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AUTHORITY
AGO ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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 OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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AD829552

IN REPLY REFER TO  
 AGAM-P (M) (8 Sept 67) FOR OT RD-670348

12 September 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 93d  
 Military Police Battalion

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 93d Military Police Battalion for quarterly period ending 30 April 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
 Major General, USA  
 The Adjutant General

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 APR 8 1968  
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FOR OT RD  
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# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

HEAD QUARTERS  
93RD MILITARY POLICE BATTALION  
APO San Francisco 96238

AVDGF-I

14 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967  
(CSFOR-65)

TO: See Distribution

## SECTION I SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION AND UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. MIS ION: The battalion mission was increased to include supervision and operational control of one (1) attached Provisional Guard Company of 300 personnel and one (1) attached Provisional Platoon of 42 personnel, the latter being further attached to the 66th Military Police Company (Guard). The Provisional Guard Company was assigned the mission of supplementing D Company 58th Infantry, in the mission of providing 24 hour security to the Ammunition Supply Depot, Qui Nhon. With the activation of the Provisional Guard Platoon, the mission of securing the five (5) bridges in the Qui Nhon area was taken from D Company, 58th Infantry, and given to the 66th Military Police Company (Guard).

2. ORGANIZATION: The battalion has assigned Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, team AD, TOE 19500D; 66th Military Police Company (Guard), TOE 19-247E; 127th Military Police Company, TOE 19-37F; and Company D, 58th Infantry, TOE 7-16E. Attached units are 177th Military Police Detachment, team FC, Provost Marshal section, TOE 19-500D; Qui Nhon Support Command Provisional Guard Company; and Qui Nhon Support Command Provisional Guard Platoon.

3. KEY PERSONNEL, ASSIGNMENTS AND DEPARTURES: During the reporting period the battalion lost four officers. The assistant S-3, Captain Scott L. Tippin, departed 3 April 1967 and was replaced by Captain Sheldon E. Vedlitz from the 127th Military Police Company. On 11 and 14 April 1967, the S-2, Captain Thomas E. Hatch, the assistant S-2, 2Lt Denis L. Burke, and a platoon leader from D/58th Infantry, 1Lt Richard L. Hanev, departed the command.

### 4. PERSONNEL, MORALE, AND DISCIPLINE:

a. Awards and Decorations: Personnel of this unit received (1) Bronze Star and (1) Commendation medal during the reporting period.

b. Savings Participation: This unit has 100% participation in the savings bond program and 51% participation in the soldiers deposits program. In March 1967, the unit was also 100% in the soldiers deposits program.

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AV30F-I

SUBJECT: Operational Report for quarterly Period ending 30 April 1967  
(CSFOR-65)

14 May 1967

c. Strength Figures: At present the battalion is 100% plus. The projected 90 day losses are 1 officer and 43 enlisted men.

d. Discipline, Law and Order: During the reporting period the battalion's assigned companies administered 21 Article 15's.

e. Civic Action Program: The battalion continued the support of the MAC AI Orphanage located in Qui Nhon, RVN. Support for the orphanage consists of voluntary monthly contributions, procurement of building materials, contributions of food, clothing, and toys. On February 5, 1967, the battalion donated to the orphanage all of the washing machines shipped with the unit from the states. This was done to provide the orphanage with the means for proper cleaning and to establish a centralized laundry service for the battalion headquarters. Presently the major project is the construction of a two story building, with materials primarily obtained from USAID.

f. SELF HELP PROGRAM: The battalion self-help program was increased during the period with the construction of two (2) two-story billets, one in the 127th Military Police Company area and one in D Company, 58th Infantry area. On 24 February 1967, the 66th Military Police Company (Guard) moved to its new area, and began framing troop tents and improving the company facilities. The newly formed Provisional Guard Company built a mess hall, an 18-man shower, 3 latrines, and floored all tents in the company area. Area beautification throughout the entire battalion, in the form of sidewalks, picket fencing, and outside movie facilities, has been completed.

5. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: During the reporting period the battalion S-2 Section validated 5 Top Secret clearances and 50 Secret clearances; 5 Secret clearances, 7 Interim Secret clearances and 250 Confidential clearances were granted, and 300 local file checks were initiated.

