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THE CHALLENGE OF THE MODERN VOLUNTEER
ARMY CONCEPT

Alfred A. Zamparelli, et al

Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

8 March 1971

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USAWC RESEARCH PAPER

AD773130

THE CHALLENGE OF THE MODERN VOLUNTEER ARMY CONCEPT

A GROUP STUDY PROJECT--GROUP RESEARCH REPORT

by

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The basic problem examined in this paper is how to reach and maintain a volunteer army of sufficient strength and quality capable of accomplishing the Army's missions. Data was gathered using a literature search, review of announcements emanating from DOD and DA, and interviews with DA staff officers. How to reach the Modern Volunteer Army goals is a much debated subject. Unfortunately many people in positions of authority and influence give the appearance of leaning heavily on Congressional support in the form of additional funds as the total solution. In reality, more money is only a small part of the solution. As more and more effort is expended on the Modern Volunteer Army Program, it is becoming evident that Army professionals, using ingenuity, resourcefulness, and experience will be the deciding factor in our success or failure in attaining the Modern Volunteer Army goals.

PREFACE

This Group Study Project Report was prepared in accordance with requirements established by the Commandant, US Army War College for the Student Research Program. This research paper is designed to fortify the concept of a volunteer army and to offer some new or revived ideas aimed at the Modern Volunteer Army goals. The two authors elected to participate in this project because of their prior experience and interest in the subject. Research for the study was generally confined to review and analysis of written references on file in the US Army War College Library. However, without the generous assistance of several DA staff agencies, who are listed in the bibliography, and the Commanding Officer, US Army Administration Center, St. Louis, Missouri we would not have been able to review and analyze the subject matter in the depth desired. We must also express our appreciation to the late Colonel George D. Hardesty, Jr. and to Lieutenant Colonel H. R. Lamp, who as appointed Research Advisers, gave us invaluable guidance and counseling in the development and writing of this research paper. Our sincere thanks go to those mentioned for their assistance.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

All men and boys able to carry a spear will go to Addis Ababa. Every married man will bring his wife to cook for him. Every unmarried man will bring any unmarried woman he can find to cook and wash for him. Anyone fit for service and found at home will be hanged.

--Emperor Haile Selassie's
mobilization order to meet
the 1935 Italian invasion
of Abyssinia.¹

As long as war is regarded as wicked it will always have its fascination. When it is looked upon as vulgar it will cease to be popular.

--Oscar Wilde (1856-1900)
Irish author

There was no question in the minds of the Abyssinians of the meaning of Emperor Selassie's order or the consequences of failing to comply. There is no doubt that Americans would respond to a similar order if the security of the United States was threatened by an invader. Fortunately the President of the United States has not had the occasion to issue an order comparable to Emperor Selassie's order. Until such time as the occasion may arise, the Secretary of the Army is charged with the responsibility of maintaining a strong Active Army and Army Reserves, to include the Army National Guard, capable of deterring enemy aggression and to provide impetus to US worldwide treaty and alliance commitments.

BACKGROUND

Today there is an intense feeling of discontent within the United States against the war in Vietnam and more specifically against involuntary induction of young men into the armed forces. To paraphrase Mr. Wilde's quote--"Our more vocal citizens have found the Vietnam war to be unjust and cruel; therefore, it is no longer a popular thing to support." Not only has disenchantment been expressed verbally and in writing, but violent physical actions against the draft in general and selective service facilities in particular are increasingly evident throughout the United States. Mutilation of draft records, burning of draft cards, vandalism in selective service offices, "skipping" the country to avoid the draft, and formation of organizations to encourage and aid draft evaders all have come to the fore in recent years.

The actions described in the preceding paragraph have not gone unnoticed by national leaders. During the past three years, three blue-ribbon study groups have considered problems relating to the draft. Two met in 1967: one, the President's National Advisory Commission of Selective Service and the other, a Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procurement set up by the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. More recently, a commission appointed by President Nixon concluded its study of the All-Volunteer Armed Force in February 1970.²

The 1967 reports rejected the feasibility of an all-volunteer armed force. The more recent Presidential Commission, headed by

!

Thomas S. Gates, former Secretary of Defense, unanimously agreed that "the nation's interests will be better served by an all-volunteer force supported by an effective stand-by draft. . . ."3

Concurrent with commissioning Mr. Gates to conduct his study, the President directed the Secretary of Defense to undertake a similar study to develop actions within the Department of Defense (DOD) to reach the all-volunteer goal. The DOD group known as the Project Volunteer Committee was assisted by service subordinate study groups. The initial round of studies relating to an all-volunteer armed force have been completed. Each Department is now in process of review and implementation of feasible recommendations leading toward the all-volunteer goal.

There is no question of the desire of President Nixon concerning an all-volunteer force. In his statement of 27 March 1970 announcing the creation of the Gates Commission he stated, "I have directed the commission to develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating conscription and moving toward an all-volunteer armed force."4

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The problem confronting DOD is how to meet the personnel requirements for the armed forces in an all-volunteer environment. Specifically the requirements we refer to are sufficient numbers of military personnel of the desired quality to provide for a nation secure from internal and external threat.

This paper addresses only a portion of the whole problem. To provide a scope capable of being addressed within the time allotted, we have narrowed our research to the study of the problem as it pertains to Army enlisted personnel of the Active Army and Reserve components.

Briefly stated, the problem we address in this paper is: How can the US Army attain and maintain a volunteer Active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard of sufficient enlisted strength and quality to meet internal and external threats and to fulfill US military commitments to foreign governments?

INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES

We have taken a positive approach to the stated problem, although a great part of our research revealed strong arguments against an all-volunteer armed force. The negative side of this subject will be addressed, but only for the purpose of informing the reader that the planners and action officers pushing toward the goal of a Modern Volunteer Army⁵ have many obstacles to overcome. Our reasons for taking the positive position are simple:

1. The thrust of the present Administration is toward an all-volunteer armed force.
2. We believe that a volunteer Army would be beneficial for the Army and the nation's defense.
3. The study provides an opportunity to review and comment on actions underway to reach the Volunteer Army goal,

to recommend fresh ideas, and to revive old ideas which may assist in the Modern Volunteer Army Program (MVAP).

Our initial research revealed a multitude of books, magazine articles, studies, congressional reports and student papers on the subject of the draft and an all-volunteer armed force. Therefore, much of our research was accomplished from sources available in the US Army War College Library, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

The frequency of DOD/DA policy announcements pertaining to a volunteer Army made it absolutely essential for daily review of pertinent references to keep our research current. Adjustments to our paper were made as required by new material. In this connection, we established 31 December 1970 as the cutoff date for new research. Therefore, any actions taken by DOD/DA after that date have not been considered in reaching our conclusions and recommendations.

In December 1970 we were able to obtain from the Office of Personnel Operations, DA, extracts of the Modern Volunteer Army Program to include a draft directive establishing the program and a listing of 215 actions completed, recommended for implementation, or under consideration. While many of our "original" ideas were included in the 215 actions mentioned, the listing and MVAP directive were most valuable to us. First, where our "original" ideas were listed as underway or being considered, we assumed that they were sound since they survived the DA staff review. Secondly, we were alerted to strengthen parts of our discussion if we found that our ideas would be too controversial or unique.

The only military agency outside of Department level to contribute to this paper was the US Army Administration Center, St. Louis, Missouri. That agency provided information concerning projected Army Reserve and Army National Guard strengths.

Last, but not least, a great deal of the experiences and knowledge of the authors has been mixed in with data obtained from interviews and written documents. The authors have a total of fifty-three years of military service, twenty-nine of which have been devoted to personnel administration and related activities.

ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER

This paper is written to provide an orderly and progressive study of the problem as stated. In order of presentation; we discuss the background of the Selective Service System and the Volunteer Army concept; we discuss personnel requirements of the Active Army and Army Reserve forces; we examine the costs necessary to support a volunteer Army and the various factors influencing choice of a military career; we present a variety of suggestions designed to support a volunteer Army, to include discussion of selected actions already underway or under consideration at DA; and, in the final chapter, we present our conclusions and recommendations.

CHAPTER I FOOTNOTES

1. Indian Army Infantry Journal (April 1959), p. 86.
2. Association of the United States Army, "White Paper on Proposals for an All-Volunteer Armed Force, Protecting the Free Society (1970)."
3. Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (1970), Thomas S. Gates, Chairman, p. 6.
4. Gates Commission, p. vii.
5. US Army Directive, "Master Program for the Modern Volunteer Army," (unpublished draft obtained from EPD, OPO, DA 27 November 1970). This directive announces the Modern Volunteer Army Program (MVAP), p. 1.

CHAPTER II

FROM DRAFT TO A VOLUNTEER ARMY

HISTORY OF THE DRAFT (1947-1951)

For the purpose of this study it was only necessary to look back into history 20 to 25 years to understand the Selective Service System (Draft) as we know it today. During the period, from 1947 to date, we were able to follow the evolution of draft problems and reasons for the recent concerted efforts made to discontinue the draft and to build a Modern Volunteer Army.

In July 1947, the then President, Harry S. Truman, decided to rely on volunteers to meet the force requirements of a 1.6 million man armed force. In so doing he permitted the World War II draft law to expire.¹

By January 1948, US armed forces' strength had decreased to a distressingly low level, 15 percent below that authorized by Congress. The causes for lack of volunteers at that time are more or less irrelevant to what can be expected today. However, the prime causes for failure of the all-volunteer force of the 1947-1948 era are mentioned here to provide a comparison of the circumstances of that failure with the prospects we foresee for the volunteer Army of today.

1. Civilian jobs were plentiful with a smaller manpower pool available, i.e., the country had a 3.5 percent unemployment rate in 1947-1948 with a manpower pool of 62 million.² In November

1970, the unemployment rate was 5.8 percent with a manpower pool of 85.6 million.³

2. Many officials felt soldiers were obsolete in the new and awesome nuclear environment.⁴ This theory has been proven false time and time again since WWII. The United States has found it necessary to employ conventional forces on foreign soil four times since 1948 and has yet to employ nuclear weapons, i.e., Korea, Lebanon, Dominican Republic, and South Vietnam.

3. Pay was low with no raises in sight.⁵ Today, low pay is a recognized problem. Current plans call for increased military pay, particularly the pay of lower grade enlisted personnel, to make it more comparable to civilian pay.⁶

Because of the downward trend in armed forces strength, in March 1948 President Truman requested Congress to take immediate action to pass a new draft law. Congress agreed, a new draft law was approved, and eligible men once again were inducted into the armed forces. As draft calls were increased, so did the number of voluntary enlistments. In fact, volunteers became so numerous that by June 1949 draft calls were suspended. Draft calls remained suspended until June 1950, the start of the Korean War, although registration and classification of eligibles continued.⁷ The Korean War also prompted the extension of the 1948 Draft Law and, in 1951, Congress continued the draft authority for a four year period.⁸

HISTORY OF THE DRAFT (1952-1968)

Since the Korean War the draft has supplied from 13 percent to 41 percent of the US armed forces annual intake requirement of 600,000 to 900,000 men.⁹

As long as draft calls remained relatively low as they did after 1954 and prior to 1966, little comment for or against the draft was heard, at least not in the pitch which was to come during and since 1966. The larger monthly calls of early 1966 placed many students in a vulnerable position for induction into the armed forces. This vulnerability caused the beginning of serious debate and questioning of the need for and the inequities of the draft system. Debate and questioning intensified even though draft calls were reduced from 346,600 in 1966 to 218,700 in 1967. Draft calls since 1967 have been 299,000 in 1968, 250,000 in 1969, and reached 163,500 for 1970. The 1970 draft call was the lowest annual draft call for any calendar year since 1964 when approximately 110,000 were drafted.¹⁰

Six times since the passage of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, Congress has renewed the Selective Service Act although it did so in 1967 amidst violent demands for reform or complete abolition of the system.

President Johnson, who pushed for continuation of the Selective Service Act in his speech to Congress on 6 March 1967 used as his opening remarks:

The knowledge that military service must sometimes be borne by--and imposed on--free men so their freedom may be preserved is woven deeply into the fabric of the American experience.¹¹

How close President Johnson's words were to those of Aristotle who said, "The citizens of a free state ought to consist of those only who bear arms."¹²

On 30 June 1967, President Johnson signed into law the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, extending the draft until 1971.

Changes brought about by the new draft law failed to stifle the growing number of voices raised in opposition to the draft. Opponents of the draft suggested an all-volunteer force as an alternative to the draft--a goal easier established than met. A goal incidentally which allegedly has more opponents than the draft.¹³

THE MOVE TOWARD AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCE

With the growing number of supporters to discontinue the draft, it was little wonder that the draft became, as it was in 1964, an issue of debate during the 1968 presidential campaign. However, this time the opposition had the added weight of the Vietnam War to push it forward. The combination of the two--unfair draft and unpopular war, was too much to be ignored by the candidates for president. Presidential Candidate Richard M. Nixon promised, shortly before election day to discontinue the draft and make the armed force an all-volunteer force; such action to be accomplished as rapidly as possible after his election.¹⁴

As promised, on 30 January 1969, the then President Nixon advised Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird of his conviction that an all-volunteer armed force should be established after expenditures for Vietnam were substantially reduced. Secretary Laird was requested to take immediate steps to appoint a special commission to develop a detailed plan of action for ending the draft. The Secretary was further advised that the President was aware of the problems of such a task, e.g., costs and maintenance of adequate strength, but he felt that an all out effort to meet the all-volunteer goal must be tried.¹⁵

Concurrent with his direction to Secretary Laird, President Nixon appointed a Presidential Commission headed by Mr. Thomas S. Gates, to recommend steps to be taken to reach the goal of an all-volunteer force. Of interest were President Nixon's guidelines, "to develop a comprehensive plan eliminating conscription,"¹⁶ rather than the more passive approach of President Johnson's guidelines to his 1967 National Advisory Commission of Selective Service. President Johnson's Executive Order establishing his Advisory Commission of Selective Service merely instructed it to examine the Selective Service System and to make recommendations to improve the system--no mention was made in the order to examine the selective service system from the point of view of eliminating conscription all together.¹⁷

GATES COMMISSION REPORT

The results of the Gates' Commission have been published by the US Government Printing Office in book form under the title, The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force. The Gates' Commission Report is now well known in government circles, at least to those offices and officials responsible for manpower procurement and maintenance of a viable fighting force. Generally the findings and recommendations of the Gates' Commission Report support the President's conception of an all-volunteer armed force, i.e., establish a standby draft system, raise military pay for personnel in the first two years of service and make comprehensive improvements in conditions of military service and in recruiting.¹⁸

Since release of the Gates' Commission Report, progressive steps have been taken by the various military departments to reach the goal of an all-volunteer armed force.

DOD REACTS TO THE GATES COMMISSION REPORT

On 21 August 1970, Secretary of Defense Laird ordered the Armed Forces to draw manpower from the National Guard and Reserves in any future rapid military build-up instead of depending on increased draft calls. His order was further announced as a major change in US policy.¹⁹ At the same time the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Mr. Roger Kelley, was given responsibility to coordinate and monitor support

and maintain minimum average trained strengths of the Selected Reserve as mandated by Congress with prime responsibility, as concerns this study, going to the Department of the Army.²⁰

On 12 October 1970, Secretary Laird issued the following Memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SUBJECT: Zero Draft Calls by July 1, 1973.

The purpose of this memorandum is to establish the goal of zero draft calls by the end of FY 1973, and to discuss actions needed to achieve that goal.

There are actions that should be taken now to move toward this goal. In addition to increased emphasis on military recruiting, other supports may be required for additional enlistments in both the Active Forces and the Reserve and National Guard components. Early Congressional action is needed on the bill that would provide a 20% increase in base pay for enlisted personnel with less than two years of service, and thereby reduce the disparity between military and civilian pay at the entry level. Consideration should be given to increasing proficiency pay to combat personnel in infantry, artillery and armor units as a means of attracting more volunteers in these areas.

Many of these actions have been considered by the Project Volunteer Committee and are among its recommendations for ending reliance on the draft. I now ask that you personally review those recommendations to identify the priority steps that will be required to reduce draft calls to zero by the end of FY 1973. Your proposed steps should be discussed promptly with Roger Kelley. He will work through the Project Volunteer Committee to assure that each service is adequately informed and that there is coordinated action between services.

This timetable for reaching zero draft calls assumes that Congress will recognize the need to extend the Selective Service induction authority for at least two years beyond its expiration date on

July 1, 1971, and that there will be favorable action during the interim period on the longer range recommendations of the Project Volunteer Report. Such action is required if we are to sustain zero draft calls for an indefinite period and thus be assured of ending reliance on the draft. It also assumes that, as we move away from reliance on the draft, provisions must be made to establish a standby draft system that can be used in case of an emergency.

