

MEMORANDUM
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MAY 1969

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DOCUMENTS OF
AN ELITE VIET CONG DELTA UNIT:
The Demolition Platoon of the 514th Battalion-
Part Three: Military Organization and Activities

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PREFACE

The present Memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the continuing study of Communist organization and operations undertaken by The RAND Corporation for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) and for the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense. It is one of a series of five closely related collections of captured Viet Cong documents, translated by RAND consultant Mai Elliott and with introductory material provided by David W. P. Elliott, now a RAND consultant but formerly a member of the research staff leading an interview team in Dinh Tuong province. Editing of the documents has been held to a minimum. Published separately for convenience in handling, the complete series consists of the following titles:

- Part 1: Unit Composition and Personnel
- Part 2: Party Organization
- Part 3: Military Organization and Activities
- Part 4: Political Indoctrination and Military Training
- Part 5: Personal Letters

To facilitate the reader's comprehension of any single part, this Preface to the entire series and its appended Chronology are prefixed to each Memorandum.

Although literally tons of documents have been captured from Viet Cong political organizations and military units, detailed records of the entire scope of activities and personnel of such units and organizations are rare. Typically, documents appear to cover only a few aspects of the organization from which they come and often raise as many questions

as they answer. A contributory reason may be that large organizations tend to disperse their records both as a consequence of their size and the diversity of their component parts and as a security precaution. Small units and organizations, while often maintaining central files, are normally represented by documents of limited value.

The collection of documents presented here is unique in presenting a detailed and comprehensive picture of a military unit that, although limited in size, reflects the organizational principles and problems of the larger force to which it is attached. At the same time, the smallness of the unit allows the important factor of personality to come into clear focus, thus complementing the recitation of abstract organizational details.

These documents were captured in mid-May 1967 by an element of a U.S. brigade operating in the Mekong Delta. Their comprehensiveness indicates that an entire file of unit records was captured intact. The records include unit rosters, personnel records, documents relating to Party activities in the unit, training documents, operational plans, unit critiques, and personal letters. Comprehensive as they are, those presented in this series are only a selection from a still larger number of documents. They do, however, exemplify most of the significant data that appear in the documents omitted.

The documents are from the records of a demolition platoon of the 514th Battalion, the Local Force unit of My Tho Province in the Mekong Delta. They reflect not only the organization and command structure of the demolition platoon but that of the battalion as well. Several documents from the battalion command staff discuss problems that go beyond the immediate concern of the demolition unit itself.

An integral part of the 514th Battalion, the demolition platoon participated in many, but not all, of its battles. Since the Battalion often dispersed its companies for operations, not all of its elements were engaged in combat at the same time. Moreover, the 514th Battalion normally played a largely defensive role in its operational area. When it did engage in offensive operations, it relied heavily on the demolition unit as the cutting edge of its attack. The unit leader notes that, "We have the responsibility of being the forward group in any attack, of opening the way for the other elements, and of removing obstacles, erected by the enemy to stop our advance, with explosives."

"Since we are the fighters who have to carry out attacks with explosives," the unit leader adds, "we should always be brave and heroic. We should carry out any task assigned to us, whether it be an attack on enemy forces stationed in posts or in the field." Because of its vanguard role in combat and the need to rely on individual initiative when the unit was operating in a dispersed pattern that makes centralized command difficult, heavy emphasis was placed on developing a unit of highly motivated members. Thus, an unusually high proportion of demolition unit members belong to the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) and the PRP Youth Group.

The period covered in the documents runs approximately from the beginning of 1966 to mid-May 1967, when the documents were captured. During this time, unit records contain at least five plans of attack but mention only three being carried out. In May 1967, the 514th Battalion and the demolition unit were subjected to a series of attacks by a

U.S. infantry unit that resulted in the Battalion's defeat and the capture of these documents.

The years 1963 to 1964 marked a campaign period that was fairly successful for the 514th Battalion. Its fortunes slipped somewhat in 1965 and 1966, then briefly improved in 1967 with a successful attack on a GVN pacification project. In the above-mentioned series of battles in May 1967, the Battalion was put out of action until the Tet offensive of February 1968. As a consequence, the documents show the unit at a low ebb. Under strength and not often in action, the 514th Battalion and the demolition unit spent much of the time training, reorganizing, and bolstering unit morale. This relatively low level of offensive military activity thus actually allows us a clearer view of the unit's nature and composition than we could normally have gained of a similar unit busily engaged in offensive operations.

Like all records of contemporary events, this one remains incomplete despite its volume and wealth of detail. From the nadir of its fortunes in May 1967, the 514th Battalion and its demolition unit recovered to play a prominent role in the partially successful and immensely destructive Tet Assault on My Tho, the Delta province town, in February 1967. In the absence of specific information concerning the revival of this unit in the intervening months, it is difficult to say how the recovery was accomplished and how permanent it will prove to be. Nevertheless, the following documents give a detailed view of the foundation on which this revival was based, and very likely provide more than a glimpse of underlying strengths and weaknesses of other and larger Viet Cong military organizations.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE C646 DEMOLITION UNIT OF THE
MY THO PROVINCE 514th LOCAL FORCE BATTALION

- May 6, 1966: Request from the demolition unit's Party Chapter to the battalion for additional men to add to current unit strength of 25.
- May 8, 1966: Three-month training course for the demolition unit initiated.
- May 27, 1966: Attack on Vinh Kim District Town by 514th Battalion and the demolition unit.
- June 1, 1966: Conference of all cadres in the battalion to discuss the new political mission set forth by the Battalion Party Committee.
- July 19, 1966: Planning for attack on Cay Son.
- Aug 12, 1966: Battalion assigned a new area of operation by the Province Military Affairs Section.
- Aug 13, 1966: Battalion moves to Hoa Dong District, Go Cong Province (part of the Viet Cong My Tho Province).
- Sept 17, 1966: Meeting of all political and military cadres in the battalion to discuss the attack on "K 100," or Vinh Kim village. There are no records of the attack taking place.
- Oct 17, 1966: Demolition unit commander notes that unit strength is down to 16 men and requests reinforcements.
- November 1966: One month of training scheduled.
- Dec 21, 1966: Unit strength totals 23 men, 19 present for duty.
- Jan 2, 1967: Indoctrination to launch the 3rd Phase of Activities.
- Jan 9, 1967: Six-day training program initiated with emphasis on political training.
- Feb 7, 1967: Battalion in bivouac for Tet.
- Feb 12, 1967: Conference of all cadres in battalion to review the tasks performed in the winter phase and to communicate to all cadres the tasks to be performed during the spring phase.

- Feb 22, 1967: Thirty-day training program ordered by the Battalion Command Staff.
- Feb 23, 1967: Conference of all military and political cadres in the battalion "to discuss the K 140 and K 111 military plans" on the "center of pacification of the enemy."
- Feb 25, 1967: New additions to unit, but active strength remains 19 members.
- Feb 28, 1967: Political indoctrination on the role of the cadres.
- March 1, 1967: Another plan of attack on points "K 11C, K 18C, and K 18B" is disseminated.
- March 4, 1967: Evaluation of the spring campaign.
- April 6, 1967: Orders given for "deep penetration into enemy areas." Battalion splits into companies.
- April 9, 1968: Meeting of all Company Command Staffs and of the Battalion Command Staff to discuss an attack plan, probably a continuation of the February 23 and March 1 plans.
- May 1, 1967: Sixteen-day training schedule issued by the Battalion Command Staff.
- May 3, 1967: Defense against a sweep operation in Long Tien village.
- May 13, 1967: Attack by the unit on Dong Hoa village, Chau Thanh District (K 19).
- May 15-17, 1967: Series of encounters*with a US-GVN operation culminating in the loss of these documents.

SUMMARY

The documents in this Memorandum concern the organization, administration, and activities of an elite demolition unit attached to the 514 VC Battalion. Except for the few that speak of encounters with Allied Forces, most of these materials are illustrative of the unit's activities during extended intervals between military engagements.

Many of them deal with an unending succession of tasks -- political indoctrination, military training, Party activities. Notable among these are the Kiem Thao sessions, a kind of critical analysis, not of personal but of organizational problems, such as cadre leadership or the unit's performance in combat.

Other documents pertain to military organization and management. For what their contents imply as well as assert, these documents disclose an elaborate pattern of organizational relationships, of interlocking channels of command, supervision, and reporting, running from the Battalion down to the squad. Beyond its obvious usefulness as a method of communication, the system functions as a means for making the lowliest fighter bear a share of personal responsibility for success or failure in military operations.

CONTENTS

PREFACE	iii
CHRONOLOGY OF THE C646 DEMOLITION UNIT OF THE MY THO PROVINCE 514TH LOCAL FORCE BATTALION	vii
SUMMARY	ix
Section	
GUIDE TO THE DOCUMENTS IN THIS MEMORANDUM	1
LIST OF DOCUMENTS IN THIS MEMORANDUM	11
DOCUMENTS	12-125

GUIDE TO THE DOCUMENTS IN THIS MEMORANDUM

The documents in this Memorandum show the Demolition Unit of the Viet Cong's 514th Battalion in few military encounters but provide a good view of its activities during extended intervals between engagements. At such times, life in the unit is an unending succession of tasks undertaken in the interest of political indoctrination, military training, Party affairs, etc., all of which of course, reflect the organizational and motivational dimensions of unit leadership.

For example, a diary on technical military matters describes in detail the concerns of the military leaders of the Demolition Unit and their relations with the Battalion Command Staff from May 26, 1966, to May 13, 1967. The interaction between superior and subordinate levels results in a constant flow of information and instruction up and down the chain of command. The unit commander's diary notes: "The Battalion Command Staff stated that the cadres would have to assess the last phase of activities for the good of the fighters. The cadres should also write a report enumerating their good and bad points in leading their unit. . . ." (1)*

*Superscribed numbers in parentheses refer to the documents correspondingly numbered and ordered in the body of the Memorandum. Documents are also listed by number and title on page 11.

These critical evaluations, known as Kiem Thao (review and discussion) sessions, are somewhat different from the more familiar self-criticism sessions (Phe Binh).^{**} Whereas the latter sessions are directed largely toward the motivational and disciplinary problems of the individual, the Kiem Thao sessions, which use self-criticism as a technique, are aimed at resolving technical problems and problems of leadership and command, in short, organizational problems.

A Kiem Thao session may be held to evaluate combat performance. Documents three and four, for example, which relate to a military engagement on May 3, 1967, discuss and analyze cadre leadership and unit performance as well as the role of the individual soldier as it affected overall performance. In accord with the dialectical method of analytic review favored by the Viet Cong, both strong and weak points are considered. However, a synthesis of the strengths and weaknesses into an explicit "lessons learned" does not appear in these documents, which are presumably platoon and squad-level reviews.

Supplementing the reviews of performance in combat is the attention paid to the broader problems of military organization. A document entitled "Improving Army Administration"⁽⁵⁾ lists the following categories of military problems: ideological leadership, administrative management, military leadership, training, application of time schedule, and commendation and punishment. Other

^{**}It should be noted, however, that in common usage, the terms are often employed interchangeably, as in many documents included here. Ordinarily, the term Kiem Thao is used to mean Phe Binh, but never the converse.

documents published in this Memorandum are largely concerned with administrative management, military leadership, and scheduling the unit's many activities. Unlike "Improving Army Administration," they usually treat administrative and leadership problems together since such problems are intimately related.

The system by which administrative problems are resolved aims also at improving military leadership. It is a system of command and communication of which the reporting and critical analysis of combat-related activities mentioned above form only a part. It is a pattern of organizational relationships, interlocking channels of command, supervision, and reporting.

In general, this system corresponds to the leadership system and techniques of Communist China. The information gathering and analytic processes are ". . . continuously repeated in a steady integration, reassessment, and implementation of decisions. . . . The general flow of [these processes] emphasizes direct, open channels of communication to the lowest level of information and opinion. Further, since the process is continuous. . . a high value is placed on regularized procedures . . ."*

The three-man cells should check and report once every hour, in the morning and in the evening. The platoons should check and report every two days in the evening. The companies should check and report once every three days at night. . . . The thoroughness of checking and reporting will vary at each level. For example, the three-man cells check the

*John Wilson Lewis, Leadership in Communist China (Ithaca, New York, 1963), pp. 72-73

activities, the appearance, the cleanliness, the weapons, ammunition, and the pickaxes of the cell members and how they live and eat. The platoons and companies check the list of the unit members, make a roll call, and check their weapons and ammunition to see if anything or anyone is missing, and check their health. . . .(5)

There is another dimension of this surveillance system. In addition to checking and reporting, discussions are held daily to review performance. "Each squad and platoon should spend 30 minutes each day to analyze and solve administrative problems. Special emphasis should be put on solving the problems reported by the troops and considering the suggestions that they make. From 10 to 15 minutes should be spent on reviewing the situation in the squad and platoon, devising means to overcome shortcomings, and pointing up outstanding achievements and good points."

"In each company, there should be a comrade permanently in charge of assessing the situation in the company, setting forth a plan of action for the company each day, reporting to the Battalion, urging the Permanent Duty Section to check the performance of the daily plan of action, and acting on the proposals of the platoons."⁽⁵⁾ Thus problem solving complements surveillance, and the conjunction of the two provides a mechanism for keeping the unit on an even keel.

Problems are discovered in their incipiency, at the lowest levels, and brought to the attention of the unit commanders before complications arise. The goal here is to force problems into the open at the earliest possible moment rather than to suppress them in the hope that they will disappear. The system has the further advantage of providing the commanders with a continuous and detailed

view of the general state of their units, and allows them to benefit from the practical, firsthand experience of their subordinates.

Perhaps most important is that this system not only permits the individual to take an active part in improving the unit but actually demands it of him. Occasional admonishments are found in Kiem Thao session reports that "Comrade X lacked a sense of struggle." In more conventional terms, this means "Comrade X" did not enthusiastically contribute to the discussion. This error of omission is serious because it marks a withdrawal and alienation from the collective process that corrects faults and regulates behavior.

Although the documents have little to say about the results of collective discussion, it is reasonable to assume that the opportunity to voice their problems and frustrations has a therapeutic effect on the unit's members. The knowledge that their suggestions and grievances are being listened to probably works for a greater identification with the fortunes of the unit.

It is the responsibility of the cadres to ensure that this system functions smoothly and continuously. An evaluation of good points and shortcomings for 1966 states: "In the case of the cadres, a small number were guilty of 'bureaucratism' (quan lieu) in their dealings with their subordinates; for example, they were hot-tempered, shouted at their subordinates, and treated their subordinates without affection. They provided shallow leadership; for example, they did not immediately indoctrinate the men who showed signs of demoralization and discouragement in their

daily activities and this was why in the past a number of comrades have deserted."⁽⁶⁾

An alternative to the Kiem Thao technique of resolving unit problems is the private "heart-to-heart" talk, a mixture of admonishment and encouragement, that the cadres give to the rank and file. There are instances, apparently, when the Kiem Thao is not considered effective, and this low-key technique is used instead. Although evidence is lacking, it might be presumed that the frequency with which the "heart-to-heart talk" replaces the more formal Kiem Thao may help to shed light on the state of morale in the unit. But by itself this is an uncertain guide, since frequency of movement and operations often determine whether more flexible and less time-consuming techniques are substituted for the Kiem Thao.

The system for commanding and administering the unit relies on a relatively benign paternalism. The cadres must be firm but patient. The rank and file also have obligations to each other, the cadres, and the unit. One shortcoming of 1966 was that, "with regard to the fighters. . . a few comrades failed to fulfill their responsibilities and their role as members of the armed forces."⁽⁶⁾ This relationship between cadres and rank and file, along with the standardized format of the Kiem Thao session, delimits the boundary between legitimate and harmful criticism, and provides a safety valve, but not a floodgate, for normal problems and discontents.

In addition to the procedures for post-combat analysis and for the internal monitoring of the unit, there is still another system designed to ensure the proper functioning of the battalion's subordinate units in the

absence of specific orders from the Battalion Command Staff or their own unit leaders. The components of this system are 1) a permanent unit duty staff at battalion, company, and, in some cases, platoon level; and 2) a series of standing orders and operating procedures, some temporary, some permanent, giving guidance to the duty staff on what actions to take if for any reason the normal chain of command cannot function.

This arrangement is particularly necessary for a province Local Force Unit. Such a unit, normally battalion sized, operates in a restricted area. Unlike Main Force Units, which can range at will throughout a large inter-province region, the local province battalion must stay on its home ground. The security problems that this poses are obvious, particularly in the relatively flat and open Delta terrain in which the 514th Battalion must operate. Two measures are taken to avoid detection: constant movement within the province and dispersal of units when security conditions are hazardous.

These countermeasures are referred to in a battalion directive, issued when the unit faced the problem of coping with newly arrived U. S. Forces. The directive ordered the convening of all military cadres in the battalion for the purpose of increasing "the responsibilities of the commanders of the companies and units under the direct command of the battalion."⁽⁷⁾ The document adds that the standing order for the battalion "will be dispersal and concentration. If an order to disperse is issued, each company should act in accordance with the standing dispersal plan."⁽⁷⁾

Operating within the framework of these general orders, company commanders and commanders of special units are given considerable latitude in overseeing the day-to-day activities of their forces. The command sections of the battalion, company, and platoon-size special units have permanent duty sections to represent them in carrying out the details of administering the unit's activities. In addition, there is a "permanent Combat Ready Section," which helps provide security for the unit during bivouac, and a "permanent Patrol Section" to police the unit in bivouac, to "check the behavior of all cadres, from the rank of Party Chapter Secretary down, and their personal appearance," and to "arrest suspects and take them to the Battalion Permanent Duty Section for consideration."⁽⁸⁾

The Demolition Unit is also required to maintain a Permanent Duty Section, whose reports are checked and certified for accuracy by the unit commander. The Permanent Duty Section, while given the authority for general surveillance during bivouac, is organizationally separate from the surveillance and problem-solving channels used by cell, squad, and platoon. It is primarily a routine recording and liaison system, with delegated authority to represent the unit commander during bivouac.

