LOCAL CIVIL DEFENSE IN NATURAL DISASTER: FROM OFFICE TO ORGANIZATION

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LOCAL CIVIL DEFENSE IN NATURAL DISASTER: FROM OFFICE TO ORGANIZATION

by

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Abstract

This report considers the functioning of civil defense in natural disasters. The focus is on the actual operations of these units within the local community. In order to account for the role that civil defense offices assume following a natural disaster, the report looks at both pre- and post-disaster characteristics of these units. The report maintains that civil defense offices tend to be hampered by uncertainty with regard to many of their important organizational dimensions, such as authority relations, tasks, internal structures, and public support. These sources of uncertainty can generate operational difficulties for civil defense offices during disasters. In discussing the mobilization and expansion of civil defense, the report distinguishes between civil defense "office" and civil defense "organization," the latter referring to the expanded post-emergency structure. The expansion personnel include regular and emergency volunteers and government employees from other agencies. Disaster tasks and activities of local civil defense organizations during disasters -- both administrative-support tasks and operational tasks -- are described.

FOREWORD

This document is one of a series of publications prepared by the staff of the Disaster Research Center, The Ohio State University. This aspect of the work of the Center has been sponsored by the Office of Civil Defense under Contract OCD-PS-64-46, Work Unit 2651-A. Below is a listing of the materials which have been included in the monograph and the report series.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This report will consider the functioning of civil defense offices in natural disasters. The focus will be on the actual operations of these units within the local community rather than attempting to explicate national or even state policy concerning their operations. While these social units have been expressly created to cope with nuclear disaster, over time they have come to be expected to assume important roles during disasters caused by tornadoes, floods, earthquakes, etc., as well as other kinds of community emergencies. While at national levels of policy the primary concern is still focused on nuclear consequences, state and local units of civil defense have become involved in disaster-related emergencies. The focus of the following chapters is on these types of involvement at the local community level.

A natural disaster generates many tasks and problems for an affected community, and numerous groups and organizations become involved in solving these problems and performing emergency tasks including police and fire departments, public works departments, and Salvation Army and Red Cross units. Thus, the contribution of a civil defense office during a disaster is only one aspect of the total organized effort.

In order to account for the role that civil defense offices assume following a natural disaster, it will be necessary to look at both their pre- and post-emergency characteristics. This will enable us to identify as well as understand some of the unique problems which characterize these kinds of units during natural disaster.

Our general thesis is that civil defense offices tend to be hampered by undue uncertainty with regard to many of their important organizational dimensions such as their authority relations, task domains, internal structures, and public support. And we will suggest that these sources of uncertainty generate operational difficulties for civil defense offices during disasters.

The groups and organizations that become involved in the overall response to natural disasters can be differentiated on the basis of the kinds of emergency tasks they perform and their post-disaster structures.[1] Some groups and organizations perform regular tasks during disasters, i.e., tasks that they are normally expected to perform, while other groups and organizations carry out new tasks. Also, some groups and organizations perform disaster tasks with established social structures, e.g., their membership and authority patterns remain pretty much as they were prior to the disaster, while others develop essentially new structural patterns.

Civil defense offices perform regular tasks during disasters with new social structures. The disaster-related tasks of civil defense units are regular in the sense that there is some expectation that they will carry them

out. And their social structures are new to the extent that they expand to include new members. Civil defense offices, then, along with Red Cross and Salvation Army units, belong in that category of disaster-relevant organizations known as expanding organizations. The fact that civil defense offices adapt to disaster conditions by expanding has significant consequences for their functioning during disaster, and in subsequent pages this and other aspects of these organizations will be considered.

Field studies conducted by the Disaster Research Center are the major source of data for this report. Since its inception in 1963, the Center has conducted over seventy field studies of organizational functioning during natural disasters. Either state or local civil defense offices, or both, were involved in the majority of these disasters in which case they were among those organizations studied by Disaster Research Center field teams. In these field studies, the data secured on civil defense functioning include (1) semistructured and unstructured tape-recorded interviews with members of civil defense and other involved organizations, (2) recorded on-the-scene observations of civil defense organizations in operation, and (3) various kinds of civil defense documents such as after-action reports and critiques. Specific identification of the sources of data is not made here. Conclusions are based on many different types of observations.

The disaster literature was a secondary source of information for this report. This data, which include both published and unpublished reports available in the Disaster Research Center's disaster data repository, supplemented the information acquired directly in the field by Disaster Research Center staff members.

The Meaning of the Term Disaster: Modification of Human Behavior

The term disaster has acquired a variety of meanings and usages. However, in most cases in which the term is used it will include at least one of the following four referents: (1) it may refer to the physical agent such as a flood or hurricane; (2) it may refer to, or include, the physical consequences of an agent such as property damage and deaths; (3) it may refer to the way in which the impact of a physical agent is evaluated, e.g., one community may consider the consequences of a tornado as being more disastrous than another community; and (4) the term may be used to refer to the social disruption and social changes generated by a disaster.

We feel that some notion of the social consequences of physical events should be included in the meaning of the term disaster. Thus, a disaster includes not only changes in the physical environment, e.g., property damage, but changes in human behavior as well, both individual and group. In this report we are interested in the changes in behavior caused by disaster agents at the group and organizational level, particularly insofar as civil defense offices are concerned.

Disasters, then, are responsible for adaptive changes in organizations. As previously mentioned, civil defense units expand their structures to include new members so that they can perform disaster-relevant functions. Also during disasters some groups and organizations are modified in the sense that they assume new disaster-generated tasks and duties.

The reduction of group and organizational autonomy is another social change often generated by a natural disaster agent. For example, prior to a disaster, groups and organizations in a community may be able to function pretty much in an independent fashion and make decisions on a pluralistic basis. However, when disaster strikes, there is a need for greater coordination and control among disaster-relevant groups and organizations because the resultant problems are so great that they cannot be effectively met by the independent actions of such social units. Usually, then, some kind of disaster control center is established following the impact of an agent where an attempt is made to establish communication and coordination between the groups and organizations that are involved in emergency functions.

In one sense, the overall organized response to a disaster can be viewed as a super or "synthetic organization."[2] That is, the disaster-involved groups and organizations working in the affected community -- both local and nonlocal -- relinquish part of their autonomy and submit to having their activities coordinated with the total effort. Thus, with the emergence of the disaster-generated synthetic organization, the community is temporarily characterized by a radically different form of social organization.

Disaster stages or time periods can be roughly differentiated on the basis of changes in group and organizational functioning. For our purposes, we need to talk only in terms of two gross time periods, an emergency period and a rehabilitation period. The emergency period refers to that time segment which immediately follows the impact of a disaster agent; and in those disasters in which there is pre-impact warning, such as in many hurricane disasters, it includes this time segment as well. The emergency period of a disaster usually lasts between three and four days during which the greatest demands are imposed on the capabilities of disaster-involved groups and organizations. It is during this period that disaster-involved groups and organizations are concerned with search-and-rescue tasks, mass feeding, shelter operations, and emergency medical treatment for disaster victims. The rehabilitation phase of a disaster usually commences several days after the impact of a disaster agent and it is during this period that the sense of urgency declines and groups and organizations begin resuming normal activities. Also, long-term and permanent recovery projects are initiated during the rehabilitation period of disaster.

In this report, we will focus on the functioning of civil defense offices during the emergency period of disasters. We will concentrate on the emergency period because this is when the greatest civil defense involvement occurs and also because it is during this period that many of its operational problems are most pronounced.

The Different Meanings of Civil Defense

An explanatory note is necessary before proceeding with the analysis. Like many terms, civil defense has several different connotations and communication is often impossible when different meanings are used without some agreement on usage. In its most inclusive meaning, civil defense connotes a function. Thus, civil defense is a description of any and all activities carried out by governmental or quasi-governmental agencies in preparation for and during actual emergencies. This most inclusive meaning is often associated with wartime and potential nuclear attack situations. This would come closest to what we earlier referred to as a synthetic organization. According to this meaning, civil defense is "civil government in emergency." The analysis which follows does not use such an inclusive meaning.

The referent here is the activities and functions which are performed by the social units called civil defense within the local community. We have found that in the vocabularies of most American communities, civil defense is most commonly used not as a function, but to refer to the particular identity and activities of the "civil defense office." In American society, the local civil defense office is not exclusively concerned with problems relating to potential nuclear attack but also becomes involved in other types of community emergencies, especially disasters. To the other community organizations which become involved in these disaster operations, the civil defense office is seen as only one part of the total emergency picture.

In addition to the use of the term civil defense to refer to the activities of social units, there is a further distinction which will be made here between a civil defense office and a civil defense organization. This distinction, in large part, is related to the nature and extent of involvement of civil defense units in various kinds of emergencies. In "normal" times, such as would be characterized in pre-disaster and also in pre-nuclear attack situations, the local civil defense unit might be best characterized as an office. It is generally small, and consequently has only a rudimentary division of labor. It lacks the complex division of labor which characterizes most of the other emergency organizations, such as police, fire, and hospitals. Its size and lack of complexity are, of course, by design. There is the expectation that when the unit moves into emergency actions, it will expand from this small cadre to include other persons and functions. As a result of this expectation, the civil defense office moves to increased size and complexity. At this stage, it is more appropriate to speak in terms of a civil defense organization. In effect, then, the social unit shifts from the status of an office in its pre-emergency existence to an organization in its emergency operations. Accordingly, we will use the term office in the next three chapters in discussing the pre-emergency status. Starting with chapter five, the term organization will be used to indicate the mobilized and expanded version of civil defense. The problems of moving from office to organization constitute the major theme in subsequent chapters.

While the shift from office to organization is the more frequent response and is the topic of concern here, it is important to recognize that

this does not encompass the total range of response of civil defense on the local level. There are certain situations when civil defense remains an office. One of these situations is when civil defense does not become heavily involved in disaster activities; this generally occurs when disaster impact is somewhat narrow and focalized, such as an explosion. Such "small" community emergencies are often handled by other community emergency organizations without extensive CD involvement. In other situations, civil defense remains an office when the local director acts primarily as "chief of staff" for the mayor and other municipal authorities. In most disaster situations of wide scope and intensity, local civil defense assumes operational responsibility for certain disaster tasks. In order to cope with these increased responsibilities, it generally moves from office to organization.

Organizational Uncertainty

Another major theme throughout this analysis is the notion of organizational uncertainty. Because of the shift expected of the local civil defense office during emergencies and because of the latent role which local civil defense offices have in the emergency pattern, they are characterized by a greater degree of uncertainty than are most of the other traditional emergency organizations. This has certain consequences.

In order to remain viable, organizations must learn to cope with uncertainty.[3] That is, they must establish strategies which enable them to reduce instability and indefiniteness in their internal structures and environments. There are numerous potential sources of uncertainty for organizations; for example, in terms of their internal dimensions, members of an organization who are assigned various tasks may begin to act in an uncoordinated fashion with a subsequent impairment of organizational functioning. Also, since organizations are not closed systems, their environments offer potential sources of uncertainty. For example, environmental uncertainty may take the form of competition from other organizations for scarce resources.

Organizations may develop strategies or procedures for minimizing both internal and external uncertainty. Returning to our previous examples, an organization may reduce uncertainty with regard to internal coordination and control by developing rules and regulations which members are expected to follow and by establishing appropriate authority structures; the result may be greater predictability of individual behavior, i.e., more certainty. In terms of uncertainty brought on by competition from the environment, organizations may turn to a strategy of cooperation; for example, agreement may be reached whereby limited resources are shared by those organizations in need of them and thus making for a stable resource base for all those concerned.

Organizations faced with uncertainty do not always develop strategies designed for their reduction, however. Frequently, organizations learn to live with indefiniteness in their internal structures and social environments. Obviously, this may sometimes be due to a lack of understanding on the part of organizational members as to the sources of uncertainty and/or their

inability to conceive of appropriate programs for dealing with them. Whatever the case may be, the presence of uncertainty and instability leaves its mark on organizational functioning.

Disasters present new sources of uncertainty for groups and organizations. Yet, much of the instability in group and organizational functioning during disaster can be viewed as having pre-disaster antecedents. As stated previously, it is our thesis that pre-disaster uncertainty is the basis for many of the dilemmas which confront civil defense organizations during disaster. We suggest furthermore that the internal processes as well as the extra-organizational relations of civil defense organizations during disaster will reflect such uncertainty.

By no means, though, has all civil defense functioning during natural disaster been marked by undue uncertainty and instability. In some cases, there are circumstances which operate to reduce uncertainty for civil defense organizations. For example, as we will discuss later, this appears to be true to some degree in highly disaster-prone communities and regions.

In summary, we have indicated in this introductory chapter that our focus will be on local civil defense in natural disasters. We suggested that the notion of uncertainty may help explain many of the problems experienced by local civil defense during disaster. In the following chapter, we will consider some of the pre-disaster patterns of civil defense offices since such patterns determine to a large degree the actual response of civil defense organizations to disaster.

NOTES: CHAPTER I

1. For an extended discussion of this topic see: Russell R. Dynes, Organized Behavior in Disaster: Analysis and Conceptualization, Disaster Research Center Monograph Series (Columbus: Disaster Research Center, The Ohio State University, 1969), chap. vi.

2. James D. Thompson and Robert W. Hawkes, "Disaster, Community Organization, and Administrative Process," in Man and Society in Disaster, ed. by George W. Baker and Dwight W. Chapman (New York: Basic Books, 1962), p. 275.

