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THE NIXON DOCTRINE--IS THERE A ROLE
FOR THE U. S. ARMY

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5 June 1973

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THE NIXON DOCTRINE--IS THERE A ROLE FOR THE US ARMY?

A MONOGRAPH

by

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ABSTRACT

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The announcement of the Nixon Doctrine at Guam in 1969, proclaimed to the world that the United States was fully committed to a Strategy of Peace. Although the initiative of the United States was commendable, the fact remains that there continues to exist a serious transworld threat complicated by a multitude of unsolved international problems which directly affect US security and that of other nations. In light of this perceived threat, there is some question **whether or not the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence** can effectively support the Nixon Doctrine and is there a role for the US Army in response to the Doctrine? An analysis of the Doctrine indicates that for the period of the 1970's **there is an even greater role for the US Army if** this country is to help bring peace and stability to the world. Analysis of the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence indicates that it lacks the realism implied in its title. Strategy continues to reflect the syndrome of the cold war period and has not adjusted **to the prevailing conditions** in the world environment. The era of bipolarity has passed and a multipolar world is emerging with entirely new threats and challenges which are not reflected in the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence, hence it is not supportive of the Doctrine.

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INTRODUCTION

Announcement of the Nixon Doctrine at Guam in 1969, proclaimed to the world the United States was fully committed to a strategy of peace. To implement this doctrine, the Department of Defense developed a National Strategy of Realistic Deterrence. The declaratory aim of this strategy was to discourage and eventually eliminate the use of military force to impose the will of one nation upon another. Although the initiative taken by the United States was commendable, the fact remains that there continues to exist a serious transworld threat which is complicated by a multitude of unsolved international problems that directly affect the security of this and other nations. In light of this perceived threat, there is some question as to whether or not the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence can effectively support the Nixon Doctrine, and in either case what is the role for the United States Army in response to the Nixon Doctrine? It is the intent of this paper to answer these two questions.

Analysis of the problems inherent in this scope is undertaken in four parts: First, by a discussion of the genesis of the Nixon Doctrine and its expressed goals; Secondly, by extracting the content of the Doctrine; Thirdly, by making an assessment of the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence in conjunction with the perceived world threats; and, finally by an examination of the role of the Army to determine what its response must be in support of the Nixon Doctrine.

PART I
GENESIS OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE

Evolving concepts and simultaneous implementation of current United States foreign policy have become a matter of domestic and international debate since the conclusion of the World War II and have reached a crescendo since the inauguration of President Nixon. Domestic and international groups have advanced numerous criticisms of the United States in its conduct of international affairs. The complaints include the opinion that the United States has no concept of how to manage its foreign policy; that the US presidents have had no plan and just attempted to muddle through from one involvement to another; that the only true security for this country is to withdraw from all foreign involvements. Within Congress there are those who believe that the formulation and conduct of United States foreign policy lies within their constitutional domain of authority. Within the academic world, scholars in pursuit of truth and without attendant responsibility draw upon a vast reservoir of data to detail almost endlessly the seeming failures of various US administrations to affectively conduct foreign policy.

President Nixon recognized this lack of consensus and took an innovative step in an attempt to bring about harmony and reunite the nation. He did this by preparing and releasing to the Congress and the people annual foreign policy reports which contained the methods required to achieve a stabilized world. He described this world as one in which nations may prosper and coexist in peace if they were

willing to demonstrate accomodation of conflicting national interests through negotiation. His documents clearly reflect an intent to rectify a long standing weakness in United States foreign policy. Instead of reacting to international events in a precipitate manner, as in the past, national response would come about as the result of a well thought out long-range foreign policy supported by a national consensus.

NEW FOREIGN POLICY--ACCIDENT OR DESIGN?

It can be argued that initial discussion of the present policy appeared during the period that Mr. Nixon was Vice-President. At that time his perception of the world's political environment was that it was made up of three parts in which one third was the Free World, one third the Communist world, with the remaining third the uncommitted nations. The latter were identified as the peoples of Asia, Africa, and the Near East. It was then Mr. Nixon's argument that it was against this last third the Communists would direct economic, political and psychological warfare.¹ Today it is the peoples of Asia that Mr. Nixon has single out as most critical to the maintenance of world peace.

President Nixon's 1967 article in Foreign Affairs, "Asia After Viet N. " contained the seminal thoughts that were to appear full blown in 1970. The core idea was the United States is and will remain a Pacific power and that the American people will resist another Viet Nam type situation. The most important thought expressed in this article was the clear statement that it would be necessary to

establish a Pacific community in the form and manner of the Atlantic community, where the Atlantic community was organized to counter the pressures of the Soviet Union, a Pacific community would be created to counter the pressures of the People's Republic of China.

The first appearance of what was to be termed President Nixon's "low profile" policy in Asia was revealed by Secretary of State Rodgers during his tour of South East Asia two months prior to President Nixon's Asian trip. The essence of Mr. Rodgers message was this:

Low profile means that the United States will seek maximum influence at minimum risk. Washington will live up to its formal commitments, but it will refuse to follow the Vietnam pattern in the future. If a country's security is placed in jeopardy, only maximum self-help on the part of the threatened client and its regional associates would stand a chance of eliciting active United States military support.²

The message carried by Mr. Rodgers reflected two key policy positions. One was the expression of the United States that Asian regional associations taking positive steps to resist Communist aggression as had the West European nations might be supported by the United States. The second position involves the interpretation of low profile which has been read as a statement that the United States will withdraw from the Pacific area. Nothing could be further from the mark as will now be demonstrated.

President Nixon, at a press conference on Guam in July 1969, formally revealed the new United States foreign policy to be pursued in Asia. This new policy has not been equaled in world wide impact since enunciation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in

1947. This new Asian policy reflected again President Nixon's views on the future conduct of foreign policy in East Asia and the Pacific. Of particular interest was this statement:

. . . the way to avoid becoming involved in another war in Asia is for the United States to play a significant role. I think the way that we could become involved would be to attempt withdrawal, because, whether we like it or not, geography makes us a Pacific power.³

Pursuing this concept President Nixon argued that for the foreseeable future Asia was the greatest hope for progress in the world and conversely represented the greatest threat to the maintenance of world peace. Accepting the validity of these assessments the United States must develop more flexible policies in which all nations would participate. To lend further credence and emphasis to the message carried by Secretary of State Rodgers, Mr. Nixon succinctly expressed his evaluation of the type of policy to be developed and followed in Asia:

I believe that the time has come when the United States, in our relations with our Asian friends, be quite emphatic on two points: One, that we will keep our treaty commitments, . . . two, that as far as the problems on internal security are concerned, as far as the problems of military defense, except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons, the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will be increasingly handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves.⁴

It would appear that a reading of the policy expressed by both the President and the Secretary of State would come forth clear and apparently was so read by the Asian nations to whom it

was addressed, both aligned and nonaligned nations. This cannot be said about the reactions of sectors within the United States. Two fundamental varying interpretations were drawn from the expressed policy. One was that we would continue to maintain massive forces in Asia and unhesitatingly commit them when and where we wished. The other was that we would withdraw all our forces to the continental United States.

In an unsuccessful attempt to forestall such a reaction, upon return from his tour of Asia, the President briefed his Asian policy to 22 Congressional leaders at the White House. At the conclusion of the briefing, News Week reported that Senate Majority Leader Mansfield hailed the appearance of a watershed in the history of our relations with the Pacific region. As Mansfield saw it, the Nixon Doctrine:

. . . indicated a shift away from an old vested policy which has outlived its usefulness in many respects, and a veering toward a new policy more in accord with the realities of the region as it exists today.⁵

Future events were to prove this was a misperception of the intent of the Nixon Doctrine but Mansfield's interpretation reflected that of many. They believed the new doctrine meant the Administration would take action to withdraw United States forces not only from Asia but also the continent of Europe. Nothing could have been further from the intent of President Nixon. This was certainly true until the Vietnamization problem and the return of the American prisoners-of-war were resolved and satisfactory negotiations concluded with the Soviet Union on the mutual balanced force reductions.

These early attempts to chart the new foreign policy were followed by intense partisan praise and nonpartisan condemnation. Thrust of the policy was to focus on the Asian region, for it is in this region that perception of greatest threat to world peace and stability exists. It is here that Mr. Nixon's basic philosophy of the way to find peace may be observed. It is the concept of a Pacific community, which if successful, would have a greater impact on the future of the world than did the Atlantic community. Policies towards Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and the conflict between the United States and Soviet Russia were not discarded. Quite the contrary, US foreign policy recognized the international environment was shifting from a bipolar model to five major power centers: the United States, Soviet Union, Western Europe, Japan, and Peoples Republic of China. Only the first two could be properly termed superpowers. If multipolar balance could be achieved and maintained it was in the best interests of the United States to ensure that neither the Soviet Union nor the People's Republic of China would be able to establish hegemony over the peoples of Asia.

With denial of hegemony in Asia as the basic concept it was necessary to develop a plan of action that would not become inflexible once announced. The basic tenets of the new approach are found in President Nixon's reports to Congress on foreign policy.

EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE

Capturing the basic tenets of the Doctrine could be likened to attempting to capture steam in a bucket and then pouring it out

for purposes of evaluation. There can be no argument that it exists; the argument centers around just what it is when it is evaluated.

The present three annual reports submitted to Congress on United States foreign policy are in fact extensions of the President's State of the Union messages and reflect the purposeful intent of the Chief Executive to place before the legislative branch of the government and the American people a policy which has been adapted to the changing international environment. By making public his policies, he hoped to obtain consensus and reestablish governmental credibility. He also hoped to insure that the metamorphosis of a bipolar balance of power into an emerging multipolar system of power centers would not leave the US behind as a dominant world force.

There is an inherent danger in placing in the public domain the avowed foreign policy of any nation. That act allows all and sundry who disagree with the policy to formulate counter actions perhaps to the detriment of the policy itself. However, the action taken by the President is in full accord with the constitution and cannot but be helpful in bringing before the American people all the charges and countercharges so long suppressed. This act in itself will result in an educative process and should forge a foreign policy which has a national consensus.

Accordingly, within the introduction of the 1970 report entitled "A New Strategy for Peace" may be found an exposition of the concept of the Nixon Doctrine. The latter was first expressed at a press conference at Guam. The first part of the 1971 report

"Building for Peace" deals exclusively with the Nixon Doctrine. It again reaffirms the concept expressed at Guam and in the 1970 report. The second report, however, deals more explicitly with methods of application and what had been accomplished to date through its use. Both reports stressed the United States would keep its treaty commitments, provide a nuclear shield, and furnish economic and military assistance. There was an explicit proviso, though, the understanding that the threatened nation must provide the military manpower for its defense. Both reports stressed that actions taken by the United States would be in its own national interests with appropriate attention given to the national interests of other nations. The policy is summed in this statement: "The United States can and will participate, where our interests dictate, but as a weight--not the weight--in the scale."⁶ The 1972 report, "The Emerging Structure of Peace," dispenses with further explanations of the mechanics of the Doctrine. Instead, it first presents an overview again of what has been accomplished through the application of the Doctrine and stresses necessity of comprehending its underlying philosophy. The "philosopher's stone" in this case may be identified as President Nixon's 1967 Foreign Affairs article "Asia After Viet Nam." It is the formation of a Pacific community of nations with all the attendant implications that may be related to the conception, formation and operation of the Atlantic community of nations.