In addition to the reports from the platoon's Permanent Duty Section, the squad leaders maintain their own records. One such "Unit Diary" lists its concerns as 1) review of the situation during the day, 2) state of mind of the unit members, 3) marching and bivouacking, 4) fortified trenches and camouflage, 5) maintenance of unity within the squads, 6) studying military and political subjects, and 7) observing the regulations and rules of

the armed forces. (11)

These topics provide the squad cadres with a standard checklist that guides them in exercising leadership over their men. At the lowest level of command, it is the squad leader's function to supervise the "nuts and bolts" of unit activity. The squad records indicate a broad range of details that must be attended to, from passwords, march formation, and keeping equipment clean, to the proper method of hanging clothes out to dry and the propriety of keeping shirt tails tucked in.

In matters of overall strategy and tactics, the Battalion Command Staff is the unit's nerve center. In actual combat, company commanders and platoon leaders play a critical role in carrying out the orders of their superiors. But in the humdrum of everyday life, bivouacs and marches, it is the squad cadre who must provide continuous leadership for the rank and file. It is he who supervises the three-man cell, passes on their reports, conducts the squad Kiem Thao session, attends the platoon Kiem Thao, staffs the platoon Permanent Duty Section, and frequently is responsible for supervising Labor Youth activities in the squad and acting as the Party's intermediary between the platoon and the squad as well.

Besides the extensive organizational structures within the unit, there is a miscellany of daily administrative activities. Among these are preparing the daily unit schedule, notifying the families of deceased soldiers, keeping financial records, procuring food, requisitioning equipment, monitoring "cultural improvement" study programs, supervising athletics, and finally, tracking down lost documents, which,

if the volume of documents represented here is any indication,
must in itself be a task of Herculean proportions.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS IN THIS MEMORANDUM

1. Diary of the Unit Platoon Leader.
2. Kiem Thao Program for the Platoon.
3. Minutes of the Kiem Thao Session on the Counter-Sweep Operation on May 3, 1967.
4. Kiem Thao Session on the Defensive Counter-Sweep Battle in Long Thien Village.
5. Improving Army Administration.
6. Evaluation of Good Points and Shortcomings for 1966.
7. Conference of all Military Cadres in the Battalion.
8. Instructions for the Permanent Duty Section.
9. Circular: A Few Regulations.
10. Daily Reports of the Permanent Duty Section of the Demolition Unit from February 17, 1967, to March 13, 1967.
11. Diary of Squad Leader Nguyen Van Be Danh.
12. Review of the Performance of the 1st Squad: Kiem Thao Session of April 1967.
13. Meeting Agenda of the 1st Squad.
14. Minutes of the Criticism Session Held at the End of March 1967.
15. Daily Review of Morale and Resolutions by a Squad Member.
16. Daily Time Schedule for the 2nd Squad.
17. Form for Notifying Next of Kin.
18. Platoon Expenditures for 1966.
19. Record of Food Expenditures for January 1966.
20. Distribution of Equipment.
21. Excerpts from "Cultural Classes."
22. Form for Reporting Lost Documents.

DOCUMENT NO. 1

DIARY OF THE UNIT PLATOON LEADER

May 26, 1966

ASSIGNMENT OF TASKS FOR THE ATTACK IN VINH KIM

One squad composed of 13 comrades will be needed in the target area.

The Following Comrades Will Take Part in the Attack

- Vinh, Squad Leader: handling 1 Thompson, to cover the other comrades.
- Hien, Squad Leader: handling 1 FTC-6 [apparently a type of mine]. This mine should be planted secretly and will be the first one to be triggered.
- Vang, Assistant Squad Leader: handling 1 FTC-6, to attack the embankment.
- Danh, Assistant Squad Leader: handling 1 Thompson, to provide cover for the other comrades.
- Met, Assistant Squad Leader: handling 1 HTT4, to attack the second blockhouse [HTT4 is apparently another kind of mine].
- Muoi, Assistant Squad Leader: handling 1 FTC-6 to attack the Van Sap bridge.

- Minh, Cell Leader: handling 1 FTC-6, to assist in the attack on the Van Sap bridge.

Replacements in Case any Comrades Sacrifice Their Lives
During Combat

- Kim will be the leader during the attack; if he is killed, comrade Phung will take his place and act as commander.
- Phung will be the deputy leader during the attack; if he is killed, comrade Vinh will replace him.
- If comrade Vinh is killed, comrade Hien will replace him.

Assignment of tasks to each Comrade

- Hien, handling one FT, will be the first to explode his mine. He has the mission of planting his mine secretly at the first blockhouse and of exploding it when an order to that effect is issued.
 - Met, handling one HT, will be the second one to explode his mine. After the first mine explodes, he has the task of exploding his HT mine to destroy what is left of the first blockhouse.
 - Liem, handling one FT, will keep it in reserve in order to reinforce the first cell when necessary.
- Vang, handling one FT, will be the third one to explode his mine. He has the task of attacking the barracks housing enemy troops.

- Phuoc, handling one HT, will be the fourth one to explode his mine. He has the task of destroying the barracks housing enemy troops.
- Manh, handling one FT, will keep it in reserve in order to reinforce the second cell when necessary.
- Phung has the special task of cutting the fence to enable Hien to plant his mine secretly and to enable the assault group to move in.
- Muoi and Minh, handling two FT, have the task of destroying the bridge. Whenever the Command Staff issues an order to this effect, they will have to perform their task quickly.
- c. - Vinh and Thanh, handling one Thompson each, have the task of shooting the sentinel. If the mine that is planted secretly is detected, they should shoot the sentinel immediately.
- After the first and second mines explode, these two comrades should fire fiercely into the enemy barracks, and at the same time they should provide cover for comrades Vang and Phuoc, handling the third and fourth mines, to enable them to achieve their task of attacking the central target.
- Comrade Phi has the task of following the attacking point into combat and bandaging the wounded, if there are any.

June 1, 1966

CONFERENCE OF ALL CADRES IN THE BATTALION

The purpose of the conference is to assess the state of mind of the unit in the past month, and to begin the new political mission set forth by the Battalion Party Committee.

June 2, 1966

Kim left to attend a reorientation session. Before leaving, he made arrangements to have another comrade replace him and control the unit tightly during his absence.

Kim will be absent for 10 days.

August 7, 1966

MEETING OF THE CADRES TO ACCEPT MISSION ASSIGNED BY THE BATTALION COMMAND STAFF

- Discussion of the marching plan: the 3rd Company, the 4th Company, the Reconnaissance Unit, the Demolition Unit, the Medical Team, and the team handling the 300 radios will move together to K2.
- The 1st Company will separate itself from the battalion and bivouac in an area where it can avoid being caught in enemy sweep operations.
- At the time prescribed by the Battalion, we will have to be present at CC (354'318'), the rendezvous point, in order to start the march together with the other units.

- By the 10th and 11th, if there are still any outfits left, they should go to Muoi Tho* and wait there until the Battalion Command Staff orders them to rejoin the Battalion.

August 12, 1966

CONFERENCE OF THE DEMOLITION, SIGNAL AND RECONNAISSANCE
CADRES IN THE BATTALION

- The Battalion Command Staff explained the map of the area of operation assigned to the Battalion by the Province Military Affairs Section for the forthcoming period.
- The Battalion Command Staff stated that the cadres would have to assess the last phase of activities for the benefit of the fighters. The cadres should also write a report enumerating their good and bad points in leading their units and in conducting reorientation for their units.
- In assessing the last phase of activities, the cadres should take the following points into consideration:
 - Understanding of the principle of concentration and dispersal of forces.

* The head of the Military Personnel Section (Ban Quan Luc) of the Province Military Affairs Section. This section is a combination of rear area headquarters for the battalion, a collection point for new recruits, and a stockade for disciplinary cases.

- Understanding the principle of penetrating deep into enemy position to attack the enemy.
- Understanding the tactic of attrition or annihilation of enemy forces.
- Implementation of resolutions and orders from above.
- Implementation of the policy concerning the dead and wounded, and concerning dealings with the people.
- Maintenance of unity between our three kinds of forces.
- Method to review the performance of the cadres.
- Detailed consideration of the fighters' performance and reporting on their performance.

August 13, 1966

MEETING OF THE DEMOLITION CADRES

- Consideration of the goals, requirements, and activities of the Battalion.
- Discussion of the next phase of activities.
- Making preparations to cross into Hoa Dong [District].*

August 15, 1966

MEETING OF THE DEMOLITION MILITARY CADRES

- The cadres met to review the military tasks that had been performed and to assess their leadership

* This marks the beginning of an unsuccessful campaign in Eastern Dinh Tuong and Go Cong Provinces.

during combat in the past months.

- During the meeting, the cadres and the collectivity unanimously agreed to entrust the function of BVF to comrade Chin Phung.
- During the meeting a number of comrades were disciplined.

September 17, 1966

GENERAL MEETING OF ALL POLITICAL AND MILITARY CADRES IN THE BATTALION

- Meeting to discuss the plan of attack on target K 100.
- The purpose of the meeting is to discuss the forthcoming plan of attack of the Battalion, and to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages that each company, depending on its mission, will encounter in attacking the main target or the secondary targets.
- The cadres should have a firm grasp of the significance and meaning of the forthcoming attack of the Battalion.
- The Party members of Party Chapter Committee level should understand this plan of attack in detail in order to lead their units well.

Detailed Explanation of the Terrain and Military Situation in Vinh Kim

a. Terrain

- To the East: it borders on Thanh Phu and Binh Duc villages, and on the Binh Duc road.

- To the West: the area on the river bank to the west borders on Song Thuan and Kim Son villages, and on a river that runs north toward Highway 4. To the west, there is a road that leads into Vinh Kim.
- To the South: there is Route 28 and the Mekong River which separates Vinh Kim from another province.
- To the North: it borders on Long Hung and Dong Hoa villages, and on National Highway 4.

b. Deployment of enemy forces

- The enemy forces are divided into four groups and are stationed in the field:
 1. To the East: one company is stationed in the northeast corner.
 2. To the West: the enemy forces are stationed along the river. One company is stationed along the upper portion of the river, and another company is stationed to the northwest along the lower portion of the river.
 3. To the South: there is one company of the Battalion Headquarters (along with the Battalion Command Headquarters).
 4. To the North: there is one enemy company with two cranes.

c. Enemy troop strength

- Total enemy troop strength is 580, including eight Americans.
- P.H., 3rd Battalion, 7th Division.

- The enemy has transformed them into three infantry companies.
- Weapons available to each enemy company:
nine 30-caliber machine guns; one 50-caliber machine gun; one mortar and one recoilless rifle.

Determination of the Battalion. The Battalion is determined to implement the mission entrusted to it by the Military Affairs Section, to attack and destroy the enemy's pacification scheme.

Guiding tactical principle. The guiding tactical principle to be applied will be that of attacking enemy forces stationed in the field.

Tactics. As we penetrate into the enemy position, we will open fire whenever we run into enemy forces. We will deploy our forces to surround the enemy quickly, penetrate deep into their lines, and cut them off from each other. Main and secondary thrusts of the Battalion's attacks.

Common mission. The units of the Battalion will be concentrated for the attack. In addition, the higher authorities will reinforce the Battalion with two 82-mm mortars, two B40, two 61-mm mortars, and one demolition cell from the province.

Mission of each company. The 2nd and 3rd Companies will form the main attacking column of the Battalion. They have the task of wiping out one enemy company, as well as penetrating deep into the enemy's position to pin down their forces.

Mission of the main attacking units and of the supporting units:

- The 3rd Company will be reinforced with one BAR, one machine gun, one recoilless rifle, one field radio, and one PRC10. In addition, it will be served by 20 civilian laborers carrying 10 hammocks [for carrying dead and wounded away].

- This company is in charge of carrying out the main thrust of the Battalion against enemy forces.

- Its mission is to approach the enemy line secretly from the east, and to take up position 100 m from the main target.

- After that, its mission is to spread out into different points to thrust deep into the enemy position, attack the enemy command headquarters, and then drive the enemy forces toward the south.

- The 2nd Company will be issued one M79, one machine gun, one field radio, and one PRC10. In addition, it will be served by a team of 30 civilian laborers carrying 15 hammocks.

- This company is in charge of attacking the main enemy target [along with the 3rd Company]. It will attack from the position of the 3rd Company and drive toward the north. It has the task of destroying completely the enemy forces, including the enemy command headquarters.

- The 2nd Company will march in from the north, and secretly take up position 100 m from the main enemy target.

- Its main task is to wipe out one enemy platoon, and to destroy the blower and the two suction dredges.
- If this equipment is found in the area assigned to the 2nd Company, this company will have to destroy it at once.
- If it is found in the area assigned to the 3rd and the 1st Companies, then the 1st Company will have to destroy it at once.
- After that, the 2nd Company should be ready to reinforce the 3rd Company, both with its troops and with its firepower. At the same time, it should be on the alert against an enemy attack in the rear to the north.
- Two squads of the 2nd Company, handling the machine gun, should be ready at any moment to reinforce the Battalion.
- The 1st Company will be reinforced with 1 Demolition Cell, two DK40, one recoilless rifle and one field radio. In addition, it will be served by a team of 20 civilian laborers carrying 10 hammocks.
 - This company will be in charge of carrying out the attack on the secondary target of the Battalion.
 - It will march in from the Northeast and secretly take up position 100 m from the enemy position.
 - The goal of this company is to destroy the blower.*

* A piece of construction equipment used for providing fill to the U.S. base adjacent to Vinh Kim, then under construction.

- Its second mission, after destroying the blower, is to use its firepower to pin down enemy forces to the west.
- The 4th Company will use its own weapons (three 61-mm mortars, one recoilless rifle, and one field radio). In addition, it will be served by a team of 10 civilian laborers carrying 5 hammocks.
 - The mission of this company is to shell the enemy forces for the Battalion. Enemy targets to be shelled are: a. Zone 1: enemy command headquarters; b. Zone 2: blockhouses; c. Zone 3: position of the enemy company.
 - The length of the shelling and the quantity of ammunition to be used will be determined later by the Battalion.
 - After completing the shelling, the 4th Company will await new orders from the Battalion Command Staff.
 - With regard to the DDQS: the Battalion Command Staff will explain its mission again later on. The task of this element is to attack along the river to reinforce the 1st Company.
- Mission of the Forward Communication Element (Buu Tien): its mission is to ensure communication from one end of the Battalion to the other, and to maintain good communication between the Battalion Command Staff and the various companies.
 - The PRC10 should keep the call signs secret.
 - This outfit is also in charge of coordinating the units' maneuvers [Van Dong].
- Mission of the Reconnaissance Unit of the Battalion: its mission is to reconnoiter the target area and to gather

accurate information concerning the situation of the enemy. When the Battalion arrives, the members of the Reconnaissance Unit will then be split up among the various companies.

- Mission of the Medical Team of the Battalion: it has the mission of setting up a forward medical station to treat the wounded.

- Its mission is to bandage the wounded and carry them to [field hospitals].
- It should make sure that Party and Labor Youth Group membership papers [of the wounded] are filled out accurately.

- Mission of the Demolition Unit of the Battalion: it should see to it that two demolition cells are equipped with specialized equipment to reinforce the 1st Company.*

September 17, 1966

Meeting of the Command Staffs of all Companies, and General Meeting of the Battalion with the participation of the Battalion Command Staff.

January 24, 1967

MEETING OF THE DEMOLITION CADRES

The Command Staff assigns to:

- Cu, Assistant Squad Leader, the responsibility of keeping food-ration money.

* This detailed attack plan was not, however, carried out. It was subsequently replaced by an attack plan in the same general area, also aimed at GVN pacification forces.

- Manh, Assistant Squad Leader, the responsibility of keeping savings funds.
- Hung, Assistant Squad Leader, the responsibility of keeping food-ration money.
- Thanh, Assistant Squad Leader, the responsibility of keeping food-ration money.

The Command Staff also sets forth the following regulations:

- When the Squad Leader and the two Assistant Squad Leaders of a squad all leave to go on mission, the remaining food-ration money of the squad should be handed to the Assistant Platoon Leader.
- Then the Assistant Platoon Leader can entrust the money to any comrade in the squad to keep.

Absent during the meeting were comrade Met, comrade Phuoc, and comrade Hung.

February 12, 1967

CONFERENCE OF ALL CADRES IN THE BATTALION

- The purpose of the meeting is to review the tasks performed in the winter phase and to communicate the tasks to be performed during the spring phase to all cadres.

- Composition of the meeting:

- Tam Thuan, the Province Unit Leader.*
- Muoi Ha, the Province Unit Political Officer.
- The Battalion Command Staff.
- The Command Staffs of all Companies.

* It is possible that the 514th Battalion uses a rotation of commanders. Other documents and interview sources have indicated at least two other "Battalion Commanders" during this period.

