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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

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16 June 1967

SUBJECT: A Model Police Force for Developing Nations


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1. The attached study, "A Model Police Force for Developing Nations", is an effort to formalize what in the past has been a "best guess" approach to advising police forces in developing nations. Although the Army's role in such operations is by no means new, this study provides a methodology heretofore unavailable to the military advisor in the field.

2. The study represents an initial effort to optimize an organizational configuration based on the best available data. As such, it is subject to modification and improvement. To assist in this effort, user comments are welcomed and should be forwarded to The Provost Marshal General, Attention: Police Overseas Internal Defense Branch, Military Police Plans and Operations Division.

1 Incl
CS


CARL C. TURNER
Major General, USA
The Provost Marshal General

JUL 30 1968

Best Available Copy

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The current "information explosion" makes it possible to support research projects by a wealth of previously developed material. While the author owes much to the authors of such background material, five people stand out as contributing far beyond what is currently written. For providing meaningful critiques and technical expertise the author owes a debt of gratitude to Colonel D. R. Dingeman, Commanding Officer, USA Combat Development Command, Military Police Agency; Mr. Martin S. Gordon, ABT Associates Inc; Professors W. H. Hewitt and C. Dana Kuhn, State University of New York at Farmingdale; and Mr. Roy C. McLaren, International Association of Chiefs of Police.

Richard D. Miller
Major, Military Police Corps

"The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to
the stormy present... Let us disenthral ourselves."

Abraham Lincoln

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CONTENTS

PARAGRAPH		Page
I.	PURPOSE - - - - -	1
II.	DESIGN CRITERIA - - - - -	1
III.	GENERAL METHODOLOGY - - - - -	2
IV.	ASSUMPTIONS - - - - -	2
V.	INTRODUCTION - - - - -	3
	A. General - - - - -	3
	B. Current Police Problems - - - - -	6
	C. Police-Military Relationship - - - - -	9
VI.	MODEL FORCE ORGANIZATION - - - - -	12
	A. General - - - - -	12
	B. Organization - - - - -	13
	C. Methodology - - - - -	14
	D. Basis for Police Model - - - - -	17
	E. Organization of Model - - - - -	17
	1. Administrative Services - - - - -	19
	a. Plans - - - - -	19
	b. Training and Schools - - - - -	20
	2. Technical Services - - - - -	21
	a. Records - - - - -	21
	b. Communications - - - - -	21
	3. Inspectional Services - - - - -	22
	a. Inspections - - - - -	22
	b. Intelligence - - - - -	22
	c. Personnel Inspection - - - - -	24

PARAGRAPH VI. MODEL FORCE ORGANIZATION (Continued)	Page
E. Organization of Model (Continued)	
4. Line Division - - - - -	25
a. Patrol Division - - - - -	25
b. Operational Support Section - -	27
5. Miscellaneous - - - - -	27
F. Model Ratios - - - - -	30
VII. DERIVATION OF FORCE STRUCTURE - - - - -	39
A. Operational Factors - - - - -	39
B. Model Country - - - - -	40
1. Economy - - - - -	41
2. Political Structure - - - - -	41
3. Ethnic Background - - - - -	41
4. Population - - - - -	43
5. Area - - - - -	43
6. Topography - - - - -	43
C. Computation of Police Strengths - - - - -	44
D. Operational Employment - - - - -	54
1. Rural - - - - -	54
2. Urban - - - - -	54
3. General - - - - -	54
E. Coordination - - - - -	58
VIII. FOOTNOTES - - - - -	60
IX. BIBLIOGRAPHY - - - - -	62
APPENDIX	

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

<u>Figure</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Page</u>
1	Forms of Government - - - - -	4
2	Police Phasing - - - - -	8
3	Police Government Relationship - - - - -	11
4	Basic Police Structure - - - - -	13
5	Survey Form - - - - -	16
6	Model Police Organization, National Level - - - - -	18
7	Indicators - Police Operations - - - - -	23
8	Functional Responsibilities of a Patrol Division - - -	28
9	Organization - Patrol Division - - - - -	29
10	Population per Police Employee (US Cities) - - - - -	31
11	Selected Police Ratios by Geographical Areas - - - - -	33
12	Police-to-Population Ratios - - - - -	34
13	Ratios of Functional Areas within US Urban Police Departments - - - - -	37
14	Subfunctional Activity Ratios - - - - -	38
15	Temporaria - - - - -	42
16	Police Subdistricts - - - - -	55
17	Typical Rural Police District - - - - -	56
18	Typical Urban Police Force - - - - -	57
19	National Govt/Police Relationship - - - - -	59

I. PURPOSE: To design an effective model for police forces of developing nations which includes a basic organization, training requirements, effective but realistic supporting equipment, and operational methods of employment for the entire sphere of internal security operations.

II. DESIGN CRITERIA: Police in a developing nation operate from a unique position in that they function in four separate but closely related roles, that is; the social, political, administrative, and tactical.¹ The social role of law enforcement involves the police function as a basic social institution; an agency of social control. The political role involves the police as a government institution; that which exercises the government's legitimate right of control. Here the police stand as the center of power in governmental operations by virtue of their security mission. The administrative role bridges the gap between the national government and the villages and people of the rural areas as well as the inhabitants of more sophisticated urban areas. The tactical role involves those offensive operations necessary to maintain the public peace. Thus, the force design must include an internal intelligence capability to detect incipient insurgency and a capability to cope with small scale banditry or guerrilla activity in addition to the capability to perform the normal police functions endemic to the environment.

III. GENERAL METHODOLOGY: This study, through the technique of comparative analysis, develops a model police force based on the socioeconomic and political aspects of varying world regions and subject to the instability projected in threat studies for the 1970-75 time-frame. To insure maximum validity of developmental factors outlined, various police structures are examined to ascertain those organizational factors which are most prevalent in US and foreign police forces.

A brief examination is made of the various conditions under which police may be utilized in a low intensity warfare environment. The force structure and operational concepts are based on the following principles; unity of command, operational continuity, jurisdictional authority, organic support resources, operational flexibility, and environmental flexibility.

IV. ASSUMPTIONS:

A. That developing nations will desire to place the greatest emphasis on the preventive aspects of internal defense.

B. That the greatest threat to world stability will be the small, localized instability of nations whose impact on world stability is disproportionate to their actual importance in the world hierarchy.

C. That, from the standpoint of effectiveness, economy, and national acceptance, police will continue to be the "first line of defense" in matters pertaining to internal security.

V. INTRODUCTION:

A. General. During the time frame under study the United States Army will be involved in internal defense type operations to a degree hitherto unknown. Current threat analyses postulate that, as the threat of general war lessens because more nations have become members of the nuclear weapons family, the Communist bloc will increase their efforts to subvert nations through the medium of internal revolution. If this is the case, the US Army, specifically the Military Police, must be prepared to assume a greater role in the creation, restoration, and maintenance of indigenous forces of law and order.

To assume a larger role in the tangled and diverse international scene will require a knowledge of the areas of operations, the cultural propensity toward law and order, and the form of government. This form may range from the family system through the tribal, city, state, country, or nation system. The specific form of government may range from oligarchy to democracy. (See figure 1.) The economic form may lie somewhere between socialism and capitalism.

For the police to be able to do their job properly and effectively, they must be aware of the effect of religion, the economic status of the nation involved, and the difference in rural tribal systems and urban advanced political systems. While this study is primarily concerned with police, both civilian and military, the role of the police cannot be isolated from the realities of the world environment. The police role touches very




Figure 1

closely on the political, economic, and social aspects of the world system. The part and place which the police play in an orderly society must be recognized. Further, we must realize that without law there is no order and without order men have no direction. Certainly, a system of orderly relationships is a primary condition of human life at every level. Such a system is formalized in a code of laws. Divergent interests are circumscribed by these laws of the state that the courts interpret and apply. But, there is a vast number of mores, taboos, and understanding that really regulate the innermost workings of the system or society. No government makes these, no court applies them, and no political executive enforces them. This is the margin within which enforcement must also operate. Thus, it behooves those who work in the police field to understand and appreciate these unwritten laws which in effect do more toward regulating a society than the enforcement element.

