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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL  
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

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## FOREWORD

The present publication is the latest in a series of volumes that have been issued annually since 1960. It contains basic documents on efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other aspects of disarmament and arms control. The annual report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, printed at the end of the documentary material, describes the work of the Agency during 1967.

The documents are printed chronologically. They are preceded by a topical list of documents and followed by a chronological list. Other reference aids include lists of abbreviations, international organizations and conferences, and persons. The volume also includes a bibliography and an index. The papers were compiled and annotated by Robert W. Lambert, with the assistance of Ruth Ihara and Jean Mayer. Useful suggestions were also received from other officers of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- A/**—General Assembly<sup>1</sup>  
**ABM**—antiballistic missile  
**ACDA**—United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
**ACMRR**—Advisory Committee on Marine Resources Research<sup>1</sup>  
**Add.**—addition<sup>1</sup>  
**AEC**—(1) United States Atomic Energy Commission  
           (2) United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (1946-1952)  
**AFL-CIO**—American Federation of Labor—Congress of Industrial Organizations  
**AID**—Agency for International Development  
**AIM**—Academy for Interscience Methodology  
**ARPA**—Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense  
**Art.**—article  
**ASW**—antisubmarine warfare  
**AWACS**—airborne warning and control system  
**BMEWS**—Ballistic Missile Early Warning System  
**BUIC**—backup interceptor control system  
**C.I.**—First (Political and Security) Committee of the General Assembly<sup>1</sup>  
**CBR**—chemical, biological, and radiological  
**CBW**—chemical and biological warfare  
**CDU/CSU**—Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union  
**CEMA**—Council for Economic Mutual Assistance  
**CIA**—Central Intelligence Agency  
**OIAP**—Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress  
**Com.**—Committee  
**CONF.**—Conference<sup>1</sup>  
**Cong.**—Congress  
**COPREDAL**—Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America<sup>1</sup>  
**Corr.**—correction<sup>1</sup>  
**C.P.S.U.**—Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
**DAC**—Development Advisory Committee of the OECD  
**DC**—Disarmament Commission<sup>1</sup>  
**DC/SC**—Disarmament Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission<sup>1</sup>  
**doc.**—document  
**DoD**—Department of Defense  
**EC**—European Economic Community  
**EMU**—European Monetary Unit  
**ENDC**—Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee<sup>1</sup>  
**Euratom**—European Atomic Energy Community  
**Ex.**—Executive  
**Eximbank**—Export-Import Bank  
**FAO**—Food and Agriculture Organization  
**FAA**—Federal Aviation Agency  
**FAR**—Foreign Area Research Coordinating Group  
**FDP**—Free Democratic Party  
**FM**—field manual  
**FOBS**—fractional orbital bombardment system<sup>n</sup>  
**FRG**—Federal Republic of Germany  
**FY**—fiscal year  
**G.A.**—General Assembly  
**GDR**—German Democratic Republic<sup>2</sup>  
**GNP**—Gross national product  
**IAEA**—International Atomic Energy Agency  
**ICBM**—intercontinental ballistic missile  
**ICRC**—International Committee of the Red Cross  
**ILN**—International Logistics Negotiations, Department of Defense  
**INTELSAT**—Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Satellite System  
**Invest.**—investment  
**IOC**—International Oceanographic Commission  
**IRBM**—intermediate range ballistic missile  
**Jt. Com.**—Joint Committee  
**L.**—limited distribution<sup>1</sup>  
**L.A.S.A.**—Large Aperture Seismic Array  
**LNTS**—League of Nations Treaty Series  
**MAR**—multi-function array radar  
**MIRV**—multiple, independently-targeted reentry vehicles  
**MIT**—Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
**MRBM**—medium-range ballistic missile  
**MR/IRBM**—medium range/intermediate range ballistic missile  
**MSR**—missile site radar  
**NASA**—National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
**NATO**—North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
**NDAC**—NATO Committee for Nuclear Defense Affairs

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

XV

NORAD—North American Air Defense Command	SLBM—submarine- or sea-launched ballistic missile
NPG—NATO Nuclear Planning Group	SPD—Social Democratic Party of Germany
NPT—nonproliferation treaty	SR—Summary Record <sup>1</sup>
OAS—Organization of American States	SRAM—short-range attack missile
OECD—Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development	SSBS—surface-to-surface ballistic missile
OTH—over-the-horizon radar	S.S.R.—Soviet Socialist Republic
PAR—perimeter acquisition radar	Stat—U.S. Statutes at Large
PC—Preparatory Committee <sup>1</sup>	TACMAR—tactical multi-function array radar
PPS—Program Planning Staff	term. def.—terminal defense
prov.—provisional <sup>1</sup>	TIAS—Treaties and Other International Acts Series
PV.— <i>procès-verbal</i> (verbatim record) <sup>1</sup>	U.A.R.—United Arab Republic
R&D—research and development	U.K.—United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
R.A.F.—Royal Air Force	U.N.—United Nations
Rept.—report	UNESCO—United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
Res.—resolution <sup>1</sup>	UPI—United Press International
Rev.—revision <sup>1</sup>	U.S.—United States
RSFSR—Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic	USA—United States of America
S.—Senate	USAF—United States Air Force
S/—Security Council <sup>1</sup>	USSR—Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
SAC—Strategic Air Command	UST—United States Treaties and Other International Agreements
SAM—surface-to-air missile	USUN—United States Mission to the United Nations
SAGE—semi-automatic ground environment system	WEU—Western European Union
SANAE—South African National Antarctic Expedition	WMO—World Meteorological Organization
SC.—Subcommittee	
SCOR—Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research	
SEATO—Southeast Asia Treaty Organization	
sec.—section	
sess.—session	

<sup>1</sup> Abbreviation used in documents of United Nations organs or international conferences served by the United Nations Secretariat.

<sup>2</sup> Communist regime not recognized by the United States.

## LIST OF PRINCIPAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 1959-

Established by General Assembly resolution 1472 (XV), Dec. 12, 1959, as a 24-member body; enlarged on Dec. 20, 1961. In 1967 the Committee comprised the following 28 countries: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chad, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Poland, Romania, Sierra Leone, Sweden, U.A.R., U.K., U.S., and U.S.S.R. The plenary Committee held 4 meetings in 1967; the legal Subcommittee, composed of all members, held its 6th session June 19-July 14, 1967, and a special session on Dec. 14-15, 1967.

### Disarmament Commission, 1952-

Established by General Assembly resolution 502 (VI), Jan. 11, 1952. Since 1959 the Commission has comprised all U.N. members.<sup>1</sup> It did not meet in 1967.

### Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, 1962-

Announced at the United Nations Dec. 13, 1961, and endorsed by General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI), Dec. 20, 1961. Eleventh session, Feb. 21-Mar. 23, 1967; twelfth session, May 18-December 14, 1967. *Membership:* Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France<sup>2</sup>, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, U.A.R., U.K., U.S., U.S.S.R. *Permanent Co-Chairmen:* U.S. and Soviet representatives. *Committee of the Whole:* all members.<sup>3</sup> *Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests:* U.K., U.S., U.S.S.R.

### International Atomic Energy Agency, 1956-

Established October 20, 1956 by statute; statute entered into force July 20, 1957. *Membership:* 98 in 1967. Eleventh session of General Conference, Sept. 28-Oct. 2, 1967, in Vienna.

### Preparatory Commission for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, 1966-1967.

Established by General Assembly Res 2153B (XXI), Nov. 17, 1966. *Membership:* Chile, Dahomey, Kenya, Kuwait, Malaysia, Malta, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Spain, United Republic of Tanzania. Held 10 meetings during Feb. 2-Sept. 15, 1967.

### Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, 1964-1967.

*Membership:* Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Fourth session, second part, Jan. 31-Feb. 14, 1967.

### United Nations General Assembly.

22d session (part I), Sept. 10-Dec. 18, 1967.

### Secretary-General's Group of Consultant Experts, 1967.

Appointed by Secretary-General Thant to prepare report in response to General Assembly resolution 2162 A (XXI) of Dec. 5, 1966. *Membership:* Experts from Canada, France, India, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Sweden, U.K., U.S., and U.S.S.R. Met Mar. 6-10, June 26-July 5, 1967, in Geneva and Oct. 2-6, 1967, in New York.

<sup>1</sup> For previous membership, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, p. xii.

<sup>2</sup> France has not participated in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee.

<sup>3</sup> Has not met since 1962.

Economic Report of the President [Extract],  
January 1967<sup>1</sup>

Despite all our efforts for an honorable peace in Vietnam, the war continues. I cannot predict when it will end. Thus our plans must assume its long duration.

But peace will return—and it *could* return sooner than we dare expect.

When hostilities do end, we will be faced with a great opportunity, and a challenge how best to use that opportunity. The resources now being claimed by the war can be diverted to peaceful uses both at home and abroad, and can hasten the attainment of the great goals upon which we have set our sights.

