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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (11 Jun 69) FOR OT UT 691355

13 June 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 24th Transportation Bn, Period Ending 31 January 1969

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

C. A. STANFIEL
 Colonel, AGC
 Acting The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 24TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION (TERMINAL)
AGO 96312

AVCA GRB-TC-TL-CO

31 January 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 24th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) for Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-1)

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I. Section I, Operations: Significant Activities:

a. During this reporting period, the battalion headquarters and headquarters detachment moved from Vung Ro Bay, Tuy Hoa Sub Area Command, APO 96316 to Cam Ranh Bay APO 96312. This not only involved the physical movement of the headquarters but also changes in subordinate assigned units and the mission of the battalion.

b. On 1 December 1968, 1st Logistical Command realigned the Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay Support Commands areas of responsibility. Under this realignment, Qui Nhon Support Command assumed responsibility for the port at Vung Ro Bay and the Tuy Hoa Sub Area. As a result, the companies assigned to the 24th Trans Bn (Tml) at Vung Ro Bay and Tuy Hoa were reassigned to elements of Qui Nhon Support Command. The Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 24th Trans Bn (Tml) remained assigned to Cam Ranh Bay Support Command and was attached to Qui Nhon Support Command for operational control to assist in the orderly transfer of the port at Vung Ro Bay from one command to the other. This realignment of units was accomplished by General Orders 1058, HQ, 1st Log Comd, dated 6 December 1968. HHD, 24th Trans Bn (Tml) remained at Vung Ro Bay until 14 December 1968. On this date, the battalion moved by convoy to Cam Ranh Bay.

c. The principal mission of the battalion and each assigned or attached unit from the beginning of the reporting period until 1 December 1968 was as follows:

(1) The 24th Transportation Battalion continued to direct the mission activities of organized terminal service and light truck units engaged in the discharge of deep draft vessels, shallow draft vessels engaged in intercoastal shipping and port and beach clearance at Vung Ro Bay. The Battalion operated Vung Ro Bay Outport and supported tenant units: Navy Harbor Defense Detachment, elements of the 577th Engineer Battalion, and a detachment from the 261st Signal Company.

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(2) The 529th Transportation Company (Lt Trk) supported battalion operations by providing trucks for port and beach clearance at Vung Ro Bay and convoys to and from Tuy Hoa.

(3) The 515th Transportation Company (Lt Trk) continued to provide vehicles for port and beach clearance as well as convoys to inland destinations while manning all defensive positions around the northern perimeter of the base.

(4) The 119th Transportation Company (TS) continued to perform its assigned mission of discharging deep draft and shallow draft vessels. The company also operated two Larc 60's which provided shuttle service between Vung Ro Bay and the Tuy Hoa area. The company also contributed extensively to construction of base defensive fortifications and perimeter security.

(5) A platoon from the 561st Transportation Company (TS) provided personnel to augment the 119th Transportation Company (TS). The 561st platoon returned to Cam Ranh Bay with HHD, 24th Transportation Battalion (Tml) where it was subsequently deactivated and its personnel and equipment absorbed by the 10th Transportation Battalion (Tml).

d. During the portion of the reporting period that the 24th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) was located at Vung Ro Bay, the Battalion and its assigned units retained principal responsibility for the security and defense of Vung Ro Bay. This was accomplished by utilizing up to 22% of the assigned strength augmented by two 106mm recoilless rifle crews from the 173rd Airborne Brigade and directly supported by B battery 30 Arty, 30KA and elements of 2nd Battalion 28th Sgt 30KA. While at Vung Ro Bay enemy activity directed against the outport was limited to the following incidents:

(1) At approximately 300030 Nov 68 the outport received 30-40 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar fire, 5 B-40 rockets and 12-15 hand grenades. Fire was returned by the 24th Transportation Battalion (Terminal), B Battery, 30 Arty 30KA, US Navy Swift Boats and Huey gun ships with unknown results. Friendly casualties were 29 WIA (10 24th Battalion, 4 US Navy, 15 577th Eng Battalion) and 1 KIA (577th En. Battalion). Further investigation at 010800 Dec 68 by the 24th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) and 2nd Battalion, 20 Sgt, 30KA revealed mortar position at approximate location CO 279241 and a small enemy camp at CO 280246. Sweep of area also indicated that enemy had penetrated the outer band of concertina wire. It is believed that the immediate reaction of 24th Trans Bn personnel manning the perimeter and the gunships to lay down a heavy base of fire averted a ground attack and penetration of the battalion perimeter, thus preventing heavy personnel and equipment losses.

