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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
ARMY CONCEPT TEAM IN VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96384

AD 855595

EMPLOYMENT OF US ARMY PSYCHOLOGICAL

OPERATIONS UNITS IN VIETNAM

AVHQC-DST (7 Jun 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Employment of US Army Psychological Operations Unit in Vietnam


HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 7 JUL 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

This headquarters concurs with the conclusions and recommendations of the report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CF:
CO, ACTIV


W. C. ARNTZ
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Assistant Adjutant General

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AVIB-CO


7 JUN 1969

SUBJECT: Employment of US Army Psychological Operations Units in
Vietnam

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

1. Reference: Letter, AVHGC-DH, Headquarters, US Army, Vietnam, 23 February 1967, subject: Letter of Instruction.
2. In accordance with the provisions of the foregoing reference, the attached final report is forwarded for review and transmittal to Department of the Army.
3. Request one copy of the USARV and CINCUSARPAC forwarding indorsement be furnished the Commanding Officer, Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV).

FOR THE COMMANDER:


JOSEPH W. STRAUB
CPT, AGC
Adjutant

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
FINAL REPORT

EMPLOYMENT OF US ARMY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
UNITS IN VIETNAM

ACTIV Project No. ACG-47F

7 JUN 1969

Approved:


JOHN E. REID
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

AUTHORITY

Letter, Department of Army, OACSFOR, 13
May 68, Subject: Army Combat Developments
and Materiel Evaluation (CD&ME) Program,
Revision of Formal Projects FY 68-69 (U)

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indebted to the following for their
assistance in the evaluation:

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14th Special Operations Wing
III Marine Amphibious Force
I Field Force, Vietnam
II Field Force, Vietnam
Senior Advisor, IV Corps Tactical Zone
XXIV Corps
1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)
1st Infantry Division
1st Marine Division
3d Marine Division
4th Infantry Division
5th Special Forces Group
9th Infantry Division
25th Infantry Division
101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
Americal Division
4th Psychological Operations Group
7th Psychological Operations Group

PROJECT OFFICERS

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ABSTRACT

The Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) conducted an evaluation of US Army Psychological Operations (PSYOP) units in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) during the period 1 December 1968 to 31 March 1969. The objectives of the ACTIV evaluation were to:

Determine the capability of US Army PSYOP units to accomplish their assigned missions under existing organizational concepts.

Describe and analyze the tasks performed by US Army PSYOP units in RVN to accomplish their missions.

The expansion of US and Free World Military Assistance Forces in RVN resulted in an unprecedented emphasis on PSYOP during stability operations. The 4th PSYOP Group was activated in December 1967 with four assigned PSYOP battalions to meet these expanding requirements. During 1968, the 4th PSYOP Group was faced with organizational, supply, and equipment problems in addition to coping with expanding tasks and responsibilities. The unit was totally committed to development, production, and dissemination of propaganda material for tactical and strategic PSYOP in support of joint and combined counterinsurgency operations.

The 4th PSYOP Group was employed effectively and was capable of accomplishing assigned missions in RVN within the limitations imposed by organizational manning and equipment levels. The PSYOP units were responsive to tactical and strategic PSYOP requirements. However, military force levels and personnel ceilings prevented the structuring or tailoring of PSYOP units to meet all PSYOP requirements. The PSYOP requirements continued to increase and gradually exceeded the capabilities of Army PSYOP units. It was found that there were overlapping missions and responsibilities between PSYOP units and various other agencies involved in PSYOP, resulting in duplication and coordination problems.

Additional PSYOP resources were needed in RVN. The ACTIV evaluation recommended approval on the proposed MTOE 33-500G to obtain added resources for the 4th PSYOP Group. There was insufficient doctrinal guidance published on the employment and techniques of PSYOP units during stability operations. It was recommended that various PSYOP functions be combined under control of one staff agency to provide central direction and control of PSYOP in RVN. In addition to specific recommendations on personnel, training, and logistical matters, it was urged that more command emphasis be directed toward the role of PSYOP in support of US objectives in RVN.

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SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

1. REFERENCE

Letter, Department of the Army, Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, 13 May 1968, subject: Army Combat Developments and Materiel Evaluation (CD&ME) Program, Revision of Formal Projects FY 68-69.

2. PURPOSE

To determine the most effective means of employment of US Army Psychological Operations (PSYOP) resources in stability operations in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

3. OBJECTIVES

a. Objective 1. Determine the capability of US Army PSYOP units to accomplish their assigned missions under existing organizational concepts.

b. Objective 2. Describe and analyze the tasks performed by US Army PSYOP units in RVN to accomplish their missions.

4. BACKGROUND

a. With the increase in US and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) activity in RVN, there has been an increase in PSYOP requirements and missions. The 4th PSYOP Group was activated on 1 December 1967 to meet these expanding requirements. During 1968, the 4th PSYOP Group was faced with organizational, supply, and equipment problems in addition to coping with expanding missions and responsibilities.

b. Department of the Army (DA) has stated that requirements exist for data on the employment of US Army PSYOP units in RVN. The detailed documentation of PSYOP organization and employment in RVN will provide the necessary background for updating doctrine, literature, and programs of instruction, particularly for future involvements in counterinsurgency or stability operations.

5. SCOPE

The project included examination and evaluation of all PSYOP units in RVN within the limitations imposed by the tactical situation and the resources available for the study. Evaluations were made of the day-to-day operations of the sample units. No requests were made for a unit to perform an operation solely for the purpose of data collection.

6. APPROACH

a. The conduct of PSYOP follows a continuous cycle oriented to the mission. To determine the most effective use of PSYOP resources, an evaluation of the operational functions common to each unit was performed. The following functions were used to provide a base for developing measurable factors:

(1) Command and Control: mission, organization, and unit employment.

(2) Operations: research and analysis, intelligence, propaganda production, dissemination, printing, and audiovisual and loudspeaker operations.

(3) Supply and Maintenance.

b. The units evaluated were the 4th PSYOP Group and its four assigned battalions (6th, 7th, 8th, and 10th PSYOP Battalions). In addition, data was gathered from the following agencies or units:

Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO)
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV)
United States Army, Vietnam (USARV)
I Field Force, Vietnam (I FFV)
II Field Force, Vietnam (II FFV)
III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF)
Deputy CORDS/PSYOP, I, II, III, and IV Corps Tactical Zones
XXIV Corps
14th Special Operations Wing, USAF
5th Special Operations Squadron, USAF
9th Special Operations Squadron, USAF
5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)
1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)
1st Infantry Division
4th Infantry Division
9th Infantry Division
Americal Division
25th Infantry Division
101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
1st Marine Division
3d Marine Division
PSYOP Teams (HA, HB, and HE) (50 of 80 teams were interviewed).

7. ENVIRONMENT

The study was conducted throughout RVN from December 1968 to March 1969. Figure I-1 depicts the locations of the PSYOP units during that time.




FIGURE I-1. Location of PSYOP Units

8. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

a. Data was collected through questionnaires; interviews with commanders, staff officers, and other personnel engaged in the conduct of PSYOP in RVN; analysis of records and reports of operations previously conducted; review of directives and authorization documents; and personal observations of evaluators. A total of 232 questions were developed into 9 questionnaires which were forwarded to the units so as to arrive approximately 2 weeks prior to arrival of the study team. This allowed staff personnel sufficient time to collect and record the requested data. Evaluators from the study team then reviewed the data with PSYOP officers to ensure that units presented the data in a consistent manner.

b. Over 2,900 responses were obtained from key PSYOP personnel. The evaluators worked with and observed PSYOP team leaders engaged in PSYOP involving audiovisual and loudspeaker operations in support of tactical units to include airborne leaflet dissemination and loudspeaker missions. The analysis was based on observed performance, examination of reports, and opinions and experiences of key PSYOP personnel.

c. The respondents were placed into three categories throughout the study and evaluation report. The three categories were PSYOP unit commanders, PSYOP team leaders, and PSYOP officers of supported units or agencies. The term PSYOP unit commanders used in this report refers to the group and four battalion commanders, representing a total of five PSYOP unit commanders. There were a total of 50 out of 80 PSYOP team leaders who were interviewed and/or responded to written questionnaires. The term PSYOP officers refers to the 28 PSYOP officers from the supported units or agencies which participated in the evaluation.

SECTION II

OBJECTIVE 1. DETERMINE THE CAPABILITY OF US ARMY PSYOP UNITS TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR ASSIGNED MISSIONS UNDER EXISTING ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPTS.

9. MISSION

a. The mission of the 4th PSYOP Group and its assigned battalions was to conduct psychological operations in support of joint and combined counterinsurgency operations and in support of other operations for which the US Army had responsibility. (1)* The basic mission of PSYOP units was applicable in RVN, in the opinion of the PSYOP group commander and three of the four battalion commanders. One commander considered the mission too broad in nature and not clearly defined. However, based on the functional capabilities of the units, the implied PSYOP tasks and the functions were clearly understood by PSYOP unit commanders and officers.

b. The mission statement was considered appropriate and adequate by 80 percent of the respondents as it afforded flexibility and latitude to supported unit commanders as well as to PSYOP commanders. The tactical situation, PSYOP resources, and target audiences were different in each area, thus there were different PSYOP requirements in each Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). Consequently, the general mission statement allowed greater versatility in balancing PSYOP capabilities with varied environmental tasks. Respondents who indicated the mission was not adequately defined pointed to an overlap of mission and responsibilities between military and civilian agencies.

c. In determining the capability of PSYOP units to accomplish their assigned missions, it was necessary to examine the relationships and responsibilities of the different units and agencies involved in the US PSYOP mission in RVN. The organization of the 4th PSYOP Group, and the problem areas and limitations affecting mission performance were also considered.

10. ORGANIZATION OF THE US PSYOP MISSION IN RVN

a. Responsibilities of Agencies

The organization of the US PSYOP mission in RVN is shown in Figure II-1. The responsibilities of each agency are described below.

(1) Ambassador

As head of the diplomatic mission in RVN, the ambassador is responsible for implementation of State Department policy. He is the senior member of the Mission Council, the primary instrument for integration of mission actions.

*References to documents listed in Annex A, Bibliography, are indicated by a parenthetical number.




FIGURE 11-1. US PSYOP Mission in RVN.

(2) Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV)

MACV has the responsibility for PSYOP in support of military operations against the enemy and in support of civil operations and revolutionary development⁽²⁾ (see paragraph 2c, Annex C). MACV exercises operational control of the 4th PSYOP Group.

(3) Mission PSYOP Committee

This committee is made up of senior officers from each mission agency and provides an advisory review of major PSYOP programs in RVN.

(4) Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO)

The Director, JUSPAO, is responsible for development of US PSYOP policy, substantive supervision and coordination of all US PSYOP in RVN, and planning and producing PSYOP material in support of national programs. JUSPAO's responsibilities for development of policy include the authority to evaluate PSYOP activities to determine the validity and effectiveness of policy and programs in the field. JUSPAO policy guidance is directive in nature to all US military units engaged in PSYOP in RVN.

(5) 7th PSYOP Group

From its headquarters in Okinawa, the 7th PSYOP Group provides backup printing and other PSYOP support, as directed by the US Army, Pacific. The 244th PSYOP Detachment, 7th PSYOP Group, located in Saigon, provides liaison between MACV and the 7th PSYOP Group.

(6) MACJ3-11

MACJ3-11 is the staff section within MACV having staff responsibility for the military PSYOP programs and for advisory assistance to the Vietnamese General Political Warfare Department.

(7) Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS)

CORDS has responsibility for developing US civil/military programs for support of the Vietnamese Pacification Program.

(8) 7th US Air Force

The 7th US Air Force provides support for dissemination of leaflets and aerial broadcasts. Flight detachments of the 5th and 9th

Special Operations Squadrons, 14th Special Operations Wing, are deployed to support US/Vietnamese/FWMAF commanders in military PSYOP and pacification operations.

(9) US Naval Forces, Vietnam (NAVFORV)

NAVFORV conducts off-shore and inland waterway operations through Commander Task Forces 115 (Coastal Surveillance Force), 116 (River Patrol Force), and 117 (Mobile Riverine Force), combining PSYOP activities with normal operations.

(10) US Army, Vietnam (USARV)

USARV has logistical and administrative responsibilities in support of US Army PSYOP units.

(11) 4th PSYOP Group

Assigned to USARV, but placed under operational control of MACV, the 4th PSYOP Group has the responsibility of conducting PSYOP in support of joint and combined stability operations in RVN. The PSYOP battalions are assigned to the Group, but operational control of the battalions is exercised by force commanders/senior advisors.

(12) Force Commanders/Senior Advisors

Each force commander and senior advisor has the responsibility for the conduct of PSYOP in his respective CTZ (see paragraph 4a, Annex C). He exercises operational control of the PSYOP battalion located in his CTZ. Force commanders/senior advisors were designated as follows:

<u>Force Commander/Senior Advisor</u>	<u>Location</u>
Commanding General, III MAF	I CTZ
Commanding General, I FFV	II CTZ
Commanding General, II FFV	III CTZ
Commanding General, Delta Military Assistance Command (DMAC)	IV CTZ

(13) Force PSYOP Officer

This officer has staff responsibility for PSYOP under the supervision of the G3 in III MAF, G5 in II FFV, and the Deputy for CORDS in II and IV CTZs.

(14) Assistant Deputy for CORDS

The deputy provides guidance and assistance to elements of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) on those PSYOP matters related to civil operations and revolutionary development.

(15) US Divisions, Brigades, and Units

These units conduct PSYOP in support of military and pacification activities by using resources of the 4th PSYOP Group and its battalions or by making use of organic capabilities. PSYOP was a staff responsibility of G5 at the division level throughout RVN.

b. Coordination of Effort

(1) With the varied responsibilities of the agencies involved in PSYOP, it was extremely difficult to coordinate the overall PSYOP effort or establish centralized control and direction in RVN. All five PSYOP unit commanders, together with 40 percent of the respondents from supported commands, indicated there was duplication of effort between Army PSYOP units and other agencies in each CTZ due to lack of coordination and centralized control.

(2) Within MACV, the PSYOP responsibilities were divided. The 4th PSYOP Group, which operated under staff supervision of MACJ3-11, conducted tactical and national PSYOP campaigns, while Assistant Chief of Staff (ACofS) for CORDS coordinated and supervised all PSYOP in support of civil operations and revolutionary development. Inasmuch as these agencies produced and disseminated PSYOP material to the same target audiences as JUSPAO, it was extremely difficult to avoid duplication of effort. Field operations in RVN proved that a division of PSYOP into tactical and pacification roles was impractical due to the combined and integrated political-military environment in RVN. By the very nature of their involvement and employment throughout RVN, Army PSYOP units were inextricably engaged in tactical, pacification, national, and strategic PSYOP campaigns.

(3) There were repeated examples of lack of coordination presented by the respondents. On 16 February 1969, there was an airborne leaflet mission in III CTZ in which a total of 84,000 leaflets with a national theme were disseminated in the 1st Australian Task Force area of operation. The Task Force PSYOP officer complained about the drop since it was made in his area without prior coordination. There were examples of US PSYOP teams appearing at a hamlet on an audiovisual or loudspeaker mission, only to discover a province team conducting a similar mission.

(4) According to the five major PSYOP unit commanders there was a need for a combined PSYOP Operations Center at the corps and province levels to exercise overall direction to the PSYOP effort of all US/Vietnamese/FWMAF agencies and units. Although MACV has encouraged the creation of US/FWMAF PSYOP Operation Centers, such centers were not fully operational or effective in the past, according

to 60 percent of the respondents. Recent steps have been taken to remedy these problems. Annex D lists the functions and responsibilities of the II CTZ PSYOP Coordination Center⁽³⁾ which officially opened at Nha Trang on 27 February 1969. Coordination centers are now operational on a daily basis in the four CTZs. Additionally, the 4th PSYOP Group and the Vietnamese Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR) Department took steps on 22 February 1969 to increase coordination and working relationships necessary at the national military level. For the first time, weekly meetings were held and arrangements were made for closer liaison to coordinate PSYOP activities and propaganda production.

(5) The organizational and personnel relationships between PSYOP units, and military and civilian agencies were confusing to many of the respondents. It appeared that military personnel were assigned to a civilian JUSPAO agency only to be later placed under control of a military agency. MACV, for example, provided approximately 120 military personnel to JUSPAO. In turn, JUSPAO assigned 70 of these military personnel as province PSYOP advisors under the operational control of CORDS. In some cases, CORDS PSYOP personnel received regulations and guidance from JUSPAO, CORDS, and MACJ3-11. In other cases, Army PSYOP units prepared directives and guidance which were authenticated and distributed by higher headquarters for implementation by field and province PSYOP advisors. It was stated by senior PSYOP officers that a single military manager for PSYOP was needed to be responsive to the force commander/senior advisor. These respondents speculated that the military personnel could be assigned directly to MACJ3-11 which would then have central PSYOP staff responsibility for military, revolutionary development, and political warfare.

c. Staff Supervision

Doctrinal guidance contained in FM 33-1⁽⁴⁾ prescribed PSYOP functions as a staff responsibility of the G3 (J3). However, the prevailing practice in RVN placed PSYOP under the staff supervision of G5. Because of differences in organizational structures within each CTZ, different agencies exercised staff supervision over PSYOP units. At the MACV level, PSYOP was split between J3 and CORDS. In two CTZs, operational control of the PSYOP units was exercised through CORDS, while in other areas control was exercised through G3 and G5. According to the respondents, there was not, and should not be, standard employment of PSYOP units because the military situations were different in each area. However, there should be a continuous and uniform staff channel from the highest level down to the lowest unit to ensure an integrated and coordinated PSYOP effort and to avoid a confusing network of cross channel communication.

d. Operational Control

According to 90 percent of the respondents, the present system of operational control of PSYOP units in RVN, as opposed to an area or direct support role, was appropriate and adaptable to stability operations. The deployment of PSYOP battalions in each CTZ provided maximum support and responsiveness to force commanders in meeting PSYOP requirements. Moreover, it allowed commanders an opportunity to evaluate military operations in terms of their psychological impact. There have been occasional conflicts in the operational control system. These conflicts occurred when command decisions were made to produce PSYOP material which was considered by PSYOP unit commanders to be either counterproductive or in violation of US policy guidance. Other conflicts arose in the diversion of PSYOP resources or equipment from one CTZ to another. These conflicts were minor and the advantages of the existing operational control system outweighed the disadvantages.

11. ORGANIZATION OF THE 4TH PSYOP GROUP

a. Structure

(1) Under Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) 33-500F, 18 September 1967, the Group was organized under a cellular team concept. In theory, a unit can be economically tailored for specific missions by structuring the organization with small teams to meet PSYOP requirements. As of 1 December 1967, the 4th PSYOP Group and its battalions were organized with 14 command and control teams, 20 supply and maintenance teams, and 71 operational teams (see Figures II-2 and II-3).

(2) Although most of the PSYOP officers indicated that the cellular concept was valid, they reported it had serious inherent deficiencies. There was limited guidance on the specific capabilities of PSYOP teams which made it difficult to properly structure or tailor a PSYOP unit to meet requirements. For example, FM 33-5⁽⁵⁾ indicated general overall capabilities of teams. The FM stated that Team FD, Propaganda (Research and Analysis), was capable of producing detailed studies of target audiences through research, the collation of intelligence, and an analysis of enemy propaganda. However, the FM did not indicate how much the Team FD should produce, or the geographical areas or target population density it was capable of supporting with a fixed number of personnel assigned to the team. Although FD teams were structured differently in various theaters of operations, added guidance on team capabilities would provide a basis which PSYOP staff officers could use to balance force structures to specific area PSYOP requirements. In addition, the team concept was not responsive to urgent requirements in RVN because of force level ceilings and lengthy administrative delays incident to preparation and submission of MTOEs.




FIGURE II-3. Cellular Team Organization at Battalion Level.

(3) To meet operational needs in RVN, the 4th PSYOP Group found it necessary to deviate from the team concept and establish normal staff functions (S1, S2, S3, and S4) similar to other Army staff structures on both the group and battalion levels. It also formed a Propaganda Development Center (PDC) as a co-equal staff section. See Figures II-4 and II-5 for current group and battalion structures.

(4) Each battalion formed two companies. The printing functions were assigned to Company A in a general support role, while Company B performed a direct support role in providing mobile field teams to supported units and agencies. It is significant that organizational doctrine called for PSYOP companies to be organized as separate, independent, and numerically-designated companies.

b. Strength

(1) Under MTOE 33-500F, the total authorized strength for the 4th PSYOP Group as of 1 December 1967 was 876 personnel: 176 for the group headquarters and 175 each for the four battalions. To supplement military personnel, a total of 200 indigenous civilians had been authorized to the units. These civilian positions included such jobs as sociologists, interpreters, translators, artists, script writers, varitypists, and persons skilled in the social sciences. Only 103 civilians had been employed due to difficulties encountered in obtaining qualified Vietnamese who possessed high level skills in the social sciences. The lack of skilled indigenous civilians available to the 4th PSYOP Group and other PSYOP agencies emphasized the need for increased development of area-oriented and language-qualified PSYOP personnel to communicate with target audiences.

(2) The following strength status reflected authorized and assigned strength for both military and indigenous civilian personnel as of 8 March 1969.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Authorized Strength</u>					<u>Assigned Strength</u>				
	<u>Off</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Aggr</u>	<u>Civ</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Aggr</u>	<u>Civ</u>
4th PSYOP Group	34	2	139	175	53	32	2	150	184	32
6th PSYOP Battalion	33	-	142	175	33	33	-	134	167	16
7th PSYOP Battalion	32	-	143	175	46	30	-	130	160	20
8th PSYOP Battalion	32	-	142	174	36	35	-	134	169	15
10th PSYOP Battalion	32	-	143	175	32	34	-	129	163	20
Total	163	2	709	874	200	164	2	677	843	103

Adjusted Strength
 8 March 1969
 Officer - 34
 Warrant - 2
 Enlisted - 139
 Total 175





FIGURE II-4. Group Headquarters Organization.



Adjusted Strength
 8 March 1969
 Officer - 32
 Enlisted - 142
 Total 174

FIGURE II-5. Battalion Organization.

The 4th PSYOP Group has submitted a proposed MTOE 33-500G with strength as indicated below.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Proposed Strength</u>			
	<u>Off</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Aggr</u>
4th PSYOP Group	32	5	165	202
6th PSYOP Battalion	33	2	151	186
7th PSYOP Battalion	33	2	151	186
8th PSYOP Battalion	33	2	151	186
10th PSYOP Battalion	33	2	151	186
Total	164	13	769	946

(3) An analysis was made of the percentage of personnel involved in each function of the Group and battalions (see Figure II-6). If approved, the proposed MTOE would increase the capability of the 4th PSYOP Group. The group headquarters MTOE allowed a 50-percent personnel increase in command and control functions, 20-percent increase in propaganda development, and 30-percent added capability for supply and maintenance. Other increases included 16 additional Teams HB and 8 additional Teams HE.

c. Qualifications and Training

(1) Each of the five PSYOP unit commanders indicated there was a sufficient number of qualified officers assigned to PSYOP units who were PSYOP school trained. The level of training improved considerably during the past year. Over 80 percent of the officers assigned to the 4th PSYOP Group had graduated from the unit or staff officer PSYOP Course, US Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, N.C., as compared to less than 50 percent approximately one year ago. Although the general PSYOP qualifications were considered adequate, there was insufficient development of area-oriented and language-qualified personnel to meet technical requirements. The number of PSYOP school trained officers assigned to tactical units was inadequate according to 70 percent of the respondents. There were less than 40 percent of PSYOP-qualified or school-trained officers assigned to the tactical units.

(2) The training provided by the PSYOP School was adequate, according to 70 percent of the respondents. However, a large percentage of the officer graduates indicated that the program of instruction was too theoretical in nature and too academic in terms of psychological concepts which were not practicable in RVN. Recommendations for improvement included more emphasis in the practical aspects of propaganda development, graphic layout and printing, loudspeaker and leaflet targeting and dissemination, and operational techniques based on lessons learned in RVN.

<u>Functions</u>	<u>Teams</u>			<u>Number Military Personnel</u>			<u>Percent of Function</u>
	<u>Gp</u>	<u>Hq</u>	<u>Bns</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Gp</u>	<u>Bns</u>	<u>Total</u>
Command and Control	1 AC	4 AB	14	38	68	106	12.1
	1 AA	8 AA					
Propaganda	-	-	-	52	96	148	16.9
Operations	1 FA	4 FA	5	3	12	15	
Intelligence	1 FC	4 FC	5	9	40	49	
Research/Analysis	2 FC	4 FD	6	22	44	66	
Graphics	2 FE	-	2	16	-	16	
Motion Pictures	1 FB	-	1	2	-	2	
Printing	2 GA	16 GB	44	58	128	186	21.2
	6 GC	16 HC					
	2 GC						
	2 GD						
Mobile Operations	-	-	-	-	336	336	38.4
Audiovisual and Loudspeaker	-	16 HA	80	-	208	208	
		32 HB					
		32 HE					
Light Mobile Operations	-	16 HD	16	-	128	128	
Radio	1 IA	8 IA	12	28	16	44	5.0
	1 IC						
	1 ID						
	1 KD						
Supply and Maintenance	-	4 BA	20	-	56	56	6.4
		16 DC					
Total		Teams	205	176	700	876	100.0

FIGURE II-6. Percentage of Personnel Per Function
as of 1 December 1967.

