purchasing power and demand at a time when marketing channels had broken down. Wheat shortages and bread riots in Tehran occurred in December 1942, despite the efforts of British "consular liaison officers" to collect the crop that year.<sup>32</sup> Energetic efforts by Dr. Millspaugh and his newly arrived mission in 1943, plus

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considerable imports of wheat by the Middle East Supply Center (MESC), were needed to restore a normal 6-month supply in storage. This experience demonstrated the rapid reaction of peasants and local officials to circumvent the low official wheat prices, forced collection efforts by the Government, and irregular harvests.

(4) During the postwar 1947-51 period, average crops of wheat, barley, and rice were equal to the prewar levels; however, this statement conceals considerable variation between successive years, which is typical of Iranian agriculture. The harvests of 1949 and 1951 were poor, while 1950 wheat production was 20 percent above prewar averages.<sup>33</sup> Iranian agriculture has been described as follows: of every 5 years, 1 year of excellent harvests, 1 of complete failure, and 3 of only indifferent harvests.<sup>34</sup> But the difficulties due to poor internal transport, storage, and wide local price fluctuations were more important causes of recurring local near-famines prior to 1940. Swift and drastic action by the central Government to control prices and enforce grain deliveries to the market have been needed frequently.

(5) The output of cash crops in Iran has also depended upon official State policies established during the Reza Shah period. Up to about 1930, almost all of Iran's sugar needs were met by imports; however, by 1926, a program to encourage the raising of sugar beets was started by the State, and a number of beet-sugar refineries were set up in the late 1920s and mid-1930s. As in the case of tea, a State monopoly controlled all imports of sugar and was thus able to set prices

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which directly encouraged sugar beet farming. Also under early Government monopoly were the markets for Iranian tobacco and the production of domestic salt. However the marked expansion of cotton production during the 1930s was largely due to private incentives and to export markets for this crop; State-owned textile factories found imported cotton preferable for its longer staple length.

(6) In 1946 and 1950, most observers believed that Iran's agricultural output made up fully half of its total production, as stated above; agricultural productivity was believed to be lower than in Iraq and in Turkey. However, these national estimates conceal the wide differences between Iran's different regions. Azerbaijan was noted for carefully-terraced fruit, grape, and melon fields, as well as its wheat surplus; the Caspian coast was also extremely fertile, contained much irrigated land, and exported rice to the Soviet Union in considerable amounts. The Overseas Consultants (OCI) report of 1949 stressed the differences between regional farm practices and the many opportunities to increase yields through better inputs of selected seed, fertilizers, and improved tools.<sup>35</sup>

### d. Agricultural consumption.

(1) The demand for agricultural goods for consumption may be thought to be inexhaustible for a near-subsistence economy such as Iran. Such conclusions do not take into account the limits which price imposes upon potential demand or the institutional problems reflected in price

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variations. Exports of farm products evidence a shortfall in effective demand, which has been the case for Iran in cotton, rice, and grains.

(2) The problems of food distribution and marketing methods are related to weight-level considerations, rather than to diet. The best available details on average Iranian diets for the pre-1951 period are from Hadary and Sai'a 1949 study.<sup>36</sup> These show that nearly 62 percent of daily caloric intake per person was drawn from foodgrains; another 22 percent from fruits, vegetables, and sugar; and about 16 percent from animal products (with milk products making up 10.8 percent of the total). The average daily intake for 1947-48 was about 1,988 calories. Expressed in weight equivalents, however, these proportions became 38 percent foodgrains, 30.7 percent other vegetable foods, 27 percent milk products, and 4.3 percent other animal products. It is apparent from these statistics that governmental control of wheat and sugar distribution between regions and for the major cities was aimed at the most important elements of diet (66.1 percent) but at a low proportion of the weight-equivalent to average consumption.

(3) The active role of the Government through specific crop monopolies in sugar and tobacco has been previously cited. Control of wheat prices and provision of wheat storage facilities were established firmly by Reza Shah during the 1930s. A system of fixed-price purchases of wheat surpluses, based upon local calculation of harvest conditions and local "official" consumption needs, was set up and undoubtedly involved considerable corruption but resulted in redistribution from



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surplus to deficit regions. Eight beet-sugar refineries totaling 44,000 capacity were built during the 1930s, to ensure public control over this staple need, and about 20,000 metric tons of sugar were imported during each prewar year.

(4) Efficient use of available water has traditionally been the most critical input to Iranian farming. In 1948, about one-third of all grain acreage was reported to be irrigated. Irrigation on the central plateau is by "qanat," a traditional type of underground water-tunnel which connects a line of dry wells to a hand-dug water-bearing well, and which may run as far as 15 kilometers. These qanats are major farm investments, and rights to their water may be divided into some 10-12 shares, to be used only at customary times or for specific purposes.

(5) The legal restrictions on water use from seasonal river flows are also strict and reinforce traditional farming patterns in many localities. Local quarrels and injustices regarding water are inevitable and frequently involve local and central officials. Lambton<sup>37</sup> describes the pragmatic way in which such water questions were settled in the Qum city area. Rigid irrigation practices tended to make farming less responsive to marked forces. It was natural that Iranian officials emphasized the development of newly irrigated lands, therefore, rather than attempt to readjust existing water rights for greater efficiency and justice.

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(6) In 1937, total cropland in use was estimated at 3 million hectares; by 1951 this total had risen to 4.6 million hectares. While data is unavailable to make precise comparisons, it may be concluded that farmed land grew roughly in step with the growth of Iran's population. Agriculture had not suffered from a lack of land, especially since large amounts were allowed to lie fallow each year, but political instability and unreliable rainfall joined to make farm marketing uncertain and sensitive to prices.

e. Iranian tribal economies.

(1) The distinctive economic features of Iran's tribal groups are their specialization in livestock, primarily sheep and goats; the consequent need to make seasonal migrations from protected winter quarters to traditional pastures; and the continual competition between neighboring tribes and settled villages to maintain their respective rights to land, water, and pasture. There has been a history of tribal settlement into permanent villages, as well, which makes any precise definition of tribal groups extremely difficult.

(2) Tribal leaders (khans) and subchiefs (kalantars) have been traditional political leaders, tribal judges, and social arbiters for their tribes or clans; they also held economic power as owners of pasture in the name of the tribe and decided which herdsman could use what pasture each year. Thus many such leaders became traditional landlords, owners of already-settled villages, and with expensive city homes in Shiraz or Tehran. The duties of his tribe to him were formalized

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only by custom; Lambton suggests they ranged upward from 3 percent of all flocks and traditional New Year's gifts of clarified butter to special levies after good lambing years.<sup>38</sup>

(3) It is not clear how many true nomadic tribal groups existed in Iran during Reza Shah's rule or in 1950; nor is it certain what share they held in Iran's livestock population. A much later estimate for 1960-61 by Stauffer holds that a true nomadic family then required 40-60 sheep or goats to maintain itself at minimum levels. On the basis of a nomad-migrant estimate of 375,000 families of four, this amounted to 15 million flocks of Iran's 1960 total of 42.5 million. Actual total nomadic flocks were placed at 45-65 percent of this amount.<sup>39</sup>

(4) Historical statistics on Iran's livestock must be considered to be only illustrative; they also show much year-to-year variation based upon weather. In 1934-35 British estimates showed some 24.8 million sheep and goats, with goats making up only 6.8 million.<sup>40</sup> An estimate for 1937 of 21 million stated that no imports of animal fats were needed by Iran.<sup>41</sup> During the 1947-51 period, an average of 3.3 million cattle, 30 million sheep, and 8.3 million goats was recorded.<sup>42</sup>

(5) The very broad trends which emerge suggest that considerable overall growth of Iran's livestock population occurred between 1930 and 1950, especially in the numbers of sheep and goats which were the nomadic form of wealth. Cattle numbers also grew, from 2.3 million in 1934- to 3.3 million on average during 1947-51. Later during the 1950s, cattle expanded further to 4 million in 1956 and 5 million in

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in 1958; this trend reflects the growing importance of dairy herding for Iran's major cities. By 1958, one observer located fully 75 percent of all cattle herds in "close proximity to urban centers, chiefly Tehran."<sup>43</sup>

(6) It is tempting to conclude that long-term output growth in livestock numbers (sheep/goats) occurred primarily in the nomadic sector up to 1950 and that later growth occurred as various nomadic groups became progressively settled into permanent villages. Iran's few statistics in this area, especially the unreliability of nomad population estimates, make even this generalization suspect. But there can be no doubt that the vulnerability of tribal flocks to hard winters, such as in 1949, and tribal overgrazing, and the difficulty of marketing nomadic livestock for city use made this sector of the economy an inherently unstable one, with rather low productivity and only very slow modernization. Not until after 1950 did official development policy take positive account of the needs of this important political group.

29. Industry. Iranian industrial growth, outside of the petroleum extraction and refining sector (discussed in section 5, para 30) is a relatively modern phenomenon and mainly traceable to initiatives of the 1930s. During this period, the leading role of State investment was firmly established, with the construction of sugar refining plants, major wheat-storage silos, the Tehran bread factory, the Tehran cigarette factory, and a cement plant. One estimate placed total industrial

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investment by 1941 at L58 million, of which about L28 million was by the Government. The wartime occupation of Iran by the Allies led to an enormous increase in money incomes and foreign reserves. During this period, private investment expanded rapidly, while State investment was halted. The postwar period in 1951 saw considerable further private expansion, restricted only by Iran's liberal import policies which dampened home production and caused many shutdowns.<sup>44</sup> With nationalization of oil in 1951 and the subsequent tight import controls, domestic industry again expanded but unevenly.<sup>45</sup>

a. Modern manufacturing.

(1) The leading domestic industry of Iran, excluding the special case of oil, was textiles. The traditional sector of woolen carpetmaking had long been distributed across all Iran. This and the cotton handloom industry were privately owned, and efforts to establish a State carpet export monopoly in 1936 soon failed. The modern merch-anized textile industry, however, was established by a State factory at Shahi, on the Caspian; by 1950 five State factories were the largest in this sector. But private capital grew more important during the postwar period; textiles accounted for 29 of the 239 factories registered in 1950 and employed 20,600 of the 60,700 nonoil factory employment. Handloom weaving crafts were estimated to employ a further 70,000-80,000; while carpetmaking handicrafts employed another 60,000-80,000 persons.<sup>46</sup>



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(2) Despite this important role for private management and capital, investment by the State was vital to creation of the industrial sector in Iran. The growth of modern industry to 1941 closely paralleled the investment sequences of Turkey's growth and has been called "State Capitalism" by Banani.<sup>47</sup> State trading monopolies were early established for critical consumer goods--wheat, sugar, tea--and this led naturally to modern food-processing or storage facilities for Tehran's central market. The Government also established Iran's first modern heavy industries: a cement plant, a sawmill, and small chemical plants serving Tehran. Until 1950, these remained the only such basic industries.<sup>48</sup>

(3) By 1950, some 39 State-owned factories made up the largest part of Iran's rather limited modern manufacturing, and their total capitalization was fully 50 percent of the estimated total of Rls4.4 billion.<sup>49</sup> This calculation excluded both the AIOC and the Persian Fisheries concessions; employment and investment in these two foreign-controlled activities was more than equal to all other Iranian industry.

(4) In addition to this leading State role in industry, the more important mines were developed by State effort, but this sector remained small and inefficient. In 1949, only 4,500 were so employed. While Tehran's major power company was privately owned by a French firm, fully 30 percent of the 90,000 kw of electric power capacity in 1949--excluding AIOC power facilities--was owned by the Government. And the largest modern Iranian establishment, the Trans-Iranian Railway, had

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been constructed by State investment of some Rls2.5 billion (\$150-200 million) during 1928-38.<sup>50</sup>

(5) Such State-run plants were extraordinarily inefficient, overstaffed, and poorly run. In 1949, the Rey Cement Plant operated at about 20 percent of full capacity, and its output was priced at more than four times the cost of imported cement.<sup>51</sup> This was possible due to the high degree of protection provided by Iranian import duties, introduced in 1931 after the 1927 abrogation of "capitulation treaties." Such conditions in Government plants made it possible for small private firms to enter the market during wartime conditions of high internal demand. During the postwar period, conditions continued to favor private enterprise, until the 1948-50 policy of liberalized importation was introduced. Many firms were established in the fields of hosiery, cotton ginning, beverages, matches, and metal workshops, but these remained relatively small and capable of meeting only local markets.<sup>52</sup>

(6) In 1948-50, Government policy sought to reduce Iran's price levels by permitting imports of consumer goods. Many small private firms were unable to compete or forced to cut back production. Meanwhile the State's role in industrial investment expanded once again--orders were placed for additional modern textile plants, cement plants, and Iran's first steel plant, as oil revenues increased and enthusiasm for the proposed Seven-Year Plan increased. Almost all these new plants were half-constructed or equipment was still to be unpacked when the May 1951 oil crisis halted further progress.

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### b. Iranian private enterprise.

(1) The Iranian entrepreneur, under conditions of "State capitalism" that prevailed during the 1930s, appears to have differed very little from the traditional bazaari man of commerce. Up to 1950, Iranian city merchants adapted only slowly to modern conditions; the import-export trade expanded more rapidly than did industry, and good Government connections plus high unit profits meant more for success in business than simple efficiency or mass output. During the wartime boom, however, numerous small businesses sprang up--the 1948-50 slump hurt many of these.<sup>53</sup>

(2) One special religious group, the Bahai, based in Isfahan, had developed a special reputation for business acumen, wealth, and energy. Jacobs has called them the "pariah enterprise owners," for their non-Iranian traits.<sup>54</sup> Their success provides a parallel to Hagen's description of the Medellin businessmen of Colombia.<sup>55</sup> But a typical merchant of wealth in 1950 looked first to investment in land and social prestige as an absentee landlord according to Lambton.<sup>56</sup> There seem to have been very few "dualistic landlords" who were ready to shift their surplus earnings from the land into city-industry capital investment, except for those with assured markets serving the Government or the Anglo-Iran Oil Company (AIOC) in Abadan.<sup>57</sup>

### c. Employment and labor.

(1) Total employment in the modern industrial sector by 1950 was estimated at 120,000 persons, including some 60,000 in the oil

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industry. About 150,000 additional persons were employed in traditional crafts of carpet and handloom weaving. Other estimates of the modern or urban labor force include some 15,000 contractor-laborers for the oil industry, plus about 30,000 for state railways. This 1950 total of 315,000-320,000 compares to a 1947 estimate of about 260,000 in modern employment. It represents a small share in the 3.7 million urban population estimates of 1950, or in the 2.1 million estimated for the eight major cities, where almost all modern manufacturing, services, and commerce were concentrated.<sup>58</sup>

(2) Iranian trade unions were unknown prior to the Allied occupation in 1941, although traditional crafts and merchant guilds had filled a similar role. In the Khuzistan oil fields, labor contractors were the local Arab sheiks or tribal khans; in other rural districts, crop-sharing peasants owed a traditional number of labor days to their landlord, which could be mobilized for State labor needs, such as roads. During wartime, Allied spending and demands for labor greatly increased the unskilled labor force and facilitated labor organization. At the same time, war inflation provided specific labor objectives for political action, and Allied needs led to official acceptance of urban leaders.<sup>59</sup>

(3) The relationship between Iran's traditional craft guilds and the growth of the modern labor union movement are close but complicated; perhaps the best records derive from Communist Party history. In 1921, Tehran was said to contain 10 major craft-guilds. In 1922, some 15,000 guild union members included 12,000 in Tehran.<sup>60</sup> From 1931 onward

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Reza Shah enforced a ban on the Communist Party; the 1937 trial of Dr. Erani marked a low point for Communist effectiveness. From October 1941, CP activity was legalized through the new Tudeh Party, which gained importance rapidly under Allied wartime policies. Communists continued as active leaders in the Central Council (United Council of Trade Unions, formed in 1944 and recognized by the WFTU World Council in 1945). A second ban on Communist activity was enforced from February 1949, but underground activity continued. By mid-1952, Communist-led union and intellectual strength was placed at 50,000 within Tehran, plus another 50,000 in provincial organizations.<sup>61</sup>

(4) The Iranian CP early determined to concentrate upon Tehran's craft guilds and labor unions, and this policy rewarded it with a permanent and strong base in the capital. The Abadan refinery and Ahwaz provincial capital for AIOC oil fields was also a natural early target; an AIOC labor union first appeared in 1945 and was legalized in 1946.<sup>62</sup>

(5) The first major labor strike occurred at Abadan in July 1946--employment at the AIOC refinery was already in excess of 20,000. By 1951, total AIOC employment was about 60,000, with two-thirds of this concentrated at Abadan. About 10 percent of the skilled personnel were foreign, holding most management positions and providing a convenient target for labor agitation.

(6) In 1946, the Majlis responded to labor union militancy by passing legalization statutes and minimum-wage laws. But the Government took no direct action to administer labor activities beyond promoting

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a federation of non-Communist unions among the State's employees, known as ESKI.<sup>63</sup> Claims by this and the Communist-led Central United Council of Trade Unions (CUCTU) of some 260,000 and 120,000 members each in 1946 were surely inflated. From 1948, official opposition to all union groups led to the withering of ESKI, the fragmenting of both central councils into local unions, and a less active labor union membership. However, Tudeh Party leaders were able to coordinate union activities with operations within the National Front during 1950-53. Union strength was greatest in Tehran, Abaden, Isfahan, and Shiraz. Communist efforts in Tabriz after 1946 were not successful, due to the strong local memories of Soviet and Tudeh influence.<sup>64</sup>

### 30. Iranian oil.

#### a. General.

(1) Oil exploration and development in Iran spans the entire first half of the 20th century--a period of rapid industrialization for Europe and the United States. The modern economic importance of oil provided a direct cause for intensified great power rivalry over Iran; it linked Iranian political events and the economy closely to events in Europe and in the rest of the Middle East area. The rapid modernization of Iran's oil industry by foreign enterprise between 1919 and 1951 also made this narrowly based sector the most significant one for growth up to 1951.

(2) Iran's early and heavy predominance in world oil output mark its economy as Middle Eastern, rather than Asian. This major

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resource attracted continual great power conflicts, especially between the UK and USSR. Oil exploitation by a foreign business company fostered Iranian nationalism. And rapid growth in the oil producing districts helped create sharp regional differences between Khuzistan-Abadan, an almost autonomous enclave, and the rest of the country.

(3) According to AIOC figures, from 1912 through 1950, total Iranian crude oil output was 333 million metric tons, exports of 290 mn. MT were valued at L1,200 million; and royalty, profits, and tax payments to Iran totalled L122 million. The AIOC cumulative investment in Iran of L90 million was two-thirds depreciated in 1950, and original capital stock was worth about L22 million.<sup>65</sup> Indirect payments flowing into Iran's economy cannot be estimated accurately; on the assumption that 1950 wages and local costs were 10 percent of the cumulative total, these may be placed at L180-200 million.<sup>66</sup> Official Iranian receipts from AIOC are recorded at some L88 million by other sources.<sup>67</sup>

### b. Early developments.

(1) The history of Iran's early petroleum industry is particularly colorful; the fact that it included technical and political efforts by so many European nations has surrounded the subject with much myth and emotionalism, both inside Iran and abroad. In 1892, a French geological team reported on Iran's high petroleum potential; this report led William D'Arcy to seek and obtain an oil concession for about 500,000 square miles in 1901.<sup>68</sup>

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(2) In May 1908, the first considerable oil was found at only 1,180 feet at Masjid-i-Sulaiman. This area was still a major oil field in 1951; Iranian wells were mostly shallow and free-flowing. The Burmah Oil Company founded the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1909, and in 1914 the British Government became half-owner in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) by investing L2 million. Thus the March 1913 decision to convert the British Navy entirely to oil-fueled ships was backed up by an assured source of supply, and the Admiralty obtained a 30-year contract for oil at specially reduced rates, which by 1923 had saved it some L7.5 million by purchases below going world prices.<sup>69</sup>

(3) The terms of the D'Arcy concession called for Iran to receive 16 percent of all APOC profits. This profit-sharing arrangement and the original D'Arcy concession area remained in effect until late 1932. By that date, total profits paid Iran had reached L12 million, and some 20 million tons of oil had been produced.<sup>70</sup>

### c. Situation during Reza Shah period.

(1) The problems of Iranian relations with the company (APOC) were twofold: profits varied independently of output or recorded exports; and all accounting and financial decisions were taken in London, without Iranian participation. So when 1931 Iranian receipts fell to 35 percent of 1930 payments, or L307,000, the Iranian Government announced a unilateral cancellation of APOC's concession in November 1932. This dispute was referred by both parties to the League of Nations. Concurrent negotiations between APOC and Iran resulted in a new Convention of April 1933, and a new basis for APOC payments of the future.<sup>71</sup>

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(2) The 1933 Convention introduced to Iran the tonnage oil royalty payments established by the earlier IPC/TPC agreement of 1925-27 with Iraq; 4 "gold shillings" per ton was royalty, plus an additional amount in lieu of all Iranian taxation of APOC operations. Recalculated on this new basis, Iran's 1931 share in APOC operations increased to L1,339,000, or by four times. By contrast, British income tax for 1931 was L0.67 and the British Government's 50 percent share of net profits was L1.16 million.

(3) Despite the depressed condition of the world oil market dating from the price war in Asia in 1928, the depression years and poor sales through 1933, APOC produced 5.7 million long tons in 1931, and later years saw a steady rise in world prices and in Iran's output. In 1937-38 a peak output of 10.2 million long tons was reached.<sup>72</sup>

(4) Other results of the 1933 revised concessions have been variously interpreted as "fair to both parties," or as "a victory for the Persian side."<sup>73</sup> The facts show that Iran gained by reducing the D'Arcy concession area by 80 percent to 100,000 square miles; by obtaining a minimum-payment guarantee (of L975,000 in pegged gold-equivalents); and by continuing to share in distributed profits and allocations to reserves, partly on a deferred long-term formula. The company gained by fixing its payments to actual export tonnage; by confirming its exclusive rights to all the oil-bearing areas in southwest Iran; by extending its concession by 32 years to 1993; and by reaffirming APOC's immunity from Iranian taxes.



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(5) In 1938, Anglo-Iranian (renamed from APOC in 1935) reached its peak prewar output, with Iran's royalties reaching L4.27 mn. But 1939's wartime preparations cut off the European market, and AIOC's output and investments again fell off. Reza Shah pressed for larger minimum guarantees, and the company agreed to a minimum yearly payment of L4 million. Such minimums were paid to 1944 and reportedly cost AIOC some L5.5 million more than required by royalty payments.<sup>74</sup>

### d. World War II period.

(1) The wartime years, 1940-45, represented a difficult period for AIOC and Iran's oil production. Most of the AIOC tanker fleet was diverted to war purposes and lost; the needed steel for new pipelines was unavailable until 1944; and AIOC materials and staff were drawn upon heavily by British and US troops in Iran. Nevertheless, the large Agha Jari field was opened up, and extensions to Abadan refinery raised its capacity from 10 million to 17 million tons per year, including aviation gas output vital to the Allies. The company's efforts to provide food and services to its employees led to an independent 1943 rationing system for some 100,000 persons; however, company housing investment lagged seriously.<sup>75</sup>

(2) The wartime years saw no halt in the efforts of competing firms and countries to obtain a share of Iran's oil potential. In 1943-44, Shell, Sinclair, and Standard-Vacuum sent missions to Tehran. And in September 1944, a special Soviet delegation suddenly arrived to seek exploration rights and a guarantee of future concessions in the northern

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provinces, where Soviet troops had held control since 1941. Iran's cabinet refused to consider concessions until after wartime, but violent Soviet-sponsored demonstrations followed and the Government fell. Dr. Mossadeq, as a new and nationalistic Majlis member, led in drafting and passing a December 1944 law, enforceable by prison terms, forbidding any oil concession discussions.<sup>76</sup>

(3) Wartime expansions had doubled AIOC's employment and output; during the same period, however, drilling and refinery construction had added Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to the list of potential major oil producers. At first, Western firms doubted that postwar market expansion would justify heavy oil investments, but this did not stop the Soviet Union from pressing for Iranian concessions. In April 1946, Qavam signed an Iran-Soviet agreement for a joint company to exploit the northern provinces. This probably was the main goal of Soviet support to the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. Soviet troops left Azerbaijan in May 1946, assisted by AIOC-supplied gasoline. But Qavam's pro-Soviet maneuvers were tactical; when the Majlis reviewed this concession in October 1947, long after the recapture of Azerbaijan, the resulting law invalidated Soviet concessions, and, by December, Dr. Mossadeq was a national political leader, only two votes away from the Prime Ministry.

### e. Postwar developments.

(1) The postwar period of 1946-50 saw heavy AIOC investments in Iran, and the rapid growth of output from 19.2 million to 31.8 million long tons--yet this final output amounted to only 3.4 percent of

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proved reserves and was drawn from merely 76-90 operating wells. (Mik-dashi, 92-3). Iran's receipts climbed from L7.1 to L16.0 million. The Abadan refinery continued its growth, from 17 million to 24 million tons per year, and held its rank as the world's largest. Iran moved up to fourth among the oil producer nations. AIOC purchases of rial exchange for Iranian operations reached the equivalent of L20.6 million, and employment grew from 43,000 to nearly 60,000.<sup>77</sup>

(2) The political events of this period, leading to Mossadeq's selection as Prime Minister in March 1951 and Iran's unilateral cancellation of the AIOC concession in May 1951 are complex. In July 1949 a new Supplemental Agreement between Iran and AIOC was signed which raised the Iranian royalty per ton to 6 shillings and provided for an immediate Iranian share in AIOC increases to its general reserve funds. But through 1949 and early 1950, the Majlis delayed consideration of the new agreement, and Mossadeq's Oil Committee rejected it in December 1950.<sup>78</sup>

(3) "Nationalization of Iran's Oil" was a political platform during 1950 for Mossadeq, for Makki, and for Mullah Kashani, thus covering the entire Iranian political spectrum. Prime Minister Razmara's assassination in March 1951 followed immediately upon his public statement that "nationalization was impracticable" according to the Government's oil experts.<sup>79</sup> While unhelpful AIOC actions and the Abadan strikes of March 29-April 12, 1951 clearly increased nationalistic tensions within Iran, it seems most unlikely that a different course of

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events would have altered the widespread Iranian determination to nationalize all AIOC operations.

### f. Factors in the 1951 crisis.

(1) Why did the AIOC and the UK Government adopt an uncompromising attitude against nationalization in 1950-51, when this policy clearly was likely to cause international violence in Iran? The answer must be found primarily in world oil markets and the oligopoly of the industry, not in mistaken British analyses of Iranian public opinion. First, oil reserves in neighboring countries, especially in convenient Kuwait and Saudi Arabia's coastal regions, had proved to be as great as Iran's. Second, the huge Abadan refinery was believed to be too complex for Iranian operation and too large for non-European markets. Third, the tanker fleet owned by AIOC was essential for any large-scale exports of Iran's crude or refined products. And forth, the long Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline to Baniyas, Syria, (built in 1950-52) and the Aramco-TAPLINE pipeline (1947-50) from Arabia to Sidon, Lebanon, had just been constructed, to cut both costs and time in supplying the European markets.<sup>80</sup>

(2) Anglo-Iranian was one of four major partners in Iraq's IPC and was half-owner of Kuwait's KOC; in both cases, crude oil production was turned over to the participating companies for marketing and could be easily expanded. Thus in late 1947, AIOC reached agreement with Standard-New Jersey and Standard-Vacuum to sell 133 million tons of AIOC oil over a 20-year period; this agreement took effect in 1952, but initially

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provided for oil from either Iran or Kuwait, at the seller's option.<sup>81</sup>  
Thanks to very low Middle Eastern costs of production and to the 1947-49 development of a "Persian-Gulf basing-point" price system, much below US Gulf rates, Mideast crude oil was fully capable of supplying both European markets and competing successfully for US East Coast markets.<sup>82</sup>

(3) The AIOC operations in Iran provide an excellent example of foreign-sponsored economic growth, which has been called an enclave economy. AIOC operations involved a large domestic workforce, but fully one-third of these represented temporary contractor labor; skilled workers were about 10-14 percent foreign nationals and lived on standards and incomes markedly higher than most comparable Iranian staff members.<sup>83</sup> The Abadan refinery covered only 400 acres; the "fields," installations, and wells at Masjid-i-Salaiman and Hafs Khel were compressed into a few square miles and only some 70 producing wells. In these narrow "modernized" areas, foreign control and practices were highly visible, and social welfare or construction depended upon company decisions. But Abadan, Khorramshahr and Apwaz were far from Tehran, where native modernizers fought for social and political reforms in the Iranian system. The desirable effects of the large benefits provided by AIOC to employees and dependents alike were, therefore, felt locally only in Khusistan.

### 31. State controls and plans.

#### a. Overview.

(1) The label of State capitalism seems particularly appropriate to describe Iran's economic conditions and growth up to the September



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1941 exile of Reza Shah. It is clear that the industrial development, extension of road and rail facilities, and import and financial policies of the prewar period depended primarily upon the initiative and active intervention of the State. Nevertheless, it is necessary to retain some perspective regarding how far State control can actually penetrate in an underdeveloped economy, and how modest the budget usually is. The total central State budget revenues of 1949-50 (Rls7.31 billion) represented only 12 percent of a national income which was probably underestimated at Rls60 billion. For the same year, total value of recorded oil exports was Rls 15.3 billion, while commercial and "free" imports totaled some Rls9.3 billion.<sup>84</sup>

(2) Reza Shah's modernization program of the 1930s was related closely on conception and timing to the contemporaneous development of Turkey under Ataturk and Inonue. In both cases, rapid growth came after attainment of full independence from the "capitulations" and foreign treaties which restricted tariff duties. Turkey, like Iran, established early State control over domestic grain prices to encourage production and exports. Turkey established separate State financial institutions to encourage industry and mining (the Sumer and Eti Banks) in the 1930s, and put particular emphasis upon the construction of railroad links, especially the famous Coal Way and Copper Way railroads to Zonguldak and Madan.<sup>85</sup>

(3) However, the contrasts between Turkish and Iranian economic growth during the 1930s were equally striking. Iran lacked the variety

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of exportable mineral products, proven in Turkey's case. Iran's major resource, petroleum, was exploited by uncontrolled foreign interests, and the Government bureaucracy lacked the long history and independence of Turkish State civil servants. Perhaps most important was the fact that, throughout Reza Shah's reign and after, expert foreign technicians continued to play major administrative roles in Iran's bureaucracy.

(4) The differences between the historical paths followed by these two economies may be seen in the extent to which the State and its bureaucracy followed consistent nationalistic economic goals and led in resisting foreign economic interests. In both postwar Iranian crises, Azerbaijan in 1946 and Abadan in 1951, the young Shah and the State machinery were reluctant to act decisively but put their faith in traditional techniques of diplomatic maneuver to balance out the pressures of the competing great powers. In Azerbaijan's case, this succeeded; but in the oil nationalization crisis, this temporizing policy failed.

(5) The postwar period of 1946-49 saw rather vigorous efforts by the Iranian Government, helped by US consultants, to develop a broad, detailed economic development plan that might use oil revenues to transform the economy. These plans were impossible to complete without assured oil markets, but this fact played small part in the 1951 crisis. There can be no doubt that Iranian opinion supported the nationalization of oil overwhelmingly, and this public opinion, working through the National Front, forced nationalization upon a reluctant Shah and Government. The economic costs of this policy, estimated by the AIOC and

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British Embassy during mid-1951 and widely publicized, did not restrain Iranian enthusiasm for nationalization.<sup>86</sup>

### b. The State budget.

(1) Iranian State budgets illustrate very clearly the rapid growth of State economic influence during the middle 1930s, which resulted in a 400 percent rise in governmental revenues between 1931-32 and 1937-38. The wartime inflation greatly expanded the nominal importance of the State budget but concealed the actual fact that State economic influence was largely redirected to controls upon consumption, during the war and in the postwar period. After 1941, State intervention in industry was greatly reduced and private business expanded more rapidly. By 1950 regular budgeted State deficits became a common practice, although these were covered by the unprogramed receipts from growing oil revenues, in reality.

(2) Budget revenues grew rather slowly from 1923-24 to 1931-32, increasing from Rls231 million to Rls322 million. "In 1921 the main sources of state revenue were three: state lands, internal taxes, and custom tariffs on foreign trade."<sup>87</sup> The importance of customs receipts was limited by foreign treaties, which set maximum duties at 4-5 percent of import values. The first Millspaugh mission from 1922 to 1927 concentrated upon refining financial controls in Tehran and rationalizing the State's income from land taxes. This complex task involved an attack upon the State's historical dependence, upon regional tax collectors and landlords, and thus fit in well with Reza Shah's efforts to weaken the

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independent tribes and landlords. Small budget surpluses were common during the 1920s.<sup>88</sup>

(3) From 1931 onward, Reza Shah's policies shifted sharply toward conscious economic development and social reform. Helpful to this shift was the worldwide economic depression following upon sterling devaluation in September 1931; the introduction in that year of high Iranian customs duties; and the 1931-32 dispute with Anglo-Persian over reduced oil payments. The State budget grew rapidly, with revenues reaching Rls1 billion and Rls1.25 billion in 1936-37 and 1937-38. This fourfold growth was not due to increased oil receipts, since these were excluded from the State budget between 1930 and 1943; nor did they come from borrowing from the new "central bank." The primary new taxation sources were customs duties (30 percent) and state monopoly profits (24 percent). The traditional tax sources, from the State's public lands (2.8 percent), from direct taxes on land and property (11 percent) and from miscellaneous indirect taxes (15 percent), were not so responsive to the rapid growth in domestic incomes and output that occurred in these years.<sup>89</sup>

(4) State expenditures during 1936-38 were also distributed quite differently from the 1920s, as Reza Shah added new central agencies and semiautonomous bongahs (departments) to the Government. Defense costs absorbed some 25-27 percent of expenditures, with a further 13 percent going to Ministry of Interior operations. Education, and industry mines each took 6-7 percent, railway construction took 15-16

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percent, while roads and public utilities received 5-10 percent of the budget.<sup>90</sup> The heavy emphasis upon State investment activities during this period is very striking.

