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DEPARTMENT OF THE 'ARMY'
HEADQUARTERS, 14TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION (AM&S) (GS)
APO US FORCES 96240

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INDEXED

AMM-CO

10 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Period Ending
30 April 1966 (Reports Control Symbol CSGPO-28 (R1))

THRU: Commanding Officer
34th General Support Group (AM&S)
APO US Forces 96307

SEP 23 1970
STATEMENT #2 UNCLASSIFIED

TO: Commanding General ~~made~~ only with prior approval of
United States Army Pacific
APO US Forces 96558

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SECTION I

1. Under the provisions of AR 525-24, US Army Vietnam Circular No. 870-1 and letter, Headquarters, US Army Vietnam, subject: Quarterly Command Report, RCS CSGPO-28 (R1), dated 14 March 1966, the following report is submitted.

2. Section I of this report is devoted to the accomplishment of the battalion between 1 January 1966 and 30 April 1966. Administration is covered in paragraph 3 thru 9, Operations in paragraph 10 thru 17 and Organizational Maintenance and Supply in paragraphs 18 thru 21. Footnotes for this section are included at Tabs A, B, and C.

3. At the beginning of this period the Battalion consisted of the Headquarters & Headquarters Company, 14th Transportation Battalion (AM&S)(GS); 540th Transportation Company (AM)(GS); 79th, 335th and 339th Transportation Companies (ADS) plus the 2nd and 260th Signal Detachments. At the close of the period the 604th Transportation Company and the Aviation Electronic Support Company North (Prov) became additional elements of the battalion. In addition, the 241st Transportation Company (Depot) was attached to the battalion for a portion of the reporting period.

4. The 241st Transportation Company (Depot) arrived in country 5 February 1966. By VOCO, 34th General Support Group (AM&S), the unit was attached to this headquarters for administration and logistical support with operational control at Group. Since no facilities for operations were available at Dong Ba Thin, the personnel were distributed to other units to meet personnel shortages and operational requirements. A small element was stationed at Dong Ba Thin to secure and maintain equipment and oversee area development. Personnel Shortages in the supply platoons of the direct support companies were filled and the balance of the personnel were attached to the 110th Transportation Company to assist the Aviation Materiel Management Center, the theater aviation depot supply activity which is an element of 34th General Support Group. General Order Number 11, Headquarters, 34th General Support Group (AM&S) dated 8 April reassigned the 241st Transportation Company to the 53th Transportation Battalion (AM&S) on 12 April 1966.

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5. The 604th Transportation Company (ADS) joined the battalion when it arrived in country 7 March 1966. After 10 days processing at Qui Nhon it moved by convoy to Pleiku from which area it will operate. The unit has been engaged in area development since that time.

6. The Aviation Electronics Support Company North (Provisional) was organized by USARV General Orders Number 1397, dated 2 March 1966 with a effective date of 23 January 1966. The authorized strength of the company is 8 officers, 4 warrant officer and 133 enlisted men for an aggregate of 145 men. The equipment and personnel is to be drawn from local resources. This unit was assigned to the 14th Transportation Battalion by 34th General Support General Orders No 6, dated 7 March 1966 effective 3 March 1966. This same order assigned five (5) Signal Detachments to the battalion. Twelve (12) Avionics personnel from the 128th Signal Depot were assigned at a latter date and Avionics personnel of the direct and general support units of the battalion were attached to the signal elements. Orders effecting these transfers are attached as inclosures 1 thru 5 Tab A.

a. Two platoons were organized from these assets to provide aviation electronic general support. One platoon was established at Qui Nhon and attached to the 79th Transportation Company for administration, rations and quarters; the other was established at Nha Trang and attached to 339th Transportation Company in the same manner. Operational control of the elements remain with the Company Headquarters stationed in Nha Trang.

b. No administrative personnel are available in these elements and an additional administrative burden is placed on other elements of the battalion.

