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ALTERNATIVE 1975-85 POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTS FOR MILITARY PLANNERS

VOLUME II

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

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VOLUME II

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ALTERNATIVE 1975-1985 POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTS FOR MILITARY PLANNERS

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PART III

MILITARY PERSPECTIVES, IMPLICATIONS AND ROLES: DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

In Part I of this report we attempted under the rubric, "Sources of Stability/Instability in the Current International System," to impart both a general comprehension as well as a "feel" for the secular trends and more immediate factors contributing in a major way to the current state of contemporary international life and politics. The social, economic and political situation of various areas of the world were scrutinized as to their current stability as related to the larger world context, particularly as regards East-West relationships. Part II augmented this approach and was designed to give the reader some insight into how the issues might be viewed from three currently important perspectives (as well as to introduce a useful methodology).

We shall attempt in this portion of the report to bring these analytical concepts and methodological techniques to bear on problems directly affecting the United States military establishment in the short and long term, domestically and internationally, in terms of technological change as well as the psychological context within which military planning and decision-making will take place. Thus, this study has taken a somewhat different tack than the original charter envisioned. The main purpose of this undertaking was to provide a "bridge" between our considerations and existing military studies. It was found, however, that a host of new issues arose, many of which Hudson believes are going to confront the military planner with serious and, so far, largely unperceived problems--at least as far as their military implications are concerned. Thus, the new title, "Military Perspectives, Implications and Roles," rather than the old--"Major Alternative Roles of Military Forces"--more accurately describes the scope and thrust of the final half of our presentation.

Many of the new issues which may plague U.S. military planners and decision-makers in the 1975-1985 period imply new and very controversial dimensions for DoD consideration. These new dimensions include problems of domestic turmoil, dissent, protest, and even an active legal and illegal resistance to certain U.S. military policies. To what extent the present situation represents a long-term trend is also controversial. However, these new factors have proved very important in the Vietnamese war--involving controversies which range all the way from those over civilian (Executive Office and OSD) "interference" in military operations, imposing complex constraints, to the multifold problems of largely negative domestic and international attitudes towards the war.

Whether these new attitudes and issues will persist, increase, or diminish remains to be seen; but there surely seems reason to believe that they will be sufficiently important to justify DoD consideration of how best to deal with them. A question can quite understandably be raised about the extent to which it is proper for agencies and contractors of the DoD even to study these issues. We have indicated in Part I our belief that it would be inappropriate for the Department of Defense to study what might be called "the manipulation of the American public" in the sense of trying to change any of its basic attitudes, much less to

attempt any program of ideological change or ideological reversal. Yet it seems clear that it is not only appropriate but absolutely essential that the Department of Defense understand the new domestic and international milieux in which it will be operating, so that it will not adopt self-defeating programs, policies and tactics; and, even more important, so that it will not further exacerbate some of the tendencies or reactions which afflict it today.

The range of problems covered in this section is extensive. While the chapters dealing with change of attitudes in various domestic milieux and their possible ramifications for the military planner are new and, therefore, interesting as well as deserving urgent considerations, older problems and questions of equal magnitude continue to confront the military planner and are included.

The focus of Part III will, of course, center on the 1975-1985 decade. But as noted earlier in this report and discussed exhaustively in Hudson's The Year 2000, this period represents a transitional period to the "era of 2000" which we have defined as the thirty-year period from 1985 to 2015. For this reason we have included for military planners an adaptation of some pertinent findings of The Year 2000 so as to encourage and lend impetus to contingency projections of varying lengths. The first three chapters deal with some of the factors expected to give concrete form to various aspects of the 1975-1985 decade. Thus, Chapter I is devoted to economic factors and trends affecting the possibilities an capabilities of nations to pursue certain policies, particularly as regards the acquisition of relatively modern weapon systems. Chapter II surveys, briefly and using only unclassified sources, military/technological possibilities for the '70's and '80's, while Chapter III, by focusing on the "world of 2000," considers world military capabilities in a post-industrial context. Of particular interest here is the scenario assuming the breakdown of non-proliferation schemes and the expected emergence of the sixth, seventh and/or more nuclear nations. Also of note is the thematic exposition (cf. foldout chart, "Two Past and One Future 33-Year Periods") of the past, current and expected history of the Twentieth Century.

Chapters IV and V attempt to traverse terrain usually avoided in similar studies: the possible impact current social trends could have on the U.S. domestic scene and the influence, if any, such an evolution could exert on the United States military establishment. Chapter IV places these trends in a broad perspective by connecting them with the "multifold trend" developed in Hudson's The Year 2000 and the possible significance of some of these trends for existing social and political institutions in America and other modern nations. "A Possible New Domestic Milieu for the Military Planner," the title of Chapter V, accurately describes its content and purview. Here Herman Kahn presents both an overview of some cross-currents in American society and contributes to a debate on his tentative findings. His views are in part amplified, in part contested by two Hudson staff members.

CHAPTER I. ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR 1975-1985

A. Introduction

It seems reasonable to start our discussion of 1975-85 with a discussion of the economic prospects. We realize of course that there is a certain tendency to lay too much stress on such things as the Gross National Product, and not enough on its composition. Even more misleading can be an insufficient emphasis on the other less quantifiable variables of a society. However, as we indicate in Chapter III of The Year 2000, such things as the Gross National Product really are of enormous interest; they do set a context of both constraints and possibilities. In the long run and to a startling degree in the medium and even in the short run, the various components of GNP are remarkably fungible in practice. And while non-economic variables more often than not dominate particular crises, the economic variables often set the basic structure and framework. We refer the interested reader to Chapter III of The Year 2000 for a discussion of these issues (in addition to the discussion at the end of this chapter). For our purposes here, we will assume that the Gross National Product (GNP) is by itself the most reliable single indicator of potential power, influence and general performance, and that such variables as GNP per capita and population are also interesting, though of lesser importance than the Gross National Product. (As described in The Year 2000, GNP expresses the product of population and output per capita and thus measures in some sense the available manpower and the available economic power per man.) We thus adopt the attitude that a high level of population does not necessarily establish a nation as a major world power though high-level GNP does, at least to some extent. In actual practice, of course, the combination of these two variables with other variables such as morale, esprit, military capability, internal discipline, prestige, authority, skill, etc., must all be taken account of in trying to judge prestige, power and influence in peace and war, in normal as well as in crisis periods. In a later section we discuss in some detail the relationship between economic and military power.

B. Economic and Demographic Projections for 1980*

Because of the difficulty associated with long-range forecasts, we have selected alternative expected growth rates which we apply to 1967 GNP and population figures. Thus, for 1980 we have a range of alternative GNP's and population estimates, both maximum and minimum levels. In some cases, however, a widely observed historical variance in growth rates will yield a wide forecasted interval for GNP and/or population. The United States, where the historical GNP/population growth rate variance

*The figures and charts presented in this and the following section represent later information than that in the book on The Year 2000; 1967 rather than 1965 is considered to be the present.

CHART I

GNP, POPULATION, AND GNP PER CAPITA OF
10 MAJOR COUNTRIES, 1967 AND 1980



Note: encircled dots are 1967; ellipses are 1980.

has been small, with a GNP of 804 billion (1967) could be expected to be in the range of $1.2-1.4--say 1.3 trillion by 1980. The total U.S. population, about 200 million in 1967, can be expected to be at the level of 228-238--say 235 million by 1980. (See Chart 1.)

The other superpower, the Soviet Union, with a GNP of 361 billion dollars in 1967, can be expected to grow to a figure in the range of $467-870--say $570 billion--by 1980, with a population growing from 236 million in 1967 to between 264-267--say 265 million--in 1980. Thus, the two superpowers are not significantly different from each other in terms of their total expected population (10-20 per cent differential). On the other hand, in terms of economic output by 1980, the difference remains substantial, in favor of the United States. Of course, the extent of the differential between the U.S. and Soviet GNP's is dependent upon the growth rates one considers "representative." It cannot be said with great confidence that the Soviet Union will not regain the high growth rates it enjoyed in the 1950's, though under our assumptions it will not.

The two defeated powers in World War II, Germany and Japan, the star economic performers of the 1950's and 1960's, begin to diverge, with Japan growing more rapidly in terms of GNP with a relatively stable population while West Germany grows more slowly with a relatively stable population. Japan and Germany in 1967 had GNP's of 142 and 135 billion dollars respectively. These figures can be expected to grow to a level of between $268-436 billion and $199-271 billion GNP respectively--say $350 and $235 billion respectively--without a significant increase in their populations.

What of the remaining nations of the North Atlantic Area? Of the four large nations (France, U.K., Italy and Canada), the rates of economic growth of France, the U.K., and Italy on the whole have not been impressive in the postwar period. Canada, benefiting from her satellite status vis-à-vis the U.S. economy, has grown somewhat more rapidly. We expect France, despite its current problems, to grow somewhat more rapidly than the U.K. or Italy. Its per capita growth rate will then be even higher since the rate of growth of population will presumably be quite low. The U.K. should grow more slowly; thus even with a low growth rate of population the U.K. may suffer a relative worsening of economic well-being when compared to France by 1980. Italy should grow somewhat more rapidly than the U.K. and enjoy a significant increase in her economic well-being because the fairly high rate of economic growth should not be accompanied by a corresponding increase in population.

Canada, beginning to reap the fruits of industrial diversification, would be expected to grow a good deal more rapidly than the other Atlantic powers. Therefore, we may expect Canada to enjoy an increase in relative economic well-being not unlike the United States.

What then of the two giants of Asia, mainland China and India? Though we must be even more cautious in making definitive statements about the economic potential and well-being of China, one certainly can say with

CHART 2

GNP, POPULATION, AND GNP PER CAPITA OF
10 MAJOR COUNTRIES, 1967 AND 2000



*Italy is dotted.

Note: encircled dots are 1967; ellipses are 2000.

some degree of confidence that China is a desperately poor country. In 1967, with an estimated equivalent GNP of only 87 billion dollars, it was required to support a population of between 700 and 800 million people. India, in similar desperate circumstances, is required to support a population of over 500 million with a GNP of only 52 billion dollars. We do not foresee any dramatic improvement in these circumstances by 1980. China and India should remain desperately poor countries in terms of per capita GNP. We will discuss the implications of these circumstances for military power in a later section of this chapter. By 1980, we expect the Chinese GNP to fall within the range of 128 and 200 billion dollars--say 170 billion dollars--but with that, China must support a population of between 836 and 1,100--say 970--million people. India is expected to emerge somewhat more favorably in terms of economic well-being by the 1980's relative to China. A slightly slower rate of population growth will be a major factor contributing to this improvement (a range of 666-700 million people supported by a GNP of between 67 and 110 billion dollars).

C. Economic and Demographic Aspects--2000

Although the primary focus of this paper is on the 1975-85 period, it is important to examine some of the trends which we expect will be dominant in the year 2000. It is important to examine these trends because expectations which are formed in any given period about some future time period have a profound impact upon current behavior. For example, our behavior in terms of weapons systems procured is conditioned by expectations of the political environment which we believe will exist, say, during the 1975-85 time period. Similarly, if one is considering the 1975-85 period, one must consider the year 2000 environment, because expectations formed for the year 2000 will begin to affect behavior in the 1975-85 period.

In general, one can expect a world-wide increase in economic well-being by the year 2000. (See Chart 2.) The two outstanding economic performers by the year 2000 should be the United States and Japan. The major indicator of economic well-being, GNP, should grow to a level of between three and five times its 1967 figure while the level of population probably grows less than fifty per cent in these two countries. The Soviet Union may do equally well in relative terms (that is, it may grow at a similar rate) if it can regain the high growth rate which it experienced in the 1950's. On the other hand, it may only see a doubling in its GNP from its 1967 level (which would approximate its long-term growth rate) coupled with only a modest increase in its population. Its expected population would be in the range of 298-352 million, while the U.S. population would be in the range of 283-336 million. Thus the populations of the two nations would not be significantly different. The range of potential GNP's may, however, be substantially different (on a range of $2.3 to $3.5 trillion for the U.S., and $694 billion to 3.3 trillion for the U.S.S.R.).

The remaining larger nations, specifically Germany, France, the U.K., Mainland China, Italy and Canada, may be expected to approximately triple their 1967 GNP's, and if one can accept the higher growth rate expectations, they may do considerably better by the year 2000. Whereas the European nations will experience a relative increase in real income because of the slow growth rates of their population, China and India will experience a relatively slow rate of increase in real income because of their more rapid rate of population growth.

D. The International Monetary and Trade Environments--1975-85

1. The Monetary Framework

The 1960's witnessed the emergence of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods monetary system, the framework within which there had been a dramatic increase in the volume of world trade since the disastrous protectionism in the 1930's. It appears unlikely that the 1975-85 period will see the same kind of monetary framework which has existed for the past twenty-five years still in operation. The most cursory examination of recent international monetary experience makes clear why this is so. From 1944 (when the current international monetary system was established) through the mid-1960's, the Western world's international monetary system was dependent upon continued deficits in the U.S. balance of payments to supply the means (i.e., dollars) of financing the major part of the volume of international trade.* That is, U.S. balance of payments deficits were financed through the willingness of foreigners to accept dollars in lieu of some other international monetary asset (e.g., gold) as the means of settling international claims. This pool of dollars enabled other nations to finance their international trade and payments, thereby encouraging international trade. Between 1958 and 1968, the U.S. monetary gold stock fell from almost $23 billion to less than $12 billion. This trend clearly indicates that foreigners are reluctant to continue to accept these dollar liabilities as a means of settlement (beyond the amount needed for working balances), and prefer some other asset, usually gold or some ultra-hard currency such as marks.

The official U.S. promise to redeem U.S. dollar liabilities at the rate of $35 per ounce of gold is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain when dollar liabilities exceed $30 billion, and the U.S. gold stock is approaching the $10 billion level. Moreover, the U.S. has, with the exception of 1957 (when the Suez crisis had helped the U.S. balance-of-payments position abnormally), maintained substantial and continuous deficits in its international balance of payments. This situation is presumably not sustainable. The relevant questions for the 1975-85 era are what

*Technically this is known as "international liquidity" which in addition to dollars and gold is various forms of international credit which enables nations to finance cyclical (as opposed to secular) deficits in their balance of payments. U.S. dollars have become the dominant component of total international liquidity.

kind of monetary framework we can expect, and what impact it will have on the volume and distribution of U.S. (and world-wide) international trade.

While it appears most unlikely that the system of fixed exchange rates can endure through the end of the century, as stipulated in the Bretton Woods Agreement, it seems likely that some variant of the fixed exchange-rate system will persist into the 1975-85 period. Steps have already been taken in the direction of maintaining the principle of fixed exchange rates, while relieving that system of its major burden; the unsustainable character of the system's dependence upon continuous U.S. balance-of-payments deficits as the primary source of international liquidity. The steps that have already been taken include an agreement among the members of the IMF (International Monetary Fund) to create a new international monetary asset (in addition to gold, dollars, and existing international credit arrangements), "Special Drawing Rights" (SDR). This new asset will enable nations to finance their international balance-of-payments deficits without having to rely upon a continuing supply of dollars to facilitate such settlement.

Thus, of the range of several alternative schemes for the reform of the international monetary system* which could evolve, we are likely to have a continuance, in modified form, of fixed exchange rates. This, of course, will not solve the problem of the weakness of the international monetary system, and can be considered no more than a temporary measure. Because of the generous credit facilities made available through the SDR's, "temporarily" will be longer than most of the other proposed "temporary solutions" to the problem of international monetary reform. What is likely to be a by-product of such temporary reform is, however, more substantial inflation than would obtain under some other international monetary regime which required deficit nations to depress their domestic economy to restore equilibrium in their balance of payments. Sometime during the 1975-85 period, one could expect that there will be some pressure for some additional and more thoroughgoing reform of the international monetary system. This could be in the direction of flexible exchange rates, if the international economic system remains prosperous, or alternatively, some form of rigid and direct controls over the operation of the international economic and monetary system such as prevailed following the gold crisis in 1931, to the detriment of world economic welfare.

2. International Trade--1975-85

Historically the growth of international trade has been the economist's primary source of optimism for international peace and prosperity. The unrestricted flow of goods and services among all countries of the world would maximize world-wide economic welfare by producing the greatest

*E.g., a system of flexible exchange rates, or a "band of permissible exchange-rate deviation" from par, or fixed exchange rates.

volume of goods and services for the least cost. This optimism reached its zenith during the latter half of the nineteenth century when international trade was growing at a rate which exceeded the rate of growth of total output. Three thirty-year periods shown below have been selected to show the growth of world trade:

1850-1880 = + 270%
1880-1913 = + 170%
1928-1958 = + 57%

Since 1928, international trade has lagged behind the growth of output (although there is evidence to suggest that in the long run international trade has a tendency to keep pace with the growth of output). Nevertheless, trade is at a far higher level now than would have been thought possible in the 1930's when protectionism was widely practiced in most of the major nations of the world. The important factor about international trade for political purposes is how 1975-85 trade patterns might be an independent source of either stability or political unrest. The single most important issue is probably the share of total world trade enjoyed by the underdeveloped areas of the world, though the likely increased share of the market and general competitiveness of Japan may be of some importance.

In the twentieth century, underdeveloped areas* have retained a share of about 25% of the world's total exports. This has not been as beneficial to the interests of the underdeveloped countries as it may appear because of the concentration of exports in relatively few goods, frequently primary products. Moreover, a substantial share of the total exports of underdeveloped nations is concentrated in oil and a few other commodities whose availability is limited to a few countries.

At this point is is useful to examine some trends which many economists (but not all) believe will serve to enhance the economic strength of advanced nations like the U.S. while worsening the relative economic position of the underdeveloped nations.

First, the change in the industrial structure of the major nations of the world to service industries or heavy industries which require little or no imported raw material. At the present time, for example, over 50% of the U.S. GNP is produced by the "service" sector rather than those which produce goods. Underdeveloped nations do not stand to gain any early benefit from this trend since services are usually oriented in favor of industrial countries. Because less than 10% of total world trade is carried out between underdeveloped countries, there may be a secular decline in the percentage of exports by underdeveloped countries to the developed areas of the world as the demand for raw material falls.

---

*Underdeveloped areas are here defined as Latin America, Asia, (excluding Japan), and Africa.

Second, numerous studies have shown a low degree of responsiveness of consumers in developed countries for the products of underdeveloped nations with respect to income.* This is important because the relatively rapid growth of income expected by the 1975-85 period for the developed nations relative to the underdeveloped nations suggests that imports by developed countries from underdeveloped nations will rise more slowly than GNP.

Finally, the use of raw-material substitutes by the developed nations is proceeding apace. The price rigidity of primary product export prices (due to the high fixed-cost component in their production) will tend to give the advantage to import-competing substitutes which can benefit from scale and transportation economies which may be unavailable for most of the products exported by underdeveloped nations.

The result of these trends is that international trade among the developed nations should grow at a rate approximately equal to the rate of growth of output with an increasing proportion of exports concentrated in the services account, and consequently less export concentration in manufactured goods. This should tend to diminish the importance of trade with the underdeveloped nations to the point where their domestic economies may suffer if their export concentration is high in commodities vulnerable to these trends. Any of these implications can become more severe for underdeveloped nations if developed nations take restrictive monetary measures under the existing monetary regime.

E. The Relationship Between Economic and Military Power, 1975-85

The subject of economic and military power and their relationship is one that has fascinated not only economists, but military strategists as well, for many years. Perhaps the most widely read modern treatment of this subject is Klaus Knorr's book, The War Potential of Nations. Written in 1956, it examined the components of the economic structure of nations in terms of their ability to wage war. Most of this was, of course, based upon observation of the experience of the major industrial nations in World War II. During this war, most of the major nations involved were required to allocate substantial portions of their resources to the war effort.

Any discussion of the relationship between economic and military power must take into account two distinct components. The first is the level of the economic potential of a nation. It is primarily to the level of economic potential that Knorr addressed himself. The level of economic potential in part determines the war potential of nations. A good example of the relationship between economic capacity and war potential is mainland China. Mainland China has a small GNP, perhaps 10 per

*That is, the income elasticity of consumer demand is low (less than unitary).

cent or less of U.S. GNP, a small percentage of the GNP of most of the major industrial nations of the world. Nevertheless, China has a formidable military establishment. Not only do they have a nascent nuclear force, but also a large (though ill-equipped) standing army.

Despite the low level of GNP, China's military capabilities are formidable, particularly when compared with nations of similar economic potential, such as India or Indonesia. The reason for this formidable military capability is embodied in the second component of our analysis of the relationship between military and economic power, the distribution of this economic potential. Chinese political authorities have demonstrated a willingness to make the resource allocation within the Chinese economy that is consistent with a high level of military expenditure. Moreover, they have allocated a substantial portion of the nation's skilled manpower to the armed forces and the major segment of their scientific manpower to their nuclear program. The point made here is that in the nuclear age, it is not the level of economic activity which is determinative of a nation's ability to wage war, but rather it is the willingness and ability to make the distribution of economic resources in a manner which favors the development of military forces.

This situation can be illustrated with a more general example, that of missile delivery systems. As of the present time there would seem to be about five nations which have the ability to build and deploy missile delivery systems and the associated subsystems. It should be noted that the nations suggested here (Figure 1) are heterogeneous politically and economically, with respect to both GNP and population levels. Nevertheless, there will perhaps be three times as many nations which would have the ability to build and deploy complete missile systems by 1980. Moreover, it seems feasible that a coalition of some of the nations which can only produce subsystems might be able to produce an operational missile system--and of course there are likely to be increasing opportunities to buy or otherwise obtain components from the world market generally and from any of these nations specifically.

From this discussion, it should be apparent that when one compares the cost of producing a modest strategic nuclear capability with the level of GNP of many of the nations of the world, it is clear that the distribution of economic resources within a country may be of greater importance for military purposes by 1980 than the level of a nation's economic potential. For military purposes, it is useful to have an idea of the kind of burden the military-oriented distribution is. This problem is discussed briefly below. It should be understood, however, that nations such as West Germany and Canada will be important--even if they don't procure strategic weapons systems, because they have or will have the economic and technological potential to do so if they choose.

Because GNP remains the best single measure of economic power, expressing military expenditures as a percentage of GNP is probably the best measure of the per capita burden of the real quantum of goods and services provided for military purposes. However, because of the complexity and heterogeneity of military forces, such comparisons do not

FIGURE 1*

POTENTIAL SUPPLIERS OF MISSILE SYSTEMS AND SUBSYSTEMS

Period	*Systems*	*Subsystems*	
To 1970	United States	United States	Italy
	USSR	USSR	Canada
	France	France	East Germany
	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	Australia
	China	China	Sweden
		United Arab Republic	Switzerland
		West Germany	Israel
		Japan	
1970-75	*Above Plus*	*Above Plus*	
	United Arab Republic	The Netherlands	
	Japan	Belgium	
	Israel	Czechoslovakia	
		India	
1975-80	*Above Plus*	*Above Plus*	
	West Germany	South Africa	
	Italy	Poland	
	Canada	Norway	
	East Germany	Yugoslavia	
	Australia	Pakistan	
	Sweden	Indonesia	
	Switzerland	Argentina	
	The Netherlands	Brazil	
		Chile	

necessarily measure the comparative worth of the forces, even ignoring such imponderables as skilled training, leadership, and the like, but offer only physical comparison. Let us, for example, consider the comparison of the United States and the Soviet Union. It would be possible to price all sorts of procurements in terms of dollars. If we do this we are likely to find that the Soviet establishment is a relatively large per cent of the U.S. If we reverse the procedure and price the U.S. establishment in rubles, we will find that the U.S. establishment looks large compared to the Soviet. The reason for this is that each country tends to buy the things which it does most efficiently. Thus the Soviets will often buy more manpower while the U.S. will buy more industrial goods. And if we price each system on the other's currency we get a misleadingly large estimate. Nevertheless, this misleading kind of calculation is often useful to do. And for this reason the concept of "purchasing power equivalent"

*Source: Military Review, February, 1969.

(PPE)* has been proposed by Benoit. This enables us to obtain a figure on military goods, which is somewhat misleading as a per capita burden but somewhat better than most figures in giving Americans an idea of what the other country is spending. (However, it should be realized that it almost invariably overestimates the per capita burden of the foreign power.)

Figure 2 reveals that two of the richest countries of the world, Germany and Japan, bear a light burden of defense when compared with the U.S. (the U.S. bears the greatest per capita burden, whether measured by

FIGURE 2**

THE WORLD'S MONETARY AND REAL COSTS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, 1966

	(1) Real Cost PPE$ (millions)	(2) Real Cost per Capita PPE$	(3) Armed Forces 000	(4) Armed Forces per Thousand of Population	(5) Monetary Cost (in units of national currency) (millions)	(6) Monetary Cost as percent of GNE %
Superpowers						
United States	63,283	322	3,094	15.7	63,283	9.1
U.S.S.R.	44,500	191	3,165	13.6		—
Total	107,783	251	6,259	14.5	xx	xx
Other Major Powers						
Mainland China	6,000	9	2,486	3.5	—	—
United Kingdom	5,761	105	438	8.0	2,202	6.1
France	4,639	94	523	10.6	26,246	5.3
Germany, Federal Republic	4,564	79	440	7.7	19,686	4.1
Total	20,964	24	3,887	4.5	xx	xx
Secondary Powers						
Italy	1,815	35	376	7.2	1,327	3.5
Canada	1,705	86	107	5.4	1,734	3.0
India	1,293	3	879	1.8	10,360	3.7
Japan	1,276	13	246	2.5	307,040	1.0

*The PPE is calculated by (1) estimating the amount spent for defense goods and services in terms of the local currency; (2) calculating the purchasing power of the dollar relative to the foreign currency in buying similar types of items in the U.S. and in the country being compared; (3) then applying these ratios to the actual foreign expenditure total to obtain a dollar value equivalent for the country involved. See Emile Benoit, "The Monetary and Real Costs of National Defense," American Economic Review, May 1968, pp. 398-416.

**Source: American Economic Review, May 1968.

real or nominal costs, population participation, etc.). On the other hand, mainland China and India have very low per capita PPE expenditures. This indicates that these nations have spent a good deal of their military budget on a relatively small quantity of goods (e.g. China's nuclear capability) since their armed forces are obviously quite large.

For the 1975-85 period it seems clear that the growth in GNP will facilitate the acquisition of strategic military forces because the cost of these systems relative to the size of the resource allocation required from the domestic economy is small. It should be noted that not all nations can alter the internal resource allocation structure either easily or quickly to accommodate the political desire to develop military forces of a given size. Moreover, the real burden of military forces on the domestic economy may make such allocations undesirable in the absence of true felt need for such forces. From the point of view of nations within the communist bloc, their relative burden is less than that of most of the major Western powers, suggesting that it may be less difficult for communist nations to increase their resource allocation for military purposes than for many Western nations.

F. Miscellaenous Issues for 1975-85

One of the most persistent prognostications of forecasters in the 1950's and '60's was that of widespread food shortages and famines in many areas of the world in the 1970's and '80's. These forecasts, made in the true Malthusian tradition, compared population growth rates with food production growth rates. The stagnant character of the latter and the rapid growth of the former led inevitably to the conclusion that there would be widespread famine during the 1970's or '80's. The disparity between population growth and food production was viewed by many as the central problem of the period since such conflict could be the source or catalyst for regional or international conflict.*

There appears to be, however, a very good chance that these gloomy forecasts may not emerge after all. The basic reason is the technological revolution which has taken place in agriculture during the past two decades. While most of the technological innovations have been applied in nations whose agricultural capability is already adequate for their present and future needs, there have been developments relevant to agrarian economies. Specifically, new strains of wheat and rice have been developed which make it possible to increase per acre yields at a rate which far exceeds the rate of growth of population.

Interesting economic issues--which may well raise special problems for the military--arise with respect to the commercial exploitation of the seabed as well as outer space. Presumably some of these issues will have to be resolved during the 1975-85 period. While commercially remunerative exploitation of the seabed, particularly beyond the continental shelf, will probably not be a dominant sector of the economy of any major

*E.g., see R.S. McNamara, Essence of Security: Reflections in Office.

industrial nation, it can be expected that such exploitation may be meaningful--particularly in the extractive industries. Perhaps its most significant economic implication is the alteration in the U.S. industrial structure it portends. For over a century, up to the present decade, the focus of economic enterprise has been in the manufacturing sector (although service-type industries have become more important in the 1950's). The successful commercial exploitation of the sea would tend to make the industries concerned with the logistical problems of seabed exploitation relatively important since environmental problems associated with such exploitation may be overpowering.

While it is difficult to foresee the economically significant exploitation of outer space during the 1975-85 period, the expectations implanted by the military exploitation (discussed in Chapter II of this Part) of outer space will inevitably color economic behavior. The exploitation of outer space may create a crisis analogous to the conflict which took place after World War I with respect to control of the radio frequency spectrum. Prior to World War I, the RF spectrum was haphazardly exploited by commercial as well as government interests. Following World War I (governments had taken control of the RF spectrum during the war), governments were reluctant to permit private exploitation. In outer space, with a long legacy of government domination of research and development and exploitation, there may be considerable reluctance to permit commercial exploitation.

It may well be that changes in the technology associated with the commercial exploitation of space may make a government monopoly impractical. Thus the issue of who will derive the benefits from the exploitation of space (i.e., governments or individuals) will be resolved during the 1975-85 period--well in advance of its widespread feasibility.

CHAPTER II. MILITARY/TECHNOLOGICAL POSSIBILITIES FOR THE 1970'S AND 1980'S

A. Introduction

Our aim in this chapter is to sketch a range of technological possibilities that may be of importance to military planners contemplating the 1975-85 period. We are mainly concerned with weapons possibilities but we also note some areas of non-weapons technology of likely military significance. Although we comment in Section C below on the spread of advanced military technology to new countries--we wish to some extent to "flag" this as a problem for military planners thinking about the 1975-85 period--our main discussion of the over-all problem of nuclear proliferation is deferred to later chapters and the next Part of this report.

We do not attempt in this report any exhaustive or detailed discussion of future military technology. One reason for this is that technology tends to receive relatively adequate attention from military planners. U.S. defense research and development is carried out on a large scale (now about $8 billion annually, or 10% of the defense budget), and is highly institutionalized. And while many aspects of the process by which R&D leads eventually to militarily useful systems can probably be improved, it can also be considered (a) relatively well understood, and (b) with many caveats, relatively effective. We say "relatively" because we believe that other types of issues--social, political, cultural, economic, etc.--need more careful and systematic study by military planners; and a principal aim of this report is to provide concepts and tools to help planners deal more effectively with these other types of issues.

The chapter may be regarded as a survey of material that can be gleaned from unclassified technical publications and the press. This precludes discussion of many details, and some technological areas. Military planners who have access to classified information can in many cases add much to what is said here, but this chapter should still serve as a useful orientation and general discussion of technological possibilities.*

In contrast to our discussion of various aspects of the 1975-85 period in other parts of this report, we make in this chapter a general separation between the military/technological possibilities of the 1970's on the one hand, and those of the 1980's on the other. This separation is logical: we can foresee the weapons possibilities of the mid-1970's much more clearly than those of the mid-1980's. One reason for this is because it is unlikely--though not impossible--that qualitatively new weapons development based on the discovery of new knowledge will play a

*Cf., D.G. Brennan, ed., Future Military Technology (U), HI-800-RR (Hudson Institute, Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y., February 1, 1967), SECRET-Restricted Data.

significant military role in the middle or late 1970's. The same statement cannot be made for the 1980's; for this period we are obliged to think more in terms of relatively "far out" ideas, such as some of the weapons possibilities for the year 2000 listed in Chapter III. We can thus claim to discuss weapons possibilities for the mid-seventies with reasonable assurance, but we cannot do the same for the period of the mid-eighties.

In Section B, following, we discuss military/technological possibilities for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.--the two "superpowers"--in the 1970's. This discussion is not particularly difficult: As noted just above we do not expect many technological "surprises" (although of course the likelihood of surprises increases in the later seventies); and, also we are accustomed to think in terms of the military technological competition as going on chiefly between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

Sketching some possibilities for U.S. and Soviet technology in the seventies helps to provide one "benchmark" for Section C, in which we discuss the proliferation of military technology to more countries: For at least the next decade or two we may expect the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to lead the way in military technology. But, increasingly, planners will have to face the fact that other countries may follow the technological lead of the Americans and the Soviets by only a few years--and in some cases surpass American and Soviet achievement--at least in some areas.

Finally, in Section D we discuss some military/technological possibilities which we consider plausible guesses for the 1980's, or at least for the early to mid-eighties. Although we use the word "guesses" advisedly, we believe we can at least see some of these possibilities and the time of their possible military significance somewhat more clearly than many of the items for the year 2000.

A chart page, entitled "The Pace of Military Technology in the Past" follows this page. The charts on the page illustrate that we have experienced a revolution in military technology every five years since World War II comparable in magnitude to the developments taking place, say, between the Civil War and the First and Second World Wars. Doctrinal adjustments have typically lagged one or two revolutions behind the technological developments.

In discussing how much strategic theory has changed since World War II it is customary to stress the important role played by new technologies such as nuclear weapons, long-range aircraft, missiles, and Polaris submarines. Almost equally important is the fact that these new technologies themselves change very rapidly. And it is not only the spectacular changes which make a difference. For example, the change from high explosives to kiloton nuclear weapons, while more spectacular, was probably not as big as the change from kilotons to megatons. In the first case, one still talks about point targets and what is destroyed; in the second case one tends to talk about what survives. In the first case one can still think in terms of World War II; in the second case,

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The Pace of Military Technology in the Past

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THE PACE OF MILITARY TEC

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] IMENTAL [illegible]

INITIAL PRODUCTION [illegible]

[illegible] FLIGHT OF [illegible]

MANUAL AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM STARTED

AIR DEFENSE HAS F-80, F-94, F-86, F-84

PRODUCTION ORDER FOR NIKE-[illegible]

[illegible] POWERED AIRPLANE UNDER DEVELOPMENT

[illegible] FOURTH GENERATION ATOMIC BOMBS

RUSSIANS HAVE: TU-4, IL-[illegible], YAK-17, MIG-[illegible], MIG-15, [illegible] HAVE TESTED THREE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

[illegible] RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMAND, LINCOLN LABORATORY, RAND CORPORATION, ETC., ESTABLISHED

[illegible] TECHNOLOGY

[illegible] PRODUCED

B-[illegible] AND KC-135 PHASED IN

B-58, [illegible], AND XP6M-1 (MARTIN SEAMASTER) FLY

REGULUS I IN SERVICE

ATLAS, TITAN, AND THOR IN CRASH PROGRAMS

CENTURY SERIES OF FIGHTERS PHASED IN

MISSILE MASTER AND SAGE IN PRODUCTION

NUCLEAR-POWERED PLANE STILL UNDER DEVELOPMENT

NUCLEAR POCKET UNDER DEVELOPMENT

NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINE LAUNCHED

INEXPENSIVE, FLEXIBLE ATOMIC BOMBS

THIRD-GENERATION THERMONUCLEAR BOMBS

RUSSIANS HAVE: BADGERS, BEARS, BISONS, MRBM'S (SS-3), H-BOMBS, MIG-17, MIG-19, YAK-25, SA-1 (GUILD)

(3) 1961 TECHNOLOGY

ARMS CONTROL (TECHNIQUES A

CONTROLLED RESPONSE (TECHNI POLICIES)

SATELLITES (VANGUARD, PIONE TIROS, TRANSIT NOTUS, ME

SOFT ATLAS AND SOFT IRBM'S

25-PSI ATLAS, 100-PSI TITA POLARIS PHASED IN

CRASH PROGRAM ON MINUTEMAN

GUIDANCE (INERTIAL) BREAKT

B-47E, B-52G AND H, B-58 F

BOMBERS OPERATED ALERT AND

SAGE AND MISSILE-MASTER PA

BOMARC A AND HAWK BEING PH

NIKE-HERCULES, F-100, 101, SERVICE

CHEAP CIVIL DEFENSE

INEXPENSIVE, EFFICIENT & V WEAPONS

THERE ARE FOUR NUCLEAR COU

GOOSE, NAVAHO, REGULUS II, CANCELLED

RUSSIANS HAVE: BLINDERS, "KIPPER," "KITCHEN," "K (SS-6), IRBM (SS-4), MI (GUIDELINE)

(4) SOME EARLY FIFTY ISSUES

1. [illegible] REFUELING [illegible] BOMBERS
2. ACTIVE AND PASSIVE DEFENSE SYSTEMS
3. DETERRENCE BY NUCLEAR STRATEGIC BOMBING VS BY "DETROIT"
4. ROLE OF MOBILIZATION BASES (PRE- AND POST-ATTACK)
5. PRESIDENTIAL COMMAND AND CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS
6. ROLE OF NATO, WEU, U.N. PEACEKEEPING, ETC.
7. ROLE AND VALUE OF SUCH METHODOLOGIES [illegible] THEORY, LINEAR PROGRAMMING, COST EFFECTIVENESS, [illegible] SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, ETC.

(5) SOME MID-FIFTIES ISSUES

1. TYPICAL ATTITUDES TOWARD NUCLEAR WAR
2. WHAT IS THERMONUCLEAR WAR
3. HOW MIGHT IT START?
4. WITH [illegible] TACTICS?
5. HOW MIGHT IT END?
6. WHAT WERE THE OBJECTIVES?
7. WHAT IS DETERRENCE?
8. WHAT IS A GOOD DETERRENT?
9. HOW DO YOU GO ABOUT ANALYZING A DETERRENT SYSTEM
10. WHAT ARE TYPICAL RESULTS?
11. WHAT ARE THE LONG-RUN IMPLICATIONS?
12. WHAT ARE THE CURRENT CHOICES FOR THE U.S.?
13. FOR OTHERS?
14. HOW DO THESE AFFECT LONG-RUN PROSPECTS

(6) EARLY AND MID-S ISSUES AND FORMULA

1. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN V DETERRENCE
2. DETERRENCE VS DEFENSE
3. CONTROLLED RESPONSE AN STRATEGIES
4. MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR F
5. ATMOSPHERIC TESTING
6. DAMAGE LIMITATION VS A TION
7. COST EFFECTIVENESS, SY AND "WHIZ KIDS" MOVE F TO PENTAGON
8. PROGRAM PLANNING BUDGE
9. OTHER INCREASED "CIVI IN RESEARCH, DEVELOP OPERATIONS, DOCTRINE A
10. CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPON
11. INEXPENSIVE CIVIL DEF

Best Available Copy

CE OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY IN THE PAST

(3) 1961 TECHNOLOGY

RMS CONTROL (TECHNIQUES AND POLICIES)

CONTROLLED RESPONSE (TECHNIQUES AND POLICIES)

ATELLITES (VANGUARD, PIONEER, DISCOVERER, TIROS, TRANSIT NOTUS, MERCURY, ETC.)

OFT ATLAS AND SOFT IRBM'S DEPLOYED

5-PSI ATLAS, 100-PSI TITAN, BMEW'S, AND POLARIS PHASED IN

ASH PROGRAM ON MINUTEMAN

IDANCE (INERTIAL) BREAKTHROUGH

-47E, B-52G AND H, B-58 FORM BULK OF SAC

OMBERS OPERATED ALERT AND DISPERSED

AGE AND MISSILE-MASTER PARTIALLY DEPLOYED

OMARC A AND HAWK BEING PHASED IN

IKE-HERCULES, F-100, 101, 102, 104 IN SERVICE

HEAP CIVIL DEFENSE

NEXPENSIVE, EFFICIENT , VERSATILE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

HERE ARE FOUR NUCLEAR COUNTRIES

OOSE, NAVAHO, REGULUS II, F-108, ETC., CANCELLED

USSIANS HAVE: BLINDERS, ASM'S ("KENNEL," "KIPPER," "KITCHEN," "KANGAROO"), ICBM (SS-6), IRBM (SS-4), MIG-21, SU 9, SA-2 (GUIDELINE)

(4) 1965 TECHNOLOGY

INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR DETERRENTS PRACTICAL

"LIMITS" OF BOMB TECHNOLOGY

MINUTEMAN III AND POLARIS A_3

SOPHISTICATED SATELLITE PROGRAM

BMEWS-B, MIDAS-B, SAGE B, BOMARC B AND C, NIKE-ZEUS A AND B, HAWK B, F-108, B-58B, B-70, NUCLEAR-POWERED AIRPLANE OR ROCKET, AND DYNOSOAR ALL TECHNOLOGICALLY POSSIBLE BUT CANCELLED

BULK OF MEGATONS ON "IMPROVED" B-52, B-47, AND B-58

PROTECTED COMMAND AND CONTROL

INEXPENSIVE, RELIABLE RESEARCH MISSILE

SUPER GUIDANCE

ASTRONAUTICS

RUSSIANS HAVE: SLBM (SARK, SERB), ICBM'S (SS-7, SS-8, SS-9, SS-11), IRBM'S (SS-5, "SCAMP," "SCROOGE" (MOBILE), YAK-28, MIG-23, STOL + VTOL TECHNOLOGY, SA-3 (GOA), MOBILE SAM (GANEF, GAINFUL), GRIFFON, GALOSH (ABM)

(5) 1970 TECHNOLOGY

PRECURSOR PRESSURES (AND PREPARATIONS) FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR "NEUTRALS" AND LOSERS OF WORLD WAR II

FB-111, SCRAM, SCAD

SOPHISTICATED MEASURE COUNTER-MEASURE BMD PENETRATION SYSTEMS

LOW CEP WARHEADS

MIRV (MULTIPLE INDEPENDENT RE-ENTRY VEHICLES)

POSEIDON

SENTINEL AND OTHER BMD SYSTEMS

SUPERHARD SILOS

AIRBORNE DOPPLER SHIFT RADARS AND OTHER SOPHISTICATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS

MULTIPLE APPLICATIONS OF LASERS UNDER SERIOUS DEVELOPMENT

C-5 TYPE LOGISTIC AIRPLANES

VARIOUS MILITARY USES OF SATELLITES (INCLUDING DEVELOPMENT OF LASP (LOW-ALTITUDE SPACE PLATFORMS) AND HASP (HIGH-ALTITUDE SPACE PLATFORMS))

DECISIONS ON AMSA, ICM, ULMS

ALSO NEW TECHNIQUES IN COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE, E.G., BARRIER TECHNOLOGY, SOPHISTICATED GUN SHIPS, COMPUTERIZED POPULATION CONTROL, NIGHT VISION AND OTHER DETECTORS, ETC., AND MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE "CLASSIC" PRINCIPLES OF PATROLS, AMBUSHES, NIGHT OPERATIONS, PURSUIT, POLICE OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE, USE OF INDIGENOUS FORCES, ETC., SO THAT MODERN TECHNOLOGY IS USED TO AID THESE OPERATIONS RATHER THAN TO FIGHT AND SUPPLANT THEM.

PERHAPS ALSO NEW TECHNIQUES IN INSURGENCY

RUSSIANS HAVE FOBS, MRV'S, THIRD-GENERATION SLBM ("SAFELY"), SOLID-FUEL ICBM, MOBILE ICBM(?), SOME ABM, HELICOPTER CARRIERS, AND NAVAL INFANTRY

(2) EARLY AND MID-SIXTY ISSUES AND FORMULATIONS

1. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN VARIOUS KINDS OF DETERRENCE
2. DETERRENCE VS DEFENSE AND OR OFFENSE
3. CONTROLLED RESPONSE AND CITY-AVOIDANCE STRATEGIES
4. MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FORCES
5. ATMOSPHERIC TESTING
6. DAMAGE LIMITATION VS ASSURED DESTRUCTION
7. COST EFFECTIVENESS, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, AND "WHIZ KIDS" MOVE FROM THINK TANKS TO PENTAGON
8. PROGRAM PLANNING BUDGETING
9. OTHER INCREASED "CIVILIAN INTERFERENCE" IN RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, PROCUREMENT, OPERATIONS, DOCTRINE AND WAR PLANS
10. CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
11. INEXPENSIVE CIVIL DEFENSE

(1) MID-LATE SIXTY ISSUES

1. BMD VS SOVIET MISSILES
2. DEFENSE OF MINUTEMAN FACILITIES
3. OTHER U.S.-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS ON ARMS CONTROL
4. CIVILIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE OPERATION OF A WAR
5. BMD FOR SAC VS BMD FOR CITIES
6. THIN [illegible]
   ESCALATION [illegible]
   [illegible]
7. CHINESE [illegible]
   SUPERIORITY VERSUS SUFFICIENCY [illegible]
   [illegible]

(3) EARLY SEVENTY ISSUES

MORE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF MANY OF THE EARLY ISSUES AND ESPECIALLY SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF PRACTICAL NON-UTOPIAN LONG-TERM CONTROL OF THE ARMS RACE.

2 AT THE SAME TIME THERE SEEMS LIKELY TO BE A LESS RATIONAL AND MORE EMOTIONAL LEVEL OF DEBATE AND DISCUSSION.

3 FOCUS ON REDUCING CO LOCATIONS OF BASES AND CITIES

4 SUPERIORITY VERSUS PARITY VERSUS SUFFICIENCY
   [illegible]
   [illegible]
   [illegible]

5 [illegible]
   [illegible]
   [illegible]
   [illegible]
   [illegible]

6 [illegible]
   [illegible]
   [illegible]
   [illegible]
   [illegible]

7 [illegible]
   [illegible]
   [illegible]
   [illegible]
   [illegible]

8 [illegible]
   [illegible]
   [illegible]
   [illegible]
   [illegible]

9 [illegible]
   [illegible]
   [illegible]
   [illegible]
   [illegible]

10 [illegible]
   [illegible]
   [illegible]
   [illegible]
   [illegible]

with multi-megaton weapons, one thinks in terms of forces of nature, of country-wide or world-wide effects; one thinks of attacks on the environment itself. To take another example, some years ago intercontinental missiles achieved a degree of accuracy which was a factor of five or more better than many had expected. This meant that against hard "point targets" missiles were at least 25 times more effective than anticipated. A thousand of the new missiles would do about the same job against hardened targets as twenty-five thousand of the old missiles. Yet very few people discussed, or even noted, the magnitude of this change and its possible consequences.

Consider another example. It has been reported by the American press that the U.S. will put three MIRV's (multiple independently-guided reentry vehicles) in its perhaps 1,000 Minuteman III's and 10 MIRV's in each Poseidon. From possessing somewhat more than fifteen hundred or so targetable warheads available for immediate launching, the U.S. would then have about five times as many, or about seventy-five hundred. If this is so, and the MIRV is reasonably accurate and flexible, it might easily provide the U.S. with an annihilating "first-strike capability" against even one or two thousand Soviet ground-based missiles. Thus even though the Soviets have, in recent years, doubled or trebled their number of deployed missiles, the introduction of MIRV greatly increases their vulnerability to U.S. attack. The opposite could also be true if the Soviets can put a technically advanced MIRV of their own in their admittedly large (in payload capacity) missiles.

As indicated by Charts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 on page 3-19c, these improvements in missile accuracy and effective numbers are only a few examples of many, many changes that occurred and are still occurring. Charts 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 illustrate the way in which issues change with technology, although the issues may not be determined entirely or even primarily by technology.

A second chart page, entitled "The Pace of Military Technology in the Future" follows this page. Chart 1 gives one scenario for nuclear proliferation in the future. It shows that it may be most difficult to preserve in perpetuity the results of World War II, with a power hierarchy giving the five members of the winning coalition (Mainland China is included here) nuclear weapon privileges while the losers of the conflict and everyone else remain "underprivileged." By 1975 the war will have been over for 30 years and the basis for the acceptance of the results of that war will presumably have been almost completely eroded.

Chart 2 shows a time scale for the development, production, and useful operational life of a strategic weapon system. The time intervals shown in the various boxes in the chart are representative of the major strategic systems developed in the last 25 years, since World War II. We do not expect these approximate time stages in the life-cycle of a strategic weapon system to change substantially in the next decade or two. So we begin our time scale at the bottom of Chart 2 this year, 1969, to offer some "feel" for future systems. Chart 2 shows that the lead time

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a fold-out chart page.

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The Pace of Military Technology in the Future

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THE PACE OF MILITARY

(3)

[illegible]	[illegible] INITIATED PROGRAMS [illegible] BLAST
[illegible]	[illegible]
197[illegible] - 197[illegible]	JAPAN IN THE EARLY SEVENTIES, WEST GERMANY ABOUT - OR 5 YEARS LATER SOON FOLLOWED BY ITALY. OTHER POSSIBILITIES ARE SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND OR AUSTRALIA AND INDIA
197[illegible] - 198[illegible]	ARGENTINA-BRAZIL-[illegible], EGYPT-ISRAEL, AND OR PAKISTAN SEEMS LIKELY. YUGOSLAVIA-RUMANIA, S. KOREA, AND TAIWAN ARE GOOD POSSIBILITIES
199[illegible] - 199[illegible]	EVERYBODY

(2)

LEAD TIMES
CENTRAL WAR



(4)

THE NEXT DECADE OR TWO

EARLY 70'S:	SUPER SOPHISTICATED TN WEAPONS & MISSILES, "EARLY" BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE. EFFECTIVE SHORT-RANGE ARMS CONTROL, BUT INDIA, JAPAN, WEST GERMANY, ISRAEL, & OTHERS WILL HAVE PEACETIME & MILITARY PROGRAMS THAT MAKE MUCH SIMPLER THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS & EVEN ADVANCED DELIVERY SYSTEMS, PREPARATORY MOVES TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
LATE 70'S:	NEW AEROSPACE OFFENSE & DEFENSE SYSTEMS (PERHAPS USING LASERS OR NUCLEAR POWERED VEHICLES), LATE 1950 & EARLY 1960 TECHNOLOGY WIDELY DIFFUSED, MANY NEW COUNTRIES AND/OR EXTENSIVE ARMS CONTROL THAT IS MORE EFFECTIVE THAN SUCH THINGS AS THE CURRENT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION TREATY AND TEST BANS
EARLY OR MID-80'S (AT LEAST POTENTIALLY):	FRANCE, GERMANY, JAPAN, AND THE LIKE WILL HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR AT LEAST A POST-MODEL A TECHNOLOGY
	CHINA, BRAZIL, MEXICO, EAST GERMANY, ITALY, AND SO ON, WILL HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR AT LEAST A MODEL A TECHNOLOGY
	POTENTIAL FOR IMPROVED MODEL T TECHNOLOGY GENERALLY AVAILABLE (IN PERHAPS FIFTY COUNTRIES)
	U.S. & S.U. COULD HAVE MASSIVE SPACE CAPABILITIES...BOTH DEFENSIVE & OFFENSIVE--EFFECTIVE AEROSPACE DEFENSE (AT LEAST AGAINST MODEL T THREATS)...EXTRAORDINARILY FLEXIBLE, RELIABLE, & ENORMOUSLY CAPABLE REAL TIME COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND [illegible] SYSTEMS...ELABORATE AND FLEXIBLE [illegible] CAPABILITIES, ETC.

(5)

IN THE LAST DECADE OR TWO

1. AS A RESULT OF ORDINARY IMPROV
   NUCLEAR-ARMED, LONG-RANGE VEHI
   SIVE AND AVAILABLE TO EVEN VERY
   LARGEST POWERS AND MANY SMALLER
   TAIN AND MAINTAIN, SAY, 500 MI
   "MINUTE-MAN CAPABILITY" OR BETT
   DOLLARS PROCUREMENT COST OR LES
   DOLLARS ANNUAL UPKEEP (1965 DO

2. MORE OR LESS WIDELY AVAILABLE T
   NEW KINDS OF NUCLEAR WEA
   VARIOUS KINDS OF LASER O
   A MENU OF TECHNIQUES FOR
   BIOLOGICAL WARFARE IN
   NEW KINDS OF BALLISTIC M
   EFFECTIVE AGAINST REL
   OR AGAINST FORCES WHI
   NOLOGY AND/OR TACTICS
   SIMILAR DEVELOPMENTS FOR
   BORNE THREATS
   WELL-UNDERSTOOD DOOMSDAY
   MACHINES)
   TSUNAMI (TIDAL WAVE) PRO
   CLIMATE CHANGERS, EARTH
   IFY OR DAMAGE THE ENV
   NEW FORMS OF PSYCHOLOGIC
   THE INVENTION OF A "NUCL
   LEAST THE DEVELOPMENT
   ABLE VERSIONS OF THE
   OF MASS DESTRUCTION
   TECHNOLOGIES OF THE

3. DEPENDING ON THE DEFENSES OF T
   POWERS (& OTHER "TECHNICAL AND
   SYSTEMS MAY PROVE TO BE "EQUAL
   WEST" SENSE, OR THEY MAY ALLOW
   SOME OF THESE SYSTEMS, AND CER
   THEM, MIGHT ALSO BE RELATIVELY
   OR AT LEAST PRIVATE ORGANIZATI

4. THE DEVELOPMENT OF VERY EFFECT
   WARFARE--A PERHAPS FOR INSURGE
   WELL. THE LATTER COULD ALLOW
   EFFECTIVELY OPPOSED, TO DISRUP
   AND SOCIETY, YET MUCH OF THE
   [illegible] OF ONEROUS SOCIA
   INSURGENCY OR TERRORA M DIFFIC

Best Available Copy

PACE OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY IN THE FUTURE

LEAD TIMES FOR CENTRAL WAR SYSTEMS



IN THE LAST DECADE OR TWO OF THE 20TH CENTURY

RESULT OF ORDINARY IMPROVEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, SIMPLE AR-ARMED, LONG-RANGE VEHICLES WHICH ARE VERY INEXPEN- AND AVAILABLE TO EVEN VERY SMALL POWERS. ANY OF THE ST POWERS AND MANY SMALLER ONES SHOULD BE ABLE TO OB- AND MAINTAIN, SAY, 500 MISSILES WITH, SAY, CURRENT TE-MAN CAPABILITY" OR BETTER FOR ONE OR TWO BILLION RS PROCUREMENT COST OR LESS AND A FEW HUNDRED MILLION RS ANNUAL UPKEEP (1965 DOLLARS)

OR LESS WIDELY AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY:
- NEW KINDS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
- VARIOUS KINDS OF LASER OR OTHER "DEATH RAYS"
- A MENU OF TECHNIQUES FOR EFFECTIVE CHEMICAL AND/OR BIOLOGICAL WARFARE IN VARIOUS APPLICATIONS
- NEW KINDS OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE AGAINST RELATIVELY SMALL OFFENSE FORCES OR AGAINST FORCES WHICH USE UNSOPHISTICATED TECHNOLOGY AND/OR TACTICS
- SIMILAR DEVELOPMENTS FOR AIR DEFENSE AGAINST AIR-BORNE THREATS
- WELL-UNDERSTOOD DOOMSDAY MACHINES (OR NEAR-DOOMSDAY MACHINES)
- TSUNAMI (TIDAL WAVE) PRODUCERS
- CLIMATE CHANGERS, EARTH SCORCHERS, OR OTHER WAYS TO MODIFY OR DAMAGE THE ENVIRONMENT ON A LARGE SCALE
- NEW FORMS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL, OR EVEN DIRECT MENTAL WARFARE
- THE INVENTION OF A "NUCLEAR SIX-GUN" TECHNOLOGY--OR AT LEAST THE DEVELOPMENT OF INEXPENSIVE & WIDELY AVAILABLE VERSIONS OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES OF THE MID- AND LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY

DING ON THE DEFENSES OF THE LARGE POWERS & THE SUPER- S (& OTHER "TECHNICAL AND TACTICAL DETAILS"), THESE WEAPONS MS MAY PROVE TO BE "EQUALIZERS" IN THE GALLOIS OR "AMERICAN " SENSE, OR THEY MAY ALLOW FOR A DEFINITE HIERARCHY OF POWERS. OF THESE SYSTEMS, AND CERTAINLY MUCH OF THE TECHNOLOGY BEHIND MIGHT ALSO BE RELATIVELY AVAILABLE TO PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS LEAST PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS & EXTREMIST POLITICAL FACTIONS.

EVELOPMENT OF VERY EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY RE--& PERHAPS FOR INSURGENCY AND/OR TERRORISTIC ACTIVITIES AS THE LATTER COULD ALLOW EVEN RELATIVELY SMALL GROUPS, IF NOT TIVELY OPPOSED, TO DISRUPT, EASILY AND EFFECTIVELY, ALMOST OCIETY. YET MUCH OF THE NEW TECHNOLOGY--WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF ENERGY, SOCIAL CONTROLS--MIGHT ALSO MAKE SUCH GUERRILLA OR TERRORIST DIFFICULT OR LIMIT ITS EFFECTIVENESS.

(3) MODEL T AND MODEL A STRATEGIC FRAS

T

- **LATE 40's:** EARLY KT, B-50's, & B-36's; LITTLE "THEORY"
- **EARLY 50's:** MATURE KT; B-47's; MANUAL AIR DEFENSE; NIKE AJAX; "SIMPLE" THEORY
- **LATE 50's:** MATURE TN; B-52's; SAGE, CENTURY FIGHTERS; NIKE HERCULES; B-36 PHASED OUT; U-2, TURKISH RADAR; APOCALYPTIC VIEWS, FIRST & SECOND-STRIKE ISSUES, RELIABLE GO-AHEAD ORDER

A

- **EARLY 60's:** ALERT FORCES; ADVANCED TN; "INVULNERABLE" MINUTEMAN & POLARIS; MANY R&D CANCELLATIONS; CONTROLLED RESPONSE; EARLY ARMS CONTROL; CIVIL DEFENSE, "ACCEPTANCE OF PROCUREMENT POLICIES & MILITARY DOCTRINES APPROPRIATE TO A DETENTE"
- **LATE 60's:** FURTHER IMPROVED TN; SOPHISTICATED MISSILES; MORE ARMS CONTROL; MORE CANCELLATIONS; LITTLE PERCEIVED THREAT; SOME ATTENTION TO "REALISTIC" SCENARIOS & MOBILIZATION BASES

*THERMONUCLEAR DEVICES

(6) HOW WILL ESCALATION BE HANDLED IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?

1. MINOR MODIFICATION OF CURRENT SYSTEM
2. ALL-OUT WAR SYSTEM WITHERED AWAY
   - A. RULE OF LAW
   - B. PLURALISTIC SECURITY COMMUNITY
   - C. RULE OF FAIT ACCOMPLI (INTERNAL WAR)
   - D. INSTRUMENTAL WARS (RATIONAL SELF-INTEREST RESTRAINTS)
   - E. AGONISTIC WARS (LIMITED BY ABSOLUTE RULES)
   - F. POTLATCH WARS (SPACE, FOREIGN AID, "SHOWY" SYSTEMS, ETC.)
   - G. OTHER SUBSTITUTE FOR CENTRAL WAR
3. ELIMINATION OR CONTROL OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION BY:
   - A. AGREEMENT OR REVULSION
   - B. LARGE SETBACK TO CIVILIZATION
4. OTHER BASIC CHANGE IN SYSTEM
   - A. BLOC SYSTEMS (WITH RESTRAINTS AND RITUALS)
   - B. COMMUNITY SANCTIONS
   - C. CONDOMINIUMS (U.S.-S.U.?, COLLECTIVE SECURITY?, U.N.?)
   - D. CONCERT OF (LARGE OR SMALL) POWERS
   - E. "WORLD GOVERNMENT"
   - F. WORLD EMPIRE (OR EMPIRES)
   - G. DISPERSED, BUT "UNCONTROLLED" NATIONS

for a new system tends to be about ten years, from the first concept of the system to the point where it is solidly established in the operational inventory. Then, even after the system is in the inventory, it probably continues in production and has several years of useful operational life.

Charts 4 and 5 indicate some possible or probable technological developments in the rest of this century. Related to future developments we should also have in mind the long-term change which may take place in the international system; both in terms of where we would like to see developments take us and what particular "solutions" we want very much to avoid. Chart 6 lists some possibilities and helps to relate this chapter on technology to other parts of this report, especially Part IV.

B. Possibilities for the 1970's: The U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

In the area of strategic weapons it seems likely that ballistic missiles will continue to be the delivery system of principal interest. It is almost certain that MIRV's (multiple independently-guided reentry vehicles) will come into the operational inventory of both the U.S. and S.U. in the early seventies and remain operational for the rest of the decade. Certainly, in the mid- or late seventies ICBM's with (or without) MIRV's can be deployed in a manner limited only by resource allocation (i.e., budgetary) choices. Qualitative improvements may also be expected; MIRV's and their associated technology will probably lead to greater accuracy and a greater range of choices among warheads and advanced penetration aids devices. But while advances in MIRV's and missile technology in general could upset the "strategic balance"--possibly even to the extent that a counterforce first strike by either side would prevent retaliation at an unacceptable level--this is not likely to occur in practice--the threatened side being likely to take compensating measures reasonably early. If warhead accuracy reaches the point where hardening no longer seems to be an effective principal means of insuring ICBM survival, then we would expect other options, such as an increased emphasis on submarine-launched missiles, active defense of missile silos (including, perhaps, a strengthened U.S. "Safeguard" system), and perhaps mobile land-based ICBM's to be pursued in time to maintain retaliatory capabilities.

We do not foresee ASW (anti-submarine warfare) developments in the 1970's which would negate the present relative U.S. emphasis on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, although this situation could change in the eighties. But it is important to note in connection with this forecast that the role and effectiveness of ASW, at least as regards strategic war possibilities, depends critically on the scenario of the war. If the actual use of strategic nuclear missiles by one side against the other is preceded by a period of extreme international tension and conflict to the extent that one or both sides tries to sink ("attrite") the other's submarines, then of course the effectiveness of the U.S. Polaris/Poseidon force might be substantially reduced. Similarly, in a "stretched-out" strategic war, attrition of missile-launching submarines could make a

major difference. But we do not consider either of these to be particularly plausible scenarios (although they are perhaps more plausible--much more plausible--than the "strike out of the blue" case). The deterrent or retaliatory effectiveness of each side's submarines could be increased if a period of tension provided time for the most advantageous or maximum deployment of the submarines. We offer these comments on ASW to call attention to the fact that the role of ASW--and the level of effort that should go into R&D on ASW, and operational ASW capability itself--appears to have been insufficiently considered by military planners in relation to different possible types of wars--e.g., the stretched out one--or the one preceded by a war largely limited to sea.

For the U.S. and the Soviet Union we expect in the 1970's relatively greater emphasis on ballistic missile defenses, both in strategic thinking and in actual operational capabilities, than has been the case in the 1960's. There seems to exist at the time of this writing (early 1969) a generally prevailing view in the military/technical community that the technological situation with respect to the offensive vs. defensive competition has shifted in the last two or three years relatively in favor of the defense. However, even if technological developments in the seventies continue to favor the defense, at least so far as the two superpowers are concerned, they are unlikely to disturb seriously the concept of a reliable "balance of terror."* We make this caveat even though a majority of the authors of this report expect to see more BMD deployment by the U.S. and the Soviets, and they interpret this deployment as a relatively favorable trend in the arms race. (But all these issues are discussed in greater depth and comprehensiveness in Chapter VI of Part IV on "Possible Alternative Central War Strategies for the U.S.")

We will not attempt to predict the quantitative level of effectiveness of BMD systems that might be deployed by either the U.S. or the S.U. in the 1970's.** But, at a minimum, it does appear that missile defenses deployed by the superpowers may be quite effective for the period of the seventies against missile attacks from other countries such as China. Ballistic missile defenses offer the advantage--to the superpowers--of tending to keep the strategic arms race more of a bilateral competition, excluding partly or completely lesser powers, who cannot afford similar investments in strategic offensive weapons. There are also various arguments, not central to the subject of this chapter, to the effect that an emphasis on defensive systems offers one means of limiting the qualitative and quantitative race in offensive systems, and thus has advantages from an arms control point of view.

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*This statement applies to the possibility of a reliable 100% defense of cities and other large and "soft" targets. It does not apply as much to attempts to limit damage to cities and hardly at all to limiting damage to hard targets such as missile silos. On the contrary, advances in offensive technology--notably increases in missile accuracy--may make active antimissile defenses loook relatively much better from a cost effective standpoint than they do now, compared with hardening or other means of insuring force survivability.

**However, see posture statement by Mr. McNamara and articles by D.G. Brennan in Foreign Affairs (April 1969) and H. Kahn in Fortune (December 1968).

We do not expect that new developments in manned strategic aircraft will affect the strategic balance between the U.S. and the Soviets in the 1970's, although some possibilities seem worth brief comment. Although it is hard to say for certain which way the technological competition might go if the competition is pushed by each side, it seems likely that strategic air defense systems can be made substantially more effective in the 1970's than has been the case in the 1950's and sixties. In favor of the defense are likely advances in detection techniques, especially airborne and other advanced radars, useful against bombers traveling at low altitude. Interceptor aircraft and missiles can probably be improved to keep pace with improvements in detection systems. In favor of the offense, however, we may note recent developments in avionics, as exemplified by the sophisticated systems now in use in the F-111 and the possibilities embodied in AMPSA to such missiles as SRAM. Air Force pilots who have flown the F-111's are enthusiastic about the terrain avoidance radar and the F-111's capability for accurate bombing by radar. We would expect these avionics developments to be especially valuable in tactical warfare, where we think more in terms of relatively short-range missions and attacks on targets heavily defended by anti-aircraft guns or missiles. Even though advanced avionics may facilitate the penetration of bombers on strategic missions, the problem of high fuel consumption at low altitude will probably continue to limit the range of strategic bombers in the 1970's.

Except for possible developments in counterinsurgency warfare, which we note briefly at the end of this section, we expect that the role of CBW (chemical and biological weapons) in the 1970's will continue to be limited by their "unfashionableness," their relative military ineffectiveness as controllable weapons, and the tacit mutual restraint which has limited the use of chemical weapons since before World War II. At least this should be the case for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. However, as noted in Part I of this report and briefly discussed in Section C below, chemical and biological weapons offer one means by which a small power can cause a larger power concern by threatening the use of CBW capabilities which the smaller power may or may not in fact have.

Turning away from the area of strategic weapons--but still confining ourselves chiefly to U.S. and Soviet technology--we think the possibilities of very large transport aircraft deserve particular attention. Development of aircraft of the C-5 type, or "growth" versions thereof--by the U.S. and the Soviets in the 1970's--may have military (and political) implications that are not yet fully recognized. One frequently mentioned and perhaps valid possibility is the prospect of substantially reducing the number of U.S. troops now stationed overseas, especially in Europe. Also, qualitatively new airlift capabilities make possible U.S. (or Soviet) intervention on a sizable military scale in relatively remote parts of the world, and may thus afford a range of options for military action that U.S. planners are not yet considering sufficiently.

There is also another possibility worth noting: The use of very large aircraft might help to ensure not only the physical survival but

also the economic viability of West Berlin, in a sense that was certainly not within the realm of possibility at the time of the 1948-49 Berlin land blockade.* Although very large transport aircraft are a technological option available to either the U.S. or the S.U. in the seventies, the still relatively limited range of these aircraft (similar to present jet transports of the 707 type) means that the U.S. with its relatively extensive complex of overseas bases should have substantially greater worldwide troop deployment capabilities than the S.U. even if both sides had, say, an equal number of similar large aircraft.

Related to large transport airplanes, of course, are concepts such as the FDL (fast deployment logistic) ships. We mention this possibility here, but without discussion, because we know that they can be built without major technological advances--although innovations in ship design could possibly result in striking performance improvements--if either we or the Soviets decide to build them.

We hope for, and are perhaps entitled to expect, significant improvements in strategic command and control systems on the part of the U.S. and the S.U. in the 1970's. These improvements may be stimulated by greater sophistication in strategic thinking, particularly when it comes to the management of central nuclear wars. It seems fairly likely that both the superpowers will recognize increasingly the need to be able to manage crises, and control and terminate wars--and that they will then see to it that they have the physical means for accomplishing this. In addition to unilateral command and control systems, it may be that both the superpowers will recognize a need for being able to communicate certain types of information to each other even while a central nuclear war is in progress. As a first step in this direction, we may note the often suggested possibility of "hardening the hot-line." This would be done more to increase its survival to accidental or third-power attacks rather than to attacks by the U.S. or S.U.

Two technological areas which will probably take on growing military significance in the seventies are applications of earth-orbiting satellites and of lasers. (Although we do not discuss here the possibility of orbital weapons of mass destruction, because we do not believe these would be advantageous weapons for the U.S. or the Soviets in the 1970's, we comment briefly on this possibility in the next section.) Military satellites can, of course, be either manned or unmanned. There may yet turn out to be in the seventies important military applications of manned satellites, although it is not yet clear exactly what these might be. (It has been suggested in Aviation Week that manned satellites could be valuable in detecting and pin-pointing ICBM and SLBM launchings.) Satellites seem certain to be used extensively and increasingly for military communications, both by the superpowers and quite possibly by other countries.

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*Planners concerned with Europe and Berlin might want to examine this possibility carefully and quantitatively although, of course, economic viability depends on much more than means for physical transportation

The development of laser systems for many, and perhaps quite diverse, military applications will almost certainly be pushed energetically in the seventies. It is a reasonable guess that by the end of the seventies lasers will be playing a significant role in military (and perhaps also commercial) communications. What other military applications of lasers may be possible depend on technical questions that are probably not yet resolved, such as the size, power, and the cost of laser systems of different types, optimum laser frequencies for different purposes, etc.

In the broad area of tactical weapons we may expect the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to make continuing progress in the 1970's, although we do not foresee any developments that would revolutionize tactical combat. A very likely possibility is significant qualitative improvements in helicopters and V/STOL aircraft. We have seen in the last three or four years the impact of helicopters on the Vietnamese war. We may expect specialized helicopter developments (e.g., gunships) to continue into the decade of the seventies. It also seems likely that hybrid aircraft types, involving features and advantages of both helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, will introduce significant new tactical operational capabilities by at least the end of the seventies.

The present war in Vietnam focuses attention on future developments in counterinsurgency warfare. We comment on this subject in this section because the U.S. (and quite possibly the U.S.S.R. as well) is almost certain to be involved in <u>some</u> counterinsurgency operations in the seventies. Probably, developments in the techniques and equipment of "counterinsurgency" will outpace progress in "insurgency." We put the point this way because it seems often to be assumed, perhaps unconsciously, that the capabilities of insurgents and terrorists--however effective, unpleasant, and currently difficult to counter--are not likely to improve very much, while capabilities for counterinsurgency are expected to steadily improve. At least this seems to have been one of the prevailing assumptions about the Vietnamese war. It seems likely that counter-insurgency capabilities will develop faster than insurgency capabilities, but perhaps only because the counterinsurgent side is likely to have the main benefits of technology and resources.

Among the more specifically technological improvements in counter-insurgency capabilities (see the list in Chart 5 on Page 3-19c above) we may include barrier technology (where "barriers" are used very inclusively), improved tactical aircraft including helicopters and V/STOL's, new techniques for identifying and keeping track of people (including the use of computers and sophisticated identification techniques), and various kinds of sensor improvements. There may also be many improvements in counterinsurgency tactics, both extremely advantageous in themselves and also developed to complement technological advances of the sort just mentioned.

But we should not overlook the possibility that insurgent groups may find it possible to obtain relatively sophisticated equipment--the "insurgents" in Vietnam, and reportedly in the Middle East, have large,

long-range Soviet-built rockets--both to give themselves qualitatively new capabilities (including, for instance, helicopters for mobility), and also for countering technologically advanced counterinsurgency techniques. From the counterinsurgent's point of view--with which we in the United States may presumably identify ourselves for the foreseeable future--it is thus important to make sure that advanced equipment that could be effectively used by unfriendly "insurgents" does not fall into the wrong hands.

C. Some Possibilities for the Spread of Military Technology

We now briefly discuss possibilities for the spread of the general level of military technology outlined above to non-superpowers, and offer various observations on the weapons proliferation problems which may increasingly confront military planners in the 1975-85 period.

It is important to note the significance of "fashion" in weapons technology. Weapons which seem economically and technologically possible, and from an overall military standpoint perhaps most valuable to a country, may not be the weapons that the country chooses to build (or buy) and deploy. The importance of weapons fashions has been fairly extensively discussed and is now a generally well-recognized phenomenon. It is exemplified now, for instance, in the apparent aspirations of a number of countries to build or obtain ballistic missiles, which missiles certainly make more sense as show-pieces for parades and propaganda and similar purposes than as cost effective delivery systems--especially for countries that do not seem likely to have nuclear warheads until very long after they have ballistic missiles.

It should be kept in mind that some smaller but advanced countries may equal or surpass either of the superpowers in some areas of technology with military applications, even though the smaller countries lack the economic resources to approach the scale of military effort of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. We may expect some of the smaller countries to have items of military equipment as good or even better than those of the superpowers. Thus Sweden currently has a Mach 2 jet fighter that can operate effectively from a 500-meter stretch of highway. The British can probably claim world leadership in some areas of V/STOL aircraft and jet engine technology. British and French military aircraft (fighters at least) compare adequately with U.S. and Soviet machines. Although its military significance in the seventies is not so clear, the Anglo-French Concorde is the first Western supersonic transport (SST) plane to fly. The U.S. SST, although planned to be bigger and faster, lags the Concorde by four or five years, and at this writing no firm decision on the pace of U.S. SST development has ever been made. Among many other things we might note the current French leadership in some areas of laser technology.

With reference to the comment in the preceding section that we hoped for and expected significant command and control improvements on the part

of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in the seventies, we may usefully draw attention to one or two misconceptions that many Americans seem to have accepted rather uncritically. For instance, it is often assumed in connection with the nuclear proliferation issue that smaller countries with nuclear weapons will lack both the military "sophistication" and the technical means for controlling these weapons with skill and restraint. (The notable example is, of course, China, so often labeled "irresponsible" by many. On this score two points should be noted: (a) Propaganda notwithstanding, the Chinese communists have on the whole practiced restraint in their military actions. (b) If the Chinese have the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons--and at this point they lead France in thermonuclear development--they can also develop very adequate command and control systems for these weapons, irrespective of delivery systems.) Interpreting "command and control" broadly, we may note, for instance, the superb "surgical" skill of some Israeli military operations.

The general point which may be of interest to military planners contemplating the next decade or two is that, even though many small countries may have nuclear and other advanced weapons, there is no reason to assume (almost a priori, as some Americans seem to do) that they will use these weapons irresponsibly or that they will lack the technical means for their control. But this is not equivalent to saying that the world-wide strategic situation may not change greatly in the next 10-20 years, or that we should not seriously reckon with the possibility of irresponsible use of advanced weapons by "small" countries.

We must also consider the chance that other countries may not, as they mostly have so far, follow the military/technological "fashions" set by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Weapons that are disadvantageous for the superpowers might, for various reasons, look more desirable to some smaller countries. For instance, as already noted in Part I of this report, chemical or biological weapons might be produced quite cheaply by a small country and used to threaten its neighbor or even the superpowers. (And there might be no way of knowing whether a country that threatens the use of chemical biological weapons actually had the weapons.)

There are many other weapon options open to "smaller" countries in the seventies and eighties. Any country with nuclear weapons and a modest space program can put at least a small nuclear weapon in orbit. Any country with nuclear weapons can threaten (or actually use them) in a variety of ways--"suitcase" delivery, ships in port, etc. Also, it is safe to say that any country that can make a thermonuclear weapon can, where size and weight do not matter, make weapons with enormous yields; and these weapons could be placed on the ocean floor, for instance, and used for "terror" or blackmail. A related possibility is that smaller countries may try to make up for deficiencies in vulnerability and perhaps in command and control by devising ways to hide its strategic capability so that it will be relatively safe from attack. A country could, if it chose, probably find ways to hide its strategic capabilities, by siting nuclear weapons on the ocean floor or on a barge floating on a domestic river or lake, for instance. It might not even reveal the

existence of its capabilities until it chose to, perhaps in time of crisis or when for some other reason it wanted to confront other nations with a sudden and startling threat.

In the area of counterinsurgency warfare, many of the techniques and equipment available to the superpowers should also be available by the end of the seventies to many smaller countries. These countries might not be able to operate the equipment on the same scale as the superpowers but, as the U.S. painfully has learned in Vietnam, equipment or weapons used even on a very large scale (compare, for instance, the bomb tonnage used against the VC and North Vietnam with that used in the most intense bombing of Germany in World War II) do not necessarily solve the problems of counterinsurgency.

In concluding this section on the spread of military technology in the seventies and eighties we ask the reader to consider again Chart 4 on Page 3-21c. Some eight or ten countries have the potential, by perhaps 1980, of building ICBM's with thermonuclear warheads that are technically as advanced as those of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. today. Although the deployment of ICBM's by smaller but advanced countries may be "resource limited," it should be noted that the cost of "Model T" and "Model A" (and still more advanced weapons technologies) drops with time. Thus, as we shall note in Chapter III, a nation as small as Israel could by the 1980's have some hundreds of Minuteman-type--or even more effective--missiles.

D. Possibilities for the 1980's

Our discussion of military/technological possibilities for the 1980's is brief, partly because we can speak with much less specificity and confidence than for the 1970's, and partly because our list of possibilities for the 1980's tends to overlap the list of possibilities for the year 2000 already included in Part I of this report.

Developments could occur in the decade of the seventies which would force either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. or other countries to develop new strategic offensive options. Some of these options would be clearly possible in the seventies, although they seem now unnecessary or too costly for consideration in that period. The siting of strategic missiles on the ocean floor is one of these options. Another is very large nuclear weapons in orbit. For instance, rockets with thrusts on the order of Saturn V (7.5 million pounds) or even substantially smaller rockets could place into low earth orbit satellites carrying nuclear warheads with yields of perhaps 1000 megatons. Such weapons, detonated at altitudes in the vicinity of 100 miles, could effectively destroy unprotected people and property over areas of tens of thousands of square miles. (The deployment of orbital weapons would of course violate the present treaty banning weapons of mass destruction in space.) We cannot rule out the possibility that, by the decade of the 1980's (or any time, for that matter) pure fusion nuclear weapons may have been developed. This means, of course, that some technique will have been found to eliminate the fission "trigger" with U-235 or plutonium upon which all known fusion weapons

depend. If this were to be achieved by a method that did not require expensive materials and techniques, especially if it did not entail expensive capital plant, it would radically alter the prospects for nuclear proliferation.

There may be, in the eighties, means yet unforeseen for the development, deployment, and possible use of chemical and biological weapons. It is theoretically possible to develop chemical and biological agents that are quite controllable, both in their geographic dissemination and in the nature and seriousness of their effects on people.

There may be new possibilities for ballistic missile defense, even though, as noted earlier in this chapter, we do not care to predict in the long run which way the offensive-defense technological missile competition may go. New BMD possibilities might be divided into two categories: (1) Currently existing possibilities which seem unsatisfactory from a cost effectiveness standpoint, such as space-based interceptors, but which might become cost effective through various technological advances; (2) entirely new, "exotic" BMD possibilities that depend on new discoveries in basic knowledge.

One item perhaps worth fairly specific attention is the possibilities for and implications of nuclear powered aircraft. The apparent success of very large aircraft of the C-5 type means that we now know that aircraft large enough to carry nuclear reactors can be successfully built and flown. This was not the case until quite recently, and it was certainly not the case in the late forties and the fifties when nuclear aircraft engine development was receiving quite substantial funding.

Given reasonable estimates about the rate at which necessary parallel developments might occur, nuclear powered aircraft are not likely to be flying, at least in any significant numbers, until about the decade of the 1980's. But such aircraft would open up several interesting military (and other) possibilities: (1) They could fly indefinitely as mobile missile launchers, approximately as Polaris submarines cruise now. (2) The present limitation on the low altitude penetration capability of strategic aircraft set by high fuel consumption would be entirely removed by the use of nuclear power (although there might, of course, be good reasons for preferring to use other types of delivery vehicles). (3) Nuclear power might permit the development of truly enormous aircraft--by present standards--with weights in the ranges of thousands or tens of thousands of tons, and these in turn would permit extremely low ton-mile costs for transportation of military and other materials. Presumably nuclear powered planes would have speeds at least on the order of those of present jets. So we could think of such planes as having the weight carrying capacities of ships, the speed of present jets, and unlimited range; and this would present revolutionary possibilities for the rapid world-wide deployment of armed forces and equipment.