This matter should receive your urgent personal attention, and action plans should proceed without delay. MELVIN R. LAIRD²¹

THE START OF A MODERN VOLUNTEER ARMY

On 13 October 1970, the Army Chief of Staff, General William C. Westmoreland, accepted the challenging task set forth in Secretary Laird's 12 October 1970 Memorandum by stating, "The Army is committed to an all-out effort in working toward a zero draft-- a volunteer force." He added, "In accepting the challenge, we in the Army will bend every effort to achieve our goal. But we need support and understanding from the Administration, Congress, and citizenry."²²

On 1 December 1970 the Army launched an allout effort to increase enlistments and reenlistments in the Active Army and Reserve components. The primary goal of this effort is to build a more professional Army that achieves maximum effectiveness within known and anticipated personnel and budget ceilings. The secondary goal is to reduce reliance on the draft in phased increments to zero by 1 July 1973. The program established to meet these goals is identified as the Modern Volunteer Army Program

(MVAP).²³ Project manager for the MVAP is Lieutenant General George I. Forsythe with title of Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army (SAMVA).²⁴

OBJECTIONS TO AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCE.

General Westmoreland, in his 13 October 1970 statement, recognized many of the difficulties which may be encountered in reaching a zero draft attitude. We will address these specific problems in subsequent chapters; however, to understand the major task ahead, one must not only understand the problems in reaching the ultimate goal, but must also understand that a number of Americans object to an all-volunteer armed force just as many Americans find opposition to the draft. Some of the major categories of objections are:

1. An all-volunteer force is not feasible.
2. An all-volunteer force will have undesirable political and social effects.
3. An all-volunteer force will gradually erode the military's effectiveness.²⁵

A detailed listing of objections considered by the Gates Commission is at Appendix 1.

We do not intend to evaluate or defend any of the objections listed in Appendix 1 since the decision for an all-volunteer force has been made and our goal established. Reference to the objections to an all-volunteer force are made merely to point out that the Army is faced with a real problem in reaching its directed goal of a Modern Volunteer Army.

MISSION--A MODERN VOLUNTEER ARMY

The goals have been established; a Modern Volunteer Army and "zero draft." However, the Army is not exactly sure how to reach these goals or if it will be satisfied with the results. The answers to these two "questions" lie somewhere in the experience and dedication of the planners, action officers and commanders at all levels of staff and command. All of us must be professional, quick, and vigorous in reaching established goals. At the same time we must be cautious, deliberate, and intelligent in our actions so that we will not regret, in the years to come, what is done now. In other words, we may reach our goals only to find that we have failed to establish a viable Modern Volunteer Army. The line separating success and failure is very thin and in the words of Edward C. Simmons, "the only difference between failure and success is doing a thing nearly right and doing it exactly right."²⁶

With the preceding philosophy ringing in our ears and the following words of General Westmoreland guiding us, we proceed with our study:

Those of us in positions of high responsibility must attack this problem with all the vigor and imagination and enthusiasm we can muster. We must apply ourselves intensively to that task. We must eliminate unnecessary elements and unattractive features of Army life where they exist. At all levels throughout the Army, senior officers will be charged personally with the responsibility for increasing retention of good people both by improving the living standards of their men and families and by an intensive effort to capitalize on the many attractive features of Army service.²⁷

CHAPTER II FOOTNOTES

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2. US Department of Commerce, The Statistical History of the United States from Colonial to Present (1965), pp. 70, 73.
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4. "Volunteer Army--When?" pp. 56-57.
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10. Lee Cowan, "Manpower is Key Element in Defense Plans During Transition to a Peacetime Budget," DOD Commanders Digest, 19 September 1970, p. 7.
11. Tax, p. 465.
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17. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service (1967), Burke Marshall, Chairman, p. 1.
18. Gates Commission, pp. vii and 10.
19. "Draft Call Shift Set By Laird," New York Times, 9 September 1970, p. 1.
20. Melvin R. Laird, "Guard, Reserve Units to Augment Active Forces," DOD Commanders Digest, 12 September 1970, p. 7.

21. Melvin R. Laird, "Zero Draft Calls by July 1, 1973," DOD Commanders Digest, 17 October 1970, p. 3.

22. General William C. Westmoreland, "Quality as Well as Quantity," DOD Commanders Digest, 17 October 1970, p. 1.

23. US Army Directive, "Master Program for the Modern Volunteer Army," p. 5.

24. LTG George I. Forsythe, "Army Willing to Make Changes in Move to All-Volunteer Force," DOD Commanders Digest, 5 December 1970, p. 8.

25. Gates Commission, pp. 12-20.

26. Tryon Edwards, et al., The New Dictionary of Thoughts (1955), p. 622 (Simmons).

27. MG G. S. Eckhardt, USAWC letter, Subject: "Modern Volunteer Army" indorsing General William C. Westmoreland's guidance on the subject of Professionalism and the Modern Volunteer Army, 3 December 1970.

CHAPTER III

REQUIREMENTS AND MANPOWER SOURCES

The critical variables of a volunteer army are size and quality. The task of raising and sustaining such an army becomes more formidable as the requirements for size and/or quality of forces increase. A relatively small army or one of low quality could be maintained with very little difficulty.

ACTIVE ARMY FORCE REQUIREMENTS

The uncertainties of the future make it difficult to present the force levels and structure which will be required in the post-Vietnam environment. However for the purposes of this paper it will be assumed that the US Force Structure will be reduced to an active duty strength level of 2.65 million. This figure equates to force levels existing just prior to the Vietnam buildup and provides for an Active Army strength of approximately 973,000. A summary of Active Army force levels existing prior to and during the Vietnam buildup is shown in Table 1.¹

TABLE 1
ACTIVE DUTY ARMY PERSONNEL
FISCAL YEARS 1963-1968

Fiscal Year	Officers	Enlisted	Totals
1963	108,302	867,614	975,916
1964	110,870	862,368	973,238
1965	112,120	856,946	969,066
1966	117,786	1,081,998	1,199,784
1967	143,517	1,298,981	1,442,498
1968	166,173	1,404,170	1,570,343

The annual accessions required to support a volunteer active force structure of 2.65 million is a subject of debate. The Department of Defense estimates are substantially higher than those submitted by the Gates Commission. A comparison of the two is reflected in Table 2.²

TABLE 2
ACTIVE FORCES
ESTIMATED ACCESSION REQUIREMENTS AND TURNOVER RATES

	1966 DOD Study Percent Unemployment		Gates Commission Study
	5.5	4.0	
Required Annual Accessions			
All Services	500,000	512,000	342,000
Army	220,000	232,000	148,000
Annual Turnover Rate (percent)			
All Services	21.3	21.8	16.4
Army	25.3	26.4	17.9

The Department of Defense Study was based on a total enlisted force of approximately 2.35 million members with an Active Army enlisted strength of roughly 870,000. The enlisted force in the Gates Commission Study was 2,089,000 with an Active Army enlisted strength of 827,000. The Gates Commission projections were based on the assumption that retention rates for a true volunteer force would be higher than that of a mixed force. Therefore, the annual turnover rate of Active Army enlisted men was projected to decline from 25 percent in the mixed force to 18 percent in the volunteer force.³ The improvement in retention plus higher levels of military pay accounted for the Gates Commission modest estimate of required annual accessions.

ACTIVE ARMY PROCUREMENT

The estimates in the DOD study more closely approximate procurement statistics for the period prior to the Vietnam buildup as shown in Table 3.⁴

TABLE 3
ENLISTED PERSONNEL PROCUREMENT
FOR THE ACTIVE ARMY
FISCAL YEARS 1963-1965

Fiscal Year	Inductions	First Enlistments	*Calls to Active Duty	Total
1963	74,387	111,746	978	187,111
1964	150,688	116,202	1,125	268,015
1965	102,497	101,901	1,141	205,539

*Includes Reserve and National Guard involuntary calls to Active Duty.

ACTIVE ARMY RETENTION RATES

The assumption made by the Gates Commission that retention rates for a volunteer force would be higher than that of a mixed force is subject to question. In the first place, it presupposes that a sufficient number of quality personnel will voluntarily elect to enter the Service. Secondly, that sufficient numbers of those enlisting will choose the Army over the other Services they now seem to find more attractive. Then, having filled the ranks with volunteers, the Commission maintains that the reenlistment rate will increase thereby reducing personnel turnover.⁵

An analysis of reenlistment statistics does not appear to support the Commission's position on the retention of volunteers. The reenlistment rate for First Term Regulars (Volunteers) has declined from 27.4 in 1962 to 14.9 percent in 1969. A summary of reenlistment rates for Fiscal Years 1962-1969 is shown in Table 4.⁶ It is interesting to note that the decline experienced by the so-called Volunteer Services was even greater than that of the Army.

TABLE 4
REENLISTMENT RATES FOR "FIRST TERM" REGULARS
FISCAL YEARS 1962-1969
(PERCENT)

Fiscal Year	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
1962	23.8	28.3	35.3	20.0	27.4
1963	22.2	25.1	35.1	15.5	24.9
1964	27.9	22.5	29.5	14.4	25.2
1965	25.7	22.8	25.5	16.3	24.0
1966	28.0	23.7	18.9	16.3	23.2
1967	23.7	18.9	16.8	10.6	18.8
1968	28.0	16.8	18.1	11.9	19.6
1969	17.4	16.3	15.2	7.4	14.9

It is recognized that not all first term regulars are true volunteers. There are no firm statistics to show how many men enlist to avoid the draft. Some Department of Defense officials estimate that about 40 to 45 percent of those who enlist in the Active Army are true volunteers.⁷ However, regardless of the breakdown, the percentage of first term regulars electing to remain in the Service is on the decline. There is no evidence to indicate that the retention rate for a volunteer force will be any higher than it is for a mixed force. In the absence of long term experience in a draft free environment, it must be assumed that the annual accession requirements for a volunteer army will be at least as high as they were prior to the Vietnam buildup and before the current wave of anti-military feeling spread across the Nation.

RESERVE FORCE REQUIREMENTS

The uncertainty surrounding projections of reserve enlistments, reenlistments and losses does not provide a base upon which to develop intelligent estimates of required input to maintain reserve strength. The Gates Commission Report is a rather comprehensive review and analysis of reserve requirements in the paid-drill category. However, two basic factors were not included in the Commission's analysis: (1) the planned force of the reserves to include the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and (2) the effect of recent policy changes on enlistments and reenlistments in the reserves.

For the purpose of this study we have made the assumption that all projected losses must be replaced. The planned reduction of Active Army strength and the "first line reinforcement" role given to the Reserves should add impetus to maintaining a large reserve force. Projected losses for the period 1971-1976 are shown in Table 5.⁸

TABLE 5
PROJECTED ENLISTED RESERVE/NATIONAL GUARD LOSSES
1971-1976

Year	USAR Unit	Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)	Army National Guard	Total
1971	45,400	41,066	101,015	187,481
1972	48,813	394,625	51,462	494,900
1973	22,005	257,931	30,940	310,876
1974	35,392	225,510	25,197	286,099
1975	35,767	6,458	57,606	99,831
1976	30,301	98	64,339	94,738
	217,678	925,688	330,559	1,473,925

RESERVE FORCE PROCUREMENT

The problem of procurement for the reserves is no less in size than the problem confronting the Active Army. In fact, from the tone of the following quotations and the announcement of their "first line reinforcement" role the reserves have greater obstacles to overcome than the Active Army in reaching their volunteer goals.

1. Mr. Alfred B. Fitt, former Assistant Secretary of Defense said, "Department of Defense surveys suggest that at least 80% join the National Guard to escape the draft and service in Vietnam."⁹

2. Reporters for the Chicago Daily News Service, in an article exposing National Guard "waiting lists" tampering, said, "Waiting lists to join the National Guard have been long. The main reason was that young men drafted into the Army were likely

to go to Vietnam, while men who enlisted in the National Guard could usually expect to discharge their military obligations close to home."¹⁰

3. "Public complaint to reach the /Marshall/ Commission centers on the allegation that men enlisting into the Reserves directly from civilian life are in effect using the Reserves as a haven to escape combat duty."¹¹

4. "The /Gates/ commission recognized from its first meeting the need for special attention to the problem of reserve forces. Surveys indicate that perhaps 75 percent of the enlisted personnel fulfilling their initial six-year military service obligation in the reserves are there only because of the draft."¹²

On 21 August 1970, Secretary of Defense Laird announced that: "Guard and Reserve units and individuals of the selected Reserves will be prepared to be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces."¹³ This major policy change places the reserves in the role of "first line reinforcements" as opposed to the "last resort" role they have been playing, i.e., active forces were reinforced by increasing selective service input prior to mobilization of reserve forces.

Add the loss of the draft incentive to the "first line reinforcement" concept and the results equal a somewhat less than desirable reason to enlist in the Army Reserve or Army National Guard. This being the case, efforts directed toward recruitment for the

Reserves and retention of reservists once enlisted, must be at least as dynamic, as original, and as creative as those directed toward the active Army.

Mr. Gates, in his report to the President, inferred that the proposed solutions and estimated requirements relating to the reserves were "much more tenuous" than those developed for the active duty force.¹⁴ Specifically he was referring to his inability to accurately predict annual first-term input requirements and what it will take to induce people to enlist in the reserve components. Of interest is the fact that Mr. Gates realized this problem some time before Secretary Laird announced the "first line reinforcement" concept. There is no question that the policy to rely on the Reserves as the initial and primary source for active force augmentation, has added to the problem as visualized by Mr. Gates.

Further increasing the scope of the problem is discontinuance of the pool of trained and in many cases combat experienced draftees who under present law must now transfer to one of the several reserve categories after they complete their two year active duty tour.

Just what does this all mean relative to yearly input requirements for a volunteer reserve component? From a numbers point of view, the requirement doesn't change--replace everyone scheduled for separation, within strength limitations. Meeting requirements will not be easy for several reasons.

First, the vacuum created by elimination of the compulsory reserve service for draftees must be filled with volunteers.

Secondly, voluntary enlistments and reenlistments of prior service personnel and enlistments of nonprior service personnel will be more difficult to induce now that the "first line reinforcement" concept has been announced.

Lastly, enlistment in the reserves will be less attractive with loss of the draft incentive.

THE REQUIREMENT FOR FURTHER REVIEW
OF THE RESERVE PROBLEM

Because of the new role of the reserves, a role not considered previously by Mr. Gates, we must reject the Gates' Commission finding that the planned reserve strength can be maintained by volunteers induced by an increase in pay alone.

Our rejection by no means indicates that we think Mr. Gates did not make the best use of information available to him at the time. The point to be made is that all of the Gates' Commission estimates for reenlistments, prior service enlistments and non-prior service enlistments must be reevaluated in light of the major change in national policy concerning the new role of the reserves in our national defense posture.

We also note that the Gates Commission failed to consider the possibility of expanded use of female soldiers in the reserves. This oversight is a serious shortcoming in the Gates Commission effort.

AVAILABLE PERSONNEL RESOURCES

An annual input rate of approximately 225,000 men and women into the Active Army and approximately 240,000 men and women into the reserves would pose no problem from the standpoint of availability. Considering the projected growth of the population, the required input constitutes only a small percentage of available resources. An estimate of the 18-19 year old male population through fiscal year 1975 is reflected in Table 6.¹⁵ The 18-24 year old female population for the year 1975 is expected to be over 13 million.¹⁶

TABLE 6
ESTIMATED MALE POPULATION, 18-19 YEAR OLDS
FISCAL YEARS 1971-1975
(IN THOUSANDS,

Fiscal Year	Age 18	Age 19
1971	1,850	1,832
1972	1,915	1,898
1973	2,128	2,107
1974	2,162	2,140
1975	2,197	2,175

While availability will not present a problem in sustaining a Volunteer Army, inducement might. In his semi-annual report to the Congress in January 1970, General Hershey made the following comments concerning voluntary enlistments:

Nearly all voluntary enlistees in the Armed Forces are already Selective Service Registrants. Some, however, are 17-year olds who are too young to have registered with the System, but must do so upon discharge from Active Duty.

During the period July 1 through December 31, 1969, 213,699 entered the Armed Forces voluntarily for regular or active duty through original enlistments. Others enlisted for Reserve duty.

Enlistments generally tend to follow the induction call trend. As the requisitions for induction rise, so do enlistments, and drop off as inductee requisitions decrease. The past has shown that when there are no inductions, enlistments fall to a point where the Armed Forces are unable to maintain their authorized strength.¹⁷

QUALITY REQUIREMENTS

An increasing demand for skilled personnel characterizes the Army as well as civilian industry. The need for quality recruits capable of absorbing complex and often technical training and willing to assume responsibility is more critical today than ever before. Furthermore the need for quality will increase as the size of the force is reduced. The smaller the Army, the more capable its members must be.