(3) The qualifications and training of enlisted personnel assigned to specific PSYOP teams, such as audiovisual and loudspeaker teams, were inadequate according to the majority of team leaders. The enlisted men had generally not received any formal PSYOP training or had any prior experience in PSYOP duties. In response to questions on the adequacy of training and qualifications of team members, 30 percent of the team leaders emphasized the need for added training on the operations, maintenance, and repair of audiovisual equipment. PSYOP commanders indicated that an MOS-producing PSYOP school was needed for enlisted men to provide training on PSYOP techniques, political warfare, advisory functions, and PSYOP equipment operation and maintenance. The PSYOP commanders were generally not aware of the newly activated PSYOP course (244-F6) for enlisted men at the US Army Special Warfare School, which was designed to provide enlisted personnel with a working knowledge of PSYOP methods and techniques. It was reported that there was a need for an improved MOS identification for enlisted skills in PSYOP fields such as printers, varitypists, and intelligence analysts. In view of the need for detailed technical knowledge of printing maintenance and production, all the respondents indicated that the printing officer authorization for the group and battalions should be converted from a commissioned officer to a warrant officer position.

d. Equipment

(1) The demands for PSYOP printing requirements were beyond the concept, design, and capability of the light mobile printing plants. All the PSYOP commanders reported that the Addressograph-Multigraph Model 1250W offset press was not adequate for the printing requirements in terms of production quantity. With no increase in printing personnel, the proposed MTOE would provide a 100-percent increase in printing production with the addition of higher speed, 17½ x 22½ inch printing presses. The proposed MTOE called for four larger presses for the group headquarters, while each of the battalions would be authorized one larger press and seven Addressograph-Multigraph Model 1250W presses.

(2) None of the printing plants were being employed according to the mobile concept. Inasmuch as all PSYOP printing equipment was contained within fixed facilities in RVN, the mobile concept should be re-examined for future stability operations.

(3) Twenty-four of the 50 PSYOP team leaders reported that their PSYOP equipment was inadequate for missions in RVN. In general, equipment considered inadequate included the AN/UNH-10 recorder-reproducer, MP-3 copy camera, loudspeaker, and paper cutters. Refer to Annex E for details on equipment shortcomings.

(4) Neither the PSYOP units nor the tactical units received adequate logistical or maintenance support for nonstandard, mission specific PSYOP equipment, according to all the respondents. Annex E describes types of nonstandard PSYOP equipment and recent actions instituted to resolve the problems.

12. PROBLEM AREAS

a. The MTOE 33-500F organization did not provide adequate PSYOP resources to satisfy all requirements, according to the five major PSYOP unit commanders. The organization and force structure of PSYOP units were not initially tailored to meet specific PSYOP requirements for each area. Each of the PSYOP battalions was organized with basically the same personnel strength and equipment without regard to target populations, ethnic groups, resources available to other PSYOP agencies, and number of tactical units in the area. The proposed MTOE called for additional propaganda development, printing, and audiovisual and loudspeaker capabilities. Despite the added resources requested, the proposed MTOE will still not satisfy all PSYOP requirements because of stringent manpower ceilings imposed on the units. Consequently, after the MTOE is approved, there will still be an imbalance between PSYOP resources and requirements.

b. A problem confronting most PSYOP commanders and staff officers was what they considered to be a lack of understanding on the part of tactical unit commanders concerning the role, capability, and employment of PSYOP in stability operations. The majority of PSYOP field personnel indicated that some tactical commanders were more interested in high body counts during combat operations than in integrating PSYOP as part of the tactical operation. One PSYOP unit commander reported that his PSYOP teams in support of a division were only 70-percent effective because team assets were used for purposes other than PSYOP. The use of projectors to show movies to US forces and the use of speakers to broadcast messages in US troop areas were examples of misuse of PSYOP resources. According to 43 percent of the respondents, the PSYOP effort could definitely be improved through more effective employment of PSYOP. The body count and kill attitude was manifested in the remark of a unit commander who boasted that his Chieu Hoi program consisted of two 105mm howitzers - one of which was marked Chieu and the other Hoi. Conversely, there were other commanders whose expectations of PSYOP were too high; they tended to regard it as a magic wand capable of producing immediate results. An improved program of instruction at Army Service Schools, to include officer candidate schools, basic officer courses, officer career courses, and the Command and General Staff College, would provide a better understanding of the significance and capabilities of psychological operations.

c. The effect of the adverse attitude toward PSYOP by tactical commanders was manifested through officers who were assigned to PSYOP positions, but expressed reluctance to remain in such assignments. They felt there was a lack of incentive in a PSYOP career and that their opportunities for promotion would be jeopardized in their career branches. In several units, there were three and sometimes four different officers assigned as the division PSYOP officer during a one-year period. This was indicative of the low priority of PSYOP assignments and accounted for a lack of continuity in the PSYOP programs.

d. There was a lack of understanding of the manner in which individual actions adversely affected the PSYOP effort and harmed the US image. Over 60 percent of the PSYOP team leaders replied that the actions of some US troops were frequently detrimental to US/Vietnamese relationships. Actions and incidents frequently cited which created adverse impact on the Vietnamese society were vehicle accidents, general misconduct of troops, and patronizing or disrespectful actions toward the Vietnamese people. Most divisions conducted a one-time initial briefing for new arrivals, but periodic briefings were needed similar to the "Personal Response" program initiated by units in the I CTZ⁽⁶⁾.

e. PSYOP unit commanders stated there was a morale problem incident to PSYOP personnel performing daily flight duties. Approximately 30 personnel from each battalion were required to perform frequent and regular aerial flights in the discharge of their PSYOP duties. These personnel were members of the PSYOP Battalion air operations section or Teams HE and HB conducting loudspeaker and leaflet missions in support of tactical operations. They did not receive non-crewmember flight status or pay, and felt they were entitled to it. Although action was taken by the 4th PSYOP Group in its proposed MTOE to request non-crewmember flying status by identifying MTOE positions, administrative delays prevented the personnel from receiving financial compensation for daily flight status.

f. There was a need for additional PSYOP capability in support of divisions in RVN. It was the unanimous opinion of division PSYOP officers and team leaders that there was a need for added PSYOP personnel and equipment resources due to the nature of the PSYOP challenge in RVN. A minimum of one helicopter was needed at division level to conduct quick-reaction PSYOP support of tactical units in contact with the enemy. Based on lessons learned in RVN, future PSYOP force structures for stability operations in Southeast Asia should provide for a minimum of one Team HA per division, one Team HE per brigade, and one Team HB per Battalion. In an area support role, one Team HE will be needed to conduct, advise, and coordinate the PSYOP effort in each province not included in the TAO of a US division.

g. Thirty percent of the team leaders stated there were insufficient DA guidelines published on the employment of PSYOP teams, techniques, or doctrine. More information was needed on the employment of PSYOP teams in combined operations with MEDCAP, armed propaganda, and cultural drama teams. Successful face-to-face communication, rumor campaigns, and rallier exploitation techniques were needed along with obtaining target audience participation at the village level in meetings, rallies, and demonstrations. Information on integrating PSYOP with traveling folk entertainment and, cultural drama shows would also be useful.

h. Additional doctrine and guidance for stability and counterinsurgency operations will be required for a phased escalation of PSYOP units and resources. Broad general guidance was contained in Chapter 6 of FM 33-1. However, the sequence of expanding PSYOP should be developed on a phased escalation basis commensurate with the degree or intensification of the conflict. A gradual escalation for PSYOP in support of stability operations could be phased from a pre-conflict to high-intensity conflict stage followed by a post-conflict stage. The phased escalation should consider the following principles.

(1) During the pre-conflict phase, the actions prescribed in paragraph 6-2, FM 33-1, are appropriate. However, added emphasis is needed for a closer integration of US PSYOP advisors, teams, and resources with the host country PSYOP effort. Development of the US PSYOP plan in closer consonance with the host country plan should be underscored since there is a tendency towards independent operations. It is during the pre-conflict stage that a concentrated research and analysis activity should be conducted because access to target audiences is usually not restricted at that time. Plans for printing and other required resources must be made during this phase.

(2) During the low intensity conflict phase, plans should be completed for implementation of national and regional combined PSYOP centers prior to the deployment of PSYOP teams or units. These combined PSYOP centers, manned jointly by key US and indigenous PSYOP personnel, are needed to provide a coordinated and unified PSYOP effort. The primary mission of US PSYOP teams or units should be to assist the host country in the conduct of its PSYOP effort by providing added advisory and resource capabilities. US PSYOP equipment may be operated in the field by indigenous PSYOP teams with the assistance of a US advisor.

(3) After additional US forces are deployed during mid and high intensity conflicts, added PSYOP units should be committed on an area support basis in conjunction with host country PSYOP forces. The US PSYOP unit would also provide direct PSYOP support to US tactical units employed in that area.

(4) During the post conflict phase, a gradual withdrawal of PSYOP units should be accomplished on a phased basis similar to the build-up. The rate of withdrawal depends on the host country's capability to assume responsibility for PSYOP programs. Limited PSYOP resources should remain in country as needed to provide advisory assistance and a logistical base for nonstandard PSYOP equipment and supplies.

13. FINDINGS

- a. The basic mission of PSYOP units was appropriate in RVN.
- b. There was a lack of coordination and central direction to the overall PSYOP effort in RVN. This was caused by a division of responsibilities among various agencies and a failure to integrate US PSYOP activities more closely with the Vietnamese PSYOP effort.
- c. Contrary to FM 33-1, staff supervision for PSYOP within Army organizations was exercised by G5 staffs rather than G3 staffs.
- d. The system of assigning PSYOP units under the operational control of force commanders and senior advisors was adaptable to stability operations and provided effective and responsive PSYOP support to tactical requirements.
- e. There was limited doctrinal guidance available on specific capabilities of PSYOP teams which made it difficult to properly structure or tailor a PSYOP unit to meet all stability requirements.
- f. The force structure of Army PSYOP units was not tailored to meet specific PSYOP requirements in RVN according to the cellular team concept of organization because of imposed force level restrictions.
- g. PSYOP companies were not organized as separate, numerically designated companies as prescribed by cellular team concept of organization.
- h. Although there were sufficient PSYOP-qualified officers assigned to the 4th PSYOP Group, there was a lack of PSYOP-qualified enlisted personnel. There was a lack of both PSYOP-trained officers and enlisted personnel assigned to tactical units.
- i. The technical qualifications of PSYOP officers could be improved through more practical instruction on propaganda development, printing, loudspeaker and leaflet targeting procedures, and operational techniques at PSYOP training installations in CONUS.
- j. The heavy PSYOP printing requirements in RVN exceeded the light mobile printing capability of the 4th PSYOP Group.

k. None of the printing plants were being employed by the 4th PSYOP Group according to the mobile concept.

l. PSYOP equipment such as recorder-reproducers, loudspeakers, cameras, and other equipment were not totally adequate for PSYOP requirements.

m. Army PSYOP units did not receive adequate logistical or maintenance support for nonstandard PSYOP equipment.

n. The 4th PSYOP Group was unable to provide added capabilities or resources to satisfy increasing PSYOP requirements. Although not yet approved, a proposed MTOE submitted by the Group will provide additional propaganda development, printing, and audiovisual and loudspeaker capabilities.

o. There was a lack of understanding by tactical commanders and staff officers on the employment, capability, and use of PSYOP.

p. Continuity of PSYOP was hampered by the rapid personnel turnover and assignment policies in RVN. Many officers were reluctant to remain in PSYOP assignments because of concern for career development.

q. The actions of some US troops were detrimental to US/Vietnamese relationships, thus adversely affecting the US image and overall PSYOP effort.

r. PSYOP personnel who were required to perform daily flight duties in support of tactical loudspeaker and leaflet missions did not receive non-crewmember flight status or pay.

s. Doctrinal guidance on the phased escalation and employment of PSYOP units during stability operations was needed.

SECTION III

OBJECTIVE 2. DESCRIBE AND ANALYZE THE TASKS PERFORMED BY US ARMY PSYOP UNITS IN RVN TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR MISSIONS

The 4th PSYOP Group and its battalions provided support to approximately 50 commands, agencies, and units (see Figure III-1). This support took the form of research analysis and PSYOP intelligence, printed material, audiovisual and loudspeaker operations, radio broadcasts, and dissemination of material. In addition to these support functions, the Group also exercised command and control of subordinate units, and accomplished normal supply and maintenance tasks. PSYOP units were capable of accomplishing all tasks, according to 85 percent of the respondents representing all force commanders and tactical units in RVN. The 15 percent who indicated that the PSYOP units could not satisfy all requirements stated that the PSYOP units were limited in printing, audiovisual, and loudspeaker capabilities by insufficient personnel and equipment. This section presents a summary of the tasks performed by the Group and its battalions. Detailed discussion is contained in Annexes E through H.

14. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command and control tasks were performed by Team AC (group), Team AB (battalion), and Team AA (company). Team AC was designed to provide PSYOP support to a theater army (e.g., USARPAC), and administrative, command, and logistical support to assigned battalions. This team can plan, manage, and supervise a strategic PSYOP program. Team AB was designed to support a field army (e.g., USARV). In RVN, there was a Team AB in support of each CTZ. It performed strategic or tactical PSYOP missions, acted as liaison with supported units, and functioned in an advisory role to the PSYOP staff section of supported units. Team AB exercised command and control over assigned Teams AA. Team AA was designed to tactically support a corps, separate division, or other command.

15. SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE

Team BA (Supply and Maintenance) provided direct support repair of signal and reproduction equipment. It stocked critical spare parts for nonstandard PSYOP-peculiar equipment. Within the PSYOP teams, the most serious problem was the lack of supply and maintenance equipment. In one case, movie projectors and tape recorders were deadlined over 60 days and the team was not able to obtain replacement parts or needed repairs. Eighty percent of the PSYOP team leaders indicated their teams were capable of accomplishing assigned tasks. However, the prevailing factor cited for not accomplishing all missions was a lack of parts and supplies which resulted in high equipment deadline rates. Team

4th Psychological Operations Group

Joint United States Public Affairs Office
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
General Political Warfare Directorate
Naval Forces, Vietnam
Free World Military Assistance Force Units

6th Psychological Operations Battalion - III CTZ

II Field Forces, Vietnam	11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
CORDS	1st Australian Task Force
1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)	Royal Thai Forces, Vietnam
1st Infantry Division	Capital Military Assistance Command
25th Infantry Division	30th POLWAR Battalion (ARVN)
199th Light Infantry Brigade	Naval Forces, Vietnam
3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division	Company A, 5th Special Forces Group
1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division	MACV Advisors

7th Psychological Operations Battalion - I CTZ

III Marine Amphibious Force	Americal Division
CORDS	Company C, 5th Special Forces Group
1st Marine Division	10th POLWAR Battalion (ARVN)
3d Marine Division	Naval Advisory Group
101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)	XXIV Corps
1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech)	MACV Advisors

8th Psychological Operations Battalion - II CTZ

I Field Forces, Vietnam	Company B, 5th Special Forces Group
CORDS	MACV Advisory Teams
4th Infantry Division	20th POLWAR Battalion (ARVN)
5th Special Forces Group	Task Force South
173d Airborne Brigade	9th ROK (White Horse) Division
503d Infantry	Capital ROK (Tiger) Division

10th Psychological Operations Battalion - IV CTZ

CG, DMAC, IV Corps Tactical Zone
CORDS
9th Infantry Division
Naval Forces, Vietnam
40th Political Warfare Battalion (ARVN)
Company D, 5th Special Forces Group
MACV Advisory Teams

FIGURE III-1. Units Supported by the 4th PSYOP Group.

DC (Maintenance) performed automotive maintenance on organic vehicles. See Annex E for detailed information on the problem areas.

16. RESEARCH ANALYSIS AND PSYOP INTELLIGENCE

a. The Propaganda Development Center (PDC) at group and battalion levels had the capability to produce detailed studies of target audiences through research, collation of intelligence, and analysis of enemy propaganda. In addition to pre-testing and evaluating propaganda material, the PDC produced graphics and text for propaganda material. PSYOP intelligence was obtained through translation of documents and interrogation of ralliers and prisoners to ascertain target vulnerabilities.

b. PSYOP units had a limited capability to develop and produce area study material, according to two PSYOP unit commanders. This capability was limited because the units lacked trained personnel to perform these studies. The proposed MTOE submitted by the 4th PSYOP Group recommended a 20-percent increase in propaganda development personnel.

c. The PSYOP units identified and verified target audiences and their susceptibilities by developing background data and PSYOP intelligence to determine significant attitudes, behavior patterns, and conditions suitable for PSYOP exploitation. This information was also obtained from civilian and military research agencies. According to all the PSYOP units, these research agencies operated independently in conducting PSYOP research, resulting in duplication of effort. For example, PSYOP studies and/or attitude studies were being conducted by JUSPAO, MACV, the 4th PSYOP Group, civil affairs units, and the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA).

d. The PSYOP units maintained liaison with other intelligence agencies as part of their PSYOP intelligence collecting effort. According to all the respondents, responses from these agencies were not timely and were of marginal use for PSYOP intelligence purposes. It was reported that the intelligence analysts were not sufficiently knowledgeable of PSYOP aspects of intelligence to produce material that could be readily used by the PSYOP community. PSYOP unit commanders stated that the most effective means of developing PSYOP intelligence has been through their own analysis of intelligence and interrogation reports and information received from PSYOP field teams.

e. Evaluating the effectiveness of enemy and friendly propaganda was a function performed by each unit. The evaluation process included an analysis of the source, content, audience, and media used for dissemination. The evaluation was directed more toward the credibility of material than its effect on target audiences. Inaccessibility of target audiences located in contested areas was a limiting factor.

f. Army PSYOP units developed propaganda within the framework of national policies and guidance received from JUSPAO. All PSYOP unit commanders indicated that PSYOP policy guidance was adequate in content, but was not received in a timely manner.

17. PRINTED MATERIAL

a. Printed material produced by the 4th PSYOP Group included leaflets, newspapers, magazines, booklets, and calendars. Teams GA, GB, GC, GD, and HC were responsible for printing and processing propaganda material for dissemination. The total PSYOP printing requirements in RVN exceeded the printing capability of the 4th PSYOP Group. Printing requirements in excess of the 4th PSYOP Group's capabilities were handled by the 7th PSYOP Group resources in Okinawa. The total leaflet requirement exceeded one billion leaflets (3x6 inch equivalent) each month. With a total of 28 presses, the 4th PSYOP Group produced over 230 million leaflets per month. Fifty-five percent of the leaflets produced were in support of the Chieu Hoi program, and 45 percent for campaigns such as the Trail, B-52, Frantic Goat, and NVA troops in RVN.

b. The 4th PSYOP Group devoted over 30 percent of its printing effort in support of civilian agencies and the CORDS pacification PSYOP effort. This lessened its capacity for tactical PSYOP campaigns.

18. AUDIOVISUAL AND LOUDSPEAKER OPERATIONS

a. There were several tasks involving audiovisual and loudspeaker operations. Included were propaganda development, intelligence collection, loudspeaker operations, dissemination of propaganda material, and showing of movies.

b. All respondents agreed that the mobile audiovisual and loudspeaker teams were fully committed and effectively employed in support of tactical units and in an area support role at the province level. Two PSYOP battalion commanders employed all their mobile teams in direct support of tactical units. Two other PSYOP battalion commanders employed their teams in support of tactical units and in an area support role. These latter commanders agreed that the teams were more effectively employed when used in an area support role.

c. Eighty percent of the PSYOP team leaders indicated their teams were capable of accomplishing all assigned tasks. The predominant factor cited for not accomplishing all missions was a lack of supplies and repair parts. This resulted in high deadline rates for mission-essential equipment. Forty-seven percent of the PSYOP team leaders reported their PSYOP equipment was not adequate for PSYOP missions in RVN.

d. Thirty percent of the respondents indicated that DA doctrine or guidelines on field techniques available in FMs, particularly on the employment of mobile teams, were inadequate. The PSYOP officers underscored the need for technical guidance on rallier exploitation, propaganda development techniques, and printing operations and capabilities. Guidance was also needed on loudspeaker aerial dissemination techniques, and definitions of area and spot size targets for leaflet and loudspeaker missions.

19. RADIO BROADCASTS

The 4th PSYOP Group was broadcasting six hours of daily PSYOP radio programs in the Vietnamese language as a part of a combined US/ARVN radio station operation. The unit was in the process of expanding its operations by installing a 50-KW radio transmitter at Pleiku and by broadcasting 11 hours daily. When the 50-KW station becomes fully operational, broadcast range is expected to be approximately 200 miles. Plans were to include broadcasting in the Montagnard language beginning 1 September 1969.

20. DISSEMINATION OF MATERIAL

a. The 7th USAF provided support for aerial dissemination of leaflets and for aerial broadcasts. Requests from tactical units for PSYOP missions were processed by the PSYOP battalions. The PSYOP battalions plotted the targets, produced and delivered PSYOP material, and coordinated the missions with flight detachments of the 5th and 9th Special Operations Squadrons, 14th Special Operations Wing.

b. The three fixed-wing type aircraft employed for PSYOP missions were the C-47, O2-B, and U-10. Air Force helicopters were not available for PSYOP missions. All PSYOP units indicated that sufficient Air Force aircraft were available for long range pre-planned PSYOP missions. However, some force commanders and tactical unit PSYOP officers stated there were insufficient aircraft assets available to provide quick-reaction loud-speaker or leaflet PSYOP missions.

c. As a supplement to Air Force aircraft, tactical units used organic rotary-wing aircraft. However, most of the tactical units complained about the insufficient number of Army helicopters available for quick-reaction PSYOP missions in support of tactical operations. It appeared that rotary-wing aircraft were more adaptable than fixed-wing aircraft for PSYOP missions in support of tactical units.

21. EFFECTIVE PSYOP MEDIA

According to MACV studies, the most effective PSYOP media in RVN were face-to-face communication, cultural drama shows, and television. Next in order of effectiveness were movies, tapes, radio, and printed material. Printed material had the lowest rating because of the high

illiteracy of the population. However, production of printed material had the heaviest emphasis for two reasons. There was a tendency on the part of tactical unit commanders to measure PSYOP effectiveness by the quantity of leaflets disseminated. This contributed to an increasing demand for greater leaflet quantities. All in-country PSYOP resources had already been fully committed, and the only available out-of-country resources were the printing facilities of the 7th PSYOP Group. Therefore, production of printed material was increased.

22. FINDINGS

a. Research Analysis and PSYOP Intelligence

(1) Army PSYOP units developed detailed PSYOP studies, but were limited in their capabilities to produce background and area studies. This was due to a lack of trained, area-oriented military personnel and a shortage of qualified Vietnamese personnel.

(2) Civilian and military agencies operated independently in conducting PSYOP research and attitude surveys, resulting in duplication of effort.

(3) Army PSYOP units were limited in their ability to develop intelligence. They were dependent upon the intelligence community for the majority of intelligence used to develop specific PSYOP vulnerabilities and to identify incidents for PSYOP exploitation.

(4) Members of the intelligence community were not sufficiently knowledgeable of PSYOP intelligence requirements and were unable to provide timely responses to specific PSYOP requirements.

(5) The most effective means of gathering PSYOP intelligence was through analysis, by PSYOP personnel, of intelligence and interrogation reports along with observations reported by organic PSYOP field teams.

(6) The primary emphasis in evaluating enemy and friendly propaganda was directed more toward the credibility of material than its effect on target audiences. The emphasis on obtaining immediate indicators of PSYOP effectiveness was frustrating to PSYOP staff officers and PSYOP unit commanders.

(7) National policy guidance was adequate, but was not received in a timely manner.

b. Printed Material

(1) The printing demands exceeded the capability of the light printing presses assigned to Army PSYOP units. This was a contributing factor to the short life and high deadline on the presses.

(2) Printing requirements for propaganda material expanded to an unprecedented level of over one billion leaflets (3x6 inch equivalent) per month.

(3) The 4th PSYOP Group produced approximately 230 million leaflets per month during 1968 along with daily and weekly newspapers, magazines, booklets, calendars, and other printed material.

(4) Approximately 30 percent of the 4th PSYOP Group printing capability was expended in support of national pacification and revolutionary development objectives.

(5) Fifty-five percent of the leaflets produced by the 4th PSYOP Group were in support of the Chieu Hoi program, and 45 percent for campaigns such as the Trail, B-52, Frantic Goat, and NVA troops in RVN.

c. Audiovisual and Loudspeaker Operations

(1) Audiovisual and loudspeaker teams assigned to the 4th PSYOP Group were fully committed and effectively employed in support of tactical units and in area support roles at the province level.

(2) The teams were more effectively used when employed in an area support role.

(3) Added guidelines were needed on employment and PSYOP techniques for Teams HE and HB.

d. Dissemination of Material

(1) There were sufficient Air Force aircraft available to support the 4th PSYOP Group for pre-planned area missions, but not for immediate tactical missions.

(2) Helicopters were more adaptable and responsive than fixed-wing aircraft for PSYOP missions in support of tactical units.

e. Effective PSYOP Media

(1) Face-to-face communication, cultural shows, and television were considered to be the most effective PSYOP media in RVN. Next in order of effectiveness were films, tapes, radio, and printed propaganda material.

(2) The tendency to measure PSYOP effectiveness by quantity of leaflets disseminated contributed to an increasing demand for greater leaflet quantities.

