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MINORITY RECRUITING IN THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

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This report analyzes the minority recruiting policies, procedures, and objectives of the Navy and Marine Corps. It examines, first, the nature of the problem, and notes that it is both quantitative and qualitative for the Navy and mainly qualitative for the Marine Corps. It then summarizes the history, background and philosophy of the recruiting and the organization of recruiting Recruiting concepts and practices are examined in detail, followed by an analysis of labor market factors affecting minority availability. The
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study then points out that the Navy and Marine Corps must develop and/or expand
affirmative action programs in order to overcome internal and external barriers
to minority recruiting. Specific recommendations are made to improve existing
practices and to aid in achieving improved minority representation, particularly
in the officer and higher enlisted ranks. Throughout the study, comparisons
are made between Navy and Marine Corps practices and those of industry. With
due regard for the different institutional environments, the recommendations
are based upon successful industry practice.

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MINORITY RECRUITING IN THE
NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

by

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FOREWORD

The abolishment of the draft has caused the armed forces to reexamine the manpower policies and particularly their potential for attracting the quantity and quality of manpower which they need to fill their ranks. This study examines one aspect of that problem--the recruitment of minorities. Because the All-Volunteer Army must compete for manpower with private industry, comparison is frequently made with policies of private industry which might provide insights to solve the problems faced by the Navy and the Marine Corps.

As this study relied extensively on field interviews, numerous persons were extremely helpful in developing information. The personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps in all parts of the country were most generous with their time and assistance, as were many in private industry and in the minority communities. Without in any way intending to slight all those who gave so freely of their time, we do wish to thank Rear Admiral Emmett H. Tidd, Commander, Navy Recruiting Command, and Captain W.J. Loggan, Commander Fred D. Richardson, Jr., and Lieutenant Commander S.W. Sigmund, all of the Navy Recruiting Command, and Colonel H.L. Blanton, Jr., and Lieutenant Colonel V.M. Salazzo, and Major Sol Hill of the Military Personnel Procurement Branch, U.S. Marine Corps, for their special assistance throughout this study. In addition, we are very pleased to express our appreciation to Dr. G.L. Bryan, Director, Psychological Sciences Division, Dr. J.A. Nagay,

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In the Industrial Research Unit, much of the typing was done by

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the manuscript and made many suggestions. Mr. Ronald M. Cowin provided

leadership to the study before his resignation from the Industrial Research

Unit in September 1973. Mr. Robert G. Liney assisted with the statistical

materials. The opinions expressed in the report are, of course, those

of the authors, and the senior author is responsible for the final draft.

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September 1974

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Focal Point	Navy and Marine Corps	Private Enterprise
I. Recruiting Philosophy and Organization		
A. Recruiting-Training Relationship	Recruiting a function of training. Recruit those who can be trained according to specific criteria.	Training a function of recruiting. Train recruits as required by manpower market and affirmative action needs.
B. Tests	Tests play a major role in selection and advancement.	Tests are downgraded in selection and advancements, especially in regard to minorities.
C. Line Responsibility for Minority Recruiting	Line (as defined in industry) does not have a direct interest in minority recruiting.	Line is held responsible for minority recruiting.
II. Recruiting Concept and Practices		
A. Recruiting Management	Personnel procurement organization not generally manned by professionals in the sense of procurement being their career selection. Training of recruiters is limited.	Personnel manning the manpower procurement organization of private enterprise career oriented to that area. Recruiters extensively trained.
B. Recruiting System	Primary elements of recruiting system are the recruiter and advertising. Heavy reliance on immobile recruiting stations. Recruiting offices usually located away from any operational military unit.	Manpower procurement organization centralized and usually located at an operating facility. Face to face contact with the members of the manpower market; major public relations operations are supported by organization. Recruiting activities highly mobile.

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Summary Table (continued)

Focal Point	Navy and Marine Corps	Private Enterprise
C. Advertising	Advertising broad and general and largely national in scope.	Advertising pointed to specific needs in specific communities.
III. Labor Market Factors		
A. Education and Standards	Standards high and relatively inflexible; educational requirements set by law and policy.	Standards flexible; educational requirements vary or waived as required to obtain objectives.
B. Image and Credibility	Heavy reliance on advertising to establish or effectuate a positive image as a potential employer. Public relations activities at the "grassroots" level appears minimal.	Utilizes public relations efforts to get involved with the community. Civic action programs are present in these community penetration activities.
X C. Big City Factors	Inadequate efforts to aid in the alleviation of such big city factors as drugs, gangs, crime, and inadequate education, although these factors influence their recruiting success in the large metropolitan areas in which minorities are concentrated.	Considerable attempts to assist communities in removing the major problems which affect them and, in doing so, create a better minority manpower procurement market.
IV. Affirmative Action vs. Equal Opportunity	There appears to be no major differentiation between equal opportunity and affirmative action as perceived by the Navy and Marine Corps. Despite several affirmative programs, current practices are designed to present an open door to those minorities who can qualify (equal opportunity) rather than attempting to prepare minorities for qualification (affirmative action).	Affirmative action efforts take the form of remedial training programs for inner-city youths, flexible qualification procedures, and many other activities to "bring minorities in instead of screening them out."

CHAPTER I

THE MINORITY RECRUITING PROBLEM OF THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

The All-Volunteer Armed Services concept requires that the armed
forces compete in the labor market for manpower with other potential
users of labor, private and public. Moreover, in their recruitment
policies the services must not only recruit any manpower that can poten-
tially fill their needs, they must, again like other public and private
users, give due regard to the public policy of utilizing minorities in
a manner that affords such minorities every opportunity and consideration
to achieve a role commensurate with their representation in the labor
force and/or population.

This study is concerned with the problems associated with the recruit-
ment of minc   ies pursuant to the All-Volunteer concept and the means by
which that recruitment might be furthered. Chapter I states the purpose,
describes the research methodology, and sets forth the problem; Chapter II
explains why the problem exists by discussing the history of minority
recruitment and the philosophy and organization of minority recruiting as
practiced by the Navy and Marine Corps; Chapter III examines the Navy and
Marine Corps' concepts and practices used in recruiting; Chapter IV dis-
cusses the labor market and other external factors which inhibit or
encourage minority recruiting; and Chapter V analyzes the Navy and Marine
Corps equal opportunity programs and their differences from affirmative
action concepts. The final two chapters summarize the study's findings and
set forth the recommendations. Appendixes provide a bibliography, a sample
of questionnaires used in interviewing, and a list of pertinent Industrial
Research Unit studies.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study was funded by the Office of Naval Research in order to assist the Navy and the Marine Corps in improving their performance in recruiting minorities. Because private industry has had a long and varied exposure to minority recruiting, and because of the considerable experience of the project director and of the other members of the staff of the Industrial Research Unit of The Wharton School in studying industrial race relations,[1] the selection of the Industrial Research Unit to make the study emphasizes the interest of the Navy and the Marine Corps in ascertaining the extent to which industry practices might be helpful in meeting the services' minority recruitment problems. Accordingly, the basic work of this study has been to conduct an analysis of the minority recruiting practices of the Navy and Marine Corps and to compare their practices with those found in relevant private enterprise.

Systems Analysis

In order to accomplish our task in a thorough and organized fashion, we chose a systems analysis approach: a step-by-step analysis of each service as a means of determining the answers to the questions set forth in Figure 1. Within this framework, three basic sources of information were utilized:

1. literature search;

2. briefings;

3. personal interviews.

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1. The publications of the Industrial Research Unit are listed in Appendix C.

Figure 1. Minority Recruiting Study
Systems Analysis for Research

Who sets the goals and objectives of the organization or section?

How are these goals and objectives transformed into directives and/or orders (i.e.,how are they broken down)?

How are these directives/orders disseminated to the parties with whom they are concerned?

To whom are the objectives, goals, directives, and orders transmitted?

What do these parties do with the information they receive?

In order to familiarize ourselves with the recruiting policies of the Navy and Marine Corps, we reviewed the extensive and rapidly expanding literature relating to armed services manpower policies, and reexamined the already familiar writings dealing with minority manpower recruitment, labor force participation, concentration, and utilization in order to consider their bearing on the problems of the Navy and Marine Corps. A selected bibliography by subject is set forth in Appendix A.

Ac this time, we were fortunate to receive detailed briefings from senior Navy and Marine Corps officers concerned with manpower planning and procurement, minority recruiting, and other facets of recruiting, both of officers and of enlisted men. In addition, we began our close association and consultation with The Officer Procurement Planning Board of Philadelphia (TOPP Board), a volunteer group of educators who cooperate with the Marine Corps in recruiting matters, and who made themselves available and assisted in recruiting others so that we would have a source to test ideas.

We then attempted through personal interviews to determine the environment within which the recruiting system must operate, discussing out queries with key personnel in the Department of Defense and the services who influence the recruiting system. At the same time, these interviews taught us much about the manner in which the armed services recruit and about the recruiting environment.

After completing this portion of our study, utilizing personal interviews and literature, we analyzed those areas which in our opinion most directly affect minority procurement. We did this by examining:

1. historical background and trends of minority recruiting in general;

2. the overall picture of recruiting efforts today;

3. future plans and goals of both services with respect to recruiting.

Interviews

All this was preliminary to a detailed selective interviewing procedure which occupied most of the summer months of 1973 for four researchers, plus some additional time in the late fall of that year. The interviewing was conducted in Los Angeles, Oakland, San Diego, and San Francisco, California; Atlanta, Macon, and Savannah, Georgia; Quantico, Virginia; Pensacola, Florida; Oklahoma City and Tulsa, Oklahoma; Chicago, Illinois; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Albany, Long Island, and New York, New York. Typically, interviews were held with Navy and Marine Corps recruiting organizations in each of these areas, beginning with the District Command level and ending with the field recruiters. In addition, interviews were conducted with officials of public utilities, aerospace firms, appliance manufacturers' service facilities, and other firms. Finally, high school counselors, Urban League and Opportunities Industrialization Center officials, and others concerned with the placement of minority youth in jobs were contacted and interviewed. Approximately 180 persons in total were polled.

All interviews were based on a series of questionnaires administered by three research assistants and the associate project director. Although the specific set of questions naturally varied somewhat according to the interviewee's position and the course of the interview, the interviews remained carefully within a prescribed form. A representative sample of the

questionnaires utilized for the different levels of the Navy and Marine
Corps, for private industry, and for minority community and placement
personnel is found in Appendix B.

THE NATURE OF THE MINORITY RECRUITING PROBLEM

The nature of the Navy and Marine Corps minority recruiting problems
can be most easily seen by examining data setting forth racial partici-
pation. Although these apply only to blacks, the situation for Spanish
Surnamed Americans and American Indians is sufficiently similar to that for
blacks that we can generalize for these minorities from the black experience.

Enlisted Personnel — The Numbers Problem

Table 1 shows the number and percentage of Negro enlisted men in the
armed forces and compares these overall data with like figures for the
Navy and Marine Corps for fiscal years 1962-1973. Comparing these data
with the percentage of blacks (11 percent) in the total population, it is
immediately apparent that both the total armed forces and the Marine Corps
have more than their proportionate share of blacks in the enlisted ranks.
Moreover, the trend in each case has been upward, with the Marine Corps
more than doubling its black participation rate in the decade since 1962.

The Navy has also increased its enrollment of black enlisted men
since 1962, but continues to lag, both behind the other services and below
the Negro population ratio. Thus, in terms of overall enrollment of black
enlisted men, the Navy, with a black participation rate less than one-half
of that of the Marine Corps, has a very different problem of numbers than
does the Marine Corps.

Table 1. Minority Recruiting Study
Total Enlisted Personnel by Race
All Services, Navy, and Marine Corps
1962-1973

Year	All Services			Navy			Marine Corps		
	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	Total	Negro	Percent Negro
1962	2,104,079	193,776	9.2	580,970	30,408	5.2	173,613	13,351	7.7
1963	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1964	2,393,229	232,012	9.7	563,119	33,560	6.0	170,968	14,838	8.7
1965	2,478,803	260,752	10.5	640,702	36,963	5.8	196,939	17,626	8.9
1966	2,959,731	296,004	10.0	658,932	33,770	5.1	256,706	24,129	9.4
1967	2,982,105	295,040	9.9	657,533	31,191	4.7	274,778	28,388	10.3
1968	2,977,026	304,136	10.2	653,422	32,561	5.0	288,054	33,189	11.5
1969	2,876,679	277,129	9.6	634,772	34,075	5.4	276,458	32,109	11.6
1970	2,471,703	270,872	11.0	566,898	30,425	5.4	208,567	23,294	12.2
1971	2,145,027	259,029	12.1	520,048	30,043	5.8	176,643	21,769	12.3
1972	2,005,767	270,529	13.5	504,953	36,547	7.2	177,465	28,047	15.8
1973	1,877,582	279,477	14.9	480,708	38,955	8.1	170,598	30,129	17.7

Note: n.a. = Data not available.

The sharp contrast between the Navy and the Marine Corps minority recruitment problem is further illustrated by Tables 2 and 3 which compare the percentage of Negroes in the Navy and Marine Corps, respectively, with that in the total armed services, 1962-1973, after the compared service has been subtracted from the total figure. The Navy percentage has followed that of the other armed services on an upward trend, but has remained just slightly less than one-half of the other service figure. On the other hand, whereas in 1962 the black participation rate of the Marine Corps was slightly below that of the combined figure for the other armed services, it forged ahead in 1968 and has widened its lead since then.

Assuming, as we believe it is accurate to do, that the black participation rate would not be significantly altered by the addition of other minorities, we can emphatically state that the minority recruiting problem of the Marine Corps as of fiscal 1973 was not one of numbers or quantity insofar as enlisted personnel were concerned, but that of the Navy did indeed include the need to increase its overall black ratio. Since 1973, as we shall discuss in Chapter II, the Marine Corps and the Navy have both tightened their enlistment standards. This could alter the situation by creating a numbers, or quantity, minority recruitment problem for the Marine Corps, and by worsening that problem for the Navy.

Enlisted Personnel — The Quality Problem

Minority recruitment and equal opportunity of course involve much more than numbers of minorities in a service. Of prime importance is the distribution of members of minorities within the occupational hierarchy

Table 2. Minority Recruiting Study
Participation in Enlisted Ranks by Race
All Services and Navy
1962-1973

Year	All Services Except Navy			Navy			Difference in Percent Negro: Navy and Other Services
	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	
1962	1,523,109	163,368	10.7	580,970	30,408	5.2	-5.5
1963	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1964	1,830,110	198,452	10.8	563,119	33,560	6.0	-4.8
1965	1,838,101	223,789	12.2	640,702	36,963	5.8	-6.4
1966	2,300,799	262,234	11.4	658,932	33,770	5.1	-6.3
1967	2,324,572	263,849	11.4	657,533	31,191	4.7	-6.7
1968	2,323,604	271,575	11.7	653,422	32,561	5.0	-6.7
1969	2,241,907	243,054	10.8	634,772	34,075	5.4	-5.4
1970	1,904,805	240,447	12.6	566,898	30,425	5.4	-7.2
1971	1,624,979	228,986	14.1	520,048	30,043	5.8	-8.3
1972	1,500,814	233,982	15.6	504,953	36,547	7.2	-8.4
1973	1,396,874	240,522	17.2	480,708	38,955	8.1	-9.1

Source: Derived from Table 1.

Note: n.a. = Data not available.

Table 3. Minority Recruiting Study
Participation in Enlisted Ranks by Race
All Services and Marine Corps
1962-1973

Year	All Services Except Marine Corps			Marine Corps			Difference in Percent Negro: Marine Corps - Other Services
	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	
1962	1,930,466	180,425	9.3	173,613	13,351	7.7	-1.6
1963	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1964	2,222,261	217,174	9.8	170,968	14,838	8.7	-1.1
1965	2,281,864	243,126	10.7	196,939	17,626	8.9	-1.8
1966	2,703,025	271,875	10.1	256,706	24,129	9.4	-0.7
1967	2,707,327	266,652	9.8	274,778	28,388	10.3	+0.5
1968	2,688,972	270,947	10.1	288,054	33,189	11.5	+1.4
1969	2,600,221	245,020	9.4	276,458	32,109	11.6	+2.2
1970	2,263,136	247,578	10.9	208,567	23,294	11.2	+0.3
1971	1,968,384	237,260	12.1	176,643	21,769	12.3	+0.2
1972	1,828,302	242,482	13.3	177,465	28,047	15.8	+2.5
1973	1,706,984	249,348	14.6	170,598	30,129	17.7	+3.1

Source: Derived from Table 1.

Note: n.a. = Data not available.

and especially their share of the better, or higher ranking positions and
assignments. In this regard, both the Navy and the Marine Corps have
basic quality problems, as do all the services, but the Navy's is far
more severe.

Table 4 shows that in all services blacks are overrepresented in the
infantry and related functions, as service and supply handlers and in
miscellaneous functions, but underrepresented as electronic and medical
and dental specialists, and as electrical and mechanical equipment repair
personnel. In addition, in the Navy Negroes are underrepresented as other
technical personnel, administrative specialists and clerks, and craftsmen.

In the Marine Corps, however, blacks have their approximate fair
share (using an 11 percent population figure as a rough measure) of jobs
as communications and intelligence specialists (12.0 percent), other
technical and allied specialists (15.0 percent), administrative specialists
and clerks and craftsmen. One must conclude that the Marine Corps
enlisted personnel include a substantial representation of blacks in
specialities, despite an overrepresentation in what are termed the "grunt"
jobs--infantry and material handling. Those categories underrepresented
in the Marine Corps are the electronic equipment specialists and the
electrical/mechanical equipment repairmen--both categories in which
minorities are also underrepresented in industry.

In regard to the Marine Corps, Table 4 shows that blacks are more
heavily overrepresented in the infantry, material handling, and related
categories than in all services combined. On the other hand, black Marines

Table 4. Minority Recruiting Study
Total Enlisted Personnel by Race and Occupational Groups
All Services, Navy, and Marine Corps
December 31, 1973

Occupational Groups	All Services			Navy			Marine Corps		
	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	Total	Negro	Percent Negro
Infantry, Gun Crews and Allied Specialties	254,325	49,199	19.3	56,534	5,777	10.2	48,331	12,678	26.1
Electronic Equipment Specialists	188,760	11,413	6.0	55,302	2,149	3.9	12,745	668	5.2
Communications and Intelligence Specialists	132,476	12,707	9.6	41,342	2,649	6.4	12,133	1,454	12.0
Medical and Dental Specialists[a]	87,097	12,461	14.3	26,633	2,271	8.5	18[a]	3	16.7[a]
Other Technical and Allied Specialties (Includes Photography, Drafting, Surveying, Mapping, etc.)	38,104	3,398	8.9	10,673	515	4.8	2,529	379	15.0
Administrative Specialists and Clerks	366,434	63,827	17.4	70,004	6,595	9.4	29,318	3,953	13.5
Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairmen	389,296	43,511	11.2	135,621	9,933	7.3	28,198	2,744	9.7
Craftsmen	90,205	11,595	12.9	28,683	1,800	6.3	5,123	681	13.3
Service and Supply Handlers	212,221	44,730	21.1	28,002	3,421	12.2	26,077	6,065	23.3
Miscellaneous Others	118,664	26,636	22.4	27,914	3,845	13.8	5,926	1,504	25.4
Total	1,877,582	279,477	14.9	480,708	38,955	8.1	170,598	30,129	17.7

Source: Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Equal Opportunity).
[a]The Marine Corps is serviced by the Navy in this occupational group.

comprise a larger proportion of several skilled categories than do Negroes
in the overall armed forces.

Although the data in Table 4 are very useful in showing how blacks
are represented in the various enlisted occupational groups, interservice
comparisons derived from such data can be misleading. Just as in the
private sector, in which a comparison of racial employment in two industries
with quite different job structures and skill requirements can be misleading
in comprehending the extent of equal employment, so it is true in the
services that comparisons of racial-occupational distributions, for example,
between the Navy and Marine Corps, fail to take account of the quite differ-
ent concentrations of personnel in the various occupations and the impact
of these concentrations on how all enlisted personnel, white or black, are
distributed within a service.

In order, therefore, to compare how blacks are distributed within each
service, Table 5 was constructed. It shows the percent distribution of
all enlisted men and Negroes by occupational groups in 1973, for all
services, the Navy, and the Marine Corps. Table 5, first of all, demonstrates
that in fact the occupational distributions of the various services are quite
different. For example, whereas 28.4 percent of the Marine Corps enlistees
are infantry, gun crews, or related personnel, only 11.8 percent of Navy
enlisted personnel are in this category. On he other hand, almost twice
the percentage of Navy personnel are electrical/mechanical equipment
repairmen as are those in the Marine Corps. Moreover, the distribution
within occupations, both for the Navy and the Marine Corps, differs from
that of all services.

Table 5. Minority Recruiting Study
Percent Distribution of Enlisted Men by Race and Occupational Group
All Services, Navy, and Marine Corps
December 31, 1973

Occupational Group	All Services		Navy		Marine Corps	
	Total	Negro	Total	Negro	Total	Negro
Infantry, Gun Crews and Allied Specialties	13.6	17.6	11.8	14.9	28.4	42.1
Electronics Equipment Specialists	10.1	4.1	11.5	5.5	7.5	2.2
Communications and Intelligence Specialists	7.1	4.5	8.6	6.8	7.1	4.8
Medical and Dental Specialists	4.6	4.5	5.5	5.8	*a	*a
Other Technical and Allied Specialties (Includes Photography, Drafting, Surveying, Mapping, etc.)	2.0	1.2	2.2	1.3	1.5	1.3
Administrative Specialists and Clerks	19.5	22.8	14.6	16.9	17.2	13.1
Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairmen	20.7	15.6	28.2	25.5	16.5	9.1
Craftsmen	4.8	4.2	6.0	4.6	3.0	2.3
Service and Supply Handlers	11.3	16.0	5.8	8.8	15.3	20.1
Miscellaneous Others	6.3	9.5	5.8	9.9	3.5	5.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Derived from Table 4.

*Less than 0.05 percent.

aThe Marine Corps is services by the Navy in this occupational group.

Turning first to the Navy data, we find that the principal differences between the total and black percentage distributions are found in the least skilled areas--infantry, gun crews and allied specialties, service and supply handlers, and miscellaneous others. In these three categories are found 33.6 percent of the total black enlisted men. On the other hand, only 5.5 percent of the blacks, as compared with 11.5 percent of all enlistees, are working as electronics equipment specialists, one of the highest skilled categories.

The occupational distribution of black Marines is equally skewed. Almost 70 percent of the black Marines are found in the lowest three occupational categories compared with 47.2 percent of all Marines. Only 2.2 percent of the blacks, as compared with 7.5 percent of all Marines, were electronic specialists, and just over one-half the proportion of blacks as all Marines were electrical/mechanical equipment repairmen--a greater disparity than found in the Navy.

It is thus clear beyond question that both the Navy and Marine Corps have racial occupational distributions in the enlisted ranks which require amelioration before equal opportunity can be achieved. Moreover, as we shall point out in succeeding chapters, this unequal distribution both requires and hinders minority recruiting improvement.

Officer Personnel

The minority officer recruiting problem of the Navy and the Marine Corps is a severe one both in terms of quantity and rank. Table 6 shows the black participation for all services, the Navy and the Marine Corps, fiscal years 1962-1973. Despite slow but steady improvement during this

Table 6. Minority Recruiting Study
Total and Negro Officer Personnel
All Services, Navy, and Marine Corps
1962-1973

Year	All Services			Navy			Marine Corps		
	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	Total	Negro	Percent Negro
1962	301,870	5,072	1.7	70,689	194	0.3	16,804	41	0.2
1963	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1964	342,911	6,100	1.8	75,855	195	0.3	17,160	61	0.4
1965	337,998	6,351	1.9	78,090	252	0.3	17,272	65	0.4
1966	362,042	7,143	2.0	80,998	273	0.3	22,692	149	0.7
1967	402,078	8,335	2.1	81,118	280	0.3	23,707	167	0.7
1968	417,125	8,696	2.1	86,559	373	0.4	24,976	231	0.9
1969	407,847	8,595	2.1	81,238	571	0.7	25,217	294	1.2
1970	389,344	8,402	2.2	77,679	512	0.7	23,034	296	1.3
1971	358,826	8,141	2.3	74,885	576	0.8	20,022	267	1.3
1972	328,757	7,915	2.4	71,484	726	1.0	19,178	318	1.7
1973	288,946	9,443	3.3	64,214	708	1.1	17,452	356	2.0

Source: Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Equal Opportunity), The Negro in the Armed Forces: A Statistical Fact Book (Washington, D.C.: 1971), pp. 4-7; and Supplement sheets, 31 December 1972, p. 1, and 31 December 1973.

Note: n.a. = Data not available.

decade, Negroes remain grossly underrepresented in all the armed services'
officer ranks, holding only 3.3 percent of such positions in 1973. More-
over, the Marine Corps, with a 2.0 percent black participation, and the
Navy, with only 1.1 percent, rank below a low all-services average.

