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AUTHORITY

AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
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IN REPLY REFER TO

AD 844816

AGAM-P (M) (27 Nov 68) FOR OT UT 683179

2 December 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army  
Transportation Command Cam Ranh Bay (Provisional), Period  
Ending 31 July 1968

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.
3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*C. A. Stanfield*  
C. A. STANFIELD  
Colonel, AGC

Acting The Adjutant General

1 Incl  
as

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ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT  
(ARMY) ATTN FOR OT UT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DEC 18 1968

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS  
US ARMY TRANSPORTATION COMMAND CAM RANH BAY (PROVISIONAL)  
APO San Francisco 96312

AVGA CRE-TC-A

6 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Transportation Command Cam Ranh Bay  
(Provisional) for the Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

TO: Commanding General  
US Army Vietnam  
ATTN: AVHGC-DT  
APO 96375

1. (UNCLAS) Section I, Operations; Significant Activities.

a. Command Section.

(1) Significant Personnel Changes. SGM Clarence Bartlett reported in and was assigned the position of Sergeant Major, 500th Trans Group on 28 May 68. He is presently working in the S3 Office of this headquarters. MAJ John J. Coughlin was reassigned from the 36th Trans Bn to Chief, Highway Operations Branch on 2 June 68. SGM Robert W. Smith, 10th Trans Bn, replaced SGM Virgil Ochoa as Command Sergeant Major on 10 June 68. CPT Joseph A. Ross, Operations Officer, Movements Control Center, was reassigned to CONUS on 14 June 68. CPT James P. Melone reported for duty as Signal Officer to replace CPT Michael E. Sedlock, who was reassigned to USA SUPCOM-CRB on 1 July 68. LTC Paul Riese replaced MAJ John Gordon as S4 on 2 July 68. MSG Morgan F. Butts assumed the duties of First Sergeant, HHC, 124th Trans Command upon the departure of 1SG Justice on 7 July 68. MAJ Jonathon R. Barrett reported from CONUS and replaced MAJ James Taylor as Chief, Plans and Security Branch. MAJ Taylor was reassigned as S3, 24th Trans Bn on 8 July 68. Effective 13 July 68, COL Robert W. Shidler, Commanding Officer, USA TCOMD-CRB was assigned the additional duty of Director of Transportation, USA SUPCOM-CRB. Chaplain (MAJ) Albert Clark replaced Chaplain (MAJ) Bruce Williams, who returned to CONUS on 22 July 68. Chaplain Clark was assigned to the 504th Field Depot prior to coming to this command.

FOR OT UT  
683179

INCLOSURE 1

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LTC Thomas E. Collins reported to duty as S3 Officer on 23 July 68, replacing LTC Maurice A. Gaincy, who had returned to CONUS. LTC Michael E. McGuinn reported for duty from CONUS and is working temporarily in the headquarters pending a command assignment in the near future.

(3) Changes in unit assignments. Effective 1 May 68, the 635th Transportation Detachment (Tug) was reassigned to Marine Maintenance Activity, Vietnam. Effective 15 May 68, the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 24th Trans Bn (Tml) and the 545th Trans Company relocated from Cam Ranh Bay to Vung Ro Bay. On the same date, the 24th Trans Company was relocated from Tuy Hoa to Cam Ranh Bay, while the 529th Trans Company was relocated from Cam Ranh Bay to Tuy Hoa. The 24th Trans Bn assumed control of the Vung Ro Bay Outport operation and the 119th, 529th, and the 545th Trans Companies. On 14 June 68, the 564th Trans Platoon (5 Ton Cargo) was relocated to Phan Rang. This platoon has the mission of providing port and beach clearance at the Phan Rang Outport and Phan Thiet FSA. When there are no barges or LST's at Phan Rang, the vehicles will perform line haul operations between Phan Rang and Cam Ranh Bay. On 14 July the 355th Trans Detachment (Y-487) was reassigned to USASUPCOM SGN by 1Log Comd general order.

