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ARE RESERVE COMPONENT OFFICERS READY

Kenneth G. Herring

Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

8 March 1973

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By

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USAWC RESEARCH PAPER

ARE RESERVE COMPONENT OFFICERS READY?

Group Study Project

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8 March 1973

ABSTRACT

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The problem of Reserve Component officer qualifications of the National Guard and the USAR is examined in this study. Also considered were the allied problems of Reserve Component officers in key positions lacking relevant active duty experience together with the problem of Reserve Component officers being significantly older than their Active Army counterparts. Of special value to this research effort were the studies of the Reserve Components conducted since World War II, the latest of which was completed in 1972. Interviews were conducted with selected members of the Department of Army Staff and certain statistical information was obtained from that source. (M)

The administrative tool of tenure restriction in Reserve Component units as a means of improving Reserve Component officer qualifications was examined. The conclusion of the study was that any restriction of tenure in Reserve Component units would be dealing with only one facet of the problem and might compound the problem. The recommendation for a solution to the problem would have to start with the creation of a Career Development System for Reserve Component officers on par with the Active Army.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

New emphasis on the Reserve components. The message is clear to those who will listen. For the military professional its unmistakable terms cannot be ignored.

#### STATEMENT OF THE NEW EMPHASIS

In the FY 1973 Annual Defense Report, Secretary Laird stated the President's policies concerning the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence. The policy concerning the National Guard and the Army Reserve is of particular interest to this paper. "Last year, I reported on the first actions being taken to place greater reliance on our National Guard and Reserve, and to preclude any need to return to a massive draft. We mean to have National Guard and Reserves that are manned, equipped, and trained to mesh, on quick notice, with our active forces. . . . We have only scratched the surface in utilizing the National Guard and Reserve forces in our strategy planning. We have had, over the past decade, too much talk and too little action in making these units combat ready."<sup>1</sup>

Although the emphasis is new, the words have been heard many times in recent decades. In the foreseeable future the certainty that the Reserve components (RCs) will be the primary source of military manpower beyond the regular active forces must be accepted. This is true in order that the nation's entire military forces can be made ready to support the President's National Strategy.

## EARLY HISTORY

The historical origin of the RCs of the United States military forces predate the Revolution by over a hundred years. The colonial militias featured certain facets of the English militia system which later were incorporated into the American system as it developed. George Washington had been a member of the Virginia Militia and was appointed commander-in-chief of the forces being raised by the Continental Congress in 1775.<sup>2</sup> The National Guard was thus an outgrowth of both the colonial and state militias. In 1792 the Congress established the state militias by federal statute.<sup>3</sup> Later in the War of 1812 federalized forces from the various states comprising 88 percent of the total force, played a rather inept role. The criticism levied at the performance of the militia units in the field was due chiefly to their inadequate training and poor discipline.

Later in the nineteenth century the federal government used state militias organized under the Act of 1792 in the Seminole War (1836-42) and in the Mexican War (1846-47).<sup>4</sup> During this later conflict militia forces representing 12 percent of the total United States force, some 12,601 out of 104,285 men, saw active service. In the Civil War which started in 1861 only about 47,000 militiamen saw service in the entire war. Most of the militia units came on duty for tours of one to three months and over 80 percent of them came from the state of New York. After these militia companies had major turnovers of personnel they were transformed into companies of volunteers, thus losing their identity as militia units. In the Spanish American War in 1898 such state



militia units that were called to duty were again transformed into volunteer units as was done in the Civil War. During this century the character of the militias of the states had changed from that of universal military service under the Act of 1792 to that of a volunteer system. This system of volunteers which had evolved was used by the national government again starting in 1916.

### EVOLUTION OF THE COMPONENTS

In the 20th century the Reserve components as we know them today evolved from the militia origins. With the Militia Act of 1903, the National Defense Act of 1916, and the amendments passed in 1933, the National Guard (NG) emerged much as we know it today. The Army Reserve (USAR) traces its beginning to the establishment of the Medical Reserve Corps in 1908; the enlisted reserve was added in 1912 and the non-Guard components of the modern RCs in the National Defense Act of 1916. "The Army of the United States" was established in legislation in 1920. It named the Regular Army, the NG, and the Organized Reserve Corps as its basic components.<sup>5</sup>

Some of the details of World War II, the Korean War, and more recent experience with the RCs will follow in Chapter II, however, the criticisms of the RCs heard during and following World War II are notable as they are basically the same criticisms levied today. One of the basic criticisms, the problem of RC officer qualifications, will be the primary focus of this research effort and will be treated in detail in subsequent chapters.

During World War II comments highly critical of the NG and with certain applicability to the USAR units were made by Lieutenant General McNair and General Marshall. They both commented on problems with the activated units which had become evident at the beginning and during World War II. Their comments dealt with the problem of a lack of professional competence in both the senior and junior officers ranks of the federalized National Guard. Of particular importance here is the problem cited of officers who were not competent to exercise the command appropriate to their rank. Also cited was the problem of officers being too old to perform the rigorous duty required of their assigned position.

#### Problem

Considering the large number of NG officers relieved for either lack of competence or being too old to properly perform their duties, General McNair stated that, "it can be seen that the structure of the National Guard was pregnant with disaster for the entire nation."<sup>6</sup> Although we are now more than 30 years removed from problems cited by Generals Marshall and McNair, studies of the RCs reveal that many of these problems are still with us. The problem to be examined in this study concerns the problem of officer qualification arising from prolonged tenure in units of the NG and USAR. The major consideration will be how RC officer qualifications may be improved by limiting tenure in units.<sup>7</sup> Of special note is the problem concerning the trend toward officers in key positions who are lacking relevant active duty experience. Finally, the allied problem of officers being significantly older than their active duty counterparts will be considered.

### Organization of the Paper

In Chapter II, recent history concerning the RCs and especially experience in World War II, Korea, the Berlin Crisis and in the Vietnam War as it relates to the problems cited in this study will be presented. In Chapter III information contained in two recent landmark studies of the RCs, one of which was conducted in 1967, and the other in 1972. In addition, information collected by the writers of this research effort will be covered. In Chapter IV the relevant examples of the experience of certain other military services will be developed. Finally, in Chapter V the conclusions and recommendations of this study will be presented.

### Assumptions

Two basic assumptions underlying this study are: first, that no change which could be construed as eliminating either of the basic two part (USAR and NG) structure of the RCs will be considered and secondly, that if the need for changes in the RC system are clearly demonstrated, effecting the necessary legislation is feasible.

