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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN NIGERIA, ZAIRE
AND ETHIOPIA AND THEIR IMPACT ON U.S.
NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

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30 May 1974

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USAWC MILITARY RESEARCH PROGRAM PAPER

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN NIGERIA, ZAIRE AND ETHIOPIA
AND THEIR IMPACT ON US NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH REPORT

by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND SCOPE

The phrase, civil-military relations, in this paper means the interactions between the political institutions and the military establishment in any country. This study is limited to three countries in what is generally called Sub-saharan Africa or Black Africa: they are the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Republic of Zaire, and the Empire of Ethiopia. I chose these three countries primarily because I believe that they are probably the most important countries in the area as far as US national security interests are concerned. They are representative of different historical and colonial backgrounds (British, Belgian and independent) and, also, of geographical locations on the continent. Each is distinct in the matter of civil-military relations. Each differs in its relations with the US and each, likewise, has a special significance for US security interests. The purpose of this paper is: 1) to attempt to describe and compare the civil-military situation in each country; 2) to cite major American involvements; and 3) to indicate the impact these countries have on US national security interests.

SOME GENERALIZATIONS ABOUT CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Professor Janowitz identifies five basic types of civil-military relations which have become classic determinants in most of the

literature in the field. They are: 1) authoritarian-personal control, 2) authoritarian-mass party, 3) democratic competitive and semi-competitive systems, 4) civil-military coalition, and 5) military oligarchy.¹

The first type is an authoritarian regime or a personal autocracy usually based on very personal and/or traditional power. In the authoritarian-mass party type the military "is no more than a mark of sovereignty and is excluded from domestic politics by the power of civilian authoritarian political power" usually rooted in one party under very strong "personal leadership, without parliamentary institutions." In the democratic-competitive type there are "competing civilian institutions and power groups, as well as a mass political party which dominates domestic politics but permits a measure of political competition." When the military becomes a political bloc, as such, and supports a civilian party and/or other bureaucratic power groups, Janowitz calls this a "civil-military coalition." The fifth and last type is a military oligarchy "where the military sets itself up as the political ruling group."²

Professor Huntington categorizes civil-military relations on three major levels:

Civil-military relations in any society reflect the over-all nature and level of development of the society and its political system. The key question is the extent to which military men and interests are differentiated from nonmilitary men and interests. This differentiation may take place on three levels: 1) the relation between the armed forces as a whole and society as a whole; 2) the relation between the leadership of the armed forces (the officer corps) as an elite

group and other elite groups; and 3) the relation between the commanders of the armed forces and the top political leaders of society. . . . Thus, civil-military relations involve a multiplicity of relationships between military men, institutions, and interests, on one hand, and diverse and often conflicting nonmilitary men, institutions, and interests on the other. It is not a one-to-one relationship but a one-among-many relationship.³

These two types of civil-military relations are the most widely accepted. I see in both of them the assumption that in any form of civil-military intermix there is a political role for the military, whether or not the military is actually ruling. The "military institution" in the developing nations, and especially in Africa, is a political factor and the question is then, not whether the military is political, but to what degree. As Feit notes,

One of the most potent misconceptions about military rule is to think of it only as rule by military officers. Rule by officers alone is both brief and rare . . . Armies that take power can seldom hold it on their own for long; they soon seek allies among the civilian administrators and form with them what may be termed a "military-administrative regime."⁴

The question becomes, what degree of political power does the military possess in the political system or the government of the country. In all countries there is an intermix of civilian-military political power. Never does one govern at the exclusion of the other.⁵ It is from this premise that I approach the subject of this paper. It is sometimes next to impossible to delineate clearly between civilian and military rule. In the three countries of my choosing I will attempt to ascertain where each government appears to fit in the spectrum ranging from predominantly military rule.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN AFRICA

Most countries in Sub-saharan Africa became independent soon after 1957. The military was a colonial phenomenon and it had little or no influence on the independence movement as such. As in every other area of life in the new nations, the military had to convert itself or be converted into an authentic element of the nation serving its new-found Black leadership.

Gutteridge says that the "armies of Africa today are, therefore, the direct descendants of the colonial forces raised in the territories by imperial rulers" and, basically, a Western-type army has survived in Africa.⁶ But, beyond that generalization enormous changes have taken place, especially in relation to political behavior. Subordination of the military to civilian institutions was taken for granted.⁷ Then also, there was the relatively quick rise of military men as leaders in Africa and soon military institutions took on a dominant role in the new nations. Zolberg describes the situation in late 1972:

About half of the new states in Black Africa have remained uninterruptedly under civilian rule while in the other half each has experienced at least one coup in which armed forces--military and police--have played a prominent role. Most of the coups were followed by the establishment of some form of military government. Sometimes the original coup leaders were overthrown by others; sometimes they returned to their barracks, hovering about the seats of power; sometimes they or others abruptly interrupted "civilianization." At present, men in uniform govern approximately one-third of the countries in the region; in a few cases, they have done so for over half of their country's history as an independent state.⁸

Since Zolberg's article the Republic of Niger and Ethiopia have had military interventions.

Usually when the military has taken over a government in Africa, they fill a few key posts with officers, and then they turn to well-chosen civil servants to carry on the regular business of running the machinery of the government, even at the highest level.

In general, the African military in comparison with civilians have been more "detrribalized, westernized, modernized, integrated, and cohesive" as an institution.⁹

The army is usually the most disciplined agency in the state. It often enjoys a greater sense of national identity than other institutions. In technical skills, including the capacity to coerce and to communicate, the army is the most modern agency in the country. . . . A more vivid symbol of sovereignty than the flag, the constitution, or the president, the army often evokes¹⁰ more popular sentiment than a political leader.

CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES

1. Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations, p. 5.
2. Ibid., pp. 5-7.
3. Samuel P. Huntington, "Civil-Military Relations," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 2, p. 487.
4. Edward Feit, "The Rule of the 'Iron Surgeons': Military Government in Spain and Ghana," Comparative Politics, July, 1969, p. 487.
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CHAPTER II

NIGERIA

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Independence from Great Britain came to Nigeria on October 1, 1960; the Federal Republic (and the Constitution) exists since October 1, 1963; and military rule began in 1966. The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces is the chief executive and serves as the head of the Federal Military Government (FMG) which comprises the Supreme Military Council (SMC) with 19 members and the Federal Executive Council (FEC) with 21 members. The legislative bodies (Senate and House of Representatives) were dissolved in 1966 and all legislative powers since that time are vested in the FMG. The Judiciary remains intact as the Supreme Court and State High Courts.¹

Nigeria is by far the most populous country in Africa with approximately 80 million people² who have a wide variety of "customs, languages and character." There are some 250 ethnic groups.³

From the outset of independence, Nigeria has been vulnerable to tribal and regional tensions; especially important was the North-South conflict. The North was more densely populated, Muslim and less developed. The Ibo ethnic group was prominent throughout the Republic which caused a constant fear of their domination both in the North and the South. A small group of army officers, mostly Ibos, overthrew the Government in January, 1966, assassinated the prime minister and premiers of the Northern regions and assumed power;

this confirmed the fear and mistrust of practically all the other Nigerians. Within six months a second military coup brought to power LTC (now General) Yakubu Gowon as Head of the FMG and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.⁴

A quick look at the military prior to the 1966 coups reveal that its size was very small (10,500 men), especially, for such a populous country. In 1969, sixty out of eighty-one Nigerian officers were Ibos, ten were Yorubas and the remaining eleven were from the North. A quota system was established in 1962 allowing fifty percent from the North. By this time many of the Ibos had already reached the rank of major or above. Most Nigerian officers had originally been trained in Britain. Even though a few of these officers were Northerners, generally, they were outshone by their Ibo rivals, who had had superior educational opportunities.⁵ During the pre-1966 coup period "the Army was widely regarded as the least tribalistic of Nigerian institutions."⁶ Gutteridge insists that even in "1961-62 the Nigerian Army was coming to be seen as an important factor in the federal power struggle." Very early the intimate friendship of officers like Aguiyi-Ironsi and Ojukwu with the politicians of the Ibos was noted. Gutteridge says that "there is no denying the atmosphere of conspiracy and counter-conspiracy . . . generated by these essentially tribal fears."⁷

Panter-Brick takes the position that the relationship of the military to the politicians in Nigeria was one of revulsion. The military "during the early days of their power . . . assumed that

the whole business of politics was somehow dirty and that the evils in the system could be attributed to the politicians and their ways." The military believed that the politicians were too talkative, that they did not speak the truth and that they concentrated "on the things that divide," whereas they considered themselves as completely opposite in these matters.⁸

When the military took control in early 1966, politics and civil rule, as such, were pushed out for a brief period; the military began to take more power on themselves. General Ironsi's regime "was at pains to declare that it (his regime) was to be thought of as a military and not as a mixed military-civil servant regime." His administration brought a brief period of decreased corruption, peace in the West, and party men became more cordial to each other; even the civil servants, who had been threatened by decrees were less active in causing trouble.⁹

This was short-lived; soon political influence became important in the army and through friendship with ethnic brothers, civilians influenced the military more and more in their actions. The inadequacy of the military's political and constitutional skills put them in a vulnerable position and the young military Turks were inundated with ideas from the aspiring politicians. The second coup in July 1966 brought LTC Gowon to power. He created a Federal Military Government which held the positions of Head of State and the Governorships of the states. He allowed all other aspects of government to be controlled by political heads, calling them commissioners, rather than ministers, but with virtually the same powers.¹⁰

Gowon reestablished the Federation after Ironsi had dropped the name and abolished federal institutions. This action on Gowon's part split the new political elite in Nigeria; even the Army officers were in two groups: the Ibos and the non-Ibos. This, finally, led to the secession of the eastern regions (Iboland) in May, 1967. LTC Ojukwu declared independence of the Eastern Region from the rest of Nigeria and proclaimed the Republic of Biafra.¹¹ Gowon's reaction was to condemn Ojukwu's move as rebellion. This led to a civil war which lasted two and one-half years (until January 1970).

Gowon emerged from the war as a "symbol of new power and importance Nigeria had gained on the continent."¹² In October 1970 Nigeria celebrated her tenth anniversary of independence from Great Britain. On this occasion Gowon set forth his program for the following six years. It is significant in what it tells about civil military relations in Nigeria under Gowon. He promised that "he would return the country to civilian rule by 1976."¹³

PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION

General Gowon is without doubt, today, the undisputed head of state and head of government after seven and one-half years of rule. The Supreme Military Council of which Gowon is the chairman is made up of nineteen members, which includes the military governors of eleven states and the chiefs of staff; all except one are top officers of the armed forces and police. This is the highest governing body and has absolute executive authority. It meets every six weeks or so.¹⁴

Beneath the SMC is the Federal Executive Council (similar to a council of ministers). Gowon nominates civilian and military commissioners who are the heads of the administrative departments of the government. Most of the commissioners are former politicians and professors and there is one military officer (Department of Establishments). The FEC usually meets weekly under the chairmanship of Gowon.¹⁵

Following the SMC and the FEC come the senior civil servants who really run the country and make the most important decisions.¹⁶ It is they who know the day-to-day needs of the country. The senior officers of the civil service are well trained and loyal, especially those responsible for economic policy. Gowon depends on them heavily in making his decisions.

