AD-760 869


PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY

Kenneth E. Pruett

Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

28 February 1973





USAWC RESEARCH PAPER

FSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY

A MONOGRAPH

by

Colonel Kenneth E. Pruett Infantry

US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 28 February 1973

AJSTRACT

AUTHOR:Kenneth E. Pruett, COL, INFFORMAT:MonographDATE:28 February 1973PAGES:45CLASSIFICATION:UnclassifiedTITLE:Psychological Operations in Support of Foreign and
Defense Policy

The purpose of this paper is to examine the role that psychological operations have played in supporting United States foreign and defense policy. A literature search reveals that psychological operations have not been used effectively due partly to a general misunderstanding of terms and a reluctance to effect coordination of their use between governmental .gencies. The historical review also shows that the public does not accept the use of propaganda as being the "American way," and that a clear doctrine for using psychological operations at the national level does not exist. The prper offers, as a partial solution, that an advisor for psychological operations be placed within the National Security Council system. The advisor's presence would focus attention on psychological operations at the highest level and would provide a focal point for coordination between the many agencies that are involved with foreign policy. The paper concludes that psychological operations, consisting of a communication program combined with positive governmental actions, should be used to promote United States interest overseas. The paper also concludes that psychological operations must be explained at every opportunity as consisting of positive, truthful actions and are not a program of trickery and deceit.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Pa	ge
ABSTRACT .		 .	ii 🗌
CHAPTER I.	INTRODUCTION		1
II.	BACKGROUND INFORMATION .		6
III.	HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL	OPERATIONS	11
	World War I		11
	World War II		15
	Cold War and Korean War		20
	Vietnam War		26
	Psychological Operations	Today	28
IV.	PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS		33
SELECTED BI	BLIOGRAPHY		43

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

With the turn of the century, nations became acutely aware of the tole that psychological operations play as an instrument of foreign policy. In reality, psychological operations support is as old consistory. Hans Morgenthau has said, "There is, of course, nothing new in the use of propaganda for purposes of foreign policy; it has been sporadically used for such purposes on a small scale since time immemorial."¹ He also stated that a new moral force in the world, which he coined as being 'hationalistic universalism," has called for an increasingly greater utility for psychological operations in international politics.³

The ultimate aim of any foreign policy is always the same; to promote one's interest by changing the mind of the opponent. This is true regardless of the instrument employed; diplomacy, military force, or psychological operations. Diplomery uses the persuasiveness of promises and threats to satisfy or deny interest. Military force uses the threat of physical impact of violence upon the opponent's ability to pursue certain interest. Propaganda, or to use a more inclusive term--psychological operations, attempts to use and create intellectual convictions, morale valuations, and emotional preferences to support particular interests of, in this case, the United States. Propaganda endeavors to mold the minds of men directly rather than indirectly through diplomacy or

physical violence. It does not and cannot operate independently, since it should be used with the other elements, diplomacy and military force. One element often balances the other in the continuing effort to further the interest of the United States.⁴

It is important at this point to clarify terms such as psychological operations, psychological warfare, and propaganda. Psychological operations have been defined as those operations that:

> include psychological warfare and, in addition, encompass those political, military, economic and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral or friendly foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior to support the achievement of national objectives.⁵

Psychological warfare has been defined as the planned use of:

propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.⁶

The last term, propaganda, has been defined as:

any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.⁷

Propaganda can also be classified according to its source as white, gray, or black. White propaganda is overtly disseminated and is the type most often used and preferred. However, at tirgs, it might be in the best interest of the United States to use gray propaganda, where the source is not identified but is left to the imagination of the audience; or black, where the propaganda purports to emanate from sources other than its real one. All of these terms are extremely general and vague, yet efforts to refine these terms would simply result in different definitions with the same ills. This paper should assist in clarifying their meaning by reviewing their historical development.

Psychological operations, while recognized as a major element of a successful foreign policy, is not appreciated or even understood by vast numbers of the public, Congress, and various agencies of the government. The reasons for this nonacceptance are many, some well grounded, while others are based on a misunderstanding of the potential that psychological operations have. Too often, psychological operations are disregarded simply because they have been so often associated with what might be referred to as "un-American."

With this brief introduction, to what does this paper address itself and what results should be expected? First, it must be recognized that an abundance of material on every aspect of psychological operations exist. The aim of this paper is to review selected materials and to present new perspectives for the use of psychological operations in its role of supporting United States foreign policy. Hopefully, some of the misgivings about psychological operations can be dispelled. The paper will follow the development

of psychological operations beginning with World War I; a war during which this nation as a whole became involved with this activity. The historical review continues to the present period and ends with an evaluation of the current state of the art. The paper concludes with organizational and doctrinal ideas for improving psychological operations support during the new era of negotiations in the seventies.

CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES

1. Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 324.

2. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 235. Hans Morgenthau has coined the term "Nationalistic universalism" to explain the deterioration of international morality, for example, with respect to protection of human life. Morgenthau explains that this deterioration has been partly due to the dissolution of an ethical system that once imposed some restraint upon the day-by-day operation of foreign policy. Morgenthau believes that as democratic responsibilities were substituted for aristocratic responsibilities in foreign affairs, nationalistic and non-Western standards of action replaced what had been universal standards.

3. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 324.

4. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 324, 325.

5. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>JCS Pub. I</u>, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, p. 240.

υ. <u>Ibid</u>.

7. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 239.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Diplomacy and warfare both have long and continuous histories and theoretical comprehension of their principles is far advanced. Propaganda, however, is a novelty as an autonomous instrument of foreign policy; both its theory and practice bear the marks of inexperience.¹

As noted earlier in this paper, statesmen and soldiers have used the technique of propaganda throughout history. However, only in recent years have they begun to suspect that there is at least a quasi-scientific art of persuasion. It has been only in the past century that nations have established permanent agencies for the systematic exploitation of propaganda as an instrument of national policy. Today no state can safely ignore that propaganda is being used. The modern revolutions in communications and transportation have been the most important developments for understanding the potentialities of propaganda.²

Andrew MacKay Scott, in his book, <u>The Revolution in Statecraft</u>, believes that the rapid growth of informal relations between nations have changed the nature of the modern state and the functioning of the nation-state system. In the past, relations between nations have been predominantly formal and confined to government-togovernment contact. This situation has changed, as national boundaries

have become porous and the techniques have been fashioned to provide agents of one nation with direct access to the population and political and thought processes of another. The resulting agencies of informal penetration have helped to make the Cold War which we know today. International politics in this century cannot be understood without a grasp of the role of informal access, while the psychological activities of a nation play an important role in this "informal penetration."³

An example of informal penetration would be the programs conducted in a foreign country by the United States Information Agency (USIA). Among other things, the USIA facilitates circulation of American literature and operates the official radio voice of America. These programs are designed to explain America's objectives and actions abroad, while at the same time, the Central Intelligence Agency conducts covert propaganda that also contributes to this country's informal access to another nation.⁴

A difficulty in establishing psychological operations as a tool for foreign policy planning and execution has been the inability of the Government to agree upon a single definition and objective. These disagreements have been more serious when relating psychological operations to the cold or quasi war situation. The use of psychological actions have been more or less accepted for use in the time of actual war. An example of these difficulties is the fact that the United States Information Agency is reluctant to acknowledge any continuing

relationship with psychological operations or propaganda. Apparently, the Agency believes that a close association with these activities could seriously impair its creditability, and therefore, reduce its effectiveness in representing the United States of America overseas.

In Palmer and Perkins' book, <u>International Relations</u>, they suggest that, for analysis and accuracy, the method of propagarda must be separated from the aims for which it is used. Simply stated, they believe that "any attempt to persuade persons to accept a certain point of view or to take a certain action" is propaganda. However, they explain that this definition is especially useful because it makes propaganda "morally neutral." Therefore, to persuade per se is neither "good" nor "bad"; moral judgment must be directed to the purpose of the persuasion.⁵

Many people in both government **and** civilian life consider psychological operations as vague and extremely difficult to visualize. They are skeptical of any association with propaganda because they relate it to something unclean, un-democratic, and therefore, un-American. They have less difficulty in visualizing a diplomat's effort to conduct foreign policy, or military weapons and their physical effects. One reason for this may be that it is extremely difficult to point to a concrete example and to say, beyond any doubt, that "this is a psychological operation." The difficulty stems from the interdependence between psychological

considerations and the other elements of our national security policies and programs. Activities that are appropriate in psychological operations are closely interrelated with our other activities and to whom, where, and why we do them. One cannot separate and identify a single national psychological operations doctrine or strategy. Yet, it is clear to those working in this field that psychological operations involve more than information, communications or even propaganda.

With this brief review of the theoretical background of psychological operations, Chapter II will discuss how this nation has dealt with its application beginning with World War I.

CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

1. Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nation, p. 325.

2. Norman D. Palmer and Howard C. Perkins, International Relations, p. 109.

3. Andrew MacKay Scott, The Revolution in Statecraft, p. i.

4. Ibid., pp. 12, 83.

5. Palmer and Perkins, p. 110.

6. Raymond Barrett, "PSYOP; What Is It?" <u>Mulitary Review</u>, March 1972, pp. 63, 64.

CHAPTER III

HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

WORLD WAR I

With the entry of the United States into the war in Europe in 1917, the American people came face-to-face with a new instrument of war--propaganda. It was during this period when the American public became concerned and pondered whether is was correct for the United States Government to engage in actions designed to influence foreign opinion by propaganda means. The upapon was not mentioned in the Constitution, which also was a cause for some concern.¹ During World War I, the American public would witness at first hand a highly developed propaganda program, operating within the geographical limits of the United States and designed to mold domestic public opinion.

In spice of the public's generally negative view toward propaganda, the United States established foreign propaganda machinery as a part of the war effort. In 1917 President Wilson formed the Committee on Public Information and appointed George Creel as its chairman. The President added the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy to act as the other participating members.

The Committee was charged with encouraging and then consolidating the revolution of opinion which changed the United States from an

anti-militaristic democracy into an organized war machine.³ George Creel put it another way when he said, "It was the fight for the minds of men for the conquest of their convictions, and the battle-line ran through everyhome in every country."⁴ This was a war that appeared on the surface to be different from previous conflicts. Creel believed that it was not only a contest of strength between armed forces, but between opposing ideals, and moral verdicts took on all the value of military decisions.

The Committee on Public Information was committed to plead the justice of America's cause before the jury of public opinion. Creel emphasized that the Committee was not an agency of censorship or a machinery of concealment or repression, and at no point did it need to exercise authorities under those laws that limit the freedom of speech and press. In summary, Creel said of the Committee, that "In all things, from first to last, without halt or change, it was a plain enterprise in salesmanship, the world's greatest adventure in advertising.⁵

Chairman George Creel was a highly capable and motivating person, but to many officials in government, he was also a highly controversial chairman. His greatest asset was the fact that he enjoyed the confidence of the President and could therefore participate in national policy on a sufficiently high level to give propaganda coordination to other governmental policy on a basis of equality.⁶ However, on the sensitive subject of censorship, contrary opinions do exist. Mock and Larson maintain that the

Committee on Public Information was actually involved with censorship, however slight. It was generally agreed that the Committee's chief function was to distribute affirmative propaganda, but likewise, it was intimately concerned with the negative phases of public opinion management. The fact was that the Committee did become involved, even though slight, with suppression of speech and publications, which was thought to be inimical to the doctrines for which America believed it was fighting. Although the censorship power was employed by Creel with moderation does not detract from its great significance and potential. Mock and Larson believe that if the Administration had wished, "it might have imposed an almost complete censorship on the utterances and publications of all Americans during the war."⁷ Mock and Larson go further by asserting that in this instance the "administration" really meant George Creel, "for in censorship, as in affirmative propaganda, he held the key."⁸

