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ODYSSEY'S END _ (ISRAEL: THE SPOILS OF
WAR)

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1 September 1972

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
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BY

COLONEL CLIFFORD E. HALL
ADJUTANT GENERAL CORPS

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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA



USARV'S RESEARCH REPORT
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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Clifford W. Hall, Col., AID
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This essay recalls the heritage of the people of Israel and their need for a Jewish National Home, to which all Jews could return after centuries of wandering in exile about the face of the globe. Data were gathered from a search of the literature, and personal interviews were held with individuals considered expert in the subject. Arab-Israeli relationship is discussed along with the difficulties involved in effecting a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. A justification of Israeli retention of territory captured in the 1967 war is made on the grounds that it is needed for defense and the economic improvement which would accrue to the land and the peoples of the occupied territories. The conclusion discusses prospects for a peace settlement in the Middle East and recommends U.S.-Israel strategy for the next decade.

I BACKGROUND

Historically, the association of the Jewish people with Jerusalem dates back to the Patriarch Abraham, the founding father of Judaism. According to the Old Testament, the first explicit promise of Palestine was made by God to the descendants of Abraham: "Into thy seed will I give this land."¹ Although this promise is generally believed to have been made to the Jews alone, it could have included the Arabs as well, for the Jews descended through Abraham's son Isaac, while the Arabs descended through another son, Ishmael. Deuteronomy, however, teaches the Lord himself set aside Israel for the Jews.² The Bible recounts the narratives of Abraham, Jacob, and other patriarchs who, with their tribes, were established in the Palestine area sometime about the end of the twelfth century B.C. The concept of Jerusalem as "the Holy City" dates from the time David made Jerusalem the cornerstone of the religious and cultic unification of Israel. David, who then remained for all subsequent history, the ideal of a herow king, and the prototype of the expected Messiah, is the father of the city as it has evolved in history. Fittingly, he was buried within its walls, and his tomb remains a venerated shrine, as it has been for Jewish pilgrims across the unbroken centuries.

The territory of Jerusalem, Palestine, and the surrounding land

¹The Old Testament, Genesis 12:7

²Ibid., Deuteronomy, 12:21

is not in the same sense the homeland of Christianity and Islam as it is Judaism. Christianity is represented by strong Christian states around the globe. There is nowhere a desire of homeless Christians to return to the original land of their religion. By the same token, the homeland of Islam is Arabia. In Jerusalem stands one of the holiest shrines of the world for Moslems; however, these three world religions --- Jewish, Christian, Islam --- regard Jerusalem as a sacred city, and seek equality of access to its shrines and venerated areas. Under present Israeli administration, free access to all shrines by all people is permitted. Such was not the case under the former Jordanian administration of Jerusalem. It should be noted also, that during the long period of Islamic rule, with its kaleidoscopic changes of dynasty, no claimant to the throne of caliphs, or even to a separate sovereignty, ever emerged from its population. Its land and the city were the alternate prey of dynasties ruling from Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, or Istanbul. Only in the 20th Century have Arabs resumed a separate identity, and that initially by the will of outsiders rather than by the will of their own population.

About 1225 B.C., an independent Hebrew kingdom was established under Saul and continued under the reigns of David (c.1013-c.973) and Solomon (c.973-c.933). After Solomon's death, the Hebrew kingdom was divided into the northern Kingdom of Israel and the southern kingdom of Judah. The former was conquered by the Assyrians in 722 B.C. and its population - the ten lost tribes of Israel - dispersed as far as the Caucasus. The kingdom of Judah, consisting of

the other two tribes of Israel, lasted until 586 B.C., when most of the population was taken into Chaldea - the Babylonian captivity. Some 40,000 to 50,000 Judean captives were returned to Palestine about 519 B.C., when the Persians defeated the Chaldeans. The limited autonomy the Persians had permitted the repatriated Jews was not disturbed by Alexander the Great's conquest of Palestine in 333 B.C. However, in resistance to Hellenic influences, succeeding generations of Jews either left or were later driven out by the then conquering Romans.³ The Romans completed Jewish eviction from Palestine about 135 A.D., from which time they have steadfastly maintained that they would return. In the 7th century A.D., the Arabs wrested control of Palestine from the Romans and have lived there ever since. Jews have been wanderers for two thousand years. But in the twentieth century, America and Palestine made Jews into something more than wanderers; they were made into immigrants, a political entity. Because they were immigrants, they became, after the fashion of America and Palestine, true pioneers.⁴