Contemplating the decade of the eighties, one can think of many kinds of R & D results with both non-military and military implications. Thus for instance: Control of the geophysical environment by various

means could bring great benefits to mankind, and also revolutionary "weapons" possibilities. Pharmacology could improve the ability of soldiers and others to maintain peak performance for long periods, enhance learning ability, etc.; or lead to the effective "weaponization" of mind-influencing drugs--a soldier under the influence of an LSD-like hallucinogen is not likely to be very effective. Advances in the behavioral sciences could lead to solutions of "cross-cultural" problems, and importantly affect political-military relationships. Developments in sensors, computers, control systems, power supplies and/or transmissions, etc., could lead to diverse types of "automata" capable of doing many tasks, including military tasks, now performed only by humans. The list of possibilities is virtually endless, even when we try to speculate only about 15 years ahead.

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CHAPTER III. SOME ASPECTS OF THE BASIC LONG-TERM CONTEXTS AND PROSPECTS

1975-1985 Will Be a Transitional Period Between the Thirty Postwar Years and the World of the Year 2000 (i.e., the Thirty Years Between 1985 and 2015)

We assume that certain contextual factors will be important for a quite wide range of scenarios covering not only the decade 1975-1985 but the whole period five to fifty years in the future. In particular, we assume that the decade 1975-1985, which is our focus in this study, will in many ways be a transitional period from the thirty years which may be thought of as "the post-World War II world" (1945-1975) to a similar period of three decades which may be considered "the world of the Year 2000"--or at least that this is a useful perspective from which to examine the decade under consideration. We therefore urge our readers to study, reasonably carefully, the chart page which follows this page. This chart page summarizes aspects of a recent Hudson study on the Year 2000 of interest to our current study. The chart page is largely self-explanatory (but as always notes are provided on the page facing the charts). This chart page tries to give both a past and future context for our study of the 1975-1985 decade. One of the most important factors in the Year 2000 world will be the military postures of the various nations and the various customs and tactics used in dealing with strategic problems specifically and of the use of force generally. The obvious potentialities for serious security problems suggested on this chart page make clear that there are also important possibilities for dramatic precursors in the 1975-1985 decade, or at least affecting this 1975-1985 decade by being such urgent possibilities of what will then be the immediate future.

In this Year 2000 World (1985-2015) we assume that about 20 per cent of the world's population will be living in "postindustrial" societies. (This term has been widely used in recent years to describe the concept that we are now undergoing a revolution as profound in meaning and consequence as the agricultural or industrial revolutions. The result of this postindustrial revolution will be a society as different from industrial society as industrial society [postagricultural] is from agricultural society or agricultural society from a hunting and fishing economy.)*

We assume that by the end of the century the world is likely to develop according to the socio-economic projections below (where the numbers given are estimates of the country's population in millions and the world's total population is estimated to be 6.3 billion). While our own focus, of course, is on the 1975-1985 decade, we can best understand many of the issues that arise in the transitional period by examining them as

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*See discussion in The Year 2000, pages 185 to 220. We can think of Europe today as within the range of industrial societies and the U.S. as a transitional society towards the postindustrial world. We label this transitional period as that of "mass consumption."

Two Past and One Future 33-Year Periods

In this chart page we attempt an overview of the Hudson Year 2000 study. We tried in this study to create a framework and context for further speculation by ourselves and others. One perspective by considering what a "surprise-free" projection (a quantitative or qualitative projection of what may happen in the next thirty-three years based on the assumption of a continuation of the general direction and nature of the present and past with corrections for any "theories" that may be believed).

Charts 1, 2, and 3 list features of the first third of the century. This period then furnishes some points of comparison. From this point of view perhaps the most striking characteristic of the period was the national self-satisfaction, optimism, and faith in the future of most Western or Westernized people. Chart 2 notes that in contrast to the expectations listed in Chart 1, the first third of the twentieth century brought some dramatic and mostly unexpected events.

The next third of a century experienced still more unexpected changes and disturbing events, as shown in Chart 4. The first item on Chart 2 and the last on Chart 4 emphasize a new Asian perspective--the century began with a non-white nation's successfully beating a white nation on its own ground and the second third of the century ended with the acquisition of nuclear weapons by another non-white nation. Chart 3 shows the Indochinese reaction to this new perspective. It may be noted that many of the items of Charts 2 and 4 would probably not have been predicted by any individual or policy research group "speculating about the next thirty-three years," in either 1900 or 1933.

Looking now at Chart 5, we can consider the final third of the century using only a "relatively apolitical and surprise-free projection." The reader will see what we mean by comparing Chart 5 with Charts 2 and 4. Taking the contrasts between 5 and those of 2 and 4 seriously suggests that our projection of the final third of the century may be unreliable as an indicator of what actually will happen, yet it is the freedom from specifically unpredictable surprises that makes the projections useful as a takeoff for discussion and elaboration. Specifically, the "surprise-free" projections rule out major changes in the old nations that might be caused by possibilities such as those listed in Chart 6 of such magnitude as to disturb the projection.

Some of the basic trends of Western society, most of which can be traced back as far as the 12th or 11th centuries, can be seen as a part of a common, complex trend of interacting elements. For analytical purposes this trend may be separated into thirteen rubrics, shown in Chart 7. If the basic, long-term multifold trend continues or is accelerated during the rest of the century, and there are no

surprising (but not-impossible) disruptions of the sort mentioned in Chart 6, then a "post-industrial" society seems likely to develop in affluent parts of the world. Chart 8 lists some possibilities often associated with this concept.

Charts 9, 10, and 11 show three typical "surprise-free" economic projections of GNP per capita for the U.S., Ten Major Countries, and Japan. These projections assume that something like present trends continue without great interruption.

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TWO PAST AND ONE FUTURE 33-YEA

(1) YEAR 190-

ONE WORLD (WESTERN-DOMINATED), THOSE WITH MAN- UNASSIMILATED, TRADITIONAL CULTURES

INDUSTRIAL, COLONIAL, OR PROTECTED SOCIETIES

DECLINING UNITED KINGDOM & FRANCE...RISING GERMANY, UNITED STATES, RUSSIA AND JAPAN

PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT AND CAPITALISM

BASIC FEELING IN ALMOST ALL CLASSES OF THE (IN MANY NON-WHITE) OF OPTIMISM, SECURITY, PROGRESS, ORDER, PHYSICAL & MORAL SUPREMACY OF WESTERN CULTURE, & A BELIEF IN RATIONAL & MORAL DOMESTIC & FOREIGN POLITICS, & PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, A RELATIVE ABSENCE OF GUILT FEELINGS

INTELLECTUAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE IDEAS OF ADAM SMITH, DARWIN, AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT

(2) FIRST THIRD OF TWENTIETH CENTURY

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

LA BELLE EPOQUE (1901-1911)

MEXICAN (1910) AND CHINESE (1911) SOCIAL (AND RACIAL) REVOLUTION

WORLD WAR I - EUROPE PARTLY DEVASTATED

FIVE MAJOR DYNASTIES (HOHENZOLLERN, HAPSBURG, ROMANOV, MANCHU, AND TTOMAN) DETHRONED

EMERGENCE OF UNITED STATES AS LEADING WORLD POWER

LOSS OF EUROPEAN (& DEMOCRATIC) MORALE AND PRESTIGE

RISE OF COMMUNISM AND SOVIET UNION

GREAT DEPRESSION

RISE OF FASCIST IDEOLOGIES & DIVERSE DICTATORSHIPS

UPSETTING IMPACT OF NEW INTELLECTUAL CONCEPTS (BOHR, DE BROGLIE, EINSTEIN, FREUD, SCHROEDINGER, ETC.)

(3) 1. YOUR
OCCASION
COVERED
ABLE TO
WE HAVE
YOUNG AN
FOR COURA
OUR ONLY

(5) FINAL THIRD OF TWENTIETH CENTURY
(RELATIVELY APOLITICAL AND SURPRISE-FREE PROJECTION)

1. CONTINUATION OF BASIC, LONG-TERM HISTORICAL TREN
2. EMERGENCE OF "POST-INDUSTRIAL" CULTURE
3. WORLD-WIDE CAPABILITY FOR MODERN TECHNOLOGY
4. NEED FOR WORLD-WIDE "ZONING ORDINANCES" FOR CONTROL OF ARMS, TECHNOLOGY, POLLUTION, TRADE, AND OTHER AREAS
5. HIGH (1 TO 10) GROWTH RATES IN GNP/CAP.
6. INCREASING EMPHASIS ON "MEANING AND PURPOSE"
7. MUCH TURMOIL IN THE "NEW" AND POSSIBLY IN THE INDUSTRIALIZING NATIONS
8. SOME POSSIBILITY FOR SUSTAINED "NATIVIST," MESSIANIC, OR OTHER MASS MOVEMENTS
9. SECOND RISE OF JAPAN (TO BEING POTENTIALLY, NOMINALLY, OR PERHAPS ACTUALLY, THE THIRD LARGEST POWER)
10. SOME FURTHER RISE OF EUROPE AND CHINA
11. EMERGENCE OF NEW INTERMEDIATE POWERS - BRAZIL, MEXICO, PAKISTAN, INDONESIA, EAST GERMANY, EGYPT, ETC.
12. SOME DECLINE (RELATIVE) OF U.S. AND SOVIET UNION
13. A POSSIBLE ABSENCE OF STARK, LIFE - OR - DEATH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES IN THE "OLD" NATIONS

(6) WE HAVE LEFT OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF MAJOR CHANGES IN OLD NATIONS DUE TO

1. INFLATION AND WAR
2. CIVIL STRIFE AND REVOLUTION
3. FAMINE
4. PESTILENCE
5. DESPOTISM (PERSECUTION)
6. NATURAL DISASTER
7. DEPRESSION OR ECONOMIC STAGNATION
8. DEVELOPMENT OF "INEXPENSIVE" DOOMSDAY OR NEAR DOOMSDAY MACHINES
9. DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR "SIX-GUN" WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY
10. RESURGENCE OF COMMUNISM, OR REVIVAL OF FASCISM
11. A RACIAL, NORTH-SOUTH, RICH-POOR, EAST-WEST OR OTHER DISRUPTIVE POLARIZATION
12. ECONOMICALLY DYNAMIC CHINA (~ 10%/YR GROWTH)
13. POLITICALLY DYNAMIC U.S., S.U., JAPAN, W. GERMANY, BRAZIL, ETC.
14. NEW RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHIES AND/OR OTHER MASS MOVEMENTS
15. DEVELOPMENT OF U.N. OR OTHER WORLD-WIDE ORGANIZATIONS
16. POSSIBLE REGIONAL OR OTHER MULTI-NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
17. PSYCHOLOGICALLY UPSETTING IMPACT OF NEW TECHNIQUES, IDEAS, PHILOSOPHIES, ETC.

(7) THERE I
1. INCREA HUMANI EPICUR
2. BOURGE NATION
3. ACCUMU
4. INSTIT DEVELO
5. WORLD-
6. INCREA
7. POPULA
8. URBANI
9. DECREA SECON
10. [illegible]
11. INCREA
12. INCREA
13. INCREA

(9) US GNP PER CAPITA 1869 2000
1965 DOLLARS



(10) SURPRISE FREE PROJECTIONS FOR THE TEN MAJOR COUNTRIES



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URY

(AND RACIAL)

BURG, ROMANOV,

RLD POWER

ND PRESTIGE

TATORSHIPS

CEPTS (BOHR,
GER, ETC.)

AJOR CHANGES

OF NEAR DOOMSDAY

ONS TECHNOLOGY
F FASCISM
T-WEST OR OTHER

GROWTH)
, W. GERMANY,

ER MASS MOVEMENTS
DE ORGANIZATIONS
ONAL ORGANIZATIONS
EW TECHNIQUES,

(3) I, YOUR HUMBLE SERVANT, AN OBSCURE STUDENT, HAVING HAD OCCASION TO STUDY NEW BOOKS AND NEW DOCTRINES, HAVE DISCOVERED IN A RECENT HISTORY OF JAPAN HOW THEY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CONQUER THE IMPOTENT EUROPEANS. THIS IS THE REASON WE HAVE FORMED AN ORGANIZATION....WE HAVE SELECTED FROM YOUNG ANNAMITES THE MOST ENERGETIC, WITH GREAT CAPACITIES FOR COURAGE, AND ARE SENDING THEM TO JAPAN FOR STUDY.... OUR ONLY AIM IS TO PREPARE THE POPULATION FOR THE FUTURE.

LEAFLET DISTRIBUTED IN ANNAM, [illegible]

(4) SECOND THIRD OF TWENTIETH CENTURY

CONTINUED GROWTH OF FASCISM AND COMMUNISM

WORLD WAR II - EUROPE AGAIN DEVASTATED

MASS MURDER & DEPORTATIONS BEFORE, DURING & AFTER WORLD WAR II

DECOLONIZATION

THE COLD WAR AND NEUTRALISM IN THE THIRD WORLD

EMERGENCE OF 2 SUPER (U.S., [illegible]), [illegible] LARGE (JAPAN, WEST GERMANY, FRANCE, CHINA, U.K.), [illegible] INTERMEDIATE POWERS (INDIA, ITALY, CANADA)

RISE AND DECLINE OF ITALY, CANADA, AND INDIA
DECLINE AND RE-EMERGENCE OF EUROPE
DECLINE AND RE-EMERGENCE OF JAPAN
REUNIFICATION AND CENTRALIZATION OF CHINA

POST-KEYNESIAN, POST-MARXIAN, AND PERHAPS POST-COMMUNAL AND SOPHISTICATED "DEVELOPMENT" ECONOMICS

EMERGENCE OF MASS CONSUMPTION SOCIETIES

"SECOND" INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

CHINESE ACHIEVE NUCLEAR STATUS

(7) THERE IS A BASIC, LONG-TERM, MULTIFOLD TREND [illegible]

1. INCREASINGLY SENSATE (EMPIRICAL, THIS WORLDLY, SECULAR, HUMANISTIC, PRAGMATIC, UTILITARIAN, CONTRACTUAL, EPICUREAN OR HEDONISTIC, ETC.) CULTURE
2. BOURGEOIS, BUREAUCRATIC, MERITOCRATIC, DEMOCRATIC (AND NATIONALISTIC) ELITES
3. ACCUMULATION OF SCIENTIFIC & TECHNOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE
4. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CHANGE, ESPECIALLY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, INNOVATION AND DIFFUSION
5. WORLD-WIDE INDUSTRIALIZATION AND MODERNIZATION
6. INCREASING AFFLUENCE AND (RECENTLY) LEISURE
7. POPULATION GROWTH
8. URBANIZATION AND (SOON) THE GROWTH OF MEGALOPOLITES
9. DECREASING IMPORTANCE OF PRIMARY AND [illegible] SECONDARY OCCUPATIONS
10. [illegible]
11. INCREASING CAPACITY FOR [illegible]
12. INCREASING TEMPO OF CHANGE
13. INCREASING UNIVERSALITY OF THE MULTIFOLD TREND

(8) THE POST-INDUSTRIAL [illegible] CONSUMPTION SOCIETY

1. PER CAPITA INCOME ABOUT FIFTY TIMES THE PRE-INDUSTRIAL
2. MOST "ECONOMIC" ACTIVITIES ARE TERTIARY, QUATERNARY (SERVICE-ORIENTED) RATHER THAN PRIMARY OR SECONDARY (PRODUCTION-ORIENTED)
3. BUSINESS FIRMS NO LONGER THE MAJOR SOURCE OF INNOVATION
4. THERE MAY BE MORE "CONSENTIVES" (VS. "MARKETIVES")
5. EFFECTIVE FLOOR ON INCOME AND WELFARE
6. "EFFICIENCY" NO LONGER PRIMARY
7. MARKET PLAYS DIMINISHED ROLE COMPARED TO PUBLIC SECTOR AND "SOCIAL ACCOUNTS"
8. WIDESPREAD "CYBERNATION"
9. SMALL WORLD
10. TYPICAL "DOUBLING TIME" BETWEEN THREE & THIRTY YEARS
11. LEARNING SOCIETY
12. RAPID IMPROVEMENT IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES
13. EROSION (IN MIDDLE CLASS) OF WORK-ORIENTED, ACHIEVEMENT-ORIENTED, ADVANCEMENT-ORIENTED VALUES
14. EROSION OF "NATIONAL INTEREST" VALUES
15. SENSATE, SECULAR, HUMANIST, PERHAPS SELF-INDULGENT CRITERIA BECOME CENTRAL

SURPRISE FREE PROJECTIONS
FOR THE TEN MAJOR COUNTRIES



(11) JAPAN, GNP PER CAPITA
(1965 U.S. dollars)



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part of basic trends extrapolated to the end of the century. In any case, some of the dominating political facts of the 1975-1985 decade will be the expectations aroused by the kinds of projections given below.

1. Early but Clearly Postindustrial

United States	320
Japan	120
Canada	35
Scandinavia & Switzerland	30
France, West Germany, Benelux	160
	665

2. Barely but Visibly Postindustrial

United Kingdom	55
Soviet Union	350
Australia, New Zealand	25
Italy, Austria	70
E. Germany, Czechoslovakia	35
Israel	5
	540

3. Mass Consumption

Spain, Portugal, Poland Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary, Ireland	180
Argentina, Venezuela	60
Taiwan, N & S Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore	160
	400

4. Mature Industrial

Union of South Africa	50
Mexico, Uruguay, Chile, Cuba, Colombia, Peru, Panama, Jamaica, etc.	250
N & S Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines, etc.	250
Turkey	75
Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, etc.	75
	700

5. Large & Partially Industrialized

Brazil	210
Pakistan	250
China	1,300
India	950
Indonesia	240
U.A.R.	70
Nigeria	160
	3,180

6. Preindustrial or Small and Partially Industrialized

Rest of Africa	350
Rest of Arab World	100
Rest of Asia	300
Rest of Latin America	100
	850

One might think of the following average per capita incomes (in 1965 dollars) as roughly associated with each of the above categories.

1. Early but Clearly Postindustrial	> $10,000
2. Barely but Visibly Postindustrial	$5,000 - $10,000
3. Mass Consumption	$2,000 - $5,000
4. Mature Industrial	$500 - $2,000
5. Partially Industrial	$200 - $500
6. Preindustrial	$50 - $200

It should be realized, of course, that even the pre-industrial nations may have enclaves with a style of life not to different from the post-industrial societies (and of course there is some possibility, though less, of one of the post-industrial nations having significant pre-industrial enclaves.) Excluding most pre-industrial and some of the partially-industrialized states, about 50 states (of the 135 or so states in the world today) will by the year 2000 have access to the military technologies

of at least the seventies and eighties--i.e., to a more advanced technology than that available to the U.S. and the S.U. today. (By the 1975-1985 period most of these states will have some significant degree of access to the technological capabilities of the United States of the fifties if not of today):

1. As a result of ordinary improvement and development, simple nuclear-armed, long-range vehicles which are very inexpensive will be available, economically and technologically, to even very small powers--at least if the smaller nations have reasonable access to commercially available technology. Any of the largest powers and many smaller ones (say 50 nations or so) should be able to obtain and maintain, say, 500 missiles with, say, current "Minuteman capability" or better for one or two billion dollars procurement cost or less and a few hundred million dollars annual upkeep (1969 dollars).*

2. At the same time, as a result of world-wide industrialization, some 100 nations or so should have a significant degree of access to at least the strategic technology of the 1960's, including, e.g., advanced thermonuclear weapons, "invulnerable" missile forces, perhaps Mach 2-3 aircraft and command and control systems permitting "controlled" responses.

3. Indeed the following technologies are likely to be more or less widely available:

   relatively small and efficient nuclear and other weapons and various techniques that can be used for their clandestine or other unorthodox delivery

   a menu of techniques for reasonably (or potentially**) effective chemical and/or biological warfare in various applications

   new kinds of ballistic missile defense particularly effective against relatively small offense forces or against forces which use relatively unsophisticated technology and/or tactics

   similar developments for active air defense against airborne threats

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*See The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years by Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, or Daedalus, "Toward the Year 2000..." for a discussion of technological innovation, including "100 likely" and "25 possible" areas of innovation, as well as of unpredictable innovation and the factors of synergism and serendipity.

**It should be noted that it is very difficult to estimate the efficiency of biological and, to some degree, chemical warfare. And for this reason it may be difficult for even the large powers to convince themselves that they are not being threatened by a small power which claimed to have a potent capability.

well-understood and perhaps relatively inexpensive doomsday machines (or near-doomsday machines)

Tsunami (tidal wave) producers

climate changers, earth scorchers, or other ways to modify or damage the environment on a large scale

new forms of psychological, or even direct mental warfare

the invention of a "nuclear six-gun" technology--or at least the development of inexpensive and widely available versions of the nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction characteristic of the military technologies of the mid- and late twentieth century

further military exploitation of both space and undersea environment (including the sea bed)

4. Depending on the defenses of the large powers and the superpowers (and other "technical and tactical details"), these weapons systems may prove to be "equalizers" in the Gallois or "American West" sense, or they may allow for a definite hierarchy of powers. Some of these systems, and certainly much of the technology behind them, might also be relatively available to private individuals or at least private organizations and extremist political factions.

5. The development of very effective techniques for counterinsurgency warfare--and perhaps for insurgency and/or terroristic activities as well. The latter could allow even relatively small groups, if not effectively opposed, to disrupt, easily and effectively, almost any society. Yet much of the new technology--with the possible reinforcement of onerous social controls--might also make such insurgency or terrorism difficult or limit its effectiveness enormously.

Any of the potential (by the year 2000) post-industrial societies should have in the 1980's reasonably good access to almost any current (mid- and late 1960's) technology. Thus a nation as small as Israel could, with its expected gross national product, by the 1980's buy and maintain some hundreds of Minuteman-type or more effective missiles. It is possible it could buy and maintain an offensive missile force some orders of magnitude more capable than the current U.S. force of some 1,000 Minutemen. Most of the seven nations (which altogether will have about half the population of the world) which we have labeled as potentially industrialized will include highly industrialized and technical enclaves. Undoubtedly these, at least, will be able to make fairly advanced nuclear and esoteric weapons.

During the period of focus of our study (the next five to fifteen years) it is not unreasonable to assume that there will have been neither any really large nuclear wars nor, on the other hand, crucial progress in comprehensive arms control or international or multinational security arrangements. This lack of arms control or other security arrangements will, in the face of the existing conditions in 1980 and in the face of the above prospects for the year 2000, be likely to arouse grave apprehensions. Yet this may not mean that most nations will feel insecure in any direct or immediate sense, even though an underlying anxiety exists. As we pointed out in Chapter II, today virtually every country of North and South America and Western Europe, and such countries as Japan and Australia, have a sense of reasonable security in the midst of an international system of considerable instability and capability for nuclear war. The average statesman--as well as the average citizen--may continue to feel like this, at least so far as day-to-day security is concerned. Indeed, without much regard for the details of their own national security efforts, it would not be surprising if the borders of these states remained unchallenged and unchanged both before and during this period--and even for the rest of the century. As discussed in Chapter II we are in some real sense already, or at least in much of the world, close to what Karl Deutsch has called a "security community." This certainly is true today for North America, Latin America, and Western Europe (with the possible exception of West Germany). A security community can be thought of as a group of sovereign nations with such a relationship among themselves that war has become virtually unthinkable--or at least is not thought about. Thus today almost no one in Western Europe worries about a Franco-German war. This is not to say that many Frenchmen do not find reassurance in the fact that the force de frappe, whether it is effective against the Soviet Union or not, is certainly effective against Germany. It is merely to say that few Frenchmen would spend much money to acquire a nuclear capability specifically directed against Germany--and even fewer would lose much sleep if France today lacked such a capability.

While Latin America today is not quite as close to a pluralistic security situation, it comes very near to being one, particularly when the influence of the United States is taken into account. By the year 1880 some four decades could have passed without a serious frontier confrontation. As a result, Latin America could feel quite firmly that such a security community existed for them--even if some of the basic underpinnings of the community were eroding. North America is such a security community and seems likely to continue to be one. Africa and Asia are not and are not likely to be by 1880. Yet it seems reasonably plausible that neither of the two strongest powers in the Far East, the Soviet Union and Japan, will have had any serious interest in expanding their national boundaries into Asia. (Japan obviously has a claim to restoration of its former Ryukyu and Kurile Island possessions but this hardly seems a potential casus belli.) It seems quite likely that this condition will continue into the 1975-1985 period, so the chief cause of instability may be due to other nations.

It is also worth noting that many are likely to still be conscious of the fact that the two nations which lost World War II, Germany and Japan, will also have been the great postwar economic successes. These nations, today the second and fifth largest trading powers in the world respectively, do not have fleets or great armies or air forces (i.e., trade no longer follows the flag). All this implies, then, that members of security communities can enjoy adequate degrees of national security virtually without regard to the military forces or preparations of their government. They might yet be embroiled in some--"unthinkable"--large thermonuclear war. But barring that awful event they do not and presumably will continue not to fear attack or invasion.

Moreover, even a proliferation of nuclear capability among various nations, if limited to "responsible nations," might even increase the sense of security in these communities. Even today, many people in Western Europe seem to feel that those parts of the world which possess nuclear weapons or which are closely allied to nuclear powers are, in effect, free of real threats. By the year 1975, and particularly in some of the contexts we will discuss below, there will likely have been no nuclear weapons exploded in war except for the two used against Japan in 1945. Thus, at the beginning of this period, we can assume that the world will have experienced 30 years of non-use of nuclear weapons, and by the end--1985--this period may well have extended to 40 years. By then, no matter how large the supply of weapons, and no matter how threatening the rhetoric of arms controllers or how large the existing military establishments, at the level at which most people react there would be little or no active sense of immediate or serious threat of nuclear war. This could be true even if there had been a number of "ostensible" nuclear crises, or even if the "rhetoric" of public discussion is replete with references to nuclear Armageddons.

It must be added that even within these security communities we must assume that most nations still will possess--and be more or less deeply concerned with--national defense establishments. Many of these nations may be aided in maintaining their establishments by outside powers. Some will have internal security problems, and some of these may be aided by outsiders in dealing with these internal problems. But as discussed in Part IV and below, many unfamiliar domestic political concerns will intrude on these military establishments.

Despite the nonproliferation treaty, some diffusion of nuclear weapons seems very likely. In particular, it seems as likely as not that Japan will make itself nuclear power number six. It is difficult to imagine that Japan will not obtain nuclear weapons at some time in the 1970's, and it also seems likely that other nations--particularly West Germany and Italy--will then follow Japan's lead. Some possible exceptions to these expectations would be India or Israel, either of which could exercise its nuclear option in the early 1970's.

To say that Japan may be the first of the "second-phase" nuclear powers does not contradict current Japanese attitudes so sharply as often is assumed. As early as the early 1960's the position was put forth at

Hudson that the Japanese were likely to get nuclear weapons in the 1970's, at least under existing programs. This was in part based on an analysis of Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment which, we argued, was more made up of anti-militarism, anti-U.S. sentiment, and opposition to the Liberal Democratic Party than genuine nuclear pacifism. When those political issues lost their relevance or found another channel of expression, we argued, opposition to nuclear weapons could decrease sharply. This prediction provoked a reaction among many Japanese, who thought it an accusation of hypocrisy or an attempt to promote Japanese nuclear rearmament. Actually, the current situation derives from World War II, and while very few Americans would hesitate today to tell Japanese or Germans that they cannot expect to change the territorial results of World War II without going to war, few Americans would tell these nations that, "Unless you go to war again you will remain politically second class." Yet many of the citizens of these two nations do feel that they are second class today, in part because they do not have nuclear weapons, and they trace their non-nuclear status to having lost World War II.

As noted earlier, Japanese attitudes, while remaining essentially ambivalent on the issues of maintaining the U.S.-Japanese security treaty, defense issues in general and certainly the question of nuclear arms, are undergoing a steady evolution in important ways. In 1964 the Japanese were hardly willing to discuss defense issues; in 1965 they were. In 1965 the same observation could be applied to nuclear arms, yet in 1966 Japanese were certainly willing to consider the proposition. In 1967 the nuclear proliferation treaty proposal aroused a surprising degree of animosity within Japan--many Japanese felt their country was being pressured or discriminated against by the United States and perhaps by the Soviet Union. By December 1967, The Wall Street Journal (December 14, 1967) cited the existence of various study groups--probing nuclear issues in connection with Japan's security--and quoted Prime Minister Sato to the effect that whether Japan liked it or not, current world stability and peace were based on a balance of military power which in turn rested on the possession of adequate nuclear arms.

However, for politicians who are incautious enough to try to force the pace of this attitudinal evolution, the price of intemperate remarks can mean a decided political setback. Kuraishi Tadao, Minister of Agriculture, declared in the debate on the defense budget early in 1968 that Japan had the need for more naval vessels to defend Japanese fishing rights in international waters. He also succeeded in provoking Sato's opposition with the wishful thought, "If we had atom bombs and a 300,000 man army ....." The minister was ultimately forced to resign by the resultant hue and cry. Despite this ambivalence both the left and the right are seriously considering the possibility, particularly under the imprint of the Chinese nuclear capability and political instability as evidenced by Mao's cultural revolution. This concern for Japanese security is also reinforced by the obvious shift in America's perception of her strategic role in Asia. Concrete evidence of this concern was manifest in an official increase in the size of Japanese armed forces

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Far Eastern Economic Review, March 24-30, 1968.

and defense budget this year. According to the Far Eastern Economic Review (July 31, 1969), defense expenditures are also slated to go up from about 1% to 1.5% during the period 1972-1976. Other voices, according to the Weekly, are calling for more dramatic increase. Thus, Kenzo Okubo, head of the Japanese Ordnance Association and President of Mitsubishi Electric, agreed with Hudson Institute's own estimate, to wit, that defense expenditures should take about 4% of the annual Gross National Product. Japan's current GNP amounts to 1,4 billion U.S. dollars and is increasing at a rate of about 10% per annum. Similar support for increased defense capabilities and public understanding of this complex question also came from the Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations) and the Defense Agency's Director General, Kiichi Arita. Thus, a new political maturity, coupled with vested economic interests, are, among other forces, fusing together to forge a new political environment which will lend impetus to a further evolution of Japanese attitudes toward the possibility of nuclear armament."

All of this merely brings us back to the probability that a confluence of forces will push Japan into a nuclear status. It also seems hard to imagine that if Japan acquired nuclear weapons this would be taken as overturning the political results of World War II, dramatized in the fact that the five principal victors of that war are the five nuclear powers of today. It is difficult to believe that there would not be great pressure within West Germany to follow the Japanese example. Then, very likely Italy, Switzerland or Sweden or some other medium-sized technologically advanced power would follow. Under current conditions at least, three or four states in the category "Large and Partially Industrialized Nations" might then well seek nuclear weapons to confirm their great-power status. And, of course, almost any of the potentially mature industrial, mass-consumption, or post-industrial societies could make the weapons if they wished.

In such a world, a not at all unreasonable world of the 1975-1985 period, it seems that the United States would certainly feel some need for competent active and passive defenses, and possibly for an even more competent offense than we have today. The existence of active and passive defenses is as likely to dampen the arms race as to exacerbate it, since defensive capabilities are likely to be relatively expensive, employing rather advanced technologies and thus make it difficult to attain true "great power" status.

For discussion of some of the implications of this situation, and programs to deal with it, see "Nuclear Proliferation and Rules of Retaliation," Yale Law Journal, Volume 76, No. 1, November 1966, and "Criteria for Long-Range Nuclear Control Policies," California Law Review, Volume 55, No. 2, May 1967.

CHAPTER IV. SOME ASPECTS OF THE MULTIFOLD TREND

A. Introduction

We want to discuss the possibility that there will be increasing need for the military to cope with the consequences of such social trends as have been indicated elsewhere in this report, as well as the consequences of some recent historical events. All of these involve distinct issues, concepts and consequences, but there is sufficient overlap--in cause, symptoms, and/or in likely impact--for it to be useful to touch on all of these issues in the course of a general discussion.

First is the importance of such attitudes, actions, and conditions as cosmopolitanism, pacifism, relativism, anti-militarism (or at least anti-"establishment" militarism); bitter intellectual dissent or opposition to "the system" and/or the "establishment"; "dropouts" from the system, new left ideologies; civil disobedience; "confrontations" with the establishment; anarchism; the "hippy" movement; "affluence values"; the influence of increasing numbers of persons raised in a very protective environment and permissive style of life; and the general lack of reality-testing in our culture.

All of these are distinct matters, yet all are clearly interconnected with one another. Until new value systems have been devised and/or adopted, or there is return to old values (perhaps because of some danger, challenge or some change in policy), these trends and their manifestations are likely to be very important, continuing and perhaps intensifying. If this is so, they will certainly affect 1975-1985 conditions, particularly if there is then an expectation that these trends and fashions will continue even beyond the period of interest.

For some of our purposes we need not try to get agreements or consensus on the causes of these phenomena but simply on the fact that they exist--that something is in fact happening and is likely to have such-and-such consequences. This, of course, is typical of any situation in which there is little or no possibility of rigorous argument on the main issues. All that really is needed in order to pursue the discussion is an agreement that a process is occurring and reasonable agreement on the probable consequences of this process. The consensus may prove to be wholly wrong, but explicating the consensus at least gives some chance that error will be found, making it easier to follow through the consequences of the consensus.

One of the reasons, of course, for the difficulty in assigning unique causes or weighing causes is that many of the issues and attitudes with which we are most concerned have a high tendency to be correlated or to occur together. Thus a cosmopolitan finds it difficult to take the claim of any parochial system seriously. Or if one feels that any system is as good as any other system, or any religion is as good as any other religion,

It is difficult to justify risking--much less killing--hundreds, thousands, or even millions of people in the defense of one system or religion against another. And so on. (Thus many pacifists today point out that even if Hitler had taken over the world, it is not likely that his "Thousand-Year Reich" would have lasted anything like that long. For others of us, the mere fact that Hitler's Reich might exist for even one day, much less for ten, fifty or a hundred years, is sufficient reason to oppose it even at heavy cost. A relativist or pacifist might regard such an attitude as immoral--particularly if nuclear war was involved.)

B. A Long-Term View

An appeal to an eight- or nine-hundred-year trend in order to explain a recent change is not likely to be easily accepted by most readers. There are at least two reasons for skepticism. The first is a general rejection of historicist theories among scholars. We tend to sympathize with this position, yet one would argue that what we call (in The Year 2000) the multifold trend exists, and that most aspects of it over the past eight or nine hundred years are reasonably well established by empirical observation. We need not appeal here simply to historicist studies. Almost any historical treatment of serious and important subjects--arts, music, architecture, law, family, government, philosophy, ethics--is likely to recognize the existence of our long-term secular trend, even if under another name.

The concept of the post-industrial culture is somewhat more controversial and speculative, but again we would argue nowhere nearly so controversial as most people might believe--certainly if we would think of this, at least for the moment, as simply a name for "symptoms" visible in our society today which seem closely related to the multifold trend.

The second issue which bothers many people is that if a trend has been going on for a thousand years, it does not seem likely to be of particular importance in any particular year or decade. This is a reasonable position. There is a growing body of evidence and conjecture, however, that this trend will reach a kind of culmination point in the next two or three decades--and, in addition, things are progressing much more rapidly today than ever before. Thus, with such an exponential trend in the time equivalent to the exponent more will have happened than has happened in the whole of previous history. It thus is perfectly proper to explain recent occurrences by a long-term secular exponential trend--if the mean-free time of the secular trend is two or three decades. One of the things we pointed out in the book The Year 2000 is that, in effect, the mean-free time for a "doubling" has tended to decrease over the last seven or eight centuries so that today it often is in the neighborhood of a decade or so. If the year 2000 "era" (1985-2015) does see a number of culminating points, a lot will have happened both in that "era" and between now and then.

It is this concept, then, which lies behind our argument that 1975-1985 may fruitfully be viewed as the transition period between the post-war era (1945-1975) and what we call the Year 2000 Era. One can make a very good case for predictable "growing pains" or "transition difficulties" in going from an industrial society to a post-industrial society. This last concept makes it easy--perhaps too easy--to accept the view that many seemingly transient phenomena are not as trivial or superficial as they seem to many--that they are not evanescent phenomena or fashions, but part and parcel of some very basic trends and changes which are of great potential importance because we are coming to this culminating point.

Contemporary Considerations

Many students of the twentieth century would consider World War I both the great divide and the prime cause of many of the changes we associate with the trend. It is often remarked that a whole civilization, a whole culture, died in the trenches of Western Europe in 1916-1918. While somewhat overstated, there is much to be said for this point of view and one must add to the direct causes of the disillusionment, skepticism, and cynicism usually associated with World War I, the effects of the way the war was treated in literature and history. (To take a rather interesting analogy bearing on this last point, one might compare Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The first still seems preoccupied with themes of nuclear weapons and death; the latter is a bustling commercial city that seems to ignore its atomic experience. Both went through much the same experience, both belong to the same nation and culture, but the first city, for various reasons, chose to relive its experience over and over again, emphasizing the horror and the shock of nuclear attack. The second emphasized a return to "normality," a return to business as usual. If one knew only Hiroshima, one would think the Nagasaki method of dealing with its experience impossible, and of course vice versa.)

World War II intensified some of the trends produced by the first great war, at least in Europe itself (it probably worked the other way in the United States). In Europe there was, after the war, a general feeling of the failure of the nation-state. In particular, the French and the Germans felt that their governments and systems had failed them. To a lesser extent the Italians, and an even lesser extent, the British, felt the same way.

"Progress" Questioned

If the post-World War I reaction against European values included much, it in no sense included everything. The reaction was basically against traditional patriotic and religious values and attitudes. Despite all of the horrors which had, after all, been devised by technology and science and then used by man, the basic European faith in science, technology and progress remained. In some ways, the concept of a beneficent science and a human technology became even stronger since some of

the older values--religious, traditional, and humanist--were no longer as strongly held. Of course, many intellectuals felt incompetent before the machine. They not only did not trust their own ability to manipulate and control technology, which seemed alien and dehumanizing in effect, but they often felt that this must be a general human reaction. (As opposed to the manual or skilled worker, who often may feel that the machine is an extension of himself and makes him a bigger, better, and more powerful human being).

Since World War II, however, there has been a growing reaction against modern science and modern technology. While this is currently restricted to a relatively small group, it has managed to achieve sufficiently widespread acceptance as to compel its consideration as a major movement. More important, the enthusiastic and unquestioning commitment to science, technology and progress of the majority of the population has seriously been eroded. While most people still take a positive attitude toward science, technology and progress, this is a much weaker and more ambivalent commitment than it was before World War II.

There are, as always, a number of reasons for the change. Perhaps most important is the H-bomb, which seems to hang like a sword over humanity. It is all very well to admonish that technology is neutral, and that it is man who can use it for good or bad ends, but thermonuclear weapons look like the very opposite of beneficial to most people.

There is the impact of population increase and growing concern about it. There are all of the problems that go under the rubric of urban-sprawl and the problems of the city. Many of these seem the unmanageable creations of science, technology, and progress, and it is now increasingly widely understood that technological solutions often raise as many issues as they settle. Of course, many of these problems, and particularly the last-named consideration, tend chiefly to concern the upper and upper-middle classes. The lower class--the majority of the people--tend not to focus attention on these issues except in so far as race relations and poverty affect them, and both of those matters seem more likely to be helped by technology, rather than hurt. But that tenth or fifth of the population which worries about these issues also tends to be the minority--the "establishment"--which runs the country and determines the "high culture"--and this means that these individuals' own attitudes are important in themselves and are likely to determine, in the long run, the tone of the culture, or at least an increasing proportion of it. One must add to the above issues some others which are becoming increasingly important, such as privacy, "1984" issues--computerized government and computerized administration--and perhaps most important of all, new developments in genetic control and genetic engineering which threaten, in the judgment of many people, to complete the dehumanization of man.* Even the most

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*One of the authors has listed in another publication about a hundred developments in science, engineering, technology, and applications of these, which are almost certain to come about before the year 2000 and

casual reader will find many of these developments more threatening than benevolent; more disturbing than reassuring; more problem-raising and anxiety-provoking than potentially helpful. This attitude implies an at least qualified rejection of what is, presumably, the crowning jewel of our modern culture. The thing in which our culture has most fully expressed itself is rationality--science and technology. If this is tarnished and suspect, one can easily believe the larger value system is on its way to rejection.

It should also be noted that modern bureaucracy is often associated with many of the problems that we have just been discussing. That is to say, many people do accept the argument that science and technology are neutral and it is men who apply them in good and evil ways, except that they go on to argue that in the modern world it is not men but bureaucracies who make the decisions. They then contend that these bureaucracies are by their very nature indifferent to humanist concerns and humane consequences. Their hostility towards bureaucracies and science and technology is increased because of the connection between the two.

America's Image Abroad

The shifting mosaics of attitudes and "life-styles" are neither confined to an individual country nor exclusively to any social group. If one accepts the view that such change is in process, then some aspects of the United States' "image" abroad becomes understandable as a logical consequence of this secular trend. If there is a growing revulsion against modern science, technology and the administrative apparatus imperative to the effective functioning of an advanced industrial society, then America, which is the embodiment of these characteristics in the eyes of the world, will find its policies and claims to prestige more and more open to question and challenge. Moreover, the erosion of the cold war and the post-war recovery of Europe and other parts of the world have all tended to make the particular kind of international "hegemony" exercised by the U.S. after the war increasingly onerous and unacceptable. Thus, the position in which much of the world found itself from roughly 1945 to 1965, when American protection was needed and when American influence, American theories, ways and techniques were accepted as pre-eminent, was and is now recognized as a most unnatural condition. This reaction also has repercussions to the American domestic scene because the seeming ingratitude of these foreign nations increases tendencies toward disillusionment, frustration, anger, annoyance, and, of course, neo-isolationism.

Under the impact of such fundamental questioning it is also inevitable that established political institutions such as political parties and other groupings should be subject to considerable stress and pressure

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make an important impact on life in (at least) the industrial nations. Most of these developments are likely to make their impact in the 1975-1985 time period. This is the reason why they are almost certain by the year 2000. They have a very high probability of coming 10 to 20 years before then. They are described briefly in Chapter II of The Year 2000.

to change if they were to survive. There follow three essays which take intelligent note of the flux in the tide of change in western society. The first examines the "crisis of liberalism" as a political philosophy, one historically embodying some of the principal political and social values which underlie modern Western society. The second deals with the increasing influence and impact of the intellectual class as instruments and catalysts of change, while the third offers a series of historical vignettes demonstrating the vitality and role of ideology and its effects on diverse social groups. The authors of these essays are staff members of Hudson Institute and have made unsigned contributions to this report throughout. In the immediately following chapter, Messrs. Pfaff and Armbruster will engage in debate with Herman Kahn on salient aspects of his overview of the American domestic milieu and its implications for the military planner.

C. The Liberal Crisis (by William Pfaff)

The least controversial thing which might be said about the political situation in 1969 is that West European and American public opinion is in a condition of great mobility, and the polarity of the established parties and the established left and right greatly weakened. Perhaps the least specific and most controversial argument to be made is that modern liberal society itself, the industrial and urban society of Europe and North America, might be at a turning point in that political development which began in the 17th-century Enlightenment and took specific form during the post-revolutionary 19th-century years in Europe and America. In this second case, the social transformations brought about within the West by all of the combined factors of "modern" as well as "post-industrial" life might now be argued to be bursting the established political structure. Thus a New Left, and a New Right as well, can be seen emerging; there is student rebellion; a marked decline of the socialist and communal parties in Europe; an alleged apoliticism among the affluent middle classes. All of these, together with individual alienation or distress within society, might then be interpreted not as ephemeral or ancillary political phenomena but as indices of a rebellion against an established politics predominantly oriented to economic issues, a politics of interest groups, a social structure dominated by economic acquisitiveness and material production, by values of economic and organizational efficiency. Thus the system of parties and parliaments which has provided our form of representative government in the West for the last century and a half is inevitably challenged, with, it may be, great significance for those aspects of the 1975-1985 environment of special interest to this study.

The first argument, then, says only that we are involved in a political reorientation, one chiefly affecting the established parties of our day and the way in which those parties define contemporary issues. The second argument suggests a much larger political transition--even a crisis--arising from forces and trends common to all of the advanced Western societies.

Certainly there is a "crisis" within the liberal political movement in the United States. Since 1933 a voting majority of citizens in this country has shared a recognizable group of assumptions about domestic needs and foreign policy. "Liberalism" at home has meant a series of economically oriented measures to maximize business competition, to protect organized labor, to establish a welfare "floor" for the very poor, to minimize unemployment. The economy has been manipulated by Keynesian techniques with the objective of increasing stability, growth, and GNP. Liberalism in this sense has been the avowed philosophy of the Democratic Party and, with some modifications, of that wing of the Republican Party which has elected the only Republican presidents of the era. The two Eisenhower Administrations clearly were friendlier to business interests, more inclined to laissez-faire and local political responsibility than the Democrats, but the difference was only one of degree, and the social objectives as well as the practical programs of both Republican and Democratic Administrations from Roosevelt to (as far as we know) Richard Nixon have been substantially similar.

Liberalism has, in fact, been the philosophy of the American popular majority. The dissident right wing of the Republican Party has articulated programs and ideas of avowed laissez-faire, states' rights, the defense of political and economic individualism, but even these differences with the liberal majority have been, by comparison with Europe, quite mild. The differences between conservative Republicans and the Democratic Administrations of the last three decades have, philosophically, been far less than those which in the same period divided Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, liberals, conservatives, neo-fascists, monarchists in Europe.

In foreign policy, isolationism in the late 1920's and the 1930's expressed a liberal as well as conservative American consensus. The Roosevelt Administrations were originally isolationist in policy, only moving toward international intervention under the pressure of events abroad (and their own negligence). Indeed, it can be argued that the dominant traits of American liberalism are directed outgrowths of a mainstream American philosophy of the 19th as well as the 20th centuries. Trust-busting and "liberal" intervention in business to defend competition has its roots in idealized Manchester individualism: it is a pro-capitalist, pro-business phenomenon, not (as in Europe) a trend originating in socialist, laboring class, or aristocratic hostility towards business and "trade."

The internationalism identified with contemporary America also has more in common with the older, isolationist, perception of America's (moral) relationship with the world than is commonly appreciated. In liberal internationalism or interventionism, as in many of the foreign policy attitudes expressed by conservative critics of American internationalist policy, there is evident the same rejection of the world-as-it-is which underlay the isolationism of America before World War II. The difference lies in a contemporary determination--only now being reassessed in government and public debate--to reform the world, often enough on

models that fairly straightforwardly project the American constitutional-federalist, and economic experience.

But today this liberalism is in serious difficulties. Whether as a result of its own errors or inadequacies, or as a consequence of circumstances beyond any policy's competence to overcome, both domestic and foreign crises have developed which liberalism has thus far been unable to resolve or even to formulate adequately. In Vietnam the (liberal) policy of containing Asian communist expansion by means of (liberal) nation-building programs and military measures of counterinsurgency sponsored by the (liberal) Kennedy and Johnson Administrations failed to produce the sought-for success. A significant withdrawal of American confidence from the Administration ensued, and the election of a Republican president who interprets his mandate as to restore peace. ("We cannot expect to make everyone our friend, but we can try to make no one our enemy.") In racial and urban affairs a considerable social crisis within America has developed despite a series of liberal reform programs. Whether these programs were right--but did not have the time or funding to succeed, or encountered greater difficulties than had been expected--or whether they were inadequate in conception is an argument outside the scope of these remarks. I am myself uncertain where the truth lies; the domestic crisis seems to me immensely complicated and I do not see any very convincing basic alternatives to the kind of liberal policies we have been following. The point I wish to make is simply that a coherent tradition in contemporary American politics, in power now for thirty-six years, is--for good reasons or bad--in evident difficulties; and the national consensus which has supported it for thirty years gives clear signs of fragmenting.

In Europe there are "post-parliamentary" political trends which respond to inadequacies in the established party systems. And the links between the political problem and a larger discontent with the norms and values of modern society are perhaps easier to see. Thus Gaullism, an example of the New Right--and significantly technocratic--response, now is addressing itself to the problem of the distribution of power within French society, offering "participation" at all levels of enterprise. The political unrest created by student rebellion in France, Germany and Italy explicitly identifies many but by no means all of the current issues of alienation from the values of industrial society.

What will--or can--follow? It seems to me that at this point the most important distinction to be made is between rational and romantic responses. Nearly all "revolutions" profess to bring about liberating changes in the condition of men, but some are fairly specific, material, and political in their immediate goals. Some are indefinite about how, specifically, reform or revolution is to be accomplished, and rather call for "spiritual" reform or the unspecified "liberation" of the masses.

This subject is discussed at length in Power and Impotence, Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff (New York: Random House, 1966).

The former would include the French and American Revolutions as well as both the February and October Revolutions in Russia and most of the national revolutions in the Third World. All of these expressed a repudiation of clearly changeable and onerous situations: foreign rule or exploitation, repressive or reactionary government, etc. Whatever the inner impulse or the rhetorical extravagance of the revolutionaries, events forced them into a practical role addressed to specific and tangible accomplishments.

The New Left today claims, with some justice, that revolutions are not made by programs but by the act of revolution itself: that the revolution is determined by the revolutionary experiment. But the vagueness of these claims and the New Left's lack of programs also reflect the fact that no clear-cut evil exists whose elimination can be expected to produce a drastic change in the social and political condition. It was otherwise for the revolutions already noted: "End British Rule!" "Overthrow the King!" "All Power to the Soviets!"--each slogan states a practical objective which forced shape onto movements arising from wide and perhaps disparate grievances. Two examples, however, come to mind of successful but unspecified "spiritual" revolutions--the fascist coups in Italy and Germany, occurring in conditions of political malaise and demonstrated incompetence of liberal government. Promising "re-birth," national pride and purgation, a place in the sun, the two fascist movements delivered what they promised, largely through improvised measures and the "experiment" of the revolution itself.

One might make the distinction, then, in these terms: some societies rebel against external forces; some against a definable abuse or institution of power within their society; some are in rebellion against the malaise, discontents, or incompetence of the society itself. In this last kind of rebellion the society is repudiating <u>not what it is forced to be but what it is</u>. This is most likely to produce romantic, irrational, self-destructive, or aggressively messianic outbursts (externalized self-aggression). One major reason for the potential importance for modern Western society of the crisis of liberalism seems to me to lie in these possibilities.

Applying these remarks to the specific concerns of this report, I would say that by the 1975-1985 period we are likely to experience either the culmination or the collapse of the social unrest which began in the late 1960's. If peace comes in Vietnam, an important factor of world-wide unease will have been removed. If the precedent of that war proves to have little effect in other disturbed societies, and the "revolutionary warfare" of the Viet Cong was a unique product of that situation and proves not to be readily or successfully transferrable as a tactic of Communist party struggle, then the inevitable unrest and disorder of the Third World may come to seem considerably less menacing to the United States and the European powers. The idea of essentially unitary "world civil wars" or "world-wide challenges" may lose ground on both sides of the present cold-war barrier. Indeed, in reaction to this there could

ensue a period in which the national rivalry of great powers, and particularly the national challenge of the Soviet Union, may seriously be undervalued in the Western states and the United States. If the various reform programs being undertaken by the established Western governments--by Mr. Nixon here, the "participation" of Gaullism, the structural reforms being proposed by the new Italian government, etc.--achieve some practical success in dealing with the real issues of discontent here and in Europe, then the present crisis may prove to have been a passing phase in the development of liberal government and society.

On the other hand, a serious world-wide economic crisis, a severe crisis of East-West relations, or almost any deepening crisis in the Third World (whether it is a matter of concerted Communist effort or an essentially unrelated series of disorders and economic failures) but one which proves beyond the competence (or moral vision) of the liberal governments, a failure of reform within the Western states--all could extend and deepen the social unrest within the West. In this case, I think that the conflict would be deeper and much more savage than is implied in Kahn's version of the humanist left-responsible center confrontation (see Chapter V). In this projection it seems perfectly possible that liberal authorities, unable to find remedies for their problems yet convinced of thier own good intentions, losing their grip on the consensus which provides "legitimacy" to their exercise of power and facing anarchical challenges, might resort to measures of frank (though ostensibly temporary) repression and authoritarian government.[1] The resistance to them, now largely sentimental and nihilist in its ideas, might under pressure take on a seriously revolutionary character and establish an ideological structure appealing to more than marginal social groups. And it would seem to me that the "revolutionary" movements in this case would very likely maintain the romanticism of their present forerunners, as against the "bankrupt pragmatism" of the Lockean liberal governments they attack. And as in the Europe of the 1920's and 1930's, the rebellion might have both rightist and leftist manifestations.

To say all of this is, of course, to deal in apocalyptic scenarios. I do not myself think that the liberal crisis will reach the kind of revolutionary climax I sketch above. Something closer to the first scenario--an easing of crisis pressures, reasonably successful liberal reforms--seems to me the more likely outcome. Moreover, I have taken no account of pressures and developments which could have the biggest say of all in the outcome. The present trend of developments within the Soviet Union seems to me far more likely to produce world crisis than events within the West. A "liberal crisis" of another kind exists in Eastern Europe, and Russia is reacting in a reactionary pattern which, while it provided, in the past, a workable solution for such threats, may no longer be a possible or valid course for Russia. In that case "revolutionary" [illegible] more dangerous to the world, in the East [illegible]

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[1] Kahn would argue that such repr[illegible] "lower middle class backlash" or other [illegible] objected to the tolerance [illegible]

D. Remarks on a Social Trend (by Raymond Gastil)

I would like here to discuss the special role that intellectuals play in creating and/or intensifying various social phenomena. As is true of many words, "intellectual" may be defined in as many different ways as there are purposes to employ the term. For our purposes here, however, I would like to define an intellectual simply as one who forms his judgments chiefly on the basis of indirect experience and who in life works with ideas rather than things. In these terms the number of intellectuals has been growing rather rapidly in recent years; with an increase in communication devices to some extent most of the population has been intellectualized. It is easy to overestimate the influence of intellectuals upon politics, and I will argue that for the foreseeable future they will not directly dominate public affairs. However, since a high proportion of our people now receive a liberal education of some sort, the opinions of college and university and research people are taken seriously throughout society. In this way the influence of intellectuals is growing and will continue to grow regardless of the outcome of particular elections. Intellectuals will not be as influential in the Nixon Administration as they would have been in a Humphrey Administration, but they will be more influential than they were in the Eisenhower Administration.

Our task, then, is to investigate the significance of this evolution for the future of our international and national politics. If intellectuals represented the diversity of interest groups which have always been responsible for American politics, then the intellectualization of politics should not be particularly striking or interesting. However, intellectuals are a special group, for it would appear that under current conditions intellectual activity generates in itself certain inevitable tendencies of thought. These are generated both by the fact of thinking about the human condition without being in an operational human context and by the heightened verbal intelligence and emotional sensitivity of the average intellectual. In the following discussion of inevitable intellectual tendencies there should be no implication that there are not always many intellectuals who think, at least superficially, in quite different ways. In particular, there are always establishment intellectuals, or what might often be referred to as "bought intellectuals," who will try to defend whatever system of values or organization happens to exist at the moment. In addition, in speaking of certain inevitable intellectual tendencies or directions of thought, I also do not mean to imply that these are restricted only to intellectuals or that the tendencies are not necessarily correct, or at least partially correct in certain circumstances. The reader should remember that although the essay is being written in a critical, anti-intellectual vein, in fact, the author is an intellectual and has persistently discovered these tendencies in himself.

The first principle or tendency is that toward relativism, toward questioning all claims, facts and assumptions. Paradoxically, Pitirim Sorokin, a sociologist of knowledge, who saw himself revolting against current intellectual trends, is perhaps one of the best symbols of this

intellectual tendency. His work was based on the proposition that there were alternative systems of truth resting upon unprovable axioms.* He then went on to show how the popularity of the alternatives fluctuated, predicting that our present system would also pass. The twentieth century was the late state of a "sensate" or materialistic civilization which was bound to change. Sorokin's theory is itself both an example of sensate thinking and of the relativistic tendency of the intellectual. Closely connected to relativism is a tendency to explain issues in terms of increasing complexity. The exuberant building of thought upon thought, alternative in relation to alternative, is perhaps best identified in the policy analysis area with the work of Herman Kahn.** The intellectual also thrives on novelty, rejecting old beliefs merely because they are old; he is always reinterpreting and reinterpreting.

One can also adduce a sociological reason for the relativism and complexity which characterizes the thought of intellectuals. For only if issues or policies can be made to seem complex enough is the intellectual indispensable to the policy maker.

The next tendency which I would argue is inevitable for an intellectual is that toward pacifism, toward the feeling that no man has a right to take the life of another person even in what is traditionally called a war. An intellectual tends towards pacifism since values are really relative to him, and neither side has more than an apparent case. The intellectual is also generally more sensitive than other people, although he may hide this sensitivity under a veneer of cynicism. This sensitivity manifests itself in an ability to empathize with other people, people at a distance, and enemies as well as friends. Such empathy means that all deaths are to some extent the death of oneself and, therefore, to kill another or to allow another to be killed or hurt in war is to hurt oneself.*** Luckily, relativism now comes to the aid of the individual by helping him to believe that all positions can be compromised, that they can be solved by talk, that there can always be reconciliation based upon the common identity of man. If we use the famous Machiavellian distinction of the fox and the lion, the intellectual is surely the fox, the person who will solve problems of defense by talking the other side out of the war by negotiation, and perhaps in this strategic age by doctrines of deterrence which sidestep considering how future wars might actually be fought. There is again here a sociological reason, for the "people of the pen," the "civilian intellectuals," tend to have relatively greater power

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*Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics (New York: The Bedminster Press, 1962 [1937-1940]).

**E.g., Herman Kahn, On Escalation (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), and Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years (New York: Macmillan Company, 1967).

***But see below, pp. 3-54, 3-55.

in times of peace than in times of war. To some extent this has been modified in recent times by nuclear weaponry, but during an actual war of the future the intellectual must continue to suspect that his role would be secondary.

The third inevitable tendency of the intellectual is towards social reformism or egalitarianism. The justifications for most inequalities ring quite hollow, and especially the justification for inherited inequality. I would like in this connection to mention the story of Mazdak, who in about the year 500 A.D. appeared in one of the most arbitrary and absolutist courts in the world, that of the Shah of Iran. Mazdak was, of course, a religious reformer and his doctrine might best be seen in terms of a particular variety of Manicheism.* However, as the story is told in one ancient source, the religious aspect is secondary to a basic intellectual position. Mazdak starts by asking the Shah a question. "If there were a man dying of snake bite, and another man had the antidote for the bite but would not give it to the dying man because he had no money, how would you judge the man with the antidote?" The Shah said, "Why, of course, the man would be a murderer, and should be treated as such." The next day Mazdak said to the Shah, "If there were a man who had been captured and been put in chains and his captors had food but didn't give it to him and he died in his chains, what would you say of the captors?" And the Shah replied, "Why, they are murderers." So Mazdak went out to the starving people and ordered them to break into the storehouses of the kingdom and of the city, and all the food was divided evenly among the populace. Mazdak then insisted that there should be no distinctions in the kingdom, that all people should be equal and all property equally divided. As is typical of intellectuals, he, of course, went too far. He went so far as, according to the story, to claim that all women should also be held in common, which did not set well in a society with a radical emphasis upon biological inheritance. He also demanded that the heir apparent, the Shah's son, join his religion. A coalition of opponents then wiped out Mazdak and all of his followers. But for hundreds of years afterwards the story of Mazdak and belief that his followers were lurking somewhere in the kingdom was a terror of Islamic society.

It is interesting to compare this story with the relationship of the current Shah of Iran and his American advisers who have also come to tell him that the people of Iran should divide up the property among the peasants. In the 1950's Iranian landowners came to me and asked why the Americans were trying to take their land away from them; of course, I didn't know what to say for we would never do this sort of thing in the United States. But I think, again, it is an example of what inevitably happens when an intellectual looks on the problem from his cold and distant point of view. As a sociological comment, it might also be mentioned that inequalities based upon intellect have, however, often been proposed and supported by intellectuals, at least since the time of Plato.

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*See Arthur Christensen, L'Iran sous les Sassanides (Ejnar Munkscaard, Copenhague, 1944); The Shahnameh of Firdowsi (many editions); and Nezam-ul-Molk, Siyasatnameh (many editions).

In spite of these tendencies, intellectuals need causes for which to work. In other words, they need goals, and yet their minds drive them toward an intellectual void that seems to have no goals. And, as a side effect, since they are the symbolic leaders of the community, or the manipulators of symbols for the community, their relativism and their void is apt to threaten to break down the value system of the non-intellectual community which they serve.

There are, then, three types of solutions which intellectuals may find for this paradox, or to overcome this paradox. First, they may decide to limit their lives to the attainment of purely intellectual goals. This kind of approach often leads to the study of methodology apparently for the sake of methodology. Or, another kind of intellectual will emphasize the search for facts for the sake of the facts alone. The world which they create is safe and satisfying within its own terms, but rather narrow, and with little outside reference.

The next approach is just the opposite--the rejection of all of the intellectual positions I have mentioned above, a general confession-repression of the intellectual life. Alfred Rosenberg, the Nazi philosopher, and Albert Schweitzer, the humanist philosopher, both saw the world in rather similar terms of a general breakdown of the intellectual position and a need for a response to it in fairly radical and mystical terms.* Of course, the outcome of their lines of thought was very different; yet in both cases it was a mystical resolution of the dead end of intellectual complexity.

The third response is apparently more moderate, but may also eventuate in a vicious form of absolutism. In this case the intellectual lifts social reformism well above pacifism and relativism, rejecting these two in a pursuit of a rigid and often radical egalitarianism in which the principle of limits, which most people intuitively use to guide their actions, is ignored as the intellectual follows his thoughts to wherever they may lead. An intellectual of this sort finds "no enemies to the left." He regards his movement as an elitist "vanguard of the revolution." His outlook is hardly democratic, and yet it is meant for, and in his own mind serves, the people. Of course, here again there is a sociological reason, for intellectuals in this mode of overcoming the paradox of their commitment have a greater chance for power and position than in either of the other choices they may make.

Psychoanalytically, if we may use that term in regard to purely intellectual problems, the intellectual who follows this road places himself in a very exposed position in terms of his own deeper rational convictions. In rejecting relativsm and pacifism, the intellectual requires ever stronger proofs of the absolute right of his social dogma. The existence of opposition, which the non-intellectual might safely ignore,

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*Cf., Alfred Rosenberg, Der Mythus des 20 (Jahrhunderts, Munich, 1930), and the introduction to Albert Schweitzer, Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur (Munich, 1923).

cannot be tolerated by the intellectual, for it represents a part of himself, forever raising questions. Intellectuals have historically often been found behind the most vicious and absolutist repressions. Thus, although intellectuals seldom rule, perhaps it is for the reasons hypothesized here that so many men have had to die for holding the wrong opinions at the wrong time.

Let us turn, then, to how the intellectual's confidence in his own beliefs has varied in this century. After World War I there was a good deal of increased support for the pacifist and relativist critique, for World War I was a purposeless war in which millions were killed, and very little, if anything, accomplished. The depression supported the doctrines of social reformism. Something had to be done, and egalitarianism and movements of the left prospered among intellectuals.

This development of the intellectual's position, both in his self-confidence and in society, was arrested by the rise of Hitler, Stalin, and World War II, by the Communist takeover of China, by the Berlin blockade, and the Korean War. After these events American society looked very good, and it looked as though it needed defending. Pacifism and relativism did not appear to be such obvious conclusions in the face of Nazis who had eliminated millions of people for a contrary doctrine. Violent reformism did not look so good since many of the violent reformers had been persuaded to join a Communist movement which also was now generally recognized to have eliminated millions of people, to have destroyed the intellectual freedom of intellectuals wherever it was dominant.

In spite of this there was the 1948 Wallace movement, but it again was captured by Communists, and Wallace himself ended by turning away from it. It is perhaps significant that the socialist and pacifist Eugene Debs received a larger percentage of the vote after World War I than did the much more widely known Wallace after World War II. I would suggest that Joseph McCarthy's success in the early fifties was partially due to the low morale of the intellectual community, perhaps almost as much as it was due to the rise of anti-communist hysteria.

In the 1950's, then, the intellectuals, faced with all these blows to their mode of thought, fell back upon their own specialties, and students responded to the attitudes of their teachers. The 1960's, however, saw new leaders in Russia and saw relative peace in the world. World War II receded into the past, and relativism could rise again. Our system no longer appeared to be good for its own sake, for the comparisons with competing systems of clearly greater evil had faded. The civil rights movement and the cause of poverty, even though poverty was less than it had ever been, revitalized social reformism. The enormous number of nuclear weapons and the increasing number of nuclear powers, and the Vietnam war, brought back pacifism, first in the form of nuclear pacifism, and then in the form of general pacifism. When intellectuals with these doctrines tried to succeed at the polls, they were often defeated, for the mass of people did not really understand their position,

even when temporarily, as in the case of the McCarthy phenomenon, they appeared to. The McCarthy group broke up after the Democratic convention in 1968, and the actual number of persons dedicated to intellectual McCarthyism began to emerge in subsequent polls and votes. The intellectual's minority status and powerlessness, and the powerlessness of their favorite cause, that of the Negroes, led them again to speak of alienation and the need for violence, the need for leadership of the majority by the minority for the sake of majority.

In conclusion, this discussion would seem to suggest that the value ferment and the student ferment which we see today is a general condition, and an inevitable condition which will rise and fall in terms of outside events, but will always be close to the surface. The pacifist, reformist and relativist ideas will tend to grow in influence in the United States and Euro-America with the growth and influence of intellectuals until they are arrested and temporarily reversed by another major shock such as World War II and the diabolical systems which surrounded it. This is not an optimistic prognosis for the 1975-1985 environment, and it gives little hope or advice on how to combat its rather gloomy predictions. But not all prognosis and prediction need be necessarily pleasant or happy.

E. Ideology in Historical Perspective (by Frank Armbruster)

Truly long-term analysis of today's specific problems is extremely difficult if not impossible. For example, the foreign policy of communist nations cannot be so analyzed; communist countries have existed for only fifty years. However, long-term examinations can be made of the behavior of nation-states which make interesting grist for differing points of view. One question that can be examined over the long term (but not so well in the typical short-term, post-World War II-type of analysis) concerns the reaction of nation-states in domestic and foreign policy when they discover themselves in an ideological confrontation with a dissident local group, another state, or group of states. The corollary question, how one knows when nation-states are in such a confrontation, is relatively easy to answer after the fact, but often hard to ascertain at the moment, i.e., it is hard to know when "politics and business as usual" between states no longer really applies.*

Nevertheless, the writer has the freedom to assume that plausible environments and reactions occur in the context of his assumptions, even if he can't absolutely guarantee the trends he uses will persist. The probability of the trends, and of certain actions occurring, however, often can be made more plausible by historical analysis, if one will

*"One is reminded of the comment that it was perfectly clear to Chamberlain that he could not treat Hitler as he would a Birmingham businessman. It was too apparent that Hitler was another breed. Chamberlain recognized this and therefore dealt with Hitler in the same suspicious and skeptical fashion that he would have with a Manchester businessman." (Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable [New York: Horizon Press, 1962], note, p. 248.)

tolerate certain analogies.* In this case an examination of the effects of ideological commitments on policy decisions in times of severe confrontations is relevant. Certainly the factors which lead to "unnatural" domestic and foreign policy decisions by the élites and even the general population of nations (deviations from "business and politics as usual") should be looked into. The tendency of many political analyses today to discount the influence of such factors could be a serious deficiency in the process. Often these decisions have changed the course of events in world history, and they have laid the groundwork for the modern world.

Ideological confrontations are commonplace in history. Though changes occurred on both sides during--perhaps even because of--these confrontations, ideologies, strongly and violently opposed to, often failed to evolve to a point where there was a common ground for the settlement of basic differences. In these cases one side had to be so totally broken that its camp became almost subservient to the other before the confrontation ceased. In other words, there were rarely "draws": one side had to lose before true "coexistence" was possible. Nor did schismatic movements within the ideological camps necessarily weaken them: In some of the most portentous ideological confrontations, the apogee of expansion and strength of a movement coincided with a crest in internal schismatic activity

I. The Muslims and Christians

In the severe confrontation between the Muslims and the Christians that spanned more than a thousand years, evolution never reached a point where compromise proved possible. In order for fundamental differences to be settled one side, or both, would have had to give up beliefs and practices essential to its life--as is usually the case when two ideologies come to loggerheads. The Muslim Orientals eventually crumbled under the pressure of the dynamic Christian Western ideology--so completely that today a coalition of Muslim states cannot handle one small Western-styled nation, Israel.

It is worthy of note that during and after the schismatic movements, and the controversy between the Islamic sects over the meaning and validity of the dogma (including bloody rebellion), Islam spread across the Middle East, North Africa and Spain. When the Muslims reached Tours in 723, several coups and assassinations had already taken place in the Middle East, and the Caliphate had changed hands in a hot debate over the "true" descendants and followers of the prophet. In fact, it was after the followers of Ali were established and had drawn thousands of converts into the Shiah "schism" in Persia, when the "Arab nation was torn asunder by the old tribal pretensions which Mohammed had sought to abolish,"** that the Umayyad Muslims came to power and swept through Spain and France.

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*In any event it is hazardous to totally ignore the motto on the Archives Building in Washington, "The Past is Prologue." In any social-science type of analysis.

**George E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), p. 22.

After the Abbasid Muslims had supplanted and virtually exterminated them in the Middle East, the Umayyads continued to rule as an independent and theologically somewhat divergent group of Muslims in Spain.* But even the collapse of the Spanish Umayyad dynasty in the eleventh century and the subsequent eighty years of Muslim civil war (a period in which some Muslim princes allied themselves with Christian princes against their fellow Muslims) did not provide the opportunity the Christian states in the north might have surmised. Toward the end of the eleventh century, when these Christians, under Alfonso, King of Leon, Castile, Galicia and Navarre, seriously began to threaten the Muslim states of Spain, the Islamic rulers, recognizing their common enemy, appealed to the Berber Almoravid Muslims (Moors) of Africa for help. There was much concern among cultured Spanish Muslims about bringing in these "uncouth barbarians," and the initial proposal to ask for their help was rejected. Some felt it would be "wiser to submit to Alfonso, the measure of whose tyranny was more easily gauged than Yusuf bin Tachfin," the Berber chieftain. But Mu'tamid, Muslim King of Seville (supported by the ideologically committed mulas), "resolved their doubts." "I have no desire," he declared, "to be branded by my descendants as the man who delivered Andalusia a prey to the infidels; I am loath to have my name cursed in every pulpit; and for my part I would rather be a camel driver in Africa than a swineherd in Castile."**

Cultural affinity and treaties with Christians notwithstanding, when the chips were down ideology was the decisive factor. Thus, with the vigor of "renewal," the puritanical Almoravid Muslim "barbarians," who had been converting their fellow Muslims in Africa by the sword, joined with cultured Muslim Spain and saved it by their victory over the Christians at the Battle of Zallaga in 1086.***

Later times saw Islam, "renewed" under the Ottomans, reach the outskirts of Vienna in 1529 and again in 1683, despite the fact that the Sunni Turkish Muslims were at the time carrying on intermittent warfare with the Shiah sect in Persia. The great, bloody conflict between Persia and the Ottoman Empire did not save the Christians in the Balkans and the Danube Valley from Muslim expansion and conquest, even if it did delay it and eventually drain much of the lifeblood of the Ottomans.****

A similar situation developed in the Christian bloc. It was during and after the Reformation, which led to wars between fellow Christians,

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*Ibid., p. 31.

**E.W. Bovill, The Golden Trade of the Moors (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 71-77.

***Ibid.

****Kirk, op. cit., p. 58; Norman J.G. Pounds and Robert C. Kingsbury, An Atlas of Middle Eastern Affairs (Rev. Ed.) (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 21.

that the Muslims (primarily the Ottoman Turks) were stopped, eventually driven back and destroyed as a world power. The great, violent Christian schism did not change the attitude of Christians as far as opposition to Islam was concerned. It was still viewed as the common enemy, as Christianity was viewed by the Muslims. Interestingly, in 1453, prior to the Reformation, when Byzantine Constantinople was besieged by the Muslim Turks, Europeans were not so clear on their loyalties. The Papal States, the Venetians and the Genoese sent help (the last, although also only a few hundred men, sparked the defense), but an attempted reconciliation between the churches was roundly rejected by the Greeks, despite their plight. Hungarians even advised the Turks how to use their artillery against the walls. The Genoese- and German-directed defense was extremely heroic and brilliant (the defenders were outnumbered about ten to one), but western aid to the Byzantines was only token. When the city finally fell to the well-armed brutal and numerous (but apparently otherwise inferior) Ottoman troops, Christendom suddenly realized that it had made a mistake. A foreign, truly heretical ideology now held the gate to Eastern Europe.[*]

Of course, vast commercial and cultural intercourse went on almost constantly between the ideological blocs, and even after the Reformation Venice, with her vital interest in maintaining the mideast trade routes, was not above selling timber to the Ottomans when they were building ships to dispute the Portuguese Cape Route to India.[**] Without the benefit of hindsight there were no doubt many at the time who in peaceful periods were not totally convinced that they were in a dangerous continuing ideological struggle.

As in earlier times, there were formal treaties of alliance between Christian and Muslim rulers, such as the one signed in 1539 by Francis I of France with the Ottoman Sultan. But as formerly, in the case of the Turkish siege of Malta in 1565, the treaty was understood not to apply. France did not spring to the aid of Malta, but neither did she aid her Muslim ally against the Catholic knights.[***] Even the Protestant Queen Elizabeth of England sided with the knights. "If the Turks," she wrote, "should prevail against the Isle of Malta, it is uncertain what further peril might follow for the rest of Christendom."[****] When Malta, "In a sense" a "dependency" of Philip's Spain, was successfully defended,[+] the victory was not only celebrated in Spain and Rome but in Paris as well and in London, where six weeks of prayers of thanksgiving were ordered by the Archbishop of Canterbury.[++]

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[*] J.F.C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Company, 1954), pp. 504-525.

[**] Kirk, op. cit., p. 64.

[***] Ernle Bradford, The Great Siege (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1962), p. 32.

[****] Ibid., p. 177.

[+] Ibid., p. 34.

[++] Ibid., p. 207.

Again at Lepanto in 1571 a "Christian League" of the Catholic powers defeated the Turkish navy.* And a century later, in the midst of an age of "Machiavellian" diplomacy in Europe, the Muslim siege of Vienna in 1683 could still induce a "noble reflex of the great crusading impulse of the Middle Ages." King John Sobieski of Poland was the champion of the French policy of peaceful relations with Turkey. An avowed opponent of the pro-Austrian "Hapsburg party" in Poland, John's concern was primarily the rising Hohenzollern power in the north. Nevertheless, Christian Poland chose sides on the basis of ideology, and Sobieski broke the Muslim siege of the Hapsburg capital. His action "won Poland offers of friendship from all the great powers,"** including those which were non-Catholic.

At times of hostile confrontation there was little confusion on this point among contemporaries of the time. If one were picked up by a Corsair in the Mediterranean, it was often as much as one's life was worth to be of a different faith from the captors.*** (In the Tower of London there is a repeating light cannon developed as late as the first part of the eighteenth century with two types of projectile--one round and smooth for use "against Christians" and one square with sharp edges for use "against Turks.")

Once the Muslim world had deteriorated to the point where it could no longer present a threat to a single great power of the polycentric but dynamic and rapidly expanding Christian world, the thousand-year-old cold-hot war began to wane. In fact, the Western nations began to squabble over the spoils of the defunct Muslim empire and signed meaningful alliances to protect Turkey, the "sick man of Europe," from its predatory Christian neighbors. The British treaties designed to keep Russia out of the eastern Mediterranean (a British sphere of influence in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) are notable examples. Indeed the parts of the Ottoman Empire which survived into modern times did so only because of this "protectorate" status under one or more of the great Christian powers.

We have not, of course, dwelt on innumerable aspects of the Christian and Muslim worlds during these centuries which also affected their development. For example, the great struggle between the emperors and the Church was taking place in Christendom while the Muslim-Christian confrontation was going on, but principles so basic as to preclude coexistence were not at stake. From this struggle evolved the nation-states, with a common (though polycentric) Christian culture, and a Catholic church greatly reduced in temporal power but gradually increasing control over its spiritual domain and administration.

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*Encyclopedia Britannica, 1959, Vol. 13 p. 945.

**Encyclopedia Britannica, 1959, Vol. 18, p. 138.

***Leslie Greener, The Discovery of Egypt (New York: The Viking Press, 1966), p. 59.

Other developments, perhaps less relevant, were "commercial." But the greatest of these, the Industrial Revolution, occurred after the Muslims had succumbed; so speculation over their fate in competition with the great coal- and iron-producing Christian nations in ideological terms is a sterile exercise. Basically, the Muslim world was wealthy, cultured and technologically competent, which made it an adequate opponent to the Christian world. But Muslim culture could not maintain its spirit and vigor over a thousand-year confrontation with the Christian West.

2. Republicans and Aristocrats

No sooner had the Christian-Muslim war died, however, than a second great ideological confrontation occurred in the civilized world: the "heretical" republicans against the established aristocrats. Here again, such basic principles were involved that someone had to lose before the "coexistence" of the antagonists was possible. Not until the republicans had reduced the aristocrats to an impotent, atrophied appendage could the two ideologies live together.*

The first outstanding success of the Republican movement was in America; then, from 1789 through 1914, the struggle continued in Europe and Asia. There was see-sawing back and forth, temporary restorations of the old monarchs in new republics, temporary installations of new monarchs, but always a steady weakening of the aristocracy. For indeed it was not necessarily the monarch but the aristocrats who were the real target of the republicans, and several constitutional (i.e. figurehead) monarchs remain today to provide continuity and focal points of loyalty while governments come and go.

The initial republican impetus in Europe came from France, where the States-General of 1789 turned into a National (Constitutional) Assembly which did away with the feudal privileges of the aristocrats and provided the basic documents for a constitutional monarchy. The resulting Legislative Assembly (for which the members of the National Assembly with two years' experience in legislative procedures were not eligible) was a far less productive body, composed largely of men "who were eager to win glory by destroying something--an ominous portent, since there was nothing left that they could destroy except the throne."** The Legislature plunged France into war with Austria and Prussia, then lost control to the Paris mob and, eventually, to Robespierre and the Jacobins. The blood baths ended only when Robespierre himself was toppled and the Directory governed under a new constitution. By 1799, Napoleon had taken over. Within a

*But the "elimination" of the aristocrats is still going on; witness the recent action to abolish the feeble residual power of the House of Lords in the constitutional monarchy of Great Britain.

**Wallace K. Ferguson and Geoffrey Bruun, A Survey of European Civilization (2d ed.), (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company), p. 641

decade the French had gone from autocracy to autocracy, but still the original aristocrats did not regain their power. Because of the reign of terror a deadly fear of extremist "republican" philosophies remained.

Interestingly enough, Napoleon was recognized throughout Europe as the champion of a truncated form of republicanism, even though he crowned himself Emperor. He pictured himself battling against the government rather than the people of each country he invaded, and this struck a sympathetic chord, for in each of these countries there were those who identified with the republicanism of the French and who were opposed to local aristocrats with their feudal privileges.

