THE AIR FORCE ACADEMY ASSEMBLY ON INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AND PROGRESS - APRIL 1-4, 1959

Air Force Academy
Colorado

4 April 1959

AD-782 043

FINAL REPORT

INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AND PROGRESS

The Air Force Academy Assembly

Cosponsored by the
U.S. Air Force Academy
and
The American Assembly,
Columbia University

OBJECTIVES

- To provide an outstanding group of college students with the understanding and insight of a major national issue, gained through study and discussion;

- To provide these students with a realization of the difficulties of analyzing and reaching consensus on such an issue;

- To develop in them an appreciation for a national community of interest through contact with contemporaries drawn from widely representative institutions.

PREFACE

On April 1, 1959, seventy-five student leaders from some thirty representative institutions of higher learning in the western United States gathered at the Air Force Academy, Colorado, for the Air Force Academy Assembly. For three days they discussed "International Stability and Progress"--United States policies of foreign economic and military assistance to the free world--and on the fourth day issued a Final Report of findings and conclusions.

During the Assembly delegates heard formal addresses by Paul H. Nitze, President of the Foreign Service Educational Foundation, and Dr. Henry M. Wriston, President of The American Assembly. On the second evening a senior roundtable presented the views of James H. Smith, Jr., former Director of the International Cooperation Administration, Dr. Louis T. Benezet, President of Colorado College, Dr. Gardner Patterson, Director of the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, and Mort Stern, Editorial Page Editor of The Denver Post. The texts of these proceedings, as well as the Final Report, are embodied in this pamphlet.

The Air Force Academy Assembly was co-sponsored by the United States Air Force Academy and The American Assembly, Columbia University. Both institutions are non-partisan and take no stand on any of the viewpoints contained in this pamphlet. The Assembly was sponsored as a public service designed to throw light on a vital issue of national policy, and to afford a group of selected undergraduates the opportunity of studying and discussing this issue. It was a regional follow-up to the Eleventh American Assembly held at Arden House, Harriman, New York, in May 1957.

The background papers used by participants for this Assembly were International Stability and Progress (New York: The American Assembly, 1957), and The Mutual Security Program, Fiscal Year 1959 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958). Participants also studied, during the Assembly, the Preliminary Conclusions of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program (Draper Committee).

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

Final Report

of the Air Force Academy Assembly
1-4 April 1959

The participants in the Air Force Academy Assembly at the United States Air Force Academy, Colorado, April 1-4, 1959, on INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AND PROGRESS, *reviewed as a group the following statement at the close of their discussions. Although there was general agreement on the Final Report, it is not the practice of the Assembly for participants to affix their signatures, and it should not be assumed that every participant necessarily subscribes to every recommendation included in the statement.*

Preamble

The United States is faced today by a new imperative of world politics calling for fundamental reassessment of this nations's foreign assistance policy. This new force in world affairs is the need, and the desire, of underdeveloped countries in the Free World for economic growth.

As President Eisenhower said in his Second Inaugural Address in 1956: "In too much of the earth there is want, discord, danger. New forces and new nations stir and strive across the earth, with power to bring, by their fate, great good or great evil to the Free World's future. From the deserts of North Africa to the islands of the South Pacific one-third of all mankind has entered upon an historic struggle for a new freedom: freedom from grinding poverty---Nearly a billion people seek, sometimes almost in desperation, for the skills and knowledge and assistance by which they may satisfy from their own resources, the material wants common to all mankind."

In the midst of this "revolution of rising expectations," the threat of Soviet power and imperialism continues to be a dominant and dangerous challenge to the United States, its allies, and the neutralist nations. The Soviet capability to play on the needs and passions of the weaker nations of the world is growing at an alarming rate, and is backed by an increasingly powerful military apparatus, and by a combination of political, military, economic, and psychological instruments.

These situations confront the United States with immediate and continuing challenges to its national interests and policy. The charging of old needs with new desires and new threats has created an explosive condition in much of the world, from which this nation cannot isolate itself. The needs of the Free World are strong enough to shape history in desirable or undesirable ways; its efforts to bring about economic progress and international stability can take the way of peaceful development and growing freedom, or can lead, through frustration, to violence, communist subversion or other forms of regimentation.

Among the instruments of our foreign policy, there is a major role for programs of military, economic, and technical assistance. In the past decade they have been effectively employed to meet the changing conditions of the world. They have proved to be a sound investment of American resources, contributing to increased strength for the free world and helping to reduce international tensions.

There is a continuing need for reappraisals in order to modify policies and adapt methods to the rapidly altering situations in which the United States finds itself. Where public apathy, indifference or ignorance exist, United States policy is faced with the pressing need to achieve wide-spread understanding and support both of objectives and methods in the situations now confronting us, and likely to confront us in this generation.

Findings and Recommendations

THE UNITED STATES INTEREST IN FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.

1. The needs and desires of the underdeveloped world for economic growth touch the interests of the people of the United States in several important ways. First, it is vital to our national security that these nations should be not necessarily allies---and certainly not satellites---but independent. In these nations, deeply resented poverty and a frustrated desire for progress are not conditions in which the desired goals of peace and international stability can be expected. Second, it is generally assumed that economic growth in underdeveloped areas will enrich world trade and investment opportunities, including our own. Third, as individuals and as a nation we have a traditional humanitarian concern with the freedom, dignity and well-being of people everywhere.

2. These interests, however, cannot find expression outside the context of our dominant concern for national security and international order. We cannot safely fail to take full account of the efforts of international communism to expand its contacts and influence throughout the Free World, at places and times of its own choosing and by a variety of instruments. Our interests must cover alike the undiminished military threat from the communist powers, and the danger that may arise from gradual political realignments favoring Russia in a large part of the globe that is now uncommitted. We must be as sensitive to political tensions between and within nations as we are to military pacts directed against us. Equally, we cannot ignore the opportunity we have to influence the internal stability and political orientation of other nations in ways favorable to them and to us. The United States has a vital and positive national interest involved in those programs which promote independence, stability and progress, and which will reduce the danger of international conflict and permit the evolution of nations as peaceful and constructive members of the world community.

THE ROLE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE

3. Military assistance is recognized as a vital instrument of our foreign policy. The interests of the United States in large areas of the globe have created a system of alliances in which the overall effects of military assistance far outweigh the legal treaty bond. These systems of collective arrangements are an indispensable part of our effort to deter aggression and subversion, and contribute toward an international order based on wide-spread concepts of stability and progress. Hence, primary reliance on our own nuclear capability does not obviate the need to maintain and support our formal alliances and military assistance programs as part of our general scheme of deterrence.

4. The military assistance programs, constituting only a small fraction of our gross national product and yearly federal budget, are well justified since they support a collective will to deter international communist expansionism, and provide a greater military defensive capability than could a similar expenditure for our own national defense establishment.

5. Although our NATO allies have demonstrated a growing ability to absorb the substantial burdens of their own military efforts, the importance of NATO has not diminished. Any weakening of the Atlantic Alliance would be certain to invite new Soviet adventures, dangerous to all nations of the free world.

6. The less developed nations have internal and external problems which require special care and attention in military assistance programs. For some, the military establishment supported by the United States may be essential for reasonable political stability as well as for their national defense. There may be desirable side effects of military assistance to underdeveloped countries, such as the development of basic mechanical and administrative skills. Imprudent military programs, however, may tax the political and economic stability of the recipient and create new conditions retarding economic development. While sudden reductions or terminations of military assistance programs may be interpreted as a retreat, the reduction of force levels without endangering security should not be ignored.

7. Military assistance should be used whenever United States interests are served by such programs. The United States should, however, be sensitive to the adverse effects, external and domestic, created by the military support of authoritarian or oppressive regimes, and to the aggravation of localized international tensions, arms races or the use of military assistance for the subjugation of colonial peoples.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ASSISTANCE

8. The long-range interests of the United States are best served by the eradication or reduction of the causes of economic and political instability. While military assistance may provide side effects beneficial to these goals, orderly and stable economic progress in underdeveloped nations is a necessary step toward erecting barriers in the path of Communist influence and control. No nation has a moral claim on United States economic assistance by virtue of any military agreement or alliance, and American long-range interests are as applicable to neutrals as they are to allies.

9. The complexities of national problems and the rates of economic development create a need for intelligent planning of assistance programs. The ultimate success of developmental programs is heavily dependent upon the ability of the recipient nations to effectively execute and administer them. The wide disparities in administrative institutions and organizational skills in underdeveloped nations dictate the nature of economic assistance and its rate of flow. Priorities in technical assistance, developmental plans, capitalization, human skills, etc., must be established country by country, according to individual national needs. Regional assistance plans may be formulated for such supporting projects as public health, education, agricultural and industrial skills, which may be implemented without sole reference to individual national requirements. However, the major economic assistance programs should be determined on the basis of individual capital requirements from either public or private sources, accumulated local savings, normal foreign borrowing, and the existing pools of skilled and professional manpower. The effectiveness of each program requires a sound definition of overall criteria and objectives, rationally applied to the actual conditions in each country considered for possible assistance.

10. The magnitude of economic developmental assistance to underdeveloped nations requires long-range programs, most of which will take several years to complete. Assurance of continuity must be given by Congress and the Administration as a means to encourage leadership in the recipient countries to make the necessary decisions for effective development. For these reasons, a well-capitalized Developmental Loan Fund, with an authorization covering several years, is preferable to dependence on recurring legislative appropriations. Since integrity in long-range development programs is an imperative aspect of our assistance, an adequate Developmental Loan Fund offers a powerful psychological instrument reinforcing the material objectives of these programs. Short of an increased capitalization of the Developmental Loan Fund, Congress should give a clear indication that it will support commitments covering several years, and grant the Administration authority to make such commitments.

11. In the interest of world economic stability and growth, there must be a tendency toward freer trade. Import quotas and other restrictive measures may be advantageous to underdeveloped nations to ameliorate the balance of trade problems endemic to their economies. The United States, however, as a developed industrial power, may have to undertake unilateral tariff and import quota reductions, and become a larger outlet for the commodity exports of these underdeveloped countries. Thus, the long-range interests of the United States transcend those of various vested interests opposed to a lessening of trade restrictions.

12. The long-range aspects of economic development can prove disheartening to nations seeking relief from immediate economic hardships. There is a strong temptation for them to turn to "showcase" items of the kind lately offered by the Soviet Union, resulting in adverse propaganda effects for the United States. These effects may be reduced by the undertaking of short-term, worthwhile projects which can also contribute toward larger constructive goals. Short-term projects are not a substitute for long-range programs, but rather inducements to the recipient to either initiate or continue the latter.

13. Long-range economic development should be wealth-producing and create the ability to repay. While assistance should preferably be on a loan basis, local hardships and differences require that developmental loans be granted on flexible and elastic terms. In many instances, loans carry advantages over pure grants because they encourage the use of economic standards in planning national projects.

14. As a general rule, effective development assistance should be insulated from the effects of military assistance within a country. While defense support assistance provides this insulation, it should, wherever possible, contribute toward long-range goals, and allow a maximum internal capital return for the dollar grant. However, care must be exercised that defense support not be converted into "showcase items," and must retain its basic present purposes.

15. Without decreasing the present programmed assistance to underdeveloped nations, a small number of countries offer the prospect of accelerated economic development. India, for example, is in possession of a capable administrative structure and a positive will for development. In such cases, there appears to be an immediate opportunity for the United States to offer sizeable economic assistance geared to the national programming, and to derive from this assistance a number of policy advantages. This assistance should be given without regard to the formal political alignment of the recipient, provided it is not within the communist bloc.

16. Flexible, special purpose assistance is justifiable to meet unforeseen crises and to support specific foreign policy objectives. There should be no objection to special arrangements with "satellite" communist states which would not contribute toward their military capability. The gift of surplus agricultural supplies for countries facing food shortages is a legitimate adjunct to our policy toward them. The Administration should have considerable flexibility in the disposition of resources available for special purpose assistance, since timely provision is often critical. Grants from surplus stocks should be made so as to avoid disturbing normal world markets and an interpretation of "dumping."

17. Apart from considerations involving the soundness of economic development programs, unreasonable and imprudent political strings should not be attached to our assistance.

18. The long-range aspects of development assistance are not particularly attractive to private investment, since it is activated by the profit motive. At least in the initial stages of most assistance programs, directed as they are toward reducing economic instability and hardships the risks of private capitalization are apt to be excessive. Moreover, foreign private investment may create currency and payments problems involving the United States in undesirable controversies. Although some opportunities do exist for private ventures, it seems evident that the bulk of development assistance will have to be undertaken with public funds until such time as conditions are created favorable to private enterprise.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

19. Technical assistance programs, costing a relatively small amount, should be continued and expanded. Of prime importance is the recruiting of a professional personnel base. Technical assistance is often a prerequisite to development programs, or their adjunct, and contributes toward the realization of our long-range objectives. It may, however, quite properly be expanded under United Nations auspices without violence to United States objectives, and should be thus promoted to serve several sets of interests. The rapid emergence of new nations, especially in Africa, suggests the need for an expansion of technical assistance as a base for future economic and agricultural growth.

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

20. The several types of assistance offered by the United States are obviously inter-related within themselves and with non-economic national objectives. Of prime concern is the improvement of decision-making and coordination within and between the legislative and executive branches of our government, so as to provide a consistent program of foreign policy.

21. Because United States policy assumes a community of interests, participation of other industrially advanced nations in assistance programs is to be sought and encouraged. When possible, this participation should be coordinated through international or regional agencies, or on a multilateral basis between the participants. Maximum international participation has a further advantage of increasing the return on the dollar effort of the United States, while at the same time reducing allegations of American special interests and positions.

A PANEL DISCUSSION IN PROGRESS

Conclusions

22. In terms of the scope of United States policy interests, the total cost of military and economic assistance has been remarkably small, accounting for the past few years for only one percent of our gross national product. Since the bulk of our foreign assistance has gone for military purposes, it should be appraised on the same terms as our domestic defense program. Thus appraised, the military assistance programs have helped to create and maintain a substantially larger and more effective defense posture around the Soviet Union than a similar dollar investment in our own defense establishment could have produced.

23. The Mutual Security Program is therefore recognized as a cornerstone of our national policy and must have the vital support of the American people.

24. Less than ten percent of the total cost of assistance programs has gone for pure economic development, mostly in Asia. The results of these programs are not immediately assessable, nor should they be expected to yield overnight results. They will require continuing programming of development assistance to promote a rate of growth satisfactory to underdeveloped nations and essential for the realization of United States objectives.

25. The total cost of foreign assistance is the price of pursuing the national interest, both present and future. Every opportunity should be taken to create public understanding and support of American objectives and programs, and to maintain, through other instruments of national policy, conditions in which these programs may be promoted and advanced. Periodic reassessments of our foreign assistance programs are essential to assure ourselves of their scope, direction, and results. Sound administration, coupled with clear statements of program objectives and means, offer the best prospect for strengthening our national determination to achieve international stability and progress.



Welcoming Address

MAJOR GENERAL JAMES E. BRIGGS
SUPERINTENDENT OF U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY

GENERAL BRIGGS:

Mr. Nitze, Dr. Wriston, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen:

It is my very great pleasure to welcome you to the Air Force Academy and to this first Air Force Academy Assembly, and in bidding you welcome, I am especially pleased for two reasons. First, because this conference is a symbol of our membership in the American community of colleges and universities--a symbol, if you would, of the academic spirit and tradition that binds us not only to our sister academies, but also to those of you who sit here tonight as representatives of our neighboring civilian colleges. And second, I am especially pleased because we have associated with us in this undertaking, The American Assembly, known and respected throughout the country as a program whose influence on national policy is very great.

