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DEVELOPMENTAL ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA-
AN APPLICATION OF THE PYE MODEL IN
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

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27 March 1972

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DEVELOPMENTAL ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA
AN APPLICATION OF THE PYE MODEL IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

A MONOGRAPH

by

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The monograph tests Lucian Pye's "six crises" in political development to determine the applicability of the model to nation building in India. Basic research consisted primarily of a literature search in the US Army War College and Shippensburg State College libraries and personal observation and experience during one year's residence in India. India's social, political and economic development are traced through the six crises: identity, legitimacy, participation, penetration, integration and distribution, and related to the nation's historical background and its national character to determine if the crises have occurred and how the government has met and dealt with them. The discussion confirms the efficacy of the model and suggests that the model may be an equally valuable tool in identifying and analyzing the effects of social and political change in any nation without regard to its stage of development.

PREFACE

This Individual Research Report was prepared in conjunction with a course requirement for Shippensburg State College, Shippensburg, Pennsylvania, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Political Administration.

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The East bow'd low before the blast,
In patient, deep disdain.
She let the legions thunder past,
And plunged in thought again.

"Oberman Once More"
Mathew Arnold

INTRODUCTION

B. S. Khanna, the noted authority on nation building in Asia, regards developmental administration,

. . . . as an administration geared to the tasks of economic, social, and political development, which has been induced by an increasing tempo, momentum, and diversity emanating from the elite and groups of people.¹

Social theorists concerned with the administrative and political development in emerging nations have advanced numerous hypotheses and have constructed a variety of models by which a nation's transition from a traditional to a modern society may be analyzed. More frequently than not, these efforts have focused on the differences in types of societies and have been directed toward discovering some progressive order of development through which a society must pass before it can achieve the stature of a modern nation-state. The trauma of change experienced by emerging societies in affecting this transition is acknowledged by all contemporary social scientists, but few have attempted to address the dynamics of this change in their models.

In 1964 Dr. Lucian W. Pye, with members of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council, developed a model which conceptualizes the process of modernization in terms of crises in political development.² The purpose of this paper is to

examine the efficacy of the Pye Model when applied to the problems of nation building in India.

MODEL DESCRIPTION

According to Dr. Pye, social stresses occur during the process of political modernization as a result of growing demands for equality and participation. These demands occur at a time

. . . when there is a need for increased capacity or governmental capacities, and when the processes of differentiation and specialization tend to become more acute.³

Dr. Pye identifies six crises which must be met and successfully dealt with by a developing nation: the identity crisis, the legitimacy crisis, the penetration crisis, the participation crisis, the integration crisis and the distribution crisis.

The Identity Crisis

This crisis is concerned with the achievement of a common sense of identity by the society as a whole, the recognition of the national territory as an individual's homeland and the acceptance of this homeland as a portion of an individual's own personal identity. It also includes the resolution of the transitional problems of moving from a traditional heritage toward modern practices and the sacrifice of parochial sentiments. This crisis normally occurs early in the political development of an emerging nation, and until it has been successfully dealt with, there is little foundation upon which a society can build to achieve a modern, stable and cohesive nation-state.

The Legitimacy Crisis

This crisis is closely related to the crisis of identity and is principally concerned with achieving agreement about the legitimate

nature of authority and the responsibilities of government. Basically this is a constitutional problem: the definition of authority between central and local government. It may involve far more, such as: the very nature of government, the determination of national goals, the relationship which is to exist between the state and the church and the part that the army and the bureaucracy are to play in the government. The legitimacy of authority may be extremely difficult to establish in a transitional society as the leaders are constantly challenged from every quarter for varied and different reasons. This precludes the leaders from exercising legitimate authority, and greatly complicates the problems inherent in dealing with this crisis.

The Penetration Crisis

This crisis is a critical problem of administration; of defining the role of government at the different levels and in reaching down into society to establish fundamental policies. The problem stems from the difference between a traditional society where the government places limited demands on the polity and a transitional society which is more ambitious and seeks rapid economic and social change. The gap in perceived values and aspirations which exist between the ruling elite and the masses in a transitional society further exacerbates the problem. In order to gain popular support for development programs, the effectiveness of formal institutions must be increased and confidence, communications and rapport must be established between the leaders and the masses.

The Participation Crisis

Solution of the penetration crisis precipitates a new problem. Once the people have been motivated to support national programs, the number of active participants soars so rapidly that existing institutions become severely strained. They possess neither the capacity to accommodate such large numbers of participants nor the ability to alter their structure to accommodate the diversity of interests which the new participants bring. As a result, new interest groups emerge which vie with the older institutions; this in turn usually leads to the formation of a party system. As this transition occurs, the principal problem facing a developing nation is to insure that the expansion of participation is channelled into specific interest groups motivated toward nation building and the common good rather than into solely parochial groups whose demands may undermine national programs.

The Integration Crisis

This crisis is concerned with the problem of establishing a healthy and progressive relationship between popular politics and the performance of government. Specifically, the problem is defined by the manner and degree to which the entire polity is organized and integrated into a system of interacting relationships. Government must attempt to meet the demands placed upon it; however, when these demands are pressed from widely diverse interest groups who possess parochial goals and who are not integrated into a viable political system, the performance of the government will be weak and inconsistent. The tasks that must be accomplished in a transitional society to achieve

a political system conducive to healthy development and progressive government is to establish interacting relationships first between the various agencies of the government, then with the interest groups who place demands on the system, and finally between the officials of the government and the citizenry.