The low Navy and Marine Corps officer participation rate is further
demonstrated in Tables 7 and 8. Table 7, comparing the Navy ratio with
that of all armed forces except Navy, shows that in 1973 the Navy's rate
is less than one-third of that of the others. The Marine Corps fares
somewhat better as seen in Table 8. Its black participation rate is 2.0
percent as compared with the other services' rate of 3.3 percent. Of
course, the Marine Corps' relative standing is aided not only by its improved
performance since 1962, but also by the low Navy rate which pulls down
the comparative figure for the combined other services. Moreover, unlike
the Marine Corps, the Navy did not improve its standing relative to the
other services in 1973, as compared with 1962, although for several years
in between it did so and then fell back. Table 6 shows that this occurred
not because the Navy did not show progress, albeit at a slow rate, but
because the other services moved forward faster.

Table 10 sheds further light on the very serious Navy and Marine Corps
minority officer recruiting problem by showing the percentage distribution
of officers in all armed forces, Navy and Marine Corps as of December 31,
1973, by race and occupational group. Negroes who are in the services
are underrepresented as general officers, but less so in the Navy, while the
Marine Corps had no black general officers as of December 1973. In all
services, black officers are underconcentrated as tactical operations

Table 7. Minority Recruiting Study
Comparison of Negro Participation in Officer Rank
All Services and Navy
1962-1973

Year	All Services Except Navy			Navy			Difference in Percent Negro: Navy and Other Services
	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	
1962	231,181	4,878	2.1	70,689	194	0.3	-1.8
1963	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1964	267,056	5,935	2.2	75,855	195	0.3	-1.9
1965	259,908	6,099	2.3	78,090	252	0.3	-2.0
1966	281,044	6,870	2.4	80,998	273	0.3	-2.1
1967	320,960	8,055	2.5	81,118	280	0.3	-2.2
1968	330,566	8,323	2.5	86,559	373	0.4	-2.1
1969	326,609	8,024	2.5	81,238	571	0.7	-1.8
1970	311,665	7,890	2.5	77,679	512	0.7	-1.8
1971	283,941	7,565	2.7	74,885	576	0.8	-1.9
1972	257,273	7,189	2.8	71,484	726	1.0	-1.8
1973	224,732	6,735	3.9	64,214	708	1.1	-2.8

Source: Derived from Table 6.

Note: n.a. = Data not available.

Table 8. Minority Recruiting Study
Comparison of Negro Participation in Officer Rank
All Services and Marine Corps
1962-1973

Year	All Services Except Marine Corps			Marine Corps			Difference in Percent Negro: Marine Corps and Other Services
	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	
1962	285,066	5,031	1.8	16,804	41	0.2	-1.6
1963	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1964	325,751	6,069	1.9	17,160	61	0.4	-1.5
1965	320,726	6,286	2.0	17,272	65	0.4	-1.6
1966	339,350	6,994	2.1	22,692	149	0.7	-1.4
1967	378,371	8,168	2.2	23,707	167	0.7	-1.5
1968	392,149	8,465	2.2	24,976	231	0.9	-1.3
1969	382,630	8,301	2.2	25,217	294	1.2	-1.0
1970	366,310	8,106	2.2	23,034	296	1.3	-0.9
1971	338,804	7,874	2.3	20,022	267	1.3	-1.0
1972	309,579	7,597	2.5	19,178	318	1.7	-0.8
1973	271,494	9,087	3.3	17,452	356	2.0	-1.3

Source: Derived from Table 6.

Note: n.a. = Data not available.

Table 9. Minority Recruiting Study
Total Officer Personnel by Race and Occupational Group
All Services, Navy, and Marine Corps
December 31, 1973

Occupational Group	All Services			Navy			Marine Corps		
	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	Total	Negro	Percent Negro
General Officers and Executive N.E.C.	4,454	30	0.7	2,572	8	0.3	673	--	--
Tactical Operations Officers	111,749	2,462	2.2	14,292	90	0.6	11,793	152	1.3
Intelligence Officers	9,792	223	2.3	1,505	9	0.6	162	5	3.1
Engineering and Maintenance Officers	43,495	1,183	2.7	12,109	93	0.8	1,370	44	3.2
Scientists and Professionals	14,937	282	1.9	4,136	40	1.0	257	--	--
Medical Officers	30,478	663	2.2	8,160	94	1.2	a	a	a
Administrators	34,954	1,329	3.8	11,096	189	1.7	970	37	3.8
Supply Procurement and Allied Officers	17,144	684	4.0	3,831	45	1.2	1,301	74	5.7
Others	21,953	2,587	11.8	6,513	140	2.1	926	44	4.8
Total	288,946	9,443	3.3	64,214	708	1.1	17,452	356	2.0

Source: Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Equal Opportunity).

aThe Marine Corps is serviced by the Navy in this occupational group.

Table 10. Minority Recruiting Study
Percent Distribution of Officers by Race and Occupational Group
All Services, Navy, and Marine Corps
December 31, 1973

Occupational Group	All Services		Navy		Marine Corps	
	Total	Negro	Total	Negro	Total	Negro
General Officers and Executive N.E.C.	1.5	0.3	4.0	1.1	3.0	--
Tactical Operations Officers	38.7	26.1	22.3	12.7	67.6	42.7
Intelligence Officers	3.4	2.4	2.3	1.3	0.9	1.4
Engineering and Maintenance Officers	15.1	12.5	18.9	13.1	7.8	12.4
Scientists and Professionals	5.2	3.0	6.4	5.6	1.5	--
Medical Officers	10.5	7.0	12.7	13.3	a	a
Administrators	12.1	14.1	17.3	26.7	5.6	10.4
Supply Procurement and Allied Officers	5.9	7.2	6.0	6.4	7.4	20.7
Others	7.6	27.4	10.1	19.8	5.3	12.4
All Groups	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Derived from Table 9.

aThe Marine Corps is serviced by the Navy in this occupational group.

personnel and overconcentrated as administrators. In the Navy and Marine
Corps, they are heavily found in the "other" (miscellaneous) category, and
in the Marine Corps, but not the Navy, in supply and procurement.

The percentage distribution of black officers must be placed in the
context of the small numbers involved. Thus, although 13.3 percent of all
black officers in the Navy were medical officers as of December 31, 1973,
there were only 40 doctors and 3 dentists in the group. Table 11 also
gives figures for other professional groups--lawyers, chaplains, and pilots.
The Navy had only one black lawyer and the Marine Corps none, and the
Navy had only five black chaplains.

Pilots are significant not only because they occupy a high pres-
tige position but also because the great bulk of civilian air transport
pilots utilized by the commercial airlines are recruited from the armed
services.[2] As of December 31, 1973, the Navy had forty black pilots, the
Marine Corps fifty-three. It is interesting to note that an Industrial
Research Unit study of racial employment policies of the air transport
industry found that in 1969 only 0.3 percent of the pilots employed by
scheduled airlines were black. At that time, 0.6 percent of the Air
Force pilots and 0.1 percent of the Navy pilots, or a total of 0.5 percent
of the total armed forces pilots, were also black.[3] The Marine Corps is

2. On this point see Herbert R. Northrup, "The Negro in the Air Transport
   Industry," in Northrup et al., Negro Employment in Land and Air Trans-
   port, Studies of Negro Employment, Vol. V (Philadelphia: Industrial
   Research Unit, Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of
   Pennsylvania, 1971), Part Two, pp. 45-49.

3. Ibid., p. 48.

Table 11. Minority Recruiting Study
Selected Professional Occupations by Race
Navy and Marine Corps
December 31, 1973

Occupational Group	Navy	Marine Corps
Pilots		
Total	12,867	4,923
Negro	40	53
Percent Negro	0.3	1.1
Medical Doctors		
Total	3,682	a
Negro	40	
Percent Negro	1.1	
Dentists		
Total	1,695	a
Negro	3	
Percent Negro	0.2	
Lawyers		
Total	676	253
Negro	1	--
Percent Negro	0.1	--
Chaplains		
Total	843	a
Negro	5	
Percent Negro	0.6	

Source: Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Equal Opportunity); Bureau of Naval
Personnel Report, 31 December 1973.

[a]The Marine Corps is serviced by the Navy in these
occupational groups.

thus doing about as well as the Air Force in this category and botn are **exceeding** the record of the scheduled airlines, but the Navy falls below both other services and its civilian counterpart as well.

Summary

In this chapter we have utilized the relevant data for black participation in the Navy and Marine Corps to determine the extent of the minority recruiting problem of these services. Our assumption is that data for other minorities, which are not available historically or as completely, if added to the tables presented herein, would not significantly alter the picture. Our conclusion is that both the Navy and the Marine Corps have severe minority recruiting problems insofar as the quality of jobs in which minority enlisted men and officers are found. In each service, blacks are underrepresented in the upper, or more skilled enlisted occupational groups and in all officer ones. Moreover, black officers tend to be concentrated in categories other than the professional or top leadership ones.

Insofar as overall representation in the Marine Corps enlisted ranks is concerned, Negroes are represented in a larger proportion than their population ratio. In the Navy, however, blacks are underrepresented numerically overall, as well as in the higher enlisted ranks.

Given these problems involving minority recruiting, it is important to examine their background and the current recruiting philosophy and organization of recruiting in the Navy and the Marine Corps in order to determine what is being done and what can be done to improve the situation. In the following chapter, we address ourselves to recruiting history, philosophy, and organization.

CHAPTER II

RECRUITING HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY, AND ORGANIZATION

The roots of the minority recruitment problems of the Navy and
Marine Corps, discussed in the preceding chapter, are found in the
history and philosophy of these services' recruiting policies, and
engendered more difficult to correct by labor market factors and current
practices. This chapter reviews briefly the history of minority recruit-
ing practices and analyzes recruiting philosophy and organization. As
in Chapter I, we shall use blacks as the basis for our minority references
because until recently, no statistics were maintained on other minorities.
Moreover, the Marine Corps still classifies Spanish Surnamed Americans
as Caucasians.[1]

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

As the following discussion will demonstrate, the Navy and the
Marine Corps altered their minority recruiting practices over the years
in response to the mores of the times. This, of course, is to be expected
in a democratic society in which the armed forces reflect the people
involved. Of significance, however, is that the roots of integration in
the Navy go back farther, if inconsistently, than do those of segregation
or exclusion. The Marine Corps, however, has a different history.

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1. This is, of course, a technically correct classification, but it pre-
   vents some minority problem analysis and cultural identification which
   many, but not all, such persons desire.

The Navy

Minority participation in the Navy began during the Revolutionary War. An estimated fifteen hundred Negroes served in the United States Navy during that war and they were always entered on the ship's books without any distinction as to race. They served primarily as seamen and gunners, although some of them were pilots of various state coastal craft. During these early days, Negroes were enlisted and emancipated for their services. "They comprised approximately one-sixth of the total naval personnel during the period of the War of 1812."[2] Commodore Perry, describing the valor of some of his Negro sailors, stated, "When America has such tars, she has little to fear from tyrants of the ocean."[3]

Negroes served in large numbers on both Union and Confederate ships during the Civil War. During the 1863-1898 period, eight black sailors were awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, as set forth in Table 12.

Table 12. Minority Recruiting Study
Negro Medal of Honor Winners, 1864-1898

Name	Year	Ship
Robert Blake	1864	USS Marblehead
John Lawson	1864	USS Hartford
James Mifflin	1864	USS Brooklyn
Joachim Pease	1864	USS Kearsage
Aaron Anderson	1865	USS Wyandank
Joseph B. Noil	1872	USS Powhatan
Robert Penn	1898	USS Iowa
Daniel Atkins	1898	US Torpedo Boat Cushing

Source: "Enlisted Minority Recruitment Guide," Nav Pers 15152, Appendix I.

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2. "Enlisted Minority Recruitment Guide," Nav Pers 15152, Appendix I.

3. Ibid.

The Navy continued its policy of enlisting Negroes on a fully
integrated basis in the Spanish-American War. They were, however, limited
to the ranks. During World War I approximately 10,000 blacks volunteered
to serve in the Navy, but for the most part they were assigned to non-
combatant duties. It was at this time that the Navy first began to show
partiality in its treatment and use of Negro personnel. The Navy main-
tained integrated crews aboard its ships until 1920. After that time, the
crews' living quarters were segregated and remained so until well into
World War II. Negroes were enlisted only in limited ratings during this
period. Then in 1942, the Navy announced that blacks would again be
accepted for general enlisted service but were limited to service in
auxiliary ships and ashore.

During the period between the Civil War and World War I, no blacks
were commissioned in the Navy. The first Negro to be admitted to the
Naval Academy was James H. Conyers of South Carolina who entered in 1872.
Between the years 1874 and 1936 no Negroes were appointed to Annapolis.
In 1945, Wesley A. Brown was appointed to the U.S. Naval Academy and
became the first black graduate in June 1949.[4]

In 1943, the Navy announced its intention of commissioning black
officers for the first time in history. Sixteen men were selected from
enlisted ranks to receive officer indoctrination. After ten weeks of
training, twelve of the group were commissioned as ensigns on March 17,
1944. Eleven staff officers were commissioned by early summer 1944.

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4. Ibid.

Included in the second group was Ensign T.D. Parham, USN, who is presently

on active duty as a Captain in the Bureau of Naval Personnel. A total of

58 male Negro officers were commissioned during World War II. Two black

Wave officers were also on active duty during that war.

By 1943, the Navy had trained and formed an all Negro Seabee battalion;

it saw action in World War II and performed creditably. By 1944, the

Navy had commissioned two anti-submarine warfare ships and manned them,

insofar as possible, with black crews.

All restrictions as to the types of ships on which black personnel

could serve were removed by 1945, except that not more than 10 percent of

any ship's complement could be black. During the 1942-1947 period, over

thirty directives were issued relating to the Negro in the naval service.

These directives demonstrated that an enlightened policy with regard to

desegregation and equal opportunity had been officially accepted and

adopted in the Navy.

During the Korean conflict, the Negro was once again an integral part

of the naval operating forces. Notable among the casualties of this

conflict was Ensign Jesse L. Brown, a native of Mississippi. He was the

first Negro to earn the wings of a naval aviator. Ensign Brown dis-

tinguished himself in combat, earning the Distinguished Flying Cross and

Air Medal. On December 5, 1950, he was killed when his aircraft was

downed by enemy gunfire.

Today, the Navy is attempting to establish an equal opportcunity basis

for all ranks and careers. There were 38,955 Negro enlisted and approxi-

mately 708 Negro officers, 8.1 percent and 1.1 percent of total active

personnel respectively, as of December 31, 1973.[5]

The Marine Corps

It was not until May 1942 that the first Negro Marines were recruited for a special battalion to be trained at Montford Point, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.[6] During the period 1942-1946, 19,500 Negro Marines were trained at this camp. At that time there were no black officers serving in the Marine Corps on active duty.

In the summer of 1944, the first Negro Marines were assigned to the Navy's V-12 Education Program. The program was designed to provide qualified enlisted personnel with a college education and ultimately a commission in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. It was November 1945, however, before any blacks successfully completed the training course and received commissions in the Corps Reserve.

The decision to accept blacks for enlistment in the Marine Corps was not without reservations. The first units assigned were primarily segregated supply and ammunition units. After the war, all of these units, twelve in number, were disbanded, and effective in May 1949, no first term enlistments of Negroes were accepted for general service, as blacks were recruited for stewards duty only. By the fall of 1949, however, several existing personnel policies received major modification, and black enlistees were accepted with these limitations:

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5. See Tables 1 and 6, Chapter I.

6. "The Negro in the Marine Corps," mimeographed report prepared for the U.S. Marine Corps, p. 1.

a. Negro officers were to be limited to command of those units composed entirely of Negro enlisted personnel.

b. All Negro recruits were to be trained with white recruits on a nonsegregated basis.

c. Individual Negro Marines were to be assigned in accordance with MOS vacancies in any unit where their service could be effectively utilized.

d. Negro women Marines were to be recruited for general service.

By 1952, Negro Marines were being assigned to all Marine units, although caution was exercised in limiting the number assigned to combat units.[7] Gradually all restrictions were lifted.

Since the end of World War II, Negro personnel strength has grown from 2,238 enlisted Marines and no officers to 30,129 enlisted and 356 officers on active duty as of December 31, 1973. These figures represent 17.7 percent of all enlisted and 2.0 percent of all officers.[8]

Summary

From the Revolutionary War until 1950, the relationship between minorities and the military has been inconsistent. When the military needed men, minorities served; when it did not, minorities were often rejected. Partially perhaps because of the Navy's inconsistent treatment over the years, and the Marine Corps' belated opening of its ranks, our interviews repeatedly found a feeling in the black communities that these services are even today "racist" and that discrimination will be practiced

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7. Ibid., p. 32.

8. See Tables 1 and 6, Chapter I.

against enlistees.[9] This feeling is most intense with respect to the

Navy, even though the Navy enrolled blacks long before the Marine Corps.

The sentiment may be partly the result of the widely publicized riots,

noted in Chapter IV, which occurred aboard aircraft carriers in 1972.

We believe, however, that those riots merely reinforced existing beliefs

based on the years of segregation. We found considerable indication that

older blacks who had direct, or even indirect, exposure to the Navy during

and immediately after World War II passed on strong feelings against the

discriminatory practices that they had endured or heard recounted to their

children or to other younger families and community members. Para-

doxically, by being totally exclusionist, the Marine Corps may have

escaped such intense feelings, passed on by an older generation which

keeps alive reactions to practices now no longer extant, thus perpetuat-

ing an image difficult to overcome even though it is no longer representa-

tive.[10]

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9. We of course recognize that we took no scientific sampling of black
communities. Yet the pervasiveness of the feelings encountered has
convinced us that our findings in this regard are completely defensible.

10. We have encountered many similar situations in industry. For example,
in the South, the textile industry traditionally excluded blacks;
the paper manufacturing industry employed large numbers of them, but
confined them to lower, segregated jobs. The paper manufacturing
industry, like the Navy, has a much higher percentage of skilled
jobs. Today, with both textiles and paper manufacturers recruiting
blacks, it is the latter, not the former, that finds itself with the
more difficult race problem. See Herbert R. Northrup, Richard L.
Rowan et al., Negro Employment in Southern Industry, Studies of
Negro Employment, Vol. IV (Philadelphia: Industrial Research Unit,
Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania,
1970), Parts One and Five. Cf. also the remark of another observer,
"Although the navy was the first service to integrate and the army
the last, in a kind of tortoise and hare fashion, it is the army that
has become the most representative service for blacks." Charles C.
Moskos, Jr., "The American Dilemma in Uniform: Race in the Armed
Forces," The Annals, Vol. CDVI (March 1973), p. 100.

RECRUITING PHILOSOPHY

Inherent in any system of recruitment, whether voluntary or compulsory, is a set of standards which determine what persons shall be eligible for selection. The classification "4F--mentally, morally, or physically unfit," utilized during World War II and thereafter, was a designation that by certain criteria some persons were unfit for military duty. This or any other standard requires definition by designated criteria. In turn, the criteria must be shaped by the needs of the armed services, the requirements of public policy, and the realities of the labor market.

All these change over time. The needs of the armed forces are different today than they were a few years ago, or than they might be a few years hence. Standards of fitness are altered by new conditions, new knowledge, or new needs. Public policy requirements are different today than they were several years ago. And the labor market for the recruitment of a volunteer army is far different than that for one staffed in large part by a draft. A basic question for the purpose of this study is whether the Navy and the Marine Corps recruitment standards are consistent with a public policy which demands affirmative action in the utilization of minorities within a voluntary armed services concept that must compete for labor with private and other public employers. As will be developed below, our conclusion is that there are basic flaws in the recruiting philosophy which open the recruitment standards to question.

Mental Standards

We are not here concerned with physical or moral standards as long as they are applied equally regardless of racial or ethnic considerations, and, except for some problems discussed in later chapters concerning center city youth arrest (not conviction) problems, we have found no evidence otherwise. Mental standards, however, are a major consideration, in part because such standards are far from being either absolute or universally accepted as valid, and in part because their application can be difficult to apply without subjective factors significantly affecting their administration. Yet the philosophy of recruiting of the Navy and Marine Corps as now practiced requires heavy reliance on mental standards.

All armed forces have the bulk of their recruits under their control for only a short period. Reenlistments among first-term volunteers in 1970 was only 9.8 percent of those eligible, and even among eligible career personnel, only 37.9 percent.[11] Few, if any, private employers must deal with a like situation.

As a result of these turnover facts, the services are greatly concerned that their recruits be capable of being trained rapidly so that they can spend the bulk of their service time on active duty. For the same reason, they stress both capability for training in recruits and selection of recruits for specific types of training who are most likely to complete their training sucessfully and rapidly and be ready for duty.

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11. Data from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Equal Opportunity), The Negro in the Armed Forces: A Statistical Fact Book (Washington, D.C.: 1971), pp. 174-230.

It is thus perfectly understandable that the armed forces have established predetermined mental standards in order to attempt to weed out before entrance those who would be unfit to serve.

Mental Groups and Tests

The concept of mental standards dates from the passage of the Selective Service Act of 1948. Essentially what has been done is to classify potential recruits into five (or actually seven, since two are subdivided) mental group categories. No. I is the highest, No. V the lowest. Persons found to be in No. V are deemed unfit for military duty and not recruited or accepted, although some so classified are still found on the rolls.

The basic criteria for determining who is slotted into these mental groups are a series of tests which are administered to all potential accessions. Table 13 shows the tests and test scores required of each Navy and Marine Corps potential recruit and the cutoff scores for each mental group as of January 8, 1974. Test and score cutoffs have varied over time, but the principle of utilizing them has been maintained. Either by varying the scores which determine mental group slotting or by varying the scores acceptable for recruiting personnel for various tasks, the armed forces have attempted both to take advantage of experience and to adjust recruiting needs to labor market realities.

The test scores have a fundamental and pervasive impact on the individual recruit's experience. If he scores high enough to be accepted, he is then offered training opportunity based on his designated mental grade slot, assuming, of course, there are available openings. To be sure,

Table 13. Minority Recruiting Study
Mental Group Classifications by Organization and Tests Used
January 8, 1974

Organization	Test	Mental Groups						
		I	II	IIIA	IIIB	IVA	IVB	V
Navy	SBTB	195	163	151	135	125	106	105
Navy	AFQT	93	65	49	31	21	10	9
Marine Corps	AFQT	93	65	49	31	21	10	9

Source: Headquarters interview, January 8, 1974.

Notes: Numbers given are minimum cutoff scores.
Mental group I is the highest; mental group V is the lowest and unfit for military duty.
SBTB - Short Basic Test Battery.
AFQT - Armed Forces Qualification Test.

other characteristics are analyzed. A person's moral, emotional, and physical characteristics are also evaluated and any one of these may prove to be the determining factor. But the test score that he obtains can determine not only if he is accepted or rejected from enlistment, but also his school, guarantee for school, job, and, later in his career, his promotions. A high enough score can offset other less desirable qualities; a low enough score can eliminate an otherwise desirable candidate.

The Navy and the Marine Corps use tests also to obtain a desired mental group mix of recruits. For example, Congress has required, as will be discussed in Chapter IV, that the Navy and Marine Corps tighten their quotas on the number of mental group IV's they will accept. Moreover, the Navy and Marine Corps have maintained their reliance on tests despite the heavy attack that tests have come under in recent years for their

common lack of relatedness to job success, their frequent lack of valida-
tion, and their possible vulnerability to racial or cultural bias.

We are not testing experts and we have not studied the tests used
by the Navy and Marine Corps as would such experts. We do seriously,
nonetheless, question whether the tests do in fact measure job aptitude
with the exactitude relied upon by the Navy and Marine Corps. Certainly,
we know that industry has greatly downgraded tests as selection tools
since the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It does
seem obvious from our experience that if a private industry utilized the
same type of tests to the same degree, and had the same minority recruiting
problems as do the Navy and the Marine Corps, it would have considerable
difficulty avoiding a charge of discrimination pursuant to Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.[12] Finally, it was very clear in our field
visits that testing procedures, facilities, and administration around the
country lacked the uniformity and sometimes adequacy which are essential
for fairness and objectivity of measurement.

For Negroes and other minorities, the tests are a serious problem.
Poorly educated, inexperienced in testing procedures, and sometimes
suffering from language and/or other communications problems, they, not
surprisingly, .o disproportionately poorly in the tests. This not only
contributes to the overconcentration of minorities in the lowest acceptable
mental group (No. IV) category, but it can also bar them from promotions
and upgrading opportunities and thus helps to perpetuate the quality
problems described in Chapter I.

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12. As in the case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).

Table 14 shows the seriousness of the Navy's problem in this regard by listing the number and proportion of enlisted personnel by race, grade, and mental group. It immediately is clear that blacks are over represented in the lowest mental group (No. IV) and, except for those in mental group IV, are concentrated in the lowest ranks within each mental group. Table 15 shows the same type of data for the Marine Corps, which also has a heavy concentration of blacks in mental group IV and below.