We have seen that law and order is a basic prerequisite for the stability of all nations, but law (that is codified law) is a sterile thing. Without its counterpart, the enforcement element, it is of little effect. The enforcement element is the force which changes law from philosophical to pragmatic reality. Therefore, any study which touches on law and order must of necessity deal with the forces which assure the rule of law. These forces are, in their basic form, the police.

The need for law and order has been exhibited throughout the centuries by each nation's development of taboos and mores. As the society is developed, the law and order forces gradually evolved to enforce adherence to these conventions. The orderly environment created by these forces has in turn made possible the development of more advanced economic and political systems. The success enjoyed by some nations in achieving economic prosperity has stimulated other less fortunate societies into what has been described as a revolution of rising expectations. The first victim of this revolutionary tide is, paradoxically, the force charged with creating an environment of order.

Destroying order is always a much easier task than maintaining it. Hence this study points out some of the problems of maintaining order in the developing nations as well as promoting a greater awareness of the police role in ensuring the rule of law. Additionally, it develops a model upon which the advisor can base the development of police forces in those areas in which he may be committed.


B. Current Police Problems. The police of many developing nations are poorly trained, are inadequately equipped, have inefficient organizational structures, are corrupt and venal, and have few, if any, records. In many cases, police personnel are illiterate and when standard police methods fail, or are unknown, they too readily resort to brutality and other repressive measures to enforce obedience to the nation's laws. These laws may, in themselves, be outdated or inadequate to the nation's need. This is particularly true of those countries whose judicial systems were originally based on a colonial

power's legal system. In many cases the laws required to control a colony are in direct opposition to those required to regulate an independent society. For instance, laws to enforce segregation in colonial African countries are totally intolerable after independence.

In general, many police forces are ill-prepared for the job which may well set the stage for the existence or even the survival of the government they support. Because the police cannot do their job at this most critical time, they are often decimated by the growing insurgency forces. For example, in the first days of the Dominican Republic Insurgency, nearly one-third of the National Police were trapped and executed by the rebels. In other countries, police have so incurred the hatred of the population that even if they survive they can hope to receive little or no popular support in their battle to contain an insurgency. Thus, as the police effort fails and the situation continues to deteriorate, major military forces must be committed to stabilize the nation.

When a US military force is ordered into a country torn by instability, the commander may find that the police force has been decimated or is at least inoperative. If so, he must take steps to establish new police forces or reestablish the authority of the existing force. This is a complex and highly specialized task. It may require recruiting, organizing, equipping, and training police personnel.

If the police structure has been totally decimated, US military forces must provide law and order during the interim period in which a new police force is created.



POLICE PHASING — STABILITY OPNS

FIGURE 2

The creation of a structure for law and order must be based on the resources available, the cultural, political, and economic background of the country and the skill and knowledge of the organizing agency. While the local environmental factors cannot be controlled, the knowledge and skill of the organizing agency can and must be. Paragraph VI provides a model structure for a police force being created or reorganized in a low intensity conflict environment. The police model provides a general organizational structure for a civilian police force which can be modified in accordance with factors applicable to each specific country.

C. Police - Military Relationship. Too frequently, an unhealthy competition between the police and military is generated. Both organizations have an important role to play and each must subordinate personal interests in order to successfully defeat insurgency. Figure 2 shows what should be the proper relationship between police and the military in an insurgency environment. This figure defines police activities in relation to the insurgent effort. Police function throughout all phases of insurgency but take precedence during some phases, just as they give way to the military force in other phases. A major problem in this respect is to identify the critical points where responsibility shifts.


Phase I. Normally, civil police, paramilitary forces, or military forces will be responsible for carrying out the functions of discipline, law, and order in support of the established government. When insurgent

forces first become active (Phase I) police forces have the responsibility for countering the threat. Since insurgents are classified as criminals, police investigative and operational techniques are utilized. The success with which the civil police meet this challenge dictates whether the insurgency escalates into Phase II or regresses to a situation of stability. It is during this phase that the police act in a "preventive" role.


Phase II. This time frame sees an intensification of the insurgency and a further attempt by police forces to control it. During this phase, police operations take on an ever-increasing military characteristic. Military advisors may assist in training police forces and some military units may be used.

Phase III. Police operations continue but due to the increasingly violent nature of the conflict, a requirement exists for military action and a centralized authority. This authority may be police or military, with competence being the key. It should be noted that these first three phases correspond to the counterinsurgency Phases I through III outlined in FM 31-22. Because this study envisions activities well beyond the combat phase, two additional phases are added.


Phase IV. This phase is identified by the reestablishment of police authority over an area. Because the area may be contiguous to uncleared areas, the police must have a capability of providing protection for themselves and the area. Reconstruction starts during



SITUATION A
 NORMAL
 PHASE I & V



SITUATION B
 EMERGENCY
 PHASE III



SITUATION C
 LIMITED EMERGENCY
 PHASE II & IV

* RETAINS ADMINISTRATIVE
 SUPPORT OF RURAL POLICE.
 PROVIDES BACK-UP SUPPORT
 AS NEEDED.

FIGURE 3

this phase and a separate phase is identified only because of the existing threat of renewed insurgency.

Phase V. This phase is similar to Phase I in that a minor insurgency threat still exists and the police must carry out an anti-insurgent role as well as the normal functions of discipline, law, and order. Successful operations during this phase insure a return to stability and allow emphasis to be placed on nation building. Figure 3 relates the police-government relationship in all phases.

The major problem in a chart such as figure 2 is that no clear boundaries of insurgency can be readily identified. Phases may be identified from I through V concurrently. Another aspect of the insurgency cycle is that successfully countering the insurgency in any phase can cause regression through the cycle. It should be pointed out, however, that this regression is applicable only to the insurgent. If a successful program is carried out, the police should never return to the backward, inefficient status which allowed the insurgency to escalate in the first and second phases.

VI. MODEL FORCE ORGANIZATION.

A. General. The question as to the composition of a police force has been debated by law enforcement experts and laymen alike for many years. Several excellent studies have been written which have attempted, through formularization, to simplify the task of determining how many police a country needs, but few, if any, have addressed the very real

problem of how the force should be structured internally. Existing studies have, by means of weighted variables, attempted to relate the police requirement to significant environmental, social, economic, and population factors. While these studies have provided an important input to the study of the problem at hand, they have frequently been so esoteric as to be unusable to the police advisor in the field. While this study does not suggest a system which can function without decisions on the values of certain variables, it is hoped that the comparative approach will provide the user a better comprehension of the problem involved and the background which is available to help him in the decision making process.

B. Organization.

1. Basically a police structure consists of four divisions.




Figure 4

2. In addition to these purely police functions, the police of many areas are responsible for additional nonpolice or quasi-police functions, e. g.

- a. Animal pounds.
- b. Vehicle licensing and inspection (taxis, private vehicles, and commercial vehicles).
- c. Maintenance of standards for weights and measures.
- d. Tax collection.
- e. Census.
- f. Customs.
- g. Border control.
- h. Presidential and VIP security.
- i. Licensing and inspection of amusement places.

3. The model shown above and as modified in figure 6 encompasses those functional areas of police effort which have been identified by analysis of police organizations throughout the United States. O. W. Wilson² also identifies these areas as the primary functions of a modern police force. While specific organizational forms may vary, these functions, or closely related ones, appear in the majority of foreign police forces analyzed during the course of research for this study.