"Israel in a country which is pervaded by the past," Colonel Verelstam has said. "The Bible is concealed behind the slightest elevation of the soil. Ancient voices may be heard clearly in its valleys and deserts. Every single stone has a story to tell."⁵

³"Palestine," Collier's Encyclopedia, 1923 ed., Vol 18
⁴Harry Golden, The Israelis, passim.
⁵Lester Kollie, Count Down in the Holy Land, p.118.

Also, it is no coincidence that archeology is the national hobby in Israel. Abba Eban, Israel's Foreign Minister, once pointed out that there is no other place in the world where a child can dig up in the garden, a stone 3,000 years old, and read and understand every word on it.⁶

II ARAB - ISRAELI MIGRANT RESTRICTIONS

Although Palestine is rich in both ancient and biblical history, its contemporary political history begins generally during the period of the First World War with the collapse and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Prior to World War I, Palestine and most of the area now occupied by the Arab States were part of the Ottoman Empire. The breakup of that empire as a result of the war made it possible to offer independence to both Arabs and Jews. Both aspired to sovereignty of Palestine, and both had a claim. To obtain the much-needed help of both peoples during WW II, the British had made conflicting promises. The Arabs had been promised their independence in a greater Arab state, including, according to their understanding, the territory of Palestine. The Jews had been promised help in establishing a national home in the same territory. During the war, the British Government issued the Balfour Declaration (See Exhibit A) which recognized the historic connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and promised to help restore a national home for the Jews

⁶Golden, p.16.

in that country. In 1922 the League of Nations gave Great Britain a mandate over Palestine to carry out the purposes of the Balfour Declaration. At first Arab leaders were not opposed to the establishment of a national home for the Jews, but it soon became apparent that better pay and living conditions under the Jews were undermining the Arab feudal system, and the Arab sheiks (landlords) began a long campaign to oppose the establishment of the State of Israel. Between 1921 and 1939, Arabs fought with terrorism and strikes; the British, siding to the Arabs, finally issued a white paper on the eve of World War II, restricting Jewish immigration and colonization. After the war, the conflict between the Jews and Arabs was renewed. The British Government finally decided to turn the question over to the U.N. for its recommendation. The U.N. Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), an 11-nation commission, recommended the partition of the country into two separate States, one Arab and one Jewish (See Map Annex B), with a corpus separatum for Jerusalem. The United States and the Soviet Union supported this recommendation. The Jews, who claimed all of Palestine, accepted the compromise partition resolution. But the Arab States rejected it and announced that they would go to war to block it. On May 14, 1948, the British terminated the mandate and left the country. On the same day the Jewish leadership in Palestine proclaimed the establishment of the State of Israel. Also, on that day the Arab armies of Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, and Lebanon invaded the new State in an effort to destroy it. The Arab State which had been recommended in the U.N. resolution never came into existence as the

Arab armies tried to seize the areas allotted to the Arab sector of the Jewish section for themselves. Egypt seized the Gaza Strip. Transjordan occupied the West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem. The fighting was brought to an end under four separate armistice agreements negotiated between Israel and each of the Arab countries, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria, during February through July 1949, under the auspices of Dr. Ralph Bunche. (See Map Annex C). Thus, a war which the Arabs had believed would take but a few weeks to bring to an end, turned out for them to be a crushing and dramatic blow, an ignominious defeat which, to this day, remains a humiliating blow to the pride and prestige of the Arab world. As Count Bernadotte (U.N. Mediator in Palestine) recorded in his final report, "the Jewish State was not born in peace as was hoped for in the Resolution of November 29, (1947) but rather in violence and bloodshed."⁷ When the United Nations decided in 1947 to partition Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states, it had not anticipated that there would be any major population disruption. As a result of the fighting which occurred, it did develop that about 726,000 Arabs abandoned their homes and became refugees. A small number moved on to other countries, but a considerably greater number took refuge in Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Gaza Strip. Thus, while the fighting had solved the Jewish question of providing the Jew in Diaspora with the national home for which his kind had long yearned, non-acceptance

⁷United Nations, Palestine Progress Report, 16 Sept. 48, p.5.

of the partition plan had created a new one: what to do with the about three-quarter million Arabs that had been displaced in the process?