The Distribution Crisis

Although considered the final crisis which a nation may be expected to meet, it is one which pervades the entire developmental process. Essentially, it is concerned with determining when government is to benefit and how its powers are to be used to distribute goods and services throughout the society. Many basic issues must be resolved in dealing with this crisis: is government to benefit all of society equally or will it afford preferential treatment to some elite? to what degree will the economy be geared to the public and private sector? will there be a land reform and redistribution of land? will foreign investment be encouraged or will foreign enterprises be nationalized? The answers to these and other questions will influence the determination of economic goals, and the manner and extent to which the government influences the distribution of wealth will to a large degree determine the direction and rate of national development. As stated earlier, nation building is dependent upon the development of sound and viable social, political and economic systems; however, of the three, economics is probably the dominating system which drives the developmental process.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND⁴

India is an immense country whose history is filled with almost constant turmoil and strife. Its area of ancient influence extended far beyond the national boundaries which are recognized today and included the present national states of Pakistan, Nepal, Ceylon and Bangladesh. As early as 3000 B.C., India possessed a mature civilization in the northwest which extended from Harrapa through the Punjab into the Indus Valley and along the Arabian Sea. The sophistication of this civilization is evidenced by its network of cities laid out in a grid pattern, each with well planned drainage systems, a written language, an active sea trade with the Sumerians of Iraq, and religious cults and family associations which are similar to those of today.

The Indians suffered their first recorded invasion around 2000 B.C. at the hands of the Indo-Aryans. These were the same people who entered Europe as Greeks, Asia Minor as the Mitanni and Persia as the Iranians. As they advanced from the northwest, they plundered and destroyed the ancient Indian cities, and over the next fifteen centuries they built anew as they gradually expanded their conquest through the Ganges Valley to the south. During this slow migration, the purity of the Indo-Aryan stock gradually eroded until they were fully assimilated by the Indians and the Hindu religion. The same fate awaited other tribes: until the 12th Century A.D., each conqueror in turn imparted some of its culture on the Indian scene, but in the end each was absorbed by the indigenous masses leaving behind scant evidence of their earlier glory.

With the passing of the ages, new religions evolved to compete with Hinduism: by 500 B.C. both Jainism and Buddhism were born as offshoots of religious reform movements and claimed followers from ancient Hinduism. Also at about this point in time, India had its first encounter with the West. Alexander invaded through Afghanistan, and by 325 B.C. had conquered all of the northwestern area. The chief impact on India of Alexander's conquest was that it opened communications and trade with Persia. Later this incursion from the West was followed by an invasion attempt by Seleucus, the Greek successor to Alexander in the East, who was decisively defeated in a battle which gave India her first national hero, Chandragupta. On this occasion the diverse Indian tribes unified for the first time to defend their territory. From this unity in defense, developed the first Indian empire. It grew and prospered under a highly bureaucratic government until reaching its epoch under the rule of Asoka, a Buddhist, who reigned until his death in 232 B.C.

During the next 700 years, India experienced a new series of invasions: first the Greeks, then the Kushans and finally the White Huns. None of these attempts achieved signal success, and as in the past, the invaders were eventually absorbed into the Indian society.

Since the early days of Islam, India had experienced Muslim influence through the Arab traders who visited the Malabar Coast. Then, in the 12th Century, the Muslim Turks invaded India through the traditional northwestern invasion route. The conquest was a lengthy one, but with the passing of centuries the Muslims succeeded in

conquering most of what is the present-day India and established a balance of power with the Hindus. By the 16th Century, following a long period of conflict and instability, the Muslims had gained superiority over the Hindus and united India for the second time in its long history. The most notable ruler of this period was Akabar. However, like the civilizations which had preceded it, this dynasty also decayed and collapsed so that by the 18th Century the ascendancy had been gained by the Hindu Brahmin families.

It was during this period of confusion that the English, in competition with the French and Portuguese trading companies, arrived on the scene. Initially English military ventures occurred in the northeast in Bengal and Bihar in support of the East India Company, but by 1818 all India had succumbed to the English military and economic power. With this expansion of English control, nearly half of British India was administered directly by the East India Company and the bulk of the remainder, except for small French and Portuguese trading centers, was at least nominally under the control of Indian Princes who paid homage to the Crown.

Nationalism in India was born under this English rule; at first it was based purely on racial and religious grounds and only some time later expanded to include economic and political issues. Ironically, the economic development of the Empire which was intended chiefly for British benefit contributed the means which made an independent and unified India possible. These factors included the introduction of the English language in schools which provided Indians a common language

for the first time if only for the middle class, the development of the press through which information could be disseminated and issues discussed, and the construction of public works and services such as railroads, dams, irrigation, bridges, and postal and telegraph systems which improved communications and changed old life styles. Under British auspices a modern police force was established for the maintenance of law and order, an Anglo-Saxon system of jurisprudence was introduced and the Indian Civil Service was developed in the image of the British Civil Service to provide indigenous participation in the administration of government. These events through the 19th Century precipitated the founding of the Indian National Congress (Congress Party) in 1885; perhaps the most significant single event in the evolution of Indian nationalism.

During World War I, the Indians actively supported the British through substantial contributions of money, troops and resources with the expectation of receiving self-determination and self-rule in return. It soon became apparent that this was not the British intent; where the Indians thought in terms of a gradual transfer of power, the Crown thought only in terms of increasing the participation and authority of the Indians within the existing administrative process. In the years following the War, the number of Indians with positions of authority in the government increased significantly, but the impact fell far short of their nationalistic aspirations.

Numerous demonstrations, strikes and riots erupted throughout the country in response to this disappointment, and the British were

forced to use repressive methods to restore order. The consequences of these actions only served to heighten the spirit of nationalism and to widen the breach between the Indians and the British. By 1920 Mahatma Gandhi had emerged as a nationalist leader and had promoted his program of nonviolence and noncooperation which proved more troublesome to the British than the more violent acts which had preceded.⁵ Eventually this movement became more radical, Nehru was elected president of the Congress and civil disobedience abounded throughout the land. The British finally agreed in 1933 to hold a conference with the Indian nationalist leaders in an effort to seek an end to the civil strife. This conference ultimately resulted in the Government of India Act of 1935 which bestowed a new constitution to India.