## CHAPTER I

### FOOTNOTES

1. Melvin R. Laird, Statement Before Senate Armed Services Committee, p. 11.
2. James C. Elliott, The Modern Army and Air National Guard. p. 31.
3. William H. Riker, Soldiers of the States, pp. 18-19.
4. Ibid., p. 41.
5. Stanley L. Falk, Defense Military Manpower, pp. 55-56.
6. Riker, p. 95.
7. By para 2-25, AR 140-10, 1 November 1972. The USAR implemented a tenure restriction of three years for commanders of units. At the time of this writing the impact of this restriction had not been reported. The Army Times in its 14 February 1973 issue reported that the three year tenure limitation was soon to be modified by a change to the regulation, increasing it to four years.

## CHAPTER II

### MOBILIZATION PERSPECTIVE

There is little doubt that the RCs of the United States have been and are currently an extremely valuable asset as a source of defense military manpower. This manpower is designed to provide a permanent reservoir of trained personnel and units available for mobilization in time of war or national emergency. There have been numerous mobilizations of our nation's forces since 1775 with varied degrees of success. In the early years when our regular forces were almost nonexistent the NG or militia played a central role in the defense of the nation. At other times the regular forces were of sufficient size that state militias were used only to a limited extent. In the mobilization for World War I and subsequent mobilizations the various reserves have come to play a substantial role in our defense.<sup>1</sup> All indicators point to the fact that even greater reliance will be placed on these forces in the future. We have made a great deal of progress in the effectiveness of our reserve forces, yet a study of our most recent mobilizations indicates that problems continue to plague the RC system. It is these problems that are the challenge of the future.<sup>2</sup>

#### RECENT MOBILIZATION EXPERIENCE

During the past 35 years the United States has on five occasions faced national emergencies of such magnitude as to require the mobilization of reserve forces. The most recent mobilizations provide

definitive examples of problem areas that must be resolved in order to provide a superior force of manned and trained reserves. The five mobilizations referred to are as follows:

World War II

Korea

Berlin Blockade

Cuban Crisis

Vietnam

In subsequent sections of this chapter note will be taken of the highlights of the mobilization experience of this nation's RCs and the associated personnel problems concerning RC officer qualifications. The Cuban Crisis will not be covered as only Air Force Reserves were called to active duty during that emergency.

#### WORLD WAR II

In September 1939, when war broke out in Europe, the strength of the Regular Army was approximately 187,000 men. However, this figure did not indicate a qualitative force. Some 50,000 officers and enlisted men were dispersed throughout our overseas possessions. The remainder of the forces within the Continental United States were scattered throughout 130 different Army posts. The force structure was basically nine square infantry divisions, two cavalry divisions and miscellaneous small separate units. All of these units were woefully understrength.

The strength of the NG in September 1939 was approximately two hundred thousand men with a designated force structure of 18 divisions

plus basic units to make up an additional four cavalry divisions and mobilization support units. Since the TOE strength of a NG division was to be twenty two thousand men, simple multiplication shows that the NG was seriously understrength. In addition, their authorized 48 training nights and two weeks of field duty each year had not been adequate to train the force. It was a force in being, but was to require extensive training before being committed to combat.<sup>3</sup>

The force structure of the USAR was to provide for 27 divisions, but the fact remains that these units existed only on paper. The strength of the USAR was one hundred nineteen thousand men broken down into one hundred sixteen thousand officers mostly from the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program, and three thousand enlisted men. Training for these reserve forces consisted largely of correspondence courses and two weeks active duty a year.<sup>4</sup>

This background has set the stage for the critical period of mobilization which occurred 15 months prior to the United States involvement in the World War II hostilities. Approximately half of the NG divisions were mobilized in three months, starting in September 1940, with all divisions being called to active duty within seven months.<sup>5</sup> Of the 19,795 officers mobilized only 6,800 had completed a course of instruction in a service school.<sup>6</sup> Additionally, the August 1940 maneuvers involving NG units had shown that some 20 percent of the officers of these units were unqualified.<sup>7</sup>

The units of the USAR were not called to active duty as units. Rather, these forces were brought to duty as individuals. The level of training of the officers brought on active duty was very low and

it was necessary to provide additional training time before they were able to assist in converting the large number of civilians into soldiers. However, General Marshall, in a letter written 30 July 1944, stated that the company grade USAR officers were superior to their NG counterparts because, "they had attained a uniform standard of technical preparation and of general education."<sup>8</sup>

Statistics gathered from NG divisions some three months after mobilization revealed that 22 percent of the first lieutenants were over 40 years of age, 919 captains were over 45, 100 lieutenant colonels were over 55.<sup>9</sup> Further, General McNair indicated that there was a dearth of competent battalion and regimental commanders and ". . . it was found necessary to make almost 100 percent replacement of the commissioned officers with troops from the grade of major general through the grade of colonel and to replace an extremely high percentage of officers of lower rank . . ."<sup>10</sup>

The comment of General McNair and the statistics quoted above reflect serious personnel problems during this mobilization period. The figures shown for age indicate that many of the officers in all grades were beyond the standards expected of an officer assigned to combat duty. Although exact statistics are not available to support the point, it appears to be a safe assumption that age was at least one of the contributing factors to the relief of officers as related by General McNair.

In both the NG and the USAR, the training level of the officers was found to be very low. In many instances officers required additional training in order to become qualified to train the troops



assigned to their units. This deficiency was a serious detriment and delayed the units reaching combat ready status. In the case of the NG divisions, some required cadre training for two months before receiving inductees.<sup>11</sup>

#### KOREAN WAR

The Korean mobilization of reserve forces was significantly different than that of World War II. It was a partial mobilization spread over a considerable time span. Korea was a limited war and existing mobilization plans were based on a World War II situation. There were no plans for a limited mobilization.<sup>12</sup>

At the start of the Korean War the force structure of the NG was 27 divisions, 20 regimental combat teams and supporting units. The NG was at 93 percent strength. The USAR consisted of both units and filler personnel. The USAR strength was about 75 percent of authorized.

The mobilizations of both the NG and USAR units again found that these units were not ready for deployment because of deficient unit training.<sup>13</sup> Individuals of the Ready Reserve forces, many of whom were veterans of World War II, made significant contributions by providing a source of replacement personnel. However, as in World War II, the fact remained that the production of combat units from the RCs was not significantly faster than that prescribed for organization of units from active army cadre and fillers.<sup>14</sup>

Although statistics on ages of the officers called to active duty from the NG and USAR are not available, numerous references can be

found which point toward the deficiency in training of officers. This deficiency, just as in World War II, caused considerable delay in formation of combat ready units.