It can be concluded that while George Creel held this power, he did not continue to expand his powers of censorship and tighten his grip on the American press, but left this aspect of his responsibility to the voluntary censorship that was being practiced by the press and others. The fact that he did not is evidence that Creel was sincere in advocating expression rather than repression.⁹

In discussing psychological operations in World War I, one must recognize that here was the beginning which illustrated the

great potential of molding opinion through a concentrated and controlled program. The high pressure propaganda campaign developed by George Creel operated domestically as well as overseas. Congress began to show concern at the Committee activities in this country, and immediately after the war abolished the Committee totally. One of the reasons for Congressional interest was the belief that Creel and his committee were overly involved in the Paris Peace Conference. In fact, the action taken by Congress was so swift that the Committee was left without sufficient funds to publish its final report. George Creel wrote a book, How We Advertised the War, in an effort to respond to this drastic action by Congress. Congress apparently wanted to prevent the Committee from making a statement of achievement to the public.¹⁰ The feeling which Congress displayed became widespread and the public began to believe that American propagands from the Creel Committee had tricked the United States into the war. The connotation and stigma of deceit and trickery became associated with propaganda and psychological activities.

The scene was set for a continuing American ambivalence toward psychological considerations. This ambivalence has continued to the present time. The American people had been made the object of US propaganda and they did not like it. Did Creel and his committee serve a useful purpose? Apparently the answer must be in the affirmative as the American people were whipped into a high state

of emotions in support of the war effort which was the objective of the Committee. In view of later events, however, one would have to question the value of the propaganda effort during World War I. The American people were left disappointed after the World War. The propaganda by the Creel Committee had promised too much. An example was the slogan boasting that this war would end wars and make the world safe for democracy. Many people thought this was overplaying the actual situation. Paul Linebarger has stated that "a more modest, more calculated national propaganda effort would have helped forestall those attitudes which, in turn made World War II possible." Apparently Creel did not consider that the peace following the war would be such a grim and difficult period. The propaganda left no room for another war and as Linebarger has put it, "perhaps they believed it <u>/</u>The propagand<u>a</u>? themselves."¹²

WORLD WAR II

The period between World War I and World War II continued with the ambivalence on the part of the American people toward psychological consideration in support of United States foreign policy. World War II began with no formal organization for considering and coordinating *psychological* operations. There had been no concerted action on the part of anyone in government to preserve pertinent skills and knowledge in the field of psychological warfare as had been developed

during World War I. Those men who were entrusted with the conduct of psychological activities in World War I had largely been civilians "experienced in furnishing news, opinions, advertisements and entertainment to the home population, and their skills appeared to be adequate."¹³ When the war had ended, these men were returned to their civilian occupations. It was believed that should the need arise again, it would be entirely feasible to restructure the organization and again rely on the experts from civilian life. The training and use of personnel in both the broad aspects and the technical details of psychological operations were completely ignored.¹⁴

In any event, World War II began with no single element of government responsible for the conduct of psychological operations, nor did any agency have the trained personnel to practice this activity. The United States, with a low public opinion as to the value of psychological operations, did not attempt to develop a propaganda capability until it became concerned with the Nazi and Fascist propaganda activities in Latin America. In 1938, President Roosevelt established an Interdepartmental Committee for Science and Cultural Cooperation, and within State Department, a Division of Cultural Cooperation. Later in 1940, after the fall of France, Roosevelt appointed Nelson Rockefeller as Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. This office was charged with launching an exchangeof-persons program between Latin American countries, sponsor libraries, and Jointly operate binational cultural centers.¹⁵

In 1941, with a need to provide Americans with information on the increasing defense effort as war drew nearer and United States war production increased, Roosevelt created the Office of Facts and Figures. Also in 1941, he established an agency for foreign intelligence and clandestine political action and sabotage. To lead this effort the President selected William F. Donovan, a former military officer, "who was given the deliberately innocuous and misleading title of Coordinator of Information."¹⁶

After the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, it became necessary to step up propaganda abroad. Robert Sherwood, a Roosevelt speech writer during the 1940 campaign, brought together the facilities of eleven private shortwave stations and launched a government sponsored broadcasting station and named it Voice of America.

In June 1942, all war information activities of the government were finally consolidated into the Office of War Information (~ I) to be led by Elmer Davis. Davis was a renowned and celebrated radio news reporter. Donovan was promoted to Major General and named to head the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) which had replaced the function of Coordinator of Information. Sherwood remained head of what then became the Overseas Branch of the Office of War Liformation. The Office of War Information was to handle propaganda attributable to the United States Government while one part of the Office of Strategic Services was to handle unattributed propaganda. In addition, the military would raintain psychological warfare groups in the European and Pacific theaters.¹⁷

From the very beginning the Office of War Information was embroiled in controversy. Elmer Davis did not enjoy the relationship with Roosevelt that George Creel had experienced with President Wilson during World War I. In addition, Davis was never comfortable in the bureaucratic jungle of wartime Washington. To make matters worse, Congress and the public still thought propaganda as un-American and some even suspected that the Office of War Information was primarily interested in propagandizing on behalf of the political party in power.¹⁸

A basic problem with American psychological warfare in World War II was the absence of any peacetime preparation for wartime propaganda.¹⁹ This lack of preparation led to weaknesses in both the organization and the actual conduct of psychological warfare. Many of its weaknesses were caused by imperfect coordination of the improvised propaganda agencies and their various branches, from the lack of adequate standards in the recruitment of personnel, and from imperfect coordination of the propaganda offices with the established authorities that made political and military decisions. Even with these deficiencies, the possibilities of psychological warfare were not fully exploited because they were never fully explored. Neither time nor talent existed for that purpose. An active interest on the part of important government agencies did not exist, and therefore, the political implications were not considered when studying the psychological aspects of the problem.²⁰