3. James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), p. 10.

CHAPTER II

THE PRE-DISASTER STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT OF CIVIL DEFENSE OFFICES

Most of the field work conducted by the Disaster Research Center has been on organizational functioning in disasters which have occurred in urban, rather than rural, areas. As a result, most of our observations in this and subsequent chapters will deal with civil defense offices in urban settings. However, we will not hesitate to draw upon examples of civil defense behavior in nonurban areas when they are relevant and when there is data available.

The field studies conducted by the Center indicate quite clearly that there exists considerable variation among civil defense offices with respect to their structural arrangements and resources. Nevertheless, we can still talk about typical or general structural patterns and typical problems. In the following section of this chapter, then, we will discuss some of the more typical features of civil defense organizations found chiefly in urban areas.

The General Features of Civil Defense Offices

The "typical" local civil defense office is organized on a city-county basis. That is, its jurisdiction includes a fairly large central city plus the outlying county area. However, some large cities maintain civil defense offices separate from those organized in their counties.

Most urban civil defense offices, whether they are organized on a city-county basis or otherwise, on a day-to-day basis operate with a small staff of professional and clerical workers. For example, a typical full-time civil defense staff might consist of a paid director-coordinator, deputy director, an operations officer, a training officer, and a secretary. Usually, one or two of the full-time professional staff members have taken civil defense courses at an OCD training school.

Generally, the job descriptions of the paid civil defense staff imply a rather rational division of labor. The actual role behavior of most staff members during both pre- and post-disaster periods, however, does not necessarily correspond with such descriptions. For example, a training officer may spend little time involved in civil defense training activities although his job description may discuss such duties at length. In most instances, it seems that the actual duties of the paid staff members overlap, and the major consideration in terms of job assignment is availability.

Usually, a civil defense director, in addition to his administrative duties, spends considerable time in public relations and public information work, for example, addressing public gatherings on civil defense related

topics and meeting with interested civic groups. Thus, one of his principal roles is that of creating and maintaining public interest in civil defense programs.

The day-to-day tasks of most civil defense offices involve preparing their respective communities to meet the problems that are likely to be generated by a nuclear disaster. This preparatory activity includes the implementation of programs related to public fallout shelters and radiological monitoring. Also, civil defense organizations are expected to spend some time developing disaster plans which can serve as guides for an effective community response to the problems that might be created by a manmade disaster.

The shelter and radiological programs and the development of disaster plans usually occupy the time of most of the full-time civil defense staff members. This generally involves locating, marking, and stocking public shelters in the community with emergency supplies; holding courses on radiological monitoring; and writing and revising disaster plans. In most cases, the latter activity receives the lowest priority.

Finally, although the brunt of public relations work may be assumed by the civil defense director -- and in some instances by a public relations officer -- all of the paid staff members at some time or another tend to engage in some public relations activity. This is related to the fact that public support is usually an uncertain and unstable commodity for civil defense organizations, and usually a special effort has to be made to generate and maintain it.

In the typical urban civil defense office, the bulk of the membership is composed of volunteers and local officials who have been assigned roles to be activated in future civil defense situations in addition to their primary responsibilities in some other local government agency or department. Some of the volunteers receive civil defense training in such areas as shelter management and radiological monitoring. It is also common for civil defense units in urban areas to include volunteer groups of one kind or another in their memberships, e.g., police and fire auxiliary units. Such volunteers are likely to participate in civil defense programs on a somewhat regular basis. However, most civil defense offices also keep lists of persons who are volunteers in name only since their involvement in civil defense programs is nominal or nonexistent. When asked about the size of their offices, civil defense officials tend to include such "members" in their figure. Most of those included as "volunteers" are not aware they are seen as a part of civil defense.

The organization charts of most local civil defense organizations depict various positions that are held by local government officials such as those in the police, fire, and public works agencies. The extent to which there is any real participation on the part of such persons in the routine activity of local civil defense organizations varies; however, the pattern seems to be that there is little participation by these local officials in civil defense programs and that they define their civil defense assignments as little more than token.

The full-time civil defense cadre found in the typical civil defense office, of course, cannot handle the additional demands which would be made on it in the event of widespread disaster. Thus, with the occurrence of disaster the volunteers and local officials with civil defense responsibilities are expected to supplement the ranks of the cadre. Obviously, this can be problematic given the apathetic manner in which civil defense "membership" is often taken by many of these volunteers and local officials.

The typical urban civil defense office does not maintain a vast supply of internal resources from which it can draw in emergencies. However, it usually does have some resources, e.g., equipment and information, which can be of varying importance in the event of natural disaster. The following resources might be found in the typical urban civil defense organization:

1. Emergency radio equipment.
2. An emergency operation center or headquarters with some standby generation equipment.
3. An inventory of some of the emergency equipment available in the community and the names and telephone numbers of numerous emergency contacts.
4. A set of disaster plans which are in the process of being completed and which are geared toward nuclear disaster.
5. Several public emergency sirens.

A portable emergency hospital with some medical supplies may also be available within the community, although not under direct supervision by civil defense.

Local civil defense officials generally concede that their organizations lack many needed resources which require the expenditure of large sums of money. However, some offices are also without those resources -- such as disaster plans -- which do not require the direct outlay of large sums of money. With the exception of some civil defense organizations in disaster-prone areas, most civil defense offices do not have adequate disaster plans, that is, plans which have been completed and rehearsed and which have become real guides for behavior. These kinds of plans entail considerable time and effort and herein lies part of the explanation as to why they are seldom developed. The small civil defense staff often has little time to devote to disaster planning after the majority of a working day has been spent on other activities receiving higher priority such as stocking shelters and training volunteers in radiological monitoring. Also, if effective interorganizational disaster plans are to be developed by civil defense offices, the cooperation of other local organizations and government agencies is required. Too frequently, however, such cooperation is not forthcoming. Furthermore, to increase their chances for effective functioning during natural disasters, civil defense offices should ideally write plans specifically for this kind of disaster situation. However, in some instances, even nuclear disaster plans are not updated, and they would at least have some transfer value for natural disaster operations.

Thus far, we have talked principally about the typical civil defense unit found in an urban context. By comparison, the civil defense office

located in a less urban setting is likely to assume an even more voluntary character. For example, members of civil defense units in small communities from the director on down are likely to be volunteers. Also, such units tend to possess even fewer resources to deal with disaster situations than their counterparts located in more urbanized areas.

By and large, the makeup of a state civil defense office parallels that of the typical urban civil defense office. As is true of local organizations, for example, the full-time cadre of a state civil defense organization is augmented by volunteers and government appointees. Of course, in the case of the state organization, the government representatives are from other state agencies and departments. The day-to-day activities of the professional state civil defense staff are apt to be quite similar to those of local defense officials. For example, considerable time may be spent developing the public shelter program and lesser time may be given to writing and revising disaster plans. And finally, similar to their local colleagues, state civil defense officials are likely to feel that their organizations are forced to operate without the benefit of important resources because of the lack of financial support.

The typical civil defense office is marked by considerable uncertainty. This will be discussed in the next two sections of this chapter.

The Environment and Internal Organization: The Basis of Uncertainty

The internal structure of organizations reflects their goals and functions. Police and church organizations, for example, are structured differently because they pursue different goals or carry out dissimilar functions. The structure of an organization, however, may also come to reflect the degree to which the organization's functions are valued by a community or society. As we indicated earlier, organizations do not function in a vacuum; their makeup and behavior varies with their environments. To receive adequate inputs or support from its environment, that environment must acknowledge the importance of an organization's outputs (i.e., its products or services). Herein lies one of the major uncertainties for civil defense offices.

The preparation of programs for handling manmade disaster has become a major function of many local and state civil defense offices. Also, such organizations are expected to create the machinery for dealing with natural disaster. These functions, however, are assigned low priority by most communities when measured against the activities of such groups as police and fire departments. As a result, public support for civil defense programs is generally precarious or uncertain.

Periodically, the uncertain character of the support of civil defense programs becomes reflected in a most pronounced fashion in the structure of civil defense organizations. For example, in June of 1963 the Los Angeles City Council voted to reduce the budget allocated for civil defense by $209,000 and to reduce the staff of the civil defense organization from

26 to 3 paid employees. Similarly, in 1966 the staff of the civil defense organization of New York City -- up to that time the nation's largest -- was reduced from 247 to 22 persons. These examples are, however, the more dramatic and unusual structural consequences of the precarious nature of public support for civil defense programs.

The most consistent structural consequence of this uncertain support is that civil defense offices must depend on volunteers or quasi-volunteers to carry out their ongoing programs as well as to meet the increased demands generated by disaster. These structural characteristics, of course, are likely to greatly affect the functioning of civil defense organizations during disaster. Compared to full-time staff members, for example, volunteers are not likely to be as knowledgeable about the goals, routines, and procedures of the organization; as well trained as professional members; or as reliable in their participation in organizational activities as professional members. As a result, civil defense offices, in addition to other contingencies, are likely to be faced with the problem of trying to coordinate and control the activities of large numbers of volunteers during disasters. Unfortunately, too, the quasi-volunteer members of civil defense organizations, i.e., government appointees, sometimes create some of the same problems as volunteers during disaster. This is, of course, related to the fact that their pre-disaster participation in civil defense activities, as has been mentioned before, is frequently only symbolic or does not occur at all. The need to rely on volunteers and quasi-volunteers, then, poses considerable uncertainty for civil defense organizations during disaster.

Related to the ambiguous fashion in which the public views civil defense are problems involving the authority and jurisdiction of civil defense organizations. We will discuss this problem in the following section.

Uncertain Authority and Task Domains

The public generally expects civil defense offices to become involved in emergency activities following natural disaster. However, too frequently, the responsibilities or task domains of civil defense organizations relative to other community groups and organizations during disaster are not well known or understood.

Similarly, the authority of civil defense vis-a-vis other emergency-relevant social units has often not been specified prior to disaster. This can sometimes result in conflicting authority relations between civil defense and other social agencies.

The nature of natural disaster is such that it would be almost impossible to completely prevent uncertainty with regard to authority and responsibility. For example, new tasks often emerge and unfamiliar groups and organizations often interact in disaster situations, creating the possibility for the development of authority and jurisdictional problems. Through effective disaster planning, however, the authority and task domains of civil defense and other

organizations that are likely to become involved in disaster operations could be outlined and made more definite. Yet, as we noted earlier, disaster preparation has low priority and usually receives less attention than other group and organizational activities.

There are, however, special circumstances in which disaster preparation seems to be more highly institutionalized and is more likely to be defined as essential activity. And as a result, public support for civil defense organizations, as well as the internal structures of such organizations, seems to be more stable. Such patterns have evolved in highly disaster-prone areas known as disaster subcultures. In the final section of this chapter, we will briefly discuss the impact of disaster subcultures on the stability and functioning of civil defense organizations.

Civil Defense in Disaster Subcultures

Disaster subcultures sometimes emerge in a community or region in response to the perceived likelihood of the appearance of high stress-inducing agents such as hurricanes, tornadoes, or floods.[1] Thus, a disaster subculture may be defined as those subcultural patterns operative in a given area which are geared towards the solution of problems arising from the perceived disaster threat. The patterns of a disaster subculture may include knowledge concerning how individuals and groups can most appropriately react during periods of stress to protect life and property. Specific kinds of disaster subcultures may arise in various parts of the United States, such as in certain sections of Texas and Florida which often experience hurricanes, and areas of the southern Midwest subject to periodic tornadoes. Some communities in such localities, through certain key groups and organizations, become specialists in handling particular kinds of frequently occurring natural disasters.

In disaster subcultural areas, civil defense offices often become one of the key organizations with regard to establishing and implementing emergency plans and procedures. Accordingly, the activity of civil defense offices in such areas is more likely to be defined as essential for the public welfare and they have a greater likelihood of being integrated into their communities. This greater institutionalization of civil defense in disaster subcultural areas often means that some of the uncertainty which characterizes such organizations in other communities is minimized.

Public support of civil defense offices, for example, is likely to be somewhat more certain in disaster subcultural areas. Also, there may be less vague authority relationships between civil defense and other emergency-relevant groups and organizations; for example, such relationships may have been specified through involvement in past disasters. There is also a tendency for civil defense volunteers to be better trained and knowledgeable in disaster subcultural areas as a result of previous experience in disasters. And finally, growing out of their past disaster experience, civil defense plans and procedures are likely to be more realistic than they otherwise might be, at least in terms of the particular type of disaster agent toward which they are geared.

To summarize, the typical civil defense office has a small full-time cadre of professional workers whose major activity centers around making preparations for dealing with problems generated by nuclear disaster. Also, such organizations are expected to become involved in emergency activities following natural disaster.

Because the activities engaged in by civil defense officials are generally not acknowledged as continuously essential by the public, the support of civil defense organizations tends to be rather precarious. One result is that civil defense organizations must rely on the assistance of volunteer and quasi-volunteer personnel rather than complements of full-time employees. This creates internal uncertainty for such organizations as problems of internal control and coordination develop. However, in disaster subcultural areas, civil defense organizations are less likely to experience severe internal and external uncertainty.

