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Leadership and Exchange in Formal Organizations

by

T.O. Jacobs
Human Resources Research Organization

December 1970

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

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Foreword

The research which resulted in the present volume was conducted under a contract performed by the Human Resources Research Organization for the Office of Naval Research, Department of the Navy. The contract, The Development of a Comprehensive Review of Psychological and Sociological Literature on Organizational Leadership, called for a scholarly integration of basic and applied research on leadership.

The research was performed at HumRRO Division No. 4, at Fort Benning, Georgia. Dr. T.O. Jacobs, the author of this volume, is the Director of the Division. The work was performed under Navy Contract No. N00014-70-C-0091, NR 171-811/9-4-69 (452).

Meredith P. Crawford
President
Human Resources Research Organization

Preface

In a 1965 review of a portion of the literature on influence, leadership, and control, Dorwin Cartwright commented that the difficulties involved in providing a comprehensive treatment of such a topic are large indeed. He found, as did the author of the present volume, that the literature related to influence processes is vast and disjointed, and challenges efforts to develop more parsimonious approaches to explaining these processes. For Cartwright, it appeared that the development of a "genuinely comprehensive theory" would of necessity be accomplished only through the use of concepts derived from social science disciplines beyond psychology.

The purpose of the present volume has been to accomplish, to some extent, that which Cartwright defined as a useful goal: to review and reinterpret the existing literature on leadership, power, and influence processes in general, in order to arrive at a somewhat more general approach to understanding them. Progress toward this goal was facilitated by at least three developments. The first was the development of social exchange theory, principally by Homans and Blau, which seems to address quite basic attributes of the interaction that occurs between and among individuals, on the basis of which more complex interactions (e.g., normative exchange) and institutions (e.g., differentiation of power) may possibly develop. The second development was a 1969 review of the leadership literature by Hollander and Julian which explicitly recognized the importance of social exchange theory as a tool for explaining the influence processes that constitute leadership. The third, and perhaps most significant, development was a growing awareness in the Navy of the need for integration and reinterpretation of the leadership literature, to provide both a better theoretical understanding of the leadership process, and a source of understanding to naval cadets of the sociological and psychological basis of leadership, both in small groups and in formal organizations.

The focus of the present volume has been on influence processes in formal organizations. While this excludes other phenomena of obvious

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importance and interest, it was judged to be an appropriate focus, considering the primary purposes to be accomplished by the book. Somewhat more than 1,000 separate titles were reviewed and abstracted. These do not by any means constitute all of the available literature, nor were all of them eventually used in the writing of the volume, which is frankly interpretive. However, it is hoped that the material on which the volume eventually was based *does* constitute a sufficient cross-section of the literature that no important concepts have been omitted.

Many persons have contributed to the completion of this effort. Many of the concepts leading to recognition of the implicit exchange between superordinate and subordinates in formal organizations were developed by Dr. Carl J. Lange, who was among the first members of the Human Resources Research Organization to study leadership. His work, which began in 1954, initiated a series of studies of leadership that has continued within HumRRO until the present time. Further, though no longer a part of HumRRO, Dr. Lange contributed materially to the thinking in the present work by reviewing the manuscript and providing many helpful suggestions.

It would be difficult within limited space to recognize the many other persons who also contributed to the completion of the work. Particular thanks are due Dr. E.E. Inman of the U.S. Naval Academy, who identified the need for the work, encouraged its development at many different points, and also materially assisted by a thoughtful and penetrating review of the manuscript. Dr. Eugene A. Cogan of the Human Resources Research Organization also reviewed the manuscript, and was a constant source of encouragement. Much of the literature was abstracted by Mr. Harold E. Christensen and Mrs. Fay F. Williams of the Division No. 4 staff.

Finally, the support of the Office of Naval Research, and particularly of Dr. John A. Nagay, is gratefully acknowledged. Such Navy sponsorship not only made possible the accomplishment of the present work but has been responsible for a substantial portion of the leadership research reported in the literature surveyed.

T.O. Jacobs
Director
HumRRO Division No. 4

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Leadership and Exchange in Formal Organizations

1

Historical Perspective

Leaders and leadership have been a focus of intense interest since, thousands of years ago, men first began to wonder about the ways in which leaders differ from other people. Outstanding leaders *are* challenging objects for study. Scientists and nonscientists alike have long sought to learn the nature of the exceptional talents and skills that have led to the significant accomplishments of exceptional leaders who have emerged over the centuries.

Indeed, such accomplishment has provided a basis for defining leadership, as the process of exceptional innovation with regard either to goal directions, methods of goal achievement, or the degree of achievement itself (e.g., Galton, 1925). One of the crucial issues in early leadership theory was probably generated by just this kind of observation. Thomas Carlyle, in 1910, postulated the so-called "great man theory," the essence of which was that the progress the world has experienced is a product of the individual achievements of great men who lived during the period in which advances occurred.

However, every theory seems to be capable of generating an antithetical position. While psychology might be defined as the study of the individual within society, sociology might be defined as the study of society itself. A sociological theory, in opposition to the great man theory, was that of "cultural determinism," which advocated the position that great men were not so much unique individuals in themselves, but rather were products of forces existing during the period in which they lived; had one "great man" not appeared, another "great man" *would* have. In this view, it is not that individuals appear who have the capability to effect great and sweeping changes, but rather that societal forces have reached such a magnitude that change must occur. Given such forces, an individual who can verbalize them and mobilize support for reasonable change will be

NOTE: The list of references cited in Chapter 1 begins on page 18.

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accorded leader status. Clearly, the requirements for leadership would be different, depending upon which view is accepted—that of Carlyle or that of cultural determinism.

Of course, neither of these two conflicting positions could be demonstrated as scientifically "correct." Basically, they were conclusions drawn from observations, and both became obsolete as knowledge accumulated about the social dynamics of leadership processes. Nevertheless, the research on leadership has shown a continuing tendency for attention to be focused either on the individual in a leadership position, or on the structure of the social group in which the leader finds himself. Only quite recently have these two apparently conflicting emphases begun to seem compatible. The purpose of this introductory chapter is to outline some of the trends in leadership research and theory that have led to a blending of these opposite poles of thought.

During the last 40 years there have been several lines of development which, in some respects, seem to have proceeded almost independently of one another. Especially during the decade prior to World War II, there was great interest in the personality traits of leaders. Individuals who had achieved leadership status in one context or another were administered psychological tests of various sorts to measure personality characteristics that might be uniquely associated with their status. At nearly the same time, however, there were beginning movements in industrial psychology by Mayo (1933) and his associates that were concerned with the productivity of industrial work groups, and the impact of the organization on the work group's motivation to achieve high levels of productivity.

These approaches constitute foci of attention on (a) the personality of the leader and (b) the group itself—respective approaches that were conceptually almost in opposition to one another in that each very nearly excluded the other's subject as an element of importance. Even so, there was also a beginning awareness of interactive aspects of the leader-follower relationship, including such notions as the nearly universal emergence of structure in the small group, and power (or authority) relationships in such group structures. Smith and Krueger (1933) note that "In one sense at least it may be said that leadership is effective in face-to-face situations in proportion to the degree of control which the leader has over the follower group. That degree of control is due in part to the security and permanence of the leader in his position."

In this statement, there is implicit recognition of the need to consider group goals, the leader's bases of power, and, perhaps, the extent to which the leader's position may be supported by a larger organizational structure. As will be seen, these are all highly important elements of the total leadership equation.

One further complication in the study of leadership has been the problem of deciding who is a leader and who is not (and, perhaps, how *much* a leader each leader is). On the surface it appears absurd that this should be a problem—surely, it cannot be so difficult to decide whether a person is or is not a leader. But the fact remains that different standards *have* been applied, with the result that different studies sometimes reach apparently contradictory results that may not even be relevant to one another.

For example, Cowley (1928) made a distinction between "headmen" and leaders. Leaders were thought to have programs in their groups, and to be moving toward objectives in a definite manner. "Headmen," in contrast, were simply administrators, with no program and no objective, marking time while holding office. (Obviously, in some cases this distinction would be a difficult one to make.) Cowley was considering position-holders in general, and then applying a *criterion of effectiveness* to them. The problem is that it can sometimes be extremely difficult to judge effectiveness, so there might be considerable question as to whether a given position-holder was in fact a leader, or just a "headman."

FOCUS ON LEADER PERSONALITY TRAITS

During the two decades before World War II, it was natural that extensive effort was devoted to discovering the specific personal characteristics that distinguished leaders from non-leaders. This development was perhaps a consequence of the earlier attention given to the study of great men as leaders and perhaps, too, a result of the rapid growth of personality theory. This latter emphasis was evident in the proliferation of "personality" tests, which were supposedly effective in measuring various dimensions (or traits) of personality.

From the studies they reviewed, Smith and Krueger (1933) listed a number of traits that had been found to characterize leaders. These traits include the following:

Personality Traits
- Knowledge
- Abundance of Physical and Nervous Energy
- Enthusiasm
- Originality
- Initiative
- Imagination
- Purpose
- Persistence
- Speed of Decision

Social Traits
- Tact
- Sympathy
- Faith in Others and Self
- Patience
- Prestige
- Ascendance-Submission

Physical Characteristics
- Some advantage as to height, weight, and physical attractiveness

Smith and Krueger noted, however, that some of these traits had "... been determined by statistical devices, others by mere observation of leaders in action, and still others by experimental procedure." They consequently included as one of 12 suggested areas for further work the following:

> One of the most suggestive attacks in the field of leadership would consist in selecting those who are considered leaders in any situation and in administering to them a battery of psychological tests in an effort to determine whether or not they actually are leaders and, if so, what characteristics they possess. Tests are available which are designed to measure such traits as the following: stability, sociability, ascendance-submission, extroversion-introversion, mental ability, academic standing, speed of decision, strength of will, self-confidence, and finality of judgment. A composite picture from the results of such an array of tests should give a rather definite idea as to whether an individual possesses the traits which may be considered characteristic of a leader in the situation studied.

As if in response to this injunction, studies of "leadership traits" became almost commonplace. Their objectives ranged from selection of business executives to identification of military leaders for hazardous combat duty. The logical assumption underlying this kind of approach was that there were leader characteristics which could be identified, and would be successful in separating leaders from non-leaders.

THE SITUATION AND LEADERSHIP

Unfortunately, the massive amount of effort invested in leadership-trait research during this period and indeed continuing until the present, has yielded very little in the way of generally useful results. Bird (1940) compared the results of 20 studies, finding that 79 traits had been investigated in the body of studies as a whole, with surprisingly little overlap from study to study.

Subsequent to World War II, Stogdill (1948) surveyed a total of 124 studies conducted to determine the traits of leaders. Figure 1 lists the characteristics reported in the studies Stogdill surveyed, together with the number of different studies, in parentheses, supporting one pole or the other of the characteristic mentioned.

While the findings regarding traits shown in the listing appear convincing, comparison of these traits with those summarized earlier shows little similarity. A possible explanation for this lack of comparability is simply that the language being used may not be precise enough to cause the same basic trait always to be named by the same word. However, this explanation creates its own problems since, if trait names are this imprecise, it is difficult to see how the underlying concepts could have any substantial value for either selecting or training leaders.

In a summary discussion, Stogdill suggested that the personal factors that had been found associated with leadership could probably be categorized under five general headings: (a) capacity, (b) achievement, (c) responsibility, (d) participation, (e) status. These findings, to him, were not surprising. Within his frame of reference, a leader was a group member who served as an important motive force in producing group movement toward the attainment of group objectives. Thus, these factors were descriptive of group members who had special competence in producing movement toward the attainment of goals.

However, Stogdill listed yet another factor which needed to be considered, *the situation*. While there *had* been agreement among many studies as to specific traits that had been either positively or negatively associated with leadership, examination of the list in Figure 1 shows some surprising contradictions. The only reasonable explanation is that in these few cases, the demands of the situation itself were sufficiently different from the ordinary that "different from ordinary" requirements existed for the would-be leader.

Leader Traits Surveyed in a Group of Research Studies

Leader Trait	Occurrence in Studies
1. Chronological Age:	Younger (6), older (10), neither (2)
2. Height:	Taller (9), shorter (2), neither (2)
3. Weight:	Heavier (7), lighter (2), neither (2)
4. Physique, Energy, Health:	Higher (12), not a factor (4)
5. Appearance:	Better (1), worse (2), neither (1)
6. Fluency of Speech:	More fluent (13)
7. Intelligence:	Brighter (23), no difference (5), a difference too great militates against leadership (5)
8. Scholarship:	Better records (22), worse (1), neither (4)
9. Knowledge:	Knows how to get things done (11)
10. Judgment and Decision:	Soundness and finality of judgment better (5), speed and accuracy of thought and decision better (4)
11. Insight:	More alert (6), better able to evaluate situations (5), better insight (5), better self-insight (2), better sympathetic understanding (7)
12. Originality:	More original (7)
13. Adaptability:	More adaptable (10)
14. Introversion-Extroversion:	More extraverted (5), more introverted (2), no difference (4)
15. Dominance:	More dominant (11), more dominant persons rejected as leaders (4), no difference (2)
16. Initiative, Persistence, Ambition:	Generally higher initiative and willing to assume responsibility (12), persistence in face of obstacles (12), ambition and desire to excel (7), application and industry (6)
17. Responsibility:	More responsible (17)
18. Integrity and Conviction:	More integrity, fortitude (6), more strength of convictions (7)
19. Self Confidence:	More self assured (11), absence of modesty (6)
20. Mood Control, Mood Optimism:	More controlled in mood (4), moods not controlled (2), happy, cheerful disposition (4), not a factor (2), sense of humor (6)
21. Emotional Control:	More stable and emotionally controlled (11), less well controlled (5), no difference (3)
22. Social and Economic Status:	From higher socio-economic background (15), no difference (2)
23. Social Activity and Mobility:	Participate in more group activities (20), exhibit a higher rate of social mobility (5)
24 Bio-Social Activity:	More active in games (6), more lively, active, restless (9), daring, adventurous (3)
25. Social Skills:	More sociability (14), more diplomacy, tact (8)
26. Popularity, Prestige:	More popular (10)
27. Cooperation:	More cooperative (11), more corporate responsibility (8), able to enlist cooperation (7)
28 Traits Differ With the Situation:	Patterns of leadership traits differ with situation (19)

Figure 1

Thus, the results of his survey, on the surface, seemed to support the theory that leaders do have at least some unique measurable traits. However, examination of *the extent to which these traits differed from situation to situation*, depending on particular situational demands, forced Stogdill to conclude that it may be more fruitful to consider leadership as *a relationship that exists between persons in a social situation*, rather than as a singular quality of the individual who serves as the leader.[1] "A person does not become a leader by virtue of the possession of some combination of traits, but the pattern of personal characteristics of the leader must bear some relevant relationship to the characteristics, activities, and goals of the followers. Thus, leadership must be conceived in terms of the interaction of variables which are constant flux and change." (Stogdill, 1948, p. 64)

This is a very important conclusion. To consider its full impact, it is first necessary to consider what the implications would have been, had it been found that there were unique, measurable qualities, or traits, that leaders did have which others did not have. This would have implied that leaders either were *born* uniquely different, or had received a unique background of experience that made them successful in doing something that others could not do. Further, for a trait theory of leadership to hold true, it would have been necessary to find that leaders in one situation were leaders in other situations as well. (This is in contrast to Stogdill's conclusion, that the nature of the situation in which the leader finds himself determines what characteristics are required for success.)

A review of two experimental studies will demonstrate why the "persons-in-situation" conclusion was necessary. In the first, Carter and Nixon (1949) conducted a study of leaderless groups with high school boys. In each of the leaderless situations, each boy worked as a member of a group which had an assigned task. The leadership behaviors of each of the boys in each of the situations were observed and recorded. The key aspect of this experiment was that there were three kinds of tasks—one intellectual, one mechanical, and one clerical. If it can be assumed that leadership is the result of a unique trait, or a combination of unique traits, then any boy who emerged as leader in one situation *should have been leader in the other two situations in which he participated, as well.*

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[1] This was a conclusion reached also, and in very nearly the same terms, by Gibb (1947, 1954).

However, this was not always the case. Boys who were leaders in the intellectual task also tended to be leaders in the clerical task, but on the mechanical task new leaders tended to emerge. This clearly indicated that the requirements for leadership differ—at least to some extent—in the mechanical task situation, as opposed to the other two situations where the requirements are more nearly alike.

If it is acceptable to define the leader as the group member who most facilitates the attainment of group goals, this result is not at all surprising. It does not mean that the leader's personal characteristics are unimportant. What it does mean is that, other things being equal, any group member who has special talents or special abilities that can be used in the attainment of a group goal will be likely to have a greater level of influence on the rest of the group members than someone who lacks such special qualifications.

However, the requirements for attainment of one kind of goal may differ from the requirements for attainment of another kind. This is why the situation itself is an important factor in determining who will emerge as leader in a particular group. The real question is who can best facilitate the attainment of the group goal.[2]

The second study was conducted by Hamblin (1958) and the object was to determine what happens to a group leader when a group is subjected to a "crisis" situation that it cannot handle. Twelve three-man groups were studied as they played shuffleboard. The groups were told that they were competing with other subjects who had previously worked on the same problem, which was to determine through trial and error what specific rules were in effect in order to play the game correctly. Correct scores were indicated by a green light, and infractions of rules by a red light.

Control groups and experimental groups were run through three periods under similar conditions that allowed them to learn most of the rules of the game. Control groups were then run three additional periods under the same condition. Experimental groups, however, operated under new conditions that permitted all previous infractions of the rules, and prevented all previous correct procedures. Further, when a new procedure of the "permitted" type was discovered by the group, the experimenter changed the rules again. The net effect was that the experimental groups could discover no correct rules during the last three periods, the crisis condition.

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[2] The question is more complex than this statement would indicate; additional factors that must be considered will be discussed in Chapter 3.

During the periods of crisis, the experimental groups replaced their leaders nine times in 12 cases, while in the control groups, there were only three cases of replacement. Significantly, in those groups where replacement occurred, it did not happen immediately, that is, in the first crisis period. Rather, replacement occurred only after the old leader had had a chance and *had failed to solve the problem.*

These findings clearly indicate that an important function of the leader is to facilitate the attainment of group goals. When he fails to accomplish this purpose, he is replaced—if the group has this option. Similar findings from other studies have repeatedly confirmed this general conclusion. Further, the reason why the situation is important in determining who will have leadership status is that a group member can have such status only if he contributes in a singular way[3] to the attainment of group goals. When he cannot do this, he ceases to have unique leadership status in the group.

It is important to recognize that many of these earlier studies of leadership (including both the study by Carter and Nixon and the study by Hamblin) dealt with what may be called synthetic groups—that is, groups constituted solely for the purposes of the experiment, often consisting of students. Such groups differ in many important respects from established groups in formal organizations. It therefore is reasonable to question whether such findings as the ones reflected thus far will also hold true for established groups.

Another review of leadership studies (Jenkins, 1947) focused to a greater extent on such formally constituted groups, and provides answers for this question. This review gave particular attention to studies that attempted to deal with the problem of selecting future military leaders, and concluded that "[no] . . . single trait or group of characteristics has been isolated which sets off the leader from the members of his group." (Jenkins, pp. 74-75). Other conclusions included:

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[3] The basis for this contribution will be explored in Chapter 7. It is sufficient here to note that such contributions depend on task demands, and fall into two principal areas, technological expertise (possession of task-relevant knowledges or skills that uniquely facilitate goal attainment) and organizational expertise (possession of planning/conceptualizing/directing skills that enable the group to function more effectively), plus some additional areas (e.g., skills in facilitating interpersonal interaction within the group) that vary in importance with the context in which the group operates.

(1) The question of who becomes a leader in a given group undertaking a given activity is determined to a major extent by the specific situation, as are the leadership characteristics displayed. Further, there are wide variations in the characteristics of individuals selected as leaders in the same type of situation.

(2) The only general factor in which leaders seemed to excel members of their groups appeared to be that of technical or general competence, or knowledge, in the particular area which constituted the group's activity.

Jenkins also noted that (a) leaders tend to have certain characteristics in common with members of their group, such as interests and social background, and (b) leaders *may* have certain unique but "poorly defined personality traits" in addition, *perhaps*, to being superior to followers in such things as physique, age, education, and so forth. However, it was felt that further research was needed in both areas before firm conclusions could be reached.

These findings may appear unreasonable; personal association with leaders who have "magnetic personalities" tends to produce disbelief that such persons might encounter a situation in which they would not be capable of leading anyone, anywhere, at any time. However, the findings summarized in the preceding paragraphs have been found to hold true in more recent research, which also demonstrates further the impact of the group task on leader selection.

For example, a study was made of the performance of groups of Air Force enlisted personnel (Rosenberg, Erlick, and Berkowitz, 1955) on a task requiring simultaneous participation by all group members. After each trial, the researchers reconstituted the groups, which consisted of three persons each. Substantial consistency of individual leadership status over different groupings of people was found, and the tendency for individual leadership status to persist from one group to another was highly significant. In this particular situation, a person who was a leader in one group tended, very strongly, to be a leader in a second group. However, *only one type of task was used in this experiment*, which means that—in contrast to the study by Carter and Nixon—the situation changed relatively little from trial to trial.

Barnlund (1962), on the other hand, used six different types of tasks while rotating the membership of groups from one session to another. When the task changed from one trial to another, the status (leadership) scores earned by specific individuals also varied substantially from one situation to another. There was a *tendency* for a person who was leader in one group to be high in the status hierarchy in other groups as well, but this was not nearly as strong as the tendency found in the study by Rosenberg, Erlick, and Berkowitz. Thus, changing the nature of the group's *task* reduced the *generality* of leadership. Apparently, the ability of the leader at the group's task is an important variable.

Additional studies have been conducted in more recent years to determine whether more modern methods and measuring instruments can produce findings that could not have been obtained in earlier years. In one of a substantial series of studies attempting to obtain predictive relationships with Officer Effectiveness Reports, Tupes (1957) correlated various *non-personality* measures with OERs obtained after commissioning. The measures and their correlations with the OERs are shown in Table 1. The relationships are, in the main, very low and are of virtually no practical use in predicting effectiveness based on the OER criterion.

Similar findings continue to accumulate regarding *personality* measures. For example, Lee and Burnham (1963) conducted a study of students in a two-year program leading to the MBA degree. The study was designed to assess whether items in an extensive battery of 44 variables—43 of which were selected scales from such psychological tests as the Strong Vocational Interest Blank, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), and so forth—were related to the subjects being rated as desirable or undesirable to have as bosses. These evaluations were made by their classmates, and thus were a form of peer ratings.

Lee and Burnham concluded that, of all 44 variables examined, the best and only stable predictor of the number of times a student was rated by his peers as desirable to have as a boss was that student's grade point average during the two-year period. This finding was repeated with a second sample of subjects.

An additional study provides a dramatic illustration of why the traits approach to leadership lacks utility. In this study, Sanford (1950) noted that there are seemingly few general leadership traits, if any at all. As did others at approximately the same time, Sanford concluded that the

Table 1

Non-Personality Measures and Their Correlations With Officer Effectiveness Reports[a]

Measures	Sample One	Sample Two
Physical proficiency tests		
1. Dips, on parallel bars	–.04	–.02
2. Shuttle run	.01	–.02
3. Basketball throw, distance	.02	–.03
Tests from Aviation Cadet-Officer Candidate Qualifying Test		
1. Current Affairs	.01	–.04
2. English Usage	.14*	–.04
3. Practical Judgment	.08	–.01
4. Aerial Orientation	.08	–.04
5. Arithmetic Reasoning	.22**	.01
ROTC Senior Personal Inventory	.13	–.05
AFROTC Proficiency Criteria		
1. Evaluation Scale (Peer Rating)	.15*	.19*
2. No. times rated on 1, above	–.04	.12
3. Military Science Grade	.21**	.07

[a] From Tupes (1957). *indicates statistical significance at the .05 level, **at the .01 level.

findings available at that time indicated a need to specifically include in any leadership theory not only characteristics of the leader, but also characteristics of the situation, *and follower*. While the characteristics of the situation were thought to determine the necessary relationship between the leader and follower, the follower was thought to be of unique importance because it is he who observes both the leader and the situation, and whose reaction is in terms of what he perceives.

Sanford had been particularly interested in the authoritarianism of the leader, where authoritarianism is defined in a manner somewhat synonymous with being arbitrary and unyielding.[4] He had predicted that *followers would* react negatively toward an authoritarian *leader*. A measure of authoritarianism was included in a study of leaders in a formal organization (Vroom and Mann, 1960). The subjects were supervisors in a large delivery company. Two distinct groups of subordinates were also studied. The first group consisted of drivers who, on reporting to work, were assigned trucks and routes, and given any other instructions for the day. From 30 to 50 drivers reported to any one supervisor; the nature of their work restricted interaction among drivers, and between drivers and supervisors, to a few minutes at the beginning and at the end of each day. The drivers were on an incentive plan that was tied in with how many parcels they could deliver. The second group of subordinates consisted of positioners who were responsible for taking parcels from a conveyer belt and positioning them on shelves. Six- to 12-man crews worked together and were paid on a group incentive plan. There was a great deal of interaction among the positioners and their supervisor, who worked alongside them throughout the shift.

When attitudes of drivers and positioners toward their supervisors were correlated with the supervisors' authoritarianism scores, an interesting finding emerged. Positioners, as expected, tended to dislike ($r = -.41$, $p<.01$) supervisors with higher authoritarianism scores, but drivers *preferred* more authoritarian supervisors ($r = .41$, $p<.01$). In both cases, the size of the correlation was such that there could be no doubt of its statistical significance; further, the difference between the drivers' reactions to their supervisors, and the positioners' reactions *to the same supervisors* was also highly significant.

To account for these findings, it is necessary to re-examine the situation from which each of the two groups of subordinates viewed the supervisor. It will be remembered that drivers had no contact with the supervisor during the day, and had only a brief time with him at the beginning (and end) of each day. In contrast, positioners had continual interaction with that supervisor in a situation that permitted, and perhaps required, continuing contact throughout the day.

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[4] Specific defining characteristics are omitted because further study of authoritarian measuring instruments has cast substantial doubt that they confirm the characteristics of the authoritarian as they were thought to be at the time of Sanford's article.

Clearly, *for the drivers*, the supervisor behaved effectively when he was able to provide clearcut guidance, structure, and instructions for the day's work during the very few minutes available before that day's work started. This was especially relevant because the drivers were on an incentive plan; with more time, they could deliver more parcels and earn more money. Thus, with the drivers, the authoritarian manner, if such did exist, was effective because it produced what they needed—informative, rapid orders that enabled them to proceed efficiently to their jobs.

For positioners, on the other hand, continuing contact throughout the day could hardly be coldly efficient and directly to the point without eventually being perceived as just that. Further, since positioners were paid on a *group* incentive plan, they probably needed a supervisor who could help resolve intragroup tensions and facilitate group interaction that would aid goal attainment. They wanted, but did not perceive an opportunity for, involvement in group decision making, a supervisor with sensitivity to their needs and feelings, and help with group problems. It is not surprising that the positioners reacted negatively to the more authoritarian supervisor.[5]

It is clear from this study that the same personality characteristic contributed positively to the effectiveness of the supervisor under one set of conditions (nature of task demands on the group, structure of working group, extent of intragroup cooperation required, and degree of contact with the supervisor, to mention only a few probable factors) and negatively under a different set. The fact that it was possible to compare reactions to the *same* supervisors under different conditions demonstrates conclusively the impact of situational factors on leader effectiveness, and illustrates why a focus on the *personality* of the leader alone is inadequate.

If further verification of this conclusion is needed, a review by Mann (1959) of more recent studies related seven personality dimensions (identified by factor analysis) to six measures of individual performance (e.g., leadership). While significant relationships were found, in no case was the median correlation between an aspect of personality and performance higher than .25, and most were closer to .15. The failure to find strong relationships confirms the fact that while personality is a significant variable in determining individual behavior and status in small groups, there must be other considerably more potent influences.

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[5] This interpretation is, to some extent, that of the present author

In summary, the research of well over 40 years has failed to demonstrate unique leadership qualities that are invariant from situation to situation. A leader with certain traits may be effective in one situation and ineffective in another. Further, leaders may be effective in the same situation with different combinations of traits.

This general set of conclusions provides the point of departure for the present volume for, as Gibb (1954) noted, ". . . leadership is always relative to the situation." It is difficult to conceive of a stable group that does not have objectives or goals that are mutually shared by the group's members. The situation impacts on leadership because the nature of these goals and the group member activities necessary to achieve them will determine which member has the *best combination* of skills and abilities to aid in their achievement.

In later sections, numerous studies will be cited that demonstrate this point. The conclusion will be reached that the success of any individual in a group leadership role will depend on the perception by the group's members that he has contributed uniquely toward goal attainment, and that *it is to the advantage of the group* for the individual to retain his leadership role. In simplest terms, the effective leader has functional utility for his group; he makes a significant contribution to it and, *in exchange*, is repaid as the group accords him the status and esteem of accepted leadership.

A central purpose of the remainder of the book is to provide an understanding of this exchange process, particularly how leaders can initially motivate their groups to accept influence, the processes that underlie the continued exertion of influence, and the ways in which leaders can make unique contributions to group goal attainment.

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2

Contemporary Positions

With the gradual abandonment of trait approaches to the understanding of leadership, interest in other approaches increased. One principal and highly promising result was acceleration in the accumulation of knowledge about group dynamics, which had already led to the conclusion that leadership is a functional role which serves important purposes for the group (Gibb, 1947). This different emphasis required different methodological approaches, also. Paralleling other developments in psychology, the approach shifted to careful study of behavior—mostly interactive, and communication in particular—within groups (Cartwright and Zander, 1960). This led, in turn, to increased use of experimental methods in laboratory settings, and to a whole new set of understandings about leadership and influence processes.

As individuals interact within a group, they develop expectations with regard to their behavior toward one another, and behavior directed toward achieving group goals. When such expectations develop, and if they are accurate, they add a measure of stability and predictability within the group environment that appears necessary for effective group functioning. In the absence of the ability to anticipate future events, such as the reactions of other group members to one's own behavior, there is anxiety and uncertainty. The more predictable interpersonal behavior is, the less uncertainty there is. Thus, the motive for learning to anticipate the behavior of others seems to be the need to reduce uncertainty and its associated anxieties (Cohen, Stotland, and Wolfe, 1955; Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder, 1961).

A substantial part of individual behavior in groups therefore is devoted to getting information about others that can serve as a basis for predicting their probable future behavior. As an early form of such behavior, children seek to learn who is friendly toward them and who is not. They also seek to learn who has the power to satisfy their needs, and

NOTE: The list of references cited in Chapter 2 begins on page 86.

who cannot (Wolman, 1956). While the learning that occurs within groups of adults is more sophisticated, there is evidence that it is still governed by similar principles (Schutz, 1957). There can be little doubt that an important first step in either the formation of a new group, or the addition of a new member to an established group is for this learning to occur. Groups cannot go about their business efficiently until it does. These group processes are important to the leader because much of his effectiveness depends on the expectations group members form about his behavior, and the expectations he, in turn, forms of the group's behavior both toward him and toward one another in working to accomplish group goals.

Emphasis on observation of behavior within groups as a means of studying influence processes was probably responsible in large part for directions taken by leadership research and theory during the period following abandonment of the traits approach. One of the problems with the traits approach had been that the effectiveness of the leader apparently varied from situation to situation. Another and more serious problem was that traits were difficult to measure reliably. Most measuring instruments were personality inventories, of one type or another, which were in part ineffective because it often was apparent how an item should be answered to be in the "desirable" direction.

Behavior measures, on the other hand, are not subject to this fault. Though an individual who is under observation may often behave in a manner more socially desirable than his usual behavior, this is somewhat less likely to happen than that socially desirable answers will be given on a personality test. Even if it does happen, the relationship between the behavior and group outcomes can still be observed and specified if it is possible to measure the behavior itself reliably. The shift from study of personality traits to study of group member and leader behavior thus constituted a move from a less precise to a more precise field of study.

Of the four contemporary positions chosen for review in this chapter, two have heavily emphasized study of leader behavior. They were chosen both for that reason and because they resulted from programs of research that have yielded, in both cases, a substantial portion of the existing knowledge about the leadership process.

The third contemporary position to be described is the contingency model of leadership effectiveness. It has been included because it demonstrates effectively the complexity of the interrelationships between the characteristics of the leader, the follower, and the situation.

Finally, a brief summary of organizational psychology will be presented, though the knowledge provided by organizational psychologists is somewhat less systematic than that provided in the other three positions. It is included because of the general agreement among many psychologists that even this less systematic information provides invaluable insights into organizational processes about which leaders must know.

STUDIES IN LEADERSHIP, OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

In 1947, the Personnel Research Board of Ohio State University decided to initiate study of leadership aspects of supervisory positions in formal organizations. At that time, relatively little research had been done on these higher-level positions, and there was little information about them in comparison with the amount and type of information available on positions at lower levels in the occupational hierarchy. At the outset, it was decided that major attention should be given to the development of concepts about leadership, and to the development of methodology for studying leadership, as well as to obtain significant new information. Variables that were thought to be of probable importance were status, work performance, personal interactions, responsibility, authority, and personal behavior patterns (Stogdill and Coons, 1957).

After substantial thought about organizational leadership and variables which affect it, the paradigm shown in Figure 2 was developed. As can be seen, the central focus was leader behavior itself—that is, what the leader does. Further, it was desired to know what he does as a function of what position he holds in the organization. Analysis of previous research had led to the conclusion that the leadership behavior of a position incumbent would be determined, at least in part, by performance demands made upon that position. This is reflected in Figure 2 which shows organizational influences (situational influences) on leader behavior.

This orientation led quite naturally to the definition of a leader as an individual in a given office or position of apparently high influence potential (Shartle, 1963).

Two broad lines of inquiry resulted from this conceptualization. The first consisted of emphasis on organizational aspects of leadership, the general effects of positions on the patterns of behavior of position holders,

Paradigm for the Study of Leadership


GROUP FACTORS
Group history
Group composition
Group structure
Group tasks and goals
Group activities
Response to environment
GROUP-CENTERED EVALUATION
Goal achievement
Group morale
Group integration
Group efficiency
Group survival
Determiners of
Concomitants of
Effects of
DEFINITIONS OF THE LEADER
Office holder
Influencer
Chosen person
LEADER BEHAVIOR
CONTENT
What he does
How he does it
DESCRIPTION
By whom described
By what method
DEFINITIONS OF LEADER BEHAVIOR
Executive behavior
Influence acts
Initiation of effects
Concomitants of
Determiners of
Effects of
INDIVIDUAL-CENTERED EVALUATION
Personal success
Votes for leader
Merit ratings
Job satisfaction
Changes initiated
INDIVIDUAL FACTORS
Biographical data
Personal characteristics
Position in group
Attitudes and values
Identifications
Responses to environment

NOTE: From Stogdill and Coons (1957).

Figure 2

and the impact of organizational influences on such functions as delegation of authority. The second major thrust was a study of *general* aspects of leader behavior that might exist in many different positions and be broadly effective. Each of these will be discussed.

Given the initial orientation that leadership is a process of interaction between persons who are participating in goal-oriented group activities within an organization of some sort, it was reasonable to develop as initial guiding hypotheses (a) that leadership is exerted by specific persons (position holders), (b) that leadership is an aspect of group organization, and (c) that leadership is concerned with attaining objectives (Stogdill and Shartle, 1948).

Most of the early research in this program, particularly with aspects of organizations, was done within various Naval commands and organizations. A guiding principle for this work was that group leadership was defined, in part, by the existing structure of organizational roles and that these roles were in turn—at least in part—derived from the expectations of the group (Shartle and Stogdill, 1953).

This is an important emphasis. The position is that formal organizations are goal-oriented, and that groups within organizations have defined goals and objectives to accomplish. Most members of the organization will have beliefs or expectations about what each of them should do in order to accomplish these objectives. To the extent that these beliefs are shared, numbers of people within the organization will then have the *same* expectations regarding what someone else in a particular organizational position should be doing as a part of the overall task of accomplishing objectives and goals. *Such shared beliefs constitute organizational roles.*

A number of important findings emerged from this research. First, a study of a large number of Naval officers in a large number of different positions and organizations indicated that there were eight different *types* of duty positions, based on the predominant type of performance accomplished within that position. These types of positions were labeled (Stogdill, Wherry, and Jaynes, 1953) as public relations representatives, professional consultants, personnel administrators, technical supervisors, schedule-procedure makers, maintenance administrators, directors or decision makers, and coordinators. While it is possible to challenge these specific names, the important point is that there apparently are types of jobs within organizations that can be described in terms of similar kinds of responsibilities, and that the responsibilities of the position determine to a substantial extent the behavior of the officer in that position.

In a further study these findings were confirmed and, in addition, specific job functions were identified that seemed to be more importantly a part of the job, as opposed to those that seemed to be more importantly a part of the man (Stogdill, 1963). These are the functions:

Functions that vary with the man

- Delegation Practices
- Time Spent on Public Relations
- Evaluation
- Reading and Answering Mail
- Reading Technical Publications
- Time Spent with Outside Persons

Functions that are constant with the position

- Level in the Organizational Structure
- Military Rank
- Time Spent in Personal Contacts
- Time Spent with Assistants
- Time Spent with Superiors
- Time Spent in Supervision, Coordination, and Writing Reports
- Number of Nominations Received for Working Partner

From these functions, it appears that interpersonal behavior within the discretion of the position holder is influenced by his personal characteristics—that is, the individual has patterns of interpersonal behaviors that are, to a degree, consistent from situation to situation. On the other hand, there are certain technical requirements of the position to which the position holder must adjust his own behavior. In the list of functions it is apparent that time demands placed on the position holder by both seniors and subordinates, as well as supervisory and coordinative requirements, are functions of the position itself. This supports the view that an organizational position is a focus of interrelationships that are oriented toward accomplishment of purposes which are mutually understood by organization members.

One reason these aspects of the position are constant, instead of changing as the position holder changes, is that other members of the organization have certain expectations as to what behavior patterns should be engaged in by the position holder. These expectations are undoubtedly interpreted by him as requirements of the position, and he then conforms to what is expected.

If this line of thought is correct, then the more clear-cut these role expectations are, and the better understood they are by all members of the organization, the better the organization should function and the better the members should feel about the organization.

In two additional studies, these predictions were found to be accurate. In one study, enlisted men in submarines were asked to complete charts to indicate their superiors, their subordinates, and their peers (Scott, 1952, 1953). When these informal preceptions were compared with the actual organization charts, it was found that errors in perception of the formal organizational structure tended to be associated with lower morale within the organization. The finding that morale suffers when lines of authority are confused, supports the general notion that it is important for role relationships to be well understood. It is difficult for the individual to be effective in an organization when he does not know where he stands in relation to others.

Certain kinds of functions are characteristic of organizations in general. Position holders, for example, have both responsibility and authority. The responsibility constitutes a statement of what they are expected to do and, usually, sufficient authority is provided to enable the position holder to meet his responsibilities. However, in formal organizations few people accomplish the total responsibilities of their jobs in isolation from others, or even with their own hands, except at the lowest level. Individuals with assigned responsibilities are, at the same time, assigned personnel resources and subordinate leaders to facilitate their successful accomplishment of these responsibilities.

The effectiveness with which subordinate leaders can function theoretically should be related to the manner in which their superiors delegate authority to deal with the responsibilities assigned to them. This hypothesis was also confirmed by a study of officers and subordinate leaders in a variety of Naval commands, including submarines (Shartle and Stogdill, 1953). Where their seniors described themselves as high in authority, juniors tended to see themselves as having little responsibility. However, if seniors described themselves as high in responsibility, juniors felt themselves to have both high authority and high responsibility.[1] This latter finding was also true for delegation, where increased delegation by seniors was accompanied by feelings among their juniors of higher responsibility and authority, and with a tendency toward higher delegation themselves.

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[1] This was not true for responsibility in small organizations.

The fact that the behavior of seniors conditioned the feelings and behavior of their juniors, and that organization size influenced these findings, again strongly supports the view that the interrelationships among positions have a strong influence on the role behaviors of position holders, and, further, that the delegation practices (authority and responsibility)[2] of higher-level position holders will determine the pattern of behavior that occurs at lower levels.

While many additional studies were performed by this research group, the studies just described outline some of the more significant findings. These, and other findings, have led to a definitive behavioral model of organization (Stogdill, 1959, 1969). The model is too complex to present in complete detail in this volume, but the essential elements of the model are shown in Table 2. This model, developed from analysis of a large amount of data in addition to that discussed so far, has some highly significant features.

Table 2

Classes of Variables in Behavioral Model of Organization[a]

Inputs		Mediators		Outputs	
Performances	(P)	Operations	(O)	Productivity	(K)
Interaction	(I)	Interpersonnel	(L)	Drive	(D)
Expectations	(E)	Structure	(Z)	Cohesiveness	(C)
Task Materials	(T)				

[a]From Stogdill (1969).

First, an organization is considered to be an input-output system, with mediators, or processors, operating between inputs and outputs. This emphasizes the essential concept of exchange between an organization and its environment. The fact that the environment does influence the activity of the organization and its eventual outputs is quite important in organizational theory, and is an essential aspect of exchange theory which will be described in Chapter 3.

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[2] Strictly speaking, responsibility cannot be delegated, but an officer can *create* responsibility for a junior, though he remains fully responsible for his own position.

A second extremely important aspect of the present model is that outputs, as shown, consist not only of productivity—which long was viewed, in organization theory, as the principal (or only) output—but rather that the drive of the group and its cohesiveness also are *products*. That is, as Stogdill (1969) notes, while an organization is working toward the creation of a product, the operations and interpersonal interactions within the organizational structure act at the same time to influence the cohesiveness and the drive of the organization.[3]

Listing drive and cohesiveness as outputs emphasizes that it is the leader's responsibility *to balance these against productivity*. If the leader pushes too hard for productivity, cohesiveness is very likely to drop, with resultant group member dissatisfaction, and turnover—if turnover is possible. If, on the other hand, cohesiveness is taken as a principal goal in itself, group members are likely to be well satisfied, but to produce at a level that prevents the organization from attaining desired goals. The Table 2 model emphasizes the requirement placed on the leader to keep these outputs in balance.

This model, which appears to be substantiated by the data, is a considerable departure from the human relations orientation (to be discussed in a later section dealing with organizational psychology) which held that group member satisfaction would lead to higher productivity. Perhaps in an ideal world it would, but in the real world it apparently does not.

This may be difficult to accept; the "common-sense" view certainly would be that drive and cohesion should affect the motivation of group members to work toward high productivity goals. Examination of a second significant line of research findings in this same series of studies may make more understandable the position that drive and cohesiveness are, like productivity, products of preceding experiences and events, rather than a cause of productivity itself.

Because of the fundamental interest of this research group in leader behavior, attempts were made at the outset to obtain descriptions of

[3] In this system, productivity is a self-evident variable, that can be described as amount or quality. Cohesiveness is described as unit, drive as enthusiasm and morale.

leader behavior that might be classified into more general categories, or classes, of behavior. From observations of position incumbents, nine different dimensions or categories of leader behavior were identified:

(1) Integration—cooperation-increasing activities.
(2) Communication—increasing group member understanding of group processes.
(3) Production emphasis—activity toward increasing amount of work.
(4) Representation—speaking for the group in outside contacts.
(5) Fraternization—leader actions oriented toward becoming a part of the group.
(6) Organization—activities leading toward differentiation of group member duties and defining ways of accomplishing duties.
(7) Evaluation—activities involved in reward distribution.
(8) Initiation—activities involved in changing group activities.
(9) Domination—activities showing disregard for ideas or actions of other group members.

A questionnaire was developed, containing statements of leader behavior illustrating these different dimensions. This questionnaire was then administered to members of many different organizational groups, as a means whereby these members could describe their leaders (Hemphill and Coons, 1957; Fleishman, 1953).

Responses of group members were analyzed by the statistical technique of factor analysis, a method which permits identification of a set of common dimensions that underlie a larger set of observations. Several different factor analyses were done, with different groups and with slightly differing results. The outcome thought to be most reasonable indicated four different underlying dimensions (Halpin and Winer, 1957):

(1) Consideration. This was the single largest factor of the four and indicated leader behavior such as doing personal favors for subordinates, looking out for their personal welfare, explaining his actions, treating subordinates as his equal, being friendly and approachable, and so on. This kind of behavior might be labeled "human relations" behavior in other contexts.

(2) Initiating Structure. This was the second most important factor, and had to do with such leader behaviors as asking that subordinates follow standing operating procedures, maintaining definite standards

of performance, making sure his own role is understood, and making his attitude clear to subordinates. These behaviors serve to define structure within the group, with regard to the accomplishment of group goals.

(3) Production Emphasis. This included leader behaviors such as encouraging overtime work and encouraging better performance than competing groups. In one sense, behaviors in this category might be thought to reflect leader attitudes that are favorable toward productivity almost to the extent of disregarding the feelings of group members.

(4) Sensitivity (Social Awareness). This factor was represented by leader behaviors such as being willing to change ways of doing things, asking individual members to sacrifice for the good of the entire group, and being aware of conflicts within the group.

Because most of the leader behavior measured was found to occur in factors 1 and 2, factors 3 and 4 were eventually dropped and a measuring instrument developed to reflect the first two.

There has been substantial study of these two resulting dimensions of leader behavior. For example, Halpin conducted two studies of bomber crews during the Korean conflict, relating leader behavior to crew performance and crew satisfaction (Halpin, 1953, 1954).

In the first study, 89 crews flying in combat over Korea were subjects. In addition to obtaining descriptions of leader behavior from the crews, ratings were obtained from seniors on overall crew effectiveness, technical competence without correspondingly high overall effectiveness, and conformity to administrative requirements. (These resulted from a factor analysis of a larger number of ratings.) Similarly, ratings from the crews yielded measures of crew confidence and proficiency, friendship and cooperation, and morale.

Correlations between the crew ratings and the consideration dimension were quite significant. Correlations with the initiating structure dimension were also significant, but the relationships were much less strong. Crew members were more satisfied when their commanders engaged in more consideration type behavior. However, the relationships with ratings from senior officers (senior to the aircraft commanders) did not show the same pattern. Their ratings correlated more strongly with initiating structure (ranging from .25 to .32), but not significantly with the leader's consideration behaviors.

A further finding of interest was that of those crews scoring highest on overall effectiveness, eight commanders scored above the average on *both* consideration and initiating structure, and only one scored *below* the average on both. Of the crews scoring lowest on effectiveness, six commanders were *below* the average on both scales, and only two were *above* the average on both.

This study illustrates findings that have been repeated many times in studies of initiating structure and showing consideration behavior. In general, it appears that groups with leaders who score high on both dimensions are higher in overall effectiveness. Group members want the leader to be high on consideration, while his own seniors want him to be higher on initiating structure. The leader who is successful within a formal organization must balance the expectations from both directions in order for his group to be outstanding in the opinion of both sets of evaluators.

This kind of conclusion is substantiated by the results of leadership training developed to emphasize leader behaviors on the consideration dimension at the expense of leader behaviors on the initiating structure dimension. Fleishman (1953a) found that the effects of such training given to industrial foremen appeared rather small from a long-range point of view. The training produced a significant short-term increase in their attitudes toward consideration, and a decrease on initiating structure. However, their on-the-job behavior was not changed by this change in attitudes. In fact, some foremen who received this training and then returned to their work groups appeared to become *less considerate* and *higher on initiating structure* than they had been before.

These unexpected results were found to be related to the attitudes of supervisors about these foremen. Foremen working for supervisors who were high on consideration were also more considerate toward their own subordinates. Conversely, if a supervisor was low on consideration behavior, so was the foreman. A similar trend existed for initiating structure behaviors, but it was not significant.

This is a "climate" effect in which each foreman was working within a "climate" of expectations his seniors held about the behavior he was expected to show toward his subordinates. If the foreman did not conform to these expectations, his supervisor would disapprove. Thus, the expectations of the supervisor strongly overshadowed the effect of the training. Such "climate" effects are not infrequent; in general, leaders at higher organizational levels expect, and approve, initiating structure behavior from their subordinate leaders, and this tendency gets stronger with higher organizational levels (Fleishman, 1953b; Halpin, 1953).

These findings can be related to Stogdill's (1969) organizational model. Cohesion, drive, and productivity are *products* because in a formal organization the leader, and the group as well, must work toward the satisfaction of two different sets of expectations. One set consists of the expectations of the formal organization itself. These expectations center around productivity and are reflected in the desires of seniors for a higher balance of initiating structure behavior, which appears to be oriented toward the accomplishment of group goals. However, the group itself also has expectations. These, as will be seen in Chapters 4 and 5, center around satisfactions received from the organization, and from interrelationships among members of the group. Leader behavior that facilitates satisfaction of these needs does lead to higher cohesion and drive toward the accomplishment of goals. Thus, productivity is an output that satisfies the formal organization, while drive and cohesiveness are outputs reflecting satisfaction of group member's needs.

Findings that provide further support for these conclusions are numerous. For example, a second study (Harris and Fleishman, 1955) was conducted to confirm the lack of permanent effect of "human relations" training on the behavior and attitudes of foremen. Again, groups that had received the training did not differ significantly from groups that had not. However, it was concluded that the training had *some* impact on the groups that had received it, in that their behavior patterns were not as stable as those of foremen who had not received the training. The training produced change, but not predictable change. Again, situational ("climate") variables had a more substantial effect than the training. These situational variables undoubtedly included expectations of seniors with regard to initiating structure behaviors.

Other studies have demonstrated the impact of situational variables on the relative effectiveness of initiating structure and showing consideration behaviors. Organizational stress was studied in three hospitals of different size (Oaklander and Fleishman, 1964). It was hypothesized that the way in which a supervisor enacts his leadership role should have an influence on the degree of organizational stress existing within and between groups. Specifically, it was thought that a supervisor scoring higher on consideration should have lower stress (interpersonal conflicts, hostility, and noncooperative relationships) among the members of his own unit, while supervisors scoring higher on initiating structure should have lower disharmony between their own and other units. These hypotheses were found to hold true only for a hospital of medium size.

The findings suggest that the effects of initiating structure behavior may be *more situationally defined* than the effects of consideration behaviors. In smaller organizations, structure (formal procedures, etc.) may be seen as relatively less necessary by the members of the group, who may desire a more personal relationship with their leader. In the small organization, where there is more opportunity for face-to-face contact, high structure may be interpreted as over-supervision. As the organization gets larger, group members may see more structure as supportive and helpful, perhaps sometimes even protecting individual members of the group from arbitrary requirements that might be imposed by others. Put another way, in small organizations, where everyone understands his role and can validate it by interpersonal interactions with other group members, structure may not be as necessary as in larger groups where there can be uncertainty, which is detrimental to morale.

These studies demonstrate that situational variables influence the balance of leader behavior that will be desired (or best). An additional study (Halpin, 1954) provides further confirmation through demonstrating that a change in the situation changed the desires of group members regarding the balance of initiating structure and consideration behaviors from the leader. When leader behavior was measured in a training situation, where risk was low, group members preferred more consideration and less initiating structure behavior. However, when these units were moved to a combat zone, where risks were higher, their approval of initiating structure activities increased and of consideration behaviors decreased. This can be interpreted to mean that group members are sensitive, as are their leaders, to situational demands and that their expectations to some extent will change as situational demands change.

The leader needs to be flexible, to balance his behaviors in order to obtain the right balance of outputs from his group. Further, in most cases the more effective leader seems to be the one who engages in both kinds of behavior, in the proper amount, rather than avoiding one type or the other (Rim, 1965). (While task and socio-emotional leadership can be handled by different persons, neither is as effective as a *single* person who can handle both roles.)

This conclusion is illustrated by an application of initiating structure and showing consideration concepts to military leadership, called the Military Leadership Grid® (Blake, Mouton, and Bryson, 1968). An example is shown in Figure 3. As can be seen, a leader's behavior can be scored in terms of his emphasis on mission performance and concern for his people.

The Military Leadership Grid


1,9 LEADERSHIP
Thoughtful attention to needs of people for satisfying relationships leads to a comfortable friendly organization atmosphere and work tempo
9,9 LEADERSHIP
Mission accomplishment is from committed people; interdependence through a "common stake" in organization purpose leads to relationships of trust and respect
5,5 LEADERSHIP
Adequate organization performance is possible through balancing the necessity to get out work with maintaining morale of people at a satisfactory level
1,1 LEADERSHIP
Exertion of minimum effort to get required work done is appropriate to sustain organization membership
9,1 LEADERSHIP
Efficiency in operations results from arranging conditions of work in such a way that human elements interfere to a minimum degree
HIGH 9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
LOW 1
Concern for People
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
LOW
Concern for Mission Performance
HIGH

NOTE: Adapted from *The Managerial Grid®* by Robert R. Blake and Jane Srygley Mouton, Gulf Publishing Co., Houston, 1964, p. 10. Reproduced by permission.

Figure 3

The Grid reflects the fact that concern for people is not incompatible with a concern for mission performance. Rather, it is quite possible (and desirable) for a leader to score high on both. This is reflected by a leader position at the upper right of the Grid, which is called 9,9 leadership. That a balance between these two concerns is necessary is reflected by the center postion of the chart, where balanced 5,5 leadership produces adequate organization performance, though it is far from the optimum.

While this view of leadership draws on other schools of thought, as well, it is a useful application of some of the findings of this research program, and one that avoids the earlier, and inappropriate, emphasis on showing consideration alone.

In summary, the Ohio State University studies in leadership have contributed in a highly significant manner to an understanding of organizational leadership. It is apparent, as Stogdill's model suggests, that leaders must be concerned with both achievement of organizational goals (productivity) and the satisfaction of group members' needs (leading to cohesion and drive). High productivity can be achieved without a correspondingly high level of cohesion, but when this happens there is substantial risk that group membership will become unstable or that group member dissatisfactions will be reflected in a loss of efficiency in other ways, such as through sickness and unexcused absences.

If one considers only two dimensions of leader behavior, initiating structure and showing consideration, then it is probable that the leader achieves the desired balance of outputs from his group by achieving a necessary balance between these two types of leader behavior. This kind of explanation would account for the findings in a review of studies of these leader behavior dimensions (Korman, 1966), which concluded that there was little evidence that training emphasizing these dimensions makes a real difference in the work group.[4]

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At approximately the same time that the Ohio State studies were beginning, a series of studies in human relations was initiated at the

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[4] Demonstrating this would require use of a statistical procedure giving differential weights to these different group output factors in balance.

University of Michigan Survey Research Center. While the studies at Ohio State were concerned with broad issues of organizational effectiveness and the impact of leader behavior and leader roles on the behavior of organization members, the work at the Survey Research Center was more concerned with factors in small work groups—particularly in foreman behavior—leading to high levels of productivity as well as high levels of individual satisfaction within these groups.

Perhaps as a consequence of the human relations research that had already been accomplished in industry, such as Mayo's, it was initially supposed that satisfaction of individual members, and the group as a whole, would be associated with group productivity. The human relations research, apparently, had found that to be the case. This is clearly contradictory to the position taken by Stogdill, as described in the preceding section, that productivity and satisfaction (cohesion) were *both* outcomes of earlier processes. However, as will be seen, the findings of the two research groups eventually were in agreement on that point.

The Survey Research Center work was characterized, as was that at Ohio State University, by an unusually effective and systematic methodology. However, while the Ohio State work had been concerned primarily with descriptions of significant dimensions of leader roles, and leader behavior, the Michigan work (Katz, 1963) used survey methodology to give extensive and thorough coverage at the individual member level throughout the organizations studied. This methodology was well suited to the study of relationships between motivation, attitudes, and morale on the one hand, and concrete measures of performance on the other. Industrial settings were selected for study because of the availability of relatively reliable performance records. The initial rationale intended also that these variables be studied in a variety of organizations to learn whether obtained relationships would be found generalizable to many organizations, or different relationships would be found in each.

The first study was with clerical workers in an insurance company. Though production differences between the various work groups studied were so small that significant findings were almost precluded, several suggestive results were obtained. First, it was found that supervisory behavior in the high-productivity sections differed in certain significant aspects from supervisory behavior in low-productivity sections (Kahn, 1960). Supervisors of highly productive sections discriminated more between what their jobs were supposed to be as opposed to what their subordinates were supposed to do, exercised more general (mission-oriented) supervision, and were more "employee-oriented."

There are certain logical kinds of job functions that a supervisor, or leader, should perform. First, when group size exceeds some small number, perhaps five or six, group members start getting in one another's way if they lack centralized direction. For this and other reasons, groups with recognized goals, either self-imposed or imposed by higher organizations, require leaders in order to function effectively.[5] In informal groups, a leader "emerges." In formal organizations, a leader is appointed. In either case, one of his logical functions is to coordinate the activities of individual members of the group so that each may contribute his energies efficiently toward the accomplishment of group goals, each doing what he does best and avoiding wasteful duplication of effort. This does not imply domination of the group, nor does it imply that group members are robots. The basic requirement, in order to achieve *efficient* accomplishment of group goals, is simply for each member to be able to work efficiently at some part of the total activity that is coordinated with the activities of other group members. Thus, the group needs a "supervisor" who can look at broader integrative aspects of the work, and coordinate individual member actions.

A second logical function which the group needs to have accomplished is that of general planning, anticipating future goals and/or obstacles which may be encountered by the group in the accomplishment of present goals.

Clearly, then, goal-oriented groups require individuals who are working on specific elements of the task at hand, as well as someone who is working at least at one level abstracted from the immediate detail. This implies a difference between what the leader's job should be and what the group member's job should be. Such a difference was found to be associated with group productivity in this initial study. Supervisors of high-productivity sections did, in fact, spend more time in planning, were thought to be better at planning, and spent less time in the actual task operations which were similar to those done by their subordinates.

In the same vein, they exercised supervision at a more general level, by giving broader goals to individual workers and allowing them significantly more autonomy in making decisions regarding the "how-to-do-it" aspect of their jobs. These supervisors were also more concerned with members of their groups *as persons* (employee-centered), as was indicated by their training group members to become better workers, providing work experiences that might qualify them for promotion, and being concerned about their problems as persons, rather than as mere tools to get the work done.

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[5] This will be discussed further in Chapters 5 and 6.

These findings were repeated in a second study (Katz, *et al.*, 1951) that was conducted with railroad maintenance workers to verify the previous findings between supervisory attitudes and behavior, and to investigate the relationship between worker morale and productivity. These workers constituted section gangs, each of which was headed by a foreman.

Based on ratings by higher-level supervisors, 36 section gangs of high productivity were matched wtih 36 gangs of low productivity, where each gang in a pair worked under conditions of equal difficulty with respect to terrain, number of tracks, and so on. The research methodology called for all workers in all section gangs to be interviewed, together with their foremen. Analysis of these interviews yielded the following conclusions:

(1) There were no meaningful differences between foremen of high- and low-productivity sections in regard to background characteristics, such as age.

(2) There was no difference in general job satisfaction between foremen of high- and low-productivity sections, though it appeared that foremen in high-productivity sections tended to give somewhat more extreme ratings for satisfaction with their jobs as foremen. That is, there were more who were enthusiastic, as well as more who were dissatisfied, and fewer who were merely satisfied, as compared with foremen of low-productivity sections.

(3) Though these kinds of variables did not provide strong differentiation between high- and low-productivity foremen, the relationship between the foreman and the worker was strikingly different for the two different types of foremen, as the following observations show.

Confirming the findings of the previous study, the foremen of high-production sections spent more time in actual supervision and less time in straight production work. While both types of foremen reported spending about the same amount of time supervising, the high-production foremen more often gave the reason that they could get more accomplished through supervision. The degree to which the foreman could differentiate his role from that of the worker was perceptible also to the workers, with members of high-productivity sections judging their supervisors to be better planners than did the men in low-productivity sections. There is a clear suggestion that the foremen in high-productivity sections had seen and grasped the significance of their foreman role as being that of a work group coordinator and goal achievement facilitator, as opposed to being merely another set of hands and a "keep-them-at-work" monitor.

In line with their apparently greater grasp of the significance of the supervisory role, high-productivity foremen also had more interest in the off-the-job problems of their men. They were concerned with the family life of members of their sections, and helped them work toward better jobs by training them in special techniques and teaching them skilled processes or some of the foremen's supervisory duties. In contrast, members of low-productivity groups were merely taught better and easier ways of doing their usual tasks when the foreman was concerned with training. An additional finding of significance was that men in high-productivity sections felt their foremen reacted less punitively when they did a bad job.

(4) As was the case with the Ohio State studies, there seemed to be evidence of a "climate" effect. Foremen of high-productivity sections tended to be more secure about their own standing with *their* supervisors, felt less pressure from them, and were more satisfied with the amount of authority they had to get their jobs done. However, those differences were not statistically significant.

(5) There were no differences between high and low sections in general attitude toward the overall work situation. However, more members of low sections than of high sections expressed strong intrinsic job satisfaction! This very surprising finding had also occurred in the earlier study of clerical workers in an insurance company.[6]

[6] The authors were at a loss to explain this finding, except for the possibility that high producers might have had high work aspiration levels, therefore being thwarted in low-skilled jobs. Perhaps a more reasonable explanation, in view of later theory (to be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4) is that many kinds of "pay" are received by members of groups in formal organizations. True leaders have skills in providing "pay" that satisfies needs other than financial needs. This is probably one of the basic differences between the foremen of high- and low-productivity sections in the present study. Thus, members of low-productivity groups expressed more intrinsic job satisfaction, because this was one of the few "pays" they received, other than financial, while members of high-productivity sections got other "pays," such as greater autonomy in their work, or harmonious intragroup relations, which led the intrinsic satisfaction aspects to be somewhat less pronounced in comparison.

These findings, particularly that satisfaction appeared to be only weakly related to productivity, led to additional explorations of the nature and sources of motivation in work groups (Katz and Kahn, 1952). Some degree of clarification resulted from a third study of approximately 6,000 employees in a company manufacturing agricultural equipment. As had been the case with the Ohio State studies, the Michigan scientists had felt that a strong production orientation was to some extent contradictory with an employee orientation. That is, it was assumed that as a foreman became more production-oriented, he would become less employee-oriented. (In a similar, though not identical, fashion, it had first been assumed that as a leader initiated more structure, he engaged in less consideration behavior.) The findings from this third study indicated that this inverse relationship was not necessarily true, and that these two orientations might even be uncorrelated, with the consequent possibility that a foreman could be either high or low on *either one or both*. The best foremen seemed to be high on both orientations, as had been found with initiating structure and showing consideration.

Apparently, foremen of high-production sections emphasized high productivity as *one* key aspect of the job, but not necessarily the most, or *only*, important aspect, while foremen of lower-production units tended to emphasize high productivity to the exclusion of other important aspects of the job. This tends to confirm the earlier interpretation, in that these foremen may not have known how to provide other kinds of "pay" (e.g., facilitating harmonious intragroup relations).

There also seemed to be a "climate" effect, as had been found earlier, in that "high" foremen reported that their own supervisors emphasized more than just high productivity. Again, there seemed to be a tendency for a foreman to act toward the members of his group in a manner somewhat similar to that in which his own supervisor acted toward him.

Another significant question answered by this research had to do with the effectiveness of the attractiveness of the group (cohesion) as a source of motivation for productivity. Theoretically, the more attractive the group, the more productive the individual is willing to be in order to remain a part of the group. (This is *similar* to a part of the rationale for the human relations approach.)

Information bearing on this hypothesis was obtained from another study (Seashore, 1954) which found that productivity was not significantly related to group cohesion. Instead, the productivity of individuals within highly cohesive groups was simply more uniform than productivity in groups with low cohesion. Groups with high cohesion had either high or low performance levels, largely depending on what the members as a whole viewed as reasonable. They were relatively less responsive than groups with low cohesion to pressures from their environment, including from their foremen. Groups with high cohesion apparently had developed an internal standard regarding what was reasonable in the way of productivity, and *supported one another in adhering to this group standard.* Group members lacking such mutual support (in low cohesion groups) were more "threatened" by external pressures for productivity and tended to produce more.[7]

The major significant findings of the Michigan research have been the identification of four general factors relating to productivity (Kahn and Katz, 1960):

(1) Differentiation of Supervisory Role. Effective foremen engaged, as has been noted earlier, in unique functions which they alone could perform, leaving straight production work to their subordinates.