Table 16 shows a comparative percentage distribution of all enlisted persons and blacks by mental groups for the Navy and Marine Corps and emphasizes the black overconcentration in the bottom group. For the Navy, nearly one-half of all enlisted personnel, but only 15.3 percent of blacks, are in Groups I and II. On the other hand, almost three times the proportion of blacks as of all personnel are in No. IV. For the Marine Corps, almost 33 percent of all personnel, but only 11 percent of all blacks, are in Groups I and II, whereas only 11.1 percent of all personnel, but 25.7 percent of all blacks are in Group IV. What this means in practice--with relatively few exceptions--is that the Navy and Marine Corps have categorized almost one-third of their enlisted personnel as ineligible for training for higher ranking jobs. Those in mental group III, 49.1 percent of the black Navy and 56.5 percent of the black Marine Corps enlisted personnel, are considered as having potential for limited training. Obviously, if these classifications are correct, the outlook for improvement in the job and rank distribution of minorities within these services by training and upgrading is limited. This, of course, begs the question of the accuracy of the criteria that determine mental

Table 14. Minority Recruiting Study
Enlisted Personnel by Mental Group, Grade, and Race
Navy, December 31, 1973

Grade	Total Mental Groups			Mental Group No. I			Mental Group No. II			Mental Group No. III		
	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	Total	Negro	Percent Negro
E-9	3,494	114	3.3	471	3	0.6	1,732	30	1.7	863	52	6.0
E-8	8,500	324	3.8	876	8	0.9	4,289	73	1.7	2,320	160	6.9
E-7	34,221	2,182	6.4	2,247	21	0.9	14,296	389	2.7	11,924	1,007	8.4
E-6	68,672	4,564	6.6	4,912	37	0.8	25,668	576	2.2	23,953	2,030	8.5
E-5	77,041	3,827	5.0	9,621	50	0.5	32,659	672	2.1	20,180	1,587	7.9
E-4	86,745	3,971	4.6	11,188	71	0.6	42,583	1,109	2.6	22,682	1,879	8.3
E-3	88,872	9,192	10.3	6,753	76	1.1	35,062	1,275	3.6	31,487	4,458	14.2
E-2	74,890	9,918	13.2	2,839	39	1.4	25,023	1,022	4.1	33,762	5,128	15.2
E-1	38,273	4,863	12.7	1,183	9	0.8	11,799	482	4.1	19,427	2,826	14.5
Total	480,708	38,955	8.1	40,090	314	0.8	193,111	5,628	2.9	166,598	19,127	11.5

Grade	Mental Group No. IV			Mental Group No. V			Mental Group Unknown		
	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	Total	Negro	Percent Negro
E-9	76	19	25.0	2	--	--	350	10	2.9
E-8	334	66	19.8	8	2	25.0	673	15	2.2
E-7	2,861	643	22.5	90	36	40.0	2,803	86	3.1
E-6	7,141	1,502	21.0	457	125	27.4	6,541	294	4.5
E-5	6,776	1,069	15.8	903	124	13.7	6,902	325	4.7
E-4	4,510	626	13.9	838	75	8.9	4,944	211	4.3
E-3	9,491	2,634	27.8	1,976	428	21.7	4,103	321	7.8
E-2	10,251	3,162	30.8	888	353	39.8	2,127	214	10.1
E-1	4,513	1,274	28.2	1,055	232	22.0	296	40	13.5
Total	45,953	10,995	23.9	6,217	1,375	22.1	28,739	1,516	5.3

Source: Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Equal Opportunity).

Table 15. Minority Recruiting Study
Enlisted Personnel by Mental Group, Grade, and Race
Marine Corps, December 31, 1973

Grade	Total Mental Groups			Mental Group No. I			Mental Group No. II			Mental Group No. III		
	Total	Negro	Percent Total	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	Total	Negro	Percent Negro
E-9	1,323	79	6.0	86	1	1.2	684	24	3.5	266	29	10.9
E-8	3,351	297	8.9	328	10	3.0	1,804	89	4.9	838	115	13.7
E-7	8,683	1,208	13.9	768	17	2.2	4,143	349	8.4	2,688	553	20.6
E-6	13,054	1,605	12.3	907	15	1.7	5,299	327	6.2	4,501	769	17.1
E-5	23,750	2,946	12.4	1,070	1	0.1	8,168	308	3.8	11,124	1,754	15.8
E-4	21,914	2,687	12.3	835	6	0.7	7,165	259	3.6	11,265	1,643	14.6
E-3	33,355	6,047	18.1	783	9	1.1	8,222	410	5.0	17,343	3,179	18.3
E-2	31,617	7,403	23.4	566	19	3.4	6,635	544	8.2	17,657	4,148	23.5
E-1	23,551	7,857	23.4	484	30	6.2	7,576	890	11.7	19,216	4,827	25.1
Total	170,598	30,129	17.7	5,827	108	1.9	49,696	3,200	6.4	84,898	17,017	20.0

Grade	Mental Group No. IV			Mental Group No. V			Mental Group Unknown		
	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	Total	Negro	Percent Negro
E-9	40	13	32.5	1	1	100.0	246	11	4.5
E-8	186	68	36.6	7	2	28.6	188	13	6.9
E-7	689	238	34.5	14	9	64.3	381	42	11.0
E-6	960	363	37.8	12	6	50.0	1,375	125	9.1
E-5	1,688	669	39.6	8	3	37.5	1,692	211	12.5
E-4	1,340	545	40.7	17	10	58.8	1,292	224	17.3
E-3	4,982	1,961	39.4	39	16	41.0	1,986	472	23.8
E-2	5,029	2,231	44.4	50	25	50.0	1,680	436	26.0
E-1	4,056	1,651	40.7	33	20	60.6	2,186	439	20.1
Total	18,970	7,739	40.8	181	92	50.8	11,026	1,973	17.9

Source: Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Equal Opportunity).

grouping and, of prime significance for this study, of the appropriateness
of the recruiting philosophy, concepts, and practices applied to minority
recruiting.

Table 16. Minority Recruiting Study
Percent Distribution of Enlisted Personnel
by Mental Group and Race
Navy and Marine Corps
December 31, 1973

| Mental Group | Navy | | Marine Corps | |
	Total	Negro	Total	Negro
I	8.3	0.8	3.4	0.4
II	40.2	14.5	29.1	10.6
III	34.6	49.1	49.8	56.5
IV	9.6	28.2	11.1	25.7
V	1.3	3.5	0.1	0.3
Unknown	6.0	3.9	6.5	6.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Derived from Tables 14 and 15.

Training-Recruiting Relationships

Although all prospective employers attempt to judge and categorize
potential recruits, the Navy and the Marine Corps do so to a much greater
extent than does private industry. In a very real sense, for the Navy
and Marine Corps, recruiting is a function of training. What these services
attempt, primarily on the basis of tests, is to decide what capabilities
a person must possess to be trained in a given category; then they try

to recruit personnel that meet these test-established qualifications.
Given the disadvantaged status of minorities in terms of education, work
experience, and test exposure, it is unlikely that the Navy and Marine
Corps can solve their minority recruiting problems if they adhere to
this philosophy.

In contrast, private industry looks upon training as a function of
recruiting. Using tests to a much lesser extent, and relying much more
upon background investigations and skilled employment personnel,[13]
industry recruits, ther devises training techniques based upon the quality
of recruits. In Chapter V, we shall return to the affirmative action
techniques of industry under which previously unqualified minorities have
been trained to handle jobs that otherwise might be considered beyond
their abilities. This could not have been accomplished under a philosophy
which considers recruiting a function of training. A major conclusion
of this study is that the Navy and Marine Corps will be unable to deal
effectively with their minority recruiting problem until they modify
their philosophy of the recruiting-training relationship.

RECRUITING ORGANIZATION

The recruiting philosophy of the Navy and Marine Corps is supported
by a carefully designed organization, the details of which are found in
standard service manuals. Figures 2 and 3 provide a summary, adequate for
our purposes, of the Navy and Marine Corps recruiting organizations.

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13. We shall examine in Chapter III the problem of the lack of profes-
   sional career recruiters in the Navy and Marine Corps.

Figure 2. Minority Recruiting Study
Major Offices of the Naval Headquarters Organization and Supporting
R & D Resources for Manpower and Personnel Management

Notes: The CNP and DCNO (MP) are the same person.   DCNO - Deputy CNO
CNP - Chief of Naval Personnel   MP   - Manpower
CNO - Chief of Naval Operations   ADCNO - Assistant DCNO

Figure 3. Minority Recruiting Study
Major Staff Agencies of the Headquarters Marine Corps Organization With
Functional Responsibilities for Manpower and Personnel Matters

Source: Department of the Navy, Basic Information for the Office of Naval Research Program in Manpower Research and Development (Arlington, Va.: Office of Naval Research, 1972), p. 168.

Examining these figures, it is apparent that the Navy and Marine Corps recruiting organizations are not unlike those of private enterprise firms, especially if allowances for size are made. There are, however, differences in line and staff relationships which we believe can significantly affect minority recruiting and need to be noted at this point.

Both the Navy and Marine Corps have established recruiting organizations with due regard for area coverage; both give special attention to minority recruiting; and both provide for the need to utilize different personnel and techniques with regard to officer and enlisted personnel recruiting. However, the Navy and Marine Corps assign recruiting to a field staff that operates separate from the line, whereas private industry places that field staff under line control and can thereby hold the line responsible for results.

In discussing line-staff relationships, we have found that our industrially oriented terminology leads to misunderstandings of meaning with the somewhat different concepts in the armed forces. We refer herein to the line as being composed of the individuals and departments that carry out the primary activities of the organization as a whole. In the Navy, the line is comprised of those who direct and man the fleet and bases; in the Marine Corps it consists of the brigades and companies manning the bases. The staff, on the other hand, is composed of the departments that assist the total efforts of the line departments. In a general sense, staff provides services. Within this definition, the Navy Recruiting Command, for example, is a staff organization, from the Admiral in charge to the recruiter in the field.

Although the organization of the recruiting function is similar in private enterprise to that of the Navy and Marine Corps, there is a basic difference. Recruiting in private industry is part of the personnel staff function, but responsibility for maintaining and achieving recruiting goals rests with the line. It is the line plant, department, or division manager who is thus held responsible for meeting any goals which may have been set with respect to minority representation and participation in the organization under his control. Thus, the staff function remains one of policy formulation, assistance, and service, and the line function remains one of producing results.

This can be evidenced both by the actual physical as well as functional relationships between a plant manager, for example, and the personnel department for that plant. Both will usually be located in the same facility, and the head of the personnel department will report to the plant manager or his representative. The head of the personnel department does have functional and policy responsibilities to the personnel staff at corporate headquarters, but these are generally of a nonoperational nature.

The Navy and Marine Corps, on the other hand, have completely dissociated the recruiting function from the operations (i.e., line) function. There is no direct line of responsibility between them and, as a result, no line control. All responsibility for reaching recruiting goals lies with the recruiting staff organization.

Thus, in Philadelphia the Navy and Marine Corps recruiting functions do not report to the chief line officers in that area, but report up their

respective organizations. In contrast, General Electric Company, a major Philadelphia employer with at least three large facilities in the area, has a personnel office in each facility, the head of which reports to the plant or department manager there. Recruiting performed by these General Electric personnel managers and their staffs conforms to policies promulgated by the company's headquarters personnel and approved by the corporate officers, but it is done under the direction of plant and department line officers who bear ultimate responsibility for its success.

This organizational distinction between private industry and the Navy and Marine Corps is, we believe, significant because of its imposition of the responsibility for the success or failure of meeting minority recruiting goals. In private industry, line officials are judged and compensated in terms of meeting goals necessary for the corporation's success. Affirmative action results are one of these goals. Our experience is that line responsibility helps to ensure that goals are met. The divorce of the line from this responsibility in the Navy and Marine Corps does not appear to provide this incentive. Rather, it seems to leave the line directly interested in having recruits who can perform successfully, but with no direct interest in meeting minority recruiting goals.[14]

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14. This is not to imply that line officers in the Navy and Marine Corps are disinterested, indifferent, or unconcerned about minority participation. It does mean, however, that such concerns are not directly linked with their responsibilities.

SUMMARY

Three aspects of the Navy and Marine Corps minority recruiting problem are fundamental to this study. The background of discrimination continues to plague minority recruiting efforts, particularly of the Navy. Recruiting is a function of training in the Navy and Marine Corps, whereas the opposite is the case in private industry. This tends to affect adversely the potential for minority recruiting. But, unlike private industry, recruiting in the Navy and Marine Corps is not under the line in the field. Thus, the line does not have a direct stake in the success of minority recruiting goals.

CHAPTER III

RECRUITING CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES

The methodology, procedures, and activities undertaken by the Navy and Marine Corps and their organizations to procure manpower are a function of the manner in which these services view their mission. An analysis of findings on concepts of the recruiting responsibility as seen by the Navy and Marine Corps is the purpose of this chapter of the study. The propriety of these concepts in the light of the manpower markets in which these organizations must recruit underlies the chapter which follows.

The recruiting concepts of the Navy and Marine Corps will be considered in this section of the report as they relate to: (1) recruiters; (2) recruiting facilities; (3) support organizations; (4) recruiting system structure; (5) management personnel assigned to recruiting; and (6) management and planning.

Where considered necessary, findings which relate only to one of the services under consideration or which differ significantly between the two services will be distinguished. In each case, it will be noted how the findings impinge upon minority recruiting problems, and how Navy and Marine Corps policy compares with industry practice.

RECRUITERS

The discussion concerning recruiter selection entails an analysis of recruiter selection, pre-job training, on-the-job training, recruiter job responsibilities, knowledge of job requirements, rewards and incentives, and length of assignment to recruiting duty.

Recruiter Selection

There are basically two ways in which an individual can be placed on duty as an enlisted recruiter:

1. He can request a recruiting post by submitting a formal request to his supervisor. The bulk of Navy recruiters and about one-half of those of the Marine Corps are volunteers.

2. He can be literally drafted into a recruiting post. (According to Naval regulations, for example, the individual has the option of rejecting such an assignment without any adverse effects on his career.)

Once his name is submitted, the supervisor (in most cases the commanding officer of the unit) will examine his service record and interview the man to determine whether he would make a good recruiter. All relevant information along with the officers' recommendation is then sent for Navy men to the Chief of Naval Personnel for processing. Once the man receives his "recruiter rating," he is asked to select three preferences with respect to geographical location. When an opening becomes available in the Navy, the recruiter is assigned to that particular Naval area command for a period of three years, although in some cases an extension is given to increase the period to four or five years.

Selection of Navy and Marine Corps recruiting personnel does not appear to be under the influence of the recruiting establishment to any significant degree. Selection of Corps personnel is done by Headquarters. The recruiting organization has no voice in this selection. The Marine Corps recruiting districts determine the number of men needed to carry out their mission, but not the particular men who will be assigned. Navy recruiters are selected on the basis of interviews held with their fleet commanding officers who are neither professional interviewers, nor necessarily familiar with recruiting requirements. The Navy also utilizes a screening of the volunteer's record book by the Bureau of Naval Personnel. The Navy Recruiting Command thus lacks control over the men who will be assigned as recruiters. Special area considerations, such as the need for effective minority recruiting in some areas, appear to be lacking in the selection process.

Once a recruiter is assigned to a district and reports for duty, there appears to be a high reluctance to screen him out. This would be serious for the recruiter's future career and would cause inconvenience to him and to his family. In addition, it would be an added cost to the Navy or Marine Corps.

A Navy area commander contended, "Someone in the recruiting command should interview all prospective recruiters before orders are cut. I have some intra-command flexibility for intra-command changes. This aids in overcoming the problems associated with poor or weak recruiters. However, I would like a greater hand in the selection of recruiters. The selection process is not individualized."

Navy personnel from the recruiting command have indicated that some effort is being made to have the men being considered for recruiter duty interviewed by district commanders before they are permanently assigned to recruiting duty. The major problem in doing this is the cost of bringing a man from his ship to the shore for that sole purpose. With the continuing emphasis of justifying expenditures, the Navy does not believe this to be a viable alternative.

Our interviews with recruiting candidates at the various training schools found considerable enthusiasm for the job. Moreover, we did not discern any prejudice which would inhibit minority recruiting. We emphasize that our belief that selection can be improved is designed to insure greater capability in recruiters, not to disparage those doing, or desiring to be doing, the recruiting.

In contrast to those of the Navy and Marine Corps, private industry recruiters (employment personnel) are usually persons with a career interest in employment, personnel, and/or industrial relations. They are selected for the most part from persons who have indicated an interest in the job, not only by seeking it, but also by concentrating their pre-employment studies in their chosen field, or by having acquired at least tangential experience for recruiting through previous work. If the selection process proves to be faulty, the person is transferred within, or phased out of the company, usually before six months, or at most, one year.

Large companies, like the Navy and Marine Corps, need a wide variety of aptitudes and skills to meet their manpower demands. To reach this diverse human market, such companies select employment recruiters with

varying characteristics and skills. Specialized recruiters for colleges, for engineers and other professionals, for skilled mechanics, and for various minority groups are commonly found on the staffs of major companies. These recruiters have aptitudes, skill knowledge or experience, and/or acceptance by the groups from which they seek to recruit. Such recruiters "talk the language" to the potential employee. The rapport thus established directly affects the results achieved. Industry understands, to a degree that the Navy and Marine Corps have not yet by practice accepted, that the highly diversified and stratified potential employment market requires equally diverse recruiting talents and characteristics to attract that market.

Pre-Job Training of Recruiters

Before embarking on a recruiting career, a potential Navy recruiter must first attend a seventeen day course (ENRO-I) in the Area Enlisted Navy Recruiter Orientation School (ENRO). Each of the eight Navy recruiting areas operates an ENRO school for incoming recruiters under what we regard as the correct assumption that experienced recruiters of a particular recruiting area will be better equipped to communicate to the newcomers the fine points of recruiting in that particular area. ENRO schools are located in the following cities: Albany, New York; Columbus, Ohio; Dallas, Texas; Great Lakes, Illinois; Macon, Georgia; Omaha, Nebraska; Richmond, Virginia; and San Francisco, California.

Each school operates under the same course outline developed by the Navy Recruiting Command. The purpose of the curriculum is, as stated

in the introduction to the curriculum, to "provide for basic knowledge necessary for a new recruiter." After this two-week indoctrination, the expectation is that the training of new recruiters will be continuous, on the job, as he is carrying out his duties.

ENRO schools visited were manned by two senior enlisted men who have extensive recruiting experience and who are responsible for communication of curriculum material to the students. Usually, the only outside lecturer brought in is a representative of a consulting firm who lectures on basic sales techniques.

The school is held every other month for a two and one-half week period. The number of new recruiters attending ENRO averages twenty per training period. Once the recruiters have completed this initial training period and have spent some time on actual recruiting duty, they become eligible to attend ENRO II, an advanced training session which is held every other month. Class sizes are limited to between 12 and 15; therefore, any one area may send a maximum of 90 recruiters per year to ENRO II. The basic idea behind ENRO II is peer recognition. The district commanders use it as a type of reward for outstanding or superior recruiters. The Navy Recruiting Command hopes to gain from ENRO II also. The last two days of the one-week session are devoted to a type of brain-storming where ideas and recommendations are discussed. Some of these have led to changes in the system.

It is also important to mention here the existence of a method whereby an area commander may attempt to improve the proficiency of the poorer recruiters or recruiters who have not previously attended ENRO in

his command. Recycling of these recruiters through the basic ENRO school is recommended by the Navy Recruiting Command. It should be noted, however, that some area commanders had failed to recycle even one recruiter through all of fiscal year 1973 while one area commander recycled over 85 percent of the 272 recruiters who were recycled during the same time period.

It appears that the Navy Recruiting Command, in developing the ENRO-I curriculum, faced a choice on the one hand between concentrating on providing the new recruiters with a thorough knowledge of Navy programs and applicant processing procedures (paperwork), and on the other, emphasizing recruiting techniques. The curriculum does not appear to have reached a balance between the two. The paperwork side of the instruction is emphasized very much in the course, as indicated by the fact that of a total of 108 units of instruction (each unit is one hour), 21 are devoted to sales motivation, 5 to community involvement, 2 to minority recruitment, and 8 units to prospecting. These units represent only 33 percent of the course instruction. The remainder is devoted primarily to paperwork processing, or what may be termed after-the-fact requirements.

The minority recruiting portion of the curriculum allots, as mentioned above, only two hours to emphasize to the new recruiters the need for specialized recruiting techniques in minority communities. Some instructors at ENRO maintain that training given all Navy personnel in human relations can make up this deficiency; others contend that in seventeen days recruiters cannot be taught special recruiting techniques for all the different racial and ethnic groups in their areas.

Generally ENRO instructors interviewed felt the new enlisted personnel recruiter could be given only the basics. Adapting these basics to the individual's recruiting problem is seen as something the recruiter will have to learn to do on the job. Although there is much to be said for such self-help, it does open the way to costly mistakes on the job. Certainly it affords only minimal assistance in the difficult minority recruiting task.

Recruiters interviewed in the field who had been through ENRO-I felt that there was far too much concentration on paperwork and speech making. They considered the latter an overall waste of time. The adaptability of these speech making techniques to a "real-life" situation was seen by many recruiters as being very difficult. As noted, the ability to relate wit inority youths in the inner city is not stressed in the ENRO-I curriculum.

ENRO II appears to do a better job of providing the recruiter with community penetration techniques. Recruiters in the field, however, felt that more follow-up courses would be helpful. Typical comments included the following:

"There is a need for much more in-depth training in certain areas . . . such as minority relations and sales techniques. All recruiters should have gone through the racial awareness program before going on recruiting duty."

"Many things are not recognized as being important during training because people assigned to recruiting cannot appreciate them. There is a serious need for a refresher program and motivational activities for recruiters and recruiter managers."

Much of what was said about the ENRO school applies to Marine Corps recruiter training. The Marine Corps concept is that the Corps prides itself on treating everyone equally, and thus does not look kindly on any different recruitment techniques or treatments of minorities. The Marine Corps school involves a seven-week course with much emphasis on paperwork and physical fitness, but no special instruction in regard to minority recruiting. Follow-up training for the Marine Corps is left to the districts. If given at all, such training varies widely. A packaged program now being developed by the J. Walter Thompson Advertising Agency will hopefully fill some of this void.

The Navy operates a Recruiting Officer Management Orientation School (ROMO) at Pensacola, Florida, which has a three-week curriculum. Obviously, in such a period, only a gloss over recruiting problems and techniques is possible. In a course of 5,435 minutes, including checking in and out and having a graduation ceremony, 175 minutes are devoted to minority recruiting. Our interviews both with ROMO instructors and students, and with recruiters who had taken the course, found a consensus that emphasis on interviewing and more instruction on minority recruiting problems and techniques would be helpful.

Training of Officer Selection Officers in the Marine Corps consists only of one week during the summer. This short time period amplifies problems of inadequate training in racial relations and salesmanship.

Recruiters in private industry receive their formal training in college or in special courses established by either the companies involved or by associations established for that purpose. In addition, well-run

companies expect their employment personnel to be familiar with the vast professional literature on the subject and to be thoroughly cognizant of the company needs to comply fully with laws and government directives regarding minority employment.

Larger private concerns who employ a staff of recruiting personnel with specialized talents or capabilities provide pre-job training to enhance their potential. Thus recruiters concentrating on minority personnel are not only selected for this specific purpose, but given additional training in such matters as civil rights legislation, company affirmative action requirements, and methods of penetrating the minority community. In short, training emphasizes the specific problems to be met and the goals which the company needs to meet.

On-the-Job Training

Recruiters are not allowed to become experienced before they are assigned a personnel procurement quota and, consequently, have to make their recruiting "mistakes" while actually engaged in recruiting. There does not appear to be an opportunity for on-the-job training under the auspices of a more experienced recruiter, either officer or enlisted, so that a new recruiter may get a better feel for the market in which he will recruit. This is especially significant in minority recruiting where a mistake in delicate race relationships can exacerbate the difficulties in attracting personnel.

There are many reasons why on-the-job training is inadequate, or even nonexistent, in some locations:

1. Sometimes there is no one at the new duty station available to train the new recruiter in his new duty assignment.

2. If someone is available (i.e., the person whom the recruiter is replacing in most cases), he is usually overly concerned with other things such as moving or getting a job, or he gives the impression to his replacement that the job is nothing to worry about and he will "pick it up in time."

3. If the person available is concerned about teaching his replacement, he may simply not have the time to do an effective job, as the normal functions of his position require his constant attention. Thus, unless the new recruiter is a fast learner and good observer, he is not likely to pick up as much as he should know. This is especially true for officer recruiters: the person whom the officer recruiter is replacing may be the only one who knows the job to which the new man has been assigned.

4. The new recruiter is then placed on the job without being fully prepared. The result is usually poor performance in a demanding situation with a corresponding drop in the high motivation developed in the recruiting school.

On-the-job training for recruiters in minority recruitment matters is of great importance precisely because it is not sufficiently stressed in the various recruiting schools. Instruction there frequently stresses what we believe to be at least a partially erroneous concept--that the basics for recruiting minorities are the same as those for recruiting anyone else. That theory, we believe, ignores some of the very reasons why the armed forces have a minority recruiting problem. Certainly, experienced recruiters with whom we talked were virtually unanimous that this is at best a simplistic concept.

On-the-job training is stressed in industry. Recruiters new on the job work with experienced ones, have their work checked regularly, and are often not permitted to handle recruiting of any significance until they are on the job for varying periods of time. Gradually, as the recruiter

learns to function and to achieve results within the framework of his
institution, he is permitted to accept greater and greater responsibility.
On-the-job training in industry is stressed much more than in the Navy
and Marine Corps, where the recruiter is often left on his own to pick
up the trade as he is able.