In 1940 with the advent of World War II, a split occurred between the Indian parties regarding the responsibilities of the nationalist movement: the Muslim League and the Communist Party of India supported the British war effort while the Congress initially opposed support of the war which they felt was intended to consolidate imperialism in India and elsewhere in the world. Once again the Congress launched a massive campaign of civil disobedience which led to the eventual imprisonment of over a thousand of its leaders including Nehru. In order to gain Indian support, Prime Minister Winston Churchill dispatched Sir Stafford Cripps, a friend of Indian nationalism, to India to seek an accommodation through a proposal to grant India dominion status within the Commonwealth.⁶ The Indians refused the proposal and countered it with a "quit India" resolution which envisaged mass rebellion. Announcement

of this resolution brought quick action from the British: Gandhi was imprisoned along with some 50,000 of his followers and the Indian National Congress was outlawed.⁷

Following the War, there was an increase in the British awareness of their inability to hold India. Political pressures both in England and India finally led Prime Minister Clement Atlee to dispatch a cabinet commission to India to settle constitutional issues, to try to reconcile the differences between the Muslim League and Congress and to prepare the groundwork for the transfer of rule to the Indians. Although the tasks of the commission were consistent with Indian aims for nationalism, the proximity of independence served to intensify the distrust and animosity which existed between the Hindus and Muslims. This animosity erupted into massive and widespread communal riots which resulted in the massacre of literally tens of thousands of people, and vigorously thrust forward the cause for partition. Eventually the extent and violence of the disorders became so intense that Atlee saw no other course available but to publicly announce that India would receive self-rule, and full power of government would be turned over to the Indians not later than June, 1948. Lord Mountbatten was sent to India to prepare the plans for this transfer of power. As a result of the recent riots, the Muslim League persisted in its efforts to achieve partition on the basis of communal minorities and to establish a separate Muslim state. In the end the Congress party was forced to reluctantly assent to the creation of Pakistan from the areas of the Northwest Frontier Province, Sind, western Punjab and eastern Bengal.

Once agreement had been reached between Congress and the Muslim League, Parliament rushed through the necessary legislation to grant India its independence. This act, The Indian Independence Bill, created India and Pakistan as self-governing dominions within the Commonwealth.

APPLICATION OF THE MODEL

General

The problem of nation building, of breaching the chasm between a traditional society and a modern one, is a tremendously difficult and complex one. Although all emerging nations are confronted with similar problems, nowhere are they identical. As each nation and social culture differ, so do the needs, values and expectations of the people. These differences between the nature of societies are more apparent than are their similarities, hence, each emerging nation must seek its own course and find solutions inimical to its own national character.

With this introduction, the applicability of the Pye Model to India will be tested by analyzing the nature of the Indian character and the manner in which India has met and dealt with each of the six crises.

The Identity Crisis

Although the problems faced in achieving a common sense of identity among the Indian peoples have been similar to those experienced in other nations, they have been infinitely more difficult to deal with due to the large size of the country, its enormous population and the diverse social, religious and ethnic cultures of its people. Historically prior to conquest by the British, India had only been unified twice in its long history: first by Asoka, a Buddhist, and secondly under Akabar, a Muslim. Even during these periods of so-called unity, India was at best a loose federation in which the people tacitly acknowledged a central authority but extended their loyalty to their tribe or prince. The situation has not varied greatly since independence, and the same

obstacles to a strong national identity persist. These are the strong traditional ties of the society to religious, caste, and ethnic groups.

Religion. Religion permeates every facet of Indian society and is a major influence in all social and political movements. It is at once a unifying and divisive force to the development of national identity. Hinduism is the traditional and most dominant religion in the country, and is embraced by 80 to 85 percent of the population. It is a highly ritualistic religion based upon the fulfillment of duties (Dharma). Founded more on acceptance of loosely related traditions than on a single creed, it possesses no uniform dogma nor formal ecclesiastical organization. Its form changes continuously as a product of the times, of geographical influences and of social relationships. Hinduism with its various sects is tolerant of other religions and in this sense acts as one of the unifying forces of the country.

The second most prevalent religion is Islamic. About 11 percent of the Indians are Muslim, and although they are considered a minority group, it should be realized that it is a sizeable minority: their number approximates 55 million and exceeds the populations of all but ten nations in the world; it is roughly half that of the Islamic nation of Pakistan. Indian Muslims have adhered to their Five Pillars of Faith and have generally lived peacefully within the larger Hindu community. However, they are extremely conscious of their earlier history when under Akabar they were dominant and exercised their will over all of India. This recollection, their religious fervor coupled with their hostility toward people who do not recognize a single God, and their

feeling of insecurity caused by their minority position and perceived injustices have created a climate of distrust. From time to time, Hindu and Muslim extremists have capitalized on this potential for violence to seek political gains and to support or oppose national programs. This susceptibility on the part of both Hindu and Muslim to renew ancient holy wars creates a major obstacle to the social unity of the Indian people.

The other principal religious groups in India are the Parsis who attest to the earlier Persian influence in the sub-continent, the Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists whose religions developed as reform movements to Hinduism, and the Hebrews and Christians. These minority religious groups together number between 40 and 45 millions of followers; however, because of their comparatively small numbers and tranquil philosophies they are generally able to live peacefully within both the Hindu and Muslim societies.

From this brief resume of the Indian religious scene, it is apparent that the Hindu-Muslim relationship is one of the major problems to national identity. The Muslims cherish their past and cannot discard their sense of superiority. The other religious minorities do not present a real problem as they do not feel particularly threatened and they have no pretensions about being a conquering race with special historic rights. This ancient rivalry stemming from philosophical and cultural differences has been kept alive in modern days by continuing crises: the partition of the Indian Empire upon independence, the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi by a zealous Hindu who felt Gandhi was

too accommodating towards the Muslims, two wars and the continuing threat of confrontation with Pakistan over the possession of Jammu and Kashmir.

