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TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT REQUIRES "DOERS"--
NOT ADVISORS

William J. Moran

Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

5 March 1973

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM J. MORAN

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USAWC RESEARCH PAPER

TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT REQUIRES "DOERS"--NOT ADVISORS

A MONOGRAPH

by

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
5 March 1973

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ABSTRACT

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The problem was to determine the role that Active Army advisors to the Army National Guard should play in the Total Force Concept. Data was obtained by extensive research of literature, documents, and several interviews. The recent reorganization of the Army, was, in part, recognition that the Advisor program, by itself, was not capable of providing the degree of assistance required by the ARNG to meet its readiness requirements under the Total Force Concept. Research reveals a lack of experience in the ARNG Officer Corps to be the single most critical obstacle in the ARNG's efforts to assume missions previously assigned to Active units. This weakness has been ignored by both the Active Army and the Army National Guard. In order to negate this weakness, an "infusion" program must be established through which outstanding Active duty officers are assigned as key staff officers or commanders in selected high priority National Guard units. This will permit the Active Army "advisor" to become a "doer." It is further recommended the ARNG control and direct this program to permit it to be evolutionary, rather than revolutionary. A logical point of departure is present in the current Advisor program.

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INTRODUCTION

The recently announced Army reorganization plan identifies the readiness of the Reserve Components as the primary mission of the Continental United States (CONUS) Armies, and results in a complete reorganization of the Active Army's supervisory structure of the Reserve Components. The objective of this reorganization is to increase the impetus from the top down in the Active Army's efforts to improve the Reserve's readiness.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of the Active Army advisor with the Army National Guard (ARNG) within the Total Force Concept to determine why the reorganization was necessary and to determine if the new system is the best vehicle available by which the Active Army advisor can assist the ARNG in improving its readiness. To do so, it will be necessary to understand the mission of the ARNG in the Total Force Concept, its priorities/problems, and its people, as well as the advisor and the role he played before and after the reorganization. This examination will permit a comparison of the systems in order to determine if the weaknesses present before the reorganization have been eliminated. As a result of this examination, several recommendations will surface--some of which are revolutionary but none of which are original.

TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT

The Total Force Concept, as defined by Secretary of Defense Laird, is as follows:

In defense planning, the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence emphasizes our need to plan for optimum use of all military and related resources available to meet the requirements of Free World security. These Free World military and related resources--which we call 'Total Force'--include both active and reserve components of the US, those of our allies, and the additional military capabilities of our allies and friends that will be made available through local efforts, or through provision of appropriate security assistance programs.¹

In the Department of Defense Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense on Reserve Forces for Fiscal Year 1971, he further stated:

The Total Force Concept, which I originally stated in August 1970, is a central feature of the National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence. Under this concept we have created a new (emphasis added) role for the National Guard and Reserve which marks a major change in the degree of attention and support provided to the Reserve Components. Our objective is to maintain the Selected Reserves of the National Guard and Reserves as a force in being, (emphasis added) able to deploy rapidly and to operate side-by-side with Active Force units, whether in training or upon actual mobilization. The type of Guard/Reserve force which we are developing is a far cry from the Reserve Component organization of the 1965-1968 period which, except for certain Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units, was virtually unequipped, poorly trained, (emphasis added) and was considered to be deployable and usable only after months of post-mobilization training and major reequipping. The transition to the type of force required by the Total Force Concept, already under way, poses a tremendous leadership challenge to the Active Forces as well as to the National Guard and Reserves.²

IS THE TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT NEW?

As far as the National Guard is concerned, the Total Force Concept is not new. Its major implications have been embodied in law for many years, in Section 102, Title 32, USC (United States Code), in these words:

In accordance with the traditional military policy of the United States, it is essential that the strength and organizations of the Army National Guard and Air National Guard as an integral part of the first line defenses of the United States be maintained and assured at all times. Whenever Congress determines that more units and organizations are needed for the National security than are in the regular components of the ground, and Air Force, the Army National Guard of the United States, and the Air National Guard of the United States, or such parts of them as are needed, together with such units of other reserve components as are necessary for a balanced force, shall be ordered to active Federal duty and retained as long as needed.³

There is no doubt that it is, however, "a new day for the Guard and the Reserves because of the new degree of attention focused on them."⁴ Why this renewed emphasis? Primarily because the political and economic facts of life have forced it. Historically, after each major conflict an irresistible national urge for a drastic and immediate reduction in defense spending has resulted in a reduction in the size of the Active Army. We haven't returned to an era of "most bang for the buck," but we will continue to face fiscal constraints that will dictate to a large degree our strategy for the future. Assistant Secretary of the Army, Hadlai A. Hull, ASA (M&RA) made this a fact of life when he called the

