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AD NUMBER
AD874586
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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IN REPLY REFER TO

AD 87 4586

AGDA (M) (3 Sep 70) FOR OT UT 702198 8 September 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army Depot, Long Binh, Period Ending 30 April 1970

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BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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AD 87 4586

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY DEPOT, LONG BINH
APO 96332

AVCA SGN FD MGT

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SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned, United States Army
Depot, Long Binh, Period Ending 30 April 1970

THRU: Commanding Officer
US Army Support Command, Saigon
ATTN: AVCA SGN GO S
APO US Forces 96491

TO: Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES:

a. PLANS AND OPERATIONS:

(1) Construction:

(a) The 19,000 LF Security Fence and Lighting project (\$1,000,000) has been completed and is awaiting final inspection by PA&E Electrical Engineers prior to acceptance. Paving of the Depot Headquarters parking lot and the Company B Mess Hall parking lot with its access road was completed on 20 February 1970.

(b) Projects under construction are:

The railroad extension to serve USADLB

The 24,000 SF Care and Preservation Whse 422 (Bldg 4535)

(c) The Hardstand Upgrade for the PDO Facility was disapproved by the Facilities Review Board as being non-essential.

(d) Other significant construction items of lesser importance occurring during the quarter were:

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Two gate houses of contemporary design, which also serve as depot entrance identification, were completed at Gate #2. These gate houses, now located at both major depot gates, enhance the appearance of the depot, facilitate Military Police operations, and provide one of the most unique entrances found at any military complex in the theater.

Civilian contractor repaired multiple breaks in the water distribution system on depot. Breaks had occurred at weak joints in the line when pressure was increased for acceptance testing.

The MHI - 208 Facility was relocated nearer the PDO Activity. This relocation reduced travel distance and saved time, and also provided a more functional yard layout. Facilities at the new location include an office shed, a dispatch and parts building, a grease rack, a maintenance and tire repair shed, and a wash-rack.

Upgraded, compacted, and provided drainage in preparation for the paving of the service road to rear of Depot Headquarters.

Constructed a cargo checkout lane at Gate #2. This lane facilitates and expedites the inspection of outbound cargo and greatly reduces the traffic bottleneck at this gate.

Significant progress was made in upgrading the storage pads in the PDO yard. Approximately 20% of the Storage Area has been completed thru self-help after normal operating hours, utilizing borrowed equipment.

Commercial power was installed in the USADLE Motor Pool eliminating four generators and releasing two generator operators for other duties.

(2) Packing and Crating: 22,000 packing and crating items were constructed by the Box and Pallet Shop during the quarter to support the depot storage and shipping operations. A shortage of pallet kits remains the critical item in this operation. At present "kits" are being fabricated by the Box Shop.

(3) Fire Prevention: A program of classes on fire prevention and fire fighting was initiated, with emphasis placed on fire drills and on electrical safety and fire hazards.

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(4) Materials Handling Equipment:

(a) All Towmotor 4,000# solid rubber tired fork lifts were exchanged for the Hyster 4,000# lift, standardizing our 4,000# solid rubber tire lifts. Deficiencies encountered with the braking system and drive tires resulted in a 28% deadline. Appropriate corrective reports were submitted as required by regulations.

(b) Fork lift utilization was closely scrutinized and over twenty 4,000# pneumatic tired Towmotor and 15000# pneumatic tired Hyster lifts have been returned to command stocks as not required for depot operations.

(5) Motor Pool Operations:

(a) Transportation of military personnel from the Troop Command Billet areas to the work sites by enclosed vans was suspended and bus service was established.

(b) Night Dispatch operations were modified to permit tighter controls on vehicles parked in the Motor Pool Parking Area. The Entrance/Exit gates are locked between 2000 hrs and 0600 hrs daily and are opened only to process properly documented vehicles.

(c) The Tool Room was completely reorganized with tool control tightened and daily inventory simplified by the development of a "Shadow" board for tool storage.

(6) Property Disposal Operations:

(a) Inventory in scrap continued to rise although usable materials inventory remained at the same approximate level. The primary problem is in contractor performance; current planning is to accumulate new receipts in regulated lots and reported as one-time sales for a definite quantity. This action should permit several contractors to remove the same type material concurrently.

(b) Operations are still hampered by the lack of suitable drained storage space; however, self-help programs are being intensified to alleviate as much of the problem as possible prior to the onset of the monsoons.

(7) Class I:

(a) Reductions in supported troop strengths have been evident, but have not had an appreciable effect on workload, since they have been more than offset by reductions in authorized and available personnel (military and local national).

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(b) Strenuous efforts have been required to bring customer service to its present level. This has involved extensive revisions in operating procedures and the implementation of new techniques. Efficiency in both cold and dry storage areas has been increased through improved stock locator procedures. A planograph system was developed and implemented in cold storage. Dry storage implemented a standard stock locator system, after extensive rewarehousing of stocks.

(c) New data processing programs have been initiated for non-perishable stock records and implemented for perishables. Increased emphasis has been put on both quantity and quality of customer service, notably by improving communications between the depot and the customer.

(d) A 100% inventory was conducted at the end of March resulting in a much more accurate count as perishable operations were halted for one day and non-perishable operations for two days. Measures have been implemented to increase personnel safety and to prevent pilferage.

(8) ECM:

(a) The Engineer Construction Material Yard was operational for 89 days of the reporting period.

(b) Per contract DAJB-1170-C-0096, the Government anticipates that it will require the following scope of supply activities per month:

1 April - 30 June

ASL Lines:	3,500
Storage:	80,000 S/T
Receipts:	25,000 S/T
Issues:	25,000 S/T
Rewarehouse:	2,000 S/T
Recoup:	2,500 S/T

(c) Performance for the Months of Feb - April 70.

