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### An Algorithm for the Solution

of Concave-Convex Games

by

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#### ABSTRACT

A master's thesis which discusses the solution of concave-convex games. An algorithm is developed, a computer program written and applied to an anti-submarine warfare force allocation problem as an illustration. Techniques for handling concave-convex problems in high dimensions are included.

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#### I. INTRODUCTION

#### A. A GAME THEORY APPROACH TO RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS

Problems in the allocation of resources can be divided into two descriptive categories: Single-agent problems and adversary problems. Single-agent problems have only one participant optimizing without intelligent opposition. In the solution of adversary problems, opponents work at cross purposes. Each choice of an allocation of resources by one participant must be made in light of those of his opponent(s). Of course, games are adversary problems.

The great interest in game theory as a technique of modelling which followed von Neumann's statement of the fundamental concepts in 1927 [12] continues today. The fascination of the game as a model for conflicts of almost any sort is enhanced by the fact that the solution to a game is entirely independent of assumptions regarding the *actual* behavior of the antagonist(s).

Matrix games and differential games are extensively treated in the literature; some references are noted here. Matrix games or games over the square are discussed in basic form by Williams [21] and a thorough study is done by Karlin [8]. For a first essay in the subject of differential games, see Isaacs [6]. Taylor [16,17] gives additional examples of the modelling of combat operations including search using differential games.

The development of the derivative game is due to Danskin [4]. A very large class of concave-convex problems

yield to solution when the algorithm based on this game is applied. It is with the derivative game and the algorithm evolved from it that this paper is primarily concerned.

**B.** THE CONTENT OF THE PAPER, BY CHAPTER

Chapter II surveys some of the more important mathematical ideas necessary to the development of the algorithm for the solution of concave-convex games.

Chapter III is concerned with the programming of an anti-submarine warfare force allocation example. The example serves to illustrate both the use of the algorithm and the theory on which it is founded. The problem is formulated and the basic computational steps toward the solution are enumerated. If any fears stem from the formidable appearance of the matrices used in the example, they hopefully will be dispelled by the description of the form for input in the programming notes. Technical matters regarding programming are considered in some detail.

Chapter IV draws together this presentation with some concluding remarks.

Chapter V contains suggestions for further study.

The Appendix consists of the programming flowchart. The Computer Program Listing is included as well.

### II. MATHEMATICAL CONCEPTS

A. GENERAL

The fundamental theorem of the theory of games in the form appropriate here is the following:

Suppose F(x,y) is a continuous function on  $X \times Y$ , where X and Y are compact and convex. Suppose that the set of points X(y) yielding the maximum to F for fixed y is convex for each such y, and that the set of points Y(x)yielding the minimum to F for fixed x is convex for each such x.

Then there exist pure strategy solutions x° and y° satisfying

$$F(x^{\circ}, y) \ge F(x^{\circ}, y^{\circ}), \forall y \in Y$$

$$F(x, y^{\circ}) \le F(x^{\circ}, y^{\circ}), \forall x \in X.$$
(1)

A complete proof of the theorem in this form can be found in [7]. Assuming that the conditions for the existence of a solution satisfying (1) are met, the problem can be stated in the form

```
Max Min F(x,y),
x y
```

which is equivalent to

where

(x) 
$$\equiv$$
 Min F(x,y).  
y

The theorem applies to two-person zero-sum games. Thus,

 $\begin{array}{rcl} & \text{Max Min } F(x,y) = & \text{Min Max } F(x,y). \\ & x & y & y & x \end{array}$ 

One important difficulty arises from the fact that, although F may be smooth,  $\phi(x)$  is not in general differentiable in the ordinary sense. Danskin, in [3], has shown that under general conditions on X and Y, there exists a directional derivative in every direction. It is this fact that has provided the key to the solution of problems of the type described.

B. THE ALGORITHM FOR THE SOLUTION OF CONCAVE-CONVEX GAMES

The algorithm to solve games concave in the maximizing player and convex in the minimizing player is developed and presented in great detail in [4]. The following gives a brief survey of those results which are most important for the design of the algorithm; to fill the apparent gaps, a thorough reading of [4] remains necessary.

1. The Derivative Game

Suppose  $x^{\circ} \epsilon X$ . Associate with  $x^{\circ}$  a non-empty set of *admissible directions*  $\gamma$ ,  $\Gamma(x^{\circ})$ .  $\hat{W}$  is defined as the convex hull (e.g., see [19]) of the sot of points

$$W(y) = \{F_{x_1}(x^\circ, y), \cdots, F_{y_k}(x^\circ, y)\},\$$

where  $y \in Y(x^{\circ})$ .

The derivative game then is

$$H(\gamma, \tilde{w}) = \gamma \cdot \tilde{w}$$

defined over  $\Gamma(x^{\circ}) x W$ . The maximizing player maximizes H by choice of  $\gamma \epsilon \Gamma(x^{\circ})$ , the minimizing player minimizes H by choice of  $\hat{w} \epsilon \hat{W}$ .

#### THEOREM I

A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a direction of increase for  $\phi(x)$  is that the value of the derivative game defined by H be positive at x°. The  $\gamma^{\circ}$  which yields the value of the derivative game is a pure strategy.

If the value is positive one can find and use this direction. If the value is non-positive, a direction of increase does not exist, i.e., the solution has been reached. The application of the derivative game in practice is greatly complicated by the necessity for approximations.

#### 2. The Lemma of the Alternative

The Lemma takes into exact account the approximations involved in the application of the derivative game. It states that a certain process (to be explained below) must either yield a sufficient increase to  $\phi(x)$  at a point  $x^{\circ}$  or determine that the point  $x^{\circ}$  is nearly optimal. Before the lemma can be formulated in mathematical terms, some further difficulties and the tools with which to overcome them have to be outlined.

a. The Brown-Robinson Iterative Process in the "Auxiliary Game"

The Brown-Robinson (B-R) process employs the following idea: Let G be the pay-off function. At stage N=0 both players choose arbitrary strategies  $x^{\circ}$  and  $y^{\circ}$ . At stage N=1 the maximizer chooses  $x^{1}$  such that G is maximized against  $y^{\circ}$ ; then the minimizer chooses  $y^{1}$  to minimize G

against  $x^1$ , and so forth. At stage N the maximizer chooses  $x^N$  as if the minimizer's strategy were an evenly weighted mixture of strategies  $y^{\circ}$ ,  $\cdots$ ,  $y^{N-1}$ ; the minimizer chooses  $y^N$  as if the maximizer's strategy were an evenly weighted mixture of strategies  $x^{\circ}$ ,  $\cdots$ ,  $x^N$ .

For matrix games, Julia Robinson [12] proved

that

$$\lim_{N \to \infty} \sup \left[ \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=0}^{N-1} G(x, y^n) - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=0}^{N} G(x^n, y) \right] = 0.$$

Danskin [1] has generalized the proof to hold for two-person zero-sum games with continuous pay-off defined over  $X \neq Y$ , X and Y arbitrary compact spaces. It should be noted here that the B-R process is very slow in convergence when applied directly to finding an approximation to the value of the game defined by (1). However, it is not applied to the basic game in this algorithm but rather to an "auxiliary game" for which an accurate solution is not required.

The derivative game mentioned above cannot be solved directly because the set  $Y(x^{\circ})$  is not known. All one has is a single element  $y \in Y$  which approximately minimizes  $F(x^{\circ}, y)$ . The place of the derivative game, therefore, is taken by the "auxiliary game" employing a modified version of the B-R process described below. This process makes it possible to keep track of the approximations involved and their consequences. The "auxiliary game" is defined as follows:

For any  $\epsilon \ge 0$ , denote by  $Y_{\epsilon}(x)$  the set of  $y \in Y$ such that  $F(x,y) = \phi(x) + \epsilon$ . Let  $Y_{\epsilon}(\Xi) \equiv \bigcup_{x \in \Xi} Y_{\epsilon}(x)$ ,  $\gamma \in \Gamma(x^{\circ})$ ,  $y \in Y(\Xi)$ .

