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RETENTION OF FIRST-TERM RESERVE ENLIST-  
MENT PROGRAM PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED  
STATES ARMY RESERVE

Moss M. Ikeda

Hawaii University

Prepared for:

Army Command and General Staff College

16 June 1972


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
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RETENTION OF FIRST-TERM RESERVE ENLISTMENT PROGRAM  
PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE



A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements of the  
degree


MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE



by

MOSS M. IKEDA  
B.Ed., University of Hawaii, 1960  
M.Ed., University of Hawaii, 1962

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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate Moss M. Ikeda

Title of Thesis Retention of First-Term Reserve Enlist-  
ment Program Personnel in the United States Army Reserve

Approved by:

Donald H. Adkins, Research and Thesis Adviser

Don Martin Jr., Member, Graduate Research Faculty

Terry C. Pursel, Member, Graduate Research Faculty

George H. Rice, Jr., Member, Consulting Faculty

William D. Denton, Member, Consulting Faculty

Date: 16 June 1972

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

The Army Reserve faces a paradoxical situation wherein it has been declared a major element of General Land Forces under the Total Force concept and, concurrently and ironically, it will lose its principal source of personnel input with the projected termination of the draft by 31 July 1973. The major thesis assumptions were (1) the Army Reserve, under the Total Force concept, will continue its role as the firstline source of military expansion and (2) the draft will be terminated by 31 July 1973 and the Armed Forces will then become a totally All-Volunteer Armed Force.

A command-level survey of the Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMs) revealed that they unanimously felt retention of first-term Reserve Enlistment Program (REP 63) personnel is a major problem, that they exert a major effort to retain REP 63 personnel, that they need to retain an average of about 18 per cent of REP 63 personnel to sustain existing units, and that they are presently retaining only approximately 6 per cent.

A troop-level survey questionnaire was designed to



determine the extent of the retention problem from the troop viewpoint and to develop recommendations for improving the retention rate of REP 63s. The questionnaire was pre-tested and then administered to a widely distributed population of REP 63s throughout the Army Reserve. The return of 572 completed questionnaires out of 1,000 mailed more than met Department of the Army's minimum requirement for establishing statistical validity (400 completed questionnaires out of each 1,000 mailed).

Tests were conducted with the hypothesis that the means and standard deviations of rank distribution of the sample and total population were equal. The hypothesis could not be rejected at the .01 significance level. Further, a chi-square test for goodness of fit was then conducted with the hypothesis that the rank distribution of the observed frequencies of the sample did not differ significantly from the expected frequencies of the total population. That hypothesis could not be rejected at the .10 significance level. Therefore, it was assumed that the sample was representative of the population from which it was drawn.

The troop-level survey findings indicated that 3 per cent of first-term REP 63 personnel plans to reenlist. This is only one-half of the actual retention rate the ARCOMs indicated. However, the survey also indicated that 16 per

cent of those surveyed was uncertain about remaining in the Army Reserve. Should the ARCOMs be successful in reenlisting the group which plans to reenlist plus the total uncertain population, they could retain 19 per cent, which would exceed by 1 per cent the rate thought necessary to sustain existing units. The importance of encouraging the uncertain population to reenlist cannot be overemphasized.

The troop-level findings showed dramatically that between 67 and 90 per cent of first-term REP 63s were draft-induced enlistees. These findings reinforce the projection that the zero draft is expected to have an adverse effect on first-term enlistments in the Army Reserve.

In quantitatively analyzing the data collected in the free-response portion of the troop-level survey, it was clearly shown that emphasis for improving the Army Reserve should be placed on non-monetary matters. Seventy per cent of the suggestions was on non-monetary matters, with 64 per cent ranking improvement in legislation, regulations, and policies, in administration of the program, and in training as the top three priorities, in that order. Six per cent desired improvement in civil-military relations. Thirty per cent wanted improvement in pay and fringe benefits and in institution of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses. Fringe benefits, with 17 per cent, ranked slightly higher than pay,

with 13 per cent.

Generally, the findings of this study envisage the Reservist as a person concerned more about matters that regulate and guide the program, with much less emphasis on monetary matters. This corresponds with recent trends and findings in the business world that see a move away from an economically oriented man to a man more concerned about the human aspects of emotional and social needs. Further, the troop-level survey findings indicated that the Reservist is seeking more self-direction and that he points to a need for changes in regulative matters, administration, and training to improve his lot. This creates a second paradoxical situation in that the Reservist appears to be a man seeking fewer external controls while he is a member of an organization that has been historically regimented and operated under authoritarian leadership.

The ARCOM headquarters viewed matters in need of emphasis somewhat differently from the way REP 63s viewed them. The primary concern of the ARCOMs in improving retention was to improve training, whereas the REP 63s ranked that third. The largest discrepancy occurred where the REP 63s ranked improvement of laws, regulations, and policies first, while the ARCOMs ranked those sixth, or last, as a matter of emphasis. Another discrepancy was that the

ARCOMs, by ranking pay second, put much more emphasis on monetary matters to improve retention than did the REP 63s, who placed monetary matters fifth.

The discrepancies mentioned point to a necessity on the part of the ARCOMs to consider the needs and concerns of the REP 63s. The ARCOMs can attempt to better communicate the goals and benefits of the program and/or can look inward to see if there is a need to reorder the areas of emphasis to meld the progress of the Army Reserve with the type force with which they are working. A set of recommendations to assist in accomplishing the above was developed as a part of this thesis.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

A word of acknowledgment and appreciation is in order for members of the Staff and Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College who assisted me in developing the approach to the thesis and analysis of the data. These are the two areas in which their expertise was of the most value. Among those who assisted were members of my thesis committee and LTC William M. Stevenson, my first thesis adviser; COL Robert J. McNeil; and LTCs W. C. Buckheit, T. A. Rehm, S. R. Shalala, and L. G. Twilley.

Acknowledgment is also given to COL Howard C. A. Gill and LTC George A. McDonald of the Department of the Army Staff, who furnished information pertaining to Department of the Army procedures and criteria for establishing statistical reliability, and to MAJ Dennis D. Flint, fellow classmate and Operations Research/Systems Analysis specialist, for assistance with the statistical treatment of data.

For assistance in determining the retention problem, I am indebted to the eighteen Army Reserve Commands, the Reserve Command in Hawaii, and particularly to men from the seven commands who took the time and effort to complete the

survey questionnaire.

I am especially grateful to Mrs. Evelyn F. Randolph, thesis typist. She was of invaluable assistance in preparation of the final copy of the thesis, which reflects her professional ability.

This thesis is dedicated to my wife, Shirley, and our children--Cynthia, Mark, and Matthew--who have had to contend with my dual status as a civilian-soldier and the many hours involved in the writing of this thesis.

The completion of this thesis would not have been possible without the assistance and understanding of those mentioned above. While sharing positive aspects of this work with them, I also assume all responsibilities for any errors or shortcomings.

M. M. I.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE . . . . .	ii
ABSTRACT . . . . .	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . .	viii
LIST OF TABLES . . . . .	xi
CHAPTER	
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
Total Force Approach . . . . .	1
Statement of the Problem . . . . .	3
Importance of the Study . . . . .	3
Delimitation . . . . .	7
Assumptions . . . . .	8
Abbreviations . . . . .	8
Organization of Succeeding Chapters . . . . .	9
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION . . . . .	10
The Draft . . . . .	10
The Army Reserve . . . . .	12
III. UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE SURVEY . . . . .	16
Survey Development . . . . .	16
Administration . . . . .	22
Analysis . . . . .	28
Suggestions To Enhance Retention . . . . .	57
Summary . . . . .	90
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . .	96
Conclusions . . . . .	96
Recommendations . . . . .	100

APPENDIXES . . . . .	113
A: ARCOM Survey . . . . .	114
B: Explanation of Abbreviations . . . . .	121
C: The Draft . . . . .	123
D: The Army Reserve . . . . .	137
E: Troop-Level Survey . . . . .	155
F: Detailed Summaries of Selected Data . . . . .	160
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	172



## LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Pay Grade Distribution by Region . . . . .	30
2. Age Distribution by Region . . . . .	31
3. Years of Service Distribution by Region . . . . .	32
4. Type Activity Distribution by Region . . . . .	33
5. Regional Information Concerning 572 Survey Respondents . . . . .	35
6. Motivation--Response to Question: Why Did You Join the Army Reserve? . . . . .	39
7. Incentives--Response to Question: What Do You Consider As Good Incentives To Remain in the Army Reserve? . . . . .	42
8. Suggestions for Improving Army Reserve by Rank Order, Category, and Region (At Least Two) . . . . .	46
9. Suggestions (Rank Order 24), from Only One Region, for Improving Army Reserve . . . . .	49
10. Importance of Sub-Categories to REP 63s and ARCOMs . . . . .	53
11. ARCOM Situation in Retention of First-Term REP 63s . . . . .	119
12. Rank Order of ARCOM Retention Emphasis . . . . .	120
13. Motivation: 1st, 2d, and 3d Choices by Region . . . . .	161
14. Incentives: 1st, 2d, and 3d Choices by Region . . . . .	166

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### Total Force Approach

It needs to be understood with total clarity . . . that defense programs are not infinitely adjustable. . . . [T]here is an absolute point below which our security forces must never be allowed to go. That is the level of sufficiency. Above or at that level, our defense forces protect national security adequately. Below that level is one vast undifferentiated area of no security at all. For it serves no purpose in conflicts between nations to have been almost strong enough.<sup>1</sup>

The "Total Force" concept includes both the Active and Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces and those of allied nations. The Army Reserve has been designated as part of the "Total Force." Because of this factor, along with the recent reduction of ground forces in Vietnam, reduction in size of the active armed forces, and definitive moves toward an All-Volunteer Army, it is expected that the role of the Army Reserve will take on new importance. In the words of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird: "For the U.S. Forces, the Total Force concept will mean increased

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<sup>1</sup>Department of Defense, Defense Report on President Nixon's Strategy for Peace (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 21, quoting "President's Foreign Policy Report to Congress," 25 February 1971.

importance for our National Guard and Reserves."<sup>2</sup>

A renewed emphasis must be placed on the "One Army" concept from the top level. The seriousness of the problem of manpower procurement in the Reserve Components is such that efforts must be exerted from all quarters, not only the Reserves, if adequate manpower is to be maintained. This takes on even more significance if and when both Active and Reserve Components are deployed as a single force in a national crisis. The concept of rounding out active units with reserve units is already under study. A program currently under evaluation is one in which Guard and Reserve battalions would be assigned to two NATO-oriented divisions. Also under consideration is the integrating of an entire reserve brigade with an active division for training exercises and deployment plans.<sup>3</sup>

This thesis provides a brief history of the draft as it relates to the Reserve Forces, a brief history of Reserve Forces, design and administration of an Army Reserve survey, findings obtained from the survey, and recommendations whereby the Army Reserve can enhance first-term personnel retention under the Reserve Enlistment Program (REP 63).

The product of this study is a set of recommenda-

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 103.

tions that may be beneficial toward resolution of some of the problems of attaining and maintaining adequate manpower in the Army Reserve. Emphasis is placed on the findings of the Army Reserve survey and on recommendations that may be of some assistance in targeting on the problems.

#### Statement of the Problem

The purpose of this study was to determine the current estimated retention rate of first-term Reserve Enlistment Program participants, what motivated them to join, what they consider as important incentives to remain, and what suggestions they have for improving retention in the Army Reserve. An essential part of the study are recommendations for improvement of retention in the Army Reserve. These recommendations were developed through a review of the draft and the Army Reserve and an analysis of data from survey questionnaires.

#### Importance of the Study

The primary input of enlisted personnel into the Army Reserve Program has been stimulated by threat of the draft. During the peak period of buildup in Vietnam, around 1965, draft calls also peaked. It was during this period that many men chose the REP 63. "Surveys indicate that perhaps 75% of the enlisted personnel fulfilling their

initial six-year military service obligation in the reserves are there only because of the draft."<sup>4</sup>

Under the REP 63, the enlistee spends a period of four to six months on active duty, primarily for basic and advanced individual training, and returns to the Army Reserve training center in his home community to complete his obligation by serving the remainder of a 6-year commitment as an active Reservist. That program became so popular as a means for young men to fulfill their military obligation that nationwide waiting lists were created in excess of 200,000 during 1965 and 1967 and in excess of 100,000 during 1966, 1968, and 1970.<sup>5</sup> Backlogs were created at training centers, and many men waited as long as six months to a year before they received orders for basic and advanced individual training.

Since the reduction of forces in Vietnam, which began in 1969, draft quotas have decreased. The decrease and a temporary halt to the draft had a negative impact on enlisted personnel strength in the Army Reserve.<sup>6</sup> Army

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<sup>4</sup>President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, All-Volunteer Armed Force (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 97.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 115.

<sup>6</sup>Department of Defense, p. 101.

Reserve Commands that previously had waiting lists depleted their lists and began to feel the pinch of small enlistments. This problem was compounded by the difficulty of retaining personnel who were completing a 6-year obligation under REP 63.

The lottery system also had some apparent adverse effects of further reducing the draft inducement. Young men with high lottery numbers no longer considered the draft a threat. Prior to the lottery system, every man eligible for the draft was a possible pick.

Secretary of Defense Laird's pronouncement of a zero draft by July 1973 has all but made a zero draft a reality. The Nixon Administration's new national security strategy has, among its seven key elements of the President's Strategy for Peace,

a new approach to U.S. military manpower, based on a goal of Zero Draft and an All-Volunteer active force, with increased reliance on National Guard and Reserve forces.<sup>7</sup>

The Department of Defense, with one eye on the reduction of forces in Vietnam and the other on the All-Volunteer Army, is giving more and more emphasis and attention to the Reserve Components. More funds and equipment than in the recent past are being poured into the Reserve Components to

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<sup>7</sup>Department of Defense, p. 17.

bring them up to a very high state of readiness.

In the light of all of this, the maintenance of Army Reserve enlisted strength is no small problem. The imagination and cooperation of both Active and Reserve elements are immediately necessary to exercise foresight and to plan carefully for the eventuality of the zero draft.

The eighteen Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMs) and the Army Reserve in Hawaii (referred to as an Army Reserve Command for this study) were surveyed to determine the extent of the REP 63 retention problem, the extent of effort being exerted to retain personnel, current and projected retention percentages, and areas of emphasis for retention.

On a 4-point scaled response question on the extent of the retention problem, which was scaled "1" major problem, "2" somewhat of a problem, "3" minor problem, and "4" no problem, the responding ARCOMs unanimously stated that retention of REP 63 personnel is a major problem.

On another 4-point scaled response question on the extent of effort being expended to retain REP 63 personnel, which was scaled "1" major effort, "2" somewhat of an effort, "3" minimal effort, and "4" no effort, the responding ARCOMs unanimously stated that they are making a major effort to retain REP 63 personnel.

The ARCOMs were asked what percentage of REP 63

personnel they are actually retaining. The responses ranged from 1 per cent to 10 per cent, with an average retention rate of 6 per cent. To measure this against a need criterion, a final question was asked about the percentage of retention necessary to sustain their units. The responses ranged from 6 per cent to 60 per cent, with an average retention rate of 18 per cent needed to sustain existing units.

Information from the ARCOM survey (Appendix A) clearly established that retention of first-term REP 63 personnel is a major problem, that major efforts are being made to retain first-term REP 63 personnel, and that current retention rates do not meet the retention rates necessary to sustain Army Reserve personnel strengths. The average shortage appears to be about 12 per cent.

#### Delimitation

This study was delimited to the maintenance of a desired level of enlisted strength in the Army Reserve. Primary emphasis was placed on the retention of first-term enlisted personnel. The problem of officer procurement and retention does not appear to be as severe as that for enlisted personnel. Officer procurement is a separate question and is not addressed in this study.



Other Reserve Components, namely the National Guard and the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Reserves, will undoubtedly face the same problems as the Army Reserve in procurement and retention of enlisted personnel. This is particularly true of the Army element of the National Guard. To limit the scope of this study, those forces are excluded.

No attention was given the career enlisted Reservist in this study. He is on at least his second term of service in the Army Reserve, has attained the pay grade of E6 or higher, has a substantial investment in the program in terms of time and effort, and has more than likely become a career Reservist. Retention of those personnel should be a matter of separate study.

### Assumptions

Two assumptions derived through research for Chapter II are used throughout this study. They are:

1. Zero draft will be implemented by 31 July 1973.
2. There will be a continuing need to maintain the Army Reserve in approximately its current role and strength.

### Abbreviations

This being a study of and for the military, a number of military acronyms and abbreviations are used. They are explained in Appendix B.

### Organization of Succeeding Chapters

As regards the succeeding chapters, Chapter II briefly reviews the history of the draft and its impact on personnel input into the Army Reserve Program. The zero draft planned for 1 July 1973 and its probable impact on reserve enlistments are addressed. This chapter also briefly reviews the history of the Army Reserve, the current status of the program, and the projected role of the Reserve Forces under the Total Force concept.

The crux of this study is the third chapter. It covers the development and administration of a troop-level survey and analysis of the data collected. The objectives of the study are met in Chapter III.

Conclusions and recommendations are presented in Chapter IV. Hopefully, the recommendations will contribute to resolution or reduction of the paradoxical situation created by elimination of the primary source of personnel input into the Army Reserve, the draft, and the simultaneous increasing role and need for Army Reserve responsiveness.

## CHAPTER II

### BACKGROUND INFORMATION

This chapter presents a brief review of the draft, its impact on personnel input into the Army Reserve Program and the zero draft planned for 1 July 1973, and its probable impact on Reserve enlistments. A more detailed coverage of the draft is presented in Appendix C.

Also presented is a brief review of the past role of the Army Reserve, the current status of the program, and the projected role of the Reserve Forces under the Total Force concept. A more detailed coverage of the Army Reserve is presented in Appendix D.

#### The Draft

It is obvious that conscription has served a useful purpose by furnishing a substantial number of men for the armed forces in time of need throughout the history of the United States. The legality of conscription, challenged from its very inception, has been upheld in favor of the Federal Government in the nation's highest court. The draft has become an American institution and, through the history

of its development, has continuously improved, with one eye on sufficient manpower procurement and the other on equality in administration. As an institution it has withstood court challenges and numerous protests.

The draft has placed into military service the complete spectrum of America's socio-economic strata, particularly during the more recent part of her history. In the early days of conscription, men were able to either send substitutes or buy their way out of service to their nation, but, recently, exemptions have become fewer and outward corruption has been virtually eliminated. Many men have seen service in the military through the draft who, under other circumstances, would not have served in uniform. This can also be said about those who volunteered for the Regular or Reserve Components by way of the draft inducement.

Existence of the draft has placed the armed forces, particularly the Army, in a favorable position in terms of manpower procurement. The Active Army has been spoiled in the last several decades because raising the draft quotas to meet the need was a very simple matter whenever there was a need for a manpower increase.

The same condition, in an indirect manner, has existed in the Reserve Components. They have been composed primarily of volunteers, whether true or induced volunteers.

The draft has played a significant role in Reserve manpower input. Reserve commanders have been spoiled also, to the extent of enjoying the luxury of long waiting lists that were produced in most part by the draft threat.

The thinking and philosophy on manpower procurement have changed over the years. The most recent change being planned, a rather drastic change, is termination of the draft on 31 July 1973. The present world of expanding alternatives, greater freedom of choice, and emphasis on self-determination have led the way to abolishment of the draft. With abolition of the draft will come total reliance on an All-Volunteer Armed Force.

Thus, the draft has had a tremendous impact on personnel input into the Army Reserve Program. Indications are that termination of the draft will drastically reduce the number of men enlisting in the Army Reserve.

#### The Army Reserve

The Army Reserve has played a vital role in the national defense of the United States. This is particularly true of the past three decades, during and following World War II. Employment of the Reserve has proved valuable as a directly deployed force and as a deterrent to aggression by potential adversary nations. More reliance will be placed

on the Reserve than on the draft for manpower in the future.

The Reserve Forces, when placed under an advanced state of combat readiness, are certainly a much more responsive means of expanding the military force than reliance on the induction of men. Administration of the draft, training draftees, and integrating draftees into active units obviously delay responsiveness of a buildup. The Active Army, as it has done historically, will take the brunt of an initial military confrontation and, hopefully, will be able to at least hold the line until other measures can be taken to reinforce its stand. Because the Reserve will be the initial and primary source for expansion of the Army when manpower buildup is required, the Reserve Components must be prepared to rapidly and effectively fulfill their mission.

Reduction of ground forces in Southeast Asia and concurrent reduction in strength of the Active Army, coupled with the forthcoming zero draft, thrust the Army Reserve into a very prominent role as the initial source for manpower expansion in a national emergency. Reserve Forces will constitute almost one-half of the General Purpose Land Forces of the 25-1/3 division force equivalents projected for the end of Fiscal Year 1972.<sup>1</sup> This means that the

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<sup>1</sup>Department of Defense, Defense Report on President Nixon's Strategy for Peace (Washington: Government Printing

Reserve Land Forces will constitute the equivalent of twelve divisions. It must be kept in mind that only land forces are considered here and that the strength of support type forces in the Reserve Components is not counted.

Thus the Army Reserve is depicted as a backup military force that has had varying degrees of importance and readiness, depending upon the type of conflict and political winds of the period under consideration. However, it seems rather apparent that the projected role of the Army Reserve will be that of a backup force which will be the first line of buildup in case of a need to expand the armed forces. Because of the increased importance of its role, the Army Reserve must be much more responsive for deployment than it has been in the past.