	<u>FEB 70</u>	<u>MAR 70</u>	<u>APR 70</u>
ASL Lines:	5,857	5,927	8,297

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	<u>FEB 70</u>	<u>MAR 70</u>	<u>APR 70</u>
Storage, Depot and customer assets	148,606.9 S/T	148,407.8 S/T	142,683.8 S/T
Receipts:	39,175.5 S/T	37,663.7 S/T	49,719.8 S/T
Issue/Shipped:	39,578.2 S/T	40,172.5 S/T	46,720.9 S/T
Rewarehouse:	4,054.0 S/T	1,871.5 S/T	810.1 S/T
Recoup:	3,334.0 S/T	2,722.0 S/T	2,085.0 S/T

(d) ECMY retrograded 3,063.5 S/T of excess materials during this reporting period.

(e) The cyclic inventory "Project Count Always", period 8 Oct 69 thru 10 Apr 70. Six thousand two hundred and seventy-eight lines have been inventoried with a dollar value of \$38,338,908.06. Dollar adjustments: over, \$521,513.58; short, \$328,366.32; Net gain, \$193,152.26.

(f) ECMY loaded and/or offloaded 16,223 trucks during the period, and received a total of 4,067.2 S/T of material by rail. Direct diversion from port was accomplished on 53,631.7 S/T of material.

(9) DPU Activity:

(a) 3SVE Version 4, 5, and 5A were instituted during this quarter.

(b) The Due-out file has been purged of approximately 60,000 lines.

(c) Two hundred KW generator was replaced with 100 KW generator. The smaller generator works fine but will not carry the air conditioner. As a result, P&E must bring out an additional generator when there is a long duration power failure.

(d) Commenced training of one LM Keypunch Operator for micromation operations.

(e) Completed 25 daily cycles in March and 28 in April in addition to 4 weekly cycles and a monthly cycle each month.

(f) Received mechanical replacements for main components of the IBM 1401 computer system, the IBM 519 Document Originating Machine, and 2 IBM 557 interpreters.

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(g) Released one IBM 29 Key punch and one IBM 59 Verifier.

(h) The Keystone Documentation system was developed because of the extensive requirements imposed upon those agencies accounting for the receipt, classification, and movements of all material handled in the Keystone redeployment projects.

(i) The Red Ball Processing Cycle has been upgraded and automated. The new system has significantly decreased depot processing time on Red Ball requisitions and referrals. In addition, automatic depot locations (up to 20) are provided for ease of storage operations.

(10) Logistics:

(a) Stock Control (ECMY):

<u>Month</u>	<u>Transaction Line Items</u>		<u>Dollar-Value (Millions)</u>	
	<u>Rec</u>	<u>Issues</u>	<u>Rec</u>	<u>Issues</u>
February	2,113	4,800	9.0	12.5
March	1,079	5,116	4.5	8.0
April	1,285	4,245	6.0	9.5
TOTALS:	4,477	14,161	19.5	30.0

(b) Storage (ECMY):

<u>Month</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>	<u>Adjustments</u>	<u>Depot Assets</u>
	<u>Received</u>	<u>Issues</u>	<u>Revised</u>		<u>On Hand</u>
					<u>End of Month</u>
February	39,175.5	39,578.2	4,054.0	835.7	123,927.9
March	37,663.7	40,172.5	2,722.0	441.4	121,860.5
April	49,719.8	46,720.9	810.1	(730.6)	124,128.8
TOTALS:	126,559.0	126,471.6	7,586.1	2,007.7	

(c) Storage: The Storage Division of USADLB continues to emphasize location surveys, research of warehouse denials, receipt processing, and processing material release orders. A central retrograde processing facility was put into operation and two new storage areas were opened.

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Storage Division received the Production Control mission and staff. The 295th Heavy Material Storage Detachment has been assigned to Storage to re-establish the Airmobile Engineer Equipment Pool. The in-storage maintenance, organizational maintenance, acceptance inspections, and inspections prior to issue, of tactical wheel vehicles are being performed by Winzell Corporation. The in-storage quality surveillance inspection of chemical and paper products continues. The training of Local Nationals in all areas of storage operations continues with outstanding results.

(d) Transportation:

(1) During the reporting period Transportation Management Division shipped 27,253.0 S/T of supplies. During the first month 6,891.7 S/T were shipped. During the last month 10,459.0 S/T were shipped. The increasing trend was due primarily to greater availability of transportation assets at the end of the period than the beginning. Towards the end of the period, asset availability began to show a slight downward trend due to an increase in competing higher priority requirements. The downward trend appears to be continuing.

(2) In January 1970 a thru-put system for vehicles was established. Back ordered vehicles are delivered directly to consignees from Newport. This eliminates an intermediate stop at the depot, thus saving time in shipment and transportation cost. The Depot Port Liaison Team, working closely with Stock Control Division, has ironed out most of the bugs and the system is operating effectively. During the reporting period, 942 vehicles and pieces of equipment were delivered to customers by means of the thru-put system.

(3) Until March 1970, Transportation Management Division's accounting and filing system had been completely manual. An off line computer program was written and put into effect in March to account for cargo shipped and show the status of cargo staged for movement. Only TCIDs are being accounted for at the present time. Accountability for each line item shipped was the original goal, but the Transportation Division presently has neither the personnel nor the facilities for such an expansion. The new machine report is proving to be a valuable management tool.

(4) In March 1970 Transportation Management Division assumed total responsibility for the operation of the cargo control point at Gate #2. Greater cargo security and reporting accuracy have been realized at the gate pass section, which accounts for and reports hand carry tonnages.

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(e) Stock Control: Stock Control Division established a Special Projects Section to handle the major portion of preparation of the Monthly Report on Changes in Appropriate Financed Secondary Item Inventories Report (SIT Report). During February, March and April, 1970, increased command emphasis on the SIT Report and the Monthly Depot Capitalization Report has resulted in significant improvement of the financial data base, including a reduction in depot capitalization of approximately 100 million dollars to approximately 200 million dollars.

b. Personnel and Administration:

(1) Troop Command:

(a) Company "A" was dissolved effective 23 February 1970 and personnel were transferred to the remaining companies. The mission of the five remaining lettered companies B, C, D, E, and F continues to be the support of the U.S. Army Depot, Long Binh.