In 1956 the Israelis, with the help of the British and French, tried to settle their outstanding political and economic differences with the Arabs by invading the Sinai Peninsula. Arab terrorist attacks during the year had formed a major role in the decision to go to war. Although they were successful militarily, they jointly suffered a complete political setback in the United Nations and were forced to yield up all the ground they had gained. This campaign had no ultimate significant effect on the refugee population. However, 1967 was another matter. In June of that year, the Israelis, alone on this occasion, invaded Arab territories, again because of political and economic differences. This time the refugee situation was considerably affected because the Israelis, who then numbered upward of two million, seized and have since held 26,000 square miles of Arab territory, giving Israel control of an area about four times the size of its 1948 armistice frontiers.⁸ (See Tab Exhibit D). According to Harry Goldin, "Israel now resembles the profile of the jaw-bone of an ass with which Janson flailed the Philistines."

The inability of the Arabs to recognize that the Jewish people have any human right or legitimate claim to establish a national

⁸Victor E. Deinore, The Arab Refugee Problem to 1968, p.54.

home in Palestine seems, finally, to come from a deeper source than the mere intransigence of political passion. The barriers to understanding are the product of a cultural isolation. If the Arabs are incapable of appreciating or acknowledging the human reality of Israel, their failure may be due in part to the rigidities of a religion that is so inalterably based on law and divorced from history. Judaism in a sense is no less rigid; it preserves a body of detailed prescriptions and a mass of minute legislation that not even Islam can rival. But unlike the Arabs, the Jews traveled throughout the world and shared in its cultural adventures and, through the centuries, had their unique experience of encounter and exodus, of change and mobility within the processes of history. Remembering their past greatness and treasuring the memory, the Arabs ask themselves: why, with our culture and our history, are we no longer great? Why aren't we a success? It is a painful question and a source of great internal suffering. The fact remains, though, that the Arabs of Palestine had never had a nation in the thirteen hundred years they had lived there; history had never granted them one; they belonged in that sense to a prepolitical age. They had had no representative leadership, and the Palestinian leaders they had in the days of the mandate, the men of wealth and influence on the Arab Higher Committee, were violent, corrupt and self-seeking. But with all these political deficiencies, the attachment of the people to their Palestinian lands was nonetheless intimate and deep. This was their tragedy. It was idle to think there could ever be a just solution for everyone, illusory to hope that

all wrongs could somehow be repaired, and impossible to envisage a settlement that could redeem the rights of all those who, through the toils of history had inherited an ancient claim to live in Palestine.⁹

The study of the Arab mind and temperament occupies some of the most gifted analysts in Israeli Intelligence. General Y. Parkati, a former Army Intelligence chief, has pointed out that the Arab is a loner, mistrustful of his fellows, quarrelsome in his home. He does not involve himself in the collective team effort to win wars. There is a lack of cohesion in Arab society, General Parkati has found, that reaches down into the family. This lack emerged when journalists probed the family background of Sirhan Fawzi Sirhan, the man accused of murdering Robert F. Kennedy. Knowing this lack of cohesion in Arab society and the Arab's tendency to go from euphoria to despair when things go wrong, the Israelis could plan to hit the Arabs as hard as they could at the outset, to shift the fortunes of war immediately. The Israelis took advantage of another known flaw in the Arab character: the Arab tendency to hide unpleasant reality beneath a dream or a lie. In anticipation of exaggerated Arab claims of victory, General Moshe Dayan ordered a blackout of war bulletins during the first day of the 1967 war. The Egyptians claimed such exaggerated victories over the Israeli Air Force that --- with no disclaimers from

⁹Winston Purdett, Encounter with The Middle East, pp. 41-75.

the Israelis --- the Russians stilled U.N. moves for a ceasefire. By the time the Russians learned the truth and pressed for a ceasefire, it was too late to salvage the Egyptian armies.¹⁰ Congressman Long, of Maryland, has described the Egyptians as a "nappy-to-lucky, un-warlike people, very disorganized."

