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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M)(15 July 68) FOR OT RD 682313

17 July 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 41st
Civil Affairs Company, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

AD 836654

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 41ST CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANY
APO 96350

3 AVFA-CA

3 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 41st Civil Affairs Company for Period
Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
ATTN: AVFA-GC-OT
APO 96350

I. SECTION 1, OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

a. GENERAL:

During the period 1 February 1968 to 30 April 1968 the 41st Civil Affairs Company implemented civic action projects and provided refugee assistance in II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). Deployment of the 16 functional teams was as follows: teams 3, 5, 10, and 16 were attached to the 29th Civil Affairs Company in I-CTZ; teams 8 and 9 were attached to the 4th Infantry Division at Pleiku, however, team 9 returned to company control 31 January. The remaining teams were under operational control (OPCON) of the 41st Civil Affairs Company. The 11 teams under company OPCON are divided into two Detachments. Detachment W supervises teams 9 and 15 in Pleiku Province, teams 6, 11, 13, and 14 in Binh Dinh Province, and team 1 in Phu Yen Province. Detachment J provides supervision for teams 4, 7, and 12 in Binh Thuan Province and team 2 in Darlac Province. Teams OPCON to 41st Civil Affairs are employed in the area concept. An effort was made to detach teams 3, 5, 10, and 16 from the 29th Civil Affairs Company and return them to II CTZ under operational control of the 41st Civil Affairs Company. This move was disapproved and the teams remain in I CTZ.

b. INTELLIGENCE:

Intelligence information gathered by the teams was volunteered by Vietnamese civilians. Team 14 was warned of Viet Cong in the area while they were assisting in the repair of a road near Truong Luong Refugee Camp near Bong Son. The information was passed on to the District Advisor. Team 7's excellent relationship with the people around Phan Thiet resulted in information given to the team on VC activity in the area. This information together with other intelligence reports resulted in tactical operations in that area which netted several VC Suspects. Team 12, also at Phan Thiet, was warned of VC activity on their Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAPS). This information was passed on to MACV.

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c. OPERATIONS:

(1) Detachments J and H moved their headquarters from their respective locations in Phan Thiet and Qui Nhon, to 41st Civil Affairs Company headquarters in Nha Trang. It was felt that they could better serve their teams from this location. With the transfer of Maj Monville to 1st Air Cavalry Div on 5 April, Detachment "H" was changed to Detachment "M" and placed under the supervision of CPT Wyatt, team chief of team 14.

(2) The tactical situation throughout II CTZ greatly influenced the direction of civil affairs activities during this period. Previously the majority of the teams' activities had been construction type projects such as schools, dispensaries, bridges, permanent resettlement areas, etc. The teams were permitted great freedom of movement and were thus able to operate some distance from their base of operations. Their Area of Operation (AO), included often one or more entire districts. However, the security conditions brought about by the Tet offensive and the massive refugee problem created by it curtailed many programs that had been in progress and turned civic action efforts in a new direction. The exact situation varied from team to team but the lack of security and immense number of refugees was typical throughout II CTZ.

(3) As a result of the Tet offensive, most combat troops were committed to offensive or defensive tactical operations. This made it difficult for the teams to get extra troops to provide security for civic action efforts in outlying areas. Some of the teams were required to spend much of their time occupying defensive positions around their camp perimeter or were occupied in fortifying their camp. Thus their activities were concentrated around their base of operations. Logistical channels became strained as they resupplied the commodities expended during the Tet offensive making it difficult for the teams to obtain materials needed for civic action. The massive refugee situation created during Tet was the top priority civic action activity during this period. Most of the teams were occupied full time in refugee relief. This assistance included establishment of refugee centers, medical assistance, distribution of food, water, clothing and other basic needs, sanitation control, and surveying the damage to the homes of the local civilians. Their task would have been doubly difficult had it not been for the efficiency of most of the GVN agencies and officials located throughout II CTZ. The teams have praised the way the Vietnamese governmental agencies and various civilian volunteers responded to the situation.

(4) Team 1 at Tuy Hoa began support of the construction of three new refugee camps - Ninh Tinh (CQ 156493), Phouc Hau, (CQ 151491) and Chop Chai (CQ 154482). Ninh Tinh and Phouc Hau will have 100 units each and Chop Chai will have 150. The projects will include housing, wells, latrines and a closed water system. Assistance has also been provided by 572 and 577 Engineer Battalions and the 173rd Airborne Brigade. The refugees have organized themselves into a working force and are providing labor on a self help basis. To date a total of 90 units have been completed. Team 1 is coordinating a Province wide MEDCAP program with the help of USAF, 91st MEDEVAC, and Phu Yen Province Hospital doctors and personnel. The 173rd Airborne Bde and 268th Aviation Co. will provide transportation for the doctors to visit outlying areas throughout Phu Yen Province. The Air Force and 91st MEDEVAC are also interested in giving additional training to ARVN

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medics and nurses. The need for medical assistance has increased with the removal of 6 Asian Christian nurses who were working in Tuy Hoa and Hieu Xuan Districts. A combined program of MEDCAP, Van Tac Vu (Cultural Affairs Cadre), PSYOPS, and Armed Propaganda Teams has visited throughout Tuy Hoa and Hieu Xuan Sub-sector. This effort, which was coordinated by Team 1, reached more than 4,000 people in its first week of operation. The operation begins with the PSYOPS team in advance with a display of pictures, pamphlets, and tapes played through a sound truck. The Armed Propaganda Team circulates throughout the village to talk to the people and inform them of the presence of the Cultural Affairs and MEDCAP Teams. The MEDCAP Team is a combination of Team 1 personnel, Vietnamese medics, public health and social workers.

