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AUTHORITY
AGO, d/a ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

140-9-2  
INDEXED

IN REPLY REFER TO  
AGAM-P (M) (11 Sep 67) FOR OT RD 670354

13 September 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation)(Provisional), 18th Military Police Brigade

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation)(Provisional), 18th Military Police Brigade for quarterly period ending 30 April 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

1 Incl  
as

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(Continued on page 2)

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STATEMENT #2 UNCLASSIFIED

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ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT  
(ARMY) ATTN: FOR OT UT, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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HEADQUARTERS  
MILITARY POLICE GROUP (CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION) (PROVISIONAL)  
18th Military Police Brigade  
APO 96491

AVBGM-C

8 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967,  
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

THRU: Commanding Officer  
18th Military Police Brigade  
APO 96491.

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army (ACSFOR, DA)  
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Section 1, Significant Organization or Unit Activities.

a. Since 1 February 1967, elements of the Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation) (Provisional) have engaged in operational activities in direct support of area provost marshals in the II, III, and IV Corps Tactical Zones, exclusive of the area under the jurisdiction of Headquarters Area Command, and those tactical units having organic criminal investigation resources.

b. During this reporting period, particularly gratifying results were obtained from a series of narcotics raids conducted on 18 February 1967. Also highly significant was the expeditious and professional manner in which investigators of this Group solved two particularly heinous multiple murders of Vietnamese Nationals by US Military personnel. Due to the shocking nature of these criminal acts there could have been serious repercussions in respect to United States relations with the local populace. This was a consequence of grave concern, especially in view of our counter-insurgency role in this country. Due to prompt and positive investigative action, however, such repercussions never materialized, and the perpetrators of both incidents were quickly identified and apprehended.

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c. During the 89 days covered by this reporting period, each detachment participated in on-the-job training and operational activities on a daily basis.

d. During the month of March 1967, one administrative move was planned and executed. This move involved relocating the headquarters elements of the Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation) (Provisional) as well as that of the 87th Military Police Detachment (Criminal Investigation) from Saigon to Long Binh. This movement was made in accordance with the United States Army, Vietnam requirement to reduce the troop population in the metropolitan Saigon area. As a result, on 26 March 1967, four officers, four warrant officers, and five enlisted men closed into a new cantonment area at Long Binh, Republic of Vietnam. The proximity of our next higher headquarters, improved communications, more responsive personnel and logistical support, reduced exposure to traffic hazards, and the ability to more fully integrate criminal investigation activities with the total military police enforcement effort conducted by the 18th Military Police Brigade are some of the more obvious advantages gained by relocating out of the greater Saigon area.

e. Although tremendous improvement was noted during the first quarter, the quality of criminal investigation reports continued to be a pressing problem during this reporting period. The technical completeness of most investigations was quite adequate. It was in respect to the administrative aspects of report writing that most of the difficulties were encountered. Some of the most common errors were:

(1) Failure to incorporate all information developed during an investigation into the written report.

(2) Utilizing investigator's statements as a substitute for taking written statements from witnesses.

(3) A failure to fully examine the elements of each offense to insure that each element was adequately covered in the written report.

(4) Apathy on the part of some investigators in regard to conforming with the format prescribed by existing regulations.

(5) The tendency to expound upon investigative techniques in the synopsis portion of the DA Form 2800.

The bulk of these administrative errors are caused by a combination of inexperience, inarticulateness, and a lack of adequate training in the fundamentals of report writing.

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f. In order to overcome the deficiencies mentioned above, a detailed analysis was made of all criminal investigation reports prepared by elements of this Group. Common errors were noted, trends identified, and a short course of instruction on report writing was prepared by the case review section of this headquarters. At the present time, investigators from each field office are receiving a concise course of instruction on the preparation of criminal investigation reports. So far the response of the investigators concerned has been enthusiastic and it is hoped that this technique will make a significant improvement in the quality of their written correspondence.