(5) From 1938 to 1951, the expansion in Iran's State revenues continued, reaching 290 percent of 1937-38 levels by March 1942. Budget deficits in these years were covered by oil receipts. But wartime occupation and inflation cut sharply into the State's activities, and the second Millspaugh mission of 1943-45 ended with total State revenues slightly less than those of 1941-42. The deficit by March 1942 was some 15 percent of receipts, in spite of the inclusion of AIOC royalty payments from 1943 onward.<sup>91</sup>

(6) From 1945 through 1949, budget revenues expanded considerably, rising from Rls4.4 billion to Rls7.3 billion over these 5 years. Direct AIOC royalty payments contributed a large share of these revenues, increasing from Rls512 million to Rls910 million, yet the State budget was in "planned" deficit throughout the period because of heavy investment plans, which actually were postponed. Iranian budget estimates did not provide any guide to real budget operations, since many sources of revenue were under-recorded and expenditure plans were budgeted for public effect, not for performance.

(7) The real role of the State in the Iranian economy is hard to estimate quantitatively, therefore. Using the estimate of Rls60 billion for 1950 national income, actual State revenues were under 15 percent, despite the inclusion of AIOC royalties (at some 2 percent). But



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the foreign exchange proceeds from AIOC sterling conversions and other sources of State incomes have gone largely unrecorded. Most important is the conclusion that postwar Iran devoted considerably less of its swollen regular budget to State investment than the prewar share, and thus wasted the potential dividend provided by growing internal revenues. Also it is clear that a number of tax sources remained untapped in 1949, in particular, land and large incomes.

### c. State investment planning.

(1) Arthur Lewis has classified the approaches to governmental economic planning since World War II into three types: the Government project approach, the public policy-targets approach, and the economywide consistency approach.<sup>92</sup> Despite the effort applied in Iranian investment planning between 1946 and 1950, resulting plans cannot be said to have advanced beyond the first of these stages. The Overseas Consultants Incorporated (OCI) report of August 1949 did attempt to outline policies that would contribute to private enterprise growth and to an independent Plan Organization that would be free from political pressures and bureaucratic inertia. But this Plan remained unrealized and represented one more foreign effort to select Iranian economic priorities from outside.

(2) Reza Shah's approach to State investment during the 1930s followed the purely nationalistic, prestige project philosophy that was common for that period. Government investments went into showcase projects, such as roads, railways, ports, and factories, and into a

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modernized Army. These projects were not selected within any plan but as a simple State priority list--the timing and speed of completion thus meant very little.

(3) At this point, it is impossible to measure the size of Reza Shah's investment effort with precision. The largest project, the Trans-Iranian Railway, was built during 1928-38 at a cost estimated at L28.5 million (or Rls2.3 billion).<sup>93</sup> By 1941 it has been estimated that L28 million of total Iranian industrial capital was in State-owned plants.<sup>94</sup> Finally, the very significant AIOC investment in Iran's oil fields and refineries may be estimated at some L65 million for the 1909-41 period with about 50-60 percent possibly falling in the 1930s. (UN, 1955, op. cit.). A review of 1937-38 budget categories suggests that some 25-35 percent of State expenditures in that peak year were attributable to State investment. Exchange for imports of capital goods presented no problem, since all AIOC royalties were paid in pounds, into a London account.

(4) During the wartime years, under Millspaugh's controls, this large investment effort was curtailed, while at the same time Allied occupation forces pressed forward a road-construction and railroad improvement program designed to move goods to the USSR quickly. Given the conditions of wartime equipment shortages, transportation delays, and heavy wear of existing capital, it seems unlikely that significant net additions to Iran's national capital stock were made.

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(5) The postwar period, however, saw the renewal of public interest in State investment. The Government set up a High Economic Council in mid-1945, and in April 1946 the Qavam cabinet instructed a Ministry of Finance commission to prepare a draft plan for development. Leading in these efforts was Abol Hassan Ebtehaj, the governor of Iran's Bank Melli (BMI) and a member of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank boards. His abrasive personality and marked abilities had contributed to Millspaugh's 1945 resignation and, later in 1955-58, were to cause much controversy over Plan Organization development efforts.<sup>95</sup>

(6) The initial failure of Ebtehaj's efforts to obtain World Bank funding led to the first economic consulting contract of this period, with Morrison-Knudson's International Engineering Co. (IECO) in late 1946. Under Max Thornberg's direction, IECO recommended three alternatively sized programs in July 1947, and an able Majlis economist, Dr. Mosharef Naficy, was officially assigned to analyze these plans. The Naficy report of 1948 recommended a Rls21 billion investment program for 7 years, and after lengthy debate the Majlis passed enabling legislation in February 1949. Naficy's recommendation for an independent development agency, the Plan Organization was thus adopted. Simultaneously, in late 1948 a second consortium of consultants under Max Thornberg was formed, and this OCI reported on detailed projects and the Plan in August 1949.<sup>96</sup>

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(7) The new Plan Organization was assigned Rls1.0 billion and Rls1.4 billion, respectively, in budgets of 1948 and 1949, representing 60-70 percent of the deficits planned for these years. In final fact, very little of these amounts were spent; there were significant differences between the sector priorities of the Naficy report, the official Government draft law, and the final Majlis Law. Successive changes shifted allocations within the Rls21 billion total to cut back amounts for roads and railroads and to expand greatly the funds allocated to social welfare and municipal lending activities. Still, the Seven Year Plan as passed was notable for its comprehensive view of desirable State investments, ranging from loans to agricultural cooperatives to public health and industrial arts schools.<sup>97</sup>

(8) Two essential features marked the Seven-Year Plan legislation: recognition that Iran's oil revenues should be largely devoted to planned capital investment, and that Plan administration required the creation of an independent, nonbureaucratic planning agency. The latter point was made as early as 1946 by a special Iranian commission: "No long-term plan can therefore be conceived and put into force unless a definite attempt is made towards a fundamental reorganization of the Government Services."<sup>98</sup> But the creation of such a new agency in the midst of a traditional bureaucracy presented many problems and delays; progress was very slow until General Razmar's Prime Ministry in July 1950. There can be little doubt that the high public expectations, raised during the extended discussion of the Plan, were disappointed

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by such delays and by the prominent part played by foreign advisers to the Plan Organization. Thronberg is quoted as writing in May 1950 that ". . . there probably is little to choose between the Plan Organization and any government organization," since it was "nearly completely dominated or victimized by either political or private personal interests . . . ." <sup>99</sup>

(9) Under Razmar's strong-handed leadership, much more progress was made: regional offices were set up, and the Plan Organization began to carry out projects under its own direction, instead of merely transferring funds to other state agencies. And in November 1950, a formal Iran-US agreement for a technical cooperation program was signed, the first such in the world. But the political issue of oil nationalization gained ground far more rapidly than did Iran's efforts to invest its rapidly growing oil receipts. Envisioned Plan expenditures from late 1948 through March 1951 were to reach Rls5.8 billion; the amount actually spent has been calculated at only Rls1.3 billion, or less than half the oil royalties received in these years. <sup>100</sup>

(10) With General Razmar's assassination in April 1951, Iran's public willingness to delay further in moving toward oil nationalization was clearly at an end. It is interesting to speculate whether more energetic outside assistance to Iran's Government and the new Plan Organization might have rechanneled national efforts into a massive development program. Certainly the World Bank's reluctance to provide financing for Iranian development, so long as oil receipts were sufficient and US



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consulting expertise available, can be understood readily by non-Iranian observers. It seems more natural to blame the incapacity of the Iranian bureaucracy and of Iranian leaders for the very slow growth of postwar development plans and the lack of state administrative reform.

## d. Foreign investment.

(1) It has already been suggested that foreign investments within Iran were relatively unimportant in determining its process of economic growth. Reza Shah's state investment projects were carried out largely from internal resources; the Iranian railways were made the beneficiary of a special internal tax upon sugar and tea during the 1934-38 period. Anglo-Iranian (AIOC) investments in Abadan, Bandar Shapur port, and the "Fields" pipelines of Khuzistan represented very large investments before the war but were located in a small and non-Iranian district of the country, with limited spread effects upon the economy.

(2) By 1951, L92 million had been invested by AIOC in capital plant within Iran; about two-thirds of this was entirely depreciated. AIOC investments between 1945 and 1951 may well have provided some L20 million in postwar investment. The employment increase during these years represented some 15,000 additional jobs in Khuzistan alone, and increased oil products consumption within Iran had further employment generating effects. It may be conservative to estimate that 100,000-150,000 persons were directly dependent upon AIOC operations in 1951.

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(3) In contrast, the Soviet Fisheries concession was extremely small, employing only 2,500 persons in 1948. The State canning factory at Babulsar was fully as large. Other foreign investments were quantitatively not important. But it must not be forgotten that these foreign agencies held special social positions in Tehran and elsewhere, which provided an easy focus for Iranian feelings of national pride.

(4) Foreign technicians have held specially privileged positions in Iran for more than a century. Iran's "capitulations," or extraterritoriality treaties with the great powers, date back to 1858 for the Soviet Union, and to 1838-42 for the United Kingdom. The Soviet-trained Cossack brigades and British-trained South Persian Rifles of the 1915-21 period represent a more modern effort to assure the internal stability needed by foreign businessmen in Iran. From before 1900 until 1941, Belgian technicians were the administrative directors for Iran's customs. In the 1930s, Swedish officers trained Reza Shah's Army, while Germans helped administer the railroad and constructed the State's sugar mills, with Czech suppliers. British influence was apparent in Tehran and oppressive in Abadan and Khorramshahr; across three Iranian borders, British influence was unquestionably paramount, especially in Iraq.<sup>101</sup>

(5) US technical specialists offered an ideal buffer against British and Soviet competition within Iran; for this reason such US specialists as Shuster, Millspaugh, Stoltzfus, and Max Thornberg were welcomed to influential positions in Iran. This policy was continued, even after oil nationalization, and up to 1963. The economic significance of

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US oil company entries into the Persian Gulf was of particular importance during the postwar period. So while the economic influence of the United States and its stake in Iran was measurably and directly small, its potential was very large. Recognition of this point led Millspaugh to urge an active US role in Iranian affairs in 1946.

### 32. Economic correlates to conflict.

a. The main characteristics of Iran's postwar economy illustrate that the central State bureaucracy in Tehran held disproportionate and negative control over the economy, and that the rural economy was sharply separated into regions having slight interdependence and without close ties to the cities. The leading private groups, bound by common economic interests, were the landlord (called the "thousand families") class, the merchant importer, bazaar grouping, and the growing labor union movement in modern city industries. Only among labor was a keen sense of common interest developed by 1950, while the merchant and the landlord groups were split by issues of local interest and of religious action and by allegiance to the institution of the Shah. The bulk of the nation, peasant tenants and proprietors, was politically inert and socially conservative.<sup>102</sup>

b. With the end of the second Millspaugh mission in February 1945, and the conclusion of the war in Europe, the extensive Allied presence in Iran and Tehran began to disappear. US troops were first to leave during late 1945; British troops followed more slowly, ending March 1946. But Soviet troops did not start withdrawal until May 1946 after Prime

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Minister Qavam had visited Moscow to give assurances that the Soviet desire for a northern Iran oil concession would be satisfied.<sup>103</sup> Meanwhile, the Azerbaijan Democratic Party, led by an old-line Communist, had seized power in Mianeh and Tabriz in December 1945. Protected by Soviets, it mobilized a peasant army and introduced a program of municipal works and land redistribution.<sup>104</sup>

c. The collapse of this Azerbaijan Separatist Movement did not come promptly after Soviet troop withdrawals; Tehran's troops moved only after a Qavam coalition government with the Tudeh was dissolved. But from Separatist Movement collapse in December 1946, Communist and Soviet influence in Azerbaijan remained very small through 1951-53. What economic factors motivated this abortive separatist move? It seems likely that this Soviet-sponsored republic was closely linked to USSR desires for a permanent foothold in Iran, possibly under a broad oil concession. Also there were special circumstances making Azerbaijan a distinctive non-Iranian province had not benefited proportionately from Reza Shah's industrialization program; its landlord and waqf shares in land ownership were among Iran's highest. Yet the Azerbaijani village peasant was more self-reliant and independent than elsewhere, with ethnic ties to the neighboring Soviet districts.

d. Soviet policy appears to have kept progress toward an oil concession in northern Iran firmly at the center. Pishvari's policies were narrowly pro-Soviet, even during the internal collapse of the Separatist Republic in late 1946.<sup>105</sup> The Soviet-Iranian oil agreement called

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for a 51-49 division of profits and ownership, far better than AIOC's historical 16 percent royalties, and this could be expected to cause future pro-Soviet issues. However, Soviet policy could not have anticipated the political response in August-October 1947, when the Majlis rejected the detailed Soviet Concession and also included a clause criticizing "southern oil" as a violation of Iranian national rights.<sup>106</sup> Nationalist spirit within Iran was heightened by comparisons with both high Venezuelan oil profits and the rapid growth of oil operations in nearby Gulf states. Sentiment against continued foreign intervention had a clear-cut economic focus, in the nation's oil wealth.

e. The role of the Shah, as a person and institution supported both by the narrow political elite and the inarticulate village masses, was not readily identifiable in economic matters of this period. During wartime, his influence was very small. The Shah's support of Qavam, throughout the Soviet oil disputes, appears to have turned into a fear of Qavam competing power. From December 1947 to General Razmar's appointment in 1950, a series of weak ministers received the Shah's support.<sup>107</sup> During this period, extensive plans for Iran's economic modernization were sketched out, a Seven Year Plan was passed, and a new development agency formed. The Shah's personal contribution to these economic plans is not clear; more important is his failure to oppose Majlis legislation regarding labor, land ownership, or foreign development assistance.

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f. Shah Mohammed Reza's personal preferences may be inferred from his 1950 announcement of a Crown Lands distribution program; these preferences clearly lay with a revival of the loyal village peasantry as against the landholding classes. They did not emphasize industrialization, the expansion of private manufacturing, or the modernization of Iran's slow-moving bureaucracy. His own influence on oil nationalization and the 1951-53 crisis has not been analyzed.

g. The connection between Iran's general economic conditions during the postwar period and the oil nationalization crisis of April 1951 to August 1953 remains to be explained. Any effort to trace the origins of this crisis to rural unrest and peasant frustration with the concentrated power of the landlord class does not seem to provide much explanatory power. More significant is the probability that the landlord and absentee landowner classes had little concern with or stake in the continued operation of the Anglo-Iranian concession. This economic class had no expectations of direct benefit from expanded oil operations and no reason to fear oil nationalization.

h. The more modern but equally conservative middle class of city merchants and importers had the largest business interest in smoothly expanding oil output under AIOC direction. Yet this economic group was aware of the wide extent of foreign financial and economic control over Iran's trade and Government. For them, national pride and national autarky in economic matters had a business and profit origin, since this

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group had survived and even benefited from rapid wartime inflation and postwar economic shortages.

i. Another major urban group, composing the State bureaucracy, was perhaps best informed on the problems of oil nationalization but was almost most aware of the striking discrimination against Iran in oil benefits, based upon international comparisons. It is likely that this State interest group was as nationalistic as the more vociferous class of modern industrial workers, many of whom worked for State enterprises, small-scale industries, or for Anglo-Iranian itself. Despite frequent British claims that the oil industry represented a highly technical specialized field that required foreign technicians, Iranians close to production could themselves see that very few real specialists were required from outside, and that the job of regulating crude oil production mostly reduced to "a simple opening of a valve."<sup>108</sup> In any event, national pride could hardly accept the thesis that Iranians could not manage a nationalized industry, when recent Iranian history showed the ease with which foreign technicians could be hired to manage the State Treasury, erect factories, and build a railway. Gen. Razmara was assassinated on the day after he reported to Mossadeq's Majlis Oil Committee that "nationalization was impracticable."<sup>109</sup>

j. It seems clear that the large economic impact of AIOC operations in Khuzistan and Abadan was not sufficiently evident in Tehran, and that the difficulties of marketing oil on a worldwide basis were not fully recognized by public opinion or by Iran's elite. This may be

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termed an inability of British and AIOC spokesmen to publicize their case; but it is more likely that the seeming logic and strength of the company's position led to an underestimate of the dangers of nationalization, plus a conviction that Iranian oil could in fact be replaced by production elsewhere, if worst came to worst. Thus, in many ways, the 1951 showdown over oil nationalization is reminiscent of the similar and earlier "showdown" precipitated by Millspaugh to discipline the Majlis and Cabinet in 1945.

k. The proximate economic factors bearing upon both Iranian crises, therefore, have been identified as expectations relating to Iran's oil reserves, known to be extensive and highly profitable since 1914 and the 1920s. In Azerbaijan, such oil remained a hope supported only by foreign competition for concessions. In Khuzistan, where an oil industry existed in reality, the level of exploitation appeared to be low, and foreign management was not serving Iran's short-term or long-run interests.

l. The postwar desire to recover control over Iran's resources, to change its economy and society without foreign management, and to recover the modernizing momentum which Reza Shah had introduced during the 1930s cannot be measured, but appears to have been intense.

m. Iran's long experience with great-power political interference had accustomed it to viewing political and economic dependency as closely interconnected. As a border state, split between Soviet and British spheres of interest, Iranian nationalism on oil represented

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only a heightened form of its normal buffer-state interests. But most of all, the example of Reza Shah's state capitalism of the 1930s existed, to convince Iranians that true economic growth and modernization, as well as social reformation, depended upon Iran's independent internal efforts and upon pressing forward its own self-interest. By 1951, the new Shah had not succeeded to his father's role of autocratic direction of the economy, and economic change had not been identified with the purpose of reestablishing Iranian power, independence, and glory.

n. It seems likely that the "state capitalism" economic model established by Reza Shah and Turkey during the 1930s was still most relevant for Iran by 1950-51. US advisers for the Seven Year Plan were predisposed to favor the newly growing private business sector and to stress the need to invest in agricultural expansion. But Iran's economic dualism, in the sense of the wide split between the rural and urban economies, was reflected in the political stability of the peasants and landlords and the unrest and activism of labor in the cities.

o. Iranian behavior of 1949-51 is well described as single economic nationalism, in revolt against a foreign oil company, as symbolic of great power control and interference within Iran. On this clear-cut issue of economic imperialism, all parties in Iran could and did unite. But Iran's inability to market oil on its own was thoroughly demonstrated during 1951-54, and public attention again turned to a preoccupation with reform of the inefficiencies, corruption, and maneuvering of the State bureaucracy.

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## CHAPTER 4

### SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS

#### Section I. Demography, Education, and Culture

by Donald S. Bloch

#### 33. Population and demography.\*

##### a. Population growth.

(1) It is estimated that the population of Iran increased from 12 million in 1931 to 18 million in 1950.<sup>1</sup> The 1956 census of Iran puts the population at 18 million.<sup>2</sup>

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TABLE III. POPULATION OF IRAN FOR SELECTED YEARS

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<u>Year</u>	<u>Population</u>
1931	12,000,000 (est)
1937	15,000,000 (est)
1940	16,549,837
1950	18,388,000
1956	18,954,704

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Source: American University, Center for Research in Social Systems, Socio-Economic Statistics on Iran: 1930-1951 (for 1931-50). American University, Special Operations Research Office, US Army Area Handbook for Iran (for 1956).

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\*The statistics presented in this section should be used with caution. The first census of Iran was accomplished in 1956, and the Iranian Government claims that this census underestimated the population by 10 percent. Statistics for the period prior to 1956 are best estimated but are only estimates. Presentation of statistical material in this section is useful only to indicate gross trends.



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(2) The Iranian Government estimated a population growth of 2.5 percent annually based on a birth rate of 45-50 per thousand and a death rate of 21-24 per thousand; however, it is the opinion of one author that the growth rate was lower and that the birth and death rates were probably higher than the Government calculated.<sup>3</sup> Wilber estimated the annual growth rate at 2 percent<sup>4</sup> and stated that the growth rate was not overtaking increased food production. In fact, he felt that available water and land resources could support a population between two and three times as great.<sup>5</sup>

### b. Population and distribution.

(1) Geographical features, such as high mountains and desert, made for an unequal population distribution throughout the nation. The population density averaged 24 per square mile in 1950 for the country as a whole but rose to 106 per square mile of inhabited area.<sup>6</sup> About 60 percent of the population was concentrated in the north along the Caspian littoral and in the northwest province of Azerbaijan; only 6.5 percent lived in the eastern desert provinces of Kerman and Baluchistan.<sup>7</sup>

(2) Table IV indicates that there has been an increase in population for each administrative unit except for West Azerbaijan. There is no explanation for the decrease in the population of West Azerbaijan; therefore, the difference is probably an inaccurate estimation. The same holds for the estimates of the urban population. Table II shows a general decrease in the percent of the population living in urban areas from 1940 to 1950. Other data show that each of 50 cities increased in population

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from 1931 to 1947,<sup>8</sup> and the census of 1956 shows 31.4 percent of the population to be urban; i.e., living in 186 population concentrations of 5,000 or more.<sup>9</sup>

TABLE IV. POPULATION OF IRAN BY ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS (OSTANS)  
FOR 1940 AND 1950

Ostan	Name	1940		1950	
		Est pop	% urban	Est pop	% urban
1	Gilan	2,367,537	14.2	2,441,000	16.5
2	Mazanderan	2,304,677	36.8	2,970,000	32.1
3	East Azerbaijan	1,540,586	29.2	2,289,000	21.3
4	West Azerbaijan	1,194,387	10.7	723,000	16.6
5	Kurdistan	1,827,591	16.8	2,066,000	15.8
6	Khuzistan	1,362,724	20.5	1,638,000	18.7
7	Fars	1,403,586	26.1	1,531,000	19.7
8	Kerman	1,080,438	15.6	1,202,000	12.2
9	Khurasan	2,036,549	20.3	2,290,000	16.3
10	Isfahan	1,431,762	22.8	1,622,000	21.3
	Totals	16,549,834	22.3	18,771,538	19.1

Source: American University, Center for Research in Social Systems, Socio-Economic Statistics on Iran: 1930-1951 (1940 figures. Herbert H. Vreeland and others, Iran (1950 figures). The 1950 estimates differ from those in the preceding tables, since they are derived from different sources.

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(3) It must be concluded that there was a rather rapid increase in the urban population after 1930. Walpole points out that the largest cities grew ". . . several times faster than the rural areas as a result of large-scale migration"; and, further, that the unskilled migrants were swelling the roles of the unemployed and underemployed.<sup>10</sup> Migration to the larger cities has been influenced by increased industrialization in Iran since 1941.

(4) Iran has a young population. According to the 1956 census, the median age of the population was 20.2 years; 49.7 percent were under 20 years of age, and only 4 percent were 65 or over. This would indicate a fairly large, young dependent population. The labor force is calculated on the basis of the population 10 years of age or older, and 32.6 percent of the population in 1956 was under 10 years of age.<sup>11</sup>

### c. Labor force.

(1) In 1956, the labor force was 61 million or almost half the 128 million individuals 10 years of age or older.<sup>12</sup> Calculating from the figures given in the 1956 census, the unemployment rate seemed very low, about 2.6 percent. This appears to underestimate unemployment based on the reports of large-scale migration to the cities of unskilled villagers. Vreeland estimated that the unemployment rate varied from 5 percent in the summer to 15 percent in the winter when farmers looked for nonagricultural work.<sup>13</sup>

(2) As would be expected in a society that is still primarily rural, most of the population depended upon agricultural and pastoral

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activities for their livelihood. In 1940, it was estimated that 85 percent of the population depended on agriculture and grazing, but this decreased to 75 percent by 1956. Close to 56 percent of the employed in 1956 were working in agriculture, forestry, or fishing.<sup>14</sup> About 90 percent were tenant farmers who were constantly in debt and who managed to provide for their families at a bare subsistence level.<sup>15</sup>

(3) Agricultural productivity tended to be low because disease and the use of opium sapped the strength of the farmers. (Section , below.) In many areas, water and fertilizer were scarce, and the farmer did not have incentives to change from his traditional practices.

(4) In 1947, it was estimated that not more than 200,000 persons in Iran were employed in industry.<sup>16</sup> The 1956 census showed that 11 million (19.3 percent) were employed in industry, construction, and crafts; 1.6 percent in professional and technical occupations; and 3.1 percent in managerial and clerical activities.<sup>17</sup>

(5) For the most part, wages were very low for the unskilled male and for women and children; working conditions were poor. Safety devices and sanitary facilities were poor in the private firms and not much better in the Government-owned factories. Labor legislation enacted in 1948, which called for a 48-hour week and provided for protection of child labor and women, was never enforced. Government regulations raising minimum wages did not keep up with inflation.<sup>18</sup>

(6) Among nonagricultural workers, productivity was also low. Here, again, disease and the use of opium sapped strength. There was

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also a high turnover among the unskilled workers because of lack of discipline. The worker was unaccustomed to industrial practices, or he wanted to "make a fortune" and then return to his village or tribe.<sup>19</sup>

There tended to be a surplus of labor in the textile and oil industries because of expansion during the WW II years during which time the labor force was expanded, but Government pressure precluded firing excess employees after the war.

### 34. Education.

#### a. Traditional education.

(1) Prior to the main impact with the West, formal education was the monopoly of the Iranian clergy. Traditionally, religious schools called "maktab" were usually affiliated with mosques, and provided elementary education to primarily urban youth of the middle and upper socioeconomic groups. These schools were supported by religious foundations, private philanthropy, or by tuition; the wealthy tended to support private maktab.<sup>20</sup>

(2) Such schools were free of Government control. Nor was there professional control by the clergy, such as a professional hierarchy or professional requirements for teachers. In many cases the teacher, called an "akhund," was free to open a maktab in any urban neighborhood or village where a school was needed and could be supported. Tuition was arranged between the parent and the akhund, and it was



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expected that the wealthy contribute more than the poor. The institution of the maktab appears to have been the major source of income and prestige for lower ranking clergy.<sup>21</sup>

(3) Enrollment in the maktab was probably less than 10 percent of the total population of school-age children. Many villagers did not have a school; the poorest rural and urban families could not afford even the most generous terms; the maktab was not available to girls; and the prospective student had to show ability to learn. "According to the cultural traditions of Islamic Persia, some people are born gifted and others are not, and it is useless to educate the unfit."<sup>22</sup>

(4) The curriculum of the maktab stressed reading and writing as the first objective with particular attention to good penmanship. The rest of the subjects were memorized under very strict discipline which usually involved physical punishment. The students memorized "the Shi'ah catechism, a good deal of poetry, a standard Persian-Arabic dictionary in verse form, known as the nisab, some Arabic grammar, and vast portions of the Koran . . . . The generally accepted mark of distinction and attainment was the recitation of the entire Koran by heart."<sup>23</sup> Their process of education usually started at age 7 and continued until the student dropped out or had learned all that the akhund could teach.

(5) There were no formal institutions devoted to secondary education. Education beyond the maktab was conducted by a private tutor, usually a lay scribe rather than an akhund. The tutors "gave painstaking attention to calligraphy, a thorough study of classical literature,

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mastery of Arabic grammar, and very occasionally, the rudiments of logic, mathematics, and music made up the sum of subjects taught . . . ."<sup>24</sup>

(6) In Iran, the only institutions of higher education were the "madrassahs" or religious seminaries which trained the "mujtahids" (religious leaders). However, some students completed their education in the madrassah and did not take up a clerical career. The madrassah concentrated on theological subjects, including jurisprudence and Arabic grammar, but also taught some logic, arithmetic, and astronomy.<sup>25</sup>

(7) Apprentices were taught their trade by master craftsmen [and the guilds] who also saw to their religious and social training.<sup>26</sup>

### b. Development of the modern educational system.

(1) Modern education in Iran was influenced by Western European educational systems and stimulated by the need for qualified personnel to fill top level Government positions and for a well-trained military. The Iranian Government founded the Dar-ul-Fonun in Tehran in 1851 and began sending students to Europe in the 1850s in an attempt to meet these needs. The Dar-ul-Fonun included secondary and rudimentary higher education on the order of the French lycée. Later, several of the ministries set up similar schools to train personnel. By 1921, a School of Political Science, a College of Agriculture, a School of Fine Arts, a Boy's Normal School, and a School of Law had been opened supplementing state elementary schools. Later the Dar-ul-Fonun became a secondary school, and the schools set up by the ministries became faculties or colleges of the University of Tehran.<sup>27</sup>

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(2) In 1910, the Majlis created the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts (waqf). The law proclaimed compulsory elementary education and gave the Ministry responsibility for collection of educational statistics, teacher training, adult education, sending students abroad, and publication of textbooks. The law also called for licensing of schools and teachers, uniform adoption of texts, maintenance and inspection of hygienic standards, state examinations to be given to maktab pupils, and a ban on physical punishment. Although there was a great deal of planning and organizational change for the administration of the educational system, political instability, clerical opposition, and the scarcity of funds and qualified teachers inhibited real progress. Nine state elementary schools were opened, and 30 students sent abroad. When Reza Shah came into power, there were probably no more than 10,000 students enrolled in all the State and private nonreligious schools.<sup>28</sup>

(3) A comprehensive program of elementary and secondary education was developed in 1921. The program covered a 12-year span: 6 years of elementary and 6 years of secondary schooling. Standard examinations were given at the end of the sixth, ninth, and 12th grades, and certificates of satisfactory completion were issued to those who passed.<sup>29</sup>

(4) The subject matter taught in the elementary grades were Persian, Arabic, penmanship, arithmetic, Persian history, Iranian and world geography, and physical education. In 1930, Arabic was eliminated and taught only in secondary schools, but in 1936, art and music were added.

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(5) The curriculum of the secondary schools developed over the years, especially the introduction of scientific courses. Toward the end of the period of concern for this study, the courses of study were probably the following: in the first year (the seventh grade), geometry, natural science, Arabic, an additional foreign language, world history, and hygiene; second and third years, algebra, biology, physics, chemistry, geology, and mechanical drawing; and in the last three grades, trigonometry, solid geometry, zoology, and economics. In the 12th or final year, a student could major in one of three divisions: pure science, natural science, or the humanities.<sup>30</sup> The academic orientation of the secondary schools was a deliberate attempt to provide educated personnel for the civil service. Reza Shah encouraged students to complete secondary school by granting military deferments, by offering teaching and Government positions to graduates, and by offering graduates an opportunity for higher education.<sup>31</sup>

(6) The expansion of elementary and secondary schools required more and more qualified teachers. At first, any person who had satisfactorily completed the sixth grade was acceptable as an elementary school teacher. Serious consideration of teacher training for elementary schools did not occur until 1929 when the Education Act of that year required candidates for elementary teaching positions to have completed the ninth grade and a 2-year education course. Later, the Education Act of 1934 authorized the establishment of 25 elementary and normal schools in Teheran and the provinces. Banani claims that this number was exceeded,



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and by 1941 there were 36 such institutions. However, in 1943 a severe teacher shortage relaxed the requirements and permitted anyone who had graduated from the sixth grade to take a 2-year education course and qualify to teach the first four grades.<sup>32</sup>

(7) Qualifications for teaching at the secondary school level were more stringent. The National Teachers College, an outgrowth of the Boy's Normal School, became part of the University of Teheran in 1934 and was the one institution in Iran for the training of secondary school teachers. Some of the provincial universities offered education courses, but to be licensed one had to pass the test administered by the National Teachers College. The College also trained the personnel who taught elementary education in the normal schools. The College offered a 3-year program leading to a B.A. degree. Students were required to study psychology, educational psychology, history of education, and comparative education but majored in the subjects they planned to teach.<sup>33</sup>

(8) As of 1951 there were two universities in Iran, the University of Tehran and the University of Tabriz. The University of Tabriz was under the control of the Ministry of Education; the University of Tehran was administered separately and received its budget independently of the Ministry. Administrative responsibility of the University of Tehran was vested in a Chancellor, assisted by the University senate. The Chancellor was chosen by the senate and approved by the Shah and the Minister of Education to serve for 3 years. The University had six faculties or colleges, five of them outgrowths of the schools set up by the

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various Ministries in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. There were also other institutions annexed by the University and subordinate departments ranging from the School of Fine Arts to the Department of Islamic Preaching.<sup>34</sup>

(9) The discussion of higher education must take account of the program of sending Iranian students to European and American colleges and universities. The Government first subsidized education abroad after Iran was defeated by Russia in 1828. These students were to study military sciences. After that time, a small stream of students of wealthy families studied abroad, but a regular Government program was not set up until 1928. It was estimated that from 1922-38, of the students under Government subsidy, 396 had returned from study abroad and 452 were still completing their studies. The total number of privately supported and Government supported students sent abroad in 1922-38 probably numbered 1,500.<sup>35</sup> The influence of the students who had been educated abroad far exceeded their comparatively small number. Banani, although perhaps overly strong in his statement, discusses the influence of the returnee as follows:

He brought about a revolution not only in the fields of intellectual activity and scientific, technical, administrative and professional enterprise, but also in the less tangible but perhaps more significant areas of cultural traditions, social relations and personal habits.<sup>36</sup>

(10) A number of technical schools were also established during this period, some of which were later incorporated into the University of Tehran. The Bank Melli, the Post and Telegraph system, the Police Force,

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and the Ministry of Finance established technical or semiprofessional schools to train and upgrade employees. The military established a military academy and several military preparatory schools. Private technical schools were also established. The most famous of these was a polytechnical school founded in Tehran by a group of Germans.<sup>37</sup>

(11) Other private schools established since the mid-19th century include the foreign missionary elementary schools mentioned above and schools run by religious minorities: the Baha'i, Zoroastrians, Jews, and Armenians. Starting in 1928, these private schools came under the control and regulation of the Ministry of Education. The Baha'i and US schools were closed as nonconformist in 1934 and 1939 respectively, and the foreign missionary educators were asked to leave in 1940.<sup>38</sup>

(12) A program of adult education was started during the constitutional period. It gained impetus when the Ministry of Education implemented its plan in 1936. The largest number of adult education classes were established by the Government, but some were established by industry or privately. In the academic year 1936-37, the Government held 1,500 evening classes for adults.<sup>39</sup> The Government program was designed to combat illiteracy. For beginning students, there was a concentration on reading and writing Persian, but advanced students had the opportunity of completing the standard 6-year elementary school course. Because of this some school-age children were not able to attend day school were found in classes with adults.<sup>40</sup>

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### c. Teacher prestige.