Mr. Nixon argues that the requisite underpinnings of a Pacific community consist of three pillars: Partnership, Strength, and a

Willingness to negotiate. An effective partnership must be one in which the participating nations jointly share in the formulation of policies and the provision of resources. Strength is to be achieved through individual national effort and regional associations. Successful negotiation must be based on the recognition that individual national interests will differ but that it is far better to seek ways of accommodating these differences rather than becoming entrapped in confrontation risking loss of national identity and existence.

If indeed the essence of the philosophy has been captured, its exposition may be found and detailed in an examination of the 1972 report on foreign policy. This report crystallizes Nixon Doctrine into an operative foreign policy. Ten regions or nations of the world are identified as belonging to one of three major areas of diplomatic concern which are classified as areas of major change, areas of continuing change, and areas of turbulence and challenge. Within these areas application of a flexible diplomacy is fully disclosed. The remaining sections of the report deal with the security, global cooperation, and the policy making process within the US, the National Security Council System.

PART II--THE DOCTRINE

AREAS OF MAJOR CHANGE

The Soviet Union, China, Europe, the Atlantic Alliance, Japan, and International Economic Policy are contained in this section. It is of interest to note that the four nations or regions represent

four of the five major power centers of the world. Significantly, the first of these to be addressed is the Soviet Union, Mr. Nixon vividly expressed his concern for our relations with the Soviet Union in these words:

Since the nuclear age began, both the world's fears of Armageddon and its hopes for a stable peace have rested on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. For most of that period, the policies of both countries have been directed more to the fearful possibility than to the larger hope.⁷

It is for the larger hope of peace that Mr. Nixon sought to transform existing relations between the two superpowers. The first step to be taken was to recognize that each nation's perception of proper national goals and the means of attaining them are totally different. This difference derives from historical events which shaped the two countries. These differences are further compounded by national attitudes and differing approaches to international affairs.

Americans consider tensions in international relations abnormal, and yearn to see them resolved as quickly as possible.

The USSR tends to view external tensions as the inevitable corollary of conflicting social systems.

Both these attitudes reflect the national experiences of the United States and the Soviet Union, and have worked for two decades to frustrate a better relationship between our two countries.⁸

The report goes on to say that there exists a deep schism between the two countries and that it must be first recognized before the process of accommodation may be initiated. The key differences that contribute to the schism are identified as:

We are ideological adversaries, and will remain so.

We are political and military competitors, and neither can be indifferent to advances by the other in either field.

We each stand at the head of a group of countries whose association we value and are not prepared to sacrifice to an improvement in Soviet-American relations.

We each possess an awesome nuclear force created and designed to meet the threat implicit in the other's strength.

We both conduct global policies. Unless prudence is used, this can create new tensions and areas of conflict in our relations.

Both our peoples are acutely conscious of almost half-a-century of sharp hostility. This historic fact conditions efforts to move toward a better relationship.⁹

In evaluating these differences Mr. Nixon suggests that the emergence of five major power centers and the evolution of monolithic communism into polycenterism has caused the Soviet Union to reevaluate its foreign policy. Other factors were the Soviet Union's military and economic expansion into the Middle East, South Asia and other areas and its expanded industrialized economy which seeks to meet domestic consumer demands. Taken together all these factors provide an incentive for a normal relationship with the industrial powers of the non-Communist world. With these conditions in mind Mr. Nixon's thesis is to move from confrontation to negotiation. Accordingly the United States policy is to be governed by four principles:

We would judge Soviet policy by its actions on the key issues which divide us. In negotiations we would adopt a conciliatory posture, but our positions would be affected only by concrete measures, not by assumptions regarding Soviet intentions.

Our objective was significant progress on divisive issues, rather than superficial changes in the climate of the US-Soviet relationship.

We would set no preconditions. We would judge each issue on its merits. Nevertheless, we recognized that accommodation is a process, and that the settlement of a major issue could not fail to improve the prospects for the settlement of others, just as a failure would cloud the prospects of broad progress.

A broad and mutual self-restraint was essential. If either side sought to gain significant advantage over the other, it would inevitably lead to counter-actions aimed at redressing the balance. That in turn would jeopardize any progress that had already been achieved, and make infinitely more difficult that task of reaching agreements on the specific issues that divide us.¹⁰

In light of diplomatic negotiations with China and the Soviet Union so successfully concluded and the prospect for new negotiations, the policy has merit. This approach has indeed broken the deadlock which existed between the two countries, for whose ultimate benefit remains to be seen. However, when looking at the constant tension which exists between the Soviet Union and China it would appear to the best interests of both the parties to seek its resolution. Contrary to the opinion expressed by some a conflict between the Soviet Union and China could hardly remain localized.

The second of the major emerging power centers addressed within the report is the Peoples Republic of China, and it is in this context that President Nixon stated, ". . . our purpose, and now our potential, is to establish contact between the world's most powerful nation and the world's most populous nation, and to confine our future confrontations to the conference table."¹¹

The rationale presented for this effort follows much the same line as was given for the efforts to obtain a meaningful dialogue with the Soviet Union. For just as the Soviet's national interests have a direct impact in Europe, the Peoples Republic of China and their national interests have an equally great impact on the peoples of Asia.

The efforts to effect the initial contact have been successful and China is now represented in the Security Council of the United Nations. Our foreign policy efforts towards China may be directed:

Assured that peace in Asia and the fullest measure of progress and stability in Asia and in the world require China's positive contribution.

Knowing that, like the United States, the Peoples Republic of China will not sacrifice its principles; . . . 12

This concludes the discussion on the policy approach to the Peoples Republic of China; it consists only of an approach to the problem not the finite resolution of how the problem is to be handled. The point that is made is that the policy is not aimed at the Soviet Union; we have enough problems to be resolved with them without further compounding the issues. We have no intentions of exploiting Soviet-Sino relations. Such a course would be fraught with international peril. At this juncture the policy turns to the other two major power centers: Europe with the Atlantic Alliance and Japan.

Europe and the Atlantic Alliance have prospered and matured for the last two and a half decades under the support of the United States. The former has now developed into an economic giant with ever growing power in the world. Expansion of the European Common

Market to nine nations reflects a growing ability to resolve internal issues in the common interest. The combined strength and power of the members of the Atlantic Alliance has indisputably deterred war on that continent. Strategic and conventional balance of force has been the principle means of maintaining peace. (Otherwise you have a tautology). The President and his advisers have no intentions of unilaterally withdrawing forces without a concomitant withdrawal of large Soviet forces. With SALT I concluded and preparations for SALT II underway, extensive efforts for MBFR negotiations continue. Until successful negotiations are concluded the forces of the United States will remain in place as a part of our treaty commitment.

The US approach to the problems of East-West Europe is based on these principles:

Every nation in Europe has the sovereign right to conduct independent policies and therefore to be our friend without being anyone else's enemy.

The use or threat of force by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe can only lead to European crises. It is therefore incompatible with detente in Europe and detente in US-Soviet relations.

We do not want to complicate the difficulties of East European nation's relations with their allies; nevertheless there are ample opportunities for economic, technical, and cultural cooperation on the basis of reciprocity. The Eastern European countries themselves can determine the pace and scope of their developing relations with the United States.¹³

The President argues that the trends within the Atlantic Alliance continue to flourish and that the leaders must continue to preserve conditions that sustain those trends. Security which permits

favorable trends must be maintained. He concludes with the statement that the US with its allies faces specific tasks:

To face squarely the economic issues between a 10-nation European Community and the United States.

To carry through, vigorously and cooperatively, the reform of the international monetary and trading system.

To intensify our efforts in NATO's Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society and bring other nations into a joint attack on the environmental and social problems of the modern world.

To finish the job of making the force improvements and equitable sharing arrangements that will sustain our common defense

To draw upon our unity and security to engage the East in the building of a broader structure of reconciliation and peace in all of Europe.¹⁴

Formulation of our policy in regard to Europe and the Atlantic Alliance can in no way be considered a detailed plan of execution. It offers instead a purpose and rationale for the direction of foreign policy options aimed at enhancing the growing Atlantic Alliance and encouraging Eastern Europe to join in an era of peace and mutual prosperity.

Japan as a nation which has benefited from peace and prosperity for the last two and a half decades is therefore the last of the major power centers addressed in this section of the report. Japan is recognized as our most important ally in Asia and is our second greatest trading partner. (Earlier in the report Canada was identified as our greatest trading partner.) Japan is linked directly to our security, prosperity and global policies. The emergence of Japan as

the third greatest industrial power in the world produced largely a beneficial impact throughout all of Asia but created a major economic imbalance for the United States. The President addressed the approach our policy is to take in both these areas.

We faced, then, not a desire for change but the dynamics of change. The question was not whether to maintain the partnership which had served us both so well. The question was how to inject into our relationship the characteristics of equality and reciprocity without which it could not be sustained.¹⁵

A major step taken to resolve friction between the two nations was the execution of a treaty which returned Okinawa to Japanese administration but retained US base rights on that island. Japan continued to play a major role in assisting Asian nations with their development needs. This action on their part reflects their recognition of the need to participate in the shaping of the environment of Asia, and has fostered greater stability in that area.

Japan's expanding economic power, not only in Asia but in the Western world, made her a formidable economic competitor for the United States. As expressed by Mr. Nixon, ". . . in our economic relationship, it was evident that Japan, like our European allies, tended to take our commitment to a liberal trading system for granted without extending equivalent access to its own market."¹⁶

Announcement of the Peking Summit meeting had an impact on Japanese domestic and foreign policy. Diplomatic reasons made it impossible to alert Japan to this meeting prior to the event. Had this been done as the pragmatic Japanese fully realize the arrangements would have leaked and the meeting would never have taken place.

This initial United States move to gain rapprochement with China could not fail to send some shock waves through Japan's political structure. It is a tribute to the realism of the Japanese that they had no disastrous impact either internally or in their relations to the United States.

In a series of diplomatic exchanges between the United States and Japan US diplomats explained that the aim in Peking was to establish a better mutual understanding but not at the expense of long-standing relationships with Japan.

In a changing world, we are both concerned with the removal of old animosities. Our alliance must now serve as the firm foundation of a stable Asia upon which both of us can confidently seek a more balanced and productive relationship with our adversaries.¹⁷

Despite constant efforts on the part of the United States to obtain a multilateral solution to redress deteriorating trade and payment situations our trading partners did not respond. Consequently, the United States took direct unilateral action to correct the problem. This action involved a general realignment of currency values and trade relations. President Nixon closed his commentary with this thought.

The process of adjustment will sometimes be arduous. But in 1971 we proved that it can be done by making the necessary adjustments in several of the most important issues on our agenda. The unjustified complacency of the recent past has been replaced with a greater awareness of the task which we both face. That fact constitutes a solid basis for renewed confidence in the future of US-Japanese cooperation, with all that such cooperation promises for the mutual benefit of our two peoples, and for the world's hopes for a stable structure of peace and prosperity.¹⁸

In the last portion of Areas of Major Change, Mr. Nixon discussed International Economic Policy. In this area his doctrine clearly reflects more substance than shadow in policy formation. He argued in 1971 that a turning point was reached in the world's economy, and that the United States had to revitalize its foreign economic policy. This in turn set the stage for fundamental and long term reforms in the international economic system. Initiatives undertaken are described under three headings: International Monetary Policy; International Trade Policy; and Foreign Assistance.

