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AGO ltr 30 Apr 1980


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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (17 Feb 69) FOR OT UT 684155

20 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 14th Engineer Battalion (Combat), Period Ending 31 October 1968

SEE DISTRIBUTION

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as


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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 14TH ENGINEER BATTALION (COMBAT)
APO 96495

EGB-BE-C

31 October 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968

THRU: Commanding Officer
45th Engineer Group (Construction)
APO 96337

Commanding General
18th Engineer Brigade
ATTN: AVBC-C
APO 96377

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVGGH-DH
APO 96307

Commander in Chief
United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: GROF-OT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army (ACSFOR DA)
Washington, D. C. 20310

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31 October 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968

Section 1. Operation: Significant Activities

On 2 August 1968, the battalion was well established in I Corps tactical zone having completed most of the initial task that had prompted the movement from Dong Ba Thin in March. Specifically, Wunder Beach was a full-blown supply depot and, in fact, was preparing to phase out with the approach of the monsoon season which, it was reasoned, would have isolated Wunder Beach by the submergence of the Hai Lang - Wunder Beach Road, the only route of egress. The Hai Lang - Wunder Beach Road was completely functional and required only the attention of a platoon from B Company to keep it operating at full capacity.

A Company began the quarter by consolidating company positions at LZ Nancy, placing perimeter wire, and preparing for the vertical MER construction that would be required upon receipt of materials.

B Company began the quarter maintaining Wunder Beach as mentioned above and upgrading the Hai Lang - Wunder Beach Road by filling holes and placing asphalt on the laterite portion. One platoon, stationed at Quang Tri, finished constructing defensive bunkers and began hauling fill for roads and hardstands in support of the 26th General Support Group.

C Company started the quarter hauling fill to bring the south end of the runway at Mai Loc up to grade, completing the carpentry for bunkers in the A Camp, and preparing for the construction of the Special Forces Command and Control Camp.

D Company was engaged in minor tasks at Camp Evans including the improvement of the airfield drainage system and improving the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) briefing bunker. Additionally, D Company supported the land clearing operation conducted by 2nd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry with one platoon reinforced with six bulldozers, two of which were equipped with plow blades.

The 630th Light Equipment Company was fully occupied providing 3 dozers to the platoon of D Company supporting the 2nd of the Seventh mentioned above, constructing the access road from QL-1 to LZ Nancy, and the interior road net at LZ Nancy.

Bunker materials for LZ Nancy began arriving in the second week of August. A Company set up a pre-fabrication yard for their construction and commenced work on 80-8'x8'x8' bunkers of the TSFC design.

The Battalion responded quickly to an urgent request from the 3rd Squadron, 5th Armored Cavalry to support a clear and search operation. Three minesweep teams and one bulldozer were committed. Twenty tons of rice in caches hidden in graves were recovered.

On 11 August, after a particularly frustrating period of slow

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progress clearing land on "The Street Without Joy" in support of the 2nd of the Seventh, a line charge (a rocket emplaced, 100 meter line bearing 1500 # of explosive) was fired into a heavily wooded and booby trapped area with rather spectacular results - a path 100 meters by 30 meters was cleared as all vegetation vaporized in the detonation zone.

At LZ Nancy, Chinook Helicopters were effectively used to lift the 8'x8'x8' perimeter bunkers into position on the perimeter from a stockpile in the prefab yard. Also, at Nancy, a disastrous attack on the night of 16 August prompted a reversal of emphasis from construction on the LZ to the preparation of defensive positions and fields of fire. All available dozers, including those that had supported the land clearing operation on "The Street Without Joy" and two 290 tractors with scrapers previously employed at Quang Tri were used at Nancy to completely clear the brush and bamboo and timber tickets that grew right up to the perimeter. A swarth ranging in thickness from 500 to 1000 meters (including 200 to 500 meters on the opposite side of the river bordering LZ Nancy on the south) was cleared in the dense foilage that had concealed the approach and departure of the attacking force. An immediate result of the attack was a 100% guard committment for all units at LZ Nancy. Thus the 630th Light Equipment Company and A Company together supplied 150 guards starting at 1800 hours and running until 0600 hours in the morning. This schedule made it necessary to permit a two hour sleep period in the morning before beginning with a resultant short work day.

