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PERCEPTIONS OF DISCRIMINATION  
IN NON-JUDICIAL PUNISHMENT

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Navy Personnel Research and Development  
Center  
San Diego, California

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## 20. ABSTRACT (continued)

A biracial pair of Chief Personnelmen boarded over 70 ships on both coasts to record disciplinary data and administer the Attitude Evaluation Form (AEF) to 324 sets of personnel. A set consisted of a black and a white offender and a biracial pair of nonoffenders, all in their first enlistment and in the same division.

Blacks committed somewhat more confrontation offenses while whites committed more military/civilian crimes. No differences were found in punishments awarded offenders, although executive officers dismissed more of the black offenders.

The perceptions of blacks and whites differed significantly on all items in the AEF concerning equality of treatment in the Navy and on more than half of the job satisfaction and supervisor supportiveness items. Few response differences were found between offenders and nonoffenders and east and west coast personnel. Item intercorrelations indicated that the interest in the man displayed by the supervisor was significantly related to low perceptions of discrimination and to high job satisfaction. The analysis of the written comments revealed that the majority of blacks believed military justice favors whites. Many whites shared this belief.

Although this study did not reveal differences in disciplining blacks and whites, equality of treatment in non-judicial punishment has not been established. The written comments indicated discriminatory practices may be occurring prior to filing a report of an offense.

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
PERCEPTIONS OF DISCRIMINATION  
IN NON-JUDICIAL PUNISHMENT

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## FOREWORD

The project described in this report is in support of exploratory development work unit, PF55.521.005.01.10, Minority Group Research. The work was initiated in response to joint Chief of Naval Operations (OP-01) and Bureau of Naval Personnel management objectives relating to analysis of non-judicial punishment data for indications of racially discriminatory practices.

It has been our fortune to work with two exceptional Navy Chief Petty Officers throughout this study. They were asked to venture into the sensitive area of race relations aboard operating ships and devise the rules of data gathering as they progressed. Their visits were often looked upon with anxiety throughout the chain of command. Their experiences traveling together, a black man and a white man, sometimes were unpleasant; not because of lack of camaraderie, but because of those in our nation who still can't accept such friendship. Not only did they handle interpersonal problems with dispatch, but also managed to do an excellent job of data collection with very limited supervision. Indeed, they anticipated several research needs not outlined in the original plans and played a significant part in developing the design of this research. To PNCS Norman L. Thomas and PNC Darwin W. Enloe, we extend a grateful "WELL DONE".

As a matter of interest some opinions reflected by the study team were that the ships evidencing the least number of apparent problems of a possibly racial overtone were generally those wherein the chain of command concept was effectively adhered to and wherein supplemental communications techniques for continuous two-way information flow were emphasized and practiced. The ship evidencing the worst breakdown in disciplinary control practiced a policy where all report chits went directly to the executive officer for processing thus bypassing intermediary supervisors. Certain procedures such as the following -- although not validated by factual data -- might thus be considered for possible use or continued use, by unit commanding officers: (1) Communication channels be promoted to ensure effective two-way flow of factual information; (2) Information concerning the offenses committed and punishments awarded at Captain's Mast be widely disseminated among the crew; (3) Commanding officers continuously assess the extent of potentially racially discriminatory acts within their commands and take corrective action in a timely manner; (4) Supervisory personnel be quickly made aware of the effect of any negative actions or attitudes noted or reported which could degrade morale.

F. L. Nelson  
Commanding Officer

## SUMMARY

### Background and Purpose

Non-judicial punishment is frequently the target of charges of racial discrimination because of the discretion permitted those reporting and disciplining violators under Article 15 (regulation concerning punishment imposed by command for minor offenses) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Refuting these charges is difficult because much of the data needed for documentation are unrecorded. The purposes of this study were to determine: (1) whether existing records indicate that non-judicial punishment is administered without regard to race; and (2) whether blacks and whites perceive discrimination in discipline, job assignments and opportunity for advancement.

### Approach

A pair of chief Personnelmen, one black, the other white, boarded over 70 ships on the east and west coasts to search disciplinary records for data and to administer an attitude questionnaire to 324 sets of personnel. A set consisted of a black and a white for whom a Report and Disposition of Offense had been filed during the previous 18 months (offenders) and a black and white with no reports on file (nonoffenders). Members of the sets had to be in their first enlistment and in the same division. The 1296 personnel in the sample completed the Attitude Evaluation Form (AEF) and the research team recorded data from personnel records and the Unit Punishment Book.

Statistical analyses were conducted of the responses to the AEF items to investigate whether differences existed between blacks and whites, offenders and nonoffenders and Pacific and Atlantic fleets. For the offenders, seriousness of the offenses, recommendations of division and executive officers and disposition of reports were compared for each racial group and fleet. In addition, the contents of the written comments by the respondents were analyzed.

### Findings

Blacks committed somewhat more confrontation or status offenses, such as, insubordinate conduct toward a noncommissioned officer while whites committed more military/civilian crimes, such as larceny (page 8). No differences were found in the punishments awarded offenders, although executive officers dismissed more of the charges against blacks (page 11).

The perceptions of blacks and whites differed significantly on all items concerning equality of treatment in the Navy and on more than half of the job satisfaction and supervisor supportiveness items (pages 12, 13, 18). Few response differences were found between

offenders and nonoffenders and east and west coast personnel (page 18). Item intercorrelations indicated that the interest in the man displayed by the supervisor was significantly related to high satisfaction with the job and to low perceptions of discrimination (pages 18, 19).

The analysis of the written comments revealed that blacks were concerned about racial slurs, discrimination in job assignments, opportunities for advancement, discipline and racial segregation as well as problems common to first-term enlistees regardless of race (page 23). The overwhelming majority of blacks believed military justice favors whites (page 24). Because many whites also shared this belief, the Navy cannot overlook the probability that discriminatory incidents are taking place aboard ships (page 20).

### Conclusions and Recommendations

This study did not reveal any significant differences in the treatment of blacks and whites for whom reports were filed in the Unit Punishment Book. This does not mean that equality of treatment in non-judicial punishment has been established, since there was no way of knowing the number of offenders of each race that were not put on report or were disciplined by their division officer (page 30).

The AEF item responses and the written comments revealed that, regardless of the data in ship's records, blacks believed they were being discriminated against in the areas of job assignments, discipline and recommendations for advancement (page 31). The vital role of the supervisor in these perceptions is noteworthy.

Recommendations for alleviating the situations apparent from this study are difficult to formulate. Because no institutional racism was uncovered, no policy changes are indicated. Contained within the body of the report are several ideas, generated from the data, for coping with the gulf between perceptions and reality (pages 31, 32).

## CONTENTS

	Page
FOREWARD . . . . .	v
SUMMARY . . . . .	vii
FIGURES . . . . .	xi
TABLES . . . . .	xiii
A. BACKGROUND . . . . .	1
B. PURPOSE . . . . .	2
C. PROCEDURE . . . . .	3
1. Research Design . . . . .	3
2. Selection of Sample . . . . .	5
3. Instrumentation and Data Analysis . . . . .	6
4. Questionnaire Administration . . . . .	6
5. Command Debriefing . . . . .	7
D. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION . . . . .	8
1. Differences in Background Factors . . . . .	8
2. Types of Offenses Committed . . . . .	8
3. Disciplinary Actions Taken . . . . .	9
4. Comparison of Number of Times Blacks and Whites Were Put on Report . . . . .	11
5. Analysis of the Attitude Evaluation Form (AEF) Items . . . . .	12
6. Comments on Attitude Evaluation Form (AEF) . . . . .	20
E. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . .	30
REFERENCES . . . . .	33
APPENDIX A . . . . .	35
APPENDIX B . . . . .	51
APPENDIX C . . . . .	53
APPENDIX D . . . . .	59
APPENDIX E . . . . .	61



## FIGURES

	Page
1. Sampling Design indicating number of Ss in each subgroup . .	4
2. Distribution of responses of blacks and whites on item 15 of the AEF. "Generally speaking, black servicemen know as much about their rights under UCMJ as other servicemen." . .	14
3. Distribution of responses of blacks and whites to item 17 of the AEF. "In general, the black and white servicemen in this Command get along well and respect each other." . .	14
4. Distribution of responses of blacks and whites to item 19 of the AEF. "Do you feel that the black sailor is as much a part of the division as the non-black?" . . . . .	15
5. Distribution of responses of blacks and whites to item 21 of the AEF. "Do you feel that any discriminatory practices exist in the disciplining of black servicemen in your Command	15
6. Distribution of responses of blacks and whites to item 23 of the AEF. "If a black serviceman and a white serviceman are equally qualified for the same job, do you feel that the black serviceman is given the same chance for that job?"	16
7. Distribution of responses of blacks and whites to item 38 of the AEF. "In general, I feel that racial prejudice has very little or no effect on the punishment awarded at Captain's Mast?" . . . . .	16
8. Distribution of responses of blacks and whites to item 39 of the AEF. "An offense committed by a black serviceman is generally processed and taken to Captain's Mast faster than one committed by another serviceman." . . . . .	17
9. Distribution of responses of blacks and whites to item 45 of the AEF. "Do you feel that punishment awarded at Captain's Mast in this Command is given to each person on an equal basis? (Regardless of race or nationality)" . . . . .	17

## TABLES

	Page
1. Population and Sample Statistics for Ships Used in Study . .	35
2. Demographic Factors and Test Scores for Blacks and Whites and Offenders and Nonoffenders . . . . .	38
3. Number and Percentage of Offenses Committed by Blacks and Whites . . . . .	39
4. Comparison of Premast Restraint and Comments on the Report and Disposition of Offense for Blacks and Whites . . . . .	40
5. Disposition of Offenses . . . . .	41
6. Comparison Between Group Means for Number of Times Offenders were Sent to Captain's Mast . . . . .	42
7. Comparison Between Group Means for Number of Times Put on Report . . . . .	43
8. Significant Main Effects and Interactions for Items in the Attitude Evaluation Form . . . . .	44
9. Mean Intercorrelations of Racial Items with Supervisor and Job Satisfaction Items for Various Subgroups . . . . .	49
10. Return Rate of Attitude Evaluation Forms (AEFs) Left for Absent Members of the Sample by Race and Fleet . . . . .	52

## PERCEPTIONS OF DISCRIMINATION IN NON-JUDICIAL PUNISHMENT

### A. BACKGROUND

Racial discrimination in all activities conducted by the Department of Defense was explicitly prohibited by DOD Directive 5120.36 of 26 July 1963. Yet, racial incidents still occur in military settings. To some, these incidents represent the breakdown of discipline; to others, they are the response of frustrated minorities to inequities in job assignments, advancement opportunities and disciplinary actions.

The annual Uniform Crime Reports issued by the FBI, consistently show that blacks are arrested in disproportionately higher numbers than are whites. In addition, blacks are more often convicted of charges and receive more severe sentences than white offenders in the civilian community (Simpson & Yinger, 1973). That such trends could be found in the military services is not surprising, though hardly more tolerable. Moreover, the military, through its command structure, has greater control over factors that influence the administration of justice and provides for greater uniformity of treatment than is possible in the civilian sector. Thus, the virtual elimination of unfair practices in the reporting, trying and sentencing of offenders is within the realm of reason without sacrificing discipline.

In 1972 the Secretary of Defense showed his concern for equality of treatment by establishing a Task Force on the Administration of Military Justice in the Armed Forces. One of its major tasks was "to identify the nature and extent of racial discrimination in the administration of military justice" (Department of Defense, 1972). In their report (1972) the Task Force presented several findings which suggest that minority offenders are disciplined more severely than white offenders. These findings were:

1. "Blacks. . . receive non-judicial punishment disproportionate to their numbers in the military."
2. "The longer duration of confinement for blacks remains when type of offense and prior military justice record are controlled."
3. "In all services, black service members received in Fiscal Year 1971 a lower proportion of honorable discharges and a higher proportion of general and undesirable discharges than whites of similar aptitude and education."

