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MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH PROGRAM

Attitudes Of Youth Toward Military Service In A Zero-Draft Environment:

*Results of a National Survey
Conducted in November 1972*

Manpower Development Division
Air Force Human Resources Laboratory

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This study analyzed the 1972 results of a continuing DoD national survey aimed at studying the enlistment motivation and attitudes toward military service of American youth. A total of 1,924 male youths, aged 16 to 21 years, were interviewed during a period of low draft calls, reduced troop levels in Vietnam, and increased service pay allowances. Topics covered included their willingness to enlist in the active service under a zero-draft condition, to volunteer for active service as officers, and their views			

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on enlistment incentives, service preference, and career objectives. Results varied according to age and educational status, with high school students showing a higher enlistment potential than college students and males not in school. Fully paid college educations provided the greatest enlistment incentive, especially to the 16 and 17-year olds. Bonus options appealed especially to non-whites. Pay and secure employment were indorsed as the two most important life goals.

Preface


This Consulting Report presents information on the attitudes of civilian youth toward military service under a real (or assumed) zero-draft environment. The major emphasis is accorded results of a national survey of civilian youth conducted in November 1972, in essentially a zero-draft condition.¹ Included, for comparison purposes, are results from three previous youth surveys which, although they were conducted while the draft was still in effect, used questions about assumed no-draft behavior on the part of the respondents. Together, the results of the four surveys may be viewed as trends in the attitudes of youth.

In total, this report covers four cross-sectional surveys of civilian youth conducted for the Department of Defense by Gilbert Youth Research, Inc. Interviews and tabulations were performed by Gilbert Youth Research, under the direction of Mr. George Mihaly, President, and Mr. Gideon D. Rathnum, Vice President. Analyses of the tabulations were accomplished by the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO) at the request of the Department of Defense.

The report was prepared by Dr. Allan H. Fisher, Jr. and Ms. Martha R. DiSario of HumRRO Division No. 7 (Social Science). Dr. Robert G. Smith is Director of the Division. Preparation of the report was accomplished for the Directorate for Manpower Research in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) under Contract Number DAHC 15-73-C-0131 (Project DATA), Task Order Number 72-12-1.

This is the fourth in a series of reports on the attitudes of youth. The first report dealt with the May 1971 survey findings and was entitled, "Attitudes of Youth Toward Military Service: Results of a National Survey Conducted in May 1971," Human Resources Research Organization, October 1971. The second report compared findings from May 1971 with findings from a replication of the survey in November 1971 and was entitled, "Attitudes of Youth Toward Military Service: A Comparison of Results of National Surveys Conducted in May 1971 and November 1971," HumRRO Consulting Report CR-D7-72-16, April 1972. The third report compared findings from a survey conducted in June 1972 with results from the previous two surveys and was entitled: "Attitudes of Youth Toward Military Service: Results of National Surveys Conducted in May 1971, November 1971, and June 1972," DoD Manpower Research Report No. MA 72-2, August 1972 (see also HumRRO Consulting Report CR-D7-72-30, August 1972).

¹ The draft was in operation until 28 December 1972 (Personal Communication: Mr. Frederick W. Suffa, OASD(M&RA) and Dr. A.H. Fisher (HumRRO), 4 June 1973), but draft calls were very low. Former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird announced the feasibility of suspending the draft for the active force in a press release of 27 January 1973.



INTRODUCTION

The concept of a continuing, national survey of civilian youth was conceived in 1971 as part of a systematic effort by the Department of Defense to study the enlistment motivation and attitudes toward military service held by American youth. Through a continuing program of research, valuable information has been accumulated on attitudes toward military service and related topics.

The report provides information about the motivations and attitudes of contemporary American civilian youth as elicited in November 1972. At that time, the draft was virtually eliminated, hence results should provide useful projections of the behavior and attitudes of youth in the zero-draft environment of the future.

For comparison purposes, data are also reported from three previous independent surveys. The surveys, conducted in May 1971, November 1971, and June 1972, encompass a 13-month period during which the following major events transpired: (a) draft calls were lowered, (b) the troop level in Vietnam was reduced, and (c) an increase in the pay allowance for Servicemen was announced.¹ The June 1972 interviews were done concurrently with the announcement that the Army was offering the \$1500 combat arms enlistment bonus.² Thus, the data base now includes four surveys, conducted at six-month intervals, which bridge the transition period from draft to no-draft conditions.

DESCRIPTION OF THE SURVEYS

Each of the surveys was conducted by Gilbert Youth Research, Inc., of New York City. The Gilbert Youth Survey sample is a national probability sample representative of male civilian youth with respect to age, geographical region, and educational status. In this research, independent samples of male youths aged 16 to 21 years were used. The size of the projected population groups for these youths, by educational status, was (1) High School, 3,915,000; College, 2,530,500; Not in school, 3,277,100.

Data were collected in personal interviews by peer interviewers working under professional supervision. The sample size for the November 1972 survey was 1,924. The sample size for previous surveys was: May 1971 (N = 2,845); November 1971 (N = 1,960); and June 1972 (N = 1,991).

¹The Army publicized the pay increase in two major announcements on 18 November and 24 November 1971. All interviews in the November 1971 survey were initiated *after* 18 November, hence all respondents had the opportunity to become aware of the pay increase. Subsequent to the Army announcement, each of the other Services initiated efforts to publicize the fact that all Services received the same pay increase.

²This incentive was reportedly advertised by the Army, but was not publicized by the Marine Corps.

LIMITATIONS OF THE REPORT

The results contained herein were obtained in four independent sample surveys of the national population of civilian male youth. The surveys were conducted at 6-month intervals in 1971 and 1972. The samples do not include men in the Armed Forces. There are no female samples.

The results presented in the report were obtained by projecting the results from respondents in each sample to the number of male civilian youth in the population, based on the estimates of the Census. The samples were stratified by age, educational status, and geographic region. Detailed results from each survey are available in the form of data tabulations and data tapes. These materials were generated by Gilbert Youth Research, Inc. The data tabulations consist of projected frequencies and percentages.

The data tapes have been converted for use with standard software packages. Information on their use may be obtained from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), requesting information on the expanded Gilbert questionnaires.

The discussion of results in this report derives from visual inspection of the data tabulations. Tests of statistical significance have not been performed on the data, due to temporal and budgetary limitations. For this reason, the discussion and interpretation of findings should be treated with caution. The report is a market research report, not a scientific technical report. Hence, certain liberties have been taken in data interpretation.

SUMMARY

ENLISTED POTENTIAL

In November 1972, 15% of the total youth sample indicated a willingness to enlist in the active service as a Regular under a zero-draft condition. Given an assumed no-draft condition, 15% said that they would enlist as a Regular in June 1972. This figure compared with 12% in November 1971, and 11% in May 1971 (see Figure I-1).

There were consistent substantial differences in enlistment potential by *age* and *educational status*. In each 1972 survey, the enlistment potential for 16- to 17-year olds was about 25% (see Figure I-2). Also in each survey, the enlistment potential among high school students was much higher than the enlistment potential for youths not in school or college students (see Figure I-3).

There is a trend over the past two years of increased enlistment potential among 16-17-year olds and high school students (Appendix A). These segments of the youth population should constitute the prime "target audience" for future recruitment activities.

There was no evidence of draft motivation in enlisted potential in November 1972 or in June 1972 (see Figure I-6).

RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD POTENTIAL

In November 1972, 9% of the total youth sample indicated that they might join the Reserve or National Guard, assuming no draft. Approximately 10 - 11% in each previous survey said that they would join, assuming no draft (see Figure II-1). Substantial evidence was noted of draft motivation in willingness to join the Reserve or National Guard (see Figure II-2).

Higher rates of potential Reserve/National Guard affiliation were noted for 16-17-year olds (see Figure II-3), for high school students (see Figure II-4), and for non-whites (see Figure II-5).

There was evidence of overlap in the potential for joining the Regular Force or affiliating with the Reserve or National Guard (see Figure II-6). This finding suggests that there may be competition for manpower between the Reserve Forces and the Regular Force.

OFFICER POTENTIAL

In November 1972, 9% of college juniors and seniors indicated a willingness to volunteer for Active Service as an officer. This figure compares to 11% who said they would volunteer in June 1972, and 13% who indicated that they would volunteer in November 1971 (see Figure III-1). The consistent downward trend in officer potential is noteworthy.

ENLISTMENT INCENTIVES

In November 1972, the single most frequently endorsed incentive to enlist in the Regular Force was a *fully paid college education* (see Table IV-1). This incentive appeals to the 16-17-year-old "target segment" of the youth population (including higher-aptitude high school students) and shows no racial differences. In contrast, a \$3000 enlistment bonus was less frequently endorsed, was more popular among low-aptitude high school students, and had higher appeal for non-whites than whites. But the two incentives most preferred for combat enlistment were the \$3000 bonus and a shorter term of service (see Table IV-2).

In November 1972, the single most frequently endorsed incentive to Reserve/National Guard affiliation was *educational benefits* (see Table IV-4). The concept of a cash bonus for Reserve/National Guard affiliation received substantial endorsement, but appealed more strongly to non-whites than to whites.

INFLUENCES IN ENLISTMENT

In November 1972, the majority of youth reported recruiter contact at some time (see Figure V-2), and reported the receipt of mailed recruiting literature (see Figure V-5). However, prime "target groups" did not report receipt of recruiting literature to the extent reported by segments of the population with lower enlistment potential, suggesting a possible need for evaluation of recruitment policy and/or media strategy (see Figure V-6). The Army appeared to be the most successful service in establishing recruiter contact with prime "target groups" of youth (see Figure V-3).

In November 1972, youth attributed considerable enlistment influence to the *recruiter in person* (see Table V-1). Among the target group of high school students, the recruiter did *not* enjoy the mass exposure of TV. However, information provided by the recruiter had more influence on an enlistment decision than did the other media. For this

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reason, the recruiter was one of the most effective forces in influencing an enlistment decision.

ATTITUDES TOWARD MILITARY SERVICE

In November 1972, 59% of the youth sample expressed a negative attitude toward enlisting for military service. Among high school students (only), the rate was 50% (see Figure VI-1). High school students were critical of the perceived military life style and lack of personal freedom (see Figure VI-2).

A substantial decrease in the number of youth expecting to go on active military service was found from 1971 to 1972. The decline was most noteworthy for college students (see Figure VI-4).

Some 8% of the youth in November 1972 expressed an expectation of being drafted in the next six months, in spite of the zero-draft environment (see Table VI-1).

SERVICE PREFERENCE

In November 1972, the Air Force (32%) and the Navy (27%) were nominated as the best overall Services. The Army, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard were selected by 5-12% each, in the same range noted in previous surveys (see Figure VII-1).

However, among only those *men who expect to enlist for active service as a Regular*, assuming no draft, differences in service preference between the Army and Navy were less pronounced in November 1972 than in previous surveys. Among only those men who said that they would enlist if there were no draft, the Air Force (32%) was the preferred Service, while the Navy (26%) and the Army (24%) were next in preference (see Figure VII-2).

Among youths who said that they might join the Reserve or National Guard, assuming appropriate incentives, service preference was 23% for the Air Force (National Guard or Reserve), 18% (Navy Reserve), 17% Army (National Guard or Reserve), and 6% for the Marine Corps Reserve (see Table VII-1).

The *image* of the Services in the total youth sample does not appear to have changed substantially from May 1971 to November 1972.

CAREER OBJECTIVES


In November 1972, *pay* (19%) and *secure, steady employment* (20%) were the two most important life goals of youth (see Figure VIII-2). The military service is perceived as

offering steady, secure employment in competition with civilian work (see Table VIII-1). However, the military service is not seen as offering the opportunity to make lots of money, even though the "low pay image" of the military service has improved over time.

Most high school students in November 1972 said that they anticipate taking additional training or education after high school (see Table VIII-3). However, there is a marked discrepancy between their anticipated first-year civilian earnings (see Table VIII-4) and what they believe a man earns in his first year of military service (see Table VIII-5). In general, high school youths underestimate military compensation.

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RESULTS IN DETAIL

I. Enlisted Potential

In the November 1972 survey, conducted in a zero-draft environment, 15% of the total youth sample stated a willingness to enlist for active service as a Regular. In previous surveys, the willingness of youth to enlist for active service was probed under an *assumed no-draft condition*. In the June 1972 survey, 15% stated that they expected to enlist under this condition. In the November 1971 survey, 12% reported potential enlistment. In the May 1971 survey, 11% reported potential enlistment when no draft was assumed.