(1) The cultural traditions of the Iranians have valued intellectual endeavor above manual labor. Before the modern educational system came into being, teaching in a maktab provided the lower clergy with an additional measure of prestige. In the modern system, at least until 1951, teaching, at any level, gained one a measure of prestige over and beyond that accorded to the akhund and the tutor. This status, primarily based on education and occupation, was reinforced by preferential treatment given to those who chose teaching as a career during the reign of Reza Shah. Graduates of one of the teachers' colleges received reasonable salaries and were given tenure, preferential promotions, and retirement benefits. This tended to professionalize the occupation and create a relatively secure socioeconomic group in the face of general insecurity.<sup>41</sup>

(2) However, with the reduction in standards for qualification as a teacher which started in 1947, the prestige of teachers began to decline. Their salaries did not keep up with other civil servants: because of being undertrained they were not able to be the fount of information which the peasants and urban workers expected them to be; and because they accepted the role of the modernizer they came into conflict with many parents. By the 1960s it could be said, "Except for college professors, teachers in Iran are generally undertrained, underpaid and have little prestige."<sup>42</sup>

### d. Trends in expenditure, enrollment, and literacy.

(1) Government expenditures on education increased rather steadily from Rls 18.6 million in AY 1932 (plus L 83,591 for education

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abroad) through Rls 380.3 million in AY 1946 and more rapidly after WW II to RLS 960.7 million by AY 1950. The money amounts do not give the entire picture. Although there was an increase of about 250 percent in Government support of education from 1945-46 to 1950-51, each expenditure represented about 10 percent of the overall budget. The same situation appears to apply to the AY 1932 through 1941 when the Shah was promoting education. Expenditures for education did not appear to increase as a percentage of the budget. The large monetary increase, which reflects a total budgetary increase, allowed for the establishment of schools at a higher rate and a concomitant increase in enrollment.

(2) From 1931-32 until the end of World War II, there was a rather slow regular increase in the number of schools and student enrollment at the elementary level and an increase at an accelerated pace from the end of World War II until 1950-51. The statistics presented in Table V include maktabas and private schools as well as State-supported public schools. The actual statistics must be considered to be somewhat unreliable and should be used to indicate broad trends rather than precise increases.\*

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\*For example, one study indicates that there were 1,516 public schools in 1940, and another study shows 2,900 in the academic year 1950-51. This would indicate, from the data in Table V, that maktabas and private schools expanded at a much more rapid pace than public schools from 1945-45 to 1950-51, yet budgetary increases would seem to permit the rate of expansion of public schools higher than that implied by the two studies. There is no way to reconcile these apparant contradictions with the available data.

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TABLE V. ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS, ENROLLMENT, AND GRADUATES  
FOR SELECTED YEARS

<u>Year</u>	<u>Schools</u>	<u>Enrollment</u>	<u>Graduates</u>
1930-31	1,048	126,052	5,633
1940-41	2,336	287,245	20,036
1945-46	2,531	287,905	15,609
1950-51	8,671	756,683	

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Source: American University, Center for Research in Social Systems, Socio-Economic Statistics on Iran: 1930-1951, p 17.

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(3) The number and percentage of graduates are very low. This is not uncommon among nations that are primarily agricultural and have recently developed an educational system. In Iran, the percent graduating from the 6-year elementary course ranged from about 4 percent to 7 percent, whereas ideally one might expect something closer than 17 percent or one-sixth of the enrollment. Here again, the trend, not the actual figures, is significant, and the percentage of graduates has increased from 1930-31 to 1945-46.

(4) Although elementary education was made compulsory during the reign of Reza Shah, it is estimated that by the end of his reign in 1941, not more than 15 percent of the school-age children were enrolled in elementary schools, and these were primarily urban children. There are no comparable data for 1951, but official Iranian statistics show that by



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1962, about 42 percent of the school-age population was enrolled in elementary schools, and that enrollment had doubled since 1953.<sup>43</sup> Estimating by extrapolation, it would appear that not more than 28 percent of the school-age population was enrolled in the 1950-51 academic year.

(5) Major expansion of secondary schools appears to have occurred between 1921 and 1930, and again after 1951. As Table VI indicates, there was a rather slow steady growth in the number of secondary schools from 1930-31 through 1940-41. However, the war years saw a decrease in secondary schools, for which there was no explanation. This trend was reversed in 1948. Enrollment continued to increase, except for the academic years 1942 through 1944, which resulted in overcrowded classrooms. Some private schools are included in the statistics presented in Table IV. Although no figures are available, it appears that the large majority of secondary schools were State-supported public schools.<sup>44</sup>

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TABLE VI. NUMBER OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS, ENROLLMENT, AND GRADUATES  
FOR SELECTED YEARS

<u>Year</u>	<u>Schools</u>	<u>Enrollment</u>	<u>Graduates</u>
1930-31	150	11,452	949
1940-41	351	28,196	2,708
1945-46	288	29,047	3,877
1950-51	308	49,553	

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Source: American University, Center for Research in Social Systems, Socio-Economic Statistics on Iran: 1930-1956, p 19.

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(6) Secondary schooling is not compulsory in Iran, and a very small percentage of youth aged 13-18 have been enrolled. The census of 1956 showed that only 10 percent of this age group was enrolled in secondary schools, and it is most probably that a smaller percentage was enrolled in the academic year 1951 and in prior years. The census also showed that urban youth were the primary beneficiaries of secondary education, with 32 percent of the urban population aged 13-18 attending but only 1 percent of the youth in the villages attending.<sup>45</sup>

(7) The schools included in the higher education category include technical and some semiprofessional schools as well as the University of Tehran and the University of Tabriz. The so-called teachers' colleges, established between 1934 and 1939, which offered a 2-year education course, were included in the secondary schools.

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TABLE VII. NUMBER OF SCHOOLS OF HIGHER EDUCATION, ENROLLMENT, AND NUMBER OF GRADUATES FOR SELECTED YEARS

<u>Year</u>	<u>Schools</u>	<u>Enrollment</u>	<u>Graduates</u>
1930-31	3	830	68
1940-41	12	3,395	610
1945-46	13	4,218	unavail
1950-51	unavail	5,502	unavail

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Source: American University, Center for Research in Social Systems, Socio-Economic Statistics on Iran: 1930-1956, p 21.

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(8) As is indicated in Table VII, both enrollment and number of graduates from institutions of higher education were rather small. Even if an estimate of 100-200 students a year returning from education abroad are added to the number of graduates, it is still a rather small number to fill the high level Government, business, and professional positions required by a rapidly developing nation. However, students returning from study abroad and Iranian graduates had trouble getting placed in Government and business positions at the levels they felt entitled to by virtue of their educational achievement. Jobs were limited by the refusal of the bureaucracy to make way for these graduates with their modern ideas; levels of entrance and prospects for promotion in Government were not attractive to the graduates; and after 1941, trade restrictions limited business expansion and job opportunities,<sup>46</sup> although there was a growth of businesses catering to the needs of the allied forces.

(9) The Tudeh Party and Mossadeq's Iran Party became the principal sources of leadership for the discontented. After 1941, both parties attracted a number of Iranian students and graduates who were in hopes of promoting modernization and nationalism through the influence which the parties could exert. (See Chapter 2, Section III.)

(10) Although adult education classes existed prior to 1936, as is shown in Table VIII, the major advance was made in 1936 when the Ministry of Education implemented a general plan with the establishment of 1,500 additional evening classes. The major reduction in classes and enrollment shown after 1940 is not explained by the sources, although

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some of the decrease was undoubtedly due to the exigencies of the war years. The official figures may very well be optimistic for all years after 1936-37. The figures for 1948 are from official sources, yet a survey made by Overseas Consultants, Inc., showed that some of the schools listed as operating were actually closed and that among the schools in operation there was anywhere from 10 to 90 percent absenteeism. Further, many students enrolled, came to a few classes, then left, despite a 1947 decree that all factories would provide literacy classes for illiterate employees.<sup>47</sup>

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TABLE VIII. NUMBER OF CLASSES, STUDENTS, AND GRADUATES  
ADULT EDUCATION FOR SELECTED YEARS

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<u>Year</u>	<u>Classes</u>	<u>Enrollment</u>	<u>Graduates</u>
1930-31	27	488	unavail
1936-37	1,597	93,371	9,356
1939-40	2,133	157,197	unavail
1948	1,034	26,279	unavail

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Source: American University, Center for Research in Social Systems, Socio-Economic Statistics on Iran: 1930-1956, p 24.

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(11) Since a very small proportion of the population had any schooling, it might be expected that illiteracy was high. Accurate figures on illiteracy are difficult to find. One estimate, written in

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1957, is that between 80 percent and 95 percent of the population was illiterate.<sup>48</sup> Another states that 75 percent of the population over 10 years of age was illiterate in 1962.<sup>49</sup> The best estimate that can be made for 1951 and prior years is that probably no more than 20 percent of the population over 10 years of age was literate, that literacy was higher among males than females, and that the urban population was much more literate than the rural population.

### e. Evaluation and conclusions.

(1) Generally, all of the writers consider the educational system in Iran to have been inadequate for the Iranian people. This appears to have been the case not only for the period under consideration here but also for the period after 1951. Except for the universities, it is pointed out that Iranian teachers were generally ill-trained; classrooms were overcrowded; and the educational philosophy promoted rote learning, obedience, and deference to authority rather than innovation. The point is also made that the curricula were academically oriented rather than vocationally oriented, so that few students learned the skills required in an industrial society. Added to this was the cultural values which degrades working with one's hands, so that the few graduates of technical and agricultural schools wanted administrative positions rather than technical or agricultural work.

(2) One analysis of the system indicates that since it prepared the student for the society in which he would live, it was to be considered successful in that respect. It was a failure only if judged by a

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broader goal of the educational system to provide the student with the knowledge and motivation to change the system rather than adapt to it. Such a judgment was made by the writer in a very, perhaps overly, harsh characterization of the system:

For the system incubates the "educated man" who primarily, although not exclusively, is a political animal, who is a good memorizer, who speaks well but not concretely, who is quick to copy and serve those in authority . . . who hates to make decisions . . . who is not objective, who cannot operate in a critical environment, who does not necessarily understand what he accepts . . . and finally, who is basically insecure and maladjusted to any of his occupational demands and consequently, unproductive . . . "50

(3) It is perhaps too early to conclude anything about the major impact of the increased emphasis given to education during the period 1930-51. In many aspects, the fruit would not be harvested until after 1951. However, education of even the comparatively small number of Iranians, especially at the secondary and university levels, provided some points of tension during the period under consideration.

(4) The new ideas and values brought home by those educated abroad, and those who accepted the new ideas expressed by European university professors teaching in Iran, ran into conflict with their traditional parents. It was these graduates who strongly supported modernization and nationalism in Iran and who attracted other students to their views. They also provided support for Mossadeq through the Tudeh and Iran Parties.

(5) The better educated teachers in the elementary and secondary schools ran into some conflict with the traditional parents of their middle and lower status students with modern ideas of sanitation, hygiene, and

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the education of women. The education of women, in itself, undoubtedly provided points of tension and maladjustment within the family and its social milieu because of its new-found interest in "male" subjects for discussion and because women could now qualify for jobs or better jobs that had been the exclusive province of the male Iranian.

## 35. Religion and religious groups.

### a. Islam and the Shi'a sect.

(1) More than 90 percent of the population of Iran adhered to the religion of Islam, and of these, over 90 percent were members of the Shi'a sect. Islam is a monotheistic religion which considered God (Allah) to be the eternal, all powerful, absolute monarch, and the source of all reward and punishment. Man is expected to submit to the will of God. Man has an individual relationship to God and requires no priestly intermediary. There is, therefore, no hierarchy of clergy, nor is an institutional church necessary as a place of worship. There are mosques in which people congregate to hear the Koran read, to pray in unison, and to hear sermons by the clergy. A separate group of clergy developed to meet a need of interpretation of the Koran. A religious group of clergy usually associated with the mosque. No idols, images, or symbols of the deity are permitted either in the mosque or in the home, and there are no altars to Allah.<sup>51</sup>

(2) The Koran contains all that man needs to attain salvation if he follows the dictates of that revelation. The Koran is a compilation of the words of Allah as revealed to the prophet Muhammad. It contains

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stories of prophets and Apostles of God from Adam to Jesus; it contains laws relating to all aspects of personal and family life as well as to the conduct of tribal and national affairs; and it has rather complete descriptions of heaven and hell. The Koran, together with the Hadith, a book of the noninspired words and deeds of Muhammad and his companions, provides the basis for a comprehensive code of conduct.<sup>52</sup>

(3) Islam recognized some 2,000 prophets; the most important, however, are Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad. The religion also reveres the first five books of the Old Testament, the Psalms, and the teachings of the four Christian Gospels; but, the Muslims believe that the Gospels were corrupted in translation and the Old Testament falsified.<sup>53</sup> Theoretically, however, since Christians and Jews are "people of the book," their religions were to be tolerated.

(4) There are five basic religious duties which all Muslims are expected to perform. These are to bear witness to the fact that there is only one God, Alah; to keep the fast of Ramadan; to pray; to make a pilgrimage to Mecca if one is healthy enough and can afford to; and, to give alms to the poor. Deeds are divided into five categories from obligatory to forbidden, and sins which are forbidden are categorized as great and little. A Muslim attains salvation and is rewarded in heaven by performing the five duties and basing his actions on those deeds which are obligatory and avoiding sins and other actions which are disapproved or forbidden.<sup>54</sup>

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(5) The basic Muslim concept of man's relations to God is that since God is infinite and unknowable, man submits to God's will (the word Islam means submission in Arabic). This concept is carried out in the physical attitude of the Muslim during the five daily periods of prayer when he kneels and touches his head to the ground. There is a definite implication of predestination in this concept, since it is believed that God give every creature an individual nature; thus a particular man does not try to attain a position beyond the nature given him by Allah.<sup>55</sup>

(6) The Shi'a sect of Islam split from the main body of Islam, the Sunni, because of a difference of belief about the legitimate succession to Muhammad. The Shi'a believe that Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, Ali, and 11 of Ali's decedents, called imams, were the legitimate and divinely-guided leaders of Islam, whereas the Sunni elected successors. Eleven imams, including Ali, have died; some of them died as martyrs. The 12th imam, it is believed, disappeared as a child. He is called the "hidden imam" and will return as the messiah, the Mahdi. The Shahs are believed to rule by the favor and with the assistance of the hidden imam.<sup>56</sup> The Shi'a also believe that the imams can intercede between man and Allah, and, in fact, that wishes will be granted if asked for at the tomb of an imam.<sup>57</sup> For the Persians, identification with Shi'a was reinforced by the belief that Ali's son, Hussein, married the daughter of one of the progenitors of the Safawid Dynasty. The Shi'a sect of Islam became the official religion of Iran under that Dynasty in the 16th century.<sup>58</sup>

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(7) Besides celebrating the fast of Ramadan, in common with the Sunni, Shi'a Muslims also observe Morharram. Ramadan is the 9th month of the lunar calendar and is set aside as a month of meditation and fasting. During this month, Muslims do not eat or drink during the daylight hours. Morharram, celebrated by Shi'ites, is the first month of the lunar calendar and honors the martyred grandsons of Ali, Hussein, and Hassan, who were the second and third imams. The celebration extends for the first 10 days of the month. During the first 9 days, passion plays are performed and conclude in a general procession of men and boys flagellating themselves on the back with steel lashes. On the 10th day, the members of the procession beat their heads with swords. These processions, especially the latter, can be very bloody. The Government prohibited the final procession in 1928, and all processions were prohibited in 1935; but they had started up again after the abdication of Reza Shah, and most likely never were completely stopped in the rural areas.<sup>59</sup>

(8) The rivalry between the Sunni and the Shi'a was bitter and, evidently, violent for some time following the split. For purposes of self-preservation, the Shi'a instituted the concept of "taqi'a," a false denial of faith. The extension of taqi'a into secular life, Groseclose maintains, sanctioned many forms of deceit in the daily life of Iranians and has become a part of the culture.<sup>60</sup> The tradition of "bast," asylum for political criminals in the religious shrines, was also sanctioned, and such asylum was extended to include areas near the Shan and foreign legations.<sup>61</sup>



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(9) A specialized clergy developed out of the need for men with considerable knowledge of the Koran and Hadith to arbitrate in religious controversies and to interpret the law, as well as in response to a developing organization. Religious authority became the province of the mujtahids, and they were the sole arbiters of law prior to the inception of the constitutional Government in 1906. A layman could choose to follow any mujtahid in matters pertaining to religion and law. A mujtahid must have completed a course of religious instruction and have obtain authorization from an established mujtahid; however, of almost equal importance was recognition by the laity as well as religious scholars.<sup>62</sup> The "mullahs" were clergy of a lower status who neither completed the required educational program nor obtained the necessary recognition. The mullahs were usually the teachers in the maktab and monopolized elementary education in Iran until the State-supported elementary education program started.

(10) Without going into cause and effect relations, it is evident that the religion of Islam and the Shi'a sect supported the general culture pattern. The institution of the Shah became very strong and a unifying influence for Shi'ites because the hidden imam was guiding him. Thus, it was easier to criticize and depose prime ministers or other subordinates than the Shah, although Shahs were deposed and dynasties changed. The concept of complete submission to God, the highest authority, supported submission and deference to secular authority and rank, and tended to inhibit, but not stop, attempts to advance one's position

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in life. On the other hand, the sanctioning of taqi'a and bast provided the vehicle through which one could try, by devious means, bribery and opportunism to get as much as possible out of one's position and attempt to climb the economic ladder. The Islamic code also supported the domination of the male over the female, as pointed out in the section on the family.

### b. Religious minorities.

(1) There are three officially recognized religious minorities in Iran: Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Judaism. These groups, relatively small in number,<sup>\*</sup> are allowed to maintain organizations and religious schools, to publish periodicals, and to be--as they have been--represented in the Majlis. Two other religious minorities are not officially recognized; the Sunni and Baha'i. The largest group of Sunni were the Kurds, numbering something less than one million, who inhabited the Zagros mountains in West Azerbaijan; next were some 200,000 Arabs living along the Persian Gulfs, and about 100,000 Baluchi tribesmen who occupied territory along the eastern border of Iran from the Gulf of Oman to Afghanistan.<sup>63</sup>

(2) In general, Zoroastrians, Christians, and Jews have lived in peace in Iran. However, there has been some conflict between the Shi'ite Muslims and the Sunnites based on the long-standing religious

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<sup>\*</sup>In 1951, there were 80,000 Christians, 75,000 Jews, and far fewer Zoroastrians.

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differences. There has been a great deal of conflict between the Shi'aites and the Baha'ites. Baha'i grew out of and is considered heretical to the Shi'a sect.<sup>64</sup> The founder of the Baha'i religion, who called himself Bab, claimed to be an intermediary of the hidden imam and further claimed that the coming of the messiah was imminent. Bab was arrested and executed. His successor continued to propagate the religion independent of the Shi'a sect. Shi'a religious leaders continued bitterly to oppose and suppress Baha'i as a dangerous heresy. In 1955, Baha'i houses of worship were closed and some members of the religion were killed and others dispersed.<sup>65</sup>

c. Elements of change and their effects.

(1) Changes that started with the inception of constitutional Government in 1906 and continued during and after the reign of Reza Shah markedly reduced the power of the Shi'a clergy by 1951. A civil code of law was established under the Constitution which was fully developed under the Reza Shah. Now only did the judicial reform reduce the power and prestige of all levels of clergy, but it also dried up a large source of clerical revenue which came from the registration of legal documents and transfers of ownership of property. Banani states that the loss of revenue forced some clergy to give up their careers and get secular jobs.<sup>66</sup>

(2) The development of a secular school system which was accelerated by Reza Shah further reduced the power, prestige, and revenues of the clergy, primarily the mullahs in this case. Encouragement and support for education of students in Western countries also had some

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effect on reducing the prestige of the Shi'a clergy. Many returnees were indifferent and even hostile toward their traditional religion and put their faith in science.<sup>67</sup>

(3) This is not to say that the clergy as of 1951 was completely without power or influence. The well-educated mujtahids still had the respect of and wielded influence among the upper class, and since very few state-supported schools had been established in the villages, the mullahs still had considerable influence in the rural areas. Their influence extended not only from their function as teachers, but also in the function of key communicators; i.e., spreading news to the villagers.

(4) As explained in the section on education, schools set up by Christian missionaries had some effect on the development of a system of elementary education. On the other hand, the nationalistic policies of Reza Shah required that the secular schools run by the minority religions be closed down.

(5) Progress toward modernization and nationalism led to changes and dislocations which produced tension between the Shi'a clergy and the secular administration as well as between the minority religious groups and the Iranian Government. Some of the tension between the Government and the officially recognized minority religions may have been mediated by permitting them representation in the Majlis as well as permitting continuation of their religious schools and publications.

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### 36. Ethnic Groups.

#### a. Introduction.

(1) This section will indicate the Salient differences among the various ethnic groups in Iran with regard to language, religion, and whether they tended to be nomadic or sedentary.

(2) The nomadic tribes may travel long distances, up to 200 miles in some cases, to drive their flocks from summer to winter pasturage. In most instances the journey takes them through difficult mountainous terrain. Many of the tribes planted crops in the area of each pasturage and leave some members of the tribe behind to harvest the crop, pack it, and catch up with the tribe or meet it at the next pasturage.<sup>68</sup> The tribes are ruled by the strict authority of the tribal leader, the Khan. Tribal leaders usually accede to their positions by right of inheritance. There are also subtribal leaders, called "kalantars" or "katkhodas," who are theoretically under the authority of the Khan. In general, family life follows the same pattern as in Persian villages. Polygyny is comparatively rare and the women were not veiled. Social life tends to revolve around the guest tent of the tribal or subtribal chief.<sup>69</sup>

(3) Many of the tribes supplemented their income from farming and from selling cattle and sheep by raiding villages and general brigandage. The degree of such lawlessness had a relationship to the character of the Shah. Lawlessness increased under a weak Shah and decreased under a strong Shah.<sup>70</sup>

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(4) During the period of concern for this portion of the study, many of the tribal leaders were wealthy, owned land, had been through college either in Tehran or abroad, and owned a house in Tehran or some other large city. Further, the major tribes, as well as other ethnic groups, took part in the Government through their own representatives to the Majlis.

### b. Major ethnic groups.

(1) The major ethnic groups were divided into two major language groups, Indo-Iranian and Turkic.

Historically, the differences in dialect within each language group were sufficient that, for example, Gilani would not be understood by the Persians. The ethnic groups had lived more or less together for some centuries so that there was some acculturation toward the Persian. Most Gilani and Mazanderani spoke Persian as well as their own dialects.<sup>71</sup> Such acculturation had occurred to a greater or lesser degree among other ethnic groups, especially among those who normally settled in villages or those from nomadic tribes who became sedentary village dwellers.

(2) The minority groups tended to inhabit the areas surrounding the Iranian plateau. The Kurds were concentrated in the Zagros mountains and plains in the southwest of Azerbaijan; the Bakhtiari and the Lurs were found in the mountains southwest of the Kurds. The Azerbaijani groups settled in the plains of Azerbaijan, and the Gilani and Mazdeonderani settled along the Caspian coast. The Turkoman were found mostly in the northeast of Iran close to the Soviet border. The Baluchi inhabited the

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highlands in the southeast corner of Iran and ranged along the southeast near the west Pakistan and Afghanistan borders. The Arabs carried on their herding and fishing along the flatlands bordering the Persian Gulf.<sup>72</sup>

(3) Tribal groups like the Kurds, Baluchi, Turkoman, and Arabs tended to have stronger identification with their cultural neighbors across the border of Iran than those groups that inhabited areas away from the borders. In the case of the Arabs, the identification was ethnic and religious. The same was true for the Azerbaijani who felt close to their cultural neighbors in the Russian Caucasus. The tribal leaders, on the whole, acknowledged the suzerainty of the Shah but did not necessarily give any one Shah their full loyalty. Cottam states that the tribes tended to resist any strong power that would restrict their activities or intrude on their way of life; thus they were ready to close ranks with other tribes and the Persians against foreign domination.<sup>73</sup>

### c. Elements of change and their effect.

(1) The major element of change which had impact on the ethnic groups in Iran derived from the concepts of modernization or westernization and nationalism marked by the establishment of a Constitution and Majlis in 1906 and vigorously carried on by Reza Shah.

(2) For the most part, members of ethnic and tribal groups who lived a sedentary village life were disturbed by these changes no more than the Persian villages. Through 1951, most of the impact of change in Iran was directed toward and felt by the larger urban areas.

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(3) One of the most pressing problems after the coup of 1921 was to restore order and Government control over the provinces. Reza Khan as commander-in-chief, and later as Shah, undertook through the Iranian Army to implement a program of control, disarmament, resettlement, and conscription of tribesmen. Government troops were successful against the Gilani, Turkomen, Lurs, Qashiqai, and Arabs.<sup>74</sup>

(4) The Government felt that control over the dissident tribes could be more firmly established if the nomadic people were resettled in villages. However, pastoral nomadism was practiced, in large part, because of the relative infertility of the land in the traditional lands of the several tribes. Therefore, it might be assumed that cultural resistance to a change from nomadism to sedentary life could be overcome in the face of larger economic rewards, especially since some members of various tribes had elected a sedentary life prior to 1921 and others settled in villages afterward. However, the Government resettled the tribesmen on unhealthy, unsuitable land which decimated their numbers through ignorance of sanitation and consequent sickness. Further, the tribesmen were oppressed by the military and subjected to onerous tax collections.<sup>75</sup>

(5) The tribesmen reacted by uprisings and revolts against the central Government. In 1930, Kurdish peasants in Khorasan rose against the Government; in 1937 and 1939, revolts occurred among the Kurds in Azerbaijan; and in 1936, the Qashiqai were in revolt. The Army was used successfully to quell these uprisings. The Shah also imprisoned chiefs

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of the Lurs, Qashiqai, Bakshtiari and Mamasonis and had others executed in order to break the power of the tribes.<sup>76</sup>

(6) These Government actions could do no less than provoke continued hostility toward Reza Shah and his government, although the tribes may not have been in a strong enough position to manifest their hostility in revolts or uprisings. On the other hand, the Shah tried to consolidate control over the tribes by encouraging leadership which identified with Iran. Land of imprisoned or executed tribal chiefs was given to more friendly leaders. The tribes were given their own representation in the Majlis, and, since many of the tribal chiefs lived in their urban homes during at least part of the year, they tended to become more a part of the body politic.

### 37. Communication and information.

#### a. Mass media.

(1) From 1908 to 1921, freedom of the press was restricted or relaxed, depending on who controlled the country; however, the number of publications grew during this period so that at the time of the 1921 coup, almost 165 newspapers were in circulation, compared with 84 in 1907. Reza Khan eliminated opposition and critical comment to the point that by the end of his regime as Shah, in 1941, less than 50 newspapers were published in Iran. Restrictions were relaxed after the abdication of Reza Shah and the number of newspapers grew to 125 in a rather short time.<sup>77</sup>

(2) The newspapers were generally rather small, about four to eight pages, and had a limited circulation. In the 1950s, the 11 largest

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and perhaps most influential dailies and weeklies had a combined circulation of about 76,000. Of these 11 papers, seven were published in Tehran, one in Shiraz, and three by the Tudeh party.<sup>78</sup>

(3) From the 1930s through 1951, the Ministry of Education passed on the application of all individuals and groups who wanted a license to publish a newspaper. The licenses could be revoked at any time; therefore, newspapers tended to interpret the news in favor of their particular interest group but without obvious criticism of the Government. The Iranians seemed to expect that communications would favor one or another interest group. Literate Iranians know which papers supported their opinions and usually read and discussed a number of different papers in order to cull information from propaganda.<sup>79</sup>

(4) The first radio station in Iran was inaugurated in 1937. As of 1953, there were 13 radio stations operating in Iran and 11 more under construction. Of the 13 operating stations, 10 were in Tehran, two in Tabriz, and one in Shiraz. Those under construction were to operate in the provinces. The Government of Iran operated all radio stations including those used by the military, and the shortwave communications used by Government and private agencies.<sup>80</sup>

(5) Radio broadcasts, which were conducted for a few hours each morning and evening, included news, religion, information on health and education, and music. The news was all Government-controlled and reflected the interests and policies of the administration. The effectiveness of such a system must be interpreted from the viewpoint of



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coverage. Radio receivers were found in the homes of the elite and in teahouses in the cities and larger towns and villages. There were, up to 1951, many villages in which there was no electricity, and battery-operated receivers were much too expensive for the teahouse in the smaller villages. It appears that the police and Gendarmerie were the main channels of communication between the Government and the village.<sup>81</sup> For example, it has been estimated that there were between 1.5 million and 1.75 million radio receivers in Iran as of 1960, and that about one-third of the population listened to radios either at home, at the home of a friend, or in a teahouse.<sup>82</sup> These figures would be much smaller for the period 1930-51.

(6) The most influential foreign broadcasts were from the Soviet Union and the Voice of America. Soviet broadcasts were aimed at the general population in Azerbaijan, concentrating on propaganda and teaching languages. The Voice of America was aimed at the educated Iranian and emphasized democratic ideals and anti-Communists concepts.<sup>83</sup>

(7) Motion pictures tended to be entertainment, escape, and a way of supporting or disseminating Western culture in Iran to some extent. As of the mid-1950s, there was at least one motion picture theater in each of the larger cities, and there were 15 in Tehran, five in Tabriz, three in Shiraz, and two in Meshed. Since World War II, US movies had been the most popular for their novelty and portrayal of forbidden subjects. English movies were most popular before World War II and were still appreciated for their solemnity. Indian and Egyptian

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productions were not liked too well, because they depicted situations considered commonplace to Iranians and were, therefore, not looked upon as entertainment.<sup>84</sup>

### b. Word of mouth communication.

(1) Word of mouth communication, or the grapevine, was the most usual method of communication in Iran during the preconflict period. This was true not only because such a high percentage of Iranians was illiterate, but also because it was part of their culture to discuss the day's events in groups and to be guided by the leaders of the groups, as well as the personalism or personal contact embodied in the culture.

(2) The day's news was discussed in teahouses, baths, houses of strength, and in the bazaars. Dervishes, traveling religious brothers who gained their keep by giving performances, were given newspapers and a propaganda message as well as some remuneration by the interest groups that supported the papers, and then read this particular version of the news to illiterates in various gathering places in the villages.<sup>85</sup>

(3) The interwoven system of cliques, the dowrah system, was a major source of dissemination of news and opinion but did not reach down to the lowest socio-economic groups in the cities and villages. And, as has been stated, the Government communicated with most villages through the police and Gendarmerie.

c. Evaluation of media. Because of the large percentage of illiterate Iranians, written communication exerted its influence among the comparatively small, mostly urban, group of educated people. Thus, it

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would appear that radio, motion pictures, and word-of-mouth communication were the most efficient means of disseminating information, but only a limited group had radios. The informal discussion groups appeared to have been the most efficient means of getting information to all parts and levels of the Iranian populace. However, for the message to have its greatest effect, the information had to be transmitted or argued for by an opinion leader in the particular subject matter. For example, a mullah's opinion would be respected concerning religious and philosophical items which cover a very wide range, but medical information should have been passed on by a midwife, and opinions about modern culture by a secular schoolmaster.<sup>86</sup>

### 38. The Village.

a. Salient characteristics. During the time period of concern in this portion of the study, 1921-51, there were probably about 45,000 villages in Iran varying in population from several households to something under 5,000 people--the majority having 500 or less. The village was normally a concentrated cluster of houses surrounded by the farming area, rather than a dispersed settlement with houses situated on the land farmed by each household.

(1) The typical peasant lived in a one- or two-room house made of mud brick, except in a few areas where wood was readily available. A mud brick wall extended from the house enclosing an open courtyard. A single doorway in the wall provided access to a lane. There was usually a pool of water in the courtyard; and it was here that the

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domestic animals and chickens were kept, where bread was baked, and where the privy was located. Drinking water was obtained from common wells, a spring, or a stream. Few villages had electricity.<sup>87</sup>

(2) If the village had gardens, they were usually located on the edge of the village. The farmlands surrounded the village beyond the gardens, and pasture land was usually found beyond the cultivated area. "The shape and lay-out of the village and its lands, however, is naturally modified by the configuration of the land and the availability of water."<sup>88</sup> Within the village, unless it was very small, there was a public bath, used for ritual cleansing of brides and for the dead and as a place for informal gossip and discussion by equals.<sup>89</sup> Larger villages had shops, a teahouse, and, during this period, a maktab; i.e., a religious primary school.<sup>90</sup>

(3) Most villages were not accessible by automobile or bus; therefore, contact with other villages or towns came about through infrequent marketing or shopping trips and when the men sought employment in the towns during the winter months. The generally monotonous life of the village was broken by the infrequent trips, weddings, and religious festivals and by the usually unwelcome visits of the gendarme and the tax collector.<sup>91</sup>

(4) The bulk of the village population was peasants. In each village, there was katkhoda, or village headman. In the larger villages there would be shopkeepers, craftsmen, clergy (including a teacher), and perhaps a landlord or more likely his agent. All of these roles were

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not necessarily found in all villages.<sup>92</sup> The headman was often the landlord's agent, since a landlord frequently owned the entire village.

(5) During the period under study, there were no formal voluntary associations in the rural areas. The peasants carried on informal equalitarian associations with one another in the public bath, the teahouse, in the lanes or village square during the winter, and in the shops or bazaar area of larger villages and towns. The shopkeepers and village headman were usually members of informal cliques based on common background and mutual interest known as dowrah.<sup>93</sup> It was in these groupings and associations that each group could escape the pressures of deference required by the highly stratified authoritarian social system; act toward each other as equals; and gain and exchange social, economic, and political information.

### b. Landlord-tenant relations.

(1) The most important and pervasive institutionalized relationship existing among members of a village was perhaps the landlord-tenant relationship. There were few personal contacts between landlords and peasants, because most of the large landowners lived in one of the larger cities or in the provincial capitols and would rarely or never visit their property, entrusting the administration of their holdings to agents. Even where the landlord resided in his village, he usually conducted business with his tenants through an intermediary. The intermediary was an agent who was paid a percentage of the crop or one who had leased the land for a fixed fee.<sup>94</sup> In either case, it was in the



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interest of the agent to see that the peasants worked hard and produced a large crop.