During the past ten years the educational level of enlisted personnel in the Armed Forces has steadily increased as shown in Table 7. The increase is due mainly to greater selectivity in procurement and retention, which have been dictated, to a great extent by increased requirements for higher technical skills.

TABLE 7¹⁸

ESTIMATED EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL
(CUMULATIVE PERCENT)

Educational Level	29 Feb 60	31 Dec 69
College Graduate	1.5%	4.9%
2 or more years college	6.1	13.4
Less than 2 years college	13.5	21.3
High School graduate	66.1	82.0

In the study conducted by the Gates' Commission, the implication is that the quality standards for the Armed Forces may be too high. The Commission points to the New Standards Program (Project One Hundred Thousand) as evidence that men in the lowest mental category (AFQT scores of 10 to 30) can achieve acceptable levels of performance and not cause appreciably greater disciplinary problems. According to the findings of the Commission, the number of enlistees in this category could represent a maximum of 20 percent in each service without detracting from the quality of the force.¹⁹ Considering an Army enlisted strength of say 870,000, this would amount to 174,000 marginal men.

"PROJECT 100,000" AS A MANPOWER SOURCE

Project One Hundred Thousand is still under evaluation and overall results may not be known for some time. However, initial results are encouraging and indicate that the majority of these educationally disadvantaged personnel are trainable and that they can perform their duties satisfactorily.²⁰

While continuation of this program will probably be necessary under the Volunteer Army concept, it should definitely be reduced in scope. The acceptance of marginal men must be counterbalanced by the procurement of high quality personnel. At present the procurement of such personnel is assured by the selectivity afforded by the draft. In a zero-draft environment the burden of procurement will rest solely on the shoulders of the United States Army Recruiting Command. The recruitment of 225,000 men a year into the Active Army will be a formidable task in itself. Notwithstanding improvements in pay, opportunity, and service life, the job of attracting personnel of high quality will add another dimension to the problem. If the Army is to establish and maintain an efficient combat ready and technically qualified force, the acceptance of substandard personnel should be kept to a minimum.

CHAPTER III FOOTNOTES

1. US Department of Defense, Directorate for Information Operations, Selected Manpower Statistics (15 April 1970), pp. 19, 24.
2. Gates Commission, p. 206.
3. Ibid.
4. DOD, Selected Manpower Statistics, p. 42.
5. Gates Commission, p. 206.
6. DOD, Selected Manpower Statistics, p. 49.
7. Roger T. Kelley, "Secretary Kelley Gives Full Report on Zero Draft," DOD Commanders Digest, 24 October 1970, p. 2.
8. US Army Administration Center, St. Louis, Missouri, letter to authors, 6 November 1970.
9. "National Guard Enlistments," Parade - The Sunday Newspaper Magazine (Harrisburg), 18 October 1970, p. 2, (quote from Mr. Alfred B. Fitt, former Assistant Secretary of Defense).
10. "Ex-Officer Admits He Got Hefty Fee to Get Young Men Into Guard Units," Sunday Patriot News (Harrisburg), 13 September 1970, p. A14.
11. Marshall Commission, p. 53.
12. Gates Commission, p. 97.
13. DOD Commanders Digest, 12 September 1970, p. 7.
14. Gates Commission, p. 97.
15. US Selective Service System, US Selective Service System, (15 January 1970), p. 31.
16. US Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of US, 1970 (1970), p. 8.
17. US Selective Service System, p. 23.
18. DOD, Selected Manpower Statistics, p. 35.
19. Gates Commission, pp. 45-47.
20. Stanley R. Resor, "Project One Hundred Thousand," Defense Management Journal (Fall 1967), pp. 3-6.

CHAPTER IV

THE COST OF A VOLUNTEER ARMY

As with any new program, particularly one the size and importance of an all-volunteer armed force, we would expect to see the results of a cost effectiveness analysis before making a final decision. Yet, we found no evidence of a systems analysis review of the all-volunteer concept, nor did we find conclusive evidence that the ultimate cost of such a program was known or given serious consideration before a decision was made. Realizing the enormous task involved in costing a program of this magnitude or costing even one proposed action, we have set aside any detailed examination of costs in reaching our conclusion and recommendations.

The main point to be made by this chapter is that the full support of the Administration, the Congress and the public is required when costs are finally computed and submitted as part of the Defense budget. However, it must be noted that success of the MVAP is not assured by financial support alone.

VARYING ESTIMATES

Research on the subject of additional costs for an all-volunteer armed force revealed estimates ranging from the zero price tag put on a 2.8 million volunteer force by A. L. Haenni¹ to the \$17 billion suggested as top estimate by the 1966 DOD Draft Study Group for a 2.6 million man force.² A more recent

estimate of \$2.1 billion was made by the Gates Commission for a 2.5 million man force.³

CAN A RELIABLE COST ESTIMATE BE MADE?

We seriously doubt that a reliable estimate of the total cost of the Modern Volunteer Army can be made at this time. For support of this thesis, we refer to the variety of estimates made by a number of commissions, study groups and individuals, some of which are quoted above. Additionally we refer the reader to Appendix 2 where twenty of the eighty-one "cost" actions don't include a cost estimate.

NECESSITY FOR FINANCIAL SUPPORT

Whatever the costs, \$2.1 billion, \$17 billion, or even \$30 billion a year, the price must be paid if the Administration wishes to continue its policy of an all-volunteer armed force. If the Army fails to obtain financial support for its Modern Volunteer Army plan, there is no question that the strength and quality of the Army will, within a few short months after a zero draft attitude is reached, swing downward as it did in the "zero draft" period of 1947-1948. To what extent the quantity and quality will decrease will depend on the Army's ingenuity in utilizing its current and programmed resources to reach the Modern Volunteer Army goals.

Recent statements by two prominent Americans, both of whom are in positions to understand and comprehend the problem of

financial support, are quoted below to sum up our feelings on the subject of additional costs to reach the Modern Volunteer Army goals:

It has been and is the intention of the Nixon Administration to spend not one more dollar for defense than is needed, but also not one dollar less. We have made the cutbacks in many base-line areas of the Defense Budget, . . . but we have delayed some of the increases that will clearly be necessary. Among such areas are . . . movement towards an All-Volunteer force, and improvement in Guard and Reserve Forces.

--Melvin R. Laird
Secretary of Defense, 17 Nov 70⁴

We are determined to achieve zero draft calls no later than July 1973. . . . But getting rid of the draft requires a good deal more than a will to do so within the Department of Defense. It requires the cooperation of other branches of government, including, of course, the Congress. It also requires the understanding and support of the American public. . . . We Americans can't have it both ways. We can't insist that the Selective Service draft must go, but fail to support those measures needed to create and maintain an All-Volunteer Force.

--Roger T. Kelley
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
18 Nov 70⁵

CHAPTER IV FOOTNOTES

1. A. L. Haenni, Draftees or Volunteers? (1959), p. 98.
(Mr. Haenni served four years as an Army officer in the US and Europe. Although not actively working in the area of military affairs, he spent ten years researching and writing his book. His major interests are the study of political and military affairs. In his book he proposes to eliminate 20 year retirement for enlisted personnel and substitute in its place a short service career of eight years. After eight years the member would receive a substantial gratuity, averaging \$21,500 depending on rank attained. With radical re-allocation of current expenditures for personnel and related costs, retirement for one, this proposal would require no more money than is now being spent., p. 67.)
2. James C. Miller, et al., Why the Draft? (1968), p. 145.
3. Gates Commission, p. 203.
4. "Major Budget Decisions Face Defense Planners," DOD Commanders Digest, 21 November 1970, pp. 6-7.
5. Rogert T. Kelley, "All-Volunteer Force," DOD Commanders Digest, 28 November 1970, pp. 6-7.

CHAPTER V

CAREER CONSIDERATIONS

Proponents of an All-Volunteer Force claim that such a force will enhance the dignity and prestige of the Military because every man in uniform will be serving as a matter of choice rather than coercion.¹ This may have merit, but its pertinence is predicated upon the Army's ability to recruit such a force.

QUANTITY VERSUS QUALITY

If the Army were concerned only with quantity, the task would be much less formidable. However as the size of our force decreases the quality of personnel needed takes on added importance. In order to attract and retain young men of quality, the Army must compete for manpower not only with civilian industry but with the other Services as well. Successful competition will depend on the Army's ability to offer incentives which are equal to or better than those available in other fields of employment. To do this, we must first identify, examine and compare factors which may influence a young man in his choice of a job or career.

PAY ALONE WON'T DO THE JOB

While it is generally accepted that military pay for first term enlistees is too low to recruit a force of sufficient size and quality, it is also agreed that pay is not the only, and perhaps not even the primary motivating force for enlistment.²

A young man trying to decide which field of employment to enter will normally consider a variety of factors. The number of factors and the weight given each will vary according to the education, background, experience, and personality of the individual concerned. Some of the more significant factors which may influence a person's decision are as follows:

- Prestige
- Working Conditions
- Living Conditions
- Hardships and Hazards
- Freedom
- Job Satisfaction
- Education and Training
- Opportunity for Advancement
- Travel
- Job Security
- Fringe Benefits
- Retirement
- Patriotism
- Pay

The above factors are not listed in order of priority or importance nor are they considered to be of equal pertinence. Some have more impact on the prospective enlistee and others bear more on the decision to remain in the Service. However, all of them are career considerations worthy of evaluation and apply, for the most part, equally to Active forces as well as Reserve forces.

PRESTIGE

The opinion Research Corporation conducted a study in August 1969 to determine how the Army is regarded by the Public in general and by Army Veterans and High School Educators in particular. The findings of the study clearly indicate that the Army's reputation for prestige is its weakest area. A substantial majority of those interviewed rate the Army as the worst service and consider it much less attractive than a civilian career. Only 13 percent of the general public said they would recommend enlistment in the Army to a friend or relative. The reasons given for the Army's unfavorable image were varied but usually related to low pay, living conditions, personal hardships, danger, less opportunity for advancement and regimentation. Many people believe the Army has lower standards of enlistment and that it attracts people who cannot make it in civilian life.³

The Army lacks glamour. The soldier is often pictured in the minds of the public as a poor, unlucky grunt who spends his time peeling potatoes, being shot at and sleeping in the mud. The image of the Army has been further damaged in recent years by reports of crimes ranging from theft to mass murder and involving privates and generals alike. The anti-war, anti-military and anti-establishment attitudes so prevalent today certainly have not improved our image any. In fact, the Army, because it represents the draft, has received the brunt of the current wave of hostility.

Prestige, glamour, social status, or whatever you choose to call it does not appear to be an Army asset. The facts clearly indicate that a young man seeking a prestigious occupation will look to the civilian establishment first, to the other services next and only as a last resort to the Army. Although prestige is but one of the factors considered in job selection it is nevertheless an important one.

WORKING CONDITIONS

Working conditions vary considerably from job to job both in the Army and in the civilian community. However, on the whole, the civilian is much better off than the soldier. Most civilians work eight hours a day, five days a week. They work the same hours every day and are free on weekends. If and when they work longer, they are paid for it. While there are some 8 to 5 jobs in the Army, they are relatively few in number and difficult to find.

Soldiers, especially those in the Combat Arms, do much of their work outdoors and a good deal of it at night. The degree of discomfort varies according to the type of work and the weather conditions. With the exception of certain occupations, civilian working conditions are closely monitored by labor unions and may be characterized as pleasant and safe. Furthermore there is less physical exertion associated with most civilian jobs than with the military.

Another unfavorable aspect of working conditions in the Army is the inequity within the Service itself. An Infantryman participating in extended field exercises and working around the clock, receives no more compensation than a soldier of equal rank working an eight hour shift in an air-conditioned office or hospital.

LIVING CONDITIONS

Much has been written and said about the need to improve living conditions in the Service. At a Pentagon briefing on 14 October 1970, Roger T. Kelley, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, said:

Housing is something that has too often been neglected in the face of budget pressures. People who are made to endure family separations when assigned to overseas posts unaccompanied by families are entitled to a decent family renewal when they return to the States, and too often this is not possible.

We regard the housing situation as a critical area, and one that needs a considerable amount of attention and investment in terms of problems that we face.⁴

The prospective enlistee who happens to be married faces long and often frequent family separations and inadequate housing facilities. He is not eligible for Government housing nor is his quarters allowance of \$60 per month adequate for living but off post slum dwelling. Additionally, personnel turbulence as a result of our commitment in Vietnam, has imposed other hardships on married personnel. The mobility of military families in recent years has often resembled that of the migrant worker. Government

dislocation allowances, though helpful, do little to compensate for personal inconvenience, to say nothing about the disruption of dependent education. Civilian jobs requiring the relocation of the employee and his family are the exception not the rule and certainly do not occur on a continuing basis. Admittedly, the negative aspects of family housing, separation, and dislocation are of little concern to the young single high school graduates who might be thinking about joining the Army. However, they too will be subjected to unfavorable living conditions. A young man used to sleeping in his own room or perhaps sharing one with a brother and in the habit of bathing in privacy can hardly be expected to find noisy, overcrowded facilities and an almost complete lack of privacy attractive.

No discussion of Army life would be complete without at least a mention of field duty. While sleeping in the field may have a certain appeal for many, the novelty soon wears off in inclement weather.

Veterans, and especially Vietnam veterans are critical of Army living conditions. Considerably more say Army housing is unsatisfactory than satisfactory. Whether justified or not, the impression of the general public concerning living conditions in the Army is unfavorable.⁵ To many civilians, the Army means the Infantry and the Infantry means "C" rations and mud. Extensive television coverage of our troops in Vietnam has tended to reinforce this erroneous image.

HARDSHIPS AND HAZARDS

The Vietnam conflict has focused much unfavorable criticism on the Armed Forces in general and on the Army in particular. Combat operations and resulting casualties receive daily national coverage. Accounts of the war are often distorted, biased or blown all out of proportion. The impressions created by a distorted account are rarely dislodged by a subsequent correction or clarification. Sensational events are overemphasized while activities that are meaningful to a complete understanding of the situation are ignored. Catchy phrases such as "Hamburger Hill" are used by some reporters in an obvious attempt to capture the imagination of the public and thereby "sell" their articles.

No mature person would deny the hardships and hazards of a soldier in combat. Few, if any, would question the right of the American public to be kept informed on the Vietnam conflict. Doubtless, competition between news agencies, deadline pressures and conflicting battle reports account for many factual errors that lead to erroneous reporting. This is particularly true of television newscasts due to the critical time element. Unfortunately, for millions of Americans the networks are the sole source of national and world news. An estimated 40 million Americans watch one of the three major network newscasts every night.⁶

The impact is obvious. To many Americans, the Army is synonymous to Vietnam and Vietnam represents danger, death, injury, personal hardships and family separations. As previously mentioned,

a substantial majority of those interviewed by Opinion Research Corporation not only feel that the Army is less attractive than a civilian career but consider it as the worst Service. When asked why they felt that way, some of the typical replies were:

"The foot soldiers have to do the dirty jobs."

"It's the toughest life physically and mentally--no comforts."

"The Army gets all the leftovers from the other Services."

"They are more on the battlefield."

"I have a nephew who had his leg amputated while in Vietnam."

"The Army Infantry was one of the most dangerous of the Services."⁷

While only a relatively small percentage of the military is actually engaged in ground combat at any given time, the hardships and hazards experienced by those so engaged have made a significant impression on the public at large.

FREEDOM

When considered in its broadest context, freedom includes a wide range of factors worthy of consideration. In civilian life, a young man or woman is free to work, study or loaf. If they choose to work, they may select any field in which they are qualified or they may apply as an apprentice to learn a particular skill. By and large, they are free to work in a location of their choosing. If they don't like the job, their supervisors or associates, they can quit with little notice or difficulty. Their free time is their own and their dress is optional except in certain

occupations requiring a uniform such as the Police and Fire Departments. Again, with few exceptions they are not subject to disciplinary or punitive action in connection with job performance or conduct. True, they may be fired for violations of company policy but they cannot be restricted, fined or imprisoned. They are free to voice their opinions, live where they choose and with whom they choose.

The young soldier, on the other hand, signed a legal contract with the Government when he enlisted, committing the soldier for a number of years. Like it or not he must serve his time. He is told what to do, when to do it, and where it will be done. He is subject to stringent restrictions regarding his dress, freedom of movement, and his behavior. He is told when he may leave the post and when to return. He is subject to disciplinary action for minor infractions and a punitive discharge for more serious offenses. In today's permissive society where many of our young people have revolted against authority in any and all forms, the factor of freedom must be considered a bar to enlistment.

