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CORG MEMORANDUM
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**POLITICAL EDUCATION
IN THE
ARMY OF COMMUNIST CHINA**

by

Brenda Atkinson

July 1967

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Fort Belvoir in 22060

Prepared by
TECHNICAL OPERATIONS, INCORPORATED
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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND
FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA

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ABSTRACT

This is a study of the political education in the Chinese Communist Army. It deals with two major areas: The parallel systems of organization for political control; and, the formal and in-service political education of officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men.

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FOREWORD

This memorandum is part of a larger CORG study effort, that resulted in six reports. The first report, CORG-M-293, US Army Socio-Political Education Requirements for Internal Defense and Internal Development Operations, contained the main portions of the investigative effort, including the discussion of the problem, conclusions and recommendations. The other five reports, including this report, are supporting documents. Previous Army operations which involved or touched upon the considerations of the overall study are covered in CORG-M-310, The United States Soldier in a Nonviolent Role: An Historical Overview. The Russian military educational system for political instruction is described in CORG-M-312, Political Education in the Army of the Soviet Union. A lesser known system of political instruction within a military structure is covered in CORG-M-314, Political Indoctrination in the Wehrmacht. The history, theory, fallacies, and practice of communism is covered in CORG-M-311, Communism in Review.

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SUMMARY

This memorandum discusses the political education in the Army of Communist China. Attention is focused on two major areas of interest. The first is the relations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The second area of concentration is the political education and indoctrination system for officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men.

As in the army of the Soviet Union, political indoctrination and control plays a most important role within the PLA; in fact, it is given greater emphasis in Communist China. Mao Tse-tung believes that power relies heavily on the continued "revolutionary consciousness" and political reliability of the people, and particularly in the army. His basic tenet, "politics is in Command" further stresses his belief in strong political control over all aspects of military life.

Through a parallel system of organization, political control is exercised throughout the military establishment. This political hierarchy is controlled through the General Political Department and its administrative apparatus, which is ostensibly located in the Ministry of Defense, but is directly responsible to the Military Affairs Committee (MAC). The MAC plays the lead role in politico-military affairs and is the Party's organization within the military. Its responsibilities include the formation and implementation of military policy and strategy as well as political training. The MAC in turn takes orders from the CCP Politburo at the highest levels of Party organization.

The political education for officers, NCO's, and enlisted men consists of both a formal network of military schools and in-service indoctrination. Continuous emphasis in both forms of education centers around the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung. This includes Mao's selected military works on strategy and tactics, and his two essays entitled "On Practice" and "On Contradiction." It is interesting to note that Maoism is the main element to be studied. The workings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin are reserved for those on a higher educational level. The more strategic the location of troops, the greater the intensity of Maoist indoctrination.

In the role of in-service education, the small study group (or thought session) is of extreme importance. Maoist propaganda is constantly emphasized. The duration of a particular indoctrination campaign must be delicately planned. There is a saturation point at which the political lesson becomes a source of irritation. Topics deal with Mao's works, history of the CCP, MAC and Party directives, and a Communist explanation of domestic programs.

Besides this all members of the armed forces must engage in Hsia-fang (an officer-back-to-the-ranks work program) and other everyday tasks, imbued with what is termed "living political education." Both serve as a source of irritation to many officers.

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The reason for this political indoctrination of the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung is to insure continued Party control of the military. The Chinese leadership needs to emphasize an external threat (the US) to take the minds of the troops off immediate woes, and thus place the blame for all ills on "imperialists and revisionists." Furthermore the low level of technology and education, plus the economic constraints, often place a limitation of actual training programs, and therefore time must be used for political indoctrination.

Despite this the Chinese leadership has incurred many problems in its handling of the military, as best exemplified by the chaotic situation today. The problem of emphasis, the development of a more sophisticated and technologically oriented Army as opposed to a reliance on revolutionary consciousness and mass technique plus self advancement remains a most pertinent problem that must be resolved.

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POLITICAL EDUCATION

IN THE

ARMY OF COMMUNIST CHINA

INTRODUCTION

Background

Mao Tse-tung has constantly pointed out that "politics is in command." In 1938 Mao enunciated a basic rule when he stated: "Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun will never be allowed to command the Party" (Ref 1, p 272).

Under Party control the armed forces have had exceptionally diversified missions. Besides playing a traditional military role, they have been a labor force, a mass medium of indoctrination, and a training school for administrative cadres and more recently for technicians, valuable to the underdeveloped Chinese economy. Obviously, they also serve as the major external security force and internal bulwark for the Party. It is only natural, in its role in contemporary Chinese Communist society, that the Party places strong emphasis on the control and indoctrination of the armed forces and thus maintains a complex and penetrating Party apparatus within the PIA to achieve these objectives.

"Mao's resolution" has recently been reiterated by the Military Affairs Committee, a Party power organization, stressing its "timelessness" and importance for present and future activities. This resolution, which clearly illustrates the character of the military and the supremacy of the Party over its entire organization is as follows:

"The foundation of an army lies in its soldiers. Without introducing a progressive political spirit into the Army, without progressive political work to make such an introduction, it is impossible to achieve real unity between officers and soldiers, to stimulate to the greatest degree their enthusiasm for fighting the war of resistance. Thus, all techniques and tactics will lack a fine foundation for showing their due effectiveness. Politics is both the supreme commander and the soul; political work is the life line of our Army and the fundamental assurance for the success of all our work. Successful implementation of our political work and a full display of men's positivism and creativeness will enable us to make good achievements in other work. Starting from this point and getting through with it, we shall find all other differences easy to overcome. Therefore, in all work the supremacy of politics must be emphasized. Political work must be carried into all operational activities, and political leadership must be enforced in accordance with the concrete situation. Party members, league members, and the entire body of combat leaders should be utilized to do political work." (Ref 2, p 67 - underlines are those of the author.)

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The Communist Party has always been in control of the People's Liberation Army since its inception as a guerrilla organization in North China in the late 1920's. Instruction in Army schools has always been heavily, if not predominantly, political. A specific organization, the General Political Department (GPD), was established in the PLA command structure in the late 1930's for the purpose of directing all political indoctrination.

The expansion and development of the PLA after 1949 led to the need to train increasing numbers of men in technical specialties. The increased requirement for technical competence and knowledge led to a conflict with the pre-existing Party-imposed requirement for political indoctrination. The struggle between professionalism and political reliability has fluctuated back and forth somewhat, but the Party has remained in control of the Army and at present is strengthening its hold as evidenced by the Red Guard conflict. While there is a definite conflict between Army and Party in China, it should be emphasized that at the highest levels the two are identical, since nearly all Party leaders are old Army men.

The Military Affairs Committee

The Military Affairs Committee (MAC) plays the leading role in politico-military affairs and is the Party's power organization within the military. It is the main link between the Party leadership and the military establishment. Although the Party Constitution states that the GPD of the PLA, under direction of the CCP Central Committee, is in charge of Party organizational and ideological work among the armed forces, in reality, the MAC represents the Party leadership and the GPD is the MAC's principle agency for such work in the PLA.

The responsibilities of MAC are extensive. The MAC has the key role in the formation and implementation of the military policy and strategy as well as political training. It is responsible to the Party for all operations, administration, and logistics within the PLA. It has launched campaigns to improve both the combat readiness and the political reliability of the PLA. It was also responsible for initiating the use of the PLA as a labor force during the Great Leap Forward (GLF) (Ref 3). No reference has been found that specifically mentions MAC activities in the development of nuclear weapons and doctrine, but presumably it would be responsible for the high-level planning and supervision necessary in the atomic energy field.

The membership of MAC is very influential and provides an excellent example of the Party's "multiple hat" policy, or the practice of dominating other major state institutions by placing Party members in controlling positions. In addition to their high Party and government posts the known members of MAC occupy most of the key military and military-related posts in the CPR. All the members of MAC are specialists in maintaining political power. However, while MAC supervises the armed forces, none of its members is now known to directly command troops (Ref 3, pp 350-352).

