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FINAL REPORT

ISSUES OF SURPRISE EXPLOITATION



IN U.S. SECURITY POLICY FOR CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE

By

William Pfaff

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
Edmund Stillman & Herman Kahn



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By

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13. ABSTRACT There are two main classes of diplomatic and strategic surprise, true surprises and those which reflect failures of analysis and anticipation. Today East-West relations in Europe are jeopardized by several important forces of change which imply a deepening, perhaps eventually decisive, alteration in the configuration of power dominating the strategic and political situation in Europe. The immediate future in Eastern Europe is likely to produce more important "surprising" changes and crises than at any time since the mid-1950's. Yet the "standard" or "classic" U.S. scenarios for European crisis, confrontation, and change seem no longer relevant. For the United States to exploit surprising events in order to bring about positive and constructive change there must be American (and NATO) policy goals for Eastern and Central Europe which are themselves positive, politically responsible, and potentially attainable. This problem will become acute since a European Security Conference is likely in the near future. Two general types of European settlements are imaginable. The more likely one apparently would confirm and regularize the Soviet role and presence in Eastern Europe. Such a settlement also is consistent with certain American tendencies towards a defensive, status-quo-preserving definition of interests. The second type of settlement would alter the situation toward what we describe as "normalization," acknowledging the national autonomy of all the European states, removing all foreign troops in circumstances assuring the security of Europe, and substituting political for military constraints generally. A "normalization" settlement is likely to be resisted by the Soviet Union. Thus a settlement on these terms would be likely to come about only under positive Western pressures, in which the exploitation of surprises and of independently-arising crises in the region would be an important factor.			

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SUMMARY

1. There are two main classes of diplomatic and strategic surprise. The first arise out of evident tendencies but are not anticipated because they seemed to analysts less probable outcomes than other possible developments. The second deserve to be considered true surprises--chiefly, though not in the most interesting cases, arising from the arbitrary acts of individuals or small groups. The first class is the most important because it constitutes a potentially remediable problem. These are "surprises" because of analytic and organizational inadequacies on the part of Western policy agencies.

2. Today the established terms of East-West relations in Europe are jeopardized by several important forces of change: in the American relationship to Western Europe, within the United States in public attitudes towards European involvement, within Eastern Europe, and in the U.S.S.R. where the present political and economic situation includes serious frustrations and inner contradictions. Together, these forces imply a deepening, perhaps eventually decisive, alteration in the configuration of power dominating the existing Central and Eastern European strategic and political situation.

3. The immediate future in Eastern Europe will be affected by several important destabilizing factors, likely to produce more important "surprising" changes and crises than at any time since the mid-1950's. These will require an American policy response, and in certain circumstances will be open to positive exploitation by Western policy. Yet the "standard" or "classic" scenarios for European crisis, confrontation, and change, which involve a Western military intervention into an East German or East European

uprising or "mutiny" seem, particularly since Czechoslovakia in 1968, no longer relevant, chiefly because of the changes noted above.

4. For the United States to exploit surprising events in order to bring about positive and constructive change there must be American policy goals for Eastern and Central Europe which are themselves positive, politically responsible, and potentially attainable. To what end are surprises to be exploited? Without a clear understanding of positive goals throughout the American agencies involved in these matters, their response to crisis inevitably will continue to be conservative, defensive, status-quo-reclaiming, and in fact open to exploitation by the other side. This is even more true of NATO, as an agency of several governments.

5. This problem will be posed in fundamental terms within the next few months since a European Security Conference seems likely to come about in the foreseeable future. Two general types of European settlements, expressing two divergent views of the appropriate goals of Western policy, are imaginable. The one more likely to come about is also the one which appears to be the more consistent with present Soviet policy, confirming and regularizing the existing situation in Eastern Europe, and notably the dominating Soviet role and presence in Eastern Europe. Such a settlement also is consistent with certain apparent Western and American tendencies towards a defensive, conservative, status-quo-preserving definition of interests. The second type of settlement would alter the situation toward what we describe as "normalization," acknowledging the national autonomy of all the European states, removing all foreign troops in circumstances assuring the security of Europe, and substituting political for military constraints generally.

6. While a negotiable agreement, potentially consistent with the valid security interests of the Soviet Union and the long-term stability of Central and Eastern Europe, the terms of a "normalization" settlement are likely to be resisted by the Soviet Union as a challenge to its established policies and immediate perceptions of interest. Thus a settlement on these terms would be likely to come about only under positive Western pressures, in which the exploitation of surprises and of independently-arising crises in the region would be an important factor.

Note: the fold-out chart pages in this report elaborate, illuminate, or provide examples for the argument made in the text, or take account of factors and concerns outside the main discussion but bearing upon it.

ISSUES OF SURPRISE EXPLOITATION IN U.S. SECURITY POLICY FOR CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE

I. TWO CLASSES OF DIPLOMATIC AND STRATEGIC SURPRISE

SURPRISES

A DIPLOMATIC OR STRATEGIC SURPRISE TYPICALLY IS NOT WHOLLY UNEXPECTED, BUT IS A CRISIS THAT ARISES FROM A TURN OF EVENTS OR A POLITICAL OR MILITARY CHOICE MADE BY ONE SIDE WHICH THE OTHER SIDE KNEW TO BE POSSIBLE BUT FOR REASONS OF BIAS, INADEQUATE ANALYSIS, OR "TRAINED INCAPACITY" DID NOT BELIEVE THE LIKELY CHOICE. EXAMPLES: THAT REVOLUTIONARY ACTION WOULD ARISE OUT OF THE EAST EUROPEAN POPULAR DISCONTENT'S OF THE MID-1950'S "THAW"; THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD INVADE CZECHOSLOVAKIA DESPITE THE EAST-WEST DETENTE; THAT CHINA WOULD ENTER THE KOREAN WAR DESPITE U.S. STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY, ETC.

THERE ALSO ARE GENUINE SURPRISES, POLITICAL OR MILITARY EVENTS WHICH ARISE FROM THE ACTS OF INDIVIDUALS (COUPS D'ETAT, ASSASSINATIONS, ETC.), OR POPULAR UPHEAVALS WHICH EVEN IN RETROSPECT APPEAR THE RESULT OF WHOLLY UNPREDICTABLE COMBINATIONS OF FORCES (PARIS 1968).

The problems of diplomatic and strategic "surprise" more often than not arise from no true surprise but from factors of doctrinal lag and trained incapacity. The events which occur, the decisions which are taken, cannot properly be considered totally unexpected. Rather, they fall into the category of conceivable or predictable events which at the same time, for one or another seemingly good reason, simply were thought improbable by analysts and policy-makers. China's intervention in the Korean War, the East German, Hungarian and Polish upheavals of the 1950's, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba in 1962, the Franco-British attack at Suez in 1956, all surprised American policy-makers. In fact, none would have been described as "impossible" or inconceivable by the policy community; indeed, often they

① WHAT IS A CRISIS?

DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS

- AN IMMINENT TURNING POINT
- THREAT, WARNING, OR PROMISE
- OUTCOME INDETERMINATE
- IMMEDIATE DECISIONS REQUIRED

FREQUENT CHARACTERISTICS

- TIME PRESSURES INCREASE
- EVENTS CONVERGE
- INFORMATION DECREASES
- UNCERTAINTIES INCREASE
- CONTROL DECREASES
- DECISION-MAKERS UNDER STRESS
- DECISION AND BARGAINING RELATIONS CHANGE

② SURPRISES

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③ A MAJOR

- 1. INTELLECTUAL LEADERSHIP, CABILITY OF THE
- 2. POPULAR UNREST FAILURE OR PC CRISIS CONSEQUENCE
- 3. NATIONALIST INFLUENCE.

④ VARIOUS WAYS OF VIEWING CRISES

RELATIVELY CONCRETELY

- 1. SPECIFIC POSSIBILITIES
- 2. PROTOTYPES (SPECIFIC SCENARIOS)
- 3. ADMINISTRATION

RELATIVELY ABSTRACTLY

- 4. STRATEGY AND TACTICS
- 5. ARMS CONTROL AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
- 6. AS HISTORICAL TRANSITION POINTS

⑦ WHAT IS "CONSERVATISM"?

A TENDENCY TO PREFER:

(MEANS)

- PASSIVE TO ACTIVE BEHAVIOR
- FAMILIAR TO NOVEL METHODS
- DEFENSIVE TO OFFENSIVE TACTICS
- RETRENCHMENT TO EXPANSION OF COMMITMENTS

(ENDS)

- STATUS QUO-MAINTAINING TO INTEREST-ADVANCING GOALS
- LOSS-MINIMIZING TO GAIN MAXIMIZING OPTIONS
- UNCERTAINTY AND RISK-REDUCING TO "UTILITY"-MAXIMIZING POLICIES

⑧ THE SOVIET

- 1. ACCOMMODATION NATIONAL RELATIONS FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT ESCALATION, ETC.
- 2. SUPPRESSION: CHANGE THE SITUATION THE ESSENTIAL DISCREDITS SOVIET CRISES.
- 3. ACQUIESCENCE: HARDLY WEAKENED VIS AND ENCOM

⑥ DISTINCTIVE ASPECTS OF CRISIS BARGAINING

- 1. HEIGHTENED APPREHENSION
- 2. MOMENTS OF TRUTH
- 3. TIME PRESSURES
- 4. CHANGED INTERNAL RELATIONS
- 5. IMPROVISED SIMPLE SOLUTIONS
- 6. IMPORTANCE OF SALIENCY
- 7. IMPORTANCE OF EQUITY, PROPRIETY AND FLEXIBILITY

h:1

③ A MAJOR "SURPRISE" MAY INVOLVE:

1. IN "ELECTION/POLITICAL CRISIS OF THE SOVIET/AMERICAN LEADERSHIP, PRODUCING A CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY/CREDIBILITY OF THE RESPECTIVE SYSTEM. OR,
2. POPULAR UNREST WITH SPECIFIC CHARGES OF ECONOMIC FAILURE OR POLITICAL REPRESSION, WITH INTERNATIONAL CRISIS CONSEQUENCES. OR,
3. NATIONALIST (POPULAR OR ELITE) RESISTANCE TO FOREIGN INFLUENCE.

④ TYPICAL REACTIONS TO "SURPRISES"

1. DON'T ROCK THE BOAT.
2. CONSIDER OPTIONS IN TERMS OF CATASTROPHIC CHOICES.
3. IGNORE LONG-TERM GOALS AND INTERESTS IN THE PRESS OF SHORT-TERM URGE TO CONTAIN THE WORST CONSEQUENCES.
4. TRY TO "LOOK GOOD" BY CONTRAST WITH OPPONENT.
5. EFFORT BY GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES TO CAPITALIZE ON THE CRISIS TO PROMOTE THEIR OWN INTERESTS: "RAISE THE MILITARY BUDGET," "BUILD UP NATO," ETC.
6. WAIT FOR "NEXT TIME."

⑤ THE SOVIET/AMERICAN RESPONSE MAY INVOLVE:

1. ACCOMMODATION AND CREATIVE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS SO AS TO ISOLATE THE CRISIS, END FOREIGN INVOLVEMENTS, REDUCE THE CHANCES OF CRISIS-ESCALATION, PROMOTE LONGER-TERM STABILITY.
2. SUPPRESSION: WHICH IF SUCCESSFUL MAY (1) "PERMANENTLY" CHANGE THE SITUATION AND IMPOSE STABILITY; (2) PERPETUATE THE ESSENTIAL TERMS OF STRAIN AND CRISIS; IF UNSUCCESSFUL DISCREDITS SUPPRESSING POWER AND CONDUCTS TO FURTHER CRISES.
3. ACQUIESCENCE/APPEASEMENT/ISOLATIONISM WHICH MAY ORDINARILY WEAKEN THE GREAT POWER IN RELATION TO ITS VIS-A-VIS AND ENCOURAGE LATER CONFRONTATION CRISES.

⑥ TYPICAL FAILURES IN PREPARING FOR "SURPRISES"

1. PREOCCUPATION WITH IN-BOX/OUT-BOX.
2. FAILURE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL TO DEFINE LONG-TERM POLICY OBJECTIVES IN RESPONSIBLE, REALISTIC TERMS TO WHICH THE BUREAUCRACY COULD RESPOND IN AN EMERGENCY: HIGH-LEVEL PREOCCUPATION WITH RHETORICAL GOALS AND IMAGE-MAKING.
3. BUREAUCRATIC/PRESS COMMITMENT, WHEN THE CRISIS APPROACHES, TO THE "MOST LIKELY" COURSE OF EVENTS.
4. CONSEQUENT FAILURE TO THINK SERIOUSLY ABOUT OTHER PERFECTLY LIKELY OUTCOMES.
5. PREOCCUPATION WITH CONTAINING THE WORST OUTCOMES: FAILURE TO CONSIDER HOW TO BRING ABOUT GOOD OUTCOMES.
6. FAILURE TO THINK THROUGH LIMITED (NON-CATASTROPHE-RISKING) MEASURES TO MAKE A GOOD OUTCOME MORE LIKELY.

TYPICALLY, POLICY IS MADE DURING THE CRISIS, IN AD HOC AND DISCONTINUOUS WAYS WHICH DO NOT CONSIDER THE TRADE-OFFS AMONG VARIOUS INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES SUPPORTED BY VARIOUS BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF A CONSIDERED LONG-TERM AND POSITIVE POLICY TOWARDS THE OPPONENT.

had been anticipated or even predicted by individual analysts or journalists, but these predictions were ignored. That these events might occur was simply regarded by the majority of analysts or policy-makers as unlikely, and therefore sufficient attention was not paid to them. Serious political and strategic preparations were not made.

These failures may be condemned in retrospect; the problem is not, however, easily remedied since it expresses an inveterate tendency or underlying characteristic of government, and particularly of a big government dependent upon large staffs and bureaucratic organizations. Majority opinion tends to prevail in these agencies of government, and not unreasonably so; the minority opinion, the "brilliant" or seemingly eccentric opinion, is distrusted or regarded with caution--even though officials may also be aware that the majority view, by definition a conventional view, is very often unreliable. There is a severe problem of discrimination. To go against the conventional wisdom is to run risks, and for a political or military decision-maker these may be far more momentous than career risks.

The very existence of strongly held minority views anticipating "surprising" developments produces controversy, and a consequent hardening of the positions of those on the other side of the controversy. Thus do people make emotional and professional commitments as well as intellectual ones, and the policy apparatus they control or influence may become in some degree aligned to buttressing their positions, at a sacrifice to dispassion and the cool appraisal of contingencies. Thus issues of doctrinal lag, and of trained (or office-induced) incapacity, constitute one of the most severe problems of government (and indeed of decision-making in most

organizational fields today). There is no complete solution in strictly organizational terms. The multiplication of information inputs, the reorganization in terms of multiple options--systematically viewing a very wide range of possibilities and scenarios--while they much enhance the probability that a true judgment will come under consideration, nonetheless present in new terms the problem of discrimination. The ability of an organization to deal seriously with a wide range of possibilities in any event remains finite, and the process is fatigue-inducing. Such solution to the problem as exists, which will never be total, inevitably lies in the individual intellectual quality and practical experience of the officers and officials assigned to responsible posts.

There also are true surprises, which in the area of foreign affairs first include events arising from the acts of individuals or small groups--coups d'etats, assassinations. Typically these can be anticipated only in generalized contingency terms, at a level of abstraction which provides little support to strategic and political policy and decision-making. What does it mean if a coup d'etat takes place in Ruritania--or Russia? The analyst must reply that the answer is scenario-contingent. What is the political character of the coup; who are its makers, and are they competent or incompetent in maintaining power once they have it; who--and how many--do they kill or lock up; what is their program--real and proclaimed; how numerous and how important is the popular support they can rally? the details are everything.

There are surprises which arise from a concatenation of individually identifiable and assessable events which together produce an unforeseen result. Paris in 1968 provides the most recent example. The growth of

Maoist, anarchist, and other leftist sentiments and commitments among French university students was well-known; the justifiable anger of students at university conditions was known; the discontent of French industrial workers with existing wage levels was perfectly well-known and widely discussed; a certain popular mood among the French people of restlessness or boredom with Gaullism after a decade of strong conservative rule would have been apparent to a sensitive observer. What was not known was that these factors would come together in an incendiary movement and produce a major popular upheaval in France.

Once the "revolution" was underway it also was possible for the analyst to see that it was no revolution at all--that the interests and instincts of both workers and the middle classes remained ultimately conservative, that the students were a marginal social group articulating certain real grievances of modern urban and technological society but devoid of serious organization or an attainable political program; that in this case the "center" would, and did, hold. That the Revolution of 1968 would fail thus was predictable, and widely predicted--and one reason the outcome was predictable was the same reason the revolutionary outbreak had been unpredictable: the combination of forces and events was implausible: there was no genuine joining of interests, no profound revolutionary interest awakened, no convergence of generally powerful forces of destruction and reconstruction.

In Communist Hungary in 1956, another modern popular revolution, but in this case a real one, deeply serious forces of revolutionary opposition to the existing political system were latent in the society: nationalist opposition to Soviet control, popular resistance to a repressive police

regime, economic discontent, reaction to the domestic failures and vacillations of the insecure regimes which had emerged during the post-Stalinist "Thaw." The incendiary event was in itself unpredictable, but that a revolution was boiling up which some catalytic event easily could set loose was perfectly clear. In France in 1968 the opposite was true. The discontents of the society clearly were subordinate to the society's essential need and wish for security and order. Thus that a "revolution" would break out had to be a surprise; that it would rapidly collapse was predictable.

In 1968 analogies were made with the Paris commune of 1871, which illustrates another point of importance. While the actual proclamation of the Paris Commune as a revolutionary response to France's defeat in the Franco-Prussian War could not have been predicted, again factors of deep unrest already existed. There had been serious economic discontents during the final years of Louis Napoleon's rule, unemployment and severe social dislocations arising out of France's nascent industrialization; there was much corruption at the higher levels of politics and the economy; France's empire in Mexico had been humiliatingly ended. Yet these alone produced no revolutionary upheaval until there was added a decisive climax: France, which had been the greatest military power in Europe for nearly a century, went to war against Prussia and was routed within six weeks. The French regime--the French "establishment" of power--thereby was dramatically revealed as incompetent, even in terms of the conservative and military standards by which it had chosen to be judged. Much the same thing was true in the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1918. Serious tensions and real conflicts within the society produced revolutionary uprisings only when the leadership of the state proved itself incompetent--its armies humiliatingly

defeated in the field by enemies which had been held in contempt. In Paris in 1968 there was no such discrediting of the competence or seriousness of the regime.

We suggest, then, that of the two classes of "surprises," the problem of true surprises--wholly unpredictable or arbitrary occurrences--is perhaps less important for the policy-maker to study than those surprises which happen not because they themselves are of their nature surprising--inherently unpredictable--but because the policy-maker allows himself to be surprised. In the first case there is nothing he could have done to avoid being surprised, and contingency planning in terms of an imagined range of unpredictable events would likely have had little specific reference in the real situation. In the second case the policy-maker is surprised because he has failed to prepare himself for an event which could have been anticipated, had his analysis and judgment been better, and had the bias induced by the trained incapacities, organizational prejudices and preferences, and positive policy commitments, of his staffs been adequately discounted or compensated for.

① OUR BASIC CONTEXT: THE EUROPEAN APINA

② SOME

WESTERN EUROPE	EASTERN EUROPE	U.S.S.R.	
AFFLUENCE	AUSTERITY ENDING (MANY ECONOMIC STRESSES)	YOUTH, INTELLIGENTSIA RESTIVE (MANY PRO-WESTERN)	1. CREDIBILITY GUARANTEE
HIGH MORALE (EXCEPT FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES)	REGIMES, ELITES, "POLYCENTRIC" AFTER CZECHOSLOVAKIA ONCE AGAIN ASSERTIVE AGAINST MOSCOW	ONLY MODERATE ECONOMIC PROGRESS	2. BALANCE OF
POLITICAL STABILITY	"SOCIALIST LEGALITY" BUT A TOUGH CENSORSHIP	LIBERMANISM FAILING	3. FEASIBILITY
COMMUNIST PARTIES DWINDLING "REVISIONIST"; LEFT-WING PARTIES AND INTELLECTUALS INNOVATIVE BUT DIVIDED, UNDISCIPLINED, HOSTILE TO ORTHODOX COMMUNISM	GROWING ALIENATION AMONG YOUNG, ELITES	LIVING STANDARD LOWER THAN IN "SATELLITES"	a. NUC b. AS c. AS d. AS
NO COLONIAL INVOLVEMENTS	BUDGETARY PRESSURES ON SOVIET FORCES	"THE SYSTEM IS GOOD; THE MEN ARE BAD"	4. U.S. AS P U.S. AS "
SOVIET INVASION THREAT "FINISHED"	DWINDLING SOVIET INFLUENCE (SOVIETS PATRONIZED, "EXPLOITED")	PATHOLOGICALLY RIGID OLD GUARD; FRIGHTENED OF CHANGE	5. DOMESTIC U.S. PRIOR
MASSIVE SOVIET NUCLEAR "THREAT"		INCREASING NATIONALISM (CHAUVINISM) AS STRAINS INCREASE	6. COMPATIBILITY FURTHER P
BARELY CREDIBLE U.S. NUCLEAR GUARANTEE		YOUNG TURK WING WITHIN COMMUNIST PARTY (BUT APPARATCHIKS TOO)	7. DÉTENTE A
HIGHLY URBANIZED, INDUSTRIALIZED	URBANIZING, INDUSTRIALIZING		8. MILITARY (SECURITY)
SOPHISTICATED TECHNOLOGY	TECHNOLOGY INCREASINGLY SOPHISTICATED		9. FEASIBILITY
SOPHISTICATED ELITES	NEW ELITES (REOPENING TIES TO OLD)		10. REDEEMING a. TO b. TO
			11. AN AMERICAN

④ WHAT DO WE WANT IN EUROPE?

A LIBERATED EASTERN EUROPE?	GUARANTEED AND ENFORCEABLE WESTERN ACCESS TO BERLIN?
A LIBERALIZED COMMUNIST EASTERN EUROPE?	MORE EUROPEAN TROOPS COMMITTED TO NATO?
SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM EASTERN EUROPE?	FEWER U.S. TROOPS COMMITTED TO NATO?
ARMS LIMITATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE?	MORE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR NATO?
EAST-WEST TRADE?	LOWER OVER-ALL NATO POSTURE AND COSTS?
THE STATUS-QUO IN WESTERN AND SOUTHERN EUROPE?	FRANCE TO RESUME A MILITARY ROLE IN NATO?
A DEMOCRATIC GREECE?	STABILITY IN ITALY/SPAIN/PORTUGAL/GREECE?
A PRO-WESTERN GREECE?	CONTINUED ITALIAN/SPANISH/PORTUGUESE/GREEK MILITARY ROLE IN WESTERN DEFENSE EVEN AT THE COST OF INTERNAL INSTABILITY
A NATO OF DEMOCRATIC STATES?	DÉTENTE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN?
A NATO REDEFINED AS MILITARY ALLIANCE ONLY?	DÉTENTE IN EUROPE?
BERLIN SECURITY THROUGH POLITICAL GUARANTEES?	

60.1

② SOME ISSUES OF U.S. SECURITY POLICY
IN EUROPE

1. CREDIBILITY (AND DESIRABILITY) OF PRESENT NUCLEAR GUARANTEE
2. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
3. FEASIBILITY OF EUROPEAN SELF-DEFENSE--
 - a. NUCLEAR VS. NON-NUCLEAR
 - b. AS "UNITED" EUROPE
 - c. AS EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY
 - d. AS NON-INTEGRATED ALLIANCE OF NATION-STATES
4. U.S. AS PRIMARY GUARANTOR OF EUROPEAN SECURITY VS. U.S. AS "STRATEGIC RESERVE"
5. DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT (AND LATIN AMERICA) AS U.S. PRIORITY CONCERNS
6. COMPATIBILITY OF INTEGRATED ALLIANCE SYSTEMS WITH FURTHER PROGRESS WITH DETENTE
7. DETENTE AND RAPPROCHEMENT AS A GAIN--FOR WHOM?
8. MILITARY VS. DIPLOMATIC GUARANTEES OF SECURITY (SECURITY CONFERENCE)
9. FEASIBILITY (AND DESIRABILITY) OF UNITED EUROPE
10. REDEEMING PLEDGES--
 - a. TO GERMANY
 - b. TO EASTERN EUROPE
11. AN AMERICAN PRESENCE--HOW MUCH AND HOW LONG?

