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# Maintenance of Reserve Components in a Volunteer Environment

Volume II

Appendix A: Phase I

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
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13. ABSTRACT <p>This appendix contains a detailed discussion of the factors that influence procurement and retention in the US Army Reserve Components. Historical and current experience of the US Armed Services and selected foreign countries is reviewed and analyzed. It furnishes an overview of the recently-completed studies of Army and DOD personnel procurement and retention in a volunteer environment. A projection of future strength levels of Army Reserve Components through FY78 is calculated.</p>		

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## FOREWORD

This report documents the work completed for the study, "Maintenance of Reserve Components in a Volunteer Environment," conducted for the Office of Reserve Components by Research Analysis Corporation.

The objective of the study is to provide the Department of the Army with a basis for making decisions concerning the composition of the program required to procure and retain personnel in the Reserve Components (RC) in a zero-draft environment, to respond to future Office of the Secretary of Defense initiative in this area, and to provide the in-depth analysis of the problem required for the FY74-FY78 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle.

Phase I of the study encompasses the determination of the factors that influence enlistment and retention in the RC.

Phase II evaluates alternative proposals that may contribute to procurement and retention, determines the interrelation between proposals, and recommends additional tests required to evaluate the effectiveness of proposals for which data are not presently available.

Phase III develops the least-cost procurement and retention program that can be expected to maintain current strength levels and two lower strength levels. This phase of the study identifies the sensitivity of the study conclusions to changes in assumptions and attitudes. It further identifies requirements for follow-on surveys or research to provide data needed to adjust the program in response to changes in attitude.

This volume, Appendix A, presents in detail the findings and accomplishments of the task group in response to the Phase I requirements.

Albert D. Tholen  
Head, Resource Analysis Department





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## ABBREVIATIONS

AD	active duty
ADT	active duty for training
AFEES	Armed Forces examining and entrance stations
AFQT	Armed Forces Qualification Test
AFR	Air Force Reserve
ALO	Authorized levels of operation
ANG	Air National Guard
AR	Army Regulation
ARF	Air Reserve Forces
ARNG	Army National Guard
ASA (M&RA)	Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs)
AT	annual training
ATCG	Annual Training Control Group
AUS	Army of the United States
BAQ	basic allowance for quarters
BLS	Bureau of Labor Statistics
CAR	Chief, Army Reserve
CDC	Combat Development Command
CHAMPUS	Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services
CONUS	Continental United States
CONUSA	Commanders of the numbered armies in the Continental United States
CORC	Chief, Office of Reserve Components
CY	calendar year
DA	Department of the Army

DOD	Department of Defense
EO	Executive Order
ETS	expiration of term of service
FHA	Federal Housing Administration
Ft(s)	Fort(s)
FY	fiscal year
HumRRO	Human Resources Research Organization
IDT	inactive duty training
IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
KAPE	Keep the Army in the Public Eye
MCR	Marine Corps Reserve
MOS	military occupational specialty
MUTA	multiple unit training assembly
MVA	Modern Volunteer Army
NPS	nonprior service
OASD (M&RA)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower & Reserve Affairs)
OASD (RA)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Resource Analysis)
ORC	Office of Reserve Components
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PL	Public Law
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
PS	prior service
PX	post exchange
QM	quartermaster
RA	Regular Army (United States)
R&R	Retention and Recruitment Study
RC	Reserve Components
RCG	Reinforcement Control Group
REP	Reserve Enlistment Program
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
RTU	Reinforcement Training Units
SAG	Study Advisory Group
SGLI	Servicemen's Group Life Insurance
SR	Selected Reserve

SSS	Satisfied Soldier Scheme
Stby	Standby Reserve
TA	Territorial Army
TAVR	Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve
TAVRA	Territorial Auxiliary and Volunteer Reserve Associations
TD	table(s) of distribution
TDA	table(s) of distribution and allowances
TOE	table(s) of organization and equipment
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
USA	US Army
USAAC	USA Administration Center, St. Louis, Mo.
USAF	US Air Force
USAFI	US Armed Forces Institute
USAR	US Army Reserve
USAREC	US Army Recruiting Command
USMC	US Marine Corps
USMCR	USMC Reserve
USN	US Navy
USNR	USN Reserve
UTA	unit training assemblies
VA	Veterans Administration
WAC	Women's Army Corps
WWII	World War II

## SUMMARY

### PROBLEM

To provide the Department of the Army with a basis for making decisions concerning the composition of the program required to procure and retain personnel in the Reserve Components in a zero-draft environment, to enable the Army to respond to future OSD initiative in this area, and to provide the in-depth analysis of the problem required for the FY 74-78 POM cycle.<sup>1</sup>

### SCOPE

Task 1. Review and analyze current and historical experience to determine how the voluntary procurement and retention of personnel in the Army RC have been influenced by active force levels, draft pressure, population levels, economic conditions, and personnel policies and procedures. Conduct a similar review of the experience gained in the other U.S. Armed Services and in selected foreign countries.

Task 2. Review and analyze the findings of recently completed or underway studies of personnel procurement and retention in the Active Army and RC in a volunteer environment.

Task 3. Determine the RC strength levels (in units and in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)) that current personnel programs can be expected to maintain in a zero-draft environment or in an environment in which draft calls are reduced to the point that there is no effective pressure to bring people into the RC.

Task 4. Identify alternative proposals which may contribute to RC personnel procurement and retention in a volunteer environment. These proposals will include (but are not to be limited to) the following: improved recruiting and advertising, modification of the unit service obligation to permit transfer from units to the IRR after a specified time, inclusion of a reserve service obligation clause in



the active service contracts, fixed and variable reenlistment bonuses, enlistment bonuses, educational benefits, changed retirement and survivor benefits, full-time provision of Servicemen's Group Life Insurance (SGLI), and maintenance of a standby draft plan/procedure.

Task 5. Initiate a survey of RC personnel to develop the data needed to determine what portion of these personnel could be induced to reenlist by different incentives, combinations of incentives, or other factors. The survey will include personnel in the sixth year of their initial enlistment in RC units and personnel in the annual training (obligor) category of the IRR, and will develop data on the reasons for initial enlistment as well as possible reenlistment. Reenlistees will be queried as to the reason for their reenlistment decision.<sup>1</sup>

Task 6. Provide the Study Advisory Group (SAG) the findings of the first phase of the study and recommended study definitions, assumptions, and preliminary concepts.<sup>1</sup>

#### ASSUMPTIONS

- (a) Emphasis in the study is on enlisted reservists.
- (b) The time frame for a zero-draft environment will be from July 1973 on.
- (c) Large-scale participation of the US Army (USA) in combat in Vietnam will have been ended by July 1973 and that, at least from that data and in the foreseeable future, the US will be in essentially a peacetime situation but with the threat of limited conflict.
- (d) Some change in organization in the present structure of the RC may be effected to complement a zero-draft Army.
- (e) The mandated strength of the RC in the Volunteer Army era will be 660,000 in units [Army National Guard (ARNG) - 400,000; US Army Reserve (USAR) - 260,000], and the planned strength of the IRR will be 656,000.
- (f) The current program for upgrading the RC will continue as planned.
- (g) The present geographic distribution of RC personnel throughout the US will not change appreciably in a zero-draft environment.

## SUMMARY FINDINGS

### Task 1 - Review and Analysis of Current and Historical Experience

1. The ARNG/USAR units can recruit only to fill vacancies and in the past have had considerable queuing of personnel waiting to enter the ARNG/USAR. Because enlistment in the ARNG/USAR has been channeled through waiting lists, it was necessary to determine the influence that has been exerted on the waiting lists, rather than on enlistments, by active force levels, draft pressure, population levels, economic conditions, and personnel policies and procedures.

2. Policy decisions such as those which establish new strengths and new structures, as well as those which result in changed personnel policies and procedures, have exerted a dominant influence on procurement and retention of ARNG/USAR personnel and on the waiting lists. Although waiting list data are insufficient for quantitative measurement, ample evidence is available to indicate that draft pressures have exerted significant influence on the size of waiting lists and on the responsiveness of this group in actually filling unit vacancies.

3. Active force levels, population levels, and economic conditions have exerted little influence on the waiting lists in the past, but the effect of these factors on enlistment and reenlistment may become more direct and pronounced in a zero-draft environment.

4. In general, the experience of the RC of the other US Armed Services parallels that of the USA RC.

5. The experience of each of the foreign countries examined - Great Britain, Canada, Australia - is unique, but some aspects can be compared with US experience. Policies and procedures dealing with such issues as organization, force structure, end strengths, and personnel management have had a dominant influence on personnel procurement and retention, as with US forces.

6. None of the countries examined offers economic incentives for enlistment or reenlistment in their RC; however, Australia and Canada are directing some effort to introducing a reenlistment bonus. Each of the countries examined has something to offer in the way of ideas that might be adapted to the USA ARNG/USAR, but it is also clear that these countries face many of the same problems faced by the USA, such as low pay, unattractive image, and antipathy toward military service.

7. Not directly related to any specific task requirement but certainly a major conclusion of this study is the need for a comprehensive uniform system for the collection, collation, and presentation of statistical data and other information (such as attitudes) on procurement and retention of ARNG/USAR personnel. Ideally this coordinated system should be established by Department of Defense (DOD) so that all Armed Services are reporting and using correlatable data and definitions.

#### Task 2 - Review and Analysis of Findings of Recently Completed Studies

1. Eight major studies and the Congressional hearings were reviewed and analyzed for findings on RC in an all-volunteer environment. In addition, over 50 trip reports of visits made by Combat Development Command (CDC) and RAC personnel were considered and are reported on in the study.

2. There is general agreement that ARNG/USAR unit mandated strengths cannot be maintained in a zero-draft environment with the present rate of reenlistment and non-draft-motivated first enlistments. Over 100 separate suggestions were made for achieving personnel numerical goals when there is no draft pressure. Good agreement (50 percent or more of studies) was found on nine recommendations, as follows:

- Authorize reenlistment bonus
- Authorize improved recruiting program
- Add to or expand survivor benefits
- Authorize educational benefits in return for enlistment, reenlistment, and/or satisfactory service
- Authorize payment of an enlistment bonus
- Authorize proficiency pay for specialty and superior performance
- Extend coverage of SGLI
- Provide quarters allowance for Reserve Enlistment Program (REP) trainees
- Increase basic rates of pay

#### Task 3 - Determination of Future RC Strength Levels

Strength levels for the ARNG/USAR units and the IRR that current personnel programs can be expected to maintain in a zero-draft environment through fiscal year (FY) 79 are shown in the accompanying tabulation.

Component	Beginning strength FY72, thousands	End strength FY79, thousands		Percent of beginning strength, %		Difference, thousands	
		U	L	U	L	U	L
ARNG units	371	379	248	102	67	+ 8	-123
USAR units	228	335	199	147	87	+107	- 29
IRR	920	195	195	21	21	-725	-725
Total	1519	909	642	60	42	-610	-877

Note: U = RAC upper estimate, L = RAC lower estimate.

#### Task 4 - Identification of Alternative Proposals

1. Alternative proposals, procedures, and management practices that might contribute to the procurement and retention of RC personnel in a volunteer environment have been selected, and each is discussed briefly. The various alternatives are organized and considered in the framework of the five operational aspects of the DA Personnel System: procurement of personnel; training and education; distribution of personnel; sustainment, in terms of satisfaction, personal growth, and productivity; and separation of personnel from the RC. Examination of alternatives in the context of the total personnel management system proves useful in helping reduce the possibility of overlooking aspects of RC service that may be sources of dissatisfaction and of subsequent personnel loss.

2. Over 50 proposals in all were considered, including such items as:

- Improved recruiting
- Enlistment and reenlistment bonuses
- Demand for critical skills and critical military occupational specialties (MOS)
- Emphasis on quality
- Length of training sessions
- Improved training facilities
- Military schools
- Training with the Active Army
- Army adviser assignments
- Individual Ready Reserve policy regarding transfer
- Extension of Veterans Administration (VA)-type benefits

No monetary loss for annual training (AT)

Career counseling

Income tax exemption

Task 5 - Survey of RC Personnel

1. This task required that a survey be conducted of enlisted members of the RC who were in the sixth year of their service obligation. The survey that was developed assesses the incentives and inducements that would be required to persuade an individual to reenlist in the RC, as well as the satisfactions associated with RC service. The survey was mailed on 6 and 7 Dec 71 to a stratified random sample of 4931 persons in the US and Territories, distributed as in the accompanying tabulation among the population of enlisted personnel in their sixth year:

Category	Population of sixth-year obligors	Sample	Proportion, %
ARNG units	45,000	998	2.2
USAR units	39,000	975	2.5
Annual Training Control Groups (ATCG)	14,000	999	7.1
Reinforcement Control Groups (RCG)	41,000	996	2.4
Standby Reserve (Stby)	385,000	963	0.3

2. Review of information available concerning the attitudes and motivations of potential RC enlistees indicates a significant gap in knowledge of such persons. A second survey, adapted to first year enlisted personnel who have not yet been called to active duty for training (ADT), is also being conducted. A sample of 1000 persons from the total population of 11,000 in this category is being polled.

MAINTENANCE OF RESERVE COMPONENTS  
IN A VOLUNTEER ENVIRONMENT

Appendix A: Phase I

Chapter 1  
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF CURRENT AND  
HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE (TASK 1)

INTRODUCTION

This chapter is a review and analysis of current and historical experience relating to the influence of active force levels, draft pressure, population levels, economic conditions, and personnel policies and procedures on voluntary procurement and retention in the ARNG and USAR. Reviews of the experiences of the other US Armed Services and of the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, and Australia have also been included. This work is in response to Phase I, Task 1 of the Work Statement,<sup>1</sup> which is:

(a) Review and analyze current and historical experience to determine how the voluntary procurement and retention of personnel in the Army RC have been influenced by active force levels, draft pressure, population levels, economic conditions, and personnel policies and procedures.

(b) Conduct a similar review of the experience gained in the other US Armed Services.

(c) Conduct a similar review of the experience gained in selected foreign countries.

To provide the DA with a basis for making decisions concerning the composition of the program required to procure and retain personnel in the ARNG/USAR in a zero-draft environment, it is essential to determine those factors that influence procurement and retention of ARNG/USAR personnel.<sup>1</sup> The experience base is broadened by examination of other US Armed Services and selected foreign countries. All the US Armed Services will be examined together since they are subject to the same population and economic factors, and essentially the same active force level and draft pressure factors. Historical experience is examined for the time period 1965-1971 since



scant data are available prior to 1965. The study has been further limited to enlisted personnel.

A description of the basic organization of the US Army RC is presented first. In the next section, IRR is discussed separately since its position is unique among all the DOD RC, and it is not subject in the same ways to the influence of the factors that affect the other components. The historical factors influencing procurement and retention in the ARNG/USAR units are discussed in the succeeding section. The experiences of the other US Armed Services are covered in the following section. In the last sections, each selected foreign country is considered separately because each has its own set of parameters.

#### THE US ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS—BASIC ORGANIZATION, 1972

The RC of the Army consist of the ARNG and the USAR. Together with the Active Army they comprise the USA. Both the ARNG and USAR result from long periods of evolutionary development. The ARNG traces its history back to the colonial militia which served in the Revolutionary War. Elements of the USAR were initially formed in 1908.

Members of the ARNG are under the jurisdiction of their respective states except when ordered into active Federal service in their states as members of the National Guard. The governor of each state is the commander-in-chief of all ARNG units within his jurisdiction which are not in active Federal service. (The President of the United States has command jurisdiction over District of Columbia ARNG units.) The USAR is a Federal force organized, maintained, and commanded by the Active Army, and members when on duty are in a Federal status under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Army.

The ARNG is composed of the Active ARNG and the Inactive ARNG. The Active ARNG consists of those federally recognized officers, warrant officers, and enlisted personnel assigned to tables of organization and equipment/tables of distribution and allowances (TOE/TDA) ARNG troop program units. The Inactive ARNG consists of those federally recognized officers, warrant officers, and enlisted personnel attached to ARNG units



who are qualified and available for mobilization duty but are temporarily unable to participate in the Active ARNG.

The USAR consists of the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve (Stby), and the Retired Reserve (Fig. 1-1). The Ready Reserve consists of troop program units and the IRR. The IRR is made up of members of the Ready Reserve who are not assigned to troop program units and assigned to:

(a) Control Group (Annual training) consisting of nonunit Ready Reserve personnel who have a training obligation but who cannot participate in unit training because of geographical location, civilian occupation, personal or community hardship, nonavailability of a unit assignment, or other cogent reason. They are required to participate in annual training (AT) when so directed.

(b) Control Group (Mobilization designee) consisting of Ready Reserve nonunit officer personnel who are assigned to an authorized key augmentation position of a mobilization TDA and who require premobilization experience and training. These personnel are considered available upon mobilization or national emergency and are required to participate in 12 days of AT exclusive of travel time.

(c) Control Group (Delayed) consisting of Ready Reserve enlisted personnel whose initial entry on active duty (AD) or active duty for training (ADT) is delayed and who are not required by law or regulation to participate in training during the period of delay. They may voluntarily participate in an attached status with a USAR unit.

(d) Control Group (Officer active duty obligor) consisting of officers appointed in the USAR with an AD obligation who do not enter on AD concurrently with their appointment. They are not authorized or required to participate in any form of training unless specifically directed by HQ, DA.

(e) Control Group (Reinforcements) consisting of all nonunit Ready Reserve personnel not assigned to another control group. They are not subject to mandatory training requirements.

The Ready Reserve is liable for involuntary AD in time of war or national emergency declared by Congress, proclaimed by The President, or when otherwise authorized by law.




Fig. 1-1—Organization of the USAR

Troop program units of the USAR are TOE or TDA units organized to serve as such upon mobilization. The types and numbers of units are based on mobilization requirements of DA as prescribed in the RC Troop Basis and include Selected Service Detachments, Army Reserve commands, and USAR schools. Commanders of the numbered armies in the Continental United States (CONUSA) may also establish USAR Reinforcement Training Units (RTU) which are nontroop program units consisting of attached personnel from the IRR and organized to provide training for their members in a nonpay status.

The Stby consists of those individuals who have fulfilled their Ready Reserve training requirement, or who are excused from such training by appropriate authority. Such personnel may serve the balance of their statutory service obligation in the Stby and are available for involuntary order to AD in the expansion of the Active Army upon declaration of war or national emergency declared by the Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law.

The Retired Reserve consists of those individuals whose names are placed on the Reserve Retired list by proper authority in accordance with law or regulation. Currently these individuals are generally required to complete 20 years of creditable service (years in which, through a combination of active and inactive duty, the reservist earns at least 50 points). He can earn one point for each day of AD, including ADT, up to an annual limit of 365 points. He may receive one point for each authorized drill attended and for each period of equivalent instruction (schools and correspondence courses), as well as 15 points for each year of active RC membership but is limited to a maximum of 60 points in any year under these three methods. When these requirements are met, the individual may apply to be placed in the Retired Reserve and at age 60 becomes eligible to draw retired pay and to have the benefits pertaining to hospitalization, post exchanges (PX), and commissaries to the same extent as retired personnel of the Active Army. Members of the Retired Reserve may, if qualified, be ordered to AD involuntarily in time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law, and then only when the Secretary of the Army determines that adequate numbers of qualified individuals in the required categories

are not readily available in the Ready Reserve or in active status in the Stby.

Units of the ARNG are generally combat units, while the USAR troop program units are generally combat support and combat service support units.

Training of the RC parallels that of the Active Army and is accomplished during periods of inactive duty training (IDT), ADT, and AT.

Inactive duty training is conducted by both ARNG and USAR units at home stations in training centers, armories, and local outdoor training areas. The various types of training assemblies, to include pay and retirement point credit authorized for each, are shown in Fig. 1-2.

Troop program TOE/TDA units are authorized to conduct 48 paid unit training assemblies (UTA) each fiscal year. Some units have recently been authorized up to 54 paid drills annually. Each UTA must be of 4 hours' duration, including roll calls and rest periods. Training assemblies in excess of 48 per fiscal year require prior approval of DA and must be fully justified. Additional training assemblies, without pay, may be conducted at the discretion of unit commanders provided that they are properly scheduled and supervised.

Reinforcement training units normally conduct 24 2-hour single training assemblies each training year. Mobilization designation detachments normally conduct a minimum of 12 2-hour single training assemblies each training year. These assemblies are conducted without pay; however personnel receive retirement point credit for attendance. CONUSA commanders may authorize the conduct of a training period similar to a multiple unit assembly two (MUTA-2) (para 3, Fig. 1-2) for RTU and mobilization designation detachments with the award of two retirement points credit and training credit for two of the authorized single training assemblies for individuals attending the entire assembly (8-hours' duration). CONUSA commanders may authorize up to 24 additional single training assemblies for RTU each training year (fiscal year for these units).

Multiple unit training assemblies are used for instructional subjects that require the use of outdoor areas or that require considerable

1. **Single training assembly.** A scheduled training assembly of at least 2 hours' duration exclusive of roll call and rest periods. A maximum of 1 day's pay and 1 retirement point is authorized for each assigned and attached individual who satisfactorily completes the entire assembly. This type assembly is authorized only for USAR schools, reinforcement training units, and mobilization designation detachments in a nonpay status.

2. **Unit training assembly (UTA).** An authorized and scheduled training assembly of not less than 4 hours' duration including roll call and rest periods. A maximum of 1 day's pay and 1 retirement point is authorized for each assigned and attached individual who satisfactorily completes the entire assembly. This type of assembly is mandatory for all troop program units except USAR schools.

3. **Multiple unit training assembly two (MUTA-2).** Two unit training assemblies (8 hours) conducted consecutively. A maximum of 2 days' pay and two retirement points is authorized each assigned and attached individual who satisfactorily completes the entire MUTA-2.

4. **Multiple unit training assembly three (MUTA-3).** Three unit training assemblies conducted consecutively on 2 successive days. A MUTA-3 may be conducted with two periods on 1 day and the third on the succeeding or preceding day. A total of 3 days' pay and three retirement point credits is authorized each assigned or attached individual who satisfactorily completes the entire MUTA-3.

5. **Multiple unit training assembly four (MUTA-4).** Four unit training assemblies conducted consecutively on successive days. A MUTA-4 may be conducted with two UTA's on each of 2 successive days or in any other combination. A maximum of 4 days' pay and four retirement point credits is authorized each assigned or attached individual who satisfactorily completes the entire MUTA-4.

6. **Multiple unit training assembly five (MUTA-5).** Five unit training assemblies conducted consecutively on successive days. A MUTA-5 may be conducted with two UTA's on each of 2 successive days with one being conducted on the day preceding, or the day following that 2-day period. A total of 5 days' pay and five retirement point credits is authorized each assigned or attached individual who satisfactorily completes the entire MUTA-5.

7. **Multiple unit training assembly six (MUTA-6).** Six unit training assemblies conducted consecutively on successive days. A MUTA-6 may be conducted with two UTA's on each of 3 successive days. A total of 6 days' pay and six retirement point credits is authorized each assigned or attached individual who satisfactorily completes the entire MUTA-6.

Fig. 1-2—Types of Unit Training Assemblies

time for organization and conduct of training. Range firing, field exercises, and staff training are examples of subjects that are appropriate for MUTA. All units must conduct a minimum of six MUTA-4 annually or any combination of MUTA totaling 96 hours. Combat and combat support units are required to conduct annually a minimum of four of the six MUTA-4, or any combination of MUTA totaling 64 hours, in a field environment and, where feasible, to include overnight bivouacs. CONUSA commanders are authorized to exempt units from these requirements when they cannot profit from such training, when facilities are inadequate, or for other cogent reasons.

Individuals may not be credited with attendance at any training assembly for pay or other purpose unless they are present in the prescribed uniform undergoing approved training during the entire assembly. (Certain exceptions to this policy are outlined in Army Regulation (AR) 140-1.) No more than two UTA may be credited to any one calendar day for pay and retirement point credit.

Annual training is the most important period during the training year for ARNG/USAR units. During this period ARNG/USAR units are able to concentrate on mission-type training for 2 consecutive weeks under field conditions normally at Active Army installations and state-owned camps. Members of USAR troop program units are required to participate in not less than 14 days of AT, exclusive of travel time, each calendar year. Members of ARNG units must perform not less than 15 days of AT, including necessary travel time, each calendar year.

Active duty for training is full-time training in the active military service of the US for training purposes, exclusive of IDT and AT. This includes REP-63 training and attendance at Army service schools. Active duty for training should not be confused with AD which is full-time duty in the active military service of the US, other than ADT.

#### THE INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

The IRR has been unique in that enlisted accessions have been almost all from AD personnel and on an almost fully obligated basis. Some of the options available for fulfillment of the 6 year obligation as enlisted men are shown in Fig. 1-3.

To whom applicable	Statutory obligation (years)	How satisfied				Remarks
		Years on AD	Ready Reserve		Years in Stby	
			Years in RC unit	Years in IRR		
Inductee	6	2	—	3	1	Subject to AT as filler each year. May be mandatorily assigned to a unit if no portion of AD served in a combat zone. Current policy—no enlisted personnel being mandatorily assigned.
	6	2	2	—	2	If individual joins a unit.
	6	2	1	2	1	If individual joins a unit under the "RC Active Army In-Service Recruiting" program or the ARNG "Try One in The Guard" program.
RA enlistee, 3 year	6	3	—	2	1	Not subject to AT. May not be mandatorily assigned to a unit.
		3	1	—	2	If individual joins a unit.
RA enlistee, 4 year	6	4	—	—	2	
RA enlistee, 5 year	6	5	—	—	1	
RA enlistee, 6 year	6	6	—	—	—	
RC enlistee	6	4–10 months	5½	—	—	If the unit is ordered to AD as in the postal strike or Pueblo incident—the Ready Reserve obligation is reduced 1 year to make it 4½ years in the unit and 1 year in the Stby.
RC enlistee for AD Title 10, USC, Sec 511 (b)	6	2	2	1	1	If individual joins a unit.
	6	2	—	3	1	

Fig. 1-3—Examples of Enlisted Options Available for Fulfillment of 6-Year Service Obligation\*

\*Incl to ORC memorandum, subject: "SAG Comments on Phase III, RAC Project 012.120," 18 May 72.



Obligors constitute 99.6 percent of the enlisted IRR strength and are almost entirely prior service (PS) personnel, although membership of nonprior service (NPS) personnel is not prohibited by statute.<sup>3</sup> Under these circumstances, it is clear that draft calls, active force levels, and personnel policies and procedures influence the procurement of personnel for the IRR and that, for all intents and purposes, none of this procurement is voluntary. Inductees and some enlistees become gains to the IRR 2 years after being drafted or induced by the draft to enlist and become losses to the IRR generally 5 years after they were drafted or induced by the draft to enlist. Examples of personnel policies and procedures that influence the procurement of personnel for the IRR are the mandatory assignment of personnel who have completed 2 or more years' AD to ARNG/USAR units, the cancellation of that policy and subsequent release from ARNG/USAR units of those who had been mandatorily assigned, and the recently inaugurated program for early release from AD. The nature of the IRR, its composition, and personnel policies and procedures presently preclude any significant influence by other factors such as economic conditions and population variations. There is virtually no reenlistment in the IRR.

#### THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND THE US ARMY RESERVE

##### Active Force Levels

Since World War II (WWII), AD military strength has varied from the post-WWII low of 1,399,000 in 1948, to a Korean War peak of 3,685,000 in 1952, to a post-Korean War low of 2,465,000 in 1960, to a Vietnam conflict peak of 3,548,000 in 1968, and is again being reduced, having reached 2,330,000 on 30 June 71.<sup>3</sup>

Active duty enlisted personnel for fiscal years (FY) 1965-1971 are shown in Table 1-1 for total DOD, USA, US Air Force (USAF), US Navy (USN), and US Marine Corps (USMC).

These active force levels were compared with NPS enlistments and immediate reenlistments. These comparisons are graphically displayed in Figs. 1-4 to 1-9 for the four active Services and their six related Reserve Components. No correlation is apparent between active force levels and either mode of enlisted accession. Active force levels, NPS gains, and reenlistments show a downward trend in the last 2 years in all



Table 1-1

ACTIVE DUTY ENLISTED PERSONNEL<sup>3</sup>  
(Millions)

Year	DOD	USA	USAF	USN	USMC
FY65	2.305	.855	.690	.587	.173
FY66	2.733	1.080	.753	.659	.241
FY67	2.981 <sup>a</sup>	1.297	.759	.664	.262
FY68	3.120 <sup>a</sup>	1.402	.762	.674	.283
FY69	3.028	1.337	.723	.684	.284
FY70	2.651	1.153	.657	.606	.235
FY71	2.330	.972	.625	.542	.191

<sup>a</sup>Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.


cases but three. Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps immediate reenlistments in the RC show an increase from 1970 to 1971. Retention of personnel has been an emphasized goal, and this increase in reenlistments may be due to this effort.

#### Draft Pressure


Selective Service draft calls for the past 22 years are shown in Table 1-2. Graphic analysis (Figs. 1-10 to 1-15) showed no apparent direct correlation between draft calls (FY65-FY71) and NPS gains.

Draft calls or pressure have little relation to reenlistment in the ARNG/USAR. These men have served their legal 6-year obligation and are motivated to reenlist for a variety of other reasons. Greater insight into these motivations is expected from the RAC survey (described in Chap. 5). It was conducted as a part of this study, and polled enlisted personnel in the ARNG/USAR in the sixth year of their initial enlistment.

Intuitively and from personal visits to ARNG/USAR units by investigators on other projects, it was felt that at least the draft pressure should show a considerable direct influence on NPS gain. Past surveys show that a large percentage of men who have enlisted voluntarily in the active forces or the ARNG/USAR were draft motivated. Nonprior service gains do not correlate with draft calls for reasons of policy and procedure, which will be analyzed later in this paper.





a. USA Active Force Levels<sup>3</sup>




b. USAR NPS Enlistments<sup>4</sup> and Immediate Reenlistments<sup>4</sup>

Fig. 1-4—A Comparison of USA Active Force Levels, USAR NPS Enlistments, and USAR Immediate Reenlistments, FY65–FY71




b. ARNG NPS Enlistments<sup>4</sup> and Immediate Reenlistments<sup>4</sup>

Fig. 1-5—A Comparison of USA Active Force Levels, ARNG NPS Enlistments, and ARNG Immediate Reenlistments, FY65–FY71




a. USAF Active Force Levels<sup>3</sup>




b. Air National Guard (ANG) NPS Enlistments<sup>4</sup> and Immediate Reenlistments<sup>4</sup>

Fig. 1-6—A Comparison of USAF Active Force Levels, ANG NPS Enlistments, and ANG Immediate Reenlistments, FY65–FY71




a. USAF Active Forces Levels<sup>3</sup>




b. Air Force Reserve (AFR) NPS Enlistments<sup>4</sup> and Immediate Reenlistments<sup>4</sup>

**Fig. 1-7—A Comparison of USAF Active Force Levels, AFR NPS Enlistments, and AFR Immediate Reenlistments, FY65–FY71**




a. US Navy (USN) Active Force Levels<sup>3</sup>




b. USN Reserve (USNR) NPS Enlistments<sup>4</sup> and Continuous Service Reenlistments<sup>4</sup>

Fig. 1-8—A Comparison of USN Active Force Levels, USNR NPS Enlistments, and USNR Continuous Service Reenlistments, FY65–FY71



a. USMC Active Force Levels<sup>3</sup>



b. USMC Reserve (USMCR) NPS Enlistments<sup>4</sup> and Immediate Reenlistments<sup>4</sup>

Fig. 1-9—A Comparison of USMC Active Force Levels, USMCR NPS Enlistments, and USMCR Immediate Reenlistments, FY65–FY71

Table 1-2  
SELECTIVE SERVICE CALLS, FY50-FY71<sup>3</sup>  
(Thousands)

Year	DOD <sup>a</sup>	USA	USN	USMC
FY50	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
FY51	555.0	555.0	0.0	0.0
FY52	373.4	292.0	0.0	81.4
FY53	523.0	523.0	0.0	0.0
FY54	251.0	251.0	0.0	0.0
FY55	211.0	211.0	0.0	0.0
FY56	136.0	106.0	30.0	0.0
FY57	175.0	175.0	0.0	0.0
FY58	125.0	125.0	0.0	0.0
FY59	109.0	109.0	0.0	0.0
FY60	85.5	85.5	0.0	0.0
FY61	58.0	58.0	0.0	0.0
FY62	147.5	147.5	0.0	0.0
FY63	70.0	70.0	0.0	0.0
FY64	145.0	145.0	0.0	0.0
FY65	102.6	102.6	0.0	0.0
FY66	334.5	312.9	2.6	19.0
FY67	288.9	288.9	0.0	0.0
FY68	343.3	337.4	0.0	5.9
FY69	266.9	254.9	0.0	12.0
FY70	209.3	200.6	0.0	8.7
FY71	152.0	152.0	0.0	0.0

<sup>a</sup>Some inductees served in USN or USAF.