> In fact, the twenty-two-year era of the Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire labored more forcefully than the era of Louis XIV for the unity of the white world. It had at its disposal the new magic formula of social upheaval. With its aid, France in decline produced a rejuvenated military power that towered above those of her Continental adversaries. By the same means, she also generated an ideological power which multiplied her material strength many times over. Just as the magnetic mountain in the legend draws the iron parts from a ship, causing it to collapse, so French propaganda disrupted the ideological forces on the other side. Napoleon understood how to wield this propaganda; and the bouquet of revolutionary achievements looked all the more alluring in his hand for being well arranged and firmly bound. There was not a country in which the new empire did not find a powerful body of supporters.*

With the demise of Napoleonic military power, reaction set in; European aristocrats, including the English,** distrusted the masses for having been infected with French ideas. Republicanism was accurately viewed as the mortal enemy of the aristocrats, and Metternich, champion of the aristocracy, took continuous but ineffective steps to suppress it.

Republican uprisings in Piedmont and Naples were put down by the Austrian army, and a French army crossed the border to suppress a Spanish republican revolt. In 1823 nationalists rebelled against Turkish rule in Greece, and "legitimate" Metternich felt that the revolt should be allowed to "burn itself out beyond the pale of civilization."*** The Russians felt a pull toward the Orthodox Greeks, who were fighting Muslims (they also, of course, felt a pull toward Turkish territory), and the classically educated British and French looked on the Greeks as the descendants of ancient Hellenes. Excesses of the Muslim Turks against the Greek Christians helped focus European attention on their plight; even at that late date, it seems, the old Muslim-Christian ideological confrontation

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*Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 142.

**Ferguson and Broun, op. cit., p. 695

***Ibid., p. 697.

had not completely died. The Christian powers ("legitimist," aristocratic Russia and "liberal" France and Britain, who found it very difficult to function together when not influenced by ideological considerations) therefore approved of the revolt, if it established a Greek monarchy and not a republic. In fact, reminiscent of times gone by, "a British admiral was in command of the combined navies of the Christian powers which at Navarino annihilated--without a declaration of war--the Turko-Egyptian fleet carrying troops to administer the final coup de grace to the Greek rebels."* Despite the fact that a strong Turkey astride the Dardanelles was more in the interest of Britain and France than one "forced...to her knees" by the Russians, humanitarian considerations prevailed over Machiavellian foreign policy interests.** But the real problems with republicanism, for the aristocrats, began shortly after these events.

In France after 1815, Louis XVIII, on instructions from the victorious allies, had been moderate in his reign and maintained many republican reforms, including the Chamber of Deputies. Unfortunately, the aristocrats who, "some scholars estimate...recovered about one-half of the landed property lost in the Revolution, failed to make the haute bourgeoisie a partner in its position of power."*** Furthermore, Charles X, who succeeded Louis XVIII, proved to be more reactionary than his predecessors and attempted to subvert the legislative and electoral processes to form an extreme right government. The result was the Revolution of 1830, which in two days proved too much for the loyal troops in Paris and caused Charles X to flee to England.**** Aristocrats and monarchs all over Europe quaked in fear of a new whirlwind as the Parisian vortex once more rumbled with republicanism.+ And in fact the resurgence of French republicanism did send sparks which kindled smaller fires throughout Europe; and many revolutionaries waited--in vain--for French help.++ Here again, as in most ideological movements, though there was a strong international flavor to the movement as a whole, and though adherents

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*J. S. Talmon, Romanticism and Revolt: Europe 1815-1848 (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1967), p. 114.

**Ibid., p. 114.

***Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 106.

****Frederick B. Artz, Reaction and Revolution (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1934, with changes 1945), pp. 266-268.

+Ibid., p. 270.

++"All the revolts had been undertaken with the hope that the new government of France would be sympathetic and would even send aid." But the Austrians began to bring pressure on Louis Philippe, the new constitutional monarch of France, who then declared that "the blood of Frenchmen belongs only to France," and subscribed to the principles of non-intervention. (Ibid., p. 279.)

looked on fellow countrymen who followed a different ideology as enemies, there remained a strong nationalist flavor. But this nationalism did not detract from the vigor of the ideological movement; on the contrary, it often strengthened it.

In Belgium, the revolt of 1830 was sparked by the same forces which exploded in France. The republicans in Belgium, however, were fighting against a foreign privileged class. Since the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Belgium had been under the rule of Holland, and though the Belgians were economically well off, the majority were extremely anti-Dutch and rejected the liberal constitution offered them by William I of Holland. Interestingly enough though the liberals, because they were anti-clerical and lukewarm to Catholicism, originally backed the Protestant Dutch, they ended up by siding against the Dutch when William retaliated against the Belgians for rejecting his constitution. The sympathies of Britain and France for the Belgians' legitimate request (so long as the radicals did not set up a republic, instead of a constitutional monarchy) led to a conference of the "powers" which agreed to an independent Belgium. Again the middle class held to a moderate course, and Catholic France played the role of Belgium's protector against Holland while Protestant Britain kept France honest.

In Poland, the French revolt (as well as the rumor that a Russian-Polish army would be sent to put down the French republicans and the Belgian nationalists) triggered an uprising against Russian dominance. The insurrection started among the officer school cadets and spread to other students. The provisional government was led by aristocrats who, it was felt, could get help from France and Britain; and the republicans were forced to take a back seat. Poland's nearest non-Russian neighbors, however, Prussia and Austria, had no sympathy for an independent Poland (as both had taken part in the Polish partition), and Nicholas of Russia had none of Alexander's sympathy for Polish nationalism. The revolt was crushed, and Poland became part of the Russian empire, complete with Russian administrators and garrisons. It was alleged, however, that the Polish revolt had prevented a Russian intervention in France and Belgium, so that even this abortive revolt can be said to have aided the republican cause in Europe.

The German states of Brunswick, Saxony and Hanover won limited constitutions. In Italy, however, when Parma and Medina overthrew their kings, and radical republicans seized Rome and declared an Italian Republic, Austria, firmly under the control of the reactionary system of Metternich, descended like an avalanche, restored "legitimate" monarchs to their thrones, and killed, imprisoned or exiled republican leaders.

In Portugal and Spain, too, "republicanism" (liberal constitutionalism) was pitted against the conservative aristocracy. In 1834 France and England formed the so-called Quadruple Alliance with the liberal governments of Spain and Portugal, and the "cleavage between liberal and

conservative forces in Europe manifested itself with unusual sharpness.[*] Compared to Austria, Russia and Prussia, republican ideology had already gained the upper hand in Western Europe, where the aristocrats could no longer muster the strength to reverse a policy certainly not designed to perpetuate their way of life.

a. 1848--Workers and Radicals

The revolutionary spirit which swept Europe in 1848 again emanated from Paris and again was "republican." Supposedly, in the forties a "fairly large proportion of the population" of Western Europe "had become saturated with liberal, democratic and indeed socialist ideas." As in Paris, "in other capitals, there were in February 1848 multitudes whose respect for the powers that be and faith in the justice and durability of the social order had been greatly undermined."[**] The Republic "was proclaimed from the balcony" in Paris on February 25, 1848, by a minority made up of the most radical revolutionaries, but power quickly shifted to the majority who opposed the radicals on the ground that this "was a matter for the whole people to decide, and that it would be an act of usurpation to present the sovereign people with a fait accompli."[***] Universal suffrage was proclaimed. But the poet Lamartine, virtual leader of the provisional government, was then stampeded into supporting the "right to work" clause of the radicals and, later, the public workshop program. The Communist Manifesto had appeared only a month earlier, and its appeal to the workers of the world to unite, having nothing to lose but their chains, was adopted almost verbatim as the slogan of the 1847 congress of the League of the Just, which changed its name at that meeting to the Communist League.

The French, however, made it clear in the elections that as a whole they rejected the extremists. This was no news to the radical Jacobins and socialists, who had been against free elections from the outset and declared that only "the revolutionary vanguard--the executor of the Will of Time armed with unlimited rights and powers," could enunciate and execute the "deep-seated will of the people."[****] A revolutionary dictatorship was their only way to power, and it could only be brought about by an emergency such as a war. In May a mass rally, called to demand that the government declare war on the Tsar and free Poland, resulted in the declaration of a revolutionary government and the "dissolution" of the Chamber. But the police arrested the ringleaders, and in a few hours the uprising was over.[+]

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[*]René Albrecht-Carrié, Europe Since 1815 (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1962), p. 59.

[**]Talmon, op. cit., p. 168.

[***]Ibid., p. 171.

[****]Ibid., p. 172.

[+]Ibid., pp. 172-173.

In June another attempt at counterrevolution by worker radicals in the government workshops, who rose in revolt when the shops were closed, also failed, but this time there was much more bloodshed. France did not back the Parisian radicals; the panic of the forces of order resulted in a violent reaction to the uprising.*

Nevertheless, Paris had rumbled, and all of Western Europe once more shook. But in Central Europe, liberal revolutionary activity was again strongly identified with nationalism. The Hapsburg Empire was a conglomeration of races, each of whom wanted to form an independent nation. In the German area, on the other hand, was a collection of small, independent states which wanted to be united. Italy was in a similar situation. Conservative Austrian dominance in both cases was again the stumbling block.

In Italy, Austria and Germany, intellectuals and the relatively unorganized people in the cities raised the flag of revolution. They succeeded in rising simultaneously in so many places that petty kings and princes and their aristocratic entourages were frightened into granting, or at least promising, constitutions, in most of the small German and Italian states. Further east in Europe, however, the Hapsburgs actually stole the liberal movement from the revolutionaries by granting rights to the peasants, who then felt more loyal to the crown than to the alien city radicals. In these areas, therefore, nationalism--Serbian, Magyar, Bohemian, Polish--was the dominant factor in the disturbances.

The attempt at German "unification from the bottom" at the Frankfurt Convention of 1848 failed when the delegates could not immediately solve all the problems involved in creating a purely ethnic constitutional monarchy in Europe. Furthermore, the moderates, including intellectuals, feared the violence of the radicals, who devoted less thought to solving problems and more to achieving power by destroying the system. The workers were not organized; an attempt at an "all-German" trades union failed to materialize, though there was a General Congress of Workers.

Karl Marx's Neue Rheinische Zeitung was "the only effective mouthpiece of social revolution"; it inspired an assembly of 234 delegates from 66 towns which demanded "a united German Republic, based on universal suffrage and radical social policies, and holding out a fraternal hand to all peoples." But the bloody June "workshop revolt" in Paris and conditions within Germany brought a "dread of Red anarchy" and melted away support of those opposed to the forces of law and order.**

In the decades following the spectacular events of 1830 and 1848 (which marked the abrupt descent, as the periods immediately after them marked the temporary ascendancy, of the power of the aristocracy), a technical and economic phenomenon occurred which changed demographic and cultural patterns in Europe. The Industrial Revolution began in England,

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*Albrecht-Carrié, op. cit., pp. 71, 72.

**Talmon, op. cit., p. 181.

propelled at an ever accelerated rate with the rapid evolution of the steam engine after 1763. Peasants who not too long before had been completely under the control of the aristocrats moved to the cities to man the mills, only to be exploited to a degree often no longer possible on the land by a new urban "aristocrat," the industrialist.

In this case, however, several differences existed which tended to differentiate the new "aristocrat-urban peasant confrontation" from the old social conflict. The numbers of people who resided in the relatively densely populated industrial cities rose so sharply, particularly in England, that simultaneously with the rise of power of the industrialists a new political force was created--the workers. Furthermore, it was possible, though not easy, for the commonborn, exploited "urban peasant" (or his son or grandson) to become one of the new aristocracy, since the primary measure of the new industrial "aristocrat" was the weight of his purse, not the length of his pedigree.* And the position of the industrial "aristocrat" was to a great degree dependent upon his skill. Business failures were commonplace, and just as the peasant's safety in the early feudal system was directly dependent upon the local aristocrat's skill in battle, the factory hand depended on the skill of his boss for work. This interdependence, together with the group identity and cohesiveness of the exploited and their ability, however remote, to change one's status, made this confrontation different from the old republican-aristocrat clash. As in the Reformation, both sides felt themselves part of the same system (Christendom in the one case, capitalism in the other), and both felt they could achieve their goals within the system without sacrificing vital principles. There was no question of heresy, only the old social schism between the "haves" and "have-nots"--but this time the have-nots had some power. Furthermore, the potential power of the relatively closely knit urban workers was greater than that of the scattered peasants under the old system.

By 1848, the effects of the Industrial Revolution on demographic patterns were most strongly felt in Britain and France,** particularly the former. East of the Rhine the effects were as yet barely noticeable,*** though coal and iron production in Germany (including Prussia, which had owned the Ruhr area since 1815) had risen sharply.**** Continental towns

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*"Ability as well as birth was now more generally a means of advancement, and never in history were so many humble men raised from poverty to riches and power." (The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. IV, "War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval 1793-1830," ed. C.W. Crawley [Cambridge: At the University Press, 1965], p. 58.)

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% Population Living in Towns	England	France
1815 (in towns above 5,000)	28%	14%
1848 (in towns above 10,000)	57%	21%

(Source: Talmon, op. cit., p. 198.)

***Rural Population in Prussia: 1816, 73.5%; 1846, 72.0%; 1852, 71.5%. (Ibid., p. 198.)

****Ibid., p. 199.

had not changed: they were by and large still market, mercantile and administrative centers, where "industry" and trade guilds still existed, both of which had a heavy salting of entrepreneurs. The articulate, "organized" groups in the cities were either aristocrats, guild members or "intellectuals," the latter group made up largely of writers, students and professors who often had little if anything in common with either of the other "organized" groups. Some radical intellectuals felt they had much in common with the unorganized mobs of "common people" in these old-fashioned cities and made common cause with them on several occasions. But the cities were alien places to the vast majority of the "common men" on the continent. Furthermore, the ideas attendant upon some of the more radical intellectual theories (e.g., atheism as compared with the more common anti-clericalism) found practically no support among the peasants and little in the continental urban "proletariat."*

For most cities, the 1848 revolution was one of the last great "international" upheavals which saw the intellectuals as the only significant "organized" liberal movement.

The position of the urban peasants was gradually improving, though the gap between the rich and poor had not perceptibly closed. Real wages in England and France in 1830 were 60 per cent higher than in 1780.** The worker's family by the second half of the nineteenth century had reached the necessary point for the class to "take off." Education became available and then mandatory for the lower grades.

Thereafter, the stark choice between entire ideologies, each of which entertained some bit of good for the worker and his family, but also required needless sacrifice of much that was near and dear to him, now appeared less necessary. The industrial workers, with their common interests (and later formal "brotherhoods"), were destined to become another organized liberal force in the new industrial cities.*** The mobs of "common men" in the cities would no longer be readily available to radical "intellectuals"; the workers would create their own goals and simpler, more direct programs to reach them. For reasons of self-interest, these goals normally at least tended toward "fiscal responsibility," and there was, therefore, an ever-present trace of appreciation of the value of stability and conservation of the best of the "old order" in them. For example, it was the "revolutionary content of Chartism which had the effect of alienating from it the trade unions..." of Britain in the 1840's.****

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*At the turn of the century Napoleon's Concordat with Rome, which at least partially healed the split initiated by the radical republicans earlier, was one of his most popular moves.

**The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. IX, p. 59.

***"Outside of Britain and France before 1850 there was scant development in the labor movement...." (Albrecht-Carrié, op. cit., p. 29.)

****Ibid., p. 28.

The strike shut down the plants; it did not destroy them. Even where the strike was not an adequate weapon, the most extreme practice ever to become even somewhat commonplace was minor sabotage.* By and large, the workers realized that they were part of the system from the very beginning of the Industrial Revolution.

Despite strenuous efforts by radical elements to seize control of this organized segment of "common men," it was (and is) surprisingly resistant; the Workingman's International "foundered in the 1870's over the issue of anarchism--the state should be wholly destroyed....Socialist votes were drawn in large measure from the membership of labor unions but syndicalism laid greater stress on the direct action in which the latter could indulge and of which the strike was the most concrete and potentially effective manifestation."** With the more practical, short-term solution of their problems now within their power, the workers had little need to support utopian theories, which promised eventually to raise their standard of living if they would jettison everything else, including their liberty and their religion. The "pure form" of socialism, as expounded by the German Socialists at Amsterdam in 1904 (calling for an "international, anti-militaristic and anti-imperialistic" social movement), was challenged, not only by the French Socialists at the conference, but apparently by numbers of German workingmen at home. Despite the German division of industry into huge complexes, which made union (and thus also, supposedly political) organization easier, the German Socialist party was "surprisingly ineffectual in the test, considering its great strength."***

b. 1968--A Familiar Radicalism?

The late nineteenth and twentieth century workingman (in so far as unions reflect his feelings) is a new phenomenon in the amalgam of revolution and ideological conflict. In an industrial society he is truly the "common man," but he is generally in favor of maintaining the entrepreneurial and the industrial system or, where he feels he can control it, some form of socialist system under a constitutional (republican) government. In his desire for reform with stability and continuity of the general system, the worker is somewhat like the bourgeoisie of old. In a crisis, to a large degree, therefore, he has many interests in common

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*The very action from which the word comes, tossing a wooden shoe ("sabot") into a machine, was a comparatively minor form of disabling equipment adopted by mill workers on the Continent. They could have used a wrench, a spare piston arm, a brake shoe, etc., or even set the plants on fire. Miners could have set coal mines afire and no power on earth could have extinguished them. Railroad workers could have wreaked havoc, and in some instances, such as the destruction by fire of the Pittsburgh terminal, they did.

**Albrecht-Carrié, op. cit., p. 157.

***Ibid., pp. 156-157.

with the industrialist. The mobs in the streets of the new cities were (and to a large degree still are) mostly industrial workers, and their mood is generally not to destroy the industrial system, particularly if there is a semblance of constitutional government to go along with it.* In the privacy of the polling booth, many of the French workers saw eye to eye with the bourgeoisie in June of 1968 and aided in bringing a crushing defeat to the Leftists as a result of recent Leftist extremism in France.

In some respects it can be argued that organized craftsmen are perhaps more stable (or at least more resistant to radical domination) than other organized groups in the cities, where revolutions are bred and ideological conflicts enacted. Many intellectuals and even the bourgeoisie were more likely to be attracted to Communist or Nazi ideology than were labor leaders (if not laborers). Because their power is so sensitive to their ability to maintain their union apparatus, labor leaders are very conscious of the value of liberty as well as equality--a point sometimes missed by the much less formally "organized" intellectuals. Both Communists and Nazis had to take over the unions with guns and bayonets. The strange but nevertheless obvious fact is that the Industrial Revolution, with its concentrated and organized craftsmen, made things harder for the ideologues. The masses of newly urbanized peasants stimulated Karl Marx and others to dream of the conversion of hordes of people to utopian schemes, but they were much less likely to succeed when such "solution-oriented" masses had obvious common goals and surer and more practical means to meet them. The "masses" were not unintelligent and far from talentless or gullible on these matters, a point the "vanguard of the revolution" often fails to recognize and so continues a patronizing attitude toward workers around the world (and recently toward Negroes).** At the height of the depression of the 1930's, each membership drive by the Communist Party in the United States scooped up more "intellectuals," though the instructions from Moscow were to capture the "base of production." Similarly, when the unions found the Reds attempting to take over,

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*It might be interesting from this point of view that Paris remains an "unstable" city, dominating France, which has the least percentage of people in industry of the great nations of Europe, and which tends to favor relatively small, dispersed industrial towns compared to the huge British and German complexes. Nevertheless, the worst thing that happened to the French student rioters in the "May Revolution of 1968" was their "reinforcement" by the general strike of the labor unions. Extremism was now much less likely. With their own organizational and bargaining direction, the workers refused to follow (and in fact had little in common with) the guilt-ridden student sons of the bourgeoisie and told them so in no uncertain terms. (Sanche de Gramont, "The French Worker Wants to Join the Affluent Society, Not Wreck It," The New York Times Magazine, June 16, 1968, p. 62.)

**Giving a satisfactory answer to the question "What are you getting out of this?" is no easy job for the outsider preaching radicalism to practical-minded workers on subjects they understand.

free elections "threw the rascals out," substantiating again the intellectual revolutionary vanguard's position that free elections for the "ignorant masses" is bad for the revolution. The political aspirations of the radicals (which they feel are essential to economic reforms) must normally be jammed down the workers' throats.

In recent years, however, events in the United States have gravely affected the worker-entrepreneur pattern. First, cities have begun to change from centers of industry to centers of service and welfare. Second, there are now seven million students in the United States, and several hundred thousand other "intellectuals" serving the students, making this group equivalent to over 10 per cent of workers in all industries. In service industries, craft or even industry-wide, unions are not likely to include large numbers of people. Therefore, just as before the Industrial Revolution, people are living together in neighborhoods without all being weavers, all machinists, etc. All they have in common is geographic location, and oftentimes race--and recently this has not been enough to foster the development of a sense of direction for economic and social advancement within the American value system. And the huge number of "intellectuals" (and if they make the right noises, thirteen-year-olds are included in this group by the group itself and by the communications media) have so much spare time that they become a more significant factor in social and political processes.*

It seems, therefore, that two traditional factors may again be operative: the susceptibility to utopian ideas of an increasing portion of the population may be creating a condition which has some resemblance to the pre-industrial Revolutionary city (at least in the West); and this is happening again during a world-wide ideological conflict. Naturally, this phenomenon can best be observed in larger cities, where the service, educational and welfare "industries" comprise a significant number of people. As in the pre-Industrial Revolutionary cities, masses of people again occasionally seek to escape from their misery (or guilt) in naive schemes preached by naive or devious people.

The very volume and variety of protest, as well as the speed with which ideas are discarded for "new," more radical versions of the Leftist ideology, leads one to question the judgment of the proponents. As Midge Decter points out, the spectrum of adherents of the New Left in the United States is very broad: one must only be anti-American to belong to the movement.** She might have added: "and identify oneself as a Leftist" (self-proclaimed Fascists are not welcome, though unknown even to themselves, many New Leftists are very close to Fascism). The key element,

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*One such thirteen-year-old turned up at a McCarthy campaign headquarters and allowed as how it was too bad he was too young to take on the role of a vote solicitor. One of the adults running the headquarters asked, "Do you believe in what McCarthy stands for?"..."Yes!"..."Then come on in; you're old enough to work here."

**Midge Decter, "Anti-Americanism in America," Harper's, Vol. 236, No. 1415, April 1968, pp. 39-48.

however, is a destructive kind of anti-governmentism, with little analysis and few practical proposals, as well as distinct admiration of Leftist revolution and revolutionaries. In other words, the New Left (particularly when its activists manifest their emotions in Western cities) has an aura of anarchic violence, based on an ideology that denies the democratic due process as a means to redress grievances. A Parisian of 1848 brought to a disordered American city in 1968 would instantly recognize the ideology the mob leaders were preaching--and its danger. There is little being said that wasn't said then.* But today the danger could be greater, for vast areas of the world are in fact governed by the "vanguard of the revolution," and these areas can and often do act as ideological, economic and even military bases for the new revolutionaries. And varied as they are, these forces can be identified as an ideological group. They are Leftists of a rather extreme variety--if one considers the traditional Liberals as being on the Left. (Labor unions, for example, are now considered Rightist by members of the New Left.)

*Compare the basic political philosophy of Marcuse (that aged hero of today's "angry young men" of the New Left) th those of the Jacobins of Paris in 1848.

CHAPTER V. A POSSIBLE NEW DOMESTIC MILIEU FOR THE MILITARY PLANNER

A. Introduction (by Herman Kahn)

It seems increasingly likely that we are entering a new era of civil-military relationships in the U.S.--or perhaps simply returning to something like the interwar period. One can argue that since 1945 the American military establishment has been treated very well by most sectors of U.S. society and government--despite the traditional suspicion of the American public towards "stars and gold braid" and such occasional unfriendly or warning references to the influence of the "military-industrial complex" as that of President Eisenhower. By and large, requests for military funds, manpower, treaties, and special military needs of all sorts have been taken seriously and been sympathetically responded to by the Executive Office, the Congress, American society, and our Allies. With some important exceptions from 1945 to 1968 the U.S. armed services have been largely free from major criticism or attack from responsible individuals or groups--either in this country or in Allied nations.

Probably the first serious inklings of an impending change, at least in domestic attitudes, came in the civil defense debate of the early sixties. The critics of the military had chosen a vulnerable target. Civil defense was without question the "weak sister" of the Defense Department. Particularly in the thermonuclear era it seemed, on the one hand, a matter of feeble and even grotesque measures--wasting money and effort--and, on the other hand, civil defense seemed to many to be "provocative." It could simultaneously be attacked on grounds both of ineffectiveness and too great an effectiveness. The latter criticism also included the charge that even a thin facade of protection might encourage the (presumably very stupid) government to take great risks--or even worse, would allow an irresponsible government to take risks because civil defense made it possible misleadingly to reassure the public. The campaign against civil defense was largely successful--at least among influential liberal constituencies--despite the fact that every serious study at that time (and subsequently) indicated that, if war occurred, simple civil defense precautions were probably the "best buy" from the viewpoint of limiting damage. At the same time, civil defense of the sort being considered was hardly likely to be so effective as either to scare the Russians or reassure the Americans--or at least not excessively. Rather than being ineffective and/or too effective, it was neither.

The debate over the anti-ballistic missile system assumed a similar shape, only now the opposition is significantly stronger. This is not due wholly to the merits or demerits of technical, strategic, and political arguments over defense and offense, nor is it mainly a result of the reaction to the Vietnamese war--important and as central as that war has been in focusing the anti-militarism, in accelerating its development, increasing its intensity and in the timing of the "crisis." Indeed, one can argue--or better, conjecture--that a number of trends have come together and reinforced one another so as to create a wave of anti-military

feeling in U.S. society, and that these trends are likely to intensify in the next few years--perhaps so as to dominate or at least strongly influence all aspects of military activities in the 1975-1985 decade. If this is true, the Department of Defense and the military services may be in for serious and difficult times. And it may become very important for those members of the public and the government who are concerned with national security to go out of their way to defend (not, of course, by simple and/or naive apologies, but to explain fairly and persuasively) certain Department of Defense policies, programs, and concepts. The Department itself will probably have to reform its methods of presenting positions and policies to the American and world publics, and even more important, to learn to adapt its procurement policies, postures, operations, tactics, weapons, doctrine, to the requirements of fighting wars in the service of a country (and almost an age) which is no longer either patriotically religious or patriotically heroic. The age not only is increasingly secular and humanist, but cosmopolitan and antimilitaristic--or at least anti-establishment military. It is skeptical of the military services' claims to prestige, honor, fame and respect in both peace and war. (It would sometimes appear that many Americans are increasingly prepared to believe our military establishment capable of almost any idiocy, incompetency, or even cruelty. Observing this, one can argue that the Greeks have already explained the phenomenon in their famous aphorism, "Whom the Gods would destroy, they first make mad." Some of us would argue that there is a relevant insight in this observation: there is a quality of distinct self-destructive irrationality in much of the current controversy over military problems.)

Cutting of U.S. Apron Strings

Moreover, it is reasonably clear that the particular kind of international "hegemony" the U.S. established after World War II was most unstable, almost certain either to be drawn tighter against growing resistance or to grow weaker. Once the cold war eroded, and once there had been a recovery of morale among the allied nations as well as economic and political recovery, increasing independence among U.S. "protectorates" was inevitable. As various countries develop more assertive policies, one important technique for expressing individuality and independence is by rejecting a posture of passive acceptance of U.S. influence and prestige--and U.S. claims to prestige and influence. The position in which much of the world found itself from roughly 1945 to 1965, when American protection was needed and American influence, American theories, American ways and techniques, were accepted as pre-eminent, was a most unnatural condition. Increasingly, all of these have become subject to questioning, review, and at least conditional rejection. It is, of course, very easy to overshoot in such a process. Americans in particular should be familiar with the concept of cutting of apron strings. (As far as being part of the normal growing up process, the necessity for a teenager to feel a certain degree of contempt for his parents is a relatively American thing, but some kind of negative attitude--even active hostility--is common to many cultures.) We may in fact understand such attitudes as in some ways a healthy reaction. But of course if the "apron-string-cutting reaction" overshoots

or is combined with other trends that force overshooting, then the reaction may be less healthy and much less transitory. This reaction also has repercussions on the American domestic scene because the seeming "ingratitude" of these foreign nations increases tendencies towards disillusionment, frustration, anger, annoyance, and of course neo-isolationism.

Effects of Mass Media

One set of issues related to mass media revolves around the tendency of the news media to be staffed by people with a liberal political persuasion. Often their reporting of the news simply mirrors their biases, often unintentionally. Another set of issues results from the fact that we live in an essentially humanist culture today. Consider, for example, the war in Vietnam. In an ideological age, the media would have emphasized the anti-communist aspects of the war. Today the respectable position tends to be anti-ideological and anti-anti-communist. This is also true, of course, of much academic discussion.

In a heroic age, some of what we referred to earlier as the "positive values of war"--the heroism, altruism, courage, dedication evoked by the war--would have been emphasized, as was true in other wars in this century, and, of course, as is true among the NVN/NLF. In America today this would often be considered indecent or immoral. Reporting tends to focus on the secular human side of the war--the picture of the dead mother, the starving child, the tired Marine, the broken bodies. These are certainly among the human aspects of war, but they also are those which cause horror and aversion. If this is amplified by poor military policy, an emphasis on such things as "body count" (as immoral, obscene, and useless a criteria as has ever been generated), one can hardly be surprised at the general attitude that soon develops.

Finally, one should comment on some of the technical aspects of the media: (1) the instantaneous reporting which often beats the official channels, so that government officials are at a loss to explain what happened, and often distort or misrepresent more in confusion than in any serious attempt to mislead; (2) the documentary, "here and now," quality of TV reporting, which again emphasizes the horror, suffering, and abnormality of war--when "business is as usual" in the country; (3) the search by the media for the sensational. For example, Jesse Gray, of the rent strike in Harlem, had a quite small following, but his spectacular language made very good copy and his face became a national symbol. Stokely Carmichael is a West Indian, an honor graduate of Bronx Science (probably the top high school in America), with relatively little contact with lower-class Negroes. He has, however, an ability to "turn on" middle class white and middle-class Negro audiences. For a period of time he was the most popular speaker at middle-class colleges, black and white, around the country. Yet during almost all of this period he had relatively little following among the Negro masses he claimed to represent--the angry masses at the bottom of the pile with whom he did not communicate nor could receive

communication (as opposed, for example, to Elijah Mohammed, who without any publicity from the white press was able to gather about 100,000 Negro recruits and make an enormous imprint on their lives).

Decline in Prestige of U.S. Armed Forces and U.S. Governing Establishment

This phenomenon is, of course, in part a specific reaction to Vietnam, as well as to other incidents such as the U-2, revelations of CIA manipulation of domestic organizations, etc. Let us start, however, with the issue of credibility. One of the great advantages the U.S. traditionally enjoyed in world affairs was that, by and large, when the U.S. said something, people believed it. This reputation has all but vanished. Many things have, of course, contributed to this, but we can only agree that most of the reaction was legitimate--a perfectly proper, and predictable, reaction to a series of what can only be thought of as misleading statements or outright lies.

The war in Vietnam, of course, has seemed to many to be conducted in a stupid and incompetent, not to say an immoral manner.* Even those who do not share those feelings do suspect that with 650,000 men in the theatre as a whole, and $30 billion a year available, the armed forces ought to have done better than they have done. The explanations, when they do not involve invidious comment on the armed forces, generally involve invidious comments on the good sense of those who got the armed forces into this morass.

In addition we may note the Pueblo incident. An "explanation" of this humiliating incident can be made on several distinct levels. From the point of view of current intelligence, evidence had been accumulating for a period of a year or so that clearly signaled a growing assertiveness, not to say aggressiveness, of the North Koreans. This new militancy was not only directed against the South Koreans and the United States. With a show of great confidence, the North Koreans had rid themselves of direct Chinese tutelage, resisted Soviet blandishments and pressure to throw their lot with the Soviet-dominated faction of world communism and had inaugurated an insistent propaganda campaign of threatened actions in support of North Vietnam and "world-wide Vietnams." Thus it was fairly clear that the North Koreans were working themselves up for some demonstrative act which would by far exceed the mere verbal militancy of the Chinese and represent their "earnest money" for joint actions against "world imperialism." In this sense then the Pueblo was a tempting "sitting duck." It can be argued that had the Pueblo been adequately

*It should be noted that not all of this criticism is from the "left." Among the relatively friendly and professional criticisms of U.S. operations in South Vietnam are Lessons from the Vietnam War, Report of a Seminar Held at the Royal United Service Institution on Wednesday, 12 February 1969 (London: Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall); and Armbruster, et al., Can We Win in Vietnam? (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968).

armed and manned the Koreans would have hesitated before engaging her in a fire fight on the open seas where the possibility of the Pueblo's holding out until help arrived could not be discounted. In the final analysis, however, it seems reasonable to say that this incident could not have occurred a decade or more ago. Naval traditions of "not giving up the ship" and "fighting until she sinks" would somehow have been too strong to have been overridden by other considerations. Moreover, the North Koreans would hardly have tried it--they too would have assumed that the Americans would have lived up to their traditions of fighting the ship and refusing to surrender. Theirs was the superior intelligence reading.

General Reaction Against "Vietnam" and a Series of Other Incidents and Revelations

Let us go back to my remarks in the preceding chapter about the reactions to World War I. There followed some two decades of cynicism, of anti-militarist propaganda and feeling. A recognition of the almost total futility of World War I was widespread, but without any attempt to "explain it." Then came Hitler. It was difficult to maintain in the face of Hitler that military preparations were nonsense. It was difficult not to feel pleased when one had good soldiers, competent generals, brave enlisted men. One could not easily say that it made no difference whether Hitler won or lost. It seemed worthwhile, suddenly, to risk much, including hundreds of thousands of lives, to prevent the conquest of a major portion of the world by the Nazis.

It was now important to have young men who made good soldiers and not poor ones. It was important to win and not to lose. It was important to have respect for those who gained the necessary skills and attitudes to lead their forces to victory; for those who were willing to sacrifice; for those who had the dedication and courage to risk everything for the nation's cause. (The confusion that resulted among some intellectuals and in liberal ranks was indicated by a book by Margaret Mead, And Keep Your Powder Dry. In this book Miss Mead predicted a victory by the Allies against the Axis powers, and she made her prediction on the courageous argument that the lessons that she and her colleagues had intended to sow in the American people had failed. The people simply had not accepted the points of view they had expressed in the interwar period.)

The same problem occurred during Korea, if to a lesser extent. Once again it was difficult to argue that it made no difference. It was difficult in the face of the record of appeasement before World War II to say we should not oppose aggression in Korea. It was difficult particularly because of the accident of the U.N. endorsement.

And it is no accident that there is little or no revisionist theory of the origins of World War II or the Korean War. The issues were simply too plain, too easily justified, for them easily to be challenged by historians. There has therefore been little subsequent disillusionment, cynicism, or other hostile reaction against the values for which these two wars were fought.

Vietnam, however, is a different matter. This is a war which it was very easy to oppose--particularly as the issues were formulated and exposited by the government. It became hardly possible for any reasonable individual in the give and take of public debate to support the government's position. The opposition consensus even spread to college and high school commencement speakers who, at least on the East and West coasts, took as their chief themes the "immorality" of their government's policy.

Value Ferment

One result of the Vietnamese war was that many who had been formed in the values of the interwar period, and for the decade between 1940 and 1950 found their original attitudes and beliefs seemingly wrong or irrelevant, now suddenly discovered themselves in the comfortable position of having "always" been right. The civil rights controversy, the persistence of poverty in the face of general affluence, and finally a seemingly unjust war, reawakened all of the original beliefs--their distrust, skepticism, suspicion and hostility towards "Establishment" actions and values.

But to what other values could they turn? Where else could they find a haven for their beliefs? This, of course, presented a difficulty. The young solved it in the simplest fashion of all: they said, "We reject the current system; but one makes revolution by making revolution. It is not up to us to prove, justify, or even indicate that a new system will be better. We simply assert that it clearly has to be."

This is not to say that there was no interaction between the obvious confusion and crisis surrounding the values of the adult world and what many believe to be "revolutionary excesses" of youthful protestors. This is particularly true when the external conditions set by adults can best be described as "receding rubber walls"; the youths in revolt are given little or no guidance as to what is legitimate and what is illegitimate, what is forgivable and what is not forgivable; what will be eventually condoned with possibly a minor reprimand, or which may, in fact, mean a jail sentence. When one adds to this a belief that any inequity in modern society is not only intolerable but a sign of the basic injustice of the social order--that such things as persistent poverty, environmental pollution, urban difficulties, etc.--all are signs of the incompetence, immorality, or callousness of the establishment or government bureaucracy, a situation is created in which alienation not only is inevitable, but, given the assumptions, quite justified.

Many youthful protestors object to the legitimacy of the government. This may derive from a general anarchist position, or amount to objection to a specific government policy, administration, or program--or lack of a program. In both cases, when the government itself or its policies are regarded as illegitimate, then the use of force by such a government is insupportable. Such an attitude often arises out of what seems, at least to the older generation, an unrealistic perfectionism. In an extreme version, this argument holds that the U.S. has no right to intervene, say,

in Africa so long as there are racial problems in the United States; no right to defend democracy abroad so long as there are voting scandals in Chicago or Boston; and so on. Thus if any "avoidable evil" or inequity exists in the system, or results even from inaction on the part of the government (much less from positive government policy), the system is illegitimate and not to be supported: indeed, there may be a moral obligation to oppose it.

Rising Expectations and Guilt Complexes

Some of the issues under this rubric are better deferred until we talk about the effects of affluence, excessive permissiveness and low frustration index. It suffices to note here that if children are raised to expect quick satisfactions of all of their demands, if they are given an unrealistic picture of life and encouraged to think that a good life requires all of the amenities they are accustomed to, they may acquire an almost paranoiac intolerance of what they call "hypocrisy"--which is to say any detectable distinction between rhetoric and reality, between declaratory advice and actual behavior, between preaching and action. They also acquire a hostility to any use of force, even if it is used prudently or in the face of counter-force or threats.

One aspect of this problem is the so-called upper-middle-class "guilt complex." One common syndrome is as follows: today's middle-class parents when young may have been very liberal or even politically radical. While their opinions changed, to some degree, as they grew older, they did not change very much. At the same time these people did very well materially. Because they did not change their opinions they cannot help feeling that they must have "sold out." This feeling of having sold out is not only transmitted to their children, but the children make the same judgment of their elders. They are not dropping the values of their parents; they are agreeing with them, and arguing that their parents are hypocritical or weak because they are not living up to their real values.

The Generation Gap

This gap in understanding and/or in communication, or simply in values, can be simply a matter of difference in age or status between the old and the young; or it can be due to the fact that conditions change markedly between youth and age. One rather conjectures that the last of these factors is by far the most important today; more important than in previous "generation gaps"--possibly even including the great generation gap which separated immigrants from their American-born children.

Some of the really important differences have already been touched upon. One is the concept of "free" security and income: as far as many of the younger generation are concerned it simply does not take much to earn a living or to enjoy physical safety and political liberty. The tree of liberty is no longer fed by the blood of martyrs. Again, many young rebels, and even many relatively "square" young people, were raised

In affluent, protected, permissive, gratification-oriented households. In their childhoods they were rather passive, being overly regulated by adults and often overstimulated. One can argue rather persuasively that it is difficult to duplicate in later life the kinds of feelings that a three- or four-year-old has in watching TV. He will never again get quite that dramatic intensity of experience, at least not from everyday affairs.

There is the question of almost immediate satisfaction of desires--often occurring before the desires themselves are fully matured. One observation almost universally valid among this college generation is that they have a very low frustration index. When they want something, they want it "now." And why not? They rarely, if ever, had to wait for any reasonable demand when they were young. This, of course, combines with the erosion of the "Puritan ethic" in causing an increasingly widespread attitude that work is obsolete. The older generation is prone to talk about the depression and other issues totally foreign to the experience of the younger group. The younger people, with no serious experience of poverty, therefore find it inconceivable that a man can lead a self-respecting and decent life at, say, 20% of their parents' income. The writer has been continually startled in discussions with university students at their complete inability to comprehend that a lower-middle-class American, earning between $5,000-$10,000 a year, not only has self-respect and independence but often a sense of satisfaction at his relative financial success in life. He does not feel poor; he feels rather well off even though he is financially pressed. He is likely to be financially pressed because he owns a nice home and has children in college--accomplishments far beyond the possibilities of his own parents. To the extent that the above is a fair description of some of the younger generation, and of tendencies and trends among others, it seems clear that military service--particularly in time of peace or in an "unjust war"--is going to be regarded as onerous, if not as an outrageous violation of individuality and humanity.

B. The Future Domestic Milieu: Three Contrasting Views

1 The "Responsible Center" and the "Humanist Left" (by Herman Kahn)

Let us continue the discussion in the last section by considering some potential domestic factors for many nations, but especially the U.S., in a larger context and in the world of 1975-1985.* I will assume for the developed nations, and much of the underdeveloped world, at least relatively, a feeling of "free" national security, widespread and easy access

*In Part I we also presented some alternative U.S. futures which take account of the possibilities described in this chapter, and some other possibilities as well.

to the world's markets and salable resources of the world, and the other conditions we will associate with the "surprise-free world" discussed in Part II. This does not, of course, imply an idyllic international or domestic situation. I would assume then that many current trends in the domestic attitudes and values of the developed Western nations will persist or even be amplified. In particular, and perhaps paradoxically, some of the divisive domestic trends we currently associate with civil rights and opposition to the Vietnam war may continue or even increase. In any case I will assume that many nations, but the United States in particular, will move increasingly towards what we may call a "mosaic society," with a great deal of largely voluntary pluralism and diversity, hopefully a creative diversity. (Within any "piece" of the mosaic there may, of course, be great conformity.) This diversity will show itself in styles of dress, talk, ways of life, in attitudes toward work, toward leisure, the government, the "Establishment," etc. Yet despite the fact that society will be very permissive of dissent and diversity, or perhaps in part because of it, alienation, cynicism, and even nihilism seem likely to increase, especially among the young, and no doubt there will be increasing concern about these tendencies among the majority of older adults. The attitude of hostility towards many of the established values and practices of many societies, evident among many intellectuals today and which, in America, most people take to be a result of the Vietnamese war, may actually prove to be one of the main continuing trends of the last third of the century. As society and culture become increasingly sensate and cosmopolitan, the nation-state as the nexus of the loyalties, values and aspirations of the society will seem less and less satisfactory, particularly to intellectuals. The national solidarity of the 1940's and 1950's will increasingly seem due to excep' onal international circumstances--the existence of Hitler and Stalin, the cold war and the aggressiveness of the totalitarian states, all of this forcing a defensive reliance on the nation-state as the instrument of international society's resistance. I will assume, as discussed earlier in this report, that (in this world projection, at least) there are likely to be few international or domestic pressures (except for backlash movements) binding the average intellectual to his government. Thus, criticisms of government will persist, and we can assume continued (if not steadily rising) levels of protest and dissent which, in the particular "surprise-free" projection I presuppose, will remain quite tolerable. The attitude of many will seem to be that virtually any defects in the society justify a withdrawal of the individual's loyalty. And, of course, no matter what is done, such defects will exist. While alienation and revolt against "computer civilization" will be important, in this projection it will be accepted simply as part of the national scene. While a substantial number of Americans will continue to "opt out," such "opting out" will no longer be recognized as a novelty or an act worthy of much public concern--so long as nothing happens drastically to accelerate it. (As I will note below, and later in Part IV, I think it particularly important that the requirements of military service do not accelerate these trends.) Yet I would assume that among many Americans, especially the older generations, there will be a rather general feeling of anxiety, of pessimism and even gloom. Even though the nation's leaders express confidence in continued peace

and progress, theories of decay and of "decline and fall" will become popular in both serious and popular literature. National self-hatred in the United States will not approach the levels that are, say, current in England today, but we, and perhaps others, will have taken large steps in that direction.

In such a fairly peaceful world, military establishments are likely to be dominated by considerations of domestic policy and domestic political reactions, not only in whether (and how) they fight in limited foreign wars, but also in their recruitment, training, and operating procedures, and in the location and operation of many military installations. Indeed, even businesses which conspicuously deal with the military establishment may have their policies and operations sharply affected. Thus in the same way that domestic issues were a primary, perhaps the primary, issue in Vietnam, tending to dominate many aspects of the war, and in the same way that domestic issues promise to affect current BMD programs, so future domestic issues may dominate or heavily influence the operation of most or all of the U.S. defense establishment.* In particular, given a general absence of perceived threats and a generally negative attitude on the part of much of the population toward defense preparations, it would seem that such programs as the draft in its present form would not be acceptable. An entirely volunteer service may be established as a preferred system for obtaining military manpower. Or a National Service program may be substituted in which easy deferments or exceptions (these may be formulated as special forms of National Service) are made for those who go on to graduate school, enter selected professions or occupations, or have urgent or crucial personal problems. One could also imagine the individual in National Service given a choice of the kind of service he is to perform, whether to be a soldier, go into a VISTA or Peace Corps-type program, or join some paramilitary service group or other special service organization. Or such a National Service program might coexist with a professional military establishment.

Thus, one may imagine in many countries the establishment of all kinds of special and elite National Service programs and organizations appealing to various tastes, attitudes, and aptitudes. Thus well-trained, highly educated, highly motivated, specialized military groups might be used in various areas--or even world wide--to advise and help indigenous governments of less well-developed nations to deal with political and economic development problems as well as police and military programs. Presumably some of these groups might be prepared, as well, to do a good deal of fighting, yet the civilian side of their activities might be more important than the military. Paramilitary or special service groups might also be created in various countries for in-country or foreign social service work or for various kinds of scientific, exploratory, or development activities. (One can imagine a year's tour of duty on the moon, in an undersea installation, or in Antarctica or the Amazon basin.) This kind of National Service might become very popular in the "overdeveloped" nations, winning the support of young people who like freedom of choice

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*These matters are elaborated on in Part IV.

and of the older people who believe that the young should experience some hard training and hard living, or at least make some public service contribution between their permissive youthful period and their affluent and comfortable adulthood.

This kind of National Service program could exist even in an inward-looking United States with a relatively isolationist foreign policy. Americans might then regard the military establishment as fulfilling a narrow defensive function in what is, for them, a "Fortress America." But in such a projection it no doubt would seem to most Americans that the country is not seriously threatened. (Obviously threats could exist, even be stimulated by a neo-isolationist U.S. policy.) One would assume that the services would be fairly restricted in size and that the defensive mission might well be heavily reliant, strategically, on "deterrence-only" weaponry. A result, or perhaps even a cause, of neo-isolationism in this projection could, I should think, be profound political and social fissures within American society. What I would call the "humanist left"--or, less charitably, the "radical" or "anarchic" left--might have quite successfully challenged the confidence and authority of government, producing a period of passive administrations. These critics on the left might support programs not so different from those of the American New Left today, though perhaps with less anarchism, and less tendency toward confrontation and violence. I foresee this domestic trend because I suspect that there may be little or nothing in the international conditions between now and the period under study to provide special justification for the role and function of "the Establishment" and its military preparations. But this assumption could, of course, be quite wrong, both on the count of international affairs and about the reaction within the United States. Common purposes, common projects, common values, and/or other new "variables," movements, or trends could act as a social cement, creating or improving the unity of American society in ways that seem unlikely today. But my assumption reflects a judgment put quite well by Henry Owen in a recent article:*

> Thus traditional notions of the power and authority of national governments no longer command--in the developed world at least--the allegiance that they did in times past. Symbols and slogans which derive from these notions are losing their force. Peoples grope for new concepts which will respond more directly to the needs of our day. The failure to find them as yet accounts for some of the unease and questioning which characterizes this transitional period.

Leadership, then, I should think, will be torn between emphasizing rationality and efficiency, concerned with the material problems and progress of society, and placing primary weight on the quality of human life even if this may involve material costs. If there is emphasis on the traditional political values and perceptions of the nation-state,

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*"Foreign Policy Premises for the Next Administration," in Foreign Affairs, Volume 46, No. 4, p. 701.

the role of world leadership and influence, on international relations and the international system, on national security, leadership will necessarily gravitate towards the "technocratic" criteria. Rather paradoxically, rather than increasing concern for fellow men, under the postulated conditions the humanist emphasis would seem more likely to imply a certain inward-turning, a laissez-faire attitude towards other nations and a lowered concern over America's role in the world. The Kennedy Administration displayed, I think, some signs of this conflict of values, applying highly rational or technocratic criteria to government action with a very ambitious conception of America's world role and purpose, but also with a certain hesitancy over where this might lead the country. But I would think of President Kennedy and former Defense Secretary McNamara as men of another category, which I will call the "responsible center." I suspect that this category would also separately include a good many people of technocratic orientation or who, like myself, are without a strong conviction about where humanity should be led but are deeply committed to the pragmatic analysis of each step that we take. Thus I believe strongly that efficiency and rationality are ends and not means and that it is important to be aware that even when these are treated as values they do not exhaust the list of values important to man. Yet it would seem important to many, including myself, that the government be both efficient and rational in the programs it undertakes--limited and tentative as these programs may be.

I contrast this general approach to issues with that of a "humanist left" which not only gives humanist values primacy but includes, I think, a certain real hostility towards "technocracy"--towards any system organized around criteria of efficiency, rationality, to material organization and production. It is less easy for me to describe this position, in part because I am out of sympathy with much of it, but in part because the position is--of its nature--less simple, less coherent. It emphasizes spontaneity, feeling, optimism; it opposes virtually any subordination of individual human freedom to the demands of organization and efficiency. It is essentially optimistic, making a strong act of faith in the goodness of men. In its more extreme form it leads to an anarchist position of one sort or another.

2. A Comment on "The Domestic Milieu" (by William Pfaff)

No joint study can exactly express the conclusions of all of its authors, but this report constitutes a case in which a disagreement among the authors seems worth recording. Parts I-III contain a series of observations on policy issues facing the United States and its military forces which all of the authors believe to be worth serious consideration. The remarks about American society made in this and the preceding chapter are, however, a subject of controversy within the Institute.

I would like to speak particularly of two matters. It seems to me that contemporary social trends are of inevitable concern to Air Force officers as individuals--and we have discussed only a few elements in an immensely complex process of social and cultural transition. That these

trends are an appropriate subject for the official interest of the Air Force seems arguable, since the role of the American military services is external, as an instrumentality of civilian political authority, and these matters affect the evolution of political opinion and the political will of American domestic society. I do not, myself, believe that the American military services and the American people are, or will be, in the relationship of severe estrangement or even mutual hostility that the chapter would seem to imply.

The assumption of this chapter seems to be that the domestic controversy over the Vietnam war derives from a major trend within American society away from values indispensable to serious government and a serious American international policy. Thus the unity of the country in World War II is contrasted with its disunity over Vietnam: the latter is ascribed to a "cosmopolitan," "new left" or "pacifist" value shift among important segments of the population, and this is then assumed to be a trend which will pose increasingly severe problems for government and the military services in the future. This seems to me wrong or doubtful on all counts.

The argument that there are a series of secular trends in modern society seems true enough, but to attribute to them a direct relationship to the student radicalism, to say nothing of the racial unrest, of the last four years seems to say both too much and not enough. The relativism and secularism of modern culture affect the whole of our society, not just an avant-garde which then reacts by opposing the political and military policies of the United States government. It is, I think, misleading to define, even implicitly, the present divisions within American society as a struggle between those more "advanced" in the course of a multifold secular trend and a government or "establishment" or military community less advanced, still acting out of older values. To do so is, in any event, hardly encouraging counsel, since if this is so the "establishment" would seem condemned to inevitable failure.

It hardly seems necessary to seek such an explanation. The young people and the intelligentsia of the 1920's were supposedly pacifist; those of the 1930's were radical. The young people of the 1950's were supposedly passive and conformist. None of this proved more than a response to the particular conditions and issues of those decades. Whatever the general social trends of the century, these particular "trends"--which were the ones with political consequences--proved reversible when the issues changed.

Putting aside the question of students, in American society as a whole World War II, and to a lesser extent World War I, provided exceptional cases of national unity in support of a war. If there is a trend in American popular attitudes against war and military preparations it must be proved, I think, on other grounds than the particular case of Vietnam. The Mexican border campaigns preceding World War I, the war against the Philippine insurrection, the Spanish American War, and the War with Mexico in the nineteenth century, all were hotly disputed in

this country. If these did not produce the eventual level of disunity of Vietnam this was in part because they were short wars, and the disproportion of technological weaponry was not of the scale which has, in Vietnam, reinforced popular moral objections or unease over American actions. The fundamental reason all of these wars were controversial is the same reason Vietnam is controversial: the public was not overwhelmingly persuaded of their political purpose or justification. In short, a tautological argument--these wars were controversial because they were unpopular to start with; and the tautology is crucial. A democratic government--whether in the nineteenth century or the twentieth--cannot easily wage a war for which there is not an overwhelming democratic mandate. This is true whether the war--objectively (by whatever standard objectivity is determined in such matters)--is justified or not. It is a condition of government in this society. If a government chooses to wage an unpopular war the military services of the country inevitably are victims of the public reaction, and ordinarily unfairly so--for exactly the reason with which I began these remarks: the military serve civilian political authority; civilian leaders, not military leaders, made the decision to enter a war.

One can take two polar positions in this matter. One can say that political authority invariably is right about the validity of a given war, and the public must be educated or persuaded to support the decisions of their leaders. (This seems to me the implied argument made in this chapter.) Or one can say that whatever the objective merits of a given war, it should not be entered into if there are objections from a sizable minority of the public. The truth, historically, has lain between these positions: leaders lead, and work to convince the public to support the policies they judge necessary, but leaders are ultimately restricted by the public and political sanction. There is a limit to their ability to overcome public doubts or opposition. Franklin Roosevelt carried the country after 1942, but before then believed--probably rightly--that despite his efforts to influence public opinion he lacked a mandate to enter World War II. Woodrow Wilson overcame the doubts of an initially divided country and entered the First World War with a clear mandate. Mr. Johnson worked to overcome the divided public opinion which existed even after the Vietnam War's start but in the end bowed--not to "New Left" or to pacifist opinion, or the views of newspaper editorialists, but to very wide currents of popular doubt or lack of conviction. In a future war or intervention the existence of a popular mandate will depend on the character of the action, its apparent justification, the popular assessment of the national interest. The proclaimed pacifism or radicalism of the students of a given generation (as with the signers of the Oxford declaration of the 1930's), or what is alleged to be the pacifism of intellectuals (quite wrongly alleged, I think; intellectuals strike me as quite as belligerent as the public at large, and the role of intellectuals in the wars and extremist politics of this century provides evidence for my belief), or trends in "permissive" child-rearing, seem to me trivial factors in the equation. Given an issue as compelling as Nazism, or Japanese imperialism in 1942, or Soviet aggression against Western Europe, this country would demonstrate again the same conviction and

unity as in the mid-1940's, or as it displayed in the late 1940's and early 1950's in supporting the military containment of Russia. Without such an issue, a government will pursue "unpopular" or "seemingly immoral" policies only at its own risk, and this seems to me so obvious as to be beyond comment.

The lesson would appear then to be to avoid policies regarded by a major part of the public as politically unwarranted or "immoral," and this is a political lesson for political leaders, not a military lesson. On the other hand, an inordinate concern with what the students, intellectuals, or newspaper men say seems to me simply mistaken, and misleading as a guide to the future. Individual critics, even ones with access to popular communications, or groups of critics, are important only to the degree that they stand for major popular constituencies in this country.

I think, in short, that it is misleading to generalize from the present situation in the United States. There is anti-military sentiment in the country today which certainly makes difficulties for military men as they attempt to carry out their responsibilities. But this particular mood in the country can adequately be explained in terms of the Vietnam war and a wider (and perfectly defensible) sense of national overextension and neglect of domestic reforms. That there are, at the same time, deeper problems of liberal commitment and popular confidence in the present institutions and formulations of politics is another matter. But this, I think, is not easily treated in terms of American civil-military relationships. There seems no more reason to project the present anti-military mood into the future as an accelerating trend, than there was reason, a decade ago, to believe that the nation's mood of support for very large military forces was a fixed factor in the national scene, unrelated to the international conditions of the day.

3. Two Other Possibilities (by Frank Armbrustar

The following description of the effect of present trends on the future are frankly written from the policy viewpoint of the "Aggressive Democrat" (further defined in Part II). Assessing the same situation as the two preceding contributors, I can imagine outcomes which are far more sharply "better" or "worse" than those which already have been indicated. Two scenarios follow, the first one my projection of certain overt present trends, the second developing out of a backlash against them.

A Pessimistic Scenario for an Environment Developing from Today's Overt Trends

First, let us imagine a continuing deterioration, but more or less along current trends, in American society's support for the armed forces and for an activist anti-communist foreign policy. Congress continues to reflect a growing hostility to any U.S. foreign policy which anticipates possible U.S. involvements to defend friendly powers experiencing communist subversion or wars of national liberation. There is growing hostility to our possession of forces capable of strategic counterforce or strategic defensive actions because they are seen as "destabilizing" and as

endangering the détente. Armed Forces appropriation bills have an uphill fight, opposed not only by normal political actions but also by loud demonstrations--or even riots--in Washington, on university campuses, and in American cities. These funds, it is argued, should be used to alleviate poverty, improve education, for urban renewal, or to eliminate the ghettos. Increasing numbers of alienated taxpayers withhold that portion of income tax they assume would be spent on national defense, or estimated to be used in financing "objectionable" programs. Though doubtless the government will collect, or it does now, by impounding bank deposits, it may not always be able to do this or the legality of the practice may be challenged or even ended by legislation.

There is also a "brain drain" of the available manpower for the armed services. In this time period, when the majority of intelligent young men will go on to college, many universities will shun ROTC programs, and recruiting on the campuses will be difficult or impossible because of the disturbances caused by dissenters. Young men who indicate a preference for military service after graduation will be the subject of ridicule or abuse by many professors and students. It may not be "intellectually respectable" to hold a view in opposition to this. In this environment the draft may prove ineffective, at least as far as sending men into action against foes they do not choose to fight. What fighting forces there are will be volunteers, primarily from "non-intellectual" backgrounds. Commissioned personnel may also tend to come more and more from this group (which may or may not be a handicap). But there will be a growing gap between the military and the major American centers of learning and consequently between the military and the major news media. This may be much more important even than during Vietnam since by the 1975-1985 decade a high percentage (perhaps half) of all young people will go to college. If many students identify with these trends, and if many of their parents also identify with these "respectable" positions (perhaps 25% of all adults will have college degrees), there will be a growing and intensely hostile gap between a rather large and articulate segment of the population and the military.

The military may also be the target of well-organized, communist, new left, and anarchist efforts deliberately to "disarm" the United States. The tendencies I have described will lend themselves to exploitation by such groups (and in key instances be generated by them).

Because of these political pressures on the President, the armed forces will be simultaneously strapped for money and men, and will--if they are to be used at all--have to be extraordinarily competent. Very likely, any military operation carried out by the United States armed forces would have to be so efficient and well directed that it used very small and unobtrusive force or its objectives were accomplished so rapidly the opposition was presented with a fait accompli. Obviously, such a requirement would be extremely difficult to meet, particularly in this time of tremendous hostility to military action and the armed forces. Preparations for many of these operations, and almost all of the pre-planning for them, might have to be highly classified actions by the government. Indeed, this might even be true of some of the actual operations.

It might be difficult, in this environment, for the President of the United States to use the American military capability in an overt way to thwart--even openly--imperialistic or subversive moves by communist or other aggressive and/or revolutionary groups. If he uses forces in a covert way (that is, without previously discussing their use with Congressional leaders and without entering into public debate in the issues over which the forces are committed*), he will have to be spectacularly successful in a very short time; and even then he may be attacked or face Congressional challenge on the mode of his action. He will risk bringing upon himself at home and abroad troubles which might shake his administration. Military operations will have to be extremely humane, since if there is a hostile press, there may be a tendency to search for American "atrocities," perhaps while ignoring enemy excesses.

Such "unpopular" military operations may have to be carried out in most cases by relatively small numbers of troops, and in such a manner as to make the enemy look as inefficient as possible. In other words, it is essential in the milieu described here for the enemy not to acquire a cloak of respectability by efficiency on the battlefield or other efficient use of violence (e.g. terror). There may be a tendency, particularly in the case of communist-sponsored "national liberation" military operations (which are almost always accompanied by persuasive political theories and propaganda aimed at foreign "progressive elements"), to equate any great ability of an enemy force to maintain itself in a country with the degree of popular support which that force enjoys. Ignored will be the fact that a military force functions effectively primarily because it is relatively effective in the mode of operation it chooses. Instead, the more efficient a force looks, the greater the tendency will be to endow it with popular sanction. In the environment I am assuming, United States forces in the field combatting communist forces may need literally to make their opponents look silly.

In this domestic environment the political attack will concentrate on military budgets with quick-reaction forces perhaps most vulnerable. For example, STRICOM forces are dependent on the ATC and CASF units to carry out their missions, but these units are both very visible and require some of the most expensive and controversial bases, equipment, personnel and training programs in the services. These are the forces which are alleged to "get us into trouble," which feed our "police-the-world syndrome." Thus, necessary men, bases and new aircraft may not be forthcoming; older planes may be mothballed or cut up for scrap; nor may fast sea transports be available.

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*Roosevelt's "Destroyer Deal" with the British and the battle demarcation line down the middle of the Atlantic in 1940 are examples of such actions.

A Scenario for an Environment Dominated by Reactions to Current Trends

In my second scenario, despite a higher percentage of people largely uninvolved in the day-to-day workings of the economy and government, the vast majority (including many of the "non-involved") recognize not only the value of the "system" but its vulnerability to radical attack. Leadership is assumed to be forthcoming, able to rally the majority (as de Gaulle did in the last French election). This is reasonable to expect in the United States, but is a severe problem for weaker nations attempting some form of democratic process. In the United States the greatest problem resembles that of the Muslim world in the eleventh through fifteenth centuries, or the aristocratic system in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: no weakness in arms or technology in the face of challenge, but a weakness of resolve, energy and endurance.* A case in point is 1860, when Buchanan was convinced that the Union was doomed and that neither the country's energy nor its desire for self-preservation were adequate to the task: ancien régime morale seemed prevalent. In fact, it was Buchanan who lacked the energy to preserve the Union: Lincoln had the strength, and the Union not only persisted but prospered beyond the most optimistic predictions.

My second scenario assumes that such energy exists. People conclude that we are in an ideological confrontation which poses some danger to our way of life, at least on the fringes of America's (and the West's) sphere of influence. This recognition of an ideological confrontation leads to re-evaluation of the whole détente policy with the Soviets and Eastern Europe (which assumes that trade and cultural exchanges between West and East will lead to the democratic evolution of "contented communists" and the reduction of communist pressures on the non-communist world). Arguments supporting a political confrontation with the communists are more persuasive than the détente arguments. The argument also is made that we already risk losing our dynamism.**

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*One should also keep in mind that the Muslim-Christian confrontation continued over the centuries and each watched for the chance to conquer the other, while a vast and continuing cultural and commercial exchange took place between them.

**In this scenario, items such as the following are considered to be serious indicators: "Members of "their camp" (despite its polycentrism and "family quarrels") do not today change sides in times of violent confrontations between communists and non-communists. British and French ships are in Haiphong; no Polish or even Rumanian ships dock at Saigon or Cam Ranh Bay. Nehru's faith in Moscow's willingness to help against a schismatic Communist China cost India dearly when China attacked. No Warsaw Pact nation complains when Russia and East Germany ignore their commitments on Berlin access routes. Our "spy ships" are seized by the communists twelve miles off the coast of North Korea, while Russian "spy ships" anchor three miles off Cape Canaveral, Taiwan, Japan, Okinawa, etc.

Many people contend that the communists stand ready to usurp or seize control of non-communist states in turmoil and then defend them against "counterrevolution" (as with Russia and Cuba). Important people also make the argument that we haven't even thought out a way in which we can help a Hungary (or perhaps Czechoslovakia will be a better example in this period) into a neutralist position--though Russia has, and uses, a tried and true method of keeping such states in line. The fact that she does it with inpunity and at her leisure, so far as Western reactions are concerned, is viewed with alarm in this new environment.

The average voter evaluates issues from the standpoint of the modern environment but without losing his sense of the importance of law, order, rights of property, safety, human dignity, and even patriotism.* On many issues (particularly of foreign policy) there remains much confusion, but not on domestic issues.

A swing to the right in this country would undoubtedly express itself in the electoral process. The same may not be true in other countries (France now has its right-wing "committees of safety," which in some cases may have taken the law into their own hands; and one cannot be sure the NPD in Germany will not become violent). But in my scenario, any European swing to the right is also assumed to be democratic. Possible confrontations and crises in both East and West camps are now assumed to be carefully thought out beforehand so that the gains and losses (around the world) contingent on any U.S. action during a crisis will at least have been considered. Crises no longer freeze us into immobility, and the dangers of action, which always loom large in a crisis atmosphere and often overshadow the possible actions, are more coolly weighed against the great dangers and costs of inaction.** The "ideologically" oriented government of my scenario is not dismayed by the fact that the world moves from crisis to crisis.

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*Craftsmen and artisans today, though they may make up less of the general population, show the traditional "conservatism" on these issues.

**See Frank Armbruster, European Trends and Issues, Part III - The Detente and Its Possible Effects on European and United States Policy, HI-682-D/3 (Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hudson Institute, April 28, 1966), particularly pp. 26-28; a. Some Common Attitudes Toward "Solutions," and b. Some Alternative Solutions. For example, an "Austrian"-type solution (neutralization) is suggested in the event of a Czechoslovak crisis such as we are experiencing today and some possible analysis toward developing techniques for influencing such an outcome (through our efforts and those of our West European allies) are discussed.

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PART IV

MILITARY PERSPECTIVES, IMPLICATIONS AND ROLES: INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

The discussions and debates contained in Part III should by now have provided an appropriate context for discussion of the specific international ramifications of the domestic aspects of the "multifold trend." These changing attitudes have, we believe, generally made themselves felt in the recent debates on most current military issues and such items as the ABM and the SALT quite specifically. And we would underline our belief that barring a big change in the political milieu (e.g. successful populist electoral revolt) this issue of domestic and international attitudes is likely to be dominating. However, except where they are specially relevant (e.g. Chapter I), we will not discuss these "new" and very important issues further here.

Most of the problems in their basic outlines covered in Part IV of this report are all too familiar to the military planner; most have been around a long time. During the years 1975-1985, it may be anticipated, however, that some will have yielded to at least a partial solution, while others, naturally, will have assumed other dimensions. Thus as a result of the coming SALT talks a limited agreement between the two superpowers on various aspects of strategic weapons arms control might be negotiated but aside from complications which the agreement itself might bring, planning might well also be complicated by a significant proliferation of nuclear arms. In most circumstances this is less likely to mean that a new and relatively insignificant "nuclear power" will try to use nuclear blackmail on one of the two superpowers than on one of its (non-nuclear or nuclear) neighbors, or just to decrease the effectiveness of nuclear threats by the superpowers. Thus, the military planner must take yet another set of possibilities within the purview of his contingencies. Some possibilities on how this problem can be handled and the kind of regional arrangements which might make control of this eventuality somewhat easier are presented in Chapter I. Of special note in this regard for the 1975-1985 decade are the nuclear retaliation theory of lex talionis and the unique role Japan could play in Asian nuclear affairs. Section B of Chapter I uses once again the technique of contrasting views and estimates of military policies and capabilities during the 1975-1985 period projected in terms of assumed military budgets and differing United States policy assumptions. The reader will be familiar with the basic assumptions from Part II where the views of the "Prudential Internationalist," the "Austere Pragmatic Interventionist," and the "Aggressive Democrat" are extensively presented.

In addition, Part IV includes discussions of particular military problems (Chapters II and III). Examined here are special bilateral defense issues associated with Britain, France, Japan and West Germany; possible military crises which could occur in areas such as the Middle East, Asia, or Latin America. An interesting scenario on a hypothetical military crisis in Thailand involving the United States and North Vietnam is of some topical interest in view of the current debate (August 1969) on the nature of U.S. commitments to that country.

Plausible approaches to the solutions of some of the problems presented in these earlier portions of Part IV--considerations related to arms control measures, likely tactical and strategic issues, and the role and missions of the U.S. armed services--are presented in Chapters IV through VII. Chapter VIII concludes by stressing the need for the military planners to consider in perspective the long-run future, and lists specific minimum criteria for evaluating aims and measures in terms of this long-range view.

CHAPTER I. THE INTERNATIONAL MILIEU: SOME GENERAL 1975-1985 POSSIBILITIES AND ISSUES

A. Some Special Aspects and Issues

To use an example mentioned earlier in this report, unless there are surprising changes in various costs (such as might be imposed by some arms control agreements), by 1980 or so any of about 20 powers should be able to procure and maintain, for instance, 500 missiles with roughly "early (1965) Minuteman capability" or better, for one or two billion dollars procurement cost or less, and a few hundred million dollars annual upkeep (1969 dollars). Thus, if one of these countries amortized its costs over a five-year period, such a missile force would represent a yearly per missile cost of substantially less than one million dollars. Depending on the defenses of the large powers and the superpowers (and other "technical and tactical details"), these weapons systems might be "equalizers" in the Gallois or "American west" sense or they might create an obvious hierarchy of powers up to the largest.

As indicated in the quote of von Neumann's (Chart 6 on page I-35c in Chapter II of Part I) and even more by the later discussions (see, for example, the charts on pages 3-19c and 3-21c of Chapter II of Part III), many people feel that the nation-state system could not accept these and other esoteric or dangerous systems which also seem likely to be available. And in the long run these fears would seem to be plausible, hence our emphasis, in this final part of the report, on Arms Control (Chapter V) and The Long-Range Perspective (Chapter VIII). Indeed, as the technology improves, the cost of destroying undefended (or poorly defended) targets decreases. At the same time, because of the likely economic growth, the money available for procurement of weapons increases. This effect of increased resources shows up especially dramatically in the case of small but relatively well-off nations such as East Germany, Israel, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, Colombia, Spain, and Taiwan, and such large and partially industrialized nations as China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Brazil. By 1980 all of these will probably be able to initiate procurement of 1950 and 1960, if not 1970, weapons systems.

How safe will the world then be? Despite some obvious difficulties most of the world might still feel relatively safe. In principle this could come about through the growth of international law and perhaps also through an increase in the authority of the U.N. However, this last at least seems most unlikely. The prestige, capacity and authority of the U.N. are not likely to increase in the next two or three decades to a point where it will play much more of a role in European security issues than it does today. In fact, it is not unlikely that the U.N. will play a lesser role.

One most important reason for this prognosis is the general inability of the U.N. to take a "reasonable stand" on major issues. It is likely

that the Security Council will continue to be blocked reasonably frequently by a veto of one or more of the permanent members. The Assembly is dominated by a consensus of LDC's (Less Developed Countries) which on the one hand feel deeply about certain basic issues but, however, cannot induce the organization to approve their suggested policies, much less follow through on them. On the other hand, generally speaking, the Assembly is unfriendly on the issues (Vietnam, Pueblo, Santo Domingo, etc.) in which the United States--the world's greatest power--would most like help. It tends also to be unfriendly to European nations when they confront a LDC. Since the Assembly cannot lead or force the world to its own consensus of LDC's and does not accept the leadership of either of the two superpowers, the Assembly seems likely to remain ineffective.

Even more, the various U.N. agencies, though often extremely useful and creative, tend to be burdened with excessive red tape and ineffective bureaucracy. One important reason for this is that the organization must be sensitive to the feelings of all 126 members--often a very dismaying bureaucratic handicap. Therefore, these functional organizations--useful as they are--are not likely to be so spectacularly successful that they create great prestige, capacity and authority for the parent organization.

Presumably the legacy of World War II, and perhaps even that of the cold war as well, will be over before or during the period 1975-1985. It also seems quite reasonable to argue that Europe should develop into what might be thought of as a "quasi-security community" of nations that are reasonably bourgeois and contented--at least relative to the gains to be achieved by risking war (as discussed in Chapter II of Part I).

In a true security community the nations involved have relationships with one another such that war is virtually unthinkable--or at least not thought about--and no serious preparations are made for such a war. A typical and much used example is the unarmed frontier between the United States and Canada. We argued in Part I that today all of Western Europe is a security community. This is, of course, less true of West Germany's eastern borders and Eastern Europe generally. However, it seems quite reasonable that the issues associated with the partition of Germany will have been worked out or stabilized by 1985 if not 1975 (perhaps by a "three Germanies" policy (East, West, and Austrian)--with the "fourth Germany" of Pomerania, Silesia, East Prussia, Tyrol and Sudetenland consigned to the history books). One result of such a settlement could be the relatively free movement of men and goods across almost all borders of Europe.

From the viewpoint of the Prudential Internationalist, it seems almost inconceivable, given likely projections, that 1975-1985 will see any great debate in Europe on Soviet Communism versus U.S. capitalism--or even a debate focused on the governmental or private ownership and operation of the components of the economic system. On the other hand, it seems unlikely that the Soviet Union will have mellowed or "converged" politically, as many current expectations assume or predict. Indeed there are

few Soviet experts--or even Soviet citizens--who believe that the Soviet Union could hold together except under a totalitarian or authoritarian regime.* And while one can assume that the current "liberalization" in Soviet industry and agriculture, academic life, commerce, etc., will continue, the control of political and cultural activities is also likely to continue--or at least the country is very likely to lack most of the important special characteristics of a parliamentary democracy.

In particular, it is likely to retain an important role for the secret police, to have some propensity for arbitrary trial and punishment, and, most important of all, to have enforceable laws against certain common Western political freedoms and other political options--so that even a growing and secure principle of Socialist legality does not prevent the government from exercising effective control over crucial political and cultural issues. This also means that the Soviet Union is not likely to be able to afford really free intercourse with the rest of Europe: this last will presumably include Eastern Europe. This is particularly likely to be true if the effective and/or visible standard of consumption in Eastern Europe appears to be higher than in the Soviet Union or if there is appreciable chance that exposure to Eastern European countries could lead to "political or ideological erosion." As a result there might well be some sense of threat felt by the rest of Europe from this "refusal" of the Soviet Union either to integrate itself fully into Europe or to allow Eastern Europe to do so. In addition, the Soviet Union is likely to play an important role in policing the Balkans in other ways; in restraining Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, or Rumania and Bulgaria, or East Germany and Poland, etc., from fighting over various territorial claims or other issues.**

However, assuming that the rest of this decade is characterized by relative peace in Europe, even if marred by occasional threats and crises, it also seems quite likely that the Europeans will feel relatively secure from Soviet aggression. This is particularly likely to be true if the Europeans have begun to acquire even a modest nuclear establishment--which will probably be one of the main new developments of the 1975-1985 time period. Such an establishment could have a reasonably high degree of potential effectiveness, even if small relative to Soviet capabilities and/or less technologically advanced--particularly if there is great uncertainty in the "penetration" capability. It is, of course, also possible that the disparity between the Soviet Union and effective European forces will be so great that Western Europe will continue to be almost absolutely dependent on the U.S. for credible retaliation or even modestly effective conventional defense; this is certainly not extremely implausible in the conventional arena where the Soviets may be willing to continue conscription and make proportionately greater resource allocations than the Europeans.

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*This is particularly clear when one questions Soviet defectors. Except for certain intellectuals, almost all seem to feel that a secret police is an essential ingredient of orderly government.

**Comments on the importance of these Soviet roles, particularly in the aftermath of the Czech invasion, appear in an article by Herman Kahn in Fortune, November 1968.

There will, however, clearly be challenges to the established order, but most of them seem more likely to arise from, or involve, Afro-Asia and to a lesser extent Latin America; i.e., Europe and North America are likely to be "zones of peace" even if--as far as Eastern Europe is concerned--somewhat precariously so.

It seems therefore quite reasonable to suppose that there will be attempts to continue and/or arrange for both independent regional arrangements and externally supported regional arrangements designated to deal with violent threats and attacks against the status quo. One very important issue would be to start thinking through arrangements and concepts to prevent nuclear use and/or blackmail, and failing prevention, to punish the perpetrators, so that some current attractions (as discussed in Chapter IV) to the acquisition or improvement of nuclear establishments will be decreased.

One very realistic possibility for the world we have just described, particularly if there is even a moderately widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons, would be to reinstitute the law of lex talionis. This could be either in the form in which it appears in Exodus, which talks about an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth (most readers do not realize that this is not only a counsel of "at least" but also "at most") or in a form which is found in the Code of Hammurabi, in which equals are punished by tit-for-tat, but inferiors by several "tits" for a "tat."

It should be realized that lex talionis is in a very real sense a peacekeeping measure, indeed in much the same way that U.N. peacekeeping attempts to induce peace.* Usually when the U.N. enters a dispute it does not ask who is right, but simply tries to stop the violence. Almost every tribe which does not have a functioning government to maintain law and order has discovered that it is almost impossible to stop the violence when the violence has been asymmetrically one-sided; but relatively easy, at least most of the time, when the violence has been evened up by some appropriate retaliatory exchange. Americans and Europeans, of course, tend to think of lex talionis as a violence-breeding measure, and it often does act that way. But even more often, it seems to have worked as a violence-dampening measure, hence its widespread use in the past--particularly in situations where there is no enforceable law. One of the main possible purposes for the regional arrangements suggested above would be to arrange for such a tit-for-tat response to occur in a reliable and perhaps semi-automatic fashion. (It might be mentioned that making a distinction between a tit-for-tat response and escalation sharply simplified many of the command and control problems for so-called multilateral forces.)

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*On retaliatory policies as arms control and security community measures, see articles in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 76, No. 1, November 1966, and in the California Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 2, May 1967, by H. Kahn and C. Dibble.

One could easily imagine a situation in which the following international customs became widely accepted.

1. Widespread acceptance of the immorality of the first use of nuclear weapons and

2. Acceptance of a concept that any nation has both the right and to some degree the obligation to punish such first use, particularly if there is no appropriate regional or other force available and capable to do so.

3. As a result of the above there is general de-emphasis of nuclear weapons, possibly even the denuclearization of world politics in which the nuclear status of a nation has little or no relationship to its influence, prestige, and status. Under these conditions there would be no automatic escalation as a result of nuclear use. In fact, there would be great pressures for a satisfactory de-escalation right after the tit-for-tat. "Equals" would thus be punished by the tit-for-tat response and unpopularity. If possible, the inferiors would be disarmed and, if not, possibly suffer several tits for a tat.

It is difficult to believe that any world-wide organization under the U.N. or other sponsors will be any more able to cope with the large nations in 1975-1985 than today. Therefore, areas like Europe, which have extremely important interests at stake and at the same time are capable themselves of providing for their own defense, could easily arrange to have either a regional nuclear force, or could possibly depend upon the major powers. Asia, too, would be a special situation. There the most likely aggressor would presumably still be China, which though an underdeveloped nation with a per capita income of approximately $100-$200 still has impressive enclaves of advanced technology. On the other hand, the Chinese culture areas on the perimeter of Asia, such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand and the Philippines, are all likely to be in the $300-$1,500 per capita region during 1975-1985--some of them a great deal over that figure. This probably means continued tension between the nations on the rim of Asia and the mainland of China, almost independently of the economic system, and almost certainly if the mainland is communist. However, this rim might easily be able to retain its vigor and viability, particularly if it is supported by Japan, India, Australia and/or the United States (some or all of whom might be members of this Asian nuclear retaliatory force).

The arguments for regional forces for Asia, the Middle East, South America and/or Africa seem somewhat smaller. For these nations there might be a relatively small and weak U.N. force but one sufficiently capable and powerful enough to be able to start a tit-for-tat against any, except perhaps the most advanced, nations (which presumably might have great or elaborate ballistic missile defense systems, or these might be forbidden by an arms control treaty). There might also be the concept that at the time when the U.N. got sufficient prestige and capability or

certain reforms had been made or other conditions met that it would gradually take over the functions of the regional and/or national forces as well.

