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A STUDY OF ISRAELI DECISIONMAKING

Beverly L. McGruder

Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

29 March 1973

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
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By

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CORPS OF ENGINEERS

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USAWC RESEARCH PAPER

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AN INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH REPORT

by

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ABSTRACT

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A recommendation is made that the State Department should consider using a management information system for developing and testing hypotheses on Israeli decisionmaking. Using the Six Day War of 1967 as the scenario, 12 major Israeli decisions made prior to the war were examined by stages (time), information available, size and type decision unit, alternatives, values of the leaders, and reinforcement received for the decisions. Using a literature search, Zionism, government organization, and Israeli leaders were studied to determine how decisions are made, what influences exist, and what the values of the leaders were. Eight hypotheses were developed on future Israeli decisionmaking based on these studies. It is concluded that with the use of a management information system more hypotheses could be developed which would assist US policymakers in determining actions to take when Israel approaches a crisis position. Also, it is concluded that Zionist's aims have not been fulfilled and continued pressure will be exerted to fulfill them.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

On Friday afternoon, May 14, 1948, the fifth day of Iyar in the year 5708 on the Hebrew calendar, 37 men and women in the Municipal Museum of Tel Aviv drew up and signed a proclamation. At 4 p.m., before 400 moist-eyed persons - some in the audience had attended the first Zionist Congress in Switzerland 50 years before, some had suffered Russian pogroms, some bore scars from Nazi lashes - the Jewish National Council (the Vood Leumi) proclaimed the first independent Jewish State in 2,000 years.¹

Leaders of a relatively young nation, now 24 years old, have had to face a number of crisis decisions. One such decision, to preemptively attack some of the Arab States, was made on June 4, 1967.²

PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY

How and why are certain decisions made? A continuous stream of questions are raised throughout the world by news media personnel, academicians, elected, appointed, and hired government employees, and by the local man on the street as to why certain decisions are made. We should study the decisions after the fact to see how and why they were made.

The Middle East is today the 'soft under-belly of Europe,' not only because it possesses oil that Europe requires, but because of its strategic locations. . . . Today, Israel is serving as the front line of Western defense in the Middle East.³

Decisions made during crisis by the leaders of nations can possibly affect the well being of the citizens of the United States (US). A study to develop methodology of crisis-decisionmaking by leaders should increase the array of alternatives open to US policymakers.

This study proposes to develop a crisis decisionmaking model and hypotheses for Israel based on the 1967 decision to go to war.

ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER

To provide proper perspective for analysis, effort will be made to glean significant facts from the biographies, statements, and reported actions of those involved in the 1967 war decision. A historical study of the Israeli Government form, to include parties and the Zionist movement, will be made. This background information from a literature search and use of a bibliography from the Defense Documentation Center should provide a view of Israeli leaders' values in 1967.

An analysis of significant events prior to June 1967 will be made to determine the information available to the decision-makers. Consideration will be given to the size of the decisionmaking unit, alternatives available, the decision itself, and positive or negative reinforcement of the decision by consensus.⁴

Finally, hypotheses will be determined and conclusions developed.

CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES

1. H. D. Quigg, "Dream of Generations: The Day Statehood Was Declared," in Israel, ed. by Frances Klogbrun, p. 8.
2. Lester Velie, Countdown in the Holy Land, p. 101.
3. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, The Middle East and American Security Policy, p. 2.
4. Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision, pp. 3-49.

CHAPTER II

ZIONISM

JEWISH HISTORY

In a certain sense all Jewish history is a prelude to the formation of Israel. Jerusalem, the dream of the return to Zion is a recurring theme in Jewish sacred literature.¹

It is estimated that Abraham brought the Jews to Palestine 40 centuries ago. From this period until first and second centuries A.D., Jewish Kingdoms rose and fell, exiles to other kingdoms took place, and rulers of Palestine, other than the Jewish, were Babylonians, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, and Romans. Romans lowered the final curtain on the Jewish Kingdom by destroying the Temple in Jerusalem in A.D. 70, defeating Kokhba in A.D. 135 and subsequent banishment of Jews from Jerusalem and other parts of Palestine. The majority of Jews went into exile.²

BIRTH OF POLITICAL ZIONISM

Both Jews and Christians have harbored ideas of Zionism for centuries. To Christians, it meant a final return of Jews to Palestine. To Jews, it was their religious Judaism which attached itself to ancient kingdoms of Hebrews in Palestine. They lament in rituals and readings on returning.³

Small migrations of Jewish immigrants from Europe and Asia took place over the centuries.⁴ It was the assassination of

Tsar Alexander II of Russia in 1881 that provided a great exodus of Jews because of pogroms which followed. Some of these immigrants founded a colony near Jaffa. The following year a movement began in Russia called Lovers of Zion, and one of their main premises was settlement in Palestine. Political Zionism was given birth.⁵

THEODOR HERZL

Theodor Herzl, a Hungarian Jew born in 1860, was educated in the legal profession, but left this field to become a writer and later, newspaper correspondent. Herzl became a truly assimilated European Jew, although seeds had been planted in early life which would grow to assist him in nurturing political Zionism.⁶

At age 32, Herzl was appointed correspondent for a Viennese newspaper with station in Paris. He found a rising tide of anti-Semitism in France which reached its peak when Jewish Captain Alfred Dreyfus was drummed out of the French Army in 1894. Reporting this story, Herzl became so disillusioned he decided the Jewish question had to be answered. Four years later he published his Jewish State.⁷

JEWISH STATE

The essence of Herzl's paper was assimilation would not protect Jews from anti-Semitism, and the solution to the Jewish question was for the Jews to form their own nation-state. He proposed

forming the Society of Jews to handle all matters in establishing the state, other than property rights, and handling those rights would be a Jewish Company. The location, either Palestine or other area, was dependent on what the Society was given and what Jewish consensus favored. Political Zionism received its first true nurture.⁸

ZIONIST POLICY

The Zionist movement was launched by Herzl at a congress held in Basle, Switzerland in 1897. The World Zionist Organization was born. Two committees were organized. An Actions Committee, which was to administer pressing issues while the Congress of the organization was adjourned; and an Inner Actions Committee, which was to act as the executive arm to provide leadership and guide policy.⁹

The Basle Congress terminated with the formulation of an official program. The ultimate goal was outlined in these words: 'The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law.' The steps to be taken in contemplation of the fulfillment of this aim were: (1) the promotion of Jewish colonization of Palestine, (2) the establishment of an organization to bind world Jewry by means of institutions in each country containing Jews, (3) the strengthening of Jewish national sentiment, and (4) the acquisition of government consent to the attainment of the aim of Zionism.¹⁰

Although partial fruition would not come for 51 more years, basic policy was agreed on among members of this congress.

POLICY INTO ACTION

Herzl spent 7 years of his life, until death, in trying to obtain point 4 of the Zionist policy. He proposed a chartered land company thesis under German protection to Kaiser Wilhelm II. The Kaiser vetoed this on the basis Great Britain, France, and Russia would disdain Germany meddling in Ottoman sovereignty. His next proposal was to the Sultan of Turkey. In return for Jewish financial assistance to the Ottoman Empire, Jews would be authorized to settle in Palestine. The Sultan refused to accept mass Jewish immigration and disapproved this plan. Herzl's last efforts were concentrated on the British Government. Efforts were to be continued by Herzl's successor, Chaim Weizmann.¹¹

THE BALFOUR DECLARATION

Dr. Chaim Weizmann, later President, was instrumental in influencing Great Britain to support the idea of a homeland for Jews. His influence with Prime Minister Lloyd George and Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour caused the British Government during World War I to issue the Balfour Resolution.¹²

His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.¹³

The Zionist now had a patron. Great Britain had an ally. She desired support in World War I from millions of overseas Jews and foresaw an ally next door to the Suez Canal. This Jewish homeland, Palestine, was envisioned as 44,000 square miles.¹⁴

THE MANDATE

By the end of 1918, Zionist efforts had succeeded in precipitating official acceptance of the Balfour Declaration in France, Italy, the United States and Japan. Then, in January 1919, the Peace Conference formally convened in Paris. On the 27th of the following month a Zionist delegation, representing the Zionist Organization, presented the Zionist case before the Supreme Council.¹⁵

The Peace Conference passed provisions in Article 22 to establish mandates in some areas that belonged to the Turkish Empire. The Palestinean Mandate was assigned to Great Britain. All the desires of the Zionist were not included in the mandate; however, major proposals were underwritten. This achievement followed Weizmann's prophetic counsel to the English Zionist Federation in 1917, that Zionism would be achieved in stages rather than in one operation.¹⁶

The text of the draft mandate presented to the League recognized historical Jewish connection with the area, the Balfour Declaration, local Jewish self-governing organizations to include the establishment of a Jewish Agency and immigration. The Churchill White Paper of 1922, issued in the face of Arab opposition to Zionism, restricted Jewish immigration to Palestine based on

economic absorption. It eliminated Trans-jordan from Palestine, stated Zionist representations would not have any special position or govern Palestine, and it was not British intent to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. This White Paper opened the door to final approval of the mandate for Palestine by the League in 1922.¹⁷

Zionist had won a battle, although not the war.