③ THE QUESTION OF CONFLICTING U.S. PURPOSES IN EUROPE

TO STRENGTHEN NATO (BEFORE TO DETER SOVIET ATTACK, PRESUMES, THERE IS, BUT PERPETUATING THE DIVISION OF EUROPE IN THE SHORT TERM AND PROBABLY ALSO THE LONGER TERM)

TO PRESERVE NATO (AS AGAINST DIVISIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, EUROPEAN NATIONALISM, AMERICAN "NEO-ISOLATIONISM," THE DOLLAR CRISIS, ETC.)

TO ACHIEVE "NORMALIZATION" IN EUROPE (THE SUBSTITUTION OF POLITICAL FOR MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS, ALLOWING U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWALS PECTICALLY WITH RUSSIAN, IMPROVING THE STATUS OF THE EAST EUROPEAN PEOPLES, LEAVING WESTERN EUROPE TO PROVIDE MUCH [MOST?] OF ITS OWN SECURITY).

TO MAINTAIN THE INTERNAL AS WELL AS EXTERNAL SECURITY AND STABILITY OF WESTERN EUROPE (BY DEFENDING WEST GERMANY, PROVIDING EUROPEAN NUCLEAR GUARANTEE, MAINTAINING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INFLUENCES UPON THE COURSE OF WEST EUROPEAN DOMESTIC POLITICS).

TO UNIFY THE WEST (ATLANTIC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS FOR THEIR OWN SAKE).

TO REDUCE AMERICAN COMMITMENTS (STRATEGIC COMMITMENTS/VULNERABILITIES, FORCE DEPLOYMENTS, OVERSEAS EXPENDITURES) AT LOWEST POSSIBLE COSTS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY AND STABILITY.

⑤ NEW ORGANS OF EUROPEAN UNITY

- 1/ A "DECISION CENTER" RESPONSIBLE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY AMONG THE SIX, ASSUMING MANY POWERS NOW NATIONALLY HELD, WITH A CORRESPONDING INCREASE IN PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL THROUGH A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (IMPLYING A SUITABLE FORM OF EUROPEAN ELECTION)--PROPOSED FOR CREATION BEFORE 1980, WITH STAGES PLANNED TO BEGIN IN JANUARY 1971.
- 2/ A SYSTEM LINKING THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANKS WITH POWER TO DECIDE INTERNAL MONETARY POLICY WITHIN THE MEMBER STATES AND EXTERNALLY TO CONTROL COMMON EUROPEAN MONETARY RESERVES--AND A COMMON CURRENCY.

PROPOSED TO THE EEC COUNCIL BY THE WERNER COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS (BRUSSELS, OCTOBER 1970).

6a.2

2. "SURPRISES" IN THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF EUROPE TODAY

A. Introduction

The threat of "surprise" in Europe today arises from several existing tendencies. Neither Czechoslovakia's "October Events" in 1968 nor France's "Spring" that same year arose out of any political vacuum. There were surprises in the particular qualities of those crises, in the scale and timing of these events, yet the underlying conditions provided a sufficient explanation for what in fact happened. These conditions, if they have been seriously and sympathetically analyzed, would have made the limits of these crises, and the opportunities which existed as they developed, apparent to policy-makers. Given the intellectual, economic, and political tensions in Eastern Europe in the 1960's, that a Czechoslovak liberalization movement would cause a crisis to emerge in Czechoslovak-Soviet relations can hardly be considered a surprising matter. Given the tensions within the Soviet Union, the established political and security interests and perceptions of the U.S.S.R., the character of the present party and governmental leadership, and the traditional recourse of the Soviet government to force in defending its interests, an invasion of Czechoslovakia was highly likely. That the invasion came as a surprise to many Western analysts and observers can only be explained as a consequence of their intellectual commitment to what they wanted to see happen, to their commitment to a model of Soviet behavior consistent with the goals of established American policy, which preferred to see a "liberalized" Soviet government practicing a foreign policy able to rank Czechoslovak ideological conformity as less important than "detente behavior" and risk-avoidance in Soviet international conduct.

An examination of the possibilities for crisis and "surprise" in Europe today, as preface to a discussion of how surprise can be exploited, then must begin with the attempt to make a reasonable appraisal of several changed factors in the American relationship to Europe, in the West European relationship to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and within the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union.

It is possible to see in this European situation today a convergence of two major forces. The first, in the West, results in declining Western political, economic, and military unity, and a--thus far--slow retrenchment of the American military and political commitment to European matters. One inevitable element in this, then, is a declining Western ability--to say nothing of willingness--to act positively and in unison to affect Eastern European and Balkan political and strategic developments. This is a crucial point to which we will return later in this report.

The second force exists within the Eastern bloc, made up of a complex of nationalism, tendencies of political liberalization, and problems of political and economic development deeply influenced by the brilliance of West European economic and political progress, underscored by the pervasive sense of an "end" to the old Cold War--and to the old terms of American involvement in Europe. In Eastern Europe, then, the force of change is disruptive, unsettling. The Eastern bloc, where a stasis of sorts, a political accommodation, was achieved or imposed by the Soviet Union and the East European ruling Communist parties--achieved at considerable cost--between the period of the post-Stalinist "thaw" and the present, shows clear signs of disintegration. The next ten years is likely to be a period of crisis and turbulence in Eastern Europe.

B. Neo-Isolationism, and Political and Strategic Multipolarity

As of 1971, the American relationship with Western Europe has reached an important turning point. Strategic scenarios concerned with Europe have for a quarter of a century been able confidently to assume an underlying stability of the American-West European context. The Western relationship with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union also existed on terms essentially established in the years between 1944 and 1949. In the years since then, the changes in this context have been evolutionary, faithfully expressing a constancy in the political, economic, and strategic interests of all parties. Perhaps of more practical importance for policy is that during this same period there has also been a constancy in how the Western publics viewed their security interests--in the national moods, the framework of national public opinions, which lay behind the actions of governments.

Now a definite, perhaps even a precipitous, decline is underway both in the matter of Western unity and bipolarity of world politics. The world authority recently exercised in explicit and implicit ways by the Soviet Union and the United States seems on its way to being greatly reduced. In both the United States and the U.S.S.R., the "neo-isolationist" trends evident since the mid-1960's are growing stronger. In the long term, American "neo-isolationism" may prove a transitory phenomenon, in part deriving from the popular political perceptions, moods, and internal conditions, of the nation today, and by the end of the decade it is possible that an apogee will have been reached; but this is by no means certain. At best a new "internationalism" may emerge; at worst, an interventionist or aggressively assertive mood reappear here--or in the Soviet Union (as we will

discuss below). But we believe that during the next few years that complex of political attitudes which are conveniently summed up in the term "neo-isolationism" will be dominant in the policies and perceptions of not only the United States but of both the present-day superpowers.

THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL PREOCCUPATIONS

<u>UNITED STATES</u>		
<u>1949</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1971</u>
DEFENSE OF EUROPE AGAINST SOVIET CONQUEST.	AVOIDING EUROPEAN INCIDENT LEADING TO STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR.	WEST EUROPEAN FISCAL CONCESSIONS, FISCAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT DURING A PERIOD OF U.S. DOMESTIC AND ECONOMIC CRISES AND ASIAN PREOCCUPATIONS.
RESTORATION OF EUROPEAN INTERNAL POLITICAL STABILITY (INCLUDING CONTROL OF DOMESTIC COMMUNIST PARTIES).	MAINTENANCE OF EUROPEAN INTERNAL POLITICAL STABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE.	STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WITH THE U.S.S.R.
REPAIR OF EUROPE'S ECONOMY.	STRENGTHENING U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION (ARMS CONTROL, ETC.).	REDUCTION OF U.S. FISCAL AND MILITARY OUTLAYS BY MEANS OF (1) DETENTE WITH U.S.S.R., (2) INCREASED EUROPEAN ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY.
EXPULSION OF SOVIETS FROM E. GERMANY, AUSTRIA, SATELLITES.	MAINTAINING INFLUENCE FOR EVENTUAL "SETTLEMENT."	MINIMIZING U.S.-SOVIET CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.
MILITARY BASES	DEFENSE AGAINST SOVIET CONQUEST OF EUROPE.	MAINTAINING INFLUENCE FOR EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT, AMBIVALENCE OVER GERMAN TREATY.
	BALANCE OF PAYMENTS.	DEFENSE AGAINST SOVIET CONQUEST.

THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL PREOCCUPATIONS (CONT'D)SOVIET UNION

<u>1949</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1971</u>
RESTORATION OF SOVIET ECONOMY (REPARATIONS LOOTING).	AVOIDING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR WITH U.S.	AVOIDING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR WITH U.S.
AVOIDING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR WITH THE U.S.	MAINTENANCE OF INFLUENCE PRESTIGE IN "SATELLITES."	MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY, INFLUENCE, PRESTIGE, ULTIMATE CONTROL, IN THE "SATELLITES."
INCORPORATION OF SATELLITES.	AVOIDING VIOLENT ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS QUO IN E. EUROPE.	CULTIVATION OF RELATIONS WITH GERMANY, FRANCE, U.K. TO PREVENT EMERGENCE OF A GERMAN THREAT, REDUCE EAST EUROPEAN PRESSURES AND DETACH WESTERN EUROPE FROM U.S.
SECURITY AGAINST RESURGENT GERMANY.	STRENGTHENING U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION (ARMS CONTROL, ETC.).	STRENGTHEN U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION ON ARMS CONTROL, ETC.
INCORPORATION OF WESTERN EUROPE.	SECURITY AGAINST RESURGENT GERMANY.	

WEST GERMANY

<u>1949</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1971</u>
RESTORATION OF ECONOMY.	MAINTENANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER.	MAINTAINING U.S. SUPPORT.
RESTORATION OF RESPECTABILITY.	RECONCILIATION WITH NEIGHBORS.	NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH U.S.S.R., EASTERN EUROPE, AS FORM OF REINSURANCE AGAINST DECLINING U.S. SUPPORT.
INTERNAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER.	DEFENSE AGAINST SOVIET CONQUEST.	DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL AS WELL AS ECONOMIC UNITY.
DEFENSE AGAINST SOVIET CONQUEST.	REUNIFICATION.	DEFENSE AGAINST SOVIET CONQUEST.
REUNIFICATION.	RESTORATION OF RANK AND PRESTIGE.	MAINTENANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER.
RESTORATION OF FRONTIERS.	ASSURANCE OF FAVORABLE MARKETS.	ASSURANCE OF FAVORABLE MARKETS.
	RECTIFICATION OF FRONTIERS.	REUNIFICATION.

THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL PREOCCUPATIONS (CONT'D)

<u>U.K.</u>		
<u>1949</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1971</u>
RESTORATION OF ECONOMY.	GROWTH (AND STABILITY) OF ECONOMY.	GROWTH AND STABILITY OF ECONOMY TECHNOLOGICAL POSITION IN WORLD
DEFENSE AGAINST SOVIET CONQUEST.	MAINTENANCE OF U.S. SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP.	ASSURANCE OF FAVORABLE MARKETS.
	ASSURANCE OF FAVORABLE MARKETS.	CHOICE BETWEEN ENTRY INTO EUROPE/MAINTENANCE OF U.S. SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP.
	SECURITY AGAINST SOVIET CONQUEST.	SECURITY AGAINST ECONOMIC, POLITICAL RESURGENCE OF EUROPE(?).
SECURITY AGAINST RESURGENT GERMANY (?).	SECURITY AGAINST RESURGENT GERMANY (?).	SECURITY AGAINST SOVIET THREAT.

<u>FRANCE</u>		
<u>1949</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1971</u>
REPAIR OF ECONOMY.	RESTORATION OF NATIONAL MORALE.	GROWTH OF ECONOMY AND TECHNOLOGY
DEFENSE AGAINST SOVIET CONQUEST.	INTERNAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER.	INTERNAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER.
DEFENSE AGAINST INTERNAL COMMUNIST PARTY.	DEFENSE AGAINST SOVIET CONQUEST.	NORMALIZATION IN EUROPE AS A MEANS TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SECURITY.
INTERNAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER.	REASSERTION OF TRADITIONAL INFLUENCE.	ASSURANCE OF FAVORABLE MARKETS.
SECURITY AGAINST RESURGENT GERMANY.	ASSURANCE OF FAVORABLE MARKETS.	REASSERTION OF TRADITIONAL INFLUENCE.
	SECURITY AGAINST RESURGENT GERMANY(?).	SECURITY "ON ALL AZIMUTHS."

At the present moment, economic issues have suddenly come to dominate the American relationship with Europe. The dollar and balance of payments problems, which involve the question of whether the West Europeans bear their fair share of the "burdens" of free world defense, now have brought about a kind of climax in the relationship of the United States to Europe. A good many repressed issues, and buried resentments, have come to the surface--at least in the American political and popular response to Mr. Nixon's defense of the dollar. The Europeans, taken aback by the abrupt style of the new American economic actions, are expressing even greater concern over the substance of what those actions may imply for the future. The question is whether the American return to protectionism might prove to possess a domestic appeal--a political momentum--which will last a good deal longer than ninety days. The fear of trade conflict, the possibility of European reprisals against the American tariff surcharge and a rise of economic nationalism in Europe, the possibility of a breakdown of the trade liberalism and currency stability of the past quarter century, all are quite real.

The international fiscal crisis, the tension it has created between the United States and Western Europe, together with American domestic and Congressional pressures for troop withdrawals from Europe, inevitably raise a newly serious question about the future of the American military commitment in Europe. The prospect that an American troop withdrawal can take place slowly and on creative political terms, enhancing the stability of all Europe, has been distinctly worsened. Senator Mansfield's persistent efforts to obtain a massive cut in the American troop strength in Europe merely symptomize a situation which over the past decade has been allowed

to develop. In the absence of political settlement in Europe and of a shifting of military burdens to the Europeans, a drastic domestic challenge to established American policy became all but inevitable.*

This problem of neo-isolationism--a phenomenon which has an obvious, even symbiotic, relationship with the decline of bipolarity in world politics--has roots in more important and tangible factors than the psychology of peoples in a given point in time. The assertive policies of Russia and America over the past two decades arose from their world primacy in military and industrial power, as well as from their political and ideological confrontation. The second World War had disastrously reduced the power of the old European great powers, drawing into a central European confrontation the two traditionally isolationist extra-European powers, Russia and the United States. Both also were in a stage of great economic, technological, industrial, and population expansion. But the growth of Russia and America clearly has finite limits. GNP measures only a few of the complex forces at work in such a period in a nation, but nonetheless provides a significant index of national effort and accomplishment, and the rate of GNP growth for both Russia and America has fallen off sharply since the mid-'60's. At the

*According to the Harris Public Opinion poll published August 23rd, 1971, better than a 2 to 1 sentiment exists in the United States that "in the future we should let other countries defend themselves." Asked specifically whether the United States should risk going to war if the Russians invaded and occupied Yugoslavia, 11 percent said yes, 66 percent no, with 23 percent uncertain. Asked the same question about a Russian conquest of Berlin and invasion of Western Europe, 47 percent said yes, 31 percent no, 22 percent uncertain. This present American popular mood of neo-isolationism is, of course, far more complex, changeable, and contingent upon time, circumstances, and specific cases, than figures such as this might suggest, but particularly with respect to Western Europe these poll results indicate an important change in the American popular mood which the Mansfield initiative, and other Congressional attempts to restrict or reduce American overseas engagements, reflect.

same time a certain emotional and ideological urgency has drained from their political and military confrontation--detente has set in. Their foreign policies in general have encountered checks and frustrations which cast doubt upon the established assumptions of policy. Russia's inability to maintain a unified Communist bloc, China and the European new Left's hatred of Russia as an allegedly reactionary and counterrevolutionary power, Russia's failure to gain real influence in the Third World, the persistent revisionism and nationalism of Eastern Europe, have driven the Soviet Union into a form of ideological isolation and into conventional and conservative "great power" policies. America's Vietnam experience has decisively undermined the national enthusiasm which underwrote, over the last two decades, America's global involvement and assumption of the role of "leader of the free world."

The reduction of Europe and Japan in 1945 at the same time misled many of the forecasts of the future made at that time. These states were so damaged in their physical and industrial plants, so demoralized by the moral effort and consequences of the war, that it was easy to regard them as permanently reduced to the roles of second or third ranking states. The future seemed to lie with those states which believed in themselves and their missions, "young" states (as America, and post-revolutionary Communist Russia seemed to be). The future seemed to favor vast, socially conglomerate, resource-rich, continental societies, of the Russian and American kind. Both Russia and America contrasted strongly with the old style European nation, socially and racially homogenous, limited in size and resources. Russia and America were on a continental scale, already "imperial" in that they embodied a great number of nationalities and even races, still possessing great undeveloped areas.

But now internal divisions are making themselves felt within these continental "superstates." Their diverse nationalities and social elements often seem sources of actual or potential weakness rather than of strength. The nationalities of European and Eurasian Russia once again present troubling problems to a governing elite overwhelmingly Great Russian in origin, to a Russian national culture based almost entirely upon the experience of European Russia, and to a national political ideology derived from the intellectual movements of Western Europe in the 19th Century. Important elites within the technocratic and industrial establishments of the U.S.S.R. question the contemporary practice, even the values, of Leninism. The United States at the same time is undergoing racial antagonisms, "nationalist claims made by elements within its racial minorities, and also a new and serious level of ethnic consciousness within the white working and lower middle sectors of the population. These tensions seem actually to express class hostilities as well as social and generational stresses of an unexpected intensity. The national "consensus" has, for the present at least, been decisively weakened in America. It is not clear that this may not remain a problem long after the Vietnamese War and its direct consequences are ended. Among its intellectual and professional elites, America finds a vanguard in reaction against technology, technocracy, science, the applied rationalism which animates modern society--and this too may persist into the late 1970's and 1980's. Its sources are deeper than a mere reaction against the style of technological war the United States has conducted in Vietnam, or against the threat of nuclear war or the existence of "irrational nuclear armories.

In Western Europe, on the other hand, ethnic homogeneity exists, and thanks in considerable part to industrial affluence, there increasingly has come to be a social homogeneity able to overcome the worst of the old European class divisions. Despite the unmistakable internal problems and stresses of the West European nations, it seems clear that in important respects they are in a much more confident and hopeful mood today than either the United States or the Soviet Union. Popular prosperity--the consumer society--is still emerging in Europe, capturing the ambitions and changing the lives of the working masses of citizens. With the opportunity to learn from the American experience, and with the discipline of a traditional culture, the consumer society in Europe may be able to avoid some of the vulgarities and contradictions which have characterized it in the United States. Freer, perhaps, from ideological preconceptions than either Russia or America today, the Europeans possess sophisticated economic planning agencies and could prove exceedingly adroit in their technocratic and managerial adaptations to change.

This much optimism about the emerging importance--and by implication, the political and strategic role--of Western Europe remains, of course, to be justified by events. There are severe political stresses in Europe, and some European governments, notably the Italian, are obsolescent in organization and function, and the systems of political representation and party function are seriously defective. Nonetheless, there is a clear contrast between present day Europe--technologically competent, open to change and adaptation, possessing strong traditions of political and economic innovation and skill, reasonably confident of the future--and the present condition of the superpowers. They give signs of disorientation, of having reached

plateaus of national accomplishment; they seem to be in some uncertainty about national direction, suffering some loss of moral and social coherence and confidence.

The political implications of common market developments must also be taken into account, since events of recent weeks have made it much more likely than before that the Six will become Ten. If Britain joins the market it seems very probable that Western Europe as a community will, within the decade of the 1970's, possess a credible nuclear deterrent force and a common currency, and that degree of political integration necessary to make both work--which implies a far more closely united Europe than before seemed entirely likely. Inevitable, then, will be a common European policy towards the external world on at least those--crucial--matters that derive from Europe's economic union. There will be a common European security policy, with that term understood in a sense which goes much beyond military security--or is even in some sense not primarily concerned with military issues and threat at all.

This new Europe will have to respond to the forces of superpower disorientation and relative decline. At its simplest, this means "Europe" becoming a "great power"--and for all practical political (and if it so chooses, military) purposes, the effective equal of Russia and America. The economic and cultural achievement of Western Europe will continue to radiate into Eastern Europe, continually unsettling the situation there.

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- UPPER THREAT OF THESE, A FIGHT WITH FOUR
DICTATOR RESULTING IN CIVIL STRUGGLE OR CIVIL WAR, OR
RIGHTIST REGIME ON THE GREEN WHITE, ALLIANCE, FROM
AND OPPOSED BY THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMON MARKET,
WITH ITALY TECHNICALLY EXCLUDED OR PENALIZED BY THE
LUMPING MASS!

LEFT-WING, ANTI-AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IN SUCCESSION
TO FRANCO, OR

CIVIL STRUGGLE WITH THE ARMY SEEKING AMERICAN
SUPPORT OR INTERVENTION.

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- INTERVIEWING ASSISTANT: [REDACTED] JCA, LOS ANGELES
OUTSIDE THEFT CONTROL, LOS ANGELES (AUGUST 1962)
TO FACTOR IN THE TOTAL STRATEGIES OF THE CUY AND
AND/OR GREECE INTERVIEW

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18.13.2

For the following pages

1 FIVE MEANS FOR POSTULATING CRISES

- A. THE PAST REVIVED
- B. EXTRAPOLATIONS FROM PRESENT TRENDS OR LIKELY EVENTS; "CLASSICAL" POLITICAL ANALYSIS AND FORECASTING
- C. A-HISTORICAL EVENTS (ACCIDENTS, COINCIDENCE, IMPLAUSIBLE EVENTS OR REACTIONS, ETC.)
- D. USE OF FICTIONAL ANALOGUES
- E. OTHER RADICAL TRANSFORMATION OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

2 WEST EUROPEAN CRISIS ISSUES:

LEFT WING IN MEDITERRANEAN OR IBERIAN REGIME OFFERING THE U.S.S.R. NAVAL BASES TO OFFSET THREAT OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION.

NEW EUROPEAN LEFTIST "MODEL" EMERGING FROM CRISES OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL OR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC/FISCAL SYSTEMS: A SUCCESSFUL "CASTRO" OR "ALLIENDE" OR "SOCIALISM WITH A HUMAN FACE" IN THE WEST.

NEW EUROPEAN RIGHTIST "MODEL"--A TECHNOCRATIC, OR OPUS DEI, OR CORPORATIST STATE, AUTHORITARIAN AND EFFICIENT, AN INFLUENCE UPON OTHERS IN A TIME OF ECONOMIC/FISCAL CRISIS OR A NEW DEPRESSION.

ILL-CONSIDERED, ADVENTURIST, OR STATUS-RECLAIMING SOVIET POLITICAL INTERVENTIONS IN WESTERN OR SOUTHERN EUROPE IN A SITUATION OF NATIONAL CRISIS IN THE WEST OR OF INTERNATIONAL SLUMP OR DEPRESSION.