(b) Security Guard Company requirements and loss of personnel still constitutes a burden for the lettered companies, which must cover the deficit in fulfilling the guard commitments.

(c) The establishment of a permanent reactionary force officer increased the reliability and effectiveness of this position, vital to the security of Long Binh Post. The permanent reactionary force OIC is able to keep up to date with the situation and daily intelligence. In the event the reactionary force is deployed, detailed awareness of the situation, blocking positions and suitable tactics is extremely important during this critical period. By avoiding daily change of OIC, many man-hours are saved in support of USADLB.

(2) Depot Inspector:

(a) During the third quarter, 25 requests for assistance were received and processed. Two Pre-AGI inspections were conducted and all Depot Non-Appropriated Funds were reviewed and inspected with satisfactory results.

(b) Inspections of all depot operating sections were conducted, plus spot checks and reinspections of some sections where necessary. Five I.G. Complaints were received and processed.

(c) A Survey of Local National attendance in comparison with Daily Personnel Status Reports on the Depot was also conducted.

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(3) Safety: Safety lectures and comprehensive safety surveys have been given to all Depot areas. Safety lectures covered a variety of subjects and included causes and lessons learned from previous accidents. Safety surveys have helped to uncover many unsafe conditions and prevent unsafe acts.

(4) Management:

(a) MEDA-05 was submitted in March 1970. Space reductions were implemented on 14 April as part of Keystone Bluejay. Largely as a result of these reduced authorizations, Military and Local National Strength has dropped approximately 15% since the last report. There has been no corresponding decrease in Depot missions or workload. The vast amount of organizational realignment is accurately reflected in the new Organization and Functions Manual, dated April 1970.

(b) The decline in strength necessitated a program of dynamic evaluation and improvement in manpower utilization. Analyses made in each operating element for conditions of reduced manning resulted in publication (Feb 70) of a Contingency Plan and Alternative Manning Levels.

(c) USADLB Command Management Objectives, containing 61 internally generated management improvement projects, was published late April 70. This document, together with the Command and Control Improvement Programs (also updated in April 70) describe much of the management program at the Depot.

(d) Management Analyses were completed during the period, as follows:

Survey and Reorganization of Flight Operations

Survey of ISSA Reimbursable Issues

Alert and Evacuation Procedures

Common Service Support

(e) Statistical studies made of Depot processing time have shown a 10.2 day improvement in IPD 12 requisition time chargeable to the Depot. This improvement has taken place since July 69, and reflects concentrated and protracted management attention. Supply system responsiveness to customers has thereby been greatly enhanced.

(f) Cost Reduction actions submitted during the quarter have brought the FY 70 total to twenty. Army Audit Agency has validated

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USADLs actions in the amount of \$2,034,300, with ten actions (\$1,962,200) still pending. A Cost Reduction study completed March 1970 evaluated 94 candidate cost reduction actions, and found thirty-five to have worthwhile potential.

(c) The Suggestion Program was also vitalized during this period. Quarterly submissions set a new record. Cumulative adopted suggestions for which awards were made, jumped from 4 to 11 during the period.

(5) ECMY:

(a) Another reduction in the manning of ECMY became effective 1 April 1970. This resulted in reduction of six US, five TCN and 38 LN personnel spaces.

(b) Administration: The new manning consisting of 27 US, 55 TCN and 602 LNs for operation of the ECMY, 1 April thru 30 June 1970, was approved by the U.S. Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam. The reference figures are a voluntary reduction by PA&E, from the contract manning of 29 US, 60 TCN and 611 LNs. This has resulted in a labor cost saving of \$10,873 per month.

(6) Chaplain Supply Items: Transactions of ecclesiastical items included: 58 transactions in February, 79 in March, and 57 in April resulting in a reduction of costed inventory (acquisition cost) from \$53,455 to \$46,859.

c. Security Operations:

(1) Security Guard Company: Operations of the Security Guard Company for this quarter have been aimed at maintaining and improving the defensive posture of the perimeter. Irregularly scheduled sweeps have been conducted throughout the area of operations as directed by GSC, Troop Command.

(2) Communications: The communications section of Troop Command in addition to maintaining communications traffic daily, has begun the task of improving communications by the installation of a 25 pair cable and terminating all lines to PDO command bunker for better control. At the present time, bunkers 300-330 are controlled by area 208 operations and bunkers 332-374 by PDO command bunkers. By using 25 pair cable, maintenance and trouble-shooting man-hours would decrease tremendously.

2. LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

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a. PERSONNEL:(1) Troop Command:

(a) Observation: The number of personnel rotating at a rapid rate and replacements slowly reporting in remains a constant problem in relation to fixed, large bunker guard commitments, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the U.S. Army Depot mission.

(b) Evaluation: The morale of the personnel is greatly affected by the increase of bunker duty with no decrease in work hours to be accomplished at the Depot worksite.

(c) Recommendation: Reduction of Troop Command bunker guard responsibility in the defense of Long Binh Post.

(2) Adjutant:

(a) Observation: Reports for Suspension of Favorable Personnel Actions (DA Form 268) were not being submitted in accordance with the time frames set forth in AR 600-31.

(b) Evaluation: Company clerks are not thoroughly familiar with the regulation, do not maintain adequate suspense files and are often not informed of developments in a case which require submission of a flagging report.

(c) Recommendation: That the Courts and Boards Office will send written notification to each company indicating which DA Forms 268 were past due and which DA Forms 268 would become due in the next two weeks. Letters of notification will be sent out every two weeks, or more frequently if required. A Depot Form Letter will be prepared for this purpose. As a result of this procedure, DA Forms 268 should be submitted as required by AR 600-31 (Note: this has been accomplished since the last reporting period).