Discussion of the first two initiatives were couched in terms of the August 15, 1971 measures which resulted in suspension of the convertibility of the dollar into gold and other reserve assets, the imposition of a temporary ten percent surcharge on dutiable imports. While the surcharge remained in effect, a Job Development Credit was not applied to give tax credit for imported capital goods. This action finally compelled other major industrial nations to enter into negotiations. Accordingly, a series of meetings were held by the Group of Ten. The short range result of these actions was the Smithsonian agreement which:

unlike the arrangements decided on at Bretton Woods, when the United States was the predominant nation--was fashioned by relatively coequal economic powers. It was the first time in history that nations had negotiated a multilateral realignment of exchange rates. Significantly, the participating nations also agreed that discussions should be undertaken promptly to consider reform in the international monetary system over the longer term.¹⁹

The December Smithsonian agreement achieved significant success in dealing with our International Trade Problem. Resultant monetary

realignment had a direct impact on our trade in that the previously overvalued dollar had made American products too expensive when competing with undervalued foreign products both in the domestic and foreign markets.

A parallel action was taken by President Nixon to curb domestic inflation and thereby increase the competitiveness of American products. Additionally, progress was made in resolving a number of trade issues which was to effect the removal of some trade barriers against American exports.

Protectionism is an unfavorable nexus of international trade and is a multilateral problem which must be resolved. The trade barriers that have been created by the European Community, Japan, the United States and other nations adversely affect each other's exports and create unnecessary monetary difficulties.

A sustained and reciprocal reduction of trade barriers is needed--to reverse the movement toward discriminatory trading blocs and to remove the restrictions in each country which others use to justify the imposition of their own new restrictions. Only an international trading system which is mutually advantageous to the major trading nations and has their confidence is sustainable over the long run. We are prepared to move in unison with other major trading nations toward this end.²⁰

In discussing trade with Communist countries, Mr. Nixon noted "As relations have improved, trade has grown. As the former continues, so will the latter."²¹

The policy toward Foreign Assistance is indicated as being a readjustment from the AID program that began with the Marshall Plan and was so successful in the post war period. Mr. Nixon

presented the argument that the nations that we assisted in the past having grown tremendously in economic stature and are now in a position to assume a greater role in providing assistance to lesser developed countries. Multilateral institutions aided by US in the past are also now able to help in the world development effort.

Review of our assistance program revealed that the purpose of the program often became obscured and enmeshed with security objectives. Based on this analysis foreign assistance was redefined to serve three main objectives:

Security assistance (including military aid and economic supporting assistance) is vital to help friendly countries develop the capability to defend themselves.

Humanitarian assistance helps countries struck by natural disasters or the human consequences of political upheaval.

Economic aid assists lower income countries in their efforts to achieve economic and social progress.²²

It becomes readily apparent that in reviewing part II of the 1972 foreign policy report, President Nixon identified US relations with the other four major world power centers and linked them with International Trade policy. National interests and the necessity to expand imports and exports will always obtain in the arena of international trade. Confrontation frequently resulted in the past from the frustrated efforts of nations to secure world markets. If this frustration may be resolved through negotiation among the five major world power centers then an era of peace may prevail. Conversely,

although not so stated, if nations fail to negotiate and negotiate successfully, confrontation and conflict will prevail.

AREAS OF CONTINUING TRANSITION

Major areas identified in Part III of the report deal with East Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

In discussing the policy direction for East Asia, Mr. Nixon again restates as a basic principle that our substantial interests and deep historic involvement in Asia assure that the US will continue to be a Pacific power. Change that is occurring in Asia must be channeled in a positive direction. Each of the major powers concerned with Asia will play a critical part in shaping that change. There is increasing evidence that efforts are being made on the part of the members of Asia to bring about stability, increased development and prosperity. However, Mr. Nixon warns that:

To create a lasting peace, the other major powers must demonstrate the necessary maturity and restraint and the developing states must act with the requisite enterprise and self-confidence.²³

While many of the Asian nations have demonstrated progress in economic development (the Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malasia, and the Philippines), insurgency and political violence continue. These forces are seen to be aided and abetted by historic and cultural differences as well as overtly and covertly by Communist nations. Indonesia has emerged as a stable nation with enlightened economic policies and active diplomacy which will be an aid to the region. The central purpose of our Asian

policy is to assist in creating a sense of regional identity and self-confidence. But the prime drive for this must come from within, not from without.

Regional economic organizations have contributed measurably to Asia's peaceful development, of these the Asian Development Bank has been a major source. In addition both Japan and Australia have been large developers. To reinforce the growing concern for the stability of the Asian region the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the nations of Europe have pooled their efforts with the United States to increase the obvious momentum that now exists in that area.

In an effort to insure the stability of the region Mr. Nixon reasoned that economic progress and political stability must rest on a foundation of security. In so doing he restates his concept of a new direction for our defense policy first expressed at Guam.

First, I emphasized that the United States would keep its treaty commitments, while relating our concrete contributions of troops and resources to changing conditions in the area. To abandon the structure so painfully built up over the past 25 years would only invite new conflict or induce sudden and unforeseeable shifts in alignments. Henceforth, however, we would carefully weigh our interests in undertaking new commitments, and we would shun a reflexive response to threats and conditions in the variegated context of modern Asia.

Second, I affirmed our intention to provide a shield if a nation allied with us or vital to our security were threatened by a nuclear power. Here, too, we were convinced of the need to forestall upheaval in the international relations of Asia or elsewhere. Our course would be to preclude nuclear blackmail while discouraging nations from developing their own nuclear capability.

Finally, I stated our intention to help meet other forms of aggression by providing military and economic assistance, while looking primarily to the threatened nation to provide the manpower for its own defense.²⁴

It is our task to assist the Asian nations in their drive for national and regional cohesion. The vast trade potential that is in existence and yet is to be developed, the right of peoples to achieve self-determination cannot be denied or ignored. For to do so would fly in the face of the most basic principles of our nation. It is through the medium of the rising requirements of international trade that the best hope rests in building a bridge with our adversaries.

Our approach toward our policy in Latin America is contained in this statement by Mr. Nixon, "The destiny of every nation within our inter-American system remains of foremost concern to the United States."²⁵ It has been successfully argued that this same expression of interest has been made by all American presidents since the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine. This fact is not debated but recognized. The root problem seems to stem from attempting to impose our form of government on the nations of Latin America and by spasmodic injections of massive aid or denial of that aid. "Solutions would be found in reconciliation of basic interests, not merely in economic programs."²⁶

Growth and drive of the Latin American nations have been most dramatically expressed in terms of nationalism and a desire for sovereignty. The United States must recognize and foster this maturing and accept these nations as equals. As a consequence:

Our policies over the past three years reflect four positive themes:

A wider sharing of ideas and responsibility in hemispheric collaboration.

A mature US response to political diversity and nationalism.

A practical and concrete US contribution to economic and social development.

A humanitarian concern for the quality of life in the hemisphere.²⁷

The doctrine in its application toward Latin America derives its thrust from the four principles enumerated above. While the policy perceives our inter-American relationship to be unique, the message follows the same theme previously espoused in other areas. We will provide a nuclear shield and come to the aid of threatened nations both in terms of military and economic assistance. It is our intent, within our national interests and resources, to provide assistance when and where requested. But fundamentally, the Latin American nations if they are to enter the world environment as viable participants, must provide the impetus of internal growth through their individual efforts and through regional association. It is this basic thought that is carried forward into our policy toward Africa.

Just as Latin America must articulate its desires so that the United States may better assist, so must Africa articulate its aims and priorities. We must also indicate to Africa in all candor that our aims and interests are limited largely to humanitarian impulses. The 14 African nations have indeed accomplished wonders in the face

of incredible obstacles. They have not only been able to maintain their independence but some have achieved significant economic progress. Despite linguistic and ethnic disparities and unnatural geographical boundaries, they have succeeded in establishing governments which hold promise for internal stability. They established regional institutions and have attempted to work within them to resolve common problems.

On the other side of the ledger, two major problems constantly threaten to tear apart the internal fabric of the fragile African nation-states. Demand for modernization is moving at a swifter pace than their ability to meet it. Resources required by these nations to sustain their legitimacy by reasonably meeting these demands is not available and poses a constant threat to the incumbent governments. This threat forces the nations to look outward for assistance. Assistance offered is perceived through the experiences of the past, and is often viewed as carrying with it the threat of renewed foreign domination.

Southern Africa's black majorities continue to demand the right of full participation in the political life of their nation and the benefits of economic life. This demand is repressed by a white minority and causes a diversion of African attention from the problems of development.

The interest of the United States in assisting the African nations in meeting their needs was well expressed by Secretary of State Rodgers.

We have no desire for any special influence in Africa except the influence that naturally and mutually develops among friends . . . we do not believe that Africa should be the scene of major power conflicts. We on our part do not propose to make it so.²⁸

President Nixon has stated that "Our interest in African trade and investment opportunities matches the African interest in American goods and their desire for American technology."²⁹ America will accord to the African states the same right for independence that we demanded and we will not attempt to define Africa's goals, nor determine how they should be met.

In regard to the South African racial problem, our policy of action is essentially one of self-restraint, for we feel that the means of solving the issue rests within the internal structure. However, we will continue to work with other nations in encouraging those efforts. Again the threads of the doctrine become evident, we will assist but the basic effort must be internal. This will again be apparent in the next major part of this policy statement.

AREAS OF TURBULENCE AND CHALLENGE

The three regions addressed in Part IV of the foreign policy report are Indochina, Middle East, and South Asia. Within the Indochina region the countries that receive explicit commentary are Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

The Vietnamese situation is addressed first by Mr. Nixon tracing the events faced by his administration from 1969 forward; the

problems have been amply discussed in many other works and the presentation here represents the facts and figures as perceived by the administration.

The progress of Vietnamization is similarly presented but within the data are certain significant features: In 1971 the Vietnamese army conducted twenty major combat engagements for every one involving US forces. By the end of the year United States forces had shifted primarily to a defensive posture. At the close of 1971 approximately 73% of the rural population was under some effective form of government control. The government had reduced inflation to 15% annually, had turned over 800,000 acres of land to tenant farmers and was planning for long range economic growth.

President Nixon then detailed the constant efforts to negotiate a settlement to the conflict. He stated that the North Vietnamese continued to insist that the United States withdraw unconditionally and that we must replace the present leadership in South Vietnam. That they offered one single political process and that was the one that would insure their rule of the South. Mr. Nixon stated that this is "the fundamental issue, ". . . will we collude with our enemies to overturn our friends? Will we impose a future on the Vietnamese people that the other side has been unable to gain militarily or politically? This we shall never do."³⁰

In his discussion of the prisoner of war issue he indicated that about 1500 of our armed forces and some 40 US civilians remain captured or missing. These people are being retained under conditions contrary to humanitarian principles and the Geneva Conventions on

POW's, conventions to which the North Vietnamese are a signatory nation.

The report contained a warning that in the coming months the North Vietnamese and their ally, at least 150,000 personnel, can be expected to do their utmost to disrupt the progress of Vietnamization.

In regard to the political progress within South Vietnam some areas have yet to experience political freedom or development and the tenuous governmental system yet remains to be tested. Elections have been conducted with numerous candidates participating. The full degree of participation was not ideal but it was not our purpose to manipulate their political system to achieve a US model.

Economic achievements were noteworthy considering large US troop withdrawals and the requirement of the South Vietnamese to support a large military force. To support this view Mr. Nixon cites these figures:

Domestic tax receipts increased 25%.

Prices increased less than 15%.

Production of rice, lumber, fish and textiles rose.