THE HONECKER REGIME UNDER HIS SUCCESSOR, A WEST GERMANY IT POLICY. THE EFFECTS OF THE OTHER (LISHED SOVIET) SECURITIZATION IS POSED. COUP D'ETAT IS ATTEMPTED BY THE EAST

OR, UNDER HONECKER ORTHODOX REGIME, FROM LIBERALIZING WHO NEED MODERATION CARE FOR EAST GERMANY. THE EAST GERMANS I TIONS OF WEST BERLIN TO RESTORE DISCIPLINE

OR, UNDER A CONTINUING BLOC, THERE

3 SUDDEN, RADICAL BUT NOT WILDLY IMPLAUSIBLE (I.E., "A-HISTORICAL") TRANSFORMATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1. REVOLUTION OVERTHROWS THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S.S.R.:

- A. POPULAR REVOLT (DEMOCRATIC)
- B. POPULAR REVOLT (FOLLOWED BY NEW AUTHORITARIANISM)
- C. MILITARY COUP (FOLLOWED BY RENEWED AGGRESSIVENESS)
- D. REVOLT, FOLLOWED BY DISINTEGRATION OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, BREAKDOWN OF USSR INTO REGIONAL COMPONENTS (UKRAINE, BYELOUSSIA, KAZAKHISTAN, ETC.)
- E. REVOLT (AS IN D ABOVE) FOLLOWED BY RENEWED CLAIMS BY GERMANY (KOENIGSBERG), POLAND, (LVIV, WESTERN UKRAINE), ROMANIA (BESSARABIA), ETC.

2. REVOLUTION OVERTHROWS PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF MAINLAND CHINA:

- A. A PRO-WESTERN (CHIANG'S SUCCESSORS?) GOVERNMENT TAKES OVER
- B. CHINA DISINTEGRATES INTO "MARXIST" WARLORD STATES
- C. U.S.S.R. INVADES, SETS UP PRO-MOSCOW GOVERNMENT
- D. U.S.S.R. INVADES, BOGS DOWN IN ENDLESS GUERRILLA WAR
- E. CHINA DISINTEGRATES AND U.S.S.R. AND JAPAN PARTITION MAINLAND

3. U.S.S.R. MAKES QUALITATIVE JUMP IN WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY (HIGHLY RELIABLE ABM, NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS, ETC.) AND LEVIES BLACKMAIL ON U.S. AND WESTERN EUROPE.

4. U.S.S.R. MAKES QUALITATIVE JUMP IN WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY (AS ABOVE) AND STARTS WORLD WAR III (NUCLEAR)

6 ITALY

DOMESTIC LEFT-RIGHT PRESSURES AND POLITICAL SHIFTS WHICH PRODUCE--

A LEFT-WING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT WHICH WITHDRAWS FROM NATO AS THE PRICE FOR COMMUNIST COOPERATION; OR

A DEMOCRATIC LEFT-COMMUNIST COALITION GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL REFORM WHICH WITHDRAWS FROM NATO; OR

A COMMUNIST-DOMINATED COALITION GOVERNMENT PROCLAIMING NEUTRALISM; OR

UNDER THREAT OF ANY OF THESE, A RIGHT-WING COUP D'ETAT RESULTING IN: CIVIL STRUGGLE OR CIVIL WAR, OR

RIGHTIST REGIME ON THE GREEK MODEL, ALIENATED FROM AND OPPOSED BY THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMON MARKET, WITH ITALY ECONOMICALLY EXCLUDED OR PENALIZED BY THE COMMON MARKET.

9 SPAIN

LEFT-WING, ANTI-AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IN SUCCESSION TO FRANCO; OR

CIVIL STRUGGLE WITH THE ARMY SEEKING AMERICAN SUPPORT OR INTERVENTION.

STRONG MODERNIZING PRODUCE A CZECH-SLOVAK BY AN INTENSELY NATIONAL ANTI-RUSSIAN POPULIST THE PROSPECT OF A EASY SOVIET VICTORY

REVOLUTION, PRODUCE

PRO-SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN WHICH THE PRO-SOVIET

LEFT-WING OR OPPOSITION TO NATO THIS IS THE MOST

CIVIL WAR IN INTERVENTION IN THE

③ EAST GERMANY

THE HOPES FOR THE PROSPECT OF INTERLUDE, EAST GERMANY UNDER HIS SOVEREIGNTY, IN A COUNCIL OF WESTERN STEEL LIBERAL DIRECTION AND TOWARD CLOSER RELATIONS WITH A WEST GERMANY ITSELF NOW INDEPENDENT IN THE POLICY AND POLICY. THE EFFECT IS SEEN ONLY TO DEFEAT THE STABILITY OF THE OTHER EAST BLOC AND TO REINFORCE THE EAST GERMANY SOVIET ALLIANCE. THE PROSPECT OF INTERLUDE IN POLAND, PERHAPS A CLEVELAND INTERVENTION OR COUP D'ETAT IS ATTEMPTED BY SOVIET AGENTS AND ANGLY RESISTED BY THE EAST GERMANY GOVERNMENT.

OR, UNDER HOPES, EAST GERMANY MOUNTS A RIGID AND ORTHODOX REGIME, FINDING ITSELF INDEPENDENTLY ISOLATED FROM LIBERALIZING LEADERS IN THE OTHER EAST BLOC STATES WHO NEED MODERNIZATION AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND HAVE LITTLE CARE FOR EAST GERMANY'S PARTICULAR PROBLEMS. AN EAST GERMAN-SOVIET AXIS SPANS A LIBERALIZING EAST GERMANY AND THE EAST GERMANS INITIATE UNPRECEDENTEDLY SEVERE PROVOCATIONS OF WEST BERLIN AND WEST GERMANY TO FORCE THE SOVIETS TO RESTORE DISCIPLINE IN THE BLOC.

OR, UNDER A CONTINUED RIGID REGIME ISOLATED FROM A LIBERALIZING BLOC, THERE IS A POPULAR REVOLT IN EAST GERMANY.

④ YUGOSLAVIA

INTERNAL STRUGGLES ARISING FROM HISTORICAL FACTIONS, BUT ALSO FROM INTERNAL CLASS INTERESTS CAUSE THE REGIME TO FAULT. INTERNAL STRUGGLES BREAK OUT AND YUGOSLAVIA AND/OR GREECE INTERVENE.

OR, A SERIOUS CONFLICT WITH REGIONAL STATES, CROATIA, SERBIA, AND/OR BULGARIA, BREAKS OUT OR IS CAUSED AND POLITICAL INTERESTS CAUSE THE INTERVENTION QUESTION IN EVEN STRONGER TERMS. IN CERTAIN REGIONS THERE IS A FRANK DEMAND FOR SOCIALIST POLITICAL NORMS AND A DEMAND FOR WEST EUROPEAN STANDARDS AND INSTITUTIONS.

OR, IN CONDITIONS OF CENTRAL AUTHORITY BREAKDOWN AND REGIONAL CONFLICT, BULGARIA AND/OR GREECE INTERVENE IN MACEDONIA.

⑦ POLAND

STRONG MODERNIZING/LIBERALIZING IN CONJUNCTION PRESSURE PRODUCE A CZECHOSLOVAK LIBERAL REGIME, IN THIS CASE BLOCKED BY AN INTENSELY NATIONALIST, COMBUSTIVE, AND HISTORICALLY ANTI RUSSIAN POPULATION. ANY SOVIET INTERVENTION FACES THE PROSPECT OF A PROTRACTED WAR IN WHICH THERE ARE NO EASY SOVIET VICTORIES.

⑧ ALBANIA

INTERNAL STRUGGLES ARISING FROM HISTORICAL FACTIONS, BUT ALSO FROM INTERNAL CLASS INTERESTS CAUSE THE REGIME TO FAULT. INTERNAL STRUGGLES BREAK OUT AND YUGOSLAVIA AND/OR GREECE INTERVENE.

⑩ GREECE

REVOLUTIONARY PROSPECTS.

PRO-SOVIET GOVERNMENT, IN STRUGGLE IN WHICH THE PRO-SOVIET FACTION IS MORE POWERFUL, OR

LEFT WING OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WHICH MAKES OPPOSITION TO NATO A CHIEF THING, OR STRUGGLE IN WHICH THIS IS THE MOST POWERFUL FACTION, OR

CIVIL WAR IN WHICH THE GENERALS DEMAND U.S. INTERVENTION IN THEIR SUPPORT.

⑪ CHINA

CHINESE REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP AND PRESSURES ON SOVIET FAR EASTERN FRONTIERS, DRIVEN BY NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, IN CREATING THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, WHILE ANY OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTIONARY FACTIONS.

OR, CONFLICT IN FAR EAST, IN WHICH A DRAW-OUT OF CHINESE STRUGGLE SEVERELY INTERFERES WITH SOVIET POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FABRIC (AMERICAN REACTION).

OR, THERE IS NO WAR ACTION IN WHICH SOVIET CENTRAL AUTHORITY IS DAMAGED AND REGIME FALLS OR COLLAPSES.

C. The Soviet Union*

What is more and more evident in the Soviet Union is a general loss of vitality in all but the military sector. The political and economic future (compared to the Western world, and especially Japan) no longer seems an exhilarating prospect. There is the distinct possibility that the U.S.S.R., while retaining formidable military power, will become more and more a technological backwater, stagnant intellectually and ruled without particular competence by a self-perpetuating but increasingly superfluous Communist Party elite.

A curious feature of the Communist scene begins to be noticeable: Communism is by origin a European philosophy, but in Western Europe and the U.S.S.R. it is beginning to lose its grip on the intellectual imagination. Communism as a dynamic force remains only in Asia--and there it largely derives its power from nationalism and xenophobia and a rather magical belief among alienated elites that it will bring them a capacity for saving order, and social unity rather than from the "class conflict" as such.

Asian Communism as a system therefore sometimes seems nearly as repugnant to the Soviets as to the West. Nor are the new-Left revolutionary movements of Afro-Asia and Latin America more congenial in spirit. Despite a lingering Soviet hope that revolutionary disorders in the Third World will sooner or later lead to a Soviet-oriented ideology and politics, the Soviet leaders no longer back such movements uncritically, as once they did in Cuba, the Congo and Indonesia. Even in the Middle-East, coldly considered, the Soviet "victory" is, to impair Western influence (at great financial cost) without gaining truly reliable allies. In Cairo, Baghdad, and

*This section is based upon a paper by Edmund Stillman.

Damascus, the local Communist Parties remain outlawed, despite the fact that Egypt, Iraq, and Syria totally depend on Soviet military aid.

Thus, for the U.S.S.R., the Chinese frontier areas pose a long-term threat, the fundamental situation of the satellite states (vide, Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1968-70) remains precarious, the probes into the Middle-East and the Mediterranean are possibly dangerous and show little evidence of being thought through to ultimate conclusions. Despite moves beyond the traditional areas of Soviet influence and domination and much ritual boasting, the impression is one of a society on the defensive.

The contemporary Soviet Union is powerful but troubled; its best minds are alienated and in the place of the dynamism and confidence evident a decade ago, there is a mere repetition of old solutions and old slogans by Party mediocrities--and a truculent assertion by the man-in-the street (the Soviet version of the "silent majority") that the U.S.S.R., in spite of everything, is first and best.

Our view of the future of the Soviet Union in this decade foresees a continuation of the "conservatism" presently ascendant in the leadership of the U.S.S.R. While we do not subscribe to the general theory of "hawks" versus "doves" in the Kremlin there is no doubt that opinion in the Central Committee follows a spectrum. At the present time the political philosophy (whether or not the philosophy can be identified with a particular clique) which may be described as conservatism--the willingness to use force, the rejection of the idea of adjustment, certainly of radical adjustment, of the traditional social system to new demands and needs--is dominant and gained an important victory in successfully suppressing the Czechoslovak liberalization movement of 1968. Threatening as the Czechoslovak example

may have been to the Soviet hegemonial position in Eastern Europe, it was not impossible to conceive of ways in which Czechoslovak nationalism and the desire for liberal reform (even if the example had spread) could have been accommodated within a newly defined Soviet security system, perhaps even a European-wide security system. The Soviet leaders chose not to follow the radical or daring course; they chose conservatism and military repression. In other words, after more than a decade of almost uninterrupted "liberalism" in the Soviet union, in 1968 Russia entered a period of attempts to freeze the status quo, with some reversion to certain discarded political forms.

Part of this has been an intensified suppression of dissent in the U.S.S.R. itself. This was the real effect of the Czechoslovak intervention on the internal life of the Soviet Union--not a sparking of widespread criticism among the Soviet masses or even the intelligentsia, but the reverse. (The Czechoslovak intervention produced nothing like the disturbance in Soviet life that the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution did in 1956. The Czechoslovaks are regarded in the Soviet Union in very much the same terms that the French are regarded in the United States--licentious, a little shocking, and ungrateful.) Suppressing Czechoslovakia was not in itself a vastly unpopular act. On the other hand, there remains much native dissent in the U.S.S.R. (by no means confined to Jews), and the Soviet leadership is incapable of at one and the same time carrying out a policy of vigorous suppression of dissent in Czechoslovakia and tolerating it at home. Such a controlled schizophrenia is foreign to the Slovak political mind. It may be true that Britain was able to acquire an empire while at home developing its civil liberties, but there is nothing

in the Russian political record which suggests a similar ability. In Russian history periods of foreign adventurism such as the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1848 or the Polish Rebellion in 1863 were normally accompanied by repressive politics at home.

This does not, however, mean a reversion to Stalinism. Apart from the appalling bloodiness of Stalin's Russia, unmatched today, conservatism and Stalinism are quite different political phenomena. We should remember that Stalinism was a doctrine aimed at the radical transformation of Russian society. Between 1928 and 1953 Stalin remade Russia and had Stalin lived he would have transformed the society of the U.S.S.R. far beyond what it was at the time of his death: we know, for example, that he planned to replace the collective and state farms with agrogoroda--giant communes or agricultural cities. Stalinism was thus an activist policy on the internal front. The new conservatism in the Kremlin is exactly that--an effort to prop up a failing order, to conserve what has been. This makes all the difference in the world--not only in style but in the substance of the kind of policies which the present leaders would be willing to countenance. The present Soviet leaders display no such activism. They are merely seeking to maintain the main features of the system which they inherited at the time of Stalin's death, short of its bloody or pathological elements.

Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the short-term future includes a continued strengthening of the "Muscovite" wing of the ruling Communist Parties in the Satellites. Clearly all forms of national self-assertion remain more dangerous today in Eastern Europe, whether they be of the liberalizing sort (Czechoslovakia) or of the Conservative Nationalist sort (as exemplified

by the Rumanians). Clearly, a new doctrine has emerged in Eastern Europe, or more accurately reemerged since 1868--that of naked Soviet hegemony over the area and the subordinate status of the East European parties. After Stalin's death, the doctrine was gradually asserted that all parties are co-equal. This no longer is true, as the so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine" made explicit. Whereas as recently as 1967 there was a general consensus throughout the bloc that reform was necessary and even desirable, today reform is seen as risking incalculable and dangerous consequences. While Hungary and Rumania in the 1970's are not likely to match the rigid conservatism of Poland, East Germany, and Bulgaria, it hardly seems likely that the Hungarian leaders, uneasy as they must be with the present Soviet leadership, will wish to call attention to the internal liberalization accomplished in Hungary over recent years.

In Rumania the situation is more complex. The usual formula given is that Rumania is defiant in foreign policy but Stalinist in internal policy. This is of course exaggeration. Not only is Stalinism a dead ideology (see above), but the Rumanian internal liberalization has been far more extensive than has usually been credited--that is to say, there is far more innovation in the arts and a freer importation of foreign movies and books than usually suspected. The Rumanian leaders seem in recent years to have been groping their way towards a more libertarian internal society, but are hesitant to press political innovations which may have the effect of causing political disturbances--thus running the risk of angering the Soviets who fear the contagion of still newer revisionist movements on their frontiers.

The Soviet Union as an ideological center faces a bleak future. It is blocked in Asia and stymied in the West. As the first Communist state, it looked forward to greatness; but it appears in retrospect merely the first expression of an ideological movement in the Communist "world" of which it is no longer master. For a society which is, and must remain, fundamentally ideological this is a serious blow--one that can hardly be apprehended in Western terms. Ideology for the Soviet Union, even granting that since Stalin's death it has waned in intensity, is not, as in the United States, a superfluous ornament to a policy of Realpolitik. Ideology in the Soviet Union--the sense of Moscow as the center of a dynamic and inevitable world revolution designed to transform international society in the image of the U.S.S.R.--is an issue of identity. The very legitimacy of the institutions which exist in the Soviet Union today, and by extension, the very legitimacy of the authority which the present Soviet leaders wield depends on such a view. A post-ideological or non-ideological U.S.S.R. is as much a logical self-contradiction as an atheist Massachusetts Bay Colony--in which magistrates who derive, according to theory, their authority from God could not deny that God and long survive in power. In the long run, therefore, the loss of this image, or more accurately self-image, of the U.S.S.R. must contribute to the erosion of morale and development of ancien regime mentality.

Furthermore, at the back of the Soviet mind must always be the analogy of Tsarist Russia's role in Eastern and Central Europe in the nineteenth century. Tsarist Russia functioned in those years as the gendarme of Europe--the prop of conservatism, the suppressor of revolution, the enemy

of all change, especially enlightened change. Certain Soviet intellectuals have already made this parallel explicit, and the Soviet leaders, who in recent years have been driven to deny fervently the reappearance of the old problem of the generation gap (the "fathers and the sons") are haunted by this metaphor. There is much tension behind the facade of Party and national unity.

With respect to economic development, it is clear that the Soviet bloc has entered into what is likely to prove a protracted period of economic under-performance. The old orthodox solutions have been dusted off once again. Libermanism is in discard, worker management and decentralization are viewed with suspicion and even alarm. The Soviet leaders are attempting to reinstitute the command economy--a system which magnifies the role of the Communist Party but fails to respond to the necessities of an increasingly complex economic organization. The strains on the Soviet and bloc economies are increased by the burdens of the arms race and the military occupation of the satellites; hence the U.S.S.R.'s anxiety to obtain from the United States agreements on mutual arms and troop limits.

This is not so much an economic regression as an economic stagnation--and this in turn is likely to have the greatest political effect. For it is not merely an integral part of Communist theory that economies are paramount, determining political action; in the Soviet bloc the theory has proved true: far-reaching political or social changes have stemmed ultimately from economic necessities. The Hungarian New Course of Imre Nagy in 1954-55 was motivated almost entirely by the stagnation of the Hungarian economy, as was the Czechoslovak reform of 1967-68.

In the Hungarian case runaway political effects soon developed which the Party sought to suppress, ousting Nagy as premier and retreating into orthodox economics under a "know-nothing" regime. The result was the total stagnation of Hungarian life and the desperate efforts of the Gero regime (Nagy's successor) to conciliate the oppositionists at the eleventh hour. In the end the result was the recall of Nagy, in the midst of revolution. The Soviet future today must be seen as one in which there is a period, perhaps protracted, of simple-minded orthodoxy, in which time the economic and social problems will proliferate and grow in gravity. Sooner or later, perhaps within five years, a reaction to these problems will occur.

OUR PROJECTIONS OF THE
STAGES OF SOVIET FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY: 1971-75

A. INTERNAL POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POLICY

1. An oligarchic centralized dictatorship; no cult of personality; despite the existence of a "military-industrial complex," civilian control remains strong.
2. There is a development of an established and "normal" dismissal process.
3. Predictability of police and judicial process, but there are occasional uses of "extra-legal" means (e.g., "medical" examinations for sanity) to discipline political deviants; certain punitive sections of the criminal code remain purposely vague.
4. The population is generally reconciled to the features of Soviet society and identifies the "socialist system" with the Motherland; there is consequently deep resentment against the "intellectuals and Jews" who "slander" the system.
5. There are moderately extensive foreign contacts: regular cultural exchanges; exchanges of lecturers, professorships; limited student exchanges; extensive foreign tourism (20-25,000 Americans yearly); but few passports are issued for Soviet citizens on unofficial business, although foreign travel is relatively common for Soviet officials.
6. There is further reduced censorship of foreign news, books, magazines; little prior censorship on non-strategic outgoing news, but foreign newsmen are still intimidated.

B. IDEOLOGY

1. The U.S.S.R. is building Communism; "all others are building socialism," Chinese claims notwithstanding; but as the target date for "Communism" approaches (1973), less and less is heard of the issue.
2. The Soviet Party asserts an ambiguous policy--theoretically recognizing "many roads to socialism" but remaining the "fore-front and leader of the progressive movement in the world" and, disquietingly, avoids defining the precise limits of the "Brezhnev Doctrine," its right to intervene to support "Socialism" where, in a "friendly" state, it is threatened.
3. The doctrine of socialist realism is no longer a positive injunction; many painters, writers, poets work in modernist or semi-modernist forms but find it difficult to exhibit or publish;

jazz and rock are everywhere; there are free canons of physical science and a noticeable weakening of sterile orthodoxy in economics and social science punctuated, from time to time, by frantic Party efforts to tighten controls.

4. The doctrine of war is ambiguous: in polemics with the Chinese, nuclear war and other "adventurism" is held to be a reckless invitation to worldwide disaster (socialist as well as capitalist); but addressing the West, military leaders seemingly assert a doctrine of Soviet nuclear "victory."
5. Competitive coexistence.
6. A general decline of ideology as such (but ideology continues to interfere with pure pragmatism, in foreign policy, economic planning, etc. nevertheless).

C. ECONOMIC POLICY

1. GNP: 400-500 million.* The living standard is at the "low-moderate European" level.
2. Still experiments half-heartedly with "libermanism," but fears political consequences of decentralization.
3. The regime affirms the relative superiority of industry over agriculture; but agricultural investment rises steadily.
4. Affirms the superiority of heavy industry over light and consumer industry; but light and consumer industry investment rises steadily.
5. Growing attempts to import consumer technology (e.g., Fiat plant at Togliattigrad) and products.
6. The virgin lands scheme has foundered; the U.S.S.R. searches, first, for an agro-technical means of raising food production; second, for organizational solutions; third, for imports from those dependent on it for security or arms.
7. There is reduced foreign aid to non-communist states.
8. The Soviet attempt to foster rational integration of Comecon economies, to match the Common Market, meets strong satellite resistance (especially in Rumania), but the Soviets persist.

*Estimate, in 1970 dollars.

D. EXTERNAL RELATIONS (WITH COMMUNIST NATIONS)

1. Rather tense relations with Belgrade (following high-point of 1962 rapprochement). On the Yugoslav side the issue has lost emotional importance, but the Soviets give occasional disquieting evidence of interest in "Socialist" Yugoslavia's internal affairs and uncertainty regarding the Brezhnev Doctrine's application to events in Belgrade.
2. National communists in satellites attempt heterodox policies but are severely constrained by the Brezhnev Doctrine justifying Soviet intervention in emergency.
3. There are many latent strains in satellite-Soviet relations: Rumanian and Hungarian leadership desire closer relations with West; middle level and rank-and-file Party members in Poland desire either more liberal policies, that is closer ties with West, or are violently nationalist, that is anti-Semitic, anti-Soviet; Czechoslovak leadership largely isolated from rank-and-file who are still pro-Western and "liberal"; Even after Ulbricht, the East-German leadership, relatively less interested than Moscow in importing Western technology, is at odds with Moscow's "detente" policy which threatens the regime's stability.
4. Break with Albania continues.
5. Moscow/Havana relations somewhat cool. Castro still seen as dangerously heterodox.
6. Virtual rupture of Party relations with Peking; serious territorial disputes over central Asian and maritime province frontiers continue.
7. Non-ruling parties are highly unstable, shifting allegiance between Moscow and Peking, or denouncing both.

E. EXTERNAL RELATIONS (WITH NON-COMMUNIST NATIONS)

1. General
 - a) "Detente." There is some interest in bargain-striking with the West in an effort to freeze the present international order and prevent a further growth of world pluralism, to reduce the cost of the overall military program, to facilitate the import of advanced technology, and to concentrate on China.
 - b) There is a general loss of direction; "knee-jerk" opportunism in Middle East, Africa, without serious analysis of costs, consequences, genuine possibilities, etc.
 - c) "Showing the flag."

2. United States

- a) There is a significant truce in Cold War as the Soviet regime's former desire to supplant the United States is modified to a more practical desire to achieve co-primacy.
- b) Embarrassed by U.S. actions in Vietnam and elsewhere which in effect demand that the U.S.S.R. makes good its proclaimed role as protector in "national liberation wars."
- c) The prestige of U.S. is still high and the U.S.S.R. is covertly seeking to emulate it, but Moscow is increasingly contemptuous of signs of American "decadence."

