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ART AND REQUIREMENTS OF COMMAND

VOLUME IV
SEVENTH ARMY COMMAND PROCESS STUDY

prepared for

Office of the Director of Special Studies
Office of the Chief of Staff
Department of the Army

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VOLUME IV: SEVENTH ARMY COMMAND PROCESS STUDY.

10 by
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NOTICE

The contents of this report, including the conclusions and recommendations, represent the views of the contractor and should not be considered as having official Department of the Army approval, either expressed or implied.

FOREWORD

This volume is part of a four-volume study conducted by the Systems Science Department of The Franklin Institute Research Laboratories (FIRL). The overall study, *Art and Requirements of Command*, is aimed at identifying and analyzing the command-control support requirements of senior commanders. The focus of the study is the commander — his requirements for communicating and for receiving objective and subjective information.

Volume I, *Summary Report*, describes the methodology employed in, and the overall objectives of, the entire study effort. Study findings are presented and a detailed, four-stage description of the command process is included. In Volume I, a preliminary command-control support requirements model is developed.

Volume II, *Generalship Study*, is the product of a major study effort. The questionnaire instrument on which it is based and the report itself were prepared by Gen. Bruce C. Clarke, USA Retired and Brigadier Gen. John G. Hill, USA Retired, consultants to The Franklin Institute. FIRL project members participated and assisted in the performance of this study. A "generalship" or "command" questionnaire was developed and distributed to 150 active or retired general officers. On the basis of more than 80 replies, a composite command portrait was developed. This volume contains a compendium of selected questionnaire responses.

Volume III, *Historical Studies*, summarizes a composite command portrait developed on the basis of review of selected past commanders. This study was performed by Col. Wesley Yale, USA Retired, and Gen. I. D. White, USA Retired, consultants to The Franklin Institute; and by members of the Institute staff. It serves as a basis for comparing past with contemporary command methods, techniques, and procedures and provides valuable insights into many aspects of the command process.

This volume, *Seventh Army Command Process Study*, reports on another major study effort. The study was performed by Col. Wesley Yale, USA Retired, and Gen. I. D. White, USA Retired, consultants to The Franklin Institute; and by members of the FIRL staff. It summarizes the command-process description and analysis developed through a questionnaire-interview program. In this volume, common patterns of Seventh Army command methods, techniques, and practices are identified and integrated into a composite command portrait.

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PROCEDURE

The objectives of the Seventh Army Questionnaire-Interview program were as follows:

First, to determine - in this case through *field research*, existing and employed methods, techniques, and procedures of active division, corps, and army commands; secondly, to identify, to the extent possible, common patterns; and, thirdly, to compare and contrast the data thus obtained with other study inputs, with a view to determining both areas of commonality and critical divergences.

Seventh Army, Europe, was selected as a target for study in part to balance future investigations into command methods and techniques in a limited-war, Vietnam-type environment. It was anticipated that valuable insights could be gained through such a study-in-contrast as that between an active-peacetime command in Europe and the Vietnam combat-command.

As in the case of the "historical" portion of the present study, the method of analysis employed for the Seventh Army program combined various research techniques. In this instance, an extensive questionnaire - interview program was designed to permit maximum exploitation of the Seventh Army data base.

A questionnaire (Appendix A) was prepared jointly by FIRL staff and experienced consultants. In order to facilitate subsequent comparisons, this questionnaire was designed to conform to the general outlines of that which was utilized for the historical section of the study. The Seventh Army questionnaire represented, of course, a greatly revised and expanded version of the historical questionnaire guide. Entire sections were added, and specific questions reworded, to permit complete coverage of command methods and techniques and to assure full consideration of the impact of technological change.

A schedule of visits was then arranged, and two highly qualified consultants visited the various units of the Seventh Army command. The field research schedule provided for 1-2 hour interviews with each Seventh Army commander (from Division level on up), and 3-4 hour sessions with each staff group.

The various questions were, in each case, reviewed in sequence, discussion of responses was encouraged, and the interviewers made every attempt to probe answers and elicit comment.