#### BERLIN CRISIS

The Berlin Crisis precipitated a unique mobilization situation. President Kennedy, as authorized by the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, saw fit to mobilize a part of the reserve forces although the United States was not involved in hostilities. Prior to the call to active duty the NG was very near 100 percent strength with a force of 27 division plus numerous separate units. The USAR units numbered 10 infantry divisions, 13 training divisions, and other support units.

Compared to past mobilizations the call to active duty for Berlin was rather small. Only two of the NG divisions and a few smaller units were activated. The USAR furnished a total of 444 company size units needed to round out the expanding active army forces.<sup>15</sup> Despite the small number of forces mobilized it was still apparent that the reserve as it existed had difficulty producing combat ready units. The problems of both advanced age and inadequate training were again in evidence. Many of the units found it necessary to suspend training until such time as qualified filler personnel were available.<sup>16</sup> As in World War II and Korea it was evident that there were still problems in the RC system.

#### VIETNAM WAR

In 1965, the decision was made by the President not to have a general mobilization of the reserve forces for the buildup in Vietnam.

One of the reasons for this decision which is germane to this paper was reflected in the statement by General Wheeler. He stated that the reserves could not be moved to combat in 90 days as had been planned, but would require four months. A unit formed using draftee fillers could be made ready within the same period of time.<sup>17</sup> Later, some three years after the US had become involved in Vietnam with ground forces, a small number of the reserve forces, something over one percent, were called to active duty.<sup>18</sup> Both NG and USAR units were called. Research indicates that once again many of the personnel and training problems noted in past mobilizations were encountered resulting in excessive time being required for units to become combat ready. A case in point shows that in one of the NG brigades that failed to achieve timely ready status the reason could in part be attributed to some lack of competence on the part of the company level officers. There was evidence of certain deficiencies in both leadership training and MOS qualification.<sup>19</sup> Certain of the reserve officers activated that were found to be unqualified, had to be replaced.<sup>20</sup> In most cases, mobilization schedules were not fully met.<sup>21</sup> Personnel problems similar to those of previous mobilizations appeared to be a significant factor.

#### SUMMARY OF RECENT EXPERIENCE

This has been a brief look at four of our nation's past mobilizations spanning some 35 years. It is evident that the reserve system was found to have significant deficiencies in World War II and was only moderately successful in subsequent crises. There are many

reasons cited for this ineffectiveness, yet in each instance deficiencies in the RC system for training officers stands out. In many areas improvements have been made but it is apparent that more attention is required to eliminate RC officer personnel problems. With the increased reliance in the future on the readiness of our RCs, problems concerning RC officer qualifications must be corrected.

## CHAPTER II

### FOOTNOTES

1. John R. Probert, "The Reserves and National Guard: Their Changing Role in National Defense." Naval War College Review, May 1972, p. 67.
2. US Department of the Army. Army Pamphlet 20-212, p. 697.
3. Ibid., pp. 549-550.
4. US Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, The Army Study of the Guard and Reserve Forces(U), Vol. III, p. IV-3, SECRET (hereafter referred to as "SSI Study").
5. Ibid., p. IV-5.
6. Jim D. Hill, The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard, p. 373.
7. Kent R. Greenfield, et al., "The Organization of Ground Combat Troops," United States Army in World War II, Vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 34.
8. William H. Riker, Soldiers of the States, p. 97.
9. Greenfield, p. 48.
10. Riker, p. 95.
11. Greenfield, p. 36.
12. US Department of the Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, History of Department of the Army Activities Relating to the Korean Conflict for the Period 25 June 1950-8 September 1951, p. 2.
13. SSI Study, Vol. III, p. IV-17.
14. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 33.
15. Ibid., Vol. III, p. IV-25.
16. Ibid., p. IV-26.
17. Lieutenant Colonel John D. Bruen, "Repercussions from the Vietnam Mobilization Decision," Parameters, Spring-Summer 1972, p. 32.

18. SSI Study, Vol. II, p. 36.
19. Ibid., Vol. III, p. IV-38.
20. Ibid., p. IV-39.
21. Ibid.

## CHAPTER III

### RESERVE COMPONENT STUDIES

Since World War II there have been numerous reviews of the status of the reserve forces with many recommendations regarding the changes necessary to create a viable and ready force. In general, these studies were comprehensive and objective. Many of the proposed ideas have been incorporated into the system, yet the problems of tenure and aging have not been resolved and they continue to influence the readiness of our forces.

After World War II, Secretary of Defense Forrestal appointed a committee to study the reserves of the Armed Forces. This study, known as the Gray Board after its chairman, Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray, proposed sweeping changes not the least of which was the recommendation that the services each have one Federal Reserve Force. This recommendation would have combined the USAR and State NG into one force under federal control. The Gray Board recognized that the NG and USAR had established excellent records in World War II however, they were concerned that it required two years of additional training after the call to active duty to produce a combat ready force.<sup>1</sup> The proposal for only one reserve force would have resolved many of the readiness problems through more active and responsive federal control. It also appears that the Gray Board solution might have assisted in resolution of the tenure problem by providing officers of the RCs an opportunity for more lateral and vertical mobility within the system. Under federal control greater flexibility could

have existed for officers to move laterally between the NG, USAR, and even within the active forces. This movement would have done much to prevent stagnation of the system and provided a means whereby reserve officers could progress in a normal career pattern commensurate with their age. As effective as the plan might have been the NG fought to prevent the loss of its identity and heritage and the matter was never presented to Congress for consideration.

As a result of the mobilization for the Korean Crisis the performance of the RCs was again under consideration. In this instance the focus was upon the USAR. Because of the problems and inequities experienced in the call to active duty, Congress established by the Armed Forces Act of 1952, the Ready, Standby, and Retired Reserve Categories, which are still in use today. Other changes were made during the 1950's in the fields of pay, promotion, and retirement incentives, but none of these considered the tenure problem and therefore had little influence on unit readiness standards.

The Berlin and Cuban Missile Crisis resulted in further attempts to change the reserve system in a fashion which would have accomplished the same results as the Gray Board although in a different manner. In this instance Secretary of Defense McNamara attempted to reorganize and realign the RCs by again attempting elimination of the dual structure of the RCs. The plan was to place the unit structure of the USAR under the control of the NG. The compartmentalization of reserve officers caused by the dual structure would subsequently have been reduced and provided a means for more lateral mobility as previously discussed. A strong lobby in Congress by the USAR to maintain their identity was successful and this action was blocked by legislation.