g. Adequate personnel resources have been available to the group during this reporting period. As personnel have been required in excess of TOE authorizations, because of various operational necessities, they have been provided from the resources of the 18th Military Police Brigade. The group headquarters, which is still in a provisional status, is staffed by three officers, three warrant officers, three non-commissioned officers and five enlisted men. Only four of these spaces are authorized by TOE for the Investigation Section, Headquarters, 18th Military Police Brigade. This section was the nucleus for the headquarters when the group was organized as a separate subordinate command. In addition, the Brigade has provided extra clerical personnel for subordinate numbered TOE detachments as required to meet the needs imposed upon them by the number and disposition of their operating field offices, and heavy work volume. Investigative personnel have been relocated among subordinate TOE units, as necessary, to adjust to fluctuating needs in the areas served by each unit. To meet still increased needs, investigative personnel have been obtained from other in-country resources. On this basis, as of 30 April 1967, the Group had three warrant officers and three enlisted investigators assigned in excess of authorizations for all assigned and attached units. With projected rotations, other losses and gains for the six month period May thru October 1967 calculated, however, these figures will change to nine warrant officer investigators below authorized strengths and seven enlisted investigators above authorizations. This represents, however, a net of two investigators below authorized levels, and eight investigators below the present operating level.

h. During this reporting period the logistical support received by the numbered criminal investigation detachments, all of which have unit identification codes and handle their own requisitioning, was more than adequate. In fact, the 40th Military Police Detachment (Criminal Investigation) was issued five additional  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton trucks in response to a USARV Form 47 submitted in October 1966. As required, an MTOE has been prepared on those vehicles, and it will be forwarded as soon as the moratorium on submitting MTOE's is lifted.

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2. Section 2, Commander's Observations and Recommendations

a. Part I (Lessons Learned)

Unit Administration

Item: Adequate training in basic Army administration is a prerequisite for efficient operations at field office level.

Discussion: Due to the dispersed nature of criminal investigation requirements in the Republic of Vietnam, most detachments must maintain several field offices. This causes routine administrative problems to multiply for field office OIC's as well as detachment commanders, because administrative requirements are compounded each time a field office is established. These problems are further aggravated by erratic courier service and tenuous telephonic communications. As a result, the investigator-in-charge of each field office must have a thorough knowledge of Army administrative procedures. As a minimum, he must be able to implement a workable suspense system, prepare routine indorsements, and maintain a basic filing system. Experience reveals, however, that most investigators are inadequately prepared to meet such a requirement. Furthermore, many of the problems confronting this command stem directly from poor administrative procedures at field office level.

Observation: Training in routine office administration should be stressed during the criminal investigation course at the Military Police School.

Police Liaison

Item: Liaison with counterpart police agencies is a vital aspect of CID operations.

Discussion: In counter-insurgency situations, liaison with counterpart police agencies is extremely important. This is especially true concerning criminal investigation activities. Due to language and ethnic differences, it is difficult for US criminal investigators to develop a network of reliable local national informants. As a result, the Vietnamese police must be relied upon to provide much police intelligence data. This will not occur automatically, however, because a sense of mutual cooperation and understanding must first be established. Unfortunately, some US criminal investigation elements have been reluctant to establish meaningful liaison with Vietnamese police authorities, and much valuable assistance has been lost.

Observation: The overall effectiveness of the criminal investigation effort in Vietnam would be enhanced if closer liaison was maintained with local

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authorities, especially the National Police and the ARVN CID. The ideal situation would be to have a certain number of these policemen attached to each provost marshal. In all probability, however, the Vietnamese do not have adequate personnel resources to permit this. As a result, it is incumbent upon the investigator-in-charge of each field office to insure that his personnel effect close liaison with local police officials.

Case Reports

Item: Uniformity of case reports presents a constant problem in respect to quality control.

Discussion: Many criminal investigators are inadequately prepared to meet the high criteria established in respect to report writing. Although some investigators are naturally more articulate than others, the basic difficulty does not lie in the realm of self-expression. It lies in lack of training, inattention to detail, and non-standardization of administrative requirements throughout the various theaters of operation.

Observation: During formal training periods at the Military Police School, investigator trainees should receive more extensive instruction on report writing. Furthermore, a Technical Bulletin should be prepared that would standardize the administrative requirements placed upon reports of investigation. Such a publication could minimize the deviance that is now caused when each major command prepares its own SOP in respect to report writing. It would further enable an investigator to transfer from one command to another without having to familiarize himself with new reporting requirements.

b. Section 2, Part II, Recommendations.

(1) It is strongly recommended that a TOE Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation) be authorized in this theater of operations. Such an organization would be responsible for all non-tactical criminal investigation elements within the Republic of Vietnam. It could, therefore, synthesize criminal investigation activities throughout the entire command. This goal will never be fully achieved under the present system.

(2) A step in the right direction was made when a provisional Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation) was organized from the resources available to the 18th Military Police Brigade. This organization has provided commanders with a single contact point in respect to criminal investigation matters arising within the 18th Military Police Brigade area of responsibility. In addition, the group concept has increased the responsiveness of criminal investigation elements to the needs of major unit commanders and supported area provost marshals.