(2) Closeness of Supervision. More effective foremen supervise less closely, apparently giving more freedom to their employees with regard to their pace and approach to the accomplishment of job assignments, as a way of increasing their motivation. (This is a type of psychological "pay.") They apparently allowed more worker participation in decisions about his own job as well (another type of psychological "pay").

(3) Employee Orientation. More effective foremen had a greater interest in work group members as individual human beings, rather than as tools for the accomplishment of the job (still another type of psychological "pay").

(4) Group Relationships. While there is no general relationship between morale and productivity, it is probable that satisfaction with the work group might influence other criteria, such as turnover and unauthorized absence. (Cohesion within the work group has an impact on productivity only if the foreman can successfully influence the standards of

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[7] This was not an actual finding, but rather the present author's interpretation of the original findings. Additional discussion of the effects of high and low cohesion will be found in Chapters 5 and 7.

highly cohesive groups. This proved to be a significant element leading to the "linking-pin" concept of management, to be discussed later.)

It can be seen that many of these findings are similar to the findings from the Ohio State studies. While initiating structure and consideration are not quite the same as production orientation and employee orientation, they are nonetheless similar. Both sets of studies show that an effective foreman needs to have an appropriate balance in his approach to his supervisory responsibilities. He cannot be effective if he neglects either.

More recent work by University of Michigan scientists has gone considerably beyond these summary findings. The lack of a relationship between group cohesion and productivity is a problem in the development of an effective philosophy of leadership. Groups with lower cohesion are more amenable to influence by their leaders to produce at a higher rate. However, it is suspected that there are high costs associated with this susceptibility to influence, perhaps including sickness, absence, and high turnover. On the other hand, a group with high cohesion may or may not be highly productive, according to what internal productivity standards it develops. If a group develops low productivity standards, and is highly cohesive, individual group members will support one another in conforming to this standard, thereby increasing the ability of the group as a whole to resist leader pressures for greater effectiveness (Likert, 1956, 1961).[8]

One possible solution to this problem is to affect the internal standards of the group, so that the group itself will either set high goals or regard them as reasonable. If the leader can accomplish this, then he can safely work toward maintaining a high level of cohesion within the group, counting on group pressures to motivate individual members toward the individual effort needed to achieve high goals. Such a situation clearly represents the optimum in favorableness for the leader; however, the problem then becomes the question of how to affect the group's standard in this way, so that group members value high productivity.

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[8] While Likert was actually writing as Director of the Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan, and not as a part of the Survey Research Center, it seems appropriate to include a brief mention of his work at this point because (a) he built on some of the findings of the Survey Research Center, (b) there was an obvious exchange of ideas between the two groups, and (c) there is some reason to suspect that Survey Research Center findings may, to an extent, contradict some elements of Likert's central thesis.

Likert has suggested that this may be accomplished through the development of an organizational structure that will allow individuals at all levels within the organization hierarchy to participate to some extent (either directly or through representatives) in the development of objectives and goals. This approach reflects the belief that increased opportunity to participate in the making of decisions regarding organizational objectives and goals will lead members—especially at the rank-and-file level—to have a high degree of commitment to their accomplishment.

The need for some procedure for obtaining a high degree of commitment stems from the fact that the members of a formal organization have differing degrees of involvement in the accomplishment of organizational goals. At the higher executive levels, there will be substantial involvement, largely because leaders at the top levels are responsible for *formulating* the goals and objectives of the organization. As a consequence, these goals and objectives tend to be in close agreement with the personal goals of the higher-level personnel, and their achievement therefore produces substantial intrinsic satisfaction. However, when objectives are redefined to make them suitable at successively lower levels, there is less and less freedom for members at those levels to influence the nature of the goals they must achieve. At the end of the process, at the level of the worker himself, there often is no latitude for decision, with the result that the worker's own personal goals and the organization's may have little or nothing in common. For the worker, then, attainment of organizational goals may not be intrinsically rewarding.

This leads to a situation in which the worker and the organization are in a reciprocal relationship that has been called an "employment contract" (Simon, 1952). The worker places his time and effort, up to a limit, at the disposal of the organization in exchange for inducements offered in return by the organization. Within this limit, which is much like Barnard's concept of a zone of indifference (Barnard, 1952), the worker accepts direction and provides effort without question. However, this tends to be a *minimum* effort, basically what can be provided without serious risk of termination of the relationship.

One goal of leadership is to obtain, at least a part of the time, individual effort that far surpasses this minimum. To obtain this greater effort, there must be some kind of process that leads the individual to be concerned about the achievement of organizational objectives for reasons other than continuation of the incentives offered him by the organization.

He must be genuinely concerned with the welfare of the organization itself (have identified with it), or must feel that the goals themselves are right and proper. Either will lead to superior effort.

Likert suggests that individual members of the organization, at each level, can participate in decision making about goals and objectives by having representation at succeedingly higher levels. Through this representation, it was thought that organizational objectives, together with ways of achieving them, can be developed so that all levels within the organization will be agreed on them, and will be committed toward their achievement.

The key aspect of Likert's approach was simply that the nature of the interaction between the organization member and his seniors (the organization) should be of such a nature that the individual will be committed to achieving the organization's goals. The more he is motivated by this interaction process, to achieve these goals and objectives, the better will be his productivity.

In Likert's view, perhaps the most important aspect of the interaction between member and organization is that the interaction must reflect to the member that the organization considers him important, and of personal worth in himself. Each person has a strong need to feel accepted and esteemed by others. To the extent the organization communicates a feeling of personal worth and support, the individual, in exchange, will feel rewarded and will be motivated to repay the organization through higher productivity. However, this probably will not happen unless the member believes that future "installments" of esteem are contingent on his productivity.

Likert also suggested a mechanism for achieving this desired interaction. He was quite aware of the importance of group forces, and suggested that organizations develop groups within the hierarchy that could, through interaction, develop objectives and goals to which the individual subscribes, while at the same time providing support and favorable recognition to individuals who would then work effectively toward the achievement of these goals.

This kind of organization is shown in Figure 4 (Likert, 1956). It is a systematic arrangement, in which groups (the enclosed spaces) are formed from members at one level of organization, together with a member from a higher level of organization (the "linking-pin" concept). A requirement for this concept to be effective is that when a problem arises, the senior should not simply resolve the problem in a unilateral manner during an individual interaction with the subordinate concerned, but rather should seek to call in others at the same level on whom the decision or problem may impact. This should lead to sharing of information that will result in a more effective resolution of the problem. Further, the fact that each individual at a given level has had an opportunity to make an input into the resolution of the problem makes him more committed to carrying out the solution he helped to develop.

Concept of an Interactive Organization



NOTE: From Likert (1956).

Figure 4

This line of reasoning led Likert to suggest, in summary, five conditions that must be met within organizations in order to obtain high productivity from organization members:

(1) Member Support. The member must perceive that the organization is supportive of him as a person, and thinks of him as important.

(2) Group Approaches to Supervision. Since group forces are required to call forth the individual's best efforts, the highest level of productivity can be achieved only when each organization member is a part of a cohesive group committed to high performance goals. (This is the "linking pin" concept shown in Figure 4.)

(3) Emphasis on Performance. While the individual supervisor must be employee-centered, high productivity will not be achieved unless the supervisor also, by group methods, has led his subordinates to believe that high production goals are desirable and necessary.

(4) Technical Knowledge. Employee-centeredness and emphasis on production goals are not adequate alone. The achievement of high productivity goals appears also to require that the supervisor be technically capable of facilitating the accomplishment of high productivity goals.

(5) Differentiation of Supervisory Role. Again reflecting earlier Survey Research Center findings, together with the "linking pin" function, a final requirement appears to be that the leader be capable of representing his group to the organization as a whole in a manner that is satisfying to them, while at the same time bringing to the group, in return, both the needs of the organization, and the views, goals, and decisions of other groups within the organization. Only in this way can his group communicate effectively with the remainder of the organization.

Though presented in highly abbreviated form, it should be evident that this is an intriguing approach to the development of commitment within organizations. Its potential effectiveness has been questioned, however (Katz, 1964), on the basis of the following considerations:

(1) The approach will not succeed in getting the views of the worker to the executive because the voice of the rank-and-file worker is attenuated as it is represented up the line by successive levels. That such would be the case is not particularly surprising, either. As organization members interact at each level, it would be unusual, indeed, to find that the particular interests *at that level* would not take precedence over the interests expressed one or two levels away. Thus, the rank-and-file would be underrepresented in rough proportion to the number of organizational levels through which their views have had to go to reach a decision point.

(2) The Likert model therefore is not as effective as are unions for dealing with interest group conflicts within organizations. Union representatives have immediate access to high management levels, and can carry the views of the rank-and-file to top management quickly, without distortion caused by their passage through many intermediate levels.

(3) These group decision processes therefore may not be effective in generating commitment, especially when they can be applied only to a part of the total range of decisions (such as how, and not what).

(4) Fractionalization in jobs, such as in the assembly-line technology, probably cannot be compensated for by the group interaction processes at the working level, anyway.

These criticisms are probably applicable to some extent; however, it is evident that both the criticisms and the Likert model itself are addressed to a central problem: *the process by which the rank-and-file communicate their views and wishes to higher decision levels within organizations.* Of course, it can be questioned whether or to what extent this is desirable. Extensive consultation among higher and lower levels of a hierarchy every time a problem arises can make for great inefficiency; further, there are some management prerogatives that are apparently not even desired at the rank-and-file level (McMurry, 1958). For example, a ship's crew under some circumstances would *not* want to be consulted concerning a decision to abandon ship.

The eventual outcome of such debate probably will be intermediate between extremes. There can be little doubt that the individual organizational member desires some degree of ability to control his actions, and his fate. This is not only a form of "psychological pay," which may be necessary for good psychological health through the satisfaction of needs for self-esteem, it is also a possibly necessary condition for the avoidance of alienation[9] at the rank-and-file level.

GROUP EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH LABORATORY, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

As will be recalled from the literature summaries that appeared during the five years following World War II, leadership theory turned at that time from a strong emphasis on study of the personality traits of leaders toward a broader frame of reference. Increased attention was given to the followers and their needs and characteristics, together with the requirements of the situation itself.

Of the two general schools of thought thus far described in this chapter, the Ohio State studies concentrated on description of the behavior of leaders in formal organizations, and sought to relate their leadership

[9] Alienation, in this context, refers to rejection of the goals and values of the organization, leading to a condition in which reciprocation between worker and organization is reduced virtually to a time-for-money swap. This, in turn, leads to minimum effort (see Chapter 1 for further discussion).

behavior to both subjective and objective criteria of group satisfaction and group performance. The University of Michigan studies, on the other hand, started with an initial focus on productivity and group morale, with a view toward identifying supervisory behaviors that are facilitative not only of productivity, but also of high morale and satisfaction.

The studies initiated in 1951 by Fiedler at the University of Illinois concentrated on still a third aspect, the personal need structure of the leader and the interaction between him and the group, leading toward group effectiveness. In most cases, these studies have also been characterized by an attempt to use an objective, concrete criterion of group productivity as a standard by which to measure the effectiveness of the leader.

The underlying rationale was that psychological variables, such as inner needs, affect the maximum utilization of the skills and abilities required of group members by a particular task. Interpersonal perception skills had been shown, at least in some cases, to be important in effective group functioning. To the extent that the leader and the members of his group incorrectly perceive the needs and motives of others in the group, presumably the group would not function as efficiently or as well as if these errors did not exist. Such errors were thought to be at least in part the result of misperception caused by the inner needs of the observer.

Thus, Fiedler felt that the perceptions of group members, including the leader, of one another would be an important variable to study in relation to group effectiveness. One kind of perceptual error a group member *can* make is to assume that others in the group have the same beliefs and values as his own, that is, to assume that they are more similar to him than they actually are. This mistaken assumption can lead to inappropriate interpersonal interaction. Hypotheses of this sort were the type Fiedler set out to test.

In the early studies, two different types of groups were involved—first, high school basketball teams, and second, civil engineering students working in three- to four-man surveying teams during a five-week field trip. While several types of variables were measured, the one that eventually emerged as most promising was the Assumed Similarity of Opposites (ASo) measure.[10] To obtain this, group members were asked to describe their most and least preferred co-workers on a series of adjective pairs such as the following:

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[10] This illustration is from the final form of the instrument. For a review of the earlier forms see Fiedler, Hartman, and Rudin (1952, 1953).

Cooperative _____:_____:_____::_____:_____:_____Uncooperative
Quitting _____:_____:_____::_____:_____:_____Persistent

Scores were assigned to responses on the basis of where the group member placed "X" marks along the line, and a "difference score" was obtained for each adjective pair. This score was the difference between how a group member would describe a most preferred co-worker and a least preferred co-worker on that adjective pair. From these difference scores, the ASo measure was computed, high scores representing relatively similar and low scores representing relatively dissimilar ratings for most and least preferred co-workers by the group member.

In the study of basketball teams (Fiedler 1954), players were asked, in addition to describing co-workers, to name the person they could play with best, and the one they could play with least well. When ASo scores for the teams as a whole (i.e., the team average) were correlated with team standing (i.e., proportion of games won), the relationships were not significant. However, when the ASo score of the team's *informal leader* was correlated with team standing, a strong and significant relationship was found ($r = -.69$). In a second study of the same teams, a correlation of $-.58$ was obtained, which was also significant. While end-of-season standings did not correlate significantly with ASo scores, they were in the same direction.

An additional finding was that in the most effective teams, *congeniality was less marked* than in the less effective teams; effectiveness and congeniality seemed to be inversely related. Further, the negative relationship between the informal leader's ASo and team effectiveness indicated that the more effective teams were according informal leadership status on a different basis than were the less effective teams. The effective teams accorded leadership status to a member who was substantially more critical of a least preferred co-worker than of a most preferred co-worker. In contrast, informal leaders in less effective groups tended not to distinguish as sharply between least and most preferred workers.

Further, since the basis of the rating was a task-oriented question (most or least preferred person to work with to accomplish a task), there was good reason to interpret these results as indicating that informal leaders in effective groups not only made sharp distinctions among their co-workers, but also that these distinctions were made in terms of their relative effectiveness in aiding the accomplishment of task objectives. In contrast, leaders of less effective groups either did not make sharp distinctions, or made them on some other basis.

Finally, the fact that this task-oriented, discriminating person *was* endorsed sociometrically by the rest of the team meant that the more effective teams, *as a whole*, were more task oriented than the less effective teams. Thus, their high standings were probably a function not only of better talent, but also of more task-oriented attitudes.

Several questions can be generated on the basis of these findings.

First, did this task orientation exist because the team had better talent and therefore felt that it was going to be successful, or for some other reason? (For example, the informal leader might well have had these attitudes before the team as a whole did, and might have become the informal leader on the basis of other considerations, after which he then influenced the team to become more task oriented as a whole.)

Second, would these results be true for formal leaders in hierarchical organizations, as well as for these informal leaders of basketball teams?

Third, what conditions influence the effectiveness of such task-oriented attitudes on performance of the team as a whole?

These and other questions led to a comprehensive and intensive research program that lasted for the better part of two decades.

Confirmation of the initial findings came quickly in a study (Fiedler, 1953) of 22 surveying parties, each composed of three to four students in a civil engineering course. The criterion of team effectiveness was the accuracy with which the assigned plots of land were mapped and measured. As was the case with the basketball study, sociometric ratings were used to identify each team's informal leader, and Assumed Similarity of Opposites scores were obtained from all students. As had been found earlier, there was a substantial correlation (−.51) between the informal team leaders' ASo scores, and the criterion of team accuracy. Further, the teams that were considered most accurate were somewhat less cohesive ($r = -.23$) than the other teams, though the students themselves preferred the more cohesive teams ($r = .37$).[11]

There were also interesting negative findings, as in one study in which officers of both the Army and the Naval ROTC programs were asked to select the 15 best and the 15 poorest leaders from their respective programs. In this study the ASo measure did not correlate significantly with the judgment of the officers as to their best and poorest cadet leaders. hus, ASo was demonstrated not to be a measure of leadership ability. As had been thought earlier, it measured either a set of attitudes or a set of personal needs, brought to the situation by the leader, which impacts in some way on group effectiveness under certain conditions. The object of continuing research was to find out what these conditions were.

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[11] A correlation of about .41 was required for significance at the .05 level.

Studies were conducted of B-29 bomber crews and tank crews (Fiedler, 1955), open hearth foremen (Cleven and Fiedler, 1955), and farm supply cooperatives (Fiedler, 1958). When study of the ASo measure was shifted to formal leaders in formal organizations, several new findings emerged and existing findings were confirmed. First, there was a tendency for the same kind of negative relationship between the leader's ASo score and group effectiveness that had been found before. That is, when groups had leaders who made distinctions among members on the basis of their effectiveness in working toward task objectives, the groups themselves were more productive and more effective. However, this relationship existed only when the formal leader was accepted (respected?) by the members of his group and, in some cases, only if the formal leader also held either his group or some of his key subordinates in high esteem. When these conditions were met, correlations between the leader ASo score and group effectiveness were high and significant, with higher group effectiveness associated with a leader tendency to make sharp distinctions among his subordinates based on task achievement considerations.

It is important to re-emphasize that, in most of these studies, if the leader did not have the endorsement of his group or of a key subordinate the relationship between the leader's ASo score and group effectiveness dropped to near zero. Further, when the leader did not hold his key subordinates in high esteem, the relationship sometimes was near zero, or even in the opposite direction.

These findings led to certain general conclusions about leadership in both formal and informal groups. First, in a task-oriented group, it was thought that the leader needed to maintain a certain psychological distance (i.e., degree of "unapproachability" or avoidance of intimate, friendly relationships) from the members of his group. It was not certain what this distance should be, but it was clear that it existed, as measured by ASo. It consisted—at least in part—of the fact that the leader in these successful groups saw himself in somewhat different terms from the way he saw his subordinates, even though he might *like* his subordinates. (This may reflect the role differentiation requirement for effective supervisors found in the University of Michigan studies.)

It was also conclusively demonstrated by these findings that in order for the task-oriented leader (ASo low) to be effective, it was necessary for him to be endorsed (accepted) sociometrically by his group or by key subordinates, or by both. Lacking such endorsement, the ability of the leader to influence the members of his group was so low that his influence attempts did not lead to higher performance. This of course is in agreement with many other studies which demonstrate that the leader's position power alone is not adequate to produce outstanding performance within his group.[12]

The finding that a leader could be characterized as being either task oriented (businesslike, extrapunitive, and "hard-headed" in his approach to group members) or primarily socio-emotionally oriented (concerned about interpersonal relations, feeling a need for approval and support from group members, and preferring harmonious work relationships) is in agreement with observations by others (Moment and Zaleznik, 1963; Slater, 1955; Bales, 1958) that members of groups, both formal and informal, tend to develop toward being either "task specialists" or "socio-emotional specialists."[13] Further, there is evidence (Longabaugh, 1966) that these tendencies toward role specialization have their roots in social learning experiences that begin at a very early age, as children begin to be sensitive to power differences among their peers, and between themselves and those older and younger than they are.

Task specialists tend to be concerned about accomplishment of "things" and gain intrinsic reward from task accomplishment. They also are relatively more independent of others and less concerned about the feelings of others than socio-emotional specialists. In contrast, socio-emotional specialists tend to avoid leadership behavior that results in initiating task accomplishment, perhaps because these activities are usually associated with increases in group tension levels. Socio-emotional specialists tend to respond to increased tension levels by behaviors that are effective in reducing them.

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[12] See Chapter 6.

[13] See Chapter 5.

When these two specialist types exist in pure form, the task specialist is not sensitive to group tensions and may drive toward task accomplishment through initiating leadership acts that create substantial disgruntlement within the group. As a pure type, the social specialist may drive toward harmonious group relationships to the extent that task accomplishment is largely forgotten. While these extreme types are rarely found in actual practice, there is a strong tendency toward specialization in one type of role or the other. However, *some* find it possible (Moment and Zaleznik, 1963) to combine these two specialty roles flexibly—able to initiate movement toward the accomplishment of group goals when it appears propitious to do so, yet at the same time to initiate tension reduction behaviors when the tension level within the group rises too high.

The person who can combine both types of role behavior is, of course, clearly in a better position to function as a leader because he can thus gain acceptance from his group on more than one basis. The sociometrically endorsed leader who at the same time had a low ASo score, in Fiedler's studies, probably combined at least some aspects of these two different roles.

Further research with the ASo measure was initiated to discover the conditions under which leaders with high and low ASo scores are effective (*high*-ASo leaders had been found to be more effective in some groups) and to try to develop an understanding of exactly what ASo is in relation to other psychological variables. While this work is too extensive to be summarized here, Fiedler has published three significant summary integrations of his work (1963, 1967, and 1970) that provide some answers to these questions. The first of these was a first publication concerning the model of leadership effectiveness, the second elaborated on this model, and the third explores the psychological dimensions measured by ASo (and LPC[14]).

In his integration of his previous work, Fiedler notes that a primary emphasis was, from the beginning, the prediction of group performance based on leadership style, and group and task structure variables. In the development of the contingency model (Fiedler, 1963), a major objective was to identify variables that interact with ASo to produce group effectiveness or ineffectiveness. The stimulus for development of this model was the observation that low ASo (or low LPC) was associated with high group effectiveness under some conditions, and that high ASo (or LPC) was so associated under other conditions. If it could be assumed that the ASo (LPC) measure was meaningful, there logically had to be differences between these situations that were acting in a systematic manner to produce the obtained variation in results.

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[14] Least Preferred Co-Worker score. This was a later measure, correlated with ASo but free, apparently, of the major methodological flaws identified in ASo by Cronbach (1957), discussed later in this section. In contrast to ASo, which is based on the differences between the ratings of most preferred and least preferred co-workers, LPC is computed from only the least preferred co-worker ratings.

The contingency model suggests that the variable causing the change from one situation to another was the *favorability* of the situation to the leader. Three major factors within the situation were thought to account for how favorable or unfavorable it would be for the leader:

(1) Affective Leader-Member Relations. The regard in which the leader and the group members hold one another determines, in part, the ability of the leader to influence his group, and the conditions under which he can do so. A leader who is accepted by his group members is in a more favorable situation than one who is not.

(2) Task Structure. If the group's task is unstructured, and especially if the leader is no more knowledgeable than the group about how to accomplish the task, the situation is unfavorable to him. Four criteria were identified, which determine the degree to which the task has structure:

(a) Decision Verifiability—the degree to which a decision can be demonstrated, in some impartial manner, to be correct.
(b) Goal Clarity—the degree to which group members clearly understand the requirements of the task.
(c) Goal Path Multiplicity—the extent to which more than one procedure can be used to accomplish the task.
(d) Solution Specificity—the question of whether the problem has more than one correct solution.

(3) Power Inherent in Leadership Position. As will be seen in Chapter 6, leadership *position* power[15] is determined at its most basic

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[15] This is contrasted with sources of power that are derived from interaction between leader and followers, which goes beyond position power alone.

level by the rewards and punishments which the leader officially has at his disposal for either rewarding or punishing the members of his group, on the basis of their performance. The extent of his power is determined by the authority he has over his followers, based on the range of acts which his own seniors in the organization would agree are within his jurisdiction. The more power the leader has, the more favorable the situation is to him.

Fiedler assumed in the contingency model that situations which are either quite favorable or quite unfavorable to the leader require a guiding and directing kind of leadership style for optimum group performance. The most favorable situation would be one in which the leader is accepted by his group members, the task is highly structured, and he has substantial position power. In such a situation, it is reasonable to believe that subordinates are ready to act and need only to learn what the leader wishes them to do in order to do it willingly and well. On the other hand, in an extremely unfavorable situation the leader is rejected by his group members, the task is unstructured and vague, and he has low position power. In this case, it may very well be that directive leadership actions are the only ones that will get any result at all; permissive or participative leadership might easily result in everyone deciding to go home. Directive leadership might have the same result, but at least it has some chance of being successful.

The contingency model presents evidence that the low-ASo (or LPC) leader, who tends to make distinctions among his group members on the basis of their task accomplishments, is more likely to be successful in these two extreme situations because he is more task oriented, and is more likely to give directive leadership than the high-ASo (LPC) leader.

For group situations that are intermediate in favorability, it was assumed that a state of group tension probably existed, which could be alleviated by leader actions that had tension reducing properties. Such leader actions have been characterized as "permissive," "democratic," "relationship-oriented," and so on. The high-ASo leader, in previous studies, had been found to be more effective in such situations, and also had been found to be more relationship-oriented.

Thus, it appeared, referring to the Ohio State dichotomy, that the leader can afford to be high on initiating structure in a situation that is favorable, and *must* be high on initiating structure in an unfavorable situation in order to have any hope at all of results. However, in situations intermediate in favorability, he may get better results by being high on consideration.

Figure 5 shows graphically how the three dimensions of leader-member relations, task structure, and leader position power are combined to yield an order of situational favorability to the leader. The model contains eight cells (all the combinations of relations, structure, and position power; high and low on each), each of which is called an octant.

Table 3 shows how each octant is classified in terms of the three contributing variables, together with one additional octant in which leader member relations are very poor.

Correlations Between Leaders' LPC Scores and Group Effectiveness Plotted for Each Cell



NOTE: The Eta between the correlations LPC ASo and performance and favorableness is .586 p .007.
NOTE: From Fiedler (1967), p. 33

Figure 5

Table 3

Classification of Group Task Situations on the Basis of Three Factors[a]

	Leader-Member Relations	Task Structure	Position Power
I	Good	High	Strong
II	Good	High	Weak
III	Good	Weak	Strong
IV	Good	Weak	Weak
V	Moderately poor	High	Strong
VI	Moderately poor	High	Weak
VII	Moderately poor	Weak	Strong
VIII	Moderately poor	Weak	Weak
VIII-A	Very poor	High	Strong

[a] From Fiedler (1967, p. 34).

If, according to the theory underlying the contingency model, the favorability of the situation is actually the key factor in determining who can best succeed as a leader, then the relation between the leader's attitudes about most and least preferred co-workers and group performance should vary from one octant to the next. This has been found to be the case, as is shown in Figure 6.

Before examining Figure 6, it should be noted that in later studies of leader attitudes, Fiedler discovered that the leader's rating of his least preferred co-worker was highly correlated with his ASo score, and shifted to a use of the LPC score to replace ASo. By so doing, he avoided certain methodological difficulties about the nature of the ASo score and the manner in which it was derived (Cronbach, 1957). In interpreting Figure 6, a high LPC leader is roughly the same as a high ASo leader, and conversely.

Figure 6 shows that predictions of the contingency model are verified by the findings from many studies.[16] Under conditions of high favorability, there is a strong negative correlation between leader LPC and group

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[16] However, for a severe methodological critique of the contingency model, which also challenges the support for the model, see Graen, *et al.*, 1970.

A Model for the Classification of Group Task Situations


Leadership position power
+
–
Task structure
+
Leader member relations
+
–
Task structure
+
Leadership position power
+
–
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

NOTE: From Fiedler, 1967, p. 146, SOURCE–The *Harvard Business Review*, September-October, 1965, p. 177. Reproduced by permission.

Figure 6

performance. This means that group performance, under favorable conditions, is probably substantially better when the leader is a low LPC type. In situations of moderate favorability, there is a strong likelihood that the high LPC leader will have a more productive group, while under conditions that are unfavorable, the low LPC leader gets better results.

Results confirming the relationship shown in Figure 6 have been obtained sufficiently often to confirm the basic process being depicted.

However, there is still some question as to *why* these two leader types respond differently to situations of different favorability. Fieldler's most recent work indicates that an understanding must be derived from exploration of the personality dynamics involved between leaders and followers in these various kinds of situations, and this in turn has shed important new light on the leadership process itself.

A significant study for understanding these processes was one in which the *same* leaders were observed under different conditions of favorability. In this study (Sample and Wilson, 1965), 14 groups of students were studied as they performed operant conditioning exercises in a psychology laboratory course. Each group had an appointed male leader with an LPC score at least one standard deviation from the mean. Eight leaders were high LPC and six were low. All were "endorsed" by their group members. These groups performed 10 different operant conditioning exercises, one under stressful conditions; stress was introduced by a requirement not to use an instruction manual that previously had been available, and to work under a tighter time schedule than that to which they had been accustomed. During the stressful session, group member (and leader) behavior was categorized according to Bales' interaction process categories. Separate counts were obtained for the different phases of the group's activities which were: planning the exercise, executing the plan, and completing the paperwork required at the end of the exercise.

The introduction of the stress treatment caused major changes in group performance. On the routine assignments, groups led by high and low LPC leaders had performed equally well. However, on the exercise conducted under stressful conditions, groups with high LPC leaders performed significantly less well than groups with low LPC leaders.

High and low LPC leaders also differed in their characteristic behaviors from one phase to another of the exercise during the stressful condition; these changes were significant in the planning and execution phases. High LPC leaders were significantly higher than low LPC leaders on positive socio-emotional behaviors during the planning phase, and significantly lower during the execution phase. However, overall, high and low LPC leaders were roughly even in the number of positive socio-emotional behaviors in which they had engaged, and they were also even on a scale measuring desire for social contact with team members.

The interpretation of these findings was that the low LPC leader was task oriented during the planning phase, to the extent that he had relatively little positive socio-emotional interaction with other members of his group. Apparently, he firmly and quickly structured the group's procedures. This meant that the group's procedures were established, for good or bad, before the execution phase began, which then permitted him to play a less dominating and sometimes even jovial role during the execution phase, particularly when the plan was good. On the other hand, the high LPC leader "... holds a group discussion during the planning period and the work is not clearly organized at that time. The leader then attempts to organize the work during the later phases, with only partial success" (Sample and Wilson, 1965, p. 269).

The less effective performance of the groups with high LPC leaders apparently resulted from the fact that these leaders used participant leadership techniques which might have been workable for routine problem solving when the instruction manual was available and more time was allowed, but which was not sufficient to meet the demands of the test problem with its more stringent time limitations.

A further observation by Sample and Wilson was that the high LPC leader also seemed to be unable to stem the torrent of positive socio-emotional behavior within his group after he had started it during the planning phase. This substantially interfered with accomplishment of task requirements under the time limitations imposed.

These and other findings have led to the conclusion (Fiedler, 1970) that the primary goals held by different LPC types are simply different, as shown in Table 4.

Table 4

Primary and Secondary Needs of High and Low LPC

Designation	Primary	Secondary
High LPC	Relatedness to others	Self-enhancement, prominence, esteem
Low LPC	Rewards from explicit competition for material and tangible rewards in work situation	Good interpersonal relations with work associates

High LPC persons are thought to be primarily motivated to seek "relatedness" with others. They have as a secondary goal self-enhancement, prominence, and esteem from others. In contrast, low LPC persons are thought to be primarily motivated by "... explicit competition for material and tangible rewards in the work situation, including praise and recognition for good work by superiors, or the feeling of accomplishment derived from the knowledge that the job was well done" (Fiedler, 1970). Their secondary goal is good interpersonal relations with work associates.

It is thought that individuals will seek to accomplish their primary goals first, and will turn toward achievement of secondary goals only if the level of satisfaction on primary goals is adequate. Since leaders in highly favorable situations probably are achieving a high level of satisfaction of their primary goals, they should then, in theory, be oriented toward attainment of goals which are actually secondary. If the goals of high and low LPC leaders have been correctly identified, the low LPC leader, under conditions of high favorability, seeks good relationships with his group; his group is thus more effective under very favorable conditions than a group with a high LPC leader, whose secondary goals are self-enhancement, prominence, and self-esteem.

In conditions of intermediate favorability, however, the low LPC leader, threatened to some extent, begins to concentrate on his primary goals which are task-oriented and mediated by task accomplishment. Thus, he becomes more dominating and demanding. In contrast, the high LPC leader under these conditions begins to concentrate on *his* primary goal, good group relationships, which results in more effective group leadership.

Under conditions of low favorability, the high LPC leader continues to try for good relationships, but unsuccessfully. In contrast, the low LPC leader continues to withdraw from interpersonal relationships and to concentrate on task accomplishment, which turns out to be a more effective course of action.

Under conditions that are generally favorable (which probably characterize most real groups in formal organizations), the high LPC leader seems to respond by being psychologically close to the members of his group. He generally will reciprocate their positive feelings toward him, and may not be giving enough attention to the task itself. This leads to high cohesion within the group, but at the cost of task effectiveness. On the other hand, the low LPC leader, under generally favorable conditions, maintains a greater degree of psychological distance from the members of his group *as a whole*, being closer to group members who contribute more effectively to task accomplishment, and more distant from those who do not contribute to task effectiveness.

The apparent difference, then, is that the high LPC leader sees group interaction as a satisfying goal in itself, while the low LPC leader never relinquishes good task performance as a primary goal, using interpersonal interaction with group members who aid in the accomplishment of goals as a selective reward for their contribution to the group's effort.

This suggests that a degree of psychological distance, under favorable conditions, probably will facilitate group goal attainment.[17] If psychological distance can be compared with differentiation of the supervisor's role, it can be seen that findings of the contingency model research are compatible with findings of the University of Michigan work, which suggested that the most effective supervisors were those who did differentiate their roles from the roles of their group members.

The Contingency Model—A Critique

The Contingency Model is the result of a comprehensive attempt to study the relationships among (a) conditions under which leadership is attempted, (b) the inner needs of the leader, and (c) the success of the group in accomplishing its goals. Thus, it provides a good insight into what type of leadership is effective, producing what type of performance, under what type of conditions, if different "kinds" of leadership can be said to exist.

In relation to the Ohio State and University of Michigan work, perhaps the single most important added dimension in the contingency model is that it takes into account different conditions of group support and task requirements in the determination of what "type" or "style" of leader behavior would produce the most effective group performance. (Indeed, lack of this dimension can be considered a deficiency in each of the other programs, though it was originally envisioned that this kind of variable would be studied in the Ohio State research.)

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[17] This seeming contradiction to the conclusions from the Sample and Wilson study and Fiedler's own conclusions regarding primary and secondary goals of high and low LPC leaders is more apparent than real. The key is that the low LPC leader is selective in his choice of which member he will allow to be psychologically "close," whereas the high LPC leader is not. Thus, every group interaction seems to be a means to a task achievement end for the low LPC leader.

However, there are some questions that have not yet been resolved by the Contingency Model. Endorsement of the leader by the members of his group is thought by Fiedler to be the most important variable in determining the favorability of the situation to the leader. Unfortunately, the data from which the Contingency Model has been built have provided descriptions of groups only at the point in time at which they were studied. What has gone on before that time in order to produce the existing situation still is unclear. Thus, one of the questions that remains to be dealt with is how the leader came to have the relations with his group that are found to exist at the point in time at which the group is studied.

A second question has to do with how flexible the leader is with regard to his group-directed behavior. As will be seen in the following section, one of the important goals of human relations training is the development of diagnostic skills and interpersonal competence skills. These skills imply flexibility on the part of the leader in responding to the group situation, in order to produce in a most effective manner that which he desires from his group members.

In contrast, Fiedler suggests that LPC attitudes and the needs underlying these attitudes are enduring characteristics of the individual, and that there is quite limited capacity for change, such as in response to changing conditions. Further, Fiedler suggested that it might be more profitable for organizations to engineer positions so that their requirements suit the capacities of available leaders, rather than trying to fit leaders to existing positions. These observations, if true, would clearly have challenging implications for organizational development and utilization of leadership talent. Convincing evidence has been mustered to support the position engineering view. However, there is equally convincing evidence to support the possibility that it may not be well based (Graen *et al.*, 1970).

Within groups, there are two broad types of leader roles—task oriented and socio-emotional. That these two broad categories exist is so well established (Bales, 1958; Slater, 1955; Moment and Zaleznik, 1963; Benne and Sheats, 1948) that it is not reasonable to debate their existence.

The two types of leader roles result from the fact that groups have two broad categories of needs, or objectives. First, it is almost inconceivable that a group can exist in any stable fashion without goals or common objectives. Therefore, the accomplishment of these goals also becomes a requirement for continued group existence. Otherwise, group members would eventually reach the decision that the costs of group membership (there are always some costs) outweigh the benefits.

The second broad category of needs stems from the fact that group members need positive socio-emotional contact with other persons. As will be discussed further in Chapter 5, positive socio-emotional contacts within groups consist of mutual interaction behaviors directed from one member to another which give pleasure and which also build individual esteem and feelings of self worth.

These positive socio-emotional behaviors are particularly important when the group faces obstacles to the achievement of its task goals, or when progress toward the achievement of goals is slowed (Sanford, 1952). They may also become important when goal difficulty increases to the point that it constitutes a challenge to the group's ability.

It is possible for both kinds of role behavior to be combined in the person of a single leader, though this is more difficult than specialization in one role or the other. One reason is that task-oriented leader behavior may create tension within the group.[18] This will occur whenever the group either is not making satisfactory progress toward accomplishment of its goals, or when its progress is not the result of a routine procedure. While positive socio-emotional behavior at this point will reduce tension, it is difficult for a leader to achieve the flexibility required to engage both in leadership behaviors that create tension, and those that reduce tension. These are to some extent incompatible, and many leaders find it difficult to find the optimum balance between them, especially when it may be necessary to engage in both kinds of behavior almost simultaneously.

Consequently, many groups develop both task leaders and social leaders. Task leaders (Bales, 1958; Slater, 1955) frequently give suggestions and guidance, and recommend solutions. They are good "idea" men. In contrast, the social leader responds mainly to an increase in tension within the group, whether it is caused by task-initiating activities by the task leader, or by obstacles in the group's path. Tension-reducing behavior consists of joking, rewarding other members (e.g., by making comments like "that's a good idea") and so on. In general, his behavior leads to an increase in the esteem of other members, and reduces group tensions while at the same time increasing cohesion.

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[18] Indeed, more productive groups have higher tension levels and lower cohesion than less productive groups (e.g. Torrance, 1955).

Between these two, the task specialist is almost always regarded as the group's leader, though he may not be the most popular member. In contrast, the social specialist may be regarded as the most popular, though he is almost never chosen as the group's leader. One reason for this is that the pure social specialist appears to be relatively rigid and incapable of engaging in active task leadership (Slater, 1955). If a social specialist is placed in a position of leadership, it is less likely that the group's goals would be accomplished. The pure task specialist can be a successful leader because, under his leadership, the group's goals do get accomplished. While group members may not be totally satisfied with his leadership, they can still accept it, especially if he permits the emergence of a social specialist in the group who can act to reduce group tensions when they go beyond a crucial level. The importance of this function is illustrated in Figure 7, which was derived from considerations presented by George (1962).

Hypothetical Relationship Between Group Tension and Group Performance



Figure 7

There probably is an optimum degree of group tension for high group performance. Tension should not be much lower than this optimum value because then the group would not have the drive to accomplish task functions; nor should it be much higher because group members would then become concerned about and affected by the tension itself, and this would rapidly disrupt effective performance. Possibly this relationship establishes the base for a degree of change in the interpretation of the relationship between LPC and leader specialization.[10]

It will be recalled that one of the basic questions not presently answered by the Contingency Model is how the group's leader arrived at his present position of group endorsement. Any improvement on the Contingency Model should be able to deal with this problem. Also, there should be provision in the theory for flexibility in the leader's behavior as he interacts with his group. In the following discussion, this will be called "role enactment flexibility."

There is evidence (Moment and Zaleznik, 1963) that a leader who has greater role enactment flexibility, and who can perform the functions of both the task specialist and the social specialist, will be endorsed more strongly by his group than a leader who is limited by his personal resources either to task specialization or social specialization.

To expand upon the relationship between role-enactment flexibility and group endorsement, one possible way in which LPC may relate to these dimensions warrants consideration. It has already been shown (Moment and Zaleznik, 1963; Slater, 1955) that the pure task specialist and the pure social specialist are, to some extent, inflexible in their role enactment behavior. However, each contributes in his own way toward the accomplishment of group objectives, and thus is endorsed to some extent by the group. The individual who is most endorsed is labeled a "star" (Moment and Zaleznik) and receives the highest relative endorsement. He is also highest on role enactment flexibility. There are some group members who do not contribute to group goals, rigidly limit themselves to generally critical behavior, and are thus very seldom given even moderate group endorsement.

The above findings on role behavior would complement Fiedler's findings if it were assumed that task specialists tend to be low LPC leader types while social specialists are high LPC leader types. Since either extreme of LPC (Cronbach, 1957) indicates rigidity of a sort, it would be assumed that the star is intermediate in LPC. Where the "underchosen" fall is not clear; however, it probably is not really important because they are generally rejected as leaders.

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[10] It is by no means certain that this interpretation is correct, but to the present author it has somewhat greater appeal than Fiedler's most recent one (Fiedler, 1970).

Tentative evidence that LPC measures predispostion toward role enactment does exist. Gruenfeld, Rance, and Weissenberg (1969) examined the behavior of high and low LPC leaders under three conditions of social support: high, medium, and low. Observers used Bales' interaction process categories to obtain counts of four types of leader behaviors: dominance, acceptance, antagonism, and tension release. Degree of group support was found to have a significant impact on leader behavior, and loss of support affected high and low LPC leaders differently.

When group support decreased from high to medium, low LPC leaders doubled their frequency of dominance behaviors (e.g., giving advice vs. asking for information), though the frequency of such behaviors among high LPC leaders remained virtually the same. While there were no significant differences between the two kinds of leaders on acceptance of suggestions from their group members, there was a significant difference on behaviors showing antagonism toward these members, with the low LPC leader tending to behave more antagonistically as group support decreased.

Graham (1968) also found evidence that high and low LPC leaders react differently to their subordinates in a work environment. It might be supposed that a relations-oriented (high LPC) leader would be high on showing consideration behavior, and a task-oriented (low LPC) leader high on initiating structure. However, Nealey and Blood (1968) did not find this to be so. Graham's study tested the hypothesis that high and low LPC leaders differ in their discrimination among their group members on three types of behavior, and found that they do differ. Highs were significantly more *consistent* in showing consideration behaviors within the groups, while lows seemed to show consideration to some group members and not to others. On initiating structure the relationship was in the other direction, but was not significant. Further, high LPC leaders, despite their primary human relations orientation, were not evaluated more favorably than low LPC leaders.

These observations suggest that LPC should not be regarded as just a measure of the primary and secondary goals of the leader, as might have been concluded from Fiedler's (1970) most recent interpretation. If it is also—or primarily—a measure of role enactment predispositions, with low LPC leaders tending to be task specialists and high LPC leaders social specialists, some of the data that currently appear contradictory would appear less so.

For example, it has been established (e.g., Kirchner and Reisberg, 1962) that the more effective supervisor does make sharp distinctions among members of his group. This holds true only when the sharp distinctions are based on accurate appraisal of the relative contributions of the various members to the accomplishment of group goals. To make sharp distinctions among group members requires that the leader be prepared to have *them reject him*. If he has a high need for approval, as the social specialist tends to have, he cannot accept this risk (Blumstein and Weinstein, 1969).

If, as suggested, the high LPC leader tends to be a social specialist, and responds to threat or tension by tension-reducing activities, he is less effective than the *accepted* low LPC leader in a favorable situation, because he then may concentrate on further behaviors designed to build his own self esteem, as Fiedler (1970) suggested. This is less effective than the low LPC leader's tendency, because it wastes group resources and, by increasing self esteem through his leadership position, probably creates resentment in his subordinates.

That this is not totally unfounded conjecture is indicated by the fact that in groups with high need-achievement members, low LPC leaders (who would presumably tend to be task specialists) are preferred to highs; conversely, when members have low need-achievement, high LPC leaders are preferred (Burke, 1965). The existence of these different preferences strongly suggests that the leadership of the high LPC leaders is more satisfying to group members with low need-achievement, and that of low LPC leaders to members with high need-achievement. If it can be assumed that this occurs because each type of leader better satisfies a type of need that is unique to the type of group that more strongly endorsed him, then it appears that group member goals typically associated with need-achievement are better satisfied by low LPC leaders, and that whatever goals were associated with low need-achievement were better satisfied by high LPC leaders.

It is tempting to conclude that the low need-achievement members were more likely to have preferred interpersonal interaction goals than task goals, to have responded with a degree of tension to the requirement to achieve goals, and thus to have presented the stimulus required to initiate the social specialist's tension-relieving activity. If this line of reasoning is correct, answers are then available for two questions that were raised earlier: (a) how the leader comes to be endorsed by his group, and (b) whether he does or does not have role enactment flexibility.

The answer to the first question is that he is endorsed by his group because his activities facilitate goal attainment, if in fact such endorsement exists. The low LPC leaders found in some studies that were not endorsed and who did not have highly productive groups probably were simply not effective in their leadership actions—for example, through poor planning, poor role differentiation, or some other factor among those already identified as important.

Low LPC will probably not guarantee that a leader will have a highly productive group or that he will be endorsed by his group. He must have ability as well. However, the Contingency Model findings do suggest that, even with ability, his group will not be productive unless he is task oriented and makes sharp distinctions among his followers based on their contributions to group goal attainment.

Implications for leadership are evident from these findings. An effective leader must be capable of enforcing the requirement that all group members contribute to goal achievement, and must be capable of making judgments about his subordinates that carry the implication of rejection, and the risk of rejection in return. No leader can properly lead if he is not prepared for rejection for this reason. Facilitating goal achievement is his business and he must be prepared to subordinate his own personal goals to this end whenever there is conflict between the two.

This, then, may be the central conclusion to be drawn from Contingency Model findings. The leader who rewards followers with esteem regardless of their productivity probably can be successful in only a limited range of situations, probably basically those in which group members themselves can become significantly more productive when within group tensions are reduced. However, in other situations, the leader who discriminates among subordinates and rewards only achievers with esteem (and other available benefits), will be more effective.

ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

Even before the growth of interest in the scientific study of leader behavior, there were intensive efforts to apply psychological techniques to improve the effectiveness with which formal organizations achieve goals. There is a subtle but significant difference between these two orientations. The scientific study of leadership is motivated by a desire to acquire knowledge about an organizational phenomenon. While this knowledge is useful to organizations, the knowledge itself is the real objective of the research and would still be sought even if it were not directly useful.

In contrast, when the goal is to increase the effectiveness of attainment of organizational objectives, observation tends to become somewhat less systematic and less well controlled. Observations tend to be made in a small number of organizations, or a few parts of a single organization, and there sometimes is hesitation to allow changes—which could interfere with operations—to be made to improve data collection. This criticism is, of course, not true of all studies in organizational settings. Some have been very well controlled, but control *is* much more difficult in the context of a formal, functioning organization. Despite these difficulties, the central focus of such studies—the attainment of more effective organizational functioning—has led to valuable findings concerning the leadership process, the role and function of small groups within formal organizations, and organizational processes that affect both leaders and groups.

As will be seen in Chapter 4, a central problem confronting most formal organizations is that of obtaining reliable role performance from organization members. At higher organizational levels, this problem is less evident because these members are more likely to have identified with the organization and to have accepted the organization's goals as their own. They also are more likely to be highly satisfied with the rewards they obtain from the organization in exchange for their involvement with it.

At the lower levels, however, this may not be the case; there may even be perceived conflict between the personal goals of the worker and the actions required of him for achievement of organizational goals. Perhaps the one central theme of the body of work here classified as organizational psychology, if such a central theme could be said to exist, is a concern for helping organizations to achieve higher productivity through obtaining a higher degree of commitment from their members, particularly at the lower levels, toward the attainment of organizational goals and objectives.

Early theories of scientific management tended to view organizations as though they existed without people. That is, a worker was viewed as a rational unit, without emotions, who could be tested, fitted into an organizational position for which his abilities qualified him, and then given training which would enable him to do certain predictable kinds of things within the organization (Taylor, 1947).

Bureaucratic approaches to organizational management had roughly the same objective—to circumvent man as an individual—but in this case by using process, procedure, precedent, and directive as a rational machine which eliminates emotion from the organizational environment. In both the scientific and the bureaucratic approaches, the employee was viewed as being undesirably unpredictable, and systems were designed to minimize this unpredictability. Ideally, the employee should have been available in equal units, with no variation one from another, to facilitate organizational operations (Weber, 1946).

However, during this period there were powerful forces at work that made both of these approaches less attractive and less manageable. Among these influences were the emergence of powerful labor unions, which progressively reduced the earlier freedom of foremen and supervisors to use negative sanctions (fear and punishment) as dominant motivational orientations, and the continuing infiltration of democratic values into the work force, which made autocratic methods progressively less successful.

A landmark was the pioneering work by Mayo (1945) and his associates and Roethlisberger (1941), who were initially concerned with the problem of labor turnover and who conducted experimental studies designed to identify the best combination of certain environmental variables in order to obtain high productivity.

The best known study (Roethlisberger, 1939) involved prolonged observation of one work group making telephone assemblies. Productivity increased, in many cases substantially, in response to almost any environmental change that was introduced. Further, productivity increased during successive test periods when working conditions were held constant. Perhaps most surprising, productivity increased even when all the experimental conditions, which were thought to be "improvements," were removed and environmental variables returned to the original condition which had served to provide a base line of productivity.

The mystery was why productivity increased in response to any change, either objectively good or objectively bad, that was introduced. It was concluded that the key was not the environmental change but the interaction between the experimenters and the workers in the initial establishment of the work group. Two workers, who were known to be friends, had been selected and asked to participate in the experiment. They were then asked to select four other workers with whom they thought they could work well. Thus, the initial selection of the workers was a procedure that, in essence, selected a congenial work team that was committed to wholehearted and spontaneous cooperation during the experiment. It was very significant that, even while producing more, the individual workers felt under less pressure for productivity.

While this may or may not have been the first explicit recognition of the importance of interaction among members and supervisors of the work group for high productivity, it certainly was a conclusive demonstration of that fact. Additional work consisted of an extensive interviewing program, designed to learn which personal and social factors lead workers to be satisfied or dissatisfied, and which produce variations in production. From this emerged the important finding that more or less tacit agreements exist among members of work groups on standards of work performance. Many times this agreement was found to be used by work groups to render managerial controls and pressure for production less effective, thereby increasing the relative autonomy of the workers themselves.

The essence of this finding is that a cohesive work group will act in unison to enforce an agreed-upon internal standard, thereby reducing management's effectiveness in applying sanctions to an individual worker for non-productivity. (This topic will be covered at greater length in Chapter 5.)

Mayo's work has been credited by some as the beginning of the human relations movement, which gave recognition to the fact that workers normally do not act solely in terms of their own economic self-interest, and that it is not possible, as a general rule, to obtain cooperation of the worker and increased productivity in response to purely tangible incentives. The worker is to some extent illogical in this respect, governed, in addition, by his desire to be personally accepted by other members of his work group. Given that high productivity could not be either forced or bought, Mayo thought that it was necessary to obtain the commitment of the worker by making him feel that his work is socially necessary. If organizations desired the loyalty of their workers, they had to convince them that the organization was protecting their interests. This was thought to lead to commitment (loyalty to organization) beyond immediate returns, and to higher productivity.

These views represented a major departure from traditional theory on at least four counts. (The following discussion is adapted from Bennis, 1959.)

(1) The work group itself was recognized as an integral unit, rather than an aggregate of individuals, that governed itself to a substantial extent—even though within a framework of the rules laid down by the organization. The governing mechanism of the group consisted of its norms, particularly concerning productivity and the amount of influence judged legitimate for the foreman to exert. These rules, or norms, were enforced by informal means, and the worker who violated them did so at the risk of rejection by his fellow workers. Such rejection would mean at a minimum that he would be denied social rewards controlled by the group, and he might even be subjected to social punishments such as insults and ridicule.

(2) The foreman's power and authority were viewed as only partly derived from his position; in part, they were also derived from the willingness of his workers to accept his authority, and his influence was simply less if they did not. While authority *could* be applied in the absence of willingness of the group members to comply, it was not as effective, and the productivity of the group would be minimal rather than maximal.

(3) An essential step to obtain compliance and commitment to a greater than minimum effort was thought to be involvement of the group itself in decision making, as opposed to handing down directives that were to be obeyed in a robot-like manner standardized by rules and time study methods. It was believed that not only would such participative methods increase the motivation of workers through involvement with work goals, but that decisions about goals and methods of attaining them would also be better. Such improvements were thought probable because of information that might exist at the worker level and could be brought to bear on decisions through participative methods. If the human relations movement can be said to have one central tenet, it is that the worker can and will contribute meaningfully to the development of more effective decisions and methods if allowed.

(4) It was thought that workers had social and esteem needs that could not be satisfied through purely economic incentives, with the result that the promise of personal development was required to obtain the full involvement of the worker in his organization. Individual development, as a goal for the leader, had to be supported by organizational policy that provided rewards for such developmental efforts. Further, the worker had to be a participant in *these* decisions as well. It was believed that workers would undertake greater responsibility for the control of their own actions and the quality of their own performance if the opportunity were allowed for growth in this direction.

While not unequivocal, there is evidence supporting at least some of these major points. As was mentioned, one of the key differences between human relations and traditional methods was the belief that high productivity could be obtained with lower costs to the organization if pressures for higher effort came from the work group itself, which the worker could hardly afford to reject, rather than from the supervisor (Likert, 1967).

In one test of the effect of allowing greater freedom for individual and group decision, such as a greater degree of autonomy, Morse and Reimer (1956) manipulated supervisory practices in a real organization to determine the effect on productivity and satisfaction of either allowing the worker a greater role in decision making, or decreasing the role already being played. Four parallel divisions of a single company were studied, each involved in relatively routine clerical work. Rank-and-file decision making was increased in two of the divisions, and was replaced by increased upper-level decision making in the other two divisions. The experiment was conducted over a period of 18 months which involved a baseline measurement, a period of six months for training supervisors to create the experimental conditions, one year of experience with the experimental conditions, and then a remeasurement.

The experimental manipulations appeared in the autonomy groups to lead to the making of many decisions that affected the group, including work methods and procedures, and personal matters. While some of the work groups made more decisions than others, all increased in their decision making. On the other hand, the groups subjected to greater supervisory control were allowed less opportunity to control and regulate their own activities, mainly through the development of individual work standards by higher level staff officials. The increased supervisory activity by upper line and staff officials also meant that the clerks had less *indirect* influence on decisions, such as through influencing their foremen.

Comparisons of terminal measures from each of these types of groups with their original baseline measures indicated that groups with greater autonomy generally had higher feelings of self-actualization, and were more satisfied with higher management and with the company. In groups with less autonomy, feelings of self-actualization decreased, and satisfaction with higher management, the company, and the job itself all decreased substantially. Of even greater interest was an analysis of 54 employees who left these four divisions during the experiment. Nine left for reasons of job dissatisfaction, and of the nine, eight came from groups with less autonomy. Further, in exit interviews, 23 employees made unfavorable comments about pressure and work standards, and of this number, 19 came from groups with less autonomy.

Of equal importance, *productivity* was about the same for all four divisions, having increased significantly in all four. This leads to the conclusion that productivity increases *can* be obtained through traditional methods, but only at the cost of dissatisfaction and loss of personnel. In contrast, productivity increases achieved through participative methods seem not to incur these costs.

The question of the effect on productivity of the worker's opportunity to influence decision making was also studied by Indik, Georgopoulos, and Seashore (1961). Subjects were employees of a package delivery concern. Through a questionnaire approach, the following variables were measured: openness of communication between supervisor and work group members, supportiveness of the supervisor, mutual understanding among workers and between workers and supervisor, and felt influence of both workers and supervisor on local operations. While all four of these areas correlated significantly with group effectiveness, the highest correlations with station productivity were obtained with the fourth area, felt influence on local operations.

Of course, it is not clear whether the correlation with productivity results from actual participation (actual influence on local operations), or from the feeling that the opportunity to influence decisions is available if desired. Hoffman and Maier (1959) obtained evidence suggesting it may well have been the latter. While their experiment was conducted in a laboratory setting and not in a formal organization, they gained the advantage of being able to *observe* the behavior of group members during the experiment.

The experimental task was to determine how points were to be distributed to the members of the group, for credit toward their grades in a college course. The parallel problem in industry is the distribution of overtime, which normally is done on a unilateral basis by the supervisor. In this experiment, it was found that neither the degree to which an individual participated in the solution nor the control he had over the solution, as determined by the ratings of others, was correlated with the satisfaction he felt with the solution. However, the individual's rating of how free he *felt* to contribute to the discussion *did* correlate significantly with satisfaction (.32). Further, satisfaction with amount of influence over the decision correlated significantly with satisfaction with the solution (.55). This strongly suggests that participation itself may have little effect on the individual's satisfaction with group decisions; rather, the important factor is his feeling that he *can* contribute *if* he wishes.

While this, in itself, does not invalidate human relations principles, it does raise a question about the use of participative methods. It may well be that the individual worker does not desire participation (McMurry, 1958), but rather only the opportunity to be heard if he feels a need to be heard. If this is so, it would clearly be to the leader's advantage *not* to use participative methods since he would thus increase the efficiency of his group. Considering that his organization probably must compete with other organizations and perhaps with only a precarious margin of relative advantage, this is a serious consideration. It is probably on the criterion of relative effectiveness that human relations methods in their pure form may be most seriously questioned.

The difficulty of utilizing group problem solving methods in functioning organizations is illustrated by a laboratory study conducted by Vroom and Grant (1969), who compared the performance of individuals acting as nominal groups with that of individuals acting as members of real groups. Members of nominal groups were not permitted to interact with one another, while members of real groups did. The task was to generate solutions to two "real life" administrative problems. Real groups generated fewer different solutions, had solutions of lower quality, and had less variety on one of the two problems. But the quality of the real groups' solutions was higher on one of the two problems, and their evaluation of solutions was marginally better. However, *the time consumed by the real groups was almost eight times greater*! This is an inefficiency that many organizations could not afford.

Leavitt (1964) also considers the efficiency of group decision making, suggesting first that groups with centralized leadership are more efficient, at least on some tasks, and second that studies of the relatively lower morale in such groups have indicated that there are ways of compensating for the lower morale without sacrificing the greater efficiency. He further challenges the desirability of equal opportunity to contribute to outcomes. In the context of a computerized business game, he had found the most effective groups to be those which have the *highest differentiation of influence* among the group members. That is, groups with members who regard themselves as about equal in power are less effective.

The questions of efficiency and effectiveness are also raised by another study (Berkowitz, 1953), that reported field observation of 72 conferences in government and industry. The objective was to learn what happens when the functions of institutionalized or designated leaders of such groups are shared by others in the group. A significant finding in these groups was that the more the chairman was the sole major leader, the more satisfied the group was with its conference. Further, the more the chairman controlled *the group process* the greater was the satisfaction of the members with the groups. In contrast, as participation by members increased, satisfaction *decreased*.

One explanation for this finding was that sharing of leadership control violated the expectations of the conference members, and led to competition among the members, and between the members and the conference leaders which was destructive of satisfaction. In this case, participation produced a negative impact, contrary to what would have been predicted on the basis of pure human relations principles. When it led to unwanted competition, which probably decreased the efficiency with which their problems were resolved, free participation by all was detrimental.

Jasinski (1959) also found group members' expectations (regarding foreman behavior) to be important. In this study, both foremen and workers in an auto assembly plant stated expectations for the supervisor's role that were reasonably similar and recognized human relations needs. However, actual foreman practices were quite different; it was found that the workers, in actual practice, really *expected* a different kind of behavior from the foreman than they had said they *desired.* In part, this was recognition of the fact that *the nature of the work environment precluded the lengthy interactions with their foremen that would have been demanded by true human relations leadership.*

The fact that participation methods are severely inefficient is a major barrier to the use of human relations leadership in either competitive industry or the military services, where timely execution of the leader's decisions may, on occasion, be the most important single requirement for success. Further, there may even be a legitimate reason to question the extent to which work group members *want* to participate. McMurry (1958) makes the point that many employees, especially at the lower occupation levels, are actually unwilling to make contributions of a creative nature. At work group levels, there is a limit to the amount of responsibility they desire. Further, even if they did desire more, it would be extremely difficult for the leader to surrender his responsibility (Tannenbaum and Schmidt, 1958). It really is not his to surrender.

There is also reason to doubt that group decisions are as *effective* as those made by good leaders. Most competitive organizations are delicately balanced so that even a small decision *can* cause large ripples. Individuals low in the organization's hierarchy do not have the perspective that those at higher levels have (McMurry, 1958) and most organizations cannot afford the time and expense to allow workers, as well as leaders, to learn which decisions are wrong, through the process of trial and error.

One alternative to "bottom-up" leadership (McMurry, 1958) is "benevolent autocracy," which is a compromise between human relations leadership and the older traditional methods. *First*, in this approach the emphasis must be on a humanistic, democratic philosophy of leadership. Absolute autocracy and bureaucracy are not the only forms of effective organization. According to this view, an ideal leadership mode should be defined for the organization's leaders, that can be used by them as a goal and guide.

Second, actual and potential leaders, as opposed to pure bureaucrats, would need to be identified within the organization.

Third, ambiguity on the job would be eliminated to the maximum extent possible. The objective would be structured decisions that would provide the guidance and support which most people need, and a uniformity of policies and practices that is necessary for efficient operation. This degree of structure is not viewed as inconsistent with the concept of humanistic leadership because it is not *arbitrary;* rather, it is something that a majority of people want and ask for. Furthermore, this approach does not prevent the leader from allowing a subordinate freedom on a low-risk decision, and this freedom may contribute significantly to the maintenance of morale.

Fourth, each subordinate must know where he stands with his superiors. This should not be accomplished on the basis of "evaluations" or merit reviews, but rather on the basis of a position analysis that would indicate clearly to whom he reports and is responsible, and would include a statement from the employee as to his personal goals for the ensuing period, and a comparable statement of goals by the leader.

Fifth, it is important to be attuned to possible causes of subordinates' dissatisfaction—perhaps by opinion polls—so that steps can be taken to remedy legitimate causes of dissatisfaction.

Though one might argue with some elements of "benevolent autocracy," the approach contains much wisdom. The fact that leaders make decisions apparently does not disturb their subordinates. This is shown by a study (Stanton, 1960) of two organizations, one of which was authoritarian in outlook while the other was democratic. In the authoritarian company supervisors felt significantly more strongly that they should clearly define and facilitate group interaction toward goal attainment. However, the two companies *did not differ significantly in* supervisors' attitudes on showing consideration toward *employees.*

It therefore appears that when supervisors do initiate more structure, it does not necessarily cause their subordinates to reject their leadership, providing that the increase in structure does not lead to supervisory practices that at the same time result in a *decrease in consideration* for the work group members. A similar finding was obtained by Friedlander (1966).

Whether or not rejection occurs depends on many factors such as the nature of the task, whether the leader's decisions are good ones, the amount of energy expenditure called for by the leader, and whether the leader's decisions are viewed as *arbitrary,* as opposed to being derived legitimately either from organizational demands or the situation itself. (Evidence on these points will be presented in later chapters.) Indeed, the point could be made that the subordinate of a competent, technically expert leader expects to have him make the decisions. Not only is his perspective different, but also his role permits, and even requires, that he engage in planning and organizing activities for which the work group member really does not have time. If the leader does not make the decisions, especially when they properly depend on his activity in these areas, he is not earning his pay, and is not justifying his position within the group.

Some evidence on the impact of autocratic leadership methods is presented by Hamblin, Miller, and Wiggins (1960) who studied the relationship between morale and leader competence in situations where the leader unilaterally decided on group outcomes, sometimes in opposition to group members. This experiment was based on reasoning that suggested there is a strong sense of justice within a group as to who holds what position. The leader, who holds a position of "high place," should be the one in the group who can function best for the common good; if he does so, the bargain has been kept but, if he does not, a sense of injustice will prevail. This concept has much in common with exchange theory concepts that will be presented in the next chapter.

In this experiment (Hamblin, Miller, and Wiggins), three-man groups were assigned the task of playing an experimental game in which they were to choose one row in a matrix, and the experimenter would then choose a column. They gained or lost depending on which row and column were chosen. A confederate of the experimenter was placed in each of these groups. The confederate knew which decision to make to maximize the group's outcomes, and also was the appointed leader. In some groups he disagreed with the other two members of the group six times out of ten, while leading the group to a maximum outcome eight times out of ten; in other groups he disagreed with members either the same or less, but always led them to the maximum outcome *fewer* times. Thus, the variable of interest was how members felt about him and the group, depending on how often he led the group to success after making a unilateral decision that rejected the choices of the other group members.

The findings indicated a significant relationship (average $r = .38$) between the leader's competence (measured by the number of times he was right) and the morale of group members. This is distinctly different from what would have been expected if *participation* had been the only important factor in the situation. An equally interesting additional finding was that group members did not *like* the leader regardless of whether he was successful.