(3) Adjusted DEROS:

(a) Observation: Adjusted DEROS (early drops) of enlisted personnel during the reporting period resulted in diminution of strength and in administrative problems in the processing of personnel.

(b) Evaluation: The procedure used of adjusting DEROS on a by - name basis with a seven to five day notice to the individual resulted

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in hardship to some of the individuals, and in increased and "crash" administrative workload. Men received drops who did not have reassignment orders issued by Personnel Services Center in their possession. They were delayed in clearing and shipping their personal property in the short time allotted to them between notice of drop and adjusted DEROS. In addition, the short timeframe did not permit advance issuance of amended orders by Personnel Services Center adjusting DEROS and UDOSA to the USARV Trans Det. The amendment, prepared in indorsement form, was forwarded by the Personnel Services Center to the Morning Report unit after the man had already signed out and departed. Non-receipt or delayed receipt of the indorsement resulted in personnel being carried as assigned on the Morning Reports who were already assigned to USARV Trans Det.

(c) Recommendation: That future adjusted DEROS of enlisted personnel be administered in such a manner as to provide sufficient time to have orders and/or amended orders with adjusted DEROS and UDOSA to the individual's unit at least 15 days prior to adjusted DEROS.

(4) Local National Attendance:

(c) Observation: In some cases time sheets are not maintained by U.S. Personnel. Time sheets should be signed in the morning when LN personnel arrive and not at night before they leave.

(b) Evaluation: A personnel status report should be maintained. Information on the amount of sick and annual leave time should be furnished to each supervisor. More care in the proper handling and verification of time sheets should be exercised by U.S. Personnel.

(c) Recommendations:

That verification of the time sheets be done periodically by comparing a list of personnel not picking up their Depot passes against the time sheets for that day.

Establish a procedure to direct the proper handling and verification of the Daily Time Sheets.

A report of LN Leave information be obtained from the Finance Office, and that this information be furnished the various activities of the Depot with instructions on how it should be maintained.

(5) Night Operations:

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(a) Observations:

Depot areas that have always been kept open at night in anticipation of receipts from the port are sometimes experiencing long periods of time without receipts i.e. vehicle park.

Some areas have personnel working hard on a project while next door the people have little or nothing to do because of no receipts or issues.

(b) Evaluation: Night crew personnel must be better than average people, who show motivation and initiative without close supervision to accomplish their missions. A good deal of manpower could be saved in areas that have little activity for extended periods of time.

(c) Recommendations: Personnel and equipment be pooled under the operational control of a night operations section. Any carry-over workload from the day shift be coordinated through that office for completion by the night shift task force. This coordination will allow the Operations Officer to concentrate his personnel force on necessary areas on a "Designated Priority" or an "As Required" basis, whichever is appropriate. (Note: This is currently being implemented.)

(6) Local National Training Program:

(a) Observation: There is urgent need to train Local Nationals at all levels in Supply and Storage operations.

(b) Evaluations: A training program for Local Nationals in Storage Operations and Procedures has been initiated and implemented. Phase I of the training program was at the supervisory level. Phase II will consist of the training of warehousemen non-supervisory type personnel.

(c) Recommendation: That training programs be accelerated and be made a matter of Command emphasis due to increase in troop withdrawals.

(7) Tet Holiday Period:

(a) Observation: During the Tet holiday period operations were continued only through the use of military personnel in jobs that belong normally to local nationals.

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(b) Evaluation: Despite incentives such as holiday pay, only about five percent of the local national workforce were present for duty during the Tet holidays. Shifting of military personnel was required to continue operations. The mission was continued only by extensive overtime by military personnel.

(c) Recommendation: That customers be requested to requisition sufficient supplies before the Tet holidays to reduce the workload; and that through coordination with the port, the number of receipts during this period be reduced.

b. INTELLIGENCE: None.

c. OPERATIONS:

(1) Paper in short supply for ADP:

(a) Observation: Three part, five part, six part paper is in constant replenishment and usually cannot be procured through normal supply channels; it must be ordered through the Property Book Officer.

(b) Evaluation: The paper is critical to our operation and creates production problems when the supply diminishes. At times we have to travel to Tan Son Nhut AMSC to obtain paper because all other supply channels fail to produce it.

(c) Recommendation: Our replenishment problem would be relieved if the normal supply channel could be used. Thus an evaluation of our supply system should be conducted by the proper authorities. (Note: this was stated in the previous report, and concurred in by higher headquarters but the situation continues to exist).

(2) Procedure for Equipment Turn-In:

(a) Observation: On turn-in Projects Cardinal and Eagle, the equipment was sent to Depot Receiving Department for inspection prior to acceptance as Depot stock. Results were the need for several inspectors at or on call for receiving area. The receiving building was crowded with turn-in equipment, much of it sent directly to PDO from building 412, and increased activity interfered with normal receiving activity work. It was not a smooth nor satisfactory operation.

(b) Evaluation: When Project Bluejay was activated, the decision was made to inspect and direct disposition of material at equipment turn in points, Di An and 604th areas. Quality Assurance Office

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furnished personnel to perform this function, and equipment was sent to retrograde, PDO, Maintenance, or Depot stock without overburdening Depot Receiving Department.

(c) Recommendation: On future Army equipment turn-in of large amounts of supplies, inspection and disposition be made by qualified personnel at processing points rather than Depot Receiving building.

(3) Planograph System for Class I:

(a) Observation: Due to the nature of products handled and rapid turnover, Perishable Storage Section found the standard stock locator system unsuitable to its needs.

(b) Evaluation: The standard stock location system proved undesirable since items are received and handled in case lots; rapid turnover and rewarehousing placed increased burdens on data processing facilities. A planograph system was incorporated, showing item locations by row and date of pack. This system has greatly enhanced location accuracy and has made stock rotation practices work much more smoothly.