An excellent example illustrating the lack of agency coordination dealt with policy guidance provided the Office of War Information. The importance of timely guidance and accurate policy information cannot be overstressed because propaganda developed and disseminated and then later refuted or denied is simply to kill any program. The responsibility for providing the Office of War Information with policy guidance rested with both the State Department and the military. In most instances, the guidance proved to be un-timely and not sufficiently specific upon which clear-cut propaganda could be prepared. The other oblivious error in the planning and development of national plans was the fact that the Office of War Information could not input directly into the "policy making" machinery. Davis was not a member of the cabinet and to make matters even worse, according to some authorities, President Roosevelt actually seemed to view the OWI as a censorship agency, which it was not.²¹ It became clear that to have an effective psychological operations program to support government policy, the activity had to be coordinated at the highest level during the planning stage. There were some military men who still considered that war dealt only with men and weapons, and not mere words. However, senior military leaders such as MacArthur, Eisenhower, and Stilwell did encourage psychological operations in their theater of operation. 22

In evaluating the success of the Office of War Information, Wallace Carroll, an OWI senior official, wrote later that "while Americans attained considerable skill in the use of propaganda as an instrument of war, they failed completely to develop the arts of persuasion as an instrument of foreign policy."²³ For the military viewpoint, the Army General Board, in its final report on the war, concluded that propaganda had been "a neglected and ineptly used political and diplomatic weapon."²⁴

COLD WAR AND KOREAN WAR

At the end of World War II the United States elected to pursue the same general course for psychological operations that it followed immediately after the first World War. It abolished the propaganda machinery that had been developed to assist in winning the war. There were, however, differences from the conditions that existed after World War I which were primarily ideological. The world situation with Russia, which continued to get worse, with the beginning of the cold war, suggested the need for a government propaganda arm. The United States Government required this capability in spite of the rather hard attitude toward propaganda that had developed starting with World War I. In view of the world situation, in 1946 President Truman directed that an information program be established within the Department of State. The new

organization, later to be called the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC), assumed duties that had been the responsibilities of the several wartime agencies. President Truman said that this new information program would not be to "outstrip the extensive and growing information programs of other nations," but to see to it "that other peoples received a full and fair picture of American life."²⁵

The State Department took an entirely different viewpoint of the need for propaganda machinery during *s* period of relative peace. The traditionalists within State Department, along with certain members of Congress, had seen little value for the program that the Office of War Information had sponsored during the last war. According to Thomas C. Sorensen, it was Josef Stalin who contributed most to the growing sentiment in America that a strong permanent information program was a necessity.²⁶ Soviet actions, time after time, blocked efforts to settle the issues of the post war world. The change in attitudes on part of the American people was reflected in the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act in 1948.²⁷ This act had resulted after a visit by Senators Smith and Mundt to Europe after which they reported that the Communists were conducting aggressive psychological war against the United States.²⁸

The Smith-Mundt Act gave Congressional approval for an effective foreign information program. Even after passage of this bill, it took another five years for Congress to create the United States

Information Agency. The period between passage of the Smith-Nundt Act in 1948 and establishment of the USIA in 1953, witnessed the creation of two offices to carry out the new law. These two agencies, Office of International Information (OII) and Office of Educational Exchange (OEX) were both within State Department. The Smith-Mundt Act provided authority for foreign information, but did not provide the appropriations. It was not until the Russians exploded their first atomic weapon did the American people see a necessity for an information program abroad. At this time the National Security Council came to the conclusion "that a major propaganda effort should be undertaken in addition to massive US rearmament."²⁹

At the beginning of the Korean War, there was no single governmental agency responsible for psychological operations. As mentioned earlier, it was not until 1953, that the United States Information Agency was created and by that date the conflict in Korea was three years old.

When the Korean War began, the Defense Department began to press for a stronger information service. The Defense Department had begun to realize the importance of psychological operations and wanted to have a hand in the role that the information agency would play. The State Department objected to having too much control exerted by the military. A comparison was agreed upon whereby an interdepartmental strategy committee would be formed to oversee the nation's effort in

this field. Defense Department representatives were members of the committee.³⁰ This interdepartmental strategy committee was assisted by a higher level group called the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) which was established by President Truman later in 1951. The members of the Board were the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State, and the Director of Central Intel: :e. After this Board was established, the original interdepartmental strategy committee became known as the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee. The Psychological Strategy Board and the Strategy Committee had little impact. Although both groups had good ideas, they were short on power. Even though the members were relatively high ranking, the fact remained that they were not head of their respective organizations.³¹

When North Korea invaded South Korea i. 1950 and the United States rushed forces to that area, Moscow began a propaganda offensive to persuade the world that it was the United States at fault. Congress reacted at once and nearly tripled the United States propaganda funds and the world-wide propaganda operations program grew rapidly.

The Psychological Strategy Board was intended to coordinate military, political, economic, and psychological factors in the Korean War, and the Cold War in general. The board did not survive because it became obvious that one cannot separate psychological operations consideration from other elements of national security programs. Inevitable, the Board developed specific programs of

psychological operations which involved activities with other agencies of the government. This intrusion of another agency's authority was opposed, and therefore, the Board's potential was checked. An expression of the contempt for psychological activities and the Psychological Strategy Board can be found in Thomas Finletter's comments:

> Psychological warfare had its extravagances a while, but they had been put to rest by the definitive report of a committee headed by William H. Jackson which recommended that the existing Psychological Warfare Board should be abolished because it was founded on 'misconception that psychological strategy somehow exist apart from official policies and actions and can be dealt with independently by experts in the field.'³³

This statement by Finletter expressed the belief held by many people, but nevertheless, where Finletter was criticizing the entire concept, many responsible individuals still could see a need for a coordinated psychological operations program that could dovetail with other parts of the governments. Although President Eisenhower did abolish the Psychological Strategy Board, he established an Operations Coordinating Board under which the National Security Council could coordinate activities.