Then  $H(\gamma, y) \equiv \frac{F(x^{\circ}+d_{0}\gamma, y) - \phi(x^{\circ})}{d_{0}}$ , for  $d_{0} > 0$ , a minimum step size, is a game over  $\Gamma(x^{\circ}) \propto Y_{\varepsilon}(\Xi)$  with  $\gamma$ the maximizing and y the minimizing player. This game has optimal mixed strategies for both players. Applying the idea of approximate optimization to the convergence proof in [1] leads to

THEOREM II  
Let 
$$\gamma^N$$
 be chosen such that  $\frac{1}{N} \frac{N^{-1}}{n \stackrel{E}{=} 0} h(\gamma, y^n)$  is  
maximized to accuracy  $\zeta$ , and  $\gamma^N$  be chosen such  
that  $\frac{1}{N} \frac{N}{n \stackrel{E}{=} 0} H(\gamma^n, y)$  is minimized to accuracy  $\eta$ .  
Then  
lim  $\sup_{N \to \infty} \left[ \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=0}^{N-1} H(\gamma, y^n) - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=0}^{N} H(\gamma^n, y) \right] \leq 2(\zeta + \eta)$ .  
This holds for continuous H.

Let  $\theta$  be the maximum oscillation of  $\nabla F(x,y)$  over a distance  $d_0$ . Then

$$\frac{F(x^{\circ}+d_{o} \gamma^{N}, y^{n}) - F(x^{\circ}, y^{n})}{d_{o}} \ge \gamma^{N} F(x^{\circ}, y^{n}) - \theta$$

The lemma of the alternative now can be formulated.

b. Statement of the Lemma

Suppose  $0 < \alpha < \beta$ ,  $y^{\circ} \in Y_{\varepsilon}(x^{c})$ .

Then the generalized B-R process will, at some stage N, determine that one of the two following statements is true:

1. The maximum over  $\Gamma(x^{\circ})$  of the directional derivative does not exceed  $\beta$ .

2. The point  $\overline{x}^{N} \equiv x^{\circ} + d_{\circ} \overline{y}^{N}$ , where

$$\overline{\gamma}^{N} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^{N} \gamma^{n},$$

and the point  $y^N \epsilon Y_{\epsilon}(\overline{x}^N)$ , where  $y^N$  minimizes  $F(\overline{x}^N, y)$  to accuracy  $\epsilon$ , satisfy

$$\frac{F(\overline{x}^{N}, y^{N}) - F(x^{\circ}, y^{\circ})}{d_{o}} \geq \alpha - 5\theta - \frac{3}{d_{o}}.$$

3. The Corollary of the Alternative

Suppose that F(x,y) is concave in x and convex in y. Then the modified B-R process applied at x° will, at some stage N, determine that one of the two following statements is true:

> 1. The pair  $\overline{x} = x^{\circ}$ ,  $\overline{y} = \overline{y}^{N}$ , where  $\overline{y}^{N} = \frac{1}{N+1} \sum_{n=0}^{N} y^{n}$ ,

> > are approximate optimal strategies for the game defined by F.

2. The point  $\overline{x}^N \in X$  yields an increase to  $\phi(x)$  by at least a specified amount.

For details and proof see [4], pp. 36 ff.

Reference [4] continues with a detailed discussion of delicate problems which can only be listed here: The choice of the minimal step size  $d_0$ ; the problem of accessibility of a point x from a point x°; the problem of obstruction; the choice of  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ ,  $\varepsilon$ , their interaction with each other, and the choice of  $\rho$  where  $\rho$  is the accuracy to which Max  $\phi(x)$  is to approximate the value of the game defined by (1). It must be noted that the conditions derived for the selection of these parameters are sufficient.

#### 4. The Algorithm

The algorithm as a consequence of the foregoing mathematical considerations is presented in section 10 and 11 of [4] and will not be reproduced here in detail. A verbal description of its basic structure - depicted in Figure 1 -, however, may be useful:

The maximizing player, called Max, having arrived at a point xx, has a direction of maximal increase  $\gamma$ , obtained either from the derivative game  $D_{\downarrow}\phi(xx)$  or from the B-R process in the auxiliary game, and a distance  $d \ge d_0$ . The minimizing player, called Min, is at a point yy. F(xx,yy) is known. Max makes a proposal to move to a point x = xx + dy. Of course, F(x,yy) > F(xx,yy). Min accepts Max's proposal and starts minimizing against x, looking for a direction of maximal decrease g. If there is none, yy is a minimum against x as well as against xx in which case Max will move to the point x. If there is a direction of decrease Min forms a point y = yy + Dg such that  $F(x,y) \leq F(x,yy)$ . A test is performed to determine whether Min has already "beaten" Max: if F(xx,yy) > F(x,y) Min stops the minimization process, and Max discards his proposal x because moving to x will not increase  $\phi(x)$ . Max halves the distance d and, with the same y, forms a new trial point x. If F(xx,yy) < F(x,y)Min continues to minimize until either  $F(xx,yy) \ge F(x,y)$  or Min can no longer find a direction of decrease. If now



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Figure 1. Flowchart of Algorithm.

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F(xx,yy) < F(x,y), indicating that Min, even after a complete minimization, was not able to "beat" Max, Max moves to the proposed point x realizing a gain for  $\phi(x)$ . Max then looks for a new direction of increase. The process terminates when such a direction does not exist.

The situation that leads into the Brown-Robinson process is the following one: The proposed points  $x = xx+d\gamma$ have been "beaten" by Min until d gets cut down to d<sub>o</sub>, in spite of the fact that  $\gamma$ , obtained from the derivative game, is an apparently good direction. If the trial point x = xx+ d<sub>o</sub> $\gamma$  does not result in a move for Max, the B-R process, Figure 2, is used.

Denote the present  $\gamma$  - the one that so far has lead to a failure for Max by  $\overline{Y}^1$ , and the associated  $\nabla F_x$ by  $\overline{\omega}^{\circ}$ . Minimize F completely against x = xx +  $d_{0}\gamma$ . The resulting y then leads to a new  $\nabla F_x$  which is averaged with the previous  $\overline{\omega}^{\circ}$ , giving  $\overline{\omega}^{1}$ . Suppose that  $\overline{\omega}^{1}$  as input to the derivative game  $D_{\gamma}\phi(x)$  produces a new  $\gamma^{\circ}$  such that the value of the derivative game is positive as required. (If such a  $\gamma^{\circ}$  does not exist the problem is solved). This  $\gamma$ , averaged with  $\overline{\gamma}^1$ , gives  $\overline{\gamma}^2$  which in turn creates a new trial point  $\overline{x}^2 = xx + d_0 \overline{y}^2$ .  $\overline{x}^2$ , or  $\overline{x}^N$  in general, then is exposed to Min's reaction as described previously. Once Max finds a direction and an associated trial point that cannot be "beaten" by Min, Max moves and leaves the B-R routine. The y-strategies are also averaged and saved although their average is never used during the computation. In case the





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game defined by F(x,y) is terminated while in the B-R process, this average of the y-strategies represents the optimal solution for the minimizing player.

III. PROGRAMMING ASPECTS OF AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE

A. FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM

An algorithm for the solution of a wide class of concave-convex games over polyhedra has been presented in abbreviated form above. In this chapter that algorithm is applied to a particular game, an anti-submarine warfare force allocation problem.

For this problem, five indices are employed: h, i, j, k, and m. In a meaningful example, the maximum numbers corresponding to these indices might be, respectively: 5, 25, 10, 500, and 5. The indices have the following meanings:

- h: Submarine type
- i: Submarine mission
- j: Type of antisubmarine weapon (or vehicle)
- k: Place in which submarine and weapon encounter one another
- m: Stage of the submarine mission.