In 1967, Secretary McNamara again attempted to merge the two components under a less ambitious plan, but strong Congressional opposition settled the issue by legislating the dual structure of the NG and USAR. Any change to the system will now have to take place within this dual structure or by modification through legislative action.

It appears appropriate at this point to look more closely at some of the more immediate studies and proposals that highlight the problems as they exist today. Two extensive studies have been conducted in the past five years that deal with many facets of the system. The first of these was the Hollingsworth Report which undertook to study the quality of officers in the RCs. A second study completed in September 1972 entitled "The Army Study of the Guard and Reserve Forces," concentrates specifically on problems encountered in maintaining the readiness of reserve units. Both of these studies do much to identify the problems related to this research effort.

#### HOLLINGSWORTH REPORT

Following the civil disturbances in Detroit in the summer of 1967 a Presidential Commission was appointed to seek the cause of these disturbances. One of the commission's recommendations suggested a review of the qualifications and performance of NG officers. The Department of the Army, after receipt of the recommendation, expanded this to include officers of both RCs. The board headed by the Brigadier General Hollingsworth produced its final report on 29 December 1967.<sup>2</sup>

Although the report covered many factors such as procurement, evaluation, retention, and elimination of officers, the board's discussion of the system for promotion highlights the problems of concern to this research effort. Concerning the system for promotion, the board pointed out that the current system which allows an officer to decline a promotion so that he may remain in unit status tends to stagnate the system.<sup>3</sup> It is recognized that the study of declination of promotion and the promotion system are not within the scope of this study. However, a correlation exists between declination of promotion and tenure in a unit in that both prolong an individual's stay within the unit structure. It follows that if a correlation exists as stated, the problems identified by the board involving declination of promotion are the same problems that are caused by excessive tenure.

Declination of promotion, and hence prolonged tenure, directly influences the morale of the junior officer who may be otherwise qualified but cannot be advanced for lack of a position vacancy. Stagnation is created, retarding the officers professional growth normally gained through more challenging assignments and bringing about age-creep through inordinately long assignments in a given position. The Hollingsworth Board found that under the present system it is possible to mobilize a 50 year old captain and that it is unlikely that such an individual would be able to perform a combat assignment at that grade level and age.<sup>4</sup> This type of problem was pointed out in a previous chapter as having occurred in prior mobilizations causing excessive turbulence and degrading the attainment of unit

readiness. Apparently the problem still existed in 1967. The Board further shows that in many instances officers in the grade of major or lieutenant colonel had been in the same positions in the unit for seven years. Recognizing this as excessive, they suggested that these individuals should be promoted or moved out of their unit position.<sup>5</sup>

Further examination of the board's findings illustrates the effect tenure can have on the age of the RCs. Finding that officers as majors or lieutenant colonels were spending excessive time in unit positions the board studied age data of all officers in the RCs with the following observation:

The officers of the Reserve Components are older than their active duty counterparts. Officers of the ARNGUS are generally older than officers in the USAR units. Non-unit USAR officers of the field grades are older than either officers in USAR units or ARNGUS.<sup>6</sup>

Army Regulation 140-10 provides suggested guidelines for maximum age limits for assignment of officers to unit status as follows:

COL--50

LTC--45

MAJ--42

CPT--40<sup>7</sup>

Although these ages are recognized only as guidelines and do not apply to the NG they were established to provide a point or basis beyond which there is a serious doubt of an officer's ability to perform a combat assignment. An idea of the magnitude of the problem of age in the NG can be shown by the following statistics from the Hollingsworth Report:

Percent of LTC by age - guideline age 45

35-40	41-44	45-46	47-52	53 and over
9%	16%	19%	50%	6%

Percent of MAJ by age - guideline age 42

32-34	35-40	41-44	45-46	47-52	8
2%	41%	21%	15%	21%	

Using these figures it can be shown that 75 percent of the lieutenant colonels and 57 percent of the majors were at or over the guideline age. These figures represent a serious and continuing problem to any future mobilization and timely readiness of the reserve forces.

THE ARMY STUDY OF THE GUARD AND RESERVE FORCES

This study is the most current study of the NG and USAR. It was initiated by the Secretary of the Army, sponsored by the Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, and performed by the United States Army Combat Development Command, Strategic Studies Institute. For the purpose of this paper it will be referred to in the future as the SSI Study. The study was an extensive evaluation of the current problems encountered in maintaining the readiness of the RCs. Examination of the study shows that many of the problems brought to light by the Hollingsworth Board still existed at the time of the SSI Study. In particular the study identifies the problem of tenure alluded to in the Hollingsworth Report and restates and confirms the problem of aging within the RCs.

With regard to age it was determined that in applying the guidelines of AR 140-10 the average age of colonels in the NG exceeded the

50 years of age in all but four states. The average age of lieutenant colonels exceeded the guideline in 45 states. In four of the five states that conformed with the standard, the average age was only equal to the guideline. The average age of majors was exactly on the guideline figure of 42. Only company grade officers generally fell slightly below the established guideline.<sup>9</sup> The SSI Study further examined the age status of command personnel in both components. The study found that about 50 percent of all NG battalion commanders were over 45 compared to 36 percent of the USAR commanders. At the regimental level 65 percent of the NG officers were 51 or older as compared to 50 percent of the USAR officers. At the brigade level 87 percent of the NG officers were 51 or older while 48 percent of the reserve officers had reached that age.<sup>10</sup> Past experience had shown that turbulence in command positions seriously degraded a unit's readiness status upon mobilization and aging of the commanders as shown above obviously portends future problems. From the statistics shown it is evident that age is still a critical factor in our RCs.

The SSI Study identified the tenure problem as a significant component of the age problem. The study, based on interviews and observations during field visits and analysis of existing regulations, found that tenure is caused by the following factors:

- a. Lack of challenging assignments outside the unit structure.
- b. Loss of drill pay when not in unit status.
- c. Difficulty in regaining unit status once it is relinquished.
- d. The fact that assignment in a unit and regular attendance at drills assures the necessary Title III retirement points without other action on the part of the individual.<sup>11</sup>

Any solution to the problem of age must take into account these factors. Solution of the tenure problem will do much to solve the problem of our aging forces. It is recognized that a solution to these problems will not be easy, as changes will be required at the heart of the RC system.

Finally the SSI Study indicated that a significant number of RC officers not only lacked recent active duty experience, but even more critical was the fact that a significant number of RC officers in key unit positions were found to never have served on active duty as an officer.<sup>12</sup> This lack of relevant active duty experience points up a serious problem in the RC officers career system in that it allows such a void in professional experience to exist.