It was at this point in 1953 that the United States Information Agency was established as a separate division in the Executive Branch. The basic purpose for this reorganization was the need to bring together the international information program into one single agency. The transfer of functions accented information activities and little attention was given to coordinate psychological operations on a national scale between the various agencies.³⁴

In the military theater of operations, the military conducted psychological warfare against North Korea and Communist China. In order to meet the challenger of the moment in Korea, it was necessary for staff personnel to improvise psychological warfare on a day-to-day basis. It was not until late in 1951 before trained psychological operations personnel were assigned duties with the Eighth Army.

The same situation for the lack of trained psychological operations personnel was true at Department of the Army level. For the first time in its history a special staff agency for psychological operations was established in the Department of the Army staff. It was at this time that Army Psychological Operations units were first established and later used in Korea. As the Army learned more about psychological operations, it was integrated more completely into overall military planning and operations. Initially in the Korean conflict, psychological operations were administrated by intelligence personnel. A year after the American initial involvement in Korea, psychological operations were divorced from intelligence and made a special staff section at theater headquarters. Later this activity was viewed more and more as an operations function and placed under the G3, Operations Officer. As additional experience in its use was accumulated, the Army began to see psychological operations as a specialized field of military operations requiring personnel with similar specialized training.³⁵

VIETNAM WAR

With the introduction of United States military forces into South Vietnam, there began a new era in the conduct of psychological operations. The most significant event was the role given to the United States Information Agency to coordinate all psychological operations in South Vietnam.³⁶ Since it was established by the Reorganization Plan No. 8 in 1953, the Agency had conceived and operated its efforts as an information program rather than one oriented to conduct psychological operations, especially in a war environment. However, this role limiting the Agency's activities to an information service was contrary to President Kennedy's directive issued in 1963 which clearly stated that the Agency's mission was:

> . . . to help achieve United States foreign policy objectives by (a) influencing public attitudes in other nations, and (b) advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated United States policies, programs and official statements.³⁷

The President further directed that:

. . . the United States Information Agency staffs abroad acting under the supervision of the Chiefs of Mission, are responsible for the conduct of overt public information, public relations and cultural activities--i.e. those activities intended to inform or influence foreign public opinion-for agencies of the United States Government except for Commands of the Department of Defense.³⁸ With the increased role for the Agency in South Vietnam, emphasis was given to the crucial importance of psychological operations in furthering internal security, rural development, and pacification. The Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) was established by President Johnson in 1965 and the United States Information Service (USIS--as the Agency's post are known overseas) was designated to lead this organization. JUSPAO continued in its role coordinating all psychological operations until 1968 when a series of organizational and doctrinal changes took the Agency out of the operational role. The Agency, feeling that its role should be confined to policy rather than involvement in psychological operations, was the apparent cause for this modification.³⁹

On the tactical psychological operations responsibilities in South Vietnam, the military capability expanded and the overall effectiveness improved. The military was primarily involved with psychological warfare against the enemy but it did participate in psychological operations activity, in coordination with JUSPAO, to win support from both friendly and hostile civilians. As a result of experience gained in South Vietnam, the military developed a greater understanding of the concept of psychological operations. It was clear, however, that the hastily improvised arrangements established in Vietnam became standard operating procedure not because they worked effectively, but because they produced the least friction. The requirement to understand the role that other government agencies play in the overall concept of using psychological operations to support a national objective became very clear to military officials.

The military, and especially the Army, became aware of the need for a review of the basic doctrine and organizational structure for psychological operations to support foreign policy in a coordinated manner.⁴⁰

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS TODAY

The problems of conducting psychological operations continues to the present period. Currently, there are at least five elements of Government which have an active influence on whether psychological operations are used to support national objectives. They are the President, Congress, State Department, Defense Department and the United States Information Agency (USIA).

At the top of the apex in all matters relating to the formulation of foreign policy and the one person who can insure proper comsideration of psychological matters is the President. In his report to the Congress in 1970, President Nixon explained the foreign policy-making process and how the National Security Council would be used during his administration. It is interesting to note that in this report, the one agency responsible for advising the President on psychological operations, which is the United States Information Agency, was not even mentioned.⁴¹

State Department provides policy guidance to the United States Information Agency for the development of psychological operations support.⁴² As a rule, State Department continues to retain a reserve policy about the proper use of psychological operations in foreign affairs matters. However, as the official organization

in foreign affairs, nothing can be accomplished without guidance provided by State Department.

Congress continues to exert positive control over psychological operations through the approval of funds for the United States Information Agency and others involved in this type of activity. Congress has continued to retain a critical attitude toward informational activities and has required detailed justification for proposed programs.

The Defense Department, and specifically the Army, became actively engaged with psychological operations in South Vietnam. However, there is still a reluctance to establish a joint doctrine for the conduct of psychological operations. The focal point at Defense Department level for psychological operations is the International Security Affairs (ISA) office; however, because no specific position has been identified requiring this expertise, ISA must rely on the talent within the Joint Chiefs of Staff when addressing these matters. Lacking a formal joint or interagency doctrine for psychological operations, only broad planning and operational guidance is provided unified and specified commanders.

The Agency most responsible for planning psychological operations is the USIA. The relationship between the Director of the Agency and the President is the key factor in determining if USIA will be involved in an important way in the development of foreign policy and the support that psychological operations will provide.