(5) Ban Me Thuot was one of the hardest hit areas during the Tet offensive. Approximately 40 % of the city was destroyed and some 19,605 people became refugees. The plight of these refugees became a full time job for Team 2. The team procured and erected tents for temporary refugee centers. Part of the team was employed full time in supplying water to the refugees. Joint MEDCAPs were held with ARVN units and the team's medic also worked in the Province Hospital. Since such a huge sanitation problem existed mass immunizations against plague were held. Team 2 reports that GVN agencies did a very good job in handling the situation. The Province began a recovery plan which proceeded quite well in most instances and the team's assistance to the refugees was limited to an "on request" basis at the end of the reporting period. Conditions have improved considerably in the refugee camps and many of the refugees began returning to their homes during the day to rebuild. The aid given to the refugees at Buon Krong Prong appears to have had more impact than many other refugee relief programs around Ban Me Thuot. Four days after the Buon accidentally burned to the ground, Team 2 in conjunction with the Province Social Welfare Dept issued emergency relief supplies and held a MEDCAP. Team 2 also surveyed the village for the possibility of immediate civic action projects. Emphasis was placed on the fact that GVN was responsible for all of the commodity and medical aid provided. With increasing emphasis being placed on advising rather than doing, the people around Ban Me Thuot are beginning to rely on their own organization. Although the CA team provided lumber for school desks at Buon Ko Tam (AO 885052) the school teacher and village chief provided the necessary skilled people for cutting and assembling the lumber into desks. English classes are being resumed for four Nuns at the Vinh Son Orphanage. The Nuns, in turn, present what they have learned to their classes. In this way the language is being eventually taught to over 400 persons. The Armed Propaganda Team requested that the team's medic accompany them on their operations. These operations are held in conjunction with 1st Bn, 12th Inf in the area north of Ban Me Thuot.

(6) Team 4 located at Song Mao provided assistance in the construction of a bridge at Phan Ly Chan (BN 288405). This project not only welded the villagers into a cohesive working unit, but has also increased the effectiveness of the GVN because the people can see how their government can benefit them. The District Chief was present at the project site at least once a day to help supervise the project. The people are now making plans to build another bridge which will also be part of a large resettlement movement. Since the villagers have learned to organize and distribute their work load it is anticipated that a minimum of supervision will be necessary.

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The water system project at the Montagnard Resettlement Village (BN 277456) is a joint project involving the villagers, Trouong Son Cadre, the District Chief, Mr John Lewellen (IVS), and Team 4. The active support of the District Chief in relieving the plight of the Montagnard tribesmen has had a tremendous psychological effect. This is one of the means in which GVN can gain further support from the Montagnards. Viet Cong saboteurs have repeatedly damaged the main water pipe leading into Song Mao, but coordinated efforts on the part of the villagers and RF/PF soldiers from Hai Ninh District have kept the pipe repaired and in operation. The irrigation overpass bridge at Minh My (BN 335396) is progressing rapidly. The people organized their work efficiently and utilized local channels to obtain some of the materials for the project. They have required a minimum of supervision from the team. Four more concrete rings were emplaced in the scowall and this project is near completion. An archway to the school at the Montagnard village was built by the Montagnards with technical assistance provided by the team. Coordination was made with the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) to combine some of their operations with the teams MEDCAP. The MEDCAP team operates one day each week with each VIS team in the area. The VIS team plays music, makes loudspeaker announcements and distributes leaflets while the MEDCAP is conducted. After the Tet hostilities, the Hoa Da S-5 and the VIS team traveled throughout the district to give reassurance to the people and nullify propaganda put out by the VC. The ARVN engineer unit attached to the 44th ARVN Regiment enthusiastically supported the CA team in repairing a culvert on QL/404 (BN 288420) which had been blown up by the VC. Sixty pounds of clothing were donated to the Montagnard Training Center at Song Mao, which is run by Mr Walker. These clothes will be used in a sewing instruction program and the reworked pieces will be re-distributed to needy Montagnards.

