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
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GUERRILLA WARFARE READINGS

The George Washington University
Alexandria, Virginia

August 1962



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
Research Memorandum

GUERRILLA WARFARE READINGS

Edited by
Franklin Mark Osanka

The material in this memorandum supplements readings presented in the volume, Modern Guerrilla Warfare, edited by Franklin Mark Osanka and published in 1962.

Approved:



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Human Resources Research Office

The George Washington University
HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH OFFICE
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Task SPECIAL

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INTRODUCTION

The articles presented in this memorandum, together with the selections in the book Modern Guerrilla Warfare*, will give the reader a comprehensive cross-section of the many facets of guerrilla warfare. These articles were originally scheduled to be reprinted in the book cited but had to be excluded for a number of reasons--primarily because of space limitations.

The first two readings are a concise review of guerrilla warfare from ancient times to the present. Griffith discusses some of the more important guerrilla leaders and their theories. Following this, Geneste takes the reader from the Spanish Civil War through the period of the Algerian rebellion of the 1960's. He shows the Communist influence on guerrilla warfare and urges that the Free World recognize and devise countermeasures to this form of aggression.

The next three readings are devoted to Soviet guerrilla activities against the Nazis during World War II and to current Soviet emphasis on this form of warfare. Bjelajac, a long-time student of the subject and a former participant in guerrilla operations, discusses the history of Russian guerrillas and the current Communist doctrine of unconventional warfare. Next, Marr reviews German security and antiguerrilla measures, and outlines the valuable lessons therein. Finally, Jacobs presents a translation of a Russian article that claims to expose the "bourgeois falsifications" of the Soviet Partisan Movement.

*F.M. Osanka (ed.), Modern Guerrilla Warfare, Free Press of Glencoe, A Division of The Macmillan Company, New York, 1962.

Chinese guerrillas were quite successful against the Japanese during World War II and later against the Nationalist government of China. Rudolph's article, which was one of the first discussions of Chinese guerrillas to appear in this country, predicts the future effectiveness of the Chinese guerrillas and shows how a guerrilla army is recruited, trained, and led.

During the period from around 1946 to 1957, Communist guerrillas attempted to take over the Republic of the Philippines and were defeated. Their defeat was attributed to a number of factors, some of which are discussed by Villa-Real.

From 1946 to 1949 the Greek government fought a Communist guerrilla enemy that was finally defeated. As in all guerrilla wars, victory is attained through a combination of tactics and techniques. Papathanasiades provides an illuminating step-by-step account of a counter guerrilla operation that occurred toward the end of the campaign.

The Korean War presented a range of separate counter guerrilla operations. A concise discussion of these by Beebe is presented here. Study of this article will offer not only an adequate understanding of counter guerrilla procedures in Korea, but also a thorough understanding of Communist guerrilla techniques that have been and will continue to be enacted in other geographic areas.

The Communist guerrilla movement in South Viet-Nam is steadily growing. Large contingents of U.S. advisors are being assigned to the area and some of them are reporting their observations of the Viet Cong guerrillas. Bashore's article is one of the earliest of these. It offers a vivid portrayal of the Viet Cong guerrilla and his U.S. opponent and asks "which

will be the soldier of the future?"

In ~~Malaya~~ during the period of around 1946 to the late 1950's, Communist guerrillas tried unsuccessfully to take over the government. British and Malayan forces defeated the Communists and re-established peace and order. The later stages of the fighting were primarily a war of the jungle in which small-unit actions were decisive. Both Miers and Meyers offer a vivid and detailed description of these actions and present suggestions for preparing to meet other Communist guerrilla threats.

The last five readings are concerned with counterinsurgency procedures and policies for the future. Atkinson argues that unconventional warfare will play an ever-increasing role in future wars. Rigg discusses the role of civic action coupled with sound military action in counter guerrilla operations--primarily as demonstrated by the French. Jacobs and de Rochefort discuss the importance of and the need for a strong political ideology in unconventional warfare, and Bjelajac offers us a "strategy of protracted defense"--a technique of internal security as well as discouragement to would-be outside aggressors. Finally, Downey urges the Free World to devise a unified theory of unconventional warfare, with emphasis on guerrilla operations against the Communist in the event of occupation of United States territory.

The editor is deeply grateful to the authors and publishers who have granted permission to reprint these selections. The individuals who have assisted him in the collection of the materials are given acknowledgment by name in Modern Guerrilla Warfare.

Guerrilla*

Samuel B. Griffith, II**

Orthodox military thought has consistently deprecated the achievements and potentialities of partisan or guerrilla operations in warfare. It is difficult to discover a basis for this opinion; it is certainly not founded on an objective analysis of history, for experience since Napoleonic times indicates clearly that guerrilla operations can make a decisive contribution to the outcome of a war. Partisans have not won wars in the past nor will they win them in the future. But their activities can be of a magnitude and intensity sufficient to prevent one side or the other from winning.

Guerrillas are a feature common to all ideological wars. Their operations have been a significant aspect of such struggles since the days of our Revolution, and should there be a third great war they will inevitably be of the greatest importance. In a future war in which ideological issues are clearly drawn guerrilla activities will be dispersed over vast areas and will draw sustenance from all levels of populations. The quality of operations will be significantly improved over the past; modern weapons and equipment will make the guerrilla of the future a formidable antagonist in the type of warfare that he will conduct.

For these reasons the history of guerrilla experience can not be ignored. It was the guerrillas of Spain and Russia quite as much as the generalship of Wellington and Kutuzov that brought Napoleon to St Helena. This was not appreciated in 1815; it may not be fully appreciated in 1950. Nevertheless, it is true, and it counsels us to more fully acquaint ourselves with partisan theory and partisan action.

The assumption that guerrilla warfare cannot flourish as in the past is faulty. The structure of western industrial society provides a fertile field for partisan operations, and it is a safe assumption that guerrillas of the future will have ample opportunity for extremely effective work.

It is equally incorrect to assume that the airplane has limited either the scope or effectiveness of guerrilla activities. Guerrillas cannot be discovered by aerial cameras or observers and they do not concentrate to present profitable targets to bombardiers or aerial gunners. The airplane proved in the last war that it can be an important instrument for the support of guerrilla operations; it is of little if any use in directly combating them.

In a study of guerrilla war in history we find quite definite patterns constantly recurring. These recurring patterns are to be found on both sides of the cloth, so to speak. That is, they repeat themselves in terms of guerrilla theory and action, and in terms of the steps taken to counter such actions. One finds Mosby in Virginia, Lawrence in Arabia, and Mao Tze Tung in China, three "intellectual" guerrilla leaders, expressing identical tactical

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theories and putting them with consistent success to the test of action. On the other hand one discovers the French in Spain, Kitchener in South Africa, and the Japanese in North China attempting in turn to suppress guerrilla warfare by measures which were uniformly unsuccessful.

It is the purpose of this paper to describe some of the important partisan figures of history and to throw some light on their theories and methods in the hope that we may discern the constants that have been common to guerrilla warfare in the past and that may reasonably be expected to reappear in the future. In the process we will discover avoidable errors being repeated again and again at different times in history, in different places, by men who spoke different languages. It has been said that Bismarck once remarked: "Fools say they learn from experience; I prefer to learn from the experience of others." Most of those who have been called upon to conduct campaigns against partisans had apparently never heard this aphorism. Perhaps in an earlier day there was some excuse for repetition of mistakes; there is none at the present time for we have at hand for study and analysis a wealth of documentary material that was not available to our predecessors.

Spain between the years 1808 and 1813 was the scene of nationwide guerrilla operations which in point of intensity and effectiveness have not been equalled in history. Dozens of talented guerrilla leaders were developed, and to their skill and daring Wellington owed a great measure of his success in the Peninsular War. The guerrillas themselves could not have driven the French from Spain, but neither could Wellington have done this without their aid and the Great Duke never deprecated the contributions of the guerrilleros to his success.

Here we see for the first time strategic and tactical co-ordination between conventional formations of both the army and the navy and organized guerrillas; we may trace the development of poorly equipped bands into well trained, highly mobile, hard striking combat groups, elusive and pervasive as mist. In their independent operations, the Spanish guerrilleros established the general pattern of partisan war with which we are familiar.

Frequently week after week passed with no communication between the Emperor in Paris, the higher headquarters of the French armies in Spain, and their columns operating in the field. Hundreds of couriers carrying official despatches were captured, foraging parties were ambushed and annihilated, and isolated garrisons were overwhelmed in surprise attacks. Supplies for the armies were intercepted, great sums of money were stolen from paymasters, traitors on whom the French relied for information were searched out and summarily executed. These activities produced in the French feelings of complete frustration, which in turn caused them to take punitive measures that were ill-considered and served only to intensify resistance. Heavy detachments were required to guard the vulnerable lines of communication, to hold the principal cities and to protect convoys with the result that forces available for the field were reduced in strength. Thus were a few able to immobilize many, to retain the initiative, to create consternation and to produce results out of all proportion to their numerical strength.

It is not necessary to investigate the background of the Peninsular War except to point out that it was an ideological war waged for the most part by

1

the Spanish people against the aggressive tyranny which Bonaparte attempted to impose upon them. Nor are we here particularly concerned with the marchings and countermarchings of the British and French armies except as they were connected with, or influenced by, guerrilla operations.

The first popular reactions to Napoleon's iniquitous coup d'etat in Spain took place on 24 May, 1808 in the Asturias, the province that was over a hundred years later to contribute the most hard-bitten fighting men in Spain to the Republican ranks. The Asturians proposed no halfway measures of resistance: They declared war on France. Other provinces followed, and by July the French had on their hands a full scale revolution, in which "Somatenes" (so called because the "Somaten," the alarm bell, roused them to arm) and "Miqueletes" (the "Minute Men")—the armed people who provided the nucleus for the guerrilla bands—played an important part. But in 1808 and 1809 partisan tactics were in their most elementary stage of development. According to Oman:

"The only Spanish fighters who were playing the proper game in 1809 were the Catalanian 'somatenes,' and even they gave battle far too often and did not adhere with sufficient pertinacity to the harassing tactics of guerrilla warfare."¹

A certain Faustino Fernandez who advocated

"The avoiding of battles, the harassing of the enemy's flanks and communications, and the employment of numerous flying bands."²

was regarded as a visionary, and in 1809 few Spanish patriots paid him much attention. They were unable to see that Fernandez was attempting to introduce a new dimension to warfare.

The first of the great Spanish guerrilleros was Juan-Martin Diaz, nicknamed "El Empecinado," "The Obstinate One," who in the fall of 1809

"raised large bands during the absence of the normal garrisons and swept the countryside capturing convoys and cutting the lines of communication—The French governors on every side kept reporting their perilous position when they could get a message through to Madrid."³

A mild foretaste of what the future held in store for the French governors!

The Emperor bombarded his commanders with advice as to how to repress the guerrillas. His orders resulted

"in much marching and countermarching of the newly arrived troops but to little practical effect in the way of repression for skilled leaders like Mina, the Empecinado and Julian Sanchez nearly always slipped between the fingers of their pursuers."⁴

¹A History of the Peninsular War by Sir Charles Oman, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 35.

²Ibid, p. 35

³Ibid, p. 83

⁴Ibid, Vol III, pp. 212-213

In the fall of 1810 Mina the elder with his guerrilla bands was extremely active in Navarre. Although he never mustered over 4,000 men he kept six French generals busy:

"...his services were invaluable during the campaign of Portugal since he was wearing out a French force of five times his own strength, in fruitless marches, under winter rains, and over roads that had become all but impassable. The archives of the French war office show lists of officers by the dozen killed or wounded 'dans une reconnaissance en Navarre' or 'dans une recontre avec les bandes de Mina' ... during the later months of 1810...Wellington owed him no small gratitude."⁵

Oman estimates that in 1810-11, there were never more than 20,000 Guerrillas under arms between the Guadarrama Mountains (north of Madrid) and the Bay of Biscay. Yet he writes:

"despite their weakness in the open field...they rendered good services to Spain and incidentally to Great Britain and to all Europe by pinning down to the soil twice their numbers of good French troops. Anyone who had read the despatches of Napoleon's 'Military Governments' or the diaries of the officers who served in Reille's or Dorsenne's or Caffarelli's flying columns will recognize a remarkable likeness between the situation of affairs in Northern Spain during 1810 and 1811 and that in South Africa during 1900 and 1911. Lightly moving guerrilla bands unhampered by a base to defend or a train to weigh them down and well served as to intelligence by the residents of the countryside can paralyze the action of an infinitely larger number of regular troops."⁶

By January 1811, Napoleon (who had lost patience with generals unable to suppress the guerrillas in the north of Spain) named Marshal Bessi res to command the "Army of the North" and gave him among other missions that of putting an end to the partisans. This proved to be a task quite beyond the means at the Marshal's disposal, and he reported to the Emperor that the guerrilla bands were daily increasing and that if he concentrated as much as a third of his 60,000 effectives to subdue them, all communications would be lost. He concluded this dispatch by pointing out that victory in Spain did not depend upon the outcome of a battle with the English, but rather upon the pacification of the country. His master, obsessed with the idea that a brilliant campaign culminating in a climactic battle would bring the war in the Peninsula to an end, was not interested in such reports. He considered Bessi res a pessimist.⁷ As a matter of fact, the marshal was an optimist.

During the spring and early summer the guerrilleros in the north were receiving arms and equipment from British cruisers operating in the Bay of Biscay and were steadily becoming stronger. The expedients the French adopted to control them were fruitless. Destruction of towns, taking of hostages,

⁵Ibid, p. 489

⁶Ibid, p. 492

⁷Oman estimates it would have taken 150,000 to accomplish the pacification—even temporary—of the north of Spain at this time.

devastation of the countryside, execution of prisoners, construction of block-houses—all were in vain. Occasionally a French flying column managed to catch a guerrilla group unaware and destroy or scatter it—if the latter the partisans soon reassembled none the worse for wear.

In June and July of 1811 northwestern Spain was "hotter" than it had ever been. Two famous guerrilleros, Longa and Porlier, in command of well organized and well equipped formations were operating in the Asturias and Leon with the result that the reports of Bessièrès were more pessimistic than usual.

"Countless expeditions against them had led to no final result. Like the holy men of old, when persecuted in one region they merely fled to another. If the flying columns and petty garrisons were withdrawn for a moment they would be at the gates of Burgos or Santander within two days and the...main arteries with France would be cut."⁸

At the end of July Bessièrès was relieved by Dorsenne.

The change in French commanders in northern Spain produced no change in the general situation, which steadily deteriorated.

"Longa and Porlier and Julian Sanchez—with the forces that were never very great in numbers, paralyzed by their ubiquity and their unceasing enterprise the greater part of Dorsenne's troops. If they had not been in existence the French might have found men enough to conquer Galicia or to attack northeastern Portugal in force. This was true throughout the whole of 1810 and 1811 and was a governing fact in the history of the Peninsula War."⁹ (Italics mine)

Dorsenne did not last long, and the French commander Abbe signalized the opening of the year 1812 by the issuance of a proclamation which prohibited "quarter" for guerrilleros, made their families and villages responsible for them and authorized the execution of hostages. Mina promptly announced that he would shoot four Frenchmen for every Spaniard, a threat that he carried out with punctuality and exactitude. Abbe withdrew his proclamation and there was a truce to terror while the French concentrated 30,000 troops to destroy the partisan chief and his band of 3,000. As the invaders busied themselves trying to track him down, Mina fell upon an immense convoy escorted by a force of 2,000 troops and completely destroyed it. The entire Army of the North spent the remainder of April and the month of May in futile pursuit of this phantom.

In June further employment awaited Cafarelli, the latest French commander in the area. Adm Sir Home Popham had at Wellington's direction concerted with Mendizabal, a well known guerrillero of the Biscay coast, a series of joint operations designed to prevent the Army of the North from aiding Marmont, who was opposing the English general. This joint campaign, brilliantly executed, culminated in the seizure of Santander, the most important port on the Biscay

⁸"History of the Peninsular War," Vol IV, p. 464

⁹Ibid, p. 474

coast of Spain. Thus Mendizabal's partisans were assured of the supplies and equipment they had previously lacked. Until the close of the campaign in the Peninsula the contributions of the guerrilleros to Wellington's success continued to be of the utmost importance, but strangely enough, even after Napoleon's return from Moscow, they never seem to have made an impression on the Emperor's mind. If we follow him to Russia we will find him still dreaming of magnificent strategic and tactical combinations; still oblivious to the potential of well organized guerrilla war, conducted by capable leaders. "La Gloire" in Russia clung blindly to the obsessions that had dominated his war policy in Spain and had been his undoing. At this period of his career it may be said of him as Metternich said of the Bourbons: he learned nothing and he forgot nothing.

Moscow, the capital, beckoned him. Once the Emperor had established himself in the Kremlin the Tsar would come to terms; he would have to; everyone had always done it that way. He could not comprehend why the Tsar would not sue for surrender after Borodino. He berated the Russian generals as inept fools and cowards because after Borodino they would not stand and fight, but chose instead to fall back slowly laying waste the countryside and arming the peasants. Swarms of hard riding cossacks and partisans attacked the flanks, rear and trains of the French Army. The people burned the hay ricks and villages, drove off the livestock, fired the crops standing in the fields and poisoned the wells. When Napoleon reached Moscow he established himself in the Imperial apartments in the Kremlin from whence he vainly endeavored to convince the Tsar and Kutuzov that Russia was beaten. But the Russians would not agree. Finally, frustrated, and aware that the march to Moscow was but the prelude to the greatest debacle to be recorded in the annals of military history, the Emperor gave the order for retreat.

From Moscow to the borders of Poland his freezing, starving army fell back through burned out towns from which all the inhabitants had fled. On the way the columns were continually harassed:

"Cossacks kept up perpetual raids along the roads, which they constantly crossed between one division and another—or even, when there was a gap, between one regiment and another...Wherever transport wagons were moving along in disorder, or unarmed stragglers were making their way as best they could, the Cossacks improvised sudden attacks, killing and wounding, robbing all those whose lives they spared, and looting wagons and carriages when they came upon them.

"It is not difficult to imagine the perturbation spread by such tactics and their effects on the Army's morale. What was worse, they made communications extremely difficult, not only between one division and another. The General Staff, as I have already explained, received no reports; its orders either did not arrive at their destination or if they arrived were too late to be of any use. Staff officers, who braved every sort of danger, were frequently captured. Then there was the ice.¹⁰...of the many who went after food, but few returned...Cossacks and armed peasants captured many of those stragglers."¹¹

¹⁰From With Napoleon in Russia by Armand de Caulaincourt, William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1935, pp. 233-234, reprinted by permission of publishers.

¹¹Ibid, p. 228

Years later Leo Tolstoi in War and Peace described the sombre spectacle of the Grande Armee stumbling down the ice covered road to Smolensk towards the border of Poland; herded along by Kutuzov, done to death by famine, winter, the blindness of its commander and the Cossacks and hordes of peasant guerrillas. This is what he wrote about the nature of the death struggles of the French Army and about the agents who presided at that historic scene:

"The battle of Borodino with the occupation of Moscow and the flight of the French, that followed without any more battles, is one of the most instructive phenomena in history.

"All historians are agreed that the external activity of states and peoples in their conflicts finds expression in wars; that the political power of states and peoples is increased or diminished as the immediate result of success or defeat in war.

"Strange are the historical accounts that tell us how some king or emperor, quarrelling with another king or emperor, levies an army, fights a battle with the army of his foe, gains a victory, kills three, five, or ten thousand men, and consequently subdues a state and a whole people consisting of several millions; and incomprehensible it seems that the defeat of any army, one hundredth of the whole strength of a people, should force that people to submit. Yet all the facts of history (so far as we know it) confirm the truth of the statement, that the successes or defeats of a nation's army are the causes or, at least, the invariable symptoms of the increase or diminution of the power of a nation. An army gains a victory, and immediately the claims of the conquering people are increased to the detriment of the conquered. An army is defeated, and at once the people loses its rights in proportion to the magnitude of the defeat; and if its army is utterly defeated, the people is completely conquered. So (according to history) it has been from most ancient times up to the present. All Napoleon's earlier wars serve as illustrations of the rule. As the Austrian armies were defeated, Austria was deprived of her rights, and the rights and power of France were increased. The victories of the French at Jena and at Auerstadt destroyed the independent existence of Prussia.

"But suddenly, in 1812, the French gained a victory before Moscow. Moscow was taken, and in consequence of that, with no subsequent battles, not Russia, but the French army of six hundred thousand, and then Napoleonic France itself ceased to exist. To strain the facts to fit the rules of history, to maintain that the field of Borodino was left in the hands of the Russians, or that after the evacuation of Moscow, there were battles that destroyed Napoleon's army—is impossible.

"After the victory of the French at Borodino, there was no general engagement, nor even a skirmish of any great importance, yet the French army ceased to exist. What is the meaning of it? If it had been an example from the history of China, we could have said it was not an historical fact (the resource of historians, when anything will not fit in with their rules). If it had occurred in a conflict on a small scale, in which only small numbers of soldiers had taken part, we might have looked upon it as an exception. But all this took place before the eyes of our fathers, whom it was a question of life and death for their country; and the war was on a larger scale than any wars we know of.

"The sequel of the campaign of 1812—from Borodino to the final expulsion of the French—has proved that victories are not always a cause nor even an invariable sign of conquest; it has proved that the force that decides the fate of peoples does not lie in military leaders, nor even in armies and battles, but in something else.

"The French historians, who describe the position of the French troops before they marched out of Moscow, assert that everything was in good order in the Grande Armée, except the cavalry, the artillery, and the transport, and that there was no forage for the horses and cattle. There was no remedy for this defect, because the peasants of the surrounding country burned their hay rather than let the French have it.

"Victory did not bring forth its usual results, because the peasants, Karp and Vlas, by no means persons of heroic feelings (after the French evacuation, they hurried with the carts to pillage Moscow), and the immense multitude of others like them burnt their hay rather than bring it to Moscow, however high the prices offered them.

"Let us imagine two men, who have come out to fight a duel with swords in accordance with all the rules of the art of swordsmanship. The fencing has lasted for some time. All at once one of the combatants, feeling that he is wounded, grasping that it is no joking matter, but a question of life and death, flings away his sword, and snatching up the first cudgel that comes handy, begins to brandish that. But let us imagine that the combatant, who has sensibly made use of the best and simplest means for the attainment of his object, should be inspired by the traditions of chivalry to try and disguise the real cause of the conflict and should persist in declaring that he had been victor in the duel in accordance with all the rules of swordsmanship. One can imagine what confusion and obscurity would arise from his description of the duel!

"The duelist, who insisted on the conflict being fought in accordance with the principles of the fencer's art, stands for the French; his opponent, who flung away his sword and snatched up a cudgel, did like the Russians; and the attempted description of the duel in accordance with the rules of swordsmanship has been given us by the historians of the war.

"From the time of the burning of Smolensk a war began which did not follow any of the old traditions of warfare. The burning of towns and villages, the retreat after every battle, the blow dealt at Borodino and followed by retreat, the burning of Moscow, the capture of marauders, the seizing of transports—the whole of the irregular warfare was a departure from the rules.

"Napoleon was aware of it, and from the time when he stood waiting in Moscow in the correct pose of the victorious fencer, and instead of his opponent's sword, saw the bludgeon raised against him, he never ceased complaining to Kutuzov and to the Emperor Alexander that the war was being conducted contrary to all the rules of war. (As though any rules existed for the slaughter of men!)

"In spite of the complaints of the French that they did not keep to the rules, in spite of the fact that the Russians in the highest positions felt

it somehow shameful to be fighting with a cudgel, and wanted to take up the correct position en quarte or en tierce, to make a skillful thrust, en prime and so on, the cudgel of the people's war was raised in all its menacing and majestic power; and troubling itself about no question of any one's tastes or rules, about no fine distinctions, with stupid simplicity, with perfect consistency, it rose and fell and belaboured the French till the whole invading army had been driven out.

"And happy the people that will not, as the French did in 1813, saluting according to the rules, gracefully and cautiously offer the sword hilt to the magnanimous conqueror. Happy the people who, in the moment of trial, asks no questions how others would act by the recognized rules in such cases, but with ease and directness picks up the first cudgel that comes handy and deals blows with it, till resentment and revenge give way to contempt and pity."¹²

Napoleon had not learned in Spain and he did not learn in Russia that guerrilla warfare on the scale he experienced was an expression of pure patriotism as well as the popular manifestation of latent political ambitions. Both peoples knew tyrannies; they did not know the foreign tyranny which the Emperor and his army represented, but they feared it more than that which they knew.

Could Napoleon have dealt with the guerrilla situations in either Spain or France by measures purely military? There is a possibility that he could have done so, but not simultaneously, and not by the methods his commanders used. Wanton devastation, pillage, murder, and taking of hostages did not serve to suppress guerrillas in Spain and Russia. They have not, and will not, serve to suppress them anywhere.

The scene of the next great drama in the history of partisan warfare is South Africa where the British and the Boer burghers fought a bitter guerrilla struggle for almost two years after the "war" was "over."

Lord Roberts who had been hastily despatched from London to retrieve the errors of Gen Sir Redvers Buller, his immediate predecessor as General Officer Commanding South Africa, had brought the war with the Boers to a "successful conclusion" in the autumn of 1900 and had sailed for home to accept the rewards and adulation that were in this instance prematurely accorded. He left the "mop-up" to his distinguished Chief of Staff, Kitchener of Khartoum. Lord Roberts, a man of considerable perspicacity, knew when "to get out from under."

As early as December 1900 guerrillas were Kitchener's major problem. In June 1901 the Boer leaders decided upon a policy of guerrilla warfare. This was a natural development but it is difficult to understand why it was so long aborning. Had a correct war policy been established by the Boer leaders at the beginning of hostilities the British would have been mired down in Africa for twenty years.

Kitchener had prior to June borrowed a page from Napoleon's Spanish book and built numbers of block houses along the railways running north from the

¹²War and Peace by Leo Tolstoi, translated by Constance Garnett, Random House, Modern Library edition, pp. 970-972.

Cape through the Transvaal and Orange Free State towards Rhodesia. The Free State was a rough rectangle with its long axis stretching some 320 miles from the northern boundary of Cape Colony to the southern boundary of Rhodesia. Following the long axis there was a single track rail line which from its southern terminus at Port Elizabeth ran north through Blomfontein and Kronstadt to Johannesburg and Pretoria. Paralleling the western border there was another north-south railway connecting Cap Colony with Kimberly and Mafeking.

This blockhouse system promised much, for it seemed that if the integrity of these rail lines could be guaranteed throughout their length two very desirable ends would be achieved. First, forces and their supplies and equipment could be moved rapidly and safely; and, second, the Boers would be walled in (or walled out) of the area between the railroads. The commandos, thus isolated, were to be driven like coveys of grouse or herds of beasts into an ever more tightly circumscribed area, and then eliminated. But things did not work out exactly this way. The idea which was possibly inspired by Kitchener's shootin' and huntin' experiences, did not take on Boers, who inconsiderately evidenced no desire to fall in with any such plan for their extermination. They refused to be hemmed in by the blockhouses and to let the beaters work them into position for the kill.

In the summer of 1901 "there was no sign that the Dutch farmers were tired of their friends the raiders."

"On the contrary, recruiting to the rebel ranks was distinctly on the increase; wherever the bands went they were sure of hospitality, refreshment, a few additional rifles and above all, information. A farmer would ride fifty miles with a warning to a commando, and that, it was often remarked, was more than most loyal farmers would do for the British."¹³

The strain of insufficient and incorrect information, or information that came too late, threads through the whole history of British South African operations just as it had through those of the French in Spain and Russia.

In August 1901 Kitchener made an attempt to bring an end to the activities by which a few thousand Boer partisans were wearing out a British force thirty times as great. He issued a proclamation which has few equals in the vast library composed of the pronunciamientos of generals. This British Commander in Chief had the effrontery to inform the Boers that they were not only a few in number but had lost nearly all their guns and munitions of war and their proper organization and were therefore incapable of carrying on regular warfare. The historians of the London Times aptly pointed out that

"it might have been answered that the reduction in numbers had gone hand in hand with aggressive vigour; that the loss of guns, so far from being a weakness had inspired more effective tactics; that while the British suffered from an excess of organization, the Boer organization, if not 'proper,' was eminently suited to its purpose, and that whether the hostilities were called 'regular' or 'irregular' was not of much account."¹⁴

¹³Pages 310-311, Vol V, The Times History of the War in South Africa.

¹⁴Pages 321-22 Vol V, Ibid.

The threats contained in the next several paragraphs of this remarkable paper were entirely without point since Kitchener was unable to carry them out. They served only to encourage the Boers to continue resistance that was in one year to cost the British thousands of casualties and to add half a billion dollars to the national debt. And be it remembered that half a billion at the turn of the century is equivalent to ten times that amount today.

Kitchener after having tried both threats and the policy of transporting Boer families, finally became convinced that it was only by the use of highly mobile self-contained columns unencumbered with heavy equipment and slow transport that positive results could be obtained. He was a long time getting around to rediscovering the method first arrived at by the French in Spain.

"Mobility was requisite...on every military ground and for every military emergency, and it had been just as requisite on the first day of the war as it was now."¹⁵

But flying columns did not solve a problem which was no more susceptible of a purely military solution that had been that of the French in Spain and Russia.

As an example of what an accomplished guerrilla leader can do to "flying" columns we have only to look at the bare bones of Botha's raid into Natal in October, 1901. At that time with a force of less than 2,000 the Boer leader tied up seven or eight columns totalling over 16,000 troops. The British never laid a hand on him though he attacked them several times. If half a dozen columns such as Botha's had been able to conduct coordinated operations simultaneously over a wide area the results for the British would have been disastrous. The war in South Africa teaches many things, among them that the policy of transportation of non-combatant women and children from guerrilla areas confers a positive advantage on the partisans. Not only does it rid them of domestic responsibilities but it burdens the transporter with psychological and logistic problems of major proportions. Obviously it would be utterly impractical if applied to any considerable area with a numerous population.

The curtain next rises in the Middle East where Col T.E. Lawrence—Lawrence of Arabia—developed and applied his theories of guerrilla warfare against the Turks. The British by this time had obviously learned something from history and they empowered Lawrence to dangle the apple of freedom and independence before the eyes of the Arabs in exchange for active participation in the war and the cooperation of the world of nomadic Islam against the Turk.

Lawrence made a unique contribution to military thought. He perceived immediately that one of the great strengths of guerrillas was their pervasiveness; their ubiquity. Guerrillas could be everywhere, but at the same time nowhere. To permit—indeed to encourage—the enemy to occupy cities and towns was not a bad idea, providing one could isolate them and keep them isolated. This the Arabs did with the Turkish garrison in Medina which sat in trenches destroying its own power of movement by "eating the transport" it "could no longer feed." The guerrillas ranged over 99% of Arabia; Turkish military power decayed in Medina and in their isolated outposts.

¹⁵Ibid, p. 323

Lawrence developed his theory of guerrilla warfare while he lay ill for several months. He was not too ill to reflect.

"I began idly to calculate how many square miles...perhaps one hundred and forty thousand square miles. And how would the Turks defend all that? No doubt by a trench line across the bottom, if we came like an army with banners; but suppose we were (as we might be) an influence, an idea, a thing, intangible, invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas? Armies were like plants, immobile, firm rooted, nourished through long stems to the head. We might be a vapor, blowing where we listed. Our kingdoms lay in each man's mind; and as we wanted nothing material to live on, so we might offer nothing material to the killing. It seemed a regular soldier might be helpless without a target owning only what he sat on, and subjugating only what, by order, he could poke his rifle at.

Then I figured out how many men they would need to sit on all this ground, to save it from our attack--in derth, sedition putting up her head in every unoccupied one of those hundred thousand square miles. I knew the Turkish army exactly, and even allowing for their recent extension of faculty by aeroplanes and guns and armored trains (which made the earth a smaller battlefield) still it seemed that they would have need for a fortified post every four square miles, and a fort would not be less than twenty men. If so they would need six hundred thousand men to meet the ill wills of all the Arab peoples, combined with the active hostility of a few zealots.

How many zealots could we have? At present we had nearly fifty thousand; sufficient for the day. It seemed the assets in this element of war were ours. If we realized our raw materials and were apt with them, then climate, railway, desert and technical weapons could also be attached to our interests. The Turks were stupid; the Germans behind them dogmatical. They would believe that rebellion was absolute, like war, and deal with it on the analogy of war. Analogy in human things was fudge anyhow; and war upon rebellion was messy and slow like eating soup with a knife."¹⁶

Lawrence was a sensitive man, and because he was he attempted to explore psychological and emotional realms with which the ordinary professional soldier is unfamiliar, and whose boundaries he ordinarily does not need or seek to cross. How to do what he had to do was a problem that Lawrence pondered a long time, for the Arabs could not afford the deaths of too many individual guerrilla fighters.

"An individual death, like a pebble dropped in water, might make a brief hole, yet rings of sorrow widened out therefrom."¹⁷

Strategy, tactics and psychology are all inextricably bound together in the world of the partisan.

"It was our obvious policy to be superior in some one tangible branch; gun cotton or machine guns or whatever would be made decisive. Orthodoxy had

¹⁶The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, T.E. Lawrence, Copyright 1926, 1935 by Doubleday & Co., Inc., pp. 192-93.

¹⁷Ibid, p. 194.

laid down the maxim applied to men of being superior at the critical point and moment of attack. We might be superior in equipment in one dominant moment or respect, and for both things and men we might give the doctrine a twisted negative side, for cheapness' sake and be weaker than the enemy everywhere except in that one point or matter. The decision of what was critical would always be ours. Most wars were wars of contact, both forces striving to touch to avoid tactical surprise. Ours should be a war of detachment. We were to contain the enemy by the silent threat of a vast unknown desert, not disclosing ourselves 'till we attacked'."18

Of the psychological element in partisan war:

"We had to arrange (the minds of our men) in order of battle just as carefully and formally as other officers would arrange their bodies. And not only our own men's minds, though naturally they came first. We must also arrange the minds of the enemy, so far as we could reach them; then those other minds of the nation supporting us behind the firing line, since more than half the battle passed there in the back; then the minds of the enemy nation waiting the verdict; and of the neutrals looking on; circle beyond circle."19

Lawrence said that guerrillas must be able to

"plan in certainty. The chief agent must be the general's head and his understanding must be faultless, leaving no room for chance. Morale, if built on knowledge, was broken by ignorance. When we knew all about the enemy we should be comfortable. We must take more pains in the service of news than any regular staff."20

Finally in a classical summation Lawrence wrote--and in precisely 153 words--the theory upon which the revolt in the Arabian desert was to be based:

"It seemed to me proven that our rebellion had an unassailable base, guarded not only from attack but from the fear of attack. It had a sophisticated alien enemy disposed as an army of occupation in an area greater than would be dominated effectively from fortified posts. It had a friendly population of which some two in the hundred were active, and the rest quietly sympathetic to the point of not betraying the movements of the minority. The active rebels had the virtues of secrecy and self control and the qualities of speed, endurance, and independence of arteries of supply. They had technical equipment enough to paralyze the enemy's communications. A province would be won when we had taught the civilian in it to die for our ideal of freedom. The presence of the enemy was secondary. Final victory seemed certain, if the war lasted long enough for us to work it out."21

One cannot say that Lawrence was a greater guerrilla leader than Mina, de Wet, the Empecinado, or the unknown partisan heroes of 1812 in Russia, but one can say that he overshadows them all because he formulated a workable

18Ibid, p. 194

19Ibid, p. 194

20Ibid, p. 194

21Ibid, p. 196

doctrine that expresses all the principles they and he applied with success. His incisive mind led him unerringly to a clear understanding of the conditions under which organized partisan warfare can be fashioned into a major strategical instrument; to a vivid appreciation of the psychological elements that are involved, and to the knowledge that here must be, as the only firm base on which guerrilla action may rest, an idea—an idea of freedom.

Lawrence was aware that success in partisan war is a factor of what Tolstoi called the "quality x."

"One of the most conspicuous and advantageous departures from the so-called rules of warfare is the independent action of men acting separately against men huddled together in a mass. Such independent activity is always seen in a war that assumes a national character. In this kind of warfare, instead of forming in a crowd to attack a crowd, men dispense in small groups, attack singly and at once fly, when attacked by superior forces, and then attack again, when an opportunity presents itself. Such were the methods of the guerrillas in Spain; of the mountain tribes in the Caucasus, and of the Russians in 1812.

"War of this kind has been called partisan warfare on the supposition that this name defined its special significance. But this kind of warfare does not follow any rules of war, but is in direct contradiction to a well-known rule of tactics, regarded as infallible. That rule lays it down that the attacking party must concentrate his forces in order to be stronger than his opponent at the moment of conflict.

"Partisan warfare (always successful, as history testifies) acts in direct contradiction of this rule.

"Military science assumes that the relative strength of forces is identical with their numerical proportions. Military science maintains that the greater the number of soldiers, the greater their strength. Les gros bataillons ont toujours raison.

"To say this is as though one were in mechanics to say that forces were equal or unequal simply because the masses of the moving bodies were equal or unequal.

"Force (the volume of motion) is the product of the mass into the velocity.

"In warfare the force of armies is the product of the mass multiplied by something else, an unknown x."²²

This quality "x" Tolstoi calls "the spirit of the troops," and represents the greater or less desire to fight and to face dangers. This desire must be inspired by a great conception. In Arabia Lawrence defined this conception in the one word "freedom."

²² War and Peace, Leo Tolstoi, p. 972-973.

Guerrillas are invariably men who enlist of their own free will. They are not drafted, conscripted, levied, or called up. They join. And just as a guerrilla fighter joins, so may he separate, though it is most unlikely that he will. The average conscripted soldier fights for one reason--because he has to; the guerrilla fights because he wills to. He is a man apart; the psychology of a drafted man with nothing to spar him on but the ardent desire to "get it over with" is not the psychology of the guerrilla who drinks from deeper and clearer springs.

It is possible that under particular circumstances guerrilla warfare can be perverted to serve a less worthy end than that of securing freedom. In Russia in 1917-18-19 V.I. Lenin, a student of history and himself no mean theorizer, propounded an hypothesis of partisan warfare disarmingly similar to that of Lawrence, i.e., that national guerrilla warfare was in essence revolutionary and that it was an instrument that could be applied by an "oppressed" people. The Russians in 1812 were "oppressed," the Arabs were "oppressed." The Russians under the Czars were "oppressed." What Lenin managed to do was to sell the idea to a reasonable number of unsuspecting Russians that they would continue to be oppressed under an government but that sponsored by the Bolsheviks. One would have to be steeped in Russian history to isolate all the reasons for Lenin's success. Perhaps we might compare him to one of those who in the old days (pre-SEC) offered enticing portfolios of stock which the speculative and unwary, eager to improve their lots, snatched--and lived to regret their hasty action.

In 1917-18-19 the effects of the Russian guerrillas contributed decisively to the success of the Bolsheviks. Some of the ideas then suggested by Lenin were studied later by a Chinese, Mao Tze Tung, and a new chapter in the history of partisan war began to be written in 1936 when the Communists in the Northwest, under the leadership of Mao, were assigned the task of conducting guerrilla operations against the Japanese.

Mao, who is a well-educated and well-read man, elaborated on Lenin's ideas for the conduct of guerrilla operations. The battle history of the Chinese Communist guerrillas proves that Mao's ideas were sound. He realized that effective guerrilla operations could only be conducted in a spacious country with relatively poor communications. He was as quick as Lawrence to see that there must be identification of the guerrilla effort with a "cause," that it must be identified with objectives acceptable to the people as a whole.

The Japanese generals in North China suffered in precisely the same manner as had Napoleon's marshals in Spain and Russia. They could get no information; they were in a perpetual fog. At guerrilla headquarters on the other hand there was constantly available the very latest enemy order or battle for the whole of North China. Japanese convoys were mined and shot up, their punitive columns ambushed and decimated, their messengers captured, their supply trains derailed and isolated posts attacked, bombed out, and burned. Thousands of miles of telephone and telegraph wire was cut down and buried in fields and the poles were carried off, chopped up and burned for firewood. Headquarters were dynamited and paymasters robbed. The Chinese guerrillas never prevented strong Japanese columns from marching anywhere they wished nor did they prevent the invader from occupying major

cities. They did harass him so vigorously that in desperation he took desperate measures. Among these were murdering hostages, torturing captured guerrillas, destroying towns, and issuing proclamations to the effect that all those who were not positively pro-Japanese were ipso facto communists and would, upon capture, be executed. But in spite of all this Japanese forces of less than regimental strength did not dare to move in the daytime. No Japanese ever moved at night; nothing, including trains and motor trucks, moved at night.

Mao's approach to the theory of guerrilla warfare is based on the Lenin dialectic—Mao positively states that "counter revolutionary" guerrilla operations cannot be successful. He naturally refuses to face the fact that in a conflict between the ideology of communism as he and his friends practice it and that of democracy, it is the adherents of the former who will be the "counter revolutionists." Mao writes that guerrilla warfare must be based in the people. This as has been pointed out is the controlling fact and it must be recognized as such. The people are the water; the guerrillas the fish. As long as the water is maintained at the right political and economic temperature the fish can swim about effectively, flourish and reproduce.

Mao did not contribute anything particularly original to guerrilla strategy or tactics but he has the distinction of being, after Lawrence (whom it appears he had not read) the first to formulate doctrine and to express it clearly and to the point.

"When we discuss the terms front and rear," he says, "it must be remembered that while guerrillas do have bases their primary field of activity is in the enemy's rear areas. They themselves have no rear...As to the matter of military responsibilities, those of the guerrillas are to exterminate small forces of the enemy; to harass and weaken large forces; to attack enemy lines of communication; to establish bases capable of supporting independent operations in the enemy's rear; to force the enemy to disperse his strength, and to coordinate all those activities with those of the regular armies on distant battle fronts."²³

Mao does not believe that guerrilla warfare can of itself be decisive:

"The concept that guerrilla warfare is an end in itself and that guerrilla activities should be divorced from those of the regular forces is incorrect."²⁴

But he does say that the opposite point of view is equally faulty and equally dangerous, and that those who condemn guerrilla activities on the grounds that warfare has no other aspects than the purely orthodox have failed to appreciate the relationship that should exist between guerrillas and the regular forces:

"We believe it can be stated this way: 'Guerrilla operations during the anti-Japanese war may for a certain time and temporarily become its paramount feature, particularly insofar as the enemy's rear is concerned. However, if we view the war as a whole there can be no doubt that the regular forces are of primary importance because it is they alone who are

²³Yu Chi Chan—Mao Tze Tung.

²⁴Ibid.

capable of producing the decision. Guerrilla warfare assists them in producing this favorable decision. Orthodox forces may under certain conditions operate as guerrillas, and the latter may under certain conditions develop to the status of the former. Both guerrilla forces and regular forces have their respective development and their proper combinations.²⁵

It is impossible to improve upon Mao's summation of guerrilla tactical doctrine:

"The movements of guerrilla troops must be secret and of supernatural rapidity; the enemy must be taken unawares and the action entered speedily. There can be no procrastination in the execution of plans; no assumption of a passive defense....The basic method is the attack in a violent and deceptive form. It is profitable only to launch and push an attack with maximum speed."²⁶

Mao's theories and doctrines of guerrilla war stood up well and regardless of the judgments that history, or his own people may eventually register against him, it must be acknowledged that his contribution to the philosophy of guerrilla action has been profound and will be lasting.

In 1940-41 the German armies invaded the Ukraine and the Baltic provinces of the USSR. The people welcomed the Germans as deliverers and came to them bringing bread and salt, traditional symbols of hospitality. The German reply to this simple gesture was torture, hanging, and shooting. Even Goebbels recognized that in this policy of the Gestapo a major and irreparable error had been made! But the Fuehrer, with a stupidity that exceeded that of Napoleon, had publicly decreed that the Russians were to be made the slaves of the greater Reich. And the Russian people began to fight, perhaps not because they did not fear the satraps in Moscow, but because they feared the more transportation and enslavement, or extermination. And they aided the Red armies to drive the Germans from the soil of Russia. The general extent of partisan aid to the Russian armies is a matter of historical record; without it the Red armies could not have achieved the rapid successes they did when they went over to the general offensive after Stalingrad. The familiar pattern of guerrilla action was repeated on a vast scale, and the Germans had no solution of either a political or military nature, for the disaster that engulfed them.

In the records of our own wars we may find further examples of the fundamental concepts that must be applied if there is to be success in partisan operations. Three of the greatest leaders in the history of guerrilla warfare were Americans: Francis Marion, the "Swamp Fox," John S. Mosby, Col, C.S.A., and Brig Gen John Hunt Morgan, C.S.A. While one cannot be sure that T.E. Lawrence had studied their operations there is some reason to believe that he was not entirely unacquainted with Mosby's theories and exploits, for Lawrence, like Col Mosby, was a student of history and an avid reader, and was familiar with the Virginia campaigns of the American Civil War through Henderson's standard work on Jackson.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

The first of the three was the Revolutionary hero. Those who were present at the birth of Francis Marion would perhaps not have foretold a martial future for him; the baby was "not larger than a New England lobster and might easily enough have been put into a quart pot." Marion grew up in South Carolina and had little formal schooling. He was a farmer—as one of the old histories puts it "he followed the pursuits of agriculture"—which leads one to believe that he was not one of the heirs of a rich planter. In 1759, at the age of 27, he joined a regiment raised to fight the Cherokees, who were then ravaging the borders of the Carolinas. For two years he served and in the course of these hostilities stored away in his mind much that was later to be put to good use against the British.

When the Revolution broke out Marion immediately accepted a commission in the Second South Carolina Regiment. By 1780 he had seen enough of the war to realize that the Continentals were overlooking a very profitable field—that of partisan warfare. Accordingly he sought and obtained permission to organize a company which at first consisted of 20 ill-equipped men and boys. The appearance of this group, with a heterogeneous assortment of arms and in ragged and poorly fitting clothing, provoked considerable jesting among the regulars of Gen Gates, but Marion's men were not long in proving that the appearance of a combat soldier—particularly if he is a guerrilla—is not always a reliable criterion of his fighting abilities.

Marion's guerrilla activities in South Carolina soon began to tell heavily on the British and most seriously inconvenienced Cornwallis, whose plans were continually disrupted by them. [It was this British general (who later surrendered at Yorktown) who gave Marion his nom de guerre, "The Swamp Fox," by which he is remembered by generations of Americans.] His tactics were those which all successful guerrilla leaders who followed him were to apply. Operating with the greatest speed from inaccessible bases which he changed frequently, he struck his blows in rapid succession at isolated garrisons, convoys, and trains. His information was always timely and accurate, for the people supported him.

The British, unable to cope with Marion, branded him a criminal, and complained bitterly that he fought neither "like a gentleman" nor "a Christian," a charge similar to those which orthodox soldiers when stung by tactics they cannot successfully counter are wont to apply in all lands and in all wars to such ubiquitous, intangible, and deadly antagonists as Francis Marion.

A cause? He had it, and because it was the cause of the people they supported him, fed him, protected him, and supplied him with information. Perfect intelligence, speed, surprise, and the ability to suit his measures to his means, and to extract maximum return from his combinations were the distinguishing characteristics of his operations. They produced upon the British the moral and physical effects he sought and contributed heavily to the final victory in the South and to that of our country. This was appreciated at the time, for Marion was highly honored in the young nation and the rank of brigadier general was bestowed upon him.

Bryant, in The Song of Marion's Men, wrote one verse that showed that he had a better understanding of guerrilla tactics and psychology than many who

have followed more martial pursuits:

"Woe to the English soldiery.
That little dreads us near!
On them shall come at midnight
A strange and sudden fear;
When, waking to their tents on fire
They grasp their arms in vain,
And they who stand to face us
Are beat to earth again;
And they who fly in terror deem
A mighty host behind,
And hear the tramp of thousands
Upon the hollow wind."

John Mosby, a graduate of the University of Virginia, a lawyer and a student of history, began his career in the American Civil War as a soldier in a cavalry company that in the spring of 1861 was assigned to the First Virginia Cavalry under the command of Col J.E.B. Stuart. In the course of the first year Mosby proved himself to be a man of more than ordinary judgment and intelligence and a scout of courage and initiative. Stuart kept his eye on the ex-lawyer and he was soon commissioned.

Mosby wanted to commence partisan operations in 1862 and tried to prevail upon Stuart to give him a few men and let him go to work on Pope's communications. That general had issued an order that fired Mosby's imagination. When Pope came east he announced that when he was in the west he had seen only the backs of his enemies; that he believed in looking to the front and letting the rear take care of itself.

"When I read what Pope said about looking only to his front and letting his rear take care of itself--I saw that the opportunity for which I had longed had come. He had opened a promising field for partisan warfare and had invited or rather dared, anybody to take advantage of it. The cavalry at Richmond was doing nothing but picket duty and 'quiet to quick bosoms is a hell.' So I asked Stuart for a dozen men to make the harvest where the laborers were few, and to do for Pope what he would not do for himself, take care of his rear and communications for him....I was sure then--I am surer now--that I could make Pope pay as much attention to his rear as his front and that I could compel him to detail most of his cavalry to guard his long line of communications, or turn his commissary department and rear over to me--which would have been perfectly satisfactory to me....Breaking communications is the chief work of a partisan--it defeats plans and starts confusion by destroying supplies, thus diminishing the offensive strength of an army. Judged in the light that is now before us it looks strange that I was refused."²⁷

Finally some months later and after a series of vicissitudes (including capture and exchange) that are not relevant to this story Mosby prevailed upon Stuart to give him 15 men to carry out raids on Union communications, "to threaten and harass the enemy."

He began the career that may well be taken as the model for all partisan commanders in January, 1863, and immediately began to produce results.

"An English officer, Colonel Percy Wyndham, a soldier of fortune who had been with Garibaldi in Italy, commanded the cavalry brigade and was in charge of the outposts. He was familiar with the old rules of the schools, but he soon learned that they were out of date, and his experience in war had not taught him how to counteract the forays and surprises that kept his men in the saddle all the time. The loss of sleep is irritating to anybody, and in his vexation at being struck by and striking at an invisible foe, he sent me a message calling me a horse thief. I did not deny it, but retorted that all the horses I had stolen had riders, and that the riders had sabres, carbines and pistols. There was a new regiment in his brigade that was armed only with sabres and obsolete carbines. When we attacked them with revolvers they were really defenseless. So I sent him word through a citizen that the men of that regiment were not worth capturing, and he must give them six shooters. We had neither carbines nor sabres, but all the men carried a pair of Colt pistols. We did not pay for them, but the U.S. Government did."²⁸

Col Wyndham was not the only one who was roughly handled by Mosby but he has the dubious distinction of being the first to start calling him names. Mosby thought this tactic was most amusing, and immediately appreciated that the more his enemies maligned him, the more he was hurting them.