A beneficial result of the attack was the appointment of a field grade officer for LZ Nancy who had complete authority to assign work priorities and coordinate the base construction in the name of CO, 2nd Bde, 1st Cavalry Division (AM).

Lieutenant Colonel Arthur J. Gow took command of the battalion on 24 August 1968.

A basic decision regarding the construction of the airfield at Mai Loc was reached toward the end of August when it was decided not to attempt to construct an asphalt road mix type surface, but rather that the best approach would be to finish the airfield to grade, improve the drainage, and shoot the surface with MC-250 heated to 220° F. This decision was reached after a trial section was prepared which, after mixing and rolling, exhibited no strength or cohesion because of the excessive fines in the Mai Loc soil.

Typhoon Bess dropped 20" of rain in the 14th Battalion AO in the first week of September and halted construction progress for at least a week, washed out roads and culverts, and undermined the Hai Lang-Wunder Beach Road. As a result of this rain, the movement of the Battalion from Wunder Beach to LZ Nancy was delayed until the Hai Lang

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Wunder Beach Road could support the loaded trucks of the Battalion.

The S3 Section of the Battalion headquarters was established at LZ Nancy on 9 September 1968 with the Battalion closing on 19 September 1968. During the period the Battalion headquarters was split between Wunder Beach and LZ Nancy, the floating bridges at Hard Core broke their anchorages and had to be extended under flood conditions to permit the passage of supply and tactical traffic.

The bridges were repaired and extended by the 3rd Plt of D Company using floats and balk flown in from Camp Evans using Chinook Helicopters.

Severe flooding occurred again in the middle of the month causing the south bridge at Hard Core to lift off its abutments. The bridge was repaired by the 1st Plt of B Company and the whole Company was committed to repair the Hai Lang - Wunder Beach Road to speed its opening and expedite the movement of supplies off Wunder Beach so it could be closed. Actually, the damage during the second flooding was more severe than during Typhoon Bess because the subgrade was saturated from preceding rains when the water in the paddies adjoining the road washed across it, tearing large gaps in the road.

Bridging was brought to LZ Nancy by the Third Marine Bridge Company for use in closing the gaps created in the Wunder Beach - Hai Lang Road.

"H" frames were assembled at LZ Nancy and flown in by Chinook Helicopter. However, the best solution was the installation of culverts (wooden box and metal) which released the tactical bridging. The major destruction of the Hai Lang - Wunder Beach Road was caused by over-topping by water flowing from the north to the south side of the road. Since the road had been constructed for use in the dry season, very few drainage structures were included. Therefore, the remainder of the quarter required at least two platoons constantly, opening ditches, installing culverts, and placing extensive fill - primarily sand hauled with dump trucks since sand was readily available and could be placed wet. 290's could not be used effectively because their wide turning radius forced them off the road into the mud on either side of the road as they maneuvered after dumping, and they were stuck continually.

At LZ Nancy, in spite of bad weather, there was great pressure to complete the aircraft revetments for the Brigade aviation platoon, (10 LOH and 6 Hueys), two Medivac revetments, and 12 ARA revetments. This construction would protect the aircraft of the 2nd Bde, 1st Cavalry Division (AM), and thereby permit the movement of the 2nd Bde from LZ Jane to LZ Nancy. The ARA revetments were completed by the 3rd Plt of D Company.

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The LOH and Huey revetments for LZ Nancy were planned to be constructed of earth filled pen-prime barrels. However, there were not nearly enough barrels available for this construction, nor was time available for such construction. The 14th found a solution using M8A1 matted berms (see inclosure 2). These revetments are capable of rapid assembly (10 men can do one a day) and do not require much construction effort other than some dozer and grader work. They have the additional advantage of being easy to fly in and out of since the sloped insides trap a cushion of air which tends to support the aircraft. As a result, the revetments were enthusiastically received by the Brigade pilots.

The road at LZ Nancy had been constructed without culverts due to the absence of materials. Accordingly, when culvert material was received, it was essential to install the culvert as quickly as possible to protect the road. Vietnamese laborers were effectively used to assemble 10' lengths of culvert outside the LZ Nancy perimeter. Fifteen Vietnamese have been able to assemble over 500' of culvert a day permitting an economy of engineer effort and greatly accelerating the project.