(2) The agent was frequently a hard and exploitive taskmaster for several reasons.

On the one hand, the bailiff (agent) is tempted to feather his own nest . . . . Further, where the landlord is an absentee the peasant has little chance of obtaining redress against the extortion of a bailiff . . . . clearly, moreover, since . . . his main concern is to raise the income of his master . . . , he is reluctant to make concessions which the owner of the land himself might make."<sup>95</sup>

This relationship held even when the landlord's prime agent was the kakhoda who was resident in the village and was recognized by the Government as the village chief.

(3) Impersonal relations such as these tended to widen the gulf between the landlord and the peasant and reinforced and exacerbated mutual suspicion between them. Lambton points out that where landowners spent time on their property, there were usually better relations between landlord and peasant and greater prosperity.<sup>96</sup> The longstanding mutual suspicion between most landlords and tenants was, in part, a function of the insecurity felt by both groups.

(4) Traditionally, land had been valued primarily as a source of political power and social prestige as well as for economic gain, and this value on land ownership persisted through 1951, albeit to a somewhat lesser extent.<sup>97</sup> Thus the possibility of loss of landholdings or reduction of the size of the landholding with the consequent loss or reduction of social prestige and political power was undoubtedly a

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source of anxiety among landowners. In Iran, there has been a constant turnover in the membership of the landowning group.

(5) Anxiety and insecurity were generated in the peasant, at least in part, by the arbitrary power the landlord had over the peasant. The landlord, usually through his agent, had the power and authority to decide what crops were to be planted, what parts of his holdings should be farmed, and by whom. He could redistribute farming areas among his peasants; he could require a peasant to travel to another village to farm his property, there to fulfill the peasant's obligation to work the landlord's land a certain number of days each year; and he could deny housing and farming privileges to a peasant, effectively expelling him and his family from the village. All this was possible since there were usually no written or enforceable contracts, and, although custom tended to mediate the arbitrariness of such actions, in practice the police and the law usually sided with the landlord.<sup>98</sup>

(6) Most landlords felt that the peasants would cheat them if the landlords were not severe with them and that any upgrading of the living conditions of the peasants would be taken as a sign of weakness, thus an open invitation of renege on dues and taxes.<sup>99</sup> The peasant, then, had little if any opportunity to improve his position while he remained on the land. The peasant was also expected to give his landlord the deference due a superior.

The peasant must always approach the landlord as an inferior to a superior, hat in hand, speaking softly, and perhaps kissing the hand of his

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superior. He must accept the landlord's arbitrary decision, even if it refers to his personal life, and must also accept his punishments, which often include personal violence."<sup>100</sup>

He was expected to present gifts to the landlord on special occasions, over and above the rent or share of the crop due the landlord.

c. Elements of change and their effect.

(1) During the reign of Reza Shah, several laws and enactments were felt directly and indirectly by the peasants. However, landlord-tenant relationships appear to have changed very little, if at all, during the period under study. The Majlis passed a law in 1930 which made the katkhoda an agent for the Government in the village or villages that he served, but none of the sources used for this section suggest that the katkhoda's new role made any difference in the power and authority of the landlord or his agent over the life and livelihood of the peasant and his family. A law of 1937 stipulated the duties and obligations of the landlord, but this law was never enforced. The Ministry of Labor issued a decree in 1946 that all sharecroppers should receive a 15 percent increase in their share of the harvest, but this decree was never enforced.<sup>101</sup>

(2) On 6 June 1925, a compulsory military conscription law was passed by the Majlis. Under this law, all male citizens were to be drafted at age 21 for 25 years of military service of which 2 years were to be served on active duty and the remainder in various levels of the reserve.<sup>102</sup> The immediate impact of the draft on the peasants was to

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reduce the labor force, and, because in practice none of the recruit's pay got to his family, some families became dependent upon the charity of the village.<sup>103</sup> However, during the 2 years of active duty, "literacy classes were conducted and attempts were made to provide rudimentary instruction in trades." The increase in literacy rates had little, if any, effect on village life, since the influence of urban life was so strong that many of the draftees remained in the towns and cities after completing their active duty tour.<sup>104</sup> Although there was an expansion of educational facilities and enrollment during this period, rural education was almost entirely neglected.<sup>105</sup>

(3) The tax imposed on tea and sugar in 1925 increased the peasant's cost of living, as did the change from use of gold and silver coinage to paper money in 1932 and the laws prescribing European dress. Here again, the effect on the villagers appeared to be minimal. The peasants did not revolt, nor did it appear that they were influenced by Communist appeals. Upton believes that the following conditions militated against major change: the Shah was generally admired by the peasants, because he virtually stopped pillaging and looting by brigands and tribesmen and because of the roads, railroads, motor transport, electric lights, and other novelties which they either saw when they visited a town or heard about from travellers; the exactions of the laws were introduced gradually and imposed by officials, not by the Shah; and traditionally the peasants were accustomed to good years and lean years,

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so that the increased burden they carried during the reign of Reza Shah did not seem overly oppressive.<sup>106</sup> Further, it appears that the law regarding European dress and abolishing the veil was not implemented in most villages. Most of the sources describe the clothing of the villagers as being traditional, although the publication dates range from 1953 to 1963.

(4) Finally, the agricultural reform programs developed and passed during this period had very little effect on most villages. Efforts to stimulate land development and mechanization of agriculture were generally not implemented. Most of the benefits of mechanization and improvement of seeds and fruit trees were used on the royal estates.<sup>107</sup>

(5) Thus, it appears that the changes and restrictions instituted during the reign of Reza Shah left village life much as it was. Life in the villages continued to remain unchanged during the decade after the abdication of Reza Shah. Upton, commenting on conditions in Iran after 1941, states that the peasants continued to play no significant political role.<sup>108</sup> Further, two surveys of education showed that as late as 1956 only one out of seven school-age children in villages was in elementary school; and as late as 1958 there was an average of one elementary school for each 25 villages, but the source does not state whether or not these were secular schools, religious schools, or a combination of both.<sup>109</sup> The absence of comment on other changes in the village conditions probably indicates that none were evident to the authors.



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(6) It is probably fair to conclude, with Banani, that changes, modernization, and economic growth which occurred in Iran between 1921 and 1951 did not essentially affect the peasant or his life in the village. However, some of the changes, such as universal military training and the growth of factories, stimulated and accelerated movement from the rural areas to the towns and cities and probably permitted increased social mobility.<sup>110</sup>

### 39. The urban sector.

#### a. Salient characteristics.

(1) The urban settlements in Iran developed as political, trading, or religious centers; most of the larger cities were provincial capitals. As Walpole puts it, "Politics is the main occupation of the city and the other occupations revolve about it."<sup>111</sup> It was in the urban areas, especially in the larger cities, where representatives of all social and economic groups were found, including erstwhile peasants drawn to the city in hopes of bettering their lot. It was in the cities where most of the wealthy landowners resided; where the tribal khans had their homes; and where the political, religious, and industrial elite dwelt (as well as the bureaucrats, bazaari, lesser clergy, industrial workers, beggars, and the unemployed).

(2) In general, the city and town were composed of a bazaar in or near the center, one or more mosques in squares or open areas, a caravansarai (inn) providing rooms and stables, teahouses, public baths, one or more "houses of strength," Government buildings, schools, and

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private homes around the center of the city which were walled and included a garden or courtyard.<sup>112</sup> There was wide variation among urban centers, depending upon size, in the number and variety of shops and artisans found in the bazaar, and in the number of mosques, schools, Government buildings, and other centers of services. Suburban areas had grown up around the very large cities in which was found the larger homes of the well-to-do and wealthy. Industrial establishments, where they existed, were usually situated on the outskirts of the city.<sup>113</sup>

(3) The crowded, covered bazaar was the center of business and commercial activity. The bazaar was a long narrow covered street with small shops on each side with living quarters above. Larger structures at intervals housed the headquarters of wholesale merchants.<sup>114</sup> The bazaar started at the main street or square and ended in a residential section. Houses in the areas close to the bazaar, the older part of the city, were crowded together and tended to be overcrowded. Vree-land estimated "that at least 60 percent of the population in the towns are living in slum buildings or in overcrowded dwellings."<sup>115</sup>

(4) City life was more varied and interesting than village life in Iran. Although the average work week extended from 44 to 48 hours in factories up to 72 hours in textile plants, most city dwellers had some leisure and places in which to spend their leisure time. Iranians were fond of conversation and discussion. Although the women might gather together for gossip in each other's homes, the men were found conversing in the teahouses, cafes, the houses of strength, and the

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public baths. Backgammon and chess were also common in the teahouses. Other diversion was also found in the cities; one might attend a movie in the larger cities, go to the play or a concert, or watch the magicians, snakecharmers, or dervishes then they made their rounds.<sup>116</sup>

(5) The teahouses, public baths, houses of strength, the bazaar, and the Majlis in Tehran also functioned as a respite from the highly structured relationships of the family, the employer-employee relationship, and the political hierarchy. Although particular teahouses, baths, and houses of strength might cater to particular economic, occupational, or social groups, "within them, men deal with each other on equal terms, as friend to friend, bargainer to bargainer, neighbor to neighbor. In the teahouse he can argue; in the bathhouse he can gossip."<sup>117</sup>

(6) It is in the Iranian city where one found the several voluntary and quasi-voluntary associations which have developed in Iran. There were formal associations such as the Iranian Medical Association, the Iranian Bar Association, political parties, labor unions, and the craft guilds. The most pervasive informal association, traditional in Iran, was the dowrah system which reached from the highest levels of the elite to the bazaari but did not appear to be prevalent among the apprentices, industrial workers, or other members of the lower socioeconomic groups. "A dowrah is an informal group of individuals who always meet periodically usually rotating the meeting place among the membership."<sup>118</sup> The dowrah was composed of a small group of people,

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usually male except in family dowrahs, who had a common interest. Most members belonged to more than one dowrah, thus providing vertical and horizontal communication through what was "a huge network of personal cliques . . . ." <sup>119</sup> The dowrah system permitted the flow of political, business, and other information throughout most of the urban society and was used, among other things, to organize political support <sup>120</sup> and to wield influence and pull strings for business and other economic gain. <sup>121</sup>

(7) For the most part, formal associations tended to be ineffective in Iran. As examples, Bill indicates that the Iranian Medical and Bar Associations were little more than groups of strife-torn factions. The explanation of the generalization seems to be that the voluntary associations did not provide release from the tensions and insecurities the members lived with during the hours they were gainfully employed and, to some extent, within their families. As Bill expresses it, in the formal associations the members had to submit to officers, cooperate with some they would consider untrustworthy, and take public stands which could leave the members open to criticism. <sup>122</sup>

(8) The bazaar, a more informally organized association which had become institutionalized, was more than a center of business and commerce. Miller claims that the bazaar rumor is a good indication of public opinion and that the bazaari, primarily small shopkeepers, craftsmen and mullahs (clergy of comparable social status), hold orthodox

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Persian views concerning religion, social relations, and politics.<sup>123</sup>

(See also Section III, para. 48 c, below.)

b. Employer-employee relations.

(1) Relations between employer and employee in Iran were primarily a function of the authoritarian, hierarchial relationships that pervaded the general culture pattern. In general, the employer had the same amount of power over an employee in the various nonagricultural business establishments as the landlord had over his tenant farmer. This relationship was mediated to some extent between guildmaster and apprentice, since the apprentice had a sense of participation in the craft,<sup>124</sup> and looked forward to becoming a guildmaster some day more realistically than the peasant could look forward to becoming a landowner.

(2) The craft guilds were organized centuries ago and have been influential in politics through the centuries. Every craft or trade was organized into a separate guild in each of the larger cities and towns. The membership included all who worked in the craft or trade--guildmaster and apprentice. The head of the guild was determined by age and status, and at the meetings the important members planned for the guild: how to buy raw materials or goods at the most favorable prices, "whom to bribe, what laws to circumvent, what salaries to pay workers and apprentices, and what action to take regarding strikes and demonstrations." Each guild tried to have a friend in the Majlis to promote its interests, and some guilds financed the education of students, then attempted to get them important Government positions after

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graduation from the university. On the other hand, politicians sought the support of the guilds which, because of their tight organization, could turn out the vote of their membership and could be ready to produce a demonstration in as little as 20 minutes.<sup>125</sup>

(3) Trade unions, a rather recent development in Iran which was imported from the West, had some effect on employer-employee relations. The first independent craft unions were organized sometime prior to World War II; they were few in number and "functional as social clubs, because the Reza Shah opposed trade-union activity."<sup>126</sup> It was only after the abdication of the Reza Shah and the entrance of the Allied Powers into the country during World War II that the trade union movement had comparative freedom. In addition to the abdication of Reza Shah, major factors favoring the organization of trade unions during the decade 1941-51 were

"the increase in industrial employment as wartime industry developed; the need for collective action to obtain wage increases in the face of rapidly rising prices; employer's willingness to negotiate with unions to avoid shut-downs and maintain high wartime profits; the activities of Communist labor organizers and agitators in areas occupied by Soviet forces; and the fear of layoffs during the postwar rise in unemployment."<sup>127</sup>

(4) Even with the mediating effects, such as they were, of guilds and labor unions, the employer tended to set the terms of employment. The absence of written contracts enabled the employer to circumvent concessions gained by unions. The Government policy of fostering unions was reversed when it was believed that a union was gaining too

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much power, thus stunting the growth and strength of unions. The Ministry of Labor, established in 1946, had little time to prove itself by 1951, and a shortage of qualified staff as well as ambiguous phrasing of labor legislation inhibited its effectiveness.<sup>128</sup>

c. Elements of change and their effect.

(1) The changes that occurred in Iran during the period under study appear to be primarily a function of culture contact with the West along with a deliberate program of westernization. These changes centered on Tehran and extended to the other cities and larger towns but did not have appreciable effect on rural life by 1951. Channels of Western influence in Iran included those who were educated or who had traveled in the West; missionary schools; translations of foreign books and newspapers published abroad in Persian; foreign trade; offices or branches of European firms; foreign experts, troops, and missions; and the program of Reza Shah. All these influences tended to be urban-centered.

(2) Western ideas were introduced to Iran and accepted by students educated abroad who returned to Iran--as well as other students educated in the newer, urban secondary schools and the faculties of the University of Tehran, which were influenced by French concepts. Discussing the impact of Western-educated students, Arasteh states:

The returnee finds many traditional customs repugnant to his new Western tastes. He rebels against the authority of his father and all those who rank as his superiors; he forgets to

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to bow and speak in the ceremonious way that the situation demands. He has grown accustomed to a life based on order and efficiency; he abhors bargaining, for it means a waste of time and carries with it in the Western sense a loss of personal dignity."<sup>129</sup>

The graduate of Western schools was accorded great respect and gained much prestige upon his return; thus his ideas found ready acceptance among many of his Iranian-educated peers and by high school and university students. The immediate thrust of the conflict between traditional and Western ideas was felt primarily among the elite. Students from lower socioeconomic groups selected for study abroad and subsidized by the State under the program initiated by Reza Shah moved into or near elite states by virtue of their education and the employment obtained upon returning to Iran. These young intellectuals not only subscribed to the westernization of Iran but also to secularism and nationalism.

(3) The deliberate program of westernization initiated by Reza Shah also had its primary impact on urban areas during the period under study. The program included industrialization, expansion of educational facilities, expansion of medical and hospital services, development of modern banking, and freer participation of women in the economy and other parts of the society.<sup>130</sup> A byproduct of the economic expansion was the importation of a variety of inexpensive mass-produced goods.

(4) Several aspects of the economic program and the acceptance of Western ideas weakened the bazaar not only as the traditional center of commerce but also as a social institution. Wide avenues were cut

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through the crowded residential sections to help relieve crowding and to make space for new buildings, and in at least one city an avenue was cut through the bazaar. "Stores line the new avenues and tend to attract shopping activity away from the older bazaars."<sup>131</sup> The strength and influence of the guilds were being undermined by the growth of unions, stimulated in part by industrialization, and by trade in imported manufactured goods which relegated the former craftsman to the position of a retailer and did not necessitate apprentices. The seeds of the following, more contemporary, observations about the bazaar were sown and nurtured during the period under study:

New ideas proclaim the bath, restaurants and shops of the bazaar merchants as unclean and unsuitable; new beliefs call his religious behavior decadent and superstitious; new business ethnics condemn his codes as archaic and provincial; new business methods outside the bazaar jeopardize his profits and new banking procedures have broken down his system of finance; all these new ideas and practices cast doubt on the validity of traditional practices."<sup>132</sup>

Thus the bazaaris, most of whom were in the middle socioeconomic group, would have felt uncomfortable, if not threatened, economically, socially, and politically, since a reduction in the strength of the guilds would tend to reduce their political influence.

(5) The middle-income groups also were most hurt economically when the Shah decreed western dress. This decree was enforced in the urban areas but not well enforced in the villages. In the cities, the upper and middle income groups bought and wore European clothing, whereas most of the lower income groups continued to wear their traditional

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costumes. After the abdication of Reza Shah, some of the women started to wear a sari-type modification of the chadur (veil) but, in general, European dress continued to be the rule among the middle and upper income groups.

(6) In the face of these threats to social and economic status, it might be expected that widespread organized resentment would occur against the Government. Organized activity, however, would have been inhibited by knowledge that the secret police were on the alert for it, and even for verbal expressions of criticism. Upton also believes that obvious physical improvements being made in the city gave the townsman "a sense of satisfaction and pride which at least counterbalanced his resentments."<sup>133</sup>

(7) Finally, it should be pointed out that industrialization and construction stimulated a large migration from rural areas and smaller towns to the larger cities. Although many of the migrants found jobs in the new industries, the cities became very crowded; overcrowding was aggravated in the older parts of the cities; and a surplus of labor was created. "Most of the immigrants from the village are unskilled and have difficulty finding employment," thus exacerbating any unemployment or underemployment problem that already existed.<sup>134</sup>

#### 40. Overview of cultural characteristics.

a. The major themes of Persian culture appeared to be based on feelings of insecurity which permeated all levels of the society. These feelings led to the idea that secular life is a contest between

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individuals for income, power, and prestige where one's only allies are kinsmen, close friends, and, from time to time, others who share mutual interests. This fostered a strong pattern of individualism; a strong sense of social position and of authority.

b. Since the individual, especially the head of a household, had to look after his and his family's needs in an insecure environment where few could be trusted, trickery, expediency and adroitness were highly valued. Truth and falsehood were not valued in the abstract but as means to desired ends.<sup>135</sup> One who was able to circumvent onerous secular laws of practiced graft and bribery to enhance his economic position or prestige, was considered adroit and resourceful, and no stigma was attached to his activities.

c. The patterns of social status and authority were closely related. Arasteh states, "In order to survive in an uncertain and perilous environment, the Persians long ago adopted an intricate code of social relations which gives due respect to authority."<sup>136</sup> The system of status relationships and obedience to authority was learned first in the family and then in school. The child soon learned that physical punishment followed disobedience to his father, older brothers, or his teachers. There were several implications of this pattern. The elaborate rituals of deference in speech and action toward a superior protected one against offending and being the brunt of the superior's authority and power. Fear of offending a superior promoted a lack of initiative, in that the subordinate looked to his superior for

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orders and direction and would not take action without them.<sup>137</sup> The Persian also utilized adroitness of speech to avoid making commitments that he might not be able to fulfill thus precluding offending a superior or placing himself in an embarrassing position.

d. Since social distinctions were important, it was important that each person's position in the social order be known and that he carry out his role properly. Any action or word that reflected negatively upon him was taken as a personal insult that besmirched his honor and dignity. As Arasteh points out,

A Persian feels it is important to defend his honor and that of his family; when insulted he may slap or physically assault his accuser, even risk his life. However, the custom of t'arof (courtesy and deference) lessens the possibility of such occurrences, for Persians strive to avoid humiliating or criticizing others; they may agree with another's statement merely to avoid publicly embarrassing him.<sup>138</sup>

e. Within this insecure environment, the family was the base of security and provided, among other functions, for the welfare of the members of the extended family. However, the patterns of status and authority were strong in the family, and the Persian went elsewhere to relax among his equals. In the city, the male Persian might go to a teahouse, public bath, athletic club, or bazaar to discuss the affairs of the day, argue, bargain, or gossip without concern for t'arof. Women gathered in each other's homes. The smaller villages might not have any of these institutions, thus discussion took place among the farmers in the village square. Personal friendships also provided respite from the

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structured status and authority relations in the society. A few strong friendships were made and friends dealt with each other as equals; however, friendships were based on mutual self-interest, and any hint of change in interest or distrust could dissolve the strongest relationship.<sup>139</sup>

f. The institution of the Shah was probably the strongest symbol of unity for the Persians. The Shah, as head of state, derived his powers from Allah and the people. He was the head of the elite group and was strong, almost by definition, since a weak Shah would be deposed.<sup>140</sup> Strength was expected of all in authority, and physical strength was highly valued in the culture. Famous leaders of the past were reputed to have had great physical strength, and many men, primarily from the bazaar, belonged to a house of strength to carry on this tradition.<sup>141</sup>

g. The Persians had great pride in their past glories. They looked back to the time when Persia was a great civilization as a standard or ideal. As they saw it, their culture was God-given.<sup>142</sup> Poetry and literature of the past and about the past and the Koran were used as authorities regarding custom and traditional practices.

h. The concept of fate is also a part of Persian culture. This concept did not inhibit one from trying to better his condition in life, but if all attempts were to no avail, he then accepted his lot as the will of Allah.<sup>143</sup>

i. The Persian male, by Western standards, was highly sensitive and emotional. In fact, the men prided themselves on their sensitivity and considered the women to be practical, logical, and unemotional.

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Their analysis on sensitivity and subjective emotional experience encompassed a love of all art forms for the esthetic experience. However, they especially valued poetry, since this art form embodied three major social values: it provided for subjective emotional experiences, it required discipline, and it required adroitness with words.<sup>144</sup>

### 41. Conclusions.

#### a. Major elements of cohesion and disunity.

(1) There were three major interrelated influences toward cohesion in Iran during the period in question. The first of these was the institution of the Shah. Not only has a Shah been the legitimate ruler of Persians for many centuries, but the past glories of the Persian empire and culture were linked with outstanding Shahs. Further, the shi'a sect of Islam related the leadership of the Shah with the hidden imam providing the institution of the Shah with religious sanction.

(2) A common religion is a rather strong cohesive force. The Shi'a sect of Islam was adhered to by over 90 percent of the population of Iran, including most of the ethnic and tribal groups. Not only did they have a common background regarding religious doctrine, but they also had a common history of persecution by the sunni Muslims which would tend to unite diverse ethnic groups against a common enemy.

(3) The other major influence was embodied in the concept of nationalism sponsored by Reza Shah. A major element of this concept was a renaissance of the past glories of the Persian civilization and culture. Since many of the ethnic groups had been in Iran for many centuries, many

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of them tended to identify with the best of Iran's past, and most were interested in reducing or eliminating strong foreign influence as much as were the Persian majority.

(4) Many of the elements or influences toward disunity tended also to be interrelated. Certainly foreign influences on Iran had many effects. Although the ethnic and tribal groups did not identify fully with Iran or give complete loyalty to the Shah because of basic cultural differences, foreign influences which played upon these differences to gain support for the particular foreign interest exacerbated what might have been a relatively minor annoyance. Western ideas brought into Iran by students and travelers returning from abroad, as well as planned programs of westernization, resulted in many dislocations to which the society had not adjusted by 1951. Among the well-educated elite, returning students were at odds with their more traditional parents; secularization of the schools and courts severely reduced the power, prestige, and revenues of the clergy; and physical modernization of the cities as well as modern business and banking practices were starting to hurt the bazaari. The transition to European dress and more freedom for women called for a cultural adjustment among traditionalists.

(5) Within the culture itself there had been strains toward disunity. A cultural pattern of distrust of individuals and groups with whom there was no clear and obvious mutual interest tended to structure the society, in one sense, along the lines of competing individuals and interest groups who would use almost any means of deceit and opportunism

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to enhance their position, with little or no concern about those who might suffer in this process.

(6) There had always been differences between urban and rural folk based on the physical isolation of many villages and the differences between urban and rural subcultures. The programs of modernization had their major impact in the urban areas, thus compounding the cultural differences between the rural and urban dwellers.

b. Factors related to the Azerbaijan Incident, 1946. Influences surrounding the Separatist Movement in Azerbaijan and its return to the Iranian body politic seem to be more political than sociological.

(1) Although the Azerbaijani within the borders of Iran were not ethnic Persians and, therefore, could be considered a minority group, centuries of close contact and integration into the governmental structure had provided for acculturation and identification with the Iranian society.

(2) As a minority group, the Azerbaijani in Iran had a cultural affinity with the Azerbaijani across the border of the Soviet Union. The weakness of the Iranian Government during WW II permitted the Soviet Union to gain control over this area and to infiltrate communist Azerbaijani into Iran. Since there are always some dissidents in every large group, the infiltrators were able to recruit some Iranian Azerbaijani and form a rebel organization which came to power with the support of the Soviet military stationed in the area. In light of later

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events, it does not appear that the Separatist Movement had a wide base of support.

(3) There was little opposition to the new Government. Probably this seemed hopeless in view of the strength of the Soviet military presence. The Iranian Azerbaijani seem to have acculturated sufficiently to accept that aspect of Iranian culture that ascribes loss of dignity and status to those who are held up to public ridicule and criticism, and, under these circumstances, failure on the part of an opposition organization would have been held up to public ridicule with concomitant loss of dignity by the leadership and the organization as a whole.

(4) With the removal of Soviet troops and the additional support of Iranian troops moving toward the capital of Azerbaijan, opposition to the Communist regime now became socially acceptable and was expressed by destruction of the shops of Communist sympathizers and by killing some Communist sympathizers. The Iranian troops entered Azerbaijan with little resistance.

c. Factors supporting the rise of Mossadeq, 1951. Support for the rise of Mossadeq to the position of Prime Minister came from disparate groups. In essence this support rested on different conceptions of how Mossadeq's implementation of nationalism would affect their status and relieve their frustrations and insecurities.

(1) The Western-educated group and their followers believed that Mossadeq supported continued or accelerated westernization without foreign domination. The intellectuals then saw themselves as an

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essential part of the Government machinery required to implement the changes, thus replacing the traditionalists in high Government positions. Modernists among the businessmen and industrialists envisioned increased status through the expansion of their holdings as the foreigners left. Both groups probably looked forward to a greater degree of security by virtue of their better positions in the society and because their values and status symbols would become the norm for the society after Mossadeq came to power.

(3) On the other hand, the large landowners, bazaari, and clergy who supported Mossadeq saw in his espousal of nationalism not just a halt to the trend toward westernization, but a return to traditionalism--to the old cultural values upon which their economic security and status rested.

(4) There is no evidence that the lower socioeconomic groups in the villages or the cities were actively involved through their own organizations. Both participated by voting but voted in accordance with the wishes of their employers or landlords. The bazaari and the guilds exploited the unrest and dissidence among the workers by organizing them for mass demonstrations. However, lack of leadership and organization prevented political action by these groups to press for their own interests.

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## Section II. The Family.

by Jessie A. Miller, PhD

42. General. The traditional Iranian family was characterized by closeness of family ties, an authoritarian mold, and extensiveness of kinship relations. It stood at the center of social organization, and its impact on the social, economic, and political life of the nation was such that it has been called by one writer "the single most important political fact."<sup>145</sup>

### 43. Marriage laws and customs.

a. The marriage laws and customs of the country had their roots in Islam and were similar to those in Arab countries. The Koran stressed the value of married life over that of celibacy. Muhammad himself is reported to have said "Marriage is my custom: He who dislikes it does not belong to me." He also said, "And marry such of you as are solitary . . . ."<sup>146</sup> There was then no place in traditional Iranian life for the religious celibate; little for any individual outside the family circle.

b. Muhammad had a low opinion of women. "Women are placed under the overlordship of men since men by creation are of higher order."<sup>147</sup> He did point out that a man could have no treasure more valuable than a virtuous wife but counterbalanced this by the advice, "Those (wives) whose perverseness ye fear, admonish them and remove them to the bed-chamber and beat them."<sup>148</sup> These teachings were reflected in the religious and civil laws of Iran. Polygyny was legal. A man was permitted

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to have four "permanent" wives at any one time. He might also take female slaves as concubines; and the Shi'a sect, to which most Persians belonged, also permitted an unlimited number of temporary marriages or mut'a (which could last a day or many years, according to the contract). The abolition of slavery eliminated the one type of relationship, but mut'a continued to be an important institution.<sup>149</sup>

c. Permanent marriages were arranged by families usually with a view linking them together and increasing their wealth, prestige, and power. The girl was nearly always young, not more than 13 or 14 years of age; the husband frequently was much older. First cousin marriages were permitted. In fact, traditionally the most desirable wife for one's son was a brother's daughter. This, it was said, strengthened the bonds within the kinship group. Daughters were entirely subject to the father's authority. The reforms of Reza Shah (1926-41) set the legal age of marriage at 16 for girls and 18 for boys and required the consent of both the bride and the groom. As late as 1951, this law had not been enforced; the traditional practice of arranged marriages continued.<sup>150</sup>

d. The dowry system was observed by all classes. In addition, the marriage contract stipulated a sum of money, mahr, to be paid to the bride by the groom or his family as a form of insurance against the day when she might be widowed or divorced. This was her personal property and could not be used by her family or her husband. In the cities, the father of the girl was usually the custodian of her dowry. In the villages, the headman was frequently the custodian.



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Failure to pay the mahr was one of the few grounds on which a woman could secure a divorce.<sup>151</sup>

e. In addition to the limitation on the number of permanent wives, the major marriage restrictions were the bar to certain relationships regarded as incestuous (sisters, father's widows, etc.); the stipulation that a man could not take more than one wife unless he could support each in accordance with her station in life; and rules that a woman could not marry a non-Muslim; that a man must choose his wives from "people of the Book"; i.e., Christians, Muslims, and Jews, and that a woman could not marry without the consent of her father or male guardian.<sup>152</sup>

f. Divorce was considered a natural right of the man, and the Koran permitted him to divorce his wife at will. He had only to repeat his repudiation three times on the same or different occasions. A woman could secure a divorce only if the husband failed to live up to specific provisions of the marriage contract and her charges had to be proven in court.<sup>153</sup> There are no statistics on divorce. The ease with which they were secured by men apparently was not accompanied by a high rate.<sup>154</sup> Divorce among tribal people was very rare.

g. Chastity in women was considered to be of the utmost importance. The traditional Koranic penalty for a girl who bore an illegitimate child was death by stoning for both mother and child.<sup>155</sup> Some writers doubt that this has been the practice in modern times. If a man killed his wife or her accomplice while in the act of adultery, he was exempt from punishment. If he killed his daughter or sister or their

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accomplices under similar circumstances, the punishment under religious law was slight. Under the reformed Civil Code of Reza Shah, the penalty was 1-6 months imprisonment.<sup>156</sup>

h. Religious teachings and civil law do not in themselves give an accurate picture of family life. A number of factors mitigated the harshness of the law. However, the mere fact that these provisions were retained in the revised civil codes of 1926-41 suggests much about the attitude toward women and the character of the Iranian family.

#### 44. Family pattern.

##### a. Patrilocal residence.

(1) Where conditions permitted, the married sons brought their wives to live in the father's household. This ultimately consisted of the first generation parents, their single children, and their married sons with their wives and children. Daughters, if divorced, returned to the paternal home. Although monogamy was undoubtedly the norm, the size of the household might be considerably increased by a plurality of wives and their offspring. Unfortunately, there are no reliable statistics on the frequency of plural marriages or on the size of households. Travelers and students have much interest in polygyny as a social institution, but economic factors alone prevented most men from supporting multiple families. Since the latter half of the 19th century, the trend of opinion, particularly among the well-to-do and intellectual classes, has been against plural marriages. Statistically, plural marriages are probably not of great social significance.

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(2) Upon the father's death, the brothers usually established separate residences and the eldest became responsible for his widowed mother, unmarried brothers and sisters, and the widows and children of deceased brothers. His home remained a family center and his brothers, if possible, lived nearby. Close contact was maintained through frequent family gatherings. Mutual problems arising from marriages, deaths, births, property settlements, and such were handled by a general family council.<sup>157</sup>

(3) With the less affluent, a common residence was not always possible, but close relatives were seldom far away. In the villages, an extended family might live in a cluster of huts. Among tribesmen, the nuclear or basic family unit shared one tent. The tents of sons or brothers were clustered nearby:

A typical nomadic tribesman lived with his family of one or more wives, a raft of children, one or more grandparents, and some dogs . . . near a smaller or larger group of his close kinsmen. The numbers depended upon the adequacy of the pasturage at any one spot . . .<sup>158</sup>

(4) Iranians of all classes were extremely sociable and hospitable. They loved to entertain friends and relatives. They enjoyed poetry, reading sessions, and ballad singing, and frequently baths and teahouses. Picnics were a favorite family diversion.<sup>159</sup> Patrilocality meant that most of these activities were shared with members of the kinship group. Economic operations, whether farming, craft, or trade, were usually joint family enterprises. Thus, the family was tied

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together by common interests and activities, kinship bonds were close, and the individual identified with the family as his paramount interest group.

### b. The patriarchal system.

(1) At all levels of Iranian society--urban and rural, tribal and nontribal--the male head of the house wielded almost unlimited authority over its members. His decisions, however arbitrary and unreasonable, could not be questioned. A wife never openly contradicted her husband, and middle-aged men were loathe to initiate any activity of which their fathers might disapprove. "Even grown men and women found their lives controlled by the violence of their fathers." "Disobedience was as unthinkable as suicide."<sup>160</sup>

(2) If, as head and master, the father demanded total obedience and respect, he also had certain responsibilities. He was expected to support the family and to supply their social as well as their material needs.<sup>161</sup> If he were timid, weak, and lacking in self-mastery, he was a source of shame for all. If he was "forceful, decisive, and brave, all were imbued with dignity and pride."<sup>162</sup> All men, sons, as well as fathers, were fiercely protective toward their women. A brother felt it his duty to defend his sister and her honor. If she were widowed, he unhesitatingly took the responsibility of supporting her and her children.