(c) Recommendation: That the current planograph system be continued in lieu of standard locator system.

(4) Contract Care & Preservation of Non-Perishables:

(a) Observation: Although the Non-Perishable Section was not staffed to perform any recoup activities, the civilian contractors have not been able to keep up with the volume of work generated. The Section has been doing all of the unpacking and repalletizing; the contractor has been performing only repackaging (placing plastic, fiberboard, and banding on the repalletized stacks) and stenciling.

(b) Evaluation: Food Management Division cannot let too large a backlog of pallets accumulate since that situation would greatly complicate inventory procedures, and create a health hazard.

(c) Recommendation: Insure that the new contract for Class I C&P explicitly states what is expected of the contractor in regard to the recoup activities.

(5) Air Missions of Subsistence Items:

(a) Observation: During this period numerous instances relating to cancelled, delayed, or missed air missions of subsistence items

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from Bien Hoa to customers at Binh Thuy and Soc Trang created critical shortages of perishable subsistence items at customer locations. When shipments were cancelled, delays by Air Force and TMA personnel in notifying the Depot resulted in losses of subsistence due to condemnations and forced issues.

(b) Evaluation: Several steps were implemented to alleviate this problem. Through direct coordination between Depot personnel and personnel of TMA and the Air Force at Bien Hoa, more responsive communications between these agencies was established. Improved working relations and mutual appreciation of problems has resulted. To offset the shortages of subsistence items at customer locations, use of Army aircraft to supplement or substitute for Air Force missions has brought excellent results.

(c) Recommendation: That cooperation and coordination between Depot, TMA, and Air Force personnel at Bien Hoa be continued and expanded where needed. And that, although it is fully understood that Army aircraft are designated principally for tactical missions, continued use be made as required of this mode of transportation to help alleviate any shortages of subsistence items at customer locations not regularly served by convoy.

(6) Improved Receiving Procedures:

(a) Observation: Increased coordination with port operations has resulted in subsistence arriving in better condition to enable more efficient handling and accounting procedures.

(b) Evaluation: Increased liaison work has aided the port in shipping Depot subsistence already palletized, in sealed vans, accompanied by more reliable TCMDs. Perishable Storage Section presently sends a liaison team consisting of an NCO and two Local National supervisors to port during offloading of reefer ships to assist in proper palletization and accounting procedures.

(c) Recommendation: That increased coordination be given command emphasis to insure greater progress in solving mutual problems.

(7) Improvement of Location Accuracy Measurement:

(a) Observation: A standard random sampling technique within 1st Logistical Command was developed by ACofS, Comptroller.

(b) Evaluation: Machine selected random samples by location population will provide a more equitable and realistic location accuracy measurement.

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(c) Recommendation: That the random sampling technique be continued.

(8) ECNY Stock Record Account:

(a) Observation: The contractor was operating a punch card (off-line) stock record account that was not compatible with 3SVN; but some of the ECNY lines appeared on the 3SVN record. The ECNY Storage Locator File was part of the Depot 3SVN Central Locator System. In February 1970, it was decided to convert ECNY to a 3SVN on-line account. With necessary delays for training personnel, writing computer programs and conducting inventories, the actual conversion to 3SVN occurred on 2 April 1970.

(b) Evaluation: 3SVN provided automatic catalog data corrections to 400 lines, central visibility of all Class IV items, standard computer-created management reports, and automatic inclusion in the Financial Inventory Reports.

(c) Recommendation: All off-line accounts be considered for conversion to 3SVN on-line accounting.

(9) Customer Assistance:

(a) Observation: Customer Assistance Branch had been operating a manual system of processing Red Ball Requisitions. Manual Red Ball requisition processing entailed: logging, screening, item location identification and preparation of 1348-1 or, in the case of requisitions being passed to ICC, a DHA and VI-V2. The relatively lengthy handling time and high rate of human error inherent in such a manual operation was unacceptable.

(b) Evaluation: Problems existed in timely status communication between depot and ICC. The storage activity encountered problems receiving Red Ball Requisitions throughout the day and reported many instances of repeated trips to the same storage location on the same day.

(c) Recommendation: Computerization of the Red Ball processing would enable Stock Control Division Customer Assistance Branch to complete both fill and pass actions within a significantly more expeditious time frame. Such a program has been implemented at USADLB. The program includes: Machine processed Material Release orders with separate control numbers, and up to 20 physical warehouse locations annotated; Status cards (AEL) BA, BM, etc. as appropriate; DHAs for those without

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recorded locations; AEB status with blank card column 66 (z in column 65); ASAs for issues; Listings which include documents with no locations; and listings which include all documents with locations. Since implementation of this computerized method of handling Red Ball requisitions, processing time through the depot has been noticeably decreased. Red Ball Customer Requisitions that were taking up to four days processing are now being handled in a single day or in a matter of hours.

(10) Document Processing:

(a) Observation: U.S. Army Depot, Long Binh was processing an unacceptable number of Material Release Denials (MRDs).

(b) Evaluation: Depot supply processing allowed continued pre-post action, against balances on items that had already drawn MRDs, until a final physical inventory verified the zero balance.

(c) Recommendation: Implement a system that feeds the computer the A6A transaction immediately following the MRD, and subsequent D7 reversal. The A6 transaction zero balances the ABF at the earliest possible time, thereby cutting off release of additional MROs. An inventory count card is produced for each location from the A6 transaction which facilitates immediate inventory and adjustment of the ABF. (Note: This system has been implemented; it has substantially reduced the number of MRDs against single FSNs, and has significantly reduced the dollar value of adjustments.)

(11) Financial Inventory Reporting:

(a) Observation: Monthly - Secondary Inventory Transaction Report (SIT) was consuming excessive man-hours of stock management time. Deadline for completion of this report has been the 8th of each month. The data processing activity seldom delivered the raw report to stock control prior to the 1st.