#### CURRENT STATUS

Information supplied by the NG Bureau in October 1972 would indicate that the problem of aging in the officer ranks as highlighted in both the Hollingsworth Report and the SSI Study still exists. Table I shows that the NG still has a problem in the lieutenant colonel and major ranks. Although the statistics were not available for colonel it can be logically assumed that the problem is equally as serious. One part of the problem can be attributed to the aging in the ranks of the NG technicians, a documented problem area.<sup>14</sup>

Table II shows a distribution of all NG Technicians of grades 2nd lieutenant through lieutenant colonel displayed by ages. Included in this group are officers in the State Headquarters; Medical, Nurse, Dental, Chaplain Corps; and Selective Service.

TABLE I AGE OF OFFICERS 13

ARNGUS - 2 OCT 1972

LTC Max Guideline Age 45

<u>Source of Data</u>	<u>32-34</u>	<u>35-40</u>	<u>41-44</u>	<u>45-46</u>	<u>47-52</u>	<u>53 and over</u>
Hollingsworth Report 1967 (all officers)	0.0%	9.0%	16.0%	19.0%	50.0%	6.0%
NGB OMRF (1972) (all officers)	0.0	6.0	29.0	9.0	40.0	16.0
NGB OMRF (1972) (technicians only)	0.0	7.0	22.0	10.0	43.0	13.0
NGB* (non technicians only)	0.0	5.0	30.0	14.0	44.0	7.0

MAJ Max Guideline Age 42

1967 - all officers	2.0%	41.0%	41.0%	15.0%	21.0%	0.0%
1972 - all officers	2.0	28.0	49.0	7.0	13.0	1.0
1972 - technicians only	3.0	34.0	45.0	6.0	10.0	2.0
1972 - non technicians only	5.0	38.0	41.0	9.0	7.0	0.0

CPT Max Guideline Age 40

1967 - all officers	2.0%	21.0%	20.0%	47.0%	9.0%	1.0%
1972 - all officers	3.0	27.0	15.0	46.0	7.0	2.0
1972 - technicians only	5.0	21.0	30.0	38.0	4.0	1.0
1972 - non technicians only	13.0	30.0	20.0	33.0	3.0	0.0

1LT

1967 - all officers	3.0%	26.0%	59.0%	11.0%	1.0%
1972 - all officers	1.0	33.0	52.0	11.0	3.0
1972 - technicians only	3.0	25.0	40.0	26.0	6.0
1972 - non technicians only	3.0	39.0	46.0	9.0	3.0

\*Data for non technicians only came from a five state sample made by the NGB especially for this study in December 1972.

TABLE II 15

2 OCT 1972

\*Distribution of Technicians (Grade vs Age)

		<u>LTC</u>																												
Age	No	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	Total			
		1	2	2	6	6	25	26	45	44	40	36	32	40	50	39	50	65	56	51	26	19	10	9	9	4	(693)			
Age	No	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	(753)		
		2	0	3	8	12	30	29	37	32	51	76	90	101	87	58	21	25	22	19	14	11	5	8	5	4	3			
Age	No	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	(935)
		1	4	4	9	11	24	40	60	39	56	80	87	112	108	88	71	41	24	27	13	17	5	5	1	3	3	2	1	
Age	No	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37														
		1	8	18	24	26	22	31	31	30	34	19	22	8	6	3	(285)													
Age	No	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33																
		2	4	9	18	20	15	20	19	20	9	7	3	2	(149)															

Total Technicians 2,813  
 ✓ Mode for Technicians  
 X Arithmetic average for all officers

Data current as of 31 Aug 1972

\*Includes State Headquarters and also officers of the Medical Corps, Nurse Corps, Dental Corps, Chaplain Corps, and Selective Service.



TABLE III 16

\*Distribution of Sample of Non Technicians (Age vs Grade)

		<u>LTC</u>																	Total									
Age	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	(95)		
No	2	2	1	2	13	2	12	9	4	6	11	8	10	4	3	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1		
											X																	
		<u>MAJ</u>																	Total									
Age	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53			(209)	
No	1	2	2	4	1	7	10	9	18	18	17	23	23	26	13	13	5	4	7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
											X																	
		<u>CPT</u>																	Total									
Age	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48		(610)
No		5	10	25	46	46	51	40	43	43	32	44	65	44	33	37	17	47	8	6	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	
												X																
		<u>1LT</u>																	Total									
Age	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38												(348)
No	4	7	43	57	37	55	42	30	31	15	9	7	4	3	3	1												
		<u>2LT</u>																	Total									
Age	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34													(535)
No	1	15	35	58	138	127	68	49	22	8	7	4	2	1														

(Sample Data furnished Nov 1972)

\*Includes State Headquarters, and also officers of the Medical, Nurse, Dental, Chaplain Corps and Selective Service.

Table III shows a sample taken from five states of the non-technicians giving the same breakout by age and rank. The sample indicates that there is a less of a problem among the non-technicians, however, it does show a number of individuals who are above the Department of Army guidelines for age by grade as well as a marked increase in the aging trend in the ranks of majors and lieutenant colonels.

Since the problem of excessive age does exist it follows that the allied problem of excessive tenure is also present. In order to find an adequate solution to the problem it is necessary to examine more closely those factors identified as causing excessive tenure. If the factors which are counterproductive to an officer's normal progress through the system can be sufficiently isolated then the system can be changed to eliminate the problem.

The present system does not offer viable alternatives when an officer loses unit status. The positions outside the unit program do not offer drill pay and are insufficiently challenging to motivate him to maintain his professional competence. Without a sense of accomplishment most individuals lose their desire to continue in the RCs. Knowing full well that there are few challenging duties outside the unit system he will seek to remain in his present position of assignment as long as possible, thus stagnating the system through his excessive tenure.

Related to the problem of lack of challenging assignments outside the unit system is the difficulty an officer experiences in regaining unit status once relinquished. Because of the compartmentalization of the dual structure, it is very difficult for an officer

of one component to gain unit status in the other component. This lateral mobility is seen as blocking the promotion of a junior officer within the component the officer seeks assignment. In order to prevent stagnation of the system it appears there must be available to the RC officers an opportunity for lateral mobility to include the possibility of an occasional tour on active duty with the Regular Army.