It is quite possible that the above regional alliances might be decoupled from almost all other political issues; the procurement and operation be handled as a very technical issue, a technical solution to deal with a very technical issue. This is not as implausible as it may sound to many people since the likelihood that nuclear weapons may be used may seem increasingly abstract (by 1975 they will not have been used for 30 years--by 1985 for 40). It should be noted that during the period of interest there may be many kinds of special needs for multinational cooperation, not necessarily directly related to military issues. Once again it is rather dubious that this cooperation will take place through the U.N. It seems more likely that it will be restricted to special groups with, for example, the role that the Committee of Ten plays in world monetary problems, or the OECD plays in the free world. The new multinational projects could involve such things as international economic development projects, multinational firms and consortia, programs dealing specifically with regionalism; all kinds of pollution issues, control of various kinds of dangerous or universal technology, exploitation of the seas or of outer space, control of movement of people (all the way from tourism to immigration and emigration), police issues including special drugs and mechanical devices that are outlawed or controlled for various reasons, and so on.

One important set of problems that may affect the 1975-1985 decade may be an increasing use of unauthorized or semi-authorized violence. We refer here, among other things, to the kinds of problems that occurred from the mid-nineteenth century until about 1914: such as those raised by anarchists who attempted what they called "propaganda by the deed," the problem raised by the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand, and the like. It seems likely in the world to come that there will be decreasing respect paid to authority and to traditional standards, particularly among the more frustrated of the less developed nations and the more disturbed of the developed. There seems to be likely to be increasing numbers of individuals willing to "bear witness," to "confront" or otherwise communicate their messages through demonstrations, confrontations, assassinations, or other deeds. These individuals might be supported more or less directly by governments, as the Archduke's assassination or the "Lebanese attack" on the Israeli plane and passengers at Athens--and the shot at Sarajevo--are reported to have been. Under these circumstances one can imagine groups of nations, particularly the developed nations--Europe, North America, and even the Soviet Union--having a special interest in controlling such violence, while many of the undeveloped nations might be politically in sympathy with the perpetrators of such violence and therefore not be willing to allow the U.N. or other world-wide agency to play an effective role. This need to control anarchist and/or terrorist violence might be an important, if very limited, function of many groupings and yet it might be tolerated or even encouraged or supported by other national groupings.

We have almost ignored here the possibility that NATO might take on some of these new roles or some other form of renewed vigor and dynamism. While this cannot be ruled out, a more likely prognosis would seem to be a much diluted and/or eroded NATO with lessened emphasis and integration, but still fulfilling a number of needs and purposes. This would represent a kind of success for NATO, since it would represent a fulfillment of its original mission.

We have already discussed in an earlier context the factors making for a new sense of world-wide security. It may be asked to what degree the ready and wide availability of nuclear weapons will compromise this sense of security. Here we meet an apparent paradox: the growth of nuclear capability among various nations might increase the sense of security in those communities. Even today, many people in Western Europe appear to feel that those nations of the world which possess nuclear weapons or which are closely allied to nuclear powers are, in effect, free from real threats--i.e. are included in the "zone of peace" mentioned earlier. We would tend to agree with the conclusion but not the premises. There we would argue that the discussion of Chapter II of Part I on the many structural forces making for peace in the world and the stability of long recognized frontiers is the main mechanism operative here.

In any case, by the year 1980, particularly in some of the contexts we shall discuss below, there may still be no nuclear weapons exploded in war except for the two used against Japan in 1945. The world would have experienced 35 years of non-use of nuclear weapons. By this point, no matter how large the supply of weapons, and no matter how threatening the rhetoric of the military establishments, at the level at which most people react there would be little or no actual sense of the imminent threat of nuclear war. This could be true even if there had been a number of "ostensible" nuclear crises as in the case of the Cuban missile crisis: At that time the rhetoric may have been quite frightening but few apparently really believed it. (Thus the magazine cartoon published in the early stages of the Cuban missile crisis: One man says to another, "Isn't it awful--we'll all be dead by tomorrow. Here, have another drink.")

One should add that this issue of "not being serious" is important but often misunderstood. Many Europeans often remark that during the Cuban missile crisis they momentarily expected nuclear weapons to detonate over Paris, Brussels, and Bonn. Yet in nearly all cases the individuals concerned did nothing to take precautions on the grounds that "there is nothing one can do." Yet many had seen fallout maps and must have known that much of Europe and almost all of Africa and Latin America could expect to survive a Soviet-American war. In addition, such countries as Sweden and Switzerland, which have made preparations to protect their populations against fallout, are likely to survive even a very large thermonuclear war not specifically directed against them. Thus the Cuban crisis should have been the occasion for West Europeans to visit relatives in North Africa or Latin America, or to tour Switzerland or Sweden. One can argue that if they had really been as frightened as they claimed, these ideas would have occurred to them.

It must be added that even within these wider security communities we may still assume that most nations will have national defense establishments. Many of these nations may be aided in maintaining their establishments by outside powers. Some will have internal security problems, and some may be aided by outsiders in dealing with these internal problems. Moreover, despite the nonproliferation treaty, some diffusion of nuclear weapons seems very likely. In particular, it is difficult to imagine that Japan will not at some time in the late 1970's or early 1980's obtain nuclear weapons. As explained earlier, this possibility does not contradict current Japanese attitudes as sharply as is often assumed.

This is really not a very complex idea. Many West Germans, speaking, one suspects, in hyperbole, assert that it would be best for their country to give up claims to nuclear weapons for the rest of history. A more relevant question is to ask if they would be willing to sign an immediate treaty renouncing such weapons for 20 years. In many cases the reply--a shocked reply--is "That's a long time!"

What is interesting about this reply is that it involves a certain increase in self-knowledge. Many such informants are surprised at their own reaction. Similarly, as pointed out earlier, one can go through a series of questions on nuclear rearmament with a knowledgeable Japanese. This Japanese will concede the significance of these questions and extrapolate the tendencies discussed, so that when finally asked to name the year when nuclear armament becomes politically possible in Japan, almost invariably the informant chooses the early 1970's--and yet he himself is shocked by the analysis.

The acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan could be stimulated and justified by an increase in the Chinese threat or some other act by China. It would enable the Japanese, who by then would have experienced 25-30 years of incredibly rapid economic growth (and who would expect another 20-25 at a comparable rate), to make clear to the world their great-power status. Even many leftist Japanese might approve, for this would make possible a basic independence of the United States.

As we have noted elsewhere, it is not hard to imagine that if Japan acquired nuclear weapons this would be taken as overturning the political results of World War II, dramatized in the fact that the five victors of that war are the five nuclear powers of today. It would then be hard to prevent West Germany from following the Japanese example. Very likely the Swiss or the Swedes or some other medium-sized power would follow. One could also argue that, under current conditions at least, three or four states in the category "Large and Partially Industrialized Nations"--i.e., India, Brazil, Pakistan, Mexico--would seek nuclear weapons to confirm their great-power status. And, of course, almost any of the mature industrial, mass-consumption societies in Europe could make the weapons if they wished.

In such a world it seems likely that the United States would feel some need for competent active and passive defenses, and possibly for an even more competent offense than we have today. The existence of active and passive defenses is as likely to dampen the arms race as to exacerbate it, since defensive capabilities are likely to be relatively expensive, employing rather advanced technologies.

B. Implications for the Military Planner

Let us turn now to what all of this may imply for the American military establishment. Its future size and many of its other characteristics, including aspects of its role in domestic affairs and government, seem best examined within an assumed world context. Let us set forth and explore four cases as follows:

1. An Integrated and Peaceful Context (or Roughly the Expectations of Many Prudential Internationalists). Both the nation and the international system are relatively peaceful, prosperous, arms controlled, nonviolent, with a high degree of integration and communication both within the U.S. and between the U.S. and most foreign nations. European, North American, and South American security communities are quite firmly established, and comparable communities may even have begun to make inroads in parts of Africa and Asia. However, China is still maverick, as are some of the Muslim countries.

2. Inward-Looking, Neo-Isolationist Context (or Roughly the Expectations of Many Austere Pragmatic Interventionists). A somewhat neo-isolationist and inward-looking U.S. exists in a world which may be as peaceful and prosperous as above, though there will be relatively little arms control or general coordination. Assume in this context relatively greater internal disunity and hostility than in Context One, and even more apathy and negativism with respect to domestic attitudes, even active hostility by various significant minorities and groups of intellectuals towards many or most aspects of the American "Establishment"--the Department of Defense in particular.

3. Disarray World (or Roughly the Expectations of Many Aggressive Democrats). In this context there is a fair degree of international hostility, something perhaps approaching the situation of the mid- and late 1950's. Defense budgets might easily be 50% to 100% larger than in the previous two contexts, and there would be many pressures for major U.S. interventions of various sorts--i.e., economic aid with perhaps political/military advice or training, or perhaps the political-military aid and/or advice supplemented by some active military or "police" support; or finally large military efforts of one or another kind. While the U.S. may not be eager to intervene in every possible crisis, it is by no means unwilling to act when it feels its national or ideological interests are threatened or even seriously involved (more or less as in the mid- or late 1950's and early 1960's).

4. A Very Hostile and Uncontrolled Arms Race World. Finally, we need to consider a world in which there has been, and still is, a great increase in international tension, fear and hostility. One can imagine several ways in which this situation might develop. It might arise directly out of the kind of U.S. world withdrawal implicit in the second context above. The United States, having in effect repudiated the role of world policeman, leaves it to other nations to make their own security arrangements. In many cases this produces arms races and the kind of self-fulfilling prophecies that we are so familiar with. The result is great turmoil; many small wars produce a widespread sense of threat arising from the success of one or another group establishing hegemony over a major portion of the world or from any of the many other reasons that leap to mind.

This world also might easily develop out of Context Three, the Disarray World, in which excessive intervention by the United States itself creates countervailing powers and hostilities such that the requirements on U.S. military forces mount higher and higher.

While it is perfectly possible that the way in which this world develops might sharply affect domestic attitude and institutions, we will not discuss these possibilities here but simply provide a fairly superficial discussion of some of the things which might arise in almost any variation of such a situation.

This range of contexts could produce defense budgets in the United States from as low as $75 billion to as high as five times that figure. We are assuming that the United States has a population of about 250 million people with a per capita income in the neighborhood of $6,000. Therefore, the gross national product should be about $1.5 trillion (as always, in 1969 dollars). In the integrated and peaceful context one would tend to assume that the military budget would be about 5 of GNP (except for the period of the Korean War and its aftermath, defense expenditures have varied between 5 and 10 of GNP in the postwar years). Five per cent is about the portion of GNP applied to military purposes by major European countries today. With a GNP of $1.5 trillion, the defense budget should be about $75 billion.

In a Neo-Isolationist, Inward-Looking World it is possible that defense expenditures would go down. Yet there still is likely to be some occasion for military intervention and some military aid given abroad. More important, in a neo-isolationist world the arms race is less controlled and there are automatic pressures on the U.S. budget to match various potential threats. We may therefore assume, more or less arbitrarily, that in Context Two the military budget goes up to about $100 billion a year--though in fact this will not make much difference in our discussion.

In the Disarray World the percentage of budget allocations to military preparations approaches that of the 13-14 characteristic of the Korean War and immediate aftermath. With a $1.5 trillion GNP this would

mean some $200 billion a year spent on defense. Finally, in the Hostile World context, assuming a sense of threat justifying, say, one-fifth to one-third of the GNP devoted to defense, the total allocation might reach $300 to $500 billion a year.

Let us now consider each of the four contexts in greater detail.

I. The Integrated and Peaceful Context

The terms "integrated" and "peaceful" do not imply an idyllic international situation but are simply relative to what might easily be the world context. In particular, we would assume that with respect to domestic attitudes and values many current trends have persisted, particularly some of the divisive trends. For one thing, we assume that the United States will move increasingly towards what we may call a mosaic society, with a great deal of plurality and diversity, hopefully a creative diversity. This diversity will show itself in styles of dress, talk, ways of life, in attitudes towards work, towards leisure, the government, the "Establishment," etc.

Yet despite the fact that the society will be very permissive of dissent and diversity, or perhaps in part because of it, alienation and cynicism seem likely to increase, especially among the young, and no doubt there will be increasing concern about this alienation and cynicism among the majority of Americans. The attitude of hostility towards many of the established values and practices of American society, evident among many intellectuals today and which most people take to be a result of the Vietnamese war, may actually prove to be one of the main continuing trends in this country. As society and culture become increasingly sensate and cosmopolitan, the nation-state as the nexus of the loyalties, values and aspirations of the society will seem less and less satisfactory, particularly to intellectuals. The national solidarity of the 1940's and 1950's will increasingly seem due to exceptional international circumstances--the existence of Hitler and Stalin, the cold war and the aggressiveness of the totalitarian states, all of this forcing a defensive reliance on the nation-state as the instrument of international society's resistance.

We shall assume that for most of the sixteen years between now and the year 1985 there will be few international pressures enforcing the loyalty of the average intellectual to his government. Thus, criticisms of government will surface, and we can assume steadily rising levels of protest and dissent which, in the peaceful and integrated world context presupposed, remain quite tolerable. The attitude of many will seem to be that virtually any defects in the society justify a withdrawal of the individual's loyalty. And, of course, no matter what is done, such defects will exist.

While this alienation and revolt against "computer civilization" will be important, in this projection it will be accepted as simply part

of the national scene. While a substantial number of Americans will continue to "opt out," such "opting out" will no longer be recognized as a novelty or an act worthy of much public concern--so long as nothing happens drastically to accelerate the process. (As we will see below, it is particularly important that the requirements of military service do not accelerate these trends.) Yet we should assume that among many Americans, especially the older generations, there will be a rather general feeling of anxiety, of pessimism, and even gloom. Even though the nation's leaders express confidence in continued peace and progress, theories of decay and of "decline and fall" will become popular in both serious and popular literature. National self-hatred in the United States will not approach the levels that are, say, current in England today, but we will have taken large steps in that direction.

Assume too that the military establishment will be respected and valued by political leaders although it may have low prestige among large segments of the public. But even the leadership regards military preparations as insurance against relatively remote eventualities or challenges.

For purposes of simplicity, let us divide our assumed $75 billion defense budget into four categories: the first for support of central war forces--say $10 to $15 billion/year; the second for support of the general purpose forces--say $20 to $30 billion/year; the third devoted to a proposed national service system; and the fourth devoted to common logistics, research and development, administration, overhead, etc. Presumably something between a half million to one million people man the central war system with a somewhat larger number--perhaps twice as many--in the general purpose forces. The whole military establishment should be slightly smaller in manpower than today--or about one per cent of the population--down from the one-and-one-half per cent of population currently in American military service. For this reason, and particularly if there is a national service requirement, we assume there will be sufficient volunteers to man the first two groups, even though national service will, as described below, be mandatory. We should add that $10-$15 billion a year for central war forces is really a quite large sum of money. It is roughly twice what we have spent in recent years, although about equal to what was spent in the late 1950's.

General purpose forces are designed for non-central wars of various sorts.* They are conventionally armed although there might be some limited tactical nuclear capabilities.

Finally, we assume $15 to $20 billion a year of military funds allocated to various national service functions. At, say, $5,000 per year per individual in national service, this would enable the government to enroll some 3 to 4 million people, which seems a reasonable number, roughly equivalent to the number of people in the 20-year age group. This implies

*It is not clear whether it is these forces or some other specialized forces which would provide a kind of "national guard" backup to local police. Whether normally used for this purpose, they would clearly always be eventually available for it.

that almost everybody serves if national service is for one year, or about half the young people (all of the males) if national service is for two years.

In this fairly peaceful world, the United States military establishment would likely be dominated by considerations of domestic policy and domestic political reactions, not only in the way it fights foreign wars, but also in its recruitment, training and operating procedures. In the same way that domestic issues have been a primary, perhaps the primary, issue in Vietnam, tending to dominate many aspects of the war, so domestic issues may in the future dominate or heavily influence the operation of the entire U.S. defense establishment.

Given a general absence of perceived threats and a generally negative to hostile attitude on the part of much of the population towards defense preparations, it would seem that the draft in its present form would not be a preferred system for obtaining military manpower. It is easy to imagine a National Service program being substituted in which easy deferments or exceptions (these may be formulated as special forms of National Service) are made for those who go on to graduate school, enter selected professions or occupations, or have urgent or crucial personal problems. One could also imagine the individual in National Service given a choice of the kind of service he is to perform: whether to be a soldier, go into a VISTA or Peace Corps-type program, or join some paramilitary service group, or other special force of various types.

Thus there might be all kinds of special and elite programs and groups appealing to certain tastes and attitudes. We speculated in Part I that Army Special Forces might be expanded into a well-trained, highly educated, highly motivated group for world-wide intervention, in most cases to advise and help indigenous governments in dealing with military, political, and economic development problems, but presumably prepared, as well, to do a good deal of fighting itself. Yet the civilian side of its activities might be as important as the military. Other kinds of paramilitary or semi-military groups might exist for service in this country or for various kinds of scientific, exploratory, or development activities. (One can imagine a year's tour of duty on the moon, in an undersea installation, or in Antarctica or the Amazon basin.) This kind of National Service might become very popular, winning the support of young people who like freedom of choice and of the older people who believe that the young should experience hard training and hard living, or at least make some public service contribution between their permissive youthful period and their affluent and comfortable adulthood.

Requiring two years of national service from all or most males (and perhaps females as well) would make it much easier for the armed forces to recruit, particularly if the terms of enlistment are made attractive.

The main reason for having females in national service is that in an egalitarian society there is no reason to differentiate between males and females except for actual combat. In addition, we may find, as the Israelis do, that if females are included and national service becomes a

It would not seem likely, in the mosaic society we have imagined, that there would be much of an attempt in national service to instill any very strong ideologies or principles among young people, at least as a whole (but this may not be true of various subgroups). In part this is because it is hard to imagine what kind of a common denominator could serve as a basis for indoctrination in the postulated mosaic (and perhaps divided) U.S. society of the period 1975-1985, and any attempt to use an ideology which raises many questions or controversies could easily act as a polarizing influence. This is not to say that there will not be great unity and organizational pride and the like, but only that the "internal propaganda" is likely to be low-keyed, matter of fact, and heavily dependent on things like unit morale and relatively technical and individual themes in preference to more chauvinistic and/or jingoistic themes.

2. The Inward-Looking, Neo-Isolationist World

Much the same kind of military establishment as indicated above could exist in this projection, but in a context of considerable domestic protest and animosity. Some will support the military establishment for its function in what is, for them, a "Fortress America," but to most people it no doubt will seem that the country is not seriously threatened. (Obviously, threats could exist, and even be stimulated by the nation's adopting a neo-isolationist U.S. policy.) One result, or perhaps even a cause, of this neo-isolationism could, at least conceivably, be profound political and social fissures in American society. What we might call a "technocratic or responsible center" party might emerge to lead the country, but experiencing attack from both the political right, seeking ideological renewal in American society, and what we might call the "humanist left" --

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way of life for young people, there is much less resentment against such national service. It may even be looked forward to more as marking the boundary between childhood and adulthood than as being specially militaristic. Indeed, for those who believe it useful for young people, for at least part of their life, to do some kind of hard training, hard living, or make some kind of physically or otherwise difficult public service contribution, the arguments seem to hold for girls as well as boys, and thus including girls emphasizes the "national service" aspect.

We have used the terms "technocratic center" and "humanist left" to describe what seems the most likely and basic confrontation the U.S. will face in 1975-1985. "Humanist left" is a conglomerate term covering those who emphasize individual rights virtually to the point of anarchy, who are anti-institutional, anti-establishment, anti-hierarchy, and desire a near-revolutionary reform of society. They are like today's radical left but with more coherent and serious--and probably more conservative--programs. The "technocratic center" runs from those simple technicians who do a responsible and effective job keeping the system running, various "stoics" who feel a sense of personal responsibility for public service and for the public good, many "epicurean" types who would prefer to be left alone

or, less charitably, the "radical" or "anarchic" left. These critics on the left would support a program not so different from that of the American New Left today, though perhaps somewhat less anarchistic, less self-righteous, with less of a tendency towards confrontation and violence.

We have assumed in both the Integrated and Peaceful Context and even more in the Neo-Isolationist World that there is little or nothing in international conditions to provide special justification for the role and functions of "the Establishment" and its military preparations.* This assumption could, of course, be wrong. Common purposes, common projects, common values, and/or other new "variables," movements, or trends could act as a social cement, creating or improving the unity of the society in ways that seem unlikely today. But the basic assumption reflects a judgment put quite well by Henry Owen in a recent article:**

> Thus traditional notions of the power and authority of national governments no longer command--in the developed world at least--the allegiance that they did in times past. Symbols and slogans which derive from these notions are losing their force. Peoples grope for new concepts which will respond more directly to the needs of our day. The failure to find them as yet accounts for some of the unease and questioning which characterizes this transitional period.

3. Disarray World

We now assume that the international hostility and competition is substantially greater than in the first two worlds. As a result the defense budget could rise to between 10-15% of the gross national product, or roughly $200 billion dollars a year. Part of the expenditure could be

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In private life or individual activity but nonetheless make a major contribution to keeping society functioning and stable. The technocratic center also covers many who might better be called members of the "humanist center," sharing many of the values of the humanist left but also too pragmatic or too cautious to accept the programs of the humanist left. The humanist center, like the humanist left, focus major attention on the kind of human being society should be creating.

There is a story sometimes told in Israel about the Moroccan Jew who meets the Ashkenazi (a Jew of European extraction) and says to him: "I don't like this European culture which you are forcing on me. Please keep it to yourself." The Ashkenazi Jew answers, "There are 100 million Arabs!" The Moroccan Jew thinks about this statement for about 10 seconds and then replies, "Where is the electrical engineering school?"

** Henry Owen, "Foreign Policy Premises for the Next Administration," Foreign Affairs 46: 699-712, July 1968, p. 701.

or extensive military aid programs for foreign countries (with some or all of the complicating issues arising we already are familiar with).

If we have the same alienated society postulated in the last context, one can readily assume some emphasis on the use of foreign legions or special elite volunteers so that it is unnecessary for the average American to participate unwillingly in foreign expeditions or interventions. If nuclear weapons have been used at some point before the year 1985, the international context could be vastly altered. If, for example, two small nations waged nuclear war and wiped one another out, then existing sanctions against nuclear weapons or the exploitation of their threat might well be reinforced. If one side came out very well, winning the war, then there could be considerable international apprehension. In the Disarray World the chance that the successful nuclear power would not be punished or penalized for its nuclear attack, perhaps even for its nuclear aggression, is fairly large. It is conceivable in this Disarray World that a nuclear power would "successfully" use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear power. Finally, it is conceivable that if something like a tit-for-tat exchange of nuclear weapons occurred, in which one side perhaps tried to bluff the other by escalating to a very limited nuclear use and encountered a tit-for-tat response, both sides might decide never to use nuclear weapons again.

In this case the concept of tit-for-tat could be deeply ingrained everywhere, and there would be great interest in protecting the United States from such attacks. Such protection might be relatively easy to achieve.

Whether or not there had been any use of nuclear weapons in the Disarray World, military issues would intrude into the national debate more than in the other two worlds. To some degree this might make the military establishment more acceptable to the public. Others would find it less acceptable, arguing that the "insanity of such a situation" is by now totally clear. "We live in a world which could solve all of its economic problems by better use of technology and better distribution of resources or other goods, yet we threaten everyone with world annihilation or worse." (The underlining is deliberate. Many will talk this way--and perhaps be right.)

In the Disarray World there might be attempts to smuggle nuclear weapons into the United States, perhaps in retaliation to U.S. interference overseas--or at least the fear of such attempts may exist. In this case one can imagine rigid control over entry points and possibly a fair amount of control over movement within the United States. Political police and clandestine surveillance could increase enormously. If nuclear weapons had been used in the internal politics of other nations,*

*See, for instance, "The Risks of Spreading Weapons: A Historical Case," D.G. Brennan, Arms Control and Disarmament, 1968, Vol. 7, 59-60.

there might be a fear of a similar event in the United States. Today we dismiss such scenarios as Seven Days In May as purely fanciful.* In the future they might become credible--or at least barely credible.

4. The Uncontrolled Arms Race World

This is a context of great crisis and risk. There may be a rather large war raging in Europe or Asia. Nuclear weapons may have been used. One can easily imagine one-fifth--and perhaps one-third or more--of U.S. gross national product in military preparations. Thus the military budget could easily range from $300 to $500 billion a year or even more.

Consider therefore a budget of, say, $400 billion a year. Assume also that the United States had made preparations before the international situation had deteriorated, so that it was able to move very rapidly. One can now imagine the U.S. having a ballistic missile defense system in space which attacks enemy missiles in their launch phase when they are very vulnerable because of their boosters. Such a system would be very expensive to deploy (say an initial $100 billion) and expensive to operate (say $20 to $40 billion a year) but once deployed might effectively prevent the other side from deploying such a system. In other words, the first side to seize outer space in this way might in fact control outer space indefinitely. And effective as this space defense system might be, it would still be only the first line of defense. Behind it would be a system which intercepts missiles in mid-transit, and behind that an upper-altitude interception system (such as the current Spartan), and behind even that a system similar to the current SPRINT missile intercepting enemy missiles in the atmosphere itself.

In the area of passive defense, one can imagine a reasonably deep shelter space available for everybody in the United States--both at home and at work. Many people and much industry might also be evacuated from the cities because one could build more effective shelters in less densely populated areas. With one or two years of advance notice it would be

*A difference between the United States, England and Scandinavia, and many countries of Continental Europe, is worth noting here. The former are basically civilian, in that it is almost inconceivable that army enlisted men would follow the orders of an officer in violent rebellion against the government. This is not necessarily true in such countries as France. There are, for example, few Frenchmen, Italians, Austrians, Germans, etc., who did not believe that there was a real possibility of a coup when General MacArthur returned from Korea and addressed Congress in 1951 following his dismissal. Yet, of course, the thought hardly occurred to Americans. In fact President Truman did not move a single squad of soldiers or police unit in anticipation of such a possibility.

possible to have many of these shelter spaces deep underground where they would survive even direct hits of multimegaton bombs. For only a fraction of $400 billion a year one could also put deep underground a good deal of the productive capacity of the United States. (Today, roughly speaking, the real tangible wealth of the United States totals something over two trillion dollars; but the productive part is only a fraction of this sum.) There would, of course, be extensive preparations--perhaps including extensive undersea installations--to protect against enemy submarines.

What we are suggesting is simply that with a profound threat to the country, a threat like that posed in the past by Hitler, or even Stalin or Tojo, there might be a reaction in the United States that simply amounted to the United States becoming a quasi-garrison state. It seems technologically and economically perfectly possible (it is also possible that it might not be possible) that, in the 1975-1985 time period, by spending hundreds of millions of dollars a year the United States could put itself in a position to wage and survive major nuclear war. It also seems plausible in the postulated international environment that by being in a position to survive a nuclear war, the U.S. might be much more capable of preventing such a nuclear war from occurring. But it is an exceedingly dim prospect, nevertheless; for one thing, the calculations are very uncertain. Nevertheless, we are suggesting that this kind of mobilization race still is meaningful despite the usual assumptions about easy and mutual nuclear overkill.

As far as expenditures are concerned, we have already had examples of comparable budget expansions. At the height of World War II the United States was spending more than 50% of its gross national product on the war (the average though in 1945 was only 50% but it hit a higher rate in the early and mid-part of the year). To take another example, in June, 1950, there was a debate in the United States over whether the defense budget should be $14, $15, or $16 billion. The previous year it had been $13 billion. A number of Americans testified to the effect that a budget of $18, $19 or $20 billion could bankrupt the country. During that month North Korea invaded South Korea; before the year was out Congress had authorized a $60-billion defense budget. It is important to note that this authorization completely changed the technological picture. Without it, people would have been saying throughout the 1950's that such weapons systems as B-52's, Minuteman, Polaris and Sage were "technologically infeasible." So they are if the budget is $15 billion a year. But they are by no means technologically infeasible if the budget is increased by a factor of five. In the year 1980 or so things may be no different. A budget increase by a factor of five may make a great many things technologically feasible. And it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that if a Hitler-type leader rises again, and says, "One of us has to be reasonable, and it isn't going to be me," that one reaction may be a very meaningful and significant doubling or tripling of the budget. This becomes much more meaningful and significant if the country has made preliminary preparations to reduce the lead time on many of the systems to be bought.

C. Conclusion

It should be clear to the reader that we have left more topics undiscussed than discussed. We have ignored the possibility of a really radical change in the international situation. Thus we have assumed that the major issues of defense and security devolve on the nation-state, which survives, unless, of course, such nations as the United States or the Soviet Union should take upon themselves regional or world hegemony.

We have not looked carefully at cases in which what we have called the "humanist left" or some "fellow traveling" group acquired great influence and "changed the rules." For example, one might imagine a situation in which the concept of conscientious objection is so broadened that no one is forced to fight in a war which is, in his judgment, unjust or unreasonable. Given the concept of national service, which would act as a spur for many people to enlist, this might be a perfectly reasonable rule which would work in a large range of situations--in other contexts it would be disastrous. Nor have we discussed the possibility that military service becomes so onerous and unpleasant that really large inducements must be provided for Americans to be willing to serve. We have not discussed the possibility of Praetorian Guards, or even of the development of a Praetorian mentality--or even of a widespread Centurion mentality.

What we have tried to do is cover a reasonable range of plausible over-all contexts and examine their salient implications for the time frame 1975-1985. We turn now to somewhat more specific and perhaps more realistic issues.

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CHAPTER II. SPECIAL DEFENSE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, JAPAN AND WEST GERMANY

We discuss in this chapter in some detail the defense policies and perspectives for the 1975-1985 environment of four countries with which United States defense planners work closely and which are likely to be of continuing concern or interest. It is sometimes forgotten that the majority of defense planning activities occur less in the direct context of the potential enemy's threat than in how to coordinate and deal with our "allies." Britain, France and West Germany have the highest defense expenditures among U.S. allies (indeed their defense expenditures rank only behind the United States, Soviet Union and Communist China). Each of these countries will present major problems for American defense planners in 1975-1985.

In the case of Britain we will have to decide whether we should continue the privileged relationship on nuclear matters, both with respect to nuclear materials exchange and delivery vehicles such as Polaris; we will have to deal with the consequences of the expected withdrawal from East of Suez; and we will have to adopt a policy towards Britain's entry into the European Community and its implications for a European nuclear force and European defense technology, or the alternatives open to Britain should she not enter "Europe." In the case of France we deal with the expected policies of that country towards the United States and NATO after the de Gaulle era comes to an end, and the implication for American defense planning on Western Europe. West Germany with its particular problems arising from the division of the Germanies, its political insecurity and instability, and its large army and nuclear option will continue to be closely watched by American planners and be of special concern to them. We also include a discussion of Japan, the country which could most dramatically and quickly alter the entire range of defense problems in Asia and which will greatly affect the security and stability of Southeast Asia after Vietnam.

United Kingdom

Britain's defense role in 1975-1985 will be markedly different from that of the commitments undertaken in the first twenty-five postwar years. This is important for American defense planners to grasp. Although it can be argued that American strategic considerations have been made "independent" of the contributions which our allies can make to Western defense, nevertheless it is a fact that Britain has traditionally been looked upon as America's closest ally and that the military capabilities and obligations undertaken by the two countries have intertwined. This has been particularly true for the U.S. Air Force which encouraged the British to build-up their own Bomber Command in the 1950's as a contribution to the Western deterrent. Subsequently the U.S. Air Force encouraged the Royal Air Force to acquire the Skybolt missile for its V-bombers in order to extend their usefulness in a strategic capacity. Moreover, there have been

a number of close relationships between the two Air Forces going back not only to the stationing of U.S. bases in Britain during World War II, but also the decision made during the Berlin crisis of 1951 to base B-29's on the British Isles.

Today the United States and the United Kingdom operate a joint early warning system (BMEWS), part of which is located in Northern England. There is an extremely close relationship between the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy because of the agreement to sell Polaris missiles to Britain. And there are a number of continuing atomic energy accords providing for the exchange of information on such items as production of fissile materials and warhead designs.

Thus there is little doubt that whatever the political differences between Britain and the United States (and they remain relatively small in comparison to, for example, the differences in views between France and ourselves), there does remain a "special relationship" particularly in the military-strategic field. One question we must try to answer is to what extent this "special relationship" will extend into the 1970's and beyond.

A second reason why Britain's defense role is important is because of its impact upon the evolution of Western Europe. In terms of military strength and technological inventiveness and capabilities, Britain has a great contribution to make to the new Europe which is likely to emerge. It would not be surprising if American planners discovered that their ability to influence the turn of events in Europe will be somewhat dependent upon the degree of involvement of the United Kingdom in the affairs of the European continent. This is particularly likely to be true if, as a result of recent political changes, Britain participates much more actively and intensely in continental economics and politics.

Third, Britain is now emerging out of at least the first stage of an important debate concerning what should be the role of her military forces in the East of Suez environment in the 1970's and beyond. Major decisions have been made with respect to the cut-back of British forces which have already presented dilemmas for U.S. planners concerned with the maintenance of stability in the Indian Ocean area and Southeast Asia. We must ask if the British withdrawal will indeed be as precipitous and total as would seem to be the case today, or if there is likely to be a change of heart as the 1971 date for withdrawal draws near, either through a reconsideration by the Labor government or the coming to office of a Conservative government in the United Kingdom. The British withdrawal from East of Suez most obviously has serious implications for American policy, vis-à-vis Australia, India and all of Southeast Asia.

Let us now consider in a somewhat more systematic manner British defense policy as it is likely to evolve in 1975-85 and the issues which it will present to American planners and policy makers. We shall consider in turn the three principal roles of British forces: the nuclear role, the contribution of NATO defenses in Western Europe, and the role in the area of East of Suez.

A. Nuclear Strategic Forces

1. A Short History

Questions concerning the continuation of Britain's nuclear strategic forces, the possible sale of Poseidon missiles to the United Kingdom, and the maintenance of exchange agreements on atomic energy matters are likely to face American planners in the 1975-1985 period. One thing seems to us perfectly clear, and that is that Britain will not voluntarily get out of the nuclear business as many Americans (and some British) had hoped in the late 1950's and early 1960's. To understand why it might be useful to review in some detail the history of the British nuclear program. We do this also because there has been considerable confusion concerning the political--economic--bureaucratic incentives and considerations relating to the British nuclear program and the consequent ability or inability of United States to manipulate British planning.

It is not widely known that the origin of the British nuclear capability dates as far back as 1940 when a secret scientific group, the Maud Committee, was appointed in London to examine whether uranium research could in time lead to a weapon of mass destruction. The Committee reported that an atomic bomb was feasible, that the Germans might be working on one, and recommended that Britain start an atomic project. Even if it did not lead to a bomb which would be usable during the Second World War, such a bomb would have important implications in the post-war world. Because of the cost of plants to produce fissile materials and the danger of bombardment by Germany, British atomic scientists moved to the United States in 1943 to join the Manhattan Project. The first atomic bomb was therefore a collaborative Anglo-American undertaking, even if a lopsided one. Nuclear collaboration was not easily achieved; the British, always mindful of the post-war world, were determined not to be edged out of the nuclear business as they suspected the Americans wished to do. Two wartime agreements signed by Roosevelt and Churchill, the Quebec Agreement of 1943 and the Hyde Park Aide-Mémoire of 1944, appeared to assure continued Anglo-American nuclear collaboration following the war. But such was not to be the case, for with the passage of the McMahon Act by Congress in 1946 restricting the exchange of atomic information, collaboration between the two countries ground to a halt.

However, there was hardly any serious consideration given after the war to discontinuing the British atomic endeavor. Nuclear research facilities were opened in 1946 and the next year, following the enactment of the McMahon Act, it was decided to build an atomic bomb independently. For the nuclear scientists this seemed natural since the costs were not held to be prohibitive and there was little controversy on moral grounds concerning the manufacture of a British bomb. For the limited number of politicians and Whitehall officials privy to the decision, nuclear weapons were seen as helping to guarantee the nation's security. In early 1947 Britain stood alone; it must be remembered that this was before the return of the American interest in Europe through the Marshall Plan and NATO. Moreover, acquiring the best military weapon available was natural for the leaders of a nation

which still thought of itself as a Great Power with an important world role, which was one of the victorious wartime Big Three, and which had a long tradition of leadership in science and technology. The first British atomic bomb was detonated off Monte Bello Island in Australia in 1952 and a thermonuclear device was exploded in 1957 at Christmas Island in the Pacific. Long-range aircraft, the V-bombers, were built to carry the nuclear bombs of the Royal Air Force.

The strategic doctrine for the nuclear force--the concept of the "independent nuclear deterrent"--was formulated not before, but after Britain became a nuclear power. It evolved out of a number of considerations in the mid-1950's which led Britain to place heavy reliance on nuclear weapons in her national security planning. The Korean rearmament program severely strained the economy and led to the conviction that the size of the existing defense forces was not compatible with a growing economy, a sound trade position and an adequate level of social welfare. Churchill asked the Chiefs of Staff to make a reassessment of British defense policy given the new availability of nuclear weapons. The "Global Strategy Paper" which they drafted and subsequently became policy, contained the thesis that the West should declare that Soviet aggression would be met by nuclear retaliation. Consequently, the West could reduce its conventional forces and rely on its nuclear superiority. The subsequent decision of 1957 to terminate mandatory national military services was said to have been made possible by a greater reliance on nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence was also the logical continuation of the doctrine of strategic bombing which had been at the heart of the RAF ever since its birth during World War I as the first separate air force. The V-bomber, like the Dreadnought of an earlier era, was seen as a "dominant weapon" which made possible a reduction in manpower and "conventional" armaments.

Independent nuclear deterrence, that is a nuclear deterrent under British control, was at first justified by the government by the fact that Britain might have a different set of targeting priorities than the United States. It received a further justification of a strategic nature when Sputnik demonstrated that the United States would be vulnerable to Soviet long-range missiles. Who could then guarantee that an American President would come to the defense of Britain if in so doing he exposed American cities to attack by Soviet intercontinental missiles? But equally important were the political justifications given for the nuclear force. It was claimed that British nuclear weapons increased London's influence in Washington and enhanced the nation's prestige and status as a Great Power. At the same time they were thought to permit greater independence from Washington in foreign and defense policy. The aftermath of the Suez affair was to increase the desire for freedom of action. In a political sense, the British bomb was aimed more at Washington than at Moscow. This was made evident by such statements as that of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan when in discussing the nuclear force he said:

> The independent contribution...gives us a better position in the world, it gives us a better position with respect to the United States. It puts us where we ought

> to be, in the position of a Great Power. The fact that we have it makes the United States pay a greater regard to our point of view, and that is of great importance.*

Not everyone agreed, however. The case against independent possession of nuclear arms was at various times made by segments of the national press, academic analysts and other private strategists, some Army and Navy officers, prominent backbenchers of both major parties, the Liberal party after 1957 and the Labour party starting in 1960. Those who were opposed to the nuclear force claimed that it was not a credible deterrent since its use would be suicidal because of Soviet missiles, following a British nuclear strike, Russia would still be capable of obliterating Britain. The mounting costs of maintaining the nuclear force were said to distort Britain's defense posture by causing a neglect of conventional capabilities including a weakening of NATO ground forces. It was seen as an unnecessary duplication of the American deterrent which conflicted with United States defense policy and undermined the solidarity of the Western Alliance.

The critics also denied that the nuclear force bought influence. Britain's influence in the world, they argued, depended on the ability to help maintain stability in Africa and Asia and her contribution to the conventional defense of Europe, the soundness of the economy; the intangibles of trust and loyalty as an ally; the quality of its advice--rather than on duplicating SAC on a minute scale Finally, some contended that Britain by her example was encouraging the proliferation of nuclear weapons, since most of the justifications cited by the British government for the nuclear force were equally applicable to other countries.

The leaders of the Labour party decided in 1960 to withdraw their support of the Conservative government's policy on the nuclear force and advocated that following the obsolescence of the V-bombers they not be replaced and that Britain "cease" to be a nuclear power. This change of position occurred after the cancellation of Blue Streak, a liquid-fuel intermediate-range missile which was intended to provide the delivery system after the V-bombers. Blue Streak was cancelled because of its spiraling costs and increasing vulnerability. Its demise occurred at the same time as the rise of support within the rank and file of the Labour party for unilateral nuclear disarmament. The debate within the party between the unilateralists and the multilateralists, a debate which was not unrelated to an attempt to oust Hugh Gaitskell from the party's leadership, threatened to tear the party apart. The cancellation of Blue Streak served as a catalyst which permitted Labour's leaders to oppose the continuation of the "independent deterrent" and thereby help end the party's civil war not on the principle of unilateralism, but on the practical grounds that the trends of technology and costs put a credible strategic delivery system beyond the means of Britain.

Thereupon Labour, supported by a substantial portion of informed opinion, was critical of plans to maintain the nuclear force, first with

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*The Times (London), February 24, 1958.

the Skybolt missile to be attached to the V-bombers and then Polaris submarines. In the months prior to the General Election of 1964 the fate of the independent deterrent was the principle foreign and defense issue between the political parties. The Tories stressed the need for "Independence" and freedom of action, charging that Labour would "hand over" Britain's defense to another country. Prime Minister Alec Douglas Home extolled in a jingoistic vein the virtues of the British bomb as a "ticket of admission" to the councils of war and peace, and insisted that British influence would be greatly reduced if nuclear weapons were renounced. Labour somewhat ambiguously indicated that it would denuclearize Britain in exchange for greater participation in American defense planning. Harold Wilson spoke of "renegotiating" the Nassau Agreement by which Britain had been given an option on purchasing Polaris missiles, thereby implying that they would not be bought from the United States.

Once in office, however, Labour took no such rash action. The missile purchase arrangement was retained and the first Polaris equipped nuclear submarine, the Resolution, went on patrol in 1968. A number of reasons were cited for continuing the nuclear force: cancellation costs on the Polaris contract had passed the "point of no return"; the Polaris force, as indicated earlier, was needed to provide a nuclear guarantee for India; the submarines were acquired on such advantageous terms that the argument that Britain could not afford to maintain a nuclear force had been deflated. In any case, the Labour government said, Britain intended to "internationalize" her nuclear arms in its proposal for an Atlantic Nuclear Force.

The underlying explanations, however, are somewhat different. First, it was recognized that the configuration of the problem of nuclear spread had altered since the time when it could be argued that Britain, by voluntarily renouncing her nuclear arms, could strongly influence other countries to desist from acquiring them. Nuclear proliferation in Asia and the Middle East was not on the horizon. In addition little enthusiasm could be conjured in London for an act of self-abnegation which would leave France as the only European nuclear power. Second, the nuclear force was seen as an important bargaining asset and instrument of diplomacy. Its existence ensured that special regard was given to Britain's point of view on such matters as the Multilateral Nuclear Force, NATO strategy, or the non-proliferation treaty. Moreover, the nuclear force would give Britain a decisive role in shaping a future European deterrent or any other European nuclear arrangement, and might also serve as the price of admission into the Common Market. Third, Labour ministers responsible for handling foreign relations acknowledged that intangibly it somehow enhanced Britain's influence.

2. The Present and Future

A fundamental aim of any British government is to find ways to have its voice heard. It is true that for the British the linkage between arms and influence is now open to serious question--or at least is very complex. But not only would it be equally difficult to prove that by scrapping her

nuclear arms Britain would be increasing her influence and prestige, but in this area--as in many areas--thinking so makes it so. And many would regard a unilateral British renunciation of nuclear force--without a suitable quid pro quo or serious ideological objective--as an open abdication of authority or bargaining power in future international politics--including "crisis management."

By 1970 the British Polaris Flotilla of four submarines will be in operation. The HMS Repulse and the HMS Renown, the second and third subs, were accepted into service by the Royal Navy in October 1968 and February 1969 respectively and are now undergoing their final trials including the test firing of the Polaris missiles off Cape Kennedy. The fourth submarine, HMS Revenge, will be entering into service in early 1970. These submarines are equipped with sixteen A-3 Polaris missiles each with a range of over 2,500 nautical miles. Because of the extensive refitting required after each sixty-day patrol it will only be possible to assure having one submarine on station at sea at all times, although normally there should be two. A fifth Polaris submarine which would guarantee two submarines on patrol at all times had once been scheduled but was canceled for economy reasons. The Royal Navy, however, can be expected to increase its pressures for a fifth Polaris-type submarine and it would not be surprising if the total British flotilla consisted of five subs by 1975.

An important policy question will be whether the United States will make Poseidon missiles available to the Royal Navy. Thus far the British have not pressed the case for Poseidon because of the heavy expenses involved and because of their belief in the ability of the A-3 Polaris missile to get through Soviet defenses. But if the Soviets continue their ABM deployment, serious questions will then be raised about the credibility of the British Polaris submarines. And the question will also be raised whether the United States should make Poseidon available. This will be a difficult question to resolve, not only because of the expenses but because of the political implications of once again coming to the nuclear assistance of the United Kingdom. The 1962 decision at Nassau to sell Polaris submarines to Britain probably had some influence upon the decision of de Gaulle several weeks later to veto the British application to the Common Market.

Unquestionably, the long history of nuclear and strategic relations between the United States and the United Kingdom has contributed to the image held by many continental Europeans that Britain is closer to the United States than to the Continent. Ever since the 1954 changes to the McMahon Act, but especially since 1958 when the legislation was amended to give Britain a privileged access to American nuclear technology, Britain has been treated sui generis. The 1958 amendments permitted the exchange of information about the design and production of nuclear warheads and the transfer of fissile materials. The British Polaris submarines will be run on nuclear fuel from the United States, will contain an American navigation system and fire-control system, will be made of American high-stress steel, will contain American communications equipment, some of the warheads will be of American design, and of course the Polaris missiles are being purchased from the United States. Although France would probably now qualify under

the terms of the 1958 amendments--that assistance be given only to nations that have already made "substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons"--it has not been the United States' policy to assist the growth of the force de frappe. (But as suggested later this may conceivably change.)

If Britain were to enter into military nuclear cooperation with a continental European nation, she would probably either have to relinquish her bilateral arrangements with the United States or persuade Washington to give nuclear assistance to an Anglo-French or European nuclear force. Indeed, under existing arrangements it would be difficult for Britain without Washington's acquiescence to disengage herself from the nuclear arrangements with the United States in such a manner that she could productively collaborate with France, since so much of Britain's nuclear knowledge and experience have become intertwined with American atomic secrets. On the other hand, an American policy which encouraged Anglo-French collaboration and perhaps provided assistance directly to it might strengthen the voice of Washington in the affairs of Europe.

In the 1975-1985 time frame Britain will be forced to make some fundamental decisions about the future of her nuclear role. In the past she has attempted simultaneously to remain an "independent" nuclear power, maintain a special nuclear relationship with the United States, and enter "Europe." It is not certain that she will be able to continue indefinitely this difficult balancing act. Britain's nuclear decisions will be influenced by the broadest political considerations regarding the choice of her future political, economic and military partners, and their choice of her. But in a narrower sense the critical question for the future of her nuclear force will be: what degree of nuclear self-sufficiency, especially in strategic delivery systems, does Britain wish to maintain? Assuming that she will not renounce her nuclear arms, there are five major alternative policies which Britain could follow.

First, Britain could seek to renew her present dependency on the United States. This may be the least expensive policy, but it is risky and it runs counter to the economic and political pressures that are pushing her into Europe. Second, Britain could pursue a policy of deliberate independence--not to be ridiculed since it is the chosen policy of all the other nuclear powers. France's example is being watched with interest and considerable envy ("French missiles will carry the tricolore; Britain's the stars and stripes"). The successful development of a French-made IRBM will spur jealousies and generate pressures for a British equivalent, but neither country is likely to be able to maintain on its own in the 1980's a nuclear force that provides a credible deterrent against a nuclear superpower.

Third, an Anglo-French collaborative arrangement might be worked out. In the past decade, through a number of joint projects such as the Concorde, precedents have grown for technological cooperation without political communion. A Paris-London "Entente Nucleaire" in the 1970's might, to give an example, exchange British knowledge of warhead design and production for the French experience with solid fuel missile propulsion, to the mutual advantage of both. Thus the growing gap between the super-nuclear powers and the

lesser nuclear powers may induce the latter to join forces. Fourth, a European defense arrangement might be sought which would be independent of the United States and NATO. This could take the form of a European nuclear force, which would be built upon the British and French nuclear forces, or a more comprehensive European organization for defense technology. The former might present grave problems because of the difficulty in giving Germany and the smaller European nations a sense of participation without engaging in nuclear proliferation and exacerbating tensions with the Soviet Union, not to mention creating extremely complex command and control problems which could only be handled through a substantial degree of political unification. A European system for defense technology, on the other hand, based on the WEU or a new European institution, might offer the most politically acceptable and efficient manner of pooling national efforts on weapons systems. In recent years, as Britain has turned towards Europe, it has looked anticipatingly towards a European technological community. Fifth, an Atlantic "solution" might be sought through a major revamping of NATO. Conceivably the United States would make nuclear weapons available to the alliance without retaining control over their use. But it is unlikely that NATO arrangement would prove fully satisfactory in the future, given the overwhelming American dominance in nuclear strategic systems and the European need for independence, self-esteem, and the dignity of a major role in its own defense.

B. Britain's European Role

It now seems quite likely that by 1975-85 Britain's defense posture will be mainly, perhaps solely, directed towards participation in European defense. Only the soothsayer can now tell what will be the political linkage between the United Kingdom and the Common Market nations, for so much of this depends upon the longevity of de Gaulle. Nevertheless we can assume that Britain's reorientation of her defense policy will have been completed by 1975 and that there will be a primary concentration of her military role in Europe following the withdrawal from bases East of Suez.

The question remains as to what will be the nature of British force commitments in Europe. In terms of existing and planned capabilities there is a strong case for Britain to make a disproportionate air and naval contribution and to do less on land. The Royal Navy, as befits a nation which once had large maritime interests, is the strongest Western navy in Europe. Already virtually all of it is committed to NATO. Britain has tactical aircraft assigned to NATO and once the medium bomber force becomes obsolescent within the early 1970's it will be transferred to a tactical role and also committed to NATO.

The case for maintaining a relatively effective British Army on the Rhine is based mainly on political grounds. For if Britain is to maintain political influence on the Continent, particularly at a time when there are no formal political links, and if she is to retain her influence in the formulation of NATO strategy, it is absolutely essential that the BAOR be retained in roughly its present size. Indeed the British have recently offered

to make available to NATO a further infantry battalion subject to the definition of a suitable role for it. As ground forces are withdrawn from East of Suez they will become available for European defense. Because it is more expensive to garrison troops in the United Kingdom than in Germany there will not be any real budgetary reasons for withdrawing forces from Germany except those relating to balance-of-payment considerations. We can expect that the British will put heavy pressure upon the Germans to continue and increase their offset payments for the stationing of British forces on the Continent.

We would emphasize, however, that Britain is not likely to become a truly continental power in the sense of committing large-scale conventional forces to Western Europe. For one thing this would necessitate the reintroduction of conscription, a step which all politicians would agree would be most unpopular to a government and probably fatal in a political sense. Moreover, a larger army would probably take the form of one equipped with sufficient armor and direct air and artillery support to be capable of rapid and substantial expansion. Such a large conventional continental standing army would be thought to be too expensive and probably not needed.

Whitehall planners tend to maintain a somewhat blind faith in the efficacy of the nuclear deterrent and are unwilling to face the possibility of a serious conventional war on the Continent. Therefore the British, despite the Labour party's inclination while in opposition in the early 1960's to support the Kennedy-McNamara policy of "flexible response," are likely to maintain emphasis upon reliance upon nuclear weapons as a deterrent in Central Europe. Denis Healey has recently taken a lead in his realistic warning that a serious military collision would soon drive NATO to recourse to nuclear weapons. The British have been engaged with the West Germans in a serious planning exercise on tactical nuclear weapons within the context of the nuclear planning group of NATO. They are fully aware that, despite the alliance's adoption in December 1967 of a policy of "flexible response," it remains largely dependent upon a relatively early use of tactical nuclear weapons. Moreover the British have taken the lead in warning that recent events in Eastern Europe, and the swiftness by which the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces were able to send troops into Czechoslovakia, does not augur well for stability in Central Europe. They have urged that NATO improve its mobilization capabilities, reserve forces and modernize its equipment. They have also stressed the importance of mobility for NATO forces, particularly with the danger of incidents on NATO's southern flank and the new perception of the Soviet threat in the Mediterranean.

Britain's gradual conversion to the desirability and perhaps necessity of entering Europe is well known and need not be chronicled here. One of the sources of pressure for joining Europe has been the need of defense-related industries, such as those of aircraft, electronics and computers, to find a market sufficiently large to sustain them. To take the British aircraft industry as a case in point, by most standards it should be the right industry for the United Kingdom to have as one of its fields of industrial specialization in the international market place. It has a sixty

year tradition of leadership in aeronautics and scientific inventiveness, and until very recently retained a highly skilled labor force and excellent airframe design teams. For the past decade, however, the aircraft industry has been unable to compete for foreign orders with the American aircraft industry's lower prices, due, in considerable measure, to the latter's far larger domestic market. For the American industry, foreign orders are a welcome bonus; but for the British they are essential to survival. The Plowden Committee, appointed by the government to examine the condition of the aircraft industry, concluded that there was no future on a continuing basis for an independent, self-supporting British aircraft industry. Since it estimated collaboration with the American aircraft industry--such as the manufacture under license in the United Kingdom of American aircraft--to be unlikely, the Plowden Committee recommended far greater collaboration with Europe, and France in particular. The logic of modern large-scale technology, of which defense is an important sector, has been inexorably nudging Britain into Europe.

The contribution which Britain could make to the European Economic Community in the field of defense technology is in fact one of its strongest selling points. Britain is, of course, one of the two nuclear powers in Europe and of the two has by far the greater experience in most aspects of atomic research for military and civil purposes, in the production of fissile materials and the manufacture and deployment of nuclear weapons. Britain will have tested her first thermonuclear device more than eleven years before France. In addition to atomic energy, Britain has a lead in many other aspects of defense technology. The United Kingdom continues to possess the largest research and development base in Europe. While it is likely that the British aerospace industry cannot remain viable without substantial overseas markets, it nevertheless remains the largest in Europe. For most of the period since the Second World War, until the start of the 1960's, Britain attempted to remain on the "frontier" of defense technology and aimed to possess an independent self-sufficient weapons industry which produced the same range of weapons as the superpowers, although in far smaller quantities. Thus Britain was the only European nation to enter the ballistic field from its inception--a move which proved unfortunate since at the time there were still too many technical and financial factors which were unknown or underrated.

The fact that Britain is the strongest technological power in Western Europe has not been overlooked by Prime Minister Wilson in his bid for French acquiescence to her entry into the Common Market. Wilson proposed a Technological Community of the Six plus Britain and the creation of a European Technological Institute. Both British bids have been accompanied by hints that entry might result in bilateral collaboration in nuclear weapons. The British are likely to take the lead in the setting-up of any type of a European-wide defense production consortium.

C. Britain's Role East of Suez

The decision has now been taken by the Labour government that Britain will wind up its defense responsibilities in Asia by the end of 1971. This represents a reversal of the policy first adopted by the Labour government after it came to office in October 1964. At that time Harold Wilson was more interested in the "world-wide" role of Britain than in being, in his words, "corralled" into Europe. Thus Wilson was driven to admit that Britain's "frontiers" were on the Himalayas and that one thousand men East of Suez were as desirable as an additional thousand men in Germany. For a time the Labour government leaders, who had been out of office since 1951, still maintained the illusion that Britain had unique global interests and responsibilities and that these would give to the United Kingdom a special political role in international affairs. Minister of Defence Denis Healey, spoke of the "peacekeeping" role which Britain's armed forces could undertake, citing as an example the East African mutinies of 1964 and the successful British operations in maintaining order in Cyprus. Moreover, there was discussion in Whitehall of a possible British nuclear role in the Far East whereby the Polaris fleet would be used to implement some type of a nuclear guarantee for India. It became apparent after a time, however, that maintaining a sizable role East of Suez would not be possible. Such a role would require new aircraft carriers and other capabilities which the British Treasury was not able to afford (or the politicians thought that the British Treasury should not be made to spend). Moreover, as the Labour government somewhat reluctantly came to the view that Britain's future lay in Europe, it became increasingly apparent that the maintenance of a world-wide role was inconsistent with Britain's attempt to portray itself as a European power. Thus the 1967 defense review envisaged the ending of Britain's East of Suez policy by 1975. The approximately 74,000 servicemen in the Far East, principally in Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong, were to be withdrawn (except for Hong Kong) and returned to England or garrisoned in West Germany. The devaluation of the pound in November 1967 forced this timetable to be moved ahead. In one of its most important defense policy statements made since World War II, the British government decided in January 1968 to accelerate the timetable by giving up Britain's bases and her traditional role East of Suez at the end of 1971.

Should American planners therefore completely forget about Britain's role East of Suez in terms of the 1975-1985 environment? We would like to make two observations on this point.

First, it should be borne in mind that there is a reasonable possibility that the present government's policy of total withdrawal by the end of 1971 will be at least partially reversed. The Labour government has suffered a series of stunning reversals at the polls in the by-elections of the last 18 months. And because of its many signs of political weakness, the divisiveness within the Cabinet and within the Labour party, and the general immobilism of the Wilson government, it would not be surprising if a general election was forced upon the Labour government at almost any time. Under any circumstances, however, the government will have to go to the polls no later than October 1971, five years after the previous election. Thus the

very final withdrawal from East of Suez (again excepting Hong Kong) now scheduled for the end of 1971 would take place several months after the election. In all probability a Conservative government will then be in office.

A careful reading of the thoughts and writings of influential Conservatives, and principally those who are likely to be in positions of power in the next decade, suggests that they will not permit the East of Suez role to be completely terminated. This is not to say that the pattern of commitments in that area that existed up until quite recently will be maintained. But they may well be partially retained in the form of a presence in the Indian Ocean and possibly the maintenance of part of the base at Singapore if the host government there wishes that it be done. In this connection it is interesting to note that Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, upon hearing that British forces were to be withdrawn in 1971, specifically asked that this withdrawal process not be completed until the very end of 1971, indicating that he still hoped for some reversal of policy by the new British government. Thus we believe that Britain's role East of Suez may not be as dead as might be apparent today, and that the Royal Navy and possibly portions of the Army will still be stationed there in 1975-85.

Second, an important question for the time frame of this study is whether the United States should replace Great Britain in the East of Suez area should there be a total withdrawal, or even a partial withdrawal of British forces. In attempting to answer this question a number of factors should be borne in mind. The Indian Ocean area remains a pivotal point for helping to assure the stability and security of East Africa as well as Southeast Asia. There are more than thirty countries that touch upon the Indian Ocean or come within 500 miles of it. As the traditional keeper of the peace East of Suez in the past, Britain has been called upon to avert or terminate conflict in such varied places as Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, Kuwait, Mauritius, and Malaysia. It has found its "peacekeeping" role to be feasible and generally well received by the nations in the area. Britain's long tradition in these countries remains an important "good will" factor which should not be underestimated. It has been said that one British military band can have more influence than a brigade of United States Marines.

Another important consideration is that in the Indian Ocean, as in the Mediterranean since the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967, the Soviet Union has taken some steps to establish a naval presence. Although the level of Soviet naval interest in the Indian Ocean is still much less pronounced than in the Mediterranean, the precedent of Soviet vessels in the area has now been established and this is something which Western planners will have to watch carefully in the coming years. Thus we have here a situation whereby the announced closing of British bases in Singapore and the Persian Gulf and the withdrawal of military forces by the end of 1971 (there are 70,000 troops in the area at present) could lead to an unprecedented strategic and military vacuum in this area.

We set out below six alternative United States policies for dealing with the East of Suez vacuum which offer various levels and forms of U.S. participation in assuring the stability of the area.

1. The United States could encourage the British to remain East of Suez and continue the role which they have had for some decades. This could probably be done by providing incentives to the British to stay there in the form of economic assistance and possibly also defense equipment assistance. Such a policy would have the advantage of avoiding further American overseas commitments and would presumably please those who are concerned about the appearance of the United States as a unilateral "world policeman." Moreover, a policy encouraging the British to remain in the area would allow the West to take advantage of Britain's intimate knowledge of the area as well as her experience and tradition in it. A disadvantage of such a strategy, however, is that it could be interpreted (perhaps willfully so) by Communist and Asian powers as meaning a post-Vietnam weakening of the U.S. resolve. This is to say that we would not want to give the impression that in the aftermath of Vietnam we are unwilling to undertake commitments in the area ourselves.

2. The United States could attempt to construct a purely "local" balance of power in the area including the Philippines, Malaysia, and Japan. Here we would comment that it is not at all clear that this would be politically or technologically feasible in the 1970's or 1980's given the current patterns of evolution in the area. Japan remains more interested in retaining a high level of economic growth and technological advances than in strongly reinforcing her defense forces and expanding her defense commitments. Japan still is playing a relatively quiet role in international politics and perhaps should not directly be encouraged by the United States to do any different. The Philippines do not appear particularly interested in taking a position of leadership and Malaysia is burdened with economic problems. India remains relatively poor with a high population level, is trouble-ridden politically and does not seem inclined to undertake a position of regional leadership. Australia is only very slowly coming around to undertaking a larger defense burden, in part because it finds a measure of security in its geographic isolation. Thus as we look around there does not seem to be sufficient joint political will, diplomatic cohesion, and tradition of alliance or military cooperation to form a truly feasible Asian balance of power, particularly one which would provide a countervailing alliance against Communist China. The construction and initial operation of a balance of power vis-à-vis China would probably be too heavy a task for the Asian states alone. The prospect of success for such an Asian balance of power would therefore probably depend heavily upon the involvement of the United States.

3. The United States could join with Britain in developing a joint force possibly using bases on the Indian Ocean islands. It had at one time been planned to develop such bases jointly for the use of Polaris submarines and F-111 aircraft but these plans were altered as a result of the decision to withdraw British forces from the area.

4. A joint force consisting of Australian and New Zealand units along with American and British forces might be developed. This force would have both air and naval units. It might include a joint base in Northwest Australia for the use of the United States and Commonwealth countries.

5. The United States could undertake a major naval presence East of Suez, in particular in the Indian Ocean area, similar to the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. It should be recognized that relatively heavy financial costs would be involved in such a decision. Moreover, the political "justifications" for such a force are less convincing than at the time that the American presence in the Mediterranean was established. There may, therefore, be opposition to the establishment of a major U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean, not only from some countries but also within the United States from persons who feel that the United States should reduce, rather than extend, her commitments.

6. A joint force might be established under the auspices of an international military organization such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or the relatively new Asian and Pacific Council. This might have at its heart some type of a joint allied naval and air force with major components coming from the United States and Great Britain. Other potential contributors could include Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Malaysia, Japan and Singapore. An arrangement might be worked out for an integrated command structure somewhat similar to the NATO system. We would not suggest having a "mixed-manned" fleet, in which sailors of several nations live and work together on individual vessels, but naval and air units of various countries might be brought together much as they are in NATO. It might be desirable to have an Asian as the Supreme Commander of such a joint military force.

France

The policy of France has been so much guided during the past ten years by the personality of General Charles de Gaulle that it is less easy than one may expect to predict what might be the policy of France in the years 1975-1985. In particular we would want to know if France will be the thorn in the side of the United States, as it has been in recent years, or if France will return to the "family" of allies in such a way as to minimize frictions between the United States and France. There are many who point out that de Gaulle is an anachronism, that he is a figure of the 19th century who is not supported by at least the younger elements of French society, and that many of his seemingly anti-American policies must be understood in the light of the treatment which he received at the hands of Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill during the Second World War. We would argue that a careful examination of French society and the issues which move its political leaders suggests that French foreign and defense policy after de Gaulle will bear many resemblances to the policy of Paris in recent years.

The major differences, perhaps "improvements," will not be in matters of substance but in matters of style. De Gaulle's foreign policy has disturbed Americans in that it has often seemed haughty, calculating, brutal, arrogant, and destructive. This is really the result more of the way in which de Gaulle has announced his intentions and plans than the substance of his announcements. Presumably a leader with a different personality will not go out of his way to annoy Americans in the same seemingly petty, vindictive and megalomaniac manner. But on the issues which divide the two countries--on such questions as the military organization of the Atlantic Alliance, the scope and methods of European unity, control of nuclear weapons, the international monetary system, American economic and technological investments in Europe, etc.--there are basic differences of national interests between two countries which are not likely to be easily resolved.

The highest importance of the nation-state as the supreme entity is deeply embedded in the consciousness of most Frenchmen. Thus de Gaulle's quest for independence from the superpowers has been well received by the French population and is likely to remain the policy of his successor. There has never been much support in the 20th century in France for supernational organizations such as the League of Nations, the United Nations and NATO. The French see little advantage in transmuting some of their sovereignty to supernational organizations which do not act exclusively in the French interest. Perhaps this is one of the legacies of the French revolution with its strong support of the national democratic government. In any case, the French have always viewed their neighbors, be they down the street or across national boundaries, with a suspicious eye and we can expect that such an attitude, which strikes many Americans as being quite parochial, will continue.

France, however, is a middle range power, not a superpower, and as such in an age of increasingly costly and complex technology it will find

its military options limited in an increasing manner. Thus we can expect that the French will find that their "force de frappe" will become less and less competitive, or seem less important, when put along side the massive nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. This will undoubtedly affect their attitude towards NATO, since the dominance of the American nuclear umbrella will not only continue but appear to increase in a proportional manner. Moreover, French military and foreign policy options will be constrained by the internal social and economic conditions of the nation. Although France has been relatively prosperous in the past decade, there are basic economic disequilibriums between the industrialized and agricultural sector, within various parts of the agricultural sector, as well as social disequilibriums between the still somewhat rigid social classes. The year 1968 has shown how brittle French society indeed can be. We saw the germination of a social revolution which could have succeeded at least to the extent of having been able to overthrow a strong government which up to that time had seemed relatively immune from such outside pressures. In the 1975-1985 period France could return to the style of political and social turmoil which existed in the 1930's and immediately after World War II. The possibility of fairly chaotic conditions in the domestic political body cannot be discounted and if they should occur they would measurably influence France's military and foreign policy. We can imagine a country which has turned inwards, which has completely shed loose its old colonial aspirations and which therefore adopts a limited and neutralist foreign policy.

Under such circumstances American policy makers may come under still greater pressures to reduce, or eliminate completely, the number of American forces assigned to NATO and stationed in Western Europe for the defense of the continent. We have already seen in the Mansfield-Symington resolutions that there is substantial support within the United States for a policy of reducing the American commitment to NATO. One beneficial impact of the result of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August of 1968 was to lead to the diminution of support for those favoring a cutback of American forces. The Soviet intervention in its Eastern European Communist ally state served to strengthen the arguments of those who consider the leaders of Moscow to be unpredictable, aggressive and not men who are seriously interested in detente. Therefore NATO has received an important psychological bolstering among the various governments which adhere to the organization and subscribe troops to it. A number of countries, chiefly the United States, Germany, Holland, Italy, and Canada which had planned reductions in forces committed to NATO decided after the invasion to rescind or at least delay the cutbacks in their commitment to NATO ground forces, but already we are seeing the revival of the détente philosophy and the reemergence of the tendency towards a cutback of forces. In April 1969 Canada announced that although she was not formally leaving the NATO alliance she intended to withdraw a large measure of her NATO forces assigned to duty in Western Europe. Similar pressures are likely to arise in other countries and particularly in the United States in part because of the large number of outstanding issues and frictions between Paris and Washington. We

can expect that a neutralist and uncooperative France will strengthen the arguments for those who favor a cutback in the American commitment to the defense of Western Europe by ground forces. It is plausible to imagine that U.S. public opinion will become increasingly disenchanted with a policy of sustaining a large-scale military effort in Europe if the French or other European countries show little interest in their own security. Under these conditions the de Gaulle charge that the United States cannot be depended upon to defend Europe, could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Even though an American abandonment of Europe is difficult to conceive, a gradually diminishing American contribution to European defense certainly is not, even if it may not be desirable.

Those who had hoped that France could be persuaded to give up its independent nuclear force most certainly will have their hopes quashed by 1975. The French nuclear program was undertaken before de Gaulle's return to power and in all probability will outlast his defeat. The incentives for atomic weapons contain a mixture of political and military factors which are likely to retain their validity. It may well be that as the French develop their thermonuclear bomb and intercontinental ballistic missiles they will run into important technological and financial constraints. Indeed it is difficult to see how a French government will be able to implement the new policy of global defense, the policy of defense "tout azimuts," which has recently been announced and according to which France must be prepared to deter an attack from any direction. To be able to deter an attack from the Soviet Union or the United States solely by threat of reliable French "second-strike" retaliation, seems like well nigh an impossible task without changing France into an extreme garrison state. But this is probably more than needed. It takes much less to deter U.S. or Soviet first strike. In any case the nuclear force is likely to be seen as a useful instrument of diplomacy and bargaining. It will put France at the "top tables" of arms control and disarmament questions and will give France a good lever in any future discussions with Britain and the EEC countries on the formation of a possible West European political or military system. Therefore the "force de frappe" will have to be taken into account in future thinking concerning nuclear forces and targeting by American defense planners.

As we note above the foreign policy of France in the post-de Gaulle era may not be markedly different from that of today. The desire for independence and the distrust of supernational institutions have strong roots in the French character. This same desire for independence will motivate France to constrain United States influence and in particular its business and technological presence on the continent even though the French have no basic hostility to the United States. It is plausible, on the other hand, that a post-de Gaulle government will lift the veto to Britain's application for membership into the Common Market. Many French businessmen recognize that Britain within the EEC would enlarge measurably, especially through Britain's commonwealth associations, the opportunities of an immense market comparable to that of the United States. London's political presence on the continent may not be as inimicable to the aspirations of the new French president as it was to General de Gaulle.

Another reason why relations between Paris and London may be entering into a new era would be the result of a revised perception of Germany by the French. Germany is growing in self-confidence and economic power at just the same time that France's policy in the East has been checkmated. It can be argued that with France's decline in recent times and Germany's ascendancy, a fundamental realignment of power will take place. Primacy in Europe may pass from Paris to Bonn. The Federal Republic today has the largest army in Western Europe, the most bountiful stocks of gold, and the highest gross national product in Europe. France may therefore relax its attitude towards British entry into the Common Market in order to restore the balance. But it should be borne in mind that the calculation that might one day make the French willing to let Britain into Europe is precisely the calculation that might make the Germans want to keep it out. The Germans know perfectly well that with the United Kingdom in the Common Market, the balance of power may swing against them, although not necessarily on all issues.

A continuing quest of French foreign policy is certain to be the limitation of German power. The fixation for security from Germany runs deep in many Frenchmen, even those born in the 1940's. Thus France may continue her overtures to Eastern Europe, especially to her old ally Poland, in order to provide a balance to what it perceives to be the unpredictable and potentially powerful German nation. On the other hand, de Gaulle's successors, like de Gaulle himself, might try to deal with the German danger by allying France with Germany.

A perhaps more profound uncertainty about France comes from the fact that France has not yet demonstrated an ability to make a presidential system work without de Gaulle. De Gaulle's ability to maintain the moral and psychological authority of the presidency depended not only on his personal qualities but also on his unique role in World War II. Can another build power upon that base? It remains to be seen whether de Gaulle's successors can maintain an effective, "Gaullist" majority in the country. Until the "quasi-constitutional" character of the post-de Gaulle France has had an opportunity to clarify itself there will be room for doubt about whether France can have a dynamic, coherent and sustained foreign policy of any flexibility. The future of French policy will therefore need to remain a matter of concern to American planners.

Japan

A convenient and significant generation difference is noted in Japan between those born before and within the rule of the present ("Showa") Emperor. Those of the "born-in-Showa" generation, now forty-three years old or under, were no older than fifteen when the war began. They bear no responsibility for it, nor for the militarism of prewar Japan, and they regard themselves as men of the democratic postwar era. They now comprise 72% of the Japanese population.* If present conventions regarding the age of men in the highest government offices persist, the "born-in-Showa" generation will come to full power in the late 1970's.

At the same time, Japanese economic growth is expected to have accomplished more than a decade of growth at an average of 17% in money terms; Japan will have a per capita wealth by the late 1970's surpassing that of Great Britain and approaching that of the United States and Scandinavia. (The Japanese Ministry of Finance now forecasts "overtaking" America in 1984, Scandinavia in 1988.** Hudson estimates place these events in the mid- or late 1990's--or about a decade later.)

By 1975, thirty years will have passed under a constitution prepared under the authority of an American military occupation, under social norms in some degree consciously adapted from American models, and in a form of modern industrial, economic and social competitiveness and mobility widely regarded by Japanese as American in style. All of these radically diverge from the political, economic, and social norms of prewar Japan--and they, in turn, represented a self-conscious and self-imposed adaptation of Japan to the "modern" world.

It is not unreasonable to see the accomplishments of Japan, and its projected future as one of the supremely successful economies of the world, as confirming the values of the present socio-economic system of Japan, and by extension, of its political standards and system. Thus the rule of the Showa generation, formed in this new Japan, might be expected to carry it forward essentially unchanged, with the added confidence--and freedom from war guilt--of men who bear no responsibility at all for the trauma which militarism and nationalism imposed on the Japanese nation in the 1940's.

Nor is it unreasonable to think that the 1970's may produce a reassertion of Japanese nationalism and an attempt to redefine Japanese national and cultural identity as against the accommodation to foreign norms and models which have characterized the preceding three decades. The modern history of Japan, admittedly short, has already seen one cycle of enthusiastic accommodation to foreign standards followed by a harsh

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*Kei Wakaizumi, "Japan Beyond 1970," Foreign Affairs, April 1969.

**The Times, London, April 8, 1969.

nationalist reaction, and the phenomenon is, of course, evident in the experience of other non-Western societies confronted with the challenge of modern material wealth, power, and accomplishment which has its intellectual and social sources in modern European civilization. The Japanese experience after the Meiji Restoration was of exceptionally wide and enthusiastic Westernization producing a radically successful modernization, followed by an exceptionally harsh nationalist reaction. Since 1945 the Japanese accommodation to Western liberal political and economic standards, and specifically to American standards, has again been far more extensive and successful than in any other non-Western society.

Evidence of a nationalist reaction exists today among the younger Japanese population groups and at several levels of society. The scale and significance of this evidence remains a matter of much dispute among foreign observers as well as among the Japanese themselves. But in present-day Japan there is considerable comment on the problem of "identity" and on a national anxiety related to this issue. The least that can be said about the political significance of this is that there exists the "first widespread positive nationalism since the crushing defeat in World War II."*

Many powerful factors combine to contain the affects of any nationalist trend in Japan: the success and prestige achieved within the present system; the absence of any profoundly felt external danger; the lack of any very obvious advantages, to say nothing of needs, to be gratified by foreign adventures (unlike the situation, as it was conceived to exist, in the era of imperialism); the obvious risks verified by historical experience, of nationalism; the relatively much greater dependence of Japan on trade and good relations with the advanced industrial nations than with its Asian neighbors; and the tendency, within the present political system, to subordinate foreign policy to domestic issues.

Yet it must also be said that any nationalist trend in Japan almost certainly would involve some increase in anti-Americanism, since America not only is the chief world power but--much more important--provides the predominant present foreign influence and presence in Japan.** And the minimum conclusion to be drawn is that the Japan which possesses the wealth and power which this nation anticipates by 1975 will have altered its present relationship of security dependence upon the United States.

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*D. C. Hellmann, "Japan in the Postwar East Asian International System," Research Analysis Corporation Publication RAC-R-46-2, February 1969.

**John K. Emerson in the January 1969 Foreign Affairs cites a public opinion poll taken in Tokyo in March 1968. Half those polled felt a "sense of crisis." Six per cent of those who felt such an anxiety attributed it to the threat of attack from a Communist nation. Fifty-one per cent attributed it to the "possibility of becoming embroiled in conflicts through cooperation with America's Asian policy.' This obviously reflects the special situation created by Vietnam, but the effects of Vietnam on Japanese opinion may be lasting.

Analysts are commonly agreed on this, even if close cooperation between the two nations continues and the security treaty remains in force. We have emphasized as a special problem the nationalist scenario, with its implications of a Japanese policy diversion from that of the United States--whether in choosing a "neutralist" great power role, a more active independent role, or the cultivation of relations with Russia or China--because this involves the most serious effects on America's strategic situation. Also implied in the nationalist scenario, but consistent with several Japanese international roles, is a Japanese nuclear force.

In this matter, there are five possibilities we would like to take note of.

1. Japan acquires a reasonably large nuclear force by the late seventies. On the basis of this nuclear force (which includes both offense and defense elements), Japan clearly becomes an independent military great power, indeed a near-superpower. With a relatively reliable ballistic missile defense system and corresponding air defense system, Japan can possibly claim strategic invulnerability over China; certainly it would have a plausible claim to this capability in a Japanese first-strike scenario. Of course uncertainties would have an inordinately large weight; with the concentration of population in Japan even two or three large H-bombs getting through could create enormous havoc.

2. Japan acquires nuclear weapons by the late '70's but only in a very limited way. It does acquire some ballistic missile defenses and some air defense and Polaris-type nuclear weapons. It does not regard this capability as giving it any real strategic edge over China--only a basic equality--nor does it look upon Japan as in any serious strategic competition with the United States or the Soviet Union (though it clearly has some deterrence against both of these). Nevertheless, given Japan's relatively homogeneous social structure and its reputation for a fatalistic discipline in war, this nuclear force leaves both the superpowers a trifle uneasy in their relationship with Japan. Japan also develops an adequate mobilization base on which it can very rapidly increase its military power in an emergency. Once again, while Japan would probably fail any strategic arms race with the United States or the Soviet Union, it clearly could outperform China if it chose to do so. But in this scenario there does not seem to be any particular reason to do so. While Japan is widely regarded as a great power, its material superiority over China is not conclusive since China effectively maintains its "revolutionary" moral stature and represents nearly a billion people with at least a limited enclave of modern industry and technology. Thus Japan's international stature is not overwhelmingly greater than China's in prestige, influence, or even in political powers. The Japanese have enough arms in existence so that no nation can lightly or easily threaten them. At the same time everyone, especially Japan's Asian neighbors, is anxious not to touch off another burst of Japanese militarism. This is a concern also shared by many Japanese citizens, including large portions of the educated elite. In some ways, therefore, the Japanese have the best of both worlds.

3. Japanese nuclear rearmament is very limited, confined largely to defense so far as national nuclear preparations are concerned. However, Japan does assume the central role in an Asian multinational nuclear retaliatory force whose major purpose is to assure a role of nuclear lex talionis. (If any country in Asia uses nuclear weapons against any other country in Asia, this force, with some degree of reliability, promises retaliation in a tit-for-tat fashion against the attacking nation.) This Asian nuclear retaliatory force could be so organized that it includes important non-Japanese authority. In particular, the executive will not necessarily be predominantly Japanese, or at least the civilian and military chiefs may not both be Japanese. In addition, the headquarters might not be in Japan.

With such a multinational retaliatory force the Japanese would get some advantages that they would not have received in the first two postures. First, the Japanese in demonstrating that they have really gone out of their way not to "rock the nuclear boat" acquire the respect and gratitude of other nations of the world. At the same time, these nations may remain fearful that Japan may change its policy. This self-denial exerts a restraining pressure on other nations which may want to acquire nuclear weapons. Second, there is likely to be a tendency for the other nuclear powers concerned with nonproliferation to go out of their way to make clear to the Japanese that Japan does not suffer any political disutilities or diminished prestige as a result of self-restraint. Third, by being the first great power to depend on an international force for security, Japan gets an enhanced voice in the arms control councils of the world.