6. PLANS, OPERATIONS, AND TRAINING: The battalion was engaged in normal operations and training for 85 days during the reporting period. On 17 to 20 April the battalion underwent their annual General Inspection, receiving a satisfactory rating, with the observation that the battalion was accomplishing its mission in an outstanding manner. During the reporting period the 66th Military Police Company (Guard) changed from 12 to 8 hour shifts.

7. COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITIES: During the period 25 February to 2 March 1967, the battalion headquarters established its present internal communications system. The system consists of land phone communications with every compound within the cantonment area, each staff section within the battalion headquarters, the Commanding Officer's office and living quarters and the battalion officers BOQ. Operation and maintaining the system is a function of the 93rd Military Police Battalion Communications Section.

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AMVGF-I

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967  
(CSFOR-65)

14 May 1967

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2. LOGISTICS AND MAINTENANCE: D Company, 56th Infantry received the six (6) 90mm recoilless rifles that they were previously short.

### SECTION II COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### PART I OBSERVATIONS (Lessons Learned)

##### 1. PERSONNEL

ITEM: Inadequate TOE

DISCUSSION: Since the battalion arrived in country, it has increasingly been assigned additional missions on a permanent basis. It is now one of the largest operational Military Police Battalions in RVN, while still working under a TOE inadequate in personnel, equipment, and maintenance capabilities to its current mission. An RTOE has been submitted for HHD and subordinate units which, if approved, will greatly increase the battalion's operational efficiency.

OBSERVATION: TOE 19-5000 is totally inadequate for any Military Police Battalion headquarters.

##### 2. LOGISTICS:

ITEM:  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton Armor Plated Vehicles

DISCUSSION: The  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton armor plated vehicles of this battalion are used in tactical support of the Ammunition Supply Depot, Qui Nhon. Experience has shown that  $2\frac{1}{2}$  ton armor kits modified to fit  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton M51-A vehicles are more effective than the issued  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton armor plating kits. While providing better all around protection for the occupants, some disadvantages of using modified  $2\frac{1}{2}$  ton armor kits on  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton M51-A vehicles are excess weight on the body and suspension system.

OBSERVATION: The suspension system and the body of the M51-A is not heavy enough to support the added weight of the armor kit. The M51-C model  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton vehicle is stronger and more suited for armor plating on vehicles used over rough terrain.

ITEM: Maintenance of vehicles

DISCUSSION: Two of three assigned companies and the battalion headquarters have no authorized maintenance capabilities. Experience has proved that a Military Police Battalion must be capable of providing internal maintenance support. If the companies must rely on external support for all maintenance, many duty hours are lost because of the low priority given satellited units.

OBSERVATION: When organizing Military Police Battalions, a critical appraisal should be made of authorizations to insure that a maintenance capability exists within the battalion. Satelliting

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967  
(CSFOR-65)


14 May 1967

Military Police units in other organizations is not a satisfactory arrangement.

PART II RECOMMENDATIONS

1. OPERATIONS: If improved armor plating kits for 2 ton vehicles cannot be made available to all Military Police units which require them, 2½ ton armor kits or V-100 Commando Vehicle, should be issued in their place. In addition, model M51-C 2 ton vehicles are preferable for use as armored jeeps because of their stronger suspension system.

2. LOGISTICS: Of equal significant importance is the lack of maintenance personnel and maintenance equipment in this battalion. Maintenance personnel and equipment should be authorized in a Military Police Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment in all US Army Military Police Battalions.

  
HIRAM E. DANIELS  
LTC, MPC  
Commanding

2 Incl

- 1 - Activation and Attachment Order Provisional Guard Company
- 2 - Activation Order Provisional Guard Platoon

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army (ACSFOR: DA), Washington, D.C.
- 2 - Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-11, APO 96558
- 1 - Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVC-D1, APO 96307
- 1 - Commanding Officer, 18th Military Police Brigade, ATTN: AVSGI, APO 96491
- 5 - Commanding Officer, 16th Military Police Group, APO 96240

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5 AVEGF (14 May 1967) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967  
(CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 16th Military Police Group, APO 96240, 25 May 1967

TO: Commanding Officer, 18th Military Police Brigade, ATTN: AVBGI,  
APO 96491

1. The Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 of the 93d Military Police Battalion is forwarded herewith.

2. This headquarters has reviewed the report, considers it adequate, concurs with the observations and recommendations and adds the following comments.

a. Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph 1, Item: Inadequate TOE; Section II, Part I, paragraph 2, Item: Maintenance of Vehicles; and Section II, Part II, paragraph 2: It is agreed that TOE 19-500, Team AD, Military Police Battalion Headquarters, is totally inadequate in both personnel and equipment resources. Recommendations have been made by this headquarters that this TOE not be used in the future, under any circumstances. MTOE has been submitted to reorganize this battalion headquarters along the lines of TOE 19-36, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Military Police Battalion. It is strongly recommended that favorable consideration be given to approving this MTOE at the earliest possible date.

b. Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph 2, Item: 1/4 Ton Armor Plated Vehicles; and Section II, Part II, paragraph 2: It is strongly recommended that the modular type armor plating kits for 1/4 ton vehicles be made available through supply channels. The heavy-duty shock absorbers which are a component of this kit would greatly improve roadability and reduce excessive wear on vehicles caused by the added weight of the armor and required sandbagging. Headquarters, 18th Military Police Brigade, has arranged for field testing of the V-100 Commando Vehicle. One of our battalions is currently training personnel in the maintenance and employment of this vehicle to evaluate its capabilities as a possible substitute vehicle for armor plated 1/4 ton trucks.

*Louis J. Kleas*  
LOUIS J. KLEAS  
Colonel, MPC  
Commanding

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AVBGA(14 May 67) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
30 April 1967, RCS-CSFOR-65

HEADQUARTERS, 18TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE, APO 96491, 12 June 1967

TO: Deputy Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVH7C-DH,  
APO 96307

1. (U) The Operational Report—Lessons Learned for quarterly period ending 30 April 1967 from the 93d Military Police Battalion, APO 96238, is forwarded herewith.

2. (FOUO) This headquarters has reviewed the report and the 1st Indorsement, considers them adequate, concurs with the 1st Indorsement and the report's observations and recommendations, and adds the following comments:


a. Reference item on Inadequate TOE in Section II, Part 1 (page 3): Concur with 1st Ind comments. Correspondence with OFMG and CDCMPC have strongly emphasized the shortcomings of the 19-500 battalion. When the moratorium on submission of MTOEs is lifted, they will be expeditiously processed by this headquarters.

b. Reference item in Section II, Part I, on 1 Ton Armor Plated Vehicles (page 3), and Recommendation 1 (page 4): Strongly concur with all comments on the modular armor kits. USARV ACTIV is presently testing the armor kits and will make its final recommendations shortly. The 151A1C has a stronger suspension system than the M151A1 1 ton vehicle. An MTOE would have to be submitted to authorize the change. Latest coordination with USARV revealed that six V-100s should arrive for evaluation and testing in mid-June.

c. Reference item on Maintenance of Vehicles in Section II, Part I (pages 3-4), and Recommendation 2 (page 4): Concur. 19-500 TOEs do not carry enough maintenance personnel. Until the moratorium on MTOEs is lifted, the units will have to maintain their vehicles by using their own TOE resources and getting assistance from their support commands.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl  
nc

  
W. P. POLBY  
CPT, AGC  
Asst Adjutant

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AVHGC-DST (14 May 67) 3d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1967 from Headquarters, 93d Military Police Battalion as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning inadequate TOE, paragraph 1, page 3, paragraph 2a, 1st Indorsement and paragraph 2a, 2d Indorsement: Concur. Recommendations were considered in a study conducted by this headquarters and submitted to DA.

b. Reference item concerning  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton armor plated vehicles, pages 3 and 4: Concur. New models of the M151A1 have the same rear suspension system as the M151A1G; however, an "Auxiliary Overload Spring Kit" is now available which increases the rear wheel suspension beyond the capabilities of the original vehicle design. Limited Warfare Laboratory is working under an ENSURE project to develop a better  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton armor kit. Six V-100 Commando vehicles have arrived in-country for testing by the 18th Military Police Brigade.

c. Reference item concerning maintenance of vehicles, pages 3 and 4: Concur. Actions taken in paragraph 2c, 2d Indorsement are considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER



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GPOP-DT(14 May 67) 4th Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65), HQ 93d MP Bn

HQ, U.S. ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 2 1 JUL 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
H. W. BENDER  
CIT, AGC  
Asst AG

2 Incl  
nc