An additional index is used. l(k) is the "kind of place." A "kind of place" might be defined by a particular set of weapon employment parameters. These include the tactical and the natural environment. The natural environment consists of oceanographic and meteorological conditions. Examples of the tactical environment are destroyers in an ASW screen and patrol aircraft in barrier patrol. The "kind of place" in which an encounter occurs impacts on the outcome of an encounter between submarine and weapon. A reasonable number of "kinds of places" in the present context might be 25.

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A submarine mission is described by a matrix  $||E_{hijkm}||$ . This matrix has as its elements real numbers denoting the extent to which a submarine of type h at stage m of mission i is exposed to a weapon of type j at the k<sup>th</sup> place. The effects of these weapons and thus of the encounters are characterized by a "technical" matrix  $||C_{hil(k)}||$  in the following meaning:  $exp[-C_{hjl(k)} y_{jk}]$  is the probability that a submarine of type h survives one exposure to y units of weapons of type j at a "kind of place" l(k). These encounters are assumed to be mutually independent. Note that the probability of survival to the mth mission stage is conditioned on the completion of the previous stages. Suppose that there are  $y_{jk}$  units of force of type j at the k<sup>th</sup> place. Then the probability of a submarine's completing stage m of mission i is

$$\prod_{m' \leq m} \exp[-E_{hijkm'} C_{hj\ell(k)} y_{jk}],$$

which, due to independence of the events, equals exp  $[-\theta_{him}]$ , where

$$\theta_{\text{him}} = \sum_{\substack{j \\ m' \leq m}} \sum_{\substack{k \\ m' \leq m}} E_{\text{hijkm'}} C_{\text{hjl}(k)} y_{jk}.$$

Now, by carrying out a premultiplication,

the exponent becomes

$$\partial_{\text{him}} = \sum_{\substack{j \\ m' \leq m}} \sum_{\substack{k \\ m' \leq m}} A_{\text{hijkm'}} y_{jk'}$$

In this example, the vast majority of the  $E_{hijkm}$ , and therefore of the  $A_{hijkm}$ , are zero. If 3000 non-zero  $A_{hijkm}$  are allowed, each type of submarine can be employed on ten different missions and undergo up to 60 encounters with antisubmarine weapon systems.

1. The Space X

Let  $x_{hi}$  be the proportion of submarines of type h assigned to the i<sup>th</sup> mission. Make  $X = ||x_{hi}||$  satisfy the conditions

$$\sum_{i} x_{hi} = 1, \text{ for every } h, x_{hi} \ge 0,$$

and

 $\alpha_{hi} \leq x_{hi} \leq \beta_{hi}$ , for every pair h,i,

where the sets  $\{\alpha_{hi}\}$ ,  $\{\beta_{hi}\}$  are supposed to satisfy

$$\sum_{i} \alpha_{hi} < 1 + \sum_{i} \beta_{hi} \text{ for every } h$$

and

 $0 \leq \alpha_{hi} < \beta_{hi}$  for every pair h,i.

2. The Space Y

Let  $y_{jk}$  be the proportion of antisubmarine forces of type j sent to the k<sup>th</sup> place. Make Y =  $||y_{jk}||$  satisfy the conditions

$$\sum_{k} y_{jk} = 1, \text{ for every } j, y_{jk} \ge 0$$

and

a<sub>jk</sub> ≤ y<sub>jk</sub> ≤ b<sub>jk</sub> for every pair j,k

where the sets  $\{a_{jk}\}, \{b_{jk}\}\$  are supposed to satisfy  $\sum_{k} a_{jk} < 1, < \sum_{k} b_{jk}$ 

and

$$0 \le a_{ik} \le b_{ik}$$
 for every pair j,k.

3. The Function F(x,y)

 $V_{him}$  is the value of accomplishing stage m of mission i for a submarine of type h. The character of F(x,y) can be examined.

Set

$$W_{him} = V_{him} \exp \left[-\theta_{him}\right]$$

where  $\theta_{him}$  is as before. Put

$$T_{hi} = \sum_{m} W_{him}$$
.

Then

$$F(x,y) = \sum_{h,i}^{m} x_{hi} T_{hi}.$$

This function is linear in x and exponential in y and is therefore a concave-convex game of the type treated in [4], defined over X x Y. The quantity F(x,y) represents the total expected payoff to the submarine player. Re-expressing F(x,y) in its explicit form gives:  $F(x,y) = \sum_{h} \sum_{i} x_{hi} \sum_{m} v_{him} \exp\left[-\sum_{j} \sum_{k} E_{hijkm} C_{hj\ell(k)} y_{jk}\right].$ 

The remainder of this chapter gives details of the application of the algorithm to the game defined above.

The principal result is the flow-chart (Appendix). Since this flow chart is constructed around the algorithm from [4], it is helpful, though not essential, to have [4] available. The complete program listing is included following the Appendix. The program is written in FORTRAN IV and was run on the IBM 360/67 computer at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

#### **B. BASIC COMPUTATIONS**

1. Computation of  $\theta_{him}$ 

For fixed (h,i),  $\theta_{him}$  is non-decreasing in the mission stage m. This reflects the trivial fact that

P[submarine survives stage m]

< P[submarine survives stage m-1].

Equality holds when the "threat" due to the encounters at stage m is non-existent, i.e., when either no ASW-forces  $y_{jk}$  are present or their effectiveness against the submarine,  $C_{hj\ell(k)}$ , is zero. Hence  $\theta_{him}$ , for each pair (h,i), is accumulated over the mission stages as follows:

 $\theta_{\text{him}} = \theta_{\text{hi(m-1)}} + \sum_{j} \sum_{k} A_{\text{hijkm}} y_{jk}, \theta_{\text{hio}} = 0.$ 

# 2. Partial Derivatives with Respect to x<sub>hi</sub>

Because of the linearity of F in x the partials with respect to  $x_{hi}$ ,  $F_{x_{hi}}$ , are the coefficients of  $x_{hi}$  and do not explicitly contain x.  $V_{him} \exp[-\theta_{him}]$  can be represented as a matrix of dimension (n x m), where n is the number of pairs (h,i). Then

$$F_{x_{hi}} = \sum_{m} V_{him} \exp[-\theta_{him}]$$

is the sum of the elements in the (h,i) row of that matrix.

3. The Value of F(x,y)

F(x,y) is obtained by pre-multiplying  $F_{x_{hi}}$  by  $x_{hi}$  and summing the products

$$F(x,y) = \sum_{hi} x_{hi} F_{x_{hi}}.$$

# 4. Partial Derivatives with Respect to y<sub>ik</sub>

Because of the cumulative property of  $\theta_{him}$ , a change in  $y_{jk}$  during some mission stage m' will affect the following stages as well. For each pair (h,i), premultiply  $x_{hi}$  by the corresponding  $A_{hijkm'}$ , where m' is the mission stage in which the  $y_{jk}$  of interest occurs. Sum  $V_{him} \exp[-\theta_{him}]$  over the mission stages for which m'<m, multiply the result with  $x_{hi} A_{hijkm'}$  and sum the products over h and i:

$$F_{y_{jk}} = \sum_{h} \sum_{i} x_{hi} A_{hijkm}, \sum_{m' \le m} V_{him}, exp[-\theta_{him'}]$$

5. Finding Directions of Increase (Decrease)

 $F_{xhi}$  and  $F_{yjk}$  are inputs to the derivative games for  $y_{jk}$  x and y. For x, the direction  $\gamma^{\circ}$  is sought such that  $D_{\gamma}\phi(x) = \nabla F_{x} \cdot \gamma$  is maximized; for y,  $g^{\circ}$  is sought such that  $D_{g}$  Max  $F(x,y) = \nabla F_{x} \cdot \gamma$ 

 $\nabla F_y \cdot g$  is minimized (equivalently,  $-\nabla F_y \cdot g$  is maximized). The side condition is that  $\gamma^\circ$  and  $g^\circ$  be unit vectors:

 $\sum_{i} \gamma_{hi} = \sum_{k} g_{jk} = 0, \sum_{i} \gamma_{hi}^{2} = \sum_{k} g_{jk}^{2} = 1; \forall h, \forall j.$ 

A method of finding such directions - called THE DIRECTION FINDING ALGORITHM - is derived from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions and the Schwartz Inequality. It is contained in [4] and has been applied to a vector - valued function by Zmuida in [22].

