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GRADIENT AND LESS LETHAL DEVICES IN  
CONTROL OF URBAN VIOLENCE

R. H. Stolfi

Ballistic Research Laboratories  
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland

March 1973

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
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by

R. H. Stolfi, et al\*

March 1973



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MARCH 1973

GRADIENT AND LESS LETHAL DEVICES IN  
CONTROL OF URBAN VIOLENCE

R. H. Stolfi, et al\*  
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School

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ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MARYLAND

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## FOREWORD

Over the past five years, the Ballistic Research Laboratories and the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, have conducted a number of cooperative research programs on subjects of military interest. Through this somewhat unique and most efficient arrangement, specialized talents of faculty and students at the Postgraduate School have been channeled, in an academic environment, to studying and answering important military questions. This procedure has proven to be very successful and recently resulted in this study, of how to cope with urban violence - a problem of immense interest to both military and civilian authorities.

The basis for this study was library research and a series of interviews with authorities in several locations in the world where civil disturbance might have been or could be a critical problem.

This report represents the efforts of a team of military officers, under the guidance of Professor R. H. Stoiffi, to shed some light on the problem of urban violence and the methods and devices which can be used during civil disorders.

The names of the contributing researchers follows with the major area of interest.

CAPT A. N. Webb, USA	Doctrine of Employment
LT J. F. Amerault, USA	Doctrine of Employment
RCDR James M. Lacey, USNR	Organization of Men and Machines
LT William M. Bokesch, USN	Organization of Men and Machines
LT COL Robert D. Hammond, USA	Hand-Carried and Air-Mounted Devices
LT COL Donald L. Smart, USA	Hand-Carried and Air-Mounted Devices
CAPT Donald J. Parrish, USA	Vehicle-Mounted Devices
LT Robert G. Elwell, USN	Vehicle-Mounted Devices

The information presented herein, reflecting the views of several nations and their respective problems and solutions to civil disorder, should be a useful reference for civilian and military authorities charged with responsibility of developing methods and devices to deal with this problem.

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<p>Worldwide authorities, charged with maintaining the peace in their communities, are united in the belief that riots and demonstrations must be handled with the minimum force necessary. To respond in this fashion requires separate contingents of civil and military forces, specially selected and vigorously trained in the operations, tactics, techniques and devices most effective in executing the "Minimum Force" theory.</p> <p>This report elicits information which describes various forms of the "Graduated" or "Minimum Force" approach for dealing with urban violence and draws upon the experiences and doctrine of civil and military authorities around the world. Weapons and devices to support special tactical units of riot control forces are a major consideration in this report.</p> <p>* This study was prepared by Dr. Stolfi, et al, for the Office of the Director, USA Ballistic Research Laboratories.</p>			

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Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.  
March 1973

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\* This study was prepared by Dr. Stolfi, et al for the Office of the Director, U.S. Ballistic Research Laboratories.

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## I. SCENARIO

In recent years there have been numerous instances of urban violence in the United States, aimed against existing civil authority. The range of unruliness and violence in these instances has been extraordinarily varied, fluctuating between mild protest by unruly and vocal crowds to wholesale destruction of entire city blocks with accompanying loss of life.

This report will not deal with the frustrations, real or imagined, which promote this type of activity. The avowed purpose is to analyze the usefulness of various gradient and less than lethal devices by existing civil and military forces for neutralizing urban violence, for thwarting attempts at extra-legal seizure of power, and for preventing coercion of duly elected or appointed authority.

In our Western civilization, tranquility is often broken at times, some violent disorder is to be expected<sup>1</sup>. There comes a point at which the seriousness of such behavior either in terms of intensity or prevalence causes alarm in the organs of government charged with maintaining the peace. Incidents with the necessary magnitudes to generate alarm have occurred frequently in the United States within the last ten years. As a result, local, state, and federal forces have been established with either primary or collateral riot-control missions. Liaison has helped to coordinate the forces and to improve their effectiveness in the control of urban violence<sup>2</sup>.

The immediate threat facing the nation in the 1970's is believed to be that of small, well-organized disturbances. Large "blockbusting" riots are not expected. From a poll of police chiefs throughout the United States, the editors of U. S. News and World Report presented the view of the law enforcement community that organized militants have turned to hit-and-run tactics to elude identification and capture<sup>3</sup>. There is always a chance that violence may erupt on a wider scale in a "chain reaction" as a result of confrontations forced by organized agitators. The presentation of events by high-intensity news media and the mobility offered by modern transportation

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<sup>1</sup>\* References are listed on page 99.

facilities have also increased the likelihood of confrontations. Even when demonstrations are peaceful in origin and intent, they often lead to violent confrontations with governing authorities<sup>4</sup>.

## II. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF URBAN VIOLENCE

### A. Statement of the Problem

In recent years there have been numerous instances of urban and suburban violence of various degrees in the United States in opposition to existing civil authority. The nature of this opposition has been as varied as the degree of violence or near-violence accompanying it, ranging from simple protest by unruly and vocal crowds to destruction of entire city blocks with accompanying loss of life. This report will not deal with the frustrations, real or imagined, which promote this type of activity. Our interest is to set forth a doctrine of employment for existing civil and military resources to neutralize effectively any attempted extra-legal seizure of power or coercion of duly elected or appointed authority.

### B. Classification of Threat by Degree

"Doctrine" is defined as a principle or body of principles in any branch of knowledge. The guiding elements in any doctrine for employment of national resources to cope with counter-insurgent, riot-control situations must be "minimum force necessary" and a "graduated response." Reacting on these principles and employing the tactics and gradient lethal weapons available today to law-enforcement and military agencies, the authorities can successfully complete their assigned mission, and our open society can be maintained.

Riot-control personnel of the National Guard and Federal armed forces are guided in their response to any civil disorder situation by a list of six graduated steps. This list lays the basis for a doctrine which closely adheres to the principle of "minimum force necessary."<sup>5</sup> The graduated responses are:

1. show of force
2. saturation



3. crowd dispersal
4. engagement of selected targets
5. volley fire
6. controlled available firepower.

With these ordered responses before him, the commander at the scene must still evaluate each situation and make a decision as to the proper control measures.

As a first step in developing such a doctrine, urban violence threat is classified by degree. Four levels of violence, in order of intensity, are defined as follows:

1. nonviolent protest
2. violence likely to result in damage to public and/or private property
3. violence presenting an immediate or potential danger to the safety of the general public and/or riot-control personnel
4. confrontation by arms.

#### C. Response to the Threat

1. Show of Force. Although the degree of threat categorized as non-violent protest may be completely legal, a crowd influenced by certain stimuli and conditions may be transformed from this tranquil state into a destructive mob.<sup>6</sup> While the fine line which separates these two levels may be quite difficult to recognize, experienced law enforcement or riot-control personnel, especially those in command positions, must be trained and prepared to detect symptoms of change. At this point, when the crowd is in danger of progressing from nonviolent protest to overt violence, a show of force, confidently and deliberately presented, will be the effective response required. Whereas this show of force is the least severe measure in the graduated response doctrine, the British consider this display necessary to convince a crowd that it can be overpowered and subjected to serious injury or loss of life. When promptly enacted with substantial resources, the show of force will usually intimidate the crowd and eliminate the threat at this earliest stage. For a show of force to be effective, it must be plausible to the crowd, e. g., the number of troops, equipment, and the troop discipline and morale must appear clearly sufficient to control the particular situation. The use of propaganda, psychological ruse, and extremely mobile

reaction forces must be considered. At this stage, employment of non-lethal weapons is not anticipated unless used in a demonstrative role and, at any rate, not against the crowd. Should the threat proceed from nonviolent protest to any other stage, a show of force would assume a secondary status to a more severe security measure. It might still prove useful as a deterrent to further violence. "A professionally displayed show of force by a well organized security force is the basis for effective crowd control".<sup>7</sup>

2. Saturation. The concept of saturation is defined in many ways both internationally and within the United States. In general terms it consists of restricting the movement of a crowd and directing it to an area favored by the security force. Saturation can be employed by a commander faced with a threat in either of the first two levels of violence. This technique can be employed to prevent a group from moving into sensitive or vulnerable areas and to maintain a nonviolent atmosphere.

Saturation, a tactic to be employed either before or after violence has broken out, will aid in confining property damage to an area of minimum size. The principal means of accomplishing the desired movements is by deploying formations of riot-control forces. These forces can then effectively herd the rioters in the proper directions. The deployment of troops in this tactic also positions forces for crowd dispersal, the next level of response.

In general, weapons should not be necessary for saturation. There may arise situations, however, when gradient-lethal devices are useful to either restrict or to hasten a crowd's movement. Non-lethal weapons are especially useful when riot-control personnel are unable to effectively saturate the mob. Lines of fire and rubber projectiles may be used instead of lines of troops to create the desired seal. In addition to riot-control formations, vehicles, mounted personnel and other techniques may be employed.

3. Crowd Dispersal. When the security commander decides that a crowd in the second or third levels of violence must cease its activity, a response must be chosen to disrupt the organization of the mob and force

it to vacate the area. Such action would follow saturation, whereby the insurgent element was restricted in its operational area. When acts of violence are being committed, the crowd must be broken up and moved from the scene. It often becomes necessary to maintain continued pressure on, and contact with, the dispersing portions of the crowd to prevent the crowd from reuniting at preselected rally points. U. S. National Guard policy is to segregate the mob into smaller and smaller portions until the violence ceases.<sup>8</sup> It is imperative to direct the crowd into exit routes leading to areas favored by the security force. Crowd dispersal should be conducted in an orderly manner, wherever possible, without creating panic.

Lethal weapons systems should rarely be used in crowd dispersal. There are only a few instances in riot-control literature in which the crowd was equipped to withstand non-lethal techniques. Such an exceptional state of preparedness would be classified as the fourth level of violence. Internationally and even within the United States, there are significant differences of opinion as to what constitutes a graduated list of appropriate dispersal measures. Water, foam, noise, chemical lachrymating agents, nerve agents, oil slicks and a host of advancements in the state-of-the-art would appear somewhere on any graduated list. One important element in the employment of non-lethal systems at this stage requires that the hardware not be committed piecemeal. Meager amounts of CS will only further alienate a crowd instead of completely subduing it. When more severe security measures are enacted, crowd dispersal generally becomes secondary.

4. Engagement of Selected Targets. Whenever it is necessary to employ force with the intent of eliminating a particular element of a crowd by lethal means, due process of law is being set aside and a summary execution is being carried out.<sup>7</sup> The legal justification for such a security response should be clear, and such action should be resorted to only under dire circumstances. The threat analyzed by the commander should be so severe and immediate as to risk death or severe bodily harm to public or security personnel; or to risk damage to property resulting in a serious health or safety hazard to the population. In the higher levels of violence, there are circumstances where lethal weapons might possibly be necessary. Whenever

possible, consideration should be placed on "shooting to wound." If non-lethal means will accomplish the task, then these measures should be employed. With either lethal or non-lethal fire, the effects of eliminating accurately identified sub-elements of the crowd, prior to the use of volley or full firepower, must be carefully weighed.

A well organized and skilled sniper unit armed with precision delivery systems can isolate and eliminate the leadership or key maneuver elements of a mob. Projectiles run the gamut from chemical agents, tranquilizing drug darts, and concussion rounds to the lethal ammunition of the high-powered rifle. Range, target protection, and crowd conditions are factors which bear on the weapon and projectile selection. The loss of insurgent commanders and other critical tactical assets may sufficiently demoralize the crowd and dissuade it from further violence. If not, engagement of selected targets may be incorporated into more severe security measures.

5. Volley Fire. When the threat has reached the third level of violence, crowd dispersal techniques or even engagement of selected targets may not be effective in restoring order. The rioters may be equipped to withstand non-lethal, crowd-control devices or may have predetermined that certain of their number are expendable. It will then be necessary for the commander to escalate the level of response to an area type or volley fire. Volley fire is the discharge of one or more lethal or non-lethal weapons in carefully controlled salvos in the direction of a target.

Volley fire often results in rapid dispersal of the crowd. A volley might be fired in the air or over the heads of demonstrators as a warning to disband. In any case, successive volleys should be used in a graduated fashion to inflict small numbers of casualties on the rioters until the cumulative effect is beyond their tolerance. Gradient-lethal devices should prove extremely effective for this method of response since they are intended to inflict incapacitating but non-lethal wounds. To cope with this sort of casualty, the rioting group must devote a large degree of its energies to assisting the wounded.

Volley fire is an extreme measure when lethal weapons are used. It

should be emphasized that the objective of this tactic is to wound demonstrators in order to force crowd dispersal and to eliminate the chance of physical injury to civilians or to security forces. When this degree of force is contemplated, medical facilities should be alerted or made available for both security forces and rioters, whenever possible. The discipline of any force using volley fire or any response which might inflict casualties must be strict. Close supervision must be exercised by leaders at the lowest levels to insure that accurate directions and proper rates of fire are maintained.

6. Control Available Firepower. The objective of each response in this doctrine is to limit urban and suburban violence and to prevent the level of this violence from progressing to a higher degree. When this objective is not met or when the level of violence is so great prior to the introduction of security forces that general armed confrontation is imminent or in progress, it will be necessary for riot-control forces to employ available firepower to quickly eliminate the threat to life and property of the public. The principle of minimizing casualties and force necessary to control rioters should be borne in mind, but protecting the general public and the security forces takes first priority. Any tactics which may prove successful in achieving these goals must be used. In extreme circumstances, non-lethal systems may assume a secondary role and may be used only to add to the shock effect of the response.

Table 1 summarizes in matrix form those security measures deemed as proper and appropriate alternatives in dealing with each of the four degrees of threat. Thus, a show of force or saturation would be appropriate responses to a nonviolent threat, while controlled available firepower should be considered as an alternative only for the highest degree of threat, armed confrontation. The purpose of each type of response is restated below in abbreviated form. The show of force should intimidate the crowd, saturation should restrict the mob's movement, crowd dispersal should disorganize the rioters, engagement of selected targets is used to attack and incapacitate the ringleaders, volley fire should inflict a few casualties to discourage the crowd, and controlled available firepower represents an all-out effort to control the demonstration.

Table 1. A Matrix of Degrees of Threat and Security Measures

		DEGREES OF THREAT			
		I. Non- violent Protest	II. Damage to Public or Private Property	III. Physical Injury to Civilians or Security Forces	IV. Armed Confronta- tion
SECURITY MEASURES	1. Show of Force				
	2. Saturation				
	3. Crowd Dispersal				
	4. Engagement of Selected Targets				
	5. Volley Fire				
	6. Controlled Available Firepower				

#### D. Organizations Designed to Control Violence

Currently, there are many diverse organizations among the world's police and military forces used to control and disperse groups of people in riot situations. A basis is needed upon which recommendations can be made for the best such organization to effectively use less than lethal devices/weapons in combatting such disturbances.

As defined here, the organization encompasses the structure, planning, strategy, and tactics of the riot-control forces using less than lethal weapons. Although it may be difficult to develop an organization that is practical and efficient for all situations, this structure must be sufficiently flexible to include lethal devices. The major objective of such an organization is to develop an elite squad/platoon/company of qualified personnel to restrain and disperse a group of individuals involved in a riot situation, and maintain law and order.

The organization of riot-control forces (tactical forces), according to the literature as well as in actual practice, is modeled after the conventional American military system of organization. The number of personnel within the tactical force is largely dependent upon the needs of the city or community that it serves. These needs relate to the potential threats of civil disturbances within the area as well as the estimate of the number of individuals who may participate in these disturbances.

As Applegate states in his book Riot Control, "The squad is the smallest, integral operating unit" within the organization. Other sources agree with Applegate but they differ in the number of men that are assigned to the squad. Applegate recommends that a squad be composed of 12 personnel (a squad leader, an assistant squad leader, and ten men). The manual of Guidelines for Civil Disorder and Mobilization Planning published by the International Association of Chiefs of Police states a squad should be composed of 10 personnel (a supervisor and nine men). The Department of the Army Field Manual of Civil Disturbances and Disasters (FM 19-15) recommends that a squad consist of 10 men. The Monterey County Sheriff's Department presently utilizes a squad of 15 personnel (a squad leader, an assistant

squad lead (and 13 men). The San Francisco County Sheriff's Department currently deploys a squad of 8 men (a sergeant and 7 patrolmen).

Several sources, such as Applegate and FM 19-15, recommend that a platoon consist of three or four squads and a company consist of three platoons. The manual of the International Association of Chiefs of Police recommends that a platoon consist of three squads and that a company consist of three platoons. The tactical force from Monterey County Sheriff's Department presently has one platoon of two squads whereas San Francisco County uses two platoons of four squads each, and a third platoon, which is mounted, to form one company.

In both the literature and in actual practice, a special sniper detection and combat unit is recommended to deal with the sniper threat. Other special units, that are within or attached to the riot-control forces, are formed to handle intelligence, bomb disposal, protection for fire fighters, arrest and confinement of rioters, area cleanup and any other anticipated major problems.

A reserve force is necessary to back up the main tactical force. This may include the regular police force, Mutual Aid agreements with the tactical forces in other cities or communities, the National Guard, and/or branches of the United States Armed Forces. Volunteers from the regular police force usually comprise a city's or community's tactical force.

Training of the members is usually divided into two distinct phases. The first should involve classroom study in subjects such as riot-control strategy, mass arrest procedures, use of the different types of non-lethal and lethal weapons, and other topics that are related to riot control. The second phase is physical fitness. Drills in military type formations should be included in this phase in order to emphasize the need for unifying the individual members of the tactical force into an effective combat team.

The type and quantity of equipment that will be available to the riot-control forces will vary according to present budgetary constraints, aid from other riot-control forces, and assistance from higher governmental organizations. Every member of the riot-control force must have sufficient



personal equipment to protect himself from the hazards of bottles, rocks and other thrown missiles.

Since communications are vital for effective command and control, each control force leader in the organization must be able to communicate with his fellow members. This may be done by miniature pocket or helmet-type transceivers.

The decision on setting up a field post should be based upon communication capabilities. The command post must be able to communicate with forces in the field, infiltrators in the mob, reserve forces, perimeter control forces, patrols, and special teams. Without proper intelligence reports and rapid communications with his forces, the field commander is not able to make proper decisions. A field command post may be set up in either a large vehicle or a building.

Riot-control forces may have difficulty in reaching an area of disturbance due to obstacles and hazards set up by the rioters. Thus, a vehicle that can deliver riot-control forces swiftly and safely to the riot area is mandatory.

The lack of accurate intelligence data, both before and during a civil disturbance, will cause serious problems for the riot-control forces. These forces must be capable of gathering sufficient intelligence data for planning purposes as well as on-the-scene information for operational purposes during a disturbance. Due to the complicated and time-consuming process of interpreting and collecting intelligence data from varied sources, an intelligence unit staffed with full-time personnel is required. This unit must be able to provide the control-force leader with accurate information that is essential for decision-making.

The capability of a riot-control force to handle a civil disorder depends essentially on two factors: proper planning and competent performance. The planning of strategy to be utilized must take into account the physical and psychological conditions of the disturbances as well as its degree of violence.

The first basic rule is for the control force to take strong and

immediate measures to overwhelm the rioters. A force of insufficient strength or hesitation on the part of the control forces will only aggravate the situation and contribute to the breakdown of law and order. The initiative must be gained by the authorities in order to discourage the unlawful activities of the rioters.

The second basic rule is to arrest and detain the mob leaders and law violators as soon as possible. This action is essential to "cooling off" the disturbance. Without the mob leaders to direct the action, the mob soon loses its unity of purpose.

The third basic rule is to maintain sufficient manpower in the area after control has been established. This display of manpower provides a psychological effect as the rioters get the impression that the control forces are everywhere. The show of strength also acts as a strong deterrent to further rioting activities.

These three general rules of strategy for riot control are sufficiently flexible to handle most riot situations.

There are no riot-control tactics that apply to every possible disturbance. The dominant requirement is to have enough personnel and equipment available to carry out effectively whatever tactics are necessary. These tactical plans should be made in advance and explained to the riot-control forces before they confront the mob. The five basic tactics are outlined as follows:

1. Disperse the rioters by using sufficient force to break the resistance of the mob. The control force leader should determine the direction in which he intends to disperse the rioters and direct his attack accordingly.

2. Gain the security of high vantage points such as roof tops. This tactic should be accomplished as soon as possible in order to spot potential problems such as rock/missile throwers. The gaining of these vantage points by members of the control force will also decrease the likelihood of successful sniper attacks.

3. Use sweeping methods to keep the rioters from reforming. The

control forces must maintain a constant momentum and mobility in order to keep pressure on the retreating mob.

4. Seal off the affected area by a perimeter control. This will prevent unauthorized persons from entering the area and reinforcing the rioters.

5. Establish an active and aggressive method of patrolling. These patrols will provide current intelligence on rioters actions and act as a psychological deterrent to rioter activity.

In selecting tactics to be used in a civil disturbance situation, the control-force leader should scrupulously abide by the minimum necessary force principle.

#### E. Hand-Carried Devices

In order to bend the will of a mob to conform with the desires of the legally constituted authority, a suitable weapons system must be available to that authority to allow application of the minimum force required to accomplish the desired mission. The importance of the word "minimum" has been dramatically emphasized in separate tragic events at Kent State University, Ohio (1970) and New York's Attica State Prison (1971). For some time, the spectrum between the two extremes of a stick or baton on the one hand and a conventional firearm with service ammunition on the other has been covered by chemical munitions (notably CS), but there exists considerable activity in other non-lethal\*, hand-delivered weapon systems.

Space constraints preclude an exhaustive list of hand-carried systems; accordingly, only the most prominent systems are reviewed.

1. Tear gas (CS)\*\*. CS induces extreme discomfort in the form of tears, burning sensation of the eyes, coughing, difficult breathing, involuntary eye closing, sinus/nasal drip, stinging skin, etc. It can be

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\* A purist would say "less-lethal" rather than "non-lethal" since any weapon system offers some chance for killing.

\*\*Note that CS is preferred to and is replacing CN because it acts more quickly, is more efficient per unit volume, and produces more severe reactions.

delivered by hand grenades in two forms (burning and bursting): portable dispensers (projected about 30 feet) and in chemical mace form (15-30 feet). Burning grenades can be projected by a rifle grenade launcher about 150 meters and bursting grenades can be thrown 35-50 meters.

2. Batons (short one-handed and 36-inch two-handed).

3. Shock Baton. The flashlight cell power supply produces a harmless but painful shock on the skin only (effective through light clothing). The Shock baton is available in various lengths and can be used as a wooden baton. The shock has a good psychological and deterrent effect.

4. Stun-gun. The Stun-gun employs a 40 mm tube with accessories; it can be used as a conventional baton or to fire a 40 mm projectile (which expands to a 4-inch diameter-flat, shot-filled bag). The effective range is 100 feet. Other loads (e.g., multiple wooden blocks, gas, flares and smoke) are available.

5. Special projectiles (e.g., 12-gauge plastic pellet shotshells, riot shotgun No. 7 1/2 and No. 9 bird shot, 37 mm riot gun shells (firing wooden blocks, rubber projectiles).