Fig. 1-10—A Comparison of US Selective Service Draft Calls, Army,<sup>3</sup>  
and USAR NPS Enlistments,<sup>4</sup> FY65–FY71




Fig. 1-11—A Comparison of US Selective Service Draft Calls, Army,<sup>3</sup> and ARNG NPS Enlistments,<sup>4</sup> FY65–FY71




Fig. 1-12—A Comparison of US Selective Service Draft Calls, Army,<sup>3</sup>  
and ANG NPS Enlistments,<sup>4</sup> FY65–FY71




Fig. 1-13—A Comparison of US Selective Service Draft Calls, Army,<sup>3</sup>  
and USAFR NPS Enlistments,<sup>4</sup> FY65–FY71




Fig. 1-14—A Comparison of US Selective Service Draft Calls, Army,<sup>3</sup> and USNR NPS Enlistments,<sup>4</sup> FY65–FY71




Fig. 1-15—A Comparison of US Selective Service Draft Calls, Army,<sup>3</sup> and USMCR NPS Enlistments,<sup>4</sup> FY65–FY71

## Population Levels

The influence of population levels on voluntary procurement of personnel in the ARNG/USAR has been outweighed by the other factors that are examined in this paper. Historically the size of the eligible manpower pool has far exceeded the requirements of the ARNG/USAR. As population levels have been high enough to fill all active and reserve needs with draft-eligible men in the period (FY65-FY71) under consideration, they may be said to have influenced procurement.

Some analysis of this demographic factor relevant to ARNG/USAR may be made. Table 1-3 shows estimates of the US population for this period. These values are displayed graphically in Fig. 1-16. As may be observed, they show a steady rise. This rise is predicted to continue through the decade of the 1970's, although at a slower rate of increase. The Bureau of the Census projects a population of over 225 million by 1 Jul 80.<sup>5,6</sup>

The population of males, 17-26 years of age,<sup>5,7,8</sup> is displayed in Table 1-4 and Fig. 1-17. This pool is of especial relevance as it is the manpower pool from which the ARNG/USAR have drawn most of the accessions. This pool is large in relation to other components of total population because of high birthrates in the post-WWII period. This age cohort is also increased by immigration which is dominated by young males. First enlistments into the ARNG/USAR are drawn from this age group. The REP-63 was restricted to this group by Public Law (PL) 88-10.

A large number of men in this pool were not available for recruitment into the ARNG/USAR because they were not qualified physically or mentally for military service or were already serving in the active forces or the ARNG/USAR.

Selective Service System records show that only a small percentage of draft-eligible men are available for the draft at any given time. A representative (June 1971) percentage breakdown of male population by Selective Service classification is shown in Table 1-5. Men in the 1-A and 1-A-0 classification as of 30 Jun 71 total 3,082,317. Of these men, 260,865 are over 26 years old but are still draft liable. The present rate of disqualification is 12.8 percent.<sup>9</sup> Based on these data, approximately 2.4 million or 15 percent of the male population, 18-26 years of age, are available to all the Armed Forces plus a large number of as yet unregistered 17 year olds.

Table 1-3

ESTIMATES OF US POPULATION, FY65-FY71<sup>5,6</sup>  
(Millions)

Year	Total population
FY65	194.2
FY66	196.5
FY67	198.6
FY68	200.6
FY69	202.6
FY70	204.8
FY71	207.0

Table 1-4

ESTIMATES OF US MALE POPULATION, 17-26  
YEARS OF AGE, FY65-FY71<sup>5,7,8</sup>  
(Millions)

Year	Male population
FY65	14.3
FY66	14.9
FY67	15.6
FY68	16.2
FY69	16.7
FY70	17.2
FY71	17.7






Fig. 1-16—Total US Population,<sup>5,6</sup> FY65–FY71




Fig. 1-17—US Male Population, 17-26 Years of Age,<sup>5,7,8</sup> FY65-FY71

Table 1-5

CLASSIFICATION OF SELECTIVE SERVICE REGISTRANTS, JUNE 1971<sup>9</sup>

Classification	Percent
1-A and 1-A-0 <sup>a</sup>	7.3
Not qualified (4-F)	5.4
Overage	45.1
Dependency and other deferments	10.6
Students	4.3
In active forces	5.5
In RC	2.2
Completed service	10.0
Qualified only in emergency	9.5
Aliens not liable	0.1

<sup>a</sup>1-A-0 objectors available for noncombatant service

More men are available for recruitment by the ARNG/USAR at any given time than are available to the active forces through the draft. Nondisabled, honorably discharged PS personnel up to age 55, students, and other draft-deferred persons might be recruited. This indicates that the population group whose level might affect ARNG/USAR voluntary procurement and retention is difficult to define and quantify.

Women in the age group 18-34 are also eligible for ARNG/USAR enlistment. This represents a very large manpower pool that has so far supplied very few to the ARNG/USAR. Social pressure (Women's Lib) and decline in draft pressure may make this population segment a more important accession source. A very small number of PS female personnel has also affiliated with the ARNG/USAR. Women comprise a very sizeable, untapped source of personnel which may be reached by active recruiting and advertising campaigns.

If it can be assumed that a fairly constant percentage of the population (or even a particular age cohort) enlist in the ARNG/USAR if given the opportunity, then, of course, large changes in the population would influence procurement for the ARNG/USAR. Given the historical conditions

of the draft, personnel policies and procedures, and the characteristics of the waiting lists, it is very doubtful that the changes we have experienced in population have had any appreciable influence on procurement of personnel for ARNG/USAR units.

#### Economic Conditions

Although the economic conditions that have a direct bearing on voluntary enlistment and retention are essentially the same for both the RA and the ARNG/USAR, the ways in which they affect the RA and the ARNG/USAR are quite different. Analyses have been made that compare the differences between civilian and military earnings (of groups from different regions, mental categories, and age brackets), pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits of civilian and military life, and the effects of pay and unemployment on enlistment and reenlistment in the Active Army; but few studies have addressed the unique way in which these factors relate to volunteerism in the ARNG/USAR.

A case in point is the relation of earnings and unemployment to enlistment (or reenlistment) in the ARNG/USAR. It has been demonstrated that there was a positive correlation between RA enlistment levels and fluctuations in unemployment rates. This finding was common to the studies of John C. Hause,<sup>10</sup> Alan Fechter,<sup>11</sup> Anthony Fisher,<sup>12</sup> and the Gates Commission.<sup>13</sup> Herman Boland, in his study on the ARNG/USAR,<sup>14</sup> found no parallel correlation for the ARNG/USAR. The reason is that the ARNG/USAR units cannot draw recruits from a universal manpower pool because they are able to recruit only within a limited territorial radius and only to fill specific military occupational specialty (MOS) vacancies in each unit. For example, vacancies in MOS 11B2 in a Boston unit cannot be filled by volunteers from Phoenix unless the recruits can be persuaded to move to Boston. The ARNG/USAR units can only recruit to fill vacancies and, when none exist, are forced to maintain waiting lists. This allows for limited "stockpiling" of manpower by the ARNG/USAR units, so long as those on the list are sufficiently motivated to enlist as soon as vacancies occur (by such compelling forces as the draft, etc.). Department of Defense recruitment policies have placed some restrictions on the effectiveness with which waiting lists can be used insofar as priorities have been established which determine which set of qualifications will govern the enlistment of these people.

In addition to being restricted in their recruiting to MOS vacancies within their total authorized strength levels and to personnel domiciled within 50 miles (or 90 minutes' travel time) from the unit, DOD Directive 1205.14, "Enlistment, Appointment and Assignment of Individuals in Reserve Components (M&RA),"<sup>15</sup> provides that the Secretary of the Army shall prescribe the physical, mental, moral, academic, professional, and age qualifications for appointment of reserve members of the Army. The same DOD Directive establishes the priorities within which assignment of applicants to units of the Ready Reserve normally will be made.

An analysis of meager waiting list histories and fluctuations in regional unemployment levels indicates little significant correlation between the length of waiting lists and levels of unemployment among 17-20 year old males.<sup>16</sup> Although scant waiting list data have been collected, the reasons for this are clear. If the need for gainful employment became so pressing that service in the military becomes an attractive option, there was little incentive for a young man to join an ARNG/USAR unit waiting list. Long queues for future vacant slots mean in most cases that immediate gainful employment could not be found in an ARNG/USAR unit by a 17-20 year old.\* The distinction of age group with regard to this point is important because more than 90 percent of the first-term enlistments into the ARNG/USAR units are in this age group.<sup>16</sup> Those in the 21-26 year old bracket generally have had much better access to unit vacancies because of PS, college degrees, special training, etc. In the final analysis it was unlikely that a 17-20 year old male could gain immediate access to an ARNG/USAR unit which has a waiting list of any substantial length. This was particularly true for 19 year olds since they had the lowest waiting list priority. It was even more true for 19 year olds who were seeking reserve service to avoid induction into the RA.

Because of the scant data available on waiting lists (Table 1-6), a significant correlation between waiting lists and pay levels cannot be

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\* The findings on this subject, although largely deductive, are corroborated by the unit personnel who have been contacted. We believe it imperative that additional data should be gathered by DA to support in-depth study in this area. The waiting list data for this study were compiled by CORC. So far as we are able to determine, these are the best data available on waiting list lengths.

Table 1-6  
WAITING LIST DATA<sup>a</sup>

ARNG		USAR	
Date	Number	Date	Number
31 Dec 69	100,572	30 Jun 69	50,216
31 Dec 70	61,646	30 Apr 71	13,308
31 Mar 71	55,743	31 Jul 71	9,700
30 Jun 71	33,008	30 Sep 71	6,800
30 Sep 71	16,039		

<sup>a</sup>Compiled for this study by the Personnel Division, ORC.

identified. The level of compensation for participating in the ARNG/USAR unit activities was hardly compelling. In 1971, Congress raised military pay [PL 92-129<sup>17</sup> and Executive Order (EO) 11638<sup>18</sup>]. Prior to the increase, the average annual earnings of a reservist in grade E-4 with under 2 years' service were less than \$200 (Table 1-7). Although this is just an average, it appears that this amount did not provide a particularly strong economic incentive. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS),<sup>19</sup> it is less by 33 to 70 percent\* (depending on actual grade and years of service), than the average 17-20 year old could earn in a similar period of time in civilian part-time jobs.

The differential which has existed between civilian and military wages since WWII has been discussed in a number of studies. An interesting insight into the attitude of reservists is obtained by comparing the amount a 17-20 year old could earn up to 1971 by participating in a MUTA-4, pumping gasoline in a Chicago filling station, and the amount of unemployment compensation for which a 17-20 year old male is eligible in the State of Illinois.<sup>20</sup> Unskilled laborers in the City of Chicago were paid an average of \$37.76 for a weekend of work in 1970. This is interesting because if a young man only worked weekends, he would be ill-advised

\*These figures are for calendar year (CY) 1971. Since the recent pay increases, this ratio has dropped to 16 to 39 percent.

Table 1-7

DRILL PAY FOR ONE WEEKEND DRILL  
(MUTA-4)

Pay grade	Longevity	EO 11577 <sup>21</sup> 8 Jan 71	PL 92-129 <sup>17</sup> 28 Sep 71	EO 11638 <sup>18</sup> 22 Dec 71
E-7	Under 2 years	\$53.20	\$59.12	\$63.40
E-6	" " "	45.88	51.04	54.72
E-5	" " "	39.64	44.84	48.08
E-4	" " "	33.32	43.12	46.24
E-3	" " "	24.12	41.48	44.48
E-2	" " "	19.88	39.88	42.76
E-1	" " "	19.16	35.80	38.40
E-1	Under 4 months	17.92	35.80	38.40

to supplant his civilian weekend earnings with the earnings he would receive as a reservist on paid drill status. This was true for several reasons: he would have to leave his domicile for at least 4 months to complete his initial ADT. This alone would preclude him from attending school, pursuing special training, being with his family, etc. In short, it still severely inconveniences him. After completing his training, being placed on paid drill status, and moving back to his domicile, he would have received in 1970 \$19.16 for participating in a MUTA-4. This same young man with no dependents (after having been a full-time employee for the same period of time taken by ADT) would be eligible to collect unemployment compensation of \$42.00 per week for 48 weeks. Even with 2 years' service as a reservist and assuming he has made E-4, the same young man could only have received \$33.32 for a MUTA-4—this was still less than he would receive for pumping gas or collecting unemployment compensation. Although this comparison may not be completely apt and the pay level of reservists has been raised, it is still within reason to suggest that the increased level of pay for reservists is hardly high enough to offset the inconvenience imposed by ADT and a 6-year enlistment obligation.

While the discussion of earnings in previous studies has centered mostly around the RA, it is generally conceded that the pay differential



was more pronounced for reservists than for the RA. Statistics gathered by the Project Talent study,<sup>22</sup> for instance, show that the number of high school graduates who become reservists is small compared to the number who enlist in the RA.<sup>10</sup> Attitude studies have shown that only a small fraction of the high school population who expected to join the reserves actually enlisted in the reserves.<sup>23</sup> The reason given for the change in attitude (which occurred during the senior year of high school) is that between the ages of 17-20 young men become aware of the importance of maximizing their earnings. The differential between military and civilian earnings disillusioned many of these young men who had intended to join the reserves. Economic pressures not felt by most 11th graders surface during the 12th year, when consideration has to be given to the expense involved in obtaining a college education, marrying, moving away from home, operating an automobile.

Other studies show that when given the choice to enlist in active service, be inducted, or enlist in an ARNG/USAR unit, the great preponderance of 17-20 year olds chose enlistment in the RA.<sup>10</sup> The reasons for this phenomenon have been discussed at length in other studies, and there has been general agreement among 17-20 year olds surveyed by those studies that active service is the most satisfactory option, both in terms of direct and imputed economic benefits.<sup>22</sup> For example, the pay of a reservist on AD was the same as that of his RA counterpart. On inactive duty, the reservist received the daily basic RA pay for a single 2- to 4-hour drill period. Special incentive pay (for flying or parachuting, for instance) was paid on the AD daily rate. But occupational differentials such as proficiency pay and variable reenlistment bonuses were not available to reservists.<sup>14</sup>

Since basic pay is only part of full AD compensation, the reservist does not receive a full day's pay for a single drill period. While it may be argued that he should not receive a full day's pay for only 2 to 4 hours of work, participation in drills is generally mandatory, and therefore necessarily prohibits the reservist from earning overtime pay or a full day's pay in a "moonlighting" civilian occupation.

A survey<sup>24</sup> conducted in conjunction with the Gates Commission study supports the observation that there was little or no economic incentive



Table 1-8  
ATTITUDES TOWARD ENLISTMENT<sup>24</sup>

Question - Would you have entered military service if:	Percent answering affirmatively	
	O-2 (1LT)	E-4 (CPL)
No draft?	45	21
Drilling voluntarily?	47	17
Drill pay were one of most significant factors in decision to drill?	50	53
Would not be paid as much in a part-time job?	53	19

for enlisted grade personnel to join or remain in the reserves (Table 1-8). About four-fifths of the E-4 to E-6 personnel in reserve drilling units stated they would not be in the reserves at all if it had not been for the pressure imposed by the draft. Between 75 and 85 percent of those surveyed believed they would have been better compensated for their time in a civilian part-time job. Of those surveyed, 18 percent were college graduates, 78 percent were high school graduates, who enlisted for the sole purpose of acquiring deferment from the draft. This perhaps explains the low motivation expressed by those sampled, and their collective disinterest in drill pay at even present pay levels.

Much additional discussion has been directed to the imputed value of personal services afforded an individual who serves in the RA. While such services as medical, housing, commissary and exchange privileges, social security benefits, and retirement pensions are not altogether absent in the reserves, they have been minimal. In addition, the value of the nonpecuniary services afforded has been perceived by the reservist to be of far lower value than they are estimated to cost.<sup>25</sup> Since the non-pecuniary benefits available to reservists were at best minimal, there seems to be little reason to suppose that they constituted any meaningful economic incentive to enlistment; and combined with relatively low pay levels, the phenomenon of waiting list queues, and the low perceived imputed value of nonpecuniary benefits, it is unlikely that one could

satisfy the requirement for immediate gainful employment by enlisting in the ARNG/USAR.

It is true that there was a positive correlation between regional unemployment levels and reenlistment in the ARNG/USAR. In periods of relatively high unemployment (e.g., the current recession, etc.), the opportunity to reenlist for an additional term of service was an option to which reservists seemed favorably disposed.<sup>3</sup> In order to reenlist, a young man did not have to contend with either waiting lists or suspension of domicile for ADT. If there was reason to doubt that equally suitable or gainful part-time work could be obtained after expiration of term of service (ETS), reenlistment became an option which added continued and significant earnings to a salary obtained from full-time civilian employment. Analysis shows that this correlation was particularly high in regions in which the levels of education, 17-20 year male earnings, and employment were particularly low.\*

Given the choice between reenlistment and similarly rewarding civilian employment, there is every indication that reservists approaching ETS have chosen to allow their service terms to expire and seek employment elsewhere. In the ARNG, only 12.6 percent of the first termers have reenlisted. Approximately 85 percent of the ARNG personnel currently on paid drill status are REP-63 enlistees who for the most part sought service in the reserves as a means of avoiding the draft.<sup>16</sup> The USAR situation is more perilous. The REP personnel comprise 91 percent of USAR units, and the REP reenlistment rate is approximately 4.6 percent.

The most significant incentives for volunteerism in the reserves have not been pecuniary ones. The ARNG/USAR units recruit for specific vacancies, volunteers have had to queue for vacancies, schooling and employment have had to be suspended to meet AD training requirements, drill pay was substantially lower than comparable civilian part-time

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\*The conclusion is drawn as a logical converse to data collected in Altman's study.<sup>16</sup> Since the aversion to the draft and average earnings are lower in the South, it follows that reenlistment rates from low economic areas (such as the South) will be correspondingly higher than for other areas. Enlistment data gathered by DA tend to confirm this observation.<sup>26</sup>

employment and not equal to full duty pay, and the service obligation is 6 years. Given this formidable list of constraints, it is consistent to conclude that RC service has not been particularly compelling as a favorable economic alternative. The fact that young men have continued to volunteer for duty in the ARNG/USAR demonstrates that more significant factors than economic considerations have influenced young men to enlist in the ARNG/USAR. The recent pay raises may change this picture.

#### Personnel Policies and Procedures

Analyses thus far in this paper have discussed the effect of active force levels, draft pressures, population factors, and economic factors on personnel procurement and retention. There was little positive correlation. Most of the fluctuations could be explained by specific changes in personnel policies and procedures to include reorganizations and re-conversions. One of the reasons for the seeming lack of correlation is obviously the complex interaction among all of the factors tending to exert an influence.

Unlike the Active Army where supply and demand interact on a relatively free basis, the ARNG/USAR enlist personnel only to fill vacancies in particular units. The ARNG/USAR unit strengths are limited at a minimum level by average annual strengths mandated by Congress and at a maximum level by Congressional budgetary constraints and a 3 percent managerial overstrength authorized by DOD. This situation appears to have been overlooked in all of the studies researched which concern themselves with the ARNG/USAR. Thus, if we assume an ARNG/USAR unit which is at its authorized strength and therefore has no vacancies, we can hypothesize increasing or decreasing active force levels, population, unemployment, draft calls, or pay by any factor we like, and it can have no direct effect on the NPS enlistments of that unit. As long as the unit has no vacancies, it cannot enlist (except, of course, for small overages allowed because of the need to meet average annual strengths, but even this overage can be considered as a part of authorized strength). Vacancies can occur in any or all of the following ways:

(a) Losses such as death, disability, transfers, retirements, as well as separations of those who have reached the expiration of their term of service or obligation.

(b) A change in the authorized level of the ARNG/USAR. This action of itself may not change the status of any individual unit with respect to vacancies, but generally results in more or fewer units. Thus the ARNG/USAR as a whole may find themselves understrength and then can seek to enlist people or, if the new strength is lower, they find themselves overstrength and must release people. The unit strength, however, in any given unit, is governed by its TOE or TD.

(c) Changes in the TOE or TD of units which may create vacancies or excess personnel. Authorized levels of operation (ALO) may be increased or decreased. In 1968 a decision was made to release personnel with 2 or more years' AD who had been mandatorily assigned to ARNG/USAR units, thus creating many vacancies in the units.

Assuming that vacancies do occur in a unit, how are they filled? Historically, most units have maintained waiting lists from which the required people have been enlisted. Table 1-6 shows the available waiting list data on an overall basis for the ARNG/USAR. This demonstrates that there has been queuing in general although not necessarily for each unit. The amount and distribution of the queuing cannot be determined on any statistically valid basis for the following reasons. Data are not available prior to 1969. Lists are maintained and controlled by each unit with the commander of the unit deciding what controls, if any, he will establish on the length of the list. Each unit's location exerts influences unique to that specific geographical location and population. Any one individual is able to (and has) place himself on several waiting lists concurrently, or can move or die without having his name removed. The strengths of the waiting lists shown in Table 1-6 are only apparent strengths. The true extent of excess supply can be determined only by testing each unit's waiting list, that is, by asking the people on it if they will enlist. General Cantwell, the President of National Guard Association of the United States, reports that as of 30 Jun 71

...the lists, moreover, had become much "softer"— that is, it was necessary to call five, eight, or even 10 persons on the list<sup>27</sup> to obtain one who was actually willing to enlist.

Only if a unit has had no waiting list or had exhausted its waiting list was it necessary for the unit to recruit actively to fill vacancies,

and these occasions have been rare in the last 20 years. It appears, then, that the key to determining what factors have influenced procurement of personnel for the ARNG/USAR lies in the composition and size of the waiting lists and the factors that influence these lists.

Unlike the Active Army, the ARNG/USAR units have a highly localized (geographically) supply and demand situation. If the Active Army requires a certain MOS in one of the units at Ft Hood, Tex., and a qualified individual is willing to enlist in Boston, he can be sent to fill that vacancy at Ft Hood, and because of the size of the Active Army, if there is no such vacancy there, it probably exists or will exist shortly somewhere else. Not so in the ARNG/USAR units. If a vacancy for a certain MOS exists in a unit in Brownwood, Tex., for example, that unit is helped not at all by the fact that there might be a surplus of qualified individuals trying to get into an ARNG/USAR unit in Boston, Mass. If the ARNG/USAR units in Boston have no vacancies, applicants can only go on waiting lists. Admittedly a person could move from Boston to Brownwood in order to fill the vacancy, but this type of move primarily for this reason is obviously very unlikely. Thus we see entirely different supply and demand factors at work in the ARNG/USAR vis-à-vis the Active Army. These factors will, of course, change for both as draft calls reach the zero level.

Active force levels, per se, can exert no direct influence on the ARNG/USAR waiting lists. Changes in active force levels are reflected in changes in other factors which may exert direct influence on the composition and size of the waiting lists, e.g., troop basis changes, draft calls, personnel policies and procedures, unemployment, ARNG/USAR unit call-ups.

Active force levels directly influence PS gains which are a function primarily of active force losses, and also of vacancies and policies which set waiting list priorities. Prior service gains from the active forces averaged 3.2 percent of the total gains of the USAR units from 1965-1970.

As Wool points out in The Military Specialist,<sup>28</sup> in order to analyze the supply of military manpower in the absence of draft pressure, it is necessary to differentiate between involuntary entrants and voluntary

entrants. Involuntary entrants include all those who entered the service only because of the existence of the draft and otherwise would not have done so. Voluntary entrants or "true volunteers" are those who would have entered the service even if no draft law existed. Hause and Fisher<sup>10</sup> recognized that

If a person has a dislike for military service, but is unable (or unwilling) to get himself exempted, one might expect him to attempt to get into the reserves or the National Guard, since most of the reserve programs require only six months of active duty.<sup>10</sup>

The PROVIDE study<sup>29</sup> agreed that

For the last several years, a high draft call condition has provided pressure on draft eligibles to volunteer for service in the Reserve Components. This draft pressure has been significant in motivating young men to serve in the Reserve and resulted in the present high manning levels enjoyed by the Reserve. (U)<sup>29</sup>

(PROVIDE went on to conclude that without the draft, RC strengths probably could not be maintained and that other incentives would be necessary.<sup>30</sup>) Alan Fechter<sup>30</sup> has studied the problem at length with respect to the Active Army and agreed that, for the Active Army, draft pressure was an important enlistment determinant, but he was puzzled by the unusually small enlistment response to changes in draft pressures.

The determination of whether an enlistee was draft motivated or was a "true" volunteer can really only be answered by the enlistee, and even this is not completely reliable. One must suspect the reliability of survey responses to questions of motivation for decisions made months or years in the past. Fisher<sup>12</sup> notes that the draft (as motivation for enlistment) represents a convenient catch-all or excuse "for those who did not attain what they had hoped by enlisting."<sup>12</sup>

The Office of Reserve Components (ORC), in its "Selected Analysis,"<sup>31</sup> reports that, of the 14,488 NPS personnel enlisted during the period 1 Oct 70 to 31 Jan 71, between 1826 and 3748 (13 to 24 percent) were not draft motivated. These figures are based on an analysis of random sequence birthdate groupings to determine the probable true volunteers.<sup>31</sup>

Figures 1-18 to 1-23 illustrate the distribution of NPS enlistments for the various RC according to the random sequence birthdate groupings used by DOD for reporting purposes. Groups are defined as follows:






Fig. 1-18—USAR NPS Enlistments by Random Sequence Birthdate Groupings, FY71<sup>32</sup>




Fig. 1-19—ARNG NPS Enlistments by Random Sequence Birthdate Groupings, FY71<sup>32</sup>






Fig. 1-20—USNR NPS Enlistments by Random Sequence Birthdate Groupings, FY70-FY71 (18 Months)<sup>32</sup>




Fig. 1-21—USMCR NPS Enlistments by Random Sequence Birthdate Groupings, FY71 (Partial)<sup>32</sup>




Fig. 1-22—ANG NPS Enlistments by Random Sequence Birthdate Groupings, FY71<sup>32</sup>




Fig. 1-23—USAFR NPS Enlistments by Random Sequence Birthdate Groupings, FY71<sup>32</sup>

<u>Group</u>	<u>Dates</u>
I	1st - 40th
II	41st - 80th
III	81st - 120th
IV	121st - 160th
V	161st - 200th
VI	201st - 240th
VII	241st - 280th
VIII	281st - 320th
IX	321st - 366th

Figures 1-18 to 1-23, which include data up to 30 Jun 71, show identifiable clustering in these last four groups and, in most cases, in the first four groups. Group V generally does not appear to be identifiable with either cluster. However, Group VI is suspect as being part of the "tailing off" of the curve. If we take then Groups VII, VIII, and IX we find an average value of 379 NPS enlistments for the USAR and of 644 NPS enlistments for the ARNG for each group. Applying these to the total population of NPS enlistments (since lottery numbers are randomly assigned, a fraction of each group would have volunteered even if there had been no draft), we obtain true volunteer rates of 13.5 percent for the USAR and 13.8 percent for the ARNG, which agree very well with the lower estimate (13 percent) of the CORC "Selected Analysis."<sup>31</sup> The numbers may also be significant when applied to the waiting list and appear to be consistent with General Cantwell's<sup>27</sup> comment about having to call "five, eight or even 10 persons on the list to obtain one." It appears that the pressure of the draft has been the motivating factor for some 86 percent of NPS enlistees in the RC. Caution must be exercised, however, in the use of this fraction to project potential numbers of enlistees without the draft.

In summary of the effect of draft pressure on NPS enlistments, there can be little doubt that such pressure has been considerable but not quite in the direct manner imagined by previous researchers who either were unaware of or lost sight of the waiting list phenomenon created by this draft pressure. Thus one can explain why direct comparison of draft calls and NPS enlistments shows no correlation (see p 1-12) and yet there can be so many draft-induced personnel in the RC. The answer, of course, lies

in the need of the RC to have existing vacancies before enlisting personnel and the fact that the direct correlation is really between draft calls and the size and composition of waiting lists.

Although historically there is a lack of correlation between NPS enlistments and economic conditions due to the waiting list phenomenon and other factors which have exerted strong influence, it is likely that, as we approach a zero-draft environment and waiting lists evaporate, economic conditions may become a stronger influence on procurement of ARNG/USAR personnel. However, this is still more likely to be true for the Active Army than for the ARNG/USAR.

It is difficult to imagine any action that could be taken with respect to the ARNG/USAR which would not ultimately be reflected in personnel policies and procedures. All the factors discussed and any other changes or innovations in the reserve system eventually must have an effect on people—the people who comprise the system. To keep this paper within manageable limits, only those major personnel policies and procedures which have had a direct influence on procurement and retention will be discussed in this section.

The impact of reorganizations has been mentioned. From the early 1900's up to WWII, the ARNG/USAR program underwent a major change on an average of every 4 years. Since WWII, changes or attempts at changes have occurred on an average of every 2 years. Table 1-9 lists some of the major measures affecting the ARNG/USAR. An appreciation for the impact of these reorganizations is gained from a statement of the President of the National Guard Association of the United States that

In the period 1946-1970, the Division structure of the ARNG was reduced by 19 and hundreds of non-divisional type units were eliminated, for a net loss in that period of 2,610 units.<sup>33</sup>

The ARNG/USAR are on the verge of another restructuring which will occasion additional turbulence. Conversion to the G/H series TOE has already begun. There will be some Branch changes and changes in missions as well as deletion from and addition to the troop basis. Although reorganizations are a fact of life in the military, with respect to the ARNG/USAR they impact on the individual, on the unit, on the community, and even on local, state, and national politics. Take, for example, a man who

Table 1-9

## MAJOR MEASURES AFFECTING THE RC

Year	Measure
1947	National Security Act
1950	Korean War legislation; calling of National Guard and Organized Reserve
1951	Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951
1952	Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952
1953	National Reserve Plan
1955	Reserve Forces Act of 1955
1958	Changeover to pentomic organization
1962	Reorganization of Reserve Components
1963	Changeover to ROAD organization
1964	Secretary McNamara's plan to merge the National Guard and Organized Reserve
1965	Selected Reserve Force established
1966	HR 17195, "To Strengthen the Reserve Components of the Armed Forces"
1967	PL 90-168 (HR 2) Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act
1968	Vietnam callup, PL 90-486 ("National Guard Technician Act of 1968")
1969	Release of RC units called up in 1968 Elimination of Selected Reserve Force
1971	Conversion to G/H series TOE and changes to RC troop basis

has been in an ARNG field artillery battery for several years, is a chief of section (E-6), has attended schools, is well trained, and hopes to become chief of firing battery (E-7). The DA decides this unit is no longer required in the force structure but that a Quartermaster (QM) Service Company is needed. One need not be surprised that the man will quit instead of converting. This is no reflection on the QM Service Company as the results could well be the same if the situations were inverted.

In FY68 the reorganization resulting from 1967 legislation occasioned a suspension of enlistments until the reorganization was completed. Early in FY69 DOD promulgated a decision that personnel with 2 or more years of active service could not be mandatorily assigned to RC units. Equity then dictated giving the option to be discharged to those who had already been mandatorily assigned to units after having completed 2 or more years of active service. The majority of those eligible opted for discharge, resulting in an increase in the number of vacancies in the units at this time. This in turn triggered increased emphasis on enlistments which is reflected in the upswing in 1969 (Figs. 1-4 to 1-9).