END OF THE MANDATE

During the inter-war period, the Mandate for Palestine had served the interest of the Zionists by permitting a gradual build-up of the Jewish community in Palestine, a process which would have resulted in the eventual establishment of a Jewish majority in the country, had it not been for the MacDonald White Paper. Consequently, the White Paper threw into question the policy of gradualism championed by Weizmann. The Mandate now had not only ceased to be of service to Zionism, but even threatened to thwart the fulfillment of one of Zionism's primary aims - the creation of a Jewish majority in Palestine through immigration.¹⁸

Since the British Administration was obstructing the aims of Zionism, great efforts were expended to end the Mandate. This was especially true after World War II when hundreds of thousands of Jews, many displaced, tried to reach Palestine. Finally, because of outright attacks on the Administration and the Arabs by the Haganah (Military Self-defense Organization) and two underground military bodies, the National Military Organization (Irgun) and the Fighters for Israel's Freedom, plus Arab attacks on Jewish

settlements, the British were forced to bring the subject of the Mandate before the United Nations (UN). A UN special committee recommended partitioning Palestine into independent Jewish and Arab States. This recommendation was approved on November 29, 1947, by the UN General Assembly.¹⁹

The decision was in keeping with the trend of the day. Like the other awakening peoples of Asia and Africa, the Yishur (community) aspired to found a State and a society of free, self-supporting and peace-loving citizens, unhampered by colonial domination, living in harmony and friendship with its Arab neighbors. So the Jewish Agency and the Yishur, though critical of yet another amputation upon the Jewish National Home and apprehensive of a patchwork pattern of borders that invited instability and friction, accepted the UN partition plan as a compromise, and pledged cooperation in carrying it into effect.²⁰

ZIONISM TODAY

The independent Jewish State of Israel was proclaimed on May 14, 1948.²¹ Herzl's basic goals stated by the First Zionist Congress are still not completely achieved, therefore, they remain today the desires of political Zionism. The larger portion of the world's Jewish population still remains outside Israel. Ingathering of Jews, as championed by Ben-Gurion, is still alive. Likewise, the borders of Israel are not those proclaimed by the Zionist as the boundaries of the Land of Israel. Before the League of Nations, in 1919, these boundaries were stated as including Palestine, Trans-jordan, and perhaps Mount Hermon and southern

Lebanon. (See the map at Appendix 1.) The Zionist have adopted almost any means for the accomplishment of their aims.²²

In fact, General Peled, who was on the General Staff during the Six Day War, claims Government aims in that war were camouflaged and were really to get the people to accept annexation of territories.²³ However, there is a question about adding 600,000 Arabs to Israel which could crush the Jewish character of the State.²⁴

CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

1. Hugh H. Smythe and Sandra Weintraub, "Intergroup Relations in Israel," in People and Politics in the Middle East, ed. by Michael Curtis, p. 18.
2. Irving Heymont, The Israel Defense Forces, pp. 2-3.
3. Alan R. Taylor, Prelude to Israel, p. 1.
4. Smythe, p. 18.
5. Taylor, p. 2.
6. Arthur Hertzberg, "Theodor Herzl," in The Zionist Idea, ed. by Arthur Hertzberg, p. 201.
7. Ibid., pp. 202-204.
8. Theodor Herzl, "The Jewish State," in The Zionist Idea, ed. by Arthur Hertzberg, pp. 204-226.
9. Taylor, pp. 4-6.
10. Ibid., p. 5.
11. Ibid., pp. 6-9.
12. Norman Bentwich, Israel, pp. 28-29.
13. Maurice Samuel, Light on Israel, p. 42.
14. Ibid., pp. 42-52.
15. Taylor, p. 26.
16. Ibid., pp. 27-29.
17. Ibid., pp. 29-38.
18. Ibid., pp. 55-56.
19. Misha Louvish, Facts About Israel 1972, pp. 15-19.
20. Ibid., p. 19.

21. H. D. Quigg, "Dream of Generations: The Day Statehood Was Declared," in Israel, ed. by Francis Klagsbrun, p. 8.

22. Taylor, pp. 106, 112-113.

23. "Israeli Motivations in 1967 War," Manchester Guardian Weekly, June 17, 1972, p. 17.

24. "Excerpts From Speech by Premier Meir," New York Times, March 17, 1971, p. 19.

CHAPTER III

GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION

PRECEDENTS

There is a Jewish Community in almost every country in the world . As members of these diverse communities came together, they brought with them diverse political opinions and values. Jews from Palestine, who have lived under many cultures, brought the traits of those cultures to their new government.

The European founders of the Zionist movement were fully committed to a parliamentary form of organization. As an amalgam of Jews from a score or more of countries, the movement developed in a number of political directions represented by a great many political parties. . . . At the outset, the leaders of the Zionist organization belonged to the party of General Zionism, which continued to supply the major Zionist leader for many years. Other political parties began to emerge as early as 1901. Orthodox Jews formed the rightist Mizrahi Party in 1902, and between 1903 and 1906 the socialist Zionists established the Poale Zion (Workers of Zion) Party, and counterparts of the left-wing groups were established in colonies in Palestine. When the first major attempt was made to organize the Palestine Jewish Community after World War I, the various Zionist parties of the left, center, and right were already well established.¹

Precedent was set for the over 20 political parties seen in later developments as contending for seats in the new State of Israel's Parliament.

BIBLICAL LAW

Law established in the Bible has been preserved by some Jewish villages throughout the years of Jewish dispersion. This law is the basis for Jewish religious law, the Torah, as practiced in Israel today and governs personal relations of the Israeli Jew.²

TURKISH RULE

The Ottoman Empire controlled Palestine for four centuries until the Allies defeated the Turks in the latter part of World War I. The Turks allowed Palestine to fall into ruin. Land was barren, neglected, and resources had been purged. Communications were almost nonexistent, public health and facilities were deplorable, and the only educational facilities were maintained by the Jewish population on a religious basis. Local communities were allowed to pursue their own cultures and become almost self-governing with the exception of enforced imperial orders. They were not allowed representation in the Turkish Parliament. Land tenure depended more on tradition than records. When the British armies arrived, local Turkish officials fled and carried with them the few government records which had been kept.³

MANDATORY GOVERNMENT

When the British Mandatory Administration was installed on July 1, 1920, it found a country without a government, lacking elementary public

security, ridden by poverty and disease, and handicapped by a crippled economy, primitive communications, and undeveloped social services. Consequently, the Mandatory conceived its task primarily in terms of restoring order, maintaining public security, administering justice, and improving communications. Given the wide gap between the Jewish and Arab levels of development, Mandatory activities were focused primarily on Arab requirements, and administrative practices were keyed to Arab standards.⁴

Since the British Administration was focusing its attention on the Arabs, the Zionist Organization was left to concentrate on the Jews. The Mandate recognized the World Zionist Organization as the proper Jewish Agency to advise and cooperate with the British in fulfilling the stipulations of the Mandate as included in the Balfour Declaration. Its President, also, became the President of the Jewish Agency. The Mandate further allowed the Palestinian Jews to form the Knesset Israel, which was an Elected Assembly, a National Council, and Rabbinical Council and Offices.⁵

Candidates to the Assembly were elected by persons on the Knesset Israel register. Votes were cast for party lists that had been submitted by the party secretariats. Candidates were then chosen from this list by priority based on the proportion of the vote each party obtained for its list. This Elected Assembly then elected the members of the National Council, who chose their own Executive. Actual administration of the Mandate area was under the control of this National Council Executive, which with the Jewish Agency's Executive and the World Zionist Organization Executive performed many functions of government.⁶ It was the