These results suggest that it is not necessary that participation methods be used if the leader has a high "batting average." As will be shown later, success is a remarkable cure for low morale, and the leader who can produce group success will be well accepted, all other things being equal. However, it probably is also important that the group members be able to perceive the reason for the leader's success, or they may attribute it to luck (as Hamblin, Miller, and Wiggins believe may have occurred in the present study) and reject the leader personally, even while being satisfied with group outcomes.

One further point about this particular experiment is probably worth making. The experiment was purposefully designed so that, in the high leader success condition, the leader would be in the position of rejecting the group's solution in a majority of the trials. The real world probably is not this way; in real problem situations, most people of good judgment who share all the information available—including perspective—probably will come to nearly the same decision. They disagree only when they do not share all available information.

In the Hamblin, Miller, and Wiggins experiment, outcomes truly were determined by luck, insofar as group members could see; that is, there did not appear to be any logical reason why the leader was successful and they were not. But, even in this extreme condition, leader competence and morale were *significantly positively related*. It is only reasonable that they will be even more strongly related in situations in which the basis of the leaders' correct decisions can be perceived by followers, and especially where they *agree* with these decisions to the extent that they can see the basis for them.

These findings suggest that another kind of group mechanism is operating, that may be the reason why participation methods are effective (when they are), and why arbitrary use of power by the leader may often lead to low morale and rejection, especially when it serves selfish purposes. In dealing with real world problems, the leader's judgment can be expected to be wrong in some cases; he can hardly be expected to be perfect. Further, there will be times when he will have incomplete information on which to base an adequate decision; in most cases when this is so, the members of his group will have at least some information that he does not have.

In both types of situation, the group's effectiveness will then suffer if there are leader-imposed barriers to communication, so that group members are not free to communicate with him. This is strongly suggestive that clarity and ease of communication within the organization with regard to organizational goals and ways of achieving them, including standards of performance for individual group members, are probably more important for group health (Humber, 1960) than actual participation in decision making. That is, group members probably do not strongly desire to participate in decision making.

As the University of Michigan work demonstrated, the leader has *his* job and the group members have *theirs,* and the work of the group goes more efficiently if each takes care of his own specialty. However, the group members *do* have a stake in the group, because they suffer from failure and profit from success just as the leader does. They consequently review his contribution to group effectiveness continuously, as they review the contribution of each of the other group members. And they strongly value what is probably perceived as a "right" to attempt to influence him—to "change his mind"—when they think his actions may lead to failure. In so doing, they would be protecting their own interest in the group.

In all probability, this is the mechanism that underlies the effectiveness of participatory methods. The logic strongly suggests, then, that the leader does not need to use participatory methods in all cases. When time pressures are great and when the leader has all the information he needs, it might even be perceived as wasteful, and therefore resented. However, the logic *does* suggest that the leader is well advised *never* to close off communication from his subordinates. In all probability, this is the action that leads to the feeling that leadership is arbitrary, and it probably is the single condition of leadership most likely to alienate followers, produce in them a feeling of powerlessness, and lead them to the conclusion that they really do *not* have a stake in the group. The consequences for motivation are obvious.

Recognition that group members also have a stake in group outcomes and that they need to be able to see the logic of the leader's decisions, even if they do not desire to participate in making them, has been an implicit part of other attempts to modify human relations principles to fit more effectively into the demands of modern organizations.

Miles (1965) has emphasized the desire of group members to be a *resource* to the leader, as opposed to being a target for human relations practices that simply make them feel good. That is, they often feel that they have something of value to contribute. McGregor (1960) makes a similar point, that a feeling of interdependence between superior and subordinate is the key to effective superior-subordinate relationships and group effectiveness.

The concepts of interdependence between superior and subordinate, and of subordinate "review" of leader decisions, appear to run directly counter to traditional concepts of authority and organizational control. However, the contradiction is more apparent than real. There can be no question that some degree of control, and its counterpart, authority, together with at least some minimum degree of productivity, are essential ingredients for organizational effectiveness. Formal organizations exist to accomplish purposes; if they do not do so successfully, they are quite likely to cease to exist in the competitive world which they face. Leaders must be committed to the accomplishment of these organizational purposes. The alternative may well be organizational failures.

This point was made by Barnard (1952) who noted that, regardless of the fact that authority rests on the acceptance or consent of individuals, the failure of many unsuccessful organizations is attributable to the fact that they did not or could not maintain authority over organizational members. However, the conditions for acceptance of orders which Barnard postulated are extremely interesting in relation to the considerations given earlier. In his view, a person accepts an order as authoritative when:

(1) He understands the order.
(2) At the time of receiving the order, he believes that it is not inconsistent with organizational goals.
(3) He believes the order to be compatible, in general, with his own goals,
(4) He feels that he has the ability to comply with the order.

Barnard felt that there are three categories of orders, in terms of their probable acceptance by group members. Some are judged clearly unacceptable and are rejected; others are barely acceptable or unacceptable, and may or may not be rejected; still others are accepted without question. Those in the third category fall into what he called a "zone of indifference," so named because within this zone the group member will do what is required without question. The extent of the zone of indifference was thought to be generally determined by the degree to which rewards provided by the organization exceeded the costs to the individual of staying within the organization and complying with orders.

There are two implications here. First, there is a limit to what an organization can require of its members, in exchange for what it gives them.[20] Leaders sometimes do not fully take into account the fact that the organization rewards them more liberally than it does their subordinates, and make the mistake of expecting the same degree of involvement with organization goals that they have themselves. Such involvement can happen only when the leader supplements the rewards given by the organization with rewards, such as esteem, that only he can give. Second, some orders that would be rejected by subordinates as unacceptable without interdependence between leader and follower may be judged as acceptable *with* an interdependent relationship that convinces the subordinate of his ability to comply successfully.

However, interdependence goes beyond this. McGregor recognized that a central problem in traditional organization theory was the question of *acceptance* of authority. Barnard's formulation merely assumed that an increase in rewards would increase the limits of the zone of indifference. The clear implication was that compliance was a negative value that had to be offset by positive inducements from the organization. In contrast, McGregor believed that it is possible for superiors and subordinates to engage in a joint collaborative process in which they mutually develop the ground rules for work and productivity. The key to this process was the hope that the subordinate could then come to see that the requirements of the job really stem from the organizational context of the job, and *not from arbitrary standards set by the supervisor himself.*

Through the perception that job requirements are a function of the situation itself and that the leader and his subordinates are mutually interdependent in accomplishing goals that neither has established arbitrarily, it was felt that a state of integration could be achieved in which subordinates perceive that they will best satisfy their own needs by working toward the attainment of organizational goals. Such a state would constitute commitment without the antagonism accompanying enforced and supervised compliance with directives which might or might not appear reasonable.

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[20] Kahn (1960) makes a similar point, defining organizational effectiveness as how well it achieves its objectives without placing undue strain on its members.

SUMMARY

This chapter has reviewed four major orientations, each of which has contributed in a highly significant way to the understanding of leadership in formal organizations. If there are major conclusions to be drawn from the large volume of findings thus far presented, they probably would center on the requirement in formal organizations for effective and efficient accomplishment of organizational goals.

While all organizational members must be committed to accomplishment of these goals, the contributions each can and should make depends on what his position in the organization is, and what is expected of him by others. The leaders' behavior is different from that of his followers. He has a responsibility for planning and organizing work and the group cannot perform efficiently if he does not do this well.

There is a need for authority and control within formal organizations to ensure that objectives are achieved. The basis for this requirement is that if the organization fails, everyone within it will have lost; everyone has a very real stake in its success. However, there are certain "human needs" which still can be satisfied within this overall context. While initiating structure does not necessarily lead to a feeling of deprivation, a lack of consideration of the worker's esteem needs will. The appearance of arbitrariness in the leader's actions toward his subordinates will lead to such deprivation, as will enforced compliance to unreasonable rules and orders.

One implication of some of the material in this chapter is that a need exists for perception of *interdependence* between leader and follower within group structures, and between organization and member regarding mutual goal satisfaction. While it was not explored fully, the suggestion is that the elements of this mutual relationship are important for a determination of the degree to which the organization member values his membership, and the extent to which he is committed to the organization. This concept will be explored at greater length in the following chapter, where it will be seen to have major significance as a determining factor in organizational leadership.

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3

A Transactional Approach to Leadership

Leadership in formal organizations was examined from four points of view in the preceding chapter. Each of these had a specific focus which yielded valuable information, but each fell short of providing a comprehensive picture of the leadership process in formal organizations.

The findings from the Ohio State studies in leadership were focused primarily on leader behavior and the leadership role expectations of seniors and subordinates. The model with which the Ohio State researchers began their work was comprehensive and impressive. The best known and most widely used outcomes[1] of this work, however, are mainly reflections of subordinates' expectations, which are different from those of seniors. This, of course, refers to the two factors which should be balanced by the leader, initiating structure and showing consideration.

Unfortunately, there is some doubt that training based on the initiating structure/showing consideration dichotomy will produce better group performance (Korman, 1966). There is good evidence that leaders who "show consideration" to their subordinates are regarded more favorably by these subordinates. There is also evidence that subordinates desire a somewhat lower degree of initiating structure. However, there is equally clear evidence that seniors do not support these expectations, and criteria of actual productivity seem not to be correlated with subordinates' reports of their leaders' consideration and structure behavior. This lack of correlation leads to the conclusion that some leader behaviors, consideration in particular, may produce more favorable endorsements by subordinates, but perhaps without making any difference in attaining organizational objectives.

NOTE: The list of references cited in Chapter 3 begins on page 120.

[1] This statement, for the moment, deliberately ignores Stogdill's (1959, 1969) excellent organizational model.

This is a harsh criticism, and probably only partly correct. It is likely that a supervisor who is low on consideration will have dissatisfied subordinates, and that this will eventually cost him in terms of unauthorized absences, sickness, and turnover, where turnover is possible. All of these are undesirable outcomes. However, the organization also desires production, and it does seem that a comprehensive theory of leadership should deal with variables that influence productivity.

Perhaps an even more serious criticism deals with the scarcity of information on the question of the proper balance required between these two factors in order to attain group goals or even whether a differential balance may be required, depending on the goal. It is also unclear to what extent the leader may be confronted with demands for flexibility—that is, differential behavior—either as a result of situational forces or in response to differences in behaviors of his followers. As will be seen, this kind of flexibility is important, and probably underlies the extent to which leadership is general from one situation to another and, indeed, was *thought* to be important by the organizational psychologists.

In this regard, the Leadership Grid probably oversimplifies the leadership picture because it seems to average leader behavior over time. There is good reason to believe that the effective supervisor alternates behavior as the situation demands, structuring when necessary, and showing consideration when desirable. The real question is what decision rules he uses. This, of course, deals with the basic problem of what it is in the situation that leads to what kind of response on the part of the leader in order to produce effective group behavior.

Research conducted to develop and verify the contingency model also has had an important conceptual basis, but has fallen equally short of the mark in practice. In the contingency model, an effort has been made to integrate variation in important situational variables into a model which deals, in effect, with a leader predisposition. But this model fails to provide for leader behavior flexibility; Fiedler (1970) has stated the belief that leaders are not very flexible with regard to either their basic needs or the attitudes he has measured as LPC.

However, there is evidence that a leader's behavior may become more flexible as a consequence of learning. Also, some leaders are more flexible than others in their ability to respond to a given situation and this flexibility apparently is at least a part of what determines whether a leader in one situation will be judged as such in another. A further problem is that the contingency model does not take into account longitudinal relationships, that is, how the leader may modify the situation to make it more favorable (while other leaders may fail at the same task), or how the situation (and/or group) may act to modify the leader's needs.

Fiedler speculates, perhaps correctly, that training in specific skills required by specific situations may make a leader more effective by making him more competent within the situation, thereby making it more favorable to him. The increase in favorableness of the situation then may make the leader's behavior more effective toward goal attainment. However, this is a complicated approach, and a simpler one would be preferred if available, especially in view of recent criticism that attacks the contingency model in terms of more searching scientific considerations (Graen, Alvares, and Orris, 1970).

The studies accomplished at the Survey Research Center have been frankly empirical. As such, they also have shed valuable light on the nature of the leadership process, and the manner by which the leader attains and maintains influence within his group. These studies were not intended to produce a systematic model for theory of leadership, and therefore cannot be criticized for not having done so.

Perhaps one of the most important outcomes from these studies is the clear requirement for the effective supervisor to differentiate his role from that of the persons he supervises, doing those things which he alone can do well, and refraining from those which they can do as well as or better than he. As an example, it will be recalled that the effective supervisor was thought by his subordinates to be better at planning than the ineffective supervisor. The effective supervisor also considered himself a good planner and gave planning more weight in determining what he should do on the job. These findings suggest that there is an exchange occurring between supervisor and work group members in which each specializes to some extent in his job-related activities. The group members depend on the supervisor (or leader) to do certain kinds of functions which they cannot do well, and endorse him when he does. Further, it is probable that the increased productivity of such groups does not result from the fact that they endorse him more, but rather that the group is simply more effective when he performs his specialized functions—if he does them well—and allows them to perform their functions. This line of thought will be explored in greater depth shortly.

The material on organizational psychology was more theoretical, and there were fewer empirical studies than in the other three areas. However, one crucially important emphasis of organizational psychology has been a recognition of the requirement to satisfy organizational goals and a search for methods by which workers can be induced to commit themselves more fully to the attainment of organizational goals in exchange for organizationally provided rewards. The recognition that organization members at the production level probably do not have the same expectations and goals as those at higher levels is in itself an important emphasis, and makes even more explicit the requirement to view the motivation of organizational members in terms of an exchange relationship in which members and organizations depend on one another for need satisfactions.

If there is an exchange between organizations and members, there also is a transaction between leaders and followers. Leaders act as organization representatives by providing earned benefits to their followers, while at the same time guiding them toward satisfaction of organizational goal attainment needs. There is substantial evidence supporting the view that such transactions do underlie organizational membership, and that both the organization *and* the members have expectations that must be met in order for the exchange to be considered fair. The exact nature of these expectations will be discussed in subsequent chapters. At present, it is sufficient to note that if either side views the exchange as unfair, dissatisfaction will result, and this will lead to efforts either to regain an equitable exchange or to terminate the relationship.

Such a view of leadership raises immediate questions, which have to do with how such exchange relationships get established, how they are regulated, what underlies the judgments of fairness just mentioned, and tactics for "bargaining." Some answers to these questions will be provided in the remainder of this chapter, which will present a transactional theory that seems to have major value for understanding leadership in formal organizations.

IDIOSYNCRASY CREDIT THEORY

One of the persistent themes that characterized the trait approach to leadership was the belief that leaders and followers were basically different in some way. Viewed in perspective, it really makes little difference whether the basic nature of these differences resides in personality characteristics (traits) or in behavior styles. When leadership research moved from a study of personality to a study of leader behavior, it moved only a little in terms of advancing leadership theory. The one major advantage in studying behavior was that behavior could be observed, whereas traits could not be. However, there still was a basic assumption that leaders and followers were different, though this assumption had not been clearly demonstrated to be true.

The importance of this assumption is demonstrated by an examination of how a group would look if it were true. Figure 8 shows two possible ways of looking at group composition. The first assumes a dichotomy between leaders and followers, where members of the group are able to differentiate among themselves as to who the leaders are. Since leaders are considerably less numerous than followers, a pyramid results, with the followers constituting the base of the pyramid.

There is evidence that this is not a correct model (Hollander, 1959). In one study (Hollander and Webb, 1955) a study was made of peer nominations on three topics: friendship, perceived value as follower, and perceived value as leader. This study was specifically designed to test

Group Composition Models



(A) Leader/Follower Dichotomy

(B) Group Member Competence Dimension

Figure 8

whether followership and leadership are actually opposites. Subjects were naval cadets in their last week of training. Each cadet was asked to assume that he was assigned to a special unit with an undisclosed mission. He was then asked to name the three persons, in order, from his unit whom he considered best qualified to lead the unit, and, similarly, the three least qualified. On the followership form, he was asked to assume that he was the leader of the unit, and to select the three men from his section whom he would most like to have in his unit, and the three whom he would least want. Each cadet was asked to name three other cadets from his section whom he considered his best friends.

Analysis of the data from this study yielded the correlations shown in Table 5. Two features of this table are noteworthy. First, there is a very high relationship between leadership and followership, almost the maximum strength such a relationship can have. This means that a cadet who was nominated as a leader was also very likely to be nominated as a follower. Further, the strength of the relationship indicates that, with few exceptions, it is probable that the same cadets were chosen on both questions in approximately the same order. However, the relationship between friendship and either followership or leadership is not nearly as strong.

Table 5

Relationships Between Leadership, Followership, and Friendship[a]

Role	Followership	Friendship
Leadership	.92	.47
Followership		.55

[a] After Hollander and Webb (1955)

These findings show clearly that the more desired followers tend to be at the upper end of the distribution of desired leaders. Leaders and highly preferred followers are the same people. Further, the choice of leader or follower is not determined by friendship choice. This, of course, suggests that the pyramid model is not correct. In contrast, some other model, perhaps like the diamond shown as Part B of Figure 8, is more realistic.

The interpretation of these findings (Hollander, 1959) is that the underlying basis for choice as either leader or follower is individual competence at group tasks. When group members perceive that a given member has competence, he is esteemed by them and, other things being equal, acquires status in the group. These and similar findings have led to the development of an important theoretical approach to understanding how status develops within group structures (Hollander, 1956). (For present purposes, status can be regarded as synonymous with leadership status.)[2]

Figure 9 illustrates how status develops within a group. Motivation to belong to a group, in the first place, is thought to be of two kinds, to satisfy needs external to the group itself (e.g., status satisfaction from fraternity membership) or intrinsic (e.g., association and social approval of other group members, or participation in group's focal activity). To the extent that one or the other of these two is stronger for a person, his

Variables Underlying Development of Idiosyncrasy Credit


Individual's Task Competence
Other Characteristics of Individual
Motivation to Belong to Group:
Obtain Social Approval
Participate in Group's Focal Activity
Relevant Behavior
Group Judgments About Member
Balance of Impressions:
+ −
(Idiosyncrasy Credit)
Status
Group Expectations:
Norms
Roles

Figure 9

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[2] The material on idiosyncratic behavior and status is a liberal interpretation of the original model; some aspects have been omitted for clarity of presentation.

choice of group may be governed by the emphasis of available groups. Some groups may emphasize social interaction to a greater extent, while other groups may emphasize a specific kind of activity. As an example, one might contrast an informal group that regularly engages in a variety of social activities with a group that is focused toward a type of activity where task competence is a variable, such as a bridge club or a work group in a formal organization. The individual's motivation to belong to the group depends largely on the group's attractiveness, which is, in turn, based on the compatibility between its relative goal emphasis and the prospective member's needs.

A member's behavior while in the group is determined partly by his competence at the kind of activity on which the group is concentrating, and partly by his other characteristics, such as personality. The key element of this model is that other group members continually make evaluative judgments about the adequacy of his behavior. These judgments of adequacy are based, to a major extent, on whether his behavior has conformed to their expectations of what it should have been.

Two kinds of expectations exist. One consists of norms, which are expectations held by each group member for all other group members. For example, most groups have a norm (set of general expectations) which limits the amount of negative emotional behavior that will be tolerated between group members; a group member who exceeds this limit is likely to be punished. The second kind of expectation consists of roles, specific either to individuals or to defined positions in the group. For example, the group leader is expected, among other things, to represent his group well to other groups. Group members need to feel proud of their leader, and therefore expect him to behave in a way that will justify their pride. If he does not, he will be less well accepted and respected as a leader.

To the extent that a group member conforms to expectations, and contributes toward the accomplishment of the group's goal, the group's judgments about him will be positive. To the extent this is not true, they will be negative. According to this theory, each group member accumulates a *balance*, which is termed idiosyncrasy credit (Hollander, 1956). This produces a certain status within the group for that member, which is quite similar to a summary evaluation of his judged worth to the group in comparison with other members. Knowledge of the member's status, in turn, influences subsequent judgments the group makes about him and, in addition, may influence the expectations they have of him and the role he should play in the group. For example, a group member who demonstrates a substantial level of skill in a group task will, other things being equal, rise in status within the group. This may modify expectations, in that group members may then expect that he will continue to make noteworthy contributions toward goal attainment, and may be disappointed if he does not—although they would not have been disappointed before the rise in status occurred.

Idiosyncrasy credit, according to this theory, is very much like a bank balance. A group member who has accumulated a substantial positive "balance" is valued by other group members, has high status within the group, and is generally free to vary his behavior from the group's expectations to some degree, without apparent penalty. This is particularly true when his deviations violate relatively noncritical norms rather than, as in the case of the leader, role expectations that are considered by group members to be an important part of his job.

If this model of leadership status is correct, it would be predicted that a newcomer to an established group or a member of a new group would not initially have a "credit balance," but would need to develop one over a period of time. This has been found to be true (Hollander, 1959). This study tested the prediction that, in problem solving groups, a task-competent member who deviates from procedural norms of the group early in the life of the group will have lower influence, while a task-competent member who initially conforms, and then deviates at a later time, will not have diminished influence. This, of course, is a graphic illustration of the meaning of idiosyncrasy credit. An individual who has accumulated a positive "balance" then has freedom to deviate because of that balance.

The group task in this study was to maximize the value of a series of 15 choices. For each one, the decision as to the nature of the choice was to be announced by the group after a three-minute discussion. Unknown to the other subjects, one of the group was a confederate of the experimenter and provided two effects. First, he knew the correct answer and announced it on all but four of the 15 choices. If the group had always followed his suggestions, it would have received a maximum payoff on all but those four choices.

The second effect introduced by the confederate was nonconformity to some of the rules by which the group operated. This nonconformity occurred either througnout the experimental session, in some of the trials but not all of them, or in none of them. It consisted of violating rules, such as majority rule would hold, group members would speak in turn, or winnings would be shared equally. When the confederate was scheduled to nonconform, he would speak out of turn, challenge the choice of another group member, or comment that majority rule was perhaps not working too well. The measure of influence was how many times the group accepted his suggestion as to what the choice should be for the group as a whole.

The findings indicated that early nonconformity had a significant effect on the number of times the confederate's suggestion was accepted, though nonconformity at a later time did not. An accumulated credit balance apparently was effective in protecting the confederate against loss of influence as a consequence of violation of procedural norms. However, just being correct did not lead to the development of influence potential when accompanied from the outset by deviation.

At the end of the problem, all subjects were asked to rate each other on *overall contributions* to the group activity. On this rating, 44 of the 48 subjects rated the confederate first and 45 of the 48 rated him first on an item relating to influence over the group's decision. This strong unanimity of opinion existed despite significant differences in the *acceptance* of his suggestions during the experiment itself. Observations of the behavior of subjects during the experiment supported these findings. In groups in which the confederate's nonconforming behavior appeared late, his behavior was accepted without question. For example, when he suggested, as he sometimes did, that majority rule was faulty, this suggestion was often rubber-stamped. However, when he had failed to conform from the beginning, such suggestions more often led to his being censured by other group members.

These findings provide clear support for the idiosyncrasy credit view of how leadership status develops, and underscore the essentially *transactional* basis for such status. If this theory is correct, a member's position in the group is determined by the extent of the contribution he can make to the group's success in achieving goals. The more capability he can bring to the group, the more effectively the group can accomplish its purposes. Since *all* members then benefit, all share in the results of his efforts. He therefore is of unique value to the group as a whole, and is esteemed by them as a valuable resource. This is the source of his idiosyncrasy credit balance, and his status within the group.

This analysis produces an interesting corollary, which is also important in its relationship to the emphasis of organizational psychologists, and others, on the importance of group goals as a determiner of properties of the group itself. Idiosyncrasy credit theory probably applies much more strongly to task-oriented groups than to socially oriented groups. In groups characterized as primarily "socially minded," a member probably will be more likely to achieve status through being well liked.

However, results in accordance with idiosyncrasy credit theory have not always been obtained. In one such study (Wiggins, Dill, and Schwartz, 1965), groups of undergraduate students were told that they were in competition with another group for a $50 prize. The task was one in which each of its four members was working on five tasks which were to be graded. "Cheating" was punished by subtracting a certain number of points from the group total. The experimental treatment was the report that one of the group's members had cheated, causing the group to lose a certain number of points. In one condition, a large number of points was subtracted, in another a medium number of points, and in a third condition only a few points. The status of the offending group member was manipulated by reporting that his score (contribution to the group's overall success) was either high, intermediate, or low. Thus, high, medium, and low status members caused their respective groups to lose a high, medium, and low number of points.

At the end of the experiment, the members were asked to rank every other person in the group on a scale from 1 to 5 indicating strong "like" to strong "dislike." Key findings from this study are shown in Table 6.

Table 6

Average Like-Dislike Scores[a]

Status of Fictitious Subject	Point Loss to Group		
	High	Medium	Low
High	4.8	2.6	2.0
Medium	3.8	3.7	2.9

[a] High scores indicate less liking. From Wiggins, Dill, and Schwartz (1965).

A high status subject who caused a high point loss for his group was disliked *considerably* more than high status subjects who caused medium or low point losses to their group, and were also disliked more than medium status subjects who had caused an equally high point loss. In contrast, medium status subjects were disliked more than high status subjects when they had caused medium and low point losses. (Low status subjects were omitted from the analysis by the original authors.)

Disregarding the high status subject who caused a high point loss to his group, these results conform to what would have been predicted from idiosyncrasy credit theory. High status subjects, who achieved their status by contributing more to the overall success of the group, were more likely to be excused by their groups for having transgressed than were medium status subjects who had contributed less. However, the very substantial reduction in liking for high status subjects with high point losses to their groups is not in conformity with idiosyncrasy status theory.

Another study (Alvarez, 1968) produced a similar conclusion. In this study, groups of 10 persons were used, one of whom was a confederate of the experimenter. These groups met for one-hour work sessions on each of four consecutive days. The confederate was assigned as an intermediate supervisor in some groups and as a worker in others. The task was to generate creative ideas for the manufacture of greeting cards.

The confederate was instructed to make a certain proportion of his task-relevant behaviors violate specific task instructions and general social standards in the work setting. He was instructed to direct aggression first toward higher officials in the synthetic organization, and then toward both them and his fellow workers. Some groups were told they were successful while others were told they were not doing well. The criterion consisted of ratings made by other group members of one another, at the end of each daily meeting.

Table 7 shows ratings by other group members of the experimenter's confederate on each of the four trials of the experiment. While the experimenter did not perform statistical tests on his data, it appears that two predictions from idiosyncrasy credit theory are not borne out. First, the higher status confederate, who occupied the intermediate supervisory position, theoretically should not have incurred as much loss in esteem as the lower status worker. However, the average loss for the confederates acting as supervisors was about the same as that for the two groups of

Table 7

Effects of Confederate Status and Group Success on Group Reactions to Confederates Non-Conforming

Trials	Group Success			
	Successful Confederate Status		Unsuccessful Confederate Status	
	Supervisor	Worker	Supervisor	Worker
1	210	218	237	212
2	212	180	195	222
3	151	174	206	217
4	163	150	170	177
1-4	47[a]	68[a]	67[a]	35[a]

[a] Number of points difference between fourth trial rating—less favorable in all cases—and first trial rating.

worker confederates. Second, the confederate in the supervisor's role in an unsuccessful group appears to have lost more esteem than that of the confederate in a supervisor's role in successful groups. Idiosyncrasy credit theory does not seem to provide for this finding either.[3]

Taken together, these studies, and others conducted by Hollander, seem to confirm most of the provisions of idiosyncrasy credit theory, but at the same time indicate that the theory may not be quite sufficient as it presently stands. Apparently, a leader's peculiarities, or idiosyncrasies, are tolerated by his followers only as long as they *themselves* do not incur a resulting cost. This is shown by the experiments in which leaders did not suffer a loss of group member esteem when the groups were successful despite the leader's behavior. On the other hand, when group members do incur a cost, they may react in a disapproving or punishing manner, that may appear almost excessive in degree. It is almost as though the leader is being measured against a standard of what leaders in general should do, and then is *punished for failure to meet this standard* in proportion to the status of the position in the group he occupies. In this view, the position of the leader is one that brings high rewards if he is successful, and high costs if he is not, with the criterion in both cases being, to a large extent, whether the group as a whole is successful.

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[3] It can be debated whether this actually is a reasonable test of idiosyncrasy credit theory. In the theory itself, the accumulation of credit occurs as a result of perceptions of members, and resulting judgments. The installation of a subject in a supervisory position is not the same thing. However, as will be seen, the purpose of this section is not to reject idiosyncrasy theory, but rather to suggest a minor modification of it. This study is at least illustrative of the need for that modification.

This set of conclusions clearly supports the idiosyncrasy model when groups are successful, but apparently does not under conditions of group failure. They consequently indicate a need for a more comprehensive approach that will deal adequately with both sets of conditions, or to modification in idiosyncrasy theory that will enable it to deal with group failure conditions more adequately.

SOCIAL EXCHANGE THEORY

Such a comprehensive approach may be provided by social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Hollander and Julian, 1969). In exchange theory, a central question is why a group member subordinates himself to someone of higher status, the leader. If this occurred only in formal organizations with appointed leaders, it might not be necessary to have more than a superficial answer. However, it is commonly observed that informal groups almost inevitably also have status hierarchies with leaders—provided, of course, the members of these groups have shared goals (as will be seen later, this is a necessary condition).

Homans (1958) has been given credit for having first conceptualized communication and interaction within groups as an exchange process, suggesting adoption of the view that interaction between persons constitutes an exchange of goods, both material and non-material.[4] In its simplest form, social behavior requires at least two persons. In Homans' view, assuming the interaction is regarded as desirable by both, the behavior each produces toward the other is rewarding in some way. At its most basic level, such behavior might consist of a compliment, an expression of agreement, or even assistance in performing some task of mutual interest.

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[4] Of course, this was not the first use of the concepts important to exchange theory, such as reciprocation (e.g., of gifts), distributive justice, and so forth. However, it is the first attempt known by this writer to deal with social interaction in the same terms as those used by economists (e.g., the law of supply and demand, marginal utility).

Some social exchange behaviors are produced at a cost, and some are essentially cost-free. For example, a compliment usually "costs" little or nothing, especially if it is an accurate compliment and does not tacitly admit that the giver of the compliment could not have earned an equal one. To compliment someone's choice of a tie, or pair of shoes, is an example. There are other behaviors that may produce a real, and sometimes substantial "cost." For example, the behavior involved in a game may be viewed as social exchange. Assuming the game is of mutual pleasure to the players, each player rewards the others by participating in the game with them. However, for some players a substantial "cost" comes from playing the game—they lose, and losing is a "cost."

One important aspect of social exchange theory is that it proposes to regard social behavior in terms of the relative costs and benefits to participants, under the assumption that each individual seeks to maximize his benefits and to reduce his costs. Thus, in a game situation, some players might find the "cost" too great. This would occur when one player or one team is sufficiently strong that he, or the team, will always win. Since there is a "cost" associated with losing, it would be expected that the player or team which always loses would eventually decide to stop playing. This does, indeed, conform to commonsense observation.

Leadership can be viewed in exactly the same frame of reference. As Hollander and Julian (1969) note, the person in the role of leader fulfills certain expectations that his group members have, in general, for leaders. Examples of these expectations are that the leader represent the group in relation to other groups, facilitate the accomplishment of group goals, coordinate group effort, and so on. These activities usually require an unusual level of competence and a balance of skills of different types, so outstanding leaders are almost always in demand and are highly valued by their groups. Because they can provide unique services for their groups, it becomes worthwhile for the groups to provide them with unique and large rewards in the form of status, esteem, and influence. The more valuable the leaders are to their groups, the larger their rewards may be.

Though this is hardly adequate as a statement of social exchange theory, perhaps it provides a reasonable explanation for why idiosyncrasy credit theory was not quite sufficient, as was indicated by the studies cited in the previous section.

As long as the leader is successful—defined by the fact that under his direction his group is successful—group members may have little reason to protest, regardless of what his non-task relevant behavior is. Even though his behavior may be "unusual" or in violation of certain rules of procedure, if the group situation is oriented toward the accomplishment of a goal, and the leader's direction results in the attainment of the goal, the group members are getting a "fair bargain." That is, they do what the leader says and, as a result, the group succeeds. The exchange is more efficient and/or effective attainment of group goals in exchange for compliance with the leader's directives.

When the group fails to achieve its objectives, quite a different situation prevails. Under conditions of failure, if the leader has conformed well to what was expected of him, and the group's failure can be attributed to chance or uncontrollable circumstances, he apparently is not particularly blamed for the group's failure, and may retain his influence within the group. In contrast, when the leader has behaved at variance with group member expectations or with "the rules of the game," and group members *can reasonably blame the group's failure on his particular failure to conform*, then there apparently is a substantial negative reaction toward him. It probably is in proportion to the benefits they gave him, such as esteem and status, which he did not fairly reciprocate in guiding the group toward success.

The extent of this negative reaction is probably in proportion to either (a) the group's judgment of inequity in the exchange—the value of the status they accorded the leader in comparison with the returns he provided the group, or (b) their estimate of the value of the benefits they would have achieved had the leader not violated norms or role expectations. If it is the latter, then a ready explanation exists for the extreme reaction that can exist against a leader who, through nonconformity, has cost the group members a highly desired benefit or reward.

In all probability, as will be seen later, both processes are operative, the question of which is the more important in a given situation being based on group members' judgments as to the effort expended by the leader for the group. If this judgment is high, reactions toward the unsuccessful leader probably are based more on an evaluation of the degree of inequity in the exchange, and will not tend to be extreme, though replacement of the leader (or non-support) may eventually occur.

Non-conformity, however, is a different matter. It tends to be seen as behavior that serves selfish motives. Group members may therefore judge that a nonconforming leader has put his own interests ahead of those of the group. When this results in group failure, with attendant costs to themselves, reactions against the leader can become extreme. They will not be nearly as extreme, and may not even be negative, when the leader continues to produce success, because in this case the group members continue to receive the rewards of group success—that is, the leader has still kept his part of the "bargain."

This suggests the need for a small (but crucial) change in, or departure from, idiosyncrasy theory. The implication is that the judgments of group members about their leaders—and one another—are made in terms of the criterion of successful accomplishment of group goals, *weighted by their estimate of the value of those goals to themselves*, and perhaps secondarily by the degree of status the leader actually presumed for himself in relation to other members of the group. In conformity to idiosyncrasy theory, these evaluations are presumed to be based at least in part on social learning that has occurred at a prior time, which has led to the development of general expectations not only for what leaders can and should do, but also for *what is fair exchange for that behavior.*

If these implications are correct, it follows that a comprehensive theory of leadership should take into account this early learning, the kinds of expectations that arise from it, and basic social exchange processes that lead to their development.

The Development of Social Exchange

According to current sociological thought,[5] it is possible to understand social structure and events that occur within social structures, such as leadership, by looking first at individual processes that occur between people, and building on them. Social exchange theory attempts to do just that: use individual interaction processes between persons as a basis for understanding more complex social behavior within group structures.

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[5] This discussion is based principally on Blau (1964).

The most fundamental interaction between people, according to this orientation, is interaction that tends to be reciprocated and leads to mutual attraction as a consequence of the mutually satisfying nature of the exchange. This satisfaction can take quite simple forms, and, with many persons, can consist of the mere presence of an agreeable or attractive other person.

The need for association with others is a fundamental need in normal humans, probably in all cultures, though some have the need to a greater degree than others. In all probability it is a learned need, derived from early experiences, such as that of the infant experiencing satisfaction of his own physical needs in association with the presence of other humans. Indeed, there is evidence that the comfort derived from being held by others, such as a parent holding a baby, or other close physical contact, may be necessary for normal development (Harlow, 1958; Harlow and Suomi, 1970). Further, it may be this need that produces the learned need for the presence of others in contrast to the physiological basis for satisfaction of needs such as hunger.

It is probable that the ability to engage in successful social exchange at later ages is developed from the learned need for the presence of others,

Development of Social Exchange Behavior



Age Group	Need	What is Learned
Infant	Physiological →	Desire for presence of others
Young Child	Presence of others →	Personal behavior that attracts others, resulting in their approval
Older Child	Approval by others →	Personal behavior that rewards others

Figure 10

perhaps following a sequence such as that shown in Figure 10. As physical needs are satisfied, always in the presence of others, the mere presence of others becomes rewarding. However, other learning is made possible by the learned need for the presence of others. As a consequence of this need, the infant learns to discriminate times when he is not in the presence of others from those times when he is. When others are absent, and the derived need for their presence becomes strong enough, the infant will engage in behavior of various types (e.g., crying, "cooing", etc.), some of which will eventually be found to attract the attention of adults (or others), and result in their presence. This behavior will then have been learned, through the process of *instrumental learning*.

As further learning occurs, the infant, and later the child, learns to discriminate between behavior that both attracts *and* results in approval, as opposed to attracting and resulting in *disapproval*. Another stage in the child's life is marked by these behaviors that serve the function of both attracting favorable attention and obtaining approval. (Approval is discriminated from disapproval because the parent typically does especially "nice" things for or to the infant/child when the infant/child has done something that is "approved," and often just the reverse for disapproved behaviors.)

It is probably in this way that the child learns to seek approval by others, and this, in turn, becomes one of the individual's basic goals in the social exchange process. It also serves as one of the motivating forces that bring individuals together in social groups, and one of the types of satisfactions that members of groups in formal organizations derive from their group membership. It is one of the "rewards" that make worthwhile those performances that earn the privilege of group membership.

There is more learning that occurs at an early age as the child learns to compete with other children for the presence/approval of another child, and also learns how to *dominate*, or establish primitive power relationships. These also are essential to the development of mature social exchange skills.

As a child first engages in social behavior with other children, he continues the basically selfish (self-oriented) behavior that had become his pattern with adults. However, he finds that other children are engaging in the same types of behaviors toward him. The result is that neither he nor the others approve, though each is seeking approval, and additional learning of a trial-and-error sort is necessary. This consists, in the main, of learning that he *can* do things that will attract other children to him, and win their approval as well. Of course, these things consist of *behaviors that reward others* in some way. Once a child has learned the principle of rewarding others in order to win their approval and, better still, to elicit specific desired behaviors from them, he has mastered the basics of social exchange.

Such behaviors are so elementary and commonplace that they almost escape notice as significant elements of social learning. Examples might consist of allowing another child to play with a favorite toy for a short while, sharing some candy, or even just smiling at the other child. The most difficult part of this learning is for the first few instances to occur and be associated with a stable attraction/approval response from the other child. When this has occurred, the child will have learned to exchange "favors" for needed approval and association with other children.

Of course, there is a limit to the amount of one-way sharing that occurs. A child with a new toy could, as an extreme, allow a friend to play with that highly desirable toy *all the time.* This obviously would conflict with the desire to play with it himself. Thus, while this "favor" produces a benefit to the child, or reward, *it also has a cost.* Eventually, he will reach the point at which he would rather have the toy than the friend, and then he will take the toy back, or at least will try. This illustrates another important point in social exchange theory that was touched on earlier. Some benefits that are provided to others, such as smiling, have little if any "cost" associated with them. But other benefits are costly to the one who provides them, and there is a constant process of assessing the value of the return against the cost.

There is a strong tendency toward maximizing the benefit/cost ratio. For example, the child may find that one friend has few toys and will provide association and approval in exchange for only a few minutes of play with the favored toy, in comparison with another friend who demands many minutes in exchange for his presence and approval. *All other things being equal,* the child will choose to play with the friend who provides presence and approval for a few minutes play with the toy.

Two other key features of social exchange theory can be illustrated by this example. One is the expectation of reciprocation, and the other is the effect of a superior bargaining position. If the child in the example above were to allow his friend to play with the toy, and the friend were to pick up the toy and start to leave, it could be predicted that the exchange relationship would suddenly come to an end. That is, if the child does not get something he wants, he will not continue giving the benefit. He will take his toy back. This teaches the other child that he must provide a return for the benefit that he is providing. In other words, *the benefit must be reciprocated.*

Further, there will come a time when the child will want his toy back anyway, because deprivation of the need to play with his own toy has exceeded the value he is receiving from the other child's presence. Either of two things may then happen. First, the other child may already have learned that *he* gets approval from other children by allowing *them* to play with *his* toys, in which case he may have brought along a toy of his own which he exchanges for the favored toy. This is another form of reciprocation, in which something of equal value is returned as a reciprocal benefit. Where the toys are really of equal value, actual "trades" may occur. (However, another kind of learning can also take place. If the other child has not already learned the concept of reciprocal exchange "in kind," or if he cannot reciprocate "in kind," he may seek to retain the toy by force. If he succeeds, he will have learned that he can obtain benefits through the application of force, which becomes an early demonstration of the utility of power. This will be discussed in more detail later.)

However, the other child may not have a toy of equal value that he can offer, and he may not be able to retain the toy by force. If the toy is actually highly desirable, he may be so fascinated by it that he cannot bring himself to leave *even though he cannot play with it at that time.* The first child may then be able to obtain the benefit he wants, the social presence and approval of the other child, merely through the *promise* that the other child can play with the toy at a later time or, in the most extreme case, just by exhibiting it for the other child to see. Instances of this sort illustrate the benefits of *a superior bargaining position*, in which one person has resources that are substantially more desirable than those of the other person. This constitutes early learning of the utility of *power* derived from another source, *the ability to command uniquely desirable or scarce resources.* However, in contrast to learning about power based on force or coercion, learning about power based on scarce resources is essential for later successful social exchange behavior.

These examples of social exchange behavior have been couched at the level of the infant and the small child for two reasons. First, it is at this level that the simplest forms of social exchange occur. Second, it is at this level that the social learning underlying the development of more mature social exchange behavior occurs. In all probability an understanding of the learning processes itself is important for the leader who must understand not only what he is doing, but also *why he is doing it.*

Several important principles have been illustrated to this point, that are fundamental and worthy of re-emphasis.

(1) Social exchange behavior is derived from the fundamental learned need to experience the presence of others, and to obtain their approval.

(2) The most basic form of social exchange behavior consists of behaviors that reward others in some way, and the most elementary of these are behaviors that indicate approval.

(3) Derived from the exchange process, at an early time, is the expectation that rewards will accrue from benefits provided, that is, that benefits or "favors" will be *reciprocated.*

(4) There is a principle of *marginal return* in which a little of a scarce benefit will offset a *lot* of a benefit that is not scarce, and in which providing more of a *type* of benefit of which a lot already exists is not very rewarding.

(5) There is a strong tendency to get the most one can for the benefits he provides in return, that is, to maximize the benefits/cost ratio.

(6) A superior bargaining position, particularly stemming from the ability to command scarce or uniquely desirable resources, is fundamental to the concept of power and the ability to influence others.

During the learning that occurs later in childhood, resulting in maturing of social exchange skills, it is probable that the emphasis is on establishing the *values* of various benefits that can be provided by various persons, and on seeking to develop greater skill in maximizing returns while minimizing costs. Remembering that the child is undergoing a socialization process (which teaches him the values and beliefs of adult society), it is axiomatic that at that time he is not *yet* completely socialized. His lack of a mature social conscience enables him to attempt techniques for minimizing his costs that are not available to more highly socialized adults—for example, the use of physical force, or direct verbal assault and insult. The child who has the capability of using physical force, or invective, for securing the benefits he desires will have found a low-cost way of obtaining them. This is another source of learning about power, which takes the form of inflicting costs (pain, loss of self-esteem, etc.) on someone else if they do not provide desired benefits.

As the socialization process continues, these behaviors[6] may, and usually do, become tempered by the finding that "approval" obtained by coercion is not lasting, and may indeed backfire, when someone of superior physical ability is able to meet the challenge successfully and enable those previously intimidated to obtain revenge. Maturity, then, brings awareness that such assets can be used to obtain positive approval only when they are used to the benefit of someone other than oneself.

For example, at an intermediate age, the child who is physically capable of successful aggression may find a friend being the subject of aggression by still another child. By *protecting* his friend—or even someone who was not initially his friend—from the aggression of the other child, he earns the gratitude of the child who was "protected." Thus, his physical assets become of high value to his friend, and he is then able to obtain the rewards of social presence and approval in a positive and enduring way, and often without additional major costs to himself. This may also extend to other friends. When he finds that he does not need to give orders coupled with threats, but rather that he need only make *suggestions* to them, which they will accept in exchange for his continued willingness to protect them, he will then have learned an important basis for influence (leadership, power) within a *group context*. This is, simply stated, that *the individual who can and does make a unique contribution to the attainment of some shared objective will acquire unique influence within that group*.

It is, of course, not necessary that this contribution be based on physical assets. The assets that are important are simply those required for the attainment of the shared objective. For the leaderless discussion group responsible for hammering out and writing a group consensus on a specified topic, the required assets may consist of verbal fluency, that is, the ability to talk and write well, and to express the group's thoughts in a desirable manner. For a football team, it might be the ability to call plays in a sequence that keeps the other team off balance. For a small work group in a formal organization, it might be planning ability, together with the effort required to look beyond the immediate task at hand and anticipate the next problem that may occur, or lay out the next job. Whatever it is, the key is that it will be an asset that is needed by the group for successful and efficient accomplishment of goals and objectives. Further, it will be a scarce asset, and the individual who has it must consider that it is worthwhile for him to offer that asset in exchange for the position of status and esteem that will then be available for him within the group. (It is worth noting that if the individual does not desire these rewards, which are the main ones the group can give him, then he may not be a leader because he is not willing to provide his assets for the accomplishment of group goals. Also, he may naively offer the assets to the advantage of the group without requiring status in return. In this case as well, he probably will not be accorded leadership status.)

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[6] For a discussion of such early behaviors, which lead to role development, see Longabaugh (1966).

Two phenomena of group process are explained by the preceding paragraphs. One is how an individual group member gains the willing compliance of others to his influence attempts as a leader, and the other is why the group reacts so negatively to a leader who causes his group to fail either through a lack of effort or through deliberate violation of "the rules of the game."

As a group member contributes in a unique manner to the accomplishment of goals, the other group members, because of their prior social learning, feel constrained to provide benefits in return, *if* they are demanded by the contributor. As was noted, among these benefits are status and esteem. As the contributor's status and esteem grow, he becomes increasingly "visible" to other members of the group, and they increasingly defer to him (if this is seen to be what he wants) because of the belief that if they do not, he will then remove the scarce assets which the group needs. This offers him the opportunity to make influence attempts of an ever more general nature, to include decisions about group goals, ways they should be attained, who should do what, and so on. If these decisions are good ones, he will continue to accumulate status and esteem, and group members are likely to defer even more to him.

Put another way, this person is in the process of emerging as a recognized, or *the* recognized leader of the group. When the members of the group eventually reach the point of believing that his decisions are likely to be right, and the best ones for the group, he will then have cemented his position of influence and leadership within the group, and it is likely that his suggestions, or influence attempts, will then be successful in producing the desired behavior in group members. This is not only because they fear he will otherwise deprive them of scarce resources, but also because they may trust his judgment in task-relevant areas more than they trust their own.

It should be recognized that, in many respects, social exchange theory is similar to idiosyncrasy credit theory. A review of the findings of the study by Wiggins, *et al.* illustrates how influence develops within the group to a point at which the leader can deviate successfully from the rules, but *only so long as the group as a whole continues to be successful.* The probable determining factor is that the group initially trusts the judgment of the influential member who has provided the means for the group to be successful, or lacks the resources to offer immediate resistance to the deviation. (This may be seen as only reasonable, anyway, because this member had previously demonstrated the ability to provide correct answers in a situation in which the basis for these answers was not clearly apparent. They may well have been willing at least to test the hypothesis that he was still just demonstrating the superior "whatever-it-is" that he apparently had.)

The point is that the group probably was not willing *immediately* to superimpose its judgment on the judgment of the leader who had been right so many times before. *When the group continues to be successful,* despite the apparently malappropriate behavior of the leader, *he has then proved his point.* It is possible that his influence might even increase as a result.

But there is a substantial difference when the group is not successful. When the leader leads, he exercises influence. When group members are influenced, they implicitly attribute higher status, greater wisdom, and more competence to him. The attribution of status, wisdom, competence, and so forth, is "payment" given by the group members in return for the resources and assets of the leader which they need in order to attain their own objectives. When the group does not succeed, they will still have paid him his "leader pay" but will not have received the expected return benefit. The reaction to this is not so great if the group believes that the leader actually tried as hard as he could, and that the failure to achieve goals was the result of factors beyond his or their control. On the other hand, when they judge that the leader did not try hard enough, or that he caused the group to fail because he engaged in behavior that satisfied his own personal needs at the sacrifice of the needs of the group members, then the reaction can be predicted to be strongly negative. It amounts to "breaking the faith." For this, the group punishes severely, in part because the leader took his benefits without proper reciprocation, and in part because they cannot trust him not to do it again.

This is shown again by examination of the Wiggins *et al.* study (Table 6). It will be recalled that the status of the offending subject in that experiment was manipulated through his alleged contribution to the group's performance, and that high status and medium status subjects were the focus of interest. It can be seen from the table that a subject of intermediate status loses no more (.1 of a point is an immaterial difference) in esteem for a high point loss to the group, which virtually put the group out of contention, than for a medium point loss. In contrast, the high status subject lost much more for a high point loss. One possible interpretation is that the medium status subject was never held in sufficient esteem that his behavior constituted a violation of their expectations for a return obligation to the group.

Additional important principles have been illustrated by this discussion, which can be added to those previously listed on page 114.

(7) While power over others can be obtained by coercion, it is not stable and does not satisfy the same needs as that obtained by positive means, and this fact tends to be learned during the socialization process.

(8) Stable group leadership consists of an established social exchange process between leader and group members, in which the leader makes unique and valuable contributions to the attainment of group goals, and, in turn, is accorded unique status and esteem by group members. This is an exchange that is viewed by both sides as equitable, that is, a "fair exchange." However, in order for these unique assets to produce leadership status (a position of influence or power within the group), four conditions must be met:

  (a) The group members cannot easily do without the benefit the leader provides.

(b) They cannot obtain it elsewhere, or from someone else.
(c) They cannot *force* the leader to provide the benefit.
(d) They cannot reciprocate equally, "in kind."

(9) Stable group leadership probably cannot exist in the absence of agreed-upon group goals, because, lacking such goals, it is difficult to conceive how a group member could contribute uniquely to the group. Note, however, that *popularity* can be achieved under such conditions, but that popularity and leadership are not the same thing, as was shown earlier (Hollander and Webb).

(10) Group success is a crucial factor in determining whether the leader will retain his influence within the group, because facilitating attainment of group goals is the leader's main reason for existing, and the main benefit he can offer the group in exchange for the status they give him. Under conditions of group failure, leader rejection is highly likely when he is seen either as not having tried to satsify his responsibility to the group, or as having tried to use his position to satisfy his own personal needs at the cost of satisfaction of the group's needs.

It should again be emphasized that this view of leadership as a social exchange process is quite similar to idiosyncrasy credit theory. In fact, it may well be that minor elaboration of idiosyncrasy credit theory, as suggested earlier, might satisfy its apparent failure to account for a few of the experimental findings. The principal value of exchange theory is that it appears somewhat more general. For example, it is possible to discuss such phenomena as motivation and group cohesion (Homans, 1958) in terms of exchange theory, while idiosyncrasy credit theory was not designed to handle such variables. This probably does not do great violence to idiosyncrasy theory, since Hollander, who formulated idiosyncrasy credit theory, has since suggested that the leadership role is legitimated by a social exchange process (Hollander and Julian).

Because of its greater generality, social exchange theory will be the framework within which leadership will be examined in the following chapters. These will deal first with small group processes, including motivation, within formal organizations, and then with specific leader roles that contribute to his acceptance and success within formal organizations.

SUMMARY

During its early years, a basic problem with leadership theory and research was that research studies did not adequately address the leadership process in terms of more basic social psychological and sociological phenomena (Janda. 1960). By looking at only one aspect of a more complex phenomenon, it is not surprising that findings sometimes were in conflict and led to confusing ends.

It is apparent that leadership, whether in formal organizations or social groups, is a transactional or exchange process between leader and led, in which there is "an exchange of rewards" (Hollander and Julian) from which each mutually benefits. The leader attains his position within the group, and legitimizes that position mainly by making unique and valuable contributions to group goal attainment. For these contributions, the leader is, in turn, rewarded by the group through his position and the status and esteem that go with it.

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4

Motivation in Formal Organizations

The preceding chapter established the basis for viewing organizational leadership as a social exchange process in which the leader serves unique and valuable functions for his followers, and they, in turn, reward him with status and esteem. In this process, the effective leader acquires increased capacity to influence the actions and goals of the members of his group. They have become more motivated to accept his influence because his ideas, suggestions, and plans have been demonstrated to have value; that is, when the group accepts the influence of the leader, it receives desired rewards in the form of more effective goal attainment.

When only the small group is considered, social exchange theory and its application to understanding leadership are straightforward. But when the theory is applied to the more complex field of organizational leadership and how to develop motivation within large formal organizations, it becomes necessary to consider in greater depth the elements of exchange, and how exchange operates not only between leader and group, but also between organization and group.

MEMBERSHIP IN FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS

At this point it is necessary to distinguish between social-recreational groups and work groups. While exchange principles apply to both, the elements (or benefits) exchanged are different. These two types of groups differ in two key respects: the source of their goals, and the source of the leader's authority.

Social-recreational groups are characterized by goals that are self-derived, and are of intrinsic interest to group members. Such groups attract members for many reasons, such as the pleasure to be derived from

NOTE: The list of references cited in Chapter 4 begins on page 151.

association with the other group members, interest in the focal activities of the group, and satisfaction of needs originating outside the group (e.g., status needs). Examples of social-recreational groups are fraternities, bridge clubs, and bowling leagues. Leaders in such groups generally do not have major problems in obtaining the involvement of individual group members in the attainment of group goals; the goals are usually of such a nature that their intrinsic value was really what attracted the member initially. As a consequence, the leader does not act like a supervisor, but rather seems to serve such purposes as being the group's representative when dealing with the external environment, and solving problems that may arise as the group pursues its goals and that would otherwise constitute barriers to goal attainment.

In contrast to social-recreational groups, work groups generally are parts of larger organizations, with specific tasks and functions to perform, perhaps with specific time schedules, and with well-defined standards of excellence that must be met. While the activities of social-recreational groups are generally rewarding in themselves (of intrinsic value), the activities of work groups may not be—for example, work on a production line may not be enjoyable. This is not to say that the activities of work groups are *never* intrinsically rewarding—sometimes they are. However, it is not *necessary* that they be intrinsically rewarding in order for the group to continue its existence. The group will exist so long as it continues to perform its part of the total organizational job, and as long as the organization itself exists.

Perhaps the most important implication to be drawn from this distinction is that, while the motivation to belong to a social-recreational group is intrinsic, the motivation to belong to a work group is not; rather, members belong to work groups because of exchange between the work group member and the organization of which the work group is a part. Motivation to belong to work groups can be understood only in terms of this exchange.

Implications may also be drawn from the second distinction, concerning the source of authority of the group's leader. In social-recreational groups the emergent leader derives his authority from the group itself; he is almost always "elected," either formally or through an informal consensus of group members, and this "election" gives him authority to act. The would-be leader in a social-recreational group thus has two problems: the first is to gain prominence in the group, and the second is to maintain it (Hollander, 1964). The first is a call for intense competition for status; the second is a requirement for accountability to group members.

In contrast, the leader of a work group generally does *not* gain his position of influence through the consensus of group members. Rather, he is generally selected by the organization itself, and *appointed* to his position of influence within the group. He therefore is fundamentally responsible to the organization, while the emergent leader is fundamentally responsible to the group of which he is a part. In actual practice, the distinction is not quite as clear-cut as it might appear, for the appointed leader must be responsible to his group to some extent. He must act as the agent of the organization in providing to group members the benefits due them as a consequence of the exchange between the group and the organization. To the extent that he does this and other leadership functions well, he will *justify* his leadership position within the organization, and win the esteem and respect of his group members.

ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE

To the extent that organizational performance depends on the motivation of individuals and groups within the organization, it also depends, at least in part, on the skill with which leaders and supervisors mediate this exchange process between organization and member. In this context, there are three requirements, or types of objectives, for which motivational systems are needed (Katz, 1964). *First*, the organization must attract qualified people into the system, and must be able to retain them. *Second*, it must be able to obtain dependable performance from them, defined as an adequate quantity of output, at an adequate level of quality. *Finally*, it must in at least some cases be able to obtain behavior beyond role specifications, that is, beyond the minimum that will do, that achieves movement toward the attainment of organizational objectives in a manner above and beyond what could be prescribed in a set of rules, regulations, or job standards. Examples of such behavior might be spontaneous actions that are crucial for the successful outcome of an unanticipated problem or situation, or cooperation among the members of the organization in which one member spontaneously helps another to do something that neither could have done alone. The development of constructive ideas is another possible example, at a different level of abstraction.

In actual practice, these three purposes are almost always interrelated to some extent. Organizations attract qualified people on much the same kind of basis that leads them to remain in the system. The decision to remain in the system carries with it an implicit agreement to conform to organizational desires in exchange for benefits to be derived from it. That is, the individual places his time and effort at the disposal of the organization for whatever inducement the organization offers him (Simon, 1952). However, the incentives and leadership practices that lead to a high level of personal commitment and involvement with the purposes of the organization may extend considerably beyond those incentives and practices that were sufficient to attract organization members initially.

This suggests, and correctly, that performance within an organization is to some extent separate from satisfaction with organizational membership. It will be recalled that Stogdill (1969) reached essentially the same conclusion, and listed these two outcomes as separate end products in the organizational model described in the previous chapter. For the present, then, performance and satisfaction will be considered separately, though it will eventually become evident that they are not completely independent. In any event, to the extent possible the present chapter will be limited mainly to the elements of exchange that are desired by the members and that can be, and regularly are, furnished by the organization in return for the member's commitment to the attainment of organizational goals. Chapter 5 will concentrate on small group processes that have an effect on organizational effectiveness, and Chapters 5 and 6 will deal with the problem of maximizing small group and organizational productivity, insofar as these are matters that the leader can influence.

THE MOTIVATION TO WORK

Early scientific management theorists made three basic assumptions about why people work, that describe what is essentially an "economic man":

(1) Man is a rational animal interested in personal economic gain.
(2) Men react as individuals within the work environment.
(3) Men may be treated as "standard units" of production with little error.

However, the research that led to the development of the human relations movement in industry demonstrated that these basic assumptions are not sound, and that "economic man," as such, does not exist. A more nearly correct phrase is "*socioeconomic man*" (Whyte, *et al.*, 1955), descriptive of a person for whom incentives other than money are quite important. Among other things, socioeconomic man desires both the approval of his co-workers, so they will engage in social interaction with him, and the opportunity to obtain social status through his work (Vroom, 1964). The fact that "economic man" does not exist, and that "socioeconomic man" does, means that the range of incentives offered by organizations, both to attract desirable members and to satisfy them, must be broader than pay alone. It must include provision for satisfaction of other needs as well.

INCENTIVES AND JOB GOALS

A substantial amount of work has been done to identify incentives that will be effective in producing a high level of satisfaction among organizational members, together with strong commitment to attainment of organizational goals. Two somewhat different schools of thought exist, traditional theory and motivator/hygiene theory.

Traditional theory holds that individual members of organizations have personal needs that can be satisfied either directly or indirectly through their work involvement. A need supposedly creates a state of tension that continues as long as the need is not satisfied. In theory, then, the organization can offer the means of satisfying the need in exchange for the worker's compliance with organizational requirements. The question of obtaining a satisfactory level of performance therefore simplifies to the problem of learning what the member needs or desires, and then of offering it to him in exchange for his services to the organization. This, of course, was the essence of the position held by Simon (1952).

In contrast to traditional theory, motivator/hygiene theory contends that the aspects of the work environment that provide satisfaction are not necessarily the same as those that cause dissatisfaction. A basic assumption here is that workers have achievement goals, many of which are relatively long-range; their attainment, or the promise of their attainment provides satisfaction. Further, organization members will seek to remain in an environment that offers the opportunity for achieving these goals. Organizational environments can also provide *obstacles* to long-range goal attainment, or irritants of other types; these will lead to dissatisfaction. However, merely removing the sources of dissatisfaction will not provide positive commitment toward achievement of organizational goals or make the member more satisfied with his overall job environment.

Each of these theoretical approaches has something to offer to the understanding of work motivation, and they will be discussed in turn.

Traditional Theory

Traditional theorists have been concerned most intensively with identifying personal needs that can be satisfied, either directly or indirectly, by the organization. In traditional theory, there is little reason to believe that work is other than simply a special area of human behavior (Schaffer, 1953). Whatever makes for satisfaction or dissatisfaction in *any* area of life should yield satisfaction or dissatisfaction in work as well.

Dissatisfaction, or a state of tension, theoretically is aroused when a person cannot meet or satisfy certain of his needs. The amount of tension or dissatisfaction that is aroused will be dependent on the strength of his needs and the extent of the opportunity for satisfying them. Thus, within the traditional framework overall job satisfaction is thought to vary directly with the extent to which an organization can satisfy individual needs. Further, job satisfaction is thought to depend on need satisfaction more closely as needs become stronger.

Substantial work has been done to learn what these needs are. One of the best known classifications of individual needs is the hierarchy of motives theory (Maslow, 1943), which holds that human needs or motives can be arranged into five sequential categories: (a) physiological needs, (b) safety needs, (c) acceptance needs, (d) esteem needs, and (e) self-actualization needs.[1]

These needs form a hierarchy in terms of importance, or prepotence, to the individual. The physiological needs, such as hunger and thirst, are most basic and prepotent, and must be satisfied before man can become

[1] The term, "self-actualization," refers to ". . . the desire for self-fulfillment . . . the tendency . . . to become actualized in what he is potentially. What a man *can* be, he *must* be," (Maslow, 1943, p. 382).

concerned with higher order needs such as esteem and self-actualization. However, while preoccupation with a more basic need, such as security (safety), will not in general permit interest in the higher level needs such as self-actualization, satisfaction of the more basic needs does not necessarily lead to a quest for gratification at the higher levels. Some degree of social learning may be necessary before the higher order, less basic needs can emerge (Maslow, 1948). Because they are not imperative for sheer survival, their gratification can be postponed for a longer period of time; it is even possible for these needs to disappear permanently, or not to be learned at all.

The more abstract needs also demand, at least initially, environmental conditions that permit, and perhaps even encourage, their emergence. A necessary condition is the absence of lower level needs, and perhaps a model from whom to learn. However, once individuals *have* learned to want the satisfaction of higher level needs, and particularly when the more basic needs are satisfied, persistent effort toward continued attainment of higher level satisfactions can be expected, and will constitute the basis on which the individual decides whether he is satisfied with his lot.

Not all these needs can be satisfied by most organizations, for most of their members. Virtually all offer reasonably ample satisfactions in the form of tangible benefits that can be translated into physiological need gratifications. Most organizations also seek to satisfy security needs. However, satisfaction of higher level needs such as self-esteem and self-actualization is more difficult, especially at the lower echelons within large formal organizations (e.g., factories with assembly-line technologies).

As the size of an organization increases, there is a tendency for rules to increase, and for the activities of lower echelon personnel to be regulated more closely.[2] As a result, the *job-related* freedoms of personnel at these echelons decrease in number and degree, to the point that they may feel they are working in an environment that is almost totally controlled, and that they have little or no personal discretion for decisions about what to do, or how to do it. Such a high degree of regulation makes it difficult for the worker to satisfy esteem needs, and even more difficult to satisfy self-actualization needs. This, in turn, may lead to alienation of the worker from the values of the organization, and to noninvolvement with its purposes, a problem that will be dealt with at greater length in Chapter 6 (e.g., pp. 243 *ff.*).

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[2] For example, Hall, Haas, and Johnson (1967) studied a variety of organizations ranging in number of members from 6 to 9,000. Relatively strong relationships were found between size and formalization of the authority structure and the stipulation of penalties for rule violation.

The amount of regulation existing within large formal organizations provides some insight into why "democratic" methods, such as group participation in decision making, that were an initial focus of human relations theorists, produced increases in worker commitment and motivation. One of our cultural beliefs is that status is correlated with decision making discretion. In fact, it has been demonstrated that span of discretion in decision making is a useful criterion for establishing pay scales; it is an implicit criterion of organizational status that is widely agreed upon by a very large range of organization members (Jaques, 1956). The opportunity to participate in decisions concerning organizational goals, and methods for achieving them, therefore should satisfy esteem needs by implying higher organizational status.