1. Winter phase.

- The enemy in our province did not intensify their activities.
- In Chau Thanh District: the enemy pacified Binh Duc village. Their intention is to establish a firm foothold in an area along the Mekong River, along communication routes, or bordering on the liberated areas.
- In all, the Americans have introduced 2,500 troops into our province.

Activities of our Battalion:

- Our battalion has achieved great progress. Why is it that our battalion fights so well?
- In recent attacks, we noticed that the cadres had good morale. They always showed great courage in performing their tasks or when they ran into difficulties.
- But there are still a number of cadres in our battalion who have an individualist attitude.
- The good cadres in our battalion have a sense of urgency when they reconnoiter targets, and make accurate reports.
- But compared to the enemy we are not as well equipped.
- But our position is favorable because we have military initiative, and because our tactics and technique are good.

2. Forthcoming Spring phase

- What will we have to do against the Americans in our province in the future?
- How will we fight against the Americans in the future?

Our forthcoming activities:

- We will use all our armed forces to consolidate our position in the three areas, in order to change the balance of forces between us and the enemy, and to change our strategy.
- The cadres at all levels should do their utmost to provide leadership and guidance to their units.
- The main point is that through our operations we will surround the enemy with three circles of forces, the Main Force, the guerrillas and the Local Force.

February 23, 1967

CONFERENCE OF ALL MILITARY AND POLITICAL CADRES IN THE
BATTALION

- Purpose of the meeting: to discuss the K140 and K111 military plans, to analyze the advantages and disadvantages that we will encounter, and to consider the significance, the goals, and requirements of the forthcoming attack.*

- Difficulties:

- There might be much confusion during the attack, because many different branches will coordinate in the attack.
- K111 lies in the enemy pacification area, right near the central pacification point, and is surrounded by 4,000 American troops.
- In order to reach the target area, we will

* This is the plan that succeeded the September plan of attack which was not carried out.

have to cross a road patrolled by four or five tanks.

- After the attack, in our withdrawal we will have to cross a large river guarded by many posts.
- 40,000 m from the target is the enemy main defensive position.
- In the target area itself there are 80 enemy soldiers, armed with 7 submachine guns, 2 machine guns, and 1 mortar. They are stationed in the field and are divided into four groups covering a square area. Their command headquarters is located in the center of this square area.
- Every 1,000 m there is 1 company of American troops.
- There are 5 companies around each perimeter to provide security for pacification purposes.
- Determination of the Battalion:
 - Our attacking forces will consist of 3 infantry companies, plus another company or a section of the 4th Company serving as the supporting unit.
- Use of our forces:
 - Our forces will divide into three prongs. One prong will thrust deep into the enemy's position and then spread out like a blooming flower.
 - It will be a surprise attack, coordinated in the manner mentioned above.
- Significance of the attack:

- This will be a spoiling attack, and at the same time an attack on the center of pacification of the enemy.
- This attack will force the enemy to pull back and draw in their lines, and to cope with us in a narrow area.
- This attack is aimed at destroying one company of American troops when they are newly arrived in our province.
- The attack will also signal the start of the winter-spring campaign.
- Requirement:
 - Our requirement is that we should attack the enemy in order to capture their weapons and arm our forces.
- Innovations [bien che]:
 - Two companies will be combined to form one attacking prong.
 - Part of our forces will be deployed to pin down enemy forces and to intercept their reinforcements.
 - The selection of the company that will carry out the main thrust into enemy lines is well made.
 - We should not think that pinning down the enemy forces or intercepting their reinforcements is a task which is not as important as that of directly attacking the enemy.
 - We should have a sense of urgency and provide accurate leadership. We should also be careful in leading our units.

- Fighting morale:

- We should carry out the attack quickly, wipe out the enemy troops completely, and withdraw quickly from the battlefield.

- Advantages:

- The enemy company is overconfident, because they know that there are many Americans near by.
- They are overconfident because they feel they are well protected by fences and other metal equipment.
- There is conflict between the American and the puppet troops.
- The terrain is favorable for us and will enable us to carry out a surprise attack easily.
- Most of our cadres are familiar with the area and know the way to the target area.
- We are strongly determined, and this determination permeates our ranks from top to bottom.
- We have an agent among the enemy troops.

- Difficulties:

- We might run into the enemy forces when we cross the road.
- We will have to cross a large river in our withdrawal.
- We will have to attack enemy forces stationed right in their own base areas and surrounded by many fences.
- The enemy has aircraft and artillery available to them, and if we do not destroy them quickly they will call in air and artillery support.
- We are required to destroy the enemy forces completely.

- We will have to avoid causing the units in charge of pinning down enemy forces to complain about the difficulties, because if they do, this will affect the morale of everyone.
- The 1st Company will carry out the main thrust against the enemy forces with the support of the 3rd Company.
- We will have to cross the river on sampans in our withdrawal and this will cause delay.
- We might run into enemy forces during our withdrawal. If this happens we will have to fight our way through to reach our defensive position in the rear area.

February 25, 1967

MEETING OF THE CADRES OF THE 1ST COMPANY

- Assignment of tasks:
 - 1st Platoon: 1 machine gun, 1 infantry squad, 2 infantry squads to attack.
 - 3rd Platoon: 1 machine gun, 1 infantry squad, 2 infantry squads to attack.
 - 2nd Platoon to attack along with 1 squad from the 3rd Company and 1 demolition cell, when the order to attack is issued.
 - The Reconnaissance Unit has the task of maintaining liaison between the various wings, and then must take part in the attack along with the infantry.
 - The Medical Team has the task of preparing an adequate supply of medicine to serve in the fighting area, along with 20 civilian laborers.

- Formation for withdrawal:
 - 1st Platoon, 3rd Platoon, Medical Team, reserve forces, and 2nd Platoon.
- Mission of the Rear Services Section:
 - Providing engineering team and sampans for the 1st Company.
 - At 1 o'clock: after rice is cooked, this section should report at the pagoda.
 - This section should bring along a package of cooked rice.
 - They should also bring along hammocks.
 - At 11 o'clock they should go and get the sampans in Tu Tuong.
- Mission of the Demolition Unit:
 - This unit will be issued three directional mines and three carbines.
 - Comrades chosen for the attack: Hien, Squad Leader; Muoi, Assistant Squad Leader; Thanh, Cell Leader; Cu, Assistant Squad Leader; Hung, Ngon and Tanh, cell members.

March 1, 1967

BATTALION MILITARY CONFERENCE

- Purpose: the Battalion assigns different tasks to each company.
- Requirement: the Command Staffs of all companies are required to implement their missions and to carry out the following attacks.
- The Battalion Command Staff made the following assignment:

- The 3rd Company is assigned to attack the K11C point where a platoon of American troops is stationed. The mission of this company is to destroy the American platoon completely and to capture their weapons (the company should capture over 10 weapons).
- The 2nd Company is in charge of attacking the K18C point. It has the mission of destroying from 1 squad to 1 platoon of enemy troops, and is to capture 7 weapons or more.
- The 1st Company is in charge of attacking the K18B point. It has the mission of destroying from one squad to one platoon of enemy troops, and capturing 5 weapons or more.
- The 4th Company has the mission of supporting the other companies and firing at aircraft.
- The Demolition Company has the mission of attacking alongside the Battalion and other companies. In addition, the Demolition Unit should concentrate its efforts to destroy one enemy vehicle moving on the road or during sweep operations.

- Time length during which various missions should be completed:

- The Demolition Company will be under the direct leadership of the Command Staff.
- The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Companies should complete their missions during the first phase.
- As for the 4th Company, it should shoot down two helicopters patrolling at night with search lights or taking part in sweep operations.

April 9, 1967

MEETING OF ALL COMPANY COMMAND STAFFS AND OF THE BATTALION
COMMAND STAFF

- The Battalion Command Staff assigns the following tasks to the companies.

KILL PLAN OF ATTACK ON TARGET A

- Enemy troop strength: 135 soldiers in all, including the command staffs of the commandoes and of the Civil Guards.

- Enemy defensive deployment: the enemy forces are stationed in the field, with fortified bunkers and embankments where sentinels are posted.

- Enemy weapons:

- In the target area:

- The 3rd Company is in charge of carrying out the main attack, and the 1st Company is in charge of carrying out the secondary attack.

- The 2nd Company should set a reserve force aside for the Battalion, which has the task of supporting the attack on the main and secondary targets.

- The remaining forces of the 2nd Company and the 4th Company should pin down enemy forces in Dong Tam [the U.S. base] and block off both ends of National Highway #4.

- Heavy weapons to pin down enemy artillery will include: 1 DKZ75, two 82-mm mortars, two 60-mm mortars, four B40, and 1 machine gun.

- The 1st Company will be reinforced with half a demolition section.

- The 2nd Company will be reinforced with half a demolition section.
- The 4th Company will be supported by the Demolition Unit with two directional mines and one B40.
- The 2nd Company will be supported by the Demolition Unit with two directional mines.
- The remaining forces of the Demolition Unit will be used by the Battalion for the attack on the K111A target.

- The Signal Outfit will be used by the Battalion.

Communication will be carried out by messengers running from place to place, by field telephones, by the 300 radio, and by firing signal flares.

- Mission of the Reconnaissance Unit:

- The Reconnaissance Unit should stay close to the targets to keep watch on the enemy until the companies arrive to conduct the attack.
- In addition, the Reconnaissance Unit should reconnoiter the roads and act as guides for the infantry units.
- The Reconnaissance Unit should also protect the Battalion Command Headquarters.

- Mission of the Medical Team of the Battalion:

- The Medical Team should set up a first-aid station to serve the battlefield, and assign more men to serve the 2nd Company.
- The team should transfer the wounded to the surgical unit (located in Tam Duong, and staffed with one medical technician and a number of medics).

- Mission of the Battalion Ordnance Team:

- They should make sure that the Battalion is provided with one DKZ75 and 20 shells, two 82-mm mortars and 20 shells, two 60-mm mortars and 20 shells; that each infantry fighter is equipped with two IP and one M26; and that there are four directional mines available to intercept enemy reinforcements.

- Time schedule set forth by the Battalion Command Staff:

- At 6 o'clock sharp in the evening of day "N minus 1," all units should report on the preparations that had been made (both in the military and political fields).
- The Rear Services Section should go and obtain sampans for the Battalion and report to the Battalion at exactly 9:00 PM on day "N minus 1" on the results of its mission.

- Marching to target area:

- At 9 o'clock sharp, the 3rd Company will start marching first, and it should organize front and rear elements to protect its column.
- The 1st Company will start marching at 10 o'clock, and the 4th and 2nd Companies will set out at 12 o'clock.
- The units should cover 3,000 m in an hour.
- The march route will be discussed later.

- Location of sampans:

- 1st Company:
- 2nd Company:
- 3rd Company:

- 4th Company:
- The units should be present at the sampan docking place at 5 o'clock sharp.
- The units taking part in the attack should be present at location 8D at 7 o'clock sharp.
- All units should be present at the Cau Trau bridge at 8 o'clock sharp.
- They should arrive at 9 o'clock sharp at the final assembly area.
- At 10 o'clock, after they have taken up their position in the target area, they should report to the [Battalion].
- From 10 o'clock to 11 o'clock: opening fire.
- Heavy weapons, such as the 82-mm mortars, the 60 mm mortars, and the DKZ75, should be set up at their predetermined position at the prescribed time.
- The team handling the heavy weapons should complete their fortified bunkers between 7 and 8 o'clock.
- The team in charge of pinning down enemy artillery in Dong Tam should be present in the area assigned to it by the Battalion at the prescribed time.
- Time of the attack: at 7 o'clock sharp, the companies will march to the target area to take up position.

- Mission of the 3rd Company: The 3rd Company constitutes the main thrust of the attack and is divided into three prongs. One prong attacks the enemy Command Headquarters directly, one prong attacks along the enemy line

of bunkers, and one prong attacks the enemy directly by moving along the road to the north. (Adjustments should be made, if necessary, depending on changes in the situation.)

If at the time the 3rd Company completes its mission the 1st Company still has not completed its mission, then the 3rd Company should get ready to use its firepower to pin down enemy forces [fighting with the 1st Company], reorganize its ranks and firepower, and report at once to the Battalion Command Staff. After that, it should get in touch with the 1st Company by using liaison signals.

- Mission of the 1st Company: This company constitutes the secondary thrust of the attack, and is divided into three prongs:

- In the first phase of the attack, the company attacks the enemy machine gun emplacement directly and it should occupy it no matter what.
- Then it should split into two prongs: one prong attacks the enemy by moving along the enemy fortified bunkers, and the other assaults straight at the fortified bunkers to the right of the enemy Command Headquarters and then moves toward the road to the north.

- Mission of pinning down the enemy of the DKZ, the 82-mm mortars, and the 60-mm mortars:

When the attack begins and the enemy returns fire, the shelling should be restrained and no ammunition should be wasted by heavy shelling.

There are 20 shells available for the two 82-mm mortars.

- Mission of the elements blocking National Highway

#4:

- If enemy forces move on the highway before the main elements in the target area open fire, the elements blocking National Highway #4 should not attack them no matter how small or large the enemy contingent is.
- After we open fire, if enemy forces move down the highway, the elements blocking the highway should open fire on them no matter how large the enemy contingent is and no matter what heavy equipment they have with them.

- Withdrawal:

- The blocking elements to the north should withdraw only when an order to this effect is issued.
- The blocking element to the south should withdraw at the prescribed time.

- Withdrawal to our defensive position the following

day:

- There are only two locations:
 - Point A, to the north, TG, Muoi Tho,
 - and Point B, to the south, PQ.
- On day "11" we will switch [our bivouacking area] between these two points A and B [from A to B, or from B to A].

- After arrival in the defensive position:

- At 10 o'clock sharp on day "N plus 1", all companies should report to the Battalion on their captured weapons and equipment.
- The element blocking the Dong Tam area will

withdraw to the Mxe area. It will be present in the K2 area the second day, and will be returned to VK [Vinh Kim village].

May 3, 1967

DEFENSIVE ATTACK AGAINST ENEMY SWEEP OPERATION IN LONG TIEN

- We lost the following weapons:
 - 1 FM [automatic weapon] of the K53 type and 2 magazines.
 - 2 directional mines and 2 kgs of explosives.
 - 2 magazines for Thompson submachine guns.
 - 3 pickaxes and 1 shovel.
- Ammunition used during the attack:
 - 60 carbine cartridges.
 - 248 Thompson cartridges.
 - 160 K53 cartridges.
 - 6 grenades.
- Number of wounded:
 - Three comrades were wounded: Tam, Phuoc, and Manh.
- Number of dead:
 - Comrades Vinh and Loi sacrificed their lives.

May 3, 1967

MINUTES OF THE CRITICISM SESSION CONCERNING THE DEFENSIVE
ATTACK AGAINST AN ENEMY SWEEP OPERATION IN LONG TIEN
VILLAGE

[This is the same text as that of Document No. 3.]

GENERAL MEETING OF THE ENTIRE UNIT

Purpose: the meeting was held to discuss the training activities for the forthcoming month of May 1967.

I. Consolidation of the unit

- We should immediately improve the unit members' behavior and discipline and enforce military courtesy, in line with the rules and regulations of our army.

- The unit should have frequent alerts, not following any fixed time schedule, in order to train the unit members to get ready quickly to deal with American troops landed by helicopters, and to make the unit members observe the time schedule well.

- The unit should strictly observe the regulation concerning camouflage and fortified bunkers in order to keep our unit's position secret and in order to be able to approach the enemy secretly to wipe them out.

- The unit should maintain and preserve the weapons and equipment of the State, and it should avoid causing damage or losses, especially with regard to cartridge pouches, ammunition, grenades, pickaxes, wire, batteries, etc.

II. Strengthening the unit

- All of us, from the cadres to the fighters, have the responsibility of strengthening the unit and making it become expert in its specialized field.

- We should build up our determination to attack with continuously exploding explosive charges, to attack the center of the enemy position and the bridge heads, and to occupy enemy targets as we advance in our attack. This will help the assault group to destroy the enemy swiftly and to implement their task well.

- We have the responsibility of being the forward group in any attack, of opening the way for the other elements, of removing obstacles, erected by the enemy to stop our advance, with explosives.

- Since we are the fighters who have to carry out attacks with explosives we should always be brave and heroic. We should carry out any task assigned to us, whether it be an attack on enemy forces stationed in posts or in the field.

- We should always have a sense of urgency, act with swiftness, and be accurate in our reconnaissance missions.

III. Allocation of tasks to the unit for the month of May, 1967

- By the end of May, our unit along with the Battalion and the Company should destroy one enemy company. Along with the other companies we should destroy two posts, and shoot down one aircraft on our own.

- In addition, we should set up an ambush in an area where the enemy is likely to land troops by helicopter to attack us with commando tactics. We can use directional mines against them, and we can use individual weapons to snipe at them.

- We should make sure that each comrade going on reconnaissance missions knows how to draw sketches of his targets, and to draw conclusions concerning the enemy targets after his reconnaissance mission is completed.

- By the end of May, the unit should complete its attack on the three targets assigned to it by the Battalion:

1. the two posts at 54'91'354', and
2. the post at 754'162 1927'16.

Plan of attack: secret.

IV. Training program for the forthcoming period:

- The unit will be divided into three large cells. The unit is free to carry this out, and to equip the unit members as it sees fit, and then moves to the village to receive training as well as to fight.