Some of the bunkers at LZ Nancy showed signs of shifting under the pressure of backfill. This was primarily due to the absence of drift pins for their construction. This problem was solved by using metal fish plates bolted to posts and caps preventing their relative displacement.

About the middle of October, the Battalion received the mission of constructing a helipad, filling a motor pool area, and draining about three acres for the 18th Surgical Hospital at Quang Tri. The mission arose primarily because the hospital was situated in a low area (rice paddy) which, with rains and runoff around the hospital, became septic and encouraged a distinct health hazard. The project was assigned to B Company.

Wunder Beach was rapidly being closed out and B Company was given the task of leveling the area to include salvaging M8A1 matting, steel pickets, and usable timber. It was found that Vietnamese local civilians could effectively assist this project and up to 400 were employed.

At LZ Nancy, the four artillery pads and eight ammunition bunkers were completed in October. The large earth berms showed evidence of failure after periods of heavy rain and firing by sloughing over the gun spade over the pad. The 14th has not found an adequate solution other than constant maintenance after rains. It is believed that piles driven in the berms to a depth of 10' - 12' to provide a stop for the spade may provide a solution, but the Battalion has not been able to test this idea.

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On 3 October 1968, the Battalion was notified that sandbags could no longer be used for culvert headwalls. Since there are many culverts in the Battalion AO requiring headwalls, particularly at LZ Nancy, a sand-cement block, capable of fabrication by Vietnamese labor was designed (see Incl 3) to solve this problem using readily available materials.

During the last ten days of the quarter B Company began driving piles for the construction of two timber pile bent bridges (100' and 140' in length) at Hard Core to replace the floating M4T6 bridging mentioned earlier in this report.

The Battalion received the mission of supporting the 101st ARVN Engineer Battalion in the construction of a sand-cement road linking Route 555 (YD450590) with Gia Dang (YD417553). The road will provide market access from a model fishing village to be constructed to house refugees at Gia Dang. The 14th EBC will supplement the 101st ARVN's heavy equipment and give technical assistance necessary to construct the road.

News that materials were being shipped for the construction of SEA huts, mess halls, and latrines to LZ Nancy prompted the assignment to A Company of the mission of constructing a pre-fabrication yard for these structures during the last week of October.

The arrival of large quantities of lumber and plywood at Dong Ha and Tan My required the dispatching of all available trucks to haul the materials to LZ Nancy before they could be diverted. This activity required a major Battalion effort and hampered the movement of equipment to the far flung reaches of the Battalion AO.

The heavy rains in early October undermined a footing under a bent on a bridge on the access road to Mai Loc and effectively prevented both the supply and extraction of C Company until the bridge could be repaired. The re-supply problem together with wet weather, which prevented use of asphalt, led to a reevaluation of the Mai Loc Airfield, and it was decided to leave it without further improvement (well drained and about 1/3 covered with an asphalt seal coat) and not tie up valuable engineer effort in what could be a fruitless wait for clear weather. Accordingly, C Company, using rock from the Marine quarries at Cam Lo, repaired the access road and the damaged bridges and began movement to its new base at LZ Nancy. One platoon was left behind to complete about one week's work on an indigenous mess hall.

On 28 October 1968, all work to construct SEA huts, laterites, etc., at LZ Nancy was suspended pending a redefinition of requirements. Also, work was received that the 18th Surgical Hospital would be moved to Camp Evans with facilities to be built by the 14th EBC.

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Thus, the quarter ends with A Company performing minor tasks at LZ Nancy and preparing to undertake SEA hut construction. B Company is maintaining the Hai Leng-Wunder Beach Road, providing a platoon to the sand-cement road, building bridges at Hard Core, and finishing its project for the 26th General Support Group at Quang Tri (frames for a laundry and a bakery remain to be constructed). C Company less one platoon has moved to LZ Nancy and is refitting and working on the wire trace for the new LZ Nancy perimeter. C Company still has one platoon at Mai Loc with about a week of work remaining on the project. D Company is performing minor tasks and preparing to assume the task of constructing the 18th Surgical Hospital facilities at LZ Evans.

The 630th has equipment and men supporting the sand-cement road project, the work on the Hai Lang Road, and at LZ Nancy the preparations for mechanized equipment.

