RESEARCH PAPER P-565

THE STATE OF RESEARCH ON INTERNAL WAR

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August 1970

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIVISION

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This paper evaluates the present state of efforts to understand the nature of internal war. It was prepared at the request of the Director, Overseas Defense Research, Advanced Research Projects Agency, in support of Project Agile.

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ABSTRACT

This paper evaluates our current knowledge about the nature of internal war and some of the research being undertaken to increase this knowledge. There were 380 conflicts in the world in the 19 years following World War II, involving 101 (81 percent) of the 123 independent countries in the world. During this period, there were from 13 to 30 new conflicts each year and an average of 13.6 on-going conflicts each month, but there was no formal declaration of war in any conflict.

Statistical analyses of data on conflict in many nations identify such common factors as <u>revolution</u>, <u>subversion</u>, and <u>turmoil</u> in internal conflict and <u>war</u>, <u>diplomatic moves</u>, and <u>belligerency</u> in foreign conflict, but with little replication among studies.

Typologies of internal war emphasize such characteristics as the target of revolutionary activity, identity of the revolutionaries, revolutionary goals, how the conflict started (i.e., spontaneous or calculated), whether or not the military activity was conventional in nature, and the involvement of other nations and of Communists.

The crucial conceptual issues about internal war are still in the pretheoretical stage. New research on internal war should examine the interaction of the antagonists on a time-line basis, utilize reliable attitudinal data, and examine what happens after hostilities are over, since the real impact of a revolution seems to occur after rather than during the period of active combat.

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SUMMARY

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate our current knowledge of
internal war, with emphasis on the research now being conducted to im-
prove our understanding of this phenomenon. As used here, the term
"internal war" includes coups, insurgency, and guerrilla war--conflict
between a government and its people, with or without external support.
The term "research" is used in a narrow sense to focus our attention
on studies that try to be systematic with regard to the collection of
data, the use of analytical methods to interpret various aspects of
internal war, and the development of theories that are amenable to
proof or disproof. Thus, the emphasis is on comparative or systematic
studies of groups of conflicts in preference to studies of individual
cases.

The time period examined is primarily, but not exclusively, from
the end of World War II to the present. There were 380 conflicts in
the world from 1946 to 1964; 101 (81 percent) of the 123 independent
countries were involved in some type of conflict, whether internal or
international. During this period, there were from 13 to 30 new con-
flicts each year and an average of 13.6 simultaneous conflicts per
month. Yet, since World War II there has been no formal declaration
of war in any conflict, including the Arab-Israeli conflicts, the
American "presence" in Vietnam, and the conflict between North and
South Korea.

The United States participated in 49 conflicts (13 percent), the
Communists in 84 (22 percent), and both in 23 cases (6 percent); in
most cases (65 percent) neither was involved.

Significant characteristics of internal wars have been compared systematically in only a few studies, and few generalizations can be drawn from these data.

The method of factor analysis has been used to examine many types of conflict in many countries. The basic data are taken from newspaper reports and national statistical series. The resulting studies suggest that different measures of conflict, related, for example, to strikes, riots, troop movements, and number of people killed, can be reduced to a few factors identifiable as revolution, subversion, and turmoil (applicable to internal conflict) and war, diplomatic moves, and belligerency (applicable to foreign conflict).

There are limitations on the use of factor analysis. Few of the analyses completed to date include attitudinal measures among the raw data; nor is the method of factor analysis well suited to show trends over time. Only a modest amount of consistency has been demonstrated among factor analyses based on similar data for two different time periods (e.g., in Tanter's study, the correlations between 22 measures for two time periods varied from 0.05 to 0.71, with a median correlation of 0.44).

Many attempts have been made to classify internal wars in meaningful categories. The major characteristics that have been taken into account in typologies of internal war are the following:

- Target of revolutionary activity (e.g., government, regime, or community)
- Identity of revolutionaries (e.g., masses, elite)
- Revolutionary goals
- Initiation (spontaneous or calculated)
- Type of military activity (conventional or unconventional)
- Involvement of other nations
- Involvement of Communists

Generally, the author of each typology emphasizes features that he considers important. Thus, Nikita Khrushchev set forth three types of war (world wars, local wars, and wars of national liberation), while

Chalmers Johnson found six (jacquerie, millenarian rebellion, anarchistic rebellion, Jacobin Communist revolution, conspirational coup d'etat, and militarized mass insurrection). Several others are described in the paper. There is little basis at present to choose among the various typologies.

The crucial conceptual issues about internal war are still in the pretheoretical stage. Satisfactory theories of internal war have neither been compiled nor evaluated. However, the following topics preliminary to the development of theories of internal war have been addressed:

- Distinction between incipient and underlying causes
- The model of a stable society (i.e., is violence the usual or the unusual condition)
- Time frame of interest (i.e., many centuries or post-World War II)
- The driving force behind conflict (e.g., frustration-aggression, elite inefficiency, multiple societal dysfunctions, disparity between expectations and achievements)
- Model of a theory (emphasis on causes for a revolution, classification, common features of all revolutions, differences among revolutions, processes of revolutionary change, and so on)

The following types of research are feasible and are required if we are to advance our understanding of internal war:

1. Most explanations of internal war include factors such as disappointment due to disparities between expectations and achievements, conflict among significant segments of the population, and reduced effectiveness of the elite. These factors center upon how members of a society view each other and their future, that is, their perceptions of the world in which they live. Yet, there is a marked absence of attitudinal data for these factors in present analyses of internal war. Thus, there is a great need for the systematic collection of attitudinal data in societies undergoing conflict. Such data must be collected in series over time to detect changes in the attitudes of adequately sampled, representative segments of

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populations. Then, the relations among attitudinal data and various demographic and economic indicators must also be examined.

2. More detailed comparative studies of selected cases of internal war are needed. The few comparative case studies that exist have had to use incomplete data of varying quality, almost always without sufficient attitudinal data. Thus, these comparative studies permit only a limited degree of generalization. There is little that can be said about the common or uncommon features of various internal wars unless additional, well-documented, comparative case studies are undertaken. The selection of cases to be studied must also, obviously, be based on a conceptual scheme about the nature of internal war. Accordingly, the samples should include cases of internal war in various parts of the world, successes and failures, those with and without external intervention, and some controls, i.e., somewhat comparable cases of societies in which internal war did not occur.

3. We should have detailed analyses showing the actions and re-actions of the aggressors and defenders in cases of internal war, where the interactions of the various players can be followed on a time-line basis from the inception of conflict to its termination.

4. There is a need to examine what happens after hostilities are terminated. The real impact of a revolution may actually occur after, rather than during, active combat.

5. Researchers should explore indicators by examining both the relations between various measures of violence, and the sub-sequent occurrence of internal war, and the relation of these measures to the pattern of success for one side or the other after the termination of hostilities.

6. Finally, attention should be placed on improving our methods for the rapid and reliable assessment of the state of affairs in an area where internal war breaks out with little warning.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This paper examines the present status of research on the nature of internal war. It does this by examining where and when internal wars occur, the nature of the adversaries, the causes of the conflict, and the final outcomes. Some comparative case studies, which look for common features among a series of internal wars, are examined. We also review a number of studies, using primarily the technique of factor analysis which allows us to reduce relatively large volumes of data about internal conflicts in order to look for common elements. Attempts to categorize the types of internal war and theories that try to explain their characteristics are evaluated. Finally, suggestions are made for research intended to extend our knowledge and understanding of internal war, because it is clear that much remains to be learned.

At the outset, some comments are appropriate concerning the scope of this paper. By internal war, we mean a widespread conflict within a country, a conflict often characterized by unconventional military operations, terrorism and propaganda. It is a conflict in which an initially weaker force seeks to achieve power by alienating people from their government and by demoralizing the forces available to the government. Many terms, such as internal war, guerrilla war, sub-limited war, and counterinsurgency, have been applied to this type of conflict. For the moment, we will use "internal war" as generally representative of all such terms. Our reasons for doing so are discussed later in the paper.

This paper is based entirely on unclassified sources. It does not consider the development of an American policy for dealing with internal wars nor the American involvement in Vietnam.

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We have limited our concern primarily but not exclusively to internal wars that have taken place since the end of World War II in 1946. Our period in history may be characterized generally by the dissolution of large colonial systems, a large increase in the number of small independent states, and the maturation of Communist countries.

In a speech entitled "Security in the Contemporary World,"[1] Robert S. McNamara pointed out that there were 164 internationally significant outbreaks of violence in the eight years between 1958 and 1966; only 15 of these were between two states. Formally declared war is not in vogue; there has been no formal declaration of war in any conflict since World War II. Internal violence seems to occur mainly in countries that are economically backward, although economically advanced states, for example, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Japan, are not immune from such violence. Communists appear to be involved in only about half of these conflicts, including seven instances in which a Communist regime itself was the target of the uprising. McNamara concluded that "In a modernizing society, security means development." Security is not achieved by military hardware, military force, or military activity alone, though they may be involved.

Most Americans know this, especially if they reflect about Vietnam. There, a small country has been willing and able to engage the most powerful country on earth; while the latter was not willing, and perhaps not even able, to bring its superior military, economic, and political power to bear on that conflict. That war has lasted for about ten years since the United States sought a military solution to a conflict that had persisted since the end of World War II. By comparison, the United States was involved for four years in World War I and three and a half years in World War II. The war in Vietnam is in fact the longest war in American history, longer even than the War of Independence. It is, of course, an even longer war for the Vietnamese.

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[1] Robert S. McNamara, address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Montreal, Canada, May 18, 1966. Text reported in Department of State Bulletin, June 6, 1966, pp. 874-881.

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Despite the magnitude of the commitment, this must be called a "limited war," that is, one in which the survival of the United States or of North Vietnam is not at stake; the same could not be said of the South Vietnam regime.

Limited war is not a new phenomenon, but its modern versions around the world are related to the reluctance of the United States and the Soviet Union to challenge each other directly. Many of the internal and international conflicts that have taken place since 1946 have been indirect confrontations between Communist and free world societies, a form of war by proxy. During the same period, however, most conflicts have not involved these two major antagonists, even by proxy. Reasons for serious internal conflict are found in nationalism; the possibility of terminating a colonial regime; religious, ethnic, and regional antagonisms arising from real or imagined historical causes; and efforts to attain political dominance by means of a revolution, coup d'etat, or bloody riot.

II. STATISTICS ON RECENT CONFLICTS

We should know more about the natural history of recent conflicts
before attempting to explain them, their growth, and their future and
speculate on how to cope with them.[1] What common features, if any,
can be discerned among the conflicts of the "insurgent era" since
World War II? Are trends discernible in the location, number, and na-
ture of these conflicts? Can generalizations be made about them?
Some descriptive information about these conflicts has been compiled
by Richardson and Waldron;[2] the statistics that follow are taken
from their study.

In 1964 there were 123 independent countries, excluding three
"pseudocountries" (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and five very small
principalities like Monaco and Andorra. There were 380 conflicts in
the 19 years between January 1, 1946, and December 31, 1964. During
these years, 101 (82 percent) of the 123 countries were involved in
internal or international conflict. Three conflicts existed at the
start of the period, 377 new ones occurred during the period, and 12
continued after 1964. From 13 to 30 new conflicts started each year;[3]
there was an average of 13.6 simultaneous conflicts each month during
these 19 years (five to 23 conflicts per month).[4] Although the

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[1]See Appendix A, "A Note on the Statistics of Wars."

[2]R.P. Richardson, Jr., and S. Waldron, "An Analysis of Recent Con-
flicts" (U), Annex B to Navy Contributions to Deterrence at Con-
flict Levels Less Than General War 1975-80, Center for Naval
Analyses, Institute of Naval Studies, Study 14, January 1966. The
types of data used in this study are shown in Appendix B.

[3]In the Montreal speech cited above, McNamara said that there were
34 new conflicts in 1958 and 58 new ones in 1965.

[4]According to McNamara, there were 40 on February 1, 1966.

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number of independent countries was increasing during this period, especially in Africa, the number of conflicts per country per year remained relatively constant at about 0.2.

Table 1 (from Richardson and Waldron) shows that about 85 percent of these conflicts were internal and 15 percent were international. More than 40 percent were coups, military revolutions, or mutinies; about 30 percent were civil disorders (uncontrolled fighting among political, religious, tribal, or economic groups); about 12 percent were internal guerrilla and civil wars. If the data are grouped in three equal time periods (6.3 years each), internal conflicts tended to increase (from 100 to 138), while the number of international conflicts remained relatively constant (at about 20). The number of guerrilla and civil wars actually decreased (from 16 to 11).

In these conflicts, the size of the forces on each side ranged from as little as ten to as many as one million men; the median appears to be about 2500 (the data on this point are difficult to interpret). In small conflicts, the threat party exceeds the status quo party in size; in larger conflicts (more than 1000 participants) both sides have about the same number of participants. About 75 percent of the conflicts resulted in 100 or fewer fatalities, but there were five conflicts with more than 100,000 fatalities.[1] More than 50 percent of the conflicts ended within one week, about 67 percent in one month, and about 85 percent in one year, but some lasted ten or more years.[2]

In more than half of these cases, there was no warning that conflict would occur; in another 18 percent, it has not been possible to determine whether or not there was any warning. There was some warning in about one-third of the conflicts, the median warning time being 14 days. Thus, there was an appreciable amount (two weeks or more) of warning for only about one-sixth of all cases.

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[1] Algeria-France, 1954-1962; Vietnam, 1959-1964; Korea, 1950-1953; Vietnam-France, 1946-1954; and banditry in Colombia, 1955-1964.

[2] Indian-Communist agitations over 20 years, Kashmir over 10 years, the terrorist campaign in Malaya over 11 years, and Vietnam over 20 years.

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TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF ALL CONFLICTS BY TYPE AND TIME
PERIOD, 1946-1964[1] (Based on starting date of conflict)

	Number/Time Period					
Type of Conflict	1/01/46 to 4/30/52	5/01/52 to 8/31/58	9/01/58 to 12/31/64	Total Number	Percent	Percent
Internal						
Civil disorder	35	32	55	122	32.1	32.1
Localized in-ternal						
Coup d'etat	26	18	43	87	22.9	
Military re-volt/mutiny	8	6	17	31	8.2	
Insurrection	15	12	12	39	10.2	41.3
Widespread internal						
Guerrilla war	12	10	5	27	7.1	
Civil war	4	7	6	17	4.5	11.6
Subtotals	100	85	138	323		85.0
International						
Conventional						
Border conflict	7	12	9	28	7.4	
Limited war	3	2	2	7	1.8	9.2
Other						
Covert invasion	6	3	6	15	4.0	
Blockade quarantine	2	1	1	4	1.0	
Threat (show of force)	0	2	1	3	0.8	5.8
Subtotals	18	20	19	57		15.0
Totals	118	105	157	380		100.0

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[1]Richardson and Waldron, Table B-III, p. B-62.

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According to Richardson and Waldron, most conflicts (over 40 per-
cent) were motivated by political factors. Four other factors each
motivated about '0 percent of all conflicts: prospects for ethnic,
nationalist, ideological, and territorial gain. In about one-third of
the cases, the threat party sought to overthrow the government by
force but wished to maintain the same form of government. In about
one-quarter of the cases, the objective was to change the form of
government by force. The threat party won in 26 percent of all cases,
and made appreciable gains, though without winning, in another 14 per-
cent. The threat party lost in 40 percent of the conflicts.

In most cases (70 percent), there was no significant outside sup-
port for either side. The United States participated in 49 cases, and
the side it supported "won" in 14 (28 percent). In 33 cases, the
United States supported the status quo party, which won nine (28 per-
cent), e.g., the Greek civil war in 1946, South Korea in 1950. In
nine cases, the United States supported the threat party, which won
five (55 percent), e.g., the Dominican Republic after Trujillo's as-
sassination in 1961, the invasion of Guatemala in 1954, and the military
coup against Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam in 1963. The United States
itself was the target in seven conflicts during this period, (e.g.,
Panama riots in 1959 and 1964, the nationalist uprising in Puerto
Rico in 1950, and the attacks upon U.S. destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf
in 1964).

Communists were involved in 84 cases. In 67 cases, they supported
the threat side, which won nine (13 percent). In 12 cases, they sup-
ported the status quo side, which won four (33 percent). The re-
mainder are indeterminate. Both the United States and Communist
countries were involved in 23 cases (6 percent), while neither was
involved in 247 (65 percent) of the 380 conflicts.

Weapon advantage is related to outcome in coups d'etat and in-
surrections. No correlation could be established, however, between
an advantage in type and number of weapons and outcome in guerrilla
wars. The status quo party achieved a high record of victories in
civil disorders with small relative forces.

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Richardson and Waldron point out that their somewhat uncertain data can support only tentative conclusions. They limit themselves to statistical summaries and apparent trends and make no theoretical observations.

Since 1946, the number of new conflicts started each year increased from about 15 to 25 per year. When normalized to the increased number of independent countries, the rate of new conflicts is constant at about 0.2 per country per year. Thus, the United States and Communist countries had many opportunities to become involved in these conflicts, and doubtless more opportunities will arise. Few of these opportunities for conflict were grasped (or perhaps thrust upon them): 13 percent by the United States and 22 percent by Communist countries; in 6 percent, both were involved in the same conflict. The essential features that may distinguish these cases from the remainder were not identified by Richardson and Waldron. Until such an analysis is made, it is not clear that the major antagonists were involved in a consistent fashion or that the pattern of their involvements changed during the period under observation.

Other compilations have been made of recent conflicts, but the numbers vary according to the purpose, time frame, and criteria employed by their authors. Although the number of conflicts that occur during any period must be finite and nonvarying, no comparisons have been made among these compilations, and no "standard" list of conflicts can be assumed to exist. Thus, Deitchman[1] selects 32 conflicts since World War II in which "third powers," as well as the direct antagonists, were involved. As noted above, in his Montreal speech, Robert S. McNamara said that there were 164 significant resorts to violence from 1954 to 1966. WINS II[2] lists 230 conflicts

[1] Seymour J. Deitchman, Limited War and American Defense Policy, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1964.

[2] A Worldwide Integral National Strategy for 1970, WINS II, Conflicts in the Lower Spectrum of War, Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army, March 1, 1965 (SECRET).

since 1945 in which violence or unconstitutional means were used in
efforts to bring about political, social, or economic change. Ex-
cluded were conflicts resolved primarily by means of overt, conven-
tional force, e.g., the Kashmir dispute, 1947-1949; the Arab-Israeli
war, 1948-1949; the Korean War, 1950-1953. Oleson[1] finds 118 inter-
nationally significant incidents since World War II involving the use
of military forces.

Condit, Cooper, and Others[2] found about 150 cases from 1898 to
1965 that met their major criteria of a military engagement between
insurgent and counterinsurgent forces lasting at least one year and
studied 57 of them, as discussed below. Bloomfield and Leiss[3] ex-
amined 52 cases for use in a typology of postwar local conflicts and
studied 13 in detail, while Barringer and Ramers[4], in a closely
related paper, studied 18. These three studies account for 64 dif-
ferent conflicts, but only six were studied in common:

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[1]Peter C. Oleson, The Uses of Military Force Since the Second World
War, Directorate of Estimates, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intel-
ligence, U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. 20330 (no date; about
September 1968), AD 689 777.

[2]D.M. Condit, Bert H. Cooper, Jr., and Others, Challenge and Response
in Internal Conflict, Center for Research in Social Systems, The
American University, Washington, D.C.
The Experience in Asia, Vol. I, February 1968
The Experience in Europe and the Middle East, Vol. II, March 1967
The Experience in Africa and Latin America, Vol. III, April 1968
Supplement, September 1968, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

[3]Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss with Others, The Control
of Local Conflict, A Design Study on Arms Control and Limited War
in the Developing Areas (published in revised form as Controlling
Small Wars: A Strategy for the Seventies; Knopf, New York, 1969),
3 Vols., prepared for The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
ACDA/WEC-98, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., June 30, 1967.

[4]Richard E. Barringer and Robert K. Ramers, The Control of Local
Conflict, A Design Study, The Conditions of Conflict, A Configural
Analysis, 4 Vols., prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency, ACDA/WEC-98, Center for International Studies, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., September 30,
1967.

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Indonesia  1946-1949
Kashmir    1947-1949
Malaya     1948-1960
Cyprus     1954-1958
Greece     1946-1949
Angola     1961-1965
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This small amount of overlap in three large, closely related studies illustrates our quite limited ability to compare the results of different methods of analysis on the same cases of conflict or even to increase our understanding on a few selected cases.

It is also well to remember that, except for the case studies just cited, the various compilations of internal war are based on a few convenient sources, such as The New York Times, The London Economist, and Keesing's Contemporary Archives. Concerning their own study, Richardson and Waldron say that "inadequacies in the data, both inherent and arising out of variable judgments, prohibit claiming more for [their] results than that they are tentative. [The results] are no more reliable than the data ... little has been done previously in this area. Consequently, it has been necessary to design and execute the research upon which this study is based without the benefit of well-developed methodology, definitions, data and techniques." (pp. B-41, B-42). Thus, such studies are best viewed as steps on the road to scholarship, not representing, as yet, any penetrating degree of scholarship. For this, we must turn to some case studies of internal war.

III. COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES OF INTERNAL WAR

There is a large and useful literature on many of the conflicts
that have taken place since World War II. Memoirs of key participants
or reports by close observers provide important information on some
military and political events (as well as valuable insights on how
these men wish to be regarded by history). Classic reports include
those of Lawrence[1] on the war against the Turks in Arabia, Bernard
Fall[2] on Vietnam, Romulo[3] on the Philippine campaign, and Thomp-
son[4] on Malaya. Nasution's report[5] is particularly interesting
because among military and political leaders he is unique in that he
directed guerrilla war by the Indonesians against the Dutch (1945-
1946) and then conducted antiguerrilla operations after independence
was granted. Some Communist leaders have had a disconcerting ability
to specify their objectives and tactics, both before and after the
fact, and have reported their successes: General Giap[6] on Vietnam,
"Che" Guevara[7] on Cuba (but not on Bolivia), Mao Tse-tung[8] on

[1] T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Doubleday, New York, 1935.

[2] Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy, Stackpole Co., Harrisburg,
Pa., (3d. rev. ed.), 1963.

[3] Carlos P. Romulo, Crusade in Asia: Philippine Victory, John Day
Co., New York, 1955.

[4] Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, Praeger,
New York, 1966.

[5] Abdul Haris Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare, Praeger,
New York, 1965.

[6] Vo Nguyen Giap, Peoples' War, Peoples' Army, Praeger, New York, 1962.

[7] Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, Monthly Review Press, New York,
1961.

[8] Samuel B. Griffith, trans., Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare,
Praeger, New York, 1961.

China, and Lenin[1] on Russia. Despite the strong tone of advocacy in these documents, they are worth reading. Then, there also exist some "handbooks," of varying degrees of sophistication, on the nature of guerrilla wars and on how to deal with them: Julian Paget,[2] Valeriano and Bohannan,[3] Galula,[4] Pustay,[5] Paret and Shy,[6] and Trinquier.[7] These books are based on the field experiences of their authors, who tend to emphasize their own operational successes or failures and suggest that most guerrilla wars probably develop in the same way. This suggestion is probably not correct and, in any case, is questionable without a relevant taxonomy for distinguishing internal wars.

Although the literature on internal war is voluminous, it is not systematic. There is a clear need to compare the same types of information on a wider variety of cases if we are to understand better the basic similarities and differences among internal wars. As reported above, this was done to a limited extent by Richardson and Waldron in their study of 380 recent conflicts.

A systematic study of 57 cases of internal war is being conducted under the leadership of Condit and Cooper.[8] Table 2 shows the

[1] V.I. Lenin, "Partisan Warfare," pp. 65-79 in Franklin Mark Osanka, ed., Modern Guerrilla Warfare, The Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1962.

[2] Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare, Walker and Co., New York, 1967.

[3] Colonel Napoleon D. Valeriano and Lieutenant Colonel Charles T.R. Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience, Praeger, New York, 1962.

[4] David Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Praeger, New York, 1964.

[5] John S. Pustay, Counterinsurgency Warfare, The Free Press, New York, 1965.

[6] Peter Paret and John W. Shy, Guerrillas in the 1960's, Praeger, New York, 1962.

[7] Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, Praeger, New York, 1964.

[8] Condit and Cooper, op. cit.

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distribution of these cases according to area of the world and time
period (coded on the basis of termination date). The case histories
have been published, and a study to compare them is under way. The
cases were selected from a list of 150 internal conflicts in accordance
with several criteria: relevance to current events (eliminating cases
occurring before the 20th century); clear government recognition of
the threat to its existence (eliminating cases in which the govern-
ment's response was regarded as minimal or nonexisting, as in a coup
d'etat, or in which it approached conventional warfare, as in the
Spanish Civil War); interest to the Department of the Army (cases in
which military operations lasted one year or more); cases in which
major powers were involved; exclusion of cases of international war;
and finally, availability of sufficient data in unclassified sources
and of qualified persons to do the research.

TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF CASES IN CONDIT AND COOPER ACCORDING TO
AREA OF THE WORLD AND TIME PERIOD

Area	Time Period			
	1898-1939	1940-1945	1945-1965	Totals
Africa	3	1	7	11
Middle East	2		3	5
Latin America	5		4	9
Europe	1	7	4	12
Asia	5	4	11	20
Totals	16	12	29	57

In the 57 cases chosen, about half occurred after the end of
World War II; the government won or lost an equal number of cases,
excluding 13 cases during World War II for which it was difficult to
distinguish between the internal and external conflicts.