C. Methodology.

1. The basic methodology used in this study is the comparison of existing police forces throughout the world in order to gain data on

strengths, organizations, responsibilities, and functions. The comparisons are made through the use of charts and graphs which establish operational means and which are translatable to usable ratios. The basic data was taken from the Municipal Yearbook-1965;³ The International Bibliography of Police Literature;⁴ Uniform Crime Reports-1966;⁵ and a survey conducted for this study.

2. A questionnaire (figure 5) was sent to 158 US cities in order to determine the percentages encompassed by the various functional areas inherent in a police structure. Of 158 surveys dispatched, 106 responses were received. Six of these were invalidated because of unresolvable mechanical errors. Specific data on responses are as follows:

SIZE COMMUNITY	NO REQUESTS	DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE	NUMBER OF RESPONSES	RATIO RESPONSES/ REQUESTS	DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES
500,000	14	8.9%	12	85.8%	11.2%
250,000-500,000	14	8.9	11	78.7	10.2
100,000-250,000	28	17.7	18	64.3	16.8
50,000-100,000	34	21.5	28	82.3	26.2
25,000-50,000	31	19.6	17	54.9	15.9
10,000-25,000	37	23.4	21	56.8	19.7
TOTALS	158	100.0%	107		100.0%

Table 1

The 21 responses from cities of 10,000 - 25,000 were invalidated during final computations because the forces involved were generally too small to allow an accurate breakdown of functional responsibilities. For example, one or two detectives performed all vice, juvenile, and criminal investigations. Traffic and patrol duties were likewise combined. The specific results of the survey are contained in figures 13 and 14 and discussed in paragraph VI F.

INSTRUCTION SHEET

1. Where a functional title varies from those used by your organization, feel free to change the form titles. If your organizational breakout is not as detailed as is shown, please indicate the number of personnel who do carry out related activities within your department.
2. Includes chief of police and other operational staff commanders, such as director/chief/commander of uniformed services.
3. Includes clerks, typists, stenographers from all divisions of the force.
4. Includes maintenance of weapons, vehicles, communications, and facilities. If maintenance is provided from outside sources; i.e., contract or by city employees, please so indicate.
5. Identify personnel listed as "other" on the back of the form. This may include such personnel as internal security, inspection, public relations, and budget.
6. Where personnel can be clearly identified as having dual functions; i.e., communications and records, spaces should be identified to nearest one-half.

POLICE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

Police Department _____

<u>Function¹</u>	<u>Number of Personnel⁶</u>	<u>DO NOT FILL IN Percent</u>
Command ²	_____	_____
Administrative ³	_____	_____
Maintenance ⁴	_____	_____
Supply	_____	_____
Jail	_____	_____
Crime Lab	_____	_____
Others ⁵	_____	_____
Traffic	_____	_____
Detective	_____	_____
Juvenile	_____	_____
Communications	_____	_____
Records	_____	_____
Vicc	_____	_____
Intelligence	_____	_____
Patrol (Harbor) (Air)	_____ _____	_____ _____
TOTAL	_____	_____

FIGURE 5

D. Basis for Police Model.

1. Based on the questionnaires returned, the organizational and operational details of each department were analyzed to determine ratios of various functional areas. Figures 13 and 14 provide comparisons made between various categories of cities to show what effect city and department sizes have on organizational ratios.

2. The functional areas analyzed were: Administration, Auxiliary Services, Operational Support Activities, and Patrol. These functional areas were broken down as follows:

a. Administration: Clerks, typists, stenographers, budgeting, personnel, public relations, plans, intelligence, and training.


b. Technical services: Records, communications, property, crime lab, jail, and maintenance.

c. Operational support: Traffic, detective, vice, and juvenile.

d. Patrol: Includes all patrol activities excluding those of traffic.

E. Organization of Model. Based on ratios derived from an analysis of data collected through the survey, interviews, and general research, a model organization has been constructed as outlined in figure 6. This model has been developed as a tool to aid the military police advisor in his dealings with civil police. It provides a gauge to determine requirements and provides a simplified system for developing an organization.

MODEL POLICE ORGANIZATION NATIONAL LEVEL



* AS REQUIRED

** MAY BE ATTACHED TO DIRECTOR'S OFFICE WHEN SUB-SECTIONS ARE COMBINED BECAUSE OF LIMITED PERSONNEL.

The user must study the model, study the area toward which he is oriented and then modify the model to fit the specific needs of the country involved. The four major functional areas of the model, with their most significant subfunctions, are as follows:

1. Administrative services. The functional elements of this division should be kept as basic as good organizational principles will allow. Two of the internal sections are particularly important and deserve special attention during organization or reorganization. They are --

a. Plans. Efficient law enforcement in a civilian environment depends as much on prior planning as does any military operation. Therefore, continuous plans must be on hand to insure that no activity occurring in the area of responsibility is unplanned for. Plans and training must be dynamic, changing as population shifts occur or as interests and activities of the population change. Examples of the type plans which must be made are --

(1) Civil disturbance plans: Fire, riots, and natural disasters.

(2) Crowd control plans: Sports activities, parades, religious gatherings, and national holiday gatherings.

(3) Traffic control plans: Visiting dignitaries and activities in (2) above.

(4) Operational plans: Robberies, terrorist attacks, murder, auto theft, and protection of critical facilities.

Many of the plans outlined above require greater manpower resources than would be readily available without degrading the enforcement effort in other areas. To preclude this happening, a reserve or "Special Force" should be maintained at all operational levels of platoon and above.

b. Training and schools. This section is responsible for all centralized training of units, cells, and individual personnel. A national police academy should be established to insure economy and uniformity of all police training. A minimum permanent staff should be established to insure economy and uniformity of all police training. Active field or headquarters personnel should provide instruction in daily operating, organizational, and logistics problems. The training curriculum should include, as a minimum, general investigative techniques, circulation control of individuals, personnel identification systems, traffic control, training, leadership, supervisory procedures and techniques, search and apprehension, national and local law, criminal investigation, crime prevention, weapons instruction, communications, vehicle operation, and care and maintenance of equipment. A major problem which has frequently been identified by police engaged in control of civil disturbances is the inability of police, who are otherwise well trained, to function as a member of a unit. To minimize this problem, unit training should be given in fire and maneuver techniques, riot

control tactics, ambush tactics, search and seizure, rural patrolling, and general tactics for small unit operations.

2. Technical services. This division provides those services which support the operational elements of the patrol and operational support divisions.

a. Records. No current total system exists but due to increased Federal interest and aid, the time frame under study should produce a standard manual model adaptable by developing countries and a low-cost automated system for more advanced nations.

b. Communications. Communications consist of both departmental or internal communications and operational or external communications. Internal communications is that equipment linking the various elements of the department. This equipment is administrative in nature and will depend on the state-of-the-art for the time involved. The two major communications problems in a police force are control when elements must function as a unit and keeping in touch with individual patrolmen when a country's communications are otherwise minimal. Police must take advantage of and acquire the latest developments in facsimile equipment, teletype, and radio-telephone equipment as early in the organization stage as possible. The problem of control of police as units in riot control operations or minor internal defense type offensive or defensive operations can best be solved by intensive training. In lieu of this, individual "handy-talky" type radios can help to increase control.

3. Inspectional services.

a. Inspections. Inspection personnel should be available to insure continuous, country-wide inspections of all police elements and activities. Inspections should insure high standards of moral conduct, isolate training deficiencies, identify equipment needs and deficiencies, identify personnel problems, make possible recommendations for increasing or decreasing police strengths, and finally investigate matters having a public relations impact.

b. Intelligence. The primary purpose of the intelligence element is to gather, evaluate, and disseminate information to the Director of Police and others who should be informed on a need to know basis. Its broad objective, thus, is to gather information and translate it into effective action through analyzation, evaluation, coordination, and dissemination. Based on the analyzation of information the intelligence element should define trends, identify emerging leaders, describe the crime or insurgency potential/climate, and in certain specific crimes supply motives and possible perpetrators. To do so in the stability environment the intelligence element must develop indicators which give a basis for diagnosing possible trends (see figure 7). Specific objectives are as follows:

"(1) Establish the existence of organized crime (in the insurgency environment, illegal opposition to the legal government), its strength, structure, and principal income.