### c. Position of women.

(1) In the cities, women of all classes were strictly secluded and had little contact with men outside the kinship group. They were

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responsible for household tasks and care of the children. Where there were servants, they spent much of their time visiting friends and relatives. Lower class women might engage in some craft work within the home, but as late as 1956 when the first census was taken, only 6.7 percent of the women in Iran were listed as gainfully employed.<sup>163</sup>

(2) Village women had slightly more freedom of movement. Living conditions for many did not permit seclusion. Most were engaged in farm work and generally went about unveiled at home. Tribal women shared the rugged life of the men. On the long spring and fall migrations, they were responsible for packing and unpacking the tents and household goods, and caring for the animals and children. As a rule, they were unveiled and had considerable freedom of movement. However, in both the village and the tribe the father remained the center of authority, strong emphasis was placed on obedience and violations were severely dealt with.<sup>164</sup>

(3) Nonetheless, it must be assumed that all women were mistreated or were without influence. Personality factors were important, and a woman's position often depended on the relationship she had established with her husband. Vreeland found that "though expected to be mutually reserved in public, with the man initiating and the wife deferring, in the privacy of their homes, husband and wife often had a warm and intense relationship."<sup>165</sup> Frequently, a wife exerted considerable influence, and it was not "unusual for a husband to consult his wife about personal or business matters, although he reserved the right to make final decisions."<sup>166</sup>



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### d. Patriarchal authority and the child.

(1) The Iranian placed great emphasis on the importance of continuing the family line. Thus, children were greatly desired and valued. However, "it was not the Persian way for men to be bothered with children."<sup>167</sup> In middle and upper class families, the young child spent most of his time in the women's quarters. Here he was allowed almost unlimited freedom of expression, although he was constantly admonished to respect and obey his elders, especially his father. The latter was approached with ceremonious reverence and submission and was addressed as Agha, literally "the master."<sup>168</sup> Village and tribal mothers kept their children close beside them wherever they went. The values in which the boys and girls were trained were not essentially different from those of the city child.

(2) By the time they were of school age--or old enough to help with the chores as the case might be--children had learned to be submissive to adjust. Boys, however, were early made aware of their superior status. They tended to be treated permissively by their mothers. Girls were taught to be docile and to give in to their brothers as later they must to their husbands. In most families, children were greatly loved and pampered. "Parents, grandparents and other relatives lavished almost unlimited attention upon them, particularly the younger children and boys more than girls,"<sup>169</sup> but as one writer comments, they were seldom treated as individuals. They were "foundled and caressed excessively and then dismissed to a corner as if they were toys."<sup>170</sup>

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(3) The concern of a father for his children was often expressed in the form of bitter criticism, suspicion, and severe punishment. "The idea of discipline was sacred . . . . Children must be forced to what was right. Fear of the father was expected . . . ." Discipline was not only harsh but arbitrary. At one time, the father might punish a child severely for a trivial offense; on another occasion a more serious misdemeanor would be overlooked. Sometimes one son was punished for anticipated wrongdoing simply because another son had already misbehaved.<sup>171</sup>

(4) The father punished the boy by beating him about the head, body, and legs with a stick. The boy was expected to take this without running away, because it developed his character. When the child was taken to school, the mulla (religious teacher) was told: "I give the child to you. All I want from you is his bone." In other words, "reduce him to a skeleton, but train him."<sup>172</sup> As Najafi says time and again,

. . . in my country children live with fear. Parents, teachers, nearly everyone near the children are stern, frequently harsh; they expect and demand absolute obedience . . . My own mother was kind, but even she believed that the mother should completely dominate the child . . .<sup>173</sup>

(5) What was the effect on the child? There are no objective studies and specialists do not agree. Vreeland, for example, says:

Self reliance in children is expected within the role they play in the family hierarchy. They must learn all things well. If sent to school they must excel. Nevertheless, much of the training and discipline designed to make a child a responsible individual is self-defeating. High expectations and severe demands often breed

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insecurity, a sense of inadequacy and greater dependence on the parents for assurance and approval. Rigid control tends to develop reliance on direction from above. Independent judgment and self-assurance is further blunted by the atmosphere of distrust clouding much of the relations between parent and child.<sup>174</sup>

(6) Vreeland's analysis fails to account for several well-documented traits, notably the strong bonds of family affection, much stronger than in most European countries,<sup>\*</sup> and the marked independence, initiative, and lively intelligence of the Iranian.<sup>175</sup> Vreeland probably exaggerates the frequency with which harsh punishment is administered to the average boy and underestimates the mitigating factors: the love and affection of his mother and other members of the household, the many festive occasions the family shares, the amount of freedom allowed the boy as he grows older, the responsibilities placed on him, and the value system which gave high approval to certain types of initiative. For example, Iranians gave their "wholehearted approval to any ingenious fellow who could out-smart others."<sup>176</sup> Probably Arasteh's conclusion is more valid:

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<sup>\*</sup>In the wider sense family feeling is much stronger than in most European countries. It is quite astonishing to what lengths family loyalty and charity will go (Suratgar, 1951, quoted by Arasteh (1964) p. 145). Many writers including Wilber refer to the individualism of the Iranian when they apparently mean initiative. Individualism as used in cross-cultural studies commonly refers to "a tendency to favor the liberty of the individual as regards his own actions," or "emphasis on the self without concern for the group." Neither of these definitions appears to fit the Iranian. The trait admired in Iranians is ingeniousness or initiative.

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. . . in the process of socialization the child acquires a personality admirably suited to the vicissitudes of Persian life. His father's arbitrary and authoritative measures reflect, in miniature, the policies of the government and those in administrative positions. At the same time the child gains a certain degree of independence and self-assertiveness from his relationship to the rest of the family. The child thus finds himself in an ambivalent position of being dependent on the father and having to submit to his domination, while being the center of attention when he is with other family members. His close ties to his mother and also to his brothers give him the feeling that his home, if nowhere else, will always be a haven of security.<sup>177</sup>

Culture and personality, said Ralph Linton, "are reverse sides of the same coin." It should not be forgotten that just as culture helps mold personality, personality helps maintain the characteristic values of the culture. Other things being equal, the authoritarian family of the Iranian would be expected to produce an individual who would be responsive to the maintenance of an authoritarian form of Government.

e. Patrilineal descent. The strongest links of affection and obligation were with one's immediate family, but the principle of patrilineal descent extended those bonds by stressing the unity of all individuals of both sexes who traced their lineage to a common male ancestor. Since cousin marriages were encouraged as a means of strengthening family bonds, maternal kin were often paternal kin further removed. Nonetheless, descent through the male line was emphasized in family organization and determined many rights and obligations. Affection might lead a man to aid a mother's kinsman, but a sense of obligation even without affection impelled him to help those on his father's side of the family.<sup>178</sup>

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(1) For the villager or ordinary urban dweller, the sense of kinship might include no more than the descendents through the male line of one's great or great-great grandfather. But for the nomadic tribes, and for some of the more influential families, the common ancestor was often so remote that actual relationships between living members could hardly be traced. In these cases, it was the claims of kinship, not its biological fact, which created the rights and duties kinsmen expected and accepted in their relationships with each other.

(2) At the higher social levels, one was not only expected to assist one's kin but to accept and further recommend clients of relatives.<sup>179</sup> It is reported that one Iranian who clipped obituary columns admitted he did so "in order to keep filling in a huge chart depicting the intricate family ties that related political and business leaders in Iran." When he needed a favor, he located the various connections and approached the individual through a relative he already knew or through one easiest for him to contact.<sup>180</sup> Influential families sought to have their sons strategically located in business or Government, so that they could "engage in mutual favor-doing on a much more extensive and effective front." One prominent man suggested that the ideal was to have one family member located in each of at least seven areas: the Ministry of Finance, the Court, the Security Organization, the Army, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Economy. His particular family was represented in each of these except the Ministry of Justice. This was later covered when two cousins with

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law degrees returned from France and secured appointments with the Ministry of Justice.<sup>181</sup>

(4) Large and influential families also tried to encompass every shade of political opinion. One brother would be a socialist or a Communist, one a staunch royalist, and another a pro-Western moderate, for

in a society where fortunes and governments change with the wind, it is best to be represented in all camps. Therefore, when the ins are suddenly ousted, there does not have to be a family or personal disaster. The personal ties supersede overt ideological preferences.

For this reason, several owners of extensive land had their sons join the Tudeh Party in the mid-1940s.<sup>182</sup>

(5) William Green Miller, in a discussion of Iranian political parties, has commented that "what is remarkable to Westerners is the overriding family solidarity which prevails despite the very different political views held by individual members of the family."<sup>183</sup> Miller apparently misses the point, so aptly stressed by Bill, that family members are in different parties not necessarily because of differences in ideology, but for strategic reasons.

(6) In brief, the extended family was, as Binder has said, "the most important political fact." It was "the common interest group par excellence." Its authoritarian structure placed the oldest male of each nuclear family in an admirable bargaining position. He was able to control all the resources of his family; his subordinates could act only

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with his permission. Through consultation (and perhaps bargaining) he could call on uncles and cousins for assistance. The network of mutual obligations gave the family strength. In it the individual found his security and his opportunity.

### 45. Conclusion.

a. In the late 19th century Iran began to feel the impact of the Western world, but these influences had not gained sufficient momentum by 1951 to affect materially either the cultural pattern of the family or its stability. Patrilocal residence was not seriously disrupted by individual mobility, and the extensive kinship system continued to function effectively as a political and economic system.

b. The authoritarian family structure was questioned by only a few of the more vocal intelligentsia. The influence did not reach the villages or tribes and did not even penetrate deeply into urban society. Reza Shah abolished the veil in 1936 and ordered men of the court circles to bring their wives with them to certain social gatherings. These changes were short-lived, and after Reza Shah's abdication, most women appearing on the streets were again veiled. On more fundamental issues affecting the position of women (such as polygyny, divorce, and child custody laws), the new civil code for the most part restated the older religious rules. Even where changes were made, as in the legal age for marriage and the provision for mutual consent, the law was not enforced.

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c. The father's authority over his children also remained largely unchallenged. The few Western-educated students returning from abroad were mostly men and were from liberal families whose fathers were inclined to give them more than the usual amount of freedom. This, combined with the great prestige accorded them by their relatives, as well as the practical advantages they saw in the family system, eased their readjustment into Iranian life. Studies of Iran during 1941-51 report relatively little serious or widespread tension on this issue. There were, to be sure, tensions within families based on rivalries, property disputes, etc., but these were not of a nature to disrupt the system.

d. There is, in brief, no indication of any basic changes, or of an appreciable increase of tensions or social disorganization traceable to the family. In Iran as in Japan during the early days of its modernization, the family was primarily a factor of strength and stability.

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## Section III. Social Classes.

by Jessie A. Miller, PhD

### 46. Introduction.

a. As late as 1920, Iranian society resembled in many ways the feudalism of medieval Europe. It was highly stratified with a wide gap between peasant and landlord, commoner and noble, and impoverished powerless many and the wealthy high-privileged few. There were, however, significant differences which produced, at least in Western eyes, a paradoxical combination of absolutism and social mobility.

b. The first major difference was in the nature of the authority exercised by those at the top. Whether one speaks of the tribe, the village, or the State, this authority was arbitrary and absolute to a degree unknown in the West.<sup>184</sup> There was also a notable lack of a code of chivalry and of a sense of noblesse oblige. Little consideration of others and brutality in personal relations were expected from persons in authority.

c. Secondly, there was no well-defined hereditary nobility similar to the aristocracy which played such an important role in most European countries. Some members of the Qajar tribe enjoyed hereditary status under the Qajar dynasty (1722-1925) as did some descendants of Muhammad. Among the tribal peoples the title "Khan" was hereditary. However, the absence of a system of primogeniture and the consequent subdivision of property resulted within a few generations of considerable downward

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mobility not only of individuals but of entire families.<sup>185</sup> The confiscation of property by the Shah had the same result, although unlike Europe, new dynasties usually brought with them a nearly complete change in the composition of the nobility. Few families were able to stay at the top for many generations.<sup>186</sup>

d. Thirdly, Islam had introduced into Iran three major channels of upward mobility: the Shi'a religious channel, the bureaucratic channel, and the military channel. "Through these channels have moved green grocers, bakers, cobblers, gardeners, stableboys, mule drivers, and soldiers."<sup>187</sup> Only one of the Qajar Prime Ministers was of royal blood, and most were of lower class origin. One was the son of a masseur, and one of a water carrier. They advanced to positions of great influence through the bureaucratic machinery. The founders of three dynasties (the Ziyarid in the ninth century, the Saffarid in the 10th, and the Pahlavi in the 20th) were of lower class background and moved to the top from low-ranking military positions.

e. Feelings of insecurity, suspicion, and jealousy and a constant struggle for prestige (traits characteristic of Iranian society) contributed further to frequent changes of personnel particularly at the apex of society. Although these dramatic examples of mobility led Lord Curzon to call Iran "the most democratic country in the world,"<sup>188</sup> the limited nature of this movement must be recognized. The unusually clever, strong, and ruthless or those favored by fortuitous circumstances were able to rise in the social scale. There was enough

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mobility to build a lively circulation into the system but not so much as to allow new social groups and classes to improve their position. The masses for the most part remained inert. The Iranian concepts of class were then hierarchical and authoritarian, rather than egalitarian and democratic, but did not close the door to upward social mobility.

f. Finally, it should be noted that traditionally Iranian philosophers have viewed society not in terms of class in the contemporary sense but in terms of function. Thus, the Constitution of 1906 provided representation for six classes: the princes, the Ulama, the Qajar family, nobles, landowners, and merchants and guildsmen. In the electoral law which implemented the Constitution slight but significant changes were made. The new categories were princes and Qajars, Ulama, nobles and notables, merchants, landowners, and guilds.<sup>189</sup>

g. There are no adequate studies and little factual data bearing on the Iranian class structure of this period. Iranians tended to identify themselves with economic activity groups or with families. Western writers generally used a threefold classification, but a comparison of the writings of Binder, Arasteh, Vreeland, and others reveals little agreement on where class lines should be drawn.

### 47. The elite.

a. The highest class was composed of the Shah and members of the royal family, wealthy members of the Qajar nobility (a holdover from the previous dynasty), tribal nobility, large landowners, and a few individuals who had studied abroad and were able under Reza Shah to

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substitute scholarship for wealth and make their way into the upper  
class.<sup>190</sup>

b. As in the past, ownership of land was the most important criterion for social status and political power. Its acquisition was the most acceptable path for upward mobility. The size of the holdings was usually more important than the quality of the land. In the mid-1950s, it was said that 85 percent of the cultivated land belonged to the so-called thousand families. At the same time, it was estimated that as many as 80 percent of the landlord families had held property no longer than from the mid-19th century.<sup>191</sup> Lambton has grouped the large landowners in terms of their background: established landowning families of several generations, many of whom acquired their wealth through Government service; the tribal Khans who had taken personal possession of much tribal land; the well-to-do clergy; relatively new landlords including "big" bazaar merchants, bankers, and Western-affiliated importers who bought land as a social stepping stone or for investment; Government officials, civilian and military, whose position enabled them to obtain land in the area to which they were assigned; and agents of landlords who used their position to get lands for themselves.<sup>192</sup>

c. The landowning elite dominated all phases of Iranian life. Its members held the key military and civilian posts; served as deputies, senators, and judges; and controlled the newly developing industrial sector. Its identity with Government and business leadership arose both

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from the ability of dominant families to place their members in key positions and from the possibility for those upwardly mobile in the power structure to acquire land and join the elite.<sup>193</sup>

### 48. The Middle Strata.

a. An examination of the middle strata emphasizes again the functional or interest-group organization of Iranian society. Although the elite had a sense of common identity, the idea of middle class, as Binder points out, was little understood.<sup>194</sup> There were simply people who had lesser status than the elite, more than the peasants and workers. The important components of this middle class were found in the center of religious institutions, the bazaar, the military, the Government, the median landowners, and, as they developed in more recent time, the liberal professions. Each group included individuals covering a wide spectrum in education, wealth, and prestige. The Shi'a clergy, for example, ranged from the mullah, who were often illiterate and virtually uneducated, to the highly educated mutjahids (a term loosely translatable as theologians), who carried considerable weight in urban circles.<sup>195</sup>

b. The core of the middle strata was made up of the clergy and the bazaar merchants. The support of the former was held necessary to legitimize a regime; they provided the primary source of education and scholarship, and through their sermons and counseling exerted a dominating influence on people of all ranks. Through most of Persian history, their power was both political and spiritual.<sup>196</sup>

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c. The bazaar was the traditional center of the business community. Despite competition among its members, they had developed a certain cohesiveness and were highly articulate. Their unity enabled them to exert considerable political pressure by closing the bazaar. They were sensitive to political and economic pressures from the large property owners. At the same time, it was primarily from this group that the upper echelons of the Government and the top social groups received new blood.<sup>197</sup> Of special interest was the organized and paid demonstration which had its origin in the bazaar:

There (were) in the bazaar men who (would) for a price, organize, train and pay groups of demonstrators to march through the streets or riot, either in support of or in opposition to almost any issue. Most of the street demonstrations in the larger urban centers (were) based on this kind of riot which (was) sold as a professional service in the bazaar.<sup>198</sup>

d. By the 1930's, significant development had begun to change the middle class.

(1) As a result of the importation of European factory-made goods and contact with Western business men, different groups began to spin off from the bazaar core. A few smaller industrialists, bankers, and businessmen established themselves outside the area; the skilled factory workers, though few in numbers, were no longer tied to the guild-apprentice system; the educated white collar worker increasingly sought other opportunities.

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(2) Reza Shah deliberately weakened the role of the clergy and cultivated the support of the new-style middle class against elite opposition.

(3) The reforms of Reza Shah and his successor greatly increased the size and power of the Government bureaucracy.

(4) Western-style education and the modernization program resulted in the growth of the liberal professions (doctors, lawyers, writers and university professors) in both number and influence.

e. In 1951, the changes that had taken place could hardly be called radical. At the upper end of the middle class spectrum were the prosperous merchants, many of whom were still closely affiliated with the bazaar, high-ranking Government employees other than the top echelon; the military in positions just below the command level; clergymen; median landowners (those of local but not national influence); and the bulk of the university professors, writers, lawyers, and doctors. In general, the members of this group were drawn from the same occupational sources as the upper class but were somewhat less successful in terms of wealth and political status. Their education varied but was weighted toward western style degrees. Many of the younger men were educated abroad.

f. The lower middle stratum included the lesser members of the bureaucracy, bazaar employees other than laborers, the low-ranking military officers, elementary school teachers, all rural and some urban mullahs, craftsmen, and small independent merchants.

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g. In the middle group as a whole, there was a wide difference of sentiment and attitude. Most continued to identify with their occupational groups and their families; hence, an individual's political loyalties and point of view were not easily related to his class position. "It [the middle class] had no real positive consciousness or cohesion and present[ed] a united front mainly in the form of resisting both foreign domination and rural conservatism."<sup>199</sup>

h. It is dangerous, particularly in the absence of reliable studies, to generalize about the attitudes of so heterogeneous a group. Quotations from two sources will indicate the problem of divergent views. On the one hand, it is said that "within this group Western ideas and techniques have had their most disturbing impact."<sup>200</sup> The tendency of many western writers seems to be to assign all "liberal" professionals to the middle class, regardless of their background and family affiliation. On the other hand,

Since the political situation changes rapidly in Iran and political connections are the key to social status, the upper-middle stratum continually hopes that some political change will bring its members into the upper class. Consequently, this stratum is not revolutionary, for although it suffers from frustrations and insecurities, it believes that there is always the chance of betterment through the existing structure.<sup>201</sup>

### 49. The lower classes.

#### a. The peasant.

(1) The peasants constituted the largest element--perhaps 75 percent--of the population. The majority of their villages had no more

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than from 40 or 50 to 500 persons. Most peasants were landless. The crop sharing system, poor soil and climate, brigandage, extortion by Government officials and landowners, and their own ignorance and lack of agricultural skills combined to keep them in perpetual debt. Poverty, disease, illiteracy, and apathy characterized their lives.

(2) There was some slight social differentiation within the village. The Headman had the greatest prestige and exerted the most influence. The few who owned their own land enjoyed a higher status than did tenants. This was also true of the craftsman, owner of oxen or a qanat (underground irrigation canal), repairman, and shopkeeper. The teacher, if there was one, and the mullah had the highest status and, in most cases, represented the lower middle class. Aside, however, from local prestige, they differed little from their neighbors in outlook and standard of living. Social mobility was almost nonexistent for the peasant.

(3) The relation between the landlord and his representative, and the tenant was one of mutual suspicion:

The landowner regards the peasant virtually as a drudge, whose sole function is to provide him with his profits and who will, if treated with anything but severity, cheat him of his due. It is widely believed in land-owning circles that anything above the rarest consideration of the well-being of the peasant would be taken by the latter as a sign of weakness and as a result he would not pay the dues of the landowner . . . . On the other hand, the peasant himself is highly conservative and resents

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tenaciously any efforts to change his age-long habits, whether as regards his living conditions or traditional agricultural methods.<sup>202</sup>

(4) The period under study saw little change in the position of the peasant. Improved law and order under Reza Shah did protect him for the first time in many years from marauding tribesman and bandits, but the rise in the cost of living, new taxes, and increased extortions by an enlarged local officialdom more than offset this gain. Although there were new insecurities and additional contacts with the outside world, they seem to have had little observable effect.

b. The urban lower class.

(1) Almost no information is available on the urban lower class. A. Reza and Josephine Arasteh, in their discussion of social structure, ignore the subject completely. Later, in another context they speak of five million people in nonagricultural jobs but make no attempt to break these down into urban-rural or into income or class groups. The US Army Handbook for Iran gives both an occupational and an urban-rural distribution of employed workers but no breakdown into skilled, unskilled, casual, itinerant, or other categories that would make it possible to isolate the lower class urban resident.

(2) Binder, Vreeland, and others write only in general terms that the lower class in the cities was a "complex of groups whose hierarchy runs from the beggar to the casual laborer--a cleaner of garden pools and the like--to the regularly employed factory worker or office boy in government service." In between there were porters,

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street cleaners, bankers, cigarette sellers, apprentices and journeymen in the bazaar, and others. Among those with the highest prestige were the police privates, postal employees, office boys, railroad workers, and tobacco monopoly workers. Some writers include the latter in the lower-middle class.<sup>203</sup>

(3) It is difficult if not impossible to draw the line between the stable and unstable elements of the urban lower class. Virtually all suffered from poverty and illiteracy. Many had no fixed residence or family ties, were newcomers to the city, or were members of minority groups. It may be surmised that these experienced a sense of rootlessness. Their frustrations and grievances were obvious: conscription, the mounting cost of living, the bread shortages, housing inadequacies, employment difficulties, and separation of men from their families. There was little chance of upward mobility. The gap between the low class city dwellers and the lower-middle stratum was much greater in mode of life and prestige than was the distance between the upper-middle stratum and the elite. Clearly, the potential of this group for violence was great. They were used as hired mobs in the power struggle of the upper classes but did not develop collective action in their own interests. Lack of leadership and of political awareness were in part responsible. Upton also suggests, "it seems probable that such things as the novelties and superficial public improvements around the urban dweller gave him a sense of satisfaction and pride which at least counterbalanced his resentments."<sup>204</sup>

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c. Tribal people. At the very bottom of the social scale were the tribal people. They varied greatly in social organization, but they had in common their strong allegiance to the group. The ordinary tribesman obeyed his Khan and was ready to fight. "The political problem of the tribes, insofar as the government (was) concerned, (was) that of the tribal leaders and not of the tribesmen themselves."<sup>205</sup>

### 50. Conclusions.

a. Although for centuries Iran has been a hierarchial society with great differentials in wealth, education, prestige, and power, the Iranian did not think in terms of distinct classes. Rather he saw one group merging into another.

b. At the lower end of the scale there was little social mobility, although much delight was taken in stories of those who did succeed in moving into upper class circles. Extreme poverty, illiteracy, and powerlessness characterized the peasant and the urban poor. The former were politically apathetic. The latter had great potential for violence but at this time had shown little initiative in their own interests. Their primary response was to economic (i.e., bread riots) rather than to political matters. (The Tudeh party was successful in organizing factory workers. The consensus seems to be that these workers are "lower middle stratum," although this is certainly a debatable point.)

c. A small, well-educated elite group owned most of the land and dominated the key positions in the Army, the top Government bureaucracy, the police, and the judiciary. There was considerable downward mobility



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from this group, as well as movement into it from the upper middle stratum. A constant jockeying for positions close to the source of power resulted from and in the insecurity of individuals and families.

d. The greatest change in class structure between 1942 and 1952 was the growth of an embryonic middle class. In addition to the former middle stratum, it included groups spun off from the bazaar, white collar workers in the growing Government bureaucracy, and an enlarged professional class. It was divided between modernists and traditionalists, but, even among those who agitated for reform, few were revolutionaries. Some had family or professional contacts with the elite; others aspired to upper class status.

e. It may be hypothesized that the ignorance and apathy of the lower classes and an element of openness at the upper end of the social scale combined to help reduce the potential for violence. On the other hand, the exploitation of the lower classes and an awakening awareness by them of their position increased the danger of future political instability.

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## Section IV. Public Health.

by Thora W. Halstead, PhD

### 51. Vital statistics.

a. Actual morbidity and mortality rates were unknown for Iran for the years 1930 to 1951. Although a law existed during that time requiring all parents to register births within 10 days, the recorded birth statistics were admittedly low<sup>206</sup> ranging from 18 to 35 per thousand population.<sup>207</sup> The error was probably due in large part to the accepted practice of not recording the birth of infants who lived less than 10 days. Obviously this also prevented the collection of infant mortality data. Reported deaths indicated an unrealistic overall death rate of less than 10 per thousand population, lower than any other country in the world.<sup>208</sup>

Disease morbidity and mortality data were similarly inadequate, since the majority of the population had no medical or health services of any kind.

b. Under these conditions, various vital statistic estimates were made. The United Nations statistical office estimated a birth rate of 48 per thousand during the late 1940s and a death rate of 25 during the late 1950s.<sup>209</sup> Death rates were even higher prior to the end of World War II.<sup>210</sup> A study of over 2,000 families conducted in 1950 indicated a birth rate of 51.4 per thousand population, an infant mortality rate of 217 per 1,000 live births and a stillbirth ratio of 20 per 1,000 live births. Deaths were believed to have been underreported.<sup>211</sup> In 1956, life expectancy was 35 to 40 years, with only about 20 percent living beyond the age of 64.<sup>212</sup>

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c. A large proportion of deaths occurred in early childhood, but childbirth was also an exceptionally hazardous experience for both mother and child. In 1940, 80 percent of the children died before reaching the age of 5. In 1949, the infant death rate was believed to be over 500 per 1,000 live births. The high infant and child death rate was attributed to the ignorance of immature and untrained mothers, to lack of proper care at the time of childbirth, and to measles, whooping cough, scarlet fever, smallpox, acute respiratory disease, gastrointestinal disease, and malnutrition.<sup>213</sup>

### 52. Diseases.

a. The Government maintained a treatment program in 115 hospitals and 350 polyclinics throughout the country, but only 10 to 15 percent of the total population was served by these facilities. It is from the records kept by these facilities that much of the following disease data are drawn.

b. During the time period 1930-51, malaria was the most important public health problem in Iran. Although a half million cases were reported annually, it was conservatively estimated that the actual number of cases was 5 million, or more than one-fourth of the population. Malaria was present in every ostan (province) but was particularly prevalent in the rice-growing Caspian area. The economic loss due to this disease included not only many million man-hours of manpower but the abandonment of desirable agricultural land.<sup>214</sup>

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c. Gastrointestinal diseases were exceedingly prevalent due to the low level of sanitation. Infant diarrhea, the most important cause of death of infants, was a leading cause of death through the country, and typhoid and paratyphoid fever and dysentery were reported widespread in every ostan.

d. Parasitic infestations including hookworm, roundworm, tapeworm and ameba were common. As many as half the general population was infected with roundworms, while hookworm was a serious problem only along the Caspian coast.<sup>215</sup>

e. The respiratory diseases, bronchitis, pneumonia, bronchopneumonia, common cold, and influenza were all common and played an important role in the high infant mortality rate. Tuberculosis was widespread, but the rates were highest in the Caspian area where it was estimated that 90 percent of the people in some villages were infected.

f. The diseases amenable to immunization also plagued Iran. Although immunization against smallpox and diphtheria was introduced in 1910 and vaccination against smallpox was made compulsory in the 1930s,<sup>216</sup> no satisfactory program was established. In 1940, smallpox was considered a necessary illness for every child except in the few localities where vaccination was enforced.<sup>217</sup> In 1947, smallpox was still widespread throughout Iran, as was whooping cough and diphtheria. Other than smallpox, immunization was limited to school children against diphtheria in a few cities and to local populations where and when epidemics of typhus, plague, or cholera developed.<sup>218</sup>

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g. Measles, mumps, and rheumatic fever were other important childhood diseases--in fact, it was a common belief that an individual did not have a future until he had had the measles. "By the age of seven or eight a child will have had the main childhood diseases. To survive this age is to pass a major milestone to a relatively long life."<sup>219</sup>

h. Typhus fever and relapsing fever were reported from every ostan, with 50,000 cases of the latter treated annually in the clinics. Typhus fever was usually in epidemic form somewhere in the country.

i. Scabies, pediculosis, and bacterial and fungal skin infections plagued the multitudes; many of the infections were spread by the unsanitary public baths.

j. Eye infections of every kind were widespread, and trachoma was one of the most prevalent diseases. It caused much blindness and involved 25 to 80 percent of the population in different regions of Iran, especially in the central and southern areas.<sup>220</sup>

k. Venereal disease had become a problem by 1940. Village boys brought to the cities for Army training contracted syphilis and carried it back to their village at the termination of their tour of duty. By 1947, syphilis was considered a major health problem although an actual survey was not made. Some villages were said to have 90 percent of the people infected, particularly with congenital syphilis.<sup>221</sup>

l. Anthrax, brucellosis, leishmaniasis, sandfly fever, actinomycosis, glanders, and rabies also occurred frequently.<sup>222</sup>



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### 53. Opium.

a. Opium was first reported appreciably in 1853 from the Isfahan region. As the silk trade declined, the poppy became more widely cultivated. Opium smoking became a custom in Iran. Addiction was related to the low economic level and low standards of public health, for it helped kill pain from disease and dulled hunger.<sup>223</sup> In 1911, opium was taxed heavily in an attempt to curb its use.<sup>224</sup> The League of Nations applied cultivation controls in 1931 in an effort to curb its production.<sup>225</sup> These efforts to restrict opium met with little success, however, for a number of reasons. Opium was a lucrative source of income in foreign trade, and it also was an exceedingly easy crop to raise.<sup>226</sup>

b. In 1940, an appreciable proportion of ill health was due to opium; addiction was quite common, and opium was even given to infants.<sup>227</sup> In 1947, it was estimated that between one and one-half million people were addicted to its use. The highest incidence of opium smoking occurred in Meshed and Kerman, where an estimated 50 to 80 percent of the people used the drug. There was very little opium in Azerbaijan and none in Kurdistan.<sup>228</sup> In 1948, the opium crop was estimated at 800 tons as compared with 300 tons the previous year.<sup>229</sup>

### 54. Nutrition.

#### a. Food supplies.

(1) The first great famine year in recent history was 1861. Thereafter, famines succeeded one another at regular intervals until the

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advent of motor vehicles and modern roads provided means of transporting food from regions of plenty to areas of want.<sup>230</sup> Famine did not disappear, however, for the poor roads, poor methods of transportation, a dearth of storage facilities, and drought still produced severe local food shortages. Famine occurred in Iran following the Soviet and English occupation of the country in 1941. The occupying troops drained the food supplies, especially in the Soviet zone of Azerbaijan. This plus a bad harvest and the disruption of transportation resulted in a famine in 1942.<sup>231</sup> Bread riots broke out in Tehran in December 1942, and isolated cases of starvation occurred.<sup>232</sup>

(2) Malnutrition, however, was the real problem, and data indicate it became more prevalent between 1930 and 1951. This was undoubtedly caused in part by steady rising living costs and taxes in the 1930s and 1940s. These were not compensated by an adequate rise in wages and income.<sup>233</sup> In 1935, an urban middle-class family spent 56 percent of its total budget on food;<sup>234</sup> in 1957, it spent 74.2 percent.<sup>235</sup>

(3) Estimates of food supplies available for human consumption vary widely, as is expected when accurate statistics of production and consumption are not available, but table IX indicates that consensus existed concerning the inadequacy of the Iranian diet. Although the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates are lower than those prepared by the other organizations, they have the advantage of encompassing the time period of interest in the current study. An examination of the data shows that the average daily diet increased progressively both quantitatively and qualitatively between 1934 and

TABLE IX. COMPARISON OF AVAILABLE FOOD SUPPLY

	<u>1947-48<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>1951<sup>b</sup></u>	<u>1954-55<sup>b</sup></u>	<u>1934-38<sup>c</sup></u>	<u>1946-49<sup>c</sup></u>	<u>1953-55<sup>c</sup></u>	<u>1960 target<sup>d</sup></u>
<u>Food supply available (kg/capita/year)</u>							
Cereals	124.5	127.0	145.3	162	144	96	162
Starchy roots				2	1		8
Pulses	8.0	6.7	7.2	9	8		13
Sugar	8.2	10.0	13.9	5	6	14	6
Fats	1.2	3.2	2.0	1	1	8	3
Fruit	40.4	51.7	43.3	75	66	40	100
Vegetables	43.9	33.3	35.1	43	42	57	75
Meat	9.8	10.2	22.5	12	10	6	10
Eggs	2.7	1.9	1.5	3	2		2
Fish		1.0	1.1	4	5	1	9
Milk	88.9	77.8	85.6	93	84	45	83
<u>Calorie and protein content (person/day)</u>							
Calories	1.988		2,001	2,010	1,820	1,730	2,150
Total protein							
(grams)				65	58	58	69
Animal protein							
(grams)				10	9	8	11

## Sources:

<sup>a</sup>Gideon Hadary and Karim Sai, Handbook of Agricultural Statistics of Iran.<sup>b</sup>Jacques May and Irma S. Jarcho, The Ecology of Malnutrition in the Far and Near East, p 388.<sup>c</sup>United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Second World Food Survey, pp 42, 49.<sup>d</sup>May, op. cit., Joint FAO/WHO Nutrition Committee data.