The results of the many interview sessions conducted with Seventh Army commanders and staffs were analyzed and then synthesized into an "overall view" of command methods and procedures. The end-product of this study segment was - as in the case of the historical segment - a command composite, representing a broad consensus. Major divergences from common patterns were, of course, duly noted.

EVALUATION OF METHOD

The pros and cons of both questionnaires and interviews as research techniques have already been discussed¹; these arguments need not be repeated here. It should, however, be noted that the combination of techniques did serve to offset most of the inherent limitations and difficulties commonly associated with *either* "questionnaires" or "interviews" alone.

As indicated in the preceding procedural description, separate interviews were conducted with commanders and staffs of Division and higher units. This probing-in-isolation of first the commander, and then his staff group, was intended to promote free and open discussion. The actual interview sessions, characterized as they were by unbridled expression of views and opinions, clearly established the value and the effectiveness of separate discussions.

In attempting, as we have, to arrive at a broad *consensus* - to establish command *patterns*, and to develop a *composite* description of Seventh Army techniques and procedures - it was inevitable that differences, disagreements, and divergences would, to some extent, be submerged. This striving for insight into the "generally-accepted" must, furthermore, bias the line of probing adopted by the interviewer. However, where differences were significant, these were carefully considered and weighed, and, aware as we were of possible pitfalls, all practical steps were taken to prevent distortion and to eliminate biases.

Finally, the basis for selection of Seventh Army, Europe, as a focus of study should be further explained. As suggested in the preceding section, investigation into this European command was intended

1. See, "Evaluation of Method" Section, Vol. III, *Historical Studies*, pp. 7 and 8.

to balance future probings into the Vietnam command environment. There are, in addition, four important characteristics of the Seventh Army and its environment which can be considered "problem areas" - having a considerable impact on command procedures and techniques - and which account for selection of this command as an object of analysis.

First - Seventh Army troop dispositions have been dictated *partly* by requirements of tactical defense - and partly by location of existing "housekeeping" installations. The result is an unusually scattered deployment pattern. This has obvious command-control implications.

Secondly - Methods of command and control are greatly influenced by certain military-political conditions present in the Seventh Army environment. Training requirements - and this includes requirements imposed by participation in the NATO defense system, more purely "civil" affairs, and the demands created by a large colony of "dependents" - all have their effects on the system. Work loads are greatly increased: requirements for dual reporting systems must be met. A considerable amount of time and energy is thus deflected from the primary need to establish and maintain an effective combat organization.

Thirdly - The rotation policy makes creation of the ideal of a well-coordinated and smooth-working headquarters "team" a difficult goal to achieve. Constant turnover means that critical personnel have little time to become acquainted with other "team" members and to learn to work effectively with them. This too has obvious implications for the command process.

Finally - Command and staff personnel are relatively inexperienced in terms of actual involvement in combat. (The majority of those interviewed had only battalion-level combat service experience - in World War II and in the Korean War.) We do not mean to suggest that these men are not prepared for their positions of leadership. On the contrary, their training has been as complete as is possible. The factor of combat-inexperience is mentioned only because it is relevant to the overall area of study and concern.

The four "characteristics" described above are not *unique* to the Seventh Army. They arise out of conditions imposed by the constant need for military preparedness in a "peacetime context." They are

certainly as applicable to other U. S. Commands. It was felt that these characteristics and the problems they represent should, however, be taken into consideration in any study of contemporary command-control systems.

SUMMARY REPORT - SEVENTH ARMY PROGRAM

The data obtained through the combined questionnaire - interview program - administered to staffs and commanders of the Seventh Army - have been analyzed to determine common patterns of command methods, techniques, and practices. The results of these analyses are summarized briefly below.²

Organization

The organization of this summary report follows the general guidelines of the questionnaire - interview program. In some instances, two or more of the categories employed in the questionnaire have been consolidated under one broader heading.³

Seventh Army Command Composite

Physical Positioning of the Commander

The question of the "physical positioning of the commander" points to one of the basic dilemmas of command: How does the commander divide his time and attention as between field supervision, staff supervision, and supervision of the overall operation? This is obviously a problem with which each individual commander must cope; there is no one, universal, formula prescribing optimum allocation of time and concentration of effort. It is as obvious, however, that the commander must somehow achieve an acceptable balance as between the need to exercise forceful, effective field command - to be at the front - and the equally critical needs to, first, remain informed on, and maintain control over, the combat situation and, second, to supervise and influence the staff and staff activities.