#### C. PROGRAMMING NOTES

The flow chart (Appendix) and the associated program may not be optimal with respect to machine time and memory space required, and may provide opportunities for improvement. For computer routines like this, intended to solve high-dimensional problems, a trade-off between time and space is generally apparent. The user, considering the particular facilities available to him, must decide on his optimal trade-off, and modify the program accordingly. The following discusses some of the techniques that have been implemented; it points out the major difficulties that have been encountered and the ways presently used to deal with these, and offers some remarks about the impact of the underlying mathematics on the use of the algorithm for realistic problems. The numbers referenced are statement numbers.

1. Presentation of Input - The Mission Description

In a realistic application, most of the  $A_{hijkm}$  will be zero because the effectiveness  $C_{hj\ell(k)}$  contained in A will be zero. Example: suppose k denotes a place in the western Baltic and  $\ell(k)$  classifies this place as shallow with extremely poor sonar conditions; j denotes a nuclear killer-submarine, h represents a conventional attack submarine. Then  $C_{hjl(k)}$  will be zero for all practical purposes.

The method of presenting the matrix E which avoids computing of and with A when C is zero, is one which is extremely easy for the user to understand and employ. He gives his description of a submarine mission by plotting it on a chart, marks off in order the places the submarine must go, and notes the forces it might meet at those places. He will give the exposure E required by the particular mission in terms of a standard which he will have set. He will mark off the points in the mission where the various stages of the mission will have been accomplished. Such a description might run as follows:

> m=0 h=1 i=1 k=1 j=2 E=1.0 j=5 E=1.5 k=7 j=1 E=2.0 j=3 E=3.0

m=1 (the first stage of the first mission is completed)

```
k=8 j=4 E=1.2
j=7 E=1.7
```

m=2

se tana kalendarahan na kala sa sa sa kananana kalendara sa sa

k=15	j=3	E=0.3
	j=2	E = 2.0
	j=4	E = 0.5

m= 3

The above mission (mission 1 for submarines of type 1) has three stages and nine encounters, in four different places. Then the listing starts for the next mission with h=1, i=2, and continues until all missions for all types of submarines have been described in this manner. Note that this listing has already taken into account the classification of the places k by l(k). This is done in such a way that for each encounter on this mission listing the associated  $C_{hjl(k)}$  is positive. In other words, a place k, and hence an encounter, will appear on the mission listing only if it seems possible that the opponent will allocate forces to that place and the corresponding effectiveness against the maximizer's submarine operating in that place is positive.

There are various possible ways of storing the information contained in the mission description in the machine. One way which is very economical in terms of storage space requirements is to read the list encounter by encounter, i.e., card by card, starting with an N=1. Then  $A(N) = E \cdot C_{hik(k)}$  and an indicator array

$$P(N) = I \cdot J \cdot K \cdot M \cdot (h-1) + J \cdot K \cdot M \cdot (i-1) + K \cdot M \cdot (j-1) + M \cdot (k-1) + m + 1$$

contain the complete information. I, J, K, M denote the maximum values of the indices i, j, k, m. The reason for using (m+1) is that the correct m appears *after* the mth stage is completed. The disadvantage of this method is that during computations the individual indices must be recomputed from P(N):

$$h = 1 + \left[\frac{P(N)}{I \cdot J \cdot K \cdot M}\right] [\cdot]$$

$$\Delta = P(N) - I \cdot J \cdot K \cdot M(h-1)$$

$$i = 1 + \left[\frac{\Delta}{J \cdot K \cdot M}\right]$$

$$\Delta \Delta = \Delta - J \cdot K \cdot M \cdot (i-1)$$

] means "the largest integer in •"

$$j = 1 + \left[\frac{\Delta \Delta}{K \cdot M}\right]$$
$$\Delta \Delta \Delta = \Delta \Delta - K \cdot M(j-1)$$
$$k = 1 + \left[\frac{\Delta \Delta \Delta}{M}\right]$$
$$m = \Delta \Delta \Delta - M(k-1)$$

In the sample program contained in this paper, the indices in their original form are stored in vector arrays and are directly accessible throughout the computations.

2. The Contraction with Respect to  $V_{him}$ 

This contraction takes into account the possibility that the stage m of a mission may have been noted, but that the associated  $V_{him}$  may have been declared to be zero. Since it is useless to calculate anything involving a  $V_{him}^{=0}$ , the corresponding elements in the index arrays of the mission are eliminated. This is done prior to the execution of the game and may therefore be referred to as the basic contraction.

3. Working in Subspaces

It can be expected that most of the  $x_{hi}$  and  $y_{jk}$ will be on their boundaries at any stage, including the approximate optimal solution. This suggests the idea of eliminating computations involving variables which have fixed values either temporarily or throughout the process.

To do this, one reduces the dimensions of the spaces, thus saving machine time. One can redefine the space so as to "freeze" the variables on the boundaries leaving the remainder free to move.

Where in the program should redefinition of the Y-space take place? The minimizer can hold the subspace fixed and continue to move in that subspace until an ap. parent minimum has been reached. At this point the allocation corresponding to this minimum has to be checked for optimality in the full space. This will require at least one iteration through the minimization routine in the full space. After a minimum valid in the full space has been obtained, the Y-space is reduced to a new subspace. An alternative approach is to redefine the space after each change in the Y-allocation, thus maintaining a continously changing subspace. The authors feel that the latter will enable the minimizing variable to stay in the subspace longer finding directions of decrease, before the need arises to employ the full space. This idea was implemented in the program.

The contractions for x (statement 1871) and y (125) eliminate computations involving elements that are on the lower boundaries. It must be noted that the contraction itself and the complications caused by its use take machine time. Worthwhile time savings in computation will not be realized until this technique is applied to relatively large scale problems.

INDX(N), N = 1,...,NNX, contains the indices of the  $x_{hi} > 0$ , INDY(N), N = 1,...,NNY, contains the indices of the  $y_{jk} > 0$ . NNX and NNY are the dimensions of the subspaces for X and Y. These index arrays are used to control which

variables are to be involved in the computations. The way this is done in practice can be seen in the program listing.

One remark concerning the DIRECTION FINDING ALGO-RITHMS, (400) and (1400), may be in order: these algorithms have to be applied row by row to the matrices  $||x_{hi}||$  and  $||y_{ik}||$ . In subspaces, the number of elements belonging to a particular row varies. The outer do-loop runs over the number of rows. To find the numbers of elements per row (these numbers serve as the termination values of the inner do-loops) a test on the indices stored in INDX and INDY is conducted (402 ff), (1402 ff). The test value, NTEST, is the index of the last element in the rows of  $||x_{hi}||$  and  $||y_{jk}||$ , respectively. Mhen the test passes, all elements in the row at hand have been collected and the algorithm begins. Before the next row is picked, NSTART is incremented by the number of elements found in the previous row so that the search through INDX or INDY always starts in the correct position.

#### 4. Machine Accuracy Problems

The program calls for frequent testing of floating point numbers. Throughout the development of the program these tests have been sources of trouble. Testing for equality must be strictly avoided even after - as has been done here in various places - variables close to a fixed quantity have been reset to that quantity (e.g., (1050 ff) or (1060 ff)). Although the program specified double-precision, it took extensive experimentation to maintain

feasibility, i.e., satisfy the side conditions

$$\sum_{i} x_{hi} = \sum_{k} y_{jk} = 1$$

to at least the 13<sup>th</sup> decimal place.