Unequal punishment rates may simply reflect unequal rates of offense commission and are not, in themselves, evidence of discrimination. However, there is compelling evidence that a majority of enlisted personnel believe non-whites are at a disadvantage in the Navy. The

recently conducted Navy Race Relations Survey (1973), given to over 10,000 men in all pay grades, included the following item: "Being white is important for getting ahead in the Navy." On a six-point scale of responses, 60 percent of the personnel agreed or strongly agreed with that statement while only 9 percent disagreed (System Development Corporation, 1973). The racial makeup of the sample was 77 percent white, 10 percent black and 13 percent other. Thus, a substantial number of whites endorsed the statement. Those who contend that the frustrations of racial minorities led to the recent outbreaks aboard ships would have little difficulty in establishing that racial inequities are extant in the Navy. Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, speaking about the outbreaks aboard the USS KITTY HAWK, USS CONSTELLATION and the USS HASSAYAMPA before the Armed Services Committee, stated that: "These incidents are not the cause of racial pressures; rather they are the manifestations of pressures unrelieved" (Special Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the U. S. Navy, 1972).

Racial incidents aboard ships represent a collapse of discipline to some military observers. In 1950 RADM Arleigh Burke published a study concerning discipline in the Navy, a condensation of which has recently been circulated due to the timeliness of the topic (Naval Training Bulletin, 1950). Its relevance to the present research lies in the four factors he identified as affecting discipline.

*In every case of breakdown of discipline the following four major factors have been present: (1) Lack of information--subordinates were not kept informed of problems or of reasons why the organization was required to take the action it did take; (2) Lack of interest--seniors had little interest in or knowledge of the problems of their juniors or if they did the juniors were left unaware that they did; (3) Slackness in command; (4) Instability. Senseless transfers of personnel, changes in operating schedules or in daily routine.*

The presence of these factors could provide an explanation for the sporadic eruptions that occur in the Navy when racial discrimination is being practiced.

## B. PURPOSE

The major thrust of this research was the investigation of racial discrimination in the administration of non-judicial punishment under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Article 15 is applicable when a minor offense is committed and the accused does not demand a trial (persons attached to vessels may not demand a trial in lieu of punishment under Article 15). It describes and limits the action which may be taken by a commanding officer without the intervention of a court-martial. The sequence of events leading to non-judicial punishment allows a great deal of discretion on the part of those

reporting and disciplining the offender. For example, a division officer may ignore or orally reprimand one offender without making a record of the incident while formally placing on report another man committing the same offense. Because of this flexibility, non-judicial punishment is frequently the target of charges of racial discrimination in the Navy. Unfortunately these charges are difficult to refute. When dismissal or punishment occurs before reaching the executive officer, an official report of the incident is usually not retained in personnel records. Thus, a complete accounting of the minor offenses committed by enlisted personnel cannot be accomplished with existing data.

Since self-report was a necessary technique for gathering the unrecorded portion of the data needed for this study, it was expedient to investigate other factors related to discipline. These included the perceptions of enlisted men concerning racial equality, the supportiveness of their petty officers, and satisfaction with their jobs. The importance of perceptions to the maintenance of discipline was emphasized by Admiral Burke in his discussion of lack of interest (lack of support) on the part of seniors. The Task Force on the Administration of Military Justice also emphasized perceptions in its letter of submission of its report to the Secretary of Defense. "It is seen that the perceptions of unfairness are as corrosive an influence on the attitudes of servicemen toward the military justice system as is actual unfairness, and must be cured" (Department of Defense, 1972). Thus, the purpose of the study was to determine the facts of equality of treatment in the administration of non-judicial punishment and the perceptions of enlisted personnel towards factors affecting discipline.

## C. PROCEDURE

### 1. Research Design

The research design for this study permitted comparisons between blacks and whites, offenders and nonoffenders, and Atlantic and Pacific fleets. A pair of black and white offenders and a pair of black and white nonoffenders were identified aboard each ship to form a quadruplet. Figure 1 illustrates this design and indicates there were 123 and 201 quadruplets from the Atlantic and Pacific fleets, respectively.

Many variables enter into the disposition of a non-judicial punishment, some of which are situational and largely unrecorded. A well matched sample of black and white offender, was desired but deemed impractical due to lack of information required for close matching. However, by controlling certain external factors, other factors would be indirectly controlled to a limited degree. Therefore, the black offender and white offender in each pair were matched using the following criteria:

	Offender	Nonoffender
White	Atlantic Fleet 123	Atlantic Fleet 123
	Pacific Fleet 201	Pacific Fleet 201
Black	Atlantic Fleet 123	Atlantic Fleet 123
	Pacific Fleet 201	Pacific Fleet 201

Fig. 1. Sampling Design indicating number of Ss in each subgroup.

- a. Time in service--both must be in their first enlistment.
- b. Supervisory personnel--both must be currently aboard the same ship, in the same department and when possible, in the same division. Thus, the supervisory personnel responsible for reviewing and disposing of the offense reports of the racial pair usually would be the same individuals.
- c. Offense--the most recent offense committed by each member of the pair must be very similar in regard to its seriousness. Thus, offenders who had violated the same article in the UCMJ were paired whenever possible.
- d. Disciplinary record--each member of the pair must have had a similar number of previously recorded offenses. That is, a man with only one offense in his record would be paired to another with a single offense; and, in like manner, repeated offenders would be paired.

To complete the quadrant, a racial pair of nonoffenders was matched to the pair of offenders on time in service and supervisory personnel. Thus, differences in attitudes found in the study could be attributed to race, disciplinary record or interactions among these variables. Later, the study was expanded to include a fleet variable, since data collected solely on the west coast might not be representative of the Navy.



For the purpose of this research, an offender was defined as a man for whom a Report and Disposition of Offense was on file in the ship's Unit Punishment Book. A nonoffender had no reports on file. This does not necessarily mean that the nonoffender was not put on report during the preceding 18 months; only that if he were, the charge was dismissed before reaching the executive officer. Conversely, an offender did not necessarily have to be found guilty of the charge of which he was accused; however, the charge had to be serious enough to be investigated, referred to the executive officer for action and a formal report of the incident filed in the Unit Punishment Book.

A black in this study is defined as one who considers himself to belong to the Negro race and was so identified in the Enlisted Distribution Report.<sup>1</sup> A white is a man who was not identified as Negroid, Mongoloid or Malasian by the Navy's race code. A very few American Indians (less than 1%) were included in the white sample.

## 2. Selection of Sample

A team of two chief Personnelmen, one black and one white, selected the sample and gathered the data. Visitation authority was obtained from the five type commanders of the ships which might be included in the Pacific Fleet sample. All the ships under their command were notified that the team might contact them for research purposes. In the Atlantic Fleet, the specific ships were notified in advance of the team's impending visit.

The team began in January 1972 on the west coast with ships in port in San Diego, Long Beach and San Francisco. They continued to ships deployed from the east coast, sampling at Norfolk, Mayport and Charleston, completing the collection of data in December 1972. The team attempted to include one ship from each of the many types, with the exception of those having less than 180 men in the enlisted ship's company. It was determined during a pilot study that this was the minimum population apt to yield enough subjects in the needed subgroups in the research design. The ships used in the study ranged in size from a tank landing ship to an attack aircraft carrier. These ships are identified in Table 1 (page 35 in Appendix A) along with the size of their enlisted company and other statistics concerning the blacks aboard.

Since the research design required an equal number of men in each of the four cells from a ship, the selection of the sample was quite involved. After the chiefs decided that a ship in port was of sufficient size and of the right type, they boarded it and contacted the

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<sup>1</sup>The race code was deleted from the Enlisted Distribution Report in June 1972, about midway in the data collection.

Executive Officer. This meeting usually involved an explanation of their mission and a request for assistance. The Chiefs were then directed to the Personnel Office to begin screening records. A step-by-step description of this process is presented in Appendix B.

No effort was made to equate the number of subjects from the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. The total number of men in the Atlantic fleet sample was 492 (123 sets) and in the Pacific fleet, 804 (201 sets), making a total of 1296 subjects.

### 3. Instrumentation and Data Analysis

a. Attitude Evaluation Form (AEF). A 46-item questionnaire was developed for group administration to the members of the quads aboard each ship (see Appendix C). Three major areas were tapped by the questionnaire: job-satisfaction, supportiveness of leading petty officers, and perceived racial discrimination in disciplinary actions and job assignments. Seven of the multiple-choice items were followed by open-ended questions to obtain more information about a response of interest. In addition, the subjects were encouraged to write comments on the back of the questionnaire whenever they felt one of their answers needed elaboration.

b. Offense Record (OR). This form was developed and utilized by the Chiefs to simplify the collection of background information on the men (see Appendix D). For an offender, all items on the form were completed. Some data came from his most recent Report and Disposition of Offense and the remainder from his service record. For a nonoffender, all data were extracted from his service record, since no offense had been recorded for him during the previous 18 months.

c. Data Analysis. An analysis of variance was performed on items 6 through 46 of the AEF. The three independent variables, each of which had two levels, were race, disciplinary record and fleet. A two-way analysis of variance was performed on selected items of the OR, using only fleet and race as variables (disciplinary record was not applicable in this analysis because the nonoffenders lacked most of the information recorded on the OR). Intercorrelations among the items in the AEF and the OR were also computed for each of the subgroups separately.

Means and standard deviations were obtained for the background variables. Frequencies of the alternative responses to the racial discrimination items were determined for offenders, nonoffenders, blacks and whites.

### 4. Questionnaire Administration

The liaison officer for each ship, usually the ship's Executive Officer or someone from the Personnel Office, was given the list of



men selected for the study. On the west coast, the men were assembled later in the week by means of the Plan of the Day. However, the limited number of days the Chiefs were assigned to the east coast required that the questionnaire be administered on the same day that the sample was identified.

The men were gathered together on the enlisted mess deck or in a training room. Administration of the questionnaire usually took 30 minutes to an hour, although on one occasion a period of three hours was needed. Great care was taken to explain the purpose of the project and assure anonymity, since the items in the questionnaire are obviously racial in content or deal with interpersonal relationships with supervisory personnel. The men were informed that half of them were chosen because they had offense records and the other half because they did not. The Chiefs explained that whenever a printed response to an item seemed inadequate, the reverse side of the page could be used for elaboration. The men were allowed to question the Chiefs at any time, but no conversation with another subject was permitted. In addition, they were requested not to discuss the project with shipmates when returning to duty.

#### 5. Command Debriefing

While the study was underway, race relations was a sensitive issue in the Navy due to several widely publicized incidents occurring in 1972. Therefore, it was not surprising that the Chiefs were requested to present a debriefing session for the command upon completion of their effort aboard the ship. Traditionally, the Executive Officer of a ship would be expected to handle a debriefing. Yet, with very few exceptions, these sessions were attended by the Commanding Officer, even on the largest aircraft carriers. The Chiefs prepared themselves by quickly tallying the crew's responses to a few critical items on the questionnaire.<sup>2</sup> They also read any written comments concerning these items to determine whether the same incidents were being reported by several men. In this manner they were able to respond to the commands' anticipated questions concerning the ships' racial and disciplinary climate, while taking care to avoid mentioning unsubstantiated events.

The Commanding Officer usually wanted to know what was going on aboard his ship, what he could do about it, and how his ship compared with others of the same class. The Chiefs answered these questions as best they could without revealing the identity of their sources of information. If a racial problem surfaced, the team recommended that one of the Human Resource Management Centers be contacted for help. When a morale problem was evidenced, they communicated its cause, as

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<sup>2</sup>Although the items used varied, usually numbers 6, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 29, and 39 were included (see Appendix C).

perceived by the men aboard that ship. Since the team made a practice of assessing the climate at enlisted clubs in each area visited, they were able to lend credence to legitimate gripes concerning the operation of the clubs. In addition, they stayed at civilian motels, ate in civilian restaurants and wore their uniforms in every port on their itinerary. They experienced the receptiveness of the community to a Navy enlisted man, particularly to a black enlisted man, and could confirm some of the experiences of the men. The commands seemed to recognize their unique mission and were quite responsive to what was presented in the debriefings. The team kept a log of their observations aboard ships, some of which are presented in Appendix E.

#### D. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

All of the statistical tables mentioned in this section may be found in Appendix A.

##### 1. Differences in Background Factors

The various background factors and test scores are compared for blacks versus whites and offenders versus nonoffenders in Table 2 (page 38). Nearly all of the comparisons between the means of the two races were significantly different. That is, whites had been aboard the ship and in the division longer, had been advanced to a higher pay grade, earned higher scores on all six aptitude tests and had fewer years of education than blacks. While the differences between the aptitude scores of blacks and whites were substantial, the differences found in background variables were slight, though significant at the .05 level. Five of the comparisons between the two disciplinary groups yielded significant differences. The offenders were slightly younger, at a lower pay grade (both currently and highest pay grade held) less educated and earned lower ETST scores than the non-offenders.