If we keep our eyes firmly fixed on those goals—and if we plan wisely—we need have no fear that the bridge from war to peace will exact a wasteful toll of idle resources, human or material.

But when that welcome day of peace arrives, we will need quick adjustments in our economic policies. We must be prepared for those adjustments, ready to act rapidly—both to avoid interruption to our prosperity and to take full and immediate advantage of our opportunities.

Planning for peace has been an important activity in many executive agencies. But the effort needs to be stepped up and integrated.

Accordingly, I am instructing the heads of the relevant agencies in the Executive Branch, under the leadership of the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, to begin at once a major and coordinated effort to review our readiness. I have asked them

- to consider possibilities and priorities for tax reduction;
- to prepare, with the Federal Reserve Board, plans for quick adjustments of monetary and financial policies;
- to determine which high priority programs can be quickly expanded;
- to determine priorities for the longer range expansion of programs to meet the needs of the American people, both through new and existing programs;
- to study and evaluate the future direction of Federal financial support to our States and local governments;
- to examine ways in which the transition to peace can be smoothed for the workers, companies, and communities now engaged in supplying our defense needs, and the men released from our armed forces.

I have directed that initial reports be prepared on all of these and related problems, and that thereafter they be kept continuously up to date.

<sup>1</sup> *Economic Report of the President*, pp. 23–24.

Television Interview With Secretary of State Rusk  
[Extract], January 1, 1967<sup>1</sup>

*Mr. Cook:* On the antiproliferation treaty, sir, the President said yesterday, I believe, that in recent weeks there have been some signs of progress.<sup>2</sup> What is that progress? Do you expect an early draft of the treaty?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, we would hope very much in 1967—among the great hopes would be that we get peace in Viet-Nam, that we get a nonproliferation treaty, and that the nations of the world can take some strong steps toward meeting the emerging food crisis which is going to be with us for the next decade.

On the nonproliferation treaty, there have been discussions. These matters are being discussed among our allies, as well as with the members of the Geneva conference. Some of the underbrush has been cleared away. But we still do not have an agreement yet, as the President indicated. We hope very much we could come to an agreement during 1967.

*Mr. Agronsky:* Mr. Secretary, how realistic could any such antiproliferation treaty be that did not include Communist China?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, the question would be who proliferates and to whom? Now, in a purely technical sense, even though Peking may not be a party to such an agreement, if everybody else is, there is no one with whom to proliferate.

I personally believe that existing nuclear powers have a strong interest in a nonproliferation treaty because it is almost in the nature of this weapon that they do not look with favor on its further spread throughout the world.

But in any event, we are working at it. We would hope very much that Peking would take part in it, although on past performance we have no reason to think that they will. But it is a matter that the rest of the world has to grapple with.

You know our basic attitude has been that one nuclear power is too many. One of the great tragedies is that the Baruch proposals of 1946<sup>3</sup> were not accepted. And if one is too many, then five are too many. But certainly 10, 15, would be too many.

We can take some comfort from the fact that we have had 21 years now in which a nuclear weapon has not been fired in anger. But we had better be very careful about trying to limit that possibility for the future.

*Mr. Cook:* Well, the Chinese just fired another test this week, Mr. Secretary. Have you revised your estimate of their timetable, when they will have an ICBM that could threaten us?

*Secretary Rusk:* No, I have not. Mr. McNamara has dealt with that. It will take some time yet. But there is no question this is an ominous development in the world situation.

<sup>1</sup> Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 23, 1967, p. 132.

<sup>2</sup> Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Jan. 9, 1967, p. 5.

<sup>3</sup> Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, vol. I, pp. 7-10.

*Mr. Agronsky:* Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary—I wish we had time to go on—for being here to “face the nation.”

*Secretary Rusk:* Thank you.

### State of the Union Address by President Johnson to the Congress [Extracts], January 10, 1967<sup>1</sup>

We are in the midst of a great transition—a transition from narrow nationalism to international partnership; from the harsh spirit of the cold war to the hopeful spirit of common humanity on a troubled and a threatened planet.

We are shaping a new future of enlarged partnership in nuclear affairs, in economic and technical cooperation, in trade negotiations, in political consultation, and in working together with the governments and peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The emerging spirit of confidence is precisely what we hoped to achieve when we went to work a generation ago to put our shoulder to the wheel and try to help rebuild Europe. We faced new challenges and opportunities then and there—and we faced also some dangers. But I believe that the peoples on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as both sides of this Chamber, wanted to face them together.

Our relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are also in transition. We have avoided both the acts and the rhetoric of the cold war. When we have differed with the Soviet Union, or other nations for that matter, I have tried to differ quietly and with courtesy and without venom.

Our objective is not to continue the cold war but to end it.

We have reached an agreement at the United Nations on the peaceful uses of outer space:<sup>2</sup>

We have agreed to open direct air flights with the Soviet Union.<sup>3</sup>

We have removed more than 400 nonstrategic items from export control.

We are determined that the Export-Import Bank can allow commercial credits to Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia, as well as to Romania and Yugoslavia.

We have entered into a cultural agreement with the Soviet Union for another 2 years.<sup>4</sup>

We have agreed with Bulgaria and Hungary to upgrade our legations to embassies.

We have started discussions with international agencies on ways of increasing contacts with Eastern European countries.

This administration has taken these steps even as duty compelled us

<sup>1</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 30, 1967, pp. 158–160.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 800 ff.

<sup>3</sup> TIAS 6185.

<sup>4</sup> TIAS 6149.

to fulfill and execute alliances and treaty obligations throughout the world that were entered into before I became President.

So, tonight I now ask and urge this Congress to help our foreign and our commercial trade policies by passing an East-West trade bill and by approving our consular convention with the Soviet Union.<sup>5</sup>

The Soviet Union has in the past year increased its long-range missile capabilities. It has begun to place near Moscow a limited anti-missile defense. My first responsibility to our people is to assure that no nation can ever find it rational to launch a nuclear attack or to use its nuclear power as a credible threat against us or against our allies.

I would emphasize that that is why an important link between Russia and the United States is in our common interest, in arms control and in disarmament. We have the solemn duty to slow down the arms race between us, if that is at all possible, in both conventional and nuclear weapons and defenses. I thought we were making some progress in that direction the first few months I was in office. I realize that any additional race would impose on our peoples, and on all mankind for that matter, an additional waste of resources with no gain in security to either side.

I expect in the days ahead to closely consult and seek the advice of the Congress about the possibilities of international agreements bearing directly upon this problem.

### Television Interview With Secretary of State Rusk: Antiballistic Missile Systems [Extract], January 12, 1967<sup>1</sup>

*Mr. Harsch:* I want to change to another subject now. In the President's state of the Union last night, he said that the Soviet Union has begun to place near Moscow a limited antimissile defense.<sup>2</sup> And he deplored this and expressed the hope that something might be done about it. Is this a subject which can best be handled in a sort of general group in Geneva, or is this something that is best handled directly between ourselves and the Soviet Union?

*Secretary Rusk:* I think the two are not necessarily contradictory, because we and the Soviet Union are the cochairmen of the group in Geneva. Therefore, we're in frequent touch with each other about the agenda of that conference.

Quite some time ago we put proposals before the Geneva conference for a freeze on the further development of both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons.<sup>3</sup> We hope very much that that can be taken up

<sup>5</sup> For the consular convention, see *Department of State Bulletin*, June 22, 1964, pp. 979-985.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1967, p. 171.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 8, 17-21, 157-162, 367-373; *ibid.*, 1965, pp. 172, 435; *ibid.*, 1966, p. 7.

and some conclusions reached, because we could move simply to new plateaus of enormous expenditure on both sides without basically changing the overriding strategic situation but thereby diverting very large resources away from the unfinished business which both of us face for our own people.

So that we're very serious about finding some way to put some ceilings on the arms race and try to turn it down. And this is one of the important elements in that.

*Mr. Harsch:* Are you hopeful?

*Secretary Rusk:* Oh, I think diplomacy must always proceed on the basis of hope and optimism, because that's our business. And we hope very much that there can be some progress made on this matter.

*Mr. Harsch:* The President says that he urges Congress to help our foreign commercial trade policies by passing an East-West trade bill. That is going to be a difficult problem with the new Congress, is it not?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, I think the atmosphere associated with the struggle in Viet-Nam will make it difficult. But we do believe that, despite Viet-Nam, we should continue to gnaw away at any points where we can improve our relations between East and West, and try to build a little peace in the world.

Military Posture Statement by Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Department of Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee [Extract], January 25, 1967<sup>1</sup>

A. THE GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR PROBLEM

During the past several years, in my annual appearances before this Committee, I have attempted to explore with you some of the more fundamental characteristics of the general nuclear war problem and the kinds of strategic forces which it involves. I noted that our general nuclear war forces should have two basic capabilities:

1. To deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States and its allies by maintaining, continuously, a highly reliable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single aggressor, or combination of aggressors, at any time during the course of a strategic nuclear exchange, even after absorbing a surprise first attack.
2. In the event such a war nevertheless occurred, to limit damage to our population and industrial capacity.