(7) Team 6 at An Khe reports that improvements at the Montagnard Resettlement area are slow but progress has been made. During the week of 19 February an estimated 23 people left Bung Bang village to return to their former homes. During the week of 4 Mar two other incidents occurred which almost resulted in others leaving the area. Viet Cong entered the Montagnard Resettlement area and Dong Che Refugee village killing one Vietnamese Hamlet Chief and kidnapping 53 Montagnards. The people in these two areas, although terrorized, remained loyal to GVN even though more security is needed around the area. Twenty (20) Montagnards volunteered to become part of the armed cadre which had 38 men at the time. Tran Kim Hung, Chief of Montagnard Affairs visited the Resettlement Area and spoke to the armed cadre. There has been an improvement noted at the Montagnard School; where enrollment is now 60 Bahnar, 43 Hre and 36 Vietnamese. The Vietnamese Cadre organized the Montagnards into a working force and performed a police call of the entire area, and the appearance of the area has improved far above its normal standard. The Montagnard Chiefs were paid 6,800\$VN by the Vietnamese government. This amount was owed to the chiefs under the GVN agreement that each would receive 3,400\$VN as a monthly wage for administering the affairs of his village. The village chief of Krong Kotu returned with 26 of his people to the Montagnard Resettlement Area. In December he had led his village back to the highlands, but after a while he realized the value of the benefits such as medical care, food and education his people gained by being in the resettlement area. Also, 77 Montagnards from the village of Djro Kotu returned to the resettlement area, and Armed Propaganda Team held meetings with the recently returned people. The Montagnard Resettlement Area and Dong Che Refugee village were seriously threatened by an outbreak

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of plague; however, the threat was overcome thru the efforts of doctors provided by 616th Med Det and immunizations given by GVN agencies. The number of deaths resulting from the plague outbreak was limited to 10 people. Dong Che Refugee Village has under construction a 3 classroom school. They are using Vietnamese channels to procure building materials and local labor. Team 6 distributed school kits to the Vietnamese village of Cuu An and provided materials to repair their school. These people are very eager to better themselves and provide maximum effort when working on community projects. Team 6 provided supervision and materials for construction of a culvert in Cuu An and the people provided the labor. A road which was impassable to vehicular traffic is now opened permitting farmers to transport crops to markets by vehicle rather than by hand.

(8) Team 7 in Phan Thiet reports that VC attacks and the resulting refugee problems have caused Vietnamese village, district and province officials to conduct meetings to form contingency plans for refugee assistance after such attacks. This planning on the part of the GVN is expected to result in better coordination between GVN officials at all levels and US forces, as well as provide for better support for the refugees. Team 7 is working very closely with the Binh Thuan Province officials, including giving the Deputy Senior Province Advisor a daily briefing on their CA activity for the day. 3/506 Airborne arrived in team 7's AO in February and indicated their interest in CA work and requested the team's assistance in getting started. The Lac Dac Orphanage Laundry & Tailor Shop which was completed in January has been very successful. The first month's operation showed a profit of 40,000\$ VN and the shop is well on its way to becoming self-sufficient. Team 7 is proud of the part it played in the establishment of the shop. The latrine project at Binh An (AN 874256) was finished. A culvert was installed at Kim Hoa (AN 878138) and a 70 ft drainage pipe was completed. Team 7 aided the villagers of Kim Hoa (AN 879138) in the construction of a well. This well, the only one in the village, will relieve the people of having to walk 2,000 meters to get water. Team 7 provided cement and well tiling, and villagers provided labor. The team used tooth brushes, soap, and other health items to make up sundry packs for distribution in the Phan Thiet Chieu Hoi Center. One of their successful programs has been the showing of movies at the refugee camps. Crowds of over 1,000 people have attended the showings as the team has planned to continue it on a regular basis. Working with the Catholic Relief Service (CRS) the team arranged for a local baker to bake bread for the refugees. CRS furnished 1,200 26 kilo bags of flour to be used over a three week period. The baker baked 270 loaves of bread per each 26 kilo bag. The baker was paid by CRS, and the team coordinated with the refugee camp administrators to choose a project leader who insured proper distribution of the bread.

(9) Team 9 was detached from the 4th Infantry Div on 31 January 68 and became OPCON to 41st Civil Affairs. In March a fire destroyed their living quarters and most of their equipment. As a result the team was occupied with rebuilding and re-outfitting during part of the reporting period. Team is occupied full time in support of the Montagnard Resettlement area at Edap Enang near Pleiku. Team 9 constructed a helicopter landing zone, which was badly needed to improve conditions for MEDEVACS, especially with the approach of the monsoon season. The team engineer officer supervised the construction, and labor for the project was provided by soldiers of 1/42 ARVN Regt and the Truong Son Cadre. The team reports that the Montagnards are beginning to take pride in their homes, using

tin and wood from abandoned villages to repair and rebuild them. They have also increased their production of artifacts and woven products, and have tilled ground for this year's planting. Rice distribution is being carried out by the GVN. In an effort to make the Montagnards more self-sufficient, classes on rice and garden crop culture were held at Edap Enang by the Agriculture Service Bureau, Pleiku Province. A demonstration garden has been planted by the team. The team also supports the leper colony, and the team medic works extensively there. 8