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The CCP, like the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), employs a complex and highly integrated system of controls which extends into every aspect of military life. The PLA contains a political hierarchy parallel to and integrated with the regular military structure. This political hierarchy is controlled by the General Political Department (GPD), which is directly responsible to the MAC. The MAC takes its orders in turn from the CCP Political Bureau at the highest level of Party organizations. Party control over the Army is exercised through a GPD network of Party committees. Involving approximately 120,000 political personnel, these Party committees are arranged in parallel with Army units, with a Party branch at the company level, and a cell in each platoon. Each Party committee consists of a political officer assigned by the GPD, the Commanding Officer, and other senior personnel. The ranking political officer or cadre in each unit has the authority and responsibility to initiate and supervise all ideological and "cultural" activities in his unit. The Party committee is required to report to the local civilian Party organization in the county in which the unit is located. This ensures civilian Party control of all military activities. These activities include propaganda, education, entertainment, relations with civilians and army dependents, postal service and censorship, and youth work. The GPD also maintains intelligence and counter-intelligence networks under the Ministry of Public Security (MPA) and Public Security Forces (PSF) both within and outside military units to guard the internal security of the PLA. All GPD personnel work closely with the CCP and the Young Communist League (YCL) members serving in the Army.

The GPD conducts a check every six months on all headquarters, military arms, branches of service, military regions, districts, academies, and schools to insure adherence to party directives. This is also done on a yearly basis by the MAC. It was found during the 1960-61 period that Party leadership organs from the company level upward were suffering from corruption and overstuffed, crowded conditions which resulted in poor work and chaotic administration. This situation was supposedly rectified. As of February 1961, 82 percent of the total number of Party branches in the army were "adjusted" (purged). It was further decided that only a limited number of cadres be assigned to a company-level organization at any one time (Ref 2, pp 384 and 593).

The Party Committee

The company is considered to be the basic unit for both combat and political work. The political officers of companies are assigned by the political department to do Party and mass work within their unit. Just as the military commander has his own staff, so does the political officer. The political officer's principal duties include carrying out political indoctrination, providing leadership for company mass organs, implementing Party policies and orders from higher levels, insuring completion of military training, and personally visiting platoons and squads to know the men and become familiar with their problems (Ref 3, p 9).

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In addition to the company political officer, the Party committees have other agents assisting in their control functions. These include liaison men recruited from reliable Party-member enlisted men. They are to report on the actual situations in their company. Other agents are from local Party civilian organizations.

These Party committees are said to be the "operational core of unified Party leadership." The control system implies a division of responsibilities at each level, but under the leadership of Party committees. Both commanders and political officers, as well as the staff departments, are placed under the committees. Ideally, the decisions of the Party committee are given to the military commander and political commissar for implementation. Theoretically, there is a division of labor between these two. In practice however, problems arise in the functional relationship between them. In the event of a dispute between officer and commissar, the matter is presumably referred to the Party committee. This is a doubtful arrangement since the commissar is the secretary of the Party committee and in the position of authority. Thus, in this situation, the authority of the military officer is not commensurate with his responsibility.

The commissar system in itself is an outward acknowledgement of Party distrust of the military. The actual presence of a political commissar in a unit questions a military commander's political reliability. As the officers begin to question the wisdom of Party leadership and doctrine, the Party naturally tightens its grip over the armed forces.

The National People's Congress

Top control of the armed forces of Communist China is constitutionally invested in the National People's Congress, or its Standing Committee when it is not in session. The Congress "elects" the chairman of the Chinese People's Republic who is ex officio Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and Chairman of the National Defense Council, a policy-making advisory and planning organization, whose members are chosen by the Congress and Commander-in-Chief. It has little actual power, being mainly honorific. The Congress or its Standing Committee also selects the members of the State Council of which the Ministry of National Defense is part.

The Ministry of National Defense, its general staff, departments, and the headquarters of the arms and services comprise the top command and administrative organization generally known as "Headquarters, People's Liberation Army." These are controlled by, and responsible to, not the Ministry of National Defense, but the Military Affairs Committee. Staff sections include:

1. The General Political Department discussed above.
2. The General Cadres Department which is responsible for routine personnel administration.

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3. The General Training Department which formulates overall policies for the training of the armed forces and for coordinating the military education system. It exercises staff supervision over the national military schools controlled by the Ministry of National Defense, the training installations of military command areas, and training programs developed by the headquarters of the various arms and services. Under its jurisdiction is the Academy of Military Science.

4. The General Rear Service Department which is concerned with logistic requirements and all the planning and problems associated with them.

5. The Armed Forces Supervisory Department, which is in charge of combat readiness and has the responsibility of assuring that military training is carried out in the approved fashion.

Overall policy for the PLA is formulated by the Chinese Communist Party through its Politburo and the MAC, which make all important military policy decisions with Politburo approval. Policy control of the armed forces is effected through Party control of the National People's Congress, Standing Committee, State Council, and the political organization within the armed forces.

POLITICAL EDUCATION IN THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

General

This section of the memorandum will deal mainly with the political education of PLA officers (including NCO's) and enlisted men. The education of Army personnel may be divided into three categories: political indoctrination, is by definition political education. The remaining two, however, are also thoroughly permeated by ChiCom politics and propaganda. Actual military training maneuvers are hampered severely by a conflict of interest in the preservation of materials and equipment and in the needs of military training. This is due in the most part to the low level of the national defense industry, and the low level of technology. Spare parts and fuel for military use is also a grave problem.

There are two basic types of political education in the PLA: formal education, the Military Academies and School Programs; and in-service education, which consists of lecture, discussion, and study sessions, living education, and work teams. Both types will be described in some detail, although information on course curriculum is very limited.

Today, under Lin Piao, the entire PLA is in the throes of an improvement campaign in both combat effectiveness and political indoctrination. The main emphasis is on the principle of "politics in command." Intensive mass propaganda campaigns have been initiated to ensure that all soldiers

¹ Lin Piao is currently one of the most powerful men in Communist China. The positions he holds include: Member of the Central Committee and Politburo; Vice Chairman of the National Defense Council; Vice Premier

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will follow the "five-point principle" set forth by Lin Piao in November 1965. The five points are:

1. Creative study and application, particularly application of the works of Mao Tse-tung;
2. Perseverance in upholding the "four firsts", (giving first place to the human factor, political work, ideological work, and the living ideas of man);
3. Dispatch of leading cadres to the basic unit to give leadership for the "four-good" companies campaign (good in political and ideological work, 3-8 style (see p. 16), military training, management of army livelihood);
4. Promotion of good officers and men to key posts of responsibility (based on political reliability);
5. Hard training to master first class techniques and tactics of fighting at close quarters and at night. (Ref 9).

The military establishment is directed by the Party to combine the formal military training in academies and schools with in-service training. The slogan for this directive is "compactness and quality." According to a General Political Department directive, the breakdown of training time per year for PLA units is as follows:

Military Training	60%
Political and Cultural Training	40%
Political education	25%
Cultural education	15%

(Ref 2, p 116)

The Administrative Council of the Military Affairs Commission and Lin Piao maintained that the time of training in each year could be arranged in one of the following three ways by each combat arms:

1. Eight months of training a year, seven hours a day
 2. Eight months of training a year, eight hours a day
 3. Nine months of training a year, seven hours a day
- Ref 2, p 36)

The military training time per year for border troops and troops in troubled areas supposedly is 60 to 70 percent of the total time (Ref 2, p 218). Two to four months of the military training time for all PLA units is to be spent in "special training" (Ref 2, p 22).

Much of the military training is carried out through political tasks. The remainder of time in each day and remaining months is to be devoted to political indoctrination, living education, work, and athletics.

of the State Council; Minister of National Defense; Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee.