6. New police shotguns (12-gauge, gas-operated, auto loading, 27 inches long, 5 shot capacity; and 20-gauge, 17-inch, double barrel, auto burglar gun) with handgun-like control.

7. Jet foam gun (plastic container with pistol-like shape). The foam neutralizes for 15 minutes without ill effects. Range is about one yard.

8. Taser (fires two electrical contacts, each trailing up to 300 feet of wire conductor which, upon contact, shock and incapacitate the target).

There are numerous instances of successful use of CS. Successes with the 37 mm multiple wooden block shell are claimed by Hong Kong and Berkeley police. The British Army is reported to have used 6-inch rubber projectiles in Belfast.

The hand-carried delivery system, currently used most extensively to bridge the gap between a stick or baton on the one extreme and a conventional firearm with service ammunition on the other, is some form of chemical

munition (primarily CS).

Existing kinetic energy, low velocity type weapons should more properly be referred to as less than lethal rather than non-lethal. However, several systems (notably a type of stun-gun and special projectiles for conventional firearms) appear to be adaptable for use in situations that require the application of minimum force to accomplish a mission.

Continued emphasis should be placed on development of less than lethal, low kinetic energy projectile systems that can be hand-carried.

Maximum effort should be taken to "learn lessons" from friendly foreign states on hand-carried systems. This is probably best accomplished through existing Defense Attache organizations.

#### F. Vehicles

The role of the vehicle and its functional areas in civil disturbances will not be studied. Ideas will be submitted for consideration of the offensive role of a vehicle. To develop these ideas, pertinent literature has been surveyed, communications have been established with manufacturers of riot-control vehicles, and "brainstorming" sessions have been conducted with experts. The technical evaluation of these ideas is not included in this report.

A vehicle, in general, has a considerable advantage over men on the ground in terms of weapon sophistication (accuracy, range of devices, height, weight, and power limitations), mobility, and protection for its occupants. On the other hand, a vehicle has several disadvantages including inability to operate in exceedingly close quarters or marginal off-road conditions, maintenance requirements, and high initial investment.

Vehicles may be categorized as administrative, command and control, or attack vehicles. A vehicle may fall into more than one category. Our focus will be on attack vehicles. Attack vehicles are those vehicles designed to engage and control a mob. Attack vehicles may be further identified as single or multi-purpose vehicles. Single purpose vehicles, such as water cannon vehicles, lack the flexibility to handle all situations. Other required

equipment, such as public address systems and lighting, must be transported by other means. A multi-purpose vehicle may be regarded as a complete package with weapon systems and support equipment organic to it. With gradient lethal weapons, multi-purpose vehicles should prove more valuable than single purpose vehicles.

Analysis of a multi-purpose attack vehicle will be developed around the three functional areas of a vehicle: carriage, command and control, and armament.

Tracked vehicles have several advantages over wheeled vehicles including lower ground pressure, smaller turning radius, and a relatively invulnerable propulsion system. Tracked vehicles can also negotiate obstacles, such as curbs or barricades, that would hinder or stop wheeled vehicles or ground effect vehicles. Physical parameters of the carriage would be dictated by height, weight, and width constraints of a U. S. city. A vehicle should be able to carry its operational equipment and sufficient personnel to operate and protect the vehicle. Personnel would include a driver, communications specialist, weapon system operators, outside protection elements, and a vehicle commander. To reduce vulnerability, the following requirements are proposed: sufficient armor to protect against small arms fire, pressurized interior and air conditioning so that the vehicle is independent of outside environment, outside fire extinguisher system, electrifiable exterior, and outside defensive personnel.

The command and control function appears to be an almost undeveloped concept. With proper communications, the vehicle assumes the larger role of controlling rather than acting as part of a team. The vehicle can provide a dominating controlling platform. The command and control function will be divided into external and internal communications.

External communications refer to contact outside the immediate environment of the vehicle. Radio contact needs to be maintained with higher authority. With sufficient radio power, the necessity for separate command and control vehicles can be eliminated except in cities with widely distributed areas. Police would then be free to work out of their normal headquarters. To permit contact with all deployed elements, automatic radio relay

capabilities could be used to permit contact with personnel using hand-carried radios. To further augment the radio system, television cameras should be an integral part of the system. The television picture can be immediately relayed to the controlling headquarters. Such television records can be used for historical purposes, to identify key agitators, and to furnish an immediate visual appraisal of the situation. Given that different levels of command maintain the authority to withhold or use certain tactics or potentially lethal weapons, timeliness of response by police forces is made very difficult. With adequate communications including radio and television, the command elements can make critical decisions operating from their normal headquarters with full knowledge of the situation.

Internal communications refer to contact between the vehicle and its supporting elements. The vehicle commander from his dominant position would be in an ideal position to control all personnel within his area. He should be able to assess and react better than a similar counterpart on the ground. Contact with subordinate ground forces would be made through receiver-transmitters in the riot helmets of those forces.

The communications described would insure a timely and effective response to any developing situation. Confusion and uncertainty would be minimized.

Armament may be considered as the interface between police control and mob action. Besides weapon systems, this interface includes public address systems and searchlights. Weapon systems are those systems used in a crowd at a determined level of lethality. Passive systems are those systems whose effects are determined solely by the proximity of the crowd. Passive systems would be particularly applicable to denial operations. Both active and passive systems would be gradient-lethal, depending in the first case upon the will of the police and, in the second, upon the will of the crowd. A given system may be both active and passive depending on its application.

Current vehicle system developments are thoroughly discussed in Riot Control by Applegate. Among the more promising are the HPS-1 sound system with curdler and the R2 multi-purpose attack vehicle. Systems under

development which appear promising are the foam-producing system and the Riotrol (instant banana peel) chemical.

Some concepts will be touched upon which have some potential as a vehicle system. Among the active systems are the following:

1. Laser: Although little more than a sophisticated bullet, their effect on individuals can be controlled by range/power parameters.

2. Plastic webbing: Projected over a group, plastic webbing could be utilized to temporarily immobilize a group by restricting movement. The webbing could also include a quick setting glue to make removal even more difficult. A large number of individual strands would accomplish a similar purpose.

3. Searchlights: Besides providing illumination, they could be used to dazzle a crowd. An alternating (strobe) light, coupled with a curdler, should prove very disorienting.

4. Nauseus gas: Projected in small pellets over crowds, the effect would be partially controlled by the density of gas created.

In the area of primarily passive (barrier) devices, the following ideas have some merit:

1. Microwave: This system would create heat inside absorbing elements. Heat creation is a function of range/power parameters. As an active weapon, except in violent confrontations, it probably lacks sufficient control of lethality because of the variation of its effects on individuals

2. White phosphorous: Projected in rope-like form across an area, it would cause serious burns to people trying to cross the area.

3. Electric fence: Deployed from the sides of a vehicle by remote control or mechanical means, it could effectively seal an area. One vehicle with a 100-foot fence on each side could control a perimeter of 200 feet; two vehicles, 400 feet. As an active weapon, a vehicle could approach a crowd and extend its fence to separate the crowd or cordon off troublesome elements. Or with fences extended, the vehicle could move forward into a crowd having the same effect as an advancing police line.



A vehicle would not be able to incorporate all these systems. However, a vehicle with several of them, properly employed, could prove to be a very effective riot-control vehicle. Examples of use of the various systems are shown in Table 2.

A vehicle generally has a considerable advantage over men on the ground in terms of weapon sophistication, mobility, and protection of occupants. The vehicle is a very powerful tool in the arsenal of the riot-control forces. The riot-control forces gain in flexibility in their response to different situations. A vehicle also has certain disadvantages aside from those related to its actual operation; the crowd may have increased antagonistic feelings from the mere sight of the vehicle.

The feasibility of developing an effective riot-control vehicle should be seriously studied. A vehicle equipped to make use of the advantages inherent in this type of system would add greatly to riot control. It seems advisable to pay particular attention to the outward appearance of the vehicle. It should be imposing but it should not look like a tank. The vehicle should be clearly identifiable as a police vehicle; white is recommended as a proper color for the outside of the vehicle.

#### G. Air Mounted Devices

The extensive use of aircraft in the Republic of Vietnam during the past seven years has provided a multitude of innovative concepts, which should be considered for adaptation in the field of urban violence control. The great flexibility of the helicopter has proven invaluable in all phases of counterinsurgency operations and this same flexibility should provide great assistance to law enforcement throughout the complete spectrum of urban violence.

This section is primarily oriented toward the employment of rotary-wing aircraft, since their civil-disturbance control capabilities and flexibility exceed those of fixed-wing aircraft in almost every aspect except that of major bombing and strafing. The chief drawback of the helicopter, when compared to light fixed-wing aircraft, is its high initial cost.

The use of helicopters in urban areas presents peculiar problems to the

Table 2. Recommended Responses for Various Combinations of  
Security Measures and Degrees of Threat

Security Measures	Degree of Threat			
	Nonviolent Protest	Damage to Public or Private Property	Physical Injury to Civilian or Security Forces	Armed Confronta- tions
	Show of Force	Vehicle Apperance		
	Saturation	Microwave White Phosphorous Electric Fence Search Lights Nauseous Gas		
	Crowd Dispersal		Plastic Webbing Searchlights Microwave Electric Fence Nauseous Gas	
	Engagement of Selected Targets		Laser Microwave Plastic Webbing	
	Volley Fire (limited)		Laser Microwave Nauseous Gas	
Controlled Available Firepower				Laser Microwave

pilot and crew. In addition to normal police flying, the crew must learn to become an integral link in the violence control structure and participate in frequent training exercises to maintain adequate proficiency.

Some types of helicopters perform the mission of urban flying better than others. For operating in urban areas, where space between buildings is limited, the rotor diameter should be small and the engine should have sufficient power to allow very slow flight and hover "out of ground effect". The helicopter should have good visibility in all directions and be stable at slow speeds to avoid hitting wires and light poles. Helicopters which stand out in this respect (although costing approximately \$90,000) are the Hughes 500 (OH-6A), with its string turbine engine and small 26-foot diameter rotor, and the somewhat larger Bell Jet Ranger 206A (OH-58A), with its 35-foot diameter rotor. The Bell 47 (OH-13) provides less lift and hovering capability with its reciprocal engine and 37 feet rotor diameter, but is currently popular due to its relatively low initial cost of approximately \$43,000.

Since a slow, low-flying helicopter is vulnerable to snipers, all aircraft should be equipped with combat-proven armor protection for the pilot and fuel control unit. The fuel tanks should be self-sealing for weapons up to 30-caliber.

Despite the use of helicopters by major law-enforcement agencies, their capabilities during urban violence have not been fully exploited. The following general capabilities will be discussed with a view both to the hardware and to the tactical employment of helicopters.

There are three general methods by which ordnance can be delivered from a helicopter: from its organic weapons, from hand-held weapons, or by gravity drop.

1. Organic Weapons. Almost any helicopter can be modified to accept a rocket-type delivery system, a 40 mm grenade launcher, or a Gatling type 7.6 mm machine gun (mini-gun). Aircraft specifically designed for this role, such as the Bell AH-1G (Cobra) or Lockheed's AH-56 (Cheyenne), combine very accurate fire with good operating performance. On the other hand, smaller

modified helicopters, such as the Bell 47 (OH-13), suffer considerably in comparison in matters of accurate fire and performance.

With some exceptions, the use of these organic weapons would be prudent only during the later stages of an armed confrontation since there is little control over their lethality. Rockets and grenades armed with chemicals will be discussed later.

2. Hand-Held Devices Fired from the Door. Although the helicopter is not sufficiently stable for precision fire from the door, it does provide a mobile base from which the experienced marksman can deliver reasonably accurate area fire. All hand-held weapons, except the recoilless type, can be fired from any door of the aircraft. This method of fire would probably be preferred by most law enforcement agencies, since the helicopter is not specifically tied down to an "armed" role only. In addition, it permits the use of all "gradient-lethal" weapons such as rubber bullet weapons, dart guns, and even stun-guns.

3. Gravity Drops and Spray. The slow airspeed capability of the helicopter enables it to deliver very accurate drops of hand grenades, leaflets, and chemicals. Spray devices, often used for the mass delivery of chemicals, such as that employed at Attica Prison, have given way to cannister drops which are more accurate, discriminating, and produce a more effective concentration on the ground.

The use of chemicals from an aircraft should follow the same general guidelines as their use on the ground. Escape routes can easily be determined from the air and the chemical can be delivered in sufficient quantities to preclude the situation from degenerating into a "game", such as rioters throwing CS grenades back at the police.

As a minimum, at least one crewman at the controls of the aircraft must wear a protective mask which also allows him radio communication; an example is the currently available military M-24 mask.

There also appears to be great potential in dropping a powder, such as Riotrol, which, when wetted down on a hard surface, makes it "...virtually impossible for an individual to move or stand up..."<sup>9</sup>. Hi-Expansion Foam,

used in firefighting, and plastic-type bubbles could also be dispensed from helicopters to create barriers or to disorient rioters.

The helicopter has proven to be an ideal mobile platform for loudspeakers and searchlights. Both devices have great psychological impact upon a crowd.

Equipped with "The Cudler (People Repeller)" connected to the military HPS-1 speaker system, sound comparable to standing behind a jet aircraft can be reproduced and amplified "...to break up slogan-shouting, chanting, and hand clapping that unifies and hypnotizes a mob".<sup>9</sup> At close ranges the rioter would be forced to cover and protect his ears.

With the use of searchlights, such as the "Night Sun", rioters can be clearly identified from an altitude of 300 feet. The unit weighs only 38 pounds and both the beam width and direction can be remotely controlled from the cockpit.<sup>10</sup> In addition to assisting ground forces in the control of a crowd, the light tends to blind and disorient the rioter.

Although this capability is not directly linked to gradient lethality, its importance to law enforcement is so great that it must be mentioned. Indirectly, the proper positioning of forces on rooftops or key intersections can have a great impact upon controlling a crowd before weapons become necessary. Doctrines for sniper and urban searches advocate that where possible, the buildings be entered from the rooftops and searched downward. Rooftop surveillance is also stressed as an effective means of reporting riot and sniper activity. Sniper control teams and surveillance personnel can most rapidly be placed on rooftops by helicopter.

Again not specifically linked to gradient lethality, this capability is perhaps the most important asset of the official responsible for controlling urban violence. Rapid and accurate intelligence information concerning the size, location, movement, and condition of a crowd is essential. This can be provided by the official actually riding airborne in the helicopter or through a remotely-located television camera linked to a central control facility. "A Los Angeles TV station assisted police through the use of airborne television during the Watts Riots".<sup>10</sup>

Searchlights can be used at night to maintain contact with the crowd and

the military HPS-1 loudspeaker system can be used to broadcast live or taped messages for a distance of 2 1/2 miles to deliver instructions to the crowd and persons in the immediate area of the disturbance.

The flexibility of rotary wing aircraft provides riot-control force increased capabilities in the area of lethal/non-lethal ordnance delivery, chemical delivery, psychological capability, airlift capacity, and command and control.

Although the cost to small police forces may appear high, the imaginative and efficient use of rotary wing aircraft can substantially extend the police capability.

Increased emphasis should be placed on the use of rotary wing aircraft in controlling urban violence; research and development in imaginative equipment and concepts of employment should be expanded.

#### H. Doctrine of Employment for Man and Machine

There appears to be no single doctrine for employment of men and machines in situations of urban violence. With training and proper equipment, successful riot control could be carried out with a minimum of injury to both rioters and riot-control personnel.

Rapid response at the first indication of a threat of violence is deemed to be the most important single key to success. The visit to Paris showed that an organization whose only function is to be trained and ready to counter urban violence situations is desirable where cost considerations allow.

The doctrine of employment developed during this project should be considered for possible use in indoctrination and training of personnel in riot-control techniques. Although it may not exactly fit every situation, it is flexible enough to be useful in these functions. The French system or organization for riot control in the large cities of France should be studied for partial or total adoption in large cities of the United States. Federal crime-prevention aid is an excellent vehicle for funding such organizations. Local control will probably be necessary due to the general fear by municipal

governments of federal impingement on their areas of competence.

The following organizations represent the ideas, suggestions, and objectives that have been presented by various sources in the literature. These squad and platoon organizations have been recommended as particularly effective for police departments in the process of forming their own tactical riot forces.

The Squad (Reinforced) - Self-Contained and Cross-Trained

A. Headquarters Fire Team

1. Squad Leader
2. Radioman
3. Sniper Team Leader
4. Marksman
5. Spotter

B. Action Fire Teams I, II, and III

1. Fire Team Leader/Shotgunman
2. Stungunman
3. Batonman
4. Batonman

C. Logistics Fire Team

1. Fire Team Leader/Guard
2. Guard/Paramedic
3. Guard/Driver

Total - 20 members (see Figure 1)

The reinforced squad would be particularly useful in an area where the threat of civil disturbance existed.

Due to the predictable sniper threat, a sniper team comprised of three members was added to the headquarters fire team. The sniper team enables the squad leader to detach the team immediately to combat sniper threats without using members of the action fire teams and thus breaking the integrity of those teams.

The three action fire teams are identical in organization. The action fire teams hence are completely interchangeable and give the squad leader




Figure 1. The Squad (Reinforced); 20 Members



great flexibility in mastering rapidly changing mob threats.

The Logistics Fire Team is necessary for the single reinforced squad which would exist at the threshold of necessity for riot-control forces. Its duties involve transporting the squad, guarding the squad's equipment, the process of arrest, and acting as a source of replacements for the squad, medical treatment and evacuation.

When increased civil disturbance threats demand more than a single squad, a platoon may be needed by the particular urban area. The following would comprise an effective platoon:

#### The Platoon

- A. Headquarters Squad (9 members)
  - 1. Platoon Leader
  - 2. Assistant Platoon Leader
  - 3. Radioman
  - 4. Logistics Fire Team I, II (3 men each)
- B. Action Squads I, II, III (14 men each)
  - 1. Squad Leader
  - 2. Radioman
  - 3. Action Fire Teams I, II, III (3 men each)
- C. Sniper Squad (11 men)
  - 1. Squad Leader
  - 2. Radioman
  - 3. Sniper Teams I, II, III (3 men each)

Total - 62 members (see Figure 2)

The duties and organization of the action fire teams, logistics fire teams, and the sniper teams are the same as those stated for the squad.

If vehicles or aircraft are made available to the riot-control forces, the force commanders would probably assign, intact, the fully interchangeable action fire teams and/or squads to the motorized equipment, either to be transported by it, engage in combat from it, or provide security for the equipment.

The following is a list of equipment that each member of the tactical




Figure 2. The Platoon; 62 Members

force should have. The equipment has the vital basic purpose of reducing the vulnerability of the individual riot-control officer.

1. Helmet with face shield
  2. Miniature transceiver
  3. Lightweight bulletproof vest (upper torso protection)
  4. One-piece, fire-resistant uniform
  5. Gloves
  6. Shin guards
  7. Reinforced athletic supporter
  8. Steel-toed boots.
- } should be integrated

### III. RESEARCH ON URBAN VIOLENCE

#### A. Introduction

In an effort to learn more about the problem at hand, field trips were scheduled by members of a team of United States military officers to those parts of the world where urban violence has occurred in recent times and has been dealt with by the authorities. In preparation for these field trips, a sequence of five questionnaires was formulated to serve as the basis for interviews with the authorities and experts in the field of response to urban violence. The content of these questionnaires is displayed in Questionnaires 1 to 5, which follow.

Field trips were scheduled to the following areas:

1. Paris, France; Officials of the French Government and the Prefecture of the Police for Paris
2. Miami, Florida; Miami Beach Chief of Police and the Sheriff of Dade County
3. Hong Kong; Provost Marshal's Office
4. Tokyo, Japan; Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department and the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force.

The Trip Reports provide answers to the detailed questions posed in the Questionnaires 1 to 5. The reader should make constant reference to these Questionnaires to relate each response to the appropriate question.

#### Questionnaire 1

##### Doctrine of Employment of Men and Machines to Control Urban Violence

1. Describe your doctrine of employment of men and machines for riot-control situations in urban areas.
2. Does your doctrine include the principle of minimum force necessary to control violence?
3. Do you have a system for classifying urban violence by degree? What is it?
4. What indicators do you use for determining when urban violence passes from one stage to another?
5. What is your system of response to threats of violence? Is it graduated?
6. Do you employ non-lethal or gradient-lethal devices and how do they fit into your doctrine?
7. Do you employ a formal training program to indoctrinate commanders in making decisions involving the level of response to urban violence?
8. Do you employ an information system to gauge the mood of a crowd?
9. Does the process of violence control include any extra-legal powers normally not enjoyed by law enforcement agencies?
10. If your doctrine is other than one of minimum force necessary and/or graduated response (such as immediate, all-out force to clear the street, etc.) do you have any backlash of sentiment from the general population?
11. Would you comment on the usefulness of the attached model (Table 1)?

## Questionnaire 2

### Organization of Men and Machines for Control of Urban Violence

1. What is the strength/size of the major cities' police forces and riot-control forces?
2. What is the strength/size of the national or provincial police forces and riot-control forces?
3. What is the organizational structure of the "combat" personnel of the riot-control forces and the numbers in each element of this structure?
4. Are the combat personnel organized on the basis of foot or motorized movement?
5. Describe the missions of the smallest integral unit and the duties of each of the members. Include the armament of each individual (especially the non-lethal weapons carried).
6. When the riot-control forces are deployed, what is the strength/size of the reserve forces?
7. What are the qualifications for selection of personnel who are assigned to the riot-control forces?
8. What training do the personnel of the riot-control forces and reserves receive and how often do they receive this training?
9. What type of transportation air and/or ground is used by the riot-control forces when they deploy?
10. How are the personnel carriers armed and what protection do they afford the transported personnel? Describe the carriers and differentiate between transport and combat vehicles.
11. How are arrested rioters transported to confinement or isolated from other rioters?
12. What methods of communications are used by the riot-control forces, e.g., radio, television, wire, light, messenger, etc.?

Questionnaire 2 (Cont.)

13. What type of a vehicle or structure is used for a field command post and where is it usually located?
14. Are there any units designated for highly specialized tasks, e.g., bomb disposal, anti-sniper defense, etc.? If so, how are they organized?
15. List all other equipment carried by each man, including protective devices, uniform clothing, etc.
16. Describe other equipment that is used by the riot-control forces.

Questionnaire 3

1. Threat Description (using the following, briefly describe the threat).
  - a. Phase of civil strife (turmoil, conspiracy, internal war, combination of two or more, or variable as a function of time/place).
  - b. Description of civil strife (participants, the area, casualties, damage and duration).
  - c. Miscellaneous classification (nature of participants, objectives of activists, techniques of disturbance, type/amount of destructive force).
2. Hand-carried devices employed in controlling civil disturbance (using the following as a guide, discuss hand systems in use or protected for future use).
  - a. Classification by principle.
    - (1) Low kinetic energy (KE) (e.g., rubber, plastic, or wood projectiles).
    - (2) Chemical (e.g., smoke, dye, CS, CN in grenade (hand-burster or baseball, or launcher) form or as Chemical mace).
    - (3) Offensive accoustical (e.g., directional devices, HPS-1 type with curdler).
    - (4) Light-producing devices.
    - (5) Electrical (e.g., shock baton).
    - (6) Flame.
    - (7) Conventional individual/crew served (CS) weapons and ammunition (e.g., semi and automatic weapons with or without bayonets, mortars, grenade launchers, flame throwers, shotguns, hand grenades).