"Strategy is only another name for deception and can be practiced by any commander. The enemy complained that we did not fight fair; the same complaint was made by the Austrians against Napoleon...."²⁹

And as we have seen, the same complaint was made by the British against Marion, by Napoleon against the Spanish and Russians, by Kitchener against the Boers, by the Turks against Lawrence, by the Japanese against Mao, and by the Germans against the Russians. It appears to be the first refuge of commanders who are taking a licking and are unable to ward off the blows.

Mosby decided to capture both Wyndham and Brig Gen Stoughton, whose troops were supposed to control the guerrilla situation in that part of the country. In a daring night raid into the General's headquarters he snatched the Brigadier and two of his staff out of a peaceful sleep and made off with a large number of prisoners and almost a hundred horses. This incursion so aroused the Government that Lincoln sent Maj Gen Stahel to Virginia charged with the mission of putting a stop to Mosby's activities. Needless to say, he was unsuccessful.

By the late summer of 1863 Mosby's 15 men had grown to five companies, well mounted (on captured horses), well armed (with Federal carbines and revolvers) and well equipped with saddles, blankets, knapsacks and binoculars (furnished by the Quartermaster, USA). Mosby was thus able to extend the scope of his operations. On the 30th of May the partisan, now a major, had the pleasure of derailing and destroying his first train and routing the train guard.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 151-152.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 157.

It was Mosby's idea that his own activities should directly contribute to Lee's operations in Virginia. He wrote that partisans should always work in cooperation with, but independent of, an army, and he operated so that Union commanders were required to subtract resources of time, men, and energy from the potential they might have employed against Lee. His operations in the summer of 1863 are typified by this report to J.E.B. Stuart, made in July of that year:

"I sent you in charge of Sergeant Beattie one hundred and forty-one prisoners that we captured from the enemy during their march through this country. I also sent off forty-five several days ago. Included in the number, one Major, one Captain and two Lieutenants. I also captured one hundred and twenty-five horses and mules, twelve wagons (only three of which I was able to destroy), fifty sets of fine harness, arms, etc., etc."³⁰

On October 1st he wrote a letter to his wife in which he recounted a raid well behind the Union lines into Alexandria where he had burned a railroad bridge and tried to capture the puppet governor, Pierpont. Pierpont, fortunately for him, was absent, but Mosby took his aide, Col Dulaney.

"Dulaney lives in Alexandria--has a son in my command, who was with me at the time....It was quite an amusing scene, the interview between Colonel Dulaney and his son. Just as we were about leaving the Colonel sarcastically remarked to his son that he had an old pair of shoes he had better take, as he reckoned they were darn scarce in the Confederacy, whereupon the son, holding up his leg, which was encased in a fine pair of cavalry boots just captured from a sutler, asked the old man what he thought of that. I am now fixing my triggers for several good things, which, if they succeed, will make a noise."³¹

Most of the things he "fixed his triggers for" did!

Throughout the winter of 1863-64 Mosby kept harassing the Yankees in Northern Virginia. In Washington Gen Heintzelman, who commanded that city and who was responsible for the security of the President and the government, was in a constant state of anxiety for his charges, and had the plank flooring removed from the Chain Bridge every night to prevent a partisan incursion.

On the 7th of August, 1864, Sheridan was named as the commander of the newly created "Middle Department," was given a strong force of all arms and directed by Grant to destroy Jubal Early, to cut Lee's communications to the southwest, and to dispose of Mosby. The partisan, with a battalion of six companies, was the man who prevented the Union General from carrying out the first two of these missions as speedily as Grant would have wished. Sheridan never did accomplish the third.

"The main object of my campaign was to vex and embarrass Sheridan, and if possible to prevent his advance into the interior of the State. But my exclusive attention was not given to Sheridan for alarm was kept up continuously by threatening Washington and occasionally crossing the Potomac. We lived on the country where we operated and drew nothing from Rich and except the gray jackets

³⁰Ibid., p. 259.

³¹Ibid., pp. 263-264

my men wore. We were mounted, armed and equipped entirely off the enemy, but, as we captured a great deal more than we could use, the surplus was sent to Lee's army."³²

The Union commanders during the fall of 1864 found the country "alive with rebel guerrillas," and no force seemed adequate to put a stop to Mosby's depredations. He was literally everywhere and nowhere; located here one day, 35 to 50 miles away the next, moving about with great rapidity and causing his enemies to spend their time and waste their strength "in pursuit of a Jack-o'-Lantern." In his memoirs Sheridan wrote that although he had a force of approximately 94,000 to Early's 20,000, the disparity was actually nowhere near as great as it seemed, for his excess of 74,000 was cancelled by the incidental demands of protecting his supply trains and lines of communication and preventing raids into Maryland and Pennsylvania! By the Union commander's own admission, Mosby was immobilizing 70,000 troops urgently needed to crush Early, out-flank Lee, and thus to conclude the war!

No courier could get through with urgent military despatches without an escort of 500 men; a convoy of supplies needed several thousand. But Mosby was not intimidated by numbers. He continued to capture couriers, to ambush convoys, to derail trains, to tear up track, and to prevent resumption of the rail service he had interrupted. Finally Custer, one of Sheridan's subordinates, in desperation, made the mistake of executing seven of Mosby's men. Mosby, after much reflection, replied in kind and sent a letter to Gen Sheridan which closed with this paragraph:

"Hereafter, any prisoners falling into my hands will be treated with the kindness due to their condition, unless some new act of barbarity shall compel me, reluctantly, to adopt a line of policy repugnant to humanity."³³

Thereafter, no more of Mosby's captured troopers were murdered.

It is not possible here to describe more of Mosby's exploits. They are inimitably recited in his memoirs from which the quotations that appear have been drawn. On first reading them, one is inclined to doubt the Colonel's estimate that he had at one time effectively immobilized two-thirds of Sheridan's available troops. But the Union General gave him credit for an even higher percentage.

Let Mosby describe in a short sentence how he did it:

"A small force moving with celerity and threatening many points on a line can neutralize a hundred times its own number."³⁴

This man was a true master of partisan warfare, and U.S. Grant was not the first, nor will he be the last, to recognize the fact.

It may be argued that John Hunt Morgan was not a partisan leader, and in the strict interpretation of that word perhaps he was not. He did not base in

³²Ibid., p. 284.

³³Ibid., p. 303.

³⁴Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. III, p. 148.

occupied territory as Marion and Mosby did and his cavalry was during most of the war considered a part of the cavalry of the army commanded first by Johnston and later by both Beauregard and Bragg. The independent command for which Morgan always yearned came to him only when the war was almost over and circumstances prevented him from doing what he might have done earlier if he had been allowed a free hand.

Morgan considered himself a "raider" and the South regarded him the Francis Marion of the Confederacy. In the North he was variously labelled a partisan, a guerrilla, a horse thief, a robber, and a murderer by newspaper editors and the public at large in whose lexicon these terms seemed to be synonymous.

As is usually the case in partisan warfare, the psychological effects of Morgan's operations, which were to inspire the entire South and to agitate the "loyal" public in Kentucky and in the northern states that border the Ohio River, were probably of equal importance with their military effects. Morgan's raids, each one of which bore the unmistakable stamp of his brilliant military personality, buoyed up Southern hopes and provided an impetus both to recruiting and to the cooperation and support that the Southern people extended to the war effort.

The general pattern of Morgan's operations were similar to that of Mosby in Virginia. He seemed to be everywhere at one and the same time.

In the spring of 1862, with Beauregard's encouragement, Morgan created such a furore behind the Union lines in Tennessee that Andrew Johnson, the military governor of that State, was seriously upset.

"Such raids as Morgan's, he pointed out, were undermining the Federal successes in larger engagements and inspiring the people to greater resistance."³⁵

The complaints of the Governor and of Union generals that more troops were needed to keep Morgan in check were dismissed rather cavalierly in Washington, where the Assistant Secretary of War stated that "all such 'guerrillas' as John Morgan should be shot without challenge as enemies of mankind."³⁶ To this one of the Federal generals replied, pointing out that Morgan's guerrillas first had to be caught—a detail which the Assistant Secretary had overlooked.

On July 4th, 1862, Morgan led 880 officers and men out of Knoxville and took the road to Sparta in middle Tennessee. His command,

"a nondescript body of soldiers, some were in uniforms and some in jeans, some armed with rifles, some with shotguns and some only with clubs. Lack of arms was no great concern, for Morgan had promised all should be equipped with rifles and pistols from Federal garrisons in Kentucky."³⁷

And they were.

A march of over 100 miles across the rugged Cumberlands behind him, Morgan turned north at Sparta on the 7th and headed for Tompkinsville, Kentucky,

³⁵Morgan and His Raiders, Virgil C. Jones, p. 106.

³⁶Ibid., p. 107.

³⁷Ibid., p. 116.

some 70 miles from Sparta and a few miles north of the Tennessee line. At day-break on the 9th, he struck, subdued the Federal garrison, took 400 prisoners, and destroyed stores valued at half a million. In the afternoon he dropped over to Glasgow, about 30 miles to the west, attacked the small force there, and destroyed more supplies. Shaping his course to the northeast, Morgan moved rapidly to Lebanon, some 75 miles from Glasgow. En route he stopped off long enough to tap into the telegraph circuits, find out the disposition of Federal forces, and send off a few false messages.

At dawn on the 11th, Morgan was in front of Lebanon, which he assaulted and captured with the usual quota of prisoners and supplies. Morgan's men were now well equipped, and the Quartermaster property for which the citizens of Lebanon had no use was burned.

Four days later the raider was in the Bluegrass at Lawrenceburg, only 15 miles from the State Capital and 200 miles inside the Union lines. Here those of his men not already well mounted "pressed" some of the horses for which the district was as famous then as it is now.

Morgan stopped long enough enroute to Georgetown to scoop up a small Federal garrison at Midway, and again to tap in on the telegraph circuit for information of enemy movements. He sent a number of messages calculated to set the Federals off on false scents and then made his way to Georgetown, where he based for two days, recruiting and sending out parties to burn bridges and harass the Federals. By this time, as may well be imagined, the entire Bluegrass was frantic and panic spread to Cincinnati. Not much help was forthcoming from that quarter as Morgan's raiding parties operating out of Georgetown had burned all the bridges south of the Ohio between Cincinnati and Lexington. Seeking to confuse the enemy still further, Morgan rode to Cynthiana, only about 30 miles south of the Ohio River and 65 miles from Cincinnati. The raiders had covered over 400 miles since leaving Knoxville. At Cynthiana he had quite a fight, drove the garrison out, inflicted 90 casualties, and took 400 prisoners.

On the morning of July 19th, Morgan passed through Paris, 16 miles south of Cynthiana, and by midnight had reached Richmond. In 39 hours his command had covered more than 80 miles, fought a pitched battle, and had suffered 37 casualties, of whom but eight were killed in action! From Richmond he rode almost due south for the Kentucky line and Sparta. He had left Tennessee with 900 men. He returned with 1200. He had killed and wounded hundreds of Federals, captured and paroled a thousand, destroyed several million dollars' worth of stores, torn up scores of miles of track and burned a dozen bridges. He suffered less than 100 casualties.

Morgan spent mid-August profitably in the vicinity of Gallatin in north central Tennessee. After entering Gallatin and surprising the entire Federal garrison which he took as prisoners, Morgan and Ellsworth, his telegraph operator, proceeded to the telegraph office. Here Ellsworth immediately began dispatching trains, and ordered one of Gen Buell's supply trains from Kentucky to proceed at once to Gallatin. When it steamed in it was captured, thoroughly looted, and burned. The railroad was then torn up and a tunnel so completely wrecked that it was impassable for weeks, which greatly incommoded Gen Buell.

It was about this time that the *VIDETTE*, a newspaper published by Morgan and edited by a New Yorker named Gordon Niles, made its first appearance. This forerunner of the *STARS AND STRIPES* and *YANK* was not designed primarily to amuse the troops, but as a propaganda medium, and as such may be considered one of the original contributions of John Morgan to the type of warfare in which he excelled.

In late August and early September of 1862 the invasion of Kentucky by Kirby Smith from the east and Braxton Bragg from the south began. It is not germane to this discussion to describe the campaign, which failed both because of Bragg's fatal indecision and the speed with which Buell reacted to the threat of an invasion of Ohio implicit in the situation. Buell moved rapidly north to Louisville, Bragg fell back from Lexington into Tennessee. And as Buell cautiously followed Bragg, Morgan set upon the Federal communications.

"Trains bearing supplies for Buell's army were wrecked or captured, stretches of the track were torn up and bridges were destroyed. Morgan was like a force whose presence could be felt but never seen."³⁸

Here we will leave "the Great Morgan," a Brigadier General, honored in Army orders, thanked by the Congress of the Confederacy, the idol of the South, for enough has been told to indicate the nature of his operations. Morgan moved rapidly and surely. He counted on surprise and usually achieved it. Operating deep in the enemy's rear, he spread consternation far and wide. When he was captured on his famous Ohio raid, the North heaved an editorial sigh of relief and the Southern press gave itself over to lamentations. More than he perhaps realized, the personality of John Hunt Morgan and the method of his operations reflected the spirit of the South. That spirit was by no means crushed when Morgan was captured, but it had lost a symbol, and in warfare—particularly warfare of a partisan nature—symbols are important.

An analysis of the hostilities in which guerrilla action has been a major factor reveals at least three important constants. The first of these is that in an ideological war partisan activities are usual and general. They have occurred in all such wars, and they must be anticipated. The second is that the problem of nation-wide guerrilla war is not amenable to a solution purely military in character. Finally, partisans can play a major role, if not the major one, in an ideological struggle. The combatant who in the future neglects these lessons of history does so at his own peril.

Modern arms and techniques have greatly increased the capabilities of partisans, but will make no radical changes in methods of operation. These continue to be (as they have always been) to spread consternation in the rear of the enemy, to mystify and deceive him, to strike at unexpected times in unexpected places and by every other means to damage him physically and morally, and to unbalance him psychologically. Guerrillas do not, cannot and should not stand and fight. They strike at times and places of their own choosing, planning their blows only after careful analysis of all available information of the enemy. Guerrillas never grope in the dark; they leave that to the orthodox opponent.

³⁸Ibid., p. 116.

Light aircraft including helicopters, will be particularly valuable for supply of guerrilla forces. Powerful explosives, shaped charges, and light rocket-firing weapons make it possible for small groups to attack and destroy heavy installations, such as structures of steel and reinforced concrete, that their predecessors were unable to cope with. Propaganda facilities which have been greatly improved by such things as light mobile presses make it easier than it has previously been for partisans to stage full dress propaganda offensives among the people.

Partisan operations are capable of redressing an unbalanced situation in respect to available military manpower. Ten thousand partisans organized into a number of columns can easily tie up 10, 20, or 30 times their own number of regular troops. Radio makes possible concerted partisan effort in widely separated areas. It also insures close strategic and tactical coordination between conventional and partisan forces and provides a means for the uninterrupted flow of information.

Anti-partisan operations embrace political, economic, and psychological measures, as well as those of a military nature. Indeed, the latter are of the least significance. The basis of partisan operations is in the people, or at least in a proportion of them. It becomes the first task then to win away important segments of this support, a task which requires correct policies in the three fields named. These policies will also make it possible to recruit one's won partisans, who should constitute the major part of the anti-partisan forces.

Partisans must be beaten at their own game. This means that mobile columns must be the primary military agency. These columns should be equipped with the lightest weapons consonant with delivery of maximum fire effect. The 60mm mortar and the light machine gun would probably be the heaviest organizational weapons carried. Light radios of varying ranges and characteristics will of course be essential.

These columns cannot be dependent upon supply trains; supply, replacement, and evacuation must be carried out by aircraft so that the columns need not be tied to a base. All equipment must be transportable by light aircraft and helicopters in order that an entire column may be moved from place to place within its operating area with the greatest possible rapidity. Two or three anti-partisan "flying columns" of several hundred men each would thus, even if operating in an area of one hundred miles square, never be out of mutually supporting distance.

Anti-partisan columns cannot be transferred from one area to another and be expected to operate effectively until some time has elapsed after they have entered a new area. They must learn an area of operations so that they know it as well as do the partisans themselves. Accurate maps are the first requirement and air photos provide means for rapid and accurate map-making.

Too much centralization of control over operations of anti-partisan columns must be avoided. There will be times when coordination of their efforts will be both desirable and necessary, but this should be a flexible procedure. Operational rigidity can result only in disaster.

Passive measures have never proven satisfactory. Cordon and blockhouse systems require an expenditure of time, men, materials, and money that is not consonant with the military return. The dispersion of troops with resultant immobilization of large numbers of men is to be avoided. In certain limited areas the use of such a system may be indicated. Again, the policies of flexibility and mobility must not be violated.

The measures adopted by a commander charged with the suppression of partisan activities in a given district must be consistent with the end in view—pacification. The destruction of towns, barns and dwellings, the devastation of crops, the seizure of innocent people as hostages, all these are of no avail. They have been tried and found wanting. They do not produce results but serve only to inflame the countryside and to produce more guerrillas. The policy of judgment of guilt because of association is likewise erroneous and will boomerang. Never in the history of partisan warfare has such a policy had any effect other than to cause more determined resistance.

Captured partisans are entitled under generally recognized "laws of war" to receive the same consideration that is accorded other prisoners. If a commander summarily executes them, which Napoleon's generals in Spain, the Germans in Russia, Custer in Virginia, and the Japanese in China did, he must prepare for repayment in kind—he will deserve it, and will receive it, with interest compounded, for the partisans may be expected to have under their control more of his men than he will of theirs. A commander's policy in this regard should be to win over captured partisans. This has been done in the past, and can be done in the future.

The experiences that the armed forces of this country have had in combating guerrillas have been inconsequential and cannot be considered valid if applied to other than relatively small nations with undeveloped technologies and in which only the most primitive form of guerrilla action is possible. The Philippines, Nicaragua, San Domingo, and Haiti all fall into this category. Each of these areas was almost totally undeveloped; each was isolated with relative ease; in none were guerrillas properly equipped, organized, or led. And yet the campaigns in each of them assumed considerable proportions, and absorbed a great deal more military energy than would have been necessary had there been a sound operational concept. No such concept was evident in Nicaragua for example, where a few hundred poorly equipped "Sandinistas" made monkeys out of thousands of Marines and native troops for six years. There were isolated instances of success, which occurred when local commanders applied political, economic, and psychological weapons to the problem, or when they made themselves more mobile than the guerrillas. However, no district in Northern Nicaragua was "pacified" by military means alone.

It is abundantly clear that the problem posed by guerrilla operations on a vast scale is not susceptible to a military solution that is completely divorced from political reality. But given a reasonable political basis, military operations can be productive if they are properly planned and executed by ingenious and imaginative leaders. In planning them, commanders of tomorrow must turn to the past for illumination of the problem. An abundant literature both official and unofficial undoubtedly exists on the subject of partisan activities in World War II. This awaits careful study and analysis, the results of which should be made available without further delay.

Recognition that a major problem exists must precede any such undertaking; there is no evidence that guerrilla action in a major war of the future has received such recognition. But to bring a future war to a successful conclusion requires more than mere recognition of the problem posed by partisan activities such as those that seem certain to occur. It requires serious study of all available historical experience, and the formulation therefrom of realistic and flexible doctrine.

Danger From Below*

Lt. Col. Marc E. Geneste, French Army

It may be that this should not be written on foreign soil in a foreign language, but, after three stays in this country--for many reasons--I feel at home here.** The mere fact that we are all on the same ship, the Western World, entitles any Westerner to speak frankly on common dangers. My purpose is to show these dangers as they appeared to me and to analyze our basic weakness, through my personal experiences during 20 years of military duty.

This thesis is an individual testimony which stems from two basic assumptions: First, that the Soviets intend as they say, to conquer the world by any available means. Second, that the Westerners will continue to adhere to their Christian ideals and principles: Peace, freedom, democracy, individualism, and the search for happiness through mental and material development.

I. The Challenge

Germany was close to chaos in 1933, when the Nazis took over. Six years later--only six years--she was the most powerful single military power in the world. She conquered Europe, invaded Russia, and was close to success, but still her power was not enough to achieve a world-wide victory. History has shown similar examples where a single group, indoctrinated and trained for conquest, has extended itself to the very limits of its physical capabilities. But initial successes no matter how great, were always stopped by the magnitude of the task. At the time of World War II, wars could not be won at the first blow. The Allied nations, once surprised, had time to organize their common resistance, and finally counterattacked. Victory, at long last, "favored the big battalions," as Napoleon said. And in the peculiar case of Germany, she was faced with the problem of defeating another totalitarian nation--Russia.

But now the picture is dreadfully different. A single, threatening, hard-core group exists dedicated to conquest and no longer limited by traditional boundaries. Victory can now be achieved at the first blow. The "big battalions" take shape, but not on our side. Furthermore, a new type of war is already being waged, undermining man's mind and will through persuasion and subversion. This type of warfare could very well achieve the goals by itself alone.

Here is the fantastic challenge which we Westerners face. Vaguely we all know that, but often we react as if we did not really believe it. Wishful thinking--a form of laziness stemming from our easy way of life--obsolete national pride, incredible ignorance of each other's problems, and distrust among Allied Nations, make the West like a mosaic which has been cemented together only because of the threat. It seems that only the impending threat of an enemy could bolster our determination and strengthen our organization.

* From U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1960, by permission; copyright 1960 by U.S. Naval Institute. A shortened version of this article, which first appeared in Infantry Magazine, is reprinted in Chapter 6 of MODERN GUERRILLA WARFARE. "Danger From Below" has been translated and published in three additional languages.

**This article was written in Norfolk, Virginia, in October, 1959.

But the enemy knows our weaknesses and will strive to avoid awakening us before H-hour. But then it could perhaps be too late.

II. The Facts

Fifteen years ago, before the West as a group had taken shape--since the threat of the East had not yet been felt--the Western Allies had a power unprecedented in history. With their technical advance, their military strength, and the atom bomb on their side, they could very well have dominated the world once and for all. Such a chance given to a single nation or group of people had never before been experienced in history.

This unique opportunity, however, was not taken. Western idealism, those democratic ideas to which we adhere, Christianity--which is no longer the Christianity of Crusaders--prevented Western expansion. This expansion was perhaps the only chance the world would have to achieve Western standards of living, and, by so doing, escape the ultimate fight in which our civilization might collapse.

Now, fifteen years later, the Communists have succeeded in seizing one-half of Europe, and two-thirds of Asia without Russia firing a single shot. Modern armies have been unable to attain victory in Korea or in Indochina. Western idealism or lack of determination, or both, have prevented Western armies from using their full strength. Below the fence, hastily built up around the Communist bloc, creeping aggression continues everywhere. Moreover, Western nations are day after day attacked by propaganda directed at the minds of uncommitted peoples who benefit from Western aid.

So great a decay, in so short a time, starting from a unique position of strength is also without precedent in history. Up to now it is not deeply felt in our countries since our material standards have not yet been affected. Numerous explanations for this are given in books and newspapers.

My purpose is not to list what others write on this problem but only to tell what I have seen around the world, down to the village level, among the people helping or fighting our cause, to tell what I feel are the true and basic reasons for our common decline.

III. The Reasons

A. The Faith of the Enemy

A Spanish Jail, 1943

Those Spanish Republicans, lawyers, professors, politicians, workers, 18 to 60 years old, whom I have met along with criminals, in this jail where Franco's police threw me a few weeks ago, have lost their fight to the Fascists and most of them will also lose their lives. From time to time, one of them disappears from the group which gathers in the prison yard, between high stone walls on which hangs a huge poster of smiling Caudillo. No one knows when his turn will come. They have lost everything--their families, their belongings; they are as vanquished as men can be, but they still have hope. They joke and show me this little slogan, which dates from the outbreak of the war:

MuSsolini
Hitler
ChAmberlain
DaLadier
QuI
ViNcero?

Who of the four men believed to have started World War II will win? The fifth-- Stalin. They still have faith. They believe that the world-wide turmoil will give way to Communism, and that better days for mankind are in sight. Have not the Soviets stopped Hitler's armies at Moscow, crushed them at Stalingrad? The Soviets have the strongest appeal ever devised, "Proletariat of the world, unite": They will unite, sooner or later, since the world has more proletariat than bourgeoisie.

My jail-mates hate the bourgeoisie more than the Fascists. At least, they say, these Fascists are men. They believe that the bourgeoisie of democratic nations, such as France or England, are idealists without guts. They are the hypocrites who supported the Spanish Republic with words, not deeds, whereas Fascists and Soviets risked their lives in battle. The Soviets will save the Western democracies from Fascism, but in the long run, it will be the Soviets who will win. They deserve to; they are men. "We will win," the Spanish assert.

This "We," from men who have lost their local battle, is impressive proof of a new split in human society, a split in depth below national frontiers and beyond traditional boundaries. It is proof that the Communists, far from Moscow, are united, organized, disciplined, dedicated to their belief.

I recall our French Communists in 1938. They were the most anti-German of all. In 1939, when Stalin and Hitler made the truce which started the war, the French Communists tried to sabotage our war effort, and their chief, Maurice Thorez, deserted to Moscow. When Hitler attacked Russia, they immediately joined the French Resistance in which they are now the hard core.

Here then, between these jail walls, is a piece of the Soviet Union. Stalin has, all over the world, his underground infantry on the objectives. Here at least, with two trigger-happy sentries on the top of the wall, these jailed vanguards are no longer dangerous. Is that the only way?

Beyond the victory over Fascism, a new problem for democracies is already in sight.

B. The Methods

Indochina, 1946. Three Pictures

In a little community in Cochin China dwell a few hundred souls, all Vietnamese, most of them trained to read and write French by an old Catholic missionary who fled the village when the Viet Minh threatened his life. In a small bamboo and clay house where a family lives on rice and fish, far from civilization, the only light from the outside world is provided by reading in French. In this house, the head of the family knows how to read and believes what he reads because it is written, and because he is among the few who can read.

There are many homes like this one in this village, and in many of them, three pictures can be found: Ho Chi Minh, Stalin, Maurice Thorez. These are respectively the chief of the local revolt; the big brother who, far away, with all the means of a powerful nation, directs the crusade and helps Communist revolts all over the world; and the chief of the French Communist party, who participates in the very ranks of the enemy, in the universal revolution.

Within six months (the Viet Minh began after the Japanese surrendered) these three pictures have reached deep in the Indochina jungle, and have penetrated the mind and soul of the average people. And along with the pictures are two slogans which are never separated, "A BAS LE COLONIALISME--A BAS LE CAPITALISME" (Down with Colonialism--Down with Capitalism).

All the jungle has been undermined. The Viet Minh began to emerge when Japan overthrew the French administration in March 1945. When Japan was defeated "because the white men were lucky enough to get the first A-bomb," the Japanese helped the Viet Minh with arms and training--the same Japanese who have demonstrated that the white man is no longer superior here.

Many educated people--in this area, that means those who can read--joined the new crusade. Somebody from abroad had given them an ideal, something to fight for, and promised them a better life. They have read about it in the leaflets and listened to the chiefs. The opponents of this crusade had their throats cut; if they escaped, their families were slaughtered. Now terror reigns in the jungle. People are silent.

One thing is obvious: in the rebels' mind, "Colonialism" and "Capitalism" are the two enemies. If they get rid of one, they will go on fighting the other. War will not cease with the autonomy of Indochina. This is not the true problem. Ho Chi Minh may win his independence; he and the Big Brother will carry on further, and the third man in France will undermine the will of our people. We shall fight alone against an international conspiracy. No one knows here in Indochina that in Brazzaville, French Equatorial Africa, the freedom of our colonies has been solemnly proclaimed as the official objective of France. Those who know, do not believe it. They believe in these three pictures which were here first. An organization, the Communist Organization, first took care of the political education of these people, enlisted their young enthusiasm in a cause which may not be their cause, but only that they will serve with the same faith as my Spaniards.

Indochina, 1947. Quality vs. Quantity

Of course, autonomy granted to Indochina in July 1946 did not solve the problem. Ho Chi Minh, chief of state, had been received in France with full red carpet honors. One month ago, he launched a surprise attack in Hanoi and the fight flared up again all over Indochina.

Always and everywhere the same pictures and the same slogans appear. A strange fight indeed with no apparent objectives. We French soldiers, however, know that the enemy is here. We find our friends killed in the morning, their houses burned. Ambushes destroy convoys. Soldiers are shot in the back, mines are placed on the roads and bombs blow up, here and there killing women and children. Every time we arrive, the enemy has vanished in the jungle or is mixed with the population. People do not talk. There is no intelligence. Our

planes (they have none) have the absolute mastery of the skies; our navy (they have none) controls the seas; our tanks, our armament, and technical skill are unchallenged. All this material, all this military strength appears to be useless. Is this a new type of war? Not at all. Partisans have always existed. What is new is the way that we civilized people have chosen to cope with them. It is a radical departure from the rules of war. The first rule was to make fighters wear uniforms (this must have been one of the first steps of civilization) in order to save civilian population from indiscriminate massacre. When these fighters were defeated, the war was lost.

But here the Communists have changed the rules of the game. Everybody is a fighter without uniform, wearing a weapon or helping with intelligence or their silence, under penalty of death. When French soldiers appear, weapons are concealed and we get smiles. Each village is friendly or hostile depending on our strength.

In the old times, this too-simple trick could not work because the village as a whole or some hostage was held responsible for any hostile act. The Communists have noticed that our determination has vanished, our idealism prevents us from using the radical remedies which are the one and only way out, unless we use a great number of soldiers. But the third man in France will prevent our government, through public opinion, from sending adequate reinforcements. All our friends, at home and abroad, believe that we are fighting an old-style colonial war. Nobody cares to think about the fact that we have given up our old colonial policy. Time and again, Far Eastern propaganda labels us "colonialists." The Organization plays with the idealists' minds like a cat with a mouse. Americans in Hong Kong print papers favoring Ho Chi Minh and approving his actions. This is a blow to our enterprise, a blow to our morale. Contributions are made even in France for the heroic "resistance" of the Vietnamese people. No one knows the facts, except a handful of soldiers lost in the jungle and our democratic government, which does not use propaganda and psychological weapons as instruments for spreading the truth. We soldiers, our government, and our friends are trapped in the net of the Organization. A world-wide machinery carefully and shrewdly built, backed by the power of a great people which succeeded in defeating Hitler's armies, is on the move and could crush us. These thoughts make heavier the hot and humid air we breathe in this deep equatorial forest. Our lonely fight, is it hopeless? We'll fight it anyway, but how?

Our units have been organized along World War II lines. Here, the enemy has been unconventionally organized to take advantage of our tactics. Within a few weeks, we have occupied practically the whole of the Indochinese peninsula. We hold the towns, roads, harbors, and the airfields. In our G-3 offices, no classical military problems appear. In G-2, intelligence people are perplexed. We hold everything, but the enemy is everywhere. We have seen leaflets which say "If you want to join Viet Minh, leave the highways." But our World War II organization ties us to these roads to get fuel, ammunition, food, and supplies. If we leave the roads, our vehicles bog down in the swamps and rice fields. If we go on foot, we are lost in a terrible terrain of jungles, mountains, and forests where malaria and dysentery are the worst of our foes. In any event, we have not enough strength--barely 30,000--to mop up everything. Mop up what? Civilians?

In daylight, we succeed in keeping order, because our planes and vehicles can quickly bring infantrymen who search the jungle. Only infantry is practical. Other weapons can find no targets.

By night, however, Indochina belongs to the Viet Minh. Our night patrols are spotted when they leave the posts. Dogs bark and disclose our ambushes. "Tam-tam" calls in the jungle mark the progress of our men. The rebels know all the trees in the forest; they fight where they used to play when they were children.

The Organization has made a military entity of each village, a little theatre of operations, self-efficient with its cells, its political commissar, its tax collector, and its supply system. We have discovered the "medical" organization of one village--only women. They confirm the fact that, willingly or not, everybody has a role. Even children bring messages or weapons. No modern army could cope with such a problem without using the old radical methods. We need at least 500,000 infantrymen trained for this special warfare. We have not even 50,000 and we do not play the same war game as the enemy. We never meet face to face. There is no hope of getting reinforcements. French public opinion, undermined by Communists and idealists of all kinds, will never agree to send draftees. Modern weapons can help to conquer land but the Communists conquer people. To control land and lines of communication among hostile people who become, when necessary, hostile fighters, a considerable number of soldiers is required. As weapons systems become more and more complicated, the more they depend on sophisticated and vulnerable logistics and lines of communications. In theaters where the Organization has thrown its underground nets, quality cannot replace quantity. On the contrary, quality--which is almost useless here--requires quantity. We need soldiers and soldiers; nothing can replace the old infantry, the only one all-weather and all-terrain weapon. This is the new military challenge of Communism, whose infantry by millions is already spread all over the world.

Are not our military chiefs a little lured by the promises of scientists, and led into dangerous concepts of warfare, relying too much on machines, and forgetting men? Obviously the machines fail in this environment; they work only in daylight and when it does not rain too much. They are useful one-half of the time and over one-tenth of the terrain; the rest belongs to foot-soldiers, to numbers. The machines, of course, will always be necessary, but in themselves they will never be sufficient. Some illusions of World War II vanish in the swamps, the forests, the monsoon, and the night of Indochina.

Finally we have met the enemy entrenched to guard a mountain pass. They have built pillboxes. At last my tanks have objectives.

When the easy fight is over, we find only corpses--no prisoners, no wounded, no weapons. The survivors have fled into the forest with their wounded and all their weapons. They do have not one rifle per soldier, only one for two or three riflemen. A cord is tied to the weapon and, if the first soldier is killed, the second man pulls on the cord and gets the gun back into his foxhole. In a pillbox hit by my tank, I find only a man's forearm, cut off at the elbow by a shell. The man has fled. But he has left his weapon with his mangled right arm--a cross bow!

This rugged Communist infantry is courageous, too. We have underrated them. Communism, as Nazism and Fascism, provides an idea--right or wrong--and this makes men fight. They have numbers. If they get weapons...

Peping, China, 1948

They will get weapons. Chiang Kai-shek's armies are routed around Peiping. There is no other way to escape except by air. Here in China, Mao Tse-tung, his regular armies and his underground infantry holding everything but the towns, will quickly reach the Indochina border and provide Ho Chi Minh with all the weapons necessary to arm his infantry and build a regular army. They are brothers in Communism and they fight for the same cause. Here, where one American dollar is worth one million Chinese dollars, anything seems better than the crumbling Kuomintang regime. People die of starvation in the streets of Shanghai. It is an unbelievable sight.

Obviously, China needs a revolution, so Stalin provides one. The Organization was in place, as everywhere. If it succeeds in policing and organizing these enormous crowds a terrific manpower potential will join the Red camp--so terrific that, in the long run, Siberia could well be the only outlet.

The Organization could succeed where Sun Yat-sen and Chiang failed. The Organization attacks the very roots of society, the villages and the poor, and promotes dedicated and enthusiastic elites from humble classes, which have not yet been corrupted by power or money. In China and all over Asia, conditions are ideal--in Africa, too. One must recognize the fact that, when food is so scarce, only a strong state can distribute a little ration for everyone. Complete freedom or strong power in the hands of a dishonest class means wealth for a few and starvation for many. Communism here might be the answer. It could even be a good thing in some times and places, had not Lenin so clearly indicated that Peiping was just a step on the way to Paris, which does not need such a remedy and prefers exclusively home-made revolutions. Such statements immediately put aside all other considerations, whatever may be the intellectual seduction of the doctrine. Here, in Peiping, I am told not to wear American military clothing outside the walls of the town--I might be attacked. Have not the Americans liberated China from Japan? Yes, but anti-Americanism is the motto of Mao Tse-tung propaganda and has a strong appeal in Chinese circles still under Chiang rule. This anti-Americanism stems from the immemorial envy of the poor against the rich, of colored against white. Furthermore, Americans abroad seldom mingle with the local population. In Communist minds, colonialism and capitalism are both evils; the first is explained only by the second, which is even worse. American capitalism may fight the so-called European colonialism, but it will not buy the favors of the Communists, although it will open the way to their enterprises.

United States, 1948

This is the country which won World War II and which leads the Free World after the suicidal and stupid self-destruction of Europe. But the people here are obviously not interested in taking advantage of their strength. They are too busy at home, in this still relatively empty and generous land, to care passionately about what happens beyond their borders. I do not believe that they will realize for a long while the dangers I have seen in Asia. Here in the United States, the Organization has little chance, for reasons opposite to those favoring its expansion in overcrowded countries. To be sure Communists will always find sympathizers in intellectual circles, vulnerable to words, to all kind of dialectics--enough to build a good spy ring, but not to infiltrate the country, at least for the time being.

My Indochinese stories are listened to with courtesy, but no one believes me. They think it is just a smoke screen for concealing our traditional objectives of stupid and old-fashioned colonialism. They underrate other countries as we underrated Germany after our own World War I victory, as every victorious nation usually underrates other nations.

Excessive national pride and self confidence nearly always results in blindness.

Aures Mountains, Algeria, 1955

Six months ago the Indochinese affair reached its logical and unhappy end. Meanwhile, the West began to awake and to take action, when Korean overt aggression could not be concealed under the guise of an anti-colonialist crusade. The West, however, did not awake to such an extent that Communist China got more than a half-hearted rebuff. This permitted the Chinese Red infantry to crow that it had succeeded in driving modern American armies from the Yalu to the 38th parallel, that the West is just a "paper tiger," an opinion that, since June 1953, East Berlin workers must also share.

Between the fantastic red rocks of the Aures Mountains, lies a Berber village where my armored unit has been stationed since the beginning of the revolt.

This village tells the whole story of underdeveloped countries. A thousand-year-old equilibrium between natural resources (pitifully scarce in this hostile land) and population, between food and people, has been suddenly upset by modern civilization. The natural resources, during the course of centuries, had determined the number of humans. Civilization has changed this factor in the last few decades, but it could not change the birth rate in the lifespan of one or two generations. Children swarm everywhere in this Algerian village. Ten million people now live where the land can feed only three--the three million who were there originally before the recent progress of medicine started the population explosion.

Moreover, the local economy has been destroyed by the products of European industry making the native craftsmanship out of date. Last, but not least, this village school--far better than many schools in France--has brought the light of knowledge, especially the knowledge that another way of life is possible, and has fostered a hope of getting out of this rocky hell, out of this endless poverty. The radio, the press, workers, and soldiers back from France tell fascinating tales of European trips.

The only true problem of Algeria, or of Africa, or of any underdeveloped country, is the human problem. All these upheavals, these disturbances created inadvertently by civilization, can be solved only by civilization itself. The best way out is immediate and massive help, a progressive and orderly climb toward a better standard of living, and then a political system freely chosen. Our policy is nothing else, it cannot be anything else.

Another way might be the Communist system with hard labor for everybody, the same as in China, with the technical help of Russia--the Soviet Empire.

There is no third way for the time being. The Sahara desert is at the gates of this village, beyond the red ridge of rocks. It extends northward slowly, year after year, destroying the few traces of vegetation still visible here and there, in a countryside where the Romans built prosperous towns two thousand years ago. Alone, and unassisted, this little overcrowded village will quickly starve to death.

But the Organization will herd the people toward the third way as fast as possible, because they know that Moslems still dislike Communism as an atheistic doctrine. For years, the Communist paper of Algiers has advocated "Independence" for Algeria. When the Algerians themselves realize that the third way is a dead end street, they will be ripe for the second. It is only vital for Communism that the Algerians reject the first way (our way), the way of progressive independence in progressive economic growth. It is vital that as many as possible "independent" artificial and backward nations, born too early and lost in the hard struggle for economic life of the 20th century, beg their subsistence here and there. Below their first Western-educated, sometimes able and Western-minded leaders, below their first ruling classes who will have neither the moral standards nor the technical ability properly to use Western "aid without strings," the Organization will charge "Capitalism" with all sins. It will prepare, down at the village level, the socialist revolution that these communities will inescapably need. Communist China will then be used as the example.

Here the old trick of blaming colonialism is being used again. When the revolt broke out in these mountains a few months ago, it was presented to the whole world as a nationalist and "liberation" war. Idealists take sides everywhere against us. It is a noble fight. The Communists cleverly avoid appearing directly involved. Here the leaflets do not mention "Down with Capitalism": it is important not to awaken those idealists who have been somewhat disturbed by the recent outcome of Indochina. It is important that this revolution not be painted in red in a NATO country.

But here and in France, the Communist press does not conceal its intent. And in my area of command, I find again my old friends the commissaire politique, the tax collector, the civilian-military fighters, the networks of cells, the logistical system, and the women and children enlisted. And again people lying on the road in the morning, their throats cut from one ear to the other, with an inexpressible savagery. I find the very same methods used by the Viet Minh. I see here on the spot, concealed under an anti-colonialist crusade, the hand of the Organization, leaving finger-prints everywhere. And one day, a young French Communist non-com deserts to the enemy with a truckload of weapons.

Again the old Indochinese nightmare, the lonely fight.

But here at last France has understood the importance of this last-ditch fight for Africa and Europe. We will carry the load.

The African Prospects, 1959

Already the peoples of French Africa have chosen their way. Most of them rely on progressive emancipation under European guidance. But Tunisia, Morocco, and Guinea have taken the most heroic and most spectacular path of

immediate and complete independence. They did so at the very moment when France, Germany, and other modern nations, including the United States, began to give up the isolationist independence concept out-dated by the atomic age. They did so because some uninformed Western idealists encouraged them to break away from the environment where the concept was born and had developed. These idealists, at the same time, wisely urged the great nations of Europe to unite, in order to face the military and economic needs of the future. And these newcomers immediately started to blackmail East and West to get their subsistence, after the massive desertion of private capital which does not rely on slogans and banners.

Within a few years, the Moslem world, said to be "impenetrable for Communists, has been infiltrated from Baghdad to Marrakech. The crumbling economy of Morocco, for instance, is an ideal terrain where the progress of the Organization, along its pre-planned patterns, is under way. Actually, some form of socialism is probably the only solution in such countries. But this acknowledgement could lure them, like Communist China, right into the nets of the U.S.S.R, which unfortunately now appears to too many people as the only disinterested and progressive power.

Why does this amazing myth work? Why does the light of liberty appear so bright to so many uncommitted peoples only in the East? Simply because the Organization, strangely enough, has found an unexpected and powerful ally--the Western camp itself! When they present European colonialism as the roadblock preventing the progress of Africans to political freedom (which is false) they find that America, or some Americans, agree with them. When they present U.S. capitalism as the roadblock to social improvement (which is false), they find that Europe or some Europeans agree with them. Why should the natives rely on the inconsistent West instead?

And whatever might be the official policy of Western governments, the Organization will always find in the Western free press enough articles to feed all its propaganda against the West itself.

Moreover the Organization is technically unsurpassed in the diffusion of psychological poison. It knows that backward people who can read generally believe what they read. The Communist newspaper was the only one in Algeria that could reach the most remote village.

This is the tragedy of our West, the tragedy of the democracies. In Africa, as in Asia ten years ago, some Western idealists are busy sawing off the roots of the Western tree; these people, unconsciously, are the best agents for the Organization.

The present and desperate Western haste to deny to the Soviets the psychological initiative in the field of political progress also serves the enemy's purpose.

Independence has been given in fact to a small oligarchy of educated people, to the upper and richer class of a native society. What can they do, with the loss of private capital, without technicians, without training, sometimes without morality, to improve their economy and the plight of the masses? In Africa the brutal end of colonialism--the achievements of which are unduly forgotten--will give all the power to such people. This policy will sell the natives,

barely out of the stone age, to a middle-age economic feudalism. The new ruling class, jealous of its independence, will get help from the outside "without control." Unfortunately, past experience shows that very often this policy means Cadillacs for government officials and nothing for the welfare of the masses.

Here Communism benefits indirectly from the Western aid.

Everyone is familiar with these things. None of the nations in history was born overnight; a political entity should be based on a certain amount of economic independence, which requires time and controlled guidance.

Why then does the West continue to make such mistakes? Is it not contrary to the real interest of the natives? Do we let children get all they want before they are adults? Why does the West sometimes seem more eager to give "liberty" to negro cannibals than to captive Hungarians? Because it is easier? Because they are colored? Sometimes, the appeasement of colored and loud-crying people to their own future detriment and to the ultimate benefit of Communism appears to be the main preoccupation of some Western diplomats.

The right of people to self determination (which unfortunately was not allowed the South during the American Civil War) should not be the right of some students to determine the fate of peoples, not at least before these peoples are sufficiently educated to understand what they are doing when they go to the polls.

Human nature has not changed sufficiently in recent years to justify such a departure from the line of conduct which has spread civilization through history.

The U.S.S.R. pursues its objective with an iron will and a strong determination, regardless of votes in the United Nations. People being what they are, the U.S.S.R. could win, and people always cheer the winners ... and despise the weak, despise the losers, whatever their good will, their good faith, or the value of their cause. All the idealists should sometimes leave their desks, their pens, and their clouds, lose themselves in a crowd, and listen. They would quickly learn this truth as old as the world.

The worst result of the present misunderstanding between Western allies about "colonial" affairs could be a collapse of the Alliance. The Organization, which does everything to wreck European influence in Africa, is at the same time busy explaining, very carefully, to Europe that the United States wants only to expel all competitors from prospective markets "as in Indochina." This insidious argument makes some people say, "If we had been allied with the U.S.S.R., we would not have lost our empire." This is probably true, but we would have lost our liberty. A fissure is already visible between Europe and the United States, and the Organization will try to widen it by any means, with all its skill and strength. The danger is immense and imminent. At stake is the future of Africa--now on its way to Communism--and the fate of the Western Alliance.

Norfolk, November 1959

I have just read in the papers that a party of Guinean students left recently for Moscow.

A well-informed friend from France told me, here in Norfolk, that numerous envoys of Communist China (which was visited recently by Algerian rebel chiefs) are now in Tunisia and Morocco. In this latter country, several hundred Chinese vanished in the mountains. "We do not know why ... It is a matter of guess."

If this information is true, I know the answer. I got it, 16 years ago, not far from Morocco, in a Spanish jail beyond the straits of Gibraltar.

IV. Conclusion

In this article, I have described frankly what I have seen and what I believe. It might appear to be somewhat exaggerated, did not the magnitude of our decline in 15 years require some radical explanations.

Today, the totalitarian organization of the U.S.S.R., far beyond Hitler's material strength and short-sighted doctrine, threatens the world with arms, and meanwhile conquers the mind with a universal doctrine. The Communists are clever and courageous, dedicated and strong. They have numbers and leadership. To what extent, and how long the unnatural Red doctrine and the Communist solidarity around the world will overcome the natural trends of men and the natural differences between peoples it intends to tie together, is a matter of conjecture. Many indulge in thinking that fissures in the Red Bloc could, sooner or later, lessen its monolithic strength, and they believe that the Soviet empire will meet the fate of earlier empires--vanquished by their own conquests.

This might be true in the long run. But, for the time being--the time in which we live--Russian achievements in technology certainly have not lessened their universal appeal or their military strength. And there is no reason why their determination to carry on their proclaimed objective should diminish. Wishful thinking of this type could be the worst danger and the spreading of this belief one of the most clever moves of the Organization.

The sad truth is that the West has almost lost Asia and is in bad shape in Africa. Nor does Latin America look very promising--all this without the Soviets firing a single shot. NATO itself is threatened with dissolution, through mutual incomprehension and ignorance. All the Allies are partly to blame in this general Western bungling.

Our cause deserves to win, however, and has all the means, material and psychological, but up to now, apparently possesses neither the will nor the skill.

Our strategy has been built against the air, land, and sea power of the U.S.S.R., to fight a three-dimensional war. It is the efficiency of a bandage on a malignant tumor, because the war has a fourth dimension. This fourth dimension does not appear on the military maps, it cannot appear, but it is visible in the streets, in the villages, in the houses, and in the farthest corner of the world that can be reached by press or radio.

The Reds have understood the problem. They have devised their political and military machinery to attack on this ground, and they push their advantages relentlessly and without shame. Practically, up to now, they have even been

able to play one Western ally against the other. This is the basic reason for our unbelievable decline.

The answer is the key to their own successes, of the initial successes of totalitarian states against democracies--teamwork, determination, and purpose.

Teamwork, determination, and purpose in that fourth dimension where the war is going on means, to begin with, political agreement and unity of action on Asian, African, and other issues. It should mean, one day, some kind of political unity in the West.

Teamwork, determination, and purpose are vital, too, in the classical military field, where no one of the Allies can get by itself quantity plus quality, of which our enemy has more and more. This requires a progressive integration of the Western forces. We military should push hard for this cause, which could promote later political unity. In that respect, the Soviet threat has a constructive side; people unite only against something, and the need to unite is written in the future, regardless of present dangers. Stalin started the unity of Europe; unity of the West could be Khrushchev's gift. This is a cause worth fighting for.

The road is long; national pride and hidebound selfishness are the main roadblocks. But this ideal might be the only one that could match, down at the village level, the universal appeal of Communism--the danger from below.

These ideas are not new, but the conviction they translate stems from observing those average people, friends or foes, or still uncommitted, in whose minds the battles of World War III have already begun.

Our common future depends on the outcome of this fight. Victory can be on our side only if we fight with courage and unity.

Soviet Unconventional Warfare Capabilities*

Col. Slavko N. Bjelajac, U.S. Army Reserve

Unconventional Warfare (UW) is a combination of guerrilla warfare, subversion, incitement of unrest, and revolt against hostile governments; economic, political, industrial, and military sabotage; assassinations, psychological warfare, and numerous other activities and acts. By these acts the enemy war-making machine is disrupted, capability harassed, and his will for continuation of a war weakened or destroyed. It is waged both in the rear of enemy armies engaged on the front and within his Zone of Interior where his war-making potential and power (political, military, industrial, and economic) is found.

Soviet Unconventional Warfare plans and intentions and the surprise the Kremlin is preparing for the United States and the Free World in the event of global war are unknown. But Soviet capabilities for Unconventional Warfare can be appraised by analysis of what they have done in the past, sometimes even improvising in the most difficult situations. The political and military importance which Moscow attributes to Unconventional Warfare as a weapon of war and the soundness and extent of development of UW concepts and doctrines in the USSR must not be underestimated.