Indications are that present incentives and recruiting and retention practices will not be able to provide the manpower thought necessary to maintain an adequate Reserve Force. The weakness seems to be in an inability to induce lower enlisted grade personnel to reenlist beyond their initial term.

Because of the expanding role of the Army Reserve and the indications of declining numbers in recruiting and

retention, it has become increasingly important to study, understand, and improve recruiting and retention in the U.S. Army Reserve to sustain the necessary forces to fulfill its mission as a firstline source of military expansion. This is in line with the ultimate objective of this thesis, which is to better understand the makeup of Army Reserve personnel, particularly those in the first term of the Reserve Enlistment Program, and to make recommendations to improve retention.



## CHAPTER III

### UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE SURVEY

A study of the history, current status, and projected picture of the draft and Army Reserve Program glaringly depicts a paradoxical situation. The Army Reserve will be faced with a dilemma whereby, on one hand, it will be given an increased role in the future as a substantial part of a Total Force concept and, on the other hand, it is expected to lose its primary source of personnel input by the projected termination of the draft. This writer therefore designed an Army Reserve troop-level survey to establish a picture of the retention situation, with some possible projections into the future, and to gather data for use in developing a set of recommendations to enhance retention.

#### Survey Development

The survey was developed with the following objectives in mind:

1. To determine the estimated retention rate of first-term Reserve Enlistment Program (REP 63) personnel.
2. To determine what motivated the REP 63 personnel

to join the program.

3. To determine what the REP 63 participant considers as important incentives to remain in the Army Reserve.

4. To solicit suggestions from REP 63 personnel for improving retention in the Army Reserve.

The overall goal of the survey was to gain a better understanding of the demographic makeup and thinking of REP 63 participants and to reveal conditions that are in need of change and improvement in the Army Reserve. The ultimate goal of the research was to develop recommendations for improving retention in the Army Reserve. Structured questions that limited the alternative responses to furnished choices and an unstructured question that offered a free response were used to get both breadth and depth of responses to meet the stated objectives.

General information.--Part I of the survey consisted of fact questions designed to determine demographic information. The data were collected to establish identity of the population surveyed and to check representativeness of the sampling. These data also allowed for further study of differences between or among different demographic classes.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Charles H. Backstrom and Gerald D. Hursh, Survey Research (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963), p. 70.

To accomplish the objective of determining the estimated retention rate of first-term REP 63 personnel, the structured question asked was: Do you plan to remain in the Army Reserve after your six-year obligation expires? Response choice was limited to "Yes," "No," or "Uncertain."

Motivation.--To accomplish the objective of determining what made the REP 63 participant join, a self-perception question was asked to determine how he perceived his reasons. The individual was asked to evaluate his own behavior in relation to others' behavior to determine what motivated him to join the Army Reserve.<sup>2</sup> One of the key factors was to determine how much influence the draft and the matter of military obligation had on motivating the young man to join.

The question asked in Part II of the survey was: Why did you join the Army Reserve? Twelve alternative responses and space for an "others" category, where the respondent had an opportunity to insert a reason that was not among the twelve, were provided. The survey participants were required to make at least one response.

Incentives.--An opinion and attitude question: What

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 72.

do you consider as good incentives to remain in the Army Reserve? was asked to accomplish the third objective. The question sought to reflect the respondent's underlying attitude structure and to determine what he thought or felt were good incentives for remaining in the Army Reserve at the time he responded to the question.<sup>3</sup>

Thirteen alternative responses were provided on the survey form. "None of the above," a fourteenth choice, was listed for those who might feel the thirteen incentives listed were not considered as good incentives. Space for an "others" category was also provided for respondents who might desire to include an incentive that was not listed. The survey participants were required to check at least one response in Part III and had the option of giving additional responses in order of preference.

Suggestions.--To attain the fourth, and final, objective of soliciting suggestions for improving the Army Reserve Program, a free-response, open-ended question was asked: What suggestions do you have for improving the Army Reserve to enhance retention?

The free-response question is especially useful  
(1) where the researcher has limited knowledge as to the kind of answers a particular question is likely to

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 71.

provoke, (2) where he anticipates a great range of responses, (3) where he is interested in what the respondent will volunteer on a subject before specific prompting, or (4) where he wants to go a little deeper into respondents' motivations.<sup>4</sup>

The last three reasons were particularly applicable to selection of this form of questioning for Part IV of the survey. The desire was to solicit voluntary information without prompting on the part of the questionnaire. A great range of responses was anticipated. Since open-ended questions generally provide more depth into a respondent's thinking, a great deal of emphasis is placed on the analysis of this part of the survey.

Commentary.--The intent was to categorize responses into logical relationships for tabulation and quantitative treatment, thereby reducing the broad range of responses by clustering them into logical groups that would be large enough to carry some weight in the analysis. The weakness here is that this writer has imposed his own classification upon the data.

There are two basic approaches to content analysis.<sup>5</sup> One method is the priori method, in which categories are

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 73.

<sup>5</sup>Frederick Herzberg and others, The Motivation To Work (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), pp. 37-38.

defined and outlined in a schematic system prior to data collection. The second approach is the posteriori approach, in which categories are extracted from the material itself after it is collected. Frederick Herzberg chose the latter approach for his study on motivation because he felt that the most valuable analysis would come out of the material itself. The posteriori approach was selected to categorize the responses in this study for the same reason, that the most valuable analysis would come out of the raw data as collected. Another advantage is that of not forcing the analyst to place responses into predetermined categories, thus offering the option to combine or invent categories if necessary. The scheme for categorizing the responses was identical to that Herzberg used in that each response was categorized into thought units. The thought units were later broken down into categories and sub-categories for analysis.

Some sample responses are included in the analysis to retain the flavor and intensity of comments. A common fault of categorizing is that the flavor and intensity of responses are lost in the process of neatly grouping the comments.<sup>6</sup> This problem is minimized by inclusion of sample

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<sup>6</sup>Backstrom and Hursh, p. 74.

comments. Further, many of the sample comments may be helpful to researchers who are pursuing development of a program to improve retention in the U.S. Army Reserve.

### Administration

Pre-testing.--Two approaches were used to pre-test the questionnaire. The first was to circulate the questionnaire to three Army Reserve officers in the 1972 Regular Course of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and to one Army National Guard officer and one Army Reserve officer in the Reserve Components class. This was accomplished before the questionnaire was put into final form. The five officers filled out the questionnaire and were asked to suggest additions, deletions, or modifications. Each of the five officers stated that he thought the questionnaire was valid and that personnel receiving it should have no difficulty completing it.

Technically, a questionnaire should be field tested under actual conditions to be used for the entire study and "thirty respondents are enough to show the faults in the questionnaire that must be corrected before conducting the study proper."<sup>7</sup> Therefore, the second approach was to field test the instrument. Twenty-nine questionnaires returned

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<sup>7</sup>Backstrom and Hursh, p. 129.

from California were used as the field test and are not reported in the data base of this study.

Responses from the field test showed that the information sought from respondents was satisfactorily received. All 29 respondents answered the structured questions in Parts I, II, and III, and 24 made comments in Part IV, the open-ended question. The last question elicited the type of responses it was designed to solicit. In most cases the pre-test responses in Part IV, suggestions for improving the Army Reserve Program, were so complete that a tentative categorizing of responses began at that point.

The only problem area was in the gathering of demographic information. Rank, age, and years of service were consistently answered and were eventually used as the basis for establishing the identity of the population surveyed. Inconsistencies occurred in information given for position, military occupational specialty, branch, and organization. Inconsistencies for organization, however, would be readily reconcilable since the questionnaires were to be returned to this writer through organizational headquarters. Therefore, inconsistencies that might appear in the demographic data were not considered important because sufficient identifying data could be clearly established if the inconsistencies paralleled those in the pre-testing by field test.



Validity.--The troop-level survey was deemed valid for the purpose intended. It was used throughout the study in the format shown in Appendix E.

Each of 10 Army Reserve Commands was sent 100 survey forms. The letter of transmittal requested that the survey be administered to a representative random sampling of first-term REP 63 personnel. Honesty and completeness of responses were stressed in the cover letter, along with an explanation of the purpose of the survey and the intended use of the results. (See Appendix E.)

The sampling procedure was a combination of stratified-random sampling, area sampling, and quota sampling. Various aspects of all three types of sampling were used. Stratified-random sampling can be accomplished by insuring that the sub-groups appear in the sampling in proportion to their numbers in the population.<sup>8</sup> The wide geographical distribution of responses introduced the concept of area sampling. All major regions of the nation are represented-- North, South, East, West, and Central United States and Hawaii. Urban, suburban, and rural areas are also represented. Aspects of a quota sampling are also found in the survey population. "The quota sample makes no effort to

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<sup>8</sup>Jum C. Nunally, Jr., Tests and Measurements (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1959), pp. 290-91.

select people randomly. The effort in the quota sample is to construct a miniature of the entire population in terms of known demographic characteristics."<sup>9</sup>

The quota sample was used as a basis for establishing that the sample population was representative of the total population being considered. Hypothesis tests of the means and standard deviations of the sample and total population were conducted at a significance level of .01. The hypothesis that the mean of the sample was equal to the mean of the total population could not be rejected at that significance level. Similarly, the hypothesis that the standard deviation of the sample was equal to the standard deviation of the total population could not be rejected at that significance level.<sup>10</sup> The likeness of the sample to the total population from which it was drawn can be graphically seen in Figure 1.

A chi-square test for goodness of fit was then conducted, using a significance level of .10 to determine

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<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>Irving H. LaValle, Untitled and unpublished manuscript on probability and statistics, Tulane University (1971), pp. 19-5 & 19-6; Alexander M. Mood and Franklin A. Graybill, Introduction to the Theory of Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), pp. 431-34; and Murray R. Spiegel, Theory and Problems of Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1961), pp. 77-79.

## PERCENTAGE

45

\*Office of the Deputy Chief  
of Staff for Personnel,  
40 Strength of the Army,  
Part III: Strength,  
Reserve Components (Wash-  
ington: Department of the  
Army, 28 February 1972),  
35 p. 10.

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

RANK E1

E2

E3

E4

E5

E6




Figure 1. Rank distribution of sample and total population.

how well the distribution of the sample population fit the distribution of the total population from which it was drawn. The hypothesis that the observed frequencies did not differ significantly from the expected frequencies could not be rejected at that significance level. In fact, they could not be shown to differ at any level of significance below the .88 level.<sup>11</sup>

It is assumed, therefore, that the sample was representative of the population studied.

According to a Department of the Army criterion, a return of 400 completed questionnaires out of each 1,000 mailed establishes statistically valid information. The Survey Section of the Office of Personnel Operations, which has Department of the Army responsibility for conducting surveys throughout the entire military environment, uses this criterion for establishing statistical validity of the surveys it conducts.<sup>12</sup>

Minimum return of the 100 questionnaires mailed to each of 10 Army Reserve Commands was anticipated to be about

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<sup>11</sup>William A. Chance, Statistical Methods for Decision Making (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1969), p. 292; and Spiegel, p. 201.

<sup>12</sup>Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, Recruiting and Retention for the Army Reserve (Washington: Department of the Army, 1971), p. 20.

50 per cent (500 returns of 1,000 mailed). Actually, seven Army Reserve Commands responded with a minimum of 57 to a maximum of 95; two responded with less than 30 each; and one did not return any of the 100. The two groups of less than 30 questionnaires were not used in this thesis. The decision was based on the rationale that the returns were insufficient for additional area comparison studies that might be based on different demographic classes. Had there been a third region with about 30 questionnaires, one composite group numbering between 80 and 90 respondents might have been established.

In the final analysis, 572 completed questionnaires of the 1,000 mailed were used as the data base for this thesis. That number of questionnaires exceeded Department of the Army's minimum for establishing statistical validity by 172. Therefore, the survey conducted is statistically valid for Department of the Army purposes.

### Analysis

General information.--Rank, age, years of service, and type of unit were used to establish the population description of the universe surveyed. This demographic information gives a composite picture of those who participated in the survey.

Rank is expressed in pay grades E1 through E6 (see Table 1). The most common rank represented was E4, with 45 per cent. This was not unusual in that the population was delimited to first-term REP 63 personnel. The other most commonly reported ranks were clustered around E4, with 21 per cent for E5 and 23 per cent for E3.

The age range was 19 through 31 years (see Table 2). The most frequently reported ages were 24, with 17 per cent, and 25, with 16 per cent.

More than 74 per cent of those surveyed had two or more years remaining on the 6-year obligation (see Table 3). The mode for years of service was three years. The number of years of service remaining is an important factor in determining the lead time available to influence retention.

The data collected for organization revealed that 33 different types of units were surveyed (see Table 4). Several duplications are shown, but, although the type of unit may be the same, the geographical locations of similar units are widely separated.

Data for position, military occupational specialty, and branch were incomplete or incorrect in some cases and are not reported. Many position spaces were left blank and some position titles were incomplete. The same held true for military occupational specialty. There was some

TABLE 1  
PAY GRADE DISTRIBUTION BY REGION

Region	Pay Grade						Total
	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5	E6	
Georgia	1	3	18	34	23	0	79
Hawaii	1	0	8	51	27	1	88
Indiana/Michigan	0	3	9	44	13	0	69
Missouri/Illincis	3	8	29	40	15	0	95
New York	4	8	37	36	5	0	90
Utah	2	5	23	28	30	6	94
Washington	5	1	10	27	8	6	57
Total:	16	28	134	260	121	13	572

TABLE 2  
AGE DISTRIBUTION BY REGION

Age	Region							Total
	GA	HI	Ind/ Mich	Mo/ Ill	New York	Utah	WA	
19	1	1	0	5	0	4	5	16
20	1	1	4	12	6	5	5	34
21	6	4	6	11	17	6	5	55
22	4	5	16	7	7	9	9	57
23	13	17	9	8	17	18	11	93
24	11	17	8	13	21	21	7	98
25	14	19	7	14	15	16	4	89
26	15	10	6	10	4	4	5	54
27	7	8	7	3	2	5	4	36
28	4	3	2	8	0	4	0	21
29	2	2	3	2	1	1	1	12
30	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	5
31	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	2
Total								
EMs:	79	88	69	95	90	94	57	572



TABLE 3  
YEARS OF SERVICE DISTRIBUTION BY REGION

Years of Service	Region							Total
	GA	HI	Ind/ Mich	Mo/ Ill	New York	Utah	WA	
0.5	5	2	0	10	5	5	5	32
1.0	7	2	2	11	1	8	4	35
1.5	1	6	5	10	8	7	4	41
2.0	9	13	9	8	7	7	9	62
2.5	4	7	2	3	14	7	3	40
3.0	16	7	9	13	30	6	7	88
3.5	8	4	10	11	14	8	5	60
4.0	17	13	6	9	6	3	10	64
4.5	3	4	10	7	2	2	0	28
5.0	6	8	5	2	0	12	5	38
5.5	1	9	7	2	0	14	2	35
6.0	2	13	4	9	3	15	3	49
Total EMs:	79	88	69	95	90	94	57	572

TABLE 4

## TYPE ACTIVITY DISTRIBUTION BY REGION

Type Activity	Region							Total
	GA	HI	IN	MO	NY	UT	WA	
ARCOM Headquarters . . . . .	28			15		9		52
Aviation Company . . . . .				10				10
Base Post Office . . . . .				7				7
Civil Affairs Group . . . . .		12						12
Convalescent Center . . . . .							9	9
Corps Headquarters Augmentation		7						7
Data Processing Unit . . . . .			4					4
Dental Services Detachment . . .				9				9
Direct Support Group . . . . .				10		24		34
Engineer Battalion . . . . .		21					9	30
Engineer Detachment . . . . .		5						5
Evacuation Hospital . . . . .							10	10
Field Artillery Battalion . . . .			14					14
Finance Section . . . . .		3						3
General Hospital . . . . .			10	23		29	3	65
Infantry Battalion . . . . .		14						14
Light Maintenance Company . . .			7					7
Military Intelligence Detachment		10						10
Military Police Brigade . . . . .							7	7
Military Police Company . . . . .					25			25
Ordnance Group . . . . .				19				19
Personnel Services Company . . .	51	6						57
Quartermaster Company . . . . .			9					9
Repair Parts Company . . . . .			6					6
Replacement Battalion . . . . .				2				2
Signal Company . . . . .		10						10
Special Forces Group . . . . .							4	4
Station Hospital . . . . .			11				5	16
Supply & Services Battalion . . .			8					8
Supply & Services Company . . . .						11		11
Terminal Station . . . . .					29			29
Transportation Company . . . . .					36	21		57
USAR Garrison . . . . .							10	10
Total								
EMs:	79	83	69	95	90	94	57	572

confusion on branch in that some spaces were left blank and others showed "Army," "USAR," or unit designation.

Position, military occupational specialty, and branch, particularly the first two, cross-referenced with all other data could serve as identifying data to locate an individual by name. This fact may have caused some to be reluctant to give all of the information requested in Part I. Difficulties in gathering these three items of data were anticipated when the pre-testing was completed, but they were considered non-essential as demographic data.

Respondents by number and percentage, mean age, mean years of service, and numbers of answers to the question pertaining to intent to remain in the Army Reserve after expiration of the 6-year obligation are presented in Table 5. A strong majority of 81 per cent (463 personnel) indicated that they do not plan to remain. Those responding "Yes" (17 personnel) fell below 3 per cent, which paints a grim picture for retention of REP 63 personnel. Some salvation may lie in the 16 per cent (92 personnel) who responded as being "Uncertain." This group could well form the first line of a retention offensive. Some of them, considering a "Yes" response as somewhat obligatory, may have hedged into the "Uncertain" block. Although the survey was anonymous, the permanence of putting things in writing was still there.

TABLE 5  
REGIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING 572 SURVEY RESPONDENTS

<u>Respondents</u>		Mean Age	Mean Years of Service	<u>Plan To Reenlist</u>		
No./Per Cent				Yes	No	Uncertain
<u>Georgia</u>						
79	13.8	24.63	3.08	0	75	4
<u>Hawaii</u>						
88	15.4	24.37	3.76	0	72	10
<u>Indiana/Michigan</u>						
69	12.1	23.88	3.56	1	50	18
<u>Missouri/Illinois</u>						
95	16.6	23.65	3.03	3	72	20
<u>New York</u>						
90	15.7	23.20	2.78	2	85	3
<u>Utah</u>						
94	16.4	23.68	3.70	10	63	21
<u>Washington</u>						
57	10.0	23.08	2.99	1	46	10
572	100.0	23.78	3.27	17	463	92

Motivation.--Of the 572 respondents, 67 per cent (381 personnel) said they joined the Army Reserve to avoid the draft. This may seem surprisingly low in the light of estimates which state that "perhaps 75% of the enlisted personnel fulfilling their initial six-year military obligation in the reserves are there only because of the draft."<sup>13</sup> "To avoid the draft," the wording provided on the survey, has connotations of draft evasion or draft dodging and may be considered socially unacceptable by some. However, this writer's intention was to determine how many respondents would attribute their membership in the program directly to avoiding the draft.

A later and similar choice was worded in much more socially acceptable terms: It is a good way to complete my military obligation. That response still definitely considers existence of the draft and existence of a military obligation for all able-bodied, mentally capable young men who become subject to the draft. It was selected, however, by 23 per cent of the respondents (133 personnel). Perhaps a statement concerning draft eligibility should have been included in Part II of the questionnaire.

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<sup>13</sup>President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, All-Volunteer Armed Force (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 97.

Combining the two responses of avoidance of the draft and completion of military obligation results in 90 per cent of the respondents (514 personnel) and exceeds official estimates for draft induced enlistments. This combination would have to be made under the assumption that the percentage figures for the two reasons would be eliminated if there were no military obligation and draft. Should this be projected to a zero draft situation, it is conceivable that enlistments in the Army Reserve could be reduced by 90 per cent. To view the figures from another perspective, it may be encouraging to note that some men will volunteer if there is a military obligation. This may become a very important consideration if the Army Reserve needs to maintain its enlisted strength and sufficient men do not join after implementation of the zero draft.

There was a big gap between the second and third motivation choices. The drop was from 23 per cent (133 personnel) for the second choice, completing the military obligation, to 3 per cent (15 personnel) for the third choice, demonstrating loyalty to the United States. This response may logically follow in this sequence in that there exists a military obligation and thereby a need to demonstrate loyalty to one's country through service in the military. It is refreshing to note that loyalty came above

all remaining motivations, which included supplementing civilian income and attending college. Although demonstration of loyalty was third in rank order, it is difficult to draw any conclusions because of the small percentage involved in the response.

The motivation responses are summarized for all seven regions in Table 6. A more detailed summary in Appendix F shows first, second, and third choices by individual region.

Incentives.--The matter of additional income from the Army Reserve was by far the leading factor given by the respondents as a good incentive to remain in the Army Reserve. Income was given as a first choice by 44 per cent (252 personnel). This finding reinforces, or is reinforced by, a suggestion in Part IV of the questionnaire that pay be increased, the suggestion which ranked second and was given by 17 per cent of those surveyed.

It is interesting to note that pay, definitely not a strong motivating factor for joining the Army Reserve, was considered an important factor for remaining in the Reserve and important as a suggestion for enhancing retention. A consideration may be that the factors of draft and military obligation are so strong as to overshadow all other factors

TABLE 6

MOTIVATION--RESPONSE TO QUESTION: WHY DID  
YOU JOIN THE ARMY RESERVE?