Guard (and Reserves) "The best security bargain of the century." According to Mr. Hull, it costs six times as much to pay, clothe and feed the full-time soldier as it does for a reservist. "The implication is clear," he said, "the Total Force Concept with greater reliance on the reserve components, can provide a greater total force within fixed budgets, or an equal force with a reduced budget."⁵

Another reason for the renewed interest being focused on the ARNG is the cost involved in improving their readiness. Many perceive this being done at the expense of the Active Army. Lieutenant General Robert R. Williams, Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development had this to say concerning the competition between the Active Army and the Reserves for the defense dollar:

The 1970's will be a decade of precarious balance for the Army's procurement. Procurement of equipment and missiles for the Army (PEMA) dollars are dwindling and the purchasing power of those dollars is depreciating because of inflationary pressures. Projected PEMA dollars will not meet the Army's requirements for the quantities of equipment authorized for its active and reserve components forces, nor will it support the necessary modernization. This has already resulted in cancelling or stretching our many procurement programs.⁶

While the role of the ARNG as an integral part of our first line of defense is not new, the rules of engagement have been, or will be drastically changed. Selected units of the Guard will be utilized as true reserves, and these units must be a force in being--ready to meet early requirements. Today, in response to

the Total Force Concept, ARNG units are assigned tasks that only a short time ago were missions for Active Army units and the deployment times have not been changed. These units are expected to meet the schedules originally designed for their Active Army counterparts. Gone are the days, as in the Korean conflict, when the Guard, as part of our Ready Reserve, could and did require an additional seven to nine months of training from call-up to deployment. Gone too, are the five additional months required for additional training by the 3/197th Artillery out of New Hampshire, the 1st Guard unit committed in Republic of Vietnam (RVN).⁷ It is indeed, a "new day" for the ARNG.

ROLE OF THE GUARD

The ARNG has a dual mission, a Federal as well as a State mission. Its Federal role requires it to provide trained units and qualified individuals for active service in time of war or national emergency, and whenever the nation requires a build-up of the Active forces. Its State mission also requires it to provide units organized, equipped and capable of functioning under orders of State authorities "to protect life and property and to preserve peace, order and public safety."⁸ A former Defense Department Secretary had this to say concerning this dual role: "The Guard serves two masters, State and Federal, and this circumstance creates predictable tensions and anomalies."⁹ While State control and local interests inevitably add to the complexity of Federally

directed reorganizations of the Guard, and its riot control mission requires some additional training not directly related to its combat mission, the problems of dual Federal and State missions can be overstated. Disaster and riot control operations can provide experience and training of a realistic nature not otherwise obtainable short of actual combat. And use of Federally funded units and equipment to meet both Federal and State requirements is a saving appreciated by the informed taxpayer. The appreciation of the local citizen for the National Guard's assistance in times of natural or man made disaster tends to be reflected in Congress to the advantage of the Guard.

To accomplish all of its tasks, the Army Guard was authorized a strength of 400,000 for FY 72. As of the end of Fiscal Year 1971, the ARNG had an aggregate strength of 402,175, of whom 30,263 were officers and 371,912 were enlisted personnel. These Guardsmen were assigned to 3,058 units and utilized 2,744 armories and another 2,479 non-armory facilities. Overall, the ARNG was in possession of Federal equipment and vehicles in excess of \$1.8 billion dollars. The budget for FY 71 was \$689,500,000--big business indeed.¹⁰

This very large, expensive organization is under the jurisdiction of the National Guard Bureau. Within the Army staff, the Bureau operates under the supervision of the Chief, Office of Reserve Component. Its mission is to advise the Department of the Army on National Guard matters and it is the lawfully designated channel of communication between the Department and the States on

National Guard affairs. Within each State, supervision and administration of the States military force are performed by the State National Guard Headquarters. The Adjutant General is, in all but a few States, appointed by the Governor, and is the ranking officer in this headquarters. He functions as the Governor's primary military advisor. Department of the Army establishes the Guard's troop basis, and the organizations and units are assigned to the States with the consent of that State's governor.

The ARNG take considerable pride, and justifiably so, in their performance in times of conflict or disorder. As the owner of the longest continuous history of any military organization in the United States, it has served "from Lexington until liberty, in peace and in war, at home and on the far flung battlefields." In World War I, two-fifths of the Divisions in AER were ARNG divisions, and the total combat days of these divisions exceeded that of either the Regular Army or National Army Divisions.¹² In World War II, a total of 297,654 Guardsmen served on active duty. A partial mobilization for the Korean conflict resulted in eight ARNG divisions and three Regimental Combat Teams mobilized, and two of these divisions were committed to combat. The Berlin crisis again resulted in a partial mobilization of the "citizen-soldier."