III CAPTURED TERRITORIES

Israel's policies in the Arab-inhabited regions it occupies show an obstinate hardening and seem marked by a trend toward a kind of "creeping annexationism," some critics of the government have recently charged. However, it would appear that the pressures on Israel's government come rather from what some might term the right but what perhaps should more accurately be described as the annexationists, those who for historic, chauvinistic, and security reasons want Israel to keep as much as possible of the Arab land it now occupies.

Israel's occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula has had an impact on the Israeli economy. The direct costs of occupation may be offset by the direct and indirect economic benefits, primarily the oil from the Sinai Peninsula. However, the indirect effects of the war --- the increasing belligerence, the border clashes and Arab guerrilla hostilities, and, most important, the large-scale rearming of the Arab

¹⁰Veale, pp. 125-126.

states by the Soviets --- have created a situation in which the post war military budgets of Israel far exceed the prewar defense burden, which was inordinately high by any standard.

The West Bank's economy has undergone some important changes during the years of Israeli occupation. Agriculture, in this 2126 square miles of land, has assumed an even more important role in the economy than before the war. The trend toward modernisation has been accelerated. Industry, tourism, trade, commerce, have all regained their prewar levels and exceeded them. The expanding economy in Israel and in the West Bank should, directly and indirectly, further reduce unemployment and underemployment. Israel's unprecedented liberal policy of allowing the West Bank to continue to do business with the Arab World and, on the other hand, giving them access to the Mediterranean ports helped that economy tremendously.

The Gaza Strip was part of Palestine under the British mandate. During the Arab-Israeli war of 1947-48 it was occupied by Egypt. The influx of refugees from the territory which became part of Israel, exceeded the indigenous population of the area. Egypt governed the Strip as a separate administration territory. Strip residents were not accorded Egyptian citizenship. They were not allowed to leave the area except in special cases. Land area of the Gaza Strip is 10 square miles. Of the territories taken by Israel in the Six-Day War, the Gaza Strip is the smallest, the most densely populated, and economically burdensome. The active opposition to Israeli presence is undoubtedly stronger than elsewhere. In 1957 when the Gaza Strip was returned to Egypt, all Arabs who cooperated

with Israel were killed. The uncertainty of the future, and fear from retaliation from its own leaders, is no doubt a factor in the Arab attitude in Gaza. Israeli leadership is convinced that its strategic value to Israel's security necessitates the retention of the area when, and if, any political settlement with the Arab states takes place. The restructuring of the postwar Gaza economy will be long-term; however, the rapid expansion of light industry and increasing trade with Israel, promises to reverse the bleak, if not hopeless, outlook of the residents and refugees under the former administrators. Recent reports would indicate implementation of plans for Israeli settlements in the southern Gaza Strip and the adjoining northern Sinai.

The Sinai Peninsula is by far the largest of the territories taken during the Six-Day War. Total area is over 23,000 square miles, almost three times the size of the territory held by Israel before the war. Oil and mineral potential of Sinai, in addition to pumping of existing wells, may make it the most valuable of the territories taken by Israel. Reports have it that Israeli leaders are considering a pilot project for the settlement of Arab refugees from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the El Arish area. The conclusion that seems to be warranted is that pending a political settlement, present policies of small-scale development of agriculture and some related industries and tourism will be undertaken with a minimum investment. If negotiations fail, and Israel becomes convinced that a political settlement is unattainable and its stay is of indefinite duration, and resources for investment become avail-

able, a period of more rapid development might ensue.