The Active Army program of 60-day early release for ARNG/USAR enlistment procures PS people by offering inductees an early release of 60 days in exchange for at least 1 year in an ARNG/USAR unit. This program has been combined with the 120-day early-release program announced in August 1971 so that CONUS-based inductees can cut their active service by 179 days by exercising this ARNG/USAR option. Initial reports of a test program indicate considerable success.<sup>34</sup>

Personnel policies and procedures influence the voluntary procurement and retention of personnel in the ARNG/USAR. Only a few examples have been presented by way of illustration.

During the course of a series of visits to ARNG/USAR units and numerous interviews with ARNG/USAR unit personnel in conjunction with another project, other influencing factors surfaced as having had effects on procurement and retention. Notable among these are training, logistics, and image. Many people noted the need for and the lack of meaningful mission training. Comments in this area were frequent enough to lead one to believe that the situation has had an adverse effect on retention.



There was general satisfaction tending toward enthusiasm over the virtual flood of standard equipment to eliminate shortages and to replace Contingency and Training equipment. Again, though the satisfaction was not quantitatively measurable, it probably had a favorable effect on retention of personnel.

Interviews and surveys indicate that REP personnel especially do not reenlist because they wanted no part of the military in the first place. Gilbert Youth Survey,<sup>35</sup> September 1971, shows that only 10 percent of civilian youth of the age group 16-21 might join a guard or reserve unit in the absence of a draft.

#### OTHER US ARMED SERVICES

A study was made of available literature and experience of the other Armed Services in the area of procurement and retention in a zero-draft environment. Although this is presently of great concern to the other Services, the area has not been of importance to them in the past. Draft pressure has created an adequate personnel supply for the Navy and Air Force. The Marine Corps has at times resorted to using the draft. The Marine Corps, of course, shares with the Army the image of hazardous combat duty. The RC of the other Services are relatively smaller, share the more favorable image of their parent Services, and attract men with special interests. Most literature available dealing with the RC of the other branches of DOD deals in speculation and unsupported recommendations for the future zero-draft environment. These suggestions duplicate the present Modern Volunteer Army (MVA) concept and programs. All Services appear to be placing a greater emphasis on advertising and recruiting practices.

#### Navy

A priority target is to increase reserve reenlistments. The 2x6 Reserve Program members, who have been referred to as the Navy's draftees, have an historical reenlistment rate of 15 percent. A significant increase to 25 percent was experienced in FY71 as a result of emphasis in the area of retention.

In a memorandum prepared for the DOD recruiting conference, 5-6 Oct 71, the Navy furnished information that was felt to be of interest to the other Services.<sup>36</sup> The findings in the reserve area are as

follows. During the period of no draft beginning 1 Jul 71, initial enlistments in the Naval Reserve have dwindled, and the Navy is only meeting about two-thirds of its requirements to support Selected Reserve (SR) strength at its authorized level. Navy Reserve waiting lists have disappeared in most quality areas. Total SR strength had decreased 6 percent by mid-September. Navy surveys have determined that 75 percent of initial enlistees into the reserve have been draft motivated.

#### Air Force

The Air Force maintains two reserve components—the ANG and the AFR. These components have not yet had major recruiting and retention problems. This appears to be the result of two factors other than the desire to avoid Army draftee status. First, they are relatively small forces. The ANG maintained an average strength of 87,923 in FY71,<sup>37</sup> and the AFR average drill strength was 50,000 for the same period. The second factor is the attractive and unique missions of these Reserve Components. These include such diverse missions as roundtrip airlift to Southeast Asia, 90-day combat duty in the Republic of Vietnam, complete weather service to Active Army and ARNG bases, and airshows performed at fairs and civic events.

Policy changes caused the ANG to experience a serious shortfall in FY70. A low strength posture was brought about by budgetary restrictions which reduced NPS input. This was aggravated by the unexpected early release of a large number of airmen who had served time in a combat zone as a result of a newly established Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy. A very successful effort was launched to maintain an adequate strength level and skilled personnel. The objective of the program, called Try One, was to induce prior active service personnel to enlist in the ANG for 1 year on a trial basis. This 1-year extension also permitted airmen to take advantage of a provision for promotion to Staff Sergeant after 6 years' service. This program was felt to be very successful, recruiting 9843 PS airmen in the last 5 months of FY71. The goal was 10,543 for the entire FY. Within the total were numerically small, but otherwise very significant, gains in recruiting minority group members and women.<sup>38</sup>

In spite of these advantages, the Air Reserve Forces share the same problems as the other Services when faced with a zero-draft environment. General Ryan, in testifying before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations for FY72,<sup>39</sup> said that the winding down of the war in Southeast Asia had

...no apparent effect on recruiting new enlistees in the Guard and Reserve. However, there has been approximately a one-third reduction in waiting list of applicants as the result of agitation created when the draft lottery system was put into effect.

He stated, in response to a question on the effect on the Air Reserve Force of a zero draft,

Draft motivation in the Reserve Forces appears to be greater than for the Active Force. To the extent that it is, the problem of obtaining and maintaining adequate reserve manpower is greater than that facing the Active Force. In addition, we expect that increasing reliance on Reserve units will tend to increase [sic] during the same time frame that draft pressure is declining.<sup>39</sup>

Later he testified that strengths can only be maintained by a continuation of the draft or the substitution of suitable incentive programs.<sup>39</sup>

#### Marine Corps

The Marine Corps Reserve (MCR) is a component tasked with the mission of providing a trained force of units and individuals to meet initial expansion of the Marine Corps in time of war or national emergency. Testimony of Marine General Chapman states that "75 percent of our Reserve accessions were draft motivated."<sup>39</sup> He further states

Sustenance of the MCR will be a problem of major proportions without an extension of the draft. To date the Marine Corps has been unable to identify any reasonable incentives that would provide an acceptable degree of assurance that the manpower requirements of the organized MCR could be satisfied in the absence of the draft.<sup>39</sup>

#### UNITED KINGDOM

##### Basic Organization

The UK Army Reserves are divided into two main elements: individual reservists (called individual reinforcements) and the Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve (TAVR).

The mission of the individual reservists is to bring active units up to full strength. Individual reservists consist of the Regular Army Reserve and the Army General Reserve. Since 1961 the British Army, including its Army Reserves, has been a volunteer army. The Regular Army Reserve is composed of former Regular Army personnel with less than 12 years' active service. A man enlisting in the British Army is required to serve a total of 12 years which may be divided between the Active Army (minimum of 2 years) and the Regular Army Reserve. To this extent service in the Regular Army Reserve might be considered involuntary, but the man who volunteers for the British Army knowingly undertakes this obligation when he voluntarily enlists. The Army General Reserve consists of certain former national servicemen and ex-regulars to whom the National Service Act applies. These men remain in the Army General Reserve until they reach age 45 or until the Act expires. (It has been extended to 30 Jun 74.) The Army General Reserve will eventually be replaced by a Long Term Reserve, which will not begin to build up significantly until the late 1970's and will comprise a pool of men under the age of 45 who have completed their Active Army and Regular Reserve service. No peacetime training is required of the individual reservists. Members of the Regular Army Reserve receive the pay appropriate to their liability for being called out only when "national danger is imminent or a great emergency has arisen and in defense of the UK."

Regular Reserve-Section A is liable to be called out when "warlike operations are in preparation or in progress." Since this is the least urgent of the crisis conditions, members of Section A receive higher pay for their greater liability for recall. Regular Reserve-Section B is liable to be called out only when "national danger is imminent or a great emergency has arisen" (greater crisis urgency than for mobilizing Section A) and therefore receive less pay in peacetime than Section A members. Individual reservists number about 60,000.

The TAVR was formed in 1967 from what was then the Army Emergency Reserve and the Territorial Army. It is composed of units from nearly every regiment and branch of service in the British Army. Some two-thirds of these units are technical or logistics units. It is currently

under expansion, and at presently projected full strength it will consist of some 5700 officers and 68,200 men.<sup>40</sup> Its current strength (June 1971) is about 53,500. Its role is "to provide a national reserve available both for employment on specific tasks at home and overseas and to meet the unexpected when required, and in particular:

(a) To complete the Army Order of Battle of British forces committed to NATO and to provide certain units for the support of NATO headquarters;

(b) To assist in maintaining a secure United Kingdom base in support of forces deployed on the continent of Europe;

(c) To provide a framework for any further expansion of the Reserves."<sup>41</sup>

Applicants for the TAVR may enlist between the ages of 17 and 17½ as young soldiers, or as adult soldiers if over 17½. The upper age limit is variable, depending on the branch of service and any prior military service. The term of initial enlistment is 2, 3, or 4 years, and soldiers may reenlist for further periods of 1, 2, 3, or 4 years. Applicants are usually accepted into the branch of their choice or assigned to the unit which they select within that branch provided there is a vacancy. Once a volunteer is assigned to a unit, he cannot be transferred to another unit without his consent, except when called out for service in an emergency.<sup>42</sup> When fully mobilized the British Army would include about 45 percent reserves.

The attitude of the UK toward its Reserve Forces is summed up in this statement from the 1971 Defence White Paper.

The significance of the Reserve Forces extends far beyond their essential military role. They, and the Cadet Forces, are among the most important of the links between the services and the civil community. From the Services' point of view this brings advantages in terms of recruiting. But that is only part of the benefit: anything that helps to root the Armed Forces more firmly in the wider community, which they exist to serve, is of mutual value.<sup>41</sup>

Contributing to a wider community understanding of the TAVR are regionally located Territorial Auxiliary and Volunteer Reserve Associations (TAVRA). These autonomous and independent associations link the Ministry of Defence, the TAVR units, and the civilian community. The chairman and members of the TAVRA are influential persons in the region

(some must be TAVR members). The major responsibilities of these associations are (a) recruiting and publicity for the TAVR and public relations, (b) liaison with employers, trade unions, and local authorities, and (c) assistance in securing and maintaining home station facilities. A central body known as the Council of TAVRAs acts as coordinating agency between the regional associations and the Ministry of Defence thus bringing to bear a concerted viewpoint. This in no way, however, infringes on the direct access of each association to the Ministry of Defence. The Council of TAVRAs and the TAVRAs are provided with small full-time staffs paid by the Ministry of Defence.

#### Procurement of Personnel

Figure 1-24 shows actual strength of the TAVR and TAVR Establishments from 1965 to 1971. The Establishments represent the legal upper limit of strength imposed by the government. Figure 1-24 does not, however, present the complete picture as to maintenance of TAVR strength because the British also impose a permitted ceiling, data on which are not available. It appears that Establishments are influenced by political, strategic, fiscal, psychological, and other factors while the permitted ceiling is primarily a fiscal limitation, i.e., monies are made available by the Government for strengths only up to this ceiling, somewhat as the US uses a paid drill ceiling. Recognizing that the permitted ceiling curve would most certainly fall between the Establishments and the recruited (actual) strengths curves, the picture of TAVR shortfalls in strength is somewhat improved. One sees from Fig. 1-24 a strong positive correlation between actual strengths and Establishments. By the very nature of the permitted ceilings curve, if it were plotted between the two, there would have to be a good correlation between it and actual strengths. Table 1-10 relates certain policy changes and reorganizations to the curves, and these decisions appear to be logical explanations for trend activity. Figures 1-25 to 1-27 show data for UK population, unemployment, and wage earnings, respectively. There is a distinct lack of correlation between strengths of the TAVR and any of these. With respect to Active Army strengths (Fig. 1-28), the strengths reflect changes in policy and strategy of the incumbent government and thus only indirectly relate to the reserves. Thus we see indications, as in the analysis of the US situation, that






Fig. 1-24—Strengths of the TAVR and TAVR Establishments, 1965–1971<sup>42</sup>

Table 1-10

## TAVR POLICY CHANGES AND REORGANIZATION

Date	Measure
July 1965	Announcement of the disbandment of the Territorial Army (TA) and formation of the TAVR. At this time the Establishment of the TA was 183,987, permitted ceiling was 137,990, and actual strength was 117,000.
April 1967	TAVR formed. Not much information published on future of the TAVR.
June 1967	Establishment of TAVR set at 83,000.
January 1968	Announcement of disbandment of a section of the TAVR (essentially Civil Defense). Losses were held down somewhat by an unusual appeal to the members of the section to continue serving (without pay or allowances) until final intentions were clear.
January 1969	Final intentions made clear and the section of the TAVR was disbanded. Establishment dropped to 61,000.
June 1970	General election. New government and new defense policies emphasizing larger TAVR missions.
December 1970	Announcement of proposed increase in Establishment to 71,500.
June 1971	New Establishment set at 71,500.






Fig. 1-25—Population of the UK, 1965–1970<sup>45</sup>




Fig. 1-26—UK Unemployment Rates, 1965–1969<sup>45</sup>




Fig. 1-27—UK Daily Earnings of Male Adult in Manufacturing  
Compared with TAVR Corporal's Pay, in US Dollars  
1965–1971<sup>42, 45, 46</sup>




Fig. 1-28—UK Active Army Strengths, 1965–1970<sup>43</sup>

policy decisions and reorganizations with respect to the reserves rather than such exogenous factors as population and economic conditions exert the major influences on procurement of personnel. For example, although the TAVR was over 80 percent of its Establishment prior to the increase set in June 1971, it dropped to about two-thirds of its authorized strength solely by virtue of that action.

The British consider that their recruiting for TAVR is continuing at a very satisfactory level but that the rate of outflow militates against a faster build-up in net recruited strength.<sup>43</sup> Figure 1-29 illustrates the intake-outflow situations for various periods during the year ending 31 Mar 71. This presentation from TAVR Magazine<sup>43</sup> is also interesting in that monthly recruiting and loss figures are published in each monthly issue of the magazine thus stimulating competition—not for the same people because of the geographical constraints—but among the commands for best recruiting performance.

Another example of the type of support and emphasis given to the reserves is at Fig. 1-30 which reproduces a message to employers from the UK Secretary of State for Defence.<sup>44</sup> Figure 1-31 is an example of a poster furnished employers who support the TAVR.

Recruiting is accomplished primarily at local unit level but with considerable support from the Active Army and by national advertising campaigns (see Fig. 1-32), and the publishing of attractive and effective brochures at major unit level. Local units use their own devices (and sometimes funds) such as having lotteries for cars, stereos, etc., tickets for which are awarded in proportion to the number of recruits brought in.<sup>46</sup>

Figure 1-33 shows the various pay, bounties, and training allowances payable to TAVR members. A recruit who is required to do 15 days of training in camp (ADT in the US terminology), 16 days out-of-camp training (IDT), and to take a range course can earn some \$200 during the year plus his bounties and allowances. This amount can be increased by voluntary training periods. As in the analysis of the USA RC, it is doubtful that many men join the TAVR solely—or even primarily—for economic benefits. It is interesting to note that when several members of TAVR were recently queried as to how much pay they earned in the TAVR, the general

## EXPANSION: LATEST NEWS

### TAVR—RECRUITING

Strength Increases (+) and Decreases (−) by Commands for the month ending March 31st, 1971.

	<i>Independent Units</i>	<i>Sponsored Units</i>	<i>Totals</i>
Southern	+223	+7	+230
Northern	+ 59	—	+ 59
Western	+124	—	+124
Scotland	+115	—	+115
N. Ireland	— 7	−1	— 8
Women's Services	+ 46	+1	+ 47
	<hr/> +560	<hr/> +7	<hr/> +567

A very good month. We wonder how much of this increased strength was due to the National advertising campaign which took place between February 18th, and March 8th.

Recruited strength and Wastage strength for year ending March 31st, 1971.

	<i>Intake</i>	<i>Outflow</i>	<i>Net</i>
Quarter ending 30.6.70	4531	3372	+1159
Quarter ending 30.9.70	3011	2406	+ 605
Quarter ending 31.12.70	4137	3229	+ 908
Quarter ending 31.3.71	4524	3768	+ 756
	<hr/> Totals 16203	<hr/> 12775	<hr/> +3428

An encouraging result. These figures do not include the recent expansion of the TAVR.

### INTAKE AND OUTFLOW OF TAVR SOLDIERS FOR QUARTER ENDING MARCH 31st, 1971

This quarter is normally the worst for Recruiting during the year. The figures are interesting.

<b>1. Intake of Recruits</b>	..	..	..	..	2636
Other Intake	..	..	..	..	206
					<hr/> 2842
<b>2. Outflow of soldiers</b>					
(a) Finish of engagement	..	..	..	..	993
(b) To Commissions	..	..	..	..	74
(c) Services no longer required	..	..	..	..	1161
(d) At own request	..	..	..	..	253
(e) Enlisted into Regular Army	..	..	..	..	103
(f) Other causes	..	..	..	..	562
					<hr/> 3146
<b>3. Loss over the Quarter</b>	..	..	..	..	304

If only we could reduce the huge figure of discharges under para. 2c the build-up to full establishment would take so much less time to achieve.

*Strength of new units by Associations—next page.*

Fig. 1-29—Reprint of Table on TAVR Recruiting<sup>43</sup>

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# THE RECRUITING AND PUBLICITY CAMPAIGN FOR EXPANSION



## *A Message to Employers from Lord Carrington, Secretary of State for Defence*

The following has been addressed by the Rt Hon Lord Carrington, to leading Employers throughout the country

I AM writing to underline the importance which the Government attach to the Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve—and to ask you to encourage your younger employees to join.

Because of the replacement of the Territorial Army and the Army Emergency Reserve by the TAVR in 1967, and the further reduction in 1968/69, some people are under the impression that the Army no longer has a volunteer reserve of citizen soldiers. This is not the case at all. The TAVR has at present a strength of nearly 50,000 men. It provides well equipped and well trained units ready at short notice to take their place alongside units of the Regular Army should the need arise.

The present units are very largely earmarked for specific tasks in support of NATO, but the Government consider it important that our national reserves should include a number of uncommitted units to meet unexpected tasks. They also believe that there are many people who would be willing to undertake this important form of voluntary service.

They have therefore decided to increase the establishment of the TAVR by some 10,000 men by tapping additional recruiting areas as well as expanding in some existing ones. If your company is a large employer it might be possible for it to form a works

platoon, for example, of a new unit. This is a matter you might wish to consider in conjunction with your local TAVR Association.

The TAVR needs not only to be well recruited but also to be well trained for its important part in our national security arrangements. A key element in this training is the fortnight's Annual Camp. I want therefore to ask you both to encourage people to join the TAVR and to make it as easy as possible for them to attend camp, wherever possible, in addition to having some holiday with their families. I know that this may create difficulties for you, but I am confident that you will make every effort to help, bearing in mind not only the national defence interest but also the fact that training in the TAVR develops qualities of leadership, initiative, responsibility and discipline which are as valuable in civilian as in military life.

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Fig. 1-30—Message to Employers from the UK Secretary of State for Defence <sup>44</sup>



# Territorial Army Volunteer Reserve

## STAFF NOTICE

The Management of this Company wish it to be known that it is their policy to support the T.A.V.R.

Whilst in normal cases they will give every encouragement to those Employees who already are, or wish to become members of the T.A.V.R., they must reserve the right to discourage the enlistment of certain key personnel or of exceptionally large numbers from any particular Department of the Company.

Any employee who is interested in joining the T.A.V.R. and wishes to know the Company attitude towards his proposed enlistment, together with particulars of absence allowed to attend Annual Camp, pay during camp, etc., should apply to:

Below this notice is a list of addresses of T.A.V.R. Units in this area.



Secretary.

join the new  
**'Territorials'**  
Territorial Army Volunteer Reserve

Fig. 1-31—Example of a Poster Furnished Employers Who Support the TAVR



TAVR soldiers trained  
in modern equipment.



It takes skill to drive this  
armoured car. Want to try?




Women are welcomed in  
the TAVR. Susan Abbott,  
24, has trained  
as a radio operator.

Fancy travelling abroad?  
Each year you spend 15 days  
training in camp, and one  
year in three this could  
mean flying to Germany, Cyprus,  
Malta or even further afield.



You'll make new friends  
in the TAVR. This is the Club  
at a typical company HQ.



Plenty of  
opportunities for  
sport in the TAVR.

## These trained soldiers are civilians.

John Burgess, 28, from Bourne-  
mouth, joined as a Private 4 years  
ago. Now he's commissioned  
as a 2nd Lieutenant in the  
39th (City of London) Signal  
Regiment. He works at a  
bank during the week.

When you're in the Territorial & Army Volunteer Reserve you  
lead your civilian life as before. But that's not all.

We train our men in the crafts and expertise of the Professional  
soldier. Our girls learn and practise skills such as nursing,  
communications, catering, clerical duties.

This is because the TAVR operates in support of the  
Regular Army. It's important, rewarding work.

Now we're expanding, and looking for more young people –  
especially if you have trade or technical qualifications – to become  
expert combat men or technicians or specialists.

Whether training at home or overseas, you'll get full Regular Army  
pay and allowances, plus generous cash bonuses every year.

You ought to find out more about the TAVR. Call at your local  
Drill Hall or your nearest Army Careers Information Office. Or post  
the coupon below. (And remember you don't have to live near a  
Drill Hall to do your training.)

# Volunteer for the 'Territorials'



## Find out about the Territorial & Army Volunteer Reserve.

To: Major D. A. Forbes,  
Ministry of Defence,  
(TAVR Publicity), Room 121,  
Lansdowne House, Berkeley  
Square, London W1X 6AA.

Name

Address

Town

County

I am over 17 and interested  
in joining the TAVR.  
Please send me the TAVR  
literature containing full  
information and details  
of how to join.



Fig. 1-32— Reproduction of a National Recruiting Campaign  
Advertisement

# PAY, BOUNTIES AND TRAINING EXPENSE ALLOWANCE

## PAY

When at annual camp, attending a course of instruction or for any complete day's training performed at other times, members of T & AVR receive pay at the Regular Army rate appropriate to their rank and previous full-time service. An increment of 20p a day is payable for men and an increment of 17½p a day is payable for women after four years' service.

### Daily Rates of Pay (minimum)

	Men £	Women £
Private*	2.50	2.15
L/Corporal*	3.05	2.65
Corporal*	3.70	3.20
Sergeant	4.30	3.75
S/Sergeant	4.60	4.00
Warrant Officer II	4.90	4.25
Warrant Officer I	5.15	4.45

Pay is subject to tax.

\*Or equivalent ranks.

## BOUNTIES

### Training Bounty

Members who complete their obligatory annual training and are certified as efficient by their commanding officer will be eligible for a tax-free bounty at the rates set out below.

### Liability Bounty

In recognition of their liability for call-out when warlike operations are in preparation or in progress, members are eligible for additional bounty of £60; £51 for women. (This bounty is taxable.) The bounty is subject to completion of a high proportion of the annual training and to certification of efficiency.

## TRAINING EXPENSE ALLOWANCE

For attendance at voluntary training periods in the evenings, a training expense allowance is payable to cover out-of-pocket expenses at the following rates:

### Expense Allowance

	At least two and under five hours £	At least five and under eight hours £
Officer	0.30	0.54
Sergeants and above	0.24	0.51
Corporals and below	0.21	0.42½

## Boundties

	First and second years of service		Third and fourth years of service		Fifth and subsequent years of service	
	Men £	Women £	Men £	Women £	Men £	Women £
Full training obligation:						
Officers	10.00	8.50	15.00	12.75	20.00	17.00
Soldiers	15.00	12.75	20.00	17.00	25.00	21.25
Lower training obligation:						
Officers	5.00	4.25	8.50	7.25	12.00	10.20
Soldiers	10.00	8.50	13.50	11.50	17.00	14.45

Fig. 1-33—Pay, Bounties, and Training Expense Allowance

Pay rise of 7 percent as of 1 Aug 1971 not included.  
Convert at £1 = \$2.40.

reply was that they did not know. One man explained that he did not care how much he earned because if he did not like what he was doing he wouldn't be there for any amount of pay.<sup>46</sup>

The TAVR also benefits from and participates in the Active Army programs such as "Keep the Army in the Public Eye" (KAPE) and the "Satisfied Soldier Scheme" (SSS). The former is concerned with favorable image building and may send on tour around England a particularly impressive mechanized platoon complete with all of its equipment and which the Army has just brought back from the British Army of the Rhine. It will give demonstrations in market places, universities, stadiums, etc. The SSS may bring back to his home town a particularly impressive soldier to work with the local recruiting sergeant.

#### Retention of Personnel

Despite the rather startling outflow statistics such as appear in Fig. 1-29, little was found to indicate any strong emphasis on reenlistment in the TAVR. The British estimate a loss of some 25 percent of TAVR strength annually (see Fig. 1-29). They estimate that of this percentage some 75 percent is TAVR-induced in that the TAVR no longer wants their services for one reason or another.<sup>46</sup> This is not consistent with the remark at the bottom of Fig. 1-29 which seems to imply a lack of control over those discharges labeled "services no longer required." It has been reported that some junior TAVR officers may not yet realize that times have changed in that TAVR service is not in high demand and that these junior officers may be acting hastily in forcing out those men whose performance is not quite what is expected or because they miss one camp period.<sup>46</sup> The British estimate that of the rest of the 25 percent annual loss, 10 percent eventually show up as gains in other units primarily because of the mobility of the population. Although there are indications of increased emphasis on Active Army reenlistment in order to cut the demand for new recruits from civil life, within the TAVR at least the visible emphasis is on recruiting.

#### Conclusions

The factors that most influence procurement of UK Reserve personnel appear to be policy and strategy decisions.

The British emphasis on recruitment programs for junior soldiers (age 15-17) and young soldiers (age 17) as well as their Cadet Forces program has had significant results in increasing strengths.

The British KAPE and SSS programs appear to be successful in recruiting for both the Active Army and the TAVR.

The British do not use any special incentives or inducements such as bonuses for enlistment or reenlistment.

## CANADA

### Missions

The primary mission of the Canadian Army Reserves is to augment and reinforce the regular land forces. The secondary mission is to assist in developing a training base during an extended emergency.

### Basic Organization and Employment

The Canadian Armed Forces represent the unification into a single service of what was formerly the Army, Navy, and Air Force. For the purposes of this paper the term, Army, has been retained as a matter of simplicity and clarity. The Militia is divided into units and two manpower pools. There are 87 major (generally, battalion) and 59 minor (company or detachment) units, all but 11 of which are assigned to and augment the Mobile Command, the major Canadian land combat force. Eleven communication units are assigned to the Communications Command. The total actual reserve strength is about 20,000, although the approved required (establishment) strength is slightly higher (23,333). One manpower pool (Ready Reserve) consists of about 1000 men with mobilization assignments to fill vacancies in static headquarters, depots, and units. The second manpower pool (Supplementary Reserve List) consists of a small number of men with prior training in the regular and reserve forces who are inactive but subject to call in an emergency. They have no peacetime obligation. The current Canadian Militia organization is the result of a severe reduction in force resulting from recently (1968-1969) redefined national military roles and consequent reductions in the budget support of military forces. On full mobilization the reserves would be about 33 percent of the Canadian land forces.

## Procurement

Service in both the Canadian regular land forces and in the Militia is strictly voluntary. The Militia is recruited from regimental and high school cadet corps, student militia courses, the Regular Army, and the general public. Enlistment is for 3 years. The minimum age is 17. The maximum age varies with the individual's qualifications and the mandatory retirement age for the grade or rank awarded. Personnel transferring from the Regular Army are generally considered qualified for one rank higher than that held on AD.

Figure 1-34 shows Canadian Militia strengths from 1965, and Fig. 1-35 shows the strengths of the land component of the Canadian Armed Forces (Army before the unification). The downward slopes of both reflect the reductions in force resulting from policy decisions that have continued to reduce the budget support for all of the armed forces. In 1968, for example, the Canadian Government redefined its national military roles in such a way that the armed forces could be further reduced and budget savings effected. Thus it was not the Active Army levels that primarily affected the Militia levels, but both levels were the results of policy decisions. Figures 1-36, 1-37, and 1-38 show population, earnings, and unemployment data. It is likely that the rising population and high unemployment rates have had some favorable effect on Militia procurement, while steeply rising wages in the civilian sector tend to be an unfavorable factor. However none of these factors appears to have exerted as much influence on procurement of personnel as the policy decisions already discussed.

Recruiting is primarily the responsibility of the Militia units, and personal contact is the predominant method used. There is no special provision or organization for recruiters in the reserves, and commanding officers are expected to use the best suited unit personnel for this purpose. Units are allowed some flexibility in manning based on their recruiting results. For example, units with a high recruiting rate may be authorized to have additional personnel above the normal paid drill ceiling strength and are encouraged to recruit for additional sub-units to compensate for those units which may be unable to recruit to their paid drill ceiling strength.






Fig. 1-34—Canadian Militia Strengths, 1965–1971<sup>47</sup>




Fig. 1-35—Canadian Active Army Strengths, 1965–1970<sup>47</sup>




Fig. 1-36—Population of Canada, 1965–1970<sup>45</sup>






Fig. 1-37—Canadian Average Daily Earnings of Civilians in Manufacturing Compared with Corporal's Pay, in Canadian Dollars, 1965-1971<sup>45,48</sup>




Fig. 1-38—Canadian Unemployment Rates, 1965–1970<sup>45</sup>

Historically Canada has had few problems in recruitment for the Militia—at least until very recently. There has been a long tradition of many volunteers for militia service, including the maintaining of family militia ties for several generations. Additionally the greatly reduced strength requirements have alleviated the need for any extraordinary measures to obtain the required accessions.

The Canadians have, in the past, made extensive use of educational benefits as an incentive for both enlistment and reenlistment in the Militia. They would send a man to a full-time Regular Army trade school or even to the US for full-time training to learn his trade (skilled MOS) in exchange for a service commitment. This proved to be especially effective in periods of high unemployment. The program has been dropped because the inducement was no longer needed and because other programs have been adopted to fill the educational gaps. There are no special recruiting inducements at this time, and no funds are committed to media advertising for the reserves. Consideration is being given to the development of a recruiting brochure. The Canadians are currently producing a 20-minute color information (vis-à-vis recruiting) film on the Canadian Forces Reserves for TV and public showing.

Next to the personal contact of unit personnel, the main source of recruits for the Militia has been the Summer Student Program. This annual program provides high school students with summer work and training in the Militia. The prospect of summer employment for high school students has high appeal for them. The Canadians have also emphasized with considerable success their cadet program, parts of which appear to parallel the US Junior Reserve Officers' Training Program (ROTC).

A Canadian Militia survey conducted in April 1971 indicates three main reasons for joining were:

- (a) Physical and mental involvement and challenge
- (b) Pay and employment
- (c) Regimental/unit comradeship.

The Canadians perceive their major problems in obtaining enlistments to be:

- (a) Lack of appeal or public motivation (the Canadians have found that especially in highly developed urban and suburban areas the proliferation of educational, social, and recreational activities is a

strong competitor for the free time that otherwise might be devoted to Militia activities).

(b) Lack of public awareness of reserves, their role, and activities.

(c) Preconceived fear of military regulations and discipline.

(d) Low military pay (the Canadians have very recently announced an increase).

#### Retention

Reenlistments are considered low in the corporal/private ranks as many individuals leave for higher education at this juncture. The Canadians are seeking inducements such as a bonus system but expect that there is no easy answer to this problem. Other major problems in obtaining reenlistments appear to be the low military pay (which is being increased) and the limited challenge or interest after completion of recruit and trades' training.

#### Conclusions

It was not possible to determine the influence of specific factors on enlistment and reenlistment other than as noted previously because the Canadian Mobile Command Headquarters reports that the enlistment and reenlistment experience is not known. Enrollment records are decentralized to Militia Area Headquarters who retain the data, and, since the system is manual, retrieval is considered to be difficult.

Canada has many of the same problems that face the US in a zero-draft environment, e.g., image, pay, competition for free time, and the lack of a continuously challenging program.

The Canadian emphasis on, and success in, the high school cadet and summer student programs are noteworthy and may indicate the desirability of increased emphasis on and/or reorientation of the US Junior ROTC program toward RC enlistment.

The one-grade increase generally given personnel transferring from the Regular Army may be an attractive incentive for adaptation to the USA RC.

### AUSTRALIA

#### Problem

A review of the experience gained in the Australian Army Reserves

with respect to the procurement and retention of personnel resulted in the following conclusions:

Australia's return to the draft in 1965 was occasioned by a reassessment of its defense needs and an unsatisfactory response to recruitment for voluntary enlistment in the Army.