Many factors clearly indicate that this type warfare is very seriously considered by the Soviets and that they will utilize it to the greatest possible extent in any future war and whenever an opportunity arises in time of peace.

Soviet Field Manuals Boyevoi Ustav Dlya Pychoty (Infantry Combat Regulations) and Boyevoi Ustav Dlya Viskih Soyedinenii (Combat Regulations for Higher Units) as well as others deal with the support which saboteurs, fifth columnists, guerrillas, and other UW elements will give the Red Army in its advance. Soviet soldiers are taught that the Communist guerrillas will organize a second front in enemy rear areas to support the Red Army; that Unconventional Warfare will start in France and Italy and in other capitalist countries. The "imperialist" armies will have to wage a war on two fronts; their lines of communications will be destroyed, supplies cut off, and troops attacked. Communist comrades in "imperialist" armies will issue false orders, murder commanders, and make "imperialist" troops surrender to the "brotherly" Red Army. These are facts confirmed by statements made to me by numerous former Soviet officers, one of whom was chief of staff of a division in World War II.

Stalin and Vyshinski

When Stalin was interviewed by the United States Labor Delegation on 9 September 1927 on the question, "What would happen if the Communist Party of the United States would appeal for aid to the Communist Party of the USSR," he replied:

I think the communist party of the USSR would render whatever assistance it could. Indeed what would be the work of the party that is in power if it

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refused to do what it could to aid the communist party of another country laboring under the yoke of capitalism? I would say that such a party would not be worth a penny.¹

In the article "Communism and Motherland," P.W. Vyshinski wrote:

The only determining criterion of revolutionary proletarian-internationalism is: are you for or against the USSR, the motherland of world's proletariat? A real internationalist communist is one who brings his sympathy and recognition up to the point of practical and maximal help to the USSR by every means and in every possible form. The readiness of workers of any country to subject all their aims to strengthening the USSR is the manifestation of revolutionary internationalism on the part of workers of foreign countries. The defense of USSR is the holy duty of every honest man everywhere and not only citizens of the USSR.

Many such statements by authoritative sources form the basis for the Soviet political and military concept of Unconventional Warfare. There is ample evidence that every Communist in foreign countries will have to support the USSR by every means and in every possible way—by directly or indirectly contributing to the Soviet UW effort. Communist Parties of the Free World, it must be expected, will, therefore, be instrumental in carrying out UW for the USSR.

A striking example of absolute obedience and subordination to Kremlin control was the full collaboration of all mid-European Communist Parties with Nazi Germany and the support of Hitler during the time of the Stalin-Hitler era of friendship (Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact) when Czechoslovakia, France, Belgium, Yugoslavia, and other European countries were falling one by one into Hitler's hands; then a switch of 180 degrees occurred when the USSR was attacked by the Germans on 22 June 1941. The author witnessed the support which the Yugoslav Communist Party gave to Nazi and Fascist regimes in World War II.

This article will not speculate about possibilities and probabilities concerning what the Soviets may do in case of general war or in which areas of the world they may wage Unconventional Warfare. It should be noted, however, that there are about 80 countries and areas in the world where the Kremlin controls the Communist Parties and organizes subversion; and we should remind ourselves that Soviet inspired or controlled Unconventional Warfare is presently being waged in many areas of the world.

Soviet Experience

A short review of the past will help to understand what may be expected. In the history of Russia typical examples are the guerrilla warfare operations of the great patriotic war of 1812, during World War I, 1914-18, and during the Civil War, 1918 to 1921. At the time of Napoleon's invasion in 1812 small military groups were formed to organize and lead guerrillas. Young officers like Denis Davidov, Seslapin, Finger, Prince Kudashev and 50-year-old Major General Dorokhov were leaders of these groups. These military groups were a kind of Russian special forces and operated in the Kaluga region, the Gubernias

¹Leninism, Moscow, 1934, Volume I, p. 385.

Smolensk and Moscow. Clausewitz notes in one of his works "that the Napoleonic Army was surrounded by an armed populace."

In World War I guerrilla activities took place in the area of Pinsk in the rear of the German front, particularly in 1915-16. These were organized and directed by the Russian Chief of Staff. The volunteers, officers and soldiers of the Russian Army, had been enrolled into small groups for that purpose. These again were the Russian special forces of that time.

In the Civil War (1918-21) the Soviet partisans fought against White Guard Armies and the British, French, Czech, American, and Japanese forces and gained a wealth of experience. The Soviets based their World War II concept and doctrine primarily on the lessons learned in that war.

The Soviet World War II concept for UW was developed in two directions and for two purposes--one for Unconventional Warfare operations in enemy countries, and the other for UW in the Soviet territories if overrun by the enemy.

Controlling Agencies

UW in foreign countries was the primary responsibility of the Soviet Communist Party, with the Central Committee being responsible for control and direction in accordance with Soviet military plans. UW on enemy occupied Soviet soil was the primary responsibility of the military. The Soviet masses were trained for UW operations by the Communist Party, particularly by the Communist Union of Youth (Comsomol), with secret police and Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) organizations participating in this effort.

Because of the defensive war waged on the Soviet soil in World War II the Soviets had to concentrate on UW activities behind German lines in order to relieve the critical military situation. Later, when the Red Army was able to check the German penetration, the Soviet Government started supporting UW in the areas outside the Soviet Union (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and elsewhere). Personnel, the military teams, materiel, and Soviet radio propaganda, such as that from the Tiflis radio station, were used for that purpose. Before that time the Allies alone directed UW efforts in European countries mostly for the purpose of alleviating the very critical Soviet military situation.

This particular situation of World War II must not delude us into the belief that the Soviets may not start UW in other countries at the very beginning of a future war.

Effective guerrilla warfare in World War II was instituted on Soviet soil by the High Command. Generally speaking, only when the Soviet High Command had infiltrated teams into areas occupied by the German Army were guerrilla units organized and put into action. Until that time neither Soviet civilians nor military personnel of the Red Army isolated in enemy rear areas cared to do anything. Of course, there were exceptions. I had the opportunity to talk with Soviet guerrillas and saboteurs, mostly members of Comsomol, who had attacked the German rear the very moment when German forces entered their area. I learned from them that those operations were mostly the defensive destruction of war materials and foodstuffs left by the Soviet troops in a hasty withdrawal. At any rate, they were very useful operations.

Direction Necessary

The Soviet High Command soon learned that the infiltration of trained teams was the most effective way of starting guerrilla warfare and that UW must be directed if it is to be useful to the Soviet war effort.

Soon after the start of the war a Central Staff for direction of UW activities, called the Central Partisan Staff, was created in Moscow. The Germans knew that any forces employed in Russia would encounter partisans. But successful staging of large-scale UW operations by the Central Partisan Staff of the Red Army was made possible only by the German occupation policy. Of the two forms of dictatorship the Russian masses chose that of the Soviets, not of the Germans. As early as Autumn 1941 many large-scale, well-organized guerrilla attacks took place. On many nights German rear commanders identified in their zones 1,200 to 1,600 incidents of railroad track demolitions; this was in addition to the numerous open guerrilla attacks against German troops.²

Soviet teams trained for UW were dropped primarily in areas in which there were large numbers of Soviet officers separated from their units and cut off in the enemy rear. Their strength varied from only five to 15 personnel because trained active officers could be found by the teams on the spot at the moment of or soon after infiltration.

In addition to guerrilla units these teams organized an underground, intelligence nets, evasion and escape mechanisms, saboteurs, and other UW elements. Hundreds of stronger, better organized, and trained Soviet teams from Moscow and Kuibyshev were infiltrated into enemy held areas soon after they were overrun, where resistance existed, or where it could be developed. This happened mainly in the winter of 1941. These teams organized the civilian population involving about 150,000 guerrillas, operating in the rear of the German Army Group Center alone.³

The Red Air Force was capable of supplying by air all the guerrilla units and organizations with ample explosives, weapons, ammunition, food, communication equipment, medical supplies, and additional experts.⁴ Generals and Communist Party high officials flew in and out of guerrilla operational areas almost at will. Numerous landing strips were constructed in a short time. The Soviet showed a terrific capability to improvise, thus making UW a most efficient weapon. The UW campaign was considered extremely successful and in the estimation of German experts it contributed greatly to the defeat of the German Army on the Eastern Front.⁵

The Central Partisan Staff of the Red Army in Moscow was headed by Sncherbakov, a member of Central Committee of the Communist Party, and by Marshal Voroshilov. German sources mention the name of General Ionomarenko also.⁶ The First Chairman of this staff was Nikita Khrushchev the Secretary of the

² Walter Goerlitz, War Without Mercy, Partisan Warfare, 1939-1945.

³ Walter Goerlitz, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 1939-1945.

⁴ German General A. Ratcliffe, Partisan Warfare Project.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Walter Goerlitz, War Without Mercy, Partisan Warfare, 1939-1945.

Central Committee of the Communist Party and Korothchenko was Secretary of the CC of the Ukrainian Communist Party. This staff included secretaries of Communist Parties of provinces and regions which had been occupied by the Germans. In addition to this staff in Moscow (later moved to STAVKA where Soviet Supreme Command was located) the regional staffs were organized in enemy rear areas. Smolensk, Bryansk, Zhitomir, Poleski, Odessa, Kiev, and other areas had such staffs for on the spot coordination of UW efforts of several teams and in several operational areas.

Unconventional Warfare Schools

Schools for UW in the Soviet Union were under supervision of the Central Staff in close conjunction with the General Staff, the Chief of Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Ministry of State Security. It is not known how many schools there were in existence in peacetime, and as for the time of the war, the existence of only some of them is now known to us. One was in Tikhonov, south of Moscow. One was located in the district of Kuibyshev. In this the student body was made up of officers from the rank of lieutenant to lieutenant colonel. Operation was directly under the General Staff of the Red Army.

Several other schools and training centers were established for the same purpose in the area of Moscow. One school and training center was also located in the city of Engels on the Volga River. In addition, several airborne schools and centers prepared students of the guerrilla schools for jumping. In the Central Staff itself courses were held for preparation of high ranking officers for UW. This staff also conducted a school for intelligence experts, and held seminars, lectures, and conferences for indoctrination of high ranking Red Army generals and Communist Party officials in UW.

Courses in the Soviet UW schools lasted four to six months depending on the type of work for which students were being prepared. A daily schedule consisted of 10 working hours and a week consisted of six and one-half working days. Subjects taught emphasized area knowledge including the geographic, ethnographic, economic, social, cultural, linguistic, and other characteristics of the region into which teams were to be infiltrated.

As for the Soviet inspired UW in foreign countries in World War II, it may be said that it represented a significant contribution to their war effort. Communist Parties in countries where it was waged were acting for the Soviets. To these only agents from the Soviet Union were infiltrated because UW trained teams were desperately needed for deployment in the Soviet soil, to prevent the catastrophic situation caused by the German onslaught. However, immediately after the Soviets succeeded in stopping the German Army and could breathe a little more freely, they dropped their UW teams into foreign areas of political and military importance.

Personnel of these Soviet teams designated for deployment into foreign areas were trained in the same schools and centers as those used on the Russian soil. They were carefully selected and many generals of the Red Army were employed for this purpose.

Lessons May Mislead

The lessons we may learn from what the Soviets did in the first phase of World War II should not mislead us because the situation was different from what Moscow intended. Soviet war plans were forcibly changed by reason of the situation with which the USSR was confronted from the first day of the war; it was the most critical situation in the Soviet military history. Contrary to how the Soviets acted in World War II we must expect, if war comes, that the Kremlin will start UW in foreign countries on D-day or even earlier. Therefore, they will develop that type of UW capability to the greatest degree in peacetime. We must expect employment of Soviet teams in all the areas of strategic, economic, and political importance to them and in which Communist Parties will exist. These parties may start UW even before M-day if so ordered. Harassment of US and allied lines of communication and creation of chaos in the rear of US and allied forces will be the initial operations. The specially trained and selected cadre of Communist Parties in foreign countries will create favorable conditions for infiltration of Soviet teams, agents, and saboteurs, and provide reception committees and safe bases for them.

And what are the Soviets preparing for the future?

There is no doubt that UW is considered a strong weapon of war. According to Soviet doctrine the Communist Parties of the world must fight for the motherland Russia whenever such a situation arises; whenever they are found in the rear of the capitalist enemy. War is but a continuation of Communist revolutionary policy by other means, and war for Communist Parties means UW, guerrilla warfare, sabotage, harassment, assassinations, and destruction of capitalist industries and forces and creation of chaos.

Sound Concept

The Soviet concept is sound. Guerrilla warfare offers exceptional possibilities and, according to them, an inestimable force which must be made a factor of maximum organized strength of the Soviet and of international communism. UW forces are considered an indispensable weapon of future war. Persistent and careful preparations for UW is a must of Soviet policy. It is armed warfare deep in the rear of the enemy with the aim to disorganize and disrupt his rear areas. Soviet controlled UW forces are considered the most effective means of the strategic reconnaissance, and are a psychological and political weapon of tremendous importance. UW is prepared for as systematically as conventional war, if not more so.

The Soviet capability for UW in foreign countries will increase or decrease with the strength of Communist Parties in the areas in which they intend to wage it. One must never underestimate the Communists, no matter where they live and to which nation they belong. Their moral standards are the same everywhere. "At the root of communist morality," said Lenin, "lies the struggle for the consolidation of communism. Therefore, from the point of view of communist morality only those acts are moral which contribute to the building up of a new communist society." According to the Small Soviet Encyclopedia: "The teaching of hatred for the enemies of communism enriches the conception of socialist humanism, by distinguishing it from sugary and hypocritical philanthropy." In his book, Great Patriotic War, Stalin said: "It is impossible to conquer an enemy without having learned to hate him with all the might of one's soul." Soviet military consider the Communists in foreign countries the second front of the Red Army.

The era of nuclear weapons did not change Soviet UW concepts and doctrines a great deal. Soviets contend that nuclear weapons alone cannot solve the problem of future war, or win a victory by themselves. UW will be used to offset a possible advantage of Western Nations in military technology. In addition, the Soviets contend that if cities, industries, and armies are destroyed by nuclear weapons, there will remain people and eventually remnants of armed forces able to engage the enemy in Unconventional Warfare, harass him, and deprive him of a final victory. Disaster and confusion which may result in foreign countries as the result of the use of nuclear weapons will create favorable conditions for the Soviet agents, spies, assassins, saboteurs, and trained UW teams.

Emphasis Increasing

From the analysis of what the Soviets have done in the past, from studies and statements made by former Soviet officers and officials, and from the Soviet political and military doctrine it is understood that the Kremlin is constantly increasing the UW capability. Some people wrongly believe that UW for World War II was not the subject of Soviet advance peacetime preparation. This belief is based on what happened in 1941, but the Soviets were forced to improvise because of an unforeseen situation which developed from the first day of German attack. The German blitzkrieg resulted in two and one-half million prisoners in two months--unheard of in history. Entire armies surrendered and brought confusion to the Soviet High Command. Aleksei Fyodorov, the First Secretary of the Chernigov Oblast's Communist Party, shortly after the blitzkrieg started was told by Nikita Khrushchev that plans for UW had indeed been laid very early at all-Union and Union Republic levels.⁷ That confirms that military plans have been worked out. Evidently the lack of detailed preparation on the regional and local levels was an inevitable corollary of the prevailing Soviet doctrine of offensive war. The Soviet did not recognize the possibility of being forced to wage UW on Soviet soil, therefore, lower executive echelons were not prepared.

Incidentally, Nikita Khrushchev directed preparations for UW in the Ukraine and succeeded in organizing numerous partisan units, including a powerful underground network, diversionists, saboteurs, and spies for the entire Ukraine before the town of Kiev, where his headquarters was located, fell into German hands. Khrushchev is today the indisputable boss of the Kremlin. Marshal Klementi Voroshilov, a hero of the Soviet partisan movement, is actual president of USSR.

According to statements by former Soviet officers and officials Soviet peacetime preparations for UW may be of two types: for waging it on the Soviet soil and for waging it in foreign countries. The first type consists of the advance organization of technical and material base, selection and training of leading cadres, elaboration of concepts, doctrines, and tactics, and psychological preparation of the Soviet peoples. Operational areas already have been defined and where possible preparations are being made within USSR and satellite countries.

⁷ Aleksei Fyodorov, The Underground Obkom in Action (Moscow: Voennoye Izdatelstvo Min. V. S. S. SSSR, 1947).

Into preparations and the increase of UJ capabilities comes Soviet propaganda which incessantly praises the exploits of legendary guerrilla and underground heroes trying to create a cult of UJ. The market is flooded with a great quantity of books relating stories of guerrilla warfare in the past, the techniques of fighting, and the rewards the participants received from the Soviet government. The Soviet radio is making frequent reference to guerrilla warfare in the past and the lessons learned from it. The same is done with Soviet films.

In the second preparation are teams to be infiltrated into enemy rear areas. Countries such as France--across which the US Army lines of communications lead--and North Italy are the most probable target areas; Greece, Denmark, North Africa, Middle East countries, and the selected countries in the Far East and Pacific also may be areas of Soviet interest.

The Soviet Union does not stand alone in this business. Not only the Soviet Communist Party but the Communist Parties of satellites will be used for sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla warfare in foreign countries. The Polish, Czech, French, Hungarian, and perhaps, Yugoslav Communist Parties are today actively supporting guerrilla movements in North Africa and the Middle and Far East. During the Sixth Congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party in 1952, Tito, Gijilas, and Rankovich--all leaders of the party--promised openly in their speeches to give full support to Tunisian and Algerian rebels and to all others who will start fighting Western "imperialists." Yugoslav ships carrying weapons to these rebels were seized. Among the best Soviet agents operating in the Middle Eastern countries, Czech, Greek, Armenian, Yugoslav, French, and other minorities are found. They have contributed significantly to the increase in the influence of Soviets over Egypt and the Arab League.

Conclusion

In concluding it is correct to state that the Soviets have a great UJ capability and will strive to increase it in the future to support Kremlin plans. Where Soviet personnel will not be suitable for the job, peoples of the satellites will be used. Khrushchev, who has personal experience in UJ and is a firm believer in that form of warfare, is today not only the boss of the Soviet Communist Party but of the Soviet Union and the Red Army. The Kremlin is still issuing orders to the Communist Parties of the world.

The Free World will most probably be faced with a difficult situation if a general war should come. It will have a crucial task of fighting against Soviet inspired and controlled UJ. Anti-Unconventional Warfare, therefore, is becoming the subject of much greater concern than ever before in history.

This article is a digest of a study entitled "Rear Area Security in Russia," prepared by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army.

The publication of this digest does not constitute an endorsement of its views and recommendations by the Department of the Army, the Office of the Chief of Military History, the Army War College, or the Command and General Staff College.---The Editor, Military Review.

An Army planning a major campaign aimed at the heart of a country occupying a large land mass is faced with many problems. Not the least of these is the problem of security for long lines of communications and widely separated administrative installations in rear of the combat troops. This is particularly true if these lines of communications must extend deep into the homeland of the country being invaded and are, therefore, susceptible to attack by partisan forces.

This problem played a significant part in the plans developed by the German High Command prior to the invasion of Russia in June 1941.

Security Measures

Deliberations, over the type and extent of essential security measures which would have to be employed, led to the conclusion that some new approach to the problem must be found. Obviously, all supply routes would be considerably longer than those required for operations on the Western front. They would, thus, be more susceptible to incursions of all kinds. The limited rail and road net, extending through vast, sparsely settled areas in which there was an abundance of shelter and concealment for partisan bands, placed a new perspective on security needs. No longer was the only danger focused on the forward areas, as in previous campaigns. The operations zone of an army now appeared to be relatively much less exposed to partisan activities than the areas farther to the rear. Areas in close proximity to the front, while subject to limited attacks from within, would be the scene of strong concentrations of forces which would have a reasonably firm control over the local rail and road net and be in a position to keep the local population under close surveillance. Normal security measures would suffice. This was not true, however, in the vast expanse to the rear.

The unusual extent of all prospective operations in the East prompted the German High Command to lay plans for the establishment of a security organization which would be more or less independent of the armies operating in the forward areas. For this reason, the area immediately to the rear of an army group operations zone was designated as an army group rear area.

Passive Defense

From the outset, a distinction was made between active and passive security measures. While special consideration was given to passive defense, the measures

* Reprinted from Military Review, May 1951 (pp. 57-62). Published by the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

to be employed would not differ materially from normal procedures. Thorough training of all agencies and forces concerned with the moving and handling of supplies was recognized as a prerequisite. Supply conservation was emphasized. All troops received continuous instructions through appropriate directives and orders, and were further trained by means of demonstrations and field exercises. Plans were made for truck columns, moving over poor roads or through endangered areas, to proceed quickly and without interruption. Single vehicles were to avoid passing through partisan-infested areas. Full use was to be made of a block system, wherein strong positions were organized at intervals along a supply route. Convoys would move from one block to another, taking advantage of the security offered by these positions during periods when the partisans were unduly active.

Unloaded supplies of all classes would be placed underground insofar as possible. At night, or during air raid alerts, all railroad stations were to be cleared of trains carrying ammunition and fuel. If supply trains could not be unloaded promptly, they were to be separated and their individual sections distributed over all available spur tracks. Provision was made to move central switchboards from railroad stations to points outside of towns, thus creating individual loop circuits around critical points. Supply trains would move at low speed (not over 10 miles per hour at night). Trains would move in convoy, with the locomotive place in the center of the train in order to protect it from immediate destruction in case of mine explosions. Special mine-clearing devices, without crews, were to be placed in front of each train to set off enemy mines in the roadbed by subjecting the tracks to continuous vibrations. In some instances, an entire empty train would precede a full one carrying critical supplies.

Active Security

For the purpose of active security, special units of various types and strengths were created. At first, they were organized in the form of separate battalions, and only in those instances where unusually extensive installations had to be protected were several battalions combined under the control of a security regiment headquarters. Most of the personnel were taken from older age groups and consisted largely of veterans of World War I or of men who had received a minimum of training in replacement units. They were led by older reserve officers, or retired officers who had been recalled to active duty. These facts need to be emphasized for the better understanding of the difficulties which these units had to overcome later on in the performance of their tasks.

The units were equipped with a variety of weapons in altogether insufficient quantities. Later, when the German replacement system no longer was able to furnish an adequate supply of small arms, which were then more urgently needed at the front, the security units had to be equipped with captured Russian weapons.

The protection of forward supply dumps involved a variety of problems. Internal security consisted of guarding the supply dumps, adjacent buildings, and facilities. These installations, however, soon grew to the size of small cities and required large numbers of security forces; for not only was it necessary to guard the stores, but the billets for the troops and the transport hauling the supplies also had to be protected. In addition, special protection had to be provided for all installations necessary for the maintenance and operation of the depots, such as power plants, railroad stations, and airfields.

The supply plan called for each newly installed central supply depot to organize a forward echelon, which was to move up behind the combat forces along the most suitable road. In addition to these forward echelon installations, other smaller supply depots were organized and located laterally in both directions.

In addition to the forces required for the tasks mentioned above, security troops were to be furnished to the several armies to protect their base supply depots and installations, and to relieve the combat troops, as soon as possible, of all rear area security duties. Experience had taught that the combat elements were burdened excessively with such duties and, therefore, were often deprived of forces which were urgently needed at the front.

German plans for active security called for an active air defense. Anti-aircraft artillery units were to be provided for the protection of large or particularly important railroad stations, workshops, bridges, and similar installations. Fuel trains and similar shipments, which at a later stage of the campaign became unusually critical, were to be protected, wherever possible, by railroad anti-aircraft batteries consisting of 20-mm four-barreled guns mounted on flatcars. These units were under the command of the army group rail transportation officer.

Troop transports and personnel on leave trains were responsible for their own security. For the protection of freight trains, cars were attached which offered observation and fields of fire over the entire length of the train.

The aircraft warning service of units in the area was hooked up with the railway signal communication system, so that all traffic control agencies could be alerted in time and with maximum speed. If the wire lines were destroyed, these warnings were to be transmitted by radio.

Russian Plans

As the plans and precautions listed above indicate, the German Army High Command was by no means caught unawares by the strong partisan activities encountered during the Russian campaign. It was known for some time that the Russians were determined to use organized partisan warfare in the defense of their Country, and that they had used propaganda to spread that idea among their population. Further proof was to be found in the "Russian Partisan Directive of 1933." Their future military leaders in partisan warfare had been carefully trained in the use of this method of combat. Just before the start of the campaign - according to information received in Germany - the Russian War Academy conducted war games in the area where certain locations were designated as so-called partisan centers.

Similarly, the Russian High Command had recognized at an early stage that, in contrast to the dense railroad and highway net of the highly organized West, with its ever present possibilities for alternate routes, the very few serviceable supply routes through the vast expanse of the Russian area were of paramount strategic importance. Furthermore, in view of the great distances, the poor condition of the highways (which deteriorated easily under the

influence of the weather), and the anticipated German shortage of motor fuel, the Russians realized that the railroads would be the principal medium for transporting supplies and that this would be equally true for all large-scale troop movements, furlough transportation, and evacuations. Clearly cognizant of this handicap, which would present itself in any military campaign against their Country, the Russians began, early in the War, to build up a "second front" behind the German lines.

Initial Activities

During the first 6 months of the Russian campaign, the German supply system generally functioned without major interruptions. Either the Russians had failed to recover from the initial blow or they were yet unable to muster the proper means for effective raids on German rear area communications. The local inhabitants generally were co-operative everywhere. They welcomed the German forces as their liberators and fervently desired nothing more than to resume their normal, peaceful activities. This attitude was demonstrated in many ways. It was a common occurrence for mayors to request German protection against scattered Russian soldiers who had formed bands in the deep forests and conducted raids against German troops and local inhabitants alike. These raids primarily were for the purpose of obtaining food, civilian clothing, and other necessities.

The German combat forces, at least during the initial period of the campaign, made every effort to restore normal conditions in the areas they occupied and to gain the confidence of the local population. A number of instances have been reported where combat divisions, held in an area for some time for one reason or another, were highly successful in the pacification of the area under their control. Every effort was made to return the economy to some degree of normalcy. Collective work shops were abolished and, henceforth, every craftsman was permitted to practice his trade freely. The administration of state farms (Sovkhoz) was decentralized and they were turned into local agricultural co-operatives. All churches were reopened, and the German troops and local inhabitants met in common worship. The news spread rapidly throughout the area; and, from afar, Russian parents would bring their children to have them baptized in the newly opened church.

With the eastward advance of the combat troops, these areas were turned over to the rear area occupation authorities and the picture soon changed. The population was treated in a manner quite different from that to which it had become accustomed. Whereas, previously certain regulations pertaining to the freedom of movement in the area or to curfew had been somewhat relaxed, they were now rigidly enforced. Every rule of common sense was suddenly replaced by strict adherence to the letter of the law. Minor infractions were punished to a degree of severity far in excess of that warranted by the act committed. The well-meaning elements among the population, who had demonstrated their willingness to co-operate fully, were now sadly disappointed, whereas, their opponents rejoiced and hastened to exploit the new situation for the benefit of the partisans and their counterpropaganda.

By late fall of 1941, occasional acts of sabotage by groups and individuals had become routine. The beginnings of a well-planned partisan organization, which operated with a variety of technical and psychological means, were clearly noticeable. A typical Russian institution, based on national tradition,

this organization grew steadily in size and importance throughout the entire War. With great skill, the Russian propagandists exploited every mistake made by the occupying power in the treatment of the local population. Whereas the local inhabitants up to that time, had been friendly, trustful, and entirely willing to co-operate, their attitude changed greatly during the first winter.

The next step was the formation of small bands which established their hideouts in the forests. They forced the inhabitants of the area to supply them with food and give support in other ways. They attacked small German camps or supply depots, raided and plundered single vehicles on the road, blew up Russian industrial enterprises that worked for the German troops, and took with them any Russians who were working for the occupying power.

Full-Scale Partisan Warfare

By 1942, Russian partisan warfare against the German rear area communications had entered a more advanced stage. A network of channels for transmitting orders and co-ordinating activities, thoroughly planned for in peacetime, reached from central headquarters in unoccupied Russian territory up to the western border of Russia and, in some regions, even into Polish territory.

There was a definite pattern to the activities of these units. While not confined solely to acts against the rail lines, the Russians knew that by destroying this means of transportation they could cause the invading armies the greatest hurt. An excerpt from the monthly report of the Chief of Transportation, Army Group Center, covering the period from 1 to 31 August 1943, contained the following information:

Despite the employment of special alert units for the protection of the railroad lines, partisan activity increased by 25 percent during August 1943 and reached a record of 1,392 incidents, as compared to 1,114 in July. The daily average amounted to 45 demolitions. In 364 cases, the rails were cut simultaneously in more than 10 places. Individual demolition points amounted to 20,505, while 4,528 mines were detected and removed. During the night from 2 to 3 August, the partisans began to put into effect a program of large-scale destruction. Numerous demolitions were carried out which caused a serious curtailment of all railroad traffic and a considerable loss of railroad materiel. Within 2 nights, the six to seven thousand miles of track in the area were cut in 8,422 places, while another 2,478 mines were detected and removed prior to exploding.

During the night of 19-20 June 1944, the partisans carried out a major operation in the area of Army Group Center. This was 1 day prior to the Russian general offensive which eventually led to the collapse of the German Army Group. Altogether, the partisans made 15,000 demolition attempts on the railroad lines running through the area and were successful in 10,500 cases, all in the course of a single night. Their main effort was directed against

the supply lines that served the Third Panzer Army, the same German unit which was to bear the brunt of the first heavy attack by the Red Army on the following day.

The undue burden on the limited rail net forced dependence on highway transportation for a substantial part of all supply shipments. As a result, the roads soon became favorite targets for partisan raids. This was especially true for stretches leading through dense and extensive forests where the partisans found perfect concealment and could not be pursued by German troops. The tactics employed in these raids followed generally the same pattern: A German motor convoy traveling through a dense forest would suddenly run into a log barrier constructed at a blind spot on the road and, while coming to a halt or trying to turn around, would be exposed to devastating enemy fire from all sides. If any vehicle managed to escape to the rear, it was only to be caught and destroyed in another road block set up by the partisans.

Conclusions

From the wealth of practical experience gained during the Russian campaign, a number of important lessons can be derived. It is axiomatic that the number of troops required to conduct an active defense in rear areas will be staggering and can be made available only at the expense of combat troops at the front. In modern warfare, even an active defense based on the combined efforts of combat troops and security forces cannot assure the complete elimination of partisan activities. It is clear, therefore, that there must be another solution to the entire problem of rear area security.

The only all-inclusive solution to the problem seems to lie in the actual pacification of occupied enemy territory. In every country under military occupation there are people, in all walks of life, whose ardent desire is the return to peace and normalcy, not to speak of those among them who, for personal reasons, are willing to support the policies of the occupying powers. Cultivating their friendship, assuring them of one's peaceful intentions, and restoring the safety of their homes, their work, and their subsistence are the best guarantees for real security in the rear of the fighting troops.

V. I. Kulikov; Translated by Dr. Walter Darnell Jacobs

One of the distinctive features of bourgeois historiography of the past few years is that increasingly more attention is being paid to historical problems of World War II and the role of the Soviet Union in it. This feature cannot be considered as accidental--it has its own reasons. The Great Fatherland War of 1941-1945 has made manifest to all mankind the immortal example of heroism, courage, and stability of the Soviet people in their struggle for freedom and independence. From an objective analysis of the origin, the course of the Second World War and the prominent role of the Soviet Union in defeating fascism, much depends on a correct estimate of contemporary problems linked with strengthening peace and averting a new war. That is why bourgeois scholars have concentrated their attention on the history of the Fatherland War of the Soviet Union. They are not at all interested, however, in striving for objective truth or for a correct interpretation of the history of the USSR. The bourgeois world is worried by the rapid growth in economic power and political authority of our country on the world arena in the post-war period. By falsifying the history of the USSR, bourgeois historians are striving in every possible way to belittle and disparage the role and importance of our socialist state in the years of the war against fascism.

The Soviet partisan movement in the war against fascist Germany aroused particularly intense interest among scholars in the United States and Western Europe. A number of articles and separate books on this question have been published by the foreign press. Among them are: E. M. Howell, The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-1944, Washington, 1956; A. Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945: A Study of Occupation Policies, New York, 1957; Ch. O. Dixon and O. Heilbrunn, Communist Guerrilla Warfare, London, 1954; D. Karov, The Partisan Movement in the USSR in 1941-1945, Munich, 1954; W. Hawemann, Achtung, Partisanen! Der Kampf hinter der Ostfront, Hannover, 1953; and many others.¹

The English military writer J. F. C. Fuller and also K. Tippelskirch, L. Rendulich, H. Guderian and other generals of the former Hitlerite army have devoted much attention to the Soviet partisan movement in their books.

Of the books and articles published on the Soviet partisans, special attention should be paid to the analysis of D. Karov, the author of the book, The Partisan Movement in the USSR in 1941-1945. This book abounds in openly anti-Soviet attacks, although D. Karov writes that the ultimate goal of his study is "to dissipate ignorance concerning the USSR" and to convey "authentic data with reference to the Soviet Union." Another work requiring careful

* Translated from Protiv burshuaznoi fal'sifikatsii istorii sovetskogo obshchestva (Against Bourgeois Falsification of the History of Soviet Society) (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo VPSH i AON pri TsK KPSS, 1960). Permission to reprint this translation must be directed to Dr. Walter Darnell Jacobs (4949-33rd Road, North, Arlington, Virginia).

analysis is the book by Ch. O. Dixon and O. Heilbrunn, Communist Guerilla Warfare. The authors declare that their works are based on "documentary data." A critical analysis of these two books reveals most clearly the basic trends of bourgeois historical science on the question of the role played by the Soviet partisan movement in the Great Fatherland War and the falsified approach to it taken by bourgeois scholars.

It must be noted that the book of Ch. O. Dixon and O. Heilbrunn has been widely circulated. It appeared in many editions in a short period of time. The book was published in a large edition in New York and London in 1954, and in Western Germany in 1956. In 1956, this material of Ch. O. Dixon and O. Heilbrunn was utilized for the publication of a book on the Soviet partisans in the French language. In 1957, the work of these two authors was translated into the Russian language.

The book Communist Guerilla Warfare attempts to generalize everything that had been written in bourgeois literature about the Soviet partisan movement. In preparing this book, the authors used the research of twenty bourgeois investigators and quoted more than thirty documentary sources which had appeared in the periodical press of bourgeois countries. The authors also used some materials from a series of Soviet publications. In a preface to the book Communist Guerilla Warfare, the commander of the military district of Northern Ireland, Lt. Gen. Reginald F. S. Denning, writes that "Brigadier General Dixon and Dr. Heilbrunn have thoroughly and carefully studied the problem of the conduct of partisan war and especially the activities of the Russian partisans against the German army in 1941-1945. The results of their investigations, which are set out in this book, have an extraordinary interest and, undoubtedly, are very valuable ..."²

As the Soviet partisan movement is similarly depicted in the book of D. Karov, why has the research of Dixon and Heilbrunn attracted the special interest of bourgeois specialists?

The national character of the Soviet partisan movement, the significant role of youth and women in it, the enormous losses inflicted on the enemy by the military operations of the partisans--all this significantly distinguishes the partisan movement in the Fatherland War of 1941-1945 from all partisan movements previously known in history. The Soviet partisans rendered great assistance to the regular army and played a very important role in the defeat of fascist Germany. However unpleasant this fact may be to bourgeois researchers, they must reckon with it although they have been striving in every possible way to belittle and degrade the role of Soviet partisans, using the methods of the falsifiers in this effort.

Ch. O. Dixon and O. Heilbrunn begin their exposition on the partisan movement in the Soviet Union with a very strange assertion, saying that "the Soviet Union had prepared for the partisan activities before the war," that in January and February 1941, "in several military districts of the Soviet Union, especially near Moscow, and in the western parts of Russia, large maneuvers were conducted in which the methods of waging partisan war were worked out; the civilian population also participated in the maneuvers."³ It develops that, even before the beginning of the Fatherland War, the Soviet Union had planned to surrender an important part of its territory to fascist Germany so that an active partisan war could develop there. The assertions of Dixon and Heilbrunn are not new and they admit this themselves. As far

back as 1944 another bourgeois researcher, Fredborg, had asserted, "The Russians prepared for it (partisan war) for years, the accumulated supplies of ammunition ... constructed radio stations and systematically trained their soldiers in the tactics of partisan war."⁴ Other bourgeois authors adhered to similar points of view. D. Karov takes another position. In his opinion, "the Soviet leadership had not prepared for partisan war on the territory of the USSR."⁵ He asserts that the Soviet government, following the instructions of V. I. Lenin which allegedly "took a most negative attitude toward partisan war," considered it dangerous to arm the people and, for this reason, prepared for partisan war on the territory of all countries except the USSR. Dixon and Heilbrunn write that the Communist Party attached decisive importance to the partisan movement. D. Karov believes that the Soviet Union "did not intend to resort to such a form of resistance as the partisan movement,"⁶ and that the attitude towards the partisans of the civil war was scornful from the military point of view and from the population--ironical.

Neither one nor the other point of view of bourgeois researchers, of course, corresponds to reality. The role of the partisan movement should not be overexaggerated nor should it be ascribed decisive importance, but it is erroneous to assert that the leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet government underestimated the partisan struggle. The partisan movement as a form of the armed struggle of the people comes into existence only in time of just war. It has always played an enormous role in the revolutionary movement of peoples. It was successfully utilized by the Communist Party in the period of struggle with foreign interventions and of internal counter-revolution. Applying a definition of V. I. Lenin, one may say that partisan detachments are "free unions of people who have decided to fight to the death and who know the locality excellently and who are most closely united with the population."⁷ But at the same time Lenin emphasized that partisan warfare can never be considered as the sole or main means of struggle, but rather it should be subordinated, balanced with other, main means of struggle. Not intending to renounce this form of struggle in case of an attack by aggressors, the Soviet government, prior to the beginning of the Great Fatherland War, held no maneuvers on the working out of the methods of partisan war and therefore the civil population participated in none. And no plans were made for the surrender of Soviet land. And, of course, the Soviet Union conducted no preparations for the development of partisan warfare on the territories of other states.

Preparations for partisan activities in the Soviet Union began after the declaration of war which was thrust upon us by the Hitlerites. On June 29, 1941, the Central Committee of the Party and Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR issued a directive on the necessity of developing partisan warfare in the regions occupied by the enemy and of creating intolerable conditions for the enemy. I. V. Stalin, in his speech of July 3, spoke in this connection on the tasks of the organization of the partisan struggle.

At the end of June and the beginning of July, there were held, in all regions threatened with occupation, meetings of local party committees on the question of developing the partisan movement. Thus, at the beginning of July, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine held a meeting of the party and soviet aktivs of the republic which discussed the question of the creation of partisan groups in all regions of the Ukraine which were threatened by enemy invasion, of the organization of

demolitions courses, of the establishment in the forests of partisan bases for the storage of food, arms and demolitions explosives. A similar meeting was held in Leningrad on July 11-13 in which A. A. Zhdanov and K. E. Voroshilov participated. A. Fedorov, the commander of the largest partisan unit in the Ukraine and twice Hero of the Soviet Union, relates the following in his memoirs: "Prior to the address delivered by Comrade Stalin on the radio on July 3, 1941, no one in our oblast prepared a bolshevik underground and no one worked on the creation of partisan detachments ...

"For all the second half of July and a part of August, the underground oblast committee was busy with preparations for activities and illegal conditions and for the formation of detachments."⁸

Preparation for the partisan movement did not spring up everywhere at the same time, but developed only in those oblasts which were at a given moment threatened by fascist occupation. The secretary of the Polesk underground oblast committee of the party and commander of units of Polesk partisans, I. D. Vetrov, writes: "In July 1941 in our Polesk oblast, several primary and raion underground party organizations, nineteen partisan detachments and seventeen saboteur groups with special training had already been created. Wherever the enemy army entered, a powerful partisan movement was developed."⁹ Partisan detachments began to be organized in the Briansk oblast somewhat later. "In August 1941, when our native Briansk was threatened with danger," writes I. M. Belin, one of the organizers of the partisan movement in the Briansk area, "the Suzemka raion committee of the party adopted a resolution on the creation of a partisan detachment for the struggle with the fascist aggressors ...

"In October 1941, the fascists broke through the front in the region of Khutor Mikhailov. Units of the Red Army were cut off from the battle in the raion center. Our partisan detachment went out of Suzemka into an out-of-the-way corner of the Briansk forest--the site of the ruins of Khiten'."¹⁰ In the Kalinin oblast, partisan detachments began active combat operations in September. The first stage of partisan warfare took shape entirely differently the Crimea. Here preparations for the partisan struggle began when heavy fighting had already developed in the north of the Crimea and the fascist troops were advancing toward Perekop. The enumerated facts convincingly prove that no sort of preparations for a partisan struggle took place in our country before the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it reached the most extensive limits. The greatest role in it was played by the initiative of the workers themselves. Right from the very beginning, the partisan struggle had a popular character and was created by the people's masses themselves. The directives of the party armed the Soviet people with a concrete program of struggle, made the partisan movement an all-out effort and, of no less importance, promoted the further growth of national initiative in the struggle with the enemy.

Dixon, Heilbrunn and several other bourgeois researchers maintain that, although the Communist Party had prepared the partisan movement before the beginning of the war, the Soviet population of the occupied territories refused to support the partisan movement in the initial period of the war. And more than that, the toilers supposedly stood on the side of the invaders, greeted them as liberators and at the outset sympathized with them in every possible way. "When the German army invaded the USSR in 1941, they did not

fear the partisan movement and actually did not clash with them at the beginning of the campaign. Many Belorussians and Ukrainians greeted them as liberators."¹¹ This opinion is encountered in other bourgeois researchers. Lothar Rendulich, a retired lieutenant general, in the book Itogi vtoroi mirovoi voyny, published in Hamburg in 1953, states categorically: "At the outset, the population of vast regions of Russia saw in the German soldier their liberator."¹² K. Toppel'skirkh speaks in the same manner in Istorii vtoroi mirovoi voyny.¹³

The transparent absurdity that the Hitlerite command did not fear the partisan movement in the first months of the war is easily disproved by documents of the same Hitlerite command. Characteristically, in May 1941, before the attack on the USSR, the German-fascist command issued the now widely known secret order "On the Application of Military Jurisdiction in the 'Barbarossa' Area and Special Troop Measures." From the beginning to the end, they were filled with fear over the possible resistance of the Soviet people in case of an attack by the Hitlerite army. If he wanted to save himself from destruction, the Hitlerite soldier was directed to kill any Russian, any Soviet person. In order to break the spirit of resistance, the fascist command encouraged by this directive, even before the attack, any atrocities on the part of its soldiers.

As to the manner in which the population actually greeted the fascist army, documents and materials published at the time by the fascist powers testify eloquently. It is sufficient to mention only a few of them in order to show the completely perfidious nature of the assertions of bourgeois historians. In the number of June 27, 1941, the fascist Minskaia gazeta stated: "Because of systematic acts of sabotage on the part of the civil population against the German military power (damage to communications lines), one hundred men have been shot. For each act of sabotage in the future, fifty men will be executed if the guilty are not brought to light."

Another Hitlerite newspaper, Neues Wiener Tageblatt, reported to its readers: "A mysterious, horrible curse hangs over us in Belorussia. German officials can find nothing that could facilitate their activities. They are forced to fight there against insurmountable difficulties. The peasants do not want to adjust themselves to the new conditions of ownership. Craftsmen are not responding to our summons."¹⁴ As is clear from such reports, in the first days--and even a year later--the population was inclined "to greet" the fascist invaders in a thoroughly definite manner. Therefore, even the fascist hangman Rosenberg was forced to admit that "as a result of twenty-three years of bolshevik rule, the Belorussian population is infected with the bolshevik world view to a definite extent, so that neither the organizational nor the personnel conditions for local self government exist" and that "positive elements, which could be trusted, cannot be found in Belorussia."¹⁵

Let us comment, in passing, on another factor. Proceeding from their contention that the population welcomed the arrival of the fascist troops at the outset, bourgeois historians conclude that the Soviet partisan movement sprang up only four or five months after the incursion of fascist Germany into the territory of the USSR. Thus, for example, D. Karov maintains that, in the Leningrad oblast, "actual partisan detachments were formed in the

spring of 1942 in the forests near the city of Luga," and supports the opinion that the partisan movement began to grow only from the end of 1941.¹⁰

The facts, taken from strictly verified Soviet documentary sources, easily refute these assertions. It is easy to understand that, due to its mass character, the partisan movement varied at different stages, so that it grew from month to month. But it originated in the early days of the invasion of the Hitlerite armies. Right from the first appearance of the fascist invaders, partisan units grew rapidly under the leadership of the Communist Party. In August 1941, more than two hundred partisan fighting units were operating in the Belorussian forests. Even in July and August 1941, reports appeared in the Soviet periodical press on important battles fought by Belorussian and Ukrainian partisans. On July 6-7, 1941, the Krasnoslobodsk partisan detachment, consisting of seventy men, liberated the Belorussian city of Slutsk from the Hitlerites, and later liberated the raion centers of Liuban' and Krasnaia Sloboda. The partisans defeated the enemy garrison and held these populated points for several days. The organizers of the first partisan detachments in Belorussia, Tikhon Pavlovich Bumazhkov and Fedor Illarionovich Pavlovskii, were awarded the title, "Hero of the Soviet Union," by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on August 6, 1941. By that time they had carried out many heroic fights and had succeeded in winning well-deserved fame.

In the Moscow oblast, seventeen districts were captured by the enemy and held for a few weeks. In that period, the glorious Moscow partisans killed more than three thousand Hitlerites, destroyed several tanks, trucks loaded with ammunition, and fuel tanks. The partisans of two districts mined roads ninety-five times, inflicting an enormous loss on the enemy. In one month, a small partisan detachment of about eighty-nine men killed three hundred forty Hitlerites.¹⁷

On November 2, 1941, the Sovinformbiuro (Soviet Information Bureau), announced that, in September and October, Smolensk partisans had destroyed two hundred eighty-seven Hitlerite soldiers and officers, eight tanks, ten airplanes, sixty guns, seven mortars, eighteen fuel carriers, forty motor vehicles with ammunition and had captured rich trophies.

In the difficult days of the battles for Kiev at the end of June and the beginning of July, 1941, three Komsomol partisan detachments were formed from a number of young persons. They numbered about five hundred persons. By October 1, seven hundred thirty-eight partisan detachments were already operating in the territory of the Ukraine.¹⁸ Similar examples could be cited from other oblasts and republics which were occupied by the fascists. The cited facts, however, are quite sufficient to prove the falseness of the assertions about the absence of partisan warfare in the first months of the incursion of the Hitlerite armies into the boundaries of the USSR.

The existence of the partisan movement as early as June and July, 1941, cannot be refuted by the attempts of bourgeois historians to show that in the first four or five months of the war against the Soviet Union the German soldier, because of the absence of the partisan movement, "hardly paid any attention to the partisans ..."¹⁹ Dixon and Heilbrunn write: "Only four months had passed after the beginning of the war when directives dealing with the struggle with the partisans were first issued by the Supreme Command of

the Ground Forces, after which many orders dealing with the creation of various anti-formations were issued to the armies."²⁰ There are numerous German documents in the Soviet archives which show the complete failure of such measures. In particular, on September 11, 1941, complete detailed instructions on how to fight the partisans were issued in secret order No. 1198/41 by the German General Rovkes.²¹ As an urgent measure for the struggle against the partisans, the staff of the German 26th Infantry Division devised order No. 575/41, dated September 11, 1941. In it were given directives on whom to consider partisans and the measures of terror to be applied to them.²² In August and September, 1941, in the 129th and 221st and also in many other infantry divisions of the fascist army, special motorized and mounted sub-units were formed for the fight against the partisans. Only after a lengthy analysis of the question of measures for the struggle against the partisans were special instructions, "Basic Principles for the Struggle Against the Partisans," issued by the staff of the High Command of the German Army--not in the middle of November as Dixon and Heilbrunn assert, but in October.²³

One of the widely circulated versions in bourgeois literature is the assertion that, in the early period of the war, the population in the occupied territories resisted the partisan movement, that it was forced to join the partisans, and, finally, that, because of the resistance of the masses, only here and there were the communists able to form groups of partisans. What is more, it is alleged that the policies of the Communist Party failed in the early period and the Communists did not succeed in organizing a mass partisan movement. D. Karov describes, in the following manner, how a single partisan detachment was "formed" from a small group. Having gathered all the population of a populated point into a square, "the commissar of the detachment, with agitational speeches, ordered the young people to join the partisans. Those who categorically refused to do so were called out and simply shot there on the village square. Those persons who volunteered were taken aside into another group and then distributed to various companies."²⁴ This is entirely an invention and a slander. There was no need to use force in recruiting persons to join partisan detachments.

A group of organizers and leaders of the partisan movement in Belorussia said the following about this issue: "The partisans did not lack reserves. Every Soviet patriot considered it his duty to fight the German fascist bandits, and the population of those regions occupied by them joined the partisans in wholesale lots. What is more, almost all the population living in regions where Germans were located considered themselves to be partisans and went into the reserves, ready at any moment to enter the partisan detachments."²⁵

The number of partisan detachments grew rapidly. Frequently they were not able to take into their ranks all those wishing to fight. Here are some concrete examples: "A group of ten members of the Ushachsk raion committee of the Komsomol (Vitebsk oblast) led by Comrade Vasilevskii, went into action on May 3, 1942. Within two weeks it had grown into a detachment of fifty men, and within four months--to a brigade of five hundred men. The detachment in the Mogilevsk oblast under the command of Makei Makholap divided its personnel into six organized groups, four of which became detachments. From the end of 1942 to the middle of 1943, the number of youth in partisan detachments had grown four to five times."²⁶ The growth of personnel in the Kovpak detachment was characteristic. "In September 1941, there were sixty men in the Kovpak

detachment, and five hundred by February 1942."²⁷ In December, 1941, in Kholmetsk and Sensk sel'soviets, Dorogobuzhsk raion, Smolensk oblast, a partisan detachment numbering one hundred twenty men was organized under the leadership of Corrade Demenkov, a member of the underground raion committee of the party. "Within a month, this detachment had grown to two hundred eighty men. In November, 1941, the Znamensk partisan detachment numbered three hundred men, and in January 1942, there were already eight hundred warriors in it."²⁸ Still more characteristic was the rapid growth of partisan detachments in Belorussia, where more than 370,000 men participated in partisan detachments. More than 220,000 men took part in the partisan movement in the Ukraine.²⁹ How is it possible, in the presence of such a wide scope of the partisan movement, to speak of forced enlistment in the partisans?