The Golan Heights is mainly a plateau with an area of 444 square miles. It was taken from Syria during the Six-Day War. The economy is agricultural. All actions of the Israeli authorities regarding the Golan since the war have been based on its permanent settlement, and the economic development plans include its complete integration into the Israeli economy. At least 10 new settlements have been established in the area since the war, with ten more in prospect. The importance which Israeli leaders attach to the retention of the Golan Heights, primarily from a point of view of security, means that it will have priority in the development plans and in resource allocation.¹¹

IV PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

The problem is that the Arabs are having a war with their own tormented vision of themselves. It is not only Israel that the Arabs hate so much, and less the Jews because they are Jews. But the fact that the Arabs believe that the West, acting from guilt after the extermination of six million Jews in Nazi Europe between 1941 and 1945, imposed Israel on them, and then abandoned them in admiration for Israel. What the Jews brought to Israel that was offensive to the Arabs was not their Jewishness. It was their westernisation and their ability to succeed. This infuriates the Arabs.

¹¹ Joseph K. Berman, The Economic Impact of the Six-Day War, pp. 4-201.

As an Israeli official recently put it: "Even if a final peace settlement were signed tomorrow, it would not wipe out the decades of hate in the Middle East. So much hatred and suspicion cannot be wiped out by treaties and government regulations." The Arab nations have not recognized and indicate they will not recognize what they regard as an alien state forced upon them, planted in the Arab world by the West as an outpost of colonialism. Israel, they maintained, has followed an expansionist policy, expansion at the expense of the Arab States, and any acceptance of the status quo would be a concession to the expansionist policy. The land lost to Israel in the 1967 war must be returned before any agreement can be reached. The Arabs have offered to accept the State of Israel as it existed prior to the June 1967 aggression. The Arab nations have publicly agreed to abide by the decisions of the international community, as they agreed in 1948-49 and 1956-57; they have offered to abide by the decision of the International Court of Justice on the question of free passage through international waters.

The issue, for Jews, is national survival. Zionists believe that the lack of a national territory to survive in will result in national disintegration. To three million Israelis, the issue is individual as well as national survival. They also feel the fate of every Jew in the world is linked to the fate of Israel. It is not strange, therefore, to find that Israel, having been born by the sword and having grown by the sword, has developed a single minded Spartan reliance on force in dealing with the Arabs.

Israel has maintained the position that the only way to achieve

a permanent peace in the Middle East is through direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab States. Any four-power or two-power imposed settlement, in the Israeli view, would in the future be repudiated by the Arabs on the grounds that it was imposed upon them and that they therefore were not bound to abide by it. According to the Israelis, other arrangements involving intermediaries were unsuccessful: (1) the Armistice Agreements of 1948-49 were reached through the mediation of a third party, the United Nations, and the Arabs did not abide by the agreements; (2) the 1956-57 conflict was settled through the United Nations and the Arabs violated the cease-fire and the United Nations Emergency Force agreements. Having been "burned" twice, the Israelis insist on direct negotiations and a contractual peace agreement signed by the Arabs. Mediation, they argue, has enabled the Arabs to avoid the recognition of Israel, despite Israel's recognition by the major powers and most of the international community. Direct negotiation will thus force the Arabs to accept the State of Israel and lead to a more "secure agreement."

Israel believes that any settlement arranged or guaranteed by either the Soviet Union or France, who have taken a pro-Arab stand since the Six-Day War, will inevitably be in conflict with Israeli interests. Rather than accept the word of these two nations, the Israelis would prefer to rely on their own devices, as they have done in the past, and upon the friendship of the United States, from which the Israelis ask only to buy arms and a neutralizing of the Arab position. Anything less than a directly contracted peace treaty

is temporary folly which they believe will only give the Arabs time to prepare for their next aggression against the State of Israel.¹²

While there is a certain unanimity among nations that Israel has a right to exist, there is no unanimity that Israel has a right to win wars. The Arabs refuse peace because they can get along without it more easily than the Israelis. The state of war is presently the sole unifying factor in the Arab world. It creates some degree of social cohesion and unity of purpose. They continue to place their hope in belligerence. They are the many against the few. They could suffer the crushing defeat of their armies in the field, retreat into their space and rely on time and their numbers to redress the balance. They can look forward to the day when their re-established and reunited armies might achieve in war the ultimate goal they hoped for, the liquidation of the State of Israel. Every defeat was an incitement to fight again. Every battle lost remobilized their passion and reared their intransigence. For the Arabs, every war was only a single battle; and after it they could withdraw, wait and prepare for the battle to come. For Israel, the position was the reverse. Every war that she fought had to be devastating, conclusive and short. Any war that she lost would be her last.¹³

The arms race between the Arabs and the Jews is serious. Each side feels a compelling need to be superior to the other. The United

¹²Hon. Charles C. Diggs, Jr., Report of Special Study Mission to Israel, H. Res. 143 Committee Print, (Sept. 1969), p.5.
¹³Burdett, p.123.