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(3) From a police administrative point of view the Group has been able to provide the cohesive element necessary to synchronize the efforts of the four numbered criminal investigation detachments assigned to this theater of operations. It has also provided a focal point for coordinating criminal investigative efforts among the various area provost marshals serviced by those detachments. These advantages have been realized, to a large extent, because criminal investigative resource control has been consolidated at the highest level practical within the military police organizational structure of this command.

(4) The Criminal Investigation Group (Provisional) has provided greater centralized command and control over criminal investigative resources in the Republic of Vietnam than was previously possible. Such control has been achieved by the Group because it has been able to accomplish the following:

(a) Establish and implement uniform policies and procedures within the guidelines prescribed by existing regulations.

(b) Control the assignment of investigative personnel on an economy of force basis.

(c) Provide the flexibility necessary to give area provost marshals specialized assistance in problem areas unique to their respective jurisdictions.

(d) Provide an increased degree of organizational emphasis on criminal investigation matters, especially as they pertain to counter-insurgency situations.

(e) Provide responsive and highly professionalized criminal investigation support to tactical unit commanders or specific tactical operations as required or requested.

(f) Insure that consistently high standards are achieved in respect to completed reports of investigation by providing a detailed and analytical review of each prior to forwarding it to higher headquarters.

(5) Many of the traditional disadvantages associated with provisional organizations have been encountered by the Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation) (Provisional), and to an appreciable degree have hindered its overall effectiveness. The first problem encountered was the requirement to organize a group headquarters with only the resources available within this command. The 18th Military Police Brigade had to provide these resources without the benefit of programmed personnel input for those units in the COMUSMACV. As a result, knowledgeable administrative personnel as

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well as certain items of equipment had to be diverted from the existing numbered criminal investigation detachments in order to staff and equip the Group headquarters.

(6) Also, due to its provisional status the Group headquarters has not been able to relieve its subordinate detachments of many of the cumbersome administrative burdens that presently confront them. Each detachment must still maintain its own property book, as well as requisition, issue and turn-in items of supply and equipment. Each must maintain a unit fund and a morning report in addition to preparing a whole spectrum of personnel, logistical and routine administrative reports.

(7) The brunt of this administration must be borne by detachment commanders. As a result, they have little opportunity to scrutinize the effectiveness of their unit's investigative efforts. Another consideration is the fact that frequently a criminal investigator must be assigned major additional duties in routine administrative areas that interfere with their primary mission of investigating criminal acts. For the criminal investigation unit commander this presents a two headed dilemma. If he assumes all of the administrative burdens himself, he can provide little meaningful assistance in operational matters. By the same token, if he uses an accredited criminal investigator on administrative tasks he seriously hampers his detachment's ability to accomplish its investigative mission.

(8) If the provisional criminal investigation group becomes a TUE organization it will assume all of the administrative tasks presently performed by the operational detachments under its control. A consolidated property book will be maintained at Group level, with all requisitions, issues and turn-ins of equipment being accomplished at that echelon of command. The only property accountability incumbent upon detachment commanders will be that of a hand receipt holder, which is far less exacting than that of a property book officer. Morning reports and unit funds as well as most of the routine recurring reports will be prepared by the Group headquarters.

(9) By assuming these administrative functions, detachment clerical personnel will be free to assist in the functional, rather than the administrative, aspects of detachment operations. This, a major consideration, especially in view of the fact that most detachments must operate one or more field offices in order to provide responsive support to area provost marshals. This taxes their organic clerical personnel resources to the utmost. Even when such personnel are released from routine administrative duties, they are still insufficient in number to adequately train, supervise and augment the work of the indigenous Vietnamese national clerical personnel that, of necessity, must be used in the field offices.

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(10) A truly centralized criminal investigation effort within the Republic of Vietnam cannot be achieved under a provisional establishment. Due largely to the Group's provisional status, only those criminal investigation detachments subordinate to the 18th Military Police Brigade are under its operational control. While this represents the bulk of non-tactical criminal investigative resources, it does not include those criminal investigation elements assigned to the Headquarters Area Command. This is highly significant because they presently have US Army military police criminal investigation jurisdiction throughout the metropolitan area of Saigon. Until these resources are also placed under Group control, a comprehensive and coordinated investigative effort cannot be achieved.