The Soviet partisan movement made use of the unlimited support of the masses. It was deeply patriotic, a truly popular movement. The Soviet people under the difficult conditions of the occupation, did not doubt for a moment, even at the outset of the war, the correctness of the policy of the Communist and they were always for the Party and the Communists. For Soviet people, the Party and the country are indissolubly connected. However, in bourgeois historical literature it is maintained that the population of the occupied oblasts allegedly tried to escape from the influence of the Communist Party, hence "a number of units preserved their independence ... There were partisans not belonging to any unit, who operated independently, like lone wolves. There were also small partisan groups ... They all operated on their own initiative, preserving their independence."³⁰

D. Karov, the German General Lothar Rendulich and others have even used the term "wild partisans" in an effort to accentuate the special status of these groups of partisans which allegedly did not depend on the communists but which actually did not exist. D. Karov goes farther than Dixon and Heilbrunn. He maintains that the "wild partisans" had no definite political program and numbered in their ranks tens of thousands of men. In order to prove that there was a difference existing between the ordinary Soviet partisans and the "wild partisans," Lothar Rendulich writes: "After the Red Army liberated those oblasts in which the wild partisans operated, the latter, as a rule, were immediately taken under supervision by NKVD organs, sent off for re-education in remote camps, sometimes to punishment companies with especially strict discipline. Their emphatic lack of discipline--the result of a constrained mode of life--was considered by the Soviet command as intolerable for regular troops."³¹

Assertions about "wild partisans," "independent groups" and the like, are pure fabrications. In fact, a series of small partisan groups, of separate partisan detachments cropped up spontaneously and there were separate patriotic-underground units operating on their own. But this is not a sign of weakness but of the strength of the Communist Party and the Soviet people. Having cropped up independently, these partisan groups persistently sought contacts with the partisan organizations. They understood that their struggle against the occupiers, organizationally directed by the Party leadership, would be more successful. Here are some convincing examples. "In the Autumn of 1941 in the village of Sotnika, Korsnu'-Shevchenko raion, Cherkass oblast, Komsomol member Sviatenko was the organizer of an underground Komsomol group. He installed a radio in his quarters and listened to the programs of Sovin-

formbiuro and later related the truth about the Soviet Army to his fellow villagers. SocrSviatenko had succeeded in establishing contact with the underground party organization called 'Committee 103' (this was the underground raion committee of the Party).

"At the end of October 1941, in the city of Suma, an underground group of youth was created on the initiative of a student of the tenth class of the Suma school, Komsomol member D. Kosarenko. In 1942, this organization was in communication with the secretary of the Suma underground oblast committee of the party, Lykashov. The Komsomol organization carried on large scale agitational-propaganda work, strengthened contact with the youth of the city and, by the end of 1942, numbered twenty-six boys and girls in its composition.

"In January 1942, having heard by radio of the defeat of the German-fascist troops in the vicinity of Moscow, a member of the Komsomol and former student of the Kiev Institute, Malinovskii, together with his comrades, formed an underground group of young patriots in Kiev. The members of the underground set up a printing press and began to distribute leaflets. The first leaflets numbered forty copies and were time for the May Day of 1942. Malinovskii and his comrades did not know what to do further in order to organize underground work. The well-known underground Communist, E. M. Ivanov, heard of the existence of this group and established direct communication with it. Malinovskii's Komsomol group operated actively in the underground right up to the liberation of Kiev by the Soviet Army ..."³²

Communists and Komsomol members were cooperative organizers of the partisan movement. Characterizing the role of the Ukrainian Communists in the development of the partisan movement, N. S. Khrushchev told the XVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Ukraine: "The organizing, the shock forces of the partisan detachments were the communists."³³ This applies with equal force to other republics and oblasts. In the period of its occupation by the Hitlerite armies, nine underground oblast committees of the Communist Party, one hundred seventy-four underground raion and city committees, and one thousand two hundred ninety-seven primary party organizations operated in the territories of Belorussia.³⁴ V. I. Kozlov, a leader of the Minsk partisans, said: "The main reason for the assured success of the struggle with the enemy was that, from the very beginning, we succeeded in creating vigorous underground party organizations which, in the course of the struggle, grew into a vast aktiv, headed by a mass partisan movement."³⁵

In their works, bourgeois researchers have given much attention to the causes of the development of the partisan movement, to the decisiveness of the role which occupation policies had in the growth of the popular resistance to the invaders. The majority of bourgeois historians believe that the partisan movement could have been averted. Dixon and Heilbrunn write: "History could render its judgment in the following words-- 'By their actions, the Germans themselves made possible the development of the partisan movement on all the occupied territory of Soviet Russia'. "³⁶ Dixon and Heilbrunn are not alone in this assertion. Werner Pikht considers, that because of the unskillful leadership on the part of the Hitlerite command, "the population of the occupied oblasts was ready, in the beginning, to welcome the Germans as their liberators who turned out to be their enslavers. This led to the strengthening of the partisan movement."³⁷ This same point of view is also supported by

Lothar Rendulich. He writes: "The absolutely incorrect policy of oppressing the people finally undermined the trust of the people in the German army and the Germans and deprived Germany of the possibility of following any other policy. Thus, in conditions of such miserable disappointment among the local population, all the preconditions for the broadening of the scale of their struggle were created for the partisans."³⁸ Analogous opinions are shared by many other bourgeois authors. They all believe that the partisan movement arose because of Hitler's tactical miscalculations and because of errors committed by commanders of the occupation troops. According to an assertion of D. Karov, the partisan movement perhaps even arose with Hitler's permission and provided an important "advantage" to the fascist troops--under the pretext of the struggle against the partisans, they physically destroyed all persons who were objectionable to the Hitlerites.

Thus, bourgeois historians maintain that the main reasons for the development of the partisan movement were the unprecedented bestialities of the fascist invaders toward the civil population. Thus, "the application by the Germans of the methods of terror led to this result--partisan detachments 'grew like mushrooms'."³⁹ D. Karov writes: "It may safely be said that precisely these punitive methods of the Germans ... made possible the development of the partisan movement in a significantly larger manner more effectively than Soviet propaganda, than Stalin's order, or all the organized work of the Soviet underground groups which were charged with the special task of mobilizing the people for partisan warfare."⁴⁰

It is no doubt impossible to maintain that the bestial and cruel treatment of the population of the occupied territories by the Hitlerites and an ever increasing hatred of fascism did not promote the growth of the partisan movement. However, it would be incorrect to limit the causes of the popular partisan warfare only to these reasons. In his article, "On the Partisan Struggle," M. I. Kalinin wrote, "The marauding debauchery of the German-fascist army, its bestial cruelty toward the population of the occupied territories, cruelty, such that even a stone would cry out for vengeance, incited even the most peaceful persons into a selfless struggle against the Hitlerite bands.

"But the violence and cruelty inflicted by the German occupiers on the peaceful population were only additional factors in the growth of the partisan struggle. The basic sources, which so abundantly nourished the partisan movement, lie significantly deeper--they are in the hearts of the people themselves."⁴¹

The partisan movement in the years of the Great Fatherland War had a profoundly patriotic, liberational character. The Soviet people marched to the battle impelled by high ideological motives. In the years of Soviet rule, every Soviet citizen had become accustomed to take pride in his Socialist state, its laws, and its customs. The Soviet people were accustomed to a free, happy life without exploitation, without landlords, without capitalists. What did the Hitlerite army have to offer them?

The occupiers liquidated the Soviet state system of Belorussia. In the composition of the all-German province--the protectorate "Ostland"--the so-called Minsk-Baranovich okrug, which was created from Belorussian land, was included. Some of the oblasts of the Belorussian SSR were forcibly annexed to East Prussia and some returned to the Ukrainian nationalists. In connection

with this division, the Hitlerites even established a "state boundary." Populated points, in areas annexed to East Prussia, could be entered only with special permits. Finally, Belorussia was redesignated "Beloruthenia" and the Belorussians were redesignated "Beloruthenians."

Having occupied almost all the territory of the Ukraine by November 1941, the Hitlerites broke the Ukrainian Republic up in parts. The Lvov, Ternoppl', Stanislaw, and Drogozbych oblasts were annexed to Germany and received the title "District Galicia." A part of the oblasts under the title "Transistria" were transferred to Rumania. From the remaining territories, the "Reichkommisariat of the Ukrain" headed by Erich Koch, was formed. Special committees for the plundering of the occupied territories were created everywhere by the Hitlerites. With the help of these committees, one thousand one hundred ninety-two landowner farms were organized in the western oblast of Belorussia. In the Kiev oblast, they set up a "new order" by forming nineteen landowner estates and two thousand six hundred thirty-six kulak farms, and giving them five hundred forty-nine thousand hectares of land taken away from the collective farmers. Everywhere in the occupied territory, the fascists established "work camps," where an enormous portion of the population faced physical destruction or deportation to Germany. The Soviet man was reduced to a condition of slavery without rights and lost everything that he had received at the hands of the Soviet power. It was really impossible to tolerate such a situation, and broad masses of toilers in the occupied oblasts rose up in a popular partisan war.

It should be remarked, it is true, that some bourgeois authors in the ardor of falsification, have attempted to place the question of whether or not the partisan movement was actually a mass and a popular movement in doubt. Dixon and Heilbrunn believe that the partisan movement was not a mass movement, but only in the beginning period. D. Karov maintains that throughout the entire course of the war, in spite of the efforts of the leaders of the partisans, the partisan movement "could nowhere be considered to have been a mass movement, except perhaps in the central region of Russia."⁴² In D. Karov's opinion, the partisans were not even representative of the whole people. He asserts that, for this reason, the partisan was not and could not become a mass movement. D. Karov asserts that, among the population of the occupied oblasts, a schism developed and that the union of the working class and the peasantry was destroyed. Allegedly the majority of the rural population and a part of the workers, who recently came into industry from the villages, supported the Hitlerite invaders. Only the intelligentsia, some workers, and city dwellers rose up against the Hitlerites. D. Karov is trying to prove that such a situation with an "arrangement" of forces, continued for the entire period of the occupation.

In order to demonstrate the complete nonsense of such assertions, let us turn to Soviet sources which are from the testimony of the participants in the partisan movement themselves. Who made up the partisan detachments? As far back as November 1941, Leningrad partisans wrote; "We are simple Soviet persons. Among us are peasants, Soviet civil servants, railroad workers... We take vengeance for the Homeland."⁴³ The nucleus of the partisan detachment of N. F. Korolev, which operated in Belorussia, was the party and Soviet aktiv of the raion--two secretaries of the raion committee of the party, the chief of the raion section of the militia, and the chairman of the raion executive committee. Later replenishments came from the collective farms, the

intelligentsia, and workers of the railroad center.⁴⁴ In 1943, there were only twenty teachers in the partisan brigade of N. F. Korolev. The partisan detachments of K. Zaslonov, V. Liventsev and others grew up in the same way. Many brought with them whole families into the partisan detachments. A significant part of the partisans consisted of soldiers who had been encircled or who had escaped from enemy captivity, and persons sent from the Soviet rear for the development of the partisan movement. Among the partisans of Belorussia, for instance, this group made up thirteen percent of the total personnel.⁴⁵ Prior to joining the partisan detachments, many of them had been commanders and political workers of the Soviet army.

In the years of the Fatherland War against the fascist invaders, the partisan struggle was of incomparably wider scope than in any other past war. The number of participants in the partisan movement exceeded one million persons.⁴⁶ The experience of the Soviet partisan movement in the years of the Great Fatherland War corroborate the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist conclusion that contemporary wars are waged not only by armies but also by the people as a whole. The partisan movement had a mass character; indeed it could not have been otherwise, for it was an inseparable part of the people's war of the toilers of our socialist homeland against the fascist invaders, for the Soviet power, for socialism. The peoples' character of the partisan movement flowed from this peculiarity of the armed struggle of the Soviet people in the Fatherland War. The temporary occupation was not able to separate the toilers, who were located in the territories occupied by the enemy, from the general fraternal family of the Soviet people. The occupation could not subdue the activity of the people's masses in the armed struggle nor deprive them of their will for victory. It worked only a change in tactics, in the methods of the struggle against the enemy and caused a deprivation of the possibility of participating in regular troop units on the part of those toilers who were located in occupied territories--and gave rise to a peoples' partisan war. The Hitlerite clique was unable to cope with this movement of broad peoples' masses. In this is one of the most important causes of the defeat of fascist Germany and the collapse of Hitler's aggressive policies, for it is impossible to conquer a people who are engaged in a just, liberating struggle.

In connection with the foregoing, it is simply ridiculous to consider the argument that the partisan movement was not a truly popular movement, expressing the interests and aspirations of the people's masses. However, some of the bourgeois historians and, above all, D. Karov, write that the partisans felt alienated from their people, from their Homeland. Others claim, with less assurance, that the Soviet partisans were isolated from the outside world and maintained contact only through some intermediate link such as a "Group of supply." These groups provided the partisans with food stuffs, transportation, allegedly by plunder of the population, took part in the recruitment of new partisans, and played the role of "filter," "sediment collector" for them on the way to the partisan detachments. This sort of fiction scarcely requires refutation. The strength of the partisan movement consisted of the fact that they were united with the masses of the people. The partisans, therefore, had no reason to fight with the people, as the people gave them unlimited support. The commander of a partisan brigade, Hero of the Soviet Union N. F. Korolev, writes: "Every day in the forests they came to us, both individually and in families. There were the members of our underground groups; there were also warriors of the Red Army who had escaped from prison camps and ordinary collective farmers."⁴⁷

The Soviet partisans were closely associated not only with the population of the regions in which they operated. Located deep in the enemy rear, the partisans were always in constant contact with Moscow and with all the Soviet nation. By a resolution of the State Committee of Defense on May 30, 1942, the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement was formed under the Supreme Command. Ukrainian, Belorussian and a number of oblast staffs of the partisan movement were in it. Partisan staffs also operated in the territories occupied by the Hitlerites. The staffs played an enormous role in the development of the partisan movement and in the realization of its cooperation with the Soviet Army. All the ever-increasing help of the Soviet people to the partisan movement was realized through the staffs of the partisan movement. Partisan centers were constantly in touch with their staffs by means of radio, and systematically obtained through them modern types of arms, ammunition, medical supplies, and the exchange of wounded. The partisans closely followed events in the Soviet country and the situation at the front. Many of the partisans who had countrymen and friends in the operating army and on the other side of the front even received letters from them.

The heroic contempt of death, so amazing to the world, which was displayed in the name of the homeland by the Soviet people in the years of the Fatherland War, came from a hatred of fascism which had attempted, by threat of death, to compel our people to renounce its right to freedom and happiness. Ilia Bergasov related the following about his comrades, Crimean partisans: "The enemy was dashing all about the Crimea. In their powerlessness to destroy the partisan detachments or even to localize their activities, the fascists instituted a bloody terror..."

"The occupiers knew that we had difficulty in getting food-stuffs and that we had many wounded on hand..."

"The enemy could not understand the source of our strength, could not understand that we were not only Russians--we were Soviet persons."⁴⁸ Hero of the Soviet Union V. I. Liventsev, characterizing the high moral-political quality of the warriors of the partisan brigade under his command, remarks: "The medacious Hitlerian propaganda had no influence at all. Every partisan deeply believed in the rightness of his cause and voluntarily took up arms because he knew what he was fighting for."⁴⁹

This is why, both during the war against fascism and even today, the word "partisan" is uttered with such respect by the people. It is not at all accidental that M. I. Kalinin, speaking of the necessity of strengthening partisan blows against the Hitlerites, wrote during the years of the war: "For his own understanding, for the inculcation into his consciousness of the fact that the partisans are the noblest citizens of the country which has suffered the attack, it is necessary to fight such an enemy long and hard."⁵⁰ However, up to the present time, many bourgeois scholars do not understand the nobleness of the deeds of the Soviet partisans.

In bourgeois literature, there is much malicious fiction about the partisans. The activities of the Soviet partisans were so much feared by the Hitlerites that even today this fear continues to haunt not only those against whom the partisans fought but also the many researchers from the camp of bourgeois science. In the broad and muddy torrent of bourgeois literature on the history of the Second World War one encounters assertions that the

Soviet partisans were persons who had returned, in their intellectual development, to the stone age, that they possessed an unusual instinct which is lacking in cultured and civilized persons. Some bourgeois historians assert with a serious face that the Soviet partisans were recruited from the "dregs of society." How far is it possible to go with such idiocy? D. Karov even introduces "examples" from actions which allegedly took place in the Briansk and Belorussian areas where there supposedly existed partisan detachments made up wholly of criminals. About one of these "detachments" he writes: "There was a distinct rule in the detachment: only those who had been in prison for at least three years would be accepted, and those who could not produce their 'prison record' within three days were expelled." 51

Another vile falsification is the assertion that the Soviet partisans permitted unbridled brutalities. Not a single one of the authors has produced or can produce facts corroborating such assertions. But can wonder at such calanders if the bourgeois historians blame the brutal outrages committed by the fascist invaders against the Soviet civil population on the Communists and the Soviet authority? The Communists, supposed convinced that they were not able to rouse the people for partisan warfare, decided to provoke the German invaders to the employment of extreme brutality toward the population. Allegedly the Soviet power "by its actions ... wanted to motivate the German soldier to the most extreme brutality, which alone could kindle the flame of the partisan struggle in all the occupied territories of Soviet Russia." 52 An analogous notion is encountered in the writings of Professor K. G. Pfeffer. He writes that the partisans "saw one of their missions precisely in disrupting peaceful cooperation, provoking repression and thereby motivating hatred in the population." 53 It is not difficult to understand the aim which motivated this accusation. It is advanced for the moral justification of the monstrous brutalities of the fascist troops, for a weakening of the great political significance which the numerous facts and documents about the atrocities of the Hitlerites, which are unparalleled in history, have. A few separate examples will suffice here to show who are the truly guilty criminals. Ia. Zorokhovitch, in the book Smolenskaia oblast', cites data of the Extraordinary State Commission which established that in Smolensk and nearby districts, the German fascist monsters killed and tortured three hundred thirty-five thousand peaceful Soviet citizens and prisoners of war and that, within the old boundaries of Smolensk oblast, the number of victims of the German fascists exceed four hundred twenty-six thousand in all. 54 The figures on Belorussia are horrifying. "Having occupied Belorussia, the Germans began to carry out there massive pogroms, arrests and executions. Of ten million men who lived in the republic before the Great Fatherland War, the German-fascist occupiers exterminated and herded to Germany two and one-half million persons."

The occupiers of the Belorussian land inflicted terrible destruction and devastation. They burned and ransacked two hundred nine cities and workers' settlements, ten thousand industrial enterprises, two thousand two hundred villages, and destroyed every collective farm, MTS and state farm and over seven thousand schools. The losses which the Belorussian people suffered at the hands of the German fascists amounted to seventy-five million rubles. 55

In the years of the war, the German fascists and their allies had, on the territory of the Soviet Union, completely or partially destroyed and

burned one thousand seven hundred ten cities and settlements, more than seventy thousand villages and towns, and deprived approximately twenty-five million persons of their homes. The Hitlerites destroyed thirty-one thousand eight hundred fifty industrial enterprises and caused damage to the national economy of the USSR and to individual citizens amounting to six hundred seventy-nine billion rubles (at the 1941 value of rubles).⁵⁶ Bourgeois historians, compelled to acknowledge these facts, could find nothing better than to accuse Soviet partisans of "brutalities" and at the same time to show that the bestiality and violence of the Hitlerites were only retaliatory measures.

All the combat tasks of the Soviet partisans were decided in the closest cooperation with units of the Soviet Army. In this is one of the distinguishing features of the Soviet partisan movement. Very often, partisans and regular troop units carried out joint combat operations. Therefore it is impossible to acknowledge the validity of the statement voiced by K. Tippel'skirkh that "the Russians, in the fall of 1942, changed their tactics by shifting the partisan war deeper into the rear. In this way, they renounced the tactics of direct cooperation between the front and the partisans."⁵⁷

Still more baseless is the assertion, made by D. Karov, that "the activity of the partisans was not intensified with the approach of the Soviet army, but, on the contrary, tended to decrease, and when the front lines were some hundreds of kilometers from one or another occupied area, the partisans almost discontinued their activities."⁵⁸

In his book, *Vtoraya mirovaya voyna*, the Soviet author G. A. Deborin cites numerous facts which prove that the Soviet partisans, both in 1942 and in all the following years right up to the end of the Great Fatherland War, continued successfully to employ tactics of cooperation with regular troop units. "At the end of January, 1942, partisans of the Moscow oblast, during the time of a raid by a cavalry corps of General Belov in the direction of the city of Vias'ma, actively took part in the attack and storming of the city of Dorogobuzh. In the course of the entire period of the offensive of the Soviet army near Moscow, the partisan gave great help to the troops, inflicting blows on the enemy from the rear and obtaining intelligence data. Partisans acted in a similar active manner at the time of the battle of Stalingrad."⁵⁹ Offensive by Soviet troops at the front were coordinated with partisan attacks in the rear of the enemy, which were organized by the party and the Supreme Command. Partisans made concentrated attacks on the enemy's communications, inflicted enormous losses on his forces and supplies, and carried out numerous raids in the rear of the enemy. In August, 1943, during the summer offensive of the Soviet army, the partisans, in enormous strength, delivered a blow on the enemy's railroad communications. As a result, the movement of trains in the territory of Belorussia was reduced by forty percent. On the rail lines Kovel'-Rovno and Kovel'-Kholm, movement was reduced by seventy to eighty percent. In the summer and autumn of 1943, the partisans practically destroyed the possibility of the operational transfer of troops and at the same time gave important assistance to the offensive of the Soviet army on the Western, Bryansk, Central and Voronezh fronts. During the battle for the Dnepr in the autumn of 1943, partisan units captured a large bridgehead on the western bank of the Dnepr and prepared twenty-five crossings of the rivers Desna, Dnepr and Pripiat' for Soviet troops. In cooperating with troops during the liquidation of the blockade of Leningrad, partisans paralyzed the rail communications of the German troops, blowing up three hundred bridges and derailing one hundred thirty-three troop trains.

Bourgeois researchers obviously like neither the high combat quality of the Soviet partisans nor their patriotism in the struggle against the invaders. According to the assertions of bourgeois authors, Soviet partisans were capable only of fighting war in an underhanded fashion. Allegedly they attacked only a weak opponent and avoided open battles. What is more, Dixon and Heilbrunn believe that the war waged by the partisans was seasonal; in summer it increased and in winter it almost completely died out. Facts from the history of the Soviet partisan movement prove the complete falseness of these assertions. Partisan warfare had a strictly planned character. Its tactical methods were based on painstaking intelligence work, on a profound analysis of the immediate situation by partisan commanders. Partisan detachments worked out every operation meticulously and prepared carefully for them. If it was necessary, the partisans adroitly altered their tactics and waged open and stubborn battles with the opponent, battles which sometimes lasted for several days and in which the partisans were significantly outnumbered. Here are some examples from the history of the Leningrad partisan krai. Partisan detachments, operating on a sector of the North-Western front, from October to December, 1941, killed three thousand six hundred ten soldiers and officers, destroyed twenty-six supply depots, derailed forty-three military transports and blew up seventy-two bridges (seven of which were railroad bridges). On January 16, 1942, a large partisan unit had just completed a march of eighty kilometers in heavy frost and straightaway attacked the well-fortified German garrison located in the city of Kholm. The partisans waged an uninterrupted battle for six hours and seized control of the city. On February 5, 1942, this same unit destroyed the fascist garrison in the village of Iasaka, which numbered two hundred fifty soldiers and officers of the 20th battalion of "SS" troops. In May and June 1942, detachments of Leningrad partisans waged an almost month-long uninterrupted battle in fighting against punitive expeditions, killing more than two thousand Hitlerite soldiers and officers.⁶⁰

By their combat operations, Soviet partisan inflicted tremendous losses on the enemy. The Ukrainian partisans alone had to their credit four hundred sixty thousand soldiers and officers killed, five thousand locomotives destroyed and burned, and fifty thousand railroad cars and about fifteen thousand automobiles destroyed. In three years of war, Belorussian partisans killed and wounded around five hundred thousand Hitlerite soldiers and officers, including forty-seven generals, blew up more than eleven thousand enemy echelons, thirty-four armored trains, and destroyed three hundred five airplanes, one thousand three hundred fifty-five tanks and armored cars,⁶¹ eighteen thousand seven hundred motor vehicles and much other war materiel.

"Operations such as the operations of the Ukrainian partisans who smashed the Sarnsk railroad junction, and such as the glorious deeds of the Belorussian partisans who blew up large bridges over the Ptich' and Drissa rivers, completely destroyed the Slavnoe station, defeated the garrison and wiped out military objectives in the city of Slutsk, as the blowing up of large bridges--Navlinskii and Vygonicheskii--with the destruction of their garrison, accomplished by the Orel partisans, as the destruction of the garrison and station of Prigor'e and the echelon located in it, accomplished by the Smolensk partisans, as the utter destruction of the four garrisons on the island of Bol'shoi Kremenetskii by the Karelo-Finnish partisans, as the destruction of the Savinsk bridge and the defeat of the Sutokskii garrison by the Kalinin partisans, as the extermination of the corps staff in Ugodsk Zavod by the Moscow partisans, and as many other operations--all are written with golden letters on the pages of the history of the Fatherland War."⁶²

The Soviet partisans were a well-organized, numerous and combat esprited, genuine partisan army, which actively helped the regular troop units right up to the complete liberation of all Soviet land.

In this connection, the especially malicious fabrication by D. Karov on the concluding stages of the Soviet partisan movement cannot be ignored. According to his assertion, the Soviet partisan movement reached its greatest extent in 1943 and then began rapidly to fade because the Soviet partisans began to doubt the usefulness of their struggle. In that period, partisan detachments allegedly suffered the moral decay of partisans. The Soviet Command itself treated them with indifference on the grounds that no real results could be accomplished by the activities of the partisans on the front. It would be difficult to think up anything more absurd! However, D. Karov goes still further. Relying on "authentic data", he claims that those partisan detachments which were saved from decay fought on for a long time and, after the liberation of the territory by the Soviet army, continued to fight against the Soviet regime. According to the assertion of D. Karov, the Soviet power and the partisan movement were incompatible and the "real" partisans in the course of the entire war fought both against the Germans and against the Soviet power.

The question then arises: what is the aim of the bourgeois specialists in publishing such malicious fabrications about the Soviet partisans?

The falsification of the Soviet partisan movement is only a part of a dirty campaign launched at the present time by the bourgeois press on the question of the role which the Soviet Union played in the Second World War. Many of the books of the bourgeois historians display lamentations on the "mistakes" of Hitler, complaints on the unfavorable climate in Russia, and so on. However, in these works there is no recognition that the source of the defeat of fascist Germany, first of all, lies in the superiority of the Soviet social and state system, in the high level of the military art, in the vivifying Soviet patriotism, and in the moral excellence of the people of the USSR who fought for their rights. The falsifiers want to inspire the notion that it does not follow that it is necessary to fear Soviet economy and military might in a possible future war. The scarlet thread in the works of the bourgeois researchers is adherence to a notion that, but for a miscalculation, the war could have taken another turn, and the partisan movement would not have reached such a scale, and the defeat of fascist Germany might have been avoided.

In their interpretation of the history of the Second World War, the reactionary bourgeois historians make their goal the concealing of the ideological defeat of imperialism. They are striving to deprive the Soviet partisan movement of political motives, to disparage its high patriotic, truly popular, genuinely liberational and heroic character. In every way possible, they evade and belittle the question of the fact that the inflexible striving of the Soviet people, including the Soviet partisans, to defeat fascism was an important factor in the securing of the victory over the Hitlerian army. The bourgeois falsifiers do not at all want to agree with this. According to the assertions of the bourgeois historians, fascist Germany was unable to break the partisan movement and suffered defeat in the war against the Soviet Union only through the fault of Hitler. Dixon and Heilbrunn write: "How did it happen that someone finally stopped Hitler? This is explained by two causes:

In the first place, Hitler's incredible miscalculation in carrying his 'ideological' war against Russia and, in the second place, the effectiveness of Russian espionage."⁶³

Such statements can be evaluated only as one of the attempts to rehabilitate the generals of the former Hitlerite war machine, which is being revived by the revanchists in West Germany at the present time. Taking into consideration the requirements of the political situation, Dixon and Heilbrunn, along with other bourgeois historians, are not only trying to explain the defeat of the fascists in the past war by accidental circumstances, but also are trying to substantiate at the same time the "necessity" of preparations for a new war, including partisan preparations.

What, then, is the main interest of bourgeois historians in the history of the Soviet partisan movement in the years of the Fatherland War? They fear that in case of the unleashing of a new world war, the aggressors will suffer the fate of fascist Germany and the partisan movement will occupy one of the decisive places in this struggle. Dixon and Heilbrunn openly state that, "If we do not prepare ourselves psychologically and organizationally for the struggle against partisans, we may commit in the future the same error for which the Germans paid so dearly ...

"Our army now needs combat regulations on the struggle with partisans."⁶⁴

In the introduction to the book, Communist Partisan Warfare, it is said that "the authors have, in their book, devoted attention, timely attention, to the necessity for free nations to develop plans for the struggle against partisans, with whom they will clash in any future war."⁶⁵ This is the main reason why the bourgeois historians and military specialists allot such great attention to the analyzing of questions of the Soviet partisan movement in the years of the Fatherland war. Of basic interest for them is study of the tactics, forms and methods of the struggle of the Hitlerite army against the Soviet partisans. Imperialistic circles of the Western powers think that their armies must adopt, in the struggle against partisans, the tactics of the Hitlerite army, introducing a few corrections into them. This is why the bourgeois researchers justify many of the measures taken by the Hitlerites in the struggle against the Soviet partisans. It is just for this reason that bourgeois historians are trying to prove that the Soviet partisan movement was illegal in its organization, in its methods of waging war and in its tactics. The former Lieutenant General of the Hitlerite army, Lothar Rendulich, writes: "... partisans did not observe a single paragraph of the provisions of international law on the waging of legal war. Therefore the partisans were placed outside the law."⁶⁶ The well-known war criminal of the Hitlerite army, Lieutenant General H. Guderian supports a similar position in his memoirs, and wishes to call the Soviet partisans nothing other than bandits. Other bourgeois researchers look at them in a similar fashion. Dixon and Heilbrunn write that "The legal status of partisans is not completely clear and indisputable ..."⁶⁷ Therefore, the Soviet partisans supposedly were not covered by the rules of the Hague Convention on the rules and usages of land warfare, so the Soviet partisans who fell into captivity did not have a juridical basis to demand any kind of humane treatment for themselves; they could be shot like bandits. The impudence with which such assertions are held is indeed boundless. It turns out that the fascist invaders, who have already been branded before the whole world at the Nurnberg trials as blood-thirsty butchers, had acted within the limits of the law, but that a

people which rose in a liberational struggle against enslavement committed the lawlessness. Aren't these good examples of bourgeois "objectivity" in the interpretation of history!

"The partisan struggle in which all the nationalities of the USSR participated," writes M. I. Kalinin in January, 1945, "clearly demonstrated to the outside world the popularity of the Soviet power, the popular love of it, the firm decisiveness to fight for its preservation and for the independence of the Soviet country. There could be no more convincing demonstration of the moral-political unity of the peoples of the Soviet Union!"⁶⁸ Hence, Soviet patriots such as Zoia Kosmodem'ianskiak, Lisa Chaikina, Mikhail Sil'nitskii, the brothers Ignatov, the young Guardsmen of the Krasnodon and many others have become symbols of loyalty to our socialist homeland. The Soviet partisans proved to be highly idealistic, devoted to the Communist Party and courageous and fearless patriots. The Soviet partisan movement has been one of the most important factors which assured the victory over the enemy in the years of the Fatherland War, and no fabrications of the bourgeois falsifiers of history are able to alter this.

Footnotes

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- ²Ch. O. Dikson and O. Geil'brunn, Kommunisticheskie partizanskije deistviia, Moscow, 1957, p. 23.
- ³Ibid., p. 89.
- ⁴See Dzh. F. S. Fuller, Vtoraia mirovaia voina, 1939-1945 gg., p. 164.
- ⁵D. Karov, Partizanskoe dvizhenie v SSSR v 1941-1945 gg., Munich, 1954, p. 70.
- ⁶Ibid., p. 24.
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- ⁸A. Fedorov, Podpol'nyi obkom deistvuet, Book 1, Voenizdat, 1948, pp. 12, 16.
- ⁹Partizanskije byli, Voenizdat, 1958, p. 239.
- ¹⁰Ibid., p. 112.
- ¹¹Dikson and Geil'brunn, op. cit., p. 29.
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- ¹³K. Toppel'skikh, Istoriia vtoroi mirovoi voiny, p. 242.
- ¹⁴See Trud, August 6, 1942.
- ¹⁵See P. P. Lipilo, KPB--organizator i rukovoditel' partizanskogo dvizheniia v Belorussii v godi Velikoi otechestvennoi voiny, Minsk, 1959, p. 70.
- ¹⁶D. Karov, op. cit., pp. 29, 58.
- ¹⁷See B. Volin, Vsenarodnaia partizanskaia voina, Gospolitizdat, 1942, pp. 43-44.
- ¹⁸See P. Tron'ko, Bessmertie iunykh, Izd. "Molodaia gvardiia," 1958, p. 30.
- ¹⁹Dixon and Heil'brunn, op. cit., p. 148.
- ²⁰Ibid., p. 174.
- ²¹Partarkhiv TsK KP Belorussii, f. 4, op. 33/a, sv. 47, d. 357.
- ²²Ibid., d. 358.

- ²³Ibid., d. 940.
- ²⁴D. Karov, op. cit., pp. 41-42.
- ²⁵Kommunist Belorussii, No. 8, 1958, pp. 65-66.
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- ²⁷Tron'ko, op. cit., p. 44.
- ²⁸P. I. Kurbatova, Smolenskaia partiinaia organizatsiia v gody Velikoi Otchestvennoi voiny, Izd. 1958, p. 46.
- ²⁹See XVI s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii (bol'shevikov) Ukrainy, 25-28 ianvaria 1949 goda. Materialy s"ezda, Gospolitizdat UkSSR, 1949, p. 12.
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- ³²Tron'ko, op. cit., pp. 52-53.
- ³³XVI s"ezd ..., op. cit., pp. 13-14.
- ³⁴See Sovetskaia Belorussiia, February 16, 1949.
- ³⁵Partiinoe stroitel'stvo, No. 11-12, 1944, p. 24.
- ³⁶Dikson and Geil'brunn, op. cit., p. 232.
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- ⁶³Dikson and Geil'brunn, op. cit., p. 246.
- ⁶⁴Ibid., pp. 152, 175.
- ⁶⁵Ibid., p. 24.
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In 1936, a year before the Lukowchiao "incident" precipitated the Sino-Japanese War, Mao Tse-tung, political chief of the Chinese communists, outlined to Edgar Snow the Red strategy in a war with Japan. China's defense, he said, should be a war of maneuver over an extended and indefinite front rather than the tactics of massed trenches and heavy fortifications. The defense should avoid being pounded to pieces by overwhelming Japanese ordnance in a campaign of positions; China must concentrate on guerrilla tactics gradually wearing down Japan economically and morally. The program could only succeed by organizing and arming the peasants to carry on the attrition campaign while regular armies were equipped and trained for an eventual counter-offensive.

Loss of cities and rail facilities, he declared, would not cripple China's decentralized, semi-agrarian economy, for China could exist without her few industrial and financial centers. On the other hand, these areas would be of little use to an invader as long as the population was hostile and non-cooperative. Unable to exploit its gains, an economically weak Japan would be drawn into a prolonged and exhaustive struggle, expensive in men, money, and morale. Eventually, Nippon would crack; then China would strike.

Ignored by the Central Government for nearly two years, this plan has finally been applied to the "second phase" of China's defense. The Red tactics are thus doubly significant, for not only have they been successful within their limits but they are an outstanding example of what a determined and experienced force can do with only half-hearted government support if backed whole-heartedly by the people.

The sole object of the North China campaign since the fall of Taiyuan has been to prolong the war and prevent Japan from cashing in on her conquest. The Reds admit that guerrilla warfare cannot itself be decisive. Final victory must rest with a successful counter blow by regular Chinese armies, if and when they become strong enough--or Japan is sufficiently weakened--for a finish fight. Lacking heavy weapons necessary to break the Japanese grip on communications, the guerrillas can and do restrict control to narrow zones, nullifying that control by organizing the people for self defense and economic non-cooperation. The idea is to bleed Japan by a slow but steady expenditure of men and treasure.

It is too early to judge the effectiveness of the Red strategy. Mao Tse-tung was wrong on at least one important point--third party intervention--while the European war is likely to upset other calculations. Furthermore, the system has only been belatedly applied to all China. Regardless of success in the north--and definite information is virtually impossible to obtain--the communist effort will be futile unless the program is effective everywhere.

The tactical method underlying this strategy is more than the semi-banditry traditionally associated with guerrillas. It is a definite system, developed through years of study and battle experience. The communists call it

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"maneuvering warfare, based on the principle of the short, decisive attack." In application it appears to be combination of Napoleon's favorite trick of dividing his enemies, the Spanish tactics that broke the Emperor in the Peninsula, and the inventiveness of Lawrence of Arabia. Its most vital element is mass mobilization of the people to assist the regular army.

The Reds reduce their system to four simple principles. "When the enemy attacks, we withdraw. When he halts, we harass. When he is exhausted, we attack. When he retreats, we pursue." Successful application of the formula demands the closest cooperation between the army and the people, who must be aroused to resist the invaders and organized to do it.

Peng Teh-huai, Red army chief of staff, explained to Anna Louise Strong that while the army used guerilla methods, it was a regular professional army and not a guerrilla force. The distinction is important. As Chu Teh described it, the Reds merely adapted tactics to conditions. Lacking the heavy armament of the Japanese, they utilized the terrain, maneuvering to obtain maximum benefit from their lighter weapons while neutralizing Japan's technical superiority.

By avoiding positional battles, the Eighth Route Army never permits the enemy to wield effectively his artillery, tanks, and air force. Prolonged and indecisive skirmishing with a tricky and elusive enemy exhausts the invader, weakens his nerves, and creates favorable openings for surprise attacks. Such tactics fritter away the enemy's resources and force him to send out numerous detachments in search of his tormentors. Repeated detachment scatters his strength and halts offensive operations: the more widespread the guerrilla campaign the greater the dispersion. When an army ceases to advance and allows its elements to spread out, it loses the initiative and is soon on the defensive.

Strong concentrations are broken up by a combination of positional defense and raids upon supp' lines and the flanks of marching columns. Small garrisons hold strategic points while the mass of the defending force harasses the advance, seeking favorable opportunities to strike. As Chu Teh has pointed out, a large army, thrown into disorder, requires time to untangle itself. An alert defense, concentrating its mobile power at the time and point of greatest confusion, may win a decisive victory.

While the Reds avoid positional warfare whenever possible, they do hold important and defendable points. They do not employ an orthodox linear defense, however, preferring to garrison only strategic points as bait to lure the attackers into a dispersion of effort, leaving the intervening areas open for maneuvering troops. Mobile units, by incessant attacks on rear establishments, draw additional troops from combat missions, further decreasing enemy striking power.

A divided enemy is attacked in detail; if concentrated, his supply lines and flanks are constantly harassed, foraging parties ambushed, and the main body subjected to repeated alarms and feints. Sooner or later he will be tormented into sending punitive columns in pursuit of tempting bait. Once out of contact with the main force, these detachments are overpowered and wiped out. Reinforcements to harried garrisons are intercepted, dispersed, or compelled to retreat. Without help, isolated positions become untenable except when strongly garrisoned. A stationary enemy may be plagued so continuously that he gets no rest.

Eighth Route Army units fight little of the guerrilla campaign; the brunt is borne by partisan bands of native villagers and farmers, armed and trained by the regular troops. Trained regulars are too valuable to be expended on minor missions. They are held in reserve, ready to strike whenever the depredations of their peasant auxiliaries place the enemy at a disadvantage. At the same time, there is no let-up in the harassing campaign.

Individual battles are fought upon the principle of the "short attack" developed by youthful but brilliant Lin Piao, whose army perfected it to a virtually unbeatable system. The short attack is a sharp, decisive blow, delivered with complete surprise at a single point, quickly launched and as quickly ended. The assault, characterized by speed and deception, catches the enemy off guard and destroys him before his superior weapons can be brought into play. The damage is done and the attackers have vanished before the arrival of reinforcements--if the latter ever come. Part of the strategy of the short attack is isolation of its victims before the blow is struck.

Carefully planned to the last detail and based upon most precise information, the short attack is never launched unless odds overwhelmingly favor success. Fighting under serious disadvantages as they often do, partisans cannot afford to lose. If not at once successful, the assault is promptly broken off before the attackers become too heavily involved. Since no reserves are held out, a prolonged fight would be disastrous.

Since well trained men are hard to replace, the Reds calculate all objectives in terms of probable casualties. If expected losses appear greater than the price they are willing to pay, the attack is not made. An attack in which losses exceed ten percent of those inflicted on the enemy is not considered a success.

The short attack demands a high degree of training, courage, and initiative. Every member of an attacking party must thoroughly understand its mission and plan and must be prepared to act on his own initiative in emergencies. It must be mobile, equipped lightly but well, trained to act independently, and capable of prompt decisions. Excellent leadership and an aggressive spirit--infantry ideals by any standard--are essential, as well as disciplined teamwork.

The tactical plan employed varies with conditions. Chu Teh once remarked that victory does not depend upon any particular type of tactics but upon the application of those best fitted to the situation. Nothing, he added, was worse than the mechanical application of stereotyped methods--his severest criticism of the Japanese. Medieval treatises of Sun the Master, China's greatest military strategist, and T. E. Lawrence's Seven Pillars of Wisdom are drawn upon equally for inspiration.

The communist pattern of resistance can succeed only if the army and the people work in closest harmony. The widely dispersed Eighth Route Army is utterly dependent upon the friendship of the population for protection. Promotion of that friendship and of a spirit of active resistance to Japan is a task at which the Reds are particularly adept.

Among an illiterate and downtrodden people who have learned through bitter generations that soldiers mean oppression, the first step is to allay suspicion and establish confidence, a delicate mission requiring splendid initiative and

understanding by the military. Only a deep sense of voluntary discipline can inculcate these qualities in large bodies of men. The disciplinary standard upon which the Eighth Route Army has so often staked its existence is perhaps the most striking characteristic of this remarkable force.

Credo of a Peasant Soldier

Despite subordination to the national effort the Eighth Route Army is still the Red Army, communist controlled and inspired. Its loyalty to the united front is unquestioned, but it remains essentially a revolutionary army--and that is why Chiang Kai-shek fears it. Moreover, it is a well trained, professional army with high standards, a brilliant record, and perhaps the best leadership in Asia.

Like all revolutionary bodies, the Eighth Route Army possesses a political-social philosophy, upon which its leaders have built a system of military discipline which, despite violations of hallowed tenets, appears singularly effective.

Red army leaders do not believe in unquestioning obedience to orders solely because disobedience merits punishment. On the theory that a man will not obey blindly what he does not sincerely believe to be right, they insist that true discipline comes only from unity of mind. Soldiers are instilled with the idea that only through willing and complete cooperation can the army achieve victory--therefore, obedience to superiors is not only a military necessity but morally proper. Development of this spirit is achieved through "political training."

Obedience knows no compulsion except that of public opinion. Political training, which has been perfected to a high degree of emotional salesmanship, has created a spirit of group solidarity that demands adherence from all members. An intense propaganda campaign against Japan, which might not work among more enlightened recruits, accomplishes wonders with the young and impressionable Chinese peasants who flock to the Red army.

Two factors probably contribute vitally to the success of this teaching. One is high morale among troops whose lot is unquestionably better than anything most of them have ever known before; the other is pride engendered in a hitherto oppressed individual who is treated like a free man instead of a serf. Every man enjoys the opportunity for advancement on ability, his opinions are encouraged and respected, and he is not subjected to the usual overbearing bureaucracy of Chinese militarism.

In contrast to the ornate plumage of the traditional Chinese officer, insignia of rank is conspicuously absent in the Eighth Route Army. Troop leaders not only wear the same uniform as their men, but they enjoy no titles or insignia of their office. The only ranks recognized in the army are those of "Fighter" and "Leader." Every soldier is a "Fighter", while those Fighters who exercise command, be it a squad or division, are called "Leaders." The idol of the army, old Chu Teh, is further dignified by the rank of "Commander." Absence of insignia is explained by the statement that Leaders are so well known that badges are unnecessary.

Equality is further maintained by common sharing of food and living quarters. Except in unusual cases, where the nature of a leader's duties

requires separate lodging, officers are billeted with their men. While certain forms of military courtesy are rigidly observed during duty hours, officers and men fraternize freely when off duty.

Discipline is simplified by the lack of voluminous regulations, articles of war, and court-martial routine. Regulations are condensed into eleven brief articles, easy to remember and understand. Instead of an exhaustive code of military offenses and punishments, public reprimand and the ostracism of their comrades are employed to straighten out offenders. Extreme cases sometimes result in expulsion from the army.

Another factor favorable to high morale and discipline is the practice of explaining impending operations to the men before they are carried out. Prior to combat, the contemplated action is carefully outlined and each unit's part pointed out. The day before the victory of Pinghsing Pass, for example, Lin Piao himself gave his division a detailed analysis of the scheme of battle. Military secrecy sometimes necessitates concealment of details, but in general every man knows the plan of action and his part in it.

Responsibility for political and general education is centered in the army political department, which shares equal authority with the military staff. The resulting dual command, while similar in form to the Russian commissar system, is more successful since the two departments exist to supplement rather than check upon each other.

Every unit, down to and including the company, has a political officer, of equal rank and authority with the fighting leader. This official directs educational activities and organizes work among civilians whenever, as frequently happens, the unit is on detached service. Although all military orders must be approved by him, his plans must likewise have the approval of the military commander. The "commissar" must keep abreast of military developments just as the commander must be familiar with the "political" status of his command. Once a course of action has been decided, both leaders are expected to render full assistance to each other.

The system calls for mutual understanding and close cooperation. Actually, the adjustment is easier than it seems. Since most of the political officers were originally soldiers, many of them with established combat reputations, they are sympathetic to the problems of the military leader. Moreover, all commissars accompany their units into battle, sharing danger with the fighting commander and thereby strengthening their own influence.

The organization of the political department parallels that of a military staff, with separate sections for regularly defined functions. Divisions of the political staff are five in number--the sections for Education, Organization, Peoples' Movements, Work Against Traitors, and Enemy Service.

The Education branch directs compulsory education and the training of leaders. Primary step in the instruction of recruits, virtually all of whom are totally illiterate, is to teach them to read and write. Later they are given lecture courses in history, war against Japan, and political theory--elementary and propagandist but adequate to keep the men alert to developments. The section also organizes clubs and volunteer educational activities. The favorite technique is the mass meeting, where speeches, group singing, and dramatics play important roles.

Mission of the Organization section is to assist in the promotion of army personnel and in the selection of leaders for work among civilians. Unit political officers are constantly on the lookout for likely candidates for special training and advancement. Military promotions are always made by the next higher military commander, but only after consultation with this section.

"Our army is among the people like a fish in the sea," is a favorite description of the mission and movements of the Eighth Route Army, whose partisan strategy demands the closest civil-military collaboration. Civilian relations are handled by the vitally important section on Peoples' Movement, whose tasks are to arouse the countryside against the invader, to organize it politically and militarily, and to establish confidence and cooperation by improving the living conditions of the people.

The efficiency of the section for Work Against Traitors is responsible for an almost airtight counter-espionage service. Widely dispersed in small groups over a great expanse of territory, the army is extremely vulnerable to the actions of spies and traitors; consequently, it is vitally concerned with blocking all channels of information. The counter-espionage section, using every weapon from moral persuasion to the firing squad, has effectively stamped out the menace of spies. In contrast to the excellent intelligence service of the communists, the Japanese are prevented from getting reliable information of guerrilla movements.

Of questionable value is the work of the Enemy Service group, which disseminates propaganda among Japanese troops. Thousands of handbills have been scattered in enemy garrison towns, while prisoners are subjected to an intense barrage of propaganda. Optimistic Chinese claims do not appear justified by results to date, although the treatment of captives has resulted in some conversions. This success is nullified, however, because the Japanese do not allow restored prisoners to rejoin their units.

Birth of a Nation

The first political workers to penetrate the northern provinces after the collapse of the Shansi front found government non-existent and large areas ravaged by roving bands of Chinese deserters. Most provincial officials and wealthy landowners had fled, leaving territory not actually occupied by the Japanese without administration. The first task of the Red organizers was to allay panic and rouse the peasants to a fighting pitch.

Upon arrival in a hsien town, or county seat, workers contacted local patriotic societies, using them as nuclei for an emergency government. Mobilization committees, wielding supreme power under a form of martial law, organized the countries for self defense and the reestablishment of civil authority. Guards posted on all roads controlled travel in the area, while bandit gangs were run to ground. Red counter-espionage methods were instituted to check the activities of Japanese agents.

Regular government was gradually reinstated in each county. Where located, former officials were returned to office; otherwise, prominent citizens were maneuvered into positions of authority. Time and conditions permitting, local and county elections were held. By the first of the year, many counties had been restored to order and guerrilla training begun.

Since these scattered administrations lacked central authority, the communists asked Hankow to authorize a provisional government embracing the reorganized zones of central Hopei, northern Shansi, and southern Chahar. With Chiang Kai-shek's consent, a conference was called in January, 1938, to establish the Hopei-Shansi-Chahar Border Government, an emergency regime subordinate to Hankow.

The conference met in the mountain city of Fuping, near the junction of the three provinces. Delegates came from hsien governments; partisan troops in the area; associations of workers, farmers, and women; patriotic societies; and even from the monks of the Wutaishan monasteries. A plan of government was adopted and a series of regulations approved. When Hankow's governor arrived in April, the machinery was ready to function. The new regime, divided into five districts, originally embraced twenty-seven counties. A similar administration was shortly inaugurated in southern Hopei and Shansi under the direction of the 120th Division.