States, Great Britain, Russia, and France at one time or another have all sold weapons to both sides. The last two countries have been hard to influence. As long as the balance remains relatively stable, the chances of further war are held down. If the balance begins to get out of hand again, it may lead either to a preemptive strike by the weaker side before a clear superiority is achieved by the other, or to nuclear proliferation in an attempt to keep ahead.

What are the chances for nuclear proliferation? Where Israel is concerned, they are good. She has a native source of uranium, a nuclear reactor capable of converting uranium into plutonium, a technical capability to make nuclear weapons, and aircraft which can deliver an atomic weapon, and a rocket system under development which could also fulfill delivery needs. Self-restraint is the only thing which keeps Israel from having a few nuclear weapons right now, if, in fact, this premise is valid, because recent Soviet reports indicate that Israel already possesses nuclear arms.

A study prepared for the United Nations Association of the U.S. named Israel as one of seven countries that could produce an atomic bomb within eight months to two years from the time a decision was made. Some experts believe Israel needs only six months to a year.¹⁴

As for the Arab nations, the chances of nuclear proliferation are poor. They lack the wherewithal to produce their own weapons. It is most unlikely that the USSR or Communist China would provide

¹⁴ibid., p.211.

the Arab countries with nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has little interest in a new flare-up of fighting at a time when the Kremlin is concentrating on detente with Europe and the United States.

What are the chances for preventing nuclear proliferation in the Middle East? Pretty good. As long as the balance of power does not get out of hand, each side will probably be receptive to the idea.¹⁵

What then, are the prospects for peace in the Middle East in the next decade? Let us examine Israel's neighbors five years after the cease-fire. From a military point of view, Lebanon is, and has been, the most pacific of Israel's neighbors, and the Lebanese government does its best to control the Palestinians on its territory. The Bar-Lev line along the Suez Canal has been almost completely quiet for nearly two years. Since King Hussein suppressed the guerrillas in Jordan, there has been no threat from that quarter. There have been occasional incidents on the occupied Golan Heights but the Syrians are keeping their Palestinians on a tight rein and not risking any confrontation there which might involve their own forces. From a civilian point of view, the Israeli economy is booming. New housing is growing up everywhere, and tourists abound, undeterred by threats of terrorism. Unemployment is practically non-existent, and the Arab occupants of the so called "administered zones," the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, share in this prosperity to an in-

¹⁵Ralph G. Kristoferson, Col., The Middle East: Opportunity For Double Detente. Essay (Carlisle Barracks, 9 Nov 67) p.12.

creasingly greater extent. Time is beginning to take its toll, and the Israelis are encouraged by what they feel to be a shift in sentiment "from hostility to indifference" among the Arab population of these areas.

Foreign Minister Abba Eban continues to emphasize Israel's readiness to negotiate with her Arab neighbors, particularly Egypt, either on an interim or a permanent settlement, either directly or through "close proximity" talks as the United States has suggested. Negotiation, however, appears to be a long way off in view of present Arab beliefs that negotiation would amount to capitulation. Israeli leaders have announced a firm intention to hold on to certain Arab territories which the Arabs absolutely refuse to concede. Since the territories in question fall within the purview of "secure and recognized boundaries" sought by the Security Council decision of 1967, and the "secure borders" demanded by Israel as essential to Israeli security, a discussion of the Israeli position concerning occupied territories is in order.