3. Western Europe

- a) A growing concern about the strength of the Common Market.
- b) Still attempting to hasten dissolution of NATO.
- c) Beginning of realization that a European security conference will not merely damage the U.S. position, but inevitably erode Warsaw Pact.
- d) Strong desire to import modern technology from Western Europe (rather than from U.S., which is humiliating).

4. Afro-Asia and Latin America

Increased skepticism about reliability of distant revolutions.

F. MILITARY POSTURE*

1. Strategic Forces

Approaching or has achieved "strategic parity" with the United States. Massive nuclear forces also targeted against Western Europe, China.

2. Other Forces

Some superiority over Western conventional forces, compromised by need to guard Chinese frontier.

Making effort to develop overseas "strike" capability in emulation of U.S.

Strong buildup of naval forces without real understanding of sea doctrine; naval forces seriously compromised by lack of air cover, distant bases.

No aircraft carriers; heavy (superstitious?) reliance on Missile defenses.

*Based on unclassified sources.

The prospective situation of the Soviet Union by 1980 must be discussed with less confidence than in dealing with the period between now and 1975. Yet in 1980 the Soviet Union will be 63 years old. The Russia whose historic features (in a "republican" rather than in a monarchical form) will be more than a thousand. As the revolutionary frenzies recede into the past, more and more the problems of Soviet society will appear to be more to be the age-old problems of Russia's uneasy and ambiguous relationship to the West. It is not merely that the generation gap--the conflict between "the fathers and the sons"--will have reappeared; or that the intellectuals, as chronically the case in the Russian past, will have proven chronically dissident and disloyal. It is that Russian society, despite the agony of the Revolution and the post-revolutionary industrial plans, will be seen to be falling farther and farther behind the West. By 1980, through a kind of revolutionary tour de force, Russia will have equalled, and even in selected areas surpassed, the Europe and the America of the model of the first half of the twentieth century: but we believe that just as Czarist Russia in the early 1800's saw its painfully acquired eighteenth century-style great power status compromised, as Europe and America developed a new industrial civilization, so in 1980, the U.S.S.R. will likely be the master of industrial techniques which are increasingly outmoded by the West's advance into post-industrial society. The Soviets are not ready for the "second industrial revolution" underway in the West. Thus we would project the U.S.S.R. of 1980 in the following way.

While the Russian sense of obsolescence may be somewhat mitigated by the spectacle of continued social dissent and the proliferation of the "counterculture" in the United States (trends perceived in the Soviet

Union as decadent), the continued progress of Western Europe and Japan within the capitalist world would confirm the Soviet's mood of depression. By 1980 Japan has clearly passed the Soviet Union in GNP--a contradiction of Marxist-Leninist theory, a blow to Soviet pride, and an implicit rebuke to harsh Soviet development policies which have, since 1917, demanded so much in suffering. West European progress, while numerically less spectacular than the Japanese growth, is even more obviously tied to rising standards of living--a development seen in many quarters as confirming the old chasm dividing "backward" Russia from the developed world.

The obsolescence is seen both outside the U.S.S.R., and by wide new groups in the Soviet Union itself. The unintellectual young see the Communist Party (with its pretensions and narrow mindedness) as essentially comical, as "square." The new intelligentsia find the Party less amusing: their reaction is the more ominous one that the Party is a reactionary clique, a "brake on progress." The ideological technocrats who staff the nation's industries are less abstract in their complaints: they see the Party professional, or Apparatchik, as a more or less useless man--a nuisance. Whatever the function of the Party may once have been, to galvanize a moribund Tsarist Russia and "rationalize" it, there is less and less need for professional administrators of other people's talents and labor--men whose claim to understand all science and economics by virtue of having studied Marx and Lenin are now seen as absurd.

The polarization between the Party and these groups is by no means complete. For one thing, the Party makes strenuous (though not always consistent) efforts to recruit the talented young, the intellectuals, the technocrats and scientists.

It pays them increasingly well--so that by 1980 the reemergence of a class system, albeit a class-mobile system, is virtually complete.

Thus it is still likely that the effort to draw the most vigorous elements of Soviet society into the circle of the Party will prove generally successful. But the bloom is off the Party and everyone knows it except...the man in-the street.

In this projection it is not so much the masses who are disaffected. Nor are the young "stilyagi" who may wear tight trousers and sport long hair, or the factory administrators and engineers, likely to mount strong political initiatives. They will not challenge authority on their own; least of all will the unimaginative "common man" whose material and legal lot is palpably improving. The challenge is merely latent in these groups. The key element is once again the intellectual. They are formulating a general critique of Soviet society. They are formulating the reasons for Soviet backwardness. A general loss of confidence by the masses could cause them to turn to the dissidents for leadership; then the regime could fall.

But the parallel with the satellite states like Hungary and Poland following Stalin's death should not be pressed too far. Barring a catastrophe (for example, a humiliating defeat or a protracted crisis in a war with China) sufficient to destroy utterly the prestige of the Communist Party, no armed challenge should be expected but rather a general stagnation of life and a steadily eroding Party morale.

OUR PROJECTIONS OF THE
STAGES OF SOVIET FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY: 1975-80

A. INTERNAL POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POLICY

1. Still an oligarchic, centralized autocracy (quasi-dictatorship), with increasingly smooth-functioning processes of dismissal, policy debate within limits, etc.
2. Civilian control of military still sure.
3. High predictability of police and judicial process for ordinary citizens; there is hesitation and inconsistency apparent in the treatment of dissident intellectuals; some effort is made to placate and meet opinions of scientific intellectuals who sympathize with demonstrators.
4. There is a growing social schism between the highly nationalistic, unthinking "man-in-the-street" and the intelligentsi who are actually needed to man the more modern sectors of the Soviet economy and society.
5. Foreigners are more or less disliked, spontaneously harassed, by populace, not merely by the political police. Tourism does not keep pace with its spectacular growth outside the bloc.
6. Inconsistent censorship policies.

B. IDEOLOGY

1. The U.S.S.R. has "achieved Communism" as promised; but the boast is actually an embarrassment.
2. The ideology is a dogmatic inheritance which no longer generates enthusiasm or deep belief but which cannot be dropped without calling the legitimacy of individual careers, the Party, and even the government itself, into question.
3. More and more the appeal of the state is to naked nationalism and traditional cultural rivalry with the "decadent" West.
4. There is ritual boasting of military superiority to the West and Communist China, but no expectation of actual war against the West (in contrast to much anxiety about China).

C. ECONOMIC POLICY

1. GNP: approximately \$600-650 billion.* Despite the theoretical gains, the living standard remains more or less at the "low-moderate European" level. There is surprisingly little mass pressure for improvement.

*Estimate, in 1970 dollars.

2. Experiments with decentralization in some disrepute as politically dangerous; attempt is now to "computerize" a centrally planned economy.
3. Industry is still favored over agriculture; there are massive efforts to improve agricultural productivity by technical means, hidden incentives to agricultural labor. Imports of agricultural produce are gradually replacing efforts to stimulate native production.
4. Heavy industry still dominates, leading to an underdevelopment of advanced sectors of the economy like computers, general electronics. (As distinct from strategic sector.)
5. Comecon is largely a dead letter.

D. EXTERNAL RELATIONS (WITH COMMUNIST NATIONS)

1. The next 10 years will pose a series of critical challenges to the stability of Eastern Europe. Some scenarios of crisis are suggested below. As a general proposition it must be said that especially if there is anything remotely resembling a European security settlement, the U.S.S.R. may find it difficult, if not impossible, to maintain authority over the satellites--particularly if, as part of the settlement, "all foreign troops are to withdraw from the territory of other states" (Rumanian formula).
2. Relations with Havana distant; there has been a considerable evolution of Cuban "socialism" on a divergent path.
3. The conflict with Communist China will probably be contained at low violence levels. (Following the death of Mao Tse-tung the transfer of power in Peking will probably be orderly and anti-Soviet policies remain in force.) There will, however, be a considerable nuclear threat to the Soviet rear. If simultaneously the Chinese avoid ideological excesses and concentrate on building an armaments industry (conventional) also, the threat to Soviet security will be severe. There is also much anxiety about U.S.-Chinese relations which, as they warm, cannot help weakening Moscow's bargaining position.
4. If in case of miscalculation, an armed conflict (at high violence levels) breaks out with Communist China, two dangers loom: (a) a long drawn out Chinese guerrilla resistance which would strain the Soviet social fabric (Amalric scenario); or (b) nuclear weapons may be used by both sides. In the second case, while the U.S.S.R. has far more impressive forces than the Chinese, nevertheless damage to central authority and command and control in the U.S.S.R. might lead to the fall of the Soviet regime.

E. EXTERNAL RELATIONS (WITH NON-COMMUNIST NATIONS)

1. General

- a) In spite of the economic burden imposed by the arms race, no agreement to sweeping arms-control limitations (SALT) is likely. Instead there are piecemeal agreements to limit ABM deployment, possibly MIRVs.
- b) Still "showing the flag" in the world's oceans but without a well-thought-out strategic purpose.
- c) Influence in the Middle-East beginning to wane. There has probably not been a major confrontation in the region, with Israel or the U.S. There may have been skirmishes, and even limited actions during which Soviet personnel and equipment came into play. So long as the numbers involved remain limited (and it is not easy to introduce large numbers without risking a world war), the Soviet performance is likely to be poor (i.e., on a man-for-man, airplane-for-airplane, or small unit-for small-unit basis the Israelis should win). The Arab states are likely to be increasingly impatient with Soviet advice which has not led to important results for them.

2. United States

"Ritual" cold war.

3. Europe

The crucial issue will be the success or failure of the European Security Conference. An imaginative Western diplomacy could move the Soviets back to the U.S.S.R. itself and attempt to stabilize East-Central Europe. Failure to do so runs the risk in the long run that the Soviet authority will break down in the region (in revolutionary fashion) or that the German problem could explode. The probability, however, is a reactionary attempt by the Soviets to maintain the status quo successfully through 1975-1980, but at increasing political, economic, and social costs, among them the growing stagnation of Soviet bloc mass technology and general intellectual life.

4. Afro-Asia and Latin America

- a) Only residual interest in far-distant regions.
- b) Stung by Japanese economic successes, grows truculent in the Far East.

F. MILITARY POSTURE*

1. Strategic Forces

Despite economic pressures to arrive at a limitation of strategic arms mutually agreed to by East and West, broad efforts throughout

*Based on unclassified sources.

the decade of the 70's are likely to fail: on the Soviet side a fundamental suspicion of the West, indeed a hostility to it, coupled with a fear of growing Communist Chinese strategic power, force the Soviets to continue their arms buildup. Consequently a light ABM system is installed around major Soviet cities capable of rapid expansion in time of national insecurity (in addition, the extensive SAM air defense network is partially upgraded to enhance overall ABM capability)--in effect, a pre-crisis mobilization base.

ICBM forces level off around the mid-70's with 1500-1750 ICBM's of varying configurations--missiles with three-six accurate MIRV's of yield ranging between 1-25 megatons. There is an ambitious SLBM capability of 40-50 Polaris/Poseidon-like submarines which are forward based, possibly at man-made islands near the continental U.S.

IRBM/MRBM capacity levels off at about 700 missiles, retargetable against Western Europe and China as the need may be.

The Soviet strategic nuclear capability is highly visible and of high quality, easily lending itself to judicious utilization as an international political lever, although strategic doctrine remains somewhat ambiguous.

The Soviets in general follow technology: they have FOB's, ABM, reconnaissance satellite killers, city busting warheads, counterforce warheads, tactical "clean" and low-yield weapons systems, all without any clear strategic doctrine. So far as there is a strategic doctrine at all, it can be summarized as: it is better to be strong than weak, more is better than little, high yield is better than low yield, develop any weapon possible because a use will turn up.

One impressive innovation may be a large Manned Orbital Space Station, which serves as a reconnaissance platform as well as a testbed for exotic space weapon systems (e.g., laser radiation weapons). The Soviets are also highly innovative in antisubmarine warfare, extending their concept of helicopter carriers to surface effect vehicles (carrying high-sensitivity magnetometers and other nonacoustic sensors, as well as bistatic sonar)--the survivability of American SLBM submarines is gradually eroding, and this "fact" is of great consequence in the perceived strategic balance.

2. Other

The armed forces remain at approximately five million in all. The Soviets have added two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers to the naval forces and have equipped them with advanced manned bomber and interceptor aircraft. They are also emulating the United States and developing a powerful overseas "Strikecom" capacity. These mobile-and amphibious forces number three divisions.

① THE SEVEN BUDGETS (100, 450, 850, 1,250, 1,650, 2,050, 2,450)

- 7. CIVILIAN CRISIS WARS
- 6. MILITARY CRISIS WARS
- 5. EMERGENCY CRISIS ATTACKS
- 4. BIPARTISAN CRISIS
- 3. INTERSTATE CRISIS
- 2. TRADITIONAL CRISIS
- 1. SUPREMACY HINDERING

UPPER RINGS

MIDDLE RINGS

LOWER RINGS

② FIVE CLASSES OF WARS

- A. NORMAL ALERT STATES
 - 1. A STATE ENTERS OUT OF THE BLUE (1)
 - 2. AN ADVERSARY ACQUITS (2)
- B. TENSION ALERT STATUS
 - 1. THE CONFLICTS HAVE A PROBLEM (1)
 - 2. A STATE ENTERS OUT OF THE BLUE (2)
 - 3. THE ADVERSARY ACQUITS (3)

③ CHANGE OF POLICY (HABILITATION RATE)

- 1. TECHNOLOGICAL BREAKTHROUGH
- 2. EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
- 3. NEW CONCEPT

④

- 1. CIVILIAN CRISIS WARS
- 2. MILITARY CRISIS WARS
- 3. SUPREMACY HINDERING
- 4. BIPARTISAN CRISIS
- 5. EMERGENCY CRISIS ATTACKS
- 6. INTERSTATE CRISIS
- 7. TRADITIONAL CRISIS
- 8. SUPREMACY HINDERING

②

- 6. CITY TARGETING (100)
- 5. CENTRAL WARS (100)
- 4. CENTRAL WARS (100)
- 3. NO NUCLEAR USE (100)
- 2. NUCLEAR WAR IS UNTHINKABLE (100)
- 1. DON'T HOLD THE RUST (100)

③ ATTENDING SYSTEMS (100, 450, 850, 1,250, 1,650, 2,050, 2,450)

- I. MINDS MUST BE OPEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHANGE IN THE STATUS OF THE WORLD (100)
- II. ATTENDING SYSTEMS (100, 450, 850, 1,250, 1,650, 2,050, 2,450)
 - A. ATTENDING SYSTEMS (100, 450, 850, 1,250, 1,650, 2,050, 2,450)
 - 1. ATTENDING SYSTEMS (100, 450, 850, 1,250, 1,650, 2,050, 2,450)
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 - 99. ATTENDING SYSTEMS (100, 450, 850, 1,250, 1,650, 2,050, 2,450)
 - 100. ATTENDING SYSTEMS (100, 450, 850, 1,250, 1,650, 2,050, 2,450)

③

- A. AUTOMATIC EXTERMINATION
- B. WAR BY ACCIDENT OR INTENTION OR BY ACCIDENT OR INTENTION
- C. MORE OR LESS THAN CITY EXCHANGE PROBABLY USING UP ALL THE AVAILABLE POLICE
- D. THE EXPERIENCE TENDS TO BE WORSE THAN THE EXPECTATIONS
- E. INITIAL SHOCK REACTION "MADMAN POLITICS"
- F. "MADMAN CEASE FIRE" AND "INTERNATIONAL CEASE FIRE"
- G. "FREEDOM" OR END OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

NOTE: EITHER 1, 2, 3, OR 4 CAN BE EXPLOITED


④

Category	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
Category	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100

27/1/2

1/1/1

① THE SPECTRUM OF (CRISIS) OR DEFENSE



② THE SPECTRUM OF (CRISIS) OR DEFENSE

6. CITY TARGETING []
5. CENTRAL WAR []
4. CENTRAL SANCTUARY []
3. NO NUCLEAR USE []
2. NUCLEAR WAR IS UNTHINKABLE []
1. DON'T ROCK THE BOAT []

④ EIGHT BASIC CONTEXTS FOR OUTBREAK SCENARIOS

- I. FIVE CLASSES OF WARS
 - A. NORMAL ALERT STATUS
 1. A SOVIET ATTACK "OUT OF THE BLUE" (5)
 2. AN "ACCIDENTAL" ACCIDENT (4)
 - B. TENSION ALERT STATUS
 1. THE SOVIETS SOLVE A PROBLEM (1)
 2. A "NON-ACCIDENTAL" ACCIDENT (2)
 3. THE AMERICANS SOLVE A PROBLEM (3)
- II. CHANGE OF POLICY (MOBILIZATION BASE)
 1. TECHNOLOGICAL BREAKTHROUGH
 2. DETERIORATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
 3. ARMS CONTROL

⑥ ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM ENDPOINTS: HOW WILL ESCALATION BE HANDLED IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? WHAT WILL BE THE ROLE OF FORCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM?

- I. MINOR MODIFICATION OF EXISTING SYSTEM
- II. ALL-OUT WAR SYSTEM WITHERS AWAY
 - A. USE, THREAT OF, OR INDEED NON-USE FOR AND OR VIOLENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MINIMIZED TO THE VANISHING POINT
 1. RULE OF LAW
 2. PLURALISTIC SECURITY COMMUNITY (OR TIES)
 3. POTENTIAL WARS (SPACE, FOREIGN AID, SYSTEMS, ETC.)
 4. OTHER SUBSTITUTE FOR--OR INFLUENCE USE OR THREAT OF VIOLENCE OR FORCE
 - B. ROLE OF VIOLENCE IS RELIABLY LIMITED BY
 1. RULE OF FAITH-ACCOMPLI (INTERNAL WAR)
 2. INSTRUMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS (NATIONAL MUTUAL SELF-INTEREST RESTRAINTS)
 3. AGONISTIC RESTRAINTS (LIMITED BY MORAL RULES)
 - C. MORE OR LESS UNIVERSAL DETERRENCE (E.G. WORLDS)
- III. OTHER BASIC CHANGE IN SYSTEM
 - A. "BLOC" SYSTEMS (WITH RESTRAINTS AND RIVALRY)
 1. WITH HEGEMONY AND/OR DISCIPLINE
 2. WITHOUT (E.G., MADEN OF RESPONSIBILITY)
 - B. COMMUNITY SANCTIONS (E.G., AGAINST FIRE ARMS)
 - C. CONDOMINIUMS (E.G., U.S.-S.U.; U.S.-S.U. COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEMS); U.N.; OR WIDE MULTINATIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL OR
 - D. CONCERT OF (LARGE OR SMALL) POWERS
 - E. "WORLD GOVERNMENT"
 - F. WORLD EMPIRE (OR EMPIRES)
 - G. DISARMED, BUT "UNCONTROLLED" NATIONS
 - H. ELIMINATION OR CONTROL OF WEAPONS OF DESTRUCTION BY AGREEMENT OR REVOLUTION (FOLLOWING A LARGE SETBACK TO CIVILIZATION)

⑤ THE EFFECT OF WAR

1. DE-EMPHASIZED
2. LESS IMPORTANT NOW
3. STILL IMPORTANT
4. ESCALATION LEADING TO UNPREDICTED FORCES
5. STANDARD WAR
 - A. TENSION AND CRISES
 - B. EXEMPLARY ATTACKS
 - C. COUNTERPOTENTIAL SALVO
 - D. SLOW MOTION COUNTERPOTENTIAL
 - E. EXEMPLARY ATTACK(S) OF COUNTERPOTENTIAL SALVO(S)
 - F. MORE OF A
 - G. TERMINATION

7/2/1

STAY OUT OF THE RINGS

CITY TARGETING (==)

CENTRAL WAR ()

CENTRAL SANCTUARY ()

NO NUCLEAR USE (==)

NUCLEAR WAR IS UNTHINKABLE (==)

DON'T ROCK THE BOAT ()

3

A COMMON WAR TERMINATION MODE:

1. "MODAL MODEL" OF THE WAR
 - A. APOCALYPTIC EXPECTATION
 - B. WAR BY ACCIDENT, MISCALCULATION OR BLIND AND/OR RELENTLESS ESCALATION
 - C. MORE OR LESS SPASM CITY EXCHANGE (PROBABLY USING UP ALL THE AVAILABLE FORCES)
 - D. THE EXPERIENCE TURNS OUT WORSE THAN THE EXPECTATIONS
 2. INITIAL SHOCK REACTION SWAMP'S POLITICS
 3. "A" HOC CEASE FIRE" (VS. "CONDITIONAL CEASE FIRE")

"REFORM" OR END OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
- NOTE: EITHER 1, 2, 3, OR 4 CAN BE EXPLOITED

7

AN ESCALATION LADDER

A Generalized (or Abstract) Scenario

ACCELERATION

ITEM ENDPOINTS: HOW WILL ESCALATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? WHAT WILL FORCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

ATION OF CURRENT SYSTEM

SYSTEM WITHERS AWAY

AT OF, OR INDEED ANY, OF THE FORCE
DILENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DIS-
ALMOST TO THE VANISHING POINT

OF LAW
ISTIC SECURITY COMMUNITY (OR COMMUNI-
)

CH WARS (SPACE, FOREIGN AID, "SHOWY"
EMS, ETC.)
SUBSTITUTE FOR--OR INFLUENCE AGAINST--
OR THREAT OF VIOLENCE OR FORCE

IOLENCE IS RELIABLY LIMITED BY:

OF FAIT ACCOMPLI (INTERNAL WAR)
MENTAL CONSIDERATIONS (NATIONAL AND
AL SELF-INTEREST RESTRAINTS)
TIC RESTRAINTS (LIMITED BY ABSOLUTE
AL RULES)

SS UNIVERSAL DETERRANCE (E.G., GALLOIS

CHANGE IN SYSTEM

STEMS (WITH RESTRAINTS AND RITUALS)

HEGEMONY AND/OR DISCIPLINE

UT (E.G., "AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY" CONCEPT)

SANCTIONS (E.G., AGAINST FIRST USE BY

MS (E.G., U.S.-S.U.; U.S.-S.U.-JAPAN;
SECURITY SYSTEM(S); U.N.; OTHER WORLD-
NATIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION)

(LARGE OR SMALL) POWERS

VERNMENT"

IRE (OR EMPIRES)

BUT "UNCONTROLLED" NATIONS

ON OR CONTROL OF WEAPONS OF MASS DE-
BY AGREEMENT OR REVULSION (PERHAPS
A LARGE SLTBACH TO CIVILIZATION)

CIVILIAN
CENTRAL
WARS

- 44 Spasm or Insanity War
- 43 Spasm or Insanity Controlled General War
- 42 Civilian Targeting Attack
- 41 Spasm or Insanity Targeting Attack
- 40 Spasm or Insanity War
- 39 Spasm or Insanity War

MILITARY
CENTRAL
WARS

- 38 Spasm or Insanity Targeting Attack
- 37 Spasm or Insanity Targeting Attack
- 36 Spasm or Insanity Targeting Attack
- 35 Spasm or Insanity Targeting Attack
- 34 Spasm or Insanity Targeting Attack
- 33 Spasm or Insanity Targeting Attack
- 32 Spasm or Insanity Targeting Attack

EXEMPLARY
CENTRAL
ATTACKS

- 31 Reciprocal Example
- 30 Complete Example (Approximately 95 per cent)
- 29 Exemplary Attacks on Population
- 28 Exemplary Attacks on Property
- 27 Exemplary Attacks on Military
- 26 Exemplary Attacks on Zone of Interior

BIZARRI
CENTS

- 25 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)
- 24 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)
- 23 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)
- 22 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)
- 21 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)

PERFORM
CENTS

- 20 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)
- 19 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)
- 18 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)
- 17 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)
- 16 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)
- 15 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)
- 14 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)
- 13 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)
- 12 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)
- 11 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)
- 10 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)

TRADITIONAL
CENTS

- 9 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)
- 8 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)
- 7 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)
- 6 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)
- 5 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)
- 4 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)

SYMBOLIC
MAINTENANCE
CENTS

- 3 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)
- 2 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)
- 1 Exemplary Attacks (Approximately 50 per cent)

DESCENDING TO Cold War

1/2/2

3. SOURCES AND SCENARIOS OF EAST-CENTRAL EUROPEAN AND BALKAN CRISIS AND "SURPRISE"

A. Factors of Destabilization

We look upon the time period 1971-1975 as promising a more dangerous situation in East-Central Europe and the Balkans than we have experienced at any time since the mid-1950's. A number of factors of latent crisis and unrest which have been suppressed, or repressed, in this region for the past twenty years seem likely to find explosive expression. At the same time those forces of change within the Soviet Union, the Western alliance, and the bipolar world power configuration, which we took note of in the previous section are tending to weaken or remove certain external pressures which in the past have contributed to the relative stability of the area. The present period, we believe, then represents a turning point, affording some opportunity for Western initiatives and policies to bring about a form of European political settlement capable of reestablishing in different ways, according to the type of settlement the stability of the region (the subject of the following sections of this report), but in the absence of those policies inaugurating a renewed period of troubles.