In each survey, age, educational status, and race were related to the reported intention to enlist, with the younger men, high school students, and non-whites more likely to plan on enlistment.

There was no evidence of draft motivation in enlistment potential in either the November 1972 or the June 1972 surveys.

PROBABILITY OF ENLISTING FOR ACTIVE SERVICE AS A REGULAR

In the November 1972 survey, each respondent was asked to report his enlistment potential for active service as a regular, assuming a no-draft condition. Responses under the no-draft condition are shown in Figure I-1 for the November 1972 survey and for previous surveys. Given an *assumed no-draft* condition, 15% said in November 1972 that they would enlist, the same rate of enlistment potential found for the total youth sample in June 1972. This rate had increased from 11% in the May 1971 survey and 12% in the November 1971 replication.

Probability of Enlisting as a Regular, Assuming No Draft




Figure I-1

The figure of 15% enlistment potential is below certain estimates of manpower requirements for an all-volunteer force. For example, the estimated demand for male, enlisted volunteers in FY74 is approximately 354,000 men. Assuming future demand at this approximate level, Binkin and Johnston (1973)¹ have estimated that at least *one in three* qualified and available men must eventually volunteer to satisfy the demands of an

¹ M. Binkin and J.D. Johnston. "All-Volunteer Armed Forces: Progress, Problems, and Prospects," a report prepared for the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 93rd Congress, Brookings Institution, May 1973.

all-volunteer active force during the period FY75-79. This figure assumes only 3,820,000 qualified available males in ages 17-22 of whom an annual requirement exists for 356,000 accessions. The one-in-three estimate derives from exclusion of the unqualified, the institutionalized, and full-time students (except for first-year and second-year dropouts) from each single age cohort group. For example, assume 2,131,000 total male youths per age cohort group, but discount 32,000 youths as institutionalized, 507,000 as college students (non-dropouts), and 505,000 as unqualified; the remainder is only 1,089,000 qualified and available, of which 356,000 (or 32.8%) must volunteer for service.

However, the projected male enlistment potential derived from this survey is sufficient to supply the projected demand. The discrepancy from Binkin and Johnston may result from the different definitions that are used for qualified and available. Based upon projections from the November 1972 survey, an estimated 576,400 youths, aged 16-21, will attempt to enlist during calendar year 1973.¹ Assuming a 30% disqualification rate,² this number of applications will generate approximately 400,000 accessions, a number larger than the requirements of male enlisted volunteers for FY74 and beyond. (However, if only 50% of applicants were assumed qualified, the projected supply would admittedly constitute a shortfall).

DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSES

In each survey, the probability of enlistment varied by age, education, and race.

Under the present no-draft condition, 15% of the November 1972 and June 1972 sample said that they would enlist. But, in each survey, the rate for 16- 17-year olds was far higher than the rate for 20- 21-year olds (Figure I-2).

Differences in enlistment potential were also found, controlling on current educational status. In the November 1972 survey, 25% of high school students said that they would enlist under no-draft conditions, but only 6% of current college students reported an enlistment intention. Similar results were found in the June 1972 survey (Figure I-3).

Certain noteworthy *trends in enlistment potential* over time as a function of age and education have also been observed. In general, enlistment potential among 16- 17-year olds has increased over the past two years of survey administrations, and this age cohort group has consistently shown a rate of enlistment potential almost twice as high as that of 18- 19-year olds. Increases in enlistment potential over time for the latter are also noted. The enlistment potential of men in high school has also generally increased over the past two years, while enlistment potential for college students and non-students appears to have stabilized (see Appendix A for details).

¹ See Appendix D for details on the timing of enlistment intentions.

² The disqualification rate is subject to change.

Relationship of Age to Enlistment Potential




Figure I-2

Relationship of Educational Level to Enlistment Potential




Figure I-3

In both the November 1972 survey and the June 1972 survey, non-whites reported a higher enlistment potential than whites. Results appear in Figure I-4.

Relationship of Race to Enlistment Potential




Figure I-4

In each survey, non-whites have consistently reported higher enlistment potential than whites. (The non-white sample size in each survey is small, relative to the number of whites interviewed, hence estimates of the extent of enlistment potential among non-whites are more variable than are the estimates for whites.¹ Nonetheless, the observed consistency across four surveys of higher non-white potential lends some credibility to the findings.) Indeed, if white and non-white youths were recruited and enlisted at the same ratio implied by their enlistment potential and population size, the military service would eventually have a non-white accession rate of approximately 21%.

In summary, there is consistent evidence of differential enlistment potential by age, education, and race, across four independent surveys conducted in both draft and no-draft environments. For this reason, demographic analyses involving age and race (as well as education and family income) have been employed elsewhere in this report in analyzing attitudes toward enlistment incentives, enlistment influences, and other subjects.

Differences in enlistment potential as a function of residence (city size, geographical area) were negligible in each of the surveys (see Figure I-5). In the November 1972

¹ This observation reportedly has also been made by reviewers of these surveys. Reference has been made to a pending ONR study conducted by researchers at Princeton University entitled "AVF: Statistical Methods for Manpower Studies." Personal Communication: Dr. Ralph R. Canter (OASD, M&RA) and Dr. Allan H. Fisher, Jr. (HumRRO), 16 April 1973. In the November 1972 survey, the non-white sample size was N = 278.

survey, slightly higher enlistment potential was reported by residents of large metropolitan areas and by residents of the South. Results for the November 1972 survey appear in Figure I-5. However, inconsistent results in enlistment potential between the various surveys have been noted in terms of residence. For example, higher enlistment potential was noted for residents of small metropolitan areas in the November 1972 and June 1972 surveys. Hence, the November 1972 findings of higher potential in large metropolitan areas should be interpreted with caution, pending replication. Results by geographical area have proved even more variable between surveys.¹

**Relationship of Geographical Factors to Enlistment Potential
(Base: November 1972 Survey Administration)**




Figure I-5

DRAFT MOTIVATION

When this survey was designed in 1971, it was appropriately envisioned that enlistment propensity would vary, depending upon the assumption of the respondent regarding his potential for being inducted into the military service. For this reason, each

¹Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). *Attitudes of Youth Toward Military Service: Results of National Surveys Conducted in May 1971, November 1971, and June 1972*, Manpower Research Report No. MA 72-2, August 1972, pp. 43-45.

respondent was asked to estimate the likelihood of his enlistment for active service as a regular under two conditions: (a) assumed no-draft condition and (b) the present condition (which presumably meant the *draft*, in the context of the earlier surveys).

A comparison was made of rates of enlistment potential under the two assumed conditions. To a certain extent, this comparison indicates whether the attitudes of youth toward enlistment varied over time as a function of draft motivation. In general, there has been negligible evidence of draft motivation as a factor in enlistment potential for the Regular Force. Results appear in Figure I-6. No difference was noted in enlistment potential under the "present condition" versus under the assumed "no-draft" condition in either November 1972 or June 1972. This finding may imply that youth regarded the present condition as being a *zero-draft environment* as early as June 1972.

It is also noteworthy that the extent of difference between rates of enlistment potential under the two conditions was minor, even in May 1971 when the draft was in force. In contrast, the following section reveals that draft motivation had a far more pronounced (and continuing) effect on the potential for Reserve/National Guard affiliation.

**Probability of Enlisting for Active Service,
Under Two Assumed Conditions**





Figure I-6



II. Reserve or National Guard Potential

In the November 1972 survey, 9% of the total youth sample stated a willingness to join the Reserve or National Guard, assuming no draft. The same level of endorsement was found in previous surveys. But a consistent draft-motivation effect was also found when the no-draft condition was compared with an assumed draft continuation condition.

In each survey, age, educational status, and race were related to reported intention to join, with the younger men, high school students, and non-whites showing higher potential for affiliating with the Reserve or National Guard.

The willingness of the same youth to enlist in either the Reserve/National Guard or the Regular Forces was analyzed. In the November 1972 survey, 4% reported an overlap in willingness to join either the Regular Force or the Reserve/National Guard, compared to 5% who endorsed only the Reserve/National Guard, and 11% who selected only the Regular Forces.

PROBABILITY OF JOINING THE RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD

Youth were asked to indicate their probability of joining the Reserve or the National Guard. Each respondent was provided the following current information about the Reserve and the National Guard.

“Thus far we have asked you just about active military service. Now we would like to ask you some questions about the Reserve Components. Joining the Reserve or National Guard for six years involves a short period of initial active duty for training, followed by inactive unit training and one 15-day active unit training period per year.

“For the initial active duty for training period (about 6 months), in addition to quarters, food, medical care, and other benefits, the trainee’s pay ranges from \$288 to \$321 per month. For inactive unit training (normally one weekend per month), the starting pay is about \$43 per month (each promotion carries a pay increase). For the two weeks of annual unit training, enlisted man in the lower grade receives about \$160.”¹

Given this information, each man was asked his likelihood of joining the Reserve or National Guard under a no-draft condition. In November 1972, 9% stated that they would join the Reserve/National Guard, assuming a zero-draft. Results are presented in Figure II-1 for the November 1972 survey and for the previous surveys when a no-draft condition was assumed. Only 9% expressed a willingness to enlist in the Reserve or National Guard under a no-draft condition in November 1972; approximately 10-11% had said that they would join the Reserve or National Guard in previous surveys. However, there is no noticeable trend in potential over time.

DRAFT MOTIVATION

The effects of draft motivation are pervasive in the decision of youth to join the Reserve or National Guard. In each survey, respondents were also asked whether they would join, assuming a continuation of the draft. A comparison of Reserve/National Guard potential under the assumed draft and no-draft conditions indicates that at least an additional 10% might join under an assumed continuation of the draft (Figure II-2). The

¹ For each survey, the information on Reserve pay was updated as necessary to be accurate for the period of the survey. The above instructions were used in both the June 1972 survey and the November 1972 survey.

**Probability of Joining the Reserve or National Guard,
Assuming No Draft**




Figure II-1

**Probability of Joining the Reserve or National Guard,
Under Two Assumed Conditions**




Figure II-2

extent of draft motivation in potential Reserve/National Guard affiliation far exceeds the extent of possible draft motivation in enlistment potential for the Regular Force (see Results, Section I). This finding suggests that, in the absence of the draft, efforts to recruit men for the Reserve or National Guard would require the skillful use of alternative incentives (see Results, Section IV-B).

DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSES

In each survey, it was found that the probability of joining the Reserve or National Guard varied by age, education, and race.

Under the present no-draft condition, 9% of the total November 1972 sample said they would join the Reserve or National Guard. However, the rate for 16- to 17-year olds was 16% in both November 1972 and June 1972, while the rate for 20- to 21-year olds was much lower (4% in November 1972). In general, the proportion of 18- to 21-year olds who indicated a likelihood of enlisting in the Reserve or National Guard in the absence of the draft declined from the June 1972 level, resulting in a slight decrease in Reserve/National Guard potential for the total sample.

Relationship of Age to Enlistment Potential in the Reserve or National Guard, Assuming No Draft




Figure II-3

Differences in Reserve/National Guard potential were also noted on the education parameter. In the November 1972 survey, 14% of the high school students said that they would join under present no-draft conditions. The rate for college students was only 4%, for non-students, 6%. Results appear in Figure II-4. Should the age and educational level of future applicants to the Reserve/National Guard reflect the differences in potential found in the November 1972 survey, the composition of the Reserve Force may shift dramatically to a younger, less well-educated force than was the case during the period of the draft. In this regard, it is useful to review trends over time in the relationships of age and educational status to the potential for joining the Reserve/National Guard.

Relationship of Educational Level to Enlistment Potential in the Reserve or National Guard, Assuming No Draft




Figure II-4

In general, Reserve potential in the 16- to 17-year old group increased over the last two years (from 12% in May 1971 to 16% in November 1972) (See Appendix B). Over the same period of time, Reserve/National Guard potential for 18- to 21-year olds has fluctuated, showing slightly higher levels in May or June of each year compared to November of each year. In no instance, however, did the rate of Reserve potential for 18- to 21-year olds approach the level for 16- to 17-year olds. In fact, the difference in potential by age appears to be increasing over time. The Reserve potential among 18- to 21-year olds is waning at the same time that the potential for 16- to 17-year olds is increasing or stabilizing. In terms of education, substantial fluctuations in Reserve/

National Guard potential were noted for non-students over the last two years (from 6 to 11%), but the highest rate of Reserve potential was reported by high school students in each survey. (See Appendix B for details.)