Of critical importance is the accuracy in the computation of the direction matrices  $\gamma$  (GAX) and g (GAY). In the neighborhood of a maximum or minimum, the partials  $F_x$  and  $F_y$  are close to zero, as are the Lagrange multipliers (XMU and YMU), and the differences  $F_x$ -XMU, $F_y$ -YMU (SD). In order to determine the value of the derivative game, the sum of the squares of these differences has to be formed, an operation that may very likely lead to erroneous results which, in turn, carry over into the computation of  $\gamma$  and g.

The countermeasure taken is to premultiply the SD when they are small by a large number, (505 ff), (1510 ff).

5. Testing the Program

As the calling of subroutines is exceedingly time consuming, the present program does not use them. This made debugging tedious. The "standard" routine, i.e., the program employing the derivative games in the original form, was tested running a small scale example where ||x|| was (2 X 2) and ||y|| was (2 X 4), making it possible to handcheck the computations.

The "auxiliary game" routine using the B-R process was debugged using the following objective function:

$$F(x,y) = 2x_1 \exp[-2y_1 - y_2] + 2x_2 \exp[-y_1 - 2y_2] + x_3 \exp[-y_1 - y_2 - y_3]$$
  
Subject to:  $\sum_{i} x_i = \sum_{k} y_k = 1$   
 $x_i, y_k \ge 0$ 

with initial allocations x = (0,0,1), y=(0,1,0). For a discussion of this example in light of the algorithm see [4]. The reason that this can only be solved through the B-R routine lies in the fact that, against the initial x, any y represents an exact minimum, however, the value of the derivative game for x is positive, yielded by  $\gamma^{\circ} = (0, \sqrt{2}/2, -\sqrt{2}/2)$ .

Finally, an example with 100 encounters was rigged up where ||x|| was (4x4), ||y|| was (5x10). While this does not yet represent a problem in high-dimensional space, the authors are confident that this example provided a sufficiently severe test to demonstrate the validity of the program as written.

6. General Comments

The following remarks are intended to facilitate the use and modification of the program.

a. Initial Allocation

The initial allocations are generated as corner points in the stationary part (99). It can be expected that, in the optimal solution, most of the variables will be on the boundaries. An initial point on the boundaries insures that the number of "absurd" allocations is minimal.

If one were to use an interior point as a starting solution, it possibly would involve large numbers of absurd allocations (e.g., a submarine in an aircraft barrier patrol). The machine would spend an enormous amount of time reducing such allocations to zero.

b. Distance Policy

The initial and re-set values for the distances are determined from the dimensions of the spaces; the user may employ his own rules. A compromise between re-set values too large causing "overshooting" and values to small causing "creeping" should be considered. In general, "creeping" is much costlier in terms of machine time. The policy for halving distances and its rationale is outlined in [4].

c. Upper and Lower Bounds

For simplicity, 0 and 1 have been used in the program. Specifying individual bounds  $\alpha_{hi}$ ,  $\beta_{hi}$  and  $a_{jk}$ ,  $b_{jk}$  does not introduce additional problems but increases the storage space required considerably (e.g., for y, two additional arrays of the same dimension as y).

d. Modifying the Objective Function

The algorithm as stated is valid for concaveconvex functions under quite general conditions. Though the present program has been designed to handle a particular lincar-exponential function, it is quite flexible. The objective function mentioned in subsection 5 may serve to illustrate this point:

 $F(x,y) = 2x_1 \exp[-2y_1 - y_2] + 2x_2 \exp[-y_1 - 2y_2]$ 

+  $x_3 \exp[-y_1 - y_2 - y_3]$ 

is produced by a very simple adjustment of the mission description:

j=1 E=2.0h=1 i=1 k=1 k=2 j=1 E=1.0 j=1 k=3 E=0.0 END OF MISSION 1 m=1 h=1 i=2 k=1 j=1 E=1.0 k=2 j=1 E=2.0• k=3 E=0.0 END OF MISSION 2 j=1 m=1 h=1 i=3 k=1 j=1 E=1.0 **k=**2 j=2 E=1.0k=3 j=3 E=1.0 END OF MISSION 3 m=1

The associated 4-values are:  $V_{111} = 2.0$   $V_{121} = 2.0$  $V_{131} = 1.0.$ 

The associated  $C_{hj\ell(k)}$  are:  $C_{111} = C_{112} = C_{113} = 1.0$ 

e. Assigning Values V<sub>him</sub>

The values (of completing stage m of mission i for submarine of type h) are relative measures. When assigning  $V_{him}$ , the user should consider that a submarine may have spent part of its weapons (resources) during stage m-1. This may reduce its operational capabilities for stage m, and the value for stage m should reflect this fact.

f. Choosing  $\rho$  (RHO)

The parameter  $\rho$ , mentioned in Chapter II, section B.2.b, has to be chosen by the user. It specifies
the accuracy to which Max  $\phi(x)$  is to approximate the value of the game F(x,y), V.  $\rho$  affects the y-minimization by controlling the accuracy,  $\varepsilon(d)$ , to which the derivative game  $D_g \underset{x}{\text{Max }} F(x,y) = -\nabla F_y \cdot g$  has to approximate its mathematical value. The y-minimization is the most time consuming portion of the process.

$$\varepsilon(d) = \frac{\rho \cdot d}{36 \cdot \delta}$$

where  $\delta$  is the diameter of the X-space. Considering the "worst" case, when d = d<sub>0</sub> =  $\rho/36 \cdot L$ , (L is the maximum oscillation of F<sub>x</sub>), it becomes apparent that

$$\varepsilon(d_0) = \frac{\rho^2}{36^2 \cdot \delta \cdot L}$$

is of order of magnitude  $\rho^2 \cdot 10^{-3}$ .

Recall that the conditions established for the valididty of the algorithm are intended to guarantee that, at the approximate optimal solution,  $|\phi(x)-V| \le \rho$ . Test runs of the program seem to indicate that the accuracy actually obtained is much higher.

Although generally valid conclusions cannot be derived from this observation the user must be aware of this feature because he will pay heavily in terms of machine time when  $\rho$  is unreasonably small.

# IV. SUMMARY

The devlopment of the mathematical theory underlying the derivative game and the concave-convex game algorithm has only been sketched out in this paper. Here, that algorithm has been employed in the formation of a potentially useful example. With programming techniques designed to provide economical running in high dimensions, large-scale problems should be amenable to the application of the concave-convex game algorithm.

### V. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

A. MATHEMATICS

In Section III.C.6.e., the question of the proper choice of  $\rho$  was addressed. Recall that

 $| \max_{\mathbf{X}} \phi(\mathbf{X}) - \mathbf{V} | \leq \rho.$ 

Even when the user has based his choice of a value for  $\rho$ on extensive experimentation with a program, he still will not know exactly how close Max  $\phi(x)$  is to the value of the game. The desirable state of affairs would be

$$| \max_{x} \phi(x) - V | = \rho$$

This would require the formulation of necessary conditions on the functions  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$  and  $\epsilon$ .

### **B. PROGRAMMING**

The fact that, for the class of games at issue, MaxMinF x y = MinMaxF can be exploited to arrive at the neighborhood of y x the optimal solution faster than the present program will: Start the problem as MinMaxF. The course of action then is reversed with considerable advantages. The maximizer sees the present y-allocation; the maximization is trivial, assigning as much weight as possible to the  $x_{hi}$  with the largest coefficients (the  $F_x(x,y^\circ)$ ), which results in a corner solution for x. Then the B-R technique is employed directly to F(x,y) which will bring x off the boundaries

again, and, after a pre-set number of iterations, will produce an allocation not far from the solution. At this stage the problem is reinterpreted as MaxMinF and solved in the manner of the present program.

Another feasible refinement particularly useful in the application of the algorithm to objective functions linear in both x and y, i.e.,  $F = \sum_{ij} x_i a_{ij} y_j$ , is the idea of "doubling", outlined in [4]. The problem is treated as MaxMin and MinMax at the same time. Here the value of the game is approached from below and above simultaneously which provides a stopping rule when the difference  $MaxF(x,y) - \phi(x) x$ arrives at a pre-specified value.