INDICATORS - POLICE OPERATIONS

NOTE: INDICATORS DO NOT INCLUDE NORMAL STATISTICAL INDICATORS OF LAW AND ORDER, I.E. TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS, THEFTS, LARCENIES, AND BURGLES. SUCH INDICATORS MUST BE USED IN ADDITION TO THOSE LISTED BELOW SINCE THEY DO NOT STRICTLY PERTAIN TO STABILITY OR ORDER. OPERATIONS THAT DO ESTABLISH THE GENERAL STRENGTH OF LAW AND ORDER.

FUNCTION	ACTIVITY	ELEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION	REMARKS	
PROTECTION	SABOTAGE	NO OF ACTS	APPLIED AGAINST LIKE PERIOD	
		TARGET	MILITARY OR CIVIL - METROPOLITAN OR RURAL	
	TERRORISM	METHOD	HIGHLY TECHNICAL AND PLANNED VS OPPORTUNISTIC	
		TYPE SABOTEUR	HARD CORE VC - IDEALISTIC SYMPATHIZER - COERCED	
		NO OF ACTS	APPLIED AGAINST LIKE PERIOD	
	CIVIL ORDER	RAIDS	TARGET	MILITARY OR CIVIL LEADERS - GENERAL POPULACE
			PURPOSE	ENFORCEMENT OF LOYALTIES VS FAILURE OF PERSUASION
			NO OF RAIDS	APPLIED AGAINST LIKE PERIOD AND AREA
		RIOTS	TARGET	MILITARY OR CIVIL - FOOD OR WEAPONS - MEDICAL SUPPLY
			METHOD	HIT-AND-RUN VS ANNIHILATION ATTACKS
PURPOSE			DESTRUCTION - REPRISAL - HARASSMENT	
STRENGTH			NO - MORALE AND ESPRIT - HANDLING OF OWN DEAD, WOUNDED	
ACTIONS			DESTRUCTION VS CAPTURE OF SUPPLIES VS DEMONSTRATION	
ATTITUDE OF POPULATION			KILL - KIDNAP - DISREGARD - PROPAGANDIZE - EXPLOIT	
NO OF RIOTS			APPLIED AGAINST LIKE PERIOD	
POPULATION AND RESOURCES CONTROL	STRIKES	NO OF PARTICIPANTS	IN EACH RIOT	
		LEADERSHIP	RELIGIOUS - ACADEMIC - POLITICAL - COMMUNIST	
		CAUSE	POLITICAL - SOCIAL - ECONOMIC	
	RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS	DURATION	DEGREE OF FORCE REQUIRED TO SUPPRESS - CASUALTIES POLICE OR MILITARY	
		CONTROL MEANS	APPLIED AGAINST LIKE PERIOD	
		NO OF STRIKES	IN EACH STRIKE	
		NO OF STRIKERS	LABOR - ACADEMIC - NEWS MEDIA - FARMERS	
		TYPE OF STRIKE	ECONOMIC - SOCIAL - POLITICAL	
		CAUSE		
		VIOLENT VS NONVIOLENT		
POPULATION AND RESOURCES CONTROL	POPULATION	CONTROL MEANS	DEGREE OF FORCE REQUIRED TO CONTROL - POLICE OR MILITARY	
		DURATION	UNION - RELIGIOUS - ACADEMIC - POLITICAL - COMMUNIST	
		LEADERSHIP	APPLIED AGAINST LIKE PERIOD	
	RESOURCES	NO OF DEMONSTRATIONS	IN EACH DEMONSTRATION	
		NO OF PARTICIPANTS	RELIGIOUS - ACADEMIC - MILITARY - POLITICAL	
		TYPE MOVEMENT	DEMONSTRATION - STRIKE - SLOWDOWN - SITDOWN	
		RESISTANCE TECHNIQUE	DEGREE OF FORCE REQUIRED TO SUPPRESS - POLICE OR MILITARY	
		MEANS TO CONTROL	RELIGIOUS - POLITICAL - ACADEMIC - MILITARY - COMMUNIST	
		LEADERSHIP		
		DURATION		
POPULATION AND RESOURCES CONTROL	POPULATION	PASSIVE VS VIOLENT	APPLIED AGAINST PREVIOUS AND TOTAL POPULATION	
		ID CARDS ISSUED		
		% FAMILY CENSUS COMPLETED	DETERMINES MAGNITUDE OF CIVILIAN SUPPORT	
	RESOURCES	NO INFORMATION "TIPS"		
		NO OF DEFACTORS		
		NO OF REDEFECTORS		
		LURFEW VIOLATIONS		
		RATIO - POLICE TO AREA POPULATION	BASED ON REQUIREMENT DETERMINED BY AREA SURVEY	
		CHECKPOINT VIOLATIONS	ID CARDS - TRAVEL PERMITS	
		VC WEAPONS RECOVERED	TURNED-IN (\$) - DESTROYED - CAPTURED	
REGISTRATIONS COMPLETED	WEAPONS - CROPS - LIVESTOCK - VEHICLES			
CHECKPOINT VIOLATIONS	CARGO MANIFESTS			

FIGURE 7

(2) Identify current and emerging criminal leaders and their associates; prepare and maintain dossiers on them; and conduct investigations in depth thereof.

(3) Identify areas or industries, legal or illegal, which are most vulnerable to organized crime (or insurgency).

(4) Maintain an informant program, an undercover unit, a surveillance unit, and a technical unit.

(5) Utilization of overt sources of information.

(6) Maintain a department-wide program to stimulate submission of information.

(7) Maintain accurate records and files with good cross-references, and a system of rapid and complete retrieval.

(8) Effectively disseminate information.

(9) Cooperation with, and knowledge of, the activities of other law enforcement and regulatory enforcement agencies."⁶

(10) Cooperation with, and knowledge of, the activities of military forces which are involved in related duties.

c. Personnel inspection. Depending on the cultural background and state of advancement of the police force, this element may be placed under direct supervision of the Director of Police. Close coordination should be maintained with the Plans Section. This section should investigate all suspected or actual cases of wrongdoing

by police personnel. Because of the position of power which personnel of this section hold, great care should be taken in their selection and training. Maximum safeguards should be taken to preclude inspection positions becoming political appointments.

4. Line division. The basic element of a police force is the line division which provides services. All other elements exist to support this basic element. For the purpose of the model, the line division is further broken down into two elements:

a. Patrol division (see figure 6). This division is the main element of the model force. It retains the nucleus of manpower and provides for urban and rural patrols. While many duties are identical in any environment, the additional requirement for protecting against terrorist attacks, sabotage, and small unit hit-and-run attacks fall primarily on the shoulders of the patrol division. Patrolmen must be trained in more traditionally combat oriented roles and equipped with arms capable of repressing or repelling small unit guerrilla attacks. General police training tends to orient policemen to actions as individuals. They must also be trained to operate as units in addition to the traditional one- or two-man beat or post. An alternative to this is the organization of special combat police units. This alternative is rejected in all but exceptional cases because it infringes on what should be purely military responsibilities and requires an excessive expenditure of manpower. This alternative may be appropriate in areas where police forces have traditionally functioned in the dual role of

internal and external defense forces; e.g., many South American national guard type units.

(1) Urban patrols. This unit provides normal patrol personnel for cities and metropolitan areas. In small cities auxiliary and administrative support can be provided from central headquarters by special teams. If the magnitude of work so dictates these teams can be assigned on a permanent basis.

