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AUTHORITY

Adjutant General's Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (10 Oct 67) FOR OT RD-670410 12 October 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 69th Maintenance Battalion (GS)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

C. A. STANFIEL
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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as

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FOR OT RD
670410

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 69TH MAINTENANCE BATTALION (GS)
APO 96312

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD
ENDING 30 APRIL 1967

V

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SECTION I: SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

The 69th Maintenance Battalion (GS) was operational for 89 consecutive days during the reporting period of 1 February 1967 to 30 April 1967.

With the advent of the Vietnamese TET Holiday period, security was increased and the number of guards was doubled. No incidents occurred during TET.

To increase security and communications the 510th Engineer Company (MDS) cut a perimeter road along the ridgeline from the shop area to the depot road. This is their sector of the defensive perimeter. All during the reporting period significant improvements were made on the battalion defensive perimeter. Barbed wire obstacles were strung, field fortifications were constructed and fields of fire were cleared or improved. Wire communications were installed to all unit command posts. The battalion completed and distributed a new defense plan to all subordinate units. Two readiness tests were held to familiarize all personnel with the new defense plan. All personnel have been instructed to carry ammunition during these readiness tests. To increase the readiness condition of the battalion and to improve unit responsiveness, units were authorized to maintain their basic loads of Class I and V in ¼ ton trailers parked in the motor pool.

On 2 March the battalion submitted an MTOE to USAD CRB for approval. It was approved by USARV and forwarded to USARPAC on 13 April 1967.

In the first week of March a plague epidemic occurred at Cam Ranh Bay. All personnel were restricted to the pennisula, and military and civilian personnel were segregated. All personnel in the battalion were revaccinated against plague and were forbidden to gather in large groups. No member of the battalion caught the plague.

The battalion placed the NCR 500 computer system into operation during this period. With this system, we converted from manual to mechanical stock accounting. Many difficulties manifested themselves from the start. Certain supported units had not submitted their PLL's nor their equipment densities thereby rendering the establishment of an accurate ASL impossible. The problem was solved by the initiation of a temporary policy of rejecting the requisitions of the delinquent units until they submitted the required information.

Another problem which plagued the NCR 500 section was an excessive amount of machine inoperative time due to malfunctioning of one or another of its components. The problem was traced to the fact that the equipment had not been "de-bugged" at the factory, and that the maintenance man did not have any technical manuals. As soon as the manuals were obtained, a significant decrease in inoperational time was noted. The inoperational time dropped from over 33% in February to only 4 hours in the month of April.

The battalion provided the facilities and the material for a series of classes on MWO's to the multifuel engine. All instruction was provided by instructors from Continental Motors and ATAC.

On 25 March the detachment of the 129th Main Support Company which had been at Phan Rang was returned, and maintenance responsibility for the southern section of the support area was turned over to the newly arrived 552nd Light Maintenance Company at Phan Rang.

In line with the self-help program here at Cam Ranh Bay, the battalion engaged in several construction projects. As the likelihood of mortar or rocket attack grew due to increased enemy capability, all units engaged in a program of sandbagging their billet areas. All billets were sandbagged to a height of one foot above bunk level and all units were advised to construct bunkers or similar type facilities to provide protection against mortar attack.

The first softball field in the Cam Ranh Bay area was constructed by the 510th Engineer Company. A series of improvements on a recently vacated area were made in order to provide the best possible facilities for two new companies expected to join the battalion after the reporting period. A new type kitchen sump was designed by the battalion operations NCO and was approved for all messhalls in the battalion. The first sump of this nature was constructed for the messhall of one of the new companies.

On 12 April the Unit Utilization Report was completed and approved. It concluded, in essence, that all units of this battalion were fully committed, and that the battalion could not afford the loss of any portion of any unit assigned or enroute.

The battalion has been notified to prepare plans for a new maintenance facility at CRB Depot. If funds are received, this facility will be one of the high priority tasks for which funds will be allocated.

SECTION II: COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PART I: Observations (Lessons Learned)

Item: Maintaining Direct Support Unit Integrity in an Overseas Theater of Operations.