(3) Distinguished visitors. Tours and briefings were conducted for the following distinguished visitors:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Organization</u>	<u>Date</u>
MG William C. Garrison	Inspector General, US Army	18 May 68
General de Brigada Jaime and party	Argentina	20 May 68
BG Chester H. Johnson	AC of S, G4, 8th Army	25 May 68
Rear Admiral Martel and party	Spain	30 May 68
LTG Frank J. Sackton	Comptroller General, USA	6 Jun 68
MG Richard G. Ciccololla	Chief, MAAG Republic of China	13 Jun 68
MG Herbert G. Sparrow	Chief, US Army Audit Agency	21 Jun 68
GEN Dwight E. Beach	GINCPAC	4 Jul 68
LTG Hutchins	Chief of Staff, GINCPAC	5 Jul 68
Mr. L. Pickering FS-1	US Embassy, Saigon	6 Jul 68

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
GEN Andrew Goodpaster	Deputy CG, USMACV	26 Jul 68

(4) Activities of the Phan Rang Outport. The Phan Rang Outport, manned by personnel of the 10th Trans Bn, handled a total of 24,339 short tons during the reporting period. The Outport experienced a problem of slow port and beach clearance which is directly related to the truck offload capability at Phan Rang Air Base. This operation comes to a halt when the Air Force staging areas are too muddy for operation of rough terrain forklifts. Ninety percent of the cargo handled is napalm, with the remainder being 500 and 750 pound bombs. The efficiency of the outport was greatly increased by the installation of the teletypewriter circuit to the USATCOMD-CRB. On 4 July 68, the outport and Air Base came under rocket, mortar, and small arms fire. The attack pointed out the need for increased active and passive defensive measures and also the need for a revetment around the ammunition staging areas on the beach to prevent injuries to outport personnel and the destruction of the port operations area and buildings.

(5) Activities of the Nha Trang Outport.

(a) The Nha Trang Outport during the reporting period handled 77,000 short tons of cargo and some 11,000 Republic of Korea troops. A large amount of the tonnage handled was Class II and IV consigned to the 100th Logistical Command (ROKA). Since the Koreans have limited line haul assets, they were unable to move their cargo in a reasonable amount of time. It finally became necessary to call in line haul assets from the 36th Trans Bn at Cam Ranh Bay in order to clear the beach.

(b) New floodlights were installed to improve security and facilitate night operations.

(c) On 15 June, the Outport Commander initiated the "Best Checker of the Month" award to improve the moral of the checker personnel. Winners will receive a \$25.00 Savings Bond and have their names engraved on a plaque in the Outport Office.

(d) During the reporting period, the following distinguished personnel visited the Nha Trang Outport: LTG Sackton, Comptroller General of the Army; BG Burns, Chief, Army and Air Force Exchange System; and COL Albert Newton, Commanding Officer, USASUPCOM CRB.

b. Personnel, Administration, Morale, and Discipline.

(1) Promotions made in the command:

LTC	MAJ	CPT	LLT	CW2	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4
1	3	5	21	8	1	2	6	1	170	268

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(2) The following awards were received for presentation:

Purple Heart	Army Commendation Medal	Bronze Star
	36	32

(3) Disciplinary and judicial actions. The following actions  
or were completed during the quarter:

Crimes against persons and property:	10
Miscellaneous and military offenses:	127
Traffic offenses:	55
Article 15:	204
Summary Court Martial:	5
Special Court Martial:	10
General Court Martial:	0

(The three most common offenses were OFF LIMITS, SPEEDING, and FAILURE TO STOP or YIELD).

(4) Public Information Activities: During the months of May, June, and July, a total of 358 Home Town News Releases were submitted, and 95 radio tape interviews were prepared for distribution to home town radio stations. Increased command emphasis on the program at both battalion and company level, is expected to further improve the program in this command.