(b) Evaluation: Financial Inventory Accounting requires exercises previously not required of Stock Control Division Personnel. Due to existing workload, Stock Management sections lacked time and trained personnel required to effectively complete the SIT Report within the prescribed time frames. Completion of the SIT Report was consuming valuable man-hours of Stock Management supervisory time.

(c) Recommendation: Assignment of a special team to accomplish the SIT Report, and other related Financial Inventory Reports, was considered desirable and feasible. (Note: Such a team has been formed and is operating within Stock Control Division, U.S. Army Depot, Long Binh.)

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(12) Requirement for Audit Trail:

(a) Observation: Transportation Management Division personnel are frequently requested to research a requisition number that may or may not have been shipped by them.

(b) Evaluation: To research a single line item in the manual file system presently employed is extremely time consuming. The 3SVN system provides fields on the ARØ card for shipping data. Under the 3SVN system these fields are used to store other data. If the shipping data were stored on the ARØ card, relatively easy access to all information concerning a requisition would be available. Due to the volume of requisition inquiries, many man-hours of research effort could be eliminated.

(c) Recommendation: In order to establish an effective audit trail for all requisitions processed through the Depot, recommend that the 3SVN system be changed to include shipping data on the ARØ card.

(13) Sale and Removal of Scrap Material:

(a) Observation: The sale of scrap material by term contracts designed to provide for the removal of scrap material as it was generated was not achieving the desired results.

(b) Evaluation: The inability of the term contractors to maintain removals current with scrap generations caused a steady increase of the scrap inventory.

(c) Recommendation: The use of one time (definite quantity) sales to permit several contractors to remove the same type of scrap material at the same time, will increase the removal rate and tend to stabilize the inventory.

(14) Timely Customer Requisitioning:

(a) Observation: A permissive attitude regarding timely submission of requisitions leads to customer violations of the 14-day RDD lead time for Class I. The result is that customers fail to requisition on time, thus creating an emergency situation.

(b) Evaluation: Customers appear to be unaware of MILSTRIP requisitioning procedures.

(c) Recommendation: That increased emphasis be placed on customer orientation and liaison between Food Management Division and using units.

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3. PILOT PROJECTS:

(1) Weevil Infestation of Flour and Other Cereal Products:

(a) Observation: A significant problem of weevil infestations of flour and other cereal products has been reported by the veterinarians. The reproduction rate of weevils is apparently stimulated by environmental conditions during shipment to and storage in the tropical climate of Vietnam. While weevils are not inedible, they are usually considered to be culturally unacceptable as a food ingredient by Americans. As a result, significant time is devoted to discovering shipments containing excessive infestations, and a considerable quantity of foodstuffs is condemned.

(b) Evaluation: Two feasible techniques for removing infestations are available. These are fumigation and radiation. Of the two, the latter is simpler and less expensive. Either, applied prior to shipment, would reduce the initial infestation so that a high reproduction rate during transit would not result in excessive populations on arrival.

(c) Recommendation: Pass all cereal products thru ionizing radiation of such an intensity as to render weevils incapable of significant reproduction. This level of radiation is far, far lower than preservation levels and is well within safety levels as far as the foodstuffs are concerned. Such a facility would be inexpensive, utilizing spent reactor fuel byproducts as an isotopic radiation source, and should not slow down operations at all since it would be inserted right into the flow of materials handling at the FOE. Additional irradiation facilities at the Depots in Vietnam would serve to eliminate subsequent infestations incurred during storage. It is recommended that this be handled on a contract basis. At least one contractor has indicated a capability and desire to perform this function.

(2) Recoup Operations:

(a) Observation: It has been noted on several occasions that highly perishable fruits and vegetables have been received at the Depot with an already high percentage of product loss.

(b) Evaluation: Items showing a percent loss, must often be placed on immediate or forced issue and shipped to the customer. This practice often creates a problem for the customer in that he receives less product than he actually requisitioned or he may be forced to accept items not needed or for which he lacks storage space. Cold Storage has begun a recoup operation utilizing organic labor when available. Plans have been submitted requesting washing facilities to enhance this operation.

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(c) Recommendation: That recap operations be expanded, time and labor permitting, in order that the customer will continue to receive a quality product against each requisition.

(3) Condition of Storage Pads:

(a) Observation: The unimproved condition of storage pads poses a serious operating problem during the forthcoming monsoon season.

(b) Evaluation: Immediate action is required to improve the storage pads with the least amount of delay possible. To accomplish the task in a minimum acceptable manner would require movement of material currently stored on the pads, build up with laterite, and provision of adequate drainage.

(c) Recommendation: That a concentrated effort to obtain additional resources to permit the completion of this improvement project be initiated without delay.

(4) Training of Depot Personnel:

(a) Observation: Training attendance has increased and training efficiency has improved now that there is a centralized classroom located at Depot in warehouse 320.

(b) Evaluation: Training attendance can still be increased if all personnel understand the training requirements fully and be more concerned about the Army Training Program.

(c) Recommendation: That directorates, special staff officers, and other personnel concerned allow their personnel sufficient time in order to arrive at the training site on time and get full benefit out of the instructions presented.

e. ORGANIZATION: None.

f. LOGISTICS:

(1) Chaplain Supplies:

(a) Observation: Special procurement of kosher food items for Rosh Ha Shannah - Yom Kippur and Passover occurs twice annually. These items are funded by Chief of Chaplains and 1st Logistical Command. The goods are shipped by vendors to Oakland Army Terminal which, in turn, route the goods via Freeflow to depots throughout Vietnam.

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(b) Evaluation: These special items (with the exception of Kosher wine) do not have FSNs, resulting in difficulties in receiving, identifying and handling of these small quantities.

(c) Recommendation: That items specially procured be assembled at Oakland Army Depot and be shipped by Sealand Vans instead of Free-flow, resulting in a single consolidated shipment to each of the designated depots.