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It was further decided by the party, and announced through one of their military organs that the contents of all areas of political education should emphasize the following four points:

1. Each situation should be explained with emphasis on favorable aspects.
2. Present internal difficulties in any area and of any type must be explained, but the overall 'good condition' of the country must be emphasized. Difficulties are to be depicted as limited to only small areas. The cause of internal "disasters" is blamed on natural calamities and counter-revolutionary elements.
3. Party policy, and all directives issued by the "Central Authorities, Chairman Mao, and the Military Affairs Commission" are explained as "consistently correct." If a directive is issued to launch a program or "rectify" a situation (the Great Leap Forward, for example) and the result is chaos and failure, the blame must be depicted as falling not on the issuing top hierarchy, but on poor management of the program and failure of lower cadres to "properly" carry out the directive.
4. The measures and favorable conditions for overcoming difficulties must constantly be clearly explained. This is to insure the obedience of all officers and soldiers to the regime, no matter what difficulties occur (Ref 2, pp 16-17).

In all military political education, both formal and in-service, selected writings of Mao must be read and then used for "contemporary practical application." It is one method of "persuasive" education. The basic text for the entire Army is the fourth volume of the Collected Works of Mao Tse-tung, which is required reading. (This is available in the US in a Peking translation entitled, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung.) High priority is also given to reading Lin Piao's, How to be a Good Communist, and The Liberation Army Journal.

The campaign to study the thought of Mao Tse-tung was launched with great intensity in 1960 and continues to the present. It is interesting to note that priority is given to thorough study of the works of Mao rather than the writings of Marx or Lenin. As a political or military officer or cadre goes up in rank or position, however, emphasis is placed on the necessity of studying the works of Marx, Engles, Lenin, and Stalin.

The emphasis placed on studying Mao's writings is obviously for practical political purposes. The many references in contemporary literature and newspaper pronouncements dealing with "undesirable elements and conditions" alludes to the fact that anti-regime or anti-regime-policy groups must exist. Mao has stated: "We must use the positive spirit of Marxism to deal with and remove unreasoning desire for freedom" (Ref 2, p 342). It is also, in all probability, an attempt to raise the revolutionary consciousness and patriotic zeal of the troops, since the theme of Mao's writings dwells on military tactics in the wars

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against Japan and the Kuomintang. Mao has repeatedly stated in the past that "The numbing thought of peace is bad for military training and political education" (Ref 2, p 330).

Officer Political Education

General

This section on officer political education will include both the formal and in-service programs and will consider officers, NCO's, and cadres of equivalent rank who receive similar training. From the limited literature available it is difficult to distinguish separate course curricula for the three groups represented. There is, however, a difference in the level of intensity, depth, and amount of course work required for each group and for each rank in corresponding courses. It must be emphasized that cadres are the command party personnel, a permanent staff of trained political workers in controlling organizations of the machinery of state. A cadre can be in any realm of society - political, military, economic etc. All, however, are considered to be politically reliable Party members, who have already received a fair level of political indoctrination. The political cadres within the PLA must undergo the military training corresponding to their level in the political apparatus to better enable them to perform their functions within the military establishment. The military position of the lowest-level cadre in the PLA would correspond to squad leader (sergeant) or deputy squad leader (corporal). It appears that the system of military academies and schools in general (excluding certain high-level specialized institutions) does not distinguish between officers and cadres. This has created a problem for the regime since the needed education is not always appropriate to the level of those taught.

All political officers receive on-the-job training in military specialties, and all military officers attend off-duty schools to raise their educational level and increase their professional competence.

Formal Education

There are approximately 300,000 officers in the PLA. In general, all officers are expected to render active service for life, which contributes to the professional attitude of the officer in the PLA. The general characteristics of the ChiCom officer are of interest. Second and first lieutenants are between 18 and 23 years of age and inexperienced. Most gain these ranks by direct commission on graduation from an eight-month course at a military school. All are said to be in excellent physical condition, politically reliable, and literate. Most have had a full middle-school education. A minority of this group has been promoted from the senior NCO ranks.

The field grade officers have, in general, less formal education than company grade officers. They are the experienced veterans of the Civil and Korean Wars and are considered politically reliable.

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Applications for the officers candidate schools in aviation, naval, tank, artillery, air defense, and "others" are sent to the military officer's recommendation committees located in schools and factories throughout the country. Applicants range from university and middle school students (students in the departments of mechanical engineering, aeronautics, civil engineering, electrical engineering, hydraulic engineering, and shipbuilding) to technicians with a scholastic level above that of the first term of the second year of the junior middle school or its equivalent, and to young workers with the cultural level of the elementary school. The periods of training are set at one year for aviation school, two years for naval school, one year for artillery, and eight months for tank school. Other known specialized military schools, with their period of study and entrance requirements, are as follows:

<u>School</u>	<u>Period of Study</u>	<u>Entrance Requirements</u>
Medical	4 years	One year of senior middle school or equivalent
Intermediate Medical	2 years	One year of junior middle school or equivalent
Telecommunications Engineering	2 years	One year of junior middle school or equivalent
Elementary Communications	1.5 years	One year of senior middle school or equivalent
Radio Operators	9 months	One year of junior middle school or equivalent
Higher Army Supplies	2 years	One year of senior middle school or equivalent
Lower Army Supplies	1 year	One year of junior middle school or equivalent
Public Security Cadres	6 months	At least junior middle school
Foreign Languages and Russian Language	2-3 years	Two years of senior middle school or equivalent

(Ref 4, pp 20-21)

The PLA has established an adequate school system providing for branch training of officers at all levels and for the technical training of specialists in the fields of engineering motor mechanics, radio and radar operations and repair, medicine, and chemical warfare. Initially, they were established on the Soviet pattern with the assistance of Russian advisors and instructors. However, since 1960 all Soviet personnel have withdrawn.

At the top of the military education framework is the Academy for Military Science of the Chinese Red Army. Founded in March 1958, it is designed for extensive training of high command echelons of the officer

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corps. The curriculum consists of the political study of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism plus instruction in the use of the latest scientific and technical developments. It also serves as a research institute (Ref 5, p 85).

Another top-ranking academy for PLA officers and cadres is the Marx-Lenin Political Academy located in Peking. All its educational courses are said to be based on the principle of "one line and five combinations." "One line" means to use the best of Party policies to study the thought of Mao Tse-tung. "Five combinations" means combine the studying of Mao's works with the selected principle writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin; with the study of Party lines, policies, and resolutions; with international and domestic situations and army building; with the study of special subjects; and with combining general theoretical education with political movements (Ref 2, p 231).

Lin Piao has stated that studying Mao's thought is the short-cut to studying Marxism-Leninism. Political Academy courses in Socialist and Communist education include such "philosophical" works as Mao's "On Contradiction," "On Practice," and "Six Articles on the Working Method." (This particular course is also taught to enlisted men who are selected to attend the Political Academy on a rotation basis.) The duration of the course is five months. It is the party opinion that courses in the Communist education curriculum, which also deal with the classical writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, should be limited to officers of a certain educational level (Ref 2, p 227).

Also introduced into the Political Academy's curriculum on Maoism are three documents cited for thorough study. The Resolution of the Kut' ien Conference, the Resolution on Strengthening Political and Ideological Work in the Army, and the Report of the Political Department of a Garrison Force to the Senior Cadres' Meeting of the Northwest Bureau (written under the personal direction of Mao to illustrate how to implement his thoughts into living educational programs) (Ref 2, p 288).

In addition every military man at the Political Academy is expected to read several newspapers daily, and to continue this practice upon course completion.

The Political Schools for ChiCom PLA officers and cadres are very important to the leadership. They are termed as the crucible for the training of cadres. Much of the curriculum consists of Party and MAC directives which are studied and then implementation explained. Great emphasis is also, of course, placed upon the studying of Mao's works; his Volume IV is the basic text.

