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**COMMUNIST CHINA IN BLACK AFRICA: THE  
TAN-ZAM RAILWAY, 1965-1970**

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**26 April 1971**

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USAWC RESEARCH PAPER

COMMUNIST CHINA IN BLACK AFRICA: THE TAN-ZAM RAILWAY, 1965-1970

AN INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH REPORT

by

Mr. James C. Curran  
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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania  
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# ABSTRACT

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The central theme is the significance of Communist China's largest foreign aid project, the Tanzania-Zambia ("Tan-Zam") Railway, in the context of China's Africa policy and its evident belief in the inevitability of a war between black and white in Southern Africa. Information was acquired by a literature search, attendance at a conference on the Indian Ocean, interviews with US Government analysts, correspondence with an authoritative private source and by nine years as a US Foreign Service Officer in Africa. Although several phases of Peking's Africa policy can be recognized, Peking still sees Africa as part of the revolutionary "countryside" of the world, which must eventually overcome the "world cities" (Europe and North America). Despite the chaos in China caused by the Cultural Revolution, China made the decision to offer to build the railway project in order to build up its influence in Africa. Zambia wanted the Railway to end its dependence on railways in white-ruled areas. The project was opposed by Western copper and railway interests; finance was refused by Western governments and the World Bank. An American company had the consent of both Tanzania and Zambia to get the project started, but US and British Government disapproval resulted in the ultimate acceptance of the Chinese offer.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT. . . . .	Page 11
FOREWORD. . . . .	iv
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION. . . . .	1
Defining the Problem. . . . .	1
Method and Sources. . . . .	5
II. PEKING'S RELATIONS WITH BLACK AFRICA. . . . .	8
Time and Tide, Opportunity and Opportunism. . . . .	8
Centuries of Separation . . . . .	10
Ideology and Policy . . . . .	12
Goals and Objectives. . . . .	15
Political . . . . .	15
Military. . . . .	17
Economic. . . . .	21
Policy Phases . . . . .	23
III. PEKING'S ASWAN DAM. . . . .	29
A Quiet Ceremony. . . . .	29
Cui Bono? . . . . .	34
Zambia. . . . .	34
Tanzania. . . . .	38
China . . . . .	41
IV. WHY THE WEST REFUSED TO HELP. . . . .	47
China's Offer . . . . .	47
The Railways and Copper Interests in Central Africa. . . . .	50
The World Bank Says No. . . . .	55
Kaiser Makes An Offer . . . . .	59
The Stamp Survey and After. . . . .	63
Postscript. . . . .	67
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . .	70
BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . .	75

## FOREWORD

Majambo ya binadamu yana kujaa na kupwa  
Yakidakwa yamejaa huongoza ushindini;  
Yakipuuzwa, safari yote ya maisha yao  
Hubakia katika maji mafu na madhilifu.

--"Julius Caesar" translated into  
Swahili by Julius K. Nyerere

There is a tide in the affairs of men  
Which taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;  
Omitted, all the voyage of their life  
Is bound in shallows and in miseries.

--Shakespeare's "Julius Caesar"

Why is it that twists and turns of one kind  
or another are bound to arise in the road  
of revolutionary advance? This is because  
revolution represents a constant struggle  
of the newborn forces with the decadent  
forces. Sometimes the balance of forces  
in this struggle is, for the time being,  
unfavorable to revolution. . . . Let the  
imperialists, reactionaries, and traitors to  
the revolution rejoice! History will prove  
that the time when the forces of reaction  
are beside themselves with joy and arro-  
gance is the time when the tide is beginning  
to turn against them.

--Excerpts from People's Daily  
(Peking), as printed in Africa  
Report, January 1967.

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### DEFINING THE PROBLEM

This report evolved out of a general inquiry into the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Africa south of the Sahara in the years 1965-1970. This sub-continent is a vast area of roughly eight million square miles with a great diversity of peoples, cultures and resources and widely varying political situations and economic conditions. Africa and its adjacent islands consist of some 55 political units, of which 42 are independent. In the sub-Saharan area, often referred to as Black Africa, there are today 37 independent states and six territories ruled by European powers or nonindependent, white-minority governments.<sup>1</sup> (See map on following page.)

All the independent sub-Saharan states but two<sup>2</sup> are under black African or Afro-Arab governments. The six territories (and South Africa) are all subject, in varying degrees of intensity and frequency, to political action by the African majorities who

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<sup>1</sup>Sub-Saharan Africa, in this paper, is all of Africa except the northern tier, i.e., Spanish Sahara, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and the United Arab Republic.

<sup>2</sup>South Africa, independent under a white-minority regime, and the Malagasy Republic, whose population is largely of Indonesian origin.



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form the great mass of their populations and who are seeking independence under black majority rule.<sup>3</sup> This action ranges from peaceful protests and demonstrations (increasingly rare) all the way to rebellion by armed, organized and uniformed insurgents. The independent African and Afro-Arab governments are predominantly one-party states with autocratic tendencies, or military governments established by coups d'etat. Peaceful transitions of power have been relatively rare.<sup>4</sup>

A general study, therefore, was begun with the object of understanding and describing the whole spectrum of Chinese Communist activities in this vast, frequently turbulent area. The research undertaken examined Chinese ideology, strategy, policies and goals in Africa, the successes and failures of various Chinese actions, and their effects on US interests, now and in the coming decade.

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<sup>3</sup>The six territories are: Portuguese Guinea; Portuguese Angola; Portuguese Mozambique; the French Territory of the Afars and Issas (formerly French Somaliland); Britain's self-governing colony of Rhodesia, which declared its independence unilaterally in November 1965; and the International Territory of South West Africa, or Namibia, which is occupied, administered, and all but annexed by the Republic of South Africa, although its League of Nations' Mandate over the Territory has been revoked by the UN.

<sup>4</sup>US Department of State Publication 8511, Africa: . . . this new dialogue . . . (May 1970), pp. 40-45, lists the African governments in power at the time. Thirteen out of the 37 in sub-Saharan Africa had come to power as a result of a coup. (Several of the countries have, in fact, had two or more coups since independence.) It should be noted that 18 of the 37 have had no change of leader since independence. The remaining six have changed governments more or less legally and peacefully.

In the course of the work, it became clear for several reasons that much would be gained by focussing the report on the outstanding Sino-African issue of the period, the construction of the Tan-Zam Railway.<sup>5</sup> The report, therefore, presents a detailed study of the largest foreign aid project ever undertaken by a single foreign country in sub-Saharan Africa, the largest foreign aid project ever undertaken by the People's Republic of China, a venture that has been aptly called "Peking's Aswan Dam."<sup>6</sup> It is felt that by placing this project, whose success or failure is obviously a matter of great importance to Peking's future in Africa, in the context of China's Africa policy as it has evolved since 1955, and by examining in some detail China's relations with Tanzania and Zambia and the implementation of the project to date, a great deal can be learned about the conduct of China in the Third World.

Furthermore, the report examines the role of Western private interests, both those in favor of and those opposed to the construction of the Tan-Zam Railway, and the negative positions taken

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<sup>5</sup>Officially, the railroad is the Tanzania-Zambia Railway, but the popular East African name for it which will be used in this paper is the Tan-Zam Railway.

<sup>6</sup>"'Two-China War' in Black Africa," U.S. News and World Report, 14 September 1970, p. 75. Some sources cite the Tan-Zam Railway as Africa's third largest foreign-assisted project. The Aswan Dam is, of course, larger, in financial terms, but is in the northeastern reaches of the Sahara. Ghana's Akosombo Dam on the Volta River and its power generation facilities are often cited as the sub-Sahara's costliest project, but it was multi-laterally financed.

by the British and American Governments and the World Bank, which eventually forced Tanzania and Zambia to accept Chinese assistance.

#### METHOD AND SOURCES

The general research on Sino-African relations took several forms. A literature search was made, primarily in American, British, and East African sources.<sup>7</sup> Primary, albeit translated, Chinese sources were not searched, but numerous items of useful Chinese material were found in the sources already mentioned; where it seemed appropriate, these were run to ground. Supplementary reading was done in classified material to compare and piece together published reports, which were often fragmentary and inconclusive. Informal interviews were held with US Government intelligence analysts in Washington, D. C. The author also attended the recent Conference on the Indian Ocean Area, also in Washington. This appears to have been the first such gathering exclusively devoted to this purpose, at least in the United States. Papers, to be published in the near future by the sponsor,<sup>7</sup> were presented by American, British, European, African and Asian experts.

The detailed study of the Tan-Zam Railway is based partly on newspaper and periodical articles, partly on World Bank and Tanzanian Government reports. In addition, it contains previously unpublished material of an unusual and controversial nature.

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<sup>7</sup>Sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University at the Statler-Hilton Hotel, 1971.

While serving in the American Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (1966-1970) as Economic Officer, the author became closely acquainted with Mr. Stanton R. Smith, an outstanding young transportation and hydro-electric power economist. Mr. Smith was at that time the Chief Economist for Kaiser Engineers of Oakland, California.

In 1965, Mr. Smith presented to the Presidents of Tanzania and Zambia his company's proposal to organize the financing, design and construction of a Tanzania-Zambia rail link, in the role of designing and supervising engineers. An agreement in principle was obtained, but opposition to the project by the British and American Governments first delayed, then derailed the Kaiser offer. Mr. Smith has generously placed at the complete disposal of the author several hundred pages of original file material dealing with his efforts to obtain financing for the railway from Western sources.

In addition to the materials described above, the author has relied on his own experience as a US Foreign Service officer in Africa.<sup>8</sup> The build-up of Chinese military and civilian personnel in Tanzania, which began modestly in 1964, had reached a few hundred by 1966; four years later the number was in the neighborhood of 1,000-1,200.<sup>9</sup> The author's responsibilities included reporting on the economic assistance programs of third countries

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<sup>8</sup>September 1960-July 1965: Economic Officer, American Consulate General, Cape Town; July 1966-July 1970: Economic Officer, American Embassy, Dar es Salaam.

<sup>9</sup>Author's estimates. Several hundred Chinese "railway surveyors" are included in the 1970 estimate.

and international organizations in Tanzania, as well as significant foreign trade matters. There are a number of observations and judgments in this report, not documented but verified by first hand experience and so footnoted. Needless to say, the report does not represent an official Department of State position. It is the author's sole responsibility; it is what comes of giving a "line officer" a year of academic freedom.

## CHAPTER II

### PEKING'S RELATIONS WITH BLACK AFRICA

To appreciate the significance of the Tan-Zam Railway project in Communist China's foreign policy, it is necessary to examine China's view of Black Africa and to see how China has acted in accordance with that view.

#### TIME AND TIDE, OPPORTUNITY AND OPPORTUNISM

The two quotations<sup>1</sup> which appear in the Foreword (p. iv) suggest, to the author at least, a dual theme which runs through Sino-African relations. The reader may find it useful in considering the future of these relations. It is: for Black Africa, political independence has meant the opportunity for sweeping political, economic and social changes; for Red China, espousing a doctrine of world socialist revolution, African independence meant opportunities to explore and exploit the accompanying turmoil and instability so as to expand its own influence and spread its ideology. The failures of several of China's very blatant subversive efforts against Black independent governments, while evidently forcing an alteration of China's mid range strategy,

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<sup>1</sup>The Swahili lines from the Nyerere translation of "Julius Caesar" and the original English lines following are the same verses.

do not appear to have altered the Chinese Communist view that there is a tide of history and it is running with them.

There is still in Black Africa--despite some disenchantment--much of the enthusiasm for "nation-building" which arose with the dismantling of virtually all of the French, British, and Belgian colonial empires. Coupled with the "revolution of rising expectations," it has been a popular force of tidal power in African affairs. The inability of many of the new, frail African governments to guide and control it is attested to by the veritable counterwave of military coups since 1964. But despite the usually conservative, often merely self-serving, nature of these frequent military interventions in politics, the indigenous forces for even more radical political change and greater economic independence from the former metropolises are still, in the author's judgment, running strong. Whether they will "lead on to fortune" or to political misery and economic stagnation is not within the scope of this paper to predict.

The quotation from a Peking newspaper appeared at a time when Red China's foreign policies had suffered what Dr. A. M. Halpern has described as:

a number of obvious reverses . . . beginning with the cancellation of the Afro-Asian conference originally scheduled for Algiers in July 1965 and going through the political upheaval in Indonesia, the overthrow of Kwame

Nkrumah's rule in Ghana, and the mutual display of bad temper between the Chinese and the Cubans.<sup>2</sup>

It reflects the Chinese Communist view of history as a struggle between revolutionary forces and reactionary forces, with first one side, then the other, gaining the upper hand, but with no doubt that eventually the tide will turn decisively in favor of the revolutionary forces.

