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ENGINEERING PSYCHOLOGY LABORATORY

Ratio Versus Magnitude Estimates of Importance Factors

Technical Report

GREGORY W. FISCHER and CAMERON R. PETERSON

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Ann Arbor, Michigan

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INTRODUCTION

Decision makers must frequently choose among courses of action which lead to the attainment of multiple goals or objectives. Seldom, however, will it be the case that one alternative is best with respect to all objectives. Thus, decision makers must trade-off one objective against another in determining which alternative is most desirable in an overall sense. Until recently this problem of weighing objectives against one another was viewed as inherently subjective in nature and beyond the scope of formal analysis. Recent studies of the subjective evaluation process, however, have revealed two major limitations of the purely subjective approach. First, subjective evaluation is characterized by a substantial degree of random error (Bowman, 1963; Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971). In addition, decision makers seem unable to take into account more than a few value relevant considerations at a time, thus ignoring potentially important information (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971).

Decomposed evaluation procedures have been proposed as a means for improving upon subjective evaluation. The essence of this approach is to divide the evaluation process into a set of simpler subtasks, each of which is well with the judgmental capacities of the decision maker. Given a set of alternatives to be evaluated, decomposition procedures usually involve the following tasks: 1) List the set of objectives or criteria against which alternatives are to be evaluated; 2) Numerically evaluate each alternative

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with respect to each objective; 3) Assign relative importance weights to each of the objectives; and 4) Compute the overall value of each alternative, usually with a weighted sum or product. For example, let $0_{1i}, 0_{2i}, \ldots, 0_{ni}$ be scores reflecting the degree to which alternaitve A_i satisfies objectives $0_1, 0_2, \ldots, 0_n$ respectively, and let w_1, w_2, \ldots, w_n be the relative importance factors assigned to these objectives. Then, using the weighted sum formulation, the overall value of alternative A_i is given by

 $V(A_i) = w_1 0_{1i} + \dots + w_n 0_{ni}.$

Several procedures are available for constructing decomposed evaluation models (Yntema and Torgerson, 1961; Fishburn, 1965; Raiffa, 1969; Hoepfl and Huber, 1970; Edwards, 1971; Keeney, 1971), and a number of validation studies have attested to both the feasibility and desirability of the approach (Yntema and Torgerson, 1961; Eckenrode, 1965; Yntema' and Klem, 1965; Lathrop and Peters, 1969; Hoepfl and Huber, 1970; Huber, Daneshgar, and Ford, 1971). But despite the generally favorable result: of these validation studies, the assessment of importance weights has proven to be a problem. Decomposed assessments of importance tend to be more uniformly distributed across objectives than are the implicit weights which underlie purely subjective evaluation (Pollack, 1964; Hoepfl and Huber, 1970). In addition, decomposed weights have been shown to be too flatly distributed across objectives when compared with statistically estimated weights in the presence of a known criterion (Lathrop and Peters, 1969). O'Connor (1972) obtained striking evidence of this problem in his development of an index of water quality.

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Water pollution experts assigned importance weights to a list of pollution parameters. Fecal coliform contamination, the most important factor and a potentially severe health hazard, initially received only 1.7 times as much weight as color, a factor of relatively minor aesthetic significance. Ahen confronted with this implication of their assessed weights, the water quality experts reassessed their weights substantially, placing relatively more emphasis on the more crucial parameters.

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In most of these applications of the decomposition approach, magnitude estimation procedures have been used to assess weights. Typically, the most important objective is arbitrarily assigned an importance of 100. Other objectives are then assigned weights which reflect their importance <u>relative</u> to the first objective. In using this procedure subejcts seem very reluctant to use numbers below 50, thus producing a flat distribution of weights over objectives.

Similar results have been obtained in probability revision experiments in which subjects are asked to modify their opinions about the likelihood of various hypotheses in light of new data. These studies have revealed that subjects tend to avoid assigning extreme probabilities to hypotheses, even in the face of overwhelming evidence (Du Charme, 1969). In addition, however, it was found that subjects made more extreme judgments when assessing odds ratios than when making magnitude estimates of probabilities (Phillips and Edwards, 1965). Extrapolating back to the context of decomposed evaluation, this result suggests that ratio assessments of importance weights should produce substantially less uniform distributions of importance over objectives than do the standard magnitude estimation procedures. The present study was designed to test this hypothesis.

METHOD

Subjects

Sixteen University of Michig in undergraduates served as subjects. All were enrolled in an introductory psychology course, and participation in the experiment contributed to the fulfillment of their course requirements. <u>Design</u>

Subjects assigned importance weights to six criteria used in the evaluation of the teaching ability of instructors. Those in one treatment condition first assessed weights using a magnitude estimation procedure, then reassessed their weights using a ratio response mode. Subjects in the other condition made the ratio assessments first, then the magnitude estimates. Procedure

The six criteria to which weights were assigned are listed below:

- Class Discussion: Does the instructor encourage students to ask questions and express their opinions?
- 2) Fairness: Does the instructor deal with students in a fair and impartial manner?
- 3) Knowledge: Is the instructor well informed about the subject matter of the course?
- 4) Organization: Are the instructor's class presentations well prepared and organized?
- 5) Relevance: Does the instructor relate the course materials to the real life experiences of the student?
- 6) Responsiveness: Is the instructor responsive to the students needs, feelings and problems?