(10) Team 11 has concentrated on improving the transportation facilities around Phu My (BR 900673). VC activity has resulted in several bridges and culverts being destroyed, which has left hamlets isolated from vehicular traffic. Culverts were installed at An Trinh (BR 897612). Van Lo (BR 908612) An Lac Tay (BR 875690) and Trung Thanh (BR 920657). Direct requests to the team for aid have been directed to district officials. The road program is then handled by district officials, aided by the team. Because of the quick, efficient way district has handled the problems the people are showing increased reliance on those officials. Civilian and PF medics have joined in the team's MEDCAP program, which has had a tremendous psychological effect on the people. Popular Force medics working with civilian medics was visible proof that GVN is interested in their needs. Team 11 has also begun an energetic youth program. Efforts to contact the District Agriculture Advisor and the District Youth and Sports Representative were successful, but both men were found to hold the position in title only. Neither had any knowledge of his job or any idea of how to acquire knowledge within his field. However, other individuals have been most helpful to the team in the development of youth projects. Michael Feldstein, CORDS advisor for youth and sports, Binh Dinh Province, guided the team in the implementation of a volleyball program among the schools in the district. Mr Hol, Binh Dinh Boy Scout representative, was enthusiastic and willing to support team efforts toward developing Boy Scouts in Phu My. Maj Rogers, S-5 7/15 Artillery Bn offered to assist any Boy Scout Program. Mr Tran Din Hai, VIS Phu My District, offered his assistance in developing a sports program. In developing a volleyball program among the schools, Team 11 succeeded in bringing together for the first time the headmasters of the Buddhist and Catholic schools in the district. They arranged a program of competitive sports and have set a date for the first volleyball game.

(11) Team 12 at Phan Thiet received excellent cooperation from the Vietnamese Navy on MEDCAP operations. The Navy provided medics, an interpreter, and a PSYWAR NCO to work with the team. US Navy doctors also worked with the MEDCAP team. Team 12's MEDCAP team consists of ARVN medic Duc, Navy medic Nguyen, and SP5 Tortorette from Team 12. After the Tet crisis, Team 12 held a joint MEDCAP with Team 7 and a GVN MEDCAP team of two doctors, two medics, and three guards in an area that had been destroyed by bombs and rockets during the heavy fighting (AN 828092). The people at the Poor-House finished putting up wire on their chicken house project, and also built 5 feeders and a brooder under the supervision of the team. The Chief at the Poor-House was given instructions in raising American type poultry by CORDS representatives. Coordination has been made to resume English classes. These classes were curtailed as a result of the Tet offensive and it has not been practical to resume them until now. The team became a part of a civil affairs task force that visited the town of Muong Man (AN 730140), where the team members contacted the military commanders and village leaders. One of the problems discussed was a lack of District and Province support in community development. The team was asked to visit the village regularly and help them. Arrangements were made for the team to stay at the ARVN compound during the second week of

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April. The team joined in an ARVN-MACV operation at Go Boi, where ARVN forces cordoned the village and searched it for contraband. National Police checked ID cards against their "blacklist", and Team 12 held sick call while the operation was carried out. A team made up of team 7, team 12, the 6th Psyops Det #8, and a squad of Chieu Hoi's visited the town of Mui No on Hai Long peninsula. Transportation for the group was provided by US Navy advisors and the Vietnamese junk/fleet. The group divided into five teams. Three medical aid stations were set up in the town which treated over 1,000 people during the day. The PSYOPS people showed movies in a theater that hadn't shown movies in several years, and hundreds of people turned out for the occasion. The Chieu Hoi team went on a door-to-door canvas of the hamlet passing out handbills and telling of their former life as a VC compared to living under GVN control. The entire hamlet responded in a positive way, and the people showed their appreciation by giving the group bananas and coconuts for their return trip.

(12) Team 13 undertook an extensive civic action program during this period. They were hampered somewhat due to post-Tet enemy activity, but the activity was not as extensive as in other regions. The Viet Cong made a surprise raid on the village of Tam Quan, north of Bong Son, burning 500 homes leaving hundreds of people without shelter and in need of medical care. The VC had also raided the dispensary and stolen all the medical supplies. At a conference with the District Chief, MACV district advisor, and the local CORDS representative it was decided that Team 13 would provide technical supervision and assistance in the reconstruction of Tam Quan. The team divided its forces and part began devoting full time duty to the reconstruction of Tam Quan while the remainder of the team continued the projects around Bong Son. Discussions were held with Mr Jerry Baker, local CORDS representative and Mr Ben McCullay, Province Agricultural Advisor about the feasibility of agricultural projects for the Bong Son area. Team 13, working with Mr Hiep, RD cadre chief, visited the various refugee camps offering help in starting small gardens and rabbit hutches. Response was enthusiastic and rabbit projects were started in three refugee camps. In addition the team has been working closely with district headquarters to complete several projects left unfinished when elements of 1st Cavalry Div departed the area. The team is assisting in the reconstruction of Trung Luong Refugee Camp, where the temporary structures are being replaced with permanent concrete block housing. The work is being done by the refugees on a self help basis, and is progressing very well. The first 38 units have been completed and 33 more are nearing completion. Men, women, and children have contributed labor to speed completion of the project. There is a shortage of lumber and efforts have been made to obtain 2" X 4" lumber. Much of the lumber on hand has been collected by the people through their own initiative. The Tam Quan market place is also progressing rapidly. The 19th Engr Bn (CBT) is providing assistance on this project. Lack of tin has interrupted completion of the main building but columns and floors are being completed on the smaller buildings. Behind the market the people are digging a well for which conduit, cement and forms have been provided by Team 13. The team hauled five loads of sand to Lai Khanh school to begin construction of a dispensary which will be an addition to the recently completed three room school. The team also transported 3,000 elementary school books from Qui Nhon to Bong Son for the local CORDS representative. They provided coordination and transportation between refugees, CORDS, 19th Engr Bn (CBT) and the 40th ARVN Regt for distribution of food and commodities at Tam Quan. The team obtained 800 lbs of surplus food from the 4th Medical Co, 4th Inf Div and delivered it to the CD camp in Bong Son. English classes meeting five times a week for one hour, have been started in Tam Quan with 15 men attending.