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Each case was prepared in a consistent format covering background, insurgency, counterinsurgency, outcome, and conclusions. Each of the 45 contributors was asked to answer questions on 91 categories of information. (These categories appear in Appendix D.) The results provide a series of descriptive accounts prepared in a generally consistent fashion. Unfortunately, not all experts followed the outline with equal care. Nor was any attempt made to compare the information in each category for different conflicts, e.g., by time period, area of the world, and whether the insurgents won or lost. Such comparisons are left for the forthcoming study.

The use of many area experts does not imply that they will provide data of equal comparability. Condit[1] reports that the opposite may be true. Condit and Cooper finally found that they had to abandon the original 91 questions; instead, they used a new set of 183 questions that they themselves answered for all 57 cases. They found agreements of 74 to 84 percent between their own answers to these questions and those of some of the original authors and of 89 percent with some experts who had not previously contributed to the study.

Without implying causality, the Condit and Cooper study indicates that insurgencies have tended to occur where the population is mainly agricultural and the terrain is favorable for guerrilla warfare; the population is ethnically nonhomogeneous; there is a markedly unequal distribution of wealth; and the government is nonrepresentative. In general, recent armed conflict, but not internal violence, is also a predisposing factor for insurgency.

The difference in the number of conflicts since World War II reported by Condit and Cooper (N = 29) and Richardson and Waldron (N = 380) warrants explanation. The latter consider all conflicts, including civil disorders, coups d'etat, military revolts, and insurrections, which account for 279 (73 percent) of their 380 cases. Condit

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[1]D.M. Condit, "A Profile of Incipient Insurgency (U)," pp. 53-57, in The Structuring of General Purpose Forces, 21st Military Operations Research Symposium, June 1968, SECRET NOFORN.

and Cooper were especially concerned with cases that might be relevant to future operations of the U.S. Army. Thus, their criteria eliminated small-scale insurgencies, coups d'etat, and campaigns that lasted less than one year.

Bloomfield, Leiss, and their coauthors[1] prepared 13 case studies on the control of local conflict outside Europe since the end of World War II (an exception is the Soviet-Iranian conflict, which started in 1941). Control refers to the prevention, moderation, or termination of organized violence, whether within or between countries. They posit a dynamic model in which local conflict may go through six phases: dispute, prehostilities, hostilities, termination, postconflict, and settlement, with transitions from one stage to the next. This model, as well as several typologies developed in the study, will be discussed later. Each case study was designed to answer 23 questions on the subject of the conflict, the positions of the adversaries, and the progression of the conflict from one phase to another. (The questions are given in Appendix E.) The raw data consisted primarily of library materials and secondary sources; primary materials and classified records were deliberately excluded. An effort was made to describe the acquisition of weapons by both sides and to determine its effect on the course of the conflicts. This information was taken from standard library sources, such as newspapers, military journals, and trade publications like Janes' All the World's Air Craft; Smith's Small Arms of the World; and The Military Balance, published by the Institute for Strategic Studies.

Like Condit and Cooper, Bloomfield and Leiss prepared the narratives in a standard format; they identified the phases of the conflict, the factors bearing on the transitions from one phase to the next, and lessons for the control of conflict. Where available, a description was also provided of the acquisition of weapons by each side and its influence on the outcome of the conflict. A significant

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[1] Bloomfield, Leiss, and Others, op. cit.

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difference from the Condit and Cooper study is the fact that comparisons were made among cases.

The principal "substantive" findings are the series of steps believed to be crucial for transition from any phase toward or away from violence. In some cases these steps were actually taken; in the vast majority they were not. The study was oriented toward determining policies that could influence, although not necessarily avoid, conflict in its various phases. The authors believe that the following types of measures could have been used to influence the conflicts that were examined:

- Intervention by United Nations and regional organizations
- Intervention by great powers, allies, and neighbors
- Military forces and strategy
- Internal-political
- Arms
- Communications and information

These measures are arranged in decreasing order of frequency of occurrence, as cited by Bloomfield and Leiss. Frequency of use, however, is not necessarily a measure of effectiveness, even if it does agree with the policy preferences of these authors, with some benefit from hindsight. There is no reason, however, to question another finding--that the distinction between interstate and internal conflicts becomes blurred when third parties become involved in an internal conflict. The authors also found (with appropriate qualifications for the subjective nature of the analysis and the limited number of cases) that violence is best controlled before a dispute has turned into a conflict. The range and variety of possible conflict-control measures decline as options begin to close; attitudes harden and attention is increasingly directed toward more violent political conduct. Roughly, there was a decrease in the number of conflict-reducing measures actually taken in view of the opportunities.

What we have here, therefore, is a series of case studies prepared with considerable rigor in regard to format, i.e., delineation

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of phases, transitions between phases, and the role of weapons acquisition, but with a nonobjective, policy-oriented appraisal for comparisons made across the cases.

Some of these cases, with additions, were also used by Barringer and Ramers[1] in a companion study to that of Bloomfield and Leiss. The purpose of the new study was to develop a structural or process model for the transition of conflict from one phase to another. The 18 case studies provided 87 instances in which conflict went from one phase to another; thus, not all of the conflicts went through all phases to settlement. Data were coded on 300 variables for the purposes of developing a series of patterns identifying the variety of ways in which these conflicts transitioned from one phase to the next or, on occasion, failed to do so. A fairly elaborate computer program was developed to perform an "agreement analysis," a form of factor analysis that identifies the basic patterns in each type of transition. The very useful point was made that no single factor can be expected to explain the growth and transitions of any conflict. A factor, such as the presence of a third party to the dispute, may lead in one circumstance to an increase of conflict but have little influence or perhaps lead to a decrease of conflict in another circumstance. Only an incomplete version of this study, which describes the methodology, was published; the substantive findings and conclusions are not available.

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[1]Barringer and Ramers, op. cit.

IV. THE SEARCH FOR PATTERNS OF INTERNAL WAR

Even to a casual observer, it is obvious that internal conflicts must be described by many variables rather than by just a few. The Condit and Cooper case studies started with 91 and ended with 195 categories of information on 57 conflicts; Richardson and Waldron used 25 categories on 380 conflicts; Bloomfield and Leiss used 23 categories for 13 case studies; Barringer and Ramers used 300 variables for 18 cases. Obviously, the use of many variables, rather than a few, does not necessarily provide more descriptive power, especially if some of the variables are redundant or simply partition the data into smaller subsets.

If we are confronted with many descriptive categories, it becomes desirable to aggregate them into meaningful groups or patterns.

Many techniques can be employed for this purpose, but the present discussion will be limited primarily to factor analysis because of its general use in identifying patterns of conflict.

The method of factor analysis is well known and will not be described here[1] except to note that it identifies the common variance in a matrix of correlations. It was employed initially by psychologists to interpret correlations between scores on different types of psychological tests in order, in crude terms, to explore the primary dimensions of the mind. Political scientists have begun to use factor analysis to study dimensions of conflict behavior within and between

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[1]Harry Harmon, Modern Factor Analysis, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970.
R.J. Rummel, "Understanding Factor Analysis," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 11, pp. 444-480, 1967.

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nations. Common to these studies are masses of data, computerized data processing, extraction of factors, and some beginnings toward a theory of conflict. The basic data in these studies are of unknown validity, the reliability of coding is either low or not specified at all, and factor analysis is generally employed in a mechanical rather than insightful manner.

The data in a cross-polity survey[1] are used in many of these studies. This survey provides a computer printout of 57 raw characteristics on 115 independent polities (all the nations in the world except Nationalist China and Western Samoa when the survey was performed). Examples of these raw characteristics, many of which may be interpreted to have some political significance, are gross national product, freedom of the press, literacy rate, government stability, and character of the bureaucracy, as well as such demographic variables as area, population, growth rate, and urbanization. The survey is not based on any theory and does not explain or predict political phenomena. "It is instead designed to stimulate the generation of hypotheses on the part of the professionally trained reader."

Other basic data often used in factor analyses of internal conflict may be found in the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators and the Atlas of Economic Development.[2]

Rummel[3] performed a factor analysis on 13 variables of domestic conflict in 113 countries from 1946 to 1959. The raw data, which were

[1] Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, A Cross-Polity Survey, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1963.

[2] Bruce M. Russett, et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1964. Norton Ginsburg, Atlas of Economic Development, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1961.

[3] R.J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within Nations, 1946-1959," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10, pp. 65-73, 1966.

collected by Harry Eckstein[1] for another study, consisted of entries in The New York Times Index.

Eleven of the 13 variables, which are defined in the report, were highly loaded on three factors, as follows:

Factor 1: revolution, i.e., rebellion, planned or carried out against government authority. High loadings on mutiny, coup, and equivocal plot.

Factor 2: subversion, i.e., attempts to undermine the strength of the government and to cause defection of the people through unconventional warfare and terrorism. High loadings on warfare or guerrilla warfare and extended violence.

Factor 3: turmoil, i.e., unplanned, uncoordinated violence that is usually not related to revolutionary and subversive behavior. High loadings on riots, turmoil, small-scale terrorism, quasi-private violence (e.g., inter-tribal disputes), unequivocal violence, and total number of incidents of unequivocal and equivocal violence.

Factors 1 and 2 are thought to represent two types of planned conflict behavior. It was not possible to identify two variables--large-scale terrorism and administrative actions to remove political opposition--with any of these three factors.

Tanter[2] performed a factor analysis of nine measures of domestic conflict and 13 measures of international conflict on 83 nations for

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[1]Harry Eckstein, "Internal War: The Problem of Anticipation," Chapter V in Ithiel de Sola Pool and Others, Social Science Research and National Security, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., March 5, 1963.

[2]Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations 1958-1960," J. Conflict Resolution, 10, pp. 41-64, 1966.

1958, 1959, and 1960. The study replicates an earlier one of Rummel[1],
which used the same measures of conflict for 1955, 1956, and 1957.
These measures are listed below:

Domestic Conflict

1. Number of assassinations
2. Number of general strikes
3. Presence or absence of guerrilla warfare
4. Number of major government crises
5. Number of purges
6. Number of riots
7. Number of revolutions
8. Number of antigovernment demonstrations
9. Number of people killed in all forms of domestic
   violence

Foreign Conflict

1. Number of antiforeign demonstrations
2. Number of negative sanctions (e.g., boycotts)
3. Number of protests (official government statements)
4. Number of countries with which diplomatic relations
   are severed
5. Number of ambassadors who are expelled or recalled
6. Number of diplomatic officials of less than ambassador's
   rank expelled or recalled
7. Number of threats (official communications threatening
   sanctions)
8. Presence or absence of military action
9. Number of wars
10. Number of troop movements
11. Number of mobilizations
12. Number of accusations (official government statements)
13. Number of people killed in all forms of foreign con-
    flict behavior.

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[1]Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Na-
tions," General Systems Yearbook, 8, pp. 1-50, 1963.

The sources of the data were The New York Times Index, Deadline Data on World Affairs, Brittanica Book of the Year, and Facts on File. The 83 nations studied were all those that had a population of 800,000 or more in 1958 and that had been sovereign for at least two years.

The factor analysis of foreign conflict measures yielded three dimensions.

1. A diplomatic dimension (with high loadings on protests, threats, and accusations), i.e., rationally calculated activities of a nonviolent nature intended to influence other nations.

2. A war dimension (with high loadings on war, military action, foreigners killed, and mobilization), i.e., activities related to the preparation for war, war itself, and war's consequences.

3. A belligerency dimension (with high loadings on severence of diplomatic relations, antiforeign demonstrations, limited military actions, and negative sanctions), i.e., emotional rather than rational diplomatic activities.

Two dimensions were found to account for domestic conflict behavior:

1. Spontaneous turmoil (defined by high loadings on demonstrations, riots, strikes, assassinations, and crises)

2. Organized internal war (defined by high loadings on revolutions, domestic killings, guerrilla war, and purges)

The technique of multiple regression reveals an apparent lack of relationship between domestic and foreign conflict behavior, although perhaps a small relationship may be observed on a time lag basis.

On the whole, Tanter concludes that dimensions derived from his data (1958-1960) compare favorably with those derived by Rummel using 1955-1957 data. Domestic conflict yields a turmoil dimension in both cases, while the internal war dimension in Tanter's study subsumes the

revolutionary and subversive dimensions in the earlier study. The three foreign dimensions (war, diplomacy, and belligerency) are similar in both studies. Domestic and foreign conflict behavior showed only a small relationship in both studies.

There are some methodological problems in a factor analysis in which the raw data consist, in one form or another, of newspaper reports. According to reliability tests run by Tanter, there is high agreement among those who code the data (85 to 100 percent agreement on recoding a random sample of Rummel's data, and virtually 100 percent agreement for two repeat tests on Tanter's coding). Systematic error, resulting from censorship or the amount of attention shown by the press in certain countries, may be more frequent in reporting on foreign conflict than on domestic conflict. Measures of censorship or press interest showed small correlations with other measures for domestic conflict, but they were larger for measures of foreign conflict. No significance tests are given for any of the correlation coefficients throughout Tanter's study because "the entire universe under investigation is being analyzed," i.e., the data sample applies to all nations in the world. However, the median correlation between Rummel's (1955-1957) and Tanter's (1958-1960) data is 0.44 (median of 22 correlations between measures used in both studies). With these data alone, it is not possible to say whether the degree of conflict (as measured here) shifted significantly between those two periods or simply that the samples are not representative. The factors are more stable than the individual measures, however, because the median intra-class correlation between the same dimensions in the two studies is 0.55.

Berry[1], in a study that has become a prototype, performed a factor analysis of 43 economic and demographic variables for 95

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[1] Brian J.L. Berry, "An Inductive Approach to the Regionalization of Economic Development," in Norton Ginsburg, ed., Essays on Geography and Economic Development, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1960.

countries using standard statistical data[1] published by the United
Nations. He found that a limited number of basic patterns could ac-
count for the many different indexes of economic development in cur-
rent use. One factor, designated as Technology, accounted for 85 per-
cent of the variance (with high loadings on such variables as imports
per capita, commercial energy consumed per capita, kilowatt hours of
electricity per capita, and fiber consumption per capita). The other
factors were Demographic (e.g., birth and death rates, infant mortality
rates, rice yields), Contrast in Income and External Relations (which
associates total national product, total energy consumption, and in-
tensity of freight movement on railroads inversely with population and
birth and growth rates), and Size (a pattern that contrasts large
countries with low population densities and high energy reserves per
capita with very small countries with high population densities and
low energy reserves).

Some generalizations on these data would evoke little surprise:
"The most developed countries tend to have mid-latitude locations,"
and "lesser developed countries have subsistence economies and more
developed countries have specialized commercial economies." Some
findings, however, run counter to conventional wisdom: "Colonies and
ex-colonies fare better demographically than otherwise similar inde-
pendent countries," and "a tropical or equatorial location apparently
has little to do with stage of economic development." This finding is
hardly consistent with "mid-latitude location" immediately above.

We may well ask why one would resort to ponderous analytical pro-
cedures that produce results that are already well known. We should
not dismiss lightly the value of objective data that confirm a well-
known, although unverified, point of view. And the same type of ob-
jective analysis can disconfirm widely held beliefs. The latter is
apparently demonstrated in Berry's finding that colonies and ex-colonies
are not necessarily inferior in economic and demographic measures to

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[1] Basic patterns of economic development, in Norton Ginsburg, op.
cit., pp. 110-119.

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otherwise similar independent countries. In any case, a factor analysis can contribute to the efficiency of research by identifying those variables that contribute information and permitting us to disregard those which are redundant or irrelevant.

The Feierabends[1] report a factor analysis of 30 domestic conflict measures for 84 nations for the 15-year period 1948-1962. Nine dimensions or factors that emerged accounted for 71 percent of the total variance. Arranged in decreasing order, according to the percentage of common variance accounted for by each, the dimensions were labelled as follows:

Turmoil (general strikes, demonstrations, riots, mass arrests)

Palace Revolution--Revolt (coups d'etat, revolts, martial law, arrests of significant persons)

Power Struggle--Purges (vacation or acquisition of office, execution of significant persons)

Riots (large and small riots, mass arrests of insignificant persons)

Elections

Demonstrations

Imprisonments

Civil War

Guerrilla Warfare

The first three factors, Turmoil (violence with mass participation), Palace Revolution--Revolt (revolt with marked lack of mass participation), and Power Struggle--Purges (violent upheavals within regimes), account for more than half of the common variance. The Feierabends regard the dimensions of Turmoil and Palace Revolution--Revolt as similar to those found by Rummel and Tanter.

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[1] Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors Within Polities, 1948-1962: A Cross-National Study," J. Conflict Resolution, 10, pp. 249-271, September 1966.
Note: The factor analyses reported in this paper were performed by Hoole and Litell, under the Feierabends' direction. The original papers, one of which was a Master's thesis, have not been reviewed.

The Feierabends did not control their analyses for gross national product per capita (GNPC) although this measure may influence all of their measures. By holding GNPC constant, Southward[1] found a partial correlation of $r = -0.03$ between Systemic Frustration and Political Instability, using the Feierabends' data (on 40 countries) and of 0.00 using Tanter's data on Turmoil. This contrasts with relationships of Yule's $Q = 0.79$ to 0.90, with one value of 0.97, on the same variables found by the Feierabends. Southward concludes that there is no evidence to suggest that systemic frustration leads to political instability.[2]

In an earlier paper, Rummel[3] examined 12 studies that included factor analyses of domestic conflict data. These studies are, in general, similar to those described above--40 to 113 nations compared on three to 13 conflict variables. Most involved recent time periods, although two covered assassinations, riots, and revolutions for the years 1837-1937.

The Turmoil dimension can be found in all factor analyses and the Revolution dimension can be found in some, but not all. Subversion is

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[1]K.E. Southward, "A Note on Systemic Frustration," J. Conflict Resolution, 12, pp. 393-395, 1968.

[2]Using the Feierabends' data on 346 violent events in 51 nations, David C. Schwartz examined the relation between frequency of violence (coups, assassinations, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and revolts) and ecology (temperature, humidity, and precipitation). For violence within or between nations, little evidence can be found to support the idea that discomfort (unfavorable ecological conditions) produces aggression or violence; in fact, there appears to be more violence in temperate than in tropical climates. Since World War II, coups, terror, and assassinations occur preponderantly as urban phenomena, while revolutions have been rural events. Even if these modest effects of ecology or violence are confirmed, there are still such questions as how ecological factors are relevant to and how they operate to produce violence. (David C. Schwartz, "On the Ecology of Political Violence: 'The Long Hot Summer' as an Hypothesis," American Behavioral Scientist, 11 (6), pp. 24-28, July-August 1968.)

[3]Rudolph J. Rummel, "A Field Theory of Social Action with Application to Conflict Within Nations," Draft, July 15, 1965.

a weak dimension, being found only in two analyses. Rummel concludes that Turmoil is a distinct and separate dimension of domestic conflict behavior. Revolution and Subversion also appear as distinct dimensions but not generally separate.

The most elaborate, data-based, and computerized study of civil violence is clearly that of Ted Gurr.[1] The model for his study is derived from the work of Dollard and others, which asserts that human aggression occurs as a response to frustration. As applied here, the model says that:

> The necessary precondition for violent civil conflict is relative deprivation, defined as actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectation and their environments' value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are justifiably entitled.... Value capabilities ... are conditions that determine peoples' chances for getting or keeping the values they legitimately expect to attain.[2]

The independent variables are measured by various indexes thought to represent deprivation (e.g., number of migrants to cities, high school dropouts), value expectations (e.g., school attendance), value capabilities (e.g., GNPC), social control (e.g., military and police per 10,000 population), and social facilitation (e.g., urbanization). The first three sets are called "instigating" variables, while the last two are called "mediating" variables. The primary dependent measure is Total Magnitude of Civil Violence (TMCV), a composite measure derived by combining various measures of turmoil, conspiracy, internal war, political rule, and technological development, in a manner to be shown below.

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[1] Ted Gurr with Charles Ruttenberg, The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model, Research Monograph No. 28, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J., April 1967.

[2] Ibid., p. 3, emphasis in original.

The data used in this analysis describe the magnitude of civil violence in 119 national and colonial entities with populations of one million or more in 1962--99 percent of the world's population. Evidence on civil violence was based largely on entries in The New York Times Index, Facts on File, and The Annual Register of World Events. Other sources, such as Asian Recorder, Africa Digest, and Eastern Europe, provided limited data on certain parts of the world. The reliability of coding the data to be described below was 0.75, described as "high"; the test was performed on a 5 percent sample of the data entries on five basic measures of Civil Violence. Note that this refers to agreement among raters in coding the data and not to either the accuracy of the information that was used or even the agreement among several sources on the same information.

The results of factor analyses performed in previous studies were used to assign these polities into more or less homogeneous sub-groups (called "clusters") in terms of each of the following characteristics:

Characteristics	Subgroup ("Cluster")
Political rule[1]	Polyarchic (similar to Western democratic)
	Elitist (led by small, modernizing elite)
	Centrist (Communist, non-Latin)
	Personalist (political personalism, mainly Latin)
Sociocultural[2]	Asian
	Eastern Europe
	African
	Latin
	Anglo-Saxon
	Western European

[1]Based on a factor analysis by Banks and Gregg, 1965.
[2]Based on a factor analysis by Russett, 1965.

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Technological development   High
level[1]
                                Medium

                                Low

                                Very low

Size of population and   Dominant
productivity[2]
                                Moderate

                                Small

                                Very Small

The three types of civil violence are based on the factors of
Tanter and Rummel: Turmoil, Conspiracy, and Internal War.

Basic measures of civil   Number of participants
violence
                                Social area

                                Number of casualties

                                Property damage

                                Duration

Finally these basic measures were combined with various weights
to produce four composite scales.

Composite scales   Pervasiveness (number of partici-
                                pants and area)

                                Intensity (number of casualties
                                and property damage)

                                Amplitude (pervasiveness and
                                intensity)

                                Total magnitude of civil violence
                                (weighted combination of all five
                                basic measures)

The need to weight variously the contribution of each basic
measure to each composite scale arises because all measures cannot be
regarded as equally significant. The difficult problem is to estab-
lish some reasonable method of estimating the relative importance of

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[1]Based on a factor analysis by Berry, 1960.

[2]Based on a factor analysis by Rummel, 1964.

the different measures. For all of his meticulous attention to objective methods, Gurr assigns arbitrary weights, supported only by the argument that this "makes the decision functions explicit." A sensitivity analysis, to determine whether some other set of arbitrary weights might have significantly influenced the results, was not undertaken. After logarithmic transformation because the measures show highly skewed distributions, the median correlation between duration and the four composite scales is 0.93 (range 0.85 to 0.99). The high correlations are due, at least in part, to the fact that all measures have one or more common components.

The method of analysis was step-wise multiple regression analysis. Multiple correlation coefficients between the independent and dependent measures were relatively low. The median R^2 was 0.32, with values ranging from 0.19 to 0.41 (R^2 is the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable "explained" statistically by the regression equation); the median R^2 increased to 0.69 (range 0.30 to 0.88) for analyses within clusters, i.e., for polities arranged in homogeneous groups as determined by previous factor analyses. The best explained dependent variable was the logarithmically transformed measure of Total Magnitude of Civil Violence, where nine independent variables accounted for 41 percent of its variation among polities. Instigating variables (e.g., deprivation, value expectations, and value capabilities) dominate in accounting for the factor called Turmoil, while mediating variables (e.g., military and police forces, urbanization) dominate in accounting for Conspiracy and Internal War. According to Gurr, the regression equations correctly account for the presence or absence of turmoil in 92 of 119 polities, i.e., 55 percent better than chance for turmoil, 73 percent better than chance for conspiracy, and 63 percent better than chance for internal war.

The relative contribution of each independent variable to the variance in the Total Magnitude of Civil Violence is shown below.

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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	RELATIVE (PERCENTAGE) CONTRIBUTION TO TOTAL MAGNITUDE OF CIVIL VIOLENCE
Instigating Variables	
Value capabilities	22
Deprived groups	21
Value expectations	9
Mediating Variables	
Deterrence	23
Persistence of anger	10
Institutionalization of protest	10
Group support	5
	100

Apart from the obvious need to replicate these results with an independent set of data and a different type of analysis, the results suggest the value of distinguishing between discontent and deprivation (the instigating variables) on one hand, and the characteristics of the social systems, how it responds to or represses these needs (i.e., the mediating variables), on the other hand.[1]

Adelman and Morris[2] performed a factor analysis of social, political, and economic characteristics of 74 modern nations at various stages of economic development. Although the study is concerned with economic development rather than with internal conflict,

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[1] Ted Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," World Politics, 20, pp. 245-278, January 1968.
Ted Gurr, "Urban Disorder: Perspectives from the Comparative Study of Civil Strife," American Behavioral Scientist, 10 (4), pp. 50-55, March-April 1968.
Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," American Political Science Review, 62, pp. 1104-1124, 1968.