New plants were built to produce textiles, plywood, electric power, plastic products and flour.³¹

At the conclusion of the statement on Vietnam, three crucial problems remain: breaking the negotiating impasse, retrieving our men and completing the transfer of defense responsibilities. We now know that the Peace negotiations were at least a limited success. The three problems were solved. Only time and restraint on the

part of all parties to this conflict will determine whether the final outcome will include true peace or renewed conflict in Southeast Asia.

In the section dealing with Laos and Cambodia the report states that Vietnam is only the central theater of a much wider war internationalized throughout all of old Indochina by Hanoi. Hanoi is charged with maintaining 60,000 KVA/VC troops and 10,000-15,000 Khmer Communists in Cambodia and 120,000 NVA and Pathet Lao in Laos. The situation in both countries is similar. Both have military structures defensive in nature with no offensive capability; both by international agreements, signed by Hanoi, are considered neutral and sovereign; both have been used, contrary to international law, by the North Vietnamese as staging bases and protected areas for attacks against South Vietnam; the presence of North Vietnam in these two countries is a direct and constant threat to their sovereignty. Both governments have attempted to restore their independence and neutrality through diplomatic means and have failed. Mr. Nixon continues by indicating that the United States and other nations have responded to their requests for assistance and have supported their defensive efforts.

Our constant objectives in both countries have been to ensure the momentum of Vietnamization and our withdrawals, and to help maintain the precarious balance within these two countries as they fight to restore their independence and neutrality.³²

As long as North Vietnam continues to mount an effort against South Vietnam both Laos and Cambodia will be subject to constant

coercion from Hanoi and it is possible that being denied in South Vietnam, Hanoi will turn its attention to them instead.

The Middle East like Indochina is an area of turbulence and threat to the world. Among the numerous conflictual areas within the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli conflict remains the greatest threat to peace and stability in the region. The single most probable hope of achieving a settlement between these two antagonists is to persuade the major powers to abstain from projecting their national interests into the conflict. This the United States has attempted to do with little or no assistance from others. In Mr. Nixon's words, "A secure peace in the Middle East requires stable relations on both levels--accommodation within the region and a balance among the powers outside."³³ The constant threat of conflict within the Middle East serves only to divert human resources away from the needs of the people and into war making activities. The diversion of these resources only serves to fan the flames of unrest and prevent the creation of viable governments.

Within South Asia, the conflict between India and Pakistan serves as a case in point. If the great powers had attempted to operate as mediators rather than as seeking to achieve personal negotiation rather than confrontation could have resolved the issue. The United States will remain a friend of Pakistan and our aid for East Bengal will continue. We have a tradition of friendship toward India and this has not diminished. "If India has an interest in maintaining balanced relationships with all the major powers, we are prepared to respond constructively."³⁴ There can be no question

that the recent war in South Asia had an impact on major power relationships, one of the goals will be to attempt to establish a more constructive relationship rather than a continuing effort to achieve hegemony over lesser nations.

If the United States is to maintain its position as a preeminent world power and continue to exert its efforts towards international peace and stability, the strength of the nation must not falter nor diminish. It is towards this goal that a reevaluation has been conducted to determine the requisite national commitment toward that end.

THE IMPERATIVE OF SECURITY

The transformation of the world powers from a bipolarity relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union into a multipolarity made up of five world great power centers has complicated enormously national security issues. While it may be argued that the two super powers maintain a precarious balance of strategic nuclear weapons, two of the other four power centers also have at their disposal nuclear weapons. This situation does not militate towards relaxation rather it places into the calculus of international relations a need for even greater delicacy in dealing with others. Recognition of the potential damage to be created by the employment of nuclear weapons will cause nations to consider employment of general purpose forces in localized conflicts in an effort to avoid strategic nuclear war.

President Nixon recognized that a failure on his part to maintain the necessary flexibility in the application of either strategic

or conventional forces would result in a total loss of options. He therefore determined that he must have a balanced defensive posture. To obtain that balance, he developed a policy that would provide a realistic mix of strategic and conventional force. This mix would be supplemented by security assistance to allies. Finally, deescalation of the arms race through negotiation would cap the process, and, by so doing, the volcano of future world conflict.

STRATEGIC POLICY AND FORCES

In his discussion of strategic nuclear forces Mr. Nixon concluded that: "Of the many elements that constitute military power in the nuclear age, strategic nuclear forces are most critical. Strategic forces:

Are the primary deterrent to nuclear attacks against the United States or its allies;

Compel an aggressor contemplating less than all-out attacks to recognize the unacceptable risk of escalation; and

Reduce the likelihood of intimidation or coercion of the US or its allies.³⁵

The policy developed for strategic forces is described as one of strategic sufficiency. This policy or doctrine has direct application in a broad military sense and also in a broad political sense. Militarily, it provides planning guidance to those who are charged with the responsibility to insure that sufficient forces are maintained so that there is enough available nuclear force to deter the enemy from launching an attack against this country or against our allies. Politically, sufficiency means the maintenance of adequate

force to prevent the enemy from applying nuclear blackmail against our country or against our allies.

To meet the requirement of nuclear sufficiency we must have both quality and quantity or it is not possible to maintain a stable strategic balance. The force structure developed to attain this requirement has been the triad concept, that is, a mixture of ICBMs, bombers, and submarine-launched missiles. This array of delivery systems, each in itself sufficiently powerful to accomplish the desired destruction, if not destroyed, eliminates the possibility that in a preemptive strike the Soviets destroy our counter-blow capability.

The Soviet Union perceiving our method of defense has duplicated this approach. Any rational appraisal of what has developed points up the achievement of some form of nuclear balance. However, the Soviet Union has not rested on attaining this balance, but continues to increase her strategic forces.

Two courses of action remain open to the United States. The first course would be for the United States to re-initiate a program that has been at a standstill for five years and match the Soviets-- weapon for weapon and system for system. A second course would be to continue to improve the technological capability of our weapons and systems. Paralleling either course would be a continuing effort to negotiate a cessation of the nuclear arms buildup through SALT. It is the second course in conjunction with the SALT programs that the United States is attempting to achieve. However, Mr. Nixon has stated that:

If . . . important systems are not constrained by agreements and the Soviet Union continues to build up its strategic forces, I will continue to take actions necessary to protect the national security.³⁶

GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

A strong, modern general purpose force is now more necessary than in the past because it provides a key option to maintain peace in the world. This required option, a general purpose force, has been driven by the advent of strategic nuclear parity between the two super powers and an increasing nuclear capability in the hands of the Peoples Republic of China. Taken together these developments point to a lesser chance of using nuclear weapons but a greater likelihood of using conventional forces to settle international disputes.

Neither the Soviet Union nor the Peoples Republic of China have demonstrated any inclination to curtail their individual efforts to dominate each other. Both either threaten or seek to dominate lesser developed and poorly defended nations. If the United States or its allies do not have the ability to interpose a credible conventional force between the Communist powers and their intended victim or region, they must choose between a strategic nuclear conflict or ignore the fate of a given state or an entire region.

Crises of the nature just described have occurred in the past and will continue to do so in the future. As a point in fact it is far more likely that the use of general purpose forces as a means of military aggression or political coercion will increase rather than diminish. The United States in concert with its allies

both in Europe and in Asia have recognized this actuality and are restructuring their general purpose forces accordingly.

In order for it to meet its national and international interests the US decided it must maintain an active Army force of 13 divisions with their combat and service support. This force is considered sufficient to counter the immediate threat envisioned in what has been termed the one and a half war strategy. The fulfillment, in part, requires that we maintain in Europe and Asia strong forward deployments of American general purpose forces. The present commitment of 4 and 1/3 Army divisions and their support will remain in Europe until such time as satisfactory Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations are reached with the Soviet Union. In Asia, we will maintain general purpose forces to protect our national interests and to provide a bulwark for our allies until they are capable of creating nationally and regionally their own defensive structure.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Traditionally the United States in the past two and a half decades has stood ready to provide a share of our resources to assist our friends and allies in the furthering of their internal development and national security. In Europe, the Marshall Plan amply demonstrated this principle. In Asia, a similar plan has evolved to gain the same result. Through the auspices of the Security Assistance program we are attempting to evoke in Asia a community of nations similar to that of the Atlantic Alliance

which developed the European Economic Community that now makes up one of the five major world power centers. Our provision of assistance to the lesser developed countries is contingent upon their own efforts of nation building and desire for world peace. Provision of resources is not intended to upset power balances that would enable one nation to prey upon another. As a corollary to the Security Assistance program creation of an arms control program is required for survival.

ARMS CONTROL

The specter of a world Armageddon in the nuclear era has caused leaders of the Free World to seek ways to forestall such an event. The United States has presented to its allies and antagonists a solution to this specter of a world holocaust or communist world domination. The solution rests within the parameters of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations.

SALT I negotiations have been concluded and preparations are underway for SALT II. If the SALT negotiations can be brought to a successful conclusion between the two super powers a checkrein will be placed on the build up of nuclear weapons and systems.

The concept of MBFR has been under intensive review by NATO since 1968, should a similar interest be expressed by the members of the Warsaw Pact, a foundation has been prepared for constructive discussions.

Breakthroughs in arms control like SALT offer hope for stability in international relations. Continued progress in this area, however, means that the nation must maintain a sufficiency of strength. It would be fatal for this nation to conceive that we could bargain with the Communist nations from a position of lesser strength, ". . . we will maintain those forces essential to deal with the challenges of the 1970's, and we will develop a solid foundation for strength over the long term to insure against potential dangers in the future."³⁷

Review of the three consecutive US foreign policy statements which embody the Nixon Doctrine do not reveal a lack of positive direction. Rather they are positive steps to bring a definitive focus and long range planning goal to our foreign policy. There is little merit in the statement that the Doctrine contains ambiguities. How else may a nation promulgate a foreign policy to treat with a Free World, a Third World, and a Communist World? A rigid policy cannot meet the constant political actions and interactions that occur on a daily basis. The Doctrine is clear in its intent to bring about peace and stability; its manner of application while containing ambiguities calls for the power centers to renounce attempts at hegemony and calls upon the lesser developed nations to put forth internal efforts to build their own countries. More powerful nations are called upon to assist this effort without efforts at subversion or foreign domination. The United States offers protection and assistance to its friends and allies and encourages others to do so also. The techniques or methods of applying the

Doctrine will always be subject to partisan dispute. To debate the mechanical means to the goal is a valid and meaningful exercise for all concerned and informed citizens, this cannot be said about debating the goal itself. The President's strategy for peace is a goal to be achieved through three pillars: strength, partnership, and negotiations. The first two are achieved by keeping treaty commitments and providing a nuclear shield. The third, negotiation, can be achieved through the medium of strength and partnership.

PART III

THE STRATEGY OF REALISTIC DETERRENCE

To implement the Nixon Doctrine, the Department of Defense developed the National Strategy of Realistic Deterrence, the aim of which was to discourage and eventually eliminate the use of military force to impose the will of one nation upon another. The Strategy seeks to deter war, but insures adequate capabilities to protect the United States and its interests should deterrence fail.³⁸

Just as the Nixon Doctrine has evolved over the past three years, so has the strategy designed to support it. Of particular interest to the scholar is a statement in the 1971 Defense Report that refers to the report made in 1970. Mr. Laird quotes himself:

Vietnamization is both a means to an end and a beginning: a means to end the American involvement in Vietnam and to make a credible beginning on our new policy for peace and increased self-reliance in Asia. This first step in implementing the Nixon Doctrine is of critical importance in ending the war. Moreover, success of the Nixon Doctrine can help remove the need for similar American ground combat involvement in future Asian wars, an important objective in our new strategy.³⁹

The cited quote raises a puzzling and unanswerable question.