Only 12,234 Army Guardsmen were mobilized for the Vietnam conflict, and most mobilized Guard units were used to reconstitute the strategic reserve rather than for deployment. Army Guard units

deployed to Vietnam were limited to two engineer battalions, two artillery battalions, a ranger company, a signal support company, a composite service company and a dental medical detachment. As of June 1970, 7,040 Army National Guardsmen had served in Vietnam with these units or as individual replacements.¹³ This extremely limited mobilization clearly ranks as the smallest of the four mobilizations the ARNG has gone through since 1940. This deliberate neglect of the ARNG during that conflict has left the Guard with many problems, to include one of image as well as a lack of combat experience.

The Guard in recent years, has been increasingly active in the execution of its State role. In the 20 years between 1945-1964, the National Guard was involved in a total of 88 civil disturbances in which 99,406 troops participated. From 1965 through 1969, there were 242 such incidents in which 291,396 Guardsmen were employed. During the past year (FY 1971) over 16,800 National Guardsmen were called by their Governors to State active duty for civil disturbance crises. On 43 occasions, these Guardsmen were used to restore order on campuses or in cities. Seventy-seven other times the Guardsmen were ordered to State active duty to assist civil authorities during natural disasters and other emergencies.¹⁴ Little wonder that many Guard leaders are concerned that their failure to be mobilized on a larger scale for the Vietnam conflict and their extensive

use in a State role could cause the Guard to be relegated to the 2nd team--a state police force rather than the most important member of the Ready Reserve.

THE NATIONAL GUARD OFFICER

The Active Army advisor will find his ARNG contemporaries to be a highly motivated group; in fact, the most highly motivated officer corps in our Reserve forces.¹⁵ The magnitude of their dedication and personal sacrifice is relatively unknown, and therefore, unappreciated by the Active Army and the civilian populace. An active Army Commander in CONUS had this to say concerning their professionalism and dedication:

Perhaps we expect too much of the Reserve Component officer. He is, after all, a part time soldier. Considering the environment in which he navigates, he performs his military duties damn well. Sometimes it is a wonder he stays in the program.¹⁶

However, he is a civilian first and as a result, he must concern himself with continuing to receive a civilian pay check. As "part time soldiers" their priorities are sometimes different than those the advisor might establish and it's difficult to imagine it to be otherwise.

The average ARNG officer will be 30 years old with almost one-fourth of the Corps being over 40 years of age. He will have an average length of service of nine years and if he is an O-5 (LTC), chances are better than fifty-fifty he will have over 20 years of service. If he is an O-4 (Major), the odds

are greater (60 percent) that he will have between 15-20 years of service, and one-half of the O-3 (Cpts.) will have 10-15 years of service. Civil education-wise, 41 percent of the Corps will have a college degree. In military education, all grades compare very favorably with the Active Army except for the grade of LTC where only 30 percent will have been of CGSC level schools, as compared to 50 percent of the Active Army.¹⁷

The Guard recruits its officers from OCS, Active as well as State, by direct appointments of combat experienced enlisted Guard personnel or professionals from civilian life, and from officers completing 2 years of active Federal service. A majority of the junior officers have come to the ARNG through the REP (Reserve Enlistment Program).¹⁸ The pressure of the draft drove many, too many, of these young men into Guard enlistments.

This data, considered in conjunction with the extremely limited number of ARNG officers having served in combat in RVN, identifies two areas that have a great deal to do with the ability of the Guard to meet its readiness requirements. The first is a lack of combat experience in the Corps and second a significant number of officers in grades O-3 thru O-5 who would be considered too old for combat assignments by Active Army standards. The problem of combat experience is further compounded by the fact that those senior ARNG personnel who gained combat experience in Korea will be retiring in the near future, further depleting the ranks of the combat tested. Without the war in Vietnam, the lack

of combat experience would have been an increasingly shared limitation between Guard and active Army officers. This disparity in combat experience resulting from the war in Vietnam provides not only the ingredients for a crisis in confidence between Active Army and Army Guard leadership, but for a lack of confidence of the Guard officer in his own abilities. Such a lack of confidence is easily transmitted downward through the enlisted ranks.

THE NATIONAL GUARD ENLISTED MAN

The young enlisted men of the ARNG, like their active counterparts, aren't the same as the soldiers who willingly marched to the sound of drums in the past. Today's Guardsman is more affluent, better educated, and more draft motivated. However, their performance in their State roles and in combat in Vietnam left little to be desired. Properly motivated and properly led, today's Guardsman is the best educated, most articulate, and best trained soldier in the entire history of the Guard.