[2] Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, Society, Politics and Economic Development: A Quantitative Approach, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1967.

it employed a variety of social and political, as well as economic, indicators, similar to those of Gurr. The 74 countries selected for study were underdeveloped in 1950; developed countries were excluded, since the focus of the study was on the process of transition and development. Less-developed Communist countries were excluded because of a lack of reliable data. Each country was categorized for 41 variables describing social, political, and economic conditions from 1957 to 1962. The variables were based on quantitative data (e.g., crude fertility rate, GNPC in 1961) and qualitative judgments (e.g., strength of democratic institutions, degree of modernization of outlook, degree of social tension). Qualitative and/or quantitative gradations (e.g., A,B,C,D) were used initially for each indicator, and these were transposed into an arbitrary, linear, quantitative scale, ranging from 1 to 100 for use in the factor analyses. Assignment of a country to a category was based, as appropriate, on data and the opinions of experts on each country. No estimate is given for the repeat reliability of the coding procedure except for the statement that differences among raters were resolved by discussion.

Four factors were derived, together with the indicators with high loadings on each factor:

Factor 1. <u>Process of change in attitudes and institutions associated with the breakdown of traditional social organizations.</u>

Size of traditional sector

Extent of dualism (coexistence of traditional means of subsistence and advanced technology in exchange sectors)

Degree of urbanization

Character of basic social organization

Size of indigenous middle class

Extent cf social mobility

Extent of literacy

Extent of mass communication

Degree of cultural homogeneity

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Degree of national integration
Crude fertility rate
Degree of modernization of outlook

Factor 2. <u>Movement from centralized authoritarian political forms to specialized political mechanisms capable of representing the varied group interests of a society through participant political organs</u>

Strength of democratic institutions
Freedom of political opposition and press
Degree of competitiveness of political parties
Predominant basis of political party system
Strength of the labor movement
Political strength of the military
Degree of centralization of political power

Factor 3. <u>Relative power of traditional and industrializing elite</u>

Strength of the traditional elite
Degree of leadership commitment to economic development
Degree of administrative efficiency

Factor 4. Identified as <u>Social and political stability</u>, accounted for only a negligible percent of the total variance.

Additional factor analyses were made that were more pertinent to Adelman's and Morris' concern than to ours, and they will not be considered here.

A factor analysis cannot be used to identify a causal relationship between levels of economic development and differences in social and political structure. Nevertheless, the finding is that "the purely economic performance of a community is strongly conditioned by the social and political setting in which economic activity takes place and that the less developed a nation is, the less powerful is economic policy alone in inducing economic development" (p. 172).

V. ON THE USE OF STATISTICAL PROCEDURES

In the study of conflict, the search for relevant data and the attempts to analyse them by a variety of statistical procedures must surely be pursued. Yet no serious scientist, political or otherwise, can overlook the severe limitations of the findings from these data and analyses. The limitations derive partly from inadequate data and partly from inappropriate methods of analysis, but above all from lack of a meaningful theory of internal conflict (as well as war between nations). In an extreme sense, it is doubtful that processing enormous volumes of data can contribute useful information if the data are not relevant to any stated purpose and if there is no theory to be tested by these data. Unfortunately, these statements are confirmed by many of the factor analyses that have been examined.

Virtually all authors of factor analyses on conflict data recognize severe limitations in the data with which they deal (the papers are fortified with various qualifications). For example, even the scope and quality of basic national statistics are not comparable among nations on such standard items as size of population and per capita gross national product. Time series data, which are mandatory if trends are to be identified, often do not exist, and when they do, the time interval between data collections may be too long to be useful for identifying trends in internal conflict, e.g., ten years or more for a national census. Clearly, data significant for social change and social conflict must be collected at shorter intervals, perhaps yearly during periods of rapid change in education and in economic growth and perhaps monthly during periods of escalating social or national conflict. The quality and availability of data are clearly related to the level of economic development of a nation. Unfortunately

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(for statistical as well as historical purposes), many internal wars occur in underdeveloped countries that suffer from inadequate economic and demographic information. Yet the unreliable nature of such data as exist is easily overlooked when they are compiled in a national report and are virtually hidden when the data are entered in a computer.

The basic source of information on war, strikes, riots, and assassinations in these studies is the index of the daily newspaper (not the newspaper itself), such compilations as The New York Times Index, Deadline Data on World Affairs, and similar sources. Although convenient, such sources present problems with respect to the completeness of coverage of various classes of events in various countries. For example, Lichtheim[1] notes that The New York Times provides better coverage of international events than of intranational ones.

In another example, Gould[2] compares the quality and quantity of reportage on the same event given by nine key newspapers in as many different nations. The event was the meeting of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva, which lasted for two weeks in the summer of 1968. Most newspapers concentrated on local news, that is, on the proposals and positions offered by the representatives of the country in which each newspaper was published. Although The New York Times gave comprehensive coverage, it concentrated mainly on the positions of the United States and Russia, neglecting the positions of other delegations. According to Gould, O Estado de Sao Paulo of Brazil and ASAHI of Japan gave more comprehensive and regular coverage of the negotiations than the other papers in this group.

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[1] George Lichtheim, "All the news that's fit to print--reflections on The New York Times," Commentary, pp. 33-46, September 1965.

[2] Gould's report was not available at the time this was written. This paragraph is based on an unsigned review that appeared in War/Peace Report, March 1970, pp. 21-22. The reference to Gould's report is given as Loyal N. Gould, The E.N.D.C. and the Press, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Sweden, 1969.

Another problem is the selective reporting of events, if not also bias, misrepresentation, and deliberate omission, in countries where special interests or the government controls the newspapers. Still another problem involves finding the appropriate information (if it exists) and coding it in a meaningful and repeatable manner. In order to reduce the cost of doing research, this effort is often performed by students as part of the ritual of earning their degrees. So much for some of the problems associated with collecting "hard" data on various forms of conflict. What about "soft" data?

There is a notable absence of attitudinal information in the data used for factor analyses of internal or external conflicts. Attitudinal data are required to show the views of various segments of the population on key issues, toward their governments, on their futures, and to each other. It is fundamental that unsatisfied expectations are a root cause of revolution. For example, Gurr, the Feierabends, and others hypothesize (probably correctly) that civil violence is more likely when there is a discrepancy "between men's value expecta-tions and what they perceive to be the capabilities available to them for attaining these values."[1] "...one compelling reason for the greater stability of modern countries lies in their greater ability to satisfy the wants of their citizens. The less advanced countries are characterized by great instability because of the aggressive re-sponses to systemic frustration evoked in the populace."[2] (Such frustrations are not absent in the great cities of the United States today.) The emphasized words show that personal desires and the per-ceived satisfaction of these desires are probably crucial influences upon various forms of conflict, especially within nations. Yet none of the factor analyses examined above includes variables that directly measure satisfaction or dissatisfaction with one's personal status or with one's government. In principle, at least, such data exist or

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[1]Gurr and Ruttenberg, op. cit., p. 106, emphasis added.
[2]The Feierabends, op. cit., p. 269, emphasis added.

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could be collected by various types of public opinion polling or by content analyses of statements by public figures on behalf of or against the government. Most closly approaching such data are various indices of dissatisfaction, such as number of school dropouts, GNPC, and number of strikes or arrests.

Before social conflict or violence can exist, the leading antagonists must develop and express opposing points of view, even if clandestine or illegal means must be used at first. Most revolutionary leaders--Lenin, Trotsky, Hitler, Mao, Ho Chi Minh, "Che" Guevara--get their message to the public in charismatic form. It may well be that statements of aspiration are a necessary but not sufficient condition for success; they did not, for example, ensure success for Regis Debray and "Che" Guevara in Bolivia, for Hitler in 1923, or for Ho Chi Minh in 1946.

In the Feierabends' study, satisfaction with the government must be inferred from data on selected variables, such as strikes, demonstrations, and arrests, on the one hand, and achievements from calories per capita per day and number of radios, newspapers, and physicians per capita. One advantage in the use of such data is that it might permit us to infer attitudes to a government for situations and time periods in which attitudinal data are not available or cannot be collected. A disadvantage is that demographic or similar data useful for inferring attitudes tend not to be collected repeatedly over short enough time intervals to show how public attitudes, which are quite volatile, may be changing, or how various attitudes are held by particular segments of the population not ordinarily identified in gross demographic data.

Although factor analysis is a rigorous statistical procedure, its application to conflict data is open to serious question for several reasons. The raw data for a factor analysis consist of a matrix of correlations. Any failure to meet the assumptions on which this statistical procedure is based necessarily limits our ability to interpret the resultant factor analysis. Thus, the correlations must

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be based on data that are intervally scaled and not dichotomous (Yes-No) or ordinal. The analysis also assumes normally distributed data and linear bivariate relationships. Some authors (e.g., Gurr and Cady) justify disregarding or violating these assumptions by making a logarithmic transformation of skewed distributions or by assuming that dichotomous and ordinal data are intervally scaled (Gurr, Gregg and Banks, Jackson and Burke). (It is difficult to understand how an assumption can normalize such data.) It is also well to remember that correlation accounts for the determinable variation between two variables and that it does not imply the existence of a causal relationship.

Apart from the validity--accuracy--of the raw data, the data must also be categorized in a consistent manner; this is called reliability. Reliability is often estimated by measuring the amount of agreement between two or more judges who have independently coded the same material; the correlation coefficient is used for this purpose. Yet Adelman and Morris coded their material on the basis of consensus among their experts--not independently--and they do not report a quantitative estimate of agreement. Tanter says "agreement ranged from 85 to 100 percent"[1] when he recoded a random sample of data on nine measures of internal conflict for five nations and compared them with Rummel's original coding; there were only two discrepancies in another sample of data coded twice, with three months intervening; and there was perfect agreement between two assistants and Tanter for another sample. Rummel reports that agreement among assistants who coded data from The New York Times improved gradually over time. At the end, the reliability coefficient (correlation among raters) was about 0.95, although some values were lower (about 0.85).[2] The Feierabends[3] report that agreement between two judges in sorting events along a

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[1]Tantor, op. cit., p. 44.

[2]R.J. Rummel, "A Foreign Conflict Behavior Code Sheet," World Politics, 18, pp. 283-296, 1965.

[3]The Feierabends, op. cit., pp. 249-271.

continuum was "fairly high (Pearson r = 0.87)"; it was "very high
(Pearson r = 0.935)."

The reliability of the dimensions identified in a factor analysis
is not reported in any of these studies. This could be determined, if
one wished, by comparing the dimensions that result from independent
factor analyses of randomly selected subsamples (split halves) of the
original data or by comparing the factor analysis to a Monte Carlo
simulation.[1] In Tanter's 1966 replication of Rummel's 1963 study,
he found that the correlations on the same 22 measures for two periods
(1955-1957 and 1958-1960) ranged from 0.05 to 0.71 (Table 2, p.47).
The median of the nine measures of domestic conflict and the 13 meas-
ures of foreign conflict was 0.44; this was also the median for all
22 measures.

Tanter's study is virtually the only one in which a factor analysis
of conflict behavior has been replicated with independent sets of data
on the same variables. Tanter concludes that the structure of domestic
conflict behavior in 1958-1960 was slightly different from that found
in 1955-1957. His internal war dimension combines Rummel's subversion
and revolution dimensions; the turmoil dimension is found in both
periods (intraclass correlations between both factor studies are 0.74,
0.45 and 0.12). The foreign conflict factors--war, diplomacy, and
belligerence dimensions--were similar for both periods; intraclass
correlation coefficients were 0.67, 0.68 and 0.67. Except for Tanter's
comparison, factor analyses of conflict data reported to date do not
meet the elementary scientific requirement that an experimental result
should be repeatable before it can be regarded as a significant find-
ing. Tanter's comparison shows only about 50 percent agreement, at
best, between his and Rummel's factors (i.e., $r^2 = (0.74)^2 = 0.55$;
$(0.68)^2 = 0.46$; etc.). In most studies the lack of rigor is explained
by the remark that the analysis is exploratory. Thus, factor analyses

[1]J. Scott Armstrong and Peer Soelberg, "On the Interpretation of
Factor Analysis," Psychological Bulletin, 70, pp. 361-364, 1968.

on internal war data are rich with exploratory studies and poor in definitive ones.

Apart from the validity of the data and the reliability of the factors, a factor analysis can be said to be successful when a few dimensions emerge that account for the information contained in many measures. When such statistical equivalences can be found, the problem arises of identifying or naming the factors. There is no rigorous method for accomplishing this function. A factor is "identified" by inferring a characteristic that is common among measures with a high loading on that factor, but is not found among measures with a low loading on the same factor. The magnitude above which loadings on a factor are regarded as high is completely arbitrary, though typically a loading of 0.50 or more is used for this purpose. Thus, a conceptual understanding of what the factor analysis demonstrates, apart from a statistical reduction in the necessary number of measures, is finally a matter of interpretation. Other features of a factor analysis that must be decided arbitrarily are when to stop factoring (the number of significant factors worth extracting) and what subroutine to use for rotating the factors.

The necessity of identifying the dimensions that "emerge" from a factor analysis brings us back to the relationship between theory and data. It can be argued that a theory is required before relevant data can be collected and processed meaningfully or, alternatively, that the processing of data can be a step toward suggesting a new theory. Each argument represents an extreme position. Tanter and Rummel, for example, say that factor analysis has implications for theory building. This position is encouraged by the relative ease and low cost of processing large amounts of data by modern computers, with or without an idea of what the data manipulations are supposed to prove or disprove. Tanter calls this "theory discovery"[1] or "implications

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[1] Raymond Tanter, "Toward a Theory of Political Development," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XI, No. 2, pp. 145-172, May 1967.

for theory-building";[1] Rummel says that factor analysis can be used to "map unknown concepts, ...illuminate causal nexuses, ...formulate theories, ...or make inferences."[2]

It hardly seems necessary to suggest, as Tanter does, that factor analysis can lead to the formation of theory or, as Rummel does, that factor analysis defines factors that can be called causes of the patterns they represent. Factor analysis, like correlation on which it is based, identifies statistical consistency without implying a necessary or causal relationship. It would not be difficult to demonstrate that a factor analysis of meaningless variables could yield a solution that meets the test of meaningfulness ordinarily used in factor analysis.[3] Further, the way in which the researcher identifies causes in a factor analysis depends on the theoretical structures that he develops to account for relationships among variables, rather than upon the factor analysis itself.[4] We close this discussion with a recollection of Santayana: "He felt that what was needed to understand the world was not more data but more mind."[5]

[1] Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior," op. cit., pp. 41-64.

[2] R.J. Rummel, "Understanding Factor Analysis," op. cit., pp. 444-480.

[3] J. Scott Armstrong, "Derivation of Theory by Means of Factor Analysis or Tom Swift and His Electric Factor Analysis Machine," The American Statistician, 21, pp. 17-21, 1967.

[4] J. Scott Armstrong and Peer Soelberg, op. cit., pp. 361-364. John L. Horn, "On Subjectivity in Factor Analysis," Educational and Psychological Measurement, 27, pp. 811-820, 1967. Ira S. Steinberg, "Professor Rummel's Cause," J. Conflict Resolution, 12, pp. 396-398, 1968.

[5] Joseph Epstein, "The Stranger," The New Republic, p. 28, March 11, 1969.

VI. TYPOLOGIES OF INTERNAL WAR

It scarcely seems possible to consider the nature of insurgency
without classifying the various forms of conflict that it takes. As
a prelude, this requires at least a conceptual framework for a theory
of insurgency. For example, Mao Tse-tung recognized the importance of
a prolonged period of irregular warfare during which he could build up
military strength upon a rural base; his formulation was in contrast
to a proletarian revolution based on strength in the cities, as speci-
fied by Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin. For Mao, the classic phases
are underground political development, followed by terrorism and
frontal attacks.

Bernard Fall observed that the National Liberation Front (NLF) in
Vietnam employed terrorism, developed a political position opposed to
the central government, and provided the peasants with services not
given by the government. He said that for the government to succeed
in insurgency it had to provide administration superior to that pro-
vided by its enemy.

The Feierabends, Gurr, and Tanter, among others, try to explain
the circumstances that give rise to internal conflict. They specify
a relationship between a group's desires and its perception that these
desires will be satisfied. Frustration occurs when the desires and
satisfactions are seen to be incompatible, and the frustration leads
to aggression. Low wants do not create pressure, nor do high wants
that are satisfied. Frustration leads to aggression when the wants
exceed the satisfactions. A society becomes unstable when the wants
of the people are increased or when the satisfactions are decreased,
both in perceptual terms, that is, in the eyes of beholders. This is
what Rostow means by the revolution of rising expectations.

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The "Dictionary of U.S. Military Terms for Joint Usage"[1] defines the following series of terms related to internal war:

Cold war--A state of international tension, wherein political, economic, technological, sociological, psychological, para-military, and military measures short of overt armed conflict involving regular military forces are employed to achieve national objectives. (JCS, SEATO)

Counterguerrilla warfare--Operations and activities conducted by armed forces, para-military forces, or nonmilitary agencies of a government against guerrillas. (JCS, I*)

Counterinsurgency--Those military, para-military, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a govern-ment to defeat subversive insurgency. (JCS, I)

Countersubversion--That part of counterintelligence which is de-voted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical subversive activities through the detection, identification, exploita-tion, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or ca-pable of conducting such activities. (JCS, SEATO)

Limited war--Armed conflict short of general war, exclusive of incidents, involving the overt engagement of the military forces of two or more nations. (JCS)

Subversion--Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, morale, or political strength of a regime. (JCS, I, SEATO)

Subversion--Action designed to undermine: (a) the military, economic, psychological, morale, or political strength of a nation; and (b) the loyalty of the subjects. (NATO)

Hans Speier[2] reminds us that many terms have been applied to the small-scale, internal wars that have occurred since the end of World War II:

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* U.S. Government Interdepartmental approval.

[1] "Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage," JCS Publication 1, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. 20301, August 1, 1968.

[2] Hans Speier, "Revolutionary War," P-3445, RAND Corp., September 1966.

Sublimited war (President John F. Kennedy, 1961; Robert S. McNamara, 1962)

Internal war (Harry Eckstein, 1961)

Intrastate war (Samuel Huntington, 1962)

Domestic war (Huntington, 1962)

Antigovernmental war (Huntington, 1962)

Intrasocietal war (Janusz Zawodny, 1962)

The twilight zone between political submission and quasi-military action (McNamara, 1962)

Insurrection, subversion, and covert armed aggression (McNamara, 1962)

Guerrilla warfare (starting with Napoleon, 1808)

Counterinsurgency (JCS)

Unconventional warfare (U.S. Army)

Partisan warfare (Otto Heilbrunn, 1962)

Antiterrorist operations (British, in Malaya)

Subconventional warfare (C.M. Woodhouse, 1962)

Revolutionary war (French)

Underground movements

Small wars

Brushfire wars

Speier concludes that "The time-honored term in political theory is, of course, civil war."

Because internal conflict is a complex phenomenon, it is difficult to devise a meaningful set of categories to group its various forms. If only a few, broad categories are used, such as insurrection and rebellion, or Communist-supported and non-Communist-supported internal war, each category must include conflicts that differ considerably from each other. For example, a category of "Communist-supported internal war" would include the Malayan, Cuban, and Vietnamese conflicts; it is obvious that the unique aspects of these conflicts may be more important than the commonality of Communist support.

At the other extreme, the use of multiple categories retains the unique aspects of many different conflicts. But the classification

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scheme may become unwieldy, and the distinctions among categories slight and of uneven significance. At the extreme, each conflict could be regarded as unique and each category could contain only a single case.

Many attempts have been made to classify internal conflict. Wilson's[1] essay summarizes fifteen such systems. All of these systems, she suggests, are arbitrary and are significant primarily for the extent to which they serve the analyst's purposes. For example, some systems, such as Chalmers Johnson's, attempt to include all domestic conflict for all time, while others, such as those of Huntington and Dougherty, are concerned only with conflict since World War II. Another arbitrary feature concerns the amount of emphasis to be placed on ideological factors in the conflict, which may be historical, nationalistic, political, religious, regional, and social.

In our point of view, typologies of internal conflict fall loosely in two classes: nominal (perhaps also called rational, intuitive, or inductive) and empirical (perhaps also called analytical and pragmatic). This distinction may be helpful, if it is not taken too seriously-- like those that Herman Kahn calls propaedeutic (for teaching purposes) or heuristic (unproven but useful for stimulating research). I choose to regard as nominal those systems that start with idealized categories and are illustrated by examples. In this class, I would include typologies that are ideological in nature (and often political as well, although the latter does not necessarily follow). One problem here is that examples are chosen carefully, and those examples that do not fit the categories are not used. I regard as empirical those systems that start with a sample of internal wars and attempt to identify common features. One problem here is that some of these cases do not fall neatly into mutually exclusive categories. Another problem is that the cases selected for study are rarely a random sample for such reasons

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[1] Barbara Ann Wilson, Typology of Internal Conflict: An Essay, Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, Washington, D.C., 1968.

as unavailability of data or uneven scholarly interest in various parts of the world.

Among the nominal typologies of conflict, those proposed by Lenin and Khrushchev are easy to understand.

For Lenin,[1] there were two classes of war:

Underline: Unjust wars Wars of conquest waged to conquer and enslave foreign countries

Underline: Just wars Wars of liberation waged to defend people from foreign attack and from attempts to enslave them, or to liberate people from capitalist slavery, or to liberate colonies from the yoke of imperialism.

Khrushchev saw three kinds of war:[2]

World wars World Wars I and II

Local wars Egypt, 1956

Insurrections Wars of national liberation, such as those in Indonesia, Algeria, and Cuba

Conley[3] would group subversive insurgencies on the basis of the strategy used by the insurgents:

1. Left strategy: Drive for the early seizure of political power
Cuba, 1959

2. Right strategy: Popular front or united coalition
Santo Domingo, 1965
Czechoslovakia, 1948
Spain, 1936

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[1] Short History of the CPSU, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, pp. 168-169, 1945.

[2] In his widely noted speech of January 6, 1961.

[3] Michael C. Conley, "The Parameters of Subversive Insurgency: An Essay at the Redefinition of the Term," pp. 269-276 in the Proceedings (U) of the 19th Military Operations Research Symposium, April 25-27, 1967, SECRET.

3. United front from below: Greece, 1941-1945; 1946-1949
Philippines, 1946-1954
Malaya, 1948-1961
Yugoslavia, 1941-1944
Vietnam, 1960
Russia, November 1917

Cross[1] makes the point that distinctions should be avoided between such terms as guerrilla and unconventional warfare in favor of precision concerning the grievances alleged by the insurgents, their political purposes, and foreign support (if any).

Sanger[2] uses three categories:

Societal revolutions (Russia, Egypt, Cuba)
Independence rebellions (Indochina, India)
Cold war conflicts (Congo, Philippines, Vietnam)

Deitchman[3] employs three categories of limited war and subcategories concerning the involvement of Communist and free world countries:

	Direct Conflict Between Communist and Free World	Conflict Not Involving the United States and/or its Allies Versus Communists
Conventional wars	Chinese civil war Korea Quemoy/Matsu India/China border	Arabs versus Israel Kashmir Suez Yemen
Unconventional wars	Greece Philippines Malaya Vietnam	Cuban revolution Algeria Cyprus Angola
Deterred wars	Taiwan Cuban quarantine	Lebanon Kuwait

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[1] James E. Cross, Conflict in the Shadows, The Nature and Politics of Guerrilla War, Doubleday & Co., Inc., Garden City, N.Y., 1963.

[2] Richard H. Sanger, Insurgent Era, Potomac Books, Washington, D.C., 1967.

[3] Seymour J. Deitchman, op. cit., p. 28.

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In addition, he finds it helpful to characterize these limited wars in terms of size (those with more than 100,000 men on at least one side in the combat area) and duration (those lasting more than two years).

McClintock[1] finds seven categories for limited war:

Limited strategic war	Greece, Korea
Simple wars for independence	Israel, Algeria, Cyprus
Domestic rebellion	Latin American republics
Civil war with outside intervention	Lebanon
Wars for the simple acquisition of territory	Kashmir, China's attack on India
Wars fought for limited political and strategic objectives	Suez
Wars of national liberation	Vietnam, Malaya, the Greek civil war, Philippines, Indonesia, Algeria, the Hungarian rebellion, Tibet

Tanter and Midlarsky[2] limit their interest to revolution, of which they find four types:

Mass revolution	America (1776)	France (1848)*
	France (1789)	Germany (1848)*
	Russia (1917)	Austria (1848)*
	China (1949)	France (1871)*
	Vietnam (1954)	Philippines (1948)*
	Cuba (1959)	Hungary (1956)*
	Algeria (1962)	Malaya (1956)*
Revolutionary coup	Turkey (1919)	Egypt (1952)
	Germany (1933)	Iraq (1958)

*Unsuccessful revolutions.

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[1] Robert McClintock, The Meaning of Limited War, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, pp. 6-12, 1967.

[2] Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, "A Theory of Revolution," J. Conflict Resolution, 21, pp. 264-280, September 1967.

Reform coup	Argentina (1955)	Pakistan (1958)
	Syria (1956)	Sudan (1958)
	Jordan (1957)	Venezuela (1958)
	Thailand (1957,1958)	Turkey (1960)
	Burma (1958)	Dominican Republic (1963)
	France (1958)	
Palace revolution	Venezuela (1948)	Guatemala (1957)
	Colombia (1953,1957)	Haiti (1957)
	Brazil (1955)	El Salvador (1960)
	Honduras (1956)	

Note that some of these revolutions failed. This typology in effect consists of revolutions and coups, large and small, and is similar to those developed by Huntington,[1] Silvert,[2] Brinton,[3] Lasswell and Kaplan[4] on revolution, and Lieuwen[5] on caudillismo.