(2) Rural patrols. Within either rural or urban patrols a further structuring may be accomplished to provide for special patrol activities, such as railway, waterway, air, or border patrols (see figure 8). When required, these special patrol activities may be augmented by teams from the operational support section discussed below. Because of the isolated nature of the rural posts, police assigned to this duty must be prepared to carry out a greater range of duties than the urban patrolman. In specific cases, i.e., murder or particularly difficult cases, central HQ will provide investigative teams.

(3) Organization of a patrol company (figure 9). The standard patrol company consists of a total of 78 personnel; 3 officers, 11 NCO's, and 64 patrolmen. The internal structuring of 2 platoons with 4 sections consisting of 4 patrol teams each, provides for 24-hour operation of 2 geographical areas. For example, a small city requiring a patrol company could be divided into two districts, each being assigned a platoon. The platoon leader with his four sections has three 8-hour

shifts with the fourth section providing a reserve force and personnel for special details as well as replacements for personnel on sick leave or normal leave.

b. Operational support section. This section is composed of traffic, detective, and juvenile subsections. In the early stages of development, juvenile duties may be assigned to the detective section. As the force becomes more sophisticated and the workload increases individual subsections may be formed to handle the below listed subfunctions.


(1) Traffic section, including traffic safety education, traffic statistics and analyses, and signs and meters.

(2) Detective section, which includes narcotics, missing persons, arson, frauds, forgery, burglary, and auto theft.

In order to provide maximum countrywide support with a minimum of manpower, this section is composed of cells which provide their functional service on-call or as needed. Personnel manning these activities should be maintained at the national or central headquarters where they can undergo special training and recycling as required. For example, due to a heavy military traffic load in Forktown (figure 15), two-man traffic cells can be dispatched and upon completion of this assignment be reassigned or recalled for further training.

5. Miscellaneous. It is not the intent of this model to degrade many functions which are important to a developed police force, but with

MAJOR FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PATROL DIVISION



CELLULAR CONSTRUCTION OF TRAFFIC, DETECTIVE, VICE & JUVENILE DIVISIONS ALLOWS SUPPORT OF PATROL ELEMENTS AS NEEDED OR BY ASSIGNMENT OF PERMANENT CELLS WHERE MAGNITUDE OF WORK SO DICTATES. I.E. CITIES WITHIN PROVINCES.

FIGURE 8

ORGANIZATION — PATROL DIVISION




FIGURE 9
29

the key element of simplicity, the unit under design must limit itself to major functional responsibilities. As the country in question gains economic maturity and can afford to support a more sophisticated police force, thought may be given to placing more police resources in support of --

- a. Research and analysis.
- b. Public relations.
- c. Liaison.
- d. Juvenile activities.
- e. Labor relations.
- f. Women's bureau.
- g. Specialized disaster squads.
- h. Police information center.

F. Model Ratios.

1. The primary purpose of the survey conducted for this study was to determine to what degree the resources committed to each functional area of a police organization could be identified. A degree of consistency was evident and the results are shown in figures 13 and 14. The results are shown as averages since no extremes of enough significance to skew them were in evidence. The ratios shown in figure 10 reflect those police in the city proper. They do not reflect the backup force which exists in the form of County police, State police, and the multitude of specialized Federal police agencies available to handle special cases,

POPULATION PER POLICE EMPLOYEE RATIOS (U.S. CITIES)—1965




FIGURE 10
31

i.e., FBI, Treasury and Secret Service, and Border Patrol police. All these agencies provide a reserve of expertise and manpower, which if not available, would have to be provided by the city. Thus, when designing a police structure these forces must be provided for. It is estimated that in the United States the police forces above the community level number 102,000.⁸ With community enforcement agencies numbering 150,000,⁹ the available police to population ratio in the United States becomes 1:242.

2. The world police, whose ratios are shown in figures 11 and 12 do not consist of one well organized, centrally directed police force with well defined responsibilities. In many cases several different forces have grown up with overlapping and conflicting responsibilities, or else differing organizations have been created to carry out varying police oriented functions. For example, the police of Belgium are split between the Communal Police, the Gendarmerie, and the Judicial Police. This multistructured enforcement element is more prevalent in the older more developed countries, while the newly developed nations seem to tend toward the centralized, single national police force aimed at more economy of manpower.

3. One word of caution must be given concerning the use of figures used in charts on foreign police forces. Information concerning a nation's police force is an indicator of national strength and as such is zealously guarded. Therefore, accurate data in an unclassified state is difficult to obtain. Because it is desired to keep this study in an unclassified configuration, the best available data was used with the

COUNTRY	POPULATION	POLICE	AREA SQ MI	POLICE PER SQ MI	RATIO - POLICE TO POPULATION	
					MEDIAN	MEDIAN
EUROPE						
AUSTRIA	6,980,000	16,131	32,375	1: 2.0	1:431	1:632
BELGIUM	8,951,000	2,675	11,775	1: 4.4	1:3,150	
DENMARK	4,513,000	6,818	16,576	1: 2.4	1:665	
FINLAND	4,227,000	7,075	119,113	1: 16.6	1:620	
F. GERMANY	54,530,781	122,266	95,734	1: 0.8	1:444	
HONGKAY	3,341,000	4,380	124,556	1: 28.3	1:829	
SPAIN	30,000,000	112,000	191,320	1: 1.9	1:265	
SWEDEN	7,328,000	9,557	173,436	1: 18.2	1:72	
SWITZERLAND	5,439,066	8,025	15,950	1: 1.9	1:67	
UNITED KINGDOM	49,507,000	84,121	88,545	1: 1.1	1:599	
AMERICA						
UNITED STATES	15,195,000	26,159	3,852,000	1:147.0	1:567	1:566
1. METROPOLITAN	174,367,000	317,000	3,615,211	1:114.8	1:131	
2. METRO-INT. COUNTY						
STATE- FEDERAL						
BACKUP						
3. TOTAL RATIO						
SOUTH AMERICA						
BOLIVIA	3,590,000	5,000	424,000	1: 64.9	1:116	1:634
CHILE	6,872,000	20,700	286,396	1: 13.8	1:300	
ECUADOR	4,579,000	5,000	108,000	1: 21.6	1:916	
PERU	2,750,000	10,000	72,180	1: 6.9	1:550	
VENEZUELA	7,520,000	9,000	352,051	1: 39.2	1:669	
AFRICA						
KENYA	7,261,000	16,860	224,960	1: 13.6	1:632	1:624
SIERRA LEONE	35,252,000	15,000	339,170	1: 22.6	1:2,383	
REP. S. AFRICA	15,641,000	27,900	472,359	1: 16.9	1:555	
ALGERIA	10,850,000	10,000	920,070	1: 92.0	1:1,080	
ASIA						
AUSTRALIA	10,509,000	15,262	2,974,381	1:194.5	1:687	1:525
JAPAN	94,870,000	123,614	147,700	1: 1.2	1:720	
MALAYA	7,409,000	20,000	50,700	1: 2.5	1:370	
REP. CHINA	11,302,000	18,500	13,890	1: .7	1:600	
S. VIETNAM	15,000,000	56,000	65,958	1: 1.2	1:270	
THAILAND	27,181,000	55,000	196,861	1: 3.6	1:450	
MIDDLE EAST						
TURKEY	26,880,000	69,000	296,500	1: 4.3	1:389	1:375
IRAN	20,678,000	49,000	628,000	1: 12.8	1:422	
ISRAEL	2,183,000	10,900	7,993	1: .7	1:200	
LEBANON	1,500,000	4,150	3,600	1: .8	1:361	

FIGURE 11




FIGURE 12

knowledge that certain variances do exist. In this respect, data for the years 1962-1965 has been combined. For the purpose of developing a methodology the variances created by combining several years data are not considered significant. Since the data depicted in figures 11 and 12 are from unclassified sources, they should only be considered as ranges, not absolutes. The user must verify the actual ratios from classified resources. In this same respect, one of the problems which plagues the researcher is the diverse interpretations as to what constitutes a nation's police forces. In some countries, purely military forces are responsible for functions carried out in other nations by police forces. This difficulty should be kept in mind as one attempts to determine a nation's total police strength.