#### CENTURIES OF SEPARATION

Many of the mistakes which Peking made in Africa in the mid sixties were probably as much a product of the centuries of separation between the two, resulting in Chinese ignorance of African conditions, as of excessive revolutionary zeal.

Despite the fact that "several Chinese fleets reached the Kenya coast in the early part of the fifteenth century,"<sup>3</sup> no lasting Sino-African connections were established. In Africa, the eastern coastline was seized and controlled by the Arabs and the Portuguese. The continent itself was almost entirely colonized by Portugal and other European powers. As for Imperial China, it "flirted with the use of naval power as a major instrument of

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<sup>2</sup>Abraham M. Halpern, Chinese Foreign Policy--Success or Failure (1966), p. 1. The reference to the Cubans relates to the first (and last) meeting of the Afro-Asian and Latin American People's Solidarity Organization in January 1966 in Havana. The Chinese were denounced by Fidel Castro for reneging on their barter agreements with Cuba and cutting Cuba's rice ration for 1966 in half. See Aaron Segal, "Havana's Tricontinental Conference," Africa Report, April 1966, p. 51.

<sup>3</sup>Basil Davidson, Black Mother (1961), p. 158.

policy . . . between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries," and then turned its back on the sea, "preoccupied with land borders" and dangers from the interior of Asia.<sup>4</sup>

In the so called "Great Scramble" for Africa in the last quarter of the 19th century, Imperial China, moribund and itself preyed upon by Japan and the West, played no part at all. As one result of this, Africa has relatively very few "overseas Chinese" residents. In the years 1904-1908, South Africa's gold mines were allowed to import over 50,000 Chinese laborers. This became a political issue; recruitment and training of Black Africans was stepped up and most of the Chinese were repatriated in the next two years.<sup>5</sup> There are still several thousand Chinese residing in South Africa, all subject to apartheid discrimination. The Malagasy Republic's long standing antipathy to Peking is partly traceable to President Tsiranana's fear of subversive activity by the "sizeable and economically important local Chinese community" who carry on an active trade with mainland China.<sup>6</sup> There are also Chinese communities on the islands of Mauritius and the Seychelles.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Angus M. Fraser, COL, "Chinese Interests and Activities in the Indian Ocean," Paper presented at the Indian Ocean Area Conference (Washington, D. C., 18-19 March 1971), pp. 2-3. COL Fraser is a Research Staff Member of the Institute for Defense Analyses and specializes in Politico-Military Studies and Chinese Military Affairs.

<sup>5</sup>"Chinese," Encyclopaedia of Southern Africa, 1961, p. 99.

<sup>6</sup>Philip M. Allen, "Madagascar and OCAM: The Insular Approach to Regionalism," Africa Report, (January 1966).

<sup>7</sup>Philip M. Allen, "New Round for the Western Islands," Paper presented at the Indian Ocean Area Conference (Washington, D. C., 18-19 March 1971), p. 16.

Interestingly, in light of the Tan-Zam Railway, King Leopold of the Belgians is said to have "imported Chinese coolies to build the Congo Railway."<sup>8</sup>

These limited infusions of Chinese, usually as a source of cheap labor, were exceptions. For several hundred years there was no significant contact between China and Africa; there were no cultural, political or economic lines of communication. The establishment of such lines had to await two of the great political transformations of our century: the decolonization of Africa and the political unification and modernization of China under an authoritarian, revolutionary regime.

#### IDEOLOGY AND POLICY

Communist China's Africa policy has evolved through five phases. The present, post-Cultural Revolution phase--and this is apparently true of China's foreign policy worldwide--suggests that Peking has decided upon a change of strategy. Nevertheless, there is as yet no reason to believe that the revolutionary ideology and the commitment to the overthrow of "bourgeois nationalism" by violent means have been discarded.

It is true that some pragmatic goals and objectives of mainland China in foreign political, economic and military affairs can be identified. These will be discussed further on. Nevertheless,

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<sup>8</sup>Dick Wilson, Anatomy of China: An Introduction to One Quarter of Mankind (1968), p. 222.

in the author's judgment, the driving force behind the formulation of Peking's Africa policy has been ideological. Africa, as a vast part of the Third World, occupies an important place in Mao's cosmology. In 1969, Waldemar Nielsen, President of the African-American Institute and an articulate spokesman for a more engaged and sympathetic American policy in black Africa, wrote:

In ideological terms, China asserts that Africa, Asia, and Latin America are today the main focus of world contradictions and that the struggle of the nationalist movements in these ex-colonial, colonial and underdeveloped countries against imperialism will be decisive for their own victory and for the victory of the Communist proletarians in the advanced countries as well.<sup>9</sup>

Mr. Nielsen notes that, whereas Lenin assigned to the "internal proletariat" of the developed countries the leading role in the socialist world revolution, including the ultimate liberation of the colonial peoples, "the Chinese have turned Lenin inside out."<sup>10</sup>

This reversal of roles grew out of the Chinese Communists' own revolutionary experience as rural guerrillas, based on the Chinese countryside, whose strategy was to confine their Nationalist opponents to the cities and towns, isolate them and overcome them bit by bit. In 1965, Marshal Lin Piao, as Defense Minister of the PRC, applied this Maoist strategy on a global scale when he wrote:

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<sup>9</sup>Waldemar A. Nielsen, The Great Powers and Africa (1969), p. 235.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called the "cities of the world," then Asia, Africa, and Latin America constitute the rural areas of the world. Since World War II, the proletarian revolutionary movement has for various reasons been temporarily held back in the North and West European capitalist countries, while the People's Revolutionary Movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America has been growing vigorously. In a sense, the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of the encirclement of cities by the rural areas. . . . Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of the establishment of rural revolutionary base areas and the encirclement of the cities from the countryside is of outstanding and universal practical importance . . . and particularly for the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and peoples in Asia, Africa, and Latin America against imperialism and its lackeys.<sup>11</sup>

Mao Tse-tung made a further departure from Leninist doctrine, one which, in the mid sixties, had a generally harmful effect on PRC-African relations. Lenin described the revolution (assumed to occur first in the industrialized capitalist states) as a two-stage process: (1) a national democratic revolution led by the "national bourgeoisie," whose "historical task" is to sweep away the ancien regime, followed by (2) a socialist revolution of the proletariat and peasantry, led by the Communist Party.<sup>12</sup> Mao, whose movement

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<sup>11</sup>Marshal Lin Biao, Long Live the Victory of the People's War! (1965). This article, written on the 20th anniversary of the victory over Japan, was first printed in the Chinese Communist Party newspaper Jenmin Jih Pao. It also appeared in Hung Chi, an ideological journal of the CCP Central Committee, as well as all mainland Chinese provincial and municipal newspapers. Before the end of 1965, English and other foreign language versions were published by Peking's Foreign Languages Press.

<sup>12</sup>Richard Lowenthal, "China," in Africa and the Communist World (1963), ed. by Zbigniew Brzezinski, p. 185.

was nearly annihilated in 1927 when the "national bourgeoisie," i.e., the Kuo Min Tang, turned on him, worked out a theory of a "new democratic revolution" at least as early as 1939 in Yen-an.<sup>13</sup> In effect, it telescoped the two stages into one "uninterrupted revolution," under Communist control from start to finish. The "historical role" of the national bourgeoisie was eliminated. As the majority of African leaders who brought their countries to independence were not only not Communist, but in many cases certifiable members of the "national bourgeoisie," Peking found itself at times backing "both established (black African) governments and the revolutionary groups opposing them."<sup>14</sup>

#### GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

##### Political

Peking's political goals in Africa might be described, Chinese-fashion, as the "Three Antis": anti-US, anti-USSR, and anti-Taipei. The anti-US disposition does not require elaboration here, except to note that almost without exception every revolutionary radical group in Africa (in or out of power) to which Peking has thrown its support has been, or has been willing to act as, an anti-American force on the local scene. Hence, Peking's support for these groups has been aimed at reducing US presence,

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<sup>13</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 3, pp. 72-101.

<sup>14</sup>Gilbert Comte, "Peking Shows Its New African Look," Africa Report (March 1971), p. 19.

prestige and influence. In presenting its own case as the correct model for a Third World revolutionary movement, China was, of course, building up its case against the USSR for a claim to the leadership of the "socialist camp" and the less-developed countries.<sup>15</sup> In 1965, Colin Legum observed that China's basic, unchanging aim in Africa and elsewhere was "to establish a Peking-oriented alliance between Africa, Asia and Latin America to prevent the isolation of China by Western and Russian diplomacy."<sup>16</sup>

As for Taiwan, the proliferation of new African states (31 of which gained their independence after January 1, 1960) gave Africa a numerical voting strength in the UN which could be crucial in deciding the perennial question of Chinese representation there.<sup>17</sup> Consequently, diplomatic recognition by black African states--but only on a "one China" basis--and support for Peking as the sole representative of China in the UN and the world, with concomitant severing of ties with Taipei where they existed, has been a definite Chinese Communist goal in Africa from the outset. As suggested above, the bourgeois character, at least in Peking's eyes, of many of the governments whose favor had to be courted

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<sup>15</sup>Robert A. Scalapino, "Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa," Foreign Affairs, (July 1964), pp. 640-654, gives a thorough analysis of this topic.

<sup>16</sup>Colin Legum, "Peking's Strategic Priorities," Africa Report, (January 1965), reprinted from Observer (London).

<sup>17</sup>Until Fiji joined the UN in 1970, the 42 independent states of Africa held exactly one-third of the General Assembly's 126 votes.

placed this diplomatic goal at variance with Peking's revolutionary activities.

### Military

In the strategic military category, one long range goal and one mid range objective can be identified, the first with some certainty, the other less so. China's purpose in undertaking both the Tan-Zam Railway and providing military assistance to the regular Tanzanian forces and African guerrillas in Tanzanian training camps was clearly put by Stanley Meisler, an able American correspondent in Africa:

The Communist Chinese are clearly gambling that a future race war in Africa will make them the main foreign influence here. That seems to be the logical goal of their heavy economic and military assistance program in Tanzania. . . .

. . . . .  
Since the beginning of the year (1970), the Chinese have become the most important foreign force in Tanzanian military organizations. They train both the army and the black guerrillas trying to wrest control of Southern Africa from its white supremacist governments.

. . . . .  
The guerrillas hardly look formidable now, but the Chinese clearly and patiently believe in the inevitability of a coming race war.<sup>18</sup>

Meisler points out the possibility of the intensification of the guerrilla war in Mozambique, leading to Portuguese action against Tanzania and a spiraling situation in which China would, as the major arms supplier to the black side, gain more and more

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<sup>18</sup>Stanley Meisler, "Red Chinese Gambling on African Race War," Los Angeles Times, 16 June 1970.

influence. His parallel with the Russian role in Egypt does not seem improbable, allowing that the scenario would perhaps take several years to reach a critical point.

The military objective discerned relates to China's missile testing program. Here one is on less sure ground, although that has not prevented press speculation such as:

Washington's China watchers expect Peking soon to begin setting up flight tests for two new, 5,000-mile-range missiles. By next March (1971), the East African control station the Chinese are building in Zanzibar should be completed and ready for test-firings over the Indian Ocean.<sup>19</sup>

The author made a serious attempt, through interviews with several US State Department personnel, to determine whether, in fact, there is a missile-tracking station under construction on Zanzibar. It is no breach of security to say that it appears at present that the station is a figment of newsmen's imaginations. Because of the seriousness of the matter, some additional background is useful.

In 1960, the United States established a "Project Mercury" tracking station on Zanzibar. It immediately became a target for a sustained Chinese Communist propaganda campaign, which invariably referred to the station as a "rocket base."<sup>20</sup> In 1964, after a radical revolution swept over the island and deposed the Sultanate, the station was closed and all its personnel were withdrawn.

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<sup>19</sup>"Peking's New Missiles," Newsweek, 30 November 1970, p. 13.

<sup>20</sup>See, for example, Peking Review, 5 July 1960.