The draft has had a direct effect on enlistments in the Active Citizen Military Force but to a much lesser degree than in the US.

The influence of major, strategic policy decisions on procurement and retention of personnel is considerably greater than is the influence of such exogenous factors as population and economic conditions.

Australia offers no special monetary inducements for enlistment or reenlistment in its reserves.

The Australian volunteer is motivated to join the Active Citizen Military Force by patriotism, adventurism, and most likely, other factors, but money does not seem to be a primary motivating factor.

#### CONCLUSIONS

The significant conclusions of Phase I, Task 1 of this study are:

1. Historically the most important influence on procurement and retention of personnel in the RC has been exerted by policy decisions such as those which establish new strengths and new structures as well as those which result in changed personnel policies and procedures.

2. The influence of active force levels, draft pressure, population levels, and economic conditions on enlistment and reenlistment in the RC could not be measured quantitatively because their influence is on the waiting lists and not directly on the enlistments and reenlistments. Waiting list data prior to 1969 are not available.

3. Sufficient evidence exists to indicate that the draft has exerted significant influence on the size and responsiveness of the waiting lists. As of 30 Sep 71 the ARNG list was at 16 percent of its 1969 level, and the USAR list was at 13.5 percent of its 1969 level. As draft calls have been reduced, the supply has diminished while the demand has remained relatively constant. Moreover, the elimination of much of the uncertainty in a potential recruit's mind by introduction of the lottery system has further served to reduce the supply. As a result of the

consumption of the excess supply in the waiting lists, the RC have begun to drop below the required strength levels.

4. Active force levels exert little direct influence on procurement and retention of RC personnel but become catalysts to such actions as troop basis changes, changes in draft calls, and new personnel policies and procedures which may affect the waiting lists.

5. The changes the US has experienced in population have had no appreciable influence on the procurement or retention of personnel for the RC or on the waiting lists, since the theoretical supply always has far exceeded the demand and the draft has been an impetus for actual supply.

6. Although there is a positive correlation between regional unemployment and reenlistment in the RC, generally economic conditions have exerted little influence on the procurement and retention of personnel or on the waiting lists in comparison with the pressures exerted on the supply of personnel to meet the personnel demands of the RC.

7. The RC of the other Services have been subject to many of the same conditions as the USA RC, i.e., same economic conditions, same population levels, generally the same fluctuations in active force levels, and similar personnel policies usually resulting from the same major defense decisions. Draft pressures have had similar effects on the waiting lists of the RC of the other US Armed Services. In general, the experience of the RC of the other Services parallels that of the USA RC including current deterioration of waiting lists.

8. The dominant factors influencing procurement and retention of personnel in the Reserve Components of the UK, Canada, and Australia are policy decisions affecting strengths and structures. These countries face many of the same problems that face the USA such as low pay, unattractive image, and antipathy toward military service.

9. Not directly related to any specific task requirement but certainly a major conclusion of this study is the need for a comprehensive, uniform system for the collection, collation, and presentation of statistical data and other information (such as indirect attitudes) bearing on procurement and retention of RC personnel. Ideally, this coordinated system should be established by DOD so that all the Armed Services are reporting and using correlatable data and definitions. Research was

hampered by the lack of reliable data and by inconsistency of data among components and services in such areas as reenlistments, waiting lists, age distributions, numbers and dates of ETS, and attrition factors.

Chapter 2  
A REVIEW OF RECENTLY COMPLETED AND ONGOING STUDIES  
OF ARMY PERSONNEL PROCUREMENT AND RETENTION  
IN A VOLUNTEER ENVIRONMENT (TASK 2)

INTRODUCTION

As a part of the initial phase of the study, "Maintenance of Reserve Components in a Volunteer Environment," the findings of recently completed studies of personnel procurement and retention in the Active Army and RC in a volunteer environment have been reviewed and analyzed (Table 2-1). This is in response to Phase I, Task 2, which is:

Review and analyze the findings of recently completed or underway studies of personnel procurement and retention in the Active Army and RC in a volunteer environment.<sup>1</sup>

No ongoing or planned studies bearing exclusively on the problems of personnel recruitment and retention in the ARNG/USAR have been identified. A large number of planned and ongoing studies relative to the MVA concept addressed to Active Army may be valuable to RC. Abstracts of these studies may be found in the "Evaluation Plan for Modern Volunteer Army Program,"<sup>49</sup> containing a collection and review of all civilian and military ongoing and completed studies on projects related to MVA programs.

Reviews of nine studies or reports, in chronological order of their publication, are presented in the succeeding sections. The findings and recommendations of these documents are presented in Annex A1. Annex A2 presents findings of reports other than the nine reviewed in this chapter.

THE GATES COMMISSION REPORT

"The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force"<sup>50</sup> was published in February 1970. Popularly known as the Gates Commission Report (or Gates Report), it presents the major questions and



Table 2-1

STUDIES REVIEWED AND ANALYZED FOR FINDINGS ON  
RESERVE COMPONENTS IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ENVIRONMENT

Study <sup>a</sup>	Service coverage	Component coverage	Originating organization	Date of publication	Bibliographic reference
Gates Report	DOD	Active and Reserve	Presidential Commission	Feb 70	50
Recruitment and Retention Study	Army	Reserve	CORC	Feb 70	51
PROVIDE	Army	Active and Reserve	DA	Mar 70	29
CSM 70-150 Study	Army	Reserve	CORC	Jun 70	52
IRR, Phase I	Army	Individual	CAR	Jan 71	53
IRR, Phase II		Ready Reserve		May 71	54
GARPEG	DOD	Reserve	ODASD (RA)	May 71	55
Selected Analysis	Army	USAR and ARNG (units)	CORC	Jun 71	56
House Committee on Armed Services Hearings	DOD	Reserve	OASD (M&RA)	Jul 71	39
Gilbert Youth Survey	DOD, civilian	Active and Reserve	OASD (M&RA)	Sep 71	35

<sup>a</sup> Complete identification of documents in References.

and considerations of relevance to an all-volunteer force. It addresses itself to both active and RC of all US Armed Services. The Gates Commission Report also presents the pertinent evidence gathered during its inquiry and the analysis underlying its recommendations. The summary volume is documented and supported by the two volume "Studies Prepared for the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force,"<sup>13</sup> published in November 1970. The Commission recommends a return to an all-volunteer force, and its major conclusions take the form of three proposals to achieve such a force. They are as follows:

1. Raise the average level of basic pay for military personnel (officer and enlisted) in the first 2 years of service.
2. Make comprehensive improvements in conditions of military service and in recruiting.
3. Establish a standby draft system by 30 Jun 71.

The average level of basic pay has been raised to that recommended by the Gates Commission by action of the 92d Congress in 1971.

The second recommendation encompasses many improvements to quality of life in or conditions of military service and better recruitment practices. The concept of the MVA and its implementation are fulfilling many of these. They are included in Annex A1, Table A1-1, which compares major study findings reviewed in this chapter.

Acceptance of the third recommendation, a standby draft system, has been delayed by the action of the 92d Congress to extend the draft until 1 Jul 73. There is still question as to whether an all-volunteer force, the Gates Commission's major recommendation, will provide personnel to equal DOD strength levels for the proposed force structure by the end of FY73. If draft calls continue at a low level, enlistment and reenlistment rates in the coming months could provide a good indication of the probability of maintaining the Army's required strength with volunteers and a standby draft.

Of particular interest is Chap. 9, Reserves. This chapter is addressed to the RC and their special problems. Analysis of these problems was severely hampered by a lack of data at the time the Gates Commission study was conducted. Only one recommendation is made in the reserve area—a proposed pay increase. It is further stated that additional

steps should await the results of experience with higher pay during the next few years. The total that this would add to the DOD annual budget is estimated to be \$150 million. The Gates Commission feels, perhaps optimistically, that RC strength can be maintained with volunteers in a no-draft environment.

#### RETENTION AND RECRUITMENT STUDY

The "Retention and Recruitment (R&R) Study,"<sup>51</sup> February 1970, is the report of the findings of a task group formed by CORC in October 1969 to examine the reasons why the RC were not retaining or attracting personnel. Two surveys (questionnaires) solicited written comments and field trips for in-person interviews and investigation provided data that were analyzed for current motivations and attitudes. The task group addressed itself primarily to personnel in grades E-4 to E-6 and O-1 to O-3. Special note was made of the responses of minority group members in these grades.

The recommendations are, in the words of the report, people oriented. They are made with the intent to attract recruits and retain personnel without regard to expense or practicality of the proposal. As a result of their research, the task group found the following to be "the distillation of what today's unit member feels is desirable." There are a total of 54 recommendations. They range from the frequently recommended (e.g., "re-up" bonus) to the unique (e.g., suggested changes to the RC briefing, AR 635-10, made to men leaving the Active Army). These proposals are grouped in 10 major areas of concern and discussed in depth in separate chapters of the report. With pertinent subheads, these areas (chapters) are shown in Table 2-2.

Among the findings reported in the R&R study is an area of especial relevance to the current RAC study of which this analysis is a task. As a part of the current (FY72) study, a survey is being made to determine present motivations and attractiveness of various incentive packages. Personnel in their sixth year of service are being polled, and among other questions they are asked to rank a number of incentives in order of attractiveness to them and to compose an incentive package of the three most likely to cause them to reenlist.

Table 2-2

AREAS OF CONCERN IN THE R&R STUDY<sup>51</sup>

Chapter	Title	Subheads
1	Current Transfer Activity on RC Procedures	Transfer Processing Shortcomings
2	Benefits That Accrue for RC Participation	Drill Pay Retirement Plan Medical Benefits Post Exchange/Commissary Benefits
3	Desired Benefits	Reenlistment Bonus GI Educational Bill Faster Promotion System Servicemen's Group Life Insurance USAR School Pay
4	Current Retention Programs in RC	Performance Counseling Equipment Impact on Retention
5	Family Support of Unit Activities and Unit Level Auxiliaries	
6	Current Recruitment Programs for NPS Personnel	Sociopolitical Factors
7	Community Recognition of RC Activities	
8	Current Information Programs Developed by the RC	
9	Minority Group Participation	
10	Other Factors Influencing Recruitment and Retention	Morale Factors Training Factors

In the R&R study, a similar approach was used. At that time (FY70) respondents in the more comprehensive population surveyed were asked to select three choices, in order of preference, from a list of 10 proposed incentives. The results of the total group choice of the most desirable incentives in order of preference are:

Rank	Incentive
1	Reenlistment bonus (\$400.00)
2	Modified GI educational bill
3	More liberal promotion policy
4	Full use of PX and commissary
5	Earlier retirement benefits
6	Proficiency pay
7	Credit for all points earned
8	Improved survivor benefits
9	Servicemen's group life insurance
10	Pay for attendance at USAR schools

These results may be compared with the RAC survey. The response to these incentives is discussed in detail in Chaps. 2 and 3 of the R&R study. Another comparison might also be made of factors mentioned when those surveyed were invited to give their own suggestions for incentives or improvements. In the R&R study this discussion is found in Chap. 10.

Most of the 54 recommendations are included in Annex A1, Table A1-1. A few of the very specific suggestions, such as preparing a brochure for recruiting purposes, have been combined under more general area headings. In the case of the example, this was considered part of improved recruiting practices.

#### PROJECT VOLUNTEER IN DEFENSE OF THE NATION

Project Volunteer in Defense of the Nation (PROVIDE)<sup>29</sup> was the DA analysis of the all-volunteer Army, both active and reserve components. The report of the study was published in two volumes in March 1970. Volume I is an executive summary which presents all the recommendations of the PROVIDE study group and a brief summary of each of the 15 chapters

contained in Vol II, "Supporting Analysis,"<sup>29</sup> a SECRET classified document containing a complete discussion of areas of interest.

As in the report of the Gates Commission, there are three major recommendations, and they are similar in presentation and scope. The first finding is to affirm support of a peacetime all-volunteer concept in principle. The second is to support retention of draft legislation and machinery for use under emergency conditions. The third recommendation is to accomplish transition to an all-volunteer force in three phases, with many suggestions for implementing each phase.

Phase I, with 24 implementations, advised the "Early development and implementation of programs and/or policies designed to enhance service attractiveness and reduce reliance on the draft without requiring additional direct costs of legislative action."

Phase II expands this proposal to include those programs considered essential to attain an all-volunteer Army which require legislative and/or budgetary action. Thirty-three recommendations are made to achieve the Phase II program.

The final phase, Phase III, is described as "deferred actions outside current budgetary and legislative constraints to be examined for implementation in the event Phases I and II fail to provide the quantity and quality of personnel required. Priority of implementation should be given to those actions which will produce the maximum yield for minimum cost." Five such implementations are listed.

The total number of suggestions for accomplishing the three phases is 62. These have been included in Annex A1, Table A1-1.

Chapter topics in the classified Vol II are listed, as follows:

- Chapter 1. Introduction
- Chapter 2. Image of the Army
- Chapter 3. Foreign Experience with Volunteer Armies
- Chapter 4. Force Considerations
- Chapter 5. Capability of Meeting Manpower Requirements without the Draft
- Chapter 6. Recruitment to Meet Manpower Requirements
- Chapter 7. Increased Use of Civilians to Meet Manpower Requirements

Chapter 8. The Use of Indigenous Forces by the United States Army

Chapter 9. Increased Use of Uniformed Women

Chapter 10. Military Compensation

Chapter 11. Incentives and Benefits Other than Pay

Chapter 12. Capability of Maintaining Reserve and National Guard  
Forces at Required Levels

Chapter 13. Medical and Dental Officers

Chapter 14. Attainment of an All-Volunteer Army

Chapter 15. Implications for the Future

Chapter 12 contains the discussion and background most valuable to CORC and the present RAC study. Twelve specific incentive proposals are made with justification, advantages, and disadvantages of each.

The PROVIDE study group concludes that:

1. Without a draft RC strengths may fall below acceptable levels and incentives will be necessary.
2. Personnel turbulence will decrease in an incentive-motivated RC.
3. Approved incentives must be available concurrently with draft phasedown to avoid an initial drop in strength.
4. Existing obligations and penalties should be maintained during draft phasedown.

Estimated costs of the PROVIDE recommendations for four RC force levels are included.

#### FUTURE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ENVIRONMENT

In June 1970, a study group tasked with forecasting the future of the RC published their report, "Future of the Reserve Components in an All-Volunteer Environment,"<sup>52</sup> otherwise known as the CSM 70-150 Study. This study group was composed of three officers each from the ARNG and the USAR. The specific problem they were to consider was "Can the RC recruit, train, and equip a force of 660,000 in troop program units and an IRR of approximately 600,000 with an acceptable readiness capability in a zero-draft environment?"

Meetings and discussions were held with a large number of individuals, and existing reports were analyzed. The group focused on problems and inadequacies in the program that they identified as falling into five general areas as follows:



1. The problem of image
2. Management of the Army RC
3. Recruiting in an all-volunteer environment
4. The IRR
5. Problems relating to unit training, equipment, facilities, and maintenance

Specific recommendations (24) have been made to solve or alleviate problems in each of these areas. They are found in Annex A1, Table A1-1. Recognizing that although shortfalls may exist in a zero-draft environment, they do not recommend a direct draft into the RC.

This study group isolated the following incentives as having the greatest potential for recruitment and retention.

1. Educational benefits
2. Flexible reenlistment payments
3. Improvements to retirement system
4. SGLI
5. Increased pay (lower grades)

#### THE INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE STUDY

The IRR Study is a report in two volumes of the two phases, containing the effort and findings of a study group specifically tasked with the problem, "How can the strength of the IRR be maintained at prescribed qualitative and quantitative levels within a MVA concept?" The Phase I report was published in January 1971<sup>53</sup> and the Phase II in May 1971.<sup>54</sup>

The Phase I task group addressed itself to determining the IRR requirement in the Army Force Structure, the sources of personnel procurement, the administration of the IRR, incentive proposals, and alternative courses of action available in planning for implementation of the MVA.

Listed sources of supportive material are briefings to panel, reviews of previous studies, data, and independent research. The primary tool of the independent research was a survey of 8400 enlisted IRR personnel, conducted to evaluate the potential effectiveness of incentives. Based on this survey, the panel concluded that

1. Twenty-three percent of presently enlisted men will reenlist for appropriate incentives.



2. The incentives with the greatest appeal are a cash reenlistment bonus, increased educational benefits, life insurance benefits, and promotion opportunities.

3. The majority eligible for military service cannot be expected to enlist in the IRR voluntarily without substantial incentives.

The conclusions of IRR Study, Phase I, are

1. The MVA concept requires an IRR of substantial size.

2. The present emoluments of IRR membership are inadequate in a volunteer environment.

3. Twenty-three incentives which have potential to attract IRR members have been identified and should be considered.

4. These incentives have varying appeal and cost.

5. The incentives with greatest appeal are those oriented to immediate and future financial gain.

6. The effectiveness of the incentives will depend in part on a positive, high quality image of the Active Army and RC.

7. The evidence of adequacy of the incentives is inconclusive, but it is reasonable to assume that adoption of the SGLI incentive with a \$200/year reenlistment bonus would provide a 23 percent annual retention rate in the enlisted IRR which would come close to maintaining the 650,000 force level in the time frame 1973-1978.

8. Incentives adopted for IRR must be available to RC unit members also, thus increasing the cost.

The recommendations of IRR Study, Phase I, are

1. That there be further evaluation of effectiveness and cost of each incentive.

2. That consideration in depth be given to alternatives to a volunteer concept.

The 23 incentives have been included in Annex A1, Table A1-1.

The IRR Phase II study group continued the work of Phase I with the additional task of establishing a final OCAR position on the viability of the IRR in a zero-draft environment and the cost of achieving this position. Among the assumptions made by both IRR study groups was one of particular interest. It is, "With present accession and loss rates, the enlisted IRR will be at virtually zero-strength 6 years after

termination of the draft." Phase II pinpointed four problem areas in maintaining a viable IRR—administration, training, recruiting, and retention. The study group concentrated almost exclusively on recruiting and retention. As in Phase I, the primary research tool was the attitudinal survey. In addition to the IRR (polled in Phase I), sample populations of the USAR, Active Army, Junior ROTC, and the general public were surveyed. Copies of the questionnaires, a description of the survey method, and an analysis of the response are contained in the IRR Study, Phase II. Information sought related primarily to intention to enlist in the IRR and the attractiveness of different incentive packages. Computations are made of the cost and cost effectiveness of incentives. Projections of strength, cost, and cost avoidance through FY80 are also displayed.

Based on data developed in the survey effort, cost computations, and projections, the Phase II study group has made seven general conclusions and five recommendations.

The conclusions of IRR Study, Phase II, are

1. Maintenance of the IRR at a strength of 650,000 is not feasible at a reasonable expenditure in the MVA environment.
2. Survey results indicate that cash incentives (e.g., "re-up" bonus or educational benefits) reach a point of diminishing returns at the level of \$200-\$300/year. Any further increase in incentives offered will disproportionately increase costs for PS personnel; there is no increase in offsetting savings.
3. In the interest of maintaining unit strength, higher incentives must be offered for continued unit service than for enlistment in IRR. This will probably deflect PS accessions that the IRR might otherwise realize.
4. Higher incentive expenditures might increase IRR enlistments from other source populations.
5. The proposed USAR recruiting organization, appropriately adjusted, is considered sound, practical, and economical.
6. Incentive options are desirable that substitute bonuses or educational assistance for the fringe benefit packages at approximately equal cost.

7. The success of the USAR recruiting and retention effort will depend upon the public's attitude toward military service in general and the RC in particular.

The recommendations of IRR Study, Phase II, are

1. The substance and conclusions of this study should be used to assist in other studies of the Army RC in the MVA environment.

2. A survey tracking procedure of the magnitude and diversity of the Phase II effort, plus public opinion research, should be initiated to monitor, at least annually, changing sociological conditions. This effort should be oriented exclusively toward the RC.

3. Regardless of the means used to maintain the IRR:

a. The name should be changed to one with more popular appeal.

b. The benefits included in the cost effective package identified in this report should be authorized immediately for all IRR and other USAR personnel.

c. Increased opportunities for participation, promotion, training and earning of retirement points should be made available immediately to IRR members.

d. Incentive options should be developed that provide bonuses or educational assistance at equivalent cost (\$200-\$250).

4. A separate recruiting organization should be established for the USAR.

5. The present public relations campaign exclusively devoted to informing young people of the advantages of USAR service should be continued and intensified.

The cost effective incentive package identified by this group is the fringe benefits package which includes the \$1250 per year income tax exemption, SGLI, and retirement at age 50. Cost effectiveness analysis has been made for the following incentives singly: \$300 re-up plus \$200 annual bonuses, \$1250 tax exemption, SGLI, retirement at 50, and educational benefits equal to \$300 for reenlistment plus \$200 per year of enlistment. Cost effectiveness has also been computed for the following incentives packages: \$300/\$200 bonuses plus fringe benefits (as defined previously), \$300/\$200 educational benefits plus fringe benefits, and fringe benefits only.

## RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GUARD AND RESERVE PROGRAM EVALUATION GROUP

A Guard and Reserve Program Evaluation Group (GARPEG) was formed in May 1971 by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Resource Analysis [ODASD (RA)], with representation from all Services. The group considered 14 major incentive proposals and produced committee positions on these as guidance to the Project Volunteer Committee. A complete report with supporting documentation was not available so the recommendations of the GARPEG group<sup>55</sup> in tabular form (reproduced in Table 2-3) were used for this comparative analysis. The findings are included in Annex A1, Table A1-1.

## SELECTED ANALYSIS

In response to memoranda (CSM 71-66<sup>56</sup> and CSM 71-192<sup>57</sup>) from the Chief of Staff, Army, CORC made an analysis of RC in a volunteer environment. Their report, "Reserve Components (RC) in a Volunteer Environment Analysis,"<sup>58</sup> was made in June 1971. The objective of the analysis was to develop a program for procurement and retention of the Army RC personnel. The scope and thoroughness of this study make it the one of major importance at present, and its findings should be considered as the starting point for new studies on this problem. Inputs to "Selected Analysis" were the information and conclusions developed in previous studies, current statistics and experience factors, and results of opinion surveys and reports from RC units and organizations. The IRR was not covered in this report since the IRR Phase II study was considered to be complementary. A discussion of the impact of zero draft upon the RC is included as part of the analysis.

Eighteen proposed recruiting and retention incentives or programs were identified and subjected to very complete staff analysis. The material used for study, the cost effectiveness analysis, the references, and any other pertinent material are included as enclosures to "Selected Analysis." The 18 incentives and programs are as follows:

1. Reenlistment bonus
2. Enlistment bonus
3. Recruiting program
4. Quarters allowance for REP trainees
5. Full-time SGLI

Table 2-3

GARPEG RECOMMENDATIONS<sup>55</sup>

Recommendation	Project Volunteer Committee guidance	Status, 17 Aug 71
Enlistment/reenlistment bonus	Continue normal staffing	OSD substitute bonus bill reviewed and reported on favorably (S1470/HR 6051)
Basic allowance for quarters (BAQ) for REP trainees	Defer to joint committee action in Congress	Awaiting Congressional action on omnibus Selective Service bill (HR 6531)
Medical, dental, and death benefits	Continue normal staffing	S 806 reviewed and reported on favorably
Retirement and survivor benefit proposals	Defer until OSD inter-departmental committee reports on their review of the subject	Deferred until receipt of OSD report
Full-time SGLI	Continue normal staffing	Draft legislation prepared as requested by OSD
In-service recruiting program test	Continue current plans	Test under way 16 Aug 71
Extension of post facilities to RC members	Do not consider further	None
Enrollment in US Armed Forces Institute (USAFI) courses	Continue normal staffing	Comments and cost estimates to OSD by Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) [ASA (M&RA)] memo 12 Aug 71
Tuition assistance	Continue normal staffing	Legislative proposal not yet received
Increased retirement points	Continue normal staffing	Legislative proposal not yet received
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) in-service loans	Continue normal staffing	Draft legislation reported on favorably (DOD Misc 1279)
Active retiree affiliation with RC	Continue normal staffing	DOD Misc 1215 reported on favorably
Increased direct procurement at higher grades	Continue emphasis	Ongoing action; no legislation required
Proficiency pay (specialty and superior performance)	Continue normal staffing	HR 6049 reported on favorably

6. Additional organizational maintenance technicians for the USAR
7. Reserve service obligation clause for Active Army contracts
8. Survivor benefits
9. Combat arms proficiency pay
10. Support of RC enlistment administration by the Armed Forces examining and entrance stations (AFEES)
11. Retention of a standby Selective Service System
12. Educational benefits
13. Flexible reenlistment payments
14. Optional insurance to protect the member's equity in retirement
15. Modified 6-year unit enlistments program to permit transfer after 3 years to IRR
16. Earlier entitlement to retirement pay on an actuarial basis
17. Cancellation of up to 50 percent of National Defense Education Act student loans
18. Authorization of additional retirement points per retirement year

Two other incentives were identified and recommended for in-depth continued analysis in FY72. These are

1. Entitlement to proficiency pay (specialty and superior performance)
2. Authorization for enrollment in USAFI courses

The conclusions of this analysis are displayed in Annex A1, Table A1-1, but are listed here because of their specific nature and importance as the starting point for analytical work done on incentives and programs in FY72.

The conclusions of "Selected Analysis" are

1. Four recruiting and retention programs have been identified for implementation in FY73 or earlier:
  - a. A reenlistment bonus of \$500
  - b. An organized recruiting program
  - c. A test of an enlistment bonus on the order of \$600
  - d. Quarters allowance for REP trainees
2. A specific program for FY74 cannot be determined at this time.

3. The following programs are not needed at this time and require no further analysis:

- a. Additional organizational maintenance technicians for the USAR
- b. A reserve service obligation clause for Active Army contracts
- c. Combat arms proficiency pay

4. The following proposals require additional analysis:

- a. Support of RC recruiting by AFEES
- b. Retention of the Selective Service System on a standby basis
- c. Educational benefits
- d. Modified 6-year unit enlistment
- e. Early entitlement to retirement pay on an actuarial basis
- f. Cancellation of student loan debts

5. Further analysis of the following proposals should be deferred pending completion of ongoing actions in OSD:

- a. Earlier entitlement to retirement pay
- b. Full-time SGLI
- c. Educational benefits
- d. Flexible reenlistment payments
- e. Optional insurance to protect the member's equity in retirement pay
- f. Additional retirement points
- g. Survivor benefits

6. The following proposals should be included in the FY72 in-depth analysis proposed for conduct by RAC:

- a. Proficiency pay (speciality and performance)
- b. Enrollment in USAFI courses

"Selected Analysis" contains in one volume a very comprehensive amount of background material on the 18 incentives and programs, including some cost analysis.

#### HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

On 19 Jul 71, a presentation was made to House Subcommittee No. 2 of the Armed Services Committee by OASD (M&RA)<sup>39</sup> concerning incentives for the RC. This presentation was to bring the results of OASD's sifting of various incentive suggestions for reservists to the Committee to assist them in determining those which should be given most consideration.



Although this transcript is not properly a report of a study in the formal sense, its findings have been included in Annex A1, Table A1-1, because this represents the current OASD position on RC incentives. The presentation was made by Mr. Roger T. Kelley, ASD (M&RA), assisted by Dr. Theodore C. Marrs, DASD (RA). This office believes it is possible to maintain the strength of the RC in a no-draft environment but with the help of incentives. They also state that the more effective utilization of RC as part of the total force concept will improve the RC picture. The incentives they support are as follows:

1. Increased basic rates of pay
2. Enlistment bonus
3. Commitments of less than 6 years be permitted
4. Variable reenlistment bonus (maximum total \$3300) allowed through the twelfth year of service
5. Improved survivor and retirement benefits
6. Mobilization of employers to encourage ARNG/USAR participation
7. Pre-separation counseling Active Forces separablees about RC participation.

Other incentives are mentioned but have not been researched, and no formal position on them has been taken.

#### GILBERT YOUTH SURVEY

"Attitudes of Youth toward Military Service: Results of a National Survey Conducted in May 1971"<sup>35</sup> is the analysis by the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO) of a national survey of civilian youth conducted by Gilbert Youth Research, Inc., for DOD. The objectives of the survey were to obtain current information about American civilian youth in the age group 16-21 and to determine, in so far as possible with this tool, the following:

1. Their potential for voluntary enlistment in the Regular and Reserve forces in a draft-free environment.
2. Their factual knowledge and perceptions of the Regular and Reserve forces.
3. Their reaction to enlistment incentives, benefits, compensation, and options or conditions of service.



4. Their enlistment propensity in terms of demographic characteristics, socioeconomic background, and educational/occupational status, achievements, and interests.

The detailed analysis encompasses the following topics:

1. Career goals and their fulfillment
2. Global assessment of military service
3. Image: An approach to measuring youth acceptance and assessment of each of the Armed Services
4. The Active Forces—
  - a. Branch of Service: Preferences and expectations
  - b. Enlistment incentives
  - c. Preferences for specialties in combat arms
5. The ARNG/USAR
6. Alternative concepts in military service
7. Exposures to military

The nature of this report is to display findings rather than to make recommendations. A large amount of very interesting and valuable material is contained in the survey tabulations and the analysis. Summary findings in the area of reserve affiliation show that the ARNG/USAR are perceived as a favorable form of military service. Assuming a draft, 28 percent claim they might join a DOD RC. Ten percent claim intention to join in a no-draft environment. The Army RC were preferred by 16 percent, with an even division of preference between the ARNG and the USAR. The most popular reason for enlisting was to avoid being drafted. Following this, educational benefits and skills training applicable to civilian life were the most popular inducements to reserve affiliation.

The three most cited deterrents to RC service were "I don't want any part of the military" (42 percent), conflict with civilian job (26 percent), and insufficient pay (25 percent). The nonwhite population segment appears to be a promising recruiting source for the RC. Far more nonwhites (24 percent) than whites (8 percent) said they would definitely join the RC, even in the zero-draft environment.

#### SUMMARY

Chapter 2 is an analysis of recently completed studies of personnel procurement in an all-volunteer environment. Major conclusions, chapter

topic coverage, survey results, and notable features of the study or document are mentioned to enable the reader to decide whether to consult the original document. The studies are discussed in chronological order of publication. The Task 2 Annexes A1 and A2 contain tables listing the recommendations found in the studies and suggestions found in trip reports, articles, and statements of position (other US Armed Forces). The Gilbert Youth Survey is not included in Annex A1 since it made no recommendations and proposed no programs for increased enlistment and retention.

There is general agreement that RC mandated strengths cannot be maintained in a zero-draft environment with the present rate of reenlistment and nondraft-motivated first enlistments. Over 100 suggestions were made for the achievement of personnel numerical goals when there is no draft pressure. Good agreement (50 percent or more of studies) was found on nine recommendations, as follows:

- Authorize a reenlistment bonus

- Authorize an improved recruiting program

- Add to or expand survivor benefits

- Authorize educational benefits in return for enlistment, reenlistment and/or satisfactory service

- Authorize payment of an enlistment bonus

- Authorize proficiency pay for specialty and superior performance

- Extend coverage of SGLI

- Provide quarters allowance for REP trainees

- Increase basic rates of pay

Eight major studies and the Congressional hearings were reviewed and analyzed for findings on RC in an all-volunteer environment. In addition over 50 trip reports of visits made by CDC and RAC personnel were considered, and are reported on in the study.

## Chapter 3

### DETERMINATION OF FUTURE RESERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH LEVELS (TASK 3)

#### INTRODUCTION

The problem set forth in Task 3<sup>1</sup> was the determination of the RC strength levels (in the units and in the IRR) that current personnel programs can be expected to maintain in a zero-draft environment, or in an environment in which draft calls are reduced to the point that there is no effective pressure to bring people into the ARNG/USAR.

The following basic assumptions govern these projections:

- (a) The draft will end 30 Jun 73.
- (b) There will be no draft calls, and hence there will be only minimum draft pressure after 30 Jun 72.
- (c) Current personnel programs (March 1972) will continue unchanged through the projection period (FY79).

Other assumptions are indicated in the discussions of the projection models. The models readily accept changes in assumptions such as draft calls in FY73, more reliable data on propensity to enlist than found in the Gilbert Youth Survey,<sup>35</sup> newer Armed Forces age distribution data, and changed attrition factors.