4. The mean ratios of police to population developed in figure 12 are established as guidelines for the geographic area within which the advisor may be working. They represent, for the most part, a state of relative tranquility. As such, knowledge of a state of less than tranquility (most likely the general case) would dictate using a higher ratio as the start point. If a state of lawlessness or insurgency exists, the advisor should opt for the higher police to population ratio as his start point.

5. Without extensive field work it is difficult to evaluate the efficiency/effectiveness of any given police force. Factors of customs, topography, form of government, propensity toward law and order,


density of population, and state of police training all weight heavily on any such evaluation. Therefore, this study must of necessity accept a coefficient of efficiency of one (1) for the mean level of existing forces. Any other value of efficiency must be applied by the user based on a knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the existing forces from which comparative data or ratios are derived.

6. In spite of the problems which have been enumerated, certain frames of reference and ratio ranges may be derived from the data provided in this study. As the purpose of this study was to develop a system for developing a police organization, not evaluate them, the relatively minor deviations in data reliability are not considered significant.

7. Within the police structure a balance between the supported and supporter must be maintained. While the internal ratios shown in figures 13 and 14 vary slightly in each category of communities, there is no evidence to indicate that an environment of insurgency would give cause to drastically revise the basic ratios of support activities. The only exception is in the subactivities of intelligence, and training and schools. Figure 14 deviates from the actual results of the survey only in that these two elements have received that slice of personnel identified as "other" in the survey questionnaire. This category encompassed such diverse duties as research, school crossing guards, and humane personnel; all of which are generally unnecessary in a force being designed for an unsophisticated area.

RATIOS OF FUNCTIONAL AREAS WITHIN U.S. URBAN POLICE DEPARTMENTS — 1966

DATA TAKEN FROM SURVEY
OF 158 U.S. CITIES IN JULY, 1966



SUB-FUNCTIONAL ACTIVITY RATIOS

AVERAGES BASED ON U.S.
CITIES OVER 50,000
1966 DATA.




FIGURE 14

VII. DERIVATION OF FORCE STRUCTURE.

A. Operational Factors. Prior to making a decision on the number and/or location of police units a detailed survey of the area or country should be made to determine the following:

1. Population density.
 - a. By total country.
 - b. By areas.
 - c. By national, ethnic, religious, or tribal grouping.
2. Ethnic background of population.
3. Religious beliefs, practices, and taboos.
4. Terrain.
 - a. Type.
 - b. Road net.
 - c. Waterways.
5. Strategic value of locale.
 - a. Proximity to friendly or unfriendly borders.
 - b. Agricultural value.
 - c. Mineral wealth.
 - d. Accessibility.
6. Population's traditional propensity toward law and order.
 - a. Existing local enforcement system.
 - (1) Tribal.
 - (2) Colonial.

(3) Family.

b. Population's association with, or acceptance of, national government and the attendant rules and regulations.

7. Strength and relative aggressiveness of actual or potential insurgents.

8. Evaluation of existing police system.

a. Crime statistics available, either formally or informally.

b. Police strength.

(1) In-country - available and proposed.

(2) In comparison with adjacent countries.

c. Status of education and training.

d. Equipment.

(1) Vehicles.

(2) Communications.

(3) Weapons.

e. Relationship with other agencies; e.g., Army and/or other enforcement agencies.

9. General competence of existing governmental hierarchy.

B. Model Country. To preclude becoming involved in the time and space required to utilize an actual country, a simple model, Temporania, will be utilized to demonstrate the use of the model force. There will be no attempt to fully develop the background of Temporania, but this should not be construed as degrading any aspect of its social, economic, or

political structure. The abbreviated country model serves only to point out the more basic aspects of the police model. Temporania (see figure 15) is a small coastal nation 10° north of the equatorial belt. It consists of three loosely structured and joined provinces. The current government is a limited democracy with a single political party. The president has recently voiced a desire to bring the country closer together and to get the outlying areas more involved in national affairs. To do this he has asked for assistance in developing a modern police force.


1. Economy. The economic base of Temporania rests primarily with the rice crop of province Chi. Of lesser importance is the embryonic rubber tree crop and the limited crop of a number of old banana plantations. Capital city is a seaport. It has a small merchant fleet and transshipment of goods provides limited capital input. The port is nationally owned and operated.

2. Political structure. While the national government is ostensibly a limited democracy, those areas outside the capital city have little or no voice in national policies. For the most part, tribal rule is in effect for the traditionally agrarian population. A small national army exists but it is backward and undeveloped.

3. Ethnic background. Temporania consists of several tribes which are generally compatible. The only exception is province Rho whose jungle dwelling tribes have never attempted social or economic intercourse with the other provinces. Governmental control has been limited to the



TEMPORANIA



SCALE :
1" = 25 MI.

LEGEND-

- ▶ PROVINCIAL CAPITAL
- RICE PADDIES
- ☁ JUNGLE
- ☼ MOUNTAINS OR HILLS
- ⋯ PLANTATIONS

FIGURE 15
42

appointment of rather ineffectual province chiefs. Their limited control has been enforced by a small detachment of the national army.

4. Population:

- a. Total - 1,000,000.
- b. Province Psi - 400,000
 - (1) Capital city - 100,000.
 - (2) One city of 10,000.
- c. Province Chi - 500,000.
 - (1) Forktown - 30,000.
 - (2) Two cities of 10,000.
- d. Province Rho - 100,000.

The remainder of the population lives in small tribal enclosures ranging from 500 - 5,000 population.

5. Area:

- a. Total - 25,000 square miles.
- b. Province Psi - 8,500 square miles.
- c. Province Chi - 12,000 square miles.
- d. Province Rho - 4,500 square miles.

6. Topography:

a. Province Psi is rolling hill country with a fairly good all-weather road net.

b. Province Chi is low and flat with a number of swamps. Much of the area has been used to cultivate rice for many years. The road net is passable only in good weather.

c. Province Rho is entirely covered by mountainous jungle terrain. The only access to this area is by porter trails. One small airstrip is available at the province chief's village.

C. Computation of Police Strengths. As stated previously, any computations of police strengths must be tempered by known facts and problems of the area involved. The computations used here are simplified and based on the model country, Temporania, in order to develop the methodology.

1. Figure 12 shows that the median ratio for police for the geographic region (for study purposes, Asia) is 1 policeman per 525 population. Thus, a 1,000,000 population \div 525 = a 1,905-man national police force.

2. The police ratio for cities of 100,000 population as interpolated from figure 10 is 1:627; for cities of 30,000, 1:667; and for cities of 10,000, 1:714, thus:

$$100,000 \div 627 = 160 \text{ police}$$

$$30,000 \div 667 = 45 \text{ police}$$

$$10,000 \div 714 = 14 \text{ police}$$

A requirement, therefore, exists for the following urban police:

1 city of 100,000 - 160 police (capital city)

1 city of 30,000 - 45 police (Forktown)

3 cities of 10,000 - 42 police

TOTAL Urban Police - 247

TOTAL Police Required - 1,905

Urban Police Required - - 247

TOTAL Remaining for Rural Police - 1,658

3. Figure 13 indicates the percentages of strength encompassed by each functional element of the police force. Based on these percentages, the support base for rural police can be computed as follows:

Rural strength	x functional area %	= support base
1658	x 11.5 (admin)	= 191
1658	x 6.5 (insp svc)	= 108
1658	x 12.0 (tech svc)	= 199
1658	x 24.0 (op spt) x 25%*	= 100
TOTAL spt base		= 598

1658
<u>-598</u>
1060 man rural patrol

*25% is an arbitrary decrease in operational support activities brought about by decreased traffic and detective requirements in the rural areas.