<sup>1</sup> *Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1968: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, First Session, on S. 666, pp. 44-68. The footnotes appear in the original text.*

The first capability we call "Assured Destruction" and the second "Damage Limitation". The strategic *offensive* forces—the ICBMs, the submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and the manned bombers—which we usually associate with the first capability, can also contribute to the second. They can do so by attacking enemy delivery vehicles on their bases or launch sites, provided they can reach those vehicles before they are launched at our cities. Conversely, the strategic *defensive* forces—manned interceptors, anti-bomber surface-to-air missiles, anti-ballistic missile missiles—which we usually associate with the second capability can also contribute to the first. They can do so by successfully intercepting and destroying the enemy's offensive weapons before they reach our strategic offensive forces on their bases and launch sites.

As long as deterrence of a deliberate Soviet (or Red Chinese) nuclear attack upon the United States or its allies is the overriding objective of our strategic forces, the capability for "Assured Destruction" must receive the first call on all of our resources and must be provided regardless of the costs and the difficulties involved. "Damage Limiting" programs, no matter how much we spend on them, can never substitute for an Assured Destruction capability in the deterrent role. It is our ability to destroy an attacker as a viable 20th Century nation that provides the deterrent, not our ability to partially limit damage to ourselves.

What kind and amount of destruction we would have to be able to inflict on an attacker to provide this deterrent cannot be answered precisely. However, it seems reasonable to assume that in the case of the Soviet Union, the destruction of, say, one-fifth to one-fourth of its population and one-half to two-thirds of its industrial capacity would mean its elimination as a major power for many years. Such a level of destruction would certainly represent intolerable punishment to any industrialized nation and thus should serve as an effective deterrent to the deliberate initiation of a nuclear attack on the United States or its Allies.

Assured Destruction with regard to Red China presents a somewhat different problem. China is far from being an industrialized nation. However, what industry it has is heavily concentrated in a comparatively few cities. We estimate, for example, that a relatively small number of warheads detonated over 50 Chinese urban centers would destroy half of the urban population (more than 50 million people) and more than one-half of the industrial capacity. Moreover, such an attack would also destroy most of the key governmental, technical, and managerial personnel and a large proportion of the skilled workers. Since Red China's capacity to attack the U.S. with nuclear weapons will be very limited, even during the 1970's, the ability of even a very small portion of our strategic offensive forces to inflict such heavy damage upon them should serve as an effective deterrent to the deliberate initiation of such an attack on their part.

Once sufficient forces have been procured to give us high confidence of achieving our Assured Destruction objective, we can then consider the kinds and amounts of forces which might be added to reduce damage to our population and industry in the event deterrence fails. But here we must note another important point, namely, the possible

interaction of our strategic forces programs with those of the Soviet Union. If the general nuclear war policy of the Soviet Union also has as its objective the deterrence of a U.S. first strike (which I believe to be the case), then we must assume that any attempt on our part to reduce damage to ourselves (to what they would estimate we might consider an "acceptable level") would put pressure on them to strive for an offsetting improvement in their deterrent forces. Conversely, an increase in their Damage Limiting capability would require us to make greater investments in Assured Destruction, which, as I will describe later, is precisely what we now propose to do.

It is this interaction between our strategic forces programs and those of the Soviet Union which leads us to believe that there is a mutuality of interests in limiting the deployment of anti-ballistic missile defense systems. If our assumption that the Soviets are also striving to achieve an Assured Destruction capability is correct, and I am convinced that it is, then in all probability all we would accomplish by deploying ABM systems against one another would be to increase greatly our respective defense expenditures, without any gain in real security for either side. It was for this reason that President Johnson decided to initiate negotiations with the Soviet Union, designed, through formal or informal agreement, to limit the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems, while including at the same time about \$375 million in his FY 1968 Budget to provide for such actions—e.g., protection of our offensive weapon systems—as may be required if these discussions prove unsuccessful.

In this connection, it might be useful to reiterate another fundamental point, namely, that the concept of Assured Destruction implies a "second strike" capability, i.e., a strategic force of such size and character that it can survive a large scale nuclear surprise attack in sufficient strength to destroy the attacker. Thus, if Assured Destruction is also a Soviet objective, they must always view our strategic offensive forces in their planning as a potential first strike threat (just as we view their forces) and provide for a "second strike" capability.

## B. THE SIZE AND CHARACTER OF THE THREAT

In order to assess the capabilities of our general nuclear war forces over the next several years, we must take into account the size and character of the strategic forces which the Soviet Union and Red China are likely to have during the same period. Again, let me caution, that while we have reasonably high confidence in our estimates for the close-in period, our estimates for the early part of the next decade are subject to much uncertainty. As I pointed out in past appearances before this Committee, such longer range projections are, at best, only informed estimates, particularly since they deal in many cases with a period beyond the production and deployment lead times of the weapon systems involved.

### 1. THE SOVIET STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE-DEFENSIVE FORCES

Two significant changes have occurred during the last year in our projections of Soviet strategic forces. The first is a faster-than-expected rate of construction of hard ICBM silos; the second is more positive

evidence of a deployment of an anti-ballistic missile defense system around Moscow. (Both of these developments fall considerably short of what we assumed in the "higher-than-expected" threat, against which we have been hedging for several years.) Our current estimates for other elements of the Soviet strategic forces are generally in line with those I discussed here last year.

Summarized in the table below are the Soviet's strategic offensive forces estimated for October 1, 1966. Shown for comparison are the U.S. forces.

U.S. VS SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

	1 Oct. 1966	
	U.S. <sup>a</sup>	USSR
ICBMs <sup>a</sup>	934	340
SLBMs (U.E. Launchers) <sup>a</sup>	512	130
Total Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles <sup>b</sup>	1446	470
Intercontinental Bombers <sup>c</sup>	680	155

a. *Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles*

As of now, we have more than three times the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (i.e., ICBMs and SLBMs) the Soviets have. Even by the early 1970s, we still expect to have a significant lead over the Soviet Union in terms of numbers and a very substantial superiority in terms of overall combat effectiveness. In this connection, we should bear in mind that it is not the number of missiles which is important, but rather the character of the payloads they carry; the missile is simply the delivery vehicle. Our superiority in intercontinental bombers, both in numbers and combat effectiveness, is even greater and is expected to remain so for as far ahead as we can see. There is still no evidence that the Soviets intend to deploy a new heavy bomber in the late 1960s.

b. *Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense*

We have been aware for many years that the Soviets have been working on an anti-ballistic missile defense system, just as we have been. After a series of abortive starts, it now appears that the Soviets are deploying such a system (using the "GALOSH" missile, publicly displayed in 1964) around Moscow. They are also deploying another type of defensive system elsewhere in the Soviet Union, but the weight of the evidence at this time suggests that this system is not intended primarily for anti-ballistic missile defense. However, knowing what

<sup>a</sup> These are mid-1966 figures.

<sup>b</sup> Excludes test range launchers and Soviet MR/IRBMs capable of striking Eurasian targets.

<sup>c</sup> In addition to the SLBMs, the Soviets possess submarine-launched cruise missiles whose primary targets are naval and merchant vessels.

<sup>d</sup> In 1965, intelligence reports estimated Soviet intercontinental missiles as of mid-1966 to number between 430 and 500.

<sup>e</sup> In addition to the intercontinental bombers shown in the table, the Soviets possess medium bombers capable of striking Eurasian targets.

we do about past Soviet predilections for defense systems,<sup>7</sup> we must, for the time being, plan our forces on the assumption that they will have deployed some sort of an ABM system around their major cities by the early 1970s. Whether made up of GALOSH only, or a combination of GALOSH and other types of missiles, a full scale deployment would cost the Soviet Union at least \$20 to \$25 billion.

## 2. THE RED CHINESE NUCLEAR THREAT

There has been no basic change in our estimates of the Red Chinese nuclear threat. Their firing of a nuclear armed missile over a distance of a few hundred miles last October falls within the limits of that estimate. They will require many more tests before they achieve a truly operational capability with a medium or intermediate range missile, and this will take time.

With regard to an ICBM, we believe that the Red Chinese nuclear weapons and ballistic missile development programs are being pursued with high priority. On the basis of recent evidence, it appears possible that they may conduct either a space or a long-range ballistic missile launching before the end of 1967. However, it appears unlikely that the Chinese could deploy a significant number of operational ICBMs before the mid-1970s, or that those ICBMs would have great reliability, speed of response, or substantial protection against attack.