Questionnaire 3 (Cont.)

- b. Classification by radius of deterrence.
    - (1) 0-15 feet (e.g., batons, mace, foam guns).
    - (2) 15-30 feet (e.g., riot-control agent disperser).
    - (3) 30-100 feet (e.g., stun-gun with bean bag projectiles).
    - (4) 100 plus feet.
    - (5) Gradient-lethal system (KE less lethal device with built-in flexibility that allows operation in more than one mode (incapacitating or lethal)).
  - c. Classification by accuracy.
    - (1) Area-type device (e.g., chemical munitions).
    - (2) Precision-type device (e.g., marksman with a rifle).
  - d. MOE used for devices above and worth/utility for each.
  - e. Which devices have been found suitable for mounted use (wheeled/tracked vehicle, horse, RW/FW aircraft)?
3. Command, Control, and Doctrine of Employment.
- a. Describe unit organizations (to include unit strengths, density and type of individual/CS weapons, and mobility provided, if applicable).
  - b. What means of communications are employed (e.g., existing civilian systems, PA sets, commercial radio/TV, RTT, radio (FM/AM, military/police/taxi), visual, audio) and what security measures are observed?
  - c. What training (individual and unit) is conducted?
  - d. Describe principles of operation and tactical procedures (key questions: control procedures for loading/firing of non- and less lethal devices, SOP-type instructions to individuals, means of communication to crowd).
4. Miscellaneous.
- a. What are lessons learned as pertain to hand-carried delivery systems from recent civil disturbances?
  - b. Are any predictive mathematical models available for KE munitions systems?
  - c. What system accuracy/lethality (as a function of range) trade-off analyses are available for both non- and less lethal systems?

### Questionnaire 3 (Cont.)

- d. Is a totally non-lethal KE munition available? If so, what is it?
- e. Has the "lethal limit" for a low velocity solid projectile been defined?
- f. Are test data on bean bag projectiles available?
- g. Describe vulnerability reduction equipment used (e.g., shields, masks, protective clothing, body armor, face pieces or goggles, protective masks, helmets or special headgear, etc).
- h. What special purpose equipment (not previously mentioned) are effectively employed (e.g., long riot batons, cameras (movie, still, or polaroid), recording devices, ropes, ladders, grappling hooks, roadblock/barrier material)?

### Questionnaire 4

#### Vehicle, Integral or Transported, Violence-Control Hardware

- 1. Is the basic combat organizational unit of your urban riot force foot, motor vehicle or aircraft mobile?
- 2. For what purpose do you employ motor vehicles with riot-control forces, e.g., logistics, communications, reconnaissance, combat purposes, etc.? What types of vehicles do you consider effective for riot-control use, e.g., wheeled, tracked, ground effects; armored, unarmored, etc?
- 4. Which of the following types of violence control devices do you mount integrally on vehicles or transport as hand-carried systems?
  - a. Gradient-lethal.
  - b. Non-lethal.
  - c. Lethal.
- 5. Describe the vehicles which you presently have in service with the riot-control forces: wheeled-- weight, speed, integral weapons, carried weapons, range, vulnerability; tracked--weight, speed, integral weapons, carried weapons, range, vulnerability; ground effects--weight, speed, integral weapons, carried weapons, range, vulnerability.
- 6. Present the general direction of your research and development effort



#### Questionnaire 4 (Cont.)

for riot-control vehicles.

7. Which of your vehicles have been employed in actual riot-control operations?
8. Describe the tactics actually employed with integral-vehicle and vehicle-mounted violence-control systems.
9. Describe the effectiveness of vehicle-associated, violence-control systems and especially the reaction of mobs to the systems. What types of vehicles are best suited for riot-control combat and reconnaissance?

#### Questionnaire 5

##### Aircraft, Integral or Transported, Violence-Control Hardware

(All questions inherently imply contemplated use as well as past employment)

1. What type air vehicles are currently used in riot-control operations? RW-FW-and specific type and capabilities.
2. Have any aircraft been equipped with organic conventional weapons or gradient-lethal weapons for use in riot control? (e.g., armed helicopters).
3. Have searchlights (Night Sun) been used in riot control?
4. Have any aircraft been equipped with loudspeakers for crowd control and communication?
5. If aircraft are planned to be used as chemical agent dispensers, what type device is envisioned? (e.g., spray, cannister drop, or individual grenade drop/projective).
6. Are there plans to drop anti-friction chemicals or similar "exotic" bubbles, etc. from aircraft?
7. Have aircraft been used for deploying police or troops, such as to rooftops for surveillance or sniper operations?
8. Are aircraft planned to be used for command and control by the individual responsible for riot control?

Questionnaire 5 (Cont.)

9. Will police or aircraft crewmen fire any type of hand-held weapon from the door of the aircraft?
10. What is considered the minimum flight altitude (if any) for operating in urban areas during riot-control operations?
11. Are aircraft equipped with self-sealing fuel cells, chemical, and armor protection for the crew?
12. Are crewmen specially trained for riot-control operations and urban flying conditions?

B. Trip Report; Paris, France

1. Orientation. For an outstanding source of information and to test the validity of the riot-control matrix suggested in Table 1, a field trip was made to Paris, France. In Paris, meetings were held with officials of the French Government and with officials of the Prefecture of Police for Paris. Notes were compared and detailed information was obtained. Answers to specific detailed questions are contained in the Foreign State Visit Report which follows. Discussion of the riot-control matrix tended to confirm its validity. However, the French are not currently faced with a threat wherein police are likely to be confronted by armed rioters.

It was found that the strength of the French in the control of riots and urban violence lay in areas of doctrine, organization, and training. Research for this field trip related to the Paris area of operations, where most of the French experience has been gained.

The Paris Police organization is a segment of the French National Police for reasons of financial support, but is independent for reasons of operational control. The Prefect of Police for the City of Paris is subordinate to the Minister of the Interior of the nation and responsible for the maintenance of order in the City of Paris. The French military has no role in riot control with the exception of static protection of public buildings.

Of the approximately 20,000 policemen for the City of Paris, there are

2000 permanently assigned in the riot-control mission. Specially chosen from graduates of the police academy, these men train and maintain their equipment in military fashion. It is this ready force which gives the French confidence in their ability to control urban violence.

2. Answers to Questionnaires.

a. Questionnaire 1.

1. The French doctrine of employment of men and machines for riot-control situations in urban areas is based on principles of mobile, rapid response with a strong force. The French retain ready forces which are specifically trained in riot-control techniques and tactics. These forces are usually positioned in different parts of the city for rapid employment and are equipped with vehicles for mobility.
2. The French doctrine included the principle of using the minimum force necessary to control violence insofar as actual confrontation is concerned. They are quick to deploy, however, whatever number of men will be necessary to be absolutely certain of success if actual force becomes necessary.
3. The French have no clearly defined system of classifying violence by degree. They rely on the judgment of trained riot-control commanders who report continuously to higher authority where decisions are made concerning the escalation of force necessary to counter violence in the street.
4. The indicators used to determine when urban violence passes from one stage to another are the degrees to which civil and municipal order are being violated. For example, if a crowd which has been peacefully demonstrating moves to occupy a public plaza and then attempts to erect a barricade of overturned automobiles, etc., then the demonstration has escalated in violence by several degrees. The French invariably have riot-control personnel on the scene who do not interfere during any peaceful demonstration; these personnel are trained to note changes in intent or mood of the crowd.
5. The French employ a graduated system of response to threats of violence which consists of show of force, saturation, and then crowd dispersal. Crowd dispersal is employed when the situation goes beyond one of peaceful

demonstration. Saturation is used by the French in any riot situation as a measure of prevention.

6. The French employ non-lethal weapons of two types: batons and gas grenades. They employ no other weapons, gradient-lethal or otherwise. These non-lethal weapons are employed in the crowd dispersal phase of a riot-control situation; gas is employed as an extreme measure and only with permission of the Minister of Interior of the nation. Gas is usually resorted to when there is a threat, due to the crowd's size, that the available manpower will not be able to contain the violence before reinforcements arrive.

7. Commanders of riot-control police forces are trained continuously in this task. Actual decisions on escalation of force to counter violence are made by district police commissioners who are in constant communication with the office of the Minister of the Interior of the nation. These commissioners are trained in making such decisions and serve 24 hours duty one day per month in the headquarters of the police department as liaison to the Minister of Interior in riot-control situations, should such situations arise.

8. The French police maintain an excellent intelligence system which allows them to have knowledge of virtually any incident which might result in an urban violence situation. They employ clandestine operatives who infiltrate dissident groups. They send infiltrators into crowds which threaten rioting in order to arrest the leaders before they can flee when the police commence crowd dispersal activities. There is an organized unit of plainclothesmen who patrol and keep a close eye on the city streets. Finally, there are almost 5000 policemen on the city streets at any hour of the day or night with direct communication to their district headquarters.

9. At any time that extra-legal powers are considered necessary in the control of violence, the Minister of Interior of the nation is in constant communication with the police commissioners at the scene and makes such decisions.

10. The French police have been effective in riot control and have suffered

no backlash from the general public. They are organized in such a way that the policeman on the street who has day-to-day contact with the population does not participate in riot-control duties and so is not made a target for any resentment that might be harbored.

11. The riot-control model in matrix form (Table 1) was deemed useful by the French police responsible for riot control. Due to the fact that the threat faced by the French is very different than that faced in the United States, only the section of the matrix dealing with responses up to and including crowd dispersal was considered applicable in the French case.

b. Questionnaire 2.

1. The police force of Paris, the largest city in France with a population of seven million, numbers approximately 20,000 men. Of these, about 2000 are retained exclusively for riot-control duty and have no other duties. They are trained and in a constant state of readiness for riot-control activity on a full-time basis. In other cities, there are roughly 200 men per city district retained in the same manner.

2. The city police of Paris form a segment of the National Police and are the only organization responsible within the nation for riot control in Paris. They can be augmented in case of extreme need by riot-control police similarly organized, from other cities. The size of this organization is the same 2000-man force previously mentioned.

3. In each of the nine districts of Paris, there are two companies of 100 men each, called, "Compagnies d'intervention," or companies of interventions (see Figure 3). Each company is on duty for an eight-hour period during every day, so that at any time there are six companies available in the city. This duty is rotated so the companies on duty are positioned in various parts of the city where they may be quickly assembled for use, as needed. Each company performs training according to a specific manual of rules and tactics and also conducts physical fitness activity and equipment maintenance during its duty period. In a period when rapid response is deemed necessary, training is omitted and the emphasis is placed on full readiness. Each company is led by a Captain who is assisted by a Lieutenant. There are four sections of 25



Figure 3. Vehicle Used by Compagnie d'Intervention

men in each company led by a Lieutenant. Each section is further subdivided into two groups of twelve men each, and each group is led by a sergeant.

4. Combat personnel are organized on the basis of motorized movement. Vehicles are designed to carry each basic element.

5. The mission of the group is rapid deployment to an area where a demonstration, peaceful or otherwise, is taking place. This deployment is to mount a show of force and to request reinforcements sufficient to deal with any contingency. In the case of a peaceful demonstration, the specific mission of the group is to identify the leaders of the demonstration and accompany them to headquarters where an accord can be made regarding the area within which the demonstration is to be restricted, the time the demonstration must dissolve, and the rules to be observed. Any deviation from this accord then becomes a basis for further reaction by police forces.

6. Reserve forces are generally requested on the principle of three reserves for each employed member. A company, for instance, usually employs one section, maintaining three sections in reserve. When large scale riots are encountered, two companies of the six available are usually kept in reserve while the 12 off-duty companies are placed on alert.

7. Personnel selected for riot-control duty are required to possess the equivalent of a high school education. They are selected from graduates of the one-year course at the National Police Academy with certain specific characteristics of athletic ability, large stature and courage.

8. The riot-control forces are in continuous training in riot-control tactics as a full-time duty.

9. Riot-control forces are transported by specially designed buses.

10. Personnel carriers are unarmed and are protected from projectiles (rocks, bricks, etc.) by wire screens over window openings.

11. Arrested rioters are transported to police headquarters by police who have a law enforcement function; these police are summoned by the two criminal police inspectors who accompany each company of riot-control police.

12. For communications, riot-control forces employ radio primarily, with

approximately 24 channels available. Combat leaders are equipped with hand-carried, two-way radios while mobile command posts have multi-channel capability. The static command post at city police headquarters is equipped to communicate with any hand-held, radio transmitter/receiver as well as any street telephone box or mobile command post. Closed circuit television monitors are available which cover each of 12 major plazas in the city. Primarily for traffic control, these monitors can be exploited, if needed, for riot-control situations.

13. Two types of vehicles are used as mobile command posts. A small land-cover type is used for the control of two companies, and a larger modified bus is used to handle forces which number more than two companies. These are usually maneuvered close to the riot area, but at a distance chosen to minimize interference with combat personnel and vehicles.

14. There are bomb-disposal units which are available from the police laboratory department.

15. Each man in the riot-control combat unit has the following equipment: high-top leather boots, protected vest (not bullet-proof), slip-on trousers, slip-on jacket, protected gauntlet (for parrying blows by clubs, pipes, etc.), helmet with bullet-proof visor, 30-inch, hardwood baton. In addition, two grenade-launching rifles and six bullet-proof, clear-plastic shields are carried per section. The trousers and jacket contain no hooks, loops or belts.

c. Questionnaires 3 and 5.

Specific answers will not be provided to the prepared questionnaire in the areas of hand-held weapons systems and aviation systems. The French have little to offer in these areas since, in the urban violence threat faced by the French, there is no evidence of sophisticated weapons in the hands of the rioters.

The single system of ordnance used by the French riot-control forces is a rifle-launched cannister of a gas virtually identical to A.T.S. It is available in a hand-projected cannister of less range and accuracy than the American counterpart. An interesting weapon is a projector capable of launching four cannisters simultaneously, mounted on a vehicle that is designed to



destroy barricades.

The French employ helicopters in a surveillance role only in riot-control situations. Cannisters of gas may be lowered from the helicopters in satchels for deployment. The French have not yet had the occasion to use this tactic.

d. Questionnaire 4.

1. The basic combat organizational unit of the French urban riot-control force is the motor vehicle mobile. These are vehicles which can transport either group-size or section-size units.
2. Motor vehicles are employed for logistics, communications, reconnaissance and combat purposes.
3. The French consider wheeled vehicles effective and economical for riot-control use. Such vehicles tend to subordinate the military appearance and are unarmored.
4. The French have only two vehicle-mounted weapons systems. One, a projector for gas cannisters, is mounted on a tractor for barricade removal and the other, a water cannon, is mounted on a large vehicle mounting the tank and pumping equipment.
5. The vehicles presently in service, all-wheeled, are as follows\*:
  - a. Motor-cycle; high-speed, carries radio equipment, no weapons. Two per company of riot-control police. Due to their maneuverability and speed, they are sent in advance of units dispatched to the scene of any disturbance. Their mission is to perform an immediate reconnaissance of the situation and request additional forces, if necessary.
  - b. Command car; small, a land-cover fitted with loudspeaker, multi-channel radio, maps, searchlight. These are used in command and control of up to two companies of riot-control police.
  - c. Command car; large, a bus with enhanced observation capability, loudspeaker, multi-channel radio, space for three radio-operators, internal communication system, map tables for two commissioners,

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\* See photographs of vehicles in Figures 4 through 8.




Figure 4. Command Cars Used by French Police




Figure 5. Transporter Vehicles Used by French Police

Le service d'urgence de police de la ville de New York, New York, a été informé par un témoin anonyme que des véhicules de police ont été vus à la gare de la ville de New York, New York, le 10 mai 1968.

Cars et voitures radio vérifiées formés de police, New York, New York, ont été vus, quand on les a vus, à la gare d'information de commandement. Leurs équipages interviennent soit de leur propre initiative, soit sur instructions radio, soit sur la requête de personnes.

en 1968

BARRAGES

20 000 INTERPELLATIONS


15 000 CONDUITES AU POSTE

2 500 ARRESTATIONS



Barricade tractor truck.

Figure 6. Barricade Tractor Truck



Portable, folding barricade, Trailer pulled.

Figure 7. Other Equipment Used by French Police






Figure 8. An Assortment of Vehicles Used by the French Police

searchlight.

d. Transporter; small, a bus with radio and space to transport one group and its equipment.

e. Transporter; large, a bus with radio and space to transport one section and its equipment.

f. Barricade tractor; a truck with high-power and dozerblade, armed with gas-projecting devices, used to remove barriers blocking approaching police forces. It can also be used as a protective vehicle to shield advancing police.

g. Water-cannon truck; a high-powered truck aimed with a powerful (60 psi) water cannon and enough water for 10 minutes operation at maximum pressure. The water supply may be replenished from street hydrants. This truck is used primarily in suppressing flames of barricades to allow approach of barricade tractors.

6. The French are confident that current vehicles are effective and that there is no need for further research at present in this area. The vehicles they now have are the products of extensive research subsequent to 1968.

7. All of the French vehicles have been used in actual riot-control action.

8. The French prefer to confine violence to small areas and the makeup of their city permits this to a large extent. Troops and prefabricated barricades are transported to the scene. French tactics for using vehicles are simple and effective and are employed against mobs which have barricaded themselves. The French use gas projectors from these tractors to disperse rioters in the immediate vicinity of the barricades and then advance with the tractors clearing a pathway through the barricade. Troops advancing behind can thus breach the barricade and then deploy to disperse the rioters. Water cannon trucks are used if conditions are not proper for employment of gas.

9. The French find their vehicles very effective in riot-control work; rioters have grown to respect and fear these vehicles under actual conditions. The French police find that their barricade tractor, small command cars, and motorcycles are especially well-suited to riot-control combat and surveillance.

C. Trip Report; Miami, Florida

1. Orientation. In preparation for the 1972 Republican and Democratic National Conventions in Miami Beach, the Governor of Florida appointed the Miami Beach Chief of Police to be responsible for the security of the conventions. However, according to the State of Florida Constitution, the Sheriff of Dade County is responsible for the security of the county. For these reasons, it was felt that both the Miami Beach Police Department and the Dade County Sheriff's Department would be able to contribute valuable information to the research effort.

The tactic plan was to have the Miami Beach Police Department stage its personnel on the perimeters of the area. The Dade County Sheriff's Department was to guard tidal installations and act as a reserve force if the demonstrators broke through the perimeter defenses. Miami Beach personnel were to be reinforced by people from the State Highway Patrol, State Marine Patrol, and other state law-enforcement agencies.

It was agreed by the researchers for this report that a visit to Miami for discussion with riot-control authorities was warranted.

2. Answers to Questionnaires.

a. Questionnaire 1 Answered by Miami Beach Police Department.

1. The doctrine of employment is to keep a low profile whenever a demonstration is passive. If the demonstration gets out of hand, then the full strength of the riot-control forces is used.
2. The doctrine includes the principle of minimum force.
3. There is no system of classifying urban violence by degree.
4. The behavior of the mob leaders, the tensions of the crowd, and the physical contact of the crowd and the forces are the main indicators for determining the extent of urban violence.
5. The system of response is to use whatever force is necessary to control the disturbance.
6. The non-lethal devices used are chemical mace, batons, and tear gas (CS



and CN).

7. There is a formal training program to indoctrinate commanders in decision-making; the course is conducted by the Miami Beach Police Department.
8. Intelligence units are used to gauge the moods of the crowd.
9. There are no extra-legal powers that are employed by this agency.
10. Not applicable, see comment below.
11. No comment.

Comment: Since the population of Miami Beach is basically composed of elderly retired people, there are no ghetto or minority problems. For these reasons, there have been few disturbances in the past to provide information.

b. Questionnaire 1 Answered by the Dade County Sheriff's Department.

1. Personnel are sent into an area to control riots only when there is a definite danger to lives or property. The supervisory personnel in this urban area determine the amount of force necessary to handle the situation.
2. The principle of using the minimum amount of force is followed to control violence.
3. No.
4. Not applicable, since there is no system for classifying urban violence.
5. A community relations team is sent into an urban area to talk to the demonstrators. They try to solve the problem before it becomes a police problem. If this effort fails, then force is used on an escalating scale.
6. Pepper fog and tear gas are the only non-lethal devices used, and only whenever the officer-in-charge at the scene decides that these devices are necessary.
7. Yes, supervisory management courses are given to commanders.
8. Yes, by utilization of intelligence teams, community relations teams, and infiltrators within the crowd.
9. No, but a request for a curfew may be made to proper authorities.

10. Not applicable, since the principle of minimum force is followed.

11. No comment.

c. Questionnaire 2 Answered by the Miami Beach Police Department.

1. There are 230 police officers in the Miami Beach Police Department, 40 of which are riot-control forces.

2. Not applicable.

3. There are 10 men assigned to a squad with four squads to a platoon.

4. The combat personnel are organized on the basis of foot movement but for the convention there will be a 200-man fluid unit with a car for each four men. This fluid unit will be composed of state personnel such as highway patrolmen, marine patrolmen, etc.

5. Upon confronting a crowd, a law enforcement officer's first concern in the past has been to protect his sidearm; this leaves one hand free to use a baton. Officials feel that this tactic often incites a crowd further. Therefore, a new tactic will be employed for the convention. A squad in soft hats, carrying no sidearms or batons will initially face the crowd. They will have chemical mace, which will not be visible to the crowd, in their pockets. If the demonstrators get out of hand, then this squad will retreat and a conventional squad with helmets, batons, sidearms, and tear gas will take their place.

6. Because of mutual aid and mutual agreement pacts, the size of the reserve force will vary.

7. The qualifications for selection of personnel is that they be level-headed, stable, and able to control their emotions.

8. Riot-control personnel receive training in the behavioral sciences, psychology, tactical training, baton training, etc.

9. Riot-control forces are deployed by bus or car, depending on the size of the unit.

10. The personnel carriers are not armed.

11. The arrested rioters are usually transported to confinement by bus; felony

arrests are transported by caged vehicles.

12. Communications between control forces is accomplished by two-way radio and by verbal means.

13. A command van was built by Gersten Lager at a cost of \$35,000 in accordance with specifications of the Miami Beach Police Department. It is unmarked and painted to resemble a mobile library. This van will be located close to any disturbance but will be kept out of sight of the demonstrators.

14. There is a SWAT team composed of one sergeant and firemen. They have an anti-sniper rifle (30-06) with a 4X scope. Two men carry shotguns and two men act as spotters. This group can be broken down into two three-man SWAT teams, if necessary.

15. Each member of the riot-control force will have a hard hat with shield, a plastic cup inserted in a jock strap, armored vest, coveralls, and gloves.

16. The control forces will have regular batons, chemical mace, tear gas grenades, tear gas guns, and 36-inch batons.

d. Questionnaire 2 Answered by the Dade County Sheriff's Department.

1. Dade County Sheriff's Department has 1546 personnel, 1000 of which are police officers. All police officers are given extensive training in riot control, and every police officer is considered a member of the riot-control force.

2. Not applicable.

3. A squad ranges from five to ten men, depending on the amount of manpower available within the district. The county is divided into districts and each district handles its own disturbances. There are three squads to a platoon and four platoons to a company.