An officer in unit status has yet another problem that forces him to remain for an excessive time in the unit program. Money can be a deciding factor. For example a lieutenant colonel on unit status draws for annual drill purposes approximately \$3000.00 a year. Loss of this amount can be of serious economic consequences. This is a substantial amount in an officer's overall economic picture and he obviously will fight to retain his status.

Last, but not least, is the fact that an assignment in a unit and regular attendance at drills assures an officer of sufficient yearly retirement points thus, no other action on his part is required to maintain his retirement year credit. This is not true outside unit status. The officer must seek retirement points by finding activities on his own which produce these points. Knowing this to be true, why should an officer attempt to leave unit status? He is comfortable, provided for and has little desire or incentive to leave this favored status. Therefore, he again has found reason to remain in unit status as long as possible.

These are the problems that must be resolved. The next chapter will show certain features of the reserve forces of selected foreign

nations and information concerning how the US Marine Corps Reserve has dealt with these problems.

## CHAPTER III

### FOOTNOTES

1. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Committee on Civilian Components, Reserve Forces for National Security, p. 11.

2. US Department of the Army, Hollingsworth Board, Review of ARNG Federal Recognition Standards and Procedures and Promotion Procedures for Reserve Component Officers, p. S-1. (hereafter referred to as the "Hollingsworth Report").

3. Ibid., p. II-5-13.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p. II-5-15.

6. Ibid., p. II-1-2.

7. US Department of the Army, Army Regulation 140-10, p. 2-9, (hereafter referred to as "AR 140-10").

8. Hollingsworth Report, p. II-1-21.

9. SSI Study, Vol. III, pp. II-29-30.

10. Ibid., p. II-46.

11. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 11-12.

12. Ibid., Vol. III, p. II-54.

13. Table I data was obtained by informal contacts with the National Guard Bureau in November 1972.

14. SSI Study, Vol. III, p. II-30.

15. Table II data obtained by informal contacts with the National Guard Bureau in November 1972.

16. Table III data was obtained from the National Guard Bureau who made a five state survey of non-technicians especially for this research effort in December 1972.

## CHAPTER IV

### OTHER RESERVE SYSTEMS

One of the strongest features of the reserve system in the United States is the deep rooted tradition of the citizen soldier of the state militias. This tradition has been the product of our nation's external and internal threats, war experience, political influences, and militia heritage. Our country is not alone in having its military reserve forces a part of its national heritage. A number of nations of the world have a significant military reserve as an integral part of their nation's defense. In a study of one nation's reserve components efficiency and effectiveness, certain information concerning the reserve forces of selected other nations will be examined next. Following this will be a brief summary of certain aspects of the United States Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR).

It is recognized that there is no single solution to the problems of RC officer qualifications mentioned in the previous chapters; however, as a basis for comparison, it will be helpful to look at other approaches to building an effective reserve military force.

#### SELECTED FOREIGN RESERVE SYSTEMS

Current information on the strengths, composition, manning in key positions and other data of the three nations selected for closer examination was obtained from unclassified sources.<sup>1</sup> Detailed information on the internal organization and personnel policies of the military organizations of the different nations was not used as the

regulations on specific detailed personnel policies of their reserve forces were not available. This was not deemed critical as the customs and traditions of any nation's military service are so diverse that specific comparisons would be of little value. However, the information on the reserve forces of three countries, Canada, Israel, and Sweden were selected for comparison because they represent countries with a fairly large range in population and size of armed forces, but with a total defense expenditure of a similar general magnitude. Also, these countries have a system of manning that includes both all-volunteer and conscripted forces. In Table IV, note the size of the total mobilized forces in comparison with the total population. Both Israel and Sweden have mobilized force levels far above Canada and out of proportion to their size of population. It is apparent that the threat which both Israel and Sweden perceives is the motivating factor in staffing both their active and reserve forces. It is also significant to note that Canada is the only one of the three nations relying on an all-volunteer force.

Certain features of these three nations reserve forces are displayed on Table II.<sup>3</sup> The mission of the reserve forces is interesting. Both Israel and Sweden have the mission to "provide total defense" of their respective nations. In Canada the reserves have the mission to "provide additional units and individual fillers." Also, note that active army cadre personnel and key commanders are assigned to the reserve units of both Israel and Sweden.

TABLE IV<sup>2</sup>

## COMPARISONS OF DATA ON SELECTED NATIONS

	<u>Canada</u>	<u>Israel</u>	<u>Sweden</u>
Population (in millions)	21.8	3.16	8.2
Defense Expenditure (in millions of US dollars)	1,936	1,247	1,510
Estimated GNP 1971 (in billions of US dollars)	95.57	6.2	32.56
Armed Forces			
Regular Forces	84,000	25,000	22,200
Conscripts on Active Duty	0	52,000	50,300
Mobilization Strength	106,700	300,000	750,000



TABLE V<sup>3</sup>

## Salient Features of Selected Systems

<u>Category</u>	<u>Canada</u>	<u>Israel</u>	<u>Sweden</u>
Mission	Provide additional units and individual fillers	Provide total defense	Provide total defense
Military service	Volunteer	Compulsory: 18-55 (18-34, female)	Compulsory: 18-47
Reserve service obligation, years	0	34	28
Active Army strength, thousands	41.5	62 <sup>a</sup>	49.5 <sup>b</sup>
Reserve strength, thousands	20	250	550.5
Reserves (less conscripts), % of fully mobilized Army	33	80	92
Largest Reserve unit	Battalion	Brigade	Brigade
Regular Army personnel in Reserve units	Administrative sergeant in all battalions	Cadres in first-hand units and some commanders	Commander in all battalions, about one-third of companies, and some platoons
Initial conscript training period, months	No conscripts	36	8
Annual active duty for training, <sup>c</sup> consecutive days	7	31	18 <sup>d</sup>
Active duty training with or directed by active army	Yes	Yes	Yes
Unit equipment with Reserve units or earmarked & readily available	Yes	Yes	Yes
Basis of active duty for training pay	Regular Army pay	Civilian pay	Conscript pay

<sup>a</sup> Includes 50,000 conscripts

<sup>b</sup> Includes 36,000 conscripts

<sup>c</sup> EM in primary age groups and first-line units only <sup>d</sup> Required only 2 to 3 times before age 35

## UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS RESERVE

Certain features of the USMCR make it an excellent vehicle for demonstrating the successful use of techniques also employed by some of the nations mentioned in the previous section. The USMCR has traditionally relied on volunteers to fill its ranks. Even though the draft may have caused some influence on USMC recruiting for both active and reserve units, their success in filling their ranks cannot be attributed significantly to the draft.