7. The personnel posture of the battalion was critically affected by shortages at the beginning of this period, as it is today. At the beginning of the period the battalion was short 266 of its authorized strength. As a result of repeated written and oral requisitions and inquiries, action to effect diversion of personnel was initiated at 90th Replacement Center. Action to effect this diversion included our initial requisitions placed as our units arrived in the theater; our confidential letters, Subject: Personnel Shortages, dated 6 November 1965 and 1 January 1966; and our Fact Sheet on Critically Short Personnel, by MOS, submitted 9 February 1966. For a period of approximately three weeks approximately 85 replacements were received as a result of these actions. By virtue of normal attrition and gains our strength at the end of February remained 258 men short. At the same time flow of replacements decreased.

a. During the first week of March 1966, this headquarters received conflicting information on our officer replacement requisitions. As a result of a visit by the Battalion Adjutant to both 34th General Support Group and 12th Aviation Group, it was discovered that neither 12th Aviation Group nor 34th General Support Group had requisitioned our officer replacements (before 1 March it was the policy of both Groups to requisition at Group level for officers from officer roster submitted by this Battalion).

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Action was taken to request our officer shortage and the requisition was submitted on 15 March. This request included one (1) month advance request for all our Headquarters Staff Officers and Company Commanders. All our enlisted shortages and all projected losses were requisitioned as of 1 March.

b. As of 30 April we had orders assigning 69 men direct to the battalion from CONUS, however, as reflected in our letter of 6 May, 28 of these men did not report in April, indicating that other units were receiving our replacements as a result of diversion.

c. As of 30 April the Battalion was short 235 men. The major contributing factor to improvement in strength was the reassignment of personnel from the 241st Trans Co (Depot) to units of the battalion and arrival of the 604th Trans Co (DS) at full strength.

d. It must be emphasized that our personnel shortages are known to higher headquarters, as all strength changes are reported daily by radio-telephone to 34th General Support Group who in turn reports them to USARV.

e. Inclosure 6 to Tab A depicts current strength of units in the battalion. Inclosure 7 to TAB A depicts current strength by MOS and projected losses by MOS.

8. This battalion has serious DEROS problems as three of our companies arrived in country in August (the 79th Trans Co (DS) with a DEROS date of 6 August and the Headquarters Company and 540th Trans Co (AM) (GS) with a DEROS of 27 August 1966). During the week of 20-26 March plans were completed to transfer 278 men within the battalion to help spread the impact of the DEROS adjustment over the battalion. All four (4) Direct Support Companies and the General Support Company were affected by the transfer. These transfers were made during the month of April. The following depicts the change in losses in August and October as a result of these transfers:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AUGUST LOSSES</u>		<u>OCTOBER LOSSES</u>	
	<u>Before</u>	<u>After</u>	<u>Before</u>	<u>After</u>
79th	138	95	2	10
335th	2	23	108	62
339th	27	54	15	16
604th	3	50	1	21
540th	120	78	3	20

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9. A Change of Command Ceremony was held at 1000 hours, 22 April 1966. Col Peyer, 34th General Support Group Commander, presented the Battalion Flag to Lt Col Harry L. Jones who assumed command at that time. Lt Col Alfred J. Reese Jr. departed this station for Headquarters, 34th Group on 24 April 1966.

10. In September 1965, the aircraft maintenance and supply support effort in the First and Second Corps tactical zones was directed toward providing direct and back-up direct support for approximately 340 aircraft assigned to 25 separate units. As of 30 April 1966, aircraft density for First and Second Corps was 985 aircraft, assigned to 43 separate units, to include complete general support maintenance support to the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Attached maintenance companies currently provide direct and backup direct support maintenance from two locations (79th at Qui Nhon and 339th at Nha Trang). When the 335th and 604th become operational at Dong Ba Thin and Pleiku, the maintenance support posture will improve in the First and Second Corps areas. The 335th is scheduled to become operational on 1 June 1966. To support the comment with reference to improved maintenance support posture, the following support requirement existed during the month of February. The arrival of a new airmobile company in country with maintenance equipment shortages, necessitated dispatching a DS element from Qui Nhon to Pleiku to provide needed support. The DS element remained at Pleiku until early April, at which time the 604th, located at Pleiku, assumed this limited support requirement.

a. The maintenance workload increased from a total number of aircraft completed during the period 1 July thru 31 December 1965 of 326 to 518 completed for the period 1 Jan thru 30 April 1966. A detailed account of the workload data is attached as Inclosure 1 to Tab B.

b. In November, plans were submitted for a DS and GS maintenance and supply complex at Dong Ba Thin. In addition, plans were prepared and submitted for an aircraft repair parts depot at Dong Ba Thin. In December, plans were submitted for the DS complex at Pleiku. While at this date these facilities are not yet completed the approved plans and construction projects provide a firm base from which maintenance and supply units will operate in the future. In addition, completion of these projects will provide a capability to offset any reverses suffered as the result of enemy actions against any single maintenance complex. Multiple maintenance complexes provide a wide range of flexibility in shifting workloads and support missions as dictated by the tactical situation. While the planned facilities may indicate a state of immobility, each DS Company is required to maintain the capability of dispatching DS platoons by road at any time as indicated above.