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1955. The average daily diet in 1934-38 contained 2,010 calories and 65 grams of total protein including 10 grams of animal origin; in 1953-55 these figures dropped to 1,730 calories and 58 grams and 8 grams of protein, respectively.

(4) Although the Iranian diet was greatly influence by geographic location, season, and economic level, almost all Iranians, whatever their social class, suffered from chronic malnutrition to some degree.<sup>236</sup> Differences between the diets of wealthy classes and peasants were great, however, even by Middle Eastern standards. A 1957 study revealed that proprietors ate four times as much meat and eggs, twice as much fat, seven times more fruit, and three times as much sugar as peasant families.

(5) Geographic location produced drastic differences in the availability of food. Although Iran was primarily an agricultural country, little progress was made in this area. The prime agricultural area was in the north; the crops of Azerbaijan were considered of such importance that it was said that when Azerbaijan had a drought, all Iram suffered.<sup>237</sup> In general, however, most crops were consumed where grown, and areas with a more diversified and abundant production enjoyed a more varied and satisfactory diet. Some surplus products were shipped to agriculturally poor areas in the center and south, but this exchange was hampered by inadequate transportation facilities.<sup>238</sup>

(6) Because of the limited means of storing food as well as the actual shortage of food, there existed considerable seasonal variation as well in the diets of peasants. They ate 10 percent less

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calories and 22 percent less animal proteins in the winter than the average for the entire year.<sup>239</sup>

### b. Diet.

(1) Cereals, usually in the form of bread except in the rice-growing areas of the north, were the major staple food in Iran. There were supplemented by dairy products, by vegetables and fruits in season, and by large quantities of sweetened tea. The price of meat put it out of reach for the vast majority of Iranian families, who ate it at most once a week and in poorer families only on festive occasions. Fish constituted an important part of the diet only in coastal regions. Mutton and goat made up about 80 percent of the meat consumed, beef 15 percent, and poultry 5 percent. Pork, frogs, crabs, oysters, horse, and hare were forbidden on religious grounds.<sup>240</sup>

(2) Milk products, mainly in the form of mast (yogurt) and cheese, were staple foods in the peasants' diet and constituted the main source of animal protein. Nevertheless, a 1950 survey of 2,033 rural families, living in an area southwest of Tehran, showed that 24 percent consumed no dairy products whatsoever. This low consumption was due not to a lack of dairy products in the area but rather to the sale of these products in the city for cash.<sup>241</sup>

### c. Malnutrition.

(1) The existence of malnutrition was recognized by a variety of physicians during the 1930-51 time period but no studies of nutritional status were carried out until a later date.<sup>242</sup> Studies conducted during the 1950's have been included in this report in an



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attempt to shed some light on the types of nutritional diseases prevalent in Iran and their regional incidence.

(2) In 1940, it was noted that many children died from lack of food.<sup>243</sup> In 1950, 9,000 peasants living south of Tehran were examined superficially and 5.3 percent were believed to be suffering from severe anemia.<sup>244</sup> A survey made by WHO in 1952 revealed many clinical signs of undernutrition and malnutrition in children. The diet of children belonging to both underprivileged and average families was lacking in adequate protein and in vitamins A, B<sub>2</sub> (riboflavin), niacin, and C (ascorbic acid).<sup>245</sup> A nutritional survey carried out in the region of Tehran in 1953 on children showed that 60 percent demonstrated clinical signs of one or more nutritional deficiencies. This same study assessed the nutritional status of school children in seven areas of the country. Protein deficiency signs were found to be common in children from the Caspian littoral and around Shiraz and Tabriz. Vitamin deficiencies were widespread among all the children, but symptoms of deficiency of vitamins A, C, and B<sub>2</sub> were most common in children from Bushire, Abadeh, Shiraz, Isfahan, Tehran, Tabriz, and Rasht. Rickets due to insufficient vitamin D or calcium was especially common in urban areas, and pellagra caused by a deficiency of niacin was widespread. Night blindness caused by an inadequate supply of vitamin A was common in the adult population.<sup>246</sup>

(3) High infant mortality rates of 216 per 1,000 live births in rural areas and stillbirths of 86.5 per 1,000 births in 1955 were due in part to faulty nutrition of the pregnant and nursing

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mothers. In addition, it was reported that infant deaths were mainly due to starvation, hookworm infestation, and chronic poisoning caused by the opium given by mothers to quiet the crying of hungry babies. Those children who survived to school age were below average in height and weight when compared with French children of the same age.<sup>247</sup>

(4) The Interdepartmental Committee for Nutrition in National Defense of the United States conducted a survey of the nutritional status of the Armed Forces of Iran in 1956 at the request of the Government of Iran. This was the first complete nutritional survey of a large group of Iranians. It must be remembered that this group represented the very best state of nutrition available in Iran--a group of healthy young adults receiving a supposedly adequate diet. A sample of troops in each of five major geographic areas--Tehran, Ahwaz, Mashad, Mahabad, and Rasht--was chosen to represent a cross-section of the Army and the country. Dietary surveys were conducted, and physical examinations were performed on 1,720 officers and men. No advanced nutritional deficiency diseases were found, but minor vitamin deficiency diseases were numerous; less than 50 percent of the subjects had a "good" nutritional appearance. Diseases due to deficiencies of vitamins A and C were most common. There were variations among the troops from different areas: those from Rasht in the Caspian Sea area had the fewest signs of nutritional disease, while the troops in Tehran, the north central area, and Mahabad (south of Lake Urmia in Azerbaijan) were in the poorest physical condition.<sup>248</sup>

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(5) Both the 1953 survey of children and the 1956 survey of troops showed malnutrition was disproportionately high in Azerbaijan, the "breadbasket of Iran" and the site of the 1945 rebellion.

(6) A visiting team of WHO medical scientists in 1957 found malnutrition ranging from benign deficiencies to severe Kwashiorkor common in Iran. Malnutrition was also considered an important cause of cirrhosis of the liver, which was very prevalent. They believed malnutrition was due to a combination of poverty, lack of sufficient food, and ignorance and superstition; and this ignorance of the majority of the adult population in matters of health and nutrition made improvement very difficult. They also observed that the faculty of Iran's medical schools had little knowledge of patients' diets and were generally unaware of the above-mentioned nutritional studies.<sup>249</sup>

### d. Awareness.

(1) The Iranian peasant seemed to have been continually cognizant of his inadequate diet, for he had a saying, "Alas, I have spent all my life thinking of what I shall eat in the summer and what I shall wear in the winter." It has been said, "He is so food conscious that he often measures good times by the number of feasts, and bad times by the scarcity of something to eat."<sup>250</sup>

e. Alcohol. Iranians were traditionally heavy wine drinkers, although as Muslims they were forbidden to drink alcoholic beverages.<sup>251</sup> Alcoholism, however, was not a problem.<sup>252</sup>

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### 55. Sanitation.

#### a. Water supply and waste disposal.

(1) Uncontaminated water and a sanitary sewage system are the backbone of preventive medicine and community hygiene. Neither was available in Iran in 1930, and almost nothing was done to secure either during the subsequent 20 years. Conditions in 1940 were much the same as they had been during the previous century. Privies were dug without regard to the proximity of wells. Open sewers were used as both public privies and sources of drinking water, housewives made tea with the water in which they had washed their clothes, and only the wealthy had plumbing. The Shah's water was piped directly from the Mazanderan Mountains. The people were convinced that running water, especially with the sun on it, or the contents of water containers holding 15 gallons or more could not possibly be impure.<sup>253</sup>

(2) The open canals or ditches (jubes) that supplied water to the urban population were fed by river, spring, or well water channeled long distances by gravity flow in underground tunnels called "kanats." These tunnels had openings to the surface at regular intervals to provide a means to maintain them. Occasionally animals and even human bodies disappeared down these openings.<sup>254</sup> Therefore, although the water at its source may have been pure, it had little opportunity to reach the consumer in the same state. Wealthy people frequently had their own kanats, had a filtering system for their water, or paid to have drinking water brought from less contaminated places. Middle class homes had a cistern or pool which they filled with water from the jube. The poor

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people of the cities either used the jube itself as a combination kitchen, laundry, bath, and lavatory or diverted some of the jube water into a scum-covered pool in the yard and used it for all their needs.

(3) Rural communities obtained their water from kanats, irrigation ditches, wells, rivers, and springs. The wells were frequently shallow, unlined, unprotected holes, situated near a privy, and generally believed to be polluted. The villagers had to contend not only with occasional gross pollution of the drinking water but with water shortages in dry years that would sometimes force whole valleys to be abandoned.

(4) In most cities, night soil was collected and carried outside the city and sometimes used as fertilizer. Excreta were also commonly observed along the streets and in the jubes. In rural areas, communal privies were most common, and excreta were generally used for fertilizer.<sup>255</sup>

(5) During Reza Shah's rule, no government action was taken to build a water system or sewage disposal system.<sup>256</sup> Instead, the Shah authorized the city street sweepers to stop the poor from using the jubes for anything but drawing water.<sup>257</sup>

(6) In 1945, sewage was still unknown even in Tehran, and the Government had still taken no action to secure a clean water supply.<sup>258</sup> In 1949, no city in Iran had a sanitary sewage system or had yet acquired a complete piped water supply, although Abadan, Bushire, and Meshed had some piped water and plans had been laid to install a public water supply in Tehran.<sup>259</sup> A piped water supply was not, however, inaugurated in Tehran until 1956. Until that time, the capital was supplied by open jubes fed by kanats from the River Karaj.<sup>260</sup> At that time, the only other large, safe piped water system was at Abadan.<sup>261</sup>



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b. Public baths. The prevalence of public baths and the religious dictates of the people to wash their hands several times a day led to a misconception of cleanliness. Instead, these baths with few exceptions were disseminators of skin, respiratory, and intestinal diseases. Water in the bath tanks went unchanged for a week or more where water was scarce, and no sick person was excluded from the bath, for it was believed that both running water and standing water in excess of 15 gallons were innately pure.<sup>262</sup>

c. Food.

(1) The greatest sources of infection by food were: milk products, raw vegetables, and prepared foods exposed to infection from flies.

(2) Milk products were staple foods in the diet of most Iranians. Milk, however, was rarely consumed in the fresh state, primarily because of the lack of preserving facilities. "Mast" (yogurt) was the most commonly used milk product; it was prepared by boiling the milk to kill other organisms and then seeding it with a previous batch of mast. Raw milk was generally used in the preparation of salted white cheese or clarified butter, the other main milk products. The high incidence of bovine tuberculosis in cattle and brucellosis in goats made the consumption of these raw milk products hazardous.<sup>263</sup>

(3) Raw vegetables were a source of intestinal infection due to the common practices of using excreta for fertilizer.

(4) Prepared foods on sale in cities were exposed to infection from flies, while the ice sold on the streets in summer was made from contaminated water.<sup>264</sup>

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(5) Although laws existed for testing foods for adulteration or harmful ingredients, no food control program existed. There were no laboratories in the oostans for diagnosing disease in animals.<sup>265</sup>

### 56. Health facilities, personnel, and programs.

#### a. History.

(1) Before the time of Reza Khan, the field of public health was left to the Europeans and Americans. English and American missionaries built hospitals, the English established a quarantine service, and a purely advisory Sanitary Council was established.<sup>266</sup>

(2) After the coup d'etat of Reza Khan, nationalization of the medical services was begun, the Sanitary Council was absorbed into the Ministry of Health, and the first Minister of Health was appointed. The British relinquished the quarantine service in 1928 after a diplomatic struggle.<sup>267</sup>

#### b. Medical training programs.

(1) The University of Tehran was opened in 1851, and of its seven teachers, one taught medicine. What became the Faculty of Medicine was reorganized and updated in 1933; and cadaver dissection, formerly prohibited by Islamic law, was introduced for the first time. In 1937, the University built a hospital, but it was not used for teaching until 1949. By 1949, this Tehran school graduated approximately 125 physicians a year.<sup>268</sup>

(2) In 1947, a medical school was founded in Tabriz, and in 1949, three schools were established in Meshed, Shiraz, and Isfahan to train "behdors" or rural medical officers who were "second-grade physicians

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for curing simple diseases which occur in villages."<sup>269</sup> Both the Tehran and Tabriz medical schools offered 3-year courses in midwives' training, while at Shiraz a lower level midwife training school was opened in 1948. In 1949, plans had already been laid for a graduate nurses' school, public health nurses' school, and a village nurse program. It can be seen that all of these medical training programs were begun too late to have had any impact by 1950.

### c. Medical personnel.

(1) In 1924, there were 905 physicians in Iran, but of these, only 253 had medical diplomas. The other physicians had received their certificates after having completed a 5-year apprenticeship with a recognized graduated physician and having passed an examination. The ratio was one doctor to every 11,000 people; however, since 323 practiced in Tehran, the ratio was 1:680 there and 1:16,800 in the remainder of the country. After 1934, medical requirements were raised, and graduation from medical school was required for certification as a physician.<sup>270</sup>

(2) By 1950, there were approximately 1,700 graduate physicians in the entire country; some 300 had been trained in foreign medical schools, the remainder at the medical school in Tehran. Excluding the city of Tehran, the ratio of graduate physicians to inhabitants was about 1:20,000. There were no public health nurses, and only a handful of native graduate bedside nurses, all of whom had been trained out of the country. The Army and the University of Tehran had trained an estimated 500 male physicians' aides or "rezeshk-yars," and the Ministry of Health employed 1,238 unschooled practical nurses. There were 190

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certified dentists, 300 graduate midwives, 330 pharmacists, one trained public health officer, and no public health engineers or educators, or trained laboratory technicians or nutritionists.<sup>271</sup>

### d. Medical service.

(1) The major activity and the main expense of the Ministry of Health was the operation of hospitals and polyclinics. In 1947-1948, there were 115 hospitals, 350 polyclinics and 344 health stations, but they were mostly confined to about 300 cities and large towns. Over 40,000 villages and all the nomadic tribes were without medical services.

(2) The health budget was spent on curative programs at the expense of public health measures. Other than a malaria control program initiated in 1948, there was no effective public health or preventive program directed by the health ministry except for sporadic vaccination programs which had very limited coverage.<sup>272</sup>

(3) Laboratories were completely inadequate in the ostan, there was no central public health laboratory, and there was no laboratory for water analysis. The Pasteur Institute was built in Tehran under the direction of Reza Shah. It was a well-run, modern institute that prepared BCG, typhoid, smallpox, rabies, and typhus vaccines as well as biological solutions.<sup>273</sup>

### 57. Summary and conclusions.

a. Following the coup d'etat of Reza Shah, the Government made its first attempt at assuming the health responsibilities of the nation. Its actions were in the form of new legislation and hospitals. An attempt was also made to improve and increase medical education within

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the country. Medical personnel were not trained in sufficient numbers or skills, however, to staff the hospitals, enforce or even satisfy the new legislation, or even keep pace with the expanding population. Yet curative medicine consumed almost all of the Government's medical budget, to the neglect of preventive measures.

b. Preventive medicine and community hygiene were almost completely overlooked. In 1951, no city had as yet acquired either a totally piped sanitary water system or a sewage system; in fact, both rural and city sanitation were much as they had been 20 years (or 200 years) before. Vaccination programs were both sporadic and limited in coverage; consequently, their impact was minimal. A malaria program initiated in 1948 later produced dramatic health results, but in 1950 virtually no change had yet occurred in the prevalence of disease among the peasants or urban poor who made up the large majority of the population.

c. It was in the field of nutrition, however, that the Government failed most and the people were most aware of shortages. Agricultural programs were not developed to prevent crop failures, transportation and storage facilities were not adequate to prevent regional food shortages, and rising costs limited the purchasing power of the poor. As a consequence, the nutritional level of the people declined during the entire preinsurgency period. Differences in diet between rich and poor were large, even by Middle East standards.

d. Morbidity, nutritional, and drug addiction studies were too limited to permit an accurate regional comparison. Data do suggest,



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however, that opium was used least in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, and nutrition was especially poor in Azerbaijan. The latter point suggests that malnutrition could have been a factor in the Azerbaijan crisis of 1945-46.

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## CHAPTER 5

### MILITARY FACTORS

by Colonel Boyce R. Meers

#### Section I. The Military and Security Establishment

##### 58. Army forces.

a. Up to 1921 there had been no national Army in Iran. There were provincial and tribal levies, the palace guard, the Cossack Division, the South Persian Rifles (SPR), and the Swedish-officered Gendarmerie. There was no organized chain of command, no unified system of recruitment, no national uniform, no regular scale of pay. The Cossack force was commanded by Czarist Russian officers who submitted their reports to and received their orders from Russia. By 1920, however, several Persian officers had been integrated into the Cossack Division. The Palace Guard Division in Tehran had no significant capability as a fighting force. The SPR operated under British officers. The British claimed they maintained this 6,000-man force to assure the safety of their trade route. Hence, the military forces in Persia at the beginning of the 1920s were not only armed differently, but the officers of these forces were hostile toward each other.

b. In late 1920, the Russian officers with the 15,000-man Iranian Cossack Division were dismissed under British insistence. They were replaced by Persian officers or Swedish-trained Gendarmerie.

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c. On 20 February 1921 under the leadership of Colonel Reza Khan, a Persian commander in the Cossack Division, a 2,500-man detachment marched on Tehran and executed a successful coup against the Qajar dynasty. Within a week, Reza Khan was the Minister of War.

d. One of the first reforms instituted by Reza Khan was the modernization of the Army. He considered this urgently necessary as a condition of restoring the authority of the central Government. During 1921-23 all foreign advisers, including the British, were eliminated from the heterogeneous military formations. The Reza Khan was then able to meld the various centrifugal and separatist groups into a closely knit centrally controlled Army. He planned for a national Army of approximately 40,000 men.

e. At the time of the coup, one Kuchik Khan, with the aid of Russian arms and instructors, held the Caspian province of Gilan in a state of rebellion. In June 1921, Kuchik Khan's forces, reinforced by some Soviet elements from Georgia, began to march on Tehran. The Persian Cossack Division was trying to hold the rebel forces in check. Eventually, following repeated protests by the Persians and agreement to the Irano-Soviet Treaty of 26 February 1921, Soviet troops withdrew from Persia on 8 September 1921. The Persian Army, under the energetic leadership of Reza Khan, was then able to march into Gilan and restore order. The leader of the rebellion, Kuchik Khan himself, was captured and executed; his head was brought to Tehran. The whole episode ended ignominiously and proved once again that, with a strong central

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Government in Tehran, autonomist or separatist movements in Persia could thrive only so long as they obtained foreign assistance.

f. In February 1922, latent separatist agitation resulted in a new outbreak and rebellion in Azerbaijan province. The leader, Lakhuti Khan, an officer of the Persian Gendarmerie, had a personal quarrel with the government of Azerbaijan and a professional distaste for the rival Persian Cossacks. The loyalty record of the Gendarmes in Azerbaijan was dubious. Their social structure and military condition compared unfavorably with that of the proroyalist Cossacks; hence, it was not difficult to stir them into open defiance of the central Government. The Gendarmes established themselves as military masters of Tabriz and demanded the Government pay them their delayed salaries and dismiss Reza Khan (then Prime Minister). The leadership of the rebellion passed into the hands of leftwing elements. Reza Khan refused to grant the insurgents any concessions. In February 1922, the national Army, mostly Cossacks, under orders of Reza Khan, surrounded and conquered Tabriz. The insurgents escaped or were captured or killed, and Tabriz was brought back under control of the central Government.

g. During the period 1921-51, the Persian Army was used several times to reduce civil disturbances, to squelch revolts, and to force settlement and pacification of the tribes. In addition to the Khurasan and Azerbaijan rebellions described above, the Army put down a rebellion by the Kurdistans in 1922. The following year, the Army marched south to bring the autonomous tribes of the Lurs, Bakhtiari, and the Qashqai

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under control of the central Government. While the Army was generally able to impose the will of the central Government upon the tribes, it was not always without loss. In the spring of 1943, the powerful Qashqai tribe in the southern province of Fars rebelled. In June 1943, the Qashqai inflicted a heavy defeat on the Army, capturing the fort of Samiron and killing its garrison of 200 men, including three colonels. The dispute was later settled by negotiation. The Kurdish tribes in northwestern Iran repeatedly were involved in skirmishes with the Army and other Government forces.

h. The Persian Army also assisted in implementing the Shah's pacification and modernization programs. ~~Military govenors were appointed to replace the authority of the khans, military garrisons were established about the country to maintain law and order, and the military assisted in disarming the tribes.~~

i. The Army organized by the Reza Shah had a good but untried reputation during the 1930s. Its reputation suffered as a result of the Soviet and British invasion of Iran on 25 August 1941. Iranian Army opposition to three columns of Soviet forces advancing south and two columns of British forces advancing north was negligible. Despite the Iranian staff's communiques, which boasted of the excellent morale of the 105,000-man Army, the reverse was true. Iranian military resistance crumbled. It was alleged that many officers deserted their units; many units abandoned their arms and melted away. The Iranian Army surrendered easily and made it possible for the Allies to take quick

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possession of most of the strategic points. On 28 August 1941, the new Prime Minister gave orders to the Army to cease all resistance.

j. The Army nominally consisted of 10 divisions, each with 5,000 men, except the two Tehran divisions which were 7,000 strong. One-third were recruits of less than 6 months service. The Army was adequately armed by the small Iranian armament factories and arsenals, but it was badly clothed and equipped in other respects.

k. The Army, since its formation in the 1920s, had not been called upon for aggressive action beyond Iran's borders.

### 59. Navy forces.

a. The first Persian naval command was appointed from the Army in 1927, but it was 5 years later that a nucleus of a fleet was acquired. Six boats arrived in Persian waters in 1932, commanded and piloted by Persian naval officers who had received their education and training in Italy. The small Navy (approximately 5,000 men) remained a part of the Army until 1955, when it was made a separate service.

b. During its early years, the Navy operated from bases at Behshahr and Bandar Pahlavi on the Caspian Sea and Khorramshahr on the Persian Gulf. The Navy was used mainly to prevent smuggling and gun-running. In 1941, the Navy consisted of the royal yacht, 2 sloops, 5 patrol vessels, 7 vedettes, and some auxiliary and harbour craft. Most of these ships were built in Italy, where the original personnel were trained.

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c. While opposing the British invasion at Khorramshahr on 25 August 1945, the commander of the Iranian Navy, Admiral Boyandor, was killed. Two Iranian naval ships and two motorboats were sunk by British cruisers, and most of the remaining Iranian naval vessels in the Persian Gulf area were taken over by the British forces. Similar was the fate of the Iranian naval units in the Caspian Sea. They were taken over by the Soviets. The small Iranian Navy did not otherwise engage in any combat actions during 1921-51.

d. The Imperial Iranian Navy was revived in 1946, when the British Government gave Iran two destroyers and a few firefighting tugs as compensation.

### 60. Air forces.

a. In 1924, the Persian Air Force was organized as a branch of the Army. The first group of Persians to learn aviation was sent to Soviet Russia, Germany, and France for training. In the period 1925 to the early 1930s, the Persian Air Force gradually acquired about 40 aircraft. The main task of the Persian Air Force was to maintain communications between various units of the Army throughout the country, as in those days land communications in Persia were undeveloped. The Air Force also participated in internal fights against the Kurd, Lur, and Qashqai tribes.

b. During the late 1930s, many of the young officers in the Iranian Air Force were receiving their training in Germany. Several developed pro-German sentiments.

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c. The Iranian Air Force, which consisted of five aviation regiments, had about 280 aircraft when the Allies invaded Iran in August 1941. Most of these aircraft were of British origin, and many were taken over by the British forces. Iranian Air Force officers with pro-German sentiments refused to obey orders during the Allied invasion and resorted to an abortive coup d'etat.

d. In 1946, the Iranian Air Force had approximately 125 piston aircraft, all types, and about 4,500 personnel. By this time, its primary mission was to provide support for the Iranian ground forces. On 24 August 1955, it was established as a separate service and given equal status with the Army.

61. Paramilitary forces. During the period under consideration, 1921-51, there was one paramilitary force in Iran: the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie (IIG). Other security forces, including a militia-type National Resistance Organization (NRO) and a National Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK), were established subsequent to 1951.

a. The IIG was established in 1911 under the Ministry of Finance and Justice as an agency to assist in tax collection. Its role soon expanded, and it was placed under the Ministry of Interior. In 1942, the Shah placed the IIG under his personal command until 1950, when it was again placed under the Ministry of Interior. The IIG had responsibility for protection of the rural areas and small towns and villages of fewer than 5,000 persons, except near the borders where the Army frontier guards had responsibility. The major mission of the IIG, as identified

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by the US Military Mission with the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie (GENMISH), was to maintain law, order, and internal security by the following:

- (1) Enforcement of the decrees and warrants issued by the Ministry of Justice.
- (2) Suppression of smuggling and narcotics traffic.
- (3) Border control.
- (4) Police protection within its area of jurisdiction.
- (5) Execution of the national conscription program.
- (6) Support and reinforcement for the Imperial Iranian Army in time of war and national emergency.

b. For operational purposes, the Gendarmerie divided the country into areas, the boundaries of which coincided, whenever possible, with political subdivisions. In addition to the Gendarmerie elements associated with the political subdivisions, four areas were independent and controlled by separate regiments. One Gendarmerie Marine Company, using boats and launchers, performed customs and coast guard duties in the Persian Gulf.

c. The Gendarmes were stationed in widely scattered posts; approximately 1,500 to 1,700 during the preconflict period under consideration, and more recently (April 1968) the Research Triangle Institute in North Carolina estimated the Gendarmes to have 2,000 posts. Traditionally the posts have been on towers, where the guards could keep watch on the countryside, with each post manned by 6-12 men under the command

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of a lieutenant or sergeant. The Gendarmes also conducted patrol activities in some areas. In some villages, they were the only legal authority, and they apprehended criminals, brought cases to trial; and acted as judge, public prosecutor, and lawyer for the defense.

d. After release of the Swedish officers by the Reza Khan in the early 1920s, the Gendarmerie was commanded and staffed by Persian officers. Officers were all military in origin. The Gendarmes were recruited from conscripts who had completed their military service. Most Gendarmes made the service a career, and many stayed in for 20 years, the minimum period required to obtain retirement benefits.

e. At the time of the coup in 1921, the strength of the Gendarmerie under control of the central Government was approximately 12,000. In 1942, when the Shah assumed personal command of the Gendarmerie, its strength was estimated at 31,000.

f. Source material does not provide instances or examples of heroic or outstanding performance by the Gendarmerie, but specifics are provided on the negative side. For example, in 1922 an officer in the Gendarmerie, Lakhuti Khan, led Gendarmes and others in a rebellion and military takeover of the city of Tabriz. During the period 1921-51, the Gendarmerie was noted for weak discipline, inefficiency, corruption, and dishonesty. In the eyes of some of the villagers, the Gendarmerie was little better than the thieves and gangs it fought. The dubious record and loyalty of the Gendarmerie would lead one to believe that

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it could have contributed as much to the causes of disturbances in Iran as it did to preventing them.

### 62. Police forces.

a. Iran had a national police force which reached a strength of approximately 25,000 officers and men by 1962. Strength figures for the preconflict period are obscure. The National Police force was responsible for public order in and around cities with a population of 5,000 or more.

b. Central headquarters, all bureaus, and more than 7,000 police were stationed in Tehran. The Chief of the National Police, appointed by the Shah and working under the Ministry of Interior, had authority over all municipal chiefs of police. Each city was divided into precincts. The police were organized into bureaus and sections, including the Detective Bureau; the Bureau of Investigation Services; the Section for Government Assignments; and the Section for Miscellaneous Cases.

c. The source of recruits for the National Police was primarily from conscripts who had completed their Army service. Prerequisites included being literate and between the ages of 19 and 23, but these requirements were not always met. Many of the senior officers were former Army men. More recently, recruitment of officers was through the Police Academy, later renamed the Police College, which was established in 1943. Secondary school graduates were invited to apply for admission through competitive examinations. Those selected on the basis of competitive examinations attended the Police College for 3

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years before becoming officers. Most patrolmen and junior officers were assigned to their own communities, but senior officers and police chiefs usually spent up to 5 years in several different cities.

d. The National Police, like the Gendarmerie, had a poor reputation. Corrupt practices, accepting bribes and kickbacks, and committing acts of violence and brutality were commonplace. Since 1960, the image of the police has been improved through its efforts to reduce corrupt practices and by assisting the people during disasters.

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## Section II. Appraisal of Military Security Establishment

### 63. Military objectives and threats.

a. Objectives. While no known reference source provides a listing of Iranian military objectives for 1921-51, unclassified sources do provide information from which the following objectives have been deduced:

(1) Maintain and defend the sovereign (the throne) against internal and external enemies.

(2) Establishment of a National Army from the various heterogeneous military formations in Iran and modernization of that Army.

(3) Disarm the tribes and maintain internal security.

(4) Prepare Iranian men, through literacy and other training, for careers in the National Police, Gendarmerie, and the Government.

b. Major threat perceptions. The USSR traditionally has represented the greatest external threat to Iran. The Soviets, however, have alternated their tactics between the use of hard and soft methods. On the hard side, the Soviets have used violent propaganda, threatening notes, subversive acts, border incidents, and open military invasion of Iran. During 1921-51, the Soviets used all of the foregoing methods to intimidate and to impose their will upon the Iranians. During 1921-51, British power in the Persian Gulf area and the Middle East, as well as British influence in Iran, represented the second greatest external threat to Iran. This statement, from an Iranian's

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point of view, is borne out by the British invasion of southern Iran in August 1941 and the movement of British military forces during the oil crisis of 1951-53. Other than the USSR, countries bordering Iran represented no major external threat to Iran during 1921-44. The Kurdish tribes, however, who numbered over one million and lived in the northwest along and astride Iraqi, Turkish, and Soviet borders, did present an external threat to Iran, and were a near-constant source of trouble throughout the preconflict period.

### c. Internal threats.

(1) The nomadic tribes, especially the Kurds, Lurs, and Qashqai, were an internal threat to Iranian Government control. The tribes in general were not inclined to feel any great obligation to their fellow countrymen. The idea of a national unity was not uniformly held throughout the country. The traditional life of the tribesman was focused on the breeding of sheep and goats, accompanied by hunting and fighting. His most prized possessions were his horse and his arms--a rifle and a variety of daggers and knives. The leaders, called khans, were, generally, opposed to the Shah's reform program. These tribes, generally isolated from political life by their nomadic or seminomadic existence, obeyed their khans and were ready to use violence if necessary. They were extremely troublesome as insurgents, particularly when operating in their own family terrain.

(2) Subversion of Iranian political parties by Communists and extremist elements threatened the stability and sovereignty of Iran

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during the period 1921-51 (see chapter 1, section IV). The Tudeh Party penetrated the Iranian Armed Forces. In September 1954, security forces found that more than 600 officers were Tudeh sympathizers. A number of officers were purged, and some were executed.

(3) A military coup d'etat from within does not appear to have been a serious internal threat. During Reza Shah's reign he either dominated the Minister of War or removed him. (The Shah was accused of having murdered a Minister of War in 1934.) Reza Shah, and later his son, Muhammad Reza Shah, carefully and personally chose their key military commanders. Both Shahs favored heavy military expenditures, and both insisted that funds from military expenditures be made available ahead of other domestic requirements. Iranian military officers, by and large, enjoyed prestige and status during 1921-51. The Shah frequently consulted with his trusted military generals before making a political policy, decision, or appointment, thus insuring the continued support of the military.

### d. Strategic appraisals.

(1) Iran occupies a strategic position, as it separates the Soviet Union from the Persian Gulf and access to the outside world through a warm water port. The traditional Russian drive for a warm-water port has long affected the security of both Iran and neighboring Turkey, which controls Soviet access to the Mediterranean through the Dardanelles. In addition to its critical geographical location, the natural resources of Iran are sufficient to make it essential that they

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be kept available to the Western nations. Iran's prime resource is oil, but deposits of chromite, gold, copper, iron, lead, zinc, maganese, and coal also are in sufficient amounts for profitable mining.

(2) One of the major deterrents to the buildup of Iranian power is the inadequacy of the country's transportation system. Railroads and highway networks are inadequate to link population centers for trade or military purposes.

### 64. Command control and communications.

a. In 1921, when Reza Khan became the Minister of War, there was no recognized chain of command in the Army. He, in fact, had almost no Armed Forces to command. He proceeded to create them by amalgamating the regional, tribal, and other autonomous forces into a National Army. The Army which he created in the 1920s had territorial and tactical organizations, a high command (Reza Shah himself), a general staff, support services, a military academy, and later a staff college and an air force and navy. The military chain of command was more clearly defined in 1955. The Shah, as Commander in Chief of all the Armed Forces, exercised operational command through the Chief, Supreme Commander's Staff, who exercised operational command over the three services. The three service chiefs (Army, Air Force, and Navy), exercised operational command over their respective service, and thence downward through subordinate commanders. The Minister of War no longer was in the operational chain of command, but he retained responsibility for administration of the Armed Forces.

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b. The IIG was under the administration of the Ministry of the Interior. For operational purposes, the country was divided into 13 areas, the boundaries of which coincided whenever possible with political subdivisions. Nine areas were under the control of district headquarters which controlled two or more IIG regiments composed of five or more companies and numerous posts. The other four areas were independent and controlled by separate IIG regiments, which had the same general responsibilities as the district headquarters.

c. The National Police Chief, appointed by the Shah, worked under the Ministry of Interior. He had authority over all municipal chiefs of police, who in turn had authority over the precincts in their respective cities.

d. During 1921-51, telecommunications with Tehran from the outside world appear to have been better than those internal to Iran. In 1921, foreign telegraph connections were in the hands of the British telegraph department and the British Indo-European Telegraph Company, which controlled in this way all of the Iranian Government's communications. In 1931, these concessions were terminated; the Iranian State Telegraph took over the equipment and systems and started to operate international lines. Long distance telephone lines constructed by the Allies during World War II were taken over by the Iranian Government after the war and integrated into the system of the State telegraph. By 1958, the national system contained about 11,000 miles of lines, which covered most of the country.

