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THE INTEGRATED PROGRAM FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY. THE CASE FOR COMPULSORY  
UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING. THE WORK-  
ABLE PREREQUISITES FOR VOLUNTARY SERVICE  
ON A SELECTIVE BASIS

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THE INTEGRATED PROGRAM FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

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THE CASE FOR COMPULSORY UNIVERSAL  
MILITARY TRAINING -  
THE WORKABLE PREREQUISITES FOR  
VOLUNTARY SERVICE ON A SELECTIVE BASIS

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## SUMMARY

A feasibility study and comprehensive analysis of the All-Volunteer Armed Force concept as an entity in itself, and as related to Selective Service, and Compulsory Universal Military Training. It concludes that as an entity in itself the All-Volunteer Armed Force is unworkable as the exclusive military manpower procurement policy for the United States under present and future world conditions; and that the Gates Commission recommendation to relegate the Selective Service System and its organization to standby status while simultaneously proceeding poste haste with the All-Volunteer Armed Force would seriously endanger the national security. Acknowledging that there are certain advantages in the volunteer concept, the essay further recommends an Integrated Program For National Security combining Compulsory Universal Military Training with the All-Volunteer Armed Force concept, all functioning under the administrative control of and coordinated by the Selective Service System and its vastly decentralized organization.

## INTRODUCTION

"Almost since the inception of warfare, the problem of how to obtain manpower for the fighting forces has been a real bone of contention."<sup>1</sup> Impressment, lotteries, universal military training, compulsory service on a selective and universal basis, hiring of substitutes or mercenaries, as well as all-volunteer systems have been tried in a variety of forms and under varying conditions, but none has produced a military manpower procurement system for the United States as yet, which meets both the long and short term security needs of the nation and simultaneously satisfies the natural desires and needs of the individuals participating in the system.<sup>2</sup>

Since this subject has once again come under the scrutiny as a result of the recently published report of the Presidents' Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (the Commission is popularly known as the Gates Commission and the report as the Gates Report), a thorough review of the various military manpower procurement possibilities at this time is most appropriate and necessary. It is the intent of this essay to determine in as practical a way as possible the feasibility of volunteer forces prior to any implementation of an All-Volunteer Armed Force for the United States.

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<sup>1</sup>Protecting The Free Society, An Association of the United States White Paper on Proposals for an All-Volunteer Armed-Force, (Washington: 1970) p.1.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

"In too many instances has this nation marched up and down the hill of preparedness, arming and disarming as the winds of international intercourse blew hot and cold."<sup>3</sup> "We are either at war or at peace, either spending much attention and money on war or generally forgetting its existence."<sup>4</sup> In a speech before the Industrial College of the Armed Forces on June 27, 1948, Mr. Bernard Baruch expressed our perpetual dilemma very well when he said: "The American people are currently in the throes of tormenting, frustrating readjustment. Both as a nation and as individuals we grew up accustomed to regard war and peace as distinctly separate, like day and night. Today we live in an around the clock emergency, a twilight of neither war nor peace. \* \* \* \* In the past defense appropriations fluctuated wildly in a feast or famine cycle. For the cold war we must scale defense expenditures so they may be sustained indefinitely, paced to the needs of changing world developments. Our military strength cannot be permitted to lapse to where it invites aggression."<sup>5</sup> That which was said approximately twenty years ago, applies

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<sup>3</sup>The Price of Liberty, Official Condensation of the First Report to the Congress by the National Security Training Commission (Washington: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, Dec. 1951)p.2.

<sup>4</sup>G.A. Lincoln, et al., Economics of National Security (New York: Prentice Hall, Inc 1950) p.8.

<sup>5</sup>Baruch, New York Sun, June 28, 1948, pp.1-2.

more so today than then. It is the same cold war that threatened our national security twenty years ago, continues today, and will threaten us during the next twenty year period.

Let us make certain therefore, that our military manpower procurement policies are geared to this long term need and do not endanger the nations security especially over the next two decades.<sup>6</sup>

Our procurement of military manpower policies and procedures must satisfy certain basic criteria in order to be both valid and feasible. These basic criteria are as follows:

1. Preservation of our National Security.

What effect does the system or concept have upon our national security? Will it assure the Armed Forces the men that will be needed under any and all circumstances to meet its commitments and to protect the nations security?

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<sup>6</sup> The Report Of The Presidents Commission On An All-Volunteer Armed Force, February, 1970 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1970)p.5 (Hereinafter referred to as "The Gates Report").

2. Equity To Individual Participants.

What effect does the system or concept have upon all the individuals participating in the system: Is it fair and equitable to the many or does it overburden the few?

3. Economic Feasibility.

What effect will the military manpower procurement system or concept have upon the US economy? Is it economically feasible over the long haul?

4. The Military Manpower Mix.

Will the system or concept achieve a heterogenous manpower mixture of the youth of America or will it give us a homogenous mix or uneven distribution of manpower as far as race, ethnic, economic and intellectual background are concerned?

5. The International Implications.

What effect will the system or concept have upon the military manpower procurement policies and procedures of our foreign allies? Will it enhance or act as a deterrent to their policies.



Utilizing these basic criteria as the measuring device, the All-Volunteer Armed Force Concept will be analyzed to determine its suitability, feasibility and validity as a military manpower procurement policy for the United States during the next two or more decades. Certain other military manpower procurement policies, programs, and concepts such as Compulsory Universal Military Training, and the Selective Service System will also be reviewed.

Conclusions will be drawn and recommendations made concerning the adequacy of the All-Volunteer Armed Force as an entity in itself, as well as determining a workable basis for the All-Volunteer Armed Force Concept.

## DEFINITION OF TERMS

There exist certain terms pertinent to a better understanding of the military manpower procurement situation. However, if these terms remain undefined, or are allowed to carry dual meanings, they will of necessity produce disillusionment rather than discernment, confusion rather than clarification. Although many of these terms have various meanings, the following definitions and distinctions will apply, if only for the sake of clarity and a common footing regarding this essay.

1. The distinction between the terms "Training" and "Service":

- a. Training: The act of educating and developing men for military proficiency with the armed forces conducting such training and the trainee having a reserve obligation but no obligation for service.
- b. Service: The performance of official military duty anywhere within the active armed forces for a predetermined period of time.

2. The distinction between the terms "Selective" and "Universal":

- a. Selective: Military manpower procurement for training or service on the basis of governmental choice with the objective of a most efficient national mobilization.
  - b. Universal: Military manpower procurement for training or service based upon the principle of equality and utilizing all personnel within the training or service program.
3. The distinction between the terms "Voluntary" and "Compulsory":
- a. Voluntary: Military manpower procurement based on the free will and discretion of the individual unrestrained by an external influence or force.
  - b. Compulsory: Military manpower procurement based on governmental order to compel training or service by means of the citizens patriotic duty or legal obligation to his country.
4. The distinction between the terms "Conscription" and "Draft":

- a. Conscription: "A compulsory enrollment, registration, and enlistment of men for military service."<sup>7</sup> i.e., compulsory military service.
- b. Draft: A fair and just drawing of men from among the manpower at large for conscription; a method of induction.<sup>8</sup>

5. The distinction between the various methods of Conscription:

- a. Militia Conscription: The plain and simple obligation to military service of the entire able bodied male population, organized as a militia.<sup>9</sup> i.e., a national mobilization system of compulsory universal military service or universal conscription.
- b. Draft Conscription: The obligation to military service coupled with payment of a bounty for service or with the right to engage a substitute.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>LTC Arthur Vollmer, Background of Selective Service, Military Obligation: The American Tradition, Special Monograph, No. 1, Vol.II, Part 1. (Washington: US Govt.Printing Office,1947)p.14.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p.14.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p.100.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p.1.

c. Selective Service Conscription: A method of conscription without any option to procure substitutes; every able bodied male citizen is liable for military duty; those most useful to the armed forces and less essential to industry and agriculture are sent forth as soldiers, while the others receive industrial/agricultural assignments; all participating in the national defense effort on a selective need basis.<sup>11</sup>

6. The distinction between the terms "Mixed Force" and "All-Volunteer Force";

a. Mixed Force: A military force for training or service made up of both volunteers and selective service conscripts.

b. All-Volunteer Force: A military force for training or service made up of only volunteers.