Indian leaders have taken numerous positive actions to accommodate the Muslim sector of the society and to overcome the volatile nature of Hindu-Muslim relationships. Prior to independence, the Congress leaders, while under pressure from some radical Hindu groups, adamantly resisted the temptation to form a Hindustan in response to the Muslim Pakistan; instead they elected to form a secular state dedicated to the principle of social, political and economic equality for all. The articles of the Constitution enumerate this general theme and provide:

. . . that all must enjoy equal rights and that no privileges, prescriptive rights or special claims will be permitted any group on the basis of religion. . . . It eliminates from the body politic all ideas of division between individuals and groups on the basis of their faith or racial origin . . . all communities must share the power as they share the duties and responsibilities of being a citizen.⁸

These basic tenets which prescribe guarantees for the freedom of worship and from fear of discrimination are practiced at all levels of government. Although the ideal is not always upheld in every sphere of employment, every major religious group is fairly represented in the offices of the central government and those of the states. As evidence to the efficacy of the guarantees, the late president, Zakir Husain, was Muslim as is the current Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and one other Justice, and within the Army there are not only several Muslim general officers but even one Hebrew.

In spite of these efforts and the reality of official equality, distrust still persists between segments of the Hindu and Muslim communities. The chief obstacle to unity now faced by the government is that petty incidents which arise from individual actions are interpreted by both segments as communal acts which must be paid for by the entire religious community.

Caste. The caste system which exists in India has no parallel in Western culture; it far exceeds any of the western class societies which we have known. It is sanctioned by ancient Hindu tradition that dates back to the age of the Indo-Aryan invasion. It is based on the concept of Dharma: each man is born into a particular station in life, with its own privileges and obligations, and he must fulfill his own Dharma, that is, sacred law or duty. The Hindu philosophy which embraces belief in reincarnation explains the sufferings of a man's existence to his conduct in past lives. Only by fulfilling the Dharma peculiar to his present position in life can he hope to gain a more favorable rebirth and eventual salvation. This ideology is manifested in a sense of resignation, passiveness and fatalism on the part of individuals and in the social conviction that "what we have is what we deserve."⁹ This attitude apart from the aspect of caste is in itself a major obstacle to progress and the transition from a traditional to a modern society. From the basic tenets have evolved the various castes (jatis) which are classically divided into four classes (varnas): the Brahmins who are the priests, the Kshatriyas who are the rulers and warriors, the Vaisyas who are the merchants and members of

the mercantile class, and the Sudras who are the farmers and craftsmen.¹⁰ There is a final distinction that is too unworthy to even be considered a class; these are the untouchables (harjans) who are virtual outcasts. The system is not nearly so simple as the four class division might make it appear: in actuality there are over a thousand variations and class levels within the caste system which represent every conceivable division of society. Within the community these units exercise a layered level of authority on members of the caste apart from any governmental authority. This is particularly true in the smaller villages where progress and modernization has not been so great and the influence of the caste leaders may equal or even exceed that of the governmental representatives. There is no intention to imply that the caste system today is nearly as strong a social force as it was a century ago, but traditions and customs die slowly, and the vestiges of the caste system still remain. Its primary effect on the developmental process has been to hinder social mobility and to act as a barrier to social equality.

In dealing with this problem, the government has taken steps to break down the class distinction. Article 17 of the Constitution abolished untouchability and ignores caste distinction, hence, there is at least no constitutional acknowledgement nor provision for the traditional privileges of the four varnas.¹¹ To a large extent the impact of Western civilization, the expansion of communications, improved education facilities and the effects of the democratic political process have accomplished a great deal toward erasing this social structure which was believed to have been "written by the gods." In a nation of close

family ties and in which marriages are still largely arranged between parents, endogamy and commensality are the most enduring caste laws.¹²

One other positive measure which the government has taken to promote equality was the establishment of special economic and social programs for the "scheduled class," formerly the untouchables. It assures members of the scheduled class representation in government by reserving seats in the House of the People, state legislative assemblies and in the public services.¹³ Although not identical to programs in the United States, they are similar to the American equal opportunity and social welfare programs.

Even though significant strides have been made in breaking down the traditional caste barriers and in providing opportunity for vertical mobility, the caste system persists as a reality of life. The higher castes in particular still perceive a sense of superiority and respect the laws of their caste. In India today it might be said that the Indian takes off his caste and puts on his shirt when he goes to work, but it is just as true that upon returning home he takes off his shirt and puts his caste back on.

Ethnic Culture. Besides the religious and caste considerations, which may well be considered ethnic in origin, language problems and associated regional differences constitute the other major obstructions to social unity. Nothing could be more divisive than the language problem in India: there are four major language families which possess 179 distinct languages and over 500 dialects.¹⁴ The government itself recognizes fourteen different languages as being official. No single

language is common to all, or even a significant majority of the people. This situation creates tremendous difficulty to universal communications, manifests distrust, and promotes regional loyalty at the expense of national unity.

In 1961 Prime Minister Shastri succeeded in gaining support in establishing Hindi as the national language while approving English and twelve other indigenous languages for regional and special purposes. This act culminated years of effort to establish a common language for all people, but passage of the act was infinitely easier than obtaining popular support. Before the signatures were dry, the act met with severe criticism which burst forth in violent riots. Although Hindi was the principal tongue of about 125 million Indians and was spoken by perhaps 200 million more, the total number of people who spoke Hindi represented just a little more than half the population.¹⁵ Parochial interests and cultural pride excited protest, and continue even today to spark opposition to attempts by the government to impose Hindi as the primary language.

The language problem may be placed in perspective through two different examples. The typical army officer is normally required to know at least four languages: English because it is the language of the officer corps and the one used in all official military communications; Hindi because it is the national language, his own tribal tongue and the language of his regiment. Similar requirements may well exist for bureaucrats and businessmen; most people need at least two languages and many speak fluently and write as many as a half dozen or more. Ironic as

it may seem, many Indian husbands and wives find it necessary to converse in English because it is their only common language.