The strategy of disaster planning coupled with actual experience, for example, may reduce authority and jurisdictional problems for civil defense organizations. Also, in such social environments, support for civil defense programs is likely to be fairly stable and reliable. In the following chapter, we will begin our discussion of actual civil defense functioning during natural disaster.

NOTES: CHAPTER II

1. Harry E. Moore, *. . . And the Winds Blow* (Austin: University of Texas, 1964), chap. x.

CHAPTER III

THE MOBILIZATION OF CIVIL DEFENSE OFFICES DURING DISASTER

Mobilization refers to the marshalling of resources, both men and equipment, in preparation for coping with some situation. In the case of natural disaster, emergency organizations and groups may mobilize prior to or after the impact of a disaster agent. Pre-disaster mobilization, of course, enhances the possibility for an effective organized response to disaster-generated problems.

Civil defense offices, along with other expanding organizations such as local Red Cross and Salvation Army units, tend to experience more difficulty mobilizing for natural disaster activity than organizations like the police and fire departments which deal with emergencies on a daily basis. Police and fire organizations, for example, are always partially mobilized since they maintain twenty-four-hour shifts of personnel on duty. As a result, they do not have to start from scratch when they mobilize for disaster. Also, police and fire organizations are composed of large contingents of professionally trained and committed full-time personnel that reliably report on duty whenever they are called. Furthermore, the police usually have units in the field at all times so that they are generally one of the first community organizations to learn of disaster. In contrast, organizations like civil defense, the Red Cross, and Salvation Army tend to have personnel on duty only on a five-day-a-week basis and during the normal 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. working hours. Thus, if a disaster occurs on a nonworking day or after 5:00 p.m., unless such organizations have received some forewarning, their personnel may not be immediately available. Also, in mobilizing for disaster such organizations as civil defense and the Red Cross must depend heavily upon volunteers, who are not as reliable as the professionally trained personnel that comprise police and fire organizations.

In the present chapter, we will discuss the initial disaster mobilization of civil defense offices. Sometimes the initial mobilization of these organizations includes some early expansion in their memberships. In the chapter that follows, we will consider the structural expansion of civil defense offices in greater detail.

Types of Disasters

While it is true that civil defense offices in general have difficulty in mobilizing for disaster, this varies with the kind of natural disaster that is involved. That is, different types of disasters present varying types of mobilization contingencies for civil defense and other organizations. According to Carr, disasters differ in terms of the character of the precipitating event or agent and their scope.

On this basis there are at least four types of disasters:

1. An instantaneous-diffused type such as the Texas City explosion which was over before anyone could do anything about it and wreaked its effects on the entire community.

2. An instantaneous-focalized type such as the 1963 Indianapolis Coliseum explosion which killed over 80 persons and injured over 400, yet left the rest of the community physically intact.

3. A progressive-diffused type such as hurricanes on the Gulf Coast, such as Betsy in 1965 and Camille in 1969, which affect whole communities gradually.

4. A progressive-focalized type such as a mine fire or a localized flood.[1]

Instantaneous-Diffused Disasters

In terms of Carr's classification, the most difficult type of disaster for organizations to mobilize for is the instantaneous-diffused type. A 1964 Northwestern earthquake was such a disaster. Since this disaster provided no forewarning, emergency-relevant organizations in the major city did not have time for preparatory mobilization. Furthermore, disaster-activated groups and organizations in the city were badly hampered in their mobilization because the earthquake was of such scope that many important streets and roads in the city were impassable and normal means of communication were disrupted. These contingencies were accentuated by other problems in the local and state civil defense organizations in the city.

At the time of the earthquake, the local civil defense office was without a director. He had resigned less than two weeks prior to the disaster; his departure was followed by considerable uncertainty as to whether or not the community would continue supporting such an organization. The only other paid member of the organization was a secretary who never reported to duty throughout the entire emergency period.

The state civil defense organization, which had its headquarters in the same city, was also at a disadvantage when the earthquake struck. For example, the director was at a meeting in the capital; also, because the earthquake occurred at 5:36 p.m., none of the other staff members was at the headquarters building. Neither the state nor city civil defense organization had completed disaster plans which could serve as a model for their mobilization. Thus, the mobilization of the two civil defense offices and their continued expansion in membership throughout the disaster occurred by and large on a trial-and-error basis.

During the first several hours after the earthquake in the major city, a number of actions were taken by various persons in the name of the city

civil defense office, yet such an entity was not in effect mobilized until the following day when the former director was reinstated by the mayor. After his reinstatement, the civil defense director assumed responsibility over a number of volunteers who later engaged in such activities as search and rescue, disaster information dissemination, and a limited amount of coordination.

The state civil defense organization mobilized more rapidly than the city organization. Although the damaged streets made driving difficult, some members of the state civil defense staff were able to arrive at their headquarters a short time after the disaster. This included the assistant director and the head of a civil defense volunteer radio group. The state director did not arrive to assume active supervision of the state civil defense organization until eighteen hours after the earthquake. Also, some of the state civil defense coordinators with headquarters in the capital could not arrive in the local area to assume their duties until several hours after the earthquake.

In addition to some of their internal structural features, then, the mobilization of the two civil defense offices was hampered by the nature of the disaster itself, i.e., its instantaneous character. Because there was no forewarning, mobilization occurred after the earthquake instead of before it. Obviously, pre-impact mobilization may be easier for an organization, since it occurs prior to the disruption of communication and transportation facilities by a disaster agent. Also, organizations that are mobilized prior to the impact of a disaster agent may be able to warn the threatened population.

A 1966 Midwestern tornado disaster, like the earthquake, was an instantaneous-diffused type of disaster in terms of Carr's typology. That is, the actual onslaught of the tornado disaster agent lasted for only a short period and the entire community was involved. In contrast to the earthquake, however, the tornado disaster was preceded by some disaster mobilization on the part of emergency-relevant organizations, including the local civil defense organization where partial pre-impact mobilization had occurred. This was due to the fact that tornadoes, unlike earthquakes, are often preceded by environmental changes which may be interpreted by officials (as they were in this community) as danger cues requiring organizational and community action and mobilization. This was particularly true in this community where tornadoes tend to be perceived as a recurrent disaster threat. Also in contrast to an earthquake-impacted city, the mobilization of civil defense and other emergency-relevant groups and organizations in the Midwestern city generally followed plans and standard operating procedures.

When severe weather conditions developed suggesting the possibility of the formation of tornadoes, a volunteer civil defense radio group was alerted by the local weather station and placed on tornado watch. Members of this group were sent with their mobile radio units to prearranged positions on storm watch lines. Through the efforts of this group and similarly involved groups and organizations, the tornado was spotted early enough so that public sirens in the city could be sounded before its impact; this was later credited with reducing the death toll in the city. After the public sirens were sounded, some civil defense officials reported to their headquarters where they utilized an emergency personnel call list to contact and advise other members to report to emergency duty.

In this case then, many community organizations, including civil defense, had at least partially mobilized prior to the impact of the tornado. The existence of some disaster subcultural patterns plus the appearance of danger cues in the form of severe weather conditions was responsible for such mobilization. Unfortunately, neither of these circumstances prevailed in the Northwestern city prior to the earthquake and thus there was an absence of pre-impact mobilization.

Instantaneous-Focalized Disasters

The disasters in the previous examples were so widespread that many of the normal activities in these communities were suspended. In contrast, the instantaneous-focalized type disaster may result in the suspension of normal community functions only within a sector of a community, i.e., largely the area of impact. However, similar to most instantaneous-diffused disasters, mobilization by civil defense and other emergency units occurs after the impact of an agent in instantaneous-focalized disasters. A 1963 Midwestern explosion was such a disaster.

Following this disaster, the local civil defense organization was, according to plan, notified by the municipal police and fire departments. Shortly thereafter, civil defense members began reporting to their headquarters. One civil defense staff member, who later played a major role in the disaster, went directly to the scene of the explosion. The local civil defense director, after seeing that his staff had mobilized, left the headquarters with medical supplies and volunteers and also went to the site. In general, the mobilization of civil defense in this instance occurred fairly rapidly given the instantaneous nature of the disaster.

A 1964 Northeastern chemical plant explosion is another example of the instantaneous-focalized type disaster. The local civil defense office began mobilizing after the civil defense director received notification of the disaster from the police. The director alerted other members of civil defense including civil defense auxiliary fire and police squads. After mobilizing, the civil defense organization was involved in emergency activity throughout the disaster.

Because the two previous disasters were narrow in scope, the gathering civil defense forces in these two communities were not hampered by damaged roads and highways. In the Northwestern case cited earlier, however, the earthquake caused widespread damage to community facilities, including streets and roads, and this proved to be somewhat of a problem for some officials returning to their headquarters to initiate emergency operations. Too, normal communications were not disrupted in the two cities because of the narrow scope of the disaster. As a result, civil defense officials in both of these cities received the notification of the disasters by telephone, from the police and fire departments in the former instance, and from the police in the latter; and in both instances, too, the civil defense officials were able to utilize the telephone to mobilize their members. The mobilization of civil defense

officials following the earthquake, however, was hampered by the breakdown of communications within the community. For example, civil defense personnel could not be contacted by telephone because the telephone system was inoperative. This problem, though, was not as great as it could have been because of the very fact that the disaster was so dramatic and widespread and that it was unlikely to go unnoticed by most persons in the community. Thus, most civil defense members did not have to be told that a disaster had occurred; they had experienced in varying ways its physical consequences. And as a result, they reported to duty on their own initiative realizing that a major effort would be required to handle the situation.

Most civil defense offices do not have the resources to constantly monitor their environments in order to detect emergency situations which might require their attention. Unlike police and fire organizations, for example, they do not function on a twenty-four-hour basis. As a result, civil defense offices in general depend on emergency organizations such as police and fire departments for information about emergency situations which might require them to mobilize. This seems to be particularly true of focalized disasters which are not usually visible throughout an entire community. Following both of the focalized disasters, for example, civil defense offices mobilized only after they had received emergency information from the police and fire organizations. In instantaneous-diffused type disasters, then, it is possible that civil defense units will mobilize late or even not at all if emergency information is not received from an emergency organization such as the police which has greater environment-monitoring capacity.

Progressive-Diffused Disasters

Progressive type disaster agents allow the greatest opportunity for pre-impact mobilization on the part of civil defense and other emergency-relevant organizations. Hurricanes and floods, for example, usually evolve gradually, while at the same time giving off perceptible cues of their imminence such as increasing wind and water levels. Consequently, if the danger cues are taken into account the emergency social units of a community will have time to mobilize and to prepare the general public. In some communities and regions which are threatened by a recurrent and progressive disaster agent, pre-impact community and organizational mobilization assumes a rather routine character. At any rate, our case materials indicate that the mobilization of civil defense organizations in disasters caused by progressive disaster agents is likely to differ markedly from their mobilizatic in disasters produced by instantaneous agents. We will confine our remarks to the progressive-diffused type disasters since we lack data on progressive-focalized disasters.

The Northcentral floods of April 1965 is an example of the progressive-diffused type disaster. Because the disaster developed gradually and could be anticipated -- the heavy snows and rain in March served as indicators of the flood threat -- considerable mobilization and preparation was undertaken by civil defense and other organizations before the river went beyond the

flood stage on April 7. In March, the governor of the state was advised of weather conditions by the weather bureau and he decided that a meeting was needed to discuss the situation. As a result, in late March representatives of the state civil defense office met with other state and federal agencies who would have responsibilities in the event of floods. The purpose of the meeting was to outline coordinative procedures and responsibilities among the organizations in attendance so that they could provide prompt and effective aid to local communities that might be affected by the impending floods. And as a result of this meeting, news briefings were established for the mass media at the state civil defense headquarters. Also, the state civil defense headquarters was designated as the flood disaster operations center and on April 5, two days before the flood stage was reached, the center went on a twenty-four-hour-a-day basis.

As a result of the progressive nature of this disaster threat, then, state civil defense and other responsible officials were able to mobilize prior to actual impact and establish a structure to handle some of the anticipated problems. If this disaster agent had been of the instantaneous variety, the mobilization by civil defense and other involved organizations undoubtedly would have been more difficult.

Communities and regions which perceive the threat of recurrent and progressive disaster agents sometimes develop highly institutionalized responses to them. And because of the progressive nature of such agents, the routinized responses which develop often involve pre-impact adaptations including organizational mobilization and warning patterns. Such institutionalized or disaster subcultural patterns are found, among other places, in sections of Florida and Texas which are exposed on a seasonal basis to the threat of hurricanes.

For example, preceding Hurricane Dora which struck parts of the South in September of 1964, a local civil defense office initiated pre-impact procedures based on its past experience with hurricane threats. After the hurricane was spotted, for example, the organization was put on a semi-standby basis for several days. Then when Dora moved closer and became a definite threat to the city and other areas of the state, the local civil defense organization mobilized on a twenty-four-hour basis. As one civil defense official put it, "Any hurricane headed toward this area is an automatic standby for us when it begins reaching within forty-eight hours." And well before Dora had hit the area, civil defense had taken the following action: communicated with key government officials, had additional telephone lines installed at their headquarters, and contacted the mass media. In contacting the mass media, civil defense had information broadcast to the public concerning the emergency and the need to take precautionary actions.