(2) Physical Security Material:

(a) Observations: During the period 1 February 1970 to 15 March 1970, concertina wire was unavailable through normal supply channels due to a critical shortage in RVN. This situation has since been alleviated, and enough wire has been made available to make repairs and improvements in the perimeter wire.

(b) Evaluation: Physical security materials (concertina wire) and construction materials are in constant need for fortification improvements.

(c) Recommendation: That concertina wire and construction materials be stocked so as to provide assured availability.

g. COMMUNICATIONS:

(1) Packing Ice Cream for Shipment:

(a) Observation: Recently, Perishable Storage Section began using excess dry ice containers to pack ice cream in small quantities for forward support areas.

(b) Evaluation: Visits to Class I supply points and forward support areas revealed that a better system was needed to minimize handling and exposure time for ice cream. The expendable dry ice container extends the time the product can be held without refrigeration; however, it has limited capability in that only a small quantity of ice cream can be packed and the volume of the container increases the transportation requirement.

(c) Recommendation: That Class I supply points make needs known well in advance and efforts be continued to use the dry ice containers where possible.

h. OTHER:

(1) Security Operations:

AVCA SGN FD MGT

7 May 1970


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(a) Observation: Cargo carrying vehicles departing the Depot to various units in the command were not logged out by TCMD number or 1348-1 number, thus making the tracing of loads impossible.

(b) Evaluation: The lack of this log prevented the positive identification or establishment of an audit trail to determine the day, time of day, truck, driver, or unit for which a particular load departed; it was thus impossible to trace cargo leaving the Depot that did not arrive at a unit, or the identify of the driver or vehicle. If a forged document was discovered it was also impossible to trace the load out of the Depot.

(c) Recommendation: That supply installations provide Military Policemen at Cargo exit gates a preprinted form to log out vehicles so that an audit or investigative trail will exist. This log should include: Time of departure, unit AT #, TCMD/1348-1 #, vehicle identification, driver's name and SSAN. (Note: This system has enabled the Depot to trace 100 pallets of Class I to destination, one 1/4 vehicle, and one 175 mm gun S.P. to the Port which would have otherwise "simply disappeared".)

1 Incl
as


ROBERT A. PEARSON
Colonel, QMC
Commanding

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AVCA SGN OO MH (7 May 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Depot, Long
Binh, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army Support Command, Saigon, APO 96491 8 JUN 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of
the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-1H,
APO 96384

1. Reference paragraph 2a (1), page 11. CONCUR. Bunkerline commitments have been reviewed and task organization and bunkerline responsibility are scheduled for adjustment on or about 24 May 1970. This reorganization will result in a fifty percent reduction in defensive personnel requirements from USADLB.
2. Reference paragraph 2a (3), page 11. NONCONCUR. The recommendation is sound in principle, but there are many factors affecting the deployment of personnel that make it impractical to apply. DELOS adjustments were made to reduce the command strength to the level established by the Department of the Army. Major factors affecting these adjustments were availability of transportation to CONUS and maintenance of a strength balance of officers and enlisted men within the units of the command. It is recognized that procedures employed increased the administrative workload. This is common whenever a command undergoes a major reorganization; however, an increase of the workload normally is only temporary in nature. Through attention to detail and strict compliance with established procedures, personal hardships may be held to a minimum. Hardships that are beyond a unit's or an individual's ability to overcome may be referred to this headquarters on an individual basis for consideration as exceptions.
3. Reference paragraph 2a (4), page 12. CONCUR. The problem as stated is a local problem and requires no action by higher headquarters. The suggested corrective action is considered adequate, and should prove to be an excellent method of controlling Local National time sheets, annual leave, and sick leave.
4. Reference paragraph 2a (6), page 13. CONCUR. The matter of LN training is being emphasized at all levels of command. The program is an excellent endeavor and efforts should continue in this area.

AVCA SGN GO MH (7 May 70) 1st Ind

3 JUN 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Depot, Long Binh, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

5. Reference paragraph 2c (12), page 19. CONCUR. Recommend submission of a 3SVN request following the conversion to the 3S system in the latter part of this month.


6. Reference paragraph 2c (13), page 19. CONCUR. USADLB has increased use of lot sales to offset poor term contractor performance. This headquarters has continuously monitored the sale of this scrap. Negotiating PDO contracts remains a 1st Log Command responsibility.

7. Reference paragraph 2h (1), page 22. CONCUR. Provision of a vehicle exit log to record necessary information concerning vehicles exiting the depot provides a permanent record which allows for an audit trail. Although the depot solution is an excellent one, the diversity of needs of various installations make a DA or Army-wide form impractical. A log book with locally determined format is a satisfactory solution. No further action required by this headquarters.

8. Lessons Learned, observations, and recommendations are concurred in by this command with the above exception.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 2604


Dwyer G. WEDVICK
Captain, AGC
Asst AG

CF:
USADLB

AVCA GO-MH (13 Jun 70) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Depot, Long Binh,
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, US Army Depot, Long Binh for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 is forwarded.
2. Due to closing of this headquarters, comments can not be staffed. Normal staffing will be done by Headquarters, USARV.