In the absence of a parliament, legislative functions are vested in the FMG which rules by decree. There are no political parties and political activity and strikes are formally proscribed.¹⁷

In order to understand the present political situation it is essential to look at Gowon's proposed program which he outlined in a speech he made on October 1, 1970. It is aimed at the restoration of civilian rule by 1976. The nine points are:

1. Reorganization of the armed forces
2. Implementation of the national development plan and repair of civil war damage
3. Eradication of corruption
4. Settlement of the question of creating more states
5. Preparation and adoption of a new constitution
6. Introduction of a new revenue allocation formula between the federal and state governments

7. Conduct of a national population census
8. Organization of genuinely national political parties
9. Organization of elections, federal and state.¹⁸

Gowon said that the first step toward restoration of civilian rule would be the appointment of a panel to prepare a new draft constitution. This was done soon after Gowon's proposal but, according to several Nigerian experts at UCLA and the University of Chicago, the panel is dormant at present. The step following a constitutional committee would be the convening of a constituent assembly and the appointment of a fiscal commission, whose work would be linked with the final distribution of functions between federal and state governments. The final stage would be the organization of free and fair elections.¹⁹

Gowon said in his proposal that there was no question of "returning to political parties which are merely state, regional or tribal blocs," because this would be to return "to the old days of permanent crisis and mutual blackmail."²⁰

According to Colin Legum, during 1972 the FMG, as a follow-up to the October 1970 speech, "responded to the national mood of frustration and disillusionment by encouragement a public debate on Nigeria's future ideology and constitution." There was much debate and lively controversy but the general feeling was that "while Nigeria's exciting possibility for the future remains, its situation in 1972 stayed in the realm of promise rather than actual positive and fundamental reforms."²¹

Politically, the situation in 1974 remains much the same as it was in 1972--more promise than actuality.

OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE

During the 1972 public debate, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, former president, made a major speech in which he suggested a joint military-civilian administration of the country for a five-year period beginning in 1976. For the most part his idea was rejected by the press which emphasized that the "natural system for Nigeria is civil government."²² There was strong feeling that the longer the military stayed in power the harder it would be to create the truly national political parties the FMG says that it wants. Many questioned whether the military should remain in power even at the present.

Jean Herskovits in a recent interview with Gowon calls Nigeria's government a "military democracy" and she feels certain that Gowon's leadership is secure and will last at least until 1976. She states that in her conversations with Nigerians that many of them hope he will continue to hold office beyond 1976 even as a civilian.²³ In all my own interviews, this seems to be the general opinion that Gowon probably will stay on as president.

US NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

Until independence there was scarcely any US-Nigerian contact apart from that of missionaries, scientists and tourists. Few Americans know Nigeria other than through recollections of a recent Civil War. Herskovits states that candidate Nixon in 1968 accused the

Nigerian government of genocide against Biafra.²⁴ When the civil war came to an end in 1970, Nigeria was no longer of special interest to the American public. Then a renewed concern came in late 1973 when an energy crisis hit the US and it was learned more publicly that Nigeria was a source of oil outside of the Middle East.

Officially, US-Nigerian relations have more depth. Since independence the Departments of State and Commerce, in particular, have recognized her potential. During the 1960's, educational and cultural exchange programs were as significant as in any country in Africa and the Peace Corps early sent in volunteers. American businessmen saw in Nigeria a populous country, full of natural resources and economic potential.

During the civil war, the USG position was essentially, non-involvement, politically and militarily. We continued to recognize the FMG as the Government of Nigeria and supported peace efforts by the Organization of African Unity and the British Commonwealth Secretariat.²⁵ Private Americans contributed heavily to the Biafran relief situation which caused friction with the FMG. Professor Sklar of UCLA said to me that the USG really took a position of "doing nothing," when really we should have taken an active role of peacemaker.²⁶

During the period FY 1950-1972, the USG gave military assistance to Nigeria with a total outlay of \$1.5 million. The breakdown according to dollar amounts of deliveries/expenditures made by fiscal years is:

1950-66	\$843,000
1967	187,000
1968	177,000

1969	23,000
1970	2,000
1971	186,000
1972	87,000 27

The pattern is obvious and follows closely USG policy toward Nigeria. During the civil war the US non-involvement policy becomes evident with decreased deliveries in 1969-70. Then in 1971 after the war is over deliveries start up again. 1972 and subsequent years have seen a trend that will continue: less grant assistance is needed as a result of Nigeria's economic breakthrough with the production and marketing of petroleum which is largely due to American private enterprise.

In US foreign military sales (deliveries) during FY 1950-1972, Nigeria bought \$1.35 million. Herewith the breakdown:

1950-66	\$335,000
1967	1,000
1968	11,000
1969	5,000
1970	---
1971	1,000
1972	1,005,000 28

Nigeria now pays the USG without loan assistance for the training being given her military. They have numbered some 300 men each year being sent to the US since 1972.

US economic assistance given through our US AID amounted to \$16.4 millions in loans, and technical assistance grants came to \$8.4 million during 1972. In FY 1973 there was a \$9.85 million program largely devoted to technical assistance for projects in agriculture, education and development administration. Included in the program is a grant for \$2.5 million which will allow the FMG to contract directly for US technical services and training.²⁹

For 1973 US imports from Nigeria were about \$500 million, mostly crude oil; US exports were mainly wheat, machinery and manufactured goods and reached \$161 million. Total US investments will rise close to one billion dollars in 1974. Nigeria encourages foreign investments, preferably in the form of joint ventures, and she has a high regard for American goods and know-how.³⁰

Professor Lofchie of the UCLA African Studies Center says that the pluses far outnumber the minuses in US-Nigerian relations. First, and foremost for him is that the USG respects Nigeria's sovereignty and her efforts toward economic development. Close behind has been the cultural and educational ties and mutual respect which emanate from them.