May 13, 1967

ATTACK OF THE UNIT IN BO TRUC IN DONG HOA VILLAGE, CHAU THANH DISTRICT (CALLED K19)

- Result:

We captured all the enemy's weapons:

- 2 Garands
- 2 carbines
- 1 Thompson
- 1 HT1 machine
- 4,000 rounds of ammunition for various weapons
- 150 grenades

- Three comrades were slightly wounded:

1. Comrade Hien
2. Comrade Kim, and
3. a fighter.

DOCUMENT NO. 2

KIEM THAO PROGRAM FOR THE PLATOON*

I. REQUIREMENTS

1. Report on the morale and actions of the unit members during the three phases. After that, point out the good points and shortcomings.

2. Understanding the leadership, morale and actions of the Party Chapter and higher authorities. Suggestions for improvement of leadership before, during and after combat.

3. Understanding the morale and actions of other phan doi [sections] to find out their good points and shortcomings.

II. CONTENTS OF THE KIEM THAO SESSION

1. Before the attack

- a. How is the morale of each individual when the combat order is issued? (the three phases)
- b. What does each individual do to get ready for combat? When the unit moves to its defensive position [vi tri phong ngu] how does each individual get his bunker ready for combat? How does he execute the orders of his unit commander during combat?

2. During combat

- a. How is the morale and performance of each

* In the handwriting of Sou Kim, Secretary of the Company Party Chapter.

individual through the various phases and circumstances of the attack?

- b. How is the morale of each individual before the fighting starts and during combat?
- c. How is the performance of each individual (courageous? brave? obeying orders)? Does he maintain unity and coordinate with the other unit members? How?

3. After the attack

- a. How does he carry out the order to withdraw? Before withdrawing, does he gather all his effects, and check his weapons, ammunition and effects?
- b. Does he implement the orders and policy concerning the dead and wounded and other policies well?
- c. Does he observe the unit formation during the withdrawal? Does he act in an orderly manner?
- d. Does he preserve his weapons well before, during, and after the attack?

III. CRITICISM OF INDIVIDUAL FIGHTERS AND CADRES OF FRIENDLY UNITS

IV. SUGGESTION FOR COMMENDATION OR PUNISHMENT

DOCUMENT NO. 3

MINUTES OF THE KIEM THAO SESSION ON THE
COUNTER-SWEEP OPERATION ON MAY 3, 1967*

I. UNDERSTANDING OF THE DEFENSIVE POSITION OF THE BATTALION
AND COMPANIES, AND OF THE MISSION OF THE BATTALION,
COMPANIES AND PLATOONS

Good points. The cadres understood how to deploy the unit, and so they placed C2 [the unit in charge of attacks on armored cars] between C4 and the position of the battalion. The Battalion pulled up one platoon from C3 and used it as a reserve force. When the enemy advanced on the position of C2, troops were sent in to breach the gap so that the unit could continue to fight on an unbroken line. The cadres understood how the battalion was deployed and they knew that when the 1st Co., at the beginning of the defense line or at the end of it, opened fire, the 1st Platoon of C3 would attack the flank of the enemy in support of the 1st Co. The cadres understood every task involved in pushing back a sweep operation.

All the cadres and soldiers understood how the battalion was deployed for the defensive attack. They had studied it in their training course and also when they studied about the forthcoming mission of the battalion.

Bad points. In the first phase, the cadres of C2 failed to make the fighters review once more the plan of

* Four pages, handwritten.

attack of the battalion and of the companies, and the mission of the phan doi*.

II. BEFORE THE ATTACK

Good points. When the phan doi received the order from the battalion, all of its members were moved to protect the front of the 1st Co. Then they stayed close to the battalion and informed the battalion that one enemy platoon was going to attack C3.

When the command staff of the phan doi ordered the unit to advance to breach the gap, all the cadres and fighters were alert and moved in immediately to fill in the gap before the fighting started.

When informed that the enemy was 15 m from our position, the Command Staff of the phan doi was on the alert and guessed that the enemy might attack half of the "front lock" [front and flank protection] element. The phan doi had only six weapons, divided between three groups. The task of the group handling the automatic rifle was to protect the river bank. But when the Command Staff thought that the enemy was going to attack half of the "front lock" element, they ordered the automatic rifle to be brought up to protect this half of the "front lock" element. The automatic rifle was replaced by two carbines for the defense of the river bank. There was one Thompson and one rifle deployed in the rice fields. In the middle of the unit's position were the automatic rifle and one Thompson. The key point was the center of the unit's position and

* Phan doi refers to a special section of the demolition unit of the 514th Bn.

not the flank facing the rice fields because the enemy was then in the orchards and not in the rice fields.

Bad points. When informed that the enemy was 15 m from our unit, the Command Staff of our phan doi did not think of planting three mines to stop the enemy when they assaulted our position.

III. DURING THE ATTACK

Good points. When the automatic rifle was moved to the fortified trenches, the enemy was 6 or 7 m from our position. When the Command Staff of our phan doi ordered the unit to open fire, the automatic rifle, the submachine guns and the rifle opened fire at the same time. All the unit members were calm and aimed accurately when the enemy assaulted our position. The automatic rifle stopped the enemy on the left and right of the front lock elements. The fighters handling the submachine guns fought fiercely against the enemy. The enemy stopped and got ready for the second assault. When the enemy opened fire again to advance on us for the second time, the automatic rifle jammed and only the Thompson was still firing. Our counter-attack was weak and so the enemy came in in force and occupied the fortified trenches where the automatic rifle was deployed. The enemy attacked fiercely from the first half of the front lock element and moved toward the rice fields. The troops of half of the head lock element were forced to abandon their fortified trenches and those in the second half had to withdraw to the river bank in order to reconsolidate their ranks. C4 finally sent in reinforcements and contact was restored.

When the troops in the first half of the head lock element had to abandon their fortified trenches they

reported accurately that they had had to abandon their trenches.

Bad points. From the time the head lock element was reinforced till the fire fight started, the cadres of the phan doi didn't receive any orders from the company, and this was why the units couldn't reinforce each other effectively during the attack.

When the troops had to abandon their trenches, the cadres of the phan doi lost contact with them, and so, in effect, the troops were without leaders. This situation lasted until the Command Staff of the Battalion ordered one squad of C4 to come to the rescue and help defend the bridge across the river. Then the phan doi cadres finally regained contact with one cell of those that had had to abandon their trenches. Half of the troops were then sent across the river; the rest were ordered to stay and defend this side of the river until 6:00 PM when a cell was ordered to return to the battlefield to look for wounded and dead fighters.

III. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE BATTLEFIELD

Good points. Half of the troops were ordered to remain on this side of the river, and the rest were ordered to withdraw across the river. The cadres couldn't maintain control over the troops that had been driven from the fortified trenches, and so the withdrawal was disorderly and not in cells.

At nightfall, one group was ordered to protect the unit while it withdrew while another group was ordered to stay behind and stop the enemy. The group protecting the unit withdrew first and then the group that had to stop the enemy withdrew last.

Bad points. When they were still on the battlefield, the fighters didn't carry the dead and wounded with them when they ran into them, so that after the phan doi had already withdrawn, the Command Staff of the Battalion had to order it to return to the battlefield to retrieve the dead and wounded.

IV. BOLSTERING FIGHTING SPIRIT

Good points. During the attack, the fighters tried to bolster each other's morale. They took turns in observing the battlefield and were determined to fight and defend their position until nightfall. The entire phan doi was able to keep the enemy at bay and to stay in their position.

V. CRITICISM OF INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCE

1. Liem aka Phong

- a. Good points. He was eager to fight. When he received the order to move his troops, he was very alert and carried out his order quickly. He constantly reminded his troops of their tasks. He checked the fortified trenches carefully to make sure that they were well camouflaged. He was able to have the dead and wounded fighters carried from the battlefield. He showed initiative during the attack and carried out immediately the order to move the automatic rifle from the river bank to the center of the unit's position.
- b. Bad points. When the enemy was 15 m from his position, he did not think of planting

three mines to stop them. He forgot to remind the fighters to do so. He also failed to protect the weapons of his squad, and as a result the squad lost the three mines.

2. Comrade Hung aka Phong

- a. Good points. He was eager to fight and had high morale. He carried out the order to move his troops quickly. When they took up position in the fortified trenches he checked everything carefully. He sent accurate reports to the Command Staff and suggested that the B40 open fire. When he was ordered to go back and check for dead and wounded fighters, he carried out the order faithfully and brought back some dead fighters. During the attack, he had initiative and made many suggestions to the Command Staff of the phan doi. He constantly reminded his troops of their mission.

DOCUMENT NO. 4

KIEM THAO SESSION ON THE DEFENSIVE COUNTER-SWEEP BATTLE
IN LONG TIEN VILLAGE*

I. PERFORMANCE OF COMRADE DUC

a. Before the attack. Comrade Duc executed orders well. He got his effects ready and obeyed the order to concentrate in fortified trenches. He carried out all orders well. He camouflaged his bunker well once in the fortified trenches and got ready to fight with the enemy.

b. During the attack. Comrade Duc obeyed the order of the Command Staff and fought without interruption. When the unit was driven out of the fortified trenches, he fled with the rest of the unit and returned to the battalion.

c. After the attack. He executed the orders of the squad. Later, during the march, he did not linger on the way.

II. PERFORMANCE OF COMRADE NAM

a. Before the attack. Comrade Nam executed well the order to concentrate in the fortified trenches. Once there, he camouflaged his bunker well. He executed speedily and well all orders that came down to him.

b. During the attack. He executed the order to be on the alert. He fought without interruption, and he only stopped fighting when the Command Staff was driven out of the fortified trenches. During the attack, he received

* Handwritten report. Clumsy handwriting and misspellings suggest the writer was barely literate.

the order to move the automatic rifle over to reinforce the 2nd Platoon. When he reached this platoon, comrade Bi berated him for having taken too much time to come over and said that because he was so long in coming comrade Ca carrying an AK had run down to his former position to look for him. Comrade Nam then ran to the position of the Command Staff, but on the way he met Lung, coming from the opposite direction, who told him that the enemy had driven the Command Staff out of the fortified trenches.

DOCUMENT NO. 5

IMPROVING ARMY ADMINISTRATION*

I. PURPOSE AND REQUIREMENTS

1. To make the cadres have a firm grasp of the task of running the army so that they can fulfill their responsibilities well. To make the fighters behave in accordance with the regulations of the army and to advance gradually to the status of a modern and conventional army.

2. To make the comrades have a firm grasp of the method and plan to implement every step of the task of running the army.

3. To make our army advance steadily from the ideological point of view, to increase their level of political, military and cultural understanding, to heighten their sense of organization and discipline, to make them behave in a manner befitting a revolutionary army, to make them ready to fight with heroism and force, to ensure their good health, to give them the initiative in all conditions and circumstances, and to enable them to score success and victory.

II. WHAT THE TASK OF RUNNING THE ARMY INVOLVES

1. Ideological leadership

2. Administrative management

- Troop strength
- Health, clothing, equipment, food
- Weapons

* Four pages, typewritten.

3. Military leadership
 - Marching and bivouacking
 - Performing mission
 - Fighting
4. Training
 - Political and cultural training
 - Military training and general activities
5. Application of time schedule
 - Unit regulations and daily schedule
 - Plan of attack (date and time of attack), plan of activities and training for each phase and each month
6. Commendation and punishment

No matter what their positions are, the leaders in the armed forces should have a firm grasp of this mission of running the army. According to their ranks and responsibilities, they are allocated tasks which have more or less to do with the mission of running the army, but basically as leaders, they cannot ignore this mission.

III. METHOD TO IMPLEMENT EACH STEP OF THE MISSION OF RUNNING THE ARMY

1. Ideological leadership

The Political Section will give detailed guidance concerning this leadership later on.
2. Administrative management
 - Troop strength, and weapons:
 - The 3-man cells should check and report once every hour, in the morning and evening.
 - The squads should check and report every day in the morning and in the evening.

- The platoons should check and report once every two days in the evening.
- The companies should check and report once every three days at night.
- The thoroughness of checking and reporting will vary at each level. For example: the 3-man cells check the activities, the appearance, the cleanliness, the weapons, ammunition, and the pickaxes of the cell members, and how they live and eat. The platoons and companies check the list of the unit members, make a roll call and check their weapons and ammunition to see if anything or anyone is missing, and check their health.

Note: after an attack, or a mission, or a move, special attention should be paid to this task of checking the troops.

- The companies and Battalion should report once every three days, or after every attack. The report should be detailed and complete.
- In order to ensure that this task is carried out well, the three-man cells should be under the supervision of the squad, and the platoon. As for the company, it should fulfill its responsibilities in supervising the troop strength and weapons.
- Each squad and platoon should spend 30 minutes each day to analyze and solve administrative problems. Special emphasis should be put on solving the problems reported by the troops and considering the suggestions that they make.

From 10 to 15 minutes should be spent on reviewing the situation in the squad and platoon, devising means to overcome shortcomings, and pointing up outstanding achievements and good points.

- In each company, there should be a comrade permanently in charge of assessing the situation in the company, setting forth a plan of action for the company each day, reporting to the Battalion, urging the Permanent Duty Section to check the performance of the daily plan of action, and acting on the proposals of the platoons.

3. Marching and bivouacking

- This problem is not new, but recently our comrades have neglected it and they have not been paying any attention to it. This bad situation has affected the fighting and behavior of the unit. This is why this situation should be corrected.

After discussing the mission of running the army, emphasis should be put on the discussion of the application of regulations concerning marches.

The cadres should have a firm grasp of the principles concerning the marches and of the basic things that they should do during marches.

- a. Gathering the troops to tell them about the order to move and the marching plan.

Purpose: to make the cadres and fighters understand thoroughly the intentions of the unit commander, the marching plan, and the existing

situation; to make them pack their effects in a convenient and light manner; to make them ready to fight if necessary; to ensure that strict discipline will be maintained during the march so as to facilitate command and to make it possible to maintain secrecy; to thereby train the cadres and fighters gradually to have good behavior, to make them ready to fight under any circumstances, to have the initiative in any conditions, and to make progress toward becoming a Regular army.

During the meeting:

- Gather the troops.
 - Inform them of the marching plan and emphasize what should be done.
 - Communicate orders relating to the march
 - Tell them what should be done in what circumstances.
 - Tell them about the observation of discipline.
 - Check all preparations.
- b. Checking and urging by the unit commanders in the squad, platoon and company
- The unit commanders should remind the squad, platoon and company of their duties.
 - They should check the formation and the ranks of the unit, and see to it that discipline is observed.
 - They should check the situation in each area that the unit is going through.
 - They should bolster the morale of the unit, indoctrinate the troops and provide ideological leadership.

c. Communicating orders

- Communicating orders is an important and necessary task during marches because the orders of the commanders should be known by the troops. Orders should be communicated quickly throughout the ranks to enable the commanders to be in control of the unit at every moment. In issuing orders, the commanders should be careful. The orders should be precise and specific. The commanders should not issue orders at random, one after another, and they should avoid giving long and involved orders. In addition, the commanders should indoctrinate the troops often about the observance of discipline; they should frequently remind and urge the troops to observe discipline; and they should often check to make sure that the troops observe discipline.

- d. Vigilance: vigilance should be maintained at the head and rear of the marching column, as well as along the flanks. Vigilance should be maintained when the unit passes through a dangerous area.
- There should be a plan of action to be followed in case the unit runs unexpectedly into the enemy while marching.
 - The unit should organize a communication and liaison system during the march.
- e. The commanders should check the time length of the march and the speed of the units. They should not let the enemy know their intentions and tactics, and especially they should not let

the enemy detect the troop strength of the units.

f. Arrival in bivouacking area

- The commanders should order the units to deploy in accordance with the plan that has been agreed upon and communicated to all the units. They should remind their troops of the existing situation and of their duties. They should assign the troops to dig fortified trenches and post sentinels. They should determine when the troops should finish digging their fortified trenches. They should report to their superiors. They should only allow the troops to rest after they finish checking everything, and they should post sentinels to keep watch.
- Strict secrecy should be maintained after the units take up position in the bivouacking area and set up their defenses.
- Finally, when everything is done, the leaders should report to their superiors to put the minds of the latter at ease and to ask for new orders.

After supervising the march of the 3rd Company for one night, we noticed the following things:

a. Good points. The company marched quickly. It has made good progress from the point of view of speed, and this shows the degree of preparedness of the troops [tac phong san sang].

- Each section of the company packed their effects in a convenient and light manner.
- The troops could stand the hardships.

But there were still a number of rather important shortcomings, which resulted from the subjectiveness of the cadres who did not indoctrinate the troops thoroughly and who did not communicate orders clearly to them. These shortcomings were:

- Some cadres did not gather the troops to tell them of their mission.
- The organization of the march was not thorough.
- The cadres did not check, urge, and remind the troops often of their duties.
- Strict secrecy was not maintained.
- Orders were not communicated accurately and quickly.
- On arrival in the bivouacking area, a number of basic principles were not well applied, and things were done very superficially.

This was why a number of problems arose during the march:

- The unit members talked freely, smoked cigarettes, and turned on their radios (even comrade Phuong, the Deputy Company Commander did so).

- Communicating orders: Orders were shouted out loud; or the cadres, instead of going down the column to give their orders, just stood in one place.

- Over a distance of 500 m, orders were given three times and these orders were extremely general in nature.

- The cadres did not check the unit.

- On the way, the men left the unit to stop by their houses to visit their families without permission from their unit commanders.