FLOWCHART OF THE PROGRAMMED EXAMPLE **APPENDIX:** 

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# COMPUTER PROGRAM LISTING

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COMPUTE THE PARTIALS WITH RESPECT TO X. SIMPLY SUN THE ROW OF THE V(H,I,M)\*EXP(-THETA) MATRIX. NOGAX=1 MEANS NO GAMMA FOR X HAS BEEN FCUND IN Restricted space . CALCULATE THE CURRENT VALUE OF THE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION. COMPUTE THE PARTIALS WITH RESPECT TO Y. A MUST BE RETRIEVED FROM THE LIST. IF(NOGAX.EQ.1)GO TO 1400 DG 236 N=1.MAXX DFX(N)=0. NX=INDX(N) NX1=NDX(N) NX1=MAXM\*(NX-1) DFDX=0. DFDX=0.L=1,MAXM DFDX=0.L=1,MAXMM DFDX=0.L=1,MAXM DFDX=0.L=1,MAXM DFDX= DO 330 N=1,NNV NN=NH(N) II=I(N) IX=MAXI\*(NN-1)+II 00 301 N=1,MAXY DFY(N)=0. 265 900 900 900 305 2355 2365 2365 239 260 275280 285 267 240 270 ပပပ 0000000000000 J

R THIS CONTRACTS THE SPACE AND GIVES THE PROPER UPPER BCUND ON DC-LCOP INDICES: NY= THE NUMBER RELEVANT ELEMENTS PER ROW. THE LOGIC SWITCH LOGICD IS USED TO DETERMINE WHETHER YMU HAS CHANGED (!) CR NOT (0). - FIND [4 JJ=J(N) kk=k(N) JK=MAXK\*(JJ-1)+KK JK=MAXK\*(JJ-1)+KK JT=INDY(L) JT=INDY(L) IF(INDY(L) IF(INDY(L) IF(INDY(L) IF(INDY(L) IF(INDY(L) IF(INDY(L) IF(INDY(L) IF(INDY(L) IF(INDY(L)) IF(INDY(L) IF(INDY(L)) IF(IN THE DIRECTION FINDING ALGORITHM FOR Y A DIRECTICN DOWN IN THE Y SPACE. LI.LE..COOCOCOCOCOCOL) SO TO 420 2 DU 325 L=MM, MA XM 00 325 L=MM, MA XM NV=MX\*( NN-1)+MAXM\*( II-1)+L SUM= SUM+VE( NV) 5 CCNT INUE DFY( JK)=DFY( JK)+SUM\*SA(N) 0 CCNTINUE 2 CG 405 N=NSTART,NNY IY=INDY(N) 1F(IY\*6T\*NTEST) GO TO 410 3 NY=NY+1 0CFY(NY)=DFY(IY) 7 V(NY)=DFY(IY) 6 CG 17NUE 7 V(N)==(IY) 1 CSY(L)=0 1 F(YY(L)=CLE..0000000001 NSTART=1 00 550 NJ=1,MAXJ SU4=0. NCCUNT=0 NY=0 LCGICD=1 405 314 330 402 403 316 325 400 400 318 320 3 22  $\mathbf{u} \mathbf{u} \mathbf{u} \mathbf{u}$ 000000000

BEEN TO THE TEST WHETHER SMALL IS SMALLER THAN YMU. NOW AS MANY ELEMENTS AS POSSIBLE HAVE DISTINGUISHED ON THE UPPER BOUND. GO LOWER BOUND. 420 470 999999) 60 T0 470 0 T0 470 .) 3C TO 480 463 20 IF(SMALL.GE.YMU) GC TO 490 LOGICD=1 YMU=(NCDUNT\*YMU+SMALL)/(NCDUNT+1) NCCUNT=NCDUNT+1 SMALL=YMU IDSY(MARK)=1 GO TO 460 00 NCW GO TO THE UPPER BOUND. F(YY(L).GE...9999999999999) DSY(L)=1 c ccuntence stmesumeder(t) stmesumeder(t) ccntinue ff(ncount.eg.o) co to 430 small=ymu gc to 450 gc to 450 small=odfy(1) syuesdofy(1) if(2JK.ett.small) small=zJK yeuesmall L=1,NY SPALL=DDFY(I MARK=L CCNTINUE 470 L=1, (1057(L), (YY(L), L SPALLEDDFY Markel ī MARK=0 D0 480 L IF(1057(L IF(77(L) MARK=0 420 425 411 412 44 WM 00 440 450 460 445 470 472 415 476 477 478 ပပပ 000

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Consider a final sector sector sector

BEFORE OM SETTING THEM ALUE FORM THE TOTAL SUM OVER THE ENTIRE DISTINGUISHED SET. IS THE VALUE OF THE DERIVATIVE GAME POSITIVE? THIS MEANS THAT NO MORE ELEMENTS CAN BE DISTINGUISHED. YMU=(NCDUNT\*YMU+SMALL)/(NCOUNT+1) NCOUNT=NCOUNT+1 IOSY(MARK)=1 SPALL=YMU GC TO 475 IF(LUGICO.EC.0) GO TO 496 IF(TOTAL.GT..CJOCCCJ1) GO TO 518 TGTAL=0. DO 517 N=1,NNY SC(N)=SD(N)\*100960290. TOTAL=TGTAL+SD(N)\*\*2 IF THIS TEST FAILS, PREMU SCUARING TO PREVENT THE MU EQUAL TO ZERO. STEP UP TH PROPCRTIGNATELV. 5 LGGICD=0 6 CT0 475 6 CT0 450 6 DC 499 L=1.NY NL=NSTART+L-1 7 FF(NL)=0 8 SD(NL)=90 9 SD(NL)=DDFY(L)-YMU 9 SD(NL)=DDFY(L)-YM CCUTINUE IF(SMALL.LE.YMU) GO TO 495 LCGICD=1 TCTAL=0. DC 515 N=1,NNY TOTAL=TOTAL+SD(N)\*\*2 RECALCULATE YMU. 481 495 480 456 500 490 497 458 499 517 0000ပပပ 00000000000000

PRO-Y WOULD NEW ASSED EPSLON=(RH0\*DF0RX\*10000000.)/(36.\*DELTAX\*DELTAV) EPSLON=EPSLON\*\*2 If(T0TAL\_LE.EPSLON) G0 T0 785 GC T0 520 EPSLON=(RH0\*DF0RX)/(36.\*DELTAX\*DELTAV) EPSLON=(RH0\*DF0RX)/(36.\*DELTAX\*DELTAV) IF(T0TAL\_LE.EPSLON) G0 T0 785 YLA=DS0RT(T0TAL) OC 525 N=1,NNY GAY(N)=SD(N)/YLA ZA CO 776 L=1.MAXY YTRY(L)=0. DC 780 N=1.NNY JY=INDY(N) YTRY(JY)=Y(JY)+DFORY\*GAY(N) IF(YTRY(JY)=0. GO TO 780 IF(YTRY(JY)=1. STRY(JY)=1. FRY(JY)=1. FRY(JY)= INI H DTEST=DFCRY DO 770 N=1,NNY IF(GAY(N),EQ.00.) GO TO 770 JY=INDY(N) IF(ST=Y(JY)+DFORY#GAY(N) IF(YTEST-LT-00.) DFORY=(1.-Y(JY)/GAY(N) IF(YTEST-GT-1.) DFORY=(1.-Y(JY))/GAY(N) CCNTINUE IBNDY VALUE DETERMI DCWN THE IF Y HAS HIT A BOUNDARY, SET VG THE TEST VA ON CF MOVE' DE CE AND CUT DCW EN RECOMPUTE F OR Y. THE TEST Y MANY TRIALS. IF(DTEST.GT.DFORY) IBNDY=1 FORM THE Y TRIAL PCINT. AFTER CCMPUTING POSED DIRECTION LEAVE ITS SPACE NECESSARY. THEN TRIAL VALUE FOR AFTER FINITELY MA 80  $\frac{2}{2}$ 0 200 525 518 520 770 622 760 775 775 777 780 000000000 ບບບ ပပပ ပပပ