The most important of the new or emergent factors of East European and Balkan destabilization seem to us the following:

1. The erosion of Soviet national competence and political will.
2. The undermining of the Soviet Union's reputation, its "image," or--in the current usage--its "charisma."
3. The ascendance of Western European unity, power, prosperity, reputation, "charisma."
4. East European popular nationalism (most important in East Germany, Poland, and Romania).

5. East European ethnic nationalisms and irredentism--Croatian, Transylvanian, Montenegrin, Albanian, Slovene, Slovak, etc.
6. East European revisionist Communism or "Socialism with a Human Face."
7. Conceivably, German irredentism.

As our remarks on Russia and Western Europe in the preceding section make plain, we regard the first six of these factors as considerably more important to the 1970's than the long-debated issue of German irredentism. Germany's division, now more than twenty-five years old, took place, as it happened, largely along an established line of cultural differentiation. The German Democratic Republic today consists of that part of Germany which historically has had a tradition of (agrarian) military autocracy and has expressed anti-mercantile, pessimistic, xenophobic, and nationalist characteristics. Now, in some significant degree its political tradition has been transmuted into a "Prussian-Socialist" authoritarianism built upon a traditionally militant proletariat. The German Federal Republic consists of those sections of the old Germany, which have been Western oriented, Latin and Roman Catholic in culture, with urban, mercantile, and bourgeois traditions, and democratic and parliamentary political experience. As Konrad Adenauer recognized in the 1950's, the permanent integration of this part of Germany into a larger Europe otherwise made up of France, Italy, and the Lowlands, is a culturally and politically consistent and hopeful enterprise. The other, "eastward looking", Germany had dominated both the Wilhelmine and Nazi empires. (The age of German unity has, in any event, been a brief one in historical perspective. Germany was unified for less than a century between Bismarck and the Nazi collapse in Berlin in 1945. Before 1870 Germany was a linguistic and economic collectivity of politically autonomous or semi-autonomous kingdoms and principalities.)

The real problem which Germany today poses for the future is only indirectly the problem of reunion (or revanchism--from whatever side). It seems to us that the serious question is East Germany's own future course in its relationship with the Soviet Union, and perhaps in its relations with the other East European states. It is a dynamic and industrially powerful nation. Its present political subordination to the Soviet Union must seem an insecure, not to say unrealistic, relationship. The tensions between them, like those at work in the other East European states subordinated to Russian power, are as much cultural as political. "Socialism" of an authoritarian, competent, austere, purposeful variety, such as exists in the GDR today, is not inconsistent with the experience and cultural traditions of this part of Germany. Subordination to, and dependence upon, the Russian nation is profoundly inconsistent with that past. Because the East German uprising of 1952 was anti-Communist as well as anti-Russian, we often tend to assume that popular feelings today would be pro-Western, sympathetic to union with the Federal Republic. This may not be an accurate judgment. Hostility towards Russia is quite reconcilable with hostility towards capitalism, and particularly with hostility towards the luxurious, and allegedly corrupt, forms of capitalism which West Germany has known since the 1950's (and not only West Germany, of course). With significant groups within Western Germany, and in Western Europe as a whole, in rebellion against the materialism of values, the "technocratic despotism" and political failures of Western Capitalism and parliamentary democracy, the East Germans can easily find moral reinforcement for a vision of socialism which is authoritarian, spartan, and also nationalistic and original. If there were to be a

major economic crisis in the West, the effects on East Germany could decisively confirm this version of Socialism combined with Nationalism.

Certainly it is difficult to believe that this decade will end with a very large Soviet military garrison still in Eastern Germany. The thrust of events in both Western and Eastern camps today seems directed towards a kind of European settlement which would allow removal of those forces while perpetuating Soviet authority in Eastern Germany. That may not easily be accomplished; or rather, the one may be accomplished but not the other, and the difference can make for the most serious kind of crisis. The issues of settlement are critical to our argument in this report, as we will make clear below.

B. PROBABLE AND LESS PROBABLE CRISIS SCENARIOS*

Yugoslavia

One virtually inevitable source of tension in the next decade will arise in Southeastern Europe out of the succession crisis following the death or retirement through incapacity of Josip Broz Tito. It is widely assumed by observers that what we have been witnessing in Yugoslavia since the Tito-cominform split in 1948 is the gradual humanization of the Communist system. Our own view is that this process has been less one of reform of Communism than of a progressive jettisoning of features which are integral to the Communist system in its modern European form.

It seems almost inevitable that following Tito's death or retirement we will witness a very rapid evolution of the system in Yugoslavia, in effect a dissolution of the remaining constraints on the free sector.

*By Edmund Stillman.

What is likely to emerge is a kind of state capitalism (large-scale industry, financed by the state, operating with considerable market autonomy, state banking, etc.) alongside a very rapidly developing free sector--small scale, light industry service trades, etc. This trend will not easily be reversed, but it is likely to arouse considerable anxiety among the older Communist Party functionaries and their younger recruits who will find themselves less and less relevant to this emerging society.

Simultaneously, there is likely to be a deterioration of the authority of the central regime in Belgrade--an authority which has always been more precarious than outsiders have supposed in its ability to dominate the contending nationalities of Yugoslavia or institutionalize an authority which actually has largely derived from the personal charisma of Tito. It seems not likely that Yugoslavia will be unable to produce a form of collective leadership capable of mediating permanently between the contending interests of so faction-ridden a society: in other words, somewhere in the 1970's the nationality issue may become extraordinarily embittered, with the old Serb-Croat rivalry reemerging as part of a general reluctance by the richer areas of the country (like Slovenia, Croatia and the autonomous region of the Voivodina, north of Belgrade) to sacrifice for the so-called "negative" regions of the country like Montenegro, the Kosmet, and Macedonia. There is very considerable feeling, for example, throughout the richer parts of Yugoslavia that the Montenegrins, who are overrepresented in the Communist Party, have been milking the "positive" regions for narrow sectional advantage.

Assuming that the Soviet Union will maintain its conservative posture through this time frame, and likewise will maintain its old

hegemonial interests in Eastern Europe and the vaguely defined "socialist world," the Russians then may view the Yugoslav developments with alarm and see new opportunities for interfering in the internal affairs of the Yugoslav state. We say this because we believe that Communism, as such, will cease to be recognizable in Yugoslavia--and the "defection" of Yugoslavia from the socialist ranks, by that point obvious to all, will be seen as a serious threat to the satellite states to the north and to the Soviet Union itself.

Albanian Irredentism in Southwestern Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia is riven by ethnic and linguistic rivalries, rather more so than any other state in Europe today. But the great time bomb ticking away in Yugoslavia is the presence of a compact Albanian minority of some one million persons dwelling adjacent to the Albanian frontiers in the southwestern portions of the country. This region, known as the Kosmet (a contraction of Kossovo-Metohija), is backward, poor and pretty much administered by the Slavic-speaking Yugoslavs, whatever they say about local liberties and autonomy, in the fashion of a third-class colony. Albanians constitute the blacks of Yugoslavia--a group regarded with contempt by all the Slavs. (The Albanians are not, incidently, a Slavic people but descendants of the ancient Illyrian inhabitants of the Balkans.)

Tensions in the Kosmet have been rising in recent years; around Pristina there has been considerable violence. The development of an outright Albanian secessionist movement has been hindered by the repressive character of the Hoxha regime to the south in Albania itself. But though Enver Hoxha is a zealot who has associated himself with the Chinese

and is sufficiently young to remain in power throughout this decade, there is no absolute reason why a post-Kosygin-Brezhnev leadership in the U.S.S.R. might not seek some rapprochement with him--especially if a Sino-Soviet rapprochement becomes possible in that period. In such a case a Soviet Union increasingly dismayed by the dissolution of Communism in Yugoslavia might very well begin to support Albanian irredentist claims on the Kosmet: the claims would have very considerable justice since there are nearly as many Albanians living in oppressed conditions in the Kosmet as in Albania itself.* The possibility therefore arises of the outbreak of guerrilla activities in southwestern Yugoslavia supported by the Albanians and possibly at one remove by the Soviets. The terrain in the southwest is extremely mountainous and rough--an area in which the Yugoslav partisan movement itself was able to hold out indefinitely against the Germans. The Albanians are a warrior people of great courage and savagery (a common Balkan characteristic) who held out for centuries against the Turks. After their conversion to Islam they became formidable foes of their Slavic neighbors like the Serbs and Montenegrins. There is no reason to suppose that such a guerrilla movement would be quickly crushed by the Yugoslavs, whose own experience in guerrilla warfare by 1975 will be thirty years out of date.

A successful conclusion to such a war, ending with the ceding of the Kosmet or a portion of it to Albania would touch off a chain reaction in the Balkans. It would, first of all, be a first breach in the post-1945 tacit rule that all frontiers in Europe are firmly fixed. One result of such a settlement might very well be the secession of other constituent

*Such a move, however, would contradict another Soviet interest, namely that all post-1945 boundaries in Europe are fixed.

republics of Yugoslavia, particularly Slovenia--a region which is Alpine, highly civilized, industrially developed and sophisticated, located in the northwest adjacent to Italy and Austria. Slovenia sees itself as a potential new Switzerland.

Such an irridentist war might also be used by the Soviets to justify other punitive changes in the frontiers of central Europe--possibly the secession of Transylvania to Hungary as a reward for loyalty and punishment to Rumania for its defiance of Soviet authority (see below).

Instability in Poland

Another potential source of instability in Eastern Europe is Poland. Here there are several possibilities: modernizing trends paralleling those of Czechoslovakia 1968; a simple popular revolt by a population which since the reforms of 1956 has largely experienced actual regression; and the emergence of a simple nationalist challenge to Soviet hegemony rather on the Rumanian model--that is to say, not necessarily accompanied by internal liberalization but expressing a traditional kind of hyper-Polish nationalism. Poland took such a beating in the last war (one in ten killed) that it is entirely possible that the romantic streak in the Polish character has been eradicated forever. But this is not certain, and the country still seems a potential storm center. In the initial stages of any Soviet intervention, at least, Soviet forces might meet formidable resistance.

An East German Replay of the 1968 Czechoslovak Crisis

This scenario is not difficult to describe; it merely plays the events of 1968 in an East German context, with the exception that there

are already substantial Soviet forces on East German soil--although these may be reduced during the 1970's. Nevertheless, the East German regime during the next decade might adopt either a liberal cast or a kind of hyper-nationalist Prussian-Socialist defiance of both the "corrupt" capitalism of West Germany and Soviet domination. Such an East Germany would not necessarily subordinate itself to the Soviet Union; its internal stability by 1975-80 might have been achieved through reconciliation with the East German proletariat and lower middle classes. And such an East German government, either Prussian-Socialist or liberal, might actually exert considerable appeal for the disenchanted youth of West Germany. (This last is a related scenario for trouble in Western Europe--a West Germany in which the young are increasingly radicalized and come into violent conflict with the established order: a kind of Marcusian New Left state of mind leading them to attack the old "corrupt, ex-Nazi Establishment." Such a youth movement might logically, or illogically, find some identification with the East German regime in the post-Ulbricht era.)

A Punitive Dismemberment of Rumania*

The Soviet Union grows increasingly annoyed with the Rumanian challenge to its integration plans and either foments rebellion in Transylvania or intervenes militarily, as in the Czechoslovak case in 1968. It then detaches the Transylvanian province from Rumania, granting it to Hungary. A thoroughly plausible case can be made for such a

*See below for a note on current developments affecting Romanian-Soviet relations and the plausibility of this--and the following--scenario.

dismemberment since there are, depending on how they are counted, and by whom, nearly as many, or perhaps even more, Hungarians in the region than the Rumanians themselves.

Soviet Annexation of Eastern Europe

Not unrelated to the scenarios above in which the Soviet Union plays on ethnic difficulties throughout Eastern and Central Europe is the possibility that the Soviet Union, increasingly perplexed by the problem of the recurrent satellite nationalist challenges, decides to incorporate Eastern Europe, substituting direct Soviet control for indirect.

There is some evidence that annexation of at least part of the region was in fact the Soviet intention after World War II. The Baltic states which had been by historical precedent part of the Czarist Empire were seized in 1940 and reincorporated in 1945. Large areas of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania were similarly seized. If, as is possible, the Soviet Union will continue to meet the kind of challenge that Czechoslovakia posed in 1968 and Hungary in 1956 (and we consider this entirely likely), the Soviet Union which has seen itself in Czechoslovakia forced to rely increasingly on its own mechanisms of control may decide that incorporation into the already multinational federated Soviet Union is the best way out. It can argue also that the preceding two or three decades of Communist rule in Eastern Europe will have sufficiently closed the gap between the societies in Eastern and Central Europe on the one hand and in the Soviet Union itself.

Nationality Troubles on the Soviet-Asian Frontier

Not implausibly, however, a Soviet Union which might seek to move on its European front could find itself infected by the same nationality

problems which have bedeviled other multinational states--in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tadjikistan, etc. So far the Asiatic nationalities of the Soviet Union have been pretty badly overmatched by Soviet police power, but it is not impossible to conceive of a national liberation movement beginning in the area, especially if (see below) the Chinese were to offer encouragement.

A Chinese Sponsored National Liberation Struggle

While Chinese interventions into the European situation today largely take the form of diplomatic and economic activity supporting the dissident Communist forces in the region, not wildly implausible scenario for Chinese action indirectly affecting Europe in a decisive way is the following: in the late 1970's the Chinese achieve a respectable thermo-nuclear capacity, sufficient to deter the Soviets from any attack on China itself by nuclear means. Operating under this overarching balance of terror the Chinese might then seek to do what so many American analysts in the early sixties considered likely for the Soviets--namely to make conventional probes against the Soviet Union, all the while avoiding the risk of large-scale conventional war.

The ability of the Chinese to stimulate national liberation movements among the Asiatic minorities of the Soviet Union would depend, of course, to some degree on the actual attractiveness of the Chinese Communist state itself. The China of the mid- and late 1970's may not be less attractive than the Soviet Union as judged by the Asiatic nationalities. On the other hand, the Chinese suffer the considerable handicap of a bad historical record--steady expansion by the Han, or ethnic Chinese people against the "barbarian" minorities on their borders.

This would be a powerful deterrent to any rising stimulated by Peking taking hold in the Soviet border regions. Similarly, the well known Chinese lack of tact when dealing with non-Chinese peoples could hinder the spread of the movement.

A possibility therefore might be less of spontaneous local uprising than a Chinese effort to infiltrate saboteurs and other irregular forces to work up a crisis in which China's by no means illegitimate claims to the lost regions could be brought to the fore--conceivably before the U.N., assuming that China will soon be a member, or simply before the bar of world opinion, for whatever that might be worth.

A Soviet Debacle in the Middle East or Elsewhere

The process of disintegration and rebellion in the Soviet Union would be powerfully stimulated, of course, by a debacle for the ruling elite. Revolutions usually are far less the outcome of economic deprivation than a function of the declining competency and reputation for competency of the ruling elite. It is significant that the Russian revolution of 1905 and the subsequent revolution of 1917 both occurred in the context of Russian military defeats. It is difficult to see the Soviet Union in the 1970's suffering the kind of debacle Czarist Russia suffered in 1917; but a failure in the style of the Russo-Japanese War is not entirely impossible--as the American agony in Vietnam gives evidence.

A superpower, in the last third of the twentieth century, may very well find itself losing or doing badly in an overseas limited war. It will do badly possibly because the risk of escalation is too high, because the economic or social costs of the war begin to outweigh the potential gains, etc. In such a case, the failure overseas will have a

feedback effect, increasing social dissidence at home and making it difficult for the superpower to pursue its original goal.

A plausible locus for such an overseas disaster (or discomfiture to be more accurate) would be the Middle East: conceivably in a new Arab-Israeli war the Soviet Union might engage its forces in one degree or another (at the very least at the advisory level as did the United States in the early stages of the Vietnamese war) and nevertheless suffer defeat. An Egyptian military defeat, for example, suffered even though several thousand Soviet advisors had been present would severely shake the reputation of the Soviet arm; and by extension of the Soviet ruling elite.

Similarly the Soviet Union might find itself meeting a military check in one of the Central European insurrections outlined above--conceivably in an invasion attempt on Poland which might meet considerable resistance, either with or without Czechoslovak forces fighting alongside. A bogged-down war in Central Europe--one that extends over a two or three week period and ends in a stalemate through external intervention (by the U.N., U.S., etc.) might very well be a catalytic event in the Soviet Union itself.

C. A NOTE ON THE CURRENT SITUATION

Certain current developments in Eastern Europe cannot be discussed as a scenario. Soviet pressure upon Rumania, and indirectly upon Yugoslavia, has become acute at the same time that Chinese diplomacy has become very active in Eastern Europe. The U.S.S.R. on August 18th accused Rumania of organizing an "anti-Soviet" bloc in the Balkans under American and Chinese patronage. Implausible as this charge may be, it

clearly reflects Soviet anxieties over both the Sino-American rapprochement and the stubborn endurance of Rumanian autonomist and nationalist impulses. Rumania, of course, restated its commitment to "independence and full freedom to establish friendly relations with all socialist countries, including China," and Premier Ceausescu challenged the idea that any one Communist party can properly claim to be the "center" or "leader" of Communism--a fairly provocative reiteration of Rumania's well-established opposition to the claims made by the Brezhnev Doctrine. The Rumanians, according to press accounts, again rejected a Soviet demand to send troops into Rumania on their way to maneuvers in Bulgaria. Rumania is cultivating its relations with Yugoslavia, while Chinese-sponsored Albania has been seeking an improved relationship with its old enemy Yugoslavia (as well as with Greece). What is emerging in the Balkans seems a tacit alliance of expediency among the three dissident or deviant socialist states, with China intervening in the situation to exploit Soviet difficulties. The probabilities, no doubt, are that the present tensions, like those which repeatedly have arisen over the last few years (but also have cumulatively deepened), will stop at a point short of war, or an open break between the Balkan States and the U.S.S.R. But the possibility that the Soviet Union will move against Rumania cannot be disregarded. In the Soviet view Rumania is an increasingly troublesome and threatening problem. China's role is exceedingly offensive. It might seem that if Rumanian intransigence has to be overcome--by subversion or coup, or by military and political pressures, or even by invasion--it would be better for the U.S.S.R. to wait until Yugoslavia enters what may be a troubled post-Titoist period. But the timing of

Tito's exit from the political scene cannot be predicted, and Yugoslavia now seems moving back from some of the separatist and ethnic-national tensions which were prominent during the last two years. The Yugoslavs, under Soviet pressure, seem more united today than in recent months, thus with America still engrossed with Vietnam, Europe angry with the United States because of the fiscal crisis, the Chinese-American rapprochement only in its initial stage, and Yugoslavia still troubled with internal conflicts, the present may be a more favorable time for a Soviet move than the immediate future seems entirely likely to present. The scenarios we have presented of Soviet punitive dismemberment of Rumania or even annexation of Eastern Europe could come about much sooner than anyone until now has been disposed to expect. And if the U.S.S.R. should move against Rumania, a major European war is perfectly possible. Czechoslovakia acquiesced in the Soviet invasion of 1968; Hungary's popular revolution of 1956 was doomed to failure when the Soviets invaded, since the government, army, and economy were in drastic disorder. But Rumanian national resistance to Russia, supported by Yugoslavia, could prove formidable, and if the battle lasted for days, weeks, or even longer, it could spread through the Balkans to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia within incalculable repercussions in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland--and elsewhere.

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12. WARSAW VIA AIR AIRPORT TO CROSS THE CZECH REPUBLIC ON.
THIS DATA SHOULD BE KEPT AND COVERED THE CITY
13. PARTY LEADERSHIP ADVANCE AN ULTIMATUM TO CINCOW
14. THIS IS INTERESTING BECAUSE THAT THE TROOPS WILL
INTERFERE. THERE IS A STRONG NATIONALIST REACTION
COUNCIL IN THE COUNTRY OF DISSENT FORBIDS
15. COUNCIL OF THE TROOPS AND THE ARMY COMMAND. BUT
EACH OF THEM WILL HAVE TO BE KEPT IN CONTACT
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17. FATAL DECISION. I WOULD ASK EAST GERMANY AND CZECH
SLOVAKIA TO KEEP THE ARMY UNITS
18. SOVIET FORCES MUST GO TO MOVE INTO POLAND AS DO EAST
GERMAN AND CZECH FORCES.

2. POLES RESIST SILENT, FINE EASTERN PLAN STAYS ARE
ALARMED. MAKE SURE (FOR BEST) 40 CONSISTENTLY TO S.U.

CRISIS

- [illegible]

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1. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANY OTHER COUNTRY.
2. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF COMMERCE OR THE FREEDOM OF TRAVEL.
3. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH OR THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS.
4. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR THE FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE.
5. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY OR THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION.
6. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OR THE FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE.
7. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF PROPERTY OR THE FREEDOM OF CONTRACT.
8. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF LABOR OR THE FREEDOM OF UNION.
9. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF INVESTMENT OR THE FREEDOM OF CAPITAL.
10. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OR THE FREEDOM OF SCIENCE.
11. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF CULTURE OR THE FREEDOM OF EDUCATION.
12. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF ARTS OR THE FREEDOM OF LETTERS.
13. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF SPORTS OR THE FREEDOM OF RECREATION.
14. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF TOURISM OR THE FREEDOM OF VISITATION.
15. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF TRAVEL OR THE FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE.
16. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF PROPERTY OR THE FREEDOM OF CONTRACT.
17. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF LABOR OR THE FREEDOM OF UNION.
18. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF INVESTMENT OR THE FREEDOM OF CAPITAL.
19. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OR THE FREEDOM OF SCIENCE.
20. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF CULTURE OR THE FREEDOM OF EDUCATION.