The First School of Political Study is a one-year program for junior grade officers and cadres. It was opened in 1954 with a four-course curriculum in: philosophy, history of the CCP, political economy, and political work in the PLA. The philosophy and political economy courses were eliminated and replaced by courses in history and politics of socialist nations (presumably intercommunist bloc history), commune education, and dogmatism and revisionism (probably anti-Soviet in character).

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Reading of the formal literature was then combined with the ChiCom teaching methods of discussion, debate, and field trips.

In 1961 the curriculum was augmented by courses entitled "Questions of War and Peace," "The Twelve Articles" (on the commune program, and "The Resolution of the Enlarged Meeting of the Military Affairs Commission" concerning "Strengthening Political and Ideological Work in the Army" and "Rules and Regulations for Work of Supervisory Education in Company Units of the Chinese People's Liberation Army" (Ref 2, p 450). The other Political Academies of equivalent level presumably follow this general curriculum.

In 1956 the Central Committee established extensive five-year political indoctrination courses, presumably at several of the political academies throughout the country, for all military officers above the rank of senior captain. This was probably done to aid in curbing the air of military professionalism which was beginning to plague PLA officer ranks. The actual curriculum is not known.

The Shihkiachwang Infantry School is another institution of which something is known. Formally a part of the North China Military University, it is intended to train company and platoon officers and cadres. Its occupancy capacity is 2,600. It also offers training-by-rotation courses, the durations of which vary from three to six months. All work had originally been predicated solely on Mao's selected writings and MAC resolutions. The teaching method consisted of 15 hours of lecturing a week and 5 hours of term explanation a day. The result was that most students did not even understand the basic points of the work. The number of hours spent per day in lecturing were reduced in 1961. In addition, courses on the practical application of the political theory studied and experience in combat-training work were included. The courses-by-rotation were also being overhauled to do more than submit slogans, hold contests, demonstrations, and oath-taking meetings.

Emphasis, of course, was placed on political education of Mao's military officers and cadres. A three-year training-by-rotation political education program was established in most military educational institutions. It apparently resulted in chaos and failure. Too many officers and cadres were on educational tours at once, leaving their units without sufficient supervision, despite the fact that "outstanding, politically reliable" NCO's reinforced their positions. This, plus the factor of excessive school enrollment, led the regime to revise this program in 1961. The enrollment quotas were reduced, and the three-year training-by-rotation courses were incorporated into the regular education received at the academies and schools. In the future, when an officer or cadre is advanced to another military level he will be required to take only a short course at one of the academies or schools before assuming command. Also the number of men occupying the same technical position assigned to schools for training would be approximately ten percent and not, under any circumstances, to exceed 15 percent (Ref 2, p 705).

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Knowledge of the curriculum offered at the technical military schools is negligible. According to a secret MAC directive all the technical schools have one-year programs (Ref 2, p 86.)

Within the ChiCom officer's formal military educational system there apparently is much overlapping, poor organization, and stretching of limited faculties. Recently the leadership has attempted to alleviate this situation through purges and reorganization.

The following is a partial list of the Communist Chinese Military Academies. Included are their location and number, if known:

- Academy of Military Sciences (Peking)
- General Staff and War College (Nanking)
- General Military Academy (Harbin)
- Military Research Institute (Peking)
- Marx-Lenin Political Academy (Peking)
- Political Schools (four or more including the
First School of Political Study)
- Public Security Forces Schools (three or more)
- Advanced Infantry Schools (three or more)
- Basic Infantry Schools (11 or more including
Kuailin Infantry School and Shihkiachwang
Infantry School)
- Advanced Artillery School (Mukden)
- Artillery Schools (five or more)
- Armored Forces Schools (two or more)
- Naval Academy
- Naval Training Schools (six or more)
- Engineering Schools (four or more including The
Military Communication Engineering
Academy, and a secret code development
and testing center located in Sian)
- Air Defense Schools (four or more)
- Military Medical College (Peking)
- Military Medical Schools (eight or more)
- Administrative School (Peking)
- Logistics School (Peking)
- Finance Schools (two or more)

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Chemical Warfare Schools (three or more)

Signal Schools (four or more)

Ordnance Schools (five or more)

Physical Training School (Canton)

Railway Troops School

Submarine School

Other special purpose schools

(Ref 4, p 22).

In-Service Education

In-service education for the Communist Chinese officer and cadre is a continuous program. As the leadership has often stated, the Army serves as a political training school. In fact, the PLA trains local civilian cadres (Ref 2, p 577). There are three basic types of officer in-service political education, all of which are compulsory:

1. Study of Mao's writings, party doctrine and directives, MAC resolutions, and other pertinent party documents to suit the desires of the regime.
2. Mass campaigns to suit the current needs of the leadership, in which the reading of pre-selected works of Mao Tse-tung play a large part (a type of political education designed to be 'living' -oriented).
3. Hsia-fang (a back-to-the-ranks work program, in which the officers theoretically act as enlisted men).

The basic in-service educational unit is the company. The Party Committee and leadership organs within each company study the prescribed program and then deliver it at a lower level to the EM. Troops in border areas, maritime islands, and the special forces receive more intensive courses in political indoctrination. The leadership has demanded that the in-service officer political educational program should be "practical and conform to realistic needs." The courses studied first in the yearly program are to be those most urgently needed. The subjects studied should be compact, emphasizing outstanding features and concentrating on the most pertinent points.

The general method used is the large lecture group which then breaks into discussion groups of squad size or smaller. Self-study is emphasized. This, however, has in the past resulted in a coercive situation, or struggle session. In teaching officers and NCO's how to discipline and educate their troops, the methods used include apprenticeship, erection of models based on sample surveys, operating short-term collective training classes, and the synthesizing of experiences. All, of course, are highly imbued with ChiCom propaganda (Ref 2, p 629).

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All officers and equivalent ranking political cadres must spend a required number of hours per year in political study. All officers at the divisional level and above must spend 400-500 hours a year in political study. Those at the regimental level and below must spend 300-400 hours a year. Officers at the divisional level and above are "encouraged" to spend one-half to two-thirds of their total study time (400-500 hours) a year on Mao's works. They are required to stress in their studies the ninth section, entitled "Strategy and Tactics" of Mao Tse-tung's On The People's War and the People's Army. This is to be done in combination with Lin Piao's, On Important Principles of Commandership (Ref 2, p219).

Officers at the regimental level, and below are to spend one-third to one-half of their total study time (300-400 hours) a year on Mao's works. The central theme for this group is the "Ten Great Military Principles" in combination with Lin Piao's instructions on the tactics of "one point and two sides" (Ref 2, p 219).

Volume IV of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung is the major text for all officers (as well as EM). Also required for all is the general investigation and careful study of relevant passages in Mao's "On Contradiction" and "On Practice," resolutions and directives of their superior Party organizations, the Party Constitution, selected essays related to the training of Party members and their characteristics in regard to Party interests, and reports on behavioral models for the units to follow (Ref 2, pp 82 and 603).

In addition, all officers at the divisional level and above are required to participate in a form of political education called "collective training." The duration of this yearly experience is 20 days. The subject material consists of a study of:

1. Four essays prescribed by the Propaganda Department of the Central Authorities as the basis for study and discussion;
2. Eighteen other military essays;
3. Lin Piao's "The Victory of the Chinese Revolutionary War is a Victory of Mao Tse-tung's Thought";
4. A Red Flag editorial entitled, "A Fundamental Summing Up of Experiences in the Victory of the Chinese People's Revolution," and
5. An editorial in the People's Daily entitled "Mao Tse-tung's Thought is the Banner of the Victory of the Chinese People's Great Revolution" (Ref 2, pp 58-59).

The method of study to be applied to this program, according to the leadership is: "unity of careful reading, deep discussion, and necessary guidance." In addition, the officers must study 15 other essays (names not known), in order to complete the program requirements.