Probably the most significant difficulty in US-Nigerian relations has been the question of Southern Africa and the liberation movements. Nigerians have felt that Americans have tended to compromise their Black African interests by their economic interests in South Africa often to the point of giving the impression of accepting a white domination of Africans in South Africa and the Portuguese territories.

Nigeria has a pre-eminent role in Africa and is rapidly showing her influence beyond the continent. There is little doubt that she will be Africa's leader for the next twenty-five years.

Nigeria is large with twice as many people as any other country in Africa. Nigeria is rich, standing in eighth place among the world's oil producers and after Canada supplies more oil to the US than any other country in the world. Some sixty US firms in the oil related industry have representatives and an interest in Nigeria.

Nigeria is open to US investments. Nigeria is militarily powerful with the largest mobilized armed force in Africa (over 200,000 men).

Even though Nigeria received considerable military assistance from the Soviet Union during the civil war, her position remains non-aligned. In fact Gowon seems to prefer American training for his military. Roughly fifty percent of foreign training is done in the US. It should be noted that a contingent from the US National War College was received, wined and dined by General Gowon on their recent visit to Nigeria.

US policy toward Nigeria is basically following a true course. Relations with Nigeria will improve and be even more effectual as the US makes more clear its essential position of the right of self-determination and development of all people, especially, as this applies in Southern Africa and the territories now in Portuguese hands.

CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

1. "Background Notes: Nigeria," Department of State, May, 1973, p. 1.
2. According to a Department of State official in May, 1974.
3. "Background Notes: Nigeria," p. 2.
4. Ibid., p. 3.
5. Gutteridge, p. 67; S. K. Panter-Brick, Nigerian Politics and Military Rule: Prelude to Civil War, p. 59.
6. Gutteridge, p. 71.
7. Ibid., p. 65.
8. Panter-Brick, p. 78-79.
9. Ibid., p. 84-85.
10. Ibid., pp. 89, 91-92.
11. Olav Stokke, Nigeria, pp. 50-51, 57.
12. "Man of the Moment: President Gowon of Nigeria," Africa Report, September-October, 1973, p. 17.
13. Ibid.
14. Conversations in the Department of State, May 1974.
15. Ibid.
16. Conversation with Professor Richard Sklar, African Studies Center, UCLA, April, 1974.
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18. Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1969-70, Oct 24-31, 1970, p. 24255; Pauline H. Baker, "The Politics of Nigerian Military Rule," Africa Report, February, 1971, p. 18f.
19. Keesing's, p. 24255.
20. Ibid.

21. Colin Legum, editor, Africa Contemporary Record, p. B 687-687.
22. Ibid., p. B691.
23. Jean Herskovits, "Nigeria: Africa's Emerging New Power," Saturday Review, World, February 9, 1974, p. 17.
24. Ibid., p. 14.
25. "Background Notes: Nigeria," p. 6.
26. Conversation at UCLA in April, 1974.
27. "Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts, May, 1973," p. 9.
28. Ibid., p. 21.
29. "Background Notes: Nigeria," p. 6.
30. "Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the US: Nigeria," US Embassy, LAGOS, December 10, 1973, p. 8.

CHAPTER III

ZAIRE

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Independence from Belgium came to the Republic of Zaire (formerly the Democratic Republic of Congo) on June 30, 1960. "Peace independence lasted only one week."¹ The army (La Force Publique) mutinied within a few days, Belgian troops were brought in to protect Belgian nationals, Tshombe declared Katanga an independent country and the Central Government sought UN assistance in bringing about order for this situation. These were the whirlwind of events that hit the "Congo." Kasavubu (the President), Lumumba (the Prime Minister), and the UN were all unhappy with each other. When Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba, Lumumba in turn dismissed Kasavubu. Colonel Joseph Mobutu took over the government, expelled Soviet and Communist Bloc diplomats and technicians and imprisoned Lumumba. In six months Mobutu returned the reins of government to Kasavubu (February 1961). Between 1960 and 1965 mutiny, confusion, and rebellion were the rule. On November 25, 1965 Lt. General Mobutu, the Commander-in-Chief of the National Army, seized control of the government once again. During the next two years Mobutu defeated the remaining rebels, expelled all mercenaries, and there began in Zaire "the longest period of internal calm and political stability that it had known since independence."²

The Zairian military during these seven years of struggle was solidly under Mobutu's leadership. With the disintegration of the

Force Publique in 1960, Mobutu reconstituted the army into a new mould.³ The military, during the 1960-1965 period was without question the best organized institution in the country. Mobutu supported Kasavubu throughout his presidency and his main job was to keep the rebellions and disorders and his own fellow soldiers under control. By 1965 Mobutu's power base was so strong and the political scene was so chaotic that his bloodless take-over was easy. He declared immediately "that he would be President for five years and disclaimed any intention to establish a military regime."⁴

As soon as Mobutu took over in late 1965, he began to reduce the political power of the provincial governments and strengthen the Central Government. By 1967 a new constitution had been written and accepted by the majority of the voters. The constitution varied a strong centralized presidential form of government with the executive power vested in the president who is Chief of State and Head of Government.

Mobutu headed what was in effect an executive council of his own creation, consisting largely of civilians and resting upon the support of the Army. All his cabinet ministers and provincial governors were civilians. According to Lefever, "Mobutu personally embodied the fusion of political authority and military power; he was head of the Army, he was head of State and head of government all in one."⁵ He ruled the country by decree until after the 1970 elections.