Since its establishment, Israel has never had secure borders and has always been faced with external threats. These are the main reasons why war broke out three times in 20 years. This is why those who really want peace --- and not just a respite between the third war and a fourth --- must ensure secure borders to all the countries in the region. To Israel, secure borders are both a condition to peace and its inalienable national right under international law. There is wide-spread recognition that the lines occupied on June 5, 1967 are not satisfactory as permanent frontiers and that the estab-

lishment of just and lasting peace requires the establishment of new and more viable frontiers. In 1957 the United States, acting as broker, negotiated an understanding between Egypt and Israel, in terms of which Israel agreed to withdraw its forces altogether from Sinai, Sharm el-Sheik, and from the Gaza Strip in return for certain assurances. Those assurances were not written down in any one document, but are represented in a scenario of public statements, designed to protect Nasser from seeming to negotiate with Israel.¹⁶ Those assurances included Israel's right to use the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal. Despite the big power guarantees, those assurances were unilaterally broken.

For Israel, present lines are ideal, militarily. Trying to take and hold additional tracts of territory would only create more difficult lines to defend and would not impose any significant loss on the enemy. Almost as important in Israeli eyes, further acquisition of territory would entail the burden of dealing with Arab population of those territories, a headache the Israelis would as soon avoid, in view of current difficulties in areas they have already occupied. Another factor is that across the canal, they might risk Soviet intervention. Present lines make invasion difficult for Arabs, and give Israel breathing room and maneuvering room. The UAR sector is reduced from 210 to 100 miles, with a water barrier, which would force the UAR to effect an amphibious cap-

¹⁶Gen. Victor Rostow, Statement before House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, 3 Nov 71, p.147.

ability on any future invasion. The Jordanian lines are significantly shorter with a river barrier and a better defensive position. The Syrian front was always critical, but Israeli positions are now occupying the high ground and are in a good defensive position.

It becomes obvious, then, that Israel could not, and should not, return to her June 5, 1967 lines. In fact, many Israelis feel so strongly about the Straits of Tiran (whose closure precipitated two wars), that they would prefer war with Sharm el-Sheik than peace without it! Israeli generals in particular, feel that the present military lines --- even though unaccepted by the other side --- represent the best possible, the only certain, assurance of Israel's security. The tacit hope in the back of almost everyone's mind is that in the course of time the Arabs, once convinced they have no real alternative, will at last accept them.

V CONCLUSIONS

The Middle East is in the throes of the Age of Nationalism. To suggest at this point a solution to suit a post-nationalistic age demonstrates neither farsightedness nor idealism; it is at best irrelevant. Those who wish to consider a speedy political solution must have the humility to consider reality. Changing the Arab position on the acceptance of Israel would not involve a political or diplomatic act alone, but a national transformation. Arab leaders repeatedly declare that if Israel does not withdraw to the former borders, they will force her back by renewing the war. The urge for vengeance and to wipe out the shame of defeat is strong

among the Arab military. Yet memories of the Six-Day war serve as deterrents. In such a situation there is always the danger of a flare-up and war, although it would appear that the Arab armies are not yet ready to engage in one. However, as General S.L.A. Marshall has pointed out, "mass itself, when systematically agitated, generates war."

Time may take care of everything; however, Israel must not resign herself altogether to a waiting position. She must do her best to explore and initiate steps and policies such as the open bridge policy over the Jordan River to facilitate a change in the Arab position and in resolution of the conflict. Nevertheless, so long as the Arabs maintain that any concession by Israel that leaves its existence intact is too small, Israel's latitude to make concessions is very limited. Perhaps the cumulative effect of the repeated failure of the Arab efforts to liquidate Israel will eventually induce the Arabs to resign themselves to Israel's existence and thus spell an end to the conflict. In the meantime, the Arabs have an option of either continuing the present situation or agreeing to negotiate. The Arabs can be sure of one thing --- Israel is an established State and intends to remain one until and unless someone disposes of all three million Jews currently in residence. Whether all of the territory now occupied by Israel becomes part of the State of Israel, or whether certain strategic areas are retained and the remainder returned to Arab control, is a matter that will no doubt take many years, perhaps decades, to determine. What is certain, for the immediate future, at least, is the fact that Israel is not going

to return to the June 5, 1967, lines. As a practical matter, Israeli officials look at the present cease-fire lines as ideal. If there are no negotiations and there is no interim settlement and the Arabs do not go to war, Israel is prepared to maintain the status quo indefinitely.