Agency that involved itself in immigration, land acquisition, and industrial development while the National Council provided the peoples' needs in the fields of education, social, and health.⁷

With jurisdiction over immigration, settlement and economic development, the Jewish Agency in time became more important than the National Council. By 1948 it had become virtually a provisional government. Thus, when the British withdrew, dismantling the machinery of government as they went, the Arabs were unprepared for independent self-government, whereas the Jews could reorganize their institutions into a modern bureaucratic state.⁸

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

As early as October 1947, the National Council and the Jewish Agency Executive, realizing the British would leave Palestine, formed a Joint Emergency Committee to prepare for statehood and to continue governmental services.⁹ From this committee evolved a Provisional Council of State. Members were from the National Council, Jewish Agency Executive, and from either communities or political parties not represented in the aforementioned groups. This Council of State was the legislative body until elections were held. It elected 13 of its members to form the Provisional Government (Cabinet). The Cabinet formed over 40 departments from the Mandate Government, Jewish Agency, and National Council Executive into 17 ministries. This Provisional Government proclaimed the new State of Israel in accordance with the UN Resolution.¹⁰

The Provisional Government, which lasted until March 10, 1949, commanded national unity and was successful in repelling Arab attacks. The Provisional Council passed the Constituent Assembly Elections Ordinance on November 18, 1948. This ordinance, following precedent of the old Mandate quasi-government, provided for candidates to be nominated by political parties, voters voting for party lists, and candidates selected by proportional vote. The Assembly would have 120 members.¹¹

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The day of elections was festive for the Israelis. It was their day to lay the cornerstone of the nation--to choose the men to write the constitution. Twenty-one parties published lists containing 1,288 candidates for 120 Parliament seats. Twelve of the parties won seats. The MAPAI Party polled almost the exact percentage of this vote as they had at the 1946 Zionist Congress held prior to declaration of the state.¹²

The Assembly first convened on February 14, 1949. It changed its name to Knesset, meaning Assembly-Parliament, rather than Constituent Assembly. Therefore, politically, it became the First Knesset and never completed its main task of writing a constitution. Politics between Orthodox groups and secular groups caused this decision. Orthodox groups demanded incorporation of traditional Torah law in any proposed constitution. Compromise was made by adopting a resolution to construct a constitution article by

article, each article would be in itself a fundamental law. This is the method by which eventually a constitution will be finalized.¹³

PARLIAMENT

The Israel Parliament which will be referred to in future comments as Knesset, is elected by universal suffrage on a party list system of proportional representation. It is a unicameral, multiparty body. This body legislates, polices the Government and its administration, and exercises a strong influence on domestic and foreign affairs. No one person, organization, cabinet, president, or the Supreme Court can veto or nullify an act of the Knesset unless a future Knesset should change it by a two-thirds majority vote.¹⁴

A large portion of Knesset business is conducted by permanent committees. Foreign affairs and defense are handled by the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee which has 15 members. Committees hold their meetings behind closed doors; however, reports are given to the press.¹⁵

PRESIDENT

David Ben-Gurion, along with popular support, desired that Israel have a weak president. This was a great deal in part based on the Jewish knowledge of dictators. Dr. Chaim Weizmann had hoped for a strong president along the lines the US represented. It was Ben-Gurion who won out. The Knesset elects the president.

His duties are limited to charging his designee, as Prime Minister-elect, with forming a government. This is done after consulting the leaders of the political parties in the Knesset. Further, he receives the resignation of a government, signs official documents, acts as ceremonial head of government, and appoints certain government officials such as justices and diplomats, but only if they are recommended by the government or Knesset.¹⁶

GOVERNMENT (CABINET)

The Prime Minister-elect designee, who is actually the leader of the party with the most seats in the Knesset, chooses his ministers, distributes portfolios, and presents his cabinet for a Knesset vote of confidence. Choosing of ministers would constitute a minimum problem for the Prime Minister-elect if his party held a majority of the seats; however, since Israel became a State, no such condition has existed. He has to form a coalition cabinet, with portfolios going to ministers from other parties, based on hard-bargained agreements.¹⁷

Due to these coalition cabinets, the Prime Minister is hindered in carrying out his coalition program. There is no legal limit on the number of ministry portfolios and the Prime Minister may divide existing functions of ministries to provide enough portfolios for the number of ministers agreed on by the coalition. However, the Knesset must approve the final cabinet.¹⁸

Work of the cabinet, especially legislative, is performed by
cabinet committees.¹⁹

A cabinet resignation is compulsory in only two cases. First, the resignation of the Prime Minister and, second, a vote of no confidence by the Knesset.²⁰

THE GENERAL FEDERATION OF LABOR

The General Federation of Labor (Histadrut); although not a part of the government, holds a place in Israeli society unparalleled by labor organizations in other countries. Through its organizations, it represents 90 percent of all the country's wage-earners. In addition to its directly owned and controlled cooperatives and businesses, it also enters into ventures with private capital.²¹

The Histadrut provides normal trade union activities, social services, cultural services, education, two daily newspapers, and economic enterprises.²²

The Histadrut Convention follows the Zionist Organization patterns by electing a General Council and an Executive Council which in turn elects the Executive Bureau. Almost all political parties, with the exception of the religious ones, are represented at the Convention.²³

POLITICAL PARTIES

In investigating the positions political parties hold in the values and views of Israelis as expressed by their voting preferences,

eight parties emerged from the gallery of more than 20. These eight units formed the National Unity Cabinet preceeding the Six Day War.

The Jewish parties in Palestine resembled social movements in that their precepts focused on colonization and pioneering. They promoted agricultural settlements, formed cooperatives, and started businesses. Formal party membership was and is most important to benefit from the parties' activities. This results in few voter shifts at election time. Parties exist from the far left to the far right.²⁴

Certain basic principles are common to the platforms of all the parties: The safeguarding of Israel's security and sovereignty by strengthening her armed forces, coupled with constant efforts to achieve peace with her neighbors; the maintenance of the cease-fire lines agreed to by Egypt, Jordan and Syria in June 1967 until the conclusion of peace treaties specifying secure and recognized borders, with free navigation in international waterways; the unity of Jerusalem as Israel's eternal capital; close ties with the Jewish people the world over and the Zionist Movement; and an open door for all Jews able and willing to make their homes in Israel.²⁵

The party which has been the catalyst for forming cabinets has been MAPAI. It is a Socialist labor party which was formed by merger of non-Marxist and Orthodox Marxist groups representing labor Zionist. It has the tradition as the party which led Zionism to statehood.²⁶ MAPAI has favored selling abandoned Arab land to private citizens. It has endeavored to steer clear of entanglements with either the West or East due to its democratic, non-Marxist,

Socialist labor party stance; although its orientation has been to the US for economic assistance. The majority of the party's leaders are past middle age and come from Eastern Europe.²⁷

The Achdut Ha' Avodah Party (Unity of Labor) broke away from MAPAI in 1948, joined with other groups to form the MAPAM Party, and then in 1954, split from MAPAM to stand as an individual party. Its following is composed largely of urban workers and it follows that one platform is to reduce imports and increase exports. The Party favors nonidentification with either the East or West. After the 1956 war, it demanded that the armed forces remain in the Sinai Peninsula and, if attacked, for them to retaliate by crossing the borders. This Party is anti-Russian because of USSR Jewish policies.²⁸ One plank calls for ingathering of the Jews to a Socialist Jewish State in the whole territory of formerly mandated Palestine by peaceful means.²⁹

RAFI, the Israeli Labour List, split from MAPAI in 1965 under the leadership of Ben-Gurion and Dayan. Its platform calls for self-reliance in matters of national security, peace with neighbors from a position of strength, and electoral reform towards a constituency system.³⁰

The Ierut-Liberal Block consists of the HERUT (Freedom) Party, which arose from a former terrorist organization (Urgum) and the Liberal Party. The HERUT Party is linked with activism or a war of expansion.³¹ Its platform, as an opposition party, is territorial integrity of the Land of Israel within historical

limits. The Liberal Party desires a written constitution, a liberal welfare state, electoral reform, and removing politics from the civil service.³²

The Independent Liberals has as part of its platform the desires of no annexation of territories and transfer of Arab refugees from the Gaza Strip to Judaea, Samaria, and Sinai.³³

A coalition of religious parties form the National Religious Block calling for peace treaties based on the Jewish peoples historical and religious right to the Land of Israel, only laws based on the Torah, and Jewish traditional religious education.³⁴

The last political party investigated was MAPAM (United Workers' Party). It advocates revolutionary socialism based on collective farming settlements. Although it urges a neutralist position and equal rights for the Arabs, it supports a ready defense force, recommends retaliation for border incidents, and supported the invasion of the Suez and Sinai in 1956.³⁵

As an example of Israelis interest in politics, 82 percent of the eligible electorate voted in the 1969 election.³⁶

CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES

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5. Emanuel Rackman, Israel's Emerging Constitution, pp. 3-6.
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14. Oscar Kraines, Government and Politics in Israel, pp. 33-34.
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20. Ibid., p. 124.
21. "The General Federation of Labour in Israel," The Israel Yearbook 1967, ed. by L. Berger, pp. 266-267.
22. Misha Louvish, Facts About Israel 1977, pp. 130-131.