In a similarly routine fashion, Southwestern state civil defense officials mobilized and prepared for the onslaught of Hurricane Beulah in September of 1967. Speaking of their standard alerting and mobilization procedures one official noted:

> We're on a direct wire to the weather bureau and we keep a close eye on it. Then when the hurricane comes into the Gulf, our standard procedure . . . is just to alert our civil defense council and put them on standby so that we don't have to chase them all over the state when it becomes time to prepare to meet.

And regarding mobilization during Hurricane Beulah, this same civil defense official reported that the civil defense council, which is composed of representatives from each of the state agencies, was ready to function prior to the impact of the disaster agent.

> The council had reported to the emergency operating center. They had a meeting and the council was in operation when the hurricane actually came ashore. And there was little stress from the human standpoint. . . . Every state agency was prepared with all of their people alerted, and when the calls for help began to come in, why, there was nothing to do but respond to those calls.

Finally, civil defense mobilization prior to the impact of the hurricane also consisted of checking resources.

> Here in the EOC /emergency operations center/ our own staff, which is the control staff, was reviewing our resource list to see how many shelter supplies we had in /other cities/, and those that were already installed in the shelters. . . . So if we had to use these supplies, we'd know where they were and how best to get them.

Thus, observing fairly institutionalized procedures, civil defense mobilized and prepared to meet Hurricane Beulah.

In this chapter, we have suggested that offices like civil defense generally have greater difficulty mobilizing for disaster activity than organizations which deal with emergencies on a daily basis such as the police. Among other things, this is related to the generally precarious nature of public support for civil defense which does not enable these organizations to monitor their environments for emergency situations on a twenty-four-hour, seven-day-a-week basis.

However, the degree of difficulty that civil defense and other organizations experience when mobilizing for emergency activity will vary in terms of the kind of disaster that is involved. The most difficult disaster for civil defense and other organizations to mobilize for is the instantaneous-diffused type. In these disasters, seldom is there an opportunity to initiate pre-impact mobilization processes; thus, mobilization tends to occur in the context of disrupted communication and transportation facilities. On the other hand, in disaster situations which involve progressive disaster agents, mobilization is generally less difficult for civil defense and other organizations. That is, in such disasters there is often time for pre-impact organizational mobilization and preparation. Some areas which perceive the existence of a recurrent and progressive disaster agent have developed subcultural defenses to cope with them. And in these areas, the utilization of

advance disaster warning systems plus realistic disaster plans and standard operating procedures significantly reduce the uncertainty which often accompanies emergency mobilization by civil defense and other emergency-relevant social units.

NOTES: CHAPTER 111

1. Lowell J. Carr, "Disaster and the Sequence-Pattern Concept of Social Change," American Journal of Sociology 38 (1932): 209-210.

CHAPTER IV

THE STRUCTURAL EXPANSION OF CIVIL DEFENSE OFFICES DURING DISASTER

Because the main function of civil defense is to respond to those comparatively rare instances when disasters strike, communities are generally unwilling to provide such organizations with enough support so that they can maintain large paid staffs. As a result, only a small cadre of employees is usually involved in the day-to-day activities of most civil defense offices, both at the local and state levels. In large-scale disasters, civil defense staffs as they are normally constituted are inadequate to handle the multitude of demands that are made on them. Thus, during such periods, CD offices must expand their boundaries to include persons who are not usually involved in their activities such as volunteers and government appointees. This expansion process can come about either as a result of planning or as a consequence of high demands. In the first instance, prior disaster plans may be evoked as a result of an emergency and these plans usually call for the mobilization of other persons and organizations. In the second instance, the scope of the tasks necessitates the utilization of many personnel unfamiliar with the planned responsibility of the organization. Those personnel are necessary, however, in order to cope with the demands. While the nature of the expansion may differ, the consequences for the organization are very similar.

The expansion of civil defense offices during periods of disaster may alleviate the manpower problem, but it may also create other uncertainties. Because many of the new members will be unaccustomed to working in the civil defense organizations in which they assume emergency positions, for example, they may have difficulty understanding established rules and procedures. Thus, internal integration and control may become problematic for civil defense organizations during disaster.

Aside from having to adjust to modified environmental circumstances during disaster (e.g., disrupted communications, the arrival on the scene of new groups and organizations with whom they must work, etc.), civil defense organizations must also cope with modified internal structures. Obviously, the need to cope with change in both the internal and the environmental spheres during disaster places a major burden on civil defense and similarly expanding organizations. In contrast, organizations like the police generally find it less difficult to cope with disaster situations. Part of this is due to the fact that their internal structures are changed very little during disaster, although they too will be faced with new environmental contingencies.

Beginning with their initial mobilization, then, to the height of their participation in disaster activities, civil defense offices expand their structures to include new members as well as the original cadres. Sometimes this expansion is quite manifold and dramatic as an organization moves from a membership of a few to one of several hundred. Also, like their initial mobilization efforts, civil defense expansion may occur according to pre-planning or it may be largely emergent in character.

During disasters, civil defense offices expand their membership to include volunteers and government officials with civil defense responsibilities. The volunteers, in terms of their prior relationship to a civil defense organization, may be regular or emergency volunteers (see fig. 1).

Regular Volunteers

Regular civil defense volunteers are those volunteers who have pre-disaster ties with a civil defense unit. Depending upon the extent to which they become involved in the pre-disaster activities of a civil defense organization, they may be more or less familiar with the structure and processes of the organization. Other things being equal, it will generally be easier to integrate regular volunteers into a disaster-activated civil defense organization than emergency volunteers because of the former's previous involvement in the organization. In some instances, for example, the pre-disaster involvement of regular CD volunteers may include their having received civil defense training as well as having taken part in previous civil defense disaster operations.

In addition to expanding to include regular individual volunteers in their activities during disaster, civil defense offices also expand to include regular volunteer groups or units. Because emergency communications are vitally important during disaster, for example, many civil defense organizations have affiliated volunteer amateur radio clubs. And when disaster strikes, such groups are expected to contribute their skills and resources to the efforts of civil defense.

For example, at the time of the 1964 earthquake mentioned previously, the volunteer membership of the state civil defense organization included a RACES radio group (Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service). The headquarters for this unit was in the basement of the state CD building where its meetings and drill sessions were held. There were some fifty amateur radio operators in the group and they were supervised by a volunteer director appointed by the state civil defense organization. Also, some of the equipment utilized by the RACES volunteers was purchased by state civil defense with federal funds. Following the earthquake, members of this group were among the initial state CD personnel to mobilize. Throughout the emergency period of the disaster, they provided state civil defense with a sorely needed emergency communications capability.

During disaster, the size of the active membership of a civil defense office may also expand to include such regular volunteer groups as auxiliary police and fire units. Following Hurricane Dora, for example, the active local civil defense forces in the city cited earlier included CD auxiliary policemen. As previously mentioned, after the chemical plant explosion in the Northeast, CD auxiliary police and fire units became involved in emergency activities along with other civil defense personnel. Finally, about 250 CD policemen became involved in the civil defense effort following the Midwestern explosion.

Figure 1

DISASTER EXPANSION OF LOCAL CIVIL DEFENSE



Civil defense organizations, then, use both regular individual volunteers during disaster operations and persons who volunteer on a regular basis as part of a unit or group. And to the extent that such regular volunteers have been previously involved in the activities and programs of a civil defense organization, it will be easier to integrate them into the ongoing disaster activities.

Emergency Volunteers

Disasters heighten the importance of some occupational roles, while at the same time significantly reducing the importance of others. The policeman and fireman roles are usually quite relevant and important during disaster situations because, among other things, there is usually a need for security and control measures (a normal function of the police) and fire control and prevention measures (a normal function of firemen). On the other hand, such persons as bank clerks, school teachers, and students may find that their roles are irrelevant during a disaster because the organizations in which they normally carry them out have ceased to function for the duration of the emergency period. Yet, such persons may want to do something to help out during the disaster. Indeed, such persons may feel that it is their duty as good citizens of a disaster-struck area to assume emergency-relevant roles. As a result, many of these persons with occupational roles that are irrelevant insofar as the disaster situation is concerned become emergency civil defense volunteers.

In contrast to regular volunteers, emergency CD volunteers have no previous relationship with such organizations. And their recruitment during disaster may take on an unsystematic character; for example, emergency volunteers are often "walk-ins." During Hurricane Betsy, for example, a man walked into the CD headquarters and introduced himself as a person who had some knowledge of radios, whereupon one CD official said: "Well, fine. There's a set over there. Check in with the boys and go to work."

Many of the persons who join civil defense organizations as emergency volunteers during disasters bring some special training or skills with them which they can utilize in their new roles; however, many do not. During disasters, civil defense organizations are often flooded by more untrained would-be volunteers than they have use for. As a result, valuable time is often lost by civil defense organizations as they attempt to determine which potential volunteers they should absorb into their emergency structures and which ones they should not. This problem is usually heightened by the fact that few civil defense organizations have plans and procedures for handling the large volume of would-be volunteers that often converge upon their emergency headquarters during disasters.

Finally, as in the case of regular volunteers, civil defense organizations may expand their boundaries during disaster to include not only individual emergency volunteers but also persons who volunteer on an emergency basis as part of a group. For example, such groups as Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts

are often temporarily assimilated into the structures of both local and state CD organizations during disasters.

Expansion Involving Government Appointees

As previously mentioned, some employees of local and state agencies and departments are often assigned civil defense responsibilities in addition to their regular duties. Thus, in addition to the utilization of volunteers during disaster, civil defense organizations may also expand to include such government appointees.

Usually, the government employees who become a part of an expanded civil defense organization will work alongside other CD personnel at the organization's headquarters or emergency operations center. Following the 1964 earthquake, for example, the core state civil defense staff was augmented at its headquarters by personnel from several state departments. And on the local level, in one city during Hurricane Betsy, persons from various local departments including police, fire, and health became a part of the staff working in the civil defense emergency operations center.

There are some problems involved in the utilization of government personnel for civil defense disaster expansion purposes. First, government employees in some instances do not take their civil defense responsibilities seriously. Thus, they sometimes fail to assume any civil defense role at all during disaster. On the other hand, in some instances the specific nature of the civil defense assignment given government personnel is never made very clear, and during disaster they may be handicapped by not knowing what is expected of them. The civil defense duties of such expansion personnel could be clarified in disaster plans; but, as we have previously mentioned, such plans are often not completed.

Sometimes during disasters, the boundaries of expanded civil defense organizations are not very clear insofar as government personnel are concerned. In some cases, for example, government employees who work with civil defense officials at the latter's emergency headquarters during disaster do not view themselves as even temporary members of civil defense. They may see themselves instead as no more than liaison representatives to civil defense from the organizations for which they normally work. Civil defense officials, on the other hand, often view such persons as actual members of their expanded organizations. In civil defense organization charts, for example, such government employees are frequently depicted as part of civil defense. Apparently, CD officials have a tendency to perceive such charts as representing real organizational structures, while many other government officials do not. Obviously, such a lack of consensus on organizational membership may lead to authority and control problems during disaster.

In addition to the expanded civil defense staff, coordinators and observers from other disaster-activated agencies and organizations are usually sent to a civil defense headquarters or emergency operations center in times

of disaster. As a result, such a location is apt to become the nerve center of what we previously referred to as the synthetic disaster organization. During Hurricane Betsy, for example, in a major city personnel from the following organizations served either as coordinators or as members of the expanded civil defense staff at the CD emergency center:

1. City Police Department
2. City Fire Department
3. Sewage and Water Board
4. Volunteer Ham Operators
5. Bell Telephone and Telegraph
6. City Health Department
7. American Red Cross
8. Civil Defense Volunteers
9. Army Corps of Engineers
10. Port Authority
11. Power and Light Company
12. U.S. Coast Guard
13. Police Service, Inc.
14. Civil Air Patrol
15. Salvation Army
16. City Welfare Department

Bringing together representatives of disaster-activated groups and organizations in this fashion usually enhances the possibility of coordinating and controlling the overall disaster response. In some cases, though, such a convergence of disaster-involved personnel may tax the size and facilities of a civil defense emergency center. Following the 1964 earthquake, for example, the number of persons who became involved in emergency activities at the small state civil defense headquarters was so great that severe limitations were placed on the organization's operations. At one point during the emergency period, over a hundred persons -- including CD expansion personnel and representatives from other agencies -- were attempting to carry out emergency activities in the civil defense headquarters building which normally had to accommodate only the several members of the core civil defense staff. The building was so cramped that it was difficult for those present to merely walk from one area to another in order to consult with someone. Eventually, mobile trailers were placed adjacent to the building and this alleviated the problem to some degree. Similarly, during the Northcentral flood threat, the state civil defense operations expanded from a five- to a twenty-man operation. As a result, it became necessary to move the flood operations center to larger quarters.

Civil defense organizations, then, expand their structures during disaster situations to include regular and emergency volunteers, and personnel from other government departments and agencies, and this is reflected in the internal patterns of authority and control of such organizations. The authority and control patterns of expanded civil defense units will be the subject of the final section of this chapter.

Expansion and Internal Patterns of Authority and Control

The mobilization and subsequent structural expansion of a civil defense office during disaster is followed by a number of changes in its authority structure. Some of these changes may grow out of preplanning, while others may occur on a spontaneous basis. Whatever the case, the authority structure of a civil defense organization during a disaster may be quite different from its authority arrangements prior to such an event.