For several years a Chinese military mission has been present on Zanzibar,<sup>21</sup> but they have shown no interest in the old station (whose buildings are still intact). Meanwhile, in the spring of 1970, the Chinese began construction of a small naval base for the Tanzanian People's Defense Forces, in Dar es Salaam harbor.<sup>22</sup> The author saw the site in the early stages of construction and both its size and location did not seem out of keeping with its announced purpose, to provide a base for a small force of patrol boats, also to be provided by the Chinese.<sup>23</sup>

Perhaps the truth of the matter is, as so often, somewhere in the middle. Newsweek later reported that a "12,000-ton freighter is being fitted in Shanghai with radar antennas and other tracking gear and is expected to be ready for Red China's first intercontinental missile tests late this year (1971) or early in 1972."<sup>24</sup> COL Fraser's opinion is worth quoting as a conclusion to this point:

The Chinese have for some time appeared to be on the verge of testing an intercontinental ballistic missile. The land mass of mainland China does not provide adequate range and there has been some speculation about the actual area of a test. To the Chinese it would probably be more useful to fly the missile over India than over Japan. . . .

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<sup>21</sup>Ray Vicker, "Reds Crowd the Road to Zanzibar," The National Observer (New York), 8 March 1971.

<sup>22</sup>"Tanzania to Have Naval Base," Standard (Dar es Salaam), 7 May 1970, p. 1.

<sup>23</sup>Meisler, "Red Chinese Gambling on African Race War."

<sup>24</sup>"Peking's Missile Men Put to Sea," Newsweek, 22 March 1971, p. 19.

It appears reasonable to think that the Indian Ocean might provide a satisfactory impact area. It is only a step from his concept to visualize tracking ships in the ocean and land-based facilities on the east coast of Africa. There has been some informed speculation that some of the construction now being done in Tanzania is intended for just this purpose. Although hard and conclusive evidence is lacking, there is a logical appeal to the idea, since it would help account for the very obvious Chinese interest in the area.<sup>25</sup>

If such is China's interest, this issue may become a source of trouble in Sino-Tanzanian and Sino-Zambian relations. Both African countries stand firmly behind the Lusaka Declaration by the Non-Aligned Summit Conference in 1970, which, among other things declared that:

. . . the Indian Ocean must be a zone of peace, and called upon all States to consider and respect the Ocean as a free zone--free from nuclear weapons, and free from Great Power rivalry and competition. They [the signers] also declared themselves against the establishment of naval or air bases [in the Indian Ocean].<sup>26</sup>

It is true that Tanzania's policy distinguishes between bases and facilities.<sup>27</sup> It remains to be seen whether this will provide a

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<sup>25</sup>Fraser, pp. 7-8. During the panel discussion on "Major Power Interests and Policy" at the Indian Ocean Area Conference, COL Fraser remarked that there was "very interesting construction going on in Zanzibar which may be connected with long range missile tracking." When questioned by the author, he implied that there is classified information to this effect; the author respectfully submits that the tracking station's existence is being inferred or deduced because of the "logical appeal of the idea," while recognizing that Chinese activities on Zanzibar are not a completely open book to Westerners.

<sup>26</sup>Colin Legum, "The Indian Ocean: A Note on Tanzania's Views," Paper presented at the Indian Ocean Area Conference (Washington, D. C., 18-19 March 1971), p. 5.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

loophole wide enough to accommodate a Chinese tracking ship, a tracking station, and the use of a "zone of peace" as an ICBM range.

#### Economic

China's long range economic goals in Africa are not entirely clear, although trade expansion and market penetration--normal goals for any developing state--can, be assumed. With specific reference to the Tan-Zam Railway, one observer sees it motivated, in part, by "China's long range ambition to control the great mineral wealth of central and southern Africa." His rationale was that, whereas:

. . . the Tan-Zam Railroad will be Zambia's principal seaport access route . . . and China may have considerable control over that seaport (Dar es Salaam), it appears as if Peking might be developing strategic economic leverage over Zambia, the world's third largest copper producer.<sup>28</sup>

This is essentially a "gunboat diplomacy" kind of argument. Whatever leverage China may acquire over Zambia's copper production will be financial, not physical. But, in view of the soft terms of the Tan-Zam loan (see following chapter) and the present high prices for copper on the world market, which seem likely to remain high over the mid range, there is no reason why Zambia should mortgage its future copper production for the Railway. Should the Chinese attempt to use their influence as benefactors, say, to purchase large quantities of copper (as has

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<sup>28</sup>Kevin Phillips, "New Balkans Created," Washington Post, 16 September 1970.

been already rumored), the Zambians appear to be under no real obligation to sell at anything less than the prevailing prices on the London Metal Exchange. The Zambians might, in fact, welcome a Chinese offer to buy as it would give them additional bargaining power in the market.

In the period 1954-1969, that is to say, prior to the signing of the Tan-Zam Railway loan agreement, Communist China had extended a worldwide total of foreign economic aid credits and grants amounting to less than US\$ 1 billion. Of this amount (\$949 m.), sub-Saharan Africa had received pledges amounting to \$246 m., or 25 percent. The principal Black African recipients were: Tanzania (\$53 m.), Ghana (\$40 m.), Guinea (\$25 m.), Congo-Brazzaville (\$25 m.), Mali (\$23 m.), and Somalia (\$22 m.).<sup>29</sup> In a study prepared for the US Congress in 1967, it was noted that:

. . . there is little as yet evident relationship between the small volume of Chinese aid expended--much of it in the form of foreign exchange deficit funding, budgetary support and miscellaneous consumer goods to finance the local currency costs of Chinese aided projects--and the growth of its exports to less-developed countries. In recent years, only between 10 and 15 percent of Chinese exports to the area appear to have been credit financed.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup>Figures from the US Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

<sup>30</sup>Kovner, Milton, "Communist China's Foreign Aid to Less-Developed Countries," in An Economic Profile of Mainland China: Studies Prepared for the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, Vol. II, pp. 615-616.

Thus, in its size and scope, the Tan-Zam Railway makes a major addition to China's worldwide foreign aid program. Coupled with a 200-mile, \$50 million railway linking Mali and Guinea, which Red China agreed to finance and build in 1968,<sup>31</sup> the Tan-Zam project amounts to nearly a doubling of all Chinese aid to Black Africa in the previous fifteen years. As China will be the main supplier of materials and equipment for the railway project(s) and Chinese commodities will be imported to help finance the local costs of the Tan-Zam Railway, China will step up its exports to Tanzania and Zambia markedly by means of the credits involved.

#### POLICY PHASES

Peking's Africa policy has followed different paths at different times. It is possible to distinguish five periods or phases, along the following lines:

1. From the Chinese Communist victory in 1949 until April 1955, Peking generally followed Moscow's lead in Africa as, apparently, in other spheres; the Chinese, then, had no noticeably different Africa policy of their own.

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<sup>31</sup>Lucius Beebe, LTC, "Communist China's New African Offensive," General Military Review, (July 1970), p. 227. China, Mali and Guinea signed an agreement in May 1968 for the construction of a railway link between Bamako, Mali and Kouroussa, Guinea. Further progress was evidently held up by the overthrow of President Modibo Keita of Mali, who had followed a policy of friendship with Peking. The agreement was never repudiated and there have been indications that the project is going to be implemented in the near future.

2. From the April 1955 Conference of African and Asian States at Bandung until the fall of 1959, Peking "was preparing the ground for a competition with the Soviets for influence in the third world."<sup>32</sup> At the end of this period the Sino-Soviet split came clearly into the open. It is interesting to note that one of the issues over which the storm broke was an African question: a difference of ideological opinion on the question of the settlement of the Algerian revolution.

3. From 1959 to the outbreak of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China in 1966, the Sino-Soviet split was the dominant factor in China's foreign policy. There was an "increasingly open struggle in Tropical as well as North Africa and in the Communist front organizations which operate in Africa."<sup>33</sup> In the African context, this period can be described as running from the first Conference of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization in Cairo, in December 1957 to the overthrow of President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana in February 1966 and the recall of China's ambassadors in Africa in the ensuing months.<sup>34</sup> It was also marked by widespread Chinese efforts to support radical revolutionary groups in Africa. In mid 1964 it could be said

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<sup>32</sup>W. A. C. Adie, "Chinese Policy Towards Africa," in The Soviet Bloc, China and Africa, ed. by Sven Hamrell and Carl Gosta Widstrand.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>It is not meant to suggest, that there is any casual relationship between Nkrumah's overthrow and the recall of the ambassadors, which was part of a worldwide phenomenon.

that "the Chinese Communists appear to be involved, directly or indirectly, in every active revolution on the African continent at present."<sup>35</sup>

It is interesting to note that the only Chinese ambassador not recalled to Peking was Huang Hua, head of the Chinese Embassy in Cairo. This was the first embassy opened in Africa by Peking; Huang's remaining at his post may be explained by his reported friendship with Premier Chou En-lai; it is very likely also an indication of the importance Peking attached to his efforts; "until late 1969 this office (Huang's Embassy) directed Chinese efforts in the Persian Gulf as well as in Africa with great skill. Most of the credit for this 'grand design' belongs to Huang Hua. . . ."<sup>36</sup>

Setbacks suffered by Peking in Africa in this period have been alluded to heretofore. While it is not possible within the limits of this paper to devote much space to the subject, some details ought to be provided. A recent New York Times article sums up the most flagrant examples:

. . . ten years ago, Chinese accredited as diplomats to African countries often spent most of their time fomenting rebellion, giving expensive backing . . . to the most radical group they could find. In 1965 the Chinese Embassy in the Central African Republic . . . had a staff of 30 men, some of them advising the leftist Government the country had then and others training a secret "people's army" for ultimate

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<sup>35</sup>Scalapino, p. 646.

<sup>36</sup>Joseph D. Ben-Dak, "China in the Arab World," Current History, (September 1970), p. 147.

use against it. In Niger . . . the Chinese were secretly backing the anti-Government Sawaba party, sending its guerrilla fighters to Nanking for training and, reportedly, financing an unsuccessful coup d'etat. In Burundi the Chinese were generally believed to have been involved in the assassination of the Premier (Pierre Ngendandumwe).<sup>37</sup>

While Nkrumah's overthrow was chiefly due to entirely domestic concerns, such as his increasingly despotic rule and the ruinous state of the Treasury, Ghana's armed forces and police were also motivated to some extent by their alarm at the program for the subversion of neighboring independent Black states which was being conducted at secret training camps in Ghana by Chinese army personnel, under the code name "Operation Green Mamba."<sup>38</sup> The Ghanaian coup was particularly humiliating to Peking: the military chose to strike on the very day of Nkrumah's arrival there on an official visit. The month before, when General Bokassa (then Colonel) seized power in the Central African Republic, he "personally expelled" the Chinese Ambassador.<sup>39</sup>

4. The onset of the Cultural Revolution in China in 1966 ushered in a period of instability bordering on anarchy in wide areas and for weeks and months at a time. It coincided

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<sup>37</sup>William Borders, "China Quietly Renewing an Active Role in Africa," New York Times, 9 April 1971, p. 1.

<sup>38</sup>Emmanuel John Hevi, The Dragon's Embrace: The Chinese Communists and Africa (1966), pp. 114-115. Although marred by a strident polemic attitude, this book by a Ghanaian, who was at one time a student in China, contains a large amount of detailed information on this particular stage of Peking's activities in Black Africa.

<sup>39</sup>Comte, p. 20. Bokassa is a veteran of the French Army and fought in Indo-China against the Viet Minh.

roughly with a period of instability in sub-Saharan Africa which was marked by a series of military coups d'etat. Although Chairman Mao called home his ambassadors in 1966, as already noted, he did not close their embassies. Charges d'affaires kept the red flags flying and carried on business as usual, if at a slowed down, pace. This curious situation lasted up to three years at some Chinese embassies. One Western observer in East Africa recently described the Chinese as having been "quiet and stagnant all over the continent since the mid-sixties."<sup>40</sup> While that was not the author's impression in Tanzania in the years 1966-1970, there was a decline in activity overall. A 1970 State Department report notes "no evidence of new Communist Chinese assistance to the LDCs in 1969, although Peking had pledged \$56 million in such aid the year before."<sup>41</sup> The same report notes a rise in Chinese Communist economic technicians in Africa from about 2700 in 1968 to 2975 in 1969. And it should most certainly be remarked upon that, during a period when "the Ministry (of Foreign Affairs) had almost ceased functioning, having been one of the prime targets of the Red Guards,"<sup>42</sup> and the post of Foreign Minister was vacated,<sup>43</sup> there was still enough decisionmaking

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<sup>40</sup>Borders, "China Quietly Renewing an Active Role in Africa," p. 1.

<sup>41</sup>US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1969," Research Study, 9 July 1970, p. 5 and p. 8.

<sup>42</sup>Derek Davies, "China's Foreign Policy: Idealism versus Reality," Pacific Community, (July 1970), p. 566.