Recruiter Job Responsibilities

The term "jack of all trades" seems an apt description for what
recruiters, especially enlisted recruiters, are expected to be once they
commence their recruiting duty. This problem is not as severe for officer
recruiters because the responsibilities for various officer programs are
delegated among the various officer recruiters. The Navy and Marine Corps
appear to want their enlisted recruiter not only to be a good salesman
but also a public relations expert, advertising expert, and market analyst.
The recruiter is expected to scrutinize his market for manpower adequately,
to prepare the correct advertising approach, to perform public relations
efforts aimed at penetrating the manpower market, and finally to "sell"
that individual within a particular market on the idea of enlisting or
being commissioned into the Navy or Marine Corps. He is expected to handle
the race relations and minority recruiting aspects of his job as well.

As an example of the delegation of certain responsibilities to
recruiters, we were told by an officer in charge of a Public Affairs
Branch of the Marine Corps recruiting structure that "the role of the PAO
is to support the recruiters with the kinds of procurement aids he believes
he needs. The recruiter, however, is responsible for the penetration of
the community in which he works [including the minority community]."

The uncertainty over the role and job requirements for the Minority Recruiting Officer in the Navy recruiting structure and the Minority Officer Selection Officer in the Marine Corps recruiting organization is of critical importance for this study. An interview with a Navy Minority Affairs Officer revealed that the command to which he was assigned was not ready for him. It had not been decided whether the MAO was to be a minority recruiter specifically, or a recruiter who had the additional duties of minority recruiting, or an advisor to the recruiters and recruiting management on minority recruiting policy and techniques.

Discussion with a Minority Officer Selection Officer at district level in the Marine Corps brought out a similar problem in his organization. Because he had no written job description (before he developed his own), there were many attempts to "saddle" him with a recruiting quota. He feels that his function is that of an advisor to the district commander and to the officer selection officers in the various recruiting offices. He also contends that he has a responsibility to monitor the minority recruiting activities and suggests ways to improve them.

An additional problem expressed by one Minority Officer Selection Officer is the fact that most black Marine Corps officers have already spent time serving as MOSO's and some are beginning to resent assignment to these positions because of interference with career progressions. It appears obvious that the duties of MOSO should be more clearly outlined and the positions filled not only by minority personnel so as not to make the minority officers responsible for bringing all the black officers into the Corps.

Our findings here conform to those of other researchers. Professor
Moskos reported:

> From an organizational standpoint, it is still unclear whether
> a race relations assignment is good or bad for one's military
> career. Race relations billets may be a precursor of an eventual
> "human resources" career specialty with attendant career enhance-
> ment, or it may be nothing more than a cul-de-sac position which
> is expendable once the command structure perceives a diminishment
> in the pressures of the moment. That the large majority of race
> relations personnel are black only compounds the insecurity of
> the occupants of these newly created positions.[1]

We found that the position of Minority Recruiting Officer does not
appear to have been satisfactorily defined at any level of the Navy or
Marine Corps. It is a source of friction in some commands. Obviously,
until the functional duties of all recruiting positions are fully defined,
as they are in all well-run private industrial concerns, the performance
of individuals functioning therein will suffer.

Knowledge of Job Requirements

Recruiters, in many instances, did not appear to have a clear view
of what their job responsibilities entailed. It was only after they had
been in the recruiting environment and functioned as recruiters that they
came to a knowledge of what was required to do the job. This supports
our belief that Navy and Marine Corps pre-job training does not provide
recruiters with sufficient information about their job responsibilities
before they reach their duty stations. Even less knowledge is imparted
about the special problems relating to minority recruiting.

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1. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "The American Dilemma in Uniform: Race in
   the Armed Forces," The Annals, Vol. CDVI (March 1973), p. 106.

One officer expressed this concern for the incoming recruiter's knowledge of the job requirements thus: "They can speak Navy but they do not have the real handle on sales techniques, nor do they have the refined attributes on how to spend their time wisely, especially in a business with which they are not familiar. We do not give them enough time to prepare and possibly not in the proper form." We may also add that some recruiters are not prepared to cope with minority recruiting problems.

In a well-run company, duties and responsibilities are clearly defined, and persons are employed to fill specific job specifications developed prior to their employment. New employees are provided with detailed job descriptions which set forth the duties, responsibilities, and authority of the positions for which they have been employed. Careful indoctrination and on-the-job training then assures that new recruiters are fully conscious of their duties and the ramifications of their job responsibilities.

Rewards and Incentives for Recruiters

Rewards for superior performance on recruiting duty appear to be tied to a team concept rather than to an individualized one. Rewards are dispensed to the recruiting station or the recruiting zone that does well, rather than to any particular recruiter. Incentives for the recruiter to do well seem to stem from negativisms. A recruiter who does not do well (meet the required quota) usually stands on his own and faces severe admonishment, which can destroy any opportunity the recruiter may have had for promotion, because his performance appraisal report will reflect

his "poor" rating, a rating which can conceivably even cause the individual's dismissal from the service. In general, the rewards for doing a good job go to the "team" and are minimal, but the punishments for failure to perform adequately are very harsh and are individually administered.

There are, to be sure, several types of incentive programs administered by the Navy or Marine Corps recruiting systems and/or the several recruiting areas of each branch. The Navy has a "recruiter of the year" award in which one of several recruiters nominated by the districts is chosen as the recipient. There are programs which award a particular recruiting zone the distinction of "recruiting zone of the month," or quarter, or year. An additional incentive for a recruiter is a one-year extension on recruiting duty because of his strong performance. The Navy Recruiting Command assigns seven extensions to each recruiting district.

District commanders in the Navy and Marine Corps contend that they are hesitant to increase the number of awards and incentive programs for individual recruiters, especially in the area of material awards such as vacation trips. They see inherent dangers in a program of that type and therefore continue to reward a group of individual recruiters rather than a single recruiter.

Commanders also indicated that they would like to allow their recruiters to take their government recruiting vehicles home in a kind of company car arrangement, and in some districts they do this, but complaints by Congressmen and others about misuse of government property tend to inhibit this practice. One officer put it this way, "How can a recruiter believe in a system when it doesn't treat him right?"

The Navy is raising the monthly special duty allowance pay for
recruiters from $50 to $150 as an incentive to get more men to apply for
recruiting duty and also to keep men on duty longer. This appears to be
a move in the right direction. Certainly, the difficult task of increasing
minority personnel in key areas of the Navy and Marine Corps might be
aided if more individual awards and superior treatment of personnel were
effectuated.

In private industry, rewards are primarily individually given.
Private industry has much greater latitude in pay and benefits, and tends
to use it. Bonuses may be given to departments in industry to subdivide,
but wise department heads then apportion them according to performance.
Rewarding the group is particularly inappropriate when the group faces
regular turnover. Moreover, there is simply no incentive like the one
that goes directly to the individual for his performance. Industry in
America is built on this simple, but oft demonstrated, concept.

Length of Assignment to Recruiting Duty

The short length of time that a recruiter spends on duty appears to
inhibit his overall success. A recruiter must spend the first six months
or more finding out what the actual recruiting job demands. After a
recruiter has established a good relationship with the community in which
he works and learns how to tap that particular manpower market, it is often
then time for him to return to his regular military occupation. The long
process needed to establish credibility in the minority community is often
rendered an impossibility by these short-duty tours.

This is a difficult problem for the Navy and Marine Corps, which must rotate men off ships and at home from far-off duty stations. The problem of duty tours too short to maximize results still remains and is certain to continue to make the minority recruiting task of the Navy and the Marine Corps difficult. The Navy has, however, made some attempts to professionalize the recruiter billet through the use of the Navy Counselor rating. This rating, with an E-6 entry level, attempts to establish a professional base of recruiters who, while on duty as recruiters, will function as both specialists in the field of recruiting and as trainers of other recruiters. The latter is an especially important aspect of their duties, because they are envis... by the Navy Recruiting Command as being utilized as zone supervisors or chief recruiters who oversee the on-the-job training of new recruiters.

Once a Navy Counselor finishes his tour of duty as a recruiter, the Navy Recruiting Command conceives of his next duty as that of career counselor. Essentially, he will be in the retention business, i.e., counseling persons on reenlistment opportunities, etc. There are hopes that these individuals will eventually return to recruiting duty, but this may not necessarily be the case.

In contrast to the general situation in the Navy and Marine Corps, private industry recruiters are career personnel who are likely to spend their working life in these jobs or in other personnel positions. The Navy and Marine Corps personnel are competing in the same labor market for the same prospects as is private industry. The recruiters for the service

are on assignments that are temporary; those for private industry are engaged in their life work. One would expect different results to be achieved.

Summary

Recruiters appear to be unaware beforehand of the responsibilities they will undertake on recruiting duty. They are expected to have enough knowledge to do market analysis, adequate public relations, advertising, and salesmanship. The recruiting establishments within the Navy and Marine Corps do not seem to have sufficient choice in the selection of personnel to perform recruiting duty. Recruiter training in minority relations, and the length of the training in general, do not seem to prepare a person to deal satisfactorily with the inner-city environment of minority communities. Recruiters are expected to perform adequately the moment they are assigned to duty, but their training is not adequate, particularly in the special problem of minority recruiting. Most of the incentives for a recruiter to do well are negative, and positive rewards are few. Recruiters are made very transient by the short length of time spent on recruiting duty, thus negating the impact which successful community relations might have on recruiting. Given the difficulties of selling the Navy and Marine Corps in the inner-city environment, this is an important factor in the minority recruiting program. Finally, Navy and Marine Corps recruiters must compete for recruits with experienced, well-trained industry recruiters who are individually awarded for performance, and who are engaged in their chosen life work.

RECRUITING FACILITIES

The analysis of recruiting facilities is discussed under two headings: locations and facilities manning.

Locations

We found indications that the time span between the request to receive authorization for the relocation of a particular recruiting office and the receipt of that authorization was unduly long. The market conditions which dictate the need for a move do not always receive a response sufficiently rapid to take advantage of the new condition or, in the case of an adverse condition, to adjust to it. Considerations for the proposed location of a station seem to depend too much on the Qualified Military Available Statistics, which supposedly indicate the availability of manpower. Little consideration is given to concepts such as economic conditions, sociological conditions (gang warfare, etc.), or accessibility of the station to the potential market. The stations are generally immobile rather than capable of reaching the market by use of mobile vans, for example. The Navy has taken some steps to alleviate the immobility factor by assigning a total of forty-two mobile vans to the various Navy recruiting districts.

The need for flexibility and mobility is very great in minority recruiting. Location of an office in one ethnic or racially dominated area can greatly hinder access to or by other ethnic or racial groups. One's "turf" in the city is significant and determine whether minorities are attracted to, or repelled from the recruiting station.

The commander of a recruiting station stated that the location of

a branch station is determined substantially at district level, although

the commander has a vote on the final decision. His vote, however, is

based on the input of the district commanding officer. The primary elements

in the district commanding officer's decision are Qualified Military

Available Statistics. The district commanding officer is heavily influenced

by his own supervisors, and the approval of the Government Services

Administration--sometimes difficult to obtain--must be acquired in order

to relocate an office. It does not appear that minority recruiting

problems are given significant attention in facility location decisions.

It is important to note that very little officer recruiting takes

place in Navy or Marine facilities. Over 90 percent of all person-to-

person contacts for officer recruiting are made on college campuses by

officer recruiting teams. There was some indication that officer recruiters

were apprehensive about recruiting on minority campuses.

Industry maintains its recruiting personnel at company, division,

and/or plant headquarters. Recruiters are flexible and can journey to

the market location, set up temporary headquarters, and remain there as

long as the market so dictates. By keeping recruiters concentrated in

work or headquarters locations, industry facilitates on-the-job training,

exchange of information among recruiters, and up-to-date and intimate

knowledge of job and position requirements for which the recruiting is done.

Moreover, such concentration encourages strong community relationships

while still encouraging flexibility. On the other hand, by not putting

personnel permanently in small communities and substations away from

plants, industry practice does not permit personnel to become part of sub-communities or areas. Of course, the Navy and Marine Corps practice of three-year duty tours greatly reduces the advantage of being a part of a small community.

Facility Manning

Discussions with recruiting organization personnel indicated that manpower for a recruiting station is primarily a function of the Qualified Military Available Statistics for a particular area. Other indicators us d are the past history of the station in terms of productivity, and the number of high schools.

One determination factor on which we found dissent was the use of ethnic or racial "typing" to decide what race the recruiter should be in order perhaps to be more productive than a recruiter of another ethnic or racial group operating in the same area. Some district commanders are strictly against this practice because they believe in the concept of "One-Navy" or "All Marines are Green" and contend that a good recruiter can recruit in any community regardless of his race. In talking with those persons close to the scene of the actual recruiting (i.e., recruiting station commanders, recruiters), we found a feeling that a black recruiter does better, generally, than a white recruiter in a predominantly black inner-city environment. The need for minorities to visualize their own kind as living examples and proof of Navy and Marine Corps credibility supports the latter view, as does industry practice, which has stressed minorities in key personnel positions as a means of emphasizing the commitment to minority employment.

Summary

Recruiting stations are usually the initial contact point between a recruiter and a person seeking information on entrance qualifications for service as a Navy or Marine enlisted person. The location and appearance of the facility, as well as the impression made on the people who are interested, by the personnel who man that station can have a positive or negative effect on the continued interest of a particular person in becoming a part of the Navy or Marine Corps. We believe that this is especially significant for minority recruiting.

We found that management personnel at the district level of the Marine Corps and Navy recruiting structure, although away from the actual recruiting location, play an important role in determination of the location of a particular recruiting station. This situation, along with the sometimes difficult task of obtaining a Government Services Administration approval for a requested location change, appears to allow the recruiting organization to respond very slowly to the need for a change in recruiting station location due to changing economic patterns, education levels, or age distribution changes of the market in which it will recruit. We did not find that minority recruiting needs were significantly considered in the location decision process.

Navy and Marine Corps management personnel generally want to impose an internal concept on an external environment. Their attitudes reflect the belief that the equal opportunity practiced within the Navy as the "One-Navy" concept and within the Marine Corps as "All Marines are Green," should be practiced in their recruiting policies. This implies that a

good recruiter should be able to recruit anyone of any race or ethnic group.
The personnel who actually man the recruiting stations, however, more
often than not feel that a black recruiter recruits better in a black
community, that a Chicano recruiter recruits better in a Chicano community,
and that this holds for other racial and ethnic groups as well, and we
are constrained to agree. The policy of the management of the Navy and
Marine Corps recruiting structure is not to assign personnel based on
racial or ethnic background. This is in sharp contrast to successful
industry practice. On the other hand, such assignments must be made with
care. Minority officers and enlisted men are not the only ones that can
recruit minorities successfully and minority personnel are not necessarily
good recruiters. A balance has been found by industry practice to be the
most successful.

SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS

The Navy and Marine Corps are affected by, and utilize, various
support organizations and tools in their recruiting efforts. Those dis-
cussed here are congressional budgetary procedure, advertising and
procurement aids, and public relations, including minority relations.

Congressional Budgetary Procedure

The budgetary procedure of the United States Congress acts as a
definite constraint to constructive planning for manpower procurement
activities, including minority recruiting. Because the Congress does not
give approval for a budget in advance, the Navy and Marine Corps must enter

a new fiscal year not sure of just how much funding they will receive. This acts as a prohibitive factor in the planning of activities which may encompass attempts to penetrate the minority manpower market.

During the summer, when youths have just finished high school or college, the budget is unresolved and this makes spending funds not yet approved impossible. Obviously it curtails the ability of the Navy and Marine Corps to take advantage of their opportunity. The ability of a recruiter to obtain funding for activities that he may wish to carry out in his particular area is minimal. He has no way to effectuate a localization of advertising, public relations, or similar efforts.

Even when the funds are available at a district or zone level, the restrictions on the use of these funds make them practically unavailable. Because funds which are marked for use in the penetration of minority communities do not always show immediate results in terms of numbers of minorities enlisted, there are attempts to curtail them rather than evaluate them on their long-run potential. Thus programs sometimes die before they can be made effective.

The way recruiting organization personnel feel about budget procedures was illustrated by one commanding officer, who said that he did not have adequate time to respond to changes in policies and procedures brought about by budget changes. "One continuous problem we have is Congress and its budget procedures. . . . We never know what we are going to get. . . . Accordingly our objectives are constantly changing."

Another commander stated that his budget requests were formulated pretty much from what happened in previous years. The commander indicated

that he did spend some time developing next year's needs, although he felt
he would not get much more funding. "They (Navy Recruiting Command) see
what our production is and has been, and then use their staff to determine
how much money we will receive." Innovative programs to recruit minorities
have little chance in such a climate. Industry's much greater budgetary
flexibility permits it considerably more latitude.

Advertising and Procurement Aids

The working relationship between the advertising personnel and the
recruiter seems very loosely knit. The recruiter does not have an oppor-
tunity to supply very much input or ideas to the advertising office or
branch which will help him improve his job proficiency. Officers in
charge of the advertising branch felt that their funding was adequate for
what they were allowed to do with the funds.

There does not appear to be any official guidance document spelling
out what the advertising arm of a district or zone should do in support
of the recruiter. There seems to be some question on both sides about
that responsibility. Procurement aids (brochures, films, etc.) appear to
be abundant, perhaps superabundant. The use of such techniques as
placing cards in magazines for an interested person to tear out and mail
in seems ineffective as a source of true leads to possible enlistees.
There seems to be a reliance on advertising to provide the recruiter with
a market which will be susceptible to him.

We do not believe that advertising alone will help the recruiter to
penetrate the minority community. The services operate under certain
restrictions which prohibit particular kinds of advertising and this limits

the advertising effort. Recruiters with whom we spoke felt that they had little opportunity to incorporate the use of community members who have enlisted or been commissioned into the service in personalized advertising in the community of operation. Yet we believe that this is essential for effective advertising in the minority community. We shall return to the role of advertising in this respect in Chapter V.

Discussions with the officer in charge of the public affairs and advertising section of Marine Corps recruiting indicated that the Corps' current aim is to make sure an integrated setting is shown to all potential enlistees and officer candidates. This officer felt the biggest responsibility is to make sure the "story" told to the public is factual and frank. The Corps' advertising agency is currently J. Walter Thompson. A Thompson minority executive has the responsibility for scrutinizing all minority advertising programs.

The Navy has recently changed minority advertising agencies. The current agent, John Small of New York, is a larger firm and the Navy feels it will be able to provide broader exposure of its ideas to the recruiters in the field in order to get more feedback as to relevance.

In private industry, advertising designed to aid recruiting is under the control of those in charge of employment. Although some such advertising is general and designed for image propagation, most is specific and aimed at particular markets. Different advertising is placed with different media and in different markets, depending on the results desired.

Public Relations

There seems to be much confusion as to who has responsibility for public relations. We were told by the Public Affairs Officers that the recruiter in the community has the primary responsibility for public relations, but we saw no attempts to prepare the recruiter for that responsibility or to provide him with funding to carry out that responsibility.

There appear to be very few efforts in public relations carried out by the Public Affairs Branch which could be called minority community penetration attempts. The Branch relies basically on advertising and the recruiter. Attempts to penetrate the minority community through minority community organizations do not seem very substantial or effective. The reliance again is on the recruiter for the grassroots public relations effort, but the recruiter has little or no training in the area.

One Public Affairs Officer stated that his staff is not nearly adequate for the size of the job he has to perform. There is, he contends, a need for good people to do the job in the field that needs to be done. "I have some good ideas. . .need capability to implement them." One of the problems this PAO points out is that the personnel who fill the PAO jobs are not advertising and public relations men. An individual called a PAO and assigned to a particular recruiting station is basically a photographer and journalist. The Marine Corps does not train men to be advertising and public relations agents. The difference between the requirements for the PAO position at a Marine base and the recruiting service are not recognized. The PAO feels this is evidenced by the directives covering the job.

A Navy Public Affairs Officer described his job as being one in which he serves the Enlisted Programs Officer, the Officer Programs Officer, and the Minority Recruiting Officer by advising and carrying out promotional and advertising efforts that support their programs. He contended that there is no written or formal guidance document that spells out what the PAO is charged to do.

Problem areas suggested by PAO's with whom we talked included: (1) the production of useless material as procurement aids; and (2) the lack of substantial input by the PAO as to what advertising aids may be best utilized by the individual PAO's.

Industry uses professionals in public relations who are trained for such positions and conduct them as careers. In addition, large companies frequently employ community relations experts to work with recruiters and public relations personnel in minority recruiting efforts. The minority community is thus both cultivated and "marketed" for recruits by professionals in industry with whom Navy and Marine Corps recruiters, often new on the job and lacking in expertise, must compete.

Summary

The formulation of the national budget and delay in its implementation places a severe restriction on the ability of the Navy and Marine Corps recruiting organizations to plan adequately for future activities. Changes in budgets which occur without much lead-time can present many problems to recruiting organizations in terms of how many accessions they can acquire in a given time, and they surely limit innovative programs to recruit minorities.

Because neither the Public Affairs Officer at the district level of the Navy and the Marine Corps nor the noncommissioned officer who functions at

recruiting station level is a professionally trained public relations or advertising person, the support to be given a particular recruiter or recruiting station is very limited and consists primarily of forwarding brochures to the recruiters. Such activity is not of significant assistance for minority recruiting.

There is a reliance on advertising and the recruiter to penetrate the minority community, but he lacks the support to do that. The ability of a recruiter to localize advertising is limited; yet recruiters see peer group influence within the inner-city minority communities as a definite factor in inducing a person to enlist.

STRUCTURE OF THE RECRUITING SYSTEM

The recruiting organizations of the Navy and the Marine Corps seem to have adopted as a concept the utilization of two primary elements in their manpower procurement process: (1) recruiters; and (2) advertising. Recruiters are the personnel who have the primary responsibility for meeting the manpower accession requirements of the Navy and the Marine Corps. The recruiter is where the process begins. Our indications, however, are that there are serious problems in the support given the recruiter to do his job. There is, as has been discussed, the problem associated with selection of personnel from other parts of the Navy or the Marine Corps to become recruiters. There are also problems associated with the kinds of training these people receive and their understanding of the requirements of the job. We have mentioned the inability of the Public Affairs branches to support recruiters adequately with advice and guidance on the penetration

of the minority community. We also uncovered information which would suggest that recruiters are not rewarded adequately for a superior performance on recruiting duty. The recruiter, then, has a difficult job with serious problems of support from the top.

Advertising is the other primary element the recruiting organizations use to procure manpower. It is relied upon to "condition" the manpower market so that the recruiter will be given some assistance in attracting men and women to the recruiting station. There are various brochures and billboards which attempt to spell out the advantages of a Navy or Marine enlistment or commission. These brochures, however, are usually designed to appeal to large segments of the manpower market. Attempts to localize the advertising aids so that a recruiter can show a potential enlistee that "Joe Jones" of the same racial or ethnic stock from down the street joined the Navy or Corps and likes it, are minimal. Advertising is planned and carried out at upper-management levels of the recruiting system. This creates a void between the needs of the recruiter and the advertising approach decided on by management. Minority needs are difficult to consider in such an overall approach.

It appears that because advertising is relied upon to interest the potential applicant in contacting a recruiter, the Navy and the Marine Corps organizations believe that immobile recruiting stations provide a place where this person can go. This is true if the advertising does provide the impetus. If it does not, however, there is a need to go to the community and attempt

to create interest in the Navy or Marine Corps. We believe that this need clearly exists and has not been adequately met.

The recruiting concept of the Navy and Marine Corps, as it applies to the structure of the recruiting system, suggests an operation which depends primarily on obtaining manpower attracted through the advertising effort and the efforts of recruiters. The advertising supposedly attracts the potential enlistee and the recruiter does the job of convincing the individual to take the final step.

A basic question raised by a recruiting structure that seems to function in this way is whether this kind of structure is appropriate and adequate to carry out the accession of needed manpower, given the absence of the draft as a motivating factor and the competition of private enterprise for the same individuals. In other words, can the recruiting structure continue to be a fundamentally passive organization or must it become aggressive in competing for the available manpower? Can a passive approach compete with aggressive affirmative action policies of private enterprise for well-qualified minority personnel?

We indicated earlier that the recruiting systems of the Navy and Marine Corps are not presently staffed to carry out an effective community penetration program which partly entails aggressiveness. Recruiters are not essentially public relations men and the public affairs billets are staffed by personnel who are not professionals.

Can a system which seemingly does not attempt to support market penetration efforts, does not see a need for professionally trained market

researchers, salesmen, public relations personnel, and advertising experts, compete in the labor market with others who do utilize these kinds of people?

One commander put it in this way: "The days of passive recruiting are over. The effort must be to get recruiters out of their offices and to go recruit within the communities." We believe that this comment is especially pertinent as regards minority manpower potential for top enlisted and officer ranks.

We believe it is also relevant to note that industry does "go recruit within the communities," and that it does so by the use of professional, career oriented personnel who are especially trained for the purpose, and who are supported by other carefully trained personnel in advertising, community relations, sales, and other specialties. When industry needs personnel, or competes in a light labor market, or wishes to increase its minority representation, it has rarely, to our knowledge, found passive recruiting sufficient to accomplish its objectives.

MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO RECRUITING

The management personnel assigned to recruiting must obviously impact directly upon the results achieved for recruiting in general and for minority recruiting in particular. The professionalism, the potential for upward mobility, and the personnel philosophy are discussed in this section.