In both the June and November 1972 surveys, non-whites reported higher potential for joining the Reserve or National Guard than did whites. See Figure II-5 for results. While differences between the races in potential for Reserve/National Guard affiliation appear to have decreased slightly from June 1972 to November 1972, caution in the interpretation of the data on non-white Reserve potential is required, because of the small non-white sample size in these surveys. However, higher non-white potential was noted in each of the three previous surveys.¹

Relationship of Race to Reserve or National Guard Potential, Assuming No Draft




Figure II-5

In summary, the same segments of the youth population reported higher potential for joining the Reserve or the National Guard in each of four independent surveys. Higher potential was consistently reported by 16- to 17-year olds, high school students, and non-whites.

¹ Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). *Attitudes of Youth Toward Military Service: Results of National Surveys Conducted in May 1971, November 1971, and June 1972*, Manpower Research Report No. MA 72-2, August 1972, pp. 93-95.

OVERLAP IN REGULAR FORCE/RESERVE ENLISTMENT POTENTIAL

Inspection of the demographic correlates of enlistment potential for the Regular force (see Results, Section I) and for the Reserve/National Guard shows striking similarities. In each case, the highest potential was found among the 16- to 17-year olds, high school students, and non-whites. This observation suggests the possibility that many of the same men who are willing to join the Regular force might also have indicated a willingness to join the Reserve/National Guard. The extent of *overlap in enlistment potential* for the Regular Force and Reserve/National Guard was determined to evaluate this possibility. Data on the willingness of youth to join the Regular Force of the Reserve/National Guard (or both) are presented in Figure II-6.

**Amount of Overlap in Enlistment Potential for the Regular Force and the Reserve/National Guard
(Base: November 1972)**




Figure II-6

While 11% of the total sample reported enlistment potential for the Regular Force *only*, 5% of the total sample reported the possibility of joining *only* the Reserve or National Guard. *The overlap of men willing to join either the Regular Force or the Reserve/National Guard was 4% in the November 1972 survey.* This overlap suggests that an element of competition may be inherent in attempts to recruit men into the Regular Force or the Reserve/National Guard.

The extent of overlap in volunteer potential assumes considerable importance when compared to the estimated requirement that about 4 out of every 10 (39%) of qualified

and available youth must volunteer for either active or reserve service (Binkin and Johnston, 1973).¹ Thus, a projected requirement for approximately 111,000 nonprior service Reserve accessions exists. This figure is the sum of the expected gain from nonprior service (74,000) and the projected shortfall (37,000).² The November 1972 survey data raise some question with respect to the extent that sufficient potential volunteers exist to accommodate this requirement. Based upon projections from the November 1972 survey, an estimated 466,000 youths, 16-21 years of age, would try to join the Reserve/National Guard *at some time in the future*. This estimate derives from those youths with Reserve *only* proclivity for military service, that is, youth who do *not* plan to enlist as Regulars. On an *annual basis*, this would represent about 77,666 Reserve (only) applicants, a figure that is below the FY74 requirement of 111,000 Reserve accessions. However, it should be noted that this figure does *not* take the factor of applicant disqualification into consideration. Assuming only a 30% disqualification rate, the number of annual Reserve accessions would be about 54,400. This would constitute a shortfall in comparison to the projected requirement. Hence, it seems reasonable to project a shortfall in the Reserve component in a zero-draft environment, in lieu of the implementation of incentives and/or an increase in efforts to expand the size of the recruitment pool. Results, Section IV, contains pertinent information on promising incentives to Reserve affiliation.

¹ M. Binkin and J.D. Johnston. *All-Volunteer Armed Forces: Progress, Problems, and Prospects*, a report prepared for the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Brookings Institution, May 1973, p. 42.

² *Ibid.*, p. 30.

III. The Active Officer Force

The willingness of college juniors and seniors to volunteer for duty in the active service as an officer was explored in the November 1972, June 1972, and November 1971 surveys. The reaction to this option under an assumed no-draft condition was reasonably consistent between surveys, although evidence of a decrease in officer potential over time was noted. Thus, approximately 9% expressed a willingness to volunteer in November 1972, compared to 11% in June 1972 and 13% in November 1971.

PROBABILITY OF VOLUNTEERING FOR ACTIVE SERVICE AS AN OFFICER

The propensity for volunteering for officer duty in the active service was explored for a select group of youth—college men in their junior or senior years. In the November 1972, June 1972, and November 1971 surveys, this particular college subgroup was asked to estimate the likelihood of their volunteering for duty as an officer, assuming a no-draft condition. In the November 1972 survey, 9% said they might volunteer. These results and results from the two previous surveys are presented for comparison in Figure III-1. Comparing the 9% rate of officer potential in November 1972 with the 11% rate in June 1972 and the 13% rate in November 1971, there appears to be a slight *negative trend* in officer potential over the period of the three surveys.

Likelihood of Volunteering for Active Service as an Officer, Assuming No Draft (Base: Junior and Senior College Students)




Figure III-1

However, there is a corresponding decrease in the demand for OCS accessions for the near-term. Hence, supply may well correspond to demand. Based upon projections from the November 1972 survey, an estimated 45,000 college graduate youths may

attempt to apply as officers on an annual basis. Allowing for a disqualification rate as high as 50%, this number of applicants would still generate over 20,000 annual officer accessions. This number is more than double the officer accession requirements for FY73 (7000) and FY74 (5700).¹

An analysis of officer potential was made by area of residence. Considering the small sample size, results by geographic area were extremely consistent between the three surveys. In each survey, a slightly higher rate of expected officer potential was found for college men from small metropolitan areas. Results appear in Figure III-2. No additional demographic analyses were reported, because of the very small number of respondents in college junior/senior status.

**Relationship of City Size to Likelihood of Volunteering for Active Service as an Officer, Assuming No Draft
(Base: College Juniors and Seniors)**





Figure III-2

¹ Personal Communication, Mr. Samuel Saben (OASD, M&RA) and Dr. A.H. Fisher (HumRRO), 12 June 1973.



IV. Enlistment Incentives

In November 1972, a *fully paid college education* was the most popular potential incentive to enlisting in the military service (14%). However, almost equivalent endorsement was found for a plan paying \$200 per month to a veteran to attend up to four years of college or technical/vocational training (13%). The concept of a fully paid college education appealed most to the 16- to 17-year olds and college students. However, the plan also appealed to high school students with higher reported grades. In contrast, 6% endorsed a \$3000 bonus for special skills as the most preferred incentive, and higher rates of endorsement were provided by high school youth with lower reported grades, and by non-whites.

The \$3000 bonus and/or a shorter term of obligated service were most frequently endorsed as incentives to combat enlistment.

Reasons for enlisting endorsed by youth who expect to serve include (a) *choice of branch of service*, (b) *travel, excitement, and new experiences*, (c) *learning a skill or trade valuable in civilian life*, and (d) *the opportunity for advanced education and training*. Less influence was accorded an enlistment bonus, or overall military personnel benefits.

In November 1972, *educational benefits* was the single most preferred incentive to Reserve/National Guard affiliation. On an absolute basis, *training in skills useful in civilian life* and *educational benefits* were most frequently endorsed. Training and education incentives appeal to the "target group" of high school students. The concepts of a \$1100 bonus and a \$2200 special-skills bonus was also strongly endorsed by this group, but these cash bonus options appealed more to non-whites than to whites.

A. ENLISTMENT INCENTIVES FOR THE REGULAR FORCE

In the November 1972 survey, a *fully paid college education*¹ in return for four years of military service was the single incentive most frequently endorsed as potentially inducing enlistment.² This option was cited by 14% of the total sample. It is interesting to compare this level of endorsement with the endorsement accorded a more realistic paid college education incentive—the provision of \$200 per month for up to four years of college, given two or more years of military service. This potential incentive was endorsed by 13% of the total sample. Other enlistment incentives were endorsed by 10% or less of the total sample. The concept of a potential \$3000 enlistment bonus for critical skills was endorsed by 6% of the total November 1972 sample. Results for the November 1972 survey appear in Table IV-1. Because of the continuing interest in bonus enlistment incentives and in paid college education incentives, additional demographic analyses have been performed to determine which segments of the youth population tend to endorse these incentives.

Table IV-1

November 1972 Data

<u>Enlistment Incentives</u>	<u>Percent</u>
● Government pays for up to 4 years college in return for 4 years service	14
● Government pays up to \$200 a month for up to 4 years college	13
● Would provide training in a civilian skill	8
● Military pay comparable to civilian income	8
● Guaranteed assignments in military specialty	7
● Bonus up to \$3000 for enlisting for 3 years	6
● Government pays for up to 2 years of technical/vocational school	5
● During peacetime guarantee of geographical assignment of choice	5
● Shorter enlistment period	4
● Government pays for up to 2 years of technical/vocational school in return for 4 years service	3
● Right to live off base	3
● A large bonus for enlisting	3
● Chance to enroll in officer training after enlistment	2
● Able to change job assignment	2
● Better living conditions for single servicemen	1
● None of these incentives	18

¹The complete definition of each incentive is given in Table C-1 of Appendix C.

²Respondents were also asked which incentives would most likely induce enlistment, with multiple answers accepted. Results appear in Table C-2 of Appendix C.

DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSES

Endorsing a fully paid college education as the best enlistment incentive was only slightly related to the *age* of the respondent. For this incentive, endorsement was most prevalent among the 16- to 17-year-old age group (15%) (Figure IV-1). Endorsement of a fully paid college education tended to decline slightly with age; the rate for 20- to 21-year olds was 13%. A fully paid college education incentive possessed more appeal for

Relationship of Age to Endorsing a Fully Paid College Education as the Best Enlistment Incentive (November 1972 Data)




Figure IV-1

college students than for high school students (Figure IV-2). This incentive received less endorsement from youth in non-student status. The extent of endorsement of this incentive was also related to average reported high school grades, for the prime "target group" of current high school students. Youths who reported receiving higher average grades in high school were more likely to endorse a fully paid college education as the best inducement to enlistment than were youths reporting lower average grades.¹ Endorsement of this option tended to decline among high school youths with lower average grades (Figure IV-3). In the total November 1972 sample, there was no appreciable race difference in endorsing a fully paid college education as the single best enlistment incentive (Figure IV-4).

¹Research Memorandum from Ralph R. Canter. "Tabulation of Enlistment Incentives by School Grades," OASD (M&RA), 9 March 1973.

Relationship of Education to Endorsing a Fully Paid College Education as the Best Enlistment Incentive (November 1972 Data)




Figure IV-2

Relationship of Grades to Endorsing a Fully Paid College Education as the Best Enlistment Incentive (November 1972 Data)




Figure IV-3

Relationship of Race to Endorsing a Fully Paid College Education as the Best Enlistment Incentive (November 1972 Data)




Figure IV-4

Endorsing a \$3000 bonus enlistment incentive for special skills was related to age,¹ with 16- to 17-year-old respondents more likely to endorse the incentive than 20- to 21-year-old respondents (Figure IV-5). A higher percentage of high school students endorsed the \$3000 bonus than did college students or non-students (Figure IV-6). Endorsement of the \$3000 bonus has strongly related to race, with non-whites more likely to endorse the enlistment incentives than whites (Figure IV-7).

It is interesting to compare these findings from November 1972 with the results reported for a 1970 survey of youth conducted by Johnston and Bachman (1972).² In comparing *higher pay* and *paid schooling* (college), Johnston and Bachman argued that paid schooling would be attractive to a higher percentage of young men than the alternative of higher pay. Further, they found important differences in the kinds of young men attracted by the two incentives. Specifically, they concluded that youth attracted by paid schooling averaged higher in intelligence, verbal skills, occupational

¹ In the November 1972 survey, it was also found that only 45% of youth had heard of the enlistment bonus. (The rate for high school students was 50%.) Of those youth claiming awareness of the bonus, only 50% correctly attributed the bonus option to the Army and only 20% attributed the bonus to the Marine Corps. Approximately 20% incorrectly attributed the bonus option to the Navy or to the Air Force.