Red China also has some bombers which could carry nuclear weapons, but most of them have an operational radius of only a few hundred miles. It is highly unlikely, on the basis of cost alone, that they would undertake the development, production, and deployment of a new, long range bomber force. If they chose to do so, it would take them a decade or more before they could deploy it. Accordingly, we have no reason on this account to change our estimate that a significant Red Chinese nuclear threat to the continental United States will not develop before the mid-1970s.

## C. CAPABILITIES OF THE PROPOSED FORCES FOR ASSURED DESTRUCTION

The most demanding test of our Assured Destruction capacity is the ability of our strategic offensive forces to survive a well-coordinated surprise Soviet first strike directed against them. Because no one can know how a general nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union might occur, prudence dictates that we design our own strategic forces on the basis of a greater threat than we actually expect.

### 1. CAPABILITY AGAINST THE EXPECTED THREAT

Even if the Soviets in the 1972 period were to assign their entire available missile force to attacks on our strategic forces (reserving only refire missile and bomber-delivered weapons for urban targets), more

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<sup>7</sup>The Soviets for more than a decade have spent substantially more on air defense against strategic bombers than has the United States. But if our Strategic Air Command is correct in its judgment that a very high proportion of the U.S. incoming bombers could penetrate the Soviet defenses and reach their targets, and I have no reason to dispute it, then we must conclude that the bulk of these Soviet expenditures has been wasted.

than one-half of the total forces programmed last year for 1972 would still survive and remain effective.

Considering the overall size and character of that force, it is clear that our strategic missiles alone could destroy the Soviet Union as a viable 20th Century society, even after absorbing a well-coordinated, surprise first attack. Indeed, the detonation of even one-fifth of the total surviving weapons over Soviet cities would kill about 30 percent of the total population (73 million people) and destroy about one-half of the industrial capacity. By doubling the number of warheads delivered, Soviet fatalities and industrial capacity destroyed would be increased by considerably less than one-third. Beyond this point further increments of warheads delivered would not appreciably change the result, because we would have to bring smaller and smaller cities under attack, each requiring one delivered warhead.

Although it is not at all certain that they will do so, we must, as I noted earlier, base our force planning on the assumption that the Soviets will deploy a reasonably effective ABM defense around their principal cities; and we must be prepared to overwhelm it.

We have been hedging against this possibility for some time, and last year we took a number of actions of which the following are the most important:

1. Accelerated development of the POSEIDON missile.
2. Approved production and deployment of MINUTEMAN III.
3. Developed penetration aids for MINUTEMAN.

Now, in the FY 1968 program we propose to take a number of additional actions to enhance the future capabilities of our Assured Destruction forces, of which the following are the more important:

- (1) Produce and deploy the POSEIDON missile.
- (2) Produce and deploy improved missile penetration aids.
- (3) Increase the proportion of MINUTEMAN III in the planned force and provide it with an improved third stage.
- (4) Initiate the development of new reentry vehicles, specifically designed for use against targets heavily defended with ABMs.

I will discuss each of these actions in greater detail later in connection with our other proposals for the strategic forces. But for now, let me point out that the net effect of these actions would be to increase greatly the overall effectiveness of our Assured Destruction force against the Soviet Union by mid-1972. Even if the Moscow-type ABM defense were deployed at other cities as well, the proposed U.S. missile force alone could inflict about 35 percent (86 million) fatalities on the Soviet Union in 1972—after absorbing a surprise attack.

As I noted earlier, a relatively small number of warheads detonated over fifty cities would destroy half of Red China's urban population and more than one-half of her industry.

Thus the strategic missile forces proposed for the FY 1968-72 period would, by themselves, give us an Assured Destruction capability against both the Soviet Union and Red China, simultaneously.

## 2. CAPABILITY AGAINST "HIGHER-THAN-EXPECTED THREATS"

As I indicated last year, our Assured Destruction capability is of

such crucial importance to our security that we must be prepared to cope with Soviet strategic threats which are greater than those projected in the latest intelligence estimates.

The most severe threat we must consider in planning our Assured Destruction forces is an extensive, effective Soviet ABM deployment combined with a deployment of a substantial ICBM force with a hard-target kill capability. Such a Soviet offensive force might pose a threat to our MINUTEMAN missiles. An extensive, effective Soviet ABM system might then be able to intercept and destroy a significant portion of our residual missile warheads, including those carried by submarine-launched missiles. (The Soviet offensive and defensive threats assumed here are both substantially higher than expected.)

To hedge against the possibility of such a threat to our land-based missile forces, we have authorized the development and production of the POSEIDON. Should still additional offensive power be required, and such a requirement is not now clear, we are considering the development and deployment of a new Advanced ICBM, designed to reduce vulnerability to such a Soviet threat. The deployment of the NIKE-X as a defense for our MINUTEMAN force would offer a partial substitute for the possible further expansion of our offensive forces.

But again I want to emphasize that we don't know whether the Soviet Union will develop and deploy the kind of forces assumed here. Even against this higher-than-expected threat, and even without a NIKE-X defense of MINUTEMAN, our proposed strategic missile and bomber forces could still inflict 40 percent or more fatalities on the Soviet population throughout the time period involved.

More extreme threats are highly unlikely. In any event, the changes we are now proposing in our strategic offensive forces would make it dangerous and expensive for the Soviet Union to move in the direction of more extreme threats to our Assured Destruction capability. If we assume, as I believe we should, that the Soviets would want to reduce the vulnerability of their own offensive forces against the possibility of a first strike by our very accurate forces in the FY 1972-73 period, they must further disperse and harden their strategic missiles, which is exactly what they appear to be doing now. To do so is expensive and for the same budget outlay results in reduced missile payloads. Not to do so would leave the Soviet force highly vulnerable. Thus, we can, in planning our forces, foreclose any seemingly "easy" and "cheap" paths to their achievement of a satisfactory Assured Destruction capability and a satisfactory Damage Limiting capability at the same time.

We, of course, cannot preclude the possibility that the Soviet Union may increase its strategic forces budget at some time in the future. That is why we are now undertaking a very comprehensive study of a new strategic missile system. And that is why we are not precluding the possible future construction of new POSEIDON submarines or the defense of our presently deployed MINUTEMAN silos with NIKE-X. While I believe we should place ourselves in a position to move forward promptly on all of these options if later that should become necessary, we need not commit ourselves to them now.

#### D. CAPABILITIES OF THE PROPOSED FORCES FOR DAMAGE LIMITATION

The principal issue in this area of the Strategic Forces Program concerns the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile defense system, i.e., NIKE-X. There are three somewhat overlapping but distinct major purposes for which we might want to deploy such a system at this time:

1. To protect our cities (and their population and industry) against a Soviet missile attack.
2. To protect our cities against a Red Chinese missile attack in the mid-1970s.
3. To help protect our land-based strategic offensive forces (i.e., MINUTEMAN) against a Soviet missile attack.

After studying the subject exhaustively, and after hearing the views of our principal military and civilian advisors, we have concluded that we should not initiate an ABM deployment at this time for any of these purposes. We believe that:

1. The Soviet Union would be forced to react to a U.S. ABM deployment by increasing its offensive nuclear force still further with the result that:
  - a. The risk of a Soviet nuclear attack on the U.S. would not be further decreased.
  - b. The damage to the U.S. from a Soviet nuclear attack, in the event deterrence failed, would not be reduced in any meaningful sense.

As I noted earlier, the foundation of our security is the deterrence of a Soviet nuclear attack. We believe such an attack can be prevented if it is understood by the Soviets that we possess strategic nuclear forces so powerful as to be capable of absorbing a Soviet first strike and surviving with sufficient strength to impose unacceptable damage on them. We have such power today. We must maintain it in the future, adjusting our forces to offset actual or potential changes in theirs.

There is nothing we have seen in either our own or the Soviet Union's technology which would lead us to believe we cannot do this. From the beginning of the NIKE-ZEUS project in 1955 through the end of this current fiscal year, we will have invested a total of about \$4 billion on ballistic missile defense research—including NIKE-ZEUS, NIKE-X and Project DEFENDER. And, during the last five or six years, we have spent about \$1.2 billion on the development of penetration aids to help ensure that our missiles could penetrate the enemy's defenses. As a result of these efforts, we have the technology already in hand to counter any offensive or defensive force changes the Soviet Union might undertake in the foreseeable future.

We believe the Soviet Union has essentially the same requirement for a deterrent or "Assured Destruction" force as the U.S. Therefore, deployment by the U.S. of an ABM defense which would degrade the destruction capability of the Soviet's offensive force to an unacceptable level would lead to expansion of that force. This would leave us no better off than we were before.

2. With respect to protection of the U.S. against a possible Red Chinese nuclear attack, the lead time required for China to develop a significant ICBM force is greater than that required for deployment of our defense—therefore the Chinese threat in itself would not dictate the production of an ABM system at this time.