- When the sections of the column were cut off from

one another, this was not reported.

- When the company arrived in its bivouacking area, the men went to the shops freely and did not bother to dig fortified trenches; those who did dig fortified trenches, lit up their lamps and so did not maintain secrecy; etc.

These errors should be corrected. Emphasis should be put on organization, coordination, supervision, checking, urging the men to perform their duties, and maintaining tight control over the unit. Subjectiveness and overconfidence should be avoided; otherwise the enemy will inflict losses on us.

4. Supervision of the performance of tasks.

This is one of the tasks of our armed forces. So what should be done to make sure that this task is carried out well?

a. After accepting a mission ordered by the higher authorities, the commanders of the squad, platoons and companies should study it to see what it involves. They should assess how much time it will take to carry it through; then they should report their assessment to the Command Staff and to the Party Chapter Committee to obtain their approval.

b. The next step is to implement the mission. The commanders should coordinate with each other, allocate different tasks to their subordinates, and urge their subordinates to carry the mission through. They should hold discussions to solve the difficulties that arise.

c. They should organize their units in order to carry out the mission. They should determine the length of time it should take their units to complete the mission,

and they should check the performance of their subordinates and constantly urge them forward.

d. While the mission is being carried out, they should supervise the performance of their subordinates, urge them forward, provide leadership, and react in an appropriate manner to all circumstances and conditions to carry the mission to a successful end. If they run into any difficulties, they should report to their superiors in a responsible manner in order to ensure the success of the mission.

e. When the mission is completed, they should make a general assessment, analyze the good points and the shortcomings, report to the higher authorities, inform their subordinates of the lessons drawn from the accomplishment of the mission and make constructive criticism to help their subordinates improve their performance in the future.

5. Supervision in combat

- This is somewhat similar to the supervision of the performance of tasks.

- Note: the leaders should encourage and train the men to be alert and to react quickly in combat, but at the same time the leaders should maintain tight supervision to ensure coordination between the troops in combat.

- Especially during the period preceding combat, they should check all preparations, train their men, maintain good coordination, and check everything -- from small to big things.

- Negligence, oversimplification, and sloppiness should be eradicated. The leaders should foresee possible difficulties that might arise, and set forth plans for each

contingency, so as to retain the initiative in all circumstances if the unit finds itself in a defensive position [bi dong].

6. Supervision of the unit's general activities, studies and training

Training and studies constitute a vital mission for the armed forces, and this is why the cadres should consider the task of supervising their units' general activities, studies and training, as all important.

- Note: the cadres should have a firm grasp of the following problems:

- a. the goals and requirements of the units' studies, general activities and training,
- b. their contents,
- c. the guidelines and method to be followed,
- d. the program and time schedule. The cadres should draw up a program and set up a time schedule on the basis of the directives from above.
- e. supervising, checking, urging the unit members to study, indoctrinating them to make them self-enlightened and to make them carry out their training and studies in a serious manner. The cadres should contribute their constructive opinion, argue logically with the unit members, and solve all difficulties for their subordinates. They should make all necessary preparations to ensure good results in training and in general activities. Finally, they should keep tabs on all activities, assess the good and bad points, draw experience to communicate to their subordinates and report to their superiors.

Note: The cadres should set a good example during training and study sessions. Only in this manner

can they motivate and urge the sections within their unit to apply themselves. In the case of a military training phase, it is necessary that the cadres have a firm grasp of the contents of the training course, not only of the principles and reasoning, but also of tactics and technique -- only in this manner can they provide good training to their subordinates.

f. In order to ensure good results in training, studies and general activities, to maintain both their quality and quantity, there should be tight coordination in leadership by the Party Chapter and the Party Chapter Committee, and the Party members should be used as backbone elements to lead the unit in training, studies and general activities. Only in this manner will the supervising task be carried out successfully.

g. In carrying out the supervising task, more attention should be paid to reporting to higher authorities and requesting guidance from them. The lower-ranking cadres should report to their superiors in a timely manner, accurately, completely, and gradually as they go along, about the training, studies and general activities of the unit. Only in this way, can the requirements set forth by the higher authorities be fulfilled.

7. Observation of daily time schedule

- We are talking here about the regulations and daily time schedule of the unit.

- Each thing should be done in its scheduled hour, in accordance with the time schedule.

- The cadres should encourage behavior befitting that of the armed forces, and criticize sloppiness and the lack of urgency on the part of the unit members. They

should also criticize the attitude of those who, though they do not act with urgency, pay lip service to the maintenance of vigilance.

- In order to obtain results, the cadres should set a good example and check the unit frequently.

- Occasionally they should carry out a general inspection of the unit, and practice alerts.

- In addition, the cadres should provide frequent political indoctrination to the unit members -- only in this way can good results be obtained.

8. Checking the health of the unit

- The cadres should see to it that the unit practices calisthenics frequently and steadily.

- They should organize sports events once in a while to encourage and motivate the unit members.

9. Commendation and punishment

- In order to ensure good results from every point of view, and in order to encourage and motivate the fighters, the cadres should pay attention to the system of commendation and punishment.

- The cadres should keep close watch over every activity of the unit members. An action, no matter how insignificant, should be commended if it is good, and punished if it is bad -- commendation should be granted, and punishment should be meted out, in time, and in a just manner.

- This will have a deep influence on the unit and will help greatly in motivating the unit.

These are only a few points related to the task of running the army. Even though this discussion is not

complete, it will help the cadres understand the main points of the task of running the army, and the secret of how to run their unit.

I hope that the comrades will implement this task well and exchange their experiences with me to help make the next discussion on this task richer.

February 11, 1966

Battalion Commander:

TRAN VAN THINH

DOCUMENT NO. 6

EVALUATION OF GOOD POINTS AND SHORTCOMINGS
FOR 1966

1. "ATTACK THE ENEMY" SPIRIT

Generally speaking, our unit had a strong determination in the past year. This determination was shown in combat by the bravery and heroism of the unit in attacks, such as the one in Ban Long, Cau Sap, Trung Luong, in big and small sweep operations, as well as in assaults on posts and shellings of posts, etc.

This determination was also shown in reconnaissance missions: no matter what the difficulties were, the comrades still completed their mission.

2. DISCIPLINE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE UNIT

In the past year, the organization of the unit was consolidated somewhat. For example, the organization of the Party, of the Labor Youth and of the Party Chapter, was tightened. The task of equipping each squad, distributing equipment and weapons to each squad, and organizing each squad, was carried out relatively well.

Shortcomings: many unit members made the people dissatisfied when dealing with them. A number stayed out at night beyond the time prescribed by the squad, and went beyond the bivouacking area of the squad. Some went to bed too early, others stayed up too late, and [still others] did not observe the rules and regulations of the armed forces strictly.

3. BEHAVIOR AND LEADERSHIP OF THE CADRES DURING THE
PAST YEAR

Most cadres were able to fulfill the requirements concerning this. For example, they behaved in an exemplary manner in combat, as well as in their everyday life, and they often helped their subordinates in order to strengthen the unit and to perform manual labor tasks.

As for the fighters, most of them were alert, always had their personal effects ready, used proper language and behaved well toward each other and in dealing with the people. They maintained unity among themselves and with the people, were modest and polite with each other and with the people, and they loved each other as though they were all members of the same family.

Shortcomings. In the case of the cadres, a small number were guilty of "bureaucratism" [quan lieu] in their dealings with their subordinates; for example they were hot-tempered, shouted at their subordinates, and treated their subordinates without affection. They provided shallow leadership. For example, sometimes they did not immediately indoctrinate the men who showed signs of demoralization and discouragement in their daily activities, and this was why in the past a number of comrades have deserted.

With regard to the fighters, a small number continued to use irresponsible and inappropriate language, to treat their comrades without affection, to have conflicts with their comrades, and did not help each other. In the past year, a few comrades failed to fulfill their responsibilities and their role as members of the armed forces.

4. MAINTENANCE OF UNITY

In the past year, most of the comrades maintained good unity. For example, in combat when a comrade had difficulties the others came to his help in order to complete

the unit's mission. They also helped each other to cope with difficulties in their everyday life. They helped each other from the ideological as well as material points of view, etc. Generally speaking, most of the unit members maintained good unity. Most importantly, during combat when a comrade was wounded or killed, the others helped carry him out.

Shortcomings. A minority disrupted unity in the unit. For example, in their everyday activities they did not help their comrades, were jealous of each other, argued with each other, talked in an irresponsible manner and so sowed conflicts in the unit.

1. Nguyen Van Sau joined the unit on February 19, 1967.
2. Huynh Van Hung, joined the unit on February 19, 1967.
3. Nguyen Van Khoi, joined the unit on February 25, 1967.
4. Ngo Van Nam joined the unit on February 25, 1967.
5. Ho Van Bay joined the unit on February 25, 1967.

DOCUMENT NO. 7

CONFERENCE OF ALL MILITARY CADRES
IN THE BATTALION*

April 30, 1967

The purpose of the conference is to increase the responsibilities of the commanders of the companies and units under the direct command of the battalion.

Their mission consists of three important parts.

Combat. In May, the battalion will have to annihilate one enemy infantry company.

The Battalion Command Staff has set forth the following requirements for the entire Battalion for the month of May:

1st Company. This company should destroy 1 enemy platoon, 1 reinforced post, 1 military vehicle, 1 airplane, and at the same time it should help the battalion destroy one enemy company, and it should capture 2/3 of all enemy weapons and equipment.

2nd Company. It should destroy 1 enemy platoon, 1 military vehicle, 1 aircraft. At the same time, it should help the Battalion destroy 1 enemy company, and it should capture 2/3 of all enemy weapons and equipment, and take enemy prisoners.

3rd Company. It should destroy 1 enemy platoon, 1 post, 1 military vehicle, 1 aircraft and help the Battalion

* Two pages, handwritten.

destroy 1 enemy company. It should also capture 1/3 of the enemy's weapons and take American and puppet troops as prisoners (special emphasis on American troops).

4th Company. It should help the Battalion and the other companies wipe out 1 enemy company, and in addition it should reinforce the other companies. During the month of May, the 4th Company should shoot down two airplanes (special emphasis: helicopters) and it should capture weapons from at least one airplane.

Demolition Unit. Along with the other companies, it should destroy 2 enemy posts, and it should help the Battalion destroy 1 enemy company during the month of May. In addition, it should reconnoiter from two to three posts with success, and it should also combine its reconnaissance activities with training activities. It should choose areas where Americans are likely to land, and lie in wait for them to come and then set off mines and snipe at them.

Signal Unit. This unit should maintain good communications between the Battalion and all the companies, and it should ensure quick communications, without delays.

Reconnaissance Unit. This unit should help the Battalion in wiping out 1 enemy company. It should try to locate enemy command outfits and artillery pieces. In addition, it should maintain good vigilance during marches and in bivouacking areas.

Standing order for the Battalion will be dispersal and concentration. If an order to disperse is issued, each company should act in accordance with the standing dispersal plan.

Concentration of activities will be aimed at: DH [Dieu Hoa], TP [Thanh Phu], PT [Phuoc Thanh], BD [Binh Duc], LH [Long Hung], LD [Long Dinh], Than Cuu Nghia, and in the Khu 12 [Zone 12]: Tan Hoi and Nhi My.

DOCUMENT NO. 8

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PERMANENT DUTY SECTION*

2. General state of mind of the unit and their performance of tasks during the day.
3. The unit's observation of regulations and time schedule.
4. Implementation of rules and regulations concerning the maintenance of security within the bivouacking area.
5. Implementation of the task of urging subordinates to perform their mission by the Permanent Duty Section.
6. Report to the higher authorities in accordance with regulations.
7. Permanent Duty Section staff should be on duty for 24 hours, from 1600 hours to 1630 hours the next day.

Permanent Combat Ready Section

1. This section should be ready to go into combat under all circumstances, whenever the Battalion and the Permanent Duty Section issue combat orders.
2. This section has the task of arresting unit members committing violations, with the approval of the Battalion.

Procedure concerning handing over Permanent Duty Section

1. The old Permanent Duty Section accompanied by the new Permanent Duty Section should go to the Battalion Office to report on the situation in the unit during the day.
2. The old Permanent Duty Section staff should sign the report when handing the section over to the new staff who

* Second half of a handwritten sheet, the first half being torn off. Probably from a high-ranking cadre in the Battalion.

should also sign it, and the Battalion will confirm the change-over.

3. The Company Permanent Duty Sections should report to the Battalion at 4 o'clock sharp. At 5 o'clock sharp, the old Permanent Duty Section [probably the Permanent Duty Section of the Battalion which must make a composite report, based on the reports from the Company Permanent Duty Sections] should report to the Battalion.

Composite report should be made in the Battalion Staff Office and submitted directly to the Battalion.

DOCUMENT NO. 9

CIRCULAR: A FEW REGULATIONS*

In order to preserve the quality of the Liberation Armed Forces and the various procedures and regulations in the army, the Battalion Command Staff has set forth a number of regulations concerning the permanent duty section, the combat ready section [truc ban tac chien] and the permanent patrol and inspection section [truc ban tuan tra] for the Tet period, as follows:

I. THE BATTALION PERMANENT DUTY SECTION

1st Company: Ba Cuc on duty on the 29th day [of the 12th lunar month, about 2 days prior to Tet]

2nd Company: Thanh Hai, on duty on the 1st day of Tet

3rd Company: Tru, on duty on the 2nd day of Tet

1st Company: Be, on duty on the 3rd day of Tet

3rd Company: Bay Phuong, on duty on the 4th day of Tet.

II. THE COMBAT-READY COMPANY OF THE BATTALION

1st Company on duty on the 29th day (of the 12th month)

2nd Company on duty on the 1st day of Tet

3rd Company on the 2nd day of Tet

1st Company on the 3rd day of Tet

2nd Company on the 4th day of Tet

4th Company to provide defense against aircraft during all 4 days of Tet.

* One page, typewritten.

III. THE PATROL AND INSPECTION SECTION

Reconnaissance outfit to be on duty on the 29th day
(of the 12th month).

Signal outfit to be on duty on the 1st day of Tet

Reconnaissance outfit to be on duty on the 2nd day of
Tet

Signal Outfit to be on duty on the 3rd day of Tet.

IV. THE TASKS OF THE BATTALION PERMANENT DUTY SECTION

- Urging the men on duty to conduct patrol, inspect the bivouacking area, and post sentinels.
- Help the Battalion Staff conduct combat if necessary.
- Gather the Permanent Duty Sections of the various companies to allocate various tasks.
- Take action against those who violate regulations during the Tet period.
- Maintain close contact with the local guerrillas.
- Check the Combat-Ready Platoons in the various companies.

V. THE TASKS OF THE PERMANENT COMBAT-READY SECTION OF THE BATTALION

This section should be ready to fight under all circumstances, whenever ordered to do so by the battalion and the Battalion Permanent Duty Section. They should also assist the guerrillas in arresting brawlers, gamblers, thieves, robbers, juvenile delinquents and prostitutes.

VI. MISSION OF THE PATROL AND INSPECTION SECTION

- Check the behavior of all cadres, from the rank of Party Chapter Secretaries down, and their personal appearance.

- Arrest suspects and take them to the Battalion Permanent Duty Section for consideration.
- Maintain order during the Tet festivities.
- Assist the local guerrillas in maintaining order in the hamlet.

The Permanent Duty Section should rotate at 5:00 o'clock each day. Each comrade should stay on duty for 24 hours -- this applies to both the Company Permanent Duty Sections and the Battalion Permanent Duty Section.

The Company Command Staff members can take turns staying on duty in the Company Permanent Duty Section if those who are supposed to be on duty have to leave to take care of any necessary matters.

The various units and individuals are to apply these regulations from the 29th day of the 12th month to the end of the 4th day of Tet. As for the regulations concerning the normal operating procedures of the battalion, a different circular will be issued on this subject later on.