² J. Johnston and J. Bachman. *Youth in Transition. Volume V: Young Men and Military Service*, Institute for Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1972, p. 188.

**Relationship of Age to Endorsing a \$3,000 Bonus
as the Best Enlistment Incentive
(November 1972 Data)**




Figure IV-5

**Relationship of Education to Endorsing a \$3,000 Bonus
as the Best Enlistment Incentive
(November 1972 Data)**




Figure IV-6

**Relationship of Race to Endorsing a \$3,000 Bonus
as the Best Enlistment Incentive
(November 1972 Data)**




Figure IV-7

ambitions, and self-esteem. These results from 1970 appear to support and extend current findings on the relative merits of the two approaches to enlistment incentives.

1. INCENTIVES TO COMBAT ENLISTMENT

Incentives *most* likely to induce youth to enlist in a combat type of branch of the service (such as the Armored, Artillery, Signal or Engineer Corps, or Infantry) were found to be (a) *a shorter enlistment period* (i.e., one year less than now offered by the Service of one's choice); and (b) *a \$3000 bonus* for enlisting for at least three years in a skill that is in short supply. Each incentive was selected as the best single inducement to combat enlistment by 7% of the total November 1972 sample (Table IV-2). Guaranteed assignment to a military specialty of one's choice was endorsed as the best inducement to combat enlistment by 6%. Less than 6% of the total sample endorsed each of the other current/potential incentives as most likely to induce enlistment in a combat branch.

2. REASONS FOR ENLISTMENT

Those youths in the November 1972 sample who indicated some possibility of enlisting or entering military service at some time (28%) were asked to review a list of

Incentive Most Likely to Induce Enlistment in a Combat Branch

<u>Enlistment Incentives</u>	<u>Percent</u>
● Bonus up to \$3000 for enlisting for 3 years	7
● Shorter enlistment period	7
● Guaranteed assignments in military specialty	6
● Government pays for up to 4 years college in return for 4 years service	5
● Military pay comparable to civilian income	5
● Able to change job assignment	5
● A large bonus for enlisting	4
● Government pays up to \$200 a month for up to 4 years college	4
● Would provide training in a civilian skill	3
● Government pays for up to 2 years of technical/vocational school	3
● During peacetime, guarantee of geographical assignment of choice	3
● Chance to enroll in officer training after enlistment	2
● Right to live off base	2
● Government pays for up to 2 years of technical/vocational school in return for 4 years service	2
● Better living conditions for single servicemen	1
● None of these incentives	42

reasons that might influence their decision to enter the service, and to indicate the degree to which each reason influenced their decision. The majority of these youths reported *choice of branch of Service* (54%) and *travel, excitement, and new experiences* (52%) as reasons most likely to exert a strong influence on their enlistment decision.¹ Some 50% attributed enlistment influence to the factor of *learning a trade or skill useful in civilian life*. About 40% or less of the sample attributed strong influence to the other reasons (Table IV-3). The concept of an enlistment bonus was attributed strong influence by only 23% of the sample. The bonus incentive was attributed influence at approximately the same rate as the *desire to qualify for the G.I. Bill* (24%) and *overall personnel benefits* (25%). Other factors were attributed more influence, for example, *the opportunity for advanced education and training* (39%) and *patriotism* (37%).

¹ See Table C-3 for comparable results from previous surveys.

Reasons That Exert a Strong Influence on Enlistment

<u>Reasons</u>	<u>Percent Indicating Strong Influence^a</u>
I want my choice of branch of Service	54
For travel, excitement and new experiences	52
To learn a trade or skill that would be valuable in civilian life	50
I want an opportunity for advanced education and training	39
To serve my country (Patriotism)	37
To fulfill my military obligation at a time of my choice	30
To become more mature and self-reliant	29
Career opportunities in the military look better than in civilian life	26
The over-all benefits: pay, room and board, medical care, & training	25
I want to qualify for the G.I. Bill	24
To get a bonus for enlisting	23
To avoid the draft	19
I want to leave some personal problems behind me	8

^aBased on 28% of the sample who report an expectation of ever entering military service.

B. RESERVE/NATIONAL GUARD ENLISTMENT INDUCEMENTS AND INCENTIVES

1. INDUCEMENTS TO RESERVE AFFILIATION

In the November 1972 survey, the three conditions most frequently endorsed as potential inducements to Reserve affiliation were:

- (1) Training in skills useful in civilian life
- (2) Educational benefits
- (3) Draft avoidance

Results for November 1972 are presented in Figure IV-8 and compared with results from the three previous surveys. Note that *multiple responses* were permitted, hence the high levels of endorsement of certain inducements.

There is an apparent increase over time in the endorsement of training and education as inducements to Reserve affiliation. Endorsement of "training in skills that could be useful in civilian life" increased from 26% in May 1971 to 36% in 1972. Endorsement of "educational benefits" as an inducement to Reserve affiliation increased from 28% in May 1971 to 34% in November 1972. Conversely, endorsement of "draft avoidance" as

**Selected Inducements to Reserve Affiliation
(Multiple Responses Permitted)**




Figure IV-8

an inducement declined over time from 40% in May 1971 to 30% in November 1972. The low level of endorsement of “supplemental income” as a reason for Reserve affiliation in each survey is noteworthy, in contrast to the other inducements, but may be due to lack of knowledge.

DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSES

The receipt of *training in skills applicable in civilian life* was considered a potential inducement to Reserve affiliation for 36% of the total November 1972 sample. A high level of endorsement was given by current high school students (45%). Results appear in Figure IV-9. Skills training is endorsed at a relatively lower level by college students and youths not in school.

There was no difference by race in endorsement of skills training as an inducement to Reserve affiliation (Figure IV-10).

The condition of draft avoidance as a potential inducement was cited by 31% of the total November 1972 sample. However, college youths were much more likely to endorse this condition as an inducement to Reserve affiliation than were youths in high school status or those not in school (Figure IV-11).

Draft avoidance was more frequently endorsed as a potential inducement in Reserve affiliation by whites than by non-whites (Figure IV-12).

Relationship of Education to Endorsement of Skills Training as an Inducement to Reserve Affiliation (November 1972 Data)




Figure IV-9

Relationship of Race to Endorsement of Skills Training as an Inducement to Reserve Affiliation (November 1972 Data)




Figure IV-10

**Relationship of Education to Endorsement of Draft-Avoidance
as an Inducement to Reserve Affiliation
(November 1972 Data)**




Figure IV-11

**Relationship of Race to Endorsement of Draft-Avoidance
as an Inducement to Reserve Affiliation
(November 1972 Data)**




Figure IV-12

In summary, draft avoidance as an inducement to Reserve affiliation has more impact on whites and college youth than on other segments. However, skills training shows promise as an inducement that is attractive to the "target group" of high school youth. Another promising potential inducement is the concept of a bonus for Reserve/National Guard affiliation.

2. POTENTIAL RESERVE BONUS ENLISTMENT INCENTIVES

In June and November 1972, respondents were asked whether they would join the Reserve or National Guard, given each of two potential *enlistment bonus conditions*:

- (1) Would you join a Reserve or National Guard unit involving 48 meetings (or 12 weekends) a year plus a two-week summer camp, if you were offered an enlistment bonus of up to \$1100?
- (2) Would you join a Reserve or National Guard unit involving 48 meetings (or 12 weekends) a year plus a two-week summer camp, if you were offered an enlistment bonus of up to \$2200 for having a skill that was in short supply?

One of the noteworthy findings is the substantial impact that might be realized from implementation of an \$1100 enlistment bonus for Reserve/National Guard affiliation.

Assessment of Potential Reserve Bonus Enlistment Incentives




Figure IV-13

Even more endorsement was accorded the \$2200 bonus for special skills than the \$1100 bonus. Figure IV-13 presents results for June and November 1972, and contrasts the findings with the estimate of Reserve/National Guard potential under a no-draft, non-bonus condition (see Results, Section II).

DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSES

In both June and November 1972, 16-17 year olds endorsed the two bonus incentives at a higher rate than did older respondents (Figure IV-14). High school students endorsed the two bonus incentives more frequently than did non-students or college students, in each of the 1972 surveys (Figure IV-15). However, non-whites endorsed the two bonus incentives at a higher rate than did whites. This result was found in both June and November 1972 (Figure IV-16).

In summary, enlistment bonus incentives have great potential appeal to youth as inducements to Reserve/National Guard affiliation. Their impact appears strongest among the "target segments" of 16- to 17-year olds and high school students. However, the appeal of the Reserve bonus is differential by race, with results suggesting less impact on whites than on non-whites.

Thus, the bonus approach does *not* appear to be a promising substitute for draft-avoidance in the attraction of better-educated white youth. The most promising inducements are skills training and educational benefits (see the following Section).

Relationship of Age to Probability of Joining the Reserve or National Guard, Under Bonus Conditions




Figure IV-14

Relationship of Education to Probability of Joining the Reserve or National Guard, Under Bonus Conditions




Figure IV-15

Relationship of Race to Probability of Joining the Reserve or National Guard Under Bonus Conditions




Figure IV-16

3. PREFERRED ENLISTMENT INCENTIVES

The single most preferred incentive to enlistment in the Reserve/National Guard was *educational benefits* (18%). A *\$600 enlistment bonus* and an *increase in pay* were each selected by 11% of the total sample. *Full-time insurance coverage* (10%) and a *shorter period of initial training* (9%) were also frequently endorsed (Table IV-4). In each of the previous surveys, *educational benefits* have been the single most frequently endorsed incentive.¹ The concept of paid *full-time insurance coverage* has gained increased endorsement in each succeeding survey, increasing in endorsement from 5% in May 1971 to 10% in November 1972.

Table IV-4

November 1972 Data

First Preference: Incentive to Reserve Affiliation	
<u>Incentives</u>	<u>Percent Choosing Incentives</u>
● Educational benefits to a maximum value of \$2,000 for six years service, payable in segments of \$500 after each year of satisfactory performance in a unit and successful completion of each segment of schooling	18
● A lump sum enlistment bonus of \$600	11
● Pay at approximately 50% increase in lower grades from what it is now	11
● Full-time insurance coverage (\$15,000 at \$3 cost per month)	10
● Shorten period of initial active duty training (from 4-6 months to 2-4 months, as an example)	9
● Modification of the six-year service enlistment option to permit transfer from a unit to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) after 3 years. (The IRR has no weekend training and only about 5% of all members are selected each year for annual active training.)	4
● Quarters allowance for dependents during initial active duty training (\$60 per month for one dependent)	4
● Cancellation of up to 50% of National Defense Education Act student loan	2
● NONE would cause me to enlist	31
Total	100

¹ See Table C-4 for comparable results from previous surveys.

In the November 1972 sample, analyses of the demographic correlates of endorsing *educational benefits* as the best incentive to Reserve affiliation revealed that this incentive appealed to the same percentage of youth in each age group and each educational status. However, the incentive was slightly more highly endorsed by whites than by non-whites in both June and November 1972 (Figure IV-17).

In summary, *educational benefits* and/or *skills training* useful in civilian life appear as promising incentives to Reserve affiliation. However, no incentive appraised to date has demonstrated equivalence with draft avoidance as a motive to attract white, college student youths. The Reserve bonus options have great appeal for target-group segments (and for non-whites). But regardless of the incentives offered to youth, it appears likely that the composition of the Reserve/National Guard will dramatically change to a younger, less well-educated force in a zero-draft environment, and that the bonus incentive might even expedite this shift in demographic composition.

**Relationship of Race to Endorsement of Educational Benefits
as the Single Preferred Incentive to Reserve/National Guard Affiliation**





Figure IV-17



V. Influences in Enlistment

As a source of military information, the influence of parents and family—strong among 16- to 17-year olds—tends to decline as youths grow older. The influence of peers (close friends) becomes more important with age.

In the November 1972 survey, 51% of the total sample reported recruiter contact at some time. Recruiter contact was higher for the Army (61%) and Navy (46%), than for the Air Force (34%) and Marine Corps (34%).

In the November 1972 survey, 58% of the total sample reported the receipt of recruiting literature through the mail. However, prime prospects were less likely to report the receipt of mailed recruiting literature than were men with lower enlistment potential.

In a comparison with other media, the recruiter in person was given the highest recruiting effectiveness rating by 16- to 17-year olds, even though the percentage of that age group that had been exposed to mass media (TV, magazine, newspaper) was considerably greater.