If Vietnamization is the measure of the credibility of the Doctrine and it fails, does it also follow that the Nixon Doctrine is a failure?

The defense strategy is based on the three key elements of the Doctrine: keeping all treaty commitments, providing a nuclear shield, and the provision of assistance. Accordingly, three basic planning criteria were established for national security planning:

Preservation by the United States of an adequate strategic nuclear capability as the cornerstone of the Free World's nuclear deterrent.

Development and/or continued maintenance of Free World forces that are effective, and minimize the likelihood of requiring the employment of strategic nuclear forces should deterrence fail.

An International Security Assistance Program that will enhance self-defense capabilities throughout the Free World, and, when coupled with diplomatic and other actions, will encourage regional cooperation and/or security agreements among our friends and allies.⁴⁰

In turn, four guidelines would be followed for implementation and which would be in consonance with the defense planning criteria which are:

In deterring strategic nuclear warfare primary reliance will continue to be placed on US strategic deterrent forces.

In deterring theater nuclear warfare the US also has primary responsibility, but certain of our allies are able to share this responsibility by virtue of their own nuclear capabilities.

In deterring theater conventional warfare--for example, a major war in Europe--US and allied forces share responsibility.

In deterring subtheater or localized warfare, the country or ally which is being threatened bears the primary burden, particularly for providing manpower, but when US interests are at stake we must be prepared to provide help as appropriate.⁴¹

If the United States is to meet its obligations outlined in the four criteria it must maintain an effective and balanced force structure. This force structure must be made up of strategic and theater nuclear weapons and adequate US and allied conventional defenses. The structure must also be modernized and display an increased state of readiness. It is toward this goal that the Total Force approach has been directed, that is, the effective and efficient utilization of all Free World resources. To accomplish this difficult task the Department of Defense has determined to place stronger emphasis on Net Assessment, Total Force and Long-Range Planning.

NET ASSESSMENT AND THE FOUR REALITIES

Mr. Laird stated in his report that: "A successful Strategy of Realistic Deterrence required a careful and intricate assessment of the various threats to peace, freedom and stability that exist in today's world."⁴²

Net Assessment is defined as being a comparative analysis of military, technological, political and economic factors which impede or might impede our national security objectives along with those factors that are available or potentially available to enable us to attain our national security objectives. Meaningful conclusions

drawn from the net assessment must be supported by four realities:
Strategic, Political, Fiscal and Manpower.

The Strategic Reality is that the Soviet Union has achieved strategic parity with the United States and is devoting its energies to surpass our present force levels.

The Political Reality reflects the growing Soviet military capabilities and presence around the world and their concomitant increase in world wide pressure to remove our stabilizing political influence. It is represented by allied concern that we maintain our forward deployments. The allied concern reflects the growing Congressional pressure to reduce those forces. The possible impact on our forces resulting from the SALT/MBFR negotiations is reinforced by the difficulty of maintaining domestic support for those programs required to maintain our national security.

The Fiscal Reality is very basic, our resources are not inexhaustible, there is an increasing requirement to commit more resources to domestic demands. During the Vietnam conflict the bulk of our Department of Defense resources were drained by demands in South East Asia while the Soviet Union was able to continue modernization of its forces.

The Manpower Reality reflects the increased cost of military manpower which is mainly attributable to an all volunteer force. Additionally it is inescapable that the Soviet Union is capable of fielding more men than the United States at equal overall costs.

The manpower reality in conjunction with the fiscal reality create tremendous pressure for smaller forces. If our forces are

to be smaller than they must possess the latest equipment, be fully manned and totally trained if they are to be expected to meet the perceived world wide threats.

THE SIX THREATS

The principle concern for the Department of Defense is the military reality in today's world. This reality is the threat posed by the military forces of our opponents, the potential impacts of military assistance and the technological challenge. The emergence of five major world power centers does not alter the continued dominance of the two super powers within that spectrum. At least during the period of the 1970's the principle military threat to the United States will be the unchanging attempts of the Soviet Union to predominate. Mr. Laird, in discussing the role of the Department of Defense in meeting this threat, recognizes three categories of military forces and analyzes them in terms of the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China. The three are strategic nuclear, theater nuclear and theater conventional. In view of the realities of these he states that: ". . . our Strategy places primary emphasis on US forces for the deterrence of strategic nuclear warfare."⁴³

First, the assessment of the Soviet Strategic Offensive Forces is that they pose an extremely formidable threat to the United States. The Soviets have developed, just as we have, a triad of offensive strategic nuclear weapons and systems. Viewing this from a rational point of

view, if their desire had been the achievement of a balance between the two powers they would not still be continuing to expand their capabilities. The assessments indicate that their efforts still continue, and our response is to attempt to restrain these efforts by threat of retaliation and through the SALT negotiations.

The analysis of the Soviet Offensive Strategic Forces concludes with the observation that our strategic forces still retain the ability to survive and penetrate the Soviet Union should deterrence fail. However this conclusion is considered valid only if the improvement programs for existing forces and new programs are approved and developed and with the final proviso that the Soviet Union does not come up with a serious technological breakthrough.

The Strategic assessment of the Peoples Republic of China is much more difficult to make with any degree of accuracy. What is known is that they have achieved a high degree of sophistication in both missile and nuclear warhead development. They do possess the IRBM and are well on their way toward the fielding of an ICBM. They do not have an intercontinental heavy bomber force, but they have evidenced interest in the development of nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines.

Second, the Theater Nuclear Threat is in itself dangerous to the Free World. Theater nuclear war is that which involves the use of theater nuclear weapons by or against US forces or our allies, but does not include nuclear attack on the US.

The Soviet Union possesses a full range of tactical nuclear weapons with the complementary delivery systems. They have a

sufficiency of MRBM and IREM missiles and surface-to-surface missiles assigned to their ground forces. In addition their air arm is in sufficient quantity and capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The naval arm is well equipped with nuclear missiles, and reflects a steady buildup in its three western fleets.

The Peoples Republic of China, at the present time, depend upon their growing fleet of medium nuclear capable bombers for a theater nuclear strike force. However, they are rapidly developing ICBM/IREM systems. The existing nuclear threat is significant and at this time ". . . encompasses most cities and other area-type targets in South and East Asia and a substantial part of the USSR."⁴⁴

Third, theater conventional warfare is defined as that which occurs when the Soviet Union or the Peoples Republic of China are involved in direct conflict with the United States.

All Soviet forces are trained to participate in conventional as well as nuclear warfare. During the past years both the Soviet and the Warsaw Pact forces have continued to improve both in terms of quality and quantity.

There is a continuing trend toward the qualitative improvement of the Warsaw Pact nations and this is most likely to continue.

The Soviet Union has increased its forces along the Sino-Soviet border with no lessening of the number of divisions and their combat power facing the NATO nations.

There is a continuing buildup of the quality of Soviet tactical aviation. The military airlift system capability has been improved

and includes medium transports, heavy lift aircraft, heavy lift helicopters and a new heavy jet transport which will soon be available.

The expansion of the Soviet Naval arm is impressive and their presence is seen projected all over the world's oceans. They have demonstrated their ability to conduct fleet exercises utilizing the task force concept which has been so successfully used by our naval forces. The Soviet Union continues to improve its tactical submarine fleet and has introduced nuclear powered cruise missile attack classes which presents a formidable threat in itself, ". . . for our ability to defend against Soviet cruise missile systems . . . has not kept pace with the growth of the Soviet threat."⁴⁵

The force capabilities of the United States and its NATO allies indicate that an effective deterrent exists in that region. In accordance with the Strategy, we will continue to maintain and improve our force capabilities in NATO, given a similar effort on the part of our European allies.

The situation in Asia is considerably different in the nature of the threat. For in this region the threat is twofold: the Peoples Republic of China, North Korea, and North Vietnam are fully capable of launching full scale conventional attacks against their neighbors; they are also fully active in efforts to penetrate their neighbors by means of guerrilla warfare, sabotage, espionage, and subversion.

The army of the Peoples Republic of China is a well balanced force and is being constantly modernized. There are constant efforts to improve sophisticated weapons systems, particularly missile systems, not only for the army but also for the air and naval arms.

Fourth, subtheater/localized wars do not involve the United States in direct conflict with either the Soviet Union or the Peoples Republic of China.

Our objective is to shift primary responsibility for deterring or fighting subtheater or localized conflict to our allies and friends. Our help will be primarily in the form of other than ground force elements, but could include force deployments under special circumstances.⁴⁶

North Korea is the third most powerful nation in Asia and possesses a modern and continually improving military force which is maintained at a high state of combat readiness.

The North Vietnamese military establishment is quite potent as has been evidenced by its ability to wage war on several fronts with a great deal of effectiveness. Both the North Korean and the North Vietnamese have powerful ground forces and a significant capability in the air but their naval capabilities are severely limited. To date this has not proven to be a handicap in their operations. Both are dependent upon aid from the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China.

It would appear that the efforts on the part of the United States and her friends and allies have served to effectively counter the threats envisioned in the concepts of Strategic Nuclear, Theater

Nuclear and Conventional Theater warfare. A nuclear balance exists between the Soviet Union and the United States and it is this balance that tends to check hegemonial efforts. As long as these two nations continue to strive for technological superiority lesser nations possessing nuclear capabilities will not be able to close the gap and the power balance will be retained between these two nations. A real and present danger exists in the relations between the lesser nations, for their drive for increased power and domination is not checked by the same nuclear threat unless that threat is made by one of the super powers. It must be the responsibility of the super powers to insure that regional power balances are not upset by the injudicious provision of arms and associated war making materials. It is this provision of military aid that has evolved into another threat to the peace and stability of the world.

Fifth, "Communist military assistance programs have come to be important instruments of Communist foreign and military policies."⁴⁷

A listing of the military aid provided by the Soviet Union since 1955 to lesser developed nations can in no way be termed altruistic. Those known to have received such military aid from the Soviets include:

. . . countries situated in an arc running from the Eastern Mediterranean, through the Red Sea, to the Arabian Sea. In this arc are countries which either control the strategic Suez waterway, contain the bulk of the Free World's oil reserves, or are adjacent to the southern borders of the USSR.⁴⁸

North Vietnam received approximately 70% of its aid from the Soviets, while North Korea has received all but a small portion from the same

source. Egypt, Syria, and Iraq were provided military aid with Egypt getting the largest share. Cuba, India, Afghanistan, the North African nations and those of the Horn have also been recipients. In each of these areas there has been conflict and unrest. The Soviets have been able to project their interests into those areas by means of military aid, a projection that had but one purpose to serve, the national interests of the Soviet Union.

The Peoples Republic of China has followed the same pattern, though on a lesser scale. They have devoted their attention to Africa, in particular Tanzania. In an effort to further their national interests and possibly to embarrass the Soviet Union they provided military aid to Pakistan.

The intent and pattern of both the Soviet's and the Chinese is evident in their provision of military aid. This aid is a means to provide a foothold in the selected country while at the same time weakening the influence of the Free World, in particular the United States. These programs of assistance are made doubly attractive through the device of low-interest, long-term loans, coupled to this is the requirement for purchases or barter with the nation providing the assistance. This device while on the surface appears to be deceptively simple often ties up the slender resources of the recipient nation. Military technicians and advisors are provided which allows additional penetration into the nation receiving the aid. The result of such actions can hardly be termed beneficial nor in the interest of the lesser developed country.