23. Ibic.
24. Bernstein, pp. 54-56.
25. Louvish, p. 70.
26. Bernstein, pp. 57-63.
27. Kraines, pp. 65-68.
28. Ibid., pp. 69-72.
29. Arnold Hadwin, Politics in Israel, p. 14.
30. Edward A. Bayne, "Palaestina Infelix, Part III, Political Reverberations in Zion," American Universities Field Staff, November 1968, pp. 3-4.
31. Hadwin, p. 13.
32. Bayne, p. 3.
33. Louvish, p. 71.
34. Ibid.
35. Kraines, pp. 68-71.
36. Louvish, p. 67.

CHAPTER IV

ISRAELI LEADERS

BACKGROUND

In 1964, when David Ben-Gurion decided to retire, he left behind him a corps of lieutenants from MAPAI to run the government. This group, called the Establishment by many authors, is a nucleus of 100 plus men and women who had assisted Ben-Gurion in building, running, and defending the State of Israel. The mantle of leadership was passed to Levi Eshkol, who was not the flamboyant leader that Ben-Gurion was and who professed a more sensitive attitude to sociological problems and a tact of gradualism in achieving national goals.¹

Levi Eshkol established a National Unity Government in June 1967 for reasons which will be discussed in future chapters. The Cabinet was as follows:

| | |
|-----------------------|------------------|
| Premier | Levi Eshkol |
| Defense | Moshe Dayan |
| Foreign Affairs | Abba Eban |
| Finance | Pinhas Sapir |
| Commerce and Industry | Zev Sharef |
| Education | Zalman Aranne |
| Agriculture | Chaim Gavati |
| Justice | Yacov Shapira |
| Police | Bethor Shitreet |
| Posts | Eliahu Sasson |
| Interior | Moshe H. Shapira |
| Health | Israel Barzilai |
| Religious Affairs | Zerak Warhaftig |
| Social Welfare | Yosef Burg |
| Transport | Moshe Carmel |
| Labor | Yigal Allen |
| Information | Israel Galili |

| | |
|-----------------------|------------------|
| Development & Tourism | Moshe Kol |
| Housing | Mordekhai Bentov |
| Without Portfolio | Menachem Begin |
| Without Portfolio | Yosef Saphir |

These men would be responsible for the Six Day War decision. In addition, Eshkol, at the outbreak of the war, appointed an advisory cabinet of himself, Moshe Dayan, Yigal Yadin, Yigal Allon, and Abba Eban.³ Appendix 2 contains biographical sketches on each of them.

AVERAGE DECISIONMAKER⁴

The average decisionmaker in the 1967 Six Day War decision was 60.7 years old. One was below 50 years of age and he was 49. Ages ranged between 49 and 78.

Five of the decisionmakers had been born in Palestine prior to creation of the State of Israel. Seven were from Poland, six from Russia, and one each from Germany, Rumania, Syria, and Africa. All of them had arrived in Palestine prior to Israel's independence. Only three had arrived prior to the Mandate; however, 50 percent were there by 1925.

The Cabinet was dominated by nine members from MAPAI. Three each were from the HERUT Liberal Block, Acdut Ha' Avoda, and the National Religious Parties. RAFI had one representative and MAPAM had two.

The majority of the Cabinet had been, or were, associated with the Histadrut and over one-half were delegates to Zionist Congresses and/or worked with the Jewish Agency.

Over one-half of the decisionmakers had military experience and 10 had served with either Haganah or Irgum. The career fields for three of them had been purely military and for nine, politician.

Only two of these cabinet members had not served in the Knesset; however, all of them had been in the employ of the Israeli Government and 18 had held ministries. During the 1956 war, 15 of them were either ministers or held high positions in the Army.

It can be said that the average decisionmaker was approximately 60 years old, had attended college, came from an East European background, came to Israel prior to independence, was a Zionist, was a member of a Socialist-Marxist party, was active in a labor organization, had military experience against the British and the Arabs, was suspicious of Arabs, had been or was a member of the Knesset, and had held a ministry during the 1956 war. The majority were strong Zionist and supported Zionist aims.

CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

1. Edward A. Bayne, "Israel's Decision Makers," American Universities Field Staff, June 1967, p. 8.
2. David Ben-Gurion, Israel: A Personal History, pp. 730, 738, 769.
3. Lester Velie, Countdown in the Holy Land, p. 10.
4. See Appendix 2.

CHAPTER V

THE STAGE

BACKGROUND

It can easily be stated that when Herzl published his treatise, The Jewish State, the conflict between Jews and Arabs was destined to begin. The majority of the information in this chapter will be focused on the period after mid-1966.

IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION

Actions and reactions of nations are determined by their national leaders' decisions based on information available to them. This information has two forms. First, the intrinsic values of the leaders and, second, the widespread information furnished by public opinion, newspapers, government discussions, and intelligence. Some of the vital items of information available to Israel's leaders prior to the Six Day War will be stated in this chapter. Some items they considered will never be known to outsiders due to classification and, also, because they were not recorded.

Mrs. Meir has given an example of some intrinsic values regarding Israeli considerations concerning wars. If other countries lose a war, they become occupied and eventually the conquerors move out. Based on lost wars in Biblical times, pogroms, and the holocaust, Jews believe they have nowhere else to go and if a war was lost it would be genocide.¹

IMPORTANT INFORMATION

At the beginning of 1964, the Israel's Army Chief of Staff briefed the Cabinet on Israel's contingency plans for fighting and winning the next Arab war according to Lester Velie, a Reader's Digest roving editor and political author. Since the armed forces were, in the majority, reservists, and the economy comes to a halt when they are mobilized, time was an ultimate constraint. War would have to be planned so that it could be won in 4 days. The concept was to hit the enemy at the precise time he is ready to hit you. To do this, an intelligence organization has to be developed that knew enemy intentions as well as the enemy did.²

The Israeli Cabinet remembered the three main objectives for fighting the war in 1956 had been to provide free shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba, stop Palestine guerrilla attacks, and neutralize the threat of attack by Egypt and Syria.

A new Syrian Government came to power in early 1966, which supported the guerrillas (Palestine Liberation Army). During October 1966, Israel appealed to the UN Security Council to assist in stopping guerrilla attacks from Syria. During this month, two serious attacks had taken place killing some Israelis. A mild resolution by the UN was vetoed by the Soviets.⁴ This new Syrian Government signed a military pact with Egypt in November.⁵

On November 13, Israel attacked the village of Es Samu in Jordan in keeping with its long established practice of retaliation

for guerrilla attacks. The UN censured Israel for this attack where 18 Jordanians were killed and 54 wounded.⁶

On April 7, 1967, the settlements of Haan, Ein Gev, and Gadot were shelled by Syrian artillery. Israeli forces returned machine gun fire and silenced the Syrian artillery. Approximately 1 hour later, the Syrians attacked with tanks. After several hours, Israeli and Syrian planes were brought into battle resulting in six Syrian planes being shot down.⁷

In early May, the Soviets passed information to Egypt that Israel was preparing to invade Syria. The Soviet Ambassador to Israel faced Eshkol with this allegation. Eshkol denied this and invited the Ambassador to survey the borders with him to prove no buildup was taking place. The Ambassador refused.⁸