##### 2. Types of Offenses Committed

The articles of the UCMJ which were violated by the offenders of each race are shown in Table 3 (page 39). These data are combined into the classes of offenses used in the Military Justice Task Force Report (1972) for convenience and comparative purposes.

Absence without leave (Article 86) was the most common offense committed, accounting for 63 percent of the charges against blacks and 62 percent of those against whites. Since this is a relatively minor offense, this finding testifies to the successful matching of the offenders on severity of offense. Whites committed the majority of the military/civilian offenses (classes 1 and 4); such as misbehavior of sentinel and larceny. Blacks were more often charged with confrontation or status offenses; such as, failure to obey an order or insubordinate conduct toward a noncommissioned officer. The latter finding is consistent with that reported in Volume III of the Report on the Task Force on the

Administration of Military Justice in the Armed Forces (1972). Only for Class 4 offenses was the difference between frequencies significant.

### 3. Disciplinary Actions Taken

Items 8, 21, 23, and 24 of the OR indicate the results of several reviews of the reports of offenses discussed in section 2 above. Since there was very little difference between the types of offenses committed by the two races, the disposition of the offense should have been similar, if equity in treatment were occurring.

#### a. Pre-Mast Actions

Before a report chit (Report and Disposition of Offense - NAVPERS 2696) is forwarded to the commanding officer via the executive officer, the comments of the man's division officer are solicited and a preliminary investigation is conducted. During this period the movements of the accused man may or may not be restricted, depending upon the severity of the charge and the prospects of the accused appearing at the proceedings.

The comparisons reported in Table 4 (page 40) indicate that there was no difference in the degree of pre-mast restraint of blacks and whites. Only about eight percent of the offenders of both races were subjected to pre-mast restriction.

The division officers' comments were very similar for members of the two races. No punishment was recommended for ten percent of the black offenders and six percent of the white offenders. This difference was not significant.

The results of the preliminary investigation again resulted in the recommendation of no punitive action for more blacks than whites (16% vs. 12%). More of the white offenders were referred for disposition at Captain's Mast than black offenders (70% vs. 64%), although these differences were not significant.

The relationship between the results of the preliminary investigation and the action of the executive officer for offenders of each race was also investigated. The chi square statistic was used to determine whether, given any one of three recommendations in the preliminary investigation, the executive officer then dismissed or sent to Mast a significantly<sup>3</sup> different proportion of blacks and whites.

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<sup>3</sup>The term "significant" refers to statistical significance throughout this report. It is expressed in terms of probability ( $p$ ) of occurrence with a  $p$  of .05 (1 in 20) or less as indicative of a non-chance event.

The same procedure was followed for the five alternative comments made by the division officer (see item 22 of the Offense Record in Appendix C). None of the eight chi square tests approached significance.

The analysis of pre-mast actions resulted in no significant difference in the treatment of members of the two races. There was a tendency, however, to recommend lesser punishment for minorities. Both the division officer and the inquiry officer recommended no punitive action for more blacks than whites and fewer blacks were recommended for Mast.

b. Offenses Dismissed by the Executive Officer

Table 5 (page 41) presents the disposition of reports after the preliminary inquiries. Significantly ( $p = .05$ ) more charges against blacks were dismissed by the executive officer than those against whites (84 vs. 62). Several interpretations may be given to this finding, the most obvious of which are: (1) more blacks were put on report for minor or first-time offenses than were whites; (2) more of the charges against blacks were unfounded (UCMJ not violated) or could not be proven; (3) more of the report chits filed for blacks had been originated by someone outside of their division;<sup>4</sup> and (4) executive officers were practicing reverse discrimination by excusing blacks, but not whites, for certain offenses.

Analysis of item 20 of the OR suggests that the first interpretation is apt to be in error. These data, concerning the number of times the offenders in the sample had gone to Captain's Mast (the disposition of the current offense is included) are presented in Table 6 (page 42). The means and standard deviations of blacks and whites are almost identical. A frequency distribution of item 20 revealed that the number of recidivists was somewhat greater among the blacks, however, since 49 percent had been to Mast previously compared to 42 percent of the whites. It is of interest to note that there was a significant difference between the Atlantic and Pacific commands for this item. Personnel on the east coast were sent to Mast significantly more often than those on the west coast. This finding was consistent within each of the racial groups although only the difference between fleets for whites was significant.

Analysis of item 22 (Division Officer's Comments), reported in Table 4, lends support to the interpretation that the offenses committed

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<sup>4</sup>This is a theory communicated to the author by a group of Chief Petty Officers who were asked to hypothesize why executive officers dismiss charges. They reasoned that a report originating within the man's division is more likely to be referred to Captain's Mast because, by putting the man on report, the division officer is stating he can no longer handle the situation.

by blacks did not occur within the division as often as those committed by whites. Since division officers recommended dismissal or no punitive action for more blacks than whites, they may not have been the originators of the report chit in some of these cases. However, the possibility that they had originated and forwarded the chits to the commanding officer as a warning cannot be ruled out. Thus, while the first-time offender interpretation is in error and the outside-the-division interpretation appears to be supported, there was no way to determine with the existing data why more blacks than white offenders were dismissed by their executive officers.

c. Offenses Referred to Captain's Mast

Returning to Table 5 (page 41), 74 percent of the black offenders and 81 percent of the white offenders were sent to Captain's Mast. At that point the commanding officer dismissed the charges against eight percent of the blacks and nine percent of the whites. In addition, punishment was awarded and suspended for 12 percent of the members of both races. No significant differences were found in the punishments awarded blacks and whites.

The severest punitive action a commanding officer can take is to award a court-martial. Four of the blacks versus nine of the whites (1.7% vs. 3.5%) were referred to such judicial proceedings. This difference was not significant.

The findings presented in Table 5 support the hypothesis that racial discrimination was not being practiced in the awarding of non-judicial punishment to the offenders in this study. If any differential treatment was operating, it was to the disadvantage of the majority group. That is, fewer of the charges against the whites were dismissed by the executive officer and more whites were awarded courts-martial.

4. Comparison of Number of Times Blacks and Whites Were Put on Report

A Report and Disposition of Offense is not kept in the Unit Punishment Book unless a preliminary investigation is conducted and, quite properly, reports of offenses committed by ship personnel at their previous commands would not be included. Thus, question 33 of the AEF was included to determine the number of times the men in the sample had been put on report.

Table 7 (page 43) reveals that blacks were put on report significantly more often than were whites. If consideration is given to the finding that blacks had been aboard the ships for a significantly shorter period of time than whites (see Table 2, page 38), the difference found for frequency of being put on report gains in importance.

In a two-way analysis<sup>5</sup> of variance of this item, using the factors race and fleet, a significant interaction was found for the offenders. Interestingly, inspection of the means revealed that blacks in the Pacific fleet were put on report more often than those in the Atlantic fleet, while the reverse was true for whites. This analysis, along with the previous one for Captain's Mast, demonstrated that blacks in the Navy are involved with the non-judicial punishment system more frequently than whites.

#### 5. Analysis of the Attitude Evaluation Form (AEF) Items

Table 8 (page 44) presents the findings of the analysis of variance of the multiple choice items in the AEF. The items have been arranged into the four groups representing the content of the AEF; i.e., job satisfaction and motivation, supervisor supportiveness, racial discrimination and advancement.

##### a. Job Satisfaction and Motivation

Whites and nonoffenders expressed greater contentment with their jobs than did blacks or offenders on all five items dealing with job satisfaction (significantly so on three items). The results for personnel from the two fleets indicate a tendency for those in the Pacific fleet to be somewhat more satisfied than those in the Atlantic fleet. On question 11, the single item concerning motivation, significant F ratios were found for two of the three main effects. Non-offenders stated they were trying harder to improve their work performance than did offenders, and more blacks stated they were trying harder to improve than did whites.

##### b. Supervisor Supportiveness

Analyses of the 14 items concerning perceived amount of support given the man by his supervisor yielded five items on which the blacks and whites did not differ and nine on which they did. On eight of the nine items where differences were noted, whites expressed a more satisfactory relationship with, and opinion of, their supervisors than did blacks. In the offender/nonoffender comparison nine significant

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<sup>5</sup>The analysis of variance technique is used to determine how means differ when several variables have been controlled in the design of an experiment. *Main effect* refers to the influence of a single variable, measured independently of all other variables. *Interaction* refers to the extent to which changing one variable affects another. For example, if blacks on the east coast respond differently than whites on the west coast, a significant interaction between race and fleet is said to exist. In this example the responses of blacks and whites or Pacific and Atlantic fleets (two main effects) may or may not have differed.



differences were found, all indicating that nonoffenders felt that LPOs were more interested in them than did offenders. No differences were found between the responses of men from the two fleets on any of these 14 items.

Three of the items in this section concerned the Leading Petty Officer's (LPOs) role in the handling of an offense (items 35, 37, and 43). The blacks and the offenders felt that their LPOs were less apt to stop a report chit at the division level and less apt to support them when a minor offense was committed than did the whites and nonoffenders. When the sample was dichotomized into black offenders versus white offenders the differences between the two groups were significant at the .01 level for all three items.

To summarize the findings of this category of questions, blacks appear to think their supervisors are treating them with benign neglect. They feel less informed about changes in duties, less supported when committing a minor offense, less helped when a problem arises, less free to make a suggestion and yet less apt to be chewed out when they err.

If one accepts Admiral Burke's theory of the causes of breakdown of discipline, these findings have ominous implications. Without a doubt more blacks than whites felt that their LPOs were not keeping them informed and lacked interest in their problems, reflecting the existence of two of the four causes mentioned by Admiral Burke.

#### c. Racial Discrimination

This section of the AEF focuses on the crucial issue of perceived racial discrimination. Predictably enough, differences were found in the ways blacks and whites responded to all eight items concerning equality of treatment of minority members. To a significant degree, blacks perceived greater racial discrimination than did whites. Only one significant difference was found between the mean responses of men from the two fleets and between offenders and nonoffenders. A significant interaction between race and fleet was found for item 17. Contrary to what might be expected, blacks on the west coast held the most dismal view concerning how well the races respect each other and get along, whereas whites on the west coast held the most optimistic view. Why the blacks responded in this manner is difficult to explain. Perhaps conditions on the east coast were not as discriminatory as they had been led to believe, while those on the west coast were not as integrated.

Figures 2 through 9 are based on response frequencies and reveal the depth of feeling of blacks and whites on these eight racial discrimination items. If the indefinite middle response is eliminated and the other four alternatives are combined into dichotomous responses, the differences between the perceptions of the two groups become considerably more obvious. For example, on item 39 (Figure 8), it becomes evident that 50 percent of the blacks as compared to 5 percent of the whites agree that an offense committed by a black is taken to Captain's Mast faster than one committed by a nonblack.




Fig. 2. Distribution of responses of blacks and whites to item 15 of the AEF. "Generally speaking, black servicemen know as much about their rights under UCMJ as other servicemen."




Fig. 3. Distribution of responses of blacks and whites to item 17 of the AEF. "In general, the black and white servicemen in this Command get along well and respect each other."






Fig. 4. Distribution of responses of blacks and whites to item 19 of the AEF. "Do you feel that the black sailor is as much a part of the division as the non-black?"




Fig. 5. Distribution of responses of blacks and whites to item 21 of the AEF. "Do you feel that any discriminatory practices exist in the disciplining of black servicemen in your Command?"




Fig. 6. Distribution of responses of blacks and whites to item 23 of the AEF. "If a black serviceman and a white serviceman are equally qualified for the same job, do you feel that the black serviceman is given the same chance for that job?"




Fig. 7. Distribution of responses of blacks and whites to item 38 of the AEF. "In general, I feel that racial prejudice has very little or no effect on the punishment awarded at Captain's Mast?"




Fig. 8. Distribution of responses of blacks and whites to item 39 of the AEF. "An offense committed by a black serviceman is generally processed and taken to Captain's Mast faster than one committed by another serviceman."




Fig. 9. Distribution of responses of blacks and whites to item 45 of the AEF. "Do you feel that punishment awarded at Captain's Mast in this Command is given to each person on an equal basis? (Regardless of race or nationality)"

The finding that blacks respond to discrimination items differently than whites comes as no surprise. What may be unexpected is that so few differences were found between the perceptions of men on the east and west coast, since the eastern ports in which the data were collected are located in southern states. When the fleet variable was introduced into the research design, it was hypothesized that conditions in the south would result in more racially discriminatory practices than found on the west coast which lacks a historical basis for racial segregation. These findings show that the racial attitudes of enlisted men in the two fleets do not differ as much as anticipated. Apparently, the cultural background of the area in which these ships were homeported had little impact on the internal practices of the ships.

d. Advancement and Knowledge of UCMJ Rights and Services

Two items (Numbers 24 and 27) on the AEF concerned advancement. Neither yielded significant F ratios.