Discussion: Prior to September 1966, three of the subordinate Direct Support Units of this maintenance battalion were attempting to operate as a consolidated direct support maintenance facility. Although consolidated maintenance shop areas are common and effective in a static CONUS-type situation where the TD can be tailored to the needs of the supported installation, TOE units, which frequently must move and take up new and different support missions, are poor candidates or subjects for tailoring their personnel and equipment structures to meet the requirements of one special, presumably static, situation. The Cam Ranh Bay area is far from being a static situation. Operational necessity dictates that supported units frequently deploy both to and from this area. A TOE company is the smallest integral unit in the US Army which permits its commander to manage three available resources; men, materiel, and time; in order to best meet the varying needs of his support mission. A TOE company also has, by its inherent structure, a reasonable and definite span of control. If TOE companies preserve their unit integrity, a definite, responsive span of control is available to the Battalion Commander.

In the situation which existed prior to September 1966, a provisional maintenance battalion supervised a consolidated automotive shop, MHE shop, canvas repair shop, metal working shop, engineer equipment shop, plus a mammoth consolidated technical supply facility. The usual (in CONUS) advantage of consolidation (personnel reductions) were immediately nullified by the cast-in-concrete nature of MOS and grade authorizations in TOE's. The disadvantages were numerous. First and foremost was the fact that the span of control for the consolidated production control office was so large as to be unmanageable. Since no one DSU was responsible for the support of any given customer unit, there was no one person a customer could ask for help. Because more than half the soldiers working in any given repair section were not under the usual 24 hour control of their section sergeant, morale was adversely affected and absenteeism was prevalent. Since the administrative element was divorced from the mission element, the mission was more often than not slighted or even severely impaired due to the indiscriminate pulling of personnel for details.

Individual soldiers had lost the versatility required by their MOS, as more often than not, they only performed one portion of the total spectrum of the tasks required by their MOS. As a result, companies were incapable of deploying quickly, and were they to have deployed, they would not have been able to perform their missions.

In the consolidated technical supply field, no company knew what its ASL was, and as it turned out, all the editors were from one company, all the parts clerks from another, and all the warehousemen and stock pickers were from the remaining unit. In no way was any single company able to operate as required by its TOE, and if operational requirements had required that a company deploy elsewhere, an ASL would have had to be deployed and supply personnel cross-trained, with a corresponding loss of time and responsiveness in deployment of the unit.

When the battalion commander ordered a deconsolidation of these activities, despite the tremendous problems involved and the long hours of extra training involved to requalify personnel in their MOS's, almost immediate results were observed:

1. Company commanders regained 24 hour control of both their administrative and mission elements.

2. Company commanders were able to flexibly manage their resources in the performance of an assigned mission and still complete necessary administrative details such as building billets.

3. The customer at last had a definite direct support unit with which to deal for maintenance, supply, and technical assistance.

4. Morale of the individual soldier improved greatly as he now worked for the same supervisor 24 hours a day and felt that his chances for promotion were just as good as every other man of his MOS and rank.

5. Unit morale was enhanced by the achievement of measureable unit goals.

6. The Battalion Commander had achieved a span of control which his headquarters had been designed by TOE to manage properly.

7. Three weeks after deconsolidation, a Light Maintenance Company was suddenly required to deploy. It was able to do so in the allotted time with a minimum of difficulty. All concerned at the time voiced the conviction that the restoration of the unit's capability to deploy successfully had justified the deconsolidation even without the other benefits which had already evidenced themselves as outlined above.

Observations: Direct Support Units should function as individual TOE units to preserve unit integrity, to give higher commands operational flexibility, and to obtain efficient operation from available resources.

Item: Converting an in-country Direct Support unit to the COSTAR concept.

Discussion: A Direct Support Automotive Company of this battalion was converted to a COSTAR Main Support Company over 9 months ago. No provisions for equipping the unit for its new expanded mission were apparently made, nor were trained personnel to assume this mission furnished in a timely manner. After 9 months the unit is still incapable of performing its complete TOE mission for lack of tools and trained personnel.

Observations: Units being organized under the COSTAR concept should be so organized and equipped in CONUS, run through a training cycle there and then deployed. Units should not be reorganized in this theater of operations as the supply and personnel replacement channels are already overworked and cannot respond to this additional requirement with sufficient speed.

Item: Excessive non-operational time of the NCR 500 computer system.