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(13) Team 14 was required to move its location twice during this period, which prevented their accomplishing any but short term projects such as sick calls and distribution of commodities. They continued repairs on the Trung Luong road after their move to LZ English. The project was begun in January when the team was located at LZ Two Bits. Sandbags, shovels, picks, and transportation was provided by the team and all labor was provided by the people of Trung Luong Refugee Camp. The road had become impassable to Vietnamese traffic because 2 1/2 ton trucks cut very deep ruts in the road. About 8/10 kilometer of road had been repaired when the people of Trung Luong informed the team that they should not come back because many VC had moved into the area. The team moved to Qui Nhon in late February and began operations in that area. Their first two weeks in that area were spent in surveying the CA situation and coordinating with Province and District Officials. Team 14 reports excellent cooperation from the people around Qui Nhon. In one instance, the team had agreed to provide transportation for moving fill-dirt on a bridge project in Tuy Phuoc District. When they arrived at the site the village chief had already organized the people and they were working on the approaches to the bridge. In addition RF/PF troops have worked side-by-side with the people showing that the GVN is interested in their problems. The team chief accompanied the senior district advisor to a bridge that had been destroyed by the enemy (CR 052348), and which the local people, with the assistance of team 14, had just finished repairing. The villagers volunteered information concerning VC activity in the area, saying that the VC had come into My Trung hamlet and had taken about 700 lbs of rice. The VC took it to a nearby hamlet, which had been known to be occupied by NVA previously, to have it milled. The information was forwarded through proper channels. Team 14 began supervising the repairs on five (5) bridges in their AO. Repairs were stopped after the third one was completed (CR 052348) due to enemy activity. The VC mined the road and while the team was working on the third bridge a Lambretta detonated a mine resulting in 21 Vietnamese killed and one injured. Two days later a second mine exploded on the same road injuring 12 Vietnamese. The following night the VC placed explosives beneath the decking of the just completed bridge and blew it. Due to the insecure situation the team has stopped repairs on the remaining bridges. Previously the civilian economy and transportation in this area was very fluid and the people moved about freely; however, since the main road has been mined, two bridges destroyed and a school damaged by the VC, travel has stopped and the people cannot market their crops which are now being harvested. Many of the people have moved from their homes because of the threat of VC terrorism. As a result of the increase in enemy activity, much attention has been given Tuy Phuoc District by refugee organizations. One of the refugee organizations from Province requested aid from Team 14 in obtaining food, wood, and clothing. This group informed Team 14 that they did not wish to work through District, which created some problems. Team 14 advised them that all aid was the responsibility of District HQ and that any help given by Team 14 would have to be approved by the District Chief. Team 14 explained how they work with District and showed them some of their projects. Results are that the Province refugee group began initiating projects through District headquarters, such as commodity assistance for a temporary refugee camp and the rebuilding of a hamlet headquarters.

(14) Team 15 at Pleiku City reports that the availability of commodities and equipment has slowed the CA program. An example of this is the need for sand and gravel for concrete work. Engineer units in the area have both commodities but are unable to supply them to CA workers. Sand can be obtained from the Kontum sand pits, but there is a lack of vehicles and the roads are insecure. GVN officials

of Pleiku Province have shown their ability to handle the critical refugee situation caused by the Tet offensive. Lt Mat Hai, Assistant S-4, understood the problems faced by the refugees and as a result the refugee centers received proper support. A great deal of progress has been made by the Province in planning for the reconstruction of the homes and buildings which were destroyed by the Tet offensive. GVN has been so successful in dealing with the refugee problem that out of the eight refugee centers set up because of the crisis, only one remains. The number of refugees has dropped from over 11,000 to less than 600. In Le Trung District, more Montagnards are understanding the proper channels which must be used to have projects accomplished in their villages, and the village chiefs are now going to the District Chief for help. While working on a school construction project at Flei Ngo, team 15 also began a MEDCAP and sanitation program. In addition to arranging for a doctor and regular MEDCAPS, they secured a supply of DDT and two spray cans. They instructed the villagers on the proper use of the insecticide and spray cans, and the villagers then sprayed all houses in the village resulting in a reduction of insects in the area.

d. TRAINING:

(1) As a result of the Tet offensive the MACCORDS Orientation Course was cancelled for the month of February. This unit was not notified that classes would resume in March, and consequently no one from the unit attended. A total of six officers attended the April class.