A. FAMILY INFLUENCE

In the November 1972 survey, personal sources of military information were evaluated. Each respondent was asked from whom he generally sought information about the military service. Most youth cited some member of their family or friends. However, there were noteworthy trends in the influence attributed to family members, as a function of the *age* of the respondent. Figure V-1 illustrates these trends, for selected personal sources of information about military service. In this survey, family influence in the provision of military information consistently declined with age, while the influence of close friends tended to increase with age. These findings suggest that recruiting appeals that are directed to the parents of youths 18 years or older may enjoy limited success. In contrast, the potential effectiveness of peer influence (close friends) should not be underestimated. Additional analyses revealed that 56% of the 16- to 17-year-old target group reported having a close friend in the Service. It is possible that these existing personal contacts could be employed as a positive vehicle to assist in military recruiting activities.

Persons From Whom Information About the
Military Service Is Sought, by Age
(November 1972 Data)




Figure V-1

Analyses of persons from whom military information is sought were also made, controlling on race. Slight differences were noted by race, in analysis of the November 1972 data. For example, whites cited their father (36%) at a slightly higher rate than non-whites (31%). Conversely, non-whites cited their mother (11%) at a higher rate than did whites (7%). Non-whites also cited "other relatives" at a higher rate (24%) than did whites (18%). However, the differences are minor, and the non-white findings are subject to variability because of the small sample size for non-whites.

Finally, it was found that only 10 to 15% of the total November 1972 sample specified that they generally sought military information from a *recruiter*. This figure appears to represent a lower bound, however, and results from a more explicit assessment of recruiter contact and influence are worthy of review.

B. RECRUITER INFLUENCE

Each respondent in each survey was asked if he had ever come in contact with a military recruiter. Approximately half the youth in each survey reported coming into contact with a military recruiter, either at school or somewhere else. Results are given in Figure V-2. There was no noticeable trend in the data, although slightly higher rates of recruiter contact did appear in the 1972 surveys, perhaps representing increased recruiter activity in advance of the zero-draft environment.

Exposure to a Military Recruiter




Figure V-2

An analysis revealed that reported rates of recruiter contact varied substantially by service. In the November 1972 survey, 61% reported some contact with an Army recruiter, while 46% reported contact with a Navy recruiter. In contrast, only 34% reported contact with an Air Force recruiter, or with a Marine Corps recruiter.

An analysis was made of the November 1972 data, to determine the extent of Service recruiter contact as a function of age. Results are presented in Figure V-3.

**Service Recruiter Contact, by Age
(November 1972 Data)**




Figure V-3

Rates of recruiter contact by age varied for the Armed Services. In each age cohort, a higher rate of contact with an Army recruiter was found, compared to rates of contact with recruiters from any of the other Services. In particular, Army recruiter contact in the 16- to 17-year-old and 18- to 19-year-old groups was much higher than recruiter contact for any other Service. By the 20- to 21-year age, differences in recruiter contact by Service were less pronounced. The data suggest that Army recruiting activity is consistent with the findings of higher enlistment potential among younger men as noted in these surveys.

The rate of Navy recruiter contact increased with age. For the Air Force and particularly the Marine Corps, there was almost no difference in the rates of reported recruiter contact as a function of age. However, the Air Force did appear to have a slightly higher recruiter contact rate among 18- to 19-year olds than among men either

older or younger. This trend is consistent with findings on the disposition of FY72 initial applicants for Air Force enlistment, which suggest that the Air Force tends to enlist men who are over 17 years of age or under 21 to 22 years at a higher rate than men at the extremes of the age distribution.¹

An analysis was made to determine if reported recruiter contact varied by race. See Figure V-4 for results.

**Service Recruiter Contact, by Race
(November 1972 Data)**




Figure V-4

The Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps had essentially equivalent rates of reported recruiter contact for both race categories. But for the Navy, a much lower rate of recruiter contact was reported by non-whites (37%) than by whites (48%). The reader is cautioned that the non-white rate is based upon a small number of cases, and may vary upon replication. However, the difference is interesting, in view of the lack of any differences in recruiter contact between races for each of the other services, and in terms of the historic difficulties encountered by the Navy in enlisting non-white youth.²

¹ For details, see A.H. Fisher and Margi R. Harford. "Enlistment Motivation and the Disposition of Army Applicants," HumRRO Draft Technical Report, May 1973.

² R.J. Stillman. *Integration of the Negro in the U.S. Armed Services*, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1968, pp. 70-71.

C. EXPOSURE TO MAILED RECRUITING LITERATURE

In each survey, each respondent was asked if he had ever received recruiting literature through the mail. Results are shown in Figure V-5. In each survey, the majority reported having received military recruiting literature through the mail.

Exposure to Mailed Recruiting Literature




Figure V-5

Additional analyses of the reported receipt of recruiting literature were performed in terms of certain demographic correlates (i.e., age, race, family income). The reported receipt of recruiting literature increased substantially as a function of age and income, and varied by race, based on the analysis of the November 1972 data. The 16- to 17-year-old prime "target group" reported the lowest rate of receipt of recruiting literature (32%), compared to the 18- to 19-year olds (73%), and the 20- to 21-year olds (76%). See Figure V-6 for results. This data suggests that the prime 16- to 17-year-old youth segment (in terms of enlistment potential) is *not* being exposed to recruiting literature at present.

Delaying exposure until youths are 18 years of age or older would appear to mitigate against providing information about military service to youth at an age when they are more favorably disposed toward enlistment.

A significant difference in rates of reported receipt of recruiting literature was found by race. Results appear in Figure V-7.

**Receipt of Mailed Recruiting Literature, by Age
(November 1972 Data)**




Figure V-6

**Receipt of Mailed Recruiting Literature, by Race
(November 1972 Data)**




Figure V-7

A much higher percentage of whites (61%) reported receipt of recruiting literature than did non-whites (37%). This finding suggests that youth in lower socioeconomic status may not be actively sought in mass media advertising campaigns of the military service. The data on reported receipt of recruiting literature as a function of family income support this tentative hypothesis. Results appear in Figure V-8.

**Receipt of Mailed Recruiting Literature, by Annual Family Income
(November 1972 Data)**




Figure V-8

Receipt of recruitment literature increased by family income level. While 44% of the lower income group (under \$8000 per annum) reported receipt of recruiting literature, 69% of the higher income group (\$20,000 or more per annum) received recruiting literature. This pattern of increased exposure with income is in sharp contrast to the general findings on Service preference declining as a function of income. Only for the Coast Guard is higher preference given by youths from upper-income families as opposed to lower-income or middle-income families. Army preference, in particular, tends to *decline* among youth from families with over \$14,000 income per annum.¹

These data suggest that an evaluation of the penetration of mailed recruiting literature is desirable, to ensure that prime prospects for enlistment are being contacted, and that resources are not being expended to reach unlikely candidates for enlistment.

¹Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). *Attitudes of Youth Toward Military Service: Results of National Surveys Conducted in May 1971, November 1971, and June 1972*, Manpower Research Report MA 72-2, August 1972, p. 55.

D. RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF RECRUITERS AND MEDIA

In the November 1972 survey, respondents who reported exposure to each medium of recruiting information were also asked whether the information influenced their enlistment decision in any way. The two indices of media effectiveness (exposure, enlistment influence) were tabulated, and a composite index was generated that permits the assessment of relative media effectiveness, controlling for differential rates of exposure. Results on each index of effectiveness were analyzed for the 16- to 17-year-old target group and are shown in Table V-1. The majority of 16- to 17-year olds reported exposure to military recruiting information through media such as television, posters, and magazines and newspapers. Indeed, among the 16- to 17-year-old segment of the youth population, *television* represents the most influential media by virtue of mass exposure (69% exposed to TV, as reported in the November 1972 survey). However, only 20% of those reporting TV exposure regard the information about military opportunities obtained from TV as influential to enlistment.


Table V-1

November 1972 Data

Indices of Media Effectiveness (Base: 16-17 Year Olds)			
Media	Percent Reporting Effects of Exposure	Enlistment Influence	Composite Index Of Media Effectiveness ^a
Recruiting literature, other than by mail	16	20	3.3
Posters	51	12	6.3
Television	69	20	13.6
Radio	35	16	5.5
Magazine/Newspaper	49	21	10.2
Recruiter in person	24	38	9.2
Recruiter by telephone	5	22	1.1

^aPercent exposure \times percent influenced to enlist.

While *TV* enjoys the highest rate of reported exposure, the *recruiter* (in person) obtained the highest mention for influencing the enlistment decision (38%). Although far fewer youths reported exposure to the recruiter in person than to the other major media sources, the recruiter was still judged to be highly effective (see the composite index) by virtue of compensating for lower exposure rates by the provision of information influential in the enlistment decision.



VI. Attitudes Toward Military Service

A negative attitude toward military service was held by 59% of youth in the total November 1972 sample. However, the rate among high school students (only) was 50%, and resistance was less a matter of antiwar attitudes than the perception that military service might interfere with the personal freedom or life style of youth.

Expectations of youth with respect to ever entering military service have declined substantially over the past two years. The decline is most evident among college students, and to a lesser extent, among high school students.

Youth over 18 years of age, and youth in college student or non-student status, showed a decline from June 1972 to November 1972 in their willingness to serve, given appropriate conditions or incentives as they define them. However, there is no apparent decrease in the service potential of the 16- to 17-year-old youth and current high school students.

In both 1972 surveys, 8% of youth reported the expectation of being drafted in the next six months, in spite of the trend toward a zero-draft environment. The rate in the 1971 surveys was 11%.

ATTITUDES TOWARD MILITARY SERVICE

In November 1972, 59% of the total youth sample stated that they would be deterred from enlistment by personal considerations. The same rate had been found in June 1972. But the trend over time was favorable, with the current rates below the high rate of 65% found in May 1971. Results appear in Figure VI-1.

Extent To Which Personal Considerations Deter Enlistment In the Active Force




Figure VI-1

Even more favorable attitudes were reported by high school students, a prime "target group" for recruitment efforts. For high school students, only 50% of the November 1972 sample were deterred from enlistment by personal considerations.

Youth has become less antagonistic toward the "military establishment" over the past two years. Thus, the *reasons* they endorse as exemplifying personal considerations that deter enlistment have tended over time to become matters of differences in life style (youth and the military) or conceptions of personal freedom, as opposed to objections to war or to the military establishment. The major reasons endorsed by *high school students* are depicted in Figure VI-2. Note the increased trend over time in perceived differences in

Major Reasons Deterring Enlistment

(Base: High School Students Replying that Personal Considerations Would Deter Their Enlistment)




Figure VI-2

life style, from 24% mentioned in 1971 to 29% mentioned in November 1972. Thus, it appears that much of the resistance to the military that was associated with Vietnam has dissipated over time. However, it is interesting that many youths still object to the perceived military life style and lack of personal freedom, in spite of efforts by the Services to ameliorate this image. (See Results, Section VIII for other image findings.)

Although the attitudes of youth toward military service have improved since 1971, there has been a progressive decline over time in the percentage of youths who *expect to enter the active military services at any time*. Results for the total youth samples are shown in Figure VI-3.

There are substantial differences over time between youth segments in military service expectations, as a function of educational status. The findings of a decline in military service expectations for high school students (only) over time generally agree with data for the total youth population. However, high school students are much more likely to expect to serve than non-students or college students. For example, among high school students, some 43% in the November 1972 survey expected to enter active service at some time, compared to less than 20% for college students and youths not in school. See Figure VI-4 for results controlling on education. There has been very little change

Expectations for Entering Military Service at Any Time




Figure VI-3

Relationship of Education to Expectations for Entering Military Service At Any Time




Figure VI-4

over time in the military service expectations of non-students. In contrast, the military service expectations of college students have declined substantially since 1971.

Youth in the June and November 1972 surveys were also presented with a common list of real and hypothetical enlistment incentives under an assumed condition requiring service in a combat branch. In this condition, 58% of the total November 1972 sample willingly endorsed one of the incentives as the best incentive to combat arms enlistment. (See Results, Section IV for information on endorsement of the incentives.) The rate for the total June 1972 sample was 61%. (Conversely, 42% in the November 1972 survey said nothing would induce them to enlist in the combat arms; the corresponding rate for June 1972 was 39%.) These results suggest a very slight decrease in enlistment potential over time. See Figure VI-5 for results from the four surveys.