CBJECTIVE SCN WILL THEN CCESSFULLY HE CURRENT X SET DFORY=MAX(CFCRX,0.1). RESTRICTED DITY IN THE MIZES **LETELY**: BEEN I Z K PI 8-R LOOP THIS BLOCK CONTROLS THE FOLLOWING: IF THE Y-MIN HAS BEEN OBTAINED IN THE F SPACE, THE MINIMUM IS CHECKED FOR VALIT FULL SPACE: AFTER X HAS MUVED, Y MINI COMPLETELY: WHEN IN B-R, Y MINIMIZES ( WHEN IN E-R X USES THE WHOLE SPACE. LON TON NOW, USING THIS TEST VALUE FGR Y, THE FUNCTION CAN BE EVALUATED. A COMPARI BE MADE TO DETERMINE WHETPER Y HAS SU DEMONSTRATED THE ABILITY T: CGUNTER TH COMPUTE THETA FOR THE TRIAL PCINT STEP PRIOR TO THE 8-R LOOP? EXPANC THE SPACE FOR Y. STORE CURRENT Y IN YBARN. 5 DC 796 N=1,MAXY 6 INDY(N)=N NNY=MAXY 1F(0F0XX.6T.00.1) GO TO 798 0F0RY=U.1 6C TO 2550 6C TO 2550 6C TO 2550 6C TO 2550 IS Y IN THE FULL SPACE? IF(13020.EQ.C) GO TO 3050 DC 791 N=1,MAXY YEARN(N)=Y(N) GC TO 3020 IS THE PROGRAM IN THE IF(NNY.LT.MAXY)G0 T0 795 IF(INBR, EQ. C)G0 T0 738 GC T0 795 IF(NBR, EQ. 0)G0 T0 1120 GC T0 1825 HAS THE FIRST EXECUTED? 861 N=1, MAXV ຊ 785 786 787 789 789 C5 L 755 756 800 161 758 0000000000 000 0000 20000000000000000

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FNN=MX\*(N-1)+MAXM\*([I-1)+MT MA=MNN-MT+MM IF(YTRY(JK)=EQ.0.) GQ TO 824 THETA(MN)=THETA(MNN)+A(N)\*YTRY(JK) GQ TO 826 THETA(MN)=THETA(MNN) FIETA(MN)=THETA(MNN) FIEMM FIEMM JK).eEQ.0.) GG TO 850 V-1)+MAXM\*(II-1)+MM )=THETA(MN)+A(N)\*YTRY(JK) COMPUTE V(H, I, M)\*EXP(-THETA). NX=MAXI\*(NN-1)+11 NX=MAXI\*(NN-1)+11 DQ 865 LX=1,NNX IX=INDX(LX) F(NX•EQ•IX) GO TO 807 TO 850 W.GT.NT)GO TO 810 1.61.17)GO TO 810 3 815 820 AXK\*(JJ-1)+KK (N) DC 870 N=1, MAXV VE(N)=V(N) DQ 900 N=1, NNX NX= INDX(N) NXI=MAXM\*(NX-1) JI THETA(N)=0. NT=NH(1) IT=I(1) MT=M(1) MT=M(1) NA=NH(N) IT=I(N) LI=I(N) ,\*(N)∀=(NW) HE T Ĩ. , , , Ĩ N. H 11 808 803 810 811 840 870 875 815 816 817 820 822 8264 8264 850 801 802 803 805 807 812 ບບບ

TEST THE NEWLY CALCULATED VALUE OF THE CBJECTIVE FUNCTION. ŇV=NX1+L IF(V(NV)•EQ•0•)GO TC 895 IF(THETA(NV)•GT•0•) VE(NV)=VE(NV)\*DEXP(-THETA(NV)) CONTINUE CGNTINUE COMPUTE THE PARTIALS WITH RESPECT TO X. SIMPLY SUM THE ROW OF THE V\*EXP(-THETA)-MATRIX CALCULATE THE VALUE OF THE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION ACHIEVED WITH THE TRIAL PGINT. THE TRIAL POINT BECOMES THE NEW Y ALLOCATION. FDIFF=FXYSAV-FXYT EPSLON=(RHQ\*DFORX\*DFORY)/(144.\*DELTAX\*DELTAY) IF(FDIFF.LT.EPSLCN) G0 f0 1080 IF(NBR.EQ.0) G0 T0 1550 IF(NBR.EQ.1)G0 T0 1550 G0 T0 1845 FXY=0. DO I000 N=1.MAXX IF(X(N).LE.C0000000000000000000000 FXY=FXY+X(N)\*DFX(N) CCNTINUE FXYT=FXY V\*EXP(-THETA) IS COMPLETE. DD 920 N=1, MAXX DFX(N)=0. CO 980 N=1, NNX NX=INDX(N) NX1=MAXM\*(NX-1) DFD250. DFD250. CO 950 L=1, MAXM NL=NX1+L DFDX 1+L DFDX 1+L CONTINUE CONTINUE CCNT(NUE DO 1060 N=1,MAXY L=1 . MAX M 895 00 1050 888 9009 7000 1000 888 940 950 980 066 0620 1010 10301035 000000  $\mathbf{u} \mathbf{u} \mathbf{u} \mathbf{u}$ 0000ںر

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ENSURE
BE
                                                                                                  FORM THE Y LIST. IT CONTAINS THE INDICES SUCH THAT Y>0.
                   THE FOLLCWING TESTING BLOCK IS NECESSARY TO
THAT THE TESTS FOR Y ON THE BOUNDARIES WILL
PROPERLY HANDLED BY THE MACHINE.
                                               IF(Y(N).GT..C000C00C00001) G0 T0 1053
Y(N)=0.
G0 T0 1060
IF(Y(N).LT..9999999999999) GU T0 1060
Y(N)=1.
C0NTINUE
                                                                                                                                                                                                            IS Y VERY CLOSE TO THE MINIMUM?
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         IF(IFAILY EC.O)GO TO 1100
GC TC 1C90
                                                                                                                    NY=0
D0 150 N=1,MAXY
IF(Y(N)•GT•C•) G0 T0 145
G0 T0 150
Y(N)=YTRY(N)
YEARN(N)=Y(N)
                                                                                                                                           GO TO 150
NY=NY+1
INDY(NY)=N
CCNTINUE
NNY=NY
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IN CHECKING THE BCUNDARIES, ALLOWANCE IS MADE FOR THE PCSSIBILITY OF X BEING OBSTRUCTED. TEST WHETHER SMALL IS SMALLER THAN XMU. XMU=(NCOUNT\*XMU+SMALL)/(NCOUNT+1) NCCUNT=NCOUNT+1 (
14.12 IF(XX(L).eT.DOX) G0 T0 1420
14.12 IF(XX(L).eT.DOXC) G0 T0 1420
NCOUNT=NCOUNT+1
NCOUNT=NCOUNT+1
14.20 CCNTINUE
14.25 SMALL=XMUNCOUNT.EQ.0) G0 T0 1430
14.30 SVALL=XMUNCOUNT.EQ.0) G0 T0 1430
14.30 SVALL=XMU
14.40 C0NTINUE
14.40 C0NTINUE 470 NGW GO TC THE UPPER BOUND. 1402 NTEST=NJ\*MAXI 1402 D0 1405 N=NSTART,NNX 1X=1NDX(N) 16(1X+6T\*NTEST) G0 T0 1410 NX=NX+1 NX=NX+1 1403 NX=NX+1 1410 D0FX(NX)=X(IX) 1405 CCNTINUE 1410 D0 1420 L=1,NX 1410 D0 1420 L=1,NX D MARK=0 D D0 1470 L=1,NX IF(IDSX(L).EQ.1) G0 T0 1470 1 IF(XX(L).LT.D0XC) G0 T0 1470 2 IF(D0FX(L).GE.SMALL)G0 T0 1 3 SMALL=D0FX(L).GE.SMALL)G0 T0 1 MARK=L 0 CONTINUE IF(SMALL.GE.XMU)GO TO 1490 LOGICD=1 XMU=(NCOUNT\*XMU+SMALL)/INC X NU=SMAL ος 1430 τ τ τ 1450 1461 1462 1462 1472 0000ပပပ