(5) Civic Actions: During the reporting period, two long term civic actions were completed or continued. Elements of the Command completed a three-month project to provide transportation to MACV in Ba Ngoi to haul building materials and other supplies for the villagers. An officer assigned to the Command headquarters conducts English classes three nights a week in Cam Ranh Village. This project, which was initiated during the last reporting period has been highly successful, and will continue. During May, three latrines from an old unit area were moved to Cam Ranh Village where they were placed near the school by the villagers. During June, two tugs and two barges were provided to off-load rice at Ba Ngoi, and the movie, Sound of Music, was shown to 600 persons in Cam Ranh Village. During the month of July, the Command initiated a new civic action program of assigning certain hamlets to specific units. The 10th Trans Bn, 36th Trans Bn, and HHC, 124th Trans Comd will each send a visitation team to their assigned hamlets each week to discuss problems and assist the villagers in self-help projects. An example of such a project is the pier constructed by the villagers of Binh Ba Island, using dunnage lumber provided by the Command. On 25 Jul 68, the Command joined the USASC-CRB in providing 70 Vietnamese schoolteachers a tour of the Cam Ranh peninsula, and an LCU ride back across the bay to Ba Ngoi.

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(6) R&R: The number of R&R allocations received and utilized in the command are listed below. Personnel are encouraged to take ordinary leave to certain specified areas and be booked against an R&R allocation to insure them a seat and make full utilization of allocations.

<u>Month</u>	<u>Allocated</u>	<u>Utilized</u>
May	141	138
June	166	159
July	163	154

(7) Safety: The following statistics reflect the Safety Program and accident prevention in the command:

(a) Total number of initial accident reports: 87

(b) Total number of reportable accidents by type.

Personal injury	7
Motor vehicles	20
Fatalities	5
Local Nationals	1
Property damage	1

(c) Mileage and manhours.

May	909,460 miles	82,240 man-hours
June	952,837 miles	83,875 man-hours
July	749,718 miles	92,991 man-hours

(d) Accident rates.

	May	June	July	Expectancy
Military injury	3.6	5.9	4.3	5.0
Military vehicle	.4	1.2	.4	1.0

(e) The problem areas experienced by the Command during the reporting period were gun shot wounds (3) and rear-end collisions (10).

(8) Reenlistment Program: During the reporting period, the Command Reenlistment Program took second place twice and was first for the month of July out of the eight major units of the US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay.



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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Airborne Command and Control  
Ranh Bay (Provided by) 1st Airborne Command and Control July 1968.  
RCS CSFOR (RA)

May

RA 1st Term	-	Disc	4	Enl	2	Percentage	50%
Career Reenlist	-	Disc	7	Enl	7	Percentage	100%
AUS	-	Disc	16	Enl	1	Percentage	6.2%
<b>TOTALS:</b>		<b>Disc</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>Enl</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>37%</b>

June

RA 1st Term	-	Disc	4	Enl	2	Percentage	50%
Career Reenlist	-	Disc	8	Enl	8	Percentage	100%
AUS	-	Disc	5	Enl	0	Percentage	0%
<b>TOTALS</b>		<b>Disc</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>Enl</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>58.8%</b>

July

RA 1st Term	-	Disc	0	Enl	0	Percentage	0%
Career Reenlist	-	Disc	22	Enl	12	Percentage	100%
AUS	-	Disc	22	Enl	0	Percentage	0%
<b>TOTALS</b>		<b>Disc</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>Enl</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>35.3%</b>

c. Operations

(1) The Plans and Security Branch initiated a Security Inspection Program and has scheduled both announced and unannounced inspections for the command's units. The inspections will keep the commander informed on his Security posture.

(2) During the past quarter, the Command initiated a 10% daily stand-down of all operational task vehicle, to allow the drivers and mechanics time to perform preventive maintenance. The overall availability of vehicles has shown considerable improvement since this program was initiated.

(3) In the communications section, the most significant event was the installation of two teletype circuits during the month of June-- one to Vung Ro Bay and the other to Phan Rang Outport. Traffic load averages 24 incoming and outgoing messages daily. A third circuit to the Nha Trang Outport is being installed. The new circuits have greatly improved the coordination and control of assets of the command and are the only means of adequate communications available for the long and frequent reports necessary for proper control. Work was begun in July to install a 100 pair cable to replace the old, damaged cable that serves the

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pier area.