Here at the Air Force Academy, our mission is to prepare Cadets for a lifetime of public service dedicated to the preservation of national security. If I could, I would underscore the words "public service." These words are the key to our great interest in national policy. We know that all of our graduates will be charged with the task of executing national policy in all of its many facets. We know too that some of our graduates will be policy makers within our traditional constitutional concepts, and that perhaps many of the young men and women participating with us in the Assembly will also some day be framers and executors of national policy, or instrumental in molding public opinions in your own communities.

These then, are our common bonds: we have brought you together to demonstrate the community of interests that exists between the informed citizen and the public servant, and to give you--together--an opportunity to discuss a very vital issue in public policy.

"International Stability and Progress" is perhaps the most fitting title we could have found for this first Assembly. While you will be discussing the political and economic implications of our foreign assistance program, your horizons will be on the world of tomorrow --your world. I don't think I am overstating the case when I say that "International Stability and Progress" depends ultimately on our willingness and determination to achieve it, and to maintain it.

Our speaker tonight is the Honorable Paul H. Nitze, and he is a man who embodies many of these things of which I have spoken. He represents dedication to public service in the very best sense of the term. He has been, as you know, Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, and a vital force in shaping the direction of American foreign policy. His career in government has cut across a wide number of departments and agencies and to each he has contributed his talents as a successful businessman, public servant, and policy architect. He is today the President of the Foreign Service Educational Foundation and concerned, as he always has been, with the dual aspects of education and policy. No one, I think, is better qualified personally and professionally to open this Air Force Academy Assembly, and I am honored therefore to introduce to you the Honorable Paul H. Nitze. Mr. Nitze:

Address by

Paul H. Nitze

President, Foreign Service
Educational Foundation



United States Policy & Foreign Aid

PAUL H. NITZE:

Mr. Carns, General Briggs, Ladies and Gentlemen:

During the next three days, the members of this Assembly will be surveying the full range of U.S. foreign policy and our foreign aid programs. This evening I am asked to give a keynote address; I am not certain what should properly be contained in a keynote address. I think the usual formula is that the keynote speaker should survey the broad field, and should point up certain of the issues that seem to him to be important, but that he should keep his own conclusions more or less in the background. I do propose to survey the field, at least in my own terms, and to point up some of the issues which I think are important; but I also propose to give my answer to those issues. The further I stick my neck out, the more fun the members of the Assembly will have in batting down my suggestions during the next two or three days.

The points that I propose to discuss are the following: In the first place, I propose to discuss what seems to me to be the basic issue underlying our foreign policy. Secondly, I propose to discuss four purposes of our foreign aid program. Then I propose to discuss four categories in which I think the countries which we aid might be grouped. I then propose to comment on alternate economic strategies which bear upon our aid program. Finally I shall offer some concluding comments on what seem to be the most important choices before us.

Let me begin with what seems to me to be the basic issue underlying our foreign policy. I think there are two ways of thinking about the world. One way is to emphasize U. S. interests, U. S. security, and the direct threat to that security posed by the hostile power and intentions of the Soviet-Chinese Communist bloc. From this point of view, allies are important to us only because of the contribution they can make to our interests and to our security. Looked at this way, the object of our foreign policy is basically defensive. It is to keep the Russians and those whom they may control from expanding into areas which would threaten our direct interests and our security as a nation.

The other way of thinking about the world is to regard U. S. interests and U. S. security as directly dependent upon the creation of some system of world order compatible with our continued development as the kind of nation we are, and believe ourselves capable of becoming. The creation and maintenance of such a system calls for a protracted and creative effort on the part of the United States--an effort going far beyond mere holding operations against Communist encroachment. From this viewpoint, policy is focused more on what it is we are trying to construct, and to defend it, while we are constructing it, than merely upon reaction to Communist encroachments.

To point up this issue, it may be useful to take a brief look at the last preceeding historical period, during which a considerable degree of world order and stability existed. The century from 1815 to 1914 was such a period. During those 100 years the balance of power among the European states operated to preserve a large measure of international stability. No single power could realistically aspire to dominate the world. England, with firm control of the seas, acted as a check on the ambitions of any of the land

powers. England was not strong enough and did not aspire to dominate the European continent. She acted as a balance wheel to preserve the balance of power between the European continental land empire. No nation outside of Eruope had the command of modern technology or an industrial base sufficient to make plausible a general challenge to European leadership. Economic institutions based on the gold standard and centered on the London capital market provided an economic framework within which large portions of the world--including the United States--were able to make tremendous forward strides in developing their economies. The principles of the common law and of political institutions based on the notion of public responsibility began to spread out to the far corners of the world.

Above all, wars up to 1914 were kept limited in their geographic extent, and in the objectives of the participants. In the progress and spread of modern technology, the two world wars shattered this system. The balance of power in Europe and the very empires on which it depended were destroyed. The power of England was weakened. The significance of sea power was diminished by modern weapon systems of great range and potentially overpowering destructiveness. The primacy of the European powers was cast in doubt. A strong United States and a bitterly hostile Russia came to the fore.

From the second point of view, the fundamental issue in the international arena today is not merely that of U. S. security, it is the question of who it is that will construct a new international order appropriate to today's world to take the place of the one that was shattered in the two world wars. Whether we have been fully conscious of it or not, what we have been doing since 1949 is contesting with the Soviet Union and its allies whether it would be they, or we and our allies, who would succeed in constructing such a new system.

Now, what are the main elements of the structure we have been trying to erect since 1946 and to defend while it was being erected?

This new structure had to have its political, its economic, and its military parts. It had to provide for certain world-wide functions. It had to foster closer regional institutions within the world-wide system. A unique role in this system had to be continuously borne by the United States, because we alone had the resources and the will to tackle the job. And it had to be constantly defended against the hostile and destructive efforts of the Soviet-Chinese Communist bloc--dedicated to the construction of quite another system.

An important part of the structure was its economic part. This had its world-wide aspects geared into the United Nations structure. The International Fund provided an institution looking toward Monetary greater stability of the world's currencies necessary for the financing of the world's commerce. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development provided a pool of capital to flow to those areas needing capital and able to make sound use of it. The arrangements under GATT, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, moved toward the reduction of administrative barriers to international trade. These international institutions were reinforced by regional and bilateral actions, such as the Marshall Plan, the OEC, the EPU, the Technical Assistance Program, and the Columbo Plan. We have tried to support these international, regional, and bilateral approaches through United States economic policies generally consistent with our new role as the world's leading creditor nation and principal reservoir of capital and technology.

In the military sphere, a similar structure, compounded of international. regional, bilateral, and individual arrangements was gotten under way. The heart of these military arrangements had to be strength at the center, strength in the United States itself. Supplementing United States strength at the center, an immense effort has gone into building strength at the periphery, through the organization of American states, NATO, SEATO, the Military Defense Assistance Program, and through our bilateral arrangements with the Republic of Korea, the Chinese Nationalists, and Japan. Much of the non-Communist world was tied together through a system of alliance. Even those parts of the free world outside of the alliance system were given a substantial measure of protection through the strengthening of world acceptance of the principle of restraint against the use of aggressive military force--and our active support of that principle.

These economic and military measures have found their place within a political structure, the broadest aspect of which was the United Nations organization, but the heart and driving spirit of which has been United States responsibility. A pattern of political relationships emerged, characterized by exceptionally close collaboration between the United States, England, and Canada, spreading out through close--but not as close--relationships with Germany, France, Italy, and Japan, and shading off to cooperation on certain basic matters with the uncommitted but free countries, such as India and Burma.

The object has been to create a structure sufficiently flexible in its arrangement and sufficiently dynamic to house the diverse interests and requirements of the entire non-Communist world. Even with respect to the Communist world, it was hoped that the structure would have something to offer and would, by its attractive power, either give room for manoeuver and draw off portions of the Communist world, as it did in the case of Yugoslavia, or result in a weakening of the bonds within the Communist world, as it did in the case of Poland, but failed to do in the case of Communist China.

The point of view I have outlined has seemed to many to be over-ambitious. If it were to be followed consistently as a basis for United States policy, it would call for a protracted and expensive effort. It challenged Soviet policy, not merely at a series of geographic points, but overall and in its essence. It is quite understandable why many Americans have thought that a modest policy, one following more nearly the first school of thought, would be more prudent. If we restricted ourselves to United States interests, to United States security, we might avoid getting ourselves too much mixed up in other people's business. Our policy would constitute a less direct challenge to Russia. We had plenty to do here in the United States. Why bite off so much, that perhaps we couldn't chew it?

As this more restricted conception of our interests has made itself felt from time to time, United States policy has fluctuated between the modest view of United States interest, and security, and the more ambitious target of participating in the construction of a novo ordo seculorum--which is the motto on the great seal of the United States. Some official pronouncements have appeared to support this point of view. Other statements, however, have implied that the object of United States should be peace with justice. The concept of justice is hardly understandable apart from a system of order within which the principle of justice is to operate.

In summary, the suggestion I am making is that the overall object of United States foreign policy is the creation and maintenance of a system of world order within which United States interests and United States security can find their satisfaction. Our interest in international stability and progress is an expression of our interest in this objective. If we fail in this objective, we will still have to

look to the defense of the United States' direct interests and security either within a chaotic world situation or within a system basically designed and created by the USSR and its associates. In either event, we will have failed in what I consider to be the major objective of our foreign policy.

Let me now turn to the purposes of our aid programs. Their purposes obviously fall within the general aims of our foreign policy. Our foreign policy is to be supported by all the tools we have available. Of these, foreign aid is only one, and not the most important tool. It is, however, a flexible tool--a tool that can effect many things.

In trying to sort out the purposes of aid--and for the moment I am making no distinctions between economic aid, technical assistance, or military assistance--it is useful to look at four ranges of possible effects of our aid program.

First, our aid programs can have effects for good and for ill on developments internal to the countries to which it is given.

Second, it can have effects on the external behavior of the countries to which it is given--again, for good or ill.

Third, it can have effects on the free world system as a whole--its defensability, its economic vigor, and its political cohesion.

Fourth, it can have effects upon the image which the United States projects abroad, and therefore, upon its prestige, its power, and its ability to provide constructive leadership.

Let me say a few words about each of these purposes of foreign aid. Let us take up first the question of the effects of our foreign aid programs upon the internal situation of the countries to which aid is given. Officially, our line must be that of non-interference in the internal affairs of foreign countries. But aid cannot help but have some internal effects for good or for ill. What we want is to increase the internal vigor and health of the political and economic systems of the countries to which we are giving aid. And in most of these countries, this is largely a political matter. It is often said that what we are trying to do with our aid programs is to promote democracy in the countries to which we are giving aid. But I don't

think it is always recognized how rare a system democracy, as we understand it, is in the world. At all periods of history democracy, as we understand it, has been the exception--not the rule. Most countries have been governed by far more centralized government--sometimes strong and sometimes weak. And it may be an over-ambitious target for us to strive for domocracy, as we know it, in each and every one of the countries to which we give aid. But certainly we want regimes that are practically adapted to the real conditions of the countries to which we are giving aid--regimes that provide a base of order and stability that are reasonably responsive to the needs of the people whom they are governing and to the will of those who are being governed, and that provide political systems from which progress toward higher forms of political development is possible.

Now this is a very difficult business. There are several techniques for trying to move things in the right direction. One can try to help the economic development of the country; and one can try to help its internal security; one can try to strengthen one section of the elite in the country as against another; and one can give advice, exert pressure, use influence to improve relations between the governing elite and the mass of the public. These are very difficult processes that require a great deal of skill, but still they probably remain the prime objective of our aid programs in one category of countries. I will subsequently get to this question of the various categories of countries to whom we give aid.

But now let me say a few words about the second purpose of our aid program: the purpose of encouraging responsible participation in the international political scene. I think the one thing that the countries of the free world have most clearly in common is the desire to work out their future, not subject to Soviet Chinese Communist hegemony. The countries of the free world differ on all kinds of things. I think the one thing that brings them together is the common desire to work out their own future in their own way not subject to Soviet direction. But even though they may have this thing in common, they see many other things differently, and they don't see the threat from the USSR quite as we see it. It, therefore, may be an over-ambitious target for us to aspire to--to have all countries of the free world look at the question of responsible international behavior in exactly the same terms that we do, or even in roughly the same terms. It may be that with respect to many of them, the

maximum that we can hope for is a more realistic target: that they behave responsibly, at least within the local region in which their more immediate international problems arise.

Now here again there are various ways in which we can increase the prospects of responsible political behavior. To a certain degree, we can do this by increasing the practicality of their conducting their foreign affairs in a responsible way. Certainly Finland, Switzerland, or India benefit from the fact that we and our allies are today balancing the power of the USSR and its allies. It is therefore practical for them to conduct a foreign policy of independence. If we were not balancing the power of the USSR, it would no longer be practical.

We can also increase the incentives and the motives for other countries to follow a course of responsible international behavior. But we also run into various dangers in trying to influence the external political relations of the countries that we are aiding. One dnager is that we lay ourselves open to blackmail--or something close to blackmail--by those countries who are prepared to trade upon the general interests of the free world in order to maximize the aid which they themselves receive. To some extent we need firmness in our policy to deal with this question of potential blackmail; to some extent we need the power of flexibility to deal with the various varieties of threats which the USSR can pose to these countries, particularly those on the periphery of the Soviet bloc.

But this again is not an easy matter to make decisions on exactly how to conduct our aid program so as to maximize the prospect of responsible international behavior on the part of the country that we aid.

Now the third purpose of our aid programs which I mentioned was that of increasing the defensibility, the economic strength, and the political cohesion of the free world system as a whole. Certainly during the period we have been through, and the current period when our B-47 bases around the world are essential to the security of the free world as a whole, it is important that we maintain base rights in Morocco, in Libya and Spain. And so our interest in assistance programs arises not just from what happens to the internal political situation within those countries or what happens

to their external relations. We are also interested in the contribution which we can get from them in the way of base rights, which contribute to the general strength of the whole free world system.

Similarly, in the economic sphere, there are times when issues arise which are important to the entire free world. Freedom of access to the Suez Canal was such a case. The free world does need freedom of communication between its various parts. Also from time to time, it is useful and perhaps necessary to get collaboration in the economic sphere between various parts of the free world in order to help other parts of the free world. The programs of assistance to India which was worked out during the last year was a collaborative program between the British, the Germans, ourselves and the International Bank.

Let me now turn to the fourth problem, or the fourth purpose of our aid programs. This has to do with the image which the United States projects abroad.

The way in which we handle our aid programs bears upon the view that other countries in the world form as to how we associate ourselves with what they consider to be their basic interests. If they feel that our relations with them are merely that we want to use them as pawns in a game between ourselves and the USSR, that is one type of relationship. If, however, they feel that we are conducting ourselves in a way which associates their basic interests with our basic interests, then they feel that we are the leaders of a group of which they are also a part--that we and they are parts of a common "we." This seems to me to be of the utmost importance.

Secondly, it seems to me important that we not project an image of the United States as being solely a status quo country. Much of the world looks to us for something much more dynamic than that. Much of the world is dissatisfied with its present position--and rightfully so. And I don't think that we can say that the world today is satisfactory to us. Certainly we must be for something more than just the status quo. We must be for some change in the future--for something that is better than the current situation.

The third point that I would like to make about the image that we project abroad is that I think it should not be directed solely to the

confrontation between the East and the West. It should be directed, in part, to surmounting and defining ways of reducing the present bleak confrontation between East and West.