Professionalism

Personnel assigned the responsibility of managing the various facets of manpower procurement do not have training in personnel management and procurement which would indicate that they are professionals. In other words, the recruiting systems of the Navy and Marine Corps are managed by persons who are not personnel specialists. This difference in concept between private enterprise and the Navy and Marine Corps is yet more noteworthy considering that the Navy and Marine Corps are competing for the same manpower as are the private industries, but the latter are training persons and making special efforts with trained personnel to attract the minorities that the Navy and Marine Corps could so well use.

The Navy Recruiting Command is aware of this problem and attempting to build professionalism within its ranks. The duty requirements and other constraints make this difficult, but the creation of the counselor post on ships is a step in this direction. Counselors can presumably return to recruiting after a tour at sea. There remains, however, much to be done to build professionalism in recruiting in both services.

Upward Mobility

The recruiting system management positions seem to offer practically no room for upward mobility or progression. Many persons look upon assignments with the recruiting system as "dead end" jobs. This, of course, does not help to motivate persons placed in these jobs to do well. Because

of this feeling, many officers appear to operate within the constraints of the given system with little inclination to recognize needed changes in the personnel procurement structure, including those that would improve minority recruiting. Here again, the Navy Recruiting Command recognizes the problem, but the pyramid within the command is ver, narrow toward the top.

In industry, recruiting specialists are part of personnel departments. There is a wide range of jobs and opportunities for upward mobility or to transfer to recruiting functions in larger facilities of the same company. Expertise gained from experience can therefore continue to be utilized.

Personnel Philosophy

In general, we found that the attitudes of most middle-management officers within the recruiting structure were positive and tne officers were anxious to improve the minority recruiting performance. There vere, however, some aspects of management philosophy which we do not believe are conducive to successful competition with private industry for the available manpower. In the absence of the draft, attitudes like the "One-Navy" and "All Marines are Green" concept, although fine when applied to certain intra-service operations, can mean many problems for recruiting in the minority manpower market. Because this philosophy suggests that the Navy and Marine Corps will establish their standards without regard to the ability of available manpower to meet these standards and without regard to private enterprise's utilization of that same manpower market, the philosophy can severely

restrict the ability of the service to attract manpower. This philos-
ophy, of course, may be a function of the inability of some Navy and
Marine Corps management personnel to understand the state of the manpower
market because of their lack of "professionalism" or training in manpower
procurement. In addition, some managers assigned to recruiting duty made
no secret of the fact that they did not believe in the volunteer force
concept and are not enthusiastic about seeing it become a viable alternative
to the draft. Such personnel often displayed even less enthusiasm for
special efforts to recruit minorities, but in both cases, these attitudes
were not necessarily typical of those whom we interviewed.

There is also some question as to whether those individuals who
hold negative racial views are screened out of positions where they
could inhibit the accession of minority personnel. Officers charged
with the minority procurement efforts related incidents of seeking
permission to attend meetings and conventions of minority groups in
order to induce these groups to assist and help the Navy and Marine Corps
to penetrate the minority community and of having these requests nullified.
This may be simply a reflection of budget constraints, but also reflects
a lack of understanding and sympathy of the problems of minority
recruiting, and of the competition, philosophy, and performance of
private enterprise faced with the same labor markets and similar problems.

MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING

The primary planning activity is the determination of manpower
accession requirements and accession quotas. This determination depends
to a large extent on authorized manpower levels, defense posture, and
budgetary restrictions as formulated by the Congress and the President
of the United States in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Navy Recruiting Command and Marine Corps Military Procurement Branch
quota assignments are based primarily on the Qualified Military Available
Statistics which indicate basically the numbers of persons within the age
range for military duty. At the time of our field survey (summer 1973),
little evidence was found suggesting that the Navy or Marine Corps attempt
to refine these statistics to indicate economic factors, or racial and
ethnic group factors, in the assignment of these quotas to the various
districts. Since then, however, this has been done by the Navy Recruiting
Command. Whereas previously each area was instructed to attempt to
recruit 18 percent of their monthly quota as minorities, with this
percentage consisting of 12 percent black and 6 percent other minorities,
the Navy Recruiting Command is now taking into account the demographic
availability of minorities and assigning these goals to areas accordingly.
Thus, Area 8--West Coast, now has a lower black accession goal and a higher
accession goal for "other" in accordance with the Mexican-American and
Oriental populations there.

Area and district commanders generally perceive their role as being the
conversion of the policies and goals communicated to them by headquarters

into "hard" quotas to be distributed to the various recruiting stations. Several commanders commented that changing policies into numbers was their most difficult task.

The fluctuation in quota assignments appears to cause many problems in generating a continuity in the recruiting environment. One cause of the fluctuations is the problem of varying funding levels. An Enlisted Programs Officer said, "First we have the money, then we don't. Quotas are down when we don't and up when we do. This makes motivating a recruiter rather difficult. One month you have to demotivate recruiters and the next month when quotas are up and applicants have been turned away, recruiters, all of a sudden, must be motivated again."

Enlisted quotas are not adjusted in accordance with the difficulty of recruiting within the inner-city environment. The increased difficulty encountered by inner-city youths in attempting to qualify under the current enlistment standards helps to exacerbate this inadequacy.

Districts seem to prefer that potential accessions be pipelined into a kind of waiting list for entry into active duty. This program is called "Delayed enlistment" and consists of an individual's being placed on a waiting list, which can last up to 180 days, for entry into active duty. Because this pipelining assists the districts and the recruiting command in estimating the flow of manpower, it would appear to be a satisfactory system. What may be a negative factor about this process is the fact that many

minority youths of the inner city decide to enlist into the Navy or
Marine Corps on an impulse basis. They want to go now or not at all.
When this is not possible because of the pipeline arrangement, potential
accessions may be lost forever.

Industry, of course, must change its needs as requirements change,
and sometimes this modulation is sudden because of sales loss, poor planning,
or out-of-line forecasting. Generally, however, companies have flexibility
to accept employees for future needs and utilize them constructively in
the interim. Moreover, companies have gone to considerable lengths to vary
needs and standards, as will be discussed in a later chapter, in order to
meet governmentally imposed affirmative action requirements. Granted that
industry inherently has more flexibility, we continue to believe that the
Navy and Marine Corps has more inherent adaptability than it utilizes.

RECRUITING CONCEPT--FINAL COMMENT

The Navy and Marine Corps recruiting concept was implicitly developed
to operate in an environment which did not require direct competition with
private industry for the available manpower. The basic underpinning of
their concept was the presence of the draft as a motivating factor for
young men to seek a choice of service before the choice was made for them.

The Navy and Marine Corps could then afford to practice a type of passive
recruiting which perhaps required only advertising to let the market know
there were openings. The other primary element required was the recruiter,
who had to do some selling, but primarily served to process the paperwork

required to secure a person for a service. The removal of the draft and
the presence of an economy which does not force most young men to seek
enlistment as an only alternative employment possibility has placed the
Marine Corps and Navy on a similar level to private enterprise in the
labor market.

These changes require an examination both of the recruiting concept
and of the structure of the recruiting systems to determine if they can
and should be adapted to the new recruiting environment. Above all, a
change would appear to be required if minority recruiting is to be more
successful. In the next two chapters, we examine the labor market
constraints which must be overcome and the differences between equal
opportunity and affirmative action which must be recognized for successful
minority recruiting. The findings of these two chapters will reinforce
the implications set forth in this chapter that there is a need for basic
change in the Navy and Marine Corps recruiting concept.

CHAPTER IV

LABOR MARKET FACTORS

Thus far we have examined the recruitment policies of the Navy and the Marine Corps and the manner in which those policies may inhibit or fail to improve minority recruiting. In addition to these internal factors, there are a number of external ones which seriously exacerbate the problem. These include: (1) the concentration of minorities in the inner urban areas; (2) educational qualifications and the lower educational attainment of minorities; and (3) the negative image of the Navy and, to a different extent, the Marine Corps, as a result of prior racial practices and more recent racial disturbances, and the sociological factors which that image reinforces.

POPULATION CONCENTRATION

In 1940, almost 80 percent of the black people in this country lived in the South and most persons there dwelt in rural areas. By 1970, more than one-half of all blacks were still living in the South, but the great bulk, both of northern and southern Negroes, were urbanites. Meanwhile, as blacks migrated to northern and western cities, whites took to the suburbs. By 1970, three of every five blacks in the South, and two of every three nationally, were living in metropolitan areas. Only 28 percent of the white population, but 58 percent of the black population, were residents of central cities within the largest metropolitan areas. Those blacks who

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still dwell in rural areas are nearly all in the South. Despite extensive migration, Negroes comprised 19 percent of the population in the South, but only 11 percent overall in 1970.[1]

The Spanish surnamed population is also largely an urban one. Puerto Ricans are most heavily concentrated in New York City, but those that dwell elsewhere in the continental United States also live in major metropolitan areas, such as Philadelphia and Chicago. Cuban-Americans have made Miami, Florida, their chief habitat. Mexican-Americans call Los Angeles their first city but are also heavily concentrated in the Texas communities adjacent to the Rio Grande, such as El Paso, San Antonio, and Corpus Christi, and increasingly in Houston and Dallas-Fort Worth as well. Only the American Indian minority remains heavily rural-oriented.

What this entails for the minority recruiting problem of the Navy and Marine Corps is that the principal source for minority accessions lies in the major cities where all minority populations except American Indians are concentrated. Unfortunately, populations which dwell within these major cities, and particularly minority populations, encounter severe and often disabling problems which limit their eligibility. These problems are, of course, related to, if not a part of, the poverty of much of this population.

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1. Data sources are found in U.S. Bureau of the Census, "The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States, 1971," Current Population Reports, Series P-23, No. 42 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 11-19; and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Black Americans: A Chartbook, Bulletin No. 1699 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 4-13.

Whatever the cause, however, there are basic labor market and sociological factors which reduce the potential of urban minority groups to be successful recruit candidates for the Navy and Marine Corps under present recruitment policies, as the balance of this chapter will make clear.

EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS AND MINORITY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENTS

Operating modern armed services require skills and professional attainments of many types. Table 17 shows how the percentage of those of the direct military combat type has declined from 93.2 percent in the Civil War to 17.2 percent in 1969. Meanwhile, the need for technical-scientific, administrative-clerical and skilled mechanics groups has risen substantially.

That this rising quality level demands higher recruit qualifications is not debatable, although the character of these qualifications, the manner in which they are established, and the practices used to determine whether individuals possess stated qualifications may remain quite controversial. In this section we shall first examine what the qualifications are, then examine minority educational attainments, and finally examine how high qualifications and disadvantaged attainments inhibit, if not prohibit, an amelioration of the Navy's and Marine Corps' minority recruiting problem.

Educational Qualifications

Along with the technical operating complexities of operating the modern military, there are a number of arguments for high quality standards. One is that higher quality recruits learn faster, have lower attrition rates

Table 17. Minority Recruiting Study
Changing Character of Military Manpower[a]
1860-1969

Occupational Group	Civil War	Spanish-American War	World War I	World War II	Korea	1954	1969
Technical-Scientific	0.2	0.5	3.7	10.1	10.7	14.5	20.5
Administrative-Clerical	0.7	3.1	8.0	14.6	15.2	17.5	18.1
Skilled Mechanics	0.6	1.1	21.5	15.8	16.9	20.3	26.2
Service Workers	2.4	6.5	12.5	9.7	11.5	10.4	12.2
Laborers, Operatives	2.9	2.2	20.2	13.6	8.6	3.4	5.8
Military-Combat Type	93.2	86.6	34.1	36.2	33.1	28.8	17.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: The Free Press, 1960), p. 65; for 1969 see, President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, Studies Prepared for the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), Vol. I, p. 1-3-17.

Note: Totals may not add to 100.0 due to rounding.

a Figures for the Civil War to 1954 represent all Army enlisted personnel; for 1969, figures represent the percent of all enlisted males in Department of Defense Occupational Groups.

in formal training, and therefore reduce training costs. Another is that rejection of lower quality recruits reduces the costs associated with courts-martial, larger military police forces, and administrative problems which these personnel have been seen to cause.

Except for establishing minimum age requirements and excluding the insane, alcoholics,and deserters, the Congress of the United States, which has final authority on military eligibility standards, has spoken on only one area that affects quality requirements, and it has since rescinded its restriction. This short-lived new requirement dictated that the manpower composition of the military services would consist of no more than 45 percent non-high school graduates. This standard appears to have been a response in part to the increasingly complex military equipment, but even more so to the desire to restrict the input of lesser educated individuals who are seen to have caused many of the disciplinary problems incurred by the services, particularly the Navy in recent years. Congress also apparently sought to negate the contention that the all-volunteer military would be composed mainly of the poor and uneducated.

Remaining quality requirements have been set by the Department of Defense and the individual services. Although the armed services were ordered to begin implementation of the all-volunteer concept after the cessation of the Vietnam Conflict, no problems in maintaining manpower accessions at an acceptable level in the light of increased recruiting standards were anticipated because of the decreased manpower requirements. The armed services, for reasons already mentioned, have increased their enlistment standards. Using Marine Corps standard changes as an example, the Corps markedly reduced its input of mental group IV personnel

beginning in December 1972, when the mental group IV accession rate was
ordered lowered from 20 percent to 14 percent by June 1973. In addition,
as of February 1973, mental group IV category recruits were limited to a
two-year enlistment. In March 1973, allowable mental group IV accessions
were further reduced.[2] Commensurate restrictions were implemented by
the Navy during the same period.

Judged by articles in the New York Times[3] and elsewhere, the tightening
of the standards was a response to disciplinary problems encountered by the
Navy and by other services. It seems that a large number of mental
group IV personnel, who are concentrated in lower ranks and jobs with
little potential and/or opportunity for upgrading, cause most of the disci-
plinary problems encountered. Although this view has been disputed,[4] it
appears quite clearly to have been accepted as armed services recruiting
policy.

In light of increasing standards the question becomes the attainment
of recruiting goals given the qualification requirements. Can the Navy
and Marine Corps maintain the quantity given the quality constraints? There
has been little analysis of the question because of the relatively
brief time span under which the all-volunteer force concept has
operated, but one study has shown that the quality-mix comparison of

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2. U.S. Marine Corps document on file in Industrial Research Unit library.

3. See, e.g., Earl Caldwell, "Navy Determined to Recruit Blacks," New
   York Times, March 11, 1973, p. 16.

4. J. Flag, J. Goffman, and J. Phelon, "The Adaption of Naval Enlistees
   Scoring in Mental Group IV on the AFQT," paper presented at the Manpower
   Management Planning Board Research Meeting, Fort Ritchie, Md., July 1967.

pre- and post-draft recruits indicates that quality has been maintained.

The author of the study notes, however,

> . . . the recruiting policies of 1973 have been geared to a force-reduction policy following the United States withdrawal from Vietnam and consequently recruiters have had the privilege of selection to meet minimum, and often maximum, quota limitations. This situation may have forced the average scores for 1973 to a level higher than will be seen in the future. Then, too, the short time span since the initiation of the All-Volunteer Force policy is most likely insufficient to be indicative of the situation once the system has begun to stabilize.[5]

The overall recruiting effort for the Navy and Marine Corps in fiscal year 1974 (July 1, 1973-June 30, 1974) has been generally successful, particularly for the Navy. Navy recruiting statistics from July 1, 1973 to May 31, 1974 show a percentage of goal attainment of 100.5. Blacks represented 10.4 percent of that total. The Marine Corps estimated that it would attain approximately 84 percent of its recruiting goal for this fiscal year (1973-1974). This low percentage is due partly to Congress' imposition on the armed forces of the requirement that the composition of their personnel include a minimum of 55 percent high school graduates. In order to meet this quota, the Corps recruited only high school graduates in April and May 1974. Congress has since had to remove the restriction, but the Corps has decided to continue the policy at least through fiscal year 1975.

The difficulty encountered by the Corps raises the question of the wisdom of a lessening of entrance standards to enable the services to meet manpower accession requirements. Although the services, for reasons mentioned earlier, are generally opposed to this solution, there have been studies that tend to

5. Bruce Kenneth Eckhardt, Quality Comparison of Draft-Motivated Navy Enlistees With All-Volunteer Force Enlistees, NTIS Publication AD-769 691 (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 1973), p. 15.

refute the services' contention that the tightened mental qualification

standards are needed for present military occupations:

> The Services have argued that higher mental standards are now needed to staff the more technically complex machinery of modern warfare. However, the broad occupational structure of each of the Armed Service; does not reflect a trend toward more complexity, at least since 1963. Further, an examination of specific occupational specialties does not indicate a trend toward more complexity over time.

> The actual staffing of occupations does reflect the technical complexities across broad occupations, but the Army has been able to man its billets with lower quality personnel. This fact, coupled with relaxation of standards since Project 100,000, demonstrates that it might be possible to further reduce minimum qualification standards.[6]

The key question for this study, of course, is will, and how will, these

increasing standards affect minority recruiting of the Navy and Marine Corps?

The discussion of minority educational attainments which follows will

demonstrate that the impact is likely to be severe.

Educational Attainment

Educational attainment has advanced markedly in our society, and

minorities have made substantial strides in catching up to the white majority.

Nevertheless, important disparities exist both in formal attainment and in

the quality of education which affect Navy and Marine Corps minority recruiting.

In 1914, slightly more than 40 percent of all adolescents were entering

high school and only about 25 percent were completing the four-year course.

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6. John A. Sullivan, "Quality Requirements of the Armed Forces, "Studies Prepared for the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, November 1970, Study 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. I-2-20.

The average age for entering the labor force was approximately 15. By 1972, 94 percent of all students spent at least one year in high school, and 82 percent graduated. The average age for entering the labor force had risen to approximately 19.[7]

As judged by data on the educational attainment of blacks, this same period has seen a narrowing of differences between the formal educational experiences of minorities and of whites. In 1960, for example, only 36 percent of the black men then 25 to 29 years of age had achieved a high school education as compared with 63 percent of white men; by 1971, these percentages were 54 percent for blacks, 81 percent for whites.[8] The catching-up process has continued. A recent study reported:

> Negro and other minority race workers in March 1973 had less education than did whites, although comparison with prior years shows a gradual closing of the gap because of the rapid gains among blacks. Between March 1964 and March 1973, the mean education of Negro workers 18 years old and over advanced from 9.4 to 10.8 years and that of whites went from 11.2 to 12.0 years of school completed. Thus, the gap between the two groups has decreased over the past 9 years from 1.8 to 1.2 years.
>
> The converging trends observed in the average (mean) educational attainment of whites and blacks should continue in the foreseeable future. Young blacks are staying in school longer than did their predecessors. In March 1973, Negro workers aged 18 to 24 years had a mean of 11.9 years of education, compared with 10.5 years for those 25 and over. For white workers, the comparable figures were 12.4 and 11.9 years. In particular, greater proportions of blacks are completing high school than in former years. The percentages of workers in March 1973 by race, age, and education were as follows:

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7. Christopher Jencks et al., Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972), p. 19.

8. "The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population," op. cit., p. 83.

	Negro and Other Races	White
High school, 4 years or more		
18 to 24 years old – – – – – – – – – – –	60.8	81.5
25 years old and over– – – – – – – – –	50.6	70.0
College, 1 year or more		
18 to 24 years old – – – – – – – – – –	23.3	32.8
25 years old and over– – – – – – – – –	19.8	30.1[9]

Projections are that by 1980, 56.1 percent of "Negro and other races" aged 25 years or older and 73.6 percent of those aged 25 to 34 will have completed four years of high school. The comparable estimates for whites are 73.4 and 83.5 percent, respectively.[10]

Co. e attendance has also increased among black males 18 to 24 years of age. In 1971, 20 percent of this age group was enrolled in college as compared with 11 percent in 1965. The comparable figure for white males remained stable over this period at 34 percent.[11]

Whether this college progress will continue remains uncertain. A recent New York Times survey reported:

> For the first time since the effort began in the middle nineteen-sixties to expand higher educational opportunity, there has been an apparent decline in the proportion of blacks entering the nation's colleges and universities.

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9. William V. Deutermann, "Educational Attainment of Workers, March 1973," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. XCVII, No. 1 (January 1974), p. 58.

10. Black Americans, op. cit., p. 128.

11. "The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population," op. cit., p. 85.

> The setback . . . seems directly related to the financial pressures
> that have spurred tuition increases and intensified competition for
> loans and grants.[12]

Minorities available for the professions continue to be rare. Table

18 shows that in 1970, only 2.3 percent of accountants, 1.1 percent of

engineers, 1.3 percent of the lawyers, and 2.2 percent of the physicians were

black. The proportion of persons of Spanish heritage in these professions

was only slightly higher in most cases. Among certified public accountants,

less than one percent were black.[13] In 1970, only about 2 percent of all

engineering students and 5 percent of those in the Bachelor of Technology

programs were black.[14] Minorities appear to be gaining in the medical

professions with 8.3 percent of medical students in the years 1968-73

classified as minority and 5.5 percent as black,[15] but such gains still

involve a relatively small number of persons. The competition for recruitment

of minority professionals is very keen. The Navy and Marine Corps are,

under the best of circumstances, certain to have a difficult time recruiting

minority personnel for such specialties.

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12. Gene L. Maeroff, "Minorities Drop in U.S. Colleges," New York Times,
    February 3, 1974, p. 43.

13. Marylin Bender, "Black C.P.A.'s a Rare Breed," New York Times, Sunday,
    October 18, 1970.

14. Robert Kiehl, Opportunities for Blacks in the Profession of Engineering,
    report prepared for Manpower Administration, U.S. Department of Labor,
    (Newark: Foundation for the Advancement of Graduate Study in Engineer-
    ing, Newark College of Engineering, 1970), p. 14.

15. Data from American Association of Medical Colleges.

Table 18. Minority Recruiting Study
Employed Persons in Selected Professional Occupations, by Race
United States, 1970

Professional Occupation	Total	Negro	Percent Negro	Persons of Spanish Heritage	Percent Persons of Spanish Heritage
Accountants	703,546	16,521	2.3	15,158	2.2
Engineers	1,207,509	13,679	1.1	25,330	2.1
Lawyers	260,152	3,379	1.3	3,775	1.5
Physicians	280,929	6,106	2.2	10,293	3.7

Source: U.S. Census of Population: 1970, PC(1)-D1, Detailed Characteristics,
U.S. Summary, Table 223.

Thus equality in educational attainment has made considerable progress
and may be expected to continue to do so despite some current counter trends.
There remain, however, disparities between white and minority scholastic-
year and professional attainments which cannot be ignored. In practice,
these differences mean that the higher the Navy and Marine Corps establishes
their educational qualifications for enlistment, the smaller the proportion
of minorities is available. Moreover, if we examine educational quality,
we find that formal attainment is probably rendered inaccurate as a measure
by the concentration of blacks in inner city areas and in the rural South
where schools are likely to be inferior.

Educational Quality

Educational quality is not a precise term and we cannot grant it exactitude. No one familiar with the urban situation, however, can fail to have observed the impact of urban ills on schools there. Broken homes, crime, and a student body from homes without books or educational background would make the educational task difficult under any circumstances. To this must be added a greatly weakened tax base that is virtually eaten up by militant teacher unions and debt service[16] and continues to shrink as not only the middle class exodus continues, but also as industry seeks new plant sites away from high taxes, poor services, transportation chaos, and a labor force of declining skills, all features of the older urban areas. In the rural South, schools are improving but are still underfinanced and understaffed relative to the suburban areas.

It is virtually impossible to obtain reliable testing data comparing urban and suburban schools, but no one who has worked in personnel over the years is unimpressed by the lack of the basic communications and arithmetic skills taught, the high dropout rates, and the general absence of qualifications in graduates that seem to characterize big city schools. Moreover, these features were attested to over and over again by Navy and Marine Corps recruiters who have seen potential recruits with formal educational qualifications fail to achieve the lowest acceptable reading or mathematics test scores.

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16. In Philadelphia, these two items account for 85 percent of expenditures. For evidence that this is typical, see Larry G. Simon, "The School Finance Decision: Collective Bargaining and Future Finance Systems," The Yale Law Journal, Vol. LXXXII (January 1973), pp. 409-460.

With minorities already making up over half of the student population in major cities of the South, Northeast, and Midwest (even though the total population of most of these cities retains a white majority), it is obvious that the ills of urban schools fall most heavily upon minorities and exacerbate their problems of achieving educational equality. Moreover, without in any way disparaging the efforts of many prominent black colleges, the fact is that most of them are not up to the standards of our major racially balanced universities. Yet a large proportion of the blacks in professional occupations are trained there: for example, about one-half of all black engineering students were in six predominantly black colleges in 1970.[17] These are among the qualitative factors which cannot be measured, but which surely add to educational disparities between majority and minority citizens.

Rising Standards and Minority Recruiting

Table 19 sets forth the mental group quality requirements for the Navy and Marine Corps for fiscal years 1973 and 1974. In the light of these requirements, the still disadvantaged educational status of blacks and other minorities, their concentration in center city areas where bad living, working, and school conditions combine with other disadvantages, the fact that the number and percentage of high school and college graduates among minorities, despite great gains, remains below that of whites, and the still

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17. Kiehl, op. cit., p. 19.