This "arms control" nuclear role is also internally relatively satisfying for Japan leading to much less domestic disunity and strife than other roles might be. It serves to satisfy nearly all elements of Japanese opinion as being desirable in itself or at least a desirable compromise.

4. Japan steadily builds up conventional forces (as generally expected) and creates an impressive mobilization base for nuclear forces. In addition, public opposition within Japan to nuclear arms erodes to the point where it no longer poses a serious political issue. However, Japan does not actually acquire nuclear weapons for a number of reasons:

a. Japan does not wish to undermine the nonproliferation treaty. By 1975 more than 20 years will have passed since any nation explicitly set forth to procure nuclear weapons; this precedent weighs very heavily with Tokyo officials, especially in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It seems quite clear that if the Japanese get nuclear weapons the Germans will do so soon afterwards. Everyone recognizes that this could then lead to very rapid proliferation.

b. The fear of Japan touching off a wave of anti-Japanese sentiment in Asia. Even though the major political legacies of World War II are long eroded, residual hostility still remains. And given the

well-advertised "nuclear allergy" a decision for nuclear rearmament could lead to great anxieties and hostility among Japan's neighbors and friends.

c. The Japanese, more than perhaps any other nation at this point, have acquired a major stake in international trade. Because of their more rapid rate of expansion than other countries, they require an expanding share of international trade. One significant element in their ability to get this growing share is the relative goodwill which other major states feel towards Japan for its self-imposed nuclear restraints.

d. The Japanese themselves are interested in keeping the burden of military expenses down. They may easily continue to believe their (at that time) current rate of military expenditure (approximately 2 or 3 per cent of an estimated 1980 gross national product of, say, $400 billion a year or $8 to $12 billion a year) large enough. They note that the two nuclear superpowers, when putting 10 per cent of their budgets into military products, maintain growth rates only half of Japan's. While economists tell them that their growth rate would be affected only by 2 or 3 per cent if they spent the same 10 per cent of GNP on military production, they may wish to avoid even this sacrifice, and may in any event doubt the economists' assurances.

5. Assuming the same conditions as in (4) above, popular resistance to nuclear armament remains a major factor in Japanese domestic politics, making impossible any decision to acquire nuclear weapons in the 1975-1985 time period.

West Germany

One of the most intractable, and yet most important set of issues facing the long-range planner revolves around the special problem of a divided Germany and, of course, West Germany by itself. West Germany is thus part of a divided nation with few hopes of unification; part of a NATO alliance which many in West Germany feel has not only conspicuously failed to act in resistance to various salami tactics and to the invasion of a neighboring country, Czechoslovakia, but did not even let these events disturb greatly the normal course of relations between the two superpowers. One result of the Czech intervention is a conspicuous failure in the German Ostpolitik; in effect, the Soviets have, in no uncertain terms, told West Germany where the limits lie. The West Germans have also been threatened by the Soviets, at least rhetorically, with possible invasion in order to prevent a reemergence of Nazism. Thus the West Germans often feel they are distrusted by their allies; slowly losing a war of attrition and nerves over West Berlin; unable or unwilling to provide for their own conventional defense (and distrusted, if they were to do so, by both sides); and in many other ways frustrated and sometimes embittered. Others wish to adapt to these conditions by a policy of almost total conciliation.

As one manifestation of the above, pressures are arising within West Germany from the liberal factions of the FDP and SPD parties for the recognition of East Germany, the setting up of normal relations between the two Germanies and the admission of East Germany to the United Nations.* In addition, a "new" communist party, the DKP (Deutsche Kommunistische Partei), has emerged in West Germany--despite the illegality of the communist party in the Federal Republic--led by the old communist leaders, under the direct orders and auspices of East Germany. Although the West German communist party is held in very low esteem by West Germans, there have been reports, which we mentioned earlier in Part II of this report (page 2-48), of communist infiltration into positions in West German trade unions.** The legality of the new communist party (and other small communist branch parties which have since formed) is in question along with that of the extreme right, the NPD.

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*Der Spiegel, 23. Jahrgang, Nr. 15, April 7, 1969, p. 27. Two regional organizations of the SPD--Schleswig-Holstein and South Hesse--which are noted for being liberal factions, have demanded that recognition of East Germany be a plank in the SPD election program. (The German Tribune, April 8, 1969, p. 4.)

It is interesting to note, however, that in an opinion poll of West Germans taken recently by the Emnid Institute for the Federal Press Office, only 29% thought it would be right for the Federal Republic to recognize the DDR government; 51% thought it would be wrong; and 20% were undecided. (Der Spiegel, op. cit.)

**The Confederation of Federal Republic Trade Unions (DGB) as well as the metal workers' and the chemical workers' unions fear the current upsurge of Communist cells in "almost all large factories" which might be "leading back to the situation that prevailed shortly after 1945."

These changes in the makeup of the German "body politic" could become very important in future German foreign and defense policy decisions. Any "swing to the left" of German trade unions* could have grave consequences for the SPD, for the unions are the primary support of the Social Democrats. In fact, the structure of German politics is such that the parties have few members per se, but instead depend for financial and organizational support on other groups. The SPD depends heavily on the trade unions; the CDU on farmers and some trade unions, Christian mens' and businessmens' clubs; the CSU on the Catholic mens' and businessmens' clubs; the FDP on businessmen.

Businessmen in West Germany are also interested in the détente for reasons of trade with the East (although the East is by no means their major source of revenue). The general approval of the Ostpolitik is therefore encouraged from many quarters for many reasons and the general trend toward a "soft on communism" or "left" movement has a broad and respectable impetus while the movements against this are relatively weak and, in some cases, politically suspect.

The general milieu in West Germany could in some sense be considered to resemble the atmosphere on many American college campuses: "nationalism" and "patriotism" are unallowable (and dangerous) words; "communism" is regarded as a red herring used by dangerous right-wing groups. In Germany no respectable politician can use the word "Fatherland" and those who do are considered neo-Nazis. The NPD, an extreme right-wing party, is therefore the only one left this option.**

The Czechoslovakian crisis only encouraged the movement. The United States and her other allies showed no will even to protest the increase of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, and the fear for West Berlin (already slipping economically) increased greatly. Her allies' main concern seemed to be for the Soviet Union and its problems with Czechoslovakia.*** Obviously, what was in the Soviet "sphere of influence" was the Soviet's, and what was West Germany's might be negotiable.

The West German Ostpolitik was designed to loosen the bonds between Moscow and her satellites through trade and cultural ties. The Soviets' move into Czechoslovakia indicated the futility of German efforts for these

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*The American AFL-CIO has voted to drop out of the International Congress of Free Trade Unions (which it largely finances) because of the leftward swing, particularly in West Germany.

**For a description of this, see Frank E Armbruster, "Themes for Alterrative West European Futures," HI-682-D/1 and "The Détente and Its Possible Effect on European and United States Policy," HI-682-D/3, Parts I and III of the five-part Hudson Institute study, European Trends and Issues, 1966.

***There are rumors that the day before it went into Czechoslovakia, the U.S.S.R. told the French of the plan.

objectives and, at the same time, pointed up the lack of alternative policies through the obvious timidity of NATO in the face of this bold and powerful Soviet effort. Even the NATO "Black Lion" maneuvers, slated months before the invasion to take place in southern Germany in September, were canceled by West Germany's allies after the Soviet move in August. In fact, the Soviets added greater anxiety to Bonn's by taking the further initiative of declaring West Germany to be the culprit in the Czech affair and pointing out Russia's "right," according to the U.N. Charter, to intervene in the internal affairs of West Germany whenever the Soviets detected "neo-Nazism." Then the Soviets stated that indeed neo-Nazism already existed and darkly hinted at Russian intervention unless it stopped.*

The result has been much denial by Bonn that neo-Nazis have any power in West Germany, and an even greater leaning toward the East as though to placate this powerful antagonist. As pointed out earlier, recognition of East Germany is now openly demanded as a plank in the SPD platform. Such a suggestion would have been political suicide several years ago, but as of summer 1969, it remains a demand of two liberal factions of Germany's socialist party. The Germans may indeed feel "alone"** and thus may take the only "realistic" course open to them. Germany thus may become another Finland.***

Obviously Germany is a "special case" in NATO just as a divided Korea provides a special case in United States' Far Eastern concerns and a divided Vietnam provides a special case in United States' Southeast Asian interests. Because of the size and potential of West Germany, however (60,000,000 population; $132 billion dollars 1968 GNP),**** she is more like Japan in both her vast potential and general rejection of disruptive, obvious, military undertakings. The matter of self defense, however, will not go away, and Germany, like Japan, has very few options left open to her. Furthermore, she has (with some justification) an ever-increasing fear of being abandoned in the face of the Soviets. She also has a growing guilt about East Germany and her inability to produce a viable theory of reunification. She cannot use nationalism to bring the various elements in West Germany together and remain on good terms with her allies.+ Furthermore, without a

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*See Chapter IV of Part II; also Steven Muller, "Anxiety in Bonn: German Fears after Czechoslovakia," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1969, Vol. XXV, No. 3, pp. 13-15.

**Muller, op. cit.

***That is, with its own form of government and freedom in domestic issues but with Soviets having something close to ve' powers on military and foreign policy. See Chapter IV of Part II.

****Current prices; German Federal Office of Statistics.

+See Armbruster, op. cit.

united population and the consent of her allies, she cannot raise the number of her own conventional divisions or get more allied divisions to offset the Soviet threat as she sees it. This tends to make a very ambivalent background for defense-oriented thinking. One way to handle it is just to deny that there is a threat (despite Czechoslovakia and the threatening statements of Ulbricht and the Soviets) which more trade and cultural exchange will not fix.[1]

Some Germans seem to see another way out of this box from their behavior in the past and now, i.e., by way of nuclear weapons. Signing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty is something which the Germans tried to avoid through one means or another. They say they want to trade their signature for some benefit to them, which is logical. If this does not occur, however, we may some day see them with such weapons, particularly if Japan gets them.

In view of its many internal weaknesses, antipathy toward things military and fear of the consequences of worsening relations with the Soviet Union, the probability seems higher that West Germany will turn into a Finland than get nuclear weapons. Whatever the long-run prospects, the first and, of course in some ways, the foremost issue associated with West Germany today is the whole question of nuclear guarantees. As noted elsewhere, analysts around the world seem to feel that nations should pledge themselves to a no first use as well as no first strike in the cause of the so-called nuclear proliferation treaty. It should be understood, of course, that a no first use is a different doctrine from a no first strike, and that in no first use we simply promise not to use nuclear weapons first. In the no first strike we promise not to strike the Soviet homeland first. One could thus use nuclear weapons in Europe without violating the no first strike ban.

Let us consider now some of the pro's and con's of a "no first use." Insofar as one wishes nuclear weapons to protect any area from conventional invasion, this would in principle be banned by such an announcement. However, this may be a little specious. One may well prepare to fight a rather large tactical nuclear war, possibly on the excuse that one needs an ability to match any escalation of the other side. Presumably, the other side could not reliably depend that his opponent would in fact live up to his pledge, and therefore given that he actually plans an invasion, he has to consider seriously the possibility that the other side would introduce the use of nuclear weapons in order to stop the invasion. The force of the prohibition, therefore, is likely to lie in the general atmosphere it creates and the general confirmation it gives the people that nuclear weapons simply are not ordinary usable devices with which one can "continue politics in other forms." As we look around the world, perhaps the only place in which the "no first use" would seem to be seriously disadvantaged is West Germany. And one can argue that the United States might well make the announcement, that as far as we are concerned, with the specific exception of a massive and controversial invasion of West

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[1] Of course, the Czech crisis was viewed by many Germans as proving that attempts at greater trade and cultural exchanges are what caused the disaster in Czechoslovakia; see Muller, op. cit.

Germany by Soviet troops, we can think of no eventuality in which we would use nuclear weapons first; but that in this eventuality we would have to reserve the problem of decision for ourselves, and therefore, as far as we are concerned, we are perfectly willing to make this limited pledge to the world. This could be a most important situation and the single exception might not disturb the force and sweep of the announcement.

Of course, in fact, the main reason why the West Germans and others wish us to use nuclear weapons in opposing a conventional invasion is because they feel that the Soviets would either be unwilling to escalate at all or if willing to escalate to match our use of nuclear weapons, would then be so frightened of further escalation to central war that they simply would not start the process in the first place. There is therefore more than implicit in this whole concept the further concept that the United States ought to be willing either explicitly to retaliate for an attack on West Germany, whether nuclear or conventional, by an attack on the Soviet heartland, or at least be willing not only to risk escalation to such a situation but in effect to follow policies which greatly increased such risks. Given the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and repeated Soviet assertions of their right to use force against West Germany based on Articles 53 and 107 of the U.N. Charter (the so-called "enemy state" clauses), that they claimed made legitimate Soviet intervention to prevent a renaissance of Nazism or the emergence of Nazism, one can sympathize with West German fears.

It is very important, when we think of West Germany, that we begin to ask ourselves how a West Germany will act as the political legacy of World War II wears off. We have already suggested that if the Japanese get nuclear weapons, the Germans will follow soon afterwards. On the other hand, if the Japarese do not get nuclear weapons, it seems quite reasonable to imagine that the Germans will not either. And Germany's allies are all too willing to help prevent such a development. In fact, one of the real anomalies of the current situation is that typically if one asks a non-German European what is the main purpose of NATO, the answer is, "To keep West Germany down." West Germans, of course, are all completely familiar with this reply and many are familiar with other savage remarks one hears about West Germans (for example, a common one in England is that "a German is either at your feet or at your throat"). This kind of an alliance could become increasingly irksome, though one hopes that with the passage of time the animosity towards West Germany will diminish.

Nevertheless, West Germany has real problems. What we call East Germany, the West Germans, of course, call Middle Germany; and Germans in both East and West Germany worry about the so-called "eastern territories"--Prussia, Silesia, Pomerania--which are now parts of the Soviet Union and Poland. There are good reasons for hoping that it will be a long time before the West Germans get nuclear weapons. This is the one spot in Europe in which it is easiest to write scenarios for escalation. On the other hand, an alliance "whose main purpose is to keep West Germany down" might easily grow increasingly irksome to the West Germans. (We would of course argue that one of the main purposes of NATO is to bury the current defense of Europe, which is basically a U.S -West German ad hoc alliance with substantial assistance from the United Kingdom,

in a more acceptable framework.) It should also be noted that it is most important to keep the British Army of the Rhine in existence. Without this essential element in the NATO forces, the U.S.-West German ad hoc alliance would be too prominent to be easily buried in the NATO framework. But as the British increasingly opt out of being a world power, they are increasingly unwilling to make major financial contributions to playing such roles, and it may well turn out that this contribution will dwindle. It may of course dwindle in much the same way the American contribution dwindles, particularly if the American contribution becomes increasingly dependent upon an airlift; and so the political facade will be maintained.

Let us, however, return to the question of West German aspirations. It seems relatively clear, as we indicated in our discussion in Part II, that the West Germans will become increasingly frustrated and yet increasingly powerful, at least so far as other European nations are concerned. They will also become an increasingly world-wide influence. There are many parts of the world where a West German entrepreneur, sales representative and/or engineer is more acceptable than any other nationality. This is particularly true in Latin America, in much of Eastern Europe, Africa, Japan, China, and in much of the rest of Asia. This last raises the possibility of some large degree of West German/Chinese rapprochement. This could take a purely economic form, or economics plus something else. The "something else" could be an explicit political or even military cooperation or these last two could occur to a greater or lesser degree, but more or less clandestinely.

This hope for a "Bonn-Peking Axis" to give the Russians a second front to worry about* may seem strange to Americans. Nehru's lesson in 1962 about the danger of assuming that a non-communist nation can count on a communist country (in this case Russia, to back India against China) seems to us to have been missed by some West Germans. Russia and China were quarrelling in 1962, while India and Russia were the "best of friends," trade agreements and all; but when the Chinese Communists invaded India, Russia turned her back on Nehru, the democrat. In the minds of some Germans, however, the combination of China and West Germany is a natural one, and the main thing that prevents it is West German fear of alienating the Americans or provoking the Soviets. From the viewpoint, however, of these West Germans, not only do the Chinese and West Germans complement each other in a very useful, interesting and natural way, but they have very few conflicting interests. They feel it makes great political and military sense for the West Germans to build up China as a pressure on the Soviet Union, thus hopefully making the Soviets much more amenable to a settlement in Europe. There is some truth in all of this: the Soviets do not really relish a two-front war or even two-front competition.

What are, then, the possibilities of such a West German/Chinese cooperation? Of course, West Germany is a democracy and it might have real difficulty preventing informal, unofficial cooperation between its

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*Der Spiegel, March 17, 1969, p. 27.

various citizens and China. This could include scientists and engineers as well as industrialists and commercial people. There are even circumstances where such cooperation could get tacit encouragement from the West German government. As long as it were not prominent, it would be most difficult for the United States or the Soviet Union to react in any dramatic or decisive fashion. Once a little toleration for such cooperation is built up, more could easily occur. It is even conceivable that the United States might, under some circumstances, encourage the West Germans to cooperate with the Chinese. From discussions with Soviets this sometimes seems to be a recurrent nightmare among them. How far can such cooperation extend? The perfect model, of course, is Rapallo, right after World War I, where the then two outlaw powers--Germany and Russia--got together; only now, of course, the two outlaw powers are indeed West Germany and China. And, therefore, this is a Rapallo in some ways in the fullest sense of the word. At Rapallo, the cooperation took the form, among other things, of helping West Germany evade the armaments provisions of the Versailles Treaty. This, too, could occur today.

But in another sense, China is not so outlawed and alone as Russia (the only Bolshevik power) was after World War II. China is a socialist state among a community of socialist states. She is invited to attend communist summit conferences in Moscow, even today, and all socialist states (including Russia) are depressed by her refusal of these invitations. Furthermore, she is unstinting in her abuse of the West German government. She invariably refers to the "West German problem" instead of the German problem, the "West Berlin problem" instead of the Berlin problem.* She also has some socialist states who are either neutral or side with her in her "family quarrel" with the Soviets. Furthermore, she has a steady stream of Western powers (Britain, France, and now Canada) who come, hat in hand, to assure her she is not an outlaw and beg her to allow them to recognize her and establish the most cordial relations with her. In fact, it is the Peking government which has refused to speak to the Western ambassadors assigned to her; it is the Chinese who burned the British Embassy in Peking, etc.

The point is not, therefore, so much that a true West German-Chinese Rapallo is in any way likely, but that it is not completely unlikely. It is one of the reasons why we should be careful in our dealing with West Germany and not be too complacent about either pushing her around ourselves or having other nations push her around or even about seeing legitimate West German interests and aspirations frustrated. The above could cause trouble in anotner way. There might be some relatively innocuous cooperation by West German private individuals and the Chinese government, but this could easily be made an occasion of conflict and crisis by the Soviets, some Americans, or even by some Europeans. This, in turn, might either result in such a suppression of West Germany that they would be

*Relay from Bonn, April 8, 1969--press comments from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of April 8, 1969.

either more frustrated and resent it greatly or have a collapse of resolve. It could also result in backfiring, so that the West Germans would no longer live with or accept such accusations and would resent bitterly any attempted infringement on their sovereign freedom. Under these circumstances, such fake or specious accusations could end up in encouraging real West German cooperation with the Chinese.

CHAPTER III. POSSIBLE MILITARY CRISES AND AN ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO

A. Introduction

In most of the other chapters of Part IV, we attempt to deal in a relatively systematic way with those major military issues that seem most important for military planners contemplating the 1975-1985 period, and which generally lend themselves to a reasonably structured discussion in individual chapters. This chapter may be considered somewhat more "miscellaneous"; our aim is to direct attention and brief discussion to some fairly diverse "crises" that do not fit readily into the structure of any of the other chapters in this Part. We assume that it will be necessary for the Defense Department to have on hand "contingency plans" (and presumably also the physical means to execute such plans) to meet crises of the type we note below; but our main aim here is only to review crisis possibilities in a way that we hope will be useful.

There are some obvious "crisis" possibilities which we do not cover in this chapter. We exclude them chiefly because they seem to have been covered relatively adequately elsewhere. Thus we largely omit from this chapter discussion of central nuclear crises arising between the United States and the Soviet Union, many European crisis possibilities, the current "crisis" of the Vietnam War, and crises related more or less specifically to the general problem of nuclear proliferation which is discussed in the next chapter of Part IV.* Nor do we attempt in this chapter any discussion of crises in terms of, for instance, escalation ladders--the point could be made that each step on such a ladder would in itself constitute a crisis.

We suggest that the ability to deal effectively with a range of diverse, "small" but nevertheless troublesome crises may be a principal concern of U.S. military forces in the 1975-1985 decade. If this suggestion turns out to be correct, then it follows that various crisis possibilities should receive more attention from military planners now.

We believe it is not unfair to say that U.S. military planners have not done particularly well in the years since World War II in anticipating and preparing for the circumstances that it turned out to be necessary to face militarily. Thus in the late forties, we took comfort in our nuclear superiority and we were badly prepared for the kind of war we were obliged to fight in Korea beginning in 1950. Similarly in the decade of the 1950's and also to some extent in the sixties, we tended to focus our attention

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*To mention only Hudson Institute studies, the reader may be interested in: Crises and Arms Control (HI-180-RR, October 1962); War Termination Issues and Concepts (HI-921/3-RR, June 1968); Central Europe in Crisis: 1967-80 (HI-805/2-RR, July 1967); and the books On Thermonuclear War, On Escalation, The Year 2000, and Can We Win in Vietnam?

and planning on "second-class" wars of the Korean type, examining, reasonably we would judge, the complex issues involved in meeting limited war threats with or without nuclear weapons. In the sixties, and especially in the late sixties, our attention has been forcibly drawn to the Vietnam War and the complex of problems related to counterinsurgency. In spite of the unsatisfactory results in Vietnam to date and the uncertain outlook, it is probably safe to say that we have gained significantly in our understanding of the problems of counterinsurgency--although some of us feel that we still have a very long way to go in this respect--and in developing appropriate weapons and equipment. It is a fair consensus among the authors of this report that the Vietnam War will be largely resolved in some manner in the next year or two, that the United States will not soon find itself participating in a major war along either the Korean or Vietnamese models, that no more drastic military actions will occur in Europe than happened in Czechoslovakia last August, and that there will be no developments to upset the strategic nuclear balance with the Soviet Union to a great degree (a balance with which most us seem to have learned to live with relative comfort). If these several assumptions turn out all to be true simultaneously, then it may follow that the principal operational concern of U.S. military planners in the 1975-1985 decade will be the kind of crises that we touch on in this chapter.

In the next five sections of this chapter, we briefly discuss crises under the headings of the geographical areas in which they might occur: Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. For each of these areas, we first briefly discuss the context or "set the stage" on which crises might occur--in some respects this brief discussion overlaps chapters in Part I and portions of Part II--and then we take note of some specific crisis possibilities. In Section G we discuss some problems connected with freedom of the seas and international air space.

The final section of the chapter is a detailed scenario representing at least one possible chain of events in the 1975-1985 period, in which the United States, having effectively lost the Vietnamese War in 1969, is eventually forced to withdraw from Thailand. This scenario, written by Frank E. Armbruster, reflects a relatively pessimistic view of domestic and international trends and the over-all environment in which the U.S. armed services may be obliged to operate. (These particular trends and environments form a part of the discussion of domestic and international milieus in Part III of this report and Chapter I of Part IV, but they do not necessarily represent a consensus on the part of the authors of this report regarding the most probable over-all 1975-1985 situation.) We have chosen to include this scenario in this chapter because it illustrates, specifically and in detailed narrative form, one crisis situation in which the U.S. military could find itself. Time and circumstances permitting we could, of course, write similarly detailed scenarios for many or all of the crisis possibilities which we note in this chapter. But it does not appear that this would be an especially valuable thing to do: We simply list a range of possible crises with brief discussion of the contexts and circumstances underlying each of them and then supply one crisis scenario in

detail. We hope in this way to reflect for the military planners to whom this report is addressed something of both (1) the diversity of crises which could occur, and also (2) the sequence of events, decisions, "branch-points," actions, inactions, etc., that could be involved in each crisis.*

B. Europe

It is in Europe that the primary material and military interests of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. meet most closely. Even there, the engagement is indirect. The argument has often been made that the security of the two superpowers, so far as their European interests are concerned, depends on the fact that Europe remains divided: Soviet-dominated to the east of the Elbe, and American-allied to the west. Both sides recognize the extent to which their own security depends on this balance, and any serious threat of change to the established situation could, logically, produce reactions--which both sides would probably immediately recognize as increasing their dangers. Thus Hungary and Czechoslovakia, American sensitivity to the Gaullist challenge to NATO, and the various "Berlin crises" have been popularly regarded in America as relatively serious security problems. We have no "hard" knowledge of the degree of concern which Soviet political and military leaders attach to possible changes in the military and political balance in Europe, but their defensive, land-force emphasis, propaganda about a "revanchist" Germany, and other factors suggest that they consider Europe very seriously so far as their own national security is concerned.

There are of course other arrangements for bringing about varying degrees of security--and a diminished likelihood of military crises--in Europe. Europe could be, in some degree, "neutralized," perhaps generally along Gaullist lines but with a relatively high degree of internal coherence and unity, and perhaps also military strength. But it could also happen that the present competitive superpower relationship undergoes basic changes, with the Europeans left neither as allies of one or the other superpowers nor united among themselves. A fragmented Europe caught between two superpowers could present a variety of dangerous possibilities. That there is some likelihood of a trend in this direction is suggested not only by Gaullism but in the current European response to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. By 1975-1985, these possible changes in the European relationship to the superpowers could have, conceivably, worked themselves into a potential crisis stage.

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*The writing of scenarios has not been a main object in this study. This is partly because our primary task was to describe alternative 1975-1985 environments and develop their significance for military planners; also, many scenarios (mostly but not exclusively dealing with possible events preceding a central nuclear war) have been written at the Hudson Institute. Essentially all of these scenarios can be made available to readers of this report who have a particular interest in them. Some of the scenarios, along with a fairly thorough discussion of the utility of scenarios as a military planning tool can be found in the references cited on page 4-55 above.

There is perhaps a particular danger to be considered in East Germany. In 1980, World War II will have been over for 35 years and in a sense East Germany, if it is still dominated by the Soviets to the same approximate extent as today, may look to many in the world as being the largest and last "colony" in existence. There may still be subjugated minorities in many countries of the world, Portugal may still have one or two small but genuine "colonies," etc., but it will still appear that East Germany is the last country in the world that is being forcibly held down by a foreign power. One possible consequence of this is that East Germany may be in fact more stable, effectively a part of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, we may speculate that it is more likely that there will be gradually, in spite of Soviet repression, liberalization in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and by 1980 perhaps other East European countries, and generally increasing independency in Europe which will make the East German situation less and less tolerable. Exactly what the East Germans--or perhaps some neighboring countries--will try to do about the situation is very hard to guess. But as we look at 1980, extrapolate from the present situation, and mentally construct some scenarios, it seems likely that East Germany will remain one of the most explosive issues in sight.

Some Soviet and East European alternatives were outlined in Chapter VIII of Part I of this report. Probably the Rumanians and the Czechs, and perhaps also the Hungarians, are going to feel increasingly oppressed by the Soviets. It may be that if the Soviets play their cards reasonably well, they can avoid more naked challenges to their authority. For one thing the Soviets can, as they appear now to be doing, carry through a satisfactory liberalization of communist-bloc economic system without a corresponding political liberalization. It is at least conceivable that, if there is a great deal of relative anarchy among many nations of the world--as seems very likely when one contemplates a globe with some 140-150 (by 1980) nations in it--the Soviet system may look relatively secure. But we cannot really say which way the situation will go and there may be increasing pressures in the West to do something about unrest behind the Iron Curtain, and to "intervene" culturally and ideologically and even militarily. At any rate a systematic study of various crises and the pros and cons of different kinds of intervention, or non-intervention, and the appropriate tactics for each choice might be a useful project for military (and other) planners.

C. Asia

When we contemplate possible crises in Asia, all of us think immediately of China. First, it is necessary to recognize that, while an enormous disparity exists between the aggressive tone of Chinese propaganda and the actual military risks that the Chinese have apparently been willing to run, there is also convincing evidence that the Chinese will not hesitate to use force if and when they may feel genuinely threatened and/or think they can get away with it without unreasonable risk. On this latter point there are plenty of examples: the Chinese intervention in the Korean War; the recent border conflicts with the Soviets (which, although the

scale of violence was small, nevertheless went beyond the norm of mere anti-Soviet Chinese propaganda and certainly incurred some risk of significant Soviet military retaliation), and a very recent report of apparently more active Chinese support of North Vietnam, especially coupled with the U.S. bombing of the North, than has heretofore been realized.* Tibet was of course an easy conquest for the Chinese, but nevertheless a military conquest. The reasons for the Chinese-instigated border fighting with India are not altogether clear, and the risk to China was obviously low, but nevertheless the Chinese did undertake aggressive military action. So, while we should not think of the Chinese as being militarily reckless, it is also unrealistic to think of China as only a "paper tiger."

Even though the Korean and Vietnam Wars have led Americans mostly to think about possible Chinese-American conflicts, it is Russia and Japan as neighboring powers which seem more likely to be directly involved in China's future. They are also much more directly affected by Chinese territorial expansion or political aggressiveness in Asia. Japan is sensitive to Korea's status, since Korea strategically flanks the Japanese islands. Japan is also sensitive to the relationship between China and Russia, since both are neighboring powers, and since Japan (as noted in Chapter VI of Part I of this report) has a claim on the Kurile Islands now held by Russia. Northeast Asian developments are surely of greater strategic concern to Japan than developments in South and Southeast Asia, although for commercial and various other reasons the Japanese could hardly ignore a degree of Chinese political primacy in Southeast Asia which went beyond "neutralization" of the small states flanking China. Nor could India's collapse under Chinese pressures leave Japan completely unmoved.**

So any Chinese moves in North or South Asia could be regarded as having a fairly high probability of stimulating definite changes in Japanese policy. It should perhaps be noted that such changes would not necessarily be towards a "free world" role. There might indeed be <u>increased</u> factors of tension in the Japanese-American relationship. Renewed Japanese activism, along with renewed Japanese nationalism, would be very likely to include anti-American elements. Although Japan now finds security in alliance with

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*See the article by Allen Whiting in <u>Look</u>, April 29, 1969.

**If India "collapses," it seems now that the collapse is more likely to come about through her own difficulties than through military or other Chinese pressures. Indeed, the argument often made with respect to China and other countries, that a degree of xenophobia is necessary to keep a country united and divert attention from internal difficulties, could be applied to India; further Chinese border incursions in the Himalayas, or perhaps Chinese IRBM's or ICBM's fired in tests into the Indian Ocean, could actually help to stabilize the presently chaotic and precarious Indian political situation. Chinese aggressiveness toward India would also increase the likelihood of significant American aid for India at the same time it helped to overcome the widespread Indian "cultural resistance" to most things American.

the United States, we have already alluded twice to the likelihood that Japan will "go nuclear" in the seventies, and Japan might well assess its national interest differently if the competitive superpower balance in the cold war seems to be changing into a non-competitive or even collaborative superpower relationship.

One can contemplate a number of aggressive actions by the Chinese that would present military crises for the United States. With the possible exception of the North Vietnamese and the Indians, it seems unlikely that any of the smaller countries on the Chinese border could really hold back Chinese troops without outside help. But it seems clear that some of these nations might defend themselves better than we might expect offhand, particularly if the Chinese have logistic difficulties in getting men and material to and past their borders in South and Southeast Asia. It seems doubtful that the Chinese can solve their logistic problems very completely by 1980 or thereabouts, although eventually they probably will solve them.

It is not clear--especially at the time this is written and great dissension continues over the U.S. role in Vietnam--to what extent the U.S. would consider its genuine security interests threatened by the Chinese or to what extent it would, in the 1975-85 decade, settle for a relative "hands off" policy toward Chinese activities in Asia. But it seems plausible that the U.S. would be willing for the foreseeable future to come to the defense of South Korea, Japan, Taiwan (if not necessarily the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu), the Philippines, Thailand (although see the Armbruster scenario at the conclusion of this chapter), probably India, and possibly Pakistan. So it is clear enough that Chinese military aggressiveness presents potential military crisis problems for the United States.

Although our main aim in this chapter, as noted in Section A above, is to direct attention and some discussion to possible military crises, and not to attempt to prescribe plans and solutions for these crises, it may nevertheless be useful to insert at this point a brief discussion of some options available to the U.S. for dealing with or containing Chinese aggression against its neighbors. Most specifically, we would like to bring up the idea of an Asian balance of power, as an effective means of stopping "Chinese crises" before they occur. Among the larger powers that could contribute to a power balance in Asia, we think first of the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India, although we have already noted some uncertainty with respect to Japanese and Indian policies. For an Asian balance of power to succeed in discouraging Chinese aggression, probably three main conditions must be satisfied:

(1) Each of the countries on the Chinese periphery ought to be able to resist low levels of subversion, either with or without outside help.

(2) Each such country should be militarily strong enough to put up a reasonably good fight if it were invaded, even though

it could not on its own win a war with China. (There is an analogy here with the "plate glass" concept of a forward NATO defense--the glass fails completely to stop the invasion but it triggers large-scale mobilization and other effective responses.)

(3) Any country which is the object of naked aggression should have reasonable confidence that major military and other assistance would be forthcoming. For the sake of analyzing the problem we could divide the case of major aggression into two categories--conventional and nuclear. For nuclear aggression, probably all that would be necessary by way of assistance to the aggressee country is the belief that the aggression would be genuinely punished, perhaps with a tit-for-tat response. This could be done with an implicit or explicit U.S. guarantee, perhaps as part of a non-proliferation treaty (in which case the guarantee might be shared with the Soviets, with the diplomatic and other advantages this would bring).

If a security guarantee were made chiefly by the U.S., rather than by the U.S. and a group of the stronger Asian states, it could turn out to be very useful for the U.S. to have a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system so that threats of U.S. retaliation against China would be "credible." This is of course one of the arguments that has been advanced for U.S. BMD deployment. What some of the authors of this report would emphasize is that the U.S. would not be so likely to need the BMD system to defend against a Chinese attack "out of the blue," but that the system would help to convince the Chinese that we would not be deterred from retaliating against their homeland if they attack one of the nations on their periphery. To an increasing degree similar arguments hold for the Soviets.

In general it would be valuable to each country for the U.S. and the Soviets to make clear to the world that they are fully prepared to tolerate a great deal of tension with the Chinese but, if forced by circumstances, they would not be deterred from striking strategically at China by fear of Chinese nuclear retaliation against the homeland. Such a strategic strike against China might or might not be nuclear. Both countries have a plethora of options for escalating retaliation against China as they choose. One step on the "escalation ladder" of options could be a "surgical" bomber strike with only high-explosive weapons against Chinese nuclear production facilities. Both countries not only have options in actual threats to use against the Chinese, but also options in communicating these threats--perhaps in the hope of making their use unnecessary. There is clearly need in this general area for some careful advanced military analysis and planning by both the Soviets and the Americans on not only their own possibilities, but on the kinds of Chinese crises that the other superpower might cause--or be forced into.

D. The Middle East

Although the level of world-wide concern about a possible or even imminent Arab-Israeli war remains very high, although almost daily incidents of violence and military action occur across the borders of Israel and its neighbors, and although the U.S. and the Soviet Union are clearly aligned on opposite sides in the tense Middle Eastern situation, most of the authors of this report do not consider the Middle East an area in which World War III is daily threatened--either now or very likely in the 1975-85 decade. This does not mean that we expect any sudden or even gradual movement in the direction of peace and tranquility in the Middle East, nor does it mean that we believe that U.S. military and diplomatic planners should not be hard at work on the situation.

The question of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East is briefly discussed in the next chapter. The possession and/or use of nuclear weapons by the Israelis or Arabs is the most serious longer-run problem that we foresee in this area. It is pointed out in the next chapter that if Israel "goes nuclear," then the Soviets will surely be under extremely heavy pressure to offer their Arab allies, if not actual nuclear weapons to be used under Arab or some sort of Soviet-Arab shared control, then at least effective guarantees of retaliation against Israel if Israel used nuclear weapons. In no sense are we inclined to minimize the terrible consequences to the countries involved if nuclear weapons were used in strikes against population on, say, Tel Aviv or Cairo. But it would still be our best guess that even a war involving the exchange of several nuclear weapons between the Arabs and the Israelis would stay confined to the Middle East; to what extent such a war would constitute a threat to U.S. security depends largely, perhaps, on the very hard question of the extent to which the U.S. would feel itself bound to come to Israel's aid if she were facing large-scale destruction or if the Israelis were being "pushed into the sea."

There are several reasons for our relative calm about the Middle Eastern situation. It appears that the Israelis, at least given some military assistance such as jet aircraft (before they are able to produce their own) from the West, can effectively defend themselves against Arab aggression for the foreseeable future. The Israeli military position is of course much improved by their possession of the occupied territories as a result of the 1967 war. However much various Arab command and terrorist groups, airplane hijackers, etc., can cause trouble for Israel, it is nevertheless clear that the Arab countries remain disunited, at least so far as the feasibility of well-planned and concerted military actions on a large scale against Israel are concerned.

According to press reports, the Arab air and armored forces lost in the 1967 war have now been largely replaced by the Russians. This means perhaps that the Arabs, especially Egypt, are at least potentially capable of accomplishing a sudden and devastating strike against Israeli aircraft on the ground, much as the Israelis did against the Arab air forces in 1967. But we are inclined to guess that the Israelis have anticipated this possibility and taken appropriate cautionary measures

through various means they presumably have available: good intelligence sources, technically effective and well-organized radar and other warning systems, and revetments and other protection as well as high alert levels for aircraft on the ground. In the case of the resupplied armor, we are inclined to take seriously press reports of the difficulties that Soviet military "advisers," operating at battalion or company levels, are having in getting their Arab allies up to good levels of military efficiency.

Israel, in contrast to the Arabs, has a responsible and effective government (even though somewhat fragmented from a parliamentary standpoint), a united people, and very effective control over its armed forces. We also assume that the U.S. can, if it so desires, exert some stabilizing influence on the Israeli government; although this influence is probably declining and may continue to decline as an increasing number of Israelis come to feel that they are "on their own."

Another important reason for some relative optimism--so far as direct U.S. security interests are concerned--is the fact that the U.S. and the Soviets have an obvious common interest in damping hostilities in the Middle East or, to put it perhaps more precisely, in seeing to it that there is no major war in the Middle East, especially a nuclear war. One recalls that the first operational use of the Washington-Moscow "hot line" occurred during the 1967 war and, if the press reports are correct, the first communication was from Moscow to Washington. Later on, as is well known, Washington used the hot line to inform Moscow immediately that its carrier-launched planes were not on an aggressive mission when the Israelis attacked the communications ship Liberty. In sum, it seems to us that even though the Soviets may make relatively loud noises about helping their Arab friends and denouncing and threatening Israel, in a time of genuine crisis which threatened to involve the U.S. and the Soviets directly, Moscow would be most likely to exercise a restraining influence on the Arabs (although, of course, Moscow might find its influence more limited than it wished).

While it probably does decrease local stability and make the area more crisis prone, we do not see any especially significant or especially serious dangers in the relatively new Soviet naval "presence" in the Mediterranean. Compared to the U.S. Sixth Fleet, the Soviet forces are, and probably will continue to remain, small. One helicopter carrier is a negligible striking force compared to one or two regular aircraft carriers. So far as we know, there is no evidence to suggest that the Soviets are aiming towards a striking force in the Mediterranean which would in any way rival the Sixth Fleet. But from the Soviet military standpoint, it would seem to be a plausible step to expand Soviet Mediterranean operations to the extent of keeping a fairly close watch on the activities of the Sixth Fleet; possibly pursuing measures aimed at inhibiting the movement of or restricting the area of operation of U.S. Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean; basing Soviet long-range patrol planes in Egypt for scouting the Sixth Fleet and perhaps keeping track of some NATO activities in the Mediterranean, conveniently soaking up useful intelligence on U.S. ships, planes, naval tactics, communications, and other operations and equipment; and occasionally resorting to minor naval harassment maneuvers and "normal" intelligence-gathering activities.

Although, for the reasons discussed above, we do not consider the Middle East a special crisis area of the highest concern so far as U.S. security is concerned, it does seem to us that the U.S. military "presence" in the area represented by the Sixth Fleet is most important. Certainly the Sixth Fleet represents a stabilizing force which could cause the Arabs to think twice with regard to some tactics they might otherwise consider using against the Israelis. It may be that the main question--aside from contingency plans for the emergence of nuclear weapons and the possibility of an imminent and complete Israelis defeat--should be ways in which the Sixth Fleet could be "beefed up" in various ways and the extent to which this might advantageously be done. In the absence of any detailed knowledge of the matter, and in an unclassified report, we can only mention some of the more obvious possibilities: perhaps increasing somewhat the complement of troops or marines that can be readily landed, by helicopter or otherwise from the Sixth Fleet to protect U.S. lives or property or conceivably undertake carefully considered military operations; perhaps taking precautions to decrease the vulnerability of the Sixth Fleet to attacks by, say, Egyptian bombers or submarines (which attacks might or might not be "authorized"--we are not concerned about the possibility of significant Soviet attacks on the Sixth Fleet in the foreseeable future); perhaps taking steps to play the harassment and intelligence "game" somewhat more aggressively against the Russians if it appears that there would be anything really to be gained by this (given the contrast between our "open" society and the "closed" Soviet society, it may be that we have more to learn by watching the Russians in the Mediterranean than they have by watching us).

The Sixth Fleet exemplifies the useful and stabilizing role of an effective U.S. military "presence" in a potential crisis area. Some of the points we have presented in this short discussion of the Middle East have wider application with respect to the probable military advantage of having available either in the area or nearby in terms of time mobile and effective striking forces with flexible capabilities. Such forces can probably be maintained at not too great a cost; in no way do they commit the U.S. to any actions which are likely to be construed as genuinely aggressive (except perhaps by the Russians and others for propaganda purposes); they can protect American lives and property when needed; and they can be used to "show the flag" in skillful ways to discourage potential threats and perhaps encourage wavering allies. Of course Congress took another position with regard to the FDL's (First Deployment Logistic Ships). The distrust and suspicion expressed by many Congressmen may increase. If one does not trust the U.S. government to use capabilities wisely there may be further attempts by Congress and others to restrict the deployment of forces which can "easily get us in trouble" by their presence in a crisis and incident-prone area or which are easily "misused."

E. Africa

This section on possible military crises in Africa, and the section on Latin America which follows, will both be relatively brief. This is not because we consider Africa and Latin America unimportant areas of the

world, or areas with which the United States should not be very seriously concerned. These areas may well be quite tumultuous and in some cases--say a large civil war in Brazil or a left-wing takeover of that country--there would be great concern in the U.S. But it is still difficult to foresee very many situations in Africa and Latin America which would constitute major military crises for the United States that also justified major U.S. intervention. (However, this is one area where various kinds of special and/or elite forces and/or individuals might be very useful.) Conceding all this we still do not expect that relatively vital U.S. security issues will be at issue in Africa and Latin America to the extent that they may be in Europe and Asia. We make this general prognosis with some confidence as far ahead as about 1980; after that, developments in Africa and Latin America may have reached a point where essential U.S. security interests are more clearly at stake, and crises with a significant military aspect may present themselves to this country.

The general trends and alternatives that we see for Africa and Latin America we have tried to describe under the heading of "The Third World Context" in Chapter X of Part I of this report. We hope that context will be useful and informative to military planners and others reading this report, but we will not attempt to discuss or elaborate it any further here. With a very few exceptions (of different types, comparing for instance South Africa, Angola, Ethiopia, and Egypt) Africa is comprised mainly of "new" nations retaining some genuine benefits of their colonial heritage, but often reacting strongly against that heritage, and led by either very weak parliamentary governments or military dictatorships of uncertain effectiveness and tenure. Over all, with the partial exception of South Africa, the nations of Africa are "underdeveloped," with all the social problems, governmental difficulties, and opportunities for foreign interventionism that this implies. In the one serious military conflict now going on in Africa, the secession of Biafra from Nigeria, it is clear that each side is receiving some foreign arms and other aid from the Soviets and from Europe, but there is certainly no significant Soviet or European or American military intervention, nor does there appear to be any appreciable likelihood of any such intervention.

Although we do not foresee a high probability of serious military crises for the United States presenting themselves in Africa before perhaps 1980, we suspect that the situation may be different with respect to U.S. diplomatic problems and relationships. We think that effort invested in careful study and planning with respect to Africa, in economic and (probably occasional) military aid; and, in cooperation with the other nations of the "northern tier" of the world, with respect to African problems may return very worthwhile dividends in the post-1980 period. We strongly believe that anything the United States can do to facilitate the social and economic development of Africa, and to help create peace and order in that chaotic continent, it most certainly should do--perhaps including the creation of the aforementioned relatively small but very skilled and capable special and/or elite forces and/or individuals.

All this is in line with our conception of an enlightened and generally "activist" over-all U.S. policy approach to Africa (and Latin America). Thus it seems worth pointing out that, while the probability of military crises for the United States seems low, there may be many occasions for the U.S. military to help advance U.S. diplomatic and economic policies in Africa. In addition, military planners may need to conceive the role of the armed services in a less narrowly "military" sense than before; they may want to have immediately available various logistics capabilities (as already exemplified in some kinds of rescue and relief operations that the services have occasionally undertaken in foreign countries); they may need to have trained linguists and "country specialists" who can communicate and deal effectively with the "cross cultural" problems that Westerners typically have so much difficulty with. In general the services should be prepared to help implement U.S. diplomatic and economic policies in a variety of ways. Indeed, the services may turn out to be the only agency of the U.S. government that can "get the job done," where the "job" may turn out to be quite unmilitary. (To illustrate with what may seem--but is not meant to be--a trivial and flippant point: Perhaps the Air Force should have paint on hand so that it can, with a few hours notice, fix its transport planes to represent not "The United States Air Force" but simply "The United States of America." There is of course a limited analogy here with "Air Force One"; the President of the United States no longer travels in a conspicuously Air Force plane, he travels in an American plane; and this unquestionably improves, in some significant respects, the foreign "image" of the United States and its President.)

F. Latin America

Our comments on Latin America will be brief, because much of what we have said just above with regard to Africa also applies to Latin America. We foresee for Latin America through the decade of 1975-85 a likely continuing turnover of military or quasi-military governments in some countries, but probably not many (if any) civil wars on the Nigerian model, and few if any national boundary changes. Various governmental and social ills notwithstanding, Latin American countries have a record of greater stability so far as their national identity and durability is concerned than do the African nations. This is probably due mainly to the fact that the African countries have largely had to make the transition from colonial status to genuine national independence since World War II, while most Latin American countries have been genuinely independent for many decades (even though from the standpoint of their citizens, inadequate governments and limited economic development have been the "norm").

Again, as with Africa, we see many opportunities for imaginative U.S. foreign policy in Latin America but few military crises in which the U.S. should want or need to involve itself. Indeed, we would emphasize that there are more <u>immediate</u> opportunities for enlightened U.S. diplomatic and

economic policies toward Latin America than toward Africa. There are several reasons for this statement: through organizations such as the Organi- of American States (OAS), there exists a substantial tradition of hemispheric unity between the U.S. and Latin America which it is certainly in the interest of the U.S. to try to continue as best it can; the Latin American countries tend to have relatively effective governments--however unsatisfactory these governments may be from the standpoint of American or Western parliamentary democracy in general; and it is possible for the U.S. to do business with these governments (unlike Africa where there may or may not be an effective government with which anyone can really "do business"); finally there are, in Latin America, relatively clearly foreseeable economic development projects* which could both benefit greatly the citizens of several Latin American countries and at the same time encourage a climate of good will towards the United States.

Turning briefly to military intervention and crisis possibilities, it would require a much larger scale of military effort for the U.S. to act in any of the major Latin American countries in the manner in which it did in the Dominican Republic; and we think any such actions in any of the larger Latin American countries extremely unlikely. There have been recent difficulties with small U.S. fishing fleets off the coast of Peru, and some disagreements between the U.S. and Peruvian governments about the boundaries of territorial waters. But, again, we do not think that a few machine gun bullets or shells fired at an American fishing boat, or the detention of the boat until a fine of some thousands of dollars has been paid, represent any serious risk of significant armed conflict between the U.S. and Peru. Nor do we attach any particular significance to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Lima and Moscow.

Cuba probably deserves some special and final mention in our comments on Latin America. Certainly, one of the greatest--perhaps the greatest--military crisis that the U.S. has had to face since World War II stemmed from the installation of Soviet ballistic missiles, presumably ready to carry nuclear warheads, in Cuba. There is certainly no need to recount here the Cuban crisis. But we do not expect any further efforts by the Soviets to take advantage of Cuba as a missile launching base as they did in 1962. Our guess is that the Soviets will be disinclined to undertake any similar strategic adventures in Cuba in the future, and that the U.S. will continue to watch Cuba carefully just in case they should.

The other issue relating to Cuba is the "export" of Communism or "Castroism" to other Latin American countries. It now appears that, in

*The Hudson Institute has studied the possibility of capitalizing on the high rainfall and low topography of the river basins of South America. Through the use of low and inexpensive dams, power, navigational benefits, and mineral exploration and exploitation are all feasible. The total benefits could result, for instance, in a several-fold increase in GNP per capita for people living in perhaps a third of the continental area of Latin America.

spite of earlier and widely expressed U.S. fears, Castro is not having much success in exporting revolutionary zeal to the rest of Latin America; that on the contrary he is beset with economic and social problems at home and some mutual disenchantment with the Soviets. So it does not seem to us that Cuba is likely to provide much of a threat to U.S. security either as a strategic base for Soviet missiles or as a political base for Communist expansion in Latin America. It is perhaps not inappropriate for us to observe that the present situation with respect to Cuba seems to offer some definite opportunities for imaginative U.S. foreign policy, and that it is at least possible that by the 1975-85 decade U.S. relationships with Cuba may have changed very much for the better.

G. Problems Connected with Freedom of the Seas and International Air Space

We include this section because the Pueblo incident and the very recent shooting down by the North Koreans of an unarmed U.S. EC-121 plane, both definitely outside the North Korean territorial limits, have created for the United States what have been widely interpreted as military crises for the United States. (We have not tried to define a "military crisis" exactly in this chapter or anywhere else in this report, but we suggest that an incident which involves: the death or internment of a significant number of American military personnel; a response involving the rapid deployment of naval vessels including aircraft carriers; the placing of at least some U.S. military forces on special alert status; and the calling up of some 15,000 reservists, constitutes a military crisis. But we would not consider the now fairly frequent "hijacking" of aircraft, be they American planes diverted to Havana or Israeli planes diverted to Algeria, as representing military crises.)

It is first of all important to note that both the Pueblo capture and the shooting down of the unarmed EC-121 were the work of the North Koreans. No similar aggressive acts have been undertaken by any other countries, large or small, although of course this possibility cannot be excluded. It is also worth noting, as was done in Section D on the Middle East above, that the Russians have scrupulously followed the "rules of the game" with respect to reconnaissance and harassment activities on the high seas and in international air space; and also that the Soviets lent naval assistance in the search for survivors from the downed EC-121.

The United States of course has many options for dealing with incidents like those of the Pueblo and the EC-121. Punitive military strikes are one option, although most of the authors of this report do not think that is a very satisfactory option, for various reasons. (E.g., given the likely political milieus described in Part III, the United States government is unlikely, politically, to be able to restore "deterrence" as a major protection of such isolated and exposed units.) There are of course opportunities for bringing to bear diplomatic, economic, and other forms of "peaceful" pressure. But these too, again given the likely political milieus and the effects of recent precedents, are likely to be limited. Or the United States could cease or substantially curtail its intelligence

collecting activities in areas where the risk to its ships or planes seems high; we are not in a position to pass judgment on the trade-offs involved here.

Or, the U.S. can take steps, as it is now apparently planning to do to make sure that some effective form of military assistance is within reach of unarmed ships or aircraft carrying out missions off the coast of North Korea, or in other areas where the risk of attack seems high. It appears that the number of areas where the risks of attack are high is low, North Korea being the conspicuous example. Also, as a guess because we have not tried to examine the question in any detail, it seems likely that the cost of affording satisfactory protection to the U.S. ships and aircraft need not be especially high. (In the case of the Pueblo incident a few fighter-bombers appropriately equipped and on ten or fifteen minute alert on air strips in the northern part of South Korea might have saved the situation. If naval force is in order, then one or two small aircraft carriers capable of launching fighters or fighter-bombers within a few minutes notice could probably provide adequate protection, at least in the North Korean case. Unarmed U.S. ships or aircraft carrying electronic equipment should be able to use some of this equipment to learn of potential threats at least some minutes before an attack is possible, and should be able to call for help immediately.) such capabilities--particularly if used successfully and intelligently--might help greatly in restoring some deterrence to the situation.

In sum, then, with respect to "military crises" associated with incidents like that of the Pueblo and the shooting down of an unarmed patrol aircraft, we think that U.S. military planners should consider appropriate protective steps (under the assumption that the steps can be taken at not too great a material cost and with almost negligible military risk). While we do not expect that the capture or destruction of U.S. ships and planes on the high seas will be a major military crisis problem in the 1975-1985 period, there may be an increasing problem of "law and order" internationally and it would be unwise to encourage it, by defective U.S. deployments.

H. A Detailed Crisis Scenario. U.S. Withdrawal from Thailand in the Late Seventies

As noted in the first section of this chapter, the detailed scenario which follows is the work of Frank Armbruster. To understand the domestic and international contexts which lead up to this detailed scenario, the reader should look again at Armbruster's "pessimistic scenario" in Chapter IV of Part I of this report. With that general "scenario" as setting and background, the detailed military scenario is as follows.

A crisis, which triggers a last-ditch effort at "containment" by the U.S.--even in its weakened political condition--arises in the form of a communist attack on Thailand (though the same domestic problems would presumably arise regardless of where the commitment of U.S. forces was made). The handwriting had been on the wall for Thailand ever since the loss of

South Vietnam in 1969 but the Thai government had managed to survive to the point where the left in the U.S. had begun to hold up Thailand as living evidence of the fallacy of the domino theory. Since the catastrophic evacuation of South Vietnam by U.S. forces, like Burma and Cambodia in the 1960's the Thai government has attempted to stave off the inevitable by changing to a policy of Peking- or Hanoi-oriented "neutrality." Bangkok also agreed to pay huge reparations for the damage to North Vietnam by U.S. bombers based in Thailand during the Vietnamese war. The U.S. "loaned" the Thais money to meet these "obligations." Hanoi went along with the act for a few years because it isolated Vientiane and time was needed to rebuild the country and to consolidate the gains in the south. She kept her cadres intact throughout Southeast Asia, however, and, once she had recouped adequately, sent her regiments to bolster a renewed Pathet Lao effort. The Royalist Laotian government collapsed. As soon as the Laotian and South Vietnamese areas were consolidated under communist control, the same fate befell Cambodia. By the second half of the 1970's Thailand was in grave danger. This country, which during the Vietnamese war was held up as an example of the type of "homogeneous" nation and legitimate government in Southeast Asia which could be defended against a war of national liberation instigated from outside, began to come apart at the seams.

In northeast Thailand, Hanoi-trained native communist cadres, aided by hard-core units from across the Mekong, began a campaign of military and terrorist operations. Transport and communications systems in the area quickly ceased to function and the police lost control of the situation. While trying to reason with Hanoi, the Thai government (à la India) maintained its neutrality even after the communist attack began. At this point, however, Hanoi and Peking condemned the government as fascist oppressors of the Thai people and pledged their support to the "Liberation Movement." The Thai government frantically began to search for support, but the remaining non-communist Southeast Asian countries now feared to support anti-communist military operations. Communist parties were strong throughout the area, and in the Philippines a revitalized Huk movement was receiving active support slipped in from Vietnam and China. At the mere request for aid by the Thai government, communist-dominated mobs instantly appeared in the streets of Singapore, Manila, Canberra, Wellington, and even Djakarta, condemning the "fascist oppressors in Bangkok."

Thai appeals to Delhi resulted in a lecture on the wages of too close an association with the United States in the Vietnamese war and on "a paranoid fear of communists." An appeal to Japan resulted in the largest, longest, wildest left-wing riots in Tokyo's history. In addition to a strike by the communist-dominated transport workers, which paralyzed Japan, Red China warned that if one Japanese soldier set foot on Thai soil, Chinese trade with Japan (which had become a large part of the Japanese import-export market) would be stopped forever. Only Seoul and Taipei responded affirmatively to the Thai appeal, but with the stipulation that the United States must help, and must guarantee to defend Korea and Taiwan should they be attacked.

The Thais would rather appeal to the communists again than to the United States. They attempt to get up a coalition government with the communists in northeast Thailand, feeling that since this generous offer is more than the communists could gain on the battlefield at this point there is reason for them to accept. They do, but à la Laos in 1960, the net result is an eventual de facto partition of Thailand, with strong communist military bases in the northeast and good, high-capacity logistic routes all the way to Saigon, Hanoi and the Chinese border of Laos. In the loyalist portion of Thailand the communist cadres are well established and guerrillas more or less infest the countryside right down to Bangkok. With his back to the wall, the King (a government hardly exists) takes the most distasteful step--appealing to the United States for help.

The hottest and most unruly debate in Congress since the U.S. Civil War ensues. "American boys are once again to be poured by the thousands into the bottomless pit of Southeast Asia in a futile effort to support a right-wing monarch (fascist government) against an uprising of oppressed peasants--when will we learn--how many dead Americans will it take," etc., "We are being asked to spend billions of dollars which are needed in our slums to support this despot." etc. The largest street demonstrations in the history of the country are organized with the help of every leftist and pacifist organization and every leftist and pacifist dollar which can be scraped up in the U.S. and abroad. The mobs hit the streets of New York, San Francisco, Washington, Chicago, Detroit, well armed with posters and with vast coverage by sympathetic reporters from every news media. "No More U.S. Aggression Against Helpless Peasants," "Bread Not Bombs for the Oppressed Peoples of Southeast Asia," "Stop This Unjust War Before It Starts," etc. Every university is shut down by "students' strikes" with the support of many professors. Tens of thousands of names are gathered on petitions by university and high school students protesting our involvement. Tens of thousands of telegrams opposing U.S. action bombard Congress. It is the best organized protest movement ever. In this period it takes only days for the "cadre" in the U.S. to touch one off, but the best organized movements sometimes intentionally go to extremes. In this case looting and burning result in some cities. The public media do not condemn these acts of violence but discuss philosophically the "underlying causes" of the riots. The conclusion? "The deep distaste of the American public for irresponsible military adventures in Southeast Asia has been demonstrated," and "The responsibility for this outburst, which is the only means the common people have to demonstrate their wishes in times of dire crises, lies clearly with the administration in Washington." Furthermore, if the government should continue on this disastrous course, further outbursts are not only to be expected but encouraged."

The President is now in a position in which his action, or lack of it, might have many more far-reaching results than those applying to Thailand. The member states of the OAS who are still friendly to the United States (or at least not irreconcilably hostile), some Afro-Asian states, and information gathered by every United States intelligence agency indicate that shaky governments and left-wing challengers--actual or would-be--throughout the world are waiting to see whether the United States has lost the ability to project its military power into an area

beset by a communist war of national liberation. If the challenged governments and the widespread revolutionary groups should come to the conclusion that helpful intervention by the communists is safe and sane and counter-intervention by the U.S. will be negligible or even just weak and uncertain, then there is the possibility that there would be an eruption of these so-called wars of national liberation around the world which could be of catastrophic proportions. In such a situation it is no longer a side issue for the United States. With a hostile communist Mexican government in power and Castroite communism (he is now the grand old man of Latin American communism) rampant in other Latin American countries, the possibility of the United States being isolated in its own hemisphere is great indeed. Under these conditions the pressure on the President not to become involved in the almost hopeless, "bottomless pit" cause of Southeast Asia is very strong, nor is this pressure made up only of idle demands. But the geographic location of the communist threat is not too relevant: any interference by the U.S. government with a communist totalitarian dictatorship, even one 90 miles off our coast in Cuba, would be condemned as the worst type of imperial aggression in the United States. The fact that the left-wing movements are close to the U.S. border is irrelevant to those who would not have us interfere once the fait accompli, such as Mexico, had been presented to us.

United States intervention, or the fact that it can be counted on in an emergency, is a key factor influencing some governments to hold out against communists. It is one of the most important weapons against the communist "wave of the future" and "inevitability" propaganda. Communist insurgent movements around the world understand this fact, as do the governments threatened by them. But mere assurance by the United States that it will assist a country "next time" will not carry enough weight to shore up resistance to communist take-over attempts. Despite protests within the United States, in order to restore the credibility of U.S. commitments what is called for is a spectacular example of U.S. capability to reverse, or at least to stem the tide of, the first communist war of national liberation.

Obviously, it is the aggressor who can choose the place and time of conflict, but now that the actual challenge has come to Thailand, it, too, is considered to be the battleground in "the wrong place at the wrong time," and in the eyes of many "the wrong war" is being fought. But for reasons mentioned above, the President is locked into a position of accepting the undesirable challenge or of risking much more. Since the collapse of the United States in Vietnam and the loss of Laos and Cambodia, Thailand is now truly a hard spot to attempt to contain the communist tide. Homogeneity, legitimate government, and other benefits which were supposed to make Thailand the "right place" to make a stand at the time of Vietnam have largely disappeared under hostile examination or are now insufficient in view of the changed conditions resulting from our "bugging out" of Vietnam. One consideration is that bases are scarce. Even in the Philippines there is a fear that if we used Clark Field to stage troops into Thailand, leftist demonstrations might threaten the government. Similarly, in Japan there is fear of grave disturbances should Japanese contractors supply war materiel or even supporting materiel for an anti-communist

effort in Thailand. Then, too, if American troops were to be staged through Japan, it is feared that there, too, outbreaks might threaten the life of the government. The only real estate available as staging areas to U.S. forces is Taiwan and possibly some bases in Australia and New Zealand.

With the exception of the use of tactical nuclear weapons (not by any responsible group), it is extremely difficult to project U.S. military power in large doses into this area. The Seventh Fleet can still launch significant air strikes along the coast of the Tonkin Gulf and the South China Sea as well as into the area north of the Gulf of Siam. The Navy can also launch light transport aircraft which could make small air drops of personnel and supplies. If the carriers are equipped for it and have the right aircraft aboard, they may even be able to provide some air refueling capability by small tankers "yo-yoing" off the ships. This may be of vital importance to the fighter-bombers of the CASFs. All other air strike and support missions must come directly from that portion of Thailand which is still available to a friendly Air Force. The port of Bangkok is available to receive American troops and supplies; but for U.S. domestic political reasons, a Cam Ran Bay-type of operation to support large logistics requirements might be very difficult to carry out. Anything that looks as if we are preparing for a long war in this area would be immediately opposed by a strong coalition of forces in the United States as well as Europe. These forces would include American Congressmen as well as political figures of note from all over the world.

The type of fighting to be considered by U.S. forces in this area therefore depends heavily on the use of Korean and Chinese Nationalist troops as well as relatively small numbers of highly specialized American ground, sea and air forces. An obvious plan suited to our military capability is quickly scrapped for obvious political reasons. This plan would call for the Seventh Fleet to outdistance the Russian trawlers which would be stalking its position in the northern portion of the South China Sea and the Straits of Taiwan and, as soon as the attack carriers were within range of Indochinese territory, to launch a surprise, all-out, low-level strike against communist airfields from the border of China to the Mekong Delta. This would be followed by an immediate transfer of U.S. CASF forces into Thailand and the embarkation of South Korean marines and U.S. amphibious forces, followed by the largest number of South Korean and Nationalist Chinese army troops which could be spared for the operations. The Chinese troops would be landed in Thailand and put into operation in the northeast area. The Korean and American amphibious forces would be used to raid the coast of Vietnam and to pin down as many troops as possible. The main body of Korean and U.S. forces would be used to cut the peninsula in half, at least temporarily, by a drive along the road from the area of Quang Tri to Savannakhet on the Mekong, where they would link up with the Chinese Nationalists in Thailand. Simultaneously, an effort would be made to instigate revolts in South Vietnam, southern Laos and Cambodia. The objective of this plan would be to reopen the whole Southeast Asian theatre by using American forces to wreck the communist base of operations, at least to the point where the Thais could have some hope of ultimate success in defending their country.

This operation is impossible, however, from a political point of view. The political will of the United States is not strong enough to support operations which would allow the U.S. fleet to take advantage of the vulnerability of the 600-mile coast line of Vietnam. In the eyes of the President the country will certainly not support an actual invasion to cut the peninsula in half and reopen the Southeast Asian theatre of operations. War plans of the "rollback" nature, which may much more easily lend themselves to the capabilities of our forces, have not been considered by the U.S. decision-makers since the late 1940's. By now the fabric of American society is so shaken that decision-makers no longer even have the option of considering such a plan realistically. At least this is the opinion of most people in positions of responsibility in Washington.

As a result, the decision is to follow the same road taken in Vietnam in the sixties, reinforcing the Thais as quickly as possible to prevent a takeover of their country by regimental-sized units of the Vietnamese army. The Vietnamese communists have a very large army (about three-quarters of a million) since Vietnam is now a single country with a population of 40 million. The Laotian-Cambodian-Thai communist forces total about another one-quarter million but have a much lower organizational and combat capability, primarily of a militia or guerrilla type. The Vietnamese forces (from both north and south), however, are now convinced that communism a la Ho Chi Minh, the deceased but almost deified "Lenin of the East," is the wave of the future and that they are unbeatable. The Vietnamese communists have till now never lost a war, and they have beaten the Americans once before. They are well aware that the war was won in Washington and not in Vietnam--but that is what they mean by beating the Americans. In their opinion the communist approach to warfare and the strength of the communist ideology is too much for the decadent nation which opposes them, despite its huge size and great wealth. Furthermore, they are convinced at this point, and for very good reason, that the danger of U.S. air strikes against Vietnam such as they faced in the 1960's has vanished. There appears to be ample logic behind their conclusion, in that the United States has not utilized its overwhelming conventional military power to force solutions extremely detrimental to communist powers in Asia for 30 years. In the spring of 1951 the takeover of at least the southern section of North Korea was not effected against a Chinese army collapsing under the pile-driver blows of the advancing Eighth Army; the mere offer of negotiations stopped the U.S. forces. In the Vietnamese war, we were even more timid as far as the sanctuary of North Vietnamese soil from ground attack was concerned.

The approved Allied plan for Thailand calls for very high-firepower U.S. units, with Nationalist Chinese and Korean troops sent in quickly to prevent the overrunning of northeast Thailand, and the rest of the country as well, by high-morale Vietnamese troops. There is, of course, an immediate debate in the inner circles of government over the theory that U.S. troops will trigger the entrance of Vietnamese troops. It is obvious that Vietnamese would already be in northeast Thailand in cadre form making preparations for the introduction of Vietnamese troops when

and if it becomes necessary, but the idea that the Vietnamese would guarantee a communist takeover of Thailand still has not occurred to some of the government personnel involved in the debate behind closed doors. They cannot grasp the idea that the Vietnamese will refrain from battle only if the communists of northeast Thailand can take over the country without their assistance, but that they are determined the country will be taken over. Thus the introduction of these troops would depend only on how difficult the task is.

Nevertheless, this argument against using U.S. forces in Thailand ("It will bring in the Vietnamese") carries weight among some groups of people who should know better. It reflects the type of discussion over the reasons for the introduction of North Vietnamese troops into South Vietnam in the 1960's when the communist (North) Vietnamese attitude was identical.

The American contribution is to place a rather heavy emphasis on armored units operating on the plains of northeast Thailand. It is hoped in this way to get the maximum protection for this area against the big Vietnamese regiments during the dry season while committing the lowest number of men (it is the number of men that the newspapers carry in reporting these wars). Similarly, there will be heavy emphasis on high firepower, air support and ground attack aircraft to help stem the tide of the Vietnamese, should they come in. In the planning stage of the operations a ground rule is made that the U.S. forces will not violate the territory of Laos or Cambodia. This, again, is to be a purely defensive operation in Thailand. The logistic routes through Laos and Cambodia will not be touched by land invasion, nor are there to be any blockades of the port facilities of Vietnam or Cambodia. The political considerations put restrictive parameters on the military operations, which, in this particular case, may be less valid than they were in the Vietnamese war. At least the entrance of China into this conflict seems less likely if American forces operate in southern Laos or Cambodia than it might have been if the Americans landed in the Hanoi-Haiphong area of the Red River Delta of North Vietnam in the 1960's. Instead of analytical discussion, U.S. political decision-makers are engulfed by the country's emotional reaction to any steps which might be "escalatory."

The major Thai effort would be in the small-war, police and constabulary areas and would be directed against home-grown communist cadre members and local guerrillas. The Thai forces would also be useful on raids into Cambodia and Laos, where they should be more than a match for local communist forces. These raids could destroy communist base areas and tie down Vietnamese troops to defend them. However, such actions may have to be prepared on the QT because, if word leaked out, opposition forces in the U.S. would torpedo the effort in Congress and elsewhere.

Presidential staff members plead with the military to go in softly, and, if they have to save northeast Thailand from the big Vietnamese units, do it efficiently and fast!

The press is extremely hostile to the movement of U.S. troops into Thailand and headlines such as "Here We Go Again!" appear in almost all the papers. The local Thai, Laotian and Cambodian communist battalions are aware they are no match for the allies and, as soon as the word is out that Taiwan, South Korea and the U.S. are sending troops, the communist units call for help. Vietnamese regiments stream over the mountain passes by truck and up the Mekong River by boat. But the heavy emphasis on police and small-unit operations by the Thais is the key element which will decide if the papers are right. CASFs, Thai and Chinese Nationalist infantry have to defend the bases from the communist battalions in the area in addition to slowing down movements of Vietnamese regiments within Thailand until the American armor arrives. But the Thai army, constabulary and police, together with U.S., Korean and Nationalist Chinese special forces troops, have primary responsibility for preventing attacks on the bases by small guerrilla mortar, rocket and satchel charge units.

The re-entry of pro-government forces into the communist-dominated area of eastern Thailand triggers large and loud demonstrations against this "escalation, which is undoing all the good that the coalition government has done and is leading directly to World War III." While these protests continue, the First Armored Division unloads at Bangkok and speeds toward Nakhon. Television cameras, on hand for the division's debarkation, send it live all over the world via satellite. The fact that the First Armored was on the way had been no secret, but its arrival makes it clear that the President has not been influenced by the "protestors," who are determined to force the President to follow their advice. After viewing the TV broadcast from Bangkok the demonstrators turn hysterical. During their wild speeches the instigators are fury and frustration personified. In London, Hamburg and Tokyo the mobs promise to burn down the cities if the governments do not condemn the "bestial aggression of U.S. tanks against the helpless, oppressed peasants of Thailand." A special session of the U.N. Security Council is called and the United States is condemned as an aggressor against Laos and Cambodia. By better than a two-thirds majority, the Assembly confirms the Security Council's decision to initiate sanctions against the U.S., South Korea and Taiwan.

In the theatre of operations U.S. Navy and Air Force fighter-bombers have been striking every communist airfield in eastern Thailand, Laos and Cambodia from the Chinese border to the Gulf of Siam. They have caused landslides along the mountain roads, knocked out bridges, sown hundreds of thousands of new, sophisticated mines on all roads leading into Thailand and planted the Mekong for hundreds of miles with new, hard-to-sweep sea mines. They have also provided air cover for U.S. and Nationalist troops, securing forward airfields at Nakhon Ratchasima and Udon Thani. By the time the main body of U.S. and Korean troops arrives in Taiwan, C-143s and C-5s are flying the troops right into these bases. The result is a sizable allied force built up in time, and to throw them out would require more than the efforts of the first few Vietnamese regiments. The arrival of the U.S. armor is a real problem for the Vietnamese and the

recent frantic world-wide communist effort to drum up opposition to the U.S. involvement is a last desperate effort to divert this division from its debarkation in Thailand. When a U.S. armored cavalry brigade and two independent armored brigades land in quick succession, the frustration of the communist and non-communist opposition elements knows no bounds. These units move out toward the Cambodian border followed by contingents of a U.S. airborne brigade and Korean and Nationalist Chinese infantry brigades. The covert nature of the preparations pays off. Not until the units are actually under way do the communists really believe that the U.S. President has done it. In this respect the demonstrations of the opposition groups in the U.S. and elsewhere did damage to the communist effort because the Vietnamese too were convinced that the U.S. President (although they expected him to bluff to the last) wouldn't dare make the move.

The Vietnamese delay their attack long enough to bring up overwhelming force but the reinforcement of Thai air by U.S. Seventh Fleet aircraft and CASF units makes this a difficult task by road or river. High firepower U.S. armored outfits plus the air-delivered ordnance capability makes outright conventional conquest of Thailand a very costly procedure.

The plains of northeast Thailand lend themselves to the use of mechanized forces and their introduction allows the allies, under cover of a ground-support umbrella, to strike at and break up the Vietnamese regiments. Korean and Nationalist Chinese along with Thai regulars then go after the remnants. If the Vietnamese mass to hold, the U.S. armor hits again and the operation is repeated. Meanwhile other Thai military units, constabulary and police forces secure the area and rout out local communist cadre and guerrillas. This task becomes more difficult as Khmer, Laotian and Vietnamese sections of Thailand are broached. Even Vietnamese and Lao regulars are hard for the Thais to dig out of these areas. Local Vietnamese, Khmer and Lao policemen are often necessary here.

The danger of a large conflict continues, however, as Vietnamese troops cross Laos and Cambodia to mass in Thailand. The interim of about a dozen years after the disastrous U.S. evacuation from Vietnam is about the right amount of time to fill the Vietnamese army with young men whose knowledge of the war of the mid-sixties comes largely from legends of brilliant victories of the Vietnamese communists over American imperialists. Now these troops are told that the same imperialists are attempting to take control of Thailand, that the Thai people, who are struggling to liberate themselves from the fascist government of Bangkok, are being slaughtered by the imperialist force of the United States, and that the Thais will welcome with open arms the Vietnamese troops who with the noblest of intentions are going to their aid. Hanoi knows this is nonsense, as are the brilliant victories it promises the troops. But far from a nonsensical idea is the projection that if it can escalate the war to a stage where American commitment is a large one, it will win the war in Washington.

As the troops continue to stream across the mountain and up the Mekong River, both the U.S. Naval and Air Force fighter-bomber units are

asked to perform almost impossible tasks of interdiction, since the airfields in Vietnam have been proscribed as targets by the White House. Fighter-bombers on runs to Laos and Cambodia are forced to carry clouds of fighters to protect them from the communist aircraft flying from the sanctuary of bases in Vietnam. It is well understood that the interdiction cannot be complete and that Vietnamese units will build up in eastern Thailand unless an offensive is carried out by the allies. As more Korean and Chinese Nationalist troops join U.S. forces, therefore, a drive is made to push the Vietnamese back to the Mekong and back into Cambodia.

An all-out allied drive down the railroad from Nakhon Ratchasima through Surin to M. Ubon makes excellent progress. The U.S. armored forces, supported by the Koreans and the Chinese Nationalists, bowl over the Vietnamese regiments and capture the Ubon and the airfield in record time. Following the allies down the railroad, Thai forces manage to secure the important towns at junctures of roads and railroads, and deploy a screen of patrols toward the mountains to the south. The secondary thrust by Nationalists and Korean forces, supported by U.S. armor and fighter-bombers, drives down the main road from Phai through Maha Sarakaham toward Ubon. The Vietnamese vigorously oppose this force, however, and its progress is much slower.

To the allies, the triangle which falls within the road and railroad to Ubon is the top priority area for "pacification," and the Thai military and police forces, before the enemy gains advantage during and after the rainy season, concentrate on this area in an attempt to secure it against local guerrilla and cadre and plan to destroy communist ammunition caches and bases. Repair of the airfield at Ubon makes it possible for U.S. fighter-bombers to operate from that advanced base. While Chinese Nationalists and Korean troops are responsible for the perimeter facing the Mekong River, the U.S. armor is held in reserve to defend the base against any large attacks, although at the height of the rainy season it is going to be difficult to operate tanks in the district.

Despite the success of these drives, however, and the relative success of the Thai government in re-establishing its position in eastern Thailand, it is obvious that this could very well be a long, drawn-out war. With the sanctuary from ground attack in Laos and Cambodia, the Vietnamese could keep the pot boiling for years. In fact, Hanoi is again saying that the Thai people should take heart, for "even if it takes twenty years, the socialist countries of southeast Asia will not stand by and see the peasants of Thailand ground under the heel of the U.S. puppet government in Bangkok supported by fascist, imperialist forces from the United States." U.S reporters once again send home photos of burning Thai villages with captions accusing American military action of destruction in the area, and once again they write articles to the effect that it will do no good to "save eastern Thailand from communism if the country is destroyed." Furthermore, because it does take significant U.S action to penetrate the area once more and because not only U.S and other

foreign troops but also Thai forces occasionally come under automatic weapons fire from the villages in the area, many newspaper articles question whether the Thais "are forcing these people to give up the system they are obviously defending." In effect, what is happening is that while the war on the battlefield is not going badly, the battle on the home front is not going nearly so well.

In fact, in some respects the battle on the home front goes from bad to worse. In almost every major city, not only in Western but also in Eastern Europe, U.S. consulates and embassies are stoned and burned. While mobs in these cities protest U.S. "aggression," almost continuous demonstrations take place on U.S. campuses and in major cities. In the United Nations, speech after speech condemns the United States for not following the U.N. orders to withdraw from Thailand, and newspapers the world over quote these speeches at length. Left-wing Congressmen make speeches from the floor of the House and Senate and, in interviews with television commentators, proclaim that the United States is alienating important areas of the world, such as Europe, and important organizations, such as the United Nations, over a problem of an authoritarian government of doubtful mandate. Furthermore, they say, all of this is being forced on an area of the world where social revolution is necessary and long overdue. Reporters, recently returned from Hanoi, Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane, testify before Congressional committees about U.S. atrocities and about the popular support enjoyed by the communists. These same reporters, carefully screened by the communists before being allowed into the area, also join television panels during which they insinuate that the Thai people are not anxious for the government of Bangkok to be restored, or, for that matter, for anyone other than the communists to hold sway over the area. U.S government statements and statistics from the area as well as those of the Thai government contradict these reporters, but the press, TV and radio treat these discrepancies as examples of the "credibility gap."

The hostility of the liberal press and the disturbances of the "intellectuals" bring the President under greater and greater pressure. He makes clear to the military that something must be done quickly to combat the "endless war" propaganda which is beginning to spread through the country. Military actions that might "widen the war," however, are firmly vetoed by the White House. This means that the ground sanctuary of Laos and Cambodia, as well as the air sanctuary of Vietnam, must stand. The result is an even greater requirement on the fighter-bombers in the area to fly all-weather missions right through the monsoon season, and to chew up the Vietnamese forces in Cambodia and Laos before they can mass for "exemplary" strikes into Thailand. Because the press will write off the entire campaign of the previous dry season as "totally ineffective" if it happens, it is essential that no large-scale Vietnamese attack be successful. Furthermore, U.S. forces must not come under mortar, artillery and rocket barrages which will cause undue casualties. This means a kind of "digging discipline" which was not carried out in Vietnam. American forces throughout the area must dig deep and cover their bunkers with thick roofs

to prevent the kind of casualties which the newspapers are already beginning to total up and feature daily, and which the TV newscasters feature every night.