First, the mobilization and expansion of a civil defense organization results in the fact that certain persons assume manifest authority who previously had had only latent authority in the organization. Such persons would be regular volunteers and government officials with secondary civil defense responsibilities. Their authority is generally latent in the sense that it is activated only when they assume active civil defense roles. And since they do not assume such roles on a day-to-day basis, they normally do not exert authority in civil defense. However, this is all changed once their roles are activated with the disaster mobilization and expansion of civil defense.

Because of their prior contact with civil defense, regular volunteers and government appointees may have a general idea of the nature of their emergency authority. For example, they may have exercised such authority in previous disaster situations involving civil defense. The extent that they are, in fact, familiar with the authority expectations of civil defense will influence the effectiveness with which they exercise their emergency authority, and the degree to which they stay within its limits.

In contrast to regular CD volunteers whose latent authority is activated with the expansion of a civil defense organization, emergency CD volunteers acquire delegated or deputized authority during disaster. Such delegation of authority is unplanned in the sense that the emergency volunteers who acquire it have had no previous connection with civil defense. As a result, the nature and scope of the delegated authority that emergency volunteers assume is often uncertain and lacking in specificity. Furthermore, such authority is ephemeral in that emergency volunteers lose their authority along with their membership in civil defense once the disaster is considered to be over.

Emergency civil defense volunteers tend to have more difficulty exerting their authority during disaster than regular volunteers. This may have repercussions for the entire organization. Unlike regular volunteers, emergency volunteers have not had the opportunity to interact with other members of civil defense prior to the disaster. As a result, they will generally be unclear as to: (1) their own authority in the organization because it is new to them, and (2) the authority of civil defense relative to other disaster-involved groups and organizations. Thus, emergency volunteers may unwittingly become involved in the authority spheres of other organizational members, or they may assume authority which belongs to another organization. Obviously, this kind of behavior by some of its emergency volunteers may impair the functioning of a civil defense office.

At times, some persons and groups may be functioning under appropriated civil defense authority. That is, persons involved in disaster activities may borrow the authority of civil defense by using its name. Such persons may actually consider themselves as civil defense members, or they may not. In either case, the general public or other disaster-involved social units may react to those persons who have appropriated civil defense authority as if they possessed legitimate civil defense authority. And, of course, the civil defense organization may have no control over the behavior of such persons; yet, civil defense may later be held accountable for the actions they take during a disaster. During a major disaster in one city, for example, a

Salvation Army board member on several occasions ordered supplies from local businesses under the name of civil defense. On each occasion, the supplies were delivered without a single challenge to the man's claimed civil defense authority and membership. It is difficult enough, then, for a civil defense organization to control the behavior of its own members who legitimately exert authority during disaster. And it is even more difficult for such an organization to control persons who have appropriated its authority.

Finally, the decentralization of decision making is another change in control patterns which tends to characterize expanded civil defense offices in natural disaster. This is usually an adaptation by these organizations to an overload in disaster tasks.

During normal periods, policy decisions and those with strategic operational consequences are usually made by such persons as the director of a civil defense organization and his immediate subordinate who may be designated as the assistant or deputy director. Also, these chief decision makers usually have frequent consultations with other members of the organization to make certain that they are operating in terms of established policy. In normal periods, those persons who are listed as volunteer members and most government employees with civil defense responsibilities seldom if ever get involved in the important decision making of civil defense units. The same can be said of the secretarial-clerical employees of these organizations. This situation may be altered, however, during disaster.

In disasters, persons with leadership positions in civil defense offices are often apt to be unavailable to their subordinates for direction and consultation. When the organization is mobilized this generally comes about because such officials, as well as other members of civil defense organizations, tend to experience a task overload during disaster. Yet, it is at this time that tasks and decisions must be promptly carried out, even by subordinates who may not have the benefit of their superior's advice and direction. As a result, lower level civil defense members, including volunteers, tend to have increased discretion in making crucial decisions and in carrying out tasks during disaster. In some instances, for example, secretarial-clerical employees of civil defense organizations have been observed to interpret policies and to make strategic decisions during disaster. Also, civil defense emergency volunteers have been known to become involved in crucial decision-making processes during disaster. For example, during one period following the 1964 earthquake, local CD emergency volunteers were observed making decisions dealing with the allocation of important resources because of the necessary preoccupation of official civil defense leaders with other disaster-related activities. Often, lower level CD personnel who assume considerably more decision-making authority than normal during disaster and who function fairly autonomously may later be praised by officials as someone who is a "true leader" or as someone who is "not afraid to act." Conversely, those persons who do not exert such initiative during a disaster may later be subject to criticism. The overall tendency, therefore, is to exceed one's authority.

We have indicated in this chapter that civil defense offices expand in membership in order to cope with the demands of natural disaster. The expansion personnel of what become civil defense organizations generally includes regular and emergency volunteers and government employees who normally work in other agencies and departments. We suggested that the need to utilize such personnel may create internal uncertainty for civil defense organizations during disaster. In the next chapter, we will discuss the disaster tasks undertaken by civil defense organizations with their expanded structures.

CHAPTER V

THE TASKS AND ACTIVITIES OF CIVIL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS DURING DISASTER

In this chapter, we will discuss the disaster tasks assumed by civil defense organizations. Civil defense organizations mobilize and expand their structures during disasters in order to carry out these tasks.

Disasters are responsible for the generation of many tasks and problems for communities. A disaster, for example, may generate the following emergency tasks and processes within an affected community.

1. Warning.
2. Search and rescue.
3. Caring for casualties.
4. Protecting against continuing threat.
5. Restoration of continuing community services.
6. Caring for survivors.
7. Maintaining community order.
8. Maintaining community morale.
9. Information, control, and coordination processes.

In the emergency period of a disaster, many community and extracommunity groups and organizations may become involved in one or more of these crucial activities and processes. Such involvement may be guided by predetermined plans and procedures or, as is often the case, it may represent emergent behavior which has little basis in pre-disaster planning or experience. Furthermore, the tasks that organizations assume under disaster conditions may be identical or similar to those activities in which they are normally involved, or they may be quite different.

Normal civil defense activity, as previously mentioned, includes identifying and stocking public fallout shelters, recruiting and training radiological monitors, developing disaster plans, public information work, and the like. During disasters such activities are set aside and civil defense organizations become involved in disaster-relevant tasks.

In general, the emergency tasks of civil defense organizations fall into two categories: administrative-support tasks, and operational tasks. We will initially discuss the latter type of civil defense disaster activity.

Operational Tasks

Civil defense operational tasks are often assumed by regular civil defense volunteer groups and units such as auxiliary police and fire groups during disasters. The activities of these kinds of civil defense volunteers

are operational in the sense that they are performed in the field. The activities of police auxiliaries, for example, are usually performed out in the disaster area and they involve "doing something" or becoming directly involved in disaster relief work rather than contributing administrative or indirect support. The activities of the operational personnel of civil defense are in one sense, then, "blue collar" activities.

The 250 civil defense auxiliary policemen activated during the Midwestern explosion, for example, engaged in such tasks as search and rescue, first aid, traffic control, and security. All of these activities were performed at the scene of the disaster. Also, the civil defense police and fire auxiliaries activated following the chemical plant explosion also assumed emergency tasks at the disaster site. And finally, during the Hurricane Dora disaster in the South, civil defense auxiliary policemen were sent into the disaster area to provide security in the many emergency shelters that were opened.

Emergency communications are vitally important during disasters. In some instances when the disaster impact is widespread, standby means of communication may be the only kind that are operative. However, even when usual means of communication have not been drastically disrupted by the impact of a disaster agent, such additional sources of communication as amateur radio may prove invaluable. Recognizing this, many civil defense organizations have affiliated amateur radio clubs which can become involved in disaster field operations when they are needed. Mention has already been made, for example, of the civil defense amateur radio group in the Midwest whose members went into the field with their radio gear to spot tornadoes. The work of this group contributed to the generation of a successful general public warning and response prior to the impact of the devastating tornado.

The relaying of information to concerned friends and relatives about the well-being of the residents of a disaster area is an important task which can sometimes be performed by civil defense radio units in the field. Following a California dam disaster, for example, the civil defense units from a nearby town established mobile communication posts around the disaster area. Upon the request of persons residing in the affected area, information concerning their safety was relayed by radio to their relatives and friends from these field communication posts manned by civil defense volunteers.

In the examples cited above, the civil defense operational tasks were carried out by regular volunteers, yet this is not always the case. Important field activities may also be assumed by persons having no pre-disaster relationship with civil defense. Following a 1964 earthquake, for example, local civil defense volunteers were involved in many emergency activities, including search and rescue. All of the civil defense volunteers involved in the search-and-rescue effort, even the person appointed to coordinate it, were emergency rather than regular volunteers.

Local civil defense organizations tend to become more involved in direct or operational functions and activities during disasters than state civil defense organizations. The latter tend to perceive their function as strictly coordinative or administrative. In contrast, local civil defense organizations

usually perceive field activities as legitimate functions of their organizations and they may prepare to assume these as well as more supportive and administrative type duties. Also, since in most instances they are closer to the ongoing disaster activities than their state counterparts, local civil defense organizations may feel more pressure to become directly involved in them. Furthermore, direct field activities are in many ways more visible to the general public than administrative activities and accordingly some local civil defense officials feel that credit from their local communities for their disaster involvement is related to the extent to which their organizations are involved in field activities. Such credit, of course, may be necessary if an organization is to receive continued public support after the disaster period.

Administrative Tasks

While civil defense organizations become involved in disaster field activities, the bulk of their activity is of a supportive and administrative nature. Indeed, most civil defense officials, at both the state and local levels, perceive the carrying out of such functions as the primary role of their organizations. The most frequently found statement of civil defense responsibility during disasters says that such organizations are to "coordinate" the emergency relief response to disaster. Evidently, this general statement is taken by most civil defense officials to mean that their organizations are to assume primarily administrative functions.

We have mentioned elsewhere that the collection of groups and organizations which become involved in emergency relief activities following a disaster can be viewed as a super or synthetic organization. To some degree, local and state civil defense organizations become the administrative or managerial arms of these synthetic organizations, while such organizations as the police, fire, and public works function as their technical or operational units. It is the job of technical units in organizations to produce something which will be used by the organization's customers. In the case of disasters, the customers of the synthetic organization are the affected persons in the community, i.e., the public; and the products of the synthetic organization are the emergency services such as search and rescue, warning, caring for casualties, etc., "produced" by the police, hospitals, and its other technical units.

It is the job of managerial units in organizations: to mediate between their technical units and those who use the organization's products, to procure the resources that are needed by the technical units so that they can continue to carry out their operational functions, and to control the technical units by establishing operational priorities and making organizational policy. The latter managerial function, i.e., control, is usually not assumed by civil defense in the case of the synthetic organization and we will discuss the reason for this in the next chapter; however, the other two managerial functions are to some extent assumed by civil defense insofar as the disaster-generated synthetic organization is concerned.

As the managerial units of synthetic organizations, for example, civil defense organizations usually try to seek out needed resources for the police, hospitals, public works, and other operational units. Also in terms of their managerial role, civil defense organizations often assume the task of mediating between such operational or technical units and the customers (i.e., the public) of the synthetic organizations. This includes determining what the public needs in the way of disaster services so that feedback can be made to the technical units, and informing the public what is being done by the synthetic organization in its behalf.

Usually, these administrative and support functions assumed by civil defense organizations are carried out at their headquarters or emergency operations center, rather than in the field. Also, it is these kinds of tasks that the cadre and the bulk of the government-appointed civil defense members are likely to engage in. To the extent that the field or operational tasks are of the "blue collar" type, these administrative activities are of the "white collar" variety.

Much of the management function of civil defense organizations during disaster situations has to do with emergency information. Frequently, this entails both the collection of needed information and its dissemination to other organizations as well as to the general public. If a disaster agent is of the progressive type, civil defense communication efforts may assist in preparing the public for the emergency prior to the actual impact of the agent. For example, after acquiring information about Hurricane Dora from the weather bureau, a local civil defense office took the following course of action:

> We began to check up on all the radio stations, all the television stations. We put out announcements to the people that Hurricane Dora posed a threat to their area and for everybody to take proper precautions. That began at 11:50. By a little after 1:00 we had contacted 12 radio stations, 2 newspapers, and 2 television stations with that essential information. Our concentration was almost total. We got almost 100 percent saturation. Anybody who had a radio on and was in listening distance . . . had a chance to know that we were in danger and that we had better prepare for it.

Similarly, prior to the Northcentral floods, the state civil defense organization put out emergency news releases and information regarding the flood danger. News briefings for representatives from the mass media were also held at the civil defense flood control center. Such preparatory activity is possible, then, when the disaster agent is a progressive one.

Usually after a disaster agent has actually struck an area, the collection and dissemination of emergency information is one of the major tasks of civil defense organizations throughout the entire emergency period. During this period, civil defense headquarters may become a collection point for disaster-relevant data. This is particularly true when the civil defense headquarters becomes the headquarters and nerve center for the majority of the disaster-activated groups and organizations. When this happens, considerable information can be funneled from operational units in the field to their

representatives at the disaster headquarters, thus becoming available to civil defense officials. Some groups and organizations in disaster subcultural areas routinely establish such information collection points at civil defense headquarters whenever disaster threatens.