After becoming familiar with this list of criteria, subjects were randomly divided into two groups of eight each. For the magnitude estimation response mode, subjects first ranked the six criteria in order of importance. They then arbitrarily assigned an importance of 100 to the most important criterion. Next, they assigned relative importance factors to each of the other criteria by making a slash through a ten inch line divided into 100 equal intervals and numbered from 0 to 100. Subjects were instructed to think of these numbers as percentages. For example, a criterion assigned a value of 50 should be 50% as important as the most important criterion.

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For the ratio estimates, subjects again ranked the same six criteria in order of importance. They then successively compared the most important criterion with each of the other five by making a slash through a logarithmically spaced ratio scale that ranged from 1:1 to 100:1. Here subjects were instructed that a ratio of 2:1 indicated that the most important criterion was twice as important as the one with which it was being compared. Use of 100:1 as the upper bound of the ratio scale eliminated the possibility that ratio judgments would be more extreme simply because they had no upper bound.

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RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

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For purposes of data analysis, each of the two sets of weights was normalized to sum to 100. Then, within each subject, the variance of these two sets of weights was computed. These variances are displayed in Table 1. The greater the variance of a set of weights, the less uniform the distribution of importance across attributes. Thus, the hypothesis that ratio assessments of weights result in less uniform distributions of importance across criteria implies that the variance of the ratio assessments should be greater than that of the magnitude assessments. This hypothesis was confirmed at an ordinal level for 15 of 16 subjects. The median variance for the ratio assessments (Vr) was 130.7 whereas the median variance for the magnitude estimates (Vm) was only 23.1. Finally, the median ratio of these variances, Vr/Vm, was 4.5:1.

These results clearly demonstrate that the ratio response mode generates less uniform weight assessments than does the magnitude estimation response mode. The next analysis was designed to determine the importance of this difference in terms of its effect on decisions. A number of previous studies have suggested that additive evaluation models are relatively insensitive to minor variations in weighting parameters; that is, that evaluation models based on different sets of weights will assign very similar overall values to multi-dimensional alternatives (O'Connor, 1972). To test this hypothesis in the present context, a simple numerical analysis was conducted. Because actual evaluations with respect to each of the six criteria were unavailable, a set of scores on the six criteria was randomly generated representing 500

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hypothetical instructors. Each criterion was assigned scores between 0 and 100, with scores being randomly generated from a uniform distribution over the range of 0 to 100. The data generating process used for this analysis was such that the criteria were uncorrelated. Next, for each subject, overall scores were assigned to each hypothetical instructor according to the following two models:

$$M_{r} = r_{1}X_{1i} + r_{2}X_{2i} + \dots + r_{n}X_{ni}$$
$$M_{m} = m_{1}X_{1i} + m_{2}X_{2i} + \dots + m_{n}X_{ni}.$$

Here, X_{ji} represents the score of the i-th instructor with respect to the j-th criteria, r_j the weight assessed for the j-th criterion using the ratio response mode, and m_j the weight assessed for the j-th criterion using the magnitude estimate response mode. Thus, M_r is the additive evaluation model based upon the ratio assessments and M_m the additive model based upon the magnitude estimates.

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Correlations between these two models were computed in order to determine the practical significance of the discrepancies between the two sets of weights. These correlations (presented in Table 1) demonstrate that, except in the case of very severe discrepancies, the models based upon the ratio and magnitude estimates are nearly equivalent. Only four of the 16 correlations are below .90, and in each of these case. the Vr/Vm ratios are extremely high. Over all subjects, the median correlation between the two models is .92. These results indicate that although the two assessment procedures do produce systematically different importance distributions across objectives, the robustness of additive models is so great that these differences will frequently be inconsequential from a practical standpoint.

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Variance of the Two Sets of Weights and Correlations Between Additive Models Based on These Weights

Subject	Group	Vr	Vm	Vr/Vm	<u>R</u>
1	1	106.1	31.6	3.3	.94
2	1	12.0	7.2	1.7	.99
3	1	73.1	80.1	.9	.99
4	1	256.9	19.9	12.9	.83
5	1	209.8	52.4	4.0	.90
6	1	53.4	23.6	2.3	.98
7	1	144.7	18.7	7.6	.89
8	1	327.0	24.3	13.5	.83
9	2	175.2	34.3	5.1	.92
10	2	47.3	12.4	3.9	.98
11	2	116.7	6.1	19.1	.90
12	2	207.9	88.3	2.3	.92
13	2	451.3	24.6	18.4	.78
14	2	17.6	13.0	1.3	1.00
15	2	20.8	.1	208.0	.97
16	2	161.0	22.7	7.1	.92
Median		130.7	23.1	4.5	.92

Note: Vr and Vm refer to the variance of the ratio and magnitude estimates respectively. R refers to the correlation between additive models based upon these two sets of weights.

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