7. The distinction between the terms "Exempt" and "Deferred":

a. Exempt: Not liable for military service or training.

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p.101.

- b. Deferred: Liable for military service or training but temporarily relieved from such liability because of certain circumstances.

The above definitions of basic terms should simplify the use and understanding of more complicated terms such as compulsory universal military training and/or service, universal military training and/or selective service, voluntary military training and/or compulsory selective service. However, since two of the concepts that we will be dealing with, "Universal Military Training" and "Selective Service" have meant different things to many people at various times, their specific objectives and characteristics for the sake of clarity, will be understood to comprise the following essentials:

1. Universal Military Training:

- a. Objectives:

- (1) Short intensive military training of approximately one year followed by a seven year reserve obligation for all physically qualified male citizens in order to provide a solid foundation for any future emergency, in which case

men would be called from the reserves into extensive military service; or from which individual trainees could volunteer for military service; or from which individual trainees could be conscripted by the Selective Service System for military service.

(2) Continuing manpower preparedness in order to reduce the time necessary to raise and train a citizen armed force.

b. Characteristics:

(1) Training for all men between the ages of 18 to 19 years for a one year period in the National Security Training Corps under the direction of a civilian oriented National Security Training Commission.

(2) No obligation or requirement for service in the armed forces during this period.

(3) Continuing reserve status for a period of seven years thereafter.

(4) A thoroughly trained, highly efficient, and ever-ready citizen reserve.

(5) A resultant small professional armed force procured through voluntary recruitment in peacetime and from the reserve during wartime expansion.

2. Selective Service:

a. Objectives:

(1) Armed Forces of sufficient size serving for a fairly long period of time to man our defense perimeter and to repel aggression until full or partial industrial and military mobilization is achieved.

(2) Service based upon selective criteria which will defer or exempt certain critical specialists essential to the national interest in fields of endeavor other than military.

b. Characteristics:

(1) Military service for a two or more year period.



(2) Universal obligation for service; selection, however, according to various standards promulgated from time to time and based primarily upon national need.

(3) Selective Service is a grass roots military manpower procurement system organized on the basis of centralized control and decentralized operation at the hamlet, village, and town level.

As long as writers such as John Swomley write articles such as "If It's Compulsory, It's Conscription",<sup>12</sup> a basic set of definitions are most essential for evaluation purposes, as well as for clarification and meaningful understanding. It is with this purpose in mind that this section had been written. Let's now turn to the investigation at hand.

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<sup>12</sup>John M. Swomley Jr., If It's Compulsory, It's Conscription (Pamphlet: 1945) p. i.

REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER  
ARMED FORCES CONCEPT

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The basic ingredients of the All-Volunteer Armed Force as recommended by the Gates Commission are as follows:<sup>13</sup>

1. An Armed Force of between two to three million men procured on the basis of voluntary recruitment.
2. To encourage voluntary enlistments, as well as to remove the present inequity in pay especially of men serving their first term in the Armed Forces, increase the military pay budget on a continuing basis from 1.5 to 4.6 billion dollars per year depending on the size of the force and including Reserve Force pay increases.<sup>14</sup>
3. In the event of a national emergency requiring a rapid increase in the number of men under arms, the first recourse would be to the ready reserves including The National Guard. These Reserve Forces also to be recruited on a voluntary basis.
4. Establishment of a standby draft system by June 30, 1971, to be activated only by joint resolution of

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<sup>13</sup>The Gates Report, pp.5-10.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p.8.

Congress upon request of the President. Thus relegating the entire Selective Service System to standby status.<sup>15</sup>

### Preservation of National Security

From a national security standpoint, the relegation of the Selective Service System to standby status, and the assumption that reserve forces can be recruited on a voluntary basis, are primary vulnerabilities and deserve more detailed study.

The Gates Commission, as referred to above, has recommended that the Selective Service System be put on a standby basis not to be reactivated without the consent of Congress after "public discussion."<sup>16</sup> Considering the past history of public debate surrounding Selective Service legislation, and remembering that in the summer of 1941 one Congressional vote made the difference for survival of the system and the nation,<sup>17</sup> this would have to be considered as being a most risky recommendation. Or in the words of the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) in its pamphlet entitled "Protecting the Free Society": "To discard a viable operative Selective

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid, p.119.

<sup>16</sup>The Gates Report, p.120.

<sup>17</sup>G.A. Lincoln, p.32.

Service System without first clearly establishing our ability to maintain adequate military forces without it, would be to accept a risk to our national security that is both unwise and unnecessary."<sup>18</sup>

In fact we do have a rather recent example of the All-Volunteer Armed Force Concept in action. On March 31, 1947, the US allowed its draft laws to lapse and undertook to raise an all-volunteer armed force. For the next twelve months the military services waged one of the most extensive and expensive recruiting campaigns in peacetime history. The Army alone set aside twenty million dollars for recruiting advertising. From July through December, 1947, the Army held to a manpower goal of 180,000 volunteers. Actually sworn in were 142,000 or 38,000 less than were needed. At that point the armed forces had declined from a World War II peak of 12.3 million men to 1.4 million and that was 15% below authorized strength.<sup>19</sup> On March 17, 1948, President Truman ended the volunteer experiment. He asked Congress for Universal Military Training, obligating male youths at age eighteen to serve one year for training purposes only. Congress rejected this proposal, but renewed the selective draft.<sup>20</sup> Hence precedence - at least modern precedence - is not on the side of the All-Volunteer force.

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<sup>18</sup>Protecting The Free Society, p.8.

<sup>19</sup>"When The Draft Stopped-Just Before Korean War", US News and World Report, March 9, 1970, p.43.

<sup>20</sup>ibid.

Now let's see the effect that the All-Volunteer Concept has on the Reserves as related to our national security. The US Reserve Forces have two primary functions: first, to supplement the active duty forces as needed; second, to help maintain domestic peace and assist in time of civil disaster. In fact under the All-Volunteer Force Concept, it is contemplated that increased reliance will be made upon these Reserve Forces which currently number approximately one million officers and men in the paid drill ready reserve category, 1.3 million in the unpaid ready reserve category, and one half million each in the standby and retired reserves, thereby totaling approximately 3.3 million men in the reserve system.<sup>21</sup> It just isn't realistic to expect that the contemplated expanding manpower requirements of the reserve forces could ever be met solely on a volunteer basis.<sup>22</sup> Since as the Gates Report indicates, the size fo the all-volunteer active force would be reduced as related to present strength,<sup>23</sup> additional reliance would have to be made upon the reserve forces at a time and under circumstances that do not permit those forces their necessary manpower procurement

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<sup>21</sup>The Gates Report, Table 9-1, p.99

<sup>22</sup>Protecting The Free Society, p.2

<sup>23</sup>The Gates Report, p.35

powers. Assuming that there will be free competition on a voluntary basis between the civilian economy, the civilian educational institutions, The Armed Forces, and The Reserves for the youth of America, it certainly doesn't take much thought to realize that the reserves will be at the bottom of the heap without some sort of draft motivation. An increased mission for the reserves with a decrease in manpower procurement efficiency is certainly not going to carry the day for the All-Volunteer Armed Force Concept.

When we realize that in too many instances in the past the Congress has reacted to the pressures of public opinion more often to that of good sense; and when we realize that the All-Volunteer Force has already been tried and failed at least in one instance; and when we realize the Reserve Force dilemma, it would be rather foolhardy to relegate the Selective Service System and its organization to standby status. The facts would tend to indicate that this action combined with proceeding "post haste" with the All-Volunteer Force would seriously endanger this nations security.

#### Equity To Individual Participants

As far as the inequities to the participating individual are concerned, I'm afraid it is a two headed coin that we must face. For example, in June 1970, the US Supreme Court

upheld the appeal of a California intellectual who claimed status as a conscientious objector (CO) not on the accepted basis of religious training and belief, but as a result of "reading in the fields of history and sociology."<sup>24</sup> This ruling on draft exemptions for CO's will make this countries system of military recruitment even more discriminatory than ever. As Selective Service Director Curtis Tarr has pointed out, the ruling will be of no use to the uneducated. It will be useful only to a would be CO who has "sharpened his intellect in the matter of religion and philosophy."<sup>25</sup> Selective Service anticipates a flood of CO applications from college graduates who have been busy sharpening their intellects.<sup>26</sup> Not only does this decision make the Selective Service System even more discriminatory, it also helps to relegate the voluntary procurement system to one that further discriminates against the uneducated as well as the lower income groups. What sensible young man wants to spend two or more years of his life getting shot at. This one example of blatant class discrimination not only adversely affects military manpower procurement and corrupts the democratic process, but it points up the fact

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<sup>24</sup> Stewart Alsop, "The American Class System", Newsweek, June 29, 1970, p.88.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p.88.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

that any military procurement policy is going to be somewhat inequitable as far as the rights of the individual are concerned, simply because of the nature of war.