(4) On 26 June 1968, Headquarters Company, 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A) received a Material Readiness Inspection (MRI). All sections earned satisfactory ratings, and the total numerical score for the Command was a commendable 82%.

(5) The Headquarters Company mess hall earned the US Army Trans Comd Best Mess Award for the month of June, and scored a second place in the USASUPCOM-CRB competition.

(6) The Command engaged in combat service support operations for the entire 92 days of the reporting period.

(a) During the month of June the motor transport elements of the command set a record for total tonnage moved. The total cumulative tonnage for port and beach, local and line haul in June was 214,531 short tons, besting by nearly 15,000 tons the old record of 199,741 short tons, which was set in February 1968.

(b) The terminal elements of the command established a new record for total tonnage handled through Cam Ranh Bay Port for the month of July. Exceeding the previous record set in June 1968 by more than 8,000 short tons the new record is 208,803 short tons.

(c) A basic re-allocation of vehicles between port and beach and line haul was accomplished. Previously, the total assets available to the headquarters for programming were allocated roughly on the basis of 55 - 60% to line haul and 40 - 45% to operations on the peninsula. During June, the ratio of vehicles for port and beach and local haul was 54% while 46% were committed to line haul.

(d) On 1 July 1968, the USATCOMD-CRB assumed responsibility for the operation of the commercial truck fleet, an effort that had previously been handled by a civilian contractor, the Vinnell Corporation. The commercial vehicle operation was assigned to the 24th Transportation Company, and that unit took over 20 Kenworth 20 ton trucks, 42 International Harvester tractors and seven M275 2½ ton tractors. The 24th Transportation Company is a medium truck company which had been short 48 M52 tractors.

(e) The proper planning of outload cargo has long been a problem in this port. In the past, the Documentation Section was compelled to rely on booking TCMDs to prepare pre-stow plans. The information concerning classification, size, weight and shape of cargo, that can be gleaned from the TCMDs is notoriously incomplete and inaccurate. With the completion of a hard-stand staging area in 1 Jul 68, many of the problems of cargo identification were eliminated. Cargo to be outloaded is staged in this area, and the personnel responsible for

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pre-stow planning now physically inspect the cargo and determine necessary and accurate information.

(f) The new staging areas have proved to be a valuable asset to the port in general. Outloading deep draft vessels has always been the slowest operation of this port, and in the past there was no provision made for this type of operation. Now it is possible to bring the cargo into the port area prior to the time the vessel is ready to receive it. This process involves double handling, but allows for the rapid loading of the vessel with cargo that is readily available.

(g) Ammunition booked for outload is currently booked with a box count instead of a pallet count. Efforts are underway to have shippers place the pallet count on TCMD's to increase the accuracy of pre-stow planning.

2. (UNCLAS) Section II, Lessons Learned: Commanders Observation, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None

b. Operations

(1) Signal and Communications.

(a) Observation: Improper grounding of Terminal, Telegraph TH-5/TG.

(b) Evaluation: Circuit outages have been caused by the ground wire being disconnected on the TH-5 when this equipment is not van mounted. When the equipment is not properly grounded, it causes the receiver terminal to copy in a garbled fashion.

(c) Recommendation: All personnel should be made aware of the necessity of grounding the TH-5/TG for proper operation.

(2) Inflated priorities and required delivery dates.

(a) Observation: USARV Message 56942, 25 June 68, stated that the movement of cargo and personnel in RVN is being hampered by indiscriminate use of transportation priorities and unrealistic RDDs.

(b) Evaluation: A three-month survey of local cargo offering indicated that 38% were priority 01; 60% were priority 02; 2% were priority 03; and 0% , priority 04. On 2 July, the Director of Transportation tasked the Movements Control Center with scrutinizing each cargo offering for unrealistic priorities and delivery dates.

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RCS, CSFOR (RL)

This office was also given the authority to challenge offerings of doubtful validity.