Table 19. Minority Recruiting Study
Navy and Marine Corps Quality Requirements by
Percent Acceptable Range
Fiscal Years 1973 and 1974

AFQT Mental Group Categories	1973		1974	
	Navy	Marine Corps	Navy	Marine Corps
I and II	33-24	31-22	34-25	31-23
III	55-59	53-56	56-59	54-57
IV	12-17	16-22	10-16	15-20
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: Qualitative Accession Requirements, prepared by Central All-
Volunteer Force Task Force (Washington, D.C.), Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs),
pp. 38-39.

small educational attainments of minorities in key professional areas,

all lead one to doubt that the Navy can, without substantially different

policies, achieve its minority recruiting goals. We would also expect that

minority recruiting by the Marine Corps will be reduced because of these

higher standards.

Given the fact that minorities comprise a disproportionate share of

mental group IV recruits, it requires little or no elaboration to see that

this result is almost inevitable. Our field work confirms this expectation.

Recruiters have told us in many cities that unless the standards are

changed, minority recruiting in the inner cities, given the constraints

on education and other factors discussed above, will be almost impossible.

Some comments from recruiters were:

> . . . because 90 percent of the guys that come through that door
> are non-high school grads the graduation requirement is killing us
> at this station.

> . . . our accession rate per recruiter has been cut in half under
> the mental group IV restrictions.

> . . . attempting to make quotas under these rules has caused some
> recruiters to take steps they normally, legally, would not take.

In sum, current restrictions on mental group IV accessions impose a

restraint on inner city recruiting for minorities. The services have con-

tended that it costs much more to train individuals who are classified into

the lower mental groups, but another point of view must be considered. It

will also cost more to find and recruit the highly "qualified" recruit in

the minority community. The situation becomes one of a trade-off between

money spent to find the above average enlistee and money spent to train

and to equip the individual who has been classified as marginal because

of his environment and education.

As well as increasing the difficulty of recruiting among minorities,

particularly in the inner city, the stricter standards compound minority

recruiting problems in another fashion: they tend to reinforce the negative

image of the Navy, and to some extent, the Marine Corps, in the black and

other minority communities. The rejected recruit is likely to see his rejection

as a confirmation of racial prejudice and discrimination. The reason for
this is discuss d in the following section of this chapter. The point of
emphasis here, however, is that the net result is likely to be a further
reduction of the pool of potential recruits from the minority community.

IMAGE AND SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS

One of the major factors in the success of an organization's manpower
procurement program is the perception of the organization by the labor
market at which procurement efforts are directed. This perception is
influenced by tne image and credibility of the organization in the labor
market. Th's section of the chapter attempts to give some indications of
the image and perceived credibility of the Navy and Marine Corps and the
reason for these views of minority communities.

Also to be considered are certain sociological factors which tend to
inhibit successful recruitment in the minority community. These factors
include gangs, drugs, and crime. Additional consideration must also be
given to unemployment conditions of minorities in the inner city, which are,
of course, related to lower educational attainment and to the decline of
general employment in center cities.

Image

A considerable portion of our field study involved discussions with
members of minority communities in order to obtain an indication of the
present image of the Navy and Marine Corps. Discussions were held with

inner city residents who functioned as college placement counselors, high
school counselors, heads of minority manpower organizations, instructors
on the college level, and managers of private enterprise manpower procurement
organizations. It must be emphasized that these interviews were intended
not to represent a survey, but rather to secure opinions and ideas relating
to Navy and Marine Corps image and credibility in the minority community.

The Navy and Marine Corps' image to a great extent has been shaped by
the past treatment of minorities in their enlistment or attempted enlistment,
and by the positions, duties, and opportunities for advancement given them
by these two services. As already discussed, blacks were altogether excluded
from Navy service between 1920 and 1932, only to have the exclusionary
policies altered in 1932 so that blacks and Filipinos could serve as
stewards in the messman's branch. Black sailors in 1942 were allowed to
serve in the general Navy but were limited to segregated harbor and shore
assignments. The Navy did take major steps ahead of the other services
after World War II to eliminate racial barriers, but the proportion of
black sailors has continued to average only about 5 percent of total personnel
over the last two decades.

The Marine Corps did not have any blacks before World War II and during
the war blacks served as heavy-duty laborers, ammunition handlers, and
anti-aircraft gunners in segregated units. In 1949 and 1950, the Corps
began to integrate and since that time the percentage of blacks in the
Corps has gone from 2 percent to 16.6 percent in 1973. We have shown in
other sections of this report that blacks are still concentrated in the
lower skilled jobs.

This history has contributed substantially to a negative image of the Navy and, to a lesser extent, of the Marine Corps. Many of those men who served as stewards or messmen in the Navy or as heavy-duty laborers in the Corps during World War II experienced the strict segregationist policies during that time and came home from the Corps and Navy to raise families. These men could only relate to their sons and daughters the realities of Marine Corps or Navy service from their own experience. Many of these men could tell their sons only about the negative effects of service life and therefore sway these young men to consider the services only as the last possible alternative for employment. Until black veterans of World War II realize that the Navy and Marine Corps have changed and have begun to eradicate any indications of prejudice and mistreatment, the Navy and Corps will have a difficult time convincing their sons to enlist.

The Navy's job is more difficult for two reasons. First, the Corps can attract those, black or white, who enjoy combat and physical performance. Second, the incidents on carriers in recent years, whatever their cause, have tended to reemphasize in the black community the unfavorable image of the Navy. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People made these cases a rallying cry and familiarized the black community with its version of events. Regardless of the accuracy of these stories, which we

have not investigated, the fact is that repeatedly our interviews uncovered evidence indicating that the net result was the reinforcement of a negative image of the Navy.[18]

Because of this history and these incidents, the Navy is not the well-thought of organization in the black community that it is in the white, where perhaps it is considered the most prestigious service, next only to the Air Force. The factor which offsets some of the Marine Corps' higher standing in the black community is the belief that a disproportionate number of blacks were casualties in Vietnam. This belief is accentuated by the fact that much of Marine service involves infantry-type duty in difficult areas such as the swamps of Southeast Asia. Of course, for those who glory combat activity, this is an asset, not a liability.

One of the major factors that will continue to contribute to the perpetuation of a poor image is the general inability of those young men who do decide to choose the Navy or Marine Corps as an employment alternative either to meet the qualifications for entrance or, if the qualifications are met, to attain a job within the service that provides an opportunity for training in a skilled area. These young men return to their communities, in many instances, disgruntled and convinced of the apparent validity of their fathers' stories of service life.

One may ask why high school counselors cannot do something to eradicate these misbeliefs about service life. Part of the answer lies in the fact

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18. For a summary of these incidents, heavily reflecting the NAACP viewpoint, see the article by Earl Caldwell in the New York Times, "Complaints Persist that Black Sailors Accused In Carrier Incidents Did Not Receive Equal Justice," April 1, 1973, p. 59.

that many of the counselors experienced service life themselves during the late 1940's and 1950's and share the same opinions and beliefs as the fathers of the young men.[19] In addition to this situation, which lowers Corps and Navy image in the minority community, are stories of the disproportionate deaths of blacks in Vietnam, as expressed by the news media and apparently taken as fact in the minority community. All these factors contribute to the negative image of the Navy and Corps. As an indication of the problems that some recruiters have in gaining access to the high school counselor and therein to the high school community, a recruiter in a large metropolitan area stated, "Out of a total of 15 high schools in our area, we get practically no cooperation from the majority of the counselors and there are still several schools which will not let us set foot on campus."

Thus the Navy and Marine Corps must presently recruit in a labor market situation which is hostile to their efforts. The perpetuation of this labor market condition among minorities will continue as long as blacks and other minorities have cause to believe that the possibilities for advancement and success in a Navy or Marine Corps career are minimal. The Navy and Marine Corps are attempting to remove the negative image which they have within the minority community, but it appears that minorities are adopting a "show us" type of attitude. Given the seeming inadequacy of the inner city schools in preparing minority youths to pass the entrance examination or, upon passing, to be assigned to a skilled service occupation, the Navy and Marine Corps

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19. For a detailed analysis of high school recruitment, see John M. Buck, High School Recruitment for a Volunteer Army (Washington, D.C.: Development Alternatives, Inc., 1972).

are having a difficult time obtaining minority youths to "show." Recruiters
told us they do not believe young men in the community are influenced too
much by brochures depicting black youths currently in the Navy or Corps. A
black youth is more likely to consider enlisting if he can relate to one
of his friends who has enlisted and has returned to the community to relate
a positive experience.

A leader of a branch of a large civil rights organization indicated
that youngsters had been very surprised to see a black Marine officer, and
frankly had not until that time believed that there were any black officers
in the services. More such living illustrations are obviously necessary,
but, as pointed out in Chapter III, the black officers cannot be overused
in this role without damaging their careers.

The section thus far has examined primarily the image of the Navy and
Marine Corps among minority youths who would probably be enlisted personnel.
A consideration of labor market constraints for officer procurement among
minorities must immediately take into account the competition the Navy and
Marine Corps face for the black college graduate. Private enterprise offers
stiff competition to the services for the qualified black college graduate,
and the negative image which the Navy and Marine Corps has among many
minority communities gives civilian enterprise a decisive edge in their
recruitment. Interviews with college placement counselors indicated that
the counselors did not give the services the same consideration as an
employment alternative to recommend to their graduating seniors as they
did private enterprise. Here again, the potential for advancement and

financial reward was seen by counselors as not equal to that found in civilian enterprise. When these counselors, who may be very influential, rate the services below par, they undermine whatever recruiting programs the Navy and Corps may undertake.

Another problem which is not generated by the minority manpower market, but which affects on minority officer accessions, was expressed to us by a Marine officer recruiter as follows:

> I tell the young man about the training program he'll be going through as an officer candidate and attempt to be as frank as possible about its toughness so that he'll have the correct attitude for making it through training, and indicate that the Corps is tough but fair. However, several guys I've recruited have gotten into the program only to be rejected for a number of reasons which appear fabricated to them. They then return to the comminuty very bitter and more apprehensive about the seriousness of the Corps than ever. The Corps then has not only lost that one man but any of his friends who were considering attempting to join.

The Navy and Marine Corps image and credibility are major problem areas, which until alleviated, will continue to make recruiting among minority communities a much more difficult task.

Gangs, Crime, and Drugs

Beyond the image problem, the inner cities of our large metropolitan communities have major problems of gangs, crime, and drugs which seriously deter the Navy and Marine Corps from attracting qualified enlistees.

Gangs are a way of life in many minority communities. Youths are forced to join one gang or another and to assist in defending their area of the city called the "turf." The gang situation gives rise to several

conditions which affect recruiting. First, actual recruiting is affected because a young man who may be thinking of enlisting is sometimes restricted to his "turf" where there may not be a recruiting station. He may literally have to risk his life if he wishes to talk to a recruiter. Recruiters related incidents to us in which they would actually have to drive their recruiting vans to a neighborhood and secretly take the young man out of the community. Incidents were also related in which gangs dared young men to enter recruiting stations or waited until they came out if they had the courage to enter.

Many times a young man attempts to enlist in order to escape this situation. More often than not, however, he will not be able to enlist because he cannot qualify by satisfying score requirements on the entrance examinations. This has become more prevalent since the Navy and Marine Corps increased their qualification requirements.

Suppose the young man can escape the gangs and can pass the entrance tests for service as a Marine or sailor, what can then prohibit his enlistment? The answer is a criminal record. A young man who lives in a gang environment has a great probability of joining a gang being involved in many types of crimes. Arrests are sometimes status symbols for gang members. Recruiters contend that certain kinds of records for inner city youths should be waived. They contend that these youths are more prone to be involved in certain recordable unlawful acts, and because of the close confinement in minority communities, are more likely to get caught.

The Navy and Marine Corps will have to deal with the problem of criminal records of many of the youths in the labor market if they are to recruit successfully in the inner cities. Recruiters say that they believe the chance of a minority youth is being arrested and charged is much greater because the suburban or rural law enforcement officer may know the youngster involved in an altercation and may therefore only admonish the young man and turn him over to his parents, whereas the central city policeman who is less likely to know the youngster may be more prone to arrest the youth for a similar infraction.

The problem of drug trafficking in the inner city also affects the ability of the Navy and Marine Corps to recruit. The drug "pushers" prey on the inner city and the poor and this often leads to the addiction of many people to drugs. Service entrance regulations are very strict on the nonacceptance of persons who have, or have had, a drug problem. Since the inner city is the center of the drug traffic, the chances of a youth's having experimented with drugs are great, thus placing another restriction on the availability of manpower within the inner city.

Unemployment

Unemployment among black youths is very high. Throughout the decade of the 1960's, black and other minority teenagers had an unemployment rate varying from 24.4 percent to 29.1 percent--almost six times the national

average and 3.5 times the average of minority adults.[20] This huge
unemployment figure may actually be an underestimate since labor force
participation rates of blacks declined in this period while those of
whites rose, and the U.S. Bureau of the Census estimates that its Current
Population Survey fails to reach about 13 percent of the minority popu-
lation of working age, compared with approximately 2 percent of the white
population.[21]

The high unemployment rate among minority youth would seem to indicate
that many youths might consider very strongly the possibility of an enlist-
ment into the Navy or Marine Corps. In fac', many minorities, the poor,
and the unemployed have often looked to the services as an avenue out of
poverty. Unfortunately, the increased quality standards of the Navy and
Marine Corps are, to a great extent, closing off inner city blacks and
other minorities from utilizing the services as a source of employment.
At the same time, those minority youths who do get the opportunity for
adequate preparation and the chance to obtain a meaningful job or to
continue on to college after high school are so few in number that the
competition for these persons from private enterprise proves very difficult
for military recruiting.

20. Gordon F. Bloom and Herbert R. Northrup, Economics of Labor Relations,
    Seventh Edition (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1973),p.441.

21. Ibid., pp. 440-443.

SUMMARY

Minorities are concentrated in inner cities. Despite great improvement, their educational attainments remain significantly below whites and they disproportionately attend schools which we believe are qualitatively inferior to those in which whites are concentrated. These educational problems are exacerbated by the rising recruiting qualifications of the Navy and Marine Corps and the increased limitations on mental group IV accessions.

Labor market factors of the inner city minority communities besides educational attainment and quality, which strongly limit the success of Navy or Marine Corps recruiting are: (1) the image of the Navy and Marine Corps among minority communities; (2) the problems of gangs, drugs, and crime; and (3) unemployment conditions.

The labor market situation may be described as follows. The Navy and Marine Corps enter a minority community to recruit youngsters of parents who already may have a negative image of the two services. Second, even if a young man disagrees with the image which his parents have, he must still convince his peers, who are often gang members, of the efficacy of his decision to examine opportunities with the Navy or Corps. If he does not convince them, he sometimes has to risk life and limb to see the recruiters. Third, when the young man overcomes that hurdle, reaches the station and talks to a recruiter, there is a possibility that he will have a record of a crime which would make him ineligible to serve with the Navy

or Marine Corps. Finally, if he does not have that problem, he comes to the factor which is then the major qualifying requirement--the entrance examinations. This is, in many instances, the end of the line for that youth. He will probably not pass the examination. As one recruiter put it: "Frankly, the new test is killing accessions."

The inner city youth has many obstacles to overcome before he actually arrives at the recruiter's office, and once he gets there his chances of qualifying are slim. The labor market within the minority community is a very difficult environment in which to recruit, given the constraints which we have discussed.

The irony of the situation is that fact that many youths feel driven to seek employment with the Navy or Corps because of the fierce unemployment situation within the minority community. They attempt to overcome the sociological obstacles placed in their paths in order to reach the last step, but then their efforts come to no fruition because of deficiencies in their education which are exacerbated by higher service entrance standards.

CHAPTER V

THE NEED FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

In the previous chapters we discussed the internal and external
constraints which limit the potential success for minority recruiting
and which inhibit the Navy and the Marine Corps in their attempts to
solve their minority recruiting problem. It is clear from the obstacles
previously discussed and enumerated that the Navy and Marine Corps cannot
succeed to the extent desired unless a fundamental change is made in
recruiting policy. Industry has already made such a change in response to
the pressures generated by governmental civil rights legislation and order.
As a result, industry has moved considerably closer to minority employment
goals. We refer, of course, to the use of "affirmative action" rather
than merely equal opportunity in minority recruiting.

THE CONCEPT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN INDUSTRY

Affirmative action as a concept derives from the experience of the
President's Committee on Government Contracts, established pursuant to
Executive Order 10557 by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. This committee,
headed by the then Vice President, Richard M. Nixon, sought, as did pre-
vious committees established by Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, to prohibit
discrimination in employment where government contracts were involved. In
its final report, issued in 1960, this committee stated that it was not
"overt discrimination" which prevented equal employment as much as "the

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indifference of employers to take action establishing a positive policy
that hindered applicants and employees from being hired and promoted on
the basis of equality."[1]

This need for a positive policy concept was grasped by President John
F. Kennedy and made a part of Executive Order 10925, issued in March 1961,
and continued and expanded pursuant to Executive Order 11246 by the Johnson
and Nixon Administrations. As now interpreted, the rule requires companies
to have an affirmative action program which:

1. analyzes all major job classifications and explains why minorities
   may be underutilized therein;

2. sets goals, targets, and affirmative action commitments designed
   to relieve any deficiencies identified by the company; and

3. provides support data, including job progression charts, seniority
   rosters, and applicant flow and rejection ratios for the job
   analysis and program plans.

Affirmative action to overcome deficiencies in minority utilization
practices by various companies includes reexamination of employment and
testing procedures, outreach programs to employ the disadvantaged and to
provide special training for them, establishment of permanent contracts with
black or other minority community organizations (predominantely minority
high schools and colleges and other sources of minority recruits), assist-
ance with inner city organizations combating crime and drugs, support for
minority business and organizations, and a host of other activities. Along
with such programs go line responsibility for goal attainment, special

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1. Committee on Government Contracts, Pattern for Progress, Final Report to
   President Eisenhower (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960),
   p. 14.

staff personnel to assist in goal attainment, and strong central direction
of policy marked by a clear affirmation of that policy and a determination
to achieve goals enunciated unequivocally by the corporate chief executive.

The way such an affirmative action program works in practice is
illustrated by the information in Figure 4, which reproduces an editorial
appearing in the company newspaper, signed by the president of McDonnell
Douglas Corporation, the country's largest aerospace concern. Despite a
reduction in employment, this company has expanded minority employment and
upgraded minorities on its payroll since 1970. It has successfully trained
totally inexperienced welfare recipients to become semiskilled workers in
airplane manufacturing, using such persons on jobs where errors cannot
be tolerated.[2]

Other examples may also be cited. To overcome the shortages of minority
engineers and engineering students, a group of companies, led by General
Electric, have inaugurated a program designed to encourage minorities to
attend engineering schools and to provide scholarships for that purpose.[3]

2. For background on problems of affirmative action in the aerospace industry,
    see Herbert R. Northrup, "The Negro in the Aerospace Industry," in Northrup
    et al., Negro Employment in Basic Industry. Studies of Negro Employment,
    Volume I (Philadelphia: Industrial Research Unit, Wharton School of
    Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania, 1970), Part Three.

3. J. Stanford Smith, "Needed: A Ten-Fold Increase in Minority Engineering
    Graduates," address to the Engineering Education Conference, Crotonville,
    N.Y., July 25, 1972, and Fred J. Borch, "The Universal Demand for Equality,"
    ibid. Mr. Smith was the Senior Vice President and Mr. Borch, Chairman
    and Chief Executive Officer, of General Electric Company. For background,
    see Theodore V. Purcell and Daniel P. Mulvey, The Negro in the Electrical
    Manufacturing Industry. The Racial Policies of American Industry, Report
    No. 27 (Philadelphia: Industrial Research Unit, Wharton School of Finance
    and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania, 1971).

Figure 4. Minority Recruiting Study
McDonnell Douglas Affirmative Action Program

Affirmative Action moves ahead

Three years ago McDonnell Douglas-St. Louis became the first industrial unit in the United States to complete an acceptable Affirmative Action Program for Equal Opportunity Employment under the Labor Department's new order No. 4.

Although McDonnell Douglas had long been a leader in offering equal opportunity for all, for the first time we were required by federal rules to take affirmative action to meet goals for hiring and upgrading minority workers.

Just last month McDonnell Douglas-St. Louis received federal approval of its fourth Affirmative Action Program, and in the coming months we expect to receive approval for 22 similar programs at each of our various other locations throughout the United States.

What have we accomplished in the past three years? First of all, McDonnell Douglas corporate-wide employment of minority group members has increased from about 11.5 per cent in April 1970 to about 14 per cent today.

In so doing, we have met and in many cases exceeded our goals for minority hiring and upgrading. The gains are especially remarkable because they were achieved in a three-year period when company employment fell about 15 per cent.

Under union contracts, many of the layoffs were made on the basis of seniority, and laid-off employes had first call on any new hiring in their former job category.

Consequently, most hiring to meet Affirmative Action goals came in non-union jobs. Minority representation in technical, clerical and managerial positions has increased sharply in the past three years.

While emphasis is placed on providing opportunity for minority personnel, the programs provide assistance to all workers seeking to improve their job status.

However, the McDonnell Douglas Affirmative Action Programs encompass a good deal more than hiring and upgrading. We have also been active in minority recruiting, educational and job training programs, housing for employes, community affairs, and in encouraging minority-owned firms to become subcontractors.

Figure 4--Continued

Sampling of MDC involvements

Listing all of our involvements would fill more space than is available, but a sampling will convey the broad scope of our efforts.

- At St. Louis and Long Beach we have operated summer employment programs for disadvantaged youths.
- More than 6500 supervisory personnel attended various AAP workshops held throughout the corporation last year.
- Procurement fairs for minority businessmen sponsored last year by our St. Louis and West Coast facilities drew nearly 1000 representatives of minority businesses.
- McDonnell Douglas has made many of its patents available to minority businesses at no charge.
- The St. Louis housing office assisted 42 minority employes in finding housing last year.
- All teammates are encouraged to complete skills inventory forms which are computerized into a talent inventory for future job requirements.
- Minority students have been encouraged to participate in the company's cooperative education program.
- West Coast and Tulsa personnel have visited high schools to motivate students to complete their education.
- Administrative and material support has been given to minority colleges through a college cluster program.
- Hundreds of teammates have volunteered their after-hours services to a number of special support projects.
- McDonnell Douglas has made significant contributions to the Urban Leagues of Los Angeles, St. Louis, Pasadena and Tulsa, to the Watts Summer Festival, the United Negro College Fund, the NAACP, the Sickle Cell Anemia Clinic of DePaul Hospital, St. Louis, the Long Beach Community Rehabilitation Industries, the Mexican-American Opportunity Foundation, and many other similar organizations.

In reviewing our Affirmative Action Programs over the past three years, I am gratified at the strides we have made. Although the initiative came from the company, the programs could not have been carried out without the wholehearted cooperation of our teammates. Special thanks are due to those who volunteered their services.

Given this kind of a commitment, we will continue to meet our Affirmative Action goals and further the cause of equal opportunity at McDonnell Douglas and in our communities.

S. N. McDonnell
President

Source: McDonnell Douglas Spirit, March 1973, p. 2.

When the Western Electric Company found that its Newark, New Jersey, and Chicago plants, which once were surrounded by ethnic populations with a long tradition of mechanical work, were now instead in Puerto Rican and black neighborhoods with no such backgrounds, it reorganized its training programs, abolished most tests, and attempted to work with schools to create the skills required.[4]

Affirmative action has in effect accomplished in American industry a reevaluation of concepts, ideas, and employment standards in order to take in people who were formerly kept out. It has not resulted in an elimination of all inequities, but it has accomplished a great deal in bringing historically excluded minorities into the work place and responsible citizenry.

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY VS. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

In a real sense, the Navy and the Marine Corps do not practice affirmative action. The two services are equal opportunity employers in that they do not intentionally, nor as a matter of policy, discriminate against minorities; but they do not affirmatively seek, as a matter of policy and regular practice, to aid minorities to overcome the barriers of the labor market, discussed in the previous chapter, nor are their recruiting practices constituted to be able to do so. We hasten to add that many persons of good will and sensitivity in both services, including some in very high places, attempt to accomplish these results on their own, and we have found many practices and policies which, if fully developed, would

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4. Purcell and Mulvey, op. cit., pp. 65-71, 105-106, and field interviews.

constitute a major portion of an affirmative action program. It is, however, regular policy and practice that we must first concern ourselves with here. And this practice fails to constitute affirmative action necessary to overcome the barriers discussed in the two previous chapters.

Understanding of Affirmative Action

Our interviews have convinced us that many persons throughout the Navy organizations have little concept of affirmative action. Often, affirmative action and equal opportunity were used synonomously. In some instances, doing something in the minority community which was normally and regularly done in the majority community was considered affirmative action. For example, one person interviewed said that with respect to affirmative action, "The Navy has implemented JROTC programs at two predominantely black and Chicano high schools in the Los Angeles area." To other persons, especially the higher ranking officers and enlisted personnel, the managers of the recruiting efforts, affirmative action is a monthly goal for minorities.

The situation was somewhat different in the Marine Corps organization. Marine Corps people tend to disregard even the need for affirmative action, since they do not have any enlisted minority quotas. One Marine Corps recruiter commented that he had never given affirmative action any thought because he does not have to obtain minority recruits.