I have dealt with four purposes of our foreign aid program. These bear upon our aid programs to different countries in the world in different ways and in different mixtures. It is difficult to deal with the foreign aid problem if you make a separate problem of foreign aid to each one of the forty or fifty countries to whom we give assistance. But you can't deal with it uniformly with respect to all countries--you have to make some distinctions.

It is hard to group these countries into a small number of distinct categories. It seems to me that the following grouping may, however, be of some use. I suggest that one put in the first category the highly industrialized, politically mature countries. This would include the principal countries of NATO: it would include Japan and Australia. With respect to those countries, we are not in a position to do anything about their internal political structure. Their internal political structure is mature today and we are not going to affect it in one way or another by our aid program. They don't need economic assistance from us, in fact they are in a position to contribute economic assistance to other countries. And there isn't any direct way in which we can affect their external political behavior through our aid program. If we are going to affect their foreign policy, it is going to be because our foreign policy is so wise and commends itself so to them that they will want to associate themselves with it.

So that with respect to this category of countries, assistance really boils down to one thing: and that is military assistance. Take the NATO countries--there we are interested in the military security of Eruope--military aid to them is important not only because of the strategic importance to us and the weapons we contribute, but also because it gives us some leverage in inducing them to do things which we consider to be important to the general strategic situation. Well, so much for Category One countries--those that are already mature and highly industrialized.

In the second category I would put those countries that are not industrialized, but are in a position of real military danger and are making a real military effort--a real military contribution--and are

putting resources into it that are more than they themselves can afford. I think in this category one could put Korea, the Chinese Nationalists, Greece, Turkey, and perhaps Spain, Yugoslavia, and even Israel. Even though Israel doesn't receive any U. S. governnent support, still it does receive considerable support from the U. S. populace from the subscription to bonds. But in any case, all of these countries are making a military effort beyond that which their own economy can support.

Now with respect to these countries we have a problem both of military assistance and of economic assistance--at least with most of them. And here the military problem is really dominant because it produces an over-strain on their economy. You can't really cut down on the defense support that we give them unless you want to cut down on the military effort that they are making. You can't really switch from one to another. Here the primary factor is whether we consider the military contribution that they are making to be an essential contribution.

Now the third category of countries would seem to me to properly include those where the principal problem is their internal political development. I would think this would include all of the countries of South East Asia, all of South Asia except India, and include all of the Arab countries of the Middle East.

As you look at these countries, the military contribution which they can make to the basic confrontation with the USSR is small. You look at their economic problems, and the economic problems are almost insoluble until there is further progress in their political problems. Take Indonesia for instance: you could give Indonesia economic aid to a faretheewell, and this wouldn't do the slightest bit of good until there is greater internal political stability in Indonesia. With respect to this third category of countries--which in some way seems to me to be the most interesting--the most difficult, and the greatest challenge to us--economic assistance and military assistance are really tools to a political purpose.

Now the fourth category of countries that I would suggest includes those countries where the military problem is relatively insignificant--where there is some longer political tradition than there is in the Category Three countries and where the bottle-neck is in economic development and in economic stability. I should think this

category would include India and the Latin American countries. I haven't put the new and emerging countries of Africa into any one of these four categories--frankly, because I am not certain where they ought to go. In part it seems to me they might properly go into the fourth category, but on the other hand they are so immature in the political realm, that I have a very deep suspicion that they will very soon be in category three.

Now I had intended to say a few remarks about alternate economic approaches. Maybe I can cut this very short. In 1947, those of us who were working on economic assistance programs thought that the main problem was the balance of payments problem. We could foresee that the U. S. would, in all probability have a five billion dollar surplus in its balance of payments with the rest of the world in each of the succeeding five years, and that this could only be reduced if other countries in the world drastically cut down on their purchases of things which were only procurable in the United States.

Today the situation is entirely different. Today the excess of our commercial exports over our commercial imports, both of goods and services, is not sufficient to cover the full amount of our military expenditures abroad and of our transfers under government aid programs. Now if you look at the economic aid programs solely from this criterion--the balance of payments situation--then I think that you would be led to the conclusion that we ought be busy reducing our aid.

But obviously this isn't all there is to the question. The second approach that I propose to discuss is the Millikan-Rostow approach. They suggest that the principal problems in the underdeveloped world is that of helping people get over the threshold of self-sustaining economic growth, and that the aid we give should only be limited by the capacity of these countries to absorb aid. Well, this seems to me to be a not wholely sound approach. It is easy to increase the capacity of countries to absorb aid, but there are real limitations upon the resources which the United States has available.

This leads me to the third approach, and that is that it seems to me you can't avoid the complex, difficult problem of tailoring the aid program country-by-country, context-by-context, within the resources which the United States can make available, and in the light of competing demands upon those resources. This is a tough and difficult job.

Now in conclusion, I would like just briefly to comment on certain of the over-arching questions which seem to me to be raised by the preceding analysis. Those are the following:

Are the broad objectives of our foreign policy which I outlined at the beginning of my remarks, realistic objectives?

Is a general re-orientation of our national strategy called for, in view of prospective changes in the nuclear relationships and in relative growth rates of the Communist bloc and of the West?

Is a larger overall effort, by the West, and particularly by the United States, necessary to make our overall strategy feasible?

Is a shift in the balance between our domestic efforts and our overseas efforts indicated?

Is a shift called for in the present allocation between types of resources going into our overseas effort?

No one can survey the problems which the United States will probably have to face over the next five or ten years without asking himself whether we can, in face, succeed in building a functioning free world system, successfully defend it against unacceptable enroachments by the Soviet-Chinese bloc, mitigate the confrontation between the two blocs, and avoid instabilities leading to a general nuclear war. It might even be argued that no one can present a convincing demonstration of how it can be done. But neither can it be demonstrated that it can't be done if we put sufficient intelligence and resources into the effort. The pertinent question is whether there is any acceptable alternate objective toward which our foreign policy should be directed.

If we falter in building a functioning free world system, who and what will fill the gap? Some have argued that the bipolarity of the world political situation will give way to a wider dispersal of effective power, that neither we nor the Russians will be able to dominate our associates to the degree that we have in the immediate postwar world; and that a more fluid and shifting multi-national balance of power will arise.

Two comments on this hypothesis seem pertinent. In the first place, it assumes an eventual break between Moscow and Peiping. If there is no such break, and if there is fluidity only among the non-bloc countries, the outlook would seem to be certain disaster for our side. In the second place, even if a break between Peiping and Moscow is assumed, some leadership towards world order will be necessary if the conflicts to be anticipated in such a fluid international political situation are not to lead to a general nuclear war. We are then right back to our initial question: if we falter, who is apt to supply leadership, and of what kind? The answer seems to be reasonably predictable. If we falter, it will be Communists of one stripe or another who will supply leadership. It is conceivable that we could adjust to that leadership without nuclear war. It seems hardly possible, however, that we in the United States could maintain anything resembling our traditional approach to life and to the world in such an environment.

The next question remains: can't we cut back our commitments, concentrate our efforts on the few most important objectives, and be more effective in our leadership than we have been in the past? My thesis is that we cannot, at least in any radical or basic sense. Certainly we want to encourage, stimulate, and help others on our side to take on all the responsibilities they can. We have so much to do that we must avoid all unnecessary tasks, and we cannot imagine that we can be unconcerned if necessary tasks are unfulfilled. We can decide that India is more important than Burma. We can decide that economic development is to us a more congenial field than military defense. We can decide that private investment is our preferred method for bringing about economic development. But if Korea is overrun, if Burma collapses and goes Communist, or if private enterprise can't do the full job in India, it is the free world system that is injured, our security that is endangered, and our policy that is defeated. Our job is to keep the free world system on the road. We have no choice but to concern ourselves with whatever will push it off the road. Much needs to be done if we are to keep the show on the road, if we are not to falter, and if the basic aims of our foreign policy are not to be further eroded by growing doubts as to whether they can and will be realized in action. The growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities places growing burdens on defense requirements for deterrence. The decreasing reliance we can place on our strategic nuclear forces effectively to deter lesser forms of aggression adds up to a requirement for greater free world non-nuclear defenses.

The differentially high Soviet and Chinese Communist economic growth rate presage an increased hostile weight of hostile economic pressure on the free world. The political weaknesses of the newly independent countries present challenges to policy which we are not today well equipped to handle.

In summary, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that a larger over-all effort by the West, and particularly by the United States, is required to make our over-all strategy feasible. It is doubtful whether it is possible to find useful general criteria bearing on the allocation of resources--between economic programs and overseas programs on the other hand--except in the context of the magnitude of the over-all effort to be made. If the over-all effort is inadequate, heavy risks must be taken as to the adequacy of all programs, or certain programs can be given full support and other potentially vital requirements cannot then be covered at all. Neither option is easy to defend. If that choice has to be made, I would support concentration on the two ends of the program. On the one hand, a secure, nuclear deterrent, and on the other hand, the politically most hopeful program in the area of greates political danger, the arc of countries between Turkey to Formosa. The politically most hopeful program in that area seems to me to be the Indian program. India has some 47% of the population of the area, and there is in India more political straw in the form of political leadership and functioning political institutions with which to work. But such a concentration of effort would present very great opportunities to the Soviet-Chinese bloc in other areas and with other techniques in the intermediate range between straight political competition and all-out nuclear war. Prudence therefore demands a more adequate over-all program, a program which covers the intermediate range of risks, and not only the extremes.

As a final point, I wish to emphasize the extent to which we must now look at all our activities in support of national policy as being part of one purpose and one strategy, and therefore inherently political in their essence. At one time it seemed appropriate to look at military problems purely from the "military point of view," and to deal with economic questions as though the only aims of economic policy were economic, and to regard diplomatic problems largely as questions for diplomacy. In a world where the logical

extension of military action to the ultimate violence technically feasible would lead to unacceptable results, and where the objectives of our enemies seem to be unlimited in their extent and duration, a fragmented approach becomes an unacceptable luxury. An adequately integrated approach however, puts a very high premium on the dedication, skill, training, and continuity in gaining breadth of judgement through experience, of those who are to plan and execute the diverse and complex program for which it calls.

Thank you.

Roundtable discussion by

James H. Smith jr., Louis T. Benezet,
Gardner Patterson, Mort Stern

THE SECOND PLENARY SESSION

International Stability and Progress - Problems and Prospects

COLONEL POSVAR:

Delegates to the First Air Force Academy Assembly, Cadets of the Wing, Ladies and Gentlemen:

We wish to welcome you to the Second Plenary Session of the Air Force Academy Assembly: a panel discussion. Your moderator this evening is Colonel Christopher H. Munch, Professor of Law and Chairman of the Division of Social Sciences at the Air Force Academy. Colonel Munch:

COLONEL MUNCH: ---Thank you, Colonel Posvar. Ladies and Gentlemen, we are privileged tonight to have four very distinguished gentlemen--as experts of one sort or another--on a quite broad question-- "International Stability and Progress: Problems and Prospects."

Last night we were privileged to hear a most comprehensive keynote address by Mr. Paul H. Nitze on the subject of "United States Policy and Foreign Aid." I am sure that he intentionally gave you many avenues for discussion in the panels today, and I understand that during the day you have had panels on instruments of foreign policy, the role of military assistance, and economic and technical assistance.

I wish to assure you at the outset that I do not share the view that the warm and gusty winds we had at the Academy today are in any way attributable to the gusty panels that were in session all day.

Our first expert today comes to us from a very short jaunt up the mountains from Aspen, Colorado. He is Mr. James H. Smith, Jr. Now I want to tell you something about Mr. Smith, because only the delegates received that very fine brochure, which contains a brief biographical sketch of the panel members as well as photographs. When Mr. Smith was asked for a photograph, he was apparently in some haste, and the photograph he furnished us shows three FF-1's, Navy Grummond fighters, in echelon to the left and to the rear--numbers 4,6, and 5--he is the pilot in number 6!

Mr. Smith has a most extensive background, not only in the field of economic aid but also in a sister field: the United States Navy. He was first commissioned in the Navy in 1932. He flew in combat in WW II in a torpedo squadron off the carriers Belleau Wood, Yorktown, and Enterprise, for which he received three air medals and 11 combat stars. I tell you this, because he comes to us not only as a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, but as former Director of the International Cooperation Administration. He therefore has an extensive knowledge and familiarity with problems not only from a military assistance point of view--dropping torpedos on the Japanese--but also from an economic aid point of view with the ICA. I am sure he has some colorful memories of some special policy problems that he encountered while Director of the International Cooperation Administration, and I think he can be of great assistance to continued gusty winds tomorrow by giving us a very definitive outline of foreign aid from his point of view. Mr. James H. Smith:

MR. SMITH:

Thank you very much, Colonel Munch. I might say that flying that number 6 between those two other airplanes is nowhere near as dangerous as the position of sitting here with an eminent psychiatrist and psychologist sitting on one side, and nearby a very distinguished economist, and of having a representative from the Editorial Page of the Denver Post within hearing range. But my role at this moment is a fairly minor one. I think what we are all looking forward to is the question and answer period, which we hope will be fairly fast and furious starting about an hour from now.

At this moment all I'm going to do is a little light shadow boxing or sparring in order to warm the arena up for the latter bout. In view of the short time available, I am going to give you a very quick, thumb-nail sketch of what I call the Mutual Security Program, as distinguished from what is here labeled the foreign aid program, and I will emphasize the mutuality of this program and not leave you with the impression that we are simply sitting here handing out aid to other people.

This is a program in which we are simply one of two parties helping each other, or in some cases, one of a number of parties joined together in partnership. Now I would also like to say that the basic concept of Mutual Security has been fully accepted and approved by the administration and by all the senior members of government that I know of. About a year ago, we had a very exceptional meeting, and in one day and in one place the President of the United States; the former President, Mr. Truman; Mr. Adlai Stevenson, the Secretary of State; the former Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson; the Secretary of Defense, Mr. McElroy; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a number of other distinguished citizens all joined together to heartily commend the concepts behind the Mutual Security Program.

This to me indicated that we have full bipartisan support for the program; however, as you know, we have had great trouble in getting necessary appropriations from the Congress, and we have had equal trouble in getting the word across to the public about the program itself. I think there are several reasons for this. One, and probably the most important, is that the objective of the program has never been clearly understood by the public, and this is partially

our fault, because we have been unable to get out around the country and tell enough of the people what we are trying to do. I think partially it is the fault of the press, because they don't give us sufficient publicity, and I'm tossing this one to my associate Mr. Stern, down at the other end of the table, and I hope he will talk on that point later on. Another problem that we've had is the fact that the administration of the program has not been without rather conspicuous fault at times. We have run some 2,000 different projects in some 60 different countries. Of those, it is inevitable that some will be failures, and unfortunately the tendency is to stress the failures and overlook those which are successful. The third problem we have is that often the apparent reaction of the recipients of our aid program is bad, and therefore we begin to think that the program itself is failing.

I'd like to start talking about the objectives first of all. There are several. But the principal ones are, first, to increase the security of the U. S. and its free world allies, and the second, which is most important in my mind, is our assumption of the responsibility that we have acquired--whether we like it or not--as the most advanced nation in the world today. Of the first of these objectives, the increase of the security of ourselves and our allies is a purely defensive objective. The second, which is our assumption of leadership, is a positive and constructive objective. The security situation is one where we are dealing largely in military matters, and of the money that is appropriated for mutual security--which runs in the neighborhood of 4 billion dollars--and I'm going to use round numbers throughout--about one half of this, or 2 billion dollars, goes to outright purchase of arms for our allies; it buys us military manpower in other countries, it buys us bases for manned aircraft, and for missiles and other weapons of war.