<sup>43</sup>L. LaDany, "China: Period of Suspense," Foreign Affairs, (July 1970), p. 703.

authority somewhere in the structure to take the series of steps which led to the decision to build and finance the Tan-Zam Railway. This may be explained by the supposition that, as early as 1965 a policy decision to do so was made on a very high level. Nevertheless, the implementation of the railway feasibility and engineering surveys was carried out during the height of the Cultural Revolution.

5. The present, or post-Cultural Revolution, phase of Chinese foreign policy in Africa and worldwide began in late 1969:

. . . it is indisputable that the main trend of the conduct of Chinese foreign policy in late 1969 and the first half of 1970 has been a return to normality, motivated by a desire to end China's self-imposed isolation and to mend the fences broken during the Cultural Revolution. <sup>44</sup>

In Africa, this new trend is characterized:

. . . by the use of much more flexible and sophisticated tactics. In contrast with its earlier revolutionary ardor, Peking now seeks good relations with radical, moderate and conservative regimes alike, while readying itself to upset the status quo in Southern Africa through its . . . commitment to construct the Tan-Zam railway. . . .<sup>45</sup>

Let us turn now to a close examination of this project whose dramatic impact on African affairs has given Communist China a very significant presence on that continent and has identified Peking as a major supporter of the Southern Africa liberation movements.

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<sup>44</sup>Davies, p. 570.

<sup>45</sup>Comte, p. 19.

## CHAPTER III

### PEKING'S ASWAN DAM

#### A QUIET CEREMONY

On October 26, 1970 President Kaunda of Zambia gave a speech and laid a cornerstone, not on his native soil, but a few miles outside of Dar es Salaam, capital of neighboring Tanzania. The ceremony was witnessed by Kaunda's host, President Nyerere, and Communist China's Minister for Economic Cooperation, Fang Yi. The crowd was small and the oratory evidently low keyed. Fang Yi, described as "more of an economic technician than an important policymaker . . . made a brief and restrained speech . . . which denounced no one."<sup>1</sup> Contrary to expectations, Premier Chou En-lai had not come, apparently detained in China by domestic affairs; Fang Yi was a far less prestigious substitute.<sup>2</sup> This modest ceremony, however, officially inaugurated the largest foreign aid project ever undertaken by the People's Republic of China, a venture far greater in projected cost than all the other aid it has given throughout Africa: the Tan-Zam Railway.

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<sup>1</sup>Charles Mohr, "Kaunda Leads Tanzam Rail Ceremonies," New York Times, 27 October 1970, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup>Robert Simmons, "Peking/Africa," Africa Report, December 1970, p. 8. Chou was reportedly planning to visit Tanzania, Zambia, Congo (Brazzaville) and possibly Uganda.

The VIP platform stood near a tent camp housing several hundred Chinese workers and technicians.<sup>3</sup> Within sight of the platform were some of the hundreds of gray earth-moving machines which have been at work since construction began last July.<sup>4</sup> While the workers in their gray cotton suits were authentically Chinese, it is quite likely that some of the bulldozers on view were Japanese; the PRC purchased 98 bulldozers worth about \$1.6 million from Japan, to be shipped from the Komatsu plant to Tanzania in the first quarter of the year, consigned to the railway project.<sup>5</sup> Stacked neatly in the vicinity were tons of railway equipment and supplies, part of a massive logistics build-up which began with 1800 tons of tracks and equipment landing in Dar es Salaam in September 1969.<sup>6</sup> Speaking in sight of this evidence of China's commitment to this enormous and controversial project, President Kaunda observed that it was "perhaps one of the most opposed schemes in the world;" Western governments, he implied, had refused financial assistance in order to keep Zambia "dependent on the white-ruled south."<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>The camp referred to is the base camp near Kurasini, the south side of Dar es Salaam, which will be the eastern terminus of the railway. The author saw this camp in May 1970.

<sup>4</sup>Charles Mohr, "Peking in Africa: Look Who's Working on the Railroad," New York Times, 8 November 1970, p. E6.

<sup>5</sup>"Peking Buys Bulldozers for Tanzania," Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 24 June 1970.

<sup>6</sup>Notes made by the author in Tanzania.

<sup>7</sup>Mohr, "Kaunda Leads Tanzam Rail Ceremonies," p. 2.

There was indeed unwillingness on the part of the British and American Governments, the World Bank, the UN Development Program (and the Soviet Union) to finance a multimillion dollar project which their economists said was unnecessary and could not, in the foreseeable future, justify itself financially. That is not the whole story, however; there are reputable economists who hold the opposite opinion and who, in the summer of 1965, proposed that a Western-financed Tan-Zam Railway could be built rapidly and operated efficiently and profitably. There were, at the same time, certain Western interests involved who preferred not to see the Tan-Zam Railway built; these were, on the one hand, the British interests in the existing railway systems and, on the other, the British and American interests in the Zambian copper mines. In retrospect, it would appear that these interests would have been better served by Western participation in the Tan-Zam Railway, rather than to permit Communist China to seize an opportunity which may bring it widespread influence in Africa. It can also be assumed that the Governments of South Africa and Portugal and the Smith regime in Rhodesia also, for their own reasons, were and are opposed to the Tan-Zam Railway.

The Tan-Zam Railway (officially, the Tanzania-Zambia Railway) will connect the deepwater port of Dar es Salaam, on the Indian Ocean, with Zambia's landlocked "Copper Belt," the source of roughly one-fifth of the free world's copper production. Some 1,116 miles of new railroad construction will be required to cross

Tanzania and link up to the Zambian Railways' system at Kapiri Mposhi, Zambia. (See map on following page.) The estimated cost is reported to be US\$412,000,000, which China has agreed to lend to Zambia and Tanzania on terms which are so generous that the loan capital is virtually a gift. The loan is interest free; no repayments are due until 1983. Starting at that time, repayments are scheduled to run for thirty years.<sup>8</sup> Considering the expense of even preferentially low interest on a loan of this size by the year 2013, it is no wonder the two African governments accepted the offer. It is impossible to imagine any Western government, international lending organization or consortium of suppliers matching these terms.

Construction of the line, barring unforeseen delays, is supposed to be finished in 1975.<sup>9</sup> Conflicting figures have been released for the line's carrying capacity. The most reasonable, considering present Zambian requirements, is 3.5 million tons per year, the estimate given by a Zambian Government spokesman in 1969, who said this would be adequate to handle all of Zambia's two-way transport requirements until 1985.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>Mohr, "Peking in Africa: Look Who's Working on the Railroad," p. E6.

<sup>9</sup>Mohr, "Kaunda Leads Tanzam Rail Ceremonies," p. 2.

<sup>10</sup>R. W. Apples, Jr., "Chinese Pressing Zambia Rail Plan," New York Times, 28 September 1969, p. 11.



### CUI BONO?

Each of the three parties to the Tan-Zam project has its own motives for participating in it, in each case a mixture of the political, ideological, strategic, and economic.

### Zambia

For Zambia, the chief beneficiary, the Tan-Zam Railway offers a strategic alternate route of access to the sea, through the territory of a friendly black-ruled state. Its historic routes to the sea, all rail lines, pass through Rhodesia and Mozambique, to the ports of Beira and Lourenco Marques on the Indian Ocean, while the Atlantic port of Lobito, in Portuguese Angola, can be reached via the Congo (Kinshasa) rail system and the Benguela Railway.<sup>11</sup> Two other routes do exist: (1) by rail-river steamer-rail through the Congo to the Congolese port of Matadi on the Atlantic, and (2) by rail-lake steamer-rail, crossing Lake Tanganyika and using Tanzania's Central Line from the lake to Dar es Salaam. As might be guessed, both these routes are little used because of the prohibitive expense of the additional handling.

The existing routes to the Indian Ocean can carry all the existing traffic, although an expansion of their capacity (by double-tracking, electrification, and other improvements) will become necessary as the economies of Rhodesia and Zambia grow and

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<sup>11</sup>Henry Sampson, ed., Jane's World Railways 1969-70, (1969-1970), p. 589.

especially as Zambian copper production continues to rise. Thus, Zambia's "first argument for the (Tan-Zam) railway is political and strategic--that it would end land-locked Zambia's absolute dependence on Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola, in moving its copper to world markets."<sup>12</sup>

Rhodesia's UDI<sup>13</sup> brought the issue into sharp focus for it "made Zambian dependence on Rhodesia's railways politically unthinkable."<sup>14</sup> A clear demonstration of Zambia's vulnerability was made when Rhodesia promptly cut off all oil supplies to the north as soon as the application of sanctions stopped the flow of crude oil from Beira to the Rhodesian refinery at Umtali. A crisis ensued. Britain and the United States, alarmed at the prospect of a loss of Zambian copper production, threw together an emergency airlift (gasoline and oil in, copper bars out), which must rank as one of the most high-priced commodity movements since the Gold Rush.<sup>15</sup> An Italian-built and financed oil pipeline was rushed through from Dar es Salaam to the Copper Belt and began pumping in August 1968, ending 34 months of fuel rationing in Zambia.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>Aaron Segal, "The Tanganyika-Zambia Railway Project," Africa Report, November 1964, p. 9.

<sup>13</sup>Unilateral Declaration of Independence, 11 November 1965.

<sup>14</sup>Anthony Astrachan, "Proposed Tanzam Railway Becomes an African Issue," Washington Post, 16 November 1967, p. F1.

<sup>15</sup>It did, however, make it possible for Lockheed Aircraft, through USAID, to sell three C-130 Hercules transports to a Zambian Government entity called Zambian Air Cargoes. ZAC went out of business in 1970. Author's note.

<sup>16</sup>"Zambian Pipeline to Start Oil Flow," New York Times, 13 August 1968, p. 61.

Were Kenneth Kaunda a different breed of politician, one willing (or able) to risk displeasure of the rest of Africa and domestic opposition, to be another "odd man out" like Malawi's Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, to make his peace with race discrimination in Rhodesia and apartheid farther south--in other words, to do business as usual, his most compelling reason for wanting the Tan-Zam Railway would almost disappear.

Such, however, is not the case. President Kaunda's sincere opposition to the continuation of white minority rule to the south of the Zambezi is unquestionable:

. . . the most cynical and hard-headed Africa watchers tend to agree that . . . he (Kaunda) and President Nyerere are among the very few African leaders who are not hypocritical on the subject and find the present Zambian bonds to the South an increasingly intolerable humiliation.<sup>17</sup>

Because of this dedication to black emancipation, and the realization that the white minority regimes will remain in power for some years to come, the Railway is, in Kaunda's eyes, an ideological, political and strategic necessity for his country.

Aaron Segal also noted three economic development, or politico-economic, arguments for the project. Briefly, they were:

(1) that the railway would stimulate economic development in the northeastern part of Zambia.  
. . . an area of marginal rainfall and eroded soil.  
. . . While the potential here is not impressive at best, the Kaunda government regards some economic

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<sup>17</sup>Mohr, "Peking in Africa: Look Who's Working on the Railroad," p. E6.

development of the area . . . as mandatory if political stability is to be ensured;

(2) that it would promote inter-African trade between Central and East Africa and make possible the establishment of certain large regional manufacturing industries . . . which could not be supported by East or Central African markets alone;

(3) that the government of Zambia needs a dramatic politico-economic project of these dimensions to help it deal with the "crisis of expectations" released by the achievement of independence. . . .<sup>18</sup>

It is fairly obvious that these are too weak arguments to carry much weight in deciding the viability of a multimillion dollar project. It is also fairly obvious that all three arguments could be made for, and satisfied by, a major highway and feeder road building program. In the author's view, President Kaunda's real motive to have a railway built to Dar es Salaam is separate from, but intertwined with, the strategic, political and ideological argument previously noted: to obtain stronger leverage over the (then) foreign owners of Zambia's copper mines. Copper accounts for about 95 percent of Zambia's exports and the lion's share of its Government revenues comes from royalties and taxes collected from the copper companies. The succeeding chapter deals with the opposition to the Tan-Zam Railway by the copper and other interests. It seems fair to say, however, that independence from these powerful foreign interests is what President Kaunda had in

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<sup>18</sup>Segal, "The Tanganyika-Zambia Railway Project," pp. 9-10.

mind at the Dar es Salaam ceremony when he said the Tan-Zam Railway would bring his country "closer to the goal of real economic independence."<sup>19</sup>

### Tanzania

Tanzania's enthusiasm for the Railway arises from a combination of ideo-political motives and the belief that it will spur the economic development of its potentially rich, but now isolated, southwest region.