-
2. Detailed analyses of the Seventh Army program - as well as the considerable body of raw data obtained by interviewers - are on file at the Office of the Director of Special Studies, Office of the Chief of Staff, Department of the Army.
 3. Although there are some differences, the categories of analysis are generally comparable to those employed in the historical summary.

In interviews with Seventh Army commanders, this problem was discussed fully. Although there was some disagreement among respondents, this was on relatively minor points. The following summary of their replies represents a broad consensus with regard to the question of physical positioning of the commander.

During the *planning* phase of operations, the commander should station himself either in, or in close proximity to, the Command Post or Tactical Operations Center. *Some* field visits should, however, be initiated immediately upon the issuing of the commander's directive. The generally-agreed upon formula: "*Availability* during planning - but without sacrifice of *mobility*."

All commanders interviewed stated that during the actual *operations* phase, frequent visits to subordinate units and personal reconnaissance of the combat area are absolutely essential. All available means must be brought into play to both increase the commander's mobility,⁴ and to enhance his capability for maintaining constant communications with the Command Post.

To refer back to the dilemma posed earlier, the nature and tone of responses suggest general agreement that *field supervision* must have first call on a commander's time and attention. None of the several commanders interviewed considered it advisable or necessary to remain in the CP. All stated that the commander should undertake some field mission as soon as practicable — whether this be to a critical point, for purpose of personal reconnaissance, etc. The feeling seemed to be that, given adequate means of communication — and a staff upon

4. Increased use of the helicopter was consistently mentioned as an especially effective means to this end. However, Seventh Army commanders also suggested - as did Vietnam returnees who were interviewed as part of the "Generalship" segment of this study, that introduction of the helicopter is a mixed blessing. It can, unless carefully regulated, tend to promote "oversupervision" - too frequent "visits" by commanders and staff officers.

which he can rely — the commander can maintain control over both the entire combat situation and the workings of his staff, even though not physically present in his Command Post.

Responses to questions directed at determining who normally accompanies the commander on his personal field visits were, once again, fairly uniform. It was widely agreed that accompanying personnel should be kept to the required minimum. Staff members included on such trips should be selected in accordance with the demands of the particular situation. One Corps Commander indicated that he was normally accompanied only by a Sergeant-Major acting as aide-de-camp.

Preparation and Dissemination of Orders

All Seventh Army units visited follow the "generally-accepted" or "standard" procedures for the preparation and dissemination of orders: *Fragmentary* orders are the normal means for *initiating* operations, the "time" factor being critical. Orders issued orally are generally confirmed later in writing by the Unit G-3. Formal, written, and complete orders are prepared as soon as possible and are then dispatched to subordinate commanders in any one of several different ways. Messengers, liaison officers, and any of the available electronic networks are among the mechanisms most frequently employed. The use of air couriers for delivering orders is apparently a fairly widespread practice in Seventh Army units.

Command Relationships

The personality, practices, and preferences of the individual commander will largely determine the nature of his command relationships. The views summarized below represent the broad *consensus* of commanders interviewed, and are in no sense offered as "definitive" solutions to the complex problems of commander-staff and commander-subordinate commander relationships.

A. Commander-Subordinate Commander Relations

Two apparently conflicting "principles" present the commander with what can only be termed a basic command dilemma insofar as his relationship with subordinate commanders is concerned: first, the injunction to avoid "harassment," to resist the temptation to tell a subordinate *how* to do his job; second, the doctrine which proclaims that "what is not inspected for is not done". A series of questions was developed to explore this problem area. Seventh Army commanders were queried in an attempt to uncover their attitudes toward this dilemma, and to investigate their reactions to a variety of "corrective mechanisms".