(c) Recommendation: Movement Control activities should establish a close working relationship with higher and adjacent headquarters to challenge successfully the numerous high priority offerings and to determine the lowest priority that can adequately meet the requirement.

(3) Commercial Vehicle Operations.

(a) Observation: Higher deadline experienced in IHC 5 ton commercial tractor. Number operational averages about 22 out of 40 after 37 days experience.

(b) Evaluation: Training period prior to assumption of Commercial Vehicle Mission and maintenance was 4 days thus not allowing a thorough training program to be initiated for the transition of operators from the M-52A2 Tactical Multifuel Vehicle to the commercial gasoline tractors.

(c) Recommendations: Prior to a Military unit assuming control of commercial equipment recommend that adequate time be allocated for training and sufficient well qualified personnel assigned to enable a unit to make the transition as smooth as possible. Initially during the transition phase the drivers and mechanics require much more supervision than under normal conditions.

(4) Discharge of ammunition vessels.

(a) Observation: It takes too long to discharge projectiles from deep draft vessels.

(b) Evaluation: The problem is caused by a difference in methods of loading and discharge. Small projectile pallets are loaded at the port of origin by means of hand-trucks and a twenty man gang in each hatch. No forklifts are used in loading these pallets or projectiles. A two inch floor of dunnage is over laid each layer of pallets and a new layer of pallets is stowed on the dunnage. The pallets are discharged at this port by six man gangs, using electric forklifts. The two inch dunnage floor will not withstand the weight of the loaded forklifts, and it is necessary to strengthen the flooring by overlaying it with sheet steel or plywood.

(c) Recommendation: Stevedores at the port of origin should install a double floor (4 inches) over every second layer of projectiles. This would allow the discharge by forklift of two layers at a time on a floor that would support the weight of a forklift.

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The cost of the proposed flooring would be justified by a safer and more rapid discharge of projectile-carrying vessels.

(5) Recouping of broken Projectile Pallets.

(a) Observation: The current method of stowing and discharging projectiles ((4) above) causes numerous projectile pallets and pallet tops to break.

(b) Evaluation: It is impossible to repair the broken pallets. If the projectiles are to be properly palletized, new pallets must be used. Currently these pallets are not returned from the using unit and there are none in stock at Cam Ranh Bay. A shortage of manpower and material precludes fabrication of pallets at this port.

(c) Recommendation: Shippers should include a supply of spare pallets in all shipments of projectiles to be used for recouping damaged cargo, in all shipments of projectiles.

c. Training: Training of Local National Cargo Checkers.

(1) Observation: Local national personnel can be trained as cargo checkers, and they can be employed to relieve military personnel for more essential duties.

(2) Evaluation. When the Consolidated Documentation Branch was organized in September 1967, it was authorized 22 enlisted men and 1 NCO to perform the checking function on piers operated by the Vietnamese contractor. During the reporting period, the military checkers from the Documentation Branch have trained local nationals in this work. By 31 July the LN enrolled in the current training program were sufficiently proficient to enable them to take complete responsibility for the checking function on Vietnamese staffed piers.

(3) Recommendation. Turning the responsibility for cargo checking over the Vietnamese is an excellent way to free military personnel for other military functions. Also, it is a sound economic move, since the Vietnamese can perform the job more cheaply than military personnel, and it provides Vietnamese men with a valuable skill. The Documentation Branch will continue to monitor these documentation functions, but the number of military personnel required will be sharply reduced.

d. Intelligence. None

e. Logistics. None

(1) Sea Wall Failure

(a) Observation. Failure of parts of the 2000 linear foot

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steel pile bulkhead in Cam Ranh Bay.

(b) Evaluation. Approximately two years prior the Army Engineer constructed a steel pile bulkhead to serve as a seawall along the pier area at Cam Ranh Bay Port. The design for the anchorage system for the seawall consisted of wire rope and turnbuckle tied to wood pile deadmen. Failure of the wall between piers 3 and 4 in January and in two other locations during July has raised question as to the adequacy of the engineers design of the anchorage system. Studies have determined that the design was in fact, not sufficient to hold the pressure of the backfill with the type material utilized. The entire bulkhead system in this port was constructed in the manner described.