February 7, 1967

Signed : TU RIN (for the Battalion
Command Staff)

Document No. 10

Daily Reports of the Permanent Duty Section of the Demolition Unit: from Feb. 17 to March 13, 1967

Date	Total troop strength	Decrease in troop strength	Reason for decrease	Number of unit members remaining in unit	Automatic Rifle	Garand	Cabine	Thompson	K44	Colt	Mines	Total	Grenades made by NLF	Smooth-surfaced grenades	Stick grenades	Batteries	Wire	Wire cutters	Large-sized pickaxes	Small pickaxes	Bell
Feb. 17	18 comrades	11		8	1 (+300 cart.)	1 (+100 cart.)	5 (+500 cart.)		2 (+200 cart.)		3	18				15					
Feb. 18	19 comrades	11	Going on mission	8 comrades	1 (+300 cart.)						3	4				15	3 coils	2 pairs	3	1	
<p><u>Observation of the Permanent Duty Section:</u> State of mind of the unit on this day: their minds are at ease, and there are no changes in the unit's morale. The unit succeeded in maintaining secrecy concerning the unit's movements and bivouacking area. The unit members maintained unity and helped each other. The fortified trenches are well camouflaged, in line with regulations. The unit members are careful when they hang their clothes out to dry and when they move around within the bivouacking area. They eat their meals and take cover in the trenches on time, in accordance with the time schedule.</p> <p><u>Signature of the Permanent Duty Section:</u> Cu Signature of replacing Permanent Duty Section:</p>																					
Feb. 19	19 comrades	11	Going on mission	8 comrades	1 (+300 cart.)						3	4				15	3 coils	2 pairs	3	1	
<p><u>Observation of the Permanent Duty Section:</u> The minds of the unit members are at ease. They maintain secrecy and are careful when they hang their clothes out to dry. They carry out civilian proselyting activities: 5 comrades helped the people scoop up mud from ditches, fetch fire wood, and fill 1 jar with fresh water. The unit members observe regulations, and take cover in fortified trenches as prescribed by regulations. Generally speaking their performance was good.</p> <p>For the Permanent Duty Section, Signed: Cu</p> <p><u>Unit Commander's Confirmation of report by the Permanent Duty Section:</u> Report confirmed accurate. Shortcomings of unit: the unit members did not take cover in trenches at prescribed time: they did not dig fortified trenches right away upon arrival in bivouacking area. For the Command Staff of the Unit, signed: Tran Hien</p> <p><u>Unit Commander's confirmation of report.</u> Report of the Permanent Duty Section is hereby confirmed accurate. For the Command Staff, signed: Van Tri Phung</p>																					

Document No.10 (cont'd)

Date	Total troop strength	Increase in troop strength	Reason for decrease	Number of unit members remaining in unit	Automatic Rifle	Grand	Carbine	Thompson	K44	Colt	Mines	Total	Grenades made by NLF	Smooth-surfaced grenades	Stick grenades	Batteries	Wire	Wire cutters	Large-sized pickaxes	Small pickaxes	Belt
Feb.20	19	11	Going on mission	8	1						3	4				15	3	2	3		1
<p>Observations of the Permanent Duty Section</p> <p>Evaluation of situation during the day:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the unit members' minds are at ease, and they concentrate their thinking on the struggle. - they maintain secrecy concerning the unit's movements and the unit's bivouacking area. They take their meals and take cover in the trenches in accordance with the prescribed time schedule. They maintain their equipment well. Only one comrade did not observe the time schedule strictly and went to bed early. <p>February 20, 1967</p> <p>Permanent Duty Section, signed: Cu</p>																					
Feb.21	19	11	Going on mission	8	1 (+30 cart.)	1 (+100 cart.)	5 (+500 cart.)	2 (+200 cart.)			3	4				15	3	2	3		1
<p>Observations of the Permanent Duty Section.</p> <p>Good points: good morale; maintenance of unity; good implementation of resolutions; observation of regulations concerning everyday life in bivouacking area; marching, taking cover in fortified trenches, and eating meals on time; and observation of time schedule. Generally speaking, the cadres and fighters take good care of their equipment.</p> <p>February 21, 1967, signed: Cu</p>																					
Feb.22	21	4	Going on mission	17	1 (+300 cart.)		3 (+450 cart.)	3 (+300 cart.)			3	11				15	3	2	3		3
<p>Observations of the Permanent Duty Section.</p> <p>Good morale; maintenance of unity; good implementation of resolutions; and taking cover in trenches in accordance with regulations. One cell went out to take part in a countersweep defensive action and performed well. Generally speaking, the cadres and fighters took good care of their equipment.</p> <p>February 22, 1967, signed: Manh</p> <p>The observations of the Permanent Duty Section are confirmed accurate.</p> <p>Signed: The Permanent Duty Section</p>																					

Confirmation
The report of the Permanent Duty Section is hereby confirmed accurate.
The minds of the unit members on this day were at rest.
The unit took good care of its weapons.
For the Command Staff of the Unit, signed: Sou Kim

Note. 7 comrades have just returned from their mission.
2 others have also just returned.

Confirmation.
The Permanent Duty Section performed its tasks well. It checked the unit and implemented everything in accordance with the regulations set forth by the higher authorities.
For the Command Staff, signed: Van Tri Phung
February 21, 1967.

Confirmation.
The Permanent Duty Section has checked the unit and reported accurately.
For the Command Staff, signed: Van Tri Phung

Document No. 19 (cont'd)

Date	Total troop strength	Decreasing troop strength	Reason for decreasing	Number of unit members remaining in unit	Automatic Rifle	Carbine	Thompson	K44	Colt	Mines	Total	Grenades made by NLF	Smooth-surfaced grenades	Stick grenades	Batteries	Wire	Wire cutters	Large-sized pickaxes	Small pickaxes	Bell	
Feb. 23	21	4	Going on mission	17	1 (+300 cart.)	3 (+450 cart.)		3 (+300 cart.)		3	11					3 coils	2 pairs	3	6		
<p>Observations of the Permanent Duty Section.</p> <p>The unit had good morale. The unit members helped each other, and observed the regulations concerning fortified trenches. They maintained secrecy with regard to marching and bivouacking area. They observed the time schedule concerning meals and taking cover in trenches. They took good care of their weapons and did not move around too much. Generally speaking, the cadres and fighters all performed well.</p> <p>February 23, 1967 signed: Phuoc</p>																					
March 13 1967	22	4	Going on mission	18	1 (+410 cart.)	1 (+160 cart.)	2 (+330 cart.)	3 (+220 cart.)		4	21					6 coils	3 pairs	3	4		
<p>Observations of the Permanent Duty Section.</p> <p>The minds of the unit members were at ease, and they did well in the study sessions. They maintained unity, camouflaged their trenches well, ate their meals on time, took good care of their weapons, and were careful to avoid detection in moving around the bivouacking area.</p> <p>March 13, 1967 Permanent Duty Section, signed: Thanh Lien</p>																					
March 15 1967																					
<p>(TN: incomplete report)</p>																					
<p>Confirmation.</p> <p>The report of the Permanent Duty Section is accurate.</p> <p>For the Command Staff, signed: Van Tri Phung March 13, 1967</p>																					

DOCUMENT NO. 11

THE DIARY OF SQUAD LEADER NGUYEN VAN BE DANH*

1st SQUAD -- 1967

Review of the situation during the day.

State of mind of the unit members.

March and bivouacking: living conditions, hanging clothes out to dry.

Fortified trenches, camouflage: observation of regulations and rules concerning this.

Maintenance of unity within the squad and with the other squads.

Studying military and political subjects.

Observations of the regulations and rules of the Armed Forces.

* A small notebook, mostly in the handwriting of Be Danh.

MEETING IN THE MORNING OF JANUARY 23, 1967

Extraordinary meeting of the cadres.

There were still many shortcomings; for example, there were times when the unit did not start the march at the time prescribed by the higher authorities. There were times when the unit did not take cover in the fortified trenches because they were overconfident and underestimated the enemy. Many unit members still came and went frequently, in violation of regulations. The unit members did not have their effects ready at all times; they were still very disorganized.

This evening we will begin the end-of-the-year general review phase, and battalion cadres will be present to observe.

Check the collection of fees and the remaining balance.

Every day the unit should be gathered to have their personal effects checked, and then everyone should take cover in the fortified trenches.

At 1:30 sharp, prepare the training field for a general review of subjects studied.

EVENING MEETING

- The situation this evening is calm. There is no sign of enemy detection of the unit.

- Restrictions of the unit members' movements.

- Those comrades whose bunkers are not well reinforced should dig and repair them.

- Everyone should take cover in the fortified trenches at 5:30, and everyone should stay there until the platoon issues the order to leave the trenches.

- This evening, we will be in the general review phase.

MORNING MEETING TO CONSIDER THE COLLECTION OF FEES DURING THE MONTH

- Each month, each squad will collect fees on the 24th day of the month.

- Those who suffer from flesh wounds will not be issued food-ration money.

- Those who suffer from internal wounds and have to stay in dispensaries should be issued all their food-ration money.

EVENING MEETING

- The situation is calm -- no changes.

- The unit members should take cover in the fortified trenches early in the morning. When they return from the trenches, they should read the newsletters that are posted.

- Passwords: "Tien" means "forward." "Seven,"*

"Cuoc Nhan," "Hop Quet,"

During the day: raise the rifle.

MEETING IN THE LATE AFTERNOON OF FEBRUARY 3, 1967

- Go to see Muoi Tho in C3 (3rd Company) who will issue weapons to the 4th Company, the Demolition Unit, and

* Possibly a form of password, often used by the VC. The number given in the text may be the sum which the challenge and response must add up to. For example, if the number is "seven," the challenge might be "four," and the response "three"; or, the challenge "five," the response "two."

the 2nd Company.

- March formation: 2nd Company, 4th Company, Party Headquarters, and 3rd Company.

- Marching schedule: 2nd Company to start march at 5:00, 4th Company and Demolition Unit at 5:20, and 3rd Company at 5:30.

- Only start march after all the units are well camouflaged.

- Password: "Chien Thang"; challenge and response number: "Seven." [See footnote preceding page.]

- March formation: 3rd Company, 1st Company, Party Headquarters, 4th Company and 2nd Company.

- If we clash with the enemy while crossing roads: the element that runs into the enemy should stay there and fight back.

- Marching schedule: 3rd Company and 1st Company to start at 2:00, the Party Headquarters, the 4th and 2nd Companies to start at 2:20.

- The units should camouflage themselves carefully during the march.

- Password: "Quoc Tinh." Challenge and response: "Nine."

MEETING IN LATE AFTERNOON

- We should implement the orders of the Permanent Duty Section.

MEETING IN THE LATE AFTERNOON -- FEBRUARY 15, 1967

- To be present at 4:00 to report to the Permanent

Duty Section.

- Check the unit for marching.
- Post sentinels to fire at aircraft. Be on the alert against artillery shelling.

MEETING ON MARCH 10, 1967

- Situation: alert situation in the Phu Qui area, in our old bivouacking area.
- Coordinate with the 1st Company.
- Formation: 1st Company, 2nd Company, 4th Company, Party Headquarters.
- 2nd Company has one B40, and 3rd Company has one B40.
- Password: "Chien Thang"; challenge and response: "Six."
- March to start at 5:30.
- Ngon carries 1 mine. Sau, Danh, Duoc: none.

MEETING ON MARCH 11, 1967

- Situation: alert situation in Kien Tuong.
- Finish eating at 4:30, and begin march at 5:40.
- Formation: 2nd Company, 4th Company, Party Headquarters, 1st Company. 1st Company to coordinate with 3rd Company.
- During the day: each man should march 3 m from the next, and during the night: 5 m.
- 3rd Company will serve as a blocking force. If unable to go far to block off possible enemy forces' movements, return to LTB [Long Thanh B hamlet, Long Dinh Village].

- Passwords: Question: "Hong Ha." Answer: "Five."
"Cuoc Nhen Quet"; "Five."
- Go over to 3rd Company at 7:00 to attend a Party Chapter meeting.
- A meeting of the entire unit will be held at 8:00 sharp.
- 1st Company will go at 7:00.
- 3rd Company will go at 8:00.
- Marching schedule: 3rd Company to leave at 2:00 and Rear Services outfit to leave at 2:15.
- Tam carries a directional (Claymore) mine
Tanh carries a directional (Claymore) mine
Kiet carries a carbine
Thanh (B) carries a carbine
Thanh (A) carries a Garand
Manh carries a carbine
Cu carries a Thompson
- In LTB: use old formation, old fortified trenches.
- Absolutely forbidden to dock at river banks on the way.
- Passwords: "Xuan" (Challenge), "He" (Response).
- Formation: 1st Company, 4th Company, Demolition Unit, Party Headquarters, 3rd Company, and 2nd Company.

In the first three months of the year, the Central Eastern Nam Bo Region (Mien Trung Nam Bo) put out of action the following number of enemy units: 20 (companies), 793 (platoons), 705 (squads), made 8,230 enemy soldiers leave the ranks of their units, attacked

75 vehicles, 34 boats, 63 aircraft, 12 cannon, and two ammunition dumps, and captured 919 weapons.

The Ben Tre Province Military Affairs Section put out of action 5,656 enemy soldiers, attacked 12 posts, 1 sub-sector, 1 sector, 8 boats, 20 airplanes, 23 vehicles, and captured 332 weapons.

My dear:

This evening I will leave to perform my mission, but my attachment to you will not diminish. This bitter note is an answer to your betrayal.

[Note: unfinished letter in the handwriting of Be Danh.]

MEETING CONCERNING THE UNIT'S MOVING

Tomorrow study sessions will be conducted at the right time.

Password: "Hoang" (Challenge) and "Bich" (Response);
and challenge and response "Seven."

MEETING ON THE UNIT'S MARCH (MARCH 28, 1967)

- Alert situation: return to Ap Bac Truong Ga.
- Formation: 3rd Company, 2nd Company, Demolition Unit, Party Headquarters, 4th Company, 1st Company.
- March begins at 5:30.
- Password: Challenge: "Dong"; Response: "Xuan."
- Recognition code: "Six."
- Absolute secrecy should be maintained. No one is allowed to contact their family and tell them of the bivouacking area of the unit.

- Meals should be eaten early, and trenches should be well reinforced.

MEETING ON MARCH 31, 1967

- Situation: calm.
- Check fortified trenches, make sure the unit members are careful when they hang their clothes out to dry.
- Comrades Thanh and Tanh are invited to go to the Battalion at 1:30 sharp to study the handling of B40.
- The entire squad is invited to come to a meeting at 8:00 to check the unit's performance during marches and while in bivouacking area. There will be a selection of outstanding members for commendation.
- Password: Challenge: "Thanh"; response: "Binh."
Recognition code: "Six."

MEETING ON APRIL 20, 1967

- Attack in K 11 zone, enemy strength: 95 soldiers.
- Weapons: 1 big machine gun, 1 mortar, 9 machine guns.
- 2nd sentinel bunker is mined (with 2 mines); there are two fences around the BC.
- Acceptance of mission: 1st Company reinforced with 2 directional mines, 6 TP, 1 Thompson, 1 carbine, 12 civilian laborers, 6 hammocks and 6 carrying rods.
3rd Company reinforced with 8 men, 2 directional mines, 16 TP, 4 carbines, 1 Thompson, 1 Garand.
- 1st Company: Anh Hien in charge of the 3rd Squad.
- 3rd Company: Anh Minh in charge of the 1st Squad.

MEETING ON MAY 2, 1967

- Moving the unit to Xom Tre.
- March begins at 5:30. Each company, each section moves independently. Vinh will wait at Cau Van 6 in Thot Not.
- Unit should finish eating by 5 o'clock.

- Tam carries a FM K53 [TN: FM = Fusil mitrailleur, or submachine gun].
 - Tanh carries ammunition for the FM.
 - Manh carries ammunition for the FM.
 - Thanh carries a B40.
 - Du carries 5 shells for the B40.
 - Thanh Liem carries a Thompson.
 - Kiet carries a carbine.
 - Danh carries a K44.

MARCH

- All companies will begin the march at 6:00 sharp.
- Demolition Unit alone should wait till the 2nd Company comes and takes it along.
 - Upon arrival in bivouacking area, all Squad Leaders and Assistant Squad Leaders are invited to come to the 1st Squad for a meeting to get information on various tasks to be completed.

Dear Uncle and Aunt Hai:

I reached the unit today, and I'm taking advantage of a free moment to write you, so as not to keep you waiting.

DOCUMENT NO. 12

REVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE
1st SQUAD KIEM THAO SESSION OF APRIL 1967 *

I. IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTIONS

a. Good points. Most of the unit members implemented resolutions well, such as those concerning the camouflage of fortified trenches, the time schedule of the squad and other regulations.

b. Shortcomings. A few unit members did not camouflage their fortified trenches well, stayed out late beyond the time prescribed for the unit, and did not strictly observe the unit time schedule and regulations -- for example, they went to bed early at night.

II. MAINTENANCE OF UNITY

a. Good points. Most of the unit members maintained unity between themselves. They helped each other often -- for example, during marches and while preparing meals. They had heart-to-heart talks with each other. Generally speaking, they maintained good unity within the unit during combat as well as during their everyday life.

b. Shortcomings. A few still disrupted unity, argued with each other, did not help each other, and tried to look for easy things to do and to avoid demanding jobs.

III. MARCHING

a. Good points. Most of the unit members observed the march formation, carried out orders accurately and maintained secrecy.

* One page handwritten.

b. Shortcomings. A small number did not observe the unit formation during marches. They ran from one squad to another, and talked or argued loudly on the way.

IV. BIVOUACKING

a. Good points. The men maintained secrecy so that the unit could stay in one place long. They were on the alert for aircraft, and were careful to avoid detection when they hung their clothes out to dry. A few of them went out to look for vegetables or for fish (to add to the diet of the unit).

b. Shortcomings. Most of the men did not bother to look for food. A small number laughed loudly and made a lot of noise, and so failed to maintain secrecy.

V. PRESEFVATION OF WEAPONS

a. Good points. A small number cleaned their weapons, picks and shovels, and preserved these things well. After they dug their trenches, they washed their picks and shovels.

b. Shortcomings. Most of the men did not preserve their weapons well. They did not clean their weapons, even when the squad reminded them to do so. As for their picks and shovels, there were many times when they did not bother to clean them after they dug their trenches.

VI. CRITICISM AND SELF-CRITICISM

a. Comrade Tanh

- Good points: His morale was firm, and he was determined to fight until death. He maintained good unity with the rest of the men; for example, he helped the others to prepare meals. His performance was good during marches,

and while the unit bivouacked somewhere. He cleaned his weapons. Generally speaking, he implemented every order well.

- Shortcomings: He did not bother to look for food when the unit stopped to bivouac. There were many times when he did not dig trenches in accordance with the prescribed measurements. He was still hot-tempered.

b. Comrade Thanh

- Good points: He had a firm Revolutionary stand. He observed regulations concerning fortified trenches. He maintained good unity with the rest of the unit, and helped his comrades during combat as well as outside the battlefield. He stayed close to his cell and observed the formation of the squad during marches. He obeyed orders well, and preserved his weapons well.