The average enlisted Guardsman is 23 years old with 80 percent of them falling between 21 and 25 years of age. Approximately 85 percent are in their first six years enlistment and the average Guardsman will have less than one year of active service. At least 75 percent of all ARNG enlistments have a draft related motive. Approximately 60 percent of all enlisted Guardsmen have some college education and one of every two will have at least two years of college. One-third of these young men earn between \$7,500 and

\$10,000 annually in their civilian profession. Another one-third earn less than \$7,500 per year while one-eighth earn more than \$10,000. For those men with less than four years of service, their military pay comprises 6 percent of their total income. For those with 20 years of service, this percentile rises to 20 percent. One-third of these enlisted men are employed in professional or managerial fields with another one-fifth employed as laborers, and one-sixth in technical fields. Two-thirds of these enlisted men are married and 35 percent of all Guardsmen's wives object to their participation in the Guard.¹⁹ Many a draft motivated Guardsman would identify with this quote from the Sunshine Soldiers concerning service in a Reserve unit:

Now we are merely week-end warriors, having bought life at a very cheap price, back for 6 years of probation, letting men with wornout egos attempt to terrorize us; men who hope that there will always be a need for armies, so that they can feel some strength and frighten little boys.²⁰

Nor would the draftee see his service differently. It is clear, motivating and training this young Guardsman, many of whom joined for the "wrong reason," may very well be "the toughest nut to crack" for the Guard officer.²¹ However, it is interesting to note that after castigating the Guard at the NGAUS meeting in Hawaii, for taking draft motivated personnel who are joining for the "wrong reason," the Department of Defense Manpower Chief, Secretary Roger Kelly, turned around and under the pressure of dwindling Guard and Reserve strength, agreed to permit young men to join the Guard

and Reserve after receiving draft notices despite opposition to the procedure by the Chief of the National Guard and by many senior Guard officers.

ARNG PROBLEMS/PRIORITIES

General Francis S. Greenlief, Chief, National Guard Bureau, in a speech at the 94th General Conference of the National Guard Association, identified five goals he felt the Guard must meet if it is to be responsive to the needs of the nation. These were: (1) to increase the ARNG's combat readiness (2) to increase and maintain the personnel strength of the ARNG (3) to improve the leadership (4) to improve the training and (5) to improve the management of resources.²²

He also indicated time is secondary only to people as the Guards "most critical resource" and to make maximum use of this precious, scarce resource, he called for "the best planning and then supervision of our training programs."²³ The key to improving readiness lies in having skilled personnel who possess the ability to teach their skills to others. It is in this area the Guard appears to be hurting the most. General Peers, as Chief of Reserve Components, had this to say: "Generally speaking, I think that what I see within the National Guard is very great," but he was blunt about senior staff officers "who don't know enough about squad, section, and platoon tactics to actually go out and constructively teach some of these problems and operations;" and "too many junior officers and NCO's who don't know their jobs."²⁴

The extreme importance of time was also noted by General Paul M. Timmerberg, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations at Continental Army Command when he noted that even though reserve units have about one-fourth of the training time that the Active Army has, "we ask of them (the Reserves) the same levels of training that we ask of most of our Active Army units."²⁵

In order to fulfill their early deployment missions Guard units must be ready to deploy within a few weeks after mobilization. Historically, this level of training has been reached by Guard units only after several months of post mobilization training. One of the obvious solutions would be to provide more training time than the 16 hours of training per month and 15 days of summer active duty now prescribed. However, this is impossible according to MG LaVern E. Weber, former Oklahoma AG, who stated in a report to the 93d General Conference of the National Guard Association of the US, that "the Bureau feels that additional drills and additional week of Annual Training for units has an adverse impact on personnel retention and our recruiting program."²⁶ A Zero Draft environment will require greater effort on the part of the commanders and junior leaders for recruiting and retention. The time required to do this must, for the most part, come out of the time now available--so training will suffer.

There is real doubt in the minds of many Guard and Active duty personnel as to whether or not these priorities/problems can be solved to permit the ARNG to meet the readiness requirements

of the Total Force Concept. Lieutenant General Harris W. Hollis, Chief of Army's Office of Reserve Components, warned that "it is too much to expect that these forces (Guard or Reserve) can play a minuteman role, ready to spring to arms at a moments notice. That is the role of the Active Forces."²⁷ Still, the Army and the Nation can ill afford to stand by dispassionately and watch The ARNG struggle to achieve the readiness now required by its mission. For under the Total Force Concept, the readiness of the Guard will play a vital role in determining the overall credibility of the nation's military deterrence as well as substantially assist or limit the Army's capabilities to meet its mission requirements. General Winston P. Wilson, the former Chief of the National Guard Bureau, summarized the Guard's ability to achieve readiness as follows: "The Guard can achieve any kind of readiness the nation is willing to pay for." An example of the Guard's outstanding achievements in providing round-the-clock participation in the nation's air defense program underscores the general's conclusion. So, the Guard has been tasked--it must hear the sound of drums ever so clearly if it is to succeed--and realistically, if it is to survive.