Although the United States should favor a restrained, business-like policy for long-term amelioration, perhaps she could best assist with efforts to win agreement on the Suez Canal, which could serve to move the stalemate off dead center. Such a development might help to start both Egypt and Israel along the road to talks and agreements. If the parties do agree to thin out their forces on the banks of the Canal and if the Canal is opened to the shipping of all nations, the danger of renewed shooting would be greatly diminished. Moreover, European countries would gain if oil became available at lower cost.¹⁷

For the Arabs, the lesson to be learned is that "discretion is the better part of valor", and that bluffing one's way into war is more than a crime; it is stupidity.¹⁸ The time has come for a realistic Arabic approach to the problem of a lasting peace. War will not accomplish anything constructive but will further complicate the situation. And as in the past, it is likely that more Arab territory would be lost. For a starter, the Canal could be reopened and the

¹⁷Near East Report, Vol. XV, No. 12, March 24, 1971.

¹⁸S.L.A. HERSHALL, "Mideast Power Balance is Nil", Los Angeles Times-Washington Post News Service, 1972.

plight of the Palestinian refugees could be resolved. The Palestinian refugee mess was a direct consequence of the action of the Arab states in opposing partition and the Jewish state. Libya's number two man, Major Abdel Salam Jalloud, admitted recently that the Palestinian refugees have been "kept in tents" for over two decades as a planned (Arab) policy.¹⁹ There is every reason to believe that most Arabs who live under Israel rule do not want another war. They are usually becoming reconciled to coexistence and friendly relationship. They suffered discrimination and neglect under Jordanian and Egyptian occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. They have prospered under Israel rule. They want, in some way, to normalize relations between Arab and Jew.²⁰ U.A.R. President Sadat's recent ouster of some twenty thousand Soviet technicians has led many foreign and Egyptian observers to expect neither a miracle nor a disaster as a result of the Soviet exodus. Instead, there is a common strain of cautious hope --- optimism is too strong a word --- that the massive departure of the Russians marks the beginning of a new ball game in the Middle East.²¹

Even so, the world is full of problems crying for solution, and ignoring the whole thing will not make the problem go away. While Israel might be justified in maintaining the status quo with respect to the captured territories, she would be well advised to move ahead with all deliberate speed toward long-range plans designed to pro-

¹⁹Raouf el-Jamal, "An Arab Speaks to His People", The Plain Truth, (July 1972), p.24.


²⁰Near East Report, June 16, 1971.

²¹News and World Report, August 7, 1972, p.38

note Arabic acceptance, if not a joyous welcoming with open arms. Israel now needs to be magnanimous, to bend over backwards in dealings with the Arabs. The situation calls for a great deal of patience and finesse. Each citizen must now become an ambassador, each public official a Solomon. Great flexibility must be maintained in the administration of occupied territories. Deliberate attempts to reduce existing animosity between Arab and Jew must be made. Occupation policies which will prove beneficial to the Arabs should be emphasized. Israel should move ahead with long-range development plans for the occupied areas, to include early conversion of existing military rule to civilian administration.

A solution to the refugee problem would deprive the Arabs of at least half of their case for support and sympathy in world opinion. Therefore, immediate and forceful measures to work alone and/or in conjunction with other nations and interested agencies to rehabilitate and resettle the Palestinian refugees should be initiated.

In conclusion, the two-thousand-year dream of a homeland for Jews has become a reality in the twentieth century, A.D. Realities, however, unlike dreams, bring attendant problems with them, and the test of a nation's, like a person's, maturity, is the manner in which it seeks resolutions to the inevitable problems with which it is confronted. Before this century ends, the State of Israel will take a prominent place among the leading nations of the world.


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
Exhibit "A"

THE BALFOUR DECLARATION

On November 2, 1917, Lord Balfour, then Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, published a statement on policy in the form of a letter to Baron Rothschild. It stated:

His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

Exhibit "B"
ISRAELI BORDERS 1947



-  Jewish State
-  Arab State

Approved for
Distribution

Exhibit "0"
ISRAELI BORDERS 1949




Exhibit "D"
ISRAELI BORDERS 1967