The UN Secretary, on May 11, stated that guerrilla attacks against Israel from Syrian and Lebanese border areas had increased. In fact, these raids which had continued over the years were building up through the months of October through May. This same day, Eshkol, in a speech, stated that Israel was getting impatient with the attacks and might revert to April 7 type measures.⁹

On May 15, Nasser marched troops through Cairo to Sinai. The next day Israel mounted a limited mobilization which was later approved by the Cabinet. Egypt proclaimed a state of emergency.¹⁰

Events were moving at a most rapid rate. The Egyptians had requested the UN Security Forces be withdrawn from the Sinai and the Gaza Strip. On May 18, 1967, the Israeli representative to the

UN met with the UN Secretary-General and requested the security forces not be withdrawn and stated that Israel should have a voice in the matter. The representative stated that Israel would not accept security forces on her side of the border. On May 19, UN Security Forces moved out of Sinai and the Gaza Strip according to Nasser's request.¹¹ On May 22, Nasser closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli ships and to other ships carrying strategic materials to Israel. On May 26, he blockaded the Straits of Tiran.¹²

On May 23, Israel sent Abba Eban to Paris, London, and Washington to seek support for peace and in lifting the blockade. Israel was actually more worried about buildup of forces in Sinai, by now, than the Straits. He returned to Israel on May 26, virtually empty-handed. President Johnson would try to arouse international support for reopening the Straits. On May 27, the Cabinet voted whether or not to go to war. The return on the vote was nine to nine.¹³ Egyptian forces in the Sinai were now estimated at 80,000.¹⁴

Premier Eshkol, in a speech before the Knesset, stated that any interference with Israeli shipping in the Gulf and in the Straits would be a violation of international law and would constitute an act of aggression. On this same day, May 23, President Johnson, in Washington, stated that such a blockade would be illegal under international law.¹⁵

On May 28, due to Cabinet pressure and public opinion, Eshkol made a speech to the people of Israel.

Ordinarily Eshkol's speeches were taped; any errors or slips of the tongue could be wiped out. But this speech was live. The people who had known him in the early days as a shrewd negotiator . . . were shocked. He kept questioning the speech as he read it. . . . His voice was querulous. He hesitated; he fluffed words. . . . The speech was a turning point . . . but for the populace the speech was a disaster. The clamor to bring back Dayan grew.¹⁶

The circle around Israel closed on May 30 when King Hussein of Jordan signed a mutual defense pact with Egypt. Mobilization was costing Israel an estimated \$15 to \$20 million per day and each day Israel waited to go to war would cost an estimated 200 military deaths.¹⁷

In a speech addressed on June 1 to troops departing for the 'front lines' in Jordan, President Arif of Iraq declared; 'It was treason and politics that brought about the creation of Israel. Brethren and sons, this is the day of the battle to revenge your martyred brethren who fell in 1948. It is the day to wash away the stigma. We shall, God willing, meet in Tel Aviv and Haifa.'¹⁸

Statements like this, and there were many, could only lead the Israelis to see another holocaust. Something the Israelis could not understand was how the Jews had stood sheepishly in lines marching to the gas chambers. For the world not to have prevented this meant that Israelis had to stand up and fight for themselves in any crunch.¹⁹

On this same day, June 1, Moshe Dayan was brought into the Israeli Cabinet as Minister of Defense.

Although the decision to add Dayan, Begin, and Saphir to the Cabinet was made on June 2, 1967, discussions in the Knesset and

between ministers and party leaders had been going on since May 22, 1967. Certain ministers threatened to bring the Cabinet down by resigning. Public opinion was losing confidence in Eshkol and vociferously calling for action. Newspapers were clamoring for a Unity Cabinet. Eshkol had had a running fight with Ben-Gurion and Dayan since they broke from MAPAI and formed RAFI. Many solutions to the Unity Cabinet were advanced by Eshkol and the leaders of MAPAI; however, Eshkol was forced to either give up the Minister of Defense position to Dayan and add Begin and Saphir to the Cabinet or see his Cabinet fall.²⁰

Three days later, two Egyptian commando battalions and an Iraqi division were sent to Jordan.²¹

The new Israeli Unity Cabinet in a formal resolution adopted on June 4, 1967, stated that military action, at a time determined by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, would be taken to liberate Israel from the existing ring of aggression.²² The Cabinet made its decision with its borders ringed with Arab troops and 14 Arab nations with 110 million people unified against Israel.²³ The Six Day War began on June 5, 1967.

Prime Minister Eshkol appointed a five-man advisory cabinet to conduct the war at the outbreak of hostilities including himself, Dayan, Allon, Yadin, and Eban. This heavily weighted military experienced unit was the only ad hoc type organization utilized for decisionmaking during the Six Day War decisions.²⁴

CHAPTER V

FOOTNOTES

1. Lester Velie, Countdown in the Holy Land, pp. 119-121.
2. Ibid.
3. Moshe Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign, p. 203.
4. Charles W. Yost, "The Arab-Israeli War, How it Began," Foreign Affairs, January 1966, pp. 304-305.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. David Ben-Gurion, Israel: A Personal History, p. 756.
8. Ruth Gruber, Israel on the Seventh Day, p. 205.
9. Foreign Affairs, pp. 306-307, 318-319.
10. Gruber, pp. 45, 205.
11. Foreign Affairs, pp. 312-313.
12. Gruber, p. 47.
13. Velie, p. 100.
14. Gruber, p. 206.
15. Foreign Affairs, p. 316.
16. Gruber, pp. 48-49.
17. "A Step-by-Step Account of Moves in Israel Before War With Arabs," New York Times, 10 July 1967, p. 14.
18. Foreign Affairs, p. 317.
19. Moshe Brilliant, Portrait of Israel, pp. 307-308.
20. Ben-Gurion, pp. 758-769.
21. Gruber, p. 205.
22. "Decision on 1967 War Disclosed by Israelis," Washington Post, 5 June 1972, p. A23.

23. "The World," Time, June 9, 1967, p. 38.
24. Velie, pp. 3, 10-11.

CHAPTER VI

DECISIONMAKING

BACKGROUND

The Cabinet, the Ministerial Security Committee, and the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Security Committee are all interested in military decisions; however, it is at the Cabinet level that strategic level decisions are rendered.¹

For the above reason, unless specifically documented, the author has chosen the entire cabinet as the decisionmaking unit.

DECISION ANALYSIS

Twelve major decisions concerning the Six Day War made by Prime Minister Eshkol and his cabinets are depicted on Table 1. They were selected from the major items of information from Chapter V. These decisions are analyzed in a model by stages, who made the decision, information available, possible intuitive alternatives, decisionmakers' values, actual decisions made, and any positive or negative reinforcement brought about by the decision.

Alternatives were selected based on the decision as being one and others were selected based on analysis of possible alternatives by the author.

The size of the decisionmaking unit varied from one individual to a cabinet of 21. Seven of the decisions were made by the full cabinets. Of the remaining five, one was later approved by the

total cabinet and two were forced on Eshkol by the cabinet. The two decisions forced on Eshkol by the Cabinet were his key May 28 speech and to enlarge the Cabinet on June 1.

All of the decisions, with the exception of the first, meets Charles F. Hermann's definition of a crisis decision.

More specifically, it has suggested the values of defining crisis as a situation that threatens high priority goals of the decisionmaking unit, restricts the amount of time in which a response can be made, and is unanticipated by the members of the decisional unit.²

Each decision is strongly influenced by Zionist aims, bureaucracy, values, and the Jewish syndrome of there is no other place to go.