The mission of these governments was to maintain a strong, non-cooperative front against the Japanese by improving the living conditions of the people and by creating an armed partisan force under the supervision and control of the Eighth Route Army. They collected taxes; helped refugees; developed schools, communications, postal services, banks; and conducted cooperative markets. Crop control, replacing cotton acreage with food staples, achieved considerable economic self-sufficiency. Centralized marketing of farm products prevented food from reaching the Japanese while assuring the importation of other essentials.

Press dispatches to the United States during the summer of 1938 described widespread agricultural development in an exceptionally well policed area, where schools, shops, and law courts were functioning as never before. Economic conditions were improved by a general reduction of rents, a debt moratorium, and a redistribution of taxes. Property of absentee land-lords was "borrowed" and divided among poor farmers and refugees.

Almost everybody was a member of some sort of society. A women's association with chapters in 8,000 villages claimed a membership of six million women, whose activities, directed by a 22-year old Chinese co-ed, included shoemaking, bandage rolling, nursing, sentry duty, and even sabotage along Japanese telephone lines. "Little Vanguard" battalions taught the young idea to spy and developed a tremendously successful intelligence service. Red Army instructors taught Young Men's Salvation Association chapters the rudiments of partisan leadership. Nearly every grown and able-bodied male was enrolled in the partisans--either in a mobile unit or the village home guards.

The present status of this movement is unknown, but from the reports of Associated Press correspondent Haldore Hansen, who visited the central Hopei district last year, a picture may be drawn that is probably representative. In March, 1938, Hansen wrote that seventeen county governments were functioning in the district, ruling seven million people, of whom fully one million were actually engaged in governmental or military service.

Among operating agencies he listed ten radio stations, postal service for 3,000 towns and villages, and 600 telephone switchboards in a 3,000 mile wire net. Seventeen daily newspapers and a monthly magazine were being published.

Fourteen hospitals with a total bed capacity of six hundred were operating with skeleton staffs and meager equipment. A uniform factory produced 1,100 guerrilla uniforms a day. Rigid anti-spy precautions had been everywhere applied to cloak the training and movements of a large partisan army.

Eleven village arsenals (later reports increased the number to thirty) were making and repairing rifles, trench mortars, ammunition, black powder, hand grenades, land mines, bayonets, and swords. Each arsenal could turn out about two hundred grenades a day. A crude tommy gun was manufactured for issue to home guards. The most serious deficiency was inability to produce good dynamite and acids.

Communications were poor. Most of the roads had been plowed under to impede Japanese troop movements and increase crop acreage, resulting in restriction of Chinese vehicular traffic as well. The few captured motor cars in use were reduced to speeds of about ten miles an hour by wretched roads and limited in range by fuel shortage. The telephone system, often extending to within easy walking distance of Japanese garrisons, was fairly complete, while radio communication with Hankow was maintained through a mobile Shansi relay station.

Throughout this activity, Red advisors and organizers directed a powerful current of anti-Japanese propaganda. Patriotic mass meetings, traveling dramatic troupes, wall newspapers, and schools dinned the inevitability of victory if the people continued to fight. All observers agreed that efficient administration plus vigorous propaganda had actually given the national government greater authority in North China than it had enjoyed before the war.

The invaders precipitated a bitter under-cover struggle by attempting to undermine the new regime. Pro-Nipponese societies were organized and their Chinese members hired to spy upon the peasant governments, spread defeatist propaganda, and to sabotage wherever possible. The Red counter-espionage service apparently neutralized the effort, either terrorizing or executing the traitors, many of whom used their positions as Japanese agents to help their countrymen.

A widespread guerrilla campaign kept pace with the development of civil government. In addition to its regular units, the Eighth Route Army mobilized and trained hundreds of thousands of partisan fighters from the farms, villages, and even the occupied cities. The Reds themselves did not know the exact strength of these guerrillas, but estimates varied from 250,000 to 1,500,000 armed men. Seven hundred thousand was the generally accepted figure, exclusive of the Eighth Army, whose strength was said to have been raised to 120,000.

Partisan irregulars were organized into two general classes, according to their duties and radius of operations. Full time volunteer bands, acting under orders from the Red army, were called mobile units, while the part-time home guards who remained in their own villages and were called out only in emergencies, were known as self defense corps. The mobile units, mustering about twenty-five percent of the total guerrilla strength, did most of the fighting.

The village "minute men" were given an hour's military training a day and, unless an emergency arose, carried on normal peacetime pursuits. They frequently assembled at night to raid nearby communications, bush-whack sentries, steal

telephone wire and railroad rails, and chop up telephone poles. Their depredations were reported to have caused tremendous replacement expense to the invaders. Routine work included sentry duty at the approaches to their villages, observation to warn of the proximity of Japanese columns, and details as supply and litter carriers.

With the assistance of the volunteers, the Reds organized a highly efficient shuttle service for the transportation of wounded. Injured guerrillas were frequently transported a fortnight's journey to hospitals, being treated and passed on from one village to another. Care of wounded, in marked contrast to their neglect by regular Chinese armies, was another factor in creating good will for the communists.

Equipment was very sketchy. A few home guardsmen flourished rusty carbines of old flintlocks and some possessed modern rifles, but most of them carried homemade swords, ancient pikes, and even clubs. They were, however, generously supplied with crude hand grenades. Occasionally a poorly built sub-machine gun was found, usually without ammunition. A few companies, more enterprising than the rest, were uniformed; most of them were not.

The mobile units, on the other hand, are reported to be well trained, ably led, and fairly well equipped with captured arms. All of them are uniformed, wearing green in summer and brown in winter. Officers are graduates of special schools, where they take a three-month course in guerrilla tactics and the technique of mass mobilization. Many partisan organizations have excellent combat records and are not far short of the professional standards of the Eighth Route Army. They form a large and trained reserve for the regular Red forces, into whose ranks thousands are eager to be admitted.

Mobile bands are generally organized into regiments of 1,500 men, divided into three battalions. The latter consist of headquarters personnel and three 150-man companies. Company organization includes a headquarters and three platoons, the latter subdivided into three sections of fourteen men each. There are no heavy machine gun companies, but every rifle section has at least one sub-machine gun. Each rifle company also includes several light machine guns, probably grouped into a separate section.

The guerrillas have no artillery service and little use for what guns they have captured, since nobody knows how to handle them. Principal supporting weapon is a trench mortar, fairly proficient up to 1,500 yards. Originally armed with rifles and mortars salvaged in the wake of the great retreat, the irregulars are now well stocked with Japanese weapons. Few carry bayonets but nearly all pack a heavy, two handed sword, their favorite weapon for hand-to-hand fighting. All specialize in hand grenades.

Regiments and battalions originally operated independently, with only nominal control from Eighth Route Army headquarters, but early in 1938 they were consolidated by the Fuping government into a "People's Self Defense Army." Organizational details are obscure, but they appear to include an army staff and at least sixteen subordinate armies, coordinated by radio from Eighth Army headquarters. The staff is composed of native officers, Manchurian veterans who have spent years fighting the Japanese conquest of Manchukuo, and Red army advisors.

The exact zones of operation are unknown, but partisans are known to be active in all provinces north of the Yellow River, in Outer Mongolia, Jehol, and even in northern Manchuria, where communist organizers have contacted the guerrillas still resisting Japan. Nipponese authorities admit the presence of strong partisan forces north of Harbin and Tsitsihar, between the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the Amur River.

Little information of importance has come out of North China in many months. Based on his observations of early progress, Haldore Hansen concluded that another year of comparative peace behind Japan's lines would enable the Red leaders to build a partisan army greater in numbers than the total Japanese strength in China. If the organization were completed before the invaders were ready to mop up the guerrillas, he felt that the latter would become too powerful ever to be wiped out. That breathing space has been vouchsafed. The end of the present rainy season may mark the beginning of a bitter phase of the partisan defense.

Lt. Col. Luis A. Villa-Real, Philippine Army

Liberation from the Japanese and the establishment of the Republic were glorious events that made the year 1946 one of bright promise for Filipinos. While some of that promise has been realized in the eight years that have passed, it was long delayed and obstructed by an armed Communist conspiracy that terrorized and divided the people, and threatened the stability of the young republic.

Early in the Japanese occupation the Socialists and Communists formed a coalition to lead guerrilla resistance against the invader. Jap-sniping became a patriotic duty and almost every Filipino was or wanted to be a guerrilla. A rifle and ammunition were treasures hidden carefully until an opportunity arose to use them against the Japanese.

Led by Luis Taruc the Communists soon wrested the coalition leadership from the Socialists, following which they sought to gain control of all anti-Japanese guerrilla groups. By the middle of 1943 the Hukbalahaps (People's Army Fighting the Japanese), or Huks as they called themselves, actually were fighting openly against guerrilla groups not under Communist control. This internal warfare seriously weakened the overall guerrilla effort against the Japanese on Luzon.

After the liberation the Communists began to exploit post war poverty and economic troubles, especially in the farming areas. For purposes of agitation and propaganda, the Communists pointed up the serious shortages of seed, draft animals, and farm implements.

Before long the Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan (People's Liberation Army), or the HMBs, as they now renamed their military organization, were making increasing use of terroristic activities to undermine the people's confidence in the strength and stability of their new government.

By 1951 about 10,000 well armed guerrillas, supported and led by well organized local Communists, had concentrated mostly in an area north and east of Manila. When local police and constabulary could cope no longer with the expanding guerrilla movement the Philippine Army was called in.

Each of the battalion combat teams (BCTs) formed for the anti-guerrilla operations had a full T/O strength of 1,047 officers and enlisted men. Normally these BCTs operated at about 70 per cent of that strength. The BCTs were organized into a headquarters and headquarters company, a service company, a reconnaissance company, three rifle companies, a heavy weapons company, and a field artillery battery, the members of which could be used also as riflemen. Also included were an intelligence section, a psychological warfare section, and a medical and dental detachment.

Attached to the BCTs, under the operational control of the S2, were military intelligence service teams, each composed of one officer and seven to twelve enlisted men. These teams, with order of battle records, terrain

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data, and related intelligence, were assigned permanently to designated areas, and were attached to the BCTs in or nearest to each area.

The Army began its task by dividing the known areas of HMB sympathy into sector commands, each having a small tactical headquarters. Depending on the situation, two or more battalion combat teams were assigned or attached to each sector command throughout the region.

In organizing logical combat sectors the provinces of Pampanga and Bulacan were formed into the Pambul Sector. Bulacan Province borders in the south on Rizal Province, in which lies Manila. Both Pampanga and Bulacan Provinces border also in the south on Manila Bay and form an area the approximate center of which lies some thirty miles generally north of Manila.

Pambul Sector can be divided geographically into three distinct areas: two mountainous and one flat and swampy. The eastern area, in Bulacan Province, is dominated by the Sierra Madre Mountains, a series of rugged, wooded ranges running generally north and south and extending eastward through Tayabas Province to the Pacific Ocean. In the west lie the Zambales Mountains, an equally rugged north-south chain which rises along the west central coast of the island. Between the two ranges are situated the fertile plains of Luzon, the southern portion of which form the center of the Pambul Sector.

In the north center of the sector the Candaba Swamp spreads some ten miles in north-south length along the eastern edge of the Pampanga River. To the northwest of the swamp, immediately west of the Chico River, Mount Arayat, a lone volcanic cone, rises approximately 5,000 feet above sea level. East of the swamp, rice paddies extend to the foothills of the Sierra Madres.

The Candaba Swamp area, considered strategically the most important part of the sector, provided the HMBs with excellent cover and concealment as well as excellent sources of food. It was recognized that if the government forces attacked the swamp area the guerrillas could move westward into the Zambales area where supplies and crops were fairly plentiful. To the east, the Sierra Madres also would provide the guerrillas with excellent hiding places, with the added advantage that contact could be maintained through the mountains with HMB organizations in the north and south. If, however, the guerrilla forces were driven deep into the Sierra Madres they would encounter serious troubles, since there is considerable unexplored territory in that area.

Having evaluated strategically the three main areas within his jurisdiction, the Pambul Sector commander determined that had sufficient troops been available it would have been preferable to launch a series of simultaneous attacks in all three areas. However, with only three BCTs in his sector it was considered more practical to concentrate efforts on single areas in turn. Any other course of action would have required deployment of all three BCTs into a given area and would have left the other two areas open to guerrilla foraging attacks and probably to purely terroristic killing, burning, and looting.

At the peak of their strength the HMBs were known to have operated small ordnance shops deep in the Zambales Mountains where they repaired weapons and

converted carbines into serviceable automatic weapons. In order therefore to destroy these ordnance shops and bases or to render them untenable, it was decided to attack the Zambales area first. Committing two of his three BCTs to this mission, the sector commander assigned the 3d the task of providing security in the remainder of the Sector.

Operations were initiated in the Zambales area in August, 1952, with one BCT moving into the rugged mountain interior where it was resupplied completely by air throughout the period. The 2d BCT took up positions covering all possible escape routes along the perimeter of the operational area. Other escape routes to the west and south outside the limits of the Pambul Sector were covered by troops of adjacent sector commands.

Up to October 1952, when the Zambales operations were terminated, seventy enemy were killed or captured of an estimated 200. All known ordnance shops and dumps within the sector were destroyed. Having accomplished his purpose in the area, the sector commander turned his attention elsewhere.

Following a phased withdrawal from the Zambales area, BCT elements in the Pambul Sector were redeployed around Candaba Swamp where squad-size patrol activity was initiated. As the troop strength increased, the perimeter was extended to encompass the swamp. Operations were then restricted to the southern portion, with light security forces covering the remainder of the circle.

Shortly before Christmas, just prior to the launching of a coordinated attack by the government forces, Communist commanders began to realize that the Philippine Army buildup in the past two months had resulted in their being surrounded and cut off from their supply sources, HMB emissaries therefore requested a truce, presumably for the purpose of discussing peace terms. Accepting the proposals in good faith, the Sector commander ordered his troops withdrawn to a larger and more lightly held line around the swamp while the peace negotiations were being held.

It is significant to note that the HMB peace proposals were timed to coincide with the rice harvest and that the area from which the government troops were withdrawn was dotted with rice paddies. Immediately available to the nearly starved guerrillas, therefore, were these rich, ready-to-harvest rice fields. The Communists had gained an advantage.

They gained an additional advantage since the enlarged perimeter created unfavorable gaps between troop units, permitting ultimately most of the guerrilla forces to escape from the swamp area. By the time negotiations were broken off by the HMBs (after New Year's Day, 1953) most of the guerrillas had vanished, as had the Communist leaders and much of the local rice crop.

While the HMBs at first appeared to have won in this clear example of Communist trickery, it soon became evident that the Army and the government really had gained the psychological advantage. The local population, especially those favorable to the Communist element, observed the contrast between the sincerity of the government forces and the obvious bad faith demonstrated by the HMBs.

During the negotiations it was believed that the Communist leaders were in the immediate vicinity, but all contact with them was lost after the nego-

tiations were broken off. When subsequent intelligence reports developed that most of the guerrilla troops were located in the area between the swamp, Mount Arayat, and the foothills of the Zambales, preparations were undertaken for the next stage in the campaign.

The 1st Cavalry Squadron (Horse), which had been assigned to the Pambul Sector late in December, remained in the Candaba Swamp area, along with the 22d BCT, in order to secure this area. The 6th and 20th BCTs, with the bulk of the 17th BCT, deployed in stages into the Zambales Mountains-Mount Arayat-Candaba Swamp triangle and gradually intensified patrol actions designed to discover the location of the top HMB leaders.

On 15 January 1953 the sector commander received word that new peace negotiations were to take place at Baliti, west of Mount Arayat. Consequently, the areas immediately west and southwest of this barrio were placed off limits to government forces.

Once again, top rebel leaders failed to take part personally in the negotiations, choosing instead to send representatives. The Communist demands proved to be as preposterous as they were transparent, and as the talks continued, bands of HMB guerrillas roamed unmolested through the off-limits area, gathering supplies within sight of government troops.

The negotiations, if they deserve to be termed as such, broke down completely and were discontinued on 3 February. Although the whereabouts of the Communist leaders were not known definitely, intelligence reports indicated that they had remained within the triangle during the talks.

Because it was the home of one of the HMB commanders and a known center of HMB sympathy, the town of San Luis, on the southwestern edge of the swamp, was thought to be the hiding place of the Communist leaders. Also considered as logical hiding places because of favorable terrain and local sympathy with the HMB cause were the area west of Angeles, in the Zambales foothills, and Mount Arayat, at the north corner of the triangle.

When Pambul Sector headquarters was informed that a guerrilla headquarters courier had been trailed to the barrio of Santa Cruz, near Mexico, that area was taken under surveillance. Meanwhile, troops attacked a number of possible hiding places within a five mile radius. By a process of elimination, the most likely location of the HMB headquarters was narrowed, to the Mount Arayat area.

On 2 April 1953 a guerrilla night patrol was contacted under circumstances indicating that it had been in touch with the Santa Cruz courier. The direction in which the patrol moved supported the earlier deduction that the HMB leaders were hiding in the dense jungles of Mount Arayat.

Early on 4 April the 17th BCT occupied positions blocking Communist escape routes along the trail connecting Gatiawin and Pinagkasalan, south of the hill, while elements of the 6th BCT moved in on the left flank of the 17th. At 0500 hours on the same day the 6th BCT attacked and searched thoroughly the objective area.

Meanwhile, at Arenas an officer of the 6th BCT's civil affairs unit

learned that five HMBs were hiding in the fields between Arenas and the 6th's assault forces. Reserves searched the area and captured two men, one an HMB commander and the other an organizer.

The captives disclosed the location of the HMB headquarters on Mount Arayat. In addition, they revealed that a woman courier had brought food, clothing, and newspapers to Santa Cruz from Manila on 2 April and that another courier and seven armed HMBs left the barrio that same day to carry the items to their headquarters. This group proved to be the patrol contacted by elements of the 17th BCT that night. Following their interrogation, the prisoners led government troops to the Communist headquarters, only to find that the position had been abandoned a few hours earlier.

It became necessary now to prevent the HMB leaders from escaping to the lowlands, apparently since they had learned of the capture of the two men. The 6th and 17th BCTs, both reinforced, quickly established a 30,000-yard perimeter, blocking the area with a series of strong points, from which patrols moved up the slopes of Mount Arayat in daylight.

Following a patrol clash east of Catiawin on the morning of 9 April, guerrilla groups ranging in size from three to forty men made several attempts to infiltrate the perimeter, particularly on the western and southwestern slopes of Mount Arayat. Because all known water points in the area were under government control, it was assumed that the HMBs soon would be forced to make a major breakthrough attempt in order to alleviate a shortage of food and water.

On 10 April three companies of the 22d BCT occupied a line along the northern and eastern slopes of Mount Arayat, where they were reinforced later by an additional rifle company. On 13 April six companies from the Batzang and Pagan Sectors were attached to Pambul Sector headquarters. On the 24th another battalion plus two companies were added to the sector's strength.

On 24 April elements of the 6th BCT and 1st Cavalry Squadron attacked a small enemy force near the barrio of Buena Vista, west of the mountain. Seven guerrillas were killed and four captured. Acting on information obtained from the captives, among whom were members of the HMB headquarters security force, elements of the 6th BCT attacked a guerrilla camp where it was thought the ranking leaders were bivouacked. Strong rear guard action, however, held off the government forces until the camp was evacuated.

On 29 April a guerrilla surrendered to the 22d BCT, and revealed that his group, comparable to a Philippine Army battalion cadre, was bivouacked on the northeast slope of Mount Arayat. Plans were made to attack this concentration, but this was abandoned subsequently in favor of a plan to reinforce the perimeter at the point where it was thought the guerrillas might attempt a breakthrough.

Before the line could be reinforced, a strong HMB force struck at the expected point. After inflicting heavy casualties on government units, the guerrillas succeeded in breaking through the line. No estimate of HMB casualties was made, since those killed or wounded evidently were carried on by their comrades.

It was impossible to determine whether the HMB leaders, whose capture was long the main objective of these operations, had escaped. Because troops patrolling behind the lines in the breakthrough area made no further contact, it was assumed that the entire Communist force had made its way safely across the Chico River, east of the hill. This would place the force in Nueva Ecija Province, which lay in another sector, ending for all intents and purposes the major anti-guerrilla operations in the Pambul Sector.

To support the anti-guerrilla combat operations a series of specific efforts were made behind the lines to isolate the guerrillas from external sources of supply and from HMB sympathizers and other civilians within the sector. These efforts may be classified as intelligence and psychological.

In the intelligence field, screening points were set up periodically in each community and all persons within a specified area were required to report for screening against the order of battle and personality files maintained by the military intelligence service teams. Prisoners in temporary custody of the teams helped to locate suspected HMB members, supporters, or sympathizers who, when so identified, were held for further interrogation.

Those cleared through the screening points were marked on the hand with a rubber stamp, the character of which was changed for each operation. The marks assisted local roving patrols in their efforts to insure that none evaded the screenings.

After each screening operation in a given area the civil affairs unit held a rally, consisting of short educational talks on citizenship, democracy, communism, and the role of the Army in the anti-guerrilla operations. Among the speakers were government officials, Army officers, prominent loyal citizens, and Communist prisoners. These psychological efforts did much to counteract HMB efforts along similar lines.

When it was recognized that the HMB forces on Mount Arayat were cut off from outside sources of supply and information, the Army initiated a brief propaganda or psychological warfare campaign designed to entice Communists into surrendering. Light liaison planes dropped two sets of leaflets over the area. One set informed the rebel leaders that the Army was aware of the HMB situation on the mountainous slopes and pointed out that they could choose now either to remain in position and die of starvation or thirst, fight their way out, or surrender. In the second communication the HMB soldiers were promised justice if they surrendered, and were told that if their superiors were seriously concerned for the welfare of their followers they would not force them to continue the hopeless fight.

Subsequent investigation showed that the guerrillas had been out of food for at least a week prior to the breakout attack. On the basis of this situation, fear of the effect of the leaflets on their followers forced the HMB leaders to attempt the breakthrough immediately.

HMB operations showed excellent planning and execution, with emphasis on deception and surprise, standard specialties of all capable guerrilla forces. In attacks or raids groups as large as 300 men and women were used,

but more often the groups were considerably smaller. Their withdrawals almost always demonstrated good order and discipline and they exhibited special skill at establishing strategically located road blocks to delay the advance of Army forces.

The guerrillas relied principally on a system of couriers for communication, and further subdivided this system into "legal" and "illegal" systems. In the legal system the couriers, usually very young and innocent looking men and women, avoided roads and highways and moved cross-country on foot, while in the illegal system the couriers used the highways and public conveyances. As is familiar in conspiratorial activities, the couriers generally knew only the location of two posts, their own and one other. The route between Communist headquarters in mountain hideaways and the nearest courier post in the lowlands usually was maintained by HMB forces.

Because of their tactics the guerrillas specialized in elusiveness, it usually was necessary to move extraordinarily close to these forces before opening fire. This therefore required skillful and diversified patrol action on the part of all government units, and, accordingly, required the utmost in training and leadership at all levels of command.

Since the collection of essential elements of information depended largely on the success of the patrols, the ability of small-unit leaders was of particular importance in effective anti-guerrilla operations. Only a well trained leader could keep a well trained patrol on its toes every second under the sometimes demoralizing circumstance encountered in the Sector. The penalty for inattention to details of training often was likely to be death in a guerrilla ambush.

There were several occasions where Army units lacked the degree of mobility that might have meant success. This is predicated on the recognized fact that guerrilla forces were most successful in terrain which hampered movements of conventional units. Since HMB elements generally sought to avoid contact with government forces, they found that the jungles, swamps, and mountains worked for them as it worked against Phillippine Army forces attempting to find, fix, and fight them.

The fruitless assault on the Communist headquarters hideout on Mount Arayat might have been successful had even a few troop-carrying helicopters been available to support a surprise encircling raid on the objective. Mobility of this type would have enabled the government forces to maintain contact with the HMBs until there remained no alternatives but to stand and fight or to surrender.

Like the anti-Japanese guerrillas of the World War II years, the HMB forces were not self-supporting. They relied on the local population for sympathy and for financial and material support. Prior to 1951 the Communists employed a quota system to collect large sums of money from their followers, augmenting this by "taxing" other civilians and civilian-sympathizers in the areas under their influence. Farmers in these areas were pressured into paying tributes of food, especially rice, which was stored subsequently in mountain hideouts and in warehouses in the larger HMB-dominated towns.

The effects of long periods of open sympathy toward the Communist cause made it difficult to effect an immediate and complete separation of the guerrillas from their civilian supporters. Despite the fact that government forces generally were able to isolate the bulk of the HMB troops, supplies and information usually continued to reach the Communists.

The operations described here were difficult and delicate. Military action against dissident factions within a country can create more trouble than can be solved unless the government forces have or can win and maintain the friendship and loyalty of the local population.

A complex legal problem arises out of the fact that a government founded on genuinely democratic principles always hesitates to bring military forces to bear against a segment of its people except for the gravest reasons of national safety and security.

Because the success of any guerrilla movement depends in large measure on sympathetic support from the civilian population, it is essential that the people understand clearly that the armed forces of the government are their friends and protectors. Every civilian who is given reason to resent and fear the government forces is a potential supporter of the guerrilla movement, even though reluctantly.

Foreign troops are certain to be less welcome among the people than are the regular armed forces of their own government. Local populations will shelter their own people against operations of foreign troops, even though those they shelter may be outlaws. For this reason, native troops would be more effective than foreign forces in operations against native Communist conspirators. It would be rare, indeed, if the use of foreign troops would not in itself doom to failure an anti-guerrilla campaign.

While this has been primarily a discussion of the anti-guerrilla operations in the Pambul Sector, the fact that the HMBs are part of a world-wide Communist conspiracy is evidenced with remarkable clarity in the parallel between the two HMB armistice negotiations and the Communist peace talks in various parts of the world.

When Communist guerrilla leaders made armistice overtures the tactical situation had turned sharply against them. They needed a respite to gather new supplies and to either regroup or slip from a trap. When, as a direct result of the time spent on negotiations, the situation again became more favorable to the Communists, they broke off negotiations and resumed fighting.

The lesson here seems to be that when operating against Communists or Communist guerrillas, regardless of the circumstances, a good working knowledge of Communist world strategy is imperative in assessing the intentions and probable tactics of the smallest elements of the movement. The HMB actions have reflected generally the trends and shifts in the master plan of the Communist conspiracy.

The Bandits' Last Stand in Greece*

Col. Theodoros Papathanasiades, Greek Army

General Situation in January 1949

After 3 years of guerrilla warfare, the military situation in Greece was far from satisfactory. The guerrillas, numbering about 23,000, with an excellent informer and intelligence network throughout the country, had the initiative. Practically no move could be made by units of the Greek Army which was not known in advance by the bandits. Unwillingness of the civilian population to give information to the Greek Army through fear of bandit reprisals further complicated the problem. As a result, guerrilla hit-and-run tactics, followed by dispersion in the rugged mountains when pursued, created a situation which imposed on the Army the need for adjusting its tactics to the most difficult type of warfare--guerrilla warfare. With the exception of the two strongly fortified areas of Vitsi and Grammos on the northern border, there was no front.

Raids were launched against towns and villages, for the purpose of looting, destroying, and abducting recruits for their forces. Kidnappings by the guerrillas for recruits had totaled 24,871 in 1948 (this figure dropped to 5,006 by the end of 1949 and, to date, in 1950, there have been none).

The guerrilla domination was so complete, that movement throughout the country was still limited to armed convoys 1 or 2 days a week in certain areas, and then only after the roads had been swept for mines. Sabotage of waterworks, industrial plants, roads, and railroads were practically daily occurrences.

As a result of guerrilla activities, more than 700,000 people had abandoned their farms and villages and moved to the larger cities, thus imposing on the Government a tremendous burden of sheltering and feeding.

Generally, lightly equipped and thoroughly familiar with the areas from which they operated, the guerrillas, when pursued, were able to outdistance the more heavily equipped National Army units. Along the northern border, guerrilla bands, when pursued too closely, simply crossed the border into the Communist-controlled countries which gave them protection and furnished them supplies for new incursions into Greece.

The guerrilla organization changed, in 1948, from small bands of 50 or 100 to a brigade and division organization. A guerrilla brigade numbered 600-800 men, with the division generally consisting of from two to three brigades. In addition to rifles, they were equipped with machine guns, mortars, and light artillery. Thus, approximately 23,000 bandits were able, with the support of the northern border countries, to terrorize a nation of 7,000,000

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people--people who lived in constant fear, not knowing when and where the bandits would strike next.

The Greek Army ceased to exist when the Germans occupied the country. It was reorganized in 1945-46, with practically no training and with very few trained leaders. In this condition, it was forced to start operations immediately against the guerrillas.

General Plans for 1949

As a result of the experiences gained and the lessons learned in 1948, plans had been developed for a major effort in 1949. The security of the towns and villages had been turned over to the National Defense Corps battalions--a force of 50,000 men. This left the Greek National Army of 147,000 free to carry out mobile operations. The general plan was as follows: while containing the guerrillas along the northern border with minimum forces; first, clear out the Peloponnesus; second, clear out Central Greece; third, reduce the strongly fortified areas of Vitsi and Grammos, adjacent to the Yugoslav and Albanian borders; and fourth, mop up the remnants of guerrilla bands throughout the country.

The first two operations were conducted generally as follows:

1. Before starting the operation, all known Communist sympathizers and suspected informers in the area were arrested and interned.
2. Advances were made on a broad front and in considerable depth.
3. The actions of mobile columns were vigorous and bold.
4. Troops pursued the enemy day and night.

As a result, the bandit intelligence network broke down completely. The guerrillas, constantly pursued, were unable to resupply themselves from their hidden mountain supply bases. No matter in which direction the guerrilla bands moved, they were met by units of the Army, and most of the bandit leaders were killed or captured.

With the loss of the leaders, bandit operations collapsed in the entire Peloponnesus in less than 2 months. Central Greece was similarly cleared out during the spring and early summer of 1949. The Greek Armed Forces were then ready, by late July 1949, to undertake Operation Torch to destroy the bandit fortified positions in the Vitsi and Grammos areas. The Operation was planned in two phases: first, to destroy the Vitsi position, which was also the headquarters of the bandit high command; and second, to capture the Grammos.

The Vitsi Operation

The Vitsi, a mountainous area of 375 square miles, is bounded on the north by Yugoslavia and on the west by Albania. It consists of two main mountain passes in the form of an inverted "V," with the Livadhopotamos River flowing southward to join the Aliakmon River and separate the two masses. One secondary road parallels the Aliakmon River from Kastoria to the north as far as the main road, which runs from Florina west into Albania. This latter road was the main

bandit supply route from Albania to the Vitsi. With no problem of defense on the north and west, the area to the south and east was strongly fortified, with the bulk of the guerrilla forces, estimated at 7,500, dispersed in considerable depth in these two directions. All possible avenues of approach were mined and covered by machine-gun, mortar, and artillery fires. As discovered later, tremendous quantities of ammunition of all types had been moved into the area. An attack was expected by the guerrillas during the summer. The guerrilla radio, however, wanted to know where it would come first, the Vitsi or Grammos. Appearing to agree with the guerrilla radio that the Vitsi could not be penetrated, the Greek General Staff prepared a plan which was carried out several days prior to D-day. Air attacks, artillery bombardment, limited small-scale local ground attacks, and considerable movement of motor transportation in the rear areas were carried out in the Grammos area.

The task of reducing the fortified area of Vitsi was assigned to "B" Corps.

By 9 August, the 9th Division had concentrated in the Oinoi area, in southwest Vitsi, in preparation for Operation Torch. The 3d Commando Division and the 10th Division were concentrated in the area of Bikovik. The 2d and 11th Divisions were concentrated in the Florina area. The bulk of the artillery of the Army was in support of these Divisions.

As a preliminary to the main offensive of Operation Torch, the 22d Brigade of the 2d Division and a separate regiment armed only with light weapons were grouped as a task force. Early in the morning of 10 August, this task force launched attacks south of Florina to capture the Polenata and Plati Ridges in the Vitsi east flank gap, which the bandits had kept open and used as an escape route. These Ridges would also provide better positions for later attacks. The 12th Light Infantry Regiment, moving from the east, quickly overcame guerrilla opposition and, by the afternoon of 10 August, occupied Hills 1386 and 1621, and Koula. These troops were forced to withdraw from Koula on the night of 10 August, due to intense guerrilla artillery fire. At 1000 on 10 August, the 22d Brigade of the task force launched attacks south from the Koulkouthouria hill mass. Using tanks, these troops, by the night of 10 August, captured the Polenata Ridge.

The weight of the bulk of the Corps now struck the center of the guerrilla defenses with a night attack which completely surprised the enemy.

At 2200 on 10 August, the 3d Commando Division launched a night attack northward from Bikovik. Moving rapidly, the Commandos, by surprise action, captured Baro and Hill 1701. At the latter point, the Commandos, by the morning of 11 August, became engaged in a fight with guerrillas occupying positions around Lesits. Intelligence reported that the guerrilla Officers School Brigade and the 102d Brigade were defending this position, and were offering stubborn resistance. However, Lesits was taken by the Commandos by the morning of 12 August, the guerrillas withdrawing to the northwest. In conjunction with the pressure exerted by the Commandos from the south, the 11th Division, after a night attack, captured Tsouka by the morning of 11 August.

The 10th Division, preceded by the Commandos, launched its attack from Bikovik early on the morning of 11 August. Roto was captured promptly, but stubborn resistance was met from guerrillas occupying Yiamata, which held out until 12 August. With the creation of a gap of more than 6 miles in its main

defenses, the guerrilla high command hastily ordered a withdrawal to better positions to the west.

Continuing the forward movement on 12 August on the heels of the guerrilla withdrawal, the 79th Brigade of the 3d Division and the 31st Brigade of the 11th Division moved from the Tsouka--Lesits ridge, and occupied Tirnovon and Trigonon on the same date. On the same day, the 10th Division and the 78th Commando Brigade advanced as far as the Livadhopotamos River.

Meanwhile, other elements of the 2d Division, on the north flank, launched an attack the morning of 11 August and met stubborn resistance from the 10th Guerrilla Division. Similarly, the 9th Division, during the night of 11 August, attacked northward from the vicinity of Flatsata but made slow progress, advancing only to Hill 1130 by early 12 August. Intense artillery fire from eight guns then struck the division in the flank from across the Albanian border, followed by a counterattack from the same direction. The counterattack was repulsed, but the 9th Division was stopped. On 13 August, the Division advanced beyond Hill 1130 but was counterattacked again, and withdrew to Hill 1130.

By 13 August, the guerrilla withdrawal in the center was a rout, and the Greek National forces were moving rapidly in pursuit. The 78th Commando Brigade of the 3d Division and 37th Brigade of the 10th Division overcame resistance at Varba and, by 14 August, had captured Korbetsi. The 79th Commando Brigade and the 31st Brigade then swung north towards Kariai and Perivoli, capturing both by nightfall on 13 August. The guerrillas attempted to leave small delaying forces in all areas, while the bulk of their troops withdrew toward Albania.

Farther north, the 2d Division captured the Vigia-Lountza Ridge on 13 August. Other troops of this Division moved west along the Yugoslavian border and captured Ayios Yermanos by 14 August.

Meanwhile, the 18th Guerrilla Brigade in the southeastern portion of the Vitsi had been cut off in the area of Blavata by the advances of the 2d, 10, and 11th Divisions. These guerrillas defended this area until 12 August, when the remains of their forces abandoned their positions and heavy equipment, and attempted to escape northward through the 11th Division. At 0300, 14 August, guerrilla resistance in front of the 11th Division collapsed, and a general withdrawal was started toward Little Lake Prespa. The 31st Brigade, in an effort to cut off this escape, moved north along the Lake from Kariai and advanced to the Lake Prespa causeway by 0830 on 14 August. Strong resistance was encountered at Bamba. The 79th Commando Brigade, meanwhile, continued its movement north and, by 14 August, reached Ayios Yermanos.

In southwest Vitsi, the 103d and 105th Guerrilla Brigades defended the Mali Madi--Boutsi--Voutsia area until the night of 13 August, when a general withdrawal was made toward Albania. The 9th Division, on the Albanian border, failed to advance rapidly enough to prevent these guerrillas from escaping. Meeting little or no resistance, the 9th Division, on 14 August, reached Hill 1214 across the old guerrilla supply road and, on this date, no further fighting was reported except in the area west of Little Lake Prespa.

The 31st Brigade, after fighting on 14 and 15 August, occupied Bamba at 1530. The Commandos crossed the Lake in assault boats on the night of 15 August,

and, on 16 August, the entire area west of Little Lake Prespa to the Albanian border was occupied by our forces.

In their hasty and disorderly withdrawal from the Vitsi area, the guerrillas abandoned all of their heavy equipment and supplies. The following equipment was captured: 43 artillery pieces; 1 75-mm AT gun; 2 AA guns; 115 mortars; 232 German light machine guns; 68 British light machine guns; 96 heavy machine guns; 25 AA machine guns; 3,392 rifles; 142 bazookas; 1,650 mines; 49 cases of artillery shells; and 7,500 artillery shells. Intelligence reported that, of the six guerrilla brigades originally in the Vitsi area, the 103d, in the southwest part thereof, was the only unit to withdraw into Albania with most of its equipment and personnel. The 18th and 102d Guerrilla Brigades were practically wiped out. The 14th, 105th, and Officer School Brigades were reported as having lost 50 percent of their strength. Guerrilla casualties reported for this operation, from 10 August to 15 August, were 997 killed; 509 captured; and 133 surrendered. The Greek National Army casualties included 229 killed; 116 wounded; and 3 missing. In addition, the Greek National Army found the bodies of 20 Albanian soldiers and captured 7 others.

As a result of the rapid successes achieved in the Vitsi operation, and in accordance with the plans of Operation Torch for further operations to reduce the guerrilla positions in the Grammos area, the Greek General Staff ordered the following:

1. The 15th Division to be released to the control of "A" Corps on 13 August and moved to northern Grammos.
2. The 2d and 10th Divisions to continue the search of the Vitsi area, and to consolidate and occupy positions in that area.
3. The 9th Division to be placed under the control of "A" Corps on 15 August, and to move to its zone beginning 16 August.
4. The 3d Commando Division to be withdrawn from the Vitsi area to the Kastoria area, and there, to reorganize and become the Greek General Staff reserve. The Division was placed under control of "A" Corps on 16 August.

And so ended the battle of Vitsi. If there is any doubt as to whether or not the bandits were surprised, the following, which includes bandit self-criticism for failure in Vitsi, is reproduced in part.

20 August 1949

Decision of the Political Office of the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party on the Battle of the Vitsi: "... We are fighting for the most righteous cause. We have the right political line. If we avoid, in the Grammos, the mistakes which were made in Vitsi or if we correct these mistakes, then we shall crush the enemy. If we rally all our fighters, male and female, and our leaders, and neutralize all those who are discouraged, then we will be able to make the Grammos the grave of 'monarchofascism.'

"The enemy tactics in the Vitsi can be summed up in the following:

- a. Surprise: The use of surprise was successful because we made great mistakes.

Tactics using surprise will be utilized again in the Grammos and that is why security measures must be strengthened. When our security is good, the enemy will not have surprise, and thus will lose the main factor in their current successes. b. The utilization of mass artillery and air force: The experiences in the Vitsi and the Grammos prove that when we have good and strong fortifications the mass of fire is of no use. Consequently, the ground must be intensively fortified. c. Utilization of tanks in mass for the destruction of our pillboxes: Here the enemy succeeded because the antitank defenses were not organized properly. The enemy in the Vitsi covered the tanks with infantry, that is, the infantry moved in front. By dispersing the infantry, we isolate the enemy tanks. The hunters can then destroy the enemy tanks. This was not done in the Vitsi. The experience of the recent battles proved that the enemy antitank guns (recoilless 75-mm) are placed in static positions to destroy our pillboxes. The finding of these guns and the destruction of the personnel that operate them is an important task. d. The enemy operated along many directions in order to confuse our commanders and to conceal, each time, which was their main effort: These enemy tactics require an extensive review by us so that we can find their weaknesses and determine where to concentrate our means. e. The enemy puts great strength in the battle with the hope that, even if many are killed, some will be left to occupy the objectives: Coolness is needed; together with a good fire plan, reserves, and plans for flank and rear attacks.

"These were the enemy's tactics in the Vitsi. In effect, we have a repetition of the tactics used last year in the Grammos. The enemy is gathering for another effort. In the Grammos, we have all the abilities to deliver a deadly blow against the enemy. We have enough means and strength; better and more advantageous terrain. In the Grammos, the fascists failed last year. In the Grammos, this year, we gave the enemy a strong blow with the maneuver held in April. In the Grammos, from 2 to 8 August, the enemy again lost prestige. We now have the experience of the Vitsi, together with the bleeding the enemy received in the Vitsi. Our main forces have crossed the Epirus and Central Greece. In spite of all their triumphant words, the 'monarchofascists' are now undergoing a strong economic, political, and military crisis. We can now destroy 'monarchofascism.'

"Male, female, and officer fighters must have faith in victory. With faith and fighting enthusiasm, we must face and crack the enemy. A hard punishment to those who think that, because we lost the Vitsi, we have lost victory. We have difficulties but we will bypass them. The Communists must lift high the flag of resistance. Those who are panicked must be refilled with enthusiasm, indomitable will, and steady faith to ensure the victory. If the Communist do their duty, all those around them will join as if one man; as if guided by a single thought; by one decision. Grammos will be the grave of fascism. Hail to our arms. Hail to our victory."

The Political Office

The Grammos Operation

Intelligence reports indicated that remnants of four guerrilla brigades (14th, 102d, 103d, and 105th) had entered the Grammos area, on 15 August, after they withdrew from the Vitsi area. The total combined strength of these brigades was initially estimated at 1,000, with the remnants of the 102d and the 105th

Brigades merged together as one battalion. The 103d Brigade had about 450 guerrillas. The 14th Brigade, of about 250 guerrillas, was moved south to the front of the 15th Division prior to the attack. The 12th Guerrilla Brigade, which was previously in the Grammos area, also moved south on 20 August to the front of the 15th Division. Consequently, on the eastern front of the Grammos, the guerrillas had the 12th, 14th, 16th, 102d, 103d, 105th and 108th Guerrilla Brigades in defensive positions.

On the afternoon of 24 August, intense artillery fires were placed on guerrilla positions in eastern and northeastern Grammos. Eighteen Helldivers plus 12 Spitfires, the same afternoon, made heavy and repeated air attacks particularly against guerrilla positions on Tsarno Ridge. In accordance with the over-all plan for the operation, at 2100 on 24 August, "A" Corps launched a major offensive to eliminate an estimated 5,000 guerrillas occupying strong defensive positions in a 200 square mile sector of the Grammos mountain area, an area more rugged than the Vitsi. The plan called for the operation to be conducted in two phases. During the first phase, the 9th, 1st, and 15th Divisions plus the 3d Commando Division were to clear the northern Grammos. At the same time, the 8th Division and 77th Brigade were to exert pressure all along the remainder of the front. During the second phase, the 8th Division and the 77th Brigade were to close in on the Grammos in conjunction with the forces from the north and east. The 1st Division, initially, was to capture the Tsarno Ridge, from which the 3d Commando Division would attack through the 1st Division toward the Corps objective, the Grammos--Skertsa--Kiafa mountain mass to the southwest.

The 1st Division moved southwest across the Aliakmon River and, at dawn on 25 August, was advancing slowly towards the Tsarno Ridge. Stiff resistance was met and, initially, progress was slow. The 3d Commando Division moved to the rear of the 1st Division into the area occupied by the 51st Brigade, and both divisions, aided by superb artillery and air support, captured the entire Tsarno Ridge by noon 26 August. The 79th Brigade of the 3d Commando Division the same day moved west across the River meeting stubborn resistance from the guerrillas. The 78th Commando Brigade, with elements of the 51st Brigade, attempted to take Flamouro, one of the strategic positions in the area. Other elements of 51st Brigade advanced on Skala where they met heavy resistance.

The guerrillas withdrew south from Flamouro and, by 27 August, the Commandos occupied it. Two counterattacks by the guerrillas against the Commandos were repulsed. Meanwhile, the 52d Brigade, on the south flank of the 1st Division, attempted to take the Kozakas Ridge on 25-27 August but failed, due to stubborn guerrilla resistance and heavy counterattacks. The Kozakas Ridge was finally taken, on 28 August, when the guerrillas began a general withdrawal to the southwest. Similarly, the 51st Brigade occupied Skala on 28 August.

The guerrilla defenses in the whole northern area collapsed on the night of 27-28 August. The guerrillas withdrew hastily to the south leaving large quantities of equipment. Following up this withdrawal, the 78th and 79th Commando Brigades, moving through the 1st Division, reached Skertsa and Kaifa. One brigade continued south along the Stavros Ridge toward Vourbiani and the other brigade moved west to join the 61st Brigade of the 15th Division.

The 9th Division captured its initial objective by dawn 25 August against practically no opposition, and continued a rapid encirclement of the enemy's left

flank. On 26 August, its 41st Brigade, meeting little resistance in a surprise move, captured Kouria and reported that the guerrillas were apparently evacuating their positions. The enemy flank was now wide open. Taking advantage of this, the Corps Commander immediately ordered the 61st Brigade of the 15th Division moved and attached to the 9th Division. Holding the 42d and 43d Brigades along the heights in the proximity of the Albanian border on the north, the 41st and 61st Brigades were pushed rapidly southwest along the border. Strong resistance was soon met in their attack on Porta Osman. It now appeared that the guerrillas would try to hold Porta Osman against the 9th Division, and Flambouro against the 1st and 3d Divisions. However, Porta Osman was captured by 1430, 27 August, following heavy artillery and air attacks. After its fall, it became apparent that all the guerrilla positions in the northern Grammos were untenable. A subsequent rapid guerrilla withdrawal to the south confirmed this belief. The 41st and 61st Brigades, moving rapidly southward along the border, captured the peak of Grammos on 28 August. The 61st Brigade then continued its movement south from Grammos in an effort to cut off the remaining guerrilla escape route into Albania, south of Bara. By 1600, Koukouli was occupied without resistance, but farther south, strong defensive action and the rugged terrain made progress difficult. Troops were later reported in contact with guerrilla forces in the vicinity of Golio.

The 15th Division, on the left flank of the 1st Division, had launched its attack westward the night of 24 August. It crossed the Sarandaporos River and advanced toward the Kozakas Ridge but made little progress. With the collapse of the guerrilla defenses in north Grammos and the guerrilla withdrawal to the south, the 15th Division reached and occupied Grammos Ridge on 28 August. The 73d Brigade, on 29 August, pushed troops farther south and made contact with elements of the 8th Division in the vicinity of Patoma and then moved west toward the border.

The operations of the 77th Brigade began the night of 24 August in the southeast Grammos gap in order to exert pressure on the guerrilla forces and close this escape route. On 25 August, the 77th Brigade captured Khristi. It then attacked Kato Arena but no progress was made until late 27 August when the position was occupied.

The 8th Division, on the south, launched its attack northward on the night of 24 August with its main effort on the west flank along the Albanian border. Its first objective was Kamenik, but intense enemy fire from across the Albanian border prevented the Division from making any progress.

Simultaneously with the withdrawal of the guerrilla forces from north Grammos, the guerrillas in front of the 8th Division withdrew to the west. By 29 August, our forces had occupied all of the Grammos except the Golio--Steno--Profitis Ilias area, held by the 107th Guerrilla Brigade to facilitate guerrilla withdrawals into Albania. The positions were attacked heavily by the ground and air forces on 29 and 30 August and, late on 30 August were captured. The Grammos area was now completely occupied.

Complete guerrilla casualties reported by the Greek General Staff for the Grammos phase of Operation Torch from 24 August to 31 August were as follows: 892 killed; 755 captured; and 109 surrendered. Greek National Army casualties included 242 killed; 1,451 wounded; and 16 missing.

The equipment captured by the Greek National Army included 14 artillery pieces (all sizes); 17 AA guns; 7 AT guns; 2 AA machine guns; 216 light machine guns; 322 German light machine guns; 66 automatic weapons; 2,704 rifles; 45 light mortars; 147 heavy mortars; 11 120-mm mortars; 10 Plats; 2 range finders; 2 mine detectors; and large quantities of artillery, mortar, and small arms ammunition and mines.

Strategic surprise was not possible in the Grammos. At this time, the Grammos was the only bandit stronghold left in Greece. Complete tactical surprise was achieved, however, as to the time and the direction of the main attack. The use of "soft-spot" tactics indicated that the enemy's left or northern flank, resting on the Albanian border, was extremely weak. Furthermore, the bandits did not expect the Grammos attack so soon. The guerrillas who escaped from the Vitsi area to the Grammos had not yet been fully reorganized when the attack was begun. The "A" Corps Commander kept his reserves close to the operation, and when the break-through occurred, there was no time lost in passing to the exploitation phase of the campaign. Once the rear or the enemy's position was reached, organized defensive areas quickly collapsed.

Conclusions

Of the nine principles of war, that of surprise probably played the most important role in these two operations. This was achieved by taking measures to deny information to the enemy, and to deceive him as to our dispositions, movements, and plans; by constant variations in the means and methods employed; by the speed and power of the execution of plans; and unhesitatingly using terrain which appeared to impose the greatest difficulties.

The rapid successes of the Greek National Army in the Vitsi and Grammos areas were due basically to vastly improved junior leadership and training. With increased efficiency came unbreakable morale.

Although the guerrillas used all of their well-known propaganda tricks, they failed to break the fighting spirit of the Greek soldier. His high morale and new fighting spirit reflected the glory of Ancient Greece, when over 2,400 years ago a Greek Army, outnumbered 6 to 1, defeated a mighty Persian horde on the Coastal Plain of Marathon.

Beating the Guerrillas *

Lt. Col. John E. Beebe, Jr., U.S. Army

The spectacular successes scored by Communist guerrillas in the Soviet Union, Albania, and Yugoslavia in World War II, and in China and Indochina subsequently have fostered the myths that somehow the Communists enjoy a monopoly on this type of warfare and that Communist guerrilla forces are almost impossible to defeat. The truth is that the Communists merely recognized the value of this relatively cheap method of warfare and that conditions in some areas favored its adoption. The Communists themselves, governing by oppressive tyranny, are vulnerable to guerrilla warfare, particularly in all of the satellite nations.