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① POLISH POLITICAL SITUATION

1. WITH END OF VIETNAM WAR, U.S. WITHDRAWS FROM FOREIGN INVOLVEMENTS
2. POLITICAL TENDENCY AMONG MAJOR POWERS IS ISOLATION AND STAGNATION
3. IN POLAND, YOUNG ACTIVISTS SUCCEED IN TAKING POWER IN THE CRACOW PARTY COMMITTEE
4. THEY PLAN TO INFLUENCE BUT AVOID CONFRONTATION WITH THE DOMINANT PARTY FRACTIONS, ARE DISCIPLINED EARLY WITHIN PARTY
5. PLANS ARE INADEQUATELY KNOWN TO THE POLISH SECURITY SERVICES
6. GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP DEMANDS DISCIPLINARY ACTION, BUT DEMANDS MEET WITH RESISTANCE, IT REVERTS TO POLICE MEASURES, ARRESTING LEADERS OF MOVEMENT AND SYMPATHETIC PROFESSORS AND INTELLECTUALS
7. THERE IS TRANSMIGRATION TO ARRESTS, LOCAL RESISTANCE SUCCEEDS, REBELS ARE FORCED
8. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT APPARATUS IN CRACOW IS NEUTRALIZED AND REBELS ENJOY WIDE PUBLIC SUPPORT
9. WARSAW LEADERSHIP OVERREACTS AND ORDERS TROOPS INTO CRACOW, GIVES LEADERS ULTIMATUM, TURN TO S.U. FOR ADVICE
10. PUBLIC AGITATION BEGINS AT THIS "OUTSIDER" INTERFERENCE
11. S.U. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BECOMES INVOLVED AT INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLE IN POLISH PARTY, FEARS POLITICS BEING PLACED ABOVE PARTY, PREPARED FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF DRASTIC ACTION
12. WARSAW LEADERS ATTEMPT TO CRUSH THE CRACOW REBELLION, THIS CATALYZES DISORDERS THROUGHOUT THE CITY
13. PARTY LEADERSHIP BROADCASTS AN ULTIMATUM TO CRACOW
14. THIS IS INTERPRETED AS THREAT THAT S.U. TROOPS WILL INTERVENE, THERE IS A STORM OF NATIONALIST PERIODICAL CRISIS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT, DISORDER SPREADS
15. CRACOW LEADERS REQUEST A POLISH GOVERNMENT, BUT PARTY LEADERSHIP REFUSES TO ACCEPT THIS, MAY TAKE ACTION TO CRUSH THE CRACOW REBELLION, INTERVENTION BY THE POLISH GOVERNMENT IS WITHDRAWN, CRACOW INTERVENTION BY CRACOW LEADERS
16. WARSAW LEADERSHIP ATTEMPTS TO CRUSH THE CRACOW REBELLION, BUT LEADERSHIP IS WEAK, CRACOW LEADERSHIP IS WEAK, CRACOW LEADERSHIP IS WEAK
17. FATAL COLLISION BETWEEN POLISH GOVERNMENT AND CRACOW LEADERSHIP, CRACOW LEADERSHIP IS WEAK, CRACOW LEADERSHIP IS WEAK
18. SOVIET FORCES BEGIN TO MOVE INTO POLAND AND TO EAST GERMAN AND A FEW SOVIET FORCES

② POLISH POLITICAL SITUATION

1. POLISH GOVERNMENT IS FORCED TO MOVE AND CRACOW INTERVENTION POLISH GOVERNMENT IS FORCED TO MOVE AND CRACOW INTERVENTION
2. WARSAW LEADERSHIP EARLY CRASHES AND APPEAL TO POLISH GOVERNMENT FOR A FEW SOVIET FORCES
3. S.U. LEADERSHIP EARLY CRASHES AND APPEAL TO POLISH GOVERNMENT FOR A FEW SOVIET FORCES
4. POLISH GOVERNMENT EARLY CRASHES AND APPEAL TO POLISH GOVERNMENT FOR A FEW SOVIET FORCES
5. WESTERN GOVERNMENT EARLY CRASHES AND APPEAL TO POLISH GOVERNMENT FOR A FEW SOVIET FORCES
6. NATO POWERS AGREE TO GROUND DEFEAT, REINFORCEMENT OF FORCES ON CONTINENT AND A MOVE TO EAST GERMAN BORDERS
7. POPULAR LEADERS BEGIN IN EAST GERMAN AND WEST GERMAN INTERVENTION
8. BECAUSE OF SEVERE REBELS AND FIGHTING EAST GERMAN TROOPS LEAVE FROM POLAND
9. WEST GERMAN DEMANDS EAST GERMAN DOMESTIC CEASE FIRE, RESULT IS INTENSIFIED STRUGGLE WITHIN EAST GERMAN, THE EMERGENCE OF DEMANDS FOR A UNITED GERMANY, AND A COMMITMENT OF S.U. FORCES TO EAST GERMAN
10. S.U. LEADERSHIP EARLY CRASHES AND APPEAL TO POLISH GOVERNMENT FOR A FEW SOVIET FORCES
11. POLISH GOVERNMENT EARLY CRASHES AND APPEAL TO POLISH GOVERNMENT FOR A FEW SOVIET FORCES

- CRACOW INTERVENTION
- A. CRACOW LEADERSHIP EARLY CRASHES AND APPEAL TO POLISH GOVERNMENT FOR A FEW SOVIET FORCES
 - B. CRACOW LEADERSHIP EARLY CRASHES AND APPEAL TO POLISH GOVERNMENT FOR A FEW SOVIET FORCES
 - C. CRACOW LEADERSHIP EARLY CRASHES AND APPEAL TO POLISH GOVERNMENT FOR A FEW SOVIET FORCES
 - D. CRACOW LEADERSHIP EARLY CRASHES AND APPEAL TO POLISH GOVERNMENT FOR A FEW SOVIET FORCES
 - E. CRACOW LEADERSHIP EARLY CRASHES AND APPEAL TO POLISH GOVERNMENT FOR A FEW SOVIET FORCES

③ POLISH POLITICAL SITUATION

1. CRACOW LEADERSHIP EARLY CRASHES AND APPEAL TO POLISH GOVERNMENT FOR A FEW SOVIET FORCES
2. CRACOW LEADERSHIP EARLY CRASHES AND APPEAL TO POLISH GOVERNMENT FOR A FEW SOVIET FORCES

- CRACOW INTERVENTION
- A. CRACOW LEADERSHIP EARLY CRASHES AND APPEAL TO POLISH GOVERNMENT FOR A FEW SOVIET FORCES
 - B. CRACOW LEADERSHIP EARLY CRASHES AND APPEAL TO POLISH GOVERNMENT FOR A FEW SOVIET FORCES
 - C. CRACOW LEADERSHIP EARLY CRASHES AND APPEAL TO POLISH GOVERNMENT FOR A FEW SOVIET FORCES
 - D. CRACOW LEADERSHIP EARLY CRASHES AND APPEAL TO POLISH GOVERNMENT FOR A FEW SOVIET FORCES

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- CRISIS OUTCOME**
- QUESTION**
- ANSWER**
- PROL**
- PROCES.**
- ION**
- CEMENT**
- AN**
- PERMAN**
- TY PULLS**
- RE; RESULT**
- EMERGENCE**
- OF S.U.**
- A. U.S.S.R. MAKES A NUCLEAR DEMONSTRATION EXPLOSION IN THE PACIFIC, DEMANDING A RESTORATION OF THE STATUS QUO IN POLAND AND GERMANY, WHICH POWER COUNSEL THE POLS AND WEST GERMANY TO NEGOTIATE
- B. SOVIETS INVADE POLAND BY FORCE, THE U.S. MAKES A NUCLEAR DEMONSTRATION, THE SOVIETS REPLY, ETC.
- C. SOVIETS INEVITABLY THEIR ATTACK ON POLAND WHILE ADDING NUCLEAR EFFECTS, AND THE EAST GERMAN FORCE MAKES A FIGHTING WITH POLAND, THEN PROCEED TO LINK UP WITH OTHER SOVIET FORCES. POLISH GOVERNMENT COMES TO TERMS WITH THE S.U., EAST GERMANY IS, IN EFFECT, ABANDONED TO WEST GERMANY
- D. S.U. MAKES A NUCLEAR STRIKE AGAINST A WEST GERMAN CONTINGENT IN THE EAST GERMANY, NATO DOES NOT RETALIATE
- E. S.U. ACCEPTS INVITATION OF ALL EUROPE (INCLUDING U.S. AND CANADA) SECURITY CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS TERMS AND SETTLEMENTS

4

THE SCENARIO OF A COLD WAR CRISIS

1. URGENT AND PRECIPITATING INCIDENT OF VIOLENCE IN EAST GERMANY OR BERLIN
2. A HIGH LEVEL OF POPULAR AGITATION WITH STREET VIOLENCE FOLLOWS IN EAST GERMANY
3. THE EAST-WEST GERMAN BORDER (OR THE BERLIN WALL) IS OPENED UP AT VARIOUS POINTS BY EAST GERMAN THUGS
4. THERE IS A LIMITED BUT IMPORTANT DEGREE OF INTERVENTION BY WEST GERMAN "VOLUNTEERS"
5. THE SOVIETS DELIVER A WARNING TO WEST GERMANY AND NATO
6. LIMITED EVACUATIONS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES
7. NATO REPLIES TO THE SOVIET WARNING WITH A WARNING AGAINST SOVIET INTERVENTION
8. VIOLENCE AND BORDER CROSSINGS CONTINUE, WITH WEST GERMANS INVOLVED IN LARGE NUMBERS
9. THE SOVIETS INTERVENE, LAUNCHING A LIMITED FORAY ACROSS THE BORDER OR INITIATING OTHER MAJOR VIOLENCE, OR PERHAPS MAKING A NONLETHAL DEMONSTRATION OF NUCLEAR FORCE
10. FURTHER EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES
11. A CESSATION OF OR ABATEMENT IN HOSTILITIES
12. "ARMISTICE" IS VIOLATED
13. MORE EVACUATIONS AND THE INITIATION OF OTHER EMERGENCY READINESS PROGRAMS
14. MORE BORDER CROSSING BY BOTH SIDES
15. ONE SIDE ISSUES AN ULTIMATUM
16. PREPARATION AND COMPLETION OF EMERGENCY READINESS PROGRAMS
17. EITHER THE SOVIETS MAKE A LIMITED ATTACK ON WESTERN EUROPE, DESIGNED TO DEFEAT RESOLVE AND TO SPLIT NATO (WITH THE RISK OF GAINING CAPITULATION, OR PRESSURE FOR CAPITULATION, BY ONE OF THE MAJOR PARTICIPANTS), OR THE U.S. MAKES A LIMITED ATTACK TO DETER THE SOVIETS
18. U.S. ANNOUNCEMENT OF OPEN CITIES AND A CITY-AVOIDANCE STRATEGY
19. SIMILAR NATO ANNOUNCEMENTS OF AN OPEN EUROPE WEST OF THE RHINE, WITH LIKELY SELECTIVE ANNOUNCEMENT OF OPEN AREAS IN GERMANY
20. EITHER THE U.S. OR THE SOVIETS MAKE A LARGE LIMITED FORCE STRIKE WITH VERY SERIOUS WARNING OF CONSEQUENCES, DEMANDING IMMEDIATE SURRENDER, EITHER A FURTHER ULTIMATUM OR AN OFFER FOR A PEACE SETTLEMENT
21. ...

- ON**
- ARE**
- RE**
- S.U.**
- CRISIS OUTCOME**
- A. S.U. FORGIVES IN EUROPE, OTHER EAST EUROPEANS HOSTILE, ISOLATED BY THE U.S. AND INVOLVATIONS IN THEIR TERRITORY, IN ORDER TO LINK UP WITH POLAND BY MEANS OF A LIMITED FORCE OF RETENTION
- B. SOVIETS MAKE A BRUTAL STRIKE IN THE EAST EUROPEANS AND HOSTILE THEMSELVES, POSSIBLY ACCOMPANYING THIS WITH A NUCLEAR STRIKE
- C. EAST EUROPEANS APPEAL TO THE WESTERN COMMUNITY TO SUPPORT THEIR MEDIA STRATEGY, IMPLICITLY APPEALING FOR WESTERN SUPPORT INCLUDING SOME FORM OF NUCLEAR PROTECTION; THIS LEADS TO ONE IN A SERIES OF WESTERN-SOVIET NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION SCENARIOS
- D. ALTERNATIVELY, WEST EUROPEANS BITTERLY BREAK OFF THE EFFORTS TO MEDIATE, BUT PREPARE FOR A POST-CRISIS EXCLUSION OF THE S.U. AND ITS INFLUENCE FROM WESTERN EUROPE, LAYING THE GROUND FOR A GRADUAL EXPULSION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE FROM EUROPE AND A REVERSAL OF THE COLD WAR DIVISION OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT

1.2.5.1

4. THE PROBLEM OF PURPOSE: SURPRISE EXPLOITATION TO WHAT END?

The fundamental problem of surprise or crisis exploitation is the problem of goals for action. Certain general objectives of American policy in Europe are clear. These are to prevent the Soviet conquest (or blackmail) of Western Europe, and also to avoid nuclear war and avert or contain crises which contain within them a risk or promise of major war. These objectives express basic American national interests: war-avoidance, as an expression of the primordial national interest in the physical and political survival of the American nation, and the defense of Europe as an expression of the American national interest that Europe, this major zone of physical and human power and resource, remain free from hostile control. But these, in sum, are defensive interests. While they may imply positive tactics and positive actions in many eventualities, these nearly always--in the nature of the situation--will be addressed to restoring a lost or jeopardized political or strategic position, or even to containing the consequences of such a loss.

It is impossible to exploit a surprising event for strategic gain without a clear, responsible, and politically realistic and attainable definition of positive policy objectives. Otherwise by what standard, or in the light of what goal, are we to judge what an improvement might be? Obviously there are better or worse tactical situations in a military crisis, and advantageous or disadvantageous political developments in a changing situation which may be measurable by criteria unrelated to the major issues of European policy. But in the absence of a definition of positive changes which the United States might wish to see come about in Central and Eastern Europe, the agencies of government are left with the

defensive interests described above, or with certain general policy injunctions concerning the stability of Europe, the preservation of detente, the strengthening of the alliance, etc. These are well enough understood, but their relevance to specific surprises and crises may be anything but clear, and in nearly any particular case other than a frank Soviet military challenge, their effect is almost certain to be conservative, counseling passive, risk reducing, status quo reclaiming behavior--or salvaging as much of the status quo ante as may be feasible after a Soviet initiative or innovation.

CONSERVATIVE BEHAVIOR

A TENDENCY TO PREFER:

(MEANS)

PASSIVE TO ACTIVE BEHAVIOR

FAMILIAR TO NOVEL METHODS

DEFENSIVE TO OFFENSIVE TACTICS

RETRENCHMENT TO EXPANSION OF COMMITMENTS

(ENDS)

STATUS QUO-MAINTAINING TO INTEREST-ADVANCING
GOALS

LOSS-MINIMIZING TO GAIN-MAXIMIZING OPTIONS

UNCERTAINTY AND RISK-REDUCING TO "UTILITY"-
MAXIMIZING POLICIES

NATO as an alliance inevitably is conservative in its response to unexpected situations. It prefers reaction to action, passive to active behavior, familiar actions and programs, resisting novelty, defensive

measures, shrinking from taking even the tactical offensive in any but the hypothetical case of a clear-cut military operation of the kind long-planned as a response to a Soviet attack. Its collective interest is to preserve the status quo, or when the status quo is overturned by an opponent, its instinct again is to restore as much of the familiar structure as can be recovered, rather than to exploit the new situation to improve on the past condition. In short, its institutional instincts--in the absence of clear direction from above--are to minimize losses and reduce risks.

TYPICAL REACTIONS TO "SURPRISES"

1. DON'T ROCK THE BOAT.
2. CONSIDER OPTIONS IN TERMS OF CATASTROPHIC CHOICES.
3. IGNORE LONG-TERM GOALS AND INTERESTS IN THE PRESS OF SHORT-TERM URGE TO CONTAIN THE WORST CONSEQUENCES.
4. TRY TO "LOOK GOOD" BY CONTRAST WITH OPPONENT.
5. EFFORT BY GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES TO CAPITALIZE ON THE CRISIS TO PROMOTE THEIR OWN INTERESTS: "RAISE THE MILITARY BUDGET," "BUILD UP NATO," ETC.
6. WAIT FOR "NEXT TIME."

These conservative tendencies infect nearly all government staffs, and become acute in international bodies where the institutional conservatism of individual national members becomes mutually reinforced. This problem can be overcome only by conscious action from above, establishing positive objectives. But what positive objectives are reasonable, politically responsible, and attainable in Eastern and Central Europe today?

With respect to Central and Eastern Europe, and the Balkans, the United States has not since the early 1950's possessed a policy designed positively to alter the strategic and political situation. The public policy of "liberation" of Eastern Europe, or of "rollback," associated with the late Secretary of State Dulles, possessed a fundamental flaw as an action policy in that, ultimately, it involved a threat of war which the United States actually was not willing to accept. The most fundamental Soviet security interests were bound up in Eastern Europe. Nonetheless it was not merely a rhetorical policy; it articulated an action program that had begun as early as the 1946-1948 years of developing East-West confrontation, and accelerated with the Greek Civil War and the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc. Through guerrilla operations, the support of underground political organizations in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and through radio and other political warfare operations from Western Europe, the Western powers actively worked to overthrow the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and to sponsor subversive and disintegrative forces within Soviet Russia. As a result of the Philby Case, the major British-American-sponsored guerrilla operation against the Communist regime in Albania between 1946 and 1952 has become known, as well as the Western support given to Ukrainian nationalists and Russian "solidarist" (NTS) movement. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation (as it was then known) functioned in those years not as "American" stations but as the voices of the East European and Russian political oppositions. Exiled government officials, political party and trade union leaders, journalists and artists, broadcast to their home countries in much the manner in which exiles from Nazi-occupied Europe broadcast over the BBC during the war years. The problem was that

there was no actual war, only a war of subversion, propaganda, and political action; hence "liberation" remained an intangible promise.

When liberation suddenly acquired a real shape and possibility in the Hungarian Revolt and Polish Mutiny of 1956, the Western powers discovered themselves unable to give it decisive support. The desiderium of liberation ran into a primordial Soviet national security perception and policy. No doubt because the Western powers had allowed "liberation" to slip into a merely rhetorical stance, or had never seriously dealt with its real possibilities and risks in their planning, they proved in the event unwilling or unable to find any positive resolution for their policy other than a military intervention which they were, for good reason, unwilling to carry out. The rebellions in Eastern Europe collapsed; the Western-sponsored exile groups subsequently, if only by implication, gave up their claim to constitute political alternatives for their lands, and Western clandestine operations shifted away from political action. Since then, as the Czechoslovak events of 1968 clearly confirmed, the thrust of Western policy in Eastern Europe has been to preserve stability and the detente in Soviet Western relations, and only within that canon to do what might be done to mitigate the political conditions of the East European peoples or, in some tactical circumstances, to embarrass Soviet policy or discredit Soviet propaganda. There has been no positive goal to take the place of the abandoned goal of liberation. Liberation, no doubt, had in any event ceased to be a serious Western objective after Stalin died and the detente emerged under the Soviet leadership of Nikita Krushchev. As for alternate methods or programs for altering the Central and Eastern European situation, they tended after 1956 to be discredited, or disregarded, because liberation had been a costly failure.

Today the criticism still can be heard within the West that the Western powers only react to Soviet moves; that the initiative invariably is conceded to the Soviet Union and its allies, and the West, confronted with such faits accomplis as the Berlin Wall, is condemned to make the best of the situation, ratifying the Soviet gain under protest. This criticism ordinarily is coupled with the argument that the United States and its allies should turn the same tactics against the Soviets, again interfering or sponsoring subversion in Eastern Europe, aggressively capitalizing on discontent or rebellions there, and imposing upon the Russians the choice between acquiescence or world war.

But it is reasonably clear today--as it has been since at least the mid-1950's--that neither the Western governments nor the Western publics have the will to conduct a risk-taking and aggressive policy. Especially today, when the detente has relaxed tensions and the fear of a war in the West, and has multiplied cultural and economic links with Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R., and the United States has become preoccupied with Asia and undergone a considerable disillusionment with policies of intervention, and as the Soviet leadership itself has lost many of the totalitarian qualities it possessed under Stalin, an aggressive Western program has become politically unsupportable. Indeed, among Western political and academic elites there has emerged some conviction of "convergence" between Western and Soviet systems as both move more deeply into advanced industrial and post-industrial society. These predictions have found an echo in dissident Soviet scientific and artistic circles, where the argument has been made that Russia and America should give up their old political and ideological conflict in order cooperatively to meet the new "global" problems of

industrial/technological society. Indeed, the simple passage of years has tended to ratify the status quo of a divided Europe. Even the German problem--the great outstanding issue--has in the past two years advanced towards, not solution, but regularization.

THE SHIFTING WEST EUROPEAN-AMERICAN
SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

1950'S

COMMON PERCEPTION OF GREAT RISK.

COMMON DEFENSE EFFORT DOMINATES: COSTS, TRADE-OFFS, BURDEN SHARING CONSIDERED "DETAILS" TO BE FILLED IN.

POLITICAL VISION OF "ATLANTIC WORLD" OR "ATLANTIC COMMON-WEALTH" WIDELY ACCEPTED, AT LEAST IN GENERAL TERMS.

EUROPEAN GRATITUDE FOR U.S. AID, DEFENSE; EUROPEAN RESPECT FOR AMERICAN POLICY AND LEADERSHIP; AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL DOMINANCE IN STRATEGIC STUDIES, THEORY; AMERICAN POLITICAL DOMINANCE.

RESIDUAL EUROPEAN LACK OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONFIDENCE, A LEGACY OF WORLD WAR II.

UNSHAKEN AMERICAN CONFIDENCE IN SELF AND IN U.S. "MISSION."

1960'S

DIVERGING DEFINITIONS OF RISK; EUROPEANS TEND TO EMPHASIZE DETENTE MORE, RISKS LESS, THAN AMERICANS.

NATO COMMON EFFORT FORMALIZED, BUREAUCRATIZED; COSTS AND RELATIVE BURDEN-SHARING A MAJOR PREOCCUPATION; GROWING U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEM; DECLINING EUROPEAN WILLINGNESS TO SACRIFICE FOR FORCE-LEVEL GOALS, MAINTAIN CONSCRIPTION, ETC. FRANCE WITHDRAWS FROM NATO MILITARY COOPERATION.

EUROPEAN POLITICAL VISION DIVIDED: GAULLIST NATIONALISM, COMMON MARKET "EUROPEANISM," "DUMBBELL" MODEL OF ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP, RIVAL THE OLD ATLANTIC VISION. INCREASING AMERICAN PREOCCUPATION WITH THE THIRD WORLD; AND AFTER 1965 VIETNAM DOMINATES AMERICAN POLICY; NATO DEFINITELY SUBORDINATED IN PRACTICE, IF NOT THEORY, TO U.S. VIETNAM NEEDS.

EVOLVING EUROPEAN EMOTIONAL AND MORAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM AMERICA; DOUBTS, HOSTILITY, TOWARDS VIETNAM WAR, AND TOWARDS U.S. POLICY-MAKING AND THEORETICAL PROCESSES TIED TO VIETNAM. EUROPEAN DISINCLINATION TO CHALLENGE AMERICA OR WEAKEN NATO ALLIANCE, ALTHOUGH MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO SUFFERS FROM BOTH U.S. AND EUROPEAN ACTIONS--THE LATTER REFLECTING NEED TO LIMIT INTIMACY WITH AMERICAN POLICY AS WELL AS DIFFERENT RISK PERCEPTION. NONETHELESS ULTIMATE EUROPEAN RELIANCE ON AMERICA REMAINS, REINFORCED BY CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968.

GROWING EUROPEAN SELF-CONFIDENCE, CHIEFLY DUE TO COMMON MARKET ECONOMIC SUCCESS, GROWING SENSE OF INDUSTRIAL, COMMERCIAL, TECHNOLOGICAL POWER.

1970'S

SHARED AND FAIRLY LOW SENSE OF RISK; EUROPEANS AND AMERICANS BOTH CULTIVATING DETENTE, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ACCORD WITH U.S.S.R. AND EASTERN EUROPE.

NATO COOPERATION WEAKENED, AT POLICY LEVEL AT LEAST, BY DIVERGENT EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN VIEWS OF BURDEN SHARING, ECONOMIC CRISIS, AMERICAN "NEO-ISOLATIONISM" AND ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM. MARKED EUROPEAN SENSE OF DIFFERENTIATION FROM AMERICA, SKEPTICISM ABOUT AMERICAN POLITICAL AND DOMESTIC STABILITY, ANGER AT AMERICAN FISCAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES.

"EUROPEAN" NUCLEAR FORCE AND COMMON POLITICAL AND FISCAL POLICIES ARE ENHANCED PROSPECTS AS THE COMMON MARKET EXPANDS. ECONOMIC RIVALRY WITH U.S. (AND JAPAN) GROWS.

TENTATIVE INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN INITIATIVES IN EASTERN EUROPE; WEST GERMAN "OSTPOLITIK" GENERALLY JUDGED BY EUROPEANS TO BE SUCCESSFUL (DESPITE AMERICAN DOUBTS); CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF WEST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE.