3. Similarly, although the protection of our land-based strategic offensive forces against the kind of heavy, sophisticated missile attack the Soviets may be able to mount in the mid- or late 1970s might later prove to be worthwhile, it is not yet necessary to produce and deploy the NIKE-X for that purpose.

I have already discussed, in connection with my review of the capabilities of our strategic forces for Assured Destruction, the third major purpose for which we may want to deploy an ABM defense (i.e., the protection of MINUTEMAN). Now, I would like to discuss the other two purposes.

1. DEPLOYMENT OF NIKE-X FOR DEFENSE OF OUR CITIES AGAINST A SOVIET ATTACK.

What is involved here is an analysis of the contribution the NIKE-X system might make to the defense of our cities under two assumptions:

- (1) That the Soviets do *not* react to such a deployment.
- (2) That the Soviets do react in an attempt to preserve their "Assured Destruction" capability.

As you know, the major elements of the NIKE-X system are being developed in such a way as to permit a variety of deployment; two have been selected for the purposes of this analysis. The first, which I will call "Posture A", represents a light U.S. defense against a Soviet missile attack on our cities. It consists of an area defense of the entire continental United States, providing redundant (overlapping) coverage of key target areas; and, in addition, a relatively low-density SPRINT defense of a number of the largest cities to provide some protection against those warheads which get through the area defense. The second deployment, which I call "Posture B", is a heavier defense against a Soviet attack. With the same area coverage, it provides a higher-density SPRINT defense for twice the number of cities.

Shown on the following table are the components and the costs (which, if past experience is any guide, may be understated by 50 to 100 percent for the systems as a whole)\* of Posture A and Posture B.

\* Even before the systems became operational, pressures would mount for their expansion at a cost of still additional billions. The unprotected, or relatively unprotected, areas of the United States would claim that their tax dollars were being diverted to protect New York and Washington while they were left naked. And critics would point out that our strategic offensive force is premised on a much larger Soviet threat (the "possible," not the "probable" threat); they would conclude that the same principles should be applied to our strategic defensive forces. For these and other reasons, I believe that, once started, an ABM system deployed with the objective of protecting the United States against the Soviet Union would require an expenditure on the order of \$40 billion over a 10-year period.

	POSTURE A	POSTURE B
	Invest. Cost (\$ Billion)	Invest. Cost (\$ Billion)
<u>Radars</u>		
MAR		
TACMAR		
PAR		
MSR		
Invest. Cost	\$ 6.5	\$ 12.6
<u>Missiles</u>		
SPARTAN		
SPRINT		
Invest. Cost	\$ 2.4	\$ 4.8
DoD Invest. Cost	\$ 8.9	\$ 17.4
AEC Invest. Cost	1.0	2.0
	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL INVEST. COST (ex-R&D)	\$ 9.9	\$ 19.4
Annual Operating Cost	\$ 0.38	\$ 0.72
No. of Cities w/Term. Def:	X	2X

The Multi-function Array Radar (MAR) is a very powerful phased-array radar which can perform all the defense functions involved in engaging a large, sophisticated attack: central control and battle management, long-range search, acquisition of the target, discrimination of warheads from decoys or "spoofing" devices, precision tracking of the target, and control of the defense interceptor missiles.

The TACMAR Radar is a scaled down, slightly less complex and less powerful version of the MAR, which can perform all the basic defense functions in a smaller, less sophisticated attack.

The Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) is a phased-array radar required for the very long-range search and acquisition functions involved in area defense. To achieve the full potential of the extended-range SPARTAN, the target must be picked up at much greater distances in order to compute its trajectory before the SPARTAN is fired.

The Missile Site Radar (MSR) is a much smaller, phased-array radar needed to control the SPARTAN and SPARTAN interceptor missiles during an engagement. It can also perform the functions of the TACMAR but on a considerably reduced scale. Actually, a number of different sizes are being studied. This "modular" approach will permit us to tailor the capacity of the radar to the particular needs of each defended area.

The SPARTAN is a three-stage missile with a nuclear warhead capable of intercepting incoming objects at relatively long range above the atmosphere.

The SPRINT is a shorter range, high-acceleration interceptor missile designed to make intercepts at lower altitudes.

The technical principles involved in the radars are now fairly well established. One R&D MAR-type radar has been constructed at the White Sands Missile Range. A contract has been let for the power plant of a second MAR-type radar, which is to be constructed on Kwajalein Atoll. The Missile Site Radar is well along in development and the construction of one of these radars on Kwajalein Atoll has also begun.

Testing of the SPRINT missile was started at White Sands in November 1965 and the tempo of testing will steadily increase during the current year. The SPARTAN is still on the drawing boards. It represents a very substantial redesign of the original ZEUS and we will not know until it is flight tested how well it will perform.

Facilities for testing both the SPRINT and the SPARTAN will be constructed on Kwajalein Atoll. These, together with the TACMAR and MSR and the programs for the computers will give us all of the major elements of the NIKE-X system which are essential to test its overall performance against reentry vehicles fired from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. (We feel we know enough about the PAR technology to be able to use the mechanically steered radars already on Kwajalein as simulators.) The system will be tested in stages, starting with the MSR and SPRINT, then the SPARTAN missile and the TACMAR radar. A large number of test shots will be launched from the west coast of the United States to Kwajalein to test the system thoroughly as a whole. The most important objective of this effort is to determine proper system integration and computer programming, since the individual components of the system will have already been tested.

But even after this elaborate test program is completed, some technical uncertainties will still remain unresolved; this is to be expected in a system designed for such a highly complex mission. Moreover, we have learned from bitter experience that even when the development problems have been solved, a system can run into trouble in production or when it is put into operation. All too often the development prototype cannot be produced in quantity without extensive re-engineering. Production delays are encountered and costs begin to spiral. Sometimes these problems are not discovered until the new system actually enters the inventory and has to function in an operational environment. The TERRIER, TALOS, and TARTAR ship-to-air missiles are a good example; after spending about \$2 billion on development and production of these missiles, we had to spend another \$350 million correcting the faults of those already installed, and we still plan to spend another \$550 million modernizing these systems.

In this connection, it is worth noting that had we produced and deployed the NIKE-ZEUS system proposed by the Army in 1959 at an estimated cost of \$13 to \$14 billion, most of it would have had to be torn out and replaced, almost before it became operational, by the new missiles and radars of the NIKE-X system. By the same token, other technological developments in offensive forces over the next seven years may make obsolete or drastically degrade the NIKE-X system as presently envisioned. We can predict with certainty that there will be substantial additional costs for updating any system we might consider installing at this time against the Soviet missile threat.

The deployment of a NIKE-X system would also require some improvement in our defense against manned bomber attack in order to preclude the Soviets from undercutting the NIKE-X defense; and we would want to expand and accelerate the fallout shelter program. The investment cost (including R&D) of the former is estimated at about \$1.5 to \$2.4 billion and would provide for a small force of

F-111 or F-12 type interceptors and airborne warning and control aircraft (AWACS). The expanded fallout shelter program would cost about \$800 million more than the one we are now pursuing. We would also need some of our anti-submarine warfare forces for use against Soviet missile submarines, but we are not yet clear whether these ASW forces would actually have to be increased over the currently planned levels. In any event, the "current" estimates of the investment cost of the total Damage Limiting package would amount to at least \$12.2 billion for Posture A and at least \$21.7 billion for Posture B.

To test the contribution that each of these NIKE-X deployments might make to our Damage Limiting objectives, we have projected both the U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces (assuming no reaction by the Soviets to the U.S. ABM deployment) to the time when Posture B, the heavier defense, could be fully in place.

The fatalities which these Soviet forces could inflict upon the U.S. (with and without a U.S. ABM defense) and the fatalities which the U.S. forces could inflict on the Soviet Union (with a Soviet ABM defense) are shown on the table on the following page:

Number of Fatalities <sup>a</sup> in an All-Out  
Strategic Exchange (in millions)<sup>b</sup>

(ASSUMES NO SOVIET REACTION TO U.S. ABM DEPLOYMENT)

U.S. Programs	Soviets Strike First, U.S. Retaliates		U.S. Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate <sup>ii</sup>	
	U.S. Fat.	Sov. Fat.	U.S. Fat.	Sov. Fat.
Approved	120	120+	100	70
Posture A	40	120+	30	70
Posture B	30	120+	20	70

The first case, "Soviets Strike First, U.S. Retaliates", is the threat against which our strategic forces must be designed. The second case, "U.S. Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate", is the case that would determine the size and character of the Soviet reaction to changes in our strategic forces, if they wish, as clearly they do, to maintain an Assured Destruction capability against us.

These calculations indicate that without NIKE-X and the other Damage Limiting programs discussed earlier, U.S. fatalities from a Soviet first strike could total about 120 million; even after absorbing that attack, we could inflict on the Soviet Union more than 120 million fatalities. Assuming the Soviets do not react to our deployment of an ABM defense against them, which is a most unrealistic assumption, Posture A might reduce our fatalities to 40 million and Posture B to about 30 million.