The Thais and allied forces have been relatively successful in preventing re-infiltration of small communist units into the cleared area by setting up a screen of ambush and patrol units, while the constabulary and police forces have had relative success in digging out those units which would be dangerous to the allied forces from within the triangle held by these troops. The allies expect a large attack by the communists with forces made up primarily of Vietnamese regiments but with enough Thai, Laotian and Cambodian troops in them to call them local forces. The Russians and Chinese have been pouring aid into Hanoi, Saigon, Danang, Cam Ran Bay, Qhui Non, Natrang, and other ports along the coast. Much of this aid consists of an improved type of surface-to-air missile, anti-aircraft weapons and shiploads of new fighters. Large Vietnamese pilot training programs have been under way for months in China, but it is not at all clear whether some pilots of these planes will be Chinese and Russian. What is clear is that the "socialist states" of the world have banded together to provide every possible aid to the Vietnamese. There is also some danger at this point that Chinese forces may follow the equipment over these routes unless the United States makes it clear that, should they use these many ports to ship in sizable numbers of Chinese troops, volunteers or otherwise, we will not only strike the ports but also the troop transports.

If the U.S. President should make such a statement at this time, however, it would almost certainly be tantamount to political suicide. But the probability of Chinese involvement remains small so long as the need is not great and the traditional Vietnamese dislike of the Chinese is not submerged by the international brotherhood of socialism. Still, if the allies are successfully to defend Thailand against the expected type of Vietnamese attack, the hard decision to increase the number of troops remains.

This fact is well known in Thailand and the government in Bangkok carefully reads the statements of every U.S. political leader. Within a short period of time it becomes necessary for the President either to make a strong statement to the effect that we will not pull out of Thailand and will reinforce the line, or else to begin to make covert plans to remove the American forces from the area. Time is running out. If the order is not given quickly to send several more U.S. divisions to Thailand, which will in turn generate an order to send more Korean and Chinese troops there, they will arrive too late.

The press and world opinion places the President at a critical crossroad. Tremendous outcries from opposition groups in the United Nations, in Europe and in Japan, bolstered by huge street demonstrations, condemn the United States for a planned "huge escalation" of the war in Thailand. Left-wing Congressmen loudly assert that a decision in favor of escalation over an area of little interest to us would be a direct step toward

world war III. They state further that this dispute is the business of the Thais only, and that we are supporting a dictatorial government which does not have the popular support of the people. Further demonstrations occur throughout the United States, and university students, as usual, go out "on strike." As a result of the tremendous outcries and the fact that he is now several months closer to an off-year election which, if it goes badly, could further reduce his support in the House, the President begins to equivocate. He feels that he cannot live with this kind of opposition and still face the members of his party in the House. Several members have already told him they will have to disown him in the coming election because they cannot support any of these issues. He can easily see himself losing the House and maybe even the Senate, and rationalizes that, should this happen, he could be even less effective if a "more important place" comes under fire from the communists. He decides to pull out of Thailand.

Preparations for the move are to be top secret, and only after a joint declaration by the U.S. and Thailand which would state that northeast Thailand is once more secure and troops will be withdrawn. Furthermore, there would be a firm statement by the United States that, should the communists come back into the area cleared, we would come back with "overwhelming force."

No sooner is this decision made than a "well-informed" source leaks it to the press with the result that the bottom falls out of the military and political situation in Thailand. There is no support for our "we shall return" as we run down the road to Bangkok, for it will not keep out the Vietnamese regiments massing in Laos and Cambodia. Local leaders in northeast Thailand begin to make deals with the communists, and areas once secure become extremely dangerous overnight. Screams of protest erupt in Seoul and Taipei and, when the news spreads to Bangkok, a wave of anti-American sentiment sweeps the city, making the streets unsafe for Americans. Communist banners appear everywhere.

The real question is whether the advance forces can fight their way out of Ubon. The outfits in Udon Thani are already in motion. It soon becomes obvious that, as the military situation collapses in northeast Thailand, the U.S., Korean and Nationalist forces are going to have to fight a rear-guard action to get out. With the loss of the airfield at Ubon, U.S. fighter-bomber capability drops off significantly and, when Udon Thani is lost, the whole area of extreme northeast Thailand, Laos and northern Cambodia becomes relatively safe for movement of Vietnamese forces. The Thai army is going to be completely unable to handle the vast Vietnamese deployment when it descends, and Thai army commanders attempt to negotiate with the Vietnamese. Because of a twofold desire--to cause acute embarrassment to the United States and to show the power of communism in the area--some temporary deals are made with Thai army commanders. The U.S. forces suddenly find whole areas to the rear of them overrun by Vietnamese regiments.

Fuel dumps and other areas absolutely vital for the evacuation of the American armored units go up in flames. Aircraft from Nakhon Ratchasima and Bangkok airdrop fuel to allied units, battling their way back from Udon Thani and M. Ubon, but it is apparent that the units from M. Ubon will have to abandon their vehicles and flee toward Nakhon Ratchasima if they do not want to be cut off completely. Toward this route of retreat Vietnamese regiments stream out of Cambodia through the gaps created by the defecting Thai forces. Furious Korean and Chinese Nationalist troops have nothing but contempt for the retreating Americans even though they themselves are also in full retreat. The big problem now is to maintain control of the airfield at Nakhon Ratchasima and the airfield and port of Bangkok.

In Bangkok, the communists are whipping up anti-American sentiment as best they can while disorder spreads through the city. Communist teams are moving as quickly as possible from Cambodia and the countryside of Thailand into Bangkok. Their objective is to sabotage the airfield and the port area in order to disrupt the evacuation of the forces as much as possible. It is now apparent that the negotiation and orderly withdrawal which the President hoped for is impossible. Thailand has collapsed, and the communists openly lecture crowds on Bangkok street corners. While the King prepares to flee, a substitute heir to the throne (a pro-communist brother-in-law) attempts to make a deal to hand over the Thai army to the communists in exchange for the status of King of a puppet Thai communist government. Anti-American sentiment is running at its crest, it no longer being safe for a white man to walk about the streets of Bangkok. The real danger is that American forces will lose control of the airport in Bangkok. C-5 aircraft are ordered to evacuate American troops as fast as possible and every ship, American and otherwise, which can be chartered, is being rushed to Bangkok to wait the chance to take aboard approximately 40,000 Americans and approximately 60,000 Koreans and Nationalist Chinese who will be forced to leave by sea. Nakhon Ratchasima now becomes a nightmare of troops streaming in from two directions without vehicles or supplies. Korean and Nationalist Chinese forces actually have occasional fire-fights with American forces as arguments erupt over who will use the bridges first, and so forth. Although C-5s and C-143s fly out of the airfield, troops argue over priority. Chinese Nationalist and Korean forces see no reason for Americans to be evacuated first and a possibility of grave disorders develops in the town. As they come under fire from Vietnamese regiments moving out of Cambodia, their retreat from the east becomes a rout and panic threatens to spread among the troops. It is reminiscent of the Marine retreat from the Chosan Reservoir in Korea but without the extreme cold, although the rain and mud are adequate to cause all kinds of misery to the dismounted tankers and armored infantrymen. The weather hampers landings of the transport craft but GCA equipment is set up and they come in under very bad conditions in the attempt to evacuate the men. In the meantime some forces continue to retreat toward Bangkok. Via satellite, live cameras televise these proceedings to every major city in the world, and there is no hiding the fact that it is turning into a catastrophe for the free world forces.

Whenever the weather clears, fighter-bombers attempt to relieve the pressure on the retreating forces by strikes against the Vietnamese regiments, but there are problems in this area also, as communist aircraft now operate out of Phnom Penh while mobile anti-aircraft weapons are thick along the Thai-Cambodian border. At this point, the First Armored Division, abandoning almost all of its equipment, evacuates by truck, rail, and air out of Nakhon Ratchasima to Bangkok. But the first U.S. C-5s, carrying U.S. troops home, encounter serious difficulties when they attempt to use the fields at Taiwan as refueling stops. Anti-American rioters disable one plane while another barely gets off the ground. A quick appeal to the Philippines results in permission to use Clark Field to bring out sick and wounded. Clark and Okinawa provide enough runway capacity to handle the military and chartered civilian planes which begin to bring the tattered army to Hawaii.

As other weary troops trudge back through the rain and mud to attempt to fight their way to the port of Bangkok and onto either air or seaborne transports, a tremendous wave of depression sweeps across the United States. The small group who had courage enough to say that the effort was correct now condemn the President for abandoning the Thais, but the various verbal groups who recommended he pull out do not defend him. The communist world is jubilant. It is now clear that the United States no longer has the will to carry on the fight, nor does it require hard fighting and heavy losses to scare off the United States. Now it only takes the obvious ability and will to put up such a fight to cause the United States to cave in. This has been almost a "bloodless" victory for the communists. An erosion of the remaining nations of the free world is now only a matter of time and choice of the communist groups. World-wide communist television carries pictures of long rows of American prisoners being marched back into Vietnam and shows miles of abandoned American equipment, tanks, mobile artillery and personnel carriers. Even some U.S. aircraft is captured intact. It is now clear that wars of national liberation do work and that small powers can beat the United States.

The last Americans and most of the Koreans and Nationalist Chinese along with the government of Thailand are finally evacuated from Bangkok. The Security Council of the United Nations, backed by an overwhelming majority of the Assembly, decrees that the United States must pay reparations to Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam for the loss of life which it caused by its "naked aggression" against the peoples of those countries. Furthermore, it decrees that the United States must pay reparations to the new People's Republic of Thailand, which has been declared by the country's communist forces. The total bill runs slightly more than five billion dollars. The shattered U.S. President instructs the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations to attempt to get the amount reduced, but he does not instruct him to refuse to pay. Meanwhile every left-wing newspaper in the country condemns the President for the blundering barbarity of his actions in relation to Thailand and for the position in which he has placed the United States. They add that any righteous person can see the justice of the demands and, therefore, they do not suggest that we

do not pay these reparations. Some editorials point out the "bright side." They state that the "true patriots were those who consistently hoped that the military adventure would fail so that our nation would be cured of its megalomania." Now, they continue, "the police-the-world syndrome should be quieted, a more realistic foreign policy should follow," and a more "flexible" foreign policy in line with "the enlightened view of the social changes occurring around the world" should begin. In turn this will lead to a "bright future" where our efforts will be turned to "solving the real problems of the underprivileged in our cities, the hungry nations abroad," etc., etc.

Actually the most urgent problem of the President is none of these. His real problem is to draw the nation together and to regroup its armed forces for the next defense, which is bound to be much closer to home. The brilliant withdrawal of the army from its precarious position in Thailand can hardly be comfort enough for the armed services. The current danger, which the President and the Services must face, is a loss of élan such as the French Army suffered after Dien Bien Phu, a disaster in which the losses of a small portion of that force led to a near collapse of the system.

CHAPTER IV. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. SOME NTH COUNTRY OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS

It is particularly important in trying to judge the strength of the pressures for the initial capability to produce, retain, or acquire additional nuclear weapons by independent powers, to discuss such questions as: "What objectives should they try to fulfill?" "What kinds of tactics might they use to fulfill these objectives?" We can then better judge the likelihood that these tactics will be successful and the objectives fulfilled, or at least judge better the expectations that some Nth (or potential Nth) powers may have.

We can classify possible objectives of the nuclear forces into four groups as listed below.

I. Improve Deterrence Against Attack by Superpower

- A. Proportional deterrence ("tear an arm off")
- B. Add strength and reliability to an alliance guarantee (e.g., prevent "miscalculation" that guarantor power's nerve will collapse)
- C. Trigger an allied or even a "neutral" superpower's or other response
- D. Deterrence by uncertainty (or threshold)

II. Improve Situation If Such Deterrence Fails

- A. "Quality weapons" for national defense
- B. Survive-the-war sanctuary
- C. Neutrality preserving
- D. Further other wartime national objectives

A portion of the material in this chapter and Chapter VI has been drawn from previous work done at the Institute, but summarized, revised, developed, and brought together for the purposes of this report. In particular, we have utilized recent work done but as yet not reported on the Vietnamese war and on national security planning in the U.S. We also draw from such books as On Thermonuclear War and On Escalation Metaphors and Scenarios, both by Herman Kahn.

We certainly do not mean to imply that only such "rational" issues will influence countries to get or refrain from getting nuclear forces. The fact that the process of spread may well be dominated by other factors does not mean that it is not worthwhile to analyze carefully the basic tactical realities.

III. In Confrontations with Other (Non-Superpower) Countries

A. "Equality" with other nuclear powers
B. Potential use as "quality weapons" if war occurs
C. Also a good deterrent--both Types I and II and helps provide escalation assurance
D. May even be a "compellent" under some circumstances

IV. Some Basically Peaceful (i.e., Relatively Non-Military) Objectives

A. Prestige and status
B. Vote in alliance or negotiations
C. Technology, knowledge, and experience
D. Blackmail and coercion (pro or con)
E. A prudent precaution (a flexible base)
F. Morale
G. Factional advantage (internally)

None of the above objectives are hypothetical. Not only did various French military analysts and Gaullist spokesmen make each of them explicit, but one can find other Europeans and Japanese (and, increasingly, other nationalists) who would seriously stress one or the other of the objectives, or some combination of them, as primary. Let us, therefore, consider these objectives set forth above, if only briefly.

A. Improve Deterrence Against Attack by Superpower

Despite the likely decrease in the perceived threat of aggression in 1975-1985 from either the United States or the Soviet Union, the first set of objectives, deterrence, is still to some countries at least primary, if only because the "non-military objective," which may be the real goal, often depends to some extent on the military reality. It is not that many Nth countries are likely to feel that either of the superpowers is going to present them with any serious nuclear crises, but that the future, as de Gaulle remarked, lasts a long time and one wishes to be prepared for the more distant future as well as the immediate present.

The most plausible theory so far of the use of "small" independent nuclear forces in a deterrent situation is the so-called proportional deterrence theory (or, in the vivid phrase of Gallois, the threat to "tear an arm off"). The theory, which is quite persuasive, is that a small power simply does not need as great a threat in deterring an attack by a great one as a superpower would need for the same purpose. Threat of a relatively low level of damage (as measured by the usual superpowers' threats) might be more than sufficient to deter attacks on smaller powers and to render threats of such attacks incredible, since the gains to be made by successfully warring against the small power are not that important.

The efficacy of this theory of proportional deterrence can be made even more persuasive if one notes that if there were a war between the two superpowers (the United States and the U.S.S.R.) and one of them won, the victor would have, in effect and in the short run at least, conquered the world. No such result is to be expected of a war between a superpower and an ordinary power; rather the opposite. The superpower, which might have been badly wounded in the war with the ordinary power, would still have to face the other superpower (or perhaps the Chinese or a resurgent Europe). Therefore, whatever damage is suffered in the war might be compounded by the new risks to be run in the postwar world. This concept is quite similar to the "risk theory" developed by Admiral Tirpitz before World War I in which he argued that Germany did not need a large enough navy to beat the British, only a large enough navy to guarantee seriously damaging the British Fleet, so that surviving British forces would not be able to deal with the second largest navy--the French. (The British handled the problem, be it noted, by forming an entente with the French.) One of the difficulties that rising nuclear powers have is that, if they use their nuclear power too aggressively, they may face a similar solution: to some extent the current test ban is both a step to such an entente and a warning of the possibility.

The second deterrence objective is also legitimate and was often emphasized by French spokesmen. It is usually conjectured that the reasons such spokesmen, in the past at least before the "all-azimuth" doctrine was enunciated making the issue explicit, used a phrase like, "add strength to the alliance by preventing miscalculation," was to employ a euphemism for expressing distrust of the United States. This may in fact have been so. But it is also a legitimate possibility that if the Soviets, in an intense crisis, face a nonnuclear opponent who is protected only by a strategic guarantee, even if the strategic guarantee turns out to be reliable, may believe it incredible before the event. Thus, deterrence may be made more reliable if the directly threatened country has some moderate access to nuclear weapons of its own.

Indeed, there may be "ideological" reasons why the relatively unsentimental Soviets (who have in the past been startlingly willing to sacrifice their allies and foreign national Communist parties to the exigencies of current policy considerations) might introspect or mirror-image and misjudge the strength of the U.S. guarantee. And the experience of Vietnam must indicate to the "socialist" countries that the Soviet Union cannot be expected to provide automatic protection against U.S. bombing.

The belief that a nation can truly trigger a nuclear response by an unwilling ally is not widely held today, and is likely to look even less plausible in 1975-1985. Yet there is some prospect that a small nation could present a superpower with the deterring prospect that if they use nuclear weapons to destroy the small country's force and thus raise the level of provocation and offense beyond the nuclear threshold (a threshold unnecessary to cross if only conventional forces were arrayed against them), then such a nuclear attack might provoke retaliation by others. This would be especially likely to be true if, as a result of dispersal and hardening, the first nuclear attack was on the country as a whole, and not a surgical

operation against the strategic forces. This would then be a very big provocation and might indeed trigger an attack by the small country's protector. This last is an important point, and one much misunderstood since it lessens somewhat the requirement that the small powers have "invulnerable" forces as compared to a would-be superpower's needs.

Because it is so important, let us discuss this point further. Consider a hypothetical situation in which, say, the French had 100 relatively soft (say 50-100 psi) nuclear armed missiles scattered throughout France. It might be perfectly feasible for the Russians to launch 300-400 missiles which could reliably destroy all 100 French missiles. One might also imagine that in a very intense crisis, the Soviets might threaten to do just that. There is, however, a world of difference between threatening to do so and actually doing so. Launching 100-400 missiles at the French would be crossing the nuclear threshold in a most pronounced way. The mere size of the attack needed is in itself an additional threshold added to the purely qualitative one of the nuclear/nonnuclear threshold.

It is much more difficult to imagine a situation in which the Soviets might actually launch such an attack than circumstances in which they would be willing to launch, either for demonstration or exemplary purposes, one or two thermonuclear weapons at a nonnuclear France, and accept all the risks of doing that. We have called this effect "deterrence (protection) by threshold."

In addition to deterrence by threshold, the Soviets could not be certain that their 100-400 missile attack would, in fact, work perfectly. Some 5, 10, or even more French missiles might survive and be launched in retaliation at the Soviet Union. They might penetrate the Soviet defensive missiles, which, after all, would not have been tested in any realistic situation, and thus succeed in destroying some Soviet cities. In addition to the immediate danger--which could be quite large--there might be very serious consequences of a political or environmental nature even beyond the immediate effects of the damage. This is a rather lengthy string of conditionals, but not an impossible one. Thus, the cumulative uncertainties might indeed deter any prudent head of state.

This "deterrence by uncertainty" can play an exceedingly important role. Deterrence by uncertainty can be of great use even in making such policies as "pre-emptive" or "preventive surrender" (or pre-emptive or preventive accommodation) work.

Pre-emptive surrender or accommodation describes a situation in which consciously or implicitly a nation intends to accommodate or surrender if a situation ever arises in which tactical information has been received that the other side is actually committing itself to launching an attack, or is actually launching an attack. The policy, then, is not to pre-empt by <u>attacking</u> in turn and trying to blunt the attack, a very difficult thing to do, but rather by holding back whatever forces one has, and accommodating to whatever extent is necessary, to induce the other side not to launch, continue or augment its attack. Such pre-emptive accommodation has been judged, by almost everybody who has considered it, as

being a much more reliable damage-limiting procedure for a European power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union than any blunting attack (even by the U.S.) can possibly be (although the effects of this policy are obvious).

The preventive surrender or accommodation tactic is an even more cautious policy designed to prevent such an intense situation. It is less a military action than a political one. It describes a situation in which a nation plans (whether consciously or not) that whenever it feels it is dangerous to wait until buttons are actually pressed, or orders have been given to press them, it will accommodate during the crisis, in advance, sufficiently to avoid great risks.*

All this may seem farfetched, but it is perfectly possible for all to agree that a nation's basic policy is, in fact, pre-emptive or preventive accommodation, and yet deterrence may succeed. The aggressor simply cannot be certain that the nation will continue with the accommodation to the last moment, or that the putative victim could actually carry out its intentions. There are so many buttons, and so many possible accidents,

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*It should be realized that, to a great extent, the above are the implicit and in some cases explicit tactics of the Europeans. Few, if any, Europeans envisage their country's surviving an all-out nuclear war in which they are a major target. Further, if they are members of the NATO alliance, they cannot imagine an all-out nuclear war in which they are not major targets.

Both notions could be wrong, particularly if the war is conducted as a no-city war or as mostly a no-city war as envisaged (or hoped for) in the controlled response doctrine. But few in Europe take this possibility seriously. Furthermore, very few Europeans believe that a nation can justifiably commit suicide or initiate actions which will lead to its total extinction or even watch passively if events are occurring which have a high probability of resulting in such extinction. Thus, a number of Europeans conjecture that the true strategy of their countries is something between pre-emptive and preventive surrender. Yet they do not feel, despite Czechoslovakia, that the Soviets have any great desire or pressure to attack Europe and that, in addition, the Soviets can clearly not be certain that the pre-emptive or preventive surrender would be carried through in time, either because the U.S. would not allow it or because the government in question would not, in fact, change the official policy, or for any of hundreds of other reasons. They feel the fact that the Soviets cannot be sure is sufficient deterrent to prevent them from trying any probes serious enough to raise the realistic specter of the need for pre-emptive or preventive accommodation, much less surrender. Thus we tend to agree with the analysis of Europeans. However, as discussed above, the policy can still be undesirable even if it is likely to work.

This is why the authors believed that it is important to raise these unpleasant problems now, during an era of détente, relative calm, and near-apathy, as pointedly and seriously as possible. In this atmosphere there is likely to be very little disutility in raising these problems (if one is afraid to talk about it, one is certainly not equipped to be very firm in a crisis), and also sufficient time to think about and institute corrective measures.

that a potential aggressor simply could not rely on the defender's accommodating. Thus it may be that the only serious military requirement that the defender needs is a force that looks as if it might be used in some way, if only to trigger off a larger war. At the least it needs to be able to assert that no one can absolutely guarantee that it will not be used.

We should note that we are not arguing that deterrence by uncertainty--particularly in the form of pre-emptive or preventive accommodation or surrender--are necessarily satisfactory strategies. There are at least three circumstances in which such tactics would tend to work out badly:

1. If there is a very intense crisis in which stark choices may be presented. The assurance of the small nation is likely at that point to vanish.

2. If there is a systematic debate on U.S. (or Soviet) national security policy. Of course, the U.S. (or Soviet) allies do not expect any such debate, but if there is one, then the policies thus expounded are not likely to prove politically palatable. Actually, so many realize this truth that few are anxious to rock a seemingly leaky and unstable boat; there is an implicit agreement not to debate such issues. This itself can be a serious source of later problems.

3. If deterrence actually fails. The policies can then lead to either excessive accommodation, to surrender, or to an extremely destructive or unnecessarily destructive war.

But, as always, it is equally relevant that not only may a policy fail, but it may succeed; deterrence, even though a "facade," may work.

B. Objectives II and III

The various objectives under II and III on the list on page 4-85 above, are virtually self-explanatory. Nevertheless, a few brief comments are still in order. While very few in the United States would still argue for the early and routine use of nuclear weapons on the grounds that such use is militarily more efficient in most situations than high explosive weapons, there are still a number of military officers in Europe who would. In any event, as we have seen, the French are weakening their capability for conventional war. They are decreasing the size of their army and reorganizing it, for the most part, into five divisions equipped for tactical nuclear war, whose purpose seems to be to use nuclear weapons routinely in the defense of France. Even if this policy has many conceptual weaknesses, it could certainly increase French bargaining power with Germany in peacetime to be in a position to offer nuclear weapons or nuclear-armed troops to Germany if the Americans seem likely to refuse or are dilatory in offering such weapons. It is also possible that with time the French will follow the U.S. path and convince themselves of the need for greater conventional capabilities.

The second purpose, "Survival of the War Sanctuary," is not to be dimissed If one believes at all in controlled-response wars and "cool" calculations by decision-makers with the national interest in mind, one must also believe that any attacker would be more hesitant to hit an enemy's city if that enemy can retaliate, than if that enemy must depend upon an ally (who may be thinking far more of his narrow national interest) to retaliate In addition, the Soviets may have a specific ideological inability to recognize fully the strength of such guarantees, or at least an insensitivity to their strength. Of course, the optimum tactic may be to stand neutral in any conflict in which a nation has no direct interest or in which a nation's direct interests are as well served by neutrality; but a nation may need at least some retaliatory capability to ensure that this neutrality will be respected. For this reason, inter alia, the Swiss and Swedes have considered procuring nuclear weapons.

C. Peaceful (Non-Military) Objections

One can also conceive of other wartime national objectives that might be better fulfilled if a nation possesses its own nuclear weapons. We have already mentioned the utility of increasing the probability that, in the event of war. nuclear weapons would be used to repel a large conventional attack on Europe. In general, the precise character and form that any limitations on such a war might take might also be more susceptible to national influence if a nation has its own nuclear weapons to employ. In desperation such a nation might always threaten to evade any limitation it did not agree to, or to enforce on its own, by its own retaliation, if necessary, those limitations it finds essential. In addition, the British Conservatives have often argued that the U.K. needs its own nuclear forces because there are certain specific targets that have a very high priority for England, and that might not have equally high priority for the United States.

We come now to other peacetime objectives that might be served by the procurement of nuclear forces. First on the list is the objective of prestige and status, through which other objectives may in turn be pursued. Clearly, as in the case of France, a nation may also seek to increase its influence in the alliance generally, or perhaps in such areas as arms control negotiations; it may also seek the acquisition of useful technology, knowledge and experience; and the ability to pursue independent policies or, at the least, to resist coercion and even to employ coercion against vulnerable states. All these are obvious objectives.

There is an important interest which does deserve some discussion: the interest in "a prudent precaution," or "a flexible base" which will enable a nation to act in the nuclear arena if diplomatic expectations are disappointed. It is not necessarily irresponsible for a nation, in acquiring an option to produce nuclear weapons, to feel that potential gains in its own increased flexibility might outweigh prospective losses to the world community. Coldly considered, it is really asking a good deal of a state that it commit its welfare and safety to another, or that it believe that such a commitment by another to itself can be relied upon

forever--*vide* the current Israeli experience of seeing its alliance, or special relationship, with France rescinded after the Six-Day War in 1967.

It might also wish to hedge against a change in that commitment by maintaining not merely an option to produce (the current Israeli stance), but a small nuclear force in being. If conditions were to change for the worse, it would then be possible to expand it more rapidly. In fact, not only the Israelis but a number of other nations have already taken out minimal options on a nuclear policy: in particular, we must note that certain nations which are normally thought of as neutrals in cold war--Sweden, Switzerland and India--have all spent a good deal of money on technological "insurance" to improve their capability to achieve a rapid military nuclear force.

It would also be useful here to discuss some specialized tactics that potential national forces might use to establish that such a force need not be all facade or deterrent. In the past there has been much discussion in the United States of the so-called deliberate and selective controlled-response strategy. Indeed, such a strategy was officially adopted during the Kennedy Administration. Much European reaction was critical of this strategy; many argued that so far as Europe was concerned, the wish was to strengthen the committal--the guarantee or threat of large, even "spasm," response if Europe were attacked even by purely conventional forces. They believed, perhaps correctly, that such a posture maximized deterrence. Selectivity and control, they believed, and many still do, might be proper for rich and powerful nations, distant from their opponents, but not appropriate to the needs of relatively small and impacted European nations.

We would argue differently. Consider a nation such as France, with 75 first-line bombers and soon, too, to have a not negligible missile force, all eventually equipped with a thermonuclear weapon. It might be perfectly appropriate for such a nation to argue that, while it does not know wholly whether it would or would not use nuclear weapons in a crisis, it is nevertheless convinced it *should* and *would* use nuclear weapons in, at the very least, a "tit-for-tat" response, acting in retaliation for the use of nuclear weapons against itself (and possibly a major ally). If the Soviets destroyed Paris, the French might try to destroy Moscow, or if they felt that was beyond their capacity, to pick some other large city in the Soviet Union accessible to their force. This is not to predict that the Soviets could necessarily succeed in defending Moscow against French attacks or even low-level bomber attacks. If, however, the French were especially energetic in pursuing countermeasures--or, equally important, to assert that the Soviets would then be faced with the choice between launching a large attack (which has its own thresholds, as discussed earlier) or attacking one French target at a time and so risking a tit-for-tat retaliation, even though they might try to crack French resolve by threatening a punishing blow which the French could not match. Such a tit-for-tat response, seemingly so equitable, would have a high degree of credibility.

It is important to note, too, that the same kind of controlled tit-for-tat response could be made part of the strategy of a European Defense Community. It is often argued that a Defense Community without a Political Community could not achieve the sufficiently high degree of credibility possessed by a nation-state or perhaps could not even achieve the unity actually "to push a button"--even in retaliation. It is widely believed that the alliance behind the Defense Community would because of inevitable differential risks and provocations (which, most likely, an intelligent aggressor would seek to magnify), disintegrate rather in the face of such a decision.

The following scheme seems to meet some of the objectives that are usually raised. The General--or Headquarters--in charge of the armed forces of the European Defense Community might be given standing orders (i.e., a firing doctrine) to reply to any nuclear attacks on the Community with a tit-for-tat response, at some fixed number of hours later. The announced doctrine need not be precise as to what the Commanding General's exact instructions are. In particular, he might actually be given instructions to underescalate rather than precisely to match the provocation so that there should be little or no question of an upward spiral of escalation arising out of simple ambiguities or misunderstandings of what constituted equivalence. The slight possible decrease in deterrence would likely be more than made up for by the increase in stability. There would, of course, need to be some method of overriding the Commander-in-Chief's standing orders. This could be done by having a committee to counter the orders if it could put together some preassigned majority--say two-thirds or three-fourths. But unless such a group agreed by such a voting rule and by the deadline either to cancel the retaliation or extend the time, the General might proceed.

Special arrangements could be made to make the Command and Control quite reliable. For example, one could add a deterrent against attacks on Command and Control by making the system to some degree "fail-dangerous," though with appropriate safeguards against accidental failures leading to firing. That is, if the forces of the European Defense Community were to receive positive affirmation that a very large-scale attack against Command and Control had occurred, they would then have orders to fire a much larger salvo, perhaps a total spasm, at the aggressor. One would then have made it very hard to destroy the Command and Control system and also make it very unproductive to try. While many details remain to be discussed, we would judge that with proper design and deployment and such a targeting doctrine, most, if not all, the Command-and-Control, vulnerability, credibility and other military and strategic problems of an EDC are soluble, leaving political and arms race considerations to be weighed.

In addition, it is plausible that the member governments of the Defense Community could agree ahead of time to such a doctrine. Compared to any other committal policy, this doctrine is likely to be judged relatively defensive, prudent, and otherwise acceptable, in part because the possibility of use would seem so remote--at least in normal times, when tensions are low.

Provisions might also be made to the effect that any country could, if it wished, withdraw its forces from the Defense Community, but only on sufficient notice so that such withdrawal did not weaken the basic defense, or otherwise cause a serious deterioration of the Community's position during an intense crisis.

There are, of course, many other ways in which a nuclear force might be used by a single European state or by a joint Defense Community. We merely wish to point out, in the course of what is a brief discussion, that possibilities do exist that have not yet been adequately considered by those who discuss these problems. There seems to be a tendency particularly among those who wish to discredit the French force de frappe, to place excessive requirements on European forces in evaluating their utility, rather than to consider what might be reasonable objectives for such forces.

It is, of course, asking for a great deal from any country--much less an alliance--to expect carefully articulated, systematic policy in such a hypothetical, emotional and politically sensitive area as the control and use of nuclear weapons. It seems more likely that a young nuclear power will merely adopt a kind of muddling-through policy according to which it may not care to plan explicitly about how nuclear weapons might actually be used; it may seek also to avoid a systematic debate on the question, because, for the sake of deterrence, ambiguity may help.

Or the nuclear power simply may have bought the weapons for the "some peaceful objectives," listed under Category III above--objectives which in some sense have little to do directly with immediate or even possible use. Policy-makers may thus not feel under pressure to explicate such awkward and controversial decisions and doctrine. Indeed they may simply argue, or feel, that if they get into a tight situation the government can invent a tactic as necessary. This last policy should not be derided: almost all seemingly sophisticated tactics discussed by analysts today are not quite so esoteric as believed. If a country has a basic nuclear capability, the pressure of specific necessity is almost certain to result in its inventing appropriate tactics. This is a much simpler thing than to attempt to think through--in an atmosphere of nuclear "incredulity"--a large number of hypothetical situations even if each one separately is simple. At least it is true that players in games--and fiction writers--regularly come up with such inventions without much training or strategic education. The nuclear power may also possess the capability of improvising whatever necessary special equipment or Command and Control its last-minute plans may need, but this last is not so certain. This is always one of the main arguments for discussing possible crises ahead of time--simply to be able to "plan" the muddling through, to build in the necessary flexibility. Muddling-through policies need not be blind: they can be thoughtful, and it is possible that a European nuclear power might follow such a planned muddling-through policy in a thoughtful and responsible fashion.

The most likely policy, of course, is simply to declare a committal policy to the effect that if the nation is attacked or the nation's vital interests threatened "whatever nuclear force is necessary will be used." This policy tends to be relatively incredible; but it is possibly credible enough for deterrence in a détente world. It is also possible that a country could or would lock itself in, either psychologically or physically, so that a committal policy would in fact be objective--even if not quite credible.

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CHAPTER V. ARMS CONTROL CONCEPTS AND ISSUES

Many of the factors discussed in preceding chapters point, in our judgment, to an increasingly prominent role for "arms control" in the 1975-1985 period--both in determining the over-all political and strategic environment, and in the military planning process. For this reason, this chapter is devoted to arms control* in the broader sense by including both mutually agreed limitations and unilateral measures to avoid arms races, etc.

We consider it most important that military planners have the best possible conceptual understanding of arms control, and we trust that no readers of this report will be offended if we therefore begin with an "Introduction" to the subject. We use, as in some preceding chapters, the chart page format with accompanying discussion.

A. Introduction to Arms Control**

1. Some Basic Concepts

a. Chart 1: Some Objectives of Arms Control

BASIC OBJECTIVES:

- REDUCE PROBABILITY OF WAR
- LIMIT SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF DAMAGE IF WAR OCCURS AND HELP FACILITATE A SATISFACTORY TERMINATION
- REDUCE PEACETIME COSTS, RISKS, "IMMORALITY," ALIENATION, AND OTHER BURDENS OF MAINTAINING ARMS--PREVENT OR DAMPEN UNDESIRABLE ARMS RACES

BOTH MEANS AND ENDS:

- REDUCE TENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
- CREATE OR MAINTAIN DESIRABLE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER
- MAXIMIZE "RESPONSIBLE" AND/OR "LEGAL" USE AND MEANS OF VIOLENCE
- PREVENT OR REDUCE MILITARIZATION OF POLITICS, DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN
- PROMOTE OTHER DESIRABLE CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
- DEMONSTRATE THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS A "PROPER HUMANIST CONCERN" FOR THE ISSUES
- PROVIDE CONTEXT FOR USEFUL NEGOTIATIONS, COMMUNICATION, AND EDUCATION
- LIMIT ANNOYING AND HARMFUL COMPLEXITIES, TRENDS, ATTITUDES, DYNAMICS, ETC.
- CREATE USEFUL EXAMPLES, FIRST STEPS, PRECEDENTS, ATTITUDES, CUSTOMS, ETC.
- INCREASE "STABILITY" IN VARIOUS OTHER WAYS

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*This chapter depends substantially on material prepared by the Hudson Institute for the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, but adapted and updated for the present report.

**The chart page containing all the charts for this section of the chapter may be found on page 4-107c.

This first chart on objectives attempts to provide a basic conceptual framework into which almost all the issues in the rest of this chapter may be fitted. Like any checklist or catalog, it contains many statements of the obvious. But rather startlingly, a great many of these "obvious" points are missed in a good number of discussions. For this reason alone it is useful to have a checklist of this kind as a basis for discussion.*

A preliminary but central distinction on the chart is the one drawn between Basic Objectives and a category we have labeled Both Means and Ends. Under the first rubric are included the three major goals that most analysts would agree properly dominate the purposes of arms control. The second group is a mixed bag; that is, it contains items which may be desirable either because they contribute to the basic objectives or because they are desirable ir themselves for other reasons. Indeed, we would argue that certain items in this second category, although they may be alleged to contribute to the Basic Objectives, in fact may either fail to make this contribution or even serve to undermine one or more of the Basic Objectives. The point here is simply that there may be a fundamental tension between these two categories, as well as those internal contradictions that we shall discuss below.

Let us now consider the Basic Objectives in more detail. Although we would argue that for most situations the first two are distinctly more important than the third, in the prevailing political climate the third objective often dominates discussion and the ensuing decisions as well. Moreover, this political climate has created a widespread belief that the first two ends conflict dramatically with each other. As a result, in many popular discussions of arms control, perhaps because of the instinctive revulsion against the horrible concept of actually fighting a nuclear war, the second objective is often denied as a legitimate concern of those dedicated to arms control. To the authors of this report, however, it seems that this second item is properly included among a serious arms controller's basic objectives. Indeed, unless one has literally perfect confidence that all forms of nuclear conflict are impossible, it can be argued that this second objective belongs at the head of the Basic Objectives list. Clearly this is a highly controversial statement, but it should also be equally clear that good arguments can be made for this position. Those who are unwilling even to consider it should consider also the question of whether such a refusal is a "responsible" act either in an intellectual or a moral sense.

In many situations, of course, the second basic objective can serve the first objective. For example, one wishes not only for stability against a first strike but also for stability against great provocations--particularly since these latter could escalate into Central War. The usual objection to the second objective is that by reducing the horror of

*For a further discussion of this point see Part I of the Hudson Institute Chart Collection #2, Basic Methodology, Context, and Overview, HI-CC-2-1/4.

war it makes war more attractive, or at least less unattractive. This is correct to an extent, but it is a more complex statement than is sometimes realized. For example, those who lived through the Hitler period might emphasize that when war is rejected totally as a policy option by one side, this creates real opportunities for certain kinds of blackmail tactics by others. It can be argued, then, that a firm balance of terror is tantamount to a nonaggression treaty (which is, of course, limited to those arms that are covered by the firm balance of terror). Such a nonaggression treaty might be more reliable than a formal signed document. And while it does not carry the same political implications as a formal signed document, it may have much the same practical military effect. There are many times when one does not wish to sign a nonaggression treaty with an opponent or an enemy, especially when one wishes not to reassure the other side that he can be as provocative as he desires.

One likely reason why this last issue is not popular in current discussions is that about a decade ago this possibility was greatly exaggerated: Almost all the analysts in the fifties focused their attention on the danger that the forthcoming balance of terror might be exploited, and that both sides would soon feel great confidence in their ability to subject the other side to extreme pressures and/or provocations without the other side escalating to very large levels of war, much less all-out nuclear war. What seems actually to have happened was that the general horror of large-scale nuclear war made decision-makers emphasize the importance of "not rocking the boat," so the opposite occurred to what most analysts had expected. It may be that one of the main reasons for this is that to an almost incredible degree the classical reasons for war have been eliminated or eroded.* As a result, there really is no great temptation to test fate. Perhaps the main reason people do not use the nuclear balance as a cover for other forms of boat-rocking is because they really do not want to rock the boat anyway. In such a situation, it takes rather little to deter: Even an extremely remote danger of eventual escalation will in many cases be enough to deter. Thus even if war were more feasible in technical terms it does not seem likely that this extra feasibility would induce decision-makers, in almost any reasonable circumstance, to risk, much less initiate, nuclear war. (We would not deny, of course, that it might make the difference under some very unreasonable circumstances, such as a major miscalculation on one side as to how much the balance of terror could be strained.)

Having noted ways in which the first two objectives may coincide, however, we do not wish to overemphasize this reciprocal support. Whether or not the two coincide or conflict, this second objective is important in its own right; it is essential to make this point clear. Indeed, perhaps the main utility of a concept such as the "doomsday machine" in the past was to make clear the importance of systems and policies that can limit the damage suffered on all sides if deterrence fails. We would argue that this is at least as important as development of systems which reduce the probability of war.

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*See "Sources of Stability/Instability in the Current International System," Chapter II of Part I.

Turning to the third basic objective, we acknowledge readily its importance, but would argue that in most cases of sharp conflict with the first two ends, the third basic objective must yield. For example, although the goal of reducing the probability of war might require highly invulnerable forces and complex communications facilities, the expense and effort needed to provide these would hardly serve (at least in the short run) the objective of reducing economic costs.* In a situation of this sort, it seems proper that economic concerns should not predominate. However, this priority of the first two basic objectives over the third should not be made too dogmatic. For example, in a case where pursuit of one of these objectives had implications that were unacceptable on moral grounds, this consideration might well be decisive, and properly so. But we are not rash enough to attempt a comprehensive treatment of such a problem here.

We turn now to a discussion of those objectives which are in a real sense both means and ends. To the extent that these objectives clearly serve as means for the attainment of the basic objectives they remain fairly uncontroversial except to the extent that they may at the same time be consistent with one basic objective and conflict with another. There may be situations in which almost all the items under "both means and ends" will appear to most policy makers and observers as intrinsically desirable while it may at the same time be possible to demonstrate that their attainment would complicate, delay or prevent the realization of the basic objectives. Thus most Americans and Europeans consider it valuable to produce an international environment with a minimum tension-level. Progress toward such a desirable state of affairs is often considered incompatible with policies which might rock the boat. Hence the perception of détente may lead to: 1) exceptional caution for the primary reason of not spoiling the détente (tending to treat this objective as overriding other political interests) and, 2) the notion that the adversary is motivated by the same utility functions. This was probably one of the primary reasons why so many in the West thought that Moscow would not intervene in Czechoslovakia even though they also subscribed to the view that the events in Czechoslovakia were likely to result in the end of communism in that country (at least in any form even vaguely reminiscent of the Soviet model) and that such a turn of events would mean the eventual break up of the Soviet imperial system in Europe and the disintegration or at least a serious demoralization of the communist order. Furthermore, if this prediction was relatively easy to make, the leaders in the Kremlin would make it too. The crucial miscalculation was in assuming that the Soviet leadership would decide to do nothing about it. The point here is that if the general atmosphere had been one of

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*Note that the third objective does in fact often override or inhibit one and two. Neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. actually has the best system they could devise or procure. It may be especially important in 1975-1985 as alienation grows more and more purely social or emotional issues are affecting hardware procurement. In post-Vietnam backlash atmosphere (as military reputation declines) it may be very severe.

more tension, some suspicion and anxiety, the miscalculation might not have been as universal.

There is no a priori reason why a reduction of tension should promote arms control arrangements. In fact it may be argued that it is precisely in a situation of high tensions and some serious expectation of armed conflict that the incentives for ameliorating the consequences or reducing the probability of such contingencies would be highest. Similarly, the incentives to conclude arms control arrangements in an atmosphere of détente may be related less to the desire to promote basic arms control objectives (which will seem less pressing under such circumstances) than to the objective of stabilizing and emphasizing the détente.

We are not suggesting, of course, that a reduction of tensions will never facilitate progress toward the basic objectives of arms control. The third basic objective is more likely to be more consistently coupled with a reduction of international tension than the others. We do insist, however, that there is no inexorable causal relationship involved.

The creation and maintenance of a "desirable distribution of power" is also associated with many problems. Most Americans and Russians appear to be satisfied with the current situation in which the two superpowers remain preeminent and in which only the senior members of the victorious coalition of World War II have nuclear weapons. However, apart from the issue of whether this is a desirable distribution of power (from the U.S. point of view) there is the question of its viability. Over the long haul, it seems most unlikely that the results of World War II can be reflected indefinitely in the distribution of power in the international system. There is also the question of whether the U.S. and Soviet Union have a shared interest in perpetuating the 1945 power hierarchy particularly given that the principal losers of World War II (Germany and Japan) in addition to constituting two of the principal challengers (at least over the near-term future) to the status quo are also among the principal allies of the United States, and a third state, Communist China, is a bitter foe of the U.S.S.R. They are to a substantial degree states which are likely to pursue their objectives according to a value system which is more consistent with a compatible world order from a U.S. point of view than is, say, the Soviet Union or China. It is interesting to note that both the Europeans and the Japanese often regard U.S. - Soviet arms control measures as designed to maintain (or at least having the principal effect of perpetuating) a particular distribution of power which they find incompatible with their long-term (potential and actual) ambitions. To the extent that this view of the real nature of the Soviet-American arms control dialogue prevails among the Europeans and the Japanese the latter are likely to enter the process of arms control negotiations with the assumption that the real name of the game is not arms control so much as bargaining over the future structure and hierarchy of the international system. The third point under this section of the chart is probably badly stated and would be better to formulate as minimizing or decreasing "irresponsible" and/or "illegal" use of weapons and infliction of damage. The reason for our formulation is that so often the issue of what is

responsible depends upon one's perspective, national traditions and self-serving formulation of issues. Sometimes, of course, what is basically a self-serving formulation of a problem may also coincide with a basically correct analysis from the point of view of some wider interest perspective, for example, in the general interest of world order.

Thus we could discuss all the items under Means and Ends demonstrating, or at least suggesting, that while they may constitute desirable and valuable objectives in and of themselves, their role as means toward the realization of the basic objectives cannot be extrapolated from the naive, but nevertheless true, observation that they share the property of being desirable. We have to concern ourselves with the routes to our desirable destinations and submit to analysis rather than to faith and conventional wisdom any assumption or hope of how we get from here to there. There are many dead ends and surprising turns on the actual road map of peace and stability.

b. Chart 3: Some Other Functions (Measures or Means) of Arms Control Agreements

STABILIZATION
LIMITATION
CONFIDENCE BUILDING
COMMUNICATION
VERIFICATION
OTHER UNCERTAINTY REDUCTION
DISENGAGEMENT
MANAGEMENT
RULE MAKING

Since Chart 2 is self-explanatory, we will go on to Chart 3. This chart lists some of the typical functions which arms control measures would be designed to perform. These functions are sometimes considered objectives in their own right, but are probably best analyzed as means related to particular ways of furthering the objectives outlined in Chart 1. The list does not attempt to be an exhaustive catalog of all possible variations, but rather tries to describe some typical functions. Of course, there may also be a dynamic relationship among some of these various functions. For example, the limitation of armaments may under certain conditions be one way of achieving or promoting stabilization. But in other instances stability may be incompatible with certain forms of limitations: strict limitations without reliable controls could produce instability because of a high expected marginal utility of avoidance or evasion of the limitation arrangements. Similar equivocal relationships could exist between the functions of stabilization and disengagement: in some instances the removal or redeployment of certain kinds of armaments may lessen the fears of attack or of explosive interactions in a crisis, while other forms of disengagement may produce instabilities because of resulting asymmetries or because of the encouragement of unilateral or competitive moves to fill the vacuum.

There is a rather close relationship between stabilization and management and a corresponding overlap of the actual measures which would promote the two objectives. Here we could list all the well-known measures of positive command and control, the protection of forces, communication equipment and central systems so as to ensure a survivable second-strike capability, etc.

It is very often accepted as a tautological proposition that any arms control agreement would contribute to building confidence and bridging the suspicion gap. Confidence building is here often viewed as the accelerator which will convert one arms control measure into a generator for more and thus sustaining a process of expanding arms control. It is, however, quite conceivable that some kinds of arms control arrangements might exacerbate rather than reduce the level of mutual suspicion. Thus an arrangement based on manifestly inadequate verification procedures and possibilities might tend to stir up mutual fears of possible evasion. This may even be the case for uncertainties which were considered tolerable in a situation without arms control but which attract more focused attention once they become part of a system of arms control measures.

The ability to communicate efficiently and reliably with an opponent in a war or during a crisis may constitute an important infrastructure of a system of arms controls. (Cf., the hot-line.) However, we must again introduce the caveats to the general proposition. The existence of reliable systems of communication permitting a quick clarification of ambiguous signals and events may generate propensities for risky behavior precisely because of a confidence in the ability to call it off and tell the opponent about it if it does not work out the way it was supposed to.* The availability of instant communication may also lead to less communication in an over-all sense, particularly of the routine and continuous kind, because there is a somewhat reduced incentive to prevent the precipitation of a crisis which, in the absence of instant communication, could very easily proceed by its own momentum.

The last item on the list, "rule making," is often both the least conspicuous and the most important kind of arms control. There is a lot of this kind of arms control being adhered to and created almost all the time in a war or a situation of military competition among potential enemies. We should want to emphasize, however, that rule-making is not necessarily, or even primarily, nonpolitical. There is in a sense frequently a competition in the interpretation, application, creation and abolition of precedents, customs, expectations, etc., and the actors are more often than not interested in furthering "rules" which are particularly and exclusively favorable for themselves (cf., Churchill's and Madariaga's parable of the animals' disarmament conference). We should want to emphasize, however, that there is also a potentially wide area of

*Note that instant communication has dangers because (a) panic reactions and tempers will not have a chance to cool; (b) X and Y will not have a chance (hours or days once) to "game" or plan safe responses; (c) it is difficult to put an onus on one's "partner" for unpleasant demands, etc.

inclusive interests in rules which will benefit all parties. And this last point carries us into discussion of the next chart.

c. Chart 4: A's Egotistical "Preference" in a Systems Bargaining Situation

1. A "CHEATS," BUT NOBODY ELSE IS INDUCED TO CHEAT BY HIS EXAMPLE.
2. A CHEATS, AND ONLY VERY FEW ARE INDUCED TO CHEAT BY HIS EXAMPLE.
3. NOBODY CHEATS.
4. OTHERS CHEAT, BUT IF A WERE TO JOIN THEM, THIS PARTICULAR PRECEDENT WOULD ENDANGER THE STABILITY OF THE SYSTEMS, SO A DOES NOT CHEAT.
5. EVERYBODY CHEATS.
6. EVERYBODY CHEATS BUT A.

We can regard "rule making" as the attempt to create a system of conduct, and "systems bargaining" as the process through which the actors try to modify the approved system of conduct, or try to further their interests within it. In a typical systems-bargaining situation an individual who is trying to behave in a purely selfish manner (where his objectives are not modified by considerations of altruism, morality, or decency) will often find himself having the preferences illustrated above. That is, if at all possible he would like to exploit the system--even, if necessary, by breaking the rules. This will generally be profitable so long as nobody else is induced to cheat by his example. And under some circumstances, if the number of induced cheaters is small it may still make sense for him to behave in this fashion. If, however, he feels that his example will be followed by too many he may simply prefer not to cheat in the hope that nobody else will be induced to cheat.

Sometimes the situation can be worse than this. He may have to tolerate others cheating and not emulate their behavior because if he did it would make the precedent of cheating so large that the stability of the system would be endangered. If, of course, the system actually collapses, then he wishes to avoid the worst situation of all in which everybody is cheating but him.

We should not put too great a weight on the thought that individuals or nations will always go through the above calculation. It is much more likely that most will operate roughly according to the working rule, simply following generally accepted standards unless great temptations appear. If sufficiently tempted, they may break the rule without thinking carefully through the issues. But even this suggests that the effective sanction against breaking the rule will less often be precise calculation, and more often be ill-defined concepts of morality, decency, altruism, good behavior, and the like. These sanctions may, of course, be reinforced by both external and internal political penalties for unacceptable behavior. But in the long run, rules are unlikely to remain stable and effective unless they become "agonistic": that is, unless

they remain in force for moral, behavioral, altruistic, religious or other reasons, rather than for reasons of selfish calculation. This may be especially true of the types of rules that are embodied in arms control agreements, whether these be formally or tacitly accepted.

Chart 5 provides a framework for discussion of the interaction between various arms control measures and other issues in international affairs. A more comprehensive examination may be found in the next section of this chapter.

2. A Basic Controversy

d. Charts 6-10: Coupling vs. Decoupling

When we speak of the debate over "decoupling," we have in mind the controversy over whether arms control should be sought without regard to a specified political context. That is, should arms control be "decoupled" from the framework of ideological competition, and perhaps even from the normal process of international politics? An affirmative answer to this question usually assumes that even deadly political opponents have mutual interests which are best pursued in a nonpolitical fashion. And this assumption can be illustrated by a number of metaphors and analogies. Consider, for example, a duel waged between two antagonists who intend to wage the duel to the death. That is, at most only one of the duellists will survive. The duel is to be waged according to the following peculiar rules: The two antagonists are provided blow torches and they are to try to burn each other to death in a warehouse filled with dynamite. It is quite conceivable that they could agree to keep the lights on, and if the issue is simply should the lights be on or off it is probably relatively easy to "decouple" it from all other issues. On the other hand, the antagonists may try to deal with more specific questions: What kind of a lighting system should be designed? Which lights should be put on and which lights should be put off? When should the lights be put on and off? In such cases, ironing out the technical details may turn out to be impossible to settle in a period of tension and suspicion. But it may be possible, in periods of low tension, to get this type of agreement on details, as a way of symbolizing and/or strengthening the over-all improvement in the political climate.

Much of the decoupling controversy, of course, turns on a more general debate about the relationship between the existence of weapons on the one hand and the existence of political tension on the other. In a sense, resembles a "chicken and egg" argument about which came first; it is clear that to some degree tension and arms reinforce each other. But even if analysis cannot resolve the question of which came first, it is clear that emphasis on one or the other may have important policy implications. This may be illustrated in the following way. Let us consider an administration made up of officials who believe that the very presence of thousands of weapons of mass destruction is a root cause of many of the strains on the present international system. To these officials, a policy is likely to seem attractive which tries to deal with weapons

problems or "technical" arms control issues" without becoming mired in the day-to-day fluctuations of the cold war. Moreover, it is likely to seem to officials holding this view that if one can in fact decouple the technical arms issues from the general political framework, progress in the first area is likely to create a momentum which will carry over into other areas and provide a broader improvement in the climate of international affairs.

Another group of analysts, however, would argue that modern technology has not altered the traditional maxim that arms are the effects or the symbols of political tension, not its cause. They feel that it is neither desirable nor possible to make real progress in the area of arms control without tying these problems closely to the broad political context. Weapons are used, in this view, as means to resolve "political issues which the parties to the issues perceive as being soluble only by going to war. If the political issues can be resolved peacefully, then arms become redundant--and so do agreements for the control and limitation of arms."*

Although it may be objected that between these two points of view there is only a difference of emphasis, it is an important difference which may have a real impact on policy. According to the first theory, for example, it makes no sense either to threaten or to carry out the threat of refusing to enter arms control negotiations because of actions in the political area of which one disapproves. On this point, there have been interesting contrasts along partisan lines in the American electoral debates. During the 1968 campaign, Mr. Humphrey argued for immediate U.S. ratification of the non-proliferation treaty and in particular said that he "did not see what Czechoslovakia had to do with the treaty." Mr. Nixon, on the other hand, while supporting the general aim of non-proliferation, argued that the United States could not proceed with ratification of what was, after all, largely a joint Soviet-American pact as if nothing had happened. We shall return to the NPT in a moment, but it should also be noted here that the decoupling debate has been specifically applied by leaders in both parties to the question of the proposed talks on strategic arms limitations with the Soviet Union. Former Secretary of Defense Clifford, for example, has appeared since leaving office as a rather strong advocate of the decoupling theory. He recently said, "there is no real inconsistency in talking about strategic arms limitations even though we may remain at a political impasse in Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia."**

Mr. Nixon, however, as quoted in Chart 8, while promising to "steer a course between those two extremes" (of coupling and decoupling) has appeared at least on the surface closer to the coupling view: "What I want to do is to see to it that we have strategic arms talks in a way and

*Robert Strausz-Hupé, quoted in War/Peace Report, December 1968, p. 9.

**Clark Clifford, quoted in The New York Times, February 19, 1969.

at a time that will promote, if possible, progress on outstanding political problems at the same time, for example, on the problem of the Mid East..."*

Before turning to consider the merits of this case, we should note that an Administration will not always be able to indulge its doctrinal preference for one or the other of these views. It seems likely that Mr. Nixon would like to have coupled the NPT more closely to other political issues, and yet he was led by a variety of counterpressures to call for ratification within three weeks of his taking office. This was true even though his condition of "normalization" of the relations between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia could hardly be said to have been met with five Soviet divisions still "supervising" the political development of the Czechs. Similarly, recent events have suggested that the Administration's preference for some coupling of the strategic arms talks to other issues may be difficult to maintain. A combination of domestic and political pressure to begin these talks, irrespective of the political pattern in Southeast Asia or the Middle East, has become very strong and will play an increasing part in the formulation of government policy as Czechoslovakia recedes with time. Turning to the merits of the debate, however, opponents of the decoupling theory maintain that in addition to being an unrealistic hope, decoupling can be positively harmful. Decoupling, in the final analysis, reflects an estimate that nuclear war is, if not near, not highly improbable and disarmament an urgent necessity. It could lead, for example, to the habit of treating all specific arms control measures as superior to or even overriding all other considerations, instead of having such measures judged for their individual value. If this were to happen, a great many undesirable consequences might ensue. One of these might be excessive hysteria over the danger of the arms race as well as the creation of unrealistic expectations about how much arms control can contribute to world peace. This, in turn, would lead to excessive disillusionment about any failures or lack of progress in arms control negotiations. Finally, it would tempt the deliberate exploitation of this obsessive concern for decoupling by others who, while not necessarily indifferent to arms control, are also anxious to attain other gains. Paradoxically, then, an excessive concern for decoupling could lead to what we might call "exploitive coupling," and it may therefore be useful that the usual fear of jeopardizing some arms control agreement remain a moderating influence on activity elsewhere in the international arena.

*But Mr. Nixon is doing something else too--playing on the U.S.S.R.'s presumed eagerness to reduce their arms budget to get specific political concessions on Vietnam, the Middle East, etc.

Introduction to Arms Control

Chart 1 lists a series of arms control objectives. It is useful to distinguish between basic ends and objectives which in effect denotes a way of attaining an end as well as the end itself. The objective of reducing the probability of war includes the need to reduce the chance that war occurs as a result of accident, misperception or misinterpretation. But it encompasses also the need to reduce the incentives for deliberate initiation of war by reducing the advantage of a first strike (to both (all) sides) and minimizing the likelihood of large changes in the number of armaments. The limitation of violence when and if war occurs may be achieved by the acceptance of rules which circumscribes the modes and extent of armed violence. Furthermore, the objective is related to the existing capacities for violence and for restraint. The objective of reducing the costs and burdens of the arms race has both a short term and a long term dimension and may be examined both from the perspective of particular national priorities and the wider viewpoint of the stability of the world order.

Chart 2 establishes some useful distinctions between the inclusive concept of arms control and more specific and limited programs of arms control.

Chart 3 focuses on various functions which alternative arms control arrangements may be designed to accomplish. Stabilization, includes improvements in command and control systems and survivability of retaliatory systems. Confidence building may be achieved e.g. by declarations concerning intentions, agreements on non-essential weapons (components), certain deployments and mutual observation agreements, etc. Disengagement refers to agreements to reduce force levels in particular areas or to exclude certain areas from the military competition altogether.

Chart 4 provides a framework for discussion of the kinds of calculation which nations may make in assessing their interest in a particular arms control agreement.

Chart 5 provides a framework for discussion of the interaction between various arms control measures and other issues in international affairs.

Charts 6-8 outline a proposition, which is frequently asserted, about the need to treat arms control as an objective divorced from political considerations in a particular context at a particular moment in history.

Chart 9 presents the major counter-arguments to the decoupling propositions.

Chart 10 outlines a series of questions and caveats which an analysis of the pros and cons of a "decoupling policy" would have to take into account. It is possible that certain bilateral S.U.-U.S. issues may be isolated from the general process of international politics in the interest of the stability of the international order. The consideration of potential arms control regimes for strategic forces may constitute such an issue, but it is not, of course, under present conditions very feasible to separate such issues from e.g., the issue of alliance obligations and guarantees. And the pressures on the latter are certainly sensitive to international political developments. The chart also raises the issue of whether the achievement of some "decoupling" does not presuppose the existence of some kind of permanent institution for the consideration of particular arms control problems. We could think of a permanent U.S.-S.U. strategic force commission (SFC), a multilateral European Security Commission (ESC), etc. The existence of such institutional structures would, of course, have some not insignificant feedback on the process of international politics and the long-term development of the international order.

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THE BASIC CONCEPTS

(1) SOME OBJECTIVES OF ARMS CONTROL

BASIC OBJECTIVES:

- REDUCE PROBABILITY OF WAR
- LIMIT SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF DAMAGE IF WAR OCCURS AND HELP FACILITATE A SATISFACTORY TERMINATION
- REDUCE PEACETIME COSTS, RISKS, "IMMORALITY," ALIENATION, AND OTHER BURDENS OF MAINTAINING ARMS--PREVENT OR DAMPEN UNDESIRABLE ARMS RACES

BOTH MEANS AND ENDS:

- REDUCE TENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
- CREATE OR MAINTAIN DESIRABLE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER
- MAXIMIZE "RESPONSIBLE" AND/OR "LEGAL" USE AND MEANS OF VIOLENCE
- PREVENT OR REDUCE MILITARIZATION OF POLITICS, DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN
- PROMOTE OTHER DESIRABLE CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
- DEMONSTRATE THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS A "PROPER HUMANIST CONCERN" FOR THE ISSUES
- PROVIDE CONTEXT FOR USEFUL NEGOTIATIONS, COMMUNICATION, AND EDUCATION
- LIMIT ANNOYING AND HARMFUL COMPLEXITIES, TRENDS, ATTITUDES, DYNAMICS, ETC.
- CREATE USEFUL EXAMPLES, FIRST STEPS, PRECEDENTS, ATTITUDES, CUSTOMS, ETC.
- INCREASE "STABILITY" IN VARIOUS OTHER WAYS

(2) SOME DISTINCTIONS

ARMS CONTROL IS AN INCLUSIVE CONCEPT REFERRING TO UNILATERAL OR COOPERATIVE MEASURES, FREQUENTLY BETWEEN POTENTIAL OPPONENTS AND EVEN EXISTING ENEMIES TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES OF CHART I FOR BOTH SIDES

IT THUS INCLUDES MORE LIMITED CONCEPTS SUCH AS:

ARMS FREEZE WHICH REFERS TO MEASURES AIMED AT PREVENTING QUALITATIVE OR QUANTITATIVE INCREASES OF CERTAIN ARMAMENTS BEYOND CERTAIN LEVELS

ARMS REDUCTION WHICH DENOTES THE MEASURES OR PROCESS OF REDUCING THE LEVEL OF CERTAIN ARMAMENTS

DISARMAMENT WHICH IMPLIES THE REDUCTION OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT(S) TO SOME MINIMUM (LOW) LEVEL

ARMS CONTROL IS NOT LIMITED TO LOWERING THE LEVEL OF ARMS. FOR EXAMPLE, IN SOME CASES (SUCH AS DEFENSIVE EMPHASIS POLICIES OR IN A SITUATION OF VULNERABLE OFFENSIVE FORCES) IT WOULD CALL FOR AN INCREASE OR A CHANGE IN ARMS. IN OTHER CASES (E.G. HOT LINE) IT MAY CALL FOR SOMETHING NEW OR DIFFERENT.

(3) SOME OTHER FUNCTIONS (MEASURES OR MEANS OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

- STABILIZATION
- LIMITATION
- CONFIDENCE BUILDING
- COMMUNICATION
- VERIFICATION
- OTHER UNCERTAINTY REDUCTION
- DISENGAGEMENT
- MANAGEMENT
- RULE MAKING

(4) A'S EGOTISTICAL "PREFERENCE" IN A SYSTEM'S BARGAINING SITUATION

1. A "CHEATS," BUT NOBODY ELSE IS INDUCED TO CHEAT BY HIS EXAMPLE.
2. A CHEATS, AND ONLY VERY FEW ARE INDUCED TO CHEAT BY HIS EXAMPLE.
3. NOBODY CHEATS.
4. OTHERS CHEAT, BUT IF A WERE TO JOIN THEM, THIS PARTICULAR PRECEDENT WOULD ENDANGER THE STABILITY OF THE SYSTEMS, SO A DOES NOT CHEAT.
5. EVERYBODY CHEATS.
6. EVERYBODY CHEATS BUT A.

(5) THE BASIC INTERACTION MATRIX

IMPORTANT POLICY AREAS / POTENTIAL ARMS CONTROL MEASURES	U.S. DOMESTIC POLITICS	U.S.-S.U. POLITICS	U.S. ALLIANCE POLITICS	SOVIET TECHNOL (RACING ISSUES)	EUROP. SECURITY	CHANGING STATUS OF CHINA, W. GERMANY JAPAN	WAR FIGHTING CAPABILITIES	NUCL PROLIF.	YEAR 2000 ISSUES
NPT									
STRAT.WEAP.ARMS C (SWAC)									
ARMS TRANSF. CONTROL									
EUROPEAN ARMS CONTROL									
SEA-BED REGIMES									
WAR-FIGHTING UNDERST									
NUCL WEAPONS DOCTRINE									
COMMAND AND CONTROL									

A BASIC CONTROVERSY
(Coupling Vs. Decoupling)

EPT REFERRING TO
ATIVE MEASURES,
OTENTIAL OPPONENTS
EMIES TO ACHIEVE THE
FOR BOTH SIDES

LIMITED CONCEPTS

URES AIMED AT PREVENT-
ANTITATIVE INCREASES
BEYOND CERTAIN LEVELS

ASURES OR PROCESS OF
CERTAIN ARMAMENTS

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YEAR 2000 ISSUES

(6) THE DECOUPLING PROPOSITION:

IT SHOULD BE A "RULE" THAT ARMS CONTROL BE SOUGHT WITHOUT REGARD TO A SPECIFIC POLITICAL CONTEXT. ARMS CONTROL SHOULD BE KEPT OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION AND THE NORMAL PROCESSES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS--EVEN TO SOME DEGREE OF DOMESTIC POLITICS.

(7) AN EXAMPLE OF A DECOUPLING STATEMENT

WE SHOULD NOT TREAT THE TALKS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TO DAMP DOWN THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE AS AN OCCASION SYMBOLIC OF POLITICAL HARMONY BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES; NOR SHOULD THIS EFFORT BE SUSPENDED TO INDICATE OUR DISAPPROVAL OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA OR TO SIGNIFY SOVIET DISAPPROVAL OF OUR ACTIONS IN VIETNAM. THIS WOULD BE SHORTSIGHTED, AND WHEN IT COMES TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MYOPIA CAN BE A FATAL ILLNESS.

MARSHALL D. SHULMAN IN
K. GORDON (ED.)
AGENDA FOR THE NATION, 1968

(8)

"...WHAT I WANT TO DO IS TO SEE TO IT THAT WE HAVE STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS IN A WAY AND AT A TIME THAT WILL PROMOTE, IF POSSIBLE, PROGRESS ON OUTSTANDING POLITICAL PROBLEMS AT THE SAME TIME, FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE PROBLEM OF THE MIDEAST, ON OTHER OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ACTING TOGETHER CAN SERVE THE CAUSE OF PEACE."

PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON
AT HIS FIRST NEWS CONFERENCE
JANUARY 27, 1969

(9) AN ARGUMENT AGAINST DECOUPLING

ACCEPTING THE CONCEPT OF "DECOUPLING" COULD LEAD TO A TENDENCY TO TREAT ANY AND ALL SPECIFIC ARMS CONTROL MEASURES AS SUPERIOR TO, OR EVEN OVERRIDING, ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS, INSTEAD OF HAVING SUCH CONFLICTS JUDGED ON THEIR MERITS. THIS IS NOT ONLY HARMFUL AND UNREALISTIC IN ITSELF BUT COULD CONTRIBUTE TO AN UNDESIRABLE DEGREE OF HYSTERIA OVER THE DANGERS OF THE "ARMS RACE" AND TO UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS ABOUT PRACTICAL ARMS CONTROL POSSIBILITIES (AND THEREFORE EXCESSIVE DISILLUSIONMENT ABOUT ANY FAILURES OR LACK OF PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS). A COMMITMENT TO DECOUPLING BY THE U.S. COULD, ON THE ONE HAND, TEMPT THE DELIBERATE EXPLOITATION OF OUR UNWILLINGNESS TO PLAY POLITICS WITH ARMS CONTROL BY OTHER NATIONS, WHICH WHILE NOT NECESSARILY UNCONCERNED ABOUT ARMS CONTROL, ARE ALSO ANXIOUS TO OBTAIN OTHER THINGS AS WELL. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT COULD LEAD TO EXCESSIVE RIGIDITY BY THE U.S. WHEN ANOTHER NATION TRIED TO BRING IN "LEGITIMATE" POLITICAL CONDITIONS. THUS OBSESSIVE CONCERN ABOUT DECOUPLING MAY LEAD TO "EXPLOITIVE COUPLING" OR UNNECESSARY DEADLOCKS. IT IS ALSO USEFUL THAT A FEAR OF JEOPARDIZING A USEFUL OR DESIRABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT REMAIN A MODERATING INFLUENCE ON BEHAVIOR AND BARGAINING TACTICS.

(10) DECOUPLING - SOME QUESTIONS AND CAVEATS

FEASIBILITY

THERE WILL ALWAYS BE ACTORS WHO REFUSE TO ACCEPT THE RULES

CERTAIN ARMS CONTROL MEASURES ARE INHERENTLY POLITICAL: E.G. CURRENT NON-PROLIFERATION MEASURES

FURTHERMORE THE CONCEPTION SEEMS SERIOUSLY INCONSISTENT WITH SOVIET AND MARXIST VIEWS OF CONFLICT WITHIN THE HISTORICAL PROCESS

DESIRABILITY

IT MAY BE USEFUL TO RETAIN THE FLEXIBILITY OF INSTITUTING OR ABROGATING ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS OR STARTING OR CANCELING ARMS CONTROL TALKS ETC. AS DIPLOMATIC COUNTERS AND MESSAGES

"DECOUPLING" MAY DECREASE THE STABILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM DUE TO HEIGHTENED POSSIBILITIES FOR MISCALCULATION AND MISPERCEPTION

ANY SERIOUS DEGREE OF "DECOUPLING" THAT IS ACTUALLY ACHIEVED MAY BE ASYMMETRIC IN PRACTICE OR EFFECTS

"DECOUPLING" MAY (AND PERHAPS INEVITABLY) BE PERCEIVED AS ACTUAL "COUPLING" WITH THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVE OF ATTAINING A U.S.-S.U. DUOPOLY (JOINT HEGEMONY)

COMMENT

PERHAPS IT IS A USEFUL CONCEPT FOR CERTAIN KINDS OF ARMS CONTROL ONLY. IT MAY BE DESIRABLE TO VIEW MOST ARMS CONTROL MEASURES AS INTEGRAL ELEMENTS OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT (POSITIVE COUPLING)

IF ONE ACCEPTS THE ABOVE POSITION, THEN WHAT KINDS OF ARMS CONTROL MEASURES ARE "DECOUPLABLE" (U.S.-S.U. STRATEGIC FORCE ISSUES?) WHAT PROCEDURES AND INSTITUTIONS WOULD SERVE TO ISOLATE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS FROM OTHER POLITICAL ISSUES? (SOME PERMANENT FORUM OF U.S.-S.U. DELIBERATIONS?)

B. Interaction of Arms Control with Other National Security Objectives

1. Introduction

The two chart pages at the end of this section constitute a framework for the discussion, examination and evaluation of how various arms control arrangements may affect other important national security policy objectives as well as how one set of arms control measures may interact with other arms control systems. The matrixes constitute no attempt at providing a complete and exhaustive interaction model. They are meant rather as heuristic and propaedeutic devices for purposes of structuring and improving a discussion of the issues.

In the following we shall concentrate on one of the rows in the first matrix, examining some of the potential interactions of a possible strategic weapons arms control arrangement with the following policy areas:

U.S. domestic policies
U.S.-S.U. politics
U.S. alliance politics
Changing status of France, China, West Germany, Japan and India
Other Nth country problems
Soviet technology (arms racing issues)
U.S.-Sino policy
European security
Middle Eastern Proliferation Problems
Other issues

There are, of course, many other areas which we could consider. Some of them, such as the impact on U.S. research and development and U.S. technology generally are already considered in other parts of this report. Others, such as the impact on Soviet domestic issues and on Eastern Europe, while conceivably important, do not seem sufficiently so--at least for the current report--except for the observation that just entering into negotiations with the Soviets will be of some value to them in rationalizing and alleviating some of the internal problems resulting from the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

2. U.S. Domestic Policies

Possibly the most important interaction of a bilateral superpower SWAC with internal U.S. politics will be its influence on public perceptions of what the world political line-up is, what the major issues are, and how they are to be formulated.

As far as the implications of a strategic weapons arms control arrangement is concerned, some of the feedbacks are clear from the current anti-ballistic missile controversy. For reasons which are closely related to established U.S. strategic doctrine with its emphasis on deterrence via assured destruction, much fear has been generated of a defense-offense arms race spiral. If, however, a SWAC arrangement included (and we would argue it ought to include) incentives to move

towards a posture based on defensive emphasis, it should then be relatively easy to generate a reformulation of American strategic doctrine, associating deterrence with relative war-outcomes rather than absolute (fixed and high) capacities for assured destruction.

In general a SWAC agreement would tend to reinforce the picture of international bipolarity, détente, mutual interest and reasonableness, inappropriateness of extreme anti-communist attitudes, Soviet pragmatism, etc. Presumably any agreement would have been preceded by some months or years, by the ratification of the nuclear proliferation treaty. Particularly, if it is months, but even if it is years, the negotiation of a SWAC will give a sense of movement and progress in arms control and U.S. and Soviet collaboration in general, focus attention once more on the special nature of nuclear (and therefore strategic) weapons, emphasizing that these are not "normal" or morally or politically acceptable tools for "continuing politics by other means." A SWAC agreement will thus--even more than ever--reinforce the general impression that "nuclear war is unthinkable" and that to the extent that one relies on such weapons at all, it is through their deterrent impact, their impact on the general context of international relations and as rhetoric and not on any serious likelihood that they will actually be used. It will therefore also make it increasingly difficult for élites as well as the general public to take any serious interest in the details of the strategic posture, much less in doctrine, plans, skill, training, leadership, strategy and tactics.

The whole issue of strategic arms limitations cuts across the cold-war cleavage as did the non-proliferation issue and may hence be expected to have a reconstructive influence on the assumptions which structure public attitudes towards international politics. Here is an area where Moscow and Washington have, apparently at least, coinciding interests and are pursuing concerted policies which bring them into conflict with U.S. allies. Given Communist China's actual opposition to the anti-proliferation efforts and the potential opposition of Germany and Japan, old resentments of former enemies may reemerge and exert pressures on the priorities and direction of U.S. foreign policy.* Hence it is possible that the diplomacy of SWAC and the NPT, in conjunction with the popular attitudes generated by the efforts, may pressure Tokyo and Bonn into a position of open challenge to the prevailing status quo, joining Communist China in this regard.

Any agreement with the Soviet Union on strategic arms stabilization is likely to influence perceptions of the cold war and the U.S.-S.U. conflict. It could very well generate illusions about "the end of conflict" and hence result in shock reactions whenever events would intervene to challenge that perception. Hence the problem is not only that illusions of security may lead to a lowering of the guard, but also the possibility of overreaction or immobility in situations where the Soviet actions

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*A SWAC agreement would tend to cut the same way by signalling the end of the cold war arms competition in spite of the original sources of political conflict remaining unresolved and the power structure in international society assuming increasingly archaic features.

would not conform with the image of a peaceful collaborator. It will take some education in the vicissitudes and frustrations of diplomacy for the American public to comprehend and cope with a situation of regulated coexistence mixed with conflicting aspirations and objectives on the part of the superpowers.

A failure to follow our non-proliferation treaty with some kind of a SWAC is, however, likely to raise issues of U.S. and/or Soviet good faith, complacency and/or a desire for a hierarchical arms structure or perhaps even "surrender" to alleged pressure from the "military-industrial complex." Thus one of the most salient arguments of the opponents of BMD has been the economic one, viewing large-scale expenses for central war forces as a misallocation of resources which are greatly needed for amelioration of the domestic ills of U.S. society. The argument is not only one of economics--the U.S. economy could surely sustain heavy programs both in the defense and domestic sectors--but rather one of commitment. Hence increased arms expenditures are likely to be viewed as evidence that the establishment is unwilling or unable to demonstrate its commitment to a rectification of the ills of American society. "The military-industrial complex" has been unmasked and emerges as the real power structure. However distorted such images may be, they are nevertheless likely to structure the perceptional framework of the alienated segments of American society and their intellectual "allies," particularly of the left and center. Hence an agreement with Moscow which would serve to dampen the arms race and stabilize expectations about the future direction and intensity of the strategic arms competition, may tend to shatter the dichotomized image of the commitments in American politics and thus serve to ameliorate and ease the growing domestic polarization in this country.

3. U.S.-S.U. Politics

Any explicit and starkly visible pattern of cooperation and coordination between the two superpowers as would emerge from the negotiation and ratification of a bilateral SWAC agreement, even if it is superficial, has many other consequences. On one hand, it will generate expectations and fears of a new "Yalta" or a superpower condominium--not only to other nations but to many alienated individuals in the United States--and in Eastern Europe and Communist China. It will look to many of them like a super "establishment" attempting to impose its will on the world. Indeed, even the most "innocent" of arrangements is likely to be thought of by many as more than just ratifying the U.S.-Soviet détente or even creating an entente. After such an agreement it will also be most difficult for many Americans and Europeans to keep alert to possible Soviet challenges or to maintain any degree of tension vis-à-vis the Soviet Union on most issues. Thus, almost any serious agreement would be conducive to increasing Western toleration of Soviet or East German "salami" tactics in Berlin, of greater Soviet pressure on Eastern Europe, and even of greater intervention by the Russians in the Mediterranean (if any of these are on the Soviet agenda and are rationalized by suitable propaganda participation). This occurs because some people will not wish to risk future arms control agreements or even the continued viability of whatever arms control systems are already functioning or in the making.

Others will not, given the relaxed and seemingly improving relations, take the slices seriously, and still others will consider many great "concessions" as part of the program toward normalization. In general "routine" and "necessary" or indeed almost any moves which might be presented as "legitimate" aspirations are likely to be more difficult to oppose vigorously if they occur (and under current conditions many such acts seem perhaps more likely to occur than not). Indeed, it is more than possible that such an atmosphere of cooperation and apparent relaxation would provide substantial opportunities for manipulative diplomacy by one side or the other. Prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia we might have judged such opportunities to be fairly symmetrical but today the political capabilities appear to be distributed in favor of the Soviet Union since the ability and propensity of the "free world" to encourage "evolution" in Eastern Europe is likely to be very limited. The atmosphere of cooperation and relaxation may also lead to unfortunate underestimates of the various risks involved in pressing for unilateral advantages.

It is, of course, much too early to establish any high confidence predictions about the future of U.S.-S.U. relations under the impact of various arms control arrangements but certain conjectural observations may be useful for purposes of raising some important issues. The NPT has already provided an occasion for coordinated diplomacy between Moscow and Washington on an issue which is very clearly one of great implications for the future state of the international system. Hence, we may applaud the demonstration of joint responsibility by the two powers most capable of enforcing order. Furthermore, the experience of this endeavor may generate a renewed awareness on part of the Soviet Union of the need for "disinterested" participation in the management of the international system for purposes of preventing a disintegration of the world order. To the extent that the NPT has already dramatized to the Soviet leaders Moscow's stake in the preservation of the current international order, it may have constituted a very significant infusion of strength to the status quo; a SWAC agreement would presumably accentuate this tendency.