c. The availability of general support in the northern zone has contributed remarkably to the total number of aircraft completed during a given period. Non-availability of general support in the past forced the existing direct support company to over commit its capability in accomplishing time consuming single jobs. With the general support company devoting efforts to

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repair work requiring in excess of 750 man hours, the direct support companies are able to provide quick turn around support to the customers.

d. Continued emphasis is placed on the two shift operations in the 79th in order to reduce the down time on individual aircraft in shop. Reducing turn around time on aircraft in shop also increases availability to the user. A letter was recently forwarded to commanders of aviation units soliciting their cooperation in helping to make the scheduled maintenance program a reality. This can be accomplished through providing aircraft to direct support companies on a scheduled for overall equipment improvements.

e. The 540th Transportation Company (GS) is authorized and has in operation one (1) each Engine (T-53 and T-55) Test Stand. During the reported period eighteen (18) T-53 and T-55 engines were submitted to the 540th for repair. Sixteen (16) of these engines were returned to a serviceable condition and two (2) were returned to an overhaul facility in CONUS.

f. The number of aircraft to be evacuated to CONUS for repair at ARADMAC has increased to (20). Aircraft are to be loaded on board ship at Qui Nhon in the near future.

(1) Aircraft to be evacuated are twelve (12) UH-1D's, three (3) UH-1B's, two (2) CH-47's, one (1) OV-1, one (1) OV-2, and one (1) U-6. All aircraft are located at Qui Nhon.

(2) Previous difficulties experienced in obtaining CH-47 and CH-54 aircraft indicated that an alternate method may be required for future movement of aircraft selected for retrograde shipment from Qui Nhon Airfield to CONUS. In an effort to provide this alternate method, coordination was effected with the Qui Nhon Transportation Office and the 394th Terminal Battalion. A meeting was conducted on 9 April in Qui Nhon and present plans provide for the construction of a PSP access road from the Qui Nhon airfield to the beach for movement of aircraft to loading site.

g. Ten (10) additional Dynallectron contractor personnel have been assigned to this battalion. These personnel are here for the purpose of installing the self sealing fuel tanks and performing wing flap modifications on OV-2 aircraft. Repair kits for effecting fuel tank modification are beginning to arrive. Completion date of this modification program is 1 July 1966.

11. The 604th Trans Co (DS) arrived in Qui Nhon from CONUS on 7 March 1966. Moving by highway the company arrived at Pleiku on 16 March 1966. Upon departing CONUS the unit had no ASL, and only a limited quantity of special tools. Prior to departing CONUS the company was assured that special tools and an ASL would be shipped to the overseas destination, but this has not materialized. Planned operational date for the company is 16 May 1966, but full effectiveness will not be realized until the ASL is approximately (50) percent on hand, and the majority of UH-1 helicopter special tools on hand.

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12. Recovery Responsibilities:

a. Two (CH-37) aircraft assigned to 339th Transportation Company (DS) were flight delivered to Vung Tau 31 March 1966 for subsequent return to CONUS. The departure of these aircraft terminated the capability of the 339th Trans Co to accomplish aircraft recovery and evacuation missions requiring lift capability exceeding the capability of UH-1 helicopters.

b. Pending publication of a theater recovery and evacuation directive interim procedures require this headquarters to inform Field Forces Vietnam I of Recovery requirements. Field Forces Vietnam will request recovery aircraft from the First Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

13. Supply activities of the battalion have not had the privilege of a static situation in which to grow and develop hard statistics. The influx of aviation units, in addition to in-country support mission re-alignments have greatly affected workloads and do have a significant impact on data reflected. Therefore, it is recommended that the data reported be taken as hard facts only after considering the influencing factors, which affect these data. The supply activity is depicted in the Tables shown as Inclosure 2 to Tab B.