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(2) At 091615 Nov, via CQ 223191 approximately 10 kilometers northwest of Vung Ro Bay, a 529th Transportation Company roving patrol vehicle reported receiving 15-20 rounds of small arms fire. There was negative damage and no fire returned. In the same area at 1735 hours another roving patrol vehicle belonging to the 529th Transportation Company reported an explosion near the road, after which time they saw 7-8 black pajama clad figures fleeing into the mountains. The patrol vehicle delivered fire into the area, receiving fire from 4 or 5 sources in return. A second roving patrol vehicle and a .50 caliber gun truck from the 529th Transportation Company were sent to the area for additional fire support. At 1810 hours a 545th Transportation Company, 1/2 ton vehicle was passing the area when a second explosion occurred. Total damage of the combined incidents resulted in one (1) slightly damaged 1 1/2 ton trailer and a 1/2 ton vehicle received a small arms round through the radiator. There were negative casualties and unknown enemy casualties.

e. November 1968 marked a record breaking month for this battalion's last month in Vung Ro Bay. The outpost established four daily records for Vung Ro Bay Outpost. Included were the records for: total cargo handled in one day, total cargo discharged from shallow draft vessels, total outload into shallow draft vessels, and total cargo outload in one day.

f. During the period 1-20 December 1968, the battalion had no subordinate units assigned or attached; its principal mission was threefold:

(1) To provide staff liaison for the transfer of control at Vung Ro Bay Outpost from Cam Ranh Bay Support Command to Qui Nhon Support Command.

(2) To prepare all TOF equipment and personnel for a unit move from Vung Ro Bay to Cam Ranh Bay.

(3) To prepare to accept newly assigned units and missions at Cam Ranh Bay.

g. General Orders 46, 44, 124th Trans Comd (Tml A) dated 24 December 1968 directed the reassignment of the following units from the 36th Trans Bn (Trk) to the 24th Trans Bn (Tml): 24th Transportation Company (Med Trk), 592nd Transportation Company (Lt Trk), 564th Transportation Platoon (Lt Trk), 234th Transportation Platoon (Lt Trk), and the 515th Transportation Platoon (Lt Trk). These orders confirmed VOCC of 20 December 1968.

h. The principal mission of the 24th Transportation Battalion (Tml) from 20 December 1968 until the end of the reporting period was as follows:

(1) The 24th Transportation Battalion directed mission activities of truck units engaged in port and beach clearance and local haul delivery of cargo and personnel at Cam Ranh Bay Port. In addition, the battalion provided supervision, guidance and technical assistance to the contractor operated Cargo Intransit Yard at Cam Ranh Bay and provided personnel to

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augment forward support areas and outports as directed by the 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A).

(2) The 24th Transportation Company (Medium Truck) provided vehicles for port and beach clearance and local haul delivery of cargo in the Cam Ranh Bay area.

(3) The 592nd Transportation Company (Light Truck) along with its attached platoons, the 234th Trans Plt (Light Truck) and 515th Trans Plt, provided vehicles for port and beach clearance and local haul delivery of cargo in the Cam Ranh Bay area.

(4) The 564th Trans Plt (Light Truck) provided vehicles and personnel to augment the Logistical Support Activity at Phan Rang Outport-IVN.

(5) Organizational charts are attached as inclosures 1, 2, and 3.

i. Concurrent with the assignment of its new mission at Cam Ranh Bay, the 24th Trans Bn undertook an intensive management program to improve port and beach clearance and local haul truck operations at Cam Ranh Bay. The battalion operations section instituted a visual vehicle control system which provides continuous up to date information on the location of every battalion task vehicle. Bottlenecks at piers and off-load sites show up immediately and action to alleviate these bottlenecks can be taken before truck turn around time is adversely affected. Supplemental control points have been established where truck traffic density is high to permit on the spot control and supervision of vehicles and drivers. Roving patrol jeeps with radios cover operational sites where the density of traffic does not support full time control. (See schematic diagram at Incl 4). Close personal liaison has also been established with both shippers and receivers to insure the smooth-flow of cargo, vehicles, and the supporting documentation. Increased emphasis on detailed planning of operations has permitted spotting trailers for loads in advance and the use of a truck-tractor shuttle service to move cargo to and from piers, staging areas, and storage sites. This has improved overall port efficiency by insuring that cargo flows smoothly and in a timely manner.