Although the fatality estimates shown for both the Soviet Union and the U.S. reflect some variations in the performance of their respective ABM systems, they are still based on the assumption that these systems

<sup>a</sup> Fatality figures shown above represent deaths from blast and fallout; they do not include deaths resulting from fire, storms, disease, and general disruption of everyday life.

<sup>b</sup> The data in this table are highly sensitive to small changes in the pattern of attack and small changes in force levels.

<sup>ii</sup> Assumes United States minimizes U.S. fatalities by maximizing effectiveness of strike on Soviet offensive systems.

will work at relatively high levels of effectiveness. If these ABM systems do not perform as well as our technical people postulate, fatalities on both sides could be considerably higher than shown in the table above, or the costs would be considerably higher if major improvements or additions had to be made in the systems to bring them up to the postulated level of performance.

If the Soviets are determined to maintain an Assured Destruction capability against us and they believe that our deployment of an ABM defense would reduce our fatalities in the "U.S. Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate" case to the levels shown in the table above, they would have no alternative but to increase the second strike damage potential of their offensive forces. They could do so in several different ways. Shown in the table below are the relative costs to the Soviet Union of responding to a U.S. ABM deployment in one of these possible ways:

<u>Level of U.S. Fatalities Which Soviets Believe Will Provide Deterrence <sup>12</sup></u> (Millions)	<u>Cost to the Soviets of Offsetting U.S. Cost to Deploy an ABM</u>
40	\$1 Soviet cost to \$4 U.S. cost
60	\$1 Soviet cost to \$2 U.S. cost
90	\$1 Soviet cost to \$1 U.S. cost

If the Soviets choose to respond in that way to our ABM deployment, the results would be as shown below:

U.S. Programs	Number of Fatalities in an All-Out Strategic Exchange (in millions)			
	(ASSUMES SOVIET REACTION TO U.S. ABM DEPLOYMENT)			
	<u>Soviets Strike First, U.S. Retaliates</u>		<u>U.S. Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate</u>	
	U.S. Fat.	Sov. Fat.	U.S. Fat.	Sov. Fat.
Approved (no response)	120	120+	100	70
Posture A	120	120+	90	70
Posture B	120	120+	90	70

In short, the Soviets have it within their technical and economic capacity to offset any further Damage Limiting measures we might undertake, provided they are determined to maintain their deterrent against us. *It is the virtual certainty that the Soviets will act to maintain their deterrent which casts such grave doubts on the advisability of our deploying the NIKE-X system for the protection of our cities against the kind of heavy, sophisticated missile attack they could launch in the 1970s. In all probability, all we would accomplish would be to increase greatly both their defense expenditures and ours without any gain in real security to either side.*

## 2. DEFENSE AGAINST THE RED CHINESE NUCLEAR THREAT

With regard to the Red Chinese nuclear threat, an austere ABM defense might offer a high degree of protection to the nation against a missile attack, at least through the 1970s. The total investment cost

<sup>12</sup> U.S. fatalities if United States strikes first and Soviets retaliate.

of such a program might amount to \$3.5 billion, including the cost of the nuclear warheads.

The effectiveness of this deployment in reducing U.S. fatalities from a Red Chinese attack in the 1970s is shown in the table below:

<u>U.S. Fatalities</u> (in millions)	Chinese Strike First (Operational Inventory)	
	<u>X Missiles</u>	<u>3X Missiles</u>
Without ABM	5	10
With ABM	6+	2

This austere defense could probably preclude damage in the 1970s almost entirely. As the Chinese force grows to the level it might achieve by 1980-85, additions and improvements might be required, but relatively modest additional outlays could probably limit the Chinese damage potential to low levels well beyond 1985.

It is not clear that we need an ABM defense against China. In any event, the lead time for deployment of a significant Chinese offensive force is longer than that required for U.S. ABM deployment; therefore, the decision for the latter need not be made now.

\* \* \* \* \*

In the light of the foregoing analysis, we propose:

1. To pursue with undiminished vigor the development, test, and evaluation of the NIKE-X system (for which purpose a total of about \$40 million has been included in the FY 1968 Budget), but to take no action now to deploy the system.
2. To initiate negotiations with the Soviet Union designed, through formal or informal agreement, to limit the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems.
3. To reconsider the deployment decision in the event these discussions prove unsuccessful; approximately \$375 million has been included in the FY 1968 Budget to provide for such actions as may be required at that time—for example, the production of NIKE-X for the defense of our offensive weapon systems.

I would now like to turn to our specific proposals for the Strategic Forces in the FY 1968-72 period.

## E. STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES

The force structure proposed for the FY 1968-72 period is shown in the classified table furnished to the Committee. To facilitate discussion of these forces, I have rearranged the order in which they appear on the table, showing first the missile forces and then the aircraft and other related forces.

### 1. MISSILE FORCES

Last year I told this Committee that:

The U.S. response to a Soviet deployment of an ABM defense would be the incorporation of appropriate penetration aids in our strategic missiles. Against area defense interceptors, penetration aids can be provided for U.S. missiles (so

that an Assured Destruction capability is maintained) at a cost to us of less than 10 percent of the cost of an ABM defense to the Soviets. The lead time for the Soviets to mount an ABM defense is greater than the time for us to produce and deploy penetration aids, provided we take timely action to develop them and can move forward promptly to produce them, and this we are doing. The decision actually to deploy new penetration aids can be made later this year. If the Soviets did attempt a large ABM defense we would still be able to produce and install the necessary penetration aids before the Soviets could achieve an extensive deployment.

... against a combined Soviet expanded strategic missile/ABM threat, the most efficient alternative available to us would be to develop POSEIDON (with the new penetration aids) and retrofit it into POLARIS boats. To hedge against the possibility of such a threat, we now propose to accelerate the development of the POSEIDON missile (which was initiated last year). The timing of a decision to produce and deploy the missile would depend upon how this threat actually evolved.<sup>15</sup>

This is essentially the program we now propose to pursue.

#### a. MINUTEMAN

Last year we had planned a MINUTEMAN force which would ultimately have consisted of a mix of 1,000 MINUTEMAN IIs and MINUTEMAN IIIs, with all the MINUTEMAN Is phased out. Now, in order to increase the capability of this force against a possible strong Soviet ABM defense, we propose to increase the proportion of MINUTEMAN IIIs in the force and equip them with a new improved third stage which will increase the payload of each missile. This increased payload will enable the MINUTEMAN III to carry more penetration aids to counter an ABM defense. The total cost of this program is estimated at \$400 million, but it will cost the Soviet Union many times more in ABM defenses if they try to offset it.

We also propose to step up the schedule for reequipping the MINUTEMAN IIs with an improved reentry vehicle and to procure penetration aid packages for all MINUTEMAN II & III missiles. Engineering development was started on these penetration aid packages last year. The total cost of this program is estimated at \$315 million, of which \$100 million was provided through FY 1967, \$125 million is required in FY 1968, and another \$90 million in subsequent years.

Eventually, it will probably become necessary to replace the earliest MINUTEMAN II missiles because of their age. At that time we could add more MINUTEMAN IIIs if that should appear desirable. Meanwhile, I believe we should initiate the development of a new improved reentry vehicle for the MINUTEMAN III, and funds for this purpose have been included in the budget request.

#### c. POLARIS-POSEIDON

By the end of the current fiscal year, 39 of the planned 41-ship POLARIS force will have become operational. The last two POLARIS submarines will be deployed by September 1967. This is essentially the same schedule I presented last year. At end FY 1967, there will be 32 POLARIS submarines with 512 missiles deployed instead of the 39 POLARIS submarines with 624 missiles which will have become operational by that date. The difference of seven is made up of six

<sup>15</sup> Not printed.

A-2 submarines expected to be in overhaul on 30 June 1967 and one A-1 submarine undergoing A-3 conversion and overhaul. When the retrofit of this last of the first five POLARIS submarines is completed, the force will consist of 13 ships equipped with A-2 missiles and 28 equipped with A-3s.

I also believe it would be prudent at this time to commit the POSEIDON missile to production and deployment. You may recall that we took action last year to place ourselves in a position to deploy such a force if that should become desirable. It was for this reason that we accelerated the POSEIDON development program and placed it on a schedule which would make it operationally available at an early date. In order to hold to a minimum the number of submarines which would have to be withdrawn from the operational fleet, we propose to spread the POSEIDON retrofit program over a period of years on a schedule tied to the regular overhaul cycle.

Although the cost of converting a submarine to POSEIDON, of procuring new missiles, and of ten years of operation is about half again as much as that of operating a POLARIS submarine for ten years, the effectiveness of the POSEIDON submarine is several times greater. The total incremental cost of developing POSEIDON, and producing and deploying the proposed force is estimated at \$3.3 billion. A total of about \$900 million is included in the FY 1968 Budget for POSEIDON. (The decision to deploy POSEIDON will produce an offsetting saving of about \$200 million in the POLARIS program.)