(c) Recommendation. That the steel pile bulkhead anchorage system be redesigned utilizing a stronger material and secured to prevent any failure. In particular the material utilized should be steel pile deadmen with steel I Beam braces to hold the outward force of backfill. This would prevent any deterioration defect such as turnbuckle threads from pulling loose.

(2) Weakness in M54A2 Vehicle

(a) Observation. A light truck company was reassigned from Cam Ranh Bay to Vung Ro Bay. Operation over the poor roads in that area caused the vehicles (with an average mileage of 30,500) to experience a failure of the cab mounting bolts and brackets.

(b) Evaluation. There have been instances of the brackets on the drivers side breaking and sliding over to the left just enough to prevent the clutch from being depressed resulting in several accidents.

(c) Recommendation. This problem was solved by welding a steel plate around the entire bracket and cab portion and placing a one inch rubber cushion between the bracket and frame of the vehicle.

f. Organization. None

g. Other. None

1 Incl  
List of assigned and attached units



ROBERT W. SHIDLER  
Colonel, TC  
Commanding

AVCA CRB-GO-0 (6 Aug 68) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Transportation Command Cam  
Ranh Bay (Provisional) for the Period Ending 31 July 1968,  
RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, CAM RANH BAY, APO 96312 25 AUG 1968

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-0,  
APO 96384  
Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375  
Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C., 20310


The inclosed Operational Report submitted by the US Army Transportation  
Command, Cam Ranh Bay (Provisional) adequately reflects the activities  
of the unit for the period indicated with the following exceptions:

- a. Reference: Paragraph 2b (4) Concur - A significant reduction  
in discharge time may be realized in addition to safer operation.
- b. Reference: Paragraph 2b (5) Non-concur - Local pallet fabrication  
facilities are in process of being developed. When in operation sufficient  
pallets will be available for recovering requirements.
- c. Reference: Section I, paragraph 1c (3) Although the teletype  
circuits mentioned do provide increased effectiveness in management and  
operations they are not the only means of adequate communications available  
for the long and frequent reports. The common-user telephone system is  
available, although it is certainly a more tedious procedure and, in the  
case of Vung Ro Bay, often takes extreme lengths of time to establish  
usable communications. In addition, this headquarters' single side band  
radio and phone patch service to Vung Ro Bay, Phan Rang and Nha Trang has  
been used extensively by the US Army Transportation Command Cam Ranh Bay  
Provisional, both in instances where the teletype has failed and for normal  
telephone calls. The teletype circuit to Vung Ro Bay has a history of  
high outage times, and this headquarters has often made phone patches  
lasting one (1) to one and a half (1½) hours each when the teletype circuit  
goes out.
- d. Reference: Section II, paragraph 2b (1) Concur - No action by  
higher headquarters is necessary. This information was originally

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provided by this headquarters (courtesy of the 1st Signal Bde) to  
the US Army Transportation Command Cam Ranh Bay (Provisional).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
J. B. DOYLE  
CPT, AGC  
ASST AG



AVCA GO-0 (6 Aug 68) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Transportation Command Cam  
Ranh Bay (Provisional) for the Period Ending 31 July 1968  
RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

15 SEP 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,  
APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, United States Army Transportation Command Cam Ranh Bay for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference Section II, paragraph b(2). Concur. Inflated priorities and required delivery dates hamper the effectiveness of the transportation system. Action being taken by the Movements Control Center to challenge offerings of doubtful validity should decrease the misuse of priorities.

b. Reference Section II, paragraph b(3). Concur. It is assumed the situation referred to was a result of cancellation of a contract. Under normal circumstances an adequate training period would be provided. No action required by higher headquarters.

c. Reference Section II, paragraph b(4). Concur. Ammunition loading methods utilized in CONUS should facilitate discharge operations in RVN. Installation of a double dunnage floor over every second layer of projectiles will enable forklifts to be utilized without further reinforcement of the dunnage flooring at the RVN port. This headquarters will request that CONUS ports consider the requirement for double flooring over each layer of projectile pallets.

d. Reference Section II, paragraph b(5). Nonconcur. USASUPCOM, CRB indicates in para b of 1st Indorsement that local pallet fabrication facilities are in the process of being developed. When this facility becomes operational sufficient pallets will be available for recovering requirements.

e. Reference Section II, paragraph e(2). Concur. However, an EIR should be submitted. No action required by higher headquarters until receipt of EIR.