John B. Ritter
JOHN B. RITTER
CPT, OrdC
CO, 15th MHD

nc

AVHGC-DST (7 May 70) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, United States Army Depot,
Long Binh, Period Ending 30 April 1970

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 6 JUL 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GOPP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, United States Army Depot, Long Binh and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Adjusted DEROS", page 11, paragraph 2a(3): nonconcur. During the period when it was necessary to strictly control individual DEROS in order to reduce the overall USARV strength to the revised 15 April ceiling, quota messages were issued to major subordinate commands 17 to 21 days prior to the quota date. Undoubtedly some processing time was required to pass the requirement down to subordinate levels. However, it is felt at least 10 to 12 days notification could have been given. These were exceptional circumstances and are not expected to reoccur. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

b. Reference item concerning "Local National Training Program", page 13, paragraph 2a(6): concur. The Central Training Institute (CTI) has met all training needs presented by the depot. In addition the CTI evaluated and selected the manpower for the Logistics Intern Program now in progress at Long Binh. The new CTI complex at Long Binh, once equipped, will provide the facilities to accelerate training to upgrade the level and degree of skill of Vietnamese employees for the depot and other activities on Long Binh Post. With Vietnamization in mind, the CTI has tested the evaluated 220 Category II and III ARVN veterans, 150 of which are available for placement within the next seven days. The Long Binh Depot Commander will select some of the veterans for training. CTI is in a position to supply carefully selected individuals once the operators have identified positions to be Vietnamized and in what number. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

c. Reference item concerning "Paper in Short Supply for ADP", page 14, paragraph 2c(1): concur. The Office of the Special Assistant to the CG/ Data Systems 1st Logistical Command recently conducted an informal review of the paper situation. In discussion with the item manager at the US Army Inventory Control Center, it was learned that there was enough planned input in all types except four- and six-part paper. At that time the item manager agreed to increase the input to meet the requirements. No action by USARP or DA is recommended.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, United States Army Depot, Long Binh, Period Ending 30 April 1970

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d. Reference item concerning "Procedure for Equipment Turn-In", page 14, paragraph 2c(2): concur. This recommendation will provide maximum utilization of personnel with the least amount of problems and man hours either during or following a Keystone Operation. It would insure completed action at one location and eliminate any possibility of duplicate documentation, handling and shipping. Unit has been so advised.

e. Reference item concerning "ECMY Stock Record Account", page 17, paragraph 2c(8): nonconcur. A great deal of effort and critical ADP resources were, more than likely, misdirected in this case. This situation developed as a result of the decision for USARV to go to version 31, USARPAC Standard Supply System (3S). The real lessons here is that the decision as to which accounts to mechanize must be made at the proper level of command. In the case of the Standard Supply System (3S) such decisions should be made by Computer Systems Command Support Group (PAC) in cooperation with USARPAC and this headquarters. Local unique requirements must be evaluated carefully to insure they are actually local and not appropriate for inclusion in the standard system. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

f. Reference item concerning "Requirement for Audit Trail", page 19, paragraph 2c(12): nonconcur. With the change to Version 31, Standard Supply System (3S), the change will have to be developed as a local unique requirement or incorporated into the standard system. The Computer Systems Command, Support Group (PAC) should evaluate this item for possible inclusion in the standard. Action by USARPAC is recommended.

g. Reference item concerning "Sale and Removal of Scrap Material", page 19, paragraph c(13): concur. The use of one time (definite quantity) sales is in effect. However, the determination for the use of one time or term contracts is a decision of sales personnel based on generations, location, transportation, etc. Good sound methods of merchandising will receive continued emphasis. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

h. Reference item concerning "Weevil Infestation of Flour and Other Cereal Products", page 20, paragraph 2d(1): nonconcur. For such a procedure to be adopted by the Army, it would require approval of the Armed Forces Pest Control Board, the Food and Drug Administration, and the US Public Health Service. The possibility of control of insects by ionizing radiation should be investigated by Department of Army.

i. Reference item concerning "Condition of Storage Pads", page 21, paragraph 2d(3): concur. Action should be initiated immediately for improving the storage pads at the Depot prior to the heavy part of the monsoon season. The responsibility for initiating action, however, lies with the using unit i.e., a job order request (DA Form 2701) to the Installation Engineer requesting repair on upgrade of these pads. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

AVHGC-DST (7 May 70) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, United States Army Depot,
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j. Reference item concerning "Physical Security Material", page 22,
paragraph f(2): concur. Every effort is made to keep up the stockage
levels of concertina wire. During the period 1 February 1970 through
15 March 1970 there was an excessive amount of concertina being installed
which was the probable cause of the shortage. No action by USARPAC or
DA is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



D. J. Winter
CPT, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
US Army Support Comd - SGN
US Army Depot - Long Binh

GPOF-DT (7 May 70) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, US Army Depot, Long Binh for Period
Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

8 AUG 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed with the following comments.
2. Reference paragraph 2c(12), page 12 and paragraph 2f, 3d Indorsement: Shipping data in CC 57-59 of the ARO card will be part of the Standard Supply System (3S) when version 31 is fully implemented about August 1970.
3. Reference paragraph 2h, 3d Indorsement:

a. Research by the United States Department of Agriculture and the Department of Army has proven that ionizing radiation is an effective and safe method of controlling insect infestation of flour and cereal products. The health hazards associated with this process is not from induced radiation but from the handling of the source (spent fuel by-products) which is sufficiently radioactive to be harmful to individuals in contact with or in the vicinity of the product. This necessitates quite elaborate shielding and protective devices and procedures. For this reason the recommended process would appear difficult to manage under conditions that exist in Vietnam.

b. A simple, safe and inexpensive method of control of insect infestation has been developed and promulgated by the ARMED Forces Pest Control Board. This information is contained in the above Board's Technical Information Memorandum No. 11. The method involves a fumigation procedure which can be used to fumigate lots (stacks) in open or closed storage and during transportation of the product.


FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



D.D. CLINE
2LT, AGC
Asst AG

Cy furn:
CG USARV

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
U.S. ARMY DEPOT, LONG BINH



Incl 1

UNCLASSIFIED
Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D		
<i>(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered. When the overall report is classified)</i>		
1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)	2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	UNCLASSIFIED	
	2b. GROUP	
3. REPORT TITLE		
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, US Army Depot, Long Binh		
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)		
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb to 30 Apr 70.		
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)		
CO, US Army Depot, Long Binh		
6. REPORT DATE	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
7 May 70	34	
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	8b. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
	702198	
b. PROJECT NO.	8d. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
N/A		
c.		
d.		
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A	OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT		
32		

DD FORM 1473
1 NOV 65

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