2. Section II. Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations

a. Personnel.

1. Observation: The 24th Transportation Company (Medium Truck) has on hand 30 Commercial Kenworth twenty-ton trucks and 30 fifteen-ton trailers over and above TOE authorization.

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2. Evaluation: These additional vehicles provide an outstanding cargo carrying capability; however, when the over allocation of equipment was made, no provision was made for the additional people necessary to operate and maintain the vehicles. An MTOE is being prepared to formally authorize the Kenworth trucks and trailers, as well as necessary drivers, control and maintenance personnel.

3. Recommendation: The Kenworth vehicles are extremely valuable in port and beach operations. The proposed MTOE should receive expeditious processing and approval.

b. Operations.

1. LST Turnaround Time:

(a) Observation: In the past LST turnaround time at Cam Ranh Bay has been above the 1st Log standard of 50 hours for discharge and 50 hours for outload.

(b) Evaluation: Upon assumption of the port and beach clearance mission, the 24th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) began a shuttle system using 12 ton S&P's to more effectively move cargo from storage sites to the LST loading points. This shuttle, coordinated with the staging areas concerned, allowed cargo to be pre-loaded on S&P trailers and quickly moved to the LST loading site when needed. This system works extremely well for Class V cargo. Advanced planning also permitted much cargo to be prestaged in the LST loading area on South Beach. In January this program helped to significantly lower the time in port for LST's. The average now stands at 63 hours per LST, or one half of the December average.

(c) Recommendation: That the shuttle system of cargo movement and the system of pre-staging cargo be used when ever possible. This requires adequate advance notification of ship movements and timely prior planning of outloads by traffic management and movement control activities.

2. Intransit Yard.

(a) Observation: Concurrent with the assumption by the 24th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) of the port and beach clearance mission, the battalion assumed responsibility for overall supervision and coordination of a cargo intransit yard operated under contract with Lambroco, Inc. (Contract Da JB 11-69-0075). The contract calls for the operation of a intransit yard and an annex for the receipt, temporary storage, and outshipment of intransit cargo, that is, cargo destined for consignees not within the Cam Ranh Bay complex. When the battalion assumed responsibility on 1 January 1969 the cargo level in the yard was near 3,000 short tons.

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(b) Evaluation: Prior to assumption of responsibility the battalion conducted a detailed study to isolate the reasons for this high level of intransit cargo. It was found that with careful coordination with Movements Control Center, much of the cargo could be routed from the original discharge site directly to a loading point for transshipment. This direct movement of intransit cargo allowed less damage and pilferage, eliminated much double and sometimes triple handling, and provided more rapid distribution of cargo to consignees.

(c) Recommendations: That in the future intransit yards be used sparingly. When an intransit yard must be used, priority for shipment must be given to intransit cargo.

c. Training. None

d. Intelligence. None

e. Logistics:

1. Division of M54 5 Ton Cargo Trucks and M-52 Tractors

(a) Observations: At the present the assets of the 24th Transportation Battalion (Tml) authorized to accomplish its mission of port and beach clearance and local haul for the Cam Ranh Bay peninsula are approximately equally divided between M54 cargo trucks and tractor-trailer equipment. Experience has demonstrated conclusively that this division of trucks and tractors is not economical in our type of operation. The M54 cargo truck provides a very necessary capability within Cam Ranh Bay for moving small lots of refrigerated cargo from the piers to storage sites, for moving certain types of ammunition and for moving less than trailer load lots of general cargo. Beyond that, their use is uneconomical as the normal payload is much less than that of M-52 tractors. The heavy reliance on M54 cargo trucks, therefore, requires more drivers to move a given amount of cargo. Moreover, this reliance on the M54 cargo truck also reduces the benefits of flexibility and efficiency gained by trailer shuttle operations. The 60 M-52 tractors and 120 M127 trailers now authorized to the battalion are not adequate to provide an efficient shuttle service throughout the port complex. During January 1969, requests were submitted to change the 564th Transportation Platoon (Light Truck) to a medium truck platoon and the 592nd Transportation Company (Light Truck) to a medium truck company. These actions were recommended in order to provide the additional tractor and trailer assets this battalion requires to effectively perform its mission.