- Shortcomings: There were times when he did not observe the regulations of the unit. He did not look for food for the unit often when it bivouacked, and he still showed a hot temper.

c. Comrade Bay

- Good points: He had firm morale, and he camouflaged his bunker well. He maintained good unity, helped his comrades, and maintained secrecy.

- Shortcomings: He was criticized for the way he got dressed. He went to bed early at night, and did not clean his weapons often enough.

d. Comrade Manh

- Good points: His morale remained the same; he remained determined to fight the enemy until death. He maintained good unity, helped the other unit members and did not do anything to offend anyone. Generally speaking,

he executed all orders well.

- Shortcomings: There were times when he went to bed too early. He did not observe the unit regulations strictly, and did not tuck his shirt tail inside his pants. He did not go looking for food for the unit when it stopped to bivouac. He did not remind the unit members to clean their weapons often enough.

VII. COMMENDATION

The performance of Comrade Manh is recommended for study by the entire squad.

VIII. DISCIPLINARY MEASURES.

The shortcomings of comrade Sau will be studied by the entire squad. Comrade Sau did not execute orders well. He did not obey the orders concerning the fortified trenches issued by the cadres. He disrupted unity, argued with the other members of the unit and did not help them in any way. He did not take good care of his weapons. He argued with the cadres whenever they allocated a task to him. His morale was shaky and he felt worried about being in a combat unit, so he requested to be allowed to return to his family. The squad has decided to discipline Comrade Sau, because he did not come to the kiem thao session so that the entire squad could study his errors. The squad also decided to forward his request to the platoon for consideration and decision.

April 1, 1967

DOCUMENT NO. 13

MEETING AGENDA OF THE 1st SQUAD*

Announcement of the purpose of the meeting.

Number of comrades present: 6

Number of comrades absent: 1 (The Squad Leader is absent because of sickness.)

REVIEW OF THE GOOD AND BAD POINTS OF THE SQUAD DURING THE
LAST 15 DAYS

1. Morale and Ideological Stand

a. Good points. Most of the comrades understood that we lived in an emergency situation; they always had their effects ready, their minds were not bothered by anything, and so they could concentrate on fighting.

b. Shortcomings. A small number of comrades did not understand the urgency of the situation. They were slow and sloppy. They were worried about having to fight.

2. Implementation of Resolutions from above

a. Good points. Most of the comrades implemented the resolutions from above, such as those concerning fortified trenches, and the unit time schedule and regulations, and observed discipline.

b. Shortcomings. A small number of comrades still did not implement well the resolutions concerning the camouflaging of fortified trenches and the time schedule and regulations of the unit.

* One page, handwritten.

3. Maintenance of unity

a. Good points. Most of the comrades helped each other during their everyday life and in combat. They maintained secrecy; for example, they succeeded in keeping their movements secret from the enemy; they were careful when they hung their clothes out to dry to avoid detection.

b. Shortcomings. A few comrades still had shortcomings. They disrupted the unity of the unit and did not preserve the unit equipment well -- for example, they did not clean their weapons or wash their picks and shovels.

4. General criticism

a. Good points. Most of the comrades maintained unity and performed their task with urgency. Their minds were at ease and so their morale was good.

b. Shortcomings. A small number of comrades did not observe discipline and did not implement orders well. They did not act with urgency, and they did not maintain unity.

5. Criticism of individuals.

a. Comrade Thanh Liem

- Good points: He acted with a sense of urgency and had good morale. He always had his personal effects ready to move in a hurry if necessary. His mind was at ease and he could concentrate on fighting. He implemented resolutions well.

- Shortcomings: He did not preserve the equipment of the unit well -- for example, he lost a pick.

b. Comrade Kiet

- Good points: His mind was at ease and so he could concentrate on fighting. He maintained unity, and succeeded in maintaining secrecy concerning the bivouacking areas of the unit.

- Shortcomings: He did not implement resolutions well; for example, he did not camouflage his bunker. He did not observe the unit's discipline and regulations well.

c. Comrade Tanh

- Good points: His mind was at ease and he could concentrate on fighting. He implemented resolutions well. He observed the discipline and organization of the unit. He camouflaged his bunker well and maintained unity.

- Shortcomings: He was hot-tempered and used irresponsible and inappropriate language.

6. Criticism of squad cadres

They did not deploy the troops in the fortified trenches correctly and their leadership was not bold enough.

As for the platoon cadres, they were hot-tempered toward their subordinates and there were times when they used irresponsible and arbitrary language in dealing with their subordinates.

7. Commendation: The entire squad will study about the performance of Comrade Liem who implemented resolutions well, camouflaged his bunker well, observed the unit's regulations and discipline, and was diligent in his studies.

April 20, 1967

1st Squad, C756 Company

Signed: Be Danh

DOCUMENT NO. 14

MINUTES OF THE CRITICISM SESSION HELD AT THE END
OF MARCH 1967*

2nd Squad

Comrade Met presided over the meeting, and comrade Cu served as Secretary.

IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTIONS

1. Comrade Phuoc

a. Good points. Comrade Phuoc implemented well the resolutions concerning marches and camouflaging of trenches. He observed the regulations of the unit well, ate early and maintained good unity. He frequently had heart-to-heart-talks with the other unit members. He observed the unit formation during marches and relayed orders accurately. He maintained secrecy. When the unit stopped to bivouac he reminded the unit members not to waste anything and to look for food.

b. Shortcomings. He did not observe the regulations concerning the fortified trenches three times by not camouflaging his bunker. He was still hot-tempered and talked in an irresponsible manner. When the unit stopped to bivouac, he did not remind the unit members of the unit regulations often, and he was not careful when he hung his clothes out to dry, and he did not preserve well his weapons -- as shown by the fact that he lost cartridges without knowing it.

*Two pages, handwritten.

2. Comrade Cu

a. Good points. He implemented the resolutions concerning marches and camouflaging of trenches. He observed the unit regulations; during marches he observed the formation of the unit and relayed orders accurately, and he did not complain when he was tired. When the unit stopped to bivouac, he maintained secrecy, was careful when he hung out his clothes to dry, observed the regulations of the unit, ate early, stayed in the trenches, indoctrinated the unit members and reminded them of their duties, went looking for food and preserved well his weapons.

b. Shortcomings. He did not observe the unit time schedule and regulations strictly. He did not often have heart-to-heart talks with the other unit members. He did not preserve the equipment of the unit well and failed to contribute to the discussions and criticism of the unit [thieu dau tranh].

3. Comrade Nam

a. Good points. He maintained good unity with the rest of the unit. During marches, he relayed orders accurately, and did not complain when he had to carry a heavy load. He had good morale. When the unit stopped to bivouac he was careful when he hung his clothes out to dry. He observed the regulations of the unit, went looking for food for the unit, and performed well in indoctrination sessions.

b. Shortcomings. He did not observe the regulations of the unit strictly. He was slow, and did not maintain good unity. During marches he did not stay close to the rest of the unit.

Comrade Nam promised to overcome his shortcomings.

4. Comrade Hung

a. Good points. He camouflaged his bunker in accordance with regulations. He observed the time schedule and regulations of the unit. He preserved well his weapons. When the unit stopped to bivouac he was careful when he hung his clothes out to dry; he went out looking for food, and so helped improve the living conditions of the unit.*

b. Shortcomings. He did not observe regulations strictly. He argued with others. He did not implement resolutions well. There were times when he did not help procure food for the unit.

Comrade Hung promised to overcome his errors.

5. Comrade Met.

Shortcomings. He failed to fulfill his responsibilities. He did not remind the unit members of their duties. He did not check the fortified trenches after the unit members had dug them. He argued with comrade Phuoc a few times. He was hot-tempered. When he argued with comrade Phuoc, he got mad, ignored comrade Phuoc completely and did not bother to help comrade Phuoc perform his tasks. He did very little to help improve the living conditions of the unit. When he went out, he rarely told the collectivity about it.

COMMENDATION AND DISCIPLINARY MEASURES

Comrade Nam was selected for commendation.

March 3, 1967

For the 2nd Squad, signed: Sau Met

* This refers specifically to the problem of food procurement and giving the unit a proper diet.

DOCUMENT NO. 15

DAILY REVIEW OF MORALE AND RESOLUTIONS

BY A SQUAD MEMBER*

May 14

Dissatisfaction with superiors. When the collectivity "expressed their opinion" [VC expression for "criticism"] I did not realize that their criticism was correct. Later on, I criticized myself and realized that the criticism of the collectivity was correct.

I promise to overcome my error.

May 28

Good morale, as shown in my performance of various tasks.

I promise to develop this good point.

May 29

Good morale. Good completion of tasks -- such as moving to another position.

I promise to develop this good point.

May 30

Good morale. I performed my tasks well; for example, I took good care of the money that Comrade Thanh forwarded to the unit.

I promise to develop this good point.

* A notebook in the handwriting of Be Nam.

May 31

Good morale. I hid my personal effects well.

I promise to develop this good point.

June 1

Good performance of tasks. I hid my personal effects well.

I promise to develop this good point.

June 2

Good morale. Good performance of tasks; for example, I hid my personal effects well.

I promise to develop this good point.

June 3

Good morale. Good performance of tasks. Good implementation of resolutions. Maintenance of unity -- I did not have conflicts with any comrades.

I promise to develop my good points.

June 4

Good morale. No bad thoughts. Good maintenance of unity: I did not have conflicts with any comrades. Good performance of tasks. Good implementation of resolutions. Observance of discipline.

June 5

Good morale, as shown by my good performance. Maintenance of unity: I did not have conflicts with any comrades. I performed my tasks zealously. Observance of discipline: I did not violate any rules and regulations. Study: I studied on my own during the day. I economized and took good care of equipment.

June 6

Good morale and firm ideological stand. Maintenance of unity. Good performance of tasks. I hid my personal effects well. I observed discipline and did not commit any violations of discipline. I economized and took good care of equipment. Study: I read books on my own.

I promise to develop these good points.

June 7

Morale: my mind was at ease, and my ideological stand did not waver. I maintained unity, performed my tasks well, and observed the formation of the unit in the bivouacking area. I observed discipline; for example, I was careful when I hung my clothes out to dry. I economized and took good care of equipment -- I did not damage anything. Study: I read books on my own.

I promise to develop these good points.

June 8

Morale: no deteriorating changes. I maintained unity and did not have conflicts with anyone. Performance of tasks: I pulled a sampan ashore and washed it. Observation of discipline: I overslept. I economized and took good care of equipment. Study: I studied on my own.

I promise to overcome my error.

June 9

Good morale: no bad changes. I maintained unity and did not have conflicts with any comrades. Performance of tasks: I pulled a sampan ashore and washed it clean of mud. I observed discipline and did not commit any violations. I economized and took good care of equipment -- I

did not damage anything. Study: I studied on my own.

I promise to develop these good points.

June 10

Good morale: no bad changes. I maintained unity within my cell as well as in my relationship with the other cells; I did not have conflicts with anyone. I performed my tasks zealously: for example, I scooped up soil and poured it in the vegetable patches to grow vegetables. I observed discipline and did not commit any violations. I economized and took good care of equipment. Study: I studied on my own.

I promise to develop these good points.

[TN: Following is a comment jotted down by a higher ranking cadre: "Write legibly. Keep notebook clean, and don't tear up pages." Date: June 10, 1966. Signature: unclear.]

June 11

Good morale: no bad changes. I maintained unity within my cell, as well as in my relationship with other cells. I performed my tasks zealously: for example, I went out to buy 1 gia of rice. I observed discipline and did not commit any violations. Study: I studied on my own.

I promise to develop these good points.

June 12

Good morale: no bad changes. I maintained unity and did not have conflicts with anyone. I performed my tasks well: I moved my personal effects from the old hiding

place to the new hiding place. I observed discipline and did not commit any violations. Study: I studied on my own.

I promise to develop these good points.

June 13

Good morale: no bad changes. I maintained unity within my cell as well as in my relationship with other cells, I did not have conflicts with anyone. Performance of tasks: I checked the hidden effects that were flooded by rain water. I observed discipline and did not commit any violations. I economized and took good care of equipment -- I did not damage or lose anything. Study: I studied on my own.

I promise to develop these good points

June 14

Good morale: no bad changes. I maintained unity and did not have conflicts with anyone. Performance of tasks: I pulled out the reeds in the canal to enable sampans to move through. I observed discipline and did not commit any violations. I economized and took good care of equipment. Study: I studied on my own.

I promise to develop these good points.

June 18

Good morale, reflected in good performance of tasks. I maintained unity and did not have conflicts with anyone. Performance of tasks: I helped comrade Thanh dig fortified trenches. I observed discipline and did not commit any violations. I maintained secrecy, and took good care of equipment. Study: I studied on my own.

I promise to develop these good points.

June 19

Good morale, as reflected in performance of tasks during the day. I maintained unity and got along well with my comrades. Performance of tasks: I pulled up bang [a kind of reed]. I observed discipline and did not commit any violations. I maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment.

I promise to develop these good points.

June 20

Good morale, as reflected in zealous performance of tasks. I maintained unity. Performance of tasks: I went out to sell bang and to buy nails and resin to repair sampans. I observed discipline, maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment.

I promise to develop these good points.

June 21

Good morale, as reflected by performance of tasks during the day. I maintained unity and did not have conflicts with any comrades. I observed discipline and did not commit any violations. I maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment.

I promise to develop these good points.

June 22

Good morale, as reflected in performance of daily tasks. I maintained unity and did not have conflicts with any comrades. Performance of tasks: I used resin to repair a sampan. Observation of discipline: I violated discipline by oversleeping. I maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment.

I promise to develop my good points.

June 23

Good morale: no bad changes. I maintained unity and did not have conflicts with any comrades. Performance of tasks: I checked the personal effects I had hidden away to see if they were soaked with water. I observed discipline. I maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment. Study: I studied on my own.

June 24

Good morale: no bad thoughts during the day. Maintenance of unity: I did not maintain unity. I got angry and wanted to return my weapon and leave the unit because comrade Ba Duyen checked my ammunition without my being present -- he went to my hut and checked my ammunition when I was not there. Performance of tasks: I repaired the wall of my hut. I observed discipline and did not commit any violations. I maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment. Study: I studied on my own.

I promise to overcome my error.

June 29

Good morale. I maintained unity and did not have conflicts with any comrades. Performance of tasks: I gathered firewood. I observed discipline and did not commit any violations. I maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment.

I promise to develop these good points.

June 30

Good morale: no bad changes. I maintained unity and did not have conflicts with any comrades. Performance of tasks: I scraped mud off the sampan and washed it. I

observed discipline, maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment.

I promise to develop these good points.

June 31

Good morale: no bad changes. I did not maintain unity: I had an argument with comrade Oanh because not only did he not perform the task I allocated to him, he argued with me about it. I got angry and argued with him. Later on, I reconsidered my action, found it wrong and corrected my error. Performance of tasks: I repaired the hut and filled in the holes. I observed discipline. I maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment.

I promise to overcome my error.

July 1

Good morale: no bad changes. I maintained unity and did not have conflicts with any comrades. Performance of tasks: I unearthed equipment buried in the old hiding place and took them back. I observed discipline, maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment.

I promise to develop these good points.

July 2

Good morale. I maintained unity and did not have conflicts with any comrades. Performance of tasks: I caught field rats to add to the diet of the unit. I observed discipline and did not commit any violations. I maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment.

July 3

Good morale: no bad changes. I maintained unity and

got along well with my comrades. Performance of tasks: I went to check the equipment I had hidden away to see if it had got wet. I observed discipline and did not commit any violations. I maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment.

July 4

Good morale: no bad changes. I maintained unity and did not have conflicts with any comrades. Performance of tasks: I went to check water jars in old bivouacking area. I observed discipline, maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment.

July 9

Good morale. I maintained unity and did not have conflicts with any comrades. Performance of tasks: I went out to gather reeds. I observed discipline, maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment.

I promise to develop these good points.

July 10

Good morale: no bad changes. I maintained unity. Performance of tasks: I attended the meeting of the Labor Youth Group Chapter. I observed discipline, maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment.

I promise to develop these good points.

July 11

Good morale: no bad changes. I maintained unity. Performance of tasks: I went along with comrade Buu to order clothes from the tailor shop. I observed discipline, maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment.

I promise to develop these good points.

July 12

I maintained good morale -- no bad changes took place. I maintained unity. Performance of tasks: I went to buy rice and gave it to the people for safe keeping. I observed discipline, maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment.

I promise to develop these good points.

July 13

Good morale: no bad changes. I maintained unity. Performance of tasks: I went to buy rice and gave it to the people for safe keeping. I observed discipline, maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment.

I promise to develop these good points.

July 14

Good morale. I maintained unity and did not have conflicts with any comrades. I observed discipline and did not commit any violations. I maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment. Performance of tasks: I went out to contact the people to buy rice for the unit.

I promise to develop these good points.

July 15

Good morale. I maintained unity and did not have conflicts with any comrades. Performance of tasks: I helped others cut down trees to build a hut for comrade Thanh. I observed discipline, maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment.

I promise to develop these good points.

July 16

I maintained good morale and unity, and did not have conflicts with any comrades. Performance of tasks: I went to buy rice and gave it to the people for safe keeping. I observed discipline, maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment.