Still another concept of affirmative action which is typical of both services is the placing of minority recruiters in minority areas. To many, this represents "doing something for minorities." Further evidence

of Navy and Marine Corps' misunderstanding of the meaning of affirmative
action on the part of recruiters are the following comments made during
field interviews:

> The Navy is looking for quality, no matter what the color. There
> is no need for affirmative action in recruiting because racism is
> being wiped out in the fleet.

> The Marine Corps can not afford to favor anyone in their entrance
> requirements.

> There is no need for goals in minority enlisted recruiting because
> the Corps is having no problem with their minority accessions.

This is not to say that these statements are not true or are without
merit. In fact, some of them represent what a truly equal opportunity
service should be like but affirmative action is required in order to
reach a point where equal opportunity is all that is necessary.

Of great concern to recruiters questioned was the feeling that if
affirmative action was to be practiced, they would have to have specific
instructions. Here are a number of statements indicative of this attitude.

Navy:

Commanders place very little, if any, emphasis on recruiting minorities.

The Navy lacks sincerity in its minority recruiting efforts.

There is no top-side support for an affirmative action plan.

There is no affirmative action in recruiting.

The Navy is not willing to compete for the qualified minority
because they do not want him bad enough.

Marine Corps:

If the people up there wanted affirmative action, we would have
it tomorrow.

If the man wanted affirmative action, he would tell me and give me the tools to carry it out.

It is both logical and reasonable to assume that the attitudes and levels of commitment which surface at the lower levels of the recruiting structure of both services do not originate at these levels. The military, like any other organization, has problems of communication which manifest themselves in those areas where prejudice or personal preferences may become involved. On the other hand, the military also has well-defined levels of responsibility. This being the case, one would expect that if affirmative action were top policy, it would be evidenced at the lower levels.

Conceptual Problems

There are a number of policies of the Navy and Marine Corps which we believe conflict directly with an affirmative action concept and must be re-examined if affirmative action is to be practiced. The three most important are the testing procedures, the "Green Marine" and "One-Navy" concepts, and the issue of remedial training.

We have already pointed out that we are not testing experts. The fact remains, however, that few, if any, major American companies today of which we are aware, place such reliance on tests to determine fitness for employment and upgrading as do the Navy and Marine Corps. We do not believe--nor do the great bulk of recruiters whom we interviewed--that the Navy and Marine Corps can substantially ameliorate their minority recruiting problem as long as present testing policy is maintained.

The "Green Marine" and "One-Navy" concepts reflect the ideals of the leaders of the respective organizations toward equal opportunity. But it must be stressed again that, until affirmative action is practiced within these organizations, there cannot be a true "One-Navy" or "Green Marine." These concepts, by definition, rule out the possibility of practicing affirmative action by denying that the problem exists.

Because of their tight budgets, the constant attempts of those not mindful of military requirements to reduce those budgets, and the impact of inflation on those budgets, the fact that affirmative action might require expensive remedial or special training is a source of understandable concern to Navy and Marine Corps officials. The possibility that more effective minority recruiting would dull hostility to the armed forces from a significant sector of the population could be an offsetting factor. Another is that such training by the military should both reduce the need of it by the civilian sector and increase the employment potential of the recipients after their service careers.

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ASPECTS NOW IN EFFECT

The Navy and the Marine Corps, as already noted, have moved affirmatively in some areas. Not only are these actions significant because they provide a core to a well-rounded affirmative action program, but by virtue of these practices and policies if the Navy and the Marine Corps adopted a full-fledged, well-rounded affirmative action program, they would not be departing from existing practices, but rather would base their actions solidly in policies which have already been found to be helpful to the total Navy and Marine Corps recruiting effort.

Navy Affirmative Activities

The Navy has, first of all, established a billet for at least one minority officer in each of its 42 principal Navy recruiting stations in the continental United States. This is a definite positive step toward establishing equal opportunity in recruiting. Nothing can prove the Navy's seriousness to the minority community more than "showing the colors" in the form of a Naval officer who is a member of a minority group. The fact, for example, that a black Naval officer can give talks in a predominantely black high school or college, that he can meet with students of his own race, and that he can tell of his experiences and his participation in the Navy can do more than anything else to illustrate and to prove that the Navy is, in fact, affirmatively attempting to recruit minorities in all enlisted and officer berths.

We believe, however, that the utilization of black officers could be enhanced. It is not necessary that the minority recruiting officer be given responsibility for minority goals. As we discussed earlier in this study, there is some question as to whether duty as a Minority Recruiting Officer is helpful to the long-run career of the person involved. The Navy should, therefore, attempt to have minorities in all billets, being careful at the same time not to assign a particular program solely to members of a particular race. Minority Recruiting Officers with whom we discussed this situation felt very strongly that they could be more useful as general advisors on the problem of minority recruiting while, at the same time, being an integral part of the total recruiting effort.

We also heard in the field considerable speculation that the Minority

Recruiting Officer's function would be phased out by 1975. This tended

to reduce the interest of various persons in accepting or striving to

obtain such a post. In view of the long-range character of the job ahead,

and the difficulties involved, it would seem that any phasing out of

the present program would be premature.

Another step toward affirmative action which the Navy has adopted is

the establishment of goals for recruiting of minority officers and enlisted

men. Obviously, the mere establishment of goals will not attain them, but

the fact that goals have been established is an example of affirmative

thinking on the part of the Navy Recruiting Command. Many of the recruiting

personnel whom we contacted felt that these goals either were not realistic

or that they were not serious. We believe neither to be the case. It is

obvious, however, that if the Navy is to achieve its goals, it must create

a positive feeling toward them on the part of its recruiters. This seems

to be a matter of communications more than anything else, since we are

convinced that the leadership of the Navy Recruiting Command feels very

strongly that these goals must be met and is endeavoring to meet them.

A third affirmative policy on the part of the Navy is its attempts

to enhance all recruiters' knowledge of the minority recruiting program

by including the problems of minority recruiting in the officer and enlisted

recruiter schools. Unfortunately, we found that the education of recruiters

in this regard was insufficient, both in terms of the knowledge of the

instructors performing the teaching and in the amount of time spent on the

subject. Indeed, we found that there was considerable complaint on the part
of the students in these schools that this was a subject which needed to
be stressed more in order to achieve success in the field.

In this regard, it should be noted that even though some of the
instructors were Minority Recruiting Officers, the fact remains that they
were not especially qualified to give instruction in this area. It may
well be that the Navy would want to develop a small cadre of outside
consultants to assist in this matter. It already does this in advertising;
hence there is precedent for the use of outsiders. We suggest that the
delicacy and significance of this area requires expertise that might
sometimes not be found within the Navy's own ranks.

We suggest also that a careful analysis of the curriculum, both for
enlisted and officer recruiting schools, will show that problems of
minorities can be integrated throughout the curriculum, rather than only
in special lectures devoted to that subject. Just as this report is in
fact an analysis of the total recruiting program, with particular reference
to minorities, so the Navy might construct its recruiting curriculum to
include within each subject the special problems of minorities as they pertain
to that subject.

A fourth affirmative policy has been the use of minority oriented
magazines, periodicals, and advertising agencies to assist the Navy
recruiting program. As long as limited results are expected of this approach,
but as it is considered a useful part of the total Navy minority recruiting
effort, this will continue to be sound.

At a number of local levels, Navy personnel have instituted programs
which seek to identify and give proper recognition to minorities and their

heritage. It might be wise to examine these programs in detail in order
to determine which ones might be used as part of a total Navy recruiting
program. At the same time, the encouragement of recruiting districts and
various Navy commands to experiment positively is commendable. In this
way, new ideas and new approaches can be tested at the least possible cost.

The Navy has experimented with several programs designed to take
nonschool eligible minorities and provide them with skilled training at
certain Navy schools in spite of their ineligibility under current rules.
These programs have been undertaken on a limited basis, but they do show
that consideration is being given to overcoming the concentration of minorities
in mental group IV and to providing a means by which they can grow and
progress in the Navy.

In this report we have reiterated our belief that the qualifying tests
of the Navy do not meet modern Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
standards. We are pleased to note that the Navy is conducting research
studies to determine the differential validities of selection and class-
ification tests when applied to minority candidates, and to determine proper
means of interpreting test scores, personnel files, and cumulative records
of minority applicants from varying demographic and economic environments.
We believe that these efforts are noteworthy and indicate the concern of
the Navy with the tests and its desire to move affirmatively to see that
qualification standards are fair and equal for all.

The Navy is also working with various other Defense Department officials and attempting to develop programs which reach the minority community. In addition, loca commands of the Navy have developed community relations programs which are worthy of note. For example, in Pensacola, Navy volunteers are working on the drug problem in an attempt to help addicted minority youth and to increase the credibility of the Navy in the minority community.

We found also a very good working relationship between the Navy and the Boy Scouts of America. Interviews held with personnel responsible for the effectiveness of the Domestic Action Program at navy Recruiting Command Headquarters indicated a potentially strong framework for participation by the Navy in community affairs. There is, however, a dire lack of funding which inhibits the effectiveness of the programs. The Navy is utilizing current funding as effectively as can be done. The statement on the role and function of the Department of Defense Domestic Action Program shows that the authority is available to implement successful community programs (see Figure 5). Serious efforts to obtain additional funding for these programs would be an ongoing effort of the Navy as a part of its affirmative action commitment.

Marine Corps

Because of its philosophy that "All Marines are Green," the Marine Corps has moved less energetically into the affirmative action field than has the Navy. It has established a billet for a minority officer in each recruiting district, but there is some question at this point whether the position will be continued. In addition, the Marine Corps has engaged in community

Figure 5. __Minority Recruiting Study__

__DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DOMESTIC ACTION PROGRAM (DAP)__

CONCEPT   -To utilize the extensive resources of DOD in cooperation with other governmental and private organizations in the national effort to overcome our nation's serious domestic problems and contribute to the constructive development of our society.

BACKGROUND   -A domestic action is defined as any activity designed to alleviate the social and economic problems of the nation.

-the DOD DAP is an aggregation of coordinated domestic action activities conducted by all DOD components to assist responsible local, state, and Federal agencies in alleviating the social and economic problems of the nation.

-DOD Directive 5030.37 of 22 April 1971 and OPNAV Instruction 5726.5A of 30 July 1970 provide guidelines for domestic action programs and broad implementing procedures for carrying out the Program.

DISCUSSION   -The DOD DAP encompasses the following general areas:

-__Equal Opportunity__. DOD DAP activities will conform with the Federal Equal Opportunity Program.

-__Manpower__. Volunteer services of DOD personnel in off-duty hours.

-__Procurement__. To encourage minority business enterprise through counseling and identifying procurement opportunities.

-__Resources__. The utilization of DOD physical resources for DAP on a reimbursable basis where feasible or whenever legally required.

-__Community Relations__. Active involvement of DOD personnel in contributing to a better society.

Figure 5 (continued)

	- <u>Transfer of Technical Knowledge</u>. To make unclassified technical advances available to interested government and private agencies.
<u>POLICY</u>	- It is the policy of the Department of the Navy to support domestic action programs to the maximum extent possible within the limits of available resources subject to the provision that support will not interfere with assigned military missions.
<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	- ASD(M&RA) [Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)] acts as chairman of the DOD Domestic Action Council (DAC) to advise SECDEF on domestic action activities and to coordinate DOD-wide support of DAP.
	- Membership on the DAC consists of designees of the Secretaries of Military Departments; Chairman of the JCS; ASD (Compt), (H&E), (I&L) and (PA); DDR&E; OSD(GC); and DSA. As of 16 October 1973, each service provides a Flag/General Officer member.
	- Navy is represented on the DAC by the ASN(M&RA) and the DCNO (Manpower).
	- OPNAV military service project officer is Op-09BC.
<u>COORDINATION</u>	- Between OPNAV and local or state agencies responsible for domestic action efforts, coordination is through the DAP officer on the District Commandant's staff.
	- In carrying out coordination, installation commanders are directed to advise local governmental executives of the DOD capabilities to support domestic action activities and to establish local Domestic Action Councils. The Councils will develop installation or unit programs in support of DOD DAP and act as a channel of communications between the installations and local, state or Federal agencies.
<u>PROGRAM SIZE</u>	- Although DAP includes support to adults as well as to youths, the following statistics are representative of the growth of the program:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Youths Supported (total DOD)</u>
1969	225,000
1970	775,000
1971	2,700,000
1972	2,900,000

Figure 5 (continued)

<u>FUNDING</u>	- No appropriate funds are programmed.
	- Domestic Action Projects will normally be undertaken within existing resources.
<u>COGNIZANCE</u>	- ASD(M&RA), ASN(M&RA)

Source: Navy Department document on file at Industrial Research Unit.

action efforts and in some interesting race relations programs. A special
tutoring effort has been undertaken at Camp Le Jeune, North Carolina, to
improve the reading skills of both blacks and whites. In addition, there
has been some civic action undertaken in an attempt to bring whites and
blacks together.

Our research indicates that the Marine Corps gives even less information
in its recruiting schools on race relations and minority programs than does
the Navy. We commend what has been done, but our comments relating to the
strengthening of the Navy program above apply even more strongly to the
Marine Corps curriculum.

The Marine Corps has also applied goals and timetables for minority
recruiting, but there is apparently considerable skepticism in the field
as to the meaning of these goals and timetables. We point out, again, that
these can only be helpful if they are meaningful and if the recruiters in
the field understand that they are to be met.

The Marine Corps will, of course, profit from some of the work being
done by the Navy, such as the reexamination of the total testing program,
participation in training, community activities, etc.

SUMMARY

In this chapter, we have pointed out that the Navy and the Marine
Corps do not have affirmative action programs as such, particularly as
the term is understood in industry. We emphasize that we do not think
the minority recruiting program of the Navy and Marine Corps can be
ameloriated substantially unless affirmative action programs are adopted.

We also note that aspects of such a program are already in effect.
Hence, the job of the Navy and the Marine Corps is to organize and
strengthen what it is doing rather than to institute something totally
new.

CHAPTER VI

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Navy and Marine Corps manpower procurement organizations operate
under several constraints some self-imposed, others a function of the
environment in which procurement is attempted. We have tried to describe
in earlier sections of this report exactly what these recruiting constraints
are and how they mitigate against successful recruiting. This chapter sets
forth the recommendations which we believe will aid in the fulfillment of
minority accession plans and goals.

It is realized that the Navy and Marine Corps are attempting to
implement some of the recommendations which will be made, so that in
several instances our ideas are efforts to suggest an expansion and
strengthening of certain policies already being carried out.

The remainder of the chapter describes the areas to which the recruiting
constraints pertain and suggest policy and practices which should be implemented.

NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

The Navy and Marine Corps should promulgate data and information to
all members of their recruiting organizations in order to clearly identify the
problems which exist in attaining adequate minority accessions. All
personnel involved in manpower procurement should be informed of the Navy
and Marine Corps' recognition of the minority recruiting problem and plans
to ameliorate the conditions which prohibit recruiting success. In this

way recruiting organization members will have a clearer view of their goals.

RECRUITING HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY, AND ORGANIZATION

Knowledge of the history of minority recruiting is also significant if recruiters are to understand attitudes of minority communities towards the Navy and Marine Corps. Utilization of materials which provide this background is vital in the training of recruiting personnel who will function in minority communities. Implementation of this recommendation would require an expansion of the existing limited training given new recruiters in this area. The history of minority participation in the Navy and Marine Corps can provide valuable insight into the perceptions of minority youths as to opportunities in the Navy and Marine Corps. Recruiting personnel would then be equipped to counter as best they can the negative images of service life established by past Navy and Marine Corps treatment of minorities.

The Navy and Marine Corps' recruiting philosophy makes recruiting a function of training. Private industry makes training a function of recruiting. A major conclusion of this study is that the Navy and the Marine Corps will be unable to deal effectively with their minority recruiting problem until they modify their philosophy of the recruiting-training relationship. If maximum benefit in the use of minority group personnel to pr   de a needed source of manpower is to be accomplished, active revaluation of the qualifications of these inner city youths for skilled training must be undertaken. The Navy and Marine Corps, if

serious about recruiting from the inner city minority community, must come
to a conclusion as to the direction to be taken in order to upgrade the
quality of that manpower market. An organization must establish standards
based on the characteristics of the environment in which it will operate.

Tests utilized by the Navy and Marine Corps are a serious problem
for minorities and should be reexamined in the light of Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission standards and of industry practice. The utilization
of tests to establish qualification standards, without consideration of
the differences in socioeconomic levels of particular labor market seg-
ments, can act as very prohibitive factors in many of these labor markets.
This recommendation is an adjunct to the recruiting/training suggestion in
that we recommend strong revaluation of testing criteria to determine what
adjustments can and should be made in the area of testing.

Recruiting organization in the Navy and Marine Corps does not give
the line (as defined in industry) a direct interest in meeting minority
goals. If such interest could be assured, greater success might be
achieved. This recommendation means that the Navy and Marine Corps must
also consider, as mentioned earlier, whether there is communication to the
line of the fact that a minority recruiting problem does exist and of the
Navy and Marine Corps' intention to correct it.

RECRUITING CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES

Recruiters

There should be personnel operating within the fleet and within
the various divisions of the Marine Corps who will act to screen persons

who desire recruiting duty. The screeners should be persons who have had

successful and lengthy recruiting experience. These persons should be

able to express adequately to interested persons the job requirements,

problems, and rewards of recruiting duty, as well as be able to make a

primary determination as to the potential for success of the screened

individuals. These personnel should be directly responsible to the

recruiting organizations of the Navy or Marine Corps in order to enable

these organizations to make the determination as to the people who will

be selected for recruiting.

Recruiter training should place more emphasis on training the

recruiter to analyze the market in which he will recruit. He should be

given the tools to accomplish community penetration and assimilation. In

conjunction with these objectives, the processing of required paperwork

should be relegated to individuals who are solely responsible for that task.

Perhaps civilians could fulfill that responsibility in recruiting offices

to avoid utilizing military manpower needed elsewhere. Recruiters should

be retrained at specified intervals to provide the recruiter with updated

instructions. This retraining will also enable the recruiter to appreciate

the relevance of training as an aid to his work.

Recruiting Facilities

Within a particular area, especially a large metropolitan area with

high minority concentrations, headquarters for recruiting activities should

be centralized as opposed to having many small one-, two-, and three-man

offices. At the centralized location, administrative details, such as

paperwork processing, record checking, and other related matters, would be handled by personnel specifically designated with that responsibility. Utilizing mobile vans, the recruiters would not only have more time to concentrate on recruiting, but would be able to penetrate different areas more easily.

Greater utilization of vans would also eliminate the negative physical appearance of certain facilities now in use, some of which reflect adversely on the services.

Support Organizations and Tools

Currently, congressional budgets for defense spending are not approved until well after the fiscal year has begun. This tends to hamper the responses of the recruiting services of the Marine Corps and Navy to changing manpower market demands because recruiters are constrained by a lack of knowledge as to whether funding will be available to carry out their programs or not. The period of indecision over spending occurs in June, July, and August, when the services should definitely have resources available to take advantage of their peak recruiting periods. Congress must be made aware of this situation and take steps to abate it. Earliest approval possible should be sought so that the Navy and Marine Corps will know what funds are available and can therefore determine where best to utilize these resources for manpower procurement. In addition, members of Congress must be made to realize the conditions under which current recruiting takes place: specifically, the direct competition with private enterprise for the same manpower. Much attention should be focused on the constraints under which military recruiting must operate today.

Advertising

Navy and Marine Corps advertising has always tended to take the form of a broad appeal to all segments of the country. We believe more localization of advertising should be accomplished. Peer group influence within the minority community is great. More attempts should be made to utilize the experiences of young men from a particular community to illustrate to others in that community the value and profitability of employment with the Corps or Navy.

There should be less advertising and more public relations. The Navy and Corps should seek to utilize organizations like the Urban League, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and others, to gain entrance to minority communities. Organizations like these can help to enhance the credibility of the Marine Corps and Navy among minority group members.

Restrictions against paid advertising over television and radio should be removed. Congress must realize the Marine Corps and Navy are competing directly with private enterprise and need to utilize every available source of publicity.

Professionalism

The Navy and Marine Corps must give considerable thought to the professionalism of persons assigned to perform their manpower procurement functions. The services can no longer pretend to be a "club" to which many crave to belong. They must see themselves as employers competing in a tight labor market for the available manpower and realize that their competition raises its potential in the labor market by utilizing professional personnel procurement specialists.

The Navy and Marine Corps contend that assigning personnel to permanent recruiting duty would hamper effective strength. We believe that strength will be hampered anyway if the personnel manning recruiting offices cannot procure manpower because of their inadequate training and lack of experience in the area.

Establishment of programs to recruit persons who have personnel experience, or who have concentrated in this area in graduate or strong undergraduate programs, would be a long-term manner by which to fill the manpower procurement billets with permanent personnel specialists. Just as the Corps and Navy seek out and utilize persons with law backgrounds to fill their needs for lawyers, they could initiate a similar undertaking for personnel specialists, including especially those experienced in, or capable of, minority recruiting.

LABOR MARKET FACTORS

Education and Standards

The Navy and Marine Corps should continue to strive to encourage entrance to ROTC programs and to seek minorities affirmatively to enroll in these programs, at both predominantly black and at more prestigious institutions.

The policies of raising standards by reducing mental group IV category recruits should be reconsidered in terms of whether such testing categorization does in fact make a person unfit for promotion, upgrading, and/or training, especially in light of industry experience that this is not necessarily so.

Image and Sociological Factors

Our findings indicate that much more emphasis should be put into creating an environment conducive to successful Navy or Marine Corps recruiting within the minority community. This can be done by utilizing domestic action programs in order to overcome some of the problems, like drugs and educational deficiencies, which tend to prevent the Corps and Navy from recruiting successfully in minority communities. The Navy is attempting, through its Domestic Action Coordinator. to join with civilian groups, such as the Boy Scouts and Big Brother, to aid in the continued viability of these groups while, at the same time, keeping the Navy on the minds of youngsters as a source of future employment. Such programs should be expanded.

The Navy and Corps must aid manpower markets in which they recruit to meet their standards as well as to assist in removing social, educational, and psychological barriers in these communities. These two services have the basic framework established to carry out this task at present, but the big problem is funding. The Marine Corps and Navy require much more funding for their domestic action programs. If the Navy and Corps are to accomplish penetration of minority manpower markets, they will require much greater resources in order to make a contribution to manpower procurement and to society. As one Navy man working in the Domestic Action Program put it, "Our work with youth in the community can build a reserve base for Navy manpower for the future."

These domestic action programs should include coordination with local recruiters so that the recruiters will have a better conception of what these programs are doing in the community. It will take, it appears, much more lobbying to obtain funding and adequate staffing for these programs to begin to contribute to successful manpower procurement. Expansion of these programs is essential to making the Navy and Corps more than just visitors to minority communities and to offset their current negative image there.

THE NEED FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

The Navy and Marine Corps should clearly identify the difference between affirmative action and equal opportunity. It should be realized that affirmative action must be undertaken if minority recruitment goals and plans are to be met. Many of the areas which involve implementation of affirmative action have been discussed earlier in this chapter. Affirmative action must involve an active attempt to qualify minority persons for service in the Navy and Marine Corps as well as active efforts to remove the negative image found in many minority communities. Our recommendations in the affirmative action area are made with the clear recognition that such efforts will involve monetary costs. We believe, however, that the long-range benefits to be obtained from attempts to utilize the abilities of a very large manpower pool will far outweigh the present monetary costs.

An examination of affirmative action policies and programs of private industry should be undertaken to see if there is any chance of adapting

these programs to the military environment. The many positive programs
of the Navy and Marine Corps already in effect should be expanded to
enhance affirmative action efforts.

APPENDIX A

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Appendix B

Questionnaires Utilized in Interviewing

Navy
Area Minority Affairs Officer Interview

Comments: The MAO acts as advisor to the CO concerning the recruiting of
minority racial/ethnic group personnel and coordinates the minority
enlisted and officer recruiting effort. As such, he coordinates
the efforts of the MRO's at the various Districts and maintains
liaison with local community groups.

Allotted time: 1 hour

1. Do you feel that the Navy has a minority procurement problem?
   a. How would you describe this problem?
   b. What can be done to resolve this problem?

2. How do you perceive your job in relation to
   a. the Area Commanding Officer?
   b. the Code 015 (Cdr. Richardson)?
   c. the District MRO's?
   d. formulation of plans and policies for minority procurement?

3. How did you become an MAO?
   a. Were you, in your opinion, qualified to be an MAO when you came
      here? Why or why not?

4. Do you feel that this area has a mission, either stated or implied, for
   minority recruiting?

5. Do you perform any actual recruiting yourself?
   a. If so, did you have any experience in recruiting prior to coming
      here? (Explore the training he received--was it adequate?)

6. Do you feel that you receive adequate time to plan your activities and
   adjust your actions according to any directives you receive? Explain.

7. How did the "floors" placed on minority recruiting budgets (FY 73) work?
   a. How were you able to separate a dollar spent for minority
      recruiting vs. one spent for majority recruiting?

8. How do you utilize persons from the MINORITY FEEDBACK PROGRAM?
   a. How helpful has this program been?

9. Would you be better able to utilize funds for minority recruiting if they were made available in a different manner?
    a. How would you use them?