(2) In order to provide familiarization with individual weapons, and to meet training requirements, headquarters personnel fired a weapons familiarization course on 17 March 1968. The course consisted of battle-sight zeroing and familiarization firing. The class was held at the ROK 1st Log Comd Firing Range.

(3) A civil affairs/civic action seminar was held 28-30 March for the benefit of the 41st Civil Affairs Company's team chiefs. All teams were represented with the exception of teams attached to the 29th Civil Affairs Company in I CTZ. The conference was held in the CORDS Conference Room, MACV compound in Nha Trang. Classes were conducted on the various aspects of civil affairs. Personnel from Company Headquarters discussed administrative problems, and guest speakers from IFFV-CORDS explained their functions and discussed ways in which they could aid the teams. This conference provided the team chiefs from various locations throughout II CTZ an opportunity to discuss among themselves the problems and successes they have experienced. They also had the opportunity to discuss ideas with representatives of other agencies who are concerned with the same areas of interest.

(4) A total of nine (9) Information Bulletins were published during the reporting period. These were of two types: one type covered general and command information such as piaster expenditure, educational opportunities, character guidance and new or revised regulations and orders; the other type presented articles written by company personnel concerning subjects of extreme importance or special interest.

e. PSYWAR:

(1) The Tet offensive created a great need for PSYWAR operations throughout RVN. The terrorism and violent attacks staged by the Viet Cong created

thousands of refugees. Psychological operations were implemented to reassure the civilians that GVN had control of the situation and was aware of their plight.

(2) In Phan Thiet teams 7 and 12 have worked extensively with US and ARVN PSYOPS units, usually in combination with MEDCAP operations. The Vietnamese Navy has also joined in the MEDCAPs and distributed pamphlets and posters. The team medic used PSYOPS leaflets to wrap medicine in, and by using two or three different messages in each village he insured good distribution. ARVN Lt Hoa and Lt Pierce, 327th Psyops Det. have worked closely with civil affairs teams, making speeches, passing out leaflets, and showing movies during the MEDCAPS

(3) Team 11 at Phu My obtained 2,000 Vietnamese newspapers from S-5 2nd Bde, 1st Cavalry Div and distributed them. The people eagerly took and read the single sheet paper. They appeared to be hungry for the printed word, so arrangements were made to obtain 2,000 papers per week for distribution.

(4) Team 4 at Song Mao conducted MEDCAPs with VIS teams from Hoa Da District. The VIS distribute leaflets and make loudspeaker announcements during the MEDCAP. Plans are being made to extend this service to adjoining Districts. The PSYOPS team from Phan Thiet spent 3 days in the area immediately after Tet broadcasting to the VC in the Cham and Nung dialects there are approximately 34,000 Chams and Nungs in the area). The Hoa Da District chief also toured the district with the VIS team after the Tet offensive to give reassurance to his people.

(5) Team 2 has been accompanied by ARVN personnel about 75% of the time. These personnel are members of Darlac Province's S-5/Psywar Group. They have been very effective in spreading information and explaining policies to the people. In addition, health and sanitation leaflets have been printed by 8th PSYOPS Bn in the Rhae dialect to be distributed by the team among the Montagnards. Team 6 at An Khe has been working with the Armed Propaganda Team that recently began operations in that area, attempting in conjunction with MEDCAPS, to improve the Chieu Hoi Program in An Tuc District. The team is also showing movies on health, sanitation and PSYOPS directed against the VC. Team 14 at Qui Nhon has also begun to use an Armed Propaganda Team (APT) to support their MEDCAP. The APT has passed out leaflets, talked to the villagers about the Government of Vietnam and the Chieu Hoi program. In addition, the APT has searched out the surrounding hamlets for sick to treat at the MEDCAP.

f. LOGISTICS:

(1) Supply: Supply support was furnished by 148 S&S Co, APO 96350. Maintenance was furnished by 63rd DS Maintenance Co, APO 96350. Requisitions for supplies have been filled much quicker during this quarter. This unit received nine (9) AN/PRC-25 radios this quarter but communication equipment is still a critical item, with only 18 radios on hand of the 64 authorized. Mosquito nets are still critically short. A requisition for these nets was made 6 September 67 and two follow-ups have been placed since then.