4. They are organized on the basis of foot movement.

5. The mission of a unit depends on the type of a crowd that it has to deal with. If the demonstrators are passive and conduct sit-downs, lie-downs, etc., then the unit will make individual arrests. If the demonstrators conduct a hit-and-run attack, then there is a mobile squad response. The unit has not had a direct crowd confrontation within the past six or seven years and does not

foresee any within the immediate future. Each individual carries a sidearm and a baton.

6. The size of the reserve force depends on the size of the original force committed since the entire Sheriff's Department is considered a riot-control force.

7. Not applicable.

8. Personnel receive monthly training for a total of 320 hours per year. The training consists of sensitivity, procedures on arresting people, riot-control techniques, psychology, baton training, etc.

9. They use buses, cars, and trucks when deploying.

10. The personnel carriers are not armed except for the weapons carried by the control forces. Combat vehicles are not used. The route to the riot area is kept under surveillance by aircraft in order to warn the personnel carriers of roadblocks and other disturbance areas.

11. The arrested rioters are taken to a confinement area and processed; then they are taken away in prison vans by the Correction and Rehabilitation Department.

12. Supervisory personnel, only have radios for communication.

13. A field command post is set up within any physical structure that is available. The communications equipment is portable. This post is located close enough to the riot area so that the field commander is in direct contact with the control forces.

14. The special weapons team is composed of three men: a marksman, a spotter, and an officer to protect the other two. There are human relations teams, intelligence teams, and bomb disposal teams. The bomb disposal team is headed by Thomas G. Brodie, who has written a book called Bombs and Bombing.

15. The riot-control forces use a standard police uniform, hard hats, face masks that snap onto the hats, gas masks, regular police baton, and three-foot baton.

16. Other equipment that they carry is tear gas and hand-carried pepper fogger.

e. Questionnaire 3 Answered by the Miami Beach Police Department.

1. No comment.
2. a. (1) No low kinetic energy weapons used.  
(2) Chemical mace, CS and CN gas that is dispensed by generator, grenades, and projectiles.  
(3) No accoustical weapons used.  
(4) No light-producing devices used.  
(5) No electrical devices used.  
(6) No flame devices used.  
(7) There are ten sub-machine guns that are available for use in unusual circumstances.
- b. (1) Batons and chemical mace are used.  
(2) Tear gas is used.  
(3) Tear gas is used.  
(4) Tear gas by means of launcher is used.  
(5) No gradient-lethal system used.
- c. (1) No comment.  
(2) No comment.
- d. No comment.
- e. No devices have been found suitable for mounted use.
3. a. The unit organizations have been previously discussed in Questionnaire 2, question 5.  
b. Communication is by means of two-way radios.  
c. Training in policy, philosophy, etc. is conducted.  
d. The instructions that are given to the control forces is that they must be geared to take verbal abuse and react as a team. They will move only on the orders of the officer-in-charge.
4. Miscellaneous.  
a. Since there have been no recent civil disturbances, there have been

no lessons learned.

b. No comment.

c. No comment.

d. No comment.

e. No comment.

f. The IACP has testing facilities which will give test results upon request.

g. Vulnerability equipment such as hard hats, face masks, gas masks, plastic cup in a jock strap, armored vests, and gloves are used.

h. Movie and still cameras, recording devices, ropes, and barricades for roadblocks are used.

f. Questionnaire 3 Answered by Dade County Sheriff's Department.

1. No comment.

2. a. (1) Do not use.

(2) Use ( ) and CS gas that is dispensed by either a launcher or thrown grenade. They also use a hand-carried pepper fogger.

(3) Do not use.

(4) The Night Sun mounted on their aircraft.

(5) Do not use.

(6) Do not use.

(7) Automatic and semi-automatic weapons are used only by the anti-sniper teams.

b. (1) Use batons.

(2) Use tear gas.

(3) Use tear gas.

(4) Use tear gas that is launched.

c. (1) No comment.

(2) No comment.

d. No comment.

- e. Use tear gas cannisters on helicopters.
3.
    - a. Unit organizations discussed in Questionnaire 2, question 5.
    - b. Communications are achieved by use of their own existing systems.
    - c. There is a continuous training program.
    - d. The forces are instructed to react as a team and never as an individual. The means of communication to a crowd is by means of a PA system.
  4. Miscellaneous.
    - a. Pepper fogger and tear gas grenades are very effective in civil disturbances. Shotguns have a psychological effect on a crowd.
    - b. No comment.
    - c. No comment.
    - d. No.
    - e. No comment.
    - f. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) has testing facilities where data can be obtained upon request.
    - g. Vulnerability reduction equipment such as face masks, gas masks, and helmets are used.
    - h. The 36-inch baton, cameras for identification purposes, and recording devices are used.
    - g. Questionnaire 4 Answered by the Miami Beach Police Department.
  1. The basic organizational unit is foot-mobile.
  2. Motor vehicles are used for logistics, communications, and reconnaissance.
  3. No type of vehicle is considered effective for riot-control use.
  4. No equipment is mounted or transported on vehicles.
  5. No combat vehicles are in service with the riot-control forces.
  6. There is no planned research and development program for riot-control vehicles.

h. Questionnaire 4 Answered by the Dade County Sheriff's Department.

1. The basic combat organizational unit is organized on the basis of foot movement.
2. Motor vehicles are used for logistics, communications, and reconnaissance purposes.
3. No effective use has been found for vehicles in riot control.
4. None.
5. No vehicles are used in riot control.
6. There is no planned research and development program for riot-control vehicles.
7. No vehicles have been employed in actual riot-control operations.
8. No tactics are employed.
9. No vehicles are used in riot control.

i. Questionnaire 5 Answered by the Miami Beach Police Department.

The Miami Beach Police Department does not have any aircraft. During the convention, however, there are plans to have military helicopters in the air at all times.

j. Questionnaire 5 Answered by the Dade County Sheriff's Department.

1. They use two Bell (three-seater) helicopters and one fixed wing STOL, aircraft.
2. The aircraft have been equipped to dispense tear gas.
3. There is one Night Sun searchlight unit on each aircraft. This device has been used very effectively.
4. All aircraft have a loudspeaker system.
5. The tear gas is dispensed by cannister.
6. There are no plans to drop anti-friction chemicals or similar "exotic"



bubbles from the aircraft.

7. Aircraft have not been used for deploying police.
8. The aircraft are used as observation platforms.
9. No hand-held weapons are fired from the door of the aircraft.
10. The minimum flight altitude for operating in urban areas, even during riot-control operations, is the altitude restriction of the F.A.A.
11. No member of the aircraft crew was available for comment.
12. The crewmen are especially trained for riot-control operations as they are considered police officers primarily and crew members as a secondary mission.

D. Trip Report; Tokyo, Japan

1. Orientation. To continue this study for the control of urban violence, first-hand coordination was sought with officials in Tokyo, Japan, on problems of real world civil disturbance control. The salient observations from this trip follow.

It must be kept in mind that both the friendly and enemy situations in Tokyo are not identical to those in the United States and so, the applicability of Japanese tactics and techniques to a civil disturbance situation in the United States may not follow a strictly linear conversion.

2. Answers to Questionnaires.

a. Questionnaire 1.

1. and 2. Permanently organized and specially trained and equipped riot-control police units are ready and available to meet any predicted threat. The primary doctrine for riot control is the flexible commitment of riot-control units backed up by special support vehicles. The number of units and their support is restricted to the minimum necessary to maintain public safety. In particular, special vehicles and weapons are held in the background allowing the burden of the responsibility to fall upon the shield-wielding, riot-control policeman. The actions of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) are generally passive. The riot-control police and vehicles are well-

padded and armored and are charged with absorbing the maximum abuse to channelize the rioters using the minimum of police response.

The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) is trained to provide back-up support to the MPD, but neither the GSDF nor the MPD foresee an occasion, short of all-out civil war, where they would be used. Both organizations were adamant in their conviction that the GSDF mission was to protect Japan from foreign enemies and the mission of the police was to maintain public order and safety. The GSDF is itself a sensitive issue to the Japanese public. It is equipped and organized for defensive operations only--hence, the name Ground Self-Defense Force instead of Army. In addition, the GSDF is very small, having approximately the same strength as the total number of Japanese police--about 175,000.

3., 4., 5., and 11. The MPD has no formal system for classifying urban violence by discrete degrees; the general concept is to continuously commit more riot-control units as the situation escalates. Much importance is placed upon accurate and timely intelligence information gathered prior to the riot. Radio-equipped plainclothesmen and the riot-control police are in abundance during all phases of the demonstration/riot and provide information to higher units which determine when the violence has escalated and when additional force is required.

The "attached model" displaying Threat vs Security Measures, was examined by the commander of the Special Vehicle Unit with interest. He indicated that the model was useful in graphically depicting the escalating riot situation, but was quick to point out that the MPD places primary importance on the "Saturation" and "Crowd Dispersal" sections of the model.

The GSDF does classify its responses in the following stages:

1. Pacification
2. Show of force
3. Isolation of leader(s) from crowd
4. Isolation of leader(s) from crowd by tear gas
5. Neutralize with tear gas or water

6. One warning shot

7. Separation of leader(s) by fire.

6. and 10. The only non-lethal or gradient-lethal weapons employed by the Tokyo MPD are the standard-length night stick, a longer wooden baton, CN tear gas, soap bubbles, and the water cannon. Aside from these instruments, they consider their most important gradient-lethal weapon to be the individual riot control policeman. If more force is required, the gradient response is to commit more riot-control units. It is felt that the use of weapons serves to aggravate the situation rather than to quell it.

7. Decision-making involving the level of response is largely based on the experience of the police leaders. Extensive schooling is periodically required for all career policemen as indicated in the pamphlet, "The Police of Japan '71", page 22.


8. The mood of the crowd is continuously gauged both by radio-equipped plainclothesmen and by the experienced riot-control unit leaders. All radical organizations have been thoroughly infiltrated by policemen enrolled in the universities as students but still on the police payroll.

9. When a riot situation is formally declared, "extra-legal" powers are afforded the police to arrest and detain any person in the riot area. As a matter of policy, all demonstrators are stopped and asked to submit to a search prior to entering a demonstration assembly area (see Figure 9). In general, no citizen is authorized to own and carry firearms and the possession of Molotov Cocktails and bombs is specifically outlawed.

b. Questionnaire 2.

1. and 2. Listed below are the current Japanese Police strengths:

Uniformed Japanese Police	175,000
Uniformed Tokyo Police	40,000
Tokyo Riot-Control Police	6,000
Trained Riot-Control Reserves (from Regular Force)	20,000



Photograph 1



Photograph 2

Figure 9. Tokyo State Visit; Photographs 1 and 2

3., 4., and 5. The Riot-Control Division of the Tokyo MPD is composed of nine Riot-Control Mobile Units, all similarly equipped, each having a strength of approximately 600 men and one Special Vehicle Unit equipped with heavier and more exotic equipment with a strength of approximately 425 men. Each Mobile Unit is composed of four Riot-Control Companies and one Headquarters Company. The Headquarters Company provides transportation and vehicle support for the other companies with its organic 130 vehicles. Each company is composed of three platoons, each platoon having three squads, and each squad having eleven riot-control policemen.

Although all units are capable of transporting their assigned police, the units are organized for employment on foot. All individuals within the squad, except the squad leader, are equipped identically; they carry no weapons except a night stick for self-defense. The squad leader is equipped with a small pocket radio with attaching earplug and frequently carries a bottle containing a chemical similar to mace. The leaders of higher echelons may carry sidearms. Within the headquarters of each company, CN grenade launchers are available, if needed. The smallest unit which would normally be committed separately is the company.


6. The strength of reserve forces remains flexible. Due to the political climate and public opinion, the GSDF cannot be considered a reserve force. In 1970, when students rampaged, Japanese authorities preferred to mobilize additional police to a total of 2.5 million rather than to request GSDF assistance. The GSDF have never been used to maintain public order.

7. and 8. Each policeman must attend Police School either for one year if a high school graduate or one-half year if a college graduate. Prior to becoming a riot-control policeman, each applicant must serve as a policeman for one and one-half years and must receive an additional two weeks training in riot-control operations.

9. and 10. Riot-control units are transported by specially designed buses (see Figures 9 and 10). The buses are protected from rocks and to a lesser



Photograph 3



Photograph 4

Figure 10. Tokyo State Visit; Photographs 3 and 4

degree, bombs. There are only two fully armored combat vehicles. The water cannons and tear gas vehicles are protected only against rocks.

11. Arrested rioters are transported from the riot area to isolated areas in the rear by bus. Special buses (see Figure 10) with openings in both front and rear are driven bumper-to-bumper to form an evacuation corridor.

12. Primary communication between all units is by radio. In addition, each unit has men designated to carry poles with their unit number lighted on the top for ease in location and identification. Television cameras are permanently installed at traditional and anticipated trouble areas and a mobile television bus is available. Television has also been used successfully from helicopter. The command post is a specially equipped truck organic to each company (see Figures 11 and 12). Communication buses are also available at the Mobile Unit level with hydraulically operated antennae (see Figure 12). The normal location for the command post is out of sight of the riot.

14. A bomb disposal unit is available with special equipment (see Figure 13) within the Special Vehicle unit. Selected marksmen, forming an anti-sniper unit, are located only at the highest echelon, e.g., Riot-Control Division, Headquarters.

15. Each man is protected with the following equipment (see Figure 14):

Police helmet w/visor

Protective vest, groin and leg guards (worn under flame retardant uniforms)

Elbow-length padded gloves

Anti-rock shields.

c. Questionnaire 3.

1. The current threat in Japan is of low intensity, primarily by radical pro-left students. Acts of destruction, bombings, sniper activity, and kidnapping are rare. The general activity is confined to speechmaking followed by a protest march.

2. No low-energy KE rounds are employed or deemed needed. CN gas and mace are




Photograph 5




Photograph 6

Figure 11. Tokyo State Visit; Photographs 5 and 6





Photograph 7



Photograph 8

Figure 12. Tokyo State Visit; Photographs 7 and 8



Photograph 9



Photograph 10

Figure 13. Tokyo State Visit; Photographs 9 and 10



Photograph 11



Photograph 12

Figure 14. Tokyo State Visit; Photographs 11 and 12

the only chemical agents used.

3. (Miscellaneous). Recent demonstrations in Japan have indicated that riots and demonstrations can be controlled with less violence and bloodshed when large numbers of police are employed in a passive role. No weapons are carried by the policeman except a night stick for self-defense.

d. Questionnaire 4.

1. and 2. Motor vehicles are used by the Tokyo MPD primarily for transportation, communication, water/CN delivery (see Figure 15), and soap bubble delivery (see Figure 16). The basic doctrine of the MPD is to conduct operations on foot.

3. and 5. All current vehicles, except a small bomb disposal crane, are wheeled. They have been very successful due to their speed. These vehicles do not draw attention while moving through urban areas. However, a tracked vehicle has been requested to increase mobility on soft terrain. Since the threat of sniper activity has been low in Japan, only two fully armored cars are used (see Figure 16). Portholes from this armored vehicle can be used to return lethal fire. A fork lift with a ballistic metal shield (see Figure 17) is available to move toward a crowd with riot police behind. When the shield is raised by the fork-lift, the riot-control police are in position.

6. The direction of research and development of vehicles has been toward controlling crowds with water, CN, and foam.

7. All vehicles shown on the photographs have been used in riot/demonstration situations.

8. and 9. Vehicular mounted searchlight and amplifiers (see Figure 18) can be remotely controlled with the protected bus. The water cannons can also be used to dispense CN tear gas to disperse the crowd. High pressure trucks can be used to physically knock the persistent rioter to the ground (see Figure 19). The vehicle shown on the photographs are deemed necessary and sufficient by the Special Vehicle Unit commander for the control of any anticipated Japanese urban violence situation. Additional photographs (taken during the Tokyo visit) are supplied in Figures 19 through 21.



Photograph 13



Photograph 14

Figure 15. Tokyo State Visit; Photographs 13 and 14



Photograph 15



Photograph 16

Figure 10. Tokyo State Visit Photographs 15 and 16





Fig. 17 Tokyo State Visit; Photograph 17



Photograph 18



Photograph 19

Figure 18. Tokyo State Visit; Photographs 18 and 19





Photograph 20



Photograph 21

Figure 19. Tokyo State Visit; Photographs 20 and 21



Photograph 22




Photograph 23

Figure 20. Tokyo State Visit; Photographs 22 and 23



Photograph 24



Photograph 25

Figure 21. Tokyo State Visit; Photographs 24 and 25

e. Questionnaire 5.

The Tokyo MPD employs six rotary wing aircraft primarily for command and control during riot/demonstrations. The aircraft used are the large Bell (Huey) and the smaller Bell 47 aircraft. They have been used successfully in demonstrations and have the capability to dispense CN gas, illuminate, broadcast television, and communicate with the crowd.

No situations are anticipated requiring the firing of any weapons from the helicopters.

E. Trip Report; Hong Kong

1. Orientation. To further explore the concepts and practices of police forces currently engaged in civil disturbance control, an official visit was made to Hong Kong. Extensive interviews have been conducted with personnel in the Hong Kong Provost Marshal's Office. The interviews spanned the entire spectrum of civil disturbance control with emphasis on the particular role and gradient-lethal weapons. The bulk of the interviews was conducted with Sir Hugh Surgeoner of the Provost Marshal's Office.

2. Answers to Questionnaires.

a. Questionnaire 1.

1., 2. and 5. In Hong Kong, the Doctrine of Employment of Men and Machines for riot-control situations is based on the principle of "minimum force necessary" with the concept of "gradual response". The Hong Kong Police, trained as a paramilitary force is the organization primarily responsible for maintaining the internal security of the colony. The British Army's role in internal security is to support and reinforce the police. Only when a situation develops that the police force is unable to handle, does the army actually take over, and then only when requested by the police.

As a result of the disturbances of 1967, the Government of Hong Kong was reorganized in order to be able to cope administratively with emergencies, particularly riots. This reorganization officially established a large degree of cooperation between the police and military. Police-Military (POLMIL) committees are in existence from the top of the Government (Governor's Council)

all the way down to the police district level. Even during calm periods, as have existed for over four years now, there still is a good deal of contact between the two forces. During times of emergency, the PO'MIL Committees are on duty continuously. In spite of this cooperation, however, the police are always the acting force. The army does not take part in controlling emergencies unless duly requested by the police or ordered by the Governor.

The Hong Kong Police, and the Government as well, believe that their successes during the 1967 disturbances are proof of the worth of their riot-control tactics and training techniques. The military uses different tactics but that is due to the fact that they do not expect to be called in unless the situation is desperate. The police and army do agree, however, on one point that is crucial to the employment of their tactics. They both believe that the caliber of their officers and men is so high, their training so good, and the discipline so strong that the on-scene commander, whether he is a battalion commander or platoon leader, has virtual autonomy. In particular, while following the principle of "minimum force necessary", the on-scene commander can, if he deems it necessary to accomplish his objective, move up the ladder of response all the way up to and including selective killing. He can do this completely on his own authority. This is done in order to prevent a situation from getting out of hand while the police are waiting for higher authority to give permission to increase the level of response.

3. No specific system for classifying urban violence by degree exists.
4. None used.
6. Discussed in a more appropriate section.
7. No formal program needed. The decision is left to the judgment of the on-scene commander.
8. No established system.
9. During 1967 several laws were passed which increased the powers of the police and government in matters dealing with internal security. For example: The Emergence (Principal Amendment) Regulation gives the police the power to enter and search without warrant where they suspect arms or explosives.

b. Questionnaire 2.

1. and 2. The Hong Kong Police force consists of 14,000 people, 2000 of whom are civilian staff. Almost all the lower echelon police are Chinese. The top members of the force are British. Just recently, the first Chinese police superintendent was appointed. This is equivalent to a precinct captain. Almost all policemen are trained in riot-control tactics. At any one time, 500 men (four companies) are on active internal security (riot-control) duty. Five hundred others are on standby.

The British Army (land forces) is 8700 strong, 1120 of whom are Chinese natives of Hong Kong. All have some training in internal security tactics.

3. The Police Internal Security Company is made up of three platoons. Each platoon has 44 men including four squads of eight men plus nine other. These other men include the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, orderly, platoon second-in-command, two vehicle drivers, two vehicle guards, and an equipment man. The first squad carries shields and long batons, the second squad carries gas pistols and gas guns (Federal riot guns), the third squad has carbines and Greener Guns (shot guns), and the fourth squad (the arrest section) carries handcuffs and short batons.

4. The combat personnel are organized on the basis of foot movement.

5. The missions of the internal security forces would include cordoning, sweeping, house searching, and attacking. Tactics for a typical confrontation are explained below.

Initially, the police will attempt a show of force, with as many platoons or companies as necessary. The tactical unit commander will have a PA system and give the order to the crowd to disperse (in English and Chinese) and warn that some action will be taken. A sign to this effect will also be displayed. Next, photographs will be taken of the demonstrators. After the crowd has been given sufficient time to disperse and has not, or is threatening the police, a sign is displayed "Warning, Baton Shells". At this time baton shells are fired (preferably at ranges greater than fifty yards) at targets specified by the platoon commander. If the crowd has not begun to disperse after a reasonable time, another sign is raised "Warning, Tear Smoke". CS is then

fired over the crowd.

Every action is taken slowly and deliberately so that no mistakes are made and the crowd has a chance to disperse. If the rioters have still not dispersed and are acting in a manner which endangers the police or other lives, the next step will be taken. A sign will be displayed "Disperse or we will use further force". The commander will then order certain men to load their automatic weapons and to fire at specified individuals (one source said they shoot to kill; another said they fire at the legs. The former appeared more plausible under the circumstances in which the statements were made. The army definitely shoots to kill). After this, the number of rounds expended is recorded, weapons used and names of the men firing are also recorded. Directed fire is the highest level of force that has been necessary so far, in Hong Kong. If the situation does not appear to be endangering any lives, or after the shooting has taken place, then the arrest section moves up. Armed with short baton and handcuffs, and wearing tennis shoes, they are instructed to arrest certain individuals. If resisted, they beat the rioters on the shoulders until resistance ceases. Those arrested are then taken back to specified vehicles and placed under guard.

The military is not trained in these tactics and does not have most of the riot-control equipment possessed by the police. When the army is called in, it would use basic military tactics. A formation used is shown in the small British Army Handbook entitled Headquarters Land Forces-Hong Kong, Internal Security-Aide Memoire. In implementing these tactics the army would employ CS automatic weapons, whichever was determined most appropriate by the military commander.

6. The reserve force is made up of the rest of the police force and all of the army. There are also provisions for bringing troops from England.
7. No special qualifications.
8. The army receives only a small amount of training since its primary duty is to back-up the police. The army also does some cordoning.

All policemen spend nine months on a Police Tactical Unit (PTU). The

initial training takes place at Fan Ling, the Police Tactical Training School. The training involves physical fitness, riot-control tactics, techniques and weapons used. There is a great deal of emphasis on discipline. Simulated exercises are conducted, and up to 12 hours a week are spent drilling in formations and maneuvers. The units are then placed in an operational status after their initial training. These units are then used constantly for many other duties besides riots, e.g., capturing drug rings, raiding gambling places. This gives the men a chance to work together under other than simulated conditions. Next, the units are placed on a standby status for actual emergencies. Finally, the policemen are dispersed and returned to normal duty. This entire process takes nine months.