Willingness to Endorse One of a Set of Incentives as the Best Incentive for Enlisting in a Combat Branch




Figure VI-5

Similar findings were noted when youths were asked to state in their own words what would induce them to enlist if they did *not* have to serve in a combat area. In the total November 1972 sample, 61% specified some hypothetical incentives or circumstances (e.g., war or a national emergency) that might induce their enlistment. The corresponding rate for the total June 1972 sample was 67%. The results suggest a potential decline in willingness to serve corresponding to the decrease in enlistment

potential previously noted. See Figure VI-6 for the findings. These data may suggest an eventual decline in enlistment potential. However, to date there has been no decline in the percentage who state that they will enlist for active service as a Regular (see Results, Section I).

**Potential for Enlistment, Given Appropriate Conditions/Incentives,
Assuming No Combat Duty**




Figure VI-6

DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSES

Analyses of enlistment potential under an assumed no-combat condition were performed controlling on age and education. Younger men and high school students reported the highest rates of enlistment potential.

Given appropriate incentives/conditions, youths in the 16- to 17-year group were more favorable toward military service (assuming no combat) than were youths 18 years of age or older. For example, among 16- to 17-year olds, 72% of the November 1972 sample reported some degree of potential enlistment under the assumed no-combat condition. In these data, there was no evidence of a decline in enlistment potential over time for the 16- to 17-year-old age segment. Instead, the observed recent decline in enlistment potential previously noted for the youth population was found to originate in the 18- to 19-year old, and particularly the 20- to 21-year-old, age segments. See Figure VI-7 for results.

Relationship of Age to Enlistment Potential, Given Appropriate Conditions/Incentives, Assuming No Combat Duty




Figure VI-7

Given appropriate incentives/conditions, high school students reported higher rates of non-combat enlistment potential than did non-students or college students. These results were found in each survey. Results appear in Figure VI-8.

Relationship of Education to Enlistment Potential, Given Appropriate Conditions/Incentives, Assuming No Combat Duty




Figure VI-8

Among high school students, 72% of the November 1972 sample reported enlistment potential under an assumed no-combat condition. There was no decline over time in enlistment potential for youth in high school. Instead, the observed declines in enlistment potential were found to be attributable to the college student and particularly the non-student segments of the youth population.

NEAR-TERM DRAFT EXPECTATIONS

Finally, youths were asked to estimate the likelihood of their being drafted into the Armed Services in the next six months. In the November 1972 survey, 8% stated that they expected to be drafted. Results for this survey and the three previous surveys appear in Table VI-1.

The level (8%) of near-term draft expectations appears to be high, considering the publicized announcements of anticipated cessation of the draft made in the Fall of 1972.¹ Perhaps of equal interest is the finding that near-term draft expectations have not decreased appreciably from 1971, when draft calls were still sizable. The findings may imply the existence of a relatively stable number of draft-motivated individuals, even during the time of a zero-draft environment.²

In summary, while a constant 15% of the total youth samples in 1972 reported enlistment potential (see Results, Section I), attitudes of youth toward military service generally improved from 1971 to 1972. However, while draft expectations have remained relatively constant over time (8-11%), there is evidence of a consistent decline over time in expectations of ever entering military service, particularly among the high school and college groups. The percentage of youth who might be induced to enlist for some reason (i.e., no combat) is also declining, as is the percentage willing to select an incentive for combat enlistment. But this decline is *not* reflected among 16- to 17-year olds and high school students. Declining trends in enlistment potential, then, do not include the key "target groups," the youth who will be available for military service in the near future.


¹In both June and November 1972, higher levels of draft expectations were reported by 18- to 19-year olds, youth not in school, and non-whites.

²See Results, Section I for the estimated effects of draft motivation on enlistment as a Regular (negligible), and Section II for the estimated effects of draft motivation on Reserve affiliation (substantial).

Table VI-1

**Expectation of Being Drafted in the
Next Six Months**

<u>Options</u>	<u>Percent</u>			
	<u>May 71</u>	<u>Nov 71</u>	<u>Jun 72</u>	<u>Nov 72</u>
Expect to be drafted	11	11	8	8
Do not expect to be drafted	87	85	90	89
Don't Know	2	4	2	3
Total	100	100	100	100



VII. Service Preference

In November 1972, the Air Force (32%) and the Navy (27%) were nominated as the best overall Services. The Army, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard were selected by 5-12% each, in the same range noted in previous surveys. But among only those *men who expect to enlist for active service as a Regular, assuming no draft*, the Air Force (32%) was the preferred service, followed by the Navy (26%), and the Army (24%).

Among youths who said that they might join the Reserve or National Guard, assuming appropriate incentives, service preference was 23% for the Air Force (National Guard or Reserve), 18% for the Navy Reserve, 15% for Army (National Guard or Reserve), and 6% for the Marine Corps Reserve.

The *image* of the services in the total youth sample does not appear to have changed from May 1971 to November 1972.

SERVICE PREFERENCE

In each survey, the total sample was required to specify the single service that they considered *best overall*. After having been presented with the numerous dimensions for evaluating the various Services, and after considering selected enlistment inducements/deterrents in terms of their association to the Services, each respondent was asked, "Which branch of the Armed Services is best overall?"

In each survey, the *Air Force* and the *Navy* were cited as best overall. Responses for the total samples in each survey are shown in Figure VII-1.

Global Appraisal of the Armed Services
(Base: Total Samples, Excluding "No Difference" Percentages)




Figure VII-1

While the global appraisal of the Armed Services may possess relevance in terms of the future support of various branches of the Armed Services by the electorate, only about 15% of youth presently plan to enter military service (see Results, Sections I and II). It is important to assess the service preference or expectations of only those youths who anticipate entering the military service.

A. REGULAR FORCE

In the November 1972 survey, 15% claimed that they would enlist for active service as a Regular if there were *no draft*. These youths stated that the branch of service they would be *most likely to enter* was the Air Force (32%). The Navy and the Army received endorsement by 26% and 24%, respectively. Branch-of-service preferences for November 1972 are presented in Figure VII-2.

Branch of Service Preference for the Regular Force
(Base: Potential Enlistees Under a No Draft Condition; November 1972 Data)




Figure VII-2

It is useful to examine trends in service preferences over time for the potential enlistee segment of the youth population. Preference for the *Army* increased slightly in the November 1972 survey, compared to lower levels of preference in November 1971 and June 1972 surveys. However, since enlistment potential as measured in these surveys is a phenomenon involving a substantial *time lag*, the reader should not infer an immediate or near-term improvement in Army recruitment, based upon these data on service preference. In general, the majority of youths who express a potential for enlistment plan to enter the service one year or more after the date of the survey (see Appendix D, Table D-1 for details). Hence, service preferences should be interpreted with caution.¹ Army results are given in Figure VII-3.²

¹ It is also a fact that DoD/Armed Service recruitment policies preclude the entrance of 16- to 17-year olds into the Services for six months to a year or more beyond the November 1972 date of survey administration.

² The graphic depiction of trends in Service preference may exaggerate the generally modest changes noted on this measure.

Trends in Preference for the Army

(Base: Potential Enlistees Under an Assumed No Draft Condition)




Figure VII-3

Preference for the *Navy* declined somewhat in November 1972 (26%) compared to a peak of 30% in June 1972. Results for the *Navy* appear in Figure VII-4.

Trends in Preference for the Navy

(Base: Potential Enlistees Under an Assumed No Draft Condition)




Figure VII-4

Preference for the *Air Force* reached the highest level (32%) noted for any Service in November 1972. There appears to be a positive trend in preference for the *Air Force* from November 1971 to November 1972. Figure VII-5 presents results for the *Air Force*.

Trends in Preference for the Air Force

(Base: Potential Enlistees Under an Assumed No Draft Condition)




Figure VII-5

Preference for the *Marine Corps* in the November 1972 survey (13%) was essentially equivalent to preference in November 1971 (12%). Results for the four surveys suggest that preference for the *Marine Corps* may be somewhat seasonal, with higher preference in the Fall and slightly lower preference in the Spring. But, in general, *Marine Corps* preference is far more stable over time than preference for the other major Services. Results for the *Marine Corps* appear in Figure VII-6.

B. RESERVE/NATIONAL GUARD

A majority of respondents in each survey expressed a positive attitude toward Reserve/National Guard affiliation under one of several incentive conditions. These respondents (only) were then asked their service preference. Results for the November 1972 survey appear in Table VII-1. In November 1972, the combined National Guard/Reserve totals by service were *Air Force* (23%), *Navy* (18%), and *Army* (15%). The *Marine Corps*

and Coast Guard each received about 7% preference. Eleven percent gave the “no preference” response.

Trends in Preference for the Marine Corps
 (Base: Potential Enlistees Under an Assumed No Draft Condition)




Figure VII-6

Table VII-1 November 1972 Data

Branch-of-Service Preference	
Branch	Percent Preferring Branch ^a
Army National Guard	7
Army Reserve	8
Navy Reserve	18
Air Force National Guard	8
Air Force Reserve	15
Marine Corps Reserve	6
Coast Guard Reserve	7
No preference	11
No answer	21
Total	101

^aBased upon 90% of the sample.

Differences in Reserve/National Guard potential by service were analyzed over the period of the four surveys. Trends in preference for the *Army Reserve* and *National Guard* appear in Figure VII-7. Preference for the *Army Reserve* was about as high in November 1972 as it had been at its previous peak in May 1971; there was a slight decline in November 1971 and June 1972.

Trends in Preference for the Army Reserve and National Guard
(Base: Potential Enlistees Under an Assumed No Draft Condition)




Figure VII-7

Preference for the *Navy Reserve* in November 1972 was at the same level observed in May 1971 (18%). A slight decline in preference for the *Navy Reserve* had been found in November 1971 and June 1972. Results appear in Figure VII-8.

Preference for the *Air Force Reserve* and *Air Force National Guard* appear to be seasonal over the four surveys. November 1972 results were essentially equivalent to those in November 1971, while equal (but lower) rates of preference were noted in May 1971 and June 1972. See Figure VII-9 for results.

Preference for the *Marine Corps Reserve* was quite consistent over time, at 4% to 6%. Preference for the *Marine Corps Reserve* may have a seasonal component, but seasonal variations for the *Marine Corps* are far less pronounced than for the *Air Force*. *Marine Corps* results appear in Figure VII-10.

Trends in Preference for the Navy Reserve
 (Base: Potential Enlistees Under an Assumed No Draft Condition)




Figure VII-8

Trends in Preference for the Air Force Reserve and National Guard
 (Base: Potential Enlistees Under an Assumed No Draft Condition)




Figure VII-9

Trends in Preference for the Marine Corps Reserve
(Base: Potential Enlistees Under an Assumed No Draft Condition)




Figure VII-10

C. SERVICE IMAGE

Trends in Service Image are shown in Appendix E, Figures E-1 through E-9. Each youth sample was asked to evaluate the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard in terms of which was best described by each of several statements ("image"). The statements, and the appropriate Figure presenting the results, follow:

- Best pay (Figure E-1)
- Best living conditions for families of servicemen (Figure E-2)
- Best chance to get ahead in a career (Figure E-3)
- Best chance to learn new and useful skills (Figure E-4)
- Most opportunity for travel in foreign countries (Figure E-5)
- Most exciting life (Figure E-6)
- Best chance to prove oneself a man (Figure E-7)
- Most attractive uniform (Figure E-8)
- Best chance to use one's skills and abilities (Figure E-9)

In each survey, the *Air Force* was cited as offering the best pay, best family living conditions, best chance to get ahead in a career, best chance to use one's skills and abilities, and best chance to learn new and useful skills.

The *Navy* was cited as offering the most opportunity for foreign travel and the most exciting life.

The *Marine Corps* was cited as offering the best chance to prove oneself a man and the most attractive uniform.

The *Army* was not cited as "best described" by any of these positive statements. In the November 1972 survey, the highest rate of Army citation occurred for the statements *best chance to learn new and useful skills* (17%), and *best chance to use one's skills or abilities* (16%). But in each case, both the Air Force and the Navy received equivalent or higher endorsement than the Army.

There do not appear to have been substantial changes in the image of the various services between May 1971 and November 1972.