JOB SATISFACTION

Job satisfaction can mean different things to different people. Some men are satisfied with an easy job. Some look for excitement while others seek security. In short, there are many factors that influence the degree of satisfaction a person gets from his work. However, under normal circumstances, if a person

is given an important job, does it well and receives appropriate recognition for it, he is usually a satisfied worker.

National security and defense can certainly be considered an important job. In fact 23 percent of Army veterans interviewed by Opinion Research Corporation said that the most valuable benefit of their military service was the satisfaction of serving their country.⁸ Commendable as this may be it does not represent the majority viewpoint. Most men are more concerned with their specific duties than they are with the goals of the organization they work for. Furthermore, people tend to resent doing things that are not directly related to their specific job. Anyone who has ever asked a civilian secretary to wash the office coffee pot is aware of the problem. In this respect, the Army is at a distinct disadvantage. Kitchen police, guard duty, police call, motor stables, GI parties, inspections--all time-honored and "necessary" tasks, but nevertheless distasteful.

Other aspects of Army life which are sometimes detrimental to job satisfaction are uniformity, eye wash, and oversupervision. Today's youth is affluent, educated, and outspoken. They seek personal recognition and self-expression. Uniformity, though necessary in many cases, is often carried to the extreme. It destroys initiative and may account in part for the criticism expressed by many soldiers that they are treated as numbers rather than as individuals. Although on the decline, eye wash still represents a major source of irritation. The menial tasks usually associated with unit beautification projects are seldom challenging,

rewarding, or satisfying. The negative aspects of oversupervision are obvious and require no elaboration.

From the standpoint of job satisfaction, it appears that industry has an edge over the military.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

In a speech at the Annual Luncheon of the Association of the United States Army on 13 October 1970, General Westmoreland, Army Chief of Staff, expressed "great personal interest" in educational opportunities for Army personnel to improve themselves. He described the Army's effort in this endeavor as follows:

In the Army school system of two colleges, 20 branch schools, and 11 specialist schools, we offer over 900 different courses of instruction on a campus that is located in 17 different states. By the end of this fiscal year, we will have had 67,000 in the classroom each day of the year and will have enrolled over 350,000 servicemen in our Army school system. These courses cover a wide spectrum of academic subjects as well as skills, trades and crafts. And most of these are readily transferable to civilian pursuits.

During FY'70, 55,000 soldiers completed high school or received equivalency certificates and over 500 received baccalaureate or advanced degrees through the Army's General Education Development Program.

These were part of the 200,000 soldiers who took advantage of Army-sponsored educational opportunities--from the elementary through the university level--during the past fiscal year.

Additionally, in this period, over 38,000 who did not possess the necessary mental prerequisites entered the Army and have been given the opportunity to improve their basic education level to meet our minimum standards.

This wide participation in educational betterment is in addition to the more than 2,000 officers who are currently enrolled in the Army's advanced civil school and degree completion programs.⁹

While many civilian industries do have training programs for employees, they cannot compare with those in the military. In fact, civilian companies actively recruit personnel trained by the Army.

OPPORTUNITY FOR ADVANCEMENT

Opportunity for advancement in the Army has been excellent, at least up until now. Whether or not it will continue to be remains to be seen. While it is difficult to compare opportunities in the Army with those in civilian life because of the great variance which exists from job to job, a sizable segment of the public cites limited opportunities as one of the reasons an Army career is less attractive than a civilian career. It is interesting to note that thirty percent of the high school educators interviewed share this opinion. As one teacher puts it, "there's more chance for advancement in a civilian career if you have any initiative at all."¹⁰

It is also interesting to note that personnel surveys indicate that opportunity for advancement is one of the factors that is often mentioned by those who reenlist.¹¹

A slow down in promotions as a result of force reduction will most certainly hurt the Army in the competition for manpower. General Westmoreland sums it up this way, "if we are to attract

and, more importantly, retain young talent, reasonable opportunities for advancement must exist."¹²

Industry certainly has no monopoly on opportunity. While you may never get rich in the Army, self-improvement, professional development, and the chance for advancement are all available to the man who is willing to work for them. However, the existence of opportunity in the Army is one thing; how that opportunity is perceived by the public in general and by young men in particular is something else. In view of current public opinion, opportunity for advancement cannot be classified as a favorable factor.

TRAVEL

In discussing the things they liked most about their military service, veterans mention travel more than anything else. In the Opinion Research Corporation survey, 68 percent cited travel as one of the things they liked about their service and 43 percent listed it as the thing they enjoyed the most. By comparison, comradeship, the second most popular aspect, was mentioned by only 15 percent as being the most enjoyable.¹³

Opportunities for travel in civilian industry are limited and generally restricted to the Continental United States. While some industries offer employment in foreign countries, the likelihood of an unskilled high school graduate securing such employment is remote.

Young people have always been adventurous and today's youth are no exception. In fact, the desire to travel is more prevalent

today than ever before. The romantic appeal of distant and foreign lands is a strong attraction, especially for the young. American students can be found in almost every country; traveling at their own expense and often under the most austere conditions, but nevertheless traveling.

Travel could be a strong inducement to enlistment but it could also be a negative factor in retention. This is particularly true for the family man. Instability of assignments is a source of irritation. An unexpected and premature transfer disrupts the entire family. The problems associated with a change of station are well known and require no elaboration. Suffice it to say that travel can be either a positive or negative factor in the Army's competition for manpower.

JOB SECURITY

The matter of job security is perhaps less of an influencing factor on the young person considering his initial enlistment than it is on the individual trying to decide whether to stay in the Service or to return to civilian life. However those who do consider job security an important factor, will find the Service an attractive career. Full employment is the rule, not the exception. There are no strikes or layoffs in the military. Despite the affluence of our society, we have a high rate of unemployment. The ranks of the unemployed include not just the unskilled laborers but teachers, technicians, engineers, and other highly qualified individuals.

While job security is most certainly a plus factor for the Army, its drawing power on the average prospective enlistee is at best questionable. It is however a factor which should be fully exploited.

FRINGE BENEFITS

Fringe benefits is another area in which the military has a distinct advantage over the civilian community. While many industries do provide certain fringe benefits for their employees, they cannot, in any way, compare with the benefits available to the soldier and his family.

However, like job security, many of the benefits offered have more of an impact and influence on the retention of personnel than they do on recruiting. The target of our recruiting effort, the young bachelor, has little need or interest in commissary privileges, free medical and dental care or low cost insurance. To be sure, these benefits will take on added significance when the individual acquires a family, but initially they will have little effect as a motivating force for enlistment.

Notwithstanding the obvious advantages a family man derives from the Service, the military also offers the young single soldier many attractive benefits, such as:

Post exchange privileges.

Thirty days annual leave with full pay.

Extensive recreational facilities.

Free educational opportunities.

GI Bill advantages.

Emergency leave with pay.

Space available free air transportation.

Low cost loans in emergencies.

High interest rate savings program.

The list of military fringe benefits is extensive and it exceeds anything offered by civilian industry.

RETIREMENT

Civilian retirement programs vary from industry to industry. They range from good to nonexistent. However even the most attractive programs cannot compete favorably with the military service. Most civilian company retirement programs require employee contributions. Retirement is usually at age 65 and payments are generally much lower than those received by a soldier after only twenty years service. In addition to his retirement pay, the soldier remains entitled to all the fringe benefits available to active duty personnel. Dollar for dollar, there is no comparison between the military and industry where retirement is concerned.

It should be noted however that this is another factor which has more bearing on retention than on enlistment. Retirement benefits assume greater significance as the length of service increases.

PATRIOTISM

It is difficult to assess the drawing power of patriotism as a motivating factor in enlistment. While we have always been a patriotic people, there is a definite tendency among Americans to conceal or at least play down this aspect of their emotions. It is always a little embarrassing to be caught "waving the Flag" so to speak.

The situation is further complicated by the growth of disenchantment with the war in Vietnam. Today's youth is bombarded with anti-war, anti-military, and anti-government propaganda. National goals are criticized, patriotism is ridiculed, the American Flag is desecrated while that of our enemy is displayed defiantly by certain segments of our society. The dissent is loud, sophisticated, and impressive. It is heard from high government officials, celebrities in the entertainment world, renowned authors, journalists and educators and even from former ranking military officers. Is it any wonder then, that some men might conceal their patriotic motivation in the interest of appearing to be sophisticated?

As discussed earlier in this report, Army veterans cite satisfaction of performing a patriotic duty as one of the prime benefits of military service.¹⁴ However we could find no statistics related to the influence of patriotism on enlistment. The Gates Commission estimates that at least half of the men who enlist are "true volunteers" as opposed to those who enlist to avoid the

draft. "Such men," according to the Commission, "volunteer in spite of an entry pay that is roughly 60 percent of the amount that men of their age, education and training could earn in civilian life."¹⁵

To what extent true volunteers are motivated by patriotism is a good question. What percentage of those so motivated would admit to it, is also a good question. Unfortunately our research has failed to disclose the answers. However, based on our personal experiences, we submit that patriotism may be more of a motivating factor in attracting young people to the military than is readily discernible.

PAY

Pay is perhaps the most frequently discussed inducement to a military career. There appears to be almost complete agreement that Service pay, especially at the entry level, is not competitive with industry. In fact even the Gates Commission with its rather optimistic approach to an All-Volunteer Force concedes that:

Military compensation in the early years of service is now so low that it will not sustain an All-Volunteer Force of the quality desired. Until this condition is corrected, an All-Volunteer Force cannot be realized.¹⁶

In a recent memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense Laird said:

Early congressional action is needed on the bill that would provide a 20% increase in Base Pay for enlisted personnel with less than

two years of service, and thereby reduce the disparity between military and civilian pay at the entry level. Consideration should be given to increasing proficiency pay to combat personnel in Infantry, Artillery, and Armor units as a means of attracting more volunteers in these areas.¹⁷

The sentiments expressed by Secretary Laird and the Gates Commission appear to be shared by sizable segments of Army veterans and the general public at large.¹⁸

SUMMARY

In our evaluation of factors which may influence a young man or woman in their choice between a civilian or military career we find six factors favorable to the Army and eight unfavorable factors.

Favorable Factors

Favorable factors include travel, education and training, job security, retirement, fringe benefits, and patriotism. Travel could be a strong inducement to the young single soldier but it could also have a negative effect on the family man. Job security, retirement, and fringe benefits probably have more impact on retention than enlistment; however if they were seriously considered by the prospective enlistee, they could have a very positive influence. The drawing power of patriotism, though difficult to document or define, must be considered a plus factor for the Army.

Unfavorable Factors

Factors which tend to negate a military career are:

Prestige.

Working conditions.

Living conditions.

Hardships and hazards.

Freedom.

Job satisfaction.

Opportunity for advancement.

Pay.

While opportunity for advancement may be a positive factor as far as reenlistment is concerned, it is considered a negative factor with respect to initial enlistment. Whether it is true or not, the fact remains that in the opinion of the general public there are more opportunities for advancement in civilian life than in the military.

CHAPTER V FOOTNOTES

1. Gates Commission, p. 19.
2. Ibid., p. 49.
3. US Department of the Army, The Image of the Army (1969), pp. 22-43.
4. Kelley, p. 7.
5. Image of the Army, p. 26.
6. "Transcript of Address by Vice President Spiro T. Agnew Criticizing Television on Its Coverage of the News," New York Times, 14 November 1969, p. 24.
7. Image of the Army, p. 18.
8. Ibid., p. 79.
9. Westmoreland, pp. 2-3.
10. Image of the Army, pp. 36-37.
11. Kelley, p. 3.
12. Westmoreland, p. 2.
13. Image of the Army, pp. 80-83.
14. Ibid., pp. 76-77.
15. Gates Commission, p. 6.
16. Ibid., p. 49.
17. Laird, p. 3.
18. Image of the Army, p. x.

CHAPTER VI

WHAT CAN BE DONE

In this chapter we will attempt to identify what can be done to meet force requirements for a Volunteer Army. We will discuss means of exploiting the positive influencing factors as well as measures necessary to overcome those with a negative aspect. We will review and comment on selected actions being considered or recommended for adoption by Headquarters Department of the Army or actions already adopted as part of the Modern Volunteer Army Program. To conclude the discussion portion we will present additional ideas directed toward attaining a Modern Volunteer Army of sufficient strength and quality to meet internal and external threats and to fulfill our foreign military commitments.

The comments made relative to Headquarters Department of the Army actions, completed, considered or recommended and additional recommendations or ideas for the most part are based on research into the experiences, knowledge and opinions of the writers and do not represent thoughts and ideas of others unless so annotated.

As previously identified, factors having a negative influence on enlistment include:

Prestige.

Working conditions.

Living conditions.

Hardships and hazards.

Freedom.

Job satisfaction.

Opportunity for advancement.

Pay.

PRESTIGE

Webster defines "prestige" as "Reputation based on high achievement." The Army's reputation is its weakest area and perhaps the area most difficult to improve. To begin with, prestige is an intangible factor. Unlike other monetary incentives, it cannot be bought for a price; it must be earned through achievement. Secondly, the Army's poor reputation is without complete justification. Our image has been severely damaged by the war in Vietnam. National surveys indicate widespread disapproval of our involvement in Southeast Asia.¹ Most of the resentment has been directed against the Army. In addressing this particular issue, General Bruce Palmer, Jr., Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, firmly stated:

We need no excuses, no justification for the war. The decisions committing US forces to Southeast Asia were and still are completely civilian ones; our military leaders have simply carried out their orders to the best of their ability. We need not be abashed, we need make no apologies. There is no reason for shame, only for fierce pride.²

If indeed Webster's definition is correct, the Army should most certainly enjoy a favorable reputation. Almost two centuries of faithful and dedicated service to the Nation would appear to warrant a position of prestige. This is not to say that none of

the criticism is justified. In many respects, the Army is its worst enemy. However it is often more difficult to change an opinion based on ignorance rather than one based on facts. For example, it would be much easier to issue a warmer overcoat than it would be to try to prove that the existing coat was, in fact, just as warm. In a sense, the Army today is in somewhat the same unenviable position as the man who is asked the question, "when did you stop beating your wife?"

Selling the Modern Volunteer Army

The situation is difficult but it is certainly not hopeless. Public pride and confidence in the Army can and must be restored. We have a good product. True, it must be improved, but above all, it must be sold. Improving the attractiveness of an Army career will not in itself, do the job. Without public awareness, improvements could go unnoticed. If our product is to be competitive, it must be publicized. The support of the American people is an essential element of the concept of a Volunteer Army. In a recent speech, General Westmoreland commented:

Given the assets, the Army can sustain its forces in a high state of readiness. But it cannot long act without public support and confidence. This fundamental relationship between the Army and society is a vital element of national power. To be effective in today's world, our Army needs public support and confidence. The survival of our nation demands it.³

If we are to gain public support and confidence, we must, among other things, initiate a massive public information program.

No effort should be spared in combating the adverse publicity the Army has received in recent years. The program should be extensive, straightforward, and dynamic. It should stress our long and dedicated tradition of service to the Nation, the favorable aspects of Army life, and the unique qualifications of its members. The program must be designed to capture the imagination of the 18 and 19 year old high school senior or graduate and the respect of those in a position of influence such as parents and teachers. The existing image of inefficiency must be replaced by one of professionalism. The Army should be portrayed as a modern, challenging, and elite organization, proud of its people, and interested in their welfare. In short, we should tell our story; we should tell it forcefully and with pride.

In the same speech, previously referred to, General Westmoreland said:

By far the Army's greatest single asset is its people, who are now as experienced as they ever have been in recent history.⁴

Personal Appearance

A recent change in uniform policy authorizes enlisted men to wear the Army green uniform with white shirt and black bow tie at social functions.⁵ The purpose is to provide a more formal uniform for lower grades who cannot afford to buy dress blues. Why not issue the blues? The benefits would far exceed the cost. After all it is the people in the lower grades who have the greatest impact on the public. In the first place, there are more of them

and secondly they have the closest ties with the young men and women we are interested in. A young soldier wearing a well tailored dress blue uniform home on leave and perhaps visiting his high school could have more of an effect on improving the Army's image than we might realize. The Army has the assets and should use them to its best advantage.

WORKING CONDITIONS

It is highly unlikely that we could ever compete favorably with industry insofar as working conditions are concerned. This is particularly true in the Combat Arms. The nature of our mission dictates long and often irregular hours. The 8 to 5 job in the Army is the exception, certainly not the rule. Additionally, much of the soldier's work involves a certain amount of physical exertion and is generally performed out doors. So long as wars are fought around the clock and without regard to weather, the nature of our training must parallel those conditions.