Two-Factor Theory

A contrast to traditional theory is provided by the motivator/hygiene theory (Herzberg, Mausner, and Snyderman, 1959), which originated in a study of satisfactions and dissatisfactions of personnel at a middle management level within formal organizations.

One of the major objectives in this research was to identify sources of work motivation. In a manner somewhat like traditional theory, it was assumed that workers want certain kinds of things from their jobs, and are better motivated toward higher productivity if they can obtain these things. However, a departure from traditional theory came from the observation that some kinds of work gratifications seemed to act as *satisfiers*, while others act as *dissatisfiers*. Further, the relationships between attitudes about work gratifications and work output were not particularly substantial.

From the motivator/hygiene point of view, it appeared that there *should* be (a) factors in the work or work environment that would lead to (b) the existence of attitudes toward work that would, in turn, (c) have measurable effects on productivity itself. A criticism of previous studies was that, in general, they did not address these three elements simultaneously. It was thought that this deficiency would be corrected by individual interviews consisting of a three-step process:

(1) Each person interviewed would be asked to identify times when his attitudes toward his job were either significantly higher or significantly lower than his ordinary attitudes.

(2) For each of these times, he would be asked to describe anything specific that might have happened, that contributed to these different feelings toward his job.

(3) He would then be asked if his work was affected by these happenings, and, if so, how.

When the interview contents were analyzed, it was found that certain kinds of job factors were more likely to be associated with unusually positive attitudes toward jobs, and other factors with unusually negative attitudes toward jobs. These factors are shown in Table 8.

Table 8

Factors Related to High and Low Feelings Toward Jobs

Factors Associated With Positive Feelings	Factors Associated With Negative Feelings
(1) Achievement	(1) Interpersonal relationships with with superiors
(2) Recognition	(2) Interpersonal relationships with peers
(3) Work itself	(3) Technical supervision
(4) Responsibility	(4) Company policy and administration
(5) Advancement	(5) Working conditions
	(6) Personal life

The factors associated with positive attitudes are relatively self explanatory. Of particular interest, some of these were more often mentioned as associated with short term attitudes, while others were associated with more persistent or long term attitudes. Achievement and recognition tended to be of the short term variety. Factors relating to the work itself, and the granting of increased responsibility and stature tended to produce more lasting attitudinal effects. Further, *all* the *positive* factors tended to produce more lasting attitudinal effects than those related to negative attitudes.

These findings are highly suggestive that the long-range goals of the individuals in this study were defined by the complex of job factors consisting of achievement, responsibility, work itself, and advancement. Advancement and work itself were significantly more often found to occur in the responses labeled as most important.

As Table 8 shows, the factors leading to negative attitudes toward the job were different. The single most important source of dissatisfaction was company policies and administration. Specifically mentioned were organizational ineffectiveness produced by inefficiency, waste, duplication of effort, or power struggles. Company policies were also criticized when they gave preferential treatment to some employees on some basis other than ability to do the job. Unfair salary practices were also criticized in this category.

While Table 8 does not show overlap between factors associated with positive attitudes and those associated with negative attitudes, this was not actually the case in the more detailed findings from which the table was drawn. The data did seem to justify the conclusion that different factors probably do lead to job satisfaction and others to job dissatisfaction. However, a few of the factors associated with positive attitudes *also* occurred in descriptions of events that caused dissatisfaction. For example, dissatisfaction sometimes resulted from the tendency of supervisors to stereotype a man regarding the kind of work he could do, and then "freeze" him in that kind of work. This fell into the category of "work itself," but was a source of *dissatisfaction*. Further, interviewees sometimes complained about the amount of work they had to do, more often being *dissatisfied* about having too little to do than too much.

These and other observations led to a slight modification of the original theory. In this modified form, it was thought that satisfier factors are more likely to lead to satisfaction by their presence than to dissatisfaction through their absence, but that factors leading to job dissatisfaction are seldom associated with increases in job satisfaction through being absent. The job satisfiers almost always dealt with factors intrinsic to the job itself, while the dissatisfiers related to the context in which the job was accomplished.

Of particular interest are the reported effects of the resulting positive and negative attitudes on performance within the job. In only about half of the descriptions characterized by negative attitudes was it reported that performance *dropped* as a result of a happening that produced a particularly negative feeling toward their jobs; however, nearly three-fourths of the happenings that produced positive attitudes were said to have caused an *increase* in performance. Thus, the factors associated with satisfaction appear to be more strongly related to performance than the factors associated with dissatisfaction.

Comparisons of Two-Factor and Traditional Theory

It is apparent that these findings are not *totally* incompatible with the hierarchy of needs, and traditional theory. In many respects, the dissatisfiers (hygiene factors) resemble the more basic needs in the hierarchy of needs model, while the factors associated with satisfaction (motivator factors) resemble higher order needs. In fact, it was thought by Herzberg, *et al.* that positive job attitudes are the result of factors that satisfy a person's need for self-actualization in his work.

The contrast is that traditional theory and the hierarchy of needs model suppose that needs at all levels ought to be associated with both satisfaction *and* dissatisfaction. Depending on what need exists, frustration of the need should produce dissatisfaction, and gratification of the need should produce satisfaction. Further, if the individual believes that job-relevant behaviors can produce the gratification of an existing need, he then should be motivated toward accomplishing those job-related behaviors.

Implications of the motivator/hygiene theory are somewhat different. According to two-factor theory, increases in productivity and long-range satisfaction demand the existence of satisfier factors within the work, that is, the work *itself* must be intrinsically rewarding, and there must be an opportunity for growth within the job to the extent required by the individual's own growth objectives. To increase the number of "satisfiers" available, it might in some cases be necessary to restructure jobs to increase the worker's ability to achieve goals that are meaningful to him. This might suggest substituting "larger" jobs for the lowest-level assembly line jobs, for example.

Another element would be to emphasize more strongly the requirements for effective planning and work organization by supervisors. While this does not mean that autocratic leadership is good, it definitely suggests that employee-centered leadership is not sufficient.[3] The role of the supervisor must include adequate guidance for his subordinates, discrimination between good and poor work, and appropriate reactions to each. It was thought that this should be accompanied by greater personal freedom for workers, not necessarily to control their own goals within the work environment—which is probably not possible—but rather to allow them to control in some manner the ways in which they can achieve their assigned goals.

A considerable number of studies have tested the differences between traditional theory and two-factor theory. Some support two-factor theory, and some support traditional theory. However, as will be seen, there appears to be doubt that the two-factor theory is correct in its entirety, though it has contributed substantially to an understanding of positive motivation toward achievement through work.

One of the most telling criticisms of two-factor theory is that the sample on which the theory was based was not sufficiently broad, that is, did not include enough levels of the occupational hierarchy. The subjects contributing to the original study were roughly at a middle management level within their respective organizations, so two-factor theory mainly reflects the values and job goals of that narrow segment. There is good evidence that the factors which are satisfying at the worker level within large organizations are not the same as those required for satisfaction at considerably higher levels. Further, there is a tendency for dissatisfier factors to act as satisfiers[4] at lower occupational levels. For example, Malinovsky and Barry (1965) studied blue collar workers in the ground crews at a large southern state university. Forty items, 20 motivator and 20 hygiene, were included in an attitude survey for these workers. Factor analysis techniques were used to analyze the responses. A total of nine factors were identified:

A. Pure hygiene factors
  (1) Salary.

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[3] Substantial evidence for the need for a balance between production-centered and employee-centered orientations has already been presented in Chapter 2.

[4] This statement does not literally mean that a dissatisfier is satisfying, but rather that a factor such as pay or security can be and often is mentioned by someone at lower occupational levels as something that leads him to be satisfied with his job, whereas security and pay are much less often mentioned in this way at higher occupational levels, where, if they are mentioned at all, they are likely to be causes of dissatisfaction.

- (2) Technical supervision.
- (3) Interpersonal relations.

B. Pure motivator factor
  - (4) Advancement.

C. Mixed motivator
  - (5) Individual accomplishment (ability to handle work assignments without supervision).
  - (6) Work role dissatisfaction (items expressing negative reactions to particular employee work roles).

D. Mixed motivator and hygiene
  - (7) Physical work environment (items concerned primarily with the total work environment, of an impersonal nature).
  - (8) Unrecognized work efforts (items expressing lack of recognition for employee work efforts).
  - (9) Work frustration (negative responses to varying aspects of the total work environment).

These factors, in turn, were subjected to another factor analysis which yielded two underlying factors, as the two-factor theory would have predicted. The first was an intrinsic work factor that seemed to resemble the motivator factors in the original two-factor theory. The second was defined as an extrinsic work environment factor, which resembled the hygiene elements. However, these two second-order factors did not correlate differently with overall ratings of job satisfaction, as the two-factor theory predicts they should. Instead, they correlated almost exactly the same.

Whitsett and Winslow (1967) have criticized the use of this kind of finding as an attack on the two-factor theory. In their view, two-factor theory makes no attempt to predict overall job satisfaction. This means that a *test* of the two-factor theory should not be based on prediction of overall job satisfaction. In the present view, the Whitsett and Winslow criticism may be theoretically sound, but appears somewhat irrelevant, in that overall job satisfaction is of interest to leaders, as is the relationship between job satisfaction and productivity. A meaningful theory should deal with meaningful variables.

Thus, the Malinovsky and Barry study can be considered a major challenge to the generality of two-factor theory, suggesting that it might be more applicable at higher occupational levels, where the most basic needs (in the hierarchy of needs) are already satisfied. Individuals at these levels consequently devote more energy to those aspects of the work setting which contribute toward personal development, and derive both incentive and involvement from having done so.

Further evidence that the generality of two-factor theory may be limited was found in a study by Centers and Bugental (1966), that focused on the differentiation between intrinsic and extrinsic factors in job satisfaction at different occupational levels. Using a rationale that resembles the hierarchy of needs model, it was thought that at a lower occupational level a man may derive a great deal of satisfaction from the work content of a particular job, but nonetheless leave it in order to take a different job that offers considerably higher pay, or better financial security. At lower occupational levels, the magnitude of monetary rewards or the value of financial security might easily exceed the worth of intrinsic factors that might be more important at higher occupational levels.

Data were collected from both white collar and blue collar workers at four different occupational levels, on both extrinsic and intrinsic job factors. As was expected, the intrinsic job elements (interesting work, opportunity for self-expression in work, and a feeling of satisfaction from the work) were more highly valued by white collar workers than blue collar workers. In contrast, the extrinsic job factors (pay, security, and good co-workers) were significantly more valued by blue collar workers. Of these six factors, security was the one that varied most in importance between occupational levels, being relatively unimportant at the highest levels and substantially more important at the lowest levels.

An ingenious study by Graen (1968) which was similar to an earlier study by Ewen (1964) offers further difficulties for the two-factor theory. The rationale for this study is shown in Figure 11.

If satisfier and dissatisfier variables are examined separately, traditional theory and two-factor theory make different predictions about the reactions of unsatisfied, neutral, and satisfied persons to satisfiers and dissatisfiers. Since satisfier variables are supposed to contribute to satisfaction only, unsatisfied and neutral workers ought to be much alike in reactions to these factors, while a satisfied group should be higher than either. In contrast, traditional theory would suggest that the neutral group ought to be higher than the unsatisfied group, though not as high as the

Differential Satisfaction Predictions for Two-Factor and Traditional Theories



Figure 11

satisfied group. A similar rationale leads to different predictions for dissatisfiers, as shown in the bottom half of Figure 11.

A questionnaire methodology was used to obtain data on overall job satisfaction and reactions to work itself, and on promotion (two satisfier variables) and pay (a dissatisfier variable). Examination of Table 9 shows that the results conform more to the predictions of traditional theory than of two-factor theory. Analysis of the differences between adjacent groups showed that for work, there was a significant difference between the neutral and satisfied groups, but not between dissatisfied and neutral.

Table 9

Means on Overall Job Satisfaction for the Groups Dissatisfied, Neutral, and Satisfied With Regard to Work Itself, Pay, and Promotion

Group	Work		Pay		Promotion	
	n	*M*	*n*	*M*	*n*	*M*
Dissatisfied	12	6.17	21	7.19	44	7.14
Neutral	18	7.17	29	7.79	33	8.12
Satisfied	137	8.47	117	8.43	90	8.68

NOTE: From Graen (1968).

While this was compatible with two-factor theory, the results obtained with regard to promotion were contrary. On the promotion variable, there was a significant difference between the dissatisfied and neutral groups, but not between neutral and satisfied groups. According to two-factor theory, the responses to these two variables should have been the same. Similarly, there were significant overall differences among the three groups with regard to pay, where two-factor theory had predicted that this would not be the case.

Another way of testing the validity of two-factor theory would be to examine reasons for termination among persons who have become sufficiently dissatisfied to take such a step. Two studies shed interesting light on this question (Estes, 1963; Hulin, 1968). In the first of these, terminal interviews were held with personnel from three different companies. Seven factors were identified in their responses. In general, they seemed to be satisfied with their jobs (the work itself), their fellow workers, their value to the company, their supervisors, and their treatment by the company. However, they were dissatisfied with wages and advancement opportunities. If it can be assumed that the decision to terminate employment is a good measure of dissatisfaction, this study also is damaging to two-factor theory, in that the principal dissatisfactions consisted of one hygiene variable and one motivator variable. Further, satisfaction was expressed with both motivator and hygiene variables.

In the second study, turnover was examined from the point of view of persons retained as well as persons leaving employment. This study was conducted in a large firm with an unusually high turnover rate among female clerical workers. In order to reduce this turnover rate, an effort was instituted in the company which included (a) a revision of wage and salary administration (to reduce inequities across departments); (b) institution of regular salary reviews and formalization of a merit raise procedure; (c) a policy encouraging intra-company transfers to increase promotion changes, and (d) institution of a policy to encourage employees to expand responsibilities within their present jobs.

Turnover rate was computed for each of the two years following the institution of these changes, and a job satisfaction questionnaire was administered, both prior to initiating the changes and at the end of the second year. Turnover rate dropped from an original 30% to 18% at the end of the first year and 12% at the end of the second year, a significant reduction. Satisfaction scores associated with the factors of work, pay, promotions, co-workers, and supervision are shown in Table 10 for both the administration preceding the initiation of changes, and the one following. As can be seen, satisfaction with work did not increase significantly. However, satisfaction with pay and promotions showed major increases in satisfaction; satisfaction with co-workers and supervision also showed significant increases.

Table 10

Satisfaction Scores Before and After Work Reform Changes

Variable	Mean Pre-Change Scores (*n* = 345)	Mean Post-Change Scores (*n* = 298)	*t*[a]
Satisfaction with:			
Work	35.33	36.11	.85
Pay	15.01	32.83	10.27**
Promotions	10.78	24.58	10.38**
Co-workers	41.53	43.49	2.45*
Supervision	40.85	43.23	2.76**

[a] ** indicates statistical significance at the .01 level; *, at the .05 level.

NOTE: Adapted from Hulin (1968).

These results indicate that turnover decisions were not associated with work itself, and probably had been associated mainly with dissatisfaction with pay and promotions, since these were the factors on which the biggest changes occurred. This, of course, is similar to what Estes (1963) found. Again, one of these factors is a hygiene variable, while the other is a motivator variable.

Thus far, it seems that two-factor theory has substantial deficiencies.[5] It appears that a given factor can be a cause of satisfaction for one person and of dissatisfaction for another, depending on several variables, one of which is occupational level. House and Wigdor (1967) include in this list of variables age of respondent, sex, formal education, and respondent's standing in his own group. Further, it appears that a given factor can cause both job satisfaction and dissatisfaction *in the same sample.* Finally, motivator factors appear to be more important for *both* satisfying and dissatisfying job events than hygiene factors.

However, there is also some support for the rationale underlying two-factor theory. It will be remembered that one of the basic assertions in two-factor theory was that satisfier variables are primarily associated with productivity, while dissatisfier variables are not. Lodahl (1964) examined job attitudes among auto and electronics assembly line workers in order to provide an occupational level contrast with subjects in Herzberg's original sample.

Two factors—affective and instrumental—were found to underlie the job attitudes of these workers. The affective (emotion-producing) factor dealt with working conditions, satisfaction with company, satisfaction with supervisor, and so on, and closely resembled the hygiene factor of two-factor theory. The instrumental factor concerned feelings about own performance, responsibility, feedback relating to work performance, and difficulty of job, which were also components of the motivator factor of two-factor theory. Lodahl thought that the affective variables were satisfying to his samples only in a very shallow sense, *being important only when they were absent.* In contrast the instrumental component concerning rewards from the work itself was thought to derive its motivating property from *what the work tells the worker about himself.* When a worker performs well in his work, if the work is beyond some minimum level of difficulty, he gains a favorable impression of himself through his success. The instrumental component is thus a source of increased self esteem and may be quite rewarding.

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[5] Many of these same criticisms, and some to follow, were also reported by House and Wigdor (1967).

A study by Weissenberg and Gruenfeld (1968) resulted in similar findings. In this study, a job satisfaction scale, containing both motivator and hygiene factors, was administered, together with a job involvement rating. Correlations were computed between job involvement and motivator and hygiene variables. Two significant kinds of findings were obtained. First, job involvement correlated significantly with recognition, achievement, and responsibility—three motivator variables—though it did not correlate with work itself and advancement. Of these relationships, the most significant was with responsibility.

In contrast, only one hygiene variable, interpersonal relations with one's own supervisor, was correlated with job involvement. Overall, job involvement was more strongly associated with motivators than with hygiene variables. However, when the total scores on the motivator and hygiene variables were related to job *satisfaction*, it was found that both motivator and hygiene variables correlated quite significantly (.70 and .60, $p<.01$ for both). If job involvement can be taken as a closer measure of what the motivators are supposed to produce than is job satisfaction, then these findings provide clear support for two-factor theory.

A DISTINCTION BETWEEN SATISFACTION AND MOTIVATION

In summary, it appears that neither two-factor nor traditional theory is adequate alone, *each to the exclusion of the other.* While an apparently meaningful distinction can be made between motivator and hygiene variables, their effect is not predictable insofar as satisfaction and dissatisfaction are concerned. But motivator variables, in most cases, are more strongly associated with job involvement than hygiene variables, and are more important at higher occupational levels. In contrast, hygiene variables may be more important at lower occupational levels.

An integration of these two theories has been suggested by Wolf (1970) on the basis of a review somewhat more extensive than the one presented in the preceding section. Wolf concludes that neither traditional nor two-factor theory is either proved or disproved by the fact that both motivator and hygiene factors can be related to both satisfaction and dissatisfaction. In his view, the key to resolving these conflicting points of view is that satisfaction and motivation need to be regarded as separate and different. Satisfaction is an end state in itself, while motivation is the force that produces movement toward an end state.

If it can be assumed that there are basic and higher-order needs, as the hierarchy of needs suggests, it seems reasonable that individuals at lower occupational levels would experience deprivation of the more basic needs (pay, security) more frequently than individuals at the higher occupational levels. Since they have not yet achieved stable satisfaction of these needs, they will be both satisfied and dissatisfied as their gratification of these needs fluctuates. In contrast, persons at higher occupational levels, who have achieved unequivocal satisfaction of the more basic needs, would only be dissatisfied by their disruption, and would be both satisfied and dissatisfied with fluctuation in the degree of gratification of higher-level needs. That is, for each occupational level, satisfaction and dissatisfaction would be focused on the need level at which there is still some degree of question as to whether the level of satisfaction he is receiving is that which he desires.

SOCIAL REFERENCE AND EXCHANGE IN SATISFACTION/MOTIVATION

The importance of distinguishing between motivation and satisfaction comes from the fact that some persons, particularly those at the lower occupational levels, probably cannot achieve satisfaction through motivator variables. Substantial gratification of the higher-level needs simply is not offered in organizational settings at these occupational levels. This leaves only hygiene variables to influence both satisfaction and motivation.

However, there probably are no absolute standards for what is satisfying and dissatisfying, or for what will motivate.[6] As will be noted in Chapter 5, there probably are only *relative* standards, obtained through a process of social comparison, in which an individual bases his judgments about his own outcomes on observations of the outcomes available to others who are significant to him. At the blue collar occupational levels, these judgments apparently hinge mainly on occupational level and pay (Form and Geschwender, 1962).

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[6] To an extent, this discussion goes beyond the conclusions reached by Wolf.

These "reference persons," for males, consist of father, brothers, or persons with whom the individual spent a good deal of time during early childhood and adolescence. Job satisfaction results from the judgment that he is doing better than they are, for (presumably) equal investments; that is, his benefits/costs ratio is better than theirs (this is an inference). Hygiene variables then could lead to satisfaction indirectly; even such variables as supervision, which he shares with all members of his work group, could be "compared" (e.g., "I don't have to put up with what they have to put up with"). Social status, probably a motivator, could then accrue from merely working in any capacity for a company with a prestigeful reputation.

A more detailed discussion of how such reference persons or groups influence the judgments that lead to satisfaction and motivation will be deferred to the next chapter. However, it is necessary at this point to introduce the concepts of equity and distributive justice, two extremely important *norms* that, among others, govern the actions of individuals in exchange relationships. These norms also influence the exchange between individuals and organizations. The norm of equity requires that the exchange between two persons, or between person and organization, not be unequal in value (Adams, 1965). While an overpaid individual apparently can rationalize his overpayment (Lawler *et al.*, 1968; Pritchard, 1969), that is, justify to himself having received more for his efforts than was really warranted, the converse apparently is not true. The norm of distributive justice applies when there is underpayment (Homans, 1961). There is a strong expectation that the "investments" one makes should be followed by returns of value in proportion to the ratio of returns over "investments" of others in similar circumstances. It is likely that judgments of satisfaction with one's job are governed, in large part, by these norms, and are possible only to the extent that comparisons can be made between one's own outcomes (considering one's "investments") and the outcomes of others who serve as a reference.

Motivation, however, is a more difficult concept to define, and to explain within the framework thus far used. As the term was used by

Herzberg *et al.*, it seemed to contain the implication of upward mobility, of effort beyond the minimum that would result in retention of the job. These are classical middle-class, Protestant ethic values which are, indeed, a part of the white-collar concept of motivation. But this concept is hardly appropriate to the blue-collar worker in an assembly-line technology, nor is it completely satisfying to believe that the blue-collar worker is lacking in "motivation."

It is proposed instead that a more fundamental meaning be applied to the term "motivation," and that it be taken to mean *the level of energy the worker feels appropriate to apply toward performing his job functions.* A meaning such as this permits "motivation" to fall easily into the framework of social exchange theory. In these terms, motivation is the level of "investments" the worker is willing to make in relation to the outcomes he believes are available to him. Because of the norm of equity, and the similar norm of reciprocity, each person will consider it fair for the organization to expect more effort from him in exchange for larger benefits, other things being equal. Further, if he wants larger benefits, it is reasonable for him to believe that he should increase his own investments.

The individual's level of motivation then probably also is based on social comparison processes, in which he evaluates his *rate* of returns from his investments, in terms of the *rates* of return he believes are being experienced by reference persons. Because concepts of social status are so pervasive, it is probable that his *level* of motivation is based on whether he desires to obtain a higher level of return than his reference persons, or is satisfied to remain at their level of returns.

A primary difference between satisfaction and motivation, then, is that satisfaction is a value judgment about an existing state of affairs, while motivation is essentially a decision about the level of investments—mainly energy inputs—that the individual is prepared to make in order to either maintain or readjust his future level of returns, in relation to significant reference persons. However, in contrast with individuals at higher occupational levels who have learned to measure their outcomes in more abstract terms reflecting "middle class" values, persons at lower occupational levels probably operate primarily in terms of the value variables shared by their reference persons, and these probably tend strongly toward tangible benefits that constitute more active needs for them. Thus, more abstract or intrinsic returns are motivators for higher occupational levels, and more tangible returns serve the same function at lower occupational levels.

One further point makes this analysis even more reasonable. As Whyte *et al.* (1955) have noted, the meanings attached to specific happenings or outcomes may not be the same from one occupational level to another. In particular the social significance of such things as pay and "clean work"[7] to occupants of the lowest levels may be far greater than at higher occupational levels, in terms of the alternatives available to the individual, the comparisons implied with those in his reference groups, and *the resulting degree of social status he assumes for himself.*

Thus, it is entirely within reason that at lower occupational levels such variables as quality of supervision, pay, and security actually have the *symbolic value* of the incentives that constitute motivator variables at the higher levels. This is a further complication for two-factor theory, and adds validity to Wolf's analysis of the differences between these apparently conflicting positions.

In summary, it does appear that neither traditional theory nor two-factor theory is sufficient in itself. The logic of the preceding discussion suggests that satisfaction, especially at the lower occupational levels, comes from a social comparison process in which the individual judges that he is receiving benefits from his efforts that equal or exceed those being obtained by other persons whom he uses for a reference in making such judgments. Further, there is suggestive evidence that even the meanings attached to the benefits that can be obtained in organizational settings are substantially influenced by these reference persons, particularly the *values* of these benefits.

Following the hierarchy of needs rationale, it does seem that an individual will seek satisfaction only of active needs, ignoring those for which satisfaction is already assured. Further, it appears that higher-level needs will not emerge prior to *both* satisfaction of the more basic ones and social learning that establishes the value, either symbolically or empirically, of the higher-level satisfier.

[7] In as yet unpublished research, Larry L. Lackey and T.O. Jacobs have found "clean work" to be an often-mentioned job goal for workers at the lowest occupational levels. In the context in which such mentions occurred, it was assumed that "clean work" implies higher social status for the job holder.

Thus, satisfaction and/or dissatisfaction can come from any factor that is made relevant by the reference persons of significance to the individual. Which of these is the case will be determined by his judgment of whether his benefits/costs ratio is equal to or better than theirs on these relevant factors.

It appears logical to conclude that motivation, in the sense that Herzberg *et al.* used the term, is a quite different concept, referring to a desire to obtain a higher level of returns than reference persons are obtaining, through making increased investments, such as, higher productivity (greater effort), conformity with the desires of the supervisor, expressing agreement with management values, and so on. A more useful concept of motivation is possible, though, which regards it as the level of "investments" a person is willing to make in exchange for a level of returns he desires to have.

The exact nature of the factors that will produce motivation probably cannot be specified in advance except in a general way, because they almost certainly are the product of a person's prior social learning and thus are almost certainly a function of his existing occupational level. However, one thing is certain: The odds are that the nature of the factors is not the same at all occupational levels.

Motivation—Expectancy and Exchange

The importance of the distinction between motivation and satisfaction, and the basis for their derivation through social comparison processes that depend on social exchange concepts, can hardly be overemphasized. Not only does this provide a basis for reconciling traditional and two-factor theory, it also has major implications for how motivation can be managed by organizational leaders.

If social exchange theory is correct, motivation depends on the level of benefits available in exchange for "investments" made by organizational members. However, it will be recalled that one of the basic orientations in the bargaining process that characterizes social exchange is the desire to *maximize* the ratio of benefits to costs. That is, there is a tendency, all other things being equal, to be willing to accept grossly unfair exchanges *in favor of oneself*, though unfair exchange in favor of another is strongly resented. In effect, the expectation in social exchange is that each party of the exchange will protect his own interests, and should be exploited if he does not (Scodel, 1962).

At the level of the exchange between individual and organization, the strong implication is that the individual will accept a grossly unfair ratio of benefits to costs, when he is favored, but will strongly resent any attempt by the organization to exploit him. Thus, a given benefit, or rate of return, to the individual organizational member probably will be effective as a source of motivation only if the organization is aware of the judged value of the benefit to the member, *can make the granting of the benefit contingent on reciprocal "investments" by the member*, and then accurately and fairly judges whether the benefit was in fact earned in terms of original understandings and agreed-upon expectations.

Recalling the fundamentals of social exchange from the preceding chapter, it seems reasonable that a given benefit cannot serve to produce an obligation on the member for a return investment if the benefit will be obtained anyway, or if the benefit can be obtained through coercion, for example, collective action in which the power of the collectivity is sufficiently great that a given benefit can be obtained by threat of punitive action. (This, as an aside, is another reason why two-factor theory does not operate at the blue-collar level in the same fashion as the white-collar level. Blue-collar levels are much more strongly unionized than white-collar levels within industry.)

Viewed from the subordinate's frame of reference, then, motivation—the level of energy he is willing to expend in the accomplishment of job functions—is a direct function of three conditions:

(1) His expectation that he will obtain a given benefit, or level of return, if he satisfies organizational requirements.
(2) His belief that he can satisfy these requirements, that is, do what is expected, if he tries.
(3) His judgment that the benefit, or level of return, will be worth the effort that will be required to satisfy these requirements.

The availability of alternative sources of these benefits—particularly if less cost would be involved—is also a consideration.

These factors, and corresponding requirements for leader actions, are shown in Figure 12. A first requirement for a high level of motivation is

Expectancy Theory Implications

Motivation = f {
Expectation of receiving benefit if successful
Expectation that success will follow effort
Judgment that benefit is worth the effort

Subordinate's Questions	Requirements for Leader
(1) Will benefit be received if successful?	(a) Be consistent in delivering benefits earned (b) Avoid violating norm of reciprocity
(2) Will success follow effort?	(a) Define expectations clearly (b) Facilitate goal attainment through technical competence (c) Plan to avoid or overcome obstacles
(3) Will benefit be worth the effort?	(a) Know what rewards are judged reasonable for any given effort, in general (b) Know what individual subordinates value in particular

Figure 12

the establishment of mutual trust between the organization and the individual. The leader influences trust through consistency in delivery of rewards or other benefits as they are earned, to the extent he can influence this, and a scrupulous avoidance of violating the norm of reciprocity, that is, failing to "deliver" as promised.

It will be recalled from discussion of exchange theory, in the preceding chapter, that the norm of reciprocity is learned early in life. It is the expectation of reciprocation of benefits between cooperating partners. Because this expectation is so strong, its violation, especially where a less powerful individual perceives that a more powerful individual has acted arbitrarily, leads to strong feelings of resentment, anger, and, often, deliberate attempts to frustrate the other in return. These emotionally motivated behaviors take the form of "getting even," a need that is so strong that the behavior itself may even be self defeating. Further, once a violation of the norm of reciprocity has occurred, and especially if emotional, "getting even" behaviors have occurred, it is very difficult to reestablish trust and mutual exchange (Loomis, 1957; Levinson, 1965; Brown, 1968).

A second important set of implications deals with the subordinate's question of whether success (necessary to obtain the benefit) is possible. A first requirement for the leader is that he convince his subordinates that he clearly and accurately makes known to them the organization's requirements. They know that the organization, represented by their leader's own superiors, is a more ultimate source of work requirements for the group than the leader himself. As long as he transmits these requirements clearly and accurately, his subordinates can have confidence that any effort they expend doing what he tells them will not be wasted.[8] If they come to feel that he is not an accurate source of work requirements, their confidence in him will be lost and their motivation will certainly suffer. This has been found (Lange and Jacobs, 1960) to be one of the most important areas of leader behavior in relation to a subordinate's evaluation of leader ability.

As Figure 13 shows, two other important leader requirements fall into this area. First, the leader must be capable of facilitating goal attainment through his own technical knowledge. Where the subordinate has no doubt that he can accomplish required tasks by himself, the leader's technical competence is of little importance. However, when the subordinate needs help, the leader who can furnish the required technical assistance will gain greatly insofar as future influence potential is concerned. (This may often happen even in highly regulated assembly-line environments, in which the value of the foreman to the work group increases when he is able to handle unanticipated stoppages or emergencies.)

Of equal importance is the leader's ability to anticipate obstacles that might prevent successful accomplishment of assigned tasks, and to plan how to avoid them. In a related sense, his ability to plan future jobs in order that they may be accomplished to desired standards in a most efficient way will also contribute, as was shown in Chapter 2, to his subordinates' evaluation of his value to the group.

Perhaps the most difficult requirements are placed on the leader by the subordinate's question of whether the offered benefit will be worth the effort. He must know what rewards are judged reasonable for any given effort, in general, and are of value to individual subordinates, in particular. This is a difficult requirement because the kinds of rewards valued by leaders two or three levels from the bottom of the hierarchy are not the same as those valued by workers. However, value decisions made by leaders several levels from the bottom often determine the rewards available to the first level foreman as incentives.

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[8] The relevance of wasted effort will become clear in Chapter 7.

The impact of differences in job values and goals, and individual needs can be illustrated by recent attempts to increase work motivation through job enlargement. It will be recalled that in the hierarchy of needs model, self esteem and self actualization needs are the two highest levels. These have a demonstrated relationship to job content factors in the two-factor model, and thus should be motivators. According to traditional logic, it should be possible to motivate workers toward higher levels of productivity by giving them more responsibility on their jobs, and allowing them to develop their jobs into more complex challenges. It is reasoned that more responsibility and challenge will produce more intrinsic satisfaction and more subsequent motivation. In actual practice, this has not always been found to be the case. For example, Alderfer (1967) compared the satisfaction of operators at a standard machine task with operators at an enlarged machine job. Among operators with enlarged jobs, satisfaction with pay and with their ability to use skills and abilities were both significantly higher than operators with standard jobs. However, satisfaction with respect from their superiors was significantly lower.

Hulin and Blood (1968) have reviewed a number of studies dealing with job enlargement and have concluded that the evidence is equivocal that job enlargement produces positive results. In these studies, job enlargement consisted mainly of giving more discretion to the worker. This can be done through allowing the worker to set his own work rate, to inspect his own work, to assume responsibility for quality control in some other way, to repair his own mistakes, to set up and repair his own machine, and/or, where possible, to choose the method by which he accomplishes his job.

Where job enlargement is produced by these methods, small town workers prefer enlarged jobs, but large urban area workers do not. This apparently results because among urban workers there is a tendency toward alienation, that is, workers tend to reject middle class work values, among which are responsibility and "larger jobs."

Social Factors in Work Motivation

The preceding discussion of satisfaction and work motivation has been focused mainly on the exchange of benefits between individual and organization, the equity of that exchange, and social comparison processes involved in making judgments about its equity. However, there is good evidence, such as the extensive discussions by Whyte *et al.* (1955) and Blau and Scott (1962), among others, that the worker does not act as an individual in an exchange relationship with the organization of which he is a part. Rather, he acts as a part of the group of which he is a member, responsive to the norms of that group, and motivated toward the social rewards that come from acceptance by that group.

The importance of the informal group in formal organizations comes from at least two functions it serves. First, as Katz (1965) has speculated, these groups provide an important source of social reward to the individual that the organization itself cannot economically afford to offer. Thus, the total level of benefits accruing to the member from his work efforts may be substantially higher as a result, but without any *apparent* additional costs to the organization. However, there may be real costs that are not apparent (e.g., members of highly cohesive groups may, by acting in concert, be able to reduce the organization's control over them). As will be seen in the next chapter, informal groups serve as an important source of stability and support for the individual, providing, among other things, a group reference for judgments of what is fair and equitable in exchange with the organization.

It therefore is apparent that motivation cannot be considered apart from the influence of the small group. To some extent, for example, it will be found that the rewards from the group for restricting production will outweigh the rewards from the organization for increasing it. However, an understanding of these and other trade-offs will require a more detailed examination of the properties and dynamics of small groups in formal organizations, which will be presented in the following chapter.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has presented a view of motivation and satisfaction in formal organizations that has integrated the most useful aspects of two-factor and traditional theories of motivation, to produce maximum utility for the leader in formal organizations. A distinction has been made between satisfaction, which is a value judgment about a present state of affairs, and motivation, which is a desire to maintain or change the level of benefits an individual is currently receiving in exchange for his investments in the organization. A case has been made for the utility of viewing both satisfaction and motivation in exchange theory terms, where the utility of the exchange is determined largely through comparisons made by the individual of his own level of returns over costs in relation to the level of returns over costs of significant reference persons or groups.

Finally, it has been noted that the individual's motivation within the work situation is based on more than just the rewards received from the formal organization. In addition, he receives important social rewards from the informal groups to which he belongs within the formal organization, and must conform to the desires of these groups in return for their continued acceptance. The operation of these groups, and the influence they have on the motivation of the individual member, will be considered in greater detail in the following chapter.

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5

Small Group Processes: Exchange Between Individual and Group

As was concluded in the preceding chapter, what goes on within small work groups is of great importance to the leader. Such groups provide an invaluable source of satisfactions to the group member that the formal organization probably could not afford to offer (Katz, 1965), and thus probably contribute toward stability in the work group, together with reduction in work tensions (Seashore, 1954). Perhaps of even greater significance to the leader, they also develop internal standards relating to how much group members should produce, and a variety of other matters of concern to the organization—even including what is reasonable and what is unreasonable in their supervisor's behavior toward group members. Even if the leader were not concerned with satisfactions derived from intragroup exchange, he could not avoid being concerned with the norms groups develop that affect group member performance.

An understanding of why small groups have so much influence over the actions and beliefs of their members requires a fundamental examination of the rewards obtained through group membership, and of small group processes that aid the development of group stability, group health, and group effectiveness in the attainment of organizational goals.

MOTIVATION TOWARD GROUP MEMBERSHIP

Perhaps the most basic reason for group membership is that groups provide their members with social support, and give them a feeling of personal worth (Sherif and Sherif, 1964). To understand the importance of these needs—and they are vitally important to almost everyone—it is necessary first to examine the most basic types of interactions among people, and the rewards obtained from these interactions.

NOTE: The list of references cited in Chapter 5 begins on page 203.

Establishing a Favorable Self-Concept

It will be recalled from Chapter 3 that the foundations for mature social exchange behavior are established early in life through interaction among children, and between children and adults. Such interaction has substantial utility when it consists of exchanges that are favorable. Favorable exchanges are an indication of acceptance and approval, providing evidence to each participant that he has personal value to the other. In general, interactions that increase self-esteem are rewarding.

Though many kinds of behaviors are involved in social exchange and their values are varied, there is an implicit tendency for each participant to evaluate his inputs, or "costs," in relation to the benefits he receives in return. This is necessary in order to avoid "losing" exchanges. Thus, because of the tendency to maximize the benefits/cost ratio, it would be predicted that an individual with high popularity would not spend a great deal of time in social exchange with a person of low popularity. Because he is more attractive to others than the less popular person, his time is in greater demand and is therefore *a more valuable commodity*; he would be "losing" to trade it for an equal quantity of a less valuable commodity.

While it is not likely that the participants in an exchange of this sort are fully aware of the logic—or lack of it—underlying their exchange, there seem to be strong tendencies to behave in the fashion suggested by this analysis. However, it is quite apparent that before a person can engage in such activities with any precision, he must have a reasonably good idea of how much he, or his time, is worth in relation to others; that is, he needs a reasonably accurate self-concept which tells him how he stands in relation to others and what he therefore can expect in exchange with them. (Clearly, he must also know how others stand, and this is a point that will be raised later.) It also is important to the individual that his self-concept be as favorable as possible; the more favorable it is, the greater will be his assets in social exchange relationships. However, it is impossible for him to know precisely how he stands in relation to others without interacting with them. There are no objective ways to measure self-value accurately independently of such interaction.

This differentiation between objective and subjective is important. Counting the fingers on one's hand yields an objective answer. If two or more people perform the same counting operation, they will generally arrive at the same answer. The individual himself can do this counting operation just as easily as any number of other persons can, and he can arrive at an objective answer that is just as good as the answer they would have obtained. Therefore, for questions to which there are objective answers, he can make the determination himself, and may prefer to do so. But on subjective matters, such as one's value in relation to others, self-determination is not possible. Thus, the image a person has of himself must be formed on the basis of the reactions of others to him (Borgatta, 1964; Bem, 1967).

However, the fact that a person must evaluate himself through the reactions of others does not relieve him of the need for a favorable self-concept. He therefore will seek to influence the outcome so that the evaluations will be favorable. This suggests that, among other things, he will choose to associate with individuals who will provide him the relatively favorable evaluations he needs, and he will be attracted to groups which provide such rewards as interactive behavior that will build his self-esteem.

This is one of the rewards that may be provided by a work group, and a person will be more attracted to work groups that provide such rewards. An illustration is provided by Jackson (1959), who studied the attractiveness of work group memberships to the staff members of a child welfare agency. A member's evaluation of the attractiveness of group membership and the pleasure of association with other members was positively associated with evaluations by the group of his value to the group. That is, when the group thought a particular staff member was of value, that staff member, in turn, rated his membership in the group as more pleasant.

Further evidence that groups are important sources of information to the individual about himself was found by Manis (1955), who studied the friendships and interrelationships of male students in their living quarters. Two key findings emerged from this study. First, an individual's self-concept was influenced considerably more by the behavior of others toward him than the reverse. It might be thought that if an individual's self-concept is not in agreement with the concept others hold of him, then the individual would exert pressure on them to change their views. In this study, such efforts tended not to be effective; instead, the *primary* effect was that individuals changed their beliefs about themselves to conform to the views of others.

The second finding was that the way in which others can change an individual's self-concept is influenced by whether they are his friends and by the relative favorableness of their initial perceptions of him. When the feelings of other persons were more favorable than the individual's own feelings toward himself, he changed his opinion of himself to conform to that of the other, whether the other was a friend or not. On the other hand, when the other person's perceptions were initially more negative than the individual's own about himself, they tended to be effective in producing a change in self-perception *only when the other person was a friend.*

This finding has substantial significance. It suggests that people are continuously seeking evidence supporting a favorable self-concept, and will accept such evidence from a variety of sources. However, because there is a strong need for a favorable self-concept, information that would tend to make it less favorable may be rebelled against. The Manis study shows that the self-concept probably will be adjusted in the negative direction only if negative feedback is provided by others whom the individual values, and *who value him in return.* (This has implications for the leader in formal organizations. One of his responsibilities is to provide performance evaluations to his subordinates. But it is evident that he cannot successfully provide negative evaluations if they are accompanied by personal rejection of the evaluated individual. It is probably for this reason that the "management by objectives" approach advocated by McGregor [1960] is successful. When the criterion of failure is objectively based, and not subjective, the evaluation itself need not be in the form of a personal attack by the evaluator, which would certainly imply personal rejection.)

The need for favorable self-evaluations has been found in many other studies as well. For example, Sherwood (1965) found that members of discussion groups evaluated themselves in terms of the group's evaluations of them when those evaluations were high, but not when they were low. There was some indication in his data that negative feedback from the group to the member simply alienated the member, that is, caused the member to reject the group. If it can be assumed that the individual's need for a positive self-concept is strong (Pilisuk, 1963), then it is reasonable to believe that the individual would reject the group and its evaluation before he would reject himself, especially when the group was to have no permanence. This, of course, is in agreement with the findings of the

Manis study, which suggested that negative evaluations probably can be accepted only in a context that does imply a degree of permanence, or continuing value, for the individual concerned.

The need for favorable evaluation by others is also demonstrated by a second study by Sherwood (1967), who manipulated the degree of apparent consensus among the other group members to see whether this would have an effect on the member's evaluation of himself. As was expected, it did. When there was strong agreement among the rest of the group, the individual changed his own self-concept to conform to the group's evaluation. However, when there was little agreement, the individual evaluated himself as he desired, that is, favorably.

Further evidence for the need for favorable evaluations is found in a study by Dittes (1959). If attraction to a group is a function of the group's satisfaction of self-esteem needs, then a person with high self-esteem needs should find greater satisfaction from membership in an accepting group than a person with low self-esteem needs, and should react more negatively to rejection. In this study, male college students in 20 different groups composed of five to six persons each were studied. Each received bogus ratings allegedly made by other group members. The self-esteem of each was also measured, as well as his attraction to the group. The results are shown in Figure 13.

Subjects who received a satisfying evaluation from other group members were almost equally attracted to the group, regardless of their initial level of self-esteem. While subjects with low self-esteem were more attracted to the group, their greater attraction was not statistically significant. Under conditions of nonacceptance, subjects with high self-esteem were not much less attracted to the group under conditions of rejection than under conditions of acceptance. In contrast, subjects with low self-esteem were very significantly less attracted to the group. It can be concluded from this study that some persons have a greater need for favorable evaluations than others. These people tend to see negative evaluations as confirmation of their own inadequate self-concepts, and to be strongly threatened by them. They consequently react more negatively to conditions of rejection than individuals with a more stable and more favorable self-concept, who are better able to deny or reject the significance of the negative evaluation.

Attraction to Group as a Function of Self-Esteem and Satisfaction/Frustration



NOTE: From Dittes (1969).

Figure 13

Consensual Validation of Beliefs and Values as a Source of Attraction

Another force producing motivation for group membership is the need for establishing social reality (Festinger, 1950). Beliefs about one's self are not the only ones that cannot be tested directly. Further, these need not be beliefs concerning only intangible events or objects. In some cases, the cost of a direct test may be too great, even when it is theoretically possible. The belief that a door is locked can be tested economically, but the belief that a fallen wire is still connected to a high voltage source of electricity, when the only available method is touching, cannot. Touching the fallen wire is possible, but potentially of a cost that could not be accepted. This example is almost facetious, but nonetheless illustrates the principle that the risk involved in testing some beliefs is greater than an individual can reasonably afford to take. There are still other beliefs that cannot be tested by empirical means. For example, it is quite difficult to ascertain in advance that one political candidate or another is better. Similarly, it is difficult to determine empirically what constitutes a fair day's work for a fair day's pay.

For concepts or beliefs that concern tangible objects in the real world, and for which a test is not costly, the individual can, if he desires, make a direct test and confirm that his belief about it is either correct or incorrect. However, the more abstract or intangible the concept, the less easily can a direct test be made. Nonetheless, there are strong needs to evaluate beliefs about such matters. Byrne *et al.* (1969) have termed the need for confirmation of beliefs and attitudes "effectance motivation," where effectance is defined as the desire to "cope effectively with the environment by means of accurate perception, logical thought processes, consistency, correct interpretation of reality, etc." The stronger effectance motivation is, the more strongly will an individual need to feel that his perceptions are accurate, that his thought processes are logical, that he is being consistent, and that he is interpreting his own observations and perceptions correctly.

But where perceptions deal with nontangible objects or concepts, and where a direct empirical test is therefore not possible, there is only one source of satisfaction of this need. Beliefs and perceptions can be confirmed only through establishing what Festinger (1950) called social reality, that is, by communication with other persons to determine whether they are in agreement with one's perceptions and beliefs. If they do agree, then there is some evidence that one's thoughts are correct. If they disagree, there is evidence that someone is not correct. In this case, if several others disagree with a single person as opposed to one against one, the isolated individual is much more likely to change his own views and accept the better evidence he has found for a different belief. This, of course, was what happened in the Sherwood (1967) experiment described earlier.

If a primary motive for association with other people is verification of one's own beliefs and attitudes, it would seem reasonable that a person would choose to associate with others who are likely to be in agreement with him, that is, whose attitudes and beliefs are more nearly like his own. Numerous studies show that this is true. The degree of attraction between persons seems to be a function of the degree of similarity between them in their beliefs and attitudes about matters that they mutually consider important.

In one study (Clore and Baldridge, 1968), students were surveyed to determine their attitudes on many topics. Later, they were shown booklets that contained 12 of the original items, supposedly representing the responses of someone else. The booklets contained three different levels of agreement with the subject's original responses to the 12 items—25%, 50%, and 75%. The impact of similarity of attitudes was highly significant. The more similar the bogus stranger's attitudes were to the subject's own attitudes, the more attractive the stranger was judged to be.

The importance of the attitude item to the subject also had a significant effect. The original attitude inventory had contained a rating scale on which subjects could indicate their interests in the topics being rated. The faked questionnaire responses which were shown to subjects at a later time included items that originally had been categorized as both interesting and uninteresting. While similarity on even uninteresting items had an effect, tending to produce attraction, agreement on one "interesting" topic was found to have about the same strength for producing attraction as agreement on three "uninteresting" topics.

The relative effectiveness of similarity of attitudes in relation to physical attractiveness was studied by Byrne, *et al.* (1968), who asked subjects to look at photographs and form judgments about the persons pictured. Some of the photographs were of the same sex as the respondent, and some were of the opposite sex. In addition, 12 statements were presented, which supposedly represented the opinions of the person in the picture. As expected, attraction was higher to a picture of an "attractive" person. But the degree of similarity of attitudes supposedly expressed by the fictitious person in the photograph to those of the subject had a much stronger impact than physical attractiveness.

Evidence that there is an effectance need would be provided by finding that communication patterns among people are designed to obtain such attitude verification, and that the effects are satisfying. There is substantial evidence that communication between persons, and particularly within established groups, is strongly influenced by member perceptions of degree of agreement. The greater the discrepancy between any two persons, the greater will be the volume of communication between them, all other things being equal (Festinger and Thibaut, 1951). These communications represent attempts by each person to convince the other toward agreement with his own position. Thus, there are pressures toward uniformity of opinion. These pressures generally become stronger as the group becomes more attractive to individual members (Festinger, 1954).

Why this pressure toward uniformity occurs is not completely clear, beyond the fact that disagreement is unpleasant. However, it probably is a requirement for long-term stability, a topic that will be discussed later in this chapter. The Thibaut and Kelley (1959) definition of norms, also to be discussed later, is suggestive, however. In their view, norms are agreements on rules of conduct that remove potential sources of discord from associations. Similarly, lack of consensus is a potential source of discord in that disagreement on an abstract issue always presents the possibility that the dissenter is correct. It would therefore be a continuing source of tension. The unpleasantness associated with such tension could very well be the motivation among group members for consensus on topics of importance to the group.

That lack of unanimity of opinion *is* unpleasant was demonstrated in a study (Brewer and Brewer, 1968) that involved observation of the interaction in two-person groups as they discussed a controversial topic. For each pair a "reward ratio" was computed; it consisted of the number of positive reinforcements (agreements) received, divided by the total number of reinforcements (agreements and disagreements). This ratio correlated significantly with attraction toward the other person in all conditions in which pairs had initially similar opinions. Further, it correlated significantly with attraction in two of the three conditions in which the two members had *dissimilar* initial opinions. The finding that attraction toward the other person increased as the number of agreements increased, even if they held dissimilar attitudes, is strong evidence for the rewarding properties of agreement and the unpleasant properties of disagreement.

A Need for Balanced Cognitions

In addition to the fact that agreement is rewarding and disagreement is not, there are other forces operating to produce consensus of attitude and opinion within small groups. However, it is not clear whether these forces cause the relationship between similarity of attitudes and personal attraction, or are caused by them. In fact, it is possible that they exist as independent and separate forces that motivate interacting individuals to have similar attitudes.

The need to achieve balanced states among facts, or cognitions, about one's self, other people, and matters of central concern has been described by several scientists (e.g., Heider, 1946 and 1958). Within a body of cognitions there may be balanced states or unbalanced states. While there is a tendency to perpetuate balanced states, tensions accompanying unbalanced states tend to cause their restructuring. The following are examples of balance and unbalance:

BALANCED	UNBALANCED
Bill likes Jim (1) Bill likes Ralph Jim likes Ralph	Bill likes Jim (3) Bill likes Ralph Jim dislikes Ralph
Bill likes Jim (2) Bill dislikes bowling Jim dislikes bowling	Bill likes Jim (4) Bill dislikes bowling Jim likes bowling

As can be seen, all the relationships involve three items or objects. The ones reflecting balance have a low potential for disagreement. In contrast, the ones reflecting imbalance have substantial potential for disagreement. While the extent of potential for disagreement may or may not be the key to understanding why a state of imbalance provokes tensions, the fact remains that it does, and that it seems to have an impact both on friendship choice and on attitudes.

This was illustrated in a study (Kogan and Tagiuri, 1957) of groups of naval enlisted personnel, to learn the relative frequency of occurrence of balanced and unbalanced relationships among the group members. Table 11 shows the relationships examined. Group members were asked to name

Table 11

Balanced and Unbalanced Relationships

Triad	Relationship			A Thinks:
Balanced	(1)	A likes B	A likes C	B likes C
	(2)	A dislikes B	A dislikes C	B dislikes C
Unbalanced	(3)	A likes B	A dislikes C	B *likes* C
	(4)	A dislikes B	A likes C	B *likes* C

three of the group with whom they would most like to spend a 72-hour liberty, and then to identify the three choices they believed each of those persons would make. This made it possible not only to learn the extent to which these relationships actually existed within the group, but also to learn what relationships were *thought* to exist by group members. The *actual* number of balanced triads was found to be greater than chance in all groups, and significantly greater in three of the five. The number of *perceived* balanced triads was greater than chance in all five groups, and to a highly significant degree. The number of unbalanced triads was so small that it was felt significance tests were not proper except for the largest group, which was found to have fewer unbalanced triads than chance, both perceived and actual.

While this study shows that a state of imbalance occurs infrequently in natural groups, it does not prove that such a state is unstable. The much higher frequency of occurrence of balanced triads could have happened simply because of the mutual attraction existing among more compatible persons. That tensions do appear to be associated with states of imbalance was shown in a study by Festinger and Hutte (1954). This experiment used six-man discussion groups, the members of which were asked, after a 20-minute discussion, to indicate which two people in the group they liked best. Fictitious feedback was then given to each group member as to how the two persons he liked felt about one another. In half the cases it was reported that they liked one another, and in half that they did not. Thus, balance was created in half the cases, like balanced triad I in Table 11, and imbalance in the remaining cases, of the following type: A likes B; A likes C; B dislikes C. At the end of the experiment, each group member again was asked to rate the others in the group as to how well he liked them.

For present purposes the finding of principal interest was that significantly more group members in unbalanced arrangements changed one of their two "best liked" choices. Apparently, the perception of imbalance was sufficient to lead to a decrease in liking for one of the two previously "best liked" members, and the substitution of a group member who appeared to make the triad more balanced. This demonstrates that the number of balanced triads found in natural groups probably is due, at least in part, to the tensions associated with a state of imbalance, as well as to the greater attractiveness of balanced triads.

The fact that people react more positively to states of balance was also demonstrated by Aronson and Cope (1968) who tested balance theory within an experimental setting that was so cleverly arranged that the participants could hardly have known the rationale for the experiment. The experimental subjects were treated either harshly or pleasantly by an experimenter, and were then allowed to overhear the experimenter being treated either harshly or pleasantly by the experimenter's supervisor. Subjects were then given an indirect opportunity to express their feelings about the supervisor.

The experimental task consisted of writing a story about each of three pictures, a task which was explained as a study of creativity. In the "harsh condition" the experimenter brutally told the subject that the stories were unimaginative and uncreative, while in the "pleasant condition" the subject was told the same thing, but gently. After this feedback, the experimenter's supervisor either praised him highly for a fictitious report or criticized him sharply for sloppy, worthless work. These "treatments" were heard by subjects through an air vent at the bottom of the door. At the end of the experiment, the departmental secretary, as she gave each subject credit for his participation in the experiment, told him that the supervisor needed volunteer workers to help make from two to 50 calls for a research project. The number of calls the subject volunteered to make was taken as an indirect measure of his feelings about the supervisor. Table 12 shows the number of calls each subject volunteered to make. Clearly, subjects were more willing to make phone calls when their experiences were "balanced," that is, for a supervisor who was either pleasant to an experimenter who had been pleasant, or harsh toward an experimenter who had been harsh.

Table 12

Number of Calls Volunteered in Test of Balance Theory

Experimenter	Supervisor	
	Harsh	Pleasant
Harsh	12.1	6.2
Pleasant	6.3	13.5

SELF-ESTEEM AND BALANCE IN FRIENDSHIP SELECTION

One of the most important aspects of balance is the strong tendency for unbalanced relationships to be brought into balance. This tendency becomes stronger as the *object* of the attitudes becomes more important to the individual involved. As was noted earlier, one of the most important areas of concern for most people, and therefore an area in which some of the strongest forces toward balance operate, is the need for development of a favorable self-concept, and for continuing reassurance that the favorable self-concept is in fact accurate. The self-concept may be defined as the organized collection of attitudes, opinions, and beliefs an individual holds about himself (Manis, 1955). It includes such matters as how competent the individual thinks he is, and in what areas, together with his beliefs about his personal attractiveness to others. Because it is quite important that this self-concept be positive, an individual's positive attitude toward himself is probably less likely to change than any other attitude. The following are four examples of balance and unbalance in relation to the self-concept.

BALANCED	UNBALANCED
A likes A	A likes A
(1) B likes A	(3) B dislikes A
A likes B	A likes B
A likes A	A likes A
(2) B dislikes A	(4) B likes A
A dislikes B	A dislikes B

The two balanced examples show that when a person has a positive self-concept, that is, thinks well of himself, he likes someone who likes him, and dislikes someone who dislikes him. (This will not always be true, of course, because there may be other factors operating; however, when other things are equal, there will be a strong tendency for these states of balance to exist.) In contrast, the two unbalanced states create tension and are unlikely to exist very long. If one is disliked by another person, it is difficult to continue liking him. Further, if one is *liked* by another person, it is difficult to continue disliking him. Most unbalanced states thus tend toward one of the two balanced states, other things being approximately equal.

One of the most important purposes of small groups is to provide evidence to the individual, in the form of people who like him, that his favorable self-concept is warranted. However, a whole group is not required for this purpose. In contrast to the added certainty provided by a large volume of agreement with non-personal attitudes and beliefs (consensual validation), positive feedback from a *small* number of other persons, in the absence of any negative feedback, is probably sufficient to reinforce a favorable self-concept to the extent needed. Under some circumstances, sufficient positive feedback will be available from only a single other person, and may even be preferred under adverse conditions. There is some evidence (Janowitz, 1959) that conditions which are more threatening to the self-concept may lead an individual to seek a higher level of support from either one other person or a small number of others, as opposed to less intense support from a large number.

It is quite likely that the balance forces thus far described are one source of friendship groups within larger work groups. One important function of these groups is the maintenance of "mental health" in their members through support in the form of reinforcement of the self-concept, and the implied willingness to aid one another if aid is needed. (This statement results from the fact that the following is an unbalanced set of cognitions: A likes B; B likes A; B refused to help A).

One constant source of tension in dealing with the real world is the possibility that one may encounter a problem or emergency that is a greater challenge than one can cope with, given one's personal resources. To the extent that small friendship groups exist, with shared expectations for mutual aid, feelings of confidence that such problems or emergencies can be mastered are increased, and anxieties about their possible development are reduced. This suggests that (a) work groups will be more effective when they contain such friendship groups, whether large or small; (b) the leader should not discourage their formation even though, as will be seen, they may decrease his authority to some extent, and (c) he should be concerned about the presence of isolates within the group, especially if the task of the group is threatening, either physically or psychologically.

Exchange Between Individual and Group—Conformity Pressures

From the preceding analysis, it can be seen that the group member is in a continuing exchange between himself and the group of which he is a part. First, he receives certain benefits from membership. One of these is consensual validation, that is, confirmation of his opinions and beliefs about the world around him. Another is a feeling of personal worth, which results from the approval of others, or their esteem for him. There is also evidence that the mere presence of others who share a mutual risk or threat is also rewarding (Schachter, 1959).

Since an individual's rewards from group membership consist in large part of consensual validation and feelings of personal worth, it would seem reasonable that the individual would seek group memberships that would provide such rewards. This has been found to be so. Experience with a new group leads a prospective member to decide quickly how similar his beliefs, attitudes, and values are to those of the other members of the group. Attraction to the group is stronger when there is a perception of greater similarity (Hartley, 1958). This indicates that an individual is likely to respond more favorably toward prospective group membership as he perceives the likelihood of rewards from the group, in the form of consensual validation and development of self-esteem, to be higher. This had also been found by Dittes (1959).

However, exchange implies mutuality. That is, if a real exchange is occurring, the individual cannot take without giving. Individuals make demands on groups and groups make return demands on the individual. One of the most important demands made by groups is that members conform to majority attitudes, opinions, and beliefs. Conformity is one of the member's costs for group membership, though within limits this may be a small cost in relation to the benefits gained. He gets certain benefits from belonging to the group, and the group demands certain returns, which may even require change in certain of his own attitudes or beliefs to conform to group majority opinion. The decision to remain a part of the group must be made by the member in terms of whether membership provides him a satisfactory benefit/cost ratio. However, if he does not conform at least to a minimal extent, the decision will be made for him by the group.

As might be expected on the basis of the preceding statement, a factor that produces greater conformity, provided the individual has decided group membership is worth the cost, is a feeling of insecurity regarding group approval. Conformity to group expectations is a tactic for gaining acceptance by other members. This is illustrated in a study by Blau (1960), who found that the less accepted members of social work organizations were also less likely to deviate from the attitudes of their work groups. It was thought that the less accepted workers desired the rewards of group acceptance, and that this created a keener sensitivity to group expectations, and a stronger desire not to do anything that would offend the others in the group.

It therefore appears that the individual's willingness to conform to group pressures is related to his dependence on the group, which in turn is determined by the availability of alternatives. As was noted earlier, a person who can subject his beliefs or attitudes to an independent verification actually needs the group less. This permits him to obtain a better benefit/cost ratio in exchange with the group, because he then is less strongly committed to the group and therefore can be less responsive to group pressures. Indeed, to the extent the individual has resources that permit him to be independent of the group, the group may in fact be less willing to place pressures on him for conformity, especially if he has high value to the group. Independence from the group can come from several sources, one of which is high status in other groups (Emerson, 1962). Another is the existence of inner standards for one's own behavior, and a high degree of confidence in the correctness of one's own attitudes and beliefs, which reduce the need for the group as a source of social reality and consensual validation (Back and Davis, 1965). A similar finding was obtained by Moeller and Applezweig (1957). It would be expected that greater certainty about inner standards would be accompanied, in many cases, by greater confidence in one's ability, and perhaps by better actual ability. This was also found by Back and Davis, together with the finding that this was accompanied by higher esteem from the group. It might be speculated that a higher level of known ability and a higher regard by the group might lead to greater certainty and stronger inner standards.

The fact that a higher degree of inner certainty results in greater independence from the group suggests that a lower degree of certainty would produce greater dependence. This might result from a task or situation with less structure or greater ambiguity. Several studies have demonstrated that the influence of conformity to group consensus is, in fact, greater with poorly structured ambiguous matters than with well-structured, unequivocal matters. For example, Crutchfield (1955) found that when no correct choice was apparent to the group member (in this instance, a problem with no correct answer), the belief that other group members had agreed on a choice led to conformity with that choice 79% of the time. But, when there was a relatively unambiguous topic with an unequivocal answer, the influence of conformity to the group consensus (on an incorrect answer) occurred only 30% of the time.

A similar finding was obtained by Allen and Levine (1968), who tested some of Asch's (1955) earlier findings in an experiment using three types of stimulus items: visual, information, and opinion. Except for the subject himself, the "group" consisted of phantoms, i.e., were represented by lights which the experimenter manipulated to show either consensus, or a lack of consensus on the item in question, prior to the subject's response which occurred in the last position each time.

The findings demonstrated that apparent "group" consensus influenced subjects to conform to an incorrect norm much more strongly on opinion items than on visual or information items. That is, the more *objectively verifiable* the matter was, the less effect the group had on the individual member's responses.

When the individual can do without the group, as through the use of objective data, there is evidence that he will. Conformity does not serve a useful purpose in itself (except as a means of obtaining acceptance by the group, as was previously noted). Deutsch and Solomon (1959) conducted an experiment in which subjects thought their performance had been either very good or very poor, and the group in which they had participated had either won or lost. They were then shown their own performance scores, and evaluations of themselves supposedly provided by the other group members. Table 13 shows the subject's self-evaluations following receipt of the evaluations of others and the performance feedback data.

It is clear from the Table that the evaluations of other subjects had virtually no impact on the subject's evaluation of himself. When the performance feedback indicated that he had done well, it made little difference that the other subjects thought he had not. In contrast, when the performance feedback information indicated that he had done poorly, it made little difference that they thought he had done well. In fact, there

Table 13

Self-Evaluation After Evaluations by Others and Performance Feedback

Subject's Performance Feedback	Evaluation by Other Subjects[a]	
	Positive	Negative
Good	2.1	2.7
Poor	6.3	5.4

[a] A low score is more favorable.

was a significant tendency for subjects receiving negative feedback from others to evaluate themselves more *positively* when they had actually done poorly on the task.

That conformity to group opinions and expectations results in acceptance by the group is further supported by an experiment by Katz, Libby, and Strodtbeck (1964). Subjects were employees of a department store, divided into groups of four persons each. There were two confederates of the experimenter in each of the groups. One of them deviated from the apparent group consensus during the first discussion session, and then switched to conformity in the next. The other confederate deviated from the group consensus during both discussion periods.