We would, however, warn against the assumption that politics somehow disappear in joint endeavors of this kind. Thus there is no doubt that the process of diplomacy associated with the NPT provided Moscow with many opportunities for manipulation of the relationship between the U.S. and its allies (particularly in Europe). Indeed the NPT constituted in many ways a means of access for Moscow to the NATO deliberations over nuclear sharing and control issues, while there were few comparable opportunities for U.S. manipulation of Warsaw Pact relationships. Nor was there, we should add, much inclination on the part of Washington to look for such opportunities. In particular, there was a tendency on the part of Moscow to view the whole problem of non-proliferation primarily in terms of preventing West Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons. We might even go further and suggest that the process of negotiation over the NPT was more important to Moscow than was the NPT as an endpoint. Given the predictable sources of opposition to the treaty, the negotiation process must have seemed ideal for manipulative diplomacy designed to break or strain the German-American alliance; an objective which we believe to constitute a primary goal of Soviet diplomacy. It is, for

example, hard to reconcile the Soviet threats about rights of intervention according to the old enemy clause of the U.N. Charter with a policy perspective which acknowledges the need to obtain German collaboration and acquiescence in the NPT. Perhaps, the Soviet government is speaking with many tongues in this matter and that the ambiguities in the posture reflect the parochial concerns of various competing segments of the Soviet decision-making system, but it should be clear that negotiating and ratifying a SWAC agreement could give the Soviets even greater opportunities for an "anti-German policy."

4. U.S. Alliance Politics

Those nations which have found maneuver space and protection in the competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and in the balancing of competitive power between the two countries may resent the agreement and perhaps even want to take some counteracting action. They may feel that this new U.S.-S.U. relationship (particularly if they exaggerate its intensity and comprehensiveness) generates a need on their own part to create new patterns. In particular the SWAC agreement may produce important pressures for countervailing alliances, for the reversal of alliances, and for other new groupings to create counterpressures, and the like.

We have already indicated that these pressures might be especially great among some U.S. allies where there might be great fear of a new U.S. hegemony. At the minimum there will be automatic and ritualistic references to "another Yalta" or speculation upon the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet condominium. Even if none of these occur the mere fact that the bilateral SWAC agreement tends to re-establish or emphasize the old superpower hierarchy among the nations with two and only two superpowers, would exasperate some of our allies, particularly France (and in a different context China). Even the British and the West Germans might be annoyed. Indeed if a sense of increased security ensues, then even more annoyance, dissent, division and opposition and independence is likely to accompany such an agreement since there will be a feeling of less need for U.S. protection.

It is clear that from the point of view of our allies in Western Europe, it will be very important how the U.S. handles the problem of the Soviet MRBM's-IRBM's in any SWAC agreement with Moscow. There is, of course, a measuring problem here of finding a relevant equivalence, but there is also the political issue involving the management of what may be perceived as an asymmetrical hostage situation.

It is generally believed that a SWAC agreement will be confined to missiles. The whole bomber issue is very complex. The Russians tend to design their civilian aircraft so that they will accommodate bomb bays as special equipment; as long as they have the pilot facilities they can thus potentially expand their bomber force rather rapidly. This would be somewhat difficult to do in the U.S., particularly to obtain a mobilization base without much advertisement.

The aircraft issue is closely connected with the equivalence problem. Our allies possess many fighter bombers which are capable of nuclear weapon delivery. We have B-47's which are effective from overseas bases. Thus there are potent arguments for at least one point, perhaps not at an early stage but later in the process, to bring the bomber issue into the SWAC package. This issue interacts also in important ways with arms transfer control issues, with European arms control and with alliance command and control.

5. Changing Status of China, West Germany, Japan and India

All of these (as already mentioned for some of them) are likely to resent the implied hierarchy. However, some resentments generated by political status considerations or by other issues such as consultation, counterparts, etc., seem almost inevitable to some degree.

If there is no SWAC agreement some of them are likely to feel that they were "swindled" into signing the non-proliferation treaty as the two superpowers did not follow through on their implied obligation to control the arms race and that they were making all the sacrifices while the superpowers reap the benefits. If there is a SWAC agreement and it happens to be just a kind of pro forma arrangement we would expect to hear from both sides. On one side the thing looks like a swindle and on the other it indicates a kind of exclusive cooperation and community of interest which can only bode ill for the three powers concerned. If the SWAC agreement is of great significance then the second point of view, as already explained, gets to be even stronger. There is no easy way of satisfying all of these countries at the same time and by the same means. Japan and West Germany would constitute particularly difficult clients. They possess a very anomalous position in the world; World War II has been over for almost 25 years and they still labor under the political disabilities of having lost that war. And it seems to be quite clear that almost whatever happens they will try in various ways to "break the chains" and regain their status which in some sense twenty-five years after the war they are entitled to. The problem then is to see to it that the motivations and incentives generated by U.S. actions not be excessively contra-productive from a U.S. interest perspective. We should try to avoid permanent bitterness, which may escalate into severe hostility and suspicion, though it should be clear that to a degree it is probably unavoidable.

Another, equally important issue is the incentives inherent in the actual posture outcomes of a SWAC agreement, particularly on the question of active defenses. If the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. sign an agreement which bans ballistic missile defense, the Chinese, West Germans and Japanese could conceivably aspire to become great powers by getting "only one Polaris submarine or so." And if the agreement be abrogated because of such developments, the duopolistic perspective on the power distribution in international society which the superpowers would thereby communicate to the world would increase the alienation of a large group of countries

in the international system and consequently generate long-term strains on the prevailing system of world order. It should also be noted that when we say that "one Polaris submarine or so" might be thought to give great power status, we are implying some requirement for invulnerability. There are many ways to achieve invulnerability which would look very unreliable and dangerous to a great power but which might be tried by a small power. For example, one might hide missiles in a very eccentric orbit; or one might hide them under the sea-bed, moving them occasionally; or one might use a floating launching site as was suggested at one time by people in the Navy. This is much less expensive than a Polaris submarine. Or one could even hide them on land, or keep them mobile. This kind of invulnerability is clearly worth something. Another kind of invulnerability would be vulnerability by threshold as one could make the missiles extremely hard so that they could only be destroyed by a large groundburst and then expect the simple abhorrence of such an act to provide their essential defense.

There is little or nothing one suspects that U.S.-Soviet agreements can do about China except to raise the internal morale of the two countries by demonstrating a commitment to being reasonable, responsible, humanistic, and so on. As far as West Germany, Japan and India are concerned, however, there are conceivable long-term arms control arrangements of the sort we discussed elsewhere, which might conceivably offset some of the considerations of this section, giving them a chance, at least in the long run, to participate in a non-invidious fashion in their own nuclear protection. We are referring specifically here to some specific ideas for regional forces and/or other joint arrangements.

6. Other Nth Country Problems

Many of the issues that we discussed in Chapter IV and in Section 5 of this chapter would apply here as well, and we will not repeat them in this context. We would expect the moral example to be relatively important. The fact that the great powers may by failing to conclude a SWAC agreement be thought to have put arms control as such in serious jeopardy, and given that the NPT is up for ratification, such a failure may have a much greater effect on the Nth countries that were not included in the discussion in Section 5. Here once again, however, the very hope of eventual regional arrangements or U.N. systems that would tend to equalize, at least in a formal sense, their status with that of the great and large powers may be very important. Such countries may be very annoyed or resistant to signing or accepting documents or *faits accomplis* which seem to condemn them to be permanently "second class," while they might be perfectly willing to accept temporary inferiority status if there exists some theory as to how they may eventually become in effect responsible for their own defense, or at least not directly and solely dependent on the great powers.

To the extent that the U.S.-Soviet SWAC agreement slows down the arms race or reduces the capabilities of the big powers, the small powers

may feel that they have a cheaper and easier access to the competition. To the extent that they perceive a SWAC agreement as the prelude to a more comprehensive agreement which would have the effect of permanently preventing them from entering the big league, they may be encouraged to try to preempt. To the extent that these kinds of agreements make clear the special role of nuclear weapons, the fact that they represent more of a burden than an asset; the fact that their only real value to a nuclear power is to negate the weapons of another nuclear power, and that if one does not have such weapons one does not need them, the total impact might be to reduce the incentives for competitive participation. Thus a stable adjustment to a system characterized by extensive arms control (including NPT and SWAC) may depend rather critically on the generally perceived utilities of nuclear weapons in general and strategic nuclear forces in particular. Weak incentives for nuclear self-sufficiency would increase the credibility of guarantees, at least in the pre-crisis environment. It may actually reduce the credibility during a crisis because no particular nation may consider itself the sole guarantor. Thus a collective security system may come to look rather impressive in peacetime and correspondingly feeble in a crisis, but in some ways this can be as much of a benefit as a loss.

7. Soviet Technology (Arms Racing Issues)

The technological complexities of a SWAC agreement are many and we shall not dwell on these issues here. The discussion of the arms race issues of any SWAC agreement must be directly related to the specific configuration of the package around which an agreement would converge. We could think of three different broad configurations:

ALTERNATIVE 1: OFFENSIVE FORCE (ICBM, IRBM/MRBM) INVENTORIES LIMITED TO X,000 LBS. THROW WEIGHT PLUS NO LIMITATION ON DEFENSIVE FORCES

ALTERNATIVE 2: OFFENSIVE FORCE (ICBM, IRBM/MRBM) INVENTORIES LIMITED TO Y,00 VEHICLES, NO VEHICLES WITH THROW WEIGHT > Z,000 LBS. ALLOWED PLUS NO LIMITATION ON DEFENSIVE FORCES

ALTERNATIVE 3: TOTAL INVENTORY OF MISSILES (ICBM, IRBM/MRBM, ABM) LIMITED TO X_1,000 LBS. THROW WEIGHT OR TO Y_1,00 VEHICLES, NO VEHICLE WITH THROW WEIGHT > Z,000 LBS. ALLOCATION ON DEFENSE/OFFENSE NOT SUBJECT TO OTHER RESTRICTIONS THAN OVER ALL CEILING

ARRANGEMENTS MAY BE SYMMETRICAL OR ALLOW FOR S.U./U.S. ASYMMETRIES

The evolution of any such broad packages will have to be made with reference to a multiplicity of parameters of which some of the more salient would be:



The operational implications of a SWAC agreement would depend on such issues as the possible asymmetries in the opportunities for avoidance and/or evasion, unforeseen asymmetries and/or inflexibilities, upgrading and retrofit options as well as the general problem of breakthroughs and the need to maintain a vigorous R&D effort. The major problem here may be one of political motivation, i.e., perceptions of priorities and needs as structures in the context of an important arms control arrangement and the associated beliefs about the future nature of international conflict.

8. U.S.-Sino Policy

It seems fairly clear that the major short-term implications of a SWAC agreement for U.S.-Chinese relations will be in the realm of perceived intentions and role distributions in the international system. Given the prevailing outlooks in Peking and the recent intensification of the Sino-Soviet conflict a SWAC agreement is likely to be seen as a reconfirmation of the Chinese expectations of a U.S.-S.U. cooperative conspiracy to freeze their own preeminence in general and to prevent China from challenging the present power distribution in particular. Hence, we cannot exclude the possibility that a SWAC agreement may tend to reinforce or create Chinese propensities for "irresponsible" challenge to the existing order, perhaps even to the extent of actively promoting nuclear proliferation.

However, the net impact of any agreement of the kind discussed here would, of course, depend on the general thrust of U.S. foreign policy in Asia. It is probably important not to become too closely "allied" with Moscow over a wide range of political issues, particularly Asian issues (including Vietnam), in order to avoid an irrevocable alienation from Mainland China. It is, furthermore, quite conceivable that U.S. interests in the future stability of Asia would imply a rather potent interest in increased abilities for interposition, arbitration, and manipulation of Sino-Soviet relations.

The provisions in respect to BMD of any SWAC agreement would also be of importance to U.S.-Chinese relations. On the one hand a prohibition on BMD could constitute an opening for the rapid establishment of China as a superpower. On the other hand an American deployment which was explicitly advertised as an anti-Chinese system is likely to be counter-productive in the sense that it would magnify, rather than minimize, the importance of the Chinese threat in the eyes of, for example, India and Japan. The result could be increased incentives for proliferation or even tendencies in the direction of Japanese neutralism and Indian disintegration. American insurance against Chinese ICBM's might also cause Peking to put greater emphasis on medium-range missiles covering the major (potential and actual) U.S. allies in Asia.

An American BMD system would extend in time the American ability to threaten China with a credible first strike. An explicitly anti-Chinese deployment may thus tend to reconfirm Chinese assumptions about incompatible hostility and slow down China's reconciliation with the international community. Thus there are strong reasons for advertising any BMD programs under a SWAC agreement in general prudential terms rather than with reference to specific villains.

9. European Security

The impact of a SWAC agreement on the issue of European security is almost by definition tenuous and highly scenario dependent.

The management of the consultative process within NATO will to a considerable extent determine the potential strains on the alliance. The question of the Soviet MRBM/IRBM's is also crucial here as we suggested in Section 4.

To the extent that the SWAC agreement would be associated with European expectations of a Soviet-American rapprochement, the systemic impact of the arrangement is likely to manifest itself in terms of increased incentives for the European powers to coalesce so as to establish a basis at least for the rapid mobilization of countervailing power should the superpower rapprochement lead to the imposition of political "solutions" inimical to European interests. Such a perspective is likely therefore to focus on the need to retain some serious option for a European nuclear force. We would argue that such an option need not be destabilizing or contrary to U.S. interests, nor need it constitute

an incentive for further proliferation. It might in fact provide a disincentive by emphasizing the image that a serious nuclear power needs a power basis which is simply not available as a target for widespread emulation. The operational doctrine for such a force could ideally emphasize the distinction between escalation and retaliation as well as between internal and external escalation. It is also conceivable that the participating European countries may come to see a no-first-use convention as a potential structuring device for multilateral decision-making. Hence a regional European force may come also to contribute to the evolution of practices, customs and outlooks which would tend to constrain the process of nuclear proliferation. It is important in this connection that the U.S. demonstrate the "limited convertibility" of nuclear weapons into useful and relevant political currency both in terms of the declaratory policy and in terms of the posture which is maintained within NATO, for example.

The conclusion of a SWAC agreement may provide a political context, reinforced perhaps by an escalation of the Sino-Soviet dispute wherein the Soviet Union might be willing to agree to a settlement in Europe which in the long term at least would imply some plausible prospects for German reassociation and increased autonomy in Eastern Europe. Expectations of such a shift in Soviet priorities and concerns might reestablish some of the pre-Czechoslovakia interest in "normalization" processes and systemic transformations of the political map of Europe.

On the other hand the conclusion of a SWAC agreement might also to some observers convey the message that the U.S. was in fact calling off the cold war and thus acquiescing in the perpetuation of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and laying the ground for a gradual disengagement from European affairs.

10. Middle Eastern Proliferation Problems

We have already mentioned in Chapter IV the unsatisfactory position in which Israel found itself following France's withdrawal of nuclear support. This "backdown" and the tendency of the superpowers to impose various solutions from the outside have, of course, worked to alienate Tel Aviv and to stimulate Israeli desire for a "secure second strike" to offset the possibility of severe loss of air power. Such a capability is well within Israeli technological capabilities, but barring nuclear "gifts" from the Soviets not within the capacities of the Arab nations within the foreseeable future.

What effect a nuclear Israel might have on the Middle Eastern countries and, for that matter, on Japan or India, for instance, is not immediately predictable. Such a development, however, would clearly seem to further complicate the relationships between the nuclear "haves" and "have nots," and perhaps be a decisive factor in the spread of nuclear weapons to countries who might otherwise have remained ambivalent.

II. Other Issues

The issues of warfighting capabilities and nuclear proliferation cut across many of the issues discussed above and there is no need to repeat the arguments and perspectives in special sections. These issues as well as the Year 2000 perspectives will receive further elaboration in Chapter VIII below.

Some Important Issues Raised by the Interaction of Arms Control and Other Policy Areas

The matrix provides a framework for consideration of some potential interactions between arms control and other basic national security policy issues. It constitutes a useful device for the illustration and discovery of potential interactions and policy implications. The elaboration serves heuristic purposes and is suggestive rather than exhaustive. It is not designed to present a point of view as much as to highlight some important policy issues.

Feedbacks from e.g. the NPT and/or a possible strategic weapons arms control (SWAC) agreement to internal U.S. politics are likely to be particularly important in terms of their influence on public perceptions of what the political line-up and issues in world politics are. NPT would tend to focus attention on those who refuse to cooperate; and prevalent among such states are likely to be the World War II adversaries of the U.S. Any arms control arrangements are likely to structure the popular attitudes towards the cold war, force, and the Soviet Union. Certain kinds of "technical" intra-war arms control arrangements are unlikely to stir up much public interest, but their reflection of a rationalist approach to problem solving may increase the communications gap to those who represent more romantic, anti-rationalistic trends in American society. Such interactions are, however, extremely tenuous.

A visible pattern of cooperation and coordination between the two superpowers may generate expectations and fears of a superpower condominium. Those who have found protection in the balance of power of a competitive U.S.-S.U. relationship may scramble for new patterns in a situation characterized by an emergent cooperative U.S.-S.U. relationship. It is, furthermore, possible that an atmosphere of cooperation and apparent relaxation may provide opportunities for manipulative diplomacy and lead to a less cautious estimate of the risks involved in pressing for unilateral advantages. Propensities of this kind are likely to be asymmetrical in the U.S.-S.U. competitive relationship.

Interactions with U.S. alliance politics are in many ways the opposite side of the coin to the interactions with U.S.-S.U. politics. The possibility of a superpower concert may produce important pressures for alliance reconstruction. Certain war management measures may, like the NPT, amplify and exacerbate some of the problems of alliance consultation, particularly in regard to nuclear weapons.

Arms race issues are not treated in detail here since specific evaluation of these ixsues must be made with reference to a particular agreement. We have, however, attempted to identify some possible sources of general uncertainty and potential conflict.

The major uncertainties associated with the potential impact of various arms control measures on future European security systems are connected with estimates of Soviet priorities, objectives and opportunities for the assertion of exclusive influence. Some arms control measures, or the diplomacy to reach agreement, may serve as catalysts for political realignments in Europe, in many instances realignments which would be inconsistent with the realization of the arms control objective in question. We have seen some tendencies in connection with the NPT and a process of expanded arms control diplomacy may strengthen such, still rather latent, tendencies.

The NPT would have the effect of enhancing the status of China as a nuclear power by ostensibly closing the door for other powers. It is more than problematical that two of the emerging giants were the principal losers in World War II. The Nuclear Club would in effect be composed of the victorious powers of World War II who are also formally recognized as the preeminent powers in the United Nations structure. It may be less than fortunate thus to have the possession of nuclear weapons formally linked with recognized great power status.

The NPT is unlikely to affect U.S. and S.U. war-fighting capabilities except in an indirect way as a consequence of pressures from the non-nuclear weapon states to limit the acquisition of arms. The effects of a SWAC arrangement could be more dramatic; but their nature and scope cannot be identified in the abstract.

Even if the NPT obtains almost universal ratification, we are faced with the issue of what will be the "normal" posture of a country which decides not to acquire nuclear weapons. Will the typical posture be one of complete abstention from nuclear weapons programs or will it be common for non-nuclear weapon states to implement measures permitting them to acquire nuclear weapons relatively quickly when and if the need arises? Hence, the issue remains as to what kinds of interactions might take place in an environment where many countries maintain a rapid acquisition posture. The interactions might under pressure from political conflicts generate incentives for eventual acquisition.

In terms of the long-term (year 2000) issues we are analytically interested in (1) how particular arms control agreements might affect the probability of certain changes taking place in the international system, and (2) how the same arms control arrangements would affect the ability of the U.S. to cope with an environment in which certain basic or marginal changes have taken place.

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SOME IMPORTANT ISSUES RAISED BY THE INTERACTION OF

POTENTIAL ARMS CONTROL MEASURES \ IMPORTANT POLICY AREAS	U.S. DOMESTIC POLITICS	U.S.-S.U. POLITICS	U.S ALLIANCE POLITICS	SOVIET TECHNOLOGY (RACING ISSUES)	EURO SECU
NPT	ATTITUDES TOWARDS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS COLD WAR FORCE FORMER (WORLD WAR II) ENEMIES	JOINT RESPONSIBILITIES MANIPULATIVE DIPLOMACY JOINT HEGEMONY DETENTE	DISRUPTION FEAR OF U.S. HEGEMONY BARRIER TO ASPIRATIONS FEAR OF U.S. "SELLOUT" "INTOLERABLE" HIERARCHY	SOVIET CENTRAL WAR PLANNING REMAIN U.S.-ORIENTED SOME RELAXATION OF PRESSURES TO STAY AHEAD	PERPETUATION OF NEW CHANCE FOR EUROPE COMPOSED STATES DRAMATIC EFFECT NUCLEAR POWER CONDOMINIUM ISS
STRATEGIC WEAPONS ARMS CONTROL (SWAC)	PERCEIVED PRIORITIES & COMMITMENTS ATTITUDES TOWARDS: COLD WAR SOVIET UNION	RELAXED COMPETITION REDUCED VIGILANCE & SUSPICION (?) FREEZE ON STATUS QUO DETENTE	MAY BE DISRUPTIVE NUCLEAR GUARANTEES HEGEMONY FEARS IMPACT ON SMALL FORCES CONSULTATION ISSUES	ASYMMETRICAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR AVOIDANCE/EVASION UNFORESEEN ASYMMETRIES UPGRADING & RETROFIT OPTIONS BREAKTHROUGHS	CATALYST FOR EU COOPERATION SOVIET WILLINGN SETTLEMENT U.S ACCEPTANCE HEGEMONY IN E U.S. WITHDRAWAL
ARMS TRANSFER CONTROLS	ECONOMIC INTERESTS ATTITUDES TOWARDS: INTERVENTION NON-DEMOCRATIC REGIMES SPECIAL REGIMES (ISRAEL) PERCEIVED PRIORITIES & COMMITMENTS	JOINT RESPONSIBILITIES REDUCED COMPETITION JOINT HEGEMONY DETENTE	ECONOMIC INTERESTS POLITICAL DISAGREEMENTS INCENTIVES FOR COALITION (TO END-RUN ARMS EMBARGOS) AUTARCHY	SOME DISPOSAL PROBLEMS LESS OPERATIONAL TESTING OPPORTUNITIES	DISCRIMINATION AUTARCHY
EUROPEAN ARMS CONTROL	ATTITUDES TOWARDS: COLD WAR OVERSEAS COMMITMENTS SOVIET UNION LOSS OF VIGILANCE DISENGAGEMENT	MUTUAL DISENGAGEMENT FEARS OF REENGAGEMENT MANIPULATIVE POSSIBILITIES BARRIERS TO INTERVENTION DETENTE	POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE ROLE OF U.S. GUARANTEE ISSUES CONSULTATION ISSUES VERIFICATION ISSUES	MRBM/IRBM PROBLEM RAPID INTERVENTION CAPABILITIES	CONTEXT DEPENDE INTERACTIONS
SEA BED REGIMES	ECONOMIC INTERESTS CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ATTITUDES TOWARDS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	SOME COOPERATION LIMIT AREA OF MILITARY COMPETITION	ECONOMIC INTERESTS DISCRIMINATION ISSUES PARTICULAR INTEREST ISSUES	FEAR OF EVASION ASYMMETRICAL U.S. DISADVANTAGE ASW BREAKTHROUGHS	SOME FEELING OF DISCRIMINATION
WAR-FIGHTING UNDERSTANDING	"NUCLEAR WAR IS THINKABLE" ATTITUDES TOWARDS: S.U. FORCE	TRANQUILIZATION NORMALIZATION CONDOMINIUM	CONSULTATION ISSUES FEARS OF SELLOUT CONDOMINIUM	UNFORESEEN ASYMMETRIES SOME COORDINATION "SHARED PREDICAMENT ATTITUDES"	DETENTE CONDOMINIUM "SELLOUT" GUARANTEES EUROPEAN ASPIR
NUCLEAR WEAPONS DOCTRINE	ATTITUDES TOWARDS: FORCE S.U. ALLIES ABM MORAL ISSUES	NATURE OF COMPETITION (RISKTAKING) PERCEIVED THREATS ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS	ALLIANCE FORCE PLANNING ALLIANCE DOCTRINE GERMAN SENSITIVITIES TACTICAL NUCLEAR INVENTORY & DEPLOYMENT	EMPHASIS ISSUES "EDUCATION" ISSUES BREAKTHROUGHS ASYMMETRIES	GUARANTEES ROLE VENTIONAL FOR MOBILIZATION ROLE OF EUROPEA NUCLEAR FORCE
COMMAND & CONTROL	RATIONAL DISCOURSE "NUCLEAR WAR IS THINKABLE" DAMAGE LIMITATION OBJECTIVES	REDUCED TENSION RISK TAKING TACIT COORDINATION THREAT PERCEPTION PREEMPTION	GUARANTEES CONSULTATION & PARTICIPATION ISSUES	BREAKTHROUGHS UNEXPECTED INFLEXIBILITIES BARGAINING UNFORESEEN ASYMMETRIES MUTUAL LEARNING MISCALCULATION	GUARANTEES ESCALATION RISK TAKING INTERVENTION

T OGY SSUES)	EUROPEAN SECURITY	CHANGING STATUS OF CHINA, W. GERMANY, JAPAN	WAR FIGHTING CAPABILITIES	NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION	YEAR 2000 ISSUES
WAR IN OF	PERPETUATION OF STATUS QUO NEW CHANCE FOR SETTLEMENT EUROPE COMPOSED OF CLIENT STATES DRAMATIC EFFECT OF THIRD NUCLEAR POWER IN EUROPE CONDOMINIUM ISSUES	CHINA "ACCEPTED" LOSERS OF W.W.II DENIED NUCLEAR STATUS PERPETUATION OF 1945 POWER HIERARCHY CHINESE LEVERAGE	RESTRAINTS ON PROCUREMENT OF NUCLEAR FORCES INCREASED VALUE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES	PRESSURES AGAINST NUCL OPTION PREMATURE PRECIPITATION INSTABILITIES FROM SHORT LEAD TIME POSTURES "PROBLEM IS SOLVED" ATTITUDE	ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREQUENCY & SCOPE OF VIOLENCE POWER HIERARCHY ALLIANCE STRUCTURES REGIONAL STRUCTURES STATUS OF W.W.II LOSERS
PPORTUNITIES E/EVASION METRIES ROFIT OPTIONS	CATALYST FOR EUROPEAN COOPERATION SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT SETTLEMENT U.S ACCEPTANCE OF SOVIET HEGEMONY IN EAST EUROPE U.S. WITHDRAWAL	U.S.-S.U. PREEMINENCE INCENTIVES TO CATCH UP ASPIRATIONS CHANGED DUOPOLY	DEPENDS ON AGREEMENT UNFORESEEN INFLEXIBILITIES UNFORESEEN ASYMMETRIES "WAR IS UNTHINKABLE"	REDUCED RELEVANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INCENTIVES TO CHALLENGE U.S.-S.U. PREEMINENCE CREDIBILITY OF GUARANTEES UNMATCHED HOSTAGE CAPABILITIES	ROLE OF STRATEGIC FORCES REALLOCATION OF RESOURCES PATTERN OF COOPERATION & CONFLICT STABILITY & LEGITIMACY OF SOVIET SYSTEM EMERGENCE OF NEW POWER CENTERS
PROBLEMS L TESTING 	DISCRIMINATION ISSUES AUTARCHY	ECONOMIC INTERESTS CHINESE LEVERAGE	U.S. & S.U. MORE DOMINANT LOCAL ASYMMETRIES	DELIVERY PROBLEMS DISCRIMINATION PSYCHOLOGY COLLABORATIVE CHALLENGE	PATTERNS OF CONFLICT POWER DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE INTERVENTION AUTARCHY TENDENCIES ROLE OF THE OUTLAW
LEM TION	CONTEXT DEPENDENT INTERACTIONS	GERMAN REUNIFICATION GERMANY'S ROLE IN EUROPE U.S.-GERMAN RELATIONS S.U.-GERMAN RELATIONS	DEPENDS ON KIND OF AGREEMENT IMPROVED MOBILIZATION BASE	DEPENDS ON KIND OF AGREEMENT REDUCED INCENTIVE GUARANTEE ISSUES INDEPENDENCE ISSUES	POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF EUROPE ROLE OF GERMANY ROLE OF SOVIET UNION ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS OCCURRENCE OF VIOLENCE
 S. NS	SOME FEELING OF DETENTE DISCRIMINATION ISSUES	DISCRIMINATION ISSUES ECONOMIC INTERESTS LEVERAGE FROM OUTSIDE (CHINA?)	SOME "INTERESTING" AVENUES CLOSED MORE COLLATERAL DAMAGE? PRESERVATION OF SUBMARINE INVULNERABILITIES(?)	SYMBOLIC AND ACTUAL LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS RACE	PATTERN OF COOPERATION & CONFLICT FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION RESOURCE UTILIZATION
METRIES ON MENT	DETENTE CONDOMINIUM "SELLOUT" GUARANTEES EUROPEAN ASPIRATIONS	SOME FEAR OF U.S.-S.U. CONDOMINIUM (INCENTIVES TO CHALLENGE)	DEPENDS ON KIND OF AGREEMENT DIFFERENTIATED CAPABILITIES DAMAGE LIMITATION	REDUCED SALIENCY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPOLITICIZATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS	ESCALATION ISSUES ROLE OF FORCE & VIOLENCE PATTERN OF COOPERATION & CONFLICT ROLE OF DETERRENCE & DEFENSIVE EMPHASIS
 UES	GUARANTEES ROLE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES MOBILIZATION BASE ROLE OF EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCES	GUARANTEES CONVENTIONAL STRENGTH CATALYTIC OPPORTUNITIES SPOILERS CONDOMINIUM	ROLE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES ROLE OF NUCLEAR FORCES DAMAGE LIMITATION FLEXIBILITY CONSTRAINTS	NUCLEAR INCENTIVES ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPHASIS/DEEMPHASIS	ESCALATION ISSUES ROLE OF FORCE & VIOLENCE NUCLEAR POWER DISTRIBUTION ROLE OF DETERRENCE & DEFENSIVE EMPHASIS
EXIBILITIES METRIES	GUARANTEES ESCALATION RISK TAKING INTERVENTION	CATALYTIC PROBLEM COMPLEXITIES OF WAR PLANNING NO EASY RIDE AS CLIENTS OR CATALYSTS	FLEXIBILITIES CONSTRAINTS POLITICAL CONTROL	COMPLEXITIES BECOME APPARENT COSTS OF GOOD SYSTEMS GO UP AWARENESS OF ESCALATION DANGERS	ESCALATION ISSUES ROLE OF FORCE & VIOLENCE PROPENSITIES FOR RISK-TAKING DAMAGE LIMITATION

Potential Interactions Between Arms Control Arrangements

This matrix constitutes a framework for integrating various arms control policy perspectives. It is useful to view the impact of one particular kind of arms control measure on the prospects and implications of othe- measures. We want to be able to assess both the cumulative and systems impacts of arms control arrangements.

We have no particular time sequence in mind so that the comments in the various cells of the matrix do not assume that e.g., the measure indicated in any row precedes the measure indicated in a corresponding column. The reader may "enter" the matrix from any direction. The comments and items in the various cells identify issues which require analysis and only in a few instances do the comments suggest a particular perspective on the issues raised.

It is clear that there exists a formal link between the NPT and S.U.-U.S. strategic force agreements in that the language of the NPT has been interpreted as committing the superpowers to hold such talks, presumably as a concession to the insistence from several non-nuclear weapon states that there be a certain balance in the obligations and concessions made under the treaty. We should note, however, that certain kinds of SWAC (particularly agreements involving low ceilings on strategic forces) may generate incentives for proliferation should they e.g. reduce the requirements for "catching up." Hence it may be necessary to cast a SWAC arrangement not only in terms of U.S.-S.U. relations but also with respect to its impact on and responsiveness to the challenges from potential superpower aspirants.

Any system of strict arms transfer limitations (arms embargos) would when superimposed on the NPT run the risk of generating widespread resentment against what will increasingly be perceived as a concerted great power overlordship. Such resentments might produce potent incentives for cooperative efforts aimed at a greater degree of autarchy, possibly including nuclear weapons.

From the point of view of Western Europe it will be very important how the U.S. will handle the problem of the Soviet MRBM's-IRBM's in any SWAC agreement with Moscow. There is, of course, a measuring problem here of finding a relevant equivalence, but there is also a political issue involving the management of what may be perceived as an asymmetrical hostage situation.

It is widely expected that following NPT an international convention covering the activities on the sea-bed will be next on the arms control agenda and that such a convention would involve a commitment to demilitarize the sea-bed. Hence there may be an important link with NPT in terms of the political importance of maintaining momentum in the arms control efforts. To the extent that the sea-bed regimes were to exclude various bottom-based sensor systems, they may

potentially exclude the procurement of a possible infrastructure for information transfer in a war or during a crisis and thus prevent certain war-fighting understandings as well as complicate the exercise of command and control. ASW barriers might conceivably constitute a means for reciprocal signalling or the deliberate transfer of information communicated by the observation of submarine movements. Such barriers could also serve as a means of verifying disengagement in a crisis to the extent that such an arrangement would involve the removal and redeployment of submarines.

The objective of being able to arrive at certain war-fighting understandings with Moscow, in e.g. a central war, may have important implications for the kind of capabilities and flexibilities which ought to be maintained within a SWAC arrangement. It is possible, for instance, that the possibility of treating cities as sanctuaries presupposes the development of a sophisticated MIRV capability (providing high accuracy and less megatonnage). Similarly certain zonal arrangements in e.g. Europe in connection with a wider settlement may provide potential focal points for disengagement in a possible war in the European environment (cfr. the DMZ in Vietnam).

A SWAC arrangement will tend to affect the options available in the realm of nuclear weapons doctrine as well, and this perspective ought to be kept in mind. Here we are faced with issues such as the potential value of maintaining a first-strike option, the relative emphasis to be accorded counterforce and countervalue missions, and, perhaps most important of all, the basic choice between a posture emphasizing deterrence based on reciprocal capacities for assured destruction or, alternatively, a defensive emphasis posture.

The problems of command and control interact with most arms control measures in terms of the expected opportunities for "outside" powers to interfere with U.S. decision-making, both in terms of catalytic objectives and in terms of access to U.S. decision-making on a cooperative basis. The command and control problems are, of course, also associated with the issues involved in war-fighting understandings and the choice of nuclear weapons doctrine.

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POTENTIAL INTERACTIONS BETWEEN ARMS CONTROL /

	SWAC	ARMS TRANSFER CONTROLS	EUROPEAN ARMS CONTROL	SEABED REGIMES	WAR F UNDER
NPT	COUNTERPARTS (CONCESSIONS) BY SUPERPOWERS TEST BAN A SWAC ARRANGEMENT MAY INCREASE INCENTIVES FOR PROLIFERATION BY STABILIZING THE TARGET FOR THOSE WHO WANT TO CATCH UP FUTURE POWER HIERARCHY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM NUCLEAR GUARANTEES	AVAILABILITY OF POTENTIAL DELIVERY SYSTEMS PERCEPTIONS OF GREAT POWER ATTITUDES, INCLUDING POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED RESENTMENT AGAINST "EXTERNAL" MANAGEMENT & POSSIBLE INCENTIVES TO COALESCE FOR PURPOSES OF CHALLENGING GREAT POWER DOMINANCE	POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE & POWER RELATIONS IN EUROPE THREAT PERCEPTIONS DENUCLEARIZED ZONES NUCLEAR RELEASE PROCEDURES TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYMENTS EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCE	THE WEAPON SYSTEMS WHICH WILL CONSTITUTE THE CURRENCY OF MAJOR POWER STATUS EXCLUDING SEABED BASED SYSTEMS, CRAWLERS, ETC. MAY FACILITATE CATCHING UP FOR POTENTIAL CHALLENGERS A SEABED REGIME MAY HAVE TEMPORAL RELATIONSHIP TO NPT OF MAINTAINING THE ARMS CONTROL MOMENTUM GREAT POWER COUNTERPARTS	EXTRANEOUS INT CATALYTIC OPTI NUCLEAR SHARIN PROBLEMS OF JOINT DECISI SIMILAR ISSUES NUCLEAR GUAR THE LATTER MAY FOR U.S.-S.U AND EVEN JOI
SWAC		DISPOSAL ISSUES, I.E., NEED FOR AGREEMENT FOR ACTUAL DESTRUCTION OF OBSOLESCENT WEAPON SYSTEMS AS E.G. B-47 BOMBERS	SOVIET MRBM'S/IRBM'S U.S. TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES GUARANTEES TO ALLIES AND OTHER NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES	FORCE COMPOSITIONS ASW TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIONS (BOTTOM-BASED ICBM/IRBM'S, ABM'S, ETC.) ARMS CONTROL MOMENTUM VERIFICATION ISSUES	DEPLOYMENT ISSI ACTIVE DEFENSES MOBILIZATION-B BEHAVIOR QUALITATIVE IM PERMIT E.G. I ACCURACY)
	ARMS TRANSFER CONTROLS		EUROPEAN ARMAMENTS BASE OPPOSITION TO ARMS TRANSFER CONTROL ON PART OF SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES COULD IMPLY INTRODUCTION OF NEW SOURCES OF TENSION IN EUROPE AND WITHIN ALLIANCES	POLICING CAPABILITIES & REQUIREMENTS NOVEL SOURCE OF INTERSTATE CONFLICTS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION ISSUES	EXTRANEOUS INTE CATALYTIC OPTIO CRISIS INCIDENC
		EUROPEAN ARMS CONTROL		NAVAL DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEAN ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENT NOVEL SOURCE OF REGIONAL CONFLICT SOVIET NAVAL PREPONDERANCE VERIFICATION ISSUES	SANCTUARIES NUCLEAR COORDIN TARGETING ZONAL ARRANGEME IZATION, DISEM WARNING & INFOR
				SEA-BED REGIMES	INFORMATION TRA MONITORING CAPA TARGETING COLLATERAL DAMA ISSUES DEPLOYMENT AND RESTRICTIONS
					WAR U

AL INTERACTIONS BETWEEN ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS

	SEABED REGIMES	WAR FIGHTING UNDERSTANDINGS	NUCLEAR WEAPONS DOCTRINE	COMMAND & CONTROL
UCTURE S IN CECURES APONS RCE	THE WEAPON SYSTEMS WHICH WILL CONSTITUTE THE CURRENCY OF MAJOR POWER STATUS EXCLUDING SEABED BASED SYSTEMS, CRAWLERS, ETC. MAY FACILITATE CATCHING UP FOR POTENTIAL CHALLENGERS A SEABED REGIME MAY HAVE TEMPORAL RELATIONSHIP TO NPT OF MAINTAINING THE ARMS CONTROL MOMENTUM GREAT POWER COUNTERPARTS	EXTRANEOUS INTERFERENCE CATALYTIC OPTIONS NUCLEAR SHARING & ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS OF CONSULTATION AND JOINT DECISION-MAKING SIMILAR ISSUES CONNECTED WITH NUCLEAR GUARANTEES THE LATTER MAY ALSO IMPLY NEEDS FOR U.S.-S.U. UNDERSTANDINGS AND EVEN JOINT ACTIONS	NUCLEAR EMPHASIS/DEEMPHASIS (NFU CONVENTION) EMULATION INCENTIVES PERCEIVED UTILITIES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS	NUMBER & IDENTITY OF DECISION UNITS DEPLOYMENTS GUARANTEES NUCLEAR SHARING & CONSULTATION
S AR S LEAR	FORCE COMPOSITIONS ASW TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIONS (BOTTOM-BASED ICBM/IRBM'S, ABM'S, ETC.) ARMS CONTROL MOMENTUM VERIFICATION ISSUES	DEPLOYMENT ISSUES ACTIVE DEFENSES MOBILIZATION-BASE & CRISIS BEHAVIOR QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS (TO PERMIT E.G. INCREASED ACCURACY)	FIRST STRIKE OPTIONS ASSURED DESTRUCTION VS. DEFENSIVE EMPHASIS CONVENTIONAL POSTURE COUNTERFORCE/COUNTERVALUE STRATEGIES DEPLOYMENTS QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS	VULNERABILITIES FLEXIBILITY INCREASED RELIABILITY & FLEXIBILITY (E.G. RETARGETING CAPABILITIES) MAY FACILITATE AGREEMENT ON QUANTITATIVE FORCE CEILINGS
BASE TRANS- RT OF NTRIES DUC- ES OF AND	POLICING CAPABILITIES & REQUIREMENTS NOVEL SOURCE OF INTER-STATE CONFLICTS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION ISSUES	EXTRANEOUS INTERFERENCE CATALYTIC OPTIONS CRISIS INCIDENCE	CONVENTIONAL EMPHASIS GREAT POWER COMMITMENTS NUCLEAR OPTION MORE "ECONOMICAL" IN AN ENVIRONMENT WHERE CONVENTIONAL FORCES HARD TO OBTAIN	EXTRANEOUS INTERFERENCE CATALYTIC OPTIONS CRISIS INCIDENCE
AN TROL	NAVAL DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEAN ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENT NOVEL SOURCE OF REGIONAL CONFLICT SOVIET NAVAL PREPONDERANCE VERIFICATION ISSUES	SANCTUARIES → NUCLEAR COORDINATION & SHARING → TARGETING → ZONAL ARRANGEMENTS (DEMILITARIZATION, DISENGAGEMENT, ETC.) WARNING & INFORMATION TRANSFER	EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCE → FORCE POSTURE (EMPHASIS) TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES (ESCALATION ISSUES) →	→ → → → →
SEA-BED REGIMES		INFORMATION TRANSFER → MONITORING CAPABILITIES → TARGETING → COLLATERAL DAMAGE & ESCALATION ISSUES DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONS RESTRICTIONS	COLLATERAL DAMAGE SANCTUARIES	→ → → TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIONS MAY BE FORECLOSED BY SEA-BED REGIME
		WARFIGHTING UNDERSTANDINGS	CITIES AS SANCTUARIES SOME CITIES AS SANCTUARIES OTHER SANCTUARIES NEW CONVENTIONS	COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS AS SANCTUARIES CONTROL CENTERS AS SANCTUARIES INADEQUATE COMMAND & CONTROL MAY PROVIDE ADDED INCENTIVES TO ARRIVE AT WARFIGHTING UNDERSTANDINGS
			NUCLEAR WEAPONS DOCTRINE	SANCTUARIES TARGETING INFORMATION TRANSFER CONTROLLED RESPONSE

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CHAPTER VI. GENERAL TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC ISSUES

A. The Importance of a More Widespread Understanding of Tactics and Strategy

In the recent past there has been a tendency to treat the tactics of insurgency war, European or Asian war (nuclear or conventional), and central nuclear war as being of narrow professional concern. There has been a failure to perceive that there is a need for both civilians and military to study and evaluate (or, more properly, re-evaluate) tactical issues. Tactics, tactical details, and the effectiveness of tactics used, must, however, be considered more seriously at almost all levels of public and expert discussion, as well as at many levels of the government. The consequences of such active consideration would likely be the recognition that existing tactical conceptions must be modified and/or new ones invented, and with some urgency.

Unfortunately, and perhaps disastrously, current trends go in the opposite direction. One can observe that at many levels of both public and government there exists an almost total lack of interest in tactical details and the evaluation of tactical effectiveness, particularly when the tactics to be considered seem to be complicated, sophisticated, esoteric or bizarre. Even if interest or concern exists, it is often ineffective because of feelings of a lack of competency or expertise to judge and evaluate adequately, or that such interference is inappropriate. This lack of interest and feelings of inadequacy or lack of authority extends along the spectrum of violence from the lowest levels such as insurgency war to the highest levels involved in nuclear war.

Yet one could plausibly maintain that the most likely inadequacy in U.S. military preparation in the 1975-1985 time period will be at the tactical level. We probably know a good deal about the appropriate tactics for a large conventional war of the World War II or Korean type; but there is a serious question as to how well we would be able to cope in an insurgency war, a European or Asian nuclear war, or a central nuclear war (of almost any size). By 1975, we may lack even the tactical know-how to fight a large conventional war. (It should probably be pointed out that, with the likely or possible exception of insurgency war, the Soviets are probably even less well prepared with appropriate tactics today, almost certainly for wars in which nuclear weapons are used. As for conventional war, no Soviet troops have been engaged in large-scale actions since 1945.)

Some of the authors of this report have indicated in three previous books* that issues of tactics can often dominate technology, politics and other policy issues, and yet often go almost totally unrecognized, much

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*On Thermonuclear War, On Escalation, Can We Win in Vietnam?

less discussed. Thus the issues of tactics and other detailed policies seems to be central in the Vietnamese war and many of our difficulties there may arise out of general misunderstandings about what can and cannot be done--typically revolving around such questions as rotation policy, use of combined operations for training of South Vietnamese, how to use police and intelligence effectively, how to do patrolling properly, the effectiveness of an "ambush patrol belt," and so on.

We are now, of course, treading on delicate ground. In wartime it has been traditional in the United States to give the theatre commander almost the maximum possible independence and authority. (But this tradition was gravely violated in the Vietnamese war and, as we shall point out below, almost inevitably so.) And in peacetime also--at least in recent years--the details of tactics have normally been the exclusive province of the professional military.

Thus, the options available in the war plans of the Pentagon for the largest possible wars as well as the details of such operations as the use of intelligence, patrolling, hamlet search, etc., in South Vietnam, are treated equally as matters on which one cannot properly question the authority of the "operators." But this has not been the case in the past. Many people concerned with such problems could and did claim a reasonable degree of expertise in the details of military operations--including Presidents of the United States. Neither Lincoln nor Churchill had any compunction in making judgments about--and even intervening in--the course of battles at quite low levels. In most cases it could be argued that their interventions displayed relatively good judgment and knowledge, and were often productive.

We have indicated a number of times our conviction of the increased likelihood that future decisions to intervene in an area, to escalate or withdraw, to commit troops or just military and economic aid and/or advice are likely to be strongly affected by the President's attitude to three very basic issues with regard to the available military forces and leadership. These three issues involve some of the most basic questions that any President could ask:

1. How good is our leadership and generalship (broadly construed) in this situation? (We include here such issues as choice of strategy and tactics, effects on morale, ability of the system (including the commander-in-chief) to derive the most out of the men and resources allocated, etc.) If initially inadequate (as is likely in many "new" situations) how fast can it learn or otherwise improve?

2. Are new tactics, operations, and/or equipment going to be needed? If so, what kind? Is this need likely to be recognized and corresponding programs carried out by the bureaucracy?

3. Are current tactics and resources going to be properly and effectively used? Are our preparations such that our initial operations will be reasonably sensible and effective in terms of overall national policy and the national goals or will Presidential intervention be necessary to guarantee responsiveness to the President's view of both the local and the global dangers and opportunities?

With no wish to appear pedantic, but for purposes of illustration, we shall use three important historical examples that indicate as well as anything the kinds of problems that seem increasingly likely to arise in the future--those revolving around the three questions given above--the issues of quality of leadership and generalship, the effectivenss with which new tactics and techniques are being developed and applied and the effectiveness with which old tactics and techniques are being applied.

The three examples from history discussed below have the great virtue that most readers are likely to be familiar with them and that they are dramatic enough to illustrate the importance of our three questions.

B. Historical Examples and Implications

1. Leadership--The American Civil War

When Lincoln became President he offered the job of the Commander-in-Chief of the Union Armies to Robert E. Lee. Robert E. Lee was clearly the best man for the job. But while Lee opposed slavery, he could not find it in himself to fight his native state and he therefore refused the offer and returned to Virginia. Lincoln then chose George B. McClellan, who was probably the best man available to him. However, even though McClellan had--on the whole, and sometimes to a marked degree--much greater resources of manpower and materials than Lee, the latter consistently defeated or blocked him. Lee was a much better general and knew how to get more out of his available resources.

Lincoln replaced McClellan first by Burnside and then by Hooker. Both of these proved to be lesser men and he reinstated McClellan. He relieved generals of the Army of the Potomac several times even though to do this involved serious political costs. Lincoln was willing to accept political sacrifices to get the best man he could, even though time and again this best man did not in fact prove satisfactory. In effect, the Union had to wait some three years for the development of better generals such as Grant, Sherman, and Thomas.

It has been asserted that Grant too was a general of inferior caliber--or at least inferior to Lee. Many European students of the American Civil War, including Liddell Hart and General J.F.C. Fuller would disagree. Grant was an excellent field commander. In his attack on Vicksburg he showed a

tactical innovativeness in field operations which might have done credit to Rommel in World War II. Facing the "impregnable" fortress of Vicksburg on the east bank of the Mississippi, he crossed his army to the west bank of the river, recrossed below Vicksburg and then boldly marched his army (which had detached itself from its supply base north of the fortress of Vicksburg) in between the army of Pemberton inside Vicksburg and the Confederate army of Johnston then coming up from Mississippi to relieve the fortress.

Grant put out a small screening force to hold the Confederate forces within Vicksburg while he turned with his main strength against the least, capturing Jackson, Mississippi, and garrisoning it before Johnston could reach the town. He then swung back and put his force against Pemberton, who had belatedly sortied out from Vicksburg, and drove him back into the town. (This was the classic example of using an army which in itself might not have been large enough to defeat the combined forces of Pemberton and Johnston by moving in between the two and defeating them piecemeal, in each case with locally superior force.) Grant's campaign was a risky and brilliant maneuver. In fact, Lincoln worried that Grant had made a terrible mistake by detaching himself from his supply base to the north and carrying out the battle plan. But Grant knew exactly what he was doing; and he knew the two men he was fighting. In this battle, as at Fort Donaldson, he was quick and imaginative in his planning and execution of military operations.

After the failure of a combined operation with General Butler, Grant tried to outflank Lee and in effect forced him back each time by circling movements, refusing, despite heavy losses, to let go his grip on the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee never again gained tactical freedom. Grant kept constant contact with Lee, but never ceased to attempt to slide around his opponent's flank. As a matter of fact, it was his "by-the-left-flank" movement which eventually slid the armies into the position that they held at the end of the war--the Union Army around Petersburg, ringing Richmond to the east.

Grant won no spectacular victories over the Army of Northern Virginia; but on the other hand, Lee gained no victories such as Fredericksburg or Chancellorsville over the Army of the Potomac either. The result, of course, was eventual grinding trench war--warfare which eventually destroyed the Confederate Army before Petersburg and led to Appomattox.

2. The Need for New Technology or Tactics--World War I

The next example, from World War I, pinpoints how there may be a need for new technology and/or new tactics to deal with an otherwise unresolvable stalemate.

At the outset of the war, the best general staffs in the world--competent as military planners, analysts, and practitioners--had not considered that a war with their available resources and technology could be anything

but a war of movement. But instead of entering into the "war of movement," the "superiority of offense," and the "decisive battle" for which they had be outfitted, the largest armies in history sat in two lines of trenches reaching from Switzerland to the English Channel and peered at each other through screens of metal. For four full years, and at a cost of more than five million dead, the two sides fought to find some way out of the resulting impasse.

It is difficult to see how the military experts could have unanimously overlooked the possibility that the widespread use of machine guns and barbed wire might result in static trench warfare.* Once trench warfare developed, the war degenerated into a battle of position in which much of the previous training and doctrine that the military had received proved to be irrelevant. In particular, the mystique of the offensive and "the will to conquer" proved to be tragically misleading.

By and large military leaders on both sides sought to solve their problem by the use of the traditional tactics and tools--more and better frontal attacks, more and better artillery barrages, strike, counter-strike, and quick decision. Those were the traditional weapons. Their minds did not turn to the development of new techniques and equipment. The philosophy of the mid-twentieth century that seeks a solution to problems in technology and invention did not fully develop until World War II. They were not insensitive to the ghastly costs involved, but were still unable to grasp the political and humane difficulties of a strategy of almost pure attrition.

However, on both sides there were a few individuals who saw that one way to break the stalemate might be by an appeal to technology. On the German side the most outstanding innovation was the use of poison gas. On the Allied side the chief innovation was the tank. However, as many readers are aware, gaining acceptance for the use of tanks and poison gas was an uphill fight on each side. There was apathy, skepticism, and opposition. Perhaps not surprisingly, the people who developed the tank had better ideas of how to use it than the operators, at least for two years or so. Indeed it was not until the battle of Cambrai that the British used the tanks properly. Col. Swinton's memo had remained unread--or at least unused.

The Germans' use of poison gas is similar in many ways to that of the tank. Even after the weapons had been developed, the command did not wish to take the risk of using the untried weapon on a large scale, though the inventors urged it. It was first tried at Ypres on April 22, 1915, and proved a tremendous tactical success. In fact, a five-mile gap was opened in the Allied lines, but the Germans were not prepared to exploit the opportunity. They were merely trying an experiment and not prepared for a broad attack. The British reaction to the use of poison gas was very prompt.

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*Particularly with the clear examples of trench warfare that had occurred in the American Civil War and the Russo-Japanese War (which ended with the virtual stalemate of the battle of Mukden with machine-gun nests and miles of trenches and barbed wire). Furthermore, a pre-war edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica carried an article on war, by a Polish banker named Bloch, in which he predicted that such impasses would occur.

Within a fortnight the British army at the front was supplied with a rudimentary respirator. As fast as this reaction was, it would be too slow in a modern war, and it might even have been too late in World War I had the Germans been prepared to exploit their new weapon.

It is interesting to note that there were other ways to break the deadlock caused by trenches and machine gun than inventions and technology. Ludendorff introduced a new type of infiltration tactic in 1917, which, combined with the classical principle of surprise, proved successful in the 1918 offensive in penetrating the Allied lines to the furthest degree in the entire war. The new tactic came close to winning the war for the Germans; they were just too late in introducing it; by 1918 they lacked the resources to exploit the new tactic against the reinforced Allies.

In comparison with the old tactic of advancing in a straight line, the new tactic called for specially trained, heavily armed, picked troops to probe for weak spots in the enemy's line and to push through these weak spots. This did have the danger that the attacker had exposed flanks which might be pinched off by the defender, but it was assumed, and correctly, that in the confusion of the attack the defender would generally not be able to exploit this weakness of the attacker; that before the defender could organize a counterattack and cut off the penetrating troops, they would have had time to fan out and attack the bypassed troops from the rear. Since the new tactic was not so dependent on a lengthy preliminary artillery barrage it allowed the Germans to use surprise attack tactics. The Germans also developed the counter to this attack, which was to organize a defense in depth, a defense that did not care if it was penetrated.

The new tactic was not invented by the Germans. A French officer, a Captain Laffargue, had found out experimentally the value of the new tactic and had written a remarkably complete pamphlet on the new ideas. His ideas had no effect on the French or English, but a copy fell into the hands of the Germans, and according to Captain G. C. Wynne it was:

> ...the concise expression of a doctrine which exactly corresponded to the course they themselves had been trying to follow by cumbersome and slow degrees. The pamphlet was at once translated into German and issued as an official German training manual, eventually becoming the basis of General Ludendorff's textbook for 'the attack in position warfare.' It was with an elaboration of Captain Laffargue's doctrine of infiltration that the Germans so effectively broke through the British position in March 1918, and the Chemin des Dames position in May; and his ideas have remained the foundation of the German training manual for attack to this day.

Quoted by Herman Kahn in On Thermonuclear War, 2nd Edition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 357.

One can sympathize with the Allied and German high commands for wishing to test the new devices and learn about their capabilities and limitations and unsuspected weaknesses before gambling large resources on their working successfully. One can also sympathize with the inability of the Allied high command to pick up new ideas such as those put forth by Captain Laffargue. However, if the war had been terminated by negotiations by the end of 1917, a strange military situation would have existed. Military experts on both sides would have believed that they knew how to deal with the new obstacles, but they never would have been able to persuade anybody to accept their beliefs. The three years of stalemate and the masses of dead would have effectively refuted their theories. This refutation would have been particularly persuasive because each side had worked out different solutions. But this refutation would have been wrong.

It is our claim that exactly the same issue could and, in fact, has arisen with respect to insurgency warfare in Vietnam, and could easily arise in the case of a nuclear war of almost any size--whether limited to Europe or Asia, or involving the U.S. and Soviet heartlands. New tactics, in the case of the nuclear war at least, might mean the difference among annihilation, surrender, and/or an "acceptable" stalemate, or even a valid and clear victory.

3. The Effective Use of Well-Known Tactics and Current Resources--The Korean War

The last example we shall consider is the Korean war. In many ways this is the one which is most relevant to the current Vietnamese experience, or at least to recent Vietnamese experience.

When the Chinese intervened in November and December of 1950 they succeeded in inflicting some severe defeats on the United Nation's forces and toward the end of the year there was an almost uniform feeling of an approaching military disaster. MacArthur made clear his opinion that he could not fight with "one hand tied behind his back." He desired to bomb across the Yalu, bring in Chinese, reserves, etc. His local field commander, General Walker shared his opinion of looming defeat--as did all of the division commanders. Indeed so did the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Walker was killed in a jeep accident and General Ridgway was appointed to replace him. In seven weeks he had the United Nations army on the offensive. Then two months more regrouping and resupplying and then a final two months offensive and the previously victorious Chinese Army was almost totally destroyed. What did General Ridgway do in a matter of 16 weeks or so to change an almost total defeat into an almost total victory? Considering the previous precariousness of our military position in Korea, it would appear that the impossible had been accomplished. The obvious question is how did General Ridgway achieve this reversal? Perhaps the greatest value will be obtained by describing the situation at the time he took command of the Eighth Army, his analysis of the situation, and his methods for dealing with it, in his own words:*

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*Matthew B. Ridgway, General USA (Ret.), The Korean War (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967). As far as we can tell there is no serious written material casting doubt on the above statement being a reasonable account--See R. Wilson and L. Stephenson, "Ridgway's Leadership in Korea," HI-1198-DP.

The Corps and Division Commanders had made a show of complying with my instructions concerning the positioning of strong forces to permit powerfu' daylight counterattacks, but I found their efforts inadequate. Consequently we had lost many opportunities to inflict heavy losses on the foe, and I knew I was going to have to bear down hard to make sure no more such opportunities were wasted. While there was certainly no air of real defeatism in our ranks, there may have filtered down some of the feeling in GHQ, and in Washington too, that we might have to pull out of the Korean peninsula altogether. At the end of December the JCS informed MacArthur of their conclusions that the CCF were strong enough to force the United Nations out of Korea if they chose to apply their full strength. MacArthur, after the success of the Chinese New Year's offensive, agreed that if the JCS decisions stood unchanged--that we were to receive no major reinforcements, that there was to be no blockade of the Chinese coast, nor any air attack upon mainland China, no permission to bomb Manchurian bases, no "unleashing" of the Chinese Nationalist forces in Formosa--then, in the absence of overriding political considerations, "the command should be withdrawn from Korea just as rapidly as it is tactically possible to do so."...

The very first task I set myself was restoring the fighting spirit of the forces under my command. This meant, in addition to developing confidence in the commander's concern for the safety of every individual soldier, the recruitment of confidence in the soundness of the top commander's decisions. In combat, every unit commander is absorbed in the accomplishment of his own mission. Be he in command of a squad, a platoon, a company, or any unit all the way up to Corps, his assigned task requires all the professional competence, all the physical energy, and as much strength of spirit as he possesses. He has no time to concern himself with how the higher-ups are carrying out their assignments...

Ridgway then describes how, in effect, he both inspired and put pressure on the Army (including firing those who fell short in any way) to do all the things they had already been taught to do--to get off the roads, to avoid ridge lines when moving, to send out patrols, to lay ambushes, to take prisoners, to take the high ground, to fight at night, to maintain contact with the enemy, etc. He then ordered an offensive.

...But this advance would be far different from the reckless and uncoordinated plunge toward the Yalu. Now all ground forces would be under a single command, with all major units mutually supporting, and the entire Army under tight control. We started rolling forward on January 25 and the Eighth Army soon proved itself to be what I knew already it could become: as fine a fighting field army as our country had yet produced.

...During Operation Kipper, which opened on March 7, 1951, the 1st Battalion of the ROK 2nd Regiment annihilated an enemy battalion without losing a single man. A patrol having discovered an enemy concentration in front of the 1st Company, Major Lee Hong Sun, commanding the ROK battalion, ordered a surprise attack that was to be a double envelopment. The first company was to attack from the front while the second attacked from the left and the third from the right. The enemy detected the maneuver and attempted to withdraw, whereupon Major Sun ordered an immediate attack. The ROK troops themselves were astonished at the swiftness of their advance. Inexorably, they pushed ahead, mowing the enemy down unmercifully and sustaining no casualties of their own. When the fighting was over, 231 enemy dead lay on the field and the ROK battalion had taken a great store of functioning equipment, including four artillery pieces and seven mortars....

The operation met with swift and complete success, with hardly a single casualty. And it brought just the results I had hoped for--and which I had outlined to the gathered war correspondents the night before: By pointing a dagger at the enemy's heart-line, actually at the brain of the enemy commander, it forced him to choose between attacking us at tremendous disadvantage to himself (inasmuch as we controlled the high ground) or abandoning the South Korean capital. On March 14, a patrol from the ROK 1st Division was sent across the Han River west of Seoul to feel out the defenses of the city. It moved north for several miles before it drew any hostile fire. That night another patrol probed the outer defenses of the city and found them nearly abandoned. On the morning of March 15, the Eighth Army moved in and once more raised the ROK flag over the ancient and battered city....

I found occasion earlier, at the command conference just before Operation Ripper had been completed, to emphasize to all Corps and Division Commanders that official reports to the Army Commander should be specific in giving the locations and movements of all friendly units. Vague and carelessly worded reports, without dates, without times, without circumstantial details--weather, number of observers, etc.,-- could lead to foul-ups as serious as any that might be caused by enemy action. As an instance, I told the conference of observing a heavy attack by friendly planes upon a hill mass just north of Uijongbu that lasted all the time I was in the air in the vicinity--about fifteen or twenty minutes. Yet when I returned to my command post, I found a report by the I Corps that the 187th Airborne had been in possession of that hill all afternoon.

I recalled too a report from the IX Corps, 25th Division, to the effect that "Elements of the 5th Infantry were counterattacked and withdrew." No details at all. And when I did learn the facts, it developed that what had really happened was not a counterattack but merely an advance by a company-sized unit of the 5th Infantry against a hill and a withdrawal under fire, on the personal order of the Division Commander, who wanted to put artillery and airstrikes on the hostile forces there.

This sort of slipshod reporting, indicative of complacency, or inadequate supervision, or insufficient staff visits to front-line units was unforgivable in my book. If I was to maintain proper control of this army, reports to my headquarters were to be complete, truthful, and specific, with no glossing over of unpleasant facts and with sufficient details included to enable me to draw swift and proper conclusions.

I also bore down hard on the need for prompt launching of attacks, and for immediate reporting of when attacks were launched. Maximum coordination meant maximum adherence to official time table and direction. Like the football coach who drills his linemen to charge Together! Together! Together! I insisted that my commanders adhere strictly to schedule and maintain the direction of the attack. I knew that more attacks failed from neglect to maintain direction than from all other reasons combined. Power applied in the wrong direction could vitiate the whole effect of the action, as a wrongly directed drive by one wrestler against another can do the attacker himself more damage than it does the man attacked.

Communication was also accorded a top importance in all my planning. I wanted no more units reported "out of communication" for any extended period. We had liaison aircraft, with personnel specifically trained to pick up and drop messages. I once more urged a return to the methods of our ancestors: using runners, or smoke signals. I ordered my commanders to make a careful study of their instructions concerning the relaying of messages.

We also had to remain ready and alert in the event of an enemy parachute drop into our rear areas--a very real danger and a move of which the Chinese were entirely capable. This was a form of attack each unit commander had to be prepared for, within his designated area, just as he was responsible for meeting any kind of ground attack in a carefully marked out section of the area assigned to his Corps or Division. I ordered each major unit to divide up its area, right back to the rear boundaries, so that every unit commander knew exactly what ground was his to defend against attack of any sort.

Preparations like this were to pay priceless dividends in coming operations. The system of maintaining close contact with supporting units, of advancing on phase lines, and of buttoning up at night to prevent infiltration, kept us from falling into traps the enemy laid for us and enabled us to blunt the power of his final massive assault when it came. I urged upon each unit commander the importance of learning to strike a balance between boldness in moving to destroy the enemy forces and caution in conserving his own As in every forward movement, there were always occasions for rapid exploitation of sudden successes To seize these opportunities, while taking care never to render our forces unable to meet sudden serious threats from enemy action or weather changes--that was a problem requiring imagination and forethought

Obviously, within a short time General Ridgway was able to change a situation of near collapse of our defensive stand to one of active and successful offense. His main technique was simply to see to it that the troops fought at least as well as the manuals they had been trained on. This is a continuing problem in warfare. For many reasons standards of performance often deteriorate in peace time. In this case, there is more than a good chance that, if events had proceeded routinely, the U.S. Army would have been evacuated from South Korea and a world-wide belief would have been created that it was basically impossible for a Western--or at least a U.S.--army to beat a Communist Chinese army in conventional battle. The belief would have become established that Communist Chinese morale, élan, dedication, skill, discipline, devotion, endurance, etc., were simply too much for Western armies--or at least American armies--to handle.

The fact that this was precluded by an apparently unpredictable and fortuitous circumstance gives rise to a number of questions that involve fundamental issues of significance to U.S. foreign and military policies, and are most particularly relevant to considerations of the Vietnamese war and perhaps similar wars, of greater or lesser scale, in the future. We present this list below:

What would have been the outcome of the War if General Ridgway had not been called to command of the U.N. forces? There appears to be no indication that General MacArthur or the JCS considered General Walker's performance less than satisfactory or that they intended to replace him. But had he been in command would we have returned to the offensive?

If we had been pushed back to Pusan, or--perhaps as a result of a collapse of the South Korean forces--forced out of Korea, because Ridgway did not come in to make the improvements he did, who would have realized how different a result would have been possible by merely increasing the competence of the military leadership?

Would a defeat resulting from failure to carry out Ridgway's reforms have been ascribed to such things as "the invincibility of Chinese hordes," "the impossibility of successful U.S. military action on the mainland of Asia," "the foolishness of trying to fight a limited war," "the failure to unleash Chiang Kai-shek," or would it have been ascribed to a failure of military leadership?

What would the chances of our using nuclear weapons in Korea have been had we been pushed back down to Pusan and found ourselves in danger of being thrown off the peninsula entirely? Does this suggest anything about the relationship between the need for nuclear weapons and military competence and leadership?

General MacArthur maintained that major reinforcements or a direct attack on Communist China was necessary to maintain the allied presence in South Korea. His estimate turned out to be incorrect How should civilian decision makers feel about such arguments in similar situations? Did General MacArthur lose any credibility among his admirers or among professional observers? Shouldn't people be "keeping score"?

Do the conditions that Ridgway found on taking command suggest that some of the North Korean territory given up in the rapid retreat before he took over need not have been lost? (For these and related issues the previous chapter of Ridgway's book, or other histories of the Korean War, can be consulted.) How much subsequent history would have been different if the U.N. had ended the war with a substantial part of North Korea?

General Ridgway made numerous changes in operations in the first few weeks after he arrived in order to correct what appeared to him to be obvious failures to observe sound military practice. There appears to be little question that his changes brought substantial improvements in performance and morale. But why is it that these deficiencies and their repair do not play a larger part in most analyses of the Korean War?

How much discussion of the Korean War has been devoted to the quality of U.S. military leadership and its effects on the course of the war (apart from the issue of MacArthur's decision to expose his forces in an attempt to rapidly occupy all of North Korea and his failure to anticipate the Chinese intervention)? Does Ridgway's experience suggest that more attention should be paid to this issue?

Is it possible that in other situations involving the real or potential use of military force, the question of military competence ought to receive attention as one of the fundamental issues?

Has anything been done to try to insure that the kind of situation that Ridgway found when he took command not happen again? Does the common failure to recognize the nature and importance of the changes that Ridgway accomplished increase the chance that the mistakes that Ridgway found will be made again?

Do the circumstances that brought Ridgway to command suggest a problem in insuring that our forces have adequate command?

C. Steps Toward Better Understanding of Tactics and Strategy

The diverse questions just presented are obviously not aimed at the single area of either tactics or strategy; nor are they addressed to a single office--executive, military or civilian. They make it remarkably clear that tactics, strategy, policy, and national goals are not independent issues. We have included them to indicate the need for decision-makers to be willing to combine efforts, whatever their office, and to be willing to openly discuss all levels.

Recognizing this, let us contrast current attitudes towards tactics with current attitudes towards force postures and strategic issues. Strategy and posture do have important apparent and "felt" relationships to

various prewar and wartime objectives. Therefore there is a much greater tendency, though still inadequate, for senior staffs and decision-makers to examine and debate these areas and issues--even to make recommendations or decisions. Everybody concedes the right and obligation of the Executive Office and of OSD to examine, debate, influence, and even make decisions on both strategy and posture. For one thing, these decisions when made, whoever makes them, have consequences that everybody can feel and/or see--which in turn means that some of the immediate consequences are political.

Therefore, for the most simple and straightforward of political reasons (these decisions can create or exacerbate, or alleviate political issues in a very direct cause-effect manner), as well as for reasons of effectiveness and guidance, decision-makers and their staffs must be deeply concerned with such things as physical capabilities and declaratory strategies. But tactics and skill, and the potential consequences of various tactics or degrees of skill, are less obvious; their adequacy or inadequacy are almost impossible for many military and civilian professionals, much less laymen, to judge. Furthermore, tactical decisions and operational skills are often highly classified and, if not classified, are at least esoteric and otherwise difficult to be informed on fully. (Several of the authors of this volume have spent almost full time on the Vietnamese war but still find it difficult to learn what is happening in detail in various districts and to what extent over-all plans, over-all concepts, and over-all beliefs of senior headquarters reflect the realities of the local situation.)

While tactical decisions and operational skills and the consequences thereof may not easily be understood or evaluated, and may not be seen or felt, they can be overwhelmingly important. As mentioned in Chapter I of Part II, in the discussion of levels of analysis, a basic national security policy is as likely to founder or questions of detail as on any of the more grand and higher levels of analysis. We have also pointed out that this issue (which in Part II we relegated to the 6th and 7th levels of analysis) is becoming increasingly important; that it is exactly the issue of skill and effectiveness that may dominate the possibilities for success and failure of most policies. All of these factors have been important in the past, but as noted, it seems likely that new criteria, involving issues of acceptance by domestic and international publics are going to become increasingly important.

These issues of acceptability could simply mean trying to select policies which we know we can implement effectively and to avoid policies raising major doubts about our ability; or even more cautiously, to avoid policies raising any serious uncertainty. Such criteria would also require improving our ability to invent new tactics and policies, and becoming sufficiently skilled in implementing both these new and appropriate older policies and tactics effectively--even in a new political/moral/morale/technological environment of the future. Whichever approach is chosen, clearly a great deal of creativity, good judgment, and a relatively careful and accurate evaluation of our ability to implement the selected policies and tactics

will be required. At least until satisfactory doctrines can be worked out (so that one can then relegate tactical issues back once more to the sixth level of analysis) we strongly recommend not only greater discussion of tactics, but a much greater willingness on the part of military professionals to bring "outsiders" into the discussion.

This could be a most costly process--costly in time, prestige, feelings, and in the possibility for mistakes--and could lead to many other difficulties. However, not to do this seems to be an almost certain recipe for disaster--whether because the decisions are then more or less arbitrarily imposed by "ignorant" civilians from the top and do not take sufficient account of the military realities--or because they are treated as narrow and parochial professional military concerns, so that we get a narrow and parochial product. The kind of discussion we are advocating is almost certain to lead to a kind of reexamination, which, if pursued in some depth or some intensity, is in turn likely to lead to a real improvement in plans, programs, policies, and, most important of all, in actual implementation and execution if such implementation and execution were ever called for.

It would seem to us, however, that there are a number of new requirements here. The professional military themselves are going to have to be less subject to such difficulties as "trained incapacity" and the "powerlessness of the powerful" (see discussion in Chapter III of Part I), more willing to "enter into dialogue," and more willing to educate and be educated, etc. In particular, they need to have a better understanding generally of what the "real" issues are and to be able to communicate their own views on these issues to their civilian superiors, civilian colleagues, and in many cases to the general public. They will probably need to be more willing to justify themselves and much more willing to allow--with good grace--for the Executive Office and OSD to "check up on them." Finally, under what seems to us to be the likely future, they will need much greater skill in the give and take of interdepartmental and public debate in order to defend properly their own points of view and their own interests.

This last is in sense improper. The United States governmental system tends to operate in such a way that if special interests do not present and defend adequately their own point of view, no one else does, and those interests and perspectives--even if they are important to the nation as a whole--will be either unrepresented or, important as they may be in the over-all national strategy, badly presented and badly defended. Possibly most important (and possibly most aggravating to the professional military) there seems to be a very serious necessity for the Executive Office itself to have--if necessary, to create--a much greater level of independent skill on these narrow and technical issues so that it can have sufficient confidence to make decisions--and then later, as events unfold--either to hold to or to change these decisions.

It is, of course, equally important for the civilians to do their homework--and, if they hope to have a major and constructive influence, serious research and thought as well. But on the civilian side of the house the tactics of either insurgency war or a European or Asian nuclear war are almost as remote from current serious consideration and reconsideration as are nuclear tactics for central war. In the last two cases, of course, it is easy to understand the lack of interest and expertise. Nuclear tactics, or the implementation of nuclear war plans, would be important only if deterrence failed--a somehow "unthinkable" occurrence. In addition, if the only possible result were Apocalypse then the details are indeed unimportant. As a result, nuclear tactics are almost certain to remain remote and hypothetical to most--and even to full-time professionals who are also afflicted with what Raymond Aron has called "nuclear incredulity."

All of this indeed makes it most difficult to take seriously the need to think through--to the end--some of the possibilities that may arise if deterrence fails. Thus there are many conscientious, responsible, intelligent individuals who would not be satisfied with any obvious (conceptual or actual) lack of understanding of any topic in an area in which they are working or have responsibilities, except for the area of nuclear war. These individuals often become annoyed when anyone attempts to "force" such discussion on them. What seems much less explainable (and sometimes less forgivable) is a similar disinterest and apathy when it comes to much more plausible issues such as European or Asian war--or even the most plausible issue of all--insurgency war.

We end this section by emphasizing once more that many major strategic and national policy issues are almost impossible to discuss seriously without analyzing current tactics and their alternatives in a somewhat more detailed, expert, and creative fashion than is customary. (Even though such relatively detailed, expert, and creative discussion might still be relatively "superficial," it need not be so superficial as to be seriously inadequate to the needs of policy analysts and policy makers.) In the absence of such discussion, a startling number of our programs are going to founder or at least be seriously defective and inadequate--either in fact or potentially--on exactly this issue of improper or ineffective tactics and/or improper or ineffective implementation.

D. Alternative Central War Strategies for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.*

U.S.-S.U. central war strategies usually in essence express relationships between the two superpowers and therefore characterize interacting and relative military postures and intentions, rather than absolute

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*The six strategic postures listed in this section, and the discussion of each, is taken directly from a recent Hudson-sponsored study reported in Comments on the Future of Strategy by Herman Kahn (HI-1089-P, September 1968); we believe that the importance of a clear conceptual understanding and framework for discussion of strategic postures justifies this repetition. Other ideas and discussion in this chapter overlap a few other Hudson studies, when a reference seems appropriate, it is indicated.

postures. One side or the other can attempt to achieve a given strategic position and yet not succeed if the other carries through adequate (or even less than "adequate") measures.

In the 1950's there were three rather well understood strategic positions held in the American government which we may associate roughly with the three services. The Navy leaned toward what we can call a Finite Deterrence position, arguing that all the United States needed for a satisfactory central war capability was a reliable ability to destroy a fixed number of Soviet civilian targets. Once we had this our strategic objectives would be met, and our remaining military energy and resources could be devoted to other kinds of forces. We interpreted this Finite Deterrence posture as an assured capability, against any Soviet defense, to retaliate against a predetermined Soviet provocation with countervalue attacks against a definite number of Soviet cities. Normally the "predetermined provocation" would be a major attack on the United States or its forces, but sometimes it has been held to include an attack on U.S. allies (former Secretary McNamara defined "finite deterrence" in this latter extended way). Some analysts or officials formulated the position in a more flexible way, but at the risk of some injustice to them we consider their modifications below, under the rubric "mostly finite deterrence."

Finite Deterrence in its pure form often includes emphasis on arms control, and responds relatively well to various problems: political, social and moral, as well as military and budgetary costs; technological infeasibility or difficulty in achieving more complex capabilities; and political acceptability. Finite Deterrence is both simple and non-aggressive.

During the same period the Army tended to support a strategy which we can call "deterrence plus insurance" (it might also be described as a "medium damage limiting posture"). This took seriously the possibility that deterrence could fail and concluded that more than a simple deterrence capability was required. If the "insurance" is measured by an ability to

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"To deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States and its allies by maintaining, continuously, a highly reliable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single aggressor, or combination of aggressors, at any time during the course of a strategic nuclear exchange, even after absorbing a surprise first strike.

As long as deterrence of a deliberate Soviet (or Red Chinese) nuclear attack upon the United States or its allies is the overriding objective of our strategic forces, the capability for Assured Destruction must receive the first call on all of our resources and must be provided regardless of the costs and the difficulties involved. Damage limiting programs, no matter how much we spend on them, can never substitute for an Assured Destruction capability in the deterrent role. It is our ability to destroy an attacker as a viable twentieth century nation that provides the deterrent, not our ability to partially limit damage to ourselves." (Emphasis added; Statement of former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1968-72 Defense Program and 1968 Defense Budget.)

withstand strain in an intense crisis, one might want some overdesign in the strategic forces. One might also want insurance, in the case of deterrence falling, in the form of damage-limiting or war-surviving capabilities. Army spokesmen usually would argue that the massive retaliation capability should be used not only in case of large attacks on the United States or its strategic forces but also in case of a full-scale Soviet attack on Europe. However, for anything less than a strategic nuclear attack in Europe--for example, conventional war or limited tactical nuclear war--the Army wanted adequate limited war forces. It held that the use of strategic nuclear forces would not be credible against smaller-scale aggressions.

Many in the Air Force seem to have argued for what we may call a "credible first strike capability." In this strategy the United States could give commitments and guarantees which implied a U.S. first strike (perhaps combining counterforce and countervalue tactics) in the case of Soviet agression. These United States guarantees would be credible and deterring because of very large military capabilities and because of its great "resolve" (an extremely firm and almost automatic commitment to attack in the case of provocation) and because of the foreign policy--and other--costs of failing to fulfill our commitment. This strategy was, of course, associated with the so-called massive retaliation policy, in which "massive retaliation" could occur at a time and place of our own choosing.

The assumptions and attitudes underlying all three of these positions have been somewhat weakened by events since the 1950's, although they still have their advocates. The main points in these strategies are, however, included variously in the following six strategic postures, any one of which could be defended as reasonable and prudent.

1. Mostly Finite Deterrence (MFD)
2. Partial Damage Limiting (PDL)
3. Arms Control and Defense Emphasis (ACD)
4. Deterrence Plus Insurance (DI)
5. Expanded Insurance (EI)
6. Not Incredible Counterforce First Strike (NCF)

They are ordered here in terms of increasing use of central war threats for positive foreign policy purposes, though this obviously is to some degree a matter of avoiding complexities.

1. Mostly Finite Deterrence

This is a less stark form of Finite Deterrence. It emphasizes adequate retaliatory capability almost, but not entirely, to the exclusion of all other issues. The system would also be designed so that there would be no unnecessary collateral damage if the opponent launched a counterforce attack against the United States. While there is no serious attempt to deny hostages to the opponent, there is an attempt to make avoidance and constraint feasible. It also has (by comparison with the 1950's) strong command and

control and survival capabilities. If deterrence failed, the United States could use a nuclear talionic or reciprocal reprisal to be followed by an ad hoc cease fire, though this is by no means assured--the threat of eruption would always be present.

2. Partial Damage Limiting

This posture is very close to Mostly Finite Deterrence, but is more concerned with the possibility of deterrence failing and/or nuclear blackmail. While it also emphasizes sensitivity to the constraints of budgets and the détente, and to the dangers of arms race, it wants "hedges" and some insurance, and to preserve at least a façade of extended deterrence capability so as to make credible strategic guarantees and some degree of escalation assurance or dominance, but it would do this cheaply and within limits determined by political (and financial) constraints.