Basis for Guerrilla Warfare

That Communist guerrillas can be defeated has been demonstrated in Greece, Korea, the Philippines, Burma, and Iran; Communist guerrillas in Malaya are slowly being defeated. Moreover, during World War II successful non-Communist guerrilla forces operated in France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, China, Burma, and the Philippines. Lawrence led the Arab revolt during World War I; Mosby and Forrest successfully carried out guerrilla warfare in the American Civil War; and Francis Marion fought guerrilla tactics during the American Revolution. The very name guerrilla came from the resistance of Spanish patriots during the Napoleonic campaigns.

A guerrilla force or resistance movement must enjoy the support of at least part of the civilian population in which it operates, and render most of the rest impassive, to survive. There must be good leadership, a strong will to resist, a willingness to endure great hardships, and favorable terrain--such as mountains, jungle, forests, or swamps--in which to establish secure bases.

The other conditions which favor the adoption of guerrilla warfare differ according to the situation in each country. There may be two contending factions, as in China and Korea, or the issue might be national resistance to a ruthless invading aggressor, as in the Soviet Union. Opposition to the re-establishment of colonialism could be used as the rallying point, as in Indonesia and Indochina. The guerrillas or partisans might be used as auxiliary forces to the main armies, as in the Soviet Union. The guerrillas operating in support of all Communist parties are the militant arm of the political party which will seek to rule the state. In some areas guerrilla operations can be assisted by geographical propinquity to the friendly bases of the sponsoring power, as was the case of the Greek, Indochinese, and Chinese Communists. In other areas the guerrilla must fight without ready access to supply from a sponsoring power and not in conjunction with any regular forces, as in Malaya and the Philippines. The guerrillas may be aligned with a foreign army on their soil, as the maquis were with the Allies in France, or against

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as the Soviet partisans who opposed the Germans.

Communist Guerrilla Strategy

Communist guerrilla strategy is simple. For a small investment in political and military leadership, and limited quantities of small-arms ammunition, a weak government is compelled to commit sizable security forces to a costly campaign. Communist political influence is expanded as elements of the population are alienated from the government. The population is terrorized into passive inaction. Various pretenses are used to cloak the real motives--revolt against colonialism, opposition to a corrupt regime, and resistance of oppression have been tried. Captured World War II weapons are furnished and satellite states act as sponsors while the Soviet Union poses as a neutral.

After sufficient area and population are seized, the guerrilla army is reorganized into a regular force, as in China, Yugoslavia, and Indochina. As soon as this force seizes a substantial part of the country, a government controlled by the Communist Party, ordinarily adorned by a few non-Communists in innocuous positions, is established as a "People's Republic" and recognized by the Communist bloc and its dupes. Alliances are then announced by the Communist bloc and agitation to remove the old government is commenced. After the new regime consolidates its position, it purges itself and drops the pretenses it used to gain power.

Early Guerrilla Efforts

The Republic of Korea was particularly vulnerable to subversive and guerrilla attack. Expecting immediate independence and unity as a nation after the defeat of Japan, the Koreans were appalled to find their nation divided along an unnatural boundary at the 38th Parallel, and occupied by the two major powers emerging victorious from World War II. It soon became apparent that the Soviets were unwilling to unify Korea unless on Communist terms. The Soviets at once began the creation of a North Korean puppet state and a modern North Korean Army. They also fostered Communist political agitation in South Korea.

Unprepared for these events, the United States Government was slow in evolving a Korean policy. Various factions were jockeying for position when the Communists made their first attempt to gain political dominance in South Korea. A Communist uprising or riot was staged in Taegu and vicinity on 1 October 1946. The number of rioters was estimated to be nearly 70,000. This Communist-instigated riot, ostensibly based on objections to certain occupation policies, was abortive and failed.

It was apparent by 1948 that no agreement with the Soviets on Korea was possible, so the United States ended her occupation and turned over South Korea to the newly formed Republic of Korea on 15 August 1948, under the leadership of Dr. Syngman Rhee. President Rhee headed a young, politically immature Government which lacked experienced administrators and rested on a shaky economic base. The Government had a small, newly organized, inexperienced constabulary force to defend it.

On 20 October 1948 a Communist cell estimated variously as from 40 to 300 in strength mutinied in the Korean 14th Constabulary Regiment while the unit was in Yosu preparing to move to Cheju Island to suppress insurgents there. The mutineers killed many of their officers and noncommissioned officers, seized an arms depot, and, joined by Communist civilians, commandeered a train and moved to Suncheon, a city of 50,000. After seizing Suncheon, the Communists fanned out in southwest Korea. By 27 October Yosu was recaptured and the Communists had fled into the Paegun Mountain area near Suncheon. Another uprising at Taegu during the period 2 to 4 November 1948 was suppressed easily. The North Korean flag was flown and it was evident that the Communist regime in North Korea had sponsored these attempts to seize power.

The Communist guerrilla organization in South Korea was now established in the rugged mountains of southwestern and eastern Korea. The infant Republic committed its embryonic Army to operations against these guerrillas and on 25 June 1950, when the North Korean People's Army attacked across the 38th Parallel, three Republic of Korea divisions were deployed in operations against an estimated 1,700 hard-core Communists who were directing the operations of an estimated 5,000 guerrillas. These guerrillas were supported by civilian Communist sympathizers and were in communication with North Korea by overland and sea routes.

Guerrillas Aid Main Army

The Republic of Korea Army suffered from this diversion in two ways: its units were not properly trained owing to the operations against guerrillas, and the Army was not strategically or tactically deployed to meet the North Korean onslaught.

The North Korean People's Army enjoyed such easy, early success that there was no apparent need for guerrilla assistance to the main forces, and the guerrillas were relatively inactive. However, after the United States Eighth Army stabilized a defense on the Naktong River line, the guerrillas became more active. Communist sympathizers, believing a victory was imminent, came out in the open.

The guerrilla threat required the Eighth Army on 19 July 1950 to designate an officer to coordinate the defense of the rear areas. He coordinated the efforts of Korean police and United States Military Police to protect railroads, highways, bridges, and signal communications against sabotage and guerrilla activity. It was also necessary to divert tactical units to secure rear areas. National Police battalions and Republic of Korea Army security battalions were formed to combat guerrillas in rear areas and to guard fixed installations.

Growth of Guerrilla Forces

The Inchon landing on 15 September 1950 broke the back of the North Korean attack on the Pusan Perimeter. The Communist Army withdrew under heavy attack from United Nations units which frequently knifed through an enemy unit and bypassed the cut-off remnants. Apparently the Communists had made no provision for this eventuality. As it was, thousands of Communist troops fled into the mountains of South Korea and joined the guerrillas there. They were also joined by many

of the Communists who had come out in the open during the North Korean occupation of the area. The guerrillas were in control of large areas during the fall of 1950, and rear area travel was unsafe. Many villages were terrorized. A minimum of 40,000 guerrillas were estimated to be in the South Korean mountains in November 1950. That there may well have been more is indicated by the National Police claim that during the period from 25 June 1950 to 31 August 1951 they killed more than 65,000, captured nearly 25,000, and an additional 44,000 enemy surrendered, for a total in excess of 135,000. This figure probably includes bypassed enemy troops rounded up in North Korea during late 1950, and may not be entirely accurate.

By mid-November 1950 a substantial part of the Republic of Korea troop strength was engaged on security missions. The newly organized Republic of Korea 11th Division drove through the guerrilla base area in southwest Korea to open the main highway routes, but many thousands of guerrillas remained active in the area.

The tempo of guerrilla activity increased during the autumn but the pattern indicated no coordinated effort. Most of the raids were for food and clothing. Survival was the objective; tactical operations declined.

Operations

The Chinese Communist intervention brought new patterns to guerrilla operations. The guerrilla organization was strengthened, new leaders were infiltrated to take charge and carry out new orders, and specific missions were assigned each unit. As the Communist armies pushed southward, the guerrilla activity increased. In January 1951 nearly half of the raids were on United Nations troops. United States Army and Marine troops, together with three Republic of Korea divisions, conducted almost continuous operations during this period to keep the guerrilla activity in hand.

The United Nations counteroffensive which began 25 January 1951 was accompanied by a new stability and increased antiguerrilla activity; many guerrillas were killed or captured and many others were forced underground. Thus firm and continuous pressure on the guerrillas before they had time to complete effective reorganization curbed guerrilla strength as the United Nations counteroffensive rolled the Communists back along the battleline. The severe winter, disease without adequate medical care, desertions, and lack of resupply contributed to a reduction in guerrilla strength. By 31 March 1951 guerrilla strength was estimated to have fallen to 15,000--a reduction from the 37,500 estimated in January. Later operations indicate this figure was a substantial underestimate, or the guerrillas were able to recruit considerable numbers to replenish their losses.

Organization

The guerrillas in South Korea were composed of the following elements:

1. Specially trained guerrillas, both as individuals and units.
2. Locally recruited Communists from provincial, county, and township organizations.
3. North Korean People's Army remnants.
4. Communist sympathizers and opportunists who were obliged to flee when the South Koreans recovered their areas.
5. Criminal elements.
6. Kidnapped citizens and prisoners intimidated by threats and force who frequently deserted at the earliest opportunity.
7. Non-Communists motivated by a desire to avenge some harsh or unjust Government action or to escape the misery and poverty of their existence.

The guerrilla organizations were under firm Communist military and political control. In the North Korean Armed Forces Defense Ministry, which is responsible for all military activities of the People's Republic, an agency known as the 526th Unit and also as the Guerrilla Guidance Bureau exercised control over guerrilla units in South Korea. The Communist Korean Labor Party also had a Guerrilla Department; this department controlled the Labor Party in South Korea, which exercised political control over guerrilla activities within the Republic of Korea area. In the Communist hierarchy, the political chief is dominant, so the structure was based upon a political party supported by a military arm. Guerrilla units operated within their assigned areas under control of the 526th Unit which operated directly under General Headquarters, North Korean People's Army.

The original plan of the North Korean Government, as outlined in a 1949 publication, provided for military coordination between local guerrilla forces and Communist armies driving down from the north to facilitate the conquest of the country. The 526th Unit dispatched hundreds of infiltrator guerrillas singly or in small groups to South Korea where they were to infiltrate various United Nations and Republic of Korea organizations and engage in underground activities. Most of these were former South Koreans who were Communists; they were specially trained and returned to work near their homes.

Secret police agents were attached to conduct investigations and to check on the political reliability of guerrilla leaders and individual members. Agents were trained and politically indoctrinated at training schools in North Korea. Military subjects such as the care and use of weapons, map reading, camouflage, and guard duty were taught.

No firm table of organization existed. Units varied greatly in size—from half a dozen up to several hundred members. Units frequently reorganized and changed their names. The units were identified by local area designation, by numerical designation, by the name of the leader, or by a name with propaganda or Party significance.

After the front stabilized in the spring of 1951, communications and supply problems became increasingly difficult and control was exercised regionally in the major mountain hideouts in southwest Korea. Guerrilla headquarters for all of South Korea was set up in the Chiri Mountain area under the leadership of Lee Hyung Sang. Ironically, Lee was removed by the Party following the purge of his sponsor in North Korea as a repercussion of Beria's downfall in the Soviet Union. Lee was killed by a member of a special antiguerrilla unit of the Republic of Korea Army shortly thereafter during a patrol action on 17 September 1953.

A word should be said about the infiltration of guerrillas, agents, and enemy soldiers among the hordes of refugees during the war of movement in 1950 and 1951. Screening 5 million refugees was an almost impossible task; and, therefore, many guerrillas were thus able to move through the United Nations lines and join guerrilla units in the mountains. The Communists also sought to exploit the opportunities to recruit members from among these homeless and destitute wanderers. Their number was beyond the ability of the shattered Republic of Korea Government to resettle at once.

Guerrilla Missions

The missions of the guerrilla forces can be described broadly as political and military. Their political missions included the support and strengthening of the South Korean Labor Party cells; the dissemination of Communist propaganda; the creation of dissatisfaction among the Republic of Korea citizens toward the Republic of Korea Government; the fostering of resentment toward the presence of United Nations troops in South Korea; the disruption of Government control over the people; the ruin of economic life in the area; the infiltration of the Republic of Korea Government, especially the National Police and Armed Forces; espionage; and finally bringing about the downfall of the Republic of Korea Government and the control of the entire nation by the Communists.

The principal military missions of the guerrilla forces were to drain United Nations manpower from the front; destroy arms, equipment, and supplies; furnish precise military intelligence of the dispositions, strength, movements, weaknesses, plans, and activities of the United Nations and Republic of Korea forces; impede the Republic of Korea war effort; cut the line of communication by sabotaging the railroads, ambushing motor transport, cutting telephone and telegraph wires, and attacking very high frequency and repeater stations; disrupt utilities; interdict roads and trails with small-arms fire; lay antitank mines; attack isolated United Nations installations; raid supply and other installations; destroy bridges; crater and block roads; make surprise attacks on command posts, artillery positions, and Korean Military Advisory Group personnel; terrorize the local population to intimidate them and prevent their supporting the Government; assassinate local officials and political leaders; and raid police stations and isolated army units or villages for food, clothing, weapons, ammunition, and other necessities. The local inhabitants of guerrilla-infested areas were given the choice of leaving their homes and means of livelihood and fleeing from the guerrillas or cooperating with the guerrillas and remaining in an atmosphere of ruthless terror and constant jeopardy. More than 5

million South Koreans lived under these conditions during the period from 1948 to 1954.

On 9 February 1951 the Soviet news agency, TASS, broadcast in Russian over the Moscow Radio an order of the day signed by Kim Il Sung, Commander in Chief of the North Korean People's Army, defining the duties of partisans (guerrillas) as follows:

Partisans and women partisans must render any desired kind of support to the advancing People's Army and to the units of the Chinese Volunteers, exterminate the headquarters of the enemy, and disorganize still more the rear of the enemy.

Owing to the energetic action of the United Nations Command during the fall and winter of 1950-51, the guerrillas never realized their potential and, although they continued to constitute a serious threat to internal security and the stability of the Republic of Korea, they were actually only a minor harassing threat to the military operations of the United Nations Command. Prompt aggressive action had prevented the formation of strong and effective guerrilla forces.

Principles

A thorough understanding of the principles of guerrilla warfare is essential if we are to combat the guerrilla successfully. The North Koreans, like other Communists, follow Mao Tse-tung's writings which can be stated briefly as follows:

1. Guerrillas recognize the superior strength and better supply system of the enemy. The guerrillas must, therefore, try to prolong the war, avoid major engagements, seek local numerical superiority, and select objectives for attacks within their capabilities to ensure victory and obtain weapons.
2. Guerrilla campaigns must be adjusted to suit political requirements.
3. Guerrillas must wage a war of extermination, seize arms, expand their forces, and destroy the enemy.
4. Guerrilla warfare must be a war of movement. Positional warfare must be avoided, although it is possible to establish and defend permanent bases.
5. Guerrillas must retain the initiative in both the attack and the retreat, and maintain great flexibility in massing, dispersing, and shifting their forces.
6. Guerrillas must conduct a defensive war but maintain the initiative by conducting a series of coordinated tactical operations, including limited objective attacks.
7. Local superiority should be sought by concentrating small units into a major unit when desirable.

8. A favorable attitude toward the guerrillas on the part of the civilian population is essential and close coordination with Party workers in the area, especially in regard to propaganda, agitation, and help to needy local people, is necessary.

9. Finally, guerrilla strength must be increased so that permanent bases can be established. These bases are the first steps toward establishing a rear area and demonstrate a relative readjustment of combat power since bases can only be established when the guerrillas are strong enough to deny the area to the enemy.

Training and Tactics

In Korea, guerrilla training varied from specially trained soldiers and political officers, who were well qualified to lead their forces, to boys who had little or no training. Training literature consisted of North Korean combat doctrine for guerrillas and translations of Chinese Communist doctrine. Mao Tse-tung's guerrilla doctrine was the basis of training. Open combat with superior forces was to be avoided. Quick action by small units was emphasized, to be followed by rapid withdrawal, dispersal, and subsequent reassembly and redeployment as a unit.

Tactical operations included ambushes, raids on army and police outposts and small settlements, harassing actions against Government forces and selected townspeople, hit-and-run terror raids, agitation and propaganda, and infiltration into Government forces.

The bulk of guerrilla incidents were raids and ambushes. Ambushes of vehicles were usually laid in a mountain pass where the road passes through a steep defile on an uphill grade and where the ambush party could take cover protected by steep banks, boulders, and forest. A road bend was a favorite place.

Small size friendly patrols were frequently ambushed from hiding at close range with devastating effect. Patrols in column are particularly vulnerable on their flanks when cover is dense.

Most raids were against towns and villages or isolated military or police installations. Raids against towns and villages usually were to loot for food, clothing, and money, and to terrorize the local population. They usually occurred at night. Police boxes along the roads were frequent targets. Towns as large as 10,000 and 20,000 population were being raided as late as the fall of 1953.

Raiding groups usually operated in groups of about 50 men, but sometimes in strengths up to 300 men. The parties were broken into two echelons. The first echelon secured the approaches and exits from the raided area, and covered the withdrawal. The second echelon, the main body, followed shortly thereafter, closed on the objective, and accomplished the mission. Withdrawal frequently would be by a different route—cross country into the mountains or across a major river. Police boxes erected on the approaches are of little value, for they can be avoided or surprised and eliminated. Similarly, bamboo and sapling woven fences around villages, costly in time, effort, money, and materials to erect, proved ineffective as antiguerrilla barriers.

Sabotage was employed to a surprisingly small degree. Apparently, a lack of mines and explosives saved the numerous and vulnerable bridges which were seldom mined or blown. Public utilities were seldom damaged, nor was there much damage to military equipment. Telephone and telegraph wires were frequently cut and trains were sometimes derailed, but the effect upon operations was negligible. The most important sabotage was arson, often in connection with terrorizing the civilian population, and sometimes--as in the cases of the great fires which swept Pusan in 1953--with huge military supply bases as the targets.

Harassment was used as a weapon of militant and propaganda operations. It was intended to lower the morale of opposing forces and intimidate the civilian population. This usually took the form of "visits" to the households of persons cooperating with the Government--threats, looting, kidnapping or murder, arson, and circulation of propaganda were the tools employed.

Propaganda disseminated by the guerrillas emphasized dissatisfaction with the Rhee regime, alleged that corruption of Government officials had contributed to ruining the impoverished people, assailed high taxes, decried police terror, and fomented anti-American sentiment.

The Communists asserted that they would ultimately win, warned the people not to support the Government, and promised a better livelihood for the people and the correction of various local grievances. Much of this propaganda was effective. The people were afraid to denounce the Communists among them or to give information until 1954, when it was apparent that the guerrillas were no longer able to take reprisals against them.

Although no longer a serious threat to military operations or supply installations, the Republic of Korea recognized that even during the course of the war it would be necessary to attempt to destroy the guerrillas who were terrorizing an area inhabited by more than 5 million people. Accordingly, a series of operations was commenced which ended on 30 June 1954 with the guerrilla menace eliminated as a material threat to peace, internal security, or stability. Less than 200 remained at large in scattered leaderless small groups at the close of the last operation. The morale and organization was broken. The remnants were surrendering and the civilian population was supporting the Government. It was then considered time to return the problem to the civil authorities as one of law and order.

Offensive Operations

The first of the special operations, Operation Ratkiller--employing a force of two Republic of Korea divisions, together with the equivalent of another division in security battalions and police--bagged the largest number of guerrillas. More than 11,000 guerrillas were killed, and more than 10,000 captured, including 50 major leaders. Approximately 4,300 of the prisoners were released after screening. This operation was conducted during the period 1 December 1951 to 16 March 1952 in the mountainous area of southwestern Korea.

Ratkiller was followed by Operation Ferret, from 17 March to 12 July 1952. Only security forces in approximately division strength operating under the Sonam (Southwest) Command--later redesignated the Southern Security Command--were employed. Several hundred guerillas were killed and captured.

Operation Mongoose, conducted with a force of approximately two divisions, operated for only a little more than a month in the same area--southwestern Korea. Nearly 500 guerillas were killed or captured.

Operation Bloodhound, conducted with approximately division strength in security forces under the Southern Security Command, continued from August 1952 to the end of November 1953. During this period the guerrilla strength had been whittled down to about 1,000 in South Korea.

The final operation, Trample, was conducted in approximately 2-division strength from 1 December 1953 to 30 June 1954. This operation succeeded in killing or capturing all the remaining leaders of significant guerrilla bands and breaking up the units. Many were entirely destroyed. The guerillas knew the end had come, and many were induced to surrender. Propaganda was directed at the civilians as well as the guerrillas, and with good effect. The population began to cooperate with the Government and to furnish information concerning the guerrillas. The reign of terror had ended. Hundreds of villages were reoccupied, land was placed back in cultivation, economic assistance was given to the relocated families, and life resumed its normal course.

Antiguerrilla Objectives

The destruction of the Communist guerrillas in Korea again proves that successful operations can be conducted against guerrilla forces. Military operations alone are not sufficient, for there are actually two objectives: the destruction of the guerrilla force, and the elimination of Communist influence on the civilian population. An over-all plan at the Government level, embracing political, psychological, economic, administrative, and military action, designed to prevent the formation of a guerrilla force, or to weaken it if it is already formed, must be adopted.

Purely defensive measures will permit a guerrilla force to grow and become strong. The initiative must be taken from the guerrillas. Limited offensive operations are better than none. Continuous, unrelenting pressure on the guerrilla must be maintained. Defensive measures are employed, of course, to protect supply and communications installations.

The major political and psychological mission is to win the active and willing support of the people and to deprive the enemy of that support. Skillful propaganda aimed at the people and the guerrilla can do much to help discourage support of the guerrillas, discourage others from joining, and induce others to surrender. A thorough knowledge of the needs, customs, and beliefs of the people is essential. The old principle of reward and punishment is still applicable. The people should be given real incentives to oppose the guerrillas in the form of economic and other benefits such as rewards for information. Punishment must be

meted out to those who support the guerrillas. Propaganda and persuasion geared to local issues and in readily understandable form should be employed. The attitude of the Government officials, police, and Army toward the people must be exemplary at all times. Harsh, unjust, arbitrary action or the mass punishment of innocent people for the misdeeds of a few will drive the people into the guerrilla ranks.

The Military Campaign

The military campaign should be in harmony with the political, psychological, and economic policies. Not only must the guerrillas be isolated from the civilian population, but they must be broken into small units isolated from each other. If the guerrillas are based in an area adjacent to or near a friendly or sponsoring power, then that base must be seized and the guerrillas cut off from contact, supplies, and support of the sponsoring power. This should drastically affect their supplies of arms, ammunition, and explosives, and should impair their communications and lower their morale. Finally, the campaign should attempt to cut off their food supply. These are the vulnerabilities of the guerrillas. The campaign plans should exploit them fully.

Intelligence

Military operational plans must also be based on complete and detailed intelligence. To this end a comprehensive intelligence net should be established with emphasis on transmitting information of guerrilla activity by the most rapid means available. All intelligence collection agencies must funnel their information in to the G2 of the antiguerrilla force commander without delay. It is especially important that police and other civil agencies understand and comply with this requirement. Also, agents must be developed among the civilians who normally pass through or live near guerrilla base areas. The judicious expenditure of funds to purchase information can save many weary, fruitless reconnaissance missions, although properly planned reconnaissance is also essential.

The intelligence collection effort should be complete. A detailed study of the weather, terrain, the local conditions, history of the guerrilla movement, reasons for the guerrilla movement, factors favoring the guerrillas, and guerrilla vulnerabilities and weaknesses must be made. Complete order of battle information on each unit to include each member of each unit is desired. Personality files should include all local connections; frequently a mother can persuade her son to surrender, or a guerrilla leader can be captured while visiting his wife or girl friend. Special efforts must be made to kill or capture guerrilla leaders and seize their communications equipment. Aerial reconnaissance is often helpful in locating hidden camps, and ground reconnaissance by trained units should also be employed.

Combat Operations

Counterintelligence plays an important role in antiguerrilla operations. The enemy ordinarily has excellent intelligence. It is essential, therefore, to preserve the secrecy of operational plans so that the guerrillas do not escape before the trap is sprung. It should

be remembered that guerrillas also attempt to infiltrate antiguerrilla organizations. The Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) must check all indigenous personnel carefully, especially any who are taken into confidence. Finally, the CIC may be able to assist in infiltrating our own agents into the enemy area, in preparing cover and deception plans, and in the collection of intelligence.

Combat operations against guerrillas follow this sequence: The antiguerrilla force commander establishes his headquarters near the guerrilla area, moves his troops in, establishes bases of operations, takes appropriate security measures, obtains essential intelligence, prepares operation plans, and launches combat operations against the guerrilla forces. Continuous pressure is maintained to seek out, gain contact with, and destroy the enemy. The guerrillas must be given no opportunity to rest, reorganize, rehabilitate, recruit or prepare for future operations. The operation is over when there are no guerrillas remaining--not when the guerrillas have been disorganized and dispersed.

Antiguerrilla Tactics

Guerrillas normally avoid contact with superior forces. They rely heavily upon their intelligence and security warning agencies in order to avoid surprise. Nevertheless, surprise should be sought in the offensive to get an opportunity to destroy them. Deception, speed of maneuver, ruses, ingenuity, and aggressive leadership offer the best possibilities of attaining surprise. Excellent mobility--on the ground as well as by vehicles--is essential to overcome the guerrillas' superior knowledge of the terrain and their intelligence system.

Encirclement is the most favored maneuver in antiguerrilla operations, but it requires very large numbers of troops if the objective is large or in rough terrain, as it normally is. There is a strong possibility that the enemy may escape through gaps in the ring of encircling troops. All troops should arrive at the line of departure simultaneously, preferably just before dawn, deployed on a skirmish line in continuous close contact. Reserves are placed in depth blocking the most likely escape routes to apprehend any guerrillas who escape. The ring is tightened as the units close on the center. The enemy must be flushed out into the open. In areas of heavy cover, skillfully camouflaged and hidden guerrilla caves and bunkers are almost impossible to detect. The reconnaissance must be thorough and painstaking if results are to be obtained.

Another maneuver is a drive across a suspected guerrilla hideout area. This may be accomplished with fewer troops than encirclement. Again secrecy and speed of execution are essential. The guerrillas should be driven toward a blocking force which will destroy the guerrillas as they seek to escape. Additional blocking forces should cover other escape routes.

Once contact is gained, the basic fundamentals of fire and maneuver, aggressive and rapid closing on the enemy's flanks, and vigorous pursuit are followed as in any other tactical engagement. The objective must be the killing or capture of the entire guerrilla force. Guerrillas will attempt to hold off pursuit by a rear guard delaying

action while the main body escapes. The rear guard would then disperse and hide or attempt to outdistance the pursuers.

Organization and Leadership

Special antiguerrilla forces--composed of experienced woodsmen, hunters, rangers, foresters, or other men at home in the guerrilla's habitat--organized, equipped, and trained to beat the guerrilla at his own game will permit minimum forces to engage the guerrilla and often achieve greater success than conventional forces many times their size. They specialize in surprise, deception, and night movement and fighting. Such forces gain in effectiveness as they gain familiarity with the enemy and the terrain, and should not be removed from an area until the guerrillas have been destroyed.

In Korea there was little occasion to employ armor, artillery, or tactical air support against guerrillas. Air reconnaissance is of value, and was not used enough. Air observers can be helpful in directing troops toward escaping guerrillas during an attack. Engagements are usually fought with small arms. Light infantry mortars are capable of delivering all the heavy weapons support needed. Light recoilless rifles are of some value. The mobility of the attacking troops must be given priority over heavy fire support. In most guerrilla warfare this means foot mobility.

Leadership, tactical ingenuity, perseverance in the face of repeated frustration, professional skill, physical endurance, and the maintenance of morale under conditions of great hardship are severely tested in conducting operations against guerrillas.

Communist guerrilla warfare can succeed if the danger is not recognized, if the character of the action is underestimated, and if only conventional military action is employed. At the lower tactical levels, the unskilled, complacent, and superficial commander is rewarded by ambush, sabotage, defeat, and failure. At the national level, the result can be catastrophe and national defeat--as the Germans in the Soviet Union, the French in Indochina, and Chinese Nationalists on the mainland learned.

The Communist guerrillas can be beaten if, at the Government level:

1. The nature, objectives, tactics, and vulnerabilities of the enemy are recognized.
2. A broad policy, combining military action conducted by adequate specially trained forces under dynamic leadership employing political, economic, and psychological measures designed to gain the support of the civilian population, and isolate and destroy the guerrillas, is adopted.

This has been demonstrated in Greece, Korea, the Philippines, Iran, and Burma.

Guerrilla Balance Sheet

What did the guerrillas accomplish in Korea? They diverted combat units and manpower from the front. They supplied intelligence to North

Korea until their communications failed. They terrorized large areas and kept millions of people in turmoil. They prevented effective Government control over large areas for several years. They prevented the cultivation of some land. They engaged in minor harassing actions against the lines of communication. However, after the front was stabilized early in 1951, they failed to constitute a real threat to the rear area or to combat operations.

What were their vulnerabilities? They suffered decreasing civilian support due to their cruel and terrorist tactics. They had no secure bases. They had no reliable, effective contact with North Korea for supply and communications. They lacked supplies, good arms, ammunition, medical service, adequate communications, sufficient training, and finally, they lacked a belief in ultimate victory.

Lessons Learned

Many mistakes were made in conducting antiguerrilla operations in Korea. At first the political, psychological, economic, and military policies were not adequately coordinated; that situation improved substantially by 1953 and 1954. Sometimes there was a lack of unity of command. This promoted rivalry and jealousy between the police and the Army; at times the two forces were operating in the same area and because of lack of coordination they engaged each other. The situation was corrected late in 1953 by subordinating the police to the Army for antiguerrilla operations. The troops used in antiguerrilla operations frequently were not adequately trained for this mission. Other units were kept continuously engaged on antiguerrilla missions until they became stale and ineffective and they needed retraining desperately. Small unit leadership was often poor and lacking in aggressiveness, as was evidenced by the fact that repeated contacts with guerrillas were made without results.

Political, psychological, and economic measures were not well coordinated until late in the campaign. The national economy suffered from inflation, the inevitable result of the war. Propaganda was not directed at the civilian population intelligently and, therefore, often lacked appeal. The offering of substantial monetary rewards for information leading to the apprehension of guerrillas would have been an effective incentive, and would have been much less expensive than the operational methods used--moreover, rewards would have actively aligned the people on the side of the Government. The police--who were too numerous and too poorly paid and trained--were ineffective and too oppressive in their dealings with the people. This helped swell guerrilla ranks by creating resentment toward the Government and a desire for vengeance.

Another serious omission was the failure to organize, equip, train, and charge local governmental units with responsibility for local self-defense. There were so-called volunteer police, but they were ineffective. The local citizens should have been given responsibility to organize recognized vigilantes to cooperate with Army units operating in the area.

There were too few specially trained antiguerrilla forces. More should have been trained to fight the guerrilla on his own terms.

Intelligence was not as effectively coordinated as it should have been. The police often failed to report information of guerrilla incidents in time for competent Army units to take counteraction.

Many of these defects were remedied or improved during the conduct of operations--others were not. To the extent that they were not, the over-all antiguerrilla campaign was impaired.

That the campaign was successfully concluded is a tribute to the untiring efforts and perseverance of thousands of Republic of Korea Army officers and men, and to many conscientious National Police officers. Many local citizens and officials who braved Communist threats to continue to do their duty and support their country also deserve credit.

Conclusions

Communist guerrillas can be beaten if prompt, aggressive action is taken. The plan must coordinate political, psychological, economic, and military operations. The initiative must be seized; relentless pressure must be applied.

The guerrillas must be deprived of civilian support, and the active cooperation of the civilian population must be gained. The guerrillas must be cut off from the support of their sponsoring power and their sources of supply.

Specially trained antiguerrilla forces utilizing qualified local men employing guerrilla tactics are much more economical in cost, numbers and results than large forces employing conventional methods. Local governmental units must be given the means and charged with the responsibility of combating guerrillas in their areas.

Adequate incentives to support the Government and oppose the guerrillas must be provided. Propaganda should be addressed to the local population and deal with local problems. The people must be reassured that it is in their interest to support the Government.

A comprehensive, effective intelligence net, utilizing all collection agencies and sources available, operating under centralized direction, is essential in antiguerrilla operations.

Tactics should emphasize encirclement, wherever possible, surprise, deception, speed of execution, thorough reconnaissance, mutual support of patrols, aggressive closing with the guerrillas on gaining contact, fire and maneuver, maintenance of contact and vigorous pursuit until the enemy is destroyed, and relentless pressure to flush out the guerrillas and keep them on the move so that superior forces, coordinated by excellent communications and taking advantage of superior mobility, can close with and destroy the guerrillas.

Operations against guerrillas should be continued without interruption until the guerrilla force is completely destroyed.

Current United States Army doctrine on antiguerrilla warfare, as enunciated in Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations--Operations,

Field Manual 31-15, Special Operations--Operations Against Airborne Attack, Guerrilla Action and Infiltration, and Field Manual 31-20, Special Operations--Operations Against Guerrilla Forces is sound and adequate.

Recommendations

It would appear desirable to give more instruction in antiguerrilla operations in service schools, and more training in this subject to units.

Antiguerrilla plans should be prepared by every command faced with the possibility of a guerrilla threat. Recommendations for the adoption of political, psychological, and economic policies designed to prevent the rise of a guerrilla force or to minimize its effect should be pressed vigorously on the government concerned.

Soldier of the Future*

Maj. Boyd T. Bashore, U.S. Army

WILL IT BE TALL, CLEAN-CUT, SUPERBLY ARMED PRIVATE JACK ARMSTRONG, ALL-AMERICAN FIGHTING MAN, OR FRAIL, UNKEMPT, ILL-ARMED PRIVATE LE CAO QUANG OF THE VIET CONG?

Private Jack Armstrong, U.S. Army, considers himself and is considered by many others as the Soldier of the Future. Soon he will be able to remain in constant contact with his squad leader through his helmet radio. He will be armed with an all-purpose hand weapon and wear starched and pressed thermal fatigues protected by a light-weight vest of armor. When not travelling in a ground zero pressure vehicle he will whip about in a helicopter, an armored vehicle, or at least a truck or jeep. When he really gets into a bind he may consider using an energy-trust propellant to hurdle hazardous, fire-swept terrain. For digging himself in he will have an explosive foxhole digger. Close air support will be provided by helicopters armed with machine guns, rockets, and guided missiles. Armstrong will be qualified as a ranger, a reconno, and a paratrooper. Backing him up is an impressive arsenal of tactical and strategic nuclear and nuclear-free missiles. He is indeed the very model of a modern combat-arms soldier.

But our Private Armstrong faces keen competition in the person of Private Le Cao Quang, Viet Cong (South Vietnamese communist guerrilla). Quang contrasts with what the U.S. Army in its most visionary press releases calls the Soldier of the Future. He owns neither helmet radio nor armor, and carries no "ray gun." Well-worn canvas, rubber-soled shoes are his zero ground pressure vehicle. He has neither trucks nor jeeps, and certainly no protection from rocket-armed helicopters.

Quang wouldn't meet the standards of even a mediocre soldier in today's U.S. Army. No six-foot, rock-jawed paratrooper or ranger, this wiry, slight, almost frail-looking soldier has little formal civil or military training and has never undergone a neat week-by-week basic and advanced individual training course. He seldom sees aircraft and never a parachute. Initially, his training consisted of dismantling and assembling his weapon a few times, dry-firing it when possible. After that he simply padded along quietly and patiently behind his better-trained guerrilla comrades moving out to actual operations. Usually, untrained guerrillas like Quang get their first combat experience on "resupply" ambushes, observing the veterans but not really participating in a key role. Quang is allowed to "waste" precious bullets only during his first real fight. Once blooded, the trainee is on his way through the course, graduating by being allowed to participate in full-scale raids against South Vietnamese positions. You pass out of this basic course by being killed or wounded.

In one of our platoons Quang certainly would lose his first crack at a weekend pass, for he would never pass an inspection of personal appearance or field equipment. Quang doesn't sport the American version of the Prussian haircut. Usually his hair is long, sometimes unkempt and stringy, often infested with lice. Not that Quang inherently is filthy, for he isn't. He

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belongs to a race that, in the proper atmosphere, is as meticulous in dress and appearance as facilities allow. But Quang is at war. He lives in the swamps of the Plaine des Joncs (Plain of Reeds), in the Mekong Delta.

Quang would be little impressed with the "realism" displayed in some of our jungle and guerrilla training. For a few weeks once or twice at most in their careers, a small percentage of our infantry soldiers undergo ranger or recondo training, living briefly in the jungle. Quang lives like a jungle or swamp animal, and develops the instincts of one. His entire military career is spent under these primitive conditions, until victory or death overtakes him.

For Armstrong's starched and pressed fatigues, stand-up field cap, and black shiny boots, Quang substitutes two combat suits of unpressed, washed-in-the-canal calico noir, the black native dress worn by the peasants of the area to which his unit is assigned. Sometimes he transforms this into a "uniform" by attaching a colored armband or a scarf around his middle to more easily identify himself in a fire fight. He has never heard of thermal clothing. In place of that stiff cap Quang prefers the floppy French military jungle cap or a native helmet, properly camouflaged. On neither of these, however, has he ever considered the need for a Polaroid face piece or a microminiaturized printed-circuit radio. His cloth-and-rubber-soled shoes win easily over the leather boot, impractical in the jungle, which for almost a decade some people have been trying rather unsuccessfully to foist upon Asian soldiers. Quang has one pair of these canvas shoes. The communists have found that to fight guerrilla style you don't have to be a conformist, every man and unit looking exactly like all others.

When Quang lays out his nonconformist full field pack, for instance, you get a perfect example of what a "poor" soldier is. There is no eyewash, no never-used-except-for-field-inspection soap, razor blades and tooth paste, all gleaming neatly in their Cellophane wrappers. If he is so fortunate as to own a piece of soap, a tooth brush or a comb, you can be sure it is well worn. Besides clothing he has a three-meter rainproof nylon sheet, a mosquito net, a hammock, and some rope. This is his full field equipment.

In a physical fitness test, Quang would draw a blast from his American squad leader, who might rate him "poor to fair" on his physical fitness score card. During his daily routine Quang has little opportunity for practicing squat jumps, sit-ups and push-ups. But turn him loose among the paddies or in a jungle, even at night, and he'll probably outwalk, outcreep and outcrawl most of us who consistently average "excellent" on the formal test. More likely than not, he's been squishing through those same fields and jungles since he was a boy in charge of the family's water buffalo. And he does it very effectively, unaided by energy-thrust propellants.

As for equipment, Quang is one of the fortunate few. He has been issued a French MAS 36 rifle. It is old and scarred, ammunition is hard to find or capture, and there are no spare parts. But at least Quang is much better armed than some of his upland brothers who must creep and crawl to within a few yards of armored cars to get an aimed shot at the crew with that splendid weapon and substitute for the SS-11, the crossbow with its poisoned arrow. Although Quang is moderately equipped with light weapons, and certainly seldom well-trained in anything higher than individual and small-unit tactics, his

side has the advantage in combat: it is on the offensive. Especially at night, Quang ranges forth from his "safe haven" in carefully planned assaults at the times and places of his choosing.

Quang considers it a privilege to be classed as an aggressive fighter in his outfit, not one of its usually unarmed "safe areas" defenders who must pick up a weapon from a casualty. The principal duty of such defenders is to dig panji traps and erect defensive positions. (A panji is a camouflaged pit at the bottom of which needle-sharp bamboo stalks are imbedded.) In the southern part of Vietnam most panjis are simply boards with nails driven through. In addition to mining these traps with hand grenades, the defenders usually urinate or defecate on the tips of the panji's slivers in hopes of inducing fatal infection or tetanus in victims. (This is one of the few occasions when Quang can be induced to relieve himself with anything like regularity, and especially in a pit. The sanitary conditions and medical standards under which he lives are appalling, and often a wound results in death.)

After panjis are dug Quang and his comrades need only sit and wait. The traps act as silent sentinels, an integral part of an ambush. The traps are cunningly concealed in cover which the enemy will instinctively seek when firing opens. (During one action a South Vietnamese infantry battalion lost one man killed by a poison arrow, 10 wounded by panji traps. During this two-day fight, no casualties were inflicted by bullets or bayonets.)

The five squads in Quang's unit bivouac are spaced about 20 meters apart. Each squad erects breastworks about 18 inches high in sections three to four yards long, and these positions are ringed with panjis. During daytime one sentinel posts Quang's unit and at night guard posts are manned by two men.

Like soldiers anywhere, Quang has a rather set routine when not actually in combat away from this "safe area" defensive position. Reveille is at 0300. Food is issued twice daily, each guerrilla's share being a liter of rice, together with some nuoc mam, a fish sauce. Each squad is issued eight liters of kerosene a month. Viet Cong guerrillas begin cooking their rice immediately after reveille and eat around 0500. Political indoctrination is from 0630 to 1130. More rice at noon, followed by the traditional siesta. Weapons training and tactical instruction are conducted in the afternoon.

After dinner, around 1900 hours, there is a critique of the day's combat operations or other activities. After this the troops are expected to listen to Radio Hanoi. Then the men are permitted to sleep.

Quang has never heard of Davy Crockett or nerve gas. He is ignorant of the fact that Pershing, Lacey or Little John could all be quickly arrayed against him. (They would have a hell of a time finding him.) When jets shriek over his swamp area once or twice a week, Quang looks up in unadorned wonder.

Since the cold war began our green herring-bone-twill Army has only once actively participated in combat. Little "unsoldierly" guerrillas like Quang have patiently padded along their trails, fighting hard and almost constantly since 1946 in the swamps of the Mekong. Quang, his methods of fighting, and the ideology which impels him are formidable adversaries. Right now he and his comrades are in the process of attempting to take over two more countries of Asia. Our black combat boots are spit-shined, our fatigues starched and pressed, our spring-up field caps well blocked. But we must never disdain Private Quang. He could very well be the Soldier of the Future.

Brigadier R. C. H. Miers, British Army **

If your job is to eliminate Communist terrorists in Malaya you won't get far these days without a good flow of Police Special Branch Intelligence; that is, information obtained from civilian informers or better still from that very rare bird, a traitor in the terrorist organization itself. With only some 1,500 terrorists now left in Malaya and those, after ten years' experience, as cunning and elusive as wild cats, it is no longer much use just going into the jungle and hunting for them. Even if you are lucky enough to find them they will seldom stand and fight unless driven into a corner, and as we all know there are precious few corners in the jungle.

To gain any measure of success, then, you must have good Special Branch information which in turn postulates good Special Branch officers, and in this respect my battalion has been well favored during the past few years. Both of the men with whom we have worked have been first class though as different in individual approach as chalk is from cheese. The first, Evan, was a particularly colorful character, a delightful companion too, with a great fund of good humor and cultural interests rare for these parts. Evan was a man of the widest interests who searched the crannies and crevices of life for its better understanding and enjoyment. To call on him in his bachelor home was always diverting. One evening he might be found resplendent in white dinner jacket taking his ease in that long chair beneath the Henri Matisse reproduction, glass of brandy in hand, listening peacefully to his fine selection of classical records. On another he would be huddled conspiratorially round a small table talking in low tones to a couple of shifty-eyed informers. Or yet again one might find him rigged out in full jungle kit, face blackened with grease paint, waiting to go out on some reconnaissance or ambush; for Evan was no back room boy. Far from it. He hated being left out of the sharp end of any operation, and as if to justify his inclusion he would often wear, perched on the back of his head, a somewhat faded and shrunken green beret to proclaim his wartime association with the Commandos. Before coming to Malaya he had for a time been Winston Churchill's bodyguard and his reminiscences of this period would, had he not once made a solemn promise never to publish them, have filled a book. Earlier he had served his apprenticeship with the Metropolitan Police as a Special Branch officer and undergone all the chores of attending, incognito, political meetings of Communists, Fascists and other eccentrics in order to note down what the speakers said. With his splendid sense of humor Evan had been less irked than most by these dreary tasks and had some delightful stories about them. In particular we loved to hear of the occasion when he and his Boss, slipping quietly into the back row of some East End meeting, were dismayed to hear the chairman call for silence and announce:

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**Army Magazine will publish another article by Brigadier Miers in March 1962 entitled "Both Sides of the Guerrilla Hill".

"Gentlemen. It has come to our notice that plain clothes policemen purporting to be members of the Party have been worming their way into our gatherings. They have no right to attend these private meetings and I ask you now to be alert and on your guard, ready to expose these miserable spies, these wolves in sheep's clothing."

An angry rumble greeted this call to arms. People turned to inspect their neighbors. At last one or two pairs of suspicious eyes began to rest on Evan and his companion. Evan rose to his feet:

"Mr. Chairman," he said, pointing an accusing finger at his Boss, "I do not like the look of this man. He has been acting in a very peculiar manner ever since he came in."

A posse of stewards rushed forward. No; said Evan's Boss, he was not a member of the Party. No; he had not got an invitation to the meeting. Yes; with a last long threatening look towards Evan, he supposed he would have to leave if he was not wanted. His hurried departure, made to the accompaniment of boos and cat-calls, was followed by the chairman hammering on the table for silence and making another announcement. The loyal comrade, he said, who had so fearlessly unmasked the impostor in their midst should be rewarded. He was, went on the chairman, unanimously elected to the platform. Loud and prolonged applause as Evan walked down the aisle and modestly took his seat among the privileged. Evan was wont to pass over lightly his subsequent interview with the Boss. The latter, still smarting from the memory of his undignified retreat from the hall, was not, apparently, altogether impressed with Evan's argument that as their exposure as policemen was imminent it was better that one should go to the wall than that both should be forced to withdraw. It was after this adventure that Evan was posted to duty with Winston Churchill, no doubt with the idea that for once he would meet his match.

We were having lunch one day when Evan came bustling in. He was dressed, as was customary, in civilian shirt and blue shorts, but we noted with satisfaction, a gap was already appearing between the two. This was an excellent sign. The more hot the news was, the more imminent approaching action, the more his shirt would ride up, until, if things were really exciting, a great expanse of jolly white belly would be exposed, shaking and wobbling in tune with its master's animated narrative.

"Can we go somewhere more private?" asked Evan, casting a suspicious glance at the Chinese waiters.

We got up and hurried along to the office. Under his arm Evan clutched the familiar battered old brief case bulging distinctively with his automatic pistol; there was always something faintly dramatic about Evan. Inside the office he opened the brief case, fished out the enormous map he always carried, weighted it down with his pistol against the breeze from the overhead fan, and got down to business.

"I have," he said, "a very delicate Source who has been working for me for some time." "Source" is Special Branch jargon for "informer," being, we always suppose, an attempt to give a flavor of respectability to what must, after all, be a pretty dubious profession. Sources become delicate not through any physical disability, but because their activities have become such as to put them in

jeopardy of discovery by the other side. This particular Source, whom we will call Joe, looked like a winner. He was in fact a full blooded member of an armed terrorist gang, but he had seen the light; or to be more accurate, he had succumbed to a combination of the vast rewards offered by Government for the elimination of his comrades and the disillusionment of living year after year in the squalor of the jungle with community reading from Marx or Lenin as the principal divertissement during the long evenings. Although he had been working for some time for Evan, they had never met. That would have been far too risky for Joe, as discovery would have led with absolute certainty to his very unpleasant death at the hands of those he was betraying. Instead he had maintained communication with Evan through devious channels and by the passing from hand to hand of letters written on fine rice paper and rolled into tight little spills, the better for secretion about the person. It was one of these spills, which, together with its translation, Evan now placed on the table in front of him. In Joe's complicated double life matters had come to a head. Another insult from his master, which might be the first germs of suspicion developing, had convinced Joe that the time had come to strike. Loss of face to a Chinese is, of course, a shocking degradation, almost but not quite as painful as losing money. To be publicly rebuked for lack of attention, as had happened to Joe at last Wednesday's community reading, was about the end. So to the possibility of a glittering financial reward was now added the sweet incentive of revenge.

Joe's plan as given in his letter was quite straightforward. Next Saturday he was due to lead his master and two other terrorists to a meeting with a neighboring gang, the selection of the rendezvous having by great good fortune been left to Joe himself. On the way they would have to pass a fairly large clump of bushes in a rubber estate, and it was here that Joe suggested we should lay our ambush. He would be the leading member of the party of four, but as additional identification he would wear, as he usually did, a white scarf around his neck. Would we ensure, he asked plaintively, that all the soldiers were fully briefed not to shoot at him? That was the outline of his plan, then followed the details. The party of terrorists would move in broad daylight probably about 9:30 a.m. relying, as they always did, on the rubber tappers and other laborers to give warning of the presence of any government troops.

It certainly seemed a foolproof enough plan, but we would have much preferred Joe to have restrained his impatience. The delivery of the slip had taken several days. It was now Friday. Action was therefore required tomorrow, which gave us much less notice than we would have really liked. Besides, we were not too keen on an informer choosing an ambush position for us. Apart from the fact that it might turn out to be a poor choice from a tactical point of view, informers have been known to play a double game: a party of soldiers huddled in a clump of bushes could look pretty stupid if the enemy knew they were there and attacked first.

"Well, What about it?" asked Evan, examining Joe's letter inscribed so meticulously with row after row of beautifully formed Chinese characters. For a man writing the death warrant of his erstwhile friends Joe seemed to show peculiarly little emotion.

We thought for a moment. The alternative to following Joe's plan was to wait for a better opportunity with possibly more terrorists in the net and more time to perfect our plans. On the other hand Joe's sands seemed to be running out; he might be unmasked by his comrades at any moment. A bird in the hand.....

"It's 'on' so far as we are concerned," I said.

"Agreed, then," said Evan. "Mind if I come myself?"

We were delighted and knew the soldiers would be too. If Evan took the trouble to come out himself it was usually a sign that something interesting would happen.