Discussion: The NCR 500 system of this battalion experienced excessive nonoperational time due to lack of the usual factory "de-bugging" period and to a delay in availability of technical manuals to the assigned maintenance man. When the manuals were obtained, this system stayed operational for significantly longer periods of time.

Observations: Proper technical manuals should be provided whenever any new piece of equipment is fielded. The more complex the equipment, the more urgent is the need for the proper manuals.

Item: Need for coordination between DSU's and customer units.

Discussion: Conversion from manual stock accounting to the NCR 500 computerized system was considerably delayed by lack of information concerning the customer units' PLL's and equipment densities. The information was essential in order to establish an accurate ASL. The problem was solved by rejecting requisitions from units until an improved PLL and equipment density listing was submitted.

Observations: Close coordination between DSU's and customer units is absolutely essential in order to insure that maximum effective supply support is rendered.

Item: Field Sanitation - Disposal of Liquid Wastes

Discussion: In sandy soil, such as that of Cam Ranh peninsula, "permanent" kitchen sumps frequently become waterlogged and clogged, necessitating construction of another sump. If pains are taken to construct adequate and effective grease traps, a major cause of clogging can be eliminated. Grease traps should be based on the siphon principle, and arranged in a series. A minimum of two such traps is suggested. Grease traps should be large enough to allow the effluent to cool thoroughly and to slow the flow rate of the effluent, in order that the grease will coagulate and float to the surface and that the solid wastes will settle to the bottom. Grease traps should be cleaned frequently. The sump box should be of sufficient volume to accomodate the quantity of wastes involved, and should be revetted or sheathed and shored to prevent sand from washing in from the sides. The bottom should be left open. The sump may be filled with clean trap rock, crushed tin cans, bottles or similar media to provide surface for bacterial growth. A cover should be provided to exclude vermin, and if the sump is to be buried, a layer of barrier paper should be placed on top of the filler material to prevent the sand from infiltrating the media. It is wise to install a length of pipe extending to the bottom of the sump at the time of construction to allow the sump to be pumped out at a later date. If two sumps are available, each should be employed on alternate days.

Observations: Proper sumps can significantly reduce health hazards and, if properly constructed, remain operational indefinitely.

Item: Excessive Delay in Postal Service to customer units.

Discussion: Many times there is excessive delay in the postal service between Direct Support organizations and their customer units. This delay is often a result of the use of improper APO numbers on correspondence.

Observations: DS units should periodically verify the APO numbers of their customer units by checking with their servicing Army Postal Units. If an incorrect APO number is used the letter must be referred to directory service, which greatly complicates postal services and results in lost time. In addition to the above, the customer units should be informed of the correct mailing address of their DSU.

Item: Organizational Equipment Deadline.

Discussion: During the past quarter the equipment deadline rate has been significantly reduced by extensive utilization of unit customer - liaison teams as well as on-site field maintenance contact teams, both in the immediate geographical area of field maintenance shops and the supported unit's forward tactical position. Particular attention has been placed on inspecting and repairing all equipment in the hands of the troops returning from tactical locations to base camps. The effectiveness of this program was noted when combat elements of an aviation battalion were provided this service. In one assault helicopter company 11 of 22 vehicles and 5 of 6 generators were found to be in an unserviceable/marginal condition and were replaced with new equipment.

Observations: Incresaed effort in customer service and the earliest possible technical inspection of equipment in the hands of using units as well as repair and replacement of unserviceable equipment improves the overall readiness of equipment and combat posture of tactical organizations.

Item: Personnel Turbulence

Discussion: Field maintenance shop operations are often affected by loss of skilled technical personnel due to rotation, emergency leave, and/or assignment to Forward Support Area contact teams, causing a void in the unit's base shop. By utilizing a constant cross training program for available personnel it has been found that engineer, refrigeration, materials handling equipment, and automotive mechanics possess similar skills and can quickly learn to repair other similar types of equipment after a short on-the-job training period.

Observations: Direct support units' field maintenance capabilities have been significantly improved by cross training skilled technical personnel in repair techniques of other similar type equipment.

Item: Broken windshields on M151 ¼ ton utility trucks.

Discussion: It has been noted that numerous windshields of M151

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trucks have been broken when the passenger seat is pulled forward to allow rear seat passengers to enter or exit the vehicle, or when it is pulled forward to service the batteries.

Observations: Operators should excercise more caution when raising the seat.