Military assistance programs should strengthen rather than weaken regional balances and national development; they should respect the needs and national pride of the recipients, rather than make them pawns in a greater international contest; they should, above all, reflect a genuine intent among major arms suppliers to bring conventional as well as nuclear weapons under control.⁴⁹

Sixth, there is one remaining military threat and that is the challenge to Technological Superiority. The Soviet Union recognized some time ago that if they are to achieve a superior posture vis-a-vis the United States that they must do it through technology. "Since the late 1960's Soviet expenditures for technological development have increased at an average annual rate of more than ten percent."⁵⁰ It is believed that the bulk of these monies are for military RDT&E and space exploration. A similar program is also under way in the Peoples Republic of China. The greatest difficulty in assessing the probable results of such efforts rests with the fact that both nations are closed societies and release only that information that suits their interests. There can be no assurances given that the United States will not be surprised by a dramatic technological breakthrough on the part of one or both of the Communist nations. The most effective hedge on the part of the United States is to continue its own RDT&E efforts without diminution.

DOES THE STRATEGY SUPPORT THE DOCTRINE?

There is an unfortunate asymmetry between the philosophy of the Nixon Doctrine and the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence as the

latter has evolved in the successive posture statements of Secretary of Defense Laird (1969-1973). While the asymmetry is so subtle that it has escaped the notice of most critics and commentators on defense matters, it is nonetheless substantive and in need of redress. The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) is the prime document within the Defense Department where the symmetry can and must be restored. Argument can be offered that until the new strategy is visualized and rationalized convincingly in the JSOP, no meaningful progress in this area can be made elsewhere--so much does the JSOP drive military thinking. The JSOP should be more than the seminal document in the military budget cycle. It should synthesize the best military thought and analysis in such a way as to preclude criticism, and command the respectful attention of military men who work with its various volumes, as well as the civilian readers who are the real decisionmakers. If JSOP does break out of the cold war language and perception of the threat in which it is now cast, it will make it possible to complete unclassified studies and papers which will be at once accurate and in harmony with the philosophy and implementation of the Nixon Doctrine. Such harmony does not now exist. Despite measurable and commendable strides over the past three years to bring it into line with the transforming international situation, the JSOP continues to lack credibility and consequently, utility in its articulation of a realistic strategic posture.

In reviewing the JSOP, it appears that it suffers from twin Achilles' heels; the first being the anachronistic way it appraises the global situation, and the second, the way it portrays the threat.

The remedy for the former is to use the best tools of the already completed research in international affairs. For the latter defect radical surgery is required to break out from the paralysis of cold war perceptions which no longer operate in the same way or in anything like the same degree. Without such a departure, the traditional progression from threat to strategy to force requirements will not produce a realistic force structure for the military of the future. To make the breakout does not mean, however, to agree with some military critics who seem to claim that the threat has receded to the point where it has disappeared altogether.

To paint the threat realistically implies that it be painted honestly, thereby stripping out from the JSOP the parochially insinuated rationales for force levels and weapons systems. Our civilian leaders and critics are quick to detect and score the piecemeal manner in which the threat has been portrayed in order to justify new weaponry, whether it be main battle tanks, aircraft carriers, missiles, or air frames. While a rationale must exist and inevitably be the subject of hard--even bitter-- debate in a society competing for scarce resources, the present JSOP is degraded when it becomes the bed on which to lay the bedrock arguments. The system must be reversed, with the rationale for new systems and forces being derived from objective analysis in the JSOP.

As a balancing comment, into the JSOP and the related contingency war planning must also go what is now closely guarded intelligence information. In some cases we have accommodated simplistically to the views of critics because we did not wish to reveal sensitive

intelligence. The problem is compounded because on at least some occasions all the relevant intelligence was not in the hands of the JSOP authors or planners. Sometimes they also glossed over critical points and accepted compromises which were neither justified nor in the interests of national security in order to protect not the nation, but the classification of the information. What needs to be done in this instance is not to bridle at the seeming harshness of these words, but rather, accept a minimally higher risk of compromise by bringing into the JSOP and planning documents some of the more closely held matters which bear on the validity of JSOP planning analysis and conclusions.

Because the portrayal of the threat is seen as the linchpin around which the new strategy will swing, it is suggested that the "net assessment approach be taken in which a separate calculus is made at international levels of the strategic, political, economic, demographic, psychological, and social factors at work in the world as a whole, and for all but the first factor as they also apply within the United States. By so doing, we would be able to break away from the false conflict where we were persuaded that the only alternatives were to be guided by capabilities or intentions of adversaries. The alternatives were never so exclusive as posed, but, in any case, neither one of itself will lead to the useful production of intelligence in the decade ahead.

Finally, as a purely philosophical reiteration, it seems fair to state that the evolution of military capabilities now embodied

in strategic and general purpose forces has led to the need for reorientation in perceptions of the need for military force. No longer can military requirements be based solely on the military structure of a purported adversary if the support of an informed Congress and public is to be maintained. Instead, the need for a military force is moving into the ill-defined and dangerous areas which require a net assessment of another's will and purpose, as well as our own, because a statement of military needs can no longer be divorced from realistic projections of the resources available to meet them.

PART IV

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

The Nixon Doctrine has created for the United States Army a new and enlarged role in supporting deterrence, flexible response, and security assistance. The traditional and statutory role of the Army is the maintenance of forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained land combat--specifically, forces to defeat land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas. The Army must provide the decisive nucleus to a balanced military force tailored to support the national strategy which is conceptualized in the Doctrine.

There are several salient features unique to the Army that make it the decisive nucleus. Its forces, well manned, trained, and equipped, are highly visible symbols of deterrence and capability. It alone can field and fully support a conventional force suited for various levels of conflict. This capability conspicuously

displayed is essential for deterrence at all levels. The Army alone can continue to build upon and sustain a conventional force at higher levels of conflict through the steady introduction of reserve divisions. It has a singular capability for the discreet employment and application of accurately placed firepower. The Army has developed a special skill for the conduct of subtheater/localized conflicts. It is especially qualified in the training and schooling aspects of providing assistance to allies and friend. ⁵¹

UTILIZATION OF THE ARMY

The utilization of the US Army in response to the Doctrine is best portrayed in key areas of the world--Europe, Asia, Middle East, Latin America, and Africa.

The danger of a crisis in Europe developing into a strategic nuclear war is greater than anywhere else. The physical presence of US Army general purpose forces, in concert with the NATO forces, fully demonstrates our firm resolve to deter conflict at any level. The absence of our forces in Europe would not only abrogate allied treaty commitments but would rupture the cohesion of Western Europe thereby causing each nation to seek its own salvation. It is most likely that we, from Fortress America, would observe the process of Finlandization take place throughout Western Europe. Should that event occur Fortress America would turn eventually into Tomb America.

The United States is and will remain a power in the Pacific. Consequently our interest in maintaining stability in Asia is of

vital importance. There are two nations that play key roles in that area--Japan and the Peoples Republic of China. Again, the presence of forward deployed US Army general purpose forces remains paramount in deterring communist incursions and domination of nations in that area. Total withdrawal of our ground forces from that region can be too easily interpreted by the communist planners as a lack of interest and by the lesser developed nations as abandonment. Continued military assistance will enable the Asian Free nations to develop a strong regional posture but the assistance must be supplemented by general purpose forces as physical evidence to all that we are committed to maintaining peace and stability.

The Middle East is a continuing source of tension and hostility. Local conflict is combined with great power involvement and lack of real control over the contentious nations. Events in the past have led to veiled nuclear threats on the part of the super powers. Although we have no deployed Army general purpose forces in the area, we must maintain the capability to employ the entire spectrum of military power in the area as a visible deterrent. Our security assistance must continue to maintain a power balance.

The capability of hostile world powers to project their influence into Latin America has been limited. A notable exception to this is the presence of the Soviet Union in Cuba. Further incursions have been limited by the obvious ability of the Army to rapidly project its power anywhere into the continent. The continuation of this ability requires that the Army maintain in a ready status a strategic reserve.

Africa remains a most doubtful factor in the power balance. Certainly Africa poses no threat to major powers but she can catalyze major war like many other small powers. While our policy has evidenced no intention of interfering with the internal affairs of the Africans, the Army must be prepared to respond to an unlikely call for assistance and an even less likely decision by the President and Congress to commit Army troops to Africa.

In all five areas the Army has demonstrated its ability in the field of security assistance and in the specialized role of the military advisor. The Doctrine places a crucial emphasis on the part security assistance is to play in attaining peace and stability. This concept calls for an increased demand for the talents of the Army in such roles as: indigenous training, logistical development, and the creation of effective technical support. The Army's goal will be to assist allied nations and friends in building forces that are within their capability to sustain. We must create an interface between our forces and theirs. Such an interface would facilitate combined efforts should our direct assistance become necessary. The role of the Army has been enhanced by the Nixon Doctrine, in that it must be the nucleus of a balanced defense structure if the national strategy is to be effectively carried out. It is equally clear that the national security will depend to a much larger degree than before on the provision of assistance to our friends and allies--an area where the Army is highly qualified to respond to the challenge.

EPILOGUE

The Nixon Doctrine is an expression of the political and psychological elements that comprise both domestic and international affairs. The contending actions and interactions of theories played out by members of the international community lead Army planners to the inescapable conclusion that there is no clear answer as to which route the international community will take nor which portion the United States will choose for its own path. The Nixon Doctrine was a staking out of certain ideological grounds for action but even that is not firm because there is latitude for discretion for civilian planners within the Nixon Doctrine guidelines. It would be infinitely more tidy if these policy decisions could be resolved before Army plans had to be made but unfortunately this will never be true. Consequently, the reality calls for a choice while the shifting tides of community life continues. This is not to say that there is nothing to do but to continue as we have before. It is obvious that the Army must take strong remedial action to alter our stance as leaders of men so that those who follow us do so willingly and intelligently--even though their field of vision is necessarily less inclusive than ours. Thus our problems as Army leaders must first be to develop our rationale as men called upon to lead the lowest common denominator of our field forces as well as the more easily fathomed man of the officer corps. Our second problem must be to translate to the civilian policy and decision makers the importance of a rationale which is translatable and reasonably supportable to those men at the field level.

What impact does the Nixon Doctrine have on the rationale for fighters?

Our men must understand limited war and objectives.

Our men must understand the meaning and use of human aggressiveness which must be channelled into limited aims and objectives.

Our men must learn to find satisfying goals in military skills not necessarily tasted by war and the rewards must encourage the honoring of those goals without impeding the ability of men to fight when called upon to do so.

Our men must learn a new self-concept different in degree if not in substance from the World War II concept of the American fighting man which we as leaders have not substantially changed since that period.



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FOOTNOTES

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5. "Asia and the Nixon Doctrine," Newsweek, 18 August 1969, p. 34.
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7. Richard M. Nixon, US Foreign Policy For The 1970's, 1972, p. 16.
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10. Ibid., p. 20.
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19. Ibid., p. 66.
20. Ibid., p. 70.
21. Ibid., p. 72.
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29. Ibid., p. 102.
30. Ibid., p. 119.
31. Ibid., p. 127.
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33. Ibid., p. 135.
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35. Ibid., p. 156.
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(Thesis: War will not end with Vietnam; man will still fight man, with weapons old and new, from the Arctic to the jungles, on land, sea, and in the air.)
3. Barnet, Richard J. "The Illusion of Security." Foreign Policy, No. 3, Summer 1971, pp. 71-87.