THE ADVISOR--ROLE AND ORGANIZATION

Having identified the role of the ARNG in the Total Force Concept and looked at the individual Guardsman, it is necessary that we now examine the role and mission of the Active Army Advisor and the Department of the Army policy concerning the execution of this mission.

Title 10, United States Code, Section 315, requires the Secretary of the Army to detail members of the Regular and Reserve Components as are necessary to "effectively develop, train, instruct, and administer" the Reserve Components. Title 10, United States Code, Section 315, tasks the Secretary of the Army to detail officers of the Regular Army to duty with the National Guard of each State and also certain specified territories of the United States. Section 506 states the President shall assign members of the Regular Army for instruction to the National Guard. In 1903, under the provisions of the Dick Act, 20 Regular Army instructors were provided to improve the training of selected militia units. These instructors were received favorably and as a result the National Guard Association requested Congress to provide additional instructors to be used at battalion level. The Militia Act of 1912 authorized the ARNG 73 Inspector-Instructors and in 1920, the National Defense Act authorized such active Army personnel necessary to help administrate and maintain government equipment issued to the newly established ARNG Divisions in each of the 9 Corps areas. During the period between the World Wars, the ARNG advisory organization as we know it today, evolved. After World War II the term advisor came into being and they began to be assigned down to battalion level.

General Westmoreland, in a 27 January 1971 memorandum for the Chief, Office Reserve Components, had this to say about the Reserve Components and the role of the active Army advisor:

I would like to inform you of what I expect of the officers and enlisted men assigned as advisors to units of the Reserve Components regarding the improvement of readiness posture.

Today we are redeploying our forces from South Vietnam and reducing the size of the Army to peacetime levels. The importance of the Reserve Components has never been greater in our planning for the national security of our country, especially as our Active Army becomes smaller. Accordingly, the preparedness of all ARNG and USAR units must be improved, in some instances to levels comparable to those expected of the Active Army. Some, but not enough, of our Reserve Component units are currently at a high state of readiness. This is where the advisor comes solidly into the picture.

. . . As draft calls are reduced and we move toward a Modern Volunteer Army, commanders at all levels must place increased emphasis on recruitment and retention of enlisted personnel, especially those who have military experience and skills. While these are the responsibilities of commanders, we must be ready to assist and advise them. The advisor's task is not an easy one. He does not command; rather, he accomplishes his objective by establishing a sound working relationship with his counterpart. If the advisor displays a high order of professionalism together with enthusiasm and imagination, his advice and assistance should be well received and be reflected in the status of training and the readiness of units.

As mentioned previously, the improvement and capabilities of our Reserve Components is a challenge for us all--Reserve and Active alike. The advisor to an Army National Guard or Army Reserve command is extremely important. How well he does his job of improving the Reserve Component units he advises is crucial to the success of the entire Reserve Component Improvement Program.²⁸

The mission of the advisor as stated in Army Regulations is to:

1. Represent and act as a spokesman for the Active Army in all Reserve Components matters under the pervue of the respective Army Commander.

2. Act for, advise, and assist the respective Army Commander in the supervision and inspection of training and readiness of Reserve Components units.

3. Render professional military advice and assistance to Reserve Components units.

4. Monitor the use of, and assist in the management of, Federal Resources in support of the Reserve Components of the Army.

5. Command other advisors, assistant advisors, and administrative personnel when so designated by competent authority.

6. In the case of the Senior Army advisor, ARNG, serve as military advisor to the state adjutant general and act as liaison officer between the CONUSA commander and State adjutant general when so designated.²⁹

Department of the Army policy guidance states:

Commanders of Reserve Components units are responsible for the administration, military discipline, health, morale, and technical and tactical proficiency of the personnel in their units including personnel of units attached thereto by competent authority. While the assistance of unit advisors should be (emphasis added) to the maximum extent possible, their presence and assistance does not relieve unit commanders of command responsibility.