The single item querying information and services available to the accused showed significant main effects for race and fleet. Blacks and men in the Pacific fleet seemed to feel less informed about military justice under UCMJ than did whites and personnel in the Atlantic fleet.

e. Item Intercorrelations

Intercorrelations were computed<sup>6</sup> among the AEF items and background variables on the Offense Record. The sample was dichotomized twice for this analysis into offenders/nonoffenders and blacks/whites. The sample size of each group is 624 since each represents half of the total sample.

Higher pay grade and longer time in the Navy were correlated positively with some of the job satisfaction items. Also, the supervisor supportiveness and job satisfaction items were consistently and significantly interrelated for all four groups, indicating that men whose supervisors are interested in them, helpful and can be trusted tend to be more satisfied with their jobs.

Since this study focused on perceptions of racial discrimination, the intercorrelations among the eight racial items and the other items are of particular interest. Table 9 (page 49) presents these data for each of the subgroups. In preparing the table, all of the correlations between the 14 supervisor items and a single racial item, for example, were averaged to determine the mean correlation. Without exception, the responses of blacks, as compared to the other three

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<sup>6</sup>BTB scores, pay grade, months on board and in the Navy, age, years of education, and number of times sent to Captain's Mast.

groups, showed the greatest positive relationship between perceptions of non-discrimination and perceptions of supervisor supportiveness. All eight of the mean correlations for blacks were significantly different from zero, ranging from .11 to .23. A review of the correlation matrix revealed that nine of the 14 supervisor items were consistently related to blacks' perceptions of equality of treatment. These items were:

10. Freedom to make suggestions to supervising Petty Officer (PO)
20. Good attitude toward PO criticism
25. PO helps prepare man for advancement exam
29. PO helps with man's problems
31. Equal treatment of PO
32. PO keeps men informed
35. PO tries to keep report chits at the division level
36. Trust in PO
37. PO supports man when minor offense committed

Job satisfaction was related to non-discrimination for blacks and for offenders on seven of the eight items and to a lesser degree for nonoffenders. For the white sample, perceptions of racial discrimination were virtually unrelated to either supervisor supportiveness or job satisfaction.

Analysis of the background items revealed that BTB scores were negatively correlated (the lower the BTB score, the higher the perception of discrimination) with perceptions of discrimination for the offenders and nonoffenders (mean correlations ranged from -.09 for CLER to -.19 for ARI). No relationship between aptitude and perceptions of racial discrimination were found for blacks and whites, nor for any of the other offense record variables in the analysis.

These findings suggest that the petty officer plays an important role in the lives of Navy enlisted men. For all groups in the analysis, job satisfaction and perceived support by the supervisor were significantly related, although the correlations were low. For minority personnel, the leadership skills of the petty officer were of particular importance. Blacks who saw their supervisors as keeping them informed, being open to suggestions, and showing interest in their career and problems tended to perceive less racial discrimination in discipline and job assignments. Conversely, blacks who could not trust their supervisors and saw them as aloof perceived a considerable amount of inequality in non-judicial punishment.

## 6. Comments on Attitude Evaluation Form (AEF)

The personnel in the sample were encouraged to amplify their responses to questions in the AEF which could not be answered adequately by the multiple choice format. Many more blacks than whites (80% vs. 36%) took advantage of this option, perhaps indicating that they felt a stronger need to communicate on these matters. After categorizing all of the comments on the AEF, statements representative of many made by a racial group were selected. They are presented in the following paragraphs with grammar and spelling intact.

### a. Comments Made by Whites

The 234 majority personnel who wrote comments on their AEFs were concerned with: (1) discriminatory practices aboard ship; (2) voluntary segregation of races; (3) interpersonal strife; and (4) problems with the Navy.

Discriminatory practices mentioned were both against whites and against blacks. The latter was far more common, with 60 men offering comments on general conditions or incidents they had observed. The most often mentioned practices were harsher punishments for blacks and giving blacks the more undesirable jobs. Career enlisted men were frequently blamed for these actions. The following quotations typify the comments concerning discrimination against blacks:

*"If a black sailor does something wrong he is always looked on as a misfit. The black always receives harsh punishment."*

*"One black man was disliked and sent to mast for willful destruction of government property which was a paper mess cook hat (5¢). He was penalized heavily."*

*"All blacks are sent to mess cooking, but not all whites when they first come aboard."*

*"They don't rotate this black man to different shops like they do the rest of us. The man is as capable as anyone in the division but the leading POs are prejudiced as are a few others in the division."*

Reverse discrimination was reported by 38 of the white respondents who felt superiors were penalizing whites to avoid charges of bigotry or to maintain peace. They mentioned blacks getting off with light punishments, shirking on the job without penalty and accusing whites of discrimination when assigned an undesirable task. Typical comments were:

*"There is a noticeable leniency towards blacks for minor infractions of rules. . . seems to indicate a fear of*

*superiors being biased against blacks so they compromise many situations by ignoring infractions."*

*"I saw and heard a black accuse a white LPO of being discriminatory. The LPO had 14 years in and gave in to the wishes of the black because he didn't feel he dare handle the situation all the way to the CO."*

*"I was busted, fined and restricted as an example and was told later that was done to prevent racial conflict and that I would be reinstated."*

One man credited the command for the absence of discriminatory practices aboard the ship. His statement was as follows: *"The captain is a great and fair man no matter what race you are. He goes strictly by the crime committed."*

Voluntary segregation and lack of understanding between races was mentioned by 36 men. Whites resented expressions of pride, longer hair styles and musical tastes of minority personnel. They noted the tendency for blacks to congregate in camaraderie, sometimes with puzzlement and at other times with approval. Typical comments were:

*"Blacks live in the past. You can't say 'boy' cause that was a name for slaves they read in books."*

*"Blacks want to do their own thing in their own company."*

*"Black servicemen wear their hair very nonregulation and are allowed to get by with it as if it was natural."*

Interpersonal relations between the races were more often noted as being bad ( $N = 51$ ) than for being good ( $N = 12$ ). One sailor obviously blamed the older generation rather than the Navy when he stated, *"As far as I'm concerned, no one is born prejudiced--they're taught all that s---. So, until those old generation racists are gone we will have prejudice. But, it is on both sides of the fence."* A yeoman in the legal office wrote at length on the subject. His comments were as follows:

*"I have heard and witnessed prejudice in both whites and blacks both claiming to be superior. Most of it has been among nonrated men who seem to be unhappy with their work. I am speaking of people in the deck division living in the same compartment with the 2nd Division. I have heard my fellow shipmates say words to the effect, 'I hate niggers,' 'I wish they would move us to another compartment; the smell is terrible.' 'Those niggers always hang around in groups trying to cause trouble.'*



The blacks in the compartment especially the bigger ones tend to intimidate the seemingly weaker members of the compartment by riding them with criticism and putting them in difficult positions as far as money is concerned. Among the officers I have seen a few examples where nonwhites are constantly brought to the attention of the CO at Mast--most times these people have committed minor offenses which could be handled at the division level but it seems that these officers derive a certain pleasure out of seeing one man's service record being shot to hell."

A few men felt that the members of the two races got along well, but in most cases their comments were personal in nature, rather than referring to conditions aboard the ship. Typical were the words of one man who stated, "I have not had any gripes with any of the blacks in my division or on the ship; as a matter of fact, most of them are good frineds." One white credited the blacks for good race relations as follows:

*"On the main deck the negroes in our division keep up the morale of the workers. They never leave until all the work is done. So I would say we get along fine."*

Predictably, some of the comments concerned the Navy divorced from racial considerations. Men in their first enlistment complained about favoritism shown to petty officers and their treatment by superiors. Statements such as, "Non-rated men hardly ever get any early liberty unless it is an emergency while rated men get off most any time they want" and "The XO will always work at proving guilt" were typical. Two sailors went into detail about conditions aboard their ships in the following statement:

*"The command of this ship is worth investigating. The morale on here is very poor and the UA rate is very high. - - - - (our type commander) has had complaints and they are due for more in the future. I am trying to get transferred to destroyer duty but it is almost impossible on this ship. I have a very bitter attitude towards the man who comes along and puts out Z-Grams which the younger crew members like and then the older officers who have in about 20 years buck them. Put younger men in charge of some of these ships that need them and you will see a high enlistment rate and reenlistments."*

*"After what I've seen and been through I hate this outfit but I try to do right to get out on a good discharge. The Navy knows it can ruin a person with a bad discharge and abuses its use so much as to cause great conflict among its men. I have no civilian record but my Navy record is a mess. Wonder why?"*



b. Comments Made by Blacks

Of the 648 blacks in the sample, 516 (80%) chose to make written comments on their AEFs. They were concerned about overt displays of prejudice, discrimination in job assignments and discipline, racial segregation, and problems common to first term enlistees of all races. Their comments, which follow, have been ordered by the frequency with which they occurred. They have been edited to the extent that names were removed and profanity abbreviated. It should be kept in mind that the nature of the questions in the AEF, particularly those inviting comments, provided some structure to the written remarks. Thus, the comments made by blacks are similar in content to those of whites, but more numerous.

(1) Racial Slurs and Overt Prejudice

Blacks were disturbed by words and acts obviously intended as racial insults. Expressions of hatred along with oral and written derogatory labels were frequently mentioned. Blacks reported being called "boy," "nigger" and "filthy animal" by their shipmates and superiors from the commanding officer on down. Typical comments were:

*"You can be walking down the passageway and a white boy would bump an look back an say F--- you Nigger. Then you want to kill him."*

*"A white 2nd Class came in drunk one night and pull a black sailor out of his rack and beat him until he broke the black sailor arm. The 2nd Class went to Mast, and all the CO gave him was reduction in pay grade. Within 3 months the CO gave his 2nd Class back. After the 2nd Class was restated, I was walking through his compartment and he saw me, so he spoke out loud to another PO that he knew the captain wasn't going to keep a 3rd Class, just for beating the \_\_\_ out of a nigger and breaking his arm."*

*"In Australia, the captain referred to the blacks as niggers during 0800 reports in front of officers."*

*"The first cruise I was on my LPO never once called me by my name. Always boy--always some derogatory statement about blacks openly. . . . It's almost impossible to project one's image as a black man and not find animosity, rancor from hidden depths arise. Example: In expressing myself as a black man pointing out inequities and discrimination with my division 9/10 of the division isolated me."*

Blacks also mentioned being verbally harassed about their hair style, mode of dress, "acting black" and wearing the black power

sign. Apparently, the latter act was not allowed aboard most ships although wearing the rebel patch by whites was permitted, an inequality that rankled many blacks. Blacks looked upon much of this harassment as an effort by certain whites to pressure them into "messaging up "

Another type of overt prejudice mentioned concerned investigation of delinquent acts. Seven men described incidents in which something was missing from a locker or a robbery occurred and only the blacks were questioned or were taken to the police station for investigation. A prevalent attitude expressed by minorities was, "if you're black, you're wrong." Some seemed quite resigned and attempted to maintain a low profile aboard ship but others, as seen in the comments below, intended to react:

*"In this man's Navy they can do what ever they want to us because the brothers and sisters on the outside can't help us now and I will be glad when my time is up so I can stand in front of the Recruiting Office and help the brothers before they hand their lives over to the white man to play with."*

Some respondents were less specific, simply noting there was a lot of prejudice, as in the following comment:

*"There're quite a few prejudiced rated men on this ship against black peoples. When go on liberty from this ship, it's like getting a 16-hour pass from prison."*

Only four blacks (out of the 516) felt there was mutual respect between the races or considered overt prejudice a rare occurrence. A few blacks, while acknowledging the existence of these acts, credited the command for taking action, as seen in the following comments:

*"I must admit that my command has 'bent over backwards' to ease racial tensions and eliminate discrimination."*

*"A yellow black service mate went to Capt. Mass for NJP and after hearing facts. . .CO (said) no NJP warranted but whites threatened. . .and demanded the CO hang him and if he didn't they would. The CO let the man off but had to call all-hands meeting to explain he would not tolerate any vigilante actions."*