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SECTION IV

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

23. CONCLUSIONS

- a. The 4th PSYOP Group and its organic battalions were employed effectively and were capable of accomplishing assigned missions in RVN within the limitations imposed by organizational manning and equipment authorizations.
- b. The basic mission of US Army PSYOP units in RVN was applicable and the units were responsive to tactical and strategic PSYOP requirements.
- c. There is a need for centralized control of both military and pacification PSYOP activities to improve the direction and coordination of the overall PSYOP effort in RVN.
- d. While FM 33-1 prescribes the staff responsibility for PSYOP as a function of G3, the execution of those functions in RVN as a G5 responsibility was effective during stability operations.
- e. The procedure of assigning PSYOP battalions under the operational control of Force Commander/Senior Advisor in each CTZ was effective in RVN.
- f. The lack of timely national policy guidance resulted in the loss of opportunities for PSYOP exploitation of significant military and political events.
- g. There was a need for additional doctrinal guidance pertaining to the phased escalation and employment of PSYOP units during stability operations.
- h. The cellular team concept of structuring or tailoring PSYOP units to PSYOP mission requirements was not valid when force level restrictions or personnel ceilings were imposed.
- i. Inadequate logistical and maintenance support for nonstandard PSYOP-peculiar equipment was a limiting factor on the capability of PSYOP units in RVN.
- j. The mobile PSYOP printing concept was not applicable in RVN.
- k. Added emphasis was needed within research and development programs for the improvement of PSYOP loudspeaker equipment.

l. More practical PSYOP instruction, at CONUS training installations, on propaganda development, printing, loudspeaker and leaflet targeting procedures, and operational techniques would increase the effectiveness of officers on their first PSYOP assignment.

m. There was a need for greater command emphasis at all levels of command on the role of PSYOP in support of US objectives in RVN.

n. Additional familiarization and training of officers at CONUS training installations would improve their understanding of PSYOP, thus ensuring more effective employment and utilization of PSYOP assets in tactical units.

o. Periodic training and indoctrination of US troops on avoiding actions which were detrimental to US/Vietnamese relationships would improve the US image and overall PSYOP effort.

p. An improved selection and assignment procedure, particularly at division level, would ensure that officers selected for PSYOP assignments were motivated and qualified.

q. The creation of the Military Assistance Officer Program will provide career incentives for PSYOP officers and help retain qualified officers in PSYOP assignments.

r. A separate MOS for PSYOP NCOs and specialists along with improved MOS identification for specific enlisted skills will facilitate classification and assignment of qualified enlisted personnel to PSYOP positions and improve the overall PSYOP effort.

s. The consolidation of research and attitude survey efforts of military and civilian agencies will eliminate duplication of effort and allow maximum use of available resources.

t. Audiovisual and loudspeaker teams were more effectively used when employed in an area support role.

u. Added doctrinal guidelines on the employment and techniques of HE and HB teams will assist team leaders in the effective use of resources

24. RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

a. The military and pacification PSYOP functions be combined under control of one staff agency to provide central direction and coordination for the PSYOP effort in RVN.

b. The MTOE 33-500G, submitted by the 4th PSYOP Group, be approved in order to provide added PSYOP capability and resources in RVN.

c. Additional doctrinal guidance be published on specific cellular team capabilities to facilitate proper structuring and balance of PSYOP units to mission requirements.

d. Added emphasis be placed on providing an improved logistical and maintenance support base for nonstandard PSYOP items of equipment.

e. The 4th PSYOP Group be granted authorization for the continued use of the Quick Reaction Procurement (QRP) system until such time as the logistical base becomes responsive to PSYOP logistical requirements.

f. Added emphasis and priority be placed on improving PSYOP materiel and equipment, particularly loudspeaker equipment, through appropriate research and development agencies.

g. The AN/UNH-10 recorder-reproducer and MP-3 copy camera authorized to PSYOP units be replaced with improved, more effective equipment.

h. Improved selection and assignment procedures be established, particularly at the division level, to ensure that officers selected for PSYOP assignments are motivated and qualified.

i. Creation of the Military Assistance Officer Program be expedited to provide career incentives for PSYOP officers and to retain qualified officers in PSYOP assignments.

j. The 4th PSYOP Group request installation of a new separate MOS for PSYOP NCOs and specialists under the provisions of AR 611-1 along with recommendations for improved MOS identification for enlisted skills required.

k. The printing officer authorization for all PSYOP units be converted from a commissioned officer to a warrant officer position.

l. Additional PSYOP instruction be provided in the PSYOP Unit Officers Course, Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, N.C., on the practical aspects of propaganda development, printing, loudspeaker and leaflet targeting procedures, and operational techniques.

m. Greater command emphasis at all levels of command be placed on the role of PSYOP in support of US objectives in RVN.

n. Training and indoctrination of US troops in RVN be established on a periodic basis to emphasize how irresponsible conduct adversely affects US/Vietnamese relationships, the US image, and the PSYOP effort.

o. Additional PSYOP instruction be included in programs of instruction at all CONUS training installations for officers with the emphasis on the role, capability, and employment of PSYOP.

p. Additional instruction be provided for intelligence officers and analysts at the Army Intelligence School regarding specific PSYOP intelligence requirements.

q. Authorization be granted for the 4th PSYOP Group to coordinate or consolidate research and attitude survey efforts with JUSPAO and CORD to allow maximum use of available resources.

r. MACV perform additional coordination with JUSPAO to emphasize the need for timely PSYOP policy guidances.

s. Doctrinal guidelines be published on the phased escalation and employment of PSYOP units during stability operations.

t. Future PSYOP force structures for stability operations in Southeast Asia, under conditions similar to RVN, should provide for a minimum of one HA team per division, one HE team per brigade, and one HB team per battalion. For area support roles, one HE team should be provided for each province.

u. The operational techniques and concepts listed in Annex I be considered for application in updating programs of PSYOP instruction and doctrinal techniques for counterinsurgency or stability operations.

v. FM 33-1 be amended to prescribe staff responsibility as a function of G5 within US Army units.

ANNEX A

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ANNEX B

GLOSSARY

1. DEFINITIONS

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL: Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administrative matters, such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.

AGITATION: Incitement, an appeal for action. It is based on the existence of a grievance, an impelling situation, or the occurrence, often by design, of a dramatic or atrocious incident.

APPEAL IDEA: A line of persuasion designed to accomplish a task of psychological operations.

AREA ORIENTED: A term applied to personnel or units whose organization, mission, training, and equipment are based upon projected operational deployment to a specific geographical area.

ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAM: A team made up of Vietnamese ralliers under the Chieu Hoi Program. Members of the Armed Propaganda Team were selected from ex-Hoi Chanh and are given training in face-to-face psychological operations procedures. The mission of the Armed Propaganda Team is to perform person-to-person PSYOP in contested or Viet Cong controlled areas, to provide security for the Chieu Hoi centers and hamlets, and to assist in the protection of Government property and citizens.

CHIEU HOI: The "Open Arms" or defection inducement program of the Vietnamese Government was inaugurated in April 1963. The program consists of appeals to dissident elements, VC, and NVA troops to rally or come over to the legally established Government, where they would be subject to a general political amnesty and given an opportunity to participate in the political, economic, and social life of the Republic. The phrase "Chieu Hoi" is a combination of two verbs "to welcome" and "to return."

CONSOLIDATION PSYOP: Consolidation PSYOP is directed toward populations in friendly areas or in territory occupied by friendly military forces with the objective of facilitating operations and promoting maximum cooperation among the civil population.

CONTROL: Authority which may be less than full command, exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations.

COUNTERINSURGENCY: Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency.

FUNCTIONS: The appropriate or assigned duties, responsibilities, missions or tasks of an individual, office, or organization. As defined in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the term "function" includes functions, powers, and duties.

HOI CHANH: Any military or civilian member of the Viet Cong or NVA who voluntarily turns himself in to the RVN or Free World Military Assistance Forces in response to the Chieu Hoi program.

INSURGENCY: A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily communist inspired, supported, or exploited.

MISSION: The task, together with the purpose, which clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task.

OPERATIONAL COMMAND: Those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational command should be exercised by the use of the assigned normal organizational units through their responsible commanders or through the commanders of subordinate forces established by the commander exercising operational command. It does not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training, except when a subordinate commander requests assistance. (The term is synonymous with operational control exercised by the commanders of unified and specified commands over assigned forces in accordance with the National Security Act.)

OPERATIONAL CONTROL: See operational command.

POLITICAL WARFARE (POLWAR): A GVN term that includes motivation, propaganda, indoctrination, security, and social welfare to create in friendly, neutral, and enemy groups the emotions, attitudes, opinions, and behavior which support the achievement of GVN national objectives.

POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL: Actions undertaken by a government to control the populace and its material resources or to deny access to those resources which would further hostile aims and objectives against that government.

PRE-PLANNED REQUEST: A request for PSYOP material designed to exploit a vulnerability and/or susceptibility that will exist in excess of 72 hours. The requestor has time to develop the PSYOP material, and ensure that the theme is consistent with the condition of the target and the vulnerability to be exploited.

PROPAGANDA DEVELOPMENT: The end product of propaganda development is the final propaganda text ready for production. Propaganda development is based on requirements of PSYOP objectives, detailed research analysis and intelligence, and availability of production and delivery capabilities.

PROPAGANDA DISSEMINATION: The delivery of propaganda by means of selected communication media such as radio, loudspeaker, television, printed matter, and face-to-face persuasion.

PROPAGANDA PRODUCTION: The preparation of propaganda for dissemination. It includes such tasks as printing of printed matter, and preparing and packaging tapes for radio and loudspeaker broadcasts.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTION: A specific political, economic, military, or ideological policy, course of action, rally, meeting, or demonstration used as a means of accomplishing a psychological task.

PSYCHOLOGICAL GOAL: A type of desired behavioral or mental effect which, if secured, will help achieve a psychological operation's objective.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP): These operations include psychological warfare, and in addition, encompass those political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral or friendly foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior to support the achievement of national objectives.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPPORTUNITY: Any social, political, economic, military, or ideological circumstance or condition within a society which may be favorably exploited for psychological purposes.

PSYCHOLOGICAL THEME: A topic, subject, or line of persuasion through which a psychological objective is achieved.

PSYCHOLOGICAL TASK: A particular project whose accomplishment will contribute to the achievement of a psychological objective.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE: The planned use of propaganda and other measures, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of enemy, neutral, or friendly groups in support of current policy and aims, or of a military plan. The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions,

emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE, CONSOLIDATION: Psychological warfare directed toward populations in friendly rear areas or in territory occupied by friendly military forces with objectives of facilitating military operations and promoting maximum cooperation among the civil populace.

PSYOP MATERIAL: All printed and recorded matter for use in PSYOP programs.

QUICK REACTION (QR) REQUEST: A request for PSYOP material, primarily a leaflet or taped message, designed to exploit a vulnerability created by an abrupt change in the relevant condition of a target group. The changed condition and the resulting vulnerability and/or susceptibility are not expected to exist for longer than 72 hours. (The QR request is processed and disseminated within 24 hours.)

SPECIAL AUDIENCE: An aggregate of persons who share certain predispositions which, when successfully manipulated, may lead to mental or behavioral reactions that will assist in the accomplishment of a psychological operation's task.

STABILITY OPERATIONS: That type of internal defense and internal development operations and assistance provided by the Armed Forces to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and without which progress cannot be achieved. (Term preferred for Army usage in reference to "counterinsurgency" when discussing the military portion of counterinsurgency activities.) PSYOP is employed in conjunction with all stability operations tasks from strategic operations at national to tactical, civil affairs, revolutionary development, and intelligence operations at the lowest military and political echelons.

STRATEGIC PSYOP: Strategic PSYOP is directed at large segments of the target nation's population exploiting economic, military, psychological, and political vulnerabilities. As opposed to tactical PSYOP, strategic PSYOP is designed to have a long range, rather than immediate, effect on target audiences.

SUBVERSION: Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological morale, or political strength of a nation, or the loyalty of the subjects, or of the regime.

SUSCEPTIBILITY: Target audience potential for being influenced by PSYOP.

TACTICAL PSYOP: Tactical PSYOP is directed at hostile military or paramilitary forces to reduce their combat effectiveness, and at civilians to

prevent interference with tactical operations, reduce noncombatant casualties, and elicit support for friendly forces. Tactical PSYOP supports the tactical plan and is based on achieving short-range objectives.

TARGET AUDIENCE: That group of persons towards which a psychological theme is aimed to obtain a specific reaction.

TASKS: Specific jobs or duties which have to be done to implement successfully the phased concept of operations stemming from the basic undertakings and the overall strategic concept. An assigned job or required function or activity to be performed.

VULNERABILITY: A weakness in the psychological make-up of a target or individual.

2. ABBREVIATIONS

ACofS	Assistant Chief of Staff
APT	Armed Propaganda Team
ARPA	Advanced Research Project Agency
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASL	Authorized Stockage List
BPU	Basic Production Unit
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific
CONUS	Continental United States
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
CTZ	Corps Tactical Zone
DA	Department of the Army
FFV	Field Force, Vietnam
FM	Field Manual
FSN	Federal Stock Number
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Force
GVN	Government of Vietnam
ICAP	Intelligence Civic Action Program
JUSPAO	Joint United States Public Affairs Office
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAF	Marine Amphibious Force
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Program
MILSTRIP	Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedure
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
NAVFORV	US Naval Forces, Vietnam
NICP	National Inventory Control Point
NLF	National Liberation Front
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
NVN	North Vietnam
PDC	Propaganda Development Center
PLL	Prescribed Load List
POW	Prisoner of War
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
PSYWAR	Psychological Warfare
QRP	Quick Reaction Procurement
ROK	Republic of Korea
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
TACAN	Tactical Air Navigation
TAO	Tactical Area of Operations
USAICCV	US Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USARV	United States Army, Vietnam
USARPAC	United States Army, Pacific
VC	Viet Cong

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 10-1

11 December 1967
(MACPD)

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (RCS: MACPD-O3(R-1))

1. PURPOSE. To prescribe policies governing the organization and functions of psychological operations conducted by the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

2. GENERAL.

a. Definitions. See Annex A, Definitions.

b. Director, JUSPAO, is responsible for development of US psychological operations policy; for substantive supervision and coordination of all US psychological operations in Vietnam; for planning and producing materials in support of national programs; and for providing advice and assistance to the Directorate of Information, including the Vietnamese Information Service, at the national level.

(1) JUSPAO policy guidance is directive in nature.

(2) JUSPAO's responsibilities for development of policy include the authority to evaluate PSYOP activities to determine the validity and effectiveness of policy and programs in the field and to seek-out necessary information for policy formulation and review.

c. COMUSMACV conducts psychological operations in support of:

(1) US/FWMAF/RVNAF military operations.

(2) Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development
(Pacification).

d. MACV provides support to psychological operations relating to US/FWMAF tactical operations and advice and assistance to RVNAF political warfare activities and RVNAF commanders at corps, division and regimental levels through the Psychological Operations Directorate (MACPD).

*This directive supersedes MACV Directive 10-1, 14 January 1967

d. MACV provides support to psychological operations relating to US/FWMAF tactical operations and advice and assistance to RVNAF political warfare activities and RVNAF commanders at corps, division and regimental levels through the Psychological Operations Directorate (MACPD).

e. MACV provides support to psychological operations relating to pacification through the Psychological Operations Division, ACofS, CORDS (MACCORDS/POD), to the Assistant Deputies for CORDS/PSYOP at the force commander/corps senior advisor level and Assistant Province Advisors for PSYOP (APA/PSYOP), who serve as advisors to GVN civil and military PSYOP personnel engaged in civil operations and revolutionary development support.

f. MACV is responsible for the execution of PSYOP in the field and is responsible for printing all tactical leaflets, including those used in the campaigns in North Vietnam. JUSPAO will continue to provide tactical tapes for loudspeaker use in support of military operations and the Chieu Hoi Program.

g. Within MACV, the Psychological Operations Directorate (MACPD) will concentrate on tactical psychological warfare in support of military operations against the enemy, including support to the Chieu Hoi Program. Support to the Chieu Hoi Program is focused on activities which induce the enemy to accept the open arms program of the GVN. The ACofS, CORDS (MACCORDS/POD), will focus on psychological operations in support of pacification and national development activities.

h. The MACV Psychological Operations Directorate operates under the staff supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3. The Director of Psychological Operations:

(1) Advises COMUSMACV and the MACV staff on psychological operations and the psychological implications of military operations.

(2) Serves as senior advisor to the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) of the RVNAF and provides staff guidance for subordinate US military advisory teams to RVNAF units in matters relating to political warfare. MACV Directive 515-1 contains policy guidance on MACV support of RVNAF political warfare operations.

(3) Exercises operational control of the 4th PSYOP Group.

(4) Serves as the MACV staff focal point for PSYOP support and assistance to the major subordinate commands of MACV through appropriate military channels.

(5) Serves as point of contact between JUSPAO and COMUSMACV for psychological operations matters pertaining to military operations.

i. The Psychological Operations Division (POD) of MACCORDS, operates under the staff supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, CORDS. The Division Chief of the Psychological Operations Division, MACCORDS:

(1) Coordinates and supervises all psychological operations in support of civil operations and revolutionary development.

(2) Serves as principal psychological operations advisor to the ACoS, CORDS, and Deputy COMUSMACV for CORDS.

(3) Arranges for psychological operations support of other MACCORDS divisions (NLD, PSD, RDC, REF, CH).

(4) Serves as point of contact for psychological operations matters pertaining to civil operations and revolutionary development between JUSPAO and COMUSMACV.

(5) Provides media and administrative support to the CORDS psychological operations advisors at region and province with budgetary, personnel and media services from JUSPAO.

(6) Serves as the MACV staff focal point for psychological operations support and assistance to civil operations and revolutionary development.

j. The Assistant Deputy for CORDS/PSYOP at the force commander/corps senior advisor level and the APA/PSYOP at the province level provide advise and assistance on psychological operations matters to elements of the GVN civil government. Under the senior province advisor, the APA/PSYOP provides direction and supervision to psychological operations conducted in the province and coordinates with commanders of RVNAF/US/FWMAF operating within the province to provide an integrated PSYOP effort. In addition to functions in support of their CORDS missions, these representatives are responsible for providing program, media and technical support to the Vietnamese Information Service; carrying out and supervising normal USIS activities and USAID communication media commitments to the Government of Vietnam; and Department of State and USIS cultural and media relations.

k. Commanders, advisors and all PSYOP personnel are responsible to ensure that the various civil and military psychological operations

are in harmony and mutually supporting. Coordination is centered at the ARVN Corps, US/FWMAF force level with the commanders of 7th Air Force and NAVFORV affecting coordination within their respective services and with commanders at the appropriate corps/force level headquarters.

1. The psychological operations companies of the 4th (US Army) Psychological Operations Group, detachments of the 5th and 9th (US Air Force) Air Commando Squadrons, ARVN POLWAR Battalions, and VNAF PSYWAR aircraft are deployed in the CTZs to support US/FWMAF/RVNAF commanders in military and pacification operations.

m. The 7th (US Army) Psychological Operations Group provides back-up printing support for MACPD. This support includes national campaign materials developed by JUSPAO and selected by agreement between JUSPAO and MACPD for mass printing. CORDS/POD field elements may request, through the force commander/senior advisor, leaflets printed by 7th PSYOP Group and shipped to the four psychological operations companies of the 4th PSYOP Group.

3. POLICY.

a. Psychological operations in Vietnam are characterized by centralized policy guidance and decentralized execution. Within the context of JUSPAO policy guidance and COMUSMACV campaign plans, subordinate commanders plan and conduct psychological operations, employing both organic and supporting resources. Operations are flexible and timely, responding rapidly to the tactical and pacification situation and taking full advantage of new psychological opportunities discovered through aggressive intelligence operations.

b. Psychological operations are planned and conducted in support of each military operation and pacification program. Psychological operations plans include clear statements of requirements for personnel, material and aerial support, including requirements for support of routine and quick reaction operations.

c. Plans for psychological operations are based on careful evaluation of the target audience, research reports, current intelligence, propaganda analysis and interrogation. When time permits, propaganda is pretested; where pretesting is infeasible, post-testing is conducted, and operational results are analyzed with a view towards refinement and improvement.

d. Targeting of propaganda is planned and executed in such a way as to provide coverage through available media of all appropriate audiences with pertinent themes in appropriate language or dialect.

e. Exploitation of VC and NVA returnees and prisoners, who so volunteer, is accomplished as rapidly as possible at the lowest practicable level by preparing leaflets and loudspeaker tapes appealing to specific members of identified units to rally to the GVN or to surrender. The procedures for the intelligence exploitation of human sources and documents captured or acquired by United States military forces are contained in MACV Directive 381-11.

f. A PSYOP annex will be prepared for all military operation plans involving contact with enemy forces and civilian population by all elements down to and including separate brigades. A PSYOP annex will be prepared by the APA/PSYOP for each province pacification plan.

4. FIELD ORGANIZATION.

a. Force commanders/corps senior advisors will organize for the conduct of psychological operations to provide maximum support and responsiveness to military and revolutionary development operations. Within each corps tactical zone, policies and priorities will be established to meet local requirements for the coordination and support of psychological operations. US/FWMAF commanders will request and employ RVNAF supporting elements and will provide psychological operations support to RVNAF as appropriate and as mutually agreed by the US/FWMAF/RVNAF commanders concerned to support the total psychological operations effort. See Annex B, PSYOP Channels of Communications.

b. In accord with MACV Directive 10-12, the US advisory effort at province is consolidated into a single provincial advisory team headed by the province senior advisor and operating under the staff supervision of the CORDS element at force commander/senior advisor level. This team, which replaced the OCO Province Team and the MACV Military Advisory Team (Province), is responsible for advising the province chief on all civil and military matters. Psychological operations advice and assistance is provided by the APA/PSYOP. PSYOP support for revolutionary development and pacification program is provided through GVN/VIS channels, with the APA/PSYOP assisting when GVN organization and resources are unable to meet the need. Requests by APA-PSYOP for support from the US Psychological Operations Companies or from JUSPAO are forwarded to the PSYOP Advisor, CORDS, at the force commander, senior advisor level.

c. Psychological operations advice for RVNAF organizations is provided by US military advisors with each headquarters at and above battalion level. Full time psychological operations advisors are not assigned below division level. Requests for psychological operations support for RVNAF military operations follow the normal RVNAF military chain of command to the Corps PSYWAR Operation Center.

d. Republic of Vietnam Ministry of Defense, Joint General Staff Memorandum Number 2577, subject: Activation of PSYWAR Operation Center, directed activation of PSYWAR Operation Centers at corps and national levels. This directive states that these centers coordinate Vietnamese psychological operations and recommend PSYWAR support measures to ARVN corps commanders. At national level, the Central PSYWAR Center, located in Saigon, coordinates the overall Vietnamese military psychological operations effort.

e. The creation of US/FWMAF PSYOP Operation Centers in each CTZ is encouraged. These centers should maintain close liaison with the counterpart PSYWAR Operation Center.

f. The PSYOP Coordinating Committee, composed of US and Vietnamese agencies and personnel, has proven to be a useful coordinating mechanism. Such committees will be operational in each province and as appropriate at regional level.

g. US/FWMAF organizations are provided psychological operations support by US tactical psychological operations companies located in each of the corps tactical zones and operating under the operational control of the US force commander/corps senior advisor. Requests for psychological operations support follow the US/FWMAF military chain of command. Field teams from the tactical psychological operations companies may be used to assist in forwarding requests for support.

5. DISTRIBUTION.

a. Pertinent JUSPAO publications, leaflets, motion pictures, posters, pamphlets, tapes, program equipment, and policy and administrative directives are disseminated to the region, province and district by MACCORDS and to US/FWMAF and US advisors to RVNAF by MACPD.

b. JUSPAO will continue to develop leaflets in support of the Chieu Hoi and National Reconciliation Programs as well as the pacification program. JUSPAO will ensure delivery to CORDS/POD field elements

sufficient quantities of these leaflets to support APA/PSYOP distribution programs through VIS and RD cadres, Armed Propaganda Teams, Regional Forces, Popular Forces, Police Field Forces and other GVN pacification elements.

c. MACCORDS publications, directives and memoranda are forwarded direct to their advisors in the field. MACCORDS forwards loudspeaker tapes, posters, leaflets and motion picture films prepared for use in support of civil operations or revolutionary development.

d. MACPD and pertinent MACCORDS publications and all items for psychological operations support of US/FWMAF military operations, including loudspeaker tapes produced by JUSPAO, are forwarded through military channels to US/FWMAF and US advisors to RVNAF organization.

6. REPORTS.

a. The following item will be provided by CG, III MAF, CG I FFORCEV, CG II FFORCEV, and SA IV CTZ to COMUSMACV, ATTN: MACPD.

(1) Nonrecurring reports.

(a) Twenty-five copies of all new leaflets and other printed propaganda material produced by subordinate commanders. English translations will accompany each product (submit whenever produced).

(b) One copy of Psychological Operations Annexes to operations orders for brigade or larger sized operations (submit as issued).

(c) One copy of Psychological Operations After Action Reports of brigade or larger sized operations (submit as soon as possible following termination of operations).

(2) Recurring Reports.

(a) Monthly PSYOP Report (see Annex C).

(b) Weekly PSYOP Report (see Annex D).

b. Reports required by MACCORDS (POD) are listed in Joint MACV/JUSPAO/USAID/CSA Directive 4-67, dated 30 October 1967.

MACV Dir 10-1

7. REFERENCES.

- a. JCS Publication 1.
- b. DA FM 33-1.
- c. DA FM 33-5.
- d. Combined Campaign Plan for 1968, snort title: AB 143 (U).
- e. MACV Directive 10-12.
- f. MACV Directive 381-2. (C).
- g. MACV Directive 381-11.
- h. MACV Directive 381-24.
- i. MACV Directive 515-1.
- j. PSYOP Guide, subject: Guide for Psychological Operations, dated 6 August 1967.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

NEIL N. SNYDER, JR.
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General

4 Annexes

- A. Definitions
- B. PSYOP Channels of Communications
- C. Monthly PSYOP Report
- D. Weekly PSYOP Report

DISTRIBUTION:

I - A

II, III, IV, V, VI, VII - C

Less DMA, AFTU, SA, RW Scty Adv Det, VN Dist Ofc, USAF PAC PSTL
& Courier Rgn, VN Regional Exchange, COMSTSO, OICC, RVN, ARC,
DCAA

Plus 250 - PD

110 - CORDS

500 - AG-AOP

5 - AG-AO

2600 - USARV

200 - NAVFORV

150 - III MAF

130 - 5th SP Forces

50 - FWMAF

DEFINITIONS


Psychological Operations (PSYOP). These operations include psychological warfare, and in addition, encompass those political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral or friendly foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior to support the achievement of national objectives.

Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR). The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.

Propaganda. Any information, ideas, doctrines, or special appeals in support of national objectives, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.

Political Warfare (POLWAR). A GVN term that includes motivation, propaganda, indoctrination, security and social welfare to create in friendly, neutral and enemy groups the emotions, attitudes, opinions and behavior which support the achievement of GVN national objectives.

PSYOP CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATIONS



- ☆☆☆ POLICY GUIDANCE, COORDINATION
- DIRECTION, STAFF SUPERVISION
- REQUEST FOR SUPPORT
- ADVICE, ASSISTANCE

MONTHLY PSYOP REPORT

The following information will be provided to COMUSMACV, ATTN: MACPD by CG, III MAF; CG, I FFORCEV; CG, II FFORCEV; and SA, IV CTZ not later than the 10th of each month, reflecting psychological operations of the preceding month. Each report will include pertinent data from all US military agencies/units conducting psychological operations in the respective CTZs and from US advisors relative to RVNAF psychological operations. FWMAF are requested to provide pertinent report data to the appropriate commander/advisor listed above.