The second example is selected to show how language and regionalism may combine to challenge national unity. Tamil is the language of Tamil Nadu, formerly Madras state; it is an ancient language of Dravidian origin and is also spoken in Ceylon. Regional feelings have always been strong in the South, and particularly so in heavily populated Tamil Nadu which has a very distinct culture of its own. The peoples of Tamil Nadu objected violently when the central government in Delhi directed that civil service examinations be administered only in Hindi and English as this necessarily eliminated large numbers of people from the competition for government positions. This language requirement precipitated in violent riots which not only resulted in considerable property damage and loss of life but served to weld Tamil loyalty while creating a lack of confidence and a feeling of hostility toward the government in Delhi. The incident is not an isolated one, there have been numerous such disorders in Tamil Nadu and elsewhere in India. The predominant Dravidian Party in Tamil Nadu which served as a prime instigator of the violence has seized upon the opportunity to demand autonomy for their state; that is, full autonomy except for matters of defense, foreign relations, currency and communications. This movement is not alone in India, be it for language, religious or regional reasons, similar desires for secession exist elsewhere as well: the Nagas desire a free Nagaland, various tribal groups in Assam seek autonomy and the Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir want to join Pakistan.

Solution to the identity crisis is the foremost problem confronting the Indian government. Other crises may be identified and met, but until the people develop a sense of unity and loyalty to the government, progress in administrative development is severely limited. To the government's credit, all facets of this crisis have been identified and are being met, but progress is slow. The underlying problems continue to persist and repeatedly rise up to complicate all attempts at nation building.

The Legitimacy Crisis


The problems of the legitimacy crisis are not entirely separable from those of the identity crisis, nor indeed from those of the other crises: all stem from the interacting relationships of the social, political and economic factors. None of them can be considered as an entity which stands alone. As stated in the description of the model, most of the problems directly associated with the legitimacy crisis are constitutional in nature. To a large extent India has already provided for these.

The Indian Constitution which was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on November 26, 1949, two years following independence, is based closely on the India Act of 1935. Although this act did not permit full autonomy, it provided for an all-India federation within the Empire and established the broad framework from which the present constitution evolved. The Constitution of India, finally proclaimed on January 26, 1950, incorporates in varying degrees features from the constitutions of other countries: a parliamentary form of government

from England, a supreme court and a bill of rights from the United States, federalism with residual powers of legislation in the central government from Canada, the division of central and state powers from Australia and the directive principles of state policy from Ireland.¹⁶

This synthesis of the constitutional experiences of other countries has resulted in an exceedingly complex and bulky constitution but one which in the end is wholly Indian in nature.¹⁷ A diagram of the governmental structure of this system appears on the following page.

The provisions of the constitution which define the relationship between the central government and the states are the ones which have aroused the greatest challenge to the legitimacy of government. The constitution reflects the principle of a strong central government in order to cope with the multitude of technical, social and economic problems experienced in a developing nation. The division of powers between the federal and state authorities is unlike that found in the United States; it is formally secured by the demarcation of legislative authority into a Union List, a State List and a Concurrent List of powers. In the first two instances, each level has exclusive authority to pass laws regarding those areas of administration included on their respective lists, while the Union has the right to repeal laws passed by the states from the Concurrent List where the two levels exercise joint jurisdiction. This may occur whenever the central administration determines that a state has initiated legislation which is in opposition to national policies and objectives.¹⁸ As might be expected, this authority of the Union is severely resented by those states with



Legend: - - - indicates Advisory Body or Coordination.

DIAGRAM OF UNION, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT. 18

strong regional interests, particularly when the crisis of identity in these states has not been adequately solved. An emergency provision of the constitution further heightens this feeling of resentment: the president is authorized to assume the executive functions of a state whenever there is a failure in the state's constitutional machinery. Under such instances of President's Rule, as in Kerala in 1959, the state legislative assembly can also be abolished and its powers assumed by the Union Parliament. The Parliament can in turn, if it so desires, delegate these legislative powers to the president. Although the duration of President's Rule is limited by statute, initially for a six-month period, it may be extended for successive six-month periods up to a maximum of three years.²⁰

The problems which have occurred due to these provisions stem primarily from the historic autonomy of many of the states under their princes and to the heterogeneous nature of the society. When policies and directives emanate from Delhi which are repugnant to a particular segment of the polity, and when this segment is regionally concentrated, old loyalties and the desire for greater autonomy rise to challenge the Union. The constant fear that President's Rule may be imposed on a state only tends to further aggravate and excite mass emotions. The volatile situation in Tamil Nadu which was cited in the discussion of the identity crisis is a case in point. In this instance it remains to be seen if the president will find it necessary to intervene and employ the powers of the emergency provision to thwart the Dravidian Party's cry for full autonomy.

By and large, there is agreement on the nature and the division of authority in India, and there is popular support for the constitution. Most Indians acknowledge the requirement for a strong central government and concur with the broad policies for development which it has enumerated. The legitimacy crisis has been relatively well controlled if not solved in India principally through a strong constitution that finitely details the authority of the Union and the states. When major conflicts regarding the legitimacy of government arise, they are more frequently precipitated as side effects of another political crisis rather than as a direct challenge to legitimacy itself. Although the methods of challenging the central authority may be more violent than elsewhere, the challenge fits the same pattern that is apparent elsewhere in the world, both in emerging and in so-called developed nations: it is a phenomena of change.