Like President Kaunda, President Nyerere is firmly committed to the liberation of the Black people of Southern Africa. It is one of the veritable pillars of his foreign policy:

Tanzania has stated that it wishes to be friendly with all peoples. However it cannot be friendly with the present governments of South Africa, Portugal or Rhodesia because it believes their policies towards the African peoples under their domination constitute a denial of fundamental human rights. For this reason Tanzania severed all relations with these three regimes.<sup>20</sup>

Referring specifically to the Tan-Zam Railway in an interview in 1969, President Nyerere said that Western nations regard the

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<sup>19</sup>Mohr, "Kaunda Leads Tanzam Rail Ceremonies," p. 2. Not a direct quotation, but the same phrase recurs in Mohr's 8 November 1970 Tan-Zam story in the Times, referring to "what Mr. Kaunda has called real economic independence."

<sup>20</sup>University Press of Africa, Tanzania Today: A Portrait of the United Republic (1968), p. 87. This book was written for the Ministry of Information and Tourism, United Republic of Tanzania and is distributed by the Ministry.

Chinese involvement in it "as an interference from the East, but we keep saying all we want is an outlet other than through people who do not regard us as human beings."<sup>21</sup>

Looked at as a catalyst for development, the Railway makes more sense for Tanzania than it does for Zambia, although a strong argument can be made that some of the development foreseen can be stimulated better and cheaper by trunk and feeder roads, which are also being built. The projected route follows the Kilombero Valley, part of the Rufiji Basin, an area described as "fertile, well-watered, and underpopulated."<sup>22</sup> The Railway is expected to open up areas of great agricultural potential in the valley and the Southern Highlands, where most of the 2,000,000 population now engage in subsistence-level agriculture. It will also come within reach of the Katewaka-Mchuchuma coalfields and the Liganga iron ore deposits, both in the Ruhuhu Valley near Lake Malawi.<sup>23</sup> The coal reserves there are estimated at 124 million tons, the iron ore at 70 million tons (unfortunately with a high titanium content).<sup>24</sup> The existence of these mineral deposits has been known for years, but their inaccessibility has ruled out exploitation. The United Kingdom's last report to the UN on its Trusteeship Administration

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<sup>21</sup>"Tanzanian Defends Chinese Rail Aid," New York Times, 23 November 1969, p. 23.

<sup>22</sup>Segal, "The Tanganyika-Zambia Railway Project," p. 9.

<sup>23</sup>"The Tanzam Railway: An African Dream Begins to Come True," Standard Bank Review (London), December 1970, p. 7.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

of Tanganyika has this to say on railway development in the then Territory:

Investigations are being made to determine whether there is economic justification for extension of the Mikumi Branch to the Southern Highlands. There would be considerable advantage in continuing the railway to the new sugar plantations in the Msolwa area, thence on to the head of the fertile Kilombero Valley at Lugoda or Mpanga, and ultimately to Makambako and the productive areas of Njombe, Mbeya and Rungwe Districts of the Southern Highlands. From Lugoda or Mpanga it would be possible for a line to be constructed to tap iron and coal fields which are undeveloped at present partly at least for want of communications.<sup>25</sup>

In the first years after independence, the Mikumi Branch was in fact extended to Kidatu. The United Republic's first Five-Year Plan, presented to Parliament on 12 May 1964, noted that over half of the \$30.8 million which East African Railways and Harbors<sup>26</sup> planned to invest in Tanzania during the 1964-1969 plan period was "provisionally earmarked to finance the extension of the Mikumi-Kidatu section of the railroad towards Ifakara and Mpanga."<sup>27</sup> (See map.) While these piecemeal extensions were advocated on the

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<sup>25</sup>Colonial Office, Tanganyika under United Kingdom Administration: Report by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the General Assembly of the United Nations for the year 1960. Part I: General Report (1961), p. 84 (hereafter referred to as "Colonial Office Report"). In view of later British opposition to the Tan-Zam Railway, one may wonder whether the inclusion of this information in a report to the UN was simply "window-dressing" the UK's administration of the Trust Territory, or was a serious project only in the view of those colonial servants who wrote the report.

<sup>26</sup>The unified rail system of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

<sup>27</sup>United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, Tanganyika Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1st July 1964-30th June, 1969, Volume I: General Analysis (1964), p. 57.

basis of local, incremental economic development, it is obvious that a trunk line from the Zambian Copper Belt to Dar es Salaam will also justify and pay for major additions to the port facilities there, thus adding even more to Tanzania's infrastructure and increasing its earnings on port revenues.

### China

What then does China expect to gain from its apparently lavish generosity in building a project requiring the largest single foreign assistance outlay by a single nation in Black Africa?<sup>28</sup>

A possible connection with the testing of missiles in the Indian Ocean has been noted in the preceding chapter. In this regard, some have attempted to correlate the fact that Tanzania and Zambia, along with Albania and Cuba, have also refused to ratify the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which Peking has denounced as an imperialist-revisionist maneuver.

China also stands to gain a foothold for trade in the East African market, which has been dominated by the United Kingdom and Western Europe heretofore. The Railway financing agreement contains a provision that the local costs of the project, estimated at 52 percent of the total, will be met from the proceeds of the sale of \$16.8 million of Chinese commodities, chiefly consumer goods,

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<sup>28</sup>According to figures in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State.

which each of the two African partners in the venture have agreed to import annually. The landed costs of the goods will be debited to a Railway loan account and must, in time, be repaid.<sup>29</sup> The repayment terms of the loan, as noted above, are so soft that if China's principal aim was commercial penetration this would have to be regarded as one of the great "loss-leader" market entries of all time.

Even so, the absorption of these seemingly modest quantities of Chinese goods are posing problems already to both Tanzania and Zambia. A Zambian trade mission to the October 1969 Canton Trade Fair found only a limited range of goods which could be imported by Tanzania or Zambia for the local costs account, and advised Lusaka to exercise caution in making purchase commitments.<sup>30</sup> The mission learned that the Chinese had trouble with delivery schedules and availability of large quantities; some of the available goods, such as cheap textiles, would have adverse effects on Zambia's own infant textile industry. The author is aware of similar problems encountered by trade missions from Tanzania's State Trading Corporation who visited the Canton Trade Fair during

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<sup>29</sup>"Tanzania-Zambia Railway: A Bridge to China?," New York Times, 29 January 1971, p. 65.

<sup>30</sup>"Zambia Cautioned on Chinese Imports," New York Times, 1 March 1970, p. 11.

his service in Tanzania.<sup>31</sup> Both Tanzania and Zambia, however, through State Trading Corporations and import licensing can, if necessary, forcibly redirect trade to China, regardless of traditional trading patterns and consumer preferences.

Except by way of demonstrating that it is now an industrialized country capable of producing a wide range of capital and consumer goods, China's interest in the Tan-Zam project is manifestly not economic or commercial. It is strategic. Despite China's new "moderate" approach to foreign affairs, there is no real reason to believe that China's leaders have dropped their revolutionary outlook. The situation in Southern Africa is the magnet for this massive investment. As COL Fraser points out:

Tanzania and Zambia lie on the front line of the confrontation between black and white in Africa. China has consistently opposed the racial policies of South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal and it is more than likely that one of her reasons for massive assistance in the area is a desire to involve herself as a partisan.<sup>32</sup>

China, now the largest aid giver to Tanzania and Zambia, and Tanzania's sole external source of military equipment and assistance, is working up to the status of an indispensable

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<sup>31</sup>Ironically, the Chinese have financed and built in Dar es Salaam a large textile factory and a farm tool implement factory. Both use antiquated, labor-intensive machinery and methods; both produce items which can be produced more cheaply in China or almost anywhere else.

<sup>32</sup>Fraser, "Chinese Interests and Activities in the Indian Ocean."

friend and protector to the two countries. Despite its own great domestic needs, China is paying a steep price to act the role of a great power in Africa. An American in Dar es Salaam gloomily remarked:

If this project goes through to completion--as it now seems it will--the Chinese will have moved into a new league in Africa. . . . This could be Peking's "Aswan Dam" in Africa--(it could) give them the same kind of foothold the Russians got by building the Aswan Dam for Egypt.<sup>33</sup>

Some indication of what impact the Tan-Zam Railway, coupled with China's more flexible diplomacy, may have in Africa are the "signs of a growing shift in African sentiment away from Taiwan towards Peking."<sup>34</sup> The UN General Assembly vote on the question of Chinese representation in the UN is the clearest indicator. In 1969, the motion (the "Albanian resolution") to replace Taiwan by admitting Peking was defeated by 56 to 48, with 21 abstentions and one absentee. The 42 African members voted as follows: 21 opposed, 19 in favor, and two abstentions.<sup>35</sup> A year later, for the first time, the resolution received a simple majority in its favor: 51 in favor, 49 opposed, 26 abstentions, and one absentee. The African membership had not changed during the elapsed year, but several African members shifted their votes; the African membership voted: 18 opposed, 19 in favor, and five abstentions.

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<sup>33</sup>"'Two-China War' in Black Africa," pp. 74-75.

<sup>34</sup>Comte, p. 19.

<sup>35</sup>US Department of State, Issues: Communist China, Publication 8499 (December 1969), p. 27.

Had Botswana, Cameroon and the Central African Republic not switched from opposition to abstention, the motion would have been defeated, 52 to 51.<sup>36</sup>

Curiously, in spite of this voting shift, as of 1 January 1971, more independent African states still recognized the Nationalist Government on Taiwan (23) than recognized Peking (20). Six years earlier, with only 36 independent African states, the recognition laurels were Peking's, by a score of 21 to 18.<sup>37</sup> The trend towards Taipei was definitely due to Peking's excessively revolutionary style. This is changing; in recent months Ethiopia and Nigeria have both recognized Peking and are exchanging envoys. It is expected by some observers that Libya, Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic may recognize Peking this year, while Ghana and Tunisia may resume diplomatic relations which were suspended, but not broken, some years ago. One Western official has said:

How Peking makes out in East Africa will determine the extent of its influence in all of Black Africa, and over the long run, there may not be room for both Nationalists and Communists.<sup>38</sup>

Because of the Tan-Zam Railway then, and a more sophisticated diplomacy, Communist China may make headway in Black Africa to the

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<sup>36</sup>New York Times, 21 November 1970, p. 1.

<sup>37</sup>US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. It will be seen from the totals that some African states "recognized" both sides.

<sup>38</sup>"Two-China War" in Black Africa," pp. 74-75.

detriment of Western interests in the long run. It is reported that there are more Chinese Communist personnel in Tanzania than in any other country outside China, except for Chinese military units in Indo-China.<sup>39</sup> The next chapter examines the question: who opened this Pandora's box and why?

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<sup>39</sup>Stanley Meisler, "Peking's Tanzam Railroad Could Enhance Role in Africa," Washington Post, 10 November 1970, p. A33.

## CHAPTER IV

### WHY THE WEST REFUSED TO HELP

Why was it that the Western powers, in particular Britain and the United States, allowed Communist China the opportunity to build the Tan-Zam Railway? Was there any likelihood or possibility that Western interests could have built it?

The full explanation of what happened is not available. Much of what went on behind the scenes is buried in Foreign Ministry files in Peking, Lusaka, Dar es Salaam, London, and Washington and will probably never be pieced together completely. Even so, the picture would be incomplete; the World Bank (IBRD); the UN Development Program (UNDP); the African Development Bank (ADB); officials in Moscow, Pretoria, and Salisbury; financiers in London, New York, and Johannesburg hold other pieces of the puzzle. What follows is based, therefore, on limited and incomplete sources.

### CHINA'S OFFER

In the first place, China's first offer to finance and build the Railway, or to investigate the possibility, may have been firm enough to clinch the project, although this does not seem plausible. That offer may have been made as early as February 1965, during President Nyerere's first visit to Peking.<sup>1</sup> A ten-year Sino-Tanzanian

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<sup>1</sup>Lawrence Fellows, "China to Build a Zambia-to-Tanzania Railroad," New York Times, 15 January 1968, p. 13, states that "China's original offer" was made at that time.