Even as late as 1967, the Army was still shaky in structure and leadership; the only cohesion it had was largely through Mobutu's personal efforts. Mobutu's chief objective as a civil-military ruler was

internal stability and normal diplomatic ties with his African neighbors and great powers.⁶

PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION

Lemarchand has analyzed the Zairian civil-military situation very well. He sees the Zairian armed forces as an arbitrator of Zairian politics on a permanent basis since November, 1965. Officially, army rule was to have terminated after a five-year interim period. He says that

. . . during this time the army would act solely as 'an organism of execution operating in a strictly military context,' and not as 'a pressure group or a political assembly.' . . . the prospects of a genuine demilitarization of Zairian politics seems extremely distant. On surface there are several indications of a military disengagement: since Colonel Mulamba's short-lived political career as Prime Minister (November 1965-October 1966), no army man other than Mobutu himself occupies a formal governmental position; the military officers appointed to administrative positions in the province in 1965 have since then been replaced by civilians; the security police is no longer the private reserve of Colonel Singa; more important still, repeated efforts have been made to convert the MPR (Popular Revolutionary Movement--the ruling party) into an effective instrument for mobilizing the 'forces vives' of the nation. But if there is no gain-saying the outwardly civilian nature of the regime, the ANZ (Zairian National Army) is nonetheless the single most important pressure group in the political system. Its role is that of an umpire. The ANZ sees itself as the guardian of civilian authority and political stability, vitally concerned with politics and openly admits it.⁷

Mobutu relies heavily upon the MPR for "restructuring and civilianizing his bases of authority." He has gradually eliminated all alternative centers of power: the students, the Binza group of politicians

(his old cronies), the metissee community and most recently the Catholic Church.

Lemarchand sees "strengthening the loyalty of the Army to the regime" as a sine qua non of the regime's survival. He cites three strategies that Mobutu is using to secure the loyalty of the Army: First, he continues to give priority to the Equator province in recruitment of armed forces (he himself is from the Equator). Secondly, "every effort is made to maintain and reinforce functional divisions within the armed forces." This maximizes the chances of retaining some loyal units, even if others may wander. Thirdly, more and more of the national income goes for higher pay and other needs of the army. The officer corps constitutes a sort of elite whose "standards of living mark them off very sharply from the masses."⁸

The Army belongs to Mobutu and he makes sure that they are taken care of, and well. Albeit, the MPR is civilianized; the military are active members down to the man.

President Mobutu Sese Seko is solidly and without dispute the sole leader of the Zaire. No one questions his authority and his complete control. Jean-Claude Willame calls the regime "a Caesarist bureaucracy." He cites as the two most noticeable features: 1) "the prominence of a personal and unique, although not charismatic, source of authority," and 2) "a progressive bureaucratization of the government apparatus."⁹

Willame says that Mobutu "has decided to base his power not so much on the military as on his own personification of the State, and a highly centralized bureaucracy served by an emerging group of young

technocrats and experts."¹⁰ During the last two years Mobutu has encouraged "personal" glorification with appellations such as "The Guide" and "the Father of the Country." At the opening each evening of television broadcasting, a short film of one of his live public speeches is shown. He appears out of the background as if he embodies the Divine, surrounded by angels and blaring trumpets.

Mobutu has brought prestige and grandeur to his country. The Zaire of 1974 is no longer the "Congo" of yesterday; he has rehabilitated his country internationally; he is second only to General Gowon in African circles; he has exalted the virtues of national pride; patriotism and authenticity are the hallmarks of his country's image.

OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE

Zaire is one of the most economically developed countries in Sub-saharan Africa. The land is rich in a variety of natural resources which include natural deposits of copper, zinc, cobalt, and diamonds. The potential for offshore petroleum deposits looks very favorable; and hydroelectric power is almost unlimited.

Politically, President Mobutu appears to have every chance to continue as the strong, undisputed leader of Zaire for many years to come (his term of office officially ends in 1977). His program of gradual Zairianization of the country's economic potential should not hurt him because he still encourages and favors foreign investments. As long as he can maintain stability, the country will continue to develop at its present rapid pace.

His image in Africa could not be better. He is constantly visiting other countries and proving to all his serious intention of making Zaire Africa's foremost example of national development.

US NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

US-Zaire relations go back deep into the country's history. American missionaries were in evidence in the days of King Leopold II's Independent Free State of the Congo and they early exposed some of the atrocities of the colonial era. Their schools were respected and their hospitals considered the best. Henry Morton Stanley, an American journalist and explorer, put Congo before the world's eyes.

Since independence it has been central in American policy toward Zaire to assist the Zairians "in their efforts toward nation building and economic and social progress. Relations between the two countries have been excellent."¹¹ During all the serious troubles in Zaire, the US respected the country's sovereignty and was always close-by and ready to give assistance when it was necessary. The Zairians have never forgotten this loyalty and to this day, elocutions at official occasions by Zairians always include words of appreciation for American Friendship through those difficult days of the past.

During the period 1950-1972, the USG provided Zaire with a total outlay of \$26.3 million in military assistance. The breakdown according to dollar amounts of deliveries/expenditures made by fiscal years is as follows:

FY 1950-66	\$10,997,000
1967	5,054,000
1968	3,800,000

1969	2,053,000
1970	3,124,000
1971	805,000
1972	422,000 12

During the immediate post-independence period, the chaos, rebellion, disintegration of the Force Publique, and the international interventions by the UN and other powers demanded large outlays of funds for personnel and equipment. As stability became more evident after 1967, less assistance was needed.

US military sales (deliveries) during the 1950-1972 period amounted to \$16.5 million. Herewith the breakdown:

Fy 1950-56	\$1,031,000
1967	56,000
1968	306,000
1969	22,000
1970	123,000
1971	4,056,000
1972	10,937,000 13

President Mobutu looks to American equipment to modernize his military material. Purchases of sophisticated equipment have become very important to Mobutu, especially as it relates to image building in Africa, and practically speaking, he needs aircraft that can span the enormous distances between cities in his country.