9. Four-ton trucks with a capacity of twenty men are used (two trucks per platoon). The small land rover is also used.

10. The personnel carriers are not armed. The trucks have a peaked roof, they are covered entirely with fiberglass and with chain armor for the lower section. They have an exterior fire extinguisher and the windows and ports are made of a substance called Makrolon. The land rovers also are protected with fiberglass and Makrolon. These two materials cannot be penetrated by small arms fire. For example, a .38 caliber slug fired from five feet would bounce off the surface.

11. Arrested rioters are transported in trucks, vans, and buses.

12. Deployed forces have two-way radios. Some of the land rovers have large radio units with which police headquarters may be contacted from all over the city.

13. The armored land rover is sometimes used as a field command post. It is located right at the site of the riot.

14. The army has bomb disposal squads. The police have anti-sniper teams consisting of three men. Two men are armed with accurate high power rifles and the third man with binoculars and a radio.

### c. Questionnaire 3.

1. The Hong Kong Government believes that the disturbances which have taken



place in the past and any which may take place in the near future are Communist-inspired and Communist-controlled. In an area as densely populated as Hong Kong, any type of disturbance is bound to attract thousands of people. Many of these may be just curious bystanders. In addition, the Communists will also have a well-organized group of rioters on hand. The rioters are either workers, members of Communist trade unions, or students, or very young school children.

The Hong Kong officials have developed a healthy respect for the capabilities of their adversaries. As a consequence, they do not underestimate the importance of any "incident". This is why they attempt to respond quickly before the Communists can take full advantage of the situation.

2. Hand-carried weapons used in Hong Kong are the following:

a. (1) Baton shells are wooden projectiles, seven-eight inches in length, one and one-half inches in diameter, shaped like a bullet. They are fired from a gas gun at the ground to bounce up and hit rioters in the shins. The effect is very painful, The guns have a loud discharge and the slugs can break a leg at 50 yards. During the 1967 riots, a baton shell killed a girl when fired at a shorter range.

(2) Experiments are being conducted with a Bolo type instrument which is fired from a gas gun.

(3) Rubber bullets, fired at the ground to bounce and then to spin end-over-end. They scare demonstrators because they can be seen coming. The bullets are very painful when they hit legs.

(4) CS--Exploding cartridges are fired from either vehicle launchers or guns. The British have not used and do not plan to use CN. They have used pepper fog successfully.

(5) Acoustic devices besides PA systems are not used, because of possible bad effects, e.g., high frequency can cause a mental breakdown, low frequency can cause internal damage.

(6) Searchlights are used to dazzle and provide light but not to blind and not as a flashing light since they could cause epileptic fits.

(7) Studies are being made concerning a net launched over a crowd of advancing rioters to slow them down.

(8) Greener Gun--A shot gun.

(9) Carbine.

(10) Long and short wooden batons.

(11) Mace is being studied.

(12) Stun-guns have been rejected as being too lethal.

3. a. Weapons are not loaded until ordered by the officer in charge. This is done only when they are to be fired. The commander specifies the individuals who will do the shooting, how many rounds, and the targets.

4. Miscellaneous.

a. Strict discipline is needed to avoid trouble. Use of all weapons must be carefully controlled.

d. The British have not found any totally non-lethal KE munition.

e. Each platoon has a diarist with a camera and/or tape recorder.

f. Test conducted with bean bags on sheep resulted in very serious kidney damage to the sheep. At very short ranges, the bean bags had not flattened out completely and were extremely dangerous.

g. Although small wicker shields are preferred by the Chinese, large Makrolon shields are replacing the wicker shields. The Makrolon is bullet-proof, transparent, and not very heavy. American flax jackets are used. Bullet-proof helmets are used with Makrolon visors. Jock strap cups.

d. Questionnaire 4.

2. Motor vehicles are used for personnel transport and communications as mentioned previously. Bulldozers are used for clearing areas. Vehicles are also used for combat.

3. Armored wheeled vehicles are considered best. Tracked vehicles are not used. They look too much like tanks and, therefore, have a bad effect on the

crowd and produce unfavorable publicity.

4. Gas cartridge launchers and machine guns, water cannons.
5. The police have fifteen Saracen armored vehicles. These are a standard British army vehicle whose statistics are contained in "Jane's Weapons Systems". The police also have some Salamander water cannons which are self-contained units with their own water supply. The vehicles work in pairs; one fires while one loads. They were found to be very effective in Northern Ireland. The army has some Saladin and Ferret armored vehicles.
7. The Saracen vehicles have been used by the police.
8. Attack vehicles have been used only as a last resort when ground forces would not suffice. The vehicles were used exclusively for defensive purposes.
12. If a situation develops in which the police are confronted by large wild crowds that they could not penetrate with ground troops, the police would proceed as follows. Armored vehicles, including personnel carriers, would be driven into the mob, dividing it into smaller crowds. Then the ground troops would be deployed to confront the mobs.

e. Questionnaire 5.

1. Helicopters are used in support of riot-control forces but none are armed or expected to directly confront mobs.
2. No.
3. Searchlights have been used to illuminate areas.
4. Loudspeakers have been used on helicopters to warn crowds to disperse. The authorities are also experimenting with closed circuit television on the aircraft.
7. In 1967, helicopters were used in a few raids to deploy police on rooftops.

#### IV. SUMMARY

Worldwide authorities, charged with maintaining the peace in their communities, are united in the belief that riots and demonstrations must be

handled with the minimum force necessary, and that the level of response must be appropriate for the degree of threat imparted by the demonstration. "Minimum force" should not be confused with "minimum forces". The first refers to the measures taken to divert, subdue, punish, or otherwise stop the rioters bent on destruction of property or acting to endanger human lives. The second refers to the actual numbers of men deployed; it is the consensus of the researchers, in fact, that the demonstrators be made aware quickly that the force representing law and order is clearly superior to their own.

Communities require separate contingents of riot-control forces, specially selected and rigorously trained to handle their distinct weapons, designed specifically to cope with rioters. Furthermore, these forces must be thoroughly disciplined so that they act, react, and respond to orders during a tense, dramatic situation in a manner which serves the best interests of the community with a minimum of physical punishment inflicted on the rioters.

The leaders of the riot-control forces must themselves be trained to understand a mob's motives and intentions; to recognize signals of change in these intentions; to make proper decisions on the level of response, the measures to be implemented, and forces to be committed; and to select the proper tactics and strategy to cope with the situation at hand.

The weapons and devices that should be considered by any modern riot-control should include tear gas (CS), solid and chock batons, stun-guns, special projectiles, special shotguns, jet foam guns, tasers, and CN. Land vehicles should supplement the riot-force personnel by providing command and control stations, communication and monitoring facilities, housing for special devices such as water cannon, public address systems, searchlights, lasers, plastic webbing, nauseous gas projectiles, collapsible electric fences, etc.

Helicopters have been found extremely useful and have added a new dimension in flexibility for the riot-control forces. Helicopters may employ organic weapons, weapons fired from the door, or drops and sprays. Furthermore, these air vehicles are excellent platforms for searchlights such as "Night Sun" and/or the "Curdler", a device for producing deafening noise. Light and

noise may be employed in such intensity as to disorient and even physically harm the rioters.

Intelligence information concerning the size, location, movement, and leaders of a demonstration may be supplied by crowd infiltrators and aerial supervision. Both television and ordinary cameras have an important role in monitoring the crowd's activities and establishing the identity of ring-leaders for purposes of providing evidence and determining the proper tactics.

Training should involve the organization, the man, the machines, and the weapons/devices. Riot-control forces, once trained and established, may serve other useful functions in police work when not on an alert basis. The organization of the riot-control forces may be patterned after any one of several existing military-type systems, such as that operating in Paris, France.

The tactics and strategies to be employed by riot-control forces are left to the discretion of the experienced commander. There are many lessons to be learned from the study of accounts of recent demonstrations and riots in Watts, Berkeley, Chicago, Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, etc., as well as similar incidents which have occurred in Tokyo, Hong Kong, Paris, and throughout Northern Ireland.

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## APPENDIX A

### Correspondence Dealing with Research on Urban Violence

1. Letter from the United States Defense Attache, Paris
2. Sample Letter to Foreign Consulate
3. Sample Letter to Police Forces in the United States
4. Correspondence Received from German Consulate
5. Correspondence Received from South African Consulate
6. Correspondence Received from Japan Consulate
7. Correspondence Received from San Francisco Police Department

1. Letter from the United States Defense Attache, Paris





EMBASSY  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE  
Paris, France

31 May 1972

Captain A. Norman Webb, Jr.  
Apartment 3G Olympia West  
1155 Monarch Lane  
Pacific Grove, California 93950


Dear Captain Webb:

I have received your letter concerning your project and a message of the visit of Lt. Amerault, a colleague of yours at the Naval Post Graduate School. I have been informed by the Naval Attaché, Captain Cummins, that arrangements are being made for Lt. Amerault to visit with various French authorities on riot control. Mr. Clark Dittmer, the Assistant Security Officer for the Embassy, is also working on the subject.

I understand that as more information becomes available, it will be passed on to Lt. Amerault.

Wishing you continued success with your fine project,

Sincerely yours,

  
JOHN W. DONALDSON  
Brigadier General, US Army  
Defense Attaché France

2. Sample Letter to Foreign Consulate

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA - 93940

IN REPLY REFER TO

1 May, 1972

French Consulate General  
2570 Jackson  
San Francisco, Calif.

Dear Sir;

We are two U.S. Naval Officers presently attending the United States Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif. We are currently doing research in the field of Urban Insurgency/Riot Control. If it is possible for you to give us any information concerning the manner in which the police forces of your country and cities deal with this problem, we would be very appreciative. Specifically, we are researching the organization, method of employment, and weapons used by the police forces.

Enclosed is a self-addressed envelope for your convenience. Thank you for your consideration in this matter.

Sincerely,

*James M. Lacey*  
James M. Lacey  
Lcdr. USNR

*William M. Boksch*  
William M. Boksch  
Lt. USN

5. Sample Letter to Police Forces in the United States

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA - 93940

IN REPLY REFER TO

1 May, 1972

San Diego Police Department  
Riot Control (Tactical Unit)  
San Diego, California

Dear Sir;

We are two U.S. Naval Officers presently attending the United States Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. We are currently doing research in the field of Urban Insurgency/Riot Control. With the upcoming political convention to be held tentatively in your city, we are interested in obtaining any available information concerning your organization of forces, method of employment of these forces, and weapons (lethal and nonlethal) that you plan to utilize.

Any assistance that you could give to us would be greatly appreciated. Enclosed is a self-addressed envelope for your convenience. Thank you for your consideration in this matter.

Sincerely,

*James M. Lacey*

James M. Lacey  
Lcdr. USNR

*William M. Bokesch*

William M. Bokesch  
Lt. USN

4. Correspondence Received from German Consulate

Deutsches Generalkonsulat  
German Consulate General

6th Floor International Building  
601 California Street  
San Francisco, Calif. 94108  
Tel.: 981-4250

RK

May 16, 1972

Lcdr. James M. Lacey  
SMC 2224  
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, California 93940

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to your letter of  
May 1, 1972.

Much to my regret, this Consulate  
General does not have available material  
concerning Urban Insurgency/Riot Control  
in Germany. Of course, this is a highly  
specialized subject, which might be handled  
differently in the various States of the  
Federal Republic of Germany.

It would be my suggestion that you  
contact either the US Embassy in Bad Godesberg,  
Mehlemer Aue, or the US Consulates General in

2 Hamburg  
Alsterufer 27

6 Frankfurt a.M.  
Siesmayerstr. 21


7 Stuttgart  
Urbanstr. 7

8 München 22  
Königinstr. 5

asking them to procure the requested information  
from the competent German authorities in their  
respective cities.

I regret being unable to be of further  
assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,



Eric Harder  
Deputy Consul General

5. Correspondence Received from South African Consulate





SOUTH AFRICAN CONSULATE-GENERAL  
SUID-AFR. KANSE KONSULAAT-GENERAAL

120 MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 1600  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104

8/62/1

4 May 1972

Lcdr. James M. Lacey  
SMC 2224  
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, Calif 93940

Dear Lieut. Commander Lacey,

Thank you for your letter of 1st May.

This is an enquiry which requires a more expert  
reply than we are able to give, and I am referring it  
through our Head Office to police authorities in South  
Africa.

As soon as a response is forthcoming I shall get into  
touch with you again.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "John Poorter".

John Poorter  
Consul Information

6. Correspondence Received from Japan Consulate

JAPAN INFORMATION SERVICE  
CONSULATE GENERAL OF JAPAN

1601 POST STREET  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94115

921-8000


May 4, 1972

Lcdr. James M. Lacey  
SMC 2224  
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, CA 93940

Dear Lieutenant Commander Lacey:

In reference to your letter of May 1, 1972 we are enclosing  
a copy of The Police of Japan '71 which contains some reference  
to riot control procedures in Japan. I hope this will be of  
some help to you and Lieutenant Bokesch in your research.

Sincerely,

  
T. Ariga  
Vice Consul

TA:lvs

7. Correspondence Received from San Francisco Police Department



POLICE DEPARTMENT  
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO  
HALL OF JUSTICE  
880 BRYANT STREET  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94103



ADDRESS ALL COMMUNICATIONS  
DONALD M. SCOTT  
CHIEF OF POLICE

June 8, 1972

OFFICE OF THE  
CHIEF OF POLICE

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO  
OUR FILE: HS 39

Lieutenant William M. Bokesch  
U. S. Naval Postgraduate School  
SMC - 2311  
Monterey, California 93940

Dear Lieutenant Bokesch:


This will acknowledge your letter  
of May 29, 1972.

In response to your inquiry regarding  
non-lethal devices, we have enclosed two  
brochures. One deals with the Stun-Gun and  
the other with the Ricochet Round. Both devices are  
non-lethal systems which can be used for riot control  
situations. Our Department has used these devices  
and found them to operate as advertised. We have  
also enclosed a brochure on our San Francisco Crime  
Prevention Company in hopes that it will prove useful  
to you.

Thank you for your interest.

Very truly yours,

DONALD M. SCOTT  
CHIEF OF POLICE

By   
Jeremiah P. Taylor  
Supervising Captain

100

Encs. (3)

## APPENDIX B

### Literature Obtained Via Trips to Troubled Areas

1. Partial Transcript of Interview with Director of Security, Stanford University
2. The Kendo Method of Crowd Control: Monterey County Sheriff's Department
3. The Police of Japan '71; National Police Agency (Chapter on Security Police Operations)
4. Crime Prevention Company; San Francisco Police Department
5. Photographs of the MBA Stun-gun
6. Internal Security Doctrine Booklet; Great Britain
7. Internal Security--Aide Memoire; Hong Kong
8. Police Press Releases; Hong Kong
  - a. "Facing the Ideological Division Line"
  - b. "HK Weapon Panics American Rioters"
  - c. "A Sight to Frighten a Rioter"
  - d. "Hong Kong Police Well Trained in Quelling Riot"
  - e. "Plans for New Riot Armoury"
9. Statistics of 1967 Disturbances; Hong Kong
10. Saracen Armored Vehicle

1. Partial Transcript of Interview with Director of Security,  
Stanford University

Interview with Mr. Marvin Harrington  
Director of Security, Stanford University

11 May 1972

Q: Does Stanford University have a riot-control doctrine?

A: Not a specific one; procedures are: at Level I on your scale, deploy uniformed officers to get the feel of the crowd; gather any leaflets, etc. for purposes of judging crowd's intent. Maintain surveillance on an outside crowd with a few officers by means of radio coverage (campus station) if crowd is inside. Prepare by keeping abreast of national events (such as United Nations speeches by President, etc.) and campus news media. When escalation to Level II is threatening, deploy officers with cameras to photograph any persons threatening illegal acts (this is to insure that witnesses can be found later for investigation as well as for deterrence of violence due to record of event). Next, deploy tactical squads to disperse crowd if crowd is relatively small. Call in Sheriff's Department after this or if crowds are too large (greater than twenty).

Q: Do you employ a definite show of force?

A: Not directly; students know all our people by sight and know we're on the job.

Q: How do you judge when violence progresses from Level I to Level II?

A: Surveillance by myself or by experienced officers (cameras). We are on the lookout for the first illegal act. We can often judge what will be the result of a group's meeting or assembly simply by those standing; then we call for immediate aid from the Sheriff's office.

Q: Do you arrest?

A: Arrests don't do much good except when it is the only way to break up illegal behavior quickly (such as blocking traffic, etc.). It is generally difficult to make charges stick and arrests give bad press. Arrests are effective if a large group can be peacefully arrested and booked at a time when further demonstrations are in the offing and police are fatigued after many days of tense situation. If a large number is arrested,



the remainder are forced to cope with the job of finding bail money, etc. and those out on bail are less desirous of getting into more trouble, This gives the authorities some time to fall back and regroup. For good press, the President of the University meets with demonstrators whenever safety permits for good press.

2. The Kendo Method of Crowd Control; Monterey County Sheriff's  
Department

# KENDO BATON



THE KENDO BATON METHOD  
of  
CROWD CONTROL

1. THE KENDO BATON

- A. Length 41 inches
- B. Banana shaped
- C. Material -- Teak or Oak wood
- D. Width -- oval 1-3/4 x 1-inch
- E. Leather thong -- 10-inch loop located 6-3/4 inches from butt of baton

2. GRIP

- A. All personnel shall use the Kendo Baton from the right hand position, thereby providing squad uniformity.
- B. The right thumb is placed through the leather thong and extended behind the hand until the right hand grips the baton approximately 8 inches from the baton unit.
- C. The baton is gripped in the left hand approximately 8 inches from its tip.
- D. All basic Kendo maneuvers, with one exception, will be executed with the above grip position.

3. NON-COMBAT POSITIONS

A. At ease (FIGURE 1)

- (1) Feet - Feet will be spread approximately shoulder width extended outward at a 45 degree angle.
- (2) Baton - the baton will be held close to the body with both arms extended downward.
- (3) Body - erect and facing forward, not looking about or talking with brother squad members.

B. Attention (FIGURE 2)

Upon the appropriate command from the squad leader, personnel shall immediately assume the position as follows:

- (1) Feet - bring both feet together, heels touching and feet extended outward at a 45 degree angle.
- (2) Baton - the left arm is brought directly to the left shoulder area. The right arm remains stationary, resulting in

AT EASE POSITION




FIGURE 1

ATTENTION POSITION



FIGURE 2

the baton being at a 45 degree angle across the body.

- (3) Body - erect facing forward, awaiting the next command.
- (4) Squad movement - All squad movement into designated formation positions will be made by marching in the "Attention" position.

C. On Guard (FIGURE 3)

For the purpose of this bulletin, the on-guard position will be used as the basis for beginning the execution of the Kendo maneuvers.

- (1) Feet - left foot approximately 12 inches forward pointed at a 90 degree angle from the body. Right foot stationary and horizontal to the body, thereby forming an inverted 1.
- (2) Baton - the left arm partially straightens, moves down and out from the body; while the right arm remains stationary. The baton is level with the ground, held inside the right elbow and tightly against the body.
- (3) Body - erect, facing forward, knees flexed and awaiting the next command.

D. Advancing Forward


From the On Guard position, the squad will advance in the desired formation upon command as follows:

- (1) Feet - maintaining the 1 foot position throughout, forward movement shall be accomplished by moving the left foot forward approximately 13 inches and then sliding the right foot behind.
- (2) Baton - the baton shall remain in the on guard position.
- (3) Body - erect, facing forward observing the aggressor and awaiting the next command.

4. COMBAT KENDO BATON MANEUVERS

The following Kendo baton maneuvers are designed to enable either an individual officer or squad perform their necessary duties with precision and grace, thereby minimizing the aura of violence and brutality. Each maneuver can be used separately as needed, or for training purposes, performed together in the Kendo dance.

ON GUARD POSITION



T  
STANCE

FIGURE 3

A. The Jab (FIGURE 4)

The Jab maneuver is used to move a crowd in the desired direction quickly, effeciently and without the aura of force and violence. From the on-guard position, the Jab is executed as follows:

- (1) Feet - from the basic 1 position, the left foot is brought forward approximately 18 inches and planted firmly.
- (2) Baton - the baton is thrust directly forward in a sharp precise movement, striking the aggressor in the solar plexus region. The baton is immediately retracted and the right foot is brought forward, re-assuming the 1 position and body balance.
- (3) Body - erect, facing forward, observing the aggressor and awaiting the next command.

B. The Vertical Butt Stroke (FIGURES 5 and 6)

From the on-guard position the Vertical Butt Stroke is executed as follows:

- (1) Feet - from the basic 1 position, the left foot is turned horizontal to the body and the right foot is brought forward approximately 18 inches in front of the body and pointed forward at a 90 degree angle.
- (2) Baton - the left arm is raised and held at the left shoulder. The right hand lowers to the hip region and is brought straight up and out; driving the butt of the baton into the abdomen and up through the chest and head area of the aggressor.
- (3) Body - the knees flex and the torso lowers with the forward foot movement and straightens during the maneuver to add force to the stroke.

Upon completion of the Vertical Butt Stroke, the left foot is brought forward into the 1 position and the baton is lowered into the on-guard position.

C. The Horizontal Slash (FIGURES 7 and 8)

From the on-guard position, the Horizontal Slash maneuver is executed as follows:

- (1) Feet - from the on-guard 1 position, the left foot is brought forward approximately 12 inches.



JAB




FIGURE 4

VERTICAL BUTT STROKE




FIGURE 5




FIGURE 6

HORIZONTAL SLASH



FIGURE 7




FIGURE 8

- (2) Baton - Position - the left hand is lowered on the baton to within approximately 12 inches above the right hand. The baton tip is then raised just below the left shoulder and the right arm extends straight out and across the body. The baton is now at a 45 degree angle with the ground and the baton tip is below the shoulder.
- (3) Baton - execution. The right arm remains in position and the left strikes outward into the aggressor in a precise snapping motion. The baton is returned immediately into position for a possible additional stroke. Once the maneuver is completed, the officer shall return to the on-guard position and await the next command.

D. The Horizontal Butt Stroke (FIGURES 9 and 10)


From the on-guard position, the Horizontal Butt Stroke shall be executed as follows:

- (1) Feet - the left foot turns horizontal to the body. The right foot moves forward and is planted at a 90 degree angle approximately 18 inches in front of the body.
- (2) Baton - the left arm moves up and next to the left shoulder and the right arm moves up to the right shoulder. Keeping the left arm stationary and in use as a pivot, the right arm strikes straight out, driving the butt end of the baton into the facial region of the aggressor. Upon completion, the officer returns to the on-guard position and awaits the next command.

E. Horse (FIGURE 11)

From the on-guard position, the Horse maneuver is executed as follows:

- (1) Feet - from the on-guard position, the right foot is brought forward parallel with the left foot, at shoulder width and knees flexed.
- (2) Baton - from the on-guard position the left arm is brought back next to the body so that the baton is now parallel with the body. Execution is accomplished by striking a sharp precise blow horizontally to the left and then to the right.
- (3) Body - the body is in a semi-crouch and body weight shifts slightly with the blow in each direction. Upon completion the officer returns to the on-guard position and awaits the next command.