VIII. Career Objectives

In November 1972, the most important occupational goals for youth were *pay* (19%) and *secure/steady employment* (20%). These results agree with the findings of the previous surveys. More non-whites cited pay as an important goal than did whites. While pay was cited as equally important in a current job and in a job five years from now, youth gave greater importance five years from now to work that offers security and good retirement benefits.

The military service was perceived as providing secure or steady work more than civilian life by 42% of youth in November 1972. Over the past two years, a slight increase was noted in the percentage of youth who cited the military service as offering a better opportunity to make a lot of money than a job in civilian life (4% to 8%).

Among *high school students* in November 1972, most (78%) expressed a willingness to receive training after high school. While 44% expect to go to college, another 25% expect to attend a junior college or technical/vocational school.

Most high school youth (75%) expect to earn over \$4000 a year in their first job. The majority (57%) underestimate the first year earnings of a man in military service.

CAREER GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

In November 1972, the two most important life goals of the total youth sample were *having a secure, steady job* (20%), and *making lots of money* (19%). No other goals were ranked first by more than 12% of the youth. Among high school students, slightly higher levels of endorsement of these two goals were found in the November 1972 survey. *Having a secure, steady job* was cited as the most important life goal by 21%, and *making lots of money* was cited by 22%. Comparable rates were reported by 16- to 17-year olds. See Figure VIII-1 for results from the total samples.

Most Important Life Goals




Figure VIII-1

In the total sample, race differences were found in life goals. Whites were more likely to endorse a *secure, steady job* as an important goal (21%) than were non-whites (13%). Conversely, non-whites were more likely to cite *making lots of money* as an important life goal (27%) than were whites (17%).

There has been a high degree of stability in the life goals of young men in the period from May 1971 to November 1972. The largest relative changes have occurred in the

proportion who most often mentioned “doing challenging work” (an increase from 7% in May 1971 to 11% in November 1972), and a decline in the proportion who mentioned “helping other people,” which fell from 11% in June 1972 to 8% in November 1972.¹ Results from the four surveys appear in Figure VIII-2.

Trends in Endorsement of Most Important Life Aims




Figure VIII-2

A substantial percentage of youth perceive the military services as a better place than civilian life for achieving selected life goals. In November 1972, 42% of the total youth sample felt that *having a secure, steady job* was a goal more easily attainable in military service than in civilian life. Indeed, in each survey, the single most preferred goal, *having a secure, steady job*, was perceived as attainable in the military service by a high percentage of youth. (However, far fewer youths view military service as offering the opportunity of satisfying the other important goal, *making lots of money*. In November 1972, only 8% thought the military offered a better opportunity to accommodate this goal than civilian

¹Recent data suggest that comparatively few 1973 high school seniors (9.8%) want to devote their lives to trying to solve social problems, whereas 30% expressed this goal in 1969. Most 1973 seniors (80%) equate money with success, consider it important and have specific ideas about how they want to earn it—a striking change from past years when 42% of seniors had only vague career plans. Source: George Mihaly, President of Gilbert Youth Research Co., in reference to a survey of 684 high school seniors, *Time*, June 18, 1973, pp. 68-69.

life.) Moreover, over the period of the four surveys, there has been an increase in favorable attitudes toward the attainment of many life goals in the military service. For example, there has been a consistent increase in the proportion who thought the military service presented a better potential for making lots of money. Although only 8% identified the military as a better place to achieve this goal in November 1972, this was double the 4% who thought the military was better in May and November of 1971. Results appear in Table VIII-1.

Table VIII-1

Career Goals	Percent Expecting Better Achievement in Military			
	May 71	Nov 71	Jun 72	Nov 72
	Having a secure, steady job ^a	35	42	46
Making lots of money ^a	4	4	6	8
Working for a better society	13	11	15	16
Learning as much as I can	17	19	23	23
Being able to do what I want in a job	4	4	5	7
Helping other people	18	22	26	25
Doing challenging work	22	25	30	28
Adventure/Excitement	39	42	44	42
Recognition/Status	37	35	37	38
Raising my own social level	10	10	12	12

^aMost important life aims of youth.

GOAL EXPECTATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

In November 1972, work providing *good income* (pay) was regarded as important at present by 21% of the total youth sample. Further, a well-paying job was accorded essentially equivalent importance now and *five years from now* (19%). In contrast, work offering *security and good retirement benefits* was judged to be far less important now (8%) compared to five years hence (27%). See Table VIII-2.

For high school students (only), similar results were noted in the November 1972 survey. Work offering security and good retirement benefits was endorsed as important now by 7%, and as important five years hence by 26%. Work offering good income (pay) was endorsed by 22% as important both now and five years from now. The finding of long-term

Most Interesting Work: Now and Five Years Hence

Type of Work	Percent Interested		Difference
	Now	In 5 Years	
Work that offers me security and good retirement benefits ^a	8	27	+19
Work that gives me a chance to be my own boss	9	15	+ 6
Work that takes care of all my needs	17	15	- 2
Work that assures me a good income (pay) ^a	21	19	- 2
Work that allows me freedom of movement from place to place	13	6	- 7
Work that offers adventure/excitement	13	6	- 7
Work that allows me to be outdoors	13	5	- 8
Some other type of work	2	3	+ 1
Don't Know	4	4	

^aMost important life aims of youth.

importance of secure employment as a life goal of youth is noteworthy, since secure, steady employment is not only judged important by youth, but also is perceived as attainable in the military service. While these themes may lack immediate relevance to a potential enlistee, the extent of implicit support is interesting.

The anticipated decline over time in interest in work offering adventure and excitement is noteworthy, since these are job characteristics viewed as attainable in the military service. Thus, the *career motivations* of recruitment appeals emphasizing these themes would seem limited, although such themes might possess immediate relevance to a potential enlistee.

EDUCATIONAL EXPECTATIONS OF HIGH SCHOOL YOUTH

Over 78% of current high school students in November 1972 claimed that they would be willing to take some type of training beyond high school. (This rate of negative response was 9%, while about 14% said that they did not know.)

The eventual educational expectations of high school youth were analyzed. In November 1972, a high percentage (44%) of current high school students reported that they intended to earn a college degree or an advanced (graduate) degree. (See Table VIII-3).

**Educational Expectations
(Base: High School Students)**

<u>Ultimate Educational Expectation</u>	<u>Percent</u>	
Do not expect to finish High School	2	}
High School diploma (only)	28	
		30
Technical or Vocational School	16	}
Junior College (Associate Degree)	9	
		25
College Degree	28	}
Beyond College (Graduate or Professional Degree)	16	
		44
Total	99	

An additional 25% expressed the intention of attending either a junior college or a technical/vocational school. The latter may constitute promising bases for future recruitment activities. Approximately 30% of the high school students have no post-high school educational expectations, and would presumably be current candidates for military service.

Most high school students expect to pay for their post-high school education through job earnings (46%) or part time work (14%). An additional 23% expected parents, family, or relatives to pay their educational costs. A substantial percentage endorsed scholarships/grants (11%), loans (5%), and savings (5%) as means of payment. Expected payment from military sources were cited as follows: G.I. Bill (2%), ROTC (1%), and training obtained in the Armed Forces (2%). (Multiple responses were permitted, hence the sum of these percentages exceed 100%.)

In summary, the November 1972 findings suggest that youth favor education and training, and most youth anticipate education/training beyond high school as an immediate objective.

EARNING EXPECTATIONS OF HIGH SCHOOL YOUTH

In the November 1972 survey, 75% of the high school students reported that they expected to earn over \$4,000 per annum in their first civilian job. Over 41% reported an initial earnings expectation in excess of \$7,500 per annum. In contrast, only 15% expected to earn \$3,500 or less in their first job. Some 9% expected to earn between \$3,501 and \$4,000 per annum, which is the current pay range for an E1. (See Table VIII-4.)

**Expected Annual Earnings for First Civilian Job
(Base: High School Students)**

<u>Expected Yearly Earnings</u>	<u>Percent</u>	
\$2,000 or less	2	}
\$2,001 - \$2,500	4	
\$2,501 - \$3,000	5	
\$3,001 - \$3,500	4	
\$3,501 - \$4,000	9	}
\$4,001 - \$4,500	4	
\$4,501 - \$5,000	10	
\$5,001 - \$7,500	20	
\$7,501 or more	41	
Don't Know	1	
Total	100	

It is interesting to contrast the expected first-year earnings of high school youth with their concept of the take-home pay earned by men in their first year of military service (assumed to be E1 for a conservative comparison).

When asked how much money a man earns in his first year of military service, high school students tended to massively *underestimate* military take-home pay. Only 12% cited the correct range of \$3,501 to \$4,000 a year. (The correct response for first-year military pay is \$3,684, \$307 per month for 12 months, for the rank E1.) In contrast, 57% of high school students cited an annual income of \$3,500 or less, while only 28% cited income of over \$4,000 (see Table VIII-5).

There is an obvious requirement to advertise the current military pay scale to target groups of civilian youth, since pay is an important factor in the life goals of youth, and the current estimates of military pay provided by youth are both inaccurate and far below the first-year earnings expectations of high school youth.

**Expected Annual Earnings for First Year Military Service
(Base: High School Students)**

<u>Expected Yearly Earnings</u>	<u>Percent</u>	
\$2,000 or less	15	}
\$2,001 - \$2,500	14	
\$2,501 - \$3,000	15	
\$3,001 - \$3,500	13	
\$3,501 - \$4,000 ^a	12	
\$4,001 - \$4,500	5	}
\$4,501 - \$5,000	8	
\$5,001 - \$7,500	8	
\$7,500 or more	7	
Don't Know	2	
Total	99	

^aCorrect response for an E1

DISCUSSION

A major concern in preparation of this report was the near-term feasibility of the all-volunteer force. Survey results presented in this report indicate no reason for undue concern with respect to the continued enlistment of sufficient quantities of young men into the active service to accommodate accession requirements for the Regular Force. In particular, consistent levels of enlistment potential for the Regular Force have been found in two 1972 surveys, together with reasonably consistent findings on the temporal aspects of enlistment intentions among youth. If present projections of enlistment potential were translated into numbers, as many as 400,000 male youth would enlist in the 12-month period of calendar year 1973, compared to a requirement of approximately 356,000.

In terms of the quality of anticipated accessions, some caveats apply. First, the data suggest that enlistment potential for college men is declining over time, and that the "target group" for recruitment is increasingly becoming the high school student—and the younger segment of the youth sample. If recruitment and enlistment corresponded to enlistment potential in a direct manner, the lower ranks of the military service would become increasingly youthful, and would include high school students in a higher proportion to college men than was the case during the period of the draft. Hence, a less skilled, less mature accession may characterize the future enlistee.

Second, the data suggest that non-white enlistment potential exceeds the enlistment potential of whites. If youth were recruited and enlisted in accordance with their enlistment potential, the proportion of non-whites among initial accessions might achieve 21%, a substantial increase over the 17.3% attained in FY73. Further, the use of bonus options as enlistment incentives would appear to accentuate this trend, as well as attracting below-average high school students (where aptitude is inferred from reported grades in school). Indeed, these data suggest that caution be employed in use of bonus options, just as previous research has cautioned against unilateral reliance upon financial incentives (Johnston and Bachman, 1972).¹ It appears unlikely that financial incentives *per se* will "buy" quality (or too much quality, as questioned by Binkin and Johnston, 1973).²

¹J. Johnston and J. Bachman, *Youth in Transition, Volume V: Young Men and Military Service*, Institute for Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1972, p. 186.

²M. Binkin and J.D. Johnston, "All-Volunteer Armed Forces: Progress, Problems and Prospects," a report prepared for the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Brookings Institution, May 1973, p. 2-3.

The proposal by Johnston and Bachman to employ a mixture of incentives involving a fully paid college education on the one hand and higher pay incentives on the other hand still appears promising. The concept of a fully paid college education for four years of service appeals to the prime 16- to 17-year-old group, to current college students, and to high school students reporting above average grades in school. In contrast, the bonus incentive might be employed in a selective, judicious manner to obtain lengthened terms of obligated service from promising applicants for enlistment—for example, for the combat arms.

The present research has *not* investigated enlistment potential among other population segments such as women and older men. However, generalizing from the present research suggests that enlistment potential declines appreciably with age, hence there may be limited value in attempts to recruit men in older age groups. In contrast, the concept of increased female utilization in the military service deserves additional study. Research on ROTC potential suggests that large numbers of women may be interested in a career as officers in the military service (Fisher and Harford, 1973).¹ Whether equivalent interest exists in service in the enlisted ranks is not yet known. A survey of enlistment potential among young women should be conducted, corresponding to the present periodic surveys of enlistment potential among male, civilian youth.