#### PROJECTION OF NPS ENLISTMENTS

Table 3-1 presents a projection of the manpower pool available to the ARNG/USAR. Table 3-1 also presents a projection of that part of the available manpower pool that may be expected to join the ARNG/USAR as NPS enlistees based on the results of the Gilbert Youth Survey administered in May 1971.<sup>35</sup> The methodology and rationale for construction of the table are described below.

Table 3-1

MANPOWER POOL PROJECTIONS, MALES 17-25 YEARS OLD  
(Thousands)

Line	FY72	FY73	FY74	FY75	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY79
Total male population	(1) 102,491	103,458	104,459	105,493	106,561	107,665	108,805	109,983
Total males, ages 17-25	(2) 16,909	17,116	17,435	17,766	18,115	18,413	18,746	18,959
Males, ages 17-25, not institutionalized	(3) 16,739	16,945	17,261	17,588	17,934	18,229	18,559	18,769
Males, ages 17-25, qualified for military service	(4) 11,768	11,912	12,134	12,364	12,608	12,815	13,047	13,195
Males, ages 17-25, qualified for military service who are not already in one of the Active Armed Services	(5) 10,118	10,328	10,550	10,780	11,024	11,231	11,463	11,611
Qualified males, ages 17-25, who are not already in the Active or RC of the Armed Services	(6) 8,362	8,572	8,794	9,024	9,268	9,475	9,707	9,855
Qualified civilian males, ages 17-25, who can be expected to join a RC of one of the Armed Services								
Upper bound	(7) 544	557	572	587	602	616	631	641
Lower bound	(8) 251	257	264	271	278	284	291	296
Estimated number of qualified civilian males, ages 17-25, expected to join a RC who would enlist in the ARNG or the USAR								
Upper bound	(9) 44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51
Lower bound	(10) 20	21	21	22	22	23	23	24

Line 1: Total Male Population (Census Bureau Projections)<sup>5</sup>

Currently the Census Bureau runs four projections—series B, C, D, and E—based on assumptions of varying fertility rates. Series B is currently the high series and series D a low series, except that series E is a special low projection based on the fertility rate that results in zero growth. Series B, C, and D do not differ from each other until after 1980. Data from these series formed the basis for the projections herein.

Line 2: Total Males, Ages 17-25, Inclusive

These figures are derived from the projections of the Census Bureau.<sup>5</sup> Ages 17-25, inclusive, were chosen as the primary target group for NPS enlistments in the ARNG/USAR. This makes optimum use of the law (Title 10, USC, Sec 651)<sup>59</sup> requiring 6 years of service from any male under age 26 who enters any of the Armed Services or components thereof and is considered to be a realistic age spread for the combat arms.

Line 3: Males, Ages 17-25, Not Institutionalized

Census Bureau data indicate that approximately 1 percent of this age group can consistently be expected to be in prisons or in hospitals for extended periods.<sup>60</sup>

Line 4: Males, Ages 17-25, Qualified for Military Service

A constant 70.3 percent of results in line 3 was used based on "Supplement to Health of the Army"<sup>61</sup> and the advice of Dr. Bernard D. Karpinos (who derived the factor) as cited in the Saber Volunteer study.<sup>62</sup> This factor eliminates from the pool those who are physically, morally, and mentally (generally Category V) unqualified for military service.

Line 5: Males, Ages 17-25, Qualified for Military Service Who Are Not Already in One of the Active Armed Services

Totals of 2.5 million for FY72 and 2.4 million thereafter were assumed for the active Armed Services. Those in the age group 17-25 comprise 66.1 percent of the total Armed Services population, and this proportion was assumed throughout the projections. These numbers were subtracted from those in line 4.

Line 6: Qualified Males, Ages 17-25, Who Are Not Already in the Active or Reserve Components of the Armed Services

This item subtracts from the pool an estimated number of people who belong to a RC of one of the Armed Services. A total of 2.66 million

was assumed for all of the RC of the Armed Services. In the absence of an age distribution for the RC, the distribution for the active Armed Services was used. This line results in estimations of those males aged 17 through 25 who are qualified and available to enlist in the RC.

Lines 7 and 8: Those of Line 6 Who Can Be Expected to Join a RC of One of the Armed Services

The Gilbert Youth Survey<sup>35</sup> found that 3 percent of the surveyed population indicated that they would definitely join a RC of one of the Armed Services and an additional 7 percent indicated that they probably would do so. These lines represent a range from the 3 percent low (line 8) to a 6.5 percent high (line 7). The high figure was derived by taking all that indicated they definitely would join and half that indicated they probably would join. The Gilbert Youth Survey sample consisted of male civilians, ages 16 through 21. We have used the unaltered results for age group 17 through 25. No reasonable basis could be found to adjust the survey data, and there are no other comparable data available. It is further reasoned that propensity to enlist would decrease in the age group 22 through 25 while it is high in the age 16 group; thus the dropping of the latter group while adding those 22-through 25 should tend to preclude gross error.

Lines 9 and 10: Those of Lines 7 and 8 Who Would Enlist in the ARNG or the USAR

The Gilbert Youth Survey<sup>35</sup> found that, of those youths who indicated they would join a RC of the Armed Services, 16 percent said they would choose the Army. These were equally divided between the ARNG and the USAR, 8 percent for each. These lines then result in the range of those who could be expected to be NPS enlistments in either the ARNG or the USAR.

Table 3-2 presents a similar projection for the 17 through 21 year old age group. The table shows that significant increases in NPS enlistments can be expected by targetting the 17 through 25 age group.

It should be recognized that the results shown in these projections are those who would enlist in the ARNG or the USAR providing that vacancies exist and that the vacancies exist in the appropriate geographic area. As has been indicated, the RC are unlike the Active Army since



Table 3-2

MANPOWER POOL PROJECTIONS, MALES 17-21 YEARS OLD  
(Thousands)

	Line	FY72	FY73	FY74	FY75	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY79
Total males, ages 17-21 <sup>a</sup>	(1)	9,693	9,920	10,152	10,327	10,469	10,555	10,709	10,761
Males, ages 17-21, not institutionalized <sup>b</sup>	(2)	9,596	9,821	10,050	10,224	10,364	10,449	10,602	10,653
Males, ages 17-21, qualified for military service <sup>c</sup>	(3)	6,746	6,904	7,065	7,187	7,286	7,346	7,453	7,489
Males, ages 17-21, qualified for military service who are not already in one of the Active Armed Services <sup>d</sup>	(4)	5,746	5,944	6,105	6,227	6,326	6,386	6,493	6,529
Qualified males, ages 17-21, who are not already in the Active or Reserve Components of the Armed Services <sup>e</sup>	(5)	4,682	4,880	5,041	5,163	5,262	5,322	5,429	5,465
Qualified males, ages 17-21, who can be expected to join a RC of one of the Armed Services <sup>f</sup>	(6)	304	317	328	336	342	346	353	355
Upper bound	(7)	140	146	151	155	158	160	163	164
Lower bound									
Estimated number of qualified males, ages 17-21, expected to join a RC who would enlist in the ARNG or the USARMC	(8)	24	25	26	27	27	28	28	28
Upper bound	(9)	11	12	12	12	13	13	13	13
Lower bound									

<sup>a</sup>Census projections.<sup>b</sup>Assumed 1 percent institutionalized.<sup>c</sup>Assumed 70.3 percent qualified and available for service.<sup>d</sup>Assumed 40 percent of total Armed Forces are 17-21 and assumed Armed Forces strength of 2.5 million in FY72 and 2.4 million thereafter.<sup>e</sup>Assumed 40 percent of total Armed Forces in Ready Reserves, aged 17-21, and a total Ready Reserve of 2.66 million.<sup>f</sup>See Gilbert Youth Survey; <sup>35</sup> lower bound determined by 3 percent who state they will join a RC of one of the Services; upper bound determined by this 3 percent plus half of the 7 percent who state they probably will join a RC (a total of 6.5 percent).<sup>g</sup>Eight percent of those saying they would join a RC indicate they prefer ARNG and 8 percent USAR.

they do not have flexibility in geographic assignment. Thus the projected pools are further limited in an unpredictable way by this inflexibility.

#### PROJECTIONS OF END STRENGTHS

Table 3-3 presents the end strength projections for the USAR troop program units. Using an enlisted mandated strength of 223,800, the projections indicate a potential shortage of some 21,000 enlisted men for FY72. Thereafter the low figures indicate continuing shortages ranging from 14,000 enlisted men in FY74 to 40,000 in FY76. The high figures indicate a potential buildup of small waiting lists starting in FY74 and increasing to a potential of some 111,000 in FY79. Since these projections are based on a continuation of current conditions (but without a draft and without any incentives), this upper range of figures is considered to be quite optimistic but not unrealistic as an upper bound—especially if the image of military service should improve, if unemployment increases, or other such influencing factors are brought to bear. As of this writing, however, the lower range of figures appears to be more realistic. As in most such cases, the truth probably lies between. However, considering the derivation of Table 3-1 (and the Gilbert Youth Survey) and the lack of any firm data on correlation between attitude and behavior or the intent to enlist and actual enlistment, it is considered that the lower end strength figures are closer to what will actually occur under the stated conditions. These projections indicate the need for incentives of some type.

The accuracy of the projections suffers from the lack of such data as NPS and PS ETSSs, terms of reenlistments, and reenlistment rates. The inaccuracy attributed to these items, however, is expected to be small considering the nature of the projections. Additionally some of the refinements that have not been available will compensate each other.

The spread between the lower and upper bounds can be reduced and the projections sharpened considerably by additional surveys of the general type administered by Gilbert Youth in May 1971, but with greater care in selecting the target population, refining the questions, and in the analysis of the results. The target population should correspond to that age group eligible and most likely to enlist. In summary, the



Table 3-3  
END STRENGTH PROJECTIONS, USAR UNITS—ENLISTED MEN ONLY  
(Thousands)

	FY72	FY73		FY74		FY75		FY76		FY77		FY78		FY79	
		U	L	U	L	U	L	U	L	U	L	U	L	U	L
Beginning strength	228 <sup>a</sup>	203		228	204	257	210	265	195	276	184	298	185	324	191
Total losses	64	34		28	26	54	52	51	47	40	35	36	29	54	27
ETS <sup>b</sup>	50	22		14		39		35		24		18		35	16
Other losses <sup>c</sup>	14	12		14	12	15	13	16	12	16	11	18	11	19	11
Total gains	39	59	35	57	32	62	37	62	36	62	36	62	35	65	35
NPS enlistments <sup>d</sup>	22	45	21	46	21	47	22	48	22	49	23	50	23	51	24
Immediate reenlistments <sup>e</sup>	8	5		2		6		5		4		3		5	2
Other gains <sup>f</sup>	9	9		9		9		9		9		9		9	
End strength	203	228	204	257	210	265	195	276	184	298	185	324	191	335	199

Note: U represents RAC higher estimate; L represents RAC lower estimate.

<sup>a</sup>Beginning strength for FY72 is actual strength 1 Jul 71 from DCSPER-46.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>b</sup>Nonprior-service accessions of 6 years previous from DD-M(M) 603 reports<sup>64</sup> reduced by attrition factor of 4 percent per year for 5 years, or a total of 20 percent. The 4 percent derives from the experience factor of "other losses" of 6 percent per year (see note c) reduced by 2 percent because not all of the "other losses" are applicable, e.g., transfer to Stby or Retired Reserve and the group is younger than the average of the force so deaths and medical disqualifications should be less than the average.

<sup>c</sup>These losses include: (1) Enlistment in other RC, (2) discharge to accept commission, (3) transfer to IRR, (4) transfer to Stby, (5) transfer to Retired Reserve, (6) orders to AD, (7) medical disqualification, (8) death, and (9) others.

These types of losses are a function of the beginning strength. Based on a review of previous years' data an experience factor of 6 percent of beginning strength has been used for this category of losses.

<sup>d</sup>Nonprior-service enlistments for FY72 are based on 7 months of actual data projected linearly over the rest of the year and checked to ensure the result is within the range of Table 3-1 projections. For succeeding FYs, NPS enlistments are given in a low and high range directly from the projections for the 17-25 year cohort of Table 3-1.

<sup>e</sup>Immediate reenlistments have been computed at 15 percent of NPS ETSs, based on results of the RAC survey of sixth-year NPS personnel. (Nine years of historical data yielded an average of 16 percent.)

<sup>f</sup>Other gains include: (1) Transfer from IRR (4000), (2) transfer from Stby or Retired Reserve (this number has been so small that it was ignored in these projections), (3) transfer from ARNG (3000), and (4) PS, enlistments (2000).

These types of gains are independent of beginning strength, losses, or other types of gains and lend themselves to projection at constant value based on experience. This has been done with the numbers in each subcategory shown in parentheses above in this note.

projections are highly sensitive to the NPS enlistments which, in turn, are derived from a survey of attitudes—the more precise the data from the survey, the higher the confidence in the projections.

Table 3-4 presents the end strength projections for the ARNG units. The model structure is the same as for the USAR units in Table 3-3. The notes for Table 3-4 indicate those factors that have been used for the ARNG. The enlisted mandated strength for the ARNG is 355,200.

Table 3-5 presents the end strength projections for the IRR. Essentially all of the enlisted personnel of the IRR come from the Active Army in the form of inductees released from 2 years of AD, 2-year first-term enlistees released from AD after 2 years, and 3-year first-term enlistees released from AD after 3 years. Longer-term first-term enlistees released after 4 or more years of AD normally go directly into the Stby for the remainder of their statutory 6-year obligatory service. Personnel who have spent 2 years on AD normally will spend 3 years in the IRR and their last year in the Stby. Those who have spent 3 years on AD normally will remain in the IRR for 2 years and spend their last year in the Stby. Figure 3-1 portrays this progression graphically and illustrates the derivation of the entries in Table 3-5.

Table 3-4  
END STRENGTH PROJECTIONS, ARNG UNITS—ENLISTED MEN ONLY  
(Thousands)

	FY72	FY73		FY74		FY75		FY76		FY77		FY78		FY79	
		U	L	U	L	U	L	U	L	U	L	U	L	U	L
Beginning strength	371 <sup>a</sup>	350		356	332	376	330	385	317	357	268	363	255	366	238
Total losses	109	59		43	41	58	55	105	100	64	57	69	62	58	31
ETS <sup>b</sup>	83	34		18		32		78		39		44		33	15
Other losses <sup>c</sup>	26	25		25	23	26	23	27	22	25	18	25	18	25	16
Total gains	88	65	41	63	39	67	42	77	51	70	44	72	45	71	41
NPS enlistments <sup>d</sup>	58	45	21	46	21	47	22	48	22	49	23	50	23	51	24
Immediate reenlistments <sup>e</sup>	16	6		3		6		15		7		8		6	3
Other gains <sup>f</sup>	14	14		14		14		14		14		14		14	
End strength	350	356	332	376	330	385	317	357	268	363	255	366	238	379	248

Note: U represents RAC higher estimate; L represents RAC lower estimate.

<sup>a</sup>Beginning strength for FY72 is actual strength 1 Jul 71 from DCSPER-46, Part III.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>b</sup>Nonprior-service accessions of 6 years previous from DD-M(M) 603 reports<sup>64</sup> reduced by attrition factor of 5 percent per year for 5 years, or a total of 25 percent. The 5 percent is derived from the experience factor of "other losses" of 7 percent per year (see note c) reduced by 2 percent because not all of the "other losses" are applicable, e.g., transfer to Stby or Retired Reserve and this group is younger than the average of the force so deaths and medical disqualifications should be less than the average.

<sup>c</sup>These losses include: (1) Transfer to other RC, (2) discharge to accept commission, (3) transfer to Inactive National Guard, (4) transfer to Retired Reserve, (5) orders to AD, (6) medical disqualification, (7) death, and (8) others.

These types of losses are a function of the beginning strength. Based on a review of prior years' data, an experience factor of 7 percent of beginning strength has been used for this category of losses.

<sup>d</sup>Nonprior-service enlistments for FY72 are based on 7 months of actual data projected linearly over the rest of the year. It is noted that this procedure results in NPS enlistments which exceed the range shown for FY72 in Table 3-1. This may reflect the fact that FY72 has not been entirely free of draft pressure and that as of the beginning of FY72 the ARNG still had 33,000 men on the waiting lists. We also suspect that the Gilbert Youth Survey data which attribute equal propensity to enlist for the ARNG and USAR may be in error since it is believed the ARNG will draw more than the USAR.

<sup>e</sup>Immediate reenlistments have been computed at 19 percent of NPS ETSs based on results of the RAC survey of sixth-year NPS personnel.

<sup>f</sup>Other gains include: (1) Transfer from other RC, (2) transfer from Inactive National Guard, (3) PS enlistments, and (4) others.

These types of gains are independent of beginning strength, losses, or other types of gains and lend themselves to projection at constant value based on experience.

Table 3-5  
END STRENGTH PROJECTIONS  
IRR--ENLISTED MEN ONLY  
(Thousands)

	FY72	FY73	FY74	FY75	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY79
Beginning strength	920	860	721	521	343	217	195	195
Total losses	415	416	353	310	258	154	132	132
Inductees released from AD	264	260	196	173	133	22	-	-
Two year enlistees released from AD	15	16	17	35	34	38	38	38
Three year enlistees released from AD	136	140	140	102	91	94	94	94
Total gains	355	277	153	132	132	132	132	132
Inductees released from AD	179	140	24	-	-	-	-	-
Two year enlistees released from AD	35	34	38	38	38	38	38	38
Three year enlistees released from AD	141	103	91	94	94	94	94	94
End strength	860	721	521	343	217	195	195	195

		FISCAL YEAR												
		67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79
Inductees, Thous	Inducted into Active Army <sup>a</sup>	299	334	254	199	156	27							
	Inductees to IRR <sup>b</sup> (Gains)			266	265	199	179	140	24					
	Inductees out of IRR (Losses)				8	8	6	5	4	1				
2-yr Enlistees, Thous	Enlisted in Active Army for 2 yrs													
2-yr Enlistees out of IRR (Losses)														
3-yr Enlistees, Thous	Enlisted in Active Army for 3 yrs													
3-yr Enlistees out of IRR (Losses)														

Fig. 3-1—Progression of Inductees and Enlistees into and out of IRR, FY67–FY79

Note: Footnotes on following page.

Fig. 3-1 (continued)

<sup>a</sup>DCSPER-46, Part II. 27

<sup>b</sup>For those inducted in FY67 to FY69, these entries were derived by selecting certain Separation Program Numbers (SPN) from DCSPER-46, Part II, and then using the actual inductee losses in these categories. The SPNs and categories selected as appropriate are:

- SPN 201 - ETS
- SPN 21L - Separation for other good and sufficient reason when determined by secretarial authority
- SPN 227 - Hardship
- SPN 411 - Overseas returnees
- SPN 413 - To enter or return to college, university, or equivalent educational institution
- SPN 414 - To accept or return to employment of a seasonal nature

For those inducted in FY70 and thereafter (scheduled for release from AD in FY72 and thereafter), an attrition factor of 5 percent per year while on AD was used.

## Chapter 4

### IDENTIFICATION OF ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS WHICH MAY CONTRIBUTE TO RESERVE COMPONENT PROCUREMENT AND RETENTION IN A VOLUNTEER ENVIRONMENT (TASK 4)

#### INTRODUCTION

Task 4 as stated in the Work Statement<sup>1</sup> for the RAC study is as follows:

Identify alternative proposals which may contribute to RC personnel procurement and retention in a volunteer environment. These proposals will include (but are not to be limited to) the following: improved recruiting and advertising, modification of the unit service obligation to permit transfer from units to the IRR after a specified time, inclusion of a Reserve service obligation clause in active service contracts, fixed and variable reenlistment bonus, enlistment bonuses, educational benefits, changed retirement and survivor benefits, full-time provision of Servicemen's Group Life Insurance (SGLI), and maintenance of a stand-by draft plan/procedure.<sup>1</sup>

The term, alternative proposals, has been expanded to include procedures and management practices that might relate to the RC in a volunteer environment. The task is developed as preliminary to Task 5 which requires RAC to develop a survey instrument and conduct a survey of RC personnel who are in the sixth year of their initial service obligation. Important alternatives identified have then been incorporated into the survey instrument.

Consideration of incentives to encourage participation in the RC in an all-volunteer environment has lagged behind similar considerations for the active forces. It appears also that the matter of maintaining the RC in a volunteer environment presents difficulties different from those anticipated for the active forces.

Characteristics of persons attracted to the RC may differ in motivation and outlook from those who are attracted to the active force. That



is, it has been asserted<sup>65,66</sup> that those persons who would join the active forces favor, and are not uncomfortable in, a structured environment and the kind of life that the military offers. They are generally traditional and somewhat conservative in outlook, are concerned about their progress in the system, want opportunity for promotion and advancement, and want their work and training to be interesting. While they value family life highly, they are more concerned over the security of their families.

By contrast, those who care least about affiliation with the active military environment have highest concern for their family life and for their own economic security. They want their work to be satisfying as well as interesting. They have higher concern for their personal development, are especially anxious for opportunities for education, and are in higher socioeconomic levels. They feel much more strongly about their personal freedom and individuality and do not necessarily favor a highly structured environment.

There appears to be a common element, however, among those who favor life in the military and those who do not, especially considering the youth culture of our time. Both those who favor the military environment and those who do not expect to be treated with respect and dignity as an individual.

That individual who voluntarily will affiliate with RC is in a sense a paradox because both the military and the civilian environments are represented. It can be assumed that persons who strongly identify with the military environment will have volunteered for active military service. Perhaps those who marginally identify with the military structure also will join the RC. The more civilian-oriented persons who find they can satisfy some of their life needs through affiliation with the RC better or easier than in other ways may join the RC, but not necessarily out of identification with the military.

Thus incentives that might be attractive in the Active Army might not be appropriate in the RC. Incentives for the RC may have to be aimed at a different class and kind of individual. On the other hand, it could be argued that incentives offered to Active Army personnel should be offered in comparable scale to the RC as well, even though they may not



be especially appealing to the RC. If they are withheld, the RC would feel discriminated against. Such things as enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, proficiency pay for critical skills, care for dependents of military personnel, educational benefits, and so on, should have a common base across both the active service and the RC.

It should be recognized that each different component of the Army places different demands on its individual members. Incentives available to a given component should consider the demands placed on an individual, and any incentive probably should not encourage an individual to move down the scale from a component which has higher demands.

The organizational and operational structure of the RC still has not been fixed for a reduced Active Army force in a volunteer environment. It may well be that the RC force might be subject to a standby draft and may be very large in proportion to the active force, as compared to the ratio of active force to RC at the present time. Many of these considerations are still under discussion, and incentives related to such considerations will be tentative until organizational and policy matters relating to that time frame are firm.

#### DEPARTMENT OF ARMY PERSONNEL SYSTEM

Alternatives to increase participation in the RC will be discussed in order as they relate to the main components of the DA Personnel System.<sup>67</sup> This system is described in terms of five operational aspects: (a) procurement of personnel, (b) training and education, (c) distribution of personnel, (d) sustainment in terms of job satisfaction, personal growth, and productivity, and (e) separation. Incentives might fall into more than one of the five personnel functions, but for the purposes of this exercise they will be described as falling under only one of the five.

##### Procurement

Procurement is defined as "the process of acquiring individuals in sufficient numbers and of the quality required to perform Army (RC) missions."<sup>67</sup> The incentives that fall under the general area of procurement are as follows:

Improved Army Image. Since the American public has over the past few years shown increasing dissatisfaction with US involvement in

Southeast Asia, the favorable image of the US military forces (the Army, in particular) has declined. This public reaction has resulted in a change in attitude toward the value of military service, a new definition of what patriotism is, an indication of lack of public support for financing military expenditure, and a drop in volunteering for military service. It seems likely that the public attitude toward the Army will need to change before an all-volunteer active and reserve force can be achieved.\*

The military image can be changed in a number of ways. It must be recognized that change will not come rapidly, that it may take as long to develop a favorable image of the Army as it has taken to acquire an unfavorable one. The Army must—through acts of achievement, valor, public and social good—demonstrate that it is serving the US society in useful and desirable ways. This policy may mean changes in activities of the Army and of the RC, in particular to put the RC into activities and roles with which the public can readily identify and appreciate the value of; such as participation in community projects, having assurance of high-quality individuals as RC leaders, advisers, and technicians to better develop an image within the community of reliability, good character, and dedication. Stabilized tours with the RC may come to be regarded as highly desirable and necessary to a full military career. It may become desirable to insure assignment of the very best AD RA officers and enlisted men to RC advisory positions, just as some of the very best personnel are now being assigned to recruiter jobs.

Several actions already contemplated by DOD and DA may influence the Army image: (a) increased use of civilians to take on work in garrison situations (as suggested in PROVIDE<sup>29</sup> and CORC R&R<sup>51</sup> studies) might help develop more amity between the military and civilian communities, (b) involvement in local projects and work with youth groups (as suggested in the CORC R&R<sup>51</sup> study and CSM 70-150<sup>52</sup>), (c) Federal attempts to gain the cooperation of employers of RC personnel in fostering understanding of the RC members' responsibilities and accommodating, as a patriotic response, to his problems so that he does not suffer significant

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\*The size of the volunteer force is of course critical. The US had an all-volunteer force in the 1920's and 1930's, even though public attitude toward the enlisted force was poor—but the Army also was relatively small.

loss of time or money by reason of RC membership. Such actions by employers have been suggested in the CORC R&R<sup>51</sup> study and in Congressional Hearings.<sup>68</sup>

Public Relations. Public relations releases for the Army have not emphasized the One-Army concept, that is, the Active Army and the RC viewed as the complete force. It would seem wise to insist that the Army as a whole be emphasized in public relations activities so that the ARNG and USAR are really not separated from the Active Army in the mind of the public that hears these messages. This identification will become more and more a necessity if the draft mechanism is continued in the volunteer environment and applied to the RC.

At the present time, little money is allocated to the RC specifically for public relations. Most public relations for the RC are conducted at the local unit level; commanders are charged with trying to keep their units in the local news.

Patriotic Response toward Military Service. As the war in Vietnam winds down and troops are withdrawn, it would be expected that current antipathy toward US military forces will decline, especially if the Services take on roles and activities which the public generally supports. It is evident now, however, that there are variations by geographic area, among ethnic groups, and by political sentiment with respect to the favor in which the military is held. Being satisfied that the quality of military personnel meets necessary standards, it would seem wise to recruit from or establish as recruiting targets those groups holding a more favorable attitude toward the military.

Certain ethnic or racial groups have more favorable responses toward the military service than others. For example, several studies<sup>66,30</sup> have shown that a higher proportion of blacks was attracted to military life than whites, that a smaller proportion of military oriented comes from Northern and Western Europe as a point of national origin, and a larger proportion is attracted to military life from the Caribbean and Central America. It is recognized that such attraction might not be explained as much by patriotic zeal as by economic and social opportunity. It appears also that a smaller proportion of persons favoring military life is found in the Middle Atlantic, West North Central, and Pacific

regions of the US. These areas should be less attractive for recruiting. By contrast, the South Atlantic, East North Central, and West South Central states are prime areas for recruiting since a more favorable sentiment is felt toward military life in these areas.

Similarly the persons who favor military life are of more conservative bent and in favor of a more traditional, authoritarian atmosphere.

It would seem reasonable then that, other things being equal, one should recruit from those areas that show most promise.

Recruiting for RC. Both within the Active Army and the RC, the recruiting effort should be treated differently than it has been in the past. The very best persons should be assigned to recruiting duty, both for the Active Army and RC, so that the Services present their very best face to those persons whom they wish to attract. Persons selected for recruiting duty should become a part of the community in which they are recruiting and become known not only as being representatives of the military service, but as being persons interested in the community and society of which they are a part.\*

Within the Active Army, efforts must be made to recruit for the RC as well as for active service. That is, while it might be desirable to try first to attract individuals into reenlistment into the active service, if that fails the next effort should be to attract them into the ARNG/USAR units. This too can be treated in stages—if they are not interested in service in ARNG/USAR units, then the advantages of service in the IRR should be demonstrated. The success of the "early out" program/experiment<sup>34</sup> at Fts Lewis and Knox suggests that emphasis upon RC recruiting before separation from active service may be very useful. However, it is difficult to say at this point how many of the 60 per week enlistments in the ARNG or USAR units were motivated by the early release provision of the program.

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\*The example presented by SGT 1st Class Flaherty, the top Army recruiter assigned to the upper-New York State area, is noteworthy. In addition to being top recruiter, he is an officer in the Junior Chamber of Commerce in the area in which he is recruiting, and takes an active part in drug treatment programs. He is an attractive individual who is well accepted by the communities in which he serves.

Recruiting within ARNG/USAR units must be stepped up, and active recruiting effort is needed in units of all sizes regardless of whether they are filled to capacity or not. Having a waiting list in a volunteer situation is highly desirable.

The Army recruiting stations across the country must be prepared to recruit for the RC as well as for Active Army service. It is unlikely that enough recruiters will be available to recruit for the RC alone, so that all recruiters should be familiar with the One-Army concept and should be recruiting for the RC as well as for the active service. New programs in an all-volunteer environment may even emphasize the reserve portions of the enlistment.

Use of AFEEs for Initial Processing into the RC. There are now some 70 AFEEs about the US, mostly located in major population centers. The AFEEs stations are equipped to do all the processing (physical examinations, mental testing, and other administrative chores) necessary, and perhaps can do such jobs better than could be done by the RC using its own personnel.\* Use of AFEEs for processing offers no real incentive to the reservist; it may be a way for the Army to handle this aspect of its processing in a more efficient way. In some respects it could appear to the reservist to be a disadvantage, since more time may be used in processing if any travel is required.

Bonuses for Enlistment and Reenlistment in the RC. It appears from surveys conducted that bonuses might be a real advantage in a volunteer environment in attracting persons into the RC, inasmuch as many persons who are coming in are doing so for some sort of long- or short-term economic advantage. Information on the effect of, and estimate of, the appropriate size of a bonus is being gathered in the current survey.

Bonuses would need to be some equitable fraction of those bonuses offered for active service enlistment and reenlistment. Enlistment bonuses might vary with the time of enlistment and might need to be paid out over the period of enlistment. Otherwise there may be a tendency for a man to default, and the Government may find itself having to attempt

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\* It has been learned the Commanding General, USAREC, has requested more RC medical units be used to assist AFEEs during peak periods in processing possible entrants into the active services—which turns the matter around, and suggests additional uses for RC personnel.



to recoup the enlistment bonus because the individual has not satisfied his obligation. There is likely to be a need for bonuses scaled according to the kind of MOS required. More may need to be paid for the scarce MOSs, as with the variable reenlistment bonus.

The same arguments hold for reenlistment bonuses as for enlistment. Additionally, a reenlistment bonus given to lower-salaried personnel may prove more cost effective to the Army considering the high costs of training.

Variable Enlistment and Reenlistment Options in the RC. Up to this point, there have been fewer enlistment options for the RC than there have been for the active force. It has been realized by the DA that the individual entering the RC should have greater choice as to the period that he is willing to devote to RC duty. (In a sense he is making a reserve option choice when he chooses his active service option—the more active service time, the less obligation in the RC.)

The new 1-year temporary reenlistment option serves a useful purpose in that it allows an individual to try out the RC for a year to see whether or not he really wants to re-up for a longer period.

The 3-year enlistment being proposed may be attractive. In reality, it is a 6-year enlistment with the option of concluding the enlistment after 3 years if the individual so chooses. The 6-year enlistment is likely to fade out, especially if a 3-year option is offered.

Enlistment at Levels Higher than Former Grade. Some RC personnel may be out of active service for a period of time before joining a RC unit. They may have acquired knowledge and skills in their civilian work which qualify them for higher level Army positions than they formerly had. These might be positions of leadership or might be positions of higher technical competence, depending upon the kind of work done in civilian life. Being able to enlist at a higher grade may be a real inducement to enlistment in the RC. The Canadian Army Reserve now offers such a one-grade increase to those transferring from the active force.