F. Jab to the Rear (FIGURES 12 and 13)

From the on-guard position, the Jab to the Rear is executed as follows:

- (1) Feet - from the on-guard position, both feet swivel and assume the opposite position. The right foot turned 90 degrees to the body and the left foot horizontal with the body.
- (2) Baton - maintaining the same grip and position of the baton, the maneuver is a sharp precise jab to the solar plexus region of the aggressor using the butt and of the baton.
- (3) Body - the officer will turn completely around, facing to his rear.

5. DEFENSIVE KENDO BATON MANEUVERS

From the basic on-guard position, below are four basic defensive maneuvers which will fend off an attack by an aggressor using a club type instrument.

A. Pari (FIGURE 14)


The Pari maneuver is designed to enable an officer to neutralize and deflect an assault by an aggressor who has jabbed towards him with a club type instrument. The Pari maneuver is executed as follows:

- (1) Feet - maintain the on-guard 1 position.
- (2) Baton - from the on-guard position, the right arm remains stationary and the left arm rotates the baton in a 12-inch circular pattern, either right or left, to neutralize and deflect any jab towards the officer by an armed aggressor.

B. Block to the Groin (FIGURE 15)

The Block to the Groin maneuver is designed to protect an officer's groin area from an aggressor's kick. The maneuver is executed from the on-guard position as follows:

- (1) Feet - maintain the on-guard 1 position.
- (2) Baton - from the on-guard position the right arm is dropped straight down in front of the groin area. The left arm remains stationary, thereby placing the baton between the aggressor's foot and the officer's groin.



BLOCK TO THE SIDE

FIGURE 16

BLOCK TO THE GROIN

FIGURE 15

PARI

FIGURE 14

C. Block to the Side (FIGURE 16)

The Block to the Side maneuver is designed to protect an officer's side and arms from an attack by an armed aggressor. The maneuver is executed from the on-guard position as follows:

- (1) Feet - from the on-guard 1 position, the left foot turns horizontal to the body and the right foot moves in front of the body by approximately 18 inches and turned out at a 90 degree angle.
- (2) Baton - the right arm drops to the right side and the left arm comes across the body to the right shoulder. The baton is held vertical alongside the body and directly against the extended right arm. The fingers are removed from the forward position of the baton against the oncoming blow.
- (3) Body - from the above position the body is rotated to meet the oncoming blow.


D. Overhead Block (FIGURE 17)

The Overhead Block is used to block and deflect an overhead oncoming blow from an armed aggressor. From the on-guard position, execution is as follows:

- (1) Feet - from the on-guard 1 position the left foot is turned horizontal to the body. The right foot moves in front of the body approximately 18 inches and turned at a 90 degree angle.
- (2) Baton - the baton is quickly thrust upward over the officer's head by fully extending the left arm upwards and raising the right arm just above the head. The baton is held at a 45 degree angle from the ground and therefore will block and deflect an overhead oncoming blow by an armed aggressor.

6. THE KENDO BATON TRAINING DANCE.

The above procedure have used as a basic starting point the on-guard position. To assist in the training of personnel in efficient effective use of the Kendo Baton Method, a dance has been developed which enables personnel to move gracefully from one maneuver to another. This assists personnel in learning all the above maneuvers without breaking the chain of continuity and enables officers to position themselves in conducting any desired maneuver from any position as circumstances dictate.




The Kendo Baton Training Dance is performed as follows:

Upon command personnel execute:

1. The grip of the baton
2. At ease
3. Attention
4. On guard
5. Pari - left
6. Jab
7. Pari - right
8. Jab



# IMPERIAL PROTECTOR COMPANY



THE  
ULTIMATE  
IN BODY  
ARMOR




## The Imperial Family of Protective Vests. . .


### low-cost life insurance

*Preliminary figures disclose that for the period from July 1, 1970 to July 1, 1971 there were a total of 1,843 police casualties. Of this number, 135 resulted in the death of a police officer. Since 1960 there have been a total of 718 police deaths.*


*--Statistics compiled by the Police Weapons Center, International Association of Chiefs of Police*



**THE LIGHTWEIGHT.** *Imperial Life-Guard Vest.* Weight approximately 1.8 pounds. PRICE \$29.95



**THE MIDDLEWEIGHT.** *Imperial Standard Utility Vest.* Weight approximately 3.8 pounds. PRICE \$49.50. Can be upgraded by combining it with THE LIGHTWEIGHT Vest.



**THE HEAVYWEIGHT.** *Imperial Full-Shield Vest.* (THE MIDDLEWEIGHT Standard Utility Vest with special magnum insert shield added.) Weight approximately 7.3 pounds. PRICE \$94.50

*Discounts on larger orders.*

THE IMPERIAL VESTS . . . were designed to save lives. The lives of America's 350,000 police officers . . . plus the lives of thousands more engaged in law enforcement and security -- including industrial security guards, private security patrols, investigators, sky marshals, armored car personnel, guards, military police, and many others.

THE IMPERIAL VESTS . . . representing a radically new family of protective material . . . are the lightest in weight, the most durable, the most effective, and the lowest-priced of any comparable body-protective armor on the market today.


Designed to be worn beneath or above the clothing, the Imperial Vests (Patent Pending) are manufactured from specially

developed, extremely tough, lightweight ballistics material which discourages penetration, ricochet, or blowback.

Each Vest . . . is body-contoured . . . covers a total torso area of 242 square inches . . . is contained within an outer covering of Reinforced, dye-fast Dacron/cotton . . . includes adjustable straps at waist and shoulders, fitting it snugly to the individual.

THE IMPERIAL FAMILY OF BODY ARMOR VESTS . . . permit an unusual ballistics versatility. For example, by using the Imperial heavy duty insert with either the "Lightweight" or "Middleweight" Vests, a mission can be easily and automatically upgraded or downgraded to fit the situation.

THE IMPERIAL VEST HAS BEEN TESTED BY THE  
U.S. GOVERNMENT UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS



## PERFORMANCE TESTS

### "THE LIGHTWEIGHT." IMPERIAL LITE-SHIELD VEST

Approximate Total Weight - 2.5 Pounds - Test results - Range 20 feet

Caliber	Type Weapon	Results
22 Long Rifle	Hand Gun	No penetration
22 Short	Hand Gun	No penetration
22 Long Rifle (non-mag.)	Hand Gun	No penetration
25 Automatic	Hand Gun	No penetration
32 Automatic	Hand Gun	No penetration
38 Special (200 gr.)	Hand Gun	No penetration
44 (non-mag.)	Hand Gun	No penetration
45 Automatic	Hand Gun	No penetration

### "THE MIDDLEWEIGHT." IMPERIAL STANDARD UTILITY VEST

Approximate Total Weight - 3.5 Pounds - Test results - Range 15 feet

Caliber	Type Weapon	Results
22 Short	Hand Gun	No penetration
22 Long	Hand Gun	No penetration
22 Long Rifle (non-mag.)	Hand Gun	No penetration
25 Automatic	Hand Gun	No penetration
32 Automatic	Hand Gun	No penetration
38 Special (200 gr.)	Hand Gun	No penetration
44 (non-mag.)	Hand Gun	No penetration
45 Automatic	Hand Gun	No penetration

### "THE HEAVYWEIGHT." IMPERIAL TUF-SHIELD VEST (Standard Vest with heavy-duty insert)

Approximate Total Weight - 7.5 Pounds - Test results - Range 15 feet

Caliber	Type Weapon	Results
22 Short	Hand Gun	No penetration
22 Long	Hand Gun	No penetration
22 Long Rifle	Hand Gun	No penetration
22 Long Rifle Hollow Pt.	Hand Gun	No penetration
22 Magnum	Rifle	No penetration
25 Automatic	Hand Gun	No penetration
22 S&W Center Fire	Hand Gun	No penetration
38 Core-Loct	Hand Gun	No penetration
38 Special	Hand Gun	No penetration
38 Special Hi-Vel	Hand Gun	No penetration
38 Super Vel	Hand Gun	No penetration
44 Special	Hand Gun	No penetration
45 ACP	Hand Gun	No penetration
357 Magnum Lead H.V.	Hand Gun	No penetration
357 Magnum Jacketed Hollow Pt.	Hand Gun	No penetration
357 Magnum Jacketed Soft Pt.	Hand Gun	No penetration
357 Mini-Magnum	Hand Gun	No penetration
41 Magnum Semi-Jacketed H.P.	Hand Gun	No penetration
12 Ga. Magnum No. 00 Buck	Shotgun	No penetration
12 GA M.C.	Hand Gun	No penetration
9 M&M Jacketed H.P.	Hand Gun	No penetration




**IMPERIAL SUPER-GUARD COMPOSITE**  
 (Patent Pending). This transparent bullet-resistant window offers a protective "sandwich" composed of multiple layer ballistic material, perfected by the aerospace industry, together with a special core insert. Complies with the Bank Act of 1968, under Public Law 90-369.

Provides maximum security and protection for banks and stores (outside teller windows, cash register areas); armored car windows, airline cockpit bulkheads; museums (to guard artifacts), plus many other industrial uses where maintenance of aesthetic values is desirable to avoid alarming the public.

Will not fragment or spall. Foils all handgun loads, including .44 magnum. Resistant to low-energy-yield bomb blasts. Weighs 7½ pounds per square foot. Can be ordered in dimensions up to 4 feet by 4 feet.

*Price quoted by order.*



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


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


3. The Police of Japan '71; National Police Agency (Chapter on Security Police Operations)

# THE POLICE OF JAPAN

'71

NATIONAL POLICE AGENCY



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*Cover: A New-Year line-up at Nagoya Castle by Aichi Prefectural Police Headquarters*

## 14. SECURITY POLICE OPERATIONS

### SECURITY SITUATION IN THIS COUNTRY

Luckily, no racial problems have been experienced in this country, and disorderly activities inherent to slum areas have rarely attracted public attention of late reflecting the long spell of prosperity in our business activities.

Currently, the largest problems facing the security police of this country are the mass of student groups and "Anti-War Youth Committee" (Hansen-Seinen-Iinkai) belonging to those ultra radical left-wing elements which have been staging unlawful and riotous activities and advocating revolution in this country.

These ultra radical left-wing elements, which launched severe and riotous "on-the-street" struggles as their "decisive battle in November", disrupted Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's visit to the United States in November, 1969, and also in 1970 continued violent activities in their "June Struggles" and other various street struggles.

To cope with these unlawful, armed, street activities, the police intensified their controlling action including timely and appropriate police check-up and raids.

Due to the police action, the radical element had to face gradual difficulty in carrying out their planned armed street struggles and were forced to shift their tactics to other areas.

They therefore launched many guerrilla-type attacks involving a small number of activists armed with explosives, homemade bombs, and Molotov cocktails, as well as sporadic direct actions by militant radical students.

So far as their direct radical activities are concerned, there occurred several incidents in this category, such as an unlawful seizure of a Japan Air Lines jet-liner on March 31, last year, perpetrated by nine member of "SEKIGUN-HA" (RED ARMY FACTION), all of whom were either wanted nationally or on bail. Also there were attacks by explosives and homemade bombs directed against the U.S. armed forces bases, Japanese police facilities, Foreign Embassy buildings and other premises by those "Rote Gewalts" of a group named "KYOSANDO" (Communist Alliance) and the leftist militant group named "NIKKYO-KAKUMEI" (Japan Communist Revolutionary Group).

In the course of the security control operations against the aforementioned rampage in 1970, there were mobilized into action a total of 2.5 million police officers across the nation and 6,042 persons were arrested.

During the above-mentioned radical activities, two students lost their lives during fighting among various factions of students groups, and a total of 158 police officers were injured while performing their official police duties.

In order to better cope with this situation, the police have been making every effort to augment the strength of "riot control police units" plus upgrading training and operations as well as equipment.



## **SECURITY LEGISLATIONS**

Since the termination of the Second World War, there has never been any enactment of national legislatures in this country specifically aimed at the direct control and suppression of mass movements and activities by citizens in general, such as holding an assembly, launching a massive demonstration, and so forth.

However, prefectural governments and city and town authorities have established their "Public Security Ordinances" to serve this purpose.

Furthermore, there is no law prohibiting citizens from going out at night at the time when a riot is underway, or giving a special functional authority to the police for controlling and suppressing riotous incidents.

## **SECURITY STRUCTURE CURRENTLY TAKEN**

There is no "National Riot Control Police" in this country with the mission to control and suppress all riotous disturbances. However, this important mission is primarily carried out by a total of 9,700 "regular riot police officers" belonging to prefectural police forces including 5,200 riot police assigned to the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department (MPD).

In addition to the above strength, there is a total of 4,200 riot police officers on a "reservist status" in all the prefectural police, who are, under normal circumstances, performing their assigned duties such as patrol or traffic control officers at their assigned posts in each prefectural police.

These police officers are scheduled to undergo special training and, on a "need" basis, they are to be organized into a provisional "riot control unit" in each jurisdiction of the Regional Police Bureaus to reinforce those "regular" riot police officers who are daily performing duties in this specific field.

It is of special interest to note here that related laws provide that the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) comprising Ground, Maritime and Air Forces can be called out for the purpose of controlling and suppressing riotous disturbances; however, these specific provisions have generally been interpreted to mean that they are to be mobilized into action only on specific occasions when the impending situation is considered to be reaching the "point of no return" in its seriousness.

Since its inception in this country in 1945, the Japan Self Defense Force has never been called out for riot controlling purposes.

## **SECURITY EQUIPMENT**

The following special equipment is currently utilized for the efficient operation of security police:

### **(1) For individual use:**

In order to protect security police officers engaged in security missions, "Police Helmet", "Anti-rock Protector", and various types of "Leather-patches" attachable to both sides of the police helmet are worn by each police officer as



*Riot police controlling ultra-leftist students' group*



*Students gathered in front of P.O. in Tokyo for a demonstration*

head and face protection gear. Also worn are "Protection Clothes (vest) and "Leg-guards" for the protection of their abdomen, shoulders and limbs.

It is to be noted they usually carry "police batons" with them for the performance of their specific duties. However, no police pistols have ever been carried by them and will not be unless the situation becomes too serious to handle.

(2) For unit use:

"Large Shield", "Anti-Rock Protection Nets" and "Barricades" have been utilized. Used also are "large-size" and "mini" transport-buses used for unit transport purposes.

Also used by the security police are specifically-designed police vehicles, such as "Security Vehicles" which are to be used as a barricade for the purpose of blocking rushing rioters, "Water Cannon Cars", "Water Supply Cars", "Floodlights Cars", "Barricade Demolishing Cars", and "Television Hook-up Cars" and so forth.

Riot police units must rely on the water cannon cars, and tear gas (CN-Chloracetophenone) to control rioters.

#### METHOD OF CONDUCTING SECURITY OPERATIONS

Basic principles and tactics currently utilized in carrying out required security operation in this country are summarized as follow: :

- (1) Highest priority is placed on how to conduct required security operations, to maintain or restore public peace and order in this country, without causing any loss of life or injury on either side, namely, the police and the opposing parties.  
In order to achieve the above objective:
  - (a) The police are making every effort to follow as strictly as possible the fundamental rule of "remote supervisory and controlling method" avoiding "direct contact" with the rioters, as circumstances permit.
  - (b) The use of police baton shall be restrained to the minimum, and, if needed, its use shall be restricted exclusively to the self-defense purposes on the part of the riot police.
  - (c) Specialized training for riot police officers shall be carried out thoroughly so that they will behave at all times in a well-organized and orderly manner under the command and direction of their commanding officers.
- (2) Emphasis must also be placed on the collection of intelligence information as early as possible, which will permit suppression of the expected or imminent riotous activities through prior apprehension of offenders through the application of related legal provisions of the law, such as Article 208-2 of the Penal Code (Law No.45 of 1907, with several amendments later.) covering crimes of "unlawful assembly with dangerous weapons", etc.
- (3) Emphasis should be placed on arrests of leaders.

4. Crime Prevention Company; San Francisco Police Department

## SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT

### CRIME PREVENTION COMPANY

The San Francisco Police Department divides the city into nine police districts for the purpose of normal everyday uniformed patrol. Each district is commanded by a Captain of Police who is directly responsible to the Supervising Captain of the Uniformed Patrol Force. The Captain of each district has a minimum of four Lieutenants of Police working under him who in turn command the three watches which divide the 24 hour day into working periods. Each Lieutenant is in charge of the police district during his tour of duty, usually 8 hours per day. Each district is divided into radio car sectors and walking beats. The walking beats do not cover the entire district, as the radio cars do, but cover strategic locations such as business areas and some warehouse sections. The Lieutenant has assigned to him an adequate number of Sergeants and Patrolmen to cover his district for normal police action during his eight hour tour of duty. He may find himself short of Patrolmen because of injuries, sickness, extra days off, etc., and not be able to place enough patrolmen on the street to cover the radio car sectors and walking beats in the manner they were set up to be covered. In this situation or even with the assigned force of patrolmen, routine calls would be backed up and the citizens would have to wait unnecessary lengths of time for police response because of longer than normal investigations or details for extraordinary police actions. Crowd control, demonstrations, civil disturbances, lengthy investigations by the beat patrolman and any other out of the ordinary situations would affect the beat coverage and police call response time. High crime areas could not be covered by the beat patrolman adequately enough to curb the ever increasing rate of violent street crimes. Also civil disturbances and crowd control situations were on the increase and district personnel were detailed to handle these situations, thereby decreasing the coverage of the district beats and creating a large backlog of unhandled calls.

It became apparent that a more flexible system was needed for the simultaneous coverage of the district beats and the new situations arising which required policing using a large number of patrolmen. Crowd control, civil disturbances, demonstrations, rising rate of violent street crimes, etc., require forces of patrolmen for proper coverage which the district stations could not provide without hindering the coverage of the district beats. In 1970 an additional company was added to the uniformed patrol force. This company was not assigned a particular district; it was basically set up to be extremely flexible in working schedules, methods of patrol, dissemination of personnel and was given the capabilities of handling many situations which would arise that required specialized handling.

The company could handle large crowds, civil disturbances, demonstrations, or any situation requiring a large force of police without calling upon district personnel for coverage. Of course, if the disturbance was too large to be properly handled by the Crime Prevention Company, the districts would be called upon to provide the needed additional personnel. The rising rate of violent street crime was drastically reduced by heavy saturation of the areas

of those crimes by the units of Crime Prevention Company. If there is an indication of the rise of street crimes in certain areas of the city, the areas are immediately saturated with marked patrol cars and uniformed personnel from the company. The personnel of the company also saturate high crime areas in plain clothes details if it is more advantageous than uniformed patrol in the prevention and apprehension of criminal suspects.

The Crime Prevention Company is composed of four platoons of police personnel. A Captain of Police is in command of the company and is directly responsible to the Supervising Captain of the Uniformed Patrol Force. Each platoon in the company is commanded by a Lieutenant of Police who reports to the Captain in charge of the company. The platoons are divided into squads of patrolmen. Each squad is led by a Sergeant of Police. The patrolmen report to the Sergeant in charge of their particular squad and the Sergeant is directly responsible to the Lieutenant in charge of his platoon.

The Squad is the basic working unit in the Crime Prevention Company. Instead of the basic working team being a pair of patrolmen or a single patrolman, as in the district stations, the squad comprises the basic unit for all police action undertaken by the company. All responsibilities and orders are directed to the squad and not the individual members of the squad. All individual members of a squad work as a team on the street and all training is carried out with respect to the fact that the squad is the basic working unit. Each individual member of a squad has assigned to him certain duties or specialties. When these members combine their assigned tasks and form a squad, the result is a highly trained, efficient, working team which is capable of handling many situations which may arise. If an incident is too large for a single squad to handle then the squads combine to form a platoon. The platoons in turn combine into company strength, the result being a strong thoroughly trained professional unit with the capabilities of policing major situations by itself. With the added manpower of the district station personnel aided by the expertise of the Crime Prevention Company, the combined forces have the capabilities of handling very large civil disturbances and stem an explosive situation before it gets out of hand.

The individual platoons within the company are charged with different fundamental responsibilities for normal daily routine. When the platoons have combined their forces to meet a situation the responsibilities are changed. Each platoon though specializing in certain fields, must be capable of taking over the other's role to fulfill any situation which may arise when that platoon is unavailable to handle the task in which it specializes. Training is given company-wide as well as to the individual platoon or squad.

The normal routine of each platoon on a day-to-day schedule constitutes patrol of high crime areas, parks and beaches, or any areas where there is a likelihood of street crimes. Backup of station personnel at calls where there is an indication of violence is standard procedure. If there is a backlog of station runs, the units of the Crime Prevention Company will respond to the calls. This relieves the pressure on the district radio car beat man and gives the citizen with the police-oriented problem faster service and possibly more time may be spent with the complainant in helping him to solve his problem without having to rush from one call to another. The squads are not bounded

to patrol within a certain district or area but usually patrol the areas with the highest crime rate which may be curbed by uniformed patrol. As the different crimes flow from one area of the city to another, the Crime Prevention Company keeps abreast of trends and maintains an effective Prevention Patrol.

The company utilizes a wide variety of equipment to carry out its duties. Types of Patrol include: sedans, station wagons, mini-bikes, horses, helicopters, and foot patrol. A wide range of equipment is utilized by the company to meet any and all situations which dictate the use of more sophisticated police weapons. Wide varieties of shoulder weapons firing both lethal and non-lethal projectiles are utilized, loud speaker systems which carry sound long distances over the uproar of crowds are utilized, different types of chemical agents for crowd control and building assaults are carried with some of the squads at all times in the patrol vehicles for instant use. The 36-inch riot baton is carried by every member of the company while he is on duty. This is the basic weapon of the company. Everyone in the company must be able to use the baton expertly in the fashion tried and proven by the company. Gas masks and bullet proof vests are carried in some of the patrol vehicles at all times. Every member of the company is required to carry a Bunco Riot Helmet with him in the patrol vehicle while on patrol. In other words, every member of the company must be ready to respond quickly, fully equipped to any situation requiring his services. Pieces of equipment too numerous to list here are available to the members of the company to carry out their mission with the greatest expertise necessary.

Special training of the members by the more experienced members of the company is necessary. The company contains experts in almost all fields of the enforcement spectrum. Using the personnel qualified in a particular field to train the other members of the company on a continuous basis has been company policy from the day of its inception. The members of the company are required to be thoroughly trained and familiar with all of the weaponry available to the company. Patrol procedures are constantly improved through training and proven technique. Building assaults are practiced for sniper control. Company drill is mandatory since it is the only method utilized for transportation of personnel within an area where there is a riot, demonstration, or civil disturbance. Vehicles cannot be utilized in these areas and in order to move the squads, platoons, or company, military formation marching is used in the assembly area. The company has modified some of the military formations to make them more adaptable for civilian use in controlling civil disturbances. The formations utilized by the company have had a high degree of success in moving police personnel from one area to another and in crowd control.