TABLE I

DECISIONS

| STAGE | DECISION UNIT | INFORMATION | ALTERNATIVES | VALUES | DECISION | REINFORCEMENT |
|-----------------------|--|--|---|---|--|-------------------------------|
| 1. Early 1964 | Eshkol Eban Allon Aranne Burg Dayan Warhaftig Sapir Shitreet M. Shapira Sasson | 1. Army Chief of Staff briefing on Contingency Plan for next war. 2. Continued guerrilla attacks. 3. War required mobilization which stifled the economy. 4. Time is ultimate constraint. 5. Intelligence. | 1. No plan. 2. Short war plan. 3. Long war plan. | 1. Zionist. 2. Majority MAPAI. 3. Military experience. 4. Strong military. 5. Use of reprisal attack. 6. See Chapters II, III, IV, & Appendix 2. | I a. Approved short war plan. b. Hit enemy at precise time he was ready to hit Israel. | 1. Agreement by cabinet. |
| 2. October 1966 | Sharef Cavati Y. Shapira Barzilai Carmel Galili Kol Bentov Plus members in Stage I, less Dayan who was not a mem- ber of this 1966 Cabinet. | 1. Two serious attacks killing some Israelis in border settlements. 2. Two serious attacks killing some Israelis in border settlements. | 1. Reprisal attacks. 2. Nothing. 3. War. 4. Diplomatic solution. | 1. Same as 1. 2. Peace with neighbors. | II Appeal to UN Security Council to assist in stopping Guerrilla raids. | 1. Resolution vetoed by USSR. |

| STAGE | DECISION UNIT | INFORMATION | ALTERNATIVES | VALUES | DECISION | REINFORCEMENT |
|-------------------------|---------------|--|---|------------|--|--|
| 3. November 13, 1966 | Same as 2. | 1. Long established practice of retaliation. 2. New belligerent Syrian Government. 3. Intelligence. 4. No support from UN. | Same as 2. | Same as 1. | III Attack village of Es Samu in Jordan. | 1. Success in attack. 2. Censure by UN Security Council. |
| 4. April 7, 1967 | Same as 2. | 1. Attack on settlements of Haan, Eln Gev, and Gadot. 2. Escalation from artillery attack to use of tanks by Syrians. 3. Intelligence. | 1. Nothing. 2. Use Air Force. 3. Use Air Force and Army units. | Same as 1. | IV a. Stop shell- ing by use of machine gun fire. b. When escala- tion took place, use Air Force. | 1. Syrian's used tanks in escalation. 2. Israelis stopped attack and destroyed 6 Syrian aircraft. |
| 5. Early May 1967 | Eshkol | 1. Leak from USSR to Egypt that Israel was planning an attack on Syria. 2. Faced by Soviet Ambassador with allegation Israel was planning attack against Syria. | 1. Denial. 2. Invite Ambassador to see for himself. 3. Nothing. | Same as 1. | V a. Invited Soviet Ambassador to visit Syrian Border with him to see that there was no Israeli military buildup. b. Denied buildup. | Ambassador refused. |

| STAGE | DECISION UNIT | INFORMATION | ALTERNATIVES | VALUES | DECISION | REINFORCEMENT |
|-----------------------------|---------------|---|---|------------|--|--|
| 6. May 15, Rabin 1961 | Eshkol | 1. Egyptian troops marching through Cairo to Sinai. 2. Egypt claimed a state of emergency. 3. Intelligence. | 1. Nothing. 2. Partial mobilization. 3. Call on UN for assistance. 4. Full mobilization. | Same as 1. | VI Partial mobilization of reserves. | Approval by cabinet. |
| 7. May 19, 1967 | Same as 2. | 1. Egyptian request for withdrawal of UN Forces. 2. Actual withdrawal of UN Security Forces. | 1. Request UN to keep troops in Sinai. 2. Allow UN Forces on Israeli side of border. | Same as 1. | VII a. Requested UN to keep forces in Sinai. b. Refused UN Forces access to Israeli side of border. | UN troops withdrawn. |
| 8. May 22-27, 1967 | Same as 2. | 1. Nasser closes Gulf of Aqaba and Straits of Tiran. 2. Estimated 80,000 troops in Sinai. 3. Eshkol speech in Knesset that closing shipping routes was act of aggression. | 1. War. 2. Nothing. 3. Diplomatic Solution. | Same as 1. | VIII a. Eban sent to Paris, London, and Washington to seek diplomatic solution for shipping and peace. b. Cabinet voted y to 9 not to go to war. | 1. Eban returned to Israel almost empty handed. 2. Washington wanted 2 weeks to martial support. 3. Johnson speech that closing Straits was illegal. |

| STAGE | DECISION UNIT | INFORMATION | ALTERNATIVES | VALUES | DECISION | REINFORCEMENT |
|-------------------------|---------------|--|--|---|---|--|
| 9. May 28, 1957 | Eshkol | 1. Public Opinion. 2. Urging of Cabinet. 3. Security situation. 4. Continued shelling. | 1. Nothing, 2. Report to Nation. | Same as i. | IX Eshkol spoke to Nation on situation. | 1. Poor speech. 2. Public loss of faith in leadership. 3. Public clamored for Moshe Dayan. |
| 10. June 1, 1957 | Eshkol | 1. Security situation. 2. Demands of Party leaders. 3. Possible resignation of members from cabinet. 4. Public opinion. 5. Demand for Dayan and/or Ben-Gurion. 6. Feud with Ben-Gurion. | 1. Continue present cabinet which probably would fall. 2. Accept Unit/Cabinet with Dayan, Begin, Y. Saphir. | Same as 1. Eshkol did not want Dayan in Cabinet. | X a. Formed Unity Cabinet. b. Gave up defense to Dayan. c. Appointed Begin and Y. Saphir to cabinet without portfolio. | 1. Good support of public. 2. Paved way for decision to go to war. |
| 11. Out-break of war | Eshkol | 1. Requirement for military support. 2. Requirement for small decision-making unit. | 1. Continue using entire cabinet for decisionmaking. 2. Appoint small decisionmaking group. | Same as 1. | XI Appointed five man advisory cabinet to run war consisting of Eshkol, Dayan, Allon, Eban, and Yadin. | |

| STAGE | DECISION UNIT | INFORMATION | ALTERNATIVES | VALUES | DECISION | REINFORCEMENT |
|------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 12. June 4, 1967 | Eshkol Dayan Eban P. Saphir Sharef Arann Gavati Y. Shapira Shitreet Sasson M. Shapira Barzilai Warhaftig Burg Carmel Allon Galili Kol Bentov Begin Y. Saphir | 1. See Chapter V. 2. New views of Unity Cabinet. 3. Intelligence. 4. Not making head- way on opening Straits 5. Defense Forces had contingency plans. Mobilize in 2 days. 6. Israel sur- rounded by Arab Forces. 7. Arabs were united by pacts. Jordan had signed on May 30, 1967. 8. Shellings were continued. 9. Public wanted action. 10. Many politi- cal parties wanted Israel to contain "Historic Area." 11. Inflammatory speeches and news releases. 12. Reasons for war were same as 1956. a. Free ship- ping. b. Stop attacks. c. Neutralize Arab Forces. | 1. War. 2. Reprisals. 3. Wait for Arabs to attack. 4. Continue diplo- matic approach. | 1. Same as 1. 2. Add values of Begin, Y. Saphir, and Dayan who were hawks. 3. Hit enemy at precise time he was ready to hit Israel. 4. If choice of surrender or fight, Israel would fight. | XII Take military action to liberate Israel from strangle- hold of aggres- sion around her. b. Timing of action to be determined by Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. | 1. Six Day War launched June 5, 1967. 2. Israel decisively defeated Arab Forces. |

| STAGE | DECISION UNIT | INFORMATION | ALTERNATIVES | VALUES | DECISION | REINFORCEMENT |
|-------|------------------|--|--------------|--------|----------|---------------|
| | | 13. Mobilization could not continue as each day of war would cost 200 military deaths and cost economy \$15 to \$20 million a day. | | | | |

CHAPTER VI

FOOTNOTES

1. Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel, pp. 213-214, 414-415, 426-427.

2. Charles F. Hermann, Crises in Foreign Policy Making: A Simulation of International Politics, p. 249.

CHAPTER VII

HYPOTHESES

PROPOSITION NUMBER 1

The Israeli Cabinet will remain as the decisionmaking body for crisis decisions.

The inherited system of rule practiced by the Jewish Agency, the Histadrut, the Zionist Organization, and the Provisional Government of selecting a small executive to make decisions will be continued by Israel. This system is immensely advantageous where the Parliament consists of members from so many diverse parties and in addition has Communist Parties which could be detrimental to security issues. Since the founding of Israel, the majority of the leaders in the cabinets have had long associations with each other in government, labor, and political parties. They make a cohesive unit; although, not always in agreement. It can be expected that not more than one or two new faces will appear in each new cabinet, because of the party list system for selecting and electing candidates.

PROPOSITION NUMBER 2

Israel will not fully integrate into the State, the Arabs of the 1967 captured Arab lands.

These Arabs will not be made a part of the State because the population of Arabs could become greater than Jews. Israel will

continue the precepts of Zionism to create a totally Jewish State. This principle is also included in party platforms.