It seemed useful to examine how the same conflict would be handled by the authors of differing typologies. It was possible to do this for four typologies, with the results shown in Table 3. Among the 52 conflicts cited as examples, only three (the Philippines, Vietnam, and the Cuban revolution) appear in all four typologies and two more (Malaya and Algeria) in three of them. It has already been noted that it is difficult to compare the results of many studies of internal war, but the few comparisons that are possible are constructive.

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[1] S. Huntington, ed., Changing Patterns of Military Politics, The Free Press, New York, 1962.

[2] K.H. Silvert, The Conflict Society, rev. ed., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., New York, 1966. Silvert, who is concerned with revolutions in Latin American countries, finds a need for such categories as simple barracks revolt, peasant revolt, regional revolt, complicated barracks revolt (one that involves both civilian and military groups), civilian political revolt, social revolution, and unstructured street violence.

[3] Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, rev. ed., Vintage Books, New York, 1952.

[4] Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1950.

[5] Edwin Lieuwen, Generals vs Presidents: Neomilitarism in Latin America, Praeger, New York, 1964.

TABLE 3. HOW 48 CASES OF INTERNAL WAR ARE HANDLED IN FOUR DIFFERENT TYPOLOGIES

	Deitchman	McClintock	Sanger	Tanter and Midlansky
Egypt (Nasser)			societal revolution	revolutionary coup
Russia			societal revolution	mass revolution
Chinese civil war	conventional war*			mass revolution
Korea	conventional war*	limited strategic war		
Quemoy/Matsu	conventional war*			
India/China border	conventional war*	simple acquisition of territory		
Arabs versus Israel	conventional war			
Kashmir	conventional war	simple acquisition of territory		
Suez	conventional war	limited political and strategic objectives		
Yemen	conventional war			
Tibet		war of national liberation		
Hungarian rebellion		war of national liberation		mass revolution**
Indochina			independence rebellion	
India		war of national liberation	independence rebellion	
Greece	unconventional war*	limited strategic war		
Philippines	unconventional war*	war of national liberation	cold war conflict	mass revolution**
Malaya	unconventional war*	war of national liberation	cold war conflict	mass revolution**
Vietnam	unconventional war*	war of national liberation	cold war conflict	mass revolution
Cuban revolution	unconventional war*	domestic rebellion	societal revolution	mass revolution
Algeria	unconventional war*	war of national liberation		mass revolution
		simple war for independence		
Cyprus	unconventional war*	simple war for independence		
Angola	unconventional war*			
Israel		simple war for independence		
Indonesia		war of national liberation		
Taiwan	deterred war*			
Cuban quarantine	deterred war*			
Lebanon	deterred war*	civil war with outside intervention		
Kuwait	deterred war*			
Congo			cold war conflict	
Turkey				revolutionary coup (1919) reform coup (1960)
Germany (Nazi)				revolutionary coup
Iraq				revolutionary coup
Dominican Republic				reform coup
Venezuela				palace revolution (1948) reform coup (1958)
Sudan				reform coup
Argentina				reform coup
Syria				reform coup
Jordan				reform coup
Thailand (1957, 1958)				reform coup
Burma				reform coup
France (1958)				reform coup
Pakistan (1958)				reform coup
El Salvador				palace revolution
Haiti				palace revolution
Guatemala				palace revolution
Honduras				palace revolution
Brazil				palace revolution
Colombia				palace revolution (1953, 1957)

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* Direct conflict between Communist and free world

** Unsuccessful revolutions

Since each author places Greece, the Philippines, Malaya, and
Vietnam in one of his categories, one can infer that the following
categories are approximately equivalent:

> Unconventional war (Deitchman)
> War of national liberation (McClintock)
> Cold war conflict (Sanger)
> Mass revolution (Tanter and Midlarsky)

The Cuban revolution, however, is an unconventional war for Deitchman
and a mass revolution for Tanter (consistent with the four examples
cited above), but a domestic rebellion for McClintock and a societal
revolution for Sanger. And, whereas Deitchman places eight conflicts
in one category of conventional wars (e.g., the Chinese civil war,
Korea, Quemoy-Matsu), McClintock uses three categories: limited
strategic war, simple acquisition of territory, and limited political
and strategic objectives. If these three terms are equivalent to
Deitchman's conventional war, McClintock applies one of them (limited
strategic war) to Greece, which Deitchman calls an unconventional war.
Deitchman distinguishes between the Chinese civil war (conventional
war) and Greece, the Philippines, Malaya, and Vietnam (unconventional
wars); while Tanter places them all in the same category (mass revolu-
tion). We may as well stop here.

Harry Eckstein,[1] in a perceptive article that should be more
widely known, gives three reasons for not trying to distinguish too
closely among internal wars. First, all cases of internal war have
certain common features, however much they may differ in detail: vi-
olence to achieve purposes that can also be achieved without violence,
collective frustration in the population, the breakdown of the legiti-
mate political order, and the inability to develop public consensus.
Second, internal wars include various combinations of violence at
various stages. Third, "the terminologies presently used to distin-
guish types of internal war vary greatly from one another; are

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[1]Harry Eckstein, op. cit.

generally ambiguous; often define overlapping phenomena, or phenomena difficult to distinguish in practice; and are rarely based on clearly discernible analytic needs. For few phenomena do social science, history and conventional language offer so various and vague a vocabulary." (p. 103)

Only a few empirical typologies of conflict, as this term was defined above, have been produced. An empirical typology would be based on such data as the results of statistical studies, factor analyses, or comparison of a series of conflicts with data arranged in a common format. Studies of this type have been reported above, and the typologies that emerge from them will be considered here.[1] The results are summarized in Table 4. Each factor is named as originally by the author. The factors are arranged vertically in subgroups dealing with domestic and foreign conflict and, horizontally, to be approximately equivalent.

Richardson and Waldron,[2] it will be recalled, summarized attributes of 380 conflicts that occurred from 1946 to 1964. They grouped these conflicts according to types (see Table 1 above), but this is an input to, rather than a result of their study. Since they drew no conclusions other than to report a statistical summary, their findings do not appear in Table 4.

All of the studies in Table 4 assume a typology of conflict as an input, as well as an output characteristic. Therefore, the factor analysis serves to reduce an a priori typology, together with other descriptive characteristics, to a smaller number of dimensions. The two Rummel studies find three dimensions of internal war, while Tanter finds two; Rummel and Tanter find three dimensions of external war; the Feierabends find these factors, and others, for a total of nine.

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[1] We would wish to include here the study by D.M. Condit, Bert H. Cooper, Jr., and Others, op. cit. This contains 57 case studies of internal conflict, occurring in the period 1898-1965, completed according to a common format using 91 information categories. However, the comparative phase of this study has not been published.

[2] Richardson and Waldron, op. cit.

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TABLE 4. FACTORS OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CONFLICT REPORTED IN FOUR STUDIES

Type of Factor	Rummel[1] (1963)	Tanter[2] (1966)	Rummel[3] (1966)	The Feierabends[4] (1966)
	22 measures	22 measures	13 variables	30 measures
	77 nations	83 nations	113 countries	84 nations
	1955-1957	1958-1960	1946-1959	1948-1962
Domestic conflict	revolution	internal war	revolution	civil war
	subversion	turmoil	subversion	
	turmoil		turmoil	turmoil
				guerrilla warfare
				palace revolution
				power struggle
				riots
				elections
				demonstrations
				imprisonments
Foreign conflict	diplomatic	diplomatic		
	war	war		
	belligerency	belligerency		

[1] Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," op. cit., pp. 1-50.
[2] Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," op. cit., pp. 41-64.
[3] Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within Nations, 1946-1959," op. cit., pp. 65-73.
[4] The Feierabends, op. cit.

Before discussing a typology that may emerge from factor analysis studies, some attention must also be given to six typologies prepared by Bloomfield, Leiss, and Others[1] in their study of the control of 52 local conflicts outside Europe since World War II. According to them, a typology can be used as an analytic tool to examine the characteristics, or variables, of conflicts. Attention was directed to the circumstances that appear to influence the controllability--prevention, suppression, termination, or settlement--of these local conflicts.

The following factors were examined in their six typologies (for details, see Appendix F).

	Gross Nature of Conflict	Hostilities Index (Relative Controllability)
Typology A		
	Conventional interstate	Hostilities continued with intensification
	Unconventional interstate	Hostilities continued without intensification
	Internal with significant external involvement	Hostilities terminated quickly after intensification
	Primarily internal	Hostilities terminated quickly without intensification
	Colonial	No outbreak of hostilities
Typology B	**Great Power Partiality**	**Hostilities Index**
	Both low	As above
	One moderate one low	
	Both moderate or at least one high	

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[1]Bloomfield, Leiss, and Others, op. cit.

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Typology C	Geopolitical Setting	Hostilities Index
	Low impediment to controllability	As above
	Moderate impediment to controllability	
	High impediment to controllability	

Typology D	Great Power Partiality	Commitment of Adversaries to Outcome
	Both low	Any combination of low and moderate
	One moderate, one low	One high
	Both moderate or at least one high	Both high

Typology E	Geopolitical Setting	Great Power Partiality
	Low impediment to controllability	Any combination of low and moderate
	Moderate impediment to controllability	One high
	High impediment to controllability	Both high

Typology F   Controllability of Conflict

This is a composite score, designated as the average score on the 17 factors identified above; each factor was weighted as follows:

Markedly favorable to control	1
Intermediate	2
Markedly inhibiting to control	3
Not applicable	0

The 52 cases of post-war conflict were assigned to cells in the matrix provided by each typology; the following tentative, "experimental" findings were drawn from this exercise:

Typology A: Relative Controllability vs Gross Nature of Conflict
"Internal conflicts are much more likely than interstate conflicts to resist prevention, moderation and termination. In other words, internal conflicts tend to be harder to control than interstate conflicts." (Vol. I, p. 10)

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Typology B: Relative Controllabili.y vs Great Power Partiality

"Considerable great power partiality has usually been a feature of those recent conflicts that have proved hard to control. The more intense that partiality has been, the more the conflicts have resisted prevention, moderation or termination of hostilities." (Vol. I, p. 10)

Typology C: Relative Controllability vs Geopolitical Setting

"Geopolitical setting does relate significantly to the relative controllability of conflicts, in that controllability correlates negatively with difficult terrain and weather conditions, with neighboring states that incite or support one side or the other, and with political instability in the region." (Vol. I, p. 10)

Typology D: Commitment of Adversaries to Outcome vs Great Power Partiality

"High commitment of will and resources by conflict adversaries tends to go with continued hostilities, thus producing conflicts hard to control." (Vol. I, p. 11)

Typology E: Great Power Partiality vs Geopolitical Setting

"Great power partiality and geopolitical impediments to controllability lead to continuation and/or intensification of conflict; or in the absence of both factors, to the quick termination of conflict." (Vol. II, p. 194)

Typology F: The Controllability of Conflict

The composite score for controllability of conflict in 16 cases of conflict studied in detail was compared to the actual outcome according to historical records (scored on a five-point scale as to whether the conflict increased or decreased). The authors come to this conclusion:

"In general, the approach represented by Typology F appears to be broadly validated by cross-reference to the historical outcomes of the sixteen conflicts." (Vol. II, p. 199)

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This conclusion is not supported by the scores shown by Bloomfield and Leiss (see Vol. II, p. 198-199). Using their data to calculate a rank-order correlation (Spearman) between "difficulty in controlling conflict" and "actual course of hostilities," I find a correlation of 0.02--a spectacular absence of relationship. It is an unusual demonstration of the difference that may occur between a subjective and an objective finding.

The major contribution of the Bloomfield and Leiss study is that it identifies factors that may lead toward or away from the control of local conflict; the study is not especially useful as a typology of conflict. If a typology were to emerge from this study after additional work, it would be a functional model with each conflict characterized by factors that lead toward or away from violence during each phase of the conflict: prior to the dispute, the outbreak of hostilities, patterns of escalation and de-escalation, the termination of hostilities, and the settlement of the dispute. In a companion study, Barringer and Ramers have used these data to code 18 cases of conflict on 300 variables, or descriptive characteristics, such as demography, economic and political factors, perceptions and policies of the regime in power, foreign relations and foreign involvement, military capabilities and performance, and casualty data. Each case would constitute a more or less unique pattern made possible by the taxonomic scheme. Finding general patterns among the many unique ones requires that the data be processed by a computer program that Barringer and Ramers call "agreement analysis." The results of this study have not been published.

From all of these studies, but especially the empirical ones, some findings emerge that are significant for a typology of, as well as for research on, internal war. At the very least, a typology of conflict should distinguish between internal and external conflicts, between organized and unorganized violence, and between military and diplomatic forms of international conflict. Further distinctions can be made within any of these major classes, limited only by the ingenuity and purpose of the analyst. These might include, for example,

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the presence or absence of external support and the involvement, if any, of Communist forces.

Although the typologies that emerge from factor analysis studies are amenable to objective verification or rejection, this remains to be done. For example, the studies cited above show from two to nine factors for domestic conflict and from three to 11 factors for foreign conflict. These studies show some agreement (Rummel, 1963, and Tanter, 1966, for foreign conflict; Rummel, 1963 and 1966, for domestic conflict) and some disagreement (Rummel, 1963, and Tanter, 1966, for domestic conflict).

Factor analysis also provides a measure of the amount of variance that can be accounted for by each of the dimensions in a body of multivariate data and, thereby, the relative strength and the composition of the factors in a typology. Its major limitation, at the moment, lies in the relative crudeness and possible irrelevance of much of the data that are being used in these analyses.

We may conclude our discussion of typology of conflict by again noting Eckstein:[1]

> One can derive from these and similar classificatory schemes a sort of composite typology, distinguishing between relatively unorganized and spontaneous riots by crowds with low capabilities for violence and modest aims, coups d'etat by members of the elite against other members of the elite, full-scale political revolutions to achieve important constitutional changes, social revolutions to achieve large-scale socio-economic as well as constitutional changes, and wars of independence to achieve sovereignty in a previously dependent territory. But this typology is not necessarily better than the others. It does relate classes by including most of the terms of the complicated schemes and adding more terms to the simple ones; but this does not make the classification more precise, easier to apply, or more suited to actual tasks of study.

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[1]Harry Eckstein, "Internal War," op. cit., p. 104.

For all of these reasons it can do no harm to consider internal wars as all of a piece at the beginning of inquiry and to make distinctions only as they become necessary or advisable. In this way, the possibilities of developing general theories are increased as is the likelihood that the distinctions made will be important and precise. In any event, I shall begin here without distinctions, though it may well become necessary to introduce them before the end.

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VII. THEORIES OF INTERNAL WAR

The collection and analysis of data on internal war would be a
relatively meaningless exercise unless the data could be related to
some theoretical structure about the nature of this type of conflict.
This is important if we are to understand as well as to predict the
outbreak and results of internal war or even its failure to occur.
No attempt will be made here to survey the range of theories or the
many quasi-theoretical statements that may apply to the various phenom-
ena of internal conflict. On the one hand, no one has demonstrated
that internal war is a unitary concept--that, despite the variations
in their setting, most internal wars have a similar cause and pattern.
On the other hand, there is almost no limit to what would be caught
by a net cast widely over the literature on internal war. Thus, it is
interesting to note that a survey of theories of insurgency does not
yet exist and that Harry Eckstein, in his introduction to _Internal
War_, says "At the present stage of inquiring into internal wars, the
crucial issues ... are pre-theoretical issues...."[1] Therefore, we
shall be highly selective and consider, among theories applicable to
internal conflict, primarily those that derive from an emphasis on
quantitative techniques and methodologies, that is, theories or
theoretical statements susceptible to confirmation or rejection. The
practical effect of this arbitrary choice is that we can limit our-
selves to recent papers, even if this exposes us to the well-known
risk of disregarding history.

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[1]Harry Eckstein, ed., _Internal War: Problems and Approaches_, The
Free Press of Glencoe, New York, p. 32, 1964.

Revolutions come in many forms and have had a long and honorable history. For some perspective on modern insurgency and the varieties of revolution that have preceded it, we are obligated to Chalmers Johnson[1] and some others who have tried to understand the phenomenon.[2]

Johnson[3] cites the following definitions of revolution:

> "For revolutions, however one may be tempted to define them, are not mere changes." (Hannah Arendt, 1963)

> "Revolution is the most wasteful, the most expensive, the last to be chosen; but also the most powerful, and therefore always appealed to in what men feel to be a last resort." (George S. Pettee, 1938)

> "Revolution is a sweeping, fundamental change in political organization, social structure, economic property control and the predominant myth of a social order, thus indicating a major break in the continuity of development." (Sigmund Newmann, 1949)

Johnson distinguishes six types of revolutions, which he calls "phyla," on the basis of four criteria:

1. Targets of revolutionary activity--government, regime, or community

2. Identity of the revolutionaries--masses, elites leading the masses, or elites

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[1] Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social System, The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, 1964.

[2] Crane Brinton, op. cit.
George S. Pettee, The Process of Revolution, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1938.
Quincy Wright, A Study of War, 2d. ed., University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1965.
Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, The Viking Press, New York, 1963.

[3] Johnson, p. 2-3.

3. Revolutionary goals or "ideology"--how the revolutionaries propose to relieve dysfunction and what will replace the unsatisfactory government, regime, or community

4. Initiation--whether the revolution is spontaneous or calculated, to distinguish cases that are otherwise similar except for their initiation

Johnson then describes the six types of revolutions as follows:

1. Jacquerie: A jacquerie is a mass rebellion of peasants with strictly limited aims, such as the restoration of lost rights or the removal of specific grievances. It aims at the restoration of legitimate government within the current regime rather than at making unprecedented structural changes in the social system. Examples are the Russian peasant revolution led by Pugachev, 1773-1775, and the French peasant revolution (Les effrois), 1358.

2. Millenarian rebellion: A revolution of this type is led by a living prophet to make complete and radical changes to rid the world of its present deficiencies.

    Conselheiro's movement in Brazil, 1896-1897
    Taiping rebellion in China, 1851-1864
    Zapata in Mexico, 1910-1919
    Boxer rebellion in China, 1899-1900

3. Anarchistic rebellion: This revolution, often anti-nationalist, occurs to reverse changes that are well along toward producing a new status quo.

    Counterrevolution in the Vendée, 1793-1796
    Tibetan rebellion, 1959
    American Civil War, 1861-1865
    Young officers' revolt in Japan in 1930's

4. Jacobin Communist revolutions: This is the classic form of revolution intended to make a fundamental change in all aspects of social structure and control.

    French Revolution, 1789-1799
    Turkish Revolution, 1908-1922
    Mexican Revolution, 1910-1934
    Russian Revolution (Kerensky), March 1917

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5. <u>Conspiratorial coup d'etat</u>: Attempts at revolutionary change
    are made by small secret associations of individuals united
    by a common set of grievances that may or may not correspond
    to the objective condition of a social system.

    > Russian Revolution (Lenin), October 1917
    > Irish Rebellion, 1916
    > Castro in Cuba, 1959

6. <u>Militarized mass insurrection</u>: These revolutions are made
    by the mass of a population under the guidance of a con-
    spiratorial revolutionary general staff. This is Johnson's
    category for modern guerrilla warfare.

    > China, 1937-1949
    > Algeria, 1954-1962
    > Ireland, 1916-1923
    > Philippines, 1946-1954
    > Malaya, 1948-1958

A simplified summary of Johnson's typology is presented in Table
5. The more significant criteria of differentiation are the "identity
of the revolutionaries" and the "revolutionary ideology." The targets
of any revolution can be the government, regime, or community and are
often all three; only the dominant or more likely target is shown in
the table. How a revolution was initiated--by calculation or spon-
taneously--may be the only feature that distinguishes a coup from
cases that may be similar in all other respects.

Johnson makes several significant observations, primarily on
revolution rather than on guerrilla warfare per se.

The causes of revolution include a background of multiple dys-
functions among several social subsystems; an elite that is intransigent
or ineffective in dealing with these dysfunctions; and some accelera-
tor of dysfunction, such as defeat in a war, to instigate the actual
revolution. Psychological studies may explain why particular indi-
viduals become revolutionaries, but not whether their revolutionary
activities will succeed. The success of a revolution depends upon the

TABLE 5. SIMPLIFIED SUMMARY OF JOHNSON'S TYPOLOGY OF REVOLUTION

Type of Revolution ("phylum")	Targets of Revolutionary Activity	Identity of the Revolutionaries	Revolutionary Goals or Ideology	Initiation
Jacquerie	Government	Masses	Reformist	Spontaneous
Millenarian rebellion	Community	Elites leading the masses	Eschatological (i.e., the final destiny of mankind)	Spontaneous
Anarchistic rebellion	Regime or government	Masses, elites leading the masses, or an elite	Utopian, based on nostalgia	Spontaneous
Jacobin Communist revolution	Community	Elites leading the masses	Nation-forming and fundamental social changes	Spontaneous
Conspiratorial coup d'etat	Government	An elite	Elitist	Calculated
Militarized mass insurrection	Regime	Elites leading the masses	Nationalistic	Calculated

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presence of dysfunctions and other problems in the society, not particularly on how certain individuals react to these conditions.[1]

The militarized mass insurrection is Johnson's term for modern guerrilla warfare; he emphasizes that its chief feature is its revolutionary purpose, directed by a conspiratorial general staff, rather than its military tactics. For Johnson, the prototype of militarized mass insurrection is the Chinese Communist revolution led by Mao Tse-tung (1937 to 1949). Johnson's monograph is concerned with revolution in general and in its various forms and not particularly with modern guerrilla warfare.

These contributions are ingredients for a theory, although they are not offered as such: they describe the conditions under which revolutions may, but do not always, occur; some necessary exclusions from a theory, i.e., that revolutionary personalities cannot make a revolution unless a variety of predisposing conditions already exist; and, finally, that various types of revolutions may be distinguished on the basis of the targets of revolutionary activity, the identity of the revolutionaries, revolutionary goals or "ideology," and whether the revolution is spontaneous or calculated.

Johnson creates an obvious limitation in his theory by emphasizing the importance of dysfunctions in society as a cause of revolution; he does not regard the type of societal system and the sources of the dysfunctions as significant factors. In his view, this limitation is simply a consequence of the level of abstraction at which his theory is developed.

Lawrence Stone's[2] critical historical review extends back earlier than recent revolutions (it includes, for example, the Peasant revolt of 1381 and the Florentine revolution led by Savonarola in

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[1]See Note on Psychological Analyses of Political Movements and of Political Leaders, Appendix G.

[2]Lawrence Stone, "Theories of Revolution," World Politics, 18, pp. 159-176, 1965.

1494; it treats the French and Russian revolutions almost as current events). Stone suggests that "revolution becomes possible when a condition of multiple dysfunction meets an intransigent elite."[1] Stone's basic concept is derived from Johnson. "Multiple dysfunction" signifies uneven societal adjustment to new conditions, such as rapid economic growth, imperial conquest, new metaphysical beliefs, or important technological changes, which give rise, all at once, to a sense of deprivation, alienation, and anomie. An intransigent elite is one that fails to accommodate to the need for reform; reasons for such failure include loss of its manipulative skill, military superiority, self-confidence, or cohesion. Revolution becomes probable with the occurrence of certain special factors, such as the emergence of an inspired leader or prophet; the formation of a secret, military revolutionary organization; or the crushing defeat of the armed forces in foreign war.

Stone makes the point that revolutions seem to require both deep, underlying causes that create a potentially explosive situation and immediate, incidental factors that trigger the outbreak. The preconditions can be analyzed on a systematic and comparative basis, while the precipitants are generally unique, nonrecurrent, personal, or fortuitous.

According to Stone, Johnson's model attempts to relate conditions directly to action and concentrates too much on objective structural conditions. He says that such a direct relationship does not exist:

> Historians can point to similar activity arising
> from different conditions, and different activity
> arising from similar conditions. Standing between
> objective reality and action are subjective human
> values. A behaviorist approach such as Brinton's,
> which lays equal stress on such things as anomie,
> alienation of the intellectuals, frustrated popular
> aspirations, elite estrangement, and loss of elite
> self-confidence, is more likely to produce a satis-
> factory historical explanation than is one that

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[1]Ibid., p. 166, emphasis in original.

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sticks to the <u>objective</u> social reality. Secondly,
Johnson leaves too little play for the operation
of the unique and the personal. (p. 166, emphasis
added.)

Similar criticism can be found in Eckstein.

Stone's paper was published in 1965, before the appearance of
statistical analyses of conflict by such authors as Tanter, the
Feierabends, and Gurr. Stone may have had similar work in mind, al-
though he does not identify it, in the following paragraph at the
conclusion of his paper:

Some of the writings of contemporary social
scientists are ingenious feats of verbal juggling
in an esoteric language, performed around the totem
pole of an abstract model, surrounded as far as the
eye can see by the arid wastes of terminological
definitions and mathematical formulae. Small wonder
the historian finds it hard to digest the gritty
diet of this neo-scholasticism, as it has been aptly
called. The more historically-minded of the social
scientists, however, have a great deal to offer.
The history of history, as well as of science,
shows that advances depend partly on the accumula-
tion of factual information, but rather more on
the formulation of hypotheses that reveal the hid-
den relationships and common properties of appar-
ently distinct phenomena. Social scientists can
supply a corrective to the antiquarian fact-grub-
bing to which historians are so prone; they can
direct attention to problems of general relevance,
and away from the sterile triviality of so much
historical research. They can ask new questions
and suggest new ways of looking at old ones. They
can supply new categories, and as a result may
suggest new ideas.[30]

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[30]See Werner J. Cahnman and Alvin Boskoff, eds.,
<u>Sociology and History: Theory and Research</u> (New
York 1964); H. Stuart Hughes, "The Historian and
the Social Scientist," <u>American Historical Review</u>,
LXVI, No. 1 (1960), 20-46; A. Cobban, "History and
Sociology," <u>Historical Studies</u>, III (1961), I-8;
M.G. Smith, "History and Social Anthropology,"
<u>Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute</u>,
XCII (1962); K.V. Thomas, "History and Anthropology,"
<u>Past and Present</u>, No. 24 (April 1963), 3-18. (pp.
175-176).