Stop the "Mickey Mouse"

This is not to say conditions cannot be improved. There is always room for improvement. For one thing, training requirements and schedules must be frequently reviewed for pertinence. The time expended in training must be justified by the results achieved. The old saying, "you can't fool the troops," is more true today than ever before. Soldiers instinctively know when they are merely being "kept busy." A night exercise is much more palatable

if it develops necessary skills than if it simply satisfies a statistical requirement for a certain percentage of training to be conducted at night.

A major step in the right direction was General Westmoreland's recent announcement that Saturday morning activity should not be scheduled when that same activity could be accomplished just as effectively during the week.⁶ While a 5 day week will not always be possible, the old 5 1/2-6 days week was certainly not always necessary.

Improved working conditions will have more impact on retention than enlistment. However, the more men the Army can retain the less it will have to recruit. The task of improving working conditions in the Army rests squarely on the shoulders of every commander and supervisor throughout the establishment.

LIVING CONDITIONS

The shortage of adequate housing for military personnel is a well established fact.⁷ The need for improvement is obvious. The desire for improvement within the military establishment is very evident. The technical know-how is available. Only one thing is missing--the money. If significant improvements are to be made in this area, funds must be made available.

Improved Living Areas

There are, however, several areas which can be improved without additional resources. The drawdown of troops in Vietnam should

permit us to stabilize assignments and to reduce family separations. While this may not have a direct influence on enlistment, it will have a favorable impact on retention. Additionally, an Army-wide program is required to eliminate unnecessary restrictions regarding the storage and display of personal articles. Within reason, troops should be permitted a greater degree of individuality in their sleeping areas. A concerted effort must be made at all levels of command to provide as much privacy as possible for the individual soldier. For example, self-help programs could be employed to construct partitions for the larger squad rooms. Dining areas, especially those in large consolidated mess halls, can be made more attractive. Movable partitions can add warmth to the mess and yet not interfere with cleaning. Improvements along these lines are not restricted by a lack of funds; they are limited only by the imagination.

There is not a great deal that can be done to improve living conditions in the field other than strict enforcement of existing regulations. With the exception of combat situations, the period of time spent in the field is not extensive. Furthermore, hardships are much easier to endure if a decent, comfortable, and attractive billet is available to return to upon completion of the exercise.

Make the Public Aware of Improvements

Another area requiring attention is related to the attitude of the American people. The impression of the general public

concerning living conditions in the Army is unfavorable.⁸ Much of this unfavorable impression is based on television coverage of the war in Vietnam and on a rather widespread ignorance of Army life in general. An indication of the latter is the number of "care packages" received by troops stationed in a peacetime environment; such as CONUS or Europe. Undoubtedly, many soldiers tend to exaggerate the discomfort of their living conditions for personal reasons. To hear some civilians talk, one might think the soldier spends all of his time in a fox hole. In any event the Army should set the record straight. Here again the need for a comprehensive public information program is clearly indicated.

HARDSHIPS AND HAZARDS

There is little argument that the hardships and hazards of military service are generally greater than those found in civilian industry. How serious a deterrent to enlistment this may be is difficult to determine with any degree of accuracy. No doubt it will have a greater deterrent effect during periods of armed conflict than in peacetime. Unfortunately, it is during these periods when Service needs are the greatest. A subcommittee on the Senate's Judiciary Committee put the problem this way: "Staffing the Military Establishment is not a typical employment problem, because of the singular circumstance that fighting may be part of the job."⁹

Disparity of Hardships and Hazards

A further extension of the problem is found in the disparity of hardships and hazards between and within the various services. In acknowledging this disparity, the Gates Commission has recommended that the maximum level of hostile fire pay be increased to \$200 per month. This level of pay would be "restricted to those who in the course of their duties are regularly exposed to hostile fire and only for the period of such exposure."¹⁰

The recommendation is sound. Army combat forces are more than deserving of this monetary reward. However commendable the recommendation may be, its power to induce enlistment is highly questionable. In the first place, and in the words of the Commission, "the specific number of individuals who will serve under such extreme hazardous conditions is likely to be small."¹¹ Secondly, payment is forthcoming only during periods of exposure. No allowance is made for the hardships and hazards the soldier experiences during "normal" periods. He receives no more compensation than his contemporaries in the Navy or Air Force. It is no wonder that only the Army and occasionally the Marines had to rely on the draft to fill their quotas during the Vietnam conflict.¹²

Combat Arms Pay

To attract quality personnel into the Combat Arms, the Army must offer, as a minimum, adequate monetary inducement. One approach might be to award a \$50 savings bond to each Combat Arms

member each month. In order to encourage saving, the bonds could be a special series requiring that they be held for a minimum of three years. Such a procedure may provide an appropriate inducement and would benefit the government at the same time. Another possibility would be to provide proficiency pay of \$150 a month to Combat Arms enlisted personnel.

FREEDOM

Authority, discipline, and regimentation are essential ingredients of any military organization. All three are under attack in today's permissive society. General Kerwin describes it this way:

The personal values of our young people appear to be changing. On the surface we can assume that pleasure is in; self-sacrifice is out. Challenging authority is in; automatic respect for authority is out. The choice to participate is in; unquestioned compliance with orders is out. Skepticism is in; traditional attitudes are out.¹³

Patience and Understanding

The situation is difficult but it is not hopeless. Recognizing that these attitudes exist, we must identify and eliminate outdated, unnecessary, and degrading practices. Military order and discipline can and must be maintained without repressing individuality or resorting to personal indignities. Greater freedom must be provided for enlisted personnel during their off-duty periods. Commanders at all levels must exercise more patience

in explaining the reasons for their demands. Respect and understanding must be instilled along with discipline. A soldier who understands the purpose and importance of a job and who has respect for his leaders is generally well satisfied and more productive.

In the final analysis it simply boils down to leadership, common sense, and compassion. While these measures, in themselves, will not overcome the natural distaste for discipline and regimentation, they will certainly help to reduce resentment in this area.

JOB SATISFACTION

The significance of job satisfaction as an influencing factor cannot be overstated. As Lieutenant General Kerwin puts it:

In the final analysis, we cannot reach our goals unless the Army is, in fact, a good place to work, where young people of ability can meet their needs for a challenging and meaningful career.

Job satisfaction is the cornerstone of an effective personnel program. Not only must the soldier be content in his job and in his surroundings; the job he is assigned must offer him a challenge and an opportunity to advance. If today's soldier does not find "Meaning" in his job, and satisfaction in it, he will go elsewhere.¹⁴

Importance of a Worthwhile Cause

Voluntary participation in the National Service Program (Peace Corps, Vista, etc.) clearly illustrates the drawing power of job satisfaction. In 1968, approximately 250,000 full-time participants were involved in the program.¹⁵ Participation is certainly

not motivated by monetary gain. Volunteers feel they are making an important contribution to a worthwhile cause. In effect, this is the essence of job satisfaction.

Today's youth has shown a desire to participate in what they consider to be worthwhile causes. If the Army can capitalize on this desire to participate, half the battle is won. Here again the burden rests with commanders at all levels. For example, oversupervision can cause more dissatisfaction than anything else. No one likes to have his boss looking over his shoulder. Granted, initial results may be less than desired but in the long run, efficiency as well as satisfaction will increase. Traditional procedures must be reevaluated. Inefficient or unproductive practices must be revised or eliminated. A company should not be used to police an area where several men could accomplish the same results. Menial tasks must be kept to a minimum consistent with mission accomplishment, sanitation, and safety. If civilian labor is available at reasonable cost, it should be used. This is particularly true in the mess hall. Where civilian labor is not available, equitable duty rosters must be maintained to insure that everyone pulls his fair share of the load.

Unit or a Labor Pool?

In many respects, line units are often treated as labor pools. The requirements come down from higher headquarters and the companies provide the "bodies." If a company commander complains, he is told that things are tough all over and that everyone is in

the same boat. Unfortunately, it is usually true. "Have six men and an NCO report to post headquarters on the double; brigade wants a jeep and driver at 1300; we need an escort officer right away; don't forget that detail for the S-4 first thing in the morning; where are those two people I asked for?" Unless and until this situation is corrected the Army will continue to have problems insofar as job satisfaction is concerned.

OPPORTUNITY FOR ADVANCEMENT

As previously discussed, the problem here is not so much the lack of opportunity for advancement but rather the negative manner in which that opportunity is perceived by the general public. The Army has always made a sincere effort to develop its people to their maximum potential. Career management programs are constantly being expanded and improved. Opportunity and advancement are based on ability without regard to sex, race, creed, or religion. In fact, the Army has always been the forerunner in race relations. Officer candidate schools, noncommissioned officer academies, flight training and warrant officer programs are but a few of the opportunities available to the enterprising individual.

Advertise Advancement Opportunities

The opportunity for advancement is a very important consideration in job selection. It is obvious the public is not fully aware of the opportunities which are available in the Army. If the Army doesn't tell them, who will? Civilian industries

constantly advertise their opportunities. While the Army cannot compete on the same scale, it certainly can and must present an accurate picture of opportunity as it exists. As a minimum, a well prepared pamphlet should be published listing the opportunities that are available and the prerequisites. The pamphlet should be directed at and provided to high school students and educators. Such a pamphlet may not cause a run on recruiting stations but it should improve the Army's image and stimulate some interest. That in itself would make the effort worthwhile.

PAY

There is universal agreement that military pay must be increased if we are to attract sufficient personnel to sustain a Volunteer Army. Numerous proposals have been made and are currently under study. One plan as reported by Army Times proposes a weekly salary of \$100 for a private E-1 with less than four months service. An E-2 would draw \$110; E-3's would receive \$115; E-4's would get \$120, and an E-5, with less than two years service would be paid \$125 a week.¹⁶

The Gates Commission, starting with an assumption that there would be an across-the-board increase of 8 percent on 1 July 1970, recommended that the average level of base pay for enlisted men with less than two years service be increased to \$115 a month effective 1 July 1970.¹⁷ The assumption proved incorrect and the recommendation has not been enacted.

Secretary of Defense Laird supports a bill that would provide a 20 percent increase in base pay for enlisted personnel with less than two years service. According to Secretary Laird this would "reduce the disparity between military and civilian pay at the entry level."¹⁸

Increased Pay is Not the Total Solution

These are but a few of the recommendations that have been proposed. All of them have merit; some more than others; each would be an improvement but none has been acted upon. A pay increase, by itself, will not attract the kind of men needed, but without it, all other measures will prove futile. Unfortunately, this is an area over which the Army has little if any control.

The old saying that, "you only get what you pay for," applies equally as well to the Army. Most proposals appear to be based on the assumption that the problem can be solved by simply raising the entrance pay to a level equal to that of a comparable civilian job. That assumption may prove to be invalid. Young people who are not particularly motivated toward military service are unlikely to accept the discipline and restrictions of Army life for the same pay they can earn in the civilian labor market. Men who are interested in the service will no doubt find a competitive pay scale a strong inducement to enlist; however, the big question is, into which service will they enlist? The Army is considered the least desirable of the services and yet it needs the greatest number of people. If the Army is to get the

number of men needed it may well have to offer higher wages than its competitors. This is especially true for recruitment into the Combat Arms. The alternatives are a lowering of enlistment standards or a limited reliance on the draft. The first alternative is totally unacceptable and the latter is undesirable. Current proposals are most certainly a step in the right direction but only the first step.

POSITIVE FACTORS

Factors which tend to favor enlistment and/or retention are travel, education and training, job security, retirement, fringe benefits, and patriotism. These are assets which should be exploited to the fullest.

It is surprising how little the average civilian actually knows about his Army. For years he has been subjected to an almost endless stream of distortion. Too often the Army has been depicted as either a slapstick, inefficient organization, an oppressed and corrupt society, or as a bloodthirsty mob on a suicidal mission. The Army has been exploited by films, books, cartoons, television, and above all, the press.

A Credible and Massive Public Information Program

A public information program is not only indicated, but essential. In presenting the Army's story, public information releases should emphasize the positive side of Army life. The television series entitled "Your man in . . . ," which depicts

service life in foreign countries, is an excellent example of what is needed. A syndicated question and answer column should be considered to address such things as fringe benefits available to the serviceman and his family. A well conceived pamphlet detailing educational opportunities, career development, and the availability and prerequisites of military schooling to acquire occupational skills, should be made available to high school students and educators. Every means of communication should be utilized. A conscientious effort must be made to show the American public what their Army is all about and what it has to offer to those who qualify.

Only through information and education can the Army establish the broad support needed to sustain a Volunteer Army. General Westmoreland recently commented:

We cannot attract the kind of soldier we need into an organization denigrated by some, directly attacked by others, and halfheartedly supported by many.¹⁹

Much of the attitude referred to by General Westmoreland is a result of distortion and misinformation. An honest, factual and straightforward presentation of the positive side of Army life will certainly help to correct this situation.

COMMENTS ON SELECTED HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY ACTIONS FOR THE MVAP

The next few pages of the study are used as a vehicle for the authors to take a look at some of the actions completed,

recommended for implementation or under consideration by DA and which are directed toward reaching the goal of a Modern Volunteer Army.

Our comments are not intended to offend, embarrass or give the impression that we are "Monday morning quarterbacking" the efforts of the Army Project Volunteer Study Group. We are merely expressing a subjective view of selected actions using as our guide our knowledge, experience, and opinion. We do so without the benefit of whatever guidance the Army Project Volunteer Study Group may have received before making their recommendations.

Grouping of DA Actions

While we are commenting on only a selected few actions, a complete listing of some 215 DA actions directed toward a Modern Volunteer Army is at Appendix 2. The actions are divided into the following groupings:

Group I: Actions implemented to date (31 December 1970).

Group II: First Priority Actions Recommended for Implementation--No Cost.

Group III: Second Priority Actions Under Consideration--No Cost.

Group IV: First Priority Actions Recommended for Implementation Requiring Additional Funds.

Group V: Second Priority Actions Under Consideration Requiring Additional Funds.

ACTIONS IMPLEMENTED TO DATE

<u>ACTION NUMBER*</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
I-8	<u>Authorized Full-Time Career Counselors at Battalion Level.</u> <u>COMMENT</u> An excellent and much needed action, however of very little value unless the trained personnel are made available to fill the newly authorized spaces. Additionally, spaces must be allocated and provided to each battalion commander in addition to those now authorized. Our experience shows that commanders are not willing to divert currently authorized or manning level spaces from mission essential positions to meet requirements of every new idea of higher levels of command, e.g., Safety NCO, Career Counselor, Information NCO, and R&R NCO. Unless trained personnel and additional spaces are provided to the commander, this action will have very little effect on efforts to reach the Modern Volunteer Army goal.
I-13	<u>Increased Flow of Uncommitted Enlistments for Regular Army Unassigned to Combat Arms.</u> <u>COMMENT</u> If this action is meant to encourage enlistment for a specific commitment it appears to be worthwhile. If not and it is merely a way to push enlistees who are RA unassigned into the less desirable jobs in the Army, we disagree with this action without reservation. The Combat Arms vacancies must be filled, but the fill should be on a voluntary basis using whatever incentives are necessary to meet strength goals.
I-19	<u>Publicized Early Release Program for Personnel Serving in Short Tours.</u> <u>COMMENT</u>

*Corresponds to Group and Action number as listed in Appendix 2, i.e., I-8 refers to Action #8 under Group I.

It hardly seems appropriate to encourage early release of soldiers when current efforts are directed toward retention. If this action is intended to encourage extension in short tour areas so that the soldier will be eligible for early release on return to CONUS, it should be stated in such positive terms.

I-42

Removed \$10,000 Limit on Soldier's Deposits for Personnel who are PW, Missing in Action, or Detained During an Armed Conflict with an Enemy of the United States.

COMMENT

A step in the right direction; however, of little value to the Modern Volunteer Army Program. This section applies to only an infinitesimal part of the Army. To make this action a bigger step in the right direction, action should be taken to lift the \$10,000 limit for all members of the Army regardless of their place of duty, i.e., overseas or in CONUS. Deposit should be limited only by the amount of pay a member receives each month plus any bonuses received.

Action should also be taken to permit a depositor to withdraw all or a portion of his savings as desired without undue restrictions and delay. Computation and payment of interest could follow emergency withdrawals.

FIRST PRIORITY ACTIONS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPLEMENTATION
NO COSTS

II-8

Accept more Personnel with Civilian Acquired Skills at Higher Enlisted Grades.

COMMENT

This action would provide invaluable assistance in getting the quality manpower required for a Modern Volunteer Army. Grade determination should be limited to specialist and include enlistment at any pay grade commensurate with the individual's skill. The effectiveness of this program will depend on a reevaluation of the comparative rights and privileges of specialists and NCOs. While the Army is expected to pay an enlistee for the skills and knowledge he possesses, it can hardly be expected to extend to the newly enlisted specialist, untrained and ignorant in the ways of the Army, the

same privileges and recognition extended to the professional NCOs.