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(b) Evaluation: The division of 5 Ton Cargo Trucks and Tractor-Trailers has limited the capability of the battalion to effectively perform its mission.

(c) Recommendation: That an MTOF change for the 564th Transportation Platoon (Light Truck) and the request to redesignate the 592nd Transportation Company (Light Truck) to a medium truck company be approved.

2. Hydraulic tire demounter and impact wrenches.

(a) Observation: The battalion vehicles have a large number of flat tires; this is to be expected when operating over poor roads. Flat tires are presently being broken down and repaired with hand tools. This has resulted in 48 manhours per day being used in back breaking labor repairing truck and trailer tires.

(b) Evaluation: The nonavailability of specialized tire repair equipment in the TOE of the companies assigned to the 24th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) has resulted in an excessive number of manhours used in tire repairs.

(c) Recommendation: That action be taken to include in the TOE of Transportation Companies a hydraulic demounter and pneumatic impact wrenches to increase and modernize the tire repair capability of the units.

3. Kenworth 552 Trucks and Trailers

(a) Observation: The Kenworth 552 truck and trailer was designed for use by the Army in the deserts of Saudi Arabia. In August 1966 they were diverted for use by forces in Vietnam. Until July 1968 twenty were operated under contract by Vinnell Corporation and ten by the 57th Transportation Group at Da Nang. By October 1968 all thirty of them (the total in RVN) were on the Can Sanh Bay peninsula being operated by the 24th Transportation Company. In mid October, the apparently trouble free days of operating these trucks were over. The left axle flange studs began to work loose, fail and/or cold work against the steering knuckle flange. Also the axle felt seals were beginning to fail. The rapid rate at which these items failed trucks soon had the available stocks of flanges and seals depleted. Flanges and seals were back ordered to Kenworth Corporation, but could not be put into production until February 1969 at the earliest. As an interim, the Vinnell Corporation Field Maintenance Shop oversized drilled and tapped the left steering knuckle flange on the top where the steering arm connects. The original stud was a 5/8" diameter with 18 threads per inch and the oversized stud is 3/4" diameter with 18 threads per inch. An experiment involving a regular tactical military tire on the front axle of the truck in lieu of the balloon tire was tried.

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However, only 14.00 x 20 tires were available. (14.00 x 24 is the size of the balloon tire. The 14.00 x 20 tires could be used if the four wheel drive were disconnected). These tires were thought to reduce the forces on the flange incurred from the balloon tires by reducing the surface gripping the road and the jolting bounce of the floatation effect of the balloon tires. However, the studs on the experimental vehicle would work loose so quickly that they had to be tightened nearly every hour. When the balloon tires were remounted, the stud remained tight. The larger 14.00 x 24 tires are on requisition. The experiment will be tried again when these tires are received. In December it was noticed that the rear frame, cross member, where the pintle hook is connected was cracking on several trucks. This may eventually develop into a problem common to the whole fleet like the left steering knuckle flange.

(b) Evaluation: The cold working of the studs on the left flange was the first major problem incurred on the Kenworth 552 truck. A second problem becoming common to the fleet appears to be in the offering with rear frame cross member cracking where the pintle hook connects. With the nearly two and one-half years of hard running in RVN indications are that a rehabilitation program would insure the continued availability and serviceability of these large capacity vehicles. Such a program, however, is beyond the scope and capability of organizational level maintenance personnel, equipment, and facilities.

(c) Recommendation: A program for general overhaul of the Kenworth 552 truck and trailers begin as soon as possible.

4. M-127 Series Trailer Rehabilitation

(a) Observation: The battalion has seventy M-127 series trailers that are badly in need of rehabilitation. These trailers were used extensively on convoys, twenty-four hour port and beach clearance operations and RO/RO operations on the BDL LTC J.W.D. PAGE. The amount of work required on these trailers now is beyond the capability of organizational maintenance personnel to accomplish within a reasonable period of time.

(b) Evaluation: The condition of these seventy trailers is such that organizational maintenance personnel would have to let other maintenance suffer in order to rehabilitate these trailers.

(c) Recommendation: It is recommended that a trailer rehabilitation program be undertaken by a support level maintenance activity to put these trailers back into serviceable condition.