(2) Civilian Supply:

During the period 1 February 68 through 30 April 68 the following items were shipped to the teams for civic action activities:

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- (a) Food 2,920 lbs
- (b) Tin 6,000 lbs
- (c) Culvert 340 linear ft
- (d) Nails 900 lbs
- (e) Toys 100
- (f) Lumber 20 tons
- (g) Text Books 300
- (h) Health iterns 500 lbs
- (i) Chairs 26
- (j) Brick machines 2
- (k) Carpentry Kits 171
- (l) Phys Ed Kits 16
- (m) Masonry Kits 24
- (n) Resettler Kits 70
- (o) Textile Kits 100
- (p) Midwife Kits 3
- (q) Sewing Kits 150

Mr Charlie Kaiser, CARE, informed Civilian Supply that CARE was requesting permission from their home office to discontinue their supply of kits because they wish to begin funding projects. At present sufficient funds are available through other sources to cover civic action needs, and the kits provided by CARE are an invaluable aid which would be extremely difficult to replace. Some of the iterns contained in the kits are almost impossible for teams in remote areas to obtain otherwise.

g. PERSONNEL:

(1) Since 1 January 68 this unit has lost 15 highly trained civil affairs officers to other activities such as RF/PF advisor teams and project Phoenix. This loss coupled with the normal rotation has put a heavy drain on our officers who are vitally needed in civil affairs work. These officers were taken from unit's functional teams which consist of only six men, and the loss of even one individual limits the teams ability to perform its assigned mission.

- (2) Authorized Strength: 140
- Average Strength For: Feb 1968-124
- Mar 1968-130
- Apr 1968-123

(3) Casualties

<u>FEB</u>		<u>MAR</u>		<u>APR</u>	
KIA	WIA	KIA	WIA	KIA	WIA
0	0	0	0	1	1

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(4) Promotions

<u>ILT</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E4</u>
15	1	7	7

(5) Awards and Decorations

<u>BSM</u>	<u>ARCOM</u>	<u>CERT OF ACHIEVEMENT</u>
5	7	1

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2. SECTION II, LESSONS LEARNED: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

a. PERSONNEL:

(1) ITEM: Loss of Civil Affairs Trained Officers

(a) OBSERVATION: This unit has lost a substantial number of Civil Affairs trained officers to other activities within Vietnam during this past quarter. Similar losses could be avoided in the future.

(b) EVALUATION: This company has lost 15 officers since 1 Jan 68 because of levies imposed for RF/PF advisors, Project Phoenix, etc. This situation would have seriously degraded the unit's ability to perform its mission had it not been for outstanding performance of duty by the officers and enlisted men remaining. This unit does have a greater number of officers assigned than most units of comparable size, but these officers are authorized by DA TOE in order to furnish the company with personnel having the necessary rank, skill and experience to accomplish its mission. While no officer is indispensable, each contributes a different skill to the operation of the team in the field. It is the sum of this variety of skills among the officers (and enlisted men) which makes possible the success of a Civil Affairs team. The loss of even one officer from a Civil Affairs team is in no way comparable to the loss experienced by a rifle company when it loses one platoon leader. The platoon leader can be, and usually is, replaced at least temporarily by his platoon sergeant, but this company has no internal source of replacements for these trained Civil Affairs specialists.

During this past quarter, the company received external replacements for the cited losses within a reasonable period of time. These replacements were not all Civil Affairs trained, however, and thus their effectiveness and contribution to the team effort were to some extent limited during the time they were being trained. Further, since most of these replacements were combat arms officers, they too became subject to levy just when they had become productive members of their teams.

This problem would be alleviated to a large extent if Civil Affairs were made an active Army branch as well as a USAR branch. If the branch were active, the officers assigned to the various Civil Affairs groups, companies and detachments could be detailed to the branch for the duration of their assignment to the units, and thus could wear the existing Civil Affairs branch insignia. A branch detail of this nature would make the individual officer less vulnerable to the many levies imposed by higher headquarters, and would provide greater stability of assignment for the officer and his unit. Furthermore, detail to the branch and wearing of the branch insignia would generate an increased sense of identity with the Civil Affairs mission in all individuals and units concerned.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That Civil Affairs be made an active Army branch, and that officers assigned to active Army Civil Affairs units be detailed to that branch for the duration of their assignment to the unit.

b. OPERATIONS:

(1) ITEM: ARVN Military Support of Civic Action

(a) OBSERVATION: The amount of military civic action performed by ARVN units varies among the units.

(b) EVALUATION: Civil Affairs teams often have difficulty in getting ARVN units to perform military civic action. One reason for this is the fact that many of the ARVN and their dependents live in deplorable conditions, in some cases no better than the refugees. It is unrealistic to expect them to render assistance to the people while their own standard of living is so low. 16

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That efforts be made to improve the living conditions of ARVN soldiers and their dependents. This would greatly increase their support of the GVN, and make them much more receptive to proposed participation in civic action projects.

(2) ITEM: RF/PF Support of Revolutionary Development

(a) OBSERVATION: The RF/PF are generally more receptive to aiding self help projects than are ARVN units.

(b) EVALUATION: In most cases RF/PF troops are stationed near their homes and villages, thus community development benefits them as well as the civilians. Use of RF/PF, even though they are local citizens, gives the civilian a feeling of government participation since the RF/PF are GVN Forces. Much of the support obtained from these units hinges on the attitude of the local US advisor. If the advisor is actively interested in RD work he can do much to stimulate the interest on the part of the RF/PF. The comments stated above concerning ARVN living conditions applies even more strongly in case of the RF/PF.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That personnel involved in RD work contact the local RF/PF through their US advisors if any are assigned, and encourage their active participation in the RD program.