Item: Excessive requests for replacement of seals.

Discussion: Recent lubrication orders state that "When a safe level of lubricant within a gear housing is indicated at scheduled lubrication, the lubricant retaining seal is functional even though the seal may indicate questionable leakage. When seepage or leakage of lubricant adversely affects the proper function of parts in the area (e.g., brakes), the retaining seal is non-functional regardless of lubricant level." Units are requesting that many seals be replaced even though DA Form 2408-1 (Daily) indicates that no oil has been added to gear case between scheduled lubrication service.

Observations: Inspectors should consult the DA Form 2408-1 for lubricant usage prior to requesting seal replacement.

Item: Steering pump on 5 ton M-series trucks.

Discussion: Numerous 5 ton M-series trucks are being job ordered into support maintenance for inoperative steering pumps. In many instances the power steering pump lines are merely loose, causing the pump to malfunction.

Observations: Before job ordering a 5 ton vehicle into support maintenance for a defective power steering pump, the organizational mechanic should check the power steering pump lines to insure tightness.

Item: Audio connectors on new series radios.

Discussion: Audio connectors on the new series radios have been shorting out and have been requiring replacement. Due to the humid weather of this area, moisture accumulates in the audio connectors. This water forms a conductor which shorts the closely placed wires in the conductor.

Observations: The user should wrap the connector with tape. This prevents moisture from entering and greatly reduces the problem.

Item: Frozen joints on vehicular mounted radio antennas.

Discussion: Due to the higher humidity and corrosive properties of the air, joints on vehicle radio antennas have a tendency to corrode and freeze, rendering them impossible to separate.

Observations: Each joint should be separated, cleaned, and lubricated weekly.

Item: D7E Tractor (full tracked)

Discussion: A recent survey conducted by this headquarters revealed that the hydraulic lines going from the scraper control valve panel to the hyraulic tank are experiencing malfunction (cracks have been developing around the flange going into the tank) due to excessive vibration forces, which are inherent to normal operation of the D7E.

Observations: Installing a support bracket (field fix) to the scraper control valve to give it added support has kept the vibration down to a minimum and has temporarily solved the problem.

It has been noted that the vibrational forces on the tractor can be kept to a minimum if the track adjustments are kept to the specifications stated in TM 5-2410-214-12, page 43, figure 27, and if the bolts on the universal joint between the transmission input shaft and the torque divider output shaft are kept tight.

Item: American Cranes.

Discussion: During the last quarter, the Engineer DS Company of this battalion has replaced a number of transmissions in American Cranes. Failure was due to loose mounting bolts where the transmission connects to the flywheel housing. The loose mounting bolts allow the transmission to move up and down during stops, starts, and gear changes causing the corners of the transmission to crack.

Observations: Periodic checks of these mountings (twice weekly) by organizational maintenance personnel would eliminate this problem and would result in a great saving to the government.

Item: Military Standard Model Generators

Discussion: It has been noted by our Engineer Inspectors that a number of Military Standard Model generators (Model 1A08-III-1½ HP and Model 2A016-III-3 HP) coming to support maintenance are in need of lubricant change in the crankcase. TM 5-2805-208-14, dated Aug 65, states that the crankcase oil should be drained and refilled every 25 hours. This figure (25 hours) is for generators operating under ideal conditions and is the maximum the generator should be allowed to operate. The operating conditions here in Vietnam (CRB), are far from ideal and it is our experience that the oil should be changed more often.

Observations: The crankcase oil in military standard model generators should be changed after every 8 to 12 hours of operation.

Item: Reaction Time of Department of the Army Assistance Teams

Discussion: Quite often this unit and others in Cam Ranh Bay have been visited by DA assistance teams whose mission was to solve some problem which had occurred some 6 to 9 months before. In each instance the problem had long since been resolved. In one case a team expressed surprise that supplies were stored in an efficient and modern depot complex, rather than strewn all over the beach as they had been led to believe was the case.

Observations: If Department of the Army cannot react and send assistance teams within two weeks of the time they were requested, it should send no team at all. Units in Vietnam, through necessity, are quite capable of resolving pressing problems themselves.