5. Organization.

1. Observation: Standard doctrine provides that transportation terminal battalions are organized and staffed to provide command and direction to port activities through the employment of terminal service, boat and amphibious units. Similarly, truck battalions are organized and staffed for motor transport operations and for the supervision of truck units.

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31 January 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarter, 24th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) for Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-1)

2. Evaluation:

(a) During the time that the 24th Transportation Battalion operated at Vung Ro Bay, its mission included both port and motor transport functions. The battalion was responsible for discharging and outloading cargo and for moving this cargo to and from inland destinations. This integration of port and motor transport functions at the battalion level proved to be extremely efficient and successful. Detailed, integrated terminal and motor transport planning was accomplished on an hour to hour basis at the operating level. Execution of both aspects of the battalion's mission was smooth and responsive. Port and highway operations were tuned to each others need, and there was a complete absence of friction between the two elements. Idle hook time during port operations and truck delays were minimized; consequently the use of personnel and equipment in both the terminal service and motor transport units was maximized.

(b) Since the 24th Transportation Battalion is organized under TOE 55-116E (Terminal), the integrated port and highway operation posed some problems in that the FOS and personnel in the TOE were not designed to properly supervise and control highway operations and maintenance. This was overcome by making internal adjustments within the battalion and by responsive support from the 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A).

3. Recommendation:

(a) The traditional doctrine involving the separation of port and highway units at the battalion level is worthy of review by USA CDC. The concept of integrated port and highway operations was successful in Vietnam, and it may well have wider application, particularly where small self-contained ports are required. In addition, this integration of port and highway activities may have validity above battalion level.

(b) Consideration should be given to developing a basic battalion headquarters and headquarters detachment TOE which permits effective integration of port and highway activities when the situation dictates. Such a TOE would require a mix of terminal and motor transport skills in the Operations Section and an augmentation to the Supply and Maintenance Section to provide necessary supervision over motor maintenance activities.

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K. S. Kelly
K. S. KELLY
LTC, TC
Commanding

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AVCA CRB-TC-CO (31 Jan 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lesson Learned of Headquarters, 24th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) for Period ending 31 January 1969 (RCS GSFOR-65)(R-2)

DA, HQ, 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A), APO 96312, 10 Jan 69

TO: Commanding Officer, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, ATTN:
AVCA CRB-IO, APO 96312

1. This report adequately reflects the operations of the 24th Transportation Battalion during the period indicated and I generally concur with the recommendations of the commander.
2. Reference, Section II, para 2a(3): Concur. Unit has been advised to submit MTOE for additional personnel to maintain equipment. MTOE will be processed speedily through this headquarters.
3. Reference, Section II, para 2c(2): Hydraulic tire demounter and impact wrenches: Strongly concur with recommendation of the battalion commander and this action should be considered when TOE's for transportation companies are revised.
4. Reference, Section II, para 3b: Kenworth 552 trucks and trailers: Concur in part. This headquarters and Vinnell Corporation agreed on a system to overhaul these vehicles.
5. Reference, Section II, para 4c: M-127 Series Trailer Rehabilitation: Concur. There is a need for trailer rehabilitation and this headquarters is in the process of drafting such a program.

John E. Murray
JOHN E. MURRAY
Colonel, TC
Commanding

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AVCA CRB-GO-O (31 Jan 69) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 24th
Transportation Battalion (Terminal) for Period Ending 31 January
1969, (iCS CSFOR-65) (R1)

DA, Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay, APO 96312 8 MAR 1969


TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-O, APO
96384

This headquarters concurs with the Operational Report of the 24th Transportation Battalion (TMB) as modified by first indorsement with the following exceptions:

a. Reference Section II, Paragraph 2 A3: Concur. The MTOE of the 24th Transportation Company (Med Trk) was approved and forwarded by this headquarters to 1st Logistical Command on 27 February 1969.

b. Reference Section II, Paragraph 2 C1: Concur. The MTOE change of the 564th Transportation Platoon (light Trk) and the request to redesignate the 592nd Transportation Company (Light Trk) to a medium truck company was approved and forwarded to 1st Logistical Command on 18 Feb 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


LEE W. SHERRILL JR.
LT, AGC
AG

CF:

124th Trans Command (TMB)
24th Trans Bn (TMB)

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AVCA GO-MH (31 Jan 69) 3rd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 24th Transportation
Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1969 RCS CSFOR-65