(3) ITEM: Black Market Commodities

(a) OBSERVATION: It has been noted that a certain amount of commodities that are distributed, for example in refugee relief, will find their way into the black market.

(b) EVALUATION: Certain commodities such as rice, salt, soap, etc, are distributed regularly in refugee relief, sanitation programs, etc. One method to prevent these items from reaching the black market is to deface the items, such as, bars of soap should have the wrappers removed and the bars cut in half. Rice, salt and cooking oil should not be distributed in the original containers if it can be prevented. Have the people bring their own containers and fill them from the original.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the above measures be followed to prevent flow of items to the black market.

(4) ITEM: Animal Husbandry in Central Highlands

(a) OBSERVATION: Successful husbandry projects are difficult to implement in the highlands with imported stock.

(b) EVALUATION: A pig raising project was attempted near Pleiku, but it was found that the mortality rate among the piglets was around 70%. Several factors contributed to the high rate:

- 11
- (1) The piglets were too young when received.
 - (2) The Montagnards had no means of feeding the young pigs.
 - (3) The pigs had suffered abuse in shipment.

(4) The climate was not compatible. Fresh vegetables are essential to successful pig-husbandry and the Montagnards do not have enough food to share with the animals. The animal must have the instinct for scavenging foods such as fruit, banana tree stalks, etc. The native animals have this instinct, and imported animals do not.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That full grown native pigs or weanling native piglets be purchased and bred in the area in order to condition the young pigs to the climate and diet of the area.

c. LOGISTICS:


- (1) ITEM: CARE Kits

(a) OBSERVATION: The various kits supplied through CARE have been valuable aids, in Revolutionary Development.

(b) EVALUATION: Civil Affairs teams have relied heavily upon CARE kits such as the resettler, carpentry, and school kits. These have been particularly helpful in refugee relief where it is necessary to help the people regain their equilibrium and become self-sufficient as rapidly as possible. In isolated areas such as Edap Enang, Bong Son, and Song Mao it is virtually impossible to purchase the items contained in these kits. Even though funds are available, the items are simply not to be had.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That CARE continue to supply these kits.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


WILLIAM R. BEAVERS
CPT, AGC
Adjutant

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AVFA-GC-OT (3 May 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 41st Civil Affairs Company for Period
Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350 3 JUN 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam,
ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96350

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and makes the following recommendations or comments:

a. Reference paragraph 2a(1) Section II page 13, Loss of Civil Affairs Trained Officers. The recommendation for the establishment of Civil Affairs as an active Army branch possibly deserves study by Department of the Army however this headquarters does not concur with the basic recommendation that Civil Affairs units not be subject to personnel levies. Senior commanders are well aware of the interference created by officer losses or levies; however, the commander cannot be denied flexibility in reassignment of officers as priorities and importance of unit missions and command programs change.

b. Reference paragraph 2b(2) Section II page 14, RF/PF Support of Revolutionary Development. The active role to be taken by RF/PF advisors in Revolutionary Development was presented to the advisors by the R/CA Division of CORDS at the RF/PF advisors conference held in Nha Trang on 18 May 1968. Continuous emphasis is being placed on Revolutionary Development by this headquarters.

c. Reference paragraph 2b(3) Section II page 14, Black Market Commodities. Appropriate action will be taken by the Civil Affairs Branch of CORDS in disseminating the suggested methods of keeping relief goods out of the black market system.

d. Reference paragraph 2b(4) Section II page 14, Animal Husbandry in Central Highlands. In addition to full-grown native pigs recommend weanling native piglets also be purchased. Purchase and selection of pigs should be coordinated with the Vietnamese Animal Husbandry Service. Local purchase of pigs can be made from pacification funds.

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AVFA-GC-OT (3 May 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 41st Civil Affairs Company for Period
Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

e. Reference paragraph 2c(1) Section II page 15, CARE Kits.
The CARE Kits are no longer available thru CARE channels however the
41st Civil Affairs Company has been notified these items are avail-
able thru CORDS logistical channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



JAMES P. GASTON
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:

2 - ACSFOR, DA, Wash DC 20310
1 - 41st Civ Aff Co

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DST (3 May 68) 2d Ind CPT Arnold/hga/LEN 4485
ECT: Operational Report of 41st Civil Affairs Company for Period
Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)


HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 13 JUN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 41st Civil Affairs Company, as indorsed.

2. Reference item concerning loss of civil affairs trained officers, page 13, paragraph 2a(1): Nonconcur. Personnel levies for the RF/PF Advisor Program are made only after careful evaluation of current and projected personnel assets of USARV major subordinate commands; levies within each major subordinate command are made at the discretion of the commander. To detail qualified officers to Civil Affairs Branch or to otherwise exempt these officers from levy to satisfy RF/PF requirements would reduce commanders' flexibility in reassignment of officers as priorities and importance of unit missions and command programs change.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


JOHN V. GETCHELL
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:
HQ, I FFORCEV
HQ, 41st CA Co

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GPOP-DT (3 May 68) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 41st Civil Affairs for Period Ending
30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 27 JUN 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C.L. Short

C.L. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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