4. Area comparison. A check of figure 15 indicates the following percentages of area for each province:

Province Psi	= 34% of area
Province Chi	= 48% of area
Province Rho	= 18% of area

5. Based on the percentages above, a rough approximation of the rural patrol force strength for each province can be computed:

Psi	1060 x 34%	= 360
Chi	1060 x 48%	= 509
Rho	1060 x 18%	= 191
TOTAL	1060 patrol	

6. Based on the rural support strengths computed in 3 above and the area percentages shown in 5 above, the support slice for each province can be computed:

Province - Area % x Rural spt slice = Province slice

Psi - 34%	x 191	= 65 Admin spt
Chi - 48%	x 191	= 92 Admin spt
Rho - 18%	x 191	= 34 Admin spt
Psi - 34%	x 199	= 68 Tech svc
Chi - 48%	x 199	= 95 Tech svc
Rho - 18%	x 199	= 36 Tech svc
Psi - 34%	x 100	= 34 Operational spt
Chi - 48%	x 100	= 48 Operational spt
Rho - 18%	x 100	= 18 Operational spt
Psi - 34%	x 108	= 37 Insp svc
Chi - 48%	x 108	= 52 Insp svc
Rho - 18%	x 108	= <u>19</u> Insp svc

GRAND TOTAL 598

7. As computed in 6 above, the support strength for each province is as follows:

Psi Province

Administrative spt	- 65
Technical svc	- 68
Operational spt	- 34
Inspectional svc	- <u>37</u>
	204

Chi Province

Administrative spt	-	92
Technical svc	-	95
Operational spt	-	48
Inspectional svc	-	<u>52</u>
		287

Rho Province

Administrative spt	-	34
Technical svc	-	36
Operational spt	-	18
Inspectional svc	-	<u>19</u>
		107

8. Figure 14 indicates the percentages of subfunctional areas for each support activity. Applying the ratios as follows for each province will produce the basic support organization.

a. Psi Province

Subfunction - Rural Total x % = Number x % of Total Force = Province Slice

Technical svc

Records	-	1658	x	3%	=	49.7	x	34%	=	17
Commo	-	1658	x	4.5%	=	74.6	x	34%	=	25
Jail	-	1658	x	2.0%	=	33.1	x	34%	=	11
Maint	-	1658	x	1.5%	=	24.8	x	34%	=	<u>8</u>
										61

Administrative

Plans	-	1658	x	2.5%	=	41.4	x	34%	=	<u>14</u>
										14

Inspectional svc

Intel	-	1658	x	3%	=	49.7	x	34%	=	<u>17</u>
										17

Assigned Slice 92

b. Chi Province

Technical svc

Records	- 1658	x 3%	= 49.7	x 48%	= 24
Commo	- 1658	x 4.5%	= 74.6	x 48%	= 36
Jail	- 1658	x 2.0%	= 33.1	x 48%	= 16
Maint	- 1658	x 1.5%	= 24.8	x 48%	= $\frac{12}{88}$

Administrative

Plans	- 1658	x 2.5%	= 41.4	x 48%	= $\frac{20}{20}$
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Inspectional svc

Intel	- 1658	x 3%	= 49.7	x 48%	= $\frac{23}{23}$
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Assigned Slice 131

c. Rho Province

Technical svc

Records	- 1658	x 3%	= 49.7	x 18%	= 9
Commo	- 1658	x 4.5%	= 74.6	x 18%	= 13
Jail	- 1658	x 2.0%	= 33.1	x 18%	= 6
Maint	- 1658	x 1.5%	= 24.8	x 18%	= $\frac{4}{32}$

Administrative

Plans	- 1658	x 2.5%	= 41.4	x 18%	= $\frac{7}{7}$
-------	--------	--------	--------	-------	-----------------

Inspectional svc

Intel	- 1658	x 3%	= 49.7	x 18%	= $\frac{9}{9}$
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Assigned Slice 48

9. Based on the strengths thus far computed, a recapitulation is as follows:

Province -	Psi	Chi	Rho
Urban Police	*174*	*73*	*0*
Capital City	(160)	Forktown (45)	(0)
1-10,000 City	(14)	2-10,000 (28)	(0)
Rural Police (patrol and assigned support)	*452	*640	*239
Patrol (para 5)	(360)*	(509)*	(191)*
Support (assigned slice) (para 8)	(92)	(131)	(48)
Support (authorized slice) (para 7)	<u>(204)*</u>	<u>(287)*</u>	<u>(107)*</u>
TOTAL	*626	*713	*239
TOTAL AUTHORIZED	(738)*	(869)*	(298)*

Total force excluding national police headquarters = 1578

1905 - 1578 = 327 strength for national police headquarters

10. The national police headquarters breakout is computed as follows:

Province Spt Slice - Attached or Assigned Spt Police = Headquarters Element

Psi - 204	- 92	= 112
Chi - 287	- 131	= 156
Rho - 107	- 48	= <u>59</u>
		TOTAL 327

11. As indicated in 2 above, the total requirement for urban police is 247. The percentages of each functional area, derived from figure 13, are computed as follows:

Capital City - 160 police

<u>No Police</u>	<u>x %</u>	=	<u>No in Functional Area</u>
160	x 11.5%	=	19 (Administrative spt)
160	x 12%	=	19 (Technical svc)
160	x 24%	=	38 (Operational spt)
160	x 6.5%	=	10 (Inspectional svc)
160	x 46%	=	74 (Patrol)

Forktown - 45 police

45	x 11.5%	=	5 (Administrative spt)
45	x 12%	=	5 (Technical svc)
45	x 24%	=	11 (Operational spt)
45	x 6.5%	=	3 (Inspectional svc)
45	x 46%	=	21 (Patrol)

3-10,000 Cities - 42

42	x 11.5	=	5 ÷ 3 = 2 (Administrative spt)
42	x 12%	=	7 ÷ 3 = 2 (Technical svc)
42	x 24%	=	10 ÷ 3 = 3 (Operational spt)
42	x 6.5%	=	3 ÷ 3 = 1 (Inspectional svc)
42	x 46%	=	19 ÷ 3 = $\frac{6}{14}$ (Patrol)

12. Now that total strengths and proportions have been determined, it remains to design organizations and support elements required for day-to-day operations. For the purpose of this study, only the force structure within Psi Province will be calculated in detail.

a. Capital city.

(1) Operational support section. Figure 13 shows a ratio of 24.0%. Thus 24.0% of 160 = 38. Traffic, detective, and juvenile sections must be apportioned based on local requirements. For study purposes, we will use the percentages shown in figure 14.

Traffic = 14.0% of 160 police = 22

Detective = 7.5% of 160 police = 12

Juvenile = 2.5% of 160 police = $\frac{4}{38}$

(2) Technical services.

12% of 160 = 19 total

Records = 3.0% of 160 = 5

Communications = 4.5% of 160 = 7

Property Control = .5% of 160 = 1

Crime Lab = .5% of 160 = 1

Jail = 2.0% of 160 = 3

Maintenance = 1.5% of 160 = 2

TOTAL 19

(3) Administrative services.

11.5% of 160 = 18 total

Budget	=	1% of 160	=	2
Personnel	=	3.5% of 160	=	5
Public Relations	=	1% of 160	=	2
Plans	=	2.5% of 160	=	4
Tng & Schools	=	3.5% of 160	=	<u>5</u>
		TOTAL		18

(4) Inspectional services.

6.5% of 160 = 11 total

Internal Investigation	=	1% of 160	=	2
Intelligence	=	3% of 160	=	5
Inspection	=	.5% of 160	=	1
Vice	=	2% of 160	=	<u>3</u>
		TOTAL		11

(5) Patrol.