Motivation	Region							Total
	GA	HI	IN	MO	NY	UT	WA	
Demonstrate loyalty to country .	1	1	3	5	1	4	0	15
Supplement civilian income . . .	0	0	0	1	1	3	1	6
Avoid draft . . . . .	65	51	37	59	69	55	45	381
Get military training . . . . .	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Learn a skill or trade . . . . .	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	4
Parent(s) encouraged me . . . .	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	3
Relative(s) encouraged me . . .	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Friend(s) encouraged me . . . .	2	0	2	1	0	1	0	6
Source for a commission . . . .	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Joined with friends . . . . .	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	3
Get away from home . . . . .	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Complete military obligation . .	10	27	21	25	15	26	9	133
Others:								
Early release from active duty	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Attending college . . . . .	0	4	1	0	0	0	1	6
Refused commission . . . . .	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Help parents . . . . .	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Forced to . . . . .	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
In business . . . . .	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Stay with family . . . . .	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Lessen interruption . . . . .	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
No choice . . . . .	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Extreme masochism . . . . .	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Total								
EMs:	79	68	68	95	88	94	57	569



that cause men to join the Reserve. However, once the man is in the Reserve and motivation for being there becomes a matter of history, the consideration becomes: Now that I'm here, what's important and how can things be improved?

The second highest response, with a substantial portion of 35 per cent (203 personnel), was "None of the above." In other words, 35 per cent felt that not even one of the thirteen incentives listed in the survey form was a good incentive to remain in the Army Reserve. This particular response may also be further borne out in Part IV, where seven of the top ten suggestions selected for improving the Army Reserve deal with improvement of training, administration of the program, and changes in legislation, regulations, or policies.

The problem here may be that whatever incentives do exist may not be real or visible to the young Reservist. Department of Defense may have recognized this shortcoming in its Five-Year Defense Program and 1972 Defense Budget report, which states, in part:

In any case, it must be anticipated that, as we draw closer to FY 1973, there will be a need for real and visible incentives to encourage young men and women to join or remain in the Reserve components.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>Department of Defense, Defense Report on President Nixon's Strategy for Peace (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 101.

Combination of the two facets of good incentives to remain in the Army Reserve and suggestions for improving the Army Reserve may well give clues as to where emphasis on retention should be placed. This is discussed at length in the sub-section below (Suggestions) and in Chapter IV.

Although the average respondent was 37 years away from the Army Reserve retirement age of 60, retirement benefits, with 5 per cent of the responses (26 personnel), ranked third as a good incentive for remaining in the Reserve. Many working with the young Reservist may sell the importance of retirement short. They may think he is too young to be too concerned about retirement or that today's youth is now-oriented and not that concerned about three or four decades hence.

Promotions ranked fourth as a good incentive for remaining in the Army Reserve, with 4 per cent (23 personnel) giving it as a primary reason. The remaining incentives were accorded scattered acceptance and constituted the balance of 12 per cent of the responses (63 personnel). No particular trend was established. Summary of the incentive selections by regions is presented in Table 7. The first, second, and third choices by individual region are shown in Appendix F.

TABLE 7

INCENTIVES--RESPONSE TO QUESTION: WHAT DO YOU CONSIDER  
AS GOOD INCENTIVES TO REMAIN IN THE ARMY RESERVE?

Incentive	Region							Total
	GA	HI	IN	MO	NY	UT	WA	
Additional income . . . . .	25	40	32	47	20	61	27	252
Promotions . . . . .	1	4	5	4	4	4	1	23
Prestige . . . . .	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	3
Retirement benefits . . . . .	2	6	6	5	2	2	3	26
PX privileges (limited) . . . . .	2	0	2	2	1	0	1	8
PX & commissary privileges (summer camp) . . . . .	4	6	0	0	1	0	1	12
Insurance policy (SGLI) (limited coverage) . . . . .	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Divergent activity . . . . .	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
I like the military . . . . .	0	0	0	1	2	1	2	6
Association with other Reservists . . . . .	1	1	5	3	0	4	0	14
Business & professional contacts . . . . .	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	4
Travel . . . . .	0	7	0	0	2	0	0	9
Pride in the unit . . . . .	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
None of the above . . . . .	43	17	18	31	55	20	19	203
Others:								
No way . . . . .	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
No meetings . . . . .	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Treatment like civilians get . . . . .	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Total								
EMs:	79	84	69	95	90	93	57	567

Suggestions.--All answers to the free-response, open-ended question (What suggestions do you have for improving the Army Reserve to enhance retention?) were coded and broken down into two major categories and six subordinate categories. The major categories decided upon were Monetary and Non-Monetary. The further categorization was accomplished to include Direct Payment and Fringe Benefits under Monetary and Administration, Civil-Military Relationship, Legislative/Regulation/Policy, and Training under Non-Monetary.

Monetary suggestions include those that involved the funding structure of the Army Reserve. Direct payment suggestions relate to money that can be readily calculated and paid directly to each Reservist. Fringe benefit suggestions involve military matters such as medical care, GI Bill, insurance, and purchases through military commissaries and exchanges. The cost factor for fringe benefits would be extremely difficult to calculate.<sup>15</sup>

Non-monetary suggestions, for the most part, can be effected with very little, if any, outlay of money. Some indirect costs may occur but, on the whole, the suggestions

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<sup>15</sup> It is not within the scope of this study to estimate the cost factor of the suggestions placed in the Monetary Category. This would be a study in and of itself.

so placed can be considered non-monetary. The Administration Sub-Category includes matters concerning administration or the running of the program. This means leadership in directing the program, administration per se, and matters that affect the welfare of personnel. Suggestions placed in the Civil-Military Relationship Sub-Category pertain to matters the Reservists viewed as having a conflict or direct relationship between the civil and military sectors. They were made to meld the two sectors together. The Legislative/Regulation/Policy Sub-Category includes all suggestions that would require official action and sanction of law, Army regulations, and policies established at major or local command levels. The regulatory machinery would need to take action on those suggestions. The Training Sub-Category includes anything that concerns the scheduling of drill dates or specific subjects covered during drill. This sub-category includes what Reservists do during drill hours in the name of training, whether training in the field, classroom instruction, or on-the-job training.

It must be understood that there is a great deal of overlap between the Monetary Category and the Non-Monetary Category and among the six sub-categories. None is pure. In many cases one will affect another either directly or indirectly. The categorizations were developed on the basis

of logical relationships and for the purpose of quantification and analysis.

After coding and categorization, all suggestions were rank ordered. Those from more than one region are presented in Table 8. Those from only one region are presented in Table 9. All suggestions are discussed in the section of this chapter that is entitled Discussion of Specific Suggestions.

A total of 777 accompanying comments were made by 72 per cent of the respondents. They ranged from terse and vulgar to lengthy and thought-provoking. The rank order of comments by sub-categories established for this thesis is (1) Legislative/Regulation/Policy, 27 per cent; (2) Administration, 19 per cent; (3) Training, 18 per cent; (4) Fringe Benefits, 17 per cent; (5) Direct Payment, 13 per cent; and (6) Civil-Military Relationship, 6 per cent.

The top three sub-categories of comments are from the Non-Monetary Category and offer many possibilities for control and direction at major and local command levels. Large expenditures of money would not be necessary to effect improvements. These findings are in accord with current Department of Defense emphasis as expressed in a statement Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird made in his report on the Five-Year Defense Program and 1972 Defense Budget. He said:

TABLE 8

SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING ARMY RESERVE BY RANK ORDER,  
CATEGORY, AND REGION (AT LEAST TWO)

RO	Sub-Category and Suggestion	Region							Total
		GA	HI	IN	MO	NY	UT	WA	
Monetary									
	<u>Direct Payment:</u>								
2	Increase pay . . . . .	7	10	18	15	8	6	7	71
11	Offer reenlistment bonus . .	1	4	4	5	0	6	2	22
	Sub-Total:	8	14	22	20	8	12	9	93
	<u>Fringe Benefits:</u>								
5	More PX privileges . . . . .	4	23	2	2	2	7	4	44
10	More commissary privileges .	1	15	0	0	0	6	3	25
12	Earlier retirement benefits .	0	8	3	1	1	4	3	20
13	Offer GI Bill benefits . . .	1	3	5	2	3	2	3	19
15	Increase benefits, in general	1	2	1	1	0	2	5	12
18	Enlarge medical benefits . .	0	3	2	0	0	1	1	7
21	Give tax break . . . . .	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	4
21	Offer insurance benefits . .	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	4
22	Give travel privileges . . .	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	3
	Sub-Total:	7	56	17	6	7	24	21	138
	Monetary Total:	15	70	39	26	15	36	30	231
Non-Monetary									
	<u>Administration:</u>								
3	Cut "Mickey-Mouse" . . . . .	6	8	10	10	4	8	4	50
9	Improve leadership . . . . .	1	3	5	3	2	9	4	27
10	Prompt promotions . . . . .	2	2	1	9	1	9	1	25
17	Respect enlisted men . . . .	0	0	1	1	3	5	0	10

TABLE 8--Continued

RO	Sub-Category and Suggestion	Region							Total
		GA	HI	IN	MO	NY	UT	WA	
	<u>Administration:</u> <u>Forwarded:</u>	9	13	17	23	10	31	9	112
18	Process enlistees . . . . .	0	0	0	5	0	0	2	7
20	Build esprit de corps . . . . .	0	2	1	1	0	1	0	5
21	Decrease paperwork . . . . .	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	4
22	Provide better atmosphere . .	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	3
23	Give EM more responsibilities	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	2
	Sub-Total:	9	16	20	31	10	35	12	133
	<u>Civil-Military Relationship:</u>								
8	Increase community service .	2	7	0	4	12	6	2	33
21	Improve image . . . . .	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	4
22	Consider societal goals . . .	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	3
	Sub-Total:	4	10	0	4	13	6	3	40
	<u>Legislative/Regulation/Policy:</u>								
1	Liberalize haircut regulation	9	13	25	11	18	30	11	117
6	Reduce length of service . .	6	2	7	7	9	5	6	42
12	Make jobs civilian-like . . .	0	2	3	5	2	6	2	20
13	Liberalize appearance policy	0	0	2	11	0	4	2	19
19	Liberalize makeup policy . .	0	1	3	0	0	1	1	6
20	Institute leave policy . . .	0	1	2	0	0	1	1	5
22	Establish more career fields	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	3
23	More civ educ opportunities .	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	2
	Sub-Total:	15	20	44	34	30	48	23	214
	<u>Training:</u>								
4	Eliminate "make work" . . . .	2	3	9	4	10	13	5	46
7	Improve training . . . . .	3	10	3	7	3	6	6	38



TABLE 8--Continued

RO	Sub-Category and Suggestion	Region							Total
		GA	HI	IN	MO	NY	UT	WA	
	<u>Training:</u> <u>Forwarded:</u>	5	13	12	11	13	19	11	84
14	Reduce number of drills . . .	0	3	7	3	3	2	0	18
16	Reduce number of drill hours	0	3	3	2	1	1	1	11
16	Schedule recreation period .	0	2	6	3	0	0	0	11
18	Regularize dates . . . . .	0	2	1	3	0	0	1	7
22	Keep mission in mind . . . .	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	3
22	Update equipment . . . . .	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	3
23	Cut work details . . . . .	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
23	Eliminate FTXs . . . . .	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	2
	Sub-Total:	5	26	32	23	17	23	15	141

## Summary

<u>Suggestions</u>	<u>GA</u>	<u>HI</u>	<u>IN</u>	<u>MO</u>	<u>NY</u>	<u>UT</u>	<u>WA</u>	<u>Total</u>
Monetary:								
DP	8	14	22	20	8	12	9	93
FB	<u>7</u>	<u>56</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>138</u>
Sub-Total:	15	70	39	26	15	36	30	231
Non-Monetary:								
Admin	9	16	20	31	10	35	12	133
CMR	4	10	0	4	13	6	3	40
LRP	15	20	44	34	30	48	23	214
Tng	<u>5</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>141</u>
Sub-Total:	33	72	96	92	70	112	53	528
Total	48	142	135	118	85	148	83	759

TABLE 9

SUGGESTIONS (RANK ORDER 24), FROM ONLY ONE REGION, FOR  
IMPROVING ARMY RESERVE

Suggestion	Monetary	Non-Monetary				Total
	FB	Admin	CMR	LRP	Tng	
Hawaii						
Convert to Natl Svc Corps				1		1
Give veteran's preference	1					1
Offer college scholarships	1					1
Recruit in colleges . . .		1				1
Sub-Total:	2	1		1		4
Indiana/Michigan						
Continue the draft . . . .				2		2
Reduce interruption to civilian life . . . . .					1	1
Vary location of AT . . .					2	2
WACs to perform admin work		1				1
Sub-Total:		1		2	3	6
Missouri/Illinois						
Consider EM's need/desire		1				1
Provide job orientation .		1				1
Sub-Total:		2				2
New York						
Encourage OCS attendance .		1				1
Recognize ability . . . .		1				1
More civilian contact . .			1			1
Re-design uniform . . . .				1		1

TABLE 9--Continued

Suggestion	Monetary	Non-Monetary				Total
	FB	Admin	CMR	LRP	Tng	
Forwarded (NY):		2	1	1		4
Use civilians for extra duty . . . . .				1		1
Sub-Total:		2	1	2		5
Utah						
Eliminate KP . . . . .				2		2
Eliminate weekday drills .					1	1
Increase allotments . . .	1					1
Liberalize transfer policy				3		3
Make combat units . . . .				1		1
More discipline . . . . .		1				1
No civilian pay loss for annual training . . . .				2		2
Optional annual training .				1		1
Train in MOS . . . . .					2	2
Sub-Total:	1	1		9	3	14
Washington						
Better food during drills		1				1
Offer choice of assignments . . . . .		1				1
Sub-Total:		2				2
Total:	3	9	1	14	6	33

"Our efforts in FY 1972 will be primarily oriented toward enhancing participation in the Reserve and Guard through improvements in their procedures and administration."<sup>16</sup>

Later in the same report, Secretary Laird made a remark that serves to tie together this study's top three sub-categories of comments by addressing the need to modify regulative matters such as legislation, regulations, and policies, which can be accomplished only through proper administration of the program and elimination of "make-work" to improve training. He said:

There is no doubt that further elimination of "make-work" and modification of unnecessary rules and restrictions will enhance the attractiveness of service life. Experimental programs suggest that the elimination of unnecessary irritants is reflected in higher first-term reenlistments.<sup>17</sup>

The respondents placed much less emphasis on the Monetary Category, its sub-categories Fringe Benefits and Direct Payment ranking fourth and fifth, respectively. A closer look at these results shows that the respondents ranked Fringe Benefits, with 17 per cent of the comments, above Direct Payment, or pay increase, with 13 per cent. Secretary Laird also placed less emphasis on the matter of pay, as shown in the following statement:

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<sup>16</sup>Department of Defense, p. 101.

<sup>17</sup>Department of Defense, p. 135.

It should be noted, however, that the recent general pay raise for active duty military personnel also accrues to Reserve and Guard personnel, which will provide some help in maintaining Reserve Component strengths.<sup>18</sup>

The most recent trends in Army Reserve recruiting and retention efforts have been toward emphasis on the monetary aspects of attractions. This was verified in a survey of the Army Reserve Commands (Appendix A) which showed, in addition to other retention information, that pay was given the second order of emphasis.

Although the sub-category of Civil-Military Relationship ranked sixth in respondent comments, its importance should not be slighted. Under the current military environment, and more so when the zero draft is effected and there is no longer a large input of draftees into the Active Army, the closest contact between the military and the community at large is and will be through the Reserve Components. The Army Reserve, with its "citizen soldiers," serves as an excellent means of establishing good civil-military relations. The need for good civil-military relations and, more specifically, for positive public recognition of the military is well summarized in the following extract from the most recent Department of Defense budget report:

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<sup>18</sup>Department of Defense, p. 101. (This Laird quote followed the two that are documented in Note 14 [page 40] and Note 16 [page 51].)

Our efforts to make military service more attractive and rewarding, however essential on their own merits, will be inadequate if they are not accompanied by public recognition that military service is a worthy career. The abusive defamation of the military that circulates in many quarters of our society is increasingly an obstacle to recruitment and retention of personnel by the Armed Forces. It is unjust, and it is dangerous to our security. If the military profession is not accorded the respect it deserves, no amount of money, no improvement in the conditions of service life, no recruitment campaign, will attract enough qualified volunteers to maintain an adequate military force.<sup>19</sup>

Further analysis of the six sub-categories of responses to Part IV of the questionnaire by comparing their importance to the REP 63 respondents and the Army Reserve Commands resulted in the rank ordering shown in Table 10.

TABLE 10  
IMPORTANCE OF SUB-CATEGORIES TO  
REP 63s AND ARCOMs

Sub-Category	Rank Order	
	REP 63s	ARCOMs
Legislative/Regulation/Policy	1	6
Administration . . . . .	2	3
Training . . . . .	3	1
Fringe Benefits . . . . .	4	5
Direct Payment . . . . .	5	2
Civil-Military Relationship .	6	4

Some glaring differences are evident. The largest variance is in the Legislative/Regulation/Policy Sub-Category, which

<sup>19</sup>Department of Defense, p. 135.

was the first order of concern to REP 63s and the last order of importance to ARCOMs. Direct payment (pay) ranked fifth among REP 63s and second among ARCOMs. Training, third order of concern to REP 63s, was of foremost concern to ARCOMs. The ARCOM response breakdown is shown in Appendix A.

The discrepancies revealed in Table 10 may indicate a need for careful study by each ARCOM of efforts expended in its retention program and also a need for reevaluation and restructuring of the priority order in which efforts are expended (Appendix A). Communication between REP 63 personnel and those responsible for regulating and administering the Army Reserve Program appears to be somewhat at odds. A melding of the two groups may be in order.

Studies of motivation in the business field have recently shown that there has been a move away from the economically oriented man in America's society toward a man who is more concerned with the human aspects of emotional and social needs. This trend is shown in the REP 63s' rank order responses, but it did not hold true for responses from the Army Reserve Commands.

It may well be that, in general, the man who joins the Army Reserve has substantially satisfied the more basic needs of economic well-being and is attempting to move higher on Maslow's hierarchy of needs to emotional and

social needs.<sup>20</sup> The normal screening process of testing, the physical examination, and the check of criminal record insure that the enlistee in the Army Reserve is fit for military service and meets certain minimum standards.

Dr. Frederick Herzberg has noted the phenomenon of a move from an economically oriented man to a man who is more concerned about human aspects. In his words:

Perhaps the greatest contribution that the behavior scientists have made during the last half-century of research on the industrial scene has been to broaden the concept of the needs and nature of man from a solely economic organism to one that encompasses some of the more human aspects--the emotional and social needs.<sup>21</sup>

This theory is further verified by Douglas M. McGregor, who stated that "a satisfied need is not a motivator of behavior."<sup>22</sup> Another aspect of McGregor's theoretical assumptions of management is reflected in this study's findings in that the responses to the survey place regulative matters and administration of the Army Reserve as first and second priority matters in need of improvement. This is in line with McGregor's Theory Y, which places problems in

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<sup>20</sup> Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper and Row, 1954), p. 80.

<sup>21</sup> Frederick Herzberg, Work and the Nature of Man (New York: World Publishing, 1971), p. 43.

<sup>22</sup> Douglas M. McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1960), p. 36.



organizational performance directly on management and management's method of organization and control.<sup>23</sup>

Other responses that ranked high in the survey may indicate the Army Reserve is working with a Theory Y person. This is manifest in such high ranking responses as elimination of "make work," undue supervision or "Mickey-Mouse," relaxing of regulations for haircut and appearance, and making Army Reserve duties more like those in a civilian job with less regimentation. These findings appear to point toward a Theory Y view which

points to the possibility of lessening the emphasis on external forms of control to the degree that commitment to organizational objectives can be achieved. Its underlying assumptions emphasize the capacity of human beings for self-control, and the consequent possibility of greater managerial reliance on other means of influence.<sup>24</sup>

The military has historically operated under authoritarian leadership. The Army and the Roman Catholic Church are still regarded as the two Theory X-type models of authoritarian management.<sup>25</sup> The resolution of a Theory X Army dealing with a Theory Y soldier, however, is complex and would have to be a matter of separate study.

The remainder of this analysis is devoted to

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<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 56.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 56.

<sup>25</sup>Harold Koontz, Principles of Management (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1968), pp. 19-20.

discussing the 67 suggestions listed in Tables 8 and 9.

### Suggestions To Enhance Retention

The overall ranking in parenthesis after each suggestion shows the potential force that suggestion has for making the Army Reserve more palatable for the young man of today. The ranking was computed on the basis of the frequency of each suggestion made by the 72 per cent of respondents who commented on the free-response, open-ended question in Part IV of the questionnaire.

The top twenty most frequently made suggestions are discussed with amplifying comments and sample responses. The sample responses are included to preserve the flavor and intensity of the responses, whether constructive or negative.

The final two elements of this section are a discussion of suggestions rank ordered 21, 22, 23, and 24 as one group and a listing of negative comments that were given on an individual basis.