For 1973 US imports from Zaire were about \$70 million mostly cobalt, coffee and zinc; US exports were mainly aircraft and parts, motor vehicles, wheat and mining equipment and amounted to \$115 million. US investments in Zaire will range between \$150-200 million by the end of 1974. (Department of State sources).

US relations with Zaire since independence have been excellent. Zaire is probably the best friend the US has in Africa and, likewise we are probably her best friend in the world.

Zaire, by its very location in Central Africa bordered by nine countries, and its size, as large as the US east of the Mississippi gives her a sort of dominance over the entire region. It is in the US interest that Zaire maintain her present stability, that her relations with her neighbors be mutually beneficial and that outside interests unfriendly to the US remain minimal.

Zaire is a force in African affairs; she is second only to Nigeria in economic potential and political influence on the continent.

For the US in particular, overflight and port visitation rights are very important. Access to purchasing the wealth of minerals becomes more important daily with the ever increasing awareness of the future need of raw materials, not only for the US but our NATO partners as well.

CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES

1. "Background Notes: Zaire," Department of State, February, 1972, p.3.
2. Ibid., p. 4.
3. Gutteridge, p. 6-7.
4. "Background Notes: Zaire," p. 4.
5. "Army and Politics in Tropical Africa," Highlights from Spear and Scepter by Erenst Lefever, p. 6.
6. Ibid.
7. Rene Lemarchand, "Army Men and Nation Building in Former Belgian AFRICA: From Force Publique to Praetorian Guard," a paper written at the University of Florida, p. 12.
8. Ibid. p. 13.
9. Jean-Claude Willame, "Politics and Power in Congo-Kinshasa," Africa Report, January, 1971, p. 14.
10. Ibid.
11. "Background Notes: Zaire," p. 6.
12. "Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales," p. 9.
13. Ibid. p. 21.

CHAPTER IV

ETHIOPIA

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Ethiopia was never a European colony. During the period of 1935-1941, the Italians invaded and occupied the land. Haile Selassie I was forced into exile and went to England to wait out the end of the occupation.

Haile Selassie is the current emperor (since 1930) of a Christian Kingdom which has existed for centuries in the north-central part of East Africa. Lefever says that Ethiopia was denied "the positive as well as the negative aspects of colonialism--cultural, economic, and political."¹

In spite of her long history as an independent, "Christian" state, Ethiopia is still one of the least developed states in Africa. The causes of this underdevelopment along with her location on the southern border of the Arab world have marked her as one of the potentially sensitive areas for conflict in Africa.

Population estimates for 1971 range from 22-27 million.² The Amhara and Tigray peoples are an elite minority who have ruled the country throughout much of its history. They make up about one-third of the population and live in the northern provinces. These people are Ethiopian Orthodox (Coptic) Christians. The largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, the Gallas (40%) are divided in their religious affiliation: those who in the East residing close to the Muslims have

adopted Islam as their religion, and those living in the Southwest have joined the Coptic Church.

The Ethiopian Orthodox Church is the established Church of the empire and comprises about 40% of the population. Muslims, as well, make up about 40%. The Church is the most powerful institution, traditionally speaking, in Ethiopia. Schwab says that the Church has been resistant to change and has even been a countervailing political power with the modernizing forces in the country. Between 18-30% of the land in Ethiopia is owned by the Church, which pays no land taxes and some 20% of the Christian population is clergy.³

Ethiopia, according to Schwab, can be described as a feudal empire because of the land tenure and landlord-tenant relations that exist in spite of some laws to the contrary. All too often the tenants are fully at the mercy of the landlords and they have little protection before the law.

The tradition-bound powerful Church, the plight of the tenant farmers and the constant tension between a Christian Kingdom and the Muslim world surrounding the country, all make Ethiopia a seedbed for potential difficulties.

For these reasons, primarily, the Army has always played a significant role in the country. Haile Selassie, himself, "has always used military power to consolidate his rule and has sought, with considerable success, to personify martial power along with political and ecclesiastical authority."⁴

Lefever says that the "contemporary army is a product of the gradual consolidation of military power in the hands of successive em-

perors, with some foreign assistance. The Imperial Army traditionally coexisted with regional armies until the mid-1940's when Haile Selassie developed a single national army whose mandate was coterminous with the State."⁵

In December 1960 when the Emperor was away in Brazil, a coup was launched by the Commander of the Bodyguard. He had fully hoped that the regular army and air force would have joined him. His goal was to have established a "progressive regime," but evidence seemed to point to the fact that it was "more an attempt to seize power than to effect basic political and social reforms." Neither the army nor the air force joined in the coup; rather they crushed the insurgents. When the Emperor returned, he completely replaced the Bodyguard officer corps with loyal regular army men."⁶

The military has always been held in the highest esteem in Ethiopian tradition and always depended on heavily by the rulers. It has been a custom that every able-bodied man was a potential soldier who was ready to bear arms for his feudal lord or Emperor. Today, the armed forces are among the most effective and best trained forces in Black Africa.⁷

In summary, the civil-military relations between the 1960 attempted coup and the early 1974 disturbances have been essentially that the armed services were loyally upholding the regime of a traditional, autocratic, but modernizing Emperor. Since January 1974, the situation has taken on a slightly different character.

PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION

The government of Ethiopia is a hereditary constitutional monarchy with a bicameral parliament. In practice the Emperor exercises effective political power. Sovereignty is vested in him, "who has supreme authority and combines the powers and duties of Chief of State and Head of Government."⁸ There are no political parties.