a. Tables A and B are a rough measure of the workload of the supply activities. From these tables it can be seen that a great imbalance apparently exists between workloads of the battalion DSUs. It is evident that the 79th Trans Co (DS) has the largest supply support mission in the battalion. Also evident, the greatest amount of supply activity occurred during the month of February 66. Influencing factors are that the majority of newly arrived units are located in the geographical area supported by the 79th Trans Co (DS). A large amount of supply traffic is generated by the new arrivals in establishing their PLL/ASL's. Over and above this consideration, the supply activity in the 79th Trans Co (DS) will remain proportionately higher than other DSU's, because of a greater density of aircraft supported, and due to being the supply element for the general support maintenance unit. A partial remedy to the imbalance will occur when the 604th Trans Co (DS) achieves operational status and assumes a portion of the workload presently shouldered by the 79th Trans Co (DS). The 339th Trans Co (DS) supply activity shows a relatively static number of documents processed. The trend here is indicative of the diminishing supply mission of the unit. The 339th Trans Co (DS) is the senior DSU in-country and within the battalion, and as a result has the firmest stockage list, least affected by the build-up. The 335th Trans Co (DS), operational for supply only, is gradually assuming a greater supply mission as is evidenced by the trend in increased supply activity. This unit's organic maintenance elements are not operational, thereby considerably reducing the normal traffic generated by this endeavor. Pending mission realignments will further increase the supply activity of this unit in the future.

b. The EDP workload and response on the part of higher level supply support activity (AMMC) is worthy of special attention. Following tables present statistics on the number of EDP requests submitted by DSUs (Table C) and ages of EDP (Table D). There appears to be little trend or pattern to be derived from the EDP statistics. The number of EDP requests initiated is felt to be more directly related to the operational commitment of the avia-

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tion units, rather than one bearing on supply. It is directly related to the stock position of the supporting DSU. More indicative, is the rate of fill on EDP requests passed to AMMC by DSUs. Weekly samplings of the age of EDP request as held to be open by DSUs are taken, and presented in Table D. It is fairly conclusive that there is a 90% assurance of fill within 20 days, and 97% assurance of fill within 30 days for EDP. Figures for any given day are susceptible to sudden rushes of EDP flow, to maintain a proper perspective, the age of EDP must be considered over an extended period of time.

c. Summary of the status of ASL's at the DSU level is depicted on Table E. Zero balances are greatly affected by changes in supply support mission, as well as indicating satisfactory rates of fill for stock replenishment. The assumption of support of a new type aircraft by a DSU automatically increases the number of line items placed in deficit position to accommodate the new aircraft. At the close of the reporting period, it may be noted that DSU's hold very nearly the same percentage of line items in zero balance. It is felt that a figure of 35% zero balance, or inversely 65% of ASL on hand, is a good representation of the stock position of the DSU's.

d. Demand Accommodation, percentage of requests received which match the ASL of the supporting DSU, expressed in percentages is depicted in Table F.

e. ASL Demand Satisfaction, the ability to fill requests received that match the ASL of the supporting DSU is expressed in percentages in Table G. ASL demand satisfaction is perhaps the best reflection available to measure the stock position of the DSU ASL's. It bears a direct relationship to the number of requests which require passing action to higher supply echelons for satisfaction. Higher stockage levels at the DSU can possibly improve the demand satisfaction rate.

f. Parts delivery from AMMC, Saigon, to the various geographical locations of the DSUs in this battalion servicing the I and II Corps areas has constituted a parts transportation problem. Expanding of the scheduled Freeloader in January 1966 has substantially reduced the parts transportation problem into this area. The number of repair parts needed in this area has not reached its peak. Operational commitments of aircraft in this area will proportionally increase demands for repair parts with the age of the aircraft scheduled, non-scheduled maintenance, and combat damage sustained. It is anticipated that increased parts traffic will materialize in this area in the future. DSUs are responsible for disseminating repair parts received to their customers by organic means of scheduled freeloader. Daily parts shipment accountability is maintained by each DSU and is reportable to this headquarters. Units co-located at DSU locations pick-up parts direct. As a consequence, selfservice pick-up by the using units is not reflected in Repair Parts Delivery (Table A Inclosure 3 to Tab B).

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g. A substantial amount of parts demands became EDP due to operational commitment of the aviation units rather than stockage in the DSU. With the large number of EDP requests passed to AMMO by DSUs, lateral search of parts between units was instituted. On-hand items found within the battalion were laterally transferred to the requesting unit by organic or freeloader transportation. Only a fair amount of EDP requests were filled in this manner, however, maintenance down time was reduced where possible by lateral transfer as shown in Table B, Lateral Transfer (Inclosure 3 to TAB B).