Liberalize haircut regulation (1): The matter of length of hair appears to be a vital concern to the youth of today. This is a bone of contention for high school students, youth seeking employment, and young men entering the military service. Hair length was worthy of mention by 26 per cent of the respondents. One of the major concerns

of those who commented on hair length and grooming was that the 10 to 20 per cent of days of a year they are in uniform for Army Reserve activities dictates, for all practical purposes, the length of their hair for the other 80 to 90 per cent of the year they are civilians. A concern here, which appears to be genuine to the young Reservist, is that because of the requirement for him to keep his hair within standards required in the Reserve, he stands out among his peers who are not connected with the military and wear their hair longer. Some respondents questioned the function of haircuts as presently prescribed and the effect it has upon mission accomplishment.

This matter might well be discussed under the category of "Mickey-Mouse" harassment, but it is broken out as a separate category because, singularly, it appears to be of such vital concern to so many. The category of appearance standards, which is also separately reported, did not specifically mention haircuts per se, but haircuts are a definite part of personal appearance and grooming. If the categories of haircut and appearance were combined, as well they might be, the intensity of concern over haircuts would be increased. Further, adding the category of "Mickey-Mouse" harassment would make the haircut by far the greatest concern, with a total of 45 per cent of those who commented

being represented. Sample responses follow.

"Let an individual's hair alone. We don't need these impressions of authority to enable the proper functioning of a unit."

"Stop telling men to have a haircut. Most of the men would look neat."

"Abolish petty harassment such as haircuts, sideburns, etc."

"Ease up on haircuts."

"No harassment, like no limit on hair style; more like a civilian occupation."

"Less stringent regulations on such menial things as haircuts, moustaches, beards, formations, etc. would make the Reserve program more attractive."

"Can't think of anything to improve recruiting except being less strict about haircuts."

"Resentment of the military has polarized this community. And, because naturally wanting to identify with fellow college peers, one readily recognized overt behavior of which side of the poles he is on by the way one wears his hair. If the Reserves do allow long hair in its program (which apparently is unrealistic because of psychological reasons), I think youngsters would consider enlisting in such a program."

"The Army Reserve must relax restrictions which have no bearing on an individual's performance (e.g., haircut, beards and moustaches)."

"Present stringent requirements, i.e., haircuts, spit and shine, particular scheduling of courses, etc., should be reviewed as to their real importance in accomplishing the Reserve objectives."

"Also the problem of haircuts. I do not like my hair excessively long and I do not like my hair as short as the regs require, and I am sure my fellow reservists feel as I do. Certain guidelines must be followed, I am sure, but the length the Army has set is much too short."

I feel this is causing much bad morale and will only get worse, not better."

"To do away with petty antiquated regulations such as the haircut regulation, in terms of modern standards, while more significance should be placed on the mission and effectiveness of the individual unit."

"I spend 28 days a month as a civilian and only 2 days a month as a Reservist. I don't see why my hair length cannot be allowed to conform to the civilian norm. As it is, I am made to feel like a 'freak' relic from the past 28 days a month. This is very bad for my morale."

"Change the hair, moustache and beard standards. My civilian job is greatly affected because I can't have long hair, long moustache and a beard."

"A liberalization of hair standards would possibly enhance this for me. I do not mean long hair (e.g., hair to the shoulders)--but longer over the ears, sideburns to the bottom of the lobe and over the collar (which can be worn in the collar). But more than this--a legal use of wigs because surely this can be a good way to conform to Army standards and to the popular standards of the day--without encroaching upon either standard."

"Hair length standards prevent many men from joining the Army Reserve. I don't feel that moderately long hair would hamper anyone's performance of his duties."

"As long as I have to feel concerned about coming to drills and having my hair and sideburns scrutinized to determine whether I can remain for the drill or not, I don't feel like I'll be too motivated to remain or encourage others to do so. I'm not a radical of hair styles, but I hate the uncomfortable feeling of being harassed for leaving my hair full or my sideburns down to the bottom of my ears."

"Relax the hair standards--this is a major complaint of most Reservists. Long hair does not make a man any less of a man or any less proud to be an American."

Increase pay (2): The suggestion to increase Army

Reserve pay ranked second overall. One concern was that the pay structure, as it presently exists, is not competitive with part-time employment. Some commented that higher ranking officers do well in terms of pay, but lower ranking enlisted men do not. The high rank order of this suggestion reinforces, or is reinforced by, the importance placed upon additional income. In response to the question in Part III of the questionnaire, respondents gave additional income top priority as a good incentive to remain in the Army Reserve, with 44 per cent making it a first choice. Sample responses:

"I feel that the incentive of pay would help to retain reservists in the Army. If pay was raised to a point that it would be profitable to remain in the Reserves."

"Increase the pay for enlisted men."

"Better distribution of money."

"Substantial increase in pay."

"Above all, the salaries should be raised to compete with civilian jobs."

"Pay increases are essential if the Reserves wish to retain or recruit. Compared to other alternatives to gain additional income, the Reserves are running a poor second, especially among young enlisted personnel. A major or colonel makes out, but a Pfc or Sp4 may lose money by attending drills."

"Increase the pay schedule for higher grade men. Sgts and above. They have increased the E1 and E2's, but not the old-timer's pay. Is this a good way to keep men in?"

Cut "Mickey-Mouse" (3): Eliminating "Mickey-Mouse"

harassment was a very high item in the minds of those surveyed. As in the Modern Volunteer Army concept, the Reservist is looking toward the removal of irritants that make his job difficult to perform. In connection with the matter of haircut regulations, which might well be included under this category, the Reservist questioned the function of what he termed "Mickey-Mouse" harassment, a term more commonly known in military parlance as irritants. Definition of the term is implicit in the sameness of the sample responses below.

"The best thing to enhance recruiting would be to get rid of the mickey mouse stuff. The overnights in the field are dumb, but in the middle of winter is absolutely stupid."

"Cut out some of Mickey Mouse routines we go through, e.g., formations after lunch on an all-day meeting."

"Better working conditions and the lessening of harassment."

"Eliminate nonsense harassment."

"Get rid of the "mickey mouse" harassment and pickey, petty rules."

"Cut the needless harassment of troops--haircuts, brass. How a man looks is no measure of how he works."

"Cut out the unnecessary rules and regulations which do nothing but waste time and harass the personnel."

"Unnecessary formations of unnecessary length, especially in bad weather."

"I think first that if this particular unit does not knock off the ridiculous harassment that it dishes out to the EM, there is not going to be enough retention to worry about having a unit."

"Today's reservist is anxiously awaiting the end of his obligation. Did he start with this attitude? No, this state of mind was induced by continual harassment by superiors, harassment based not on performance or lack of same but on appearance, a facade to appease those who have decided to reduce the efficiency of the Reserves by placing emphasis on non-training and non-performance standards."

Eliminate "make work" (4): The respondents making this suggestion generally felt that their work in the Army Reserve lacked challenge, meaningfulness, and interest. There was a definite feeling of discontent with the presence of busy work or "make work" as opposed to emphasis on productive work. A general tenor of boredom, with an apparent willingness to work if the activity was considered worthwhile or productive, can be perceived in those who commented in this category. Sample responses follow.

"The Reserve Support Group I am now with is concerned mainly with paperwork and ridiculous busy work that would bore even a retarded person."

"More meaningful work and attention to such and less attention and concentration on parade and drill. The amount we do now will not make us any more ready if the need occurs, but only lowers the citizen soldier morale by burdening him with trivia. The actual meaningful work can be gratifying."

"Less disorganization - more responsible duties - less 'make-work'."

"Lots of units don't have anything to do besides sleep some place, or they act like they're doing something."

"Provide productive, significant work and/or duties, perhaps related to civilian job of reservist."



"Make work more interesting."

"Any type of duties that might challenge an individual rather than the theory that work will expand itself to meet the time allotted."

"Provide a job for each man which will be challenging to his ability and explain the duties of that job to the individual."

"Have a definite related job to your MOS."

"Make drills a thing you want to attend without the thought of being forced to."

"A major source of discontent is the feeling that drills are meaningless and that the reservist is not accomplishing anything."

"Offer more rewarding and challenging things to do during drills (avoid boredom)."

"More professionalism vs 'makework' projects."

"Have jobs to keep everyone busy and supply incentives for the men to work at their jobs. Not the incentive that when you finish that here is something else to do."

"Try to make him feel like he is doing something, rather than him feeling like he is just putting his six years in."

"Working your own MOS instead of busywork."

"Eliminate the wasteful drills. If something other than worthless red tape paperwork drills can be performed, fine, on with the USAR. If they continue in the future as they are now, they are a complete loss and waste."

"Drills should be called only when 50% or more of the time will be spent in our MOS training or other meaningful (to the members) duties."

"Have better plans for drill meetings and participation in useful activities."

More FX privileges (5): The consensus of those suggesting expansion of post exchange privileges was that exchange privileges be made available to the Reservist on an unlimited basis throughout the year. Other suggestions were for unlimited purchases on drill days, once a week, or after the Reservist has spent a specified number of years as an active Reservist. Sample responses follow.

"As reserve members we have no privileges at a Base P.X. unless at summer camp." [Note: Although limited post exchange privileges are granted to Reservists on drill days, there may not be an exchange facility available for use by a Reservist during drill, but only when he participates in annual training.]

"Give full P.X. privileges."

"Full-time PX and commissary privileges while enlisted in the reserves."

"Full PX privileges at all times."

"To have more privileges, not only at drill time and summer camp. But to have it year round, and I think more people will stay in. Maybe I will consider staying in."

"Give the Reserve the same privileges as the Regular Army all year."

"Same privileges at PX and Commissary as RA's on drill days."

"More benefits for the active Reserve member. (Maybe weekly PX privileges.) As it is now, purchasing is very limited. Could be expanded."

"PX and commissary privileges all year, with some system employed to stop misuse of that privilege."

Reduce length of service (6): Reduction of length of service in the Army Reserve from six years to a total obligation period of four, three, or two years was a frequent suggestion. Several who suggested that the length of service be reduced did not specify the reduced length of service. This suggestion may have a great deal of merit if the prospective enlistee is given an option of from two up to six years in yearly increments. Enlistment and reenlistment bonuses could be graduated with the number of years of service, if and when such bonuses are implemented. Such a flexible program, along with increased incentives for retention and the consequent hopeful increase in reenlistment rates, may well increase the overall strength. Sample responses follow.

"I think six years is too long an obligation; four years would be plenty."

"Under VOLAR conditions, a three-year Reserve program would attract the mildly patriotic, and not undermine their enthusiasm as a six-year grind."

"Cut time to 3 or 4 years for reservists."

"Reduce years of enlistment."

"Reduce obligation to 4 years active reserve and two years inactive reserve."

"I think that only by reducing the initial commitment in the Reserve program from six years to three years will there be any chance of maintaining any semblance of current Reserve strength."

Improve training (7): The primary concern in this category was the quality of training. Terms such as "useful," "practical," "interesting," and "meaningful" were used to express the desires of those who responded in this category. Some suggested the conduct of more training that is more directly related to their MOS and assignment in the unit. Sample responses follow.

"A higher level of communication and training might help with some retention."

"The training program should be completely revised--so that the unit is trained to do something useful, i.e., their mission if called up or some civil project (some cleanup for the community, etc.)."

"Meetings should provide more practical and learning experiences, rather than sitting around doing routine tasks."

"Meaningful classroom learning experiences."

"Form a specialized unit so that training will be interesting and do things that are constructive instead of just infantry training."

"If we had more interesting topics during class sessions."

"Use of qualified instructors for classes (subject matter and teaching ability)."

"Subject matter should cover more current events and points of interest to the particular group. I realize that the Army requires that certain basic subject matter be taught. However, even those "boring" subjects can be made interesting if a little bit more imagination and planning are used in setting up training schedules."

"More technical training may make it attractive for those needing the background."

"More training in MOS and less busy work."

"More training in the field you are in."

"There is no real training in area to which I have been exposed. The Reserve could be informative, interesting and worthwhile. It is none of these."

"More training related to actual mission."

"Plan really constructive classes with active army personnel; they are in the know."

"Interesting training is a must."

Increase community service (8): The gist of suggestions in this category was that the Army Reserve should devote some time to community service/action projects. The feeling derived was that time spent in busy work and excessive repetition of subjects in training can be better devoted to community projects. Today's youth is becoming more conscious of, and involved with, environmental controls. An additional concern by some was the matter of building better relations with the community. Those commenting generally indicated that community service projects would be useful, worthwhile, and satisfying. Except in one instance, there was no suggestion to completely forsake military training for civic action but, rather, a consensus that community projects as an adjunct to military training would round out the total program. Sample responses follow.

"More community-environmental service."

"The only worthwhile thing I've done in the Reserve is the things our unit has done to help certain civic organizations."

"Make the Reserves a civilian 'social help' corps. There are many trained people who would be interested in such an activity as an alternate to their . . . 'obligation' . . . ."

"Do something else with the units and men, like help in the community."

"Perhaps community services could be expanded. Projects for the community are mainly conducted during summer camp. Individuals in the Reserve seem to achieve a large degree of satisfaction and pride from aiding community organizations or individuals in need."

"More participation in community projects would most probably promote enthusiasm as well as a feeling of purposefulness in the unit."

"In addition to military training, more emphasis could be placed on sports activities and community projects with civilian population. Prove that the Army Reserve is good for something else than riot control and can function as a unit for good."

"More active participation by the Reservists in community oriented projects."

"More community service orientation vs militaristic may make it a little tolerable."

"We spend 90% of our time sitting on our butts. Why can't we do anything worthwhile like city clean-up or big brother programs or other civic services?"

"Restructuring the USAR to serve the civilian community, such as participation in pollution control projects, eradication of poverty and welfare areas. Active partnership with civilian construction firms in eliminating blighted areas in cities and towns."

Improve leadership (9): The two primary concerns in

the suggestion to improve leadership in the Army Reserve were quality of leadership and leadership techniques. The first concern was to eliminate substandard officers and noncommissioned officers. The second concern, leadership techniques, was a little more involved and was oriented on the method used in controlling and commanding. It was suggested that less reliance be placed on autocratic leadership and more emphasis be placed on democratic leadership. Sample responses follow.

"Retire many of the substandard officers."

"A few worthless officers can degrade the efficiency and morale of a unit seriously."

"The Reserve program is based on a coercive management theory--each soldier is assumed to abhor work, therefore must be coerced to do work. This philosophy ignores all management theories developed in recent years--30 or so. Individuals will assume responsibility--if they are given motivational incentives.<sup>[26]</sup> All the current emphasis on pay (more) and benefits ignores the fundamental problem of a positive, modern-day management theory."

"Train higher NCO's and officers in group management."

"Deadwood, uneducated and power oriented ought to be realized as such and eliminated from interfering with the unit."

"Get rid of senior NCO's that aren't doing anything."

"If possible use less bull force and threats toward the men to get things done."

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<sup>26</sup>McGregor, pp. 47-48, discusses such a management theory.

"Army needs to change its attitude on leadership qualities relevant to today's soldiers. Officers lack leadership training in being less dependent on fear tactics and traditionalism and being more sensitive to the humanism in individuals. Group dynamics should be included as part of the training content."<sup>[27]</sup>

"I would mainly suggest to improve the reserves to have more organization and better communication in the chain of command."

"The only way to improve this organization is to alter the closed minds which serve as our leaders. Remove the desire from those in command for complete and utter control of subordinates."

"Less regimentation and complete re-vamping of many seemingly ridiculous AR's--too many 'leaders' going by the book."

"Army drills wouldn't be quite so ineffective if some (half) of the people involved didn't use rank as an excuse for being an ass."

"Delegation of authority, responsibility or incentives must not be working because there isn't enough to do for me or the other members of the unit. The NCO's and officers always seem to be busy but us pfc's and sp4's just seem to be wasting our time."

"Do away with the old rule that rank has preference (obtaining rank means more responsibility in the command structure, not preferred treatment)."

"The Army Reserve today is being run by officers who served in the active Army during World War II. They are trying to use the methods and policies of then to run the Reserves today. I think the best way to improve the Reserve program is by having schools to teach the officers and senior NCO's how today's Army is run."

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<sup>27</sup> Harold J. Leavitt, Managerial Psychology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 303-304, discusses leadership qualities.



More commissary privileges (10): Tying with the category of prompt promotions for the tenth overall ranking as a potential force to make the Army Reserve more palatable for today's young man, the suggestion to expand commissary privileges might well have been recorded in combination with the fifth ranked category of more post exchange privileges. However, there was a difference in the number of specific respondents who made the two suggestions. The reason fewer suggested expansion of commissary privileges than post exchange privileges may be attributed to the fact that bachelors have fewer occasions, or no need, to take advantage of commissary privileges.

The consensus of those who made this suggestion was that commissary privileges should be made available to the Reservist throughout the year on an unlimited basis. The discussion and sample responses for the suggestion to expand post exchange privileges (page 65) apply equally well to this category.

Prompt promotions (10): The concern with promotions, the other part of the tenth-ranked tie, was twofold: the number and frequency of promotions given and the policies by which promotions are regulated. It was generally felt by those who commented that not enough promotions are given.

Beyond the matter of number of promotions was concern for the purported delay of promotions for those who are qualified. There appeared to be general dissatisfaction with the policies regulating promotions, and it was intimated that there is some favoritism in granting promotions. Most of those who commented on promotions did not lose sight of qualification and ability. Sample responses follow.

"The chance for promotion is very slow after E-4."

"Promotion comes too slow--promotion policy poor."

"Quicker promotions."

"Perhaps there should be an objective promotion board which assesses the individual readiness to be promoted. Presently, the unit CO's have ultimate authority. The unit CO's should be able to determine the men he wishes to promote, but I think too much of his impression is based on personal preference rather than necessarily on ability and leadership criteria. I can name the individuals in my unit who were promoted purely because of their 'brown-nose' ability--and not their efficiency, conscientiousness and knowledge. And I can name those individuals who were promoted because the CO was 'impressed' with them and not because they contributed significantly to the unit."

"More and quicker promotions."

"Promotions (quick) on basis of ability."

"Pay and rank increases based on 'time in grade' factor obstructs a conscientious soldier's chances for advancement. If he cannot advance unless he has spent 'X' number of years (or months) in his present rank before he is promoted, he will begin to realize that he need not strive very hard and that rank will come 'in time.' This is the source of the current attitude prevalent among reservists."

"They should give out more promotions to qualified personnel."

"Having slots opened for advancement in rank if qualified for them"

Offer reenlistment bonus (11): Respondents who made the suggestion to institute a reenlistment bonus for Reservists felt simply that it, much like that for the Regular Army soldier, should be given. Sample responses follow.

"Offer a monetary incentive for remaining in the Reserve."

"Substantial reup bonus."

"Bonuses for reenlistment."

"Bonus reup plan."

"I feel there should be a reenlistment bonus for reservists when they reach their ETS."

Earlier retirement benefits (12): This suggestion and a suggestion to make jobs civilian-like tied for twelfth rank order. The consensus of those who commented on earlier retirement benefits was that the present retirement age of 60 for drawing benefits needs to be lowered. Most felt that retirement benefits should become effective after completion of a minimum of 20 years of service and retirement. Otherwise, there was no desire for drastic change or expansion. Sample responses follow.

"Lower number of years."

"Have privileges before 60."

"Better retirement benefits--to hold people who don't expect much retirement income from regular job."

"Having full military privileges (retirement pay, PX and commissary privileges) after 20 years of service in the Army Reserve."

"Perhaps it would be worth investigating the possibility of giving benefits to reservists with more than six years of service. Is it possible to offer short-term benefits to reservists with more than six years service, possibly on a graduated scale?"

"Retirement benefits should be given to the men as soon as they complete their 20 years. Why should they wait 10 or 20 years to collect? They may die before they reap any benefits."

"Retirement paid from date of retirement instead of 60 years."

Make jobs civilian-like (12): In this tie for twelfth rank order, there appears to be a desire that Army Reserve duties be conducted as civilian jobs are. Further, there appears to be something of a cultural shock in adjusting from a civilian role to a military role and back again, especially in such a repetitive fashion. The suggestion made here was that the Reservist's civilian occupation be considered and that his civilian education and skills be employed in his military role. This would require less turmoil in switching roles and would certainly make use of existing assets and resources.

Another consideration derived from these suggestions

is that the Army Reserve Program be conducted like an extension of a civilian job, with civilian dress and atmosphere. In this respect, the category under consideration here is closely related to and should include the discussions about haircut (pages 57-60) and appearance, the category next in rank order.

The aspect of this suggestion that relates to matching civilian education and skills with military needs of the Reserve unit covering a geographical locale is entirely possible within the ability of the Army Reserve. The number and type of military occupational specialties would vary with the type and size of the unit. The Active Army has greatly improved the matching of aptitudes and skills with job descriptions in assigning personnel through improved techniques and conduct of testing and interviewing. The Army Reserve may need to give this factor more attention.

The aspect relating to civilian dress and atmosphere may not be beyond the realm of feasibility. Certain types of units do lend themselves to civilian type dress and atmosphere. This might be feasible during monthly drills, with strictly military training, such as range firing and field exercises, conducted in uniform during the two weeks of annual training. This arrangement might be much more palatable to the Reservist and less of a cultural shock and

inconvenience throughout most of the year. Sample responses follow.

"These [personal appearance] requirements make me stand out a certain degree in civilian life and this to me is offer.sive. It lowers my morale and constantly makes me sorry I am a member of the U.S. Reserves. I feel that without these restrictions I would feel the Reserve program was more interested in me as a person and the contribution I could make to the program."

"Let us be civilians, not military men. We are only soldiers three days a month, yet we have to look like them 10^ of the time. If this isn't changed, I'll never reenlist."

"Treat the reservists as civilians."