PROPOSITION NUMBER 3

Israel will continue to utilize nations and organizations to reach Zionist aims and drop them when they have fulfilled Israel's aims.

Weizmann stated that Zionism would be achieved in stages rather than in one operation. Zionist used Britain, the League of Nations, Russia, the US, and the UN to achieve statehood. Each of these, except the US and UN, were put aside when they had fulfilled their maximum contribution to the Zionist. Britain ended their influence with the end of the Mandate. The UN has more or less been shelled by Israel since it cannot maintain peace or obtain Arab States recognition of Israel. Russia was downgraded by political parties because of persecution of Russian Jewry. This has caused Israel to retaliate and to fight her own wars. It can be foreseen that Israel may look for new partners and drop present friends, if they do not assist her in reaching her aims.

PROPOSITION NUMBER 4

Israel will continue to utilize retaliatory raids against enemies who attack her.

Historically, Jews have been under the dominion of someone else. It is felt by many Jews that they did not stand up and fight

the Nazis, but acted like sheep. Assistance from the UN has not fostered peace. Israelis consider they must stand up and fight and show their Arab neighbors they are strong. They have done this by the technique of retaliation. If sabotage and other incidents are continued against Israel, her leaders will pick their time and place to retaliate.

PROPOSITION NUMBER 5

Israel will continue to utilize preemptive attack against enemies when faced with attack.

Since Israel cannot afford a large standing army, she must be dependent on reserves and mobilization. Mobilization over an extended period stifles the economy. War plans of 1964 were based on striking the enemy just as the enemy was preparing to attack. Israel will continue with such a philosophy.

Two other features add to the reasons for this philosophy. The small area of the country prevents accepting large penetrations and the large mass of the Arab population which could be brought into battle against Israel.

PROPOSITION NUMBER 6

Consensus of public opinion will shape Israel's policies.

Israel's Jews are immensely interested in the Government's decisions. Her inhabitants believe they have nowhere else to go. Israel is the last stand for Jews. This theory is proven by the

large voter turnout for elections, participation in party and participation in labor affairs. Public opinion forced the 1967 Unity Cabinet into being.

It has been Zionist policy to shape and utilize world opinion in their favor since the days of Herzl. Obtaining government (Great Britain) support for Jewish immigration was a plank of the First Zionist Congress. Eban was sent out to Paris, London, and Washington prior to the 1967 war.

Consensus is important to Israel. The Israeli Government will continue to try and forge world consensus for her acts, and her acts will be forged by her citizen's consensus.

PROPOSITION NUMBER 7

Israel's people will unite when faced with foreign crisis.

The syndrome of we have nowhere else to go forces the Israeli citizens to come together for forceful action when faced with danger. This syndrome is caused by remembrance of the holocaust and the pogroms. The myriad of political party factions joins hands in crisis as was done in the Unity Cabinet of 1967. After the crises, the people returned to their domestic in-fighting.

PROPOSITION NUMBER 8

Israel will continue to maintain a strong defense force.

Zionist suspicions of the Arabs will cause Israeli policy to maintain a viable defense establishment. This hypothesis could

charge as Israeli Sabras like Moshe Dayan gain the majority of the decisionmaking positions in government. The Sabras are more pragmatic and less suspicious. As long as the older East Europeans, whose faith in Zionism, are in charge, suspicion will remain the key word.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

CONCLUSION

The Six Day War scenario has provided an excellent vehicle to study crisis decisionmaking in Israel.

In developing the hypotheses, it has become apparent to the author that the wealth of information available on a rather young nation and its leaders plus the enormous amount of information available from newspapers, periodicals, and speeches could be placed in a management information system. This information could then be developed and tested against hypotheses as was done in this paper manually, to determine when Israel was reaching a crisis position and thereby provide the US policymakers with needed information to react. Such a system would provide description, explanation, and prediction of expected actions and reactions as the eight hypotheses developed in this paper can do on a small scale.

It is, also, concluded that the strong Zionist in the leadership positions will continue to press for conclusion of Zionist aims.

RECOMMENDATION

Recommend further study of Israeli decisionmaking be undertaken to develop more hypotheses. The Department of State should consider

use of a management information system for developing and testing hypotheses and determining expected decision.


BEVERLY L. McGRUDER
LTC CE

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
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APPENDIX 1



APPENDIX 2

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

Levi Eshkol was born in the Ukraine in 1895 and migrated to Palestine in 1914. He was a noted labor leader, a member of the Jewish Agency Executive, Chief of that agency's Settlement Department, and then the Treasurer. A member of the MAPAI political party, he was elected to the Knesset in 1949. Eshkol served in Ben-Gurion Cabinets as Minister of Agriculture and Development and Minister of Defense.¹ In 1963, Eshkol became the leader of the Government and served as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, relinquishing the latter position in 1967.² He is a noted author who holds a PhD degree from Hebrew University. He has served as a member of the Jewish Legion, Secretary of MAPAI, delegate to Zionist Congresses, and as a member of the Histadrut.³

Yigal Allon is a soldier turned politician. Born in Palestine in 1918, he became Commander of the Haganah, was a founder of the Palmah (Haganah shock troops) and its Commander, fought with the Allies in Syria in 1942, and was a Commander of Israeli armies in the War of Independence. Politically, he is leader of the Achdut Ha' Avodah Party, a member of the Knesset since 1955, and Minister of Labor since 1961.⁴ Allon attended Oxford University. He has been a member of the Histadrut Council and a delegate to Zionist Congresses.⁵ His view is the Jordan River forms Israel's natural defense boundary. He expressed the thesis of anticipatory counter

attack which states that Israel should consider any large force movements in the Sinai as sufficient reason to attack those potential enemies.⁶

Zalman Aranne, born in 1889, came to Palestine in 1926, from Russia. In 1936, he became Director of the Histadrut's School for Trade Union Leaders. As Secretary General of MAPAI, he was elected to the Knesset in 1949. He has served as Minister Without Portfolio (1953-1955) and Minister of Education and Culture (1955-1960, 1963-1967).⁷ Aranne is a contributor to the press, a member of the Histadrut's Executive Committee, National Secretary of the Achdut Ha' Avoda Party, delegate to the UN in 1950, and a member of the World Zionist Action Committee.⁸ He was educated at the University of Kharkov.⁹

Israei Barzilai was Israel's first Ambassador to Poland. He was born there in 1913 and immigrated to Palestine in 1934. A member of MAPAM he was elected to the Knesset in 1955, and became Minister of Health until 1961.¹⁰ He attended the Sorbonne in Paris, has been to Zionist Congresses, and was a member of Eshkol's 1967 Cabinet as Minister of Information.¹¹

Menachem Begin came to Palestine in 1942 with the Polish Army. He was born in Poland in 1913. Begin became Commander of the terrorist Irgum Tzevai Leumi (National Military Organization) in 1943. He is a lawyer and writer who was educated at the University of Warsaw. After the Irgum was disbanded, he and his followers founded the HERUT Party in 1948, and he was elected to the Knesset.¹² Begin was a former Minister of Communications,

attended Zionist Congresses, and in the 1967 Cabinet served as Minister Without Portfolio.¹³ He has led the Knesset opposition for 18 years and considers himself a hawk. He considers Abba Eban a dove.¹⁴

Mordekhai Bentov, born in Poland in 1900 and immigrated to Palestine in 1920, is a noted labor leader, who served in the Provisional Government as a Minister. A MAPAM member of the Knesset since 1949, he is also the founder and editor of that party's daily newspaper.¹⁵ Bentov served as delegate to the UN in 1947, member of the Political Committee of the Jewish Agency, and executive of Histadrut.¹⁶ He was educated at the University of Warsaw. Bentov was Minister of Housing from 1965-1967.¹⁷

Josef Burg, an ordained rabbi, holds a PhD degree from the University of Leipzig. A member of the National Religious Parties, he was Vice Chairman of the First Knesset. He served as a member of the Zionist Actions Committee from 1939-1950.¹⁸ Burg, born in Germany in 1909, immigrated to Palestine in 1939, as a teacher. From 1951 to 1952, he was Minister of Health and from 1952 to 1958, he was Minister of Post. He served as Minister of Social Welfare from 1959-1967.¹⁹