For example, we aid Spain, and they in turn give us the use of bases in their country. This is true of Morocco, and Libya, and other countries around the world, principally supporting the SAC bases which are so important. This money is also used to support our alliances, such as NATO, SEATO, the Baghdad Pact, and others. All of this is in the book on mutual security, which I think you have had, and I will not go into any further detail, but I would like to say this--that in presenting the program to Congress, we are apt to stress very heavily the military side, and I am not sure that this is a good thing, but it's done because the military side, the defense side,

is politically palatable. Congressmen and their constituencies are very apt to approve of expenditures for defense, where actually they are very skeptical about some of the other expenditure fields. Also I would like to point out again the stressing of this mutuality. For every dollar we put into it, our allies and the recipient countries are putting in about five or six dollars, so that our dollar going into the military assistance program generates five or six times as much activity itself. This part of the presentation--as far as Congress is concerned--is easy. It's the remaining half, which is about 2 billion dollars, labeled economic aid, which is difficult.

This is the half that I am principally concerned with. Of this amount, some 700 million dollars, or approximately 1/3, is called defense support. This is money or goods which we supply to countries where the military requirement in the country, in our opinion and in their opinion, is greater than they can afford, due to the low level of the economy of their country. These countries are principally those which are bordering on the Russian border or the Chinese Communist border, and therefore are countries which are more personally threatened than any other.

This leaves out of the 4 billion we started with, about 1 billion, 300 million, which should be labeled pure economic assistance. Of this, about 1/2 is loaned, through the Development Loan Fund, which is a government corporation, which is run as a business, which lends money out after careful consideration of projects, and which receives a repayment of the money, although not necessarily in dollars. We lend dollars, and if the country to which it is being loaned has a local currency problem, and does not have access to dollars, we accept repayment in the local currency. This local currency is not obviously as useful as the dollar, but on the other hand, it can be recirculated in the country again to start up other economic projects. The remaining half, or approximately 700 million, is granted to various countries; some of it is loaned.

Now I use these figures so that we can get some idea of the scale of what we call foreign aid It amounts to about $7 per person in the United States. As far as the recipients are concerned it amounts to about 1 dollar per person in all of the countries that are being aided. In other words, we are talking about somewhere in the magnitude of 1 billion, 300 million dollars, going to 1 billion, 300 million

people. Compared to the total budget of the United States, it amounts to about 2%. Thus it is not big, it is not overwhelming. Still, it is a billion dollars, and when a Congressman has to answer the question: "Why are we spending a billion dollars to help people overseas when we are pleading that we are too poor to build hospitals or schools or do other things in this country?," it is a very difficult question for him to answer. Therefore, we must come up with a good reason for doing this.

In my opinion the answer is not too difficult. I believe that we in this country have now become mature enough to know that our affairs are world-wide, and that we have a responsibility of leadership in this world, and furthermore, that we have the skill, the energy, and the resources, to give impetus to another great peacetime advance in the welfare of mankind. I think if you look back over the last few years, you will see that this country, principally during war time, or because of the threat of war, has engaged in an enormous amount of research, and this has produced for us much new knowledge and much new technology, and a great deal of this has been applied to war. It is our intention now, and has been for some time, to make the greater application of this knowledge and technology to peacetime uses, and to help other countries, particularly the lesser developed countries, and the newly independent countries, to make use of this knowledge. The President's program, "Atoms for Peace," is a good example of this. So in brief, it's our purpose to give our knowledge to those who would otherwise spend decades trying to acquire this themselves through the very limited means that they have.

Now, on the humanitarian side, this is not difficult to do. We have sizeable programs in health, education, agriculture, and other activities. In health, one of the most dramatic things we have done is to undertake the elimination of malaria. Now there has been no malaria in this country for some time, but the job of eliminating it in the rest of the world is a very substantial one. We have had good luck in getting other countries to join with us in this effort; in fact, the Russians themselves decided to come along and do their part in the job--rather lately. We are making use of radio isotopes, which were originally developed for wartime purposes, or as a byproduct of the Manhattan project, in our health work overseas. We are doing some of the simplest things in sanitation, which we in this country take for granted, but which are totally unknown in other countries. In

education, we know that this is the base of any good economic program, and yet the mass of people who have to be educated overseas is so great that you cannot just rest and use the conventional methods, so we are trying to produce new methods, visual aids, our use of radio, and things like that to accelerate the whole educational process.

In agriculture, in many parts of Africa and Asia, they simply don't know the things that the least educated County Agent in this country would know, and we feel that we can move this knowledge in increasing productivity of the soil, increasing protein content of their food, and things like that with these people rather quickly, and without great expense. However, on the industrial side, it is more difficult. There are many people in this country who say: "All right, I don't worry if you simply make the people in the less developed countries healthier, make them a little better educated, give them a little more food, but be sure not to give them any of our industrial secrets." Now we don't believe that this is a proper procedure. We don't believe that you can make the rest of the world into a market for the United States. We believe that trying to do this would immediately indicate that we are trying to set up economic colonies as distinguished from political colonies, and it would be a very short-sighted point of view. And furthermore, the people whom we are dealing with are sophisticated enough to know that this would not work out properly for them. I am very happy to say that a number of the people we are working with have been educated in this country or in American-sponsored universities, so that they are fully aware of the problem of having to bring about some industry within their own country. I think it is only fair to note that our country developed, starting out with a highly industrialized center in the East, and the industrious of the East were very pleased to have industry moved gradually to the West and raise the whole level in the U. S., and not attempt to keep this locked up in one particular area of the country, and I feel that the situation in the world is somewhat analogous today. In any case, we have accepted this concept, and I am very pleased to say that many other countries are doing the same thing--the British, the Canadians, Italians, Swedish are all active in aid programs, helping these countries become somewhat industrialized as fast as they can.

So, I feel that the concept is good, but the question remains as to how we are going to do this. It is a job of enormous magnitude. How are we going to administer such a job properly? The first thing

MR. JAMES H. SMITH AND STUDENT PANELISTS

that keeps hitting my mind is that we have never trained a corps of people to do this job. Now we sit here in this great Academy which is just launching itself, and you people here in this room are being given the finest education in the world. Yet we have never sat down and decided that we must train people, and it would take a very few in number, compared to the military side--possibly a total of 10,000 people to undertake the job of helping other countries in their economic development.

We are moving ahead; we are getting people who are better qualified professionally; we have put a lot of money into training people in the languages and the cultures of the countries in which they will work. We are fortunate in having some 55 American universities helping us in the program, but nonetheless, we do not have a corps of dedicated people who can see a long term future in this work, and I think this is one of the essential things that we must develop soon.

There are many other questions about how to do it. There is the basic question whether the government should undertake the full job, or leave the large part of it to private enterprise. Very fortunately, on the humanitarian side, we have a number of foundations, such as the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller--there are too many of them to enumerate--who are doing wonderful work. There

are missionaries undertaking educational facilities all over the world, and they are doing work which I believe the government should not interfere in, or move in on in any way. On the other hand, there are some features which have to be done by the government, because no one else will. On the industrial side, we are very anxious to have private enterprise go ahead as rapidly as possible. We want to see American business and other businesses established in some of these countries. This has been a successful program in Latin America. I think the American companies now have on their payroll some 600,000 Latin Americans. On the other hand, in some of the lesser developed countries, for a businessman to go in, he would find that there are no real property laws, no provisions for corporation, no insurance of laws or anything like that--of course an almost impossible base from which to start a business. For this reason, I feel it's proper for the government to act as the initiator until those things can be established.

I know another question you have is what you do in a country, and how do you decide to do it. It is very important to realize that we don't decide what to do with a country. We look at a country, and in consultation with the people who run that country, we try and figure out a reasonable program in which we will both participate. I don't know of any case, except in an emergency, where we undertake a program in which the other country does not come up with a very decided effort of its own to match ours. This is the matching fund spirit. We have to be careful to find a proper balance. We are always being criticized. The educators say we don't do enough in education. Some people say we don't do enough in health. Industrialists say we don't do enough in building new plants. Unfortunately, all of these things have to move ahead together, and they move ahead rather slowly. But if you get out of balance, if you educate too many people, and don't have jobs for the educated people, you are creating unrest rather than the stability that we are looking for.

Another thing that is complained about to some extent is the fact that we tie so-called strings to our aid. This word "strings" is a very vague word. I feel myself that the conditions we impose on the granting of aid, one of which I just mentioned to you--and that is that the other fellow comes up and does his full share--is a very proper condition, and I think by all the mature people we deal with, it is also contributing to a proper condition.

I am running out of time, and I am going to skip a little bit here. I know you are interested in where are we going to do our work. There has been a suggestion that we should do as the Russians do and simply concentrate on the strategic spots in the world. We believe that this would be the wrong way of going about it, that we should not focus our attention simply on those areas of particular interest to us. We should work across the board and give to the free and uncommitted world a real sense that we are interested in their future, not simply because we are interested in our own future, but because we do want to raise the general outlook. I don't believe that we should ape the Russians in any way. I feel that we went into this business a long time before the Russians did, we now have the initiative, we have had more experience in the work than the Russians have, and we should not be in a position where we get concerned about what we are doing to the extent of "aping" what they do. I think we must continue to look at each country, diagnose its particular problems in a very careful manner, and come up with a very tailor-made solution for their problem. We should not become alarmed because the Russians come in one day and do something very sensational in a country, and in that way get some immediate impact benefits, but not honestly give a strong economic base to the country in the long run.

Another very basic question that is asked is: "How long are we going to continue to undertake this work?" And I know that often when this question is asked it is asked in the frame of mind, "Can't we stop doing this work?" "Can't we get someone to undertake the work for us?" Now my feeling is almost totally opposite to this. I feel very strongly that this is work that we are going to do as long as we maintain our technological lead over the rest of the world. This is work that is fully in keeping with our American tradition, and it's evidence of our faith and our confidence, and furthermore, it evidences and demonstrates our conviction that economic progress can be made without loss of individual freedom, and that wealth can be created by the system that we have, without exploitation of the people of the world, or without domination of the small countries. Now at this point I am going to stop, because we are short of time, and I know that later on you would like to ask some questions. Thank you.

COLONEL MUNCH: ---Thank you very much, Mr. Smith. I am sure the audience shares with me the regret that the initial time did not permit you to cover all of the subjects that you wished, but I should hope that questions asked from the audience during the question period will permit you to cover the rest of your subjects.

Our next panel member is Dr. Louis T. Benezet. He is known to many of us. He is a neighbor. He is the president of Colorado College, an institution which I understand is co-educational. Dr. Benezet has a Master's degree in psychology. His Doctor's degree is in Higher Education. He literally sprang from the cradle into the educational world. His father was a Superintendent of Schools. He has taught at many colleges throughout the country. He was President of Allegheny College in Pennsylvania from 1948 to 1955, and since 1955 has been President of Colorado College. Now Dr. Benezet has consented to act as our informed layman, our public-spirited citizen, and I am certain that he meets all of those qualifications. In addition he would be a very strange college president indeed if he didn't have a healthy interest in economics and aid, because every college president I have met so far has had some interest in those matters. I think that Dr. Benezet will perhaps cover for us some of the moral issues covered in economic aid, particularly to a country such as Spain or Yugoslavia, which do not quite meet all American ideals of a democracy. Perhaps he might also give us some of his views on the effect of public opinion--student public opinion, community public opinion--on the Congress with respect to foreign aid. Dr. Louis T. Benezet:

DR. LOUIS T. BENEZET:

Thank you, Colonel Munch. I find it very pleasant to come up here as a neighbor, and visit this great institution to our North--to come up here and find out where all that wind is coming from. I feel, Ladies and Gentlemen, that I have already made the greatest contribution I can to most of this group by helping to provide the co-education of which you were speaking. I sometimes wonder if in the last year or two there hasn't been a little more "co" and a little less "education." I understand that the upper-classmen are now allowed to disguise themselves as civilians; but they still don't look quite the same as our boys. We're very glad to have you, and it's giving our boys good competition: really making some magical changes. Some of our men have taken to wearing ties on Saturday night.

Colonel Munch has said that this panel represents experts of one type or another. I am the "another." My role in this panel of otherwise distinguished spokesmen on the topic is, I take it, that of Mr. John Q. Public, a traditional cartoon figure. And although I lack the traditional brown derby hat and glasses and toothbrush mustache and umbrella--and perhaps I am a little tall for the act--I can at least put on his traditional worried look.

There are a good many reasons for it, and I am delighted that Mr. Smith has started off, because I find that my remarks underscore, in another way, everything he has said. My worried look comes partly from the concern of this student generation over what they call apathy. Student generations take their attitude, after all, not out of thin air, they take them from their elders. They process the attitudes and add color and vernacular and give them back. Then the elders look at them and say, "Where in the world did our youngsters get such ideas?"

A good example of this is the security-mindedness in youth which you hear decried at each meeting of the Rotary club. We have security-minded young people all right; but we have security-minded young people because we have security-minded old people, and security-minded middle-aged people. I don't care whether you're talking about the Townsend clubs or the 45 year-old sales agent living like a millionaire on his company's expense account. We have plenty of security-mindedness today, and one thing we can trust about our youngsters is that they take their attitudes from their elders. The other thing is that they are not easily fooled.

The apathy we worry about tonight, however, concerns mutual security in the broadest sense. I don't mean apathy about intercontinental missiles or missiles-defense, because one can hardly be apathetic about that today if he wants to stay alive. The apathy I refer to is the kind of apathy which at this moment is permitting Congress--at least tentatively--to kill the 225 million dollar Development Loan Fund, of which Mr. Smith spoke--that program of so-called soft loans, through which the United States has been able to spread hope among underdeveloped nations.I am sure Dr. Gallup would find out that not one citizen out of twenty has even heard of the Development Loan Fund, and I am sure also that not one citizen in twenty could tell what ECOSOC is, even when told it is part of the

United Nations. Dr. Ralph Bunche might be known by one citizen in ten, but the Trusteeship Council which he headed would again drop us to one in twenty by a safe guess.

European visitors are surprised and depressed to see what tiny space is given to United Nations activities in the American press, except the name-calling fights in the Security Council. There isn't a citizen in any town near here with 50 miles who, for instance, couldn't tell you the record of the Air Force Academy's splendid football team last fall; in Colorado Springs Mr. Martin has been beatified and is shortly, I understand, to be canonized.

At the same time, gentlemen and ladies, I had to look on page 6 of our paper, in rather small type, to find out anything about this Assembly--this splendid affair on world-important topics attracting student leaders from all over our part of the country and from the East too. Mr. Stern might tell us, if we asked him, that the press after all must follow the public vote on what is considered important news. Or must it? Our fight for international stability (--don't worry about Mr. Stern, he speaks last on our panel--) our fight for international stability through a diplomatic, economic, and military leadership has become so immensely complicated that even the best U.S. senators are confessing bewilderment in the difficulty of keeping up with it all. And as for the constitutents, John Q. Public and Mrs. John Q., they seem to have given up entirely. This, in the world's greatest democracy, is a dangerous thing to happen.

You young people are here on the initiative of one government activity, and you of the delegates are here on the invitation of that activity, which has realized the danger--that danger of giving up--and is trying to do something about it. Do you already, like your parents, perhaps feel hopeless and apathetic about understanding, much less helping, the course of U.S. foreign policy? If so, there is work for us all to do, or truly we shall be lost.