All Seventh Army commanders questioned expressed adherence to the general command principle of "helping, but never harassing, subordinate commanders." The commander should not interfere with his subordinates in the performance of their assigned duties. It falls within the realm of his responsibilities to offer *guidance* and advice, but he should not presume to tell a subordinate *how* to run his own show.⁵ The direct intervention of the commander is justified during operations when the purpose of such intervention is to provide the subordinate commander with such additional resources as artillery support or reserve troops.

There was total agreement on the need for effective tactical command supervision, provided that "supervision" was not interpreted as a device permitting undue staff interference or the imposition of staff "advice" on subordinate commanders. This command problem evoked considerable interest and discussion. Interviews disclosed that the Patton system of employing observers to report on local conditions directly to the Army (or lower) commander was in effect — in some form — in many Seventh Army units.

5. The line between "guidance" and "interference" is a very thin one. Although the commanders interviewed all adhered *in principle* to the concept of non-interference, further probing generally disclosed that most did, in effect, occasionally stray *in practice*. The common rationale offered to justify this deviation from the "ideal" pattern was that "the success of the operation is the paramount concern" — the situation may require direct involvement.

Although subordinate commanders frequently participate in the formal planning sessions held in the Command Post, their advice and opinions were generally solicited more informally by the commander during his visits to their units. The commander exploits these visits as a means of apprising his subordinates of the overall situation, as an occasion for discussion of impending operations, and as an opportunity for acquainting himself with both the physical condition and morale of the troops, and the resources available to them. He further attempts to assure understanding of his basic plan and to secure the acceptance of orders and missions before these are formally issued. It is thus evident that, whether he actually participates formally or is called upon informally, the subordinate commander is given the opportunity to influence plan development.

During the operations phase, the commander maintains direct contact with his major subordinate commanders by personal visit, radio, or phone. Such contacts serve both to keep the commander informed as to the progress of the battle and to provide the subordinate commander with the opportunity for seeking advice, guidance, or additional resources.

Finally, all commanders interviewed expressed a strong belief in the necessity to exercise command over their subordinates with a minimum of staff interposition. This was evidenced by their repeated references to the need to confer *directly* with subordinate commanders - in both the planning and operations phases.

B. Commander-Staff Relations

The governing principle cited almost universally by Seventh Army commanders with regard to Commander-Staff relations was: "Make full use of your staff - but only for *staff* functions." The common practice is to permit the staff to handle most "routine" matters, referring critical items to the immediate attention of the commander.

During "shake-down" periods with a new staff, the commander frequently requires that even more routine problems be checked with him. As the staff becomes more experienced, the commander withdraws his attention from such matters, relying upon his Chief of Staff for close supervision.

While staff personnel do have *direct* access to the commander, it is generally required that they keep the Chief of Staff informed as regards any such contacts. The more common practice - and the decidedly preferred practice - is for staff officers to work *through* the Chief of Staff whenever possible.

It is the responsibility of the commander to keep his staff apprised of all important developments. The mechanisms employed to assure this critical transmission of information vary from formal "briefing" sessions to the more casual reports of actions and developments relayed by the commander throughout the day and while in the field.

As would be expected, all Seventh Army commanders questioned emphasized the importance to the commander of a well-informed, efficient, and highly capable Chief of Staff. As mentioned earlier, the commander relies - and, indeed, *must* rely - upon his Chief of Staff for primary supervision and monitoring of staff activities. The Chief of Staff acting as "alter ego" of the commander is decidedly viewed as the "desirable" command condition.

It was generally agreed that, in the event the commander was lost, it is the Chief of Staff who would function as temporary commander, assuming full authority over - and responsibility for - operations until such time as a permanent replacement was made available to the unit. Given this charge, in addition to his regular and extensive responsibilities, the respondents stressed the importance of keeping the Chief of Staff completely up-to-date on all plans, decisions, and operational developments.