Funds have also been included in the budget for the development of certain desired improvements for the POLARIS missile.

#### c. TITAN II

The TITAN II force, consisting of 54 missiles deployed in hard silos, presently makes a unique contribution to our strategic offensive capabilities. Its long range (6,100 n.mi.) allows it to reach targets beyond the range of presently available MINUTEMAN missiles. However, with the deployment of MINUTEMAN III and, later, of the POSEIDON, this capability of the TITAN II will no longer be unique. The MINUTEMAN III from the continental United States and the POSEIDON from forward under-sea locations will be able to reach all the important targets in the Soviet Union.

The TITAN II is very expensive to operate, at least \$600,000 per missile annually and probably closer to \$1 million when the indirect costs of this relatively small force are considered. Accordingly, we now propose to end procurement of new TITAN boosters for testing and operational reliability demonstration with the FY 1966 buy, and, instead, use boosters already in the inventory for these purposes in the future. With about six follow-on tests per year, the force of 54 TITAN missiles on launchers can be maintained for a number of years.

#### d. New Strategic Missile Systems

Although we believe the strategic missile programs now proposed will be adequate to meet the threat, even if the Soviet Union were to carry out a full scale deployment of an ABM system and develop more

effective ICBMs, we are making a very comprehensive study of a new long range missile system. To shorten the lead time on any option selected as a result of this study, we have included funds in the FY 1968 Budget for contract definition should such a decision become warranted.

## 2. STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCES

The manned bomber forces we propose to maintain through FY 1972 are the same as those I presented here last year for the FY 1967-71 period. The B-52C-Fs and B-58s will be phased out as planned, leaving a force of 255 B-52G-Hs and 210 FB-111As.

The cost of operating this force is strongly influenced by two factors: the ratio of crews to aircraft and the number of aircraft assigned per home base. The crew ratio and, in turn, the crew work week determine the proportion of the force which can be maintained on 15 minute ground alert. The number of hours each B-52 must actually be flown is determined primarily by the crew ratio, since each crew must be afforded a certain number of flying hours to maintain its proficiency. As is to be expected, the higher the crew ratio and the longer the work week, the greater the proportion of the force which can be maintained on 15 minute ground alert.

The present work week of SAC crews and the present crew ratio permit an alert rate of something in excess of 50 percent of the force. While a high alert rate was necessary during the period when our strategic missile force was being built up, it is not as important today and will be even less so in the future. However, we must also take into account the possible requirement to use the force for large scale conventional bombing. Once crew ratios are reduced, it would probably take several years to train additional crews and rebuild the ratio. Accordingly, the crew ratio should be held high enough to support the maximum number of conventional sorties per B-52 squadron that could be sustained before aircraft maintenance becomes a limiting factor.

In view of these considerations, we now propose to make a modest reduction in the crew ratio and reduce somewhat the proportion of the force kept on 15 minute ground alert. In order to support the extensive conventional bombing operations in Southeast Asia, I have authorized the continuation of the higher crew ratio for the bomber units which are now being used in that effort.

Since the new FB-111s with the SRAM air-to-surface missile will be entering the bomber force during FY 1969-71 and the B-52G/Hs can be maintained in a suitable operational condition well into the 1970s, there is no pressing need to decide on the production and deployment of a new bomber in the FY 1968 Budget. Clearly, the first order of business in the strategic offensive forces program at this time is the provision of penetration aids and other improvements for our presently planned strategic missile force, and the production and deployment of the new POSEIDON. These are relatively expensive programs, particularly POSEIDON, but they are far more important to our future Assured Destruction capability than a new manned bomber. Indeed, if the Soviets were to deploy a full scale and highly sophisticated ABM system and enhance their strategic missile capability, I

believe the requirement for a new highly survivable ICBM would have a far higher priority than a new manned bomber. Nevertheless, we plan to continue work on the engine, avionics, and the related air-frame studies, for which a total of \$26 million is programmed for FY 1968.

### 3. AIR LAUNCHED MISSILES

Last year I said that we planned to keep the HOUND DOG missiles in the operational inventory through FY 1970, phasing their number down in step with the phase out of the B-52C-Fs. We now propose to phase out the older HOUND DOG "A" by end FY 1968, retaining only the "B" models. These missiles will be more than sufficient to meet the primary HOUND DOG mission—attack of area bomber defenses and lower priority airfields.

The SRAM program is unchanged from that which I presented last year. While we still do not plan to deploy SRAM on the B-52G/Hs, we are continuing the development of the necessary avionics to permit such a deployment if it should become desirable.

### 4. STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE

The strategic reconnaissance force is the same as that presented a year ago.

## F. STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE FORCES

The strategic defensive forces proposed for the FY 1968-72 period are shown on the classified table provided to the Committee. The Civil Defense program for FY 1968 is shown separately on Table 2.

### 1. SURVEILLANCE, WARNING AND CONTROL

The programs shown under this heading are, with two exceptions, the same as those I presented last year. Activation of BUIC III control centers will slip somewhat from the schedule shown last year due to delays in firming up the technical details of the program. The delay will be made up by the temporary retention of two of the BUIC II control centers and 12 of the manual backup centers through FY 1968. By end FY 1969 all 19 BUIC IIIs should be operational and the remaining BUIC II and manual control centers will be phased out.

The second change pertains to the search radars. Last year we had planned to reduce the number of these radars to 151 by end FY 1967. As you may recall, this reduction was predicated on the internetting of our radar system with that of the Federal Aviation Agency. However, in order to make the inputs from the FAA radars compatible with the SAGE-BUIC III system, they must first be converted into appropriate computer language by a special piece of equipment called a "digitizer". Because of a slippage in the production of this digitizer, five more Defense Department radars will have to be operated until FY 1969, when we expect to be able to reduce the number to 149.

Under our present plan, the 19 BUIC III stations will be fully integrated with the 12 SAGE direction centers. Two BUIC IIIs are to be deployed in each of eight SAGE sectors along the western, northern,

and eastern borders of the United States. Three sectors will need only one BUIC. In each of these 11 sectors, the direction center and the BUIC IIIs will be integrated with 10 to 15 radars, thus enabling any one of the centers or BUIC IIIs to handle the entire sector even if the others were destroyed. The remaining interior SAGE sector will not have BUIC and will operate only with its direction center. All 12 sectors will feed into five combat centers. These, in turn, will feed into the NORAD Combat Operation Center which is now fully functioning in its new underground facilities deep in the Cheyenne Mountain caves.

## 2. MANNED INTERCEPTORS

The manned interceptor forces are generally the same as those presented last year.

As you know, we have been studying during the past several years various ways of modernizing our air defense forces. Interceptor versions of both the SR-71 (F-12) and the F-111 have been considered for this role. Either one, equipped with the improved ASG-18/AIM 47 fire control and missile system and used with an effective Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), would be better than the present interceptors in operating from degraded bases and independently of the vulnerable fixed ground environment, and in countering concentrated bomber attacks, including air-to-surface missiles. In fact, a small force of such aircraft operating with AWACS would have a combat capability superior to the programmed force of several hundred Century series fighters and the hundreds of ground radar and control sites.

The feasibility of this plan, however, depends upon the successful development of the AWACS. We now have a test program underway to examine three proposed solutions to the problem of developing an overland airborne radar which could provide effective coverage at all altitudes. Design efforts are also being pursued on the airframe and avionics. We hope that by the end of this year sufficient data will be available to demonstrate the feasibility of the AWACS. Only then will we be in a position to make a decision on the interceptor force. Accordingly, we propose to continue development work on both the F-12 and the F-111 types of interceptors and on the fire control and missile systems, and \$20 million is included in the FY 1968 Budget for this purpose. Although no additional funds are requested for work on the AWACS airframe, another \$10 million is included in the FY 1968 Budget to continue work on overland radar technology.

## 3. SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES

The NIKE HERCULES and HAWK missile forces are the same as planned a year ago except that we now intend to replace eventually some of the present HAWK missiles with the new Improved HAWK which is now in development.

In addition to the Improved HAWK, which is designed primarily for the field forces, we also have in advanced development a new surface-to-air missile called the SAM-D. While this system is also primarily oriented toward air defense of the field forces, it also has a potential application for Continental Air Defense. This effort, thus

far, has been directed mainly to development of the required components or "building blocks" and a deployment decision at this time would be premature. Additional funds have been included in the FY 1968 Budget to continue development.

#### 4. BALLISTIC MISSILE WARNING

The numbers of Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems (BMEWS) and Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radar sites are the same as shown last year. The OTH radars, themselves, provide another form of early warning of ballistic missile attack, as I described to the Committee last year, particularly against Soviet missiles fired on trajectories beyond the BMEWS coverage.