Historically the USMCR has been mobilized in both World War II and in the Korean conflict.<sup>4</sup> The expansion was accomplished by utilizing mobilized reserve personnel as individual fillers rather than retaining them in their units when the units were brought to active duty. The USMCR has undergone a significant change in its basic structure starting in 1962. It is today much as it developed starting with the new program initiated in 1962.<sup>5</sup>

The authorized strength of the USMCR is 45,849 with its current actual strength approximately 42,000.<sup>6</sup> It is organized into one division with one associated air wing which includes four squadrons with F-8 aircraft, two squadrons with CH-53A, and C-46A helicopters. The USMCR differs from the Army RCs in that it is a pure federal reserve<sup>7</sup> where the Army NG has a dual federal-state relationship. This dual status problem is not germane to this study and will not be discussed further.

The key features to be discussed here are as follows:

a. The close ties between the active Marine Corps and the USMCR units brought about by the full-time division headquarters staffed by both regular and reserve officers on extended active duty.

b. Certain features of the system for assignment of officers to USMCR units will be discussed along with a general discussion of the USMCR's experience in officer personnel especially concerning junior officers procurement, officer tenure in units and the active duty experience level of USMCR officers.

It is significant to note that the USMCR's major unit, a division with associated air wing, has a full-time division headquarters consisting of approximately thirty officers.<sup>8</sup> As both regular and reserve officers on active duty comprise this group, close ties and a favorable rapport have developed. An integration of active and reserve officers at every level possible within the division contributes to this closeness.

The officer positions in the full-time division headquarters may be filled by qualified reserve officers on extended active duty or by qualified regular officers. The first division commander for the USMCR's division after the initiation of this program in 1969 was a regular USMC General Officer. The two assistant division commanders selected were Reserve Brigadier Generals who were on regular paid drill status. In addition to the other regular and reserve officers on extended active duty, the other officer positions in the division headquarters were filled by reserve officers who held paid drill positions and trained regularly in their jobs. The remainder of the officer positions were filled by reserve officers who spent selected time in their positions each year in an annual training status. The regimental commanders of the division are full time positions filled by regular officers or by reserve officers on extended active duty.

It is immediately apparent that by integrating regular and reserve officers in full-time key positions within the division's headquarters, a potential exists for achieving a high degree of unit training readiness. Also the active duty experience level of reserve officers is improved by serving for significant periods of time in these key full-time active duty positions. The regular officers better appreciate the problems of meeting the readiness requirements with part-time soldiers, thus they are able to make a better contribution in solving the training and other problems in the reserve units.

Certain features of the USMCR's system for the assignment of personnel to the division is of interest. While an automated system of personnel planning and management is in use for enlisted assignments, a by-name assignment system is made by the Marine Corps Districts for the officer personnel. Reserve officers assigned to the division have their tenure in unit assignments limited to two years with one year extensions to this policy being authorized when no qualified replacement is available. It has been determined that this policy of limiting tenure in unit assignments has been most significant in maintaining assignment opportunities for qualified officers without undue regard to their professional and social contacts within or without the reserve activity or to their length of residence in the area. When unit vacancies occur the unit is required to notify all qualified USMCR officers within its geographic area and solicit applications for assignment to the position vacancy. The actual assignment is made by the Marine Corps District Headquarters with inputs from the appropriate reserve unit commander and the appropriate

full-time active duty officer responsible for the unit. The policy of limiting tenure and broad notifications of unit vacancies have had the effect of keeping the best qualified officers either in units or available for assignments to units. The number of USMCR officers in unit assignments who are Vietnam veterans appears to be high. This is due in part to the broad notification system for unit vacancies. Also a serious effort for recruiting officers who have recently served on active duty provides an input of officers with recent active duty experience. This adds to the overall experience level of the units. As there are not sufficient unit assignments for all who desire them, officers waiting out tenure limitations (one year between unit assignments) before being reassigned to paid drill unit positions may be assigned to non-paid units administered by the Marine Corps Districts.

The USMCR is not without personnel problems, but they have developed some unique solutions to some of the problems. As all USMCR officers must have a bachelors' degree and must be graduates of the Marine Corps Basic Course before being eligible for a unit assignment, the input of officers is necessarily limited to officers who have served on active duty, enlisted marines who are college graduates who apply for and are accepted for attendance at the Marine Corps Officer Candidate School (OCS) and finally college graduates with no prior service who are enlisted for attendance at OCS.

All officer candidates attend the regular OCS, as there is no special RC OCS. Branch qualification is acquired immediately after OCS by attending the Marine Corps Basic Course. During the 1960's

when there was a severe junior officer shortage, selected senior non-commissioned officers who were required to assume positions of leadership and other responsibilities normally performed by officers were given warrants. This was an interim solution to the officer shortage and met the immediate need for officers without sacrificing the quality standards for commissioning officers.

In contrast the shortage of officers in the Army RCs has been met differently by the use of RC OCS organized by the state NG in many states. The commissioning of the OCS products and their initial unit assignment are made before they have had the opportunity to become qualified at the basic level in their branch of service.

#### SUMMARY OF OTHER SYSTEMS

In this chapter certain information concerning the reserve forces of three foreign nations was presented along with certain information about the USMCR. A significant similarity common to all is the use of active duty officers in key positions in the reserve units. In the USMCR and in the reserve units of both Israel and Sweden a considerable number of active officers are placed in key command positions. This system undoubtedly contributes significantly to the effectiveness of these reserve units.

## CHAPTER IV

### FOOTNOTES

1. Information on the armies of Canada, Israel, and Sweden was obtained from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1972-1973 and the Research Analysis Corporation Review and Analysis of Selected Foreign Reserve Systems.

2. The Military Balance 1972-1973, pp. 18, 26, 27, 31, and 32.

3. M. H. Rosen and I. Heymont, Review and Analysis of Selected Foreign Reserve Systems, p. 2.

4. Joseph F. Donahoe, Jr., COL, The Capability of the United States to Fulfill Manpower Requirements of the Annual Force Without Mobilization, pp. 7-9.

5. William A. Donald, MAJ, "A Ready Reserve for the 70's," Marine Corps Gazette, October 1965, pp. 51-53.

6. The Military Balance 1972-1973, pp. 4-5.

7. There is an insignificant exception to USMCR being a pure reserve without state control, namely, the New York Naval Militia; however, this exception is not germane to this research effort and will not be discussed further.

8. SSI Study, Vol. III, pp. III-13-17. In addition information concerning the USMCR was obtained from selected USMC officers in the AWC 73.