FORMAT

1. Total number of leaflets received from other than military agencies (locally produced, JUSPAO, etc.): _____.
2. Ground Operations.
 - a. Total leaflets hand delivered: US Forces _____; RVNAF _____; FWMAF _____ (Specify).
 - b. Total number ground/waterborne loudspeaker broadcast hours: US Forces _____; RVNAF _____; FWMAF _____ (Specify).
3. JUSPAO newspapers distributed by air _____; ground _____.
4. Total posters distributed: _____.
5. Movies shown: _____.
6. Total cultural team performances: _____.
7. Total County Fairs: _____.
8. Narrative evaluation of effectiveness.
 - a. General.
 - b. Chieu Hoi Campaign.
 - c. NVA Campaign.
 - d. PSYOP in support of brigade and larger combat operations.

(SAMPLE FORMAT)

MACV Dir 10-1

- e. **Lessons learned relative to psychological operations.**
- f. **PSYOP anecdotes (highlights).**
- 9. **Problem areas.**
- 10. **Recommendations.**

WEEKLY PSYOP REPORT

The following information will be reported to COMUSMACV, ATTN: MACPD by CG, III MAF; CG, I FFORCEV; CG, II FFORCEV; and SA, IV CTZ via telephone MACV 2157/2820/3027 prior to 1200 hours each Friday, reflecting psychological operations for the previous seven day period as of 2400 hours each Wednesday. Each report will include pertinent data from all US military agencies/units conducting psychological operations in the respective CTZ and from US advisors relative to RVNAF psychological operations. FWMAF are requested to provide pertinent report data to the appropriate commander/advisor listed above.

FORMAT

1. Total leaflets printed: US PSYOP Gp. _____; ARVN POLWAR Bn. _____; US Div/Bde _____; FW Div/Bde _____.
2. Number of PSYWAR sorties flown (includes loudspeaker and leaflet sorties): USAF _____; US Army _____; USMC _____; US Navy _____; FWMAF _____ (Specify); VNAF _____.
3. Total leaflets air dropped by: USAF _____; US Army _____; USMC _____; US Navy _____; FWMAF _____ (Specify); VNAF _____.
4. Total number hours aerial loudspeaker broadcasts: USAF _____; US Army _____; USMC _____; US Navy _____; FWMAF _____ (Specify); VNAF _____.

(SAMPLE FORMAT)

C1, MACV Dir 10-1

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222

CHANGE 1
DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 10-1

10 July 1968
(MACPD)

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (RCS: MACPD-03(R-1))

Directive Number 10-1, this headquarters, dated 11 December 1967, is changed as follows:

* * * * *

4. FIELD ORGANIZATION.

* * * * *

e. (Superseded) The PSYOP Coordinating Committee, composed of US and Vietnamese agencies and personnel, has proven to be a useful coordinating mechanism. Such committees will be operational in each province.

f. (Superseded) US/FWMAF PSYOP Operation Centers will be established in each CTZ. The Operation Center should maintain close liaison with the counterpart POLWAR Operation Center and with Provincial Coordinating Committees to insure maximum effective use of PSYOP resources and materials.

* * * * *

C1, MACV Dir 10-1

FOR THE COMMANDER:



WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

SIDNEY GRITZ
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

I-A

II-C, III-C, IV-C, V-C, VI-C, VII-C

Less:

DMA, AFTU, SA, RW Scty Ad Det,
VN Dist Ofc, USAF PAC PSTL & Courier
Rgn, VN Regional Exchange, COMSTSO,
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Plus:

2600 - USARV

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150 - III MAF

130 - 5th Sp Forces

50 - FWMAF

5 - AG-AO

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222



MACJ3-11

26 April 1969

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Instructions for Submission of "Weekly PSYOP Report" (MACV Form 48) (RCS - MACJ3-51-R1)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Effective 1 May 1969, Letter of Transmittal, MACJ3-11, 4 December 1968, Subj: Transmittal of Instruction for Submission of "Weekly PSYOP Summary Report" (MACJ3 Form 8) (RCS - MACJ3-51), is superseded and MACV Form 48 (11 April 1969) replaces MACJ3 Form 8.
2. Attached for action as required, are instructions for submission of Weekly PSYOP Summary Report (MACV Form 48) (RCS - MACJ3-51-R1).
3. MACV Directive 10-1, currently under revision, will establish the requirement for submission of the subject report. The first report utilizing MACV Form 48 will be for the report period ending 7 May 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Edwin J. Buda". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first letters of the first and last names being capitalized and prominent.

EDWIN J. BUDA
Captain, USA
Assistant Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION:

I - A
II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, - C
Less AFTU, SA, RW Scty Adv Det, VN Dist Offc, USAF PAC PSTL & Courier Rgn, VN Regional Exchange, COMSTSO, OICC, RVN, ARC, DCAA
Plus 250- J3-11, 110-JUSPAO, 50-PWMAO, 5-AG-AO, 600-USARV, 200-NAVFORV, 150-III MAF, 130-5th SPF GP
VII-A
Plus 2-NIS/FIS Dept of State, 5-SACSA, 5-ODCSOPS, 5-AFXPD, 2-CNO, 2-G3 USMC, 2-CINCUSARPAC, 2-CINCPACFLT, 2-CINCPACAF, 2-COMTFARPAC, 2-USA Mil Acad, 2-USN Mil Acad, 2-USAF Mil Acad, 2-USAFSPOPPRC, Eglin AFB, 2-USAF SPOPSCH, Hulbert Fld, 10-JFKCENSPEWAR, 5-C&GS Col, 2-USN Amphib School, 2-CAS, 2-USAR, Ft MacArthur, 2-7th PSYOP Gp, 2-306th PSYOP Bn, 2-93d PSYOP Co, 2-2nd PSYOP Det, 15-14th SOW, 2-USAFAS, ATTN: PSYOP Dept, Ft Sill.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF MACV FORM 48

(Weekly PSYOP Summary Report)

1. PURPOSE. To provide instruction for preparation and submission of the "Weekly PSYOP Summary Report" (MACV Form 48) established in MACV Directive 10-1. These instructions are complete and receipt of MACV Directive 10-1 is not necessary to prepare correctly MACV Form 48, (RCS-MACJ3-51-R1).
2. CONCEPT. This reporting system will provide COMUSMACV with the capability to monitor comprehensively the quality, location, and quantity of PSYOP effort expended and will also provide major subordinate commanders with a consolidated monthly summary of PSYOP activities in their respective tactical zones of responsibility.
3. GENERAL.

a. MACV Form 48 (11 April 69) will be used for the submission of data pertinent to PSYOP activities, as required by MACV Directive 10-1. MACV Form 48 will be submitted in one handwritten copy. Reporting units will insure that information thereon is legible, complete, accurate, and assigned appropriate security classification.

b. This report will reflect all PSYOP activities conducted at various levels of command, but need not be consolidated prior to submission. A brief narrative, relating important incidents, trends, vulnerabilities, successes, etc., is encouraged, but not required.

c. MACV Form 48 is available from MACV AG Publication channels. Local reproduction is authorized.

d. Typical examples of correct reporting entries are contained in Annex B.

4. REPORTING PERIOD.

a. Reports will cover a seven day period from 0001 Thursday through 2400 Wednesday and will be submitted to Headquarters, MACV (ATTN: MACJ3-11) as soon as possible thereafter.

b. An exception to the above occurs when the weekly reporting period does not coincide with the end of the calendar month. In these instances, the weekly report will be submitted in two parts. (Example: One report will be submitted for the period 0001 the last Thursday of the month to 2400 the last day of the month. A second report will be submitted to cover the period from 0001 the first day of the month through 2400 the following Wednesday.)

5. SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF MACV FORM 48.

a. Header Data.

(1) WEEK ENDING (Boxes 1 - 6). Record on each page the last two digits of the year, a two digit month code, and a two digit day code from left to right in that order. Boxes 5 and 6 should reflect either a Wednesday or the last day of the month, as appropriate.

(2) CORPS (Box 7). Record on each page the digit 1, 2, 3, or 4 to indicate the Corps Tactical Zone in which the activity occurred. Reports submitted by units outside the Republic of Vietnam should leave this entry blank.

(3) FLIGHT HOURS (Boxes 17, 18, and 19). Record the total whole hours flown in direct support of PSYOP missions during the reporting period. This entry is to be made only on page one of the report.

(4) SORTIES (Boxes 20, 21, and 22). Record the total sorties flown in direct support of PSYOP missions during the reporting period. This entry is to be made only on page one of the report.

b. SECTOR 1: BASIC DATA. The data entered in this section of Form 48 is basic to every PSYOP activity and will contain entries on all lines with two possible exceptions: (1) Under "Targets", "Quantity" and "C" CANNOT contain entries on the same line; and (2) "Quantity of Items Dispensed" and "Time" CANNOT contain entries on the same line.

When data for any line is identical with the data on the previous line, it may be designated by drawing an arrow down that column through all lines for which that entry is repeated. (See Annex A for correct use of vertical arrows.)

(1) AREA (Columns 8, 9, 10, and 11). Record the UTM Grid Coordinate corresponding to the lower left corner of the 10 kilometer by 10 kilometer area in which the targets are located. Columns 8 and 9 will contain two alphabetic characters and columns 10 and 11 will contain two numerical digits. If greater than 80% of the PSYOP effort was within one area, report the total as being in that area. If this is not the case, interpolate and report portions in relation to the appropriate UTM Square. In these cases, each area affected will constitute a reportable target. When DELIVERY METHOD is RADIO or TELEVISION, report the area from which the program emanated (NOTE: Examples 1 and 2, Annex A). In some instances, areas located near the Everest Spheroid/International Spheroid (UTM correction zone) do not encompass the normal 100 square kilometers. For the purposes

of this report, consider this correction factor in terms of the same dimensions as for other areas.

(2) DELIVERY METHOD (Column 12). Record the applicable alphabetic code from Table 1, Annex B, to designate method of delivery.

(3) UNIT or AGENCY (Columns 13 - 14 and 15 - 16). Table 2 of Annex B applies to both columns 13 - 14 and 15 - 16. Record the appropriate code under columns 13 and 14 to indicate the unit or agency conducting the PSYOP effort. Record from the same table, the appropriate code under columns 15 and 16 to indicate the unit or agency being supported. It is feasible that the same code could be valid for both columns 13 - 14 and 15 - 16.

(4) TARGETS (Columns 17, 18, 19, and 20).

(a) Record in columns 17, 18, and 19 the number of times PSYOP is conducted by one delivery method in one area, except when the delivery method is aircraft (Aircraft delivery of leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts will be reported as separate targets even if they are conducted simultaneously).

NOTE: Examples 3 and 4, Annex A.

(b) Column 20 is used to indicate that data recorded in columns to the right of column 20, is additional PSYOP conducted on the target(s) recorded previously under columns 17 through 19. Record a "C" under column 20 to report additional campaigns, themes and/or items dispensed on the same target(s). NOTE: All entries to the left of column 20 must be the same as the previous line except no entry will be listed in columns 17, 18, and 19. EXAMPLES 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7, Annex A.

(5) CAMPAIGN (Column 21). Record the alphabetic code from Table 3, Annex B, to designate the PSYOP Campaign supported. NOTE: More than one campaign can be reported for the same target by using the continuation line. NOTE: EXAMPLES 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7, Annex A.

(6) THEME (Columns 22 and 23). Record the numerical code from Table 4, Annex B, to designate the PSYOP theme used. NOTE: More than one theme can be reported for the same target by using the continuation line. EXAMPLES 1, 2, 4, 6, and 7, Annex A.

(7) ITEM (Column 24). Record the alphabetic code from Table 5, Annex B, which describes the item dispensed. Quantities of like items can be summed and recorded on one line as long as they were dispensed during operations in the same area.

When more than one item is dispensed on a target, report this by a continuation line for each additional item. EXAMPLES 4, 6, and 7, Annex A.

In reporting face to face, checking watercraft, and armed propaganda team targets, record code "S" on the first line of item column to indicate the total time expended and the total personnel contacted. EXAMPLES 6, 7, and 8, Annex A.

(8) MEASURE (Column 25). Record the alphabetic code from Table 6 Annex B, for the unit of measure necessary to describe the quantity of items dispensed under columns 26 - 30, (See note 1, Table 6, Annex B), or the time expended under columns 31 - 35 (See Note 2, Table 6, Annex B).

(9) QUANTITY OF ITEMS DISPENSED (Columns 26 through 30). Record the numerical digit that reflects the quantity of items dispensed, or the

radius of coverage, as applicable (EXAMPLES 1 and 2, Annex A). The figure should be relative to the measure code recorded in column 25. There cannot be an entry in "Quantity of items dispensed" columns 26 - 30 on the same line that an entry is made in the time columns (31 - 35). NOTE: EXAMPLES 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 9, Annex A.

(10) TIME (Columns 31 through 35). Record the hours under columns 31 through 33 and the minutes under columns 34 and 35. Record the time expended for all the targets summarized on the first line. (NOTE: The total time and quantity of targets must appear on the first line of a multi-line entry (EXAMPLE 6, Annex A). In describing time expended in the delivery of different items on the same target, (e.g. face-to-face targets during which movies are shown, entertainers perform, medical/dental aid is provided, etc.,) record the respective times devoted to those operations on the continuation lines corresponding to the correct items and measure. The sum of times recorded on continuation lines will not necessarily equal the time recorded on the first line. Time is calculated for the period during the actual conduct of PSYOP, NOT TRANSIT TIME. An entry CANNOT appear in these columns on the same line as an entry under QUANTITY OF ITEMS DISPENSED columns 26 through 30.

(11) HOSTILE FIRE (Column 36). Record "Y" (Yes) or "N" (No) under column 36.

c. SECTOR 2: PERSONNEL DATA.

(1) CONTACTED (Columns 37 through 40). This entry is applicable ONLY when delivery method (Column 12) contains "C", "F", or "P". Record on the first line, the total number of persons present at the target location.

1

Entry should be recorded on the same line as the entry in the target column (17-19). Total number of personnel contacted as it appears on the first line will not necessarily be the same as the sum of personnel contacted on subsequent lines. Record numbers of persons exposed to individual PSYOP activities on lines corresponding to the items. NOTE: EXAMPLES 6 and 7, Annex A.

(2) DETAINED (Columns 41 through 44 and 45 through 46). Record under columns 41 through 44, the quantities of Hoi Chanh and/or prisoners received as a direct result of the PSYOP effort described on that line. Quantities of personnel of different classification (Columns 45 and 46) must be recorded on separate lines by use of a continuation line. Record under column 45 and 46, the classification code from Table 7, Annex B, that best describes the classification of personnel recorded under columns 41 through 44 of the corresponding line. This is a preliminary classification assigned by the unit actually receiving or detaining personnel as a direct result of psychological operations. NOTE: EXAMPLE 9, Annex A.

(3) Info RECEIVED (Column 47). Record the code from Table 8, Annex B, that best describes the type of information received. Should more than one type of information be received, record the appropriate codes (one per line) by use of continuation line. This column is applicable when direct contact is established with the target audience regardless of whether personnel were detained. NOTE: EXAMPLES 7 and 9, Annex A.

TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR ANNEXES

ANNEX A - Example Entries on MACV Form 48

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXAMPLE</u>	
1	1	Radio Transmission
	2	Television Transmission
2	3	Aircraft Delivered Leaflets & Loudspeaker
	4	Aircraft Delivered Leaflets & Loudspeaker
3	5	Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol
	6	Face to Face
4	7	Checking Watercraft
	8	Armed Propaganda Team
5	9	Ground & Air Loudspeaker and Air Leaflets
	10	Watercraft Delivered Loudspeaker
6	11	Ground Dissemination of Leaflets & Radios
	12	Artillery Delivered Leaflets

ANNEX B - MACV Form 48 Entry Code Tables

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>TABLE</u>		<u>COLUMNS</u>
1	1	Delivery Method	12
2	2	Unit or Organization I CTZ	13 thru 16
3	2	Unit or Organization II CTZ	13 thru 16
4	2	Unit or Organization III CTZ	13 thru 16
5	2	Unit or Organization IV CTZ	13 thru 16
6	3	Campaign	21
7	4	Theme	22 & 23

ANNEX E (CONT'D)

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>TABLE</u>		<u>COLUMNS</u>
8	5	Item	24
9	6	Measure	25
10	7	Classification of Detainees	45 & 46
11	8	Information Received	47

WEEKLY PSYOP SUMMARY REPORT

WEEK ENDING (LAST DAY OF REPORT)	YEAR	MONTH	DAY
1 - 2	3 - 4	5 - 6	
CORPS	7		
(1, 2, 3 OR 4 ONLY)			

FLIGHT HOURS (NEAREST WHOLE HOURS)	17	18	19
SORTIES	20	21	22

REPORTING UNIT

PAGE OF

NOTE: ENTER FLIGHT HRS & SORTIES ON 1st PAGE ONLY.

SECTOR 1: BASIC DATA										SECTOR 2: PERSONNEL DATA									
AREA	UTM SQUARE	UNIT OR AGENCY	CONDUCTED BY	IN SUPPORT OF	TARGETS		THEME	QUANTITY OF ITEMS DISPENSED	TIME	CONTACTED	DETAINED	INFO	CLASSIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION				
					QUANTITY	C													
XS 89	A	WS	WS	WS	2	2	P 10	20											
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓	2	2	↓		30										
EXAMPLE 3																			
An entry reporting two leaflet and two loudspeaker targets covered by II FFV aircraft in support of CMAC. (Leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts could have been dispensed simultaneously.)																			
YD 25	A	MS	WG	WG	1	1	P 10	10											
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓			V 90	5											
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓	1	1	↓		15										
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓			D 20		20										
EXAMPLE 4																			
An entry reporting one leaflet and one loudspeaker target conducted by the 1st MARINE AIR WING in support of XIIV CORPS. Both targets were covered by two themes and supported two campaigns. (It is possible that leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts were dispensed simultaneously.)																			
NOTE: EXAMPLES 3 AND 4 DIFFER IN THAT EXAMPLE 3 REPORTS THE DISPENSING OF LEAFLETS IN SUPPORT OF ONE CAMPAIGN AND ONE THEME ON TWO OCCASIONS, WHEREAS EXAMPLE 4 REPORTS THE DISPENSING OF LEAFLETS ON ONE OCCASION BUT IN SUPPORT OF TWO CAMPAIGNS AND TWO THEMES; THE SAME IS REPORTED FOR LOUDSPEAKER BROADCASTS IN BOTH EXAMPLES.																			

WEEK ENDING LAST DAY OF REPORT PERIOD	YEAR	MONTH	DAY
	1	2	
	3	4	5 - 6

	7
--	---

CORPS
(1, 2, 3 OR 4 ONLY)

**FLIGHT HOURS
(NEAREST WHOLE HOURS)**

SORTIES

PAGE -- OF --

NOTE: ENTER FLIGHT HRS & SORTIES ON 1st PAGE ONLY.

BASIC DATA

SECTOR 2: PERSONNEL DATA

[illegible]

EXAMPLE 5

An entry reporting a Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol during which 500 leaflets supporting the VOLUNTARY INFORMANT PROGRAM and 300 leaflets supporting the ELEPHANT WALK campaign were dispensed.

WS	80	F	A	N	40	/	D	10	S	H		4	20	N	375
						C	P	30	L	K	5				
								10	M	H		2	10		165
									E	T		1	50		300
							V	90	L	K	5				
							P	91	P	F	10				

EXAMPLE 6

An entry reporting Pace to Pace delivery of leaflets, medical aid, entertainers, and posters. NOTE: "S" ENTRY ON THE FIRST LINE INDICATES THAT TOTAL TIME AND PERSONNEL CONTACTED ARE RECORDED ON THE FIRST LINE.

[illegible]

WEEK ENDING
(LAST DAY OF REPORT PERIOD)

YEAR MONTH DAY

1 2 3 4 5 6

WEEKLY PSYOP SUMMARY REPORT

REPORTING UNIT

PAGE 7 OF 7

FLIGHT HOURS
(NEAREST WHOLE HOURS)

17 18 19

SORTIES

20 21 22

WEEK ENDING
(LAST DAY OF REPORT PERIOD)

YEAR MONTH DAY

1 2 3 4 5 6

WEEKLY PSYOP SUMMARY REPORT

REPORTING UNIT

PAGE 7 OF 7

FLIGHT HOURS
(NEAREST WHOLE HOURS)

17 18 19

SORTIES

20 21 22

SECTOR 1:

AREA

UTM SQUARE

10 11 12

UNIT OR AGENCY

CONDUCTED BY

13 14 15 16

TARGETS

QUANTITY

17 18 19

THEME

20 21 22 23 24 25

QUANTITY OF ITEMS DISPENSED

26 27 28 29 30

TIME

HOURS

31 32 33

MINUTES

34 35

CONTACTED

DETAINED

DLV CODES

INVOLVING DIRECT PERSONAL CONTACT

37 38 39 40

CLASSIFICATION OF DETAINEES

41 42 43 44

INFO

45 46 47

SECTOR 2: PERSONNEL DATA

CONTACTED

DETAINED

DLV CODES

INVOLVING DIRECT PERSONAL CONTACT

37 38 39 40

CLASSIFICATION OF DETAINEES

41 42 43 44

INFO

45 46 47

EXAMPLE 11

An entry reporting the ground dissemination of leaflets and radio receivers by ARVN SPECIAL FORCES in support of III CTZ. NOTE: USE OF "G" AS A DELIVERY METHOD INDICATES THAT PERSONAL CONTACT WAS NOT MADE WITH THE INTENDED TARGET AUDIENCE.

EXAMPLE 12

An entry reporting the delivery of ten leaflet rounds containing a total of 20 thousand and leaflets. NOTE: THE NUMBER OF ROUNDS IS ENTERED AS QUANTITY OF TARGETS.

TABLE 1 DELIVERY METHOD

(Column 12)

<u>CODE</u>	<u>DELIVERY METHOD</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
A	AIRCRAFT	
C	CHECKING WATERCRAFT	1
F	FACE TO FACE (Movies, MEDCAP, DENTCAP, Entertainers, etc)	2
G	GROUND	3
L	LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROL	
P	ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAM	
R	RADIO	
S	ARTILLERY OR MORTAR	
T	TELEVISION	
W	WATER CRAFT	

NOTES:

1. Checking and searching watercraft are considered synonymous for this report. Enter under "TARGETS" the number of watercraft checked and/or searched, only if PSYOP material is distributed.
2. FACE TO FACE is used when personal contact is made with the target audience except when codes "C" or "P" are applicable.
3. Unless other codes are obviously applicable, GROUND is used when PSYOP materials or loudspeaker broadcasts are disseminated without personal contact with the target audience (e.g. placing leaflets, posters, etc. along roads; loudspeaker broadcasts from moving vehicles or to persons across enemy line, etc.