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e. General Afra's description of military operations in his book *Under Five Shahs* indicates that military communications during 1921-45 were primarily by messenger and landline telegraph. The landlines were frequently cut during rebellions and civil disturbances. While Iranian security forces were using some radios in the 1940s, it was not until after WWII that these forces were extensively equipped with radios. The Gendarmerie and the National Police would have had essentially the same communication limitations as the Army.

f. Available reference sources do not provide specific details or long-range planning for security forces. Achievements, however, indicate considerable planning must have taken place, with the Reza Shah personally directing most of it. This is evidenced by the Shah's planning in 1921 for an initial National Army of 40,000, reaching a strength of 105,000 by 1941; by passage of a manpower conscription law in 1925; by the modernization of the Army in the 1930's; by establishment of a light armament industry; and by literacy training of recruits in the Army. Preparation of the defense budget under the Minister of War each year and its approval by the Majlis also was a form of long-range planning.

### 65. Military training and indoctrination.

a. The enlisted recruits, largely from the lower class and illiterate, received approximately 13 weeks of basic training prior to being assigned to an organization. Once assigned to a unit, they received more advanced training. During their time in the service,

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illiterates received schooling in the official language of Iran. No formal political training, per se, was given to enlisted trainees.

b. The officers, who were largely of the elite or aristocratic class, received their basic education from private tutors supplemented sometimes by study or travel abroad. The training tended to be in languages, literature, philosophy, and arts; practical application to current circumstances was virtually ignored. The customs and practices of polite society and its attitude toward other segments of the population were acquired by practice and observation under supervision of tutors. The most outstanding omission from the officers' education was the lack of experience in manual labor. The stigma attached to such work probably was the reason officers employed so many orderlies. During the 1930s, a special military primary school was operated for the Crown Prince and attended by the sons of generals and colonels. There was also a military academy in Tehran, now called Military College, whose graduates were commissioned second lieutenants. The Military College continued in operation during the Allied occupation, commissioning 515 lieutenants in 1943. Iran has only one Military College, and graduates may be assigned to the Navy and Air Force as well as to the Army. There was also a Command and General Staff College, where officers received advanced schooling, and branch schools for specialist training.

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66. Military equipment capabilities.

a. In the 1920s, Iran had little or no capability to manufacture military armaments. Thus, in his drive to modernize the Iranian Army, Rezh Shah sent buyers, primarily Ibrahim Arfa, all over Europe and the United States shopping for arms. In addition to normal armaments, Iran was ordering aircraft and antiaircraft batteries in the early 1930s.

b. During the 1930s, under German technical assistance, an armament industry was developed in Iran. A machinegun factory in Tehran and an airplane factory in Shahbas were established. According to the Orient Nachrichten, the airplane factory was capable of producing a squadron of smaller fighter planes every 2 months. They were convertible into light bombers. German-Iranian cooperation in the armament industry were just getting started at the outbreak of World War II.

c. General Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs, provides an indication of Iranian military equipment capabilities in the late 1930s and early 1940s as well as of the tactics of the Soviets. The event described took place in 1943 after Qavam became Prime Minister in July.

The Russians at this time pressed on Qavam a demand to deliver to them 100,000 7.92 rifles made in Iran, 3,000 light machineguns Model Brno, also of Iranian make, and 1,000 heavy Maxim machineguns, which were in the arsenal. These arms were delivered to them in their cases in Teheran. We did not understand then the reason for this request, as these arms were not in use in the

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Soviet Army; on the other hand we had still enough arms left in our units and arsenals for our own army which had by then been reduced to 100,000 men plus 15,000 gendarmes. The reason became apparent after two years, when we discovered that the Soviet-organized army of the puppet-state of Iranian Azerbaijan was armed with these rifles in an attempt to make the world believe that this armament has been taken from Iranian units, and not provided by the U.S.S.R.

d. During 1921-51, Iran did not have a sufficient metallurgical industry to produce all needed heavy armaments. Iran had to depend on procuring heavy armaments abroad. Most armaments purchased abroad prior to 1941 were from Germany, Sweden, and Czechoslovakia. Subsequent to 1945, some arms were received from the United States.

### 67. Differences and rivalries between services.

a. Available data sources do not indicate any serious rivalry among the Army, Air, and Naval forces of Iran during the preconflict period. This could be attributed to the fact that the Air Force and Navy were organized as branches of the Army in 1924 and 1927, respectively, and both remained as branches of the Army until 1955, when they were organized as separate services. Subsequent to 1955, the Army and Air Force occupied about equal levels of prestige, with the Navy occupying a level of prestige somewhat below the other two services.

b. While there apparently was little or no rivalry within the Army, there was some antagonism between the Iranian Army and the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie during 1921-51. In the 1920s, some of the IIG, especially in northern Iran, had a professional distaste for their rival Cossacks. The IIG social structure and material conditions

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compared unfavorably with that of the traditionally proroyalist Cossacks. The IIG subsisted on whatever money was left over after the Army received its share of the budget. Officers of the IIG were all military in origin, probably men of lower qualifications than those retained in the Army. Also most Gendarmes were recruited from conscripts who had completed their military service, thus the Gendarmes were aware of the better conditions which existed in the Army. A state of poor relations between the Army and the IIG prevailed until about 1953.

c. Some antagonism also existed between the National Police and the other security forces. Disputes with the IIG were common, because areas of jurisdiction were not precisely defined. Also, former Army men held most of the senior officer positions, causing discontent on the part of the patrolmen because they knew their chances of promotion were slight. Also, the lack of interdepartmental cooperation contributed to the antagonisms. These general conditions existed during the 1921-51 period.

68. Loyalty of the military. In examining the loyalty of the military during 1921-51, the officers, the noncommissioned officers, and the conscripts must be looked at separately. They came from different social strata, (paragraph 72 below).

a. Most officers were from the Iranian elite group. This, plus the fact that the Shah personally approved appointments to high rank and high command positions, helped to assure their loyalty to the

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throne. Whether or not an officer was selected for high position, he realized that his self-interest and the interest of his upper class family would be best served by stability and permanence of the throne. Three incidents which reflected unfavorably on the loyalty of the military during the preconflict period were the coup d'etat on 21 February 1921, led by Reza Khan himself, the abandonment of their units by many Iranian officers during the British and Soviet invasion of Iran in August 1941, and the Tudeh/Communist infiltration of the Armed Forces during 1942-54. In years subsequent to 1944, some Iranian officers sympathetic to Communist and Tudeh Party causes did lead rebellious movements and commit other actions of sabotage and disloyalty. Otherwise, military officers appear to have been loyal to the throne during 1921-51.

b. The noncommissioned officers, nearly all of whom were career men, enjoyed positions of comparative prestige and authority with other Iranian middle class elements. They realized that their careers and self-interest were dependent upon stability of the throne. Thus, they carried out their orders and as a group were loyal to the Shah.

c. The conscripts' habit of obedience to constituted authority and rigid discipline during their middle class or tribal upbringing were reflected in their service. They accepted the rigid discipline of the service, followed their harsh instructions, and were traditionally loyal to the Shah.

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### Section III. Environmental Factors.

69. Military aspects of terrain. Iran is a rugged, semiarid to arid country of mountains and high plains with relatively few perennial streams and forests. Sixty-five percent of the country is mountain rimland, 25 percent is interior basin area, and 10 percent is lowland area.

a. The mountain rimland, which includes the Northwest, Elbuz, Eastern, and Zagros Mountains, surrounds the interior basin. These rugged hills and mountains are generally 1,800 to 3,050 meters in elevation; the highest peak rises 5,771 meters above sea level. Dense forests are found on the slopes facing the Caspian Sea; in other areas, slopes are barren. Almost all of the perennial streams drain through the western and northern part of the rimland in deep-sided valleys or gorges. Most of the population centers and water supply are located in the rimland. In areas adjacent to the Caspian Sea, mountains extend almost to the shore, and conditions are generally unfavorable for military ground operations. In the intermontane basins and some of the peripheral plains, cross-country mobility is good except from November through April, when wet ground, swift flowing streams, or snows inhibit movement. Two active seismic belts underly the northern and western part of the rimland, and frequent earthquakes trigger landslides that block transportation routes, cut off communications, and disrupt water supplies. On the northern slopes of the Elburz Mountains, concealment is limited. The rugged hills and mountains restrict

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airborne operations, but the intermontane basins and plains provide suitable areas for airdrops and airfields.

b. Flat plains, widely scattered barren hills, and mountains rising to 914 meters above the adjacent plains comprise most of the interior basin region. Salt-encrusted mudflats and sand dunes as high as 600 feet also are found in this region. Water supply is scarce, and there are few populated areas or transport facilities. Throughout the interior basin, movement is limited mainly to roads. Military operations are possible in the uplands areas but must be oriented on water and transportation routes.

c. The southwestern Kurdistan lowland region in the vicinity of Abadan/Ahwaz has flat to rolling grass-covered plains dissected by several large, perennial streams. Along most of these streams near the coastline, marshes and mudflats are inundated from March through May. Some of Iran's major oilfields, rail lines, oil pipelines, and population centers are located in this region. Military ground operations are feasible in this region. Much of the ground is relatively firm and suitable for cross-country movement most of the year.

70. Climate. Iran has one of the most severe climates in the world. It is characterized by extremes; extreme dryness or aridity in the central plateau, extreme cold at the high elevations of the Elburz and Zagros Mountains, extreme heat during the summer months, and very high winds with accompanying dust storms, especially during the summer season. Dust storms may reduce visibility to less than 1 mile for



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several hours. Surface winds are light and generally from the southwest, although north and northwest winds prevail in October and November. Average temperatures vary from 40° F. in the north in winter to more than 100° F. in the south during the summer. Annual precipitation ranges from 100 centimeters in the mountains of the north to as little as five centimeters in the basin areas. Mean annual precipitation in the Caspian Lowlands is often as much as 127 centimeters, but in the Persian Gulf Lowlands it is usually less than 25 centimeters. Precipitation occurs throughout the country from October through May; the only area receiving appreciable rainfall in the summer is the Caspian Lowlands.

### 71. Manpower and demography.

a. Statistics on the manpower available to the Iranian military during 1921-51 are obscure. The first nationwide census was not until 1956. Population and manpower figures prior to 1956 were mere approximations, liable to all sorts of errors at their source. The inhabitants evaded registration in the hope of escaping taxation and conscription. Local officials sometimes estimated by sheer guess or by repeating previous long-outdated estimates. Estimates of the settled population were made by counting houses and reckoning five persons to a house. Tribal estimates were made by counting the tents at points of passage, such as passes or bridges, during the seasonal migrations and likewise reckoning five persons to a tent.

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b. While no accurate statistics were recorded, it was estimated that one-third of the Army normally was made up of conscripts. Based on this, one could estimate that one-third of the Army was in the age group 20 to 24 years. Any further estimation on the age distribution within the Army would be pure speculation. The 1956 census, however, did indicate that 699,358 males, or approximately 3.7 percent of the population, were in the 20-24 year age group.

c. In 1962, the male population of the overall military age (15 to 49) was estimated at 5 million with about half that number considered physically fit by Iranian standards for military service. About one in every 25 in this age group was in the service.

### 72. Social factors.

a. The essential features of Iranian culture and character are discussed in chapter 4. These are an important element in understanding the Iranian military forces, as well as most other aspects of the Iranian national scene during 1921-51.

b. Persians were taught discipline and to respect authority from early childhood. Respectful obedience was expected as normal behavior. Severe punishment was meted out by the fathers in the home and by the teachers in the schools. At home, a disobedient boy could expect to be beaten about the head, body, and legs with a stick by his father. The first thing a policeman did when he arrested a suspect was to beat him. If a man was beaten by the police in error, he was expected to accept his bad luck with good grace. The Persian conscript brought

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with him into the Army the innate qualities of discipline and respect for authority. The discipline and control that the conscript found in the Army was simply an extension and continuation of what he had always known.

c. There was no existing cult of heroism; although the Persian admired dead heroes, he had no desire to become one. This may have directed his actions in the face of overwhelming odds, as, for example, the failure of the Army to stand up longer than 72 hours against British and Soviet occupation forces in August 1941. Officers fled, leaving the leaderless troops to fade away before the enemy.

d. The officers of Iranian security forces came, for the most part, from the better families who resided in or near the cities. Many were from the elite families of the upper class. Many officers had the advantage of education abroad, and most attended some kind of military academy either in Iran or abroad. Since the military was in favor with the Shah, officers quite often fared better than persons of comparable status in the civil service. Officers attaining the rank of general usually acquired upper class status. These upper class officers did not identify themselves with the peasant or tribesmen. They had a different language and culture, and they were in general indifferent to the misery of poverty that surrounded them. This was also true for officers of the Gendarmerie and the National Police, since the military was their primary source of officers. Very few officers were of middle class origin, and even fewer officers were of tribal origin. Officer

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origin continued to be [narrow]-based [socially] on the upper class until well after World War II.

e. Noncommissioned officers, who were recruited voluntarily, came largely from middle class city dwellers, principally from the bazaar group. They had some education and were tough disciplinarians.

f. The enlisted men were mostly lower class in origin, primarily of peasant and tribal stock. This sector of society was 85 to 90 percent illiterate during the preconflict period. The conscription law passed in 1925 and subsequent amendments operated in such a way as to draft most illiterates. All males upon reaching the age of 21 were subject to being conscripted for 2 years in the Armed Forces. As they were chosen by lot, and as the number required by the Armed Forces was less than half the number reaching age 21 each year, many were never called to serve. The educated young men from the middle and upper classes could and did legally buy deferments for as little as \$65. After an eligible individual escaped being chosen in three successive drafts, he was permanently exempt. Thus, there were many abuses of the conscription laws, which resulted in most illiterates being inducted into the Armed Forces. This may have been theoretically unjust, but in actual practice it may have worked for the benefit of the nation. The illiterate conscripts were taught to read, write, and speak the national language and learned trades that they could not have learned in their villages. Also, after release from the Armed Forces, these conscripts were the primary source of manpower for the Gendarmerie and National Police.

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g. Men who had received a university education were exempted from conscription, and students in secondary schools served only 1 year. These exemptions were later restricted, but for supporters of families, service was limited to 4-1/2 months. The period of general liability for service in 1944 amounted to 25 years; 2 in the Army, 4 in the Army reserve, 14 in the first general reserve, and 5 in the supplementary reserve.

h. About 85 percent of the Iranian population are Muslims of the Shi'la sect of Islam. This is the official religion of the country. To a Muslim, all non-Muslims are infidels. Thus, Islam, by its very teachings, is prejudiced toward other religions. Articles 1 and 58 of the General Principles of the Iranian Constitution reflects this prejudice:

Article 1. The State religion of Iran is Islam, according to the true Ja' fariya doctrine, recognizing twelve Imams. The shah of Iran must profess and propagate this faith.

Article 58. No one may be nominated Minister unless he is a Muslim of Iranian origin or an Iranian subject.

With a Shah and a Minister of War who are required by the Constitution to promote the Muslim religion, it has not been possible for non-Muslims to achieve high command or policymaking positions in the Iranian Armed Forces.

### 73. Economic considerations.

a. The Iranian defense budgets exceeded those of every other Ministry, including education and health. Mr. Arthur C. Millspaugh,

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in his book Americans in Persia stated, "I held to the belief that the Army, in spite of some apparent reforms, constituted this wasteful government's [Iran's] most colossal extravagance." Perhaps the Iranians were being guided, in part, by the maxim of one of their ancient leaders, Sassanid King Ardashir (A.D. 226-241) when he said, "There can be no power without an army, no army without money, no money without agriculture, no agriculture without justice."

b. The Iranian Government generally operated with two budgets, an ordinary budget and an extraordinary budget. The former included what could have been called estimates of normal revenues and expenditures, and the latter included special revenues and expenditures. For example, in 1943-44, the ordinary expenditures were Rls3.297 billion, and the extraordinary expenditures were Rls589 million. Of the ordinary expenditures of 3.297 billion, the Army received about 1 billion, the Gendarmene received about 298 million, and the National Police received about 187 million which, together, accounted for about 45 percent of the ordinary budget.

c. Table X below provides an overview of Iranian defense expenditures relative to overall expenditures.

#### 74. Level of violence; constraints on the military forces.

a. Iranian history has been filled with turbulence, assassinations, riots, and revolts. The period 1921-51 was no exception. It began in 1921 with Reza Khan's coup d'etat against the Qajar dynasty. The following chronology illustrates the prevalence of conflict:

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Table X

## Defense Budgets of Iran, 1943-62

(In millions of dollars--75 Rls = US\$1)

<u>Year</u>	<u>1944</u> <sup>a</sup>	<u>1949</u> <sup>b</sup>	<u>1950</u> <sup>b</sup>	<u>1957</u> <sup>c</sup>	<u>1958</u> <sup>c</sup>
Total expenditure	43.7	342.1	353.	529	600
National defense	19.8	105.4	118.7	112	133
Percent of expenditure	45.	30.8	33.6	21.2	22.1
<u>Year</u>	<u>1959</u> <sup>c</sup>	<u>1960</u> <sup>c</sup>	<u>1961</u> <sup>c</sup>	<u>1962</u> <sup>c</sup>	
Total expenditure	667	730	729	725	
National defense	170	174	193	192	
Percent of expenditure	25.5	23.8	26.5	26.5	

<sup>a</sup>Great Britain, Naval Staff, Persia.

<sup>b</sup>US Dept. of State, Office of Intelligence Research, Military Expenditures of Greece, Turkey and Iran.

<sup>c</sup>American University, SORO, US Army Area Handbook for Iran.

<sup>d</sup>Ordinary expenditure only.

1921--Kuchik Khan and his Jangalis held the province of Gilan in rebellion, and Ismail Simko led the Iranian Kurds in a movement for Kurdish autonomy.

1922--Lakhuti Khan led a rebellion in Azerbaijan and revolt spread to Luristan.

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1925--Qashqai and Bakhtiari tribesmen forcibly disarmed and pacified along with the Iranian Turkomans.

1927--Clergy openly were outraged by Reza Shah's social reforms.

1928--Police measures were used to enforce the decree banning native costumes for townsmen, peasants, and tribesmen.

1931-32--There was disagreement with the APOC over oil royalty payments.

1934--There were rumors of political murder and assassinations; even Reza Shah was accused of murdering the Minister of War, and there was trouble with Afghanistan over Afghan bands raiding in Iranian territory.

1941--The British and Soviets occupied Iran, Reza Shah abdicated his throne; tribal chiefs who were under restriction returned to their districts and to tribal life as before; Iranian Armed Forces were set back by the Allied invasion; the Government virtually collapsed.

1942--Lawlessness, robbery, and holdups were widespread; the Kurdish and Turkoman tribes causing trouble; Communists active in the Tudeh party; and the trouble associated with the Iranians brawling with Allied soldiers over Iranian girls.

1943--There were bread riots in Tehran; the Army dealt a serious defeat by the Qashqai at Semirom south of Esfahan.

1944--The Tudeh Party inspired and led violent demonstrations in Tehran and Tabriz; the Qashqai tribes attempted to gain autonomous status; Soviets dominated the northern provinces; there were more than 100 Iranian Army officers suspected of being sympathetic to communism; Kurds caused trouble in Mahabad.

1945--The autonomy of Iranian Azerbaijan was proclaimed, with Soviet support.

1946--Azerbaijan remained in open rebellion until December.

1949--There was an attempted assassination of the Shah; and the Tudeh Party outlawed.

1951-53--Oil and Mossadeq crisis.

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b. Political and legal constraints governing the use of military forces for internal security during the preconflict period were largely those imposed by the Shahs and their ministers. The Iranian Constitution does not contain restrictions on the use of the Armed Forces. Reza Shah, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, used the Iranian military forces to impose social reforms and to maintain internal security in such ways as to be accused of oppressions, using repressive tactics, and of being a military dictator. During the same period, however, the Armed Forces in fact did contribute to modernization and nation-building programs by pacifying the tribes and providing literacy training.

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### Section IV. Military Impact on Society.

75. Attitude toward military. The attitude of the Iranian populace toward the military during the preconflict period was one of general detestation. The same was true for other Iranian security forces. These forces were avoided because of their methods of operation under the Shah. This resulted from the forcible military disarmament and pacification of the tribes, stationing of troops about the country to control movement and collect taxes, frequent use of martial law, allocation of the largest share of the national budget to the military, and the overall dominant position assumed by the military in all communities during Reza Shah's reign. Even many of the landowning aristocracy were opposed to the military, as their group was losing political control. Also, many of the landowners were forced to pay taxes, whereas in the past they had been able to avoid doing so. The aristocracy was somewhat mollified as time passed, insofar as it was able to introduce members into the dominant military hierarchy or establish alliances with it through marriage. In this way, aristocrats were able to participate in the profits accruing from the possession of power. Bitterness toward the military, especially along the middle or lower classes, continued even after World War II.

76. Relation to civilian branch of Government. The Iranian military played a major role in their civil Government. Reza Shah himself was military in origin. As Shah and Commander in Chief of the Iranian Armed Forces, he was judged by some to be a military dictator and by

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others to be a benevolent autocrat, depending on how his programs had affected them individually. Ranking generals wielded considerable influence, individually or in cliques. They were usually members of large influential families and well-connected with members of the Majlis or Cabinet. During military pacification of the tribes, military governors were appointed to replace the khans. In some parts of the country the paramilitary Gendarmerie was the only government or control in the area. Following abdication of Reza Shah and the invasion of the Allies in 1941, the Iranian military officers must be given considerable credit in preventing the complete collapse of the Iranian Government. The Armed Forces were the principal support of the Shah's political power and influence during the period.

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## Section V. Foreign Factors and Influences.

### 77. Military assistance programs.

#### a. US military assistance programs.

(1) The United States has maintained a military mission in Iran since 27 September 1941, although initially it was concerned with lend-lease assistance in the Middle East. In October and November 1942, a US military mission headed by Major General C. S. Ridley, assisted by Colonel Dumond and 10 other officers, arrived in Iran. They acted in an advisory capacity only. Their competence extended primarily to supply and support matters and not to operational matters. It was said that General Ridley had good relations with his Iranian colleagues. In November 1943, a formal contract was signed between the two Governments specifying the organization and mission of the US Military Mission with the Imperial Iranian Army (ARMISH). The assigned mission of ARMISH was to advise and assist the Iranian Minister of War; the Supreme Commander's Staff (now Joint Staff); and the commanders and staffs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in matters pertaining to plans, organizations, administration, and training. Members of ARMISH had neither command nor staff authority in the Iranian Army. A revised contract was drawn up and signed by the two Governments in October 1947. The contract has been extended for 1-year or 2-year increments since that date.

(2) During 1942-45, the United States established the Persian Gulf Command (PGC) in Iran of about 30,000 noncombatant troops headed by Major General Donald H. Connolly. The PGC developed Khorramshahr

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into a large, modern seaport in less than a year. The same may be said of the airport at Abadan and the port facilities at Bandar Abbas and Bandar Shahpur. The PGC's accomplishments were a show of truly US tempo. The Iranians learned about Americans by watching the US troops and finding that they were efficient and dynamic at work, friendly, cheerful, and human in their free time. To the Iranians, the Americans did not have the aloofness of the British or the coldness and fearsomeness of the Soviets. The US PGC evacuated Iran in January 1946, in accordance with the agreement to do so not later than 6 months after the end of the war.

(3) In May 1950, a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed by the United States and Iran. To carry out the objectives and to assure effective implementation of this agreement, a US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to Iran was established. However, Military Assistance Program (MAP) equipment did not begin to arrive in quantity in Iran until February 1952. Under the MAP, the United States gave arms, ammunition, and equipment to Iran totaling \$530.10 million by the end of June 1961.

(4) In 1942 the Iranian Government requested the United States to provide technical assistance for the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie. The United States responded by sending Colonel H. Norman Schwarzkopf, a former chief of the New Jersey State Police who was well-known for his handling of the Lindbergh kidnapping case. Colonel Schwarzkopf was granted some executive authority, but his role was primarily one of

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an adviser. He was credited with having gained respect and influence among the Iranians and with contributing significantly to the improvement of the Gendarmerie. In 1948, the contract for the US Military Mission with Imperial Gendarmerie (GENMISH) was renewed, but with a provision that the Chief of GENMISH would serve in an advisory role only. GENMISH has been a small mission, approximately 20 US military. The mission of GENMISH has been to advise the Iranian Minister of Interior on improving the organization and operations of the Iranian Gendarmerie.

(5) L. S. Timmerman, a US police expert, assisted the Iranian municipal police from 1942 until his death in 1944.

(6) The impact of US troops and military advisers in Iran near the end of the preconflict period, generally speaking, was a positive one. Friendship between the United States and Iran was strengthened, Iranians gained confidence in the United States, and Iranian courage was bolstered against Soviet infiltration. The feelings of the Iranians toward the United States was reflected in 1945 when the US Consulate in Tehran was besieged by a large number of students seeking admittance to American Universities. The US presence was also a deterrent to Soviet aggression.

b. Soviet military assistance programs. The Soviet Union did not provide Iran with military assistance during 1921-51 in the sense that the United States did during and after World War II. The US military assistance was designed to strengthen the Iranian Government, while

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Soviet military programs in Iran were designed to weaken it. The negative aspects of Soviet efforts are reflected in the incidents described below.

(1) Upon leaving Iran after World War I, the Soviets left behind more than 100,000 rifles, many machineguns, and even several mountain guns, together with all kinds of other war material at Tabriz and Sharifkhaneh, or sold such material to the populace. These weapons fell into the hands of the local leaders and tribes.

(2) Until after World War I, Russian officers, about 70 in number, were with the Persian Cossack Division as instructors, but these officers in fact commanded the Cossacks. They were dismissed during 1921-23.

(3) During the occupation of Iran in World War II, the Soviets demanded in 1943 that the Iranians deliver to them 100,000 7.92 rifles, 3,000 light machineguns, and 1,000 heavy machineguns. These arms were delivered to the Soviets in their cases in Tehran. Two years later it was discovered that the Soviet-organized army of the puppet state of Iranian Azerbaijan was armed with these weapons.

(4) In 1943 while visiting the Shah, Stalin promised the Shah that the USSR would give, as a gift, a regiment of tanks and a wing of war planes to the Iranian Armed Forces. Afterwards, the Soviet Union demanded that the tank regiment be located at Kazvin under Soviet instructors, who would be allowed to choose the cadres for the regiment themselves, and that the Air Force wing at Nushed should operate under

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the same conditions. It was clear that the moment the Soviets judged it convenient, these units would march on Tehran to install the Tudeh Party government in Iran. The Shah saw through the Soviet scheme and declined Stalin's offer.

c. Germany military assistance to Iran began in about 1927 and ended with the Allied occupation of Iran in 1941. With the help of German technicians, internal airlines were established, roads and bridges were built, and the trans-Iranian railway was completed. Under German technical assistance, a small-arms factory at Tehran and an airplane factory at Shahbas were completed. Also, in the late 1930s, several Iranian Air Force officers were trained in Germany.

d. British military assistance to Iran during the preconflict period was very small. Under the Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919, British military and economic missions were sent to Tehran. In February 1921, Reza Khan appealed to the British, on the one hand, to delay evacuating their troops from Iran and, on the other hand, requested transfer of the South Persian Rifles (6,000 men) to Iranian control. Being unable to reach a satisfactory agreement with the Iranians, the British evacuated their troops, disbanded the South Persian Rifles and evacuated or destroyed the equipment, and withdrew their military mission--all by 1923. The British did, however, sell or otherwise provide to the Iranian Air Force most of the 280 aircraft that the Iranians had on hand at the time of the Allied invasion in August 1941. After the war, the British gave Iran two destroyers in 1946.

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78. Impact of foreign military ideologies. Foreign ideologies which had substantial impact on the Iranian Armed Forces were of Western and Soviet origins. Western influence was reflected in Reza Shah's modernization of his Army and in its organization, training, and doctrine. Soviet or Communist influence was reflected by the successful winning over of several hundred Iranian military officers as sympathizers of the Tudeh and Communist parties. Toward the end of Reza Shah's reign, the Nazis had gained considerable influence among the Iranian Air Force officers. These officers had acquired strong German sentiments while being trained in Germany. They refused to obey surrender orders issued to the Iranian Armed Forces following the Allied invasion in August 1941 and resorted to an abortive coup d'etat.

79. Alliances. During the preconflict period, Iran entered into the following important treaties and alliances:

a. On 26 February 1921 an Irano-Soviet treaty was signed which cancelled all Iranian debts to the Soviet Union and renounced all treaties previously conducted by Czarist Russia with Iran. The Soviet Union retained the right of intervention in the event of an invasion of Iran by a third power. Article 6 of this treaty stated:

If a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia, or if such power should desire to use Persian territory as a base of operations against Russia, or if a foreign power should threaten the frontiers of Federal Russia or those of its Allies, and if the Persian Government should not be able to put a stop to such menace after having been once called on to do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations necessary

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for its defense. Russia undertakes, however, to withdraw her troops from Persian territory as soon as the danger has been removed.

b. In 1938, Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Afghanistan signed the Saadahad Pact of nonaggression and friendship.

c. On 29 January 1942, the Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union and Iran was signed in Tehran. This treaty set forth conditions of the Allied occupation, and Article 5 agreed that the Allied Powers would withdraw from Iranian territory no later than 6 months after all hostilities ceased between the Allies and Germany.

d. Important treaties and alliances of a military nature entered into by Iran prior to 1956 include the following:

(1) In October 1947, an agreement for Iran to receive military assistance from the United States went into effect.

(2) In 1955, Iran joined the Baghdad Pact. After the 1958 coup d'etat in Iraq, the Baghdad Pact changed its name to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).

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### Section VI. Conclusions.

#### 80. Conclusions.

a. From this review of Iranian military and military related matters for the 1921-44 period, the following tentative conclusions concerning factors, indicators, and indexes of impending low intensity conflict were reached:

(1) There was no single military factor, by itself, which could have acted as a warning to the Iranian Government that low intensity conflict was imminent.

(2) The most apparent factor was the habitual interference or intervention in Iranian internal affairs by major powers, particularly the Soviet covert and overt military support of Iranian dissent groups.

(3) There were frequent internal clashes with dissident tribes and groups involving the use of the regular military organizations.

(4) The regular Iranian military establishment suffered demoralization and weakening as a result of the Allied invasion in 1941.

b. The following are considered to be military indicators of possible impending low intensity conflict.

(1) Corruption was widespread in the nation's security forces, including the Armed Forces, Gendarmerie, and National Police, especially during 1942-44.

(2) Dissenting groups and tribes were being armed and supported by an outside major power.

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(3) There was a general detestation of the security forces by the populace, especially during the 1930s.

(4) There were military officers with strong pro-German, pro-British, and pro-Soviet sentiments.

(5) The Iranian Armed Forces were penetrated by political parties hostile to the Iranian Government.

c. The following are considered to be military indexes which, in connection with other factors, might have indicated that the outbreak of low intensity conflict was possible.

(1) A soldier turned politician (Colonel Reza Khan's coup d'etat).

(2) There were imposed social reforms enforced by national security forces.

(3) A wide culture and class gap existed between the officers and enlisted men and between the officers and the common people.

(4) Many of the elite officers were foreign trained.

(5) There was rivalry and antagonism among the Police, Gendarmerie, and Armed Forces.

(6) Communications, including telecommunications, were poor.

(7) Suitable cover and redoubts for guerrilla operations existed in most of the Iranian mountain rimland.

(8) The populace was made up largely of rugged people accustomed to surviving under severe and austere conditions.

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(9) Twenty-five to forty-five percent of the annual national expenditures was to support the military establishment.

(10) Xenophobia prevailed within the country during 1921-51.

d. In spite of obvious abuses by some greedy officers and the involvement of some officers in the Tudeh/Communist conspiracy, the Army remained a coherent unit, was loyal to the throne, was a deterrent to insurgency, and was the single most stabilizing factor in Iran.

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## ANNEX I

### A HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN IRAN

#### 1. Pre-Soviet history.

a. Soviet efforts to expand southward into Persia began early in the 18th century. In a document purported to be his will to his successor, Czar Peter the Great advised a continual state of war along Soviet border; temporary commercial cooperation with Britain until Soviet expansion in the East no longer required it; incitement of wars in Turkey (a contestant at that time for control of Iran) and in Iran itself; and the use of the decadence of Iran (then called Persia) to penetrate to the Persian Gulf in order to reestablish trade with the Levant and to open the way for invasion of India.<sup>1</sup>

b. In the 19th century, there were several military efforts to further Soviet influence in Persia. Czar Paul attempted to interest Napoleon in a joint expedition to India through Persia. In the 1820s, the Soviet Union again sought to penetrate Persia but succeeded only in forcing the Persians more into the British sphere which had been created with the defeat of Napoleon. In 1884 the Soviet Union overthrew the Uzbek power and established the current boundry with Persia. The United Kingdom separated Afghanistan from Persia by military force in 1887, and in 1896, took what is now Western Pakistan. Soviet and British political and commercial rivalry at the Persian court became intense in this period, and almost all of the important segments of the Persian economy were under the control of one or the other power.<sup>2</sup>

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c. The Japanese defeat of the Soviet Union in 1905 encouraged the belief that the great powers were not invincible. In addition, the abortive revolt against the Czar in the Soviet Union caused many rebels to take refuge in Persia, where they found an audience appreciative of their revolutionary ideas. Many of these early associations with Soviet revolutionaries were to continue to take broader form after the success of the Bolshevik revolution. In 1905-6, Persian nationalists succeeded in forcing the Shah to proclaim a constitution and establish the Majlis (National Assembly) despite the opposition of both the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. Efforts by the Shah to subvert the Majlis and to a national uprising in 1909, at which time Soviet forces invaded to support the authority of the Shah. An army of Bakhtiari tribesmen from the south marched on Tehran to support the nationalists, who then succeeded in depositing the Shah and forcing the Soviets to retire to northern Persia, where they were to remain well into World War I.

d. Similar successes of the Turkish revolution at the time further heartened the Persian nationalists to press for modernization of Government and riddance of foreign influences. The United Kingdom and the Soviet Union began to find their respective interests jeopardized and, in face of the growing German threat to them elsewhere, agreed to divide Persia into spheres of influence, thereby protecting Soviet interests in the north and the British interest in the south.<sup>3</sup>

e. With the coming of World War I, Soviet forces extended their control over the northern provinces, while British troops established



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themselves in the Persian Gulf areas. Soon the Soviet forces were engaged by the Turkish Army. The British were kept occupied by German agents who were agitating among the tribesmen to encourage attacks upon the British oil pipelines and refinery. After the Communist revolution took the Soviet Union out of the war and Soviet forces in Persia were substantially reduced, the British were forced to occupy much of Persia to facilitate operations against the Turks and to prevent a possible Turko-German invasion of Persia and India.

f. At the end of the war the British found themselves in largely undisputed control of Iran. They sought to formalize this arrangement for commercial advantage by the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919. Popular indignation over this treaty was intense, and it played into the hands of the leaders of the new Soviet regime in the development of Communist doctrine and tactics for application in Persia.<sup>4</sup>

### 2. The early Soviet adventures: 1917-20.

a. The early successes of the revolution in the Soviet Union led Soviet leaders to believe that the revolution would gain in impetus by its very nature and spill rapidly into neighboring countries. Highest hopes were held for success in Germany and Hungary, industrialized states with large proletariat classes and, therefore, according to Marxist doctrine, most prepared for the socialist revolution. At the same time, opportunities for revolution in Persia and the Orient were not overlooked; intense debates took place in efforts to develop a doctrinal view of, and a program to encourage, revolution in the East.