Stone makes several perceptive observations. His distinction be-
tween the underlying causes and the precipitating causes of revolution
is important; it argues that generalization is possible concerning the
underlying causes but not the immediate ones; data relevant to a revo-
lution should be in a time series rather than at some instant in time
(as in factor analysis). He also regards society as a system in which
violence is a usual condition, where "multiple and perpetual tensions
(are) held in check by social means, ideological beliefs and state
sanctions." (p. 161) This is in contrast to the "model of society in
a stable, self-regulating state of perpetual equipoise. In this
utopian world of universal harmony, all forms of violent conflict are
anomalies, to be treated alike as pathological disorders of a similar
species. This is a model which, although it has its uses for analyti-
cal purposes, bears little relation to the reality familiar to the
historian." (pp. 160-161) Also useful is Stone's judgment about the
classes of data that are likely to be relevant to revolution. To re-
peat, "A behaviorist approach such as Brincon's, which lays equal
stress on such things as anomie, alienation of the intellectuals,
frustrated popular aspirations, elite estrangement, and loss of elite
self-confidence, is more likely to produce a sa isfactory historical
explanation than is one that sticks to the objective social reality."
(p. 166, emphasis added)

Stone would also have us believe that the historian's unique
ability to recognize significant conditions can be accepted without
the challenge of tests on the repeatability, reliability, and validity
of the data. If the causes of revolution are such conditions as
anomie, elite inefficiency, disorienting social processes, and frus-
trated aspirations, means must be developed for observers to recognize
their presence, at least in a qualitative way and if possible in a
quantitative way as well. Stone disregards the problem of measurement
and does not appreciate the fact that experts, including perhaps his-
torians, might observe different features in the same events. To this
extent, he offers little encouragement and no guidance to anyone who
might wish to test his provocative suggestions.

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The Communist model of subversive insurgency has been best pre-
sented for our purposes in a series of papers by Michael Charles
Conley.[1] Stated very briefly, the model describes a Communist-di-
rected insurgency movement as political in nature, revolutionary in
intent, and conspiratorial in leadership. Conley's papers emphasize
the bureaucratic and administrative characteristics of Communist or-
ganizations and their cellular structure and committee systems at all
levels. By reducing the interactions of their members with the gen-
eral public, Communist organizations enforce discipline and isolate
their members from the normal processes of social control. If suc-
cessful, the Communist party structure develops military forces, a
complex of mass organizations, and a de facto administrative agency--
a complete shadow government.

According to Conley, Communist leaderships of insurgent movements
have attempted to achieve power by means of three possible grand
strategies:

1. Left strategy: the drive for an early seizure of political
    power, based on a judgment that the masses are ready and
    that the time is right.

2. Right strategy: the popular or united coalition front.
    This is a relatively protracted strategy whereby the Com-
    munists joint various trade unions and liberal but non-
    Communist organizations for the purpose of discrediting
    their leaderships and taking over control of the memberships.
    This strategy was used in Spain, 1936-1937; Czechoslovakia,
    1944-1948; Guatemala, 1954; and the United States before
    World War II.

[1] Michael Charles Conley, Essentials of Communist Insurgent Strategy:
Organization and Concept of Operations, Special Operations Research
Office, The American University, manuscript, no date.
"The Parameters of Subversive Insurgency," op. cit.
The Communist Insurgency Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study
of Organization and Strategy, 2 vols., Center for Research in
Social Systems, The American University, July 1967.
"The Framework of Communist Strategy," ORBIS, IX, pp. 970-984, 1966.

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3. United front from below: an attempt to disenchant the membership of non-Communist political parties and associations and then absorb them into and direct them in Communist-dominated, parallel organizations. This strategy was followed in the Bolshevik revolution of October 1917; the Greek insurgencies of 1941-1945 and 1946-1949; the Philippines, 1946-1954; Malaya, 1948-1961; and Yugoslavia, 1941-1944.

James Davies'[1] theory of revolution, published in 1962, is cited by Gurr, Tanter, and the Feierabends, among others, as one basis for their heavily data-oriented analyses of internal conflict. In his paper, Davies made the following statements:

> Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. The all-important effect on the minds of people in a particular society is to produce, during the former period, an expectation of continued ability to satisfy needs--which continue to rise--and, during the latter, a mental state of anxiety and frustration when manifest reality breaks away from anticipated reality. The actual state of socio-economic development is less significant than the expectation that past progress, now blocked, can and must continue in the future.
>
> Political stability and instability are ultimately dependent on a state of mind, a mood, in a society. Satisfied or apathetic people who are poor in goods, status, and power can remain politically quiet and their opposites can revolt, just as, correlatively and more probably, dissatisfied poor can revolt and satisfied rich oppose revolution. It is the dissatisfied state of mind rather than the tangible provision of "adequate" or "inadequate" supplies of food, equality, or liberty which produces the revolution. In actuality, there must be a joining of forces between dissatisfied, frustrated people who differ in their degree of objective, tangible welfare and status. Well-fed,

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[1] James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," American Sociological Review, 27, pp. 5-19, 1962.

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well-educated, high-status individuals who rebel
in the face of apathy among the objectively de-
prived can accomplish at most a coup d'etat. The
objectively deprived, when faced with solid opposi-
tion of people of wealth, status, and power, will
be smashed in their rebellion.

It is when the chains have been loosened some-
what, so that they can be cast off without a high
probability of losing life, that people are put in
a condition of proto-rebelliousness. I use the
term proto-rebelliousness because the mood of dis-
content may be dissipated before a violent outbreak
occurs. The causes for such dissipation may be
natural or social (including economic and political).
A bad crop year that threatens a return to chronic
hunger may be succeeded by a year of natural abun-
dance. Recovery from sharp economic dislocation
may take the steam from the boiler of rebellion.
The slow, grudging grant of reforms, which has been
the political history of England since at least the
Industrial Revolution, may effectively and contin-
uously prevent the degree of frustration that pro-
duces revolt. (pp. 6-7)

In 1967, Davies wrote:

...revolution is most likely to take place
when a prolonged period of rising expectations and
rising gratifications is followed by a short period
of sharp reversal, during which an intolerable gap
develops between expectation and gratification.[1]

These thoughts are not new. In 1856, de Tocqueville said that
revolutions are more likely to occur when there has been social and
economic progress; he had the French Revolution in mind. And Marx
said in 1848 that despair resulting from progressive deterioration in
the welfare of the working class would lead to revolution; he also had
the French Revolution in mind. Davies says that both ideas have ex-
planatory value, if they are put in the proper time sequence.[2] The

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[1] James C. Davies, "The Circumstances and Courses of Revolution: A
Review," J. Conflict Resolution, 11, pp. 247-257, 1967.

[2] Davies notes that about a year after Marx wrote The Communist
Manifesto, he also wrote that an improvement in the workers' eco-
nomic condition that did not keep pace with the growing welfare of
capitalists would lead to widespread unrest. Marx is not remembered,
however, for his transient agreement with de Tocqueville.

concept is shown schematically in Figure 1 below and is then applied
in Figure 2 to Russia, from the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 to
the Bolshevik revolutions in 1917. The shape of the curve in Figure
2--the magnitude of "need satisfaction" at various periods, especially
the drop from 1906 to 1917 that culminated in the revolution--is purely
illustrative, since no attempt is made to measure "need satisfaction."
Examinations of the events leading up to the Egyptian revolution in
1952 and the Davis rebellion in Rhode Island in 1842 show similar re-
sults.

Davies recognizes that his concept requires an assessment of the
state of mind or mood of the people and suggests that this might be
accomplished by a systematic analysis of public opinion--interviews or
content analysis of speeches and such--or by the judicious analysis of
social statistics on the cost of living, employment, strikes, and the
use of force against rebels. The studies of Tanter, Gurr, and others
have responded to Davies' suggestion by using a wide range of economic,
social, and political data found in statistical yearbooks and news-
papers.

Others have also embroidered, with particular highlights, what
Davies accomplished by joining de Tocqueville with Marx. Thus, the
Feierabends[1] relate their statistical studies of aggressive behavior
within countries to the frustration-aggression hypothesis described by
Dollard et al, 1939.[2] According to this hypothesis, aggression is
always the result of frustration, although the reverse is not neces-
sarily true. Aggression is not likely to occur if aggressive behavior

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[1] The Feierabends, op. cit.

[2] John A. Dollard, et al., Frustration and Aggression, Yale University
Press, New Haven, 1939. The "et al", not otherwise identified by
the Feierabends, are Neal E. Miller, Leonard Doob, O.H. Mowrer,
and Robert R. Sears. Miller, Mowrer, and Sears served as presidents
of the American Psychological Association, and Miller received the
President's Medal of Science in 1964. The basic idea relating
frustration and aggression comes, of course, from Freud's A General
Introduction of Psychoanalysis, 1920, and his Civilization and its
Discontents, 1930. It may also be found in William James' The
Principles of Psychology, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1890.

Taken from Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," op. cit., p. 6.

FIGURE 1. Need Satisfaction and Revolution, According to Davies

Taken from Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," op. cit., p. 13.

FIGURE 2. Need Satisfaction and the Russian Revolution in 1917,
According to Davies

is inhibited by punishment or social pressure. This notion, developed
to explain the behavior of individuals, is adapted to group behavior
and societal phenomena by regarding political instability as aggressive
behavior. The next step is the following formula, which is, of course,
subject to verification:

$$\text{systemic frustration} = \frac{\text{social want satisfaction}}{\text{social want formation}}.$$

The Feierabends are concerned more with verifying the frustration-
aggression hypothesis with a variety of objective data than with a
formal theory of societal conflict. Thus, "the results of these
studies are an encouraging indication that cross-national, correlational
and scaling methods can profitably be applied to complex areas such as
the analysis of internal conflict behaviors."[1] The theoretical find-
ings are modest:

> The results of the studies provide empirical
> corroboration for many current notions regarding
> the determinants of political instability. The
> fact that change may lead to unrest has been sug-
> gested. By applying postulates drawn from the
> frustration-aggression model to this area of in-
> ternal conflict behavior, and by subjecting the
> area to empirical analysis, new insights are also
> obtained. On the basis of these finds, it may be
> suggested that one compelling reason for the
> greater stability of modern countries lies in their
> greater ability to satisfy the wants of their citi-
> zens. The less advanced countries are characterized
> by greater instability because of the aggressive
> responses to systemic frustration evoked in the
> populace. It could be argued simply that the in-
> crease in instability resulting from a change in
> ecological conditions is due to the disruptive ef-
> fect of change. But it is also possible that the
> satisfaction of wants is a feedback effect, adding
> to the strength of the drive for more satisfactions.
> As wants start to be satisfied, the few satisfac-
> tions which are achieved increase the drive for
> more satisfactions, thus in effect adding to the
> sense of systemic frustration. It is only when a

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[1] The Feierabends, op. cit., p. 269.

> high enough level of satisfaction has been reached
> that a country will tend toward stability rather
> than instability. (p. 269)

Tanter and Midlarsky[1] add the concept of expectation and suggest some changes in terminology in Davies' theory. See Figure 3. First, they define achievement as the combination of political, economic, and cultural developments (Davies' actual need satisfaction). Then they define aspiration as the results of political, economic, or cultural attainment known to the general populace (Davies' expected need satisfaction). Aspirations are in the nature of hopes and optimism generated by long-term past performance. Expectation is defined as the current outlook of the public caused primarily by recent changes in the production of social commodities. The "distance" between the two concepts (revolutionary gap) may be a measure of the potentiality for the occurrence of a violent revolution. The larger the revolutionary gap, the longer and the more violent the revolution may be (pp. 270-271). This is shown schematically in Figure 3.

Tanter and Midlarsky test their theory by examining data on domestic violence, achievement, aspirations, and expectations in 17 cases of successful revolutions that occurred during the period 1955-1960.[2] They disregard their previously noted distinction, however, that there are four types of revolution: mass revolution, revolutionary coup, reform coup, and palace revolution.

They make and test two hypotheses:

"1. The higher the rate of increase of GNP/CAP preceding the revolution and the sharper the reversal immediately prior

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[1] Tanter and Midlarsky, op. cit.

[2]
Argentina (1955)	Haiti (1957)	Pakistan (1958)
Brazil (1955)	Jordan (1957)	Venezuela (1958)
Honduras (1956)	Thailand (1957)	Cuba (1959)
Syria (1956)	Burma (1958)	El Salvador (1960)
Colombia (1957)	France (1958)	Turkey (1960)
Guatemala (1957)	Iraq (1958)	

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to the revolution, the greater the duration and violence of
the revolution.

"2. The lower the level of educational attainment prior to the
revolution, the greater the duration and violence of the
revolution." (p. 272, emphasis in original)

The first hypothesis derives directly from Davies, while the second
comes from Seymour Lipset.[1]

Tanter and Midlarsky, op. cit., p. 271.

FIGURE 3. Relationships Among Rate of Achievement, Aspirations, and
Expectations, According to Tanter and Midlarsky (Adapted
and Modified from Davies, 1962, p. 6)

This attempt to test theory with data is a notable one, but it
requires broad assumptions that concept, indicator, and data are re-
lated at each stage, as follows:

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[1] Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," American
Political Science Review, 53, pp. 69-105, March 1959.

Concept	Indicator	Data and Source
Revolution	Domestic violence, duration	Number of deaths as a result of domestic group violence, as reported in The New York Times
Educational level	Level of educational attainment	Number of pupils enrolled in primary schools divided by total population aged 5-14, as reported in World Survey of Education, II, UNESCO, 1958
Achievement, aspirations	Time rate of change of gross national product divided by population (GNP/CAP)	GNP and population, as reported in UN Statistical Yearbook, 1955-1962
Expectations	Drop or reversal in rate of change of GNP/CAP	GNP and population, as reported in UN Statistical Yearbook, 1955-1962
	Degree of inequality in income or land distribution	Gini index (a measure of the area between the Lorenz curve of any distribution and the line of perfect equality)

Tanter and Midlarsky exclude unsuccessful revolutions, although it would be helpful to know that the relationships observed in successful cases were absent in the unsuccessful ones; since they also excluded colonial revolutions, we would like to know whether they are different from noncolonial revolutions. The time rate of change of GNP/CAP was examined for a period of seven years prior to the outbreak of each revolution. This arbitrary choice resulted primarily from the availability of comparable data, and the authors note that the investigation of longer periods might yield different results, without further exploring this matter. Even so, the data for GNP/CAP for two countries (Iraq and El Salvador) were not available in standard form and had to be calculated separately from net national product and population data; the limited data available for two other countries (Syria and Thailand) led the authors to base the values on four and six data points respectively; and no data were available for two other countries (Haiti and Jordan). The data on primary school enrollment

were for the years 1950-1953 for three countries (Brazil, Cuba, and Iraq), 1952-1954 for two countries (Haiti and Jordan), 1950-1952 for one country (Turkey), and not available for one (Pakistan). This recital simply emphasizes the considerable difficulties encountered in collecting adequate, reliable, or even comparable data and is not intended to detract from Tanter and Midlarsky's efforts. The authors themselves point out in a footnote that different yearbooks reported varying values of GNP/CAP for the same country for the same year. An attempt was made to reduce this type of inconsistency by using the time series data from only one yearbook for each calculation.

The findings are shown as a series of correlations in Table 6. As hypothesized, there is a high and statistically significant relationship between achievement and aspirations and revolution (time rate of change in GNP/CAP and number of deaths due to domestic violence) in Asia and the Middle East (six and four cases of revolution, respectively), but neither in Latin America (seven cases) nor when all revolutions studied are taken as a group. The same finding applies in the same locations for the negative relationship between expectations and revolutions (primary school enrollment ratio and number of deaths due to domestic violence).

TABLE 6. CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN CHANGES IN WEALTH, LEVEL OF EDUCATION, AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE[a]

	All Cases	Latin America	Asia	Middle East
Time rate of GNP/CAP	0.22 (14)	-0.12 (7)	0.94 (6)	0.96 (4)
Primary enrollment ratio	-0.31 (16)	0.33 (9)	-0.76 (6)	-0.92 (4)

[a]Domestic violence was logarithmically transformed for the first two values in the second row. No transformations were necessary for the calculation of the remaining values.

The dependent variable in the calculation of these coefficients was domestic violence.

Source: Tanter and Midlarsky, op. cit., p. 273.

These hypotheses were also tested by calculating correlations between the duration of the revolution (in number of days) and the rate of change of GNP/CAP and the level of the primary school enrollment ratio. None of these was found to be significant; this finding thus challenges the findings above. Tanter and Midlarsky argue, however, that it is extremely difficult to measure the duration of a revolution (but not, apparently, to make an inference about it).

An examination was also made of the hypothesis that the probability of revolution is greater in countries where there is an appreciable gap between aspirations and expectations; it was tested in terms of a high level of inequality in land distribution. The Gini index[1] for land distribution was compared for ten countries that experienced successful revolutions in the period 1955-1960 with 40 countries that did not have successful revolutions (the latter group appears to include countries in which revolutions were not attempted as well as those in which all attempts at revolutions were failures--not a notably homogeneous sample). The difference is statistically significant ($p = 0.05$), a finding similar to that of Russett (from whom the Gini indices were taken) who found in 44 cases that $r = 0.44$ between the Gini index of land inequality and domestic violence.

If Tanter and Midlarsky are to be faulted, it is in their choice of method to test their theory, rather than in their choice of data. Despite its popularity among data-oriented political scientists, the use of domestic violence as an indicator of revolution is an arbitrary one and, in the absence of information about the causes of the violence

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[1] The Gini index cumulates for a population the difference between a theoretical cumulative distribution of values and the actual one. In geometric terms, the area between a Lorenz curve and the line of equality is divided by the maximum possible area of inequality. The greater this area, the more highly possession of the value is concentrated or unequal. See Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, "Indices for Comparing Inequality," p. 349-372 in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966.

as seen by the government as well as by the public, far from an adequate description. It concentrates on the relationship between violence and revolution, not on the role of violence in the more normal processes of societal adjustment. Then, a low level of educational attainment, while suggestive of a possible disruption in society, may indicate complete subjugation of the populace and therefore not be a predictor of the duration and intensity of revolution.

It may be observed that Tanter and Midlarsky used data that could be collected rather than data that should be collected, the latter probably being beyond their resources. Their paper does not dwell upon the desirable characteristics of any additional data. Confirmation of their theory is far from a trivial exercise, and an adequate test would require data that are not readily at hand.

Ted Gurr[1] has also developed a fairly elaborate model of civil violence based on the frustration-aggression hypothesis. Relative deprivation, he says, is the basic precondition for civil strife of any kind and there is a direct relationship between the magnitudes of deprivation and strife. Figure 4 shows the relationship between deprivation and strife, through four intervening variables, with the direction of influence on the magnitude of violence indicated as positive (+) or negative (-).

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[1] Ted Gurr with Charles Ruttenberg, op. cit.
Ted Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," op. cit.
Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife," op. cit.
Ted Gurr, "Urban Disorder," op. cit.
Ted Gurr with Charles Ruttenberg, Cross-National Studies of Civil Violence, Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, Washington, D.C., May 1969.

Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife," op. cit., p. 1105.

FIGURE 4. Relation Between Deprivation and Magnitude of Civil Strife, According to Gurr

Coercive potential is coercive force size weighted for the degree of loyalty of the population to the regime (negative).

Institutionalization is the extent to which societal struc-
tures beyond the primary level are broad in scope, command sub-
stantial resources or personnel, and are stable and persisting
(negative).

Facilitation refers to environmental factors that encourage
the outbreak and persistence of strife, such as past high levels
of civil strife and the acceptance of strife as a way of life
(positive).

Legitimacy is the extent to which people accept and comply
with the directives of the regime (negative).

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Gurr's major contribution (as with Tanter and the Feierabends), is that he tests the predictive power of his model, which he calls a causal model. He accomplishes this by determining the correlations of data on economic and political conditions with data on civil strife in 114 national and colonial political entities having populations of one million or more, for the period 1961 through 1965. There are many problems in this type of analysis, for instance, how to transform the available raw data into meaningful indicators of the key variables, such as "deprivation" and "strife", as well as into intervening variables, such as "institutionalization" and "legitimacy." There are problems with incomplete data and with methods for coding the data, and some data distributions are highly skewed. As a result of his analysis, Gurr revised his causal model so that "deprivation" now consists of two components ("persisting" and "short-term deprivation"), "facilitation" is re-defined to mean "social and structural facilitation," and "past strife" is added as a new intervening variable (see Fig. 5). With this model, he is able to explain 65 percent of the variance in the magnitude of civil strife, for the countries, data, and period examined in his study. At this stage, the model is obviously incomplete and requires further evaluation using other data. Note, also, that "civil strife" is defined in this model as a much broader concept than internal war.

In his theory of revolution, David C. Schwartz[1] is concerned primarily with the processes by which a revolution changes from one stage to the next. An attempt is made to explain the common features of all revolutions rather than the major differences among revolutions, the latter being the basis for typologies. Schwartz identifies

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[1] David C. Schwartz, "A Theory of Revolutionary Behavior," University of Pennsylvania, March 1967 (manuscript).
"A Theory of Revolutionary Behavior: The First Stage" (U), unclassified paper, pp. 277-283 in Decision Processes for Military Operations and Systems Design, Proceedings of the 19th Military Operations Research Symposium, April 25-27, 1967 (SECRET).
"Toward a New Knowledge Base for Military Development Operations During Insurgencies," ORBIS, XII(1), pp. 73-86, Spring 1968.

at least ten separate stages or subprocesses in the general case of a complete revolution:

1. Initial political alienation: withdrawal
2. Origination of revolutionary organizations
3. Revolutionary appeals
4. Revolutionary coalition and movement building
5. Nonviolent revolutionary politics
6. Outbreak of revolutionary violence
7. Rule of the moderates
8. Accession of the extremists
9. Reigns of terror
10. Thermidor

Schwartz does not analyze all of these stages in detail; thus stages 5 and 6 are discussed together, as are stages 7 through 10 under a heading of "the post-violent stages of revolution."[1]

In a process model of revolution, the problem is not only to describe the initial, intermediate, and terminal stages, but also the conditions and rules that affect the transitions from one stage to the next. Schwartz provides his most complete explanation at stage 1, where he shows how alienation from political processes may develop; this initial condition, though not yet catastrophic, may result eventually in revolution. Schwartz's descriptions of the subsequent stages become successively less detailed until, as indicated, the last four stages are grouped together.

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[1] In his 1968 ORBIS paper, Schwartz uses six gross stages: 1-4 as above, "5. Nonviolent revolutionary politics" (which combines stages 5 and 6 (above) and "6. The outbreak and cause of revolutionary violence" (which combines stages 7-10 above). All explanations are very brief, while the new stages 5 and 6 (the original 5-10) are discussed together. In the 1967 manuscript, stage 1 received 18 pages of discussion, while stages 7-10 received only 4 pages.

THE PROPORTION AT THE TOP OF EACH CELL IS THE SIMPLE r^2 BETWEEN THE VARIABLE AND CIVIL STRIFE, I.E., THE PROPORTION OF STRIFE ACCOUNTED FOR BY EACH VARIABLE SEPARATELY. THE PERCENTAGES ARE THE PROPORTION OF EXPLAINED VARIANCE ACCOUNTED FOR BY EACH VARIABLE WHEN THE EFFECTS OF ALL OTHERS ARE CONTROLLED, DETERMINED BY SQUARING EACH PARTIAL r, SUMMING THE SQUARES, AND EXPRESSING EACH AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE SUM. THE EXPLAINED VARIANCE, R^2, IS 0.65.

Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife," op. cit., p. 1121.

FIGURE 5. Revised Causal Model of the Determinants of Magnitude of Civil Strife

These stages are similar to those suggested by Rex Hopper[1] for the development of revolutionary movements:

1. A preliminary stage of mass (individual) excitement and unrest

2. The popular stage of crowd (collective) excitement and unrest

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[1] Rex D. Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process," Social Forces, 28, pp. 270-279, 1950.

3. The formal stage of the formulation of issues and formation of publics

4. The institutional stage of legalization and societal organization

Hopper also employs a process model that is sociological rather than psychological in nature, i.e., group rather than individual.