(Thesis: The crisis of national security now faced by the United States stems from a fundamental misconception of the nature of the problem. For twenty-five years we have been building a Maginot Line against the threats of the 1930s while the threats of the 1970s are rapidly overwhelming us along with the rest of mankind.)
4. Basiuk, Victor. "Perils of the New Technology." Foreign Policy, No. 2, Spring 1971, pp. 51-67.

(Thesis: Perhaps more politicians these days should be reading science fiction because the fast pace of technological change is taking most of the world's governments by surprise. Few policymakers seem to be aware of it, but the technological tail is already wagging the policy dog.)
5. Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "Half Past Nixon." Foreign Policy, No. 3, Summer 1971, pp. 3-21.

(Thesis: Never before has an administration said so much so often and in so many words about its foreign policy--and yet so little has been understood. The author suggests why this is the case despite the effort by the President and his associates to articulate a coherent, understandable, and relevant foreign policy)
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(Thesis: The President's fascination with the balance of power concept deserves closer scrutiny on two levels: first,

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- (Thesis: A foreign policy debate is underway between limitationist and globalist partisans. This review traces the development of limitationism in the political thought of Lippmann, Morgenthau, and Kennan; analyzes the meaning and substance of American globalism; and presents a systematic critique of limitationism through an evaluation of recent polemical literature.)
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(Thesis: The 1950s saw a renaissance of strategic thought. In 1961 the promise was high. The civilian strategist came to Washington to assume an influential role in a new administration. Yet in 1971 it is fair to say that their performance has not lived up to their promise.)

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(Thesis: So long as the United States enjoys the ambivalent pleasures of foreign responsibilities, then must United States policy-makers recognize that they have no choice but to bid for influence in a world from which the traffic in armaments is ineradicable.)

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(Thesis: Bureaucrats cannot be expected to have the same interests as the President, to see the same face of an issue or to take the same stand. If the President and his senior associates are clear about their own priorities, select options with care, and understand that the nature of the bureaucratic game is organizational interests, they can lead rather than follow the bureaucracies.)

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(An analysis of the impact of the Nixon Doctrine on the Army and an outline of how the Army can best support that doctrine in the 1970s.)

62. Vernon, Raymond, "Multinational Enterprise and National Security." Adelphi Papers, No. 74, January 1971.

63. Warnke, Paul L. and Gelb, Leslie H. "Security or Confrontation: The Case for a Defense Policy." Foreign Policy, No. 1, Winter 1970-1971, pp. 6-30.

(Thesis: The trouble with our foreign commitments is that they have acquired an independent life transcending the US security interests which brought them into being. Collectively, our commitments remain what they have tended to become: an undifferentiated mass which defies discriminating analysis for defense planning purposes. There is little evidence that the government has learned to distinguish between actual threats to national security and ideological confrontations. To avoid senseless confrontations and achieve sound defense planning, the cardinal need today is for a searching analysis of what these commitments should be in the light of our genuine national interests.)

64. Yarmolinsky, Adam. "The Military Establishment (or How Political Problems Become Military Problems)." Foreign Policy, No. 1, Winter 1970-1971, pp. 78-97.

(Thesis: Influence of the military establishment on domestic politics and the home economy may be functions of its budget and its size. Its influence on foreign policy depends on an altogether different variable: the capacity of civilians in the executive branch, in Congress, and among the public to remember that political problems when thought about primarily in military terms become military problems.)

APPENDIX 1

TABULATED CROSS REFERENCE--US FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE
1970s (USFP)

<u>USFP</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>COMMENT</u>
I	NSC	Part I p. 17	Entire
II	NSC	Part VI p. 225	Entire
III	NSC	Part VII p. 208	Entire
I	Nixon Doctrine	Intro. p. 1	Concept
II	Nixon Doctrine	Part I p. 10	Entire
III	Nixon Doctrine	Part I p. 2	Overview
I	United Nations	Part II p. 103	Partnership
II	United Nations	Part V p. 200	World Interest
III	United Nations	Part V p. 184	Global Cooperation
I	Int. Eco. Pol.	Part II p. 91	Partnership
II	Int. Eco. Pol.	Part II p. 134	National Interest
III	Int. Eco. Pol.	Part II p. 60	Global Cooperation
I	Europe	Part II p. 27	Partnership
II	Europe	Part II p. 24	National Interests
III	Europe and Alliance	Part II p. 38	Areas of Continuing Transition
I	Japan	Part II pp. 54, 57, 61	Partnership
II	Japan	Part II pp. 102-104	National Interest
III	Japan	Part II pp. 52	Areas of Major Change
I	Asia and The Pacific	Part II p. 53	Partnership
II	East Asia/Pacific	Part II p. 91	National Interests
	South Asia	Part II p. 111	National Interests
III	East Asia	Part III p. 82	Areas of Continuing Transition
	South Asia	Part IV p. 141	Areas of Turbulence and Challenge
I	Vietnam	Part II p. 62	Partnership
II	Indochina	Part II p. 58	National Interests
III	Indochina	Part IV p. 110	Areas of Turbulence and Challenge
I	Middle East	Part II p. 77	Partnership
II	Middle East	Part II p. 121	National Interests
III	Middle East	Part IV p. 133	Areas of Turbulence and Challenge

<u>USFP</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>COMMENT</u>
I	Africa	Part II p. 83	Partnership
II	Africa	Part II p. 121	National Interests
III	Africa	Part III p. 101	Areas of Continuing Tension
I	Soviet Union	Part IV p. 136	Era of Negotiation
II	Soviet Union	Part III p. 155	Entire
III	Soviet	Part II p. 16	Areas of Major Change
I	Eastern Europe	Part IV p. 138	Era of Negotiation
I	Communist China	Part IV p. 140	Era of Negotiation
III	China	Part II p. 26	Areas of Major Change
I	Arms Control	Part IV p. 150	Era of Negotiation
II	Arms Control	Part IV p. 186	National Interests
III	Arms Control	Part V p. 171	Imperative of Security
I	Issues for Future	Part IV p. 150	Era of Negotiation
II	Global Challenge	Part V p. 207	World Interest
III	New Dimensions of Diplomacy	Part VI p. 195	Global Cooperation
I	Military Posture	Part III p. 111	America's Strength
II	Military Posture	Part IV p. 165	Securing National Interests
I	Defense Planning	Part III p. 114	America's Strength
I	Strategic Policy	Part III p. 118	America's Strength
II	Strategic Policy and Forces	Part IV p. 167	Securing National Interests
III	Strategic Policy on Forces	Part V p. 154	Imperative of Security
I	General Purpose Forces	Part III p. 127	America's Strength
II	General Purpose Forces	Part IV p. 177	Securing National Interests
III	General Purpose Forces	Part V p. 163	Imperative of Security
II	Security Assistance	Part IV p. 183	Securing National Interests
III	Security Assistance	Part V p. 168	Imperative of Security

APPENDIX 2

A SUBJECTIVE ABSTRACT OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS TO CONGRESS AS THEY APPLY TO THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND TO THE SOVIET UNION, THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA, JAPAN, AND WESTERN EUROPE.

NIXON DOCTRINE

New Strategy
for Peace
(1970)

- Statement of a new approach to foreign policy.
- Three basic principles (pillars): Partnership, Strength, and a Willingness to Negotiate.
- Central thesis: US will participate in defense and development of allies and friends; it will not conceive all plans, design all programs, execute all decisions, or undertake all defense of free nations, but will assist where it makes a difference and is in our interests.

(Cite: Introduction)

Building for
Peace
(1971)

- A major American role remains indispensable.
- Other nations can and should assume greater responsibility, for their sake as well as ours.
- Change in strategic relationships call for new doctrine.
- Emerging polycentrism of the Communist world presents different challenges and new opportunities.
- The US will keep all its treaty commitments.
- The US will provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of an allied nation whose survival is considered vital to US security.
- The US in cases involving other types of aggression will provide military and economic assistance when requested in accord with treaty commitments. The nation directly involved has the primary responsibility for providing the manpower for its defense.
- The US can and will participate, where our interests dictate, but as a weight--not the weight--in the scale.
- The new policy calls for a new form of leadership, not an abdication of leadership; it must reflect a changed public will and shape a consensus for a balanced and positive American role.
- The Nixon Doctrine applies most directly to our dealings with allies and friends; but it animates all areas of our new foreign policy--to our economic, defense, negotiating, and global postures.
- I have repeatedly emphasized that the Nixon Doctrine is a philosophy of invigorated partnership, not a synonym for American withdrawal.

(Cite: Part I)

SOVIET UNION

New Strategy for Peace (1970)

- The central problem of Soviet-American relations is whether our two countries can transcend the past and work together to build a lasting peace.
- While certain successes have been registered in negotiation and there is cause for cautious optimism that others will follow, our overall relationship with the USSR remains far from satisfactory.
- At issue are basic questions of long conflicting purposes in a world where no one's interests are furthered by conflict.
- In regard to Eastern Europe, it is not the intention on the US to undermine the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union.
- The United States views the countries of Eastern Europe as sovereign, not as parts of a monolith and is prepared to enter into negotiations with them.

(Cite: Part IV, pp. 131-139)

Building for Peace (1971)

- The fruitfulness of the United States-Soviet Union relationship depends significantly upon the degree to which the Soviet Union's international behavior does not reflect militant doctrinal considerations.
- The natural expansion of Soviet influence in the world must not distort itself into ambitions for exclusive or predominant positions. Such a course ignores the interests of others, including ourselves. It must and will be resisted. It can lead only to confrontation.
 - The principle of mutual accommodation, if it is to have any meaning, must be that both of us seek compromises, mutual concessions, and new solutions for old problems.
 - The existing military balance does not permit us to judge the significance of Soviet actions only by what they say--or even what we believe--are their intentions. We must measure their actions, at least in part, against their capabilities.
 - In our relations with the USSR there should be no misconceptions of the role we will play in international affairs. This country is not withdrawing into isolation.
 - Where interests conflict, we prefer negotiation and restraint as the method to adjust differences. But when challenged the United States will defend its interests and those of its allies. And, together

with our allies, we will maintain the power to do so effectively.

- An assessment of US-Soviet relations has to be mixed. There have been some encouraging developments and we welcome them. On the other hand, certain actions inevitably suggest that intransigence remains a cardinal feature of the Soviet system.

(Cite: Part III, pp. 156-162)

**Emerging
Structure
for Peace
(1971)**

- Since the nuclear age began, both the world's fears of Armageddon and its hopes for a stable peace have rested on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. For most of that period, the policies of both countries have been directed more to the fearful possibility than to the larger hope.

- A constructive relationship with the Soviet Union cannot be built merely by mutual assertions of good intentions or assurances of good will.

- The issues that divide the United States and the Soviet Union are real and serious. They require concrete agreements on the specific problems which cause the tensions between our two countries. Such agreements can be obtained only by a careful and painstaking effort by both countries. It requires each to exercise restraint, to recognize and accept the legitimate interests of the other, and to negotiate realistically to accommodate conflicting views. For our part, we are committed to such an approach.

- We would judge Soviet policy by its actions on the key issues which divide us. In negotiations we would adopt a conciliatory posture, but our positions would be affected only by concrete measures, not by assumptions regarding Soviet intentions.

- We do not, of course, expect the Soviet Union to give up its pursuit of its own interests. We do not expect to give up pursuing our own. We do expect, and are prepared ourselves to demonstrate, self-restraint in the pursuit of those interests.