II-23 Increase quotas for WAC recruiting in the fields of Medical Service, Automatic Data Processing, and Photography.

COMMENT

This is a surprisingly cautious and limited step for an organization looking for new and dynamic ways to fill its ranks. Whatever the rationale behind limiting expansion of recruitment quotas to the three fields stated, it appears that the Army failed to recognize that WACs are capable of performing just about any job a male can perform, including heretofore all male specialties.

Use of WACs in All-Male Units

We are not advocating use of WACs as infantrymen, armor crewmen, artillery crewmen, and the like. But, we do submit that there are many positions, not now filled with WACs, which can be filled with WACs without regard to location or type of unit.

Increased WAC Authorization

Colonel Bettie Morden, Office of the Director of WAC, indicated that the current 12,400 WAC enlisted strength limitation established by the Secretary of the Army was currently being reviewed and may be increased as much as 80 percent in the near future.²⁰ The possibility of a 9,000 increase in the WAC authorization is a step in the right direction. However, the expected increase is hardly enough to realize the full potential of the vast number of females eligible to enlist in the Modern Volunteer Army.²¹

50,000 (✓) WACs

Colonel Morden further stated that while she did not agree with our rather liberal approach for utilization of WACs she was in full agreement that WACs could be put to wider use. She further stated that if given the force level authority and the funds for advertising she would have no difficulty in recruiting two, three, or four times the current WAC strength. The only stumbling blocks seen in expansion of the WAC strength, other

than those previously mentioned, were lack of training facilities and billets.²²

Flexible Response

There is no question that there would be problems with an expanded use of WACs. But, should the Army risk failure in reaching the Modern Volunteer Army goals because it isn't flexible enough to meet the problems with workable solutions? We hope not.

- II-27 Improved the troop menu Army-wide to include more of the foods and the methods of feeding which the troops desire. Consider brunch feeding, the serving of hamburgers and soft drinks on the weekends and more short order meals.

COMMENT

This is an excellent idea if followed in moderation. Left to its own course this action could lead to soldiers who are not physically fit or mentally alert because of improper diet. This action will require close scrutiny by qualified dietitians.

- II-52 Subject to further study, authorize the retirement benefits of eligible reservists who die before retirement be paid their beneficiaries.

COMMENT

This recommendation should be expanded to include payment of retirement benefits to dependents of retirees, Regular or Reserve, who die while in retirement.

SECOND PRIORITY ACTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION NO COSTS

- III-3 Insert a six-month probational period in each enlistment contract. This would enable the government to eliminate militants, dissidents, and nonproductive Category IV personnel from the service.

COMMENT

This is an excellent idea; but, it is not new.²³ Regardless of its vintage, this action is certainly one of the type we are sure General Westmoreland expected when he told those responsible for developing a Modern Volunteer Army "to attack the problem /MVAP/ with all the vigor and imagination and enthusiasm we can muster."²⁴

Our enthusiasm for this action is accompanied by several caveats: separation must be within the authority of a commander with GCM authority and must not require complicated, time consuming boards or administrative details; the person being separated must not enjoy the privileges and benefits of a man who is separated under honorable or general conditions; and the separatee should not receive a discharge certificate as we know it today, but should be provided with "probational release" papers

- III-8 Delegate waiver approval authority to Headquarters US Army Recruiting Command for enlistment of personnel with certain offenses now requiring decision at Department of the Army level.

COMMENT

An action of questionable value to the Modern Volunteer Army Program. Assuming this action is directed toward offenses above the "traffic ticket" variety and is meant to include repeated juvenile offenders, simple assault offenders and the like, we see this action as a danger to maintaining a high level of quality required by the Modern Volunteer Army. Our position is based on the rationale that a headquarters, in this case USAREC, having been given a numerical enlistment objective should not be given an authority which would allow that objective to be met by enlistment of sub-standard personnel. Our position is further justified by the fact that USAREC does not have the responsibility to train and discipline those men entering the Army under waiver. Enlistment standards must remain at a high level and be rigorously enforced.

- III-14 Allow all military personnel, after ALT, to live off the post if they so desire.

COMMENT

It is obvious that the perpetrator of this suggestion did not take into consideration General Westmoreland's comments on Professionalism and the Modern Volunteer Army, when the general stated, in part: "I want to make very clear that we are engaged in a development program--not a 'give away' program. We want to build units around the qualities of competence, confidence and teamwork."²⁵

Consideration must also be given to the Gates Commission finding that closer relationship between the military and civilian communities "may have an adverse effect on morale in the military." The Commission rationalized their comment with the following statement: "By working and living together, servicemen develop a rapport which is very important in combat. One cost of having more civil-military integration may be a less effective defense establishment."²⁶

It is incomprehensible to see how the Army can build a unit of the type desired by allowing all unit members to live off post, miles from their contemporaries and without regard to their health and welfare. In addition to detracting from unit competence, confidence and teamwork several other problems are inherent in the actions proposed:

1. Planning for military construction would be more difficult because there would be no way of predicting the number of AIT graduates who would elect to live off post.

2. Single personnel living off post would likely live in less desirable quarters and neighborhoods for financial reasons. For the same reason they would probably eat something less than the wholesome meals designed to keep the soldier physically and mentally ready to meet the demands of his or her position. This is particularly true for those men whose specialities demand above average strength, endurance and alertness, e.g., Paratrooper, Infantryman, and Armor Crewman.

3. Units with alert missions would have an almost impossible task to assemble the required number of personnel to meet mission requirements in a short period of time.

FIRST PRIORITY ACTIONS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPLEMENTATION
REQUIRING ADDITIONAL FUNDS

- IV-22 Adopt a salary system for military personnel in order to achieve and maintain pay comparability with civil service and private enterprises. Pending establishment of a salary concept, adjust basic pay, basic allowance for quarters and allowance for subsistence to comparable standards.

COMMENT

Regardless of the fancy title given to a soldier's pay--gross pay, salary or whatever--if it is to be an effective incentive to attract and retain men and women in the Modern Volunteer Army, it must put more money in the hands of the soldier. Not more money to be paid back to the Army for services rendered, but more money for the soldier to spend on pass or on leave.

If this action plans to increase military pay by "paying" each soldier a BAQ, subsistence allowance, a 6.5 percent increase for retirement payments and a tax differential as proposed by the Hubell Pay Task Force²⁷ then it behooves those authorized to take such action to reconsider. To pay a soldier more money only to collect it back again because government quarters and subsistence are furnished is a farce and an insult to the intelligence of each member of the US Army.

If this is a valid action and its purpose is to "prove" to all that soldiers make as much money as civilians, then consideration should be given to the following concept of gross pay or salary:

1. Increase BAQ and subsistence payments to an amount more in line with the actual cost if a member were required to rent a room with bath and buy all of his meals in a civilian cafeteria or restaurant.
2. Include in the monthly salary the value of any medical or dental services received during that month. The price of such service to be determined based on the average cost for such services in civilian medical facilities.
3. Include in the monthly salary the value of SGLI, the value of savings realized at the post exchange, the post theater, post barber shop, Class VI store, and on and on.

4. Include 6.5 percent for retired pay costs and an amount for tax advantage because the member must now pay taxes on the allowances previously not paid or tax free.

5. Deduct all value added items and retirement pay costs from the gross pay or salary so that the soldier doesn't have an increase in net pay. He will however, be able to tell his friends and family how much his civilian friends would have to make to live as well as he does.

A more logical approach, if we are interested in touting the dollar value of Army service would be to include in the booklet referred to in Action IV-16, Appendix 2, some average dollar values of Army fringe benefits. The dollar value information can also be printed on the reverse side of the Army pay voucher. This approach will allow the Army to accomplish the same purpose as the salary concept without going through the "I'll pay you so you can pay me" routine.

IV-24 Establish barracks space and furniture standards equal to that authorized by the Department of Defense.

IV-25 Utilize portable or temporary partitions to provide privacy in barracks with open bays.

COMMENT

We agree with these actions; however, the proposed action to permit all AIT graduates to live off post (Action III-14) is in direct opposition to this effort. These actions are in line with the MVA goal of building a more professional Army, an Army with cohesion and esprit de corps capable of fulfilling its missions. Action III-14 is dedicated to an Army of "civilians" who come to the military installation at 0800 and leave at 1700--or sooner if they can avoid retreat--to return to their low priced hovels.

IV-31 Authorize "Space Required" travel aboard military carriers for personnel stationed overseas on three year tours who desire to visit CONUS on leave. Limit to one authorization per three year tour.

COMMENT

This action should be expanded to provide a "space required" trip to all Active Army personnel at least once each three year period. The destination of the trip would be limited to areas normally serviced by military or government carriers.

- IV-33 Relax quarters clearance procedures with the eventual goal of DOD defraying all costs.

COMMENT

Another excellent fringe benefit; however, care must be exercised to make occupants responsible for other than fair wear and tear on the quarters. Without strict control standards, Army housing areas and quarters would quickly turn into the "garrison ghettos" of tomorrow.

- IV-43 Offer reservists a \$100 Reenlistment Bonus and a \$100 Bonus for each year of satisfactory service.

COMMENT

The proposed action has some merit; however, it is questionable whether the proposed payment is large enough to meet reserve force goals. In this connection, General Wilson, National Guard Bureau stated: "We are running a sample survey of 15 states on the proposal of a reenlistment bonus and indications are that this would certainly help. The amount would not be so great as to offset savings in training costs, but a useful bonus should probably be greater than the \$100 a year that has been proposed in a pending bill in the House of Representatives."²⁸

One hundred dollars reenlistment and yearly bonus was probably adequate prior to announcement of the "first line reinforcement" role of the reserves by Secretary Laird and the planned zero draft posture.²⁹ With the loss of the reserves' greatest enlistment incentive, safety from active duty and conflict with the enemy in Vietnam, the Army is now faced with offering a larger inducement to encourage reenlistment. Money alone won't do the job, but it will help.

SECOND PRIORITY ACTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION
REQUIRING ADDITIONAL FUNDS

V-10 Establish a variable cost-of-living allowance to supplement regular high cost CONUS areas.

COMMENT

This action is long overdue.

V-14 Increase SGLI to \$20,000.

COMMENT

Consideration should be given to increasing SGLI to an amount equal to that recommended by reputable insurance companies. Minimum amount of insurance could be \$20,000 with higher amounts and higher premiums for personnel in higher grades and with larger families. For example:

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Number of Dependents</u>	<u>Amount of Insurance</u>
2LT	One	\$29,000
1LT	Two	44,000
CPT	Three	55,500
MAJ	Three or more	65,500
LTC	Three or more	70,500 ³⁰

Are There Any New Ideas?

With 215 actions and recommendations already on the board, plus some suggestions offered in our review of the DA actions and recommendations one may surmise that every stone has been turned. Such is not the case nor should it be the case in the foreseeable future.

The Army's professionals are its greatest asset and mainstay in reaching the Modern Volunteer Army goals. Personal innovations, recommendations, revival of old ideas and positive reaction to

recommendations offered by subordinates, regardless of how unconventional they may seem, will be the determining factor in the success of the MVAP.

With this in mind we present the following ideas. They serve to point to just a few of the many possibilities still open for consideration by the Office of Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army.

1. Direct government loans to military members for housing.

- a. Provide government loans to military members to purchase housing. Government loans would be low interest loans, e.g., 1 to 2 percent per annum.

- b. This "no cost" action would produce three significant benefits:

- (1) The military member would realize another fringe benefit, thus making military service more attractive.

- (2) The military member and his family would have the opportunity to become first-class citizens capable of owning property in a suitable neighborhood, at reasonable cost, thus increasing desirability of Army service and adding to the prestige of the Army.

- (3) Low interest rate loans should increase building or purchase of homes by military members. The requirement for construction of government family housing units should be reduced accordingly. This benefit is significant in that at the present rate of family housing construction it will take approximately 40 years to meet our quarters requirements.³¹

c. The provision of the low interest rate loan would be in lieu of the variable cost-of-living allowance referred to in DA Action V-10 if the member's home is in the area in which he is stationed.

2. Expand post exchange services to include provisions for the member to purchase any item at cost not to exceed 10 percent, e.g., cars, furniture, appliances, tires, sporting goods, quality clothing, and other personal needs not sold by the PX. This is a "no cost" action with big dividends.

3. Construct self-supporting, nonprofit, first-class Armed Forces Recreation Centers at resort areas throughout the United States similar to those now in Germany and planned for Hawaii. These centers would be designed to provide low cost recreation for military members and their families or guests. The number and location of these centers would have to be determined by further study, but worthy of consideration are areas such as Aspen, Colorado; Stowe, Vermont; Miami, Florida; New Orleans, Louisiana; New York, New York; Virginia Beach, Virginia; Las Vegas, Nevada; and Lake Geneva, Wisconsin.

4. Enlistment Bonus.

a. Consider payment of an enlistment bonus, in lieu of continued pay increases to induce men and women to enlist.

b. Such bonuses should become progressively higher as the length of the enlistment increases. Example:

\$1000 a year for the first three years.

\$1200 a year for each year over three years up to and including six years.

\$1500 a year for each year over six years up to and including twelve years--maximum bonus not to exceed \$15,600.

c. The enlistment bonus would be payable in lump sum after the enlistee completes the six-month probation period (DA Action III-3) or could be placed in Soldier's Deposit. If the latter is selected, the enlistee could elect to receive a monthly amount as he desires, could change his payment election at least once each year and should be able to withdraw portions of the total deposited as required.

d. The enlistment bonus would not replace the current reenlistment bonus which would continue to be paid at a rate to be determined.

5. Provide added incentive for Reserve personnel to enlist and reenlist. Some incentive ideas not previously mentioned in this paper are:

a. Consider enlistment bonus for Reserve enlistments.

b. Consider extending medical support to members of the Reserve and their families.

c. Consider providing "space required" travel aboard military carriers once every five years to anywhere in the world normally serviced by military or government contracted carriers.

d. Consider allowing members of the reserve and their families to utilize the Armed Forces Recreation Centers referred to above.

e. Expand the use of WACs in the reserves in accordance with the concept discussed in Action II-23.

6. Consider renewal of the program for enlistment of male and female aliens in the Regular Army. The program would be similar to that described in the Act of 30 June 1950, known as the Lodge Act.³² The Lodge Act authorized the Secretary of the Army to accept enlistments or reenlistments of unmarried aliens in the Regular Army for periods of not less than 5 years. The Lodge Act enlistee who then completed 5 or more years of service or if discharged earlier under honorable conditions, was deemed to have been admitted to the United States as a permanent resident insofar as naturalization acts were concerned.

The few preceding ideas are but a few of the many ideas that all of us as professional Army officers, will have to review, analyze, discard or act upon during the next few months or years. The success of the Modern Volunteer Army will depend on our ability to develop and act on new ideas and on the ability of our leaders to get the financial and moral support of the Administration, Congress and the Nation. This is not a responsibility that can be shrugged off as something for the next higher level of command or supervision to accomplish. Many of the "grass roots" actions aimed at living and working conditions, prestige, discipline, advancement and job satisfaction come within the purview of each level of command and supervision.

A "DO-IT-YOURSELF" PROGRAM

Notwithstanding the outside financial and moral support required for the Modern Volunteer Army Program, General Westmoreland provided a perfect summation to our discussion of what can be done to reach the Modern Volunteer Army goals when he stated:

Today our society is in the throes of change and there are real pressures for immediate and drastic changes to the Army. In some areas we are prepared to meet this new environment. These are areas which involve creating conditions where every man can serve with dignity, where we give our individuals a keen sense of job challenge and satisfaction, and where we put our trust in those who have clearly demonstrated their capability to merit our trust. These are the areas in which we will make changes. On the otherhand, we will not make changes by reducing our proper professional standards. We will not tolerate slovenly appearance. We will not condone disrespect or performance. We must always keep in mind that the Army must be prepared to fight; that fighting is tough; and that it takes strong, disciplined, and highly motivated men to fight and live. This is the balance we must strike--discipline and motivation. We must build on both. This is the heart of the Army, and on this we cannot compromise. I expect all members of the Army to understand this dual goal and support its attainment.³³

CHAPTER VI FOOTNOTES

1. "How the Public Rates the Ability of Its Military," The National Observer (Washington), 16 June 1969, p. 1.
2. "1970 Green Book," Army, October 1970, p. 32.
3. Ibid., p. 28.
4. Ibid., p. 27.
5. US Department of the Army, Army Regulation 670-5: Uniform and Insignia; Male Personnel (1 May 1969), p. A-3.
6. Westmoreland, p. 2.
7. Kelley, p. 7.
8. Image of the Army, p. 26.
9. AUSA White Paper, p. 4.
10. Gates Commission, p. 61.
11. Ibid.
12. AUSA White Paper, p. 4.
13. "1970 Green Book," p. 69.
14. Ibid., p. 70.
15. Donald J. Eberly, "National Needs and National Service," Current History (August 1968), pp. 70-71.
16. Larry Carney, "\$100 a Week for E-1s," Army Times, 12 November 1969, p. 1.
17. Gates Commission, p. 10.
18. Laird, p. 3.
19. Eric C. Ludvigsen, "Tough, Mobile, Elite--A Report on the 1970 AUSA Annual Meeting," Army, November 1970, p. 37.
20. Telephone interview with Bettie Morden, Colonel, Office of the Director of WAC, US Army, Washington, 2 February 1971.