Item: Forecasting Support Maintenance Load

Discussion: The supply system is not as responsive to the procurement of repair parts for certain high-failure mission essential items, such as the 5 ton truck tractor, as it should be. In order to keep these items from remaining deadlined beyond acceptable limits, it is necessary to insure that repair parts are on order in time to arrive as soon as or shortly after they are needed. Red Ball Expanded provides for requisitioning channels for parts for imminent deadlines. To predict the probability of a heavy workload one merely has to determine the peak activity periods of the transportation truck units in the area, and add about 5 days.

Observations: DSU shop officers should maintain close and constant liaison with the operations sections of their transportation truck company customers in order to accurately predict peak workload periods in advance.

PART II: Recommendations

A. That all Direct Support Units be permitted to function as individual TOE units. Besides preserving unit integrity and assuring the best, most flexible possible maintenance support, it allows a unit to deploy readily.

B. That all Department of the Army assistance teams be dispatched to RVN within two weeks of initial request. If such teams cannot be dispatched within a two week time frame, they should not be dispatched at all. Units in Vietnam, through necessity, are quite capable of resolving pressing problems by their own devices.

C. That units being organized under the COSTAR concept be so organized, equipped, and trained in CONUS. This would prevent the population of this theater of operations by underequipped, untrained, Direct Support Units which are incapable of performing all elements of their assigned missions.

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SECTION III: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

69TH MAINTENANCE BATTALION (GS)

HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT

128TH SIGNAL COMPANY (D)

129TH MAIN SUPPORT COMPANY

135TH HEAVY EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE COMPANY (GS)

510TH ENGINEER COMPANY (MAINT) (DS)

L. CONRAD DAVIS
LTC, OrdC
Commanding

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AVCA CR-D-OC (5 May 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS US ARMY DEPOT CAM RANH BAY, APO 96312 12 MAY 1967

TO: Commanding Officer, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay, ATTN: AVCA CR-IO, APO 96312

Subject report from the 69th Maintenance Battalion (GS) has been reviewed by this headquarters. It adequately reflects significant events in that battalion for the reporting period.

TEL: CAB 3483

AUSTIN F. TUSSING
LTC, QMC
Commanding

cc: ACSFOR, DA (2 copies mailed direct)

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AVCA CR-IO (5 May 67) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)

Headquarters, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, APO 96312 2 JUN 1967

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96307
Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, APO 96307
Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

The inclosed Operational Report submitted by the 69th Maintenance Battalion (GS) adequately reflects the activities of the unit for the period indicated.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Lloyd M. Lee

LLOYD M. LEE
1LT AGC
ASST AG

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25 JUN 1967

AVCA GC-O (5 May 1967) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR 65)

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND, APO 96307

TO: Deputy Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96307

1. The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by the 69th Maintenance Battalion for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1967 is forwarded.

2. Reference page 4, first item, and page 9, paragraph C:

a. Concur with the statement that units organized under the COSTAR concept should be so organized, equipped, trained, and be required to pass an Army Training Test in CONUS and then be deployed to perform a mission.

b. Non-concur with the statement that units should not be reorganized under the COSTAR concept within a theater of operations. Units are continually being reorganized for increased effectiveness based on experience gained. The fact that a unit is presently in a theater of operations should not be the governing factor as to whether a unit should or should not reorganize if it would increase the unit's effectiveness. A major reorganization such as from a purely technical service mission to one of a COSTAR concept requires planning and certain actions to be performed, such as the acquisition of equipment and skills and the transfer of equipment and skills. In most instances this can be accomplished by the transfer of equipment and skills between the units affected within the same theater of operations without placing a requirement on CONUS resources. When this is not possible due to the lack of compatible units, requisitions must be submitted immediately for personnel who can not be easily cross trained and for equipment peculiar to the added mission.

c. Recommend that CONUS agencies responsible for deploying units be assured that units are equipped and properly trained prior to deployment.

d. The reporting headquarters was informed to follow up on equipment and personnel requisitions.

3. Reference page 5, first item: Concur. The commodity manager for this item should insure that the proper technical maintenance manuals are included with the NCR 500 computer system prior to shipment to a customer.

4. Reference page 6, last item: Non-concur. Four M151 vehicles were inspected to ascertain if this condition exists. In each case the minimum distance between the top of the seat back and the windshield, with the seat tipped forward for rear passenger unloading, was 4 inches. An investigation should be made to determine other causes for windshield breakage. The 69th Maintenance Battalion was informed through the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command.