C. Reserve Unit Commanders

Although there was no one agreed-upon practice with regard to the commander's relationship with reserve unit commanders, it was the consensus of those interviewed that close contact must be maintained. The reserve commander should be kept abreast of all changes in the combat situation - in preparation for commitment of his unit.⁶

Combat Command Organization

The Seventh Army headquarters in the field is organized in recognition of the requirement for rapid transformation of a "peacetime establishment" into a viable "war organization." The following brief description of the organization of the Field Army is included chiefly to demonstrate that the organizational pattern itself serves as a distinct command-control mechanism.⁷

The primary sub-groups within the main headquarters are:

1. *Basement Operations* - a skeleton Operations Center intended to initiate operations from a barracks status to the field. It has minimum representation of staff sections, operating under the Chief of Staff, with functional responsibilities charged to G-3.
 2. *Main Lead* - the link in time and functions from Basement Operations to the Main. Its role is to conduct operations - for a period of up to 72 hours - until Main becomes operational in the field. The Chief of Staff moves from Basement to Main Lead, and G-3 is again charged with operational responsibility. Main Lead is responsible for setting up the communications system for field operations.
 3. *Mobile Command Group* - an organization established to permit the Army Commander to operate in a forward position away from
-
6. One Corps commander stated that it was his practice to keep the commander of the Corps reserve with him -whether in the Command Post or in the field.
 7. Parallel outlines and discussions of Corps and Division level organization are omitted from this summary report. These are, of course, available and on file.

the Main Command Post.⁸ The MCG has a helicopter capability, but moves principally by tracked vehicles. It is staffed by approximately 8 officers and 19 enlisted men. The Mobile Command Group generally plans on satelliting on a Corps or Division command element and aims at observation of critical action points.

4. *Seventh Army Main* - including the Tactical Operations Center, Main (-), and Units Supporting Main. It directs, coordinates, and controls combat and combat support operations, and assumes the functions of the Alternate CP in an emergency. Main locates forward, within security limits.

Units Supporting Main are generally in the category of Transport, Signal Complex, Weather, Security Agencies, etc., and are dispersed at distances of 3-10 miles from Main.

Tactical Operations Center directs, coordinates, and controls immediate combat and combat support operations within Main - and integrates the combat support forces available to Seventh Army and Central Army Group. It coordinates air defense operations.

Main (-) includes command and support elements from the Main CP. It houses the Chief of Staff. It furnishes command-decision information to the Army Commander, provides a War Room, and constitutes a nucleus capable of assuming the functions of the Alternate CP in an emergency.

5. *Alternate Main* - has the function of formulating long-range personnel and logistical plans. It is set up to assume the role of Main in the event of an emergency.

Command Techniques and Procedures

There are, of course, almost an infinite number of techniques, mechanisms, and procedures employed by the commander in the exercise of his command-control functions. Only a small number of these have been selected for brief discussion. In interviews with Seventh Army staffs and commanders, these were frequently referred to and are, therefore, of especial interest.

8. Directly comparable to TAC at Corps and Division levels.

A. Command and Staff Communications and Information Processing

A number of questions were put to the interviewees regarding *methods* of information processing. These questions were not aimed at determining the employment details of radio or other electronic devices.

It is Standard Operating Procedure in all Seventh Army units that certain types of information are referred directly to the commander. One Corps stated that personal messages, messages containing nuclear information, and messages from higher authority were referred directly to the commander, with G-3 exercising judgment. Three divisions indicated that nuclear and higher authority personal messages were so handled; two included tactical messages from higher authority and one directly transmitted only personal information.

Queried as to who on the staff is charged with judging the priority of incoming messages, respondents indicated a variety of patterns. One Corps stated that the Chief of Section to which the message applied should recognize the priority; and another stated that operational messages were not stopped in the Message Center but were forwarded immediately, while administrative-logistical traffic was processed in the Message Center and priorities established there. In two Divisions, the G-3 was charged with decisions on operational messages and the Adjutant General on other types. Other units had no special provisions for this function.

The above cited responses suggest that further investigation into the methods of information processing may be desirable. It would appear that more definite and precise methods are required and that some headquarters agency should be explicitly and formally charged with expediting information flow.