21. There are approximately 11 million females in the 18-24 age bracket living in the United States. US Department of Commerce, Pocket Data Book--USA 1969 (1969), p. 48.

22. Morden, 2 February 1970 interview.

23. The following quote was made by an Air Force Major in 1948 as part of an OSD survey relating to service careers: "Qualify every soldier before accepting in service. Put them on a probationary period of 3 months before making enlistment final." US Office of the Secretary of Defense, Armed Forces Information and Education Division, Special Memorandum 41-319: Voluntary comments related to Service Carrers (Fall 1948), June 1949, p. 58.

24. Major General Eckhardt, USAWC letter, Subject: "Modern Volunteer Army," 3 December 1970.

25. Ibid.

26. Gates Commission, p. 139.

27. "Its Official--12.6% 1 July; Hubell Deferred," Armed Forces Journal, 29 March 1969, p. 18.

28. "NG Draws More Vietnam Veterans, But So Far It Fails to Meet Goal in Getting Members to Extend Enlistments," New York Times, 2 August 1970, p. 17.

29. Laird, p. 7.

30. Army Mutual Aid Association, 1971 Information Booklet (1971), pp. 41-42.

31. Ludvigsen, p. 39.

32. US Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Extending the Authority for Enlistment of Aliens in the Regular Army, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957, Report No. 689.

33. Eckhardt, letter.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The conclusions to be drawn from this study and the recommendations made are few in number and are not presented as particularly new and unique.

STATEMENT OF CONCLUSIONS

In general, we conclude that the Modern Volunteer Army concept is feasible and practical in a peacetime environment. Further we conclude that, with some limitations, the MVAP goals are attainable, but will be more difficult to realize in the Reserve Components than in the Active Army. With regard to the resources required to attain the volunteer Army goals we find that manpower availability is more than adequate to meet requirements and that additional funds are necessary but are not as important to our success as proper use of resources currently available to the Army. As important to the MVAP success as money and "no cost" improvements is starting a massive and effective public relations effort to improve the Army's image.

Specifically our conclusions are:

1. The Modern Volunteer Army concept is feasible and practical in a peacetime environment.
2. The MVAP goals are attainable; however, attainment of the "zero draft" goal by 1 July 1973 will not be likely. The primary obstacle to reaching the "zero draft" goal will be the

difficulty in attracting quality personnel as opposed to quantity.

3. Reaching and maintaining the required Army Reserve and Army National Guard strength in a volunteer environment will be the most difficult task confronting the Army.

4. The male and female population of the United States is more than adequate to support a volunteer Army.

5. Funding at current levels plus an additional amount to be determined is required to reach the MVAP goals. In this connection, costs equals results ($C=R$) is an insolvable equation without the added factors of experience, national economic situation, and "no cost" actions taken.

6. Dollars alone will not assure success in reaching and maintaining a volunteer Army of the quantity and quality required.

7. The most promising avenue toward the MVAP goals is exploitation of the resources now at the Army's disposal and within the Army's authority to modify or utilize. Herein lies the basic success force of the MVAP.

8. The Army's image is at a dangerously low ebb. Improvement of the Army's image must come without delay if the Army is to realize optimum benefit from expenditure of funds or from implementation of "no cost" improvements.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Our recommendations, aimed at reaching and maintaining a volunteer Army, are of two types--those suggesting specific actions and those suggesting study or review of concepts and ideas. The order of presentation is not indicative of the importance or priority of the recommendation. We have attempted to avoid repetition of recommendations already under consideration; however, where duplication does occur it is done to place emphasis on the subject of the recommendation. Recommendations referring to DA actions appearing in Appendix 2 and commented on in Chapter VI are annotated to permit easy review by the reader.

It is recommended that:

1. Public information and recruiting programs be expanded and revitalized utilizing every means of communication available.

2. An attractive, factual, and comprehensive Army Career Catalog be made available to high school students and educators detailing:

- a. The availability and prerequisites of civilian and military educational opportunities.
- b. Career development policies.
- c. Assignment procedures.
- d. Fringe benefits available.
- e. Leave and pass policies.
- f. Opportunities for advancement and travel.

g. Retirement benefits.

3. The Dress Blue uniform be made an item of free issue to all enlisted personnel.

4. Commanders and noncommissioned officers at all levels be indoctrinated as to the important role they play in the success of the Modern Volunteer Army Program. Indoctrination should include, as a minimum, a review of modern leadership techniques, methods of insuring job satisfaction, discontinuance of menial tasks, understanding and application of the "Freedom of Failure" technique and lessons learned to date from various tests and studies relating to the Modern Volunteer Army.

5. More attractive personnel policies be adopted with regard to stabilized assignments and family separation.

6. Living and working conditions be made as attractive and rewarding as possible commensurate with military order, discipline and mission accomplishment.

7. High enlistment standards be established and maintained to provide selectivity in procurement and retention.

8. The Army continue to push for a wage scale competitive with industry and for additional and substantial monetary incentives to attract qualified personnel into the Combat Arms.

9. A trained career counselor and authorization for one additional manpower space be provided at battalion level. (DA Action I-8, page 78.)

10. The \$10,000 limit on Soldier's Deposit be lifted and all military personnel be permitted to utilize Soldier's

Deposit for savings regardless of their location, i.e., overseas or in CONUS. (DA Action I-42, page 79.)

11. The comparative rights and privileges of noncommissioned officers and specialists be reevaluated in light of the plan to enlist men and women with civilian acquired skills at higher enlisted grades. (DA Action II-8, page 79.)

12. The feasibility of giving female soldiers a wider role in the Army be examined. Examination should include a review of the desirability of increased female strength authorization beyond that now planned and a look at utilization of female soldiers in the "all male" units and positions of the Active Army and Reserve Components. (DA Action II-23, pages 80-81.)

13. Qualified dieticians continually review application of the modified feeding concept referred to in DA Action II-27. (Page 81.)

14. Retirement benefits continued to be paid to dependents after retiree's death. (DA Action II-52, page 81.)

15. Authority for separation of probational enlistees be delegated to GCM authority. Separation should be quick, simple, and without veterans benefits, or receipt of a discharge certificate as we know it today. (DA Action III-3, page 81.)

16. Waiver approval for enlistment of personnel with certain offenses be withheld from USAREC. (DA Action III-8, page 82.)

17. The plan to permit all military personnel, after AIT, to live off post if they so desire be withdrawn from consideration. (DA Action III-14, pages 82-83.)

18. The "salary system" for military pay as suggested by the Hubell Pay Task Force be withdrawn from further consideration. (DA Action IV-22, pages 84-85.)

19. "Space Required" travel aboard military carrier be provided for all Active Army personnel at least once each three year period for the purpose of recreation and leave travel. Destination limited to areas normally serviced by military or government carriers. (DA Action IV-31, pages 85-86.)

20. The reenlistment bonus concept for Reserve Components be reevaluated with the thought toward increasing the size of the bonus. (DA Action IV-43, page 86.)

21. SGLI be increased on a sliding scale upwards depending on rank and size of family. (DA Action V-14, page 87.)

22. Direct low interest government loans be made to military personnel for purchase of private homes. (Pages 88-89.)

23. Post exchange services be expanded to provide military members an outlet for the purchase of any item needed for personal or family consumption. (Page 89.)

24. Armed Forces Recreation Centers be constructed at resort areas throughout the United States similar to those now in Germany or planned for construction in Hawaii. Centers will be constructed with nonappropriated funds and will be self-supporting and nonprofit. (Page 89.)

25. An enlistment bonus be established in lieu of continued pay increases to induce enlistments. (Pages 89-90.)


26. An enlistment bonus for reservists, medical support for reservists and their dependents, "space required" travel every five years for recreational purposes, and utilization of Armed Forces Recreational Centers be established for or extended to members of the Reserve Components. (Pages 90-91.)

27. A program for enlistment of male and female aliens similar to the Act of 30 June 1950, known as the Lodge Act, be considered as a source of manpower. (Page 91.)

28. The Selective Service System be retained on a standby basis.



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APPENDIX 1

ARGUMENTS AGAINST AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY

<u>GENERAL CATEGORY</u>	<u>SPECIFIC OBJECTION</u>
Feasibility	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. An all-volunteer force will be very costly--so costly the Nation cannot afford it.2. The all-volunteer force will lack the flexibility to expand rapidly in times of sudden crisis.
Undesirable Political and Social effects	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. An all-volunteer force will undermine patriotism by weakening the traditional belief that each citizen has a moral responsibility to serve his country.2. The presence of draftees in a mixed force guards against the growth of a separate military ethos, which could pose a threat to civilian authority, our freedom, and our democratic institutions.3. The higher pay required for a voluntary force will be especially appealing to blacks who have relatively poorer civilian opportunities. This, combined with higher reenlistment rates for blacks, will mean that a disproportionate number of blacks will be in military service. White enlistments and reenlistments might decline, thus leading to an all-black enlisted force. Racial tensions would grow because of white apprehension at this development and black resentment at bearing an undue share of the burden of defense. At the same time, some of the qualified young blacks would be in the military--not in the community where their talents are needed.4. Those joining an all-volunteer force will be men from the lowest economic classes, motivated primarily by monetary rewards rather than patriotism. An all-volunteer force will be manned, in effect, by mercenaries.5. An all-volunteer force would stimulate foreign military adventures, foster an irresponsible foreign policy, and lessen civilian concern about the use of military forces.

<u>GENERAL CATEGORY</u>	<u>SPECIFIC OBJECTION</u>
Erosion of Military Effectiveness	<p>1. A voluntary force will be less effective because not enough highly qualified youths will be likely to enlist and pursue military careers. As the quality of servicemen declines, the prestige and dignity of the services will also decline and further intensify recruiting problems.</p> <p>2. The defense budget will not be increased to provide for an all-volunteer force, and the Department of Defense will have to cut back expenditures in other areas. Even if additional funds are provided initially, competing demands will, over the long term, force the Department of Defense to absorb the added budgetary expense of an all-volunteer force. The result could be a potentially serious deterioration of the nation's overall military posture.</p>

NOTE 1: Answers in reply to these objections are contained in pages 12-20, Gates Commission Report (Bibliography item #32).

APPENDIX 2

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY ACTIONS TO INCREASE VOLUNTEERING AND REDUCE RELIANCE ON THE DRAFT

GROUP I: Actions Implemented to Date.

1. Gave US Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) priority second only to RVN to improve USAREC command structure, increase recruiter assigned strength, reducing recruiter shortage from 500 to 178 as of end August 1970.
2. Stabilized successful recruiters in their assignments.
3. Advertised recruiter vacancies Army-wide.
4. Improved quality of recruiters through improving the recruiter selection process (Standardizing recruiter applicant personnel data and recruiter applicant appraisal sheet used by recruiter interview boards, and revising height and weight standards for recruiter applicants).
5. Improved individual recruiter effectiveness by providing increased training, more leased housing, distributing over 42 million pieces of recruiting material (69 and 70) and increased advertising.
6. Established career evaluation system to eliminate unsatisfactory recruiters.
7. Simplified the enlistment screening test.
8. Authorized full-time career counselors at battalion level.
9. Provided for the periodic counseling of all Regular Army enlisted personnel on a regularly scheduled basis.
10. Improved the processing of prior service enlistees and the enlistment options available to them.
11. Increased enlistments of prior service personnel from 8,877 in FY 69 to 13,967 in FY 70. Enlistments expected to exceed 17,000 in FY 71.
12. Publicized the need for WAC recruiters and reduced WAC recruiter vacancies by 40 percent.
13. Increased flow of uncommitted enlistment for Regular Army unassigned to combat arms.

14. Developed enlistment options which provide for guaranteed assignment to geographic area of individual choice for a minimum stipulated period.
15. Enhanced recruitment by implementing new enlistment options in the Medical, Engineer, and Ranger fields and in the Combat Army.
16. Increased opportunity for Reserve officers to be integrated into the Regular Army.
17. Improved USAREC facilities, installed IBM 7040 computer to facilitate more rapid access to data, and collocated 648 recruiting stations with other services.
18. Mailed recruiting literature to over 200 youth organizations serving young men between 17 and 20 to be followed up with visits by recruiters.
19. Publicized early release program for personnel serving in short tours.
20. Expanded high school testing: over 134,000 students in 2,528 schools tested in 69-70.
21. Established an Army advertising guidance committee to help prepare recruiting guidance and provide a link with people serving in the field.
22. Submitted request for 800 additional housing units for recruiter personnel and received funding support for 75 units for FY 71.
23. Tested the five day work week and found it improved morale, production, and reenlistments.
24. Developed and tested a training technique which emphasizes individual abilities, self-paced instruction and peer group instruction (APSTRAT). Test being expanded to validate results.
25. Developed and tested merit reward system. Test being expanded to validate results.
26. Awarded a PMOS of Drill Sergeant to those serving in that position. Allocated promotion quotas for these slots.
27. Authorized additional clothing for Drill Sergeants.
28. Developed a three level NCO educational development program similar to that used for officer progression.

29. Developed a training program in support of Warrant Officers' current career patterns.
30. Permitted scholarship cadets not selected for RA to attend graduate school on the same basis as nonscholarship ROTC USAR officers.
31. Tested use of equal opportunity councils and found them to be useful in reducing racial tension. Pending implementation Army-wide.
32. Adopted career management fields (CMF). Will chart clear progression for all personnel from E-1 through E-9.
33. Centralized enlisted promotions, E-8 and E-9.
34. Established a new enlisted evaluation report.
35. Made more time available for military personnel to attend school during duty hours.
36. Tested increased privacy in barracks and found it improved morale, production, and reenlistments.
37. Eliminated the requirement to occupy available quarters when they are substandard.
38. Participated in a DOD study to determine the feasibility of abolishing the dual component (RA-AUS) officer career force and converting it to RA. Will concur when service staffed by DOD.
39. Established a degree completion program for all career officers who do not have a college education, first two years through GED Off-Duty program, last two in residence.
40. Enlarged and staffed installation laundries to provide adequate laundry and dry cleaning service to the troops at minimum cost.
41. Provided overseas government transportation for personnel on emergency leave.
42. Removed \$10,000 limit on Soldiers' Deposits for personnel who are PW, missing in action, or detained during an armed conflict with an enemy of the United States.
43. Authorized up to eight days time off (not chargeable to leave) to enable members to take care of personal matters attendant in moving from one post to another.
44. Authorized up to 90 days extension of members' overseas tours to enable their children to complete senior year of high school.

45. Implemented student loan program, beginning January 1971, whereby dependent children may receive loans up to \$1500 annually for payment of costs incident to college or vocational schools.

GROUP II: First Priority Actions Recommended for Implementation.
No Cost.

1. Freeze all recruiters in place until USAREC is up to strength, except compassionate cases and approved exceptions.
2. At USAREC option, provide for up to two years extension for successful recruiters, one year at a time (above stabilization of 3 years).
3. Increase authorized strength of the Recruiting Command to a level that insures 100 percent recruiter coverage in the field.
4. Restore the personnel authorizations cut from USAREC in the amount of 176 people.
5. Assign all CONUS (or on order to CONUS) personnel selected for promotion to E-7 who hold a primary or secondary MOS of OOE to the Recruiting Command.
6. Reevaluate recruitment advertising to insure proper theme and appeal to target group.
7. When administratively feasible, offer an option which guarantees training in and assignment in a job of the enlistee's choice.
8. Accept more personnel with civilian acquired skills at higher enlisted grades.
9. Exempt USAREC from "stopper list" procedures which impede hiring quality civilian employees.
10. Hold Army White Book conferences earlier so that enlistment quotas are available to USAREC prior to the beginning of the 120-day delayed entry enlistment period.
11. Remove restrictions on prior service personnel enlistment except for moral, mental and physical restrictions.
12. Reduce the period of enlistment for ARADCOM from 4 to 3 years.
13. Extend the enlistment week for certain options from 5 days to 7 days.
14. Make more of the popular school and career group quotas available to USAREC during peak enlistment periods.