Twenty-five years ago I was midway through college. We were then, in 1934, only a very few Dow-Jones points out of the depths of the great depression. The graduating senior who had found a job, any job, was given a party by his classmates to celebrate--a hard-times party to be sure. And yet there was, I submit--and perhaps it isn't just middle-aged nostalgia--idealism and hope on the campuses in those days. The campuses were rife with causes. Some of

them were fleeting causes. Others were somewhat radical. Many were impractical. A sardonic professor used to observe to me a few years later that those very students who had led in the taking of the Oxford pledge in 1935, vowing never to bear arms for any cause, were among the first to volunteer in 1936 for the Lincoln Brigade in the Spanish Revolution. Most of the causes went awry, yet there was a feeling for cause, and the campus was a lively place because of it.

Are there no causes today? Is there nothing on the horizon today big and bright enough to light a student's eye? Has the struggle become too grim, too complex, too impersonal? I for one don't believe so. But then I am a worker in education, and education is based on faith in the future. If there are causes somewhere, is it not our job to bring them out, underline them and simplify them if you will, and then turn them over to our students to see what happens? And if this is the course, could there be a more promising area for causes than mutual security, international stability and the ingredients of world progress?

While the great powers are standing each other off in reasoned terror of nuclear warfare, there may yet be time to talk about the cause of world progress. Still the citizen has to involve himself in the right question. What makes the issue so hard to see? I've already used half of my time asking the question. I'll use the other half suggesting just one road to an answer.

My suggestion is that causes and ideals are based in morality, and that we need a new understanding of morality restated in world terms. Let me make that more clear if I can. We need to move our thinking from purely national morality--without weakening national morality, understand--to universal morality if that be possible. One difficulty I see lies in interpreting one nation's foreign policy--diplomatic, economic, and military--in these broader moral terms. Morality in foreign policy for centuries has been based on the principle that there is no higher good than to serve one's country and to advance its single interest. Over the centuries it has been assumed that the higheet good permitted the diplomat was to do anything which would promote his country at the expense of another country. It's no accident that the most famous definition of an ambassador still comes, as we know, from Sir Henry Wotten, from the 18th Century--namely that "an ambassador is an honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country." We are still unable quite to

get past the belief that altruism stops at the three-mile limit, or that we cannot support any national action that might benefit another country, temporarily at least, more than or even as much as it helps us.

The 20th and 21st Centuries will not permit nations to operate wholly within this older morality. For one thing, instantaneous world communication makes it impossible for ambassadors to report facts abroad that are not so. I presume 300 years ago Mr. Khruschev might have gotten away with preaching peace to nations at the same time his tanks were rolling over Hungarian patriots. By the time the incident has been reported in the 1600's, if it ever got reported, the desired propaganda effect might have already been secured. The artifacts of electronic ears and eyes have put all nations into glass houses. World morality may come upon us, if for no other reason than that it is objectively harder to fool one's neighbors than before the dawn of radio and television.

Yet there is more to it than this. In 1947 the Marshall Plan brought to the world what may in time be called the first day of a new world morality. I am proud that a man like my neighbor here, Mr. Smith, has had a chance to administer its direct descendant. The Marshall Plan was not a military alliance; it was not an economic treaty; it was not a monster loan program. It was an attempt to shore up the economy of war-torn nations, and the only self-interest we might have been accused of was the simple reality that modern society does not permit prosperity and security to last in one nation alone, while others remain destitute. Some of the nations wouldn't believe it, and some are still looking for the "joker." Political experts tell us that Russia's refusal to go into the Marshall Plan may have been her greatest diplomatic mistake of that era. And yet I wonder sometimes whether the thinking of America itself has yet caught up with the philosophy of the Marshall Plan. Some of our own people are still looking for the jokers. So-called practical men are telling us that world altruism is impossible and foolish. It is "bunk," or "globaloney"--as one noted woman writer and stateswoman named it in her pre-ambassadorial days. Immediate self-interest is still the only proper basis for diplomacy, the wise money tells us. We lend wheat to India--we should have a right to expect to have Indian votes on our side at the next UN session, shouldn't we? Let's make foreign loans--yes--, but not soft loans. Let's not look like suckers. So on and on come the voices of the past, warning

against softness, altruism, "globaloney," milk for Hottentots. How Khruschev must cheer those voices and hope they continue in America, as he promotes his own foreign aid program. How hard it is to lose 25,000 years of caveman thinking or 5,000 years of marketplace morality: a dollar's return today for a dollar invested today, and don't let those interest rates drop.

As against this we see slowly forming the new morality, which like all true morality, is based simply on the practical. We live in a world now where no one people will be content to live like animals while other people are living like men. The security we help build in Bolivia or Burma becomes, in shortening run, the basis for the security of America. Altruism must in time become fashionable.

Still, the citizen finds these long-range views hard to accept. Some Washington Congressmen are not yet understanding it or accepting it, as Mr. Smith said. Education labors, meanwhile, in a climate of post-war materialism, teaching the broader horizons to a student in order that the world tomorrow may survive. Education itself runs into very great criticism when it teaches broader horizons. How far ahead of public thinking can the schools foresee? The answer is, not very far. At the start of our discussion I identified educators as optimists. I think they are, but they are puzzled and easily intimidated. I believe America and the other nations need world morality and that this is the highest meaning of the terms, mutual security and international stability. I believe this new morality can be taught, as Plato once discussed, though there is difficulty and even danger in it. And furthermore I believe it holds power for the renewed idealism of college youth.

How do we proceed? We need help. There are problems and obstacles of great size in teaching this new morality, some of which might be discussed in meetings like this. Meanwhile the final belief I would try out on you is that a new morality in world diplomatic relations, far from being un-American, is at our very essence. The implications of democracy are world-mindedness. To Woodrow Wilson we owe our American principle of self-determination. Our policy in the Philippines still stands before the world as a shining example of this. And to that same English statesman, Sir Henry Wotten, quoted for his cynical definition of the ambassador, we owe also a happier verse, which might guide our way toward a more world-minded morality:

How happy is he born and taught
That serveth not another's will;
Whose armor is his honest thought,
And simple truth his utmost skill.

COLONEL MUNCH: ---Thank you very much, Dr. Benezet. I neglected to say, in introducing Dr. Benezet, that he also has military service in his background. Military service is a misnomer. He served also with the United States Navy, and you might be interested to know, if you have run into any hard-working and well-educated sailors in your time, that Dr. Benezet was instrumental in establishing the off-duty programs at the Great Lakes training center in Chicago, in the San Francisco area, in the Philippines,in New Guinea, and in Australia. So he has traveled quite widely, and is well-qualified to give his views on morality as an issue closely connected with our problem of economic aid and international progress and stability.

Our next member also served a stint in the services during WW II, also in the United States Navy. Dr. Gardner Patterson received his AB and MA degrees at the University of Michigan, and a PhD at a small Eastern college, Harvard University. He has spent his time almost exclusively in the economic field and in the political science field. He is presently the Director of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. He served in the government in many capacities in the period from 1940 through 1950: on the War Production Board and with the United States Treasury Department; he served on the Greek currency commissions; and consequently, if in Greece they have some new words for currency, you may attribute this possibly to Dr. Patterson's efforts over there. He is an international economic expert, and has consented tonight to take the role of a non-government expert in economic aid and international stability and progress. With his extensive service in the government, he is going to have to close one eye in order to be a non-government expert on this panel. Dr. Gardner Patterson has consented to discuss some of the cogent problems of economic aid and international stability, particularly some of the apparent inconsistencies or paradoxes that economic aid may give rise to, when you look at it from a stability standpoint. Dr. Gardner Patterson:

DR. GARDNER PATTERSON:

Thank you, Colonel Munch. Gentlemen and Ladies. I really did wonder what the colonel was going to say to commend me to you. Mr. Smith has had a distinguished military career. This was a particularly fine recommendation for you men, especially since it was in the Navy Air Arm. I, too, was in the Navy. But that isn't the full measure of my military career. I was a reserve officer in the Navy. Even worse than that, I was in the Supply Corps. As you know, that "ain't military service at all!" Then our second speaker, even before he said anything, was a friend of yours because he comes from, and represents, a co-educational college. Of course, I come from Princeton, and there is absolutely nothing at Princeton that would attract any of you on a Saturday night. I'll correct that--any of you except the 12 that the rest of you have been watching like hawks--or should I say vultures?

I'd like to look at this question of economic development and international stability. The theme of this Assembly is often given as a shorthand expression of one of the objectives of United States foreign policy--"International Stability and Progress." Certainly it's frequently given as a shorthand expression of what are the objectives of our foreign economic aid policy. It has been an easy assumption for many people that we will help other countries--the poor countries of the world--in their economic development effort; as they develop economically, their incomes will go up; as incomes go up the appeal of drastic political doctrines will become less potent; the result will be stable democracy. Now, we know this isn't true. It's not that simple--as a matter of fact the effects may be quite the opposite. Aid to facilitate economic development is likely to lead to international instability. I think in logic we should have expected this, and I think it is important that we come to expect this.

By economic development I mean what I think most people mean --concerted efforts by government authorities drastically and radically to alter the structure of their economies. The situation is a very different one if it is simply a free society, deciding by the actions of thousands of individuals, to go ahead and bring about some change.

Economic development these days means great effort by governments to encourage these changes. Now I think there are a series of reasons why these efforts--and especially when they are aided by us --to facilitate economic development will result in instability.

In the first place, economic development, as it is being practiced in the mid-twentieth century, leads to serious inflation, and serious inflation in these sorts of countries means a great increase in the maldistribution of incomes and it means a frustration of expectations. And this means political unrest. The reasons it means inflation are quite straightforward and simple. Once countries embark on economic development, especially if they are aided by a foreign government, they almost always set their sights very high. In technical terms, the attempted investment almost always exceeds the planned savings within the country. This is partly because they underestimate what it is going to cost to bring about the reforms they think they want, and that we'd like to see them have. They also certainly underestimate the amount of voluntary saving that people are willing to do. And they underestimate the great increase in consumption the people will demand.

Furthermore, it's something like preparing for war or carrying out war. Any government which carried out an economic development program that didn't result in inflation could probably quite properly be charged with not doing everything it could do, just as a government that fought a war without inflation would probably be unpopular with its allies since this would create the presumption that there must be some more to give to the war effort.

We haven't the time, or you the interest, to go into all the technical economic details of why you get inflations, but it has to do with the ease with which governments can put money into the economy. It has to do with the sorts of projects that appeal to underdeveloped countries, often very costly and whose products are very slow in coming to the market. It has to do, too, with the promises made to people by their political leaders and which result in their consumption standards rising much more rapidly than the output of the new facilities. But the result, and I know of no exception--not one--where a serious economic development effort in which we have played a part has been undertaken, the result, I say, is a serious inflation and a serious inflation leads to political instability and dissatisfaction with the existing government.

A second major source of instability accompanying economic development is that the effort to alter the economy of these poor countries leads to serious balance of payments problems. By balance of payments problems, I mean international financial problems. Partly this is a consequence of the inflation just noted. Inflation means that foreign goods become the cheapest goods that you can buy--so your imports increase, and inflation also means that your own goods become very expensive to foreigners, so your exports fall off. You thus get a reverse scissors effect, expenditures of foreign exchange tend to go up and earnings down. You are in international financial difficulties.

But it is more than this. Even where you can hold inflation at bay for a while, economic development in practice means the importation of a lot of foreign equipment. Doing the new things, adopting the new technology--not just new human skills--but also the new industrial and agricultural machinery, means larger imports. These are frequently quite carefully planned for in the first instance. What often is not planned for is the maintenance and the upkeep and the running of this new equipment. All of these run into foreign exchange expenditures that often are much greater than the initial investment. The results of this are balance of payments problems. It is usually hoped that the increased production in these poor countries resulting from economic development will permit them greatly to expand their exports and so provide relief for balance of payments strains. This sometimes happens. But a more frequent experience is that the increased production that was planned to go for exports is diverted to the domestic consumer. And why not? He was promised a higher standard of living and it's time this promise was fulfilled, if you want political stability. The result of using the additional output is that a little peace is bought for a time, but the balance of payments problem quite quickly becomes more serious since export earnings are not going up. Then must be faced the common phenomenon of severe shortages of imported goods. These can quickly become most serious in underdeveloped countries which have taken some steps toward "modernization."

In the days when the peasants farmed with donkeys and mules, if the ships didn't come in from abroad, then they still tilled their soil. But if they have gotten rid of the donkeys and modernized, they now have tractors and if they can't pay for the petroleum, the

international oil companies soon tire of delivering fuel oil. The same thing happens with respect to truck tires, bus engines and so on across the economy. The result is that the planting or harvesting doesn't get done, the factories stop, the bus lines don't meet schedules, et cetera. This situation quickly makes for political instability.

Parenthetically, another factor here worth mentioning is that once a nation gets into this sort of a mess, the temptations to greatly increase their trade with the Soviet bloc become almost irresistable. Once you've priced yourself out of the world's market, and once you're short of imported raw materials, then the one country in the world that can quite easily make barter deals with you, in which you both overprice your goods, becomes very attractive. This question of the increased Soviet offensive in the underdeveloped countries has many facets, of which this is not the most important, but it is nonetheless worthy of note. Countries in the process of economic development seem very commonly to be driven by the sheer force of short run economic considerations into a greater amount of economic transactions with the Soviet bloc.

DR. GARDNER PATTERSON WITH ASSEMBLY DELEGATES

Perhaps more important as a source of political instability than any of the things already mentioned is the relationship between economic development and population. The typical situation in the agrarian peasant economy is a very high death rate--brought about by ignorance, poor medical care, poor diets, and poor sanitation--and a very high birth rate. The very high birth rate being in part because there are some economic advantages to having children and they aren't very costly in these countries. But also it came about because there had developed over the centuries social beliefs and customs that were absolutely necessary if a high death rate society were to continue to exist. Now, once you start economic development, and especially with help from the West, you slash the death rate. As Mr. Smith said, we can quickly wipe out malaria. You can do that in two or three years. And with the new antibiotics and modern medical care and sanitation, the death rates right through the age scale are cut drastically and very quickly.

Economic development may also reduce the birth rate. We aren't sure about this, but it may have some effect in this direction for a variety of reasons. It may result in people learning more about how to meet these problems, if they see high birth rates as a problem and if they want to meet it. Economic development may result in fewer births because there are fewer economic advantages to larger families in an industrialized society than in an agrarian society. With lower death rates there is less motive for higher birth rates and this may make itself felt. But it's obvious that these effects come about much later--a generation later--maybe two generations later. Every society puts a great premium on reducing deaths. But there is no such consensus in any society about reducing the number of births.

The result during the early years of economic development is likely to be a population explosion. This is likely to mean a larger number of people living at the misery margin. And this does not make for political stability. Although economic development may permit a country to show graphs with steel production going up, with wheat production going up, and so on and this all looks very good, it is sometimes the case that as soon as this is put on a per capita basis, you find there are more people who are living at what has been called the misery margin than there were before.

This is not a situation that makes for political stability. Many countries now may be able, with good luck, to get a 3% per year increase in national income. That's what we do in the United States. But if you have a 3% per year increase in population--and that is very easy to do--this is no increase in per capita incomes. For people that have been led to believe that there is going to be an improvement in their economic situation, this is going down hill. This is frustration. This is certainly going to be a source of difficulty for the underdeveloped countries and the so-called free world for a long time to come. We must face up to its implications--either expand the development effort, or take more energetic measures to reduce the growth of population, or prepare to live with more misery and its threat to political stability. We must not ignore the problem.