AVCA GO-O 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR 65)

5. Reference page 7, third item: Non-concur.

a. Moisture will not short out connectors.

b. The improper assembly of the connector will cause a short within the connector.

c. The reporting headquarters will be informed through the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command.

6. Reference page 7, last item:

a. Non-concur with the observation stated as pertains to lubrication of antenna joints. Concur on that portion of the observation which states that antenna joints be cleaned weekly.

b. Lubrication of the antenna joints will effect the performance of the antenna.

c. Antenna joints should be cleaned by the use of a wire brush and kept dry.

d. The reporting headquarters will be informed of proper organizational maintenance of antennas through the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command.

7. Reference page 8, last item, and page 9, paragraph B:

a. Concur on that portion of the observations stated which pertains to the reaction time of DA Assistance Teams. Non-concur on the statement that personnel within units in Vietnam are quite capable of solving pressing problems of a highly technical nature. DA has fully qualified personnel who are well trained in their specific speciality. These personnel should be called on for assistance when the maintenance unit has a requirement.

b. Higher headquarters should react to requests for assistance from units in Vietnam within a time frame which would meet the needs of the requesting unit.

8. The 89th Maintenance Battalion engaged in combat service support for 89 days during the reporting period.

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25 JUN 1967

AVCA GC-O (5 May 1967) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR 65)

9. Concur with basic report as modified by indorsements. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Timothy S O'Hara

TIMOTHY S. O'HARA
1LT, INF
Acting Asst AG

TEL: Lynx 782/430

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AVHGC-DST (5 May 67) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1967 from Headquarters, 69th Maintenance Battalion (GS) as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning converting in-country D/S unit to the COSTAR concept, Section II, part I, page 4; Section II, part II, paragraph C, page 9 and paragraph 2b, 3rd Indorsement: Concur with comments outlined in 3rd Indorsement.

b. Reference item concerning DA assistance teams, Section II, part I, pages 8 and 9; Section II, part II, paragraph B, page 9 and paragraph 7, 3rd Indorsement: Concur in unit recommendation; however, to recruit and process teams within the suggested time frame is not realistic. Securing a port call is one of the major processing problems in CONUS, and recent arrivals have indicated that a 30 to 60 day time frame is normal. If the DA teams were accorded a higher priority at DA level the response time could be reduced accordingly and in all probability the two week-time frame could be met. It is agreed that as a stop gap measure, improvisations and field fixes can be used to resolve some immediate pressing problems; however, as stated in 3rd Indorsement, units are not always capable of solving problems of a highly technical nature.

c. Reference item concerning DS units functioning as individual TOE units, Section II, part II, paragraph a, page 9: Concur; however, this is a commanders prerogative. Other battalion commanders desire to and do run consolidated shops. The statements concerning lack of integrity and inflexibility of TOE organization are valid. Saigon Support Command apprised USARPAC representatives of this problem in December 1966.

d. Reference item concerning audio connectors, section II, part I, page 7 and paragraph 5, 3rd Indorsement: Concur in unit observation. The unit has been requested to submit an EIR concerning the shorting of wires in audio connectors of the new series radios. In addition, USAECOM

AVHGC-DST (5 May 67) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

Field Office, Vietnam has been requested to assist in isolating the problem and to make recommendations for product improvement.

e. Reference item concerning frozen joints on vehicular mounted radio antennas, Section II, part I, page 7 and paragraph 6, 3rd Indorsement. Concur with unit observation. Action has been initiated to publicize the need for frequent preventive maintenance on vehicular radio antennas.

f. Reference item concerning broken windshields on M151 ¼ ton trucks, section II, part I, pages 6 and 7, and paragraph 4, 3d Indorsement: Concur in unit observation. M151 ¼ ton trucks are equipped with both adjustable and non-adjustable type passenger front seats. When the adjustable seat is moved to the extreme forward position and raised with force it is possible to break the windshield. This will occur more easily when the cover and padding on the top of the seat back is worn and/or torn. The Director of Maintenance, 1st Logistical Command has been informed of this problem. Precautionary measures to preclude broken windshields will be published in the USARV Maintenance Information Summary.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
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GPOP-DT (5 May 67) 5th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 from HQ, 69th Maint Bn (GS) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 2 OCT 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

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