The Battalion has operated water points at LZ Evans, LZ Nancy, Wunder Beach, LZ Sharon, and Mai Loc serving a total population of approximately 16,000 personnel. The Battalion water supply capability was augmented with the addition of a 3000 gallon unit provided by the 111th Water Supply Company.

During the quarter, the Battalion conducted 80 days of operations and six days of training. Headquarters Company spent 14 days preparing and moving from Wunder Beach to LZ Nancy, C Company spent 7 days preparing and moving from Mai Loc to LZ Nancy, and B Company spent 4 days moving to a new location at Wunder Beach and, subsequently, 2 days moving from Wunder Beach to Quang Tri. The Battalion has effectively utilized the replacement facilities of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) at Camp Evans for training its replacements.

The 40 mine detectors, model P-158 authorized this unit have not been sufficient to meet the operational requirements of this Battalion. The severe weather conditions and generally poor operating conditions have combined to place 15 detectors in the Battalion support maintenance facilities for a two month period.

Severe maintenance deadlines have resulted from the lack of adequate spare parts for engineer, ordnance, and signal items in the Battalion support maintenance facilities. The non-availability of such items as turbo-chargers, voltage regulators, and generators has caused the simultaneous deadline of up to 10 of the Battalion's 16 assigned D7 dozers. Six of the Battalion's 10 authorized transmitters (T-195) for radio set (AN 6RC-19) (AM) have been scored out as not repairable and have not been replaced.

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2. Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel: None.

b. Operations:

(1) Helicopters may be used to lift complete bunkers from pre-fabrication yard to installation site.

(a) Observation: After prefabricating bunkers, it was extremely difficult and time-consuming to transport them on tracks over the rough terrain at LZ Nancy to the locations for their installation.

(b) Evaluation: After a stock of bunkers have been pre-fabricated, helicopters can quickly and easily move them from the storage point to the point of installation.

(c) Recommendation: Helicopters are an effective and efficient means of moving bunkers to their emplacement sites.

(2) Preparation of defensive positions before initiating construction.

(a) Observation: The enemy attack at LZ Nancy was very costly because the enemy sappers were already within the defensive positions before their mortars began falling so they were able to destroy bunkers and tents before our forces were alerted.

(b) Evaluation: Dense jungle and foliage grew right up to the edge of the LZ Nancy perimeter giving the enemy a covered route of most right into our positions and providing a concealed place for observing our defenses. The removal of the foliage would have made it much more difficult for the enemy to penetrate the starlight scope equipped perimeter without being detected.

(c) Recommendations: Before initiating construction at a work site, priority should be given to removing vegetation that provides the enemy concealed routes of approach.

(3) Use of 290 tractors with scrapers for clearing fields of fire.

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(a) Observation: After the 16 August attack at LZ Nancy, it was apparent that a large acreage would have to be immediately cleared to deny the enemy a covered route of approach.

(b) Evaluation: 290 Clark tractors with scrapers lowered sufficiently to just skim the earth rapidly and effectively strip small vegetation from large areas.

(c) Recommendation: When the ground is firm enough to support the weight of 290 scrapers and the vegetation to be cleared is relatively small, the 290 scrapers will rapidly clear away cover and fields of fire.

(4) Effectiveness of Bull blades on dozers relative to Rome plow blades for clearing operations.

(a) Observation: When conducting land clearing operations on "The Street Without Joy", the dozers with ordinary Bull blades were more effective than those equipped with Rome plow blades.

(b) Evaluation: Most of the material to be cleared along Route 555 in the 14th EBC AO is small and can be fairly easily cleared with standard Bull blades. An objective of the land clearing was the destruction of bunkers and dikes that might serve as VC hiding places. The Rome plow blade, being designed for cutting timbers and small trees, was not effective in the sand dikes and became quickly dulled.

(c) Recommendation: Prospective land clearing operations should be carefully evaluated to determine the proper mix of Rome and standard blades. If many large trees are to be cleared, more Rome blades will be necessary than if the operation consists mainly of leveling bunkers and earthen structures.

(5) Line charges for land clearing.

(1) Observation: The line charge emplaced by its rocket across a dense jungle is an effective rapid method of land clearing, particularly if the area has been booby trapped.