My time is almost gone, but I would like to mention one other set of circumstances that lead me to conclude that economic development leads to political instability. Economic development must inevitably weaken those restraints which the traditional societies have had over deviance. Political instability means that people deviate from the previous situation. Now in the traditional societies, the Church and the family played a dominant role in holding the youth to the traditional ways of doing things. These societies developed their own forms of restraint so that would-be radical members were not permitted to get very far out of line. But in economic development, as we have defined it, you have to break these ties, if for no other reasons than you probably cannot economically develop a country without having many of the children move away from where their parents live. You can't develop unless you move your population about. Moreover, the children have to do different things than their parents did. Once the children move away and do different things, then restraints that parental authority exercised have gone, and so, it turns out in many countries, the influence of the Church is also weakened. There are more subtle pressures at work too. Economic development means change, and you cannot expect a society to embrace change in their economic activities, and assume that you won't have change also in their political life. This change may be in the democratic direction. But again it may not be.

I would, then, argue that economic development, which is the major objective of a large part of our economic aid, is a major

engine for political instability. I want to emphasize that this is not an argument for dropping our aid programs in these poorer areas. These countries are already bent on economic development, and it behooves us to see that the changes they bring about are as little uncomfortable for us as possible. The Russians are now in this field, and if we don't help they certainly will. It would be a major catastrophe for us if all the economically backward areas were to align themselves, politically, economically, and militarily with the Soviet bloc or were to resort to home-grown types of authoritarianism. We can also hope that these political instabilities are temporary problems, and that after my generation and your generation, they will be over. But you are going to have to live with them and I'm going to have to live with them, certainly for the next 25 or 30 years. We can also hope that instability is not inevitably against our interests. The status quo isn't always something that is the end-all of our policies. Let us not forget that this nation of ours had its beginning in a revolution.

But even if none of these factors were potent reasons for continuing our policy of aiding the economic development of the poorer areas, I would come back to the primarily humanitarian concern. It seems to me that the time has passed when we in this country can be callous to the problems of the grinding poverty of a large part of the world.

COLONEL MUNCH: ---Thank you very much, Dr. Patterson, for your very excellent presentation of some of these instabilities that we will encounter in the attempt to achieve international progress and stability.

Now I have intentionally saved the last panel expert for the final speaker on this program. He is Mr. Mort Stern, who is the Editorial Page Editor of that behemoth of journalism in the Rocky Mountain empire, The Denver Post. I am certain that Mr. Stern may be much more proud of his accomplishments than of the one I am going to mention, but I'm going to mention this one first. Mr. Stern is a veteran of World War II in the United States Army Air Forces. Obviously Mr. Stern's field is that of Journalism--that of the press--of public

opinion. And he has quite a background in this. First of all he has several degrees--a Bachelor of Arts degree from Arkansas and a Master of Science degree from Columbia. In addition to that he served as night bureau manager for the United Press. Unfortunately he served in this capacity in a small southern town of which almost nothing newsworthy ever proceeds--the town of Little Rock, Arkansas. He was also political writer and state editor with the Arkansas Gazette in 1954 and in 1955, and he was subsequently the recipient of the very coveted Nieman Fellowship in journalism at Harvard University.

Obviously Mr. Stern can give us some very valuable insights into the subjects raised by the previous three speakers, as well as into some of Mr. Nitze's remarks last night, from the point of view of information. What does the public think of all these problems? Does the public think anything about these problems? And if they don't, why not? He can perhaps give us some idea, from a newspaperman's point of view who is associated with other newspapermen--Indians, Chinese, Germans, and what not--of what their feel of public opinion abroad is as to the American image. Are we getting more on the instability side than the stability side in some of our efforts to promote international progress? In addition I understand that he has several things that were said about the press by some of our former speakers that he may wish to rebuke. So I now give you Mr. Mort Stern of the Denver Post:

MR. MORT STERN:

Colonel, before I do anything else, may I make a bid for the sympathy vote here. Did you see how all these Navy guys were ganging up on me? I suppose you think this is because I am a member of the press. Well, it's not so--it's that Air Force connection. It reminds me about the story they told about the Admiral when he learned that Sputnik I had been launched. He said: "Who launched it?" The junior officer replied that it was the Russians. The Admiral said, "Oh thank heavens, I thought it was the Air Force!"

And I'm not an expert, unless you would consider me an expert in World War II of the nastiness, if that be the polite word, of cadet officers. In my generation we called this "chicken," but I don't know what you guys call it. But I have been cast in the role of critic, and find instead I am cast in the role of principal subject. Well, I don't mind being the critic, in fact it is a refreshing change, because some people have accused me and my newspaper, or the editorial page, of being salesmen for the Administration that Mr. Smith has represented.

The truth is that we have been in effect the salesmen for this Mutual Security Program, because we believe in it; we endorse it heartily in its general principles and its general objectives. And we have come to that position after a thorough study of this. But we don't get there, we in the newspaper business or press in general, without asking questions, without raising embarrassing questions, without criticizing, and without extensive coverage that sometimes people in colleges have overlooked because they are busy, but it's there. Really, my job is to ask questions, to raise questions, because that's the way I serve you, whether you're college students, civilians, or members of the Cadet Corps, you are still my boss. Oh yes, and you are the boss of all the public servants. It may not seem this way to you at times, but you are. You make, and "you" means all of you, the ultimate decisions. You are the bosses, so it's the job of people like me to link up the sources of information like Mr. Smith, like Mr. Benezet, and at times like Dr. Patterson, with the sovereigns, meaning you.

Now as I say, I agree, and we agree at the Denver Post, as does the majority of the American press, with the general objectives of the Mutual Security Program. But we raise questions about specific points. The first thing we don't like is the way the program seems to operate at times, strictly reacting to what the Communists do. We think that an intelligent program ought to have objectives and plans. We ought to behave as if we are helping the people that we help, not because we want them to get mowed down first, but because we have an interest in them. Sometimes it doesn't seem this way. I've got all kinds of documents here, which I'll never get to use. I hope somebody will ask me a question that has to do with one of these documents. I was going to quote from one of these, from a magazine called "Foreign Affairs," which describes the difficulties

we had with Egypt in the summer of 1955. We refused to sell the Egyptians arms, and we said (I won't go into the morality of it) this was because they didn't have sufficient dollars. Egyptians then went to the Czechs, who sold them arms, or offered to sell them arms, in return for cotton, which the Egyptians had a lot of. When we found this out we sent the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Allen, to Cairo to offer to sell them the arms. Well, the Egyptians learned an interesting lesson, so they printed a story in their papers, which their government controls, and they said that Russians had offered to build the Aswan Dam. Now that's a billion and a half project that is very important to the Egyptians, because this is the dam that would store up the water of the Nile, and would fertilize their valley, and they certainly could use it. Well, we said "Boy, we'll build that!" But the Russians got a big laugh, because they didn't offer to build it. When we found that out, we withdrew our offer. When the Egyptians found out we had withdrawn our offer, they closed the Suez Canal. That got us in a big mess. After the British bombed Port Said, and certain parts of the Suez Canal area, we refused to unfreeze the Egyptian credit of some 40 millions of dollars that they had here, to send them 14,000 dollars worth of medical supplies. We also cut off certain of their CARE food shipments, which we had very nobly said before was for starving Egyptian children.

Well, that's beside the point. It does show you though why we wonder, we newspapermen, about some parts of foreign aid. But don't get me wrong--we believe in it. We believe in the validity ("Do I sound like Orval Faubus?")--I'm just getting wound up here--

We believe in the validity of military aid program--don't get us wrong, but sometimes we wonder. You see it's hard to get the facts. The information is secret. It is secret--we can't even find out, and the public can't even find out, how much money in round numbers is going to Vietnam, and how much is going to the Philippines, let's say. Because the argument is given, not that it's military security--we understand that there are certain phases of military security, and we don't want to know that, but there are some phases that we think we ought to know, the public ought to know as to whether we should keep doling out the money--The reason given is that if a country hears that it has tentatively been proposed to give them so many million dollars, and then Congress gives them less for military

aid, they are going to be pretty unhappy. The second argument is if we give 40 million of military aid to one country, the neighbor finds it out and only gets 39, the head man there is going to raise the dickens with our people over there. Well, we think this is a slightly phoney argument, because figures on economic aid do get out, and there have been no disasters that we know of.

Another surprising thing happens with the military program, which makes us wonder. When, for example, we find that airborne rockets have been sent to the Cuban dictator Batista to use on the rebels, we're just not sure how this helps us to contain the Russians. Now maybe the rebels had it coming, but these rockets were used on villages and we think this is shortsighted, because in the first place, it gets around, and in the second place sometimes these rebels get in power. Now that's just plain embarrassing. Then there is another very serious problem: we sometimes find out that military aid gets to countries which we are told are on our side, but then we read tomorrow's newspaper and find out that the fellows on our side are gone. This happened in the anchor part of the Baghdad Pact, in Iraq. One day we woke up and found that our friends were hanging (I don't mean to make light of this--it's tragic) but they were in a very embarrassing situation, and we didn't know who was going to be using that military equipment. Well, again this just raises some questions--and again, I mean it seriously--we're for the military program.

Now, in the economic aid program, we believe in the objectives that have been stated here tonight. We do think in the long run it is doing some good, but we wonder a little bit about some of the people who are sent out to do the job. I have several quotes from a document, but I do want to give you this one. Quoting it alone, it does tend to distort the picture. But this document was put out by the Comptroller General of the United States, summarizing our aid program to the country of Laos, formerly part of French Indo-China. We are putting Laos on its feet--notice how we do it. Quoting the Comptroller General of the United States--"However, our examinations disclosed the import of automobiles in numbers and makes beyond what appear to be reasonable requirements of a primitive country like Laos. We noted in the course of our review of selected expenditure vouchers the shipment of as many as 642 automobiles under one procurement authorization, and 153 on another. Many of these cars, both American

and foreign makes, were in the medium and higher priced brackets, including such models as DeSoto and Mercedes Benz. Also these automobiles were equipped with accessories--whitewall tires, radios, etc.,--generally not eligible for ICA's financing." The report concludes that this country was so backward that millions of dollars of heavy equipment that we sent over rusted in the fields, because they just didn't have anybody to use them. They just didn't know how. Now they are--the situation is improving there, I think, but it's this kind of stuff that makes you wonder.

There is a book out called "The Ugly American." The ugly American was a good guy in this book, and I think it's a pretty good book, although Dr. Wriston and others pointed out to me at dinner tonight that it's not 100% correct. But then, who is? But the book does point out an interesting lesson. Some people that we send over there to operate in the field, to operate our aid program, must be real clods. The only foreign word they know is "martini." They don't mix with the natives, and I don't mean by "natives," the gals in grass skirts, but these are pretty sophisticated people. In "The Ugly American," by Gene Burdick and Bill Lederer, this custering of Americans abroad,--who have gone abroad, many of them, for high overseas pay and the cushy jobs they think they are going to get, and the luxury of having Asian servants--they cluster together and they stay away from these people. They don't want to be contaminated. Well, sometimes the water is bad, but we could get over that--not immediately, but within a reasonable length of time. Any way, these people, at least up until recently, until Dr. Wriston discovered it, I guess--they didn't bother to learn the language, they didn't have any sense of mission, they were arrogant, they looked down on the people in foreign countries. The Americans abroad looked on the people in the countries as foreigners. Well, you run into a little difficulty. They're bound to not like you when you do that. And so much of what we did was looked on with a little suspicion. But the people in the field aren't the only ones that come in for criticism. It's a temptation to read this letter. But it's from a man in the field who wrote to our newspaper--very critical of the chiefs of the ICA. I have what's called a moral dilemma as to whether to read this or not. I don't think I will. Oh, I will read this part. This letter writer (I've taken the trouble to clip the signature)--I don't distrust anybody, but I'm--oh well, you know. Anyway the very critical letter from the man in the field, he says, "Hell fire, we need someone who will defend us and tell you guys who are

supporting me that we are really doing something and not for two years self-imposed assignment to the post, but continuously. You are the ones who are getting gypped. If the Administration is going to spend your money to keep me better than I have asked to be kept so that I can do a better job than I think is being done, then why don't you sit yourself down at your flaming keyboard and tell Eisenhower, by God, that you want someone in ICA who will have ICA as a first interest, and not as a way-station somewhere else." And in a paragraph later on, "Oh sure, you Republicans have tried to set foreign aid up as a private investment program and have hoisted the Development Loan Fund and money-lending gimmicks to push economic development in countries that are strictly pre-industrial. Sure, then you beat us poor field hands over the head for lack of human savy . . . can you name a warm-blooded banker?" I won't read the rest of it. My point is, let me say again, that we do believe in the general objectives of a foreign aid program. We think it has done a good job and a successful job, with certain weaknesses which should be looked into. The government should come clean. Let's look at the whole thing. It's a little embarrassing however, when you start picking pieces out because sometimes members of Congress tend to lose sight of the overall objectives. Mutual aid programs have been, and still are good instruments of American policy.

COLONEL MUNTZ: ---Thank you very much, Mr. Stern. At this time, because of extraneous remarks of your moderator, I have exhausted the time we intended to have for questions. I must therefore most humbly seek your forgiveness for having taken this time in my introductions and tell you that if you really want to ask these gentlemen questions, some of them will be here tomorrow---

Address by

Dr. Henry M. Wriston

President, The American Assembly

DR. HENRY M. WRISTON

Revolution and the American Citizen

DR. HENRY M. WRISTON

The United States finds itself playing a great role in the world. To a large extent, it is the inevitable consequence of the world-wide nature of our economic activities. We require raw materials from all over the globe; our productive capacity requires markets in many parts of the world. Partly, however, our involvement is the result of deliberate choice.

That word, "deliberate" is to be taken in both its usual meanings. It was deliberate in time, and it was by conscious intent. Decisions were reached slowly, by stages. We did not make a full commitment early, or at any one time. The advice of George Washington in his Farewell Address is classic: "The great rule of conduct for us.... is, in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible." You will notice that he did not

speak in absolutes, but in relative terms; he knew political connections were inevitable as economic activities abroad increased. By Monroe's time, our interests required that this hemisphere should be free of further European encroachment. Then we participated in the commercial and political opening of the Far East. In this century, we were drawn into two world wars and, finally, into alliances around the world. As our interests expanded, as our weight in international affairs increased, we accepted more and more responsibility. Currently we are one of the two superpowers in the world.

There have been times in our history and there have been public moods which would have welcomed this greatness because historically confidence has been one of our dominant characteristics. A century ago such confidence led to the famous toast "To the United States: bounded on the north by the Aurora Borealis, on the south by the precession of the Equinoxes, on the east by Primeval Chaos, and on the west by the Day of Judgment." Such ebullience is not only gone, it is almost forgotten. When it is recalled, usually it is to apologize for such callow brashness.

The current temper is one of doubt whether we can handle our responsibilities capably and with courage. Two famous men, one a journalist and the other a diplomatist-scholar, have doubted that American democracy can manage foreign relations. Mr. Walter Lippmann asserts that "The people have acquired power which they are incapable of exercising." "The unhappy truth is that the prevailing public opinion has been destructively wrong at critical junctures." "It was not for want of power but for want of statesmanship that the liberal democracies failed." I do not accept his conclusions, yet he makes a strong case--not invulnerable but impressive, none the less.