All ministers and senior government officials are appointed by the Emperor and all of the organization, powers and duties of their offices are determined by him. He appoints government officials down to the level of director (about five ranks below minister). "No decisions of any importance are made without the knowledge and approval of the Emperor."⁹

According to the US State Department, the primary objectives of the Ethiopian Government include:

- 1) The improvement of the government structure and internal administration; 2) the improvement of economic and social conditions within the country; 3) the adherence to the policies of non-alignment and the right to judge each issue on its merits; 4) support of the United Nations and the principle of collective security; and 5) progress toward African unity.¹⁰

During the months of January, February and March of 1974 unprecedented changes have taken place in Ethiopia. There have been combined military, student and labor turmoils which finally brought down the government of Prime Minister Akilu. According to a special report in Africa, a London-based English language monthly news journal, "Ethiopia will never be the same again." The reports says that "at first sight the Army mutiny, the student unrests and the first successful

general strike in the nation's history "seemed to signal the end of an old order."¹¹ In some ways this seems to be true still; and even though the dust has not yet completely settled at the time of this writing, it appears as if there are some basic indications of what has happened or is happening. There are many non-commissioned officers throughout the country who have asserted their power and influence and have suggested reforms which are being respected and acted upon. The issues are corruption, land reforms and better benefits for the military.

The Emperor was never under any serious threat to his throne. Even from the beginning, the mutineers and dissidents made it clear that they were loyal to the Emperor personally. A new prime minister has been nominated and the Emperor announced that the Prime Minister's cabinet would become responsible to the Parliament and not to the Emperor as such.

OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE

History weighs heavily upon Ethiopia and most of the country remains as it has been for centuries. Yet time has caught up with the long established order, and forces of change can no longer be held at bay. Ethiopia must, therefore, provide for the least disruptive changeover from familiar old patterns to the bewildering new ones. The Nation has so far managed to weather periodic threats to its stability, but it is clear that the final solution to this problem must include the due participation of all groups in the cultural and political life of the country.¹²

This is an excellent statement summarizing the outlook for Ethiopia's future. The preservation of the country's institutions and integrity, in general, depends on the leadership's ability to reform

land ownership and to assimilate its peoples, especially the Gallas who have so little influence politically, socially, and economically in the country. The succession is a problem, even though it was not a major issue in the recent disturbances, but it will be raised more and more in the near future. There is little doubt, now, after the recent events, that "no Ethiopian Emperor will ever again be as powerful as Haile Selassie."¹³

The military will continue to have an important, if not predominant, influence on Ethiopia's political life. There seems to be no doubt that they could take over the government at anytime they wanted to do so, and they will if rapid social and economic changes are not made soon. The only reasons that they have not assumed full control before now are 1) their high respect for the person of the Emperor and 2) the almost worshipful attitude toward the Emperor of a large segment of the population. A dethroning of the Emperor would almost certainly lead to a full scale civil war.

Haile Selassie will continue to reign, if not rule, and probably the same for his successor, though with even more power. Ethiopia will continue to have a civilian government backed and pressured by the military.

US NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

US-Ethiopian relations have historically always been very friendly. The two nations signed a treaty in 1903 and after World War II grew even closer together. In 1951 agreements were signed for general technical assistance which was to help with numerous projects of

economic development. In 1953 two agreements were signed: 1) the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement by which the USG agreed to furnish Ethiopia with certain military equipment for its internal security and to train Ethiopian armed forces in the use of the material, and 2) an agreement to regularize the operations of the US communications facility (Kagnew Station) at Asmara.¹⁴

The Kagnew base was leased from the British in the early 1940's but with the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1953, we signed with the Ethiopians a twenty-five year agreement for its use. The USG made two promises: 1) to assist in Ethiopia's economic development and 2) to equip and train and help maintain an Ethiopian army of about 40,000 men.¹⁵

During the period 1950-1972, the USG provided Ethiopia with a total outlay of \$163.3 million in military assistance. The breakdown follows according to dollar amounts of deliveries/expenditures made:

FY 1950-1966	\$91,649,000
1967	8,911,000
1968	17,430,000
1969	11,358,000
1970	11,207,000
1971	11,598,000
1972	11,160,000 ¹⁶

This represents by far the largest amount of military assistance given anywhere on the continent. The total military assistance to Africa during 1950-1972 was \$292.7 million. Ethiopia alone received more (\$163.3 million) than all of the rest of Africa put together.

Ethiopia received this assistance, primarily, in order to help her with the counter-insurgency operations in Eritrea and against the threats that were coming from the newly independent Somalia (1960).¹⁷

In March, 1972, General George Seignious, Director of the Department of Defense's Security Assistance Agency, told Congress that cuts in the military aid program were severely damaging US credibility in Ethiopia.

US military aid to Ethiopia, despite its cuts was still larger than that for Spain, Greece or any nation in Latin America. What the general apparently did not tell Congress in the spring was that the US was cutting personnel at its communications center at Asmara by 40% to 1000 during the first six months of 1972. While Ethiopian officials reportedly were unhappy with the phase-out, American officials were optimistic in late 1972 that the US might be completely out of Asmara within a year or two at most. The principle requirement keeping the US in Asmara for the moment apparently is the Navy's communications with its polaris submarines in the Indian Ocean.¹⁸

In foreign military sales (deliveries) during 1950-1972 Ethiopia bought \$723,000. Herewith the breakdown:

FY 1950-1966	\$663,000
1967	12,000
1968	34,000
1969	1,000
1970	7,000
1971	6,000
1972	less than 500 ¹⁹

The US outbid the Soviet Union in 1960 on supplying arms for Ethiopia in what she conceived as a threat from Somalia. Somalia, in return, asked the USG for arms, but its request was rejected because of Ethiopian objections. Somalia, then, turned to the Soviet Union and was given \$35 million in military aid.²⁰

US economic assistance to Ethiopia has mostly concentrated in the agricultural and educational fields and has amounted to about \$268 million (from late 1940's to 1971).²¹ During the last two year it has

ranged between \$10-30 million per year. We are the largest bilateral donor to Ethiopia.