Treaty of Friendship was signed and a joint communique was issued in which Tanzania supported China's position on Vietnam, Korea, Cuba, nuclear disarmament, and Peking's admission to the UN, but there was no mention of the Railway.<sup>2</sup> President Kaunda, at any rate, "did not seem particularly interested"<sup>3</sup> in Chinese help at that time. In June 1965, Premier Chou En-lai repaid the Nyerere visit. The railroad must have been on the agenda for that visit, but again the communique was silent.<sup>4</sup> Kaunda remained stand-offish; in August a twelve-man team of Chinese hydrological and geological experts arrived in Tanzania at President Nyerere's request to make a preliminary survey of the Tanzanian section of the Tan-Zam route, but they were not invited into Zambia.<sup>5</sup>

It was not until June 1967 that President Kaunda paid his first visit to China. On returning to Lusaka, he announced that China had offered to provide \$280 million in finance and to construct the Railway. Even then, he would only say that the Chinese offer would be examined, together with whatever responses were received from four countries which had also been approached--the United States, Britain, France, and Japan.<sup>6</sup>

From the first rumors of a Chinese offer even until hundreds of Chinese were engaged in surveying the rail route four years later,

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<sup>2</sup>"China-Tanzania Joint Communique," Peking Review, 26 February 1965, pp. 5-10.

<sup>3</sup>Fellows, "China to Build a Zambia-to-Tanzania Railway."

<sup>4</sup>"China-Tanzania Joint Communique," Peking Review, 11 June 1965.

<sup>5</sup>"News in Brief: Tanzania," Africa Report, October 1965.

<sup>6</sup>"Zambia Says China Offers Railway Aid," New York Times, 29 June 1967, p. 4.

there was an element of skepticism which entered into most Westerners' assessments of the situation. A New York Times' editorial in the summer of 1965, for example, stated:

Belief is widespread that reports of a Chinese offer to build the road amount to a bluff--an attempt to force a positive decision by the United States and the West. Peking's highly advertised aid program for Tanzania to date has been short on performance. Economists are skeptical that China will now take on a project likely to cost upwards of \$200 million.<sup>7</sup>

There was some basis for skepticism. Although it was known that the Communist regime had successfully built some hundreds of miles of new railway lines into remote parts of western China, over terrain as difficult as that of east Africa,<sup>8</sup> it was also known that the collapse of the Great Leap Forward and the economic crisis of the early sixties had halted or slowed rail construction throughout the country. Several thousands of miles of partly completed lines were abandoned and the great drive to expand the national rail network was thought to have been set back for years. In retrospect, one must draw the conclusion that, to the Chinese leadership, the opportunity to build the Tan-Zam Railway was worth a much greater level of sacrifice of domestic needs than a Westerner would have thought reasonable.

Largely because of this miscalculation, it seems, skepticism prevailed and the time which President Kaunda's coolness to China made available was lost. Also miscalculated was the strength of

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<sup>7</sup>"China and the Tan-Zam," New York Times, 29 August 1965, p. E12. See also Waldemar A. Nielsen, The Great Powers and Africa (1969), p. 233, where it is implied that the Chinese might never complete the project.

<sup>8</sup>Sampson, p. 603.

President Nyerere's determination, although his statements on the subject were clear and frequent. In January 1965 he had assured the new Zambian High Commissioner to Dar es Salaam: "The railway link between Tanzania and Zambia must and shall be built, and we shall spare no efforts to further this plan. . . ."9 In July, returning from London, he told the press: "I am determined that it (the Railway) should be built and I am prepared to accept money from whomever offers it to see it is built."<10

#### THE RAILWAYS AND COPPER INTERESTS IN CENTRAL AFRICA

A rail link between East Africa and Central Africa was a part of Cecil Rhodes' vision of a Cape-to-Cairo railway before the turn of the century.<sup>11</sup> It is one of the ironies of history that the building of that link has been most opposed by the railway and mineral interests who owe their existence to the grand design of Rhodes and the British South Africa Company which was his instrument. The nature of this opposition was described in 1966 in these terms:

However, there are other important vested interests opposed to the Tan-Zam Railway. We have noted that the copper companies in Zambia, Katanga and in Rhodesia are held by a small group of financial interests operating within an international cartel. The interlocking directorates of these financial interests include extensive holdings from Katanga to South Africa. One of the major holding companies, Tanganyika Concessions, not only owns a major share of the

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9"News in Brief: Tanzania," Africa Report, February 1965.

10"News in Brief: Tanzania," Africa Report, October 1965.

11"Rhodes, Cecil John," Encyclopaedia of Southern Africa, 1961, p. 425.

copper mines in Zambia and Katanga, but the world's largest coal mine, the Wankie collieries (in southern Rhodesia), which feeds a million tons into the copper belt via the Rhodesian Railway and also owns the Benguela Railway over which virtually all of Katanga's copper is directed to the sea.

It is therefore understandable that these copper interests should take an active part in opposing the Tan-Zam Railway utilizing their significant political influence in Western Governments. The copper interests have much at stake; the construction of the Tan-Zam Railway will in the end be paid for primarily from the copper revenues and the profits on their investments in the alternative railway routes and in the existing coal mines in Rhodesia will be lessened as a result of the new railway and coal field developments in Tanzania. (Author's underlining.)

However, the interest of the copper companies in directly preserving the profits of existing investments by maintaining traffic on the existing railways is not the most important reason for their opposition. The new railway will also insure the national political and economic integrity of Zambia. As long as Zambia is held to ransom by unfriendly governments with its lifelines to the sea passing through their territories, it will have to be amenable and compliant to the copper owners. Without the Tan-Zam Railway, Zambia is not likely to follow Chile's aggressive taxation and nationalization policy.<sup>12</sup> (Author's underlining.)

The interrelation of railway and copper (and other mineral) interests is not a figment of Mr. Smith's, or President Kaunda's, imagination. It is a vital part of the history of the development, in the era of imperialism, of Southern and Central Africa. Tanganyika Concessions, for example, obtained its first prospecting rights

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<sup>12</sup>Stanton R. Smith, Chief Economist, Kaiser Engineers, Intro-office Memorandum: Recommendation for the Construction of the Tan-Zam Railway, to the President of the African Development Bank (ADB), 31 August 1966. At this time, Mr. Smith was a member of a Working Group of consultants which was convened by the ADB to evaluate the request for financial assistance for the Tan-Zam Railway made by the Governments of Tanzania and Zambia.

in Sud-Katanga as early as 1900 and was a major owner of the famous Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga, whose pre-independence mineral rights in the Congo were to run until 1990.<sup>13</sup> The Benguela Railway was built through Angola to Lobito in the years 1903-1929 by British and Portuguese capital; Tanganyika Concessions provided 90% of the share capital and, as of 1956, held the entire debenture capital of the railway.<sup>14</sup>

The British South Africa Company, mentioned earlier, was a company whose powers rivaled those of the fabled East India Company; the Royal Charter, signed by Queen Victoria in 1889, authorized it to occupy territory, enter into diplomatic relations and carry out military expeditions.<sup>15</sup> Under Rhodes' powerful leadership, the "Chartered Company" took the lead in the building of the Rhodesian railway system; the impetus was from the south, the line of march was to the north. The major segments were built in response to new mineral discoveries, such as the coal at Wankie, lead and zinc at Broken Hill in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and, finally, the great copper deposits of the Copper Belt itself.<sup>16</sup>

In the course of time, the Chartered Company's rule over Southern Rhodesia was superseded by "responsible government," its mineral rights in the same area were purchased by the colonial government and its interests in Rhodesian Railways were also bought out.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>Lord Hailey, An African Survey--Revised 1956 (1957), p. 1502.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. 1570-1571.

<sup>15</sup>"British South Africa Company," Encyclopaedia of Southern Africa, 1961, p. 71.

<sup>16</sup>Hailey, pp. 1550-1551.

<sup>17</sup>"British South Africa Company."

Nevertheless, until a few years ago, the Chartered Company continued to hold in toto the mineral rights for all of Zambia. It was the grantor of concessions to the copper companies, and until relatively very recently, collected a royalty on every ton of metal mined in the country. In 1950 the Company agreed to transfer these rights to the Northern Rhodesia Government in 1986 and, in the interim, to pay 20% of the royalties to the Government.<sup>18</sup> This arrangement was unilaterally abrogated by the Kaunda Government in 1969.

The Chartered Company confined its concessions to financially powerful companies. Eventually two groups emerged in control of all the producing mines: Rhodesia Selection Trust, owned by American and British interests, and Anglo-American Corporation, which, despite its name, is a South African company, headed by Mr. Harry Oppenheimer, with its headquarters in Johannesburg. There is some British share capital in the company.<sup>19</sup>

The copper companies' fears of a more aggressive Zambian policy, should the Tan-Zam Railway find the necessary backing, were not unfounded, nor were they inactive or lacking in imagination. In September 1968, although the Chinese rail survey was by then well underway, reliable sources in Dar es Salaam reported that one of the companies had proposed to President Kaunda that a new railway, far less expensive than the Tan-Zam, be built across western Zambia to join the Benguela Railway. This would have by-passed the Congo

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<sup>18</sup>"Northern Rhodesia--Chronology," Encyclopaedia of Southern Africa, 1961, p. 430.

<sup>19</sup>Hailey, p. 1502. Details of ownership provided by author.

section of the existing route, which had allegedly become a severe bottleneck since 1960. The proposers obviously hoped to wean President Kaunda away from the Tan-Zam project, but he did not choose to pursue the matter.<sup>20</sup> South African interests, perhaps official as well as private, i.e., Anglo-American Corporation, had similar thoughts and tried to promote an alternative rail route through Botswana and westward across South West Africa (Namibia) to an Atlantic port. Reportedly, "considerable dialogue between Zambia and South Africa" took place.<sup>21</sup> Again, the effort was unavailing.

To move ahead of the railway story, in August 1969, President Kaunda announced that his Government was taking control of all mineral rights and intended to acquire compulsorily 51% of the shares of the copper mines. On January 1, 1970 the acquisition took effect, with the Zambian Government agreeing to pay for the shares out of future profits. The two giant companies had their concession areas cut from 64,000 square miles to 9,000 square miles. Having broken their hold, President Kaunda invited other foreign companies to invest in the country and by June 1970, American, Italian, Yugoslavian, Rumanian, Japanese and other mining enterprises had applied for licenses.<sup>22</sup> In retrospect, it appears that President Kaunda had waited until he was firmly convinced of China's commitment to build and finance the Tan-Zam before making these momentous moves.

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<sup>20</sup>Notes made by the author in Tanzania.

<sup>21</sup>Edwin S. Munger, "South Africa: Are There Silver Linings?" Foreign Affairs, (January 1969), p. 384.

<sup>22</sup>Martin Meredith, "Zambia's Mines," Africa Report, (June 1970), p. 10.

## THE WORLD BANK SAYS NO

Politics aside (although they seldom are), the question of the economic wisdom of the Northern Rhodesia-East Africa, or Tan-Zam, rail link can be reduced to a simple one: a railway for what purpose? Two, perhaps over-simplified, answers can be given: (1) to help develop the region between points A and B on the existing rail systems which will now be joined, and (2) to haul large quantities of high tariff copper from the refineries to the sea. Economic analyses to prove or disprove the worth of the project will end up with widely differing conclusions, depending on their assumptions as to what traffic the railway will carry. The "development case" was examined in the preceding chapter, and railway extensions towards the southwest were being considered in Tanzania before independence.<sup>23</sup> In 1952, East African Railways (the unified system of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania) actually surveyed the complete route from Kapiri Mposhi, Zambia to a point on Tanzania's Central Line, and declared it a practicable project from an engineering standpoint. Construction costs were put at about US \$91 million.<sup>24</sup>

At the same time, an economic survey of the region around the right of way was carried out by "an Anglo-American team of consultants," who concluded that "there was as yet no evidence of potential

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<sup>23</sup>Colonial Office Report, p. 84.

<sup>24</sup>East African Railways and Harbors, Report on an Engineering Survey of a Rail Link between the East African and Rhodesian Railway Systems, Nairobi, June 1952, cited in Hailey, p. 1553.

industrial development sufficient to warrant railway construction" and suggested that road development might be preferable.<sup>25</sup> As Zambian independence approached, the future leaders continued to press the British authorities on the subject of the railroad. The British Government asked the International Bank for Reconstruction (IBRD) to conduct a survey of the economic feasibility of the project. Mr. Smith contends that:

This survey was conducted hastily without proper consultation of Zambia's new political leaders or the interested development groups in Tanzania or Kenya. . . . The most serious limitation of the study's economic analysis was its assumption that the two existing railways including the primary route through Rhodesia to Beira would not lose 1 ton of traffic to the new Tan-Zam Railway. The only traffic they project for the new railway was a marginal growth of traffic out of Zambia. . . . Then utilizing an unrealistically low-cost for road transport, . . . , they condemned the Tan-Zam Railway with the statement that its Internal Rate of Return was only 1%.<sup>26</sup>

Without wishing to cast a shadow on the probity of the IBRD, or the British Government for that matter, it is worth noting that in 1953 the Bank had loaned the Territory of Northern Rhodesia US \$14 million, for 19 years at 4 3/4%, for railway development. The money was needed for a modernization program, Rhodesia Railways having been "heavily overburdened" since World War II because of the "exceptionally rapid development of the Rhodesias" in the

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<sup>25</sup>Report on Central African Rail Link Development Survey to the Colonial Secretary by Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners of London and Overseas Consultants Incorporated of New York, June 1952. See Hailey, p. 1553.