We had a lot to do in a short time. First to select the men to form the ambush party. With a thousand to choose from, every one of whom would have given a week's pay and his back teeth to join such a promising enterprise, Solomon in all his glory would have been hard put to it to arrive at a just decision. Nor do my Welsh soldiers with their very, very plausible claims for individual preferment on these occasions exactly help the matter of selection. However, we settled for Captain Cyril Morgan in command, the Intelligence Officer, a Bren gunner, a man armed with a short gun for close quarters work, and a couple of riflemen. To these had to be added Evan and his henchman, making a total of eight men. For the next few hours these men aided by a dozen helpers worked flat out in making their preparations. In the battalion we have very strict rules for ambush parties. Nothing must be left to chance. Faces, arms and hands, in fact every inch of exposed white skin must be smeared with black grease paint lest the ambush party be spotted by a passing tapper or terrorist. Hair cream must be thoroughly washed off, for the natives have a very keen sense of smell. Anything which can possibly rattle, rifle sling swivels, metal buckles on equipment, must be bound down with adhesive tape. Then a minute inspection is carried out by two or three officers who will, for example, remove a forgotten watch from someone's wrist (the dial can act like a heliograph if it catches the sun's rays), and check that no one is suffering from a cough. After that, according to our drill, the party must carry out several rehearsals on a piece of ground similar to the actual one, and finally go down to the rifle range for a last practice shoot and check of weapons. Overelaborate preparations for such a miserable enemy? Not on your life. After living for so long like hunted animals the terrorists have acquired an instinct for danger and a speed of reaction to it which are little short of the uncanny. At the slightest hint of trouble they will be off--slipping and twisting through the undergrowth like some unearthly djinns. And they seem, too, to live with their fingers on the triggers of their weapons; they are uncommonly quick on the draw.

So in the time available the party spared no pains in their preparations. I went down shortly after midnight to see them off. Evan, green beret pulled well down on his head, carbine slung over his shoulder, loomed large and bulky among the soldiers. I said my short piece to the men which was much the same as I say to all ambush parties: Don't fire until you are certain you have your man in the sights of your rifle; to "brown off" towards a fleeing terrorist is useless. It is, like most advice, much easier to give than to follow, but it is undoubtedly the answer to obtaining success in jungle operations. Cyril Morgan then fell the party in and they moved off.

Problem One is to arrive at the ambush position undetected. It is always Problem One. Go by truck and everyone in the neighborhood will know you are in the vicinity. Walk, even by night, and the chances are that someone will spot your footprints next morning and get word to the terrorists. Fortunately in this case Joe's clump of bushes was fairly near the railway line, so Cyril decided to travel by Wickham trolley--the name given to those large enclosed armored wagons which in Malaya precede passenger trains as a form of protection against terrorist sabotage. With ample room for the whole party the trolley rattled off down the line. By previous arrangement the driver slowed down at a secluded spot; the party leapt off, slid down the embankment and waited in the shadows until the train following had passed by. The time was now 3 a.m. At the first streaks of dawn they set off in single file, taking great care to avoid leaving tracks. The last man, walking backwards, brushed over any footprints inadvertently left by the others.

So far so good. Joe's now famous clump of bushes was found without difficulty. It wasn't too bad as an ambush position, though it was a pity the track which the terrorists would use was so overgrown with vegetation. Those were the first thoughts which passed through the mind of Private Bevan, one of the riflemen of the party, as he took up his allotted position in the bushes. As a very young National Serviceman he was, as a point of fact, lucky to have been chosen, but he was a consistent good shot and had proved himself to be steady on patrol. His personal problem was now the one which, to a greater or lesser degree, has perplexed anyone who has ever tried to lay an ambush. If he moved forward until he could get a good view of the track there was more than a chance he would be spotted by a passerby; if he moved farther back he couldn't see a damn thing. Private Bevan chose what he thought was a sensible compromise and having done so, gently raised his rifle. He could just see the track all right, but now grass and fern lay over the foresight. What was that the Old Man had said? Don't fire until you have got them in your sights. Easier said than done. Well, he'd have to stand up and shoot even though that made a split second delay. His little plan made, Private Bevan settled down. It was no good pretending he was comfortable. The ground, sloping slightly upwards, made the sitting position misery. But if he lay down he could see nothing at all. Minutes dragged themselves by. At least another three hours to wait. Sweat trickled into his eyes and ran down his back. Muscles began to twitch and ache. Now all the discomfort seemed to be centered in his left leg. Hell! the wretched thing was going to sleep, that's what it was. Very gently Private Bevan tried to shift it to a new position. It caught in a branch, shaking it slightly.

"Sss . . . sh," whispered the Intelligence Officer a couple of yards away. Private Bevan worked his toes up and down in his boot. That was better. He'd take good care not to let a leg go to sleep again. His thoughts turned to his mates back in barracks. They'd be on their way to breakfast now. Lucky devils, walking about free and easy, talking and laughing. And there was he sitting like a trussed owl not even daring to clear his throat. Wouldn't the folks back home in Newport have a good laugh if they could see him. And what would they be doing now? Eight hours difference in time between Malaya and England they said, but was it forward or back? Private Bevan never had time to work this one out for suddenly there was such a resounding crash just above his head as to make his whole body rigid with tension. He gripped his rifle until it began to shake in his hands. A fresh stream of sweat ran down his face. Gingerly he peered out on to the track. Not five yards away an elderly Chinese tapper was stacking a pile of tins of the kind used for collecting the liquid rubber from the trees. The pile had toppled over with a noise which in that silence and so close at hand sounded like the knell of doom.

Farther along Cyril Morgan watched the tapper anxiously. It was just possible that the ambush party had been spotted and that the play with the tins was a general warning that troops were in the area. It was the sort of thing the tappers did, either out of real sympathy with the terrorists or because if they failed to give warning they feared the later consequences; terrorists can be very unpleasant to tappers whom they suspect of being on the wrong side. However this time Cyril's fears seemed unjustified. More people were arriving for the day's work by bicycle and on foot and everything seemed normal.

Evan was quite unperturbed. Old soldier that he was, he had selected his position on arrival and now lay flat on his back, eyes half closed. Joe had said that he would cough on approach and that was warning enough for Evan.

It is an axiom for which it is difficult to find an exception that ambushes never work out as planned. Either the terrorists come from a totally unexpected direction, or only one comes instead of the promised half-dozen, or they don't come at all. In this case they beat all guesses by coming early. It was 9 a.m. when from down the track came the sound of voices. They had a different note altogether from those of the tappers, more purposeful somehow, more authoritative, as they called out to workers in the fields. As they came nearer it was apparent, too, that they were travelling at a good pace; indeed the measured tread of their feet could now be heard. Eight pairs of eyes looked out from the bushes. Suddenly four figures, neatly dressed in khaki drill, peaked caps with a bright Red star as a badge, appeared, as it were, on stage. Each was carrying a rifle in the ready position. One of them was having an acute coughing fit.

The next few seconds were, to say the least, confused. But with the advantage of retrospect I have pieced together what I believe is the story. In the first place "white" is a classical euphemism for the dirty little strip of cloth, indistinguishable from his yellow Chinese skin, which Joe had tied round his neck. In the second place Joe made the cardinal mistake of failing to maintain his position in the lead.

As planned, Cyril fired the opening shot, wounding, but failing to stop, his man (thereby providing yet another example of the phenomenal amount of lead a terrorist can carry and still get away). Quick as a cat Evan was on his feet as Cyril swung his Tommy gun on to Joe's master--by far the most important terrorist present. But to Evan, Joe's master was blanketed by a rubber tree. What Evan thought he saw in that split second was Cyril pointing his gun in the direction of Joe himself who, at that moment, blissfully relying on his scarf for identification, was happily watching the elimination of his erstwhile comrades.

"Not that one, for God's sake!" yelled Evan.

"Okay," shouted Cyril, shifting his aim from Joe's master and letting fly at Joe, the only other terrorist he could see. Down went Joe with two bullets in his leg.

"Not that one, I said," screamed Evan.

"Make up your something mind," said Cyril, nettled.

Meanwhile the Intelligence Officer and Private Bevan were being kept busy. The fourth terrorist was dodging back to the undergrowth. Private Bevan was on his feet. "Get them in the flippin' sights," he repeated to himself. But before he could fire he felt a sharp hot pain in his thigh. This time his leg really had seemed to have gone to sleep. A broad patch of blood seeped through his trousers. Private Bevan subsided into the bushes.

Joe's master, for it was he who had opened fire on Private Bevan, decided his luck had held long enough for one day, and zigzagging through the trees, disappeared in the direction of the jungle hotly pursued by Cyril and the remainder of his men, though they had little real hope of catching a fleeing terrorist in that thick country. Ten minutes later they returned and took stock. The results were disappointing. The only visible addition to the bag was the one terrorist accounted for by the Intelligence Officer. Private Bevan and Joe lay wounded on the ground, though fortunately neither was badly hurt. Somewhere in the area there was another wounded terrorist, and Joe's master unfortunately was still at large.

It was at this stage that I arrived by helicopter in a small clearing near the scene of action. After seeing the wounded men loaded into the helicopter for the return journey I got Evan and Cyril to tell me what had happened. Relations between the two, as they recounted their separate stories, were, not surprisingly, a trifle cool. Later of course they would dine out on their misunderstanding for months to come, but at the moment the weariness which assails everyone who has been in an action, and the disappointment of missing the principal terrorist subdued even Evan's robust sense of humor. In fact, none of us need have worried. Within an hour our "follow-up" party, complete with a tracker dog, picked up the wounded terrorist and not long afterwards Joe's master, hunted and harried, gave himself up. But all that belongs to another story.

That afternoon, after the hue and cry had subsided, I went to visit Private Bevan in Hospital. In one bed, looking very comfortable, was Private Bevan. In the other, bright as a peacock and welcoming me with a friendly grin, was Joe. Both were astonishingly cheerful and obviously getting on famously together. A nurse dressed in spotless white came bustling in. The boys, she said with mock severity, had had quite enough excitement for one day. Time for sleep. For a moment I watched her tucking in the bedclothes and smoothing the pillows. The whole thing was delightfully incongruous. British soldier in one bed. Chinese ex-Communist in the other. A moral seemed to be lurking somewhere round the corner, but it escaped me. However, in the inimitable manner of the British soldier Private Bevan summed it all up with precise accuracy.

"It is," he said as he obediently closed his eyes in preparation for sleep, "a flippin' rum sort of war."

Malaya Jungle Patrol*

Maj. Bruce F. Meyers, U.S. Marine Corps

The 1st New Zealand Battalion is stationed in northern Malaya near the Thai border. Its mission is much the same as any Marine infantry battalion's: "...seek out and destroy the enemy in the jungle and its fringes." In the 18 months since its wiry, little commander, Lt. Col. Kim Morrison, DSO, brought his men from New Zealand to the jungles of Malaya, the battalion has 15 counted "kills" and taken 13 prisoners.

The battalion is billeted at Taiping and operates its headquarters and four rifle companies from this semi-permanent base. The rifle companies are commanded by majors and average 120 in strength. They operate from company bases which vary in location with the tactical situation.

I was assigned to Company "C", commanded by Maj. Jock Harvey, which was operating in the Liman Kati area on the Thai-Malayan border. Liman Kati is the name of kampong and one of the so-called new villages. Early in the campaign Security Forces found that Communist Terrorists (CTs) were being fed and supplied by Chinese sympathizers working as rubber tappers and living as squatters along the fringes of the rubber plantations and jungle. In an effort to cut off supplies for the CTs, all civilian rubber tappers and jungle farmers were relocated in government-built "new" villages. Liman Kati is such a village. It is situated on the floor of a large valley with many rubber estates. A paved roadway connects it with the towns of Kuala Kangsar to the south and Grik to the north. The village is quite typical. It is surrounded by two concentric barbed wire fences eight feet high and 20 feet apart. Entry is controlled through a central gate where Malayan police (male and female) check identification of all persons. By this means, the supply of rice and other food to the CTs is greatly controlled. All residents are under a nightly curfew and must be in their re-settlement villages by dark.

The terrain for Charlie Company's operations in the Liman Kati area is typical of Malaya. Rubber estates border the roadway down the center of the valley and extend a half mile inland on either side of the road. These estates consist of acre after acre of neat rows of trees, each with its bark slash dripping white rubber sap into a tiny cup. The edge of the rubber estates is a sharp dividing line with the dense secondary jungle. Primary jungle is relatively free of undergrowth. The area surrounding Liman Kati, however, is secondary -- once cleared and now grown back. Every conceivable type of grass, creeper, vine, plant and bamboo grows together to make a nearly impassable tangle of undergrowth. Such was the area for our operations.

Most Malayan jungle operations are conducted on squad and platoon level. This is not to say there is little activity at higher echelons. Before any operations can be conducted, detailed coordination and control is required to prevent the clash or ambush of friendly forces. Needless to say there is also the very necessary logistic, communication and command support for lower echelons.

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British rifle platoons, though smaller in size, bear some similarity to Marine rifle platoons. Usual strength is one officer and 31 men. Platoon headquarters consists of the lieutenant platoon commander, a platoon sergeant, a batman, a signaller and a rifleman. There are three nine-man sections (squads). Each is broken down into three, three-man groups: a reconnaissance or contact group (scouts), a support group (with the Bren gun), and a rifle or reserve group.

Charlie Company's camp was located about a quarter-mile from the new village of Liman Kati, 100 yards off the road on the edge of a large rubber estate. It consisted of five tents similar to the Marine Corps' squad tent in size. One was the headquarters tent (including communications back to the battalion area); one each for the two platoons (7 and 8 Platoons--the British platoons being numbered consecutively from 1 to 12 in the battalion); a recreation tent (including the charwalla, a Chinese concessionaire with limited PX supplies); and a supply and medical tent.

Most of the patrols from Charlie Company's Liman Kati patrol base were of three kinds: ambush, curfew and jungle patrols (either combat or reconnaissance). I was fortunate enough to participate in all three types.

Ambush Patrol.

Most ambush patrols are laid along known or suspected CT tracks (footpaths). Some are set up on the basis of information Special Branch (Intelligence) gains from interrogating prisoners or from informers. Seven Platoon (1st Platoon, Company "C") was scheduled for an ambush patrol during my first evening in Liman Kati. The 12-man patrol was led by Lt. Gil Duncan. It consisted of three ambush parties and a three-man curfew "cover" party. The patrol was to leave base camp early in the afternoon, taking a route through the rubber estates along the lallang grass parallel to the jungle edge. The route would take us in view of Chinese rubber tappers working the trees on the estate. Disguised as a curfew patrol, its real mission would thus be covered. The patrol would quietly drop off ambush parties along its route and continue back to the base camp at nightfall. Each of the ambush locations was covered in the patrol leader's briefing (the familiar five paragraph order). A lance corporal or senior private was in charge of each party. The party commander carried a Bren gun (similar to our BAR) and two riflemen had Stirling LMGs.

Our party was dropped off late in the afternoon about a quarter mile from our pre-selected ambush site. We took cover and rested in the tall lallang grass a half mile from the jungle edge. At about 1800 the smokeless cookers (similar to C-ration heat tabs) were broken out and the party "brewed up." A hot can of ration stew, some crackers and jam and the tea completed our meal. The jam, incidentally, comes in a tube like a tooth paste--a better method than our flat C-ration can of jam. Our last cigarette for the evening was snuffed out just before dusk and we backtracked to our ambush site.

The site was in the center of a large meadow-like area of lallang grass bordering the rubber estate. It lay along the intersection of two trails cutting through a natural fence line of scrub brush. It seemed a logical route for any CT making a rendezvous for a food pickup. Moving as silently and as unobtrusively as possible (visual reconnaissance had been made earlier in the patrol as we passed the vicinity), we arrived just prior to dark. Our three

ponchos were spread on the ground behind some grass cover two to three feet high. The Bren gun was set into position as the primary weapon and was centrally located for field of fire. Spare magazines were carefully positioned on the ponchos for immediate use. Wire was laid about 25 yards up the trails to RAF ground signal flares on both sides of the ambush. The flares, which burn four minutes, would box-in the ambush with adequate light.

Our party was in position and the ambush was set soon after dark. The three of us took up prone or sitting positions an arm's length apart, and waited. We were to wait there until 0200 and then return to base.

I was to set off the ambush by spotting the target with a three-cell flashlight. Pvt. Bowdler, at my left, was to detonate the two ground flares and use his Stirling. The Bren, sited to my right by the ambush commander, LCpl. Houtre, was our main weapon. Site selection gave us grazing fire toward gently rising ground covered with short grass stubble.

One hundred percent alert was maintained for the first three hours. After that, one-third alert status gave us each a bit of rest. Finally, we left the ambush position after seven hours of waiting, stiff, sore and disappointed. No contact. All had been bitten by the hordes of mosquitoes rising from a swampy jungle stream nearby. Insect repellent worked for a time but heavy perspiration progressively reduced its protection.

Incidentally, some patrols and ambush parties do not use repellent and rely on the twice daily tablet of Paludrine to prevent malaria. This is done because captured CTs said they had been able to avoid many ambushes because of the tell-tale smell of various items used by British and Commonwealth troops. Mosquito repellent and scented soap were two of the items. Many patrols still use the repellent, but all now use non-smelling soap.

Curfew Patrol

The curfew requires all civilians (primarily rubber tappers and small farmers) to be on a recognized track by 1600 enroute out to the rubber or jungle edge. Once they reach the main road, they can remain out of the kampong or resettlement village until dark.

Curfew patrols are made at irregular intervals and by different routes. The military turns those apprehended over to the police for investigation. But some patrols have made "kill" contacts, surprising CTs enroute into villages.

Lt. Gil Duncan was again the patrol leader. Our briefing gave the route, time of departure and return and a review of the arm and hand signals to be used. The signals are similar to Marine Corps signals. "Halt" and "forward" are the same. "Silence" is a finger to the lips. "Listen" is a cupping of the hand to the ear. The most important signal is that for the enemy--a clenched fist with the thumb pointed downward. Friendly troops are the reverse--thumbs up.

Our four-man patrol left base camp in the afternoon during a heavy rain. It continued until our return at dark. Our jungle green uniforms, canvas boots and floppy jungle hats were quickly soaked and made us blend even more with the

jungle. The canvas boots have rubber cleated soles and are about the same height as our boon-dockers. The hats, though soaked, did a fine job of keeping the rain from dripping down my neck. Weapons included an FN automatic rifle and three Stirling Patchett sub-machine guns.

A three-mile trek through rubber estates and up along the jungle edge gave the patrol quite a workout in the slippery mud and wet jungle floor. The rain helped considerably in silencing the movement of the patrol. It was pleasing to see a patrol moving silently by use of arm and hand signals, covering an area in a most thorough and professional manner.

Lack of contact and approaching darkness brought us back down to the road where we hailed a three-ton army lorry which returned us to our base camp.

Description of the ambush and curfew patrols with their unspectacular lack of contact is significant. Most patrols (more, lately, as CT contacts lessen) are boring, routine and without incident. Some units patrol for months without contact. Troop morale, it would appear, would be quite a problem, but it wasn't. Men of this battalion, from my observations, could be considered typical of those throughout Malaya. Many were National Service (British draftees) or short-service enlisted. As in the Marine Corps, most NCOs were long-term servicemen, the careerists. Without exception, after months of steady, monotonous patrolling, the morale remained very high. When a contact was made morale would soar, and then level off until the next contact. It was indeed gratifying to see the professional attitude of these modern counter-parts to Kipling's Tommy Atkins after nearly two years in the jungles of Malaya.

Jungle Patrol

The deep patrol is the more common type now being conducted in Malaya. Going into the ulu, or jungle, for periods of a few up to as many as 20 days is routine. Depth from the jungle edge is really quite a relative thing. Once inside the overhead cover, the patrol's alertness and actions are the guiding factor, regardless of distance from the patrol base.

British classify patrols by mission, either reconnaissance or fighting (combat). Like the Marine patrols, the recon party is small (three to four men) and travels so as to avoid contact. The fighting patrol is larger (platoon or more) and seeks out the CT.

Our patrol was scheduled for four days in the area west of Liman Kati. It was larger than the normal recon patrol and smaller than the average combat patrol. The patrol leader made his final medical check of personnel. This reduced the patrol to nine men. A twisted leg and recent hospitalization of two men, plus the normal leave and other administrative reasons, set the figure.

Lt. Mervyn Stewart of 8 Platoon was the patrol leader. LCpl Hales was the second in command. Migan, a native Iban tracker, a signaller, four privates, and myself completed the complement. Weapons included an M5 .303 caliber Jungle Carbine carried by the tracker, three of the new FNs, and five 9mm L2A3 sub-machine guns (Stirlings).

We had two sets of jungle green uniforms, one worn and the other carried as a "dry" spare in the pack and worn at night when based up. We wore canvas

jungle boots and carried a pair of tennis shoes ("hockey boots" to the British) to wear at night. These are of Malayan manufacture (Chinese) and don't leave the tell-tale track of the British jungle boot. They are identical to the type worn by the CTs.

Two different types of packs are used, the standard British model 1944 web pack (similar to a large Marine Corps haversack) and the Bergen rucksack. The pack holds mess gear, three days rations (for a four-day patrol), a blanket, a poncho or plastic rain sheet for overhead cover, a nylon hammock (made from two gores of a parachute that had been used for aerial resupply on a previous deep patrol), a small heat tab cooker, and miscellaneous toilet articles.

Our assigned area west of Liman Kati was to take us into dense secondary jungle three miles from the jungle edge. The route took us from an elevation of 200 feet upward to a ridgeline over 2,800 feet. The terrain was rough and broken. Many finger ridges with swift mountain streams gave us a complex of terrain compartments to patrol.

The patrol had been cleared for the area for four days. This meant liaison had been effected by Charlie Company and Battalion and any person contacted in the area was assumed to be enemy. The rules are basic. Once clearance has been obtained in an area, shoot on sight. Brevity of contact has been the history of most engagements. A unit may patrol for weeks and months and then when contact is established, the fire fight may only last from ten to 50 seconds. Obviously, it takes immediate recognition and accurate, well-aimed shots to get the "kills."

Men in the 1st New Zealand wear a blue ribbon sewn around the rim of their floppy jungle hats. Each unit has a different color or design. In the split second before firing, the hat band serves to identify friend or foe. Fortunately, contacts between friendlies have been rare and with the close patrol coordination are now nonexistent.

The CT uniform, in contrast to the Security Forces', is khaki shirt and trousers and tennis shoes. Some wear a peaked soft khaki cap with the typical red star similar to those seen in Korea.

Prior to leaving the road and entering the jungle edge, Lt. Stewart assigned primary sectors of fire. Techniques of patrolling were in most cases identical to Marine Corps methods.

Getting an early start in the morning, the patrol entered the jungle shortly after 0730. Winding upward toward our patrol objective, the high ridgeline west of Liman Kati, took most of the morning. The formation was a loose column through the lallang grass. Entering the jungle proper, the formation tightened. Interval varied from 15 to 25 feet between men and in particularly dense undergrowth, it was necessary to close up to about five feet. Stops were made every hour. During these breaks each man faced outboard toward his sector of responsibility. All communication between patrol members was by arm and hand signal.

When the patrol crossed a stream (which occurred sometimes five and six times a day), each man took a drink from his water bottle and replaced the water from the stream, not failing to add the purification tablet to prevent leptospirosis. (The British canteen is similar to ours. It has a larger mouth,

making it easier to fill and empty. Another advantage is its noiseless soft rubber top.) Even on high ridgelines the nearest stream is usually only 400 yards down either side. On occasion, water vines were cut for drinking water. A two-foot section of vine furnished a quarter canteen cup of drinkable water. It had a slight peanut-like taste.

About lunch time the first day, the patrol came across an old Communist Terrorist camp, judged to be about a year old. It was on a small slope near a swift stream in an area relatively free of undergrowth. There were three bashas, jungle shelters made of bamboo. These are small sleeping platforms about six inches off the ground with an overhead framework of bamboo poles covered with leaves to keep the occupant dry. Each shelter could bed two men and from this the camp was estimated to have been for six men. A small area had been leveled and cleared for a parade ground and evidence of a lectern and several benches indicated the occupants had undergone indoctrination even deep in the jungle. Coordinates were taken and an appropriate report made.

The patrol continued toward the ridgeline and then circled back down-slope to an area selected for a base camp. The site was some distance off the trail and near a stream for an adequate water source--but not so near that the noise of the water would drown out jungle sounds and thus reduce security. As the patrol moved into the selected area, Lt. Stewart indicated a base or 12 o'clock position. Once designated, each group moved into its assigned defensive position. All hands faced outboard and listened for about a half hour. On occasion patrols doing this have detected CT camps in the immediate area by the sound of chopping.

Once the area is determined secure, men take turns standing security while their buddies set up one-man shelters. The jungle parachute hammock is strung between two trees some 12 feet apart; overhead is stretched the poncho or plastic rain sheet; the pack and other equipment is stowed on the deck below the hammock. Cooking on the small metal cooker with heat tabs is done under the shelter.

Most units base up early in the afternoon. A 20 to 30-minute period is set to cut poles, vines, etc. and all clearing must be done at this time. A quick bath in the nearby stream and change into dry uniform and tennis shoes does wonders for one's morale after a long day of patrolling. Individual weapons are always carried or within reach even when bathing.

On this patrol we had both the standard British ration and the local or Malayan-packed ration. Both were good. The standard British ration is similar to our C-ration with oatmeal, beans, bacon, corned-beef, cheeses, stews and other similar foods. The local ration included rice and curry and makes a tasty Mulligan curry.

Members of the patrol slept in their clothes with weapons at hand. Mosquito repellent was used and some of us slept with a portion of the nylon parachute over our faces.

The fact that most of the patrol slept at night may, at first, seem incongruous with the constant alert during the day. Such is not the case. Security Forces have found that in deep jungle, the CT does not usually move at night and bivouac sites are purposely selected away from the jungle trails.

Any movement at night through heavy jungle is quickly detected by the noise or the light from a flashlight that would have to be used.

The two most critical times in security are at dawn and dusk. All hands stand-to, each facing outboard, weapon in hand, in complete alert. Personnel on night security awake the patrol about 15 minutes before dawn. The stand-to is maintained until visibility allows security of the position. At dark the same applies, hence the early stop in the afternoon so all cooking and lights will be extinguished by dusk.

Standard drill for basing up calls for establishing perimeter and connecting trails. Jungle vines are used for communication at night. Sentries can alert the patrol leader (usually located in the center of the base) by tugging on a vine. Similarly all hands can be alerted.

After stand-to and an early breakfast, our patrol moved out next morning minus packs. Two men were left as base security. The patrol could move more quickly and silently without packs. A noon snack and tea were carried in a pouch on our web belts.

The patrol worked up the steep slope some 1,000 yards to the ridgeline. The aborigines and subsequently the CTs found ridgelines offered the most rapid means of movement in the jungle. Thus, many of the major ridgelines have some form of jungle track or trail tracing their length, as did our ridgeline running up to Hill 2850. The tangle of creepers and vines which covers the slopes does not grow on the ridgelines. Instead, a plant called atap, which is 12 to 15 feet in height, grows here. Its large, narrow, spike-like leaves dry and drop to the ground, forming a noisy carpet. Only after rain is it easier to move with less noise.

Our Iban tracker stopped periodically to check for signs of CT movements. The Iban is a native of Sarawak in British North Borneo and is born in the jungle. His are mountain people. They are considered superior to the Dyak tribe who were used for a time for jungle tracking in Malaya.

Few wild animals were encountered on our patrol. On occasion, giant vultures could be seen through breaks in the overhead foliage, soaring over the tree tops. They would emit a distinctive screeching sound. Periodically, monkeys would spot the patrol and set up a howling and hooting almost human. Four wild pigs were surprised one day, and ran grunting through the undergrowth.

There are two main types of leeches in Malaya. The bull, or water leech, and the grass leech. The former is larger than the grass leech and is dark in color. The water leech lives in slow-moving streams and will attach himself to anything moving. Fortunately, we didn't encounter any of the water leeches. The grass leeches that attached themselves to us were about an inch and a quarter to an inch and a half in length and dark brown in color. Small in diameter, they are about the size of a piece of insulated wire. Once attached, they swell to two or three times in size as they fill themselves with blood. The grass leeches were found on the ground, vines, plants and grass. As the patrol made its way through this area, they would attach themselves to clothing and seek entry to the skin. It is amazing how they find even the smallest opening, such as the eyelet in the jungle boot, or small tear in the jungle pants. Particular care had to be taken after halts. Once inside the trousers,

they attach themselves to the inside of the legs near the crotch. I was told that a small amount of insect repellent spread around the tongue and eyelets and down the back seam of the canvas jungle boot would keep them out. Leeches are difficult to detach once they have bitten. If brushed off, the head may be detached in the skin. This will infect and form jungle sores.

Besides leeches, other medical problems patrols have are: scrub typhus, for which we hand-treated all of our jungle clothing with an oily substance called DFT, supposed to protect for two weeks; leptospirosis, for which we treated all water with the chlorine-smelling water purification tablets; and, malaria, for which we swallowed a twice-daily tablet of Paludrine.

Jungle sores are a modest problem. Most of us patrolled in the daytime with the sleeves of our bush jacket-like shirts rolled to the elbow because of the heat and intense humidity. During the course of the day, one was bound to be scratched by tuta mati or other sharp jungle vines. All scratches festered easily and by the end of the patrol, most of us had a number of sores that had to be treated with gentian violet to dry up.

Lack of contact characterized the second day's patrolling. The patrol returned to base just prior to dark, having covered nearly 4,000 yards of heavy jungle.

Jungle navigation is difficult and made more so by heavy overhead cover which precludes orientation by resection from distant hills and peaks. In addition to constant references to compass and map, streams, stream intersections and ridgelines are commonly used. One technique, in deep rolling jungle with few landmarks, is the use of balloons. A large plastic, colored balloon is inflated with a small, lightweight, chemical generator. It is raised 50 or so feet above the jungle cover and an Auster liaison aircraft (similar to the OE) is contacted by radio. The aircraft, having altitude, can quickly and usually quite accurately tell the patrol leader his location. Care is taken that the plane does not circle the patrol's position and disclose it to possible CTs in the area.

Checking in on our pre-arranged radio schedule, the third day, we received a CW message on the small, battery-powered Australian VHF 510 set (similar to but smaller than an AN/GRC-9). A party of six CTs had been sighted several miles north of our patrol area. Decision was made to withdraw our patrol, give the men a day to refit, and then move with reinforcements into the area of the sighting on a 20-day deep patrol.

We returned to the company base camp at Liran Kati that afternoon, tired, wet, and disappointed again at the lack of contact. This was but one patrol of hundreds deep in the jungle day after day, year after year, with only an occasional contact. Small unit leadership is at its best to keep troops at a high peak of efficiency and morale under such circumstances--a tribute to the British and Commonwealth soldiers.

The author is indebted to many people of the British, Commonwealth, and US armed services for the hospitality and efforts displayed in making these patrols possible. Particular thanks are given to Col. James Eales, USA, Military Attache, US Embassy, Kuala Lumpur, Malaya; to Lt. Col. W. R. K. Morris, DSO, Commanding Officer, 1st New Zealand Battalion, 28th Brigade,

17th Gurkha Division; and, to Maj. A. M. Cranstoun, Staffordshire Regiment, Office of the UK High Commission, Malaya. Finally, thanks are extended to the men who made these remarks possible--the patrols.

American Military Policy and Communist Unorthodox Warfare*

James D. Atkinson

Through the changing concepts of human struggle and the development of weapons from the dawn of recorded history, men have sought answers to the problems posed by the phenomenon of war. From the Napoleonic Wars onward there has been a tendency, however, to study war (and hence to build up a body of doctrine) from a single viewpoint. This viewpoint centered on the conventional aspects of warfare almost to the exclusion of the unconventional aspects of which guerrilla warfare is one. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the dead hand of military formalism is the handmaiden of military defeat. As a former Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, Gen. Alexander A. Vandegrift has wisely written (U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings: Feb. '48), "it is too often the failure of successful military forces and philosophies that they tend to fight the last war."

WWII with the air power stress on "bombs, more bombs and still more bombs" tended to reinforce the views of those who believed that doctrinal and theoretical concepts of war should be centered on strictly conventional warfare. Indeed, the appearance of nuclear weapons in 1945 seemed to add the final evidence that war was now, more than ever, a question of the simple delivery of massive destructive power.

When it became apparent that nuclear weapons would not forever remain in the hands of a single great power, questions began to arise concerning the nature of the warfare of the future. Thus, as early as 1947, the British military historian, Liddell Hart, wrote that "aggression is also likely to pursue an improved technique, designed to exploit weaknesses in the opposition while abstaining from such a direct menace, on an obviously vital issue, as to precipitate an all-out struggle."

And by 1954 an Air Marshal of the Royal Air Force believed that nuclear bombs, together with advance aircraft and the approaching perfection of long-range guided missiles, had changed the entire basis of both peace and war. Thus, Sir John Slessor wrote that "the first and most far-reaching consequence of this revolution is that total war as we have known it in the past forty years is a thing of the past."

Yet while men speculated about the strategy and doctrine of the war of the future, a different kind of "war" had been under way from the moment that the guns of WW II fell silent and this was, ironically, a war which had been given impetus by that great war of "bombs, bombs and more bombs." But this was a different kind of war. Instead of being a thing of blacks and whites--of a definite condition of either war or peace--this was a war of shadows. For this was a war in which conspiratorial and unconventional techniques played the major instead of the minor role. This was a war in which techniques of espionage,

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sabotage, subversion, strikes, psychological pressures, diplomatic maneuvering and the fomentation of class, religious and racial tensions marched side by side with guerrilla warfare. This, then, was the real war, but because there were no longer the blacks of war or the whites of peace, this amorphous grey area would sometimes reveal, mostly conceal the constant, relentless, tireless struggle which was taking place. As Professor T. A. Taracouzio has so aptly observed about the Communists, "peace must be ranked on a par with war, which has always been an instrumentality and never an end per se."

Communist Theory and Doctrine of Guerrilla Warfare

It might be expected that of all of the forms of unconventional warfare, Communist leaders would take greater interest in matters of theory related to guerrilla warfare. This is not solely because Marx and Engels devoted a good deal of attention to guerrilla warfare, but much more because the actual conditions of operation (including even geographic factors) in Russia, Eastern Europe, China, Malaya and the like, tended to favor this kind of conflict.

Communist leaders (whether Russian, Chinese or Titoists) have ever considered theory as a guide to practice. Thus, much attention has been paid to the development of a body of theory and doctrine so that guerrilla warfare can be tailored to fit a given situation in a given area or country. Guerrilla warfare then, as developed in Communist doctrine, must not be thought of as only an appeal to physical force. It represents, instead, a combination of violent methods with such things as propaganda and political organization.

Mao Tse-tung has written about guerrilla warfare more extensively than any other Communist chieftain. He illustrates this concept of the mixing of violent and non-violent methods (and hence of the necessity for a body of doctrine) when he states that "without a political goal guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political aspirations do not coincide with the aspirations of the people, and their sympathy, cooperation, and assistance cannot be gained." Implicit in this theory is the idea that guerrilla warfare proceeds from the agitation and propagandizing of the people, from economic bases, from political-organizational activities, and from, in many cases, stimulation through carefully thought-out acts of terrorism.

In a practical fashion we find much evidence to suggest that these theoretical and doctrinal concepts are followed through in actual situations. Thus Tito, when he launched his partisan warfare campaign in Yugoslavia, concentrated on the political side of affairs well before his partisans engaged in any real combat against the German forces. For example, a "People's Committee" was set up as a framework for a "shadow" government in Serbia, a Communist guerrilla newspaper, BOREA (FIGHT) was put into operation, and a "People's Front" (for the attraction of Yugoslav nationalists as well as for Communist sympathizers) was launched with the idea that it would form the basis for the new Communist regime which Tito and his associates believed could be forged from the fires of the guerrilla war. This impact of Communist theory in developing a long-range view of the nature and conduct of guerrilla warfare has been well analyzed by a Greek commander who was faced with a similar problem during the post-war period. Field Marshal Papagos has pointed out that during WW II, the Greek ELAS partisan

force "was developed not to help the Allies win the war but to help Moscow win the peace after the war--and with the ultimate, very long-range objective of placing the Soviet Union in a dominant position in the Mediterranean."

An example of still another method of the application of doctrine to a concrete situation in guerrilla warfare is furnished by Khrushchev's use of terrorism. During WWII Khrushchev was in charge of guerrilla warfare on one large sector of the eastern front. In order to get more recruits for the guerrillas and to inflame the populace, he gave orders for the assassination of the milder local puppet rulers set up by the Germans while the cruel puppet leaders were spared in order to better create hatred of the Germans among the occupied population.

Thus, whether the methods used are "people's fronts" for gaining segments of the population, the employment of clandestine newspapers and roving agitators to enlist sympathy, or the use of terrorism, the theory of Communist guerrilla warfare provides for a mixing of violent and nonviolent techniques in what is a blended politico-military effort. Major General Sidor Kovpak, leader of Soviet guerrillas in the Ukraine, has stressed this idea by stating that "in partisan warfare the sympathy of the population must be won. Reliable and constant contact with the people means everything. Partisan warfare is inconceivable without the support of the people." The Chinese Communists stress even more the idea of the intermixture of political-sociological-military factors in guerrilla war. Thus a resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party of 1 September 1942, pointed out that "because of the special nature of the guerrilla areas, the unification of leadership should not merely be limited to mutual relationships; there must also be unification, when necessary, of party, governmental, military, and mass structures. . ."

The long Communist struggle in Malaya, however, supplies one of the best available case histories in illustrating the conduct of guerrilla warfare in accordance with a body of doctrine. This "bandit war," as it has been called by the British, has now been going on for 10 years and there is no end in sight. The cadres for the leadership of the guerrilla warfare in Malaya may be said to have been established as far back as 1924, for in that year the Chinese Communist Party sent agents to Malaya. One of the early Communist organizers in Malaya later became an important guerrilla chief in his own right. This was Ho Chi-minh who came to Singapore in 1930 as a Comintern representative. It was not until WWII, however, that the patiently built Communist cadres acquired the necessary strength and opportunity to engage in actual operations. This occasion arose with the Japanese occupation and the acquisition of arms sent in by the British for resistance against the Japanese forces. The first phase of the anti-British guerrilla war was begun in 1947 (civil government had returned to Malaya in 1946) and plans for a "People's Democratic Republic" were launched by the Malayan Communist Party on 25 January 1949. Since that time the guerrilla war has adhered to the classic Communist doctrine of propaganda, alternate blandishment and terrorization of the indigenous population, assassination of opposition leaders (for example, the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney was ambushed and murdered on 7 October 1951), quick hit-and-run raids and occasional operations with larger forces. This coordinated pattern of guerrilla warfare on the Malay peninsula has, in accordance with Communist theory, been aided and

abetted by supplementary unconventional type operations in Singapore itself, consisting of extensive propaganda, penetration of existing free institutions such as the schools, strikes and (October, 1956) demonstrations and rioting. The New York Times (29 October 1956) reported that the most recent outbreak of rioting from 24 through 28 October had made it necessary to withdraw "strong elements" of British troops from the Malay Federation area in order to quell the riots. These troops were thus diverted from their anti-Communist guerrilla operations through the application of a somewhat different kind of pressure and yet a pressure which, in the Communist doctrinal view of the politico-military nature of guerrilla warfare, is related to the over-all objective. Above all, the Communist doctrine of guerrilla warfare, whether applied by Chinese Communists, Viet Minh Communists, or Russian Communists permits Communists of whatever country or area to approach the struggle with non-Communist forces not only in a way attuned to their historical approach towards all forms of unconventional war, but also in terms of the actual weaknesses of Communism itself and, especially in this nuclear age, in a way which tends to minimize the risk of all-out war.

The Study of New Departures in Warfare

Only within the past decade has there been a serious attempt on the part of writers in the non-communist world to grapple with the problems of guerrilla war and other unconventional warfare methods. For it must be remembered that guerrilla warfare is much broader than any mere arbitrary assignment of its employment by communists alone. For the past several years, for example, guerrilla warfare has been used in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco against the French and many of the border forays between the Arabs and Israelites have adhered to the classical guerrilla pattern. Even more, the 1956 happenings in Hungary indicate that resistance-type warfare is a double-edge sword. While it can be employed effectively by the Communists, it is a weapon which can also be turned against them. The Communists have found that strong nationalistic impulses can be employed by them to stir up revolt against the constituted authority of various non-communist countries. We have witnessed graphic demonstrations in both Poland and Hungary of how these same intensely held feelings of nationalism may be used against entrenched Communist regimes. In fact, in the attention which Communist theoreticians and military men have devoted towards building up a body of doctrine of guerrilla and resistance warfare, we can find many elements which may be turned against the Communists themselves. Equally, while the political leaders of the free world hesitate to employ nuclear weapons in areas in which the Communists are conducting guerrilla warfare, we have seen, illustrated by the fighting in Hungary, that the Communist leaders themselves hesitate to employ nuclear weapons against the anti-Communist rebels.

The Warfare of the Future

It would be a bold prophet indeed who would predict the future pattern of warfare. We do seem to be able to stand on firm ground, however, when we refuse to become wedded to any single weapon or strategy. Most of all we must avoid the tendency to develop atrophy of military thought for in this direction lies not merely complacency, but madness. There is a real danger that our military thinkers (and planners) may devote so much attention to the massive operations of WWII--important though they were--that we will fail to build up a body of

doctrine for the "little" wars which we may well have to fight. We hear assurances that "if we can handle a big war, we can also take care of a little war." This is misleading, for military operations of different purposes and magnitude require different types of armed forces and, significantly, a different body of doctrine. And here, it would seem, we must take cognizance not only of the lessons of guerrilla warfare and resistance movements during WW II, but also of the guerrilla and other unconventional warfare operations in Malaya, Tunisia, Algeria, Greece and other parts of this great globe during the troubled decade 1946-1956.

For we must realize that in spite (or, possibly, because) of the development of nuclear weapons, jet aircraft and guided missiles, guerrilla warfare with its small actions, its propaganda appeals to the local population (rather than mass propaganda to millions) and its other special problems is very much with us. The United Press reported on 31 October 1956, for example, that a Chinese Communist newspaper stated that guerrillas "attacked Red soldiers, disrupted communication lines and sabotaged 'production units'" in Sinkiang Province. This is typical of the news stories which one may read over his morning coffee and, although these stories do not usually gain the headlines, they do point up the problem: guerrilla warfare is one the problems of warfare of our times. It is a challenge which calls for a response on the part of our military thinkers.

During the period between the two great wars, the US Marine Corps pioneered in the development of a body of doctrine for amphibious warfare though many military people were skeptical about the need for such a doctrine. In the present world crisis, the unfolding chain of current events indicates the necessity for a doctrinal foundation for many of the unconventional aspects of warfare of which guerrilla warfare certainly plays an important role. These challenges as well as the challenges implicit in new techniques in the employment of conventional weapons will vitally affect the warfare of the future. Will our armed forces respond to these challenges?

Twilight War*

Col. Robert B. Rigg, U.S. Army

No one has truly measured the potentialities and problems of an outer space war, much less fashioned the military doctrine for such a possible conflict. However, earthly warfare has a variety of still unsolved problems even more urgently in need of solution because they are with us now. This is especially true in respect to "Twilight War." Twilight War is a unique form of contemporary and future conflict. It is warfare which a modern nation can fight with true assurance that it will never lose, but with equally sound assurance that it has no chance of winning, unless the country concerned is prepared to meet the strange proportions of twilight conflict. The ugly quality of this type of armed struggle challenges the orthodoxy of a modern military machine and its inherent doctrine. The beauty of Twilight War--from an aggressor standpoint--is that it serves to sap opposing strength by its form and attrition.

In the destruction and process of war, civilian structures are demolished or fall. Conversely, in the construction and process of peace, military concepts and procedures never fall or fail until ultimately disproved by the next war. Then, it is sometimes too late to rectify faulty military concepts and procedures.

Inherently, every nation largely accepts its own military solutions--solutions based on its own war experience. But the lessons of military experience should not be so narrowed. One must not be afraid to borrow wisely. There is no penalty for plagiarism in military methods. The penalty of defeat lies in the failure to capitalize on the experience of others.

Essential Lessons

The records of recent combat cause us to reflect on the fact that two national forces have fought for a long time, and portions of their experience have value. In recent history, France has fought more than 20 years. Communist China has been in combat for more than 26 years. During the course of this warfare, each of these military forces has strengthened itself by its failures. Certain essential lessons are apparent: each side has had to modify its methods with the passage of time, and adapt itself to new situations.

For example, the Communist Chinese began military operations as an elusive enemy. Gradually they changed into a massive military force, as in Korea. Conversely, the French in Indochina opposed an elusive enemy (Chinese oriented) with an orthodox military force, and lost. Faced in Algeria with another elusive enemy, the French have evolved a technique to play the enemy at his own game--and now they seem to be gaining strength and making headway.

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This is an age of two contrasts: the first, of elusive enemies such as those found in Indochina, Malaya, and Algeria; and second, of massive forces such as those encountered in the human wave attacks under certain conditions in Korea.

The United States has not recently fought a Twilight War, characterized by combat with elusive enemies and years of frustration wherein the people and geography of a region are as much of a combat factor as the enemy forces themselves. Mao's Communist Chinese and Ho-Chi minh's Vietnamese forces came to significant power on the basis of Twilight War. Today, France's power is once again being challenged (in Algeria) by an enemy waging Twilight War. The question arises, how well prepared are we to wage and win against an enemy who chooses this type of conflict?

Up to now, we have separated warfare organizationally into two neat little packages: first, combat operations, and second, civil affairs. Consider the victories of communism in China and Indochina. Take a look at Algeria! It is evident that the exigencies of Twilight Warfare demand that the two packages be more closely wrapped into one basic concept of operations. Conceptually, we appear to be approaching limited warfare with two other neat packages. First is the orthodox military approach to combat, and the second is the separate but unorthodox approach of unconventional warfare. In short, we have one form of combat on the line, and the other behind the lines--while tacitly acknowledging a connection and liaison between the two.

Military-Social Force

There is a significant bridge needed over this apparent military gap. This bridge is duality. However, it is a complex duality not fully understandable unless we recognize that in Twilight Warfare an army--or the ground combat element--must become not alone a military force, but also a social force. It is here that we can borrow some lessons from the Chinese Communist book; and more currently from French doctrine now being developed and applied in Algeria.

Algeria, like Malaya, Indochina, and China (1927-45), is not only a test tube but a significant combat laboratory for Twilight Warfare. One side stalks the enemy but rarely comes to grips with him. Military orthodoxy often fails under these conditions or vanishes in the face of intangibles.

In Algeria, the French Army first acted as an orthodox military machine fighting an elusive enemy. During the first two years of its orthodox campaign the French Army built its strength to more than 300,000 troops. The enemy began the conflict with only 15,000 to 20,000 guerillas. Today, the French Army is turning itself into a military-social force that is slowly demonstrating that it is able to defeat the rebels, to consolidate people, and to secure regions.

In Algeria the majority of people did not necessarily side with the French National Liberation Movement (FLN). As in the Chinese Civil War, the people tended to support whichever side controlled the local region. Warfare of any type destroys and damages villages and crops, and produces chaos. Consequently, the civil population always looks hopefully to whichever side can restore normalcy,

either partially or totally. It is also true that people caught in the changing tides of war become close-mouthed and do not volunteer information. The orthodox military force always needs more information than the elusive force. From an intelligence viewpoint, uncommunicative people hinder military operations.

In 1956 the French High Command was startled by a report from Brigadier General de Bolladiere, a young veteran-hero of two wars who analyzed his military ledger and balance sheets with the conclusion of military failure for lack of information. He recommended using troops to organize communities, to provide work, and to relieve local misery. Object: make the military not a repressive force but a constructive one; give the soldiers a feeling of being engaged in construction as well as destruction; supplant the mayors and civilian bureaucracy with nonpolitical partisans--the military. General Bolladiere also made another unorthodox proposal: infiltrate squad units to live off the land and among the people.

Parallel Objectives

Hard pressed, the French High Command finally agreed to experiment with these proposals. General Bolladiere had no overnight success with his ideas. He was criticized for using troops as civilian supervisors and medical practitioners. But a portion of the French Army built and taught schools, rebuilt bridges, helped with irrigation and farm projects, and helped the people in sickness and in health--all in the process of its military campaigns. French Army influence extended to the back areas and brought help. They used not only ordinary soldiers, but specialists as well. They especially used the SAS or Specialized Administration Section, the equivalent of our civil affairs, in joint and parallel action.

The lesson is that by directly helping indigenous people, combat success is furthered and the area is militarily strengthened to the mutual security and benefit of all concerned. This is not easy. To help means to divert combat strength. To help means to divert from the classic and clearcut missions of "Take Hill 109" or "Drop in Zone Zebra." Plainly, military operations in a Twilight War embrace not only military objectives. Military operations and objectives are parallel to political operations and objectives.

Twilight War may be considered not true war. Plainly, it is not war in the classic sense, but it is true war in a modern sense. Twilight War generally is practiced by the Communist and it will be with us for a long time. From the Communist viewpoint it is a safe form of conflict that can be waged with conventional weapons within the panoply of nuclear weapons.

The Communist technique--amply demonstrated in a decade in which mutual nuclear weapons have existed--is to pose the small threat, magnify it into armed conflict of Twilight War proportions, and then challenge the West to contain or end it. Twilight War is a special form of limited war--but so special as to challenge present-day military doctrine. Do we have an organizational concept that foresees sending a unit from platoon to regiment size into the countryside on its own? Could the unit impose its will either by force or persuasion or both, while making full use of doctors, mayors, chaplains, and uniformed school teachers as well as military bridge builders? Could the unit simultaneously bring a true sense of military-political-economic protection to local communities?

Classic military actions, especially those in which the opposing forces sweep back and forth in the ebb and flow of maneuver and success, leave communities at the mercy of self-survival.

If limited warfare is changing--and there is evidence that it is--then, it is changing into a form of a military-political-economic force wherein the soldier emerges to play dual and difficult roles. Heretofore, it was simply military affairs for the military and political affairs for the civil servant. Times change! The military, whether it likes it or not, will be concerned with the full range of military-political-economic affairs. In limited wars of the future it is possible for the Western soldier to fight with all his modern weapons, but he can become lost--and he can lose--if he doesn't have his political-economic feet under him.

The Communist soldier travels on many legs: military, political, economic, sociological, propaganda, and psychological. But the Western soldier up to now has walked primarily on only two--both military--yet he is learning rapidly that Twilight War differs from classic combat.