"Would prefer job related to civilian occupation, not just in general field, but your civilian occupation and your military occupation should match, or be in a direct relationship."

"Try using men's skills more."

"If there was more respect given to civilian education and professional expertise in assignments in military units there might be some incentive to stay in the reserves."

"More efficient use of civilian training."

"More like a civilian occupation."

"I would suggest that the USAR operate in a manner similar to private industry. That will mean eliminating a great deal of the harassment, relaxing regulations and reducing the force to a small body of good, efficient soldiers."

"Let the reserves function more like a civilian job."

"Place individuals in a military position as their civilian occupation and education warrant."

Liberalize appearance policy (13): This category was separated from the category concerning haircut because the matter of hair length appeared to stand in and of itself, with general appearance being of less concern. Although the comments categorized here do not specifically mention haircut, hair grooming is implied in most. If the comments on appearance standards were combined with those of the haircut category, the latter would be substantially increased, thereby being the most common concern by an even greater margin. "Mickey-Mouse" harassment is another category where appearance overlaps. Sample responses follow.

"No uniform or appearance regulations. After all, most units are office bound, on combat at summer camp. The appearance of a man has no bearing on his attitudes and abilities."

"Personally, I feel that the demands by the Army on my personal appearance are a considerable encroachment upon my personal life. I do not advocate radical appearance. However, the present restrictions are too stringent. To meet the requirements for sixteen hours a month, my appearance for 704 hours of the month are dictated."

"Wake up and realize that intelligent responsible men do not want to have a two-day per month responsibility dictate a personal grooming code for the other 28 days they try to live normally."

"Liberalization of appearance code."

"Relax requirements in regards to personal appearance."

"I wish the military were more concerned about the ability and quality of its members and less concerned about their appearance."

"I recognize the Army's desire for uniformity, but in this day and age we have come to recognize that uniformity is not the answer to efficiency. The Army must up-date to fit the needs and interests of modern man or zero draft will have serious consequences."

"Lower standards of grooming (within reason)."

Offer GI Bill benefits (13): Individuals who made this suggestion, which tied with the one regarding the appearance policy, felt that GI Bill benefits should be extended to Reservists. Sample responses follow.

"Allow Reservists to take advantage of the GI Bill and other GI benefits."

"To have all the benefits of a veteran."

"Offering Reservists the G. I. Bill might help."

"A great incentive would be the granting of GI benefits to Reservists."

"If extension of the GI Benefits to cover Reservists was implemented, I am sure that retention and recruiting would be a lot more successful."

"The GI Bill for reservists would really help, especially if used to further a reservists' education."

Reduce number of drills (14): Suggestions in this category ranged from reducing the number of drills to combining all drills within a given month into one weekend or combining all drills into a longer period of annual training. Implicit in some of the other categories were factors which reflect or impact upon this suggestion. The matters of



interference with civilian and family activities, conflicts with civilian occupational obligations, particularly business trips, and the need to adjust to military duty and readjust to civilian life repeatedly throughout the year have undoubtedly led many to suggest that the number of drills per year be reduced. The expressed feelings that drills they attend are not worthwhile, interesting, or productive also probably influenced some to suggest a reduction in the number of drills. Sample responses follow.

"I would suggest that drills be changed from three a month to one weekend a month."

"Make drills on one weekend a month."

"Cut down amount of meetings."

"Fewer drills per year--maybe 24 instead of 48."

"Cut down on the number of meetings per year. A meeting every other month along with the 2-week summer camp would be quite sufficient."

"Do away with mandatory monthly meetings and substitute real training quarterly."

"Eliminate all monthly meetings and have one full month of active duty."

"Eliminate all monthly meetings because there is very little accomplished at these meetings. Instead, have a summer camp that is lengthier to make up for all lost training."

Increase benefits, in general (15): This category was not well-defined in the respondents' comments. As may

be seen in the sample responses below, those who commented suggested an improvement in benefits, in general, but did not specify any particular aspect of the total program.

"Benefits similar to those active duty soldiers and retirees receive."

"Make EM aware of benefits."

"Improve benefits."

"Increase benefits to Reserves."

Reduce number of drill hours (16): The basic suggestion, tied with one for the scheduling of a recreation period during all-day drills, was that the number of hours during both weekday and weekend drills be reduced. The general tone was that some of the time is wasted. Another factor to consider is that drills may begin early in the evening and end late at night, thereby causing conflicts with evening meals and other civilian schedules. The problem becomes even more difficult for those who drive long distances to and from training sites. Sample responses follow.

"Two hour drills on Wednesday nights."

"Back to 2-hour drills on week days."

"Shorter meetings."

"Reduce drill days to 6 or 7 hours."

"Decrease the hours."

"Shorten the meetings to 4 hours for an MUTA. Most of the work is accomplished in the morning anyway."

"Use the weekend time better--put the time to use or allow the men to go home when the job is finished."

Schedule recreation period (16): The suggestion to have a recreation period as part of the training schedule during all-day drills was rank ordered the same as the preceding suggestion. Apparently there are some who feel a need for divergent activity during all-day drills. Others suggested that incorporating a recreation period would enhance morale of the unit. Sample responses follow.

"If one hour of recreation and/or competition could be organized each day of Reserve duty, I believe the morale problem would be reduced and efficiency would increase."

"Provide some type of deviation from the regular routine. Set aside some time during each meeting for some sort of entertainment."

"I feel an hour of recreation on all-day meetings would help build the morale if nothing else."

"In addition to military training, more emphasis could be placed on sport activities and community projects and relations."

"Organize some sort of recreation time during drills instead of having classes all day long."

"Day Room (pool tables, ping-pong and TV)."

"Have some recreation during a weekend meeting, like basketball or team handball."

"One thing that could be done is utilization of Commanders time for recreation. As long as I've been in the unit we have never had any recreation. Our unit's

building has facilities for basketball and volleyball, and I would like to see it used."

Respect enlisted men (17): The main concern of respondents who commented in this category was that enlisted men be treated with dignity and respect. Other terms used were "gentlemen," "human beings," and "adults." This category overlaps with the "Mickey-Mouse" harassment and leadership categories. All three intimated that enlisted men are not being treated and led properly because of the process of harassment and lack of good leadership techniques. A deeper concern here may be that under no circumstances, whether military or civilian, should a person be subjected to treatment that is without dignity and respect.

The impression derived is that those who commented feel a general lack of well-being and a lack of trust on the part of their leaders. While the comments regarding leadership (pages 70-71) apply particularly and equally well to this category, additional sample responses follow.

"Respect a man (EM) for his abilities and not his rank."

"Treat Reservists with dignity."

"The educational level of the majority of EM in Reserve Programs is basically higher than the officers of the unit, and they [officers] seem not to realize this and treat them [EMs] as high school dropouts."

"If a man has a job to do he will work at it, only if he is treated as a man and not an inferior human being."

"Treat people as adults."

"Higher educational background to match the accomplishments and training of the EM who are mostly professionals, and to treat them in a manner as people of their status deserve, rather than constantly harassing and demeaning them as is done now."

"To be treated like a gentleman, without yelling and cursing."

"Treat soldiers like human beings."

"Generally treat enlistees with more respect."

"Treat the men as men and not as children--show that the Reserve is happy to have lower grade men in it."

"A man should be treated as a man, with respect. He should be judged more by the job he does than by anything else."

Enlarge medical benefits (18): Enlarge medical benefits, process enlistees, and regularize dates were in a 3-way tie for Rank Order 18. First, the suggestions for medical benefits to Reservists ranged from medical insurance coverage to hospitalization and medical care. Those making the suggestion seem to desire medical care at Army medical facilities and/or coverage similar to the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services. Sample responses follow.

"Medical coverage."

"Hospitalization benefits."

"Unlimited medical benefits."

"Full medical insurance coverage."

Process enlistees (18): Concern in the second element of the 3-way tie for Rank Order 18 was that many men who enlisted had to wait long periods of time between being sworn into service and being ordered to basic and advanced individual training. Uncertainty accompanying the delay in processing caused difficulty in planning education and employment. While much of the delay was caused by backlogs in training centers during peak periods of input into basic and advanced individual training centers, setting definite dates for training and for specialized schooling, if appropriate, will allow the enlistee to plan his schooling or work schedule. Sample responses follow.

"Sending recruits early when they enlist."

"To be able to tell a new recruit exactly when he is to go active within a reasonable time after being sworn in."

"Definite date for start of active duty when new reservist is inducted."

"If a man knew he would go for his six months of active training he could plan accordingly. Right now he can be called any time to fill his obligation."

"Less time before going to basic training would also enhance it a little more."

Regularize dates (18): The prime concern in the third element of the 3-way tie for Rank Order 18 appeared to

be the predictability of drill dates. Adequate advance notice and regularity in the scheduling of drills are important factors for unit members in coordinating their military and civilian activities. Changes in drill dates, particularly short-notice changes, can cause undue hardship and inconvenience and may have a detrimental effect on morale.

Sample responses follow.

"Schedule activities that do not interfere with civilian life."

"Drill schedule should be 'set' each month of the year and not vary."

"Set up drill schedules so they don't interfere with family and civilian life."

"A uniform schedule of drills that an individual could depend upon."

Liberalize makeup policy (19): The basic suggestion is to allow more leeway and flexibility in the makeup or equivalent training policies. Conflicts sometimes occur between drill dates and civilian employment and travel activities. Those making this suggestion felt there should be more flexibility in the administration of this policy.

Sample responses follow.

"Allow reasonable leeway on missing scheduled meetings for valid reasons. More liberal than is presently allowed, provided equivalent training is performed by individual."

"Amends should be made to those who wish and need to

travel because of their occupation. Right now, in our unit, it is rather difficult to be excused from regularly scheduled drills and to make it up."

"Increase the flexibility of drill schedules by giving the reservist the choice."

"One optional weekend drill off without a "U" (unsatisfactory) for performance."

Build esprit de corps (20): This suggestion and the one to institute a leave policy tied for Rank Order 20. The main concern regarding esprit de corps was that there is a lack of pride in the units and that unit pride is essential to a good organization. Both individual pride and esprit de corps are implied in the sample responses that follow.

"Recruiting and retention will be enhanced if pride and esprit de corps exist in the unit. Have a unit a man can be proud of."

"I feel there is a need to improve the general outlook of the Reserves, and the Reserve 'Prestige' and 'Pride in the Unit' are a must."

"In my opinion, most Reservists do not have any respect for their units or the Army in general. Thus the quality and pride of belonging to the reserves are very poor. This would have to be improved."

"If I could be proud of my role I would be more inclined to reenlist."

Institute leave policy (20): The gist of this suggestion, which tied for Rank Order 20, was that there should be some type of policy whereby the Reservist can earn leave credit and be granted leave, as in the Active Army.



Sample responses follow.

"Allow men to earn leave credit and take leave like in the Regular Army."

"We should be allowed to take leave time for good reasons."

"Leave with pay should be given as an award for outstanding performance--such as top recruiter."

Rank Orders 21 through 24 (see Tables 8 and 9, pages 46-50): Rank Order 21 suggestions were "Give tax break," "Offer insurance benefits," "Decrease paperwork," and "Improve image."

Rank Order 22 suggestions were "Give travel privileges," "Provide better atmosphere," "Consider societal goals," "Establish more career fields," "Keep mission in mind," and "Update equipment."

Rank Order 23 suggestions were "Give EM more responsibilities," "More civilian education opportunities," "Cut work details," and "Eliminate field training exercises."

Rank Order 24 contains 26 suggestions (see Table 9, pages 49-50). Each suggestion was made in only one region and generally by only one respondent.

Information furnished with the suggestions in Rank Orders 21 through 24 was insufficient to establish a trend or feel for them. However, the fact that no suggestion in this grouping was made by more than four respondents should

not necessarily negate its value or validity. Each suggestion can be considered on its own merit and feasibility to effectively round out any program for improvement.

Negative comments: The negative comments below were given on an individual basis and are reported in their entirety. They constitute only a small percentage of the comments, but it should be noted that such comments were made by Army Reserve personnel. In each case the comment quoted was the total reaction; they are not quoted out of a larger context.

"There is no way to enhance an objectionable part of a corrupt social policy."

"There is no way, unless they do away with meetings."

"There is no way to improve."

"Eliminate the program."

"Release all reservists as soon as possible."

"There is no hope."

"Nothing can be done at this point to alleviate the atrocities of the U.S. Army Reserve System."

"I feel they should give the Reservist more freedom in all ways. As it is right now it's just a waste of government money."

"It is my personal opinion that the Army is beyond help."

"There is nothing in this world you can do to enhance recruiting and retention."

"Get rid of it."

"We don't give a damn about recruiting and retention because we believe that the Army is fundamentally rotten, misguided and immoral. Until the command structure which invented the body count, nurtured My Lai and discovered the "Bell-Telephone-Hour" is destroyed, there can be no dialogue."

"I have none, it is all a waste of time."

### Summary

The findings of this survey paint a composite picture of the expected retention rate, why the REP 63 participant is in the program, what he considers important or not important as incentives, and how the program might be improved to enhance retention. A better understanding of what kind of person the REP 63 participant is and what might be done to better work with him in terms of improving existing conditions gives the Reserve Forces commander and those responsible for the regulation and execution of this program a foundation from which to work.

The data collected showed that 3 per cent of first-term REP 63 personnel plan to remain in the Army Reserve after completion of their 6-year obligation. A significant finding is that 16 per cent indicated uncertainty about remaining. In terms of retention, substantial attention might be given this sub-population as a possible lucrative source for personnel sustenance. Sufficient attention must

be given to the uncertain population. This writer's survey of the Army Reserve Commands showed that an average of 18 per cent retention is thought to be necessary to sustain existing units. Compared with an average current retention rate of 6 per cent, the average shortage is about 12 per cent. If Army Reserve Commands are successful in retaining both those who plan to reenlist plus those who are uncertain, they would retain sufficient personnel to sustain a predicted personnel strength level in their commands.

A substantial majority of 81 per cent of the respondents indicated they do not plan to remain in the Army Reserve after completion of their obligation.

The strongest motivating factor for joining the Army Reserve was to avoid the draft, 67 per cent of those surveyed having given it as their primary reason. When combining this response with that of joining to fulfill a military obligation, which polled 23 per cent, it becomes clear why most Reservists joined the program. The primary motivator certainly was not attraction of the program; rather, it was the external influences of the draft and a military obligation. The next most frequently given reason for joining the Army Reserve was to demonstrate loyalty to this country. All other responses were scattered and constituted the remaining 7 per cent.

Pay, by far, was given most frequently as a good incentive for remaining in the Reserve. This response was given by 44 per cent of those surveyed. The next most frequent response, given by 35 per cent of the respondents, was that not one of the incentives provided on the survey form was considered a good incentive to remain in the Reserve. Retirement, with 5 per cent, ranked third in the order of responses and was followed closely by promotions, with 4 per cent. All other categories of incentives received scattered responses.

In the final section of the questionnaire, which solicited suggestions for improving the Army Reserve to enhance retention, the most frequently given suggestion was to liberalize the haircut regulation. If this is coupled with the response on liberalizing appearance regulations, which did not specifically mention haircuts but implied such, the matter of haircuts would be clearly the most common concern.

The compilation of these suggestions points up that there is a great deal of concern about how the Army Reserve Program is regulated and administered, the type and quality of training conducted, and the quality and techniques of leadership exercised by leaders. This is brought to light here to bring forth the idea that improvement of the program

does not necessarily mean large additional expenditures of money.

A serious limitation of this study is that the questionnaire evoked responses that were primarily focused on dissatisfiers. The manner in which the question in Part IV was phrased (What suggestions do you have for improving . . . ?) probably totally overlooked factors that are already satisfiers. Because of this, the reader must be careful not to neglect what Herzberg found as satisfiers in his study on motivation. He found that the basic satisfiers are recognition, achievement, advancement, responsibility, and work itself.<sup>28</sup>

The findings of this survey orient heavily on hygienic factors or conditions that surround the doing of the job as described by Herzberg. Most of his hygienic factors of supervision, interpersonal relations, physical working conditions, salary, company policies and administrative practices, benefits, and job security are found in the results of this study. Herzberg said: "Improvement in these factors of hygiene will serve to remove the impediments to positive job attitudes."<sup>29</sup> The findings of this

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<sup>28</sup> Herzberg and others, Motivation To Work, p. 80.

<sup>29</sup> Herzberg and others, Motivation To Work, p. 113.

study closely parallel the five major dissatisfiers found in Herzberg's study: company policy and administration, supervision, salary, interpersonal relations, and working conditions.<sup>30</sup> The first three categories in both studies follow the same general order of importance.

Generally, the findings of this survey envisage the Reservist as a person who tends to be or desires to be what McGregor calls a Theory Y man who is serving in a military system that is Theory X oriented.<sup>31</sup> This is a factor commanders and junior leaders must contend with and attempt to resolve.

The survey conducted for this thesis has revealed conditions that need to be changed. It has also served as a means for those who participated to present grievances, as manifested in the tone of some of the comments forwarded in the free-response portion. Finally, the survey has certainly furnished constructive ideas to help improve the retention rate of first-term Reserve Enlistment Program, 1963, personnel.

The problem of maintaining a Ready Reserve is succinctly summarized in the blueprint for improving the Army

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<sup>30</sup> Herzberg, Work and the Nature of Man, p. 74.

<sup>31</sup> McGregor, p. 56.

that has been prepared by General William C. Westmoreland, Army Chief of Staff. He closed the Reserve Components section of the document entitled The Modern Volunteer Army by stating:

The problem of strengthening Reserve Component professionalism--indeed, simply of attracting sufficient men--grows increasingly critical. The introduction of imaginative new approaches--both in the recruiting of capable Reservists and Guardsmen and in their training to a state of true preparedness--is a necessity. Those measures implemented thus far are only a modest beginning to a much larger program to be phased over succeeding years.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>32</sup>Department of the Army, The Modern Volunteer Army (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 29.



## CHAPTER IV

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Conclusions

The draft has served as a very expeditious means of manpower procurement during the past several decades. It has been effective in its ability to respond quickly and with great flexibility to the changing needs of the Armed Forces. It also had a spin-off value of serving as an inducement for young men to volunteer for both the Regular and Reserve Components of the Armed Forces.

The Nixon Administration has promised termination of the draft and full reliance on an All-Volunteer Army. The draft is expected to be phased out by 31 July 1973, and initial phases of an All-Volunteer Army are already being implemented. Whether or not a standby draft will be established has not been determined or announced at this date, but indications are that some standby machinery will be necessary for activation in the event of a large-scale war. Concurrent with loss of the draft will be loss of its inducement in generating volunteers. The advent of the zero draft will probably have adverse effects on manpower

procurement in both Active and Reserve Components.

The period in which this study was conducted was rampant with perplexities in maintaining stability of military manpower. A rapid reduction of forces in Southeast Asia, coupled with drastic reductions in Active Army strength, suddenly propelled the Reserves into an exceedingly prominent position in the total Army forces structure. The Army Reserve will continue its role as a backup force and, without a draft and as a substantial part of the General Purpose Land Forces, will be the primary source for manpower expansion during periods of emergency.

The Army Reserve must rely on its own ability to attract and retain personnel to sustain enlisted strength. This must be an all-out effort to resolve the paradoxical situation of an increasingly important role for the Army Reserve at a time when the primary impetus for personnel input into the program, namely the draft, is projected to be eliminated.

The Army Reserve survey administered for this study indicates that only 3 per cent of Reserve Enlisted Program (REP 63) personnel plans to remain in the Army Reserve. A substantial 16 per cent stated they are uncertain about remaining. This sub-population could form a potentially lucrative target for retention efforts. As long as a man

remains uncertain about remaining in the Army Reserve, there is some hope that he may be convinced to reenlist.

For manpower sustenance, the Army Reserve will need to place more efforts on sources of maintaining strength other than retaining first-term REP 63 personnel. In other words, Army Reserve commanders will need to exploit all available sources of manpower procurement. Although retention of first-term REP 63 personnel is a source, indications are that retention percentages will fall below that which is necessary to sustain existing units unless drastic improvements are shown. Should the current attitude of avoiding the draft by REP 63s surveyed be projected to the population that forms the recruiting target for the future, the recruiting picture becomes very grim. Recruiting non-prior service personnel in the future could be reduced by about 67 per cent. The gravity of the problem of recruiting would be compounded by adding to the avoidance percentage that percentage of men serving to fulfill a military obligation, keeping in mind that a zero draft would pose no draft threat and there would no longer be a military obligation as previously placed upon all mentally and physically qualified young men. This combination could reflect a potential loss of 90 per cent in non-prior service enlistments. A source of maintaining strength that may be very fruitful is

attraction of Regular Army personnel who are being discharged from active service. That source probably has not been given sufficient attention in the past and may prove to be a very good source of manpower procurement for the Reserves under the All-Volunteer Army concept.

Suggestions for improving the Army Reserve are not limited to monetary matters. Although some monetary considerations ranked high in suggestions in the survey, more emphasis was placed on matters concerning regulation of the Army Reserve, improvement in administration of the program, and training, in that order. Most of the suggestions within the last two categories are within the authority, purview, and prerogative of major and/or local unit commanders to influence.

More visible incentives for remaining in the Army Reserve that appear good to the Reservist need to be injected into the program. Fringe benefits ranked higher than a pay increase in the survey.

A closer relationship between the Army Reserve and the civilian sector regarding appearance standards, job training, and job performance appears to be desirable on the part of the participants. Wherein feasible, more direct ties through cooperative efforts and projects, along with mutually better understanding and acceptance between the

military and civilian communities, might make the program more attractive to a wider population.