Officers at the regimental and battalion level must also participate in the 20-day collective training program. Their requirements, however, are limited to the thorough study of 14 essays from Volume IV of the Selected

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Works of Mao Tse-tung, plus eight other essays to be read individually
(Ref 2, pp 58-59).

During 1960-1961 the political education mass campaign conducted within the military centered on the "Two Remembrances" (class hardships and nation's hardships) and "Three Investigations" (standpoint, will to fight, and work). This consisted of the recollection of actual and fabricated hardships by officers and then the troops, and the subsequent Party investigation into the standpoint, will to fight, and work of the military establishment.

According to Lin Piao, the main purpose of the movement was to "raise the level of awareness of all soldiers and cadres and to help them hold fast to their political convictions and realize the true nature of the internal situation, in order to get through the temporary hardships" (Ref 2, p 100).

The program of the "Two Remembrances" and "Three Investigations" was to be implemented together with indoctrination and checking. The "Three Investigations," however, was to proceed only in a squad or small group, with intensive sessions for two-(or at the most, three-) day periods. There would follow a brief break and then a repeat of the pattern for the scheduled duration.

The political education of the "Two Remembrances" was to be conducted in all military units and schools from 1 January 1961 to 10 February 1966. There was to be no military training during this period. It was to proceed in two stages with set purposes:

Stage 1. The purpose of this stage of remembering (or fabricating) hardships was to awaken in small "struggle-sessions" stories of past hatred, horror and grief, with the aim of overcoming the present existing "ingratitude." It was also designed to "renew hatred towards imperialism, to eradicate the tendency toward 'the numbing thoughts of peace', and to strengthen the will to fight" (Ref 2, pp 109-111). Field trips to neighboring villages were scheduled for all officers to see what was termed "amplified evidence of old times" (Ref 2, p 102).

These sessions in Stage 1 were solemn, disciplined meetings in a suitably decorated place with a well-planned atmosphere. Officers and cadres were informed that they should reiterate to the EM that the reason for the present situation with its chaos and poverty was "American imperialism," the "Chiang Kai-shek reactionary regime," and the "capitalistic system of private ownership of the productive source." The unrest of the populace was to be attributed to a lack of understanding of the comparative drudgery of life in the "old society" (Ref 2, pp 109-111).

Stage 2. The purpose of this stage was to make favorable comparisons and to discuss only the pleasant things of the present. The political requirements, standard of living, and culture of the past and present were compared. Lastly, the future was to be depicted as a "fast-approaching glorious Communist state" (Ref 2, p 111).

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If the military unit (company) did not meet the ideological standard set by Lin Piao upon completion of this political education program, more time was to be allotted and indoctrination intensified. Upon completion of this nation-wide program, the leadership launched the military into the "four-excellent companies" and "five-excellent soldiers" movement for more indoctrination of the same sort.

"Four-excellent companies" are companies which excel in ideological work, working style, military training, and management of daily life. "Five-excellent soldiers" are soldiers who excel in shooting, bayoneting, political work, grenade throwing, and digging.

The basic conduct code of the Red Chinese soldiers is the "Three Precepts of Discipline" and the "Eight Rules of Behavior" formulated by Mao during the war, the 3-8 working style. They almost literally correspond to General Sun Wu's rules (500 BC). The "Three Precepts of Discipline" are:

1. Obey an order under all circumstances.
2. Don't take away from the people a single needle or a single thread.
3. Turn over to the government every bit of booty.

The "Eight Rules of Behavior" are:

1. Talk politely with the people.
2. Be honest in all business matters.
3. Return anything you borrowed.
4. Make up for any damage you cause.
5. Don't swear and don't beat anybody.
6. Don't damage fields that have been tilled.
7. Don't maltreat prisoners of war.
8. Show respect to women (Ref 7, pp 3-4).

The third and final phase of officer in-service political education is hsia-fang, more commonly known as the "back-to-the-ranks" program. All military officers, at all levels of command, and political cadres are required to spend at least one month participating in this program. The program consists of manual labor on communes, in factories, or on construction projects. All participants, regardless of military rank, are on an equal level, worker or peasant, depending upon the type of work. The work is overshadowed by political tones. It is a move by the party leadership to attempt to break the military professionalism of the officer corps.

In addition to the officer academy system and in-service political education, all officers must constantly keep abreast of developments in

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the military field. This is made possible through the various publications of the GPD. In addition, the military academies and branches publish periodicals which are given wide circulation among professional military ranks. All this, plus the constant barrage of propaganda and "study-sessions," is an attempt to make the professional military totally politically reliable and thus ensure the supremacy of the CCP.

Noncommissioned Officer Political Education

Very limited information is available on the political education system at the NCO level. Some of the known NCO activities and programs have been mentioned in other sections of this report.

The PLA contains approximately 300,000 NCO's, most of whom are 19 or 20 years old. They have attained this level through promotion from the lower ranks while serving their conscription period, their selection being based on the Military Service Law and the Regulations on the Service of Officers Law. Privates who have shown promise, militarily and politically, are sent to the division training battalion where they receive a three-month course to qualify them as squad leaders. Graduates of the school are returned to their unit as corporals and assigned as squad leaders or deputy squad leaders. Subsequent training, except in technical specialties, is in the field.

A few NCO's are older conscripts who have been permitted by the Party to remain in the ranks. NCO's are considered by the leadership to be more politically reliable than regular enlisted men. Their reliability, in all probability, can be attributed to longer exposure to political indoctrination, and the abundance of Party propaganda to which they have been subjected. Heavy reliance, however, is placed upon these "veteran soldiers" to drill and instruct the new recruits. Their rudeness and roughness does, at times, create problems, both practical and theoretical, for the Party.

Enlisted Men's Political Education

General education for the enlisted man is divided into three categories: military, political, and "cultural" (literacy, arithmetic, and history). Technically, the military education is under the supervision of the General Training Department of PLA Headquarters, with the military commander bearing the responsibility. In actuality this, as well as the other two categories, is under the supervision of the GPD. Political influence dominates every phase of military training and education.

In accordance with State dictates, the military thought of Mao Tse-tung is considered the basic guide in all training, education, strategy, and tactics. Mao's principles and solutions are to be studied and reapplied to present and perhaps future situations, but not blindly. Volume IV of the Collected Works is the major text.

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Inducted into the service in accordance with the Military Service Law, most ChiCom conscripts are drawn from the peasant population. They are young; physically sturdy; accustomed to hardship; little interested in matters not directly affecting themselves, family, or home area (native area and family problems easily affect ideological emotions); and have been subjected to intensive political indoctrination. The conscript, however, has generally had enough basic education to enable him to understand the very simple troop publications. Through constant indoctrination and Party activities in his home area previous to induction, he is made aware of the value of membership in the Youth Corps or the Party, which have accustomed him to levels of political control. Within the military, the Young Communist League (YCL) serves as the main indoctrination and recruiting institution for the Communist Party among EM's. League members work closely with GPD personnel on all levels down to the squad with its "political warrior." Loyalty to the Party must supplant loyalty to an individual commander.

The leadership, however, feels that most conscripts possess the "incorrect attitude," thinking they are "soldiers of peace." This is probably one reason that EM lack the understanding of "the concept of rigid organizational discipline," and thus are inclined towards "extreme democratization" (Ref 2, p 618). This may be one of the reasons for the reorganization of the economy on a more militant pattern, a "rectification" movement.

Formal Military Education

Once in the service, the individual soldier is integrated into a politico-military system which leaves him little free time and virtually no privacy. He is under the constant supervision of military superiors and political personnel. He is constantly subjected to "persuasive" and continuous indoctrination designed to shape his outlook.