Mr. George Kennan, a diplomatist and a scholar, also questions the efficacy of democracy in diplomacy. "I think the record indicates that in the short term our public opinion . . . . can be led astray into areas of emotionalism and subjectivity which make it a poor and inadequate guide for national action." "It is clear that there has been in the past a very significant gap between challenge and response in our conduct of foreign policy, that this gap still exists, and . . . . today puts us in grave peril." He also adduces impressive evidence in support of his position.

Though I do not agree with the conclusion of either of these distinguished men, my purpose is not to debate the matter. I cannot forbear to point out, however, that both men regard this as a twentieth century problem. Indeed, Mr. Lippmann dates it from 1917. Yet the answer to both of them, almost in classic form, was given by the famous journal of opinion, THE ECONOMIST of London, in 1859--a century ago. Referring to a high official's contempt for public opinion, it said: He "indulged himself . . . . with a perfect paroxysm of Pharisaic scorn over the loose fragments of thought and knowledge which go to make up what is commonly called 'public opinion'." Then, concluded THE ECONOMIST, "The people may be very vague-minded and tolerably ignorant, and yet the necessity of securing their acquiescence may breathe a completely new spirit into political life. It ensures in statesmen a wider range of thought; it obliges the well-informed official to take a broader base for his calculations." Clearly, like so many other "new" arguments, this is old straw newly threshed. Indeed, you can find a reasonalby "modern" discussion of the problem in the eleventh chapter of Book III of Aristotle's "Politics," written in the fourth century B. C.

I cite the current revival of a jaded topic as evidence of a loss of confidence in the capacity of the American people to handle our affairs with skill and deftness in this complex and dangerous world. It is fashionable just now to sell America short. That is my objection to the Ugly American. Yet that is what makes it a best seller. Our course of international action should be debated, and criticism should not be bridled. On the other hand, defeatism about democratic control of foreign policy serves no constructive purpose; it does nothing to improve our performance. When faith in the viability of the American process is impaired, the result is not to increase our security but enhance our danger. We should inquire how the democratic process--citizen control--can best be made a constructive force in foreign affairs.

There are many roads by which an individual citizen may approach the issues of international relations. I shall speak of but three: scholarship, emotion, imagination. Then I shall seek to illustrate how the citizen can use those in dealing with the new and underdeveloped nations.

Knowledge is the first method of approach; the process for its attainment is scholarship. It is the path I chose as a young man and pursued with all my heart for over ten years. I have every personal reason, therefore, to appreciate its value. The scholar amasses all the information he can possibly assemble on the particular area of learning he has selected. He seeks to arrange the facts in some orderly sequence so that they can be remembered, evaluated and made meaningful. A concept takes shape in his mind and brings order out of confusion. If he has access to ample sources, is industrious, preceptive--and lucky--he may open up riches of information which had been buried in the rubble of history. This is the way to develop a specialist, a man who knows a great deal about some important area in time or space or thought--or all three.

Such men are absolutely essential to progress in the quest for peace. Nevertheless the method has limitations. By concentrating upon one range of topics, others are inevitably neglected. The scholar is always in danger of becoming narrow. Perhaps a simile will make the point clear. The scholar is like a miner. He descends to his work through a shaft--that represents what has been learned before about his subject. He does not have to dig out all that has been mined before. Then having located a new vein, he picks away at the face of the rock, running galleries along lodes until they pinch out, and further digging in that direction produces no worth-while reward.

Two observations are pertinent. Both are important though they may appear to be obvious. The first is that not every citizen may follow this path. He will have other concerns--making a living in some profession or business, for example, which will preclude concentration upon scholarship. The second comment is that if it were possible for every citizen to follow this path, we would not be much further on. For the specialist seldom has a broad perspective. You do not get an over all view of the horizon when you are digging in a shaft. So the specialist will be consulted at appropriate times, but he rarely makes policy.

Scholars, essential as they are, are not, characteristically, men of action. Their concepts of policy are likely to be timid, for while they can see many reasons for pursuing one course, they are aware of other considerations that suggest a different--even an opposite--program. When action is demanded, scholars are likely to remain poised upon the edge of making up their minds while the time for

decision and action passes. In summary, without specialists of vast learning, statesmen would lack access to essential knowledge, but among scholars there is seldom leadership in action.

The citizen who thinks about foreign affairs and helps shape the public opinion that controls the statesman cannot, obviously, be a scholar. But he can profit by what scholarship produces. For the work of many scholars is summarized and synthesized by secondary writers. They make the essentials of knowledge available in broader perspective and in palatable form. Each citizen should learn as much as possible in the light of his other obligations. Above all, he should think about what he knows.

Emotion is the second approach to the issues of foreign affairs. This road is hard packed, for it has been well traveled by youthful idealists. No one with any sensitiveness can look out upon the world without becoming acutely aware of hunger, amounting to starvation; poverty almost beyond belief; disease, misery, degradation of life itself, which prevail in so much of the world among the great majority of its people.

DR. WRISTON AND ROBERT H. SITEMAN, ASSEMBLY CADET CHAIRMAN

Consider one basic fact: Your expectation of life is about seventy years. In much of the world expectation of life is 30 to 40 years less than yours--although those people are equally "endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights--among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." Their unalienable right to life is curtailed; their right to liberty is totally erased by forces over which they have no effective control. As for the pursuit of happiness, where will they turn to start the chase?

These facts lie right on the surface. He who walks abroad in the land stumbles over them, however heedless he may be. To one who has cultivated his emotions as well as trained his mind, they will rightly seem intolerable. They cry out for action.

Those whose responses are primarily emotional will be tempted to make a direct, naive assault upon these evils. One concrete instance comes to mind. A well-to-do and well intentioned lady from the Mid-west heard of the misery and suffering in India. Thereupon with no intensive study or preparation, she flew to New Delhi, sought an interview with one of the highest officials and said in effect: "I know you need help. Tell me where you want me to begin." Such sentimentalism, uncontrolled by wisdom, is self-defeating and retards reform by offending those whom it desires to help. Headlong action may well leave the state of the world not only no better, but actually worse.

None the less, the impulse to all action has its roots in the emotions. This is true in international relations as in other aspects of life. As the citizen who would be effective in shaping public opinion must draw knowledge from the scholar, so also he must draw inspiration from well-disciplined emotion.

Imagination is the third method needed by the citizen eager to be effective in forming public opinion regarding foreign relations.

Imagination is not dreaming; dreams are unreal. The imagination can be, and must be, disciplined. He who would train his imaginative powers will draw upon the knowledge accumulated by scholars. He will realize that grasp of fact constitutes one vital difference between a dream world where unreality seems palpable, and imaginative appreciation from which unreality is rigidly excluded. He will learn as much as time and energy and talent make possible. He will not set up fanciful postulates that excuse him from action.

You are all familiar with the ancient mathematician and inventor, Archimedes. He said that if he had a lever long enough and a fulcrum upon which to rest it, he could move the world. This boast manifested the pretentiousness of escapism. Archimedes well knew there was no such lever, that if there were he would not have strength enough to lift it. He knew, too, that there was no available fulcrum. Even if there were such a lever, such a fulcrum, and if both were in place, he would not live long enough to get to the end of the lever. For it would have to be so long that his journey to its end would require many lifetimes. In short, he knew no one could challenge him to prove his point in action.

Many people who talk about foreign affairs set up postulates as fanciful as those of Archimedes. They say that if appropriations were large enough and if sound administrative structures were available it would be possible to abolish poverty, hunger, ignorance and disease. That is not use of imagination; it is flight from reality.

He who takes the road of imagination will draw also upon the idealism, the urge "to do something about it" of those dominated by sentiment. He will be energized and galvanized by awareness that the tincture of a man's skin is an historical accident and neither adds nor subtracts from his "unalienable rights." He will remember that a stranger's mores, his pattern of thought and action, even his value judgements are inherited. They may be modified by skill and patience, but the process must be slow and is unlikely ever to be complete.

Patience must, therefore, be a principal ingredient in the discipline of the imagination. Only by the cultivation of almost infinite patience can he escape the defeatism that arises when the initial effort fails to produce perfection. This lack of patience tends to be characteristic of journalists and accounts for their prevailing pessimism. They are looking for "news," something decisive, dramatic. The slow process of evolutionary change is not observed because their perspective is too short. Even if they could catch the drift, they would not think it worth a line of type because it lacks sensational impact. Thus much of the progress of the world goes unreported.

The man of disciplined imagination, on the other hand, will be content with progress which, though small, will astonish the scholar, while its slow pace will dismay the sentimentalist. The problems of

ignorance, disease, poverty are not the fruits of imperialism or colonialism or the industrial revolution. They are as old as mankind. Not being the product of the twentieth century, they will not be banished in this century. That is not pessimism. It is a call to patience.

This suggests perserverence or, more sharply, persistence as another ingredient in a well-tempered imagination. As patience knows that great results will not be swift, persistence knows that even slow progress will grind to a halt unless effort is vigorous and continuous.

Having established a vivid and disciplined imagination as the chief instrument available to the ordinary citizen in thinking constructively about foreign affairs, let us apply the imaginative method to our relations with the newly independent, the anciently ignorant, the shockingly poor, and the sadly diseased nations of the world.

The first necessity is to rid ourselves of nervousness when "revolution" is discussed. Politicians often shy like skittish horses at the mere mention of the word. That is a nonsensical attitude. Thomas Jefferson once wrote in a letter: "What country before ever existed a century and a half without a rebellion? . . . . the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure."

Revolution is a normal phenomenon in the life of every nation. Like Jefferson, we should be surprised at its absence, not its presence. That statement is a flat contradiction of one of the dominant cliches of our day. Times without number we are told that this is a new age, that our era is unique, like no other the world has ever known. There are elements of truth in such assertions; nearly every cliche starts with some grain of fact. But in many vital respects the statement is wrong. The universality of the experience of revolution highlights the falsity of so broad a generalization.

It does not require vast stores of knowledge to realize that revolutions are about as old as recorded history--and as current as today's news. The Cromwellian era in British history was revolutionary; so even the most stable institutions have been shaken to their foundations in years gone by. The United States broke its ties with the mother country by revolution. Our fathers were not ashamed

of the fact, they put a motto on the Great Seal, in Latin, which translated means "A New Order in the World." It symbolized a fresh start after revolution. Even a state we regard as conservative, New Hampshire, put this passage in its Constitution of 1792: "The doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind."

Since the 18th century, revolution has been endemic in France. The latest instance occurred only last year when DeGaulle swept into power. Though legal forms were meticulously followed, though violence was latent rather than employed directly, the substance of the change was revolution. No one could doubt that fact. A series of revolutions occurred in Italy and in Germany, both in the 19th and the 20th centuries. I need not recall the revolutions in Russia. The first, the overthrow of the Czar, Woodrow Wilson called "a great and heartening" thing; that statement was fresh proof of our sympathy with the revolutionary ideal.

If the well developed, stable parts of the world have experienced so may explosive changes, there is no reason to be astonished that revolution is not merely endemic but epidemic in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

It is easy to sit here in peace and assert that all changes in government should be achieved by ballots instead of bullets. But the realities of human experinece make that a mere wish-fancy. So common has been revolutionary change that there is a considerable body of literature in defense of the idea. The United States is the source of some of the most eloquent pleas for the legitimacy of revolution. Read again the Declaration of Independence: "When in the course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the Earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation." Among the "causes" appears this statement: "That whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing

its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness . . . . Another cause is thus described: "...when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object exercises a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government."

It would be difficult to find a more persuasive defense of revolution. Implicit is a denunciation of imperialism and colonialism. That statement, too often forgotten or neglected in the United States, is quoted frequently in the new nations and in those that still seek independence. Sukarno, of Indonesia, at the Bandung Conference, cited the American Revolution as inspiration. He quoted a passage from Longfellow's poem THE RIDE OF PAUL REVERE, and declared that such cries of defiance to tyranny shall continue to echo until all peoples "can say that colonialism is dead." The Declaration of Independence makes us kin to all the new nations which have escaped from the status of wards and attained the stature of indepeddence.

Out own interest in revolution did not wave when we achieved independence, nor did we regard it as a blessing appropriate to ourselves alone. We sought to stimulate revolution in Spanish America. Our recognition policy from the days of Washington almost to the presidency of Wilson revealed that interest. Jefferson put it in these words: "We surely cannot deny to any nation that right wherein our own government is founded--that every one may govern itself according to whatever form it pleases and change these forms at its own will . . . . the will of the nation is the only thing essential to be regarded."

We rejoiced in Kossuth's effort to make Hungry free in 1849. At that time Daniel Webster said the United States could not be indifferent to "the fortunes of nations struggling for institutions like our own. Certainly the United States may be pardoned . . . . if they entertain an ardent affection for those popular forms of political organization which have so rapidly advanced their own prosperity and happiness." To our ears, in our current mood, his words seem bombastic. But they evoked passionate approval from the public. They expressed a deep emotional urge to see the world free.

In later years we used a more moderate tone, but there was no diminution of interest. Abraham Lincoln spoke for all Americans when he spoke of the Declaration as "a stumbling block to tyrants" and giving "hope to the world for all future time." It was that which gave promise that in due time the weight would be lifted from the shoulders of all men. Woodrow Wilson spoke of "self-determination" and a world safe for democracy. It would be possible to compile a long list of instances when we welcomed and encouraged revolution.

If we familiarize ourselves with our own record we will have no difficulty in understanding all revolutions. 1776 launched the Age of Revolution; 1959 is still part of that Age. Once the citizen has become accustomed to this idea, there will be no tempation to over-emphasize "stability" or to bewail the violent change of political status when peaceful efforts have failed. The first essential in an imaginative approach to new goverments, therefore, is to realize that revolution is normal, sancitified by history and by theory.

The second step in understanding new governments is the realization that they will be unstable, that there will be keen competition to govern. This likewise is a very simple idea, all too often forgotten. The reasons lie plain upon the surface. When there is a struggle for independence all patriots can unite upon that one common goal. Minor differences are subordinated to that single paramount objective. During the years of effort, all deficiencies in the public service, of whatever sort, can be blamed upon the metropolitan (or, as they call it, the imperial) power. Taxes, burdens of every kind can be attributed to the distant rulers; every such burden is "exploitation."

With independence, all that is changed. Unity of purpose can no longer be attained by fighting against an outsider; no distant devil can be blamed. There must now be purpose for, not against; and every man is likely to have his own program. The new rulers must accept the motto that adorned President Truman's desk: "The Buck Stops Here."

Again, our own history illustrates the problem perfectly. The colonies, having become states, set up a central government. Because they were resisting centralized control, they established a weak central government. Our customary language tends to conceal the reality. We call our first constitution "The Articles of Confederation." But language cannot hide the failure of that first constitution

of the United States. It was slow in the drafting (seventeen months), tardy in acceptance (over three years), feeble in action. From the Declaration of Independence to the establishment of our second government in 1789, nearly thirteen years elapsed. Even then we had not fully faced reality. The new Constitution made no reference to parties. Washington and others denounced the idea of parties, calling them factions. Yet between the ideas of Jefferson, on the one hand, and Hamilton on the other, there was a great gulf. Not all the prestige, nor all the persuasion, nor all the efforts of Washington could bridge the gap. Parties were essential to energize the government.