Demand for Critical Skills and Critical MOSs. There will be some RC MOS requirements that may be hard to fill, especially if they are filled accurately and properly. Some persons trained in civilian life may have a special knowledge qualifying them for these critical and

unique MOSs. An incentive that allowed for an enlistment primarily from NPS personnel, but to include PS personnel, for enlistment into MOSs other than the MOS they might have had the time previously, may be an attractive inducement.

Emphasis on Quality in RC. The only real qualitative restriction in the RC (other than physical disability) is that the individual not be in mental category V. Experience since 1963 has been that RC enlisted men have generally been in higher mental categories than active service personnel as more often than not they were college-trained persons, and so scored better on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). This fact perhaps should be emphasized in ARNG/USAR units to attract others into units who wish to associate with highly qualified people. If the ARNG/USAR units were to emphasize that they were especially interested in quality, it might be attractive from a status standpoint—one is being accepted into an unique organization.

"Quality" is an ambiguous attribute. In the sense just used, it is wholly an indication of the mental capacity of the individual, as measured by paper-and-pencil tests of mental ability. Unhappily, measures such as the AFQT have many shortcomings—they can predict military performance only very modestly; they sometimes inadvertently are culturally biased, favoring some ethnic and racial groups over others; they sometimes are biased socioeconomically. But they are the best instruments available to date. Quality in the RC needs to be associated with high levels of performance of RC units, part of which can be aided by personnel with requisite intelligence and skills, but which also is generated by leadership that develops high morale, and pride in self and organization.

Additional Roles for Women in the RC. Recent organizational changes permit a greater proportion of Women's Army Corps (WAC) in the RC. It may be necessary to increase this proportion still further and encourage still more to be a part of RC service. If more women can be attracted into ARNG/USAR units, it is likely that the RC will become much more attractive for the men. (There may be a need for child-care centers operated along with ARNG/USAR units that have duties handled equally well by women or men.) Making a place for additional women in the RC

also could have public appeal from the standpoint of the Women's Lib movement.

Policy Changes in RC Obligation. At present a RC obligation is associated with all Active Army enlistments of less than 6 years. There could be greater freedom to move about within the RC after the Army AD obligation has been satisfied. There might be an ability to transfer to the IRR after a term of, say, 3 years of active service in a unit.<sup>58</sup>

Maintenance of a Standby Draft Procedure. It is an Administration position that the draft procedure now in operation should not be terminated, especially since the machinery might be very hard to reinitiate,<sup>58</sup> even though there were no military draft for the active forces. It has been proposed that the draft machinery be maintained and that it be used to maintain RC strengths, if required. One proposal<sup>58</sup> for use of the standby draft machinery for RC service lists four different alternatives:

(a) Draft RC personnel for  $\frac{1}{2}$  year of active service,  $3\frac{1}{2}$ -year obligation in a RC unit, and 2 years in the IRR.

(b) Individual enlists in RC for:

(1) 2 years of active service, plus 3 years in IRR (MOS on availability only).

(2)  $\frac{1}{2}$  year of active service, plus  $3\frac{1}{2}$  years in a RC unit, and 1 year in IRR (MOS on availability only).

(3)  $\frac{1}{2}$  year of active service, plus  $1\frac{1}{2}$  years in a RC unit, and 4 years in IRR.

It is seen that alternatives a, b2, and b3 are essentially the same as available to REP-63 personnel at this time, except that b2 requires only 5 years' total obligation, while the rest require 6. Plan b1 is essentially the same as the present draftee obligation, but has a total of 5 years of service. The individual need not be assigned to a unit upon completion of his 2 years of Active Army service and has only 3 more years of service in the IRR for a total of 5 years. In the two 5-year programs, the individual gives up some of his latitude for selection of MOS within his unit (however it is suspected that if an individual has pretty close liaison with his ARNG/USAR unit commander he probably will come close to getting the MOS that he has desired anyway).



The nature and distribution of RC units nationally pose serious problems not yet resolved. Units are not distributed in proportion to the national population; both USAR and ARNG units are underrepresented according to the population in the Pacific States; the ARNG also is underrepresented in the Middle Atlantic States but overrepresented in the West North Central States. This geographic distribution poses problems of equity in assignment of drafted RC personnel. There also are potential legal implications associated with drafting into the ARNG.

There may be other alternatives developed related to a standby draft procedure for the RC. A possible substitute program might be one that only tags an individual so that he is required to put in sufficient<sup>\*</sup> Active Army service over a period of years, so that he really does not have to commit himself to the full  $\frac{1}{2}$ -year AD for basic combat training and advanced individual training.

Another alternative within the standby draft concept might be the resurrection of universal service for all young persons in the nation. A portion could voluntarily serve with the active military Services and their reserves, and the draft machinery would be maintained for registration only. Associated with such a program might be a relaxing of physical fitness requirements for those MOSs not demanding maximum fitness standards.

It can be argued that a standby draft for the RC is contrary to the idea of a voluntary military force. However it must be recognized that, should the voluntary force fail in its procurement and retention of personnel, some sort of compromise conscription plan may be required if the national security is to be maintained.

#### Training of RC Personnel

The training function is described as "the process of transmitting and acquiring attitudes, skills, and knowledge to build and replenish the Army's requirements."<sup>67</sup>

The training function in the RC has three parts—that associated with the training in RC units, that knowledge and skill acquired through extension courses and schools, and that acquired through AT. These vary

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\* By present law, a RC member is supposed to have 4 consecutive months of ADT before he can be considered to be deployable. Under this alternative, the law would need to be changed.

with individual reservists and with the service options that he has chosen. Within each of these aspects of training are possible changes that could make aspects of the acquisition of skills and knowledge required more attractive.

Length of Training Sessions in Units. In nonpay units, training sessions customarily run for a 2-hour period, exclusive of initial formation, sign-in, and dismissal. In pay units, the period of training is 4 hours, including sign-in and dismissal. The training may be combined into MUTA so that subjects may be covered in greater depth, and those subjects that require greater length of time to cover properly (such as command post exercises, range firing, field exercises, and so on) can be properly managed. These are normally covered during weekend periods. The length of the training assembly has varying attractiveness to a RC member. Some would prefer weekly meetings of short duration, while others would prefer the longer weekend assemblies. It would seem that preferences of unit members (consistent with training effectiveness) could be acknowledged and provided for.

Frequency of Assemblies. The frequency of meetings is intimately tied to the length of meetings, so decisions as to frequency and length must take into account the subject matters and preferences of the unit members. The frequency of assemblies also will vary with the kinds of options that RC members are attracted to, and the options chosen also will depend on the options available and the kinds of reserve organization required in a volunteer environment in relation to the strength of the active force.

Quality of Reserve Training. All too frequently, unless managed by persons who are highly motivated and interested in the mission of the RC, satisfying the training requirement is regarded merely as putting in the required time. The RC units have a good deal of latitude in the kinds of training programs that they mount. The training hinges to a degree upon the character and content of the training subject matters, on the emphasis that is placed on good instruction and proper instructional techniques, on the evaluation of training that has been conducted, and on the relevance and meaningfulness of the training.

Training quality also is related to the quality of the trainees. If the persons being trained are malassigned with respect to the training that they are receiving or are significantly above or below the level being trained for, there is likely to be disinterest and lack of motivation on the part of those being trained. The quality and character of training must be closely related to the ability level of those being trained. It may sometimes be necessary in RC units to depart from the formal training schedules to inject a note of diversity and uniqueness in the training to recapture the attention of the trainees. This of course can be overdone, and the training schedule present nothing but a smorgasbord of things of, perhaps, high interest but not related to the mission of the unit.

Improved Training Facilities. The meeting places of many RC units are not adequate to the unit being trained; supply rooms and motor pool areas often are poorly located. This is not to say that new armories should be built for all RC units, but it cannot help but reflect upon the unit status and the regard with which it is held in the community if the training site and its facilities are not adequate.

Capability of Training Personnel. The ability and ingenuity of the training officer in a unit has much to do with the quality of training. Also the capability of the unit adviser will have great influence on training quality. In the assignment of unit advisers and in the hiring of administrative personnel, there needs to be constant attention to quality. Inasmuch as recruiters need to be selected for their high ability, their personality, and the ability to involve themselves in the community, so the unit adviser needs to have been selected with the same care. The unit commander and his staff need also to be carefully chosen for criteria directly related to their training capability, as well as other skills. Political influence in choosing of higher level unit personnel now present in the administration of reserve affairs needs to be eliminated.

Modern and Up-to-Date Equipment. The rate is accelerating at which more modern equipment is being furnished to RC units.<sup>69</sup> Combat units are able to train with more up-to-date gear. However units requiring heavier equipment (such as construction equipment and more intricate

electronic gear) probably will not have good equipment on which to train for a long while. Equipment maintenance facilities are becoming available for units located in the population centers, but units located in more outlying regions may not have the proper means of storing and maintaining their equipment.

Extension Course Program. At the present time the extension course program for RC members is well developed. It might be improved by offering courses in the area of personal development. (Such courses might be more closely related to the "sustainment" personnel category.) It is realized that the extension course program usually must deal with military subject matters. Still the program could offer a range of courses to RC members so that one may sample other areas in other than his own military specialty. In this way he could develop his knowledge and skills over a wider spectrum of military science, and thus he could improve himself as an individual without respect to military subjects. There would need to be limits established as to which courses would carry retirement point credit.

Military Schools. The RC school program has been developed to a high degree. Instructors for the schools have been chosen quite carefully. There seems to be a basic inequity in school attendance however in that, while individuals might earn points for attendance at a RC school, they are not able to earn pay for this attendance. If one is putting in the time, could he not be paid for it? The same kind of criticism of the school offerings could be made as was made of extension course offerings; that is, a reservist could be able to choose courses (subject to space availability) which are not necessarily related to this MOS or present career field.

Appropriate Numbers of Administrative and Maintenance Technicians. The availability of administrative and maintenance technicians has a good deal to do with the character of the training which the RC may offer. The technicians can do much in handling routine administrative matters relative to training, preparing training materials, and maintaining equipment so that it is available for training. The number and dedication of technicians will enhance the quality of a RC unit. However it should be recognized that if the technicians are performing too

many of the duties of RC members, they may in a sense be taking away some of the on-the-job training of unit members, as, for example, administrative duties of administrative personnel, often carried on during unit assemblies.

Duration and Season of AT. Some plans under consideration would increase the length of the period for AT and remove some of the need for unit training. If all AD takes place during the summer, there will be greater chance of interference with leaves and vacations. Also, in farm areas the summer AT often takes RC members away from their occupations at the time they are needed most. If individuals and units can be assigned to AT with parent units in the active force, it would appear that this training could take place most any time during the year so that it would not be necessary to have AT with the complete ARNG/USAR unit during the summer months (the normal practice) and at posts which often are standby installations opened only for the training of RC.

Annual Training with Active Army. If the AD always took place with the active Service, it would appear that the period and length of training, and perhaps even the location of training, might be altered considerably to attract individuals to RC duty. For example, it is known that the British train some reservists at overseas posts. Is it unreasonable to do the same thing? While transportation costs might be greater, there might be compensating benefits in heightened interest and in providing training missions for MATS personnel. We could train reservists in Britain and Germany, in Korea, Hawaii, and Alaska, and make the training an adventure for the RC member.

#### Distribution of RC Personnel

The distribution function is defined as "the process of allocating, assigning, and transferring individuals to fill military position requirements more effectively."<sup>67</sup>

In the RC it would appear that there needs to be an additional consideration. Not only do military position requirements need to be filled most effectively, but the interests of the individual reservist must be considered so that his needs are satisfied. When the RC member is recruited in his own area and assigned to a unit or becomes a member of the IRR, there is no distribution problem. However consideration must

be given to the mobility of the American citizen. Many young members of the ARNG/USAR move as their schools and employment change. Provision needs to be made so that they can be easily reassigned from one unit to another.

Active Army Adviser Assignment Policy. As was noted in the sections on Procurement and Training, the policy concerning selection of Active Army personnel assigned to the advisory role in RC has a great effect upon the character of the RC unit. The quality of personnel chosen for this kind of assignment and the length of his tour may have a good deal of bearing on the effectiveness of the unit. It is speculated that an especially apt individual will fit better into the civilian community and improve the Army image; he will advise the RC unit with better judgment; his own training will be expanded and his own operations will be more effective; and the general concept of One-Army will be better implemented.\* Perhaps RC and Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) assignments should come to be regarded as choice in the professional development of the individual, and become just as much a criterion for promotion as command assignments.

Transfers from Unit to Unit. With the mobility of young persons in the civilian society, it becomes increasingly important to have a mechanism for easy transfer of an individual from one RC unit to another without any lapse of service. This sometimes presents a problem when the type of unit in the area moved to is not of the same type as the previous unit, or if there is not the same choice of MOS available in the new unit. It may be necessary to allow for a greater degree of overstrength within a unit than presently applies, or to be able to create or have available heterogeneous standby units that can be used to accommodate this kind of fluctuation.

Transfers from Unit to IRR, and vice versa. The same logic applies in transfers from unit to IRR, as was noted in the previous item. It should be made easier for a member to go from a unit to the IRR or to go from the IRR to the unit, depending upon the individual's interest and

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\* This would appear to be a good area for additional study. Determine the characteristics of a good adviser: are they the same, for example, as those of a good parent or good teacher—one who maximizes and brings out the best in his charges?



available time provided the initial 6-year obligation has been fulfilled. The civilian job requirements of an individual change from time to time, sometimes allowing him less time to spend in RC activity. Similarly family responsibilities sometimes require a change in allocation of the individual's time. During such periods in the lives of RC members, they should be able to transfer from the Ready Reserve to the Stby as necessary, without undue sacrifice to their retirement benefits; that is, they should be encouraged and procedures made easy for them to rejoin the active reserve forces.

Distribution of AT Sites. This item has been mentioned previously. An assessment should be made of the interest of individuals respecting the training site location. Do they want it to be some distance from their home, or would they rather it be close by? How would they feel about training at an overseas post? There might even be some logic to government assistance in arranging civilian carrier economy family fares to an overseas location so the individual could take vacation time following his AT. In other words, for those individuals who may not necessarily be attached to the same Active Army unit for AT, the distribution of training sites should, if possible, accommodate to the interests of the individual RC member.

#### Sustainment

Sustainment is defined as "the process of providing Army jobs, tours and careers that promote job satisfaction, personal growth, and productivity."<sup>67</sup>

The sustainment functions include a great variety of benefits which might encourage one to continue in RC affairs. Not only are there tangible benefits, such as improved opportunity for education and the monetary benefits to make living easier, but benefits which accrue from changes in missions and operations of the RC unit.

Extension of VA-Type Benefits to RC Members. It would not be reasonable for a RC member to receive the same VA benefits as a veteran, but he might, by virtue of his participation in the RC, be offered some fractional amounts generally proportionate to the extent of his participation, to include:

- (a) Home loan guaranteed by the VA and/or FHA.

(b) Guaranteed business loans by VA and Small Business Administration.

(c) Educational benefits prorated strictly according to service time, as is done for persons who serve in the active forces; scaled over the period of the RC obligation to the extent of \$300-\$500 per year.

(d) Counseling benefits through the VA to help individuals choose the type of work and training for which they are best fitted psychologically.

Ability to Take USAFI Courses. Members of the active service are able to take the USAFI courses at no cost. Perhaps the same benefit can be extended to members of the RC. It might be that some nominal fee could be charged for the courses. Many of these courses can be used to satisfy credit for high school and college.

Servicemen's Group Life Insurance for RC Members. An additional amount of SGLI might be allowed the RC member if one were to pay a nominal premium for having this coverage.

The length of time over which SGLI would cover the individual's needs could be determined. It might be expected that the term insurance rate would go up as the member became older, just as the VA insurance now does, or one could convert to some other type of policy.

Change in Retirement Credit and Benefits for RC Members. It has been proposed that additional retirement points be allowed for the reservist so that he can earn more than the limit of 60 per year for retirement credit. This in a sense would increase his retirement benefits. The limit of 60 points per year is regarded as unfair by the more active RC members who consistently earn more than the limit but for which they are not credited.

Retirement earlier than age 60 with reduced benefits could be quite attractive to the dedicated RC member. Such an actuarially reduced annuity option is presently being considered by a DOD interagency committee.

Health Care for the Dependent and the RC Member. This would indeed be of major economic benefit, but it probably would be difficult to get approved. It would almost necessarily have to be health care from civilian sources or from contract physicians and dentists, and thus would be



an extension of the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) program.

Income Tax Exemptions for RC Duty. This may be a rather farfetched incentive unless the active force also gains income tax exemption for its duty. A figure of \$1250 annually has been mentioned which could be a significant savings for someone in a high bracket. It might not be much of a benefit for someone who is in the 18 percent bracket. How to clear such a benefit through the rest of the budget structure might present many complications, but it is a benefit perceived as attractive by RC members. Its cost to the Federal government probably is small. State income tax exemption for members of the ARNG probably would be attractive also.

Career Counseling within the RC. At the present time career counseling in RC is not especially effective. A RC member is left mostly to his own resources. Those persons who are in the IRR are eligible for VA counseling. A legitimate career counseling service within units might do much to increase motivation and incentive for participation in the RC.

Equity in Promotion and Advance as Related to Skill and Knowledge. There is an apparent favorable policy in the RC at the present time with respect to officer promotion, in that they stay relatively with their age group in the active force. Whether the same is true with respect to enlisted promotions is not known. It is suspected however that enlisted men often advance in their civilian work beyond the status of their jobs in the ARNG/USAR. This somehow should be able to be applied to the RC assignments, and they should be able to advance in grade as a function of their true skill and knowledge. It might be that some sort of series of proficiency examinations would be required if one wishes to try for a higher position to demonstrate skill and knowledge acquired through extension courses, civilian schooling, RC unit and school training, and one's civilian job.

Improved Satisfaction with Assignment. Means should be taken to assure the individual that he indeed is an important element in the One-Army concept and that his needs are being looked out for with improved training, improved assignment, improved promotion procedures, and with other aspects of the operations of reserve units in which the individual

might be disappointed. If improvements are made and the suggestions of RC members taken into account, general satisfaction with RC duty should improve.

Proficiency Pay for Extraordinary Accomplishment or Skill Level.

Proficiency pay is allocated for certain skill levels in the active force, and there is current discussion of proficiency pay for the combat arms being applied in the form of reenlistment bonuses. Proficiency pay within the RC would have to be scaled down to agree in principle with the amount paid to the active forces. It would be a real inducement however, and recognition for the individual who qualified for it. It is suggested that some sort of visual badge of excellence as, for example, a stripe or a ribbon might be useful also as an inducement and an acknowledgment of the skill the individual has.

Transfer of Job Skills from Military to Civilian Job and vice versa.

Reserve Component service is going to be most satisfying if the individual finds he can use his civilian job skills in his military work, or if he is learning something in his military work that gives him greater breadth in his civilian work. There is also the possibility that the military job assignment might serve as a diversion or a sort of hobby. The character of the individual and his needs regarding this kind of skill transfer should be taken into account and attempts made to satisfy those needs.

No Monetary Loss for AT. It is not now unusual that the individual suffers a monetary loss when he goes on his AT if his RC pay is less than his civilian pay, or if he may have to take his AT during vacation or leave time. If the member's employer has no policy that allows military leave, then it would be hoped that the employer can be convinced that the firm should make up any deficit which might be incurred by RC duty. The testimony given to the Executive Session of House Committee No. 2<sup>31</sup> suggests that a strong effort is going to be made to convince employers of the worth of RC training and to so affect company policy that the RC member suffers no loss because of his patriotic response.

Employer Appreciation of RC. It follows from the preceding item that if the civilian population has a generally wholesome regard for RC duty there will be greater participation in the RC, and the employer will

be more understanding of the problems which the reservist faces in satisfying this obligation. Employers, too, might encourage participation in RC—which would be the most favorable response. Such interaction between government/employer/citizen is being achieved with some success in the UK.

Change and Broadening of RC Missions. If the RC are going to become closely related to their communities, they must become involved in community effort to improve the quality of the community. Thus it should be possible that RC units have some time set aside (implicit relief from required training requirements) wherein they might participate as units in community activities or where members of the unit as individuals could participate in community domestic action activities, such as tutoring, solving of ecological problems, poverty, housing, etc., and receive RC credit for this kind of work, as well as the plaudits of the community. Such involvement of RC units in community work has been enunciated as policy and has been very successful, where tried.

More Social Activities Associated with RC Units. There may need to be attempts to involve the individual more in the unit so that he associates with unit members on a social as well as duty basis. The family of the serviceman also needs to be aware of the member's obligation in the unit and would benefit from participation in social activities in the unit. It should be possible to develop other collateral activities, such as athletic teams and sporting events related to the unit. The more the unit can participate in community activities and get the whole family of the individual participating in the unit-community activities, the better the unit will be accepted in the community, the greater will be the participation of RC members in the Reserves, and the more wholesome will be the attitude toward the RC in the Army as a whole.

Concern for the Family of the RC Member. Just as the Active Army expresses concern for the families of its members and the concept of the "Army taking care of its own" applies in the active force, so should this apply in the RC. If the Army regards itself as One-Army, including the RC, this becomes an easier thing for the RC to accept and implement. However unit commanders need to be especially aware of the needs of the RC member as related to the member's family concern, and the RC unit

commanders may need to take special steps to see that the family of the RC member is taken care of in times of stress and misfortune. If the RC member knows that his family is more secure because of his affiliation with the ARNG or USAR, the more likely he is to join such units.

Greater Personal Freedom concerning Grooming. Many members of the RC find that, while they are civilians for the bulk of the time, one night a week or one weekend a month they have to fit into the military culture. This is regarded as an unfair constraint by many young RC members. They feel they should have almost the same freedoms in the RC as they have in civilian life, and feel that greater personal freedom concerning grooming and personal appearance (hair, beards, moustaches) should be allowed, except perhaps when performing AT.

#### Separation

Separation is defined as a process "whereby military personnel are released from active duty or military control, discharged or retired."<sup>67</sup>

There might be some question as to whether or not separation is a legitimate part of the RC alternatives. It is judged that there are several things that may be associated with a separation which are inducements to affiliation with the RC.

Reserve Component Concern for Family. This is a repeat of the item mentioned under Sustainment. If the reservist knows that "his outfit" is going to be looking out for him and his family regardless of his personal misfortune, it should be an inducement to his participation.

Post Exchange, Commissary, and Medical Benefits for Retirees. It presently is a rule that the PX, commissary, and certain medical benefits are available to those persons retired from RC service. This information may not be widely publicized and is not offered as an inducement. It should be more widely noted. Post exchange and commissary can apply only where they are available—as near a military base. Medical benefits are available through the CHAMPUS program.

Survivor Benefits for RC Members. The available death benefits should be known to the family members of a member of the RC. Presently a survivor is able to receive a portion of the retirement benefits of the individual if he has reached retirement age and has elected such an option. Consideration is being given to expanding this option by allowing

the benefits even though the RC member dies before retirement age. This ties in with the family concern mentioned previously, and can be a point of contact between the RC leadership and the family of their personnel.

Scholarship Assistance for Children of Reservists. This is another way of looking out for the family of the reservist. Each unit might set up some sort of scholarship fund on its own terms. If scholarship funds are not available from the Federal government, the units might even sponsor projects in the community to develop scholarship funds. Provision might be made for a quota of service academy entrants from the RC. This item is not looked upon as a cost to DOD.

Lobbying and Social Organizations Associated with RC Duty. There are a number of organizations, such as the Reserve Officers Association, the National Guard Association, and the Association of the United States Army, that have the Army interest at heart. These organizations should continue to work closely with the RC to help promote RC interest and to attract as members those in units as well as in the IRR.

Encouragement of Reenlistment after a RC Member May Have Been Away from the Unit for a Period. This ties in with the distribution function. As a man is separated from a RC unit, he should be encouraged to affiliate again at some later time. Some mechanism should be developed so that the units may be able to keep track of people who have been out, and might be encouraged to affiliate again. Such prior RC service personnel might also be able to reaffiliate with an increase in their grade if they can provide satisfactory evidence of accomplishment while they have been out of the RC.

#### SUMMARY

Alternative proposals, procedures, and management practices that might contribute to the procurement and retention of RC personnel in a volunteer environment are identified, and each is discussed briefly. The various alternatives are organized and considered in the framework of the five operational aspects of the DA Personnel System: (a) procurement of personnel, (b) training and education, (c) distribution of personnel, (d) sustainment, in terms of satisfaction, personal growth, and productivity, and (e) separation of personnel from the RC. Examination of alternatives in the context of the total personnel management system proves

useful in helping reduce the possibility of overlooking aspects of RC service which may be sources of dissatisfaction and the cause of subsequent personnel loss.

## Chapter 5

### RAC SURVEY OF RESERVE COMPONENT PERSONNEL (TASK 5)

#### INTRODUCTION

Phase I, Task 5 of the study requires that RAC:

Initiate a survey of RC personnel to develop the data needed to determine what portion of these personnel could be induced to reenlist by different incentives, combinations of incentives, or other factors. The survey will include personnel in the sixth year of their initial enlistment in RC units and personnel in their annual training (obligor) category of the IRR, and will develop data on the reasons for initial enlistment as well as possible reenlistment. Reenlistees will be queried as to the reason for their reenlistment decision.<sup>1</sup>

#### CONTENT OF SURVEY

The purpose of the survey was to learn the satisfactions and motivations as well as expectations of RC personnel, described in the Work Statement.<sup>1</sup> This is accomplished in the survey by a series of questions dealing with the satisfactions of enlisted personnel according to nine different areas:

- (a) Assigned duties
- (b) Friendships and personal associations
- (c) Economic benefits associated with ARNG/USAR
- (d) Status in the community
- (e) Effect on family life
- (f) Effect on free time
- (g) Effect on vacation time
- (h) Employer's attitude toward the RC
- (i) Transfer of skills between RC assignment and civilian work



These nine items are ranked on a 7-point scale as to how well they are satisfied in the RC, and then are also ranked by the individual in importance to him.

A major goal in the survey was to determine the effect of economic incentives on attitude toward reenlistment in the RC. Attitude toward reenlistment is expressed throughout the survey on a probability scale so that in the analysis the mean of the probabilities may be arrived at to learn the probability of reenlistment under various specified conditions. The economic incentives considered were the following:

- (a) Fifty percent increase in pay
- (b) \$500 bonus for a 3-year reenlistment
- (c) Guarantee of no economic loss during AT
- (d) Education support having the same monetary value as the reenlistment bonus—\$500 for 3 years
- (e) Servicemen's Group Life Insurance at a nominal cost
- (f) Improved retirement benefits
- (g) Medical and dental benefits for member and his dependents
- (h) Guarantee of home loan by FHA or VA
- (i) Proficiency pay for MOS or skills in short supply
- (j) Federal income tax exemption of \$1250

The respondent was required to select two or three items to constitute a package of economic incentives, and then to evaluate them in terms of their effect on the probability of reenlisting at the end of the 6-year obligation.

Additional noneconomic incentives that are more in the nature of policy or organizational incentives were considered as well. The items considered in this portion of the survey were:

- (a) Liberalization of ARNG/USAR mission
- (b) Establishment of a more favorable public attitude toward RC
- (c) Better utilization of individual skills in RC
- (d) More social and recreational activities in RC units
- (e) Greater freedom of choice with respect to grooming and personal appearance
- (f) Greater opportunity for promotion



- (g) Responsibility for family taken on by the ARNG/USAR unit
- (h) Career counseling in RC
- (i) Effective high esprit in RC units
- (j) Reduced frequency of assembly with a longer period of AT
- (k) No multiple weekend assemblies, but more frequent weekday

assemblies

- (l) The ARNG/USAR unit as a part of a parent Active Army unit
- (m) Better instruction, equipment, and facilities in the ARNG/USAR
- (n) Greater number of WAC in the RC
- (o) Ability to remain in the IRR at much reduced benefits

In this part of the survey only the three items felt to be most important were considered. These items were then put together in a package, and the reenlistment potential assessed. Finally a combination of these noneconomic incentives and the economic incentives judged most important by the respondent were assembled as a large package, and the reenlistment potential again assessed.

The respondent was also asked to furnish information of a biographical nature and make suggestions as to how persons might be enlisted into the RC.

A number of questions were added to the survey that were similar to the 1969 survey conducted by the Special Assistant for Policy Studies for OASD (M&RA).<sup>69</sup> That survey was conducted with RC members of all Services. The common elements in the two surveys will allow some comparison of responses between the two instruments and assist in interpretation of the current survey, in light of response on the 1969 DOD survey.

A copy of the RAC survey of RC personnel and the covering memorandum accompanying it will be found in Annex A<sup>4</sup>.

#### SAMPLE

As noted in the Task Statement,<sup>1</sup> the sample was to be confined to personnel in the sixth year of their initial enlistment. The random sample for the survey was developed from the five tape files maintained by the US Army Administration Center (USAAC) in St. Louis, Mo. These five files and the numbers of persons drawn from them are as follows:

Category	Total enlisted men	Population of sixth year personnel	Sample	Proportion, %
ARNG units	367,000	45,000	998	2.2
USAR units	228,000	39,000	975	2.5
ATCG	885,000	14,000	999	7.1
RCG		41,000	996	2.4
Stby	439,000	385,000	963	0.3
Total		524,000	4931	0.9

It is seen that the total sample of 4931 is roughly 1 percent of the total population. However it will be noted that the sampling of the various files has been done in different proportions; that is, the ARNG, USAR, and RCG were sampled to the extent of over 2 percent, about 7 percent in the ATCG, and about 0.3 percent in the Stby. Slightly under 1000 were sampled in each category. It is felt these sample sizes are adequate for the survey, especially since most of the critical survey items are continuous scale items, which means that one can develop statistically significant data with numbers of 100 and less.

The sample was developed on a systematic basis by USAAC and provided to RAC in the form of a printout of names and two sets of mailing labels for mailing the surveys proper and reminder letters. The surveys were mailed on 7 Dec 71. Reminder letters were mailed on 15 Dec 71 to jog the memories of those persons who had not yet returned the survey.

#### PLAN FOR ANALYSIS

The analysis will take two forms: (a) a description of the characteristics of the sample, and (b) the relation of the probability for reenlistment associated with the most favored incentives in the sample to socioeconomic indicators developed from the background information. These include such things as educational background, annual income, and so on. The most favored incentive will also be related to the region of the nation in which the respondent lives, his employment status, and so on.

Information on the incentives is, of course, necessary to the costing effort in Phase II of the RAC study. Development of information

concerning incentives on a reenlistment probability basis makes such information extremely useful, and permits direct use of the information without making inferences about probability as ordinarily is necessary. It is felt that the use of the probability scale, as has been done in this instrument, is an innovation in scaling techniques.

The pretest of the instrument was conducted with two USAR units in the local area: A US Army general hospital based in Rockville, Md., and a US Army garrison based in Baltimore, Md. A total of about 40 respondents completed the pretest in early November. The pretest showed the survey to be easily used by the respondents and causing no difficulty in response.

#### FIRST-YEAR ENLISTED PERSONNEL SURVEY

As a part of the costing effort, it appeared necessary to learn the attitudes of personnel who have not had extensive RC service toward the RC and the various incentives to enlistment and reenlistment. RAC decided to add to the study persons who have not yet been called for ADT by surveying 1000 members of ARNG and USAR units. The population of such persons is about 11,000 at this time. The survey is very similar to that used for the sixth-year personnel.

#### SUMMARY

This task required that a survey be conducted of enlisted members of the RC who were in the sixth year of their service obligation. The survey developed assesses incentives and inducements that would be required to persuade an individual to reenlist in the RC, as well as the satisfactions associated with RC service. The survey was mailed on 6 and 7 Dec 71 to a stratified random sample of 4931 persons in the US and its Territories, distributed as follows among the population of enlisted obligors in their sixth year:

Category	Population of sixth year personnel	Sample	Proportion, %
ARNG units	45,000	998	2.2
USAR units	39,000	975	2.5
ATCG	14,000	999	7.1
RCG	41,000	996	2.4
Stby	385,000	963	0.3

Review of available information concerning the attitudes and motivations of potential RC enlistees indicates a significant gap in knowledge for such persons. A second survey, adapted to first-year enlisted personnel who have not yet been called to ADT, is also being conducted. A sample of 1000 persons from the total population of 11,000 in this category is being polled.