(11) It would be entirely possible to organize an effective criminal investigation group from the personnel spaces available to the non-tactical criminal investigation elements presently functioning within this theater of operations. A total of 104 such spaces are to be found within the organizational structure of the following organizations:

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>SPACES AVAILABLE</u>
Headquarters, 18th Military Police Brigade	4
504th Military Police Battalion	9
716th Military Police Battalion	13
720th Military Police Battalion	9
300th Military Police Company	3
527th Military Police Company	3
40th Military Police Detachment (Criminal Investigation)	12
87th Military Police Detachment (Criminal Investigation)	21
90th Military Police Detachment (Provost Marshal)	6
147th Military Police Detachment (Criminal Investigation)	12
252d Military Police Detachment (Criminal Investigation)	<u>12</u>
Total Personnel Spaces Available	104

(12) These spaces could be incorporated into one criminal investigation group capable of providing much more flexible and responsive support than is now possible. Furthermore, such an organization would require little significant adjustment in the existing grade structure.

(13) Appended to this report at inclosure 3 is a copy of the personnel and equipment section of a proposed TOE that would permit a criminal investigation group to be formed from the personnel spaces currently available in the Republic of Vietnam. When the moratorium is lifted in respect to submitting MTOE's, this headquarters will prepare a formal MTOE, to include full justifications, concerning the organization of a numbered criminal investigation group for this command.

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
AVBGA-C

8 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967,  
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3 Incl

1. Organizational Chart
2. Administrative Information
3. Proposed TOE

  
EDWARD K. BRAKENRIDGE  
LTC MPC  
Commanding

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AVBGA(8 May 67) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
30 April 1967, RCS-CSFOR-65

HEADQUARTERS, 18TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE, APO 96491, 8 June 1967

TO: Deputy Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DH  
APO 96307

1. (U) The Operational Report--Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1967 from the Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation)(Provisional), APO 96491, is forwarded herewith.

2. (FOUO) This headquarters has reviewed the report, considers it adequate, and concurs with the observations and recommendations made, subject to the following comments:


a. Reference paragraph h, Section 1, Part I: The MP Gp (CI) (Prov) has requested additional  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton vehicles for their investigators and their requests will be submitted on an MTOE pending instructions from USARV on MTOEs.

b. Reference item in Section 2, Part I, on Police Liaison (pages 4-5): Concur. Joint efforts in all phases of this Brigade's missions have been effective thus far, and the Brigade's Commanding Officer has encouraged all commanders to increase joint police operations whenever and wherever possible.

c. Reference item in Section 2, Part I, on Case Reports (page 5): Concur with comments concerning quality control of CI reports. Future correspondence from this headquarters to the United States Army Military Police School will include mention of the need for additional training in report writing.

d. Reference paragraphs 1-13, Section 2, Part II: Concur with evaluation and recommendations. CI operations would be greatly enhanced by adoption of proposed TOE.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
W. P. POLEY  
CPT, AGC  
Asst Adjutant

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AVHGC-DST (8 May 67) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 1 JUL 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-OT,  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report--Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1967 from Headquarters, Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation) (Provisional), 18th Military Police Brigade as indorsed.

2. Reference item concerning the proposed TOE, paragraph 2b(1)-(13), pages 5 - 8: Concur. The proposed TOE, to include the personnel and equipment sections, appears workable and consistent with space limitations currently imposed on this command. However, any increase in troop strength above that now present in Vietnam will require an increase in strength of the proposed TOE by the addition of one or more LD teams, TOE 19-500D.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

3 Incl  
nc

E. L. ...  
CPT, USA  
Asst Adjutant General

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
GPOP-DT(8 May 67) 3d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65), HQ MP Gp (Criminal Investigation)  
(Provisional) 18th MP Bde

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 21 JUL 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:




H. SNYDER  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

3 Incl  
nc

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ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

LEGEND:

————— Command  
 - - - - - Attached

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Administrative Information

1. Arrival, Departure and Assignment of key individuals:

a. 1 February 1967:

(1) MAJ Richard A. Wilson was reassigned to HHD, 504th Military Police Battalion.

(2) MAJ Holley D. Bradley was appointed PDY as Executive Officer with an additional duty as S-3.

b. 20 February 1967: CW4 John L. Kelton Jr. joined the command and was assigned as assistant S-3.

c. 25 February 1967: SFC David E. Shortt joined the command and was assigned as S-4 sergeant.

d. 18 March 1967: CPT Adileno Bauce was reassigned to CONUS (204th Military Police Company, Fort Sheridan, Illinois).

e. 22 March 1967: CPT Hector L. Lopez joined the command and was assigned as Commanding Officer, 252d Military Police Detachment (CI), Vung Tau.