At the end of the first discussion, there was an "election" in which each group member was asked to nominate other group members for a variety of positions within the store, ranging from division manager to stock girl. Subjects were assigned during the second discussion period to the specific roles to which they had been elected. During this second period, one confederate switched to conformity, while the other continued to non-conform. It was found that the two confederates, who had not conformed, were significantly lower in status at the end of the first discussion period than all of the other subjects combined. This confirmed a finding of long standing that non-conformity is negatively related to status. (It will be recalled that this is a central thesis of idiosyncrasy credit theory.) Following the second discussion, the confederate who switched to conformity gained in status, while the confederate who continued deviating dropped further.

Conformity as a requirement for group stability will be further discussed in a later section. For present purposes, it is evident that individuals who conform to group expectations, other things being equal, are better accepted and have higher status within the group. Failure to conform leads to rejection by the group or, at the minimum, decreased status.

CONCLUSIONS

Several important conclusions can be drawn from the studies thus far cited.

(1) Individuals have a strong need for certainty (social reality) about their beliefs, opinions, and attitudes concerning the world around them. They need to believe that they are accurate in their perceptions of the real world, and to believe that they can cope with it. Further, they have a strong need for a favorable self-concept, which both gives them increased confidence and establishes their value in relation to the relative value of other individuals.

(2) Where there is an objective means for establishing social reality, including the self-concept, such objective means will be preferred, and the opinions of others will tend to be rejected when they are in disagreement with objective data.

(3) Where an objective means is not available, the attitudes and opinions of others provide the only basis on which an individual can evaluate his own opinions and attitudes, and they consequently are valued for this purpose. (Festinger [1954] makes this point also, commenting further that subjective opinions and beliefs are unstable when no such comparison is possible.)

(4) Favorable self-concepts and enhanced feelings of competence and confidence generally result from agreements obtained from others on topics that are of interest and importance. Individuals consequently are attracted to groups where these rewards are available, and tend to reject groups where they are not.

(5) There is a strong tendency to reject negative evaluations from others, even when accompanied by objective evidence of performance inadequacy. Negative evaluations will be more likely to cause the individual to reject either them or the group itself, and the individual will remain

in the group only if other attractions inherent in group membership outweigh the negative value of these criticisms. Where this is the case, the individual will tend to change his beliefs and/or attitudes to conform to group member opinions.

(6) Finally, there is evidence that satisfactory support from small groups (friendship groups) is necessary for optimum individual stability. Some persons need this support more than others. The more dependent a member is on the group, the less effectively can he bargain with it. Since conformity is a tactic that increases acceptance by the group, conformity will be higher among the more dependent and insecure members.

REQUIREMENTS FOR GROUP STABILITY

Just as the individual requires a degree of stability and certainty, so do groups. For the individual, uncertainty about how the real world is constituted, how others will react to him, whether he will be able to respond effectively, and so forth, are all sources of concern. To the extent this uncertainty cannot be resolved, he is compelled to endure a state of tension that certainly is unpleasant. Many of the same considerations apply to individual interactions within groups.

For the individual, uncertainty and ambiguity are resolved through the accumulation of information that verifies his perceptions about reality, and aids him to develop accurate predictions about future happenings, particularly the responses he most likely can expect from other persons in the future. In fact, uncertainty in a group environment increases attention which group members give to cues from other group members, particularly acceptance and rejection cues. In a secure environment, group members are less sensitive than in a relatively less secure environment, especially to rejection cues (Festinger and Hutte, 1954).

For much the same reason, there are powerful forces that lead groups to develop internal structure. The development of stable expectations concerning probable member behavior is a requirement both for effective group action, and for an acceptable level of tension within the group. If such stability is not present, the group is not likely to be able to function effectively. Further, the group member may find himself alienated from the group if he makes too many mistakes in predicting the actions of others either with regard to the group task, or toward himself (Goslin, 1962). The requirement for predictability is also shown in a study by Johnson (1954), who explored the relationship between employee morale and the ability of the employee to predict the responses of his supervisor. There was a very significant difference in morale between employees who could most and least accurately predict the responses of their supervisors. Further, when high-morale and low-morale employees were separated into groups, there were significant differences between these groups in the ability to predict supervisor responses. This is clear evidence that the ability to anticipate the actions of others leads to lower tensions and higher satisfaction with the group.

Berkowitz (1953) found similar evidence in a study of bomber crews. For this study, a 48-item questionnaire was developed, each item of which described a kind of behavior. Crew members were asked to indicate who in the crew was characterized by the statement. The responses to this questionnaire were factor analyzed, with four clusters of items emerging. These items were thought to reflect four general areas of activity:

(1) Maintenance of standards of performance.
(2) Behaving in a nurturant manner.
(3) Behaving upon an awareness of situational needs.
(4) Maintenance of crew coordination and teamwork.

While correlations of crew proficiency with these four areas were not particularly large, crew feelings of "confidence in Air Force management" and "personal liking" for other crew members were higher when the aircraft commander engaged in more of the behaviors described by these areas. This is significant because it is reasonable that crew members would expect their aircraft commanders to "lead," and there should be a greater degree of predictability in the crew when he in fact does lead. These findings therefore can be interpreted as additional evidence that clarity of structure and accuracy of expectations within a group contribute positively to morale and satisfaction. (It will be recalled that a similar finding emerged from the Ohio State studies in leadership.)

The Emergence of Status Hierarchies

One of the first steps in the development of structure within a group is the emergence of a status hierachy. This is an intensely competitive process in a newly formed group, in which members compete strongly to determine who will have influence over whom.

The motivation for this status competition is not clear, despite the large amount of research that has been done on it. One explanation is that a status hierarchy is necessary for efficient accomplishment of group goals. There is evidence that early determination of who is going to lead does produce greater group effectiveness. Pryer, Flint, and Bass (1962) demonstrated this to be so, and felt, further, that their groups could move on to a state of task *only* after this question was resolved. Shelley (1960) found that the development of high agreement on the first status position, especially, led also to higher levels of group cohesion, that is, attraction to the group.

However, there is another possible reason why this status competition exists. There is a distinct possibility that status competition is a characteristic behavior of persons in groups that results from early social learning in which each individual sought to dominate the other as a means of establishing the level of social rewards to be expected from social interaction. There can be little question that the status and esteem accorded by others to the recognized leader are rewarding. Evidence that matters of dominance and acceptance are of key importance in childhood interaction was found by Longabaugh (1966).

Several studies have found evidence for behavior within group settings that was clearly oriented toward the attainment of individual prominence. Carter (1954), for example, conducted a factor analysis of eight independent group situations that differed in size, kind of task, and leadership structure, which yielded the following factors:

(1) Individual prominence—A dimension of behavior reflecting the prominence of an individual group member as he stands out from the group. The behavior associated with this factor included aggressiveness, leadership, confidence, and striving for individual recognition. This was behavior through which the member attempted to achieve individual recognition from the group.

(2) Group goal facilitation—Behavior oriented toward achieving group goals. Efficiency, adaptability, and cooperation were characteristic of behavior in this category.

(3) Group sociability—Behavior oriented toward the positive social interaction of members of the group. Sociability, striving for group acceptance, and adaptability were all characteristic of behaviors in this category.

The second and third of these dimensions clearly resemble initiating structure and showing consideration. However, the factor of individual prominence seems clearly different.

The possibility that the competition for status is self-motivated is further supported by a study of the emergence of the leadership role in small discussion groups (Geier, 1967). While the main purpose of this study was to determine the basis for leadership emergence—that is, whether patterns might be revealed that would help to explain the process of emergent leadership—secondary observations are dramatic in their indication of the extent to which group tension resulted from competition for status.

Two possible reasons for this extreme tension are that the competition usually delays the group in proceeding toward other goals, and that (at least in this study) it is characterized by interpersonal aggression. The leader apparently was eventually selected by a process of elimination, based mainly on negative characteristics of persons who fell from competition. In the final stage of competition, a major factor accounting for elimination was offensive verbalization. That the presence of near insults within a group would lead to a reduction in the number of positive social exchange actions, and to tension, is not surprising.

That this competitive process is self-oriented is indicated by two additional studies. Knutson (1960) used students in two laboratory courses as subjects. These subjects—some having been identified as high and some as low participants—were divided into four groups based on their tendency toward participation in discussion: very vocal, vocal, quiet, and very quiet. The experimental task was to pretest a pamphlet prepared for public distribution by a state health department. In the very quiet group, members were surprised to find themselves without a vocal member, and no one spoke for 15 minutes after assignment of the task. Even then, this group spent considerable time on just the mechanics of getting started, while the very vocal group immediately set to the task, hardly taking time to analyze the assignment's meaning.

When the participants rated their experience at the end of the task, members of the more vocal groups were more satisfied with their groups and their memberships, as well as with their production and their own participation. However, when the quality of the work they did was evaluated by an outside agency, it was found that the quiet and very quiet groups had produced the most integrated reports, which reflected careful thought and planning. In contrast, the reports prepared by the vocal groups were lacking in organization, and the one prepared by the very vocal group even included a page of personal observations for each member of the team, perhaps as an indication of the extent to which the competitive process had prevented the group members from combining their efforts to produce an integrated product.

One might think that an evolutionary reason for such competition is that it identifies the group member best qualified to facilitate the attainment of group goals. That this is not so is shown by another study (Riecken, 1958) in which the ability to assist in solving the group's problem was manipulated by the experimenter. Two sessions were held in which the task was to solve problems through discussion. The most frequent participator and least frequent participator were identified in each. Then a third problem with a "best" solution was given; in some groups, the most talkative member received a "hint" as to what the best solution was, while in other groups the least talkative member received the hint.

The hint was accepted by the group more often when given to the most talkative member than when given to the least talkative. Further, the more talkative member was ranked higher in influence by the other group members than the least talkative, except in those groups in which the least talkative member was able to get his solution accepted. However, it is quite significant that the least talkative member never was successful in getting his solution accepted except *when he had the active support of a more talkative group member, who was the second most talkative member of the group in four of five cases.*

Similar findings were obtained by Jaffee and Lucas (1969) in an experiment in which the experimenter's confederate was either talkative and incorrect, or not very talkative and more often correct. Again, the amount of talking correlated more strongly with recognition of leadership status than the correctness of the response. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that the amount of time spent talking by the most talkative group member, which generally leads to recognition as leader, is actually a competitive process which prevents other members from developing influence potential within the group. If "talking time" can be viewed as a scarce resource, then talking is competition for the resource, and recognition as leader is the result of the ability to monopolize or control it.

These findings have implications for appointed leaders in formal organizations. While appointed leaders are not generally required to compete with their subordinates, or face a challenge which could depose them, there may be some occasions when it will be necessary to utilize the full resources of the group to solve a problem. When such an occasion arises, it is possible that a status competition will occur unless the group has an existing status system. (Normally, such systems exist.) If the group does have a status system, there will be group members who will not be in a position to compete for talking time, or who will not desire to.

One function of the leader is to upgrade the group's decision making capabilities by permitting individuals with low competitive capacity to contribute to the group's output. The value of this function is demonstrated by a study of discussion groups (Maier and Solem, 1952), in which problems were presented both with and without an appointed leader. Group members first had to read the problem and submit a private answer, discuss the problem, and again submit a private answer. In the groups without formal leaders, about 45% gave the correct answer the first time, and 71.6% the second time. But in the groups with formal leaders, about 45% gave the correct answer at the outset, and 83.6% the second time. This suggests that low competitiveness is not necessarily the same as low ability, and confirms that the opportunity for non-competitive members to contribute may increase group effectiveness.

Shaw (1959) also studied the effects of individual prominence behaviors on group effectiveness, and member satisfaction as well. This was a particularly significant study because it also tested the possibility that individual prominence behaviors may not be so seriously debilitating if they occur in the context of an appointed leader group, as opposed to an initially leaderless group.

In Shaw's experiment, undifferentiated groups were created by assigning responsibility for the final decision to all members; differentiated structures were created by giving one group member the full responsibility for the final decision. Following the group task, each subject completed a questionnaire on which he rated his personal satisfaction with the job, group cooperation, and group performance, as well as other members of the group in order of the amount of influence they had on the group's decisions. In addition, observers scored the behavior of group members on their suggestions and perceived influence on the group process.

Table 14 shows the relationship between group performance and measures of individual prominence behavior within the groups. Group performance was measured both in terms of the percentage of points earned by the group out of the total possible, and the number of trials required by the group to reach a correct solution to the problem. The presence of individual prominence behaviors within an initially leaderless group significantly reduced performance effectiveness, though the presence of these behaviors in a group with an appointed leader did not. This was not because appointed leaders did not display individual prominence behaviors. They did. Apparently, the relationship between low performance effectiveness and the presence of individual prominence behaviors in the initially leaderless groups could be attributed to a competition for leadership status in those groups, which detracted from group performance.

Table 14

Relationship Between Mean Individual Prominence Behaviors and Group Performance[a]

	No Appointed Leader	Appointed Leader
Percentage Score	–.40*	–.07
Trials Required	.41*	.17

[a] From Shaw (1959, p. 384). *indicates $p < .05$, one-tailed test.

Regardless of the reason for status competition, and of the fact that it may decrease group effectiveness, it apparently does exist in nearly all initially leaderless groups. Schutz (1958) hypothesizes that groups go through three necessary phases as they develop from aggregates into functioning unities. The first is an inclusion phase which is marked by decision making processes in which each person decides how much he wants to invest in the group, and how much he wants to have the group interact with him. The second phase is a power struggle, which involves decisions as to how group responsibilities are to be shared, how control is to be established, and who is to occupy the various positions of status within the group.

The final phase, which Schutz calls an "affection phase," follows only after the problems of inclusion and control are settled. Only at this point can individuals begin to enjoy one another in an emotionally integrated manner, and interact with one another on a personal level as well as a group business level. However, this last stage must be achieved in order for the group to be able to function efficiently and in a stable manner over a long period of time. The competitive process simply creates too much tension for the group to have long-term stability.

Similar observations were made by Heinicke and Bales (1953) based on study of the interaction behavior of members of small groups. The first session was characterized by a heavy emphasis on task-oriented interaction, and inhibition of more affective (social) interaction. In the second session, there was a sharp rise in overt negative reactions, which was accompanied by a decline in task-oriented activities. The second session produced greatest conflict for most groups. In sessions three and four, groups shifted toward greater affect, while the lower emphasis on task-oriented activities continued. During these sessions, negative reactions decreased and the positive reactions increased. The interpretation of primary interest was that their groups apparently went through some sort of crisis during the second session. When compared with Schutz's observations, it would appear that the crisis consisted of the completion of the control phase, and the end of the competition for status.

The following conclusions appear reasonable from the preceding studies:

(1) Whenever individuals form a group there is a period of competition for status, which is oriented primarily toward determining who will have the most influence within the group. This is a competitive process that can provoke deep tensions.

(2) This competitive process is destructive of group effectiveness and efficiency, and it also leads to a reduction in group cohesion and morale.

(3) This status competition appears not to occur in groups which have appointed leaders, though the individual prominence behaviors of the appointed leader apparently do not disappear. The effect of appointing a leader is simply to eliminate, at least at the outset, the destructive competition among contenders within the group. (However, as will be found later, the appointed leader *is* required to validate his power by performing effectively. When he does, he has the same influence

potential as emergent leaders, though not gained through a competitive process. Sells [1962] makes a similar point.)

(4) It is probable that the motivation for this competition is primarily to determine *who* will receive *what* status rewards from group membership. Taken in conjunction with the earlier discussion of individual self-esteem needs, it is likely that the principal utilitarian outcome is the establishment of a rate of social exchange between each group member and the group as a whole.

(5) A requirement for long-term group stability and effectiveness is that this status competition be resolved as quickly as possible so that friendship relations can emerge as a source of social exchange rewards that make the group and membership in it attractive to the individual.

Role Development and Differentiation

The preceding section described competitive processes that almost always exist in a newly formed group, and that result in the emergence of a more or less stable status hierarchy. While the competitive process is largely self-oriented, the nature of the competition and the question of who wins may depend also on the nature of the group's goals.[1]

Insight into why group members may be eliminated from the competition is furnished by a previously cited study (Geier, 1967), in which college seniors and graduate students were placed in a group discussion situation. One of the tasks for each subject was to keep a diary of personal experiences during the group activity. A total of four sessions took place, after which diaries were collected. The major objective of the study was to determine whether patterns might be revealed through introspective data sources which would help explain the process of emergent leadership.

The general pattern, as was noted earlier, was competition for leadership, during which individuals who possessed what the members perceived to be negative characteristics were eliminated. Factors which most readily led to rejection apparently were characteristics which hindered group goal attainment. These consisted principally of lack of information concerning the group goal, nonparticipation toward attainment of the goal, or a lack of flexibility or adaptability in actions toward the attainment of the goals. The single greatest eliminator of leader contenders during the first stage was being uninformed, second was nonparticipation, and third was lack of flexibility.

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[1] Leaderless groups do not normally exist in formal organizations. The most frequent condition is that in which a new member enters an existing group. In that case, he enters an existing status hierarchy and must learn the expectations of the group before he can begin to compete for status. The nature of the processes involved is much clearer when one studies newly formed groups, which is the reason they are emphasized in the preceding section.

Of equal interest are the factors that led to elimination as a leader contender in the second stage of competition, which was characterized by more explicit attempts at leadership by leader contenders than during the first stage. Further, there were contender behaviors during this stage that were not particularly obvious in the first stage. Approximately one-third of the contenders in the second stage were eliminated for being authoritarian. A second cause of elimination was offensive verbalization, that is, the member expressed himself in an offensive way toward other group members.

These findings strongly suggest two things. First, even during the early stage of competition, there is recognition of the goals the group is to accomplish, a feeling of need to achieve them, and an attempt at evaluation of contender capability for facilitating goal achievement, mainly on the basis of being informed. Second, there is a requirement for ability to interact successfully with other group members without creating excessive tensions or hostilities. (As will be seen in the next two chapters, this is also an important basis for evaluation of established foremen in formal organizations.) It appears that effective leadership must take into account both of these functions: capability for facilitating group goal attainment, and interpersonal competence which can facilitate interaction that reduces the tension caused by some leader behaviors.

The fact that both of these concerns exist, and that they exist simultaneously, actually produces a tendency toward the emergence of two different kinds of leaders within small groups. This tends to occur because it is difficult for a single individual to engage in the highly tension-provoking competition for influence and power within the group, and at the same time engage in behaviors that reduce the resulting tensions. The consequence is that at the same time a status hierarchy is emerging (oriented toward the attainment of group goals), there is often another member who has high interaction rates within the group, and whose apparent function is to reduce the tensions generated by the more competitive activities of the other members. The existence of these two roles within such small groups was noted by Barnard (1938), who called the behaviors goal achievement and group maintenance activities. Group members who become involved in these activities have also been called task specialists and social specialists (Slater, 1955; Bales, 1958).

Studies of task specialists and social specialists using the Bales (1950) interaction process categories show that these two leader types, or specialists, engage in different kinds of characteristic behaviors, and are regarded differently by other group members. The task specialist, who is usually regarded by other group members as the "leader," has a high rate of interaction with other members and engages somewhat more often in such activities as giving suggestions, giving opinions, and giving an orientation (Bales, 1958; Borgatta and Bales, 1956). In contrast, the social specialist, who is often nominated by other members as "best-liked," engages relatively more frequently in such behaviors as showing solidarity (raising the status of other members, giving help, rewarding performance), showing tension release (joking, laughing), and agreeing with others.

The existence of patterns of behavior which characterize the interactions of group members engaged in specific group functions suggests that group activities may be facilitated when members do develop such patterns, and when the rest of the group learns to expect them. That is, the more predictable a given member's behavior is, the easier it should be for others to work with him in the accomplishment of group tasks. "Knowing what to expect" should reduce the need for communication in the coordination of activities, and also minimize misunderstandings and wasted effort (Sarbin and Allen, 1968).

The motivation for achieving consistency in behavior within the group setting thus is to facilitate the coordination of group member activities, increase the effectiveness of group performance by reducing the time required for the accomplishment of group tasks, and also minimize psychological tensions associated with member interaction. When such stable behavior patterns are developed and connected to specific group positions, they become *roles*. In a more formal sense, a role is the set of expectations for behavior held by others about any given person *in a specific capacity* with whom they interact. That is, a role is a set of behaviors expected (and to a major extent *required*) of the incumbent of a specific social or organizational position, and other group members would expect *anyone* occupying that position to engage in the same pattern of behavior, because of its functional utility in the accomplishment of the group's tasks. Regardless of who the foreman is, his subordinates expect the same things because the *foreman position* does certain things. Again, the primary motivation for the development of role expectations is the fact that interaction is smoother and more efficient when interacting members can better predict the probable behavior of each other.

Because of the functional utility of roles and clear role expectations, there is some degree of compulsion on a role incumbent to conform to the expectations of others in his role behaviors. The role expectations held by the other members of the group for a given role therefore define the range of behavior that the group will tolerate from the incumbent, and deviations from role expectations will be punished in much the same manner as deviations from the group's expectations regarding conformity on attitudes and beliefs of concern to the group.

Studies of small informal groups indicate beyond doubt that roles develop, and probably start to develop at about the same time as does the status competition discussed previously. However, there is little agreement as to how rapidly these roles develop, the extent to which they crystallize over time, and, indeed, how many types there are. Bales (1958) suggests that there probably are as many as five different role types, based on various combinations of an adaptation of Carter's (1954) three factors, which he reconceptualizes as *activity*, *task ability*, and *likeability*. (It should be noted that these factors are also quite similar to three dimensions postulated by Bass [1960], self-orientation, interaction orientation, and task orientation.) Bales' suggested role types include:

(1) A person high on all three factors. Such a person typifies the "great man" concept.
(2) A member high on activity and task ability but lower on likeability. This person is probably a task specialist.
(3) A member high on likeability, but lower on the others. This man is a social specialist.
(4) A member high on activity and low on the other two, who is described as an overactive deviant.
(5) A member low on all three, who is described as an underactive deviant.

Of these five, the last three types are less rare than the first two, and the second is less rare than the first. The second and third are thought to complement one another well, and to produce good group leadership in conjunction with one another.

A great deal of effort has been devoted to identification and study of role types in small groups. In one study with an interesting and unique methodology, Cloyd (1964) used four groups of 10 members each, which met 18 times. Observers listed group member behaviors; later they gave the list to group members and asked them to name the other group members of whom they thought when they read each behavior. The purpose was to identify any regularities in the behaviors of the various group members that could be reliably ascribed to any group member. Six different role patterns were discovered. While these did not correspond to the five types hypothesized by Bales, they did occur regularly, and appeared in other groups than the one from which they were derived.

Further, the more closely a given member confined his behavior to a single pattern, the more often it was associated with him by other members. Members who did not confine their behaviors to a recognizable pattern were less often correctly associated with a pattern. That is, the more clearly definable a person's role behaviors are, and the more reliably he performs them, the better other group members can anticipate his actions.

It is unfortunate that these role patterns did not correspond in a meaningful fashion to the types defined by Bales. However, they did contain elements of both task and social specialization as might have been expected, seemingly intermixed with activity indicators.

In an earlier study, Slater (1955) had approached the problem of role type identification in a somewhat different way, through the evaluations of other group members, seeking to learn to what extent they would rank one another similarly on criteria assumed to be different: contribution of best ideas for solving the problem; who did most to guide the discussion; and how well liked the member was. Of particular interest were behavior differences between members earning high ratings on these three criteria, the extent to which roles became better crystallized over time, the way the individual role types behaved toward one another, and personality factors associated with these differences. The group task was a discussion activity.

One of the most interesting findings from this study was that two kinds of groups resulted, depending on whether a strong consensus was reached regarding the group's status hierarchy. In high consensus groups, role differentiation seemed to result in an active task specialist and a best-liked other person. In the low consensus groups, there tended to be three role types—an active participator who was neither well liked nor highly rated on task ability, a more passive person who was a task specialist though not well liked, and a most-liked person who was neither active nor high on task ability.

Apparently, there was always a tendency for both a task specialist and a popular individual to emerge separately, with low group consensus occasionally resulting from the presence of a high participator who was neither highly popular nor good at the task. (This is good evidence for Carter's individual prominence category, together with Bales' reinterpretation of that category as activity, and for the present interpretation that these behaviors may be largely self-oriented.) There was a strong tendency for the individual who was well liked not to be high on either talking, receiving communications from other group members, contributing best ideas for solving the problem, or giving guidance to other group members. Best liked men initiated more activity in the general area of positive reactions to others, while idea men engaged in more problem solving attempts.

Slater's findings also suggest another important possibility, that status consensus may be based to some extent on a special relationship between the best-liked man and the idea man. In the groups in which high status consensus existed, both the idea man and the best-liked man gave one another higher ratings than other persons did. Further, the best-liked man tended to interact more with the idea man than with the other people in the group, and more than other persons in the group did with the idea man. This suggests the possibility that status consensus within such a group may arise from the existence of both specialists (when both functions cannot be combined in the same person), and where these two specialists form a coalition that can exclude other group members from the competition for status at an early time, thereby permitting the group to begin moving rapidly toward the accomplishment of its goals with a low level of tension.

The possibility of a special relationship between these two role types had, of course, also been considered by Bales. It appears, however, that this particular type of coalition may have significance considerably beyond small laboratory groups, and thus merit some degree of special attention. Freilich (1964) examined a wide variety of naturally occurring groups, and concluded that the rewards for these broad types of role specialization were probably sufficiently great that they would occur as a general case, and that there were also good reasons to expect special relationships between them. As will be seen in Chapter 6 there is a strong tendency for coalitions to form among persons who can gain through their mutual effort. Uniting forces is a way of gaining power with regard to the opposition. In the case of the task specialist and the social specialist, there not only is a mutual power gain, which was indicated in Slater's findings of greater group consensus on status, but also there probably is an additionally rewarding social exchange between these two specialists.

If Bales is correct in his analysis of these role types, and the social specialist is lower in activity rate than the task specialist, the task specialist probably emerges early in the status competition as a "probable" high influence person, but not without continuing challenge from other competitors. The social specialist will have been identified as a lower activity person *who does not like the competition*, and who probably is not competing actively with the task specialist, but who seems to be gaining in popularity with the remainder of the group members.

A universal social exchange tactic to gain support is providing a benefit that the other participant desires but cannot obtain in any other way. If the task specialist were at this point to defer occasionally to the social specialist, he would be granting the social specialist some of a commodity, talking time, that is scarce and which would not be obtained by the social specialist through his own efforts; in return, he would be gaining the gratitude, and thereby the support, of the *most popular man in the group*. Not only would this efficiently bring the power struggle to an end, but it also would provide the basis for effective joint leadership for the group. While the extent to which this kind of coalition does occur probably depends on group goals and the expected life of the group, it is a coalition of such apparent value that it probably can be expected in most or all natural groupings, except where there is one group member who combines both liking and task specialization.

The importance of group goals as a determiner of the role differentiation process is indicated by several studies. Bales and Slater (1955) had originally thought that different groups would emphasize task and social emotional functions in varying proportions, and that the question of who gains leadership status would be determined by how well contending individuals are able to perceive these emphases and behave accordingly. It was felt that the member who was most successful in fulfilling the function needed by the group at that point in time would emerge as leader.

A similar point is made by Sells (1962) in a review of military small group performance under isolation and stress. His review indicated, as Bales and Slater speculated, that roles develop according to expectations of other group members and the individual's ability to fulfill such expectations. Assumption of a role requires the consensus of other group members, and their acceptance of the individual in the performance of that role. Further, each role has a relative status which reflects, among other things, its contribution to the common effort. Thus, the resulting role status hierarchies in these small military groups appeared to be a natural consequence of the group's evaluation of the value of the functions performed in reference to the attainment of group goals.

Shelley (1960) suggests that one key variable is the function served within the group by interaction. When group interaction is a means to the attainment of group goals rather than an end in itself, and when the level of motivation within the group is relatively low, leadership is probably a matter of administrative convenience. That is, group goals can best be accomplished with focused leadership and the group probably will react more favorably to a highly differentiated role structure which permits the very rapid attainment of assigned tasks. In such groups, status striving and power seeking may not be an important process. This would be a situation in which the task specialist would emerge quickly, and in which the status hierarchy would develop without substantial competition and tension. There consequently might not be a social specialist in such a group, because he would have no material function to perform. On the other hand, when the group interaction is an end in itself, there probably will be a strong competition for status, and a positive relationship between the participation of group members and liking for the group by the members. This could result in low status consensus, because of competition for status within the group, which would almost require the emergence of a social specialist.

Confirmation for this reasoning was found by Marwell (1968), who learned that a crystallization of role behavior did occur in medium-sized discussion groups with regard to instrumental behavior (the task specialist) but not with regard to social specialization. Apparently, the concentration of all group members was so focused on instrumental behavior that the task-oriented behaviors of the task specialists were viewed as legitimate and did not create tension. Gustafson (1966), in a re-analysis of other data, came to a similar conclusion, suggesting that role differentiation probably does occur but that the question of who is noted as "best-liked" depends on the nature of the group task. Where there is a high task requirement, the task leader may be the most popular group member even though there is another group member providing socio-emotional release for the group.

Burke (1967) provides substantial evidence for this view, in an experiment that compared the relative frequencies of task-oriented and socio-emotional behaviors in discussion groups with high task legitimacy and groups with low task legitimacy. It was found that inequality of task participation (where some group members participated more heavily in task-oriented activities than others) was related to dislike of the task specialist under conditions of low task legitimacy, but not under conditions of high task legitimacy. That is, when task activity was viewed by group members as desirable and necessary, high task-oriented activity rates were not related to tension and dislike. Where task legitimacy was low, this was not true. Instead, high task participation by task specialists and competition over who would have the role of task leader were associated with a reduction in social participation by these task leader contenders. A distinctly different social specialist role then emerged as a consequence of the competition, and associated tension, between task specialists for the task leadership role.

Personality Variables and Role Enactment Predispositions

These findings offer not only evidence for role differentiation within small groups, but also some insight into the reasons why such roles emerge. If, in fact, the social specialist is more likely to emerge in a group in which there is competition and associated tension, this would be a basis for believing that the social specialist is a group member who simply dislikes tensions, and responds to them with tension-reducing behavior. Slater (1955) provides evidence that strongly supports this view. His "best-liked" group members gave quite different kinds of responses to the question of how well they liked each of the other group members. Best-liked men tended to respond to this question with the statement, "I like everyone," while idea men (task specialists) responded least frequently of all in this manner.

The parallel between task and social specialists and low and high LPC leaders, identified in Fiedler's work, should be re-emphasized here. In emergent groups, the high LPC/social specialist almost never gains leadership status. However, he might be *selected for advancement* in a formal organization, and thereby be placed in a position of power and authority. The analysis in this chapter suggests that decreased group effectiveness might be the result. The evidence is suggestive that it might be easier to develop increased interpersonal competence in the task specialist than to change the deeply rooted interpersonal relations orientation of the social specialist.

Strong support for the proposition that role enactment predispositions are the result of social learning and individual needs is furnished by Moment and Zaleznik (1963). In an extensive review of other work, they reached the following general conclusions:

(1) Individual performances addressed to task and group maintenance problems are required in group problem solving. Task problems tend to demand aggressive and disruptive behaviors, while social maintenance problems tend to demand more passive, nurturant, and integrative behaviors.

(2) The life expectations of an individual—his prior social learning together with the personal needs he reflects in his own behavior—determine his role enactment predispositions.

(3) The interaction between external role requirements, posed by the group's task and its environment, and internal predispositions determine an individual's actual behavior in a specific group activity. Within limits, interaction between external demands and internal predispositions will produce behavior of the four extreme types shown in Figure 14.

(4) The actual pattern of predispositions for role taking displayed by an individual at a given time and place will lie somewhere between those predispositions appropriate to his current stage of development, and predispositions appropriate to earlier phases of development, that represent inappropriate defenses in the face of current realities.

These propositions are complex, but highly significant. A key outcome of this logical development is the prediction of the four extreme role types[2] shown in Figure 14 and the assumption in Conclusion 4 which essentially says that the individual's ability to interact within a given

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[2] The term "extreme role type" is used because it is assumed by this author that a group member can fall at any position between the center of the figure and a position occupied at the edge, thereby being less extreme, i.e., less a pure case.

Role Enactment Behavior Types


Technical Specialization
High Task Relevance
Role Fusion
Low Social Relevance
High Social Relevance
Self-Oriented Behaviors
Low Task Relevance
Social Specialization

NOTE: From Moment and Zaleznik (1963).

Figure 14

situation is a function of the extent to which he feels threatened by the situation itself.

Three of the four extreme roles were thought by Moment and Zaleznik to serve ego-defensive functions. For example, the technical specialist was thought to be such not only because of the intrinsic rewards of task performance alone, but also because concentration on the properties of the task protects the individual to some extent from the requirement for socio-emotional interaction with other group members. At the same time, the social specialist, through his relatively undifferentiated socio-emotional behavior, is protecting *himself* from the tensions that result from a requirement to initiate task activity and from possible rejection by other group members. Each therefore is defending himself to some extent from an area of behavior in which he supposedly does not feel competent to engage, based on his prior social learning. (See Chapter 3 for a discussion of early social learning that has relevance to these points.) Only the individual who is able to combine both kinds of role enactment predispositions in a flexible manner is able to react in an undefensive way within the group.

A study of the interaction behavior of discussion group members confirmed the existence of these four types, and also confirmed the fact that the technical specialist and the social specialist are to some extent defensive in their behaviors toward other group members. The task specialists definitely appeared to avoid social behaviors, and the social specialists definitely avoided hurting people. Task specialists were quite independent within the group environment, and were concerned with task activities. Social specialists were highly dependent and were person-oriented.

In contrast to the defensiveness of these two roles, group members who were able to attain a role fusion, whom Moment and Zaleznik called "stars," did not avoid either task or social behaviors, perhaps thereby exemplifying the Blake and Mouton (1964) 9,9 leadership style. They reacted flexibly to each group situation and, perhaps most significant of all, *were open to disagreement with their own ideas.* Also, they were significantly higher than the other types on personalness, that is, reacting to other group members as unique persons.

The stars also were heavily involved with group process as an end in itself, apparently feeling that interdependence among group members gets the work done better. When confronted with disagreement in a group situation, the star did not withdraw, as others did, or respond aggressively, but continued to remain in contact with the individual who had disagreed in order to work toward a resolution of the disagreement. The technical specialists tended to react aggressively to such interaction, and the social specialists to avoid it entirely. Thus, each of them had a limiting disability in group interaction capability, which the stars did not have, and which thereby aided the stars to be more effective in the group.

Analysis of the personality characteristics of these various types indicates that, in all probability, there are basic needs that differentiate between these role types. In comparison with the other two specialists, the stars were as high on need achievement as the technical specialists, and somewhat higher on need affiliation than the social specialists. Further, they were higher on a need for belongingness than the social specialists. Thus, it would appear that the star has both achievement needs and affiliation needs and, further, has learned during childhood how to interact with other persons in order to satisfy both kinds of needs. He is not inflexible (defensive) within a group interaction situation, as the task and social specialists are, perhaps because he either does not have high status needs (or has already satisfied them adequately), or because he feels more confident in his own ability in the group interactive situation. This second possibility would imply that the reason for the defensiveness of social specialists and task specialists is a possible perception of inadequacy or lack of adequate skills.

A study of the impact of defensiveness on role flexibility in small groups (Gibb, 1960) suggests that the second of the two above interpretations is probably more nearly correct. As has already been seen, a role consists of the behaviors that will be accepted or tolerated by group members from a person occupying a specific position within the group. The boundaries of the role separate behavior that will be accepted from that which will be rejected and perhaps punished.

It is tempting to speculate that status competition increases the level of defensiveness within a group, and that this, in turn, produces a restriction in role behaviors attempted by increasing reluctance to approach the known limits of behavior too closely, perhaps as in Figure 15. A role is conceptualized here as those behaviors lying within the role boundaries, shown as circles. Because the role boundary conceptually is the point of separation between behavior that will and will not be accepted, it is also reasonable to postulate that the risk of punishment for a given behavior is proportional to its distance from the inner or most "safe" region. When the threat potential in a group is low, it is assumed that the role incumbent will feel free to approach the actual boundaries of his role quite closely, and perhaps even to experiment with extensions of these boundaries. However, under conditions of threat, such as when there is an ongoing status competition in which contenders may actually be seeking justifications for censuring other members, it is assumed that a member who fears censure would avoid behaviors that lie close to the boundary.

Thus, defensiveness would tend to produce a more narrowly circumscribed set of role behaviors that would tend to be less flexible and perhaps more rigidly enacted. This should pertain to both social specialists and task specialists, in comparison with "stars." Because social specialists are more dependent on the approval of others, it would seem reasonable that they would fear censure more, would react more to conditions of threat, and would be disproportionately handicapped by threat when in a position that requires task behaviors. (If it can be assumed that a high LPC leader is conceptually much like a social specialist, then it can be

Role Enactment Flexibility Under Conditions of Varying Threat


Conditions of High Threot
Role Boundary
Conditions of Low Threat
Behavior Set
Low
High
Risk of Censure
Behavior Set
Low
High
Risk of Censure

Figure 15

seen that the above analysis is also strongly confirmed by the Sample and Wilson [1965] study described in Chapter 2.) By the same token, task specialists may be handicapped under conditions of *threat to the group*, in that they may not recognize socio-emotional needs in time to deal with them, or may not be able to deal with them once recognized.

The Development of Norms

Two essentials for group stability have been discussed thus far, the development of a status hierarchy within the group, and the emergence of differentiated roles. These contribute in different but equally useful ways to group stability. Until a stable status hierarchy develops, the group is fixated in a state of continuing status competition, from which it cannot easily extract itself, and which is both detrimental to the attainment of group goals and tension provoking to members.

The more rapidly a group evolves through this period of competition, the more effective it will be; further, it will remain at a high level of effectiveness only so long as the competitive processes do not get revived. The implication for the established group in a formal organization is equally strong, that there should be a stable status hierarchy in which the established leader fulfills all the requirements of his role within the group and thereby escapes challenge from other group members that might prove to be destructive of group effectiveness and morale.

The emergence of differentiated roles adds to group stability in a different way. Assuming that there are goals to accomplish, the group can operate more effectively if there is some degree of *specialization*, that is, if each member contributes to the total group effort by doing what he is personally best suited to do, and if each group member has clear expectations about what the other members are going to do and how his own efforts fit together with theirs.

These expectations constitute group member roles; the more clear-cut and well understood the group member roles are, and the more closely members conform to them, the more effectively will each be able to anticipate what the other will do, and the more effective will the group be as a whole. The contribution of differentiated roles to group stability therefore is greater efficiency of goal attainment, through increased predictability of member behavior that leads to more coordinated effort, and a reduction in group tensions that would otherwise result from lack of predictability in behavior.

However, uncertainty can exist with regard to other behaviors than just those associated with the particular positions occupied within the group by the various members, and there is a need to reduce this uncertainty also. Just as was the case with role behavior, uncertainty is reduced through the development of shared expectations as to member behavior, both within the group and between group members and non-members. To the extent that these expectations are shared by all (or nearly all) group members, pertain to all group members, and are enforced, they are *norms.*[3] They differ from *roles*, in that roles consist of sets of behavior expected of a person who occupies some particular position or status within the group. Thus, there would be one set of *role* expectations for one role incumbent within a group, and a different set for another role incumbent. However, there would also be some general expectations of both, and of all other members of the group as well. The behaviors that are associated with a position, and with the position alone, are role behaviors; those that are associated with group membership solely are norms.

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[3] There are some expectations that may be common to *all* incumbents of a set of positions. To the extent that this is true, these may be considered normative for those positions.

Norms serve purposes for the development of group stability that are equally as useful as roles. Both add to the predictability of behavior within the group, and thus reduce the need for communication, on the one hand, and ensure the communication of correct meanings, on the other hand. However, it is probable that norms have additional value, in their capacity for regulating social exchange within groups and between groups and the extra-group environment.

A useful analysis of norms in an exchange theory framework has been made by Thibaut and Kelley (1959). In their view, basic exchange processes between the members of a two-person group, or dyad, often are conducted under circumstances in which both members cannot achieve their most favored outcomes simultaneously. When the exchange relationship is based purely on the individual power of each of the participants to influence the outcomes of the other, the less powerful of the two may very well find himself in an uncomfortable position because he is in a constant position of obtaining lower than desired outcomes in the exchange—each desires to maximize his benefits/cost ratio. Further, the more powerful participant may be in a position that is nearly as uncomfortable because of the risk of withdrawal of the other from the exchange altogether. Further, the exercise of personal power in an exchange is a negative outcome in itself, to the extent that it makes more evident the existing power differentials and thereby increases the costs of the less powerful participant. This increase in costs must be compensated in some way by the more powerful member of the pair, or there is again a risk that the less powerful member will re-evaluate his outcomes over costs and withdraw from the exchange.

The exercise of personal power in such exchanges is made unnecessary if an agreement can be reached that in effect sets a benefits/costs ratio that will be accepted as reasonable by each participant. When such an agreement is reached, it constitutes a definition of what each can expect of the other, in exchange for what each provides the other. As in the Thibaut and Kelley example, this may take the form of an agreement between a husband and wife that they will go to the movies one night and dancing the next. When such "rules for trading" are agreed upon, exchanges are likely to operate smoothly, and to lead each participant to believe that he is getting a *fair* return over costs. This, of course, is a key word, because a *fair* return is not necessarily a *maximum* return. It therefore appears that one value of such rules is that they provide a basis on which exchange can proceed within the group on a basis of fairness of outcomes, as opposed to maximization of outcomes. This, of course, defines the norm of distributive justice.

This analysis also indicates another reason why norms are so useful for group stability, and why the pressures toward conformity with norms can be so strong. In addition to facilitating distributive justice, in the form of *fair* returns to all participants, the existence of such agreements makes less visible the existence of power differentials which could otherwise have been used by the more powerful participants. This has the effect of reducing the costs (the exercise of power always implies a cost for the less powerful member) for a substantial number of the members of the group, and thereby has the effect of increasing the benefits/costs ratio of the group as a whole, if such a ratio can be said to exist. This happens, in all probability, because the decrease in use of personal power permits the emergence of a greater frequency of positive socio-emotional behaviors between group members, which form one type of social exchange that groups need for permanence. This, of course, corresponds to the third stage of group evolution identified by Schutz, and to the post-crisis stage described by Heinicke and Bales (1953) in which the affective exchange between members increases the total volume of rewards available from group membership, and thereby increases cohesion. This use of the term cohesion is much like Homans (1958), who defined it as a value variable that corresponds to the degree of reinforcement members obtain from the group's activities.

Still a third utility of norms is described by Thibaut and Kelley—their capacity for making the operations of the group more automatic and less effortful. Many of the functions of the group that would otherwise require time-consuming decisions are made much more efficient through resort to agreement and precedent, which establishes expectations for future behavior. Just as a family may have dinner at a specific time each day, by custom, a group may handle a certain contingency in a certain way, by precedent. A set time for dinner relieves participants of the time that would otherwise be required for coordination and decision making. Similarly, where the contingency is amenable to resolution by precedent, the group saves time and effort that it would otherwise need to expend in decision making.

In formal organizations, as well as in small groups, norms are developed through interaction among members in much the same way that roles are. The initial step in the development of norms is the development of a system of shared beliefs and opinions (Blau and Scott, 1962) that arises through communication among group members. This system includes beliefs about what objectives are worthy of attainment, how people should act and feel about issues of relevance to the group (or in general), and even about what is important and what is not.

Conformity to the group's norms is judged important by members, and non-conformity of either opinion or behavior leads to pressures for conformity. In laboratory groups, these pressures take the form of verbal communication—persuasion initially, and perhaps even argument. In work groups in formal organizations, pressures may sometimes move rather quickly to ridicule or minor physical harassment (Blau and Scott). Continued deviation or non-conformity might lead to complete ostracism.

As was seen earlier, one of the values of norms is their utility for controlling social exchange relationships in the informal exchange between individuals. An equally important function, for groups in formal organizations, is the control of exchange relationships between the individual group member and the organization. As Seashore (1954) notes, the individual employee often feels subjected to continuous pressures for productivity by the organization and may perceive the company's desire for productivity to be virtually insatiable. At the same time, because of lack of intrinsic interest in the job itself, there may be strong forces within the worker for minimal productivity. When these conflicting forces are viewed in an exchange framework, it appears that both the worker and the organization are seeking to maximize their benefits/costs ratios, and that the worker is in the position of being considerably less powerful than the organization, which could lead to his exploitation, that is, he either produces an unreasonable amount or he is dismissed.

It could be expected that there would be strong forces at work in the group to establish a basis for greater equity, and these forces do exist. While the individual alone may be at a major disadvantage in bargaining with the more powerful organization, he finds himself in a *much* better position when he is bargaining as a part of a group which acts in concert.

This, of course, is a basic force that led to the development of unions. The company could fire a single worker, or a few workers who acted in defiance of management, but it could not afford to fire the entire work force. Thus, when the entire work force bargains as a unity, there may very well be a power "stand-off" that permits greater equity in bargaining, and in subsequent exchange.

The same forces influence norm formation in work groups that are much smaller than the total work force. Again, the object of most norm formation in small work groups probably is to develop "rules" regarding the exchange between member and organization that will prevent exploitation by the organization, and ensure that the organization cannot act against any one individual in the group without the risk of retaliation from the group as a whole. An illustration of these functions is provided in a description (Blau and Scott) of norms in a formal organization during depression years. These norms had at least three functions:

(1) They defined, as perhaps the most important single issue, what was a "fair day's work." The shared definition of what was a fair day's work allowed the workers to increase their control over their environment, in defiance of management, which desired higher productivity than was being obtained. This was prior to the installation of a union; nonetheless, by consensus the workers could act in unison and through rate-restriction afford to defy a management desire. This was accomplished through the development of a productivity norm, which was enforced informally within the group.

(2) The productivity norm achieved the purpose of preventing an increase in productivity that might have cost some of the workers their jobs. Through enforcing the norm, they were protecting their future wage-earning prospects.

(3) Finally, the productivity norm had the effect of strengthening group solidarity, by preventing competition among the members of the group that might otherwise have occurred as each member attempted to demonstrate that he should not be "fired" during those depression years.

While these observations are clearly pertinent to the work groups observed, it is probable that the functions being served by the productivity norm are relevant to a much wider variety of conditions than just the depression years during which these observations were made. For example, Whyte (1955) described work groups years later, and observed many of the same functions in situations in which economic and labor conditions were presumably different. In Whyte's observations, rate restriction was a group norm, and the group generally agreed on what percentage of production was permissible beyond the norm set by management. Perhaps one of the most salient characteristics of conformers to the norm was their desire for the approval of their co-workers, and their feeling that management was made up of bloodsuckers. These are key observations, illustrating the presence of a strong group feeling of need for self-protection against supposed exploitation by more powerful management, and a feeling of attraction to and (perhaps) dependence on the group.

Blau and Scott define an important additional concept, group solidarity. This "... is a broader concept than cohesion. It encompasses not only the uniting bonds of group membership but also the collective strength derived from this unity." Solidarity is manifested by the presence of collective actions of various types, including collective economic actions. One measure of solidarity in a group would be the degree of threat members would face before retreating, such as the threat of coercive action by management, and so forth.

Examination of the functions served by work group norms indicates that these are useful functions in any high solidarity group, *particularly the function of the norm restricting what otherwise could be destructive competition* within the work group. However, the principal relevance probably is not the desire to protect against the loss of jobs, but against *disruption in the informal status hierarchy in these work groups*. Whyte identified three sources of status within a work group:

(1) Production performance in terms of speed or skill. "Making out" on a difficult job was very prestigeful. However, trying to break the rate, that is, make more than the minimum guaranteed wage through the piece rate, and failing, was losing face.

(2) Interpersonal skill.

(3) The job a man holds. This was of prime importance, because there generally is a group-accepted hierarchy of jobs in terms of their prestige value.

While the desire to "beat management" is probably one strong source of rate restriction norms, the norms almost certainly also stem from a desire to maintain the status of slow but otherwise respected workers, that is, workers who rank high on the second and third prestige items, but low on the first. This conclusion is supported by the earlier discussion of status competition within laboratory groups, and the disruptive effects of competition on the achievement of group goals. It is quite reasonable to believe that the combination of the two forces, a desire to avoid re-initiation of intra-group competition for status and a felt need for greater control over group outcomes (i.e., to protect the group against exploitation by management), is probably sufficient to produce the norm development and enforcement activities noted.

CONCLUSIONS

(1) Small groups have a strong need for the development of stability and distributive justice in exchange relationships among their members, and between their members and the extra-group environment.

(2) A competition for status characterizes the early stages of evolution of groups that do not have appointed leaders. This competition probably serves the function of establishing the level of exchange each member can expect to receive from his participation in the group. However, the competition itself is a cause of strong intra-group tensions, and will reduce group effectiveness. Group effectiveness increases when, and to the extent that, a stable consensus is developed on the statuses of the group's members.

(3) Group effectiveness is increased by the development of specialized roles, so that each member contributes to goal attainment most efficiently. Because there are two generally important objectives for the group, task accomplishment and group maintenance, there is a strong tendency for both task specialists and social specialists to appear as role types. However, the nature of the group's goals may influence whether both types occur. Role expectations serve the purpose of increasing the predictability of group member behavior in the pursuit of group goals, and there consequently are strong expectations for conformity to established roles.

(4) Group effectiveness and cohesion are also increased through the development of "rules," or *norms*, for exchange relationships among the group members, and between the group members and the external environment. As is the case with roles, these norms facilitate interaction by making behavior more predictable, reducing the need for decision processes for routine matters, greatly reducing the use of personal power

as a variable in exchange, and making exchange outcomes more equitable for all group members. One significant use of norms in work groups in formal organizations is for the establishment of productivity expectations for group members. These expectations satisfy an apparent need for a feeling of greater control by the work group over its environment, and prevent the development of status incongruence within the work group that might otherwise lead to disruptive intra-group competition.

This chapter has reviewed some of the literature on small group processes relating to attraction of members to groups, and group processes required for stability and member satisfaction. As was apparent from Chapter 4, satisfactions offered by the organization to the individual worker are limited. Many of the satisfactions desired by most persons simply cannot be made available through deliberate action of the organization. To a large extent, these are social satisfactions, which can and are provided by the informal work group within the formal organization. However, as has been seen in this chapter, the informal work group may also develop norms that work to the disadvantage of the organization. The influence of these norms on organizational effectiveness, and ways of increasing organizational effectiveness will be explored in Chapter 7.

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6

The Organizational Context of Leadership

Two major areas of exchange activity have been discussed in the two preceding chapters. The exchange between individual and organization that results from the "employment contract" to which each organizational member subscribes was considered in Chapter 4. The exchange resulting from this relationship consists mainly of providing tangible, and some intangible, benefits to the member in exchange for his services in aiding the organization to develop a product. In Chapter 5, the topic was social exchange between the individual and the work group of which he is a member. While much of the research discussed in that chapter was in the form of laboratory studies, the findings appear to have strong application to work groups in formal organizations, particularly insofar as attraction to and dependence upon the group are concerned. The exchange between individual and group consists basically of social approval and acceptance in return for the member's commitment to the group and the support of its norms.

As the preceding statements imply, and Chapter 5 made explicit, forces are produced by these two sets of exchange relationships that impact, sometimes in opposition to each other, on the behavior of organization members. On the one hand there is a clear obligation to serve the organization's aims, while on the other hand there inevitably is a limit on how far that obligation may extend before the group judges that inequitable demands are being made.

However, organizations cannot allow goal attainment to be governed by group judgment; the outcomes of such judgments may be too unreliable to form a stable basis for organizational existence. Consequently, a

NOTE: The list of references cited in Chapter 6 begins on page 257.

variety of mechanisms are called into play to serve the functions of motivating some consistently acceptable level of effort toward the attainment of organizational objectives, providing consistently accurate guidance in the application of this effort, solving problems and eliminating obstacles to goal attainment, and providing feedback to higher organizational levels concerning the adequacy with which these functions are being accomplished.

As the organization's immediate representative at the level of the working group, the leader is responsible, in part, for these and other functions and for the use of mechanisms to accomplish these functions. The purpose of this chapter is to identify and discuss some of the tools that are placed at the leader's disposal by the organization, and to assess their impact on organizational and member effectiveness.

ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESSES AND STRUCTURE

Most recent views of organizations[1] have retreated from the earlier structural conceptualization exemplified by Weber (1947). He conceived of organization as a hierarchy of positions with a flow of authority extending from higher positions to those below, the purpose of which is to provide standardization of operations and individual performance. In contrast, open systems theory, which has been applied to organizational analysis by Katz and Kahn (1966), visualizes the organization as an entity in an exchange with its environment, obtaining inputs from the environment, acting upon them in some fashion that produces a product or a service, and then returning that to the environment in exchange for additional resources to continue the process.

As Olmstead notes, systems theory in application to understanding of organizations has the advantage of emphasizing the processes that occur within organizations and that constitute the invisible part of the iceberg. Admittedly, structure is necessary, as a container within which process functions. However, without knowledge of the process itself, knowledge of the structure would permit understanding of organizational life only by

[1] Joseph A. Olmstead, "Organizational Factors in the Performance of Rehabilitation Workers," unpublished report.

inference. Consequently, while structure does affect process, most recent organizational research has turned to a study of processes themselves, and the effects of interrelationships and interactions on organizational members. This has shifted the focus from the structure of positions (the organizational chart) alone, to a study of what position incumbents do.

Organization as a Structure of Roles

Perhaps the most important single implication of open systems theory for understanding of organizations is its emphasis on the close relationship between an organization and its supporting environment. The environment provides resources for the organization and the energy to act upon them; these are exchanged for products or services in a cyclic manner. It is evident, therefore, that the goals of continued survival and success require that the organization be doing things (i.e., developing products or providing services) considered valuable by recipients within the environment. Open systems theory also suggests that there probably is one superordinate goal, survival of the organization, and three subordinate goals toward which each organization must strive:

(1) Preserving the demand for its product or services, or, conversely, changing its product or services to meet changing demands.

(2) Preserving the efficiency with which its product or service is provided, so as to maintain a favorable balance of exchange.

(3) Seeking, in the long run, an accumulation of energy resources that will permit survival during periods of unavoidably unfavorable exchange.

The best specific organizational structure for accomplishing these general goals apparently is determined, to a major extent, by the nature of the specific product and/or service being provided, and the technology utilized in providing them. Similarly, the optimum interactions between levels of organization apparently also are influenced by these same factors (Dubin, 1965). In general, however, organizations exist as hierarchical structures of positions, varying in complexity (Cyert and MacCrimmon, 1968) as a consequence of size and other variables. As Figure 16 shows, in a highly oversimplified view of organization structure, each position is associated with a statement of responsibilities and a statement of required actions; taken together, these constitute a set of programs and constraints



Organization Structure

Most General Goals
Less General Goals
Least General Goals
A statement of responsibilities
A statement of required actions

Figure 16

(Cyert and MacCrimmon) that govern the behavior of the position's incumbent. The statement of required actions constitutes an organizational role which he, or any person holding that position, would be expected to perform.

The structure of roles serves the important purpose of translating general organizational goals from quite general statements at the highest levels into successively more detailed statements. At the lowest level, these statements guide the production processes that act upon inputs to yield products or services of value to the organization's environment. While the number of layers between the highest and lowest levels in an organization apparently depends on many factors, probably the most important are the number of persons required to do the production job and the nature of the technology involved (Dubin, 1965), the relative degree of professionalization of the persons doing the job (Meyer, 1968a), and the size of the job performed by the individual at the production level.

The Authority of Roles

Perhaps the two most important requirements of any intermediate role (position) within an organization are the definition of goals to be achieved by personnel at lower levels, and the facilitation of their goal accomplishment activities. These activities constitute major components of the "programs" that Cyert and MacCrimmon conceive to constitute role behavior for position incumbents. However, the requirements to define goals for subordinate levels, and to facilitate (or ensure) their accomplishment, in fact constitute a requirement for supervision by one level of the activities of another. To the extent that superordinate and subordinate levels share expectations that this supervision will be exercised, these requirements serve as the basis of the authority one position incumbent has over another, and provide a form of legitimate influence over subordinate positions. This influence, to the extent that it is based on shared expectations, allows the superordinate to govern performance of job duties by subordinate levels, and is thought by Cyert and MacCrimmon to be the primary mode of organizational goal implementation.

Much has been written on the nature of the authority relationship between positions. Though the earlier structural theorists conceptualized authority as a one-way flow of influence, in recent years there has been increasing recognition that organizational authority rests on the acceptance or consent of the individuals over whom authority is exercised.[2] Barnard (1952) identified four characteristics that lead a subordinate to accept a communication as authoritative. Those most relevant for present purposes are that (a) *at the time of his decision,* he believes the communication is consistent with the purpose of the organization, and (b) he can comply with its contents.

The relationship between this conceptualization of organizational authority and the goal defining functions of position incumbents is apparent. For Barnard the "zone of indifference," within which each individual accepted orders without consciously questioning their authority, reflected agreement by subordinates on the right of the superordinate to govern within that area to further the accomplishment of organizational goals. A key point is the assertion that authority is supported by the norms of subordinates and their expectations for the role behavior of superordinates.

The Requirement for Authority

Authority relationships within organizations are obviously necessary for the accomplishment of organizational goals. This was recognized by

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[2] Authority will be contrasted with power, which is more nearly unilateral, in a later section.

Stogdill (1952) who defined authority as a derivative of responsibility, that is, a right to enlist the assistance of specified others to perform one's task. This association also is shown in the classical statement that position authority must be commensurate with position responsibility.

The position incumbent, according to Stogdill, obtains the legitimate right to take action because he has been given responsibilities to discharge. The fact that a position holder cannot discharge responsibilities without the right to require actions of others is the legitimating factor in authority. By the same token, the fact that authority is to be used to accomplish responsibilities limits the scope of the right to require action of others, specifically to the accomplishment of those responsibilities that constitute statements of goals for the position involved. Significantly, when influence attempts go beyond this scope, or when subordinates and superordinates disagree as to the extent of responsibility, influence attempts are likely to produce conflict, and to impact negatively on morale (Pondy, 1967).

Scott, *et al.* (1967) provide a similar conceptualization of authority and authority systems. They define authority as authorization to engage in certain attempts at control. One position incumbent has authority over another to the extent that his control attempts would be supported by his own superordinates in the organization. This approach differs from Barnard's in that it views authority *as a product of the consensus of superordinates*, in contrast with congruence between the norms of subordinates and the requirement for action. In this sense, authority, as Scott *et al.* use the term, is not legitimated by the acceptance of subordinates, and must therefore be supported by the availability of negative evaluations and negative sanctions for noncompliance. In both cases, however, the objective of an authority system is believed to be the same, to facilitate organizational performance. Consequently, authority was thought to be task specific, that is, a position incumbent would be authorized to engage in control attempts only for specified purposes.

While both definitions view authority as necessary for the accomplishment of organizational purposes, they differ in their assumptions concerning the basis for the authority right of one position incumbent over another. The difference is between the legitimation of authority by the norms of subordinates, and legitimation by agreement of superordinates in the authority hierarchy, supported by the sanctions that can be brought to bear by the organization to enforce its desires. It is apparent that this is not an accidental difference, from the definitions of authority in Peabody's (1964) excellent review, in which examples of both approaches are provided. It is tempting to conclude that their simultaneous existence may reflect a difference between the *perception* of what ideally *should be*, and the *description* of what actually *is*.

To an extent, this conflict is also reflected by attempts to distinguish between various *types* of authority. For example, Stogdill (1952) differentiated between formal authority and effective authority. Meyer (1968a, 1968b) makes a similar distinction between professional and bureaucratic authority.[3] In this view, bureaucratic authority is based on position, and derives its ultimate legitimacy largely from organizational regulations. While bureaucratic authority does provide the means for coordinating the activities of the various parts of large organizations and a basis for translating organizational goals into directives for action, it stands in contrast to professional authority which is based on the recognition by subordinates of the personal competence of the position holder.

Peabody (1964) distinguishes between formal and functional authority. Formal authority, in his view, is based on formal position, the legitimacy of the control attempt by the position incumbent, and the capacity for positive and negative sanctions inherent in the position itself. In contrast, functional authority is derived from the recognition of professional competence, experience, and human relations skills, which may either support or compete with formal authority.

POWER AND AUTHORITY

The Contrast Between Power and Authority

The apparent need to differentiate between functional authority and formal authority is indicative of the confusion in the organizational literature between the concept of authority and the concept of power.[4] (It will also be shown, in a later section, that leadership has been distinguished from both power and authority, but without sufficient clarity.) Since power appears to be a more basic concept with generality to a wider range of relationships between persons, it is probable that useful purposes would be served by making a clear-cut distinction between it and authority.

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[3] This was a distinction made previously by Weber (1947), and amplified by Parsons (1947).

[4] Perhaps the ultimate in confusion of these concepts is Stotland's (1959) definition of power as ". . . the authority that one person has to prevent another from reaching his goal," Cartwright (1959, p. 54).

In a review of approaches to definition of the concept of power, Nagel (1968) distinguishes at least two current streams of thought that have developed from the work of Lasswell and Kaplan (1950). One is based on political science and game theory and appears to incorporate concepts similar to those employed by social exchange theory, which suggests that power is developed through an imbalance of exchange. The second centers in social psychology and is represented, among others, by Cartwright (1959, 1965).

In most definitions of power, there are two essential features: One, that power is an aspect of a relationship between people, not an attribute of a given person; two, that power consists of one person's capacity to get another to do something that he otherwise would not do.

Definitions of power differ with respect to such variables as the basis of power, the amount and direction of power, the means, and the costs, of exercising it (Nagel). One of the simplest definitions is provided by Dahl (1957), essentially that just given. Emerson (1962) suggested a similar definition, but also emphasized that a power relationship requires ties of dependence in which one person is in a position, to some degree, to grant or deny the gratification of an existing need in the other.

Most theoretical frameworks also contain what amounts to a basic postulate that there are costs associated with the use of power (Schopler, 1965), apparently derived from two sources. One consists of the fact that compliance to the exercise of power has *negative value* in this culture (Blau, 1964). In social exchange theory, the capacity to provide an imbalance of necessary benefits which cannot be obtained from another source or through coercion gives an individual the capacity to require others who depend on him to conform to influence attempts that may serve personal goals. The essence of power, therefore, is the capacity to withhold further benefits (or inflict punishment) if compliance is not forthcoming and is essentially coercive in nature. Because it is coercive, in the final analysis it implies the capability of one person to cause behavior in another despite his opposition, and consequently must constitute an invidious comparison between the two with regard to their relative statuses. Thus, it seems possible that the negative value of compliance may stem from the fact that it provides the individual who must comply with a negative status and esteem comparison between himself and the one who has forced compliance. Because (as shown in Chapter 5) a positive self concept is quite important to the individual, such denigrating comparisons must inevitably be resented, with the result that the exercise of power "costs" the user.

There is a second reason why the exercise of power is costly to the one who uses it. It, however, stems more from the *extent* of the power differential between the more and less powerful, than from the fact that a differential exists. Wrong (1968) distinguishes between relationships in which there is a balance of power and those in which decision making and initiatives to action belong to one person alone. In the second type of relationship, with large power differentials, there is clearly a risk that an unintentional use of power may occur that will prove damaging to the less powerful member. As Wrong Suggests, "Does not the elephant who dances with the chickens exercise a power of life and death over them even though he has no wish to trample them underfoot?" (Wrong, 1968, p. 677).

It can be anticipated that the degree of anxiety felt by the less powerful member in such a relationship will be directly related to the magnitude of the difference in power he perceives to exist. However, as Blau (1964) notes, the existence of power is made visible through its use; indeed, some systems suggest that power is defined through the evidence of its use (e.g., Dahl, 1957; Levinger, 1959). It therefore appears that the magnitude of the power differential between persons will probably be judged by the less powerful member of the relationship in terms of the frequency of influence attempts that seem to be predicated on the existence of a power differential (Levinger, 1959, Chapter 6). That is, when one person shows that he can inflict unpleasant outcomes on another if compliance is not forthcoming, either through direct demonstration or indirect manipulation, he has demonstrated the necessary conditions for a power differential. In most systems, when compliance follows it is concluded that a power differential exists; further, the degree of the differential is said to be larger in proportion to the range of behavior that can be influenced in this manner by the more powerful member.