TABLE 2 UNIT OR ORGANIZATION (I CTZ)

(Columns 13, 14, 15, and 16)

<u>CODE</u>	<u>UNIT or ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CODE</u>	<u>UNIT or ORGANIZATION</u>
01	QUANG TRI PROVINCE AGENCIES	V2	VIETNAMESE NAVY/NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP
02	THUA THIEN PROVINCE AGENCIES		
03	QUANG NAM PROVINCE AGENCIES	JA	7TH AIR FORCE
04	QUANG TIN PROVINCE AGENCIES	J2	5TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON
05	QUANG NGAI PROVINCE AGENCIES	J3	9TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON
92	DANANG SPECIAL SECTOR AGENCIES	J4	606TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON
		J5	374TH TACTICAL AIRLIFT WING
M2	III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE	J6	3RD AIR DIVISION
M3	1ST MARINE DIVISION	J7	360TH TEWS
M4	3RD MARINE DIVISION	J8	361ST TEWS
M5	1ST MARINE AIR WING	J9	362ND TEWS
M6	FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND		
		Q2	VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE
WD	5TH SPECIAL FORCES		
WE	AMERICAL DIVISION	YX	AIR AMERICA
WF	101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION		
WG	XXIV CORPS	G2	VIETNAMESE INFORMATION SERVICE
WY	3RD BRIGADE, 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION	G3	NATIONAL POLICE
		G4	REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE
AA	I CTZ HEADQUARTERS	G5	PHUONG HONG
AE	1ST ARVN DIVISION	G6	TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES
AF	2ND ARVN DIVISION	G7	CHIEU HOI MINISTRY
AS	ARVN SPECIAL FORCES		
AU	GENERAL POLITICAL WARFARE DEPARTMENT	CV	COMUSMACV
		WW	USARV
K2	2ND DIVISION ROKMC		
N2	TF115 (MARKET TIME)		
N3	TF116 (GAME WARDEN)		
N4	TF117 (MOBILE RIVERINE)		
N5	HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP		
N6	DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP		
D2	US COAST GUARD		
R2	RVN MARINE CORPS		

TABLE 2 UNIT OR ORGANIZATION (II CTZ)

(Columns 13, 14, 15, and 16)

<u>CODE</u>	<u>UNIT or ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CODE</u>	<u>UNIT or ORGANIZATION</u>
06	KONTUM PROVINCE AGENCIES	N2	TF115 (MARKET TIME)
07	BINH DINH PROVINCE AGENCIES	N3	TF116 (GAME WARDEN)
08	PLEIKU PROVINCE AGENCIES	N4	TF117 (MOBILE RIVERINE
09	PHU BON PROVINCE AGENCIES		
10	PHU YEN PROVINCE AGENCIES	D2	US COAST GUARD
11	DARLAC PROVINCE AGENCIES		
12	KHANH HOA PROVINCE AGENCIES	V2	VIETNAMESE NAVY/NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP
13	NINH THUAN PROVINCE AGENCIES		
14	TUYEN DUC PROVINCE AGENCIES		
15	QUANG DUC PROVINCE AGENCIES	JA	7TH AIR FORCE
16	LAM DONG PROVINCE AGENCIES	J2	5TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON
17	BINH THUAN PROVINCE AGENCIES	J3	9TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON
93	CAM RANH SPECIAL SECTOR AGENCIES	J4	606TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON
		J5	374TH TACTICAL AIRLIFT WING
		J6	3RD AIR DIVISION
WA	I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM	J7	360TH TENS
WD	5TH SPECIAL FORCES	J8	361ST TENS
WH	4TH INFANTRY DIVISION	J9	362ND TENS
WJ	173RD AIRBORNE BRIGADE		
WK	TASK FORCE SOUTH	Q2	VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE
WL	18TH ENGINEER BRIGADE		
		YK	AIR AMERICA
AB	II CTZ HEADQUARTERS		
AG	24TH SPECIAL TACTICAL ZONE	G2	VIETNAMESE INFORMATION SERVICE
AH	22ND ARVN DIVISION	G3	NATIONAL POLICE
AJ	23RD ARVN DIVISION	G4	REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE
AS	ARVN SPECIAL FORCES	G5	PHUONG HONG
AU	GENERAL POLITICAL WARFARE DEPARTMENT	G6	TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES
		G7	CHIEU NOI MINISTRY
K3	CAPITAL BOK INFANTRY DIVISION	CV	COMUSMACV
K4	9TH BOK INFANTRY DIVISION		
		WW	USARV
R2	RVN MARINE CORPS		

TABLE 2 UNIT OR ORGANIZATION (III CTZ)

(Columns 13, 14, 15, and 16)

<u>CODE</u>	<u>UNIT or ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CODE</u>	<u>UNIT or ORGANIZATION</u>
18	BINH TUY PROVINCE AGENCIES	N2	TF115 (MARKET TIME)
19	LONG KHANH PROVINCE AGENCIES	N3	TF116 (GAME WARDEN)
21	PHUOC LONG PROVINCE AGENCIES	N4	TF117 (MOBILE RIVERINE)
22	BINH LONG PROVINCE AGENCIES		
23	BINH DUONG PROVINCE AGENCIES	D2	US COAST GUARD
24	TAY NINH PROVINCE AGENCIES		
25	HAU NGHIA PROVINCE AGENCIES	V2	VIETNAMESE NAVY/NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP
26	BIEN HOA PROVINCE AGENCIES		
27	PHUOC TUY PROVINCE AGENCIES		
28	LONG AN PROVINCE AGENCIES	JA	7TH AIR FORCE
29	GIA DINH PROVINCE AGENCIES	J2	5TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON
		J3	9TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON
WS	CAPITOL MILITARY AREA COMMAND	J4	606TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON
WB	II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM	J5	374TH TACTICAL AIRLIFT WING
WD	5TH SPECIAL FORCES	J6	3RD AIR DIVISION
WM	1ST CAVALRY DIVISION	J7	360TH TEWS
WN	1ST INFANTRY DIVISION	J8	361TH TEWS
WP	25TH INFANTRY DIVISION	J9	362ND TEWS
WQ	3RD BRIGADE, 9TH DIVISION		
WR	3RD BRIGADE, 82ND DIVISION	Q2	VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE
WT	199TH LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE		
WU	11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT	YX	AIR AMERICA
AC	III CTZ HEADQUARTERS	G2	VIETNAMESE INFORMATION SERVICE
AK	5TH ARVN DIVISION	G3	NATIONAL POLICE
AL	18TH ARVN DIVISION	G4	REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE
AM	25TH ARVN DIVISION	G5	PHUONG HONG
AS	ARVN SPECIAL FORCES	G6	TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES
AT	CAPITOL MILITARY DISTRICT	G7	CHIEU HOI MINISTRY
AU	GENERAL POLITICAL WARFARE DEPARTMENT	CV	COMUSMACV
S2	1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE	WW	USARV
T2	ROYAL THAI ARMY VOLUNTEER FORCE		
R2	RVN MARINE CORPS		
P2	PHILIPPINE CIVIC ACTION GROUP		

TABLE 2 UNIT OR ORGANIZATION (IV CTZ)

(Columns 13, 14, 15, and 16)

<u>CODE</u>	<u>UNIT or ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>CODE</u>	<u>UNIT or ORGANIZATION</u>
30	GO CONG PROVINCE AGENCIES	N2	TF115 (MARKET TIME)
31	KIEN TUONG PROVINCE AGENCIES	N3	TF116 (GAME WARDEN)
32	KIEN PHONG PROVINCE AGENCIES	N4	TF117 (MOBILE RIVERINE)
33	DINH TUONG PROVINCE AGENCIES		
34	KIEN HOA PROVINCE AGENCIES	D2	US COAST GUARD
35	VINH BINH PROVINCE AGENCIES		
36	VINH LONG PROVINCE AGENCIES	V2	VIETNAMESE NAVY/NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP
37	AN GIANG PROVINCE AGENCIES		
38	KIEN GIANG PROVINCE AGENCIES		
39	CHUONG THIEN PROVINCE AGENCIES	JA	7TH AIR FORCE
40	PHONG DINH PROVINCE AGENCIES	J2	5TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON
41	BA XUYEN PROVINCE AGENCIES	J3	9TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON
42	AN XUYEN PROVINCE AGENCIES	J4	606TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON
43	BAC LIEU PROVINCE AGENCIES	J5	374TH TACTICAL AIRLIFT WING
44	CHAU DOC PROVINCE AGENCIES	J6	3RD AIR DIVISION
46	SADEC PROVINCE AGENCIES	J7	360TH TEWS
49	PHU QUOC ISLAND AGENCIES	J8	361ST TEWS
		J9	362ND TEWS
WC	DELTA MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND		
WD	5TH SPECIAL FORCES	Q2	VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE
WQ	9TH INFANTRY DIVISION		
		Y2	AIR AMERICA
AN	7TH ARVN DIVISION		
AP	9TH ARVN DIVISION	G2	VIETNAMESE INFORMATION SERVICE
AQ	21ST ARVN DIVISION	G3	NATIONAL POLICE
AR	44TH SPECIAL ZONE	G4	REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE
AS	ARVN SPECIAL FORCES	G5	PHUONG HONG
AU	GENERAL POLITICAL WARFARE DEPARTMENT	G6	TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES
		G7	CHIEU HOI MINISTRY
AD	IV CTZ HEADQUARTERS	CV	COMUSMACV
R2	RVN MARINE CORPS	WW	USARV
P2	PHILIPPINE CIVIL ACTION GROUP		

TABLE 3 CAMPAIGN

(Column 21)

<u>CODE</u>	<u>CAMPAIGN</u>	<u>THEMES NORMALLY SUPPORTING</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
A	ARC LIGHT	20, 50	1
B	BUFFALO TRACK	90	2,3
C	CAMEL PATH	10, 20, 50	2,3
D	DAI DOAN KET CHIEU HOI	10, 20, 30, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90	
E	ELEPHANT WALK	90	3
F	DOWNED FLIERS	90	3
G	FRANTIC GOAT	10, 50, 80, 90	3
H	TALLY HO	90	3
L	TRAIL	10, 20, 50, 82	3
P	PACIFICATION	10, 20, 30, 50, 60, 80, 90	
S	FRANTIC GOAT SOUTH	10, 20, 30, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90	3
T	TACTICAL	10, 20, 50, 80, 90	
V	VOLUNTARY INFORMANT PROGRAM	10, 20, 80	

NOTES:

1. Not reported below MACV level.
2. Report must be classified.
3. Reported only by commands designated in current operations orders.

TABLE 4 THEME
(Columns 22 and 23)

<u>CODE</u>	<u>THEME</u>	<u>EXAMPLES OF THEMATIC APPEALS/EVENTS</u>
10	GVN IMAGE	Patriotism, Growth & Prosperity, Religion, Land Ownership, Defense, Democracy, MEDCAP, PSYOP Kits, etc.
20	DAI DOAN KET/CHIEU HOI	Safe Conduct, Nostalgia, Meaning of Chieu Hoi, Rally Instructions, Death or Danger, Slogans, Poems, Personal Appeals, Deprivation, Benefits, Life in Chieu Hoi Center, Third Party Inducements, Magazines, Newspapers, etc.
30	RD AND NEW LIFE DEVELOPMENT	Public Health, Food Preparation, Agricultural Developments, Education, Current Events, Entertainment, Civil Defense, etc.
40	(not currently used)	
50	US/FWMAF IMAGE	Medical Assistance, Friendship, Construction, Civic Action, US/FW Assistance, etc.
60	PUBLIC SAFETY	Sanitation, Check Points, Traffic & Safe Driving, National Police Recruiting & Services, Resources Control, etc.
70	REFUGEE PROGRAMS	(Self Explanatory)
81	ANTI-VC	VC Activities, Communist "Truths", Surrender, VC "Heroes", etc.
82	ANTI-NVA	NVA Activities, Current Political Events, Communist "Truths", Surrender, NVA "Heroes", etc.
83	ANTI-NLF	Communist Elections, VC Infrastructure, "Liberation" Acts, etc.
90	SPECIAL/MISCELLANEOUS PROGRAMS	Weapons Reward, PW Rewards, etc.
91	INSECTICIDES	(Self Explanatory)
92	HERBICIDES	(Self Explanatory)

TABLE 5 ITEM

(Column 24)

<u>CODE</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
B	BROADCAST	1
T	TRANSMISSION (Radio and TV Delivery Methods Only)	1,3
D	CULTURAL DRAMA TEAM	1
E	OTHER ENTERTAINERS	1
V	MOVIES	1
M	MEDICAL/DENTAL AID	1
S	TOTAL (Hours/Minutes and Personnel <u>only & only on same line as entry under "QUANTITY".</u>)	1,2
C	TELEVISION RECEIVERS	
R	RADIO RECEIVERS	
F	FLAGS	
K	PSYOP KITS	
L	LEAFLETS	
P	POSTERS	
W	"FREE WORLD" MAGAZINE	
H	"HONG QUE" MAGAZINE	
J	OTHER MAGAZINES	
X	"TU DO" NEWSPAPER	
Y	"MINI TU DO" NEWSPAPER	
N	OTHER NEWSPAPERS	

NOTES:

1. These ITEMS must be reported using the "MEASURE" code "N" in column 25 from Table 6.
2. This ITEM code should be entered on the first line of an entry reporting "DELIVERY METHODS" "C", "F", and "P", and indicates the total time spent in direct contact and the total number of personnel contacted.
3. This ITEM code requires a two-line entry: the first line indicating TIME expended and the second (continuation) line indicating radius of coverage. (See Table 6 MEASURE)

TABLE 6 MEASURE

(Column 25)

<u>CODE</u>	<u>UNIT OF MEASURE</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
E	EACH	1
T	TENS	1
K	HUNDREDS	1
M	THOUSANDS	1
H	HOURS and/or MINUTES	2
R	RADIUS OF COVERAGE (Radio & TV Only: in miles, from point of origin)	3

NOTES:

1. Use of these codes requires an entry under "QUANTITY OF ITEMS DISPENSED" column(s), PROHIBITS any entry under "TIME" on the same line, and allows accurate reporting of any quantity (e.g. the quantity 25,000 can be correctly entered as "25", "250", "2500", "25000", by entering "M", "K", "T", or "E" in the "MEASURE" column, respectively.
2. Use of this code requires an entry under "TIME" column(s) and PROHIBITS any entry under "QUANTITY OF ITEMS DISPENSED" column(s) on the same line.
3. Use of this code requires an entry under "QUANTITY OF ITEMS DISPENSED" column(s) and PROHIBITS any entry under "TIME" column(s) on the same line.

TABLE 7 CLASSIFICATION OF DETAINEES

(Columns 45 and 46)

<u>CODE</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>
N2	NVA PRISONER OF WAR
N3	NVA HOI CHANH
N4	NVA (Uncertain Classification)
V2	VIET CONG PRISONER OF WAR
V3	VIET CONG HOI CHANH
V4	VIET CONG (Uncertain Classification)
P2	POLITICAL PRISONER
P3	POLITICAL HOI CHANH
X2	PRISONER (Other than the above)
X3	HOI CHANH (Other than the above)

NOTE: This is a preliminary classification to be assigned by the unit actually receiving or detaining personnel as a direct result of psychological operations.

TABLE 8 INFORMATION RECEIVED

(Column 47)

<u>CODE</u>	<u>MEANING</u>
A	IMPENDING ENEMY OPERATION(S)
B	BOOBY TRAP(S)
F	FOOD CACHE(S)
P	PRISONER LOCATION OR RECOVERY OF FRIENDLY KIA(S)
T	ENEMY TROOP LOCATION(S) OR MOVEMENT(S)
V	VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE
W	WEAPONS CACHE(S)

NOTE: Information received can be reported regardless of whether or not an entry is made under the DETAINED columns.

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ANNEX D

CIVIL OPERATIONS AND
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT
Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96350

AVFA-COPDS-CH/MPD

9 Jan 69

FACT SHEET

SUBJECT: Proposed Organization for PSYOP Activities in II CORPS

1. PURPOSE: To establish an organization having as a goal close coordination (three nations) of all PSYOP activities in II CORPS on a daily basis.

2. BACKGROUND: Previous PSYOP activities in II CORPS have been conducted by each nation on a more or less self - governed basis. Periodic coordination was effected between nations by liaison, scheduled meetings, reports, etc. Experience has shown that this type of autonomous operation does not meet the criteria for a well coordinated PSYOP program. Past observations have led to the development of an organization involving the free world forces where coordination of all PSYOP activity could be conducted on a daily basis.

3. DISCUSSION:

General. (See inclosure 1) The proposed plan for organization of PSYOP activities in II CORPS consists of one PSYOP Coordinating Committee (CORPS LEVEL) and two PSYOP Coordinating Centers. One PSYOP Coordinating Center will be located at Nha Trang and another will be located at Pleiku. The US will provide facilities for the Center at Nha Trang and the GVN will provide facilities at Pleiku. A similar organization consisting of a PSYOP Coordinating Committee and Coordinating Center will be established at each province.

a. The Region PSYOP Coordinating Committee will consist of the following members:

- (1) CG, II CORPS, Co-Chairman
- (2) CG, IFFORCEV, Co-Chairman
- (3) CG, ROKV-FC, Co-Chairman
- (4) Deputy C/S, POLWAR, II CORPS, Secretary General

- (5) POD Representative, CORPS, Member
- (6) PSYWAR Officer, II CORPS, Member
- (7) G5, ROK, Member
- (8) Chief, Office of Military Affairs, CORPS, Member
- (9) Chief, Chieu Hoi Div, CORPS, Member
- (10) Chief Mil PSYOP Div, CORPS, Member
- (11) Refugee/Civil Affairs, IFFV (CORPS), Member
- (12) CO, 8th PSYOP Bn, Member
- (13) CO, ROK PSYOP/CA Company

b. The PSYOP Coordinating Committee will have the following functions:

- (1) Publish necessary guidance to be furnished to all PSYOP organizations in II CTZ to insure that all PSYOP programs are fully coordinated.

- (2) Monitor the various PSYOP programs and make recommendations for improvement.

- (3) Coordinate with military commanders in II CORPS to insure a consistent PSYOP effort in support of tactical operations.

c. The PSYOP Coordinating Committee will meet at a minimum of one time every four months or as often as necessary to insure the successful accomplishment of stated goals.

d. A Secretariat is formed from selected members of the Region PSYOP Coordinating Committee to exercise daily supervision of the two PSYOP Coordinating Centers at Nha Trang and Pleiku. The Secretariat will consist of the following members:

- (1) Chief, PSYWAR, II Cor:
- (2) G5, ROKIV-FC
- (3) Chief, Mil PSYOP Div, CORPS

The secretariat will be available to solve daily problems that cannot be resolved in the Coordinating Centers.

e. The two PSYOP Coordinating Centers will have the necessary personnel assigned from all nations represented to insure daily operation. The Coordination Center will be a functional Propaganda Development Center as well as center for coordination. The following functions will be accomplished:

- (1) Prepare recommendations for submission to commanders on methods to improve the overall military PSYOP effort.
- (2) Develop PSYOP media directed towards enemy forces in support of military operations.
- (3) Coordinate and furnish PSYOP aircraft support within the II CTZ.
- (4) Act as the support agency for requests for printed matter and loudspeaker tapes from requesting agencies.
- (5) Analyze enemy propaganda directed at friendly forces.
- (6) Formulate intelligence requirements, assemble and process intelligence information from support units, and extract that information of PSYOP importance.
- (7) Develop and verify enemy psychological vulnerabilities and opportunities which are exploitable by propaganda messages.
- (8) Produce detailed studies of target audiences through research, the collation of intelligence input from supporting units and develop recommended psychological objectives through target analysis.

f. Each province will also have a Coordination Committee and Coordination Center. The Coordination Center will combine all of the personnel at the province level that have daily contact with PSYOP activity. The Province Chief will have the responsibility for coordinating the PSYOP efforts in each province.

g. The Province Coordinating Committee will consist of the following members:

- (1) Province Chief - Chairman
- (2) Sector PSYWAR Chief - Secretary General
- (3) Provincial VIS Chief - Asst Sec General
- (4) PSYWAR Officer - Sector S5

- (5) Chieu Hoi Service Chief - Province
- (6) Refugee Chief - Province
- (7) National Police Chief - Province
- (8) S5 Advisor - Sector
- (9) Military PSYOP Advisor - Province
- (10) POD Representative - Province
- (11) Chieu Hoi Advisor - Province
- (12) Representative of ARVN, ROKFV-FC and US Tactical Units operating in the Sector.
- (13) Director of Radio Broadcasting Station operating in the Province.

h. The Province Coordinating Committee will perform the following functions:

- (1) Provide facilities for and coordinate all PSYOP activity within each Sector.
- (2) Provide information to the Regional PSYOP Coordinating Centers as required.
- (3) Prepare recommendations on PSYOP matters which should be discussed by the Regional PSYOP Coordinating Committee.
- (4) Prepare PSYOP plans for attacking various targets within the Sector.

i. The Province Chief will determine the meeting times of the Sector PSYOP Coordinating Committee, which should be, as a minimum, once a month.

j. The Sector PSYOP Coordinating Centers will have an executive committee consisting of the ARVN S5, US S5 Advisor, US Military PSYOP Advisor, POD Advisor, and the US Chieu Hoi Representative. The Center Chief will be assigned by the Province Chief. The Center will also have an Exploitation Section, Leaflet Drafting Section, and Civic Action Support Section.

k. The Sector PSYOP Coordination Center will operate on a daily basis and will perform the following functions:

(1) Prepare and forward requests for PSYOP support to the Regional PSYOP Coordinating Center.

(2) Recommend plans for PSYOP campaigns in the Province.

(3) Screen and approve all locally produced PSYOP media before dissemination in the Province.

(4) Furnish reports of activities to the Regional PSYOP Committee.


(5) Coordinate PSYOP activities in the Province on a daily basis.

/s/Eddie L Brandon

/t/EDDIE L BRANDON

MAJ, GS

Asst Mil PSYOP Off



ANNEX E

SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE

One of the biggest problem areas for PSYOP unit commanders and staff officers was the lack of adequate supply and maintenance support for non-standard PSYOP-peculiar items of equipment.

1. PSYOP LOGISTICAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

a. Nonstandard PSYOP Equipment

Nonstandard PSYOP supplies and equipment are usually restricted in design and utility and are not normal established items of issue for Army units. PSYOP nonstandard equipment and certain expendable supplies are not usually stocked by the Army supply depot system. Consequently, direct support units in RVN were generally unable to provide supply or maintenance support to PSYOP units. Actions to improve supply support is discussed in Annex E, par 1b(4). For description and quantity of nonstandard special PSYOP equipment, see app. E-1.

b. Procurement Systems

(1) MILSTRIP-QRR

The Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP), project code QRR, was not responsive to PSYOP requirements in RVN. Data from the 4th PSYOP Group during a seven-month period in 1968 indicated that the percentage of requisitions filled under QRR procedures varied from 7.1 percent for the group headquarters down to zero percent for a PSYOP battalion. The average percentage of requisitions filled during this period was only 4.7 percent for the group and battalions.

(2) Quick Reaction Procurement

Inasmuch as the MILSTRIP-QRR supply system proved inadequate for procurement of low-density, nonstandard PSYOP equipment, special authorization was granted to the 4th PSYOP Group for use of the Quick Reaction Procurement (QRP) System. This action resulted in an overall 85-percent fill action on supply requisitions. Accordingly, PSYOP units in RVN were almost completely dependent on the QRP system for procurement of mission essential equipment and nonstandard supplies. The use of the QRP system was considered vital to the overall PSYOP mission in RVN and its use was requested on a permanent basis.

(3) Maintenance of PSYOP Equipment

In the maintenance field, the direct support maintenance units supporting the PSYOP units did not normally stock repair parts for nonstandard PSYOP equipment. Maintenance personnel were neither familiar

with this equipment nor qualified to repair PSYOP items such as printing presses, composing machines, recorder-reproducers, and platemaking equipment. In some cases, maintenance personnel were not familiar with standard PSYOP equipment. The AN/UNH-10 recorder-reproducer, for example, is an Army accepted standard item of equipment, yet the direct support maintenance units did not have the capability to repair it.

(4) Present Status

The US Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam (USAICCV), USARV, and USARPAC logistical support personnel were familiar with the problem areas and recently instituted new procedures to improve procurement of nonstandard supplies and equipment. Results of the actions listed below are inconclusive at this time.

(a) Nonstandard Items Branch, Ground Forces Division, USAICCV was established as a single manager for designated groups of nonstandard items.

(b) The 4th PSYOP Group was authorized to establish authorized stockage lists (ASL) on PSYOP-peculiar items obtained through QRP. USARV approved the retention of this ASL for all PSYOP units until June 1969. The flow of QRP requisitions was changed so that all were passed from the requisitioner directly to the 4th PSYOP Group, and requisition fills were made from stock on hand. Unit requisitions which were not filled were mailed or hand-carried to the USAICCV for referral to depot, or mailed to National Inventory Control Points (NICP).

(c) Plans have been made to consider the Long Binh Depot as the key depot in USARV for nonstandard items in June 1969. If approved, after stockage is established and the system is functional, the 4th PSYOP Group ASL will be downgraded to prescribed load list (PLL) status and all PSYOP units will be supported by the depot.

(d) In recommending that the use of the QRP System be authorized on a permanent basis for PSYOP units, USARPAC directed that necessary action be taken to improve supply support for PSYOP-peculiar items using MILSTRIP-QRR requisitioning procedures.

2. SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

The following is a list of problem areas, comments, and observations, pertaining to equipment employed by Army PSYOP units in RVN.

a. Light Mobile Printing Plant

(1) None of the printing personnel operated out of the light mobile printing plant shelters. The printing plants were not being

employed according to the mobile concept in which separate mobile units are employed with tactical units. In a few units, the layup and platemaking functions were performed in the shelters. The actual demands for PSYOP printing were beyond the capability of the present concept and design of the light mobile printing plants. The mobile concept was not applicable or required in RVN and all of the PSYOP units have moved the printing presses from the vans into fixed facilities to increase production and to facilitate supply handling and shipments.

(2) The Addressograph-Multigraph Model 1250W offset press was used by PSYOP units in RVN. The machine was rated with a maximum production of 6,500 impressions per hour and a normal rate of 5,000 impressions per hour. However, because of environmental conditions and wear due to heavy usage factors in RVN, the presses actually averaged 3,500 impressions per hour for 18 hours per day. The group headquarters and all four battalions reported that the press was not adequate for the printing tasks in terms of production. It was significant that the units requested heavier 17 $\frac{1}{2}$ x22 $\frac{1}{2}$ inch presses on the proposed MTOE. All units reported a need for presses with greater production capabilities. Total printing requirements are reflected in Annex G. The total downtime for maintenance, repair, and waiting for spare parts on the Model 1250W press was considered excessive. For example, in a one-month period, the 25 presses assigned to the units were inoperative for 1,333 hours, averaging over 50 hours per press.

(3) Although adequate for small copy or polaroid copy work, the MP-3 Copy Camera was unsuitable for producing finely detailed work as currently required. This piece of equipment, originally intended for use in conjunction with light mobile operations, was not adequate for the degree of sophistication and detail required to fulfill missions in RVN. The largest negative obtainable from the MP-3 Copy Camera was 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ x4 $\frac{1}{2}$ inches. This small size required modification or shortening of the text desired for propaganda material. Moreover, the small negative size did not allow sufficient definition or detail on photographs. The MP-3 Copy Camera was not an enlarger. The requirement for larger negatives along with increased use of the 3M plate process indicated that an 11x17 inch process camera with a vacuum back was needed in order to produce larger negatives for quality press reproduction.

(4) The small 12-inch paper cutter was totally inadequate and could not keep pace with printing production. All units required and had obtained paper cutters with at least a 30 $\frac{1}{2}$ -inch blade, and some had 42-inch cutters.

(5) The technical manual for the Addressograph-Multigraph⁽⁷⁾ press had shortcomings. More guidance was needed on daily, weekly, monthly, and semi-annual maintenance requirements according to PSYOP printing officers. In addition, a better system of cross-referencing Federal Stock

Number (FSN) parts and manufacturer's part code was needed. The 4th PSYOP Group printing officer indicated there were no maintenance manuals available for the Web and Barker printing presses.

(6) All of the printing officers indicated there was a need for additional doctrinal and technical guidance on printing, particularly on terms and definitions. All of the PSYOP units in RVN, for example, were using basic impressions for measuring printing production. A basic impression was defined as one 10x16-inch sheet printed on one side in one color. The 7th PSYOP Group in Okinawa used a basic production unit (BPU) and a 3x6-inch equivalent leaflet as a measure. A BPU was defined as one 8x10 1/2-inch sheet of paper printed on one side in one color. There was confusion in equating basic impressions to BPUs, particularly when multicolored press equipment was involved. Consequently, MACV was required to indicate basic impressions, BPUs, and 3x6-inch equivalents when ordering leaflets to avoid confusion and misunderstanding of requirements.

b. AN/MSQ-85 Mobile Audiovisual Unit

(1) The AN/MSQ-85 is an assembly of standard audiovisual equipment housed in a standard shelter mounted on a 3/4-ton truck. Audiovisual teams of the 4th PSYOP Group received the units in August 1968 as a replacement for the audiovisual jeepster. The 4th PSYOP Gp has submitted an evaluation report through channels on the AN/MSQ-85.