Schwartz defines each stage in terms of the principal actors or political subsystems that are operating in the given time period and their behaviors and interactions. The behavior of individuals within a stage is explained in psychological terms, primarily on the basis of cognitive consistency (using Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory), but also using such psychological concepts as ambivalence, anxiety, and conflict. The transitions to any following stage are explained as a result of the interactions between actors or subsystems at the previous stage, when the interactions produce a systemic environment with significant new characteristics. Although a complete revolution proceeds through all stages, some of the stages can be foreshortened and the order can be reversed. The work is conceived as "a theory of the middle range," an attempt to identify

> ...powerful process analyses ... in which the same variable or variables (though not necessarily the same variable magnitudes) account for all of the transitions between the stages or states (e.g., the transformation process by which some materials in an initially solid state pass through a liquid to a gaseous state as a function, ceteris paribus, of the variable, heat).... If revolution is a process, its ultimate explanation must be a series of conditional probabilistic statements.... A precise description and comprehensive explanation of the cause of a modal form of revolution, then, would be an equation in conditional probabilities where the combination of the probabilities were equal to the probability of the end-state (terminal state, final result). The theory ... is an attempt to facilitate this kind of explanation [but] it does not itself achieve it. (pp. 8-9)

According to Schwartz, revolutions begin as individuals attempt to withdraw from politics, especially their attention, affection, and involvement. Withdrawal occurs because the individual attempts to reconcile the conflicting or contradictory interests to which he is exposed in his society. Conflict develops when the individual's cognitive structure perceives a disparity between the images of the political system and of its political values; in the balanced case, no distinction would be made between the two. When we remember that values may be economic, religious, cultural, and social, as well as narrowly political, it is clear that there are many opportunities for conflict. Schwartz limits his concern to the perception of personal and systemic inefficacy when conflict exists in the politicized aspects of such basic values.

Withdrawal, alienation, and restlessness, which Schwartz explains in psychological terms, have been noted by others, such as Brinton, Hopper, and Edwards (and eloquently though not "scientifically" by Eric Hoffer, in The True Believer), as the earliest noticeable signs of a possible revolution.

In the next stage, organizations that are revolutionary from their inception develop in response to a critical minimum of perceived passive alienation. Reformist groups, which would repair and retain the system, become antisystem in purpose. Again, the explanation is cognitive. The alienated proliferate, find, and reinforce each other and thereby become independent of the rewards that social conformity may previously have offered.

In seeking a wider base of support, the primitive revolutionary organizations develop the beginnings of revolutionary appeal to a wider set of audiences. According to Schwartz, the psychological aspects of this process are reasonably well known: the appeals focus dissatisfaction and anxiety on a few political symbols; they provide a sense of community; they explain the threat to the revolutionaries in terms of a loss of their community; and they project their hostility and alienation outward onto some identifiable group, such as the

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government or the police. And so, almost irreversibly from one sta'e to the next, cognitive conflict and frustrations provide the motive force that enlarges the revolutionary potential. In such circumstances, almost any government response is likel: to be incomplete, come too late to be useful, and so fuel the engines of revolution.

At about this point, the details of Schwartz's explanation become sparse, although his major concept is reasonably clear. Admittedly making a preliminary effort, Schwartz indicates in a footnote that "systematic data, designed specifically to test the validity of this theory in its own terms, is now being generated." (p. 13)

Two serious problems may be anticipated in attempting to confirm Schwartz's theory. The underlying explanation is psychological, involving ways in which political and personal values are perceived and ways in which conflicts among these values may be resolved in a societal setting. Thus, the basic data are personal, psychological, and perceptual. Personal data are generally evanescent, and it is not easy to conceive of how they can be collected on historical events. It would be difficult enough for current events. In addition, there are formidable problems in ensuring that the information adequately represents the significant portions of the population (including the passive parts) in the society undergoing a revolution and that it is reasonably accurate and detailed.

Another problem is related to Schwartz's attempt to find common features in all revolutions. To do so, he de-emphasizes the significance of the temporal and structural aspects of specific societies in revolution. In extreme form, this might mean that revolutions against monarchies are not thought to be different from revolutions against democracies; or that political, cultural, and religious traditions that distinguish Eastern from Western countries are of little significance for the form their revolutions may take; and so on. Of course, Schwartz does not imply so severe a view. (Nor does he explicitly deny it, either.) The further development of his theory and data should clarify the extent to which commonality among revolutions

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exceeds the unique aspects of their settings, in terms related to time, place, politics, and tradition.

Some of the problems of a processual model may be highlighted by recalling the incomplete work of Barringer and Ramers[1] and of Bloomfield, Leiss, and Others[2], reported above. Barringer and Ramers coded 300 variables for all parties (antagonists and third parties, if any) in 17 cases of internal and international conflict between 1936 and 1967 and one case that occurred in 1906. The variables involved demographic and economic data, the political system and structure, political perceptions and policies, foreign involvements, military capabilities and performance, and casualties. The purpose of the analysis, accomplished by an algorithm related to factor analysis, was to identify patterns, if any, as these disputes passed through the various phases assumed by Bloomfield and Leiss in their conflict model. The phases were Dispute, Conflict, Hostilities, Escalation, Termination, and Settlement. Thus, the process model is similar in the theoretical structures of Schwartz, Barringer and Ramers, and Bloomfield and Leiss. But there are also some differences; Schwartz is concerned with revolutions over a time scale and in countries not yet specified. Both Barringer and Ramers, and Bloomfield and Leiss considered only relatively recent cases in which military action occurred, both within and between states. Another significant difference is that Schwartz bases his explanation on cognitive factors, whereas the others base their explanations on political factors.

Although the substantive findings and conclusions of the Barringer and Ramers study are not available, the published material shows a data base of more than 50,000 items of information (300 data bits for each of two or more parties at each of 87 thresholds from one phase to another in the 18 cases of conflict). The analytic technique involves grouping all cases at various levels of classification

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[1] Barringer and Ramers, op. cit.

[2] Bloomfield, Leiss, and Others, op. cit.

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in order that each has more characteristics in common with other members of its class than with any other class. This results in a hierarchical series of patterns that defines the predominant characteristics at each level. The classification is analogous to a Linnean chart, or branching diagram, with the levels designated (from higher to lower) as class, family, genus, species, and individual cases, and with various patterns to distinguish the categories at each level. Thus, it is reasonably clear that most cases of conflict will yield unique patterns, associated at each level of classification with a different group of conflicts with which they share some common characteristics. This is a different outcome from the one suggested by Schwartz, whose cognitive concept provides a more unitary explanation. Barringer and Ramers report a reliability test in which two judges agreed in 85 percent of their judgments when they coded 210 items into prescaled categories; this suggests that the matter of coding the raw data may be a formidable problem.

The Bloomfield and Leiss study utilizes a process model to identify the crucial factors bearing on transition toward or away from violence. The attempt is to develop a catalog of policy measures shown to have influenced the growth or decline of violence at the various phases of local conflicts and not, curiously enough, to validate the model used in the analysis. By the authors' admission, the analysis is inescapably dependent on subjective judgments (Vol. 1, p. 13), a problem likely to be encountered by Schwartz as well. Bloomfield and Leiss find that "the range and variety of ... measures [that might control conflict] declined as options began to close; attitudes hardened; perceptions increasingly narrowed down to a preoccupation with the violent bands of the spectrum of political conduct." (Vol. 1, p. 13) Overlooking, if we wish, any methodological problems in connecting the conclusions with the raw data from which they are drawn, we can see that the findings agree with common sense and would probably be consistent with Schwartz's formulation.

Eckstein[1] reminds us that most so-called theories of internal war are simply summaries of data, not hypotheses to be tested. He offers, instead, a two-point paradigm as a preliminary but necessary step toward theory building. First, "internal war-potential (the likelihood that internal war in some form will be precipitated) should be conceived formally as a ratio between positive forces making for internal war and negative forces working against it--with the pos-sibility that internal war of some kind may be fomented existing no matter what the overall potential, and the probability of its occur-rence increasing as internal war potential rises." (1965, p. 159, emphasis in original) Second, each of the forces involved should be conceived as functions of four factors:

Positive forces (making internal war likely)

1. Inefficacy of the elites (lack of cohesion and lack of expected performance)
2. Disorienting social processes (delegitimization)
3. Subversion (deliberate attempts to activate disorienta-tion, form new political orientations, and impede the efficacy of elites)
4. Facilities available to potential insurgents (communi-cations, favorable terrain, popular support)

Negative forces (obstacles to internal war)

1. Facilities of incumbents
2. Effective repression
3. Adjustive concessions
4. Diversionary mechanisms

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[1] Harry Eckstein, "Toward the Theoretical Study of Internal War," Introduction to his Internal War: Problems and Approaches, The Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1964.
"Internal War: The Problem of Anticipation," op. cit.
"On the Etiology of Internal Wars," pp. 133-163 in History and Theory, Studies in the Philosophy of History, Vol. IV, George H. Nadel, ed., Mouton and Co., Printers, The Hague, 1965.
"The Study of 'Internal Wars'," unpublished memorandum, February 1969.

Thus, the overall balance of positive and negative forces in a society determines its potential for internal war.[1] Eckstein says that the particular combinations and ratios of forces that are strong or weak should enable one to determine what kinds of internal wars are likely to occur. For example, a palace revolution may result where elite inefficacy predominates among the positive forces, a coup where subversion is a large factor, and a civil war where incumbent and insurgent facilities are equally matched. Theory and typology must eventually complement each other. Eckstein notes that it is necessary to determine the relative importance of and to identify the possible interactions among positive and negative forces, but he does not attempt to do so.

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[1] Eckstein has apparently abandoned an equation in his 1963 paper that he called a form of "pseudo-mathematics ... for the sake of vivid representation":

$$W = f \frac{Cer. \ I. \ Fi}{(Adi, \ R, \ E, \ Fr)} \ , \qquad \text{where}$$

W = internal war <u>potential</u>

C = social changes relevant to the occurrence of internal wars

Ce = extensiveness of relevant changes

Cr = rate of change

I = imbalancing mechanisms in a society that intensify the strains arising from social change

Fi = facilities available to the insurgents

A = adjustive and diversionary mechanisms

Ad = adjustive mechanisms, such as concessions, deliberately adopted by regime

Ai = adjustive mechanisms in the institutional structure of society, such as organizational means for resolving conflicts, and social mobility patterns

R = extent of effective repression exercised by the incumbents

E = degree of elite cohesion in a society

Fr = counter-facilities available to the incumbent regime

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Eckstein's explicitly modest contribution to a theory of internal war derives from his assessment that our present knowledge in this area is so limited. He prefers the general term "internal war" to such terms as revolution, guerrilla war, and coup d'etat until a better theoretical basis exists for distinguishing among them. Since the various definitions of these terms are ambiguous and apply to phenomena that in practice are difficult to distinguish, we cannot generalize from the resulting studies. Thus, the comparative studies accomplished so far, principally by Edwards, Brinton, Pettee, and Arendt, have made scant contributions to our knowledge of internal war. These authors were concerned primarily with the great revolutions in Western society between 1640 and 1917, which are not closely relevant to recent internal wars and which ignore smaller revolutions such as coups and guerrilla wars. Yet the studies of recent conflicts by Tanter, Rummel, Gurr, and the Feierabends face difficulties resulting from masses of unreliable and not always relevant data and represent generally a single slice in time rather than a developmental view of internal wars.

Theories of revolution have ranged so widely over the subject that it is difficult to find a factor that some expert has not singled out as the major cause. Thus, intellectual, economic, political, sociological, personal, and conspiratorial factors have each been seen as the major determinant of revolution. Although these explanations are likely to be true in pârt, they make neither good science nor perhaps even very good history. History is so rich with events that the search for confirming examples poses no serious problem, even if we disregard the influences that lead to the creation, retention, and availability of some records and the absence and neglect of others.

So many institutions and events are affected by an internal war that it is easy to assign a crucial role to some institutions or to some recent events, more or less innocently disregarding the influence of other institutions or a history of preceding events. Eckstein is at his best when he reminds us that to some extent all explanations are plausible and that complex phenomena rarely yield to simplistic explanations or to convenient data. An explanation of internal war

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must consider not only the precipitants (which are likely to be unique
to particular cases, ephemeral and fortuitous) but also the preconditions (which are more likely to be common among many cases of internal
war, thus permitting some generalization). Even if it is reasonable
and in some senses easier to study the insurgents (who, after all,
"create" internal war), it is the incumbents who are being threatened
and whose inefficacy makes an insurgency probable or, occasionally,
whose efficacy turns it off, either through repression or judicious
concessions.

There has been a recent surge of interest in behavioral explanations of internal war, such as Davies' theory that revolutions occur
when there is an intolerable gap between what people want and what
they get, even after a rise in actual need satisfactions; the work of
Gurr, Tanter, and the Feierabends; and especially Schwartz's theory.
These studies are richly larded (not a bad metaphor) with such behavioral ingredients as anomie, threat, cognitive dissonance, alienation, and frustration-aggression. By comparison, staunch hypotheses
involving the structural aspects of society (economic conditions, social
stratification, geographic and demographic features) appear to be neglected. It almost appears that, in the search for broad, general explanations, insufficient attention is now being given to such obvious
features of specific internal wars as the country, date, type of government, elite structure, stratification, culture, tradition, and
relevant history. Finally, except for Abt's study[1] on the termination of internal revolutionary conflict, little attention is being
given to the end of internal wars and virtually none to the reconstruction of society after the fighting ends. Brinton, Pettee, and Arendt,
who have studied the great revolutions of America, France, and Russia,
tell us that the revolution really takes place, or is lost, after the
fighting ends.

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[1] The Termination of Internal Revolutionary Conflict (U), Project
TIRC, Final Summary Report, Abt Associates, Inc., Cambridge, Mass.,
June 20, 1967, SECRET.

VIII. GENERAL DISCUSSION

In this chapter, we shall attempt to assess the present state of our knowledge about internal war and to develop a strategy for research to extend our understanding. In brief, our knowledge is broad and our understanding is shallow.

It is probably necessary, as well as convenient, for a government official or a guerrilla arrayed against him to view internal war in relatively simple, rather than intellectual, terms. For each, the issue must be how to win the war now. For each antagonist, the issue is survival, not science, even if some scientific understanding would improve his effectiveness. Even if the circumstances or personalities of the antagonists permitted a degree of detachment concerning their day-to-day problems, their freedom of action is severely constrained by limitations in the amount and reliability of relevant information, the availability of resources to achieve agreed goals, and, above all, the need for political compromise to achieve even limited objectives. The wisdom that comes from history is not available to those who make history.

All of this means that tnose who win and lose internal wars do so within the limited scope of what they can know and what they would like to see happen--their commitments as participants rather than as detached observes--and an appreciable amount of luck. Only with difficulty can a participant extend his view beyond his current problems. An internal war is probably only the most visible aspect of a series of fundamental changes affecting a society; it is an incident in a revolution. The basis for the war in Vietnam, for example, extends earlier than the Geneva Agreement of 1954; it goes back at least to 1946, the end of World War II, which means that that revolution is at

least 25 years old, or almost 100 years if we include the period of French colonial rule. The Russian Revolution must be dated to include at least the period from 1907 to 1953, when Stalin died. If we regard America's current urban problems as being related, at least in part, to problems left over from the Civil War, we see that the revolution is not yet complete after 100 years. Revolutions, in which internal wars are significant but transient events, must be seen as very long-term processes. And the war, as such, does not settle very many of the basic problems.

Some of the difficulties of understanding, predicting, and perhaps influencing the outcomes of internal wars result from the fact that internal wars are features of long-term, fundamental changes in societal structures. Most social institutions are engaged in these changes, many in direct conflict with each other. Therefore, an adequate explanation must describe, in social, political, military, and economic terms, the role of all institutions in conflict, the positions taken by participants on each side of the struggle, and the patterns of involvement of various elite groups. It appears obvious that an adequate description is likely to be complex rather than simple and grounded as deeply in history as in current events. There is room, apparently, for many diverse, conceivably accurate, but also incomplete, descriptions of such a complex process. The addition of vagaries of the historical setting and local culture makes it easy to see why we have not progressed very far toward developing a typology or theory of internal war. To be done systematically, it would be a task of very large scope indeed.

The theory and typology of internal war, being reflections of each other, are at present in a formative state. Among the many theories and typologies that may be found, we have concentrated on a few that are stated with sufficient clarity and coherence to be susceptible to proof or disproof. Two key ideas appear to be significant and complementary. One is that internal war develops as part of a process that goes through many stages. The other is that the force for change may be found in cognitive processes.

A series of interactions are always going on among all institutions in all societies at all times. These interactions are not always rewarding to the participants, but most societies appear to be able to sustain a certain amount of ineffectiveness or conflict without being torn apart. But this is not always the case, and particularly tense situations can arise in a variety of ways: losing a war, famine, or industrialization, such factors often being exacerbated by an ineffective elite. Events like these can trigger an irreversible change that propels a society to more severe, although not necessarily revolutionary, conflict. A key factor in this process seems to be the initial alienation of the elite, which is sometimes called the failure of the regime to recruit new leaders. From here, the chain from the development of revolutionary ideas, to the development of revolutionary groups, i.e., from organized opposition to the regime to actual revolutionary conflict, is a long one that may be broken in many ways, including effective repression by the government or ineffectiveness on the part of the revolutionaries. Process models of revolution, showing the inception and aftermath of internal war, have been developed by several authors. Useful examples include Schwartz's model, which is primarily conceptual, and that of Barringer and Ramers, which is more pragmatic. Although these process models require considerable further development, they promise a better understanding of internal war, and their present incompleteness should not be overemphasized.

Another key idea is that revolutions occur when there is an intolerable gap between what people want and what they get. This concept, expressed well by Davies, is supported by data and analyses reported by Tanter and Midlarsky, Gurr, the Feierabends, and others. Davies, and de Tocqueville before him, observed that people who are severely repressed and most in despair do not necessarily revolt. Rather, revolutions occur in response to disappointment, even after there have been some improvements. This observation is grounded in two psychological concepts, concerning the behavior of individuals, that have been adapted to explain the behavior of social groups: the frustration-aggression hypothesis and the theory of cognitive dissonance.

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The frustration-aggression hypothesis is that aggression is always the result of frustration, but not necessarily the reverse.[1] According to the theory of cognitive dissonance, the individual attempts to resolve inconsistencies in his perceptions because these are a source of conflict to him.[2] Although these concepts were developed to account for individual rather than social group behavior, Schwartz, Tanter, and the Feierabends apply them to political behavior, specifically to different forms of political violence, such as strikes, riots, mutiny, and internal war. Although groups in society are made up of individuals, the same type of explanation does not necessarily apply equally in both cases. If it were otherwise, there would be little need for a department of sociology and another department of psychology on each college campus. Much work remains to be done to support the assumption made by a variety of authors that psychological mechanisms are able to explain great conflicts within societies: the transformation from individual to group processes is far from being well understood.

Scholars and analysts (to make an invidious distinction) have begun to elaborate these ideas and to test them with data. The real question is what should be done next, a matter to which we now turn.

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[1] John A. Dollard, et al., op. cit.
Leonard Berkowitz, Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1962.

[2] Leon Festinger, The Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Harper & Row, New York, 1957.

IX. RESEARCH ON INTERNAL WAR

The single most significant contribution to our understanding of
internal war would be a theory to explain its occurrence, course, and
aftermath in its various forms around the world. This is not a small
request. Theory does not spring into existence on demand. Neil J.
Smelser said a theory is like a number of empty boxes that we try to
fill. The empty boxes are

> ...categories which refer potentially to a wide
> range of facts. These categories maintain con-
> sistent logical relations among themselves; they
> possess a stable structure. Moreover, definite
> yet abstract propositions govern the interaction
> among the categories under conditions of change.
> Finally, to fill the boxes correctly, one must
> isolate empirical instances to accept or reject
> the logical relationships among the categories.[1]

We should try to evaluate the boxes that we already have, such as
those provided by Davies and Schwartz, and see if we can fill them.

Severe problems are likely to be encountered in gathering the
data needed to test and develop theories of internal war. Such prob-
lems result primarily from the scope and magnitude of the data that
must be collected, although we can anticipate conceptual problems con-
cerning what data should be collected. In order to permit even pre-
theoretical generalization, different internal wars must be compared
on a series of common variables regarded as significant to the par-
ticular theory being evaluated, for instance, occurrence of internal

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[1]Neil J. Smelser, Social Change in the Industrial Revolution,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1959, 1, p. 8, emphasis
in original.

war in relation to number of strikes per year, percentage of population receiving a public school education, and disparity of annual income between the urban and rural population. Thus, data must be collected for countries thought to vary in some way significant to internal war—with or without frequent coups d'etat, with or without a history of colonialism, with or without cyclic periods of violence, with or without a stable bureaucracy, and so on.

The most serious need is for attitudinal data, i.e., reliable information on the perceived needs of significant portions of the population over relevant time periods. The next most serious need is for the continuous collection of data in order to study trends over time and interactions among the data series. Finally, data must be sufficiently fine grained that they permit observation of trends and interactions among significant segments of the population: urban versus rural, young versus old, elites versus nonelites, government employees versus nongovernment employees, and so on. National statistics tend to be collected to assess representation in government, tax policy, economic growth, and educational programs. Such data are aggregated too grossly to identify the status of significant segments of the populations involved in internal conflict: elite, nonelite, religious, cultural, and economic strata. The time intervals between the collection of such data tend to be too long to be useful in terms of studying the development of internal conflict, which can change very rapidly. Finally, attitudinal data are likely to be totally absent in the current stores of national demographic statistics.

For statistical purposes, the number of countries in each subset of the matrix is likely to be large; there must be enough countries in the sample to demonstrate that the presumed effect that the presence or absence of a stable bureaucracy, say, has on the likelihood of internal war can be detected or denied despite the contaminating effects from other variables, such as the history of colonialism, interest of powerful neighboring countries, and so on. And of course large numbers of observations are needed because of limitations in the reliability of the raw data; collecting the necessary data becomes a very large enterprise.

This is one of the foundering points of studies like those of
Tanter, Rummel, Gurr, and the Feierabends. By and large, these studies
have been restricted to data found in standard statistical yearbooks
issued by various countries and the United Nations and to current
events as reported in The New York Times Index, Deadline Data on World
Affairs, and similar compendia.[1] It is well to remember that these
authors have used the summaries and the news indices, but not the raw
data or the daily newspapers. This is said not so much to fault the
various researchers, but rather to remind us of the remoteness of the
data. Discrepancies, the seriousness of which we cannot assess, have
been observed in reports of the same events in different compendia;
and it should be obvious that the quality, quantity, and frequency of
demographic data provided by various nations are by no means standard.
Use of the data in a series of studies permits comparisons concerning
various ways of treating the data, but it should not obscure the uncer-
tainties that are present in the original data.

Thus, progress in research on internal war requires development
of a data bank with reliable information. To some extent, a useful
start has already been made, although for somewhat different purposes,
by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research at the Uni-
versity of Michigan, the Yale Political Data Program, the Dimensionality
of Nations Project, and the University of Hawaii (Rummel).

The data bank is particularly deficient, however, in attitudinal
data. Public opinion polling comes to mind as a method of collecting
attitudinal data, but a wider repertoire of techniques is available
for this purpose: content analyses of published and broadcast in-
formation, census questionnaires, standardized observation checklists,
informal repertorial conversation, and interview and survey techniques.
All require systematic sampling procedures to ensure that the data

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[1]The complete set appears to include the New International Year-
book, Facts on File, Encyclopaedia Brittanica Book of the Year,
the Annual Register of World Events, and some regional registers
on Africa, South America, and so on.

are representative for those population segments of interest. By using these techniques, we can acquire information on what people are thinking about various aspects of their society and how various groups agree or disagree on central issues. Attitudinal data permit us to interpret demographic data and can, as well as must, be collected over short time intervals. Whatever limitations attitudinal data may have, and they are many, they are the only means available to suggest what people want and would like to see happen in the future. All theories that relate expectations to achievements require such information.

There are certain requirements if attitudinal data are to be used to detect trends. They must be collected regularly. There must be records concerning the time and place of the survey, the sampling plan, and information on the characteristics of the people in the sample, as well as some systematic procedure (such as repeated interviews) to test the quality of the data. This is not a very novel suggestion, since it is followed routinely by professional survey groups. Yet Webb finds that social science studies performed in Vietnam were not comparable because such background records were not kept or were too incomplete to be useful.[1] He notes also the absence of precise information to describe how well the questions were translated from English to Vietnamese and the answers back to English--a nontrivial complication in assembling data involving a number of different languages and cultures, as well as varying status roles among the individuals involved in the interview.

Assuming that a reliable data bank on internal war comes into existence (or that such data can be identified in the existing data banks) and that it expands as new information, largely attitudinal, becomes available, what should we do with it? The next step would be to identify a meaningful set of countries for continued, in-depth study

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[1] Eugene J. Webb, A Review of Social Science Research in Vietnam with Procedural Recommendations for Future Research in Insurgent Settings, STD Research Paper P-450, Institute for Defense Analyses, Arlington, Va., December 1968. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

with generally comparable data series. Comparable data series significant to internal war do not exist at the present time, although a few halting attempts to develop them can be identified: Condit's and Cooper's CRESS series, Bloomfield and Leiss, Richardson and Waldron (INS Study 14), and the termination of conflict series prepared by Abt.