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST;
APO 96375

1. The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 24th Transportation Battalion for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning 24th Transportation Company, Section II, page 4-5, paragraph a. Non-concur with paragraph a, 2nd Indorsement. MTOE for the 24th Transportation Company has not been received by this headquarters. Coordination with USASUPCOM, Cam Ranh Bay, reveals that the MTOE has not been forwarded by that headquarters. Upon receipt by this headquarters, MTOE will receive expeditious handling.

b. Reference item concerning LST turnaround time, Section II, page 5, paragraph b(1). Concur with actions taken to reduce LST turnaround time. Proper utilization of vessels requires the shortest possible amount of time being spent in port.

c. Reference item concerning Intransit Yard, Section II, page 5, paragraph b(2). Concur with action taken to eliminate intransit storage facility. This action has improved throughput capability and assisted in the reduction of deep draft vessel turnaround time while the elimination of the contract caused a substantial monetary savings.

d. Reference item concerning division of M54 5 Ton Cargo Trucks and M52 Tractors, Section II, page 6, paragraph e (1). Concur with basic recommendation. Although subject MTOE actions have not been received at this Headquarters, they will be given proper consideration when they do arrive.

e. Reference item concerning 564th Transportation Platoon and 592nd Transportation Company, Section II, page 6-7, paragraph e (1). Non-concur with paragraph b, 2nd Indorsement. MTOE for the 564th Transportation Platoon was returned to USASUPCOM, Cam Ranh Bay for justification of additional equipment and for preparation in accordance with pertinent regulations. No request for redesignation of the 592nd Transportation Company as a medium truck company has been received by this headquarters. Coordination with USASUPCOM, CRB, reveals that no such action has been forwarded to this headquarters. MTOE and redesignation action will receive expeditious handling upon receipt.

AVCA GO-MH (31 Jan 69) 3rd Ind

1969

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Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1969 RCS CSFOR-65

f. Reference item concerning hydraulic tire demounter and impact wrenches, Section II, page 7, paragraph e (2). Concur. 1st Logistical Command Circular 310-4 informs subordinate commands of proper procedures for obtaining authority for additional equipment.

g. Reference item concerning organization of 24th Transportation Battalion, Section II, page 8, paragraph f (1). Concur in part. Composite organization at battalion level and lower have definite merit when tailoring a unit to the mission. Operations which warrant a command or group level organization make composite organization infeasible at this level.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: IBN 4839

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() D. Stafford 1K1, KEC

LANNY K. KESEY
1LI ACC
Asst. Adjutant General

CF:
USASUPCOM, CRB
124th Trans Command
24th Trans Bn

AVHGC-DST (31 Jan 69) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 24th Transportation
Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65)
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
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 27 APR 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 24th Transportation Battalion.

2. Reference item concerning Organization of 24th Transportation Battalion, section II, page 8-9, paragraph 2f(1), and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 2g; concur. Mission requirements at times require the assignment of truck units to terminal battalions for port and beach clearance. It is recommended that USACDC explore the possibility of establishing an augmentation consisting of motor transport control personnel for TOE 55-116(E), to be authorized whenever motor transport units are attached to terminal battalions.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


W. C. ARSENAULT
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
24th Trans Bn
1st Log Comd

GPOP-DT (31 Jan 69) 5th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 24th Trans Bn for Period Ending
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 22 MAY 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310


This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. Shortt
C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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Organizational Chart for Period 1 Nov 68 - 1 Dec 68




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Organisational Chart for Period 20 Dec 68 - 31 Jan 69

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ROSTER OF PRINCIPAL STAFF




LTC K.S. KELLY	BATTALION COMMANDER
MAJ H.J. REEDY	EXECUTIVE OFFICER
MAJ G.R. KUGLER	S-3
CPT J.L. FENSTERMAACHER	ASSISTANT S-3
CPT S.D. BENNETT	MAINTENANCE OFFICER
CPT R.L. SHORT	S-4
CPT P.D. RHODES	CH. PLAIN
1LT R.M. GASNER	S-1
CW3 J. DENNIS JR.	UNIT SUPPLY TECHNICIAN
CW3 H.S. HENSON	UNIT PERSONNEL TECHNICIAN
SGM G.J. BENHAM	SERGEANT MAJOR

Incl 3


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CO, 24th Transportation Bn

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