(b) Evaluation: The VC had effectively slowed a 14th EBC land clearing operation by heavily booby trapping densely wooded areas. The effectiveness of the booby trapping is attested by the reluctance of dozer operators to operate in areas to be cleared without being preceded by a minesweep team. A rocket launched line charge quickly cleared a swath 100 yds x 30 to 40 yds wide.

(c) Recommendation: Line charges can be used to decrease

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
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casualties and speed land clearing in heavily booby trapped areas.

(6) Use of sand blanket under laterite caps on roads subject to saturation.

(a) Observation: Sand roads capped with a 6" to 12" cap of laterite withstand the ravages of floods and are more quickly returned to service than roads constructed of laterite only.

(b) Evaluation: The sand blanket permits the rapid drainage of the saturating moisture. Sand will support a load, even if wet, so long as it is confined. The laterite cap serves to confine the sand, prevents displacement under load, and provides a smooth wearing surface.

(c) Recommendation: Sand blankets be used in laterite roads that are subject to inundation, particularly inundation without severe cross currents.

(7) A single coordinator with executive authority effectively conserves engineer effort and speeds base construction.

(a) Observation: The appointment of a base development coordinator at LZ Nancy with executive authority with respect to construction effort served to increase the speed of development of LZ Nancy.

(b) Evaluation: The base development coordinator ends indecision, permits continuity of engineer effort, ends false starts, and permits effective planning, conserving engineer effort and speeding construction.

(c) Recommendation: Before starting construction of a base involving many interested agencies, a base development coordinator should be appointed to coordinate requirements and establish construction priorities,

(8) Vietnamese Nationals can be effectively used to assemble culverts.

(a) Observation: The tedious assembly of culverts seems to take a disproportionate amount of engineer effort which can be released if Vietnamese are used to assemble culverts.

(b) Evaluation: Vietnamese Nationals accomplish tedious tasks rapidly and effectively.

(c) Recommendation: Vietnamese labor be used whenever possible to assemble culvert lengths (10' seems to be a handy figure) to speed culvert construction effort.

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(9) Fishplates can help prevent bunker collapse.

(a) Observation: Stable bunkers can be constructed without drift pins if bolted metal fishplates are used to join caps to posts.

(b) Evaluation: Bolted metal fishplates prevent relative movement between caps and posts where drift pins are not available.

(10) Engineer units require extensive transportation support to move supplies.

(a) Observation: A unit's effectiveness and ability to react to changing situations may be adversely affected if a lot of organic transportation is required to transport supplies.

(b) Evaluation: Most of the organic engineer vehicles are required on a daily basis for the movement of men, equipment, and material within the Battalion AO where the AO is large and many diverse projects are under construction.

(c) Recommendation: Vehicular support for engineer units should be increased or Engineer TO&E's for Vietnam be amended to increase the number of authorized Lowboys or stake and platform trailers with tractors and operators.

(11) Standard asphalt is not appropriate for use in the monsoon season.

(a) Observation: Asphalt will not "take" under excessively moist conditions; it tends, instead, to roll into balls or rivulets with no penetration.

(b) Evaluation: When the soil pores fill with water, a petroleum based asphalt will not penetrate between the soil particles.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
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(c) Recommendations:

1. All petroleum based asphaltic construction should be finished before the onset of the monsoon season.

ii. Asphalt emulsion should be available for use in Vietnam.

(12) MC-250 asphalt provides a better surface when applied over an application of soil binder than when used on relatively impervious soil.

(a) Observation: Excellent road seal coats were obtained with MC-250 on clayey lateritic soils when the road had first been sprayed with soil binder.

(b) Evaluation: The soil binder apparently has better penetrating qualities in relatively impervious soils than MC-250 and provided a surface to which the MC-250 readily adheres.

(c) Recommendation: Soil binder should precede the application of MC-250 on impervious soils.

(13) Deadlined mine detectors.

(a) Observation: Excessive mine detector deadlines seriously hamper the ability of a unit to meet minesweep responsibilities.

(b) Evaluation: The repair of specialized delicate electrical equipment in Vietnam is a lengthy and unresponsive process due to the lack of repair parts and trained technicians in support units.

(c) Recommendation: Support units should maintain a maintenance float equal to 25% of the authorized mine detectors in supported units.

(14) Repair Parts Shortage

(a) Observation: Frequently 50% of vital engineer and signal equipment is deadlined because of the absence of spare parts.