The advisor acts as a link between the Active Army and the Reserve Component commander. He assists (emphasis added) in the execution of the prescribed responsibilities pertaining to the Reserve Components of the Army. The advisor's principal objective is to further the training progress, operating efficiency, and mobilization readiness of the Reserve Component unit(s) with which he is associated.³⁰

CONARC Pamphlet #135-4--Reserve Components Guidance For Active Army advisors--the "bible" for advisors, lists their specific duties and responsibilities. These duties can be identified and categorized in 5 general areas. These are:

1. Those functions performed by the ARNG for which advice and assistance are provided i.e., administration and training.
2. Those functions performed in support of the ARNG i.e., liaison with active Army units, or attendance at annual active duty training.
3. Those functions performed in the supervision of the ARNG units, i.e., advisor inspections and reports.
4. Those functions performed in support of the active Army which are unrelated to the ARNG, i.e., next of kin notification or survivors' assistance.
5. Those functions performed in support of the advisory system, i.e., advisory housekeeping.

In summary, the advisor is to supervise, inspect, and support the training of the ARNG.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ADVISOR SYSTEM

The Commanding General, CONARC, was responsible for providing Active Army advisory services to the ARNG units located in CONUS, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. The CONUSA Commanders were tasked with the execution of the advisor missions within their specific geographical areas. These services are the responsibility

of the Active Army advisor group found in each State. Each group is normally headed by an officer in the grade of Colonel who functions as the Senior Army advisor (SAA) to the State and as the Commander of all Active Army advisor personnel assigned as advisors to the ARNG.

Each Army National Guard unit was to have either an officer or an enlisted Active Army advisor. This individual is detailed for duty with this unit only with the consent of the Chief, NG Bureau and the State concerned.

The assignment of officers for duty with the National Guard could be effected only by Department of the Army. In order to be assigned to this duty, the officer must be a member of the Regular Army or a Reserve component officer on active duty and be able to complete a normal tour as prescribed in AR 614-5 prior to being reassigned or to mandatory retirement. In addition, the following criteria has been established for selection for advisory duty:

1. Colonel: Graduate of Senior Service College (desirable), credit for command of a brigade or command recommended by career branch (desirable), college graduate, combat experience (desirable).

2. Lieutenant Colonel: Graduate of Command and General Staff College (CGSC) or equivalent (desirable), (emphasis added), credit for command of a battalion or command recommended by career branch (desirable), (emphasis added), college graduate, combat experience (desirable), (emphasis added).

3. Major: Graduate of branch advanced course, graduate of CGSC or equivalent (desirable if substituted for higher grade), command of a company size unit or equivalent, record which clearly indicates officer will be command recommended upon promotion to Lieutenant Colonel.

4. Captain: Graduate of branch advanced course and credit for command of a company.

5. All officers must have at least two years of active duty remaining prior to separation to mandatory retirement.

6. Grade substitutions for advisor positions must be within one grade except that Lieutenants will not be assigned or used as advisors.

7. Officers assigned as advisors to units having special skills (e.g., ranger, airborne, aviation or explosive ordnance disposal) must possess appropriate branch and special skill qualifications.

8. Army National Guard Senior Army advisors must be acceptable to the Chief, National Guard Bureau and to the State concerned, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia, the Commanding General, CONARC, and to the commanding general of the appropriate CONUS Army. All other Army National Guard advisors must be acceptable to the Chief, National Guard Bureau and to the State concerned, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia.³¹

As of 30 June 1972, there were 733 Active Army Officers, to include one WO Aviator, present for duty with the ARNG. This

represented an 85 percent of fill and compares very favorably with the 66 percent fill in October 1965, and the 35 percent fill in September 1967. This was an increase of 115 officers over the preceding year. The breakout was as shown:³²

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>PRESENT FOR DUTY</u>	<u>% OF ADVISORS PRESENT FOR DUTY</u>
COLONELS ^{1/}	83	82	98
INFANTRY	211	162	76
ARMOR	87	77	88
FIELD ARTILLERY	145	151	104
AIR DEFENSE	23	19	82
ENGINEER	83	74	89
SIGNAL	53	45	84
QUARTERMASTER	24	18	75
TRANSPORTATION	43	40	93
MEDICAL SERVICE	21	2	9
ARMY NURSE	0	1	NA
MILITARY POLICE	34	22	64
ORDNANCE	53	38	71
MILITARY INTEL	0	1	NA
WARRANT OFFICER (AVN)	0	1	NA
TOTALS	<u>860</u> ^{2/ 3/ 4/}	<u>733</u> ^{5/ 6/}	<u>85</u>

- ^{1/} Includes 52 Senior Army Advisors
- ^{2/} Includes 10 Special Forces Qualified Officers
- ^{3/} Includes 56 Army Aviators
- ^{4/} Excludes 22 Adjutant General Corps (AGC) Officers (Admin)
- ^{5/} Includes 59 Army Aviators
- ^{6/} Excludes 27 AGC Officers and 2 WAC Officers (Admin)

How successful was this advisor system? The recently announced Army reorganization plan is the result of DA and Reserve Components recognition that the system was about 50 percent effective and therefore, was unacceptable in today's Total Concept environment.³³ The Chiefs of the Office of Reserve Components and the National Guard Bureau had felt for some time that "the present advisory system alone--no matter how high the

quality and fill of the advisors--cannot produce all of the assistance needed" by Guard units.³⁴ This plan is an effort to maximize the "doers," versus "planners" and "on-lookers."