The Impact of Power on Interpersonal Relationships

Because of the esteem costs associated with the use of power, especially when the ultimate basis for the influence attempt is the capacity to deprive or punish unilaterally, it appears that an inevitable response will be resistance and resentment, together with attempts by the target of the influence attempt to seek to improve his lot in one or more of the following ways:[5]

(1) To reduce the power differential by means of certain "balancing" actions.
(2) To seek approval from the more powerful figure on some basis other than the one on which the power differential is based.
(3) To increase the distance between himself and the more powerful other, through reduced interaction, withdrawal from the relationship, or both.

Balancing operations, which tend to reduce the power differential, can take four forms (Emerson). Perhaps the simplest is reducing the motivational dependency of the less powerful member on the more powerful one. Assuming that an imbalance of power occurs because the more powerful is the sole supplier of a needed benefit, the power differential can be reduced if the need can be reduced or eliminated. As an example, group members with a high need for social approval have a high dependence on the group that provides it, and the group gains a correspondingly large amount of power over them (e.g., to enforce demands for compliance to norms). To the extent that the member can manage without the group's approval, he is then less dependent on it, and it has less power to influence his behavior.

In a similar fashion, a power imbalance can be reduced by finding an alternate source of satisfaction of a need that cannot be ignored. Using the same analogy, the dependence of an individual on a *given* group is less if he has alternate membership groups to which he can turn for approval.

A third, and perhaps more frequently occurring way to reduce power imbalance is by obtaining control over some source of satisfaction required by the more powerful member. A typical example is through the formation of a coalition, the combined strength of which is greater than the strength of the power figure alone. The tendency of individuals of lesser power to form coalitions in order to deal effectively with more powerful persons is well illustrated by the work of Caplow (1956), Gamson (1961), Vinacke and Arkoff (1957), and Vinacke (1964), all of whom studied coalition formation in three-person laboratory groups.

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[5] A similar discussion can be found in Cartwright (1965, pp. 35-38).

Caplow assumed that in a triad with members of unequal strength, the stronger can and will attempt to control the weaker. However, he further postulated that if this occurs, the weaker will strongly tend to form coalitions to oppose the stronger.[6] These predictions were supported by Vinacke and Arkoff, and Vinacke. Tendencies toward coalition formation are quite important for understanding clique formation and influence processes in small groups in formal organizations as well as in laboratory settings. Emerson suggests that because the power of weaker members of a group is increased through such collective action, coalition formation is a quite general tendency in a threatening environment. It is from this tendency toward collective action that norms and role expectations gain their strength in formal organizations. And it is probably for this reason that cohesiveness, and strength of conformity to group norms, can *increase* as a result of external threat to the group, as seen from the observations of Blau and Scott (1962) in the preceding chapter.

Finally, a fourth balancing operation consists of developing a source of satisfaction on which the more powerful member can be induced to become dependent, which then provides a means of reducing the unequal exchange that is thought to produce power imbalances. A good example of this process is the attribution of status by the weaker member to the more powerful member.

While this occurs more often within informal groups, it can also occur within formal organizations. If a group contains a member who is of particular value to the group, there is a strong likelihood that he would be of value to other groups as well; that is, he will have a substantial degree of mobility because of his value. If, however, the members of his group attribute to him a higher degree of status than he could attain in other groups, then he may become dependent on the group for continued satisfaction of his esteem needs, thereby increasing the power of the group to hold him as a member.[7]

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[6] This statement is a slight modification of the original fourth assumption made by Caplow.

While these balancing operations have been illustrated through reference to small group processes, their analogies—especially the first three—in formal organizations are easily recognizable. For the first two, parallels are a reduction in personal involvement in one's work, and a decision to terminate employment. Both reduce the power of the organization over the member. The parallel for the third is the development of work group norms that enable the members of the group to act concertedly to resist the influence attempts of the more powerful organization; unions are a type of coalition in which the strength of all workers together is equal to, and may often exceed, the strength of the organization.

The second general approach to improving relations with a more powerful figure, seeking approval on some basis other than the one in which the power differential is based, is a common phenomenon in organizations. It may be as costly to effectiveness as the balancing operations just described. Cartwright (1965) mentions "apple-polishing" as a technique falling into this category. Jones *et al.* (1963) suggest there may be three techniques for ingratiation: (a) enhancement of the other through flattery (Cartwright's "apple-polishing"); (b) conformity to or agreement with the more powerful person's views or opinions on some subject (which should then make the less powerful person more attractive); (c) self-presentation (an attempt by the less powerful person to make himself more attractive by in some way demonstrating superior characteristics). Each of these carries a risk; for example, flattery may be interpreted for what it is by the more powerful person (Iverson, 1968), which might lead to undesired consequences. However, each *is* a theoretical possibility, and Jones *et al.* found each occurring in an experiment investigating the tactics of ingratiation used by members of lower power.

Perhaps of equal interest, in this same experiment Jones confirmed one of Blau's (1964) predictions from exchange theory, that the more powerful member of a pair conformed to the attitudes of the less powerful member *on items not critical to the basis of his greater power*, but not on items that would lead to a challenge to his power. This illustrates not only the tendency for less powerful members to seek reduction of power imbalance, but *also the probable perception by more powerful members of the discomfort caused by power differentials*, with accompanying willingness to see some reduction of the imbalance.

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[7] It should be recognized that this supports the contention in the preceding chapter that individual prominence behaviors and the initial power struggle in groups are oriented toward determining the esteem satisfactions that can be obtained from group membership, and also supports the premise that several theorists have built into their models, that power relationships are often reciprocal (e.g., Nagel, 1968).

A variation that also may be found in formal organizations is described by Freilich (1964). When one person in a group has considerable power and one is weak, the latter can often influence the former through the intercession of a friend with sufficient power to protect the interests of the weak member. An example can be found in the anecdotally described tendency for military commanders to be "paired" with assistant commanders in such a manner that one plays the role of "hatchet man," while the other relieves tension by acting as "court of appeal." Where there is conflict between two such powerful persons, the system undoubtedly will be severely compromised. However, when these two roles are complementary, that is, when a coalition exists between the two and they act in concert to further the achievement of common objectives, Freilich suggests that the group can be much more effective. The less powerful member is motivated to comply with the demands of the "hatchet man" to avoid the unpleasantness of overt exercise of power, but without the feeling of powerlessness (Pearlin, 1962) that might lead either to apathy or to escape from the system.

While these two general ways of reducing power imbalance have obviously important implications for leadership in formal organizations, the most significant effects of power differentials may result from the third general approach listed earlier—the tendency of less powerful members to increase the distance between themselves and the more powerful. This tendency is reflected particularly through reduced interaction. Because interaction between two persons of substantially different status or power often leads the person of lower status to be unfavorably compared with the other, Blau (1964) suggests that there will be a general tendency for interactions to decrease as the power differential between two persons increases. This theoretically occurs for two reasons: One is the comparison process just mentioned, which inhibits interaction attempts by the less powerful individual; the second is the cost of interaction with an individual of lower power (status), in comparison with the potential gain, which tends to inhibit the initiation of communication downward by the more powerful member. The combination of these two forces produces a strong tendency for individuals to interact more with equals than with persons at other status levels.

This conclusion must be tempered by the question of how the more powerful individual reacts to an interaction initiation by a less powerful person. If he consistently reacts in an accepting and rewarding manner, the attempts at interaction should increase. However, theoretically there should be sufficient motivation toward limitation of interaction with individuals of lower power that the conclusion should still hold *as a general rule.*

Evidence of a reasonably strong tendency for communication to be most frequent between equals is presented by Homans (1961, pp. 197-200), among others. There is also evidence that suggests this occurs because of both postulated forces against communication between persons of widely differing power. Alkire, *et al.* (1968) studied the accuracy of information exchange under conditions of differential social power, using sorority members and pledges. They found that communication was significantly *less* accurate when members (with high actual power) communicated with pledges (with low actual power) than when communication was in the reverse direction. This was, apparently, because the member felt free to interrupt the pledge to question or to structure the information being given. In contrast, the pledge apparently felt less free to interrupt the member or to provide feedback on the adequacy of the information being provided, and therefore was less effective in solving the problem. When communication was between equal-status persons (e.g., member to member), this was not an obstacle to problem solution.

Equally illuminating findings were obtained by Lawler, Porter, and Tennenbaum (1968), who studied 105 middle and lower level managers from five organizations. Perhaps the most significant finding from this study was that higher level managers felt more positive about interactions they initiated themselves; the most negative feelings expressed were those toward *contacts initiated by their subordinates.* As the authors note, it is not surprising that superordinates in organizations frequently complain that they do not know what is going on; it seems unlikely that they could avoid communicating their feelings about subordinate-initiated contacts, which should lead subordinates to reduce the frequency with which they initiate them.

In the sense in which the term has been used in this section, power appears to serve as a double-edged sword in formal organizations, as well as in small groups. The existence of power differentials, especially large differentials, produces a variety of counterproductive behaviors among the less powerful. One of the most damaging to organizational effectiveness is reduction of communication initiations by the less powerful with their superordinates, and probable distortion of the content of the communication initiations that do occur. The end result is that facts that may be quite relevant to solving organizational problems may fail to reach decision makers. This is especially likely to happen when there is some indication that the facts may not agree with predispositions existing at the decision level. Information about problems or other unpleasant matters may also be directed upward by subordinates reluctantly, if at all, or perhaps only after counterproductive delays, under circumstances when such initiation actions may lead to unpleasant consequences—as they often may when superordinates have substantially more power than their subordinates, and make use of this power within the organizational setting.

Bases of Power

To the extent that power consists of the capacity to affect outcomes unilaterally, which implies that the ultimate base is coercive in nature, it would seem that these findings would hold in virtually any circumstance. There is, however, a surprising lack of consistency in the definition and use of this concept in the literature, and observations concerning the use of power in interpersonal relationships differ according to which definition is being used. Sometimes, as has been noted, power is confused with authority. In still other cases, it appears that a concept other than power—as power was defined in the previous section—is being used, in that there appears to be no ultimate basis for influencing outcomes or enforcing deprivation.

In recognition of these multiple uses, and the multiple types of reactions ascribed to the use of power, French and Raven (1959) developed a now well-knowr taxonomy of power types, determined by the basis of the power one person has over another. Five different power bases were identified:

(1) Reward Power. This derives from the capacity of one person to provide desired outcomes to another in exchange for compliance with desired behavior. It was thought, as social exchange theory would suggest, that the strength of reward power increases as the value of the available outcomes increases, and that the use of reward power tends to cause the rewarding person to be more attractive to the complying person. Compliance to the desires of the more powerful person was expected to occur without supervision, when the basis for the influence is reward power and the results of compliance can be inspected.

(2) Coercive Power. In contrast to reward power, this consists of the capacity to inflict negative outcomes on another person, and compliance is a means for avoiding or escaping these negative outcomes. Coercive power is not simply the withholding of rewards, but rather implies actions or outcomes of negative value to the recipient (e.g., physical punishment). Compliance with coercive power is not likely to occur in the absence of inspection and supervision; there is usually also a need for some force to cause the individual to remain in the situation, and to prevent him from avoiding the punishment by withdrawal. The outcome of the use of coercive power is frequently uncertain, because the aim of the less powerful person is to avoid the punishment rather than to accomplish the act desired of him. When there are other ways to avoid the punishment (such as through cover-ups, false reports of performance, etc.), they may be substituted for the desired act, to the detriment of the organization.

(3) Legitimate Power. Legitimate power results when the less powerful person believes that he "ought" to comply. It consequently rests on group norms derived from a consensus of group members that the observed influence attempt is reasonable and correct, and usually consists of role behavior (i.e., behavior expected of a person in the position occupied by the initiator of the influence attempt). Bases for legitimate power include cultural values (e.g., age), acceptance of the social structure (e.g., the hierarchy of authority in an organization), a legitimizing action (e.g., an election by the group of a group leader). Since legitimacy results from norms and lies in role specifications, legitimate influence attempts generally must fall within areas that are appropriate for the exercise of

influence by the role incumbent. French and Raven thought that the attempted exercise of power outside these areas might lead to a decrease in the legitimate power of the role incumbent, and also in his attractiveness. It was also thought that behavior resulting from the use of legitimate power probably requires supervision in most cases.

(4) Referent Power. The basis for referent power is a sufficiently high attractiveness of the power figure so that the less powerful person identifies with him and wishes to please him by seeking to comply with his wishes. Compliance with the wishes of a source of referent power does not require supervision; as French and Raven note, it is quite possible for the less powerful person to comply with a wish of the referent power figure while unaware of the power that person has over him. (This is the charismatic leader who "inspires" others to follow.)

(5) Expert Power. This is a function of the less powerful person's judgment that the other person has knowledge or ability that exceeds his own in the area in question. To the extent that the expertness is relevant to goals that the less powerful person seeks to attain, influence attempts by the more powerful person are likely to produce compliance without supervision, in direct proportion to the strength of the belief that he is in fact expert. Normally, expert power is limited to areas of demonstrated capability, though a common and perhaps fallacious assumption is that a person who is expert in one area is also expert in others. Further, the capacity to influence the behavior of others probably requires that they be motivated to attain goals in the area of expertness.

This taxonomy has apparently been useful to a number of researchers, though clearly it is not comprehensive.[8] Perhaps its greatest value is its capacity for suggesting how reliable the response of the less powerful person will be, and how dependent that response will be on supervision by the influence agent, as a function of the basis of power being exercised. Unfortunately, it is also subject to criticisms beyond a lack of comprehensiveness. It seems not to have been derived empirically, and there is evidence that the five sources of power do not occur independently in formal organizations. While there was no indication in

[8] For example, control over scarce resources is a widely recognized basis for power that, in some cases, goes beyond what apparently was included under reward power. An example is information; its control confers power (e.g., Goldberg, 1955).

their development that they would be, it seems that a taxonomy would be more valuable if its elements were independent. Further, Schopler (1965) notes that while the taxonomy aids in clarification of the kinds of forces one person can bring to bear on another, it does not aid in clarification of the resistance forces.

As a part of his review of studies on social power, Schopler included several studies that directly tested key aspects of this taxonomy of power bases. He commented that such research is difficult, apparently because of the problems involved in *keeping the power bases uncontaminated* (which may reflect the possibility that they may not be independent in real groups). Nonetheless, evidence was found that:

(1) Coercive power induces greater resistance than reward power, though overt conformity to both may be comparable. However, coercive power is not very effective in producing compliance without inspection, because it does not result in attitude changes favorable to such compliance. (This may lead the power figure to misjudge subordinate attitudes, in that favorable attitudes may be inferred from the public behavior, when they do not actually exist.)

(2) Users of reward power are liked more than coercive power figures.

(3) Conformity to coercive power increases with the strength of the potential punishment, while both conformity and liking for the power figure decrease as the strength of the resistance force increases.

(4) As the legitimacy of a punishing act increases, conformity also increases, though liking for the punishing figures does not.

(5) Expertness on one task produces the ability to exert influence on a second, but only when the tasks are comparable.

While these findings generally support the predictions derived from the taxonomy, three studies that appeared after Schopler's review illustrate the problems that result from the apparent nonindependence of the bases. In a study of the effect of perception of various power bases on a wide variety of industrial criteria, Student (1968) found that few correlations with measures of productivity were really high, suggesting either that these concrete measures had little variance or that they were not very amenable to supervisor influence.

However, within these limitations, it appears from analysis of Student's tables of correlations[9] that some supervisors tended to emphasize legitimacy of position, together with its reward and coercive aspects, while others tended to achieve their ends through referent and expert power. The second type appeared to be able to elicit somewhat higher *quality* of production without loss of quantity. Emphasis on coercion seemed to yield average quality of production, together with higher maintenance and a high volume of suggestions, as might have been expected. In contrast to what might have been expected, however, emphasis on rewards seemed to yield higher quality at the cost of lower quantity, as measured by earnings. Perhaps this last finding would be understandable with more complete knowledge of the context within which the data were collected.

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[9] This is a conclusion of the present writer.

Warren (1968) also studied the impact of type of power base on compliance among public school teachers regarding their techniques in four areas of teacher performance, in relation to data collected from their principals as to the methods they desired. The intercorrelations in Table 15 show that there are substantial interdependencies among the power bases. The *actual* degree of interdependence can be questioned since the basic data were obtained from the teachers (their perceptions), and not from direct observation. However, with this reservation, these results and those obtained by Student suggest that power rarely exists in natural groups as a function of one base alone. In Warren's study, half the school principals, as described by teachers, were high on at least three power bases.

While these findings suggest that laboratory experimentation on *individual* bases of power may be moot, the taxonomy still contributes

Table 15

Intercorrelations Between Bases of Social Power[a]

Bases of Social Power	Bases of Social Power			
	Reward	Expert	Legitimate	Referent
Coercive	.35	.33	− .10	.30
Reward		− .34	.49	.67
Expert			.42	.82
Legitimate				.70

[a] From Warren (1968).

usefully to knowledge of organizational behavior, in that it seems that there may be different predispositions among supervisors regarding the *combinations* of bases to which they resort, and different types of reactions among subordinates to the combinations used. In particular, it appears that influence attempts that reflect *the capacity to deprive* threaten subordinates, and result in less effective performance, as French and Raven originally suggested. In Warren's study, for example, total compliance was higher *when referent power alone was used* than when all types of power were used. The clear suggestion is that for greater effectiveness and lasting compliance, influence attempts in formal organizations should be based, to the greatest possible extent, on referent and expert power and only as a last resort on coercive power.

POWER, AUTHORITY, AND LEADERSHIP

The bases of power are of theoretical interest, and, as concepts, facilitate communication regarding the behavior of position incumbents in formal organizations. However, questions of organizational effectiveness need to focus more strongly on such matters as the impact of distinctly different types of influence attempts—if such types can be identified—and, in particular, the question of whether resistance is generated by the influence attempt. Theoretically, at least, organizational effectiveness should be maximized to the extent that resistances can be minimized. It would appear that organizational leadership might advantageously be defined in terms of techniques that produce compliance without producing resistance.

Two interesting taxonomies that are similar to that of French and Raven, but differ in key aspects, offer clues to a possible set of mutually exclusive definitions. In the first, Peabody (1964) identified four bases of authority:

(1) Authority of Legitimacy. Peabody believes that the notion of legitimacy is implicit in the concept of authority, which is not the case with the concepts of power and influence. Legitimacy exists because authority is normative (i.e., lies in the consensus of both subordinates and superordinates), which enables the authority figure to make demands without resistance.

(2) Authority of Position. This resides in the power of control of outcomes by the organization's representative, such as the power to hire and fire, to promote or demote, and to make incentive awards. However, the ultimate basis of position authority is in these sanctions, and thus his legitimacy with his subordinates is ultimately weakened if it is used too often.

(3) Authority of Competence. This, which is virtually self-defining, was thought to extend beyond relationships in hierarchical organizations, and to be a source of functional authority, which complements and reinforces formal authority as exercised by a position incumbent in a formal organization.

(4) Authority of Person. While not defined as explicitly as the other types, this appears to be what many writers have called leadership. As such, it supplements and reinforces formal authority.

The parallels between this taxonomy and that of French and Raven are too obvious to need further discussion. However, an important weakness in Peabody's taxonomy is the lack of explicit definition of what constitutes authority of person. In a science of human behavior, the observation that some individuals apparently can influence others because of their personal characteristics is hardly a significant contribution. At the same time, Peabody has experimental evidence supporting each of these concepts as a basis for influence within the three formal organizations he studied, together with indications that superordinates and subordinates view authority from different frames of reference.

In particular, superordinates were inclined to define authority as an attribute of position, whereas rank-and-file members were more likely to cite expertise as the basis for authority. Perhaps at the risk of going beyond Peabody's data, this may suggest that superordinates are more interested in protecting their influence potential over their subordinates, while subordinates are more interested in reducing the degree to which superordinate authority is arbitrary. Unlike Simon's theoretical "employment contract," it appeared that the subordinates in this study did concern themselves with the quality of the order given them—perhaps, as Barnard suggested, to determine the extent to which it was in fact legitimate, judged by its probable impact on the performance of their own jobs. In contrast, the view of the superordinate tended to be that of issuing orders with the expectation that they would be obeyed.

A second interesting taxonomy is a revision by Raven (1964) of the earlier French and Raven system. Six types of influence were identified, of which three are salient for present purposes:

(1) Independent Influence. This was thought to stem from the informational content of a communication by the influencing agent, to the effect that the recipient of the communication would receive inherent benefits as a consequence of performing the desired act. The outcome of this type of influence is that the desired behavior becomes self-motivating.

(2) Public-Dependent Influence. This derives from the exercise of coercive power and reward power, as defined in the earlier system. In contrast to independent influence, which produces self-motivating behavior, public-dependent influence requires continued observation by the influencing agent in order for compliance to occur.

(3) Private-Dependent Influence. This has three sources, and, as with independent influence, does not require observation in order for compliance to occur. It stems from expert power, referent influence (when a person uses another person or group as a frame of reference against which he evaluates some aspect of himself), and legitimate influence (much like legitimate power in the earlier taxonomy).

Raven also identified three other types of influence—negative influence, secondary influence, and manipulation; however, these appear less useful than the three listed above for developing distinctions between the concepts of power, authority, and leadership so that they will be logically consistent and mutually exclusive. Social exchange theory, together with elements of the two immediately preceding sets of concepts, does provide a basis for accomplishing this purpose, in the form of the following definitions:

(1) Power. In this system, power is defined in a sense compatible with its use in the section, "The Impact of Power on Interpersonal Relationships," as the capacity to deprive another of needed satisfactions or benefits, or to inflict "costs" on him for noncompliance with an influence attempt. This corresponds to Peabody's authority of position, and to Raven's public-dependent influence. As might be suggested by Raven's analysis, the exercise of power as so defined requires observation by the influencing agent, because the recipient of the influence will seek the reward by ulterior means if possible, and avoid the punishment by leaving the situation whenever able. Implications for organizational

effectiveness stem from the cost of resistance, and the cost of supervision to ensure that the desired performance occurs. Communication during an influence attempt need not be two-way, and often will not be, except when resistance forces lead the recipient of the influence to challenge the power of the influencing agent, or to try to avoid the performance requirement in some other way.

(2) Authority. In contrast to power, authority resides in the relationships between positions in an organization, and is derived, as Peabody suggests for his authority of legitimacy, from consensually validated role expectations for the position incumbents involved. An influence attempt based on authority therefore is not resisted, because it is expected that such influence attempts will be necessary in order for recognized objectives to be accomplished.

The objectives, in turn, are the purposes and goals defined by higher echelons, in formal organizations, to both the superordinate and his subordinates through him. Thus, while power may be arbitrary, authority is not. The exercise of authority is required of the superordinate (e.g., Emerson, 1962) and compliance with authoritative influence attempts is required of the subordinate; for both, the specified behavior is that which is required for organizational effectiveness, and is the price paid for organizational membership. There is, however, a limit not only to the scope of authority (e.g., see Scott *et al.*, 1967), but also to the manner in which it may be employed.

Scope refers to the range of content which may be addressed by the authority figure. He may have nonresistive compliance regarding technical aspects of the job, but strong resistance to influence attempts which are not a part of the job. Further, it is probable that the consensus of his subordinates regarding the limits of the influence attempts to which they will comply is fluid, resulting in his having a greater scope of influence to the extent that their experience indicates that he is expert in the job, and a reliable source of job requirements.

Considerations of manner of employment are probably as important as considerations of scope. Again in contrast to power, authority does not necessarily imply invidious esteem comparisons between the instigator of the influence attempt and the recipient. Authority-based interactions therefore create little resentment, unless the influence attempts are made in a manner suggesting that the authority figure believes that he does have superior status or power over the subordinate (McClelland, 1969). While power does not require two-way communication, authority probably does. Since authority rests on the normative consensus of subordinates, the authority figure presumably must communicate sufficient information about the overall group effort so that his subordinates understand not only their jobs but also his. This is needed in order to obtain their agreement that his role calls for him to engage in the influence acts required to discharge his own responsibilities. While authority is a derivative of that responsibility (Stogdill, 1952), his subordinates will know what form it must take only if they know what the responsibilities are and what he must do to satisfy them. This knowledge must be produced through communication.

(3) Leadership. This is the most difficult of the three concepts to define, as others have also found. However, in the present system, leadership is taken as an interaction between persons in which one presents information of a sort and in such a manner that the other becomes convinced that his outcomes (benefits/costs ratio) will be improved if he behaves in the manner suggested or desired. It corresponds to Peabody's authority of person (which was not adequately defined) and to Raven's independent influence, and produces behavior that is self-motivating.

Communication skills are more important in leadership, as here defined, than in influence attempts based on either power or authority, because its essence is the development of a new state of knowledge, belief, or attitude in the target of the influence attempt. Since it is a process of producing new understandings on matters about which the target may have feelings, it is essential that the leader anticipate the need for two-way communication and the possibility that the target will not reach a decision favorable to the leader's desires. That is, in the present system the key distinction in the exercise of influence through leadership is the recognition that the influence recipient has the option of deciding for or against compliance with the leader's wishes, without incurring coercive penalties.

Two kinds of reward potentials probably underlie successful leadership attempts. One is that the act desired by the leader will produce intrinsic benefits to the follower who complies; the second, that the act will result in social approval of the follower by the leader, under conditions that cause the follower to admire the leader and seek his approval. (It should be recognized that this is suggestively similar to the French and Raven concept of referent power.)

The development of these definitions might be criticized, on the basis that they are too similar to existing definitions, and, even if they were not similar, that they could hardly add significantly to the many existing definitions. It appears, however, that they can also be defended, on the basis that the distinctions (summarized in Figure 17) seem somewhat more cleanly drawn than in other systems, and are stated in terms of dimensions that are of substantial importance in understanding the problems of control systems in formal organizations.

In the present system, perhaps the most important distinctions lie between leadership and each of the other two concepts. As defined, it is probable that leadership depends on the competence of the leader at the task at hand, on his ability to understand the motives of his followers in order to provide convincing evidence of the desirability of an act that he desires, and on his tolerance for counter-influence attempts. He will probably be more influential as a leader if his personal characteristics, whatever these may be (and they will differ from one situation to another, and from one set of followers to another), increase his capacity to be admired by his followers.

Of all recorded examples of leadership, one of the most impressively illustrative of the concept intended in the present set of definitions is provided by Whyte's (1943) description of the techniques of informal leadership in "corner gangs." While it is evident that there is a differentiation of power and status in such gangs, developed through processes much like those described in Chapters 3 and 5, *leadership* within the gang structure *consisted of influence attempts that avoided the invocation of power and relative status.* According to Whyte, the underlying obligations of one member to another (that developed through an imbalance in benefits exchanged and constituted the basis for power differentials) were brought to light only when the group ceased to function smoothly on the less threatening basis:

> "When life in the group runs smoothly, the obligations binding members to one another are not explicitly recognized. Once Doc asked me to do something for him, and I said that he had done so much for me that I welcomed the chance to reciprocate. He objected: 'I don't want it that way. I want you to do this for me because you're my friend. That's all.'" (Whyte, 1943, pp. 256-257)

Power, Authority, and Leadership

	Communication Requirements	Consequences of Noncompliance	Basis of Influence Attempt	Organizational Consequences
Power	Unilateral. Communication upward not a requirement and not desired except when power figure may desire to reduce the apparent power differential.	Coercive deprivation by power figure, or assessment of coercive penalties.	Control of positive and negative sanctions.	Resistance, noncompliance where possible, high costs of supervision, low morale, and turnover where possible.
Authority	Two-way. Influence is exerted primarily downward, but may be reversed. Upward communication essential for confirmation of mutual understanding of basis for and scope of authority.	Possible negative sanctions by peers in the work group, and/or by organizational representative because of non-attainment of goals.	Mutual understanding between superordinates and subordinates of the requirements placed by the organization on the various position incumbents between whom authority relations exist.	No negative consequences for influence attempts based only on authority. However, compliance probably requires supervision, or control systems, or both.
Leadership	Two-way essential. While the influence is primarily directed from leader to follower, receptivity to counter-influence attempts is essential.	None, except where there might be (a) net loss of benefits by not acting in intrinsically beneficial manner, or (b) reduction in approval by a respected leader.	Capacity to interact successfully with subordinate to influence belief systems, etc., and (probably) a means of earning the subordinate's respect.	Increased organizational effectiveness to the extent that the leader's influence attempts are *competent*, i.e., do identify more adaptive courses of action.

Figure 17

The skillful use of influence is apparent in the quotation from Whyte, as is the reluctance to use recognition of past favors as the basis for the influence attempt. The request that the favor be done for the sake of friendship is powerfully compelling, in that refusal would be an unthinkable denial of friendship, but at the same time it appeals to positive social values and thus is noncoercive in form, if not in substance. The artfulness of the approach is further illustrated by the fact that *if the influence attempt is successful on this basis, then the influence initiator will still retain, relatively untapped, the imbalance of prior favors on which his power within the group is largely based.*

This suggests, correctly, that established leaders almost always also have power advantages over their followers. However, it is apparent that the gang leaders Whyte observed tried to preserve this power differential in two ways: first, by not obligating themselves to their followers, while at the same time seeking to obligate them; second, by trying to use informal influence to achieve their purposes, as opposed to using the existing power differentials which would have been reduced if used.

The first process, that of obligating followers while not becoming obligated, was illustrated by the fact that leaders spent money on their followers, especially followers close to them in the status structure of the group, but did not allow the reverse to occur; of interest, they strongly avoided borrowing money from followers, which would have produced dependency on the followers, and a decrease in power.

The second process, that of achieving ends without recourse to power, was illustrated by a description of how the leader, on one evening, mobilized his group to change its routine from bowling to another activity because he had no money. Of key interest here is the implicated recognition of social exchange principles in leadership, the requirement to demonstrate the intrinsic worth of the desired behavior:

> "I had to show the boys that it would be in their own interests to come with me—that each one of them would benefit. But I knew I only had to convince two of the fellows. If they start to do something, the other boys will say to themselves, 'If Joe does it—or if Chichi does it—it must be a good thing for us too.' I told Joe and Chichi what the idea was, and I got them to come with me. I didn't pay no attention to the others. When Joe and Chichi came, all the other boys came along too." (Whyte, 1943, p. 260)

Still another example illustrates avoidance of the use of power, and the sometimes necessary willingness of the leader to tolerate both counter-influence and noncompliance by the target of the influence attempt. In this particular case, a gang leader and one of his lieutenants had disagreed upon group policy:

> "One time we had a raffle to raise money to build a camp on Lake Blank [on property lent them by a local businessman]. We had collected $54, and Joe and I were holding the money. That week I knew Joe was playing pool, and he lost three or four dollars gambling. When Saturday came, I says to the boys, 'Come on, we go out to Lake Blank. We're gonna build that camp on the hill.' Right away, Joe said, 'If yuz are gonna build that camp on the hill, I don't come. I want it on the other side.'
>
> "All the time, I knew he had lost the money, and he was only making up excuses so he wouldn't have to let anybody know. Now the hill was really the place to build that camp. On the other side, the ground was swampy. That would have been a stupid place. But I knew that if I tried to make them go through with it now, the group would split up into two cliques. Some would come with me, and some would go with Joe. So I let the whole thing drop for a while. After, I got Joe alone, and I says to him, 'Joe, I know you lost some of that money, but that's all right. You can pay up when you have it and nobody will say nothin' but, Joe, you know we shouldn't have the camp on the other side of the hill because the land is not good there. We should build it on the hill.'
>
> "So he said, 'All right,' and we got all the boys together, and we went out to build the camp." (Whyte, pp. 260-261)

This example of effective leadership is almost exquisite in the aptness with which the leader accomplished his purpose, which was to get implemented what he knew to be a good decision. (Whyte comments that the gang, as do most groups, depended on its leader for good decisions. By so doing, they availed themselves of, perhaps, superior talent, while also avoiding dissent. By centralizing the decision function, they also facilitated maintenance of group solidarity, and prevented clique formation.) Key elements in obtaining an eventually favorable outcome were:

(1) Knowledge of the motives underlying the behavior of others, especially other key persons, in the gang.

(2) The ability to predict what other gang members probably would do if he tried to resort to his personal power as accepted leader.

(3) His (probable) recognition of the almost certainly disruptive consequences of allowing his lieutenant to "lose face," by making public the real reason for dissent.

(4) His capacity to *absorb the challenge to his own status* in the group without becoming defensive, which would probably have led him to try to force the issue, to his own detriment.

(5) His sense of timing, (e.g., of knowing when to initiate the next influence attempt).

The dynamics underlying effective influence attempts in informal groups are quite complex. For instance, it is quite possible that the leader in the foregoing example could have made his initial influence attempt, to go build the camp, in order to maneuver Joe into a disadvantageous position—having to commit himself hastily to a "cover-up" that could turn out to be poorly conceived. When the initial interaction then *did* have this outcome, he found himself in a favorable bargaining position to obtain two objectives: (a) getting the camp built and (b) getting Joe to pay back the money he had lost without directly accusing him of having lost it, which probably would have led to denial and disruption of the coalition between the two.

By first tricking Joe into an essentially impossible position, he could use the illogic of that position as indirect proof of the loss of the money, and allow gracious retreat from the position to be the incentive for agreement to repay it, which may have been the more important aim all along. Perhaps the most important dynamic here, and in the preceding illustrations, is the avoidance of direct confrontation by the leader of any key member on whom he relies for some of his power over the rest of the gang. This is also one of the most important distinctions between power, authority, and leadership in the present set of definitions. A direct confrontation is always evidence of either superior power or a challenge to the power of another, and consequently must always be disruptive to group cohesiveness and solidarity. (See Chapter 5) *Leadership is characterized by avoidance of direct confrontations, and is based on the interpersonal interaction skills required to move persons and groups toward goals without interactions that make evident power or status differentials.*

ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL SYSTEMS

While influence processes in formal organizations are different in scope from those in informal groups, it is very likely that group experiences during childhood and adolescence set the pattern by which the individual interprets interactive experiences that occur during adulthood in formal organizations. This is one of the reasons for the specific forms given to the definitions of power, authority, and leadership in the preceding section. Further, it is likely that the behavior of position incumbents in formal organizations is governed, at least in part, by their prior experiences and successes as *influence initiators* in informal groups.

To the extent these two assumptions are correct, it could be concluded that (a) the reactions of subordinates to influence attempts would be expected to decrease in favorableness as the influence initiator shifts from leadership to authority relationships to position power as the basis for his influence attempts, and (b) position incumbents in formal organizations should seek to influence their subordinates through leadership more than through authority or power-based techniques.

The first of these conclusions seems to be confirmed by the facts of organizational life, but the second seems to be contradicted. While the organizational environment does not seem to temper the reactions of members to arbitrary influence attempts, at the same time it does little to eliminate them as a source of discomfort and discord (e.g., by reinforcing the use of leadership in supervision). On the surface, this seems surprising indeed.

However, in-depth analysis of the organizational environment in which leaders and supervisors function provides some possible reasons for this apparent paradox. Perhaps the most significant is that the many functions required of the supervisor in formal organizations sometimes pose quite difficult demands on his available time. Since it is probably reasonable to conclude that effective leadership, as herein defined, requires more time than the exercise of power or authority, then it is probably also reasonable to conclude that the demands made on the supervisor in formal organizations tend to push him away from interactive exchanges with his subordinates that could be classified as effective leadership. In fact, there are good reasons to believe that groups with centralized decision making are *more efficient* than groups that resolve problems through discussion methods that are probably necessary for effective leadership.[10]

An equally important reason for observed supervisory methods may be that, in many cases, leadership may not be really appropriate for many decisions and actions that the supervisor must influence. When organizational goals are decided at the top, and implementation is developed through the process of sifting these goals from the top to the bottom, then it is unlikely that the coordinated purposes of the organization can tolerate much change from the already determined objectives and procedures. This, of course, makes leadership riskier than assignment of tasks through authority relationships, in that the supervisor could not really afford to offer the option of noncompliance. Compliance would be an obvious necessity, and leadership might therefore be seen by the supervisor to have the possibility of costs without adequate returns. If the subordinate chose noncompliance, then a recourse to coercive power might be necessary when it otherwise would not have been—and perhaps with even greater costs than if it had been used initially.

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[10] This point was discussed at greater length in Chapter 2.

A further problem, as will be discussed shortly, is that supervisors tend to view supervision parochially; circumstances of their jobs lead some supervisors to view as acceptable supervisory techniques that they would not regard as acceptable if they were the recipients rather than the initiators.

The Origins of Organizational Control Systems

Control in formal organizations has been considered by a variety of authors, from a variety of viewpoints, and for a substantial period of time. Blau and Scott (1962) discuss the approaches that have been taken in conceptualizing control systems. They define four implicit models:

(1) Executive Leadership. In this view, management is thought to consist of such functions as defining objectives, policies, and implementation techniques, as well as motivating the accomplishment of objectives. Barnard (1938) and Selznick (1957) are both mentioned as descriptive of this approach.

(2) Bureaucratic Authority. This focus, exemplified by Weber (1947), is on impersonal discipline and rational expertness, in which rules and regulations originate at the top of a pyramidal organization, and are moved through various layers of the organization to implementation levels.

(3) Regulator of Incentive Systems. The principal assumption in this approach is the utility of tangible rewards for inducing productive effort in organizations, and their consequent utility for obtaining and guiding movement toward organizational objectives.

(4) Centralized Planning. A major emphasis here deals with the functions of management in planning the work in advance so that

conditions can be created within the organization that will result in *indirect* rather than direct, control of the productive effort of the member. An illustrative contrast is between job-lot technologies, in which the effort of the member is of necessity directly controlled by supervisors through specification of goals and procedures, and assembly-line technologies, in which the goals and procedures of the worker, and also to some extent his level of effort, are governed by the flow of work on the line itself.

From the present point of view, distinctions among these four models are illustrative of the problems faced by organizations, that have produced the need for organizational control systems. However, to hold to one or another view, while rejecting the others, is probably to make the same error as the blind men exploring the elephant. All four models probably are representative at least to some extent of control systems in all organizations, and each is probably more representative of some organizations than the others; both of these facts were recognized by Blau and Scott. It seems appropriate, therefore, to regard the functions emphasized by all four models as essential to organizational effectiveness, and to question the means by which top levels of organizations accomplish them.

This conclusion is almost forced by more recent views of organizations (e.g., Katz and Kahn, 1966)[11] as energy systems that are in a continuing state of competition for scarce resources, and that must make adaptive responses in the form of "salable" products to an environment which places a premium both on the desirability of the product and on its price. (It should be noted that these are generic terms in this usage. Salability is synonymous with "in demand" and price with "cost," where cost may, on occasion, be expressed in terms other than dollars.)

It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that the two key aspects of organizational existence that introduce the requirement for management and control systems are the demand for accurate appraisal of the "market" (i.e., an accurate determination of what the organization's objective must be in order to survive) and for efficiency of response to the demand. Accurate determination of demand requires centralized gathering of information that can be interpreted and translated into objectives;

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[11] A more complete discussion of open systems theory as Katz and Kahn apply it to organizations will be found in the next chapter.

efficiency requires organization-wide coordination and control of movement toward these objectives through specification of rules, techniques, and standards of performance.[12]

Structure and Function of Control Systems

Organizational control systems reflect both of these purposes in their design—both to assure movement toward defined objectives, and to assure that the movement will be accomplished efficiently enough that the organization will continue to survive. The requirement for rules and standing operating procedures as a means of achieving operational efficiency is emphasized by Hage and Aiken (1967), in a discussion of formalization of job responsibilities in organizations. In their view, formalizing responsibilities and rule making are results of centralization of the decision function in organizations (following Weber).

While it is not inevitable, there apparently is a strong tendency for division of labor in organizations to increase ($r = .51$) as organizational size increases (Rushing, 1967). That is, as size increases, specialization also tends to increase, and, probably, the *scope* of the average individual job tends to decrease correspondingly (Jasinski, 1959). As the scope of a job decreases, the amount of coordination required between jobs increases, in order for everything to "come out even." This coordination must be accomplished through control mechanisms of some sort.

This logic suggests that as organizational size increases, the requirement for control systems of some sort also increases. This requirement is amplified by the centralization of decision making; as fewer and fewer organizational members make more and more of the decisions about where the organization is going, and how it should get there, the requirement for control systems increases (Hage and Aiken, 1967; Tannenbaum, 1962). This occurs for two reasons. One is that the decision makers in a centralized organization become increasingly hard pressed for time as centralization increases, and cannot afford to use decision processes to deal with routine matters; where situations of the same type occur repeatedly, it is considerably more efficient to develop rules by which subordinates can be

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[12] This statement must be qualified to some extent by the level of professionalism in the organization and the nature of the technology employed to satisfy the demand. High professionalism and a strong client orientation may produce decentralization of both functions (Blau, 1968).

"programmed" to react in standardized and approved ways. Thus, rules and SOP relieve the central decision-maker of the requirement to make routine decisions, and also serve to ensure uniform organizational behavior even though his personal attention is not given to each situation. This latter is, of course, the second reason for the existence of control systems in formal organizations; they are a means of achieving uniformity of behavior through an impersonal mechanism rather than through personal contact and observation, which becomes more difficult as organization size increases.[13]

Rules and Authority

It should be evident that explicit rules and regulations may serve as a basis for authority relationships in organizations, either in addition to or instead of role consensus through interaction between superordinates and subordinates. Two of the functions of supervision are to maintain the overall level of productivity specified by the organization as necessary for continued survival, and to ensure that the reports of *who* produces are correct. Based on observation or other techniques, supervisors feed back productivity information both to higher organizational levels and to their own subordinates. In both cases, the purpose of the feedback is to provide a basis for influencing future performance (McGregor, 1967).

Management may react to performance information that is not in accord with organizational needs by redefining standards of acceptable performance and objectives, and by formulating either new incentives for acceptable performance or sanctions for noncompliance with organizational needs (McGregor). The problem which then arises is that the new standards or requirements may represent a change from old standards that have been legitimized by work group norms, and attempts by the supervisor to influence the productivity of his subordinates toward the new standards may be interpreted by them as being unreasonable, or outside the "zone of indifference" within which their norms would have supported his influence attempts. This inevitably leads to conflict between the supervisor and his subordinates, which can be resolved in three ways.

[13] This use of the control system concept is considerably narrower than Tannenbaum's (1962) usage (as one example), which included all forms of influence exercised by the organization over the member. The present distinction is between a control system and control, per se, which seems to be Tannenbaum's intended meaning.

One way is through leadership, as previously defined. This is effective in convincing subordinates of the necessity for the new standards or performances. When conflict *is* resolved through leadership, the outcome is, by definition, a change in the supporting norms of the group, which will then have been influenced by the leader to conform to the requirements of the new situation. (This, incidentally, underscores both the strong desirability of organizational *leadership*, because it produces self-motivating behavior, and the apparent scarcity of effective leadership skills in formal organizations, in which it is apparently easier or more comfortable for the position incumbent to turn to position power instead as the basis for his influence attempt.)

A second way of resolving the conflict is through recourse to position power, as just suggested. This occurs, in all likelihood, because of a complex set of processes that will be described in the following section, and has the result of producing resistance and resentment, just as does the exercise of personal power.

The third way of resolving conflict is intermediate between the first and second in the reactions it is likely to generate; it consists of substituting impersonal organizational rules and procedures for the more direct personal control that produced conflict (Pondy, 1967). This reduces conflict in much the same manner as Thibaut and Kelley (1959) suggest occurs when an exchange norm develops between two persons of unequal power. When organizational expectations are formalized through explicit rules, it is made clear to work-group members that the supervisor's influence attempts are neither arbitrary nor calculated to serve his own selfish interests, but are instead legitimate attempts to conform to organizational expectations for his own role performance. While there may still be resistance to the rules, or resentment, the basis for conflict between supervisor and subordinate will have been removed, at least to some extent.

Pathology in Control Systems

McGregor (1967) suggests that while control systems generally work to some extent, they almost always produce additional, unintended effects. Among these are antagonism to the controls and to the persons who administer them, successful resistance and noncompliance with the rules, falsification of performance information with a resulting requirement for close surveillance, and high administrative costs. This is not surprising, where control systems are based on authority and power alone, because in such cases they eventually become coercive in nature. The basic reaction to coercion, as has been observed, is resistance to the influence attempt. This is often accompanied by apathy, alienation from the goals of the organization (Pearlin, 1962), and a lack of involvement in the situation itself (Zander and Curtis, 1962), which lead to efforts to avoid the punishment rather than to accomplish the performance.

These unintended effects probably arise because of two basic problems with organizational control systems when reliance is placed on the system alone to ensure high performance (i.e., when effective organizational leadership does not also exist to support attainment of performance objectives). One problem is an inherent lack of flexibility and responsiveness that characterizes a control system based on rules, together with the likelihood that the subordinate often can use loopholes or rules out of context to support noncompliance with other rules. The second problem is the tendency for supervisors to overgeneralize their legitimate authority relationships, interpreting compliance with influence based on authority as indicative of recognition that they have higher status than their subordinates; this, of course, may clash strongly with subordinates' reluctance to attribute personal status and may produce conflict. Each of these contributes uniquely to decreased morale, and possibly decreased organizational effectiveness.

Rules, and impersonal control techniques of other sorts (e.g., rate controls in assembly-line technologies, standardized performance records, budgets, incentive systems, quality control procedures, and time and motion studies to mention only a few), while reducing the likelihood of direct confrontation between supervisor and subordinate, produce, as by-products, inflexibility and a trend toward mediocre organizational performance.

Recourse to rules as a control mechanism probably results from the fact that they do reduce uncertainty, for both supervisors and subordinates. As was suggested earlier, rules and regulations tend to make explicit the role relationships between positions, and thereby facilitate understanding, if not acceptance, of the authority rights of superordinates. When leadership skills are in short supply (especially the communication skills essential to good leadership), it may be necessary to formalize the authority structure in this way. A greater degree of explication of rules and regulations also serves to reduce uncertainty for superordinates (Allan, 1966), to the extent that they can be used for decision making as well as for supporting authority rights.

Rules, however, tend to become permanent. When they are used either as guides to behavior or for decision making, the result is that organizational behavior becomes less flexible; when confronted with new conditions, it is likely to be slow in adjusting, and inappropriate rules may be changed only after a period of obviously nonadjustive behavior. Further, as rules proliferate, the freedom of action of first and second level supervisors may be restricted to the extent that their capacity for leadership, as herein defined, may be severely limited.

Another problem arising from control through rules and regulations is that such systems may act as two-edged swords, giving the subordinates greater power on occasion, while at the same time robbing them of autonomy and the opportunity for self-actualization. Mechanic (1964) points out that in a heavily rules-oriented environment, subordinates who have the opportunity to learn all the rules can often, when they wish, find one to support noncompliance with the requests of their supervisors. The lower ranking organizational member may thereby gain some degree of power over his superordinates, especially when he knows the rules better than they do. This is particularly likely to occur at the organizational level at which management personnel are first brought into the hierarchy. As new organizational members, they may then be supervising line personnel who have long been organizational members and have learned the rules thoroughly. As another example, the newly commissioned military officer finds himself in the similar position of not being as familiar with the rules as his subordinates.

Even though rules sometimes can be used against the rules makers by lower participants, the more general effect of a proliferation of rules is a feeling of decreased freedom of action and discretion among operating personnel. As the total control by higher organizational levels increases, the level of involvement in the organization's goals by lower participants tends to decrease. This was shown by Tannenbaum and Georgopoulos (1957), and has been the subject of comment by numerous others. The worst effects of control through this means probably stem from an apparent disparity of power in systems with a strongly formalized rule structure, and from the resulting lack of discretion (Jaques, 1956) which leads to a relationship between organization and member that is not congruent with the needs of the "healthy adult" (Argyris, 1959).

In postulating the basic contradiction between socialization practices and organization control procedures, Argyris suggests that cultural values lead individuals to develop from a state of passivity as infants to a state of increased activity as adults, from dependence to relative independence, from shallow self-oriented interests to more mature other-oriented interests, and to develop longer time-spans or time-perspectives. These are developmental tendencies that run counter to the organizational environment characterized by high superordinate control, which imposes requirements for dependence on the organization, and subordination to supervision and direction. Pondy (1967) raises a similar point. As more and more rules are imposed, the subordinate is deprived of power (perhaps a better word would be discretion) that had existed as a consequence of the previous ambiguity. Subordinates regard such deprivations as threatening, especially when they are seen as resulting from the action of a supervisor who seeks to reduce the subordinates' autonomy in comparison with his own.

The value of autonomy, or discretion, was demonstrated by Jaques (1956) in a study of wage equalization in industry. A central problem in compensation systems is that of providing equitable incomes to organizational members who may be doing jobs with vastly different requirements. The question of equitable compensation arises because of the lack of a common criterion on which all jobs can be scaled. Jaques found that the amount of discretion the job-holder had *is* a common criterion, that is widely accepted by organization members as a reasonable criterion of the *importance* of the job, and therefore of the compensation the job should receive. The measure of discretion consisted of identifying the decisions made by the job incumbent, and then learning the maximum length of time between when the decision was made, and when it was reviewed by someone higher in the organization.

The significance of this work is the universal extent to which discretion was accepted by a wide range of organization members as a reasonable criterion of job importance. (For hourly rated employees, aspects of discretion were tied to the maximum cost that could be incurred through wastage or scrapping of production as a consequence of inappropriate operator decisions.)

The widespread acceptance of this criterion as a measure of the value of the job suggests, as Argyris concluded, that cultural values are involved, and that jobs are more highly valued as their discretionary components increase in respect to the prescribed components. Conversely, as the prescribed components increase, the value of the job should decrease because of loss of discretion. To the extent that control systems decrease the discretionary components of a job, it would be expected that they would decrease satisfaction and involvement with the job. This, of course, was Tannenbaum's (1962) point when he suggested that lowered morale was not associated with the *amount* of control in organizations, but rather with the *disparity* of control, where higher echelons had great control over lower echelons.

Disparity of control raises yet another point—how much power a lower position incumbent sees others in the organization to have over him, and the effect of large power differentials on both involvement with the organization's objectives and satisfaction with the work situation. McGregor suggests that while control systems theoretically could be established so as to note and reward positive deviations from the norm, as well as to identify and punish negative deviations, they seldom are so established in actual practice. In most cases, they are designed to identify noncompliance. One consequence is that the organizational atmosphere becomes one of threat for failure to conform, which tends to cause members to turn to closer association with their peers who experience the same threat, in what is essentially a coalition against the threat (Cyert and MacCrimmon, 1968; Argyris, 1959; Buchanan, 1965).

A second consequence of control systems designed primarily to punish noncompliance is that organizational performance tends to stabilize over time at a lower-than-desired level of efficiency. When performance standards are developed, they usually are designed so that, with reasonable effort, everyone can meet them. If this were not so, the organization would be in the position of tolerating noncompliance with the standard by a large proportion of its members—a situation counter to the concept of what control systems are designed to accomplish. In practice, it often is found that the low members of a work group will produce at about 90% of standard, but not much lower on a continuing basis. If a normal distribution of ability within the work group can be assumed, this logic suggests that rates set in formalized control systems are focused on performance that is substantially below the capability of most of the members of the group. However, these rates become the focus of the group's rate-restricting norms, which prevent high performers from reaching rates of which they are capable. Thus, it probably is reasonable to conclude that increased emphasis on control systems may often be associated with a bias toward *lowered* efficiency.

Thus far, the major thrust of this section has been to demonstrate that preoccupation with control through rules and authority structures leads to decreased efficiency and reduced satisfaction, if not to resentment and resistance as well. However, there is another and perhaps even more serious potential for pathology in organizational control systems, which may produce even more serious consequences in terms of dissatisfaction of organizational members and subsequent inability of the organization to retain its members. This results from misinterpretation by supervisory personnel of behavior shown toward them by their subordinates, and consists of the presumption by the supervisor of more personal status than his subordinates intend, or are willing, to grant. The consequence is that the supervisor may behave toward his subordinates as though he had higher personal status than they, and they may seek to behave in a fashion that denies this. When each behaves toward the other in a fashion that is different from what is expected, conflict is the usual result.

The tendency for the supervisor to seek satisfaction of esteem needs, which was discussed in the previous chapter, is probably derived from earlier social learning experiences in informal groups, in which the group exchanged status and esteem for the unique contributions of the leader in attaining group goals. If it is assumed that this exchange must be equitable in order to attain a stable equilibrium, then the inevitable conclusion is that the leader's contributions to the group's goal attainment capacity must offset his esteem and status rewards.

It is also reasonable to conclude that such an equilibrium is not possible except when there is a group goal that the leader can help achieve, and when the esteem he derives from the group offsets *for him* the cost of his leadership effort. (It can be argued that sometimes the leader finds attainment of the goal itself sufficiently rewarding that esteem satisfactions are not necessary in order for his leadership effort to be worthwhile to him. It seems likely in this case, however, that the individual would probably not compete for leadership except when goal attainment is jeopardized through someone else's leadership. Some of

Whyte's observations suggest that this was certainly true in the gangs he studied; it theoretically should be true in most or all groups.)

The existence of an esteem need, which is satisfied by deference, compliance to influence attempts, and the like, is thus probably a necessary element in the leader's motivational make-up. It can be assumed further that it is a general need for all supervisors in formal organizations, and that it finds expression in their supervisory behaviors in the form of individual prominence actions. (See Chapter 5.) Esteem needs tend to be satisfied also by status perquisites of office, and by the responsiveness of subordinates to influence attempts *that lie within the zone of indifference*, that is, are properly judged to be within the authority rights of the *position holder*, whoever it is. Indirect evidence shows, however, that the position holder may sometimes misinterpret the responsiveness of his subordinates to his *position* to indicate esteem and respect for him as a *person*. Similarly, he may also seek to have them respond to him personally in the same manner as to the position.

Stouffer *et al.* (1952) comment on such a tendency in the military services during World War II. Their observation was that both power and social distance constituted barriers between officers and enlisted men. As attributes of actual status differences between positions at different hierarchical levels, they were underscored by requirements for deference to officers by enlisted men, and for military courtesy—for example, saluting and addressing superordinates as "Sir". While this should not be interpreted as condemnation of these institutions, they did lead to a problem. During the course of time, some officers came to believe that this deference indicated real respect of a voluntary nature. To the extent that this was not the case, their behavior toward their subordinates did not correspond to what the subordinates desired and expected, and their expectations of their subordinates' behavior were also not fulfilled.

In an excellent review of inequality in industrial authority, McClelland (1969) provides case study data that support Stouffer's observations, by indicating that similar processes occur in a variety of industrial environments. In a preface to McClelland's survey, Gurr and Eckstein (1969) identify several different criteria on which organizational members may judge their relative worth, and suggest that partly from such judgments come *deportment norms* that specify how members should, ideally, treat one another.

> Hypothetically, workers who think their supervisors no more worthy than themselves want to treat them as familiars and will do so if they can. The behavioral opposites of familiar treatment are *arrogance* and *obsequiousness*. The super who feels infinitely more worthy than his underlings is likely to think and act arrogantly towards them. The worker who shares such a view of his own unworthiness is likely to feel and act obsequiously toward his supervisors. (McClelland, 1969, p. viii)

In the case studies drawn from American industry there were few instances of obsequious behavior of subs toward supers; rather, there was considerably more often a clash between the supervisors' norms and practices of deportment and those of the workers, which led to friction in the work unit, and decreased effectiveness.

One of the more interesting case studies was drawn from Gouldner's (1954) description of a wildcat strike in one of the industries studied. Apparently the strike was caused by accumulated frictions following the replacement of a lenient manager by a considerably more formal and restrictive one, and was precipitated by an incident in which a supervisor cursed (personal derogation) a union steward. McClelland's analysis suggests that one of the key factors in the reactions of the workers was the lack of congruence between cultural values that are basically egalitarian, and industrial practices that were basically anti-egalitarian. Thus, while cultural expectations would have led the workers to believe the "boss" to be no more worthy than they, *on the basis of his intrinsic merits*, the behavior of the "boss" did not conform to expectations based on this belief.

Perhaps because of the power of position, and the authority in relationships between "boss" and workers, "bosses" tended to be more formal and more distant under the new manager, which was resented by workers. Why the quality of supervision changed under the new manager is not clear. McClelland quotes Gouldner as concluding that the new supervisors were somewhat insecure and regarded friendship with the workers as threatening, making it difficult for them to relate informally to their workers, so that they had to fall back on their formal status to get things done. From the workers' point of view, key points of resentment were the increased status orientation of the supervisors, which by comparison led to deprivation of status for the workers, and increased closeness of supervision, which also was a denial of equality between supervisors and workers.

While McClelland does not reach specific conclusions about workers' feelings concerning authority relationships between themselves and their supervisors, it appears to the present writer that rejection of authority, as defined in this chapter, was not a problem. The basic problem seems to have been the use of supervisory techniques that implied status differences between workers and supervisors that went beyond the work itself. To the extent supervisors believed the status differences real, their behavior was self oriented; to the extent workers perceived this, they suffered *relative deprivation* in the sense that the supervisors were obtaining more rewards from the relationship with no more investments or inputs than before. If this logic is correct, the conclusion must be that the workers felt the norm of distributive justice had been violated, and consequently were reacting to a perceived injustice.

It seems quite likely that similar mechanisms operate in all formal organizations to one extent or another, and that persons in positions of authority are probably universally in error to some extent in their conclusions about the esteem their subordinates have for them. It is likely that these errors increase in magnitude to the extent that the esteem needs of the position holder are greater, and his actual position power in relation to his subordinates also is large. When both of these conditions prevail, the position incumbent is likely to seek to maximize the status differential between himself and his subordinates, and they, in turn, may not care to expose themselves to the possible losses that the more powerful supervisor might choose to inflict on them for not satisfying his needs for esteem satisfactions. The result would be a situation with large though hidden costs to the organization, and at the same time limited feedback to the supervisor by which he might be able to identify the cause of his problems.

Effective Organizational Control

There is substantial evidence that organizational control systems are subject to tension provoking problems that are disruptive of organizational effectiveness. Where such outcomes are evident, there seem to be two basic causes. One is the over-regulation of the work group, and the second is the perversion of the authority system by supervisors who equate authority with status and seek to satisfy personal needs through their organizational positions. In both cases, the outcome is a deprivation of autonomy and self-esteem that is resented by the worker, and that leads to conflict between workers and supervisors. In some cases, this conflict is direct; in others, it is reflected either in work group solidarity directed against management, or in low cohesion and inability of the organization to retain its members.

It seems fair to conclude that in all cases when problems of this sort occur, there is a basic lack of leadership among supervisory personnel. This probably need not be so. McGregor (1967) suggests that it is possible to avoid such pathology through mutual goal setting. Data presented in Chapter 3, however, suggest that participation methods, which would seem to be necessary for mutual goal setting, are not necessarily effective, and may actually be disapproved by some organization members under some conditions. This does not in itself invalidate McGregor's thesis, but does suggest that there may be some key ingredient in the management by objectives approach which is in itself worthy of identification.

A potentially fruitful approach is offered by Miles (1965), who contrasts human relations and human resources approaches. In his view, participation has been widely touted as a curative and has been "bought" in large measure, although it appears that the "buy" is conditional. Supervisors apparently have accepted the human relations approach for their own subordinates, but reject it for themselves.

Figure 18 illustrates the points of difference between these two approaches, as Miles views them. In his belief, participation aspects of the human relations model have been adopted by management as a technique by which to "pay" workers for their commitment to organizational goals, and not as something of intrinsic merit. Implicit in this use of human relations techniques would be the belief that management might actually be more efficient, and perhaps easier, if the supervisor could actually make the decisions (which he thinks are correct anyway), and get on with the business at hand. In contrast, supervisors apparently reject this kind of treatment from their own superordinates, believing that they have something to contribute to the *quality* of organizational decision making, and desiring the opportunity to do so. Miles suggests that this is probably an accurate appraisal, and that the human resources approach, which he relates to McGregor's management by objectives, not only will improve satisfaction and morale, but will do so through improved decision making and control—a position remarkably similar to some aspects of Stogdill's (1969) model.

Human Relations and Human Resources Models


Human Relations
Participation
Improved satisfaction and morale
Lower resistance Improved compliance with formal authority
Human Resources
Participation
Improved decision making and control
Improved subordinate satisfaction and morale

Source: Miles, 1965 (abridged)

Figure 18

This suggests that one key ingredient of both this approach and McGregor's probably is the subordinate's desire to contribute to the decision process when he has something to offer that will materially improve its quality; this, of course, is a conclusion that was reached earlier in discussion of participation methods. However, there undoubtedly are other important aspects. While the management by objectives approach, especially in McGregor's later explication (1967), leaves little doubt that "bottom-up" determination of group goals within the organizational context was intended, it appears that the human resources approach is more realistic in dealing with this complex and sensitive area. As already noted, there is a substantial question as to the capability and interest of the group member in determining qualitative goals for the group; these must almost always be determined by top management. The human resources model appears to recognize this fact, and implies that the group member will often have valuable information concerning how best (most efficiently) to achieve the goals already identified by management.

The suggestion then is that group goal attainment will be maximized to the extent that the group, through the leader's ensuring that all members have the opportunity to comment on *means of goal attainment*, uses the best available information for decision making, and has not overlooked any potential problems in reaching its final decision. In actual practice, this does not imply any surrender of authority or responsibility by the formal leader; indeed, he could not surrender responsibility even if he wished. This is assigned to his position by his own superordinates. What it does imply is that the leader never has perfect knowledge, a condition which at times will penalize the group unless he seeks to guarantee against such imperfection through a regular procedure of consultation with the group or key group members.

However, consultation—seeking information and advice from the group—poses a difficult problem for the authority figure, although not for the leader. Consultation with a subordinate, in the true sense, *decreases power and status differences between the two.* The fact that the supervisor seeks the advice of the group member, especially when the supervisor is esteemed by the group, indicates that he values the opinion of the member. Consultation with a subordinate therefore increases the self-esteem of the subordinate, and increases his stature within the group.

As this occurs, the differential between the supervisor and the subordinate decreases. This represents a short-term "investment" by the supervisor which will "pay off" in the long run if consultation results in *superior group achievement*. However, unless the supervisor's own self-esteem is sufficiently high, the short-term surrender of status to a subordinate may well constitute a threat that cannot easily be tolerated. The result may be a supervisor who must depend on position power for his capacity to influence his group. It may also pose difficult problems for the supervisor who does not need power, but who must depend on authority because he does not know how to lead.

It is probably in part for these reasons that the human relations approach—which is no different from the human resources approach for supervisors who do not really understand either—has not attained widespread popularity among first-line supervisors. Successful implementation of the human resources approach probably requires at a minimum, a supervisor who is not threatened by competent group members, and perhaps also one who is skilled in two-way communication and leadership.

It is not too difficult to project the probable additional benefits from this supervisory philosophy. As status differentials decrease between supervisor and subordinate, threat also decreases and trust increases, other things being equal (Deutsch, 1962; Pilisuk and Skolnich, 1968; Blau, 1964). As member esteem rises because of the leader's tendency to consult on matters relating to work procedures, the leader's importance as a source of esteem satisfactions may also increase. While this will not occur unless the supervisor is accurate in identifying the most capable group members with whom to consult, it will occur when he does, and his own value to the group should also increase as a consequence.

Trust may also increase between group and supervisor for still another reason. Effective utilization of the skills and knowledge of subordinates is probably out of the question without first providing them with a clear statement of the problem, and the requirements on the group. This was one of the first steps in McGregor's management by objectives, and appears to be equally necessary in the human resources model. It might be predicted that the sharing of information in this manner by the supervisor would inevitably result in decreasing any impression of arbitrariness in the supervisor's decisions, and the development of a firm foundation for legitimate authority relationships between supervisor and subordinate.

Clearly, the human resources model is not a panacea, although it does make excellent sense within the framework already established through the application of exchange theory to analysis of intra-organizational processes. In essence, the human resources model creates a demand for the more frequent use of leadership techniques by superordinates in formal organizations, as leadership has been defined in this chapter. An equally strong demand is created for superordinates who understand human motivation, group dynamics, and bureaucratic processes in formal organizations well enough to recognize that they can satisfy their own status and esteem needs only to the extent to which they contribute uniquely and more than their group members to the accomplishment of group goals.