In the final analysis, retention of first-term REP 63 personnel is a major problem that needs major effort in its resolution. Those involved in resolving the problem must have a good understanding of its many ramifications, must formulate a plan of action to resolve the problem, and must vigorously pursue the plan of action formulated. Command emphasis and involvement are essential ingredients in resolving a problem of this gravity. Commanders at all levels are in a position to act upon most of the recommendations below, as applicable, and are able to have a definite impact on improving retention.

### Recommendations

Recommendations that may be helpful in formulating a plan of action to resolve the problem have been derived from the total data base of historical research and the survey findings. They are presented in the general order of importance the survey respondents placed upon them. The recommendations can be viewed from the full spectrum of levels in the Army Reserve, that is, from the individual soldier all the way to the United States Congress. Each level is in a position to review the findings and recommendations and to

contribute to improvement of the Army Reserve Program.

Some recommendations deal directly with the REP 63 personnel. Others, with the ultimate intent of increasing retention of personnel, are oriented toward improvement of the Army Reserve Program as a whole. Most of the recommendations are directly related to some facet of the total study, including the background development and survey findings, with emphasis placed on the survey findings. Others were derived from the broadest base of historical research, the survey findings, and this writer's personal experiences. Each recommendation has been intentionally couched in general terms to allow for wide exercise of ingenuity and creativity on the part of those who may be responsible for implementation.

The 16 specific recommendations that follow should enhance retention in the United States Army Reserve.

Identify unit personnel who have definite intentions of reenlisting and unit personnel who are uncertain about reenlisting: Assuming the validity of approximately 3 per cent planning to reenlist and a 16 per cent uncertain population, unit commanders might launch a concerted retention program by identifying and using that 19 per cent population as a baseline. Once those personnel are identified, their

sphere of influence might be expanded. The survey indicated that 6 per cent joined the Army Reserve with a friend. It might pay just to increase the uncertain population for possible future exploitation. Peer influence and group action are very influential forces in this age bracket.

Remove all unnecessary irritants that do not contribute to accomplishment of the unit mission: The Army Reservist has a difficult enough time adjusting rapidly from a civilian to a soldier and back to civilian on a repeated basis. He should not have to contend with unnecessary irritants. Unnecessary irritants, commonly termed "Mickey-Mouse" by the survey respondents, should be eliminated. Irritants such as excessive formations, inspections, and other forms of harassment serve to irritate and discourage participants. Any actions that tend to demean an individual's dignity try the tolerance level and will tend to discourage him from continuing in the program. The human aspects of emotional and social needs must be given every consideration and a high priority of attention.

Improve quality of leadership at all levels: There must be a higher quality of leadership at all levels through a process of increased opportunities for schooling, improved promotion policies, and retention of only the best qualified

personnel. All personnel in leadership positions must keep abreast of the latest developments in management and psychology. Officer and enlisted personnel who are simply putting in time for personal gains of pay, privileges, and retirement, but are making no contribution to the program, should be screened out of the Army Reserve.

Review appearance standards with an eye toward flexibility: Consideration might be given to a more relaxed standard of appearance in the Army Reserve, keeping in mind that the vast majority of a Reservist's time is spent in a non-military environment. The concern about dual standards could be argued in that there are many varying conditions between the Active and Reserve Components. There are differences in compensation, benefits, privileges, training, equipment, and other facets. Because of the nature of their immediate functions and environment, the two components cannot be considered as identical entities.

Consideration might be given to performance of some duties and training in civilian clothes. Functions that are purely office type in nature and training that involves lectures, conferences, or discussions, with no practical application to require wearing the uniform, can be accomplished just as well in civilian clothes. Training that



requires wearing of the uniform for functional purposes, such as field tactical training and participation in annual training, should be conducted in uniform.

Offer opportunities for short term tours of active duty through career management to upgrade qualifications and to improve leadership quality of commanders and leaders:

Non-commissioned, warrant, and commissioned officers might serve short tours of active duty from one to four years for recruiting, Army Reserve management, or service with Active Army units. Overseas tours may be attractive to many personnel. This would increase the proficiency and readiness of individual Reservists and, at the same time, would serve manpower needs of the Active Army. Those participating in this program would be brought up-to-date on the latest technical developments in the Army and would be brought abreast of the most current leadership techniques employed in the Active Army.

Offer flexibility in length of service, with a 2-year minimum enlistment and a 6-year maximum enlistment:

Enlistments of varying periods--two, three, four, five, and six years--might be established, with benefits accruing to the individual increasing with increased length of service. Enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, if instituted, and

fringe benefits could be graduated with the number of years of service.

Many men want shorter periods of commitment, as pointed out in the survey results. They might accept enlistments of two or three years on a volunteer basis but would not accept a longer obligation of six years. This flexibility may well prove profitable for the Army Reserve if first-term enlistments of two or three years would be increased over first-term enlistments of six years. Once the young man enlisted for two or three years, the program should be made attractive enough for him to pursue additional terms of service.

Exert a concerted effort to improve administration through more time and/or personnel devoted to administrative aspects: The Army Reserve needs to become more self-reliant, with less emphasis on the need or desirability of advisory personnel. More self-reliance and independence will appreciably upgrade its true readiness for deployment. An increase in the full-time Army Reserve technician staff and conversion of selected positions in the unit as full-time positions would serve to increase the full-time capability to sustain unit administration, operations, and maintenance on a continuing basis.

Another method of effecting continuity in administration, operations, and maintenance would be to grant each commander additional authorized paid drill time to call key personnel for additional active duty for training to perform necessary functions to maintain readiness. This additional paid drill time is normally needed prior to critical periods such as various annual inspections and annual training.

Increase prior-service personnel input through development of encouragement and incentives for Active Army personnel being discharged to continue their military career in the Army Reserve: Because of a currently discouraging picture of retention of first-term REP 63s, other sources of manpower procurement must be pursued vigorously to sustain the necessary personnel strength in the Army Reserve. Sufficient attention has not been given to one of the best sources for reserve manpower, that of the personnel being released from active duty. This may have been extremely difficult when the majority of those being discharged were draftees, but the prospects of capitalizing upon this source should improve under the All-Volunteer Army concept.

For this source to prove lucrative, encouragement must come from Active Army personnel and Reservists. What better source is there for trained and experienced

personnel? Men being discharged after their first-term enlistment will already have a 3- or 4-year equity toward retirement. To be totally discharged would mean to forfeit the investment made toward retirement. The experience factor contributed by former Active Army personnel to the Army Reserve would lend more credibility to the conduct of Reserve affairs, particularly training.

Develop and execute well-planned military training programs, particularly for lower ranking personnel: Development of training programs that are useful, practical, interesting, and meaningful will serve to create and retain the interest and enthusiasm of Reservists. Training needs to be related to the man's job description and the unit's mission. The survey conducted for this study indicated that there is strong resentment toward "make-work" training and projects. Opportunities might be provided for a Reservist to become qualified in a skill or trade related to the civilian occupation of the enlistee's choosing. Arrangements might be made for acceptance of the Reservist into apprenticeship and civil service training programs prior to or during his Reserve assignment.

Improve level of unit readiness: A general upgrading of all facets of the Army Reserve Program should enhance

retention. The survey conducted for this study clearly indicated that the regulatory aspects and administration of the Army Reserve Program are considered foremost among the various areas in need of improvement. A need for improvement in the following areas was both explicit and implicit in the survey: regulations and policies, administration, personnel functions, training, equipment level and serviceability, modern weaponry, and military schooling.

Develop fringe benefits that are attractive and well-known to all participants and prospective participants:

Consideration must be given to improved and/or expanded fringe benefits in the following areas:

1. Establishment of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses.
2. Medical and dental care for participants.
3. Expansion of post exchange privileges--expansion of the list of purchasable items and/or improvement of exchange facilities that are developed for the specific use of Reservists, as a minimum; complete and unlimited privileges throughout the year, as a maximum.
4. Expansion of commissary privileges, with unlimited use during drill days, as a minimum, to unlimited privileges throughout the year, as a maximum.

5. Increased retirement benefits--an earlier age for retirement benefits to become effective, either 55 or 50 years of age. An important aspect of this is the age at which the fringe benefits become available to the Reservist. Even if it is not feasible to pay retirement at an age earlier than 60 years, the fringe benefits might be made available at age 55 or 50.

6. Full coverage under Servicemen's Group Life Insurance--coverage throughout the year rather than as currently restricted to travel to and from drill and annual training and during periods of drill and annual training.

7. Increase in the awards and decorations program.

8. Extension of GI Bill benefits to Reservists.

9. Development of government sponsored investment programs.

Develop intermediate benefits within reasonably close reach of a young man considering joining Army Reserve:  
Under present legislation, a Reservist does not reap any of the benefits of his service until reaching age 60, when retirement pay; medical, exchange, and commissary privileges; and other benefits become effective. The age of 60 is rather remote to young men just out of high school or college. Some benefits, perhaps post exchange and commissary

privileges, might become effective upon a Reservist's reaching ten full years of service for retirement purposes, something young men of 18 to 21 could readily foresee.

Develop a plan to better integrate potential enlistee's continuing education plan with Army Reserve service: Acceptance into a college, university, or vocational-technical training school prior to the prospective Reservist's initial active duty tour would be attractive to those young men who hesitate to enlist in the Reserve because of difficulties experienced in enrolling in higher and continuing education directly out of high school if they have a 4- to 6-month interruption. Often the 4- to 6-month active duty dates are not made known to the enlistee immediately, making it extremely difficult for him to plan his educational and employment programs. Tuition assistance or exemption or other benefits for the young man who wants to combine furthering his civilian education with Army Reserve service should prove attractive to some.

Develop a pay scale that is competitive with part-time civilian employment: The benefits of reserve pay must be competitive with part-time civilian employment in order to attract and hold those persons who are able to devote the same amount of time to part-time civilian employment and

usually earn more money. This consideration is particularly important in that the survey data for this study showed clearly that pay in the Reserve is far and away the strongest incentive for remaining in the program. The pay must be substantial enough for a Reservist to include his reserve pay as a significant part of his financial planning and budgeting process. The importance of reserve pay must become a reality before the Reservist completes his first term of service.

Conduct civic action programs to serve a number of purposes for individual Reservist, Reserve Program, and community: The individual Reservist will be able to observe and recognize his contribution to the betterment of his community and the nation through such activities as assisting with the Post Office emergency in New York in 1970, assisting with riot control, aiding during natural disasters, and rendering a myriad of different community services. These civic action projects will furnish the needed manpower and machine resources in times of dire need and will further aid in cementing better relations between the military and the broader community.

Application of principles to all Reserve Components:

Although this study was confined to the Army Reserve, many



of the principles underlying the recommendations may be helpful in sustaining strong and effective reserve programs in the other services. These general principles are:

1. Reasonable, equitably applied, and palatable regulations and policies.

2. Efficient administration of the program.

3. Fair and equitable promotions.

4. Improved leadership at all levels.

5. Improved training.

6. Productive and satisfying work.

7. Attractive and visible fringe benefits.

8. Increasing privileges.

9. Adequate monetary compensation.

10. Good community participation and relations.

11. Increasing self-reliance and independence in mission performance.

APPENDIXES

## APPENDIX A: ARCOM SURVEY

Letter to Commanding Generals . . . . .	115
Questionnaire . . . . .	116
Retention Situation . . . . .	119
Rank Order of Retention Emphasis . . . . .	120

U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

SUBJECT: Army Reserve Command (ARCOM) Survey

TO: Commanding General  
97th U.S. Army Reserve Command  
ATTN: G1  
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

1. I am an Army Reserve officer attending the Regular Course of the Army Command and General Staff College and am writing a thesis titled "Retention of First-Term Reserve Enlistment Program Personnel in the United States Army Reserve."
2. The purpose of the thesis is to survey the retention situation in the Army Reserve and to develop a set of recommendations to improve retention. First-term Reserve Enlistment Program personnel from seven other Army Reserve Commands participated in the troop-level survey.
3. I am in need of information pertaining to the retention picture as seen from the Army Reserve Command level.
4. Request that the inclosed questionnaire be completed at your headquarters level based on your estimate of the retention situation in your command. Please return the completed questionnaire in the inclosed self-addressed envelope at your earliest convenience.
5. Thank you for your assistance.

2 Incl  
Questionnaire  
Self-addressed envelope

/s/ Moss M. Ikeda  
MOSS M. IKEDA  
Major, Infantry, USAR  
Student, USACGSC

## ARCOM SURVEY ON RETENTION OF REP 63s

Please complete the following 4-part survey at your command level and return it to me in the inclosed self-addressed envelope.

PART I: CONCERN OVER RETENTION  
(please check one item)

1. ☐ Retention of first-term REP 63 personnel is a major problem in this command.
2. ☐ Retention of first-term REP 63 personnel is somewhat of a problem in this command.
3. ☐ Retention of first-term REP 63 personnel is a minor problem in this command.
4. ☐ Retention of first-term REP 63 personnel is not a problem in this command.

PART II: EFFORTS TO RETAIN  
(please check one item)

1. ☐ We are making a major effort to retain first-term REP 63 personnel in this command.
2. ☐ We are making somewhat of an effort to retain first-term REP 63 personnel in this command.
3. ☐ We are making a minimal effort to retain first-term REP 63 personnel in this command.
4. ☐ We are making no effort to retain first-term REP 63 personnel in this command.

PART III: PERCENTAGE OF RETENTION  
(please circle one or fill in blank)

1. We need to retain the following percentage of REP 63

personnel to sustain our units in this command:

1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%

higher: \_\_\_\_\_% (indicate percentage)

2. We think we will actually retain the following percentage of first-term REP 63 personnel:

1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%

higher: \_\_\_\_\_% (indicate percentage)

PART IV: AREAS OF EMPHASIS FOR RETENTION  
(please place in rank order from #1 to #6)

In attempting to retain personnel in this command, emphasis is placed on the below-listed factors in the following rank order:

NOTE: Although not all possible factors affecting retention of first-term REP 63 personnel are listed, these six are the major factors being considered for this particular study. Please confine your rank ordering to these choices.

\_\_\_\_\_ Sell the Army Reserve Program to the participants based on the benefit of additional or supplemental income.

\_\_\_\_\_ Sell the Army Reserve Program to the participants based on fringe benefits (i.e., PX privileges, SGLI, retirement, etc.).

\_\_\_\_\_ Improve training to retain the interest of the participants.

\_\_\_\_\_ Improve the administration of the unit, to include the leadership techniques and quality of NCO's and officers.

\_\_\_\_\_ Improve upon the interpretation and implementation of laws and regulations and develop and improve upon local level policies.

\_\_\_\_\_ Stress and improve civil-military relations between  
the unit and the broader community, to include  
participation in civic action projects.

\_\_\_\_\_

Please send this command a copy of your final report:

YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

TABLE 11

## ARCOM SITUATION IN RETENTION OF FIRST-TERM REP 63s

(ARCOMs unanimous that retention is a major problem and that they exert major effort to retain first-term REP 63s.)

ARCOM		Retention Estimate		Shortage
		Needed	Projected	
63d	California . . . . .	10%	8.0%	2.0%
77th	New York . . . . .	10%	1.0%	9.0%
81st	Georgia . . . . .	10%	6.0%	4.0%
83d	Ohio . . . . .	15%	9.0%	6.0%
86th	Illinois . . . . .	10%	3.0%	7.0%
88th	Minnesota . . . . .	10%	5.0%	5.0%
94th	Massachusetts . . . . .	50%	10.0%	40.0%
96th	Utah . . . . .	10%	4.5%	5.5%
97th	Maryland . . . . .	60%	6.0%	54.0%
99th	Pennsylvania . . . . .	10%	8.5%	1.5%
102d	Missouri . . . . .	6%	10.0%	None
120th	South Carolina . . . . .	10%	8.0%	2.0%
121st	Alabama . . . . .	10%	8.0%	2.0%
123d	Indiana . . . . .	10%	5.5%	4.5%
Hawaii	. . . . .	50%	2.0%	48.0%
Mean Estimate:		18%	6.0%	12.0%



TABLE 12

## RANK ORDER OF ARCOM RETENTION EMPHASIS

ARCOM	Rank Order of Retention Emphasis					
	Direct Payment	Fringe Benefits	Training	Adminis- tration	LRP	CMR
63d	3	4	1	5	6	2
77th	1	5	2	4	6	3
81st	3	2	1	5	6	4
83d	4	5	1	2	6	3
86th	2	1	4	5	6	3
88th	3	2	1	5	6	4
94th	3	5	1	2	6	4
96th	5	6	2	1	3	4
97th	3	2	1	5	6	4
99th	2	5	1	3	6	4
102d	4	5	1	3	6	2
120th	4	5	1	2	6	3
121st	2	4	1	3	6	5
123d	1	2	4	3	6	5
Hawaii	3	4	1	2	6	5
RO:	2	4	1	3	6	5

## APPENDIX B

### EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS

Admin: Administration	ARCOM: Army Reserve Command
AR's: Army regulations	AT: annual training
civ educ: civilian education	CMR: Civil-Military Relationship
CO's: commanding officers	DP: Direct Payment
E1: enlisted pay grade 1	EM: enlisted man
ETS: expiration term of service	FB: Fringe Benefits
FTXs: field training exercises	FY: fiscal year
GA: Georgia	GI: government issue
GI Bill: Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act	HI: Hawaii
IN; Ind/Mich: Indiana/Michigan	KP: kitchen police
LRP: Legislative/Regulation/Policy	MO; Mo/Ill: Missouri/Illinois
MOS: military occupational specialty	MUTA: Multiple Unit Training Assembly
Natl Svc: National Service	NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO's: noncommissioned officers	No.: number

NY: New York

OCS: Officer Candidate  
School

pfc's: Privates first class

PX: post exchange

REP 63: Reserve Enlistment  
Program, 1963

REP 63s: Reserve Enlistment  
Program, 1963, personnel

RO: Rank Order

SGLI: Servicemen's Group  
Life Insurance

sp4's: specialists 4

Tng: Training

U.S.: United States

USAR: United States Army  
Reserve

UT: Utah

WA: Washington

WACs: Women's Army Corps  
personnel

## APPENDIX C

### THE DRAFT

To fully understand the current personnel makeup of the Army Reserve and the major factor influencing personnel input into the program, it is necessary to understand the background of the draft and its impact on personnel input into the Reserve program. Another important factor concerning the draft and its importance to this study is the potentially negative impact the zero draft projected for 1 July 1973 will have on Army Reserve enlistments. This appendix reviews the early beginnings of conscription in the United States, covers the establishment of the draft as it exists today, and discusses the zero draft, initial phases of which are already underway.

#### Historical Review

There has been some form of conscription in the United States since her early developing days. The colonies passed some 650 laws and ordinances to effect conscription in one form or another during the period 1607 to 1775.<sup>1</sup> In

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<sup>1</sup>Irving W. Hart, Outline of Historical Background of

the days of the colonies, the assumed duty of every male citizen was to take up arms for the protection of his community or colony. There was no apparent dissatisfaction or protest on this matter since the threats for which the men bore arms were certainly real and immediate. The threat of Indian attacks and contention for new land with other nations expanding their influence in the New World were among the primary reasons for bearing arms.

The wars in which manpower mobilization was necessary to protect the interest of America were the American Revolution (1775-1783), the War of 1812 (1812-1815), the Mexican War (1846-1848), the Civil War (1861-1865), the Spanish-American War (1898), World War I (1917-18), World War II (1941-1945), the Korean conflict (1950-1953), and the Vietnam conflict (which began in 1962 and continues at this time).<sup>2</sup>

The Revolutionary War period had conscription in the form of compulsory military training in the thirteen colonies. Those who served in the colonial militia were required to furnish their own weapons but were not required

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Selective Service and Chronology (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 1.

<sup>2</sup>Eileen Galloway, History of United States Military Policy on Reserve Forces (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 441.

to fight outside of their home territory. The nature of the force was very fragmented and there was no central control because of the lack of good organization, communications, and transportation. Militia forces of the thirteen separate colonies, which were not about to surrender their sovereignty to a central national government, fought the War of Independence.<sup>3</sup>

Because of their fight for independence, the colonies were very reluctant to accept a national militia that might bolster the power of the Federal Government. Although Washington, Jefferson, and Madison advocated a well-regulated militia in the form of an effective citizen army that would be called upon in time of need, the public would not support it. Washington was very farsighted and, in "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment," wrote, in part:

It may be laid down as a primary position, and the basis of our system that every Citizen who enjoys the protection of a free Government, owed not only a proportion of his property, but even of his personal services to the defense of it, and consequently that the Citizens of America (with a few legal and official exceptions) from 18 to 50 years of Age should be borne on the Militia Rolls, provided with uniform arms, and so far accustomed to the use of them, that the Total strength of the Country might be called forth at Short Notice . . . [and] able bodied young Men, between the age of 18 and 25 . . . drafted to form a Corps in every State . . . to be employed whenever it may become necessary in the

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 442.

service of their Country.<sup>4</sup>

It is interesting that some aspects of the current Reserve Component system, particularly the National Guard, and some aspects of the current draft are found in Washington's statements. The matter of exemptions was even considered in the provision for "a few legal and official exceptions."