The Director is not a member of the NSC and attends meetings only at the pleasure of the President. Therefore, the Director must exert μ_{IS} influence on day-to-day operations through the NSC Senior Review Group which is chaired by Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Frank Shakespeare, former Director of USIA, comments that "to have an effective propaganda operation within the US Government, we must put the director of the operation right into the scheme of things and use the organization as a finely orchestrated mechanism to achieve our goal. ^{77,1}s is not being one in our country, and I think it should be done."¹43

The history of United States psychological operations since World War I reveals a plausible explanation for current attitudes toward this type of activity. It is evident that the propaganda produced by George Creel and the Committee on Public Information oversold World War I. As a result, the United States used much of its effort in World War II trying to explain the war and the actions of allies, rather than directing the main thrust of propaganda toward the known and very difficult enemy. After the war, the United States was forced on the defensive by the Communist propaganda. In the process of trying to shake the credibility of Communist propaganda, the United States made everyone suspicious of all official explanations. However, for the future, as the United States visible overseas responsibilities recede, it should be possible to concentrate on a fewer number of counter propaganda programs, and to conduct an offensive psychological operations in a professional manner.

CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES

1. Ralph Block, "Propaganda and the Free Society," The Public Opinion Quarterly, Winter, 1948-1949, p. 678.

2. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 677.

3. James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, <u>Words That Won The War</u>, p. 5.

4. George Creel, How We Advertised America, p. 3.

5. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 4.

6. Paul Linebarger, Psychological Warfare, p. 67.

7. Mock and Larson, p. 19.

8. <u>Ibid</u>.

9. <u>Ibid</u>.

10. Creel, p. ix.

11. Raymond J. Barrett, "PSYOP - What Is It? And What Should We Do About It," <u>Military Review</u>, March 1972, p. 66.

12. Linebarger, p. 68.

13. Hans Speier, "The Future of Psychological Warfare," <u>Public</u> Opinion Quarterly, 12:7-8, Spring 1948, p. 5.

14. Ibid.

15. Thomas C. Sorensen, The World War. p. 9.

16. <u>ibid</u>.

17. <u>Ibid</u>., pp. 11, 12.

18. Ibid., p. 10.

19. Speier, p. 6.

20. Ibid.

- 21. Sorensen, p. 12.
- 22. Elliot Harris, The UnAmerican Weapon, p. 3.
- 23. Wallace Carroll, Persuade or Perish, p. 320.
- 24. Sorensen, p. 12.

25. Barrett, p. 66.

26. Sorensen, p. 22.

27. Ibid., p. 23.

28. Barrett, p. 66.

29. Sorensen, p. 25.

30. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 28.

31. Ibid.

32. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 26, 27.

33. Thomas K. Finletter, Power and Policy, p. 126.

34. Barrett, p. 67.

35. William E. Daugherty, <u>PSYOP in Perspective</u>, in American Institutes for Research, "The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application," pp. III-9, III-12.

36. John W. Henderson, <u>The United States Information Agency</u>, p. 243.

37. The United States Information Agency, <u>The Agency in Brief</u>, <u>1970</u>, p. 4.

38. Ibid.

39. Barrett, p. 68.

40. Daugherty, pp. III-13, III-14.

41. Richard Nixon, "US Foreign Policy for the 1970's," pp. 17-23.

42. The United States Information Agency, p. 3.

43. Frank Shakespeare, "Who's Winning the Propaganda War?," U.S. News and World Report, p. 51.

CHAPTER IV

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN THE 1970'S

For the first time in thirty years, the United States faces a considerably different geopolitical situation. The economic resource base is limited and will exercise a restraining influence on continued economic and military assistance programs abroad and defense spending at home. More is involved than an analysis of the shifting balance of power relationship as measured against the ever present risks of nuclear war. A review of American military experience is in order to prepare the United States national future in a same and responsible manner. One small segment of such a review would certainly include an overall perspective of psychological operations.¹

The evolution of psychological operations doctrine is an outgrowth of three concepts: (1) a felt national need for explaining America's position in and to the world; (2) a conviction that advertising is an instrument peculiar to the American genius and deserving of national attention; and (3) a reluctant acceptance of the proposition that psychological warfare represented a tactical weapons system usable in wartime circumstances.² From this basic design the United States slowly evolved a doctrine of use variously termed and organized as propaganda in World War I, psychological warfare in World War II, international information in the "Cold War" period, and psychological operations in the Korea-Vietnam era. This approach precluded the development of a single national doctrine,

and left the concept and programs fragmented among various agencies of government much as they are today. As a result, policy makers and national leaders were faced with a series of less than satisfactory half-triumphs and bureaucratic rivalries that by 1970 had caused an already skeptical Congress to wonder about the cost effectiveness of American psychological initiatives.³

The organizational impasse, while fundamental and serious, has been only one reason for the lack of progress in development of a viable psychological operations program. A more fundamental reason, derived from the very foundation of our national character, has been the American distrust of political intrigue, propaganda, and psychological manipulation. This distrust has existed despite impressive psychological victories in our history dating back to the impact of the Declaration of Independence. Unfortunately, this suspition still exists as reflected by Congressional refusal to permit the USIA to disseminate its output within the United States without prior and specific approval of Congress.⁴

This paper has been limited to a discussion of the American approach to psychological operations and doctrine. Similar treatment has not been given to the Communist approach; however, it is important to note that Communist nations appreciate both the high risks and high rewards of aggressive political and psychological warfare. The Soviet approach, contrary to the American technique, has not been "the word" but rather the hardened organizational cadre.

The Communists make no sharp separation between words and deeds, or between political and military warfare.⁵ Even though this nation has entered a period of negotiations, it is important to understand that basic Communist doctrine has not changed and must be considered in the development of our foreign policy.