46% of 160 = 74 total

b. Rural police.

(1) As indicated in paragraph 9, Psi Province is allocated 360 patrol personnel, 92 assigned support personnel, and 112 support personnel assigned to national police headquarters. The breakdown of support personnel is specified in paragraph 8a.

(2) The number of patrol companies is computed as follows: $360 \div 78$ (see figure 9 patrol company) = 4.3 patrol companies.

This may be equated to 4 companies, 1 platoon, 2 sections. These units will be deployed as shown on figure 16, and as discussed in paragraph D, Operational Employment.

13. As a verification of ratios involved with the current structure, two checks remain to be made.

a. Population ratio.

<u>Province</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>÷</u>	<u>Assigned Strength</u>	<u>=</u>	<u>Ratio</u>
Psi	400,000	÷	626	=	1:639
Chi	500,000	÷	713	=	1:701
Rho	100,000	÷	239	=	1:418
<u>Province</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>÷</u>	<u>Strength + Spt Backup</u>	<u>=</u>	<u>Ratio</u>
Psi	400,000	÷	738	=	1:542
Chi	500,000	÷	870	=	1:575
Rho	100,000	÷	298	=	1:336
Nationwide	1,000,000	÷	1905	=	1:525

b. Area ratio.

<u>Province</u>	<u>Area (sq mi)</u>	<u>÷</u>	<u>Assigned Strength</u>	<u>=</u>	<u>Ratio</u>
Psi	8,500	÷	626	=	1:13.6
Chi	12,000	÷	713	=	1:16.8
Rho	4,500	÷	239	=	1:18.8
<u>Province</u>	<u>Area (sq mi)</u>	<u>÷</u>	<u>Strength + Backup</u>	<u>=</u>	<u>Ratio</u>
Psi	8,500	÷	738	=	1:11.5
Chi	12,000	÷	870	=	1:13.8
Rho	4,500	÷	298	=	1:15.1

D. Operational Employment.

1. Rural. Each province is regarded as a police district.

Thus, Psi District is Psi Province. To facilitate command and coordination, each district is subdivided into numbered subdistricts (see figure 16). Forktown is, therefore, Chi-2 as a separate subdistrict of Chi district.


a. Command. The company located at each province capital assumes a role as district headquarters. Thus, the patrol company commander has a dual role of district commander and subdistrict commander (see figure 17).

b. Support. The district commander may either attach support elements to subdistrict units or retain them under central control at district headquarters. Typical of decentralized elements are communications teams and intelligence teams.

2. Urban. All cities of 10,000 population and over are designated as separate subdistricts. The only exception to this division is Capital City which is a separate metropolitan district. Continuous requirements for support elements dictate the direct attachment of support teams to the urban forces. In smaller cities lesser used support teams may be held on an on-call basis, for assignment as needed. Schematically, an urban force would be organized as shown in figure 18.

3. General. Each city subdistrict police force will be under the command of the district police chief within which it is located. Capital City's police force will report directly to the Chief of the

TEMPORANIA



POLICE SUB-DISTRICTS

FIGURE 16

TYPICAL RURAL POLICE DISTRICT

NOTE: THE CHIEF OF POLICE AND STAFF OF SUB-DISTRICT P-1 FUNCTION IN DUAL CAPACITY OF DISTRICT CHIEF AND STAFF.





FIGURE 17

TYPICAL URBAN POLICE FORCE



* PERMANENT TEAMS MAY BE PROVIDED BY THE NATIONAL POLICE HQS WHEN THE MAGNITUDE OF WORK SO DICTATES.

** TO BE ATTACHED AS REQUIRED.

*** NUMBER OF COMPANIES AS REQUIRED.

FIGURE 18

Patrol Division at National Police Headquarters. The overall police to government relationship is depicted in figure 19.

E. Coordination.

1. Throughout each of the many historical studies done on insurgencies, lack of coordination evolves as one of the prime contributors to police failure. Coordination must be established with all elements of government if the internal defense plan is to have any chance for success. Continuous lines of communication must be opened to the political, social, economic, and military or paramilitary arms of government. The resultant exchange of information and benefits derived therefrom, are nowhere more aptly pointed out than in the successes of Malaya and the early failures experienced in Vietnam.

2. Coordination must not only be accomplished throughout all elements of government, but also across all levels. This includes coordination at the highest level, the Area Coordination Center, and the lowest level, the patrolman on the beat and his relations with local officials. No matter how efficient a police organization, or how well organized they are, they cannot work in a vacuum. Without the support of, and coordination with, the social, economic, and political order, the police program is doomed to failure.

NATIONAL GOVT AND POLICE RELATIONSHIP




FIGURE 19

VIII FOOTNOTES

¹Warren H. Metzner , LTC. US Assistance in the Peruvian Police Internal Security Mission. (US War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.)

²O.W. Wilson. Police Planning. (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1952), p. 44.

³International City Manager's Association. The Municipal Year Book 1965. (Chicago, 1965).

⁴International Police Association. International Bibliography of Police Literature. (London: Butterworth, 1962).

⁵Uniform Crime Reports for the United States. (Washington, D. C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation, July 1966).

⁶John F. Shanley. Address to the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit Eastern Regional Conference. (Chicago, Illinois, 1 November 1963).

⁷Uniform Crime Reports for the United States. (Washington, D. C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation, July 1966), Table 43.

⁸International Police Association. International Bibliography of Police Literature. (London. Butterworths, 1962).

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¹¹International City Manager's Association. The Municipal Year Book 1965. (Chicago, 1965).

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APPENDIX
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

I. GENERAL. As a result of the research conducted for this study, certain derivative data was collected which, although not critical to the development of the model, is helpful as background knowledge to the advisor in the field.


II. PAY AND OPERATING COST COMPARISONS.

A. Figure 1 shows a gradual decline in salaries paid police employees, while operational costs increase, as the size of the community decreases. While the significance of the decreasing salary scale is understandable, care should be taken in evaluating increasing operational costs. While an efficiency factor may be evident to some small degree, procurement costs would seem to impact heaviest in the small community. In a small community, probably every officer is mobile. Thus, the ratio of vehicles to police is higher. Again, due to bloc procurement, the sedan that costs the city of New York \$1,400.00 may well cost Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, \$2,200.00. The same is true of weapons, riot control equipment, and even basic forms and stationery.

B. Salaries range between 82% and 93% of the police budget in all categories of communities. (See figure 2.) Thus, it may be well for the advisor of an underdeveloped nation to give thought to using such a range for the greatest return in enforcement. This would make the department

AVERAGE COSTS—OPERATION OF¹⁰ U.S. POLICE DEPARTMENTS IN COST PER EMPLOYEE

TOTAL COST/POLICEMAN	—————
POLICEMAN SALARY	- - - - -
OPERATIONAL COST	- · - - -



SIZE OF COMMUNITY

FIGURE 1

SALARIES VS OPERATIONAL COSTS¹¹




FIGURE 2

people-oriented rather than gadget-oriented. It is recognized that most US communities have a base or physical police plant on hand that only requires maintenance, updating, or occasional replacement. This is not true of many new countries; still, other comparable Government agencies will more than likely still be preponderantly people-oriented.

C. While it is impossible to accurately compare police salaries and costs with other service-oriented agencies on a worldwide basis, figures 3 and 4 show comparative costs for US police and fireman. These differences may be roughly compared for developing nations to give the advisor a feel for the adequacy of police pay in the country of interest.

COMPARATIVE COSTS OF POLICE & FIRE SERVICES IN 1964 (SALARIES VS. OPERATIONAL COSTS)





FIGURE 3

COMPARATIVE COSTS OF POLICE¹³ & FIRE SERVICES IN 1964 (COSTS PER CAPITA)



SIZE OF COMMUNITY

FIGURE 4