REORGANIZATION--WHY?

Under the new plan, CONARC is eliminated. Force Command is in overall charge with the three Armies supervising National Guard training. Nine Army Readiness Assistance Regions have been established based upon the disposition and number of NG (and USAR) units. In each of these Regions a Regional Headquarters will be established whose function will be to coordinate the efforts of all Active Army elements in this region. This headquarters will consist of approximately 30 personnel to include a CG, an active Army Major General; a deputy, if at all possible a reserve officer; an administrative section; an operations section and eight to ten officers called Readiness Coordinators. These Readiness Coordinators, O-6, Cols. for the most part, will manage the training and readiness of the units in these regions. A portion of these Coordinators will be branch oriented depending upon the composition of battalion size units in this region. The remaining coordinators will manage the other units not covered by the branch oriented coordinators. All coordinators will be expected to have a portion of the responsibility for the training and readiness of their specific units. To assist these coordinators, Branch Specialist

teams, consisting of Officer and Enlisted personnel, will be established in each Region on a ratio of one branch specialist per battalion in each Region. These personnel will be experts in their fields and would provide the Readiness Coordinator the skills necessary to assist him in performing his mission.

In addition, Functional Teams will be established at region level to provide assistance in logistics, administration and other fields. These three or four man teams will be assigned on a ratio of one team for each five or six battalion equivalents in the region. ³⁵

The advisors will remain at Brigade and Division level but will be removed from the majority of battalions.

What caused the Advisor system to be judged to be operating at only 50 percent effectiveness? The ARNG's response to this question would be because the system did not require the Advisor to operate with a direct sense of responsibility for his unit's performance. Another reason offered by the ARNG would be that it failed because of a distinct lack of quality in those officers selected for this duty and, having spent two and one-half years in Office of Personnel Directorate, I concur wholeheartedly with this response. My experience has shown that the majority of these advisors have had less civil education, a lower level of military education and lower efficiency reports than their Active Army peers. In addition, too many of these officers are on their last tour of active duty. This was pointed out by General Woody, CG of Army Reserve Command, who said ". . . in my area, nine out

of the last 10 LTCs assigned as active Army advisors were in their last active assignment, where as this should be a challenge to younger, up-and-coming officers to get exposure to the Guard and Reserve picture."³⁶

The advisors view as to why the system didn't function better is quite different. They say that where there is no command, and he did not command, there is no "clout." The advisor has to rely upon the rapport he has or has not established, in order to perform his primary duty of advising. Too often these advisor personnel, especially those on their last active tour of duty, are reluctant to risk damaging this rapport and become prisoners of the situation either for personal or professional reasons. Apparently, there is a real concern among active officers concerning the professional risks involved in an Advisor assignment. LTC King, a former advisor, had this to say in the Death of the Army, concerning this duty.

. . . Being an Army advisor to the National Guard or Reserve is like being an advisor to a foreign army, except the language is the same. An Army advisor is expected to keep reservists abreast of current Army training and doctrines, maintain surveillance over government equipment, and certify the payrolls of Army Reserve units. This can be a most difficult task. . . . You start rocking the boat and these bastards (the ARNG and Reserves) will fix your career for good through political friends.³⁷

An extreme view, to be sure, but a very real part of the image that surrounds advisor duty.

Not only is the advisor handicapped by having no "clout," he really hasn't had a lot to do. Most units meet for training one weekend per month. Few "advisory" duties or real value can be accomplished by the advisors on other than those days. This fact was recognized earlier by a star-studded committee composed of both RA and NG officers at the 94th General Conference in September 1972 when they recommended a reduction in the number of officer advisors.³⁸

As stated earlier, the Reorganization Plan is designed to generate considerable interest at the top in the status of the Reserves' readiness. However, I do not believe this system will permit the active Army and its officers to operate with a direct sense of responsibility for their performances with the ARNG. Can one have responsibility without authority? Not really, and remember FORSCOM will supervise the ARNG training, not command the units conducting the training. So, we have the same basic weakness, from the Active duty officer's point of view, present in this system as we had in the old system. Only the name has changed. This reorganization plan is really nothing more than a formal, dedicated program, Army-wide, of mutual support. It has not honestly addressed the real weaknesses in the ARNG, these being: (1) the lack of fully-trained and combat experienced young officers to provide the professionalism and necessary expertise to conduct and supervise a realistic training program, and (2) the absence of sufficient time to train the trainers.