## (2) Discrimination in Discipline

The belief that blacks get put on report more often, have a greater number of their report chits forwarded to the executive officer and receive more severe punishment than whites was pandemic

among minority personnel. Some respondents stated this belief without substantiating evidence while most had incidents to relate. Usually the events involved a black and a white committing similar offenses but receiving vastly dissimilar punishments. The following comments were representative:

*"They said I broke into a locker. A white boy stole \$84 and got dismissed. This crazy and uncertain captain without seeing me at Capt. Mast gave me a summary court martial. They should have given the white boy one, they caught him dead wrong."*

*"Two black sailors were UA for a total of 4 hours. They were immediately placed on report, summoned to XO's Mast within the same hour, the CO's Mast the next day. At Mast both received 10 days restriction, 10 days extra duty and a bust. Two weeks later a white sailor reported back to ship after being UA for 28 days, going to Mast a week or so later he gets away with a mere bust."*

Some respondents described events in which the punishment appeared grossly unfair. Since the offender involved was a black, they attributed this lack of justice to racial discrimination. Typical comments were:

*"A 3rd Class cook didn't want to feed a black; when the black asked why he was placed on report and punished for disrespect of a Petty Officer."*

*"A black was put on report for saying something to a leading seaman and he got 3 days bread and water. His first offense."*

Certain events reported were unfair for obviously racial reasons or left no doubt that the race of the offender entered into the disposition of an offense. Some comments of this type follow:

*"A black petty officer wrote up a white sailor for threatening his life. Before they went to mast the white sailor laughed and told him he was going to get off because he was white, sure enough he did. After Mast he sat at the lunch table and laughed some more in front of the black PO and told him 'I told you they weren't going to do nothing to me, you know why? Cause I'm white.'"*

*"The XO will tell you as he told me, 'I am prejudice, I hate blacks.' When you go to mast if you are black keep your mouth shut you get less brig time, don't defend yourself."*

*"I went to quarters with my ball cap on instead of a white hat and the reason I had the ball cap on was because someone stole my white hat, so my chief took me to the department heads office and told the Boatswain and the Boatswain made the remark 'can't you people do anything right.' So they gave me 2 hours of EMI and a sea bag inspection and then a working party and the very next day a white guy had his ball cap on at quarters and the chief and the boatswain didn't say anything to him and when I brought this to their attention they said mind your own business."*

Only four blacks felt that minority personnel were treated more leniently than majority personnel. One of them stated: *"The command shows a great deal more patience with black sailors than others, which is not bad at all but discriminatory."*

Thus, while three percent of the blacks commenting on naval discipline felt reverse discrimination was operating, 39 percent of the whites believed this was the case.

### (3) Discrimination in Job Assignments and Personnel Matters

Blacks invariably felt they were getting the less desirable jobs. They frequently mentioned favoritism shown whites whose qualifications were equal to those of blacks seeking a division transfer, advancement or formal school training. Some seemed to feel this was an organized effort on the part of whites to keep minority members from getting ahead in the Navy. These issues were commented on in the following manner:

*"When everyone is drinking cokes the PO would come and get the blacks to work."*

*"No black sailor has worked in the ship stores or any ship office in the past three years."*

*"An AN striking for AMS has all course and other qualifications in and is ready to go up for advancement, but his division officer holds him back for no apparent naval reason. When confronted by his command he still didn't give any evidence of why he did this. By this time though the advancement exams were given and said AN did not take it. I must admit the command did take steps by repremanding the officer and ordering another test, that somehow never gets here. (I hope you see what I mean). So it boils down to 'Charlie did it again'".*

*"One black and one white applied for yeoman. The black told me he typed better than the white. The white had*

*been convicted for dope violation, the black had never been to Mast. The white got the job. Although the white didn't hold the job the black wasn't given a chance."*

Blacks generally felt they were being discriminated against in matters of leave and request chits. They reported very similar situations in which a white was granted his request and the black was denied his. For example:

*"Department head tells black SHSN leave won't be given on underway period (3 days). Seaman's wife just had a baby. White storekeeper got leave during underway period (5 days) to get married."*

Only four blacks, of the 516 writing comments, felt that no discrimination was being practiced in these areas. A very perceptive assessment of the dilemma facing the Navy in its treatment of black sailors is found in the following quotation:

*"The black suffers from insufficient education, in many cases they seem to prefer to remain ignorant. Majority of the blacks don't fraternize, they're very clannish. I feel that the majority of the complaints of blacks stem probably from a sense of insecurity. Many of them have never had any real education or even a chance to do anything worthwhile. They arrive in the Navy and most of them get very menial jobs, this adds to the frustration. You've got to educate people first (it's the same for any young man from a deprived environment). Schools and courses are not made as available on this ship as they would like you to believe. Unfortunately I think the Navy will have to play favorites for a while and help the under privileged which in most cases happens to be the black. I'm leaving the Navy in a couple of weeks, I've enjoyed my time in it, I've traveled and learned quite a bit. I hope maybe some day all of my people will be able to compete without special help and attention and understanding."*

#### **(4) Racial Segregation**

Many respondents noted that blacks and whites worked reasonably well together but were segregated during off duty hours. Several expressed the belief that whites wanted it this way, while most felt it was by mutual desire. The following comments were typical:

*"The men work well together but there is a lack of confidence in each group. In other words we work together but don't socialize like a team is supposed to."*

*"The only time we belong is when some sport comes up for the division--then they come running to us blacks."*

*"There is a certain isolation that blacks feel because of the ratio of blacks and whites. Basically one is accepted within the limits of working or living on board. . .but there is very little genuine respect for blacks. Even on a leadership basis on my part whereby I've found need for reprimanding a white crewman there is the opposition of the crew and even the LPO."*

Others felt that whites were uncomfortable and suspicious about gatherings of blacks and tended to break them up. The following comments expressed this feeling:

*"If blacks sit in the chow hall and it be a crowd they will send the Master of Arms down and try to see whats going on."*

*"Whites strongly show uneasiness resentment with blacks. A space has been open to any member of the crew till a few blacks utilize the space then its closed with no valid reason."*

One black, recognizing the segregation that exists, suggested positive action for bringing the races together.

*"To me this command is usually fair in dealing with racial problems. The only thing I object to is that they usually avoid the real issues in a case of minority and majority, instead of facing up to the fact that racial prejudice exists on the ship, as it does throughout the Navy and country. I suggest that there should be meetings regularly of both races to discuss problems of racial sort. I object to having minority meeting in which just blacks attend, all that does is increase the problems because more problems are brought out. If meetings were set up where both sides were allowed to express their views, a lot more could be accomplished. There is always two sides to a story. If the meeting is all black, then black is right, on the other hand if the meeting is all white, then white is right. The only way to get to the roots of the problems is to hear both sides and go from there."*

Another black felt that after-hour segregation of the races is almost inevitable because of cultural differences. His statement was:

*"I feel as a black that I belong to my division as far as working level is concerned. When it comes around to*

the social aspect, I feel far apart from everyone else mainly because of the different ways I was reared. When there is a division or ship party the white and his family have more fun than the black because everything is did the way he likes it. Everything is white even music. For the black to have fun he has to separate himself and do his thing. I believe that the only way any black can feel more a part of the division or the entire Navy that he is in is to see more black oriented things. One very good simple example is, there almost all kinds of food served on ship, Italian, Spanish, etc. but I have never seen a menu that said "soul food."

The only comment concerning institutional racism was as follows: "On a cruise we have various shows with entertainment strickly for nonblacks."

Four of the men discussing this issue denied the presence of racial segregation. Three mentioned having white friends and one credited the Navy for integration when he stated: "The Navy in its own way is uncommonly resourceful in uniting the white and black."

#### (5) Navy Problems

Fewer blacks than whites (3% vs. 10%) complained about non-racial problems. However, when blacks did complain it was about the same things bothering the majority group; i.e., favoritism shown to career enlisted and petty officers' treatment of non-rated men. Some sample comments were:

"On one occasion some upper in rate crew members and staff were drinking on watch or drunk on watch and nothing happened."

"Division officer stated that he disliked persons with beards, mustaches and longer hair than his (which is short).

"We all dislike the rigid attitude of our superiors. There are prejudice people but you learn to live with them. The overwhelming majority of personnel aboard this ship want a transfer. Silly regulations like no gedunks aboard."

#### (6) Sterotyping

Blacks resented being attributed with characteristics believed by whites to be common to all members of the minority race. Traits most frequently mentioned were laziness, intellectual inferiority, and troublesomeness. Some typical examples were:



*"The black is looked at and automatically put in one of two categories either controllable or not, meaning he is either passive or militant."*

*"A black is usually prejudged by stereotype whites who believe the inflexible contemporary misconception that a black is lazy, sluggish and must be forced to be productive."*

*"At my mast the theory that I was a credit to my race was mentioned. I think that was irrelevant to the case."*

They also noted that some whites seemed surprised when a black was advanced to petty officer or was able to complete a job without making mistakes.

#### E. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There are two precautionary points that need to be introduced before drawing conclusions from these results. One concerns the equivalency of the offenses committed, which were categorized by article number in the UCMJ. The comments made on the AEF lead one to suspect that the conduct by members of different races resulting in a specific charge could have been of quite disparate seriousness. For example, blacks claimed, and whites verified, that minority members were given Article 91s (insubordinate conduct toward warrant officer, noncommissioned officer or petty officer) for asking a petty officer a reasonable question. Thus, while a determined effort had been made to pair the offenders of each race on severity of offense, it is possible that the whites in the sample might have committed more serious offenses than did the blacks, since the basis for matching was the recorded UCMJ number.

The second point concerns the differences found in the analysis of variance of the AEF items. The AEF measured perceptions and self-reported information and any conclusions based on these items must be interpreted accordingly. For example, one cannot conclude from analyses of item responses that petty officers actually were displaying favoritism towards whites even though significant differences were found between the means of blacks and whites concerning supportiveness. Perceptions are important, however, not only because they modify the behavior of the perceiver but also because they may reflect real life situations.

This study demonstrated that the perceptions of blacks and whites concerning treatment by supervisors and military discipline differ significantly. Minority members feel discriminated against in job assignments, disciplinary actions and in interactions with their petty officers, while whites were much less aware of these possible inequities.



Had a majority of whites agreed with the blacks, the existence of prejudicial practices in operation in the Navy would have been more conclusive. What these results do suggest, however, is that supervisory personnel need to be made more aware of the effect of their decisions on the morale of their juniors. Decisions which may appear arbitrary or blatantly discriminatory should be justifiable for most men can accept a certain amount of unpleasant work if it is assigned fairly and terminates after a reasonable period of time. Lack of information is probably the crux of the problem. Yet there is little doubt that minorities in this study perceived discrimination when they failed to obtain the better job assignments, special leaves or recommendations for advancement.

The one area in which objective indicators of possible discrimination were investigated failed to reveal significant differences in the treatment of blacks and whites. That is, members of both races for whom a Report and Disposition of Offense was filed were treated equally by those responsible for awarding punishment. However, executive officers dismissed more of the charges against blacks than whites and there was a tendency for more courts-martial to be awarded whites than blacks. As was pointed out earlier, there was no way of verifying whether the offense committed by the black and white pairs were equivalent. Thus, equality of treatment in non-judicial punishment has not been established; only that there is no evidence of discrimination against blacks.

The written comments demonstrated that black personnel in their first enlistment generally believe that military justice is tilted to favor whites. Interestingly, this belief was shared by many whites; indeed, more than those who felt reverse discrimination was being practiced. Because of the agreement of white personnel, the Navy cannot overlook the high probability that inequities in job assignments, opportunities for advancement and discipline do occur. These incidents may not be frequent but their effect is profound since most minority members have come to believe that discrimination in the Navy is ubiquitous.

Many comments also demonstrated a lack of understanding between members of the two races. Some whites didn't comprehend that blacks felt insulted by the labels applied to their race and blacks interpreted the preference of whites to socialize exclusively with other whites as segregation. This is an area in which the Navy's Race Relations teams are attempting to effect attitude changes. In the meantime, racial slurs should not be tolerated wherever they may occur. This includes the oral language of noncommissioned and commissioned officers and written language on bulkhead walls. It is virtually impossible to convince minorities that the Navy is nondiscriminatory when such speech is tolerated in career personnel.