There is one standard training year for all PLA units (company). It varies in content in accordance with the type of unit, geographical or climatic condition, and its operational responsibilities. The training year consists of 140 training days in seven months, which may be considered basic individual and unit training, scheduled to accommodate the periods when the troops will participate in production and construction duties. Every troop unit is required to spend from one to two months annually (or more in an emergency) on agricultural or industrial production. Actually, the training cycle for each month is composed of four weeks of six training days each. Sundays are spent in semi-supervised study. The remaining three to four months are spent in political education.

Beginning in April, the units progress through individual and small unit training, to maneuvers of divisional or greater size in November and December. Testing of both individuals and units is a continuous process, culminating in end-of-the-year inspections. The attempt is to combine as many subjects in a short time under as realistic conditions as possible. Each unit participates in a campaign for "one specialty and many skills."

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Emphasis in individual training is placed on close-quarter combat tactics with five techniques to be mastered: shooting, bayoneting, grenade throwing, explosives handling, and digging. Also, as referenced in the "Five-principles," attention is focused on night marches, night fighting, and infiltration. The lack of materiel causes joint services operations to be neglected (Ref 8, p 63).

There is no formal military educational system for the EM during the seven-month period of basic training. Presumably, after completion of the eight to nine-month period (including production work) conscripts are tested and then selected to attend one of the many technical specialty schools in Communist China. The number, type, course curriculum, and duration are not known by the author. In all probability they are very similar to those in the Soviet Union, with perhaps a lower level of technical expertise. It is interesting to note how the ChiCom leadership compiles instruction materials for these schools. Besides emphasizing their own technical training experience, they study the technical training programs of armies in foreign countries in order to absorb the parts which are considered most suitable for the PLA (Ref 2, 688).

However, it is known that a number of schools for EM have been established in paratroop and amphibious operations. Recent reports also indicate that "general nuclear training" is being given to the recruits, but details are not known (Ref 6, p 38).

In-Service Political Education

The in-service political education program for the EM is quite intense. As mentioned previously, three to four months a year are spent on political indoctrination. There are two basic types of indoctrination, actual political education, which may be termed supervisory education, and living education, which includes Army work teams.

Supervisory political education is considered essential so that all men will read pre-selected essays from volume IV of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. The essays are chosen to correspond closely to the actual situation in which the EM finds himself. The method used is group instruction and then small study groups.

The small study group (a squad or smaller) is also called "accusatory education." It is a political indoctrination hate session. The propaganda-saturated program is handed down from the MAC, eventually reaching the squad and deputy squad leaders for implementation. An excellent example was an education program on revolutionary traditions which was conducted in all Army units in 1961. Group instruction was based upon such materials as "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire" (Ref 2, p 378). Study groups were then formed with the face-to-face on-the-spot guidance of the political cadres. The EM are methodically led to develop their "political and class consciousness" through the recall of the alleged cruel exploitation in the old society prior to the "people's glorious revolution." This is led by selecting, or more accurately fabricating, "typical cases." These emotionally charged stories have the intention of arousing the listeners to

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search their own memories or imaginations for similar tales. Strong appeals are made to the EM's Party loyalty and national pride. Fear of ideological criticism which results from these study group self-criticism sessions serves as further motivation.

If the study group does not measure up to the set ideological standards, the method of separate, individual talks between the political cadre and enlisted man is employed. In these "individual discussions" the main emphasis is put upon commendation for good people and good deeds, which corresponds to the satisfactory execution of the political education. This method of "persuasive" education is conducted repeatedly and patiently (Ref 2, p 373).

There are, however, many problems in the ChiCom system of supervisory education. In many cases, the program is hastily implemented, resulting in low ideological retention. Also, a working relationship between the EM and the NCO and political cadres is often lacking. The enlisted men and occasionally their families are at times very poorly treated and perhaps not even fed (Ref 2, p 501).

The other form of political education for enlisted men is termed "living education." According to a MAC resolution² the program of study for living education for the year should include the following:

1. Party lines and policies as well as the directives of the Central Authorities of the Party and Mao Tse-tung.
2. The international and domestic situation and the task of the struggle.
3. Different tasks of various army units.
4. Different ideological problems of different types of persons.

² "Resolution on Strengthening Political and Ideological Work in the Army" by the Enlarged Meeting of the Military Affairs Commission (members of the Military Affairs Commission; of the Central Bureaus of the various provinces, cities, and autonomous regions; of the various Party Committees in the Ministries; and of the various Party Organizations at the First Level of the Central Government):

The Central Authorities have reviewed the resolution of the Enlarged Meeting of the Military Affairs Commission adopted on October 20, 1960... and believe that the meeting was very successful and the resolution well presented... This resolution summed up the rich experience gained in the work of building the Army and of conducting political and ideological work... It unequivocally pointed out the direction of ideological work..., presented suitable measures for consideration, and hit upon key points for emphasis. It illustrated the problem of the four relations in the domain of political work; it clearly pointed out the importance of controlling ideological work in the conduct of political work and in turn the importance of controlling

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5. The glorious tradition of the Army; emphasizing the building of the Army, the system of leadership, the system of political work, the 3-8 working style, the three main rules of discipline and the 8 points for attention, respect for cadres and love for soldiers, and the history of the Army, emphasizing heroic events.

6. Festivals celebrating the revolution.

7. Commendation of good persons and good affairs and criticism for bad tendencies, persons and affairs.

8. Practical ideological problems (Ref 2, p 79).

The methods to be employed in conducting this vast program, according to the same resolution, are the following:

1. Combine the political movements with regular education (supervisory).

2. Political organizations at the division level and above should write the lectures and slogans to be recited at roll call and at preparatory meetings (study groups).

3. State construction, mass movements, inspection and interview, social investigation, productive labor, and rescue work (Army work teams).

4. Debating, contending, arguing, posters.

5. Beside classroom lectures, collective training and discussion meetings also adopt forms of local leaders giving lectures recalling past and comparing to present, individual interviews, slogans, issuance of wall bulletins and big character newspapers, exhibitions, evening parties, local cadre and mass (people) reports.

6. Literary, art, and evening entertainment work for troops.

ideological work in the conduct of political work and in turn the importance of controlling living thought in the conduct of ideological work, and the importance of improving working methods and establishing a foundation at the primary level. It called on the rank and file to raise high the red flag of Mao Tse-tung's thought, become thoroughly acquainted with it, and to insist on its supremacy in the conduct of all affairs. The Central Authorities hold that all these points made in the resolution are correct... Not only is it a directive for the work of building up the Army... it is useful to the Party organizations, government organs, schools... Those cadres in the army who have the necessary education qualifications must study the classical writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. The study of methods must be made for the sake of our operational needs... to learn the spiritual substance of Marxism-Leninism... The same method should be applied to reading Comrade Mao Tse-tung's works. In the past the method of studying theories in the Army was to read only the dead language. That is incorrect...

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In the "living education" course³, the basic educational unit in the PLA is the company. The program on current events and policies is carried out within each company by the political director, and also involves regimental and battalion officers. Initially, a lecture is delivered to the entire company by the "leaders" at set intervals, presumably based on the "Source Material." Each squad then holds predetermined discussion and study groups on the lecture topic.

Within each company there are programmed activities which include readings and discussion of events in the newspapers and news bulletins. The Company has one copy of the Peoples Daily, six of the Liberation Army News, and one of China Youth News. Each squad has one copy of Army Construction News. The discussions and readings, however, are timed irregularly and poorly managed, with the soldiers paying little, if any, attention. Names of various countries such as Cuba, Laos, or the Congo were (1960-62) frequently mentioned, but, lacking visual aid equipment and basic geographic knowledge, even the locations of these states were not known by most soldiers. Each company also has a library, but collections are general, superficial, and in most, inadequate (Ref 2, p 288).

The approach and duration of discussions of each theme or major discussion topic is decided on by high party authorities in coordination with MAC. This may be concluded from the fact that each theme, especially domestic ones, is used not only to educate or thoroughly indoctrinate the troops, but also to direct them into "the right frame of mind" for the campaign which normally follows to "rectify," "improve," or "expand" the discussed situation. It is emphasized throughout the educational program that all action is based on "revolutionary zeal" and the "enthusiasm of the people."