The data from this research are not optimistic with respect to accommodation of the accession requirements of the Reserve Forces. Evidence was found of competition for the same men between the Regular and Reserve Forces. To the extent that recruitment activities are successful in meeting the requirements of the Regular Force, there may be a shortfall in accommodating requirements for the Reserve. Hence, the need exists to increase the supply of potential initial accessions to the Reserve Forces.

Data from 1972 surveys suggest that *bonus options* possess extremely promising application as incentives to Reserve affiliation. The appeal of the \$1,100 or \$2,200 bonus options is substantial, and their use may increase the size of the applicant pool. Bonus options could also be used to modify the low non-white proportion found among Reserve accessions. However, other anticipated changes in the demographic composition of the Reserves from older, draft-motivated, highly educated men to younger, less-well-educated true volunteers would also be exacerbated by employment of bonus options as incentives. A promising alternative approach would be to emphasize the provision of educational benefits and the opportunity to learn a trade or skill useful in civilian life.

¹ A.H. Fisher and M.A. Harford. *Enrollment and Career Potential for College-Based Military Officer Training Programs*, Office of the Secretary of Defense (M&RA), Manpower Research Report No. MA 72-3, November 1972, p. 19.

Appendix A

TRENDS IN ENLISTMENT POTENTIAL FOR THE REGULAR FORCE

Likelihood of Enlistment for Active Service as a Regular With No Draft, by Age




Figure A-1

Likelihood of Enlistment for Active Service as a Regular With No Draft, by Education Status




Figure A-2

Appendix B

TRENDS IN POTENTIAL FOR JOINING THE RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD

Probability of Joining the Reserve or National Guard With No Draft, by Age




Figure B-1

Probability of Joining the Reserve or National Guard With No Draft, by Education Status




Figure B-2

Appendix C

DETAILS OF INCENTIVES FOR REGULAR AND RESERVE AFFILIATION

Table C-1

Verbatim Definitions of Enlistment Incentives

<u>Short Title^a</u>	<u>Verbatim Definition of Incentive Provided to Respondent</u>
Would provide training in a civilian skill.	The military offers to help you get started in a civilian job after you finish active duty and, if necessary, would provide training in a civilian skill.
Government pays up to \$200 a month for up to 4 years of college.	The government agrees to pay \$200 a month or more for up to 4 years of college and/or technical/vocational school, at the school of your choice, in return for 2 or more years of active duty. The college or training would come after military service.
Government pays for up to 2 years of technical/vocational school.	The government agrees to pay for up to 2 years of technical/vocational school, including a living allowance, for you to learn a skill required in military service. After completing school you enter the service at an advanced pay grade and use the skill you learned.
Government pays for up to 4 years of college in return for 4 years of service.	The government agrees to pay for up to 4 years of college, including living expenses, at the school of your choice in return for 4 years of active duty. The college could come either before or after the military service.
Government pays for up to 2 years of technical/vocational school in return for 4 years of service.	The government agrees to pay for up to 2 years of technical/vocational school, including living expenses, at the school of your choice, in return for 4 years of active duty. The training could come either before or after the military service.
Guaranteed assignment in military specialty.	<i>Guaranteed</i> assignments, including necessary training, in the military specialty of your choice (for example: draftsman, electronic technician, bulldozer driver, paratrooper, auto or aircraft mechanic, truck driver, etc.).
Military pay comparable to civilian income.	Military pay that's comparable to the income you would expect to be earning as a civilian.
A large bonus for enlisting.	A large bonus for enlisting (for example: \$1,000).
Bonus up to \$3000 for enlisting for 3 years.	A bonus of up to \$3,000 for enlisting for at least 3 years in some skill that is in short supply.

(Continued)

Table C-1 (Cont.)

Verbatim Definitions of Enlistment Incentives

<u>Short Title^a</u>	<u>Verbatim Definition of Incentive Provided to Respondent</u>
Shorter enlistment period.	A shorter enlistment period (for example: 1 year less than now offered in the service of your choice).
Chance to enroll in officer training after enlistment.	A chance to enroll in an officer training program after enlistment, even if you don't have a college degree.
Able to change job assignment.	Assurance that you will be able to change your assignment after some period of time if you don't like the work.
During peacetime, guarantee of geographic assignment of choice.	During peacetime, a guarantee of assignment to a geographic area of your choice in the U.S. or abroad.
Right to live off-base.	Right to live off-base if you prefer.
Better living conditions for single servicemen.	Better living conditions for single Servicemen.
None of these incentives.	None of these.

^aAs used in the text.

Table C-2

Trends in Responses to Structured Enlistment Incentives

	Percent Selecting Enlistment Incentive														
	Enlistment Incentives					ONE Most Likely Incentive					ONE Most Likely to Induce Service in Combat Branch				
	Under Present Status		Nov 71		Jun 72		Nov 72		May 71		Nov 71		Jun 72		Nov 72
● The military offers to help you get started in a civilian job after you finish active duty and, if necessary, would provide training in a civilian skill.	27	29	33	31	10	9	9	8	5	3	4	3			
● The government agrees to pay \$200 a month or more for up to 4 years of college and/or technical/vocational school at the school of your choice, in return for 2 or more years of active duty. The college or training would come after military service.	a	a	33	34	a	a	12	13	a	a	5	4			
● The government agrees to pay for up to 2 years of technical/vocational school including a living allowance, for you to learn a skill required in military service. After completing school you enter the service at an advanced pay grade and use the skill you have learned.	a	a	21	20	a	a	3	5	a	a	2	3			
● The government agrees to pay for up to 4 years of college including living expenses at the school of your choice in return for 4 years of active duty. The college could come either before or after the military service.	42	44	34	31	24	25	16	14	7	8	6	5			

(Continued)

Table C-2 (Cont.)

Trends in Responses to Structured Enlistment Incentives

	Percent Selecting Enlistment Incentive											
	Under Present Status				ONE Most Likely Incentive				ONE Most Likely to Induce Service in Combat Branch			
	May 71	Nov 71	Jun 72	Nov 72	May 71	Nov 71	Jun 72	Nov 72	May 71	Nov 71	Jun 72	Nov 72
Enlistment Incentives												
● The government agrees to pay for up to 2 years of technical/vocational school including living expenses at the school of your choice in return for 4 years of active duty. The training could come either before or after the military service.	19	20	13	14	6	6	3	3	1	3	2	2
● Guaranteed assignments, including necessary training in the military speciality of your choice (e.g., draftsman, electronic technician, bulldozer driver, paratrooper, truck driver, etc.)	26	28	30	27	8	10	9	7	6	10	9	6
● Military pay that's comparable to the income you would expect to be earning as a civilian	25	27	27	30	7	7	5	8	5	6	4	5
● A large bonus for enlisting (e.g., \$1000)	20	24	20	23	4	4	3	3	5	6	5	4
● A bonus of up to \$3000 for enlisting for at least 3 years in some skill that is in short supply.	a	a	22	26	a	a	3	6	a	a	6	7
● A shorter enlistment period (e.g., 1 year less than now offered in the service of your choice).	30	32	26	25	7	8	5	4	11	11	7	7

(Continued)

Table C-2 (Cont.)

Trends in Responses to Structured Enlistment Incentives

	Percent Selecting Enlistment Incentive															
	Enlistment Incentives			Under Present Status			ONE Most Likely Incentive			ONE Most Likely to Induce Service in Combat Branch						
	May 71	Nov 71	Jun 72	Nov 72	May 71	Nov 71	Jun 72	Nov 72	May 71	Nov 71	Jun 72	Nov 72	May 71	Nov 71	Jun 72	Nov 72
● A chance to enroll in an officer training program after enlistment even if you don't have a college degree	12	16	13	15	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
● Assurance that you will be able to change your assignment after some period of time if you don't like the work	22	26	24	23	2	3	3	2	7	8	5	5	5	5	5	5
● During peacetime, a guarantee of assignment to a geographic area of your choice in the U.S. or abroad.	28	32	31	29	6	7	6	5	5	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
● Right to live off-base if you prefer.	22	26	30	27	2	2	3	3	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	2
● Better living conditions for single Servicemen.	14	18	20	19	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
● None	23	15	17	17	23	16	18	18	45	37	39	42	45	37	39	42

^aThis incentive was not evaluated in the May 1971 and November 1971 surveys.

✓ Table C-3

**Trends in Endorsement of Reasons for Enlistment
(Base: Expect to Enter Service)**

<u>Reasons That Exert a Strong Influence On Enlistment</u>	<u>Percent Indicating Strong Influence</u>			
	<u>May 71^a</u>	<u>Nov 71^b</u>	<u>Jun 72^c</u>	<u>Nov 72^d</u>
I want my choice of branch of Service	45	46	48	54
For travel, excitement and new experiences	38	41	46	52
To fulfill my military obligation at a time of my choice	32	31	32	30
To learn a trade or skill that would be valuable in civilian life	32	37	49	50
To serve my country	33	28	34	37
I want an opportunity for advanced education and training	30	32	42	39
To become more mature and self-reliant	19	23	26	29
I want to qualify for the G.I. Bill	15	17	19	24
The over-all benefits: pay, room and board, medical care, & training	9	17	24	25
To avoid the draft	19	20	18	19
Career opportunities in the military look better than in civilian life	15	16	22	26
I want to leave some personal problems behind me	8	6	8	8
To get a bonus for enlisting	NA	NA	NA	23

^aBased on 40% of this sample.

^bBased on 37% of this sample.

^cBased on 32% of this sample.

^dBased on 28% of this sample.

Table C-4

Trends in First Preference for Incentives to Reserve Affiliation

Incentives	Percent Choosing Incentives			
	May 71	Nov 71	Jun 72	Nov 72
● A lump sum enlistment bonus of \$600	7	11	8	11
● Pay at approximately 50% increase in lower grades from what it is now	8	10	10	11
● Full-time insurance coverage (\$15,000 at \$3 cost per month)	5	6	9	10
● Quarters allowance for dependents during initial active duty training (\$60 per month for one dependent)	3	3	4	4
● Educational benefits to a maximum value of \$2,000 for six years service, payable in segments of \$500 after each year of satisfactory performance in a unit and successful completion of each segment of schooling	17	24	22	18
● Cancellation of up to 50% of National Defense Education Act student loan	2	2	4	2
● Shorten period of initial active duty training (from 4-6 months to 2-4 months, as an example)	11	13	11	9
● Modification of the six-year service enlistment option to permit transfer from a unit to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) after 3 years. (The IRR has no weekend training and only about 5% of all members are selected each year for annual active training.)	5	5	6	4
● NONE would cause me to enlist	38	26	26	31
● No answer	4	<1	--	--
Total	100	100	100	100

Appendix D

TEMPORAL CONSIDERATIONS IN ENLISTMENT INTENT

Table D-1

Schedule of Enlistment	Timing of Enlistment							
	May 71		Nov 71		Jun 72		Nov 72	
	Percent ^a	Percent of Total	Percent ^a	Percent of Total	Percent ^a	Percent of Total	Percent ^a	Percent of Total
Within the next 6 months	14	2	14	2	15	2	15	2
6 months to a year	14	2	23	3	14	2	26	4
At some future time or when eligible	72	9	63	10	71	10	59	9
Total	100	13	100	15	100	14	100	15

^aBASE: Those who would definitely or probably enlist *under present conditions*.

Appendix E
TRENDS IN SERVICE IMAGE ✓

Branch of Service Offering Best Pay




Figure E-1

**Branch of Service Offering Best Living
Conditions for Families of Servicemen**




Figure E-2

Branch of Service Offering Best Chance to Get Ahead in a Career




Figure E-3

Branch of Service Offering Best Chance to Learn New and Useful Skills




Figure E-4

Branch of Service Offering Most Opportunity for Travel in Foreign Countries




Figure E-5

Branch of Service Offering Most Exciting Life




Figure E-6

Branch of Service Offering Best Chance to Prove Oneself a Man




Figure E-7

Branch of Service Offering Most Attractive Uniform




Figure E-8

Branch of Service Offering Best Chance to Use One's Skills and Abilities




Figure E-9

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