14. AAMTAP training was used to great advantage during this past quarter. Technical proficiency of mechanics was advanced primarily toward the UH-1 aircraft and T-53 engine. The 335th Trans Co (DS) arrived in Vietnam with helicopter mechanics who had no training or experience with the UH-1. Other attached units with heavy requirements for UH-1 maintenance were also short on trained personnel. This headquarters requested and obtained the full UH-1 training allocation for two AAMTAP Courses, which involved sending two full classes to the UH-1 airframe school and two full classes to the T-53 engine school. In addition, quotas were increased for the CH-47 and the T-55 engine. Breakdown of AAMTAP attendance since 1 January 1966 follows:

<u>UH-1</u>	<u>T-53</u>	<u>CH-47</u>	<u>T-55</u>	<u>CV-2</u>
34	36	15	17	2

15. This quarter has been a time of growth for aircraft armament activities in this battalion. Requisitions were submitted in December and January for a shop stock of armament parts in the 540th Trans Co (AM) (GS). These requisitions were based on anticipated needs for both DS and GS maintenance activities. It was obvious at that time and would be forced to pass DS maintenance on to the 540th Trans Co (AM) (GS). When requisitions for GS shop stock were placed receipts of common machine gun parts began almost immediately. Aircraft armament peculiar items took somewhat longer to arrive. As of 1 May approximately 60% of the 1016 lines originally requested have been received by the 540th Trans Co (AM) (GS). This places the 540th in a position to perform a responsive armament mission at this time.

a. Considerable armament system down time can be eliminated by effective use of DX assemblies at DS support level. Unfortunately these assemblies are in short supply in Vietnam because the increase of armed aircraft in recent months. At a 4 March 1966 meeting in Headquarters, 34th General Support Group (AM&S) it was agreed by armament maintenance officer in the 765th Trans Bn and this battalion to divide the available DX assets. This has been done. However, these assets fall far short of minimum requirements. Requisitions for these items were submitted together with the part requirements in January.

b. Assignment of the aircraft armament maintenance and supply mission from 1st Logistical Command to 34th Group has necessitated a realignment of armament maintenance facilities. A letter of instruction to

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attached units was sent on 30 March (Inclosure 4 to Tab B). This calls for a three phase build up in aircraft armament maintenance and supply capability.

(1) Phase I initiated the establishment of an aircraft armament maintenance shop in the 540th Trans Co (AM) (GS). This shop to utilize the combined personnel and material assets of the 79th Trans Co (DS) and the 540th Trans Co (AM) (GS). This shop is now operational.

(2) Phase II - This phase was entered on 1 May with receipt of a message from 34th General Support Group (AM&S) stating that aviation units would submit requirements for aircraft armament parts to their supporting DSU. At that time our three operational supply units submitted ASLs to AMMC. The ASLs submitted contained little or no organizational aviation unit PLL data. Listed parts are primarily from organic DS armament shops. The aviation units were slow to respond to DSU requests for armament PLL's. Liaison visits to the 17th Aviation Group S-4 alerted that headquarters to the need for submitting this data as soon as possible. The 17th Aviation Group in turn alerted the G-4 of Aviation Brigade that armament PLL's are almost non-existent for aviation units in-country. The Brigade S-4 determined this to be a fact and said that they would prepare PLL guides for all aviation units. These guides are to be used by aviation units in developing PLL's based on their own equipment density. In essence, the guide will only be an extract from the appropriate sub-system I2P manual. Brigade interest in the PLL problem should prove of direct value to all DSUs.

(3) Phase III - This phase is entirely dependent upon receipt of supplies and equipment. Receipt of 65% of ASL items and 90% of authorized equipment and tools by assigned units will permit them to enter this final phase. As direct support companies achieve these percentages this battalion will allocate to them a portion of the available maintenance float and DX assemblies based on type and density of supported equipment. At that time units will be directed to begin maintenance operations for aircraft armament in supported aviation units. The 540th Trans Co (GS) will continue to carry all or portion of the DS mission until all DS units are operational in armament maintenance. At that time the 540th Trans Co (GS) will revert to GS support only.

c. The 540th Trans Co (GS) armament shop has not yet experienced the full import of its support mission. Maintenance Requests have been less than the anticipated workload in the future. Supported units are not yet fully aware of the change in responsibility from the Saigon Armament Shop to 540th Trans Co support. The current issue of the battalion maintenance newsletter contains a notice explaining that the 540th Trans Co will perform aircraft armament maintenance in I & II Corps. An official notification through aviation channels explaining the changeover in support activities would be an aid to all concerned.