(2) When compared to the audiovisual jeepster, this unit performed favorably and was considered an improved replacement. However, during field evaluations, the shelter van appeared too heavy for the 3/4-ton vehicle, resulting in breakdowns and broken rear springs, particularly while traveling over rough roads or under cross-country conditions. The PSYOP units recommended that the shelter vans be made lighter, with single wall construction instead of a double wall.

(3) Various components of the unit were found to be too elaborate, sophisticated, and complicated for use in the field. A smaller, high-reflective screen could easily replace the larger screen. The motion picture projector could be replaced with a simpler, less expensive model.

(4) The frequency response range of the tape recorder was not sufficient to provide faithful reproduction of high-pitched voices. A useful feature would be a tape recorder to accommodate cassettes as well as three-, five-, and seven-inch reels. The unit should be capable of using the electrical system of the vehicle for loudspeaker operations from the truck. A rechargeable power source should be available for portable operations away from the truck.

(5) The preliminary operator's manual did not adequately explain or describe the process for establishing the electrical connections involved in setting up the shelter.

(6) To prevent pilferage, items of equipment should not be mounted or installed on the outside of the shelter. Normal operations required the truck to be among large groups and audiences. Consequently, locks were needed on the doors for security purposes.

(7) The design of the unit allowed the equipment to be easily dismounted; however, the generator was too heavy. A generator with a two-kilowatt capability and as rugged as the present model was needed. The generator should be light enough to be carried by two people.

(8) Two external speakers should be provided to allow the vehicle to be placed in the middle of a village or audience and possess a 360° sound coverage.

(9) None of the teams used the AP-9 35mm Slide Projector as a part of the PSYOP audiovisual program in RVN. The reason for this was that no 35mm PSYOP slides were ever produced for PSYOP presentations.

(10) Within the shelter, the shelf for the projector did not appear to be properly designed because the controls were difficult to reach and the shelf above obstructed the reel arm. The slots for movie film in the film rack were too narrow, resulting in film spillage when the vehicle moved over rugged terrain. The heater was not needed for operations in RVN and should be replaced with an air conditioner. The fire extinguisher was located in an awkward place and obstructed the unloading or loading of the generator.

c. AN/UNH-10 Sound Recorder-Reproducer Set

This item of equipment proved to be almost totally ineffective in RVN because of its poor quality of reproduction and bulky size. The recorder produced an extremely annoying high frequency squeal when played over the public address set. From the numerous complaints from Team HE leaders, this defect seemed to be inherent in the majority of the sets. Several recommendations were made indicating that the recorder should contain an adapter that would allow it to be operated on batteries or from a 110-volt AC source. A frequent complaint was that the recorder was too bulky and heavy for manpack operations. A smaller, lightweight set was needed for use by Teams HB during tactical operations and in rural villages. Inasmuch as the set was found ineffective, most of the units were using the Model 800 Sony Tape Recorder, which was performing satisfactorily. Action has been taken by the 4th PSYOP Group to obtain this recorder through QRP as a replacement item.

d. AN/UH-5 Public Address Set

(1) This equipment appeared to be adequate for its intended purpose. Team leaders reported that the set was reliable. The 4th PSYOP Group found that one inoperative module will overburden the other three

modules of the loudspeaker system and burn out the set. To prevent such a mishap, the unit published guidelines requiring operators to check daily by placing their hand on each module while high frequencies were being emitted to feel for vibrations indicating that the module was functioning properly. There is a need for a standardized mount designed and developed for installation of loudspeakers on helicopters for aerial loudspeaker operations. Practically every tactical unit in RVN used a different type of loudspeaker mount on the UH1 series helicopter.

(2) The BB451 nickel-cadmium battery proved unsatisfactory as a power source for the AN/UIH-5. The most frequent complaint was that the nickel-cadmium battery would not hold a charge. Weighing 16 pounds, the battery was far too heavy. This power source provided an operational broadcast time of only 1 to 1½ hours and the recharging equipment for this battery was not readily available in the field. It was found that this battery must be completely rebuilt if it is operated below a charge of 22 volts. An adequate supply of these batteries for replacement during field operations was not authorized and never existed according to reports. Loudspeaker teams improvised by using two AN/PRC-25 batteries, in series, as a power source. Not only were the AN/PRC-25 batteries readily available, but they provided a much longer broadcast time (four to six hours), and weighed only one quarter that of the nickel-cadmium power supply.

e. AN/GIH-3 Public Address Set

The most frequent complaint in the field pertained to the inadequate power source for the AN/GIH-3 set. The battery designed for the set was a lightweight, nickel-cadmium unit with 20 cells supplying a nominal output voltage of 24 volts when fully charged. The main problem was that the nickel-cadmium battery did not hold its charge properly in RVN. Most of the field operators improvised by using two AN/PRC-25 batteries wired in series permitting the public address set to be operated independently of any vehicle battery or other power source. This modification prevailed throughout most of the PSYOP units in RVN. It fit the metal case and the amplifier plug was easily adapted for this modification.

f. Miscellaneous

(1) The environmental conditions in RVN and lack of air-conditioned facilities had an adverse effect on PSYOP equipment, paper stocks, and chemicals. The humidity and inadequate air-conditioned storage areas caused breakdown and deterioration of chemicals used for photo plate and printing expendables. Temperature and moisture conditions damaged paper stocks, particularly lightweight paper, by causing them to warp. Warped or curled paper wrinkled when fed into the printing press. One battalion commander estimated that the environmental conditions in RVN reduced printing production by 25 percent. The USAICCV has been requested through supply channels to notify General Services Administration (GSA) of the requirement to upgrade packaging of paper.

(2) Three of the five PSYOP units expressed dissatisfaction with the poor packaging of paper stocks. Packaging did not provide adequate protection from the weather and monsoon rains, allowing stocks to become damp or watersoaked in outdoor storage areas. Paper singled out for poor packaging was Paper, Book, Offset White, FSN 9310-061-1711, 10 1/2 x 16 inches, 7.1#-A/A-6/67. It was estimated that 20 percent of all the paper stocks were ruined or damaged due to poor packaging and lack of protection from severe weather conditions.

(3) In general, all the portable loudspeakers and public address systems assigned to the 4th PSYOP Group were unsatisfactory for sustained manpack operations and carrying into combat operations. Present systems were too bulky and heavy. A smaller, compact, lightweight loudspeaker-recorder unit is needed with the same or greater range capabilities, mounted on a backpack and light enough to be carried long distances by one man.

(4) There were repeated examples reported by PSYOP printing officers in which a lack of supplies hampered mission performance. Units had to shut down their printing plants for several days due to lack of paper, chemical, plate, or photographic supplies. One PSYOP commander stated that paper stock was so low the unit could support only priority one tactical missions during a one-month period. In another PSYOP unit, individuals purchased film and other photographic supplies at their own expense from the Post Exchange to accomplish urgent missions.

APPENDIX E-1

TYPE NONSTANDARD SPECIAL PSYOP EQUIPMENT

<u>NON-PSYOP US ARMY UNITS</u>	<u>ESTIMATED TOTAL</u>
Camera, Polaroid, Model 180	12-15
Typewriter 20"	
Plate Maker Pioneer II	12-15
Paper Cutter (Multigraph 155)	12-15
Press A/M Model 85/1250	12-15
Public Address Set ABS-4	100-103
Megaphone 25 Watt PP-IT	350-400
Public Address Set UIH-5	300-400
Model 800 Sony Tape Recorder	55

4TH PSYOP GROUP

Camera Still Picture Designed for General Photography	56
Camera Still Picture for Studio and General Photography	4
Comparator Color, H2O/ION Pocket Commercial	4
Composing Machine Changeable Type - Plate 4	16
Composing Machine Photo Printing Type 10-84 Point Range	8
Cutter Paper Guillotine: Floor Mtd, Elec AC220V 3 PH 60cy	16
Eraser, Magnetic MF Z/U	48
Printing Plant Special Warfare Semi-Trailer Mtd	4
Printing Plant SPWAR Transportable Lt Wt	24
Public Address Set AN/UIH-6	48
Recorder-Reproducer Set Scund AN/TNH-2	56
Unit Camera and Platemaking, 22 Components	4
Mobile Audio Visual Unit MSQ-85	44
MAVU	20
Portable TV	40
Camera Copying, Litho	1
Camera Still Picture Designed for General Photo	6
Camera Still Picture for Studio and General Photo	2
Camera Still Picture for Studio and Gen Photo JANAS KS-17A	1
Composing Machine Changeable Type - Plate Style 16" LW/PS	5
Composing Machine Photo Type 10-84 Point Range	3
Cutter Paper Guillotine, Flr, Elec AC220V 3PH 60cy 5" pile	4
Drier Photographic Film E2-4	1
Drier Photographic Print Glossy Type	1
Eraser Magnetic: MF Z/U	1
Flash Unit Repeating Photographic	2
Frame Print Vac: 8" Bench Util	2
Magnifier: Monocular Type 12XMAG Pwr Frame	6
Meter Photo Exposure, 0 to 1000 Candles Per Sq Ft	1
Plate Coating Mach Photo Lithographic, Size 20Wx24L	2

Printing Press Offset 17"x22 1/2" in	2
Printer Contact Photographic	1
Printing Plant SPWAR	1
Public Address Set AN/TIQ2	1
Receiving Set Radio AM/TRR-18	1
PH422A Safelight Darkroom Photographic	4
Printing Press Offset Rotary SW Type III-3	2
Studio Van AN/MRT-5	1
Photo Cyp and Processing Machine	1
EK(1) Print Washer	1
EN-15(1) Printer Projector	1
Projection Set Motion Picture Sound AS-2	1
Projector Still Picture for Slide	1
Projecture Still Picture: PH 637/PFP PH 637A	1
Projector Still Picture 35mm	1
Table Line and Register Stationary	1
Table Line Up and Register Fluorescent	2
Table Litho Layout Fluorescent	2
Table Litho Rub Up	2
Transmitting Set Radio TRT-22	1
Camera, Polaroid Model 250	3

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ANNEX F

DEVELOPMENT TASKS

Propaganda material must be developed within the framework of target audience vulnerabilities and credibility prior to the production and dissemination stages. Accordingly, propaganda development is a primary function of any Army PSYOP unit. The 4th PSYOP Group reorganized its Teams FA, FB, FC, FD, and FE to form a Propaganda Development Center (PDC) in the group headquarters and each battalion. The PDCs were organized to cope with increasing tasks in analyzing target audiences and tailoring propaganda messages to specific audiences and PSYOP programs.

1. PROPAGANDA DEVELOPMENT CYCLE

a. The propaganda development cycle begins with determination of requirements based on operational needs. The requirements are analyzed and the audience's vulnerabilities are determined on the basis of compiled information and studies. Propaganda messages and themes are developed and the best dissemination media are determined. PSYOP messages and themes are then evaluated using indigenous Vietnamese as a test panel.

b. After evaluation for credibility and appropriateness, the propaganda material is revised, if necessary, and finalized. The required coordination with other agencies is conducted and the product is produced and disseminated. The last step in the cycle is evaluating and reporting the effects of the message on the target audience. From these results, recommendations can be made for improving the effectiveness of the propaganda material.

2. POLICY GUIDANCE

a. The PDC developed propaganda within the framework of national policies and guidance issued by JUSPAC. Current files were maintained on PSYOP policy circulars and field memoranda. All PSYOP units indicated that PSYOP policy guidance was adequate, but was not responsive to important local or international events. The lack of policy guidance or untimely guidance on the bombing halt in North Vietnam, peace talk negotiations, and various military tactical incidents were cited as significant examples in which US agencies and forces were placed in a defensive PSYOP posture.

b. Ninety percent of the respondents indicated that they were not aware of any policy violations or counter-productive PSYOP material produced by PSYOP units. The remaining ten percent stated that several propaganda leaflets which were written by senior US officers, together with several "cheesecake" or pin-up girl photographs used on propaganda

material, were contrary to US policy guidance. Examples of ineffective PSYOP material included items which were obviously written by Americans and lacked credibility because of ambiguous or confusing literal translations.

3. RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

Each of the Army PSYOP units performed certain common tasks in the development of propaganda within their operational and organizational capabilities. These tasks involved obtaining PSYOP intelligence data and conducting detailed research and analysis of target audiences.

a. Conduct of Background and Area Studies

The PLC conducted detailed background and area studies of sociological, political, economic, and military subjects. The background studies were used to identify and analyze tentative and potential targets. Although the group headquarters and the battalions produced a limited number of area studies, the commanders of two battalions stated that they lacked trained personnel to properly perform this task. This lack has been noted in other studies and evaluations of US Army PSYOP in RVN.

b. Identification of Audience Susceptibilities

The PDC identified target audiences and verified their susceptibilities by acquiring current intelligence data from the intelligence agencies and organic PSYOP teams. The intelligence was used as a basis for developing specific messages and selecting themes for propaganda messages.

c. Develop of Propaganda Themes

The PDC developed propaganda material in support of the following general themes, listed in order of priority.

(1) The GVN Image

Material was developed to build support for the GVN by creating the conviction that the GVN was working in the interests of the people. This material included information of actions and programs undertaken by the government on the people's behalf. On the military side, victories over the VC/NVA by Vietnamese forces was emphasized to create among the people of RVN a sense of inevitable victory and pride in their armed forces.

(2) Chieu Hoi/Dai Doan Ket

This propaganda was designed to motivate members of the VC/NVA forces in RVN to rally to the cause of the GVN and people of RVN. The Dai

Doan Ket program was directed to motivate higher-ranking VC/NVA to rally to the GVN. A secondary objective of this propaganda material was to promote and gain support among the national population and the RVNAF for the program.

(3) Revolutionary Development

This material was designed to acquaint the population and VC/NVA forces with the successes achieved in the revolutionary development program and the growing prosperity being created by the program. The propaganda was directed towards obtaining the cooperation, support, and participation of target audiences in the revolutionary development program.

(4) Refugee Program/New Life Development

The primary objectives of the propaganda were to improve the attitudes of refugees toward GVN programs in general and toward programs for refugee aid and rehabilitation in particular. The New Life Development material explained government-sponsored or self-help programs in the fields of agriculture, education, and other programs to obtain the support and participation by target audiences.

(5) Public Safety

This material promoted public attitudes toward the police and security forces which should contribute to the achievement and maintenance of public safety. In general, the material emphasized the constructive role of the National Police in implementation of the resources control program, identification card, and other programs.

(6) US/FWMAF Image

Informing the national population of the reasons for US/FWMAF presence in RVN was the primary objective of this theme. It was designed to persuade the general population that the presence of US/FWMAF benefits the people in terms of protection against invasion, security, and national sovereignty. Attempts were made to counteract enemy propaganda which pictured the US/FWMAF as colonialist powers with colonial ambitions in RVN. Support material emphasized that RVN was an independent, sovereign nation, and not ruled by a puppet government.

(7) Anti-VC/NLF/NVN Attitudes and Activities

To general population groups in GVN areas, the propaganda material was designed to develop and maintain opposition to the goals, programs, and actions of the NLF/VC/DRV. The material directed to audiences in VC/NVA-held areas was to convince the people that there was a great

disparity between the professed goals of the NLF and its real goals. In an effort to discourage VC recruitment, emphasis was placed on presenting a factual picture of the hardships, fears, nostalgia, and disillusionment suffered by the VC. Communist propaganda was discredited. Items were developed to create dissatisfaction with the VC/NLF/NVN regime and to exploit their intimidation, taxation, and terror techniques.

(8) Special and Miscellaneous Programs

Special and miscellaneous programs included material not classified above, such as the insecticide and herbicide programs.

d. PSYOP Campaigns and Programs

In addition to developing tactical PSYOP campaigns and programs, Army PSYOP units conducted operations and developed campaigns and programs in support of the following national PSYOP campaigns.

(1) 1969 TET Campaign

The TET campaign was a coordinated MACV/JUSPAO campaign in support of GVN. The broad objectives were to produce the maximum number of VC/NVA defections, erode the morale and effectiveness of VC/NVA personnel, enhance popular support for the Chieu Hoi Program throughout RVN, and to exploit the growing viability of the GVN and the increased acceptance of the GVN by the people. The 1969 TET campaign was conducted in phases from 18 January to 24 March 1969. Emphasis was placed on hand-written PSYOP appeals from members of families who had relatives in the VC units. Other material included posters, leaflets, PSYOP novelty items, songs, TV programs, and motion pictures. Although the final results were still being tabulated, a comparison of ralliers is outlined in Figure F-1.

(2) Nguyen Trãi Campaign

Nguyen Trãi campaign plans began in August 1968 for implementation during the period 15 October 1968 through 31 January 1969. The basic objective of the Nguyen Trãi campaign was to induce maximum defections from high and middle ranking communist cadres, VC forces, and the NVA in RVN. It was also designed to encourage families in the VC-controlled areas to aid in the defection effort. This campaign, named after a historical figure of the Le Dynasty, was initiated by the GVN. However, PSYOP assets of the US and FMAF were used to support the campaign. During the campaign, 1.16 billion leaflets, of which 80 percent were printed by US PSYOP units, were distributed as of 31 December 1968. The leaflets were air-dropped, passed out by intelligence agents, and hand-delivered by troops operating in the field. Six thousand hours of aerial loudspeaker operations were conducted in addition to ground loudspeaker operations. The campaign was effective, resulting in a total of 5,776 ralliers and 561 assorted weapons. The overall accomplishments surpassed the returnee goal by 30 percent.

AREA	YEAR	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
I CTZ	1969	273	269	219	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
	1968	272	71	92	185	267	336	346	228	321	424	221	287
	1967	204	234	317	84	184	344	225	195	124	123	219	259
II CTZ	1969	257	141	310	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
	1968	221	121	60	149	183	99	202	196	159	163	145	235
	1967	843	780	1517	1171	686	570	223	397	197	262	317	255
III CTZ	1969	323	279	324	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
	1968	151	150	146	127	172	179	316	268	180	381	368	357
	1967	713	1096	1492	783	655	764	796	501	403	414	274	163
IV CTZ	1969	2376	1761	1989	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
	1968	535	421	301	599	417	450	980	759	714	1413	1535	2269
	1967	512	807	2231	767	674	787	1009	649	724	641	451	212
TOTAL BY MONTH	1969	3229	2450	2842	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
	1968	1179	763	599	1060	1039	1064	1844	1451	1374	2381	2269	3148
	1967	2272	2917	5557	2805	2199	2465	2253	1742	1448	1440	1261	889
TOTAL TO DATE BY YEAR	1969	3229	5679	8521	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
	1968	1179	1942	2541	3601	4640	5704	7548	8999	10373	12754	15023	18171
	1967	2272	5189	10746	13551	15700	18165	20398	22140	23588	25028	26289	27178

FIGURE P-1. Chilean Mol Returns.

(3) Third Party Reward Program

The Third Party Reward Program was initiated on 1 November 1968 and was scheduled to terminate 31 January 1969. The objective of the program was to induce 5,000 enemy to rally to the GVN; this goal was surpassed on 31 December 1968. The entire PSYOP community participated in operations to advertise the program. Methods used included aerial and ground dissemination of leaflets and newspapers, aerial and ground loud-speaker broadcasts, posters, banners, radio, and television. The success of the PSYOP effort was illustrated by the results of the reward program which accounted for 34.8 percent (790) of the Chieu Hoi returnees in November, and 53.1 percent (1674) of the returnees in December. In January, the Chieu Hoi rate continued to increase with this program considered responsible for 56.9 percent (1839) of the monthly total. In terms of increased numbers of Chieu Hoi returnees, the Third Party Reward Program was most successful. Because of the impressive results, the Chieu Hoi Ministry extended the program indefinitely. See Figure F-1 for total Chieu Hoi returnees since 1967.

e. Analysis of Enemy Propaganda Trends

The group headquarters and all battalions monitored and analyzed enemy propaganda trends to obtain indications of conditions or attitudes existing in an area of operations. Monthly reports were submitted by the PSYOP units indicating an analysis of individual propaganda material and trends during that period. The chiefs of two battalion PDCs complained that enemy propaganda was normally forwarded by combat units through existing intelligence channels, circumventing PSYOP channels. Consequently, enemy propaganda material was usually not received by the PSYOP units in a timely manner. It was indicated that critical information pertaining to location, time, and conditions was frequently omitted on the reports.

f. Evaluation of Propaganda Effectiveness

Each unit evaluated the effectiveness of enemy and friendly propaganda. The evaluation process included an analysis of the source, content, audience, and media used for dissemination. However, the emphasis was directed more toward a content analysis and credibility evaluation than to an evaluation of the propaganda's effect on target populations. A limiting factor in the evaluation of friendly propaganda was the inaccessibility of target audiences located in contested areas. The reliability of prisoners of war or Hoi Chanhs, who tended to report information to please interrogators, was questionable and accentuated the difficulty in obtaining an accurate measurement of effectiveness.

4. PSYOP INTELLIGENCE

a. Development of PSYOP Intelligence Requirements

After background studies indicated a likely target or general themes, the PDC developed requirements for specific information which were passed through normal intelligence collection agencies. In some cases, personnel assigned to PSYOP field teams acted as a source of PSYOP intelligence.

b. Liaison with Intelligence Agencies

Liaison was conducted with other intelligence agencies to obtain intelligence data for background and area studies and current data for use in developing tactical and strategic PSYOP campaigns and programs.

c. Sources of Intelligence Data

(1) Data was obtained from approximately 15 civilian and military intelligence agencies. The best intelligence data was reportedly received by the 4th PSYOP Group from the US Embassy, MACV J2, and the Vietnamese National Police. However, the cooperation and relationship between the 4th PSYOP Group and other intelligence agencies were excellent. The other agencies included JUSPAO, CORDS, USAID, and the MACV Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam.

(2) In general, it appeared that tactical PSYOP intelligence was adequate at the PSYOP team level, but inadequate for long-range planning at the PSYOP battalion and group level. The reasons cited were that tactical PSYOP intelligence requirements were more easily satisfied on a quick reaction basis and were concerned solely with specific enemy target groups. According to 74 percent of the PSYOP team leaders working with tactical units, there was sufficient tactical intelligence data available for PSYOP teams to accomplish their mission. Detailed and long-range intelligence requirements at the corps and higher national levels were concerned with all target audiences in the area. This information was more difficult to obtain on a systematic basis at the PSYOP battalion and group level.

(3) Although the intelligence community attempted to support PSYOP intelligence requirements, four PSYOP units reported the intelligence agencies were not sufficiently knowledgeable of PSYOP requirements to recognize material of interest to PSYOP units in the collection and editing process. Most respondents felt that this deficiency could be corrected by added PSYOP intelligence instruction at the Army Intelligence School.

d. Review of Intelligence Data

Through a continuous review of intelligence reports, all the PSYOP units identified incidents for PSYOP exploitation. Tactical PSYOP intelligence data was submitted to PSYOP units from assigned Teams HE and HB members providing direct support to tactical units, and from intelligence staff officers assigned to the tactical units. The group headquarters and three battalions indicated that they collected information and developed intelligence. Most of the intelligence collection and development effort was concerned with a review of intelligence supplied by intelligence agencies and the extraction of significant PSYOP items. As a result, the PSYOP units were dependent upon the intelligence community for most of their PSYOP intelligence data.

e. Translations and Interrogation of Prisoners

The PSYOP units had a capability for interrogating prisoners of war and Hoi Chanh ralliers and for translating foreign language documents. This capability was designed to allow pre-testing and post-testing of propaganda material for effectiveness and to obtain attitude surveys on a limited sampling basis as a supplement to the PSYOP intelligence effort.

5. PROPAGANDA DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

a. An analysis was made of PDC activities at the battalion and group levels for a three-month period. These activities included:

(1) Production of 53 tactical and strategic propaganda leaflets directed to 15 general PSYOP themes in support of national objectives.

(2) Translations of 1649 enemy letters, propaganda material, and other documents.

(3) Tabulation of 800 questionnaires.

(4) Review and evaluation of 517 printed PSYOP items such as leaflets, posters, and handbills.

(5) Production of 60 taped propaganda loudspeaker messages for broadcast from the air over VC-controlled areas and on the ground in support of tactical operations.

(6) Production of text and photographs for a monthly 16-page magazine aimed at Vietnamese employees of US forces (90,000 circulation).

(7) Completion of three studies: TET Campaign Plan for 1969, Psychological Impact of Colors on the Vietnamese Population, and Viet Cong Elections.

b. One recent study completed by the 4th PSYOP Group PDC outlined the disparity existing between field-produced leaflets and those produced at the national level regarding Chieu Hoi rally instructions. The following is a summary of the study.

(1) It was found that there were two basic schools of thought regarding the instructions to be given to the rallier. The first was that he should be told to rally with his hands over his head to avoid being accidentally shot; the second, that he should not be given any instructions concerning raising his hands. The reasoning was that the rallier would instinctively raise his hands to ensure his own preservation, and that instructing him to do this was tantamount to telling him to surrender, a connotation incompatible with the objectives of the Chieu Hoi program.

(2) Responses from the majority of Hoi Chanhs interviewed disclosed that having the arms upraised was a sign universally understood for rallying to a military unit. The majority of combat units contacted recommended including a statement requiring this action of the rallier. Most interviewees gave no hand signal at all, because they rallied to non-military authorities. Those who did rally to military authorities either raised their hands or displayed a leaflet. It was interesting to note that more than 35 percent felt that it was necessary to have a leaflet in order to rally. More than half of the returnees stated that they had received Chieu Hoi information from leaflets and aerial broadcasts, attesting to the effectiveness of these media. Twenty-nine percent indicated that their families provided information on rallying.

(3) Leaflets and loudspeakers were effective as shown by a high percentage of favorable responses in I CTZ. A recent interrogation of 337 Hoi Chanhs in Chieu Hoi Centers throughout I CTZ revealed the effect of PSYOP leaflets and loudspeakers, as follows:

<u>Questions</u>	<u>Positive Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Have you seen leaflets?	322	96
Were you influenced to rally by what you read?	300	90
Did you hear aerial broadcasts?	306	91

(4) The recommendations of the study were that the following instructions be included in each standard rally leaflet and speaker tape:

- (a) Rally only during daylight hours.
- (b) Hide your weapon before coming in to rally.