15. Expand the Army service school courses available for the delayed entry program.
16. Increase USAREC quotas for the NCO candidate and the Ranger options.
17. Reinstitute the Overseas Command, the CONUS Station and the Area enlistment options.
18. Revise DA Pamphlet 350-10 and AR 611-201 to eliminate inconsistencies in prerequisites for enlistment.
19. Relax commissioning standards for commissioning in the Army Nurse Corps so that associate degree holders are eligible.
20. Allow commissioning of all diploma school course graduates.
21. Increase maximum age for nurse commissioning from 33 years to 40.
22. Allow commissioning of certain nurses in the grade of Captain.
23. Increase quotas for WAC recruiting in the fields of Medical Service, Automatic Data Processing and Photography.
24. Establish a five-day training week.
25. Eliminate daily reveille troop formations except for ceremonial and other occasions.
26. Eliminate requirement for Armed Forces Liberty Pass (DD Form 345) and allow personnel freedom of movement on or off post when they are off duty. Eliminate requirement to sign in-out.
27. Improve the troop menu Army-wide to include more of the foods and the methods of feeding which the troops desire. Consider brunch feeding, the serving of hamburgers and soft drinks on the weekends and more short order meals.
28. Minimize the number of inspections and conduct them as part of the normal training or work week--particularly CMMI.
29. Stabilize command tours at eighteen months minimum in noncombat zones and twelve months in combat zones.
30. Deemphasize comparison of units by statistics.
31. Reduce the number of imposed requirements on commanders by eliminating, where possible, restrictive regulations.

32. Examine additional duties required of company level officers. Eliminate nonessential requirements and allow noncommissioned officers to perform these additional duties.
33. Stabilize the assignment of company clerks for two years.
34. Require submission of assignment preference statements by all Regular Army enlisted personnel.
35. Emphasize the attention given to expressed personal preferences in career management. In the event a personal preference cannot be followed, notify the individual as to the reason.
36. Change promotion criteria to give less weight to time in grade and more to ability and training.
37. Change regulation to eliminate requirement that enlisted promotions be tied to number of each grade authorized in a unit. Base promotions on Army-wide vacancies (MECCA).
38. Eliminate reception centers and combine in-processing with basic training.
39. Continue to eliminate hazing and other undesirable practices that hinder the training effort.
40. Grant a worldwide amnesty for drug abusers and develop a program to rehabilitate them.
41. Expand the ongoing guest house construction program at all posts in the US to provide for temporary family occupancy during PCS and for use of invited guests of military personnel.
42. Give "career reservists" more security with respect to term of service on active duty, and give them the same personnel management consideration and career opportunities given to RA officers pending adoption of a one component concept.
43. Liberalize branch transfers for officers who desire them in exchange for extension of service obligation.
44. Develop ROTC programs for every college environment ranging from low visibility on campuses where ROTC is threatened to high visibility on campuses where ROTC is desired.
45. Establish equal opportunity councils at installation level.
46. Liberalize and decentralize authority to discharge dissidents and conscientious objectors.

47. CORC develop an intensified recruiting program to attract additional volunteers for the Reserve components upon termination of the draft.
48. Reduce the length of the reserve enlistment period to three years.
49. Request legislation authorizing a reserve retirement option which begins at age 50.
50. Allow credit for all inactive duty points accumulated in computing reserve retirement pay.
51. Provide for Post Exchange and commissary privileges for Reserve personnel in a paid drill status.
52. Subject to further study, authorize that retirement benefits of eligible reservists who die before retirement be paid their beneficiaries.
53. Implement, as a last resort, a plan for use of a lottery draft to provide fillers for reserve units and to maintain the TRR.

GROUP III· Second Priority Actions Under Consideration. No Cost.

1. Authorize an 18-month and a 24-month term of service for enlistees in the Combat Arms.
2. Permit unrestricted enlistment of individuals in the upper spectrum (AFQT 16 through 30) of mental Category IV subject to the recommendation below.
3. Insert a 6-month probational period in each enlistment contract. This would enable the government to eliminate militants, dissidents and nonproductive Cat IV personnel from the service.
4. Establish an officer and enlisted specialist program for recruiting personnel.
5. Review POI of recruiter courses to determine if they are adequate for training recruiters to function in a draft free environment.
6. Consider transfer of the Recruiting School from AG to USAREC.
7. Develop a simple and effective method for use by recruiters in the field to demonstrate comparability (to prospective recruits) between locally available employment and a career in the Army.

8. Delegate waiver approval authority to Hq. USAREC for enlistment of personnel with certain offenses now requiring decision at DA level.
9. The United States Army Recruiting Command establish and maintain continual liaison with the Department of Labor to facilitate the collection, distribution and use of labor market information of value in carrying out the Army's recruitment function.
10. Support designation of an executive agent to manage the ASVAB Program (High School Testing Program).
11. Reduce frequency of "hardship" tours and family separations.
12. Reduce the number of permanent changes of station where possible.
13. Evaluate the enlisted uniform with a view toward improving acceptability.
14. Allow all military personnel, after AIT, to live off the post if they so desire.
15. Authorize reimbursement to troops who miss meals on weekends or pass.
16. Make more time available for educational opportunities.
17. Reexamine the military/civilian mix.
18. Direct more of our advertising program toward wives and parents of enlisted personnel to increase retention rate.
19. Fund tuition assistance from "educational funds" controlled at DA rather than from installation funds which can be diverted to other uses.
20. Repeal Section 5532 of Title 5, USC relating to reduction of the pay of retired RA officers who are employed by the Federal Government.
21. Amend the Internal Revenue Code to exclude from gross income all military compensation received by members of the Armed Services and accompanying Federal Civilian Employees while in a prisoner of war, missing in action, or in a detainee status during armed conflict against an enemy of the United States.
22. CORC Actions:
 - a. Design a reserve recruiting effort to reach:

(1) Prior service veterans of other services who possess skills required by the Army.

(2) Civilians who possess certain identified skills. These individuals would be enlisted at an advanced grade commensurate with their skills.

b. Provide for the development of interest:

(1) Through Army participation in various youth programs, including Junior ROTC.

(2) Through introduction by the AUSA of a program similar to the Sea Cadet Program now sponsored by the Navy League.

c. Develop a program providing for a number of options with limited incentives for individuals designed to motivate them for IRR service.

d. Consider development of the IRR as a "pipeline" activity for Reserve component personnel not in units and tied more closely to the Active Army and Reserve component units.

e. Determine the feasibility of protective coverage by optional insurance for the Reserve member's equity in retirement, for the period between the date a Reserve member qualifies for retirement and the date he is eligible for retirement.

23. ACSFOR Actions:

a. Develop a specific training objective for each Reserve unit which allows greater flexibility toward achievement of BUT requirements.

b. Place greater emphasis upon frequent training with, and mutual contact between Active Army and Reserve component units.

c. Require major headquarters and advisors to monitor Reserve MOS training and employment of Reserve enlisted members.

d. Develop, verify and continuously refine a complete force structure responsible to all requirements which the IRR must furnish.

GROUP IV: First Priority Actions Recommended for Implementation.
Requiring Additional Funds.

	<u>Estimated Cost in Thousands of Dollars</u>
1. Conduct a test using a TOE Division with units stationed both in CONUS and overseas. Test a wide array of improvement actions for feasibility and desirability. Project results for expected impact if actions were implemented Army-wide.	Unknown
2. Restore TDY funds in the amount of \$125,000 cut from the USAREC budget.	125
3. Increase USAREC advertising budget by \$9 million additional in FY 71 with subsequent phased increase to \$36 million annually.	9,000
4. Defray out-of-pocket recruiter expense up to \$20 per month. (Legislative Proposal DOD 91-27.)	720
5. Conduct a controlled experiment to saturate urban areas and rural areas with additional recruiters. (Recruiter aides can be used.)	40
6. Provide sufficient DOD leased quarters earmarked specifically for USAREC to meet USAREC's requirements (800 units).	1,104
7. Increase subsistence rates for recruiters from \$2.57 to \$3.42 per day.	931
8. Increase uniform maintenance allowance from \$6.90 to \$12.00 per month for recruiters after 2 years of recruiting duty.	92
9. Seek DOD Directive change to establish rationale for paying proficiency pay to recruiters.	1,124
10. Investigate the legality of a recruiter incentive program. Institute if possible.	63
11. Continue and emphasize the program to collocate Army Recruiting facilities with those of other services.	515
12. Detail highly qualified young enlisted personnel as recruiters' assistants to sell the Army in their home towns.	3,640
13. Organize a program for visits to high schools by Army bands, drill teams and speakers.	50

	Estimated Cost in Thousands of Dollars
14. Offer an option which provides enlistees with 4 years of post-service all-expense college training in exchange for 4 years of service and in lieu of VA educational benefits (cheaper than 2 draftees taking advantage of GI bill).	20,000 (4 years after start)
15. Offer an option providing for 2 years of post-service all-expense paid vocational training in exchange for 3 years of service and in lieu of VA educational benefits.	20,000 (3 years after start)
16. Prepare an information handbook for enlistees and their families telling what they can expect from the Army and what the Army expects of them. Distribute before enlistee reports for duty.	50
17. Mechanize the system of allocating quotas for Army service schools and career groups.	Unknown
18. Expand the operational capability of the OPO RECAP office to make it better service the needs of the recruiters.	22
19. Make more funds available for Recruiting Main Stations sales seminars.	50
20. Make funds available to pay fees to local law enforcement agencies for release of past arrest history of potential enlistees.	200
21. Develop tests which will measure how well recruits with civilian acquired skills compare with military personnel in the same occupation. Use results of tests as a credit toward AIT.	50
22. Adopt a salary system for military personnel in order to achieve and maintain pay comparability with Civil Service and private enterprise. Pending establishment of a salary concept, adjust basic pay, basic allowance for quarters, and allowance for subsistence to comparability standards.	1,500,000
23. Provide adequate housing for all military families through leased housing or increased quarters allowance commensurate with housing in the local civilian community.	904,000

	<u>Estimated Cost in Thousands of Dollars</u>
24. Establish barracks space and furniture standards equal to that authorized by the Department of Defense.	19,300
25. Utilize portable or temporary partitions to provide privacy in barracks with open bays.	15,008
26. Increase attractiveness of the combat arms by providing distinctive uniforms, glorifying it through advertising and perhaps P3 pay of \$150 per month.	220,000
27. Contract to have KP performed by civilian labor in garrison.	148,500
28. Increase capacity of the WAC Training Center to accommodate an 80 percent increase in WAC strength.	11,000
29. Initiate a phased program to increase authorized strength of the WAC by 80 percent to include renovation of quarters at 60 installations worldwide.	1,320
30. Provide 82 spaces and \$.5 million to allow completion of Phase I of MECCA.	500
31. Authorize "Space Required" travel aboard military carriers for personnel stationed overseas on three year tours who desire to visit CONUS on leave. Limit to one authorization per three year tour.	28,000
32. Extend entitlements to reimbursement of family travel and dislocation allowance to all enlisted personnel.	115,000
33. Relax quarters clearance procedures with the eventual goal of DOD defraying all costs.	Unknown
34. Review and adjust the concepts and amounts of special and incentive pays currently authorized military personnel. These include: Hostile Fire Pay, Flight Pay, Demolition Pay, Parachute Pay, Proficiency Pay, Separation Severance Pay, and Professional Pay (Second Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation).	Unknown

	Estimated Cost in Thousands of Dollars
35. Review and adjust miscellaneous allowances currently authorized military personnel. These include Family Separation Allowance and Dislocation Allowance.	Unknown
36. Expand medical service to include dental care for dependents.	120,000
37. Implement NCO educational development program.	1,650
38. Continue to increase the operating hours of commissary sales stores, and improve the quality of facilities and services until they are comparable to similar civilian enterprises.	Unknown
39. Establish a Uniformed Services Academy of Health Sciences to train doctors and other health service personnel for the armed forces.	68,000
40. Expand AMEDD procurement and training by increasing the number of medical scholarships in each age for a service obligation.	3,700
41. CORC conduct a survey of Reserve personnel and the manpower pool to determine the appeal of existing and proposed incentives.	50
42. Develop an intensified Reserve recruiting program to attract additional volunteers for the Reserve components upon termination of the draft and authorize additional funds to support an extensive advertising program.	10,000
43. Offer Reservists a \$100 reenlistment bonus and a \$100 bonus for each year of satisfactory service.	25,800
44. Extend EGLI coverage to all Reservists.	29,600
45. Provide medical care for Reservists who contract a disease or aggravate an injury during any training period.	400
46. Authorize quarters allowance for Reservists on ACDUTRA for periods in excess of 30 days.	9,500

	Estimated Cost in Thousands of Dollars
47. Develop a plan for providing proficiency pay for enlisted Reservists.	7,400
48. Offer tuition assistance to a selected number of career Reservists.	348,800
GROUP V: <u>Second Priority Actions Under Consideration.</u> <u>Requiring Additional Funds.</u>	
1. Conduct a study to determine the optimum allocation of recruiting offices with regard to target populations.	50
2. Assign an advertising-marketing expert to DCSPER-DPD.	35
3. Issue the Dress White as well as the Army Blue Uniform to recruiters.	450
4. Conduct a study to determine if a substitute can be found to replace the quota system for recruiters.	50
5. Develop a new sales personality test for recruiter applicants.	5
6. Further expand ROTC scholarship programs to 10,000 per year as an incentive for increased ROTC enrollments.	1,000
7. Provide a system whereby students in colleges which do not have ROTC programs may receive training to qualify for commissions (i.e., Platoon Leaders Course).	1,000
8. Analyze enlisted MOS to determine quality of personnel required for each MOS. Establish variable enlistment standards based on MOS requirements.	50
9. Periodically conduct Army image surveys and studies.	108
10. Establish a variable cost-of-living allowance to supplement regular compensation in high cost CONUS areas.	Unknown
11. Increase dislocation allowance to cover total moving costs.	11,000

	Estimated Cost in Thousands of Dollars
12. Pay a bonus to AUS junior officers who accept a "Voluntary Indefinite" commitment, or accepts a Regular Army commission.	Unknown
13. Increase the 18 cents per mile limitation on dependent travel to approximate the actual cost of travel expenses.	Unknown
14. Increase SGLI to \$20,000.	20,500
15. Increase DA Personnel Counseling Teams so that they may periodically visit installations to counsel junior officers.	120
16. Expand the AG course designed to train Personnel Noncommissioned Officers.	100
17. Expand two-year associate degree plan for enlisted men.	130
18. Review and modify the military retirement and estate programs to make them comparable with civilian industry.	Unknown
19. Establish a vested interest retirement system which would provide retirement benefits or lump sum payments scaled to years of active service.	Unknown
20. Increase authorized weight allowance for household goods from 13,500 lbs to 16,000.	Unknown
21. Provide uniform allowance of \$300 to enlisted personnel and civilians upon appointment as officers in the RA.	450
22. Provide individuals in the Health Services with more opportunities for post-graduate and advanced military education, long term course at civilian institutions, in-service short courses and seminars, and attendance at professional meetings.	10,665
23. Provide more opportunities for post-graduate education at civilian institutions.	300
24. Civilianize to the maximum extent possible consistent with operational requirements.	Unknown

	<u>Estimated Cost in Thousands of Dollars</u>
25. Increase use of host nation military and civilian personnel in overseas areas.	Unknown
26. Extend MEDICARE eligibility to foster child.	Unknown
27. Make other than natural parents eligible for medical benefits in service facilities.	Unknown
28. Establish domiciliary care and nursing programs for retirees.	Unknown
29. CORC Actions:	
a. Develop a one year pilot plan for execution during FY 72 in which an organized and coordinated recruiting effort will be initiated. The plan should provide for Reserve component personnel to be trained and employed by USAREC to support Reserve component recruiting in the field. During the pilot phase, exact requirements, an effective organization and methods can be developed for the future.	Unknown
b. Examine spaces which should be programmed to the Armed Forces Entrance Examining Stations to provide direct support to Reserve units for accomplishing necessary enlistment administration.	Unknown
c. Consider a plan to provide educational benefits to members of the Reserve components, to a maximum value of \$2,000 for six years of service, payable in segments of \$500 after each year of satisfactory performance in the Reserve and successful completion of each segment of schooling.	100,000
d. Consider flexible reenlistment payments in order to retain desired skills.	25,000
e. Consider increasing pay for E1, E2, E3, and O2 to a rate more comparable to civilian wage scales for comparable skill levels.	Included elsewhere
30. DCSLOG action: Expedite issuance of adequate equipment both in quality and quantity, to Reserve component units. MTOE is desirable; however, first priority for issue of equipment should be those items needed for training at ARNG Armories and USAR Centers.	Unknown