B. The Airborne Command Post

All respondents maintained that an airborne command post capability would be of significant value and assistance in the command and control of mobile combat operations. The airborne CP should operate as an adjunct to the regular Command Post. The command helicopter was cited

as an appropriate and superior mechanism for establishing and maintaining extensive contacts with front-line commanders.⁹ The more traditional and standard modes of transportation continue, of course, to be employed where and when appropriate.

C. Staff Mobility

Interviews with Seventh Army personnel revealed that modern means of transportation have been successfully exploited to enhance staff mobility during operations. For purposes of reconnaissance, the 1/4 ton truck, the helicopter, and light aircraft are the most common means of transportation. The 1/4 ton truck and the helicopter are the preferred vehicles for staff visits and supervisory functions.

D. Accuracy of Reporting

Interviews with Seventh Army commanders revealed total agreement that "supervision" and "observation" are necessary and critical aspects of the command process. The commander must have the means and the opportunity for "checking" on all essential items of information and for assessing the overall situation. As noted earlier, discussions revealed that the "Patton System" of employing observers who report directly to the commander on local conditions was in some use. Many respondents felt that the observer system — if properly applied and properly explained — did not generate excessive resentment on the part of the subordinate commanders. The need for assuring that such a system would in no way be interpreted as an excuse for staff interference and staff usurpation of the fundamental command role was stressed.

With regard to the specific techniques available to the commander for insuring accuracy of reporting by subordinates, the respondents offered the following comments:

9. Use of the helicopter has, in general, vastly increased the capability for *mobility* at all critical levels of command.

A CG must rely upon the reputations of his subordinates ... to the extent that he *knows* his subordinates, he is able to evaluate the accuracy of their reports to him.

Frequent inspections and visits are essential.

Normal channels of communication can, and should, be supplemented where necessary through the use of observers.

E. Automatic Data Processing

In 1965, Brigadier General C. J. Girard was nominated to head a Board charged with investigating the possible applications of Automatic Data Processing Systems (ADPS) to Seventh Army needs. A large scientific support staff was appointed and this essentially "experimental" effort, the Tactical Operations System Project, was charged with the following tasks:

1. Identify areas for automation;
2. Assist in system design;
3. Identify desirable system characteristics;
4. Determine applicability of existing commercial hardware;
5. Produce time and cost data on maintenance and training;
6. Gather and analyze military and technical data; and
7. Provide Seventh Army interim system.

FIRL survey team members undertook to investigate ADPS applications in Seventh Army commands. At the time of their visits, Seventh Army Headquarters was already operating data processing equipment in a mobile van under the project Seventh Army Command-Control Information System (CCIS). Teams had been sent to each Corps and even to one Division to initiate preliminary instruction in punch card and related procedures. Discussions were, therefore, held with members of the Tactical Operations Systems Project Board with a view to determining both immediate concepts and ADPS potentials.

The FIRL team queried Board members as to the possible future role of ADPS. The Board appeared to consider that the *ultimate* purpose of

automation was to provide a commander with much of the information currently supplied by his staff, but to provide it on a selective basis; that is, to allow a commander to acquire output specific to a projected decision. However, the *current* concept is to provide a *data bank* which will receive input from — and deliver output to — Rear, SATOC, CTOCs and DTOCs, each being equipped with a remote station data terminal linked to a central processor and communications exchange. Principal staff sections will be equipped with a Staff User Input-Output device.

Equipment procurement is proceeding on an incremental schedule. The first increment of a central computing center (van mounted), four remote station data terminals, and 18 user input-output devices are to be delivered in August of 1967. Several different configurations will be tried, including lateral organization-wise and vertical organization-wise. The initial set of function areas is enemy situation; friendly unit information; nuclear fire support; and effects of enemy nuclear strikes.

It would appear that these initial steps are wisely designed to provide a command control *tool* for the command and staff, amounting essentially to an automatic filing system. The system will not attempt to *solve* tactical problems, but will be so constructed as to quickly provide the facts on which decisions can be based.