EUROPEAN SELF-CONFIDENCE FAIRLY HIGH, BUT PERHAPS LESS HIGH IN THIS PERIOD, WHEN AMERICAN DISENGAGEMENT SEEMS A REAL--AND IN SOME WAYS THREATENING--POSSIBILITY, THAN IT WAS IN THE LATE 1960'S. GENERAL UNWILLINGNESS SERIOUSLY TO CONFRONT THE POSSIBILITIES OF EAST EUROPEAN CRISIS.

① SIX DISTINCTIONS OF POLICY

1. NATO AS AN INSTRUMENT VS. NATO AS A VALUE
2. EUROPEAN RECONCILIATION VS. EUROPEAN UNIFICATION
3. DISENGAGEMENT DESIGNED TO MITIGATE COLD WAR VS. SETTLEMENT DESIGNED TO RATIFY COLD WAR'S "END"
4. EAST GERMAN LIBERATION VS. ALL-GERMAN REUNIFICATION
5. LIMITED TREATY RESTRICTIONS VS. "PERPETUAL" RESTRICTIONS
6. NEUTRALIZATION VS. DISARMAMENT

② A PROGRAM FOR NORMALIZATION

1. THE WESTERN ALLIES EXPLICITLY CONDEMN INTERVENTION AND SPECIFICALLY THE 1956 HUNGARY INTERVENTION, REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE ITS AFTERMATH OR TO REGARD AS LEGITIMATE ITS EFFECTS.
2. THE WESTERN ALLIES SEEK NEGOTIATIONS FOR A EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT ON "NORMALIZATION" TERMS, ACKNOWLEDGING AND PROVIDING PRACTICAL CATEGORIES FOR SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS ALONG THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN DEFENSIVE CORRIDOR.
3. THE WESTERN ALLIES DECLARE THE PRACTICE OF NONINTERVENTION TO BE A SINE QUA NON OF DETENTE, AND SPECIFICALLY OF ARMS CONTROL TREATY AND GOOD COMMERCIAL/ TRADING RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.
4. THE WESTERN ALLIES PRACTICE NONINTERVENTION WITH RESPECT ESPECIALLY TO SUCH POTENTIAL OR CONCEIVABLE CRISIS AREAS AS GREECE, SPAIN, ITALY, AND THEY ENFORCE SOVIET NONINTERVENTION IN SUCH AREAS.
5. ENFORCEMENT MEASURES TO BE CONTINGENT IN INTENSITY AND DURATION UPON THE SCALE AND DURATION OF THE OPPOSING INTERVENTIONS (INTO EITHER EASTERN OR WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS' AFFAIRS), AND DIRECT, THROUGH PROXIES OR BY MEANS OF SUPPORT FOR ONE OR ANOTHER CONTENDING GROUP OR FACTION.

④ NORMALIZATION GOALS

THE OBJECTIVES ARE:

1. TO OBTAIN A WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET MILITARY FORCES AND POLITICAL AGENCIES--AND REMOVE THE THREAT OF SOVIET INTERVENTION--FROM THE NATIONS OF EASTERN EUROPE IN ORDER TO RECREATE A EUROPE OF STABLE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS.
2. TO PREVENT SOVIET INTERVENTION IN, AND EXPLOITATION OF, DETERIORATION--OR "SURPRISES"--IN THE ESTABLISHED ORDER OF STABILITY IN EUROPE AS A WHOLE.

THIS MEANS ESTABLISHING NONINTERVENTION AS A PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT IN EUROPE.

⑥ EUROPEAN NORMALIZATION IMPLIES:

- A. GENERAL CONFORMITY OF SECURITY MACHINERY TO NATURE AND SCALE OF THREATS
- B. THE PRIMARY RELIANCE ON DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL MEANS INSTEAD OF PRIMARILY MILITARY MEANS TO MAINTAIN BALANCE
- C. GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT WORLD WAR II CLOSED

⑤ THIS POLICY

1. IS CONSISTENT WITH THE "NIXON DOCTRINE," AND INDEED IS INDISPENSABLE TO A LONG-TERM POLICY OF REDUCING THE AMERICAN PRESENCE IN EUROPE.
2. ACCOMMODATES THE AMERICAN PUBLIC MOOD OF DOMESTIC PREOCCUPATION, DISILLUSIONMENT WITH FOREIGN INTERVENTION AND CONFLICT; CONFORMS TO THE REALITIES OF A WEAKENED DOLLAR AND AMERICAN TRADE BALANCE.
3. RESPONDS TO THE EMERGING EUROPEAN IMPULSE TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE, FISCAL AND POLITICAL UNITY IN ADDITION TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION, A "EUROPEAN IDENTITY."
4. BUT DO THESE THINGS CREATIVELY, ESTABLISHING A POSITIVE GOAL FOR AMERICAN POLICY, MAKING AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL FROM EUROPE RECOGNIZED WITH SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, REDEFINING EUROPEAN POLITICS RATHER THAN DESTABILIZING THEM, TURNING DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL CRISIS INTO AN ADVANTAGE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF LONG-TERM EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PEACE AND FREEDOM.

⑧ THE PAST REVISITED:
WHAT MIGHT WE HAVE DONE?

HUNGARY 1956: UNITED NATIONS RECOGNITION OF NAGY GOVERNMENT WITH IMMEDIATE DISPATCH OF NEUTRALIZERS AND DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION DURING THE THIN LULL BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND SOVIET INTERVENTIONS; U.S. AND ALLIED (1) RENUNCIATION OF A MILITARY INTERVENTION IN HUNGARY; (2) URGING OF A NEUTRAL, "AUSTRIAN" STATUS FOR HUNGARY TO BE MULTILATERALLY GUARANTEED; (3) ASSURED THE U.S.S.R. OF WESTERN ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND RESPECT FOR THE PERMANENT SOVIET SECURITY INTEREST IN THE HUNGARIAN AREA; (4) ELABORATION IN FORCEFUL TERMS TO THE U.S.S.R. OF THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY REPRISALS TO FOLLOW A SOVIET ATTACK UPON HUNGARY.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1968: U.S. AND ALLIED COMMUNICATING TO THE SOVIET UNION, PRIOR TO THE INVASION, THAT INTERVENTION WAS THE CONDITION OF CONTINUED EAST-WEST RELATIONS, CONTINUED AND EXPANDED TRADE, FURTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, ISSUED THAT NEUTRALITY WAS INDISPENSIBLE TO THE CONFIDENCE WHICH UNDERLIES EXISTING ARMS AGREEMENTS. PROPOSED TO THE SOVIET GUARANTEES OF CZECHOSLOVAK AUTONOMY, AND POLITICAL AND MILITARY NEUTRALITY, IN EUROPE, AND FOR LARGER EUROPEAN SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS AIMS TO PROVIDE TO THE U.S.S.R. WITH A REVISED FORM OF SECURITY GUARANTEES AND PROTECTION OF ITS ESSENTIAL POLITICAL INTERESTS IN EASTERN EUROPE.

660.1

GOAL OF NORMALIZATION

PROGRAM FOR NORMALIZATION

EXPLICITLY CONDEMN INTERVENTION,
THE BRINKMAN DOCTRINE, REFUSING TO
LEGITIMIZATION OR TO REGARD AN ILLEGITIMATE

SEEK NEGOTIATIONS FOR A EUROPEAN
NORMALIZATION" TERM, ACKNOWLEDGING
POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS FOR SOVIET SECURITY
IN CENTRAL EUROPEAN DEFENSE GLACIS.

DECLARE THE PRACTICE OF NONINTER-
VENTION, QUANTUM OF DETENTE, AND SPECIFIC
TRUST AND GOOD COMMERCIAL/

PRACTICE NONINTERVENTION WITH
TO SUCH POTENTIAL OR CONCEIVABLE
GREECE, SPAIN, ITALY, AND THEY ENFORCE
STABILITY IN SUCH AREAS.

ES TO BE CONTINGENT IN INTENSITY
THE SCALE AND DURATION OF THE
TIONS (INTO EITHER EASTERN OR
ATIONS' AFFAIRS), AND DIRECT, NOT
BY MEANS OF SUPPORT FOR ONE OR
GROUP OR FACTION.

MEAN NORMALIZATION IMPLIES:

UNITY OF SECURITY MACHINERY TO REAL
LE OF THREATS

LIANCE ON DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL
F PRIMARILY MILITARY MEANS TO

US THAT WORLD WAR II CLOSED

PAST REVISITED:

MIGHT WE HAVE DONE?

UNITED NATIONS RECOGNITION OF THE IMPL
IMMEDIATE DISPATCH OF NEUTRAL OBSER-
REPRESENTATION DURING THE THREE DAY
AND SECOND SOVIET INTERVENTIONS. RAPID
RENUNCIATION OF A MILITARY INTEREST IN
OF A NEUTRAL, "AUSTRIAN" STATUS FOR
LATERALLY GUARANTEED; (3) ASSURANCES TO
ERN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND RESPECT FOR
SECURITY INTEREST IN THE HUNGARIAN
IN FORCEFUL TERMS TO THE U.S.S.R. OF
MIC AND MILITARY REPRISALS THAT COULD
CK UPON HUNGARY.

1968: U.S. AND ALLIED COMMUNICATION
PRIOR TO THE INVASION, THAT NON-
CONDITION OF CONTINUED DETENTE IN
CONTINUED AND EXPANDED TRADE RELATIONS,
NEGOTIATIONS--IMPLIES THAT NONINTERVEN-
LE TO THE CONFIDENCE WHICH UNDERLAY
ENTS. PROPOSALS TO THE SOVIETS FOR
SLOVAK AUTONOMY, AND POLITICAL AND
IN EUROPE, AND FOR LARGER ALL-
OTATIONS ABLE TO PROVIDE THE U.S.S.R.
F SECURITY GUARANTEES AND PRESERVATI
POLITICAL INTERESTS IN EASTERN EUROPE.

3 THE OBJECTIVES OF NORMALIZATION

TO SUBSTITUTE POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS FOR
MILITARY ONES.

TO MAKE MILITARY PENALTIES AND PRESSURES THE ULTIMATE
RESORT, AND THE PENALTY FOR A BROKEN "NORMALIZATION,"
RATHER THAN THE IMMEDIATE AND CONVENTIONAL TERMS OF
EAST-WEST POWER RELATIONSHIPS.

TO END THE DIVISION OF EUROPE.

TO RESTORE NORMALITY TO THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS AND
RELATIONS OF THE EAST EUROPEAN STATES BY REMOVING FOREIGN
TROOPS FROM THEIR TERRITORIES.

TO END THE DEPLOYMENT ON EUROPEAN SOIL OF AMERICAN
FORCES.

TO RATIFY IN CREATIVE AND LASTING TERMS THE EUROPEAN
DETENTE.

7 A STRATEGY OF NORMALIZATION

1. DETERMINATION AND PROMULGATION, IN CONSULTATION
WITH AMERICAN ALLIES, OF THE GENERAL TERMS OF A
EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT AND SECURITY "NORMALIZATION"
ACCEPTABLE TO U.S.
2. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO OBTAIN THIS THROUGH
NEGOTIATION.
3. EXPLOITATION, THROUGH POLITICAL AND MILITARY MEAS-
URES, OF CRISES AND DIPLOMATIC "SURPRISES" TO
ADVANCE TOWARD THE GOAL OF NORMALIZATION.
4. GENERAL CONFORMITY OF SECURITY MACHINERY TO REAL
NATURE AND SCALE OF THREATS.
5. PRIMARY RELIANCE ON DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL
MEANS INSTEAD OF PRIMARILY MILITARY MEANS TO
MAINTAIN BALANCE.
6. GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT WORLD WAR II CLOSED.

9 THE ROMANIAN FORMULA FOR TERMS OF AN ALL- EUROPEAN SECURITY SETTLEMENT:

"ALL FOREIGN TROOPS ARE TO WITHDRAW
FROM THE TERRITORY OF OTHER STATES."

61 a 2

[illegible]

THESE PROBLEMS HAVE INTERESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TIME FACTOR IN THE LIFE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS. FIRST, THE CONSTITUTION IS INTERESTING, RAPIDLY REFORMED, AND THE REFORMS ARE INTERESTING. SECOND, THE REFORMS ARE INTERESTING, RAPIDLY REFORMED, AND THE REFORMS ARE INTERESTING. THIRD, THE REFORMS ARE INTERESTING, RAPIDLY REFORMED, AND THE REFORMS ARE INTERESTING. FOURTH, THE REFORMS ARE INTERESTING, RAPIDLY REFORMED, AND THE REFORMS ARE INTERESTING. FIFTH, THE REFORMS ARE INTERESTING, RAPIDLY REFORMED, AND THE REFORMS ARE INTERESTING. SIXTH, THE REFORMS ARE INTERESTING, RAPIDLY REFORMED, AND THE REFORMS ARE INTERESTING. SEVENTH, THE REFORMS ARE INTERESTING, RAPIDLY REFORMED, AND THE REFORMS ARE INTERESTING. EIGHTH, THE REFORMS ARE INTERESTING, RAPIDLY REFORMED, AND THE REFORMS ARE INTERESTING. NINTH, THE REFORMS ARE INTERESTING, RAPIDLY REFORMED, AND THE REFORMS ARE INTERESTING. TENTH, THE REFORMS ARE INTERESTING, RAPIDLY REFORMED, AND THE REFORMS ARE INTERESTING.

[illegible][illegible]

SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS ABLE TO
USED FORM OF SECURITY GUARANTY

A TOLAND 10-1 AM-17FE-571U

EAST GERMAN HERETICAL MOVEMENT (AS IN 1953. ON
HUNGARY IN 1946)

PLEBISCITE

DEMULTIPLIED TO EAST OF OILIN

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}, \quad B = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}, \quad C = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

ANOTHER THREAT (EVENT). NEW GOVERNMENT. THEN PAUSE
BEFORE 'S'VET OR OTHER COMMUNIST INTERVENTION.
APPEAL FOR HELP TO DISCOURAGE INTERVENTION)

SUPPORT OF NEW GOVERNMENT WITH VISIBLE, IF TOREX,
SUPPORT (AS IN THE SENDING OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT
AND TROOPS TO CUBA)

INTERNATIONAL FORCE (UN OR NOW ON)

②

[illegible]

SECRET
JAN 11 1968
U.S. AND ALLIED COMMUNICATION
SECURITY

...NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIETS FOR THE U.S. R. ...

A TOLAND 10-1 AM-17FE-571U

EAST GERMAN HERETICAL MOVEMENT (AS IN 1953. ON
HUNGARY IN 1946)

PLEBISCITE

DEMULTIPLIED TO EAST OF OILIN

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}, \quad B = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}, \quad C = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

ANOTHER THREAT (EVENT). NEW GOVERNMENT. THEN PAUSE BEFORE 'S' VICTOR OR OTHER COMMUNIST INTERVENTION. APPEAL FOR HELP TO DISCOURAGE INTERVENTION.

SUPPORT OF NEW GOVERNMENT WITH VISIBLE, IF TOREX, SUPPORT (AS IN THE SENDING OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT AND TROOPS TO CUBA)

INTERNATIONAL FORCE (UN OR NOW ON)

5

- See the following pages for greater detail

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THE ACTION PRINCIPLE OF A DYNAMIC POLICY

IN A CRISIS OR "SURPRISE" TO RAISE THE STAKES IN CALCULATED AND RESPONSIBLE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY WAYS, SO AS TO MAKE NORMALIZATION THE PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE FOR THE OPPONENT.

AN UNDERLYING AND INELUCTABLE ASSUMPTION OF A "NORMALIZATION" POLICY:

THAT EUROPE SHOULD BE OPEN TO NEW IDEAS AND POLITICAL CHANGE -IN BOTH EAST AND WEST.

④ THE ROMANIAN FORMULA FOR TERMS OF AN ALL-EUROPEAN SECURITY SETTLEMENT:

"ALL FOREIGN TROOPS ARE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRITORY OF OTHER STATES."

⑤ AN "AUSTRIAN-TYPE" SOLUTION.

CZECHOSLOVAKIAN NONCOMMUNIST OR NONALIGNED MOVEMENT

SOVIET DIFFICULTIES (AGRICULTURAL, SUCCESSION-OF-LEADERSHIP CRISES AT HOME, UNREST OR TITOIST MOVEMENTS AMONG THE BLOC COUNTRIES)

SHOW OF WESTERN RESOLVE INFLUENCING SOVIET DECISION - INTERNATIONAL FORCE

SOVIETS MAY PREFER AUSTRIAN-TYPE SOLUTION RATHER THAN ATTEMPT TO REPEAT "HUNGARY" AND PERHAPS LOSE THE ENTIRE BLOC

⑥ A "FINLAND-TYPE" SOLUTION:

POLISH HERETICAL MOVEMENT

BUFFER STATE STATUS MAINTAINED

SECURITY OF SOVIETS AND OF POLAND MAINTAINED (RECOGNIZED SOVIET INTEREST IN POLISH FOREIGN RELATIONS, MUTUAL DEFENSE PACT, ETC.)

② THE PAST REVISITED: WHAT MIGHT WE HAVE DONE?

HUNGARY 1956: UNITED NATIONS RECOGNITION OF NAGY GOVERNMENT WITH IMMEDIATE DISPATCH OF NEUTRAL VERS AND DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION DURING THE THREE LULL BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND SOVIET INTERVENTIONS. U.S. AND ALLIED (1) RENUNCIATION OF A MILITARY INTERVENTION IN HUNGARY; (2) URGING OF A NEUTRAL, "AUSTRIAN" STATUS FOR HUNGARY TO BE MULTILATERALLY GUARANTEED; (3) ASSURANCE TO THE U.S.S.R. OF WESTERN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND RESPECT FOR THE PERMANENT SOVIET SECURITY INTEREST IN THE HUNGARIAN AREA; (4) ELABORATION IN FORCEFUL TERMS TO THE U.S.S.R. OF THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY REPRISALS THAT WOULD FOLLOW A SOVIET ATTACK UPON HUNGARY.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1968: U.S. AND ALLIED COMMUNITIES TO THE SOVIET UNION, PRIOR TO THE INVASION, THAT NO U.S. INTERVENTION WAS THE CONDITION OF CONTINUED DETENTE IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, CONTINUED AND EXPANDED TRADE AND FURTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS--INDEED THAT NO U.S. INTERVENTION WAS INDISPENSIBLE TO THE CONFIDENCE WHICH UNDERLIES EXISTING ARMS AGREEMENTS. PROPOSALS TO THE SOVIET UNION GUARANTEEING CZECHOSLOVAK AUTONOMY, AND POLITICAL AND MILITARY NEUTRALITY, IN EUROPE, AND FOR LARGER ALL-EUROPEAN SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS ABLE TO PROVIDE THEM WITH A REVISED FORM OF SECURITY GUARANTEES AND PROTECTION OF ITS ESSENTIAL POLITICAL INTERESTS IN EASTERN EUROPE.

⑦ A "POLAND-IRANIAN-TYPE" SOLUTION:

EAST GERMAN HERETICAL MOVEMENT (AS IN 1953, HUNGARY IN 1956)

SOVIET PROBLEMS ELSEWHERE--WEST GERMAN ARMY GUARANTEES AND "FACE-SAVING"

PLEBISCITE

DEMILITARIZED ZONE EAST OF BERLIN

UN FORCE BETWEEN BERLIN AND ODER

⑧ A "CUBAN-TYPE" SOLUTION:

ANOTHER "HUNGARY" (REVOLT, NEW GOVERNMENT, TROOPS BEFORE SOVIET OR OTHER COMMUNIST INTERVENTION, APPEAL FOR HELP TO DISCOURAGE INTERVENTION)

SUPPORT OF NEW GOVERNMENT WITH VISIBLE, IF TANGIBLE, SUPPORT (AS IN THE SENDING OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT AND TROOPS TO CUBA)

INTERNATIONAL FORCE (UN OR NON-UN)

PAST REVISITED:
MIGHT WE HAVE DONE?

UNITED NATIONS RECOGNITION OF THE THREE
IMMEDIATE DISPATCH OF NEUTRAL OBSER-
PRESENTATION DURING THE THREE DAY
SECOND SOVIET INTERVENTIONS. RAPID
DECLARATION OF A MILITARY INTEREST IN
A NEUTRAL, "AUSTRIAN" STATUS FOR
TERMINALLY GUARANTEED, (3) ASSURANCES TO
IN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND RESPECT FOR
SECURITY INTEREST IN THE HUNGARIAN
IN FORCEFUL TERMS TO THE U.S.S.R. OF
IC AND MILITARY REPRISALS THAT COULD
UPON HUNGARY.

68: U.S. AND ALLIED COMMUNICATION
PRIOR TO THE INVASION, THAT NON-
CONDITION OF CONTINUED DETENTE IN
CONTINUED AND EXPANDED TRADE RELATIONS,
NEGOTIATIONS--INDEED THAT NONINTERVEN-
TO THE CONFIDENCE WHICH UNDERLAY
ITS. PROPOSALS TO THE SOVIETS FOR
WAK AUTONOMY, AND POLITICAL AND
IN EUROPE, AND FOR LARGER ALL-
TIATIONS ABLE TO PROVIDE THE U.S.S.R.
SECURITY GUARANTEES AND PRESERVATION
ICAL INTERESTS IN EASTERN EUROPE.

"AUSTRIAN-TYPE" SOLUTION:

ICAL MOVEMENT (AS IN 1953, OR
5)

ELSEWHERE--WEST GERMAN ARMY

"ACE-SAVING"

ZONE EAST OF BERLIN

TEN BERLIN AND ODER

"CUBAN-TYPE" SOLUTION:

(REVOLT, NEW GOVERNMENT, THEN PAUSE
OR OTHER COMMUNIST INTERVENTION,
TO DISCOURAGE INTERVENTION)

VERNMENT WITH VISIBLE, IF TAKEN,
THE SENDING OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT
CUBA)

CE (UN OR NON-UN)

3

7. THE UNITED STATES MUST BE PREPARED

1. A CONFERENCE OF THE ALLIED POWERS OF WORLD WAR II
LEADING TO-
2. A TREATY OF PEACE CALLING FOR:
3. A DIVISION OF GERMANY INTO TWO STATES, WEST AND EAST,
FOR A TERM OF 20 YEARS;
4. A GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE ODER-NEISE FRONTIERS, WITH
MINOR ADJUSTMENTS IN EAST GERMANY'S FAVOR;
5. THE INCORPORATION OF BERLIN, ALL ZONES, AS A FREE CITY
UNDER INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE, ALSO FOR A TERM OF
20 YEARS;
6. FREE ACCESS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST GERMANY, AND BETWEEN
THE TWO GERMANIES AND BERLIN, LIMITED BY MUTUAL AGREE-
MENT OF THE PARTIES TO HOLD IMMIGRATION TO STRICT
QUOTAS, FOR A TERM OF 20 YEARS;
7. BOTH GERMANIES TO FOREGO THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, FOR A TERM OF 20 YEARS;
8. BOTH GERMANIES TO CONTRACT NO ALLIANCES (OTHER THAN
ECONOMIC) FOR A TERM OF 20 YEARS;
9. NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL POLICIES OF THE TWO
GERMAN STATES BY EXTERNAL POWERS, AND BY THE TWO
GERMANIES THEMSELVES;
10. BOTH GERMANIES AGREE TO FOREGO FORCE AS A MEANS OF
ACHIEVING AN EARLIER UNIFICATION OR RECTIFICATION OF
FRONTIERS;
11. ALL POWERS GUARANTEE THE TWO GERMANIES' SECURITY AND
FRONTIERS;
12. WEST GERMANY TO MAINTAIN AN ARMY OF 20 DIVISIONS,
EAST GERMANY 10;
13. ADEQUATE INSPECTION, FOR A TERM OF 20 YEARS;
14. A PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES (SOVIET, U.S.,
U.K., FRENCH) FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE TWO GERMANIES
OVER A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS;
15. AT THE CONCLUSION OF 20 YEARS, THE TWO GERMANIES AND
THE FREE CITY OF BERLIN MAY NEGOTIATE A UNION ON SUCH
TERMS AS ARE MUTUALLY AGREEABLE, WITHOUT INTERFERENCE
BY EXTERNAL POWERS, ACQUIRE SUCH WEAPONS SYSTEMS AS
THEY DESIRE, AND CONTRACT SUCH ALLIANCES AS THEY
DESIRE;
16. NO INDEMNITIES.