15 SEP 1968

AVCA GO-0 (6 Aug 68) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Transportation Command Cam  
Ranh Bay (Provisional) for the Period Ending 31 July 1968  
RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by indorsements. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



TEL: LBN 2684

John S. Waddell  
1LT, AG  
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy Furnished  
USA Trans Comd CRB  
USASUPCOM, CRB

AVHGC-DST (6 Aug 68) 3d Ind

MAJ Klingman/ds/LBN 4433

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Transportation Command Cam Ranh Bay (Provisional) for the Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

11000 104

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPCP-DT, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968, from Headquarters, US Army Transportation Command, Cam Ranh Bay (Provisional) and concurs with the report as modified by the preceding indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
A.R. GUENTHER  
CPL AGC  
ASSI. ADJUTANT GENERAL

Cy furn:  
HQ 1st Log Cnd  
HQ USATC, CRB

GPOP-DT (6 Aug 68) 4th Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, US Army Trans Comd Cam Ranh Bay  
(Prov) for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 14 NOV 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-  
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. L. SHORTT  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

LIST OF ASSIGNED AND ATTACHED UNITS

US Army Transportation Command Cam Ranh Bay (Provisional)

HHC, 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A)

HHD, 500th Transportation Command (Motor Transport) - Minimal Strength

10th Transportation Battalion (Terminal)

HHD, 10th Transportation Battalion (Terminal)

469th Transportation Detachment (USAV John U. D. Page)

97th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat)

266th Transportation Detachment (46' Steel J-Boat)

271st Transportation Detachment (65' Tug ST 2106)

276th Transportation Detachment (Floating Crane, 100T, BD 6662)

358th Transportation Detachment (100' Tug LT 1977)

486th Transportation Detachment (Reefer Barge, BRM 6230)

532nd Transportation Detachment (Floating Crane, 100T BD 6655)

627th Transportation Detachment (100' Tug, LT 1940)

116th Transportation Company (Terminal Service)

512th Transportation Detachment (Cargo Handling)

123rd Transportation Company (Terminal Service) Minimum Strength

155th Transportation Company (Terminal Service)

870th Transportation Company (Terminal Service)

261st Transportation Detachment (MHE Maintenance)

24th Transportation Battalion (Truck)

HHD, 24th Transportation Battalion (Truck)

119th Transportation Company (Terminal Service)

529th Transportation Company (Light Truck)

545th Transportation Company (Light Truck)

36th Transportation Battalion (Truck)

HHD, 36th Transportation Battalion (Truck)

24th Transportation Company (Medium Truck)

442nd Transportation Company (Medium Truck)

566th Transportation Company (Medium Truck) (-)

592nd Transportation Company (Light Truck) (-)

670th Transportation Company (Medium Truck) (-)

3rd Platoon 515th Transportation Company (Light Truck)\*

564th Transportation Platoon (Light Truck)

\* - Attached unit

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D		
<i>(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)</i>		
1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		Unclassified
		2b. GROUP
3. REPORT TITLE		
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, US Army Transportation Command Cam Ranh Bay (Provisional) (U)		
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)		
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 Jul 68		
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)		
CO, US Army TC Cmd (P)		
3. REPORT DATE	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
6 August 1968	19	
6a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	6b. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
b. PROJECT NO.	683179	
c. N/A	6c. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
d.		
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A	OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT		

19

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\* SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_

\*\* FOR OT UT # \_\_\_\_\_

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\*\* FOR OT UT # : Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

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