Interviews with Seventh Army commanders and staffs regarding the use and desirability of ADPS revealed that although opinion was divided, there was a general attitude of willingness to experiment. As a *staff tool* — as opposed to a decision-making device — an ADP system should be able to cut down significantly on staff operating time.

The usefulness and desirability of ADPS in decision-making remain to be investigated. A major question must also be answered: whether ADPS will be able to provide sufficient service to overcome the handicaps which its introduction implies; that is, increased vulnerability of the CP and the possibility of over-dependence upon mechanical devices for what are essentially human decision-making problems.

F. Role of the Commander

While the command techniques and practices of individual commanders vary, the role of the commander remains the same. It is the commander who is charged with - and must exercise - forceful, positive, and *personal* command over staff, subordinate commanders, and the entire combat organization.¹⁰ Maintaining close and continuous contact with both, he must insure that staff and subordinate commander relationships work to secure the efficient and effective operation of the command organization. Finally, it is his responsibility to prevent undue staff interposition as between himself and his immediate subordinates.

10. It is, thus, the commander's responsibility to keep always abreast of such critical factors as supply and communications.

Appendix A

SEVENTH ARMY QUESTIONNAIRE AND INTERVIEW GUIDE

Section A. Physical Positioning of the Commander

1. During the planning stages of an operation, where will the commander usually station himself?
 - a. At the Main Command Post
 - b. At the TOC
 - c. At the rear
 - d. Elsewhere (specify)
2. If the commander leaves the Command Post, when will this occur?
 - a. When he has issued a directive
 - b. When orders have been formulated
 - c. When some significant event occurs after the initiation of operations
 - d. Other (specify)
3. Will the CG ever make personal trips through the combat zone - either by aircraft or motor vehicle?
 - a. Never
 - b. Occasionally
 - c. Frequently
 - d. Specific missions (specify)
4. What means are employed by the commander to keep informed of the situation when not present in the Command Post? When present?
 - a. CS
 - b. G-3
 - c. Other (specify)

Section B. Command Relationships

1. Do subordinate commanders ever participate in the planning of an operation?
 - a. Never
 - b. Occasionally
 - c. Frequently
 - d. Specific missions (specify)
2. Are the essential features of an operation ever given personally by the CG to subordinates through visits or by electronic communication?
 - a. Never
 - b. Occasionally
 - c. Frequently
 - d. Specific missions (specify)
3. During the progress of a battle, is it advisable to call a subordinate personally by radio or telephone to get reports on the situation?
 - a. Never
 - b. Occasionally
 - c. Frequently
 - d. Specific missions (specify)
4. Is intervention by the CG justified to provide guidance to a subordinate when movements are not proceeding according to plan?
 - a. Never
 - b. Occasionally
 - c. Frequently
 - d. Specific mission (specify)
5. Is intervention by the CG justified if used to provide additional resources (i.e., artillery support, reserve troops, etc.) to the subordinate commander?
 - a. Never
 - b. Occasionally
 - c. Frequently
 - d. Specific mission (specify)

6. If the commander leaves the Command Post or TOC for personal observation, who will usually accompany him?
- a. Chief of Staff
 - b. G - 3
 - c. G - 2
 - d. Artillery
 - e. TAC-Air-ALO
 - f. Engineer
 - g. CBR
 - h. Other (specify)
7. When a reserve force is committed, should the commander
- a. Personally lead it
 - b. Closely supervise its commitment
 - c. Give it mission-type orders
 - d. Other (specify)

Section C. Preparation and Dissemination of Orders

1. In the event a directive for the preparation of an operations order by the staff is given, does it represent the commander's own concept of the operation?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Other (specify)
2. In what form are orders usually prepared?
- a. Handwritten copy
 - b. Electrical dispatch (crypto) (clear)
 - c. Voice radio transmission (crypto) (clear)
 - d. Other (specify)
3. Are fragmentary orders issued?
- a. Never
 - b. Occasionally
 - c. Frequently
 - d. Specific mission (specify)
- If so, how?
- a. Radio
 - b. Liaison officers
 - c. Telephone
 - d. Personal visit
 - e. Other (specify)

4. Are oral orders later confirmed in writing?

- a. Never
- b. Occasionally
- c. Frequently
- d. Specific missions (specify)

If so, who is normally responsible for the confirming?