10. Are there any questions which I did not ask which you feel I should have asked?

11. Do you have any suggestions for our study?

ONR MINORITY RECRUITING STUDY
Industrial Research Unit
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania

Navy
District Officer Programs Officer (OPO) Interview

Comments: The OPO is responsible to the Head Recruiting Officer for
           accomplishing the officer procurement mi sion assigned to the
           command. To this end, with respect to minorities, he works
           closely with the MRO to obtain the best qualified minority
           males from civilian sources.

Allotted time: 1 hour

1. Do you feel the Navy has a minority procurement problem?
        a. How would you describe this problem?
        b. What can be done to resolve this problem?

2. How do you perceive your job in relation to
        a. the MRO?
        b. the Recruiters?
        c. Minorities?

3. Do you feel that you were adequately prepared to perform your mission
    when you came here? Explain.
        a. Did you receive any training specifically directed at minority
            recruiting while at ROMO?

4. How much contact do you have with the Recruiters at the branch stations?
        a. Is this contact formal or informal?
        b. How do you keep the recruiters informed of changes in officer
            programs, etc.?

5. How do quotas affect you?
        a. What has been the impact of the consolidation of reserve and
            regular Navy recruiting as it relates to minorities?

6. How do you make your initial contacts?
        a. How do you follow these up?

7. Do you actively seek minority applicants specifically?
        a. What, in your opinion, is the best way to sell the Navy to a
            minority?
        b. Is this any different than the way in which you sell to a majority
            applicant?

8. Do you feel that you receive adequate time to plan your activities and adjust your actions according to any directives you receive? Explain.

9. What kinds of support do you receive from Recruiting Aids?
    a. Do you feel it is adequate?

10. Are there any questions which I did not ask which you feel should have been asked?

11. Do you have any suggestions for our study?

ONR MINORITY RECRUITING STUDY
Industrial Research Unit
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania

Navy
District Enlisted Programs Officer (EPO) and/or the Chief Recruiter Interview

Comments: The EPO is responsible to the Head Recruiting Officer for
accomplishing the enlisted procurement missions assigned to the
command. As such, he works closely with the recruiters who
are ultimately responsible for him.
The Chief Recruiter is the principal assistant to the EPO.

Allotted Time: 1 hour 30 minutes

1. Do you feel the Navy has a minority procurement problem?
   a. How would you describe this problem?
   b. What can be done to resolve this problem?

2. How do you perceive your job in relation to
   a. Code 33 at the NRC? (Code 33 is the Enlisted Programs section
      of operations.)
   b. the MRO?
   c. the Recruiters?
   d. Minorities?

3. Do you feel you were adequately prepared to perform your mission when
   you came here? Explain.
   a. Did you receive any training specifically directed at minority
      recruiting while at ROMO (for the EPO)/ENRO (for the Chief
      Recruiter)?

4. What are your feelings about RACS? (The Recruit Allocation Control
   System)
   a. Could this system be biased, either for or against minorities?
      Explain.

5. How do quotas affect you?
   a. What has been the impact of the consolidation of reserve and
      regular Navy recruiting on minority procurement?
   b. Do you have any mission, either stated or implied, for minority
      procurement specifically?

6. What directions concerning minorities do you give recruiters in the
   field?
   a. How are these given?

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7. How many recruiters have been sent or will be sent to the Advanced
    ENRO classes?
    a. How have they/will they be chosen?

8. Do you feel that you receive adequate time to plan your activities and
    adjust your actions accordir. t any directives you receive? Explain.

9. What kinds of support do you receive from Recruiting Aids?
    a. Is it adequate?
    b. Do you have any part in directing minority advertising?

10. How have minority accessions been affected by the higher quality
    standards being imposed?

11. Have you ever had to tell your recruiters to de-motivate? Why?

12. Are there any questions which I did not ask which you feel I should
    have?

13. Do you have any suggestions for our study?

ONR MINORITY RECRUITING STUDY
Industrial Research Unit
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania

Navy
District Recruiting Aids Supervisor Interview

Comments: He is responsible for assisting the Head Recruiting Officer in
coordinating the command public affairs programs. Also, he
procures recruiting aids and distributes them to branch stations.

Allotted time: 1 hour 15 minutes

1. Do you feel the Navy has a minority procurement problem?
   a. How would you describe this problem?
   b. What can be done to resolve this problem?

2. How do you perceive your job in relation to
   a. the EPO?
   b. the OPO?
   c. the MRO?
   d. the Recruiters?
   e. Minorities?

3. Do you have any mission directed at minorities?
   a. Do you receive any direction on the best ways to reach the
      minority community? From whom?

4. How do you secure pamphlets for the branch stations?
   a. Do you have any trouble in obtaining them? Explain.

5. How often do you have direct contact with the recruiters?
   a. Who usually initiates it?
   b. Do you consult them or seek their advice on possible changes
      in Recruiting Aids?

6. Do you feel that you receive adequate time to plan your activities and
   adjust your actions according to any directives you receive? Explain.

7. What is your opinion of the job which
   a. the comm 40 is doing?
   b. the Grey advertising agency is doing?
   c. Vanguard is doing?

8. Are there any questions which I did not ask which you feel I should have
   asked?

9. Do you have any suggestions for our study?

ONR MINORITY RECRUITING STUDY
Industrial Research Unit
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania

Navy
District CO and/or XO Interview

Comments: The CO is responsible for all recruiting efforts within his
District and has direct authority over the MRO.

Allotted time: 1 hour

1. Do you feel that the Navy has a minority procurement problem?
    a. How would you describe this problem?
    b. What can be done to resolve this problem?

2. How do you perceive your job in relation to
    a. the District MRO?
    b. the District EPO?
    c. the District OPO?
    d. Minorities

3. What input does this office have in obtaining recruiters through the
    NRC?
    a. Do you see them prior to their being assigned to your district?

4. Do you receive any goals for minorities from the area?
    a. Are any goals for minorities initiated at this level?

5. Do you feel the recruiters in your District have the proper background to
    do a good job? Explain.

6. Do you feel that you receive adequate time to plan policies and procedures
    in response to directives from above?

7. Who handles and administers the budget?
    a. Do you feel they are qualified?
    b. How are your budget requests formulated?
    c. Is there any part of the budget laid aside for minorities?

8. Do you have any incentive programs for recruiters who reach their goals?

9. How do you decide on locations for branch stations?

10. Are there any questions which I did not ask which you feel I should
    have asked?

11. Do you have any suggestions for our study?

Navy
Recruiters Interview

Comments: The recruiters are the main, and in some cases, only contact a
potential enlistee will have with the Navy, prior to swearing
in. Obviously, he is the key to the recruiting system.

Allotted time: 1 hour 30 minutes

1. Do you feel that the Navy has a minority procurement problem?
   a. How would you describe this problem?
   b. What can be done to resolve this problem?

2. How do you perceive your job in relation to
   a. the OPO?
   b. the Zone Supervisor and/or Recruiter-in-Charge?
   c. the MRO?
   d. Minorities?

3. Were you, in your opinion, qualified to perform your mission when you
   arrived here?
   a. Did you receive any training on minority procurement while
      at ENRO?
   b. If yes, please describe it.

4. Do you receive adequate time to plan your activities?
   a. Does anyone aid you in your decisions about how you will or
      won't recruit?

5. Have you ever been asked to de-motivate? Why?

6. How do quotas affect the ways in which you do your job?
   a. How do they affect your attitude toward the job?
   b. Do you feel they are absolutely necessary for you? For all
      recruiters?

7. How do you "sell" the Navy to a potential enlistee?
   a. Is your approach different for minorities than it is for
      majorities? How?

8. What are your feelings about RACS? (Recruit Allocation Control System)
   a. Could it be biased, either for or against minorities?

9. What has been the impact of the consolidation of reserve and regular Navy recruiting as it relates to minorities?

10. Do you ever "tutor" an applicant prior to administering the SBTB? How?
    a. Do you feel it is effective?
    b. In what ways?
    c. To whom?

11. What kinds of support do you receive from Recruiting Aids?
    a. Is it adequate? Explain.
    b. Do you have any input as to what types of advertising will be used and where?

12. What are your feelings on the coupon contact system?

13. Are you involved in any community activities?
    a. Has this aided you in your job? How?

14. How much time per day do you spend
    a. _____% recruiting
    b. _____% paperwork for recruits
    c. _____% paperwork for the Navy (i.e., reports, etc.)
    d. _____% following-up coupons
    e. _____% community relations
    f. _____% market planning and preparation

15. Age _____
    Length of service _____
    Time in recruiter slot _____
    Background _____

16. Are there any questions which I did not ask which you feel should have been asked?

17. Do you have any suggestions for our study?

Marine Corps
District Assistant Director, Personnel Procurement and Recruiting Station
Commander Interview

Comments: This officer is charged with the responsibility for coordination
of all recruiting efforts within the District (RS) and controls,
to a great degree, the emphasis placed on a particular recruiting
program at any one time. This interview attempts to ascertain
the emphasis which the ADPP feels should be placed on the effort
to recruit minorities.

Allotted time: 45 minutes

1. Does minority recruiting effort refer only to quotas and goals, or is
there a planned program of directives and policies pertaining to this
area of recruitment?

2. What agency promulgates policy to minority recruitment and how much
control do you have in establishing this policy?

3. What major factors do you see as contributing to the inability of many
minority group persons to meet entrance requirements for Marine Corps
Officer and enlisted service?

4. Discuss the adequacy of training received by recruiters and suggest
improvement needed.

5. Describe the considerations that go into the assignment of a recruiter
to a particular station.

6. Discuss the major functions of the District (RS) Officer Selection
Officer.

7. Discuss the conversion to a system of consolidated procurement and its
effect on implementation of minority recruiting goals in reserve
recruitment.

8. Who formulates budget plans for the District (RS) and is any consideration
directed specifically to minority recruitment efforts?

9. What criteria does the District (RS) use for the assignment of recruiting stations to an area?

10. Are there any thoughts or suggestions not raised by these questions that you would like to make?

Marine Corps
District Enlisted Procurement Officer Interview

Comments: This officer is responsible for coordination and supervision of
recruiting for enlisted personnel within the District. This
interview attempts to ascertain this officer's perception of the
minority recruiting efforts and problems.

Allotted time: 45 minutes

1. Describe your perception of the enlisted minority recruiting situation
in the Marine Corps generally, and this District specifically, as it
relates to problems, if any, associated with minority accessions.

2. Discuss any plans or policies directed by Headquarters Marine Corps
or initiated by the District and aimed especially at minority recruitment
and analyze their adequacy.

3. Do you perceive minority recruiting as a separate recruiting function
and is it, in your view, supported adequately by Headquarters Marine Corps?

4. Discuss your views as to assignment of recruiters based on race or
ethnic background in order to create an immediate relationship base
between recruiter and recruit.

5. What major factors act to hinder the entrance of more minorities into
hard-skill areas within the Corps?

6. What effect does the assignment of quotas for minority accessions have
on recruitment techniques?

7. What is your opinion as to the tightening of Marine Corps entrance
standards particularly as it affects minority accessions?

8. How has conversion to an All-Volunteer Force affected enlisted procurement
generally and minority procurement specifically?

9. Under the consolidated procurement system what have your observations
been as to minority participation in the Marine Corps Reserves?

10. Do you have any other suggestions or comments not brought out by this
questioning?

Marine Corps
District Officer Selection Officer Interview

Comments: This officer is charged with the coordination and supervision of officer recruitment within the District. He should provide information as to minority officer recruitment policy and perception of its associated problems.

Allotted time: 1 hour

1. What are the factors which make minority recruitment a problem?

2. Discuss the origin of minority recruitment goals and the methods in which they are communicated to the District describing their adequacy.

3. Discuss the organization of the minority officer recruiting structure at Headquarters Marine Corps and analyze its effectiveness and sincerity.

4. Are Officer Selection Officers adequately trained to perform their function and are they chosen from officers having backgrounds which favor recruiting success?

5. Discuss the Marine Corps advertising and public relations aspect of minority recruitment giving your view as to its success and changes needed in it.

6. Are efforts to penetrate minority communities and colleges backed and funded at District level adequately?

7. What function do you see your office as having in relationship to minority recruitment?

8. Do you believe the District adequately perceives and backs the minority recruiting effort?

9. What other suggestions or recommendations do you have concerning minority officer recruiting?

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Marine Corps
Recruiting Area Supervisor and Recruiter Interview

Comments: This noncommissioned officer supervises from two to three
recruiting substations. By selecting a supervisor who operates
within a predominately minority group community, we should get
some views as to problems faced in this area. The recruiter
only works out of one station, but can give us the most personal
exposure to recruiter problems.

Allotted time: 1 hour

1. Do you believe the Corps has a minority recruiting effort rather than
just a numbers goal? Describe this effort in terms of planned programs,
if any.

2. Discuss your recruiter training and recommend areas you think need
improving.

3. Which factors act most to restrict minority youths from successfully
qualifying for enlistment?

4. Discuss the availability of funding for community relation projects
you may wish to undertake and the effectiveness of Corps advertising in
your area generally.

5. Given the increased "quality" standards imposed by the Corps and the
All-Volunteer Force concept, how have you maintained accessions at
adequate levels?

6. Is it your belief that a recruiter should "sell the Corps" to a potential
enlistee or seek out and "sell" the recruit what he wants out of the
Corps?

7. Do you feel recruiters should be selected from any particular kinds of
military billets to assure better performance as a recruiter?

8. What percentage of your daily activities is spent in each of the
following areas: (not applicable to Supervisor)
    a. completing paperwork
    b. office discussions with potential enlistees
    c. outside office recruiting activities
    d. other military duties

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9. Discuss the feasibility of assigning recruiters based on race or ethnic group and indicate its recruiting effectiveness.

10. What recommendations do you have for improving the minority accession efforts particularly as they relate to getting more minorities into hard-skill areas?

Private Enterprise Interview

Comments: As stated in our research contract, the purpose of conducting
interviews with private enterprise are to (1) learn about minority
recruiting practices of relevant companies and (2) to identify
essential features of these recruiting practices in order to
ascertain their potential to aid the Navy and the Marine Corps
in improving their minority recruiting systems. The focus of
these interviews will be on the affirmative action employment
recruiting, selection, placement and training practices.

Allotted time: 2 hours 30 minutes to 3 hours

1. What are the elements you consider essential for making affirmative
    action work within the company?
    a. How does this relate to recruiting?

1a. Please identify and describe those special recruiting techniques and
     approaches your company has instituted to obtain more minority employees
     (both for management and non-management type jobs).
     a. How much advertising (broadcast and printed media) does your
         company engage in to attract minority job applicants? (Attempt
         to obtain a dollar figure per applicant.)
     b. To support your minority recruiting effort, does your company
         engage in any special efforts to develop a specific image or
         create credibility in the minority community? (If yes, please
         describe.)
     c. How many employment offices does your company have in this
         community; where are they located; and what is the size of
         each office staff?

2. To increase minority employment representation within your company,
    has your company found it necessary to alter or change any of its
    employee selection practices or procedures? (If yes, please explain.)
    a. Has your company had to change its pre-employment tests,
        testing procedures, or test qualification scores?
    b. What is the relative significance of pre-employment tests to
        other criteria used in the selection process? (Do you weigh
        test scores as heavily for minorities as for majority applicants?)

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    c. Defining productivity as output per man hour worked, has your
        company found that changes in selection standards have had a
        negative impact on productivity?

    d. Does your company use any special programs to assist minorities
        in qualifying for employment?

3. To achieve greater minority representation in each job classification,
    has your company instituted any special initial employment placement
    procedures for minorities? (If yes, please describe.)

    a. Has it been difficult to find qualified minority applicants
        for certain jobs? (If yes, please identify these jobs.)

    b. For difficult to fill jobs, has your company had to change
        its qualification standards?

    c. Are tests used in making initial employment placement
        decisions? (If yes, has it been necessary to modify
        cutting scores in order to qualify minorities?)

4. Does your company have jobs that require the satisfactory completion of
    a formal company training program as a condition for entry into that job?

    (If yes to the above, ask the following questions.)

    a. Are any of these jobs entry-level positions?

    b. Are tests used as a means of qualifying persons for these
        positions, and are other criteria used in the selection
        decision? (What is the relative significance of test scores
        as to the other criteria?)

    c. If tests are used, are these tests intended to measure a
        person's potential to satisfactorily complete the training
        program or perform satisfactorily on the job?

    d. In order to gain greater minority representation in jobs
        requiring formal training programs, has your company had
        to make any changes in its training programs? (If yes,
        please describe these changes and the reasons for making them.)

    e. Defining productivity as output per man hour worked, have
        changes in your training programs, for the purpose of gaining
        greater minority representation, had any effect on productivity?

5. (After briefly explaining the general approach of the Navy and Marine
    Corps recruiting effort and minority recruiting effort, ask the
    following question.) In light of your experience with affirmative
    action procurement efforts, do you have any recommendations as to how
    the Navy and Marine Corps might improve their minority procurement system.

Note: Request a copy of the company's affirmative action plan that is on
       file with OFCC.

ONR MINORITY RECRUITING STUDY
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Community/Education Research
Educational Guidance Counselor and College Placement Officer Interview

Comments: The purpose of this effort is to meet with Educational Guidance
            Counselors and College Placement Officials in order to (1)
            assess the attitudes of Guidance Counselors and Placement Officials
            towards the military as a viable career for young adults; (2)
            identify those influential organizations and persons which may
            provide the Navy and Marine Corps a more effective channel for
            communication with the educational community; and (3) assess the
            attitudes of the high school and college age minority youth
            towards the military--esp. the Navy and Marine Corps.

Allotted time: 1 hour 30 minutes

1. Would you briefly describe the function of this office?

2. What youth market do you impact on or interact with? (Enlisted or Officer)
        a. Age range   b. Race

3. In regard to employment opportunities and future careers, are you giving
    the military the same break as private enterprise? Explain.

4. In your opinion, what changes would have to occur because the military
    is on the same par with private enterprise? (pertaining to career
    opportunities)

5. How much influence does this organization have on the youth population
    in the educational community? (both high school age and college age)

6. What organization or person inside the (educational) community has the
    greatest influence on the
        a. High school age youth?
        b. College age youth or college student?

7. What is the general attitude of the minority community towards the military?
    (especially Navy and Marine Corps)

8. What are the attitudes of the high school age minority youth towards
    the military? (especially the Navy and Marine Corps)
        a. The attitudes of the college age or college student towards the
            military?

9. What effect does racial strife in the services have on the military image in the educational community?

10. Have you had any contact with the local Navy or Marine Corps recruiter? PROBE for reaction.

11. In your opinion, where are the best minority recruiting markets located? (Black, Mexican-American, and Indian)

12. How can the military penetrate the minority market? (e.g. personal contact, advertisement, etc.)

13. With the elimination of the draft and introduction of the All-Volunteer Force concept, what are some of the changes as well as problems do you foresee with respect to minority recruiting?

14. Do you have any recommendations or comments on how the current recruiting system could be improved? PROBE for reaction with respect to:

Mental Group Classification	Testing
Advertising Approach	Training of Recruiters
Minority Public Relations	Minority Recruiter Assignments
Personnel Assignments	Decrease in MGIV Quota

15. Are there any questions which were not asked which you feel should have been asked?

16. Would you be willing to assist and advise the Navy and Marine Corps on how they could improve their current recruiting system?

APPENDIX C

Industrial Research Unit
Publications

RACIAL POLICIES OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY SERIES

1. The Negro in the Automobile Industry,
        by Herbert R. Northrup.   1968. $2.50

2. The Negro in the Aerospace Industry,
        by Herbert R. Northrup.   1968. $2.50

3. The Negro in the Steel Industry, by Richard L. Rowan.   1968. $3.50

4. The Negro in the Hotel Industry, by Edward C. Koziara
        and Karen S. Koziara.   1968. $2.50

5. The Negro in the Petroleum Industry, by Carl B. King
        and Howard W. Risher, Jr.   1969. $3.50

6. The Negro in the Rubber Tire Industry, by Herbert R.
        Northrup and Alan B. Batchelder.   1969. $3.50

7. The Negro in the Chemical Industry,
        by William Howard Quay, Jr.   1969. $3.50

8. The Negro in the Paper Industry, by Herbert R. Northrup. 1969. $8.50

9. The Negro in the Banking Industry,
        by Armand J. Thieblot, Jr.   1970. $5.95

10. The Negro in the Public Utility Industries,
        by Bernard E. Anderson.   1970. $5.95

11. The Negro in the Insurance Industry, by Linda P. Fletcher. 1970. $5.95

12. The Negro in the Meat Industry, by Walter A. Fogel.   1970. $4.50

13. The Negro in the Tobacco Industry,
        by Herbert R. Northrup.   1970. $4.50

14. The Negro in the Bituminous Coal Mining Industry,
        by Darold T. Barnum.   1970. $4.50

15. The Negro in the Trucking Industry, by Richard D. Leone. 1970. $4.50

16. The Negro in the Railroad Industry,
        by Howard W. Risher, Jr.   1971. $5.95

17. The Negro in the Shipbuilding Industry, by Lester Rubin. 1970. $5.95

18. The Negro in the Urban Transit Industry,
          by Philip W. Jeffress.   1970. $4.50

19. The Negro in the Lumber Industry, by John C. Howard.   1970. $4.50

20. The Negro in the Textile Industry, by Richard L. Rowan. 1970. $5.95

21. The Negro in the Drug Manufacturing Industry,
          by F. Marion Fletcher.   1970. $5.95

22. The Negro in the Department Store Industry,
          by Charles R. Perry.   1971. $5.95

23. The Negro in the Air Transport Industry,
          by Herbert R. Northrup and others.   1971. $5.95

24. The Negro in the Drugstore Industry, by F.Marion Fletcher. 1971. $5.95

25. The Negro in the Supermarket Industry,
          by Gordon F. Bloom and F. Marion Fletcher.   1972. $5.95

26. The Negro in the Farm Equipment and Construction
          Machinery Industry, by Robert Ozanne.   1972. $5.95

27. The Negro in the Electrical Manufacturing Industry,
          by Theodore V. Purcell and Daniel P. Mulvey.   1971. $5.95

28. The Negro in the Furniture Industry, by William E. Fulmer. 1973. $5.95

29. The Negro in the Longshore Industry, by Lester Rubin
          and William S. Swift.   1974. $5.95

30. The Negro in the Offshore Maritime Industry,
          by William S. Swift.   1974. $5.95

31. The Negro in the Apparel Industry, by Elaine Gale Wrong. 1974. $5.95

STUDIES OF NEGRO EMPLOYMENT

Vol. I. Negro Employment in Basic Industry: A Study of Racial Policies in Six Industries (Automobile, Aerospace, Steel, Rubber Tires, Petroleum, and Chemicals), by Herbert R. Northrup, Richard L. Rowan et al.   1970. $15.00

Vol. II. Negro Employment in Finance: A Study of Racial Policies in Banking and Insurance, by Armand J. Thieblot, Jr., and Linda Pickthorne Fletcher.   1970. $9.50

Vol. III. Negro Employment in Public Utilities: A Study of Racial Policies in the Electric Power, Gas, and Telephone Industries, by Bernard E. Anderson.   1970. $8.50

Vol. IV. Negro Employment in Southern Industry: A Study of Racial Policies in the Paper, Lumber, Tobacco, Coal Mining, and Textile Industries, by Herbert R. Northrup, Richard L. Rowan, and others.   1971. $13.50

Vol. V. Negro Employment in Land and Air Transport: A Study of Racial Policies in the Railroad, Airlines, Trucking, and Urban Transit Industries, by Herbert R. Northrup, Howard W. Risher, Jr., Richard D. Leone, and Philip W. Jeffress. 1971. $13.50

Vol. VI. Negro Employment in Retail Trade: A Study of Racial Policies in the Department Store, Drugstore, and Supermarket Industries, by Gordon F. Bloom, F. Marion Fletcher, and Charles R. Perry.   1972. $12.00

Vol. VII. Negro Employment in the Maritime Industries: A Study of Racial Policies in the Shipbuilding, Longshore, and Offshore Maritime Industries, by Lester Rubin and William A. Swift. 1974. $12.00

MANPOWER AND HUMAN RESOURCES STUDIES

4. The Impact of Government Manpower Programs, by Charles R. Perry, Bernard E. Anderson, Richard L. Rowan, and Herbert R. Northrup.   1974. $18.50

3. Manpower in Homebuilding: A Preliminary Analysis, by Howard G. Foster.   1974. $6.95

2. Educating the Employed Disadvantaged for Upgrading, by Richard L. Rowan and Herbert R. Northrup.   1972. $5.95

1. The Reluctant Job Changer, by Gladys L. Palmer et al.   1962. $7.50

INDUSTRY STUDIES

Market Restraints in the Retail Drug Industry, by F. Marion Fletcher.
        Major Study No. 43.   1967. $10.00

The Carpet Industry: Present Status and Future Prospects, by Robert W.
        Kirk. Miscellaneous Report Series No. 17.   1970. $5.95

The Economics of Carpeting and Resilient Flooring: An Evaluation and
        Comparison, by George M. Parks. Major Study No. 41.
                                                              1966. $2.95