The management role that civil defense organizations often assume for the operational or technical units of the synthetic organization can be clearly seen with regard to the dissemination of information to the public. Civil defense organizations, for example, are frequently responsible for releasing information from disaster headquarters regarding what disaster-activated groups and organizations are doing for the public's welfare, when such groups and organizations expect to have services restored, and information concerning the things the public can do to facilitate the work of the emergency units. Thus, in such cases civil defense serves as the mediating link between the synthetic organization and the public (see fig. 2).

In addition to releasing emergency information to the public via the mass media, civil defense personnel spend considerable amounts of their time during disasters answering individual telephone inquiries when telephones are still operative. In one city during Hurricane Betsy, for example, civil defense received numerous calls from persons who wanted information about where the nearest shelters were located and how they should secure their homes during the storm. During a flood in a mountain state, the telephones at civil defense headquarters were constantly busy with people asking such questions as, "Should we evacuate?", "How fast is the water rising?", "What agencies are involved in emergency activities?", etc. And as a final illustration, in a Southeastern city during Hurricane Dora civil defense personnel were kept busy with calls from the general public wanting to know where food could be secured and where evacuation assistance could be acquired. By passing on answers to such inquiries, civil defense functioned as the mediator between the public and the operational emergency units; this served to link those with a need to those who had the capacity to meet it (see fig. 3).

Civil defense's success in carrying out this informational role during disasters, of course, is dependent upon its ability to stay "in the thick of things" and to have ready access to the sources of information, i.e., access to those groups and organizations that are out in the field or their representatives. If a civil defense organization cannot make contact with such groups and organizations during a disaster, it will essentially be isolated and its ability to play an important role with regard to emergency information will be significantly impaired. In an earlier study, Rosow reports, for example, that following the Worcester tornado the local civil defense organization was hampered in its operations because it did not have access to information regarding what was happening in the field.[1]

Finally, the role of civil defense in disseminating emergency information may be hindered by the existence of competing and sometimes unreliable sources of information. Following the Northwestern earthquake, for example, civil defense officials found it difficult to control the dissemination of inaccurate information to the public by some broadcasting officials. As a result, this situation to some extent undermined the faith of the public in official civil defense emergency information releases.

Figure 2

THE MEDIATING ROLE OF CIVIL DEFENSE IN THE DISSEMINATION OF DISASTER INFORMATION



Figure 3

THE ROLE OF CIVIL DEFENSE IN LINKING DISASTER OPERATIONAL UNITS WITH THOSE IN THE PUBLIC WHO REQUEST ASSISTANCE



The other major function of civil defense, as the managerial component of the synthetic organization, is that of procurement. Needed disaster resources are often located by civil defense for operational groups and organizations so that they can continue to "produce" disaster services for the public. Such procurement may involve the location of a needed resource for a particular organization right in the synthetic organization itself, i.e., among the other involved emergency units. This, then, entails the redistribution of the needed resource from one unit in the synthetic organization to another. Civil defense, therefore, not only provides a link between the synthetic organization and the public, but it provides a vital linkage between the operational units within the synthetic organization as well. Also, civil defense can sometimes make available to other emergency groups and organizations items from its own arsenal of resources such as medical supplies and emergency communication and generation equipment.

The procurement activity of a civil defense organization may also entail locating and securing needed resources outside of the affected community or area. This type of procurement is usually done at the state civil defense level.

There are numerous illustrations from recent disasters of the involvement of civil defense organizations in the emergency supply and distribution process. In a Gulf state during Hurricane Betsy, for example, most of the coordination effort of the local civil defense organization consisted of linking those who needed such resources as manpower and equipment with those units who could make them available. Following the Midwestern explosion, civil defense was responsible for locating badly needed emergency equipment such as jacks, acetylene torches, wrecking bars, a mobile crane, etc.; this equipment was utilized by the police, the fire department, and other disaster-activated organizations to extricate trapped victims. Civil defense had a detailed inventory of emergency supplies available in the community which was useful in quickly locating such equipment. After the plant explosion in the Northeast, the local civil defense office became a center for procuring supplies and equipment. The work of the civil defense personnel along these lines was responsible for the prompt arrival of foam trucks, gas masks, and emergency crews and equipment needed by firemen and other emergency personnel at the disaster scene. Finally, during the Northcentral floods the state civil defense organization received numerous requests for emergency equipment and personnel at its flood disaster operations center. Much of the staff's time was spent locating these needed resources.

In some instances, civil defense organizations have pre-disaster knowledge concerning the location of disaster-relevant resources and capabilities in their respective communities and areas. However, in most cases, this is done on an emergent, trial and error basis during an actual disaster. Obviously, prior knowledge of available emergency resources in the form of inventories would enable civil defense organizations to more rapidly procure assistance for those in need, whether it is the general public or units of the synthetic organization. Unfortunately, such preplanning usually has low priority relative to other organizational demands.

To summarize, we noted in this chapter that civil defense organizations become involved in both operational and administrative activities during natural disasters, with the latter type receiving the most attention. We suggested that civil defense organizations can be viewed as managers of the synthetic organizations which develop to handle the problems produced by disasters. Civil defense organizations, for example, provide the public with feedback as to what disaster-activated groups and organizations are doing for its welfare. And finally, they procure needed resources for the general public as well as the emergency-involved social units.

It should be noted in retrospect that there is considerable discontinuity from the normal day-to-day functioning of the civil defense office and the tasks and responsibilities which it assumes as a civil defense "organization" in emergency conditions. This is particularly true of the administrative responsibilities which are acquired in emergency. For example, there is very little prior experience in the collection and dissemination of emergency information; little experience is also acquired in the development of administrative skills. This means that much of this has to be learned on the spot under emergency conditions. While learning does occur that way, it is probably still true that there is greater discontinuity between pre-disaster and post-disaster activities within civil defense organizations than would be found in most other organizations, such as police, fire, and hospitals, which traditionally become involved in emergency activity.

NOTES: CHAPTER V

1. Irving Rosow, "Authority in Natural Disasters," mimeographed manuscript (Columbus: Disaster Research Center, The Ohio State University, 1968).

CHAPTER VI

THE AUTHORITY RELATIONS AND JURISDICTION OF CIVIL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS DURING DISASTER

Authority refers to the likelihood that a given command will be obeyed. As such, it is recognized as one of the key dimensions of human interaction. Without its legitimation in some form or another, it is difficult to conceive of the possibility for organized behavior. Governments and other bureaucratic organizations, for example, are able to function because they are invested with legal or enacted authority.

Authority arrangements are crucial during both crisis and noncrisis periods. In some respects, however, authority is even more crucial during periods of crisis such as during disaster; this may be particularly true with regard to intergroup and interorganizational authority relations. During noncrisis periods, the various groups and organizations of a community can function in a fairly autonomous fashion. However, during disaster, if a community is to respond effectively and rapidly to disaster-generated problems, substantially greater collective decision making and coordination will be required of its groups and organizations. This entails the delineation of authority and jurisdiction among the disaster-relevant groups and organizations. If this is not accomplished, the result may be the overlapping of responsibilities, duplication of effort, and the neglect of some important emergency tasks.

Sometimes the areas of responsibility and authority of disaster-relevant social units have been predetermined, e.g., through disaster plans. Too often, however, as we have mentioned before, these things are not planned and therefore their development takes on a trial and error character. Yet, even when authority and jurisdictional spheres have been mapped out by disaster planning, the nature of disaster is such that it is unlikely that all such problems can be either anticipated or prevented.

In this chapter, we will discuss the authority and jurisdiction of civil defense organizations during disaster vis-a-vis other disaster-activated groups and organizations. In many respects, this is one of the most serious problem areas for such organizations. This is generally true because civil defense organizations frequently have uncertain authority during natural disaster and/or because other disaster-involved groups and organizations may fail to acknowledge the legitimacy of their claim to authority.

Uncertain Authority and Responsibility

While civil defense organizations are expected to become involved in natural disaster operations, it is often unclear as to what duties they should perform and what authority they possess relative to other public agencies and

organizations. In some instances, both civil defense officials and officials of other agencies may be similarly uncertain about this. A mountain state flood is a case in point. Within the affected community, the role of civil defense was not clearly defined. While some city officials felt CD should assume responsibility for the entire effort, it was clear that the local director, as a part-time appointee with a staff of volunteers, had only limited capabilities to provide overall coordination and control. Local CD had never received much support in the community either from elective officials or the technicians among the city employees In addition, although a capable man in his own right, the director himself was unclear concerning the responsibilities of his office in natural disasters. Thus, the civil defense staff spent much time the first night of the flood and the forenoon of the next day discovering what they could and should do in the emergency.

On the other hand, some civil defense organizations have utilized the "lead time" (i.e., the time prior to the impact of a disaster agent) afforded by a progressive disaster agent to clarify authority relationships. Prior to the Northcentral floods, for example, state civil defense officials held meetings with officials from other disaster-relevant agencies to outline authority relationships and disaster responsibilities. State CD officials attributed the relative absence of authority and jurisdictional disputes during the flood emergency operation to such efforts.

Other things being equal, it appears that there is a tendency for the natural disaster task domains of civil defense organizations to be less uncertain in disaster subcultural areas. This is related to their greater institutionalization in these disaster-prone areas, and to the fact that they may have been frequently called upon to operate alongside other emergency units, thus having the opportunity of establishing fairly definite task and responsibility spheres.

Yet, natural disasters can create unanticipated contingencies that sometimes cause a blurring of organizational task and authority domains even in areas characterized by disaster subcultural patterns. For example, a hurricane disaster subculture appears to have evolved to some degree in many Gulf Coast cities and the patterns of this subculture include the delineation of the disaster tasks of emergency organizations, including civil defense. However, during the emergency relief operation following Hurricane Betsy, a dispute arose in one community between the local civil defense organization and the Red Cross over the jurisdiction of the emergency shelter program. In terms of a formal agreement, the Red Cross had the authority to operate the public shelters. During the disaster, however, the demand for emergency shelter was according to civil defense officials, greater than the Red Cross had prepared to handle. As a result, civil defense became involved in providing shelter for refugees. One civil defense official put it this way: "Under an arrangement between the state and the Red Cross, the Red Cross is responsible for disaster shelters. However, the refugees were of such a magnitude I felt that we had better get into this shelter program real quick." Because civil defense became involved in the shelter program, some conflict developed between it and Red Cross.

In general, disputes over emergency task domains are not uncommon between civil defense and organizations with a voluntary membership character such as the Red Cross. Like civil defense, the Red Cross often assumes social service and support tasks during disaster, as well as the residual emergency tasks which have not been assumed by the more institutionalized emergency organizations such as police and fire departments. As a result of generally functioning in the same task areas during disaster, such organizations sometimes overlap in terms of specific emergency activities. Following the Midwestern explosion, for example, civil defense and the Red Cross experienced some overlap in their emergency activities. While Red Cross representatives were compiling lists of the dead at the explosion site, the county civil defense director insisted that all welfare inquiries should be directed to the disaster site, since that was the location of the command post. However, the executive director of the local Red Cross chapter thought that all such inquiries should be handled at its own headquarters. The conflict was quickly resolved when the executive director telephoned the CD director and indicated that the Red Cross was expected by the public to handle such activity. He declared that a casualty list would be sent out only when it was completed and that CD could do whatever they wanted with it at that time. While this conflict was quickly resolved it indicated potential sources of disagreement between the two organizations. As long as the two groups had a large overlap in functions some disagreement was inevitable. Similarly, Rosow in an earlier study reports that in Worcester following the tornado the local civil defense organization and the Red Cross experienced considerable overlap in their emergency activities, particularly with regard to the registration and relief of disaster victims.[1]

This kind of overlap in emergency functions between CD and similar organizations is sometimes due to more than the existence of amorphous task and authority domains. Like civil defense, the Red Cross and Salvation Army must also be concerned about public support, since their normal activities are similarly not viewed by outsiders as central to the public's welfare. Sometimes during disaster, then, these organizations overlook even well-delineated task and authority domains in order to "get into the thick of things" so that they can legitimize their claim for public support. Thus, this may result in these organizations assuming overlapping emergency functions.

Contested Authority

Earlier, we suggested that civil defense organizations function to some degree in a managerial capacity for disaster-generated synthetic organizations by doing two things: by providing the operational units of synthetic organizations with many of the resources they need to continue producing disaster services for the public, and by mediating between these operational units and the public. The managerial units of most organizations, however, also perform a third function, i.e., control. Thus, in order for a civil defense organization to completely function in a managerial role for a synthetic organization, it too would have to function in a control capacity, i.e., direct and

control the emergency activities of its operational units. Usually, however, the authority which would enable a civil defense organization to do this does not evolve.

Civil defense organizations are usually potential sources of coordinative authority during natural disaster. And sometimes when they attempt to exert such authority over the overall disaster response of a synthetic organization, or over important segments of that response, the legitimacy of this is challenged or not acknowledged by other groups and organizations.

Following the Midwestern explosion, for example, a civil defense official attempted to coordinate the distribution of the injured to hospitals so that the hospitals closest to the scene would not become overloaded. First, he attempted to determine the conditions at different hospitals and then he directed ambulance drivers to particular ones in such a way that the distribution of patients would be fairly even. However, the ambulance drivers did not follow the directions of the civil defense official; apparently, they did not recognize the right of civil defense to coordinate and direct their efforts. As a result, the distribution of patients to hospitals in the community was far from even.