- a. CG
- b. DCG
- c. CS
- d. G - 3
- e. Unit addressed
- f. Other (specify)

5. Do you feel that the speed of command and staff action should be adjusted to the tempo of operations?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Other (specify)

Section D. Command Techniques and Aids

1. Should the commander be provided with the capability of operating an air command post, equipped with both UHF and VHF frequencies for communicating directly with the Air Force and with Allied Command Europe airborne facilities?

- a. Yes
- b. No

2. If an airborne command post were used, should it be an adjunct to the fixed ground command post?

- a. Yes
- b. No

Section E. Organization of the Staff for Combat Operations

1. What elements constitute the Command Post in the combat zone? What personnel are generally stationed at each? What is the usual deployment of the segments? Please describe.

2. Assuming in each case that the CG is not present, who directs the activities of Main? of the TOC? of the Rear?
3. Should staff sections be organized and manned for around-the-clock operations?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Other (specify)

Section F. Command and Staff Relationships

1. What matters does the CG pass on to the staff for consideration?
 - a. The CG passes on all business concerning the unit
 - b. Nearly all "routine" matters are left to the staff except during "shake-down" periods of operation
 - c. Other (specify)If "b", please clarify "routine"
2. Do members of the staff confer directly with the CG?
 - a. Any member of the general or special staff should feel free to speak directly with the CG on the progress of action at any time
 - b. All business must be transacted through the CS
 - c. "a" above applies only when the CS is not available
 - d. Other (specify)
3. In a mobile situation, does the CG frequently advise the staff of his concepts for future plans?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
4. Do G-2 and G-3 utilize the same operations map?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
5. Should the Communications-Electronics Officer have General Staff rating and/or prestige?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No

6. Who succeeds the CG permanently if he becomes a casualty?
 - a. DCG
 - b. CS
 - c. Senior office of command
 - d. Other (specify)
7. Do any Special Staff officers report to any of the General Staff sections?
 - a. Never
 - b. Occasionally
 - c. Frequently
 - d. Specific missions (specify)
8. Is any staff section required to coordinate actions with any agency other than corresponding sections in echelons immediately above and below?
 - a. Never
 - b. Occasionally
 - c. Frequently
 - d. Specific missions (specify)
9. How does G-2 keep informed of the latest intentions of the commander?
 - a. Personal contact
 - b. Staff briefings
 - c. Other (specify)

Section G. Command and Staff Mobility

1. Please describe the means of transportation most frequently used by commander and staff personnel during operations.

Section H. Accuracy of Reporting

1. Please discuss the various techniques which can be employed by commanders to insure accuracy of reporting by subordinates.

Section I. Command and Staff Communications

1. Should the commander and staff have a special radio net for intra-staff communications?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No.
2. When a message is received requiring immediate action, is it referred directly to the
 - a. Commander
 - b. Chief of Staff
 - c. G - 3
 - d. Other (specify)before processing?
3. Is there an SOP or understanding that certain types of information are referred to the CG directly?
 - a. Yes
 - b. NoIf "yes", what types of information apply?
4. Who on the staff judges the priority of incoming messages?
 - a. G - 3
 - b. C&E Officer
 - c. Other (specify)
5. If "staff consideration" is given to an urgent combat matter, what is your estimate of the minimum time required for staffing?
 - a. 5 minutes
 - b. 15 minutes
 - c. 30 minutes
 - d. Other (specify)
6. What are the general policies concerning the use of electrical communications?
7. If key members of the staff leave the Command Post during an operation, are they required to report into a radio net immediately and maintain contact?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No

8. What action is taken when electrical communication is lost with any subordinate element?
9. Assuming a loss of communications with the commander during his absence from the Command Post, what action would be taken?

Section J. Logistical Control

1. How does the commander keep abreast of supply and maintenance conditions during combat?
 - a. Briefings by log and administrative staff
 - b. Personal inspections
 - c. Reports
 - d. Other (specify)