Recommendations for alleviating the situations apparent from this study are difficult to formulate and implement. Because no evidence

of institutional racism was uncovered, no major policy changes are indicated. Instead, commands need to become more aware of the particular problems disturbing their personnel. This could be accomplished through periodic anonymous surveys with open-ended questions or by bringing small groups of enlisted men of both races together in an appropriate nonthreatening forum. Better communication channels through which information could flow, both up and down the chain of command, might alleviate problems arising from misunderstanding and also identify developing areas of trouble.

One problem which appeared universal was lack of information concerning the rationale for awarding different punishments for seemingly identical offenses. The Report of the Task Force on the Administration of Military Justice recommended that a minority representative be present at all Captain's Masts involving blacks. This recommendation should be extended to all disciplinary masts, regardless of the race of the offender. In addition, a white observer should be assigned also, since many whites in this study failed to understand disciplinary actions involving minorities and felt reverse discrimination was operating. These observers must be peers of those accused under Article 15 in order to function effectively as believable reporters of mast proceedings. This assignment as a mast observer should be brief (a single day or week) so that a maximum number of personnel may be exposed to and possibly deterred by the experience. It is recognized that the Senior Enlisted Advisor routinely attends Captain's Mast aboard some ships and that witnesses frequently observe the proceedings of several cases. However, the findings of this study attest to the failure of current efforts to close the gulf between what actually occurs and what is believed to have occurred at disciplinary mast.

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APPENDIX A

TABLE 1

Population and Sample Statistics  
For Ships Used in Study

Type of Ship <sup>a</sup>	Fleet	No. in Enlisted Ship's Company	No. of Blacks in First Enlistment	No. of Blacks Going to XO or CO Mast	No. of Black Offenders in Study <sup>b</sup>
AD-14	P	831	30	2	2
AD-15	P	800	19	11	9
AD-18	A	675	48	25	9
AD-19	A	825	60	14	10
AD-27	A	640	19	3	3
AE-32	P	315	15	1	1
AE-33	P	309	17	7	5
AE-34	A	308	40	17	9
AF-52	A	195	17	9	5
AFS-7	P	367	14	4	3
AO-52	P	221	16	6	5
AO-58	P	215	13	10	5
AO-64	P	210	14	2	2
AOR-1	P	350	12	5	5
AOR-5	P	352	25	12	12
AR-5	A	658	28	10	4
AR-6	P	745	20	9	8
AR-8	P	730	40	9	8
AS-12	P	786	23	4	4
AS-37	P	1083	20	3	3
CLG-6	P	900	65	9	8
CVA-14	P	1583	60	6	6
CVA-62	A	2460	161	32	18

(Appendix A continued on next page)

## APPENDIX A (Continued)

TABLE 1 (continued)

Type of Ship <sup>a</sup>	Fleet	No. in Enlisted Ship's Company	No. of Blacks in First Enlistment	No. of Blacks Going to XO or CO Mast	No. of Black Offenders in Study <sup>b</sup>
CVA-64	P	2437	174	36	14
CVAN-65	P	2673	170	60	28
DD-717	P	261	17	6	6
DD-787	P	245			2
DD-788	P	256	19	7	5
DD-790	P	235	6	3	2
DD-839	A	260	20	9	6
DD-841	A	266	20	6	6
DD-866	A	250	10	4	3
DD-878	A	252	14	7	4
DD-951	P	256	9	4	3
DDG-2	A	318	20	7	6
DDG-7	P	316	15	3	2
DDG-8	P	295	7	3	2
DDG-11	A	330	12	6	2
DE-1044	A	204	11	5	5
DE-1083	P	236	12	4	4
DEG-1	P	245	9	3	2
DLG-28	A	409	13	7	4
DLG-30	P	414	9	4	4
DLGN-35	P	506	24	4	3
LCC-11	P	416	19	6	6
LKA-112	P	276	6	2	2
LKA-114	P	293	9	5	2
LPA-248	P	369	14	2	2
LPD-2	P	375	13	6	5
LPD-5	P	384	9	3	3

(Appendix A continued on next page)

APPENDIX A (continued)

TABLE 1 (continued)

Type of Ship <sup>a</sup>	Fleet	No. in Enlisted Ship's Company	No. of Blacks in First Enlistment	No. of Blacks Going To XO or CO Mast	No. of Black Offenders in Study <sup>b</sup>
LPD-7	P	383	10	3	3
LPD-8	P	387	13	3	3
LPD-11	A	407	20	13	9
LPD-15	A	412	38	18	8
LPH-2	P	570	22	6	5
LSD-28	P	281	9	3	3
LSD-34	A	311	17	9	6
LSD-35	P	285			2
LST-1182	P	208			2
LST-1192	A	214	15	9	6

<sup>a</sup>Ships' classifications and symbols:

AD Destroyer Tender  
 AE Ammunition Ship  
 AF Store Ship  
 AO Oiler  
 AR Repair Ship  
 AS Submarine Tender  
 CLG Guided Missile Light Carrier  
 CVA Attack Aircraft Carrier  
 DD Destroyer  
 DE Escort Ship  
 DLG Guided Missile Frigate  
 LCC Amphibious Command Ship  
 LKA Amphibious Cargo Ship  
 LPA Amphibious Transport  
 LPD Amphibious Transport Dock  
 LPH Amphibious Assault Ship  
 LSD Dock Landing Ship  
 LST Tank Landing Ship

<sup>b</sup>The number of black offenders represents one-fourth of the sample aboard a ship and is equal to the number of white offenders, black non-offenders and white nonoffenders.

(Appendix A continued on next page)

APPENDIX A (continued)

TABLE 2

Demographic Factors and Test Scores for Blacks and Whites and Offenders and Nonoffenders

Variable	Black		White		Difference Between Means		Offender		Nonoffender		Difference Between Means
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
Months Aboard	14.68	10.51	15.84	9.87	-1.16*		15.62	9.64	14.89	10.73	0.73
Months in Division	12.01	9.38	14.22	9.53	-2.21**		13.25	9.14	12.98	9.88	0.27
Current Pay Grade	2.86	0.89	2.94	0.81	-0.08 <sup>a</sup>		2.79	0.86	3.02	0.82	-0.23 <sup>a</sup>
Highest Pay Grade	2.89	0.86	2.98	0.80	-0.09 <sup>a</sup>		2.86	0.82	3.01	0.84	-0.15 <sup>a</sup>
Years of Education	11.80	1.60	11.64	1.27	0.16*		11.56	1.65	11.87	1.18	-0.31**
Age	20.67	1.98	20.67	1.61	0.00		20.46	1.74	20.88	1.85	-0.42**
GCT	44.67	8.48	51.44	9.02	-6.77**		47.92	9.15	48.21	9.62	-0.29
ARI	44.61	6.58	50.56	8.12	-5.95**		47.39	7.98	47.83	7.95	-0.44
MECH	42.03	6.10	48.96	7.56	-6.93**		45.66	7.95	45.40	7.65	0.26
CLER	47.35	9.20	51.42	9.44	-4.07**		49.34	9.48	49.46	9.60	-0.12
SHOP	43.60	6.33	50.17	7.65	-6.57**		47.02	7.99	46.76	7.50	0.26
ETST	46.99	8.52	51.84	9.34	-4.85**		48.91	9.15	49.96	9.35	-1.05*

<sup>a</sup>While the differences between means were tested for significance for all other variables, the chi square statistic was applied to the distributions of pay grade. The differences between the current and highest pay grade of blacks and whites were significant at the .05 level and those between offenders and nonoffenders at the .01 level.

\*p < .05

\*\*p < .01

(Appendix A continued on next page)



APPENDIX A (continued)

TABLE 3

Number and Percentage of Offenses Committed by Blacks and Whites

Offense Classification and <sup>a</sup> Article Numbers in UCMJ	Blacks		Whites		Total	
	N	% Within Class	N	% Within Class	N	%
Class 1: Major Military/ Civilian Crimes--Articles 77, 80-81, 107-109, 115, 118-132 and 134	38	44	12	56	86	13
Class 2: Drug related offenses <sup>b</sup>	0		0		0	
Class 3: Confrontation or Status Offenses--Articles 89-92, 95, 116-117	79	56	24	44	141	22
Class 4: Other Military or Civilian Offenses-- Articles 103, 111-113	3	20	1	80*	15	2
Class 5: Unauthorized Absense--Articles 85-87	204	50	63	50	406	63
Total	324		100	324	648	100

<sup>a</sup>These classifications were developed by the Task Force on the Administration of Military Justice in the Armed Forces (1972).

<sup>b</sup>During this period drug-related offenses were usually coded as Article 134 in Class 1. Eighteen blacks and 29 whites in this study were charged with violating Article 134, which is defined as: "all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital"

\*p < .05

APPENDIX A (continued)

TABLE 4

Comparison of Premast Restraint and Comments on the Report  
And Disposition of Offense for Blacks and Whites

	Black		White	
	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
<b>Premast Restraint</b>				
Confined for Safekeeping	1	1	0	0
No Restrictions	126	92	133	92
Restricted to Command	9	7	11	8
Total	136	100	144	100
<b>Division Officer's Comments</b>				
Recommended No Punitive Action	28	10	16	6
Recommended Light Punishment	67	23	71	25
Recommended Dismissal of Charge	24	8	22	8
No Recommendation	170	59	171	61
Total	289	100	280	100
<b>Recommendation of Preliminary Inquiry Report</b>				
Dispose of Case at Mast	181	64	194	70
Refer to Court-Martial	1	0	0	0
No Punitive Action Necessary	45	16	33	12
Other	58	20	49	18
Total	285	100	276	100

(Appendix A continued on next page)

APPENDIX A (continued)

TABLE 5

Disposition of Offenses

Action	Black Offender N	Black Offender %	White Offender N	White Offender %	Difference Between %
Dismissed by Executive Officer	84	25.9	62	19.1	6.8*
Referred to Captain's Mast	240	74.1	262	80.9	6.8*
Total	324	100.0	324	100.0	
-----					
Action by Commanding Officer					
Dismissed by CO	18	7.5	24	9.2	1.7
All punishment suspended	28	11.7	32	12.2	0.5
Admonition or Reprimand	7	2.9	2	0.8	2.1
Deprivation of liberty <sup>a</sup>	85	35.4	82	31.3	4.1
Deprivation of pay <sup>b</sup>	28	11.7	18	6.9	4.8
Confinement on bread and water	4	1.7	1	0.4	1.3
Reduction in pay grade	8	3.3	8	3.0	0.3
Deprivation of liberty and pay	39	16.2	55	21.0	4.8
Deprivation of pay and reduction in pay grade	0	0.0	5	1.9	1.9
Deprivation of liberty and reduction in pay grade	7	2.9	10	3.8	0.9
Deprivation of liberty and pay and reduction in pay grade	4	1.7	6	2.3	0.6
Miscellaneous combinations of above punishments	8	3.3	10	3.8	0.5
Awarded Special Court Martial	0	0.0	1	0.4	0.4
Awarded Summary Court Martial	4	1.7	8	3.1	1.4
Total	240	100.0	262	100.1	

<sup>a</sup> Restricted to command, correctional custody and extra duty.

<sup>b</sup> Forfeiture of pay and detention of pay.

\*p < .05

(Appendix A continued on next page)

APPENDIX A (continued)

TABLE 6

Comparison Between Group Means for Number of  
Times Offenders were Sent to Captain's Mast

Sample	N	Times Sent to Mast	
		Mean	SD
Blacks in Atlantic Fleet	123	1.52	1.12
Blacks in Pacific Fleet	201	1.38	1.43
Difference		.14	
Whites in Atlantic Fleet	123	1.76	1.47
Whites in Pacific Fleet	201	1.24	1.29
Difference		.52**	
Atlantic Fleet Personnel	246	1.64	1.31
Pacific Fleet Personnel	402	1.31	1.36
Difference		.33**	
All Blacks	324	1.43	1.32
All Whites	324	1.44	1.38
Difference		.01	

\*\*p < .01

(Appendix A continued on next page)

APPENDIX A (continued)

TABLE 7

Comparison Between Group Means for  
Number of Times Put on Report

Sample	N	Times Put on Report	
		Mean	SD
Black Offenders	324	3.42	3.22
White Offenders	324	2.65	2.40
Difference Between Means		0.77**	
Black Nonoffenders	324	0.81	1.31
White Nonoffenders	324	0.39	0.92
Difference Between Means		0.42**	
All Blacks	648	2.11	2.70
All Whites	648	1.52	2.14
Difference Between Means		0.59**	
Black Offenders - Pacific	201	3.62	3.57
Black Offenders - Atlantic	123	3.09	2.52
Difference Between Means		0.53	
White Offenders - Pacific	201	2.50	2.32
White Offenders - Atlantic	123	2.91	2.27
Difference Between Means		0.41	
All Offenders - Pacific	402	3.05	1.54
All Offenders - Atlantic	246	3.00	1.55
Difference Between Means		0.05	

Note.--There was a significant ( $< .05$ ) interaction between race and fleet for the offenders.