Chapter 6  
FINDINGS OF PHASE I OF STUDY (TASK 6)

Chapter 6 contains the summary of findings of research conducted in Phase I, and the assumptions (unchanged from those in the study plan).<sup>1</sup>

FINDINGS

Task 1—Review and Analysis of Current and Historical Experience

1. The ARNG/USAR units can recruit only to fill vacancies and in the past have had considerable queuing of personnel waiting to enter the ARNG/USAR. Because enlistment in the ARNG/USAR has been channeled through waiting lists, it was necessary to determine the influence on the waiting lists, rather than on enlistments, that has been exerted by active force levels, draft pressure, population levels, economic conditions, and personnel policies and procedures.

2. Policy decisions such as those which establish new strengths and new structures, as well as those which result in changed personnel policies and procedures have exerted a dominant influence on procurement and retention of ARNG/USAR personnel and on the waiting lists. Although waiting list data are insufficient for quantitative measurement, ample evidence is available to indicate that draft pressures have exerted significant influence on the size of waiting lists and on the responsiveness of this group in actually filling unit vacancies.

3. Active force levels, population levels, and economic conditions have exerted little influence on the waiting lists in the past, but the effect of these factors on enlistment and reenlistment may become more direct and pronounced in a zero-draft environment.

4. In general, the experience of the RC of the other US Armed Services parallels that of the USA RC.

5. The experience of each of the foreign countries examined—Great Britain, Canada, Australia—is unique, but some aspects can be compared with US experience. Policies and procedures dealing with such issues as organization, force structure, end strengths, and personnel management have had a dominant influence on personnel procurement and retention, as with US forces.

6. None of the countries examined offers economic incentives for enlistment or reenlistment in their Reserve Components; however, Australia and Canada are directing some effort toward introduction of a reenlistment bonus. Each of the countries examined has something to offer in the way of ideas that might be adapted to the USA RC, but it is also clear that these countries face many of the same problems as the USA, such as low pay, image, and antipathy toward military service.

7. Not directly related to any specific task requirement but certainly a major conclusion of this study is the need for a comprehensive, uniform system for the collection, collation, and presentation of statistical data and other information (such as attitudes) on procurement and retention of ARNG/USAR personnel. Ideally this coordinated system should be established by DOD so that all Armed Services are reporting and using correlatable data and definitions.

#### Task 2—Review and Analysis of Findings of Recently Completed Studies

1. Eight major studies and the Congressional hearings were reviewed and analyzed for findings on RC in an all-volunteer environment. In addition over 50 trip reports of visits made by CDC and RAC personnel were considered and are reported on in the study.

2. There is general agreement that RC mandated strengths cannot be maintained in a zero-draft environment with the present rate of reenlistment and nondraft-motivated first enlistments. Over 100 suggestions were made for the achievement of personnel numerical goals when there is no draft pressure. Good agreement (50 percent or more of studies) was found on nine recommendations, as follows:

Authorize a reenlistment bonus

Authorize an improved recruiting program

Add to or expand survivor benefits

Authorize educational benefits in return for enlistment, reenlistment, and/or satisfactory service

Authorize payment of an enlistment bonus

Authorize proficiency pay for specialty and superior performance

Extend coverage of SGLI

Provide quarters allowance for REP trainees

Increase basic rates of pay

### Task 3—Determination of Future RC Strength Levels

Reserve Component strength levels that current personnel programs can be expected to maintain in a zero-draft environment through FY79 are shown in the accompanying tabulation.

Component	Beginning strength FY72, thous	End strength FY79, thous		Percent of beginning strength, %		Difference, thous	
		U	L	U	L	U	L
ARNG units	371	379	248	102	67	+ 8	-123
USAR units	228	335	199	147	87	+107	- 29
IRR	920	195	195	21	21	-725	-725
Total	1519	909	642	60	42	-610	-877

Note: U = upper estimate; L = lower estimate

### Task 4—Identification of Alternative Proposals

1. Alternative proposals, procedures, and management practices that might contribute to the procurement and retention of RC personnel in a volunteer environment are identified, and each is discussed briefly. The various alternatives are organized and considered in the framework of the five operational aspects of the DA Personnel System: procurement of personnel; training and education; distribution of personnel; sustainment, in terms of satisfaction, personal growth, and productivity; and separation of personnel from the RC. Examination of alternatives in the context of the total personnel management system proves useful in helping reduce the possibility of overlooking aspects of RC service which may be sources of dissatisfaction and of subsequent personnel loss.

2. Over 50 proposals in all were considered, including such items as:

- Improved recruiting
- Enlistment and reenlistment bonuses
- Demand for critical skills and critical MOS
- Emphasis on quality
- Length of training sessions
- Improved training facilities
- Military schools
- Training with the Active Army
- Army adviser assignments
- Individual Ready Reserve policy regarding transfer
- Extension of VA-type benefits
- No monetary loss for AT
- Career counseling
- Income tax exemption

#### Task 5—Survey of RC Personnel

1. This task required that a survey be conducted of enlisted members of the RC who were in the sixth year of their service obligation. The survey that was developed assesses incentives and inducements that would be required to persuade an individual to reenlist in the RC, as well as the satisfactions associated with RC service. The survey was mailed on 6 and 7 Dec 71 to a stratified random sample of 4931 persons in the US and its Territories, distributed as in the accompanying tabulation among the population of enlisted personnel in their sixth year:

Category	Population of sixth year personnel	Sample	Proportion, %
ARNG units	45,000	998	2.2
USAR units	39,000	975	2.5
ATCG	14,000	999	7.1
RCG	41,000	996	2.4
Stby	385,000	963	0.3

2. Review of available information concerning the attitudes and motivations of potential RC enlistees indicates a significant gap in knowledge of such persons. A second survey, adapted to first year enlisted personnel who have not yet been called to ADT, is also being



conducted; a sample of 1000 persons from the total population of 11,000 in this category is being polled.

#### ASSUMPTIONS

(a) Emphasis in the study is on enlisted reservists.

(b) The time frame for a zero-draft environment will be from July 1973 on.

(c) Large-scale participation of the USA in combat in Vietnam will have been ended by July 1973 and that, at least from that date and in the foreseeable future, the US will be in essentially a peacetime situation but with the threat of limited conflict.

(d) Some change in organization in the present structure of the RC may be effected to complement a zero-draft Army.

(e) The mandated strength of the RC in the Volunteer Army era will be 660,000 in units (ARNG - 400,000; USAR - 260,000); and the planned strength of the IRR will be 656,000.

(f) The current program for upgrading the RC will continue as planned.

(g) The present proportionate distribution of RC personnel about the US will not change appreciably in a zero-draft environment.

Annex A1  
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF EIGHT STUDIES

Annex A1 presents the findings and recommendations of eight of the studies analyzed in Chap. 2. The Gilbert Youth Survey has been excluded as it contained no recommendations for increasing enlistment and retention. Table A1-1 displays these findings listed alphabetically and classified under the general headings as follows.

Compensation

- Bonus
- Death and survivor benefits
- Educational benefits
- Family travel
- Medical care
- Retail facilities
- Quarters allowance
- Retirement benefits
- Salary
- Servicemen's group life insurance

Other incentives

- Enlistment options
- Entry grades
- Term of service

Procurement and retention programs

- Maintaining a favorable Army image
- Medical personnel and services
- Prior service personnel
- Recruiting
- Standby draft
- Other programs

## Professionalism

All-volunteer Army

Civilianization

"Esprit de corps"

Management policies and practices

Quality of service life

Training

Studies are listed in chronological order beginning with the most recent. In this way it is possible to identify those suggestions which have survived over a period of several years' study. For example, the payment of a reenlistment bonus was recommended in the earliest study<sup>51</sup> specifically dealing with the RC and has been included in every subsequent study.

It should further be kept in mind that some of the findings of the Gates Report and PROVIDE apply only to the Active Army.

The incentive proposals did not take the same form in every study. For example, there were many variations of the enlistment and reenlistment bonus in the different studies. These variations, i.e., amount, trial basis, geographic, skills needed, etc., were all included under aggregate headings.

The total number of suggestions is 135. An examination shows however that 86 findings occurred only once and 31 more were proposed twice. The recommendations that appeared in four or more of the eight studies are listed in Table A1-2.

Table A1-1

THE FINDINGS OF RECENT STUDIES OF PERSONNEL  
PROCUREMENT AND RETENTION IN THE ACTIVE ARMY  
AND RC IN A VOLUNTEER ENVIRONMENT

Finding	HR Hearing 19 Jul 71	Selected <sup>58</sup> Analysis	GARPEG <sup>55</sup> Study	IRR <sup>53, 54</sup> Study	CSM 70-150 Study	PROVIDE <sup>29</sup> Study	CORC R&R Study	Gates <sup>50</sup> Study
Compensation								
Bonus								
Payment of an enlistment bonus	X	X	X	X <sup>A</sup>			X	
A reenlistment bonus should be authorized	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Reenlistment bonus should be made in flexible payments	X				X			
Analysis of the proposal to make flexible reenlistment payments should be deferred pending completion of ongoing actions in OSD		X						
Death and survivor benefits								
Increased or additional death benefits			X					
Addition or expansion of survivor benefits	X		X	X		X	X	X
Further analysis of survivor benefits should be deferred pending completion of ongoing actions in OSD						X	X	
Subject to further study, authorize beneficiaries' retirement benefits to eligible reservists who die before retirement								
Educational benefits		X						
Educational benefits, by month or year of education or by dollar payment for years of enlistment, reenlistment and/or satisfactory service	X		X	X	X	X	X	
Educational benefits require further analysis and action should be deferred pending outcome of OSD actions		X						
Proposed cancellation of up to 50 percent of National Defense Education Student loan debts						X		

<sup>a</sup> Recommended a limited test of an enlistment bonus.

Table A1-1 (continued)

Finding	HR Hearing <sup>39</sup> 19 Jul 71	Selected <sup>58</sup> Analysis	GARPEG <sup>55</sup>	IRR <sup>53,54</sup> Study	CSM 70-150 <sup>52</sup> Study	PROVIDE <sup>29</sup>	CORC R&R <sup>51</sup> Study	Gates <sup>50</sup> Study
Enrollment in USAFI courses							X	
Enrollment in USAFI courses requires additional analysis and action should be deferred pending outcome of OSD actions		X						
Provide individuals in the health service with ample opportunities for postgraduate and advanced military education, long-term courses at civilian institutions, in-service short courses and seminars, and attendance at professional meetings						X		
Initiate a 2 year associate degree program for the top five enlisted grades						X		
Vocational training for civilian careers during last 6 months of service and job placement assistance						X		
Encourage commanders to make maximum time available for members to take advantage of educational opportunities						X		
Family travel								
Reimbursement of family travel expense and dislocation allowance extended to all enlisted personnel								X
Medical care								
Extend coverage for health care (in commercial carrier group, CHAMPUS)			X			X	X	
Improve dependent medical and dental care						X		
Extend coverage or authorize medical care for injuries sustained while on or traveling to and from IDT								X
Retail facilities								
Extension of commissary, PX, and theater privileges to RC and all RC retirees								X

Table A1-1 (continued)

Finding	HR Hearing 19 Jul 71	Selected 39 Analysis	GARPEG <sup>55</sup>	IRR <sup>53</sup> , <sup>54</sup> Study	CSM 70-15C <sup>52</sup> Study	PROVIDE <sup>29</sup>	CORC R&R <sup>51</sup> Study	Gates <sup>50</sup> Study
Commissary and PX privileges should not be extended to the RC			X					
Quarters allowance								
Provide adequate housing for all military personnel					X			
Increase dislocation allowance to cover the actual cost of a move, and provide temporary lodging or allowance on permanent change of station						X		
In the absence of a salary pay system, establish a variable allowance for quarters for members not furnished government housing which is sufficient to cover the actual cost of rent, utilities, and commuting expenses						X		
Provide quarters for REP trainees		X		X		X		
Retirement benefits								
Authorize earlier entitlement to retirement pay on an actuarial basis						X	X	
The proposal to authorize earlier entitlement to retirement pay on an actuarial basis requires additional analysis		X						
Consider legislation authorizing a Reserve retirement option which begins at age 50				X		X	X	
Implement an improved retirement plan	X							
Retirement credit should be given for all points earned						X	X	
Authorize additional retirement points			X					
The proposal to grant additional retirement points should be deferred pending completing of ongoing actions in OSD		X						
Salary								
Raise basic pay rates for personnel in the first 2 years of service								X

Table A1-1 (continued)

Finding	HR Hearing <sup>39</sup> 19 Jul 71	Selected <sup>58</sup> Analysis	GARFEG <sup>55</sup> Study	IRR <sup>53,54</sup> Study	CSM 70-156 <sup>52</sup> Study	PROVIDE <sup>29</sup>	CORC Study	R&R Study	Gates <sup>50</sup> Study
Increase basic rates of pay	X			X	X				X
Raise hazardous duty (combat) pay						X			X
Extend pay differential for desired skills to enlistees									X
Introduce a comprehensive military salary system								X	X
Pay for attendance at USAR schools			X	X				X	X
Proficiency pay for specialty and superior performance						X			X
Combat arms proficiency pay is not needed at this time		X							
Implementation of a cost-of-living allowance plan for high cost CONUS areas						X			
FHA in-service loan availability extended to RC	X		X						
Servicemen's Group Life Insurance									
Extend coverage of SGLI			X	X	X	X		X	
Increase coverage of SGLI						X			
Further analysis of full-time SGLI should be deferred pending completion of ongoing actions in OSD		X							
Optional insurance to protect equity in retirement be made available					X				
Further analysis of optional insurance to protect equity in retirement be deferred pending completion of ongoing actions in OSD		X							
Other incentives									
Enlistment options									
Determine feasibility of offering guaranteed 3 year assignment to choice of geographic location						X			X

Table A1-1 (continued)

Finding	HR Hearing <sup>39</sup> 19 Jul 71	Selected 58 Analysis	CARPEG <sup>55</sup> Study	IRR <sup>53,54</sup> Study	CSM 70-150 <sup>52</sup> Study	PROVIDE <sup>29</sup> Study	CORC R&R <sup>51</sup> Study	Gates <sup>50</sup> Study
Determine feasibility of offering guaranteed training in and three year assignment to a job of the individual's choice								
Entry grades								
Allow entry at higher grades					X			
Expand the program for accepting personnel with critical skills into the enlisted ranks at a higher entry grade						X		
Term of service								
Enlistment for less than a 6-year period	X							
Elimination of the present system of obligated terms of service for enlisted personnel								X
Consider the reduction of the length of the RC enlistment period to 3 years						X		
A modified 6-year enlistment program requires additional analysis		X						
Procurement and retention programs								
Maintaining a favorable Army image								
Involvement in local projects and work with youth groups to gain community support				X	X		X	
Increase publicity to gain local community support								
Seek cooperation of employers of RC personnel by a suitable information campaign								
Promote activities which involve members' families	X						X	
Publicize retirement benefits	X						X	



Table A1-1 (continued)

Finding	HR Hearing 19 Jul 71	Selected 39 Analysis	58	IRR <sup>53,54</sup> Study	CSM 70-150 <sup>52</sup> Study	PROVIDE <sup>29</sup> Study	CORC R&R <sup>51</sup> Study	Gates 50 Study
Publicize the role of women in the Army						X		
Modify TOE/TDAs to include spaces for information personnel				X			X	
Increase the number and frequency of news items and general information releases through DOD publications and news media				X			X	
Increase efforts to reach and improve image among minority groups				X			X	
Encourage and stimulate patriotism				X				
Change the name of the IRR				X				
Conduct periodic surveys and studies to measure the image of the Army, identifying Army strengths and weaknesses against which advertising efforts and personnel actions should be directed						X		
Survey the RC personnel and manpower pool to determine the appeal of existing and proposed incentives				X		X		
Medical personnel and services								
Provide more medical scholarships				X				
Expand Army Medical Department procurement and training						X		
Provide maximum opportunity for medical officer specialization						X		
Support establishment of an Armed Forces Medical Academy						X		X
Provide optional choice of civilian medical facilities when military facilities are overtaxed						X		X
Increase total compensation of medical officers								X
Adjust pay of medical officers to approach that of civilian counterparts						X	X	

Table A1-1 (continued)

Finding	HR Hearing 19 Jul 71	Selected 56 Analysis	GARFEG 55 Study	IRR 53, 54 Study	CSM 70-150 52 Study	PROVIDE 29 Study	CORC R&R 51 Study	Gates 50 Study
Prior service personnel								
Eliminate restrictions which prohibit or discourage PS enlistments and reenlistments						X		
Effort should be made to recruit men with PS in other branches of DOD				X				
Implement in-service recruitment			X			X	X	
Briefing by RC to Active Army separatees should be oral							X	
Recruiting								
Increase the advertising budget of the USAREC						X		
An improved recruiting program should be authorized		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Modify TOE/WDAs to include spaces for recruiters			X	X		X	X	
Recruit through youth programs, including the Junior ROTC			X					
Use minority group members for recruiting							X	
Standby draft								
Draft legislation and administrative machinery should be maintained						X		
A standby Selective Service should be established								X
A standby Selective Service with a lottery for filling RC units and IRR should be retained					X	X		
Retention of the Selective Service System on a standby basis requires additional analysis		X						
Other programs								
AFES support for necessary enlistment administration and processing					X			

Table A1-1 (continued)

Finding	HR Hearing <sup>39</sup> 19 Jul 71	Selected <sup>58</sup> Analysis	CARPEG <sup>55</sup> Study	IRR <sup>53,54</sup> Study	CSM 70-15 <sup>52</sup> Study	PROVIDE <sup>29</sup> Study	CORC R&R <sup>51</sup> Study	Gates <sup>50</sup> Study
An incentive program with a number of options should be offered					X			
Monitor enlistment options to ensure their compatibility with changing needs of the service and desires of the potential enlistees				X				
Maintain physical and moral standards at their present level, and reevaluate the feasibility of accepting a greater number of new standards personnel (Project 100,000)				X			X	
A Reserve Service Obligation Clause for Active Army contracts is not needed at this time		X						
Require Reservists to fulfill their current Reserve obligation, and maintain adequate enforcement penalties during transition to an all-volunteer force						X		
Professionalism								
All-volunteer Army								
All-volunteer peacetime Army recommended						X	X	X
Appointment of a task group to ensure detailed study and phased implementation of move to an all-volunteer Army						X		
Civilianization								
Use of civilians to the maximum extent possible						X		
Civilianization of KP except in combat areas						X		
"Esprit de corps"								
Create a sense of "esprit de corps"				X				
IRR should be made aware of ties to Active Army and RC units. These ties should be strengthened								X

Table A1-1 (continued)

Finding	HR Hearing <sup>39</sup> 19 Jul 71	Selected <sup>50</sup> Analysis	GARPEG <sup>55</sup> Study	IRR <sup>53,54</sup> Study	CSM 70-150 <sup>52</sup> Study	PROVIDE <sup>29</sup> Study	CORC R&R <sup>51</sup> Study	Categ <sup>50</sup> Study
Implementation of a proposed Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS) which would provide personnel with a point of unity and identification					X			
Increased contact of RC units with Active Army units					X			
Encourage Active Army retirees to affiliate with RC			X					
Management policies and practices								
Issue adequate (quality and quantity) equipment to RC; ARNG armories and USAR centers to have priority					X			
Provide USAR with organization maintenance technicians					X		X	
Additional organizational maintenance technicians for the USAR are not needed at this time		X						
Conduct a review of the RC management					X			
Centralize management of the RC					X			
A complete and continuously updated force structure should be supplied to the IRR					X			
Establish controls to ensure an acceptable quality composition						X		
Support centralized personnel management actions presently being developed, to include complete implementation of Management of Enlisted Careerists Centrally Administered (MECCA), and maximum use of Career Management Fields (CMF)					X			
Intensify the use of Career Counseling teams at all major installations to assist in career counseling, to explain major changes in personnel policy, and to explain advantages of RC service to separatees								X
Performance counseling				X				

Table A1-1 (continued)

Finding	HR Hearing <sup>39</sup> 19 Jul 71	Selected <sup>58</sup> Analysis	CARPEG <sup>55</sup> Study	IRR <sup>53,54</sup> Study	CSM 70-150 <sup>52</sup> Study	PROVIDE <sup>29</sup> Study	CORC R&R <sup>51</sup> Study	Gates <sup>50</sup> Study
Higher headquarters must establish effective controls to monitor counseling programs				X			X	
Advancement in grade as warranted by civilian career qualifications				X	X		X	
Prompt payment of personnel							X	
Reevaluate social and recreational activities so that they are responsive to current interests						X		
Elimination of inadequate commissary and PX service by expansion of facilities and improved management						X		
Increased use of foreign military and civilian manpower resources to support US units in overseas areas						X		
Monitor foreign experience with a volunteer armed force						X		
Re-examine all manning documents and designate spaces that are suitable for substitution with women						X		
Increase strength of WACs						X		
Construct additional WAC training facilities and rehabilitate space Army-wide for increase in WAC						X		
Quality of service life								
Identify and eliminate in-service irritants					X			
Reduce the frequency of unaccompanied tours or establish a system of compensation for those who must serve a disproportionate number of unaccompanied tours						X		
Reduce to the minimum the number of permanent changes of station						X		

Table A1-1 (continued)

Finding	HR Hearing <sup>39</sup> 19 Jul 71	Selected <sup>58</sup> Analysis	GARPEG <sup>55</sup>	IRR <sup>53, 54</sup> Study	CSM 70-150 <sup>52</sup> Study	PROVIDE <sup>29</sup>	CORC R&R <sup>51</sup> Study	Gates <sup>50</sup> Study
Explore measures to provide to enlisted personnel maximum freedom of movement during off-duty hours; examine the possibility of reducing the length of the work week						X		
Increase the use of awards and decorations (e.g., National Defense Service Medal)				X		X	X	
Amendment of appearance regulations (e.g., AR 600-20) to standardize requirements for hair lengths, etc.				X			X	
Training								
Minimum time should be spent on MUTA-4's							X	
Flexibility should be allowed for achieving basis unit training and specific training objectives					X			
Major headquarters and advisors should monitor MOS training and employment of enlisted personnel					X			
RC training held with Active Army					X			

Table A1-2  
MOST FREQUENTLY RECOMMENDED  
FINDINGS OF TABLE A1-1

Finding	Number of times recommended
A reenlistment bonus should be authorized	7
An improved recruiting program should be authorized	7
Addition or expansion of survivor benefits	6
Educational benefits, by month or year of education or by dollar payment for years of enlistment, reenlistment and/or satisfactory service	6
Payment of an enlistment bonus	5
Proficiency pay for specialty and superior performance	5
Extend coverage of SGLI	5
Provide quarters allowance for REP trainees	4
Increase basic rate of pay	4

## Annex A2

### FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS

#### MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS

A large number of excellent suggestions to increase procurement and retention rates of the RC has been found in material available for review other than those findings of in-depth studies addressed in the first part of this analysis. These recommendations, shown in Table A2-1, are included without detailed analysis, review, or source but with the number of times this particular suggestion was found.

The sources of these suggestions are varied. A major source was the trip reports of personnel who participated in the field observation for the ongoing RAC study, "Alternatives for Improved Army Force Capabilities," conducted for the USA CDC. Other suggestions or recommendations have been found in articles written for service and allied publications and papers written for course work at staff schools. These may include general recommendations made for RC of other branches of DOD as well as the Army.

These recommendations are of value for several reasons. They express the opinions of many who are presently serving in the Active Army or RC. Rather than emphasizing major incentives, a large number are proposals for changes which will improve the quality of an individual's service experience thus overcoming reluctance to reenlistment. Quite a few will accomplish change for the better at little or no cost to the DOD. Certain major incentives, such as the reenlistment bonus, which have been extensively studied and are a part of the findings of the in-depth studies previously analyzed, are included again as a measure of their widespread appeal. They are grouped by general area of application or similarity. The frequency with which each was found to have been made follows the proposal.



Table A2-1

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM VARIOUS SOURCES TO IMPROVE PERSONNEL  
PROCUREMENT AND REENLISTMENT IN THE ARMED FORCES

Recommendations	Frequency with which found
Incentive proposals	
Cash bonus reenlistment	7
Grant retirement at any age with 20 years of service	7
Post exchange and commissary privileges	7
Medical and dental care for dependents	6
Package of VA benefits -- education, home loans, "some sort of GI bill"	3
Reduce retirement age from 60 to 50 years	3
Enlistment bonus	2
Better RC pay	2
Assistance with loans for housing from FHA and VA	1
Provide members of ARNG with free auto tags, distinc- tive auto tags, freeway and turnpike tickets	1
Reduce enlistment period to three years	1
Proficiency pay	1
Use of military clubs	1
Require employers to grant leave with pay for AT	1
Grant employers a tax write-off for loss of employee's time or salary while on duty	1
Proposals to improve RC image	
More publicity, especially of new incentives	1
More recognition in local news media of promotions and activities	1
Carry out a comprehensive program to increase the image of the military establishment	1
Publicize special units to appeal to special enthusiasms (e.g., boats, aircraft)	1
Give more publicity to financial benefits (present) of ARNG duty (example: AD time may pay an equivalent of \$4.00/hr)	1
Use members of the unit working at the local radio/TV stations and newspapers to obtain better and more frequent publicity	1
Public relations should be oriented toward getting support of employers	1
Hold periodic orientations, demonstration rides in ARNG equipment	1

Table A2-1 (continued)

Recommendations	Frequency with which found
Sponsoring trials by youth to pass the Army Physical Fitness Test and presenting suitable certificates to those who pass	1
Sponsoring athletic events and field days for junior and senior high school students	1
Sponsoring visits of the USA Field Band and arranging for local musicians to play with or audition for the Band	1
Proposals to improve quality of service experience	
Issue same ID cards (same color) as are used by Active Army	4
Use buses and/or private cars rather than trucks to travel to MUTA	3
Conduct an AT in Europe	2
Identify Reserve unit with a close-by active unit and participate with this unit rather than under its supervision	2
Make a realistic appraisal of extra time expected from each individual, provide paid time for administrative load	2
Relax personal appearance requirements except during AT	2
Make assistance from RA recruiters available to RC	2
Conduct an AT at a southern post during the winter (if found feasible) for a northern based unit	1
Eliminate meaningless training and administrative harassment	1
Eliminate drills and lengthen AT	1
Arrange AT at distant and interesting locations	1
Retain only those units with challenging and meaningful training	1
Do not require unit to both recruit and train	1
Drill pay should be monthly and prompt	1
Provide more realistic training on modern equipment	1
Organize an Active Army training team to provide better quality training	1
Supply RC units with equipment for training equal to the Active Army	1
Make ANG aircraft available for moving ARNG/USAR personnel to and from some training sites	1
MOS should be compatible with civilian job and training	1
Promote a sense of "esprit de corps"	1

Table A2-1 (continued)

Recommendations	Frequency with which found
Conduct parades as a community service on such occasions as Independence Day and Veterans Day	1
A boat company uses boats to provide rides for Boy Scout troops. They plan to extend this to their families and community.	1
Utilize equipment in more community service projects to enhance the military image	1
Provide funds and drill time for more Junior leader personnel	1
Sponsor more social activities	1
Provide a lounge for dependents at armories	1
Establish a "sense of belonging" for families	1
Form auxiliaries or wives clubs	1
Use armories as open houses for displays by government and industry on environmental problems	1
ARNG and USAR units spearhead drives to clean up parks, rivers, playgrounds, beaches and highways. Units to furnish vehicles and supervision for community involvement.	1
Begin Operation Paintbrush to provide supervision and labor to repaint youth clubhouses, schools, orphanages, and public buildings in coordination with local unions and contractors.	1
Begin Operation Clean Sweep to provide supervision and labor in disadvantaged areas, in coordination with state and local governments for ridding streets, alleys and vacant lots of debris which contribute to both pollution and unsightliness.	1
Provide technological advice and assistance on air and water pollution based on technical expertise of units' members.	1
Provide assistance in rural areas to forestry projects, advice and counsel to 4-H Clubs and Future Farmers of America.	1
Coaching and sponsorship of team sports for under-privileged children.	1
Vocational and technical training of disadvantaged youth in Army-owned facilities	1
Supervising field trips to Army installations or armories for youth and school groups	1
Supervising camping trips to military installations	1
Sponsor awards for scholarship and military achievement to units of the National Defense Cadet Corps and ROTC	1

Table A2-1 (continued)

Recommendations	Frequency with which found
Other proposals	
Community colleges and vocational schools can effectively train personnel in certain skills, such as ADP, clerical, stenographic, etc., and provide a motivation to people to enlist or re-enlist by having the Army paying the education expense and providing the soldier with a civilian-recognized accreditation which has high transfer acceptability to civilian work	1
Use high school counsellors to identify, encourage, and guide young men who might benefit from specialized military service training related to their intended vocation	1
Form groups for special interest among members such as an investment club	1

## OTHER ARMED FORCES

### Navy

The Navy endorses a reserve incentive program almost identical to the Army as follows:

- (a) Pay raise
- (b) Reenlistment bonus
- (c) Initial enlistment bonus
- (d) Selective proficiency pay
- (e) Full SGLI coverage
- (f) Tuition aid assistance
- (g) Use of USAFI facilities
- (h) Increased retirement point credit
- (i) Increased medical/dental and death benefits
- (j) Increased use of direct procurement of Petty Officers program
- (k) Improved career counseling
- (l) Per diem payment while on ADT without pay
- (m) Travel and per diem cost reimbursement for attending drills.

The findings in the reserve area in a low- or zero-draft environment are as follows. Shortages are expected in the nonrated personnel which will erode capability to support the total force concept beginning in FY73. Serious petty officer shortages are expected to commence in FY74. The Navy expects "a gradual degradation of reserve capability" unless incentives are introduced to enhance recruitment and retention. These incentives were stated in a Navy memorandum, "DOD Recruiting Conference, 5-6 October 1971."<sup>36</sup>

### Air Force

The Air Force has not yet experienced a drop in RC waiting list strength as severe as the other Services. However they too believe that as draft pressure declines, waiting lists will tend to disappear. According to testimony of Secretary of the Air Force Robert C. Seamans before the Senate Committee on Appropriations<sup>39</sup>, "Along with an increased recruiting effort, the Air Force is currently developing incentives to attract personnel into the military service, including the Reserve Forces, in a zero-draft environment. It is not our aim to create an imbalance which will make the Guard and Reserve Services more attractive than active

service. Rather, we desire to develop incentives which will be mutually beneficial to all components of the total force."<sup>39</sup> Selected incentive programs on which active development work is being done at present are as follows:

- (a) Enlistment and reenlistment bonuses for Reserve personnel
- (b) Junior college scholarships for reservists
- (c) Tuition assistance program for Reserve Forces
- (d) Increased authorizations for Air Reserve technicians
- (e) Authorization of survivor benefits to reservists on AD
- (f) Increased uniform allowance for Reserve officers
- (g) Early retirement with reduced annuity
- (h) Provide survivor benefits for members with 20 or more years of creditable service toward title III retirement
- (i) Additional retirement point credits per year.

These incentives were presented by the Honorable Robert C. Seamans in the Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations.<sup>39</sup>

#### Marine Corps

The Marine Corps proposes the following incentives or programs for the Reserve to offset loss of draft-motivated recruits in the zero-draft environment:

- (a) Authorize six officers and 80 staff noncommissioned officers as school-trained recruiters for the Reserve.
- (b) Offer an enlistment/participation bonus of \$400 to be paid to the individual reservists upon completion of each year of satisfactory service during the initial four-year enlistment period.
- (c) Provide a retention bonus of \$500 to career-oriented reservists at the completion of each year of satisfactory service.
- (d) Authorize education/tuition assistance to a satisfactorily participating reservist in the amount of \$500 per year not to exceed \$2000.
- (e) Reduce Reserve contractual service to four years.
- (f) Construct new training centers to replace existing antiquated structures.
- (g) Increase Marine Corps participation in Marine Corps Junior ROTC by two units per year.

(h) Enact legislation permitting selected members of the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve to participate in regularly scheduled drills and AT and to receive pay for such training.