The state of the art in the United States to conduct psychological operations could be summarized as follows: (1) the United States lacks a coherent, government-wide doctrine for the conduct of psychological operations; (2) the division among government agencies to accept psychological operations as a tool of foreign policy is still apparent; (3) the military has not fully accepted psychological operations as a necessary and fundamental tool in today's world of communications; and (4) the United States Information Agency, who is charged with the overall role for the conduct of psychological operations, still prefers to apply its energies toward information and cultural activities, rather than to a persuasive and meaningful propaganda program.⁶

What actions are required to face the realities of a failing psychological operations program? First, in view of a future based on a policy of negotiations by the United States and in the face of a world continuing to be confronted with revolutions, nationalism, and an ever present Communist effort, the necessity for a viable psychological doctrine and organization to support our foreign policy must be fully acknowledged. A loss of authority by State Department,

or a reluctant USIA, or the slow progress of the military in developing its expertise in and sensitivity to psychological operations, should not prevent a continuing and vigorous attempt by the government to correct these shortcomings and to move forward with a viable program.

An important function that should be continued is the information and cultural programs conducted by the United States Information Agency. These programs are essential to establish a basic groundwork of familiarity with the United States and its overseas programs and can serve as a foundation for psychological operations.

To win the "war of words," it will be necessary to reach key foreign groups and decision-makers through an effective psychological operations program of communications and actions to insure that their concept of the "truth" does not conflict with the United States' national interest.

History tells us that a single agency in government designated to guide a total mational program for psychological operations has never been practicable. Eventually such an agency is forced to tread on the legal operational responsibilities of other agencies who also have an interest in the conduct of foreign policy programs. The Creel Committee of World War I and the Psychological Strategy Board that operated during the Truman administration are convincing evidence that a single agency would operate under excessive restraint.

In any case, the USIA has been inclined not to accept this role; and, as stated, there is a definite advantage for leaving the USIA to pursue its traditional role of conducting information and cultural program. The State Department is not staffed to assume such a role, and if it were responsible for this coordination, the Department might find that its role as the visible representative of the United States overseas compromised. Other government agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Department, are even more limited for the broad responsibilities that would be required for a government-wide psychological operations program to support national objectives.⁷

From information provided, it can be concluded that certain factors should be stressed in structuring a psychological operations program: (1) The United States cannot ignore the fact that psychological factors are essential elements of our national security policies and program. The new era of negotiations make it imperative that the proper climate be established to further international relations; (2) Since psychological operations are designed to influence key foreign groups, it consists of activities more than just an information and exchange program. This dows not mean that trickery and deceit must be used. As a rule, psychological operations involve a judicious combination of diplomatic, military, and economic activities to strengthen understanding of United States purposes and to foster actions by others likely to assist in achieving those goals; (3)

Psychological operations should be selected with care and limited to those efforts that will provide substantial benefits to the United States; (4) By being selective in the limited psychological operations to be conducted will permit the collection and use of appropriate intelligence data; (5) By defining the specific efforts and how they would be approached will make it easier to allay the fears of Congress and domestic opinion that psychological operations are deceitful and not under positive control.⁸

From the historical review, it would appear that a possible location where psychological operations direction could be attained would be within the National Security Council system.⁹ This is not to imply that considerations are not now being given by officials to the psychological operations impact on foreign affairs. In fact, recent events in the Vietnam peace negotiations would indicate that the psychological aspects were of great importance. In any event, a structural change within the NSC system would provide the continuity between changing administrations and the status of psychological operations.

A partial solution would be to have a position within the NSC staff designated specifically as an advisor to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. This advisor would be knowledgeable in the field of psychological operations and would be responsible for identifying opportunities which might provide substantial benefit. The advisor's suggestions would be provided directly to the Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs. If the advice proved to have merit and supported national objectives, after considering all other aspects of the foreign policy equation, it could then be introduced into the NSC system. In this manner any decision to use psychological operations would have been coordinated at the highest level and could then be included in a directive issued to appropriate agencies. The directive would assign tasks to be accomplished and require continuing coordination between the participating agencies.

It is important that the advisor should not have either directive or operational authority. His role would be to monitor and to recommend the support of psychological operations where an impact could be obtained. No attempt would be made to include psychological operations in every possible situation of foreign policy.

It is possible to state an alternate bet of observations which ties together explicitly the history of psychological operations, its theory, and suggested solutions to the problems as set forth above. First, it must be pointed out that World War I psychological operations were the responsibility of one man, George Creel. His policies clearly oversold the war, which led to a general distrust of the entire propaganda enterprise. In the many attempts to balance this distrust, psychological operations were split into clandestine operations under the OSS and the Central Intelligence

Agency. This left the Office of War Information to attack the problems at a higher cultural level. When the Government did not retain a similar propaganda effort at home after the war, the Communist nations had a clear field to attack the United States as an imperialistic nation.

As Allies became enemies (e.g. Russia and China), the United States Government did not possess an apparatus that could deal effectively with the strong Communist line. The USIA proved to be unprepared to conduct programs which could assist in molding foreign opinions. In addition, fragmentation of effort continued to exist among various agencies who had a share of the responsibility for psychological operations. It is the opinion of the author that a review of the historical aspects of psychological operations, together with an understanding of its theory and actual practice today, suggest that the proposal to effect necessary change through the National Security Council system is the only and proper course to follow.

Psychological operations have become an essential part of the world scene and international politics, whether nations are ready to accept it or not. To promote a viable national security program, psychological operations should be considered during the planning, the execution, and the evaluation of foreign policy. It is even more important, however, to recognize that psychological operations consist of both communications with the foreign audience in addition to positive actions. Physical actions, such as the movement of a

naval force overseas, must be viewed in light of the psychological impact that they may have on United States foreign policy. The same consideration is true with economic and political actions. In brief, the United States image abroad is the result of many facets, and these facets require maximum coordination to persuade a foreign audience to view this country as we would wish for them to see us.

The final question might be: Can the United States, under a democratic government and in peacetime, engage in psychological operations--the total coordination of diplomatic, economic, military and psychological programs in support of national policies? There are many who would answer with an emphatic "no." The proper answer would be, in the opinion of the author, an unqualified "yes." In the immediate future, America must be prepared to coordinate national programs in peacetime as well as during periods of conflict. This will require maximum coordination between the various governmental agencies that play a role in inclementing foreign policy, and more importantly, for creating psychological conditions that will best support national objectives.