I promise to develop these good points.

July 17

I maintained good morale, and unity -- I did not have conflicts with any comrades. Performance of tasks: I rowed the sampan away for repair. I observed discipline, maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment.

I promise to develop these good points.

July 20

I maintained good morale. I maintained unity, and did not have conflicts with any comrades. Performance of tasks: I went to buy rice and gave it to the people for safe keeping. I observed discipline, maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment.

I promise to develop these good points.

July 21

I maintained good morale. Maintenance of unity: average. Performance of tasks: I went to buy rice and gave it to the people for safe keeping. I observed discipline, maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment.

I promise to develop these good points.

July 22

Good morale. I maintained unity. Performance of

tasks: I rowed the sampan away for repair. I maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment.

I promise to develop these good points.

July 23

Good morale. Good maintenance of unity. Performance of tasks: I went to buy rice and then transported it back to the barracks of comrade Cu. I observed discipline, maintained secrecy and took good care of equipment.

I promise to develop these good points.

July 25

Good morale. Good maintenance of unity. Performance of tasks: I helped comrade Thanh gather reeds.

DOCUMENT NO. 16

DAILY TIME SCHEDULE OF THE 2nd SQUAD
THE LIBERATION ARMED FORCES OF SOUTH VIETNAM

Letter box: 7809^m

2nd Squad

SCHEDULE

Morning

4:45 AM	Getting up
From 4:45 AM to 4:50 AM	Gathering for morning roll call
From 4:50 AM to 5:00 AM	Calisthenics
From 5:00 AM to 5:20 AM	Personal hygiene
From 5:20 AM to 5:40 AM	Breakfast (unless something happens)
From 5:40 AM to 7:20 AM	Getting ready for combat
From 7:20 AM to 11:30 AM	Studying and performing tasks
From 11:30 AM to 1:15 PM	Rest

Afternoon

From 1:15 PM to 1:30 PM	Getting up; getting ready to study
From 1:30 PM to 4:30 PM	Studying and performing tasks
From 4:30 PM to 5:10 PM	Review and cleaning weapons
From 5:10 PM to 6:00 PM	Bath and dinner
From 6:00 PM to 6:30 PM	3-man cell and squad activities
From 6:30 PM and 7:00 PM	Leisure time
From 7:00 PM to 8:30 PM	General activities and study
From 8:30 PM to 9:00 PM	Roll call, putting out all fires, going to bed

SLOGAN: "VIGILANCE AND OBSERVATION OF DISCIPLINE AND
REGULATIONS ARE PART OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF
THE TROOPS."

DOCUMENT NO. 17

FORM FOR NOTIFYING NEXT OF KIN*

THE NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMED FORCES
OF SOUTH VIETNAM

The 514th Battalion

THE SOUTH VIETNAM NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

DEATH NOTIFICATION

To MR.....MRS.....

It is with pain and sorrow that we inform you and your family of the death of:

Comrade.....Alias.....
Born in.....village.....district.....
province,
Residing in.....village.....district.....
province,
Son of Mr.....and Mrs.....
Enlisted on.....
Admitted in the Labor Youth on.....
Belonging to the class of.....
Admitted in the Party as a probationary member on.....
as an official member on.....
Holding the rank of.....and the function of.....

* Typewritten.

He has completed his glorious mission for the Fatherland, and has sacrificed his life heroically on the day of..... of the month of.....1967, or the.....th day of the.....th month of the Lunar Year.

He has been buried in the area.....

Personal effects returned to family:.....

.....

.....

Opinion and solution offered by the unit:.....

.....

The entire unit is in deep sorrow, because we have lost a comrade in arms and because your family has lost a loved one. In the name of the entire unit, we offer you our condolences.

Date/.....

For the 514th Bn Command Staff,

signature.....

(DOAN MINH QUANG)

DOCUMENT NO. 18

PLATOON EXPENDITURES FOR 1966*

Total amount of money: 1,000.00

Expenditures: a. purchase of two big pickaxes: 228.00
b. Vinh borrowed: + 100.00
Total: 328.00

Total amount of money left: $1,000.00 - 328.00 = 672.00$

Money deposited in savings fund: 360.00

Expenditures: a. purchase of fabric: 35.00
b. purchase of 6 notebooks: + 30.00
Total: 65.00

Amount of money left in savings fund: $360.00 - 65.00 = 295.00$

Total amount of money left: $295.00 + 672.00 = 967.00$

Food money of the unit: 1,040.00

Unit members borrowed: - 500.00

Amount of money left: 540.00

Total amount of money left: $540.00 + 295.00 + 672.00 = 1,507.00$

Signature of comrade to whom this money was handed over:

* Handwritten.

Comrade Vinh:

We did not add the cost of the equipment that you lost. We only added up the price of the wrist watch and the amount of food-ration money for three people that you lost. The food money lost was: $753.00 \times 3 = 2,259.00$ (two thousand two hundred and fifty nine piasters). We only know that the 1st squad has handed in their savings funds, and we do not know whether the 2nd squad has done the same or not. The 1st squad handed in 100.00 in savings.

Total amount of money lost: 2,259.00, plus a Sando wrist watch valued at 3,000.00. (Three food ration issues for comrade Vinh, comrade Phung and comrade Hien.)

May 5, 1967 For the Command Staff of the Demolition
Section: Sau Kim

Document No.19
Food Expenditures for January 1966

Number of unit members	Date	Name of comrade in charge of purchasing food	Amount of money issued	Money spent on rice	Money spent on other food items		Amount of money left	Amount spent over & above amount issued	Reason for deficit
					(a) Food items	(b) Price			
7	1	Vang	\$56.00	\$42.00 (6 liters)	Salted bean curd and fish.	\$17.00		\$ 3.00	Bought too much food.
7	2	Danh	\$56.00	\$33.00 (5 liters)	Fish sauce and fish.	\$17.00	\$ 6.00		
7	3	Tinh	\$56.00	\$34.00 (5 liters)	Fish sauce.	\$ 6.00	\$16.00		
7	4	Cu	\$56.00	\$28.00 (5 liters)	Duck, sugar and lemon.	\$23.00	\$ 5.00		
7	5	Manh	\$56.00	\$26.00 (5 liters)	Duck, meat and fish.	\$29.00	\$ 1.00		
7	6	Vang	\$56.00	\$27.00 (5 liters)	Shrimp, salted bean curd and vegetables.	\$43.00		\$14.00	Bought too much food.
7	7	Danh	\$56.00	\$30.00 (6 liters)	Vegetables.	\$15.00	\$11.00		
7	8	Tinh	\$56.00	\$30.00 (6 liters)	Bean paste and fish.	\$25.00	\$ 1.00		
7	9	Cu	\$56.00	\$33.00 (5 liters)	Fish, salted bean curd and fish sauce.	\$31.00		\$ 8.00	Bought too much food.
7	10	Manh	\$56.00	\$28.00 (5 liters)	Shrimp and fish sauce.	\$26.00	\$ 2.00		
8	11	Vang	\$64.00	\$33.00 (6 liters)	Shrimp, shrimp paste and fish sauce.	\$34.00		\$ 3.00	Bought too much food.
8	12	Danh	\$64.00	\$18.00 (3 liters)	Bean sauce and horse-radish.	\$ 7.00	\$39.00		
8	13	Tinh	\$64.00	\$32.00 (6 liters)	Shrimp, horse-radish and fish sauce.	\$12.00	\$15.00		
8	14	Cu	\$64.00	\$33.00 (6 liters)	Shrimp, salted bean curd and fish sauce.	\$24.00	\$ 7.00		
8	15	Manh	\$64.00	\$36.00 (6 liters)	Dry fish and fish sauce.	\$25.00	\$ 3.00		
8	16	Phuoc	\$64.00	\$37.00 (6 liters)	Shrimp and fish sauce.	\$27.00	None		
8	17	Vang	\$64.00	\$37.00 (6 liters)	Fish and shrimp.	\$11.00	\$16.00		
8	18	Danh	\$64.00	\$36.00 (6 liters)	Fish and duck meat.	\$16.00	\$12.00		
8	19	Tinh	\$64.00	\$38.00 (6 liters)	Fish, squash.	\$11.00	\$15.00		
8	20	Cu	\$64.00	\$ 0.00 (3 liters)	Fish and vegetables.	\$23.00	\$41.00		
8	21	Manh	\$64.00	\$39.00 (6 liters)	Meat and fish.	\$ 6.00	\$19.00		
8	22	Phuoc	\$64.00	\$13.00 (2 liters)	Squash and fish sauce.	\$19.00	\$32.00		
8	23	Vang	\$64.00	\$39.00 (6 liters)	Bean sauce and fish.	\$22.00	\$ 3.00		
8	24	Danh	\$64.00	\$36.00 (6 liters)	Fish sauce and chicken.	\$31.00		\$ 3.00	Bought too much food.
8	25	Tinh	\$64.00	\$18.00 (6 liters)	Fish sauce and duck meat.	\$65.00		\$15.00	Bought too much food.
8	26	Cu	\$64.00	\$36.00 (6 liters)	Fish and fish sauce.	\$11.00	\$13.00		
8	27	Phuoc	\$64.00	\$30.00 (6 liters)	Fish, fish sauce and squash.	\$19.00	\$15.00		
8	28	Vang	\$64.00	\$39.00 (6 liters)	Squash, meat and fish sauce.	\$36.00		\$11.00	Bought too much food.
6	29	Danh	\$48.00	\$19.00 (5 liters)	Dry fish, bean sauce, fish sauce and fish.	\$35.00		\$ 7.00	Bought too much food.
7	30	Tinh	\$56.00	\$32.00 (5 liters)	Bean, fish sauce and vegetables.	\$30.00		\$ 6.00	Bought too much food.
8	31	Cu	\$64.00	\$30.00 (6 liters)	Fish and fish sauce.	\$29.00	\$ 5.00		

DOCUMENT NO. 20

DISTRIBUTION OF EQUIPMENT*

April 5, 1967

Equipment

- K53	:	Ammunition:	417	cartridges
- Garand	:	Ammunition:	160	cartridges
- Carbine	:	"	150	"
- Thompson	:	"	148	"
- Beta grenades	:	6	grenades	
- Electric wire	:	5	coils	
- Big pickaxes	:	4		
- Pliers	:	1	pair	

Signature of comrade to whom this equipment was
handed over: Manh

- Thompson	:	Ammunition:	150	cartridges
- 2 K44	:	"	300	"
- Big pickaxes	:	1		
- Small pickaxes	:	1		
- Pliers	:	1	pair	
- Wire	:	Two 50-m coils, and one 100 m coil		
- Grenades	:	4		

Signature of comrade to whom this equipment was handed
over: Phuoc

* Handwritten.

- Two carbines : 320 cartridges
- 2 directional mines
- Wire : 5 coils (two 200 m coils)
- Pickaxes : 2 small ones
- Pliers : 1 pair
- Four grenades

Signature of comrade to whom this equipment was
handed over: Liem

LIST OF LOST EQUIPMENT

Comrade Hung lost: 1 knapsack, 2 pairs of long pants (Main Force type), 1 (Main Force) shirt, 1 nylon hammock, 1 mosquito net, 1 blanket, 1 rice pouch.

Comrade Liem lost: 1 pouch, 2 pairs of (Main Force) long pants, 2 (Main Force) shirts, 1 black pajama top, 1 pair of shorts, 1 rice pouch, 1 radio, 1 mosquito net, 1 blanket.

Comrade Kim lost: 1 pouch, 2 long-sleeved shirts (1 made of Popeline fabric and 1 made of Nylfranc fabric), 2 pairs of long pants (one (Main Force) pair of pants made of Popeline fabric, and one pair made of Fine fabric), 1 mosquito net, 1 blanket.

Comrade Ngon lost: 1 knapsack, 1 pair of (Main Force) long pants, 2 shirts (one long sleeved, and one (Main Force) type), 2 pairs of shorts, 1 mosquito net, 1 blanket, 1 nylon sheet (3 m), 1 pair of long pants (made of gray khaki).

May 5, 1967

For the Command Staff of the
Demolition Section,

Sau Kim

REQUEST FOR EQUIPMENT FOR THE
DEMOLITION UNIT, MAY 1967

- 8 sets of Main Force clothes, type B
- 3 knapsacks
- 6 pairs of shorts
- 2 blankets
- 1 pouch
- 3 nylon sheets

May 9, 1967

Signature of comrade making
request: Tran Hien, for the
Command Staff

- 2 Thompson cartridge pouches
- 10 carbine cartridge pouches in leather
- 1 K44 cartridge pouch
- 1 bag for B40 shells
- 100 cartridges for K44
- 150 cartridges for American weapons
- 200 cartridges for carbines

May 11, 1967

DOCUMENT NO. 21

EXCERPTS FROM "CULTURAL CLASSES"

[Translator's Note: following are a few samples of the problems in arithmetic that the Demolition Unit members studied in their cultural classes. The notebook in which these problems are found belongs to Thanh Liem.]

September 13

Problem

A unit is given 15 boxes of explosives, each box weighing 24.50 Kgs, to make 150 bangalores. How much does each bangalore weigh?

Problem

A rectangle plot of land measures 45 m long and 35 m wide. Two roads, each 1.50 m in width, are built one along the length of the land and the other along the width of the land. What is the remaining surface area of the plot of land?

Problem

A comrade goes on mission, going from his house to the unit. It takes him 6 hours to reach the unit on foot, and he covers 4.50 km in each hour. On his return trip home, he is in a hurry and borrows a bicycle, and it takes him only 2 hours to arrive at his house. How many kilometers did he cover by bicycle in one hour?

Problem

Three platoons take part in a production emulation campaign. The 1st platoon produces 300 kg of horseradish and 170 kg of vegetables. The 2nd Platoon produces 380 kg of horseradish and 250 kg of vegetables. The 3rd platoon produces 460 kg of horseradish. There are 150 comrades in the company. On the average, how many kilograms of horseradish and vegetables does each comrade produce?

Document No.22
Form for Reporting Lost Documents

UNIT _____

DATE _____

LIST OF LOST DOCUMENTS*

Date lost	Type of unit (Type of force)	Type of document	Classification																																						
			Secret	Top Secret	Absolutely Top Secret																																				
<table border="1"> <tr> <th colspan="2">Number of</th> <th rowspan="2">Lost under what circumstances ?</th> <th colspan="5">Rank of comrade losing documents</th> </tr> <tr> <th>a/ pages</th> <th>b/ charts</th> <th>a/ fighter</th> <th colspan="4">b/ cadre</th> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>Squad</td> <td>Platoon</td> <td>Com.</td> <td>Bn.</td> <td>Regt.</td> </tr> </table>		Number of		Lost under what circumstances ?	Rank of comrade losing documents					a/ pages	b/ charts	a/ fighter	b/ cadre							Squad	Platoon	Com.	Bn.	Regt.																	
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<table border="1"> <tr> <th colspan="3">Political status of Comrade losing doc.</th> <th colspan="3">His Party function</th> </tr> <tr> <td>a/ Party member</td> <td>b/ Labor Youth member</td> <td>c/ Mass (e.g. non-Party and non-L.Y member)</td> <td>Party Committee member (Company level)</td> <td>Party Com. member (Bn. level)</td> <td>Party Com. member (Regt. level)</td> </tr> </table>			Political status of Comrade losing doc.			His Party function			a/ Party member	b/ Labor Youth member	c/ Mass (e.g. non-Party and non-L.Y member)	Party Committee member (Company level)	Party Com. member (Bn. level)	Party Com. member (Regt. level)																											
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* Typewritten form for filing report on lost documents

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA

1 ORIGINATING ACTIVITY THE RAND CORPORATION		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
		2b. GROUP
3. REPORT TITLE DOCUMENTS OF AN ELITE VIET CONG DELTA UNIT: THE DEMOLITION PLATOON OF THE 514TH BATTALION - PART THREE: MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES		
4. AUTHOR(S) (Last name, first name, initial) Elliott, David W. P. and Mai Elliott		
5. REPORT DATE May 1969	6a. TOTAL No. OF PAGES 136	6b. No. OF REFS. ---
7. CONTRACT OR GRANT No. DAHC15 67 C 0143	8. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT No. RM-5850-ISA/ARPA	
9a. AVAILABILITY/LIMITATION NOTICES DDC-1		9b. SPONSORING AGENCY Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)/ Advanced Research Projects Agency
10. ABSTRACT <i>of</i> <i>The report presents a collection</i> Translations of Viet Cong documents pertaining to the military activities of a demolition unit operating in the Mekong Delta. This Memorandum is third in a series representing the entire file of unit records captured intact. (The others are RM-5848, RM-5849, RM-5851, and RM-5852.) In the period covered by the documents, early 1966 to mid-May 1967, the battalion was under-strength and saw little action. Most of these documents illustrate the unit's activities during extended intervals between military engagements, during which life was a succession of political indoctrination, military training, and Party activities. Notable are the records of <u>Kiem Thao</u> (review and discussion) sessions, which used the technique of self-criticism to resolve organizational problems such as the unit's performance in combat. Other documents deal with military organization and management. They all disclose an elaborate pattern of interlocking channels of command, supervision, and reporting, from the battalion to the squad. Beyond its usefulness for surveillance and control, the system involves even the lowliest fighter in the responsibility for success or failure in military operations.		11. KEY WORDS South Vietnam Viet Cong Military organization Military operations Counterinsurgency and insurgency Ground forces Asia