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b. In the discussions of the first and second Congresses of Muslim Communists in 1918 and 1919, the Communist Congress at Baku in 1920, and the first Comintern Congress in 1920, the issues emerged clearly. Nationalist movements, spurred on by anti-Western, anticolonialist sentiment, were recognized as a rising force. Should the Communists encourage and make temporary alliance with these nonproletariat and nonsocialist movements in the hope of eventually securing control of them, or should they seek to create purely Communist proletariat-based movements to oppose the nationalists? Was it possible for the East to skip the capitalist stage of development and pass directly to the socialist system? Lenin argued for temporary alliance with the nationalists; the Iranian Communist, M. N. Roy, pressed for the creation of a proletariat-based movement to oppose the nationalists. Not until the second Comintern Congress was the argument resolved. A. Sultan Zade, the Baku Communists leader, suggested as a compromise that bourgeois democratic nationalist movements were to be supported in countries where they were still in the early stages of development; everywhere else the party should progress to the creation of the Communist movement.<sup>5</sup>

c. The situation in Persia gave the Soviets good cause for optimism. The burst of nationalist sentiment which began in the 19th century was gaining momentum. Popular opposition to the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919 was mounting. Although the bourgeois middle class was the most active element in the nationalist movement, the lower classes were also giving evidence of growing awareness. In the late 19th century, the textile

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workers, hard pressed by the open markets given to Soviet and British interests, had migrated to Turkestan, Soviet Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Some returned to Persia in the 1900s and began to form labor groups and stage protests. In 1907, the customs and postal employees of Tabriz went on strike; in the same year, peasants in Rasht went on strike and refused to pay rent to their landlords. In 1910, the United Association of Printers struck and began publishing its own leftist-oriented newspaper. By 1917, labor unions had been organized in Tehran, Rasht, Tabriz, and other cities among skilled workers. In 1918, a general strike occurred in Tehran. The collectivist and socialist movement in Persia was strongly established.<sup>6</sup>

d. In addition, two separatist movements had emerged during World War I, and the weak Persian Government appeared unable to deal with them. These movements in Gilan and Persian Azerbaijan were thought to have a high likelihood of success. Also, shortly after the Soviet revolution, a group of Persian oil workers at Baku had formed the leftist Adalat (Justice) Party and were seeking to encourage revolutionary change.

e. In 1918, the Bolshevik writer K. Troyanovsky summarized the situation in Persia and outlined the role it was to play in World revolution:

India is our principal objective. Persia is the only path open to India. The Persian revolution is the key to the revolution of all of the Orient, just as Egypt and the Suez Canal are the key to the British domination of the Orient. Persia is the Suez Canal of the revolution . . . . For the success of the oriental revolution Persia is the first nation that must be conquered by the Soviets. This precious key to the uprising of the Orient

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must be in the hands of Bolshevism, cost what it may . . . . Persia<sup>7</sup> must be ours; Persia must belong to the revolution.

f. The new Soviet Government began to organize to pursue the world revolution. It created the commissariats for Nationalities and for Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel) and the Comintern, with overlapping responsibilities in the fields of propaganda and diplomacy and in the organization and control of the Communist infrastructure.<sup>8</sup> With respect to Persia, an intense campaign was developed in this period, making use of a combination of propaganda, diplomatic pressure, subversive organization, manipulation of separatist movements, and, as a last resort, military pressure.

g. On the diplomatic front, in June 1918, Trotsky sent Tehran a note declaring null and void the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which had divided Persia into spheres of influence, and promised to undertake the evacuation of all Soviet troops. Two more notes in 1918 also declared the new Soviet Government's intention to divorce itself from the imperialist policies of the old Czarist regime and its desire to establish friendly relations.<sup>9</sup>

h. The propaganda line was revealed in a Soviet direction to its agencies in July 1919 titled, "The Nature of Propaganda to be Carried on in Persia." Agitation was to be concentrated, first, against the general hatred of the British; second, against domestic oppressors. Agitators must work through the local cells and organizations of the Persian Socialists and through the Separatist Movements in Baku and Persian



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Azerbaijan. These organizations were to be considered the basic material for the revolution, even though they were not numerous, "nor do they represent a socialistically dependable and sufficiently class-conscious element."<sup>10</sup> In August 1919, the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs addressed an appeal to the workers and peasants of Persia. It sought to divorce the Soviets from previous Soviet imperialism, condemned British imperialism, and issued a call to rise against the unlimited rule of the Shah and the oppression of the Persian feudal classes. It also promised an end to Soviet interference in Persia's internal revenues, freedom of Persian access to the Caspian Sea once it was cleared of British interests, determination of boundaries based on the freely expressed will of the inhabitants, and the annulment of all Russian public and private concessions in Persia.<sup>11</sup>

i. Failure to impress Tehran with its friendly overtures and to make rapid headway in mobilizing socialist and separatist sentiment in Persia caused the Soviets to reverse their approach in 1920. In May, Bolshevik forces invaded Baku and the Caspian port of Enzeli with the aim of driving out the small British and White Soviet forces there and linking up with the Separatist Movements in the provinces of Gilan and Persian Azerbaijan.

j. In June, the Adalat Party at Baku was reorganized to put Soviet-trained revolutionaries in control and renamed the Persian Communist Party (PCP). The PCP began immediately to penetrate the Separatist Movements and to organize revolutionary committees and cells among the workers

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and the leftist intellectuals, professionals, and students in Tehran, Tabriz, and other cities. Haidar Khan Amu-oglu emerged as leader of the PCP at the Baku Congress (replacing A. Sultan zade, who passed out of favor for a time because of his advocacy of working with the nationalist movements in Persia, a policy judged a failure in 1920). Haidar Khan was a Soviet-trained Baku Communist; he had been responsible for organizing revolutionary committees in the Caspian provinces and in Tehran and Tabriz. He was now sent to coordinate efforts with the Gilan Separatist Movement.<sup>12</sup>

k. Other leaders of the Party included Jafar Kavian, Moscow-trained organizer, active since 1918, who would later become the Minister of the Peoples' Army in Azerbaijan in 1945; Jafar Pishevari, who would later publish a Communist paper in Tehran and become the Prime Minister of Azerbaijan in 1945; Reza Rusta, who organized the Gilan peasant unions and who would eventually head the Tudeh Party unions after 1945; Begher Emani, long-time Soviet espionage agent who was soon to become the PCP leader and the martyred saint of the Tudeh Party.<sup>13</sup>

1. Gilan appeared to be a likely area for a Separatist Movement, and the Soviets appeared to have high hopes for success in either absorbing the area or in using their influence there to force concessions from Tehran. Gilan, on the Caspian Sea, was separated from the rest of Persia by the Elburz mountain range. Unlike the rest of Persia, Gilan had good rainfall and, thus, economic surpluses. The port of Enzeli and the capital city of Resht were important commercial and trading centers.

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m. The leader of the Gilan movement was Mirza Kuchik Khan, a tribal intellectual and landowner who had fought along with the nationalists for the restoration of the constitutional regime in 1909. In 1915, he and a group of local leaders drew up a general reform program for Persia. They felt that Tehran government was controlled by the Soviets and the British, and they agreed to separate Gilan from Persia until such time as Tehran changed its policies. Kuchik Khan's followers, calling themselves "Nehzat-i Jangali" (Forest Brethren), fought the Soviets, British, the tribes, and the local robber bands alike. However, after the Soviet revolution and announcement of the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919, the British became the national adversary. Although no Communist himself, Kuchik Khan allowed himself to be talked into accepting Soviet help by his pro-Soviet lieutenant, Ehsanollah Khan. Under PCP guidance, systematic extortion began against the wealthy and the landowners. Land began to be distributed among the peasants, and an intense propaganda campaign was initiated to gain peasant and worker support.<sup>14</sup>

n. In Persian Azerbaijan, the Soviet revolution was greeted with enthusiasm, for the withdrawal of Czarist forces brought an end to the Soviet occupation which had begun in 1909. However, Tehran was unable to exert control, and, in the ensuing political vacuum, Sheikh Mohammad Khiabani assumed leadership in Tabriz. As with Kuchik Khan in Gilan, Sheikh Khiabani was not a Communist, nor did he desire separation from Persia; but the seeming British control of Tehran and the 1919 Treaty

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caused him to break with the Government in April 1920 and form Azadistan, the Land of Freedom.

o. At this point, historical analysis becomes somewhat confused, for the Soviets and the other principal actors in the Separatist Movements have presented contradictory views of events in efforts to rationalize the failures and justify doctrinal and tactical decisions. It is apparent, however, that there were differences of opinion among the Communists themselves as well as with the non-Communist nationalists as to how to proceed. Both movements began to lose popular support and Haidar Khan was killed. Soviet propaganda in the 1920s insisted that Haidar Khan had decided to overthrow Kuchik Khan, and Kuchik Khan had him killed in self defense. In the 1950s the Soviets were still analyzing the failure, by this time insisting that Kuchik Khan had been plotting a counterrevolution with British and Persian agents, and that they had assassinated Haidar Khan and other leading Communists. Similar confusion surrounded the Azerbaijan movement. Soviet historians have alternately characterized Sheikh Mohammad Ehiabani as the hero and as the betrayer of the revolution.<sup>15</sup>

p. As the movements began to lose support, attempts at suppression became more widespread. The middle class, especially, became appalled by the violence, disrespect for property rights, and overt foreign control. At the same time, the Soviets embarked upon an antireligious campaign. It was directed principally at the minorities within the Soviet Union, but it soon had repercussions in Persia. The brutality of

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enforcement quickly alienated remaining areas of popular support. In addition, the chaotic conditions in the Soviet Union were causing Soviet leaders to reconsider their preparedness to force the pace of world revolution.<sup>16</sup>

q. In October 1920, the Soviets withdrew support from the Separatist Movements and renewed diplomatic initiatives with Tehran. It appears that the combination of failure to achieve rapid successes while refusal of Tehran to be intimidated and blackmailed by the Soviet thrusts, caused the sudden policy reversal. In subsequent Comintern Congresses, it was rationalized that the political unawareness and lack of preparedness for revolution of the Persian proletariat, together with the political unreliability of nationalists and bourgeois elements in the movements and party had caused the failure.<sup>17</sup>

r. The Soviets retained forces in the port of Enzeli, but otherwise permitted the crushing of the Separatist Movements by an apparently revitalized Tehran, led by the powerful personality of Reza Khan, the new Minister of War. In February 1921, a treaty was signed in which the Soviets confirmed the renunciation of all Soviet concessions, except for the Caspian fisheries, and reserved the right to send troops into Persia in case of a threat to the Soviet Union by a third power.<sup>18</sup>

### 3. The interlude, 1921-41--Soviet retrenchment and Party reconstruction.

a. Despite the self-denying treaty of 1921 and the protestations of the Soviets that they were acting in the interests of the Persian people and helping protect Persia from British colonialism, Tehran remained



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justly suspicious of Soviet policies and permitted itself to be moved only very slowly in subsequent negotiations. Continued Soviet occupation of Enzeli remained the principal outstanding issue between the two Governments, and the Soviets were intent on using this leverage to compel firm agreement on some form of Soviet control over the Caspian fisheries. Otherwise, the Soviets embarked on a program of liberal trade with Persia, permitting free access to Soviet markets by Persian merchants, liberal monetary exchange, and repatriation of profits. In 1923, however, the Soviets found these liberal policies to be putting a heavy burden on their domestic economy, already in a chaotic state as a result of the war and early attempts at instituting the socialist economic system. By a combination of diplomatic and propaganda pressures, they began to seek commercial and mineral concessions from Tehran.

b. In 1924, the Soviets proposed a joint company to operate the Caspian fisheries; the US economic adviser to the Tehran government, Millspaugh, prevailed upon the Government to refuse. To force the issue, the Soviets instituted an embargo on all Persian imports in 1926; this produced great economic hardships in the north, especially among Persian merchants. In the meantime, Reza Khan emerged to take control of the Tehran Government and have himself declared Shah. The new Iranian Government at first resisted Soviet demands, but finally, in 1927, Millspaugh was forced to resign and a concession was granted to the Soviets. In return the Soviets withdrew their forces from Enzeli and the port was renamed Pahlavi in honor of the new Shah.<sup>19</sup>

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c. While official relations between the two countries remained cordial through the 1930s to the beginning of World War II, Tehran was by no means free of pressures. The Soviet Union embarked on a program of commercial aggressiveness reminiscent of pre-Soviet Russia. In 1930, the Soviets created the Eastern Trading Company to exercise a monopoly on all Soviet commercial relations with Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan. The company employed, from time to time, all the tactics of a large-scale capitalist enterprise in the 19th century tradition: it practiced transit obstruction, dumping, withholding from sale, and favoritism to establish control over foreign markets.<sup>20</sup> In an effort to protect its economy, Tehran in 1931 attempted to form a similar monopoly for foreign trade, but without much success. In 1932-33, Iranian bazaar merchants attempted a boycott of Soviet products, but Soviet pressure on Tehran caused them to abandon it. This remained the pattern of Soviet diplomatic and commercial policies until the advent of World War II offered new opportunities for Soviet initiatives.<sup>21</sup>

d. With the fall of the Separatist Movements, the PCP, soon to be called the Iranian Communist Party, was obliged to go underground in Azerbaijan and Khurasan. Many Communist organizers moved to Tehran and other cities to support and direct the labor unions organized in 1920 and to launch propaganda publications.<sup>22</sup> Party policy now emphasized the awakening of the proletariat to provide a firm base for the revolution, laying the groundwork for future collaboration with the nationalist movements. However, there was considerable distrust of the

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nationalists: Stalin had emerged as leader in the Soviet Union in 1927, and he had little faith in their usefulness, except as a well-trained, disciplined Communist movement might usurp nationalists gains.<sup>23</sup>

e. The ICP and its subsidiary organizations made no effort to hide their Communist revolutionary nature and their Soviet connections. In 1926, their Party and the Young Communist League of Iran openly urged the Soviet Union to intervene militarily in Khurasan, when another local revolt broke out there. However, the Communist leaders of the trade union movement consistently denied any Soviet or Communist ties. In 1921, the unions had combined to form a Central Council; by 1925 they boasted a membership of 30,000.<sup>24</sup> Until 1929, these unions openly participated annually in May Day demonstrations in major cities.

f. A Sultan zade reemerged as head of the Party. Pishevari published the leftist newspaper, Haqiqat, in Tehran; Reza Rasta worked with the trade unions. Other leaders included Bagher Emani, Shareqi, Kavian, Bahrami, and Buqrati.

g. Initial Party and Soviet response to the emergence of Reza Shah was enthusiastic. He was heralded as the leader of the nationalist anticolonialist, antifeudalist revolution, a development which fit well into the current theoretical doctrine of the Communists, who believed now that the socialist revolution must be preceded by an awakening of the populace and by successful nationalist revolution. Soviet attitude became cooler in 1926-27 as the powers of the Shah enlarged and as he showed a willingness and ability to control political events in Persia

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and to keep the ICP under close control. By 1930, Soviet attitudes were hostile; in the party debates, the Shah was characterized as the betrayer of the national revolution in its first stage of development.<sup>25</sup>

h. The Shah began to round up ICP leaders, especially those involved with the unions, in 1928. In 1930, a Soviet defector, George Agabekov, revealed the extent of Soviet subversive and espionage activities in Iran and named many of the Soviet agents in Iran. In response, hundreds of agents were arrested.<sup>26</sup> In 1931, the Majlis passed a comprehensive law for the suppression of political and press offenses. In 1932, 29 Communist leaders were tried and convicted of espionage. In 1935, the Communist newspaper Dunya was suspended; and again in 1937 there were arrests and convictions of Communist leaders. By this time, most major leaders were in jail: Pischevari early in the period; Reza Rusta and Dr. Taqi Erani and his 52 associates late in the period.

i. Erani is believed to have been an amateur in the revolutionary affair. In the 1920s he had studied in Berlin and became attracted to Marxism. In 1930, he returned to Iran and began to congregate about him like-minded intellectuals and professionals trained mostly in Europe and students. None of these had received Soviet training, and it is unlikely that they ever received much ICP or Soviet support. They were convicted, however, of espionage for a foreign power and jailed along with the professional Soviet-trained agitators, such as Pischevari and Reza Rusta. Pischevari later wrote that this worked to the advantage of the Communists,

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for it gave the professionals the opportunity to recruit and train the amateurs while in jail:

They were all well educated, but they had not had our experience. Their appearance gave us an opportunity to teach them. They learned from us how to resist and endure, and we gave them moral support. Doctors and professors who were the intellectuals of Iran acted like trained political warriors.<sup>27</sup>

j. The polemic debates over policy continued in Moscow through this period, but no one appeared to have much hope for the movement in Iran. During the 1930s, the full impact of the Stalinist purges was also being felt; most of the Eastern revolutionary experts had been eliminated, and those who survived were too cautious to commit themselves to new policies of initiative either in Iran or elsewhere. By the mid-1930s, the Communist movement was substantially dead, killed by developments in the Soviet Union as much as by the repressive measures of Reza Shah in Iran. Assisting in the death was the emergence of a new menace to the Soviet Union--Nazi Germany.<sup>28</sup>

#### 4. World War II, 1941-46: renewed Soviet opportunity.

a. In the face of German military successes along the eastern front and in the Mediterranean, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom agreed in 1941 to divide Iran and send forces into their respective spheres, to protect supply lines and deny the Germans ready access to the area. Reza Shah abdicated, and the Iranian Army was temporarily dissolved. By August 1941, Soviet and British troops occupied their positions.



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b. In January 1942, a treaty of alliance was signed by the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and Iran which formalized the status of the foreign forces. Article 4 of the treaty states in part:

It is understood that the presence of these forces (of the Allied Powers) on Iranian territory does not constitute a military occupation and will disturb as little as possible the administration and security forces of Iran, the economic life of the country, the normal movements of the population, and the application of Iranian laws and regulations.

c. Article 5 states:

The forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice . . . or on the conclusion of peace between them, whichever date is the earlier.<sup>29</sup>

d. It is difficult to tell at what point the Soviets saw the post-war opportunities offered by their military presence in northern Iran, but they failed to live up to Article 4 of the treaty almost from the beginning. They took over the administration of northern Iran, especially Azerbaijan, and increasingly denied Tehran access to the area. By 1943, northern Iran was virtually sealed off from the rest of the country.<sup>30</sup>

e. Meanwhile, in September 1941, following the abdication of Reza Shah, an amnesty was granted all political prisoners, and a strong upsurge of political activity began. In January 1942, the newly released leftists formed the Tudeh Party and immediately set about organizational



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and propaganda activities. A mass demonstration was held in February at the grave of Dr. Erani, who had died in prison shortly before the amnesty. Party policy at this time was to attract intellectuals, liberals, and the working classes, regardless of individual feelings about Marxism or the Soviet Union.<sup>31</sup>

f. The leaders of the Tudeh Party were largely the cultured, modernist, and progressive elite of Iran--doctors, dentists, engineers, writers, other professionals, and intellectuals--who had been trained in Berlin or Brussels between the wars. They had returned to engage in political activity, and many had been imprisoned by the Shah. The Party was led by Soleiman Mohsen Eskandari, a Qajar prince with impeccable credentials. The hard-core, Soviet-trained Communists appear to have been a minority in the party and took secondary leadership positions, well-placed to take over the Party when the appropriate time arose. (See chapter 2, section III.)

g. By 1943, the Tudeh had emerged as the principal political party throughout Iran, although it was especially powerful in the north where it operated with the advice and protection of the Soviet Union. In the December 1943 elections, the Tudeh sent eight deputies to the 15th Majlis, mostly from the northern districts. Through their discipline and singleness of purpose, they became a major factor in the central politics of Iran.<sup>32</sup>

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h. In 1944, the Soviets began to exploit the situation. They revived their claim to an interest in the northern oil reserves and requested that Tehran reach an agreement with them on Soviet development of the oil fields at Kavir-e Khuryan.<sup>33</sup> They demanded oil and mineral concessions which would have meant a virtual economic monopoly on all of northern Iran. Although hard-pressed, Tehran pointed out that the Soviets had repudiated their claims in the treaty of 1921. The Government sought to alleviate the situation by agreeing to discuss with the Soviets a new concession. In October, the Majlis passed a resolution that no concessions should be made until all foreign troops had been removed from Iran--a measure aimed directly at avoiding negotiations with the Soviets while their troops still occupied the northern provinces.

i. The repercussions to this announcement came immediately: in late 1944, the Soviets began propaganda attacks on Tehran as a reactionary Government, emphasizing the miserable conditions of the Iranian population and the unwillingness of the Government to join the Soviet Union in the economic improvement of the country.<sup>34</sup> At the same time, Soviet influences in the Tudeh Party were revealed; the Tudeh began to foster demonstrations against the Government and undertook an intense press campaign against Premier Sa'id which caused him to resign. In mid-1945, the Soviets again pressed for extensive concessions and expressed their wish to provide Soviet experts in all branches of public administration to assist in the governing of the country. They also requested authority

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to build a pipeline to the Persian Gulf and to maintain troops in a corridor along the pipeline to protect it. Tehran politely refused to accept the Soviet generosity.<sup>35</sup>

i. By November 1945, it began to be apparent that the Soviet Union also might not honor Article 5 of the 1942 treaty, to withdraw from Iran 6 months after hostilities with the Germans came to an end. Political tensions in Tehran became intense, and the crisis of Azerbaijan and Mahabad were in the making, beginning the first Soviet experiments in satellite tactics.

5. The separatist conflicts of 1945-46. A subsequent paper on the conflict period will deal in greater detail with the conflicts in Azerbaijan and Mahabad. They are briefly summarized here.

a. In September 1945, the Tudeh Party in the northwest was suddenly disbanded and replaced by the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan. Under the leadership of Jafar Pishevari, the hard-core Communists emerged to take control of the new party. Krasnik, the Soviet Consul General in Tabriz, appears to have masterminded the development of the organization and the subsequent separatist attempt; he exercised control through an apparatus of town commandants under political rather than military occupation command.<sup>36</sup>

b. In December, Pishevari moved to replace the remaining officials of the central Government in Azerbaijan and declared the creation of the Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan. Soviet troops surrounded the barracks of the small Iranian constabulary units to prohibit them from

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intervening in the Separatist move; they also turned back a small force dispatched from Tehran to deal with the situation. A well-prepared program of public works, welfare measures, and land reform got underway immediately, and an overt, organized armed force was developed, assisted by the forceful recruitment of the political police. The rebel ranks were augmented by infusions of "refugees" from Soviet Azerbaijan, Soviet-trained military leaders and administrators. Terror tactics were implemented to deal with any internal opposition. Muhammad Beria (no relation to the Soviet Beria) became Minister of Labor, Education, and Propaganda; he had been the head of the street cleaners union in Tabriz. He directed the terror campaign, using squads of strongarm toughs, known as the "Society of Friends of Soviet Azerbaijan," to silence opponents of the revolution.<sup>37</sup>

c. At the same time as these events were taking place in Azerbaijan, a group of Soviet officers cooperating with Kurdish separatist leaders brought into being the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. In April 1946, Mahabad and Azerbaijan concluded a treaty of fraternal friendship and declared their determination to resist the central Government.<sup>38</sup>

d. In Azerbaijan there was strong popular dissatisfaction with the economic situation which had prevailed during the Reza Shah period. Many Azerbaijani felt that the Shah had discriminated against the economic interests of the area during his reign. Also, some Separatist feeling had continued to exist after the Separatist failure of 1921. In addition, the existence of a strong Communist structure and the presence of

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Soviet forces in Azerbaijan led the Soviets to estimate a high probability of success. They believed that a strong social program and a land reform scheme would build support for the new government among the dissatisfied sections of the population. Propaganda was directed at the personal level to the peasants and illiterate laborers. Soldiers were promised rapid promotions and high pay. The idea of an independent Azerbaijan was never stressed; rather, propaganda emphasized that Azerbaijan and Mahabad were the vanguard in a crusade against a corrupt and antinational central Government. Their aim was to restore democratic rule in Tehran, free of Western influences.<sup>39</sup>

e. In January 1946, Pischevari called for a jihad (holy war) against the throne and the central Government, and an intense propaganda campaign was launched against Tehran. In the same month, Qavam took over the Prime Ministry, and Iran addressed an appeal to the UN Security Council. By March the United States had adopted a policy of firm support for Iran and addressed several notes to the Soviet Union.<sup>40</sup>

f. The first break in the Soviet policy came in April, when Soviet leaders agreed to withdraw their forces in Iran by 6 May and to regard the status of Azerbaijan as an internal matter to be settled by Tehran and the people of Azerbaijan. The Soviets seemed to have given up the idea of outright annexation and decided to accept a settlement recognizing their paramount interest in the area. The decision was apparently due to a combination of factors: lack of headway in gaining popular support in Azerbaijan and Mahabad; refusal of Tehran to give way to



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Soviet pressures; US support for Iran; and refusal by the UN Security Council to remove the question from its agenda. Pischevari was ordered to moderate his propaganda tone toward Tehran and to seek negotiations with Qavam. At the same time, the Soviets continued heavy pressure on Tehran to withdraw its case from the Security Council and to agree to a Soviet oil concession in the north. Increased Soviet troop movements in Azerbaijan and along the Turkish border in April kept Tehran in a state of intense suspense as to whether the Soviet leaders would honor their agreement to withdraw in May. The Iranian Army also reported increased clashes along the borders of the Soviet-controlled areas.<sup>41</sup>

g. Prime Minister Qavam attempted to ease the Soviet withdrawal by appearing to follow the Soviet line. He cracked down on the activities of anti-Soviet elements in Tehran, gave the Tudeh Party full freedom of expression, and introduced legislation in the Majlis favorable to the leftwing labor movement. He also agreed to an extensive oil concession for the Soviets, subject to ratification by the Majlis after Soviet withdrawal.<sup>42</sup>

h. In May, the Soviets withdrew their forces but left behind 2,500-3,000 Soviet personnel in civilian clothes and a great quantity of war material to assist Azerbaijan in continuing to defy Tehran. The Tudeh Party continued to generate demonstrations and labor trouble to keep the Government off balance. Discussions began between the leaders of Azerbaijan and the central Government. In June, an agreement was concluded in which the "autonomous" government was to be dissolved and Azerbaijan

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reincorporated into the Iranian state, but the Azerbaijan government was to exercise considerable powers of local administration and tax collection. In August, Qavam introduced three Tudeh ministers into the cabinet as a further gesture of conciliation to the Soviet Union.<sup>43</sup>

i. Finally, in October, Qavam felt strong enough to move against the Tudeh Party. Using the pretext of a series of real and imaginary revolts in the south directed against Tudeh and Soviet influence in Tehran, Qavam removed the Tudeh ministers and announced his intention to send troops into Azerbaijan and Mahabad. Against an intense barrage of Soviet propaganda threatening military intervention and dire consequences for Iran and official Azerbaijani pronouncements threatening to fight to the death, Qavam ordered Iranian forces to move north in early December. The sporadic resistance offered Iranian forces was easily put down; those Azerbaijan Democratic Party leaders who did not escape to the Soviet Union were either taken into custody by the Iranian forces or were killed by the popular uprising which immediately preceded their arrival. Elsewhere, Tudeh and labor leaders were arrested and the Party structure was left in disarray. Broken, defeated, and having lost its principal leaders, the remains of the Tudeh Party offered no contest in the new elections in January 1947.<sup>44</sup>

6. Reconstruction, opportunities in the new radical nationalism, and the rise of Mossadegh, 1947-51.

a. Apparently Stalin had never been overly optimistic over the chances of the Tudeh Party. Failure in Azerbaijan seemed to have

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confirmed the Stalinist belief that only a tightly organized, disciplined, proletariat-based party had any real chance of success. Loose, broadly based parties with large intellectuals and leftist-nationalist membership such as the Tudeh were not then popular in Moscow.

b. In 1947, Soviet and Party propaganda organs worked intently to try to repair the Azerbaijan damage and overcome Iranian suspicions. The Soviet Union was depicted as the one great power that sympathized fully with Iranian nationalist aspirations. The Tudeh press insisted that the West had entirely misrepresented the Soviet role in Azerbaijan; the Pishevari regime was actually nationalist, wanting only to overthrow the British-Iranian feudal alliance which governed Iran to the detriment of the Iranian people. Until the emergence of Mossadeq, Soviet policy toward Tehran was conciliatory, principally in an effort to stem the growing US influence on Tehran.<sup>45</sup>

c. Within the Tudeh Party, deep schisms developed. The intellectual leftists argued that the combination of a lack of vigorous political theory and a corresponding lack of a compact organization led to the undoing of the Party. The moderates expressed distaste for the degree to which Party policy was dictated by Moscow in the light of the international situation, not of the specific circumstances existing in Iran. A number of groups defected from the Party, some going so far as to join the government's Iranian Democratic Party.<sup>46</sup>

d. The Government had decided not to outlaw the Tudeh Party in 1946-47 so as not to drive it underground at the very time its popularity was

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waning and mass defections were weakening its structure. At the same time, the central Government was in the process of consolidating its own powers (the Government party won almost 90 percent of the Majlis seats in the 1947 elections) and did not feel immediately threatened by what remained of the Tudeh.

e. However, the objective circumstances which had contributed to the emergence of a powerful Tudeh Party in the early 1940s had not changed significantly by 1947-48. There were still strains of nationalist fervor, anti-Westernism, religious fanaticism, and labor and peasant unrest over economic disadvantage; none of these forces could find adequate expression either in the government party or in other opposition movements. By the Second Party Congress in April 1948, the Tudeh had reconstituted its leadership, adjusted to new theoretical directives, and begun to make substantial headway in recruiting among the disaffected elements in the society.

f. Under the young and dynamic leadership of Ehsan Tabari, the Party began again the reorganization and indoctrination of a tightly knit cadre. Tabari had been the leader of the Party's youth league; he was not tainted by the failures of the past leaders, and the Party's intellectuals trusted him. With renewed vitality, the Party began to operate, in anticipation of the elections scheduled for mid-1949, with a militancy and shift toward leftist radicalism which never had been fully displayed previously. Propaganda hammered incessantly against the British oil interests and the increasing US influence. As in previous



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efforts, the response of the working class was the most satisfactory; using the remaining hard-core union organizers, the Party managed to regain and hold its dominant position in the labor movement through its United Council. At the same time, intellectual and middle class elements were attracted because, with the absence of overt Soviet pressures on Iran, the Party could claim to be a genuine indigenous movement seeking only solutions to the social and economic ills of the country.<sup>47</sup>

g. On 4 February 1949, a commemorative rally was organized by the Tudeh at the grave of Dr. Erani. Up to 30,000 Party members and sympathizers attended the rally, indicating to some degree the renewed Party strength and giving Party leaders high expectations for the forthcoming elections. However, on the same day, an attempt was made on the life of the Shah, the assassin proved to have Tudeh connections, and the Government moved promptly to outlaw the Party. In the midst of the ensuing confusion, many Party and labor leaders were arrested. Some managed to escape to the Soviet Union; 10 more escaped in 1950 after a daring Tudeh raid on the prison in which they were being detained. There is no indication that the Party planned the assassination attempt; indeed, its taking place at this time was clearly contrary to Tudeh interests, for it once again destroyed the Party at the very time when it seemed on the brink of playing a decisive national role in a legally sanctioned manner in the coming elections.<sup>48</sup>

h. Although it had once again lost its top leadership, control of the labor movement, and propaganda access to the population, the Tudeh

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was not altogether unprepared for this eventuality. Alternative operative networks and plans had been devised which would be adopted if the Party were forced underground. The second echelon of hard-core cadre took over leadership of the Party, front organization tactics were devised, and by December 1949 the Party press began to distribute clandestine publications.<sup>49</sup>

i. By 1950 Government pressure on the outlawed Party began to abate somewhat, principally because of the deteriorating strength of the Government in the face of the emerging oil crisis and the coalescing of a determined nationalist opposition. Clandestine Party recruitment continued with some mounting success. However, neither the Tudeh nor the Soviet Union was in a position to take initiatives until some dramatic event would permit new alignments and more open political expression.

j. The sudden emergence of Mossadeq and the National Front caught both the Party and the Soviet Union by surprise, but it was interpreted as the awaited event. Initially the National Front pursued an anti-Communist line, hoping to attract US support in the oil nationalization issue. The Soviets opened an anti-Mossadeq propaganda campaign, and the Tudeh press attempted to brand him as a US imperialist tool. As US relations became more strained in 1952, the Soviets quickly reversed their tactics, acclaiming Mossadeq a nationalist hero. The Tudeh was instructed to provide all possible support for him. This suddenly permitted the Party to make common cause with the rising nationalist tide.<sup>50</sup>

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k. Mossadeq permitted the Tudeh to operate openly, seeming to use it as a tool to frighten the United States and the conservatives into supporting him. Beginning in 1952, the Party organized increasing numbers of mass demonstrations in support of Mossadeq and mass strikes to intimidate and dispel his opposition. The groundwork was now laid for the 1953 crisis.

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