All comparative studies of internal war that could be found are reported in this paper. These studies show a surprising lack of overlap on the internal wars that they examine. For example, of the 380 internal wars cited by Richardson and Waldron, only two (Kashmir 1947-1949 and Greece 1946-1949) were examined in the four studies that attempted large-scale comparisons. There is also a need to study meaningful samples of countries that have experienced different types of internal war. This selection is not made any easier by the lack of a meaningful typology of internal war. The only recourse, it would seem, is to start with a provisional, not overly restrictive typology that can be changed as our knowledge increases. The preliminary typology proposed by Eckstein[1] appears to be useful for this purpose:

1. Unorganized and spontaneous violence: riots
2. Coups d'etat: revolt among elite groups
3. Full-scale political revolutions
4. Wars of independence to achieve sovereignty in a previously dependent territory

Alternatively, Johnson's typology[2] of revolution is also reasonable. He found six types that differed according to the targets of revolutionary activity (regime, government, or community), identity of the revolutionaries (masses or elite), revolutionary goals (reformist, nationalistic), and initiation (spontaneous or calculated).

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[1]Eckstein, "Internal War," op. cit., p. 104, 1963.
[2]See pages 107-117 above.

Such typologies invite us to identify examples of different types of internal wars; this, of course, is their utility. The examples must include some cases in which the insurgents won, others in which the incumbents won, and some that were a draw. We should also include data on the stability of the outcome, say five to ten years after the termination of hostilities.

One of the most significant flaws in almost all studies of internal war to date is the absence of "controls." We need two types of control groups: (1) countries that have not experienced an internal war and (2) countries in which internal wars were started but did not get very far. We might well restrict our concern to the 20th century. In this case, some of the great democracies may be suitable candidates for the first control category. For the second, modern Thailand and Bolivia (where "Che" Guevara failed) come to mind as recent examples.

Without suggesting that we can identify all studies on internal war that should be undertaken soon, we believe that the following six are worthy of special mention:

1. Two-sided analyses of internal war
   A series of case studies, including successes and failures, would involve an attempt to develop a complete account, on a time-line basis, for the actions taken by the insurgents and the incumbents in response to each other's actions through the various phases of the conflict. In short, the effort would be to identify and assess the interactions between the antagonists.

2. Postinsurgency
   As suggested by Eckstein, it would be useful to examine the political interactions between the antagonists after hostilities are terminated. This problem will be faced sooner or later in Vietnam. There are lessons to be learned from such cases as Greece, Algeria, Malaya, and the Philippines.

3. Relationship among various demographic and attitudinal indicators

    Not enough is known about the extent to which economic and other demographic data are related to attitudes significant to civil unrest, violence, and internal war. The data required for an examination of such interrelations are only now coming into existence. If some statistical, as well as causal, relationships could be established, a significant tool would become available for predicting the potential for internal war. This is, of course, the "indicator" problem.

4. Relationship between violence and internal war

    Which types of violence tend to escalate to internal war, which do not, and which, if any, are parts of societal safety mechanisms that tend to reduce the likelihood of internal war by "letting off steam?" This type of study would also be useful for examining effective and ineffective action by elites in responding to the potential development of internal war.

5. Quick reaction capability for understanding particular internal wars

    Since our ability to understand and thus to predict internal war is still poor, it is not surprising that we have been confronted in some instances (the Dominican Republic and Lebanon) with little warning. In such cases, there is an urgent need to collect reliable data about the insurgents and the incumbents on very short notice and in troubled circumstances. Content analyses and opinion survey techniques offer some potential in this respect; this possibility should be explored.

6. Relationship among policy, theory, and research

    It may be said that two worlds exist: that of the responsible government officials who cope with internal war and that of the scientists who try to understand what is going on. Each has something to contribute to our understanding

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of internal war. There is room, we believe, for studies of the decision problems faced by policymakers and of the information that they believe would provide helpful guidance. The purpose of such studies would be to identify useful background data that may already exist as well as to orient the scientists toward problems worthy of study.

Since this list could readily be made longer, it may be fitting to note that certain types of important studies have not been included. These would include a range of more or less well-recognized problems related to village society, refugees or displaced persons in countries undergoing internal war, insurgent organizations and procedures, intelligence systems, and indicators (how-goes-it data) on the progress of internal war. Such a list is virtually endless.

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APPENDIX A

A NOTE ON THE STATISTICS OF WARS

Several notable attempts have been made to search for patterns among recorded wars. Sorokin[1] considered internal disturbances starting with ancient Greece in 600 B.C. and ending with the close of World War I. He found 1629 "important social disturbances" in 11 European countries during this period. "All nations are orderly and disorderly according to the time." (Vol. III, p. 475.) "There is hardly any definite periodicity in the ups and downs of internal disturbances." (Vol. III, p. 482.) Although major sweeps--rises and falls--may be observed in the frequency and severity of disturbances, he found that "most of the fashionable theories of foreseeing, forecasting, and of later 'engineering,' planning, and controlling the course of sociocultural processes can hardly be taken seriously. They are mainly a manisfestation of the wishes of persons who mistake their own wishes for accomplished facts." (Vol. III, p. 485.)

Quincy Wright[2] found 278 wars from 1482 to 1939, including recognized states of war and undeclared wars involving more than 50,000 troops. The number of wars would be at least ten times larger if revolutions, insurrections, interventions, and pacifications were also included. (App. XX.) Using Richardson's criterion of magnitude 3 war (source given in next paragraph), he found 30 more conflicts between 1945 and 1964. (Appendix C, pp. 1544-1547.)

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[1] Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, 4 vols., The Bedminster Press, New York, 1962.

[2] Quincy Wright, A Study of War, 2d. ed., The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1965.

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In his famous Statistics of Deadly Quarrels, Richardson[1] lists over 300 wars from 1820 to 1949 in which 317 or more people were killed. (The unusual criterion level of 317 arises because Richardson used an exponential scale for the magnitude of a war, given as the logarithm to the base 10 of the number of people who died because of that quarrel. He started with $10^{3 \pm 0.5}$ because the data for smaller magnitudes are scrappy and unorganized; $10^{2.5} = 316$.) Richardson concluded that "wars seem to have been distributed in time by chance in respect to both beginning and end. There is no evidence that they have been becoming more or less frequent although there seems to have been a tendency, at least since 1820, for large wars to become more and small wars less frequent; and there is evidence of oscillations in the frequency of wars in periods of 9 to 144 years." (p. ix.)

Recently, Beaumont[2] studied the geographical location of 271 wars from 1839 to 1949 included in Richardson's book. He found that more small wars occur in the tropics than occur in the temperate zones (150 vs 94 small wars); and there are fewer wars north of the equator, but they also happen to be the larger ones. Based on geography alone, one might conclude that the quality and size of these wars correlate with the quality and size of the warring nations (although Beaumont does not make this point).

According to McClintock[3], "In 1960 a Norwegian statistician asked a computer how many wars there had been in 5560 years of recorded human history. The machine produced the statistic that there had been 14,531 wars in that space of time or 2.6135 a year." McClintock gives no references for this interesting statement.

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[1] Lewis F. Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels, The Boxwood Press, Pittsburgh, 1960.

[2] Roger A. Beaumont, "Geographical Patterns of Conflict," Military Review, 49(2), pp. 73-76, February 1967.

[3] Robert McClintock, The Meaning of Limited War, Houghton-Mifflin Co., Boston, p. 197, 1967.

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The following article appeared in _Time_ in 1965:

> Five years ago a Norwegian statistician set a
> comput.r to work counting history's wars. The ma-
> chine quickly, competently and a bit contemptuously
> announced that in 5,560 years of recorded human
> history, there have been 14,531 wars, or, as the
> computer pointed out, 2.6135 a year. Of 185 gen-
> erations of man's recorded experience, the machine
> noted with a touch of sarcasm, only ten have known
> unsullied peace. And even as he always has, man
> these days is fighting man.[1]

Time does not identify the Norwegian statistician, nor the clever
computer, and I am sorry to say, neither can I. But I can see a re-
semblance between the two quotations.

Tackaberry[2] says that "In the last 5,500 years there have been
14,531 wars, for an average of 3.18 per year; and in the last twenty
years the frequency has increased to 5.2 wars per year." No reference
is given for these data, either, although the average number of wars
appears to have changed from 2.6 to 3.18 per year for the 5,500 years
of recorded known history.

Finally, Quincy Wright reminds us that the use of historic data
is not rewarding because the records are fragmentary, that no class
of military incidents has the same significance in all periods of
history, and that data are far from uniform for various civiliza-
tions.[3]

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[1] "On War as a Permanent Condition," _Time_, p. 30, September 24, 1965.

[2] Thomas H. Tackaberry, "Social Science Research, Aid to Counterin-
surgency," _The American Journal of Economics and Sociology_, 27(4),
pp. 1-8, 1968.

[3] Quincy Wright, _op. cit._, "Historic Warfare."

APPENDIX B

CHARACTERISTICS OF CONFLICT DATA USED BY RICHARDSON AND WALDRON[1]

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[1]R.P. Richardson, Jr., and S. Waldron, "An Analysis of Recent Conflicts", Annex B to Navy Contributions to Deterrence at Conflict Levels Less Than General War 1975-1980, Center for Naval Studies, Study 14, January 1966.

I. Conflict characteristics

    a. Conflict I.D. number
    b. Date conflict began
    c. Duration
    d. Magnitude (total fatalities)
    e. Disruptive effects
    f. World location
    g. Sea access
    h. Type of conflict
    i. Warning
    j. Tempo of operations
    k. U.S. interest
    l. Outcome
    m. Motivation

II. Characteristics of party attempting to alter the status quo

    a. Party I.D. number
    b. Ultimate objective
    c. Size of force
    d. Degree of control
    e. Employment of forces
    f. Level of weapons
    g. Movement of troops and supplies
    h. Third party support

III. Characteristics of party attempting to preserve the status quo

    a. Party I.D. number
    b. Ultimate objective
    c. Size of force
    d. Degree of control
    e. Employment of forces
    f. Level of weapons
    g. Movement of troops and supplies
    h. Third party support

APPENDIX C

INTERNAL WARS STUDIED BY CONDIT AND COOPER[1]

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[1]D.M. Condit, Bert H. Cooper, Jr., and Others, "Strategy and Success in Internal Conflict," Center for Research in Social Systems, Kensington, Md.

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Non-General War Cases

Country	Years	Incumbents	Insurgents
Government Military Wins			
China-I	1898-1901	Anti-Boxer Chinese and foreign powers in North China	Boxers and antiforeign elements
Dominican Republic	1916-1924	U.S. authorities	Bandits and anti-American elements
East Germany	June 1953	Soviet and East German authorities	East German workers and demonstrators
Greece-II	1946-1949	Greek government	Greek Communists
Haiti-I	1918-1920	U.S. authorities and Haitian provisional government	"Cacos" (bandits) and anti-American elements
Haiti-II	1958-1964	Duvalier government	Anti-Duvalier elements
Hungary	October-November, 1956	Soviets and Kadar government	Hungarian workers and supporters of Nagy government
Indonesia-II	1958-1961	Sukarno government	PRRI rebels in Sumatra and Sulawesi
Kenya	1952-1960	British authorities	"Mau Mau" elements from Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu tribes
Madagascar	1947-1948	French authorities	Malagasy nationalists
Malaya-II	1948-1960	British and Malayan authorities	Malayan Communists
Morocco	1921-1926	French and Spanish authorities	Berber tribes and "Rif Republic" of Abdel Krim
Nicaragua	1927-1933	U.S. and Nicaraguan authorities	"Sandinistas" and bandits
Philippines-I	1899-1902	U.S. authorities	Filipino nationalists and Aguinaldo government

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Non-General War Cases (Continued)

Country	Years	Incumbents	Insurgents
Government Military Wins (continued)			
Philippines-III	1946-1954	Philippine government	Huks (Communists)
South Africa-I	1899-1902	British authorities	Boer Republic forces
South Africa-II	1961-1964	South African government	Black African nationalists
South Korea	1948-1954	Republic of Korea	Korean Communists
South-West Africa	1904-1907	German authorities	Herero and Hottentot tribes
Tibet	1951-1960	Chinese Communist authorities	Tibetan nationalists and supporters of Dalai Lama
U.S.S.R.-I	1917-1921	Soviet government (Bolsheviks)	Ukrainian separatists, anarchists, and supporters of Makhno
Venezuela	1958-1963	Venezuelan government	Venezuelan Communists and Revolutionary Leftists
Government Military Nonwins			
Algeria	1954-1962	French authorities	F. L. N. nationalists
Angola	1961-1965	Portuguese authorities	U. P. A. and NPLA nationalists
Burma-II	1948-1960	Burma government	Burmese Communists and Karen separatists
Cameroon	1955-1962	French and Cameroonian authorities	U. P. C. nationalists
China-II	1927-1937	Nationalist (Kuomintang) government	Chinese Communists
Colombia	1948-1958	Colombian government	Bandits, dissident elements, Communists
Cuba-I	1906-1909	Palma government (Moderate Party)	Anti-Palma elements (Liberal Party)
Cuba-II	1953-1959	Batista government	Anti-Batista elements and supporters of Castro
Cyprus	1954-1958	British authorities	Greek Cypriots (EOKA)

Non-General War Cases (Continued)

Country	Years	Incumbents	Insurgents
Government Military Nonwins (continued)			
Indochina	1946-1954	French and Vietnamese authorities	Vietnamese Communists (Viet Minh) and nationalists
Indonesia-I	1946-1949	Dutch authorities	Indonesian nationalists
Iraq	1961-1964	Iraqi government	Kurdish nationalists (KDP)
Ireland	1916-1921	British authorities	Irish nationalists (Sinn Fein)
Israel	1945-1948	British authorities	Jewish nationalists
Jammu-Kashmir	1947-1949	Indian and Jammu-Kashmir state authorities	Kashmiri Muslims (Azad Kashmir "government")
Laos	1959-1962	Royal Laotian government	Laotian Communists (Pathet Lao)
Lebanon	1958	Chamoun government	Anti-Chamoun elements
Mexico	1916-1917	U.S. (Pershing Expedition) and Mexican (Carranza) government	Pancho Villa supporters and bandits
Outer Mongolia	1919-1921	Mongolian and Chinese authorities and anti-Bolshevik Russian elements	Mongolian Revolutionary Party (Communist) and Soviet elements
Palestine	1933-1939	British authorities	Arab nationalists
Portuguese Guinea	1959-1965	Portuguese authorities	African nationalists
South Viet-Nam	1956 November 1963	Diem government	Viet Cong forces (NLF)
Arabia	1916-1918	Turkish colonial authorities	Arab nationalists
Burma-I	1942-1945	Japanese occupation authorities	Kachins, Karens, and Burmese elements
China-III	1937-1945	Japanese occupation authorities	Chinese Communists and nationalists (Kuomintang)

Non-General War Cases (Continued)

Country	Years	Incumbents	Insurgents
Government Military Nonwins (continued)			
Ethiopia	1937-1941	Italian authorities	Supporters of Haile Selassie
France	1940-1944	German occupation and Vichy French authorities	French resistance
Greece-I	1942-1944	German, Italian, and Bulgarian occupation authorities	Greek resistance
Italy	1943-1945	German occupation and Italian Fascist authorities	Italian resistance and anti-Fascist elements
Malaya-I	1942-1945	Japanese occupation authorities	Malayan Communists and anti-Japanese elements
Norway	1940-1945	German occupation and "Quisling" authorities	Norwegian resistance
Philippines-II	1942-1945	Japanese occupation authorities	U.S.-Filipino resistance, Huks, anti-Japanese elements
Poland	1939-1944	German occupation authorities	Polish resistance and Warsaw Jews
U.S.S.R.-I	1941-1944	German occupation authorities	Soviet partisans and anti-German elements
Yugoslavia	1941-1944	German and Italian occupation authorities and pro-Axis Yugoslavs	Communist forces of Tito and non-Communist and royalist forces of Mihailovich

APPENDIX D

INFORMATION CATEGORIES USED BY CONDIT AND COOPER[1]

[1] D.M. Condit, Bert H. Cooper, Jr., and Others, Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, Washington, D.C.
The Experience in Asia, Vol. I, February 1968.
The Experience in Europe and the Middle East, Vol. II, March 1967.
The Experience in Africa and Latin America, Vol. III, April 1968.
Supplement, September 1968, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

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Table 1: THE INFORMATION CATEGORIES

Section I: Background Facts

The Country

    1. Size of country (compare to a state)
    2. Terrain
    3. Climate

Ethnic and Social Background Factors

    4. Size of population and geographical distribution
    5. Ethnic groups (numbers and/or percentages)
    6. Religions (numbers and/or percentages)
    7. Briefly characterize the familial, ethnic, and social patterns that had a significant bearing on the insurgency (e.g., urban, rural, and regional differences, traditional view towards violence).
    8. Rank (1-2-3) in order of importance those factors noted in category 7.

Economic Factors

    9. Characterize the general economic situation of the country (e.g., agricultural-industrial-commercial ratio, GNP) and its standard of living (e.g., unemployment, farming conditions, distribution of wealth within state, wealth of people in relation to their neighbors, etc.) at the time insurgency began.
    10. Rank those economic conditions that affected the outbreak or growth of the insurgency.

Political Factors

    11. Form of government (at the outbreak of insurgency)
    12. Major political parties
    13. Major political figures
    14. Popularity of government (e.g., bases of support, antigovernment sentiment)
    15. Antigovernment political groups (e.g., number, aims, relative importance)
    16. Role of communism (may be same as #15)
    17. Rank the political conditions which especially affected the outbreak or growth of the insurgency.

Military Factors

    18. Briefly describe and rank according to importance any military conditions that affected the outbreak or growth of the insurgency.

Other Factors

    19. List and rank any conditions not noted above that affected the outbreak or growth of the insurgency (e.g., foreign occupation).

Ranking Between Factors

    20. List in descending order of importance the conditions or factors noted in 1-19 above that you feel were mainly responsible for the insurgency.

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Table 1 (continued)

Section II: The Insurgency

Form of Insurgency

21. For each of the following forms which are applicable, give, if possible, the approximate dates for such activity, the area(s) affected, and any special features of such activity:

    a. Underground resistance
    b. Overt guerrilla warfare
    c. Insurgent area control
    d. Use of conventional tactics (i.e., positional or large-scale warfare)

Political Phase of Insurgency. Answer 22-28 for each major resistance group.

22. Political organization(s)
23. Major political leaders
24. Political aims
25. Communist involvement (e.g., kind and degree, leaders, organization)
26. Popular support (at varying dates and places)
27. Underground strength and organization
28. Underground operations (propaganda, terrorism, etc.)
29. Relationships and interaction among political resistance groups

Military Phase of Insurgency. Answer 30-38 for each major resistance group.

30. Military organization of fighting units
31. Major military figures
32. Recruitment, training, and indoctrination of troops
33. Local logistic support:

    a. Mobile
    b. Fixed bases
    c. Equipment and supplies

34. Strengths (at varying dates, particularly at start and finish, and high and low points)
35. Insurgent casualties (if possible, distinguish as to dead, wounded, and missing)
36. Strategy and tactics (describe briefly)
37. Intelligence and counterintelligence
38. Special features (e.g., tribalism, special ceremonies)
39. Interrelationships and interaction of guerrilla groups

External Aid for Insurgents. Answer 40-44 for each major resistance group.

40. Countries involved
41. Date(s) aid began and ended
42. Form and degree of aid:

    a. Personnel (type of work, relation with insurgents, numbers, etc.)
    b. Supplies (type, amount, how delivered)
    c. Sanctuary (where, use, etc.)
    d. Cost of aid (give basis for estimate, personnel casualties, supply tons, aircraft losses)
    e. Other

Table 1 (continued)

43. Effect of outside aid on insurgency situation, both military and political
44. International reactions to external aid for insurgents

Ranking Between Factors

45. List and rank those features of the insurgency situation discussed in categories 21-44 above that should be emphasized in any discussion of the subject.

Section III: Counterinsurgency

Recognition of the Problem and Initial Response

46. Describe briefly (a) the first recognition of and (b) the first concerted response to the insurgency problem by the counterinsurgents.

Indigenous Counterinsurgency Forces

47. General organization of forces (including tactical troops; police at national, local, and municipal levels; paramilitary units; pro-government political and social organizations)
48. Major military figures
49. Strengths (at varying times and places)
50. Recruitment and training of special counterinsurgency troops
51. Casualties (distinguish as to dead, wounded, and missing):

    a. Military
    b. Civil administration
    c. Civilians

External Aid for Counterinsurgent Forces

52. Identify the most applicable role of non-indigenous counterinsurgent forces in one (or more) of the following terms:

    a. Colonial power
    b. Friendly power
    c. Occupier
    d. Dominant area power (e.g., Russia in Eastern Europe, the United States in Latin America)
    e. Regional organization (NATO, OAS)
    f. World organization (United Nations)

53. Describe their relationship to indigenous forces (e.g., as advisers, leaders, tactical forces, etc.).
54. Organization of such forces at varying times and places
55. Major foreign figures involved in counterinsurgency
56. Strengths (at varying times and places)
57. Recruitment and training of troops
58. Casualties (distinguish as to dead, wounded, and missing):

    a. Military
    b. Civil administration
    c. Civilians

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Table 1 (continued)

59. Eccnomic aid, including technical personnel, equipment, and funds
60. Home country reaction to involvement of non-indigenous forces in counter-insurgency
61. International reaction to involvement of non-indigenous forces in counterin-surgency:

    a. Free world
    b. Communist
    c. Uncommitted

Military Measures

62. Strategy
63. Tactics:

    a. Field operations
    b. Airpower
    c. Amphibious and naval power
    d. Psywar field operations (distinguish three targets: enemy personnel, POW's, local population in operational areas)
    e. Other special features (e.g., pseudo-gangs)

64. Intelligence and counterintelligence
65. Logistics
66. Special military problems
67. Rank measures according to effectiveness.

Nonmilitary Measures

68. Economic and social reforms (note timing)
69. Political, administrative, and legal reforms (note timing)
70. Offers of armistice and parole; settlement and rehabilitation of active in-surgents
71. Population management and control:

    a. Civic action programs
    b Resettlement programs
    c. Control of sabotage and subversion
    d. Riot and strike control, curfews
    e. Intimidation, repression, coercion (e.g., collective punishments, re-prisals, hostages)
    f. Other measures

72. Political ideology and indoctrination—psyops, slogans, etc.; information media (radio, press, etc.)

Other External Influences on Counterinsurgency

73. Describe briefly any critical external influence by powers other than the dominant external counterinsurgent force (e.g., British aid in South Vietnam where U.S. is dominant external counterinsurgency force).

Ranking

74. List, in order of importance, the military and nonmilitary measures that were of greatest effectiveness in counterinsurgent operations.

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Table 1 (continued)

75. Briefly discuss the reasons for the failure of the counterinsurgent campaign, ranking the reasons according to their importance. Distinguish among military, political, economic, and other external factors.

Section IV: Outcome and Conclusions

End of Hostilities

76. When ended; how
77. Military situation at end of hostilities
78. Political situation at end of hostilities
79. Economic and social situation

Political Settlement

80. What it was
81. How arrived at
82. International influences on
83. Ramifications of political settlement

Economic Consequences of Conflict and Settlement

84. Negative: loss of agricultural and industrial products, unemployment, homelessness, devastation of villages and economic resources, civilian casualties, famine, inflation, breakdown of trade patterns, etc.
85. Positive: resettlement, buildup of roads, introduction of outside aid, absorption of minority groups, better division of land, etc.

Other Results

86. Describe briefly.

Future Prognosis

87. Describe briefly:

    a. Viability of settlement
    b. Short-range (5 years) vulnerabilities
    c. Long-range vulnerabilities (e.g., irredentism, hostile neighbors)

Section V: Working Aids

Chronology

88. Give a brief chronology of the most important and decisive events of the insurgency and counterinsurgency situation (e.g., dates of beginning and end of colonial and/or occupation period, outbreak and cessation of hostilities, etc.

Maps and Illustrations

89. List any maps and/or illustrations that would be helpful in presenting this short study. Of particular importance for this study are maps showing

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Table 1 (continued)

topographic features and lines of communication <u>at the time of the insurgency</u> and any available military situation maps.

<u>Reading</u>

90. Cite and briefly annotate the books and/or articles that you believe would best help in giving the reader a clear and more ample view of this particular counterinsurgency situation.

<u>Other Materials</u>

91. Are there any other persons to be consulted or materials that might be used to clarify or amplify this study?

APPENDIX E

QUESTIONS USED BY BLOOMFIELD AND LEISS IN COMPARATIVE
CASE STUDIES OF LOCAL CONFLICT[1]

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[1] Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss with Others, The Control
of Local Conflict, Study ACDA/WEC-98, Center for International
Studies, Vol. II, pp. 82-86, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge, Mass., June 30, 1967.

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1. Identify the adversaries. In some cases each "side" may in fact be a coalition of several groups; if so, identify the major elements and the relationships among them.

2. Describe briefly the past relationships among the adversaries. Are they long-time enemies? Have they engaged in wars with each other in the past?

3. Has the subject of the particular conflict been a matter of dispute or conflict in the past?

4. What features of geography, climate, terrain, etc., affect the nature and conduct of the conflict—e.g., long, mountainous borders, inaccessible jungles and swamps, monsoons, etc.?

5. In addition to the subject of the present conflict, along what other dimensions do the adversaries differ: ethnic, racial, linguistic, religious, ideological, etc.?

6. What formal external security ties do the adversaries maintain? U.N. membership? Regional organization (OAS, OAU, Arab League)? Bilateral or multilateral security alliance (NATO, SEATO, CENTO, ANZUS Treaty, Warsaw Pact, special relationships with the United States, Soviet Union, France, Britain, etc.)?