The War of 1812 brought about further complications in manpower procurement. Although the Militia Act of 1792 gave the Federal Government the power to call all able-bodied men for military service, the President, because of strong opposition in Congress, required the states to furnish the militia. The real problem came about when certain states refused to comply. To further compound the problem, some states fell back on the historical concept that they were formed to repel invasions and could not invade another country. The Supreme Court of 1792 had decided that issue in favor of the Federal Government and had given the President authority to call the state militia in a national emergency. State governors, therefore, really could not legally refuse to furnish militia quotas.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>John C. Fitzpatrick, The Writings of George Washington (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944), pp. 389-90.

<sup>5</sup>Galloway, pp. 445-46.

The Mexican War was fought by regulars and volunteers. Since the fighting was on foreign soils, the militia was not called. A high reliance on volunteers, compounded by allowing short term enlistments of one year, caused the American Army to virtually run short of troops right in the middle of the battle, half way to Mexico City. No draft or reserve system was in effect. George Washington's concept of a standing army reinforced by trained reserves had unfortunately been lost in the archives.<sup>6</sup>

During the Civil War the North relied solely on federalizing the militia of the several states. Initially, the term of service for those called was three months. Realizing that this was not sufficient time to ready the troops for battle, in July 1862 Congress authorized the President to call the militia to active service for nine months. When it became apparent that the North could not rely on volunteers and activation of the militia, a draft was instituted in March 1863. The draft called forth all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of 20 and 45 and required them to serve for the duration of the war, but not to exceed three years.<sup>7</sup> Further, establishment of the 1863 draft resulted in the first major draft protest in this

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<sup>6</sup>Galloway, p. 447.

<sup>7</sup>Galloway, p. 449.



nation. Opposition was widespread, and 10,000 troops were required to quell the rioting that occurred in New York City in July 1863 because of the draft.<sup>8</sup>

The South relied on volunteers a year before it instituted a draft. The term of service was twelve months. By way of comparison with militia calls for three and nine months in the North, the 12-month term in the South was a definite advantage in maintaining continuity.<sup>9</sup>

There was much dissatisfaction with conduct of the drafts during the Civil War. Having been instituted late, in the North almost two years after the war had begun and in the South a year after its beginning, machinery for draft administration was not efficient and there was inequity. In the North a man could either buy his way out for \$300 or send a substitute. In the South a draftee could hire a substitute based on wages negotiated between the two, a practice that often resulted in substitute wages being many times that of governmental pay. The authorization of liberal occupational exemptions, common to both sides, caused a flourish of newly adopted jobs and titles designed to avoid the draft.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>William A. Ganoe, The History of the U.S. Army (New York: Appleton, 1924), p. 289.

<sup>9</sup>Harc, p. 6.

<sup>10</sup>Hart, p. 6.

Brigadier General James Oakes, Assistant Provost Marshal General, State of Illinois, made an evaluation of the Civil War draft in which he recommended that

no bounties be paid; no substitutes allowed; service should be for the duration of the war; drafted men should be required to report personally to a registration office and not be recruited in their homes; drafted men should be listed according to their permanent address and not the place of registration; the quotas of men to be raised should be allotted by States and not congressional districts; and medical and legal personnel should be provided for State administration offices.<sup>11</sup>

During the Spanish-American War, which lasted only 109 days, it was not necessary to resort to conscription. As in the Mexican War, it was fought by both regulars and volunteers.<sup>12</sup>

Congress passed the Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, to grant the President authority to increase the military establishment through a selective draft of men from 21 to 31 years of age. That draft law followed very closely the recommendations General Oakes made following the Civil War. It provided that there would be no bounties or substitutes, very few exceptions were allowed, and states became the base for the quota system. These basic reforms in

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<sup>11</sup>U.S., Selective Service System, Backgrounds of Selective Service (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 67.

<sup>12</sup>Galloway, p. 452.

addition to better administration led to what General Oakes had described as "a simple, direct, and palpably just and intelligible distribution of the burden."<sup>13</sup> Under the 1917 Act, 24 million men were registered and 2,810,296 were drafted into military service.<sup>14</sup>

### Recent Draft Laws

The 3-decade period from 1940 to the present has seen the widest utilization of the draft in United States history. The first full scale draft, as known today, was established as recently as 1940. On 16 September 1940 Congress passed the Selective Training and Service Act and the President signed it into law.<sup>15</sup> With this act a national organization was established and the first nationwide Selective Service System went into effect. This started a series of Selective Service Acts and extensions that have lasted over the past three decades. The 1940 Act provided manpower requirements for World War II and, despite the large number of volunteers during that war, more than 10 million men were drafted during the period November 1940 to October 1946.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>Galloway, p. 458.

<sup>14</sup>U.S., Selective Service System, p. 81.

<sup>15</sup>Hart, p. 9.      <sup>16</sup>Galloway, p. 460.

The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 expired on 31 March 1947. However, world conditions and tensions were such that there was an immediate need to build up the armed forces again to insure the security of this nation. The historical practice of demobilizing drastically after each war had occurred at the end of World War II. To meet the manpower needs during the subsequent uncertain period, another Selective Service Act was passed on 24 June 1948. An interesting side effect occurred that was to continue throughout the period a draft was in effect. The Act stimulated enlistments in both the Active and Reserve Components of the armed forces. This is borne out in a statement by Gordon Gray, Secretary of the Army at that time, who pointed out that the Selective Service Act "acted as a spur to thousands of otherwise undecided youngsters and that the prompt enlistments following its passage raised our recruiting quotas dramatically."<sup>17</sup> Enactment of the Selective Service Act of 1948 gave birth to a new "source" of manpower procurement for the military, the "draft threat."

With the outbreak of the Korean crisis on 25 June 1950, Congress extended the 1948 Act to 9 July 1951.<sup>18</sup> During the Korean conflict, which lasted from June 1950 to

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<sup>17</sup>Hart, p. 18.

<sup>18</sup>Hart, p. 19.

June 1953, 1.5 million men were inducted through the Selective Service. The Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 was enacted with an expiration date of 1 July 1955. The purpose of that Act was first to raise immediately the manpower necessary to build and maintain an armed force of the size determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be the country's minimum security requirement and, second, to provide for the maintenance of an adequate force of trained Reserves for the future security of the United States.<sup>19</sup> A new provision of the Act was that anyone inducted, enlisted, or appointed in the armed forces, prior to becoming 26 years of age, should be required to serve on active training and service and in a Reserve Component for a total period of eight years. All men physically and mentally qualified were transferred upon release from active training and service to one of the Reserve Components. This, in effect, drafted men into the Reserves.

A proposal for a National Security Training Corps to be designed to insure a constant flow of 6-month trainees into a Reserve Component, where the individual would serve seven and one-half years, failed to pass the 82d Congress.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>U.S., Senate Armed Services Committee, Senate Report No. 117, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951, p. 1.

<sup>20</sup>Galloway, p. 472.

This, in effect, would have provided for a draft directly into the Reserve Components.

Because of a continuing need to maintain substantial active armed forces, the 84th Congress extended the Universal Military Training and Service Act for four years, until 30 June 1959. Before it expired, however, Congress, in March 1959, again extended it. Expiration date of the second extension was 1 July 1963.<sup>21</sup>

The Reserve Forces Act of 1955 established the 6-month Reserve program in which a Reservist served six months of active duty with a seven and one-half year obligation in the Reserves. That program became very attractive as an alternative to extended active service, because an individual who participated in it was exempt from induction except in time of war or national emergency declared by Congress. According to the Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procurement, which was headed by retired General Mark Clark:

The Panel is of the opinion that in certain respects participants in this voluntary program may escape or mitigate service to which drafted men are subject. When a participant enlists voluntarily in that program under present conditions he ensures effectively against his having to serve initially for two years in active training, combat or other fulltime military service, since

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<sup>21</sup>Hart, p. 27.

the full-time training period is basically six months.<sup>22</sup>

Former presidential assistant George E. Reedy, commenting on the 6-month Reserve program, wrote: "Obviously, as contrasted to active service in Vietnam, this is a 'good deal,' and Reserve unit waiting lists have been jammed for the past few years."<sup>23</sup>

The draft, then, has supplied men for both Active and Reserve Forces by direct or indirect methods. It has further acted as an inducement for many other actions. The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force reported:

In addition to draft-induced volunteers for the military, selective service results in draft-induced college students, draft-induced ministerial students, draft-induced husbands and fathers, and draft-induced employees in exempt occupations.<sup>24</sup>

Recent reductions in the draft have had a negative effect on Reserve personnel input. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird has reported that "it is apparent, however, that the downward trend in draft calls will have an effect

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<sup>22</sup>U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procurement (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 4.

<sup>23</sup>George E. Reedy, Who Will Do Our Fighting for Us? (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1969), p. 106.

<sup>24</sup>President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, All-Volunteer Armed Force (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 32.

on Reserve manning, which can be seen from the fact that waiting lists for entrance into some Reserve units are declining."<sup>25</sup> Matters of the draft and draft inducement are expected to become history as of 31 July 1973. Secretary of Defense Laird has announced termination of the draft and full adoption of an All-Volunteer Armed Force effective 31 July 1973.<sup>26</sup>

Effects of the zero draft are further highlighted by the following:

A year hence, the draft will have little impact to stimulate enlistments of 17 and 18 year olds. By January 1973, the draft will have ceased to swell enlistments in the Reserve forces. Recruiting problems can become serious if steps are not taken to increase voluntary accessions of the Guard and Reserves.<sup>27</sup>

This writer emphasized the urgency of the preceding extract in Chapter I.

The probability is very high that there will be some type of machinery to reinstitute the draft in case of an all-out emergency. Until the all-volunteer concept has been fully tested, and even if it should be successful, there

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<sup>25</sup>Department of Defense, Defense Report on President Nixon's Strategy for Peace (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 101.

<sup>26</sup>Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense on Reserve Forces, Fiscal Year 1970 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 74.

<sup>27</sup>Department of Defense, p. 135.



will probably have to be some standby draft provision for expanding the military forces for a major war. Little is said about a standby draft when discussing the zero draft, but the necessity of such a provision is recognized by Secretary Laird, who said that although the induction authority may expire on 1 July 1973, standby draft machinery should be retained in the event there is a need to rapidly expand military forces in a national emergency.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup>Department of Defense, p. 138.

## APPENDIX D

### THE ARMY RESERVE

To understand the current makeup and role of the Army Reserve, it is necessary to understand the historical development, current status, and projected role of the program. This appendix reviews the historical development of the program, its part during the major conflicts and crises of this nation's growth, and the expanding role the Reserve Components are expected to take in the future.

#### Historical Review

The concept of a reserve military force had its birth in the Constitution. America's founding fathers realized there would always be a need for military forces to uphold the Constitution and defend the country. The following extract from Article I of the Constitution has served as a basis for the establishment of reserve forces:

Sec. 8. (15) To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

Sec. 8. (16) To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the

Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; . . . .<sup>1</sup>

Although political and military leaders advocated a strong militia system, the general public did not accept the idea very well. Washington, Jefferson, and Madison wanted to establish a well regulated militia, but public opinion did not support them. The Militia Act of 1792 did affirm the power of the Federal Government to call able-bodied men for military service, but the Act was not fully applied during the War of 1812 because of strong opposition in Congress.<sup>2</sup> Two factors had bearing on this reluctance to fully mobilize the militia. First, there was fear of the danger of military control and rule of the nation if a militia were allowed at the national level. This certainly was not desirable during a period of history when the United States had fought for independence from British rule and was developing as an independent nation. Second, the concept of the militia during this segment of history was a military force organized for suppressing insurrections or repelling invasions within the realm of the militia's home territory.

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<sup>1</sup>Eileen Galloway, History of United States Military Policy on Reserve Forces (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 443.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 444-45.

Consequently, the militia was not called upon to fight the Mexican War. As noted in Chapter II, that war was on foreign soil and had to be fought with regulars and volunteers.

During the Civil War, President Lincoln called ten companies of the District of Columbia militia. However, those troops could not be sent out of the District, so Lincoln also called to duty 75,000 militia from the states to bolster the Regular Army, which was inadequate in strength. The existing law limited the federal service of the militia to three months. This untrained reserve force could not be readied for battle in time to be of any value to the army. In fact, they became a hindrance in that they literally marched off the battlefield when their terms of service expired. The short term of service for the militia, compounded by problems in securing a sufficient number of volunteers, prompted Congress to authorize the President to call the militia of the states to active federal service for nine months.<sup>3</sup>

The 9-month authorization was made in July 1862. Winter had set in by the time the militia were called and trained. They could not be used effectively during the

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 448-49.

winter months and their 9-month period had expired by the time spring of 1863 rolled around. The concept of calling an untrained militia for short periods of time obviously was not a viable means of developing an effective fighting force. Because of the failure in employing the reserve forces, the Federal Government resorted to the draft.

The South first relied on 100,000 12-month volunteers, one-third of them trained and equipped by April 1861. After one year, however, the South was not able to rely on volunteers only and resorted to the draft.

The Spanish-American War saw no improvements in the development of the reserve concept. The Federal Government remained responsible for the defense of the nation, but still had to rely on the states for their militia or on volunteers from the militia.<sup>4</sup> The reserve concept remained disorganized and fragmented because there was no central agency for planning and for coordinating the several state militia.

It was not until 21 January 1903, with passage of the Dick Act, that there was any form of national reserve. This marked the birth of the National Guard as it is known today. The Dick Act provided that the militia would consist

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 453.

of all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of 18 to 45 years and that they would serve in one of two categories. The Organized Militia was to be known as the National Guard of each state or territory, and all other male citizens within the age bracket would belong to the Reserve Militia, which was a manpower pool. The National Guard began its close ties with the Federal Government through annual federal appropriations and was organized, armed, and trained in a fashion similar to the one for regular and volunteer forces.<sup>5</sup> The creation of this dual status led to some new problems.

Just prior to United States involvement in World War I, President Wilson gave new impetus to the reserve forces movement. He stated: "We must depend in every time of national peril . . . not upon a standing army . . . but upon a citizenry trained and accustomed to arms."<sup>6</sup> A few years later, on 16 June 1916, the National Defense Act was passed. It strengthened the National Guard by giving it full federal status, provided for reserve officers, and laid the groundwork for compulsory wartime service.<sup>7</sup>

The National Defense Act of June 4, 1920, and the 1933 amendments to the National Defense Act of 1916 served

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 454.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 455.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 456.

to clarify further the role of the National Guard and the Reserves. The 1916 Act stipulated that the National Guard was under state control but could be called to become part of the Army of the United States. It also provided for the Officers' Reserve Corps and the Reserve Officers' Training Corps. A 1933 amendment made the National Guard the National Guard of the United States and a Reserve Component of the United States Army, the pattern that has survived to this day.<sup>8</sup>

World War II was the first and only United States war or conflict in which all means of procuring manpower were effected on a full scale basis. Through a process of evolution, the military force of the nation then consisted of the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserve Corps. Because of the all-out effort of World War II, it was necessary to call upon all three of the components, to step up recruiting, and to resort to the draft.

The first large scale callup of reserve forces occurred during the early stages of World War II, which actually began in 1939. Because of the imminence of United States involvement, the National Guard strength was built up

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid., pp. 456 & 459.

to 18 divisions during 1940 and 1941. The Gray Commission evaluated the mobilization of the National Guard by stating:

In addition to training themselves the Guardsmen furnished many officers for expanding staff, and for miscellaneous duties. They contributed to cadres for organization of new divisions, and from their personnel were commissioned some 75,000 officers. The fact that it produced 18 divisions whose performance in the war was excellent and furnished cadres and officers to other components, is ample evidence of its value. It must be kept in mind, however, that this was done after nearly 2 years of additional training after the Guard was ordered to Federal service.<sup>9</sup>

The Organized Reserve Corps had a strength of approximately 120,000 at the beginning of World War II. Its primary input into the war effort was 117,000 reserve officers. The remaining strength of 3,000 in the Enlisted Reserve Corps was of little benefit since they were so widely dispersed.<sup>10</sup>

The period following World War II saw quick demobilization of military forces and the expiration of the Selective Service Act on 31 March 1947. It soon became obvious, however, that World War II was not a war to end all wars and that world tensions still existed. Further, it became apparent that a military force of approximately 1.4 million

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<sup>9</sup>Report to the Secretary of Defense by the Committee on Civilian Components: Reserve Forces for National Security (30 June 1948), p. 1.

<sup>10</sup>Galloway, p. 463.



was dangerously low for national security.

On 24 June 1948, the Selective Service Act of 1948 was enacted. Incorporated into it was induction for 21 months followed by appointment in a Reserve Component for 5 years.<sup>11</sup> The five years of Reserve Component service did not require the person to render further active service or attend reserve drills or classes. Other options available to the inductee included enlistment in an organized reserve unit for three years to reduce his total military obligation or full discharge from military service by remaining on active duty for an additional year. The reserve obligation applied equally to those who volunteered in the Regular Army for 21 months. Another provision of the Act was that 18-year-olds could enlist for one year followed by a 6-year obligation in the Reserve. The Selective Service Act of 1948 provided a ready-made input into the Reserve Forces.

A large scale callup of Reserves was effected during the Korean conflict. During the first 18 months of the war, 806,000 Reservists were called to active duty. The urgency with which they were called led to many inequities and administrative problems. Many of the men called had little lead time in which to set their personal affairs in order

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<sup>11</sup>Galloway, p. 467.

before reporting for active duty, records of Reservists were not in order or up-to-date, and inactive Reservists were called to duty before active Reservists.<sup>12</sup>

The 82d Congress passed two pieces of legislation in an attempt to improve the Reserve Program. Lawmakers had been grappling continuously with the difficulties of determining the strength of the Reserves in the light of budgetary limitations and in developing a program that would be acceptable to the general public and universally equitable in the sharing of the country's defense. Thus it was that the Universal Military Training and Service Act amended the Selective Service Act of 1948. The amendment provided that all men between the ages of 18 and 26 years of age had to register for military service, with those between 18-1/2 and 26 years being liable for induction.<sup>13</sup> Inductees were required to serve 24 months on active duty and, after discharge, six years in a Reserve Component.

The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, approved on 9 July, provided that each of the Armed Forces would maintain a Ready Reserve that was liable for involuntary call to active duty, a Standby Reserve that was to be called when adequate Ready Reserves were not available, and a Retired

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<sup>12</sup>Galloway, pp. 469-70.

<sup>13</sup>Galloway, p. 472.

Reserve that was designated as a third priority force.<sup>14</sup>

All categories of Reservists were liable for call in time of war, in a national emergency declared by Congress, or when authorized by law. Ready Reservists could also be called to active duty in a national emergency proclaimed by the President.

#### Current Status of Reserves

The next act Congress passed was the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, which has had the biggest impact on the Reserve Components structure as it stands today. That Act established the 6-month Reserve Program. The Reservist served six months of active duty followed by a seven and one-half year obligation in the Reserves, giving him a total military obligation time of eight years.<sup>15</sup> Enlistees in the program were exempt from induction except in time of war or national emergency.

This was followed in 1963 by the Reserve Enlistment Program (REP 63), which is commonly known as a 6-month program. Some modifications of the 1955 Act were that the enlistee would serve from four to six months of active duty,

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<sup>14</sup>Galloway, p. 473.

<sup>15</sup>Irving W. Hart, Outline of Historical Background of Selective Service and Chronology (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 24.

primarily for basic and advanced individual training, and then return to his reserve unit to finish off a 6-year obligation, rather than eight years. The REP 63 is still in effect today.

The 6-month program was a boon to the National Guard and the Army Reserve units in that the input, followed by the balance of a 6-year obligation, reduced turnover and permitted the Reserve Components to advance beyond individual training and improve their overall readiness.<sup>16</sup>

On the other hand, this attractive alternative to extended active service has not gone unnoticed. A former presidential assistant, George Reedy, pointed out that the long waiting lists to join the Reserve Program illustrate desirability of the Reserve Components as contrasted to active service in Vietnam.<sup>17</sup> The Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procurement, under the leadership of retired General Mark Clark, was a little more direct on the matter of avoidance of the draft. That Vietnam era panel stated, in effect, that those volunteering for the REP 63 could escape service in combat or full-time military service

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>17</sup>George E. Reedy, Who Will Do Our Fighting for Us? (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1969), p. 106.

to which drafted men were subject.<sup>18</sup> Finally, the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force noted that "perhaps 75% of the enlisted personnel fulfilling their initial six-year military obligation in the reserves are there only because of the draft."<sup>19</sup> Findings of the Army Reserve survey conducted for this thesis indicate that 75 is probably a low percentage.

A similar criticism in a report by the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service is that there has been "some public complaint that men enlisted in the Reserves directly from civilian life are in effect using the Reserves as a haven to escape combat duty." Despite some criticisms, the Commission lauded the Reserves by stating:

The history and record of the Reserves in this country are both honorable and honored. They are indispensable to the military security of the nation, as their performance in both World War II and Korea demonstrated. The United States' military policy involves the maintenance of a strong Reserve force.<sup>20</sup>

Later, during the Berlin Crisis, when 150,000 offi-

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<sup>18</sup> U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procurement (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 4.

<sup>19</sup> President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, All-Volunteer Armed Force (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 97.