The Explosive Ordinance Demolition Unit is also part of the company. The personnel of that unit have stopped many wouldbe disastrous bombings before they occurred through the use of the high degree of technology developed by the unit. The men who comprise the EOD unit are assigned to various other companies and details within the department, but the unit administrators are assigned to the Crime Prevention Company since it is a specialized unit and works closely in conjunction with the other units of the company. All personnel who are assigned to the EOD unit who are on duty, are also "on call" for any EOD problem that may arise. Also an "on call" basis is rotated throughout

the EOD unit with the off duty personnel so that the department is never without the services of the EOD unit. The personnel of that unit are in constant training to keep ahead of the element of society which is developing more highly sophisticated explosive devices through their use of modern technology. The unit works in conjunction with the Federal and State authorities in various phases of the EOD program.

The following sections give a more complete and detailed description of the individual squads, platoons and specialized units of the Crime Prevention Company.

#### FIRST PLATOON

The First Platoon of the Crime Prevention Company, formerly known as the TAC Squad, has the basic responsibilities of policing demonstrations, crowds, and civil disturbances and is charged with the responsibility of sniper control and building assaults.

The First Platoon is comprised of four squads and the EOD unit and is commanded by a Lieutenant of Police. Each squad contains seven Patrolmen and one Sergeant of Police who leads his particular squad. All orders and communications for the patrolmen in a squad are first given to the sergeant in command of that squad who in turn gives the appropriate commands or orders. There is no "going over the head" of the sergeant by anyone in leading the patrolmen of the squads. There can be no mix-up in the duties to be performed if the chain of command is strictly adhered to.

Each squad is a team and works as a team under all conditions. Each squad has the same capabilities as the other in the First Platoon. Each squad is a counter-sniper team, a building assault team, and stays as a team for all crowd control or civil disturbance policing. All action taken is team-wise and no individual member action is allowed. If the individual cannot work as part of a team he is transferred immediately from the company.

During large scale civil disturbances or crowd control the squads themselves must work as a team in platoon formation. If necessary, the platoon must work as a team with the other platoons of the company in company formation. All directives and orders are given to the Lieutenant in charge of the platoon who will in turn give the appropriate orders to the squad leaders for moving and controlling a crowd or disturbance. In Platoon formation the Lieutenant will move the squads from one area to another and give all commands for the action to be taken formation-wise in a situation which calls for action by the platoon as a whole. In a platoon action where the squads are not in formation the Lieutenant is in charge of the overall action but the squad leaders are in command of the squad actions being undertaken through the direction of the Lieutenant. The Lieutenant will decide if an incident shall be resolved by the use of one squad or more and the action to be taken by the squad is decided by the Lieutenant and the Sergeant in charge of the squad.

During the normal daily routine the squads patrol in the fashion prescribed in the company functions. Main areas of patrol are the high crime



areas and assigned areas which may be the target for trouble such as parks, schools, or certain districts of the city which may be experiencing juvenile gang trouble. If there is an overload of district station calls the squads will handle the excess calls to take the burden from the station personnel.

The platoon is constantly training in all phases of their job. Baton drill and training is practiced by each individual member until he has mastered the techniques tested, tried and required by the platoon. Baton drill is also practiced in squad formation and platoon formation since these formations are used for controlling crowds and civil disturbances. The baton is the basic weapon of the platoon and each member must be thoroughly familiar in its use by him as an individual, as a squad, and as a platoon.

The members of the platoon are required to train with shoulder weapons which are available to them from the company arsenal. The members are required to have a working knowledge of all the weapons utilized by the company and constantly train with their assigned shoulder weapon so they may be thoroughly proficient in its use and safety. The First Platoon is the only unit in the department authorized to carry shoulder weapons while on duty; therefore, many lives depend on these few men who carry the weapons and expertise in their use a must. There are several types of shoulder weapons carried by the squads and each squad is basically equipped with the same types of weapons. The number, types and distribution among the squads will be given to a requesting law enforcement agency upon approval by the Chief of Police.

The squads also utilize chemical agents during certain phases of control work. Since the use of chemical agents in the United States for control of civil disturbances is relatively new, the platoon has had to undergo intensive training under various conditions and using the different available chemical agents to come up with a working knowledge of the effects under riotous conditions. The members of the platoon must be thoroughly proficient in the use of chemical agents and refrain from indiscriminate use just as though it were a lethal weapon. The types and number of chemical agents utilized by the company will be given to a requesting law enforcement agency upon approval of the Chief of Police.

Building assaults for counter sniper measures are practiced by the platoon in squad formations. All weapons used for an actual assault are employed during the practice runs so that there is no second thoughts about which weapon or piece of equipment should be employed under a certain condition on an actual assault of a building. The methods and equipment utilized will be given to a requesting law enforcement agency upon approval by the Chief of Police.

The squads of the First Platoon respond to any call for assistance for an officer in need of help, or when there are deadly weapons being employed or a possibility exists where there may be employment of such weapons against other police officers or citizens. The members respond to any call for a district patrol car when there is a possibility of any resistance on such a call. The members of the squad patrol in two vehicles -- four men in each

vehicle. A large show of force in a minimum amount of time has cooled many situations which would have resulted in policemen or citizens being hurt if just one or two station patrol cars would have taken the calls which indicated violence.

The normal watches worked by the members of the platoon are: one squad works during the daytime hours of 1000 hours to 1900 hours, and two squads work during the nighttime hours of 1900 hours to 0300 hours. These watches have been found to be the optimum shifts for coverage of the high crime areas during the times when most of the street crimes occur. These watches can be changed from day to day to fit a changing crime picture or when a demonstration or crowd may need policing.

#### SECOND PLATOON

The Second Platoon of the Crime Prevention Company has the basic responsibilities of saturating high crime areas of the city during high crime hours. The Second Platoon also serves as a large backup unit for the First Platoon during a large civil disturbance or control of a large crowd.

The Second Platoon is comprised of four squads and is commanded by a Lieutenant of Police. Each squad contains seven patrolmen and one Sergeant of Police who leads his particular squad. All orders and communications for the patrolmen in a squad are first given to the Sergeant in charge of their squad who in turn gives the appropriate commands or orders. If the orders or commands are given through the proper chain of command, there will not be any misunderstandings or mix-ups as to the proper course to follow during an incident.

Each squad is a team of men and works as a team during the course of duty. The team commander is the Sergeant in charge of the squad, and all matters of question are directed to him by his men. The squad is the basic working unit of the platoon and all individual efforts must be made in conjunction with the rest of the team.

The Second Platoon, like the First Platoon, is skilled in handling and controlling crowds and civil disturbances but does not have that basic responsibility. The Second Platoon may be patrolling the high crime areas of the city, which is its basic responsibility, while the First Platoon is policing a demonstration. If the demonstration becomes too large for the First Platoon, then the Second Platoon is called in to form a large backup contingent. The Second Platoon works in the same team fashion as the First Platoon in any civil disturbance and efforts using both platoons are coordinated by the Captain and Lieutenants of the platoons.

The platoon members are in constant training in all phases of their job. The baton, which is one of the basic tools of the platoon, is practiced and mastered by the members as individuals, squads, and platoon formations. Training sessions are conducted in all phases of patrol functions which may apply to the responsibilities of the platoon. The teamwork utilized by the squads has presented a most formidable weapon for use against the violent

street crime which confronts some sections of the city. With the success of squad patrol in the high crime areas of the city, all training is directed towards the squad working as a team instead of an individual member.

During the normal everyday routine the squads work from 1900 hours to 0300 hours. The high crime areas of the city are patrolled during this time, which is usually the time of the highest rate in these areas. Two to four men ride in a patrol vehicle during patrol; the number usually is set up on a day-to-day basis for maximum coverage of a particular trouble spot. If an incident is known to happen at a certain time which requires a large show of force in a minimum amount of time, then four men will be placed in a patrol car and one or more such patrol cars will be required to patrol that area of likely trouble.

The squads of the second platoon remain extremely flexible in working hours and methods. The working hours may be changed on a day-to-day basis to stem a changing crime scene which may have suddenly flared up at off hours of the usual peak crime period. If there is unexpected trouble at a time when the members of the platoon are off duty, and that trouble requires a large force of men to take the appropriate action, the squads will be called in for duty and the force is usually ready in a very short time to quell the disturbance. The squads may be called upon to work plain clothes details in squad strength to stop a series of robberies, burglaries, or any other violent crimes which uniformed officers may not be able to apprehend because of the uniform. Many suspects who have committed a series of those types of crimes have been apprehended in the act by members of the Second Platoon working as a team in plain clothes.

The members of the platoon will handle station calls for the districts they are patrolling if there is a backlog of runs. This gives much better service to the citizens who are in need of help and relieves the pressure from the district patrolmen who would otherwise have to rush from one call to another and possibly cut down on the quality of service rendered in order to cover all calls unanswered. The squads will serve as backup units for station personnel answering a run which has a potential of violence. The show of force has cooled many routine fights and family disturbances which may have flared up and resulted in an officer or citizen being hurt badly.

### THIRD PLATOON

The Third Platoon of the Crime Prevention Company has the basic responsibility of patrolling the parks and beaches of the city with uniformed, highly mobile officers.

The Third Platoon is comprised of five squads and is commanded by a Lieutenant of Police. Each squad is led by a Sergeant of Police who is responsible for all actions of his particular squad. Three squads contain six patrolmen in each squad and their basic mode of transportation is the horse. Two squads contain seven patrolmen in each squad and the small Honda 90 motor bike is their basic mode of transportation. The platoon also has four-wheel drive jeep vehicles which are used for patrol work. The standard police sedan is a secondary mode of patrol vehicle usually used during stormy

weather or when the patrol function assigned to the squad calls for the dispatch of a larger force of men than usual to an incident in the downtown area which is not feasibly reached by mini-bike or horse.

With the inception of the Third Platoon the vandalism and violent crimes in the parks and beaches have been significantly reduced. The citizens who were driven from these areas by hoodlums have returned once again without the fear of being robbed or attacked. All areas of the parks and beaches can be patrolled by the members of the platoon because of the high mobility of the small motor bikes and the horses. The officers carry portable radios while on patrol so they are in constant touch with one another and headquarters. Patrol is carried out in teams and if more help is needed to quell a situation in any areas of the parks or beaches the portable radio is used to call for assistance. The response is almost immediate because of the high mobility factor of the platoon and the availability of the other platoons of the company.

The squads of the Third Platoon are utilized in the same fashion as the Second Platoon for crowd control, and civil disturbance action. If the incidents are too large for proper handling by the First and Second Platoons, the Third Platoon will be called upon for their services. The horses have been used for crowd control with a high degree of success. There is a great psychological deterrent when a crowd is confronted by a squad of horses. The mini-bikes have been used in demonstrations to keep the crowd moving and also are able to go through alleyways and pedestrian walkways in a hurry when assistance is required immediately at a certain area which is blocked by traffic. The bikes can be maneuvered around snarled traffic and crowds of people and are able to keep up with the troublemakers in a violent demonstration and prevent them from causing serious damage to property. The members of the platoon always work as squads in these situations which is beneficial for defence against hostile crowds and the show of force prevents many incidents of violence.

All squads work in conjunction with the overall plan of police action which includes the other platoons during a joint effort involving the whole company. The same formations are used by the Third Platoon as used by the other platoons. Constant training is mandatory in all areas of their job: individual, squad, platoon, and company strength. The same training must be utilized by the Third Platoon as the other platoons of the company practice. Joint platoon efforts are numerous and coordination among the platoons is mandatory for an effective unit to combat the modern day disturbance.

#### FOURTH PLATOON

The Fourth Platoon of the Crime Prevention Company has the basic responsibility of searching and surveillance using specialized equipment and methods.

The Fourth Platoon is comprised of three squads and is commanded by a Lieutenant of Police. Each squad is led by a Sergeant of Police who is responsible for all the actions of his particular squad. Two squads are specially

trained and equipped with dogs. These two squads contain five patrolmen in each squad, and each member of the squad is assigned his own dog to work with, train, and care for. An additional two patrolmen are assigned to this unit and have two highly trained dogs which are capable of locating explosive devices. The third squad contains four patrolmen who are licensed helicopter pilots. This squad has the responsibility of operating the department helicopter.


The dog units specialize in building searches for burglary suspects, area searching for hidden fleeing suspects, and under the right conditions may be called upon to search for lost persons. The dogs are never used for crowd control work since the crowd could agitate the dogs and their handlers could lose control. The dog unit has had an extremely high degree of success in locating and apprehending criminal suspects hidden from view which the average search by police personnel would have failed to uncover. The dogs are trained and cared for by the member he works with on duty. The dog also lives with the family of the officer he works with and makes an excellent house pet, and is gentle with the children.

The officers of the dog unit also undergo the same extensive training as the other platoons have for civil disturbances and crowd control. The officers serve as backup units as squads when additional manpower is requested by other platoons for controlling a disturbance.

The helicopter squad specializes in surveillance from the air. Roof top searches from the air and surveillance of large areas leave almost no escape routes for the fleeing suspect either on foot or by car. The helicopter is able to stay with any fleeing car since he does not have to worry about traffic jams and other automobiles which may get in the way of the pursuit. Night surveillance is carried out just as a daylight search would be using a high intensity light mounted on the helicopter.

Crowd control using the helicopter in conjunction with ground units has been highly successful. The helicopter is able to take in the entire scene from the air and observe the movement of segments of the crowd which could not be seen from the ground. The information is radioed directly to the ground units who may take the appropriate action guided by the helicopter.


TABLE OF ORGANIZATION - CRIME PREVENTION COMPANY



## THE PROBLEM

Situations are increasingly common where the public's respect for a uniformed officer is not sufficient to maintain order, and where lethal force is either not allowable or not desirable. Riots are an obvious example. Less dramatic, but equally important, is the fact that peace officers who have used excessive force to effect an arrest have been held liable for damages in a court of law.

## THE SOLUTION



FOR RIOT CONTROL AND OTHER APPLICATIONS WHERE THE LETHALITY OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IS UNDESIRABLE

### EFFECTIVE

The Ricochet Round employs soft plastic projectiles which deflect or ricochet at shallow angles. This means that firing the RR at virtually any muzzle-down angle will result in low-angle deflection from the ground, and terminal impact below the subject's waist. Our tests indicate that the RR used in this way will generally cause temporary disability or pain sufficient to be extremely discouraging.

### TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY

The Ricochet Round converts a shotgun into an intermediate-effect weapon affording tactical options not available with conventional weapons. If the need for lethal force arises, direct fire at vital areas will be incapacitating or deadly. If used in ricochet fire, the low ricochet angle of the soft plastic projectiles makes hits above the knees unlikely, with consequent low risk of lethal damage.

### 12 GAUGE

Usable in any standard shotgun or riot gun chambered for modern 12 gauge 2-3/4" ammunition (low recoil requires manual operation of automatic shotguns).

### ACCURATE

Comparable to rifled slugs to 40 yards.

### DISTINCTIVE

Smooth, transparent plastic (no brass head) easily identified by sight or touch, minimizing the danger of selecting the wrong load in a tactical situation.

# SPECIFICATIONS


	Std. Vel.	Hi-Vel.
Size:	12 gauge	12 gauge
Closure Wad Color:	Black	Red
Projectiles:	Two per cap., soft plastic, wt. 0.28 oz each	
Muzzle Velocity:	500 fps	700 fps
Muzzle Energy (both projectiles)	140 ft. lbs.	275 ft. lbs.
Max. Effective Range:		
Ricochet Fire:	35 yards	60 yards
Direct Fire:	50 yards	75 yards

**CAUTION** - Direct fire at short ranges may be lethal.


## Penetration:

At one yard the RR will penetrate 1/2" marine plywood. The Standard Velocity RR has been fired at 35 yards without breaking the skin of a clothed person.

RR can be used at ranges just beyond night stick reach.




## TRAJECTORY AFTER RICOCHET



## EXTERIOR BALLISTICS

THESE PERCENTAGES CAN BE APPLIED TO BOTH THE STANDARD AND HIGH VELOCITY RICOCHET ROUND.



## RECOMMENDED RICOCHET TECHNIQUE

Aiming at a point on a hard surface, halfway to the target, will typically produce hits below the knees. **THIS IS THE RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUE.** If the aiming point is closer to the target, the hits will be closer to the feet with more delivered energy. Conversely, if the aiming point is closer to the shooter, the hits may be above the knees but with less delivered energy.



## STATEMENTS

(From Police Officers - Major Cities in S. F. Bay Area)

### A Police Captain

"This is best yet for the purpose of Riot Control."

### A Police Lieutenant

"Six men - properly trained in strategic locations -  
We own the street in the face of mob action using  
RICOCHET ROUND."

### A Police Sergeant

"I aimed at and HIT a tennis shoe from atop a 2-  
story building (approximately 20 yards).  
Accuracy was good at 50 yards. This thing  
WORKS."

### A Police Training Officer

"Training a police officer in the use of the RICOCHET  
ROUND will require 20 to 30 rounds for  
familiarization."

### An Interested Attorney

"Everyone hates fatal incidents. Using this ROUND should essentially eliminate the  
need to apply lethal force to persons committing technical felonies - looting, rock  
throwing, etc."

From the San Mateo (Calif.) Times  
January 13, 1971

## 3rd Knifing at Soledad

SOLEDAD (AP) - Authorities at Soledad Prison today were investigating the third knifing incident in four days at this maximum security facility.

Alan L. Jones, a 34-year-old guard, was treated for superficial wounds Tuesday after he was cut on the cheek by a sharp object as he distributed guarded razors and mirrors to inmates at shaving time. One inmate was being questioned, officials said. Another inmate is being questioned in the stabbing Monday of guard Perry D. Settenoir, 26, who was injured in a fight with a ceramics class tool.

The prison earlier reported guards last Saturday used plastic pellets fired from shotguns to break up two fights among inmates. One inmate was stabbed in a shower room and six men in the canteen. One man was scalded with hot soup and another suffered a broken hand during a fight in the dining room.

5. Photographs of the MBA Stun-gun



Photographs of the M2A M1000 "Tiger" in action on the night of 1972, at the demonstration during the visit of Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson to San Francisco. The M2A M1000 "Tiger" was deployed with the 1st Platoon of the San Francisco Police Department.



6. Internal Security Doctrine; Great Britain

INTERNAL SECURITY DOCTRINE  
AND INSTRUCTIONS AIDE MEMOIRE  
FOR SUB UNIT AND DETACHMENT COMMANDERS  
THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL DISTURBANCES

This booklet deals with the military procedure for assisting the Civil Authority. It describes assistance requests, general principles, arrests, and the use of force. A copy may be obtained by writing the Ministry of Defence of Great Britain and Referencing Army Code Number 70726. This booklet could not be included due to its security classification.

7. Internal Security--Aide Memoire; Hong Kong

# HEADQUARTERS LAND FORCES

## HONG KONG

### INTERNAL SECURITY - AIDE MEMOIRE

#### PART I. THE LAW FOR TROOPS WHEN ACTING IN AID OF THE CIVIL POWER

##### Opening Fire

1. Individual Responsibility. You are never to use more force than is necessary to achieve your aim. You may only open fire if you have no alternative. Whenever possible, you are to give warning that you will open fire. If you act honestly and carefully you are protected by the law and you have nothing to fear.

##### 2. How to Fire

- Always fire aimed shots.
- Aim at that part of the body you are least likely to miss, i.e. the middle.
- Never fire warning shots over people's heads.

##### 3. When you should fire

- If there is no lesser alternative, then it is your duty to open fire:
  - To defend yourself and all other persons against an actual or imminent attack so serious as to endanger life.
  - To prevent serious damage by a crowd (i.e. more than three persons) to any property whether vehicle, building, installation or equipment.
  - To arrest any persons whom you see committing or honestly believe to have committed an act of extreme violence against persons or property.

- When ordered to do so by an officer or non-commissioned officer in command of you.

##### 4. When you should not fire

- If you can achieve your aim by any other means.
- If the situation is not serious or where damage is slight.
- If you are not sure that a person who is escaping from you has committed a serious offence.
- When under command of a superior, until you are ordered.

##### 5. Snatch and Requests. If when on a guard duty and there is no other way then you may open fire:-

###### a. In Protected places

- At any person entering or leaving who fails to halt when challenged.
- At any person whom you believe to be breaking in, stealing, or committing deliberate damage in the protected place who fails to halt when challenged.
- At any member of a crowd of more than 3 persons, who attacks you and is likely to cause you serious harm.

###### b. In Closed Areas

In order to arrest a person whom you believe has no permit or whom you suspect to have committed a serious offence in the closed area.

###### c. In Any Place

If you or the person or place you are guarding are attacked with arms or explosives, you should open fire at once.

##### Arrest and Search

6. You may arrest any person you see committing an offence or whom you suspect has committed an offence.

7. You may stop any vehicle or vessel to check identity, but you may not search or arrest without good grounds for suspicion.

8. Only a woman may search a woman.

9. A building may not be entered and searched except on the orders of a Police Officer or Commissioned Officer, unless you are in pursuit of an offender.

##### Individual Self Defence

10. If you are attacked with arms or explosives shoot the attackers at once, wherever you are.

11. Don't join in brawls. Always avoid trouble if you can.

##### Use of the Self Protection Aid Device (SPAD)

12. SPAD should only be used as an alternative to causing severe physical injury, e.g. cracked skull. Normal rules for use of minimum force apply. Therefore SPAD is only to be used as a last alternative before using any weapon likely to cause severe physical injury, e.g. bayonet or shooting.

#### PART II. MILITARY IS PLATOON

##### Loading List


##### 1. Personal Equipment and Arms

Asst	Egt	Arms	Amo
a. Pl Cmt	Compass, Torch, Whistle, Maps, Watch	Pistol or Rifle	14 rds 9mm or 40 rds 7.62 mm
b. Pl Sgt		Rifle & Bayonet	40 rds
c. Signaller (HMD)		1) or Pistol	5 CS Carts
		Rifle & Bayonet	40 rds
d. diarist	Diary (mounted on a clipboard with weather proof cover) Pencil and pencils, Camera and spare roll of film, watch	Rifle & Bayonet	40 rds
e. Bugler	Bugle/Trumpet, Megaphone	Rifle & Bayonet	40 rds
f. Messenger Two Banners, (2)		Rifle & Bayonet	40 rds
		1) or Pistol	5 CS Carts
g. Stretcher Bearer, Medical Bearer (2)	Stretcher, Medical Bearer	Rifle & Bayonet	40 rds
h. Signaller (10)		Rifle & Bayonet	40 rds
	No 1 and 2 Sect		
i. Signaller (5)		Rifle & Bayonet	40 rds
	No 2 Sect		
		1) or Pistol	5 CS Carts
			4 CS Grenades
		Rifle & Bayonet	40 rds each
Note: The 112 is located between Pl veh and TGV as required.			
	Egt	Arms	
	Pistol, Knife and Shooting Tool, Pliers, 4 nails, Vaseline, Battery	1200 rds, semiautomatic	
	Shooting net, 5 Lamps, Water, 1 Blanket, Greenal & soap.		


Note: The equipment scales are subject to change.