7. Has either of the adversaries had previous recourse to the United Nations or a regional security arrangement in connection with this or another conflict? If so, describe briefly and indicate whether it led to the achievement of the adversary's claim, the loss of his claim or of opportunity to press it, or had no effect. In other words, would past experience suggest that the adversary has been frustrated or gratified in seeking to use available machinery for peaceful settlement?

8. The same questions apply to previous attempts to invoke bilateral or multilateral security arrangements.

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9. How far is the locus of the conflict from the United States? The Soviet Union? Communist China? A Soviet or Chinese satellite or a U.S. ally? An area generally regarded as of strategic importance by one of the above: e.g., the Suez or Panama Canals, important oil fields or other economic resources, major military bases? If there are third-power military bases in the area, describe them briefly (i.e., are they missile bases constituting part of Western defenses against the Soviet Union, airfields, naval bases, home ports of major fleets, etc.?). In addition to fixed bases, are the waters of the area regularly patrolled by a major fleet?

10. What are the relative sizes of the opposing military forces of the adversaries? How do they compare qualitatively—in terms of training, morale, organization, mobilization procedures? How do they compare in terms of equipment, both qualitatively and quantitatively? How would you estimate the over-all military "balance" between the forces? Define the character of the "deterrent situation" between the adversaries.

11. What is the political role of the military forces in the adversary state or states? Are they or have they recently engaged in political activities? Alone or in alliance with other interest groups? In coups or attempted coups? Do they at present control the government? If so, how did they come to power? By election or other constitutional process? By a coup led by the military leadership? By a coup by younger officers against both the military commanders and the political leadership?

12. Where does the military materiel come from? Is there local production of arms and ammunition? How much and of what? Is local arms production dependent on external suppliers of raw materials, machinery, or technicians? Whose? Are local factories locally owned or are they subsidiaries of foreign firms? Whose? Whether weapons are produced locally or imported, are there local facilities for their repair and maintenance? What portion and what types of weapons are imported? Openly or clandestinely? By purchase, long-term assistance, gift? From whom? How long ago? As part of a long-term modernization of the armed forces? Are the forces trained in their use and the commanders in appropriate strategies and tactics to employ them? Are spare parts, replacements,

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and ammunition available in large quantities or does the supplier keep control of these?

13. Does either of the adversaries have a nuclear capability? Is it thought to be seeking to develop one? Is there evidence or speculation that it may have received or be about to receive nuclear weapons from an ally? For use at its discretion or controlled by the ally?

14. The same questions apply to chemical and bacteriological weapons and to delivery systems for CBR weapons.

15. If hostilities broke out in the conflict, in what way? Large-scale surprise attack? A gradually intensifying series of small skirmishes? An attempted surprise that was anticipated and met with adequate counterforce?

16. What are the relationships between the adversaries and the United States, Soviet Union, Communist China, or a major ally of one of the above? Do they maintain diplomatic relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, and/or Communist China? Are they receiving economic development assistance from one or more of these or from major allies of one or more of them? At what general level of magnitude?

17. In cases of interstate conflicts, are the adversary countries united behind their government's pursuit of the conflict? Or is the conflict a matter of domestic political difference? Does either adversary have a potential ally within the territory of the other--e.g., a local Communist party? Racial, linguistic, religious, ethnic, or other minority? Are there significant émigré groups that are important factors in the conflict?

18. How do the adversaries describe their aims and objectives? Independence (including secession)? Control of the government? Autonomy? Redress of special grievances? Territory? Procedural concessions opening the door to future gains (e.g., free elections, representation in government, etc.)? Do these stated aims change in the course of the conflict (e.g., does a stated goal of independence become a stated goal of local autonomy, or does a stated claim to territory become a stated goal of plebiscite)? In terms of conflicts that have been

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ended and disputes that have been settled, how do the terms of settlement compare with the initially stated goals? In your judgment, how deeply committed are the adversaries to the achievement of their goals? Are the governments (or insurgent leaders) in a position vis-à-vis their own constituents to accept a lesser solution?

19. In terms of the territory or territories of the adversaries, how widespread or restricted is the conflict? For example, does it involve only points on the border or the entire border? Only certain provinces or the entire country? Only urban or only rural areas?

20. What proportion of available military force is committed in the conflict? Does either adversary feel it necessary to station part of its forces elsewhere--e.g., to maintain internal order or protect against encroachments by another neighbor?

21. What size and calibre police force exists? Are the armed forces being used for police-type functions? Why? Because they are regarded as politically more reliable?

22. In terms of the numbers and equipment of the armed forces available, is the adversary's conduct of the conflict "limited"--e.g., is it pursuing a more modest strategy than it is capable of pursuing? Are there classes of targets one or both could have hit but that are not attacked? Destructive weapons available that are not used? Vulnerable borders that are not crossed? Supply ports or routes that are not hit, etc.?

23. Does either adversary enjoy on its own or another's territory a sanctuary in which its forces can rest, regroup, train, amass supplies, add recruits, etc.?

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APPENDIX F

SIX TYPOLOGIES ON THE CONTROL OF LOCAL CONFLICT
PROPOSED BY BLOOMFIELD AND LEISS[1]

_____.

[1]Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss with Others, The Control
of Local Conflict, Study ACDA/WEC-98, Center for International
Studies, Vol. II, Appendix A, pp. 169-200, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., June 30, 1967.

TYPOLOGY A
GROSS NATURE OF CONFLICT

HOSTILITIES INDEX	CONVENTIONAL INTERSTATE	UNCONVENTIONAL INTERSTATE	INTERNAL WITH SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT	PRIMARILY INTERNAL	COLONIAL
HOSTILITIES CONTINUED WITH INTENSIFICATION	◇ Kashmir 1947-49 ◇ Korea 1950-53 US-Ch-SU₂	◇ Indonesia-Malaysia 1963-65 ◇ Vietnam 1959 - US-SU₂-Ch₂	△ Congo (Katanga) 1961-64 Greece 1944-49 US₂ US-SU₂-Ch₂	△ Congo 1960-64 US₂ ◇ Chinese Civil War 1945-49 Ch-US₂ ◇ India 1945-48	◇ Indochina 1945-54 △ Algeria 1954-62 ○ Cyprus 1952-59
HOSTILITIES CONTINUED WITHOUT INTENSIFICATION	◇ Quemoy-Matsu 1954-58 US₂ ○ Palestine 1945-48 ○ Aden-Yemen 1954-59 ◇ India-China 1954-62 Ch₂		○ Yemen 1962- ◇ Laos 1959- US₂-SU₂-Ch₂ △ Tibet 1955-59 Ch₂ △ Burma-Nationalist China 1950-54 ◇ Malaya 1950-60 ◇ Borneo Civil War 1962-54 □ Venezuela 1960-64	○ Iraq (Kurds) 1959-63 □ Dominican Republic 1961-62 US₂ □ Cuba 1956-59 ◇ Philippines 1948-54 □ Colombia 1960-	△ Angola 1961- ◇ Indonesia 1945-49 △ French Morocco 1952-56 △ Kenya 1952-58
HOSTILITIES TERMINATED QUICKLY AFTER INTENSIFICATION	◇ Kashmir 1965 - Ch₂ ○ Suez 1956		□ Dominican Republic 1965 US		
HOSTILITIES TERMINATED QUICKLY WITHOUT INTENSIFICATION	○ Soviet-Iran 1941-47 SU △ Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya 1963-64 △ Algeria-Morocco 1962-63		◇ Bay of Pigs 1960-61 US₂ □ Guatemala 1954 US₂ ○ Cyprus 1963-		◇ Goa 1961-62
NO OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES	△ Morocco - Spanish Morocco 1957-58 □ Honduras-Nicaragua 1957 ○ Kuwait-Iraq 1961		□ Costa Rica 1955	□ Costa Rica 1947 ○ Lebanon 1958 US	△ French Cameroon 1955-60 △ Madagascar 1947 ○ Muscat-Oman 1954-59 △ West Irian 1962-63

Legend: ○ Middle East   US: Direct   US₂: Indirect
△ Africa   SU: Direct   SU₂: Indirect
□ Latin America   Ch: Direct   Ch₂: Indirect
◇ Asia

Note: Conflicts underlined have been arbitrary of some ranking. In the hostilities index, the order of the vertical objection of termination and escalation does not imply a judgment as to their respective value.

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TYPOLOGY B

HOSTILITIES INDEX	BOTH LOW (A)	ONE MODERATE, ONE LOW (B)	BOTH MODERATE OR AT LEAST ONE HIGH (C)
HOSTILITIES CONTINUED WITH INTENSIFICATION	**A-1**	Kashmir 1947-49 India 1945-48 UK Cyprus 1952-59 UK Indonesia-Malaysia 1963-65 **B-1**	Korea 1950-53 Greece 1944-49 Vietnam 195- Congo 1960-64 Congo (Katanga) 1961-64 Chinese Civil War 1945-49 Indochina 1945-54 Fr. Algeria 1954-62 Fr. **C-1**
HOSTILITIES CONTINUED WITHOUT INTENSIFICATION	Palestine 1945-48 Burma-Nationalist China 1950-54 Burmese Civil War 1948-54 **A-2**	Yemen 1962- Tibet 1955-59 Iraq (Kurds) 1959-63 Angola 1961- Indonesia 1945-59 Aden-Yemen 1954-59 UK Colombia 1960- Venezuela 1960-63 **B-2**	Quemoy-Matsu 1954-58 Laos 195- Malaya 1948-60 UK Dominican Republic 1961-62 Cuba 1958-59 Philippines 1948-54 French Morocco 1952-54 Fr. Kenya 1952-58 UK Indo-China 1956-62 **C-2**
HOSTILITIES TERMINATED QUICKLY AFTER INTENSIFICATION	**A-3**	Kashmir 1965- **B-3**	Suez 1956 Dominican Republic 1965 **C-3**
HOSTILITIES TERMINATED QUICKLY WITHOUT INTENSIFICATION	Algeria-Morocco 1962-63 Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya 1960-64 Goa 1961-62 **A-4**	Cyprus 1963- **B-4**	Soviet-Iran 1941-47 Bay of Pigs 1960-61 Guatemala 1954 **C-4**
NO OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES	Morocco-Spanish Morocco 1957-58 Honduras-Nicaragua 1957 Costa Rica 1955 Costa Rica 1947 French Cameroun 1955-60 Madagascar 1947 Muscat-Oman 1956-59 **A-5**	Kuwait-Iraq 1961 West Irian 1962-63 **B-5**	Lebanon 1958 **C-5**

GREAT-POWER PARTIALITY

Note: In the hostilities index, the order of the control objectives of termination and moderation does not imply a judgment as to their respective value.

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TYPOLOGY C

HOSTILITIES INDEX / **GEOPOLITICAL SETTING**

HOSTILITIES INDEX	LOW IMPEDIMENT TO CONTROLLABILITY	MODERATE IMPEDIMENT TO CONTROLLABILITY	HIGH IMPEDIMENT TO CONTROLLABILITY
HOSTILITIES CONTINUED WITH INTENSIFICATION	India 1945-48 Kashmir 1947-49 **A-1**	Cyprus 1952-59 Algeria 1954-62 Chinese Civil War 1945-49 Indonesia-Malaysia 1963-65 **B-1**	Vietnam 1959- Indochina 1945-54 Korea 1950-53 Congo 1960-64 Congo (Katanga) 1961-64 Greece 1944-49 **C-1**
HOSTILITIES CONTINUED WITHOUT INTENSIFICATION	 **A-2**	Cuba 1956-59 Quemoy-Matsu 1954-58 Colombia 1960- Venezuela 1960-63 Kenya 1952-56 India-China 1954-62 Indonesia 1945-49 Philippines 1948-54 French Morocco 1952-56 Dominican Republic 1961-62 Tibet 1955-59 Aden-Yemen 1954-59 **B-2**	Malaya 1948-60 Burmese Civil War 1948-54 Palestine 1945-48 Yemen 1962- Iraq (Kurd) 1959-63 Laos 1959- Burma-Nationalist China 1950-54 Angola 1961- **C-2**
HOSTILITIES TERMINATED QUICKLY AFTER INTENSIFICATION	Kashmir 1965 **A-3**	Dominican Republic 1965 **B-3**	Suez 1956 **C-3**
HOSTILITIES TERMINATED QUICKLY WITHOUT INTENSIFICATION	Algeria-Morocco 1962-63 Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya 1960-64 Ceylon-Iran 1961-47 Goa 1961-62 **A-4**	Bay of Pigs 1960-61 Guatemala 1954 Cyprus 1963- **B-4**	 **C-4**
NO OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES	French Cameroon 1955-60 Kuwait-Iraq 1961 Madagascar 1947 West Irian 1962-63 **A-5**	Lebanon 1958 Morocco-Spanish Morocco 1957-58 Muscat-Oman 1956-58 Honduras-Nicaragua 1957 Costa Rica 1955 Costa Rica 1947 **B-5**	 **C-5**

Note: In the hostilities index, the order of the central objectives of termination and moderation does not imply a judgment as to their respective value.

TYPOLOGY D

GROSS NATURE OF CONFLICT (columns) × **GREAT-POWER PARTIALITY** (rows) × **COMMITMENT OF ADVERSARIES TO OUTCOME**

GREAT-POWER PARTIALITY	GROSS NATURE OF CONFLICT	ANY COMBINATION OF LOW AND MODERATE	ONE HIGH	BOTH HIGH
ONE HIGH OR BOTH AT LEAST MODERATE	INTERNAL	**A-1** ① Lebanon 1958, ④ Dominican Republic 1961-62, ⑤ Dominican Republic 1965	**B-1** ① Laos 1959-, ② Guatemala 1954, ③ Congo 1960-64, ⑥ Kenya 1952-56, ⑤ Congo (Katanga) 1961-63, ⑥ Cuba 1958-59, ⑥ Fr. Morocco 1952-56, ⑥ Philippines 1948-54	**C-1** ① Malaya 1945-60, ② Chinese Civil War 1945-49, ④ Algeria 1954-62, ⑤ Greece 1944-49, ⑥ Indochina 1945-54
	INTERSTATE UNCONVENTIONAL	**A-2**	**B-2**	**C-2** ⑤ Vietnam 1959-
	INTERSTATE CONVENTIONAL	**A-3** ② Soviet-Iran 1941-47, ④ India-China 1954-62	**B-3** ① Quemoy-Matsu 1954-58, ② Bay of Pigs 1960-61	**C-3** ⑤ Suez 1956, ⑥ Korea 1950-53
ONE MODERATE, ONE LOW	INTERNAL	**A-4**	**B-4** ① Cyprus 1952-59, ④ Colombia 1960-, ② Iraq (Kurds) 1959-63, ② Cyprus 1963-, ③ Angola 1961-, ⑤ Venezuela 1960-63, ④⑤ Indonesia 1945-49	**C-4** ⑤ India 1945-48, ④ Yemen 1962-
	INTERSTATE UNCONVENTIONAL	**A-5**	**B-5** ⑤ Indonesia-Malaysia 1963-66	**C-5**
	INTERSTATE CONVENTIONAL	**A-6** ① Kuwait-Iraq 1961, ④ Aden-Yemen 1954-59	**B-6** ① West Irian 1962-63, ⑦ Kashmir 1965	**C-6** ⑤ Kashmir 1947-49, ② Tibet 1955-59
BOTH LOW	INTERNAL	**A-7** ① Costa Rica 1955, ④ Burmese Civil War 1948-54	**B-7** ① Costa Rica 1947, ② Muscat-Oman 1956-58, ③⑥ Yemen 1947, ⑤ French Cameroun 1955-60, ⑥ Burma-Nationalist China 1950-54	**C-7**
	INTERSTATE UNCONVENTIONAL	**A-8**	**B-8**	**C-8**
	INTERSTATE CONVENTIONAL	**A-9** ② Algeria-Morocco 1962-63, ④ Honduras-Nicaragua 1957, ⑤ Morocco-Spanish Morocco 1957-58, ⑥ Somalia-Ethiopia 1960-64	**B-9** ② Goa 1961-62	**C-9** ④ Palestine 1945-48

COMMITMENT OF ADVERSARIES TO OUTCOME

TYPOLOGY E

GREAT-POWER PARTIALITY	GEOPOLITICAL SETTING		
	LOW IMPEDIMENT TO CONTROLLABILITY	**MODERATE IMPEDIMENT TO CONTROLLABILITY**	**HIGH IMPEDIMENT TO CONTROLLABILITY**
ONE HIGH OR BOTH AT LEAST MODERATE — INTERNAL	A-1	Lebanon 1958, Guatemala 1954, Algeria 1954-62, Dom. Rep. 1961-62, Kenya 1952-56, Dom. Rep. 1965, Philip. 1948-54, Cuba 1956-59, Fr. Morocco 1952-56, Chin. Civ. War 1945-49 B-1	Lebanon 1958, Indochina 1945-54, Laos 1959-, Congo 1960-64, Congo (Katanga) 1961-64, Malaya 1945-60, Greece 1944-49 C-1
INTERSTATE UNCONVENTIONAL	A-2	B-2	Vietnam 1959- C-2
INTERSTATE CONVENTIONAL	Sovienben 1941-47 A-3	India-China 1954-62, Quemoy-Matsu 1954-58, Bay of Pigs 1960-61 B-3	Suez 1956, Korea 1950-53 C-3
ONE MODERATE, ONE LOW — INTERNAL	India 1945-48 A-4	Cyprus 1952-59, Venezuela 1960-63, Indonesia 1945-49, Colombia 1960-, Cyprus 1963- B-4	Iraq (Kurds) 1959-63, Angola 1961-, Yemen 1962- C-4
INTERSTATE UNCONVENTIONAL	A-5	Indonesia-Malaysia 1963-66 B-5	C-5
INTERSTATE CONVENTIONAL	Kuwait-Iraq 1961, West Irian 1962-63, Kashmir 1947-49, Kashmir 1965 A-6	Aden-Yemen 1954-59, Tibet 1955-59 B-6	C-6
BOTH LOW — INTERNAL	Madagascar 1947, French Cameroun 1955-60 A-7	Costa Rica 1955, Costa Rica 1947, Muscat-Oman 1956-59 B-7	Borneo Civil War 1958-54, Burma-Nationalist China 1950-54 C-7
INTERSTATE UNCONVENTIONAL	A-8	B-8	C-8
INTERSTATE CONVENTIONAL	Goa 1961-62, Somali-Ethiopia-Kenya 1960-64, Algeria-Moroc 1962-63 A-9	Honduras-Nicaragua 1957, Morocco-Spanish Morocco 1957-58 B-9	Palestine 1945-48 C-9

GEOPOLITICAL SETTING

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TYPOLOGY F

	1 Geopolitical Setting	2 Gross Nature of Conflict	3 Commitment of Adversaries to Outcome	4 Ideological Motivation of Adversaries	5 Military Balance Between Adversaries	6 Governments of Adversaries	7 Economic Burden on Adversaries	8 Ethnic-Religious Minorities	9 Non-violent Means Foreclosed to Adversaries	10 Time Pressure on Adversaries	11 Great-Power Partiality	12 Third-Power Military Presence	13 Likely U.N. Involvement	14 Likely Regional Organization Involvement	15 International Agreements	16 World Opinion	TOTAL	Average X 100
Malaya 1948-60	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	3	3	2	3	3	3	–	3	3	15/41	273
Greece 1944-49	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	3	2	3	2	2	–	3	3	15/39	260
Indonesia 1945-49	2	3	2	3	2	2	3	–	2	2	2	2	2	–	3	2	14/32	229
Cyprus 1952-59	2	3	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	–	3	2	15/34	227
Angola 1961-	3	3	2	3	1	3	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	3	1	16/34	213
Suez 1956	3	1	3	2	2	2	2	1	3	2	3	3	1	–	1	1	15/30	200
Venezuela 1960-63	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	–	3	2	2	2	15/30	200
Cyprus 1963-	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	3	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	16/30	188
Kashmir 1947-49	1	3	3	3	2	2	1	3	2	2	2	1	1	–	1	2	15/28	187
Bay of Pigs 1960-61	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	3	3	3	3	–	1	–	1	1	15/28	187
Indonesia-Malaysia 1963-65	2	2	2	3	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	–	2	1	19/26	173
India-China 1954-62	2	1	1	2	2	2	1	–	1	3	3	2	3	–	2	1	14/24	171
Soviet-Iran 1941-47	1	1	1	2	3	2	2	3	2	1	3	2	1	–	1	1	15/25	167
Kashmir 1965	1	1	2	3	3	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	–	1	1	15/25	167
Algeria-Morocco 1962-63	1	1	1	1	3	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	16/25	156
Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya 1960-64	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	3	1	1	1	–	2	1	2	2	15/23	153

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APPENDIX G

NOTE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSES OF POLITICAL MOVEMENTS AND
OF POLITICAL LEADERS

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There is a large literature on psychological aspects of political movements, as well as many psychological studies of political leaders. Major contributors to this literature include Sigmund Freud, Harold D. Lasswell,[1] Erik H. Erikson,[2] Stefan T. Possony,[3] Bychowski,[4] and others.[5] An interesting recent example is Victor Wolfenstein's[6] effort to explain the careers of Lenin, Trotsky, and Gandhi in psycho-analytic terms. He tries to interpret their personal motivations as follows:

1. Why does a man become a revolutionary?
2. What personality attributes enable a man to be an effective revolutionary leader?
3. What psychological qualities help the revolutionary to effect the transition to power?

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[1] Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics, The Viking Press, New York, 1960.
Power and Personality, The Viking Press, New York, 1962.

[2] Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther, W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York, 1958.
Childhood and Society, W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York, 1963.

[3] Stefan T. Possony, Lenin: The Compulsive Revolutionary, Regnery, Chicago, 1964.

[4] Gustave Bychowski, Dictators and Disciples, International Universities Press, New York, 1948.

[5] James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox, Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., New York, 1956.
Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics, Markham, Chicago, 1969.

[6] E. Victor Wolfenstein, The Revolutionary Personality, Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, October 1966.

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Wolfenstein's primary evidence consists of the memoirs and writings of the three revolutionaries as well as of those who knew them well. Freud's point of view, it may be recalled, was clinical in nature and based on extended personal interviews with his patients. It is obvious that Wolfenstein cannot work in this way and that he encounters severe methodological problems in attempting to interpret whatever information remains in the historical record.

Another recent example is Walter H. Slote's, "Case Study of a Revolutionary."[1] The revolutionary was a 22-year-old man who belonged to the Venezuelan Communist Youth and who had recently been apprehended by the police, accused of carrying a revolver and of instigating the workers of a factory to violence. Interviews were conducted with the help of a translator. The raw material consists of 16 interviews lasting from one and one-half to four hours each, for a total of about 45 hours over a period of seven weeks. The Rorschach and Thematic Apperception Tests were also administered. In this case, the methodological problems concern the adequacy of communication between and mutual understanding of the analyst and subject when different cultures, different languages, and interviews conducted through a third person are involved. Most psychoanalysts assume that psychoanalytical concepts apply universally to the individual motivations and personality of all peoples around the world. Slote does not even bother to say that this assumption underlies his effort, although it is obvious that this would have to be the case.

Slote[2] used the same interview technique and method of interpretation with four Viet Cong captives in a detention camp in South

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[1]Chapter 10 in Frank Bonilla and José A. Silva Michelena, eds., A Strategy for Research on Social Policy, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1967.

[2]"Psychodynamic Structures in Vietnamese Personality: Implications for a Preliminary Statement of National Character," Annex 1 to Studies of Entrepreneurship and National Integration in South Vietnam, draft copy, Simulmatics Corporation, February 1968, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

Vietnam. He used this information as the basis for a general estimate
of the Vietnamese personality and national character. In addition to
the methodological problems already alluded to, we find here a mighty
small population on which to base a concept of those who reject tradi-
tional (or current) Vietnamese society and no population at all to
represent those who may uphold it.

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DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)	2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES 400 Army-Navy Drive Arlington, Virginia 22202	UNCLASSIFIED 2b. GROUP --

3. REPORT TITLE

The State of Research On Internal War

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)

Research Paper P-565, August 1970

5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)

Jesse Orlansky

6. REPORT DATE	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
August 1970	163	179

8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO. DAHC15 67 C 0011 b. PROJECT NO. ARPA Assignment 20 c. d.	9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) P-565 9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report) None

10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

This document has been approved for public release and sale; its distribution is unlimited.

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY Advanced Research Projects Agency Washington, D. C.

13. ABSTRACT

This paper evaluates our current knowledge about the nature of internal war and the types of research being undertaken to increase this knowledge. There were 380 conflicts in the world in the 19 years following World War II, involving 101 (91 percent) of the 123 independent countries in the world. During this period, there were from 13 to 30 new conflicts each year and an average of 13.6 on-going conflicts each month, but there was no formal declaration of war in any conflict.

Statistical analyses of data on conflict in many nations identify such common factors as revolution, subversion, and turmoil in internal conflict and war, diplomatic moves, and belligerency in foreign conflict, but with little replication among studies.

Typologies of internal war emphasize such characteristics as the target of revolutionary activity, identity of the revolutionaries, revolutionary goals, how the conflict started (i.e., spontaneous or calculated), whether or not the military activity was conventional in nature, and the involvement of other nations and of Communists.

The crucial conceptual issues about internal war are still in the pretheoretical stage. New research on internal war should examine the interaction of the antagonists on a time-line basis, utilize reliable attitudinal data, and examine what happens after hostilities are over, since the real impact of a revolution seems to occur after rather than during the period of active combat.