While it seems contradictory to speak of control systems based on techniques that are almost self-deterministic, there is sufficient evidence for the effectiveness of allowing some degree of self-determination that attention must be given the possibility that this contradiction is more apparent than real. As will be seen in the next chapter, it may well be that the actual villain is arbitrariness in the development of standards of performance by superordinates, and threat in their application; McGregor (1967) has suggested, for example, that noncompliance tends to occur in the presence of perceived threat. Thus, the stereotyped resistance response may stem from the fear that management will eventually require unreasonable performance if resistance is not forthcoming to *any* change in performance standards (see Chapter 5). The response to unilateral decisions about performance standards then *is* resistance and, to the extent possible, noncompliance.

If this reasoning is correct, then resentment and resistance are not the products of control systems themselves, but rather of the arbitrary development and application of work standards and methods in a threatening environment. The implication is that organizational control of member performance *can* be effected, even within the framework of formal management control systems, provided the element of threat is removed and standards are not developed arbitrarily. That is, the organization member has the opportunity to affect the quality of the decision when he has the competence to contribute significantly toward improving methods or procedures, or to correct a standard that is incorrect.

It will be recognized, of course, that this analysis approaches oversimplification; however, this is not necessarily a fault. The complexities of formal organizations are such that it would be difficult to visualize a written analysis not subject to this difficulty. What the present analysis does suggest, and probably correctly, is that the interactions between work group members and their immediate superordinates probably are key in determining worker reactions to the organization itself, and that these interactions themselves are probably rather inflexibly determined by the types of control systems imposed by the top levels of organizational leadership, and the purposes to be achieved by these systems.

SUMMARY

A primary objective of this chapter has been to differentiate between the concepts of power, authority, and leadership in formal organizations. While organizational control over members—a vital necessity for existence—can be accomplished through any one of these, and perhaps through any combination, effects of their use on organizational members must also be taken into account.

The exercise of power is almost always resented and resisted, covertly if not overtly, because it inevitably results in loss of self-esteem by the less powerful member in the relationship. Authority alone, while not resented if restricted to the practices included in this chapter's definition, leads more to ordinary performance than to the exceptional achievement that organizations sometimes need to adapt to changing conditions, or to meet unusual challenge. Further, authority relationships probably do not satisfy the higher-order group member needs discussed in Chapter 4. Leadership must be regarded as the technique of choice for the nonroutine influence attempt in formal organizations. Because it is less efficient than influence attempts based on authority relationships, leadership cannot be utilized as the sole technique for influencing member behavior. However, this is no indictment against its calculated use as a selective method of choice.

A sense of timing is probably one of the essential skills of leadership; the leader-supervisor should know not only the interaction techniques to use but also when to use them. When the timing is right, it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that the benefits to group members more than justify the costs, and will produce control that accomplishes the joint objectives of facilitating accomplishment of organizational objectives while at the same time producing an environment that does not suppress what Maslow identified as higher-order needs.

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7

Leader Behavior and Organizational Effectiveness

The three preceding chapters have dealt with three major factors that influence the behavior of organizational members, and thereby also influence both the behavior and the effectiveness of superordinates within organizations. In the present chapter, an attempt will be made to apply the concepts already developed to the exploration of superordinate role behavior in organizations, and its impact on group and organizational effectiveness.

FACTORS AFFECTING SUPERVISORY EFFECTIVENESS

If there is a single conclusion to be drawn at this point, it is that the role of the superordinate in formal organizations can be extraordinarily complex, and that the complexity seems to increase as one moves from lower levels to higher levels. This complexity can, to some extent, be attributed to the existence of multiple responsibilities that compete for available time, and demand both a sense of timing and an accurate appraisal of real-world priorities in the making of decisions. However, a factor of perhaps even greater significance is the existence of conflicting forces within the organizational environment with which he must deal, often under circumstances which prevent a complete resolution of the problems that produced them. To the extent that these forces cannot be resolved, he must then be satisfied with attaining in each case a *workable balance* which constitutes the best solution available within the constraints

NOTE: The list of references cited in Chapter 7 begins on page 332.

of time, resources, and vision that limit his ability to adapt at any given point in time.

The major focus of conflicting forces in formal organizations is on productivity and group effectiveness. As has been seen, superordinates at more senior levels are concerned with identifying goals and practices that lead to the productive effort essential for the continued existence of the organization, and with instituting organizational control systems that ensure this productive effort. However, an opposing force tends to be developed through the generation of work group productivity norms that define what is fair in the way of individual and group output, in exchange for the rewards obtained from the organization. It seems inevitable that these conflicting forces would produce conflicting expectations regarding the role to be played by the supervisor at any level, and numerous studies *have* found conflicting expectations from below and above to exist.

Contributing to the superordinate's difficulties is the fact that his ability to discharge his responsibilities may well be limited by the nature of the organizational environment, by the nature and extent of the control systems used by the organization, and by his own interpersonal interaction skills. Clearly, the first two of these conditions are largely beyond his control.

Perhaps the principal factor in the organizational environment that impacts on his ability to exert influence is the production process that is being employed. In a discussion of the effect of the industrial supervisor on work group productivity, Dubin (1965) cites a study by Woodward, that identifies three types of technologies which apparently call for different kinds of supervision and supervisory skills. These are unit production, mass production, and continuous process. In a unit production technology, the worker is a craftsman who produces a "large job" outcome, for the quality of which he bears major responsibility. In a mass production technology, on the other hand, the job may be small, and the responsibility for quality control may lie with an inspector. In a continuous process technology, the smallness of the job is carried one step further, in that the work is done by machine and workers merely monitor the process as it occurs, as would be the case in a refinery with largely automated operations.

Dubin suggests that the answer to the question of *what* supervision is needed (and what its impact will be) depends on where quality control lies. In unit production systems, such responsibilities lie at the worker level, which produces a requirement within the organization for a greater level of worker commitment, and a supervisory style that will develop this commitment. However, with a continuous process technology it is possible to conceive of conditions when just the opposite might be the case.

Blau and Scott (1962) present another way in which technology impacts on requirements for supervisory style and leadership. They suggest that, in an assembly line technology, the pace of the work as well as its content are fixed by management, with the result that the supervisor has a relatively small function insofar as setting goals is concerned. Instead, he becomes a problem solver, and the representative of his group to "get things done" in interaction with other groups in *both* the horizontal and the vertical dimensions (e.g., with maintenance or stock room managers, as well as with his own superordinates). His success in keeping his line going through solving problems and making sure that needed resources are always at hand, then, is a measure of his worth to his men, and a criterion by which they judge him. (It is a particularly valuable function, because it permits them to continue "making rate" without the need for "spurts" to make up for lost time).

A significant implication of this arrangement, according to Blau and Scott, is that it then may be viewed as reasonable for *the direction of influence attempts and authority relationships to be inverted*, with the subordinate having the "right" to influence the foreman on certain matters, and to require him to take action within the limits defined by the authority relationship. This authority right, when it exists, is accepted as a requirement of the job, a necessity for getting the work done. (As was seen in Chapter 6, this is the usual basis for authority relationships in formal organizations.) Thus, the technology may reduce not only the *size* of the supervisor's job, but also the direction of responsiveness to influence attempts in comparison with conventional concepts of the superordinate's role.

The nature of the control systems used by the organization may also impact on the supervisor's capacity to influence his subordinates, much as does the nature of the technology involved. Just as mass production and continuous process technologies reduce the capacity of the supervisor to impact on productivity except through solving problems and removing obstacles, the imposition of control systems may limit the flexibility and willingness of the work group to respond to the supervisor's initiatives (according to McGregor, 1967, for example), and may limit the supervisor's options with regard to objectives and supervisory style.

Control systems provide a means not only for evaluating the worker and his group, but also for evaluating the effectiveness of the supervisor in serving organizational objectives. That the second would almost always accompany the first is an inevitable conclusion, if it is assumed that McGregor's (1960) analysis of assumptions underlying the type of management practices he identified as "Theory X" is correct. If higher management believes that measurement is essential for production effectiveness at the worker level, then it is probable that measurement is also viewed as essential for evaluation of their supervisors—both requirements stemming from man's inherent dislike of work which therefore requires essentially coercive techniques for achieving productivity (McGregor's second, "Theory X" assumption).

However, as if confirming this assumption, one problem with control systems is the possibility that they will be manipulated; in this way the supervisor can gain a greater degree of discretion within his job, which may increase his influence with his subordinates (Pelz, 1951), though it may well result in subversion of the goals of the organization.

The nature of the supervisor's interpersonal interaction skills must also be considered an important determinant of the influence he can have on productivity, when the organization's production, technology, and control systems permit such influence to occur. As was seen in Chapter 6, it is probable that the supervisor can have a significant positive impact on his subordinates only through leadership techniques, which, in turn, are based in large part on the use of communication skills. The supervisor who cannot communicate—both "transmit" and "receive"—is in a precarious position when he attempts to *persuade.*

However, the nature of the formal organizational environment *may* hamper communication between hierarchical levels, with the result that leadership is discouraged. If, for example, the supervisor recognizes that the workable balances he develops among conflicting forces are only temporary, and that problems will tend to reoccur so long as the forces that produce them continue to exist and be in conflict, then it is reasonable to assume that he will experience higher tension levels concerning his performance than he otherwise would.

As tension levels increase, it is reasonable to expect that the supervisor's defensiveness, both with regard to his own role behaviors and those of his subordinates, will also increase (see Chapter 5), with attendant decrease in the effectiveness with which the communication processes essential to leadership can occur. (McGregor [1960], among others, suggests that "mutual confidence" is a requirement for effective organizational leadership.) An obvious requirement therefore is the ability to tolerate pressure and uncertainty without becoming defensive or passing the pressure and uncertainty on to one's own subordinates, and creating defensiveness in them (Miller, 1965). Unfortunately, this is not an easy task, and the superordinate's effectiveness is probably compromised to the extent that he is incapable of its accomplishment.

In all likelihood, processes of this sort were basic to the conflict between workers and superordinates described by McClelland (1969), and noted in the previous chapter. To the extent that the new (replacement) superordinates, described by Gouldner (1954), were insecure in their belief that they could influence their subordinates through leadership—insecurity brought on by lack of confidence in their technical abilities and probably also by a resulting loss of communication—they fell back on the formal organizational structure and its authority and power implications, which were not as effective as the more equalitarian techniques that had been used earlier. The preceding analysis, however, suggests that problems of influence and control are more general in formal organizations than even McClelland's analysis might indicate, and that they may pose more formidable barriers to organizational leadership than would have been concluded on the basis of the earlier literature, such as the Survey Research Center studies in Chapter 2.

In separate chapters of a treatise on leadership and productivity, both Dubin and Homans (Dubin, Homans, *et al.*, 1965) present evidence that would support such a conclusion. Homans cites Argyle's estimate that increases in productivity associated with good supervision in the Michigan sense are usually not larger than 15% of the total output, and Dubin, though acknowledging that supervisory behavior does affect productivity by being appropriate to the work setting, is hardly more optimistic regarding its extent.

It consequently appears that there are difficult-to-resolve contradictions in this area as well as in the other areas already treated. While there is a considerable volume of work (cited in Chapter 2) which indicates that the quality of supervision may be strongly related to work group productivity, there are also logical reasons for suspecting either that the magnitude of this influence may have been overestimated in the earlier studies, or that there may have been changes (e.g., increased unionization) in whatever the key factors were that led to the earlier findings.

A difficult problem in fitting many of the existing studies into a reasonably rigorous framework is that, in many cases, their designs prohibit definitive conclusions about the direction of causality because of the use of correlational methodology. While such methodology permits the statement that *at that point in time* certain supervisory behaviors were associated with certain group outcomes, the odds may be as good that the group outcomes caused the leader behaviors as the reverse. That is, it is possible to make the case that certain kinds of "desirable" leader behaviors are made possible by the fact that the group's productive behavior is already within a desired range, which relieves the supervisor from the need for the "less desirable" behaviors, such as close supervision, that sometimes appear in low production groups.

EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES OF LEADER BEHAVIOR EFFECTS

Questions about the direction of causality generally can be answered only through controlled experimentation, in which key variables of interest are manipulated, in a situation in which other variables that might contaminate the results have been either controlled or eliminated. Unfortunately, while many experimental studies of leader behavior have been conducted within laboratory settings using synthetic groups, there are few such studies in formal organizations. The reason for this scarcity is straightforward. Most formal organizations rely on a rather narrow margin of profits over costs for their continued existence. There consequently is substantial risk attached to experiments with real groups because a relatively small drop in overall productivity, from a miscalculated experimental manipulation, *might* compromise this profit margin to an unacceptable extent.

However, some controlled experiments have been conducted in real work environments. One of these (Jackson, 1953) was concerned with nine foremen of nine repair sections in the Bell Telephone System of Canada. Each foreman supervised nine subordinates. As an initial step, a battery of "attitude toward leadership" scales was administered to the section members. On the basis of mean scores accorded the various foremen on these scales, three pairs of foremen were exchanged and three were left unchanged for control purposes, as shown in Table 16. In each case, a foreman whose section had placed him above the mean was exchanged with one who had scored below, so that half the experimental groups received a foreman who had been rated initially higher, and half one who had been rated lower.

Table 16

Initial and Final Attitudes Toward Leadership in Foreman Exchange Study

Group	Initial	Final
Experimental		
A	56.8	42.2
B	40.2	58.2
C	53.3	49.1
D	43.4	50.9
E	58.7	40.3
F	48.0	56.4
Control		
G	52.9	52.0
H	45.4	46.4
I	53.8	53.9

Approximately four months later, the groups were again given the same scales, with the results shown in the second column of Table 16. Initial and final ratings of the same foreman can be examined by following the dashed lines within each pair of experimental groups. Even though they were obtained in the contexts of different groups of followers, they were remarkably similar. A correlation computed on these initial and final ratings was high (r=.76), but failed to reach significance because of the small number of groups involved in the experiment. However, when the control groups were added to the correlation (a perhaps questionable procedure), it did achieve significance (r=.83), mainly through the addition of cases which reduced the standard error of the correlation. In contrast, the correlation, considering only experimental groups, between the initial and final scores given by the group to the foreman present at each administration (two different persons in each case) was —.89, which did achieve marginal significance with only six groups.

These findings provide fairly strong evidence that the responses of group members to their appointed supervisors are strongly determined by the supervisors themselves, and not by different expectations from one group to another, or different group performance factors, or standards to which the supervisors might have then reacted. A reasonable inference is that different work groups doing the same general kinds of work under roughly the same circumstances probably have roughly similar kinds of expectations for the role behavior of their supervisors, and reach roughly similar kinds of conclusions about the adequacy of their supervision—reacting favorably when their expectations are reasonably well met, and unfavorably when they are not.

Evidence supporting these conclusions is found in an experiment by Rosen (1969, 1970), similar in concept to Jackson's study in that it involved the deliberate swapping of foremen between work groups in a formal organization. However, Rosen's study also included carefully developed productivity data for the objective evaluation of group effectiveness before and after the foreman exchange took place. The upholstering department of a furniture manufacturing company served as the setting for the experiment. This department contained eight manually paced work groups, each organized as an assembly line, and each building a particular piece of furniture for the length of a production run. Each man in each group had specialized functions, that is, arm-makers, back-makers, and so forth. The movement of furniture down each line was managed through the use of four-wheeled "trucks," and the progress of each piece was determined by the pace of the individual worker and the extent to which pieces could be accumulated at the next position. When bottlenecks occurred, a worker was required to move from one position to an adjacent position to help remove the bottleneck. Thus, there was a substantial amount of task interdependence among the members of each group.

One significant department policy was the practice of posting quarterly average earnings not only for the individuals within groups, but also for the groups themselves. This constituted an effective performance feedback system for the entire department. As has been seen, the amount of pay earned is often taken as an indication of status within the group, especially by blue collar workers. This particular feedback system therefore probably not only had the effect of making public the status hierarchy within each of the groups, but also provided an incentive to maintain the existing hierarchies.

One other characteristic of these work groups is worth mention. Their members were all highly competent in their jobs, and had a long average tenure (10 years). In addition, turnover was quite small. The foremen were high in task knowledge, were integrated members of their groups, and had some responsibility for planning, making policy, and deciding matters relevant to the functioning of their groups. The picture thus is one of stability and generally good relations between workers and management.

As part of the design, several measures were taken from each group by means of a questionnaire one year prior to the experimental reassignments of foremen among groups. This interval was designed to prevent workers and foremen alike from connecting the measures to the experiment itself, which in all probability would have had an effect on the results. The measures consisted of group attraction (cohesion), foreman preference, status consensus on foreman, and group productivity data.

When reassignment occurred, two groups received a highly favorable foreman reassignment and two others a highly unfavorable reassignment, with the remaining three falling between. Of the seven groups, five received a foreman who had been ranked lower overall than the initial foreman, while two received more favorable foremen. Weekly productivity data were obtained for a total of 16 weeks following the change. In addition, some portions of the initial questionnaire instruments were readministered at the end of the tenth week following change to assess worker reactions to their new foremen.

Mean productivity changes after foreman exchange are shown in Table 17 as percent of change from the base line rate which was computed before the exchange occurred. Surprisingly, at the end of the second week, productivity changes were positive in five of the seven groups, and in four of the five that had received a less well liked foreman; further, one

Table 17

Mean Productivity Change[a] After Foreman Exchange

Group	New Foreman	Base Line	At End of Two Weeks	At End of 10 Weeks	At End of 16 Weeks (Total)
B	Much Worse	123	12	5	9
C	Worse	156	6	3	6
D	Much Worse	140	−4	0	−1
E	Worse	131	8	−7	−2
F	Better	130	16	7	11
G	Better	136	−13	1	4
H	Worse	140	10	2	0

[a] Numbers are mean percent increase or decrease in relation to base line.

of the two that dropped had received a "good" swap, one of the best foremen available. However, at the end of the first 10 weeks following the foreman exchange, productivity levels had returned nearly to their original levels, and remained so at the end of the 16th week. Thus, it can be concluded that while the foreman exchange (though not necessarily the new foreman himself) did have an immediate impact on productivity, the groups had by the end of the tenth week been able to reestablish productivity levels quite similar to original levels. (It should be noted in passing that this is good evidence for the existence of group productivity norms, and for the probable role of this department's performance feedback system both as a focus for the norms and as a means of stabilizing performance in conformity with the norms.)

Table 18 shows worker preferences for foremen before and after change. The first column shows the group's preference rank for its original foreman, and the second preference column shows the group's evaluation of the new foreman, prior to change when he was foreman of another group. The third preference column shows each group's preference rank for its new foreman at the end of the tenth week following change. After this experience with the new foreman, six of the seven groups gave him a better rating than they had before the change occurred, while he was

Table 18

Worker Preference for Foremen Before and After Change

Group	Original Foreman Mean Preference Rank Before Change	New Foreman Assigned	New Foreman Mean Preference Rank Before Change	New Foreman Mean Preference Rank After Change
B	1.7	Much Worse	6.0	3.0
C	2.0	Worse	5.3	1.9
D	1.4	Much Worse	5.8	2.6
E	2.8	Worse	3.8	2.5
F	6.5	Better	2.9	1.4
G	5.1	Better	2.7	1.0
H	3.1	Worse	5.2	5.8
				rho=.71

foreman of another group. However, the *relative order* was much the same (*rho*=.71), indicating that while six of the seven were generally ranked higher, the most preferred were generally still most preferred. This, of course, confirms Jackson's earlier findings.

Of perhaps greater importance, for present purposes, are data collected both before and after the change, consisting of workers' ratings of most and least desirable foremen, and most and least desirable work groups (Table 19), on a number of factors. Rosen (1969) judges the relative importance of a given factor by the size of the *t* test result, shown in the third and sixth columns. Before the change, six factors had been found to yield a highly significant difference between the worker's first choice for work group, and his last choice. Of these six factors, the most important was the amount of money that could be made in that group, the second was "speed of work pace," and the third was opportunity to use one's head. Cooperation and friendliness of workers followed, as did the amount of self-pacing possible.

However, only two factors yielded a difference as significant *following* the change: the amount of money that could be made in that work group, and the speed of the work pace. If it can be assumed that the size of the *t* test result *is* an index of criticality, then this finding permits a

Table 19

Worker's Rating on Certain Factors of Most and Least Desirable Work Groups

(Mean description by workers (N=60)* of their first- and last-choice work groups and t-tests on the differences, by scale and group, before and after experimental change.)

Rating scale item	Pre-test			Post-test		
	First-choice line	Last-choice line	t	First-choice line	Last-choice line	t
Amount of money you can make on this line	5.6	4.0	5.46†	4.8	3.5	4.64†
Speed of work pace	5.6	4.4	3.95†	5.1	4.4	2.94†
Opportunity to use your head	5.4	4.6	3.36†	4.4	4.4	0.00
Amount of cooperation among workers	5.1	4.2	2.84†	4.1	3.7	1.28‡
Friendliness of workers	5.6	4.9	2.58†	4.8	4.3	1.90†
Amount of self-pacing	5.6	4.8	2.45†	4.6	4.6	0.00
Amount of physical effort required	5.8	5.6	1.44†	5.6	5.4	1.64†
Fairness of rates	4.2	3.9	1.40†	3.7	3.4	1.27‡
Amount of skill required	5.7	5.5	0.89‡	5.5	5.2	2.05†
Amount of variety in work	5.5	5.3	0.69‡	5.5	5.4	1.02‡
Opportunity to talk	5.0	5.0	0.00	4.8	4.6	1.24‡

*N includes only those workers present on *both* measurement occasions who were involved in the experiment proper and who provided usable data.

†Significant beyond .05 level (Critical value = 1.29, one-tail test.)

‡Not significant.

NOTE: Reprinted from Ned A. Rosen: *Leadership Change and Work-Group Dynamics: An Experiment* (Table 11), Copyright © 1969 by permission of Cornell University Press.

quite interesting inference. The pace of the work on the line is a measure of the rate with which the worker expends energy. In one sense, this is his major cost as a part of the work group and the organization. The monetary return may well be his most important benefit, at least as judged by the size of the *t* test result. These two elements do constitute a cost/benefits ratio. While the next step is necessarily conjectural, it is inviting to speculate that the individual worker in this study may well have evaluated the relative desirability of his work group in terms of the equity of the exchange it permitted him to achieve with the organization, where this exchange was judged primarily in terms of the monetary return obtained from a given investment of energy or effort.

An even more significant observation results from comparing the pre-test and post-test ratings of first-choice line. Assuming that each preferred his own work group more than others, that is, that his group was the one identified as first-choice, and that the pre- and post-test ratings are comparable, it seems fair to conclude that the individual worker was, on the average, *less satisfied with his own work group after the change occurred.* In fact, his ratings of first-choice line *after* the change corresponded roughly with his ratings of *last-choice line before* the change, indicating a substantial drop in satisfaction with own work group.

Significantly, the pre- and post-change ratings of first-choice line changed relatively little on the last five factors in Table 19. These factors seem to concern company policies and practices, and the actual physical requirements of the work itself. In contrast, the first six seem to deal with friendliness among members of the work group, the amount of autonomy within the work group, and the relative instrumentality of the worker's first-choice line in relation to other lines for making money. If these findings can be taken at face value, they are evidence that the exchange of foreman substantially upset a previously existing stable equilibrium, threatening members with loss of earning capacity, and creating uncertainty as to the quantity and type of influence attempts the foreman would make, that is, what leadership role he would attempt. (Many of these conclusions were also reached by Rosen, 1969). Cooperation and friendliness, both of which dropped substantially, probably reflect a higher degree of tension within the group, resulting from the disruption of previously established expectations regarding roles and relative responsibilities between the foreman and worker.

Work group members were also asked to rate first-choice and last-choice foremen on a number of scales; the ones found to be most significant discriminators dealt with the foreman's *personality*, his *ability to get things for his men from management*, and his *ability to plan and organize the work*. The second and third will be recognized as items previously found important. Ability to plan and organize had repeatedly been found to distinguish between descriptions of foremen of high and low productivity sections in the Survey Research Center work, and is a logical outcome in the present case when it is considered that a major concern in the present sample was their earning power, and the instrumentality of the work group for this purpose. This is suggestive evidence that the foreman's role is viewed by his men as that of a facilitator, whose purpose is to ensure that the instrumentality of the work group as a means of attaining individual goals will not be compromised.

The emergence of "ability to get things for his men from management" as an important factor provides further support for this interpretation. The influence of the foreman with his own supervisors logically should determine the extent to which he can perform the facilitating role that his men seem to expect. A similar observation was made by Pelz (1951), who found that a supervisor's influence, or power within a department, conditions the way his supervisory behavior relates to employee attitudes. Only influential supervisors impacted favorably on work group member attitudes through efforts to aid them. Since a foreman's efforts to help his men should be of little utility without some degree of influence with his own supervisors, this really is not too surprising.

Because of major interest in "personality" of the foreman, the first of the three factors listed earlier, a substantial number of items descriptive of foreman behavior was given to work group members at the *second* administration, and the responses of group members were factor analyzed. (The entries in the correlation matrix were differences between first and last choice foremen). Table 20 contains an abridgment of the results.

Four factors were found to underlie the "personality" judgments made by work group members: General Personality, Employee Centeredness, Initiation of Structure and Stress Management, and Motivation to Lead. The first of these consisted of behaviors and characteristics that were basically unpleasant in nature, that is, with negative social

Table 20

Factors and Scales on Which Workers Differentiated Between "Most" and "Least" Preferred Foremen[a]

Factor and Scale	Factor and Weight			
	1	2	3	4
(1) General personality				
Likes to critize	81			
Bossy	77			
Has a chip on his shoulder	75			
Flies off the handle	73			
Hard to talk to	70			
Acts too quickly without thinking	65		–43	
Moody-temperamental	64			
Things have to be done *his* way	63			
Changes his mind	63			
(2) Employee-centeredness				
Good listener		72		
Can take criticism		61		
Makes men feel important		55		
Friendly		53		
Polite		51		–43
Interested in his men		48		
Energetic, lots of drive		48		–40
(3) Initiation of structure and stress management (Technological-administrative competence)				
Handles emergencies			72	
Avoids problems he should handle			–63	
Ability to plan and organize the work			61	
Is relaxed			60	
Can be pushed around			–58	
Gets upset			–52	
Ability to get things for his men from management			48	

Continued

Table 20 *(Continued)*

Factors and Scales on Which Workers Differentiated Between "Most" and "Least" Preferred Foremen[a]

Factor and Scale	Factor and Weight			
	1	2	3	4
(4) Motivation to lead (Role differentiation)				
Skill as an upholsterer				90
Extent of his job knowledge				75
Sticks to company rules				−38

[a] Abridgment of Table 13, Rosen (1969, p. 93).

desirability, such as "Bossy" or "Likes to Criticize." The high relative importance of these behaviors to work group members was indicated by the fact that this was the first factor identified in the analysis, and accounted for 42% of the variance in the intercorrelation matrix. That this should be a most important factor is reasonable, if the view of the foreman as a facilitator of group goal attainment is correct.

In a smoothly functioning work group that has no problems and is meeting its production goals handily, there is really little need for a foreman. (Indeed, his presence under such conditions may even be a "cost" to his subordinates.) He becomes of value when a problem arises, or when production goals are not being achieved. When this occurs, and it seems to occur with at least moderate frequency (Skeaff, 1967), there is then a need for his help. But if he responds with negatively toned or emotional behavior, there is a negative "cost" attached to the help he eventually gives toward solving the problem, and this "cost" probably inhibits requests for help. The accumulated "cost" to the work group is then the loss of self-esteem to the member who incurs such behavior (the fact that he must endure the behavior demonstrates that he has lower status than the foreman), and *increased loss of productivity and earnings by the member and the group*, because of delays in seeking the foreman's help. That these costs would be strongly resented, especially the latter, is evident from the previous discussion of the preeminent criteria by which these workers judged their groups.

The second factor in Table 20, Employee Centeredness, appears to be quite similar to the employee orientation factor identified in the Survey

Research Center work, and the consideration factor from the Ohio State studies (see Chapter 2). Such behaviors, especially by a higher status person, confer status to others and enhance their self-esteem. More importantly, however, if one of the foreman's principal values is as a problem solver and expediter, *these behaviors serve to minimize communication constraints by reducing status differentials and their attendant discomforts*, and thereby probably serve to encourage the initiation of interaction by work group members. When this aids him to learn about production problems more quickly, group goal attainment should be facilitated, and his utility to the group should be higher. (However, it is worth noting that encouraging such behavior through high employee centeredness, but without a high productivity orientation as well, could easily lead to an excess of socially oriented interaction that may interfere with the primary purposes of the group. This was suggested earlier as a reason why high LPC [Least Preferred Co-Worker] leaders have less productive groups under highly favorable conditions.)

The third factor is more obviously related to the foreman's postulated planning and troubleshooting role than the preceding two, and requires no further elaboration. But the fourth factor is not so clear. Rosen interpreted this factor as an indication of motivation to undertake the special role of leader, and thus compared it with the role differentiation requirement found in the Survey Research Center studies. It may be that this is an appropriate interpretation. However, in view of the description of the task specialist provided by Moment and Zaleznik (1963), it is possible that this factor might instead reflect the defensiveness they found to characterize the task specialist in interpersonal interaction. If this is so, it would appear that Factor Three might be more appropriately an indication of role differentiation, while Factor Four might be more a measure of avoidance of the interpersonal interaction necessarily associated with leadership.

This pattern of findings, together with other observations from the Rosen study, weaves a meaningful picture of the contribution of the foreman to the work group, and criteria by which group membership and the foremen are evaluated by group members. Rosen concluded that the very fact of foreman exchange was initially interpreted by the members of the department as an expression of dissatisfaction with the department's productivity. Why else would management take such an extreme action? This, together with the foreman exchange itself, upset the equilibrium of each group, after which each was faced with the task of regaining a satisfactory steady state.

One of the initial features of this search for new equilibrium was *increased* productivity by all but one of the groups. In fact, there was a strong tendency for the groups initially lowest in productivity to show the largest gains (*rho*=−.61) immediately following the foreman exchange. Three measures were found to correlate with post-exchange productivity changes. One was the money motivation of group members, as measured one year prior to the exchange (*rho*=.71); a second was the degree of leadership consensus within the group 10 weeks after the exchange (*rho*=.85); and the third was attraction to the group (*rho*=.83) which also was highly correlated with status consensus about the foreman (*rho*=.83).

These findings form a complex pattern, but with a not too difficult interpretation. Given that the foreman exchange was a threat to individual need satisfactions, it seems reasonable that the money motive would have become activated, and that group members would have become concerned about how their new foreman would influence their earning capability. The assumption here is the conclusion stated earlier: that members view the work group as an instrumentality for the accomplishment of personal goals—making money in this case being primary—and the foreman as a group asset for facilitating goal attainment. Given this assumption, which seems true in the Rosen study, it is then reasonable to believe that agreement within the group about how good their foreman is (status consensus) would be higher to the extent that they have found him to perform this function well; similarly, attraction to the group would be higher to the extent that it has been found to remain instrumental in the personal goal attainment. This set of interpretations is, of course, supported by the findings presented in Table 19.

It seems possible to draw some additional inferences from these findings, that provide further support for the value of exchange theory as an approach to understanding behavior in formal organizations. If the principal concern of the group member is the equity of his return, considering his investment of energy or effort and his financial return on this investment, then it may be inferred that the immediate concern of the subjects of this study was not focused on the possibility of a *loss* of earnings so much as on the possibility that they might need to exert more effort than previously required to maintain earnings, which would create a decrease in their benefits/costs ratio and would perhaps be resented almost as much as an actual loss of earnings.

The conclusions from this study are of such importance that they merit a summary listing:

(1) The workers in this study, and probably workers in general, saw the group as an instrumentality for attaining individual goals which, at least in the present case, were primarily tangible, such as earnings. (This is in agreement with Homans' (1965) belief that tangible rewards may be the principal ones required for satisfaction of the blue collar worker.)

(2) The workers' attraction to their groups probably was a function of the *ease* with which the group met its production goals, added effort representing an additional cost to the worker which would decrease his benefits/costs ratio.

(3) The foreman was a valued asset to the group to the extent that he could facilitate group goal attainment (and individual member earnings) through problem solving, troubleshooting, and representing the group successfully to management. Specific dimensions involved in his evaluation by his subordinates were (a) his general personality (pleasant-unpleasant), (b) being employee-centered (not the same as pleasant personality), (c) planning, organizing, and handling problems and emergencies, and (d) being motivated to lead.

(4) Production was not strongly affected by the exchange of foremen, suggesting that the performance-stabilizing variables in this specific situation were considerably more influential than the foremen. While this may not be surprising, considering that the range of ability among the foremen in this stable work force was probably low, the almost non-influence of the foreman on productivity may also reflect the type of performance feedback system used in the department, and the existence of group productivity norms focused on this feedback system.

THE ORGANIZATION AND THE WORK GROUP AS ENERGY SYSTEMS

Substantial space has been devoted to describing the Rosen experiment, for two reasons. The first is that this experiment seems to confirm certain important cause and effect relationships regarding the leader's contribution to his group. The second is that these relationships support the view of an organization as an energy system[1] (Rosen, 1970). This view suggests that an organization has a finite amount of energy[2] at any given time for the accomplishment of goals. While this amount may change as the result of the effectiveness with which the organization operates, at any given point in time it is finite. A central organizational purpose is to use this energy to act on inputs (raw materials) in order to create a product or service. The product or service is then exchanged with the environment for further energy, which the organization can then use for further processing of inputs to make products. This exchange is cyclic and is repeated until resources of one sort or another are depleted. If it is assumed that the organization has a finite amount of energy at any one point in time, and that if it "runs out" of energy it will cease to exist, then a priority objective ought to be the accumulation of surplus energy. The accumulation of a surplus, or reserve, is insurance against peak demands that might be made at a future time, or a period of negative outcomes during which a reserve would be essential and without which the organization might cease to exist.

There is reason to believe that the work group, and perhaps also the individual within the work group, functions according to similar principles. That is, there probably is an upper limit, all other things being equal, to the amount of energy that can be drawn from either an individual or a work group for the accomplishment of organizational purposes. This amount depends, to a major extent, on benefits offered by the organization. As was found in Chapter 5, work groups tend to develop norms and require members to conform to them. The norm defining equity of exchange between member and organization is salient for all individuals and work groups. Rate restricting norms are a consequence, in part, of this equity norm, and serve important functions for the work group. Among

[1] This is a reference to open systems theory and its application to organizations, a good discussion of which is found in Katz and Kahn (1966). A detailed discussion of open systems theory as such would be more complex than required by the purposes of the present volume. This discussion of open systems theory has therefore been considerably simplified, though the adaptation still bears some resemblance to the discussion in Katz and Kahn.

[2] The word "energy" in this context may be confusing. If the word "resources" is substituted instead, the sense of the discussion will be the same insofar as organizations are concerned. For individuals and work groups, however, it is probable that energy (effort) is a more meaningful concept than resources.

these are protection of the group's own internal status hierarchy and protection against management pressures for increased productivity, which many workers regard as insatiable (Seashore, 1954a). Deviance from the group's productivity norm is punished in part because it is evidence of a capacity for greater effort which members feel they should not be required to make, and which, indeed, they perhaps could not continue on a long-term basis. The operation of equity norms, in conjunction with specific productivity norms for each work group, then defines an upper limit to the amount of energy available within the work group for organizational purposes.

However, the existence of this upper limit is not a guarantee that it will be achieved in actual practice. It will be recalled that there is a strong tendency in all exchange relationships for participants to maximize the ratio of benefits to costs. Where possible, each seeks to minimize his own costs, and there is even some evidence for a norm which permits exploitation of "suckers" (Scodel, 1962) who do not properly insist on equity in exchange.

There is, of course, a close parallel between the concept of maximizing a benefits/cost ratio and the tendency of energy systems to accumulate a reserve by decreasing the energy expenditures required to accomplish necessary output functions. (In actual practice, work groups usually also have *minimum* productivity norms as well as rate restricting norms, probably because work group members fear that the organization will take punitive action if production falls below those levels. However, these minimum norms define a level of production below what most organizations desire.)

It appears, therefore, that the amount of energy available within a work group is defined at the upper limit by the group's judgment of what constitutes a fair investment for offered returns and at the lower limit by what the group feels the organization will tolerate. This last point is worthy of reemphasis. If the organization does not require an equitable return on the benefits it provides the work group, through production emphasis by its supervisory personnel, the "sucker exploitation" norm may allow the work group to reestablish minimum production norms at any level that will be tolerated. As will be seen, morale *and* productivity probably depend on the ability of the organization (a) to judge accurately what does represent an equitable exchange for both sides, and (b) to use the energy available from the work group to best advantage. It is probable that the work group forms evaluative judgments about the organization on both counts.

Both social-recreational and work groups require energy expenditures for two broad categories of effort, task activities and group maintenance. The distinction between these two activity categories was found in Chapter 5 to be the basis for development of task specialist and social specialist roles in small groups. In the present discussion, it is useful to think of these as two ways in which energy (effort) is spent from a finite total energy resource. This is not a new concept, of course. Cattell in 1951 defined the term *synergy* as the total *interest* investment by members in the group's activities; this, in turn, was equated with the energy group members were willing to invest in group activities, part of which was required for group maintenance activities, and part for an effective expression of the group's goal-seeking activities. Cattell further proposed that the measure of the leader's effectiveness might well be the ratio of these two.

While there is agreement on the existence of these two activity areas, there might not be agreement that simply maximizing the ratio of task to maintenance energy defines group effectiveness. It seems reasonable that there would be some intermediate point at which the amount of energy going into group maintenance activities is small, but not zero, and the amount of energy available for task purposes has become large, though not totally to the exclusion of maintenance. This follows from the assumption that a certain level of group-provided social rewards, which the organization cannot economically provide, is necessary to supplement organizationally provided rewards, and that a certain level of energy investment is necessary in order to maintain the group as a source of these rewards. Within these limits, however, it appears that more effective groups probably have become so by investing a greater amount of their energy in task activities.

This effect can be deduced from findings such as those of Fiedler (1954) and Torrence (1955), which suggest that more effective groups tend to be less congenial. The use of more of the groups' total energy for maintenance purposes would result in more congenial groups, but would decrease the energy available for task activities, and thereby decrease effectiveness.

Evidence for a reciprocal relationship between maintenance and task energy expenditures, and the effect of this ratio on group productivity is found in an experiment by Schachter, *et al.* (1961). In assembly line technologies, it sometimes is necessary to change either the product or the procedure. Whenever such changes occur, they are commonly accompanied by major productivity changes. Most often there is a sharp drop, followed by a slow return to previous production levels. In the present study, Schachter, *et al.*, suggested that one probable cause for such production decreases was the amount of energy used by workers to assimilate tensions with which they were confronted in their work environment. The effect of such tensions was not felt to be strongly associated with productivity while a line was on an established run because most individual tasks on a line are highly automatic, and require little concentration for their accomplishment after they are learned. It was felt, therefore, that the existence of tensions, and any energy expenditures required for handling them, would have more effect during a changeover, because this would be a period during which the worker would be learning new procedures, and therefore would need to expend more energy in order to obtain the same production outcomes. In this study, then, there was a base line period to measure productivity, a manipulation phase in which some groups were subjected to annoyances while other groups were protected from them, and a changeover phase during which productivity was measured on the new product.

While data from the two different factories involved in this experiment were not in complete agreement, it seemed that the annoyances to which work groups were subjected had little effect on their productivity *before* changeover. However, *after* changeover, errors in the protected groups quickly came down to the level of the pre-changeover base line, while errors by members of the annoyed groups increased substantially. These findings were confirmed by a second study which included as "controls" workers who did not have their jobs changed, and who did not change in their error rate after the changeover point.

While it was not the original purpose of this experiment to demonstrate the effect of requirements for maintenance energy expenditures on group performance, it seems nonetheless to have done so. Apparently, the more energy the group is required to use in assimilating tensions, the less it will have to devote to the accomplishment of group tasks. It is worth commenting at this point that these findings may provide an explanation for why the use of group discussion prior to changeover often protects an assembly line against a sharp reduction in productivity after changeover (for example, Seashore, 1954b). In the Rosen (1969) experiment, one of the most interesting findings was that the concern of work group members about making money increased after the exchange of foremen. Further, the motivation for high earnings correlated substantially with group performance during the 10 weeks after foreman changes were made, though it had not earlier.

Regardless of the source of motivation for financial rewards—Whyte, *et al.* (1955) suggest that it is partly because relative earnings imply relative status, while others (e.g., Homans, 1965) think it is because the money motive may not be sufficiently well satisfied among blue-collar workers—a threat to continued satisfaction of this motive should create tension, which should require an energy expenditure. When the source of tension is product changeover, its explanation is probably a combination of three factors: (a) anticipated loss of earning power because of the requirement to learn a new operation, (b) anticipated need to exert more effort to bring earnings back to their original point after learning the new operation, and (c) resentment over the fact that there is a need to exert any additional effort *for the same return.* That this third factor may well be the major one in causing a slow return to standard production after a changeover is strongly suggested by Coch and French (1948). They showed that new operators in a garment factory learned a "changed" operation a good deal faster than experienced operators who had been changed from another operation when changeover was accomplished through the same procedures that had been traditional in the factory, but not when participative leadership techniques were used prior to and during changeover.

THE FUNCTION OF LEADERSHIP IN FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS

These considerations invite a somewhat different view of the role of leadership in formal organizations than has been customary. If the subordinate's judgment of the fairness of his outcomes is a principal determiner of his productive effectiveness, and if these judgments are based (consciously or unconsciously) on an exchange model which focuses on the equity of his returns in comparison with the costs incurred to obtain them, then it seems reasonable to conclude that there are two major leadership objectives to be accomplished in formal organizations. One is to influence subordinates to believe that their outcomes are equitable, and the second is to initiate changes in organizational activities or processes in such a way as to convince organization members that the equity of their outcomes is not in jeopardy.

This also suggests a key aspect of the role of the supervisor, as viewed by both subordinates and superordinates. While their expectations for *how* the supervisor should do his job differ, in both views he is the trustee of certain human resources which he must use wisely and efficiently in the accomplishment of assigned tasks. The superordinate values the accomplishment of goals, and thus expects the highest performance possible from the investment the organization is making in the group. On the other hand, subordinates value the supervisor who can aid the group either to accomplish these objectives with less effort, or to attain higher outcomes with the same effort. Thus, the effectiveness of the supervisor probably should be defined in terms of his ability to mediate a balance between these somewhat contradictory expectations, so that both superordinates and subordinates are reasonably satisfied.

As a definition of supervisory effectiveness, this departs to some extent from conventional views. But, it follows closely Kahn's (1960) definition of organizational effectiveness as "... the extent to which an organization as a social system, given certain resources and means, fulfills its objectives without incapacitating its means and resources, and without placing undue strain upon its members." And it is strongly supported by the results of the Rosen (1970) study.

This approach to definition of the roles of leadership and supervision serves to make another important distinction. Supervision is not necessarily leadership, nor are leadership techniques necessarily appropriate at all times during the supervision of organizational activity. While in the previous chapter a distinction was made between actions based on the use of authority relationships and those based on leadership skills, it probably is worth making again. Leadership implies two-way communication, and the time to resolve a situation through persuasive interaction. It is likely that most supervisory situations do not call for the use of leadership techniques, and that such techniques may not be cost-effective except when they serve needed purposes that cannot be accomplished through other means with equally good outcomes.

Much of the confusion in the literature concerning power, authority, and leadership, as described in the preceding chapter, probably stems from failure to distinguish between "leader" as a person, and "leadership" as a technique, or subset of role behaviors, to be used by superordinates *as the situation demands*, in order to obtain the specific results that such techniques can attain.

Why this failure occurred is unclear, but an excellent example of the kind of thinking that may have contributed to it is found in Gibb's (1954) distinction between leadership and headship. Headship, according to Gibb, is characterized by:

(1) Maintenance by an organized system instead of the spontaneous accord of group members.

(2) Unilateral choice of goals by the head, as opposed to decision through group consensus.

(3) Little or no shared feeling of joint action in pursuit of the goal.

(4) A strong desire by the head for high social distance between himself and his subordinates as a tool for their further coercion.

(5) Authority based on extra-group sources, as opposed to derived from the consensus of the group itself.

The basis for this set of discriminanda is not stated; it is tempting to conclude that they are derived as much from the author's definitional biases as from any empirical data. If the behavior of a position incumbent in a formal organization is considered as a whole—this is his positional role—then Gibb's discriminanda seemingly either require role inflexibility just because the incumbent is a member of a formal organization (i.e. since he must, for example, set at least some goals or objectives unilaterally, then by definition he cannot "lead") or have excluded leadership as an influence technique in formal organizations.

The second of these interpretations seems controverted by, as one example, participative techniques (e.g., Coch and French, 1948), and the first interpretation is a logical absurdity. Yet there is a continuing tendency in the literature for reference to be made to persons as leaders because some part of their role repertories consists of behaviors successful in influencing others without recourse to either authority or power relationships. This obscures the fact that almost certainly there are other parts of their repertories that are based on shared expectations as to who should tell whom to do what, that is, authority relationships, in order that the complicated machinery of formal organizations might operate as efficiently as possible.

It thus seems essential to examine the total spectrum of role behaviors of effective supervisors, in order to obtain a better understanding of the relationship between leadership and non-leadership in the supervisor's role, and between leadership and group effectiveness. It seems likely that what will be found is the presence of a balance in the supervisor's role between leadership behaviors, which are used skillfully to accomplish specific purposes as the situation demands, and other behaviors which are not leadership, but which are more effective for the purpose (at the time) than leadership behaviors would be.

To recall the theme of the criticism of Gibb's distinction between leadership and headship, it probably is a serious error to assume that a superordinate with a real potential for coercive influence may not also command effective leadership skills which enable him to influence without recourse to coercive power. Consequently, it seems necessary to conclude that the mere fact of formal organization does not prohibit leadership, that leadership is an appropriate technique for formal organizations, and that its appearance probably hinges on two requirements. One is an organizational environment—both climate and technology—that permits leadership techniques to be used, and the second is possession of the interpersonal competence skills necessary for the communication between supervisor and subordinate that is essential for leadership.

This analysis leads to a different position than that adopted, for example, by the Ohio State researchers, who assumed that leadership is what position incumbents do. While it is undoubtedly necessary to know the total spectrum of role behaviors required of the incumbent, it is also necessary to separate what is leadership from what is not. The difficulty is that to do so requires some kind of criterion of what constitutes leadership, apart from the mere fact that it is done by someone with influence. For purposes of the remainder of this chapter, the distinctions made in the previous chapter will serve as just such an independent criterion of what leadership is, within the total repertoire of the supervisor. Equally important, as in previous sections the use of the word "leader" to describe the superordinate in a formal organization will be avoided. For reasons already given, it is unlikely that it is appropriate as a descriptive term.[3]

If the role of the superordinate is examined, it appears that there must be at least three general areas of activity in which he must be competent, if he is to have the balance required to achieve the status of the "star" described by Moment and Zaleznik (1963). One is the management of human and material resources, so as to attain the highest outcomes possible within the limits of effort considered fair and reasonable by work group members. The second area is the use of leadership techniques to maintain facilitative relationships among subordinates, to initiate change—when change is seen by the subordinate as a threat to the equity of exchange between worker and organization—and to develop and maintain attitudes compatible with the effective and efficient accomplishment of organizational purposes.[4] And the third area is the use of similar techniques to coordinate laterally and in an upward direction with other organization members who control needed resources, in order to obtain from them what is needed for his own group to accomplish its assigned objectives without undue delay or hardship.

The first two of these areas of activity have appeared as components of superordinate behavior in numerous studies, in one form or another, and the third has appeared at least occasionally. Both Stogdill (1959) and Bowers and Seashore (1966) have conducted short reviews of the literature to identify dimensions of superordinate behavior. While their conclusions were drawn from somewhat different perspectives, the outcomes are quite similar. Bowers and Seashore, who reached conclusions perhaps more typical of the literature generated by factor analytic studies, suggest that there are probably four dimensions:

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[3] For equally compelling reasons, discussed at length in Chapters 3 and 5, a good case could probably be made against using the term in many of the informal social-recreational groups, and especially informal laboratory study groups, which some theorists have held to be a locus of leadership. Especially in laboratory studies, demand characteristics of the situation may be more powerfully compelling than even the authority structure of formal organizations.

[4] These are quite similar to objectives of leadership listed by Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1958), who suggested that leadership serves to: (a) raise the level of employee motivation; (b) increase readiness of subordinates to accept change; (c) improve the quality of managerial decisions; (d) improve teamwork and morale; and (e) provide for individual development of subordinates.

> "(1) Support. Behavior that enhances someone else's feeling of personal worth and importance.
>
> (2) Interaction Facilitation. Behavior that encourages members of the group to develop close, mutually satisfying relationships.
>
> (3) Goal Emphasis. Behavior that stimulates an enthusiasm for meeting the group's goal or achieving excellent performance.
>
> (4) Work Facilitation. Behavior that helps achieve goal attainment by such activities as scheduling, coordinating, planning, and by providing resources such as tools, materials, and technical knowledge."

The similarity of these dimensions to those identified in earlier studies, some of which were presented in Chapter 2, is quite apparent. Within the present context, it seems possible to go somewhat further in analysis of these four areas of superordinate behavior, as was done with the factors identified in the Rosen study. If it can be assumed that social exchange principles govern the decisions made by subordinates as to the relative desirability of their positions in relation to the organization, then it seems likely that one of the functions of leadership in organizations is to influence these decisions, and perhaps also to influence work group norm formation in directions favorable to the organization. This probably is what Bakke (1959) described as the fusion process, and one of the necessary keys to obtaining desired outcomes in the management by objectives approach (McGregor, 1960), to mention only two examples.

To go one step further, it seems probable that the superordinate accomplishes this purpose through ability to enter into exchange relationships with other members of the organization, and through sensitivity to a need for exchange relationships among subordinates that go beyond exchange either between subordinate and organization, or between subordinates and himself.

Examination of the four factors suggested by Bowers and Seashore from this frame of reference is quite rewarding. Support, for example, might easily be characterized as superordinate behavior that awards esteem and builds the self-concept of subordinates. Providing that the superordinate is esteemed by the subordinate—Blau (1964) suggests that this is a requirement—it seems reasonable to postulate that this type of behavior is one of the most important elements of leadership. Through such behaviors, the value of group membership is increased, the value of the superordinate-subordinate relationship is increased, and the subordinate's willingness to act in response to the superordinate's *wishes*—not demands—is increased through activation of the norm of reciprocity. This clearly *sounds* like leadership. Yet, what is being described is *social* exchange, which is not unlike the exchange that was found in Chapter 5 to underlie the development of interpersonal commitment, and affective relationships necessary for cohesion within groups. (There are implications for organizational leadership in this analysis—one is the possibility of a need to reconsider the function of status and social distance in organizations. Imposition of social distance, especially, *could* limit the opportunity for the use of leadership.)

The same analysis could be applied to the second factor, Interaction Facilitation, except that in this case the object of the superordinate's intention would be the development of conditions that would produce high rates of social exchange *among* group members. While Goal Emphasis does not fit obviously into an exchange model, it can be recognized as an essential if it is assumed that subordinates who desire to reciprocate benefits need to know what the superordinate values. Finally, the fourth factor, Work Facilitation, requires little elaboration.

Perhaps a central theme of the two preceding chapters, as well as a good part of the present one, has been that the superordinate's value to the group is largely determined by the unique contribution he can make to its productive effort. Indeed, this may well be how he earns the group's esteem initially, so that his support of them (first factor) as persons is valued.

It is strongly tempting to conclude that skill in social exchange is one of the key requisites for effective leadership, and that the use of leadership skills in formal organizations then involves, at a minimum, the following elements: correct assessment of one's own bargaining position, including the value of one's own "offerable" benefits; correct assessment of the needs of the other member(s) of the bargaining relationship; bargaining skills, including both the capacity for open, non-defensive communication and the ability to compromise; and a set of personal values that lead him to understand the commitments he has made to others in order to avoid violating agreements and thereby preventing the development of mutual trust.

It is important to emphasize that the "benefits" involved in these exchanges need not necessarily be tangible, and that the value of the non-tangible benefits may need to be known even more accurately than the value of the more tangible ones. For example, as was mentioned earlier, praise from an esteemed person is valued and leads to the desire to reciprocate in some way—to prolong the relationship if nothing else; however, praise from a person who is *not* esteemed is interpreted as flattery, and leads to suspicion about his motives (Blau). One of the implications for the superordinate, therefore, is that he must know how his subordinates regard him before he can risk the use of praise. At a very practical level, a new member of the management hierarchy who has entered laterally (instead of coming up through the ranks), such as the newly commissioned junior officer in the military service, may do himself a disservice by praising a subordinate, such as a noncommissioned officer, who is many years senior to himself in experience. On the other hand, he *may* earn "credits" by seeking that person's advice about a technical problem, which would also serve to increase that person's self-esteem, but by a different means.

EXCHANGE ASPECTS OF THE SUPERORDINATE'S ROLE

Evidence has already been presented that subordinate members of organizations probably evaluate their outcomes in terms of exchange principles, and that they probably evaluate the effectiveness of their supervision in the same terms. (By this, it is not meant that subordinates are aware of social exchange theory or that they can verbalize exchange principles. As Blau suggests, they probably cannot. except perhaps in a most rudimentary manner. However, they do *act* as though they were cognizant of exchange principles, and do conform *roughly* in most cases to predictions from exchange theory. Blau discusses ways in which people depart from conformity with exchange principles, and offers some suggestions as to why these deviations occur ignorance of available alternatives being one reason.)

Given that the four factors identified by Bowers and Seashore are typical of the behavioral dimensions of the superordinate's role and that these dimensions can be expressed in the terms of exchange theory, then analysis of findings relating these functions to group effectiveness should produce insights into possible relationships between the superordinate's skill in mediating exchange processes and both the satisfaction and the motivation of his subordinates.

In the following sections, which will seek to accomplish this analysis, it will be assumed that certain conclusions, which have been drawn at earlier points, are in fact correct:

First, that the energy model (simplified open systems theory) is appropriate for predicting worker attitudes toward work, that is, that the worker sees as his primary cost the effort he puts into his work and that he seeks to minimize this cost, though not *necessarily* at the cost of reducing either the quality or the quantity of the work he does.

Second, that good intragroup relations are necessary as a source of exchange satisfactions within the work environment, and that maintenance activities performed by the group serve to increase the "quality" of intragroup relations.

Third, that threat or tension in the work environment will increase the individual's need for the support he obtains from good intragroup relations, while at the same time decreasing the group's capacity to provide it.

Fourth, that effort and attention will be diverted from productive activities toward maintenance activities when intragroup relations decrease in quality as a consequence of tension or threat to either the group or its individual members.

There is one additional conclusion that could be reached at this point, based on the preceding four and on exchange principles. When one partner in an exchange is subjected to what he regards as a deprivation, he will have a strong tendency toward *retaliation* (Brown, 1968), a seemingly purposeful attempt to produce a deprivation in the other that at least equals his own. This is an apparently general response to perceived violation of the norm of distributive justice.

In the first assumption/conclusion above, it was assumed that workers would not necessarily seek to reduce the quality or quantity of their work output in order to minimize their costs. However, where the worker makes a judgment that the amount of effort called for by a change in his assigned tasks is a relative deprivation (e.g., when a change in work methods or process causes him to exert extra effort to achieve the same outcomes) and when he judges that this is either arbitrary or unnecessary, then it might be predicted that he will restrict his production, or be more careless, to seek to inflict on the organization some penalty, as he feels that he himself has been penalized by the organization's action in introducing change. (This situation, incidentally, underscores one of the requirements for leadership in formal organizations. The impact of change within the organizational context should depend on how it is *interpreted* by those on whom it impacts. In turn, their interpretations should reflect how well they were prepared psychologically for the change, how well they think they can cope with the change, and how much help they can expect from their superordinates in coping with the change. This kind of preparation for change would fall within the definition of leadership as given in the preceding chapter, along with other functions.)

Goal Emphasis—Maintaining a Productivity Orientation

While the Bowers and Seashore interpretation of this factor suggests a leadership type of activity—stimulating enthusiasm for goal achievement—a productivity orientation factor of one type or another has been repeatedly found to be a significant emphasis in high achievement groups. Kahn (1960), in a summary of the Michigan work, notes this, and Bowers and Seashore suggest, on the basis of their review, that it is a general finding. Within the context of the present chapter, it seems reasonable to conclude that superordinate behaviors which emphasize productivity are required of him as the organization's representative in defining to the work group what the organization considers minimal to ensure distributive justice for itself. The problem for leadership is in maintaining a productivity emphasis that does not exclude other considerations, and that does not compromise the work group's norm of distributive justice, that is, produce an inequitable situation by setting standards too high, or by allowing workers to *believe* that they are too high.

The maintenance of an equitable production emphasis is, unfortunately, a difficult task. Superordinates have the same problem with production quantity that individuals do with beliefs. In both cases, concrete criteria may be lacking; beliefs are therefore confirmed by consensual validation. Similarly, production standards must generally be set by comparative study methods which admit that production is a relative variable. That is, a standard for a new job is generally set either through comparison with an old job, or through analysis of the components of the new job in view of time requirements for these elements as components of other jobs. In both cases, performance expectations are *relative* and therefore subject to error.

Where many different groups are involved in doing the same job, deviant groups can be identified. However, when this is not possible, it may be extremely difficult to know whether a given level of productivity is satisfactory, is too low because of the difficulty of the task, or is too low because of inadequate effort from the group itself. The traditional utilization of time and motion experts as a resource for industrial management reflects this concern about the relative nature of production standards and a desire to make them more objectively verifiable.

However, within the present context, it would seem that the manner in which production expectations are developed and communicated to workers may be more important than the absolute nature of the expectations themselves. As has already been established, two essential requirements for stable exchange relationships are that mutual trust exists, and that each has the opportunity to bargain with the other without constraint. In the terms of the work-day environment, the worker must be able to trust his boss, and must feel that he can protest (successfully) what he considers unfair. (In exchange terms, a successful protest would be one that either accomplishes change in the situation, or results in the discovery of new information that makes the need of the other appear more reasonable.)

It therefore seems that no matter how production expectations are established, if they are decided upon unilaterally without the opportunity for comment by those whom they will affect, there is always the risk that the workers will feel the goals are too high, and that they are being exploited by the organization. Since exploitation violates the norm of distributive justice, there theoretically should be resentment and attempts at retribution, which might take the form of decreased production, or perhaps a reluctant increase which is associated with hostility, aggression, and attempts to leave the situation.

Both types of findings have been obtained. Pepinsky, Pepinsky, and Pavlik (1960) studied the performance of student groups in a laboratory task that required the assembly of "products" of two complexities from modular parts, with time pressures ranging from low to high. On both simple and complex assembly tasks, group productivity was higher under medium time pressure than either low or high pressure. It is significant that high time pressure resulted in *reduction* in performance, even though these were student groups, which presumably were more motivated toward high productivity than traditioned work groups would have been—knowing that the high output would not need to be sustained over a prolonged period, and lacking rate-restricting norms. Nevertheless, high time pressure still resulted in *reduction* in performance, that is, when the pressure became too great, performance dropped.

Day and Hamblin (1964) studied the effects of close and punitive supervision, where close supervision was designed, among other things, to include production pressure. While other aspects of the "close supervision" role (e.g., low autonomy for the college student subjects) could have accounted for the findings, there was nonetheless a significant reduction in productivity, together with a significant increase in aggressive feelings toward the supervisor, and a tendency toward increase in aggressive feelings toward co-workers.

Perhaps of even greater interest, however, is a study by Morse and Reimer (1956), previously cited, in which a decrease in autonomy was coupled with greater pressures for production in a clerical staff section of an industrial organization. The pressures for productivity took the form of requiring a constant amount of work from a decreasing work force, with the result that the group was apparently unable to mobilize an effective rate-restricting norm. Consequently, the group was producing significantly more at the end of the period of observation than at the beginning, but there was evidence that dissatisfaction and turnover increased as a result. Thus, the company actually made a productivity gain through arbitrary production pressure., but at the cost of turnover and subsequent re-training costs when production pressures were not accompanied by concomitant gains by the workers themselves.

These studies suggest that the level of production expected, and the manner in which expectations are communicated, are both important. Excessive production emphasis will either cause an immediate drop in productivity, or an increase that is not stable (or not worthwhile) because of its added costs to the organization in personnel turnover. Further, production emphasis that is communicated in a unilateral or coercive manner will almost surely create resentment and discontent.

These conclusions seem to challenge expectancy theory, as described in Chapter 4. From a purely theoretical point of view, it might seem that an organization should be able to obtain high productivity by making organizational rewards contingent on whatever level of effort is required. The threat of withholding rewards if this level of effort is not forthcoming should then be sufficient to elicit the desired effort. It is possible that straightforward motivational effects of this nature would occur if the organization were dealing with *individuals* in the work force. However, as was shown in Chapter 5, the organization does *not* deal with individuals; rather, it must deal with groups, the members of which agree with one another as to what is reasonable and then support one another through rate-restricting norms. These norms have two effects, one of which was mentioned earlier—that the enforcement of a norm below the desired standard makes it difficult for the organization to be confident that this standard is either fair or possible. The second effect is that collective action by the group may prevent effective denial of tangible rewards by the organization for failure to achieve the standard.

However, even with these limitations, there still is evidence that expectancy theory predictions are accurate to at least a limited extent, and that productivity is affected by the belief that desired rewards are contingent on work performance. Georgopoulos, Mahoney, and Jones (1957) studied productivity in two factories with relatively standard incentive plans (i.e., a base rate for all workers and a piece rate providing additional earnings for productivity beyond the base). Ratings were obtained from workers as to what their goals were, and how instrumental they saw high productivity to be for the attainment of those goals. The key issue was whether a belief that high productivity was instrumental in achieving job-related goals would in fact be related to behavior, that is, high productivity.

The findings did demonstrate a relationship between productivity and the belief that high productivity was instrumental in attaining their goals, as reported by the workers themselves. For example, if a worker reported that he thought high productivity would help to get more money "in the long run," he was more likely to be a higher producer than someone who did not feel that way. Further, the relationship between behavior and belief of instrumentality was stronger among workers who had a higher need to achieve the various job goals tested.

Of perhaps equal interest is the relative effectiveness of the three job goals used to test instrumentality in this study. They were "more money in the long run," "getting along well with work group," and "promotion to a higher base rate." Of these, "more money in the long run" was most effective in producing higher productivity when it was believed to be instrumental for that goal. This, of course, is supportive of previous evidence that motivation toward tangible rewards is a strong factor influencing the behavior of blue-collar workers.

Partially supportive findings were also obtained in a well-controlled laboratory study by Graen (1969). However, Graen also found some conditions under which instrumentality effects were not noted, and concluded that behavior is not likely to be affected by reward contingencies except when (a) the job situation permits reliable and accurate performance evaluation, (b) desired performance is rewarded with favorable outcomes, and (c) employees know that these contingencies exist. Of course, these are requirements which expectancy theory specifies to be crucial. That is, the individual must be convinced not only that effort will be rewarded, but that if he does make an effort he will succeed, and that the reward will be worth the effort required.

It should be noted that results obtained in both of the two preceding studies were apparently influenced by additional factors within the situation beyond the incentives offered. Graen, in particular, noted that workers are also influenced by their groups (e.g., rate restrictive norms) and by forces within themselves (e.g., the extent to which they judge the work itself to be attractive). Also, examination of the percentages of workers responding to the instrumentality of high production in the Georgopoulos, *et al.* study suggests that this may not be a significant influence on behavior for a majority of workers. Rather, it may influence a minority—though a large minority—who probably constitute the more highly productive members of the work group, within the upper limits permitted by the rate-restricting norms of their groups. An interesting implication is that group productivity may be influenced by superordinates and organizations in either (or both) of two ways: One, through dealing with the group *as a group*, using leadership techniques to influence group productivity norms (this will be discussed further in a subsequent section); two, through dealing with *individuals* within the group, in essence satisfying their individual needs when they push the limits permitted by group norms. This probably produces some return in productivity and might even influence norms. Which of these two is attempted must depend on many factors, among which is group cohesion. It would be predicted that with high levels of group cohesion, only the first approach would work; with intermediate levels, both might.