<sup>20</sup> National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, Who Serves When Not All Serve (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 53.

cers and enlisted men of the National Guard and Army Reserve were mobilized, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stated that Chancellor Adenauer of West Germany wrote President Kennedy that, in his opinion, "the prime factor influencing Khrushchev in his slowdown on Berlin was the swift, decisive buildup of American forces."<sup>21</sup> Under the Kennedy Administration it was felt that the known possession of strong reserve forces, particularly Army forces, in an advanced state of combat readiness was a factor Soviet planners had to consider.<sup>22</sup>

Because of the modern technological advances in military warfare and the possibility of nuclear warfare, the rapidity with which the United States can react to an attack may make the difference between victory and defeat. Reservists, down to the last rifleman, must be made aware of the gravity of their mission. George F. Eliot stated this mission very succinctly. In his words:

It is the mission of the reserve components of the Army --the ARNG [Army National Guard] and the AR [Army Reserve]--to provide trained citizen-soldiers organized in units in sufficient numbers, and at adequate levels of training and armament, so that the Army as a whole shall always be able to meet the responsibilities which

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<sup>21</sup>George F. Eliot, Reserve Forces and the Kennedy Strategy (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Company, 1962), p. 5.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

the national policy and the national interests require of it.<sup>23</sup>

To avoid a situation which would delay the calling of reserve forces because of need for congressional approval, or in the event a crisis occurred while Congress was out of session for several months, a joint resolution was passed to authorize the President to order units and members of the Ready Reserve to active duty for not more than 12 months. The resolution also authorized the Secretary of Defense to extend the President's recall order for an additional year. This, in effect, gave the President power to call individual Reservists and units to active duty for a period of 24 months.<sup>24</sup>

Without this flexibility in response, the whole concept of a combat ready reserve force ready for deployment on minimal notice would be lost. Delays through legislative process could delay the call to active duty of the Reserves beyond a point of effectiveness under present world conditions. The joint resolution authorized the President to call up to 150,000 men without declaring a national emergency.

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<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>24</sup>U.S., Congress, Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, S.J. Res. 224 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 1.

In more recent years, the desirability of flexibility is clearly illustrated by moves toward more responsiveness on the part of the Reserves. For example, in 1967 the Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Procurement recommended that

the President be given permanent authority to order Reserve forces to active duty without the necessity of declaring that a new national emergency exists.<sup>25</sup>

Next, the Army Chief of Staff announced in December 1969 that the Reserve Components would be the initial source for any future rapid expansions.<sup>26</sup> Then, in his 1970 report on the Reserves, the Secretary of Defense stated under objectives:

The near term objectives which have been established for the coming year follow the pattern of our emphases during Fiscal Year 1970. The priority concern is to strengthen combat readiness and to prepare the Guard and Reserve to be the primary and initial source of augmentation for the armed forces in the event of war or national emergency.<sup>27</sup>

The concept that the Reserve Forces will be the initial and primary source in the event there is a need to expand the military forces because of a war or national

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<sup>25</sup>U.S., Congress, Civilian Advisory Panel, p. 97.

<sup>26</sup>Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense on Reserve Forces, Fiscal Year 1970 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 6, sec. iii.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 12.



emergency is further borne out in a later report by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. In his report on the Five-Year Defense Program and 1972 Defense Budget, Secretary Laird stated:

One major step we have taken is our new policy with respect to Reserve Forces. Members of the National Guard and Reserve, instead of draftees, will be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces.<sup>28</sup>

Because of a need for increased preparedness, combat readiness in terms of equipment has been given much attention recently. During Fiscal Year 1970, \$300 million in equipment assets were made available to the National Guard and Reserves to enhance their readiness. This amount was double the allocation given Reserve Components during Fiscal Year 1969.<sup>29</sup>

Training is another aspect of combat readiness that has been getting much attention of late. Improved training not only upgrades combat readiness but also tends to maintain the interest of the participants. Department of Defense has recognized this and, in its 1970 report on the Reserves, stated:

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<sup>28</sup>Department of Defense, Defense Report on President Nixon's Strategy for Peace (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 36.

<sup>29</sup>Annual Report, p. 2.

In addition to our concern for providing better incentives for Guard and Reserve participation and enhancing the effectiveness of recruiting programs, we are aware that what an individual does while he is in a unit has a major impact on whether he will remain with the unit after the expiration of his first enlistment. Accordingly, we are examining all aspects of training programs including the policies governing their operation to eliminate "make work" aspects and classroom instruction to the maximum extent and make the programs productive and interesting.<sup>30</sup>

Recruiting in the Reserves up to 1970 was not a major task because of the backlog created by men awaiting enlistment and initial training. In several instances the waiting list exceeded the enlistments, which certainly did not cause any problems in manpower procurement for the Reserves.<sup>31</sup>

With low draft calls, the problems in recruiting are beginning to show up and will probably become even more serious when the zero draft becomes a reality. Difficulties in manpower procurement in the Army Reserve are not limited to getting first-term enlistments. They are compounded by a severe problem of retaining those who are already members of the program, the focal point of this study. This first reenlistment is a critical point in that those men who joined the REP 63 around 1966 and 1967 are completing their

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<sup>30</sup>Annual Report, p. 13.

<sup>31</sup>President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, p. 115.

first term of enlistment. The reenlistment rate in the Army Reserve has been very low, as illustrated by a report by the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Army. The report shows that of those who had less than six years service and are required to drill, 3.4 per cent stated an intention to continue paid-drill participation in 1969.<sup>32</sup> Some commands have had limited success in recruiting but lost more men through expiration of term of service than they recruited.

Prior service personnel, a potentially lucrative source of manpower for the Reserves, has been somewhat neglected. The reason for this may be the waiting lists mentioned earlier. The 1970 Defense Department report notes:

[T]he lack of significant incentives for participation in Guard and Reserve programs has hampered efforts to attract the needed, highly qualified people. As active forces are reduced in size and greater numbers of prior service personnel become part of the target audience for recruiting, there is a possibility that our efforts will have more success. However, it appears that new and effective incentives such as reenlistment bonus payments will be essential to insure the continued manning of Guard and Reserve units at adequate levels both in total manpower and personnel readiness.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup>President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, p. 107.

<sup>33</sup>Annual Report, p. 8.

## APPENDIX E: TROOP-LEVEL SURVEY

Letter to ARCOM Commanding Generals . . . . .	156
Letter to REP 63 Participants . . . . .	157
Questionnaire . . . . .	158

U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

8 November 1971

SUBJECT: Army Reserve Survey

TO: Commanding General  
63d U.S. Army Reserve Command  
ATTN: G3  
Hazard Park USAR Center  
1350 San Pablo Street  
Los Angeles, California 90033

1. The inclosed survey is being conducted by the undersigned as part of a thesis titled "Retention of First-Term Reserve Enlistment Program Personnel in the United States Army Reserve" in partial fulfillment of the Master of Military Art and Science degree at the Army Command and General Staff College.
2. Request that the inclosed questionnaire be administered to a representative, random sampling of first-term Reserve Enlistment Program (REP 63) personnel in your command.
3. The questionnaire is anonymous and should take from five to fifteen minutes to complete, depending upon how much time the respondent chooses to spend on the last open question.
4. Instructions are either self-explanatory or explained in the cover letter and questionnaire. It is requested that sincerity and honesty be emphasized.
5. Request that the completed questionnaires be returned to me in the self-addressed, stamped envelope inclosed not later than 31 January 1972.
6. Results of the survey for your command will be furnished upon request.
7. Thank you for your assistance and cooperation.

2 Incl  
Self-addressed envelope  
Questionnaires (100 cy)

/s/ Moss M. Ikeda  
MOSS M. IKEDA  
Major, Infantry, USAR

U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

8 November 1971

SUBJECT: Army Reserve Survey

TO: REP 63 Participant

1. The attached survey is being conducted as part of a thesis requirement for the Master of Military Art and Science degree at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
2. I am an Army Reserve officer currently on active duty for training to attend the Regular Course at the College. My last assignment, prior to reporting to the College, was as the Commanding Officer of the 100th Battalion, 442d Infantry, an Army Reserve unit in Hawaii.
3. The results of the survey will be used in a thesis titled "Retention of First-Term Reserve Enlistment Program Personnel in the United States Army Reserve."
4. Your honest and complete responses will enable me to make projections on retention of first-term REP 63 personnel. The survey results and related research will enable me to make recommendations to deal with the problems inherent in manpower sustenance in the Army Reserve.
5. Your participation is appreciated.

/s/ Moss M. Ikeda  
MOSS M. IKEDA  
Major, Infantry, USAR

APPROVED FOR DISTRIBUTION:

/s/ Wm. M. Stevenson  
WILLIAM M. STEVENSON  
LTC, Infantry  
Adviser

/s/ Bernard J. Leu, Jr.  
BERNARD J. LEU, JR.  
Colonel, Armor  
Class Director

## ARMY RESERVE SURVEY

This survey is being conducted to project the retention picture of first-term Reserve Enlistment Program (REP 63) personnel in the United States Army Reserve. Please answer the questions completely and honestly. This is an anonymous questionnaire.

## PART I: GENERAL INFORMATION

Rank \_\_\_\_\_ Position \_\_\_\_\_ MOS \_\_\_\_\_  
Age \_\_\_\_\_ Years of Service: Active \_\_\_\_\_ Reserve \_\_\_\_\_  
Branch \_\_\_\_\_ Organization \_\_\_\_\_  
Do you plan to remain in the Army Reserve after your 6-year obligation expires? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ Uncertain \_\_\_\_\_

## PART II: MOTIVATION FOR JOINING THE ARMY RESERVE

Why did you join the Army Reserve? Choose at least one response. If you give more than one response, put 1st, 2d, 3d, etc., before each response to indicate order of importance.

- \_\_\_\_\_ To demonstrate my loyalty to my country
- \_\_\_\_\_ To supplement my civilian income
- \_\_\_\_\_ To avoid the draft
- \_\_\_\_\_ To get military training
- \_\_\_\_\_ To learn a skill or trade
- \_\_\_\_\_ My parent(s) encouraged me to join
- \_\_\_\_\_ My relative(s) encouraged me to join
- \_\_\_\_\_ My friend(s) encouraged me to join
- \_\_\_\_\_ It is a source for a commission
- \_\_\_\_\_ I joined with my friends
- \_\_\_\_\_ I wanted to get away from home
- \_\_\_\_\_ It is a good way to complete my military obligation
- \_\_\_\_\_ Others (write in your own reason(s)) \_\_\_\_\_

## PART III: ARMY RESERVE INCENTIVES

What do you consider as good incentives to remain in the Army Reserve? If you select more than one response, please rank them 1st, 2d, 3d, etc., in order of importance.

- \_\_\_\_\_ Additional income
- \_\_\_\_\_ Promotions
- \_\_\_\_\_ Prestige
- \_\_\_\_\_ Retirement benefits
- \_\_\_\_\_ PX privileges (drill status - limited purchases)
- \_\_\_\_\_ PX & commissary privileges (summer camp - unlimited)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Insurance policy (\$15,000 SGLI)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Divergent activity from civilian job
- \_\_\_\_\_ I like the military
- \_\_\_\_\_ Association with fellow Reservists
- \_\_\_\_\_ Business and/or professional contacts
- \_\_\_\_\_ Travel
- \_\_\_\_\_ Pride in the unit
- \_\_\_\_\_ None of the above
- \_\_\_\_\_ Others (write in your own incentives) \_\_\_\_\_

## PART IV: IMPROVING THE ARMY RESERVE

What suggestions do you have for improving the Army Reserve to enhance retention? This is an open question. Please respond in your own words.

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APPENDIX F: DETAILED SUMMARIES  
OF SELECTED DATA

Motivation . . . . .	161
Incentives . . . . .	166

TABLE 13

MOTIVATION: 1ST, 2D, AND 3D CHOICES BY REGION

Motivation	Choice			Frequency
	1st	2d	3d	
Georgia				
Demonstrate loyalty to country	1	0	3	4
Supplement civilian income	0	0	1	1
Avoid draft	65	5	1	71
Get military training	0	0	1	1
Friend(s) encouraged me	2	1	1	4
Joined with friends	0	1	0	1
Get away from home	0	1	0	1
Complete military obligation	10	19	0	29
Early release from active duty	1	0	0	1
Sub-Total:	79	27	7	113
Hawaii				
Demonstrate loyalty to country	1	0	5	6
Supplement civilian income	0	3	0	3
Avoid draft	51	10	0	61
Get military training	1	0	1	2
Learn a skill or trade	1	1	2	4
Parent(s) encouraged me	0	1	0	1
Relative(s) encouraged me	0	0	1	1
Friend(s) encouraged me	0	2	2	4
Source for a commission	0	0	3	3
Joined with friends	1	1	2	4
Get away from home	0	1	0	1
Complete military obligation	27	24	2	53
Finish college	4	4	0	8

TABLE 13--Continued

Motivation	Choice			Frequency
	1st	2d	3d	
Forwarded (HI):	86	47	18	151
Refused commission	1	0	0	1
Well-rounded person	0	0	1	1
Help parents	1	0	0	1
Sub-Total:	88	47	19	154
Indiana/Michigan				
Demonstrate loyalty to country	3	0	2	5
Supplement civilian income	0	2	1	3
Avoid draft	37	9	2	48
Get military training	0	1	0	1
Learn a skill or trade	0	2	0	2
Parent(s) encouraged me	1	1	1	3
Relative(s) encouraged me	0	1	1	2
Friend(s) encouraged me	2	1	3	6
Joined with my friends	0	4	3	7
Forced to	1	0	0	1
Attending college	1	0	0	1
In business	1	0	0	1
Stay with family	1	0	0	1
Complete military obligation	21	15	3	39
Sub-Total:	68	36	16	120
Missouri/Illinois				
Demonstrate loyalty to country	5	2	0	7
Supplement civilian income	1	3	3	7
Avoid draft	59	5	2	66

TABLE 13--Continued

Motivation	Choice			Frequency
	1st	2d	3d	
Forwarded (Mo/I11):	65	10	5	80
Get military training	0	2	1	3
Learn a skill or trade	1	1	1	3
Parent(s) encouraged me	0	2	1	3
Relative(s) encouraged me	1	2	0	3
Friend(s) encouraged me	1	1	3	5
Source for a commission	0	0	1	1
Joined with friends	0	2	1	3
Complete military obligation	25	18	0	43
Attending college	0	1	0	1
Lessen interruption	1	1	1	3
No choice	1	0	0	1
Travel	0	1	0	1
Sub-Total:	95	41	14	150
New York				
Demonstrate loyalty to country	1	2	0	3
Supplement civilian income	1	2	0	3
Avoid draft	69	5	1	75
Learn a skill or trade	1	0	0	1
Parent(s) encouraged me	0	1	4	5
Friend(s) encouraged me	0	1	2	3
Source for a commission	0	0	1	1
Joined with friends	0	1	0	1
Complete military obligation	15	14	0	29
Extreme masochism	1	0	0	1
Sub-Total:	88	26	8	122

TABLE 13--Continued

Motivation	Choice			Frequency
	1st	2d	3d	
Utah				
Demonstrate loyalty to country	4	9	4	17
Supplement civilian income	3	5	5	13
Avoid Draft	55	11	5	71
Learn a skill or trade	0	3	2	5
Parent(s) encouraged me	2	8	4	14
Relative(s) encouraged me	0	1	0	1
Friend(s) encouraged me	1	3	2	6
Source for a commission	1	0	0	1
Joined with friends	2	5	5	12
Get away from home	0	0	1	1
Complete military obligation	26	19	8	53
Sub-Total:	94	64	36	194
Washington				
Demonstrate loyalty to country	0	2	0	2
Supplement civilian income	1	1	3	5
Avoid draft	45	2	0	47
Get military training	0	2	1	3
Learn a skill or trade	1	0	0	1
Parent(s) encouraged me	0	0	2	2
Friends(s) encouraged me	0	1	0	1
Source for a commission	0	0	1	1
Joined with friends	0	4	1	5
Complete military obligation	9	18	3	30
Complete college	1	1	0	2
Sub-Total:	57	31	11	99

TABLE 13--Continued

Motivation	Choice			Frequency
	1st	2d	3d	
Summary				
Georgia:	79	27	7	113
Hawaii:	88	47	19	154
Indiana/Michigan:	68	36	16	120
Missouri/Illinois:	95	41	14	150
New York:	88	26	8	122
Utah:	94	64	36	194
Washington:	<u>57</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>99</u>
Total:	569	272	111	952

TABLE 14

## INCENTIVES: 1ST, 2D, AND 3D CHOICES BY REGION

Incentive	Choice			Frequency
	1st	2d	3d	
Georgia				
Additional income	25	6	2	33
Promotions	1	9	2	12
Prestige	1	2	2	5
Retirement benefits	2	1	3	6
PX privileges (limited)	2	2	1	5
PX & commissary privileges (summer camp)	4	5	2	11
Insurance policy (SGLI) (lim- ited coverage	0	0	5	5
Association with other Reserv- ists	1	0	0	1
Business & professional con- tacts	0	1	0	1
Travel	0	0	1	1
None of the above	43	0	0	43
Sub-Total:	79	26	18	123
Hawaii				
Additional income	40	10	4	54
Promotions	4	10	2	16
Prestige	0	2	2	4
Retirement benefits	6	9	5	20
PX privileges (limited)	0	7	5	12
PX & commissary privileges (summer camp)	6	7	6	19
Insurance policy (SGLI) (lim- ited coverage)	0	1	1	2

TABLE 14--Continued

Incentive	Choice			Frequency
	1st	2d	3d	
Forwarded (HI):	56	46	25	127
Divergent activity	1	0	0	1
Association with other Reserv- ists	1	3	2	6
Business & professional con- tacts	1	2	1	4
Travel	7	1	2	10
Pride in the unit	1	0	0	1
None of the above	17	0	0	17
Sub-Total:	84	52	30	166
Indiana/Michigan				
Additional income	32	8	1	41
Promotions	5	10	1	16
Prestige	0	2	0	2
Retirement benefits	6	6	5	17
PX privileges (limited)	2	1	0	3
PX & commissary privileges (summer camp)	0	2	2	4
Insurance policy (SGLI) (lim- ited coverage)	0	1	5	6
Divergent activity	0	3	0	3
I like the military	0	0	2	2
Association with other Reserv- ists	5	6	3	14
Business & professional con- tacts	0	0	3	3
Travel	0	0	4	4
Pride in the unit	1	0	0	1



TABLE 14--Continued

Incentive	Choice			Frequency
	1st	2d	3d	
Forwarded (Ind/Mich):	51	39	26	116
None of the above	18	0	0	18
Sub-Total:	69	39	26	134
Missouri/Illinois				
Additional income	47	3	1	51
Promotions	4	9	2	15
Prestige	1	1	0	2
Retirement benefits	5	2	7	14
PX privileges (limited)	2	5	1	8
PX & commissary privileges (summer camp)	0	4	5	9
Insurance policy (SGLI) (lim- ited coverage)	0	1	5	6
Divergent activity	0	3	0	3
I like the military	1	0	0	1
Association with other Reserv- ists	3	2	2	7
Business & professional con- tacts	1	6	1	8
Travel	0	2	1	3
Pride in the unit	0	1	0	1
None of the above	31	0	0	31
Sub-Total:	95	39	25	159
New York				
Additional income	20	2	1	23
Promotions	4	7	5	16
Prestige	0	0	1	1

TABLE 14--Continued

Incentive	Choice			Frequency
	1st	2d	3d	
Forwarded (NY):	24	9	7	40
Retirement benefits	2	1	2	5
PX privileges (limited)	1	1	2	4
PX & commissary privileges (summer camp)	1	3	0	4
Insurance policy (SGLI) (limited coverage)	0	1	1	2
Divergent activity	0	0	1	1
I like the military	2	0	0	2
Association with other Reservists	0	3	1	4
Business & professional contacts	1	0	1	2
Travel	2	1	0	3
Pride in the unit	0	2	0	2
None of the above	55	0	0	55
No way	1	0	0	1
No meetings	1	0	0	1
Sub-Total:	90	21	15	126
Utah				
Additional income	61	3	1	65
Promotions	4	30	0	34
Prestige	1	0	2	3
Retirement benefits	2	3	14	19
PX privileges (limited)	0	3	3	6
PX & commissary privileges (summer camp)	0	1	3	4

TABLE 14--Continued

Incentive	Choice			Frequency
	1st	2d	3d	
Forwarded (UT):	68	40	23	131
Insurance policy (SGLI) (limited coverage)	0	1	3	4
Divergent activity	0	4	0	4
I like the military	1	1	2	4
Association with other Reservists	4	5	2	11
Travel	0	3	4	7
Pride in the unit	0	1	0	1
None of the above	20	0	1	21
Sub-Total:	93	55	35	183
Washington				
Additional income	27	5	1	33
Promotions	1	1	3	5
Prestige	0	0	1	1
Retirement benefits	3	6	3	12
PX privileges (limited)	1	5	2	8
PX & commissary privileges (summer camp)	1	4	3	8
Insurance policy (SGLI) (limited coverage)	1	0	1	2
Divergent activity	0	0	1	1
I like the military	2	0	0	2
Association with other Reservists	0	0	2	2
Business & professional contacts	1	0	1	2
Travel	0	0	1	1

TABLE 14--Continued

Incentive	Choice			Frequency
	1st	2d	3d	
Forwarded (WA):	37	21	19	77
Pride in the unit	0	1	1	2
None of the above	19	0	0	19
Treatment like civilians get	1	0	0	1
Availability of schools	0	1	0	1
Sub-Total:	57	23	20	100
Summary				
Georgia:	79	26	18	123
Hawaii:	84	52	30	166
Indiana/Michigan:	69	39	26	134
Missouri/Illinois:	95	39	25	159
New York:	90	21	15	126
Utah:	93	55	35	183
Washington:	<u>57</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>100</u>
Total:	567	255	169	991

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