(c) Try to have a leaflet, however, it is not necessary to have a leaflet to rally.

(d) Rally to any GVN or FVMAF authority.

ANNEX G

PROPAGANDA PRODUCTION TASKS

Propaganda production is the preparation of propaganda material for dissemination. It includes such tasks as printing and processing of printed matter, and recording and packaging tapes for loudspeaker broadcasts.

1. LEAFLETS

Leaflets produced by the 7th PSYOP Group's printing resources rose from three billion leaflets in FY 1967 to over six billion leaflets during FY 1968. These leaflets were primarily national or strategic-type leaflets. The 4th PSYOP Group produced over 2.4 billion propaganda leaflets during CY-1968. The group headquarters produced approximately 150 million (3x6-inch equivalent) leaflets each month, while all the PSYOP battalions printed approximately 80 million leaflets per month. Figure G-1 shows the printing plant of the 6th PSYOP Battalion.

a. Leaflet Programs

These leaflets were directed to the following programs.

(1) Chieu Hoi Inducement and Dai Doan Ket Programs

Approximately 55 percent of the leaflets were in support of the Chieu Hoi Inducement and Dai Doan Ket programs. These leaflets urged members of the Viet Cong and their supporters to leave the VC and return to the side of the legitimate government of RVN. Leaflets inducing members of middle and higher level cadre to return aided in the destruction of the VC/NLF infrastructure. Tactical Chieu Hoi leaflets were designed to provide assurance of good treatment to ralliers and explain how and where to rally. The five major vulnerabilities exploited were hardship, fear, loss of faith in victory, disillusionment with the enemy cause, and concern about families.

(2) B-52 Followup Program

About five percent of the leaflet effort was directed to the B-52 Followup Program. This program was conducted in RVN to take advantage of the psychological vulnerability created by the B-52 bombing missions. Within four hours after a strike, leaflets were dropped into the area informing the enemy that he had just experienced a B-52 raid. The leaflet reminded him that the B-52 would return to strike his unit again and urged him to rally to the GVN. The major objectives of this program were to reinforce the fear of the B-52; lower morale of enemy forces; create friction between cadre and soldiers; encourage malingering, desertion, or defection of enemy personnel; and create a spoiling effect of impending enemy operations.



FIGURE G-1. Printing Plant. Printers from the 6th PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group, produced propaganda leaflets, posters, newspapers, and other printed material at their plant in Bien Hoa. The 4th PSYOP Group produced approximately 230 million leaflets each month for dissemination throughout RVN in support of PSYOP objectives.

(3) NVA in RVN Program

Approximately ten percent of the leaflet effort was conducted against NVA troops in RVN. This program was designed to create fear in the minds of the NVA troops within RVN about their chances of survival, the dangers of injury and disease, burial in unmarked graves, and the hopelessness of their situation. It also helped to create doubt in their minds about the fate of their relatives and friends in North Vietnam, and the competence and good faith of their commanders, the Hanoi authorities, and the Lao Dong Party. The NVA were invited to Chieu Hoi or accept capture with the assurance that they would receive good treatment.

(4) Frantic Goat Campaign

The Frantic Goat Campaign accounted for about 20 percent of the leaflet program. This program was conducted outside of RVN with a mission of disseminating news and facts to the North Vietnamese audience. Themes used on these leaflets included social and economic prosperity of RVN. The North Vietnamese reader was asked to compare this with conditions in the North. The campaign attempted to counter the false or misleading propaganda produced by the North Vietnamese government and to provide information which was not ordinarily received by the North Vietnamese public. To give news to families of prisoners, one leaflet listed NVA soldiers who were held in PCW status in RVN. Since the recent bombing halt, this campaign was redirected to the NVA in RVN Program.

(5) Trail Campaign

Approximately ten percent of the propaganda leaflets were directed against the military and civilian personnel who used and maintained the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The PSYOP objective of this out-of-country Trail Campaign was to weaken the will of military target audiences and encourage them to rally upon arrival in RVN. Along the Trail, the vulnerability of loneliness was attacked by using leaflets with nostalgic poetry written by NVA soldiers about their life at home. The themes of hardship and probable death were constantly brought to the NVA soldier's attention as he moved down the Trail. Once in RVN, the NVA soldier was confronted with the Safe Conduct Passes urging him to rally.

b. Leaflet Catalogs

Each PSYOP battalion published a catalog listing 600 to 800 available leaflets. The catalog was numerically indexed and gave data on leaflet number, theme, target, size and color of the leaflet, together with the leaflet and English translation. Catalogs were inventoried and screened periodically to maintain current leaflets. Catalogs were distributed to tactical units and PSYOP customers to facilitate ordering specific leaflets for the target audience. Action was taken by the 4th PSYOP Group to cross-index leaflet catalogs according to PSYOP themes. It was noted that several units initiated or completed indexing of catalogs by target audiences as well.

c. Leaflet Stock

Each battalion maintained a stockpile of propaganda leaflets, usually ranging from 150 million to 200 million leaflets. Various methods were used by PSYOP units to keep leaflet requestors informed of leaflets stocked. For example, the 7th PSYOP Battalion published a weekly stock report showing leaflet or mix number, theme, size, paper weight, quantity on hand, and the campaigns to be supported by the leaflet. This report

identified incoming leaflet shipments expected by delivery date from either the 4th or 7th PSYOP Groups. Both the 4th and 7th PSYOP Groups furnished backup propaganda leaflets to the PSYOP battalion.

d. Leaflet Requests

Although the procedure used to request leaflet or PSYOP support varied slightly in each CTZ, all US and FWMAF units submitted their requests to the force commander/senior advisor. The office exercising staff supervision over PSYOP assigned a priority and routed the request to the PSYOP battalion. Printing and reproduction priorities were categorized, for instance, within I CTZ according to the following priorities:

(1) Priority one was designated for quick reaction support of tactical operations, while priority two was used for exploitation of ralliers. Priority three was printed material required in support of III MAF operational plans. Non-tactical requirements were designated priority four, and priority five was used for routine reprints.

(2) High priority leaflet requests for quick reaction support of tactical operations were usually printed by the PSYOP battalions. Low priority printing requests, priority three or lower for non-tactical operations or civic action programs, were sent to the 4th PSYOP Group in Saigon if the requirement exceeded the capability of the PSYOP battalions. A quick reaction request, priority one, was defined as an immediate exploitation of a vulnerability which was not expected to exist for longer than 72 hours and required the propaganda to be disseminated within a 24-hour period. However, there were still a number of units which did not fully understand the definition of quick reaction. Many of these units attempted to obtain a priority for routine missions using the quick reaction system as a substitute for lack of prior planning.

e. Leaflet Shipments

The PSYOP Division of MAC J3 consolidated all leaflet requirements to be produced by the 7th PSYOP Group in Okinawa. Approximately 800 million leaflets (3x6-inch equivalents) were printed monthly and shipped in CONEX containers from the 7th PSYOP Group to the PSYOP battalions located in Da Nang, Pleiku, Nha Trang, Saigon, and Can Tho. Prior to November 1967, all leaflet shipments from the 7th PSYOP Group printing resources were made using air transportation. There were no particular problems in late leaflet shipments when air transportation was used. However, because of prohibitive cost factors, the 7th PSYOP Group was directed to switch to surface transportation beginning in December 1967. Subsequently, a high percentage of off-shore produced leaflet shipments failed to meet required delivery dates due to slower modes of transportation and delays in cargo handling coupled with trans-shipment and storage problems. To help alleviate this problem, the 7th PSYOP Group instituted a new shipment

notification system which notified PSYOP battalions of the voyage number, ship, date shipped, and other advance shipping information. This procedure assisted units in locating specific shipments and allowed for greater control.

2. NEWSPAPERS

PSYOP units printed many national and local newspapers, which proved to be extremely effective propaganda tools in RVN.

a. Ban Tien (News Clips)

Twice weekly, 10 1/2 x 16 inches, two pages, 72,000 copies per edition. The 7th PSYOP Battalion printed Ban Tien for Vietnamese target audiences in I CTZ.

b. Tin Tong Hop (News Roundup)

Daily, 10 1/2 x 16 inches, two pages, 40,000 copies per edition. The 6th PSYOP Battalion printed Tin Tong Hop for VC and general population audiences in support of CORDS III CTZ.

c. Tin Chien Truong (News from the Front)

Weekly, 8 x 10 1/2 inches, one page, 50,000 copies per edition. The 6th PSYOP Battalion printed Tin Chien Truong for VC/NVA troop target audiences in support of CORDS III CTZ.

d. Khanh Hoa

Twice monthly, 10 1/2 x 16 inches, one page, 15,000 copies per edition. The 8th PSYOP Battalion printed Khanh Hoa for distribution by hand during face-to-face PSYOP missions in III CTZ.

e. Tudo (Free South)

Every two weeks, one page, two editions. The 10 1/2 x 16 inch edition had a 700,000 copy circulation and was distributed by assistant province advisors. The 8 x 10 1/2 inch edition was printed on 60- and 40-pound paper, and 2,600,000 copies were pre-mixed for air drops throughout RVN. This national newspaper was produced by JUSPAO and printed by the 7th PSYOP Group. It was aimed at impairing enemy morale in enemy-held and contested areas, and gaining support for the GVN.

3. MAGAZINES, BOOKLETS AND CALENDARS

a. Thong Cam (Mutual Understanding) Magazine

The 4th PSYOP Group produced a monthly 16-page magazine targeted to Vietnamese employees of US military forces and civilian firms. This

multicolor magazine was printed by the 7th PSYOP Group in 80,000 copies. Initially, distribution of the magazine was limited to III CTZ. However, plans were made to expand the magazine to 32 pages in 135,000 copies per month beginning in July 1969 to allow country-wide circulation. Expected readership should be between 675,000 and 1,080,000 persons. The magazine was aimed at promoting good will and understanding between the US and Vietnamese people.

b. Miscellaneous Booklets

Twelve propaganda and political warfare booklets were printed during 1968 by the 4th and 7th PSYOP Groups representing a total of approximately 500,000 copies. The average booklet contained 75 pages and its size was 7-3/4x10 inches. These booklets did not include those produced by the battalions which were estimated to be the equivalent of 20 smaller-size pamphlets.

c. Calendars

The 7th PSYOP Group printed three wall calendars in 730,000 copies in support of RVNAF and ROK forces during calendar year 1968. These 13 1/2 x 19 1/2 inch, four-color calendars contained PSYOP and political warfare themes. In addition, one million wallet-size calendars were produced for ROK Forces.

4. ANALYSIS OF PRINTING REQUIREMENTS

a. Commensurate with the expansion of US and FVMAF in RVN, PSYOP printing requirements increased to an unprecedented level, particularly with the emphasis in support of national pacification and revolutionary development objectives. Although this support was essential, the 4th PSYOP Group was devoting over 30 percent of its printing capability to the CORDS PSYOP effort, thus detracting from its printing capability for tactical military campaigns. Inasmuch as the 4th PSYOP Group was originally organized to meet only military requirements, it became evident that it could not cope with these heavy printing tasks with their light, mobile printing presses.

b. The tendency on the part of tactical units to measure PSYOP leaflet effectiveness by quantity rather than quality contributed to an increasing demand for greater leaflet quantities. To counteract this competitive tendency, MACV published new reporting guidelines which discouraged quantitative measurement by eliminating leaflet quantities from the reporting system while including information regarding coverage of target areas.

c. The present printing support was considered adequate. However, in the event the US becomes involved in any future insurgent situation similar to RVN, it may be feasible to subsidize the civilian printing industry for increased production of propaganda material and aid in the nation building program at the same time. This proposal would require a detailed and long range analysis of US vital interests and overall objectives in that country.

d. The total PSYOP support requirements for RVN for FY 1970 are listed in Figure G-2. These requirements were submitted to CINCPAC by MACV for support from the 7th PSYOP Group.

5. TAPES

a. Production

The PSYOP battalions and the group headquarters produced taped propaganda loudspeaker messages, in support of tactical military operations, which were broadcast from the air over VC-controlled areas and on the ground. Although the production of tapes varied in each CTZ depending on requirements, a typical PSYOP battalion developed and produced approximately 30 original tapes per week while supporting 4 US tactical divisions. The group headquarters produced approximately 75 tapes each week. These tasks involved script and message preparation, pre-test, production and recording, post-testing for effectiveness, cataloging, and distribution.

b. Catalogs

Each PSYOP battalion published a catalog of available loudspeaker tapes. The catalog contained information on ordering tapes and described the theme, target audience, tape number, reel size, language dialect, and English translation of all tape scripts. The tape catalogs were distributed to supported units to facilitate ordering specific tapes for a target audience.

c. Observations and Problem Areas

There were several types of tape recorders used. Compatibility between cartridge and reel type recorders had been a problem in the past. Tapes often came on standard reels and it was necessary to transcribe the message to the cartridge type reel. The standard reproduction equipment authorized to the group headquarters was not adequate in terms of production quantity. A requisition was submitted by the 4th PSYOP Group for three AMPEX studio tape recorders and component equipment to improve its production capability. In the interim, the Navy Research and Development Unit-Vietnam provided an AMPEX Model 860 tape recorder, with a capability of dubbing ten cartridge tapes simultaneously, to meet requirements.

	Quantity (In Thousands)	Basic Production Units (In Thousands)
Safe Conduct Passes	1,200,000	1,545,120
Multicolor Leaflets	1,200,000	1,545,120
Black and White Leaflets	6,000,000	2,575,200
FY 1970 TET Campaign Leaflets	500,000	429,200
Pamphlets	1,000	68,570
Booklets	1,000	144,000
Brochures	750	25,505
RVNAF Calendars	310	26,864
ROK Calendars	400	37,138
ROK Wall Calendars	800	333
ROK Pamphlets	240	9,120
ROK Posters	240	4,274
TuDo Newspaper (every two weeks)	2,600	208,000
Vietnamese Employees' Magazine (monthly)	135	5,400
Miscellaneous Printing		355,134

Additional Requirements

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Cost</u>
Miniature Radios	20,000	\$ 80,000.00
PSYOP Soap	100,000	\$ 13,000.00
Miscellaneous		\$132,000.00

FIGURE G-2. PSYOP Support Requirements for RVN (FY 1970) Provided by 7th PSYOP Group.

ANNEX H

PROPAGANDA DISSEMINATION TASKS

Propaganda dissemination is the delivery of propaganda by means of various communication media such as radio and loudspeaker broadcasts, printed matter, and face-to-face communication. Figure H-1 shows the overall PSYOP dissemination activities for 1968. This annex examines those dissemination tasks conducted by Army PSYOP units in RVN relative to use of audiovisual and loudspeaker operations, radio, leaflet bombs and shells, and aerial dissemination.

1. AUDIOVISUAL AND LOUDSPEAKER DISSEMINATION

The audiovisual and loudspeaker tasks were categorized into several areas: propaganda development and intelligence, movies, loudspeaker, and dissemination of propaganda material. The tasks were performed by cellular teams: Team HA (Light Mobile Operations), Team HB (Loudspeaker Operations), and Team HE (Audiovisual).

a. Employment

The manner of employment and number of teams varied in each CTZ; however, there was a pattern of employment in RVN related to the concentration of US troops within the CTZ. For example, within I CTZ and III CTZ where the majority of US Forces were located, all mobile PSYOP teams were fully committed in support of tactical units. Conversely, in the II and IV CTZs, the teams were employed in a combination of roles in support of tactical units and in an area support role. The emphasis was toward an area support role in conjunction with MACV Advisor Teams at the province level, particularly if that province was not included in a US division TAG. Attempts were made in II and IV CTZs to assign one Team HE to each province in an area support role, but there were insufficient teams to accomplish this and the teams were placed in priority provinces.

b. Team HA

Team HA was authorized to the PSYOP battalion to provide the capability of planning and producing propaganda. The three-man team was employed at the division level in a tactical support role or at a province level in an area support role. Team HA coordinated and supervised the activities of attached Teams HB and HE. Based on actual operations in RVN, additional capabilities of the team included plotting and coordinating aerial loudspeaker and leaflet targets, exploiting quick reaction PSYOP conditions, and coordinating armed propaganda and cultural drama teams.

	LEAFLETS Hand Delivered (In Millions)	LEAFLETS Air Delivered (In Millions)	LOUDSPEAKER Ground/Water (In Hours)	NEWSPAPERS Hand Delivered (In Millions)	POSTERS Distributed (In Thousands)	MOVIES (Showings)	CULTURAL DRAMA FILM (Showings)
1968							
Jan	4.412	745.1	6,136.2	2.009	660.2	1,204	294
Feb	3.891	495.7	7,538.0	0.254	351.6	765	267
Mar	7.729	652.1	7,227.3	4.654	314.4	912	214
Apr	9.072	606.1	7,891.9	1.380	178.7	1,350	262
May	15.198	641.5	8,172.8	0.339	318.8	1,445	336
Jun	10.676	520.5	9,433.6	1.694	645.7	1,170	192
Jul	16.325	527.6	7,779.6	2.452	450.3	1,262	526
Aug	11.305	444.0	11,177.7	1.267	474.2	1,522	439
Sep	14.374	39.0	15,698.3	3.049	457.7	1,654	469
Oct	22.263	640.5	17,883.0	2.827	621.0	2,867	704
Nov	24.068	713.4	21,976.0	2.690	673.0	2,865	653
Dec	20.349	783.6	24,055.0	1.496	342.4	3,630	839
Total	158.382	7,632.6	144,969.4	24.111	6,024.0	20,266	5,150

STANDARD UNIT: POWER DISSEMINATION DISTRIBUTION SEP 1968

c. Team HB

(1) Employment

Team HB was authorized to the PSYOP battalion for man-portable or vehicular-mounted tactical loudspeaker operations in direct support of tactical units. The three-man team disseminated live or taped propaganda messages to enemy troops in contact from infantry positions, observation posts, tanks, and helicopters. The team responded to targets of psychological opportunity and also planned and conducted loudspeaker operations against other selected target audiences such as villagers in VC-contested areas. It was equipped with remote control equipment so that the operator could remain some distance away from the loudspeaker in a defilade position.

(2) Allocation of Teams

Although the group was augmented with nine additional Teams HB, tactical units expanded to the point where there were not enough loudspeaker teams to provide more than three teams per division and still maintain area support missions as well. In I CTZ, there were only 12 Teams HB to support 4 divisions.

(3) Support Activities

When the Team HB was employed with a ground tactical division, the effort expended in support of ground loudspeaker operations averaged 90 percent, with approximately 10 percent used for aerial loudspeaker broadcasts. If the Team HB was employed with an air mobile unit, such as the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) which had greater aircraft assets, 90 percent of the effort was directed to aerial loudspeaker broadcasts and 10 percent for ground roles.

d. Team HE

(1) Employment

Team HE was authorized to the PSYOP battalion to conduct sound and film operations. The team was employed with divisions or in an area support role at the province level. The three-man team was equipped with a public address system for addressing rallies and crowds, and showing films or film strips. The team was ideal for presenting propaganda on a person-to-person basis in MEDCAP, pacification, and revolutionary development operations. The team was used to distribute leaflets, posters, and other items prepared by higher headquarters. The team could also conduct surveys and opinion polls, and report on local attitudes and opinions. Generally, there was at least one Team HE operating with each division in RVN.

(2) Propaganda Development and Intelligence

(a) In an area support role, approximately ten percent of the Team HE effort was expended in propaganda development and intelligence activities. This activity involved the construction of PSYOP messages and script preparation in support of tactical operations. According to team leaders, approximately 40 percent of the loudspeaker message themes and 10 percent of the printed material were developed by the team members. This activity included providing rapid response to develop propaganda to exploit a tactical or terrorist incident.

(b) Leaflet and loudspeaker messages were developed to exploit substantial friendly victories and to create among the VC/NVA forces a strong sense of ultimate defeat. During interviews of Hoi Chanhs, team members obtained taped messages from the defectors appealing to their comrades to surrender. Other appeals were made in leaflets. The leaflet would contain a photograph of the Hoi Chanh and a personal appeal letter in his own handwriting. In the letter he gave his name and former unit, stated why he rallied and how he was treated, and appealed to his comrades to rally. For general audiences in VC/NVA and non-contested areas, propaganda was developed to discredit Communist propaganda and to create dissatisfaction with the Communist regime.

(c) The team coordinated and obtained appropriate military intelligence from division G2 channels, Hoi Chanhs, and prisoners of war to identify target vulnerabilities. According to 74 percent of the respondents, there was sufficient tactical intelligence data available for the Team HE to accomplish its PSYOP mission.

(3) Film Operations

Approximately 30 percent of the Team HE effort was connected with presenting PSYOP movies to Vietnamese villagers in support of county fair, population control, refugee center, MEDCAP, and pacification missions. Each team maintained a stock of 15 to 20 films on subjects pertaining to revolutionary development, public safety, the GVN image, and FWMAF, as well as popular Walt Disney films.

(4) Loudspeaker Operations

Loudspeaker tasks accounted for approximately 20 percent of the Team HE effort (see Figure H-2). Using the ARVN interpreter attached to the team, announcements were made in target areas before, during, and after movie showings. In support of refugee and MEDCAP missions, the Team HE assisted in controlling and entertaining the people, similar to county fair operations. The public address set was used to provide information and instructions to the local populace. Rally and assembly instructions were given along with PSYOP messages and information on

health, sanitation, and hygiene. Various civic action programs and local officials were publicized for their accomplishments on behalf of the Vietnamese people. Appeals and announcements on the Volunteer Informant Program proved extremely effective in obtaining information on weapons and food caches along with intelligence data on the VC infrastructure. Leaflets were generally distributed during loudspeaker operations to reinforce the PSYOP message.



FIGURE H-2. Loudspeaker Operations. Loudspeaker operations were particularly effective for addressing crowds and rallies on a person-to-person basis. Live or taped propaganda broadcasts can be made to enemy troops or villagers in support of tactical or pacification operations. Loudspeakers can be ground-mounted, vehicular or aircraft-mounted, or installed on watercraft for disseminating PSYOP messages to coastal target audiences.

(5) Aerial Broadcasts and Leaflet Drops

In the province support role, the Team HE devoted approximately 20 percent of its effort to coordinating aerial loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflet drops. In support of divisions, the Team HA leader usually coordinated this function through the division PSYOP officer. The tasks involved obtaining and plotting PSYOP target data by map coordinates, recommending themes, and submitting requests for air support through the PSYOP battalion for pre-planned and quick reaction missions.

(6) Hand Dissemination of PSYOP Material

Ten percent of the Team HE effort was directed toward distribution of PSYOP leaflets, newspapers, and posters to build support for the GVN and to inform the villagers of actions and programs undertaken by the government on their behalf (see Figure H-3). The team also provided printed PSYOP material to US and FWMAF for hand dissemination during normal patrols and other tactical missions.

(7) Miscellaneous Tasks

Approximately 15 percent of the teams' activities were devoted to coordination, administrative, and maintenance tasks. In an area support role, various team leaders were given the responsibility of advising, controlling, and scheduling missions for armed propaganda and cultural drama teams, and they integrated the Team HE activities with the Vietnamese for a combined PSYOP effort.

e. Mobile Advisory Team

To increase the ability of US and FWMAF to conduct PSYOP, the 4th PSYOP Group initiated a Mobile Advisory Team to assist tactical units. The team was made up of PSYOP technicians who had field PSYOP experience and provided training to field units requesting support. The team presented instruction and advice on all aspects of PSYOP. The training presented ranged from leaflet production and loudspeaker operations to various types of PSYOP techniques in support of pacification and tactical operations.

2. RADIO DISSEMINATION

a. In December 1967, the 7th PSYOP Group Radio Detachment (Provisional) deployed from Okinawa to Pleiku, with a 50-kilowatt radio transmitter, to begin operations as part of a combined US/ARVN PSYOP radio station. The ARVN personnel were responsible for all radio programming, while the US provided the equipment and supervised the technical operation of the station. The station began daily broadcasting on 20 January 1968 under Operation Yellowbird with six hours of news, music,

and PSYOP messages to VC/NVA troops, their dependents, and sympathizers throughout the Central Highlands. As a result of an enemy attack on 24 March 1968, the station equipment was completely destroyed.

b. This mission was later received by the 4th PSYOP Group as a function of Teams IA, IC, ID, and KD. Installation of a new 50-KW radio transmitter was near completion. Broadcast coverage is expected to be approximately 200 miles when the station becomes fully operational. Plans include the distribution of mini-radio receivers by US Special Forces, Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, CIDG forces, and others throughout the western portion of II CTZ in areas known to harbor VC/NVA troops.



FIGURE H-3. Hand-to-Hand Dissemination. One of the most effective methods of disseminating printed propaganda material is through hand-to-hand delivery combined with face-to-face communication. Military units and ground patrols can distribute propaganda material as a part of tactical operations. PSYOP leaflets, posters, and other items can be placed on the ground, roads, trails, and buildings or distributed through person-to-person contact.

c. Despite a heavy Montagnard population, there have been no programs broadcast in the Montagnard language. The Chief, RVNAF General Political Warfare Department, has recognized the desirability of motivating and indoctrinating the Montagnards to support the GVN and decided to use Radio Pleiku as one of the principal means of accomplishing this task. Plans were underway to procure the added personnel and funds to increase broadcasting from 6 to 11 hours daily. The increased time will include programs directed primarily toward the Montagnard audience. Programs in the Montagnard dialect are scheduled to begin 1 September 1969.

d. Pending final installation of the AN/TRT-22 50-KW radio transmitter, radio programs were broadcast over AN/GRC-26 radio station facilities as an interim measure (see Figure H-4).



FIGURE H-4. PSYOP Radio Station. The 4th PSYOP Group Radio Section teamed up with its ARVN counterparts in broadcasting 11 hours of daily PSYOP radio programs from its radio site in Pleiku. The radio station broadcast news, music, and PSYOP programs to VC/NVA troops, their dependents, and sympathizers throughout the Central Highlands.

e. The 4th PSYOP Group has not been tasked with producing television programs. The 10th PSYOP Battalion does provide limited advisory and graphic support to the Can Tho television station. Support for the four GVN national radio networks and three GVN television ground stations is a responsibility of JUSPAO.