A third study (Evans, 1970) provides a further test of these concepts and, in addition, investigates how supervisory style, as measured by initiating structure and showing consideration, influences workers' beliefs about the instrumentality of their work behavior in achieving desired goals. This study also supports expectancy theory, but, as Graen found, with some qualifications. Evans obtained data from both a public utility and a general hospital. Findings from the utility were considerably more supportive of expectancy theory than those from the hospital. While the lack of support from the hospital data may have been the result of ambiguity in the data collection instrument, and there is reason to believe that this occurred, there is also a suggestion that the job goals structure in the hospital was more complex, and that there may have been goal instrumentalities not under the control of the supervisor.

The findings of this study, however, have significance considerably beyond their support for expectancy theory, in that they also demonstrate that supervisory behavior effects the clarity with which various goal paths are seen to be instrumental for the attainment of desired goals. In the utility, higher levels of supervisory behavior on either initiating structure or showing consideration, but *especially the latter*, were associated with clearer perceptions among subordinates of what behaviors would be instrumental for attaining desired goals, and with higher frequency of occurrence of these behaviors. If it can be assumed that consideration behaviors facilitate communication between persons of different organizational statuses, and structure behaviors define path instrumentalities, then these findings are in good agreement with Rosen's, and provide a reasonable explanation for the higher morale and effectiveness found associated with higher levels of structure and consideration behaviors by the Ohio State researchers (see Chapter 2).

In summary, there is good evidence that supervisory behavior which emphasizes the importance of productivity, and at the same time makes desired job goals contingent on productivity, will in fact produce higher performance. Judging from the findings presented in this section, however, the impact will not be massive unless some effort is also made to modify group norms. Productivity is restricted by work group norms, and probably is affected by production emphasis only to the extent that some individuals within the work group (probably a large minority) tend to produce at the upper limit permitted by the group's norms.

The finding that showing consideration behavior is a mediator of subordinates' reactions to productivity emphasis is also significant. Consideration behaviors are those which convey esteem to another, and communicate interest in him as a person. As suggested earlier, these behaviors probably facilitate communication between statuses, and therefore would be essential for leadership. However, they probably also have specific importance in demonstrating to the subordinate that the superordinate has concern for him as a person, thereby promoting the development of mutual trust without which exchange is not possible.

It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that "consideration" behaviors probably form a necessary context for organizational leadership by making it possible for the subordinate to accept task-oriented influence attempts (e.g., initiating structure activities) without becoming suspicious that he is going to be pressured beyond what is reasonable. That is, if he is convinced that the organization has concern for him as a person, then it is unreasonable for him to believe that the organization will make unfair demands on him. This probably is the basis for the continued finding (e.g., Korman, 1966) that initiating structure and howing consideration are strongly related in actual practice, and that more recent training programs based on these dimensions of superordinate behavior (e.g., Blake, *et al.*, 1968) emphasize a blending of both kinds of behavior.

Work Facilitation—Facilitating Group Goal Attainment

If it is correct that the energy available from the work group for task activity is limited, and considering that organizational rewards are generally contingent on the accomplishment of task objectives, then it is reasonable that the group will value more highly a superordinate who uses their energy efficiently for those purposes. This suggests that, in addition to mobilizing task energy, the superordinate must also facilitate the accomplishment of objectives through supervisory activities which maximize the efficiency with which group energy is used (e.g., through planning and good management) and minimize wastage (e.g., by eliminating problems and handling emergencies).

Evidence supporting this point is substantial. It will be recalled that among the earliest studies of high and low productivity work groups by the Survey Research Center, the foremen of high sections were found to spend more time in planning, reported that they could get more done by supervising, and were judged by their men to be *better* planners (Katz *et al.*, 1951). Further, foremen of high productivity sections were more open to communication from their subordinates about important aspects of the job (Likert, 1953). It is assumed that this openness encouraged subordinates to bring work problems to the attention of the foreman at an early time, before much energy had been wasted by the group itself. That *ease of communication* is an important area of concern to the group member was also shown by the "personality" items in the Rosen (1969) study (see Table 20). It will be recalled that the first factor found in this analysis was loaded with items reflecting temperamental behaviors by foremen toward their subordinates. These behaviors probably had the effect of discouraging upward communication, especially about unpleasant matters such as work problems. To the extent a problem required action by the foreman, then, such behaviors would have had the effect of delaying initiation of action toward relieving the problem, and thereby would have wasted group energy. Assuming that members apply the norm of distributive justice to the *effort* they expend, and not to output itself, it might be predicted that such behaviors would lead to lost productivity, consequent financial losses to group members, and subsequently to decreased satisfaction with both superordinate and job.

This logic suggests that the ability of the superordinate himself should be significantly related to both work group satisfaction and work group effectiveness, because higher ability should lead to more effective use of group resources. It will be recalled that Rosen found evidence that the workers in the furniture factory *believed* this to be true. After the foreman exchange, work group members discriminated between first and last choice foremen more strongly on the foreman's job knowledge and his skill as an upholsterer, purely technical aspects, than before the exchange.

While these may have been merely reflections of attitudes which had no basis in fact, there is additional evidence of the relationship between superordinate competence and group effectiveness, where group effectiveness was measured independently of group attitudes toward superordinates. Havron-McGrath (1961) found in a study of Army squads that measures of squad leader[5] job knowledge and intelligence correlated positively (r=.35 to .50) with squad effectiveness scores in a field performance test. Havron found another interesting measure that distinguished between good and poor squad leaders, which seemed to reflect their willingness to take action when confronted with a problem. Each squad leader was seated in a room alone, and a field telephone extension in the room was made to ring. Most of the effective squad leaders answered the phone, while most of the less effective ones did not.

Greer (1961) reported that leaders of more effective squads were rated by their subordinates to be better problem solvers. While it is possible that squad members were merely more highly motivated when they felt their squad leader was a better problem solver, and therefore tried harder, an equally inviting interpretation is that they were more successful with a given energy expenditure when the squad leader was more effective in directing the use of that energy.

Of course, as might be expected, not all studies show that superordinate competence is correlated with group performance. There may be several reasons for such results. One is that the measure of competence may not be relevant to the demands of the task itself. This was the case in a study by Anderson and Fiedler (1964) who studied the performance of groups of students on four kinds of tasks: writing stories about a Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) card, listing unusual uses for common objects, giving creative solutions to a problem dealing with a summer recreation project, and listing pro and con arguments about a controversial military leadership award. There was an overall lack of relationship between the group leaders' military ability and aptitude as rated by instructors and peers, and the creative performance of their groups. This, of course, is not too surprising, in that the instructor and peer evaluations were probably based on observations of behavior in somewhat different kinds of situations than those in the experiment.

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[5] A position title, which does not necessarily mean that leadership was the only influence means used.

It is evident from the discussion in the previous chapter that productivity also could fail to correlate with superordinates' competence when group norms concerning productivity are sufficiently restrictive that supervisory effectiveness is translated into a lower energy expenditure, or perhaps into some other form instead of increased productivity. It is tempting to conclude that this was the basis for a set of findings obtained by Student (1968), who tested the Katz and Kahn concept of *incremental influence* as a factor in organizational leadership. This is defined as influence that leads the subordinate to performance beyond mechanical compliance with routine directives of the organization; it was thought by Student to be a combination of the esteem in which subordinates hold the superordinate, which tends to produce identification with him (referent power), and the knowledge subordinates believe him to have about the job at hand (expert power). Student obtained ratings from hourly employees in a factory making major home appliances. They concerned both the foreman's referent and expert power, and the other "types" of power the foreman theoretically should have, as described by French and Raven (1959). Measures of productivity included indirect costs, maintenance costs, supply costs, scrap costs, performance against schedule, quality, average earnings, excused absences, unexcused absences, accidents, turnover, and number of suggestions submitted in the company's program. Of interest in the present context is the fact that expert power of the foreman, as rated by work group members, correlated significantly with only two of this large number of productivity criteria—supply costs and quality. Production *rate* did not correlate significantly with expertness, or, for that matter, with any of the other measures of influence.

This clearly underscores the importance of other factors that may affect productivity. There can be little question that group members react considerably more favorably to superordinates whom they consider competent. Indeed, the perceived ability of the leader to contribute to group outcomes was the key variable in Hollander's idiosyncrasy credit theory, and has recently been reaffirmed by Hollander and Julian (1969) as the variable which shows the greatest significance in determining acceptance of his influence. However, whether competency in facilitating goal attainment will be translated into greater productivity, as opposed to some other outlet, will depend to a great extent on such factors as group norms, established production standards, and the effectiveness with which the superordinate handles other aspects of his role, particularly maintaining a productivity orientation that is viewed as reasonable by the work group.

Support—Reducing Maintenance Energy Requirements

Bowers and Seashore defined support as behavior that enhances someone else's feeling of personal worth and importance. Much of the human relations literature has been devoted to demonstrating the need for this kind of superordinate behavior, and its efficacy for increasing organizational health and effectiveness. The present framework would also suggest its need, but from a slightly different orientation, and for slightly different reasons. One reason is that support behaviors probably lead the subordinate to be more amenable to the superordinate's influence attempts when such attempts are based on the use of leadership techniques. (Knowledge that he is esteemed by the superordinate should lead the subordinate to be more trusting, and therefore more open to the communication leadership techniques require.) A second reason is that support behaviors probably decrease the tensions that exist within the work environment, which otherwise would require the use of group energy for maintenance purposes.

Maintenance energy is required by the work group for a variety of reasons. At the lowest occupational levels, work is repetitive, achievement rewards are difficult to obtain, and the scope of responsibility is low (Homans, 1965). Further, the worker is at a disadvantage with regard to management in the determination of what his job is, and what controls he will have over it. It is quite likely that there are tensions associated with this state of affairs that are not totally caused by the job itself, but result as well from a feeling of inability to control one's outcomes, that is, a feeling of powerlessness, which is quite tension provoking.

It is reasonable to view many of the actions of work group members as attempts to decrease uncertainty about future events. As one example, the kinds of constraints which unions seek to impose on management probably reflect the basic dissatisfactions of workers with their organizational environments. Typically, in addition to wage increases, unions are concerned with job security, with the establishment of a predetermined order in which personnel will be let go during times of economic distress (seniority), and, in general, with other constraints which reduce the ability of management to act unilaterally or capriciously. Further, one of the greatest strengths of the union seems to be the ability of the union steward to file a grievance at a management level substantially higher than that of the immediate superordinate. This reduces the relative disadvantage of the worker by giving him a voice at a high management level, and enables him to compete successfully with his foreman, if that foreman is thought to have behaved unjustly. It is thus a hedge against exploitation based on position power which might otherwise be used in a discriminating manner.

These thoughts suggest quite strongly that maintenance energy requirements within organizational settings are generated largely by conditions that provoke uncertainty, or create fears that more powerful persons or the organization itself will act arbitrarily to decrease the individual's outcomes. Because interaction with one's peers in a quasi-primary group tends to alleviate the negative impact of these uncertainties and fears (Schachter, 1959), conditions that generate them cause the individual to turn more strongly to his group for support and thereby cause group members to use more of their total energy for maintenance purposes.

Perhaps the clearest evidence for this analysis comes from the use of participatory leadership methods in industry. It will be recalled that the human relations movement established participatory leadership as one cornerstone of its theoretical structure. The sharing of leadership was supposed to increase the worker's opportunity for esteem and self-actualization gratifications, lead to higher motivational levels, and thereby result in higher productivity.

While early human relations studies did appear to demonstrate the correctness of this proposition, later studies have raised questions. As noted in Chapter 2, the time available for organizational decision making may not permit group discussion before action must be taken. Further, there is some basis for believing that sharing of leadership may actually reduce cohesion and satisfaction among group members, under some conditions. This was, in fact, what Berkowitz (1953) found in a study of conferences where some leaders shared leadership and others did not. In this particular case, sharing of leadership apparently permitted the development of status competition among other conference members, and made the groups less efficient. It appears, then, that at least under some conditions, such as when it decreases the group's effectiveness, sharing in itself will be disapproved by members.

If it is correct that participation in decision making is desired not necessarily as an end in itself, rather only to the extent that it serves to reduce work-associated anxieties, then it should be possible to find evidence that either representation or the opportunity for reclama are sufficient in themselves to produce the positive benefits generally attributed to participation itself. Exactly this type of evidence is found in a study by Fleishman (1965). It will be recalled from an earlier discussion that one problem of substantial concern to industrial management is a characteristic production drop when changeover occurs in the product or process of a line operation. This is a cyclic phenomenon, consisting of a stable production rate preceding changeover, an often substantial drop following changeover, and a gradual recovery of output.

In the Fleishman study, the hypothesis was that participation in deciding how the new job ought to be done should result in a smaller drop following changeover and a more rapid recovery in productivity. The experimental group received a fairly typical treatment, including participation. The findings indicated that, as expected, this experimental group did not drop appreciably below its plateau on a previous product, and completed an expected eight-day run on the new one in three days. Further, when shifted back to the earlier product, they not only did not show a productivity drop, but actually progressed to a higher plateau than had previously been obtained on that product.

This was not an unexpected finding; similar demonstrations of the effectiveness of participatory methods are numerous. The unexpected finding was that *the productivity of the control group, which did not have the opportunity for discussion, was indistinguishable in all respects from that of the experimental group.* When an explanation for this surprising finding was sought, it was found that in the actual work force the experimental and control groups were intermingled. Of course, hindsight indicates that there must have been substantial discussion among the members of the control and experimental groups. The strong suggestion, then, is that *participation itself was not a requirement* since the control group members did not participate. Rather, representation was sufficient, and control group members were represented by members of the experimental groups who did participate.

Further evidence on this point comes from findings obtained by the Survey Research Center. Schwab (in Likert, 1953) suggests that the profile of a successful supervisor includes the following four items:

(1) Goes to bat for his employees.
(2) Shows an interest in how they get along.
(3) Lets his employees know what he thinks of their work.
(4) Listens to his employees' ideas and does something about them.

Of course, these four statements may not reflect specifically how group members felt. But if they can be taken as reasonably precise, the sense of the fourth item is that of being open to influence from members of the work group, as opposed to drawing them into decision-making conferences. This, of course, is a major distinction.

Additional evidence is found in a laboratory study (Bass, 1967) conducted to learn about conditions under which discussion may contribute to the success and effectiveness of permissive supervision. The particular variable of interest was the effect on the group of whether the appointed leader revealed his own opinion, and when. There were four conditions:

(1) The appointed leader (head) never revealed his opinion.
(2) The head gave his group his provisional opinion before the discussion began.
(3) The head announced only at the end of the meeting what he was going to do.
(4) The head stated his preliminary opinions at the beginning of the session, and at the end he stated the final decision he was going to submit.

For purposes of the present discussion, the feeling that leadership had been shared was greatest when the head stated his own opinion early, and least when he stated it late. The commonsense view here is that this resulted in the impression of greatest willingness to be influenced. When one states his own position initially and then listens, the implication is that he is doing so to obtain any possible information that would lead him to want to change that position. If this line of thinking is correct, then it is not participation itself which increases motivation, at least for most work group members, but rather it is the opportunity to be heard if there is a need. The evidence seems to indicate that if the worker feels he *can* influence his supervisor, given the need, then he will be as satisfied and as motivated as if he had in fact participated in decision making.

A most reasonable interpretation of these findings, that is somewhat at odds with the human relations interpretation, is that participation does not really have its beneficial effects by virtue of satisfying esteem and self-actualization needs, thereby increasing motivation; probably, most blue-collar workers do not have self-actualization needs of quite this type, and this explanation merely projects middle-class values onto the blue-collar worker. It is quite tempting to conclude instead that participation has beneficial effects because it convinces the worker that he is not completely powerless, and, by giving him confidence that he does have control over his outcomes, reduces his need for support from his informal group.

As has been postulated earlier, it is probable that a decrease in support needs reduces the amount of energy the group needs for maintenance purposes, and makes more total energy available for task purposes. While that energy may not be used for production, because of rate-restricting norms or other factors, it may still have desirable manifestations, such as reduced turnover and absenteeism, or the much-less-than-expected production drops following product changeover found in two studies cited in this section (Fleishman, and Coch and French).

Vroom (1960) reached somewhat similar conclusions in a study of the effects of participation in a parcel delivery company. Observation had indicated that some station managers used essentially a participative type of leadership, while others did not. Three significant facts emerged from this study:

(1) Measures of participation obtained from superiors, subordinates, and peers intercorrelated to a low and generally nonsignificant level. The finding that participation as rated by various sources yields generally low intercorrelations indicates either that the sources were unreliable, or that they were reporting what they believed, as opposed to what was actually happening. If this latter were the case, it would support the earlier contention that *amount* of participation is not the crucial variable, but rather the feeling that the amount of participation is satisfactory or unsatisfactory.

(2) Different work group members had different levels of need to participate. Those with a high need for independence and who scored low on a test of authoritarianism reacted most favorably to participatory

leadership. It should be noted that this was actually joint decision making, mostly between supervisor and one subordinate, as opposed to delegation by the leader to the subordinate *group* of decision responsibility through discussion.

(3) Under low participation conditions, work group members with low need independence were as likely to perform well as members with high need independence; a similar finding was obtained regarding authoritarianism. This suggested that the effect of participation on motivation may not be so much that participation itself is motivating, as it is that *domination, the condition in which the work group member is given an arbitrary decision (and thus cannot influence his own outcomes), is demotivating.*

In summary, it seems that behaviors by superordinates that indicate esteem for their subordinates, such as involving them in decisions about their work, asking their advice to improve the effectiveness of operations, and so on, are important for the production of group effectiveness, and probably for the two reasons suggested at the beginning of this section. First, such behaviors are probably required for the development of exchange between superordinate and subordinate, in that they promote mutual trust. By so doing, they lead the subordinate to be more receptive to the leadership influence attempts of his superordinate. Second, they probably reduce the need for maintenance energy requirements within the work environment especially by reducing apprehension that exploitative demands are going to be made on the workers.

There probably is a wide range of individual differences in the need for such support, as Vroom's work shows. However, when the need exists unsatisfied, it probably is a barrier to group effectiveness, especially under conditions of change. This suggests that while support from the superordinate is probably important in any technology, it is most important in small batch technologies, or line technologies, in which there are frequent requirements for change in either the process or the product, and especially when there is a requirement for production standards to change with the change in process or product.

Interaction Facilitation—Increasing Total System Energy

While organizations cannot make available many of the social and esteem rewards that individuals desire, it would seem reasonable to believe that the opportunity for such rewards within the work environment might increase the value of work group membership to the individual, and thereby increase the investment the worker might be willing to make in his group membership. (Of course, this would not have an impact on productivity if the organization also cannot make continued membership contingent on productivity, and influence group norms so that the group itself will sanction increased productivity.) While the formal organization usually cannot make these rewards available directly, they still may be provided by superordinates, through leadership techniques that produce a higher degree of cohesion within the work group, as well as other intangible satisfactions.

The logic of the preceding paragraph suggests that high group cohesion should be related to high performance effectiveness. That is, if the group is more desirable, then the member should be willing to do more to retain membership. Examination of the findings on cohesiveness and group effectiveness indicates, however, that this predicted relationship often is not found. Vroom (1964) concludes from a review of this literature that cohesiveness may have either positive or negative effects on the level of performance of individual group members, depending on the value placed by the group as a whole on high productivity. The reason for this variable outcome becomes apparent if cohesion is examined from the point of view of small group exchange processes discussed in Chapter 5.

Janowitz (1959) suggests that the basis for small group cohesion is the capacity of individual members to offer and receive affection from one another. This fits well with Homans' (1958) definition of cohesion as a value variable, reflecting the level of social exchange among members of the group. Within the present frame of reference the group itself is a source of many different kinds of rewards, such as social reality, consensual validation of intangible values and beliefs, social approval, recognition, security, and so on. These rewards constitute benefits that are exchanged among members of roughly equal status, and are both of relatively *low cost* to those who grant them, and of *high value* to those who receive them. Their low cost comes from the fact that granting them generally does not have implications for relative status in the group, and their high value comes from the fact that they aid the recipient to maintain high self-esteem. A group with high cohesiveness then is one with high internal rates of social exchange, in which members provide for one another relatively low cost—but highly valued—benefits that satisfy acceptance and esteem needs.

This analysis suggests that the members of high cohesiveness groups may be more dependent on their groups than members of low cohesiveness groups. This results ultimately from the fact that, within limits, higher rates of this type of exchange lead to a steadily increasing benefits/costs ratio for each member. Because the benefits are low in cost and high in value, each rewarding behavior should initially have a quite noticeable effect on benefit/costs ratios, and there should consequently be a strong tendency for these behaviors to increase until a point of marginal return is reached. At this point, the value of the behavior will no longer exceed its cost, which should establish an equilibrium. As the level of exchange among members increases toward this point, however, the attractiveness of the group as a source of acceptance and esteem satisfactions should increase, in comparison with other sources of these same needs, and as it becomes more attractive the member should become relatively more dependent on it. At the same time, as he becomes more dependent on it, the group will acquire greater power to influence his behavior (e.g., to conform to salient norms), because of its ability to refuse satisfaction of these needs if he does not conform.

As has been discussed earlier, one of the norms to which the group expects conformity is that dealing with the level of effort the organization can expect in exchange for the benefits it offers. It consequently would be expected that more cohesive groups would be more internally consistent on productivity, though the *group* rate might or might not be "high." Evidence confirming this expectation was found by Seashore (1954c). In this study, cohesiveness was defined in terms of a perception of being a part of the group by individual members, preference to remain in the group, and perception of superiority of their group in terms of the way the men got along together, the way they helped each other, and the way they "stuck together." Actual productivity was found to be significantly more uniform *within* groups with high cohesiveness, though high-cohesiveness groups differed from one another more than low-cohesiveness groups did. This indicates, as the preceding analysis suggested, that the high-cohesiveness groups were apparently less responsive to external productivity pressures, and relatively more responsive to internal standards, than groups with lower cohesion. Where the internal standard supported higher productivity, the group as a whole was more effective. In contrast, groups with less cohesiveness were less internally consistent (their members differed more from one another in their productivity levels) and tended to be more similar in average productivity.

This illustrates well the conclusions reached in Chapters 4 and 5 that the worker receives benefits from both the organization and the group, as well as expectations from each concerning key aspects of his behavior. His behavior as a member of the organization will depend then on the extent to which these two sets of demands are in conflict, the relative value to him of the rewards he obtains from each, and the extent to which rewards from one source can compensate for possible deprivation from the other. It would be expected that there would be a strong tendency to maximize both sets of benefits to the extent possible, but that where the demands of the group are in conflict with the demands of the organization, the group's demands will be given higher priority. This would occur because the group's rewards and punishments are more immediate, and because the group may, by sticking together, be able to influence the organization's expectations for what constitutes satisfactory behavior.

Data supporting these expectations are found in an experiment by Schachter, *et al.* (1951), which studied the effect of cohesiveness on the productivity of three-person groups under conditions in which members were led to believe the group was urging either increased or decreased productivity. The experimental task consisted of the assembly of cardboard checkerboards. Each member was assigned to a different workroom, thinking each was working on one part of the total assembly job. Communication between members was by written notes, which permitted the experimenter to substitute standard messages for those actually written by the subjects themselves. Half the groups were led to believe that they would be compatible with one another, and half that they would not (high vs. low cohesiveness). The experimental treatment consisted of giving members of these groups notes urging either increased productivity or decreased productivity during the second half of the work period.

The results of this manipulation are shown in Table 21. Of interest, the notes suggesting increased work pace were effective whether the group supposedly had either high or low cohesion. In contrast, the notes suggesting slowing down were effective only if the subject felt she was in a group of compatible persons (high cohesion). It is probable that there

Table 21

Change in Productivity Resulting From Notes Requesting Either Increased or Decreased Work Pace

Group	Speed Up	Slow Down
High Cohesion	+5.92	−2.16
Low Cohesion	+5.09	−0.42

were two sources of perceived rewards in this experiment much as there are in a formal organization. One was the experimenter, and the other was the group, perhaps through anticipated social rewards that might follow mutual interaction among group members after the experiment was over. (Being told that they constituted a compatible group would have led them to be at least mildly interested in further interaction beyond the experiment itself.)

The fact that productivity increased to nearly the same extent regardless of the cohesiveness of the group suggests that the source of reward under "speed up" conditions was irrelevant; the subjects probably responded within perceived equitable limits, even under the low cohesion condition, when group expectations were in the same direction as behavior that would please the experimenter. But when group expectations were in *conflict* with the desire to please the experimenter, a situation existed that resulted in a significant decrease in productivity only in the high cohesiveness condition, in which the subjects probably assumed that they would have compensating support and rewards from other group members if they conformed to a rate-restricting norm.

Evidence that conflict of perhaps a similar nature exists in actual work groups is found in the same Seashore study (1954c) mentioned earlier. Among the 228 groups studied, the groups with both high productivity *and* high cohesion showed a slight trend to feel *less* pressure for production, while nine groups with very high cohesion and very low productivity (presumably thus in a state of conflict between group norms and organizational pressures) reported that they hardly ever finished their work no matter how hard they tried, or that they sometimes finished but felt pushed all the time.

Two other studies add further support to this analysis of cohesion in its relationship to group effectiveness. In the first, Danzig and Galanter (1955) studied real work groups in a synthetic task on which presumably there were no production-restricting norms, and thus no group forces that would run counter to productivity. In this study, 50 six-man work groups, consisting of five employees and their regular plant supervisor, worked at an experimental task consisting of the assembly of two of the company's products that normally were shipped disassembled. The measure of cohesiveness was a function of the number of reciprocated choices; all groups with isolates were excluded. Within the remaining (N=26) groups, the measure of cohesion correlated very significantly (*r*=.88) with the productivity of the group, as measured by time for completion of the assembly task. In this case, it is highly likely that the density of reciprocated choices was a good measure of cohesiveness as defined earlier—the level of social exchange in the group. If this is so, it confirms the thought that higher cohesiveness increases the amount of group energy available for the foreman to mobilize on the task, which will be reflected in productivity in situations in which there are no productivity norms to restrict the output of the group.

Somewhat similar findings were obtained by Van Zelst (1952), in a situation in which rate-restrictive norms did apply, but in which the groups' energy could be reflected in other ways than productivity. Subjects in this study were two groups of skilled tradesmen, carpenters, and bricklayers, who had been together on the same job for an average of five months.

The two groups were formed into mutual choice teams of two persons each, with a way of developing groups of four—also based on mutual choice—if larger groups were needed. In the pairings that resulted, 22 workers received their first choice, 28 their second, and 16 their third. Eight isolates were paired until they could successfully be worked into a mutual choice group. Periodic checks of the stability of choice were made and satisfactory work groups were left undisturbed.

The criteria in this study were actual cost of construction indices for labor and for materials in comparison with engineer's estimates of what these costs should have been, turnover records, and production records of the two overall groups in comparison with their productivity during the period prior to pairing. The results of the study show a significant drop in turnover, and a highly significant drop in both materials costs and labor costs. There was also an increase in productivity.

Perhaps the most significant factor that contributed to the dramatic impact of the cohesive pairs in the Van Zelst study was the interdependent nature of the work accomplished by these two-man groups. George (1962), in an analysis of the relationship between cohesion and group effectiveness, called attention to the importance of the group task, and requirements for interdependence among group members, as moderators of the relationship between cohesion and group effectiveness. Where group members are interdependent, a lack of reciprocation in their "liking" responses for one another would seemingly lead to increased tension that would decrease the amount of energy available for the accomplishment of task purposes. Further, to the extent that nonreciprocation might reflect attempts by group members to dominate one another, even more energy might be taken away from task activities. George also suggests that a high level of domination attempts may reflect a large number of individuals high on Carter's individual prominence factor within the group, which would itself lead to low cohesion.

This section was introducted with a rationale which speculated that increasing the rewards obtained by work group members would perhaps increase productivity because of the possibility that members would feel constrained to respond in an equitable fashion. The evidence suggests that this probably is correct only when the leader can influence the group norm toward higher achievement levels, when the group norm already supports higher productivity, or where a group norm on productivity does not exist. Where a rate-restricting norm is already in existence and cannot be influenced, it seems unlikely that an increase in cohesion will result in an increase in productivity. The group norm apparently is simply more potent than organizational pressures, including the offer of tangible rewards. (Further, individuals within the work group may not feel obligated to the organization for increases in social rewards resulting from a higher rate of social exchange among group members.) However, it is evident that under some conditions, the organization will still gain indirectly from higher work group cohesiveness, even if productivity increases do not occur.

Further, even though the members of the group may well not attribute higher cohesion to efforts taken by the organization, there nonetheless are organizational policies and practices that will lead to higher cohesion levels within work groups; Cartwright and Zander (1960) describe several. One is the use of group feedback procedures, or group rewards, that tend to promote cooperative processes among group members, as opposed to individual feedback or reward that produces competition. Increased cohesiveness also results from the perception by group members that they share a common outcome. Group feedback is effective in promoting this perception.

Cohesion also increases within a group as the opportunity for interaction increases, providing it is positive interaction. While there is undoubtedly an upper limit to the amount of interaction that can be permitted before group effectiveness begins to drop, organizational policy toward group member interaction clearly will then influence cohesion. It goes without saying that supervisory techniques also influence group cohesiveness. Where the leader's interaction with his group is punitive or negatively toned, it can be anticipated either that cohesion will drop, or that the group will become polarized against the leader with a subsequently higher level of cohesion as the perception of sharing a common fate is increased.

REDUCING THE COSTS OF SUPERVISION

As suggested in Chapter 6, the motivation to play the role of a superordinate in a formal organization apparently must include some desire for the prestige and individual prominence rewards that usually are associated with those roles. Thus, superordinates may provide benefits to their groups, through the four categories of role behavior just discussed; however, they also impose costs by virtue of the prestige and individual prominence rewards they receive.

A supervisor may increase costs in his work group, or reduce them, by the manner in which he supervises the accomplishment of group tasks. There are four general ways that supervisory costs are increased: (1) imposing status differentials that are greater than those required to accomplish supervisory tasks, or indeed, than warranted by the position; (2) excessive requirements for compliance; (3) unnecessary reduction in the worker's autonomy through close supervision; (4) punitive supervisory methods.

Exchange theory suggests that large perceived status differentials between interacting persons are a source of tensions to the individual of lower status (Blau, 1964). These tensions probably arise for several reasons, one of which is the possibility that the high status person may produce a demand on the other that would constitute a cost (e.g., an expectation for deference). A second reason is that the high status person may arbitrarily deprive the other of some benefit that he desires, while a third reason is that the high status person will be more successful in competing for influence (in three-person or larger groups) which results in negative comparisons that threaten the self-concept.

A study by Triandis, *et al.* (1966), which investigated respect and friendship dimensions of interpersonal relationships, demonstrates some of these by names. "Respect" was found to be a positive function of the status of a stimulus person ("admire ideas of" and "would obey") and a negative function of the relative status of the individual responding. On the other hand, average friendship response was higher when the status differential between the stimulus person and the individual responding was smaller.

The discomfort in a lower status person is sufficiently evident that superordinates often seek to reduce status differentials where this will not compromise their own effectiveness. This was demonstrated in a study by Jones, Gergen, and Jones (1963), which demonstrated a strong tendency for high status persons to agree with the opinions of lower status persons (yield to their influence attempts) on matters that were not related to their higher relative status, though they would not yield on topics that *were* related. By yielding on irrelevant matters, the higher status member permitted the other to maintain a higher level of self-esteem, and thereby made himself more attractive, without compromising his effectiveness on task matters.

The motivation to emphasize status differences, which the leader *can* do, is probably to satisfy the leader's own esteem needs. It will be recalled that one of Carter's factors (1954) was an individual prominence factor. George (1962) suggests that there are individual differences in the need for achieving individual prominence, and provides evidence that individual prominence behaviors may reduce group effectiveness.

Insistence by a leader on status perquisites probably results from a high level of need for satisfaction on this dimension, together with a limited level of satisfaction in relation to the need. Bowers (1962) supports this reasoning in a study of foremen and their subordinates in two different industrial plants. An assumption in this study was that second level supervisors judge foremen in large part by the productivity of their groups, and expect them to pressure their own subordinates rather vigorously toward higher productivity. When there is not good evidence that this is being done, they provide feedback to the foreman which may well be interpreted as critical, much as feedback from the foreman to the individual subordinate can be interpreted as critical. Critical feedback should theoretically lead the foreman to make defensive judgments about his own adequacy, and thus to have lower self-esteem. It was therefore assumed that the feedback given the foreman would have an impact on the nature of the interaction between the foreman and his group, that is, that a "climate" effect would be produced by perceived lack of support from the foreman's own supervisor.

Good evidence for these assumptions was found in the study. When the supervisor was supportive, the foreman had a significantly higher evaluation of himself, that is, higher self-esteem. Foremen with lower support had lower self-esteem, tended not to use a group approach, had a lower impression of their own subordinates' attitudes toward themselves, and tended to be alienated from their subordinates. It is tempting to conclude that the alienation, together with the higher requirement for self-esteem satisfactions, may well have led these foremen to impose higher status differentials between themselves and their subordinates than was warranted, thereby *alienating subordinates* and "*turning off*" *upward communication from them.* Seeking greater-than-warranted esteem satisfactions, therefore, would impact negatively on group effectiveness, not only by creating "costs" to the group (relative status deprivation), but also by depriving the superordinate of information needed to run the group effectively.

Excessive demands for compliance or restriction in the autonomy of the worker also increase costs that, in turn, will require an increased use of group energy for maintenance purposes. Gouldner (1954) suggests, however, that a tendency for both close supervision and reduced autonomy are characteristic of large organizations. This results from the fact that top management is not able to observe the productivity of individual members of the work force directly. However, productivity levels necessary for the accomplishment of organizational purposes are known, as are other standards of conduct that are considered desirable.

Consequently, there is a strong tendency in large organizations to generate rules that regulate work procedures throughout the organization, and that establish production standards expected for each job.

These rules do have some advantages. One is that they relieve the individual foreman from having to use his personal position power to specify performance standards and work procedures. In this sense, such rules have a function similar to the function of norms within small groups, and result in lower tension levels within the work force. But published standards also have negative effects. One is that they give the group a statement of what the organization will accept, and work group norms tend to be strongly influenced toward these minimum levels, rather than to whatever levels could possibly be achieved. Supervisors then sometimes try to maintain performance at a higher level by personal intervention and through the use of close supervision, which causes increases in worker resentment and tensions. That close supervision does cause increased costs to the worker, and lower productivity was verified by Day and Hamblin (1964). Of course, it will be recalled that close supervision had also been found related to low productivity in the Survey Research Center work (e.g., Likert, 1967).

However, while the unwarranted presumption of status and reduction in the work group member's perceived autonomy are both resented strongly, perhaps the most costly leader-to-subordinate behavior is that which is negatively toned with emotion. This includes two categories of leader behavior. One consists of emotional reactions to problems and/or complaints, which may occur as a result of low frustration tolerance in the foreman. The second consists of punitive reactions to performance failure, which appear to be the result of the foreman's attaching personal blame to the subordinate for not succeeding. Each of these will cause negative reactions and cause performance quality to drop, eventually if not immediately.

Evidence that punitive or emotional reactions are associated with low productivity comes from several sources. It will be recalled (Chapter 2) that among the findings of the Survey Research Center, it was learned that foremen of low-producing sections tended to react more punitively to failure by their subordinates, while the foremen of high producing sections tended to be more "understanding," less punitive, and, presumably, more oriented both toward understanding the cause of the failure and toward seeking to prevent future occurrence rather than punish past happenings.

The Rosen (1969) study also adds weight to the case against negatively emotional punitive leader behavior, and, further, offers some evidence concerning the relative importance of such factors. Reexamination of Table 20 shows that there were four factors underlying the 41 personality items. The first of these, which accounted for 42% of the variance in the matrix from which the factors were extracted, seems to be descriptive of impulsive, negatively emotional reactions toward subordinates. Two items have the connotation of hasty reaction: "has a chip on his shoulder," and "flies off the handle." Yet a third, somewhat lower on the list, was "acts too quickly without thinking."

It should be noted that this factor analysis was composed of difference scores based on first and last choice foremen in the study, rather than on descriptions of specific individuals. There is a consequent risk that these factors, therefore, may constitute descriptions of what the work group member would like, rather than of any existing leader. That this may not be the case is indicated by a study (Lange and Jacobs, 1960) in which behaviors of platoon leaders (a position title) toward their subordinates in Army platoons were studied. This work shared one problem with the Rosen (1969) study, in that behavior descriptions and leader evaluations were both obtained from subordinates, and therefore may have been subject to distortions. However, essentially similar findings emerged; leaders who were prone to react negatively and emotionally toward their subordinates were strongly downrated, as were leaders who reacted impulsively.

Given that punitive supervisory methods have negative impact both on the attitudes of workers toward their supervisors and (probably) on production, it seems reasonable to ask why supervisors use such methods. It is probable that an explanation lies in their early social learning experiences, in which they developed the role enactment predispositions which later find expression as punitive supervisory methods in formal organizations.

It will be recalled (Chapter 3) that during these early experiences, which lead to the development of skill in social exchange relationships, it probably is inevitable for most persons to learn that they can control the behavior of others through force (or that others can control them). A demonstration that this is true is provided by Longabaugh (1966) who factor analyzed behavior data from children and obtained, in each of two different factor structures, one set of behaviors which were labeled interpersonal deprivation. These included assaulting, symbolically aggressing, and attempting to dominate, that is putting down the target person which, by comparison, elevates the person acting. Such activities appear to reflect reassertion of dominance relationships, which probably have the dual purpose of quantifying how much esteem satisfaction each person can draw from an exchange relationship, and of determining what scarce resources, if any, each can command in an exchange relationship.

Applied to the organizational setting, such behaviors are equally effective in producing compliance from other persons who are less powerful. That is, the supervisor occupies a position in the organization which has greater power attached to it than that of the subordinate. The supervisor may lack formal sanctions which can be used against the subordinate, because of union protection of the worker, or organizational constraints. However, the foreman controls *some* non-tangible rewards, as well as "costs." Among these are esteem satisfactions. By acting *punitively*, he can "impose a cost" on a subordinate by causing him to lose self-esteem, that is, lose "face." Since a loss of self-esteem is undesirable, punitive methods are generally successful for the *short run* in producing immediate and visible compliance—unless, of course, work group members form a coalition which is sufficiently powerful that it can return the aggression and thereby cause the supervisor to lose "face."

In the long run, however, punitive methods are virtually certain to reduce productivity (Day and Hamblin), increase feelings of aggression toward the supervisor, and produce a reduction in the efficiency and effectiveness of the work group by requiring a greater investment of energy in group maintenance functions at the cost of energy available for task functions.

The previously cited experiment by Bowers (1962), together with a study of the use of rewards and punishments by Rothbart (1968), sheds further light on the reasons behind the use of punitive supervisory methods, despite their long-term ineffectiveness. It will be recalled that Bowers' rationale was that the supervisor's own superordinates are more rewarding of actions that produce higher productivity in the work group, and less rewarding of consideration behaviors. It will be recalled that this was, indeed, the pattern found by the Ohio State studies regarding the relative expectations of more senior persons and subordinates with regard to an intermediate supervisor's desired role. Subordinates desired showing consideration to a greater extent and initiating structure to a lesser extent, while the relationship was reversed for more senior people.

If it is assumed that production is an important goal, and that the supervisor's own superordinates exert strong pressures on him for production, and, especially, castigate him for not achieving higher productivity, then it is assumed that the supervisor's self-esteem will be low. The research findings confirmed this, as was indicated by a rank correlation of .80 between the supervisor's self-esteem and perceived supportiveness of the second level supervisors. Bowers also found, as was previously indicated, that lack of supportiveness of second level supervisors led supervisors to be more alienated from their own subordinates, to behave less supportively toward them, and to be less accepting of their opinions and advice.

It is tempting to conclude that, under such conditions, the supervisor might apply the norm of distributive justice in his behavior toward his subordinates. That is, if he has been caused to lose self-esteem because of their noncompliance with productivity desires of the organization, then it should be only fair that they should lose self-esteem also. That an equity principle of this sort is operating may have been demonstrated by Rothbart's experiment, which used a complex design in which college students served as both subjects and supervisors. The supervisor was allowed the option of using either a monetary punishment or a monetary reward to motivate workers toward an achievement goal which had been set by the experimenter. Evidence that punishment was not used because it was more effective (which would be relevant to any learning theory explanation of why punitive methods are used) was provided by the observation that when the worker had increased in productivity as a consequence of the use of punishment, there was a strong tendency for punishment not being used as an incentive on the next trial. In comparison, reward often was used following compliance to a reward incentive. That is, when reward was followed by compliance, there was a much stronger tendency for reward to be used again than was the case when punishment was followed by compliance. It therefore appeared that punishment was viewed as a more costly or risky method and was used, perhaps, only as a last resort, or *as a way of making the subordinate's "costs" come more into balance with his outcomes*, a clear equity explanation.

In a second condition, evidence was obtained that at least a part of the rewarding and punishing actions in the preceding condition could be attributed to the supervisor's desire to adjust the monetary incentives received by the worker to rough correspondence with his own as was suggested above. That is, in this particular experimental setting, a higher use of reward and a lower use of punishment tended to bring the worker's rewards more into line with the rewards of the supervisor, and therefore to be more equitable for both.

Following a similar line of reasoning, it would appear that part of the basis for the supervisor's punitive behavior toward his subordinates may be a desire to cause them to lose self-esteem, much as he himself has lost as a consequence of his own superior's pressures toward productivity and negative evaluations of past success in achieving satisfactory results. If this is correct, it suggests that the use of punitive methods in formal organizations probably is in large part a result of "climate" variables and the lack of realization by superordinates that they are, in fact, passing down supervisory pressures that will have a long-term negative impact.

If this analysis is correct, the conclusion seems almost inevitable that formal organizations provide what is essentially a trap for supervisors, in the form of a set of conditions which invite supervisory behavior that will alienate subordinates from organizational values and produce suspicion of organizational motives. On the one hand, organizations motivate members to seek and perform in the supervisory role by offering esteem and status satisfactions. But, on the other hand, pressures are brought to bear for production and efficiency that may lead to negative evaluations of the supervisor by his own superordinates. Such evaluations imply disapproval and seemingly must result in loss of self-esteem, which is perpetuated downward through the supervisory ranks as each position incumbent seeks to decrease the esteem satisfactions of his own subordinates to correspond with his own losses. Since disapproval begets disapproval, the organizational climate can thus easily be turned into one of mutual *dis*trust and suspicion, together with destructive internal competition.

Since productivity is a central concern of formal organizations, this type of outcome seems difficult to avoid, especially in that *any* senior position incumbent in a hierarchy can initiate the chain of deprivations postulated above, if the underlying mechanism is actually that described by Rothbart. However, a possible way of reducing this particular type of supervisory costs is suggested by the fact that the deprivations seem to occur as a consequence of, or in conjunction with, reactions to performance that for one reason or another does not meet expectations. It will be recalled that McGregor, one of the organizational psychologists identified in Chapter 2, suggested management by objectives as a means of avoiding controversy between superordinate and subordinate, both in regard to what performance is desired and how it is evaluated.

Of all the tasks of the supervisor, performance evaluation may well be the most difficult because of the difficulty of making the evaluation objective and impersonal. A typical outcome of performance evaluation when objectivity is not achieved is illustrated in a laboratory study by Hanson, Morton, and Rothaus (1963), who used role-playing techniques to obtain their data. Subjects were 36 nursing administrators, who were asked to use two methods of performance feedback with each subject serving as either a supervisor or a subordinate in each situation. One method consisted of "trait" ratings, on the following variables: knowledge, quantity of work, quality of work, punctuality, adaptability, cooperation, ingenuity, judgment, economy, and supervision.

A key finding in this study was that "supervisors" when using the "trait" method rated their subordinates significantly more negatively than subordinates rated themselves. That this happened is not surprising, considering the need of the subordinate for a high positive self-concept. The supervisor would not feel the subordinate's need as strongly, and thus *would in general, tend to rate him lower, based on the same performance data*. Because of the dynamics involved, this probably is a universal tendency, which means that the outcome of *any* "trait" evaluation method may well be a discrepancy between the performance of the individual as he sees it himself, and as the supervisor sees it.

During an evaluation session, this discrepancy would become visible to the subordinate, as it did in the present experiment, and create hostility and resentment, together with a need to re-establish the originally high positive self-concept. At the working level, the source for the support necessary to maintain a high self-concept is the work group itself, which provides social reality for its members within the work environment. However, its use for this purpose seemingly should also, as a by-product, polarize the group against the supervisor and the organization.

An interesting example of this kind of outcome is found in an experiment by Stotland (1959), in which subjects were given the task of laying out the structure of a new town, under the supervision of a confederate of the experimenter who provided performance feedback that was ambiguous and incorrect. Some of the subjects were allowed to talk during break times with other subjects doing the same task, while others were not. As might have been expected, subjects who were allowed to talk together during the first break showed much greater hostility toward the supervisor during the next work period than did those who had not been allowed to talk. They were also less cooperative with the supervisor during the remainder of the experiment.

These findings strongly suggest that the major costs of ineffective supervision may very well be incurred while providing performance feedback, when the supervisor provides performance evaluations in a manner that either deprives the subordinate of esteem, or is perceived by the subordinate as incorrect or inaccurate. This suggests that it may be possible to reduce such costs through techniques that lead toward objectivity in performance evaluation, as opposed to subjectivity. While subjectivity leads to errors of personal reference, in which the underlying assumption seems to be that the subordinate could have done better had he tried harder, objectivity seems to lead to mutual decision making about the adequacy of the behavior instead of the adequacy of the person.

The use of an objective performance feedback system was illustrated in the Rosen (1969) study. In the factory in which those data were collected, the earnings of each assembly line were posted within the department. While each group undoubtedly had its own rate-restricting norm, the public nature of its performance, in the form of earnings, should have served as a powerful inducement toward stabilization of work group productivity at a level judged at least satisfactory by management. However, workers in this factory reportedly felt production pressures from management to be relatively neutral. Another way of providing feedback which may be equally effective and no more threatening or arbitrary than the one described in Rosen's study is to provide a means by which the worker can assess his own output by the volume of completed work.

Such a feedback system was used in a laboratory study by Hundal (1969). The task was to form a metallic piece into a specified size and shape. Completed pieces were stored in boxes in the vicinity of the workers. In the first feedback condition, the finished pieces were kept in boxes with flaps that prevented workers from seeing how many pieces they had completed. In the second condition, the boxes did not have flaps, so the accumulation of finished pieces was visible; however, supervisors never emptied the boxes completely in order to prevent workers from making a precise estimate of their output. In the third condition the boxes did not have flaps, but the supervisors completely emptied the boxes each time, to enable workers to make better estimates of their progress than in the other two groups. In addition, a number was displayed on a card beside the box that was an index of the amount of work completed, though workers were not told what the number was. Table 22 shows the average output for each group during a base line period preceding its experimental feedback treatment, and also under the feedback conditions just described.

Table 22

Average Group Output During Base Line and Feedback Conditions

Group	Pre-Experimental Base Line	Experimental Feedback Conditions
A	38.7	40.2
B	39.0	41.8
C	38.3	44.3

While all groups were somewhat higher during the experimental phase than during the base line period, they were not significantly higher when all three groups were considered together. However, Group C, when considered alone, did show a significant increase in productivity. While this is admittedly a laboratory study, and probably occurred in a situation in which rate restricting norms did not develop, it nonetheless is an illustration of the effectiveness of objective feedback as a means of indicating productivity emphasis, and perhaps of increasing production. While Hundal did not assess the attitudes of his subjects to determine whether they felt unreasonable pressure for productivity, it is quite possible that they did not, and that the increase in productivity was obtained without a concurrent cost of worker resentment.

There is also evidence that providing feedback on a group basis has a desirable effect, where it is possible. Berkowitz and Levy (1956) conducted an experiment with a miniature three-man air defense warning center. When group feedback was given, ratings by group members of pride in group were higher than where equally favorable evaluations were received by individuals within the group. Further, task-oriented discussion occurred more frequently when group evaluations were given. This suggests that pride in group performance may result in higher group task motivation, and that this results from perceptions of group effectiveness rather than from each individual's perceptions of his own effectiveness.

Whether pride in group produces higher group productivity or results, in turn, from productivity is a point on which the evidence is unclear. In fact, it probably would not be possible to design an experiment that could unequivocally decide this question. But it can be said with reasonable assurance that even if feelings of pride in group do not produce increased performance, they at least will increase the esteem rewards available to group members, and therefore are desirable in themselves.

Of course, it is impossible to provide group evaluations under some conditions. An example would be a task in which each individual works alone, and is not dependent on any other group member. When this is so, group feedback might not make sense. However, when there is a real group, when the members interact, and when there is an established status hierarchy as a result of their mutual interdependence, it is likely that group feedback will be advantageous. It tends to increase the amount of interdependence among group members, and decreases the risk of disrupting existing status hierarchies within the group. This, of course, is necessary in order to maintain a desired level of group cohesion. Perhaps significant in this regard, group member interdependence and maintenance of existing status hierarchies were also key concepts in the Scanlon (Whyte, 1955) incentive award plan that has been used with some degree of success in industry to obtain work group member involvement with organizational purposes.

The relationship between congruence on status indicators and performance is well illustrated by experiment (Trow and Herschdorfer, 1965) in which experimental work groups were required to perform an interdependent, sequential typing task under conditions of status congruence and incongruence. While group members did not evaluate the various status dimensions in quite the same way as the experimenters, the teams with congruent status (i.e., status hierarchies on which all status indicators are in agreement for each member of the hierarchy) outperformed the incongruent teams to a highly significant extent, and indicated that they enjoyed working with their teams significantly more.

The implication is that individual feedback that clashes with other status indicators within the work group will produce status incongruence. This, in turn, will produce tensions that will require the use of maintenance energy and probably will reduce work group performance. Group feedback techniques may reduce this risk.

In summary, it appears that a major area of costs in supervision consists of the reactions of the supervisor to the performance of his subordinates. This stands in contrast, at least to some extent, with conclusions from some of the earlier work in organizations (see Chapter 2) which seemed to indicate that the major gains were to be made in the area of setting objectives, particularly through the use of participatory methods which allow the subordinate a voice in determining what his work objectives should be or, at a minimum, the methods by which objectives should be achieved. These are not challenged as important goals of supervision by the present analysis; in fact, it is difficult to understand how subordinates could perform satisfactorily without clear understanding of the organization's requirements.

However, the major gains from such methods may well lie in the fact that they provide the supervisor with a basis for performance evaluation at a later time that will not create resentment and thereby alienate the subordinate from the organization. To the extent that this can be achieved, organizational costs attributable to supervision should decrease, and organizational effectiveness should increase, at least to the extent that effectiveness can increase as a consequence of increased member involvement with and interest in the organization's purposes. But the actual extent to which increased effectiveness *can* occur is another matter. The findings reviewed in the present chapter seem to confirm Dubin's (1965) conclusions that the impact of increased supervisory effectiveness on productivity is not very great. In particular, where *supervision* is concerned, it appears that while poor supervision can have a substantial *negative* effect on productivity and effectiveness, the opposite is not necessarily true.

WHEN THE SUPERVISOR ALSO LEADS

The conclusion that the quality of supervision does not have much positive impact on organizational effectiveness is not a very satisfactory outcome for most students of leadership, and for good reason. There is much anecdotal evidence to support the contention that skillful leadership can sometimes achieve unbelievable results. Within the present framework, in which supervision is distinguished from leadership, these two apparently contradictory observations are not really in conflict. If the definition of leadership given in the preceding chapter is accepted, then the conclusion is rather strongly forced that there really is not a great deal of leadership being used in most formal organizations, and this is why supervision—which achieves efficiency in a rather sterile way—generally does not impact *positively* on organizational effectiveness, except, as Dubin suggests, through the making of decisions that increase the efficiency of the organization as a whole.

It has already been suggested that leadership has more narrowly circumscribed goals than supervision, which is a more general concept as it pertains to organizational roles. Specifically, supervision addresses as a central objective the most efficient possible utilization of available resources, an objective quite similar to that addressed by management as that concept is usually defined. In contrast, leadership addresses the question of attitudes and motivations of subordinates, and of persuading subordinates to adopt norms and beliefs that are compatible with organizational objectives, among other things.

Supervision generally has little positive impact on productivity and effort exerted because the right to supervise comes from outside the group, that is, from the formal organization and thus is not a force that is effective in changing the group's norms and values. Since the group's norms govern the effort that will be expended by individual group members in aiding attainment of organizational goals, it seems reasonable that supervisors can influence effort expended in a major way only through the use of leadership techniques which may successfully modify these norms and values.

That leadership techniques can result in changes in group member behavior and group effectiveness is illustrated in a penetrating analysis of the effectiveness of pilots at a British Air Force base during World War II

(Paterson, 1955). Paterson speculates that, at least in this situation, individuals had both a prestige drive and a service drive. (These might be compared with Carter's individual prominence and task facilitation factors.) Because contact with enemy pilots was not experienced at this base, the British pilots were unable to perform the task they supposedly had been trained for, and their service drive was frustrated. Status competition, a reflection of the prestige drive, then became an end in itself. Further, status competition existed between categories of individuals, such as pilots and weather forecasters. This decreased cooperation, and increased the frequency of status-oriented pilot behaviors which, in the long run, caused a high accident rate.

Paterson provides a fascinating description of leader actions that resulted in correcting this situation, through manipulating group norms and then obtaining group conformance with the new norms. The first step was the identification of a common goal for all members at the air base. This was accomplished through labeling weather, which was frequently quite bad, as the "enemy." Through identification of a common "enemy," it became possible for all members to work toward a common cause. The common cause permitted identification of task functions that were meaningfully interdependent, and through which each could assist the other as all personnel at the base worked toward "beating the enemy." By enabling each man in the station team to see how his efforts aided others in accomplishing the common purpose, it was possible to develop cooperative effort and interdependence.

Group norms were skillfully influenced. It was Paterson's observation that, while groups act as anchors for norms, there are individuals within groups who serve as opinion leaders. (This, of course, is quite similar to the observation made by Katz and Lazersfeld [1955].) Paterson manipulated group norms and values through discussions with group opinion leaders in which he enlisted their support for the new objectives, and for behavior in conformity with those objectives.

As might be surmised, this was not a process that achieved results overnight. Many meetings were necessary before the full support of group opinion leaders had been gained, and even more time was required before their influence was felt at the group member level in terms of a commitment toward different objectives—that is, service as opposed to status.

The time necessary for leadership techniques to be effective in such a situation is, of course, their principal drawback. Because leadership techniques are essentially persuasive, and usually also seek to affect attitudes, it is not possible for the superordinate to press too far at any one time in seeking to obtain major change. If he does, he will generate resistance that may in the long run defeat his purposes. The problem thus created in formal organizations is that time works against the superordinate who desires to use leadership techniques. He may feel pressure from his own superordinates to move quickly in order to achieve obviously needed change within the shortest time possible. In short, he then is torn between a desire to use the persuasive techniques that promise greater effectiveness, and time pressures that virtually require that he rely instead on position power and "order" the change to occur. Such conflict can lead to errors in judgment, or to miscalculations in interpersonal interaction, either of which may result in a confrontation with normative forces from within the group.

It is suggestive at this point to reconsider some of the Survey Research Center findings concerning supervisory effectiveness, particularly that the more effective supervisors both were better planners, and willingly assumed planning as a supervisory responsibility. A ready interpretation of this finding is that these supervisors had more effective groups because they were better at organizing and thus were better able to allocate resources. However, there is another, less obvious possibility. It is probable that the supervisor who accepts responsibility for planning group efforts, and does this well, is in a better position to anticipate potential problems and thereby *has more time to act on them.* Having more time, he then is able to use leadership techniques more often in circumstances that demand their use.

Of course, there are other requirements for organizational leadership, all of which can be deduced from the discussion in Chapter 6. Among them are interpersonal competence, the desire and ability to maintain open lines of communication with both superordinates and subordinates, a history of consistency that encourages trust by subordinates, and the ability to maintain supervisory effectiveness while minimizing apparent status distinctions between oneself and one's subordinates. The point of the present discussion was not to overlook these, but rather to emphasize the one key requirement—for planning, in order to "buy" time, and patience, in order to use available time properly—that seems to overshadow the others in the application of leadership within the context of a formal organization.

SUMMARY

This chapter has been concerned with the general role of the supervisor in formal organizations, and the extent to which leadership is a proper part of his role. Perhaps the most important proposition advanced in the chapter is that the work group in formal organizations constitutes an energy system, which sanctions through its norms the expenditure of a finite and reasonable amount of energy that can be used by supervisors for the attainment of organizational goals. The actual amount of effort that is viewed as reasonable by the group is thought to depend—though perhaps not consciously so—on exchange principles, in which the individual uses the group as a source of social reality to determine what is equitable.

Four general areas of supervisory role behavior were discussed as they relate to ways of maximizing the efficiency and effectiveness with which this resource is used in the accomplishment of organizational purposes. Perhaps the most meaningful conclusion drawn from the findings presented in this chapter is that supervision that excludes the use of leadership techniques probably will not be particularly successful in mobilizing a greater amount of energy from the work group. Since group norms govern the energy that will be expended, a higher level can be obtained only through the use of leadership techniques which may successfully influence those norms.

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8

Leadership and Social Exchange–An Overview

The purpose of this volume has been to present a review and reinterpretation of the research literature pertaining to leadership in formal organizations. Accordingly, an effort has been made to reconcile both earlier and more recent findings, and to relate the entire body of work, insofar as possible, to social exchange theory, a fairly recent theoretical approach to conceptualizing interaction among persons. The reader must judge for himself the extent to which this effort has been successful in extending understanding of leadership as an interactive phenomenon. To the author it has appeared to present important insights into the role of leadership in organizations, and the ways in which leadership skills are developed and blended into the total role behavior that characterizes superordinates in organizations.

WHAT CONSTITUTES LEADERSHIP?

Perhaps the greatest weakness in the leadership literature has been a striking lack of precision in the use of the term, "leadership," and probably even in what constitutes the concept. It is thus not surprising that the processes studied under the label of leadership have been quite varied. Analysis of conditions surrounding the measurements that have been employed, and the situational contexts in which they have been employed, indicates that the total range extends from what seems to be garrulousness, through coercive power, to authority relationships established by the "demand" characteristics of instructions provided by experimenters.

With "inputs" (where the measurement decision virtually serves as an input) as different as these, it is not surprising that there is a substantial variety of outcomes in the literature concerning what leadership precursors are, and the conditions that facilitate its practice. What *is* surprising is that there seems to be a convergence—of a sort—as to what constitutes effective superordinate behavior in formal organizations, and in informal groups as well. In the present frame of reference, this convergence undoubtedly has been generated by the fact that leadership, and power and authority relationships as well, are what they are in formal organizations essentially because these concepts have been defined by the prior socialization experiences of the individuals who later become organization members.

LEARNING SOCIAL EXCHANGE SKILLS

In the present orientation, the learning of social exchange skills is a key part of the socialization experience. This social learning begins at a very early age, and eventually develops the foundation on which the individual learns to discriminate "power" from "leadership." If the learning proceeds far enough, it is also the basis for distinguishing each of them from "authority."

The essence of social exchange is the development of relationships with other persons, such that benefits of mutual value can be "traded" between participants of both equal and unequal status. Where the exchange is of benefits of equal value, and between participants of equal status, the relationship serves the purpose of promoting self-esteem development and maintenance, and of providing social reality by which the individual can judge the merit of intangible issues. Where the exchange is between persons of unequal status, it serves as the basis for differential power, wherein one participant emerges with greater resources than the other, and with some resultant degree of control over the other.

Leadership is a more "sophisticated" exchange than the more primitive process that leads to differentiation of power, in that it involves persuasive communication of some sort—not necessarily verbal—which convinces the influence recipient that he will benefit in some way if he behaves as the influence initiator wishes, but probably with the special requirement that this not be "backed up" with the threat of coercive reprisal if he fails to behave as desired.

It is probable that the ability to lead must be based on the competence to make some kind of unique contribution to the success of the group being led. It appears, thus, that leadership is a transaction between the leader and the group. One type of pervasive behavior within groups is competition for superordinate status; within the present framework, this is viewed as competition for status and esteem need satisfactions which serve to motivate superordinates in virtually any kind of group to produce the unique contributions toward group goal attainment of which they are capable. Thus, the group provides status and esteem satisfactions in exchange for unique contributions to goal attainment. Where these two benefits are in balance, a state of equity exists, and the superordinate is secure in his acceptance by the group. But when they are not in balance, as when the superordinate receives esteem satisfactions or demands status perquisites which the group views as excessive in terms of the contributions he makes to the group in return, a state of disequilibrium may exist and the superordinate may lose influence potential within the group—perhaps even his superordinate status if the group is free to depose him.

The principal contribution of exchange theory is its capacity for explaining the dynamics of superordinate-subordinate relationships in both formal and informal organizations, and it has been used in the present review for just such a purpose. For example, authority relationships in formal organizations, when viewed within an exchange theory framework, appear to be aspects of roles that operate in much the same way as norms within informal groups, to relieve participants from the need to use either personal power (or personal position power) or leadership techniques'for initiating action. Where mutual expectations for what is necessary or desired can be developed, one member of a relationship can then initiate action in conformity with the expectations of the other, without causing the other to incur a "cost." Thus, authority relationships in formal organizations serve to protect participants from exposure to power, and to increase the efficiency with which formal organizations conduct their business.

Authority serves its purpose to the fullest extent, in all likelihood, only when the content of expectations between superordinate and subordinate has been developed through the use of techniques which lead both to decide that the outcomes are fair for both, as opposed to the exercise of power or coercion in which this may not be true. Without attempting to apply value judgments to the exercise of power or to leadership, a major conclusion of this review is that the judgment of equity is likely to be reached more often by both superordinate and subordinate when the content of authority relationships is determined through leadership techniques which, as defined in Chapter 6, imply willingness on both sides to attempt to achieve equity for both sides.

LEADERSHIP, POWER, AND AUTHORITY

Perhaps the most important conclusion reached in this work is the importance of distinguishing between the concepts of leadership, power, and authority, and of identifying superordinate role behaviors that constitute each. A substantial portion of the current literature (e.g., Fiedler[1]) has been devoted to the question of what happens in leadership training, and whether such training is effective. The present view suggests that existing answers to such questions may miss the mark by a generous margin. Superordinate behavior is the product of both prior social learning and constraints imposed by the formal structure, including the expectations of subordinates, within which superordinate behavior occurs. That part which is determined by the existing structure, or context, clearly would not be particularly amenable to change at the discretion of the superordinate. And the part that is a product of prior social learning would almost certainly be difficult to change, as any other set of well-ingrained responses to stimulus situations would be.

Analysis of role theory findings relevant to leadership practices suggests that most superordinates fail to lead because they are not "open" to counterinfluence attempts by their subordinates, or, in present terms, have inadequate skills in social exchange. Lacking such skills, they resort to position power more often than they should, when the formal organization makes such a resource available, and thereby lose the capacity for positive influence by imposing barriers to communication between themselves and their subordinates. This suggests that leadership training properly should focus on the pragmatic question of "what works"—as judged in terms of a balance between satisfaction of organizational needs and subordinate responses to the behavior in question, and should consist of *expansion of superordinate role repertoires to include such behaviors.* Of course, the process need not be as ad hoc as this might sound. A great deal is known about "what works."

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[1] Fiedler, Fred E. *On the Death and Transfiguration of Leadership Training*, Technical Report 70-16, Organizational Research, Department of Psychology, University of Washington, Seattle, December 1970.

It is true of any science that knowledge is never complete. This is *certainly* true of the study of leadership. It is also true of a science that knowledge should grow, through systematic re-examinations of the body of findings, to seek among other things more parsimonious explanations for known relationships. While a social exchange approach to understanding of the processes involved in "superordinate-ship" may not be the ultimate solution, it appears to contribute to more ultimate purposes by offering a mechanism that seems to deal equally effectively, and in the same terms, with influence processes in both formal organizations and informal groups.

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13. ABSTRACT

The focus of this volume is on influence processes in formal organizations. It is based on an integration of basic and applied research on leadership, drawing upon review of more than 1000 separate titles. The most important conclusion reached in this work is the importance of distinguishing between the concepts of leadership, power, and authority, and of identifying superordinate role behaviors that constitute each. The volume also provides a basis for identifying fruitful work in organizational leadership and for immediate application of existing organizational and leadership findings.

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