### Riot formation

16. The following is the basic formation of the Military Riot platoon.



### LEGEND



→ Direction faced when pl is halted

5

### Riot Drills

#### 17. Orders

Order	Action
a. "Platoon will advance" "Advance"	The pl advances at the port. No 2 Sect watches the flanks. No 3 Sect watches the rear.
b. "Platoon halt"	Pl halts, remains at the port and turns as indicated by the arrows on page 4. The sections then come to the "on guard" position.
c. "Platoon will ret./advance"	All sections port arms and turn to the front.
d. "About turn"	Pl turns about No 1 and No 3 Sect exchange roles, and the pl take up positions as in sub para 5 above.

18. The following are the sequence of orders for using irritant smoke or burning fire:

Irritant Smoke	Burning Fire
a. "Odd numbers smoke"	a. "Hoist the firing banner"
b. "Even numbers smoke"	b. "No 1 Section prepare to fire"
c. "Hoist the smoke banner"	c. "Target/targets....."
d. "Prepare to use smoke cartridges/grenades"	d. "Present"
e. "Bugler and Signaller smoke"	e. "Fire"
f. "No 2 Section Double march"	f. "Safety Catches on"

6

g. "No 2 Section. Prepare to throw/fire.....  
grenades/rounds"

h. "No 2 Section. Throw/Fire" h. "No 1 Section. On guard"

#### 19. Signals

##### a. Whistle

- (1) One prolonged blast - "Halt"
- (2) Succession of short blasts - "Prepare to Advance"
- (3) One short blast - "Watch my hand signal"

##### b. Hand Signals

- (1) 'Deploy' - the arm is extended to the full extent over the head and waved slowly from side to side.
- (2) 'Close' - the hand is placed on top of the head.

7

### PART III. THE ROYAL HONG KONG POLICE


20. Organisation. The Royal Hong Kong Police Force is organised into four Districts and two Units. The districts are further divided into Divisions. Upon the Police Force converts to its emergency organisation (i.e. forms District Emergency Forces (DEF)) it can provide twenty-eight riot companies each of three or four riot platoons, and twenty four Light Striking forces.

Districts	Divisions	Riot Units
a. Hong Kong Island	Western Central Wanchai Bay View	6 Coys 8 LSF's
b. Kowloon	Tsimshui Hong Kow Shan Shui Po Kowloon City Wong Tai Sin Kwan Yee	10 Coys 12 LSF's
c. New Territories	Tuen Mun Yuen Long Frontier	4 Coys 4 LSF's
d. Marine	Sectors Harbour & Islands	2 Coys
e. Police Tactical Unit	-	4 Coy. (CP's "near us")
f. Police Training School	-	-

8



## 21. Police Riot Platoon



### LEGEND

- Pl Comd (Insp)
- Pl 2 i/c (Pl)
- Pl Sgt
- Sect or Coln Comd
- Constable

### Summary of Weapons

- Long Batons - 8
- Gas Pistols - 4
- Federal Riot Gun - 4 Plus 8 in yeh
- Grenade Gun - 4
- Carbines - 5
- Pistols - 15
- Sterling - 1

(Weapon scales are subject to change)

Ora - Orderly/Bannerman  
G - Gas Gun  
LSP - Light Striking Force

## 22. Police Ranks and Badges

	Commissioner of Police		Superintendent
	Deputy Commissioner		Assistant Commissioner
	Senior Assistant Commissioner		Chief Inspector
	Assistant Commissioner		Inspector
	Chief Superintendent		Sergeant
	Senior Superintendent		Probationary Inspector

### Notes:

Red tabs on the shoulder of rank and file members of the Hong Kong Police signify that the Police Officer can understand elementary English.

23. Police ranks are not exactly equivalent to military ranks, but as a guide, it can be assumed that Police and Army Officers whose badges look similar are of similar rank.

## PART IV. USEFUL TELEPHONE NUMBERS

### 24. Telephone Exchange from civil telephones

#### a. Military

(1) Force (for Stanley Fort, Lyemun, Stonecutters, and Victoria) - M 238111

(2) Kowloon (for Sun Club, Shamshuipo, etc.) - K 800231

(3) 'No. 1' (for Blackdown and RAF Kai Tak) - K 820331

(4) New Kings Park (for etc.) - K 847111

(5) AT (for Sai Kung, Cassino, Gallipoli, Perama) - NT 88391

#### b. Police

(1) Hong Kong - M 234011

(2) Kowloon - K 800231

### 25. POLMILS (Military)

- a. Colony - F 3285
- b. Island - F 3475
- c. Kowloon - F 3288
- d. New Territories - SK 592 or 594
- e. Frontier - SK 512
- f. Marine - K 6118

### 26. Duty Officers

- a. HQ Land Forces - F 3352
- b. HQ 40th (Urban) Inf Bde - SK 592 or 594
- c. HQ 51 Bde - K 6104
- d. RA Regt - SK 324
- e. Sun Club - K 8226
- f. Stanley Fort - S 22
- g. Gallipoli - K 320
- h. Queen's Hill - K 611
- j. Cassino - CB 37


June 1969

HQ Land Forces  
Hong Kong

8. Police Press Releases; Hong Kong

# Facing the Ideological Division Line

Hong Kong's riot police  
are among the world's best



IN THE SUMMER of 1967, the ideological conflict which had plagued Hong Kong suddenly erupted and turned a job into a life-and-death struggle. Facing them were phalanxes of police, who, in the months to follow, would prove to be among the world's best in riot control.

The 13,000 men of the Royal Hong Kong Police Force have been justifiably smug over this hard-earned reputation. During the riots—euphemistically referred to as disturbances—they displayed a restraint which could well be a model for police the world over. By repressing their tempers the police were largely responsible for averting the consequences of needless bloodshed such as that experienced in the recent campus riots in the United States. For the entire period of the 1967 confrontation, fewer rounds of ammunition were fired than the amount expended during a single night of the Watts ghetto riot in California.

Riot police have been equipped with an array of weapons ranging from sophisticated smoke dispensers to the crude but efficient night-stick. They constantly look out for innovations and improvements in riot-control equipment. The smoke-making machines have recently been tested, and police officials are satisfied with the results. These machines can choke up smoke building with dense smoke and flush out offenders into the open.

Some weapons which have long been used by the Hong Kong police are only now being adopted by other countries. For example the long-range tear-gas launchers which are also capable of firing hard-hat peas are now being used by the British Army to quell recent riots in Ireland. The cops have invariably adopted hit-and-run tactics during assaults on the police. One officer who served with

which has long been the symbol of Hong Kong's riot police, has been used by the rough-and-tumble Chicago police. It is hoped that the little shield will help Chicago's riot police maintain their monopoly on head-busting. Indeed, Hong Kong is fortunate that its police force has decided to make best use of its equipment.

The police force in Hong Kong did not always function with its present efficiency during times of civil agitation. In 1956 the Nationalist riot resulted in more than 100 civilian deaths. The Government of Hong Kong admitted that police shortcomings were greatly to blame for the appalling death toll, and this set the pace for the reorganization of training to provide intensive instruction in riot tactics. The Police Training Contingent was formed at Faning in the New Territories and it has become the nucleus of the Police Tactical Unit. Today

Chief Inspector "Lai" Guo, in charge of instruction at the P.T.U., is a burly ex-Army sergeant major whose military experience has been invaluable in streamlining the riot-drill system. He places a lot of emphasis on police discipline. Between large jolts of snuff he said, "The mere appearance of even a small group of well-trained and disciplined police tends to have a quelling effect on a mob."

The new platoons used for riot duty are unique in design and extremely flexible. Their structure enables each platoon to break down into four separate units of ten men each. These units perform the basic operations of cordoning, sweeping, house searching and, if the occasion should arise, attacking. Before the reconstruction of the riot companies, riot-control groups consisted of large 80-man units which lacked maneuverability in the labyrinthine alleyways. Since the effective operation of the old riot company depended on the full complement functioning as a single unit, rioters in the Colony have invariably adopted hit-and-run tactics during assaults on the police. One officer who served with

the riot squads 15 years ago told of the problems he encountered: "The 80-man company was just too awkward to be effective. The only function we were able to handle for certain was a show of force. Rioters would hit us with a fusillade of rocks and other projectiles and then they would break and run. More often than not we would find them regrouping—behind us!"


Tactical Unit training is as rigorous as that given to Army commandos. In particular, there is a 30-yard T-Bar slide which runs downhill at an elevation of 25 feet. This apparatus sends the trainee rocketing down the slope, where he must land at a dead run in order to keep himself from crashing into the ground. Civilian instructor Frank Drake oversees the physical training, sporting a good-natured smile which belies his unrelenting drive. He indulges in a bit of playful sadism by naming his sit-up bench "the rack." And in addition to his regular schedule he gives grueling sessions of karate, an art at which he is a qualified expert.

Briskly sprinting over Taimoshan, the highest mountain in Hong Kong, Drake found himself experiencing all the tense emotions of a fugitive from justice. In conducting a simulated search exercise, instructors assume the role of the enemy and head for the hills to avoid capture. They take the task of evading very seriously, for if captured, they will be treated with all the indecate deference due a resisting mob agitator. In smaller exercises the instructors are assigned to hide in a building on the base. Each building is cordoned off and subjected to a top-to-bottom search. Escape is extremely rare.

Every policeman on the force is required to do a nine-month tour of duty assigned to the Tactical Unit. Here he receives advanced training in riot tactics which covers a much wider scope than his basic training. In this period of intensive drill, daily practice of riot formations and procedures take up almost 10 hours of the weekly schedule. Some of the men are given no complaints about the dullness of the daily routine. "It's absolute madness," says one trainee. There is, however, a method in this madness. The repetitious procedure serves to sharpen the policeman's ability to function efficiently during a riot. Each man exercises his duty with professional confidence. In 1967 the performance of police units served to justify the hard and unrelenting pace of training. Inspector Raymond Wong of the Tactical Unit explains the value as such: "When the men are called out they go with the confidence that they will be able to function efficiently as a team. They are eager and ready."

In other countries police panic has been cited as a factor contributing to excessive violence and deaths during times of civil disorder. The entire concept of the riot unit has been designed to prevent such consternation by conditioning the men to act under almost any conceivable situation. These methods have given the Colony's police a reputation for having an

continued on page 14



moments of confrontation.



Whispering that gives victims a sense of hope.


This late September, September 27, 1979

continued from page 7

telligent approach to the matter of crowd control. "No man would ever take it upon himself to fire into a crowd," says Edward Moss, Commandant of the Tactical Unit. "He is not even allowed to load his weapon unless ordered to do so by a responsible

officer. If gunfire is considered necessary, it is carried out by a sniper marksman designated to do so, and even then only at a specific target. Such methods have prevented the indiscriminate use of firearms by irresponsible persons."

Police have been adamant in their statements that gunfire is used only as a last resort. Inspector Raymond Or,



Police charge: baton and shield.

a P.T.U. instructor, gave us an account of his experiences during the 1967 riots. He was assigned to one of the first riot platoons called out to face an angry gesticulating mob in the factory area of Sanpokung. "It was an unnerving experience," he said. "I had never faced anything like it before. But, oddly enough, I knew



Instructor Frank Drake during a grunting.

We took our positions, sealed off the area and then marched up and quietly arrested the agitators. I'm sure it was the training that kept the scene during the first days in Sanpokong from becoming a repeat of 1956. They say that deaths caused them were due to mistakes on the part of the police. I don't know if that is true

but even if it is I can tell you there will never be a repeat of past errors. New mistakes are bad enough and the leaders of the P.T.U. have drummed it into us that repeating an old mistake is inexcusable."

The entire Hong Kong Police Force has won distinction for its cool efficiency in quelling riots with a minimum

of bloodshed. In the words of the Commandant of the Tactical Unit: "The success of our efforts can be attributed to the unfailing loyalty given the company commanders by each and every member of the rank and file. I'm confident that the new riot training system will enable us to handle any situation." —W. D. HOWE



● RIOT police stand ready with their *Greaser* guns in the San Francisco riots of 1967. Police yesterday refused to allow photographs of police with the "broomstick" guns. "We don't want to emphasize police might," a spokesman said.

## HK weapon panics American rioters

HONGKONG police have received another compliment from a major American police force — the famous "broomstick" guns which helped break up Red rioters in 1967 are now being used as standard equipment in California.

Police in the troubled University centre of Berkeley used the broomstick guns this month to disperse crowds of rampaging hoodlums.

According to an article in *Time* magazine, several hundred people smashed windows, looted stores and parking meters and tried to overturn cars in a riot in Berkeley this month.

### Surprise

But there was a surprise in store for them when police arrived, the article said.

Only 14 policemen turned up to face the hundreds of protesters.

They were armed with broomstick guns.

The magazine says Berkeley police bought the guns after reading of their success in Hongkong.


They fired four broomstick projectiles at the crowd, which rapidly dispersed.

Police in California are reported to be delighted with the new — for them — anti-riot weapons.


The guns fire wooden plugs which ricochet off roads and smash into the rioters' legs and knees.

They are not fatal — but they hurt, and the noise of the guns frightens rioters.

The move to follow Hongkong police methods in California follows another widely-publicised imitation in Chicago, where riot police now go into action behind wicker shields similar to those used by Hongkong police.



AUXILIARY police, armed with batons and shields, undergo riot training.



●HERE'S one learner driver everybody is going to give the right-of-way! Not even a taxi driver wants to tackle a tank. The crew aboard one of the new police **SPACE** armoured cars got plenty of room to manoeuvre when it was out on a practice run at North Point this week. Traffic stopped at every intersection to let the big blue monster pass. This picture was taken in Java Road.



# A SIGHT TO FRIGHTEN A RIOTER

It is a reassuring yet somehow frightening thing to watch the Hongkong riot police in training.

Armed with batons, gas guns and carbines, they drill with superb military precision, the obvious result of iron discipline.

Even their war cries sound rehearsed. And as they swing at the skulls of an imaginary hostile crowd, they look like some strange, savage chorus line.

Most of them are very young—about 19 or 20.

Internal security training, at the Police Tactical Unit at Fanling, lasts 16 weeks, although the course is now being extended to 10 months.

The aim is to give riot training to every police recruit as soon as possible after completion of basic training at Aberdeen.

"The key word of the training here is flexibility," said officer in charge, Mr Roy Moss.

On the parade square in front of him, a company of three platoons was performing an exercise drill.

They lined up in four sections. The first section carried shields and batons. The second carried gas pistols and federal gas guns. The third carried carbines and Greener 12-gauge shot guns.

Reporter ... Alan Daniels  
Photographer ... C. Y. Yu

And the fourth, the lock-up section, held handcuffs and short batons. They are also responsible for taking prisoners and treating casualties.

"You will notice that everything the men are doing is done very slowly and deliberately," said Mr Moss.

"This is because we give a crowd which refuses to disperse ample opportunity to see what we are doing and how we plan to deal with it.

"Very often a show of force is sufficient to show trouble makers that it is better for them to push off.

## Last resort

"We will use gas before we use batons because gas causes less casualties and we'll use batons before we use firearms. Firearms are the ultimate deterrent and their use is strictly controlled. There must be no mistakes.

"Before an order is given to fire, the two or three men who will actually fire are selected. As soon as they fire, their numbers are recorded in a diary.

"And immediately after firing, the platoon commander's orderly picks up the expended rounds from the ground and these are kept as a double-check.

"The men aim at the knees

of the crowd unless somebody spots a bomb thrower or something like that. Then they may shoot to kill."

Before gas is used, verbal warnings to the crowd are given in English and Chinese. Then a banner is held up which reads: "Warning. Tear Smoke."

If batons or guns are brought into force similar warnings are given. The banner this time reads: "Disperse, or we use further force."

The chief instructor at Fanling is Les Guyatt, ex-army, ex-India, ex-regimental sergeant major, a professional disciplinarian of the old school.

He is heavily tattooed and the waxed ends of his moustache points skywards.

"Discipline is very important," he said. "During the troubles last year the Communist press accused us of killing hundreds of people and wounding thousands.

"If it had not been for discipline this might have happened."

He paused to take a pinch of snuff.

"We also teach the men unarmed combat, from what we call 'come-along holds' to defence against attack.

"We don't teach 'em 57 varieties. We teach 'em half a dozen or so. But what they know they know well."

# HONGKONG POLICE WEL TRAINED IN QUELLING RIOT

This was clearly evidenced by the manner in which the high school and riot squads handled the riot during the 1968 election.

the 4-week  
members of the  
were instructed in  
the use of weapons  
and in  
the use of weapons.

By ALF  
STRAND

4444

any action is done

## Lost resort

Firearms are only used  
as a last resort and police  
are instructed to aim at  
the knees.


## Warnings

Only when the situation is extremely desperate, as for example, the mob

In a bid to ensure that Hongkong maintains its high standing in riot control, the Government is planning to expand the Police Training Unit from four to eight divisions, handling more than 1,000 officers and men.

Plans are also underway to move the unit to a new and larger facility in Lung Cheung Road in Kowloon.

While undertaking the riot control course, members of the Tactical Unit are used as an operational



# NEW RIOT ARMOURY

SENIOR police officers, military and Government men sat down in a quiet room in Central District last week to talk about violence.

At a secret seminar they discussed riots — how to deal with them and when to use weapons.

They talked about the use of riot gas, tear gas, and other weapons like clubs which cause a lot of trouble.

A seminar report would be made, it was said, and would be a sensitive subject.

THE 1967 RIOTS: The police tried to control the riots by using force. They tried to use tear gas, but it was not very effective. They also used clubs, but this was not very effective either.

## HAWKS

The police tried to use force to control the riots. They tried to use tear gas, but it was not very effective. They also used clubs, but this was not very effective either.

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## By China Mail Staff Reporters

have been who believed that the police should use force to control the riots. They tried to use tear gas, but it was not very effective. They also used clubs, but this was not very effective either.

And they have done who prefer to talk of social reform.

Last year, the middle class worked and police thought it was the better class to take. "We are not sure, but we are sure," they said.

THE USE OF FORCE: A study of police action was drawn up from reports to the use of force.

THE WEAPONS: Last year, the police used tear gas, clubs, and high-powered water hoses. They were not very effective, but they were used.

## METHODS

The report suggested new methods of prevention and suppression can be improved.

"The methods for the suppression of riot should be improved. The police should use force to control the riots. They tried to use tear gas, but it was not very effective. They also used clubs, but this was not very effective either.

"Some of the methods of prevention have been outlined already but suppression of riots is another matter.

"The methods for the suppression of riot should be improved. The police should use force to control the riots. They tried to use tear gas, but it was not very effective. They also used clubs, but this was not very effective either.

"What one speaks of doing a riot with force which disorganizes and isolates a rioter the hard-headed policeman is inclined to say but such actions and others are currently being experimented with.

MADE in America, the police have been attacked because it was thought to be dangerous. Officials of the Hong Kong Government and the police have said that they

have any doubts about that. They tried to use tear gas, but it was not very effective. They also used clubs, but this was not very effective either.

"The police were not very effective. They tried to use tear gas, but it was not very effective. They also used clubs, but this was not very effective either.

## JUSTIFIED

GUNS: The report said that it was agreed that the police should use force to control the riots. They tried to use tear gas, but it was not very effective. They also used clubs, but this was not very effective either.

Guns, said the report, should be used only as a last resort and even then aimed to inflict minimum injury.

THE ARMY: The army is mainly in charge of the border area leaving "internal security" to the police.

Discussing the right time for soldiers to take over from police in controlling riots.

The use of army forces tend to boost the confidence of the population and so the army should be used.


## AWARE

One section discusses whether it would be a good thing to tell people how the police deal with riots.

The conclusion was: "It was thought that this was not necessary, as the bulk of the public already were sufficiently aware of how the police work in these situations and did not need reassurance.

There was moreover the danger of appearing to excuse police activities should these things be explained to them.

The report of the seminar was published in the Hong Kong Government Gazette.



THE GREENER GUN wounds and seldom kills. (extra)

anti-riot deter-  
world over and  
more.

**SECRET**

PHES . . . deplored but justified in  
certain circumstances.

THE MAGE . . . effort to and how to

THE GREENER GUN . . . on a rifle gun which normally wounds and seldom kills. Effective and probably justified in extreme circumstances.

9. Statistics of 1967 Disturbances; Hong Kong  
APPENDIX VI. Hong Kong Publication

APPENDIX VI  
CONFRONTATION STATISTICS  
As at 31st December 1967  
(Paragraph 194)

1. CASUALTIES

(a) Killed		
Police . . . . .	10	
Military . . . . .	1	
Fire Service . . . . .	1	
Others . . . . .	39	
	<u>51</u>	
(i) Police		
Killed by explosion . . . . .	2	
Killed by stabbing . . . . .	2	
Killed by shooting . . . . .	6	
	<u>10</u>	10
(ii) Military		
Killed by explosion . . . . .	1	
	<u>1</u>	1
(iii) Fire Service		
Killed by explosion . . . . .	1	
	<u>1</u>	1
(iv) Others		
Killed by explosion . . . . .	12	
Shot by Police . . . . .	17	
Killed by incendiary attack . . . . .	2	
Found dead, or found seriously injured and subsequently died . . . . .	5	
Died in the course of riots but not through Police action . . . . .	2	
Died whilst in Police custody . . . . .	1	
	<u>39</u>	39
Grand Total . . . . .	<u>51</u>	

NOTE: 'Others' killed by explosion include 4 persons in possession of bombs which exploded.

# APPENDIX VI (Contd.)

(b) Injured	
Police . . . . .	212
Armed Forces . . . . .	29
Fire Brigade . . . . .	4
Hawker Control Forces . . . . .	2
Others . . . . .	585

832

## 2. PERSONS CONVICTED

(i) Riot . . . . .	318
(ii) Unlawful Assembly . . . . .	465
(iii) Breach of curfew . . . . .	232
(iv) Possession of bombs (real) . . . . .	40
(v) Possession of bombs (simulated) . . . . .	45
(vi) Explosive offences . . . . .	33
(vii) Possession of inflammatory posters . . . . .	209
(viii) Inflammatory Speech . . . . .	81
(ix) Intimidating Assembly . . . . .	185
(x) Other offences . . . . .	328

Total . . . . . 1,936

## 3. DAMAGE TO PROPERTY

### (a) Buildings

Post Offices . . . . .	8
Resettlement Estate Offices . . . . .	5
Police Stations/Posts . . . . .	9
Rural Committee Offices . . . . .	3
Banks . . . . .	24
Cinemas/Theatres . . . . .	6
Other buildings . . . . .	47

### (b) Vehicles

Government . . . . .	23
Buses . . . . .	38
Trams . . . . .	7
Taxis . . . . .	24
Public cars . . . . .	6
Other vehicles . . . . .	66

## 4. BOMBS

Uncontrolled Explosions . . . . .	253
Suspected bombs dealt with by bomb disposal teams . . . . .	8074
No. of genuine bombs . . . . .	1167



APPENDIX VI (Contd.)

	Bombs discovered as a result of Police	
	action before planting . . . . .	146
	Sticks of gelignite seized . . . . .	164
	Sticks of dynamite seized . . . . .	564
5.	CURFEWS	
	Kowloon . . . . .	5
	Hong Kong Island . . . . .	3
	New Territories (border areas) . . . . .	1
6.	POLICE RAIDS ON SUSPECTED PREMISES . . . . .	1281

10. Saracen Armored Vehicle