- One series of conversations in Moscow cannot be expected to end two decades accumulation of problems. We will be confronted by ambiguous and contradictory trends in Soviet policy.

- In the past year, however, we have had evidence that there can be mutual accommodation of conflicting interests, and that competition need not be translated into hostility or crisis.

- The USSR has the choices: whether the current period of relaxation is merely another offensive tactic or truly an opportunity to develop an international system resting on the stability of relations between the superpowers. Its choice will be demonstrated in actions prior to and after our meetings.

(Cite: Part III, pp. 16-25)

PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA

New Strategy
for Peace
(1970)

- Communist China will deploy its own international missiles during the coming decade, introducing new and complicating factors for our strategic planning and diplomacy.

- The success of our Asian policy depends not only on the strength of our partnership with our Asian friends, but also on our relations with Mainland China and the Soviet Union. We have no desire to impose our own prescription for relationships in Asia. We have described in the Nixon Doctrine our conceptions of our relations with Asian nations; we hope that other great powers will act in a similar spirit and not seek hegemony.

- The principles underlying our relations with Communist China are similar to those governing our policies toward the USSR. United States policy is not likely soon to have much impact on China's behavior, let alone its ideological outlook. But it is certainly in our interest, and in the interest of peace and stability in Asia and the world, that we take what steps we can toward improved practical relations with Peking.

- Our desire for improved relations is not a tactical means of exploiting the clash between China and the Soviet Union. We see no benefit to us in the intensification of the conflict, and we have no intention of taking sides.

(Cite: Part IV, pp. 105-107)

The Emerging
Structure of
Peace
(1972)

- The following considerations shaped this administration's approach to the Peoples Republic of China:
Peace in Asia and peace in the world require that we exchange views, not so much despite our differences as because of them.

It is in America's interests, and the world's interest, that the Peoples Republic of China play its appropriate role in shaping international arrangements that affect its concerns. Only then will that great nation have a stake in such arrangements; only then will they endure.

No one nation should be the sole voice for a bloc of states. We will deal with all countries on the basis of specific issues and external behavior, not abstract theory.

Both Chinese and American policies could be much less rigid if we had no need to consider each other permanent enemies. Over the longer term there need be no clashes between our fundamental national concerns.

China and the United States share many parallel interests and can do much together to enrich the lives of our peoples.

(Cite: Part III, pp. 28-29)

JAPAN

New Strategy

- Our Asian friends, especially Japan, are in a position to shoulder larger responsibilities for the peaceful progress of Asia.
- Japan, as one of the great industrial nations of the world, has a unique and essential role to play in the development of the new Asia. Our policy toward Japan during the past year demonstrates our conception of the creative partnership we seek with all Asian nations.
- A sound relationship with Japan is crucial in our common effort to secure peace, security, and a rising standard of living in the Pacific area. We look forward to extending the cooperative relationship we deepened in 1969. But we shall not ask Japan to assume responsibilities in consistent with the deeply felt concerns of its peoples.

(Cite: Part II, pp. 54, 57, and 61)

Building for Peace (1971)

- The decision of Japan to contribute one percent of its Gross National Product in governmental and private transfers to foreign economic assistance by 1975 is a singular contribution to the kind of Asia they and we seek.
- No less significant is Japan's decision to liberalize its trade and capital restrictions, thus improving

the access of others to the burgeoning Japanese market, and promising, to the benefit of all, a greater participation in meeting Japan's capital needs.

- Japan's economic growth is unprecedented. It has made her the third greatest economic power on earth.

- We are two strong nations of different heritages and similar goals. If we can manage our extensive relationships effectively and imaginatively, it cannot help but to contribute to the well-being and prosperity of our two peoples and to the nations of the entire Pacific Basin.

(Cite: Part II, pp. 92, 97, 102-104)

The Emerging
Structure
of Peace
(1972)

- Japan is our most important ally in Asia. It is our second greatest trading partner. It is an essential participant, if a stable world peace is to be built. Our security, our prosperity, and our global policies are therefore intimately and inextricably linked to the US-Japanese relationship. The well-being of both countries requires cooperation and a shared commitment to the same fundamental goals.

- Asia stability was bolstered by our pledge to work together in the common defense. Our defense postures together provided the fabric of Japan's security, while our forward basing in the area contributed to regional defense.

- Asian development was symbolized by Japan's economic links. As Japan gained in strength, our parallel development assistance efforts nourished a broader regional advance.

- Asian political freedoms were strengthened by the process of Japan's recovery under a democratic system of government. The health of political ties between our democracies served as an example to the democratic experiment elsewhere in Asia.

- We share a fundamental interest in improved relations with China. We both have an enormous stake in ending the era of confrontation in Asia. Japan is already China's largest trading associate, and for some time has had not only economic ties but trade representation in the Peoples Republic of China. The issue between us, then, is not whether the opening to China is desirable--but the need to harmonize our sometimes differing perspectives and interests in a common strategic conception and a shared overall goal.

(Cite: Part II, pp. 52-59)

WESTERN EUROPE

New Strategy for Peace (1970)

- The peace of Europe is crucial to the peace of the world. This truth, a lesson learned at a terrible cost twice in the twentieth century, is a central principle of United States foreign policy. For the foreseeable future, Europe must be the cornerstone of the structure of a durable peace.

- We must adapt to the conditions created by the past successes of our alliance. European politics are more fluid, and the issues facing the alliance are more subtle and profound than ever in the past twenty years. These issues challenge our mastery of each of the three elements of a durable peace: Partnership, Strength, and a Willingness to negotiate.

- The issue we face is the fundamental question of what shall be the content and purpose of the European-American relationship in the 1970s. In today's world, what kind of an alliance shall we strive to build?

- A more balanced association and a more genuine partnership are in America's interest. As this process advances, the balance of burdens and responsibilities must gradually be adjusted, to reflect the economic and political realities of European progress. Our allies will deserve a voice in the alliance and its decisions commensurate with their growing power and contributions.

- As we move from dominance to partnership, there is the possibility that some will see this as a step towards disengagement. But in the third decade of our commitment to Europe, the depth of our relationship is a fact of life. We can no longer disengage from Europe than from Alaska.

- We recognize that America's contribution will continue to be unique in certain areas, such as in maintaining a nuclear deterrent and a level of involvement sufficient to balance the powerful military position of the USSR in Eastern Europe.

- We favor a definition by Western Europe of a distinct identity, for the sake of its own continued vitality and independence of spirit.

- Our support for the strengthening and broadening of the European Community has not diminished.

- We recognize that our interests will necessarily be affected by Europe's evolution, and we may have to make sacrifices in the common interest. We consider that the possible economic price of a truly unified Europe is outweighed by the gain in the political vitality of the West as a whole.

- In assessing our common security, we must not be satisfied with formal agreements which paper over dissimilar views on fundamental issues or with language that is acceptable precisely because it permits widely divergent interpretations. Disagreements must be faced openly and their bases carefully explored. Because our security is inseparable, we can afford the most candid exchange of views.

- The forging of a common understanding on basic security issues will materially improve our ability to deal sensibly and realistically with the opportunities and pressures for change that we face, including suggestions in this country for substantial reductions of US troop levels in Europe and the possibility that balanced force reductions could become a subject of East-West discussions.

(Cite: Part II, pp. 27-40)

Building for
Peace
(1971)

- Western Europe is uniting, and will soon be in a position to forge an identity of its own, distinct from America within the Atlantic world. As nations and peoples we in the West now share both the horizons and the burdens of the most advanced modern societies. This challenges us to develop a partnership engaging the collective energies and wisdom of our sovereign states.

- The expansion of Soviet military power has put NATO's postwar reliance on US strategic nuclear strength into a new perspective. America's guarantee of nuclear defense remains crucial, but it can no longer be the sole basis of Allied deterrence.

- America's task today is to evoke the contribution which the Alliance is capable of making. This new purpose of our leadership and partnership will test our maturity and compassion just as the Marshall Plan tested our energy and skill.

- The common interests requires the prosperity of both Western Europe and the United States. This means freer and expanded trade and restraint in protecting special interests. We must negotiate a reduction in our trade restrictions.

- We believe that Western European and American interests in defense and foreign policy are complimentary:

In defense, geographic proximity makes the linking of our allies' defense systems logical and feasible; their collective power makes it advantageous. But a coherent strategy of European defense, today and as far into the future as I can see, will require mutual support across the Atlantic.

In diplomacy we share basic objectives: Western security, European stability, East-West détente. Two strong powers in the West would add flexibility to Western diplomacy. Two strong powers could increasingly share the responsibilities of decision.

- America's will to employ nuclear retaliation in defense of NATO remains central and necessary to Allied security. But in the conditions of today's new strategic equation, it can no longer be the sole basis for Allied deterrence.
- We and our allies reaffirmed our consensus that we must have forces able to deter and defend below the threshold of general nuclear war, to give us full flexibility in responding to any outbreak of hostilities. This means a strong and credible deployment of modernized NATO conventional forces. These forces must be capable of rapid mobilization and reinforcement and of sustaining a successful forward defense against conventional attack.
- I decided that given a similar approach by our allies, the United States would maintain and improve its forces in Europe and not reduce them without reciprocal action by our adversaries.
- America's presence in substantial force is psychologically crucial.
- Accurately or inaccurately, our allies would interpret a substantial withdrawal of American forces as a substantial withdrawal of America's commitment.
- I have repeatedly emphasized that the Nixon Doctrine is a philosophy of invigorated partnership, not a synonym for American withdrawal. Our relationship with Western Europe proves it.

(Cite: Part II, pp. 24-45)

The Emerging
Structure of
Peace
(1972)

- Competitive habits within the Atlantic world are most natural in the economic sphere--precisely the field in which integration in Europe has come first. While reduction of trade barriers is a major goal of the Community, this has progressed more rapidly within the Community than between it and the outside world.
- There is only one constructive solution: to face up to the political necessity of accommodating conflicting economic interests. In the post-war period this came easily; today it will come only with effort.
- Western collective defense in Europe has deterred war for more than two decades and provided the essential condition of security in which free European nations could revive and flourish. Today, the military balance

underpins the overall stability on the Continent which makes detente feasible in the 1970s.

- In an era of strategic balance between the US and the USSR, the more plausible threats were those below the threshold of strategic nuclear war. The Alliance therefore reaffirmed its consensus that it needed a flexible strategy, resting on the deployment of appropriate forward defenses. We could not afford to be dependent solely upon conventional forces, because these might be inadequate to prevent defeat of our armies or loss of territory. Sole reliance upon early resort to nuclear weapons, on the other hand, would leave us no option between capitulation and risking all-out mutual destruction.

- Today's conditions, not those of twenty years ago, make America's strength in Europe absolutely essential. I therefore intend to maintain it.

- This Administration has regarded a resolution of the political issues dividing Europe as a paramount objective of our foreign policy.

- Another principle I have long emphasized is that detente will not come about except through negotiation on concrete problems.

- Our approach is based on these general principles:

Every nation in Europe has the sovereign right to conduct independent policies and therefore to be our friend without being anyone else's enemy.

The use or threat of force by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe can only lead to European crises. It is therefore incompatible with detente in Europe and detente in US-Soviet relations.

We do not want to complicate the difficulties of East European nations' relations with their allies; nevertheless there are ample opportunities for economic, technical, and cultural cooperation on the basis of reciprocity. The Eastern European countries themselves can determine the pace and scope of their developing relations with the United States.