\*\*p  $< .01$

(Appendix A continued on next page)

APPENDIX A (continued)

TABLE 8

Significant Main Effects and Interactions  
For Items in the Attitude Evaluation Form

Categorized Questionnaire Items	Significant Main Effects			Significant Interactions
	Black/White	Offender/Nonoffender	Atlantic/Pacific	
<u>Job Satisfaction and Motivation</u>				
6. How satisfied are you with your present job?	**	**	NS	None
7. How do you feel your present job matches your interests and abilities?	**	**	NS	Offense by Fleet*
8. Given a chance to choose any rating in the Navy, would you choose the same rating you are in now?	NS	NS	*	None
12. In your Command, what chance do you have to show what you can do?	NS	**	NS	Race by Offense*
13. Whenever there is a low-class or dirty job to be done in your division, is it usually assigned to you?	*	NS	NS	None
11. How hard are you trying to improve your own work performance?	**	**	NS	None
<u>Supervisor Supportiveness</u>				
10. How do you feel about making a suggestion to your LPO about your work or any improvements in the division?	**	NS	NS	None
20. How do you feel after your supervising Petty Officer has criticized you about some poor work you have performed?	NS	NS	NS	None

(Appendix A continued on next page)

APPENDIX A (continued)

TABLE 8 (continued)

Categorized Questionnaire Items	Significant Main Effects			Significant Interactions
	Black/White	Offender/Nonoffender	Atlantic/Pacific	
25. How much effort does your LPO make to prepare you for the next advancement examination? (Such as: ordering courses, administering practical factors, being assigned to work which is related to advancement, etc.)	NS	**	NS	None
26. How much effort is made by your LPO to encourage all of his men to advance themselves?	NS	NS	NS	Race by Offense by Fleet*
29. In general, my LPO is usually aware of his men's problems and offers help whenever possible.	*	NS	NS	None
30. My LPO shows his men that he respects them as men with dignity and that he is proud to be associated with them.	NS	*	NS	None
31. When assigning duties, giving rewards and punishments, does your supervising Petty Officer treat his men equally?	**	**	NS	None
32. Are the men in your division told the reasons why your LPO changes their jobs or work assignments?	**	**	NS	None

(Appendix A continued on next page)



APPENDIX A (continued)

TABLE 8 (continued)

Categorized Questionnaire Items	Significant Main Effects			Significant Interactions
	Black/White	Offender/Nonoffender	Atlantic/Pacific	
35. How much effort is made by your LPO in stopping a report chit and handling it at his division level?	*	**	NS	None
36. How many of your present Petty Officers are the kind you can place a great deal of trust and confidence in?	**	**	NS	None
37. Would your supervising Petty Officer back you up and stand behind you if you committed a relatively minor offense?	**	**	NS	None
41. How often does your supervising Petty Officer chew you out because he is dissatisfied with your work performance?	**	NS	NS	None
42. How much favoritism does your LPO show in reprimanding his men?	NS	*	NS	Offense by Fleet*
43. If you committed a minor offense, would your division LPO offer you the opportunity to accept Division EMI reprimand instead of sending you to Captain's Mast?	**	**	NS	None
<b>Race</b>				
15. Generally speaking, black servicemen know as much about their rights under the UCMJ as other servicemen.	**	NS	NS	None

(Appendix A continued on next page)

APPENDIX A (continued)

TABLE 8 (continued)

Categorized Questionnaire Items	Significant Main Effects			Significant Interactions
	Black/White	Offender/Nonoffender	Atlantic/Pacific	
17. In general, the black and white servicemen in this Command get along well and respect each other.	**	NS	NS	Race by Fleet**
19. Do you feel that the black sailor is as much a part of the division as the non-black sailor?	**	*	NS	None
21. Do you feel that any discriminatory practices exist in the disciplining of black servicemen in your Command?	**	NS	**	None
23. If a black serviceman and a white serviceman are equally qualified for the same job, do you feel that the black serviceman is given the same chance for that job?	**	NS	NS	None
38. In general, I feel that racial prejudice has very little or no effect on the punishment awarded at Captain's Mast.	**	NS	NS	None
39. An offense committed by a black serviceman is generally processed and taken to Captain's Mast faster than one committed by another serviceman.	**	NS	NS	None

(Appendix A continued on next page)

APPENDIX A (continued)

TABLE 8 (continued)

Categorized Questionnaire Items	Significant Main Effects			Significant Interactions
	Black/White	Offender/Nonoffender	Atlantic/Pacific	
45. Do you feel that punishment awarded at Captain's Mast in this Command is given to each person on equal basis? (regardless of race or nationality)	**	NS	NS	None
<u>Advancement</u>				
24. How well do you think you could perform the duties of the next higher pay grade?	NS	NS	NS	None
27. What were the results of the last advancement examination you were eligible for, including advancement to pay grade E-3?	NS	NS	NS	None
<u>Other</u>				
40. In your Command, how much information about the UCMJ and the rights and services available to the accused is given to a person who is placed on report?	**	NS	**	None

NS - Not significant

\* $p < .05$

\*\* $p < .01$

(Appendix A continued on next page)

APPENDIX A (continued)

TABLE 9

Mean Intercorrelations of Racial Items with Supervisor and Job Satisfaction Items for Various Subgroups

Racial Items	Sample (N=624 for each group)	Mean Intercorrelation		
		14 Supervisor Items	7 Job Satisfaction Items	7 Other Racial Items
15. Generally speaking, black servicemen know as much about their rights under the UCMJ as other servicemen.	Offender	.10	.08	.30
	Nonoffender	.08	.06	.22
	Black	.12	.08	.17
	White	.04	.04	.16
17. In general, the black and white servicemen in this Command get along well and respect each other.	Offender	.11	.09	.36
	Nonoffender	.11	.09	.26
	Black	.19	.14	.28
	White	.04	.04	.14
19. Do you feel that the black sailor is as much a part of the division as the non-black sailor?	Offender	.13	.14	.39
	Nonoffender	.15	.18	.29
	Black	.23	.22	.27
	White	.04	.06	.13
21. Do you feel that any discriminatory practices exist in the disciplining of black servicemen in your Command?	Offender	.14	.13	.41
	Nonoffender	.09	.08	.31
	Black	.17	.15	.28
	White	.04	.03	.20
23. If a black serviceman and a white serviceman are equally qualified for the same job, do you feel that the black serviceman is given the same chance for that job?	Offender	.16	.14	.41
	Nonoffender	.12	.14	.35
	Black	.18	.17	.27
	White	.07	.06	.15

(Appendix A continued on next page)

APPENDIX A (continued)

TABLE 9 (continued)

Racial Items	Sample (N=624 for each group)	Mean Intercorrelation		
		14 Supervisor Items	7 Job Satis- faction Items	7 Other Racial Items
38. In general, I feel that racial pre- judice has very little or no effect on the punishment awarded at Captain's Mast.	Offender	.10	.12	.36
	Nonoffender	.08	.06	.32
	Black	.11	.10	.32
	White	.06	.04	.20
39. An offense committed by a black serviceman is generally processed and taken to Captain's Mast faster than one committed by another serviceman.	Offender	.12	.12	.40
	Nonoffender	.12	.14	.37
	Black	.15	.16	.30
	White	.06	.05	.16
45. Do you feel that punishment awarded at Captain's Mast in this Command is given to each person on an equal basis, regardless of race or nationality?	Offender	.14	.16	.31
	Nonoffender	.15	.14	.32
	Black	.15	.16	.33
	White	.12	.11	.16

Note.—A correlation of .09 is significantly different from zero at the .05 level.

## APPENDIX B

### Selection of Sample

The enlisted Distribution Report (BUPERS Report 1080/14M) was used to determine quickly how many blacks in their first enlistment were on board the ship. Since a black offender and a black nonoffender were required, the research on the ship would terminate at this point if fewer than two blacks could be located. If sufficient blacks in their first enlistment were on the distribution report, the team noted their names and continued.

The Unit Punishment Book was the next source of data used in defining the sample. It contains a list of all personnel put on report, as well as their division and department, during the current and past calendar years if the report was forwarded to the commanding officer. Thus, it could be determined whether any of the blacks identified from the Enlisted Distribution Report had committed a recorded offense in the past 18 months. If none of them or all of them appeared on the list, no comparison between offenders and nonoffenders could be made and the research aboard the ship was discontinued. The Unit Punishment Book also was used to determine whether a pair of blacks in the same division or, less optimally, in the same department could be located.<sup>7</sup>

The Report and Disposition of Offense (NAVPERS 1626/7) was the third source of data used. This document is kept in the Unit Punishment Book and contains a detailed accounting of the action which led to the man being put on report and the punishment, if any, which resulted. In this manner the severity of the offense was determined as well as the number of reports filed for an offender.

After the paired black offenders/nonoffenders had been identified, steps were taken to find a white pair which was as similar to the blacks as possible. This required that both of the whites be in the same division as the two blacks (this requirement could be waived on smaller ships). In addition, the white offender should have committed an offense of similar severity to that of the black offender and have approximately the same number of prior offenses on his record during the past 18 months. While selection of the white pair involved considerable effort, it could always be accomplished. Thus, no ship with an appropriate pair of blacks was ever eliminated because a parallel white pair could not be located to complete the quartet.

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<sup>7</sup> Ships are divided into departments and departments into divisions based on the type of work performed.

APPENDIX B (continued)

If a man in the sample were away from the ship for any reason at the time the questionnaire was administered, the team would try to contact him on another day. If he were still unavailable, they would leave his form with another member of the quartet, requesting that it be completed by the absent member and returned in the addressed envelope provided. Peers of the missing men were used to make the contact, rather than supervisors, because of the confidential nature of the questionnaire and the possibility that a supervisor would require that it be returned to him after completion. Table 10 presents information concerning the number and percentage of questionnaires left for later completion.

TABLE 10

Return Rate of Attitude Evaluation Forms (AEFs) Left for Absent Members of the Sample by Race and Fleet

Fleet	Number of AEFs Left for Later Completion		Number of AEFs Completed and Returned <sup>a</sup>		Return Rate by Fleet
	Black	White	Black	White	
Atlantic	83	99	73	78	82.9%
Pacific	80	73	60	43	67.3%
Total	163	172	133	121	75.8%
Return Rate by Race			81.6%	70.3%	

<sup>a</sup>Not all of the AEFs returned by mail were used in the analyses. Of the 1296 questionnaires in the samples, 83 percent had been completed under the supervision of the research team.



**APPENDIX C**  
ATTITUDE EVALUATION FORM

Activity \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Your Last Name

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
								2

Your Social Security Number

10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18

1. How many months have you been on board this Activity? (If under 10 write 01, 02, 03, etc.)

19 20

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2. Describe briefly what you do on your job: (Give rate first)

21 22

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\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

3. How many months have you been in your present division?

23 24

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4. How many months have you been under your present supervisor?

25 26

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5. How many men are presently in your division?

1. Less than 10
2. 11-15
3. 16-25
4. 26-50
5. More than 50

27

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6. How satisfied are you with your present job?

1. Thoroughly satisfied
2. Quite satisfied
3. Satisfied enough
4. Not too satisfied
5. Not at all satisfied

28

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7. How do you feel your present job matches your interests and abilities?

1. Very poorly
2. Not too well
3. Fairly well
4. Very well
5. Almost perfectly

29

--

8. Given a chance to choose any rating in the Navy, would you choose the same rating you are in now?

1. Yes
2. No

30

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9. If you answered NO to question #8, which rating would you prefer?