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16. The Aviation Electronic Support Company North (Prov) has the mission of providing aviation electronics general support maintenance and supply for US Army aircraft and supporting equipment in the I and II Corps areas of Vietnam. Currently the headquarters and two platoons have been established as indicated in paragraph 6 above. The platoon at Nha Trang will provide direct support to units in the Nha Trang area and when fully operational will provide general maintenance and supply support to aviation units located at Nha Trang, Ban Me Thout, Dong Ba Thin and numerous Air Traffic Control units in authorized areas. The platoon at Qui Nhon will provide direct support to units in Qui Nhon and when fully operational will provide general maintenance and supply support to aviation units in Qui Nhon, Hue, Phu Bai, Pleiku and numerous Air Traffic Control units in authorizing areas. A letter to all supported units was dispatched on 29 April 1966 which indicated support assignments and procedures. (Inclosure 5 to Tab B). In a later organizational phase it is planned for additional general support platoons at Dong Ba Thin and Pleiku. With the authorization of the provisional aviation electronic company certain administrative problems require solution. The company draws all of its resources from TOE detachment and the Transportation DS and GS companies. Because of its provisional status there is no authorization for transfer of personnel and equipment to the company. Personnel remain on the morning report of the TOE units. Equipment continues on the property books of the individual TOE organizations. To partially offset the problem of separate property books, one property book officer has been appointed by special orders for the property books of all units located at one installation. Publication and authorization of a TOE for the avionics company and interim authorization to transfer personnel and equipment, without requisitioning by the losing organization, will solve this problem. It is understood the 34th General Support Group is in the process of taking appropriate action.

17. It was determined upon arrival in country that the TOEs of Headquarters and Headquarters Company and the General Support Company were not compatible with in country mission requirements. A Modification of Table of Organization and Equipment was submitted for the Headquarters and Headquarters Company in January 1966 in accordance with USARV Regulation 11-1. Due to a change in format and requirement for citing line numbers as listed in Supply Bulletin 700-20, the MTOE was returned to this headquarters in March 1966. Changes were completed and MTOE resubmitted before the end of April 1966. The MTOE for the headquarters reflects the deletion of the wholesale supply mission listed in TOE 55-66F. The MTOE for the General Support Company, which has been submitted since the close of the reporting period, anticipates the assumption of the component repair workload by the Corpus Christi Bay. If approved this MTOE will reduce the numbers of component repair and avionics personnel in the company and correspondingly provide for an increase in airplane, helicopter and airframe MDS spaces. This action will provide for the workload we have experienced to date.

18. Report for quarter ending 31 December 1965 reflected numerous TOE equipment shortages in assigned units. In re-evaluating supply status it was

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determined that a high percentage of the pending requisitions were not on file in the supporting supply activity. Letter AVAM-D, this headquarters, Subject: Shortage of Supplies and Equipment was distributed to all assigned units on 26 April 1966. (Inclosure 1 TAB C). This letter reemphasizes the unit commanders responsibility in assigning appropriate issue priority designators, obtaining due-outs when requested items are not available, and making periodic follow-ups to ascertain current status. Shortages which materially affect accomplishment of unit mission will be reported to Battalion S4 every 30 days, for command action with the supporting supply activities in an effort to resolve this problem.

19. During this period, three assistance visits were made by the supply and automotive maintenance technicians. Command Maintenance Management Inspection were conducted in four of the seven assigned companies. Areas inspected were motor maintenance and operations; maintenance of assigned aircraft; special tools and records; housekeeping and administrative equipment; weapons maintenance and security; property records and accountability and communications equipment. All deficiencies noted have been corrected by each unit.

20. 14th Trans Bn Reg 700-1, dated 1 April 1966 was distributed to all assigned units (Inclosure 2 to TAB C). This regulation prescribes policies and procedures for unit supply, mess functions, sanitation and redoubt control, personal clothing and command inspections.

21. In order to establish policies and procedures for maintenance and operation of equipment, 14th Trans Bn Regulation 750-11 dated 30 April 1966, (Inclosure 3 Tab C) was distributed to all assigned units. Guidance includes such areas as driver and training and licensing, maintenance responsibilities, motor stables and vehicle safety. Units are required to report status of all motorized equipment and trailers on a weekly basis. In so doing, required parts are being obtained by Battalion automotive maintenance personnel through salvage yards and from other units. Fifty-two (52) major items were removed from dead-line through these means, thus maintaining a deadline rate of less than 5% during the entire period.

SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED

1. Section II of this report is devoted to lessons learned and recommendations. Paragraphs 2 and 3 apply to Administration, paragraphs 4 thru 13 to Operations and 14 thru 19 to Organizational Supply and Maintenance.

2. The extreme difficulty in obtaining replacements requires that command emphasis be placed on insuring that all replacements programmed for the command are received and every effort is made to obtain as many unassigned personnel as possible upon their arrival in country.

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3. The lack of personnel replacements and fillers coupled with additional organizations within the command contribute to an excessive administrative workload. Administrative "overhead" should be kept to a minimum in order to preserve operating efficiency at reduced manpower. The practice of operating with an administrative burden in a combat zone equal to or greater than CONUS requirements may well prove extremely detrimental to operations. The personnel shorages will especially be noted when large rotation humps are experienced. Efforts should be made to "streamline" operations in anticipation of operating with reduced personnel due to rotation humps. All staff sections and commanders should attempt to eliminate any unnecessary reports and reduce publications to essential items.

4. There exists in theater a great degree of non-standardization in procedures for aviation supply. This lack of uniformity extends throughout all elements concerned with aviation supply. The chief contributor to this condition is the absence of written procedures for aviation supply for theater application. Present system incorporates excerpts from several Army Regulations, USAAVCOM Supply Letters, local SOP's, and numerous messages and letters from various headquarters. At a particular disadvantage are incoming operational units confronted with the task of organizing a supply operation. Maintenance and supply assistance teams of this battalion do assist in this respect; however, the lack of written procedures somewhat restricts their efforts. A comprehensive theater-wide supply policy is needed to provide definitive guidance to all supply levels.

5. Transportation of aviation supplies in I and II Corps is usually entirely dependent on the services of Freeloader (CV-2) to deliver cargo from Saigon (AMMC) to direct support units. Only a fraction of aviation supply transportation requirements are met by USAF intra-theater airlift, normally consisting of low-priority items, or those of such bulk and weight as to prevent movement by CV-2. Once delivered to direct support units, distribution of aviation supplies is accomplished by several means. Aviation units co-located or adjacent to a direct support unit present no problem, having access to vehicular delivery. Aviation elements at scattered, remote locations fare less well. It has been the policy of this battalion that parts deliveries to customers units will be made by supporting direct support units via the most expeditious means. Airlift organic to direct support units is limited to UH-1 aircraft. Freeloader circuits are scheduled stops at stations of major aircraft concentrations. Direct support units are able to exercise limited control over Freeloader aircraft, and much utilization is inevitably lost. Neither means, organic or Freeloader, offer any genuine flexibility insofar as intra-battalion airlift requirements are concerned. A definite need does exist for a capability to shift assets, move reparables to and from the general support unit, and to perform EDP lateral transfer actions. Recommend that a comprehensive logistical distribution system be the subject of a study. It would appear that the mission of moving supplies from the wholesaler (AMMC) to the retailer (DSU) is basically a USAF function. Freeloader is an innovation adopted to compensate for a deficiency in response for high-priority EDP items. Secondly, that

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fixed wing cargo type aircraft be mission-assigned to direct support units at Nha Trang and Qui Nhon. These aircraft would perform parts deliveries throughout the I and II Corps areas. This measure would achieve the desired flexibility, as well as assuring aircraft utilization.

6. Under the COSTAR concept, the supply mission of the direct support units is one of considerable magnitude. Personnel authorizations in the TOE are inconsistent with the enlarged supply mission. Particularly affected are direct support units assigned the mission of supporting a general support maintenance unit for supplies. Direct support units are organized under TOE 55-457E. The TOE authorizes twenty-eight enlisted personnel and one officer. The commissioned officer position calls for the grade of lieutenant. It can be readily envisioned that few officers of this junior grade have the necessary experience or technical background. It would appear judicious to have a supply warrant officer (MOS 768A) authorized in the supply platoon to provide the extensive technical knowledge required, while a commissioned officer in the grade of Captain be authorized for normal command and leadership functions. Further TOE inadequacies are evident in that key punch operators (MOS 74B20) are not authorized. Supply Personnel must be diverted from their normal duties, cross-trained and converted to this MOS field.