<sup>26</sup>Smith, Inter-office Memorandum: Recommendation for the Construction of the Tan-Zam Railway, 31 August 1966.

post-war era. The loan was guaranteed by the United Kingdom. Part of the funds were used for "the building of the new line . . . to the border of Portuguese East Africa . . . (which would connect with) the port of Lourenco Marques, and will give the land-locked territories served by the Rhodesia Railways a new outlet to the sea."<sup>27</sup> Five years later, the Bank loaned to the then Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (present day Zambia, Rhodesia, and Malawi) a further US \$19 million, also guaranteed by the United Kingdom, for railway development. This was an 18-year loan at 5 3/8% and was essentially for improvements, such as better communications, large locomotives, rails and coaches.<sup>28</sup> That the IBRD considered a Zambia-Tanzania link a threat to its investments in Rhodesia Railways is clear from a stipulation attached to its US \$24 million loan to the East African High Commission in 1955 for railway development. This provided that East African Railways "should not undertake the Makumbako extension (in Tanzania's Southern Highlands, see map) out of funds provided nor should it commit itself to other loans for this extension without the approval of the World Bank."<sup>29</sup>

The Bank's Report on the Tan-Zam Railway, as Mr. Smith indicated, would not take account of any possible diversion of copper shipments.

No large amounts of bulk traffic can be forecast.  
It is not trade between the Copperbelt and overseas

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<sup>27</sup>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Ninth Annual Report 1953-1954, pp. 19-20.

<sup>28</sup>IBRD, Thirteenth Annual Report 1957-58, pp. 24-25.

<sup>29</sup>Stanton R. Smith, Africa Development Bank Inter-office Memorandum: Relevance of the US Aid-financed Brookings Institution Transport Study to the Tan-Zam Railway Project, to Mr. G. Mancini, African Development Bank, 27 January 1967.

areas but growing intra-African trade and increasing agricultural production that will provide the traffic. . . . As far as traffic between the Copperbelt and the ocean is concerned, no major addition to existing facilities is likely to be required for ten or twenty years because existing railway lines to Beira, Lourenco Marques and Lobito are operated efficiently and cheaply . . . the (Tan-Zam) railway would run at a loss at least until 1990.<sup>30</sup>

The Bank Report mentioned, as additional obstacles, two other points, both of which indicate its orientation toward Rhodesia Railways. It assumed, on the basis that copper would not be carried all the way to the sea, that the Tan-Zam would join the Tanzanian Central Line-- which is meter gauge, whereas the Tan-Zam would be 3'6", as is the rest of the southern African rail system. The additional cost of transshipment was cited as another argument against the project. In February 1969 the problem was disposed of when the Zambian Government announced that the Chinese had agreed to build the new 3'6" line all the way to Dar es Salaam, another 150 miles beyond Kidatu, the original link-up point.<sup>31</sup>

The Bank also noted the existence of the Agreement on the future of Rhodesia Railways, according to which the Northern and Southern Rhodesian Governments, then the owners, formed a Higher Authority; should one party, i.e., Northern Rhodesia, want to build a new line which would divert traffic from the existing system, against the wishes of the other party, it could do so--under certain conditions. These included payment of compensation in full for any loss of revenue on the old line attributable to the new competing line. A

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<sup>30</sup>IBRD, The Northern Rhodesia--Tanganyika Rail Link (27 May 1964). Hereafter referred to as "Bank Report."

<sup>31</sup>"News in Brief: Zambia, " Africa Report, May-June 1969, p. 44.

diversion of 350,000 tons, for example, could mean compensation payments of about US \$8 million per year.<sup>32</sup>

This obstacle also disappeared. In 1965 the Smith regime in Salisbury approached the Zambian Government with an offer to split the system into two separate national systems.<sup>33</sup> For various reasons, including the legal difficulties of dealing with an illegal regime it did not recognize, this was not accomplished until June 30, 1967. (In November 1966, President Kaunda had given the British Government an "ultimatum" demanding the appointment of a negotiating authority to break up the Railway; the "British response . . . was not, helpful, and at best obstructive;"<sup>34</sup> accordingly, in March 1967, to their distaste, the Zambians dealt directly with Salisbury to arrange dividing the Railways' assets and liabilities.) Thus the way was legally clear for Zambia to utilize a new route to the sea without penalties for refusing to use the old routes.

#### KAISER MAKES AN OFFER

The Bank Report was a disappointment to the two African Governments concerned. By February 1965, as noted earlier, President Nyerere was in Peking, where China's first offer may have been made.

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<sup>32</sup>Bank Report, p. 26.

<sup>33</sup>Stanton R. Smith, Kaiser Engineers, Inter-office Memorandum: Trip Report--Tan-Zam Railway Proposal Presentation with Earl Peacock 20 November-4 December 1965, 16 December 1965. (Hereafter referred to as "Smith, Trip Report."

<sup>34</sup>Zambian Government statement, 23 March 1967, on the opening of the negotiations, quoted in "News in Brief: Zambia," Africa Report, May 1967, p. 27.

In April representatives of Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda met in Lusaka to discuss accelerated construction of the railway.<sup>35</sup> On July 1, Zambian Vice President Kamanga publicly discounted press reports that China had offered up to US \$420 million for financing the project, a remarkably accurate figure as it has turned out.<sup>36</sup> A joint committee was set up to review Communist China's offer and others; the two Presidents were said to be studying the idea of an international consortium to raise the money under the aegis of the African Development Bank (ADB).<sup>37</sup> In August, President Kaunda let it be known that he would like to see a World Bank-sponsored consortium arrange the financing, but added: "All we are interested in is the railway. Where the money comes from doesn't matter."<sup>38</sup>

It might possibly have come from an American-organized consortium. In August 1965, armed with letters of introduction from Mr. Robert Gardiner, Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa,<sup>39</sup> a supporter of the Tan-Zam project, to Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda, Mr. Smith came to offer the assistance of Kaiser

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<sup>35</sup>"News in Brief: Zambia," Africa Report, June 1965, p. 32. Until creation of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority, East African Railways had the sole legal right to construct and operate a railway in Tanzania.

<sup>36</sup>"News in Brief: Zambia," Africa Report, August 1965, p. 35.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid. The ADB, founded in 1963 under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity, was still in its infancy and in no position to undertake a massive investment, or even to organize one, the size of the Tan-Zam Railway.

<sup>38</sup>"News in Brief: Zambia," Africa Report, October 1965, p. 58.

<sup>39</sup>Robert K. A. Gardiner, UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), letters to Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda, 19 August 1965.

Engineers. Recently, at the author's request, he wrote this account of what happened:

As you know in August 1965 I obtained the enthusiastic agreement of both Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda for Kaiser to take over supervision of the immediate accelerated construction of the Tan-Zam Railway. My proposal, in which I was personally backed up by UN Undersecretary Robert Gardiner, was to utilize readily available contractor and supplier financing from Japan, Italy and other European countries to initial immediate construction.

The railroad was so highly profitable that it could readily repay medium-term loans and would have been operating today (I gave the Presidents a 3-year schedule.) This would have saved Zambia millions of dollars which are wasted annually on road and air transport. . . .

In 1965 I obtained President Kaunda's personal assurance that every ton of copper from central Africa would be directed by his government to the new railway but was instructed by (US) Ambassador Good to keep this information confidential. In the succeeding years the State Department continued to attack the economics of the railway with erroneous traffic information.

Our estimate of the railway's cost was \$300 million and it is obvious that the million tons of copper traffic, which presently pays \$50 per ton to get to Beira, would alone provide \$50 million a year of revenue sufficient to pay all operating costs and contribute toward retiring the capital costs. An additional 3 million tons of traffic would also have moved on the Tan-Zam railway, including high-tariffed petroleum supplies making the railway one of the most financially-attractive ventures in Africa (the oil pipeline to Zambia would have been unnecessary)!

The action of (Secretary of State) Dean Rusk on 29 August 1965, in instructing Ambassadors Good and Bernhardt<sup>40</sup> to inform Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere, during my contract negotiations, that "the US Government would not contribute financing or support Kaiser's construction of the Tan-Zam railway" contributed strongly to their ultimate decision to

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<sup>40</sup>This name is incorrect; the American Ambassador to Tanzania at this time was William Leonhart.

take up the Chinese proposal. At the time I was, of course, shocked at the Secretary of State's action as we had no need for American Governmental assistance and had not requested any.

Later the next month during our discussions in Washington we were told by the State Department officials that Rusk took this action to prevent our constructing the railway. I was also informed that Rusk and (President) Johnson personally overrode (Ambassador-at-Large W. Averell) Harriman's advice to support the project. . . . I feel Rusk's cable accelerated the downturn of American influence in black Africa much as the earlier action of Mr. Rusk's old boss John Foster Dulles, with his advice, rebuffing Egyptian construction of the Aswan Dam, accelerated the downturn of American influence in the Middle East. . . .

I know from my discussions with Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere, after they received Rusk's attack, that if I could have brought Mr. (Edgar) Kaiser back to personally assure them of our determination to complete the project in the face of all obstacles the two Presidents would have gone ahead with us anyway. Mr. Kaiser refrained from direct participation following our State Department meetings in spite of my urging and I always suspected that President Johnson may have telephoned him personally and requested him to play the project down.<sup>41</sup>

Whatever may have been the reasons behind President Johnson and Secretary Rusk's decision against any official US involvement in the Tan-Zam project--and the Southeast Asia situation in the summer of 1965 was certainly claiming the lion's share of high-level attention in Washington--they seem to have been grounded in the long-standing American policy, if that is the proper word, of leaving Africa, not to the Africans, but to the British, the French, and

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<sup>41</sup>Stanton R. Smith, Harvey Aluminum (Inc.), letter to the author, 23 March 1971. Mr. Smith is now the Chief Economist for Harvey Aluminum, having left Kaiser some time after 1969.

whomever else had a former title to the property. In this case, British interests, short-sighted though they were, prevailed.

#### THE STAMP SURVEY AND AFTER

In that busy summer of 1965, under pressure from the Tanzanians and the Zambians and unable to do much about rebellious Rhodesia, Britain sought to buy some time by offering to pay one-half the cost of yet another economic feasibility study of the Tan-Zam. A Kaiser memorandum of the time records that "Zambia and Tanzania would not furnish any funds for the Stamp study (\$420,000) but would furnish up to \$3,000,000 for Kaiser's study as they feel Stamp survey is British delaying tactics."<sup>42</sup>

The Stamp survey, officially the "British-Canadian Feasibility Study on Zambia-East Africa Rail Link" was carried out by a team of analysts led by the firm of Sir Maxwell Stamp & Associates, London. As its title suggests, the other half of the capital was donated by the Canadian Government. The survey team in Africa was headed by a South African expatriate, Mr. John Lang. Whether Mr. Lang's personal abhorrence for his native country's apartheid regime, which had, in fact, caused his exile from South Africa, had any influence upon the outcome of the Stamp survey, one cannot say. In any case, if the British Government had hoped for a repeat of the World Bank's negative findings, it was disappointed. From the outset, the two

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<sup>42</sup>Earl G. Peacock, Kaiser Engineers, Inter-office Memorandum, 17 September 1965, p. 2.

African governments had laid down terms of reference for the survey, which they had not been able to do for the IBRD study. These evidently required that the political situation in Southern Africa be considered, as relating to Zambia's imperative need for an outlet to the sea through a friendly independent country.

In August 1966 the Stamp survey was finished; it estimated "that with the carriage of 2 million tons of copper and general goods per year, the line would be profitable from its first year of operations;" the price was estimated at US \$350 million.<sup>43</sup> Another US \$33 million was estimated as the cost of expanding Dar es Salaam's port facilities to handle the extra cargo. In its economic justification, the survey made the argument that, even if there were no political objection to Rhodesia Railways, it would make sense to build the Tan-Zam. The Zambian economy had developed so much faster than the IBRD had forecast that Rhodesia Railways would have to make a capital investment of a comparable amount. The cost of the Tan-Zam Railway, looked on as a substitute for that investment, was not relatively a great deal more.<sup>44</sup>

Armed with this good news, the Tanzanians and Zambians set out to see what response they could obtain from the West. Here a curious "welter of political and diplomatic maneuvers"<sup>45</sup> set in about the whole affair, to no one's particular credit. The Zambians

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<sup>43</sup>United Republic of Tanzania, Background to the Budget: An Economic Survey 1967-68 (1967), p. 41.