Another officer from the Haganah and a brigadier general in the Israeli Army is Moshe Carmel, who immigrated to Palestine from Poland in 1924, at the age of 13. A member of the Achdut Ha' Avođa, he entered the Knesset in 1965 and was Minister of Communications from 1955-1959.²⁰ Carmel is a noted author, was

educated at the University of Paris, and has been affiliated with the Histadrut.²¹

Moshe Dayan, who has been Minister of Defense since 1967, started with the Haganah in Palestine, where he was born in 1915. He was a founder of the Palmah, served with the British Army in WW II, and as Israeli Army Chief of Staff was responsible for the 1956 Sinai Campaign. Dayan was a member of MAPAI until he followed Ben-Gurion into RAFI. As a member of MAPAI, he was elected to the Knesset in 1959, and was Minister of Agriculture from 1959-1964.²² Dayan received his degree from the School of Law and Economics, Tel Aviv, and attended the British Senior Officer's School. He was the Chief of the delegation at the Armistice Meeting after the Sinai Campaign.²³ Dayan is a champion of the younger generation. As a Sabra (Custus-Israeli born Jew), he is pragmatic and familiar towards the Arabs and without the suspicion of the Zionists.²⁴

Abba Eban, Israeli diplomat and politician, was born in Africa in 1915 and raised in England. He attended Cambridge University and holds KRL and LL.D. degrees. He first came to Palestine in 1940. Eban served as a liaison officer between Allied Headquarters and the Jewish population of Jerusalem during WW II. In 1946, he became a member of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency.²⁵ Eban served as a member of the Jewish Agency delegation to the UN in 1947, where he fought for formation of Israel. After independence, he served jointly as Israeli UN Representative and Ambassador to the US until 1959. A member of MAPAI, he was elected to the Knesset

in 1959, and served as Minister Without Portfolio. Subsequently, he became Minister of Education and Culture and, in 1967, Minister of Foreign Affairs.²⁶

Israel Galili, who served in the 1967 Cabinet as Minister of Information, was born in Russia in 1911 and migrated to Palestine in 1914. In the First Knesset, he served as a member of MAPAM, which he helped found. Later, he joined the Ahdut Ha' Avoda Party. Galili helped found Palmah and served as Chief of the National Command of Haganah.²⁷

Israel farmer and organization executive, Chaim Gavati, was born in Poland in 1901 and came to Palestine in 1924. A member of MAPAI, he served as Minister of Agriculture in 1964-1967, although he has not been in the Knesset. From 1950-1958, Gavati was Director General of the Agriculture Ministry.²⁸

Moshe Kol has been a member of the Knesset since 1949, and a member of the Independent Liberal Party since 1959. He arrived in Palestine in 1932 from Russia where he was born in 1911. Kol is a member of numerous boards for youth organizations including UN sponsored organizations. He is a noted author and pursued his studies at Hebrew University. He served in the Jewish Agency Executive, as a member of the General Zionist Construction Fund, as a delegate to all Zionist Congresses since 1933, as a member of the Executive Committee of Histadrut, and as a member of the Provisional Council. As a member of the opposition, he had not been a minister prior to appointment as Minister of Development and Tourism in 1966.²⁹

Yosef Saphir was educated at Hebrew University in his native Palestine where he was born in 1902. His great prominence has been in citriculture. He is a director of many boards and civic clubs. Saphir is an Independent Liberal. He was elected to the Knesset in 1949. He served as Mayor of Petah Tikvah under the Mandate Government. Saphir joined the 1967 Cabinet as Minister Without Portfolio.³⁰

Pirhas Sapir, a member of 'A'li, was born in Poland in 1906 and came to Palestine in 1930. He has been Director General of both the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Finance. During 1955, he became Minister of Commerce and Industry.³¹ It was in 1963 that Sapir became Minister of Finance and he served through 1967 in that position. Sapir was in charge of arms and ammunition logistics during the War of Independence. He has been a member of the Knesset for many years.³² Sapir claims to be a leading dove in the Cabinet. It is his desire that Israel remain a Jewish State and not integrate the Arabs.³³

Pliaku Sasson has been Minister to both Turkey and Italy and Ambassador to Switzerland. He was born in Syria in 1902 and moved to Palestine in 1927. He holds his degree from St. Joseph College, Beirut. He is a noted author, a member of MAPAI, and has been Minister of Posts since 1961. Sasson headed the Arabic Department of the Jewish Agency, served as a member of the Delegation to the UN from 1947 to 1949, and again in 1961, and served as a delegate to the Egyptian Armistice Agreement in 1949.³⁴

Moshe Shapira came to Palestine in 1925 from White Russia where he was born in 1902. He has been Ministers of Immigration and Health (1948-1949), Religious Affairs and Social Welfare (1952-1959), and Interior (1949-1952, 1959-1967).³⁵ Shapira attended Rabbinical Seminary in Berlin. He has been a delegate to Zionist Congresses and was head of the Jewish Agency's Immigration Department and a member of the Executive. Shapira has been a member of the Knesset since 1949 and is affiliated with the National Religious Parties.³⁶

Yacov S. Shapira was Israel's first Attorney General. He had been in private law practice since obtaining his law degree from the University of Jerusalem until 1948, when he was appointed. Born in 1902, in Russia, he came to Palestine in 1924. He was a member of Haganah. Although a MAPAI member of the Knesset since 1951, his first Ministry was Justice from 1966.³⁷

Zev Sharef was sent from Palestine on important Zionists' missions to Poland, Latvia, Austria, and Finland during the period 1931-35. He was born in Rumania in 1906 and arrived in Palestine in 1925. Sharef served in Haganah, the Jewish Agency's Political Department, and was a member of the Provisional Government. Sharef has been Secretary of the Government of Israel, Director of Civil Service, Director of State Revenue, and in 1965, joined Knesset as an electee from MAPAI. In 1966, he became Minister of Commerce and Industry.³⁸

Bethar S. Shitreet has been a policeman since Mandate days. In 1948, he became Minister of Police of the State of Israel. A member of MAPAI, he has been in the Knesset since 1951. Shitreet was born in Palestine in 1895 and is a graduate of the Jerusalem Law School.³⁹

A member of the Knesset since 1949, Zerah Warhaftig has been Minister of Religious Affairs since 1961. He was born in Poland in 1906, graduated from the University of Warsaw, and practiced private law until migrating to Palestine in 1947. A noted author and ardent Zionist, he has attended numerous Zionist Congresses as a delegate. Warhaftig is a member of the National Religious Parties.⁴⁰

Yigal Yadin, appointed to the 1967 Advisory Cabinet for conduct of the Six Day War, is the only non-minister decisionmaker considered in this paper.⁴¹ He is a soldier and a scholar. His military experience culminated as Chief of Staff of the Army in 1952. He had been Chief of Operations during the War of Independence.⁴² Yadin was born in Palestine in 1917. In 1937, he became the Haganah's instructor in small arms and by 1940, was an instructor in the officer's training school. From 1947 to 1948, he was Haganah's Chief of Operations and then moved to the Israeli Army in the same position. He obtained his PhD in 1955, from Hebrew University and has been serving there as Professor of Archaeology since 1959.⁴³

APPENDIX 2

FOOTNOTES

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10. Roth, p. 23.
11. Schneiderman, 1965, p. 56.
12. Roth, p. 255.
13. Rosenshaft, p. 44.
14. "An Israeli Hawk - Menachem Begin," New York Times, 3 August 1972, p. 2.
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16. Schneiderman, 1965, p. 72.
17. I. J. Carmin Karpman, ed., Who's Who in World Jewry 1972, p. 81.
18. Roth, p. 374.
19. Schneiderman, 1965, p. 131.

20. Roth, p. 407.
21. Who's Who in the World (1970), p. 157.
22. Roth, p. 535.
23. Schneiderman, 1965, p. 187.
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25. Schneiderman, 1965, p. 204.
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27. Ibid., p. 722.
28. Karpman, p. 369.
29. Ibid., p. 491.
30. Roth, p. 1653.
31. Ibid.
32. Schneiderman, 1965, p. 835.
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36. Schneiderman, 1965, p. 881.
37. Harry Schneiderman and Itzbak J. Carmin, ed., Who's Who in World Jewry, 1955, p. 700.
38. Schneiderman, 1965, p. 836.
39. Roth, p. 1710.
40. Schneiderman, 1965, p. 1018.
41. Lester Velie, Countdown in the Holy Land, p. 10.
42. Roth, p. 1932.
43. Schneiderman, 1965, p. 1066.