The Penetration Crisis

One of the most difficult challenges which faces any government is the establishment of direct communications with the electorate. This necessitates breaking the numerous barriers to communications and reaching down through the layers of society to touch the people themselves. Until this channel is established, it is difficult for a government to successfully impose its policies, and it is all but impossible to achieve popular support for those policies and to be responsive to the electorate. The problem is compounded in developing countries as the old institutions are often inadequate to the task and new information systems must be developed. This crisis is principally

a political one, and it occurs due to the "lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change."²¹

In the traditional Indian society, there was little central authority and the process of government was itself decentralized. Individuals owed loyalty and reacted to direction from the family, caste, tribe and ruling princes; only occasionally was there an awareness of a larger central authority, and seldom was its impact felt by the people. With the establishment of the Union, it became necessary for the people to shift their loyalty to a higher level of authority (identity crisis) and similarly incumbent upon this new central government to reciprocate and establish rapport with the people. In government this is accomplished through political and administrative institutions at successive levels of government. The political institutions are discussed later as a key factor in the participation crisis, and the governmental system of India has already been mentioned in the discussion of the legitimacy crisis. The issue at stake here is that if government is to be responsible to the will of the people and responsive to those it serves while simultaneously imposing demands on them for the state's general welfare, then each branch of government must be represented at each of the principal levels: central, state and local, as must elements of the ministries and other governmental institutions. This organization and dispersal of government functions has been accomplished in India, but this in itself has not assured good government nor solved the penetration problem.

The upper levels of Indian administration are generally of very high quality and are probably the equal of any bureaucracy in the

developed countries of the world.²² However, the quality tends to decline at each successively lower level of administration until at the lowest levels, which consist of postal clerks, semi-skilled clerical personnel and local administrators, it is of a very low order. This is partially caused by the lack of competent manpower, but it is exacerbated by the desire of the more qualified and ambitious administrators to escape the rural areas and move to the urban centers where pay and prestige of service are greater. The less able are left to tend the countryside.

One need only to travel from one of the larger metropolitan areas into the country and stop at several of the local administrative offices to recognize the enormity of the gap that separates the upper level administrators from the local officials. It is not difficult then to understand how frustrating it is for a rural citizen to get an electrical connection to his house, or to have a telephone installed, or to get a well or canal cleared of debris, or even to obtain a birth certificate or driver's license. The unfortunate aspect is that the central ruling elite are oblivious to many of these problems which serve as constant daily irritants to the people. Also unfortunate is the too frequent attitude of some officials who are aware of the problems but feel that these low-level difficulties are too primitive and therefore not worthy of their attention. The irony of the situation is that the government expends considerable resources to reach the people, publicize national programs and seek popular support while at the same time ignoring this one area which would influence the people

the most. The people quite naturally judge their government and its effectiveness by their own experiences.

To date, the penetration crisis has only been partially identified and dealt with in India. Although the structure of the government and the dispersal of its various instrumentalities has been adequately provided, the higher levels of administration have failed to identify and associate with the people. An interest and sincere concern is required on the part of the high level administrators. Without this interest, knowledge of the plight of the people will not be forthcoming, and without sincere concern and perhaps a degree of humility, they will never attempt the effort to solve the daily irritants which in the end undermine the success of government programs. Until such time as the central and state leaders realize this need for their attention in these matters, and until they accept their responsibility to act and correct the deficiencies in the system, the government and its officials will not gain the loyalty and support of the people.

The Participation Crisis

This crisis is closely related to the penetration crisis, and its solution invariably leads to the restructure and expansion of the party system to meet the demands of the vastly increased participation. It may be of interest to note that the appearance of this crisis need not necessarily point to pressures for democratic processes; it occurs in totalitarian societies as well, and can be organized to provide the foundation upon which may be established manipulated mass organizations.

Political parties in India have only been in evidence since the end of the last century, but even this relatively short existence far exceeds that found in most other emerging countries. They occurred as an early expression of nationalism and developed primarily through the accumen of Curzon, Gandhi and Nehru who advocated independence and a prominent world role for India. Only since independence has there been a marriage between the social structure and the political system; although they developed together alien rule under the British and limited franchise kept them apart. British rule insured nearly complete impact of Westernization on the political system, but only partial and uneven impact on the society itself.²⁴

Indian political parties, under the pressure of nationalism, developed between the two world wars in the Western mode. However, in a fashion consistent with the heterogeneous nature of the Indian society, a profusion of parties and fronts emerged. While nationalism remained the primal interest, the diverse parochial interests of the varied political groups remained latent and did not present a major problem to political development. Certainly the array of parties and associated fronts provided a place for all participants. With independence however, the common nationalistic goals of the parties which had acted earlier to cement them crumbled, and the submerged differences rose to the surface to create a lack of unity which threatened the course of development. A realignment of parties and consolidation of interest groups evolved into what was essentially a one-plus party system: the dominant Congress party and the non-Congress parties. This structure may be

envisaged as one with the Congress Party in the center, the Communist and Socialist Parties at the left and the Swatantra (Freedom Party) on the right with numerous smaller communal and regional parties scattered throughout the spectrum. Within this system the opposition parties did not constitute an alternative to the ruling Congress, but functioned from the periphery in the form of pressure groups.²⁵ Rajni Kathari explained the role of Indian opposition parties as one:

. . . to constantly pressurize, criticize, censure and influence public opinion and interest inside the margin, and above all, exert a latent threat that if the ruling group strays away too far from the balance of effective public opinion, and if the factional systems within it is not mobilized to restore the balance, it will be displaced from power by the opposition groups.²⁶

The Congress was itself fractionalized with splinter groups representing interests ranging from the far left to the far right. Although perhaps somewhat similar to the liberal Republicans and the conservative Democrats in the American parties, the breadth of interests within the Congress and their impact on the party far exceeded that of the factions in the American parties. A system of one-party dominance is unusual to a democratic society, but it functioned well in India because the plurality which existed within the dominant party proved representative of the people. The party also possessed a high degree of flexibility in that it readily and willingly absorbed outside groups and made room for different interests within the party to assure its continuing preeminence.²⁷

Although the interests of the parties have varied extensively, the primary areas of divergence of views have in the past contended around three differences: the ratio and size of the public sector of

the economy, the degree and form of governmental control, and the direction and pace of land reform.²⁸ Another major political conflict which is increasingly becoming a menace to Indian solidarity is the renewal of old differences concerning the theme of government. This has precipitated a new crisis as it seeks to define new relationships relative to the roles of the center and state governments, the influence of the supreme court on the federal balance through its interpretation of the constitution and the whole range of disputes dealing with internal division of territory and the linguistic decisions.