Basis for Doctrine

Seven principles for the foundation of a doctrine for Twilight War have emerged:

- Protect the people.--This is a difficult job, especially when warfare is fluid. This means that communities must be given inner protection if they are isolated. This is objectionable because it bleeds fighting power. But in a Twilight War, if an area is lost temporarily to the enemy, it can be profitable to leave behind isolated but strong bodies of troops. These units not only can protect the people, but also can provide combat islands in the enemy's territory. These military "left behinds" need never be "sacrifice troops," provided they are supported by air and reinforced by subsequent air and ground combat action.

- Organize civilian life to fit the situation at hand. This is a large order, but it can be done. After all, wars are fought for people and for their protection and needs. Soldiers cannot stop, drop their guns, and stoop to care for civilians, but there are ways to delineate the problem, fix the areas and functions of responsibility, and keep the combat troops in action. This is an organizational problem of combining "packages."

- Organize and carry out reconstruction and education.--The havoc brought by war is not quickly reconstructed. The side that does its utmost quickly will win the favor of the local populace to some degree. Create a local administration of power, vigor, and efficiency. We have done this before. The point is, that it must be done quickly and with staying power.

- Clean up the terrorists.--The people, if assisted by a variety of methods and means, may be of help. However, if the region is a formerly hostile one, the effort must be persuasive, efficient, and logical in a political-economic sense and the over-all effort must have the quality of permanency and logic.

. Find the enemy through the people.--The keystone to the success of this effort will be what the military force has done for the people by applying the aforementioned principles. This principle was applied in Malaya with good success.

. Deny the enemy through the people.--In Malaya the British practiced this principle and found it basic in wiping out the Communist irregulars.

. Rally the public.--This may be brought about more easily if the other principles have been applied soundly. One must project a logical political ideal--a tangible, sensible form of government and order that has meaning to the people.

Perhaps all of these principles are self-evident. There is need to study, examine, and amplify them further, shaping them into doctrine for Twilight War.

Walter Darnell Jacobs and Nicolas de Rochefort

In judging the defense preparedness of the United States, President Kennedy has placed an emphasis on the need for capabilities in unconventional warfare. This emphasis must be eagerly welcomed.

Events of World War II and, still more, those of recent years demonstrate the important, perhaps decisive role played by unconventional operations in modern armed conflict. The communist states, in particular, have shown an ability to use unconventional operations in a systematic way. Laos is only the most recent of a series of examples.

The President's actions indicate an appreciation of the importance which unconventional operations will have on battlefields of the future--where actual operations may range all the way from unlimited nuclear exchanges to minor clashes of irregular bodies of poorly armed persons. The United States has, consequently, embarked on a serious program of training personnel in the art of unconventional operations.

The development of this program is gratifying to all. It is to be feared, however, that the federal agencies in charge of the planning and training for unconventional warfare operations will continue to deal with this matter as in the past, that is, on a purely technical plane. The upshot may be that unconventional warfare plans will be developed without proper attention being given to ideological considerations. If such a situation should arise it would be most unfortunate for the interests of the United States because effective unconventional operations are not possible without an underlying basis of ideological motivation.

Indeed, neither specifically military actions by small guerrilla groups (whether or not in support of actions by regular units) nor related operations of sabotage, destruction, terror, or even intelligence gathering, can be developed to any significant extent by units or individuals introduced into an area from the outside unless they find support and cooperation on the part of the local population. Material incentives alone are not sufficient to secure this cooperation to any sizeable extent because material incentives are not sufficient to overcome fears of betrayals, reprisals, etc. In fact, material incentives are always limited and subject to outbidding by the enemy. They may also remain ineffective, whatever the amount of reward offered, with regard to the perils involved. Except for some entirely insignificant exceptions, no member of the French or Dutch resistance movements during the German occupation was tempted by material rewards into helping Allied agents. No such possible profit was worth the risks of torture by the Gestapo or the death ovens of Matthausen. Only ideological incentives can cause men to accept the dangers and fears involved in unconventional operations.

Communist successes in unconventional operations result largely from the fact that they are directed by men thoroughly indoctrinated in communist theories and trained in ideological propaganda. Ideological operations were an integral part of these undertakings.

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In the present international situation there is an almost universal struggle in progress between the fundamentally contradictory ideologies--the ideology of communism and the ideology of freedom.

The more attractive and more reliable ideology--the ideology of freedom--can certainly enjoy a greater success in the organization of ideologically motivated unconventional warfare than can the ideology of communism. It is essential that, in our planning and training for unconventional warfare, we attain ideological preparedness and propaganda fitness in each person trained. Each prospective unconventional combatant whom the United States places in the field must combine technical knowledge of unconventional warfare and ideological and propaganda preparedness.

The organizer of unconventional warfare whom the United States dispatches to another country can hope for cooperation from the local population only on a basis of a shared ideology. This basis of a shared ideology far transcends current concepts of "psychological" warfare.

The current concept of psychological warfare, as practiced in the United States, is not concerned with the propagation of ideas. It is concerned more with coaxing and with manipulating minds than with establishing an area of shared beliefs. Our psychological agencies are dispersed throughout the governmental structure. They are staffed by persons who are specialists in socio-psychology or simply in the techniques of advertising. They know all the techniques and have the ability to produce grand charts and generalities (applicable to any society, free or slave). Many of them, unfortunately, simply have no ideological preoccupation and do not believe in the value of ideology--of belief--in human life. One cannot disseminate a belief with any degree of persuasiveness unless he professes it with enough fire and dedication to want to communicate it and to make his communication convincing. St. Paul was neither a Doctor of Social Sciences nor an advertising agency executive.

The Soviet leaders have made it clear that their understanding of the concept of "peaceful coexistence" does not extend to ideologies. Khrushchev has challenged us to a battle of ideas. He has issued the challenge with some confidence because of a number of propaganda successes.

Yet, for all their propaganda successes abroad, the Soviet leaders all but confess to their own vulnerability in the field of ideology. There are ceaseless efforts against the "survivals of capitalism" and "infiltrations of bourgeois ideology" into the minds of Soviet citizens. A variety of social phenomena which evidence individual or group behaviors "alien to the spirit of communism" are taking place in the USSR at a growing rate.

This acknowledged vulnerability of the communist world must be utilized by us in the "struggle of ideologies" which Khrushchev has proposed. But an ideology such as communism can not be fought by advertising gimmicks nor by socio-psychological charts. This struggle needs men of profound inner conviction, fervent believers in their ideals--ideals opposed to those of communism.

The role of ideological operations in unconventional warfare and the need for an immediate struggle against the ideology of communism are inseparable parts of the same program. One part is concerned with situations short of war while the other has to do with operational conditions in actual war.

We must accept Khrushchev's challenge for a struggle for the minds of men--and fight to win them. There is one weapon in that fight--an ideal, clearly proclaimed and fervently advocated. Scientifically concocted coaxings and peddled slogans cannot win in such a struggle. Victory can be achieved by clearly proclaiming our ideals and advocating them with fervor and utter dedication.

It is not merely a matter of "training" unconventional warfare cadres in ideological warfare (but that is an essential precondition). They must be themselves ideologically inspired to the highest degree. They must believe with dedication in their ideals. They must be able to propagate their ideals with zeal and sincerity. They must be able to communicate their beliefs.

In the present period of "peaceful coexistence," which by Soviet definition is "another form of the class struggle against the capitalist world," it is necessary to set forth now, and make known to the world, the well-defined tenets of the American ideology of freedom. This ideology, clearly and forcefully opposed to the communist ideology, must be set forth with the same bluntness and sharpness as that used by Soviet leaders in their enunciation of the militant communist ideology. It is on the basis of which ideology prevails that unconventional wars will be won or lost.

Recommendations:

It is suggested that an agency, preferably attached to the White House, be charged with the responsibility of supervising and coordinating the various scattered organs which at this time study, plan and prepare operations of psychological warfare. It is suggested that training in ideological warfare and propaganda be given to all persons trained for employment in unconventional operations. It is further suggested that central guidance be given in the dissemination of the American ideal both in situations short of war and in conditions of actual war.

It is further suggested that this supervision and coordination, together with inspiration and leadership, be provided not on the low-level and unrewarding plane of technical socio-psychological gimmicks, but on the level of ideology.

Strategy of Protracted Defense*

Col. Slavko N. Bjelajac, U. S. Army Reserve

A defense along the borders of European nations proved ineffective in World War II. Superior in strength, the aggressor smashed this type of defense in one situation after another. Armor and motorized forces drove wedges deep into the defender's front, penetrated into rear areas of field armies and into the interior of the countries cutting units and sectors of the front into ribbons. Encirclement of forces so divided ended in surrender of entire units. The personnel of these units threw down their weapons, often without having a real chance of using them.

Poland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Yugoslavia, and Greece were smashed in this manner, faster than anyone could believe. I observed at first hand the conquest by the Hitler armies of one European country after another.

I witnessed the incredibly swift fall of Yugoslavia, her defense positions cut into pieces. The command posts of field armies and divisions were disorganized or destroyed outright before the troops had a chance to enter the fight. Divisions and regiments had no chance of reestablishing their defenses; the enemy advanced much faster than the defense could withdraw or repair the breaks. An army, which from 1912 to 1918 opposed successfully superior German, Austrian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian Armies, surrendered this time in a matter of two to three weeks. It was a surprise which should not have been.

It would be wrong to believe that the debacle of Yugoslavia and other European countries came so fast only because of German superiority in armor and air, and because of their air and land mobility. The term enemy superiority often is used as an excuse for omissions and mistakes in an attempt to justify defeat. Both the new offensive strategy used by the German forces and the obsolete type of defense used by the defender should be credited for German success.

The concept of blitzkrieg became a reality mainly because the defending countries did not know how to defend themselves. Some European armies had no chance to use their weapons or expend their basic loads of ammunition. In many instances, artillery, including antitank artillery, was never once committed. Some soldiers had no chance to be faced with or even to see the enemy soldier until their unit surrendered and the Germans came to pick them up as prisoners. A tremendous amount of ammunition and war materials was seized in stores. The concept of war and the strategy of the defense of these countries proved to be catastrophic.

Lessons of World War II

The situation confronting the allied European countries is much different since the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries have integrated their individual defenses into a common defensive organization. Weaknesses which are inherent to an exposed and small country have been eliminated. However, that is not the case of allied countries through Asia. These still have their weaknesses, multiple indeed, which the European allied countries once possessed.

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Therefore, it is believed that an examination of deficiencies in the concept of war of European nations prior to World War II may offer a lesson to the allied countries in the Middle and Far East.

The following principal deficiencies in the concept of defensive war are to be blamed for unexpectedly fast and early defeats of the European nations.

First, main lines of defense along national borders, with no capability of withdrawing forces for orderly defense of the interior of the country, resulted in a zero capability for prolonged resistance subsequent to formal military defeat.

As we know, an orderly withdrawal requires forces, weapons, and equipment capable of resisting the enemy, and a command apparatus capable of conducting a most delicate, complicated, and difficult military operation. High morale, self-confidence, and psychological preparation of the troop units and of the local population to accept a forced loss in territory are the most important requirements for effective resistance following initial defeat. Without psychological preparation even a loss of frontier provinces may be detrimental for the final issue of the war.

Depth of the battlefield will be needed in any future war. This is particularly true in the case of weak armies, because the enemy superiority at the outset will require mobile defense in depth. A strong army--well-trained, well-equipped, and well-supported by air--is required to execute a successful withdrawal before a superior enemy force. A probable use by the enemy of vertical envelopment with air mobile battle groups and use of nuclear weapons will complicate the defensive strategy more than ever in the past. It is conceivable that a successful withdrawal may become almost impossible in the future.

Few exposed and economically weak countries in Asia possess the material resources, manpower, training, and skill required to provide effective resistance along their national borders. Loss of frontier provinces or even of the greater part of the country to the enemy may be inevitable in the beginning of war and, therefore, must be included as a possibility or probability in the defensive plans and preparations.

Second, there was no established concept for a continued war against the invader through prolonged resistance by the remnants of the conventional forces. Once the main lines of defense were smashed, resistance to the enemy ceased. Troops were neither indoctrinated nor told to disperse to avoid capture and to continue to fight by regiments, battalions, companies, platoons, and whatever remained. Instead of striking against the rear of the aggressor--against his lines of communications, reserves, and supply columns--troops surrendered, although they had an abundant quantity of arms and ammunition at their disposal. There was no planned concept for utilization of military manpower after the conventional defenses failed. Troop units believed that since the command posts of their field armies and divisions were over-run, it was normal for them to surrender and become prisoners--an act of which they were not ashamed since they were "beaten in combat."

Third, the concept of utilization of military manpower was one-sided and inadequate. It was planned for conventional combat only. Although manpower remained abundant after the collapse of conventional defenses, it was abandoned

to the enemy. If post-defeat resistance had been planned, numerous dispersed battlefields could have been organized over all these countries by the utilization of this costly and well-trained manpower.

Unconventional warfare as a continuation of conventional war was, unfortunately, not considered by these governments, and herein lay another error of their policy and concept for defense.

The example of General Mikhailovitch of Yugoslavia, who continued the war by the use of guerrilla tactics, was unique and isolated. His action was not a part of the government's planning; he improvised. A planned and prepared resistance program never would have ended in the Communists taking power either in Yugoslavia or in some other countries. Communist parties would not be able to use occupations and disorganizations of authority for Bolshevization in these countries. However, the Communists fish well in muddy waters.

Fourth, there existed no common concept of the continuation of resistance by an overrun country in order to assist the adjacent country when attacked. Although the countries were sincere allies, their planning was for themselves alone--chacun pour soi. Lack of concept of a prolonged resistance after conventional fronts collapsed resulted in destruction of one country after the other. Such resistance, if planned and applied, would buy the time and space for the adjacent allied country.

It is evident that many nations did not know how to defend themselves and that their concept of defense in World War II was a failure. Nothing has happened since that would indicate that such a concept may be feasible in the future for any country. On the contrary, inherent defensive weaknesses, new and modern weapons--including nuclear weapons--great land and air mobility, and the probability of the aggressor having the initiative makes that concept of defense even more unthinkable. Such a concept of defense would be catastrophic for allied countries in Asia, particularly for those which are geographically exposed to aggression and cannot maintain forces strong enough to oppose a superior aggressor by themselves.

Defense Problems

The USSR and China, if aggressors, can always establish the required superiority to smash the defense of these countries easily and quickly no matter the number of divisions with which the defender may oppose them. Therefore, if these countries have more divisions in the future than they have today, assistance will not be increased materially if divisions are going to be deployed only along conventional lines.

The cost of maintaining a number of modern conventional divisions may present a serious financial problem for an economically weak country. Support of such divisions may mean not only a great economic burden but eventual bankruptcy. For some countries, it may not be the problem of money alone, but of the command cadre which may be difficult to find, educate, train, and maintain on the level required by the standards of a modern army. Able command cadre and modern equipment which can match the enemy, efficient maintenance, and many other requirements of modern war may overburden the economic structure of the weaker nations. A balanced force composed of divisions and of independent battle groups and combat teams may be the answer to the real requirement of some of these countries.

For other countries even divisions may prove to be too large. The same manpower, if organized into lighter independent battle groups and combat teams, may do a much better job for a longer period of time particularly in mountainous countries. Such organization would require less financial effort and much less equipment. Whatever may be the case in a particular country--a balanced force consisting of independent battle groups and combat teams only--both must be capable of a protracted defense against an enemy much superior in strength.

Elements of a Defense

A protracted defense by an exposed country against a much superior enemy should rest on three clearly distinguished elements:

The first element would be a conventional defensive zone with field armies, divisions, or independent battle groups for defense in depth of the most favorable terrain features. Possibly the most vital parts of a country should be defended. If the strongest positions are found in the heartland, they may be defended instead of splitting forces on several separate defensive positions. Defense must be prepared against vertical envelopment no matter where the conventional defenses are established--in border zones, in the heartland, or elsewhere.

The second part would consist of battle groups or combat teams which occupy and defend positions far ahead of conventional defenses. These may be placed in the border areas with the role of retardation. These units will withdraw to predesignated positions or stay and fight on initial positions. If overrun, no matter where they may be, the units will split into smaller groups to avoid annihilation and then attack enemy rear elements harassing supply trains and lines of communication and tying down his forces.

In case of withdrawal of the first element of defense, additional battle groups or combat teams may be left as stay-behinds with the same or similar purpose as battle groups and combat teams placed in border areas. Depending on the capability of the enemy, each battle group or combat team sooner or later will split into guerrilla type units, and will carry out operations by the use of guerrilla tactics. Each guerrilla unit or group of units will be given an area of responsibility and a long-lasting mission in order to avoid the necessity of an elaborate communications net. The areas of operations would coincide with the system of enemy lines of communications, which should be the primary target areas to be covered.

The third element would be guerrilla type forces composed of specially trained regulars, indigenous population, and other unconventional warfare type forces and supporting organizations. These would be placed in the spaces extending from conventional defenses to the groups or teams in border zones and even farther into enemy territory to carry out harassments in depth. The guerrilla forces would be placed also in the rear of conventional defense positions and on the flanks, eventually covering the entire country.

Manpower and Materiel

Among the principal requirements of the protracted resistance type defense is manpower and light weapons and equipment. Loss of personnel, light weapons, and equipment to the enemy must be reduced to a minimum. Consequently,

battle groups or combat teams will resist aggressor in a mobile defense, and will split into smaller groups or guerrilla units before losing the bulk of their manpower.

When the main defensive zone is overrun and resistance on it becomes impossible, the conventional forces would split into small groups and continue operations against the enemy by attacking him where he is found. In order to avoid annihilation these groups may split further. Light guerrilla groups and units will be the last splitting phase. It should be noted, however, that conventional units, once overrun, may under favorable conditions preserve their structure for a period of time and fight as units. In principle, the splitting into smaller and reverting into larger units and groups may be a continuous process depending on necessity and feasibility. The largest possible degree of flexibility is recommended to suit changing situations.

The protracted defense is waged as a continuation of conventional resistance until the end of the war. In addition to the military manpower which is preserved after conventional units have been overpowered, the civilian population is recruited. Those not recruited into military units will provide food, transportation, and other support while working on their normal jobs. Undergrounds and other covert supporting organizations are fully utilized. Another principal requirement of protracted resistance now may be an adequate outside system of resupply of expendable items which cannot be found within the country itself.

Tie-Down Capability

If such a protracted resistance is conducted, it is believed that even the weakest country may become capable of tying down much superior enemy forces and of inflicting greater losses than by employment of conventional combat only. The contribution to the allied war effort by small countries may be more effective and may last for the duration of war.

The lessons from World Wars I and II teach that one guerrilla can tie down 10 to 15 conventional troops and, therefore, that the enemy must have a force 15 to 20 times superior to fight guerrillas. If we assume that an allied country of Asia which has eight divisions is overrun but has succeeded in preserving manpower and light equipment, and that preserved manpower is utilized for a continuation of the war by application of guerrilla and unconventional warfare tactics, that country will have the capability of tying down an enemy force equal to 80 divisions.

According to German statistics, 612,000 German troops were tied down in World War II in the Balkans by 25,000 to 45,000 guerrillas and their supporting undergrounds. It was a contribution greatly appreciated by the Allied Headquarters, for these German forces if used on the Russian front possibly could have changed and certainly would have prolonged the war. In his book, Closing the Ring, Winston Churchill has stated that "Guerrilla forces in Yugoslavia and Albania are containing as many [German] divisions as are the British and American armies put together."

It is believed that the tie-down capability of small allied countries, if applied in a protracted defense, may in the future be the key to victory, particularly because of existing superiority of Sino-Soviet bloc countries in

military and civilian manpower. Even if 50 percent of the manpower is lost--killed, missing, wounded, and those taken prisoner--in the above case the allied country, having now assumed manpower equal to four divisions, may retain a tie-down capability equal to 40 enemy divisions.

Geographical Factors

The feasibility of protracted resistance may be questioned in certain areas because of terrain and other conditions. It is often wrongly believed that only mountainous terrain is suitable for guerrilla type operations. On the contrary, it is the intermediate type of terrain which is much more suitable, and as we know, guerrilla warfare is waged even in deserts. Operation of other components of unconventional warfare--such as the underground, civilian support elements, and intelligence--is influenced little by terrain. Psychological warfare and propaganda know of no terrain barriers.

Density of communications, of industrial areas, and of population settlements will not hamper resistance. Where guerrilla units cannot operate because of security forces, the underground and other resistance organizations may be used with the same effect.

It is evident that a nation's resources--such as foodstuffs, transportation, and civilian manpower--may be better utilized in a planned than in an unplanned protracted defense. Denial of a nation's resources to the enemy is done on an organized and planned basis contrary to the situation where guerrilla bands and the underground emerge and operate on their own initiative without a well-established plan.

The command cadre and personnel for a protracted defense to be waged mainly with battle groups, combat teams, and guerrilla groups is easier to provide than the cadres required for modern large conventional units. The latter are becoming more and more complicated and require very capable personnel including scientists. It is expected that the indigenous personnel of even underdeveloped countries can be trained relatively easily for this type warfare. Their nature and situation may well suit guerrilla type warfare and small unit operations.

Preparation

Strategy of protracted defense, as a future means of resisting aggression by weak and exposed countries, should be planned and prepared as an eventuality. Conventional forces must be so trained and both the military and civilians of a country prepared psychologically. It must be understood that a loss of territory for conventional combat does not mean the loss of it for unconventional combat. Through the latter the territory (a part of an entire country) is dominated and parts may be completely controlled.

A type of special forces, similar to the US Special Forces, may be organized and trained by these countries to provide each with the capability for dealing with the specific problems of unconventional warfare. These forces may take over the most difficult operational areas of an overrun territory, serve as experts and advisors to guerrilla area commands and staffs in the others, and train troops and civilians in guerrilla tactics and types of unconventional warfare operations. At the same time, special forces will be best suited to be infiltrated into enemy territory in order to wage guerrilla

warfare against the enemy on his own soil. Guenther Blumentritt, former German General has stated:

It is my belief that in a future war the fight will be directed primarily against enemy activities in rear and that battle will be sought only as an auxiliary means to achieve victory. Only in that way will it be possible to end war quickly and minimize the mass losses to men and material. By the same token the cost of war can be reduced.

The degree of the application of strategy or protracted defense may vary from country to country depending on the geographic position, exposure to aggression, depth of national territory, terrain, nature of population, and on the expected US and allied support in case of aggression. The weaker the military position of a country the greater the application of protracted defense must be in order to save manpower and continue resistance.

The strategy of protracted defense as suggested here seems to offer a way by which a small and weak allied country can by itself, and left almost to itself (with the exception of supplies), contribute to the allied war effort throughout an entire war. At the same time, this strategy offers a possibility of dominating and eventually controlling its soil in spite of occupation by the enemy of parts of all of the country. This is not the case in the absence of a planned protracted defense. In the absence of this, the country and its peoples are at the complete mercy of the enemy. Furthermore, the application of this strategy may prevent seizure of power by the Communists, for the Communist Parties will in the future, as they have in the past, try to utilize occupation for the Bolshevization of a country.

The strategy of protracted defense is by itself a powerful deterrent to aggression, for the enemy must count on a long period of resistance which would tie down his large conventional forces, and cost him lives, money, and materiel.

As to the problem of cold war and the internal security of an economically weak and exposed allied country, this type defense will suit best the needs for suppression of revolts and harassments by Communist inspired guerrillas and terrorists. Conventional and unconventional units with personnel trained in guerrilla warfare, utilization of civilian support, and use of the underground and other devices of unconventional warfare the the most suitable for suppression of these subversive activities. These forces will be a strong deterrent to revolts and terrorist actions by indigenous troublemakers and volunteers of the Chinese Communist type.

Theory of Guerrilla Warfare *

Edward F. Downey, Jr.

Since the blitzkrieg of the Germans in World War II, the major trend in warfare has been toward greater mobility. The lightning war of the Nazis would seem pedestrian in comparison with the present destructive potential of the strategic air forces we have today. Tomorrow, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) will relegate the jet bomber to the horse and buggy days. The increasing destructive capacity of nuclear weapons has added wings to the trend toward greater mobility in war.

In the Second World War the German armored forces punched through the defense systems of country after country. France was felled in a shockingly short time because the French failed to evaluate the new mobility of the blitzkrieg properly, and with their theory of positional warfare were unable to defend themselves. Before France could devise new tactics, the war was over and she was defeated. Other countries suffered similar defeats.

Experience with airborne tactics in World War II in such places as Crete and Burma indicates that modern ground armies equipped with transport planes and helicopters can mount a three-dimensional blitzkrieg today. Even the limited experiences of such tactics under unfavorable conditions in Korea substantiate this point.

Defense in Depth

Every country that has fallen before the onslaught of a modern blitzkrieg has collapsed because that country failed to develop an effective defense in depth. Once the Germans slashed through the perimeter defense of the Polish and the French, the forces of those countries became so disorganized that effective inner defense was impossible. For the Germans the balance of the campaign was a mopping-up operation. Aerial blitzkriegs were even more devastating because they started out by eliminating the necessity for breaking through; they were mopping-up operations from the start.

It was well into the war before an effective concept of defense in depth developed. Then commanders were forced to organize their districts into a pattern of what might be described as modern military feudalism: districts organized around strong points prepared for all-around defense. Even this concept was sketchy and poorly applied. Later, in Korea, our damaging reverses at the hands of the Chinese Communist blitzkrieg proved that, all too often, American soldiers had forgotten, or had never been taught, the importance of defense in depth.

Because we recovered from our setbacks in Korea by massive military effort, we did not have time to see a guerrilla movement develop among the South Koreans. During World War II, however, every Allied country that was invaded developed

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some type of resistance movement. These activities for the most part were spontaneous and slow developing. That they did grow universally is a basis for the need of a theory to govern similar activities. At present, there is no adequate unified theory of guerrilla warfare.

Total War

Naturally, most Americans will think this discussion boringly academic since, as everyone knows, we have a Strategic Air Force equipped with nuclear weapons capable of wiping out an enemy in a few short hours. Such a force exists, and has the capability of doing just that. The danger is that Americans generally believe that we will use this strategy. Whether we do or not depends upon more than military factors. As Henry A. Kissinger states in his book, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy:

In such a situation, it is futile to speak of 'purely' military considerations. From a military point of view, nothing is more efficient for cratering airfields, destroying port facilities or eliminating transportation centers than a megaton weapon. But the crucial problem of strategy is the relationship between power and the willingness to use it, between the physical and the psychological components of national policy. Faced with the knowledge of the consequences of a thermonuclear war, policymakers will be reluctant to engage in a strategy, the penalty for which may well be social disintegration.

Thus at least one author disagrees with current thinking in regard to carrying out a modern war. Too few Americans have considered warfare as anything other than a struggle for annihilation, while history is largely the record of conflicts falling short of this ultimate objective. General Karl von Clausewitz in his book On War considers the relationship of politics to warfare when he writes:

We see, therefore, in the first place that in all circumstances we have to think of war not as an independent thing, but as a political instrument. And only by taking this point of view can we avoid falling into contradiction with the whole of military history. This alone opens the great book to intelligent appreciation. In the second place, this same point of view shows us how war must differ according to the nature of their motives and of the circumstances out of which they arise.

From this discussion it appears that there are two courses open to the United States in relation to offensive mobility in war. The first is to launch an unrestricted nuclear offensive in case of attack. The second is to carry out a war on more conventional grounds, achieving mobility on the structure of World War II tactics. Both of these policies would be militarily possible. Because of American disdain for the theoretical, our military policy leans toward the more easily grasped "total war" concept of the first alternative; yet our experience in the postwar era has forced us to practice the second concept, "For Korea caught us completely unprepared not only militarily but above all in doctrine." ¹

¹ Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Harper & Bros., New York, 1957, p. 43.

All or Nothing

At the present time Americans are indulging in the luxury of an all or nothing theory of war. The prevailing thinking is that we either win or we do not, but, whatever the case, we will know shortly after the war breaks out. This is too shallow an attitude to take toward national survival. No matter how destructive the war, conventional or nuclear, chances are something will be left after it is over. Supposing we were to lose a nuclear war; we would be like a fighter down but not out. If a fighter or a nation has to think while it is on the canvas with a reeling head, the decisions are not likely to be the best.

A trained fighter and a trained nation will have prepared and drilled on a plan for such a possibility. The United States, at the present moment, is like a winning fighter. Not having lost any fights, we have not prepared ourselves for that possibility. Since the only recourse history offers a defeated nation, besides total submission, is a resistance movement, we must develop an adequate theory of guerrilla warfare so that we will have a prepared course of action.

Clausewitz emphasizes the political character of war. So do the statesmen of our day. The ideological conflict between the democratic nations of the West and the communistic nations of the East is the factor which, if anything, will touch off a cataclysmic nuclear war. If this should happen, and if we should lose such a war, the ideological differences would still exist. Providing the differences in belief are sufficient to cause such a bloody conflict, they are worth defending even if we are defeated temporally. Should the differences not be worth the destruction, we should accept the Communist beliefs and avoid the struggle. This is a course which would not be taken by Americans. Therefore, we must develop a plan for our defense in depth in case we are defeated. Because of the increasing mobility of warfare, the only practical solution is the development of a guerrilla capacity. And development of a guerrilla capacity is dependent on the existence of a sound theory of guerrilla warfare.

Cultural Aspects

So far the ideas related to the need for a guerrilla theory have been concerned almost exclusively with military considerations. Another need, which has grown in the last few years, exists in the political sphere. In fact, it has social and cultural significance. The rise of communism has resulted in a political ideology differing greatly from our beliefs. Now we are fighting an enemy bent on our annihilation. He is concerned not with a military annihilation, but with the attempt to displace all the political, social, and cultural concepts of our society that vary with dictatorial materialistic socialism. This political aim of our enemy should warrant our greatest concern, but receives almost no attention. Should we be defeated in battle, and should we lack a comprehensive theory of guerrilla warfare, we would be helpless in the face of an organized attempt to change the political and cultural complexion of our people.

That Communists feel this way is evident in their writings. In The State and Revolution, Lenin signals the changes that must come:

But the dictatorship of the proletariat--i. e., the organization of the vanguard of the oppressed as the ruling class for the purpose of crushing the oppressors--cannot produce merely an expansion of democracy. . . . We must crush them in order to free humanity from wage-slavery; their resistance must be broken by force; it is clear that where there is suppression there is also violence, there is no liberty, no democracy.

We read so much today that is written by the dead leaders of communism that some people question whether this thinking is still prevalent. To show that it is, and to sample perhaps the most authoritative criticism of communism available today, the following statements have been extracted from The New Class by Milovan Djilas, former Vice President of Yugoslavia:

From theory and practice, Communists know that they are in conflict with all other classes and ideologies, and behave accordingly. They are fighting against not only actual but also potential opposition. In the Baltic countries, thousands of people were liquidated overnight on the basis of documents indicating previously held ideological and political views. The massacre of several thousand Polish officers in the Katyn Forest was of similar character. In the case of Communism, long after the revolution is over, terrorist and oppressive methods continue to be used.

On intellectual freedom Djilas writes, "The Communist system, as a rule, stifles and represses any intellectual activity with which it does not agree; that is everything that is profound and original. "

Communist Aims

Perhaps the most effective indication of what the United States must expect from communism is apparent in the following evaluation by Djilas:

Absolute brutality, or use of any means, is in accord with the grandiosity, even the unreality of Communist aims.

By revolutionary means, contemporary Communism has succeeded in demolishing one form of society and setting up another. At first it was guided by the most beautiful, primordial human ideas of equality and brotherhood; only later did it conceal behind these ideas the establishment of its domination by whatever means.

* * * * *

Thus, by justifying the means because of the end, the end itself becomes increasingly more distant and unrealistic, while the frightful reality of the means becomes increasingly obvious and intolerable.

When we read this from the pen of a man only recently Vice President of a Communist country, and even now in a Communist prison, we can judge the truth of what so many others have written. We can also gauge the fearful implications for our country if we should be defeated while lacking a plan for opposing an organized attempt to remodel our society.

Thus we have developed, in addition to mobility of modern warfare, a second trend of modern times: the attempt to remake a conquered country along the political, cultural, and social lines of the conqueror. Some will object that this has been a long-standing historical trend, but few will deny that never before has the attempt been made in such an organized and determined manner and with such a variety of techniques. And fewer still will deny that we have planned no defense for such an eventuality.

What makes this trend toward political and social reconstruction particularly effective and dangerous today is the high degree of organization and interdependence of our society. Once an enemy can break down the delicate interrelationships of our social order effectively, as he tries to do in a blitzkrieg attack, he can conquer us. This done he can set about reconstructing our social world. He gains control of the communication media, he uses secret police to hunt down subversives, he controls the economy, he eliminates the dangerous and potentially dangerous leaders, he sets up controls for schools, and he revises textbooks. Every repressive technique is used.

Planned Resistance

Naturally, any society which has lost a war to protect its social values should have devised some means of continuing its culture in the face of organized social change. The answer is a resistance movement: guerrilla warfare. Obviously, a concept of guerrilla warfare envisioning the guerrilla organization as the transmitter of culture as well as a military force is a concept of partisan warfare far advanced over the cowboy and Indian theory held by most people. As far as can be determined, no extensive investigation has been made into this political sphere of guerrilla warfare.

There are, nevertheless, historical precedents to indicate this trend. Every country which developed a guerrilla movement established schools to train partisans. These schools were basically technical, but the same type of activity could have been used for political and cultural purposes. Perhaps the activities of Communist cells offer the best examples of political projects that could be assigned guerrillas.

Any country that is brought to its knees in an international conflict must expect a long, hard, up-hill struggle to recovery. It must plan for a protracted resistance, and unlike most guerrilla resistance of World War II, it must plan for a resistance without outside help. Most of the current ideas about guerrilla warfare presuppose outside assistance.

Communist China offers the best example of the political and cultural aspect of guerrilla warfare. In his Red Star Over China, Edgar Snow writes:

Under institutional education the Reds already claimed to have established about 200 primary schools, and they had one normal school for primary teachers, one agricultural school, a textile school, a tradeunion school of five grades, and a Party school, with some 400 students. Courses in all of these lasted only about six months.

Other cultural activities are indicated by Snow in that Chinese Communists maintained a central printing plant at Kian with 800 workers, producing books, magazines, and the national newspaper, the Red China Daily News. In addition, he states that they set up factories, however primitive, to produce their own goods, and established armories to repair and manufacture weapons and explosives.

Therefore, after considering the military and political conditions that point to the need for a unified theory of guerrilla warfare, we may conclude that greater mobility in war and the conqueror's attempt to impose his political and social structure on the conquered nation demand that we develop a defense in depth. Experience indicates that the only effective defense in depth established during World War II was the resistance movement. The slow development of this movement and its variety indicate that a sound theory is needed. Before this theory can be developed, however, we must uncover certain trends that will point the way for further research.

Identifiable Trends

Since there is no all-encompassing theory of irregular warfare, there is no sound definition for the words guerrilla warfare. A common definition, "An irregular mode of carrying on war, by the constant attacks of independent bands" is insufficient. Confusion develops between partisan bands operating in their own homeland and commando type raiders. Are they both guerrillas? In most military literature they have been grouped together. Yet there is considerable difference between these forces despite the similarity of their tactics. A comprehensive theory will separate these forces and concern itself only with those operating within their own countries.

Commando type raiders usually are highly organized, superbly trained troops. They come from an area beyond that in which they operate. They usually are supplied by forces outside the battle area, or they carry their own supplies. When they conduct operations they do so mostly in areas where the population is hostile or untrustworthy. Normally, they have a limited objective which they destroy by a rapid concentration of superior force. As soon as their objective is eliminated, they attempt to return to the regularly organized forces of their country. They are not irregulars; they are elite regulars operating independently of the main body of troops. Therefore, they will no longer be considered within the scope of this article.

If the guerrillas are people operating within their homeland, then we are beginning to limit the definition. If they also operate normally within their own locale, as is stated by Brigadier C. Aubrey Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn in their study Communist Guerrilla Warfare, then we may assume guerrilla warfare to be a form of defense. Thus it would seem that defense of the homeland is the strategic objective of guerrilla warfare. The tactics of the guerrillas, however, are offensive. They operate like commandos, trying always to be stronger than their enemy where the fighting takes place. Their major objective, tactically, is to achieve superiority of force at the decisive point.

Lawrence

The first great theorist on guerrilla warfare was T. E. Lawrence who thought about guerrilla combat while serving in the Arabian Campaign of the First World War. Considering the possibility of fighting the Turks with Arabian guerrillas, he wrote in his Seven Pillars of Wisdom:

My wits, hostile to the abstract, took refuge in Arabia again. Translated into Arabic, the algebraic factor would first take practical account of the area we wished to deliver, and I began idly to calculate how many square miles: sixty: eighty: one hundred: perhaps one hundred and forty thousand square miles. And how would the Turks defend all that? No doubt by a trench line across the bottom, if we came like an army with banners; but suppose we were (as we might be) an influence, an idea, a thing intangible, invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas? Armies were like plants, immobile, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head. We might be a vapor, blowing where we listed. Our kingdoms lay in each man's mind; and as we wanted nothing material to live on, so we might offer nothing material to the killing. It seemed a regular soldier might be helpless without a target, owning only what he sat on, and subjugating only what, by order, he could poke his rifle at.

Lawrence figured that in order to defend Arabia from a guerrilla attack in depth the Turks would need a post every four square miles. Each post would have to have 20 men. Thus the Turks would need 600,000 men to defend Arabia properly. Naturally, this would be an impossibly large number.

Yet the trend indicated by Lawrence developed during the Second World War as witnessed in the following report by B. H. Liddell Hart in The Red Army.

The situation in the immediate vicinity of the railway lines showed that the German occupation authorities held only the larger administrative centers and those railways and roads which served as the main lines for the front. Whole districts in the rear were burnt out and uninhabited, the roads were not being maintained, no bridge was left intact, while the railways of secondary importance carried no traffic. On the other hand, the wild forests and out-of-the-way marshy regions were filled with life. They harboured the population of the centres occupied by the Germans, and the actual lords of these forests: the partisans.

Guerrilla Operations

Only guerrillas can operate in a country that is conquered by the enemy. Unlike a national army, they are not dependent upon supply bases and fixed communications. Normally, they do not try to defend specific land areas. They do not remain concentrated. They are dispersed throughout the countryside and concentrate only to accomplish a military objective. Once this mission is effected, they disperse into the anonymity of the countryside. Enemy troops are sent to catch them, but exhaust themselves chasing the "vapor" that Lawrence described: "Many Turks on our front had no chance all the war to fire on us, and we were never on the defensive except by accident and in error."

Because guerrillas choose the time and place of attack, they always hold the initiative. Melting into the countryside after an attack, they demoralize the enemy who chases a shadow army.

By attempting to be superior at the decisive point, guerrillas always attack under favorable circumstances. As they become more active, the enemy is forced to consolidate his forces to prevent their piecemeal destruction. The more the conqueror must concentrate his forces, the more he must surrender the countryside to the guerrillas. Take any small town, for example. How many troops could a conqueror spare to occupy it? If any, the number would be small, and they would be a perfect target for guerrillas. In order to prevent the destruction of these occupying squads and platoons, the enemy would be forced into the larger nearby centers of population. From these focal points he could send out patrols, but for the most part would have surrendered the countryside to the guerrillas.

Gaining control of the countryside, therefore, is one of the major objectives of the guerrillas; yet this is a trend that has not been adequately appreciated in the current theory. That this trend exists, however, is history. In Secret Forces, Ferdinand Otto Miksche writes:

Very primitive and poorly equipped at the start, as time went on the resistance organization improved to such an extent that towards the end of the war it had almost attained the standards of a regular army. Whereas in the spring of 1941 the Germans required only twenty divisions to destroy the Yugoslav and Greek armies within a few days, the subsequent occupation and policing of the countries called for the employment of fifteen German and thirty Italian, Bulgarian, and Croatian divisions. Territories the size of Belgium were governed by Yugoslav partisans.

When the guerrillas control large territories they can train their men more effectively, since they can do it openly. Moreover, they can carry out their political mission more efficiently. They can establish local governments, tax inhabitants, conscript troops, and engage openly in the social and cultural activities previously pointed out.

Regular Organization

Another overlooked trend in current theory is the tendency of guerrillas to develop an army organized along regular lines. As soon as the guerrillas can control territory, they must begin to think along offensive as well as defensive lines. Wars cannot be won by defense alone. When the resistance forces gain freedom of operation, they must begin the transition toward a new national army so that eventually they can assume the offensive and drive the enemy from their country. This trend has been largely overlooked in current theory. Yet it is logical they should create forces capable of tackling larger concentrations of enemy troops.

Again the historical example exists. General Barr in a report to the Department of the Army in which he discusses a 40 percent increase in the strength of the Chinese Communist Forces over the Nationalists in one year says, "The

expansion was accompanied by continued reorganization along more uniform and orthodox lines." ² Further substantiation of this development may be found in this statement from Rigg's Red China's Fighting Hordes:

The Red Army of China fought a guerrilla war against the Japanese; a division war against the Nationalists; and now they are fighting an army war against the UN forces in Korea.

To any country interested in national survival, this overlooked development of guerrilla warfare merits the closest attention. Guerrilla warfare gives a defeated country a chance to engage its enemy along conventional lines and to rise again as a national power. The offensive itself could not be guerrilla warfare, but the resistance movement would make possible the transition toward a higher level of military organization.

Chinese Communists

Perhaps the most searching inquiry into guerrilla strategy and tactics has been made by the Chinese Communists. The best source of information on all aspects of Chinese Communist guerrilla strategy and tactics, including the political approach, is Snow's Red Star Over China. Some of the principles developed by Mao Tse-tung and related by one of his officers are listed by Snow as follows:

1. Fight no losing battles. Refuse engagements that cannot be won.
2. Use surprise. Avoid static battles where the advantage is with the enemy.
3. Since superior maneuvering ability is vital to guerrillas, enter no battle without a carefully detailed attack plan, and, particularly, a carefully planned retreat.
4. Local defense forces must be won over politically, or defeated militarily.
5. Always outnumber your enemy in a regular engagement. Experienced guerrillas may hit larger units that are marching, resting, or poorly guarded.
6. In case enemy strength has been miscalculated, or some other mishap intervenes, guerrillas should be able to disengage the enemy as fast as they attack them. Reliable subordinates must be available to replace leaders.
7. Pretend to attack in the east while attacking in the west.
8. Avoid fighting the main force of the enemy; concentrate on the weakest or most vital link.

² United States Relations With China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949, Department of State Publication 3573, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1949, p. 322.

9. Prevent the enemy from locating the guerrillas' main forces. Partisans should avoid concentrating when the enemy is advancing, and should shift positions as often as two or three times a day just before an attack. Secrecy in movement is vital. The plans for dispersal after an attack should be as well worked out as the plans for assembling for the attack.

10. Besides superior mobility and mass at the decisive point, the guerrillas must have superior intelligence. Multiple lines of gathering intelligence must be established and all must be protected.

11. Support of the inhabitants is absolutely necessary. The inhabitants are the base of the army.

The information just cited is of tactical as well as strategic value. Actually, the guerrillas cannot be separated from their tactics, since, to a large measure, tactics are so interwoven into their strategy.

One of the most significant aspects of guerrilla warfare pointed out here is that the people form their base. A guerrilla movement will be short-lived if the people do not actively, or passively, support its objectives. Inasmuch as the guerrillas are not dependent on physical supply depots, they live off the country and off the people. Unless their activities have widespread popular support, they are doomed to defeat.

This facet of guerrilla warfare is well-appreciated in the current theory but has been evaluated improperly by military forces. It is interesting to note this statement made by Goebbels in his diary:

April 25, 1942: The inhabitants of the Ukraine were at first more than inclined to regard the Fuehrer as the savior of Europe and to welcome the German Wehrmacht most cordially. This attitude has changed completely in the course of months. We have hit the Russians, and especially the Ukrainians, too hard on the head with our manner of dealing with them. A clout on the head is not always a convincing argument--and that goes too, for the Ukrainians and Russians.

Even in this limited aspect of guerrilla warfare there is not complete agreement or understanding. Again, we have returned to the need for further research. We must attempt to discover trends as yet uncovered in this method of warfare. We must verify or denounce popular prejudice that has too long stood for fact.

American Military Policy

While we are improving the theory and tactics of irregular warfare, we cannot remain idle. The United States must develop a guerrilla potential as quickly as possible, based upon the best available information and experience. We have seen how unplanned partisan movements have provided other nations with defense in depth. At the same time, we have seen that defense in depth came too late for most of these countries. Therefore, since lack of action can be fatal, we must develop our guerrilla capacity NOW.

Naturally, the first step should be an exhaustive study of guerrilla warfare. Our objectives and the means of accomplishing them must be outlined clearly in our own minds. We must create a sound theory for a resistance movement, and determine the most suitable tactics and organization to implement it. To accomplish these objectives we must glean every lesson from existing guerrilla literature. More than this, we must search out guerrilla leaders who have not published their experiences. Full development of any theory waits upon accumulation of information.

An adequate theory of guerrilla warfare exists, but it is hidden in the pages of history. Like the theory of gravity before Newton, it has not yet been fully seen, interpreted, and accepted. Even if guerrilla movements in an emergency do develop eventually, they waste valuable men and time. Given a sound theory from the start, many preparations can be eliminated before hostilities. By establishing a chain of command, conflicts between leaders will be minimized in time of adversity. By training peacetime guerrillas, we would prepare wartime potential. By concentrating stores of arms and supplies, we would use effectively equipment now becoming obsolete for regulars, but still valuable for partisans. In the light of our present knowledge of guerrilla warfare, these things should be done now.

Considering the fact that untrained peoples throughout the world have built guerrilla armies, we must concede that workable tactics can be grasped easily and quickly. There is no reason why we cannot incorporate guerrilla indoctrination into all phases of our current military training. The skills taught in our military schools would be needed by guerrillas. We would not have to increase the training time, we would merely give perspective to the training by showing how these skills could be used by guerrillas. In this way we would prepare our Armed Forces with their high personnel turnover for additional duty as citizen-soldiers. Professional military men would be prepared for the day when their organized military units might be destroyed or disbanded.

One of the greatest sources for guerrilla units lies in the vast pool of Reserve personnel not affiliated with Active Reserve organizations. These men with their military experience offer the best available manpower pool for a guerrilla army. For this reason, drastic cutbacks in the number of these reservists are unwise. There is no reason why our Government could not establish a basic guerrilla training program for these men. With their varied military and civilian backgrounds, the entire activity would be enriched. Perhaps, above all the Reserve programs now existing, this would provide the greatest return as insurance against disaster.

Conclusion

Additional study will indicate other practical applications of guerrilla theory, but for the moment we may safely conclude that the United States would be strengthened materially if we develop a guerrilla capacity. Our defense in depth would be assured, our social institutions would be safeguarded, and our ability to rebound from disaster would be enhanced. With the development and application of an adequate theory of guerrilla warfare, we would place the ultimate responsibility for our Nation's defense where it belongs--in the hands of our citizens.

APPENDIX I

MODERN GUERRILLA WARFARE*

Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961

Franklin Mark Osanka, Editor

Human Resources Research Office (HumARO)
The George Washington University

Editor's Preface

Introduction: "Guerrilla Warfare in Theory and Policy"

Dr. Samuel P. Huntington

Institute of War and Peace Studies
Columbia University

PART I REVIEW OF GUERRILLA WARFARE AND MODERN APPLICATION

1. Guerrilla Warfare, Lt. Col. Frederick Wilkins, U.S. Army (Retired)
2. Nowhere Yet Everywhere, Lt. Col. A. H. Sollom, U.S. Marine Corps
3. Guerrilla Warfare and Modern Strategy, Col. Virgil Ney, U.S. Army
(Retired)
4. Irregular Warfare in Transition, Lt. Col. J. P. Kutzer, U.S. Air Force

PART II SOVIET RUSSIA

5. Irregular Warfare and the Soviets, Dr. Walter Darnell Jacobs,
Columbia University
6. Partisan Warfare, V. I. Lenin; Tr. by Regina Eldor with explanatory
footnotes by Dr. Stefan T. Possony, both of
the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Univ.
of Pennsylvania
7. Russia's Hidden Army, Brooks McClure, Newspaper Correspondent
8. Combatting Soviet Guerrillas, Ernst von Dohnanyi
9. Guerrilla Warfare in the Ukraine, Enrique Martinez Codo, Editor of
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11. The 'Long March' as Extended Guerrilla Warfare, Capt. Wilbur W. Dinegar, U.S. Marine Corps
12. The Chinese Red Army and Guerrilla Warfare, Gene Z. Hanrahan
13. Mao Tse-tung as a Guerrilla - A Second Look, Walter Darnell Jacobs

PART IV THE PHILIPPINES -- POST-WORLD WAR II

14. Huks in the Philippines, Maj. K. M. Hammer, U.S. Air Force
15. Dual Strategy for Limited War, Maj. Boyd T. Bashore, U.S. Army
16. The Philippine Anti-Communist Campaign, Lt. Col. Thomas C. Tirona, Philippine Air Force

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17. Guerrilla Warfare in Greece, 1946-1949: A Case Study, Lt. Col. Edward R. Wainhouse, U.S. Army
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20. Indochina: The Seven Year Dilemma, Dr. Bernard B. Fall, Howard University
21. Guerrilla Warfare, Lt. Col. Marc Geneste, French Army
22. Red Parallel: The Tactics of Ho and Mao, Col. Robert B. Rigg, U.S. Army
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25. They Call'em Bandits in Malaya, Dr. Paul M. A. Linebarger
26. The Guerrilla War in Malaya, Dr. James E. Dougherty, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Univ. of Pennsylvania
27. Action in Malaya, Maj. Anthony Crockett, British Royal Marines

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Each section includes a list of Further References in addition to the Research Bibliography on Guerrilla and Unconventional Warfare at the end of

the book; there is no duplication between the two listings. (xii)*

The Communists have demonstrated great skill in utilizing social, economic, and political weaknesses as major assets to guerrilla operations. Their success has been greatest in less industrialized societies, where they have been able to identify themselves as champions of the suppressed and discontented. Some of the selections in this volume are intended to broaden our understanding of these problems. For it is not enough merely to oppose the Communists and thus appear also to be opposing social and economic progress. The development of positive programs to end the threat of Communist guerrilla movements will require greater use of our intellectual resources by social scientists as well as military strategists. (xiii)

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GUERRILLA WARFARE.

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GUERRILLAS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

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