The mountain state flood provides an illustration of how the authority of civil defense to coordinate emergency measures may be actually challenged by another agency. During the entire emergency period as the crest of the flood approached the city, there was jurisdictional conflict between the office of the city engineer and local civil defense. At first, when civil defense did not attempt to control or coordinate much of the local activities, there was not much disagreement. The two offices operated somewhat independently. However, after the proclamation of the governor, indicating that civil defense would be the official coordinating agency, there were several sharp verbal clashes between officials from the two offices. An impasse was reached with the city engineer's office coming to handle most of the activity in the city and in some of the adjacent suburban areas. The local civil defense coordinated information and took upon itself whatever else was not being handled at the civic center office.

For civil defense organizations to exert authority and control over important disaster activity may be even more difficult and uncertain when volunteers are heavily involved in the attempt. A Northwestern flood is a case in point. Throughout the disaster, the local airport was one of the key centers of emergency activity. The airport served as a logistics center as several hundred thousand pounds of emergency supplies were flown there from outside the city. Also, from this point thousands of residents were evacuated to another city. State civil defense officials delegated authority for directing the important activities at the airport to a group of volunteers. In terms of our previous discussion, these were emergency volunteers since they had had no prior connection with civil defense.

The authority of these civil defense volunteers, however, did not go unchallenged. Resistance came from the National Guard who had some members of their organization theoretically assigned by state civil defense officials

to work in support of the volunteers at the airport. There was some feeling in the Guard that a civilian volunteer group could not effectively direct an operation as important as the airport logistics center. On several occasions National Guard officers contested the authority of the civil defense volunteers by making decisions that the volunteers had been authorized to make. Also, Guard officers sometimes countermanded the orders that had been given by the civil defense volunteers to Guardsmen who had been assigned to work under them. The civil defense volunteers were aware that their authority was being undermined; yet, being emergency volunteers with no previous involvement with civil defense, they were uncertain as to the exact nature of their authority. Meetings between civil defense officials and the Guard finally resolved this dilemma. However, up until this point, the situation proved to be quite troublesome.

In general, an organization which is usually not viewed as having the capacity for leadership, i.e., men, equipment, relevant expertise, etc., will find it difficult to get other groups and organizations to recognize its claim for authority to direct disaster activities. This is true even when the organization has been officially designated such authority. Civil defense organizations are often perceived by other emergency groups and organizations as not possessing the capacity for leadership. This is, of course, the result of their generally uncertain position and support in most communities and their need to rely upon volunteer and quasi-volunteer personnel rather than full-time professional members.

Organizations with highly trained professional personnel are particularly prone to view civil defense units as amateur organizations and to challenge the legitimacy of their authority to direct disaster activities on this basis. In an earlier study Rosow, for example, found that the police in a Northeastern city viewed civil defense in this fashion during the tornado disaster. For example, one interviewee expressed it in the following manner:

> A disaster like this is really a police job, it's a police operation. But in an emergency, the police are subordinate to civil defense according to state law. . . . This just ties the hands of the police department. But what the hell do guys over in civil defense know about something like this. Nothin'. Why, hell, it took them three hours to get themselves untangled and get one single rescue team out there. Big deal! Can you depend on people like that? They got nice guys over there -- personally nice I mean -- and a couple of them are capable. But they don't know anything about handling emergencies -- any kind. And they have no real organization. You just can't expect them to know what to do when something like this happens. Sure, they can help just like anyone else. But they can't <u>run</u> a show like this.[2]

What resulted was a separation of leadership from formal authority; that is, the police exerted the leadership although civil defense possessed the official authority in the disaster.

There are circumstances which facilitate the exertion of leadership and authority by civil defense organizations during natural disaster. These conditions or circumstances include: the firm support of civil defense authority by such officials as the mayor or governor, the absence of competing authorities, and the presence of a real capacity to exert authority. During the Northwestern earthquake disaster, the presence of the governor at the state civil defense headquarters gave support to that organization's claim of emergency coordinative authority. Similarly, the support of the local mayor during Hurricane Betsy bolstered the claim of the local civil defense organization to coordinative powers. The relevance of the absence of competing authorities is demonstrated by the role of state civil defense organizations in some small communities during disaster. For example, during the North-central floods, state civil defense officials found it necessary to exert considerable authority and leadership in some areas because of the absence of effective leadership at the local level. The importance of civil defense leadership capacity seems to be fairly well demonstrated by the data on disaster subcultures. For example, it seems that there is a tendency for civil defense organizations located in disaster subcultural areas to more consistently carry out important leadership roles during disaster because of their greater institutionalization and their greater resources such as disaster plans and experienced members.

Rosow reports that all three of the conditions which tend to facilitate the exertion of authority by civil defense organizations during disaster prevailed in a suburban community during a 1953 tornado disaster in the Northeast. During the disaster the emergency authority system consolidated around the civil defense director because: he had a small but viable civil defense organization with some modest preplanning; there were few persons in the town capable of competing with him for authority and leadership; and the mayor of the town legitimated the civil defense director's authority by supporting his decisions and generally reassuring him.[3]

In the preceding discussion, we left out questions dealing with authority relations between civil defense organizations during natural disaster. This will be considered in the next and final section of this chapter.

Authority Relations Between Civil Defense Organizations

Both local and state civil defense organizations may become involved in emergency activities when disaster strikes a wide area. And in such cases questions of authority and jurisdiction sometimes evolve.

Usually, state civil defense officials are eager to acknowledge the jurisdiction of local civil defense organizations over their own areas. When a local organization has established an adequate disaster operation, state officials may remain pretty much in the background while concentrating on emergency activities at their own level. For example, while commentating on the situation during Hurricane Dora, one state civil defense official observed:

> We got a lot of calls that should have gone to the local [civil defense] operation, to the county. And we try not to get involved in the local operations. In other words, if a man was calling from _____ County for a generator or a pump we'd turn him over to the county because this office is to coordinate state action, not the county. And many of the people of course look down in the telephone book and the first civil defense they hit they call. Of course if we started interfering with the local operation, if we were trying to assist county people and the county's doing it, then we got a mix-up. It'll confuse the issue.

Local civil defense organizations are expected to organize and have jurisdiction, then, over their own grass roots disaster operations. And the role of the state civil defense organizations is expected to be that of marshalling state resources and providing the local organizations with state assistance as it is required. Also in this connection, state and local civil defense organizations are supposed to function in a liaison capacity for their respective levels. A local organization, for example, is expected to screen requests for state assistance made by local people, making certain that a requested resource or service is not available at the grass roots level before passing it on to the state level through the state civil defense organization. In turn, the state civil defense organization is supposed to locate the needed resource or service at the state level and then pass it on to the grass roots level by way of the local civil defense organization. This expected relationship between local and state civil defense organizations during disaster is illustrated in figure 4.

However, this clear-cut division of authority and subsequent channeling of requests is sometimes not realized. For example, there are times when state civil defense organizations become more directly involved in local disaster operations than they care to. Likewise, there are occasions when official channels for requesting and allocating disaster resources are not followed. And when the respective jurisdictions of state and local civil defense organizations are ignored, problems may occur.

After the 1964 earthquake, for example, as we mentioned previously, separate state and local civil defense operations were established in the same city. On some occasions during the disaster state civil defense dealt directly with local residents and organizations in allocating resources, instead of working through the local civil defense organization. Similarly, in some cases local civil defense officials went directly to state agencies for resources and services instead of coordinating through the state civil defense organization. These occasional jurisdictional and coordination breakdowns led to some duplication of effort. Part of this situation did stem from communication problems brought on by the earthquake; for example, normal means of communication were badly disrupted and it was not always easy for groups and organizations to make contact so that they could coordinate their efforts. Part of the problem was also based, however, on the nature of the internal structure of the two civil defense organizations and the manner in which they were viewed by the rest of the community.

Figure 4

EXPECTED LIAISON RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOCAL AND
STATE CIVIL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS DURING DISASTER



LOCAL LEVEL

STATE LEVEL

During the emergency period in this community, the general public as well as many of the disaster-activated groups and organizations often failed to differentiate between the state and local civil defense organizations. This was undoubtedly due to the generally low visibility that these two organizations had in the community prior to the disaster. As a result, demands were often made on the two organizations during the disaster without regard for their separate jurisdictional boundaries. Occasionally, for example, local groups went directly to the state civil defense organization for disaster assistance, instead of turning to the local civil defense organization.

Also, as we noted in an earlier chapter, both state and local civil defense organizations acquired a considerable number of volunteer members during the disaster. Like the general public, many of these volunteers were unfamiliar (at least during the early stages of the disaster) with the jurisdictions of the two civil defense organizations. As a result, volunteers in one civil defense organization sometimes met requests that should have been handled in the other organization.

The occasional disregarding of civil defense jurisdictions that occurred in this community was not all unintentional, however. Some of this was done intentionally because of time pressures. For example, during the disaster the local civil defense organization was officially supposed to channel requests for military assistance through the state civil defense headquarters. But because of the requirement for speed, during one point in the emergency period local civil defense with the approval of some military officials bypassed state civil defense and presented their requests for assistance directly to the military command. According to some officials, this was done in order to "cut the red tape."

Finally, jurisdictional lines between state and local civil defense organizations are sometimes ignored on those occasions when state civil defense organizations find it necessary to become overly involved in disaster relief operations at the grass roots level. This usually happens when a local civil defense organization seemingly does not have the capacity to organize an effective disaster operation. A 1967 flood is a case in point; in this instance, the state civil defense organization assumed control over civil defense functions in the community during the disaster. One of the main reasons that this occurred was that given the enormous size of the flood disaster the state rather than the local civil defense organization was viewed as possessing the skills and resources required for organizing an effective emergency operation. Acknowledging the desirability of local direction of community disaster operations, state officials reported that they reluctantly became directly involved in the situation.

In summary, we suggested that civil defense organizations often experience some difficulty in terms of their authority and jurisdiction during disaster. Among other things, this is due to the fact that their disaster authority is often unclear or is not acknowledged as legitimate by other disaster-activated social units. However, as we indicated, there are conditions which facilitate the exercise of leadership and authority by civil defense organizations during natural disasters.

Finally, local and state civil defense organizations may become activated during the same disaster. When this occurs, questions regarding their respective authority and jurisdiction may arise. Often, local and state civil defense organizations establish separate operations and work in support of one another. On other occasions, however, authority and jurisdictional spheres may be breached.

NOTES: CHAPTER VI

1. Irving Rosow, "Authority in Natural Disasters," mimeographed manuscript (Columbus: Disaster Research Center, The Ohio State University, 1968).

2. Rosow, "Authority in Natural Disasters," p. 135.

3. Rosow, "Authority in Natural Disasters," p. 88.

CHAPTER VII

IMPLICATIONS FOR A NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE

In these concluding pages, implications concerning the operations of local civil defense units will be projected into the more inclusive context of events which might occur in a nuclear catastrophe. The basic assumption made here is that the range of problems experienced by the local civil defense unit in a disaster setting would be similar to those which would be encountered subsequent to a nuclear catastrophe. Where there are differences, they can be visualized primarily as ones of degree. With the exception of the specific form of secondary threat, i.e., radiation, and the probability that a wider geographical area will be involved, a nuclear explosion would not create essentially different problems for community response.

Given this assumption of similarity, it is perhaps appropriate to review some of the more problematic aspects of the operation of civil defense in disasters. Many of them, but not all, could be expected to be problematic in nuclear situations. It is perhaps well to remember that civil defense has been traditionally oriented toward potential nuclear situations rather than other types of community emergency. In addition, civil defense in these nuclear situations was visualized as constituting any and all emergency actions, not just those actions engaged in by the identifiable community unit called civil defense. The local civil defense director was seen as constituting the chief of staff to the officials of civil government in such emergency situations. How these expectations about the role of civil defense are realized in disaster emergencies will provide some insight into its potential role in nuclear emergencies.

It is perhaps necessary to point out that one of the "difficulties" local civil defense units have experienced in operating in natural disasters is that national policy is primarily nuclear oriented. Local and state agencies, however, are permitted and indeed encouraged to become involved in other types of emergencies, including disasters. This discontinuity between national and local "policy" provides an initial problem which provides a degree of ambiguity in conceptions of community responsibility. This ambiguity would, of course, be resolved in operations subsequent to a nuclear catastrophe. Other problems, however, would not be resolved in the same way.

Community Perceptions of Civil Defense

First and critically important in the pattern of emergency operations is the way in which civil defense is viewed at the local community level. Based on experience in disasters, there is a tendency for organizational officials, both governmental and nongovernmental, to see civil defense, not as the function of civil government in emergency, but as constituting a separate emergency organization. This perception, of course, determines how other organizations

respond to the entity called civil defense. For example, the police department relates, as an organization, to another organization called civil defense rather than considering their own police activities as a part of the "overall" civil defense effort.

While civil defense is seen as an organizational entity, this entity is also viewed as not possessing particularly significant resources to be used in emergencies. In other words, other organizational personnel within the community tend to see it as being "weak," both in its material resources and in its capacity to provide manpower and/or leadership.

In addition to being seen as an organizational entity, the civil defense office is also seen as being a "national" organization, as contrasted with a local one. Most emergency organizations, such as police, fire, and hospitals, have deep community roots which result in the generation of community pride and possession. While, in many ways, civil defense is just as local, the identification with national problems and the partial support provided from outside the community tends to reduce the strong community identification for civil defense. This lack of support and the lack of clarity as to the civil defense role within the community emergency pattern tends to exclude it from constant consideration as being an integral part of the emergency effort within the community.