\_\_\_\_\_ Why? \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

31 32 33

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10. How do you feel about making a suggestion to your LPO about your work or any improvements in the division? 34

1. Pretty bad - he resents them
2. Not too good - he seems to resent them
3. Good enough - he shows a little interest
4. Fairly good - he shows some interest
5. Very good - he shows real interest

11. How hard are you trying to improve your own work performance? 35

1. As hard as I possibly can
2. Quite hard
3. Fairly hard
4. Not very hard
5. Not trying at all

12. In your command, what chance do you have to show what you can do? 36

1. No chance at all
2. Not much of a chance
3. A fairly good chance
4. A very good chance
5. An excellent chance

13. Whenever there is a low-class or dirty job to be done in your division, is it usually assigned to you? 37

1. Yes
2. No

14. If you answered YES to #13, why do you think this is so? 38

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15. Generally speaking, Black servicemen know as much about their rights under the UCMJ as other servicemen. 39

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Uncertain
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree

16. If your answer was 1 or 2 to question #15, please explain: 40

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17. In general, the Black and White servicemen in this Command get along well and respect each other. 41

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Don't know
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

18. If your answer was 4 or 5 to question #17, can you give some examples of things you have seen or experienced? 42

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19. Do you feel that the Black sailor is as much a part of the division as the non-Black sailor? 43

1. I feel he really belongs
2. He belongs in most ways
3. He belongs in some ways
4. He belongs in very few ways
5. He is never really a part of his division

20. How do you feel after your supervising Petty Officer has criticized you about some poor work you have performed? 44

1. Very bad - he always tries to put me down
2. Fairly bad - he talks as if I should have known better
3. Like I would if any other supervisor criticized me
4. Not bad - he just shows me what I did wrong
5. Not bad at all - his criticisms are usually justified

21. Do you feel that any discriminatory practices exist in the disciplining of Black servicemen in your Command? 45

1. None at all that I can see
2. Not many--maybe a few
3. About an average amount
4. Quite a lot
5. Don't really know, one way or the other

22. Can you cite an example of discriminatory practice in your Command? (Please DO NOT give names) 46

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23. If a Black serviceman and a White serviceman are equally qualified for the same job, do you feel that the Black serviceman is given the same chance for that job? 47

1. Yes
2. No

24. How well do you think you could perform the duties of the next higher pay grade? 48

1. Not at all well
2. Not very well
3. Well enough--I would perform adequately
4. Pretty well
5. Extremely well

25. How much effort does your LPO make to prepare you for the next advancement examination? (Such as: ordering courses, administering practical factors, being assigned to work which is related to advancement, etc.) 49
1. Every possible effort
  2. A lot of effort
  3. A fair amount of effort
  4. Not much effort
  5. Very little effort
26. How much effort is made by your LPO to encourage all of his men to advance themselves? 50
1. Very little effort
  2. Not much effort
  3. A fair amount of effort
  4. A lot of effort
  5. Every possible effort
27. What were the results of the last advancement examination you were eligible for, including advancement to Pay Grade E-3? 51
1. Not recommended to participate
  2. Not eligible to participate
  3. Failed examination
  4. Passed examination but not advanced
  5. Passed examination and will be advanced
28. If you were not recommended for advancement, please state the reason: 52
- 
- 
29. In general, my LPO is usually aware of his men's problems and offers help whenever possible. 53
1. Strongly disagree
  2. Disagree
  3. Uncertain
  4. Agree
  5. Strongly agree
30. My LPO shows his men that he respects them as men with dignity and that he is proud to be associated with them. 54
1. Strongly agree
  2. Agree
  3. Undecided
  4. Disagree
  5. Strongly disagree
31. When assigning duties, giving rewards and punishments, does your supervising Petty Officer treat all his men equally? 55
1. Almost every time
  2. Usually
  3. Occasionally
  4. Seldom
  5. Almost never
32. Are the men in your division told the reasons why your LPO changes their jobs or work assignments? 56
1. Never
  2. Seldom
  3. Occasionally
  4. Frequently
  5. Almost all the time

33. How many times have you been placed on report at this Command?  
(If never, so state)

57 58

34. For what reasons were you most often placed on report?

59

1. Unauthorized absence
2. Disobedience of orders
3. Disrespect or insubordination
4. Failure to be at appointed place of duty
5. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

35. How much effort is made by your LPO in stopping a report chit and handling it at his division level?

60

1. Every possible effort
2. A lot of effort
3. A fair amount of effort
4. Not much effort
5. Very little effort

36. How many of your present petty officers are the kind you can place a great deal of trust and confidence in?

61

1. None of them
2. Not very many of them
3. About half of them
4. Most of them
5. All of them

37. Would your supervising Petty Officer back you up and stand behind you if you committed a relatively minor offense?

62

1. He would almost always back me
2. He would usually back me
3. He would back me about half the time
4. He would back me occasionally
5. He would hardly ever back me

38. In general, I feel that racial prejudice has very little or no effect on the punishment awarded at Captain's Mast?

63

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Undecided
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree

39. An offense committed by a Black serviceman is generally processed and taken to Captain's Mast faster than one committed by another serviceman.

64

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Uncertain
4. Disagree
5. Strongly disagree

40. In your Command, how much information about the UCMJ and the rights and services available to the accused is given to a person who is placed on report? 65
1. Not very much information
  2. A little information
  3. Uncertain--I don't know
  4. A lot of information
  5. A great deal of information
41. How often does your supervising Petty Officer chew you out because he is dissatisfied with your work performance? 66
1. Almost all the time
  2. Frequently
  3. Occasionally
  4. Seldom
  5. Almost never
42. How much favoritism does your LPO show in reprimanding his men? 67
1. Almost none at all
  2. Not much
  3. About an average amount
  4. Quite a lot
  5. A very great deal
43. If you committed a minor offense, would your division LPO offer you the opportunity to accept division EMI/reprimand instead of sending you to Captain's Mast? 68
1. Definitely would
  2. I think they would
  3. I am not sure
  4. I think they would not
  5. I definitely think they would not
44. In your division what methods other than sending a person to Captain's Mast are used to handle minor offenses? 69
- 
- 
45. Do you feel that punishment awarded at Captain's Mast in this Command, is given to each person on an equal basis? (Regardless of race or nationality) 70
1. Yes, almost always
  2. Yes, usually
  3. Sometimes yes, sometimes no
  4. Hardly ever
  5. Almost never
46. If you answered 4 or 5 to question #45, please explain: 71
- 
-

OFFENSE RECORD

Activity \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

1. Last Name:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
								1

2. Social Security Number:

10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18

3. Current Rate:

19	20	21	22	23

4. Highest Rate Held:

24	25	26	27	28

5. Race: 1. Negro  
2. Other

29
<input type="checkbox"/>

6. Date of Current Offense:  
(Block #30--Month (1-9--Jan-Sep/O-Oct/J-Nov/B-Dec)  
(Block #31--Year (0-9))

30	31

7. Nature of Offense (UCMJ Article Number):

32	33	34	35	36	37
I.			II.		

8. Pre-Mast Restraint:  
1. Confined for Safekeeping  
2. No Restriction  
3. Restricted to Command

38
<input type="checkbox"/>

9. Number of months active service (to date of offense):

39	40

10. Number of months at present command (to date of offense):

41	42

11. Highest school grade completed:

43	44

12. GCT

45	46

13. ARI

47	48

14. NECH

49	50

15. CLER

51	52

16. SHOP

53	54

17. LTST

55	56

18. Age (years)

57	58



19. Marital Status:

1. Married
2. Single
3. Other

59

20. Disciplinary Record:

1. Number of Captain's Masts
2. Number of Courts-Martial

60 61

21. Preliminary Inquiry Report:

1. Dispose of case at mast
2. Refer to Courts-Martial
3. No punitive action required
4. Other

62

22. Division Officer's Comments:

1. Recommend no punitive action
2. Recommend light punishment
3. Recommend dismissal of charge(s)
4. No recommendation
5. No comments offered by Division Officer

63

23. Action of Executive Officer:

1. Dismissal
2. Refer to Captain's Mast

64

24. Action of Commanding Officer:

1. Dismissed
2. Dismissed with warning
3. Admonition: Oral/Writing
4. Reprimand: Oral/Writing
5. Restricted to Command
6. Forfeiture of pay
7. Detention of pay
8. Confinement to command
9. Confinement on bread and water
10. Correctional custody
11. Reduction to next inferior pay grade
12. Reduction to \_\_\_\_\_
13. Extra duties
14. Punishment suspended
15. Recommended for trial by GCM
16. Awarded Special Court
17. Awarded Summary Court

65 66 67 68 69 70

25. Where Captain's Mast was involved, appeal rights explained, understood and initiated by accused.

1. Yes
2. No

71

26. Appeal submitted by accused:

1. Yes
2. No

72

27. Final results of appeal:

1. Allowed
2. Denied

73

Recorded by \_\_\_\_\_

OFFENSE RECORD

Activity \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

1. Last Name: 

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
								1

2. Social Security Number: 

10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18

3. Current Rate: 

19	20	21	22	23

4. Highest Rate Held: 

24	25	26	27	28

5. Race: 1. Negro 2. Other 

29

6. Date of Current Offense:  
(Block #30--Month (1-9--Jan-Sep/0-Oct/J-Nov/B-Dec) 

30	31

  
(Block #31--Year (0-9)

7. Nature of Offense (UCMJ Article Number): 

32	33	34

 1. 

--	--	--

 11. 

35	36	37

8. Pre-Mast Restraint:  
1. Confined for Safekeeping  
2. No Restriction  
3. Restricted to Command 

38

9. Number of months active service (to date of offense): 

39	40

10. Number of months at present command (to date of offense): 

41	42

11. Highest school grade completed: 

43	44

12. GCI 

45	46

13. ARI 

47	48

14. MECH 

49	50

15. CLER 

51	52

16. SHIP 

53	54

17. LIST 

55	56

18. Age (years) 

57	58

## APPENDIX E

While visiting ships on the east and west coast, the research team of chief Personnelmen observed many situations tangential to the project but, nonetheless, of interest and value to the Navy. The most vivid single observation was the difference noted between pairs of ships of the same classification, commissioning year and homeport location. In physical terms, these ships were identical yet the "feel" aboard each was often in contrast. Soon the team found themselves writing in terms of "good ships" and "bad ships" in the logs kept of the data gathering phase of the research. Usually, but not invariably, these differences were reflected in unusually low or high rates of disciplinary actions.

Upon reviewing the team's logs, it became apparent that certain recurring observations were made aboard "bad" ships. Violation of the chain of command was the most common theme. For example, one tender had over 1,000 entries in the Unit Punishment Book during an eighteen month period. Upon inquiry, it was determined that the executive officer demanded that all report chits reach his desk, bypassing the prerogative of lower supervisory personnel to impose extra instruction or administer a verbal reprimand to minor offenders. Low morale among the chief petty officers was rampant due to the preemption of their disciplinary power. The crew sensed the weakened state of the chiefs and reacted by ignoring orders and going directly to division officers and department heads with requests or complaints. Meanwhile, aboard the "good" sister ship, less than 100 offenses had been logged in the Unit Punishment Book during this period of time and a responsible middle management was performing its function. There were no racial overtones to disciplinary actions aboard either of these ships.

A pair of carriers, one having twice as many black offenders as the other, was also noteworthy. The executive officer on the "bad" ship had set up a permanent disciplinary investigation group which actually initiated report chits. The legal officer was routinely bypassed when reports were forwarded from department heads. The executive officer used his investigative team to search for evidence leading to multiple charges against those put on report, particularly blacks. On several instances, men were sent to mast day after day for the same offense. On the "good" sister carrier less than 20 percent of those put on report were sent to Captain's Mast. Each case was investigated by the department head, division officer and the legal officer, all of whom were required to attend mast with the offender and present their findings. The offender was asked to explain his behavior and rebuttals were allowed. The captain reviewed the evidence orally and presented his rationale for the punishment awarded. The research team, who had been invited to attend mast, noted in their log the thoroughness of the proceedings and the unhurried consideration of this Captain who had over 5,000 men under his command.

Another factor noted aboard several ships with higher rates of black offenders than their sister ships was racial preconceptions. Executive officers were encountered on several ships who considered all nonrated blacks incipient troublemakers. These executive officers felt the research was unnecessary because the solution to disciplinary problems among blacks in their first enlistment was so obvious--don't enlist low aptitude blacks and discharge those already in the Navy when they violate the UCMJ. Reportedly, this attitude was vocally shared by a Senior Chief Petty Officer in charge of the deck department (on another ship) who appeared to have disrupted the flow of communication both between the races and up and down the chain of command.

To summarize, the research team noted the following conditions aboard "good" ships: enforcement of the chain of command; establishment of a disciplinary review system; strong commanding officer who ensured that his subordinates knew what was expected of them; and good communication channels. "Bad" ships were typified as having inexperienced petty officers, lack of respect for superiors and personnel wandering around without duties to perform.

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