This reorganization plan is based on the assumption that education through assistance/supervision is a realistic substitute for experience. The Active Army's traumatic experience with its junior officers and NCO's in RVN from 1969 on is a good example of the price you must eventually pay for this sort of logic.

The reason the problem of providing experienced commissioned leadership has not been realistically addressed is, in my opinion, due to a fear on the part of the ARNG that something had to be done to prevent the Active Army from becoming actively involved in manning either all the key staff positions or command positions in selected ARNG units. (This proposal was under consideration when the Reserve Components drafted their recommendations that resulted in the establishment of the Readiness Assist Regions and the Readiness Coordinators.)³⁹

If the ARNG is to realistically address this question the ever present anti-Federalism dogma that had dominated the Guard thinking for years, perhaps forever, must be put to rest. If the Active Army is to meet this challenge, it must adopt an open-handed, honest relationship with the Guard. Both sides will have to make concessions of some degree if Our Army is to succeed in meeting the leadership problems posed by the Total Force Concept.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The vehicle that will require concessions from both sides is an ARNG initiated and directed "infusion" program which will permit the assignment of outstanding active duty officers to key Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) command or staff positions in Guard units. How better to make the active Army "responsible" than by making them an integral part of the system and the problem? The immediate advantages are obvious, the principal one being a concentration of effort by Our Army in providing the best deterrence for the diminishing defense dollar.

This peacetime "infusion" of active duty officers must be done in an evolutionary, not revolutionary manner, and initially only in carefully selected units with the highest priority missions. There have been only four years since 1945 in which major reorganizations of the ARNG have not taken place. These reorganizations have reduced the Guard from a peak of 5,442 units in the late 1940's to its present number of 3,058. Nineteen of the 27 post-war (2nd WW) combat divisions have gone by the board. The loss of battalion and group headquarters runs into the hundreds. Infantry battalions alone have shrunk from 378 to 119.⁴⁰ These reorganizations only compound the Guards recruiting and retention programs and disrupt the stability of the units upon which the Guard has leaned on in the past for achievement of readiness through stability.

In order to make it evolutionary, a good point of departure for this is to "infuse" initially, the Advisor personnel currently working with ARNG units selected for this program.

If these Advisors aren't the best the Army has, and as pointed out earlier, they won't be, they would remain with that unit until they can be replaced by the most competent professionals the Army can identify. A transition period, once the new officers are aboard, should be permitted in order to minimize the impact on the units involved. The ARNG should have the responsibility for determining which positions these officers are to occupy and this decision would be based on the known strength and weaknesses in each unit involved.


This infusion should be accomplished at Troop/Company, Battalion and Brigade levels. The assignment must be for a 3 year period and in the event of mobilization, these officers would remain with their ARNG unit. These officers would be rated for their performance by an ARNG officer and endorsed by an Active duty officer. The Readiness Coordinator for that region should be the Indorser. This would require him to be intimately aware of not only the officer but of his units progress and performance.

If this program is to succeed, the Active Army must put its muscle where its mouth and intentions have been in the past. It must ensure the selection and nomination process provides only the very best officers for this program. If this principal is violated or bent, the Army's intentions will continue to have a very low level of credibility, not only to the ARNG but to the Active Army and Congress.

The selection criteria must be as high or higher than any other assignment in the Army, and so must the rewards for outstanding performance. Without rewards, i.e. selection for Command and General Staff College or War College level of instruction, no program can be "sold" to today's Active Army Officer Corps. It must be made as professionally enhancing as the Command Program.

These "infusion" programs should then be carried one step further and ARNG officers should be assigned to TOE positions in Active Army units. Ideally, the active unit involved should be the unit with which the Reserve unit has been identified with formally or informally. This tour must also be for a minimum of three years and the selection process within the Guard should be as critical as the acceptance criteria used by the Guard for the infused Active Officer. This "infusion" program should also be used at Troop/Company, Battalion and Brigade levels. The ARNG personnel probably most qualified and available will be found among the Technicians and again, this would permit an evolutionary rather than revolutionary process.

Unless the Active Army Officer is made a "doer" through this infusion program rather than remain advisor/coordinator, the ARNG's efforts to reach and maintain a degree of readiness that is creditable to the rest of the world might not be successful. If the infusion of ARNG officers into Active units doesn't become a part of this program then the Our Army theme will be as much of a myth as the One Army theme.


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FOOTNOTES

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