<sup>44</sup>Astrachan, p. F1. This is virtually the only news story on the Stamp report that appeared in the US press.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid.

treated the Stamp survey as a state secret, even after its basic estimates and conclusions appeared in the press. In November 1967, the American Embassy in Lusaka could still say truthfully that it had not been approached officially on the subject, nor did it have a copy of the Stamp report--officially, "although American diplomats have been seen with copies of it."<sup>46</sup> As noted already, President Kaunda spoke of approaches made to the United States, Britain, France, and Japan. Because of the mystery which swathed the conduct of these "approaches" one cannot be certain which, if any, of the four nations mentioned regarded itself as "approached." This is not meant facetiously, but in fact the Zambians seemed to be proceeding to the beat of a different drum. In August 1966, the two Governments asked the IBRD, the ADB, and the UN Development Program to examine the Stamp report and arrange for the financing of the project. All three organizations returned unfavorable critiques of the Stamp report. The UNDP was unhappy about the political factors in the terms of reference. The high traffic projections were viewed as unrealistically optimistic as were the low operating costs. Interestingly enough, the ADB Working Group, in which Mr. Smith took part, found some of the Stamp survey's construction costs far too high, compared to the East African Railways' estimates, which were still the only real engineering estimates available.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>46</sup>Ibid.

<sup>47</sup>Mr. Smith has lent the author a file of the Minutes of the ADB Working Group, which held twelve meetings, presumably at the Bank's headquarters in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, in January-February 1967. The Group prepared the Bank's position for a Washington meeting with IBRD and UNDP representatives.

Although the ADB's final position paper is not available to the author, the general tenor of the meetings of the Working Group was favorable to the project although critical of certain aspects of the Stamp survey.

The outcome was, perhaps, foreordained. Tanzania and Zambia were asked to permit another examination of the economic feasibility of the Railway and some further technical studies. They would not listen to the former suggestion, but were willing to have the technical studies done. On this basis, the three financial institutions would proceed no further. On September 5, 1967 Tanzanian Finance Minister Amir Jamal and Zambian Minister of States for Finance Ackson Soko signed an agreement in Peking. The agreement bound China to extend an interest-free loan for the construction of the Tan-Zam Railway, to be preceded by a detailed survey by Chinese personnel.<sup>48</sup>

On April 8, 1968, a tripartite protocol was signed, providing for the engineering survey and a separate Chinese loan to cover it. Five days later, the graceful, French-built and Chinese-owned passenger ship "Yao Hua" entered Dar es Salaam harbor. Its afterdecks were jammed with hundreds of young men in identical white cotton shirts and gray cotton trousers. They were the first 154 engineers of the survey team.<sup>49</sup> The view from the American Embassy's office

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<sup>48</sup>"News in Brief: Tanzania-Zambia Rail Link Pact Signed in Peking," Africa Report (November 1967), p. 39.

<sup>49</sup>Lawrence Fellows, "Chinese Communist Engineers Arrive for Tanzanian Rail Survey," New York Times, 25 May 1968, p. 2.

building, which overlooks the waterfront, was impressive, if not depressing.

#### POSTSCRIPT

At some time during the critical period of the summer of 1965, President Nyerere appealed to the Russians to build the Tan-Zam Railway, but was unsuccessful.<sup>50</sup> An interesting glimpse into the Soviets' view is contained in a letter, written a few years later, by a senior member of the African Institute of the USSR Academy of Science to Mr. Smith:

It was not a surprise to me to see in your article<sup>51</sup> that Kaiser Engineers, California, USA, heartily supports the brave China which promised its financial support to this controversial Tan-Zam Railway. But really, from your point of view, any money is good to pay for your services and equipment, and perhaps you get your piece of meat out of this scheme. I, for my part, consider this railway as a paper project with no future.<sup>52</sup>

On the copy of this letter which Mr. Smith sent the author, Mr. Smith wrote:

Mr. . . .<sup>53</sup> told me personally that he had recommended a USSR action program on the Tan-Zam following our discussions in 1965, but the (Soviet) Govt felt that Kaunda was too "wishy-washy" to back!

Reference has been made to meetings between Kaiser officials and State Department officials in Washington following Mr. Smith's

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<sup>50</sup>Ibid.

<sup>51</sup>Stanton R. Smith and J. Sorton Jones, "Necessity for a Pan African Railway," International Railway Journal, June 1969.

<sup>52</sup>Vladimir C. Vigand, African Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, letter to Dr. Stanton R. Smith, Kaiser Engineers, Oakland, California, 2 July 1969.

<sup>53</sup>Another official of the Institute.

first negotiations in East Africa. Kaiser Engineers recorded its version of these discussions as part of a position paper to guide its management in selecting a course of action. According to this document, the State Department and the Agency for International Development were both committed to supporting the British opposition to Kaiser's efforts, but not to the same degree:

Kaiser Engineers met with the State Department on September 15-16 to obtain their views on the project. . . . The State Department originally supported Kaiser's activities in behalf of the Tan-Zam Railroad until British pressure forced them to reverse this position. . . .

It was very evident that the Political Division of the State Department would like Kaiser to remain in East Africa and inferred they would support Kaiser if in some way a solution could be found whereby the Stamp study was made and that Kaiser confine their activities to engineering. But, the AID personnel stated very pointedly that they wanted Kaiser to stay completely out of the picture (even though finances were provided by the local governments from their own resources to finance Kaiser's activities) until after the Maxwell Stamp feasibility study had been completed.<sup>54</sup>

The company decided, in view of what looked like a split in the State-AID front, to try to obtain a policy decision from a higher level in the State Department. A meeting was held, on the strength of which Kaiser advised the Tanzanians and Zambians that the US Government felt it advisable to defer Kaiser's proposed engineering studies until the Stamp survey was finished, "but the decision was for the two governments to make."<sup>55</sup> The two Governments

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<sup>54</sup>Peacock, p. 7.

<sup>55</sup>L. N. Cutler, Kaiser Engineers, telegram to Edgar Kaiser from Washington, D. C. 24 September 1965.

were still at that point anxious to have Kaiser press on. On November 27, 1965, Mr. Smith presented the Kaiser draft contract to President Nyerere, who told him it was the first formal proposal he had received.<sup>56</sup> As we have seen, events turned out far differently. The Peacock memorandum contained this interesting, somewhat prophetic paragraph:

In view of the Chinese offer to build the railroad, their presence in Tanzania, the statement by President Nyerere that he would prefer to have the West build his railroad but if they declined he would turn to the East, further that he felt that the Maxwell Stamp study was a delaying tactic by the British and would have no effect on his or Zambia's desire to build the Tan-Zam Railroad, it appears that if Kaiser does not go forward with their commitments to both countries the Chinese will build the railroad without waiting for the results of the Stamp study. The State Department had no answer to this problem but did state that they hoped that the Stamp study would delay both Presidents from taking further action on the design and construction of the railroad.<sup>57</sup>

On this somewhat dismal note, let us turn to the future.

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<sup>56</sup>Smith, Trip Report.

<sup>57</sup>Peacock, pp. 7-8.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Many years ago Dr. W. E. B. DuBois, speaking at the first Pan-African Congress, said: "The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line--the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Africa and Asia, in America and the islands of the sea."<sup>1</sup> Many years later, Mao Tse-tung is reported to have told a visiting Algerian delegation: "The Europeans and Americans despise you and they despise us. There are only 10 million of you and there are 600 million of us. But the bond that unites us is that we have both been humiliated, and this is a stronger bond than numbers."<sup>2</sup> Both are statements that can be faulted; Dr. DuBois did not foresee that the threat of nuclear annihilation of mankind would be the pre-eminent problem of our age; Chairman Mao was speaking as the leader of a people whose ethnocentrism and racial chauvinism have been noted for centuries. There are not a few Africans who see through Chinese efforts to form and lead a racial front. Nevertheless, many see in China a champion of the colonized and oppressed, a people of vast numbers and vast potential who have thrown off Western domination and are asserting themselves again as a world force.

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<sup>1</sup>Quoted by Frank Moraes, "The Importance of Being Black," Foreign Affairs (October 1964), p. 101. The Congress was held in London in 1900.

<sup>2</sup>Quoted by Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Independence (1961), p. 147.

In this perspective, it is disturbing to read that "the American (official) attitude toward the (Tar-Zam) railway has been evolving toward one of benign indifference."<sup>3</sup> While there is no point in protesting the Chinese presence in East Africa or wishing the Tanzanians and Zambians bad luck with their new friends, the West should ponder seriously on the consequences of that presence. China, in building the Railway and arming, equipping and training anti-white guerrillas in Tanzania, has identified itself unmistakably on the side of Black Africa on the two major issues in that continent today: economic nationalism and the black-white confrontation.

It is true that even FRELIMO, the largest, best equipped and most active guerrilla force in Africa today (there are probably about 10,000 armed FRELIMO guerrillas; the movement claims it controls one-fifth of Mozambique) is probably years away from anything approaching victory, and the Portuguese, up until now, have shown a willingness to pay the price of a long-drawn out counter-insurgency. But the Chinese are not counting on a victory in Mozambique this year or next. They have demonstrated often enough, one would think, that patience is one of their great strengths.

In recent months, China has shown signs of moving towards a quieter, more conventional foreign policy. Thus, President Nixon speaks of Mainland China in these terms:

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<sup>3</sup> Charles Mohr, "Kaunda Leads Tanzam Rail Ceremonies," p. 2.

The past four years have been a period of internal turmoil . . . . A calmer mood now seems to be developing. There could be new opportunities for the People's Republic of China to explore the path of normalization of its relations with its neighbors and with the new world . . . .<sup>4</sup>

In Africa, the most one can expect of this new Chinese approach is that it will cease attempting to overthrow at least those independent Black states with which it has diplomatic relations, even though the government in power may be distinctly "bourgeois" by Chinese standards. There is no reason to expect any lessening of Chinese identification with and support of racial war.

Having missed the opportunity to preempt Chinese construction of the Railway--which would probably have cost no more than the \$400,000,000 which the US spent to support and stabilize the ex-Belgian Congo in its first four years of independence<sup>5</sup>--surely it behooves the United States to consider how best to minimize the impact of what the Chinese are doing and how best to prevent Africa from becoming the scene of a major clash involving China-supported Black states against a white NATO ally.

In the author's personal view it is time that the United States took a more firm and forthright position in favor of self-determination in Portuguese Africa. The value of Portugal's

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<sup>4</sup>President Richard M. Nixon, US Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace; A Report to the Congress, 25 February 1971, as printed in Department of State Bulletin (22 March 1971), pp. 383-384.

<sup>5</sup>G. Mennen Williams, "US Objectives in the Congo, 1960-65," Africa Report (August 1965), pp. 12-20.

real contribution to NATO, in particular the real significance of the Azores base, ought to be weighed most carefully against the erosion of Western influence in Black Africa and our future position in those white-ruled territories where Black rule seems a distinct possibility in the coming decade.

A few years ago Professor Hans Morgenthau, noted for his criticism of US intervention in Southeast Asia, had this to say about intervention in general:

Many nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America are today in a pre-revolutionary stage, and it is likely to be only a matter of time until actual revolution will break out. . . . The revolutionary movements which will then come to the fore are bound to have . . . a communist component; that is, they risk being taken over by communism. . . .


. . . . .  
In truth, the choice before us is not between the status quo and revolution or even between communist and non communist revolution, but between a revolution which is hostile to the interests of the United States, and a revolution which is not hostile to these interests. The United States, far from intervening against revolutions per se, has therefore to intervene in competition with the main instigators of revolution-- the Soviet Union, Communist China and Cuba-- on behalf of revolution.<sup>6</sup>

Such intervention need not take a violent form. Indeed, given the full weight of the diplomatic, political, economic and psychological pressure which the United States can bring to bear on any matter on which it has the will and determination to make itself felt, there is reason to think that non-violent "intervention" would generally obtain at least limited, selected objectives for which

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<sup>6</sup>Hans J. Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene," Foreign Affairs (April 1967), pp. 433-434.

it would seem reasonably suitable. In any event, if the United States wishes to live in a peaceful world environment, then it must make up its mind that it is going to have to help promote peaceful change. One thing about our times seems certain: change will come, peacefully or not.

  
JAMES C. CURRAN  
USFS

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