## CHAPTER V

### CHALLENGE FOR THE FUTURE

The challenge of the foreseeable future requires that the RCs of the United States carry a significant load of the responsibility for the defense of our country. The varying degrees of competence to which the RCs have been effective in acquitting themselves of this responsibility is a matter of history. The outstanding strength of one nation's RCs lies in the deep rooted heritage of the old state militias which have evolved into the two elements of the RCs as we know them today, the USAR and the NG. It has served to carry the RCs into all walks of life of our nations diverse population. Our nations very survival appears to be linked inseparably to not only the continued existence of the RCs, but to the RCs achieving a degree of excellence never previously attained.

Recognizing that the role of the RCs as they are presently structured will continue to increase in importance, any effort for changing any facet of either the USAR's or the NG's basic structure will be met by a massive resistance to change. Before any change is introduced, a necessary assumption is that changes to improve the effectiveness of the RCs should be introduced in such a way that the existence of either component will not be threatened. The passage of the necessary legislation through the Congress to implement most of the changes that might be proposed in the RC officer personnel system is feasible only if it does not eliminate either of the RCs and if the need for the changes are clearly demonstrated. Most of the major



changes in the RC officer personnel system must provide some degree of protection to the multitude of vested interests of many of the present members of the RCs. It is not unreasonable therefore, to consider that many such proposed changes in RC officer standards and qualifications must be phased into the current system with sufficient resolve on the part of the military and civilian leadership of both the Active Army and RCs to insure continuity of the proposed actions to improve the RC system.

In the following discussion a distinction will not be made between the USAR and the NC in the proposals because a high degree of commonality and compatibility of the requirements for officers of both the two elements of the RCs are essential to the success of the RCs and the Active Army in performing their missions.

#### PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH TENURE

It has been documented in this study that the related problems of long tenure in assignments, officers older than the Department of Army age guidelines, lack of recent active duty experience, limited assignment opportunities are all present in the RCs and tend to degrade their readiness.

On the surface the proposal for limiting tenure in units appears to offer a high potential for increasing assignment opportunities for a number of officers presently excluded from serving in units. If officers were required to leave their unit assignments after two years and wait one year before being eligible for another unit assignment as in the USMCR, officers now excluded from the unit program for want

of a unit vacancy would have vastly increased opportunities for unit assignments. Applying a tenure limitation in RC unit assignments of two, three, or four years might be criticized for introducing an unacceptably high degree of turbulence in RC units. It has been established that there is a problem of stagnation and aging of the officers in certain RC units, therefore, the disadvantage of introducing some degree of turbulence is greatly outweighed by the introduction of new officers with new ideas and new perspectives. With an increase in the assignment opportunities, undoubtedly many more officers, some of whom have been on active duty recently, might be attracted into the RC program. A potential advantage of the forced one year break between unit assignments would allow time for attendance at one of the various active or USAR school programs for achieving the appropriate level of branch qualification, CGSC or other courses required for professional development and for meeting prerequisites for promotion. The USMCR has had no recent problems of formal education or basic branch qualification as all of their new officer inputs through ROTC or OCS are college graduates and achieve branch qualification before receiving a unit assignment. A change in the entrance requirements for officers being commissioned through the RC OCS program would also be in order now to maintain a reasonably high formal educational background among RC officers and to encourage the recruitment into the unit program of officers recently returning from active duty. The Active Army OCS program at this time has all but closed, which means that the Active Army officer input comes almost totally from the college ROTC program and the USMA. If a commonality of officer qualifications is

to be maintained between the RCs and the Active Army, the RC officers entrance qualifications should be raised to that of the Active Army. Further, to preclude officers serving in units without the necessary branch qualifications, attendance at the Active Army basic branch schools should be completed before being given a unit assignment just as is done in the USMCR.

One problem area in limiting RC officer tenure in units is the potential loss of pay when the tenure limitation might force an officer out of a paid drill space in a unit. This is a very real problem, the solution for which would require an increase in the number of paid drill spaces for selected other assignments outside the unit structure such as the introduction of pay for attendance at certain of the USAR schools and for other similar assignments. Also to provide more assignment opportunities, the detailing of qualified RC members to mobilization designee positions in both the Active Army and in the RC structure should be expanded for both RC elements. This type of detail has the advantage of providing an opportunity for the RC officers to receive experience not available in the present assignment structure of the RCs. Care must be taken to improve the mobility and flexibility between assignments in the Individual Ready Reserve of the USAR and the units of the NG.

Another area that reduces the effectiveness of many RC officers is the documented fact that many officers in key positions are lacking in relevant professional experience as they have never served on active duty. Currently there is no requirement or hardly any opportunity for a RC officer to serve on active duty except in times of national

emergency when their units are mobilized. In order to correct the effects of not having active duty experience, a program to provide selected RC officers an opportunity to serve in key positions in Active Army units for a period of time up to one year should be developed. If there were such opportunities for active duty experience, later a requirement for RC officers to serve on active duty every five to seven years might be introduced as a promotion criteria. In conjunction with the RC officers service in Active Army units, a provision for exchange tours between members of units of the Active Army and units of the RCs should be developed. Considering the mutual benefits of such an exchange program in providing RC officers with first hand experience with an active army unit and the contribution that an active army officer could impart to a unit of the RCs, the obstacles of developing such a program, though significant could and should be overcome.


This exchange program is but one of the interesting, responsible and challenging assignment opportunities that could be developed within or without the RC structure. Such assignments could prove to be just as valuable an incentive as pay and prestige.


#### CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The final conclusion of this paper which started out to study the problem of RC officer qualifications arising from unrestricted tenure in units of the RCs is that there is no effective career development system for the RC officer. Any attempt to improve RC officer qualifications by use of an administrative tool such as restricting tenure in units without establishing a career development system is working

at only one facet of the problem. Therefore, the recommendation of this study is that a system for career development should be established for the RC officer on par with the Active Army system. Such a system for both the USAR and NG should have a high degree of commonality of standards of commissioning, assignments, promotion, and the like with those of active army officers. It should provide for professional training, opportunities for assignment in both RCs, and to staffs of Active Army mobilization tables of distribution, opportunities to serve with the Active Army units on active duty and other opportunities for assignments which assure that the RC officer possessed all the requisite professional qualifications and experience. Such a career development system would have the goal to produce RC officers who would be ready to meet the challenge presented by the Secretary of Defense;

. . . to have a National Guard and Reserve that are manned, equipped, and trained to mesh on quick notice, with our active forces.<sup>1</sup>

  
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CHAPTER V

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