These incentives were presented by Marine Corps General Chapman in the Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations, FY72.<sup>39</sup>

### Annex A3

#### A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR STUDIES WHICH ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF MAINTAINING FORCE STRENGTH LEVELS IN A ZERO-DRAFT ENVIRONMENT

The first of the major efforts is that by Stuart A. Altman of Brown University and Alan G. Fechter of IDA.<sup>11</sup> Their approach consisted of the application of a sophisticated time series regression analysis technique to enlistment rates, manpower reservoirs, and various elasticities in an attempt to predict (a) the supply of 17-24 year old men who could be induced to enlist in the Army in a nondraft situation, and (b) what costs the Army could expect to incur by maintaining specified force levels using these supply parameters. Their analysis, a scholarly and legitimate attempt to extend a statistical model to Army recruitment problems, did not directly address itself to the question of maintaining RC force levels in the absence of a draft. However they did recognize briefly that recruitment in the RC poses problems which are significantly different from those of RA. For this reason, however valid their conclusions may have been with reference to projecting RA force levels, it is not reasonable to extend their findings to include the RC.

In 1969, Anthony C. Fisher published another time series regression analysis,<sup>12</sup> based on data collected prior to 1967, in an attempt to predict the cost of ending the draft and maintaining an all-volunteer Active Army. Again, though his model appears to be mathematically valid, it did not touch on the problems encountered by the RC. The two main conclusions of his study (which are of interest, nonetheless) were that (a) approximately 24 percent of all NPS enlistments in the Active Army are draft motivated, and (b) the cost to maintain an all-volunteer Army commensurate in strength and readiness to 1969 force levels would fall somewhere in the range of \$4.8 to \$6.9 billion.

Subsequent studies, including one by Benjamin P. Klotz,<sup>25</sup> took issue with Fisher's findings, asserting that his predictions were biased because



(a) Fisher's key supply parameters were not reliably estimated, and  
(b) that the resulting bias caused the projected cost of \$4.8 billion to erode to only \$2.0 billion.

Later in 1969, Stuart H. Altman<sup>16</sup> published a study in which he tried to establish a statistical relation among earnings, unemployment, and the supply of enlisted volunteers in the absence of a draft environment. The major result of his effort (which centered its attention almost solely on the RA) was his discovery that unemployment rates have a high correlation with first-term enlistments in the Army, but have no significant correlation with enlistment into the Reserve Forces. However, reenlistments in the RC show a high correlation to fluctuations in the unemployment rate. His recommendations that a higher military wage scale would have a strong positive effect on enlistment rates in the absence of a draft is echoed in a number of other studies.

The single major shortcoming of these three studies (aside from the fact that they do not address themselves to the cost of obtaining a voluntary reserve force) is their admission that, in general, regression equations show increasing margins of error as their applications approach the upper and the lower limits. When extended to embrace a zero-draft environment, they are not likely to be reliable predictors.

Prior to the fall of 1969, no study of any kind applied itself to providing meaningful projections of cost and end strengths which could be expected in RC given a no-draft environment. The earlier time series regression studies (1964) suggested that only 25 percent of all first-term enlistments are truly draft motivated. A 1964 attitude survey conducted by DOD estimated that the rate is closer to 40 percent. Studies which compare the 1948 and 1950 zero-draft periods suggest the rate then may have been as high as 60 percent. As of summer 1969, however, it was generally believed that even though each of these types of evidence presents different problems of sorting out the controlling conditions, the actual effect of the draft on enlistment (though it is sure to change with time) was probably within this range.

In September 1969, DA undertook a study, "PROVIDE, Project Volunteer in Defense of the Nation,"<sup>29</sup> which attempted to provide a definitive answer to the problems which could be anticipated in maintaining the strength of both the RA and its RC in the absence of a draft (see Table

A3-1). This study concluded that there was no authoritative research available to date which could predict accurately the number of young men who would enlist or reenlist in the RC in a nondraft situation. Nor are such predictions likely, this study asserts, considering the difficulty in evaluating attitudes toward military service, future employment rates, and possible threats of war. It is significant, however, that they asserted that as high as 7 percent of the available manpower pool (the number they estimate is needed to maintain RC strength levels) can be motivated to enlist or reenlist with combined incentives packages.

[Some reference has been made to the Hubbell (or 5 percent) survey which preceded this study, but it is largely discounted as a valid predictor because of (a) the insufficient number of responses elicited from E-1 and E-2 grades; (b) the fact that the survey embraced only draft-environment pre-conditioned individuals; and (c) the unit members surveyed already had their attitudes to the RC colored by PS.]

Some of the PROVIDE conclusions are worthy of note at this point because they bear directly on the most recent research effort which was underwritten by DOD. The study concluded, first, that elimination of the draft will require that shorter terms of duty be implemented to attract volunteers; second, that shortening of the service terms will proportionately increase personnel turnover, training, and equipment costs; and third, that this will ultimately result in a substantial loss of manpower and readiness in the first 3 years following suspension of the draft. They estimate FY76 end strength to be approximately 30 percent of FY70 beginning strength.

The projection prepared under the auspices of the PROVIDE study, using statistics provided by CORC, CAR, and ARNG, is based on five major assumptions. After closer examination of these assumptions, several anomalies appear which frustrate the validity of the projection. It is perhaps most efficacious to discuss each of these assumptions in turn.

Assumption 1: Career Strength Remains Stable  
at a Level of 50,850 per Year

According to the Selected Analysis<sup>58</sup> made available to our study by DA, the career strength (that portion of the RC which historically has reenlisted past the tenth year) that this study assumes to be stable at 50,850 per year has historically shown wide yearly fluctuations, but has

Table A3-1

PERSONNEL STRENGTH SHORTFALL PROJECTION <sup>29</sup>

Year	Total strength	Careerist strength	Beginning less careerist strength	Loss	Strength after losses	Nonprior service gains	End strength	Careerist strength	Total end strength	Percent of beginning strength
FY70	585,144	50,850	534,294	97,524	436,770	56,079	492,848	50,850	543,699	92.92
FY71	543,699	50,850	492,849	97,524	395,325	58,257	453,582	50,850	504,432	86.21
FY72	504,432	50,850	453,582	97,524	356,058	60,615	416,673	50,850	467,523	79.90
FY73	467,523	50,850	416,673	153,603	263,070	61,218	324,288	50,850	375,138	64.11
FY74	375,138	50,850	324,288	155,781	168,507	62,283	230,790	50,850	281,640	48.13
FY75	281,640	50,850	230,790	158,139	72,651	63,576	136,227	50,850	187,077	31.97

## Assumptions:

Career strength remains stable.

Basic statistic for computation equals FY70 beginning strength minus career base.

Beginning strength will be lost in six even increments.

Nonprior-service gains (REP) will be lost after 3-year enlistments expire.

One-third of 2 percent of manpower pool Reserve strength can be recruited each year (0.67 percent).

averaged in the past decade approximately 25,000 per year. Our research has failed to find sufficient data to substantiate the validity of a historical claim to a careerist strength of 50,850 per year in the ARNG and USAR.

Assumption 2: Basic Statistic for Computation Equals  
FY70 Beginning Strength Minus Career Base

The difficulties presented to the PROVIDE study by this assumption are manifold. The draft was expected to be cancelled altogether by end of FY70, over a period of 4 months, when the study was completed. It implicitly assumed that the wind-down to ultimate cancellation of the draft would be much more abrupt than we now anticipate. This presents some compelling ramifications when an attempt is made to apply the numbers implied in this assumption (to a situation in which draft pressure is reduced to a level insufficient to cause draft-motivated young men to enlist in the RC) long before the draft is actually ended. The "gray area" of 21 months, from September 1971 to July 1973, during which the current draft will phase-out, is extremely difficult to assess with conventional predictors because (a) there is little valid precedent on which to base a model, (b) only the barest details are available from the July to October 1971 zero-draft period, and (c) the several other factors shown to have an effect on enlistment rates (the unemployment rate, threats of war, attitudes toward service in the military) are sufficiently difficult to evaluate that it is unlikely that anything other than an intuitive predictor can be applied with any degree of reliability to this period without additional broad, large-scale research efforts. Therefore this assumption appears not to apply to our study.

It is interesting to note that the statistic which is actually used in the project is not, in fact, the beginning strength minus careerist strength. The annual loss of 97,524 is one-sixth of 585,144, not one-sixth of 534,294, as assumption 2 stipulates.

Assumption 3: Beginning Strength Will Be Lost in  
Six Even Increments

While it may be convenient to deal with declines in strength in terms of equal increments, it is by no means valid to assume that losses over specific periods of time will be equally incremental at all. Recent projects conducted at RAC for the Army have shown that although seasonal

fluctuations in any given year can be identified for enlistment levels in each month and for successive quarters, no statistical model has been entirely successful in predicting changes for corresponding future periods (see "Reserve Personnel Projection Model RP2M System"<sup>72</sup>).

Assumption 4: NPS Gains (REP) Will Be Lost After  
3 Year Enlistments Expire

When the PROVIDE study was begun, it was anticipated that the term of enlistment in the RC would be halved, from 6 years to 3. Since this has not occurred (and there are no 3-year enlistments in the RC), only 6-year terms can be considered. If the assumption will accept 6-year terms, then it seems to be a fairly reliable one. The most recent DA statistics show that approximately 85 percent of the ARNG and 91 percent of the USAR are REP-63 personnel. Of these, an average of 12.6 percent of the ARNG units and 4.6 percent of the USAR units have been reenlisting for at least 1 year.

Assumption 5: One-Third of 2 Percent (0.67 Percent) of  
Manpower Pool Reserve Strength Can Be  
Recruited Every Year

This appears to be a fairly conservative estimate since an analysis of recruitment statistics covering the last 15 years indicates that even in periods of low-draft pressure a percentage significantly higher than 0.67 percent of the manpower reservoir, particularly between ages 17-20, have been induced to enlist in reserve units.<sup>10</sup> It is interesting to note that 0.67 percent of the available manpower pool is 55,500 ( $0.67 \times 8.5$  million), just about half the annual average first-term enlistment rate of 104,000 for the past 6 years. This is an illuminating observation since it is also found that the RC have not mounted any concerted marketing attempts based on a uniform strategy to tap available manpower sources. It seems quite likely that an effective, well-coordinated marketing effort, using current pay levels and terms of service, would be able to induce at least 0.67 percent of the available pool of young men to enlist in RC. Elsewhere in the project study, the PROVIDE originators estimate that as high as 7 percent of the available manpower pool can be induced to enlist in all the Armed Forces, given sufficiently compelling incentives.

The upshot of the analysis of the PROVIDE projection is that, because at least three of the five major assumptions which define its

boundaries are either invalid or are essentially irrelevant to the period under current consideration, it is therefore particularly difficult to utilize their findings in this study.

The final study which is available to researchers on this subject was completed in February 1971 by DA.<sup>52</sup> As a follow-on to PROVIDE, "Project Volunteer" also delivered a force strength projection which extends through FY76. The projection which was generated through this effort was based on three major areas of concern: (a) an estimate of strength requirements through FY76 for all the RC units; (b) the results of a survey designed to determine what percent of NPS enlistments in the RC are truly nondraft motivated; and (c) an extension of minimum/maximum NPS accession levels through 1976.

The attached projection from the Project study (see Table A3-2), shows mandated strengths and a projection of personnel requirements based on the USA estimate of personnel strength requirements (Table A3-3).

The fulcrum on which the reliability of the Project Volunteer study hinges is an attitude survey which predicts the level of NPS accessions which can be anticipated for the 6 FYs which follow its completion. The survey sampled recruits from 1 Oct 70 to 31 Jan 71 (reported quarterly in DD-M(M)998),<sup>32</sup> defined by random sequence birth date groupings which sampled a portion of the total 14,488 NPS personnel who enlisted during this period. The findings of the study indicated that 1826 to 3748 of the 14,488 enlistees were "truly nondraft motivated." This represents a statistical range of 13 percent to 24 percent of the total enlistments for the quarter. Taken by itself, this survey appears to be the most precise instrument developed to date to measure attitudes towards enlistment in the RC.

However valid the survey may be as it stands alone, several points of interest are worthy of note concerning the application of the results of the survey to personnel requirements estimated by the 31 Jan 71 status report. First, the Project Volunteer projection which uses these results assumes that the level of accessions sampled during the October to January period are (a) consistent with enlistment levels during every quarter for the year, and (b) that the enlistment levels for the sampled quarter are consistent with the quarterly accession rates of NPS personnel for both the several preceding years of a draft environment, and periods



Table A3-2

RESERVE COMPONENTS FORCE PROJECTION<sup>52</sup>

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Reserve Component NPS enlistment required	131,821	67,005	45,930	82,815	126,560
Potential capability w/o draft (max)	10,434	10,434	10,434	10,434	10,434
w/o draft (min)	5,478	5,478	5,478	5,478	5,478
Potential short fall w/o draft (min)	121,387	56,571	35,496	72,381	116,126
w/o draft (max)	126,353	61,527	40,452	77,337	121,082
End strength (max)	538,613	482,042	446,546	374,165	258,039
End strength (min)	533,657	477,086	441,590	369,209	253,083

Table A3-3

PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS<sup>52</sup>

Component	Mandated strength	Years				
		FY72	FY73	FY74	FY75	FY76
ARNG	400,000	68,821	29,005	15,930	27,815	76,560
USAR	260,000	63,000	38,000	30,000	55,000	50,000
Total	660,000	131,821	67,005	45,930	82,815	126,560

immediately to follow in a zero-draft environment. The projection further assumes that accession rates will remain constant (within the prescribed range) over each of the FYs ending with FY76. This is inconsistent with the fact that the reserves can only recruit for vacancies as they occur.

The question here is not so much with the validity of the survey itself [although it tends to show nondraft motivated enlistments at a higher level than either the USAR or ARNG personnel offices currently estimate; USAR estimates a lower level of 7.6 percent (though this level of precision is open to question) and ARNG estimates approximately 10 to 15 percent], but with the application of the survey's results to the projections. Analysis of the NPS enlistments in the RC shows that over the past 6 FYs the NPS mean enlistment rate is approximately 65,250 per year for the ARNG, and 38,000 per year for the USAR units. The total of these two, approximately 104,000 per year in unit enlistments, is significantly higher than the (approximate) 57,000 per year assumed by extending to annual rates the 14,488 derived from the surveys. The assumption that the statistical range derived from the survey (13 to 25 percent) can be applied in a straight line to an annual extension of the enlistment level sampled during the quarter October 1970 to January 1971, as a reliable predictor for the next 5 FYs, seems basically unsound in view of the fact that the RC recruit personnel for vacancies only. We feel it consistent to suggest that the usefulness of the Project Volunteer projection with regard to the maximum and minimum end strengths it projects, is open to discussion. It is worth repeating here that Project Volunteer is the most definitive study undertaken to date to predict RC end strengths using current enlistment programs in a zero-draft environment.



Research Analysis Corporation

McLean, Virginia 22101



Area Code 703  
893-5900

November 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Certain Members of the Reserve Components  
of the US Army

SUBJECT: Survey of Reserve Components Personnel

The Research Analysis Corporation is an independent, non-profit organization that conducts research studies, under contract, for various departments of the Federal, state and local governments. The attached survey is a part of the study, "Maintenance of Reserve Components in a Volunteer Environment," sponsored by the Chief of the Office of Reserve Components, Department of Army. It deals with how the Guard and Reserve forces of the Army can be made most attractive to persons like yourself, assuming that participation in the Guard and Reserves were completely voluntary — that there were no military draft.

You have been randomly selected to participate in the survey. The information requested from you is not available from other sources. Your opinions on this matter will have considerable influence in determining what actions should be taken in the Reserve Components. Your responses will be treated anonymously in the statistical analysis.

It probably will take about thirty minutes to complete the survey. Please fill it out and return it as soon as you can. Thank you for your cooperation.

Wallace L. Clement  
Study Leader

Enclosure

# Research Analysis Corporation



McLean, Virginia 22101

## RESERVE COMPONENTS SURVEY

### INSTRUCTIONS

This is a survey dealing with your attitudes about the Reserve Components of the Army (the Guard and the Reserves). *Please complete it as soon as you can.* Your cooperation is important.

As you may have heard in news accounts, there is a good possibility that the military draft will not extend beyond July 1973. After that time, so long as there is no significant threat, it is proposed that the United States military forces will be recruited from volunteers. In an all-volunteer environment it may be necessary to make changes in the military services so that the services are more attractive to prospective members. While it may be necessary to make the active military service more attractive, it also may be necessary to make changes in the *National Guard* and the *Reserves* so that sufficient numbers of persons will be attracted to military reserve forces.

The purpose of this survey is to secure the opinions of personnel now in the Guard or Reserves as to how the Reserve Components might be improved. You will be questioned as to your preferences toward different incentives and combinations of incentives that would increase the probability of your reenlistment in the Guard or Reserves upon termination of your current obligated tour. The survey will also ask questions about your initial enlistment.

The survey is being mailed to about 5000 persons in the Reserve Components of the Army. Your name was selected randomly according to a computer program. The number at the top of the page is to assist in keeping track of the forms as they are returned. Your answers will be treated anonymously in the statistical analysis which will be conducted by this organization; in no way will your name be associated with your responses. Please be honest and candid in completing the form.

For most of the survey you will answer questions by circling the appropriate response for the question. At some points in the completion of the survey you are asked to write in ideas you might have that are not included in the alternatives listed.

When you have completed the survey, place it in the enclosed stamped, addressed envelope and mail without delay.

November 1971



**A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION** (please circle appropriate item)

- [illegible]

18. Your present family income from all sources (you and your spouse combined):

- |                          |                           |                           |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| (1) Less than \$4000     | (6) \$12,000 to \$13,999  | (11) \$22,000 to \$23,999 |
| (2) \$4000 to \$5999     | (7) \$14,000 to \$15,999  | (12) \$24,000 to \$25,999 |
| (3) \$6000 to \$7999     | (8) \$16,000 to \$17,999  | (13) \$26,000 to \$27,999 |
| (4) \$8000 to \$9999     | (9) \$18,000 to \$19,999  | (14) \$28,000 or more     |
| (5) \$10,000 to \$11,999 | (10) \$20,000 to \$21,999 |                           |

19. Religious preference:

- (1) Jewish    (2) Protestant    (3) Roman Catholic    (4) None    (5) Other

20. Race:

- (1) American Indian    (2) Caucasian    (3) Negroid    (4) Oriental    (5) Other

21. Type of community in which you grew up:

- (1) Farm    (2) Small town    (3) Suburb    (4) City

22. In what State (district, territory, or possession)? \_\_\_\_\_

23. Type of community in which you now live:

- (1) Farm    (2) Small town    (3) Suburb    (4) City

24. Present residence: \_\_\_\_\_

STATE

COUNTY

CITY

## B. RESERVE COMPONENT SERVICE— SATISFACTION AND IMPORTANCE RATINGS

There are two things to do in this part of the survey:

- (a) Indicate your level of satisfaction with each of the various topics stated.  
(b) Rank the topics in terms of their importance to you.

**SATISFACTION RATING.** First, then, you are asked to express your satisfaction by drawing a circle around what you feel to be the appropriate number on the dotted line under each question. As you see, one end of the scale indicates satisfaction; the other end of the scale indicates dissatisfaction. You may choose any of the numbers, 1 through 7, to express the degree of satisfaction you feel. Do this for each of the nine items before you rank them in importance.

- \_\_\_\_ 1. How satisfying do you find your Guard or Reserve duty with respect to your assigned duties, and the freedom you have to carry them out?

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7  
-----  
Not at all                                      About                                      Very  
satisfying                                      overage                                      satisfying

- \_\_\_\_ 2. How satisfying do you find your friendships and your personal associations with others in your unit, both occupational and personal contacts—do you look forward to these associations during drill period and find them worthwhile to you?

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7  
-----  
Not at all                                      About                                      Very  
satisfying                                      overage                                      satisfying

- \_\_\_\_ 3. How satisfying do you find the economic benefits associated with the Guard and Reserve—benefits in the way of pay and retirement credit you have as a consequence of membership in the Guard of Reserve?

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7  
-----  
Not at all                                      About                                      Very  
satisfying                                      overage                                      satisfying

4. How satisfying do you find the way the Guard or Reserve is regarded in your community—is it a good thing for you personally; are you looked up to because of your Guard or Reserve membership?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 Not at all About Very  
 satisfying overage satisfying

5. What effect or influence does your Guard or Reserve membership have on your family life—does it cut into your family activity; is your wife in agreement with your Reserve Component duty?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 Very bad About Very good  
 effect average effect

6. How do you feel about the effect that your Guard or Reserve membership has on your free time—does your Reserve Component obligation take away so much of your free time that it is bothersome to you?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 Much About Little  
 effect overage effect

7. What effect or influence does your Guard or Reserve duty have on your vacation time—do you have to sacrifice leave and vacation time because of your Guard or Reserve obligation?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 Very bad About Very good  
 effect overage effect

8. Is your employer's attitude toward your Reserve Component obligation satisfying to you—does he understand your situation and take measures to relieve any economic distress you might experience because of it?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 Not at all About Very  
 satisfying overage satisfying

9. How satisfying a relationship is there between the skills necessary in your Guard or Reserve assignment and those in your civilian work—do you learn things in your Reserve Component duty that you can apply in your civilian job and vice versa; does Reserve Component duty offer you a welcome change?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 Not at all About Very  
 satisfying average satisfying

**IMPORTANCE RANKING OF PREVIOUS ITEMS.** You have considered nine different things that related to your satisfaction with your Guard and Reserve service. Please look back over these nine items and in the blank to the left of each item, indicate the importance of that item to you. For example, if you thought that Question 3 (economic benefits) was most important to you, you would put a 1 in the space beside it. If the influence of Guard and Reserve duty on family life was second in importance, you would put a 2 beside it, and so on, until you had ranked each of the nine items in terms of importance; thus, the item that is least important to you would have the number 9 beside it.

10. Is there anything else you would add as being a satisfying element of Guard and Reserve service?

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How would you rank it in comparison with the other nine? \_\_\_\_\_

### C. POTENTIAL FOR REENLISTMENT IN GUARD OR RESERVE

1. As your term of obligated service comes to a close, what is the probability that you will reenlist in the Guard or Reserve? Circle one of the numbers from 0 to 100 on the line below to indicate the percent probability that you will reenlist, assuming that the Guard or Reserve will remain about the same as it presently is.

0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
-----										
(PERCENT PROBABILITY OF REENLISTING)										
No, certain I would not reenlist										Yes, certain I would reenlist

2. If you circled any number from 0 to 40, please indicate why you have a tendency not to reenlist.

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3. If you circled any number from 60 to 100, please indicate why you have a tendency toward reenlisting.

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### D. ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO REENLISTMENT

In this part of the survey a number of items are listed that represent changes related to the attractiveness of Guard and Reserve service. Please examine each of the changes separately, and indicate on the scale below each one the probability of your reenlisting in the Guard or Reserve, assuming that such a change was in effect. Circle the appropriate number in each case.

1. Suppose your pay for scheduled meetings and annual active duty training were increased by as much as 50 percent. Considering only this item, what would be the likelihood that you would reenlist in the Guard or Reserves?

0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
-----										
No										Yes
(PERCENT PROBABILITY OF REENLISTING)										

2. Suppose you were to receive a bonus for reenlistment of up to \$500 for a three-year reenlistment in a Guard or Reserve unit. Considering only this item, what would be the probability that you would reenlist in the Guard or Reserves?

0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
-----										
No										Yes
(PERCENT PROBABILITY OF REENLISTING)										

3. Suppose the Army were to guarantee that you would suffer no loss of income during annual active duty training; if the employer did not make up the difference between your salary and your military pay so that you suffered no loss, the Army would make up the difference. Considering only this item, what would be the probability that you would reenlist in the Guard or Reserves?

0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
-----										
No										Yes
(PERCENT PROBABILITY OF REENLISTING)										

4. Suppose you were to receive education benefits for Reserve Component service equivalent to \$500 for three years of Reserve Component service, benefits such as cancellation of student loans for services in the domestic interests of the nation, the ability to take Armed Forces Institute courses, monetary allowances to offset education expenses, and so on. Considering only this item, what would be the probability that you would reenlist in the Guard or Reserves?

0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
-----										
No	(PERCENT PROBABILITY OF REENLISTING)									Yes

5. Suppose you were allowed, as a member of the Reserve Components, to carry \$15,000 of Servicemen's Group Life Insurance (SGLI) at a nominal cost to you of, say, \$3 to \$4 per month. Considering only this item, what would be the probability that you would reenlist in the Guard or Reserves?

0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
-----										
No	(PERCENT PROBABILITY OF REENLISTING)									Yes

6. Suppose you had improved retirement benefits for yourself (for example, retirement with pay at age 50), and benefits for your dependents if you were to die before retirement age. Considering only this item, what would be the probability that you would reenlist in the Guard or Reserves.

0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
-----										
No	(PERCENT PROBABILITY OF REENLISTING)									Yes

7. Suppose you were to have medical and dental benefits for yourself and your dependents while you were in the Guard or Reserves. Considering only this item, what would be the probability that you would reenlist in the Guard or Reserves?

0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
-----										
No	(PERCENT PROBABILITY OF REENLISTING)									Yes

8. Suppose you were able, because of being in the Guard or Reserves, to secure a home loan guaranteed by FHA or the VA. Considering only this item, what would be the probability that you would reenlist in the Guard or Reserves?

0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
-----										
No	(PERCENT PROBABILITY OF REENLISTING)									Yes

9. Suppose you were to receive proficiency pay for on MOS or skills that were scarce or in short supply, or in which you demonstrated uncommon expertise because of the degree of your skill. Considering only this item, what would be the probability that you would reenlist in the Guard or Reserves?

0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
-----										
No	(PERCENT PROBABILITY OF REENLISTING)									Yes

10. Suppose you were allowed a Federal income tax exemption of \$1250 while you were in Guard or Reserve Service. Considering only this item, what would be the probability that you would reenlist in the Guard or Reserves?

0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
-----										
No	(PERCENT PROBABILITY OF REENLISTING)									Yes

11. Is there any other economic incentive you would suggest that would have an effect on your attitude toward membership in the Reserve Components?

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Considering only the item you have just suggested as being in effect for the Guard and Reserves, what would be the probability that you would reenlist?

0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
-----										
No	(PERCENT PROBABILITY OF REENLISTING)									Yes



12. Suppose now that you were able to combine any three of the above economic incentives into a "package" and were to have all three of them in effect. Which three would you choose? Item \_\_\_\_, Item \_\_\_\_, & Item \_\_\_\_\_. Considering these three incentives to be in effect, what would be the probability that you would reenlist in the Guard or Reserve at the end of your current obligated tour?



### E. OTHER INCENTIVES TO REENLISTMENT

There are other aspects of Guard and Reserve service that might have an effect on your attitude—for example, changes concerned with missions, with the organization, and with the operation of Guard and Reserve forces. A number of such things are listed below. Please read the entire list, and then check the three (3) things that are most important to you—check three of the items in the blanks to the left of the items.

- \_\_\_\_\_ 1. Suppose that Guard and Reserve personnel were used much more in local community, domestic action programs to help correct conditions of poverty, poor health, bad ecological conditions, and so on.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 2. Suppose a more favorable public attitude toward the Guard and Reserve arose (perhaps through good public relations, advertising and recruiting) so that you felt greater pride in being a part of the Reserve Components.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 3. Suppose there were much better utilization of your individual skills in the Guard or Reserves.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 4. Suppose there were more social, athletic, and recreational activities developed around the Guard and Reserve so that your whole family found more enjoyment in your Reserve Component duty.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 5. Suppose you had greater freedom of choice in the Guard or Reserve with respect to grooming and personal appearance.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 6. Suppose you had greater opportunity for promotion and greater chance to be commissioned in the Guard and Reserve.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 7. Suppose the Guard and Reserve took on greater responsibility for your family if something were to happen to you, regardless of whether your misfortune were related to Reserve Component duty.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 8. Suppose there were someone associated with the Guard or Reserve to whom you could go to get factual information about the Reserve Components, someone who could properly advise you on all the privileges and benefits of Guard or Reserve duty.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 9. Suppose you were a member of a Guard or Reserve unit in which the morale was very high, the leadership was well above average, and you felt that you were part of a highly productive and effective unit.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 10. Suppose the frequency of Guard and Reserve assemblies were reduced, and there were instead a longer period of annual active duty for training.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 11. Suppose Guard and Reserve units were to have no multiple weekend assemblies, but only more frequent weekday assemblies.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 12. Suppose your Guard or Reserve unit were an integral part of an active Army unit, and your annual active duty for training were always with that parent active Army unit at its home base.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 13. Suppose your Guard and Reserve training were significantly improved, including better instruction and up-to-date facilities, equipment, and weapons.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 14. Suppose the Guard and Reserve organization and MOS structure were modified so that it were possible to have a significantly greater number of women (WAC) as members of the Reserve Components.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 15. Suppose you were able to remain in the Individual Ready Reserve (that is, not in a Guard or Reserve unit) with benefits somewhat less than those received by members of units—your only Reserve Component obligation being your period of active duty training, if called.



Age Group	Percentage
18-24	18%
25-34	22%
35-44	15%
45-54	12%
55-64	10%
65-74	8%
75-84	5%
85+	3%

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100  
No (PERCENT PROBABILITY OF REENLISTING) Yes

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100  
No (PERCENT PROBABILITY OF REENLISTING) Yes

(1) Army National Guard Unit      (2) Army Reserve Unit      (3) Individual Ready Reserve      (4) None

1. Army planners often are in doubt as to the proper amount of a bonus or benefit. How much do you think a minimum, but fair, yearly bonus or benefit should be to encourage and make it worthwhile for one to stay in the Guard or Reserve? Be fair in your estimate. A minimum, fair yearly bonus or benefit should be about \$ \_\_\_\_\_.

(1) No (4) Yes, three or four years ago  
(2) Not sure (5) Yes, five or six years ago  
(3) Yes, within the past two years

(1) Permits two weeks extra vacation leave with pay	(4) My employer will not permit special leave without pay. I must use my regular vacation leave.
(2) Permits two weeks leave without pay	
(3) Permits two weeks leave but only pays me the difference between my military and civilian pay	(5) Does not apply. I am self-employed or unemployed.

(1) Yes, I definitely would have entered the Service      (4) No, I definitely would not have entered the Service  
(2) Yes, I probably would have entered the Service  
(3) No, I probably would not have entered the Service      (5) I have no idea what I would have done

5. What was the one, *primary* reason for your initial entry into the Guard or Reserve? (Circle appropriate item)

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| (1) Involuntarily assigned from active forces                         | (7) Friends were in the Guard or Reserve           |
| (2) To learn a trade or skill that would be valuable in civilian life | (8) Supplement my income by drill and training pay |
| (3) Went into the Reserve Components rather than be drafted           | (9) Retirement benefits                            |
| (4) To serve my country   | (10) For the travel, excitement, new experience    |
| (5) To fulfill my military obligation at a time of my choice          | (11) To become more mature and self-reliant        |
| (6) Opportunity for advanced education, professional training         | (12) Other than above _____                        |
|   | _____  |
|   | _____  |

6. Would you encourage your friends and relatives who had not had military service and who do not have a service obligation to join the Guard or Reserve?

- |                          |                      |
|--------------------------|----------------------|
| (1) Definitely would not | (4) Probably would   |
| (2) Probably would not   | (5) Definitely would |
| (3) Not sure             |                      |

7. What do you think might be the best ways to recruit persons into the Guard and Reserve?

- (1) \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
- (2) \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
- (3) \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

8. You have been asked a lot of questions about your attitude toward the Guard and Reserve. Now, one final question: Are you going to reenlist in the Reserve Components for at least a year?

- |                                  |                              |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------|
| (1) Definitely will not reenlist | (4) Probably will reenlist   |
| (2) Probably will not reenlist   | (5) Definitely will reenlist |
| (3) Not sure                     |                              |

This is the end of the survey. Thank you for your participation. Please return the survey immediately in the enclosed envelope. The postage has already been paid; just seal and mail.

*If you have any additional comment,  
please write it below.*

ADDITIONAL COMMENT:

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

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