9

CAN THERE BE A "PERMANENTLY" DIVIDED GERMANY?

GERMANY NOW HAS BEEN DIVIDED FOR 26 YEARS.

A UNITED GERMANY EXISTED ONLY FROM 1871 TO 1945--AND EVEN
THAT UNION EXCLUDED GERMAN-SPEAKING SWITZERLAND AND, FOR
67 OF THOSE 74 YEARS, AUSTRIA.

THERE ARE TODAY AT LEAST FIVE "GERMANIES": AUSTRIA; THE
WEST GERMAN FEDERATION OF RHINELAND AND LANTINATE (CATHO-
LIC) STATES; THE EAST ("MIDDLE") GERMAN FEDERATION OF
(PROTESTANT) BRANDENBURG-MECKLENBURG-SAXONY-THURINGIA;
THE GERMAN-SPEAKING SWISS CANTONS; AND SILESIA-POMERANIA-
EAST PRUSSIA, NOW RUSSIAN AND POLISH TERRITORIES WITH THE
GERMAN POPULATION LARGELY EXPELLED.

FROM THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES UNTIL NAPOLEON, GERMANY WAS A
COLLECTION OF FEUDAL PRINCIPALITIES; FROM 1814 TO 1871
IT WAS A CONFEDERATION WITHOUT CENTRALIZED POWER--"INCAP-
ABLE OF ATTACK, IMPEGNABLE IN DEFENSE."

SINCE THE TREATY OF ROME, WEST GERMANY HAS BEEN INTEGRATED
INTO A WEST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC UNION WHICH IS EVOLVING
FORMS OF POLITICAL UNITY.

5. EUROPEAN SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS AND THE GOAL OF "NORMALIZATION"*

A European security conference now seems virtually certain to take place during 1972. In the preparations for this conference the question of America's positive policy objectives in Central and Eastern Europe is likely to receive a formal answer, even if the answer may prove to possess unconsidered implications. It is necessary to distinguish in general terms between two kinds of European settlement, either one of which might be sought by the United States and its allies in this conference. The first version of settlement is the one which since the 1950's has been recommended by certain policy analysts and commentators in the West and by certain East European governmental spokesmen. Described in the 1950's and 1960's as "disengagement," it might better in present circumstances be given the title of "normalization." The "norm" of normalization is fairly simple and traditional: all the European states are acknowledged to be autonomous, free from the threat of foreign intervention into their internal affairs and from the presence of foreign troops on their soil; in general, political arrangements and restraints are substituted for the military security arrangements which now dominate the relationship of Eastern and Western powers in Central Europe. No doubt there would be certain generally agreed, and accepted, constraints upon the external policies and perhaps the military forces of Germany, and possibly of the East European nations, as concessions to Soviet security needs and perceptions.

*For an earlier discussion of normalization, its political issues, outcomes, and forms of settlement, see E. Stillman and W. Pfaff, "The Goal of Normalization: United States Security Policy in the 'New' Europe," HI-583-RR, January 25, 1966.

THE GOALS OF NORMALIZATION

TO SUBSTITUTE POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS FOR MILITARY ONES.

TO MAKE MILITARY PENALTIES AND PRESSURES THE ULTIMATE RESORT, AND THE PENALTY FOR A BROKEN "NORMALIZATION," RATHER THAN THE IMMEDIATE AND CONVENTIONAL TERMS OF EAST-WEST POWER RELATIONSHIPS.

TO END THE DIVISION OF EUROPE.

TO RESTORE NORMALITY TO THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS AND RELATIONS OF THE EAST EUROPEAN STATES BY REMOVING FOREIGN TROOPS FROM THEIR TERRITORIES.

TO END THE DEPLOYMENT ON EUROPEAN SOIL OF AMERICAN FORCES.

TO RATIFY IN CREATIVE AND LASTING TERMS THE EUROPEAN DETENTE.

A POLICY OF NORMALIZATION

1. IS CONSISTENT WITH THE "NIXON DOCTRINE," AND INDEED IS INDISPENSABLE TO A LONG-TERM POLICY OF REDUCING THE AMERICAN PRESENCE IN EUROPE.
2. ACCOMMODATES THE AMERICAN PUBLIC MOOD OF DOMESTIC PREOCCUPATION, DISILLUSIONMENT WITH FOREIGN INTERVENTION AND CONFLICT; CONFORMS TO THE REALITIES OF A WEAKENED DOLLAR AND AMERICAN TRADE BALANCE.
3. RESPONDS TO THE EMERGING EUROPEAN IMPULSE TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE, FISCAL AND POLITICAL UNITY IN ADDITION TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION, A "EUROPEAN IDENTITY."
4. BUT DOES THESE THINGS CREATIVELY, ESTABLISHING A POSITIVE GOAL FOR AMERICAN POLICY, MAKING AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL, STABILIZING EUROPEAN POLITICS RATHER THAN DESTABILIZING THEM, TURNING DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL CRISES AND "SURPRISES" TO THE ADVANTAGE OF LONG-TERM EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PEACE AND FREEDOM.

The second form of European settlement is that apparently envisaged in Soviet policy today. It would preserve the present political situation in Eastern Europe, including the Soviet claim to a right to intervene against "anti-socialist" developments within the East European states, but it would make the preservation of this status quo less uncertain and expensive through certain agreements, among them an agreed mutual reduction of Soviet and American troop levels in Europe.

PRESENT-DAY MOTIVES FOR A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE:
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL

FOR THE U.S.S.R. (WHICH IS ANXIOUS THAT THE CONFERENCE
COME ABOUT)

1. REDUCE OR ELIMINATE AMERICAN TROOPS IN EUROPE, AMERICAN INFLUENCE IN WESTERN EUROPE.
2. UNDERCUT OR DISARM WEST EUROPEAN POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC INTEREST AND INFLUENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE.
3. REGULARIZE OR RATIFY SOVIET CONTROL OF THE EAST EUROPEAN STATES, ISOLATING DISSIDENTS (AS IN RUMANIA), UNDERMINING LIBERALISM (AS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA), INCREASING THE PRESSURE ON YUGOSLAVIA AND ALBANIA TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE U.S.S.R.
4. LEGITIMIZE THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND THE DIVISION OF GERMANY.
5. ALLOW MILITARY REDEPLOYMENTS TO THE SOVIET-CHINESE BORDER, PERHAPS REDUCED SOVIET MILITARY BUDGETS.
6. EXCLUDE CHINESE INFLUENCE FROM EASTERN EUROPE.
7. INCREASE THREAT AND BLACKMAIL POTENTIAL TOWARDS WESTERN EUROPE.

ALL THESE BUT THE LAST ARE REDUCIBLE TO AN ATTEMPT TO REGULARIZE AND STRENGTHEN THE SOVIET SECURITY POSITION-- IDEOLOGICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY AND POLITICAL--IN EASTERN EUROPE, AT LOWERED COST IF POSSIBLE.

FOR THE U.S. (WHICH HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO SEE THE
CONFERENCE COME ABOUT)

1. WITHIN THE GENERAL OBJECTIVES OF CONTINUING TO ASSURE THE SECURITY OF WESTERN EUROPE AND PROMOTING EAST-WEST STABILITY AND DETENTE;
2. REDUCING AMERICAN BUDGET COSTS AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICITS THROUGH MUTUAL AND BALANCED EAST-WEST TROOP REDUCTIONS, AND/OR THE TRANSFER OF SECURITY COSTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE WEST EUROPEANS, WITH A MAJOR REDUCTION IN U.S. TROOPS IN EUROPE.
3. AND SO FAR AS POSSIBLE, MAKING SECURE THAT DEGREE OF AUTONOMY OF FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNAL LIBERALIZATION ACHIEVED WITHIN CERTAIN EAST EUROPEAN STATES.

THESE SEEM REDUCIBLE TO AN ATTEMPT TO PRESERVE THE EXISTING POLITICAL SITUATION AND RELATIONSHIPS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE WHILE REDUCING THE COSTS TO THE UNITED STATES--BOTH FINANCIAL AND IN TERMS OF ACTUAL TROOPS AND POLITICAL COMMITMENTS. THE DOMINATING INFLUENCES ARE FISCAL (BALANCE OF PAYMENTS) AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL ("NEO-ISOLATIONISM," THE MANSFIELD AMENDMENT).

The formulation of motives made in the above chart no doubt would be debated, but it is difficult to believe that any alternate listing of American and Soviet policy objectives in the matter of European security would alter certain conclusions. These are that the Soviet objectives are positive and directed towards improving the Soviet's strategic position by reducing the insecurities in their relationship with the East European states, and reducing or eliminating the American force deployed in Europe. The American objectives are negative; to cut costs while maintaining essentially the present political structure in Europe. The improvement sought by the Soviet Union is not primarily a matter of tangible, immediate gains, or concessions from the Western powers. Rather it lies in eliminating certain sources of insecurity and opposition within the Soviet bloc, actual or potential threats to the status quo. The status quo, then, must be

understood as one which, to the Soviets, includes element of risk and possible change. The present situation is one in which certain dynamic forces are at work which jeopardize the present stability of the region and cast doubt upon what is, in Soviet eyes, the desirable condition: a Warsaw bloc wholly made up of governments in essential matters subordinate to and dependent upon the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, these dynamic forces, in combination with the American military force deployed in Europe, today requires a large and expensive Soviet garrison in Eastern Europe. If the Soviet Union were to achieve the substance of the goals attributed to it above (even excluding the aggressive seventh point), its strategic situation would be immensely improved.

In contrast, the American goals we list could in two out of three cases be achieved in a manner consistent with the substance--if not intent, as the third point makes clear--of the Soviet Union's goals. It is not in the least implausible, then that a European security agreement could actually come about which provided or brought about:

1. Mutual and balanced U.S. and Soviet troop reductions (negotiated separately).
2. A major shift of Western security responsibilities to the West Europeans, with American troops in substantially a reserve role.
3. But with mutual NATO and Warsaw Pact troop reductions as well, a reduction, or at least no significant increase, in West European troop levels.
4. And by virtue of these steps, together with the act of security agreement itself, an implicit but seemingly unmistakable pledge by the Western powers not to attempt to alter, or intervene to support an alteration, in the political situation in Eastern Europe, thus--

5. An implicit Western acquiescence in the Brezhnev Doctrine, perhaps coupled to a--
6. Non-aggression treaty, a formal or implicit Soviet guarantee of the present status of West Berlin, or an assurance of non-interference and non-intervention outside the Warsaw Pact bloc (possibly including a specific assurance of non-interference in Yugoslavia).

But the question which must be asked is whether, of the two versions of settlement we have described, this one is the more advantageous for the West, or more consistent with the national security interests of the United States. Either version of settlement remains a possibility. It is the second one, tacitly conceding the perpetuation of Soviet authority over the affairs of Eastern Europe, which presently seems the more likely to come about. In our opinion the short term effect of this probably would be stabilizing, tending to reiterate and reinforce the lessons of the Czechoslovak invasion of 1968 and ratifying the substance of the "Brezhnev Doctrine." In the longer term this version seems to us likely to introduce new, and newly intensified, instabilities into the region, in time bringing about a more risk-taking mood of nationalism, popular discontent, and anti-Russianism in Eastern Europe, inviting eventual Soviet actions of a kind which would seriously affect West European and American interests.

The alternative, which we have called a policy of "normalization," constitutes a positive policy directed to constructive change in Europe. Moreover, it postulates an objective which, while it clearly is negotiable, in practice may be attainable only through an intelligent and adroit exploitation of surprise and crisis in Europe.

6. THE GOAL OF "NORMALIZATION" AND THE EXPLOITATION OF SURPRISE

A. The Strategic and Tactical Value of a Positive Goal

A policy goal may be valuable because it is reasonable to expect that it can be attained, and the steps towards it, together with the costs which it involves, are fully understood and accepted. This, however, may be a situation infrequently met. Certainly in a political relationship where major national interests are in conflict the attainability of a goal becomes in important ways contingent upon the process and progress of the policy. A policy goal is also valuable when that goal is clearly understood to be a definition of purpose which may or may not be achieved in its stated terms, and is likely to be revised or reframed in the course of events and under the pressure of change.

In the second case there is value in the fact that while the goal may or may not be attained (in the terms in which it was initially stated), the goal nonetheless establishes a series of secondary policy objectives which are attainable, and desirable in themselves, and the goal also provides an intelligible standard of progress, a measure of gain or loss, a framework for decision, in a political process which otherwise is likely to become dominated by immediate events, specific problems, and improvised or ad hoc, decision-making.

The goal of normalization, then, is interesting not only because of the importance of what it might accomplish in the longer term evolution of European politics and America's security situation, but also because it provides an intellectual and political structure for policy and action in the shorter term. It addresses the problems of drift, improvisation, and defensive decision-making, which critics attribute to America's European policy today.

Just as the military and political agencies of government tend to be disarmed by a lack of positive goals, reduced to conservative and status quo seeking behavior, public opinion cannot easily be summoned to the support of policy without a reasonable statement of the positive goals of that policy. So long as the European alternatives are understood in the West as largely a choice between maintaining or marginally altering an existing situation and, on the other hand, that kind of risk of catastrophic war which became apparent in the policy of "liberation" and "rollback," the inevitable choice will by default be the status quo. And as we have argued, a defense of the status quo against an opponent with positive objectives is foredoomed to at least incremental failures. If our European policy is recast in terms of a goal of normalization, then it becomes possible to summon public support for those measures--including contingent military commitments in Europe--which clearly support that goal. Argumentation, debate, becomes possible which can create through public discourse a popular consensus supporting an American policy in Europe, and in NATO, which possesses both a purpose and an intelligible outcome.

It should parenthetically be said that this has been a widely misunderstood issue in recent years. The "credibility" problem is essentially a creation of government, not of the press, however much the press may have contributed to the development of the problem. It is a responsibility of government to formulate policy and recommend it to the public, to structure debate and enter into the debate to win a consensus for the actions which a professional elite and the responsible officers of government regard as necessary or desirable. There obviously can be no serious policy if government turns itself to supine subordination to public opinion polls, which in

any event are in an important respect irresponsible consultations of opinion (unlike voting, where the citizen performs a considered act with a definite outcome). But at the same time representative government means an ultimate submission of policy to the public will--even if the public will, in the eyes of the elite, proves mistaken or ill-informed. After the experience of the Vietnam War it should be unnecessary to labor this point. Unless the public has given government a clear--if necessarily generalized--mandate for a given course of action, it is a fatal step for government to go ahead on that course. To do so is an irresponsible act in terms of principle, but is also likely to prove fatally damaging in practical political terms since popular trust in government is challenged and a repudiation of the responsible administration or governmental officers may ensue--no doubt after a period of divisive national controversy.

It is important to make this point in the present context since a forward policy of normalization in Europe is feasible only if it enjoys popular support. At present it seems reasonable to say that the public has been given little consideration of the options open to Western policy in Europe other than acquiescing in the status quo in Central and Eastern Europe. If the public debate has in this case been inadequate, it is in part because of a failure within government, a failure to define and articulate a serious alternative choice. An even worse failure would of course occur if the government were itself to shift policy but treat public opinion as unworthy of serious and open consultation and debate.

B. A "Normalization" Program

Let us formulate the goals of a normalization policy as, briefly,

1. To obtain a Soviet acknowledgement, explicit or at least effective, of the autonomy of all the East European governments and of their right to conduct the internal policies they individually choose.
2. To obtain a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe as a condition of withdrawal of American troops from Western Europe, and with that a general withdrawal of all foreign troops in Europe from the soil of other countries.
3. Implicit in this is the understanding that the Soviet Union has a reasonable security interest that the East European countries will not enter into hostile military alliances or arrangements; certain constraints on the external policies of the East European states and possibly (as part of a general European settlement) of Germany are appropriate subjects for negotiation, as are non-aggression assurances or other multilateral security assurances among all of the European powers and the United States--as the interested non-European power and as well as a victor of World War II.
4. A general opening of political, trade, economic, and cultural relations across the borders of the existing eastern and Western blocs.

These are not objectives likely to be achieved through negotiation in the present circumstances, when, as we have noted, American troops seem likely to be reduced or withdrawn for reasons of American economic needs and domestic public opinion, and when the Soviet relationship with the East European states seems increasingly troubled. The former circumstance reduces, if it does not promise to eliminate, the main external pressure upon the Soviet Union to make concessions. The latter offers the prospect of solution in two different ways: through renewed repression and Soviet military pressures and intervention--the Brezhnev Doctrine--or through political adjustments which render nationalism and internal liberalizations in Eastern Europe no longer threats to Soviet security.

The purpose, then, of a new American policy would be (1) to make use of residual American leverage through making troop withdrawals contingent upon Soviet concessions, (2) to supply new forms of leverage through a program of active and forward promotion of "normalization," in order (3) to make political adjustments in the Soviet relationship to all of the European powers a more advantageous and reliable solution to the perceived Soviet security problem than their present course of repression and intervention.

To do this would involve the following

THE WESTERN ALLIES EXPLICITLY CONDEMN INTERVENTION,
AND SPECIFICALLY THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE, REFUSING TO
RECOGNIZE ITS APPLICATION OR TO REGARD AS LEGITIMATE
ITS EFFECTS.

This act is obviously a challenge to the Soviet Union, which would interpret such a declaration as itself an intervention into the affairs of the socialist bloc. The result would unquestionably be a heating up of Cold War rhetoric, which is unimportant provided that the Western powers have an intelligible, politically and morally responsible response put forward. That response would be that nonintervention, national self determination, are indispensable principles of a world order which provides a promise of permanent peace and stability among nations. Detente, a profoundly desirable condition in East-West relations, requires a commitment on both sides to the full sovereignty and internal autonomy of all the states of Europe. A certain standard of political conduct is required if the states of Europe are to have that confidence in their future which will allow them to reduce their military deployments and expenditures, and begin to dismantle the security arrangements which are the inheritance of World War II, Stalinism, and the years of Cold War. That standard of conduct, which was assumed to exist

during the early years of detente, is irreconcilable with the Brezhnev Doctrine; that Doctrine, then, is irreconcilable with a European political settlement which the Western powers could accept. There cannot, of course, be any reasonable expectation that the Soviet government would publicly repudiate the Brezhnev Doctrine. Conveniently, as it happens, that Doctrine has remained to some extent ambiguous in the formal statements of Soviet policy since 1968.

THE WESTERN ALLIES SEEK NEGOTIATIONS FOR A EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT ON "NORMALIZATION" TERMS, ACKNOWLEDGING AND PROVIDING PRACTICAL SAFEGUARDS FOR SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS ALONG THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN DEFENSIVE GLACIS.

The stand we have described undoubtedly could delay, even jeopardize, the European security conference which now is expected to take place following ratification of the ambassadorial agreement on Berlin. However it is the Soviet Union and the East European states who are anxious to have this conference. The Western powers can only improve their positions with respect both to such a conference and to an eventual normalization by adopting a clear and positive position on the terms for normalization and settlement.

THE WESTERN ALLIES DECLARE THE PRACTICE OF NONINTERVENTION TO BE A SINE QUA NON OF DETENTE, AND SPECIFICALLY OF ARMS CONTROL TRUST AND GOOD COMMERCIAL/TRADING RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

The first stage in the normalization program establishes a positive stance as Western policy and articulates the Western objective. The second stage is to make use of "surprises" or "crises" to move towards that goal. A crisis situation in fact provides favorable circumstances, since the

leverage possessed by the Western powers is more easily employed in a crisis. That leverage consists in (1) military pressures--troop reinforcements and troop movements, heightened readiness preparations, new weapons deployments, etc.; (2) political pressures: including the suspension or breaking off of diplomatic or consular relations; negotiations or a refusal to negotiate on a range of practical issues, the most important of those being arms control and trade and other economic agreements; and a very wide range of political warfare and propaganda activities directed to third parties, or to the opponent's populations or elements in those populations; (3) economic and fiscal pressures, including embargoes.

In all of these matters the Western powers obviously have things to lose; these steps in some degree would be self-penalizing; but in nearly all of them the Soviet Union and the East European states have more to lose than the Western powers. They are in need of Western consumer plants, Western technology, trade with Western Europe, Western economic credits, and arms limitations agreements. These pressures could have been employed to deter, or to exact a penalty for, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. They were not because the will to employ them was lacking; one important reason the will was lacking was that a positive and intelligible course of action and long-term objective was lacking in the West. In a future crisis, with contingency planning and a considered formulation of goals and public policy, they might be used effectively. The importance of these pressures will steadily increase as Eastern economic ties and arms agreements with the West increase over the next few years.

THE WESTERN ALLIES PRACTICE NONINTERVENTION WITH RESPECT ESPECIALLY TO SUCH POTENTIAL OR CONCEIVABLE CRISIS AREAS AS GREECE, SPAIN, ITALY, AND THEY ENFORCE SOVIET NONINTERVENTION IN SUCH AREAS.

There is, inevitably, a reciprocal element in such as a program as this, and if normalization is taken seriously as a long-term objective of policy then the standards which it would attempt to establish within Eastern Europe must clearly prevail within the West. That is, the Soviet Union's present attitude towards the Eastern bloc expresses not only a naked power interest, an ideological interest, and certain not unreasonable (in terms of historical experience) security interests, but also reflects a view of Europe as divided into spheres of influence. Stalin once observed to Winston Churchill that the U.S.S.R. did not concern itself with what the British did in liberated Belgium and the Netherlands; why should Soviet conduct in Poland concern Great Britain? The question was both provocative and untrue in its implications, since the U.S.S.R., through its political agencies and the foreign Communist Parties was already interesting itself in the lowlands, and since what the Soviet Union was doing in Poland in 1944-1945 included extinguishing that country's political independence. But the question reflected a reality as well: the Western Allies of World War II dominated Western Europe and tolerated little interference from the U.S.S.R. in that area. The U.S.S.R., dominating Eastern Europe, intended to suffer no interference in the vastly different political regime it intended to impose--at what proved to be immense human cost. Today the U.S.S.R. may still believe that a left-wing government elected in Italy which included the Communist Party, or an uprising in Spain or Greece which seemed to offer the prospect that the Communist Party would come to power through its own actions and without external intervention in its support,

would bring American political, if not military, intervention.

ENFORCEMENT MEASURES TO BE CONTINGENT IN INTENSITY AND DURATION UPON THE SCALE AND DURATION OF THE OPPOSING INTERVENTIONS (INTO EITHER EASTERN OR WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS' AFFAIRS), AND DIRECT, NOT THROUGH PROXIES OR BY MEANS OF SUPPORT FOR ONE OR ANOTHER CONTENDING GROUP OR FACTION.

Soviet action which contravenes the national autonomy of another European state should be met with direct measures of reprisal, whether these are political, economic, or in some circumstances, military in character. That these should be direct is a significant point. To respond to a Soviet initiative that makes use of indirect methods or proxies with tactics of the same kind, establishing a client or proxy of our own, tends (as our experience in Greece as well as Vietnam would suggest) to dilute and distort the real issues of conflict. Setting proxy against proxy tends to perpetuate the conflict, and the parochial interests of the proxy inevitably will dominate his own actions, thus creating American political and moral investments which may be unwanted but also unavoidable (the sponsor may find that in important respects it has become the client). Irrelevant or unwanted issues obscure the real significance of what is at stake and the real objectives of action and counteraction. Our policy objective should be unmistakable: that the nations of all Europe should be free from foreign interventions into their affairs.

THE ACTION PRINCIPLE OF THIS POLICY:

IN A CRISIS OR "SURPRISE" TO RAISE THE STAKES IN CALCULATED AND RESPONSIBLE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY WAYS, SO AS TO MAKE NORMALIZATION THE PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE FOR THE OPPONENT.

AN UNDERLYING AND INELUCTABLE
ASSUMPTION OF THE POLICY:

THAT EUROPE SHOULD BE OPEN TO NEW IDEAS AND POLITICAL CHANGE--IN BOTH EAST AND WEST.