(b) Evaluation.

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- i. The stockage of repair parts and subassemblies for heavily used items such as dozers, dump trucks, and radios is too limited.
- ii. Support units are not effectively employing the computerized support system.

(c) Recommendation:

- (1) Repair parts stockages in DSU's must be increased.
- (2) Supply personnel must be better educated in the use of computerized supply system or a simple more responsive system developed.

3. Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information.

A negative report is submitted for "escape, evasion, and survival" information.

3 Incl
as

Arthur J. ...
 ARTHUR J. ...
 LTC, CE
 Commanding

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EGD-3 (31 Oct 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 14th Engineer Battalion (Combat)
for the Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65)

DA, Headquarters, 45th Engineer Group (Const), APO 96337

TO: Commanding General, 18th Engineer Brigade, ATTN: AVBC-G, APO 96377

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 14th Engineer Battalion (Combat) has been reviewed by this headquarters and is considered to be an excellent account of the 14th Battalion's activities during the reporting period ending 31 October 1968.

2. The recommendations of the Battalion Commander are concurred in.


JOHN G. WAGGENER
COL, CE
Commanding

AVBC-CS (31 Oct 68) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 14th Engineer Battalion (Combat) for
the Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R1)

DA, Headquarters, 18th Engineer Brigade, APO 96377 14 DEC 1968

TO: Commanding General, U.S. Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the 14th Engineer Battalion (Combat) as indorsed by the 45th Engineer Group. The report is considered to be an excellent account of the battalion's activities for the reporting period.

2. This headquarters concurs with the observations and recommendations of the battalion and group commanders with the following comments added:

a. Reference: Section 2, paragraph b(11). Asphalt emulsion is available in Vietnam and can be requisitioned through normal S-4 channels.

b. Reference: Section 2, paragraph b(13). Concur, at present the large amount of minesweeping done by units in this brigade requires immediate replacements for D/L mine detectors. The First Logistical Command has been made aware of this problem.

c. Reference: Section 2, paragraph b(14). Concur, the First Logistical Command has been made aware of this problem.



DOUGLAS K. BLUE
Colonel, CE
Acting Commander

CF: CO, 45th Engr Gp
CO, 14th Engr Bn

AVHGC-DST (31 Oct 68) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 14th Engineer Battalion (Combat) for
the Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 4 JAN 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 14th Engineer Battalion (Combat).

2. Reference item concerning engineer units requiring extensive transportation support to move supplies, page 11, paragraph 2b(10): Non-concur. The Battalion was involved in an extensive construction program during the period cited in the report. Trucking support in that area was provided by the 26th General Support Group. Trucking requirements by the Engineer Battalion were requested from the 26th General Support Group and cargo was shipped in accordance with established priorities. Transportation assets are not critical at the present time due to the slowdown in construction material requirements. Future requirements should be satisfied through transportation assets of the 26th General Support Group (augmented as may be required), as opposed to a TOE change in the Engineer Battalion.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



A.R. CUENTHER
CPT. AGC
ASST. ADJUTANT GENERAL

Cy furn:

HQ 18th Engr Bde

HQ 14th Engr Bn

GPOP-DT (31 Oct 68) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 14th Engr Bn (Cbt) for Period
Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 13 JAN 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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ORGANIZATION OF THE 14TH ENGINEER BATTALION (COMBAT)

AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1968

1. Headquarters and Headquarters Company
2. Four Engineer Companies (A, B, C, & D)
3. 630th Engineer Company (-) Light Equipment
4. Provisional Company - Contains about one platoon of assorted equipment with operators from 591st Engineer Company (Light Equipment), one line platoon from B/14th EBC, and control and administration personnel from the 630th Engineer Company (Light Equipment) and Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 14th Engineer Battalion (Combat)



Inclosure 1

18

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MBA1 Matted Helicopter Revetments





NOTES:

1. Dimensions are in accordance with appropriate directives for the aircraft to be protected.
2. Peneprimed sand bags may be added to reach desired heights.
3. If the terrain is rolling, the revetments may be quickly cut with dozers, the sides shaped with graders, and matted.



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Send Cement Cement Blocks for Roadwalls



NOTE: Blocks may be placed without mortar



Inclosure 3

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UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

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