In large part, the lack of clarity of the function and role of local civil defense is characteristic of a situation which emerges when any new form of organization is created. New organizations have to create new relationships with others. Usually these relationships are developed on the basis of some exchange of mutual advantage. Most traditional community organizations perhaps find it difficult to understand the reciprocal advantages to be derived.

Functioning of the Civil Defense Unit in Disaster

The uncertainty of the role of civil defense in community disasters on the part of other community organizations is reflected in the internal operations of the civil defense unit. This uncertainty is heightened by the ambiguity between national and local policies of involvement. While local CD directors may be more certain of their potential role in a nuclear situation, they are likely to be less certain of their role in disasters. This lack of certainty may be increased by his definition of the uniqueness and lack of similarity of nuclear situations to disaster operations. The uncertainty is also aggravated by the fact that other emergency organizations within the community see the role of civil defense as being different from the way that the local CD director sees it.

The ambiguity of the role of the CD director in local government is also important as background to understanding the functioning of CD in disasters. Particularly in a small community, the person who fills this position may be the sole continuity between the pre-disaster office and the post-disaster organization. His role then is of critical importance. Based on the concern

for the possibilities of nuclear attack, local governments were encouraged by a variety of means ranging from moral to financial to institute a new municipal role -- that of local CD director. While the initiation of any new municipal function takes time to become institutionalized, there is added difficulty in institutionalizing a role which is to be activated primarily in the future. Consequently, it was often difficult to get local governments to allocate extensive resources, even with federal help. As a local official with no immediate operating responsibility and with minimum local support, the position came to have relatively low prestige within the local government hierarchy. Compared with other municipal positions, there were both limits and a minimum of opportunities to accumulate political power. Too, as we have already indicated, federal support which helped initiate and maintain the position carried with it the impression that civil defense was more of a federal than a municipal concern.

As a result of all of these factors, the role of the local civil defense director was vaguely defined and not clearly understood both by other municipal officials as well as by the general public. While the local director might have his emergency responsibilities legally defined, his position is usually structurally weak. He cannot depend on tradition to validate his authority, nor does he have visible resources available to strengthen his position. To assume that this relatively weak position within the local governmental structure would change to a dominant, perhaps even central position in emergencies is, of course, unrealistic. While disasters are often assumed to create dramatic changes, they seldom do. There is greater continuity to community evaluations and actual behavior in post-disaster situations than is commonly imagined, so a weak position is seldom strengthened in such circumstances.

In emergency conditions, the anticipated role of the local CD director was seen as being chief of staff to the recognized municipal officials, particularly the mayor. In actual practice in disasters, this pattern of assistance does not develop. There seem to be two major reasons for this. First, mayors seldom play the dominant coordinating role in disasters which is envisaged for them. This does not imply that they play no important part; they do. Perhaps the best way to visualize a role played by mayors in disasters is to suggest they play a "symbolic" function. They tend to symbolize the unity and continuity of community life. Their concern, as expressed on television, radio, and other public appearances, is one of reassurance and maintaining morale while identifying with the tragedy and suffering which cuts across the community. In many respects, the mayor seems to assume the "emotional" leadership within the community. This is a role that cannot be assumed by others within the community quite as easily. No one else symbolizes the total community in the same way that the mayor does, although other elected officials, clergy, and mass media personnel also can contribute to this function. Since the mayor cannot be "replaced" in this role, this means that he does not often become involved in operational tasks and in tasks of coordination. Much of this responsibility then tends to fall on the local CD director.

There are two other forces which tend to push the local CD director into operational tasks subsequent to disaster impact. First, psychologically, it is difficult to maintain an advisory position. There are pressures on all

organizational officials to "do something." Advising and acting as chief of staff to other municipal officials is seldom perceived by local CD officials (and by others viewing him) as "doing something." This pressure tends to move him into more concrete operational tasks. A second, more important factor pushing the CD director to assume operational tasks is the fact that disasters create many problems which are new and outside the domains of traditional emergency organizations. Most emergency organizations define and prescribe the scope of their activity either in their organizational charter or by common agreement. Fire departments fight fires; police departments do not, etc. Many disaster tasks, however, often fall between existing organizational responsibilities or are new and, thus, are the responsibility of no traditional organization. Civil defense directors by "default" become involved in these unwanted tasks. Personnel have to be recruited to perform these tasks. These personnel, in effect, become a part of the civil defense organization. And the CD director has to assume his own "organizational" problems.

Problematic Tasks

The tasks which most often become the "responsibility" of the civil defense organization are (1) information collection and dissemination, (2) search and rescue, and (3) control and coordination of emergency activities.

Generally, no traditional organization within the community sees as its emergency responsibility the collection of information as to what has happened to the community. Each organization tends to collect information which is particularly relevant to its own operations. This means that knowledge about the effect of impact is diffused throughout the community but nowhere in the community is this information collected, collated, and stored. After a period of time, when community officials attempt to make emergency plans based on incomplete information as well as the duplication of effort, there is the attempt to centralize the information already collected and to fill in the gaps where it is nonexistent. Such a responsibility often falls to civil defense.

As this information becomes available, organizational officials, as well as the general public, seek it out. Civil defense often finds that it is responsible for providing news for the mass media, requests for specific types of equipment, inquiries about victims and potential victims from relatives and friends, the determination of the truth value of certain reports, etc. In order to fulfill these requests, some type of organizational structure has to be provided to receive and process information. Thus, local civil defense becomes operational. (Sometimes, of course, this task is not assumed by CD or by any other organization within the community.)

A second task which often becomes the responsibility of an operational CD is search and rescue. While other emergency organizations often have rescue operations as a responsibility, their expectations are to engage in such tasks on a limited basis, primarily as an adjunct to their major

responsibilities. This seems to characterize the attitudes of fire and police departments. In instantaneous-diffused disasters, the scope of damage often presents a vast area to be searched for potential victims. At the same time, there are many obvious tasks which seem relevant to the major responsibilities of police and fire departments and to which personnel of these organizations become committed. Rescue activities, thus, are conducted somewhat haphazardly and consistent search activities are often nonexistent. When this becomes apparent, civil defense organizations often assume this responsibility. And, again, civil defense is pushed into operational tasks.

The third area in which civil defense becomes operational is in terms of what might be called the control and coordination of emergency activities. At the site of disaster impact, the involvement of many different organizations with their personnel is necessary since many different skills are needed to solve the problems which have been created. Civil defense "officials," that is, persons identified with the civil defense organization, often become involved in the process of attempting to keep this effort moving. At a different level, one in which the total needs and efforts of the community have to be considered, there are emergent problems of coordination of effort. Again, civil defense officials often become involved. It is at this level that the civil defense director comes closest to the expected chief of staff role. The role of the mayor in such situations, however, varies. The efforts at coordination which emerge in disasters are most likely to take on the form of a very complex "brokerage" system where the involved organizations exchange information, goods, services, and credit. The local civil defense director often provides the facilities and the setting in which this exchange can take place.

There are other tasks which have become the responsibility of local civil defense. In general, one could say that local civil defense is likely to assume tasks which emerge in disaster situations which are not considered the responsibility of any other existing emergency organization within the community. In this sense, the local unit has to assume as operational tasks "unwanted" and "residual" responsibilities.

The actual tasks assumed would depend primarily on two factors -- the nature of disaster impact which might create special unanticipated problems, and the "coverage" of responsibilities of existing community organizations. In the final "assignment" of responsibility, it is predictable that a certain amount of tension will develop between civil defense and two other community organizations -- the police department and the Red Cross. This is because these organizations have a broad emergency mandate and, even though they may not assume operational responsibility for a particular task, they may resent the assumption of this responsibility by another organization.

It is perhaps important to add that the optimum condition which tends to produce operational tasks for the local civil defense units is the diffused type of disaster. Widespread community impact, which can result from earthquakes, hurricanes, etc., would also be characteristic of nuclear impact. In addition, a diffused type of disaster is likely to create the conditions in which disaster operations are most difficult. Damage to communication and

transportation facilities presents barriers for mobilization, the collection of information, adequate search and rescue, and control and coordination.

It is also important to note that in the "design" of civil defense for the local community, it was not anticipated that the local unit would have extensive operational responsibilities. We are suggesting that it does in disaster. This is implied in the suggestion of a shift from "office" to "organization." This means that personnel have to be recruited for these tasks and the local director becomes involved in a series of problems which attend the expansion of organizations -- recruitment, mobilization, training, task assignment, etc. These operational tasks have to be assumed in addition to the advisory tasks which he expects. This means that he has more responsibility than he anticipated. In addition, since he is involved in operational tasks, there is generally no provision for back-up personnel or shift personnel to replace him. Since most disaster emergencies extend over a period of time, the problem of fatigue becomes most critical for the person who may have the greatest "overall" responsibility.

While the previous sections have concentrated on certain problematic aspects of civil defense involvement, it is also useful to explore the conditions in which local civil defense units have "successfully" become involved in emergency activities in disasters since this will provide insight into their anticipated role in a nuclear situation.

Conditions of Successful Civil Defense Involvement in Disasters

Perhaps the best overall generalization which can be made concerning the successful involvement of civil defense organizations in disaster is that their degree of success is dependent upon their ability to provide the local community with resources which are necessary for emergency activity. These resources can be in the form of the skills and knowledge of personnel or in the form of equipment and facilities.

The conditions which are most likely to be productive of successful involvement are as follows:

1. that local civil defense has developed previous experience in handling community disasters. There are two aspects to this: first, the fact of previous involvement in most instances indicates the accumulation of experience in the definition of responsibility, the identification of tasks, and the practice of coordination; second, disaster experience provides the opportunity for other community emergency organizations as well as the general public to see the utility and competence of local civil defense.

2. that municipal government provides a structure which accepts and legitimizes the civil defense function. Local civil defense directors are found in different governmental units and in different "levels of importance" within these structures. This is due to the

fact that there is considerable diversity in municipal administrative forms. For example, some directors are orga izationally isolated from the major daily activities of a municipal government. This rather marginal position could perhaps be justified from the viewpoint of efficient municipal administration. A position which has responsibility for events which are both problematic and in the future is not as organizationally important for municipal administration as those offices concerned with continuous daily municipal responsibility -- e.g., the maintenance of public order, the collection of garbage, the maintenance of streets, the provision of public utilities, etc. By contrast, if the position of civil defense director is structured so that the person is involved in the daily ongoing process of municipal administration, this tends to create a situation in which his function is both appreciated and utilized when emergencies do occur. Attempts to integrate his function into municipal operations become very problematic during an emergency when operational demands are pressing. If this integration has already taken place through previous involvement, then the operational demands can be more easily handled.

3. that the local civil defense director has the ability to generate significant pre-disaster relationships among those organizations which do become involved in emergency activities. In large part, this condition is more easily achieved as an extension of the previous one. If local directors are structurally integrated into municipal administration, they are more likely to develop the contacts which are necessary to develop effective coordination. In certain instances, however, local directors through their long tenure, active involvement, emergency experience, previous community contacts, and/or individual abilities are able to develop a network of personalized relationships with persons in other community agencies which serves as a basis for the development of coordination in future emergencies. The development of coordination is perhaps most directly related to the importance given the civil defense position within municipal government but, in certain instances, the development of these personal relationships provides a secondary basis upon which coordination can be built.

4. that emergency-relevant resources, such as an emergency operations center, be provided and the knowledge of the availability of these resources is widespread through the community. There are certain resources which are normally not a part of any emergency organization within a community. These resources may be considered to be luxuries in the sense that their infrequent use does not justify their maintenance in terms of the central organizational goals. There are other resources which are not necessary to any one organization but are significant in any type of overall community effort. Local civil defense can provide such resources as a part of the overall community effort. One specific example of relevant resources would be the development of emergency operations centers. While these EOC's are often justified on the basis of maintaining

communications capabilities, the major importance is in providing a location for the reception and storing of information and, as a by-product of this, the center for coordination of the complex brokerage system which develops among the various involved organizations. If relevant information is available, these EOC's become centralized locations for the coordination process. If such facilities are made available and are used by communities in actual emergency situations, they generally demonstrate their usefulness. Sometimes, however, these EOC's are seen primarily as locations for technical communications facilities and the space necessary for becoming a logical center of activities is not available. Consequently, they can become the mere location of the technical transfer of information without being utilized to guide and coordinate activity. In any case, the provision of community-relevant resources such as a fully functioning EOC is one of the important ways in which civil defense exercises its responsibility.

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13. ABSTRACT

This report considers the functioning of civil defense offices in natural disasters. The focus is on the actual operations of these units within the local community. In order to account for the role that civil defense offices assume following a natural disaster, the report looks at both pre- and post-disaster characteristics of these units. The report maintains that civil defense offices tend to be hampered by uncertainty with regard to many of their important organizational dimensions, such as authority relations, tasks, internal structures, and public support. These sources of uncertainty can generate operational difficulties for civil defense offices during disasters. In discussing the mobilization and expansion of civil defense, the report distinguishes between civil defense "office" and civil defense "organization," the latter referring to the expanded post-emergency structure. The expansion personnel include regular and emergency volunteers and government employees from other agencies. Disaster tasks and activities of local civil defense organizations during disasters -- both administrative-support tasks and operational tasks -- are described.

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