³ Data on "living education" course content exists in the secret "Bulletins of Activities," translated by the Hoover Institute and published under the title The Politics of the Red Army. Included intermittently in the "Bulletins" are sections designated as "Source Material," which are fairly detailed accounts of international or national situations or programs. They are reports on progress, attitudes, chaotic areas, policy, plans, and strategy. The "Bulletins" are ChiCom classified documents and only for study by cadres, officers, and officials at or above the regimental level. It is constantly emphasized by the Party that the contents must be kept secret, without quote or copy. At times this is printed after "Source Material" sections.

In various reports throughout the "Bulletins" references were made to the "educational program on current affairs and policies." The complete character of the program is not known but a general outline may be established.

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The source materials used for "living education" on internal situations appear to be unusually free of "anti-imperialist" propanganda. They are, however, heavily imbued with praise and encouragement for the Communist methods of operation.

The domestic reports deal with five main types of developments:

1. Agricultural and industrial situations, with heavy emphasis on the commune and the "glorious advancement of the Great Leap Forward."
2. Technical military improvement programs.
3. Militia activities.
4. Program and progress of a certain activity in a military region of unit.
5. The internal situation of the country as a whole or a sector of it.

The most prevalent of these programs has been the emphasis on the communes and the "success" of the Great Leap Forward. The political education on this theme is divided into three major sections. These are:

1. How the three-year program of the Great Leap Forward helped the Chinese Peoples Republic to make general across-the-board achievements.
2. The experience gained from this program, and the necessity for "further progress."
3. The present and "encouraging" conditions in rural districts.

The aim of this program is to establish a favorable view of the internal policies of the regime in the minds of the soldiers.

In 1961 Lin Piao launched a nationwide campaign for the army which was titled "Draft of Rules and Regulations Concerning Work in the Rural People's Communes" or better known as the "Sixty Articles." It was an attempt to rectify what the Party termed, "erroneous views," "vague concept," and "poor ideological conditions." The program was administratively handled by the General Political Department, the purpose being to "domestically and ideologically educate cadres, officers, and soldiers in order to increase their awareness and strengthen their confidence in their ability to overcome difficulties" (Ref 2, p 411).

The Great Leap Forward program and the development of the commune had obviously resulted in chaotic failure. Both political cadres and military men were extremely discontented even to the point of questioning Party policies and the superiority of the system. Laws and ordinances were violated; famine and Party insubordination rampant. A factor adding to the discontent was the hsia-fang movement of officers to the ranks, and military aid in civilian labor. In view of this situation, the Party had to launch the entire military organization into an educational program to regain tighter political control.

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The program began in April 1961 with the military and political cadres at regimental level and above, proceeded to the other cadres and military officers, and lastly to the troops. It was conducted in this fashion because "only in this way can we provide a more reliable assurance of success of the second (battalion and below) ideological battle." (Ref 2). In all probability the party recognized the basis for military discontent. If superiors were apathetic or even adverse to the Great Leap Forward and communes and lacked the "necessary correct education and viewpoint," then surely the troops could fare no better. Cadres above the regimental level were "encouraged" to study the two documents entitled "On Investigation Work" in coordination with the "Sixty Articles" (Ref 2, p 411).

In order to proceed with the domestic education program among the troops, the first step was for the cadres and officers (regimental and above) to:

1. Study political and ideological conditions of Army units (company).
2. Distinguish between differences and the nature of the problem.
3. To "correctly" solve the problems by conducting the study of the "Sixty Articles" among all units (Ref 2, p 411).

The actual implementation of the study of the "Sixty Articles," considered to be a glorious product of the thought of Mao Tse-tung, was conducted over an eight-day period in a collective study within each company. The study of the "Articles" was divided into three separate parts with a fixed period of study for each. They are as follows:

1. The "Sixty Articles" were studied in detail with each key point made clear. The teaching method consisted of reading, lectures, discussions, and comprehension of the "basic spirit" of the articles before suggesting problems and opinions - three days duration.
2. Organized discussion was held on several principal problems, reporting information, conducting investigations, and making visits - four days duration.
3. Results of the study were summed up, encouraging a broad viewpoint - at least one-half-day duration (Ref 2, p 466).

The questions on the articles which arose most frequently were:

1. True situation in the rural districts.
2. Were the People's communes actually superior organizations.
3. Relationship of proportioning earnings according to labor.
4. Problems of family sideline occupations and rural markets.
5. Implementation of the "Sixty Articles" (Ref 2, p 467).

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After approximately two months the commune education campaign was evaluated and found lacking. Lin Piao blamed three factors:

1. Inevitable defects from a lack of governmental and Party experience in such a program to serve as a guide.
2. Low education level of the troops.
3. Vagueness in knowledge of the true situation by cadres.

Lin Piao directed that the following innovations be followed by political and military cadres:

1. Grasp the major issues of the articles and seriously organize the discussion of these issues.
2. Keep certain problems in mind while studying the articles.
3. Purposefully study documents chosen from The Selected Documents concerning Rectification and Reorganization of Communes in Rural Villages.
4. Compare difficulties of past and present methods of making comparisons and evaluating the situation.
5. Make full use of living persons, local affairs, and teaching materials to educate the Army units.
6. Teach cadres to observe the results and analyze the problems through four basic viewpoints:
 - a. Class analysis.
 - b. Divisional production.
 - c. Theory of uninterrupted revolution and theory of the stage of development in revolution.
 - d. Mass viewpoint (Ref 2, p 515 and p 526).

The following educational courses and document studies were carried out as supplemental education with regard to the "Sixty Articles." These educational courses were:

1. Policy of the Party on the rural people's communes.
2. Study of the payment of compensation for damages done during the Great Leap Forward.
3. Problem of food shortages.
4. Problems of the rural market (Ref 2, p 494).

The four documents to be studied by the entire army, according to the GPD were:

1. "An Open Letter from the Central Authorities of the CCP to All Comrades with Regard to the Draft of Rules and Regulations Concerning Work in Rural People's Communes."

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2. " Rules and Regulations Concerning Work in the Rural People's Communes. "

3. " An Open Letter of the Central Authorities of the CCP to the Various Central Bureaus and the Party Committees of the Various Provinces, Cities, and Districts Regarding the Faithful Carrying out of Investigation Work. "

4. " On Investigation Work" (Ref 1).

These four documents were to prove that the general Party line, the Great Leap Forward Program, and the People's Commune were and are completely accurate policies, and that the leadership of the Central Authorities and of Mao was extremely brilliant. In the actual work, mistakes and losses were blamed on wrong methods of local leadership, the inability to recognize true facts, laxness in investigation work, and the failure to correlate the actual situation with the guidance of the Central Authorities and Mao. These four documents were distributed to cadres at all levels for study. Campaigns or purges were launched to rectify the " mistakes. "

Militia activity programs, progress of military regions, and unit education reports stress the importance of high political awareness, strong and healthy physique, and maintenance of certain standards of military training. The " follow-the-good-example" image is enunciated.

The program for studying the current internal situation of the country generally runs for seven days. It is divided into four major sections:

1. Discussion of the present conditions.
2. Discussion of the report of the leadership and talk about their reactions.
3. Reading of pertinent documents (Mao's) and questions on them.
4. Discussion and analysis of the subject which resembles a struggle meeting (Ref 2, p 417).

Problem areas are always referred to as temporary and secondary. They are compared to China's overall standing which is always depicted as favorable. The method of studying problem areas always compares the present with the " oppressive, backward past. "

A wide variety of international situations and events are also covered in living education. All are heavily imbued with anti-American, anti-" imperialist" propaganda. All support the " people's liberation movements. " The situation or event is always explained in Marxist-Leninist-Maoist terms with heavy emphasis placed on the scientific approach to historical or dialectic materialism. Situations are also studied from " the viewpoint of class analysis" (Ref 2, p 481).