The internal conflicts and the contradictions of the 84-year-old Indian National Congress provided the seed for its own destruction. In 1969 as the tension between the government and its organizational wings increased to the point of open conflict during the presidential election, Indira Gandhi challenged the Party and sought to reestablish the primacy of the Prime Minister in the party and the socialistic bent to development. As a result of this challenge to the syndicate, Mrs. Gandhi was ousted from the Party. However, she commanded such vast popular support that her leaving split the Congress, and she emerged as the undisputed leader of the dominant "New" Congress Party bolstered by a coalition of the Communist right, Socialist and DMK (Dravidian Progressive Federation) parties. Upon dissolving Parliament and seeking new elections in 1971, Mrs. Gandhi achieved a clear mandate to power. For the first time she now possesses at least the opportunity to develop a government with greater continuity and cohesiveness than has been experienced in the past.

The evolution of the Indian political system has been full of confusion and contradictions. Because there exist such deep divisions in ideology, temperament and social practices between the left and the right, polarization in Indian politics is not assured. Nevertheless, in the process of modernization and the construction of a viable democratic nation, the political institutions which emerged as the old institutions were strained by the influx of new participants have provided the means for these participants to become actively engaged and to shape their nation's development. Although the means by which power is accrued differs from the American experience, it is consistent with the Indian character and is not too different after all from the coalition arrangements of some other Western nations.

The Integration Crisis

As is true of the other crises, the integration crisis is not wholly independent nor absolutely distinct from the others; in a sense, it represents the effective solution to the penetration and participation crises. Once the communication link has been established between the ruling elite and the people and institutions exist to accommodate the political interests of the electorate, it becomes necessary to define the roles of the politicians and the administrators. This definition may never be precise, but it should at least detail the responsibilities of each within the political system and should promote a sense of harmony between the two that transcends parochial interests.

India appears to have experienced many problems in dealing with this crisis. Since independence there seems to have been a constant

struggle to determine whether the country is to be led by politicians or bureaucrats, and the very nature of the party system under the dominance of the Indian National Congress has contributed to political inconsistency. The numerous factions which existed within the Congress forced it to respond to pressures by initiating programs and practices which were frequently contradictory, by conceding basic issues and advancing opposition programs, and by compromising its position on national and local issues in order to consolidate power.²⁹ This type of accommodation, aimed at achieving a national concensus, has not been conducive to the effective performance of government; the inconsistencies which were created by these practices contributed to confusion and distrust in the polity.

As discussed in the description of the Model, the first step toward solution is to organize a system of interacting relationships among the offices and agencies of the government. Fortunately, India inherited a tradition of competent administration from the famed Indian Civil Service (ICS), but with independence and the departure of European and Muslim officers from the Service less than half of the officers remained to serve in its successor, the Indian Administrative Service (IAS).³⁰ However, regular recruiting programs and selection by open examinations since 1947 have produced sufficient numbers of officers while a comprehensive training program, consisting of the Indian Training School and the National Academy of Administration, has assured their quality and competence. These administrators as well as officers of the Indian Police Service (IPS) and Indian Foreign Service (IFS) provide the bureaucratic nucleus at the highest level which has

contributed to the administrative continuity in the face of political inconsistency. The relationships between the offices of the different agencies of government and with their subordinate administrative echelons has as a rule been free and open with a minimum of intra-agency rivalry and competition.

The development of interacting relationships between the various groups and interest that make demands on the system has been more difficult to accomplish. The heterogeneous nature of Indian society and the complexity of the party system have contributed to a near chaotic situation of divergent political pressures. Past attempts to consolidate interest groups through absorption in parties and the restructuring of parties have not succeeded in diminishing the number of separate demands placed on the government. At present it is impossible for the government to cope with all of these demands simultaneously. Many of these demands stem from parochial interests which as a composite are contradictory: some, if permitted to persist, may seriously conflict with national integration and give rise to new problems in the identity and legitimacy crises.

The final step, that of creating discourse and response between the officials and the citizens has already been mentioned in the consideration of the penetration crisis. The Indian tradition of respect for authority and for those in authority has generally been extended to government officials, but it is not reciprocated by those in the various levels of the bureaucracy, particularly those at the highest levels. There is a very definite relationship between the citizen and the officials, but except for the more affluent and influential citizens, it is hardly an interacting one.

The Indian leaders have a clear perception of the problems incidental to the integration crisis, but in the nation's present stage of development there are many apparent areas of deficiency and little evidence that the appropriate effort is being devoted to deal with them. The problems are vastly more complex and difficult than they may appear on the surface, but they must be met. Development of interacting relationships between the articulating parties and government is essential to the process of modernization and the political development of the country.

The Distribution Crisis

The basic questions of who is to benefit from government and how is wealth to be distributed are answered in the Preamble and Articles 38 and 39 of the Constitution of India. The Constitution provides for a welfare state and directs that the State assure:

- (b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to serve the common good;
- (c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment; . . .³¹

The more encompassing question of how the government is to accomplish these principles defines the crisis for India.