Kenner hE Pruett. KENNETH E. PRUETT

NNETH E. PRUETI L INF

CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

1. Robert F. Delaney, <u>Psychological Operations in the 1970's:</u> <u>A Program in Search of a Doctrine</u>, in American Institutes for Research, "The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application," p. I-1.

2. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. I-3.

3. Ibid., p. I-4.

4. Ibid.

5. Wilbur Schramm, "Soviet Psychological Warfare," <u>A</u> <u>Psychological Warfare Casebook</u>, ed. by William E. Daugherty, p. 780.

6. Raymond Barrett, "PSYOP: What Is It?" <u>Military Review</u>, March, 1972, pp. 69-72.

7. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 70.

8. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 70, 71.

9. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 71.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

- American [Nstitutes for Research. <u>The Art and Science of</u> <u>Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military</u> <u>Application</u>. Unpublished Draft Report. Kensington, Md.: 1972. Chapter I, "Psychological Operations in the 1970's: A Program in Search of a Doctrine", Robert F. Delaney; Chapter III, PSYOP in Perspective, William E. Daugherty.
- Barrett, Raymond. "PSYOP: What Is It?" <u>Military Review</u>, Vol. LII, March 1972, pp. 57-72.
- 3. Block, Ralph. "Propaganda and the Free Society." <u>The Public</u> <u>Opinion Quarterly</u>, Winter, 1948-49, pp. 678-686.
- 4. Carroll, Wallace. <u>Persuade or Perish</u>. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948. (D810 P663)
- 5. Choukas, Michael. <u>Propaganda Comes of Age</u>. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965.
- 6. Creel, George. <u>How We Advertised America</u>. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1920. (D632 C86)
- 7. Daugherty, William E., and Janowitz, Morris. <u>A Psychological</u> <u>Warfare Casebook</u>. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1956. (UB275 J59)
- 8. Dyer, Murray. <u>The Weapon on the Wall</u>. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1959. (UB276 D8)
- 9. Elder, Robert E. <u>The Information Machine</u>. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968. (E744.5 E541)
- 10. Finletter, Thomas K. <u>Power and Policy</u>. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1954. (E835 F5)
- 11. Harris, Elliot. <u>The UnAmerican Weapon</u>. New York: M.W. Lads Publishing Co., 1967. (UB275 H33)
- 12. Henderson, John. <u>The United States Information Agency</u>. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. (E744.5 H4)
- Lasswell, Harold Dwight. <u>Propaganda Technique in the World</u> War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927. (D639 P6L33)
- 14. Lasswell, Harold Dwight, et al. Psychological Warfare. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1951. (E744 H43)

- Lasswell, Harold Dwight. <u>Propaganda and Promotional Acitivites</u>. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1935. (HM263 29L3)
- 16. Lavine, Harold, and Welchsler, James. <u>War Propaganda and the</u> <u>United States</u>. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940.
- Lerner, Daniel. <u>Propaganda in War and Crisis</u>. New York: George W. Stewart Publishers, Inc., 1951. (UB275 I4)
- Lerner, Daniel. <u>SYKEWAR</u>. New York: George W. Stewart, Publisher, Inc., 1949. (D810 P6L42)
- 19. Linebarger, Paul M.A. <u>Psychological Warfare</u>. Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces Press, 1954. (UB275 LS1)
- 20. London, Kurt. The Making of Foreign Policy. New York: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1965. (JX1391 L6)
- 21. Mock, James R., and Larson, Cedric. <u>Words That Won The War</u>. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939. (D632 M6)
- 22. Morgenthau, Hans J. <u>Politics Among Nations</u>. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967. (JX1391 M59)
- 23. Nixon, Richard. <u>US Foreign Policy For the 1970's, A New Strategy</u> <u>for Peace</u>. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 18 Feb 1970. (JX1416 A675)
- Palmer, Norman D., and Perkins, Howard C. <u>International Relations</u>. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969. (JX1391 P35)
- 25. Sava, George. <u>War Without Guns</u>. London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1942. (D810 P653)
- 26. Scott, Andrew MacKay. <u>The Revolution in Statecraft</u>. New York: Random House, 1965. (JX1395 S35)
- 27. Sorensen, Thomas. <u>The Word War</u>. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1968. (E744.5 S6)
- 28. Shakespeare, Frank. 'Who's Winning The Propaganda War?" US News and World Report, 1 May 1972, pp. 48-52.
- 29. Speier, Hans. "The Future of Psychological Warfare." <u>Public</u> <u>Opinion Quarterly</u>, Vol. 12:7-8, Spring, 1948, pp. 5-T8.
- Speier, Hans and Davison, Phillips. <u>Psychological Aspects of</u> <u>Foreign Policy</u>. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 15 Dec 1954. (Rand P-615)

- 31. Szunyogh, Bela. <u>Psychological Warfare</u>. New York: The William Frederich Press, 1955. (UR275 S9).
- United States Information Agency, <u>The Agency in Brief, 1970</u>. Washington, D.C.: 1970.
- 33. US Department of the Army. <u>Field Manual 33-1</u>: Psychological Operations US Army Doctrine. Washington, D.C.: Feb 1971.
- 34. <u>US Government Organizational Manual</u>, 1972/73. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1972. (JK421 A3).
- 35. US Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS Pub. 1, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington, D.C.: 3 Jan 1972.
- 36. van De Velde, Robert W., and Holt, Robert J. <u>Strategi</u>, <u>Psychological Operations</u>. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960. (E744 H6).
- 37. Whitton, John Boardman, ed. <u>Propaganda and the Cold War</u>. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1963. (E744.5 P7).