Even though President Nixon cited the Selective Service System as inequitable: "a system of compulsory service that arbitrarily selects some and not others cannot be squared with our whole concept of liberty, justice, and equality under the law \* \* \* \* the inequity stems from one single fact -- that some of our young people are forced to spend two years of their lives in the nations defense while others are not",<sup>27</sup> it does not exonerate or absolve the volunteer system from similar discrimination or inequities. That young men be permitted, in time of national need or emergency, to decide to join the armed forces or whether or not a particular conflict is to their liking is sheer folly. No matter how patriotic a young man may be, the most unpopular war to him, in Revolutionary days or today, is the present one in which his life might be endangered. The decision therefore cannot be all his. Government interference is the price we pay for our liberty under a democratic system which Winston Churchill once described as "The worst form of

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<sup>27</sup>Richard M. Nixon, Radio Speech of Oct. 17, 1968, Reprinted in "Protecting The Free Society", p.1.



government except for the alternatives."<sup>28</sup>

The volunteer armed forces manpower procurement system of 1947/1948 that permitted or caused certain individuals to have to serve in a Korean war for two or more years after already having served in World War II, and then had them serve four to six years in the reserve, while thousands of others did not volunteer, found ways to evade the reactivated draft, got no military training and had no reserve obligation, was also a most inequitable and shamefully discriminating system.<sup>29</sup> An exclusive All-Volunteer Armed Force, as an entity in itself, is as discriminating and inequitable as is the Selective Service System. The voluntary system's only advantage, if it is an advantage, is that it gives the decision making to an immature, insecure, emotionally charged youth who will have certain difficulties in determining the difference between the well being of our nation and his own.

### Economic Feasibility

Let's now investigate the economic feasibility and effectiveness of the All-Volunteer Armed Force Concept.

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<sup>28</sup>Protecting The Free Society, P.2.

<sup>29</sup>"Texts on Report of Training Commission", New York Times, December 15, 1953.pp.14-15.

Assuming for the moment that the All-Volunteer Force is effectively in being, it would of course be more cost effective as the pipeline of manpower entries was reduced which of course would cause a commensurate reduction in training overhead.<sup>30</sup> However, the necessary material increases in compensation to attract and maintain sufficient volunteers into the system would overwhelmingly override such economic advantages as above. Is the basic economic premise for an All-Volunteer Force valid? Can we actually pay a man enough money to get shot at? Should we try? What role does traditional patriotism and sense of duty play in the pay situation? It is one thing to emphasize the need for improvements in a variety of phases of career attractiveness, as well as improving the effectiveness, dignity and status of the Armed Forces and its personnel,<sup>31</sup> yet it is quite another to catch the taxpayer in a pay rate escalation of unquestionable proportions.

Just the recommended pay increases for first-term enlisted men would raise their pay by approximately 35 percent and that of second-term enlisted men by roughly 7 percent above present pay scales.<sup>32</sup> Expressed in another way and as related to our present 3.3 million man force, an all-volunteer force level

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<sup>30</sup>Gates Report, Table A-VIII, p.189

<sup>31</sup>Gates Report, pp.49-67.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., pp.181-183.

of three million men would cost an additional five billion dollars per year more than for the equivalent mixed force of today plus an additional 450 million dollars per year for the reserve forces to support it.<sup>33</sup> Incidentally, these Gates Commission figures are sharply at odds with the previous Pentagon estimates which put the price as high as 17 billion dollars a year.<sup>34</sup> In addition to the cost figures advanced by the Gates Commission appearing to be seriously understated, they fail to include many of the costs of improving career attractiveness which are definitely necessary if sufficient volunteers are to be attracted.

There is another problem that does not seem to have been surveyed sufficiently by the Gates Commission. How will the Armed Forces equate the proficiency pay of a highly skilled soldier handling the sophisticated highly technical equipment against what the Army and Marines pay the foot slogging infantryman who may be here today and dead tomorrow.<sup>35</sup> On the one hand industry will steal the armed forces dry of their sophisticated young blood, if pay and allowances

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<sup>33</sup>Ibid.,pp.195-196.

<sup>34</sup>"Alternatives To The Draft",Time Magazine,March 2, 1970, p.46.

<sup>35</sup>Warren H. Kennet,"All-Volunteer Army Plan Raises Problems", Newark News, August 30, 1970,Section 2,p.cl.

aren't vastly improved, and yet the unsophisticated infantryman will be discriminated against if his pay is beneath that of the specialist. In the interim the taxpayer is caught in the middle. It would also appear incorrect to assume that there would be an automatic spillover into the Army of excess enlistment applicants for the other choice services, especially when everyone to include the prospective volunteer realizes the plight of the Army "grunt". Hence the Army and to an extent the Marines, especially in time of war, will continue to be the least popular as well as being undermanned in a voluntary atmosphere.

Finally, there is nothing in our history to suggest that Congress will consistently over the long haul appropriate those very sizable expenditures that will be required to do all the things necessary to attract volunteers in the numbers needed. As an interim summary it is concluded that the situation is much more complex than simply suggesting that all that has to be done is increase pay and adequate volunteers will be forthcoming for all the services as well as the reserves. As stated above: you simply can't pay a man enough money to get shot at; therefore why try? There's got to be another way!

## The Military Manpower Mix

Historically speaking the military manpower mix has primarily been dependent upon economic necessity. As the individuals in the highest strata of the economy have seldom become involved with the military except in periods of dire emergency or war and usually because of the draft, those in the lower echelon of the economy tend to listen to and heed the hew and cry of the recruiters. This then can become a rather important problem if not properly understood. In fact the military itself fears that the all-volunteer force would lose its heterogenous mix. As one Army General stated "You wouldn't believe how high the quality of our manpower intake is now, compared with what it was before World War II. We now get a good cross section of America's youth from the draft and our enlistments. It includes people with all sorts of skills and high educational background. We have come to rely upon them to perform the technical jobs for the modern Army. This highly qualified input would be largely cut off to an all-volunteer system exclusively. We would go back essentially to the caliber of men we had in the small prewar Army, when a high school graduate was a rarity and discipline

was a major continuous problem."<sup>36</sup>

"Do not be mislead, either, by all the denials that an All-Volunteer Force would be a largely black force. We think it would be at this stage in our history; the reason being purely historical. In the past the Army's volunteers have come largely from the lowest economic group. At one time they were mostly Irish immigrants, then the Italians began to predominate. If we go back to an all-volunteer basis now, it will be the Negroes who are in the lowest economic group and who will volunteer in biggest numbers."<sup>37</sup> Since the well being and defense of the US is dependent upon the participation of all the youth in the various strata of the nation, any system which emphasizes a homogenous rather than a heterogenous military manpower mix is detrimental to the well being of the nation. The All-Volunteer Armed Force would seem to be such a system.

#### The International Implications

What are the international implications of the All-Volunteer Armed Force Concept; or expressed differently, what effect will it have upon the military manpower procurement policies of the major US Allies especially those

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<sup>36</sup>"Can Volunteer Army End The Draft", US News and World Report, March 9, 1970, p.42.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p.42.

## Allies in Western Europe and NATO?

Conscription presently provides the bulk of Western Europe's military manpower and in the words of West Germany Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt: "Any weakening of the system thus would seriously affect the defense posture of NATO."<sup>38</sup> He further stated that the abandonment of the Selective Service System by the US would make continued conscription impossible in West Germany as well as for the governments of America's other Western European Allies who would also find it probably impossible politically to maintain conscription should Washington end the draft system or allow it to become inoperative.<sup>39</sup>

The least that must be said regarding the international implications of the All-Volunteer System is that it must be considered prior to the implementation of such a system. Obviously in this instance it was not coordinated internationally and should have been especially when it is realized that an exclusively All-Volunteer Armed Force for the US is detrimental to the conscription systems of our Western European Allies, and that without essential coordination with them NATO could falter.

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<sup>38</sup> Drew Middleton, "Bonn Minister Says That If US Ends, So Would Germany and NATO Would Falter", NewYorkTimes, July 26, 1970, p.12.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

## Conclusions Regarding The All-Volunteer Armed Force

In addition to the five basic criteria which as previously cited are generally not supportative to the All-Volunteer Armed Force Concept as the exclusive method of military manpower procurement for the US, there is another more general weakness. Volunteer methods in general are absolutely unpredictable as to numbers of personnel and time, and result in an inequitable and uncontrollable withdrawal of manpower from civilian needs. During the debates regarding the passage of the original 1940 Selective Service Act, Dr. Robert Hutchins, then President of the University of Chicago, said: "The whole effort in any selective service is just what the name implies, to put people where they belong. Volunteering defeats that."<sup>40</sup> Again in 1940, former Secretary of War Henry Stimson summed up the arguments very well when he said: "We have always had a penchant for volunteering. It has been tried again and again, \* \* \* \* and it has proved a costly failure. \* \* \* \* From the standpoint of principle the Selective Compulsory System is the only one which is fair. It is the only system which distributes the primary duty of national defense upon every citizen \* \* \* \* so that each man

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<sup>40</sup>"Hutchins", New York Times, Sept. 1, 1940, p.9.



may serve in the capacity where he is most effective.\* \* \* \*

The volunteer system is not only inadequate to raise modern armies, but it is disruptive of industry, agriculture and of all the sciences and the specialties upon which a nation must depend in time of war."<sup>41</sup>

Not only did the Presidents' National Advisory Commission on Selective Service of 1967 - a group of twenty distinguished citizens, headed by Burke Marshall - conclude that an All-Volunteer Force was neither feasible nor desirable, but also the Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procurement - which was set up by the House Armed Services Committee, and chaired by retired Army General Mark Clark - rejected its feasibility as well.<sup>42</sup> The Association of the United States Army, in its white paper of 1970 on proposals for an All-Volunteer Armed Force, concluded further that the Volunteer Armed Force, as an entity in itself, is not feasible and "That no irrevocable, emotional decision should be made on such a fundamental matter \* \* \* \* as the defense of our nation."<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>41</sup>Hearings Before The House Committee On Military Affairs On H.R. 10132, 76th Congress, 3rd Session (Washington: US Govt. Printing Office, July 30, 1940) pp. 382-384.

<sup>42</sup>Protecting The Free Society, p.1.

<sup>43</sup>Protecting The Free Society, p.8.

In fact, the statement of the President's Committee on Manpower Resources for National Security in its December 18, 1953 report to the then Director of Defense Mobilization expressed such caution in a most exemplary fashion: "The Committee is confirmed in extreme caution by its belief that any new and different program of procurement and training for potential military duty should be embarked upon only if it is expected to continue for a considerable period of time. Such programs are large undertakings and require not only extensive planning and operations on the part of the Government, but also widespread understanding, acceptance, and support on the part of the people."<sup>44</sup>

When national security is at stake mistakes can be suicidal. The All-Volunteer Armed Force Concept as the exclusive military manpower procurement policy presents too many pitfalls, loopholes and incorrect assumptions which must be eliminated prior to any thought of its implementation. While pay will have an important bearing on our ability to attract volunteers, some scheme not yet covered by the Gates Committee's recommendations will have to be found to fill the ranks of those who must close with the enemy on the battlefield and defeat him; in addition it must also replenish

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<sup>44</sup>"Text On Findings and Proposals by Presidents Committee on Manpower Resources", New York Times, Jan. 10, 1954, p. 64.

and maintain an effective Reserve Force supportative to the active Armed Forces.

## HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

With the major weaknesses and limitations of the All-Volunteer Armed Forces Concept uppermost in our minds, let's look further and briefly investigate the historical background and contents of two other military manpower procurement systems or concepts - namely the Selective Service System, and the Compulsory Universal Military Training Concept - that have been utilized or studied over the years and which may give us incite or have application in this instance and situation.

### The Selective Service System

After much public and congressional debate, Congress for the second time in the Twentieth Century (the first being the Compulsory Selective Act of 1917) passed the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 which was signed into law (Public Law 783) by President Roosevelt on September 16, 1940, thereby establishing a system of selective service conscription for the US under the administrative and operational control of the Selective Service System.<sup>45</sup> Between that time and March 31, 1947, when Congress temporarily permitted it to expire in behalf of voluntary enlistments, this vast Selective Service Organization composed of a National Headquarters, 54 State Headquarters, approximately 4000 decentralized local appear boards

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<sup>45</sup>LTC Irving W. Hart, Outline of Historical Background of Selective Service, (Washington: US Govt. Printing Office, 1952) pp.32-44.

and totaling approximately 22,000 workers of which almost 70% were uncompensated,<sup>46</sup> registered over fifty million men of whom more than thirty six million were liable for training and service each of whom required detailed attention every time he came up for possible selection,<sup>47</sup> and processed almost ten million men into the Armed Forces with the remaining five million voluntarily enlisting primarily because of the pressure of draft vulnerability.<sup>48</sup> A tremendous endeavor that ran as smooth as silk, thanks to the preparation, efforts and organizational ability of the Director of Selective Service, Major General Lewis B. Hershey, and the unswerving support and endless efforts of his local draft boards.

Having done its job, President Truman in a special message to Congress on March 3, 1947, recommended that the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 to be permitted to expire on March 31, 1947. The President made it plain, however, that if voluntary enlistments could not be kept up, reenactment would be requested of the Congress.<sup>49</sup> During the

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<sup>46</sup>E.A. Lewis, The Selective Service Acts as Amended, (Washington: US Govt. Printing Office, 1952) Public Law 759, Sec. 10, pp.83-87.

<sup>47</sup>Problems of Selective Service, Special Monograph No. 16, Vol. 1, 1952 (Washington: US Govt. Printing Office, 1952) p.3.

<sup>48</sup>Hart., p.12.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p.35.

next year voluntary enlistments did not keep up with force objectives and by 1948 the military manpower deficiency was obvious to all. Therefore on March 17, 1948 the President requested re-enactment of Selective Service legislation and also Universal Military Training.<sup>50</sup> The act officially known as the Selective Service Act of 1948 was passed by Congress on June 12, 1948 without the UMT provisions and signed into law by the President on June 24, 1948.<sup>51</sup> It is worthy of note that it took the Congress almost three months to react to the Presidents' urgent request and at a time when the world was in tension and the Soviet Union restless. Between November, 1948 and mid-January 1949, only 35,000 men were inducted and none were drafted in the next year and a half as the Armed Forces were cut drastically in an economy drive. In fact the Congress was about to let the Selective Service Act expire on June 24, 1950, its expiration date under the 1948 Act, even though the President in his message of January 4, 1950 to the Congress asked for the continuance of Selective Service as a vital part of the defense structure.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>50</sup>"Selective Service Asked" NewYorkTimes, March 18, 1948, p.4.

<sup>51</sup>Lewis., pp.68-111.

<sup>52</sup>NewYorkTimes, p.113.

Bitter oratory and hearings were resorted to once more, and it was only because of the outbreak of war in Korea on June 25, 1950 that the 1948 law was extended for one year and also authorized the President to order individuals or units of reserve components to active duty.<sup>53</sup> It was this latter clause that saved the day for the nation but also set an unfair burden on the World War II veteran.

When North Korea attacked South Korea and the US came to her aid, our men under arms numbered 1,459,000 which had to be expanded as rapidly as possible to 3.5 million men. The combination of the failure of the 1947/1948 voluntary enlistment experiment, with the deemphasis and disuse of the draft system between 1948 and 1950, and the Armed Forces economy cut just prior to the Korean conflict forced the Selective Service System to initially call up the Reserve Forces and their individual personnel even though the vast majority were World War II veterans. It also caused a revitalization of the manpower procurement system resulting in the passage by Congress of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of June 19, 1951 which while continuing the usual processes of Selective Service registration, record

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<sup>53</sup> Lewis., p.113.

keeping, classification, deferring and exempting or selecting, and delivery for examination and induction as in the past, also placed new tasks on the system such as increased reclassification and review of dependency deferments and physical exemptions, increased use of and responsibility for conscientious objectors in support activities, surveillance of those liable for service to age thirty-five, increased number of appeal boards and the creation of a National Security Training Commission and proposed National Security Training Corps for which the Selective Service System would be prepared to provide trainees.<sup>54</sup> The Selective Service System once again carried the day and continued on through the fifty decade and into the sixty decade and the Viet Nam situation. In fact some very interesting conclusions and incites can be gained by comparing the manpower procurement data from the Korean War with that of the war in Viet Nam.

When the Korean War ended in 1953 the armed forces contained 3.5 million men of whom 935,813 were draftees and 938,000 were reservists nearly all of whom had to serve again after doing their bit in World War II. The Vietnamese build-up peaked in 1969 also around 3.5 million men of whom 519,977 were draftees.<sup>55</sup> While force levels reached roughly the

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<sup>54</sup>Lewis., pp.119-132.

<sup>55</sup>"When The Draft Stopped", p.43.



same plateau in both the Korean and Vietnamese Wars, there were 418,880 fewer draftees on duty at the end of 1969 than at the end of 1953 and the reasoning should not be overlooked as it is of key importance for military manpower procurement policymakers. Before the Korean war the draft was virtually dormant, with chances of being drafted very nearly zero; hence the initial and heavy reliance on the reserves in the absence of an immediate and adequate military force. On the other hand 2,347,325 men were drafted since 1965 for the Vietnamese situation, and in the same time frame 10,487,352 men volunteered.<sup>56</sup> As draft calls increased, more men volunteered primarily to end the uncertainties surrounding their draft status and disjointed life. The point at issue is that there must be and is a more dynamic motivation than simply money to expect a man to volunteer to be killed for his Country and its causes. In effect the draft provided the encouragement for the volunteer to volunteer.

In any case the Selective Service System performed its dual function in its typically highly efficient manner by providing manpower for the Viet Nam crisis as it did for the Korean crisis and World War II, and by simply being "in being" as a motivational force for voluntary enlistment.

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<sup>56</sup>Ibid.

The measure of importance of the Selective Service System as a military manpower procurement system is indicated by the following excerpts from a statement by General Hershey, former Director of Selective Service: "it is no small task to register and classify the fifty million of our manpower as we did in World War II. \* \* \* \* Such an organization was not built overnight. The Selective Service Act of 1940, which was passed in September of that year, did not produce men at the rate of 400,000 a month until 1942. Fortunately it was not called upon for this rate of production earlier."<sup>57</sup> Much cautious thought and wisdom should be consumed prior to dismantling such a system, especially when we realize for example that the cost of continuing the selective service machinery in being and registering each new class of young men as it came of military age was about ten million dollars a year during the Korean era.<sup>58</sup> A small price when compared to the security benefits.

#### Compulsory Universal Military Training (UMT)

Since one of the major arguments and emotional outbursts against Compulsory Universal Military Training (UMT) in

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<sup>57</sup> Congressional Record, Appendix, January 26, 1950, p.A567.

<sup>58</sup> Lincoln., p.118.

peacetime has been that "our whole American tradition is against such a concept",<sup>59</sup> let's remember that although the US has never had such a system in peacetime there are multitudinous examples of it in the Thirteen Colonies.<sup>60</sup> In fact the first settlers in America brought with them the English militia system of a self-armed citizenry founded on the principle that every able bodied male citizen was obligated to keep himself physically fit, armed, and ready to fight the common foe when occasion demanded.<sup>61</sup> There certainly is plenty of precedence and tradition behind UMT, yet it's not the "tradition myth" that seems to have been the problem in UMT not being enacted by the Congress in 1948, 1952 and again in 1954. The problem in each instance was a lack of understanding on the part of the public and the inability of the Executive and Legislative branches of government to enlighten the public regarding the concept, its purpose and characteristics.

The basic purpose of UMT is threefold:

1. To avoid the necessity of maintaining a large active Armed Force in peacetime.

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<sup>59</sup>Conscription Is Not The American Way, Pamphlet, (New York: The American Press, 1945)p.6.

<sup>60</sup>Vollmer., pp.10-17.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid.

2. To insure that our large citizen reserve system is properly trained, manned, and always ready for any contingency.
3. To provide to the overall military manpower pool sufficient numbers of qualified trainees to preserve the national security.<sup>62</sup>

In consensus, those advocating UMT envision its basic elements and characteristics as follows:

1. A small highly trained professional Armed Force as our first bulwark of defense, reinforced by a large well trained and effectively organized citizen reserve system drawing its personnel primarily from the UMT program.
2. Compulsory military training for all physically and mentally qualified male youth, upon attaining the age of 18 years, for a specified period of time to be followed by a mandatory reserve obligation for a prescribed duration.

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<sup>62</sup>A Program For National Security, Report of the Presidents Advisory Commission On Universal Training, May 29, 1947 (Washington: US Govt Printing Office, 1947) pp. 90-95. (Hereinafter referred to as "The Compton Report").

3. The status of the trainee would be that of a civilian in military training under the general control, direction and supervision of a civilian oriented Training Commission using qualified military personnel from all services of the Armed Forces to conduct the training. During the training period the trainee would have no obligation for service in the Armed Forces without the express consent of the Congress. Upon completion of the training obligation, or in a national emergency be subject to draft for military service by the Selective Service System.<sup>63</sup>

The first serious approach to UMT in the postwar era occurred just prior to the conclusion of World War II, when, on January 6, 1945, President Roosevelt in his message to Congress pointed the way for UMT when he said, "I am clear in my own mind that as an essential factor in the maintenance of peace in the future, we must have Universal Military Training after this war, and I shall send a special message to the Congress on this subject."<sup>64</sup> Not long after the death of President Roosevelt, President Truman carried the torch to the Congress in joint session on October 23, 1945

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<sup>63</sup>"Trumon On UMT", New York Times, Oct. 24, 1945, p.3.

<sup>64</sup>Congressional Record, Appendix, Jan. 25, 1950, Vol. 91, Part 1, p.95.

when he most forcefully presented his recommendations with respect to UMT.<sup>65</sup> It was not long thereafter that he appointed an Advisory Commission on Universal Training consisting of nine recognized authorities under the chairmanship of Dr. Karl Compton, and charged them to determine whether the security of the nation and the preservation of world peace required the establishment of a system of universal training and if so, how to carry it out.<sup>66</sup>

The commission transmitted its final recommendations to the President on May 29, 1947 and unanimously concluded that a universal training system was an essential element in an integrated program of national security.<sup>67</sup>

The commission cited eleven major benefits to be derived from a UMT program and it may be well to detail them since the Compton Report of 1947 has been the basis for all that followed in its path:

1. UMT would shorten the time in which our effective fighting force could be mobilized in case of war.

2. It would give our young men the essentials of military training that would be the basic prerequisites for technical, specialized, or unit training in an emergency.

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<sup>65</sup>"Truman on UMT" p.3.

<sup>66</sup>The Compton Report.,pp.103-104.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid.,p.95.

3. It would make possible an effective National Guard and organized Army, Navy, Air, and Marine Reserve capable of rapid absorption into the professional military establishment in time of war.

4. It would improve the efficiency, quality and alertness of the regular forces in peacetime.

5. It would help produce qualified Reserve Officers in numbers that would assist in meeting the officer requirements of the regular services and the civilian components, and to staff the forces needed after M-day in any future crisis.

6. It would present additional opportunities for inculcating spiritual and moral ideals in support of the American democracy.

7. It would establish a pool of young, physically fit, and trained reserves who could be mobilized if a future crisis arose.

8. It would provide a large trained group in every community capable of withstanding and dealing with the problems of civilian defense and mass disaster.

9. It would provide a mechanism that could be converted immediately into a wartime Selective Service System, and it would make possible a continuous inventory of military skills, aptitudes, and leadership qualities that could be used advantageously in making military assignments should war come.

10. It would help to channel qualified young men into programs of scientific and vocational training in fields important to national defense.

11. It would give greater military strength at least cost than would be provided by exclusive reliance on a large standing military force, since this latter cost would overburden the national economy.<sup>68</sup>

On the basis of all these considerations the Commission recommended that UMT be made the obligation of every young man upon reaching the age of 18, or upon completing or leaving high school, whichever is later, to undergo a period of training that would fit him for service in any future emergency, for six months, under the general supervision of a civilian controlled Training Commission;<sup>69</sup> to be

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<sup>68</sup>Ibid., pp. 92-93.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., pp. 93-94.



followed by certain reserve options of which the total liability of the trainee for duty would be approximately ten years;<sup>70</sup> and finally the Compton Commission recommended that the program be initiated at the earliest possible date.<sup>71</sup> Justice Owen J. Roberts, National Chairman of the National Security Committee, comprising 61 affiliated organizations and totaling a membership of 23,703,850 individual Americans, summed it up very well when he said, "The hour is late, and the need for public pressure both on the defense establishment and upon the Congress is imperative \* \* \* \* or it will fail largely to the willingness of an election minded Congress to dodge the issue."<sup>72</sup> As we already know, the Congress dodged the issue during an election year and satisfied the minimum requirement by reestablishing the Selective Service System on June 24, 1948, while excluding the Presidents' request for UMT.<sup>73</sup>

President Truman was not to be stopped, and in early 1951 he encouraged the then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, chairman of the Preparedness Sub-committee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services to commence hearings on manpower procurement, which finally after much heated debate and the usual amount

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<sup>70</sup>Ibid., pp.77-88.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid., pp.88-89.

<sup>72</sup>"Peace Through Preparedness", National Security Committee Interim Report, May 10, 1948, pp.7-8.

<sup>73</sup>Lewis., pp.68-111.

of compromise resulted in the Universal Military Training and Service Act of June 19, 1951 (Public Law 51), which not only updated and extended Selective Service System, but also incorporated the major recommendations of the Compton Commission regarding UMT.<sup>74</sup> Public Law 51 provided for the establishment of a NSTC and the rules and regulations upon which it was to be governed. However, there was one stop gap regulation in the law; the Congress would not permit anyone to be inducted into the Corps until the National Security Training Commission submitted for congressional approval certain legislative recommendations regarding the well-being of the individual trainees.<sup>75</sup> Here then was the loophole that ultimately caused the downfall of UMT in the 1950 decade.

On June 29, 1951, the Senate approved the Presidents' nominations for the five membered National Security Training Commission under the chairmanship of James W. Wadsworth. It went to work immediately and on October 29, 1951 submitted its first report to the Congress entitled, "Universal Military Training: Foundation of Enduring National Strength", (referred to as "Wadsworth Report") including a draft of proposed

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<sup>74</sup>"UMT Approved", New York Times, June 20, 1951, pp.1,15.

<sup>75</sup>Lewis., pp.119-132.

legislation entitled, "The National Security Training Corps Act".<sup>76</sup> In satisfying the detailed requirements of the Congress as expressed in Public Law 51, the Commission utilized much of the Compton Reports recommendations, however it recommended using the Selective Service System as the processing agency for the Corps as well as for the regular forces; it also estimated that the training of 800,000 trainees per year would cost approximately four billion dollars during the first year and that because of non-recurring items the annual cost in later years would be approximately two billion dollars.<sup>77</sup>

However, with the advent of an election year, a presidential one at that, the Congress once again fearing the electorate, made a political football out of UMT and Public Law 51. On March 4, 1952 the House of Representatives by means of a confused parliamentary procedure, refused permission to the President to initiate the UMT program by referring the bill back to the Armed Services Committee for further study.<sup>78</sup> This action locked UMT out for 1952 at least.

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<sup>76</sup>Universal Military Training: Foundation of Enduring National Strength, First Report to the Congress by the National Security Training Commission, Oct. 29, 1951 (Washington: US Govt. Printing Office, 1952) p.iii (Hereinafter referred to as "The Wadsworth Report")

<sup>77</sup>The Price of Liberty., pp.15-20.

<sup>78</sup>UMT Dies, New York Times, March 5, 1952, p.13.

A New York Times editorial of March 6, 1952 stated the case very well: "Rejection of the UMT bill is a heavy blow to the long-range security of the United States. \* \* \* \* The House evidently was able to vote for UMT in the abstract, but when it came down to brass tacks it sadly failed in its duty to itself, to its constituents, to its country. \* \* \* \* When Congress plays politics with UMT in an election year it plays with the safety of America."<sup>79</sup>

Early in 1953, after the electioneering subsided, Congress expressed concern regarding the simultaneous utilization of the draft system for both the active Armed Forces and the NSTC, thereby possibly reducing the manpower available for one, or the other, or both. Because of this impasse, President Eisenhower, in 1953, directed the National Security Training Commission, now under the chairmanship of Major General Julius Ochs Adler, the General Manager of the New York Times, to submit a report by December 1, 1953 on the feasibility of operating UMT concurrently with Selective Service Conscription.<sup>80</sup> The Commission in its report of December 14, 1953, stated that National Security Training is in essence a Reserve Forces Training Program in support of

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<sup>79</sup>"UMT Dies", New York Times, March 5, 1952, p.13.

<sup>80</sup>"Texts On Report of Training Commission", New York Times, Dec. 15, 1953, pp.14-15.

a large trained non-veteran Reserve, ready to mobilize on a moments notice. As back-up for a small power packed professional active force, such a reserve force would give us maximum strength at minimum cost and with the highest regard for the democratic liberties we are defending. The Commission further stated that we need a Reserve and we want it to be trained. For the sake of fairness, it made a major point in preferring that the Reserves be composed of those who have not yet had the privilege of serving their country and that National Security Training is essential for a strong, trained, and vitalized non-veteran Reserve.<sup>81</sup>

Regarding the concurrent operation of UMT and the draft, the Commission stated that the Selective Service System can operate inductions for Service and Training simultaneously as long as necessary. It envisioned the impartial drawing of lots to decide who would serve and who would train, which in their opinion was much fairer than the selection of some for service and reserve obligation of eight years, while those not selected having no obligation whatsoever. In the event of emergency, however, men with

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<sup>81</sup>Ibid.

universal military training would be recalled ahead of veterans, but all would have a total eight year military obligation. Under the details of their proposed National Security Training Program, every young man not needed for service would receive six months basic and specialist military training and would spend his remaining reserve obligation of seven and a half years in the Ready Reserve, unless he voluntarily enlisted for service.<sup>82</sup>

National Security Training as envisioned by the Commission is an historic compromise between our cherished tradition against large active military forces in peacetime, and our need for habitual preparedness against the continuing reality of the hostility of international communism. Neither did it neglect the element of civilian control of the NSTC; to the civilian majority Commission, it assigned the duties of establishing policies and standards for the conduct of the training, exercising general supervision, and submitting a comprehensive report to the Congress bi-annually on the operation of the Corps.<sup>83</sup>

Here then for the first time do we see UMT not only tied directly to the Reserve Forces, but also the idea of voluntary

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<sup>82</sup>Ibid.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid.

enlistment spin-offs for service from the NSTC, all under the administrative coordination of the Selective Service System; an innovation that we might keep in mind for the future.

However, as in the past, the Congress turned a deaf ear and from 1953 to the present consistently took the easy way out as far as UMT and the NSTC was concerned. It simply extended the Selective Service System whenever it came up for review or extension.<sup>84/85</sup> In fact the Gates Commission, in one short paragraph, glossed over and discarded UMT as a method of military manpower readiness and procurement because it could force on the Services from 1.5 to 2 million non-career men which would be prohibitively expensive on the one hand and contrary to our traditional respect for individual freedom on the other.<sup>86</sup> This statement reflects either a lack of understanding on the part of the Gates Commission regarding the purpose, history and utilization of UMT, or it's their way of getting around a potential political hot bed. The UMT concept is presently laying dormant somewhere in the congressional archives, yet if America is to have a long range security

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<sup>84</sup>Elie Abel, "Pentagon To Ask Modified UMT To Help Reserve", NewYorkTimes, May 13, 1954, p.1.

<sup>85</sup>"Government Asks Universal Draft To Resist Soviet", NewYorkTimes, Aug 1, 1954, p.1.

<sup>86</sup>The Gates Report., p.175.

program, the relative value of UMT must of necessity come to the fore, since it truly is one of the basic essentials to any long-range program for national security.



## THE INTEGRATED PROGRAM FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

Now that we have investigated the strengths and weaknesses of the All-Volunteer Armed Force Concept, as well as having reviewed the historical background, purpose, and characteristics of the Selective Service System and Compulsory Universal Military Training, it is quite obvious that none of them can do the military manpower procurement job alone. Visualize for the moment:

1. A small, highly efficient, power packed, professional active Armed Force in peacetime is, and always will be the vital role, - the first line of defense - even better, if feasibly based on an All-Volunteer procurement system.

2. A highly efficient, well trained, and immediately available, large citizen Reserve Force - the back-up force - so strong that its reputed capability would in itself be a major deterrent to any would be aggressor.

3. A Selective Service System in the event of a major mobilization - the third line of defense - to draft from the general manpower pool in order to convert as rapidly as possible the small professional Armed Force and the

Reserve Force for the long haul to victory. In the interim periods it would act as the registration agency for the general manpower pool, the procuring agency for the National Security Training Corps (NSTC) of UMT, and the Reserve Forces, and the coordinating agency for voluntary enlistments from NSTC to the small professional Armed Force.

4. A compulsory Universal Military Training Program - the feeder force - developing and sending well trained "trainees" from NSTC primarily to the Reserve Force with spin-off voluntary enlistments to the peacetime active Armed Force.

All are vital and essential elements of national security, and must be considered together as an Integrated Program For National Security. As far as procurement of military manpower is concerned a UMT program, The Selective Service System, and the All-Volunteer System are, in effect, separate and in some instances overlapping military manpower procurement programs each having its special application and area of activity, and therefore must be made to operate together in behalf of our overall national security. The mission of UMT is twofold; first, to bolster the Reserve Forces, and then to encourage voluntary enlistments for the peacetime

active Armed Forces. That of Selective Service is fourfold. First, it must register and classify personnel for the general manpower pool in the event of an emergency. Second, it must register, classify, and induct personnel for training in the NSTC. Third, it must register, classify, induct and monitor personnel from NSTC for the Reserve Force. Fourth, it must coordinate procurement of personnel from NSTC for voluntary enlistment in the Armed Forces during peacetime. The All-Volunteer Armed Force procurement program would strengthen our freedoms by removing an inequity now imposed on the expression of patriotism among our youth, and minimize government interference with the freedom of the individual to determine his own life in accordance with his individual values; it would promote the efficiency of the Armed Forces in peacetime and increase its dignity and professionalism by more effective utilization of the serviceman for longer periods of time; and it would engender cost savings through lower turnover of personnel once force levels become stabilized.

In its report of December 18, 1953, the Presidents' Committee on Manpower Resources for National Security stated as follows: "It is believed there will be found greater national security in avoiding a dual system, since the availability of manpower for two current programs of procurement

for service and training is uncertain over a future period of some years."<sup>87</sup> The Committee was referring to the hazard of simultaneously and separately operating a limited UMT system in direct competition with the Selective Service System. It was the separate uncoordinated competition for manpower that was objected to and not the validity of the systems. The integrated system envisioned here, however, is a combining, an integration or amalgamation of both UMT and The All-Volunteer Concept, utilizing the Selective Service System as the matrix within which they jointly thrive. Of utmost importance is the fact that under the Integrated Program For National Security (IPNS) the Selective Service System, which has performed so capably in the past, would be preserved in an "in-being" status, and remain operative and ready for any major emergency build-up. In addition the keynote of the integrated system is flexibility since it is built around the uncertainties of the future. In the event of a national emergency it permits the Government a gamut of practical options which heretofore have never been available to it. Once IPNS is established, the time lapse from initial utilization of the first line of defense, to calling out the back-up force, to call up of the third line

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<sup>87</sup>"Text of Findings and Proposals by Presidents' Committee on Manpower Resources" NewYorkTimes, January 10, 1954, p.64.

of defense, i.e., the general mobilization, would be a matter of days, not months or years as in the past; and it would be a most effective operation since all personnel involved would be well trained in advance and immediately available.

Regarding length of service and duration of training, IPNS visualizes UMT in the NSTC for one year followed by seven years in the Ready Reserve, and a first term enlistment period of three or more years depending on service chosen, for those who volunteer from NSTC for service in the small professional peacetime Armed Force. The reasoning behind this is the fact that since combat effectiveness has steadily been stepped up by the application of new weapons, new techniques, and more complex technology, there is an increased need for more highly skilled and trained personnel than ever before. The old concept of military manpower in terms of sheer numbers of people is no longer true. The decisive factor is the capacity and training of military manpower to cope with the ever increasing complex technology of war. "A program based on a training period which is insufficient to provide the kinds of military skills most urgently required creates the illusion rather than the substance of a trained military reserve, as well as a trained active force."<sup>88</sup>

Effective training of military personnel requires substantially more time and effort than has ever been true in the past. This is another reason why the integrated system is both workable and unique. While the UMT phase must be lengthened to one years duration in order to meet the minimum training requirements of the technical complexities of war, it reaps the dual harvest of providing either a suitable filler for the Reserve Force, or a well-trained, highly skilled volunteer for the active Armed Forces. In any case the older duration recommendations of three or six months of training for UMT are no longer applicable. One year should be both politically and operationally acceptable to the nation in general and the military in particular.

In addition, it is both ludicrous and pathetic to realize that when a young man is drafted into today's active service for two years, he spends the first six months or more being trained, and the last few being processed for discharge; we're lucky if he spends one year in actual service.<sup>89</sup> Under IPNS all basic and advanced individual training as well as some unit and specialized training would be accomplished during the one year while training in the NSTC, and activity in the All-Volunteer Armed Force would be active operational duty for the full period of service.

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<sup>89</sup> Milton Friedman, "The End Of The Draft" Newsweek, March 16, 1970, p.90.

quotas and the drawing of lots might have to be established by Selective Service in order to give everyone a fair chance for service.

As far as costs and economic feasibility of the Integrated Program For National Security are concerned, conclusions can be made without getting bogged down or overwhelmed in details, simply by comparing and extending the accepted cost data furnished by the Wadsworth Commission in 1951, when it was preparing to launch Compulsory Universal Military Training. Based on these recommendations it would cost approximately 4 billion dollars during the first year, and because of many non-recurring expenses, 2 billion dollars every year thereafter to train 800,000 men in the National Security Training Corps.<sup>92</sup> Let's take 1980 as the target year and assume that inflation increases at an annual rate three percent per year, or ninety percent over the thirty year period, thereby converting the 4 billion and 2 billion dollar figures to 7.6 and 3.8 billion dollars respectively for an 800,000 man NSTC. If we again assume that by 1980 there will be approximately 2 million men becoming eighteen years of age annually and entering NSTC, and that the first year of NSTC commenced in the first half half of the 1970 decade when 1.5 million men were turning eighteen annually,<sup>93</sup> the costs for the first year of NSTC

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<sup>92</sup>The Price of Liberty., pp.15-20.

<sup>93</sup>The Gates Report., p.205.

Let's take a look at the ability of IPNS to provide manpower to the small professional peacetime active force on a voluntary basis. To maintain a peacetime active force of approximately 2.5 million men would require an average of approximately 400,000 new personnel per year.<sup>90</sup> If we assume that 1.5 to 2 million men will become eighteen years of age per year during the 1970 decade,<sup>91</sup> it is not too inconceivable to conclude that approximately 20/25 percent of them would be encouraged to volunteer for service from NSTC, since the balance would otherwise automatically revert to the Reserve Force to include the National Guard to fulfill their seven year reserve obligation. In fact this just might be an under assumption when we realize that the young man upon completion of his UMT will no longer have the normal fear of the unknown. If this factor and the high quality of training are combined with a reasonable pay and allowance policy especially for the first term enlistee and officer, there should be no problem in filling the manpower needs of the peacetime active force on a voluntary basis from the NSTC. In fact interest just might be so high that

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<sup>90</sup>"Nixon Panel Asks Volunteer Army by Middle of 71," New York Times, February 22, 1970, p.1.

<sup>91</sup>The Gates Report, p.7.



quotas and the drawing of lots might have to be established by Selective Service in order to give everyone a fair chance for service.

As far as costs and economic feasibility of the Integrated Program For National Security are concerned, conclusions can be made without getting bogged down or overwhelmed in details, simply by comparing and extending the accepted cost data furnished by the Wadsworth Commission in 1951, when it was preparing to launch Compulsory Universal Military Training. Based on these recommendations it would cost approximately 4 billion dollars during the first year, and because of many non-recurring expenses, 2 billion dollars every year thereafter to train 800,000 men in the National Security Training Corps.<sup>92</sup> Let's take 1980 as the target year and assume that inflation increases at an annual rate three percent per year, or ninety percent over the thirty year period, thereby converting the 4 billion and 2 billion dollar figures to 7.6 and 3.8 billion dollars respectively for an 800,000 man NSTC. If we again assume that by 1980 there will be approximately 2 million men becoming eighteen years of age annually and entering NSTC, and that the first year of NSTC commenced in the first half half of the 1970 decade when 1.5 million men were turning eighteen annually,<sup>93</sup> the costs for the first year of NSTC

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<sup>92</sup>The Price of Liberty., pp.15-20.

<sup>93</sup>The Gates Report., p.205.

would be approximately 15.2 billion dollars, and that for every year thereafter no more than approximately 9.5 billion dollars. Since our present 3.5 million man active Armed Force will most likely reduce to 2.5 million men in the next few years, and a reasonable pay raise especially for the first termers will be forthcoming for the active Armed Forces, let's assume that the force reduction and the pay increase will offset each other. Let's finally assume that the increase in Reserve Force activity under IPNS will cost us approximately 2 billion dollars per year in lieu of the Gates Commission's recommendation of 450 million additional dollars which seems too low.<sup>94</sup> Therefore the prime cost increase of the IPNS would be for the NSTC of UMT and the Reserve Forces which would average out at between 10-13 billion dollars per year. When we realize that the All-Volunteer Armed Force as recommended by the Gates Commission would cost anything from an additional 5 to 17 billion dollars per year,<sup>95</sup> with all its pitfalls, the least that can be said of IPNS is that it is economically feasible over the long range.

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<sup>94</sup>The Gates Report., p.195-196.

<sup>95</sup>"Alternatives To The Draft", Time Magazine, Mar. 2, 1970, p.46.

The Essential Elements Of The Integrated Program  
For National Security

Without getting too deeply involved but in order to increase our understanding of IPNS and most importantly to prevent needless misapprehensions, let's detail certain essential elements of the integrated system.

1. All young men upon attaining eighteen years of age, and prior to entering college, will register with the Selective Service System for induction and for training in the National Security Training Corps.

a. Young men not having graduated from high school will not be inducted for training until they graduate, cease to pursue their studies satisfactorily or reach their twentieth birthday, whichever occurs first.

b. Volunteering for NSTC by those under eighteen will be restricted to young men who have graduated from high school or who have left school for good reasons and have parental consent.

c. Permissive deferments now authorized by regulation for men liable for induction for service should be disallowed for induction for training in

NSTC. All current reasons for exemptions from service should be reviewed by a special Presidential Committee with the intent to make induction for training as universally feasible as possible.

d. Based upon the male citizen's dual obligation to his country - the payment of taxes and a military obligation for service - the special Presidential Committee should review and make recommendations regarding a special tax burden to be placed upon the deferred or exempted person during his total period of military obligation.

e. Each trainee prior to reporting to the Corps will be screened and classified to determine aptitudes, future work plans, and probable future residence and its proximity to existing reserve facilities. The trainee's year of training in NSTC to be as near his home as possible. Upon completion of the training year the trainee will be encouraged to pursue special skills acquired while in the Corps either through existing reserve training facilities or civilian institutions, or within the active Armed Forces whichever he chooses.

f. Where possible, young men will be allowed to specify the month of the year following their eighteenth birthday during which they prefer to be inducted for training with priority being given to farm workers.

2. Upon completion of his National Security Training obligation, the trainee will either be transferred by the Selective Service System to a unit of the Ready Reserve closest to his home for a period of seven years, or be encouraged to voluntarily enlist in one of the active services for the prescribed enlistment period of three or more years weighted in favor of the Army and Marine Corps.

a. Upon completion of training, inducements to voluntarily enlist in the various services will be offered to trainees primarily based upon the needs of the services. However, every opportunity will be given the trainee to specify the service of his choice. When conflicts develop or where service quotas are filled, lots will be drawn first to determine who will be transferred to the Reserve; and where necessary a second drawing will be conducted for those volunteering for service to determine said service; all conducted on a computerized basis

under the auspices of the Selective Service System.

b. The troop basis for the Reserve Force will utilize current ready, standby, and retired reserve categories with minimum changes based upon quantity of trained personnel in the reserve pool, and the exigencies of the world situation.

c. The period of Ready Reserve liability for each individual will be varied based upon the degree and extent of participation of the individual in reserve activities as well as his active service record.

3. The National Security Training Corps should be prepared to receive approximately 1.5 million trainees through 1975 with an increase to 2 million trainees by 1980 with a leveling off thereafter.<sup>96</sup> All training operations will be decentralized with control centralized in the civilian majoritized National Security Training Commission.

a. Training will be of one years duration, and will be an integrated composite program of the three armed services consisting of basic and advanced individual training to be followed by specialist

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<sup>96</sup>The Gates Report.,p.205.

training based upon individual aptitude classifications and the needs of the services and the reserves.

b. Basic literacy courses will be offered to trainees who have not learned to read and write, and every effort will be made to utilize and train other limited personnel in the Corps.

c. Instructor and support personnel will be organized on a cadre basis, and will not exceed the number authorized for similar training in the active Armed Forces. Instructors should be of highest moral and ethical character; and instructors in non-military subjects should strive to present the broadest and most generally accepted principles of our society and should encourage individual discussion wherever possible.

d. The trainees right to speak, to question, to dissent, to believe as he chooses, to equal justice under law, should be maintained to the highest level possible.

e. Local citizen advisory committees should be formed in cooperation with the local Selective Service office to help improve the off duty and extra

curricular environment of the trainees.

f. Existing military training facilities should be used for the UMT program to their fullest capacity and minimal new major construction should be authorized where necessary.

g. While all trainees are not subject to military service without the expressed consent of Congress, they will be subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice with specific exceptions based upon recommendations of the special Presidential Committee.

4. In summary the IPNS or integrated system would add these specific values to our defense posture and ability to survive:

a. The inequities of the past regarding recall of those who have already served, the drafting of the uneducated many, the class of privileged deferees, and the plight of the low income masses would be eliminated once and for all.

b. The United States would be better prepared to contend with local aggression; to hold and seize vital land areas; to protect our sea and air bases;



to aid our Allies before they are overrun; to use or refrain from using power weapons in being and on hand in accordance with moral and practical considerations; and to contend with internal security activities at any time. In fact the steadiness of our long term preparedness, in itself, should help deter war and aggression.

c. The Department of Defense would be assured of the continuing existence of a training plant, manned and equipped, so that regular forces would not have to be broken up for training purposes in an emergency and at a time when they are most needed for combat operations.

d. The Reserve Force would be vitalized as never before by a steady flow of trainees with the manpower procurement and monitoring function under the control of the most capable Selective Service System. In national emergency situations the Reserve Force would be truly supportative to the Active Force.

e. Disruption of civilian life and the civilian economy would be minimal, since the NSTC trainee would take training at the natural break between high school


and college or a career.

f. To whatever extent our active forces could be safely reduced because of this added security, more of our young man would have more time for worthwhile civilian pursuits, giving the nation a stronger economy and security position, and the young man a sense of purpose and belonging without the uncertainties of the past.

Our political history is filled with multitudinous examples of human weakness and error on the part of our public opinion as well as our leaders. For public opinion we have an excuse, since it is too erratic, inconsistent, arbitrary, unreasonable, and has a compulsion for making mistakes. It rarely if ever speaks in one, loud, clear, united voice. It must be lead by those in our executive and legislative agencies of government who take the well-being of this nation to heart, and who will not be befuddled, sidetracked, or tempted by political expediency as has happened so often in the past. Our leaders have an obligation not simply to themselves, - not only to the next generation - but especially are they obligated to those who are no longer with us, to those who died for us, who gave to us

the opportunity to play in todays arena, freely and independently, and without fear. With all that the Integrated Program For National Security can do in our mutual behalf, why not get on with it Mr. President - Mr. Congressman?

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