3. DISSEMINATION BY LEAFLET BOMBS AND SHELLS

a. A means of disseminating printed propaganda material to target audiences was through the use of leaflet bombs and artillery shells (see Figure H-5). The M129E1 leaflet bomb was designed for external and internal carriage on fighter or bomber aircraft with a capacity of 70,000 leaflets per bomb, depending on the leaflet size. Also used were 105mm artillery rounds. Each round was packed with 800 to 900 leaflets, depending on the weight of the paper and the size of the leaflets. By use of the leaflet bombs, pinpoint accuracy could be obtained in placing leaflets on target in any kind of weather, in mountainous terrain, and during the day or night.



FIGURE H-5. Leaflet Bomb Loading. Members of the 4th PSYOP Group Bomb Squad load M129E1 leaflet bombs onto a pallet in preparation for an aerial dissemination mission.

b. During February and March 1969, the 4th PSYOP Group headquarters packed approximately 250 leaflet bombs per month with a 10-man bomb loading squad. Inasmuch as there was no continuous requirement for this function, there was no permanent section organized to accomplish it. The ten-man detail was formed as required. The 7th PSYOP Battalion received a one-time requirement to load 750 artillery shells in support of the 3d Marine Division. The 10th PSYOP Battalion reported their team members loaded approximately 200 rounds of 105mm shells per month.

4. AERIAL DISSEMINATION METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

a. Responsibility

The 7th USAF provided support for aerial dissemination of leaflets and for aerial broadcasts. Figure H-6 gives the number of leaflets disseminated by aerial means in RVN during 1968. Requests for PSYOP missions were processed along with target coordinates from combat units to Army PSYOP battalions. The PSYOP battalions plotted the targets, produced and delivered PSYOP material, and coordinated the missions with flight detachments of the 5th and 9th Special Operations Squadrons, 14th Special Operations Wing.

1968	Number of Leaflets (in millions)				
	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	IV CTZ	TOTAL
January	282.6	203.5	127.1	131.9	745.1
February	160.5	198.6	82.7	53.9	495.7
March	251.7	256.9	98.4	45.1	652.1
April	202.1	169.3	152.3	82.9	606.6
May	231.4	147.0	121.5	141.6	641.5
June	200.9	119.9	101.3	98.4	520.5
July	132.1	124.9	169.4	101.2	527.6
August	217.3	187.3	180.4	89.0	674.0
September	179.0	188.8	154.3	116.9	639.0
October	116.4	199.8	228.5	95.8	640.5
November	221.5	152.3	242.0	97.6	713.4
December	169.2	235.6	249.9	128.9	783.6
TOTAL	2364.7	2183.9	1907.8	1183.2	7639.6

FIGURE H-6. Aerial Leaflet Dissemination for 1968.

b. Aircraft

The three fixed-wing aircraft employed for PSYOP missions were the C-47, 02-B, and U-10. Figure H-7 shows the 02-B and Figure H-8 shows the U-10. Air Force helicopters were not available for PSYOP missions. The 02-B and U-10 were used principally for loudspeaker missions, while the C-47 was employed primarily for leaflet dissemination. A minimum altitude of 1,500 feet (4,000 feet when hostile fire was encountered) and an optimum of 3,000 feet for loudspeaker missions were prescribed. Using organic UH-1 helicopters when available, Army tactical units operated at lower altitudes, depending upon the type of loudspeaker employed and the tactical mission. All Air Force navigators used prescribed dissemination techniques for computing leaflet rates of fall and target procedures. (8)



FIGURE H-7. 02-B Super Skymaster. A USAF 02-B drops leaflets over RVN as its loudspeakers broadcast PSYOP messages to enemy troops.



FIGURE H-8. U-10 Aircraft. Although it is used primarily for PSYOP loudspeaker broadcasts, the U-10 can carry approximately 85,000 leaflets.

c. Aircraft Availability

(1) Each flight detachment usually provided two C-47s and eight O2-Bs or U-10s for PSYOP missions in each CTZ. All PSYOP units indicated that sufficient aircraft were available for long-range pre-planned PSYOP missions. Some force commanders and tactical unit PSYOP officers stated there were insufficient aircraft assets available for quick reaction PSYOP missions. The poor weather and night time limitations of the aircraft, coupled with frequent maintenance requirements, were all factors resulting in insufficient aircraft availability for tactical PSYOP missions.

(2) The O2-B and U-10 were equipped to fly only under Visual Flight Rule conditions. The C-47 was equipped with TACAN and could fly during adverse weather or night time conditions. Consequently, the C-47

was the only aircraft that could be used for night loudspeaker missions. The II FFV PSYOP officer reported insufficient C-47s for night loudspeaker missions in III CTZ.

(3) Take-off and landing restrictions of these aircraft were other limiting factors in providing responsive tactical support. For example, the III MAF PSYOP officer reported that neither the O2-B nor C-47 aircraft could land at three of the five provincial capitals in I CTZ. Conversely, the experience of tactical units which employed helicopters to supplement USAF aircraft indicated that helicopters offered advantages over fixed-wing aircraft, particularly for picking up ralliers in jungle areas, for live PSYOP broadcasts, or for disseminating specially prepared propaganda messages. The helicopter appeared to be the most versatile aircraft for quick reaction PSYOP support to tactical units.

(4) There were various tactical units which had sufficient air assets. The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) employed one PSYOP helicopter with each brigade. This was considered extremely effective in furnishing immediate PSYOP support to tactical units in contact with the enemy. The majority of units did not have any aircraft available specifically for PSYOP missions. Because PSYOP priorities for aircraft were subordinate to tactical priorities, helicopters were not usually available when needed for quick reaction missions.

d. Targeting

According to air operations and dissemination personnel, there were inconsistencies in the target area sizes submitted by tactical units. Large area targets (ten square kilometers) were preferred for leaflet dissemination, while small spot targets (three square kilometers or less) were preferred for loudspeaker missions. For loudspeaker missions, it required approximately 15 minutes for the aircraft to circle a 3-square-kilometer target, repeating 30-second messages 30 to 40 times while orbiting. In one CTZ, a total of three C-47 sorties were scheduled daily to disseminate approximately 6 million leaflets on approximately 100 to 125 targets with a density of 6,000 to 15,000 leaflets per square kilometer. The definition of a target size was not uniform or consistent in other CTZs. In one corps area, an area target was defined as six square kilometers, while pinpoint spot targets were defined as no larger than one square kilometer.

e. Effective Methods

(1) A number of tests were conducted in RVN by the Air Force and Army to determine the most effective method of disseminating aerial loudspeaker PSYOP messages. These stemmed from various allegations that aerial loudspeaker messages could not be heard or understood when aircraft flew at excessively high altitudes. Results of these tests were as follows.

(a) A test of the O2-B aircraft with its 1800-watt speaker system was conducted by Flight C, 9th Special Operations Squadron with US Army assistance. In a report published by the 14th Special Operations Wing, January 1968, it was found that satisfactory sound reception was obtained by operating the aircraft between 3,000 to 4,500 feet above the target using bank angles of 20° to 30°.

(b) During tests conducted by the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (9), tactics and techniques were developed for the use of an ABS-4 1,000-watt loudspeaker system by Army PSYOP units.

The following techniques were found to be effective:

1. Hovering at 3,000 feet at zero ground speed with speakers oriented on the target.
2. Circling the target at 3,000 feet at 45 knots air-speed with speakers oriented on the target.
3. Covering the target area in a succession of rectangular swaths by a straight and level flight at 3,000 feet at 45 knots air speed.
4. Circling at 45 knots with the speakers oriented on the target area. This produced the minimum vulnerability to the aircraft with the maximum effective audio coverage on the ground.
5. Mounting 8 speakers on one side of the aircraft with the plane of propagation rotated 15° outward and 10° toward the rear. This was found to be the best speaker arrangement.

(2) Considerable research and testing have been conducted on leaflet operations. Techniques were developed to a point where trained personnel can place leaflets on targets over 100 miles from the aircraft release point. Most leaflet operations in RVN were conducted from relatively low altitudes of 3,000 feet or lower. The basic principles of leaflet dissemination remain the same regardless of the altitude. The large number of personnel engaged in leaflet dissemination coupled with the rapid turnover of personnel initially produced problems of over-saturation of leaflets in some areas and insufficient leaflet coverage in other areas.

(3) PSYOP personnel improved leaflet dissemination targeting by using leaflet sizes and paper weights prescribed in FM 33-5. Previous practice in various PSYOP facilities was to print leaflets in a size designed primarily to permit accommodation of the printing presses. This practice often caused unfavorable aerial dissemination characteristics and precluded target accuracy. Guidance was published prescribing the 3x6 inch leaflet on 16- and 20-pound paper as a favorable leaflet for aerial dissemination.

ANNEX I

OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES AND CONCEPTS

1. GENERAL

a. In RVN, the newest PSYOP concepts and techniques were being tested and analyzed for future development. Military experience in the past has been limited to propaganda campaigns in support of general or limited war campaigns. The realities of cold war and stability operations in RVN have presented new challenges for PSYOP as a military weapon.

b. PSYOP is still in a state of development. However, improvements are constantly being made in new and effective techniques. This annex lists new techniques or variations of techniques and lessons learned in RVN by the 4th PSYOP Group and other members of the PSYOP community. Documentation of these techniques may serve as a basis for future concepts and doctrine.

2. ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPT

a. A new PSYOP organizational concept of placing one standard PSYOP company in support of each division was being studied by the 4th PSYOP Group to provide a complete and flexible PSYOP capability responsive to each tactical unit.* This standard PSYOP company, consisting of 9 officers and 59 enlisted personnel, contained a general support and a direct support platoon (see Figure I-1). The general support platoon had a printing and reproduction section, propaganda development section, and a supply and maintenance section which would provide a general support role to a division.

b. The direct support platoon consisted of four field detachments which would provide one detachment of three loudspeaker teams and one audiovisual team to each supported brigade. With its six-man propaganda development section and three-man light mobile special warfare printing plant, the general support platoon had an organic capability to produce, develop, and disseminate propaganda.

c. The concept called for one PSYOP battalion in support of each corps area to provide back-up general support to assigned PSYOP companies. The battalion provided an aviation section with four pilots and two UH1-D helicopters to furnish quick reaction aerial loudspeaker and leaflet missions on a corps-wide area basis. Added to its greater printing and propaganda development capability, the battalion had 4 field detachments, representing a total of 4 audiovisual and 12 loudspeaker teams for an area support role.

*4th PSYOP Group MTOE 13-500G was submitted by USARV to CINCSARPAC on 15 Apr 69. It did not include the concept discussed in paragraph 2. Subsequent MTOE action concerning this concept cannot be initiated until DA has completed action on the current MTOE.




FIGURE I-1. New PSYOP Operational Concept.

3. PSYOP TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

a. Operation Tintinnabulation

(1) Operation Tintinnabulation, a new PSYOP technique being tested by the 10th PSYOP Battalion, in cooperation with the 5th Special Operations Squadron, was recently employed against two VC battalions. Tintinnabulation (which literally means the ringing of bells) involves two C-47 aircraft, one "Spooky" (minigun-equipped) and the other a "Gabby" (loud-speaker-equipped). During the initial phase, the Gabby employs a frequency pulsating noisemaker designed to harass and confuse the enemy forces during night hours, while the Spooky provides air cover. During the second phase, the harassing noisemaker continues, however, emphasis is given to use of Chieu Hoi tapes. The first phase is designed to eliminate the feeling that the night provides security to the target audience, while the second phase is designed to reinforce the enemy's desire to rally. Targets for both phases are recommended based on the results of daytime ground operations.

(2) During a recent operation in Vinh Long Province, a total of 24 missions were flown with over-the-target time of approximately 2 hours per aircraft. The number of Hoi Chanhs in the province more than tripled (122 in September to 379 in December), and ralliers stated that the effects of the night missions caused them to rally. The initial success of Operation Tintinnabulation suggested this concept should be considered for use in other areas.

b. PSYOP Air Strikes

The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) successfully employed quick-reaction helicopters to psychologically exploit contacts with the enemy in battle. A UH-1 helicopter, equipped with airborne broadcast equipment, was located near the operations center of each of the three brigades. When contact was established, the Gabby helicopter with Team HB or brigade PSYOP personnel aboard scrambled to the battle area. The Gabby checked into the net of the ground unit after arriving over the contact area. The PSYOP effort was integrated with artillery fire, tactical airstrikes, and helicopter gunships. Experience with the helicopter as a PSYOP carrier provided the following information:

(1) The helicopter should be flown between 60 and 80 knots in level flight to avoid the blade noise which interferes with broadcasts.

(2) The loudspeaker equipment should be securely mounted to avoid shake or rattle.

(3) The interpreter, when broadcasting live voice messages, should sit facing outboard on the opposite side of the helicopter from the loudspeaker. This procedure greatly reduces the possibility of feedback distortion.

c. PSYOP Intelligence

An Intelligence Civic Action Program (ICAP) was added to the PSYOP program of the 9th Infantry Division. ICAP is a combined activity of civic action, intelligence, PSYOP, and security personnel each performing their regular duties in a contested or insecure area. The ICAP proved effective when used in conjunction with cordon and search operations. It was also used independently in the contested and VC-controlled hamlets which were selected for upgrading in the Accelerated Pacification Campaign. The PSYOP portion of the ICAP included special leaflets and broadcasts targeted at specific hamlets. The ICAP's psychological objectives were to undermine the VC infrastructure, explain the presence of US/FWMAF and ARVN forces, and to publicize the goals of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign.

d. Mobile Television

(1) Audiovisual teams of the 7th PSYOP Battalion employed television in support of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) in I CTZ. Mobile audiovisual teams were equipped with television sets and sent to rural villages to conduct PSYOP on a person-to-person basis in conjunction with showing PSYOP television programs. These PSYOP television programs were transmitted from Da Nang and included news, music, and PSYOP messages to enhance the GVN image. In addition, PSYOP messages provided a quick reaction interpretation of political and military developments to counter fear rumors and VC propaganda. The PSYOP television drew crowds and was considered to be quite successful (see Figure I-2).

(2) The 4th PSYOP Group was studying the feasibility of equipping all audiovisual teams with television sets. They were enthusiastic about the potential of television for mass communication of PSYOP messages, even in underdeveloped countries with limited television facilities. Video and kinescope recording tapes could be sent to audiovisual teams in rural areas to show PSYOP tapes on portable built-in television monitor equipment. To create a sense of nationalism and unity, another alternative was to make numerous copies of special PSYOP television programs on positive prints for distribution to audiovisual teams for immediate motion picture showings through an entire country.

e. Motorized PSYOP Sampans

A new PSYOP technique in An Giang Province involved the use of motorized sampans to reach remote hamlets not serviced by roads. Each sampan contained a television set or movie projector and a Honda generator. The sampan moved to the target hamlet where the crew consisting of representatives from Province S-5, Vietnamese Information Service, and Revolutionary Development disembarked and talked to the residents of the hamlet. At nightfall the television or movie was used for a PSYOP message to the hamlet audience. At the end of the evaluation, four sampans were operating in An Giang Province.



FIGURE I-2. PSYOP Television. PSYOP television programs shown by the 7th PSYOP Battalion to Vietnamese audiences in rural areas proved extremely effective in I CTZ.

f. Pinpoint Leaflet Dissemination

Under special circumstances, accuracy was of paramount importance in the aerial delivery of special purpose leaflets. For example, a special leaflet was designed to discredit enemy political cadre and village liberation committees. The credibility and effectiveness of the leaflet was dependent on hitting only those villages where committees were active. Free dropping of leaflets from an altitude of 1,500 to 3,000 feet did not permit accurate and effective pinpoint dissemination. Villages could be saturated with leaflets using this method but not without placing leaflets on adjacent villages where they might be counter-productive to the PSYOP effort. The 5th Special Operations Squadron modified the dissemination techniques taught to U-10 pilots at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. This modified technique,

similar in principle to the delayed opening leaflet system also used in Thailand, involved dropping a small bundle of leaflets (1,000 to 2,000) held together with a rubber band. The rubber band had a short time fuze attached which burned through in time to cause the bundle to burst at an altitude of 500 feet. This technique was accurate and reliable for reaching pinpoint targets.

g. Armed Propaganda Teams (APT)

(1) Proper use of the APT can be the most effective PSYOP medium directed against the enemy, according to the 10th PSYOP Battalion. Since December 1968, the battalion has employed PSYOP advisors with the APTs in IV CTZ to assist in training. The unit reported that the VC contested/controlled areas provided the ideal environment for APT operations.

(2) The APT should be used in VC contested/controlled areas and should operate as a platoon size, highly mobile unit. For effective organization, the platoon should be divided into three squads with one squad designated as the propaganda squad and two squads as security elements. The two security squads should be heavily armed to provide the protection essential for the conduct of face-to-face communication by the propaganda squad.

(3) The propaganda squad should consist of ex-VC members who have rallied from that operational area. The propaganda squad need not be heavily armed as its primary mission is to conduct face-to-face communication and to root out the VC infrastructure. The security squads and the US advisor should not enter hamlets but establish security cordons and ambush sites near likely avenues of approach into the hamlet. Heavily armed personnel moving into a hamlet were considered detrimental to the work and the PSYOP mission of the propaganda squad.

(4) After security is established, the propaganda squad should visit door-to-door in the hamlet, talk with families, and distribute PSYOP material. Through face-to-face communication with the VC, their families, and friends, the squad urges VC to rally. Security and ambush sites may be maintained overnight to intercept VC members traveling to or from their hamlets. The 10th PSYOP Battalion reported that the APT was the most effective PSYOP weapon in penetrating VC havens and striking at the enemy from within his own perimeter.

h. Cultural Drama Teams

(1) Cultural drama shows were an extremely effective medium for disseminating PSYOP messages to rural target audiences in RVN according to PSYOP team leaders. There were 36 Cultural Drama Teams conducting operations within the provinces, providing entertainment to audiences in the villages and hamlets (see Figure I-3).



FIGURE 1-3. Cultural Drama Teams. There were 36 Cultural Drama Teams throughout RVN providing entertainment in the form of songs, dramas, dances, and magic shows.

(2) The objectives of the Cultural Drama Teams were to achieve a spiritual identification with the rural masses, to win their favor, and to establish a channel of communication between the masses and the GVN. The teams used PSYOP as a part of cultural drama shows to support various government programs and activities. The teams accomplished this by providing entertainment. Each performance lasted approximately 1 1/2 hours and included modern and traditional songs, magic shows, dances, stories, and skits. PSYOP themes of virtually all the material were politically oriented, e.g., Chieu Hoi, nation building, the anti-communist effort, social reforms, and elections.

4. PSYOP DEVICES

a. PSYOP Soap

(1) The 7th PSYOP Group developed a technique of disseminating propaganda messages imbedded on successive layers of soap, thus enabling the originator to convey several messages to the user over a considerable period of time. After favorable evaluation by the 4th PSYOP Group for field application to target audiences in RVN, messages were developed to include a wrapper layout emphasizing that the soap was a gift from the GVN.

(2) The layered messages used a "soft-sell" approach and consisted of symbols and short slogans. The soap was used in support of the 1969 TET Campaign. This was the first field application of PSYOP soap and NAVFORV was assigned the mission of conducting an intensive field test to determine the suitability and effectiveness of the soap for possible use as a future PSYOP medium. The field test was being conducted in the Delta during riverine operations.

b. Grocery Bags

The IV CTZ PSYOP Campaign "Grocery Bag" was completed on 4 September 1968. Small paper bags, printed with PSYOP messages, were disseminated to market place vendors. The objective of this campaign was to convey PSYOP messages into VC controlled/contested areas. The following themes were stressed in support of the campaign: Chieu Hoi, Support the National Police, and Join and Support Self-defense. Reports from provinces were favorable. No province reported resistance by vendors to having Chieu Hoi materials in their possession. In Dinh Tuong Province, Cultural Drama Team members handled the distribution of the grocery bags and reported the merchants received the bags with enthusiasm. All indicators pointed to a very successful campaign.

5. PSYOP EQUIPMENT

a. Hurricane Hustler

Leaflet operations in RVN were conducted at an unprecedented rate. Up to half a billion leaflets were dropped monthly over RVN from low-altitude aircraft. A particular problem existed in leaflet dissemination from helicopters. Leaflets were thrown out in small handfuls which required considerable muscular exertion to get them clear of the rotor wash and caused much difficulty for the crewman. This difficulty led to development of the "Hurricane Hustler Leaflet Disseminator," a device which permitted placement of leaflets into the mouth of a chute where they were sucked from the craft into the slip-stream below (see Figure I-4).

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


FIGURE I-4. Hurricane Hustler. The Hurricane Hustler leaflet dispenser (right) is a device mounted on helicopters which permits leaflets to be disseminated without obstruction by rotor wash or air slipstreams. The Hurricane Hustler and the ABC-4 1,000-watt loudspeaker (left) are used by the 8th PSYOP Battalion for quick-reaction missions.

8. Image Projectors

The 4th PSYOP Group initiated a test of five Miltralux Image Projectors on 1 September 1963. These were commercial slide projectors much like the 35mm slide projector, but using a 85mm slide and a 1,000-watt projector bulb. This gave the projector the capability of using buildings, mountains, and even low cloud banks as projector screens. The testing program subjected the projectors to many types of climatic and geographic characteristics. It was determined that the equipment, in its present state of development, was unsuitable for PSYOP use.

c. Earlyword System

(1) Earlyword is a nickname given to a small adapter unit used to connect the airborne loudspeaker system on PSYOP aircraft with the intercom system on the aircraft. It was designed by B Flight, 5th Special Operations Squadron to allow quick-reaction exploitation of a Hoi Chanh rallier. Live PSYOP messages were broadcast from ralliers or interpreters at a ground radio station and relayed through aircraft loudspeaker systems to target audiences in remote areas.

(2) The system was extremely effective in broadcasting personalized messages of GVN officials to the populace of outlying villages according to personnel of the 6th PSYOP Battalion. PSYOP personnel could remain at ground stations and address widely separated hamlets through the aircraft loudspeaker system, thus eliminating dangerous travel into VC-controlled areas. Messages could be tape-recorded in the aircraft for re-broadcast. In addition, re-broadcast of scheduled radio programs could be made to remote villages where radios were non-existent or limited.

(3) The Earlywood system is a simple device which consists of two resistors, a miniature phone jack, a headset cord assembly, and miscellaneous hardware (see Figure I-5). The system is applicable mainly to the C-47 and U-10 aircraft, 1,000-watt loudspeaker system.

6. AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING

a. PSYOP Campaigns and Activities

MAC J3 PSYOP Division has developed a new computerized reporting system to improve the management control of national PSYOP programs. The volume of PSYOP campaigns and activities previously reported was unmanageable. However, through automatic data processing, new attempts were being made to statistically assess PSYOP effectiveness. The specific items programmed into the computer were designed to provide data on the overall effectiveness of PSYOP programs as well as to show areas and audiences exposed to PSYOP themes and campaigns.

b. Computerized Interview Data

The Rand Corporation conducted a substantial number of in-depth interviews with prisoners and Hoi Chanh over a period of several years. They developed a computer technique to code information contained in the interviews. A limited study was run to determine leaflet effectiveness. Results of the study indicated a favorable trend toward leaflet effectiveness. The effective responses were those indicating belief in or use of leaflets in rallying. Ineffective responses were those indicating disbelief and failure to react positively to the leaflet. Neutral responses included those who had never seen leaflets or those who could not be classified




FIGURE I-5. Earlyword System.

in either the effective or ineffective categories. Results were as indicated below:

<u>GROUP</u>	<u>EFFECTIVE</u>	<u>INEFFECTIVE</u>	<u>NEUTRAL</u>
POW	70%	15%	15%
Military Hoi Chanh	75%	25%	---
Civilian Hoi Chanh	80%	20%	---

c. Computerized Questionnaires

The Advance Research Projects Agency developed a computer questionnaire which was designed to accumulate data on Hoi Chanh and prisoners of war. Drafts of the questionnaire were administered on a random basis to Hoi Chanh to test the questionnaire. When the system is fully operational, MACV envisions that the computerized data, showing the effect of PSYOP, will be continuously accumulated with summaries produced periodically.

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Item 13 (continued)

between PSYOP units and various other agencies involved in PSYOP, resulting in duplication and coordination problems.

Additional PSYOP resources were needed in RVN. The ACTIV evaluation recommended approval on the proposed MTOE 33-500G to obtain added resources for the 4th PSYOP Group. There was insufficient doctrinal guidance published on the employment and techniques of PSYOP units during stability operations. It was recommended that various PSYOP functions be combined under control of one staff agency to provide central direction and control of PSYOP in RVN. In addition to specific recommendations on personnel, training, and logistical matters, it was urged that more command emphasis be directed toward the role of PSYOP in support of US objectives in RVN.

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13. ABSTRACT			
<p>The Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) conducted an evaluation of US Army Psychological Operations (PSYOP) units in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) during the period 1 December 1967 to 31 March 1969. The objectives of the ACTIV evaluation were to:</p> <p>Determine the capability of US Army PSYOP units to accomplish their assigned missions under existing organizational concepts.</p> <p>Describe and analyze the tasks performed by US Army PSYOP units in RVN to accomplish their missions.</p> <p>The expansion of US and Free World Military Assistance Forces in RVN resulted in an unprecedented emphasis on PSYOP during stability operations. The 4th PSYOP Group was activated in December 1967 with four assigned PSYOP battalions to meet these expanding requirements. During 1968, the 4th PSYOP Group was faced with organizational, supply and equipment problems in addition to coping with expanding tasks and responsibilities. The unit was totally committed to the development, production, and dissemination of propaganda material for tactical and strategic PSYOP in support of joint and combined counterinsurgency operations.</p> <p>The 4th PSYOP Group was employed effectively and was capable of accomplishing assigned missions in RVN within the limitations imposed by organizational manning and equipment levels. The PSYOP units were responsive to tactical and strategic PSYOP requirements. However, military force levels and personnel ceilings prevented the structuring or tailoring of PSYOP units to meet all PSYOP requirements. The PSYOP requirements continued to increase and gradually exceeded the capabilities of Army PSYOP units. It was found that there were overlapping missions and responsibilities</p>			

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