3. Arms Control and Defense Emphasis

Adherents of this position usually hold that the deliberate use of civilians as hostages (implied in most other central war strategies) is basically undesirable and should play as small a role as possible, even if such a policy is intended to further arms control and stability. They argue further that if the two superpowers are without defenses then any state which can procure one or two dozen protected missiles, and thus be able to threaten five or ten cities, becomes a "superpower." This is prevented if both superpowers have complex active defense systems. Adherents of this posture also assume that arms control is more feasible and more effective if there is some balance between offense and defense, e.g., that on the one hand control of offensive arms can be made to work if there is enough active and/or passive defense available to alleviate the uncertainties and to hedge against disaster, while active and/or passive defenses can be made to work if the offense is limited. This posture may heavily emphasize defense at the expense of offense. Its adherents argue that to the extent that the harm an enemy can do is limited by our defense our need for basic deterrence is reduced and, perhaps more importantly, to the extent that our deterrence is based on our enemy's calculation of the relative damage in a war, our defense serves as deterrence.

4. Deterrence Plus Insurance

This takes very seriously the possibility that deterrence may fail. It argues that more deterrence may be required than ordinarily is believed because deterrence is really measured by the ability to withstand strain in an intense crisis. Even then deterrence can still fail, and this position accordingly includes some war-fighting and war-surviving capability, providing more options for a controlled response than the Mostly Finite Deterrence policy. As suggested earlier this posture can be thought of as being a "Medium Damage Limiting" posture.

5. Expanded Insurance

This can be considered an even more prudent position than DI. It offers even stronger deterrence with more emphasis on the need to cope with intense crises. It may also include a capability for initiating Preventive War if desperate circumstances--such as the rise of a new Hitler--required the nation to weigh "unthinkable" appeasement against "unthinkable" war. Finally it emphasizes acquiring emergency capabilities and mobilization programs but does not attempt--in normal times--to obtain foreign policy advantages from these.

6. Not Incredible Counterforce First Strike

Although this posture attempts to perpetuate a capability which would underwrite the current American system of explicit and implicit strategic guarantees, and tries to maintain some degree of preventive war potential, it is one of the weakest of the explicit extended deterrence strategies. Its most important quality is that it would try to secure and keep central war forces competent to achieve at least some high degree of escalation assurance--but not necessarily escalation dominance--in a crisis. The emphasis is as much on the term "not incredible" as on the term "counterforce first strike."

E. Special Comments on "Deterrence"

Since strategic "deterrence" has played so central a role in U.S. strategic thinking over the last two decades, and is likely to continue to play a major role at least through the 1975-85 decade, the subject perhaps warrants some supplementary discussion in this chapter. "Deterrence" has various ramifications which military planners may need to consider in the future, e.g., non-nuclear deterrence, and deterrence of actions by "smaller" countries.

What we may label "basic deterrence" is a most familiar strategic problem, and it is useful to review the structure of this problem briefly before commenting on possible changes in strategic issues in relation to deterrence in the next 5 to 15 years. Deterrence became in the post-World War II period dominant among strategic concepts because the destructive power of nuclear weapons made countries vulnerable even when their armies were undefeated and their shores unattacked. Since we could not count on physically stopping an enemy from killing our population and destroying our physical assets once the power to cause large-scale destruction could be packaged in less than a ton, we had to base our security substantially upon dissuading potential enemies from hurting us. The simple strategy inevitably chosen was to threaten potential enemies with retaliation to convince them that they dare not attack us.

Having settled on deterrence as a basic strategy, the discussion then turned to aspects of its implementation; how much harm we could (or needed to) cause the enemy, and the technical problems of insuring that we could retaliate at the chosen level or higher. There was also significant discussion of "the credibility question"--the problem of making sure a potential enemy will be deterred from attacking because he really believes we would retaliate. Generally this discussion of credibility focused on cases involving attack on a U.S. ally, rather than on the United States itself. It has been widely assumed that we would retaliate after a major attack on the United States and that an enemy would indeed expect such retaliation if he were not physically able to prevent it. These simple concepts of deterrence will probably be as relevant in the seventies and eighties as in the fifties and sixties.

Probably the major change in discussions and thinking about deterrence in the future (although fundamentally it will not necessarily be a big change) involves the possibility of more extensive strategic defenses on the part of one or both sides. If the Soviet Union and the United States spend on their strategic defenses in the next 20 years as much as they have spent in the last 30 years--and particularly if the United States division of effort between strategic offense and defense becomes more nearly like that of the Soviet Union--then quantitative deterrence calculations may begin to shift toward the fatality numbers that existed in the early fifties, although more symmetrically. That is, the United States will be able to kill, say, 5-50 million Russians and the Soviet Union about the same number of Americans. There is a possibility that fatalities from nuclear attacks might be very much less than we have become accustomed to thinking about in recent years.

This represents, however, a situation different from the early fifties in several ways. Most important is that the Soviets will have the ability to kill very many Americans, if our defenses don't work and if their attacks do. There will also be calculations for various circumstances that will indicate much higher damage levels on either or both sides. Thus, between the superpowers, if the seventies and eighties are a period in which substantial strategic defenses have been constructed, quantitative uncertainties about deterrence will loom larger than before. Substantial uncertainties about the outcomes of nuclear wars have always existed, but in the recent years most thinking has been dominated by the notion of unopposed missile strikes against undefended targets, and there was insignificant doubt about the quantitative effectiveness of strategic attacks.

Other major changes in thinking about deterrence might involve new levels of subtlety and sophistication regarding the credibility considerations of Type II deterrence; and also some integration of thinking about warfighting and deterrence.

For a while, and to some extent today, people believed and asserted with emphasis and confidence that the United States could reliably be expected to retaliate with a major strike against the Soviet Union if the

Soviets launched a major conventional or nuclear attack against our allies in Europe. But increasingly people have come to believe that the central issue in deterrence is not the physical ability to deliver destruction but the need to convince the enemy that it will in fact be delivered. As the Soviet Union has increased its ability to damage the United States even in a second strike, more people have come to doubt whether or not the United States could be counted on to retaliate against an attack on our allies in Europe. It may be necessary to distinguish more clearly for many purposes between attacks on the United States and attacks on foreign and allied territory--although, of course, we might not want to emphasize these distinctions to potential enemies--or even allies.

We have seen that there are circumstances in which we are willing to accept attacks on merican ships and airplanes on the high seas without retaliation. We may need to take into account the possibility that the Soviet Union, in some conceivable circumstances, might believe that she could get away with certain kinds of attacks on the United States without adequate American retaliation. This means that we may have to think through what kinds of (political and) strategic war plans the Soviets might make against us. These plans might involve the combination of a political or political-military objective (presumably a desperate and perhaps defensive one), some form of limited strike designed to advance that objective, and a combination of steps (threats, strengthened defenses, etc.) to protect them (the Soviets) against retaliation. The threats and other efforts and indeed the retaliation the Soviets would be willing to risk would depend upon the circumstances and what they needed to accomplish. All would depend on the scenario; but when and if developments portend less certain retaliation against the Soviets, military planners should perhaps enlarge their range of scenarios. This certainly would occur if the Soviets achieved any significant degree of superiority--and perhaps occurs to a degree today when they have achieved a significant degree of parity.

One of the occasionally noted and perhaps most significant reasons for having substantial active U.S. ballistic missile defenses is that it is then harder for the Soviets to construct high-confidence war plans. This is, of course, not only a matter of calculations and rational analysis; it is also a matter of atmosphere and psychology. Some people believe that the world will be more dangerous if the U.S. President can imagine nuclear war as leading to anything but the destruction of the nation. They may be right, but it can also be argued that the dangers of this apocalyptic view, from the point of view of preserving the peace and of protecting U S. interests, has been underestimated, and the dangers of keeping the President terrorized in crises have been underestimated.

The relatively recent North Korean attacks on one U.S. ship and one airplane stimulate thinking about the problem of deterring small countries in the seventies and eighties. These attacks emphasize, of course, the point that deterrence is not only a matter of ability to retaliate. There is no question of the ability of the United States to cause virtually any degree of destruction in North Korea that we desired to. Some questions about retaliation in the Korean or similar cases are:

(1) Is it necessary and/or desirable?

(2) What kind of retaliation is appropriate?

(3) What responses could be expected from the object of our retaliation or others?

(4) How would the decision-making process on such an issue work in a democracy?

(5) What should be the timing of retaliation?

One of the reasons for our failure to retaliate against Korea, although it has not been discussed very explicitly, is probably some awareness of the difference between retaliating against a single enemy, and against an enemy that is seen as one of a large number of potential enemies (or sources of military provocation) Of course, it can be argued that the fact that many countries have the physical power to destroy American ships and planes is precisely the reason that we need to retaliate for the Korean attacks. But we have been confronted with what seemed in many ways a new game, and we have probably not yet decided by what rules we would play or even what our objectives and principles of behavior should be.

As more countries get nuclear weapons (if they do) or if the United States seems willing to accept provocations and attacks by smaller countries, a strategy of deterrence against small power attacks may be a matter of increasing concern for military planners. This will surely be part of an over-all strategy. That is, we will protect against attacks by "Koreas" partly by the way in which we respond to or talk about our response to attacks from other countries, and partly by our position on these issues in forums such as the United Nations. Of course, actions will probably always speak louder than words, but actions are likely to occur subtly and in complex circumstances and words are spoken in advance. From a military standpoint, we would probably need to emphasize physical capabilities for flexibility in choice of targets, reliability of prediction of the results of attacks, controllability of collateral damage, and an over-all need for being able to accomplish "surgical" military operations.

F. Concluding Observations on Tactics and Strategy

In the two preceding sections we have considered various strategic postures and briefly reviewed some of the (past, present, and future) complexities of "deterrence." Finite and simple deterrence has many advantages that we have noted. But finite deterrence happens, most of us believe, to be dangerous, both as a picture of the world and with regard to the strategic posture it leads to. We would argue that while pure finite deterrence is unacceptable any one of the following six strategies, as elaborated in Section D above in a different order, could be taken seriously as a possibility for the United States today

1. Mostly Finite Deterrence
2. Partial Damage Limiting
3. Deterrence Plus Insurance
4. Not Incredible Counterforce First Strike
5. Expanded Insurance
6. Arms Control and Defense Emphasis

We would be prepared to defend any one of them as practical, feasible, and fulfilling the national interests of the United States. The choices among the strategies are based mainly upon subtle differences in assumptions and values and not on rigorously objective considerations. (We might note with some regret that the list is ordered in terms of declining political feasibility and, in our judgment, increasing desirability. However, the first four are in the range of practical political discussion.)

What we would urge most strongly is that the United States must choose a strategy by making an overall analysis and not by "muddling through." That the choice must be made by clear decision and overall plan and concept is one of the most important changes that has occurred since World War II. If we accept only incremental or gradual changes or muddling through, we will almost certainly end by choosing one of the first two strategies, or some other form of relatively simple deterrence. As we suggested earlier, this may be one of the major reasons variations of finite deterrence enjoy such widespread popularity in the West.

Especially, we wish to offer some comments about the Arms Control and Defense Emphasis posture. Its advocates often try to make clear that defense is not necessarily antithetical to arms control. In fact, if one had to choose between a strategic balance in which a number of countries were allowed to have very large defense budgets, possibly as large as they wished, but with severe limits on the offense, or one in which there were large offense budgets but very severe limits on defense, the first alternative should be preferable for a number of reasons. The most important of these are (1) It is very cheap to get into the offense business if there is no defense, therefore, with some caveats (which may easily be neglected) any nation can become a nuclear power and may be tempted to do so. (2) If deterrence fails and there is war, the amount of damage will be significantly limited. (3) It is much more difficult to indulge in nuclear blackmail if one has a small offense and the opponent has a large defense. (4) There remains probably more than enough deterrence for normal situations, since nobody is actually going to believe the calculations or, probably, as a practical matter, be willing to risk rocking the boat very seriously. On the other hand, if the

situation is abnormal--if a country tries "rational or irrational" attacks--resistance to these is likely to be much more credible.

No concluding discussion of future tactics strategy would be complete without some comment on the future of guerrilla warfare and its interactions with higher forms of violence. There are many reasons (discussed earlier in this report) for believing that increasingly, around the world, various disaffected groups may be inclined to use violence to achieve their objectives. These include racial, ethnic, or religious minorities, nativist movements, some kinds of populist movements, student groups, Castro-type guerrillas, various political groups, and even groups which are more bandits than political. One can argue that, at least for a time and to some degree, the seemingly more stable a society, and the more permissive and economically successful it is, the more likely it is to experience anarchic movements of various sorts. But these, of course, are a far cry from the kind of guerrilla warfare being waged now in South Vietnam. It does not seem likely that guerrilla war of this intensity will be very common in the future. One requirement of such a war is a group of people as dedicated, competent, disciplined, and "manic" as the Viet Minh or Viet Cong. Another requirement is suitable geography, such as jungles or mountains. A possible third, some of us believe, may be a certain kind of mismanagement by the large, intervening power.

One could, of course, have a much lower level of war. For example, it is very likely that Czechoslovakia will resist the Soviet occupation with "good soldier Schweik" techniques, but this will not prevent the satisfaction of many Soviet objectives, as well as a good deal of ad hoc cooperation with the Soviets. We may or may not wish to think of such passive resistance as a kind of low-level guerrilla war.

One of the real nightmares associated with these "low-level" wars is the possible use of advanced technology by the insurgents (Chapter II of Part III of this report also notes this possibility.) There seem to be extraordinary possibilities here. At least in the United States, technical people characteristically ask questions of the form "What if somebody tries to...?"--"What then?" This, of course, is not the current style of guerrilla warriors, who are ordinarily not technologically trained nor technologically imaginative. Up to now, well-educated and technologically trained people have been far likelier to be members of the establishment than insurgents. But increasingly it seems possible that technical intellectuals may be co-opted into one or more kinds of violent movements. While it is not difficult to imagine the kinds of things that could then happen, we do not think it would be appropriate to furnish any illustrations.

Let us conclude our discussion of tactics and strategy by considering what is sometimes called the "powerlessness of the powerful"--but

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There are other reasons why the Arms Control and Defense posture could be a good one, but we cannot go into them here. For some discussion of these see John J. Holst and William Schneider, Jr. (eds.), Why ABM? Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy, New York, Pergamon Press, 1969), particularly articles by D. G. Brennan and H. Kahn.

is a very special kind of impotence. It is often a self-deterrence which rests on unwillingness to offend public opinion or upset some modus vivendi between one power and another. If a nation is willing to accept a great deal of unpopularity this self-deterrence could virtually disappear.

This "self-deterrence" may have complex aspects. Consider a situation, for example, in which one of the medium powers has a moderately large force of, say, 100 missiles and 100 bombers, neither of which could be guaranteed to penetrate a superpower's defenses but which might penetrate the defenses. Conceivably the superpower might then launch a very large attack and with very high reliability destroy its opponent's 100 missiles and the 100 bombers on the ground. However, as we have pointed out above in our discussion of the possible utility of small nuclear forces, that would be a very large attack and it is very hard to imagine any plausible crisis which would justify destruction of such magnitude. On the other hand, the superpower might be deterred from a very small attack on the medium power because it could not then feel secure that the medium power could not retaliate and, as the French say, "tear off an arm." Thus the superpower could be "self-deterred" from making an annihiliating attack, while deterred by fear of retaliation from making a small attack. (But it is important to remember self-deterrence is only self-deterrence.)

There is another reason for what might be called the "powerlessness of the powerful," and this operates not only between superpowers and small to medium powers but between, for example, the trustees of universities and their dissident students. There is a very real tendency for the powerful not to think through new problems. The powerful are, by and large, no less intelligent than the powerless, but they know that power can usually be used to rescue them from the consequences of their mistakes. In general, they simply do not feel under pressure to become ingenious, daring, imaginative, courageous, or innovative. The powerless, if they are not too neurotic, are very clear about the fact that they cannot get away with much through sheer megatonnage, or millions of people, or billions of dollars. They have to be clever, ingenious, daring, innovative, and use all kinds of "jiu-jitsu." Under these circumstances the powerful may lose the competition because the other side has in fact circumscribed, avoided, or otherwise nullified their power.

On the other hand, these difficulties of the powerful may be overcome once they become apparent enough. For example, many of us believe it is not the existence of huge stocks of megaton weapons that prevents the United States from winning in South Vietnam, but poor tactics and strategies instead. Resources of 30 billion dollars a year and hundreds of thousands of men are being invested in that war. While there is self-deterrence from major escalation, there is no self-deterrence on the level at which the war is being fought--just ineffectiveness stemming in part perhaps from a kind of over-confidence of the powerful.

This particular ineffectiveness in counterinsurgency and Vietnam-type wars may be lessened or removed in the future. For one thing there are many kinds of new techniques becoming available, such as barrier technology, sophisticated gun ships, computerized population control, night vision and other detectors. (See the discussion and chart page in Chapter II of Part III.) Even more important, there is developing a better understanding of the "classic" principles of patrols, ambushes, night operations, pursuit, police operations, intelligence, and use of indigenous forces, so that modern technology is beginning to be used to aid classic operations, rather than in a mistaken effort to supplant them. Thus the technological factors that tend (perhaps relatively unavoidably) to lead to some comparative "powerlessness of the powerful" on the strategic level do not necessarily lead to any corresponding effectiveness on the tactical level. Superior technology can be turned to advantage provided that its uses are properly thought through--but this requires that the effectiveness of the technologically superior not be taken for granted.

CHAPTER VII. ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES

A. Introduction

It is perhaps simpler to describe the roles and missions of our Strategic Forces than of the General Purpose Forces, both now and in the future. The role of the latter gets particularly difficult in a 15 to 20 year perspective. But if certain current trends continue, the operations and even the role of the Strategic Forces might change considerably within the next ten or fifteen years. The roles and missions of these forces depend to a large extent upon the view of the citizens of their own country and their role in the community of nations. There have been times in history when the self-image of a nation has changed very slowly; for example, the basic (19th-century) British view of itself lasted more than a hundred years before there were any significant changes. The same can be said for pre-World War I France, and even pre-World War I Germany. Germany viewed itself as the large and strong buffer between the forces to the east and Europe: the "guardian of the gate." She obviously no longer does so.

One cannot be certain of the view the United States will have of itself in the year 1985. In some ways 1969 and 1970 could be years of transition. In any case, if certain of today's trends continue, the United States could have quite a different view of itself, and the rest of the world could concur in that view or have one differing from it but still being quite different from their current view of the United States. If one goes back only sixteen years, one sometimes finds it hard to believe the changes that have occurred. In 1953 we had overwhelming nuclear superiority and felt we needed it because the communists were our "enemies" and dangerous. This view was not completely without cause: just prior to this time Korea had barely been saved from a communist takeover by a U.N. allied force. Today, in some sense, we refuse even to maintain a parity in the strategic area in both offense and defense. (Thus the U.S.S.R. has at least a thin ABM program to protect its cities--we say that our initiation of a similar program to protect our cities would be provocative to our communist "opponents"; and the prediction now is that by mid-1969 the Soviets will have more of their huge land-based ICBM's deployed than we will have of our relatively small ones.*) In the tactical conventional war area today we fight to prevent South Vietnam from suffering the fate of South Korea, with apologies to allies, many of whom hurl invectives at us for our effort. Indeed, most join the communists in sending their ships to Haiphong--in effect supporting the communist war effort against us. In Europe sixteen years ago, NATO was building a large conventional force. Today France is all but out of NATO, our bases in that country are gone, and the conventional forces on our side of the Elbe continue to dwindle despite the increase of Warsaw Pact forces east of the Elbe since the Czech crisis. The Soviets now have a Mediterranean fleet of considerable strength (45 naval vessels) and keep the Middle

*The New York Times, April 11, 1969, p. 5.

East in turmoil. Despite the continued doubtful reliability of some Warsaw Pact forces for some wars in Europe (and let us not forget the doubtful reliability of some NATO forces for some wars in Europe) and other mitigating factors, things have changed in the Free World-Communist confrontation in the last fifteen years, and not by any means all for the better. If one still has doubts, one may have them shaken by an unscheduled airline ride to Cuba, a country ninety miles off our coast, whose communist government is reported to have been guaranteed by the government of the United States (without a reciprocal guarantee of Cuba's small neighbors against her aggression) in a deal with the U.S.S.R. made in 1962.*

One need not have a paranoiac fear of communists or communism to recognize that the general posture of this nation and its influence on its allies has eroded considerably since the early 1950's. There has, of course, also been deterioration of many aspects of the Soviet position, but a persuasive argument can be made that the Soviet position has not deteriorated to the same extent--for example, Soviet control of the Warsaw Pact powers (or at least the important centrally located ones) has not deteriorated to the same extent as our "control" of Western European powers. It is true that the Soviets must use force to keep Czechoslovakia in line, but the fact of the matter is that Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany are in line. This is a key issue for the military planners of the NATO countries: more Soviet divisions now face them than in the past. The reliability of the Czech army may be lower than it was in the past but it never was considered to be high. One has grave doubts whether the Soviets ever intended to use the Czech forces as anything other than guards for their LOC or whether the Soviets even trusted them that far. The same can be said for the Poles. The changes there have been primarily to make circumstances that already existed more obvious by the outward signs of Soviet military movement.

It is also possible that there may be a resurgence of the feeling of solidarity and responsibility of not only the NATO powers, but of our other allies around the world. But most people will find this argument quite difficult to make. More likely would be a swing in the other direction as part of the general swing away from military commitments and the "containment of communism" in Europe and elsewhere. The roles and missions discussed in this chapter will mostly reflect the main political trends as we now judge them, and to some extent the probability of changes in one direction or another and their impact.

B. The Strategic Role of the Armed Forces

The declaratory strategic role of the Air Force should remain relatively unchanged through alternative policies and strategies in the political and diplomatic areas mentioned in this and the preceding Parts of this report. That is, the mission will be to deter an attack by a

*See repeated statements by Khrushchev before and after his retirement.

hostile power on the zone of interior of the United States, and in the event of failure to deter such an attack, to fight a war in such a manner as to preserve this nation and its social values while defeating the enemy who launched the attack. However, the emphasis on "war fighting" and "damage limiting" is likely to decline steadily, perhaps leading, in practice, to an almost total emphasis on pure deterrence. (However, as discussed later, this emphasis could reverse--to a degree--in the latter part of the period of interest or even earlier.) The missions that go along with this primary role of deterrence--and to some degree of the increasingly neglected roles--are currently assigned primarily to the Strategic Air Command with a secondary role to the Navy and a tertiary role to the General Purpose Forces. In the future the Poseidon Strike Force will bear the main responsibility for this secondary mission while the tertiary mission will fall to the other forces of the Air Force and the Navy. The deterrent role of SAC and the Poseidon force is quite straightforward. It is primarily to strike at the enemy weapon systems and other targets within his zone of interior. This strike could vary in size from a "demonstration attack" to a large strike into the high levels of "assured destruction" as outlined by Secretary McNamara and others. This is not to say that in the case of a nuclear war, on a scale below that which could be called central war, i.e., between the Soviet Union and the United States, that the SAC and Poseidon forces could not be used on other missions. It does not even mean that the strategic forces could in some way not be used for a conventional war. As long as aircraft are part of the Strategic Air Command's arsenal, the use of these aircraft to drop conventional weapons, as they are doing in Vietnam today, will always be there. But the primary role of these forces--deterring a nuclear strike against the United States and (the increasingly neglected role) if deterrence fails to limit physical damage and political losses--remains overwhelmingly their primary goal.

With the other forces of the Air Force and the Navy, the role is not so clear-cut. These forces can have strategic missions in time of central war, and the Air Force Century-series fighter bombers, as well as the carrier-based Navy aircraft, can deliver high-yield thermonuclear weapons on the zone of interior of the Soviet Union and China, possibly even before the SAC forces detonate their first weapon. But these forces have other missions as well, and although some of these aircraft can always be allocated exclusively to this assignment, the over-all force has a varied responsibility. There is even a slight capability on the part of at least one Army missile to act in the strategic role: Pershings based near the DMZ in Korea might be able to hit Vladivostok in the Soviet Union and could hit many strategic targets in Manchuria and northern China. In Europe it might even be possible to hit the part of the U.S.S.R. that was formerly East Prussia with this missile by launching from forward bases in the northern area east of Hamburg near the dividing line between East and West Germany.

The number and kind of issues which would raise even a not incredible (much less credible) possibility of the use of any or all of these weapons in a strategic mode may decline drastically under several "alternative futures." In fact, this credibility could decline to a point

where only a direct threat to the United States would seem to risk the U.S. initiating use of any kind of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, if U.S. commitments to Europe, for example, were challenged, a theatre nuclear war might start which could involve some of our strategic forces rather quickly. This would be most likely if the Soviets used their ZI-based IRBM's as an assist to the battlefield situation. The same situation could hold true if the U.S. were to honor commitments in East Asia in the face of a nuclear threat. Here again, the U.S. could have a requirement to bring strategic forces into play for a theatre operation simply because the Soviets or Chinese had used IRBM's to support the theatre operation.

C. The Tactical Role and Mission of the Armed Forces

As mentioned above, so-called tactical or "General Purpose Forces" can have strategic missions, some of them perhaps quite essential and quite deep in the enemy ZI, such as "Century-series" aircraft flying out of Germany, Turkey, Korea or Japan. But, by and large, the missions we will discuss now are truly tactical in nature and deal with considerably more subtle requirements than the strategic mission.

1. The Army

When one speaks of the tactical mission of the Armed Forces the primary forces that are normally engaged and must provide the largest amount of manpower as well as the most unique and varying capability are the ground forces. In fact, for most conventional engagements, even in the 1975-1985 time period, the other armed forces will probably be in support of the ground forces in their conventional operations. This is particularly true if one is thinking about limited warfare in the conventional mode. The ground forces also need a relatively clear and detailed definition of roles and missions. It must be able to fight limited conventional wars of the classic nature as well as counterinsurgency wars that can vary anywhere from tiny things such as the Bolivian Army's expedition which snuffed out Che Guevara's insurgents, to an operation as large as, or perhaps larger than, that going on in Vietnam today. (This latter war, like the one in Laos, has a screen of guerrillas cloaking the operations of large standard formations.) Because of the potential variety and complexity, the counterinsurgency mission probably requires the largest amount of analysis and creative planning. The role of the U.S. soldier or marine can change drastically; thus, under some circumstances, the primary role of the conventional armed forces of the host country and the United States will be to provide security for the police, so that they can carry out their mission of discovering and digging out the infrastructure of the guerrillas.* Counterguerrilla and counter-"infrastructure" operations are basically a police action, particularly when the insurgency is a true guerrilla operation with the infrastructure of the guerrillas buried in the society of the host country. In this sense

*Armbruster et al., Can We Win in Vietnam? (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 227-272.

we can call counterinsurgency or counterguerrilla warfare a "political" operation.

This does not mean that the ground forces can give up their role as defenders of the host country against larger enemy formations. In fact, if a "War of National Liberation" is taking place in a country which is contiguous to a relatively strong communist power, this ability to defeat large enemy formations is vital. For this reason the standard ability to carry out combined operations of armor, infantry, artillery and sea and air power will probably remain vital. In fact, the techniques of such combined operations as well as the tried and true infantry techniques of combat should be brought up to a high peak. The major difference between fighting a standard war against standard formations and counterinsurgency consisting of guerrillas backed up by large indigenous or imported formations is the increased requirement for a distinct mission not only to support the police but to produce the very hard-to-come-by, up-to-date tactical intelligence. This later requirement is vital to the efficient use of the reaction forces, the minimization of friendly casualties and the maximum embarrassment of enemy formations. The basic fulfillment of this requirement stems from traditional patrolling and maintaining contact with the enemy.

In recent years the role and mission of the ground forces has probably had more change than that of any of the other services. Although all the armed services have been affected by the counterinsurgency missions, the ground forces are the ones that must look the most efficient and competent in this role. Furthermore, they must be extremely effective the moment they enter the theatre, which could be most anywhere. In this decade we are used to having Wars of National Liberation fought more or less in undeveloped areas and, as stated earlier, primarily on the periphery of the communist bloc. There is nothing to indicate that they must remain in the undeveloped areas, however, and it is possible that in the 1975-1985 time period we may see something like Wars of National Liberation--low-level but effective use of violence and threats in the subversion of governments--beginning to take place in Europe. The probability of insurgency taking place in this relatively stable area is surely lower than elsewhere, but when one looks ten or fifteen years into the future one must "suspend one's disbeliefs" a bit.

It should be not beyond serious imagination to consider that if certain trends in Europe should become predominant, West Germany might become susceptible to some type of incursion from communist East Germany or at least some type of subversion by native West German communists influenced from the East. This could occur even though there is good reason to feel that such a turn of events might be undesirable from the point of view of a conservative or suspicious Soviet hierarchy.

A united Germany, even under communism, may very well bring up the issue of the lost lands of Silesia and Pomerania, now part of Poland, and East Prussia, part of which is held by the Soviet Union. There is also the possibility that the Soviets would have less control over East

Germany in this time period if Ulbricht's successors should become "schismatic" communists. For such successors of Ulbricht to afford the luxury of a schism with the U.S.S.R., however, West Germany would have to become very weak indeed, for it could only occur in the absence of Soviet troops in East Germany. But one does not have to stretch the imagination too far to see that current trends in several West European countries--including Italy and West Germany--could point towards their becoming very unaggressive--and perhaps even susceptible to a type of communist subversion that has caused problems in other parts of the world.

Several things about such a situation could have grave consequences for the United States. If Germany should follow the general trend of Britain, or reconsider the existence of her land army as suggested by the new German President Gustav Heinemann of the SPD, this could indicate a loss of élan in West Germany which might be accompanied by even greater belief in the urgency of the "Ostpolitik" détente policy. Larger and more disturbing student riots and sympathy with leftist thinking might also develop--or an increasing unwillingness to accept military service.* Under these circumstances one could easily imagine the official--or unofficial but effective--loss of American bases in West Germany similar to the loss we recently suffered in France. Without these bases from which to function, the United States might easily be forced to leave the continent and our whole posture from both a conventional and nuclear tactical war point of view would change drastically.

As mentioned elsewhere in this report, the revocation of, or certain changes in, the American-Japanese security treaty and changes in our relations with Korea could cause the same problem in the Pacific. Japan, in particular, may prove to be vulnerable to elements which are anti-military, anti-United States and/or anti-nuclear weapons. An interesting point in the case of both Germany and Japan is that it might be the obvious military effects which cause the most trouble; i.e., the draft, big obvious native and U.S. troop units and bases, etc. A small, "inconspicuous" force de frappe-type of nuclear force (particularly if it is based in a remote area or on the ocean) might look like a better bet from the point of view of political "cost-effectiveness," even for a timid government. After all, with the nuclear threshold the real barrier, deterrence the "only" policy, and a big U.S. nuclear arsenal which could--in theory at least--be triggered by a force de frappe, the small nuclear force may look like a cheap way out, both monetarily and politically. This is the apparent basic policy of both Britain and France today and may become the policy

*In 1968, 11,000 West German draftees--1.3% of eligible young men--asked to be removed on grounds of conscience (The Los Angeles Times, March 3, 1969). This was considerably more than in all previous years together since the founding of the German NATO army. Gustav Heinemann of the SPD, the newly elected President of the Federal Republic, said in a newspaper interview a few days after his election that the position of the German army should be put into question.

of our other large allies as well. Germany may not be so sure of U.S. involvement in case of a war if U.S. troops are no longer in Germany as "hostages," but if (as mentioned above) the whole military apparatus (including the hostages) becomes too much of a political burden, she may choose the "nuclear tripwire," or even no tripwire at all.

Therefore the need to be able to use ground forces (as well as the rest of the General Purpose Forces) without the help of an extensive peacetime net of foreign bases may increase in all parts of the world. If this occurs, it could prove to be a most difficult problem for the ground forces to provide a "dual purpose" (conventional and nuclear) capability in the 1975-1985 time period. And trying to do the two together (for there are definite inconsistencies and incompatibilities) could cause problems at least as difficult as our current counterinsurgency problems. Fighting back onto a continent from the sea by the conventional mode has proven to be a costly business even when the enemy could not concentrate all his forces against the invasion. The landing at Normandy cost 2,000 American dead (and over 7,000 more before the breakout from the peninsula)--and we had complete control of the air and sea and nearby bases in England. The mission of launching and conducting a sizable conventional ground force campaign from "Fortress America" may be in the cards, at least for planning purposes, by 1975-1985. This, along with the mission of countering Wars of National Liberation, could be the primary concern of the Army.

2. The Air Force

The vast majority, if not all, of the tactical missions the Air Force will be required to perform in the 1975-1985 time period will be conventional. Barring some drastic domestic and international political changes, the chances of having to deliver a number of--or even a few--nuclear warheads on an enemy target in that time period will probably vary little from what they are now. And right now they are close to zero.

Since the development of aircraft as fighting machines in World War I, the standard requirement for their ordnance delivery has not changed radically. This should not be surprising. Once the third dimension was introduced into the battlefield, one could feel rather certain that the aircraft requirements that were quickly developed would be around for quite a while. The one thing that could have changed all this would have been a breach of the nuclear threshold. This might have made air defense so very effective that very few planes could get through; but on the other hand, those planes that did get through would deliver such terrifying weapons that the destruction wrought on some few target areas would perhaps exceed the surgical, selective destruction of many target areas by the great number of planes that normally would have gotten through with conventional loads. The nuclear threshold, however, has held--and one has the feeling that it is probably going to hold--for the foreseeable future. In this case, aircraft will be required to do its yeoman's job in

any battles we may fight between 1975-1985. This is particularly true if we are still dealing with "Wars of National Liberation" and other low-level types of aggression. These low-level wars bring out requirements for our weapons systems which look truly historic. In some respects, the aircraft is like the warship. The first naval bombardment was almost simultaneous with the introduction of gunpowder into the maritime powers. Of course, vast improvements were made in guns and ships, but the basic notion of the way to use ships and their firepower from tube artillery has remained with us for many hundreds of years. It remains with us simply because the basic idea was a correct one for the use of these weapons systems. Interestingly enough, the targets also basically remained more or less the same; i.e., the enemy's base of fire on his warships and targets ashore, either to be hit independently or in support of landing parties. The ships were also used in defense of fixed installations on the shores and the routes of land and sea forces. These techniques were used by the Spanish in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, by the Allies in Normandy and in the Pacific, and in Korea, and are being used today in Vietnam. Of course, the introduction of aircraft made a significant difference in the ability to use warships. In fact, at the end of World War II the general opinion was that naval ships other than those which themselves carried aircraft or supported aircraft carriers had been made obsolete by the introduction of aircraft. We found out quite quickly in Korea and in Vietnam, however, that the enemy aircraft threat against ships can be nullified by keeping control of the air, and many argued a renewed requirement for gun warships.

It would seem correct to consider the historical, tactical and conventional warfare roles and missions of the Air Force as possessing a relationship to those of today and at least the near future. (Like the warships, these vehicles have the "right" missions.) There is always a possibility, of course, that a missile system of such simplicity and devastating accuracy will be developed that aircraft cannot exist in enemy air space. (This would equate somewhat with the introduction of aircraft into naval warfare.) There is also the possibility that very cheap and relatively long-range missiles with phenomenally small CEP's, able to carry conventional warheads, will be developed. Such a system could be effective against fixed targets, but obviously a missile system would have difficulty covering tactical "targets of opportunity" unless there were some type of observation to indicate to the missile where the target was. Under these circumstances, if the observation vehicle transmitting the information to the missile were aircraft, it might as well fire a missile or drop a bomb on the target itself rather than depend on the firepower of the surface-to-surface missile. At the moment, however, we don't know how to develop such an accurate surface-to-surface missile within the required price ranges to take over this mission. Furthermore, there is no existing air missile that can completely deny airspace to aircraft all the way down to a few hundred feet of altitude (at least not in view of countermeasures and tactics to avoid it). The "armed recon" mission, particularly in low-level wars, will probably still be a requirement for aircraft in the 1975-1985 time period. Furthermore, the aircraft will no doubt continue to play a role in developing that

current Air tactical intelligence, mentioned earlier without which ground and sea forces normally cannot develop a battle to their advantage.

It is probably safe to assume, therefore, that within this time frame, aircraft will continue to play a part in the tactical, conventional mission of the Armed Forces. Like the warship, it is likely to be around for quite a while and its targets are quite likely to be somewhat the same as they are today. These are targets designed to destroy the enemy's air force, suppress its air defenses and destroy enemy ground and sea forces, their logistic bases and deployment and logistic routes.

The counter-air and long-range and short-range interdiction targets, as well as the ground support targets of the tactical air forces, are likely to be found anywhere in the world, but the probability is that the general area will coincide somewhat with the regions of the borders of communist domination. It is possible that we would have to intervene in wars between non-communists and even between communists. But the highest probability is that we could be involved in wars between communist powers and non-communist victim states. This means that non-communist countries bordering on communist states (particularly those contiguous with the Soviet Union and China) are more likely to be the victims of aggression, while their communist neighbors are most likely to be the trouble-makers of the future as they have been in the past. One of the authors recalls in 1949 talking to the Cultural Attaché of the Soviet Embassy about the relative vulnerability of the Soviet Union in the Far East. He replied, "Oh, the Chinese will fight for us over there." The author chuckled at the suggestion, assuming that he was naive about how far China was likely to go for a Soviet or communist cause. Within a year it was proven that China was to go a great distance in the support of a neighboring "social" state in a war which, if not instigated by, was at least encouraged by Moscow.

As mentioned earlier, our means of coping with these problems may well be changed by political considerations. It is not inconceivable that should we become engaged on the periphery of the communist bloc, we would have to "appropriate" airfields (as we did from the French in Morocco in 1942) or capture them (as we did from the Japanese) to get even our longest-legged tactical aircraft within range of the primary targets. This does not mean that we will change the role of these aircraft but that our whole mode of operation may have to be different. In the initial phases of American involvement in the 1975-1985 time period. (We may have nothing but CASF forces of a truly independent nature which can operate in these conditions. Small aerial tankers based on aircraft carriers to refuel USAF tactical aircraft in mid-ocean may even be needed.) Obviously, if we are coming to the aid of some friendly host country these issues will not come up. If not, the joint operation of World War II may again become the important factor. In effect, the first air operations to take place may be those of naval aircraft launching carriers in support of an amphibious invasion; the invading forces, in turn, will make airfields so that the tactical aircraft can operate further inland against mobile targets

Long-legged aircraft in that time period may be something quite different from today's. In fact, we may have an inflight refueling capability within range of enemy fighter aircraft. Furthermore, these aircraft may be capable of such extremely high speeds that they can, in effect, even fly two sorties a day at very long range. Here is where the technical capabilities of the era will make a difference. If by that time we have an aircraft which is capable of both low speed and high maneuverability for close-in target strikes and extremely high speed, long-range approach flights, we may be able to carry out tactical missions with highly accurate, sophisticated, conventional weapons from bases a very great distance away. Somehow one feels that this tactical air capability must be maintained for the kind of wars we are likely to experience in the decade under discussion. In fact, it is our apparent capability to provide a sophisticated tactical air power at the right places at the right time which gives us a significant edge over probable enemies. This capability means that the enemy is often forced into a mode of fighting with his ground and sea air forces which might be highly detrimental to him. Without our control of the air, the American mode of fighting would have to change radically: in fact, our spectacular capability in the logistics field may be negated by enemy air strikes. This would, of course, be disastrous, for it is in this area of establishing very quickly and efficiently large logistic bases and supporting them with tremendous amounts of materiel that the American Armed Forces have an outstanding capability.

For all these reasons, it is hard to see a drastic change in the roles and missions of the tactical Air Force despite changes in the political milieu in the time period under study. At least it is hard to see a change in the primary and basic roles of this arm of the service. The changes indicated above would hopefully have their effects in some initial period of the war and then only to the extent that the tactical air might have to "stand down" until beaches have been secured by amphibious ground force troops supported by naval aircraft and gunfire. Once we had beachheads and airfields we would shift to our normal mode of heavy ground-based air support, large logistic support, heavy firepower, etc.

3. The Navy

One phase of the role and mission of this branch of the service has already changed radically from the traditional one. This has occurred primarily because of the new type of threat against both our enemy's and our own ZI's. Earlier we mentioned the strategic threat Poseidon-type missiles will create for the enemy in the 1975-1985 time period. But the enemy's nuclear-missile-carrying submarines will also present a threat to our ZI. For this reason, for the foreseeable future the anti-submarine warfare capability of the Navy will continue to be an extremely important defensive measure against strategic attack against the homeland. ASW submarines and surface craft, as well as naval aircraft, will have a heavy responsibility in detecting and destroying or at least keeping

enemy missile-carrying submarines out of range of the homeland. Anti-submarine warfare is not new to the Navy; but unlike any of its previous activities in this area, failure to detect or stop or drive away a single submarine could now be disastrous for the country.

The Navy will continue to have other roles in the tactical area, some of which have been mentioned above. If one has no airfield in the vicinity of a battle zone, but does have blue water in which a carrier task force can operate, one can bring these floating airfields within range of the forces needing air support. This will continue to be a naval role. Furthermore, the old naval gunfire will, as far as one can see, be in demand even in the 1975-1985 time period for low-level kinds of ground wars. Here, again, if there is blue water near the battle area, one can bring in these extremely efficient and effective gun platforms to give fire support to troops on the shore. Of course, there is always the possibility that these naval forces will also have to clean out some enemy naval units. But this is the traditional role of the Navy, and one feels that since large navies are so extremely expensive to build and service and provide trained crews for, we can more or less predict who will have these fleets. The only current contender for an enemy fleet of any size is the Soviet Union. Since they to date have no aircraft carriers, their tendencies to engage American forces with our fast attack carriers would seem to be somewhat suicidal unless it were done within range of Soviet land-based aircraft. This is indeed what they may attempt to do. There is also another element which has been introduced recently into naval warfare, and that is the long-range surface-to-surface anti-ship missile. This may tend to offset the United States carriers; but it is difficult to imagine technological breakthroughs in the ship-to-ship missile area adequate to allow (except in restricted waters) a Navy without aircraft carriers to engage one with such vessels equipped with main batteries of long-range efficient aircraft manned by well-trained pilots.

The possible lack of foreign bases mentioned earlier, however, will affect the efficiency of our high-seas fleets as we now operate them. It may well be that we will have to begin to think of our fleets operating in a mode somewhat similar to the German submarine fleets of the two World Wars. In this time period Germany was also without bases and depended on replenishment of her fleet of submarines on the sea. We currently have this capability to fuel and provide minor repairs on the high seas, and in fact, it is standard procedure to do so. But we may have to look into the possibilities of doing some rather heavy repair work on ships while they are afloat and, even to consider building such things as large repair ships which could do much of the work done in yards in calm weather on the high seas. This is a difficult problem to beat, but if we intend to use our fleets in the far corners of the world in this time period, some such maintenance capability on the high seas may be necessary to keep them up to strength. Certainly, for some repairs and overhauls these ships will of course have to come home. You cannot drydock a ship in the middle of the Pacific (although there is perhaps some capability to use floating drydocks in some "neutral" lagoon).

What we are saying is that our Navy may now have to operate in a hostile environment in many sections of the world. This is not a new experience for naval men: this was the problem of the French navy in the Napoleonic period and of the Confederate Navy during our Civil War. In each of these cases the navy was inferior and was not asked to perform large tasks. There were certain exceptions, such as Napoleon's expedition to Egypt when he expected his navy to maintain his supply lines to the homeland. Despite his success in providing a base for this fleet in Alexandria, the result was a failure and much of the fleet was lost at the battle of the Nile.

In short, our fleet will have to be able to provide support for our air forces and also carry out its mission of protecting the homeland from nuclear missile attack from submarines. Furthermore, if we do carry out a large-scale intervention, it will have to protect convoys from conventional submarine attack. This is a lot to ask of a fleet which may have very few bases. In fact it might call for an entirely new mode of operation allowing the Navy to keep ships on station adequate to provide all these vital functions.

D. Some Other Possibilities

It is probably worthwhile, before terminating this discussion on roles and missions, to indicate some of the changes that might occur. First and perhaps most likely, current trends towards de-emphasis of defense are not likely to continue. At some point before or during the 1975-1985 time period the U.S. (including many of the arms controllers who now seem to think of defense as a moral crime) is likely to notice that the Soviets are completely unwilling to go along with any serious limitations on defense but might be willing to go along with many other elements of a comprehensive arms control program. (The Soviets, after all, must worry about real and actual Chinese missiles and possible West German missiles.) Even the United States is likely to be concerned, if only in an abstract fashion, with the fact that if the two superpowers have no defense against missiles, any small power with ten missiles can have aspirations to two-way deterrence against a superpower.* Rather than striving, therefore, for both sides to be naked of active defense, it is very likely that the United States and the Soviet Union might conclude an agreement that emphasizes heavy defense on both sides but very limited offense. Having a heavy defense will make it possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to denigrate, both in rhetoric and perhaps in reality, the significance of small Nth-power missile forces. In addition, their self-limitations on defense would give them the moral authority to discourage offense by other nations. This could not only go far to preserve the current hierarchy; it might make for more or less comprehensive world-wide arms control; it would certainly make more

*See articles by Herman Kahn and D.G. Brennan in Why ABM? Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy, op. cit.

feasible (both from the viewpoint of deterrence, and action if deterrence fails) the punishment of any Nth power that used its nuclear weapons. All of this indicates an eventual emphasis on "damage limiting" and "war fighting" by the two superpowers. This emphasis will come even earlier and be greater if there was any use by an Nth power of a nuclear weapon, so that people would be no longer willing to rely on deterrence working perfectly.

Another change, at least in emphasis, from current perspectives might occur if the kind of tumult and violence that seems plausible in much of Afro-Asia actually occurred. If, for example, there were a series of Nigerian-type civil wars conducted with cruelty and enormous casualties, both civilians and non-combatants, the pressure for the developed powers to intervene might become overwhelming. Such intervention could be multinational and/or sponsored by the U.N. or it might be delegated to one or a small number of powers. It is certainly easy to imagine that the U.S. could easily get into the logistics of such operations (as we already have in the Congo). It might also be easy to get involved in the actual fighting and administration. All of this, of course, would have great impact on all three services. It is also conceivable, particularly if there were naked aggression by China against, for example, India or some of the nations in Southeast Asia, that the United States might be forced to intervene in a reasonably large-scale way and then be forced to stay (in much the same way that the U.S. has had to keep two divisions in South Korea). It is also not implausible that the United States could have a large logistics tail in South Vietnam--and perhaps Laos and Thailand as well--five, ten or even fifteen years from now. In fact, this last could also include a fairly large group of Americans acting as advisers, trainers, and in quasi-leadership roles (much as the Special Forces do today). If the above is to work smoothly for a matter of decades, this could emphasize to the extreme the necessity of all three services to work in close coordination with allied forces with which there are all kinds of linguistic and cultural difficulties. Further, it might well happen that we might much prefer in fulfilling these roles to use equipment which is much closer to that which can easily be procured, operated and maintained by the indigenous forces than that which we are accustomed to using. In any case, one of the major missions of all three services is likely to involve various variations of the training and advisory roles.

E. Conclusions

Over the next decade and a half such gradual, but nonetheless radical, political and military changes as those mentioned earlier could change operations, and in some cases even the roles and missions of the General Purpose Forces (and a significant portion of our Strategic Forces), drastically. Assuming that such changes do not occur (or at least, not all of them), the probability is, of course, greater that the general configuration of the forces (except for technical changes) and their mission will remain somewhat the same. Nevertheless one "feels" that it would somehow be wrong to assume that our foreign basing system, or our control of it, or the extent of it, and at least the credibility of

of some roles and missions are not going to be different than they are today. Of course, the primary roles and missions of the Armed Forces in some sense can never change, for these forces are the buffer and shield of the country. It is largely in their secondary roles that they change. "Type II" deterrence for our nuclear forces (deterring an attack on areas other than our homeland by threat of nuclear retaliation) may lose much of its credibility by the 1975-1985 time period. In this case that mission of the United States Armed Forces may change; the argument will be that there is little sense in spending great amounts of money to support forces specifically for this mission if we, our allies and our "opponent" know we will never be allowed to use it.*

The conventional roles, as pointed out above, are quite likely to change in their implementation, particularly if we are forced to fall back on a "Fortress America" approach to military policy. Nevertheless, just as when India (a country who had no U.S. bases, or even an alliance with us, and in fact opposed us in favor of Communist China on many occasions) asked for and received United States aid when she was attacked by China in 1962, so we may in the future have to become "interventionist" even without foreign bases.

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*The argument for "deterrence by uncertainty" is much more subtle and hard to make for expenditures against a détente "opponent" rather than an "enemy," i.e., even though we all know we won't use these forces, if we did use them, the effect on the enemy would be terrible and he can't be sure there won't be some slip up which would cause them to be used anyway--therefore he is deterred from action, particularly over issues which are not absolutely vital to his survival.

CHAPTER VIII. A NOTE ON LONG-RANGE PERSPECTIVES AND POLICIES*

A. Long-Range Perspectives and Planning

Almost everyone today has the sense of living under some kind of "sword of Damocles," and one which gets a keener blade and thinner threads each year. There is a widespread feeling that current technology, if left uncontrolled, is going to create a situation which will eventually be disastrous. And it is no longer necessary (as it may have been in the immediate post-World War II period) to point out that this threat must be considered on at least two different levels--as requiring both a political and a strategic response. For these reasons this chapter, as well as the foregoing, contains many references to the spread or control of nuclear weapons. It also makes little or no distinction between the military or political decision-maker; any suggestion is aimed at both, since suitable solutions will likely stem from joint action.

One of the most important things that should be done by the national security analysts and military planners is to get a better understanding of long-term risks and what kinds of measures might be reasonable in trying to deal with them. Indeed, many of us have an increasing concern that because we tend to focus on relatively short-term objectives many of our decisions may foreclose useful future developments. For example, in the fifties there were a large number of people who, deeply concerned with the advent of ICBM's, argued that the danger of holocaust would be greatly increased since these devices could easily be kept alert and could reach their targets in 15-20 minutes. Planes were harder to keep alert and tended to take 5-20 hours to reach their targets, and therefore created less of a threat.

On balance, in looking back over the last decade, most of the military and even arms controllers are now agreed that the substitution of the missile for the bomber has really increased the stability of strategic forces in all kinds of desirable ways--the world has probably been safer because of this substitution, at least for most of the last decade and probably for the next decade or so as well. However, this evolution may look somewhat less fortunate in the even more distant future, if missiles become rather widely available to a number of countries and if the missile defense issue (against small and relatively unsophisticated forces) turns out to be more difficult to resolve than has been forecast--perhaps because of limitations by arms control agreements or established practices, rather than the limitations of technology.

To give another example, any freeze on changing missile silos may have disadvantageous consequences for both sides in the long run. Even more immediately, it seems inconceivable that a strategic arms freeze which did not include bombers would constitute a stable and sufficient

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*This chapter depends significantly on material prepared by the Hudson Institute for the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, but adapted and updated for this report.

arrangement. The bomber issue is, however, even more intractable than the missile problem. It is, for example, possible to convert civilian aircraft to bombers, and a bilateral agreement to limit or freeze bombers would thus constitute a very uncertain and complex deal to make and manage, given the large number of commercial airplanes available to both sides. There would also be the problem of fighter bombers stationed at bases close to the Soviet Union.

One could also imagine that American and Soviet planners may be faced with the necessity for almost completely rethinking the deterrence policy which has been accepted since the early fifties, in most circles, almost without question. This policy depended more or less upon variations of the assured destruction capacity as a basis for our national security. Other objectives (such as damage limitation) were sometimes added to assured destruction, but (with the possible exception of damage limitation) these were generally not considered to be on the same level of priority.

We may all come to feel that for a variety of reasons we wish to move in the direction of a posture of greater defensive emphasis rather than relying exclusively, or almost exclusively, on offensive forces. If the arguments for a defensive emphasis turned out to be acceptable, it would be most important that arms control agreements, for example, not foreclose such options politically, physically, or diplomatically.

These examples are only a few of many that illustrate the need for considering any decision in terms of both the short and long run. Let us now consider the less immediate future by commenting on possible culminating points for some or all of the many implications stressed in this report--possible changes in the world system (including the system of war) as we know it.

B. Possible Systemic Changes and Endpoints

The following list gives three basic possibilities, and a number of sub-possibilities, for transformation of the current system:*

1. Minor modification of the current system

2. All-our war system withers away

   a. universal deterrence--e.g., "Gallois worlds"
   b. rule of law
   c. pluralistic security community
   d. rule of fait accompli (internal war)

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*For elaborations see Chapter IX of Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967).

e. instrumental wars (rational self-interest restraints)
f. agonistic wars (limited by absolute rules)
g. potlatch wars (space, foreign aid, "showy" systems, etc.)
h. other substitute for central war

3. Other basic change in the system

a. bloc systems (with restraints and rituals)
b. community sanctions (e.g., no first use by anyone)
c. condominiums (U.S.-S.U.?, collective security?, U.N.?)
d. concert of (large or small) powers
e. "world government"
f. world empire (or empires)
g. disarmed, but "uncontrolled" nations
h. elimination or control of weapons of mass destruction by agreement or revulsion following a large setback to civilization

With only a "minor modification of the current system," one would expect that in the long run the system would have most or all of the following characteristics, to some degree at least:

Strongly hierarchical (superpower-dominated, at least for a while)
Arms control is "imposed from above" after superpower agreement
Guarantee system may extend superpower reach into local developments
Some thrust to formal non-nuclear club
But also some restiveness in threshold nations over second-class status
Increased intra-European cooperation to gain leverage on superpowers
Active guarantee system would increase Security Council activity, could strengthen whole U.N. institution (but: failure to meet first test could wreck entire scheme)
Non-structural features (e.g., nuclear self-deterrence, general reluctance to use force in a major way) may dominate

In evaluating the kinds of scenarios which could characterize the developments over the next decade or two, the following elements seem rather plausible:

NPT ratified by Big Three, plus all current threshold nations
Security Council adopts Soviet-American guarantee resolution
Joint U.S.-S.U. guarantee to India supplements resolution
Additional private U.S. guarantee to West Germany, Israel
Big Three make formal no-first-use declaration
De facto self-restraint by superpowers on conventional arms transfers
formal agreement bars mass-destruction weapons on sea-bed
Tacit agreement limits offensive and defensive strategic forces

A hopeful takeoff for the above projection would be a basic arms control success that resulted from the non-proliferation treaty and other current attempts to limit proliferation. These attempts would presumably have to be facilitated by extreme self-restraint by the superpowers as well as by their cooperation, coordination and relatively uniform firmness against actual and potential "transgressors." In addition, there would probably have to be serious attempts to organize from below in such a way as to reinforce the system as a whole. This scenario need not be unrealistically optimistic; it need not, for example, assume that China or India will sign the treaty, but it probably does have to assume that West Germany, Japan, Israel and Italy go along and that the Europeans acquiesce in something like a no-first-use convention of at least the Big Two if not by more nuclear powers.

One objection which many would have to the hopeful outcome drawn above is the assumption of the retention of a strongly hierarchical international system, but the assumption of such a system reflects some basic current and likely future realities. The U.S. and the Soviet Union <u>are</u> the superpowers and there is no easy way for any other nation to challenge their supremacy--at least in the next decade or two. It is likely, in the above circumstances, that there would be some pressures on the Europeans to cooperate, and even coalesce, in order to mobilize some countervailing power, but there need not be very strong pressures for the erection of countervailing power units if the authority, influence and power of the superpowers is by and large exercised with enlightened restraint.

European political unification could, of course, also have a stabilizing effect, depending on circumstances and the specific nature of the unified polity. To some degree the United States and the Soviet Union will need to give the non-nuclear powers something amounting to a blank check in their dealings with other nuclear powers. In the long run this might lead to pressures on the superpowers for "pre-emptive intervention." While the term "protectorate" as used in the nineteenth century has lost many of its original connotations in the twentieth century, there is good reason for arguing that the concept is nevertheless likely to retain some relevance for analysis and political calculation. It seems, on the whole, plausible that in combination, such concerns would create rather formidable resentment against an international system so obviously dominated by the superpowers.

The form which this resentment might take, of course, is not altogether clear. It might simply be, in those nations that have the technical capability to build nuclear weapons, a general restiveness over the second-class status which has been imposed upon them by the arms control measures and other understandings between the superpowers. It might also find expression in increased pressure for new institutions to provide an outlet for the energies and ambitions of the smaller nations; one of these might be a formal non-nuclear club in which the superpowers would either not be present at all or would be present without a vote.

Acting in combination, of course, the smaller nations, or the non-nuclear nations as a whole (depending on how the new institutions were to emerge), could make life much more difficult for those larger countries who had become used to having their own way. But organization of the non-nuclear nations would not necessarily be a major disruptive force, and on the contrary might provide a useful channel for allowing nations other than the nuclear nations to participate in an internationally stabilizing process.

Another possibility arising out of this model would be increased co-operation among West European, or even among all European, nations in order to gain increased leverage on the superpowers. In this sense a strongly hierarchical world, in which arms control agreements or other restrictions are imposed from above, might contain the seeds of their own undoing. That is, they would increase the motivation of smaller nations to act cooperatively and perhaps increase the likelihood of genuine integrated supernational blocks being created. Such a development, of course, would constitute a major structural change.

The basic model being discussed here might also have interesting implications for the United Nations. On the one hand, it can be argued that the guarantee system described above would strengthen the whole United Nations institution, initially by increasing the activity and prestige of the Security Council, and then by allowing this to spill over into other U.N. activities. But it should be pointed out that this argument might just as easily cut the other way. If the guarantee system and the Security Council through which it operates were to fail in its first major test, there would be a good likelihood of the entire guarantee structure failing, and perhaps an equal likelihood of permanent damage to the Security Council and to the U.N. as a whole.

Should such damage occur, those who argue that the United Nations is the kernel of a world government would certainly have been discredited, and a reversion to either bilateral guarantee mechanisms or simply to nuclear self-help would seem a likely implication. But it may be unwise to concentrate too much on the institutional makeup of the world which this scenario would create. For it may well be that the non-structural features--the set of attitudes, fashions and traditions which determine specific responses to specific situations--will be most important in influencing the makeup of this international system. For example, if the existing degree of nuclear self-deterrence and the general reluctance to use official force in a major way were to become increasingly fashionable, the "all-out war system" might well wither away of itself, whatever the other structural changes and characteristics of the system might be.

It is, of course, also possible that any attempt to preserve the current system with only minor modifications will encounter serious obstacles. For instance, despite serious efforts, widespread proliferation may occur, and rather rapidly at that. As an illustration of this concern it may be

useful to examine the spread of battleships in the Latin American subsystem and Southeast Europe in the early 1900's. The process went roughly as follows:

1907 Brazil ordered two dreadnoughts, "Minas Geraes" and "Sao Paulo"

1908 Argentina ordered two 1,000-ton gunboats

1909 Chile ordered two dreadnoughts
Uruguay ordered cruiser
Peru purchased 6,000-ton cruiser from France
Venezuela purchased gunboat from U.S.
Equador purchased torpedo boat

1910 Cruisers built for Turkey, Chile and China
Turkey bought two old German ships
Turkey ordered two dreadnoughts, "Reshadieh" and "Reshad-i-Hamiss"

1911 Argentina ordered two dreadnoughts

1913 Brazil ordered super-dreadnought, "Rio de Janeiro"
Greece ordered two battle cruisers - one named "Salimis"
Turkey bought the "Rio de Janeiro" from Brazil, renamed "Sultan Osman I"
Greece bought battleships "Idaho" and "Mississippi" from U.S., renamed "Kilkis" and "Lemnos"
Greece bought new cruiser, "Fie Hung," from Japan, renamed "Helle"

A not-so unlikely scenario for the future spread of nuclear weapons, which would in fact be somewhat less precipitous than the history of the spread of the battleship, might proceed as follows:

1945 - "1955": Five victors of World War II either initiated programs or achieved a blast

"1955" - 1970: "Gestation" for proliferation to non-victors

1970 - 1979: Japan in the early seventies, West Germany about 4 or 5 years later soon followed by Italy. Other possibilities are Sweden and Switzerland or Australia and India

1980 - 1989: Argentina-Brazil-Mexico, Egypt-Israel, and/or Pakistan seem likely; Yugoslavia, Rumania, South Korea, and Taiwan are good possibilities

1990 - 1999: "Everybody"

Particularly if, as we have indicated elsewhere, rather inexpensive but reasonably invulnerable systems became available, for example, systems which basically depended for protection on hiding missiles in certain "parking" orbits or under the ocean, perhaps on the continental shelf or in floating, movable or portable launchers, or in various orbital systems, then the proliferation might become really extreme.

There are, of course, a large number of scenarios that would cause such proliferation. Such scenarios could involve the following kinds of elements: a major or even an important power refusing to ratify the nuclear non-proliferation treaty; some of the guarantees demanded by various countries from the U.S. and/or the Soviet Union and/or the Security Council are denied; there could be a new Czech uprising or other unrest in Eastern Europe which was brutally crushed by the Soviets and/or another East European government. Developments of this nature would result in the basic hostility between the Soviets and Europe and/or the United States becoming so intense or politically potent that arms control negotiations were either broken off or even retrogressed. A party to one or another arms control treaty could accuse another party of major violation or some party could be detected in a major violation. One of the key "threshold nations"--Japan, India, Israel or West Germany--might acquire nuclear weapons and thus touch off a relatively widespread proliferation.

Even without any of the above, one or several countries could be believed to have acquired nuclear weapons and such beliefs could in turn produce major system upsets. Another possibility would be an increase in NATO's emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons and on a first-use policy to deter or resist a Soviet conventional invasion. It is also possible to imagine some kind of classical arms race being initiated by either the Russians or the Americans.

What effect would a strategic weapons arms control (SWAC) agreement have on either the optimistic or pessimistic scenarios? It seems reasonably clear that some kind of SWAC would be most important for long-run stability, both for its own sake and because of the demands of the other powers, as indicated in Chapter V. On the other, as also indicated in that chapter, a badly negotiated SWAC, or one negotiated in an inappropriate context, or even just one which ran into bad luck, could easily increase both the possibility and the intensity of the pessimistic projection. This is one of those cases where everything depends on the skill, intelligence and good luck of the various parties involved and possibly also on their good will and good faith.

It should be clear that if properly negotiated, properly drawn up, and properly implemented, a SWAC might be very useful in strengthening some of the possibilities in which the "all-out war system withered away" was the major objective. As we indicated in Chapter V, it certainly reinforces the belief that "nuclear war is unthinkable" and that nuclear weapons constitute inappropriate, immoral and politically unwise means for "the pursuit of politics by other means."

The chart page at the end of this chapter delineates some of the more important systemic changes discussed above and implications relevant to the evaluation of measures that may affect military planning in the 1975-85 period

C. Some Desirable Long-Term Objectives and Policies

As we mentioned, the emphasis of this chapter (and, in fact, the entire volume) would tend to indicate that the first order of business is to get a sense of what would be desirable, comprehensive and long-term objectives and policies for military planners. We shall conclude, therefore, with what may be a minimum list of reasonable characteristics or criteria for long-term policies:

1. Limit both current nuclear proliferation and the proliferating effect of limited future nuclear proliferation.

2. Perhaps by making nuclear weapons be and/or seem less useful--or even contraproductive--from the national interest perspective of the non-nuclear weapon states either politically or physically.

3. Above probably requires providing both a credible and politically acceptable mechanism for preventing nuclear intimidation of non-nuclear nations and

4. Decreasing the prestige associated with the national ownership of nuclear weapons.

5. The policies should not be aimed mainly at perpetuating current security arrangements, divisions, and hierarchies (in particular, U.S. and Soviet status, power, leadership, perquisites and obligations), though it should be conservative in "using up" the prestige, morale, or influence of the leading powers.

6. Nor should these long-run policies require France, the United Kingdom, Japan, India, West Germany, or Italy (in roughly this order of priority) to accept indefinitely an invidiously inferior nuclear status or an unnecessarily precarious or dependent security position. Similar provisions may eventually be necessary for Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Indonesia, Pakistan, etc. In particular, these long-run policies should not attempt to preserve and perpetuate the political results of World War II so as to permit nuclear weapon status to the members of the winning coalition* of that war only. Such a policy would be a prescription for a systemic challenge from the emerging great powers.

*For this purpose, mainland China is to be thought of as a victor of World War II.

7. If, despite the above, nuclear weapons are used, the policies should limit the physical, political and moral damage that is done (they should not rely on persuasion and deterrence working perfectly).

8. They should also be able to withstand crises and small and even large conventional wars as well as breaches or even sustained violations of the nuclear threshold.

9. They should be responsive to the relevant national interests, sentiments, and doctrines, and thus be negotiable.

10. Thus they should not have been foreclosed or embarrassed by prior commitments or alignments (and, of course, vice versa).

11. They should be represented as apolitical ("above the melee" of normal diplomatic in-fighting and posturing--i.e., as "de-coupled").

12. They should also be thoroughly planned so as to be able to supply useful options for "sudden diplomacy" if there is a crisis or other event which requires (or creates a possibility for) such diplomacy.

13. As much as is practical, measures proposed, particularly in arms control, should be potentially permanent, and yet flexible enough to hedge against events and opportunities in negotiation and operation. In particular, the immediate agenda should not be designed too much as a transitional arrangement. However, it should allow for major or basic developments, bargaining and other changes as conditions change or negotiations proceed.

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Some Long-Range Alternative System Endpoints

This page sets out some alternative ways in which the international system as a whole might affect, and be affected by, various developments, particularly those related to possible proliferation or likely in the field of arms control. Chart 1 provides a general framework for this discussion, and the following charts elaborate four of the possibilities mentioned here.

In the first model, we have assumed that the major items of the current arms control agenda are achieved without any major structural change in the system; i.e., without any crucial alterations in the distribution of power within the existing system or in the institutions governing that distribution. Chart 2 outlines some characteristics of the international system which such a series of events might produce. One important element is that if one projects the existing tendency for arms control to flow primarily from superpower agreement, the ensuing system is strongly hierarchical and will tend to create resentments and counterpressures to deal with this. Here, the optimism of the model is reflected in the fact that these resentments and pressures do not take radically disruptive forms, but are assumed to be channeled into such institutions as a non-nuclear club and a more active United Nations. Another important feature is the last mentioned on the chart, namely that although there is no structural change in the model of the system, it may be dominated by other "non-structural" features such as the general attitude to nuclear war and to the use of force. These attitudes may be of greater importance in restraining the number and character of future wars than any structural changes we could envisage. Chart 3 provides a scenario through which such a system endpoint might be reached. The reader will note that the model is explicitly described as optimistic in that it includes success in such currently contentious areas as a formal declaration banning the first use of nuclear weapons and some sort of progress in the field of strategic nuclear forces.

The second model on the chart page also avoids assumptions of any major structural change but chooses to emphasize the more pessimistic possibilities for arms control. Chart 4 stresses again the importance of perceptions and other non-structural features in any international system. In this pessimistic projection, the widespread expectation that proliferation and other types of weapons procurement will follow the technical capabilities of nations may be as ominous for arms control as the actual acquisition of weapons by any particular nation. A further implication of this chart is that the development of the German nuclear weapons program might not only have destabilizing consequences in the narrow military field, it might also permanently wreck any hopes for European unification. In particular, Chart 5 reflects the view of some observers that whatever one may think of the substance of the pending non-proliferation treaty, its defeat at this late date would be a major setback for arms control.

The chart also notes that perhaps because of the Nixon Administration's inclination to "couple" political and technical arms control considerations, a major crisis in the political area (such as a renewed Czech uprising) could have disastrous effects on the effort for superpower arms control.

The third major alternative considered here is one in which the effort to control the spread of nuclear weapons is largely a failure. Chart 6 reflects the widespread belief that contrary to the views of General Gallois, a world of wide nuclear spread will be a very unpleasant one. But an interesting implication of this model is that it may lead to greater rather than diminished interaction between the superpowers, if only to protect themselves against the worst features of such a system. Chart 7 notes again the importance of the U.S. lead in this field, although there is no claim here either that U.S. ratification of the treaty will by itself stop proliferation, or that the U.S. failure to do so will necessarily provoke a rapid and explosive proliferation.

A fourth model considered here involves another major structural change, in which the focus of international relations shifts from the individual nation-state to the larger unit of the bloc or regional institution. Chart 8 notes in particular that in a world where the major components of the system are larger than the nation-state, there may be a rather pervasive trend to the possession of nuclear forces by these blocs, even in that case noted below where the bloc system itself arose out of progress in the field of regional denuclearization. Chart 9 outlines some alternative scenarios through which such a system could arise. It will be noted that this development could ensue either from the positive desire of nations to build such institutions or simply from their desire to avoid the worst features of a world in which nationalism, especially in its military aspect, seems to be rampant.

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SOME LONG-RANGE ALTERNATIVE SYS

(1) ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM ENDPOINTS: HOW WILL ESCALATION BE HANDLED IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? WHAT WILL BE THE ROLE OF FORCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM?

1. MINOR MODIFICATION OF CURRENT SYSTEM

2. ALL-OUT WAR SYSTEM WITHERS AWAY
   - A. UNIVERSAL DETERRENCE--GALLOIS WORLDS
   - B. RULE OF LAW
   - C. PLURALISTIC SECURITY COMMUNITY
   - D. RULE OF FAIT ACCOMPLI (INTERNAL WAR)
   - E. INSTRUMENTAL WARS (RATIONAL SELF-INTEREST RESTRAINTS)
   - F. AGONISTIC WARS (LIMITED BY ABSOLUTE RULES)
   - G. POTLATCH WARS (SPACE, FOREIGN AID, "SHOWY" SYSTEMS, ETC.)
   - H. OTHER SUBSTITUTE FOR CENTRAL WAR

3. OTHER BASIC CHANGE IN SYSTEM
   - A. BLOC SYSTEMS (WITH RESTRAINTS AND RITUALS)
   - B. COMMUNITY SANCTIONS (E.G., NO FIRST USE BY ANYONE)
   - C. CONDOMINIUMS (U.S.-S.U.?, COLLECTIVE SECURITY?, U.N.?)
   - D. CONCERT OF (LARGE OR SMALL) POWERS
   - E. "WORLD GOVERNMENT"
   - F. WORLD EMPIRE (OR EMPIRES)
   - G. DISARMED, BUT "UNCONTROLLED" NATIONS
   - H. ELIMINATION OR CONTROL OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION BY AGREEMENT OR REVULSION FOLLOWING A LARGE SETBACK TO CIVILIZATION

(2) SOME PLAUSIBLE CHARACTERISTICS OF

STRONGLY HIERARCHICAL

ARMS CONTROL IS "IMPOSED FROM ABOVE" A AGREEMENT

GUARANTEE SYSTEM MAY EXTEND SUPERPOWER DEVELOPMENTS

THRUST TO FORMAL NON-NUCLEAR CLUB

RESTIVENESS IN THRESHOLD NATIONS OVER

INCREASED INTRA-EUROPEAN COOPERATION T SUPERPOWERS

ACTIVE GUARANTEE SYSTEM WOULD INCREASE ACTIVITY, COULD STRENGTHEN WHOLE UN IN FAILURE TO MEET FIRST TEST COULD WRECK

NON-STRUCTURAL FEATURES (E.G., NUCLEAR GENERAL RELUCTANCE TO USE FORCE IN A M DOMINATE.

A "PESSIMISTIC" ARMS CONTROL PROJECTION WITHOUT MAJOR STRUCTURAL SYSTEMIC CHANGE

(4) SOME PLAUSIBLE CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS SYSTEM

AS IN PREVIOUS MODEL, NON-STRUCTURAL FEATURES MAY DOMINATE: WIDESPREAD EXPECTATION OF PROLIFERATION, U.S. RETRENCHMENT, FASHION OF "WE BUILD WHAT WE CAN" IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS

IN FRANCE, (A) FEAR OF GERMAN BOMB PROGRAM, (B) LACK OF PLAN FOR HEADING IT OFF, OR FOR INTEGRATING WITH IT IF IT MATERIALIZES

MISSILES DEPLOYED ON CONTINENTAL SHELF

U.N. LARGELY INACTIVE AS ARMS CONTROL MECHANISM

(5) A SCENARIO FOR THIS PROJECTION

U.S. SENATE DEFEATS NPT 1969, ALL SIGNATURES VOIDED

WEST GERMAN, ISRAELI REQUESTS FOR NEW GUARANTEES ARE REFUSED BY U.S.

SOVIETS CRUSH NEW CZECH UPRISING, U.S. BREAKS OFF MISSILE TALKS

U.S. CHARGES SOVIETS NEW FOBS VIOLATES OUTER SPACE TREATY, U.S. DECLARES ITSELF NO LONGER BOUND BY PACT

MME. GANDHI'S GOVERNMENT FAILS, PRO-NUCLEAR FACTION TAKES IMPORTANT ROLE IN NEW INDIAN GOVERNMENT

ISRAELI "EMBEDMENT BOMB" WIDELY BELIEVED

TALINN SYSTEM UPGRADED FOR BMD

SENTINEL DEPLOYED, U.S. HEAVY SYSTEM EXPECTED

U.S. MIRV'S FULLY DEPLOYED

INCREASED NATO EMPHASIS ON TAC NUCS TO HEAD OFF GERMAN BOMB

(6) SOME

EXPECTATIO NICAL CAPA

UNEVEN, AS

MANY PRIMI

NUCLEAR WE

HEAVY DEFE

EFFORTS TO INCENTIVE

GENERAL U.

INCREASED WAR THROUG

SELECTIVE AVOID WORS

MAJOR STRUCTURAL CHANGE: A BLOC

(8) SOME PLAUSIBLE CHARACTERISTICS OF A BLOC SYSTEM

THRUST TOWARD INTEGRATED NUCLEAR FORCES (THIS COULD BE TRUE EVEN AS LAST SCENARIO ABOVE)

ATTRITION OF INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR FORCES

RETURN TO CLASSICAL MULTI-POLAR BALANCE OF POWER FLEXIBILITY

STRONG INTRA-BLOC REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCES

THRUST TO A FEDERATION OF BLOCS, POSSIBLY REACTIVATING U.N.

PROLIFERATION OF INTRA-REGIONAL MILITARY AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

INTRA-BLOC FREE TRADE AREAS, PROTECTIONISM V. OTHERS

(9) SOME

BREAKTH AFTER

OR INTEGRA SYSTEM

OR DEFENS DETERI

OR OUTGRO LATIN

ONG-RANGE ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM ENDPOINTS

AN "OPTIMISTIC" ARMS CONTROL PROJECTION WITHOUT MAJOR STRUCTURAL SYSTEMIC CHANGE

SOME PLAUSIBLE CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS SYSTEM

NGLY HIERARCHICAL

S CONTROL IS "IMPOSED FROM ABOVE" AFTER SUPERPOWER EEMENT

RANTEE SYSTEM MAY EXTEND SUPERPOWER REACH INTO LOCAL ELOPMENTS

UST TO FORMAL NON-NUCLEAR CLUB

TIVENESS IN THRESHOLD NATIONS OVER SECOND-CLASS STATUS

REASED INTRA-EUROPEAN COOPERATION TO GAIN LEVERAGE ON ERPOWERS

IVE GUARANTEE SYSTEM WOULD INCREASE SECURITY COUNCIL IVITY, COULD STRENGTHEN WHOLE UN INSTITUTION (BUT LURE TO MEET FIRST TEST COULD WRECK ENTIRE SCHEME)

-STRUCTURAL FEATURES (E.G., NUCLEAR SELF-DETERRENCE, ERAL RELUCTANCE TO USE FORCE IN A MAJOR WAY) MAY INATE.

(3) A SCENARIO FOR THIS PROJECTION

NPT RATIFIED BY BIG THREE, PLUS ALL CURRENT THRESHOLD NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTS SOVIET-AMERICAN GUARANTEE RESOLUTION

JOINT U.S.-S.U. GUARANTEE TO INDIA SUPPLEMENTS RESOLUTION

ADDITIONAL PRIVATE U.S. GUARANTEE TO WEST GERMANY, ISRAEL

BIG THREE MAKE FORMAL NO-FIRST-USE DECLARATION

DE FACTO SELF-RESTRAINT BY SUPERPOWERS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

FORMAL AGREEMENT BARS MASS-DESTRUCTION WEAPONS ON SEA-BED

TACIT AGREEMENT LIMITS OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGIC FORCES

MAJOR STRUCTURAL CHANGE: WIDESPREAD PROLIFERATION

(6) SOME PLAUSIBLE CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS SYSTEM

ES VOIDED

ANTEES ARE

AKS OFF

R SPACE
ND BY PACT

R FACTION
ENT

TED

D OFF GERMAN

EXPECTATION THAT PROLIFERATION WILL FOLLOW SPREAD OF TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES

UNEVEN, ASYMMETRICAL SPREAD

MANY PRIMITIVE, POORLY CONTROLLED, VULNERABLE FORCES

NUCLEAR WEAPONS MADE, MARKETED BY PRIVATE INDUSTRIES

HEAVY DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENTS IN U.S., S.U.

EFFORTS TO FOLLOW SUIT IN ALL BUT WEAKEST NATIONS, POSSIBLE INCENTIVE FOR REGIONAL DEFENSE PRODUCTION COOPERATION

GENERAL U.S. FOREIGN POLICY RETRENCHMENT

INCREASED SUPERPOWER EFFORTS TO REDUCE DANGER OF CATALYTIC WAR THROUGH ANONYMOUS ATTACK

SELECTIVE SUPERPOWER TECHNICAL AID TO Nth COUNTRIES, TO AVOID WORST FORMS OF PROLIFERATION

(7) A SCENARIO FOR THIS PROJECTION

AS ABOVE, U.S. SENATE DEFEATS NPT, TREATY FAILS

ISRAELI, GERMAN REQUESTS FOR NEW GUARANTEES ARE REFUSED BY U.S. IN MOOD OF POST-VIETNAM RETRENCHMENT

POST-GANDHI GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCES MILITARY NUCLEAR PROGRAM

U.S. SUCCESSFULLY USES TAC NUCS AGAINST NORTH KOREAN ATTACK

U.S. CUTBACK OF EUROPEAN-BASED FORCES PROMPTS GERMAN ANNOUNCEMENT OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

1970 - 1979	JAPAN IN THE EARLY OR MID-SEVENTIES, WEST GERMANY'S STRATEGIC WEAPONS ABOUT 4 OR 5 YEARS LATER SOON FOLLOWED BY IT LY. OTHER POSSIBILITIES ARE SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND OR AUSTRALIA AND INDIA
1980 - 1989	ARGENTINA-BRAZIL-MEXICO, EGYPT-ISRAEL, AND/OR PAKISTAN SEEMSLIKELY, YUGOSLAVIA, RUMANIA, S. KOREA, AND TAIWAN ARE GOOD POSSIBILITIES
1990 - 1999	"EVERYBODY"

(See Page 4, Chart 5)

MAJOR STRUCTURAL CHANGE A BLOC SYSTEM

A BLOC SYSTEM

ES (THIS COULD BE

ES

CE OF POWER FLEXI-

NG FORCES

BLY REACTIVATING

ARY AND POLITICAL

ONISM V. OTHERS

(9) SOME POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR THIS PROJECTION

BREAKTHROUGH IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL INTEGRATION AFTER DE GAULLE

INTEGRATION OUT OF FRUSTRATION WITH HIERARCHICAL SYSTEM ABOVE

OR DEFENSIVE INTEGRATION OF DEVELOPED NATIONS IN A DETERIORATING WORLD

OR OUTGROWTH OF REGIONAL DENUCLEARIZATION PROGRESS LATIN AMERICAN PRECEDENT BECOMES INSTITUTIONALIZED