If, with all the inheritance from British constitutional tradition and all the training in self-government our forefathers possessed, they could not remain united, how can we expect these new nations, most of whom have no such sound inheritance, to do better? At the end of thirteen years of declared independence, our government was virtually bankrupt. Even after the new government was set up, and fiscal order restored,as late as 1800 Aaron Burr almost stole the presidency from Thomas Jefferson. Few Americans now recall that Jefferson finally won only on the 36th ballot. It took a constitutional amendment to prevent a recurrence of so scandalous a gambit--and to admit thereby how essential a role parties play. Yet we tend to feel upset if, though none of them are yet so old as we were in 1789, new nations and new governments show evidences of instability, rivalry among leaders, fiscal disorder--in short all the symptoms we exhibited in our own infant days. In summary, the second point to remember as we seek to interpret new nations is that instability is inherent in post-revolutionary states.

This suggests a third characteristic of these new governments which imagination should help us understand, namely, the relationship of the new rulers to their political opponents. In our own country, the political wars are sham battles, to some extent. Men will denounce each other on the floor of the Senate, then go to lunch together in great amiability. We think nothing of social relations between foreign ambassadors and leaders of opposition parties. If the British ambassador did not know Adlai Stevenson, Senator Lyndon Johnson and Speaker Sam Rayburn, we would feel he was not up to his job. Similarly, our ambassador in the United Kingdom should know Hugh Gaitskell and Aneuran Bevan. Accepting these facts

is a mark of a high degree of political, social and economic sophistication. Rotation in office is taken for granted as normal, natural, inevitable.

In a revolutionary situation, different rules apply. The opposition is not a mere political competitor, often it is the enemy. The recent battles were not sham battles in any sense of the word; they were desperately real and deadly. The defeated opponent is probably plotting the overthrow of the new government, even assembling armed forces clandestinely. As one means to acquire power, there is a strong tendency for the "outs" to be even more intensely nationalistic than the "ins." They will interpret friendly relations on the part of the new government with foreign nations as "truckling to the imperialists." A revolutionary leader, in these circumstances, cannot look with calm upon social or other relations between foreign ambassadors and his opponents.

Again our own history will assist in understanding the problem. When these new governments seem to sacrifice freedon for "internal security," we would do well to remember our own Alien and Sedition Acts during the administration of John Adams. Like much legislation in modern new states, they were aimed at suppressing political opposition. Though we hope we have outgrown such maneuvers, there are survivals of such feeling in the United States today. This was shown when Mr. Mikoyan came to this country. Mr. Meany of the AFL-CIO refused to meet him. Some depositors in banks which had given him a luncheon withdrew their business, sometimes to discover to their chagrin that the head of their new bank had also met Mikoyan.

It required all our political maturity and sophistication to treat Mikoyan not as the author of savagery in Hungary, but as the First Deputy Premier of a great power with whom the realities required us to deal. If it is so hard for us, we ought to be able to understand

the oversensitiveness of a weak, new government menaced by an opposition unwilling to seek power by ballots and ready to resort to bullets at the first hope of success.

There is a fourth fundamental point about revolutions which an imaginative approach makes easy to understand. The words "revolution" and "revolve" come from the same root. Revolution is like the turning of a wheel. Start a wheel and its momentum takes over to some extent; it rarely stops--except in closely controlled circumstances--just where you want it to. Roulette illustrates the point. If it is honest, it is unpredictable. Only when it is crooked is it controlled.

Thus even revolutionary leaders who are pure in heart, dedicated in purpose, democratic in ideals, cannot make the wheel spin and stop exactly one hundred and eighty degrees from the starting point. Their energies may prove deficient and move the wheel not at all--or only 90 degrees. Their impulse may be too strong, and the wheel turns a full circle--360 degrees. The French Revolution went all the way from the Bourbons clear around to Napoleon. In short, the righteousness of the initial impulse does not wholly govern the result.

The recent revolution in Cuba offers a case in point. No one need feel regret at the overthrow of Batista. His tyranny was scandalously corrupt, viciously brutal. Add adverbs and adjectives to taste; you will hardly do violence to the facts. Fidel Castro was almost everything a revolutionary should be. A man of good family and fortune, well educated, he abandoned comfort and career to gamble his life on a military adventure which any knowledgeable strategist would immediately have branded as hopeless. He lived in the wilderness, was hunted like a wild animal; yet his own life was marked by unusual self-discipline. He imposed a control upon his followers which was astoundingly strict. He never repaid torture with torture; he refused to copy his enemy's practice of killing prisoners. I am speaking of him as a revolutionary leader, not as a prime minister. His program in that office I do not know, and I am not sure he does.

If we recall these facts, it is equally clear that after years of hanging on by the slenderest margin, Castro had a sudden success which developed enormous momentum, and ran beyond his control.

Even so, the number of executions was a fraction of the Batista murders. Despite precedural deficiencies, the revolutionary trials were far less lawless than the midnight murders of his predecessor. Yet nearly all American newspapers and commentators gave the impression that there was an orgy of blood.

The excesses ought to be easy for undergraduates to understand. vicotry is a heady wine. We can observe this even in well-disciplined institutions. I have noted the behavior of students at the moment of football victory. It can only be described as exuberant, irrational, abandoned. It is more intense when the team's record had been poor for some time, or when it had been behind and then, with some break in the game or some dramatic surge, victory was seized from the jaws of defeat in the last few seconds. In those circumstances, the emotional reaponse was violent.

If, with the whole tradition of sportsmanship which exercises a rigid control over our normal behavior, we can let loose so much wild and ungoverned emotional energy over what is, relative to the great events of the world, so minor an occasion, how much more is the intoxication of success justified in those who have brought an end to tyranny, at imminent risk of life.

It would be folly (and I speak as one who has participated in such outbursts from both sides of the fence), for the college president to try to halt a student victory demonstration at its height. Such an attempt would be bound to fail. It would be evidence of an unrealistic estimate of the situation. Yet there were grave and reverend senators, there were judicious and statesmanlike columnists and commentators who complained that Castro did not instantly suppress the wild, emotional explosion that followed victory.

Is it any wonder that Castro felt he was misunderstood? The plain fact is that he was misunderstood and misinterpreted in quarters, supposedly "liberal," whose imaginations should have made them more understanding. I have used Castro as an illustration because events in Cuba are close at hand, recent, and so fresh in mind. Remember, then, that revolutions develop a dynamic of their own, and no one can predict just how far they will go.

That leads to the fifth aspect of revolution which we can apprehend imaginatively. Revolutionary victors do not take kindly to advice.

In gaining independence, they were "do it yourself" men. Many leaders in the world today and virtually all the revolutionaries have been in prison, in exile, in great personal danger--Bourguiba, Mohammed, DeGaulle, Adenauer, Gomulka, Tito, Nasser, Kassim, Diem, Nehru, Sukarno, Rhee--and many more. Most of them owe no thanks to the armchair critics that they are now rulers rather than corpses.

They feel that they achieved success, no thanks to us. Indeed, did we not do business with their late masters and so "help" the "enemy." We gave money and military goods to many of the former rulers. We did not do it in order to help them hold their colonies or suppress revolution. Though that was not our purpose, our motives were not stencilled on the goods. Our aid may have been employed in ways we did not desire. Even when it was not, the net result of our aid was to strengthen the metropolitan power or the predecessor government. It released other goods and money for the attempt to frustrate revolution.

Despite our anti-colonialism and our historic sympathy for revolution we have not always been free to manifest those feelings since we became a world-wide power. Our relations with Europe--the necessity for maintaining allies--sometimes conflicted with our passion for colonial freedom in Asia and Africa. We urged the Netherlands to give independence to Indonesia; in so doing, we strained our relations with that key nation in Europe. But that diplomatic pressure was neither so overt nor so dramatic as the Marshall Plan and aid through NATO. Sukarno was aware of our tangible help to his enemy; our intangible diplomatic pressure was not so visible to him.

The plain fact is, therefore, that the revolutionary leaders are suspicious; they want very little advice and absolutely no strings. Moreover, they are under severe domestic pressures. In rallying their own people to make the sacrifices required to bring about the revolution, they made promises, explicit or implicit. They cannot now simply take power and make no major changes. Having achieved the miracle of independence, no minor achievements will suffice.

It may well be that the first need of the new country is wiser use of the land, improved breeds of hens to lay more eggs, better cows to give more milk. But that does not mean that such programs

will have priority. Far from it, and for a number of reasons. The first is that these things are not dramatic; their results appear only slowly, too gradually to satisfy people whose expectations have been inflated. Having achieved something great and dynamic, the new leader cannot wait for evolutionary processes to mature over a long period of time. He is a symbol of action, not of more eggs!

Another reason is that of all phases of production agriculture is the most completely tradition-bound. Often it is closely tied to religious beliefs with which it is dangerous to tamper. To do his country any good, a politician must stay in office. Consequently he is gingerly in tackling such sensitive matters. It is only normal that, as a man of wide experience has put it, "New governments may sometimes insist on types of growth which have more to do with prestige than need."

Remember always that independence means freedom to do the wrong thing as well as the right. That ought not be be a difficult concept to grasp. We have only to study our own history to realize that we have made many mistakes. We are pursuing a farm policy which is bound to pile up bigger and bigger surpluses and higher and higher costs and deficits. It is economic folly, but is thought to be politically profitable. Clearly, we are in no position to be overly censorious of those with less experience, less training, and fewer resources if they do things we think are wrong--even self-defeating.

The "revolution of rising expectations" has often, therefore, more to do with the dramatic than the simple. The new rulers want what the French call infrastructure--roads, telephones, dams, hydro-electric plants, railroads, steel mills. The argument that these developments should be left to private capital--or to "free enterprise"--will fall on deaf ears. To begin with, the word "socialism" has no terrors; on the contrary, it has deep attraction for them. They know that most of the free nations of the world have now, or have had, socialist governments. They realize far more than do we that our own economy is a mixture--that government plays a very large role in our economic life. The Tennessee Valley Authority is one of our most conspicuous exports. Our railroads were built with heavy government subsidy. Our canals and waterways are all public enterprises. In most free nations, so are railroads and telephones and the universities.

Moreover, these men who engineered revolution want also to manage the economy. They remember that the hated imperial control followed in the train of private trade and investment. We tend to think that trade follows the flag; they know their own history which shows that often it was the other way round. They view with deep suspicion, therefore, great capitalistic enterprises coming from abroad. Having once found that process a prelude to colonialism, they are twice shy.

They fear and detest the rule of prices by a free market. Many of the new nations are raw material producers--tin, rubber, coffee, cocoa, tea, jute and so on. They can point to a United Nations calculation that in recent experience their reduced incomes from such exports, occasioned by free markets, just about offset the grants in aid to free Asia. They say that if the United States puts quotas on oil, zinc, copper, sugar and defeats the free market in agriculture by government intervention, why should we be critical when they do likewise?

They do not want free enterprise, moreover, because they have not the wealth to support it. There is no accumulation of domestic capital with which to launch industry. Poverty is so intense that savings for capital investment can be found only, as in Stalin's day or in Red China, by grinding the faces of the poor and letting millions starve. If, therefore, the nation is not to become totalitarian the money must come from abroad. But so sensitive are the new leaders that they will regard any advice, any cautionary devices connected with aid, as "strings." The ordinary requirements which we all accept when borrowing money they will resent. They will see them as manifestations of economic--and ultimately political--imperialism. Having just escaped from one form of dependence, they do not want to fall into another.

Do you wonder, now, why I laid so much emphasis upon the need for patience on our part? Is it clear why our foreign aid program is not uniformly a "success." Those who feel that if only we had a different organizational structure, or more money, or this or that or the other thing miss the point completely. There is no simple, easy way to achieve the desirable ends. We must do the best we can, profiting by experience, not endlessly repeating the same errors, but accepting, nevertheless, the inevitability of failure to attain

Utopia in a short time. The growth of economic freedom, as of political freedom, is a slow process, with many painful delays and setbacks.

So far I have spoken of revolution as a turn toward freedom. I wish it were always so. But the sixth point to remember about revolution is that the wheel has no ratchet to prevent it from turning backward. What a happy world this would be on the way to becoming if revolution always meant turning out the rascals, even if their successors fell short of sainthood. But the record is different. People tire of virtue and, even more rapidly, they become fatigued with the disciplines virtue requires. Right now, the American people appear to be tired of public thrift. References to a balanced budget are almost uniformly accompanied by a sneer, as though solvency involved an emphasis upon forty pieces of silver and the betrayal of the nation.

The most rigorous discipline of all, the most painful experience for many is thought; people flee the agony of making up their minds. Freedom often loses its appeal, therefore, when it involves sacrifices. So a demagogue comes along. He exploits moral fatigue; he mocks the economic hardships involved in a solvent economy. He will offer to make the hard decisions. He will promise the modern equivalents of bread and circuses. So we get Hitler, Mussolini, Peron, Batista, Trujillo--and hundreds of others down the ages. This reversion to tyranny is no new phenomenon. You can read all about it in Plato and Aristotle. History, ancient and modern, tells the same story.

This backward turn of the wheel clearly presents us with a different sort of problem in imaginative understanding. Such events run counter to our own history and are alien to our ideals. Reaction of that kind cannot be equated with our own experience. Yet there are passages in our past which throw light upon how we should approach such human disasters.

A series of events gave us what used to be called a "special position" in the Caribbean. "Special position" is diplomatic double-talk for domination. We determined to build an Isthmian Canal, which President Hays called "part of our coastline." The clear inference was that we should have virtual control of areas within our coastline. The Spanish War gave us possession of Puerto Rico,

and the right to intervene in Cuba. Later President Theodore Roosevelt, to use his own words, "took the Canal Zone" and undertook to manage the finances of Haiti and Santo Domingo. Bankruptcy, revolution, disorders sometimes bordering upon anarchy in the area, led us to land marines in several countries and assume more and more control in their affairs. In many instances, we determined, by one means or other, who should rule several supposedly "independent" nations. To use a current term, we made them into satellites--for their own good. We determined not to tolerate violent reaction.

Ultimately, it became clear that the management of satellites was an unrewarding business. It did not produce desired results where tried, and it made other nations outside the area fear "Yankee imperialism" which, under the so-called Roosevelt corollary of the Monroe Doctrine, intimated we had a right to intervene in Latin America to exercise a "police power," unilaterally.

The results were so unsatisfactory in the Caribbean and so disastrous elsewhere that even Theodore Roosevelt said in 1913, after he was out of office, "The Monroe Doctrine in the sense of special guardianship thereof by the United States of the north no longer applies." His successors in office slowly dismantled the whole policy of intervention. The Platt Amendment, giving us special responsibility for Cuba, was abandoned; Puerto Rico was made a dominion, free to leave the United States; fiscal control over independent nations was ended; our marines were withdrawn from all the Caribbean countries. The American adventure in satellitism was liquidated.

We learned the hard way--at great cost both economic and political--that we must not let regret at political and social retrogression in an independent nation and dislike of tyranny lead us into an attempt to manage other people's affairs. We may use such diplomatic instruments as are available to resist moral, social and political catastrophe; beyond that it is unwise to go. Otherwise, we set ourselves up as censors for the world and become moral imperialists, seeking to choose not only our own course but also to direct the program of other nations.

We have come to the end of our journey together. I have sought to show how, dealing with revolution, the private citizen can form a

sound opinion in foreign affairs. I cannot claim novelty for what I have said. In his Politics Aristotle made the essence of the argument long ago. In substance, he said the citizen need not be an expert in order to exercise a sound judgment in public affairs.

Therefore, I urge you to close your ears to the modern clacque against the democratic control of foreign policy. Learn all you can; cultivate warm emotional response; discipline your imagination so that you can appreciate the problems and feelings of others. Exercise patience, without flagging, in persistent effort. Then you can play your full role as responsibie citizens. It is not beyond your intellectual powers. I have faith to believe it is not beyond your firmness of will.



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