7. Aviation Electronics Support Company administrative personnel should have been assigned upon activation of the company.

8. Requisitioning authority should have been given to the aviation electronic support company at some period before they were to assure a supply mission. This would allow them to build up an ASL rather than using (and depleting) the existing ASL of the individual detachments.

9. The Aviation Electronic Support Company TOE should not include the 31Q20 MOS (Avionics Line Men). The company mission is general support and back-up direct support, and it cannot be fulfilled with repairmen trained only in changing modules in aircraft.

10. The number of supply personnel authorized the AVEL Co is inadequate to carry out a dual mission of technical supply for direct and general support.

11. Aircraft armament must make considerable progress to achieve an acceptable supply and maintenance capability. All attached DS and GS companies are lacking parts, tools, and test equipment in varying degrees. Our immediate goal is to obtain sufficient material to perform our mission in all assigned DSU's. Maintenance support will be provided from the 540th Trans Co (AM) (GS) while the DS companies are preparing to go into operation. Our ultimate objective is to provide armament maintenance in DSU's utilizing DX and floats to a maximum. This will keep a maximum number of armament systems mission ready at all times.

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12. Support type units (Aircraft Maintenance and Supply) are ineffective without tools and repair parts. Assurance should be obtained that prior to deployment from CONUS necessary tools, equipment, and repair parts either are on hand or are available at destination. Companies not attached to this battalion have arrived in-country with either gross shortages of equipment and supplies, or with insufficient types or quantities of each.

13. The 540th Transportation Company (GS) is organized under TOE 55-458E. The TOE does not provide for an adequate airframe repair capability. As a result, an augmentation of civilian airframe repairmen (20 ea) from the Dynalectron Corporation was assigned to the 540th Trans Co (GS). The assignment of these highly skilled civilian personnel has provided a nucleus from which assigned military personnel can gain experience, and has also provided an important augmentation to the GS maintenance capability of this battalion. It is strongly recommended both DS and GS TOE's be reviewed and the airframe repair capability be increased by at least 100%.

14. Inspections. Prior to January 1966, only assistance visits and inspections were conducted by the battalion staff; however, when CMMI type inspections began in January, it was found that corrective action recommended during assistance visits was inadequate or ignored. Although more time consuming, it is obvious that periodic command inspections are necessary in order to keep equipment and records in an acceptable state.

15. Special tools authorized in pertinent technical manuals were found to be short or missing. Only after a report on status of special tools and shop sets was required, did the units submit requisitions for missing items. The requirement from 34th General Support Group (AM&S) for posting these tools in the property book not only insures accountability but also makes an annual inventory mandatory on these items.

16. Tracer letters on important correspondence which has been pending for 60-90 days has proven to be essential in moving requests for equipment in excess of authorized allowances and Reports of Survey. One tracer letter helped to locate four USARV Forms 47 which had been submitted in December 1965. An intermediate headquarters found the correspondence in late March 1966 with priority 05 requisitions attached.

17. Improper use of issue priority designators has resulted in excessive delay in obtaining required items. Supporting supply activities are reluctant to cancel high priority requisitions and until a higher supply echelon rejects the request for improper use of priority, the requesting unit awaits supply action. Items for which 02 priority was used for clothing and bedding, neither of which can justify higher than an 05 priority. Had the proper priority been assigned originally, supply action would have been continued on the requisitions rather than rejected and requiring resubmission several weeks later.


AVAM-CO

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18. Due to theft of items which other units need but are unable to obtain through supply channels, extra security of equipment is required in country. Security around aircraft maintenance ramps has been increased after loss of two generators by assigned units. Pilferage often occurs while equipment is in transit. Sensitive equipment should always have a unit representative accompany the shipment.

19. To maintain the lowest possible equipment deadline rate, a weekly equipment status report must be required from assigned units, listing status of all motorized equipment. All efforts at unit and battalion level must be exhausted to obtain required repair parts.


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DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) HQ DA, OACSFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	
		2b. GROUP	
3. REPORT TITLE Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 14th Transportation Battalion			
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates) Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations 1 Feb to 30 April 1966.			
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name) CO, 14th Transportation Battalion			
6. REPORT DATE 10 May 1966		7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 16	7b. NO. OF REFS
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.		8b. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) 660084	
b. PROJECT NO. N/A		8c. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
c.		d.	
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT			
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY DA, OACSFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT			