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**AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCE: A  
VITAL COMPONENT, NOT AN ALTERNATIVE**

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
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
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BY

COLONEL CARTER E. PORTER  
FIELD ARTILLERY



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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA



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## SUMMARY

Proposals for an All-Volunteer Armed Force are not a panacea for the current national discontent with conscription. Selective Service and Universal Military Training are needed to maintain our capability to meet the varying levels of mobilization requirements. The optimum balance between cost, strength, and public support can best be achieved with a combination of: (1) a highly-paid volunteer force of career "regulars", (2) a backup, active defense force of short-term volunteers or draftees, (3) a strong reserve, (4) a short Universal Military Training and Classification program, and (5) an optional Universal National Service program.

AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCE:  
A VITAL COMPONENT, NOT AN ALTERNATIVE

The United States must meet its military commitments for the national security, for the preservation of peace, and for the defense of freedom in the world. It must be able to do this under any circumstance, under any condition, under any challenge. This fundamental necessity is the bedrock of our national policy upon which all other considerations must rest.<sup>1</sup>

Lyndon B. Johnson

An all-volunteer armed force or a modified draft law? Do we really have the choice of one to the exclusion of the other? The heated polemics<sup>2</sup>, which have become more vitriolic with the increasing discontent over the South East Asian war and the inequities of the draft, have concentrated on the moral and constitutional issues involved.<sup>3,4</sup> Support for each side includes both Democrats and Republicans, hawks and doves, liberals and conservatives.

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<sup>1</sup>Lyndon B. Johnson, "A Message from the President of the United States Relative to the Selective Service, March 6, 1967," in How Can the United States Best Maintain Manpower for an Effective Defense System?, comp. by U.S. Library of Congress (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 8.

<sup>2</sup>Robert G. Sherrill, "The Draft Under Fire," Nation, March 14, 1966, pp. 285-288.

<sup>3</sup>Bruce K. Chapman, "Selective Service and National Needs," The Reporter, June 16, 1966, pp. 15-18.

<sup>4</sup>Donald J. Eberly, ed., National Service: A Report (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968), pp. 467, 485.

Some essential considerations seem to have been lost or buried in the recent emotion-laden debates and confrontations:

1. An operating Selective Service system must be retained in order that our nation may meet its current mobilization plan for our ultimate defense. Our industrial and military forces must be capable of greater and more rapid expansion than in World War II. This goal is impossible to achieve without some form of Universal Military Training (UMT) and a strong reserve, coupled with an up-to-the minute classification of our entire manpower pool.

2. On the other hand, it seems equally apparent that our voters, and their representatives in Congress<sup>5</sup>, will no longer tolerate the use of draftees for combat in support of our foreign policy and commitments, short of a formal Congressional declaration of war, or direct attack upon US territory, and the probability of all-out mobilization.<sup>6</sup>

Is there a middle road? There must be, and there is. This paper proposes a comprehensive program, most of the components of which have been previously

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<sup>5</sup>Sherrill, Nation, p. 287.

<sup>6</sup>Robert T. Stafford, et al., How to End the Draft. The Case for an All-Volunteer Army (Washington: National Press, 1967), entire volume.

considered by many of our private citizens, administrators, and lawmakers:

1. A volunteer force, unrestricted as to location of employment, highly-paid and experienced, subject to periods of foreign assignment and the hazards of limited war combat.
2. A domestic defense force composed of (a) volunteers from (1) on home tours, and (b) lower-paid, short-tour draftees or volunteers.
3. A strong, organized reserve, trained and effective, unit and individual, based on the draft and UMT.
4. A pool of all fit males, basic trained (UMT) and classified (Selective Service).
5. A national service program to improve the human and natural resources of our nation.

First we will examine the various proposals for the distribution or allocation of our human resources in time of emergency, then turn our attention to the question of manpower utilization and program implementation.

## SOURCES OF MANPOWER

### 1. VOLUNTEERS.

The problems inherent in a conscription system in an environment of only a partial call-up have led many to recommend that we take all steps necessary to increase the attractiveness of military service so that the requirements will be met by volunteers. Both the executive and legislative branches of our government have been studying this problem since World War II.

The latest and most complete study, even if it is one not universally accepted, is by the Gates Commission appointed by President Nixon on 27 March 1969.<sup>7</sup> This Commission's primary proposal was that military pay scales be raised to the equivalent of civilian salaries, or higher, to attract the needed numbers of volunteers for our active duty forces. In addition, it recommended the retention of the draft system in stand-by form for large-scale mobilization. Longer tours of duty and the maximum utilization of civilian and female employees by the Armed Forces would minimize the number of service men required.

There are several major uncertainties which prevent

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<sup>7</sup>The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, Thomas S. Gates, chairman (London: Collier-MacMillan Ltd., 1970), p. 10.



this recommendation from being precise:

- What would the total cost be, including military pay and benefits and civilian salaries, to achieve a given size of volunteer force?

- What would be the effect on the Reserves and ROTC if the draft "inducement" were removed? What steps would be required to keep and strengthen these programs?

- What type of force would result - a military elite unresponsive to civilian authority, all-negro, low IQ? Or will the quality of the volunteers, which have manned our forces so well for 160 out of our 190 years as a nation, be maintained as the size of that force increases relative to the total manpower supply?

- How will the forces cope with major year-to-year fluctuations in manpower requirements?

Major and sensible steps have been taken in the direction of an All-Volunteer force. The Department of Defense has studied the areas of fringe benefits such as: retirement policy, pensions, civilian job training, educational incentives, aid to the physically and mentally handicapped, etc.<sup>8</sup> President Nixon has requested

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<sup>8</sup>US Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Project Volunteer in Defense of the Nation, Vol.I (U), (Washington: US Department of Defense, 15 September 1969), entire volume.

an across-the-board pay hike and promised to look into a further significant increase for those with less than two years service.<sup>9</sup> The US Senate, however, defeated an attempt to fully implement the Gates Commission recommendations in one step. Though sympathetic with the intent of the proposal, President Nixon felt that such an implementation was too much and too soon and that attainment of the objective was too uncertain.<sup>10</sup>

## 2. SELECTIVE SERVICE.

Many persons have claimed that the concept of a draft violates the basic and democratic principles, and the constitutional rights, of freedom of speech and freedom from servitude. Yet forced military training and service have been a part of our democratic heritage since the days of ancient Greece, and from our own Colonial period, when all able-bodied male citizens bore arms for the common defense. That this defense also included offensive action is evidenced by the fact that segments of the colonial militia were "drafted" for

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<sup>9</sup>"The Nixon Plan for Ending the Draft," US News and World Report, May 4, 1970, pp.25-27.

<sup>10</sup>"Senate Bars Plan to Bring Volunteer Army," New York Times, August 26, 1970, pp. 1, 16.

campaigns into Indian territory.<sup>11</sup>

Conscription for US Federal service was not resorted to until late in the Civil War - 1862 for the Confederates and 1863 for the Union. Its second wartime use was in 1917. The first peacetime Federal conscription was the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940, as the nation armed for World War II. The draft was allowed to lapse for a year in 1947, but was reinstated in 1948 and has been with us ever since.<sup>12,13</sup>

Conscription was accepted by the people in 1917 and 1941 when all who could serve were called. "Selective" meant in fact the assignment of each individual to military, civil, agricultural, or industrial service; wherever his talents and capabilities indicated that he could contribute most effectively to the all-out war effort.

Conscription has not been favorably received when the process includes loopholes which tend to reduce the

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<sup>11</sup>US Department of the Army, American Military History 1607-1958: ROTC Manual No. 145-20, (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 18.

<sup>12</sup>Rocco M. Paone, "The Last Volunteer Army," Military Review, December, 1969, pp. 9-17.

<sup>13</sup>"The Case for a Volunteer Army," Time, January 10, 1969, p.25.

hardship for certain sectors of our citizenry:

- Paid replacements, as in the Civil War, which favored the wealthy;
- Educational, occupational, and parenthood "deferments" which have too often been parlayed into complete exemptions which again favor those who can afford college;
- Lack of a uniform nation-wide policy, i.e. drafting teachers in one area but deferring them in another (ignoring the fact that there may be a surplus of teachers in the first area).<sup>14</sup>

Conscription has also been less favorably received when only a limited number have been required for military service, a situation likely to continue for generations. "Selection" then results in a decision as to who will be free to continue their plans for education, career, family, etc., while the "selectees" must sacrifice up to two years of their early adulthood to onerous, if not hazardous, duty at low pay.

Prof. Milton Friedman has likened this selection process to a tax on the selectee, i.e. the difference between the money that he could have saved as a civilian, after paying for all the necessities of life (including

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<sup>14</sup>Bruce K. Chapman, Wrong Man in Uniform, (New York: Trident Press, 1967), p. 48.

taxes), and that which he can save out of his military pay.<sup>15</sup> Since the draft reduces the military payroll and the taxes on the rest of the population, would it not be just as logical, or ridiculous, to draft for other necessary services at reduced cost - 400,000 police, 700,000 postal employees, or 2,500,000 teachers?

Since World War II all US administrations have been actively studying methods for removing the injustices in the draft laws.<sup>16,17</sup> President Nixon has recently secured Congressional approval for a lottery system, ordered a cessation of deferments for education, occupation, and parenthood, and instituted a nation-wide system of uniform call-up.<sup>18</sup>

Selective Service will not be displaced by the All-Volunteer Army concept, as proposed by many. Even with Universal Military Training and a strong Reserve,

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<sup>15</sup>Milton Friedman, "The Case for Abolishing the Draft and Substituting for it an All Volunteer Army," The New York Times Magazine, May 14, 1967, p.23.

<sup>16</sup>US Selective Service System, "The Reasons for Selective Service", in How Can the United States Best Maintain Manpower for an Effective Defense System?, comp. by U.S. Library of Congress (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 17.

<sup>17</sup>National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve, Burke Marshall, chairman (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), entire report.

<sup>18</sup>"Nixon Plan", US News and World Report, p.27.

Selective Service will still be required in time of complete mobilization to determine where each should serve for the best interests of our nation.<sup>19</sup>

Far more important is the position of weakness to which an exclusively volunteer force - with no provision for selective service - would expose us. The sudden need for more men than a volunteer force could supply would find the Nation without the machinery to respond....<sup>20</sup>

### 3. UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING.

As noted before, the concept of a militia for community security has been with us since our earliest Colonial days. Webster's defines "militia" as:

a part of the organized armed forces of a country liable to call only in emergency... the whole body of able-bodied male citizens declared by law as being subject to call to military service....<sup>21</sup>

Our Constitution states in Article 1, Section 8:

The Congress shall have power ... to provide for calling forth the militia; ... to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; ...

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<sup>19</sup>Chapman, Wrong man in Uniform, p. 135.

<sup>20</sup>Johnson, A Message from the President ..., p. 9.

<sup>21</sup>Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, (Springfield, Mass.: G & C Merriam Co., 1967).

Unfortunately Congress did not set minimum standards for the States for training and service. After problems of lack of training, short tours of duty, and poor response hampered the Revolutionary War effort, Congress passed a law in 1792 mandating the citizen's obligation to serve.<sup>22</sup>

However, the militia situation was still unsatisfactory during the Civil War, forcing Congress to decree Federal conscription. The 1792 law was revised in 1903, at which time the modern National Guard was organized. Poor leadership, training, and manning were still in evidence at the beginning of World War II and stricter standards for the Guard were decreed.

It is evident from the above that a universal military obligation has been a part of our heritage since the Pilgrims landed. Where we have been lax is in seeing that conscriptees were adequately trained and that the States met their implied obligation to organize an effective militia, large enough to meet Federal needs in time of national emergency. Regardless of this background, there are many that feel that a peacetime universal training program is unconstitutional.

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<sup>22</sup>Herbert L. Marx, Universal Conscription for Essential Service, (New York: Wilson, 1951), p. 42.

Shortly after World War I the Army unsuccessfully proposed a system of three months of Universal Military Training (UMT) to permit the rapid build-up of the armed forces from a small nucleus of regulars in the event of another major war.<sup>23</sup> The National Defense Act of 1920 rejected UMT but did upgrade the ROTC program and implement the Citizens Military Training Corps.<sup>24</sup> President Truman tried to secure the passage of a UMT law during the years 1945-1948. His attempts were unsuccessful though the program had strong public support.<sup>25</sup>

During the Korean War Congress instituted a Universal Military Training and Service Act which "obligated" all males for eight years combined active and reserve duty. As draft calls diminished so did the crusade to enforce this obligation. The Reserve Forces Act of 1955 modified the program but failed to make it universal.<sup>26</sup> UMT still had the strongest of support from President Eisenhower in 1966:

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<sup>23</sup>DOA, American Military History, p. 361.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 366.

<sup>25</sup>George H. Walton, Let's End the Draft Mess, (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1967), p. 161.

<sup>26</sup>DOA, American Military History, p. 524.



war, of course, is always unfair to youth. Some men have to fight and others do not, and I see no complete cure for that until the blessed day arrives when men have learned to live in peace .... Today more than ever, therefore, I think this country should adopt, as the cornerstone of its defense establishment, a workable plan of universal training - and I mean universal, with a minimum of really essential exemptions.<sup>27</sup>

It is important that we differentiate between military training and military service. The concept proposed in this essay is that all males would get 3-6 months of basic military training and classification. The service part would be separate, whether voluntary or mandatory. Conscientious objectors would receive training for suitable service to the nation in emergencies. Those with educational or physical defects would be aided. Proposals have even been made to include women.<sup>28,29</sup>

Many criticisms of UMT have been raised. Some of the pros and cons are discussed in the following paragraphs.

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<sup>27</sup>Dwight D. Eisenhower, "This Country Needs Universal Military Training," Reader's Digest, September, 1966, p.49.

<sup>28</sup>A Program for National Security: Report of the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 42.

<sup>29</sup>U.S. President's Task Force on Manpower Conservation, One Third of a Nation; A Report on Young Men Found Unqualified for Military Service, Willard Wirtz, chairman (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 25.

The minimum disruption to education would occur if all were trained immediately following graduation from high school. If facilities are available to handle an emergency mobilization, they should be capable of handling this summer influx of UMT trainees and available for other programs in the winter. Teachers and reservists might then handle the bulk of the training. If much of the basic training class-room type work<sup>30</sup> were incorporated into the high school curriculum, a three-week summer camp might complete the program, permitting college students to continue their education and spreading the load on the facilities and staff. College basic ROTC could also satisfy the UMT requirement.

Many argue that the armed forces cannot use so many men. Of the two million boys soon to reach their eighteenth birthday each year, 20 - 30% will be below minimum physical or educational standards,<sup>31,32</sup> and another 25% will serve in the active forces. The remaining million or so will probably remain for ten

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<sup>30</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, The Soldier's BCT Handbook, PAM 21-13, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 28 October 1968), entire pamphlet.

<sup>31</sup>Walton, Let's End the Draft Mess, p. 27.

<sup>32</sup>Manpower Conservation Task Force, One-third of a Nation, p. 25.

years or more in the group which would be of more value in uniform than in industry, in a period of maximum emergency. This would provide an accumulated pool of over 10 million men. It is not inconceivable that we would need such a large pool. Prior basic training then can be thought of as additional insurance for peace through maximum strength.

Some have listed social benefits among the bonuses claimed for UMT, but the active duty period would be too short. However, this period does offer the opportunity to locate and identify educational and physical deficiencies, and to start any beneficial remedial activities. It would also offer ample opportunity for discussion and counseling with each boy regarding his alternatives for national service, active duty, and military reserve programs.

#### 4. UNIVERSAL NATIONAL SERVICE.

...the spirit of volunteer service in socially useful enterprises will, we hope, continue to grow until that good day when all service will be voluntary, when all young people can and will choose the kind of service best fitted to their own needs and their nation's.<sup>33</sup>

Most of us agree that the concept of individual service for the betterment of our community is a worthwhile ideal. But many question the small number of

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<sup>33</sup>Johnson, A Message from the President ..., p. 16.

meaningful jobs available for the millions of candidates, the problems of cost and control, the effect on education and employment, and, most important, the basic nature of such an undertaking - whether it should be voluntary, creditable towards military service, or compulsory.<sup>34</sup>

According to Donald J. Eberly<sup>35</sup> there are some 200,000 jobs open today in the fields of improvement of our human and natural resources, and this could be increased to 5 million in 5-10 years.<sup>36</sup> The Civilian Conservation Corps enrollment peaked at 600,000 in the 1930's.<sup>37</sup> With a pool of one million boys available each year for National Service, it appears that there will be ample opportunity for two years of meaningful service for them, and for most of the girls, too.

It has been estimated that such a project might cost \$4000/year per person, but much of this would be spent directly on worthwhile service. Some visualize a

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<sup>34</sup>Hanson W. Baldwin, "The Draft is Here to Stay, But it Should Be Changed," The New York Times Magazine, November 20, 1966, p. 96.

<sup>35</sup>Donald J. Eberly, ed., National Service: A Report (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968), p. 67.

<sup>36</sup>Walton, Let's End the Draft Mess, p.142.

<sup>37</sup>Edward F. Hall, "National Service and the American Tradition," Current History, August, 1968, p.74.

monstrous new administrative bureau, while a more practical proposal is for a National Foundation to train, classify, and assign Corps members to existing local agencies.<sup>38</sup> The latter would pay, supervise, and house them.

The current interest in National Service has been generated by the concept that it might serve as an elective alternate to the draft for military service. The Peace Corps was originally proposed as a three year period of service which would substitute for two years of required military service.<sup>39</sup> In 1966 the public favored this concept.<sup>40</sup> However, some feel strongly that compulsion would reduce the effectiveness of the National Service participants, an experience not observed in the case of drafted conscientious objectors. Others argue that such a mandate would violate our constitutional freedoms<sup>41,42,43</sup> - side-stepping the fact

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<sup>38</sup>Eberly, National Service, p. 69.

<sup>39</sup>Hall, Current History, p.76.

<sup>40</sup>Walton, Let's End the Draft Mess, p. 161.

<sup>41</sup>Chapman, The Reporter, p. 17.

<sup>42</sup>A. L. Haenni, Draftees or Volunteers (New York: Vantage Press, 1969), p. 26.

<sup>43</sup>Eberly, National Service, p.489.

that we are compelled to attend school, pay taxes, serve on juries, support our poor (sometimes in violent) neighbors, and justify any need to "bear" arms. Their opponents argue that a voluntary program will miss the important extreme groups - the poorest and the wealthiest.<sup>44</sup>

Mandated service, some contend, would delay marriage, education, and careers, and harm our economy by reducing our productive work force.<sup>45</sup> Such service could, however, be scheduled for a period other than that immediately following high school. Summers during college would enable the Corps to use college-educated specialists for educational service, social work, and administration of the program. Service before college, on the other hand, might have several benefits such as G.I. bill-type tuition credits<sup>46</sup> and more mature, more serious students. The suggested deleterious effect on the labor force is hard to accept in face of the trends toward 30-hour work-weeks and retirement at age 55.

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<sup>44</sup>Eberly, National Service, p. 467.

<sup>45</sup>Chapman, The Reporter, p. 17.

<sup>46</sup>"G. I. Bill in Reverse," Chemical and Engineering News, July 27, 1970, p. 10.

## ORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSE TEAM

Having examined the sources of manpower in the preceding section, let us now turn to the proposed organization of the various components of our defense system.

### 1. THE REGULAR ARMED SERVICE.

This would be an all-volunteer, career, professional force, unrestricted as to assignment and subject to the hazards of combat in limited wars in support of our Nation's foreign policy. It would be a high-paid force, relative to current scales, in order to attract the 1 - 1½ million men required to meet our long range overseas needs of 1/3 - ½ million (on the basis of three years foreign service to six years domestic duty). The pay scale should be high enough to attract sufficient personnel so as to give the services potential for selection. Suitable compensation would be made for extra-hazardous duty and enforced absences from families.

### 2. A HOME DEFENSE SERVICE.

This category would consist of 1½ million or so lower-paid, short service enlisted men and officers, available for duty outside of the US only for (a) short term civil aid in the event of a natural catastrophe or (b) combat in the event of a Congressional directive.

If sufficient volunteers can be attracted to the Regulars at reasonable cost, this home defense category may disappear; but until this is demonstrated by step-wise improvements in incentives we should depend on the draft for manpower. It should be noted that no country has succeeded in raising by voluntary programs the size of armed force, relative to population, that the US currently requires.<sup>47</sup>

The discontent resulting from drafting a selected few for hazardous peacetime duty would be overcome by this restriction on the use of draftees. It would also help those who claim to be willing to serve and fight but object to the South East Asian War; though the morally honest ones in this group could even now resolve this problem by fulfilling their obligation in the Reserve or Guard. The residual discontent towards any military draft could only be offset by a total draft, including National Service.

This group from the Home Defense Service, in combination with the Regulars on home duty, would form the Home Defense Force. Rapid emergency expansion could be accommodated by manning these active units at reduced strength (i.e. two active brigades out of three in the

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<sup>47</sup>Michael R. Foot, Men in Uniform (London: Praeger, 1961), pp. 162-163.



divisions) and assigning to them full-strength trained ready Reserve units which would perform ACDUTRA with their parent active units.<sup>48</sup>

### 3. A STRONG RESERVE.

This would be a three million man force, about the size of, but more effective than, the present reserve,<sup>49</sup> capable of doubling the size of the active duty forces within 90 days of a Congressional call-up. Smaller forces might be activated at the discretion of the President with suitable safeguards against repeated peace-time activations of the same units. This reserve would be composed, as at present, of effective units and individuals in ready and standby categories within the Organized Reserve and National Guard. Some of the units would be assigned to active-duty parent units as discussed in the preceding paragraph. Others would man summer UMT stations and prepare for the massive influx of draftees in the event of war.

### 4. SELECTIVE SERVICE.

The primary purpose of a continued Selective Service System would be to maintain up-to-date information

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<sup>48</sup>Committee No. 12, USAWC National Strategy Seminar, A US National Strategy and Supporting Military Program, recorded presentation to Non-Resident Class of 1971, 24 July 1970, at USAWC, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

<sup>49</sup>Melvin R. Laird, Fiscal Year 1971 Defense Program and Budget (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 163.

on all adult males so as to supply up to six million men to the Armed Forces within 12 months of a declaration of war, while maintaining the strongest possible logistic potential to back up those forces.<sup>50</sup> It would also draft men for peacetime active or reserve service if reasonable voluntary incentives continue to be insufficient.<sup>51, 52, 53</sup> It should be under civilian control to emphasize the Congressional responsibility to determine National Goals and to supply the necessary manpower.

#### 5. UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING.

This program would incorporate the class-room type of basic training activities into the high school curriculum and the practical field and weapons work into a short active duty period, usually during the summer following high school graduation. It would strengthen our mobilization program by assuring that most of those called-up in the event of war would already have completed their basic training.

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<sup>50</sup>Chapman, Wrong Man in Uniform, p. 135.

<sup>51</sup>Baldwin, "The Draft is Here to Stay,...", p.112.

<sup>52</sup>US Dept. of the Army, Project Volunteer ...

<sup>53</sup>Warren R. Kennet, "National Guard Ranks Face Manpower Crisis," Newark Sunday News, September 20, 1970, Section 1, p. 9.

## 6. NATIONAL SERVICE.

This would be a voluntary program, creditable towards conscripted peacetime service in the Home Defense Force, but not creditable towards UMT or Reserve duty or toward any war-time assignment by the Selective Service System.

### CONCLUSION

We face a hostile ideology - global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method. Unhappily the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite duration.... A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be<sup>54</sup> tempted to risk his own destruction.

Our best defense is to convince any potential aggressor that his chances of victory are slim and that he has more to lose than to gain by taking offensive military action. Since we espouse the principle of "no first use" of nuclear weapons, except in the case of an overwhelming conventional attack upon a NATO member, we must be prepared for any type of conflict. Since we depend on allies, we must make commitments to them which could involve us in future limited wars as well as all-out wars. Whether the next war be

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<sup>54</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Farewell Address, January 18, 1961," American Military Thought, ed. Walter Mills (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 509-510.

nuclear or conventional, man-power is still an essential element of our deterrent. Only the capacity, and the will, to bring our full potential to bear rapidly, if need be, will convince a potential enemy of the futility of war. That potential includes men as well as ABM's and MIRV's. An All-Volunteer "regular" force is a key component of the complete team, but it cannot do the job alone.

  
C. E. Porter  
COL, FA, USAR

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