We are also continuing work on "back scatter" Over-the-Horizon radars. In this system, echo signals from the target would be returned directly to the transmitter, thereby making separate receiving stations unnecessary. An interim capability to detect sea launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) is being phased in during FY 1968. The SLBM detection system will include modified SAGE and SPACETRACK radars.

#### 5. ANTI-SATELLITE DEFENSE

As described in previous years, we have a capability to intercept and destroy hostile satellites within certain ranges. This capability will be maintained through FY 1968.

### Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Study on Arms Sales and Foreign Policy, January 25, 1967<sup>1</sup>

#### PREFACE

This study is the result of the belief of the Committee on Foreign Relations that the problems and responsibilities the United States has acquired with its ever increasing arms exports are of prime concern to the Congress. The complex nature of these arms sales, as well as their implications for national and foreign policy encourages the belief that this study can serve a useful purpose.

It should be emphasized that this study does not necessarily reflect the views of the committee or any of its members.

J. W. FULBRIGHT, *Chairman.*

#### I. THE CHANGING PATTERN OF AMERICAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Since the Second World War the United States has recognized that it is in the national interest to give military support to friendly countries to enable them to defend themselves against the threat of

<sup>1</sup> Senate Foreign Relations Committee print, 90th Cong., 1st sess.

aggression. The military assistance programs beginning in 1949 with congressional approval of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act<sup>2</sup> have provided various kinds of grant military aid to countries unable to pay for their own defense needs. Over the years the Congress has paid particularly close attention to the military assistance programs with an eye to withdrawing such aid from countries having sufficient resources to maintain their own forces and preventing U.S. military aid from either being misused or overburdening struggling economies.

In recent years both the President and the Congress have become increasingly aware of another responsibility directly related to the use of military assistance. This is the question of conventional arms control in the developing regions of the world. In his message of last January to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference, President Johnson reminded the delegates:

As we focus on nuclear arms, let us not forget that resources are being devoted to nonnuclear arms races all around the world. These resources might be better spent on feeding the hungry, healing the sick and teaching the uneducated. The cost of acquiring and maintaining one squadron of supersonic aircraft diverts resources that would build and maintain a university. We suggest therefore that countries, on a regional basis, explore ways to limit competition among themselves for costly weapons often sought for reasons of illusory prestige.<sup>3</sup>

Despite President Johnson's concern, the pursuit of "illusory prestige" has recently quickened throughout the developing regions of the world. For example, the United States has agreed to sell to Iran a squadron of F-4 Phantoms, its most sophisticated operational supersonic aircraft. Morocco has purchased 12 F-5's, among the United States most modern fighter-interceptors. The international record of such sales is long: American F-104's interceptors to Jordan, British Hawker Hunter jet fighters to Chile, American A-4B tactical attack aircraft to Argentina, Soviet Mig 21's to Iraq, Czechoslovakian armored cars and bazookas to Cyprus—to cite some recent examples.

What is clearly in process is a competition among the industrial nations to sell arms to the developing nations of the world. In the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East these sales have contributed to an intense arms race; while in North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and most of Latin America the situation is still, in Lincoln Bloomfield's words, that of an "arms walk." But the arms pace, even where it still remains a "walk," shows every sign of accelerating, unless the major powers take a stronger interest in slowing the pace.

This growing problem of arms competition in the underdeveloped world and the diversion of scarce resources is directly related to a dramatic shift in the composition of U.S. military assistance and sales programs. It seems that at a moment of increasing congressional oversight of the military grant assistance, emphasis has shifted from these programs to a concentration on military sales. In the fiscal years 1952 to 1961 the U.S. military grant aid programs and military sales

<sup>2</sup> Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49* (S. doc. 123, 81st Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 1356-1364.

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 7-8.

amounted to a total value of \$22 billion—\$17 billion in grant aid and \$5 billion in sales. According to the Defense Department, the comparative amounts will be radically altered in the 1962-71 period—that is \$15 billion in military sales, and \$7 billion in grant aid. (In fiscal year 1961, for example, sales were 43.4 percent of grant aid; in fiscal year 1966, sales stood at 235.1 percent of aid.) Since 1962 the Defense Department has already obtained \$11.1 billion in foreign military orders and commitments. The average of all military export sales in the 1952-61 period was around \$300 million annually. In fiscal year 1961 military export sales rose to \$600 million; they were \$1.3 billion in fiscal year 1963; \$1.26 billion in fiscal year 1964; \$1.97 billion in fiscal year 1965; and were around \$1.93 billion in fiscal year 1966. That is a total of some \$6 to \$7 billion in the past 4 years.

Of the \$9 billion in orders and commitments the United States received between 1962 and 1965 almost \$5 billion has been received in cash receipts, an amount offsetting almost 40 percent of the dollar costs of maintaining U.S. forces abroad during that period. Furthermore, these sales offsets have risen from 10 percent of oversea expenditures in 1961 to 44 percent in 1965.

Secretary of Defense McNamara made it very clear in 1965 that he considered military grants and the increasing military sales as an important instrument of American foreign policy:

I think it is extremely important to understand that in our military assistance program and in our military sales program we face two extremes.

In the one case we face nations, our allies, who for a variety of reasons may not have developed their defense program to a level commensurate with their economic strength, their obligations to their own people, and their obligations to the alliance of which we are a part. Nations that fall in that category are the developed countries, the countries which have had a remarkable economic growth, in the last decade or two, economic growth in many cases stimulated by Marshall plan aid.

In these instances it is very much in our interest to work with those nations to expand their defense program, to increase their military personnel strength, to add to their equipment, and where it can be done to our mutual advantage to insure that they buy their equipment from U.S. producers. This we do.

The result has been very substantial increases in the defense budgets of many of the Western nations, Australia, the Federal Republic, to name two. This is ultimately in their interest. It is very much in our interest. In no way does it conflict with economic development and economic strength which I want to emphasize as Secretary of Defense I consider to be the foundation ultimately of national security. In any case, that is one extreme.

The other extreme is represented by those underdeveloped nations which have not yet met the minimum needs of their people for social and economic progress but who nonetheless are inclined to divert an unreasonable share of their scarce human and material resources to defense.

In those cases our first objective is to use the influence that we gain through the military assistance programs and occasionally through the military export sales programs to work with them to reduce the share of their resources devoted to defense and to increase the portion of their human and material capital that is allocated to economic and social programs.<sup>4</sup>

It is difficult to fault the objectives and the logic of such an approach to the military assistance and sales programs. But the developing nature of the arms competition seems to defy the best intentions of Mr. McNamara's reasonable explanation of how the United States conducts its arms sales. The question that must be addressed is whether

<sup>4</sup> News conference, Sept. 16, 1965.

the governmental machinery designed for the management of our military sales program is adequate to the task of bringing the U.S. actions in line with Secretary McNamara's intentions.

There is evidence to suggest that it is not.

## II. THE DIMENSIONS OF THE ARMS SALES PROGRAM

Since its establishment in October of 1961 a Defense Department office called International Logistic Negotiations (ILN) has been the center of U.S. military sales. In 1964 the Director of ILN, Henry J. Kuss, was promoted to the rank of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense as the result of his success in boosting military sales. ILN's sales force of some 21 professional officers is organized into four teams—red, grey, blue, and white—each charged with particular functional and regional responsibilities. The white team, for example, devotes almost its entire efforts to selling military equipment to West Germany in an effort to offset by military sales the approximately \$775 million it costs the United States in dollars to keep our troops in the Federal Republic (West Germany has bought some \$3 billion worth of military equipment in the last 4 years). The measure of ILN's success is the 600-percent increase in annual military sales over the levels of the 1950's.

The Defense Department's approach to the arms sales field has been dynamic and aggressive. The Department through the Military Export Committee of the Defense Industry Advisory Council has sought the cooperation of industry and the financial community in an effort to further overseas military sales. Defense is also supporting plans to organize symposia throughout the United States aimed at convincing the smaller arms manufacturers, the "non-bigs" as they are called, of the advantages of entering the military export market.

In fostering these commercial ties, the Department of Defense is appreciative of the fact that there are a number of ways by which arms can be sold abroad: private firms selling to a foreign government, private firms selling through an agency of the U.S. Government, and government to government sales. There are other possibilities as well, such as a U.S. manufacturer licensing a foreign firm to produce his products. Because of the variety of ways that arms are sold and distributed it is difficult to know the extent of just how much equipment is being purchased. For example, the F-86's Venezuela recently bought from West Germany were manufactured in Italy under a U.S. licensing arrangement. The F-86's West Germany "sold" to Iran but which mysteriously seem to actually belong to Pakistan (despite U.S. efforts to halt the flow of arms into Pakistan) were manufactured in Canada.

In other words, neither the sales figures given by International Logistics Negotiations—which do not include commercial military sales with the