2. Awards and Decorations:

a. 6 April 1967: Army Commendation Medal awarded SP4 Gordon E. Smith Jr., 252d Military Police Detachment (CI), for meritorious service.

b. 11 April 1967: Bronze Star Medal awarded CPT James L. Duncan, 40th Military Police Detachment (CI), for meritorious service.

c. 19 April 1967: Army Commendation Medal awarded SSG Lex R. Hodges, 147th Military Police Detachment (CI), for meritorious service.

d. 19 April 1967: 1st Oak Leaf Cluster to the Army Commendation Medal presented CW4 John L. Kelton Jr., for meritorious service while assigned to the 4th Military Police Group (CI).

e. 20 April 1967: Bronze Star Medal awarded to CW2 Frank J. Scott, 40th Military Police Detachment (CI), for meritorious service.

f. 22 April 1967: Bronze Star Medal awarded to CPT Adileno Bauce, 252d Military Police Detachment (CI), for meritorious service.

g. 23 April 1967: Army Commendation Medal awarded SP6 George P. Luketic, 40th Military Police Detachment (CI), for meritorious service.

h. 25 April 1967: Bronze Star Medal awarded CW2 Henry I. Nishikawa, 87th Military Police Detachment (CI), for meritorious service.

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i. 26 April 1967: Army Commendation Medal awarded to SP6 Russell A. Sweetland Jr., 40th Military Police Detachment (CI), for meritorious service.

j. 27 April 1967: Bronze Star Medal awarded CW2 Donald L. Mitchell, 147th Military Police Detachment (CI), for meritorious service.

k. 28 April 1967: Army Commendation Medal awarded to SP5 Joseph M. Kennison, 87th Military Police Detachment (CI), for meritorious service.

3. Courts-martial, Article 15, Reductions:

On 27 April 1967, PFC Charles V. McCallum, RA18992561, was reduced to the next inferior grade under the provisions of paragraph 7-30, AR 600-200.

4. Strength:

a. Beginning of period:

	OFF	WO	EM-I	EM-A
Asgd	3	42	18	9
Attchd	<u>3</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>3</u>
	6	49	26	12

TOTAL STRENGTH

93

b. End of period:

	OFF	WO	EM-I	EM-A
Asgd	4	41	16	21
Attchd	<u>3</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>
	7	47	22	27

TOTAL STRENGTH

103

5. Mail: Effective 25 March 1967, all mail for Headquarters, Military Police Group (CI) (Prov), was received thru APO 96491. The change from APO 96307 was due to relocation in Long Binh, Republic of Vietnam.

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6. Promotions:


- a. 15 February 1967: CPT Adileno Bauce, 252d Military Police Detachment (CI), was appointed to his present grade from CW3.
- b. 28 February 1967: SP4 Thomas L. Rogers, 87th Military Police Detachment (CI), was promoted to his present grade.
- c. 10 March 1967: CW2 Lindell R. Bishop, 504th Military Police Battalion (attached to 40th Military Police Detachment (CI)), was promoted to his present grade.
- d. 27 March 1967: CW2 Robert D. Olsen, 252d Military Police Detachment (CI), was promoted to his present grade.
- e. 28 March 1967: WO1 John O. Robbins, 40th Military Police Detachment (CI), was appointed to his present grade from SP6.
- f. 7 April 1967: PFC Joseph J. Amato, Headquarters, Military Police Group (CI) (Prov), was promoted to his present grade.
- g. 14 April 1967:
  - (1) PFC Alvin Isom, Headquarters, Military Police Group (CI) (Prov), was promoted to his present grade.
  - (2) PFC James B. Pfister, Headquarters, Military Police Group (CI) (Prov), was promoted to his present grade.
- h. 21 April 1967:
  - (1) SP7 George P. Luketic, 40th Military Police Detachment (CI), was promoted to his present grade.
  - (2) SP7 Tommie McMoore, 40th Military Police Detachment (CI), was promoted to his present grade.

7. Civilian Employees: There were 48 Vietnamese National employees employed by units under this command. They were employed as follows:

- a. Headquarters, Military Police Group (CI) (Prov) 1
- b. 40th Military Police Detachment (CI) 19
- c. 87th Military Police Detachment (CI) 12
- d. 147th Military Police Detachment (CI) 10
- e. 252d Military Police Detachment (CI) 6

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MILITARY POLICE SERVICE ORGANIZATION  
— MILITARY POLICE GROUP (CI)



c

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Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) HQ DA, OACSFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	
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