US trade and investments in Ethiopia are insignificant. Coffee is Ethiopia's major product, and constitutes more than 50% in value of exports. Most of it is exported to the US.²²

Ethiopia is probably the most important country in Africa for the US from a point of view of our security interests. Its nearness to the Middle East makes it a key spot geographically, given the oil situation and reopening of the Suez Canal. It is the only country on the East Coast of independent Africa where the US can port its ships and obtain overflight rights easily.

Haile Selassie has much respect and influence in Black Africa. Addis Ababa is OAU headquarters and the principal site of most international forums held on the continent.

There is a great possibility that the country is rich in oil and copper resources.

Probably, the single most important US interest is that Ethiopia remain stable politically. Bordering on Somalia where Soviet influence is especially significant, (they are pumping in large quantities of sophisticated military equipment), conflict between the two countries could cause increased tension between the US and the USSR. Likewise, conflict with the Soviet-aided Sudan to the south could generate similar problems. Any change in the present detente between Ethiopia and her Muslim neighbors could create international stirrings.

It is in the interest of the US that in Ethiopia as in other African countries that we avoid major power conflicts on the continent.

US policy toward Ethiopia appears to be on the right course. Even though our military assistance may decrease, it is extremely important that we recognize and respond to Ethiopia's need for our economic assistance and investment.

CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

1. Lefever, p. 7.
2. Peter Schwab, Editor, "Ethiopia and Haile Selassie," Facts on File, 1972, p. 5; "Background Notes, Ethiopia," p. 1.
3. Schwab, p. 6.
4. Lefever, p. 7.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Britannica, Vol. 6, p. 1004.
8. "Background Notes: Ethiopia," p. 3.
9. Britannica, Vol. 6, p. 1004.
10. "Background Notes: Ethiopia," p. 3.
11. Peter Enahoro, "Ethiopia's Melting Pot," Africa, May, 1974, p. 15.
12. Britannica, Vol 6, p. 1004.
13. Enahoro, p. 17.
14. "Background Notes: Ethiopia," p. 4.
15. Mordechai Abir, "The Contentious Horn of Africa," Conflict Studies, June 1972, p. 9.
16. "Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales," p. 9.
17. Schwab, p. 137.
18. Legum, p. A79.
19. "Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales," p. 21.
20. Schwab, p. 137.
21. "Background Notes: Ethiopia," p. 4.
22. Ibid.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

One of the purposes of this paper has been to take a look at civil-military relations in the three countries in Black Africa thought to be the most significantly related to US National security interests. It has not always been an easy task to make a clear distinction between civil and military in the power structure. Perhaps, it is just as well, because in most African states there is an unusual importance given to "force" in the political process. Zolberg says that, seemingly, there is "a tendency to accept whatever authority establishes a claim to rule on the basis of force, as if force generates its own legitimacy." This authority is accepted for as long as it holds the "substance of its initial force."¹

Military rule or civilian rule or even civilian-military rule concepts often have little meaning in the African context. Too often the designations are superficial; trying to decide who is ruling. For many Africans, it appears to be unimportant "who" rules, because the essential elements are whether or not there is stability (or perhaps, lack of chaos), and whether or not there is the hope or opportunity for some kind of economic amelioration of the lives of the people.

Mobutu in Zaire depends upon the military as a force to keep him in power, yet the military are rarely seen in administrative or political positions in the government and in the party. Mobutu, himself, is a "civilian" president de jure if not de facto.

Gowon, who without equivocation, is a career military officer, who is the head of a military government, rules Nigeria primarily through the politicians (without party) and civil servants.

Haile Selassie, a sort of civilian, who is head of state, head of government, head of church and principal decision-maker of life in general in Ethiopia, rules but by the grace of the military who now are the foremost pressure group who refuse to dethrone an image.

In Zaire the government appears to be what is traditionally called "civilian," with a party base, and duly elected officials. In Nigeria, the opposite is the appearance--no party, no elections and a military officer as head of state and government. In Ethiopia there is no party, no elections and a civilian head of state and government. Yet all three depend on the military for rule. Mobutu's manner is militaristic, Gowon appears to rule in a "civilian" way and Haile Selassie has the special "divine right" rule. Actually, the question of who rules, the military or the civilian or the intermix is academic and almost useless to debate. Each, both and all three designations are valid depending on the moment the essential decisions are being considered.

The second purpose of this study is to look at US relations in these countries and to evaluate what impact they have on US national security interests. Americans have a broad range of interests in Africa, particularly, in these three countries. We have noted that missionaries, explorers, geographers, slavers, and scientists were the forerunners of US involvement; then fast on their heels came businessmen with an eye toward trade and investments. Early after World War II Americans pushed for self-determination throughout the continent and, in less than

two decades, there were over forty independent states; all were in need of economic assistance and national development in one form or another. Officially, the USG responded with an AID program, a Peace Corps, Educational and Cultural Exchange projects, and with a military assistance program (MAP). The MAP is in a large measure responsible for maintaining good relations and influence with the governments and military of these three countries. But, in the overall worldwide scheme of things security-wise, the continent of Africa and the individual countries within it, have had a low priority. In Sub-Saharan Africa there is no major, vital US security issue or involvement. None of the three countries considered in this report presents a threat to the US nor its allies nor would they be the catalysts for a great conflict between the US and those unfriendly to her interests.

The overriding security interests for the US is that these countries remain stable internally, develop economically and remain at peace with their neighbors. It is to those ends that the USG has given assistance and sought friendly and mutually beneficial relations with Nigeria, Zaire and Ethiopia.

CHAPTER V

FOOTNOTE

1. Zolberg in Bienen, p. 95.

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