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SD BEFORE FROM SETTING THEM F VALUE THE DIRECTION FINDING ALGORITHM FOR X MUST BE REPEATED WITH THE FULL SET OF PARTIALS WITH RESPECT TO X. L EXPAND THE RESTRICTED X SPACE TO FULL SPACE. IS IF(TOTAL.6T..0000001) GO TO 1518 TOTAL=0. DO 1517 ^=1,NNX DOTAL=TOTAL+SD(N)#10000000.)/(36.\*DELTAX) EPSLGN=EPSLCN\*\*2 IF(TOTAL=EPSLCN\*\*2 IF(TOTAL=EPSLCN\*\*2 IF(TOTAL=EPSLCN\*\*2 BEPSLCN=EPSLCN\*\*2 IF(TOTAL=EPSLCN\*\*2 TEST THE VALUE OF THE DERIVATIVE GAME. POSITIVE? IF THIS TEST FAILS, PREMULTIPLY SQUARING TO PREVENT THE MACHINE EQUAL TO ZERO. STEP UP THE TEST PROPORTICNATELY. × D XLA=DSQRT(TCTAL) DC 1522 N=1,MAXX C GAX(N)=0. 1525 N=1,NNX 1X=1NDX(N) 1X=1NDX(N) 5 GAX(1X)=SD(N)/XLA NBR=NBR+1 6 GC TU 1750 4 IF(NNX.EC.MAX) GO TO 1720 COMPUTE THE GAMMAS FOR DO I716 N=1,MAXX INDX(N)=N NNX=MAXX NCGAX=1 1525 1705 1714 1715 1510 1517 1518 1520 1522 ່ບບບບບບ ບບບບບບ ပပပ ပပပ

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THE NEW TRIAL POINT FOR X. PUT IN X(N) VECTOR IRK WITH IT, STORE CURRENT, GOOD X POINT IN N) VECTOR. THIS TEST DIRECTS THE PROGRAM INTO THE B-R ROUTINE BY ITS FAILURE. BASE AT THIS POINT X HAS FAILED, WRITE THE LAST GOOD X BACK INTO X(N), DISCARD XTRY(N). X HAS HAD A SUCCESS. XTRY(N) BECOMES THE NEW POINT FOR X. DISCARD X(N). DD 1875 N=1,NNX NX=1NDX(N) IF(X(NX).6E..000000000000001)G0 T0 1863 X(NX)=2... TO 1870 5 D0 1786 N=1,MA XX 6 XTRY(N)=0. 1 V0 1790 N=1,NNX 0 XTRY(IX)=X(IX)+DFORX\*GBARX(IX) 0 D0 1810 N=1,MAXX XTHOLD=XTRY(N) XTHOLD=XTRY(N) XTHOLD=XTRY(N) XTNUE IF(DFORX.GT.DCX)GO TO 107 DFORX=D0X GC TO 3010 FDIFF=FXYT-FXOYO FPSLCN=(RHO\*CFORX)/(18.\*DELTA)) IF(FDIFF.LT.EPSLCN) GO TO 1850 GO TO 1860 FDIFFFXT-FX0YC EPSLON=(RHC\*DFGRX)/(18•\*DELTAX) IF(FDIFF•LT、EPSLON) GO TO 1850 GO TO 1050 GG TG I & 70 IF(X(NX).LE..9999999999999)GU X(NX)=1. DD 1852 N=1, MAXX X(N)=XTRY(N) GO TO 1880 FORM TH TO WORK XTRY(N) 1815 1820 1825 1830 C 1831 C 1845 1850 1852 1765 1785 1767 1847 1790 1800 1610 1860 1863 0000 ပပပ

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PUT THE TRIAL POINT IN THE X(N) VECTOR TO WORK WITH IT. STORE THE GOOD POINT IN XTRY(N). WHEN NOT IN B-R ROUTINE REFORM THE X-LIST. IT CONTAINS THE INDICES SUCH THAT X>0 . DFORX=DELTAX\*0.5
DFORX=DELTAX\*0.5 T=0FCRX#0.5 TEST.6T.00X) GO TO 1885 X=0CX 0 1785 X=0TEST ČŘX\*0.5 •GT.00X) GO TO 1895 AILX.EC.0)G0 T0 3000 1890 x=1 IF(INBR.EQ.1) GO TO 1873 NX=0 [3026=1 [F(INBR•EQ•1)60 T0 3020 [NBR=1 D0 3017 N=1.MAXX XHOLD=X(N) X(N)=XTRY(N) XTRY(N)=XHCLD G0 T0 107 STEDFUS STEDFUS CRXEDD NZ)=N 1870 CCNTINUE BNDX=C 3012<sup>-</sup> 3015 1890 1895 1873 1874 1880 1880 1882 1885 30.00 3010 3017 1872 1852 3016 1871 ပပ

THE × WRITE THE (APPROXIMATELY) CPTIMAL STRATEGIES FOR AND FCR Y AND THE VALUE OF THE GAME. IN CASE THE PROGRAM ARRIVES AT A SOLUTION WHILE IN THE B-R ROUTINE, THE AVERAGED Y'S REPRESENT I OPTIMAL STRATEGY FOR Y. PUT THE TRIAL POINT IN THE X(N) VECTOR TO WORK WITH IT. STORE THE GOOD PCINT IN XTRY(N). PUT THE TRIAL POINT IN THE X(N) VECTOR TC WORK WITH II. STORE THE GOOD POINT IN XTRY(N). WRITE(6,4001) FCRMAT(\*1,30X,\*THE CPTIMAL SOLUTION FOR X\*) WRITE(6,4002)(X(N),N=1,4) WRITE(6,4002)(X(N),N=5,8) WRITE(6,4002)(X(N),N=5,8) WRITE(6,4002)(X(N),N=13,16) FCRMAT(\*0,30X,4FI6.10) FCRMAT(\*0,30X,4FI6.10) FCRMAT(\*0,30X,\*THE OPTIMAL SOLUTION FOR Y\*) CD DD 3021 N=1.MAXX X{N}=XTRY(N) X(N)=XTRY(N) X(N)=XHOLD CONTINUE 1 2012C=0 60 107 60 107 FDIFF=FXTYT-FXOYO FPSLON=(DDX\*RHO)/(18.\*DELTAX) IF(FDIFF.6E.EPSLON) 60 TO 3060 IF(INBR.EQ.0)G0 TD 4008 DC 4007 h=1,MaXY Y(N)=YBARN(N) WRITE(6.4004)(Y(N),N=1,12) WRITE(6.4004)(Y(N),N=11,20) 2 DD 3053 N=1, MAXX X(N)=XTRY(N) X(N)=XTRY(N) XTRY(N)=XHOLD 3 CCNTINUE 60 TD 1140 0 IFAILX=0 60 TD 1860 3053 4000 3020 3021 3050 3060 3052 4003 4008 4008 40.02 ပပပ  $\mathbf{v} \mathbf{v} \mathbf{v} \mathbf{v}$ Q 00000

		GAME . )		
	THE			
WRITE(6,4004)(Y(N),N=21,30) WRITE(6,4004)(Y(N),N=31,40)	HEALT (1,1,1,0,4) (1,1,1), N=41,50)	FORMAT ( 0, 2002, THE VALUE OF	FCRM≦T(*0*,45X,FI2.€) STOP	END
	4004	4005	4056 99999	

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