With independence, India needed to plot her economic course: from her standpoint the courses open were basically to pursue a policy of free enterprise, one of socialism or a compromise of the two. She chose a compromise course, but one which leaned heavily on the socialist approach. This decision proved to be a vital one for it dictated the

preeminence of effort to the public rather than the private sector. The government proceeded with a series of five-year plans aimed initially at the growth of human and material resources, then the development of agriculture, irrigation and power, industry, transportation, communication and social services. This thrust of economic activity impacted in several ways. First, the nature and scope of activities of the State underwent sudden transformation. The traditional functions of government, maintaining law and order, collecting revenue, administering justice and providing for security, were relegated to a position below attainment of the immediate economic and social goals. Next, because the planning for this economic development was accomplished within the political framework and social policy of the Constitution it created numerous problems in the integration of public politics and government. Because this type of planning is susceptible to public opinion, it is slow and generates political pressures which tend to hinder growth on economic principles. Further, it raised a variety of new problems concerning the relationship of the enterprises with the legislature and complicated the relationship not only between the Union and the states, but between the states themselves. Finally, it created a maze of legislation which became necessary in order to direct, limit and control the implementation of State policy in each activity. This morass of legislation in turn has upset the distinction between the legal functions of the executive administrators and the functions of the courts due to the continuous requirement for administrators to adjudicate. The administrative agencies have established their own tribunals for this purpose while the courts, caught unprepared by the sudden burst of activity, are still

trying to sort the functions and test the constitutionality of the whole endeavor.³²

In spite of these consequences, bad crop years, inflation and high military expenditures from three wars, India has succeeded in making a quantum jump toward becoming a modern industrial nation. Even though the industrial growth has fallen far short of the planned goals, the achievements have been remarkable. While industrialization has progressed rapidly, agriculture has not fared as well. A great deal of land legislation has been undertaken to redistribute land, to consolidate holdings and to provide reforms to the tenancy system. While the various land reforms have largely been implemented, a substantial part of Indian agriculture is still burdened by uneconomically small holdings, inadequate irrigation systems and insufficient quantities of fertilizer. The agricultural problem is further complicated by its inability to grow at a greater rate than that of the population. The same is true in the fields of transportation and communications: everywhere the means and facilities are inadequate, and outside the larger urban areas they are primitive as well.

The distribution of wealth has suffered a similar fate. The strides made in modernizing and expanding education, medical attention and social welfare activities, while remarkable, fall short of the minimum requirements. By any standard, the masses are still unimaginably poor and many lack even the barest essentials to sustain life. The population of India is so large and is growing so rapidly that productivity has no opportunity to develop to meet the demand, and in spite of the

very excellent government programs, there has been little if any marginal improvement in the plight of the common man.

The distribution crisis looms as India's most serious obstacle to breaching the gap from a traditional to a modern society. Her population problem defies quick solution, and completely offsets the tremendous progress which has been made since independence. As before, this crisis too is recognized by the leaders at all levels of government, and for years they have been attacking the problem of the population growth which they correctly identify as key to a solution, but thus far all of their efforts have proven inconsequential.

CONCLUSIONS


This review of Dr. Pye's six crises in political development through discussion of selected problems and situations that impact in each crisis tends to confirm the Model's applicability to India. Although no mention of Pye's specific terms was discovered in any of the source materials consulted, it is evident that India has an appreciation for the substance of the crises and has taken deliberate measures to deal with them. Certainly she has experienced all of them on more than one occasion. Her incomplete solutions to the crises does not degrade the Model, but simply confirms that India is still a developing nation.

The Model is definitely not a mere check list of steps to progress, but rather it is a sophisticated means of identifying major requirements of the modernization process and a means of analyzing actions and reactions within the political system. It appears to be particularly useful in this regard as it permits an assessment of the impact that an action in one area will have in the other crisis areas.

The interrelationship of the crises makes them somewhat difficult to consider and treat within finite bounds. This perhaps is not a failure of the Model but a reflection of the realistic fashion in which it treats the tremendously complex process of nation building.

The process of nation building is a continuous one which is kindled by constant social, political and economic changes. Even in the most advanced Western nations, Pye's crises are evident. They appear and reappear time and again in an apparently unending cycle.

Perhaps in this observation lies the true value of Pye's Model. It is more than simply a device for use in analyzing the progress of newly emerging nations, but is equally applicable to all. It is a means by which social and political scientists can identify problems and trace their probable impact on the society as a whole. This definition of a problem and understanding of its relationship with all other social and political activities affords a clearer insight into the methods of solution.


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FOOTNOTES

1. Edward W. Weidner (ed.), Developmental Administration in Asia (Durham: Duke University Press, 1970), p. 341.
2. Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1966), p. 63.
3. Ibid.
4. The principal source used for the historical resume was: Rinn-Sup Shinn, et al., Area Handbook for India. DA Pam 550-21 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 53-88. This is the source reference unless otherwise indicated.
5. Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 48.
6. Ibid., p. 277.
7. Ibid., pp. 287-291.
8. Kavalam M. Panikkar, The Foundations of New India (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1963), pp. 164-165.
9. Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1970), pp. 8-10.
10. Wyndraeth H. Morris-Jones, The Government and Politics of India (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1964), pp. 55-59.
11. The Constitution of India (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1951), Article 17, p. 9.
12. Ralph Braibanti and Joseph J. Spengler (eds.), Administration and Economic Development in India (London: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 209.
13. Lelah Dushkin, "Scheduled Caste Policy in India: History, Problems, Prospects," Asian Survey, VII, No. 9 (September, 1967), 626-636.
14. Louis Barron (ed.), Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 82.
15. Braibanti and Spengler, op. cit., p. 104.
16. Shinn, op. cit., p. 331.

17. Panikkar, op. cit., p. 175.
18. Hardgrave, op. cit., pp. 80-82.
19. Richard L. Park, India's Political System (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), pp. 80, 87.
20. Hardgrave, op. cit., pp. 80-82.
21. Ibid., p. 4.
22. Park, op. cit., p. 85.
23. Pye, op. cit., p. 65.
24. Braibanti and Spengler, op. cit., p. 52.
25. Hardgrave, op. cit., p. 124.
26. Rajni Kathari (ed.), Party Systems and Election Studies (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1967), p. 3.
27. Ibid., p. 6.
28. Morris-Jones, op. cit., p. 53.
29. Myron Weiner, Party Building in a New Nation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 15, cited in Hardgrave, op. cit., p. 125.
30. Braibanti and Spengler, op. cit., p. 74.
31. The Constitution of India, Article 39, p. 20.
32. Braibanti and Spengler, op. cit., pp. 72, 73.

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