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Topics chosen for study during 1961 may be categorized as follows:

1. Laotian question.
2. The Congo situation.
3. Current international tensions in Laos, Cuba, the Congo, Taiwan, North and South Korea, North and South Vietnam, East and West Germany, and the problem for and stand of Communist China and the Socialist camp.
4. Questions on disarmament, nuclear test bans, general relations between East and West (peaceful coexistence), and the United Nations.
5. US and Allied strategy in tension situations.
6. Visits of Chiefs of States to the United States.
7. US Presidential statements on any military increase in men, equipment, development, and funds.

The main emphasis was centered upon Laos and the Congo. Indoctrination was conducted in the following manner:

1. General background on the history of the country.
2. United States, Great Britain, and France's plans and strategy toward the given country and why.
3. Methods used to achieve Western (i.e., US) goals.
4. The attitude of the Chinese Communist Government and Party.
5. Future predictions.

"Source material" pronouncements of Allied visits are generally followed by "hate campaigns" and emphasis on the need to increase military efficiency. The barrage of inaccurate propaganda under the guise of political education material is designed to inculcate hatred and distrust, and thus increase the revolutionary zeal of the troops. A good example of this form of current event education was Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda's visit to the US and his meeting with President Kennedy and Dean Rusk. The points dealt with were the following:

1. The actual visit, and reason for it, plus press statements.
2. Past "joint conspiracies" against China, including the Mutual Security Pact.
3. Present joint "acceleration of expansion" in Southeast Asia and "plots" against the Chinese government and people.
4. General attempts by the US and Japan to dominate the Southeast Asia area.

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In addition to this more formal political foreign area orientation, there are the "normal activities" such as holding meetings and rallies for the support of a country (Cuba, for example). Attendance is compulsory (Ref 2, p 561).

Family letters are one of the factors that more regularly affect the thinking of the EM's. Therefore, they are one means continually used by the political authorities in indoctrinating the soldiers in domestic reports, party lines and policies, commendations, etc. In opening letters to servicemen from their families before they are delivered, the political cadres can learn the causes of any apparent change in the ideological outlook of the conscript. This information is then used to launch the proper living educational program to rectify any "erroneous views." Letters that are too complaining are retained. On the other hand, the EM whose family resides in a disaster area is given special ideological training attention (Ref 2, p 5). At times letters are not delivered due to personal or "educational" malice (Ref 2, p 478). Cadres and officers of many units often urge the families of their troops to report the favorable situation, whether it is true or not, in their home and rural area. Soldiers are also "requested" to write back home about the "good conditions and comradely treatment" existing within their unit (Ref 2, p 612).

Enlisted men who receive permission to take leave to return home are subjected to an intense ideological education program. Before acquiring leave permission a soldier is supposedly thoroughly investigated through group education and individual conversations. Thus only the most enthusiastic, politically reliable conscript would be permitted to leave. Those who exhibit dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs within the PLA or whose families are located in disaster areas are not given leave permission. The intensive political education for those who receive a pass is centered around internal economic conditions. It is confined to future plans, plus present improvement over past conditions (Ref 2, p 161).

The soldiers who obtain passes to visit their families are often asked to call on families of other soldiers who lived in their area. Upon complying with orders they must obey the following four rules:

1. To convey warm greetings to these families.
 2. To "introduce" these families to the "favorable" life and study of their brothers and sons in the army unit.
 3. To find out problems and dissatisfaction with their conditions.
 4. To report to the squad leader upon return about the meetings.
- (Ref 2, p 614).

This is another check-up system, the information from which can be used as leverage in persuasive education if needed. It also leaves one with the impression that only the enlisted man who's the best politically indoctrinated, probably a Party member, is allowed leave to return to a single area.

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All EM's returned from leave are kept under surveillance to study what is termed "their ideological impressions" (Ref 2, p 161).

In the past, the content of living education has been found to be lacking because of relaxation of discipline. Cadres and NCO's are blamed for such sins as "evasion of responsibility," "retreat in the face of difficulties," "indifference," etc. In many cases the situation in the unit reflects either overcautious dealing or superficial performance (Ref 2, pp 301-307).

The army work team may also be listed under "living political education." It consists of the military participating in civilian industrial and agricultural projects to help build a modern China. All servicemen participate in this program, which is designed to be viewed as a "political task." The duration is at least one, and more likely, two months per year. Each work group of EM's is headed by a deputy political director and two platoon leaders (Ref 2, p 209). This program in particular has bred great military resentment of political authority and supremacy.

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APPENDIX

TASK ASSIGNMENT

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12 April 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, CORG

SUBJECT: Task Assignment No. 7

1. The Commanding General requests you to perform a study within the scope of work of Project Number Three of your contract for Calendar Year 1966.

2. TITLE: Political Education Requirements for US Army Personnel Engaged in Stability Operations.

3. STATEMENT OF WORK: Determine the means required to train and maintain the proficiency of the US Army in the political aspects of counterinsurgency.

a. Analyze the systems of education that have been employed historically and that are presently being employed to instill, in an Army, an understanding of those aspects of low intensity conflicts which may be broadly referred to as political in nature.

b. Analyze the existing US Army educational system in terms of the quantity and quality of information that it provides on the political aspects of low intensity conflicts. Attention will be devoted to both officer and enlisted training in career and specialty schools and in operational orientation.

c. Determine the extent of political knowledge required with the US Army for stability operations. This should include but not be limited to knowledge of: the basic factors that contribute to insurgency development, the patterns of evolution of insurgency (subversive and non-subversive), US political systems, and US foreign policy and organization. Requirements should be defined for specific officer and enlisted grade levels.

d. Analyze the education and organizational requirements necessary to impart and maintain this knowledge in the US Army.

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SUBJECT: Task Assignment No. 7

4. WHY IS WORK REQUIRED:

a. Close relationship between the military and non-military aspects of internal defense (See CDC letter dtd 1 Mar 66, subj: "New and Revised Terminology, ") and the dominant role of the political factor therein make it mandatory that the US Army maintain a proficiency in this field.

b. Operational experience gathered to date indicates that the extent and nature of political education in the US Army at present is inadequate to prepare personnel for problems to be faced in the field.

5. RESULTS ANTICIPATED: This study will produce recommendations concerning measures to be adopted to best improve the US Army's capabilities, including:

a. Qualitative statement of subject matter to be covered.

b. Quantitative statement of allocation of emphasis on various subjects.

c. Recommendations for instructional material.

d. Recommendations for the organization of US Army educational systems to effect the proposed educational innovations.

6. The study will be presented to the Commanding General in the form of a CORG publication entitled Annex 2, Project 3.

7. GUIDANCE.

a. References:

(1) USACDC SWCAG Doctrinal Review Program.

b. Administration:

(1) Direct coordination with RAC, SORO, USCONARC and subordinate agencies of USACDC is authorized.

(2) A final draft report will be completed by 30 June 1967.

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SUBJECT: Task Assignment No. 7

8. Correlation: This project is identified as USACDC Action Control Number 7291 and supports the following:

- | | |
|---|--|
| a. Army Concept Program | Army 70 |
| b. Study "Analysis and Development of US Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Organization;" USACDC Action Control Number | 3162 |
| c. Army Tasks | 3: Low Intensity Conflict Type I
4: Low Intensity Conflict Type II |
| d. Phase | Evaluation |
| e. Functions | Intelligence
Command, Control and
Communication
Service Support |

9. It is requested that you analyze your resources, indicate your acceptance and/or recommendations, and provide the following information:

- a. Estimated man-months.
- b. Computer time.
- c. Proposed Completion Date.
- d. Project Officer.
- e. CORG Project Number.
- f. Type of publication.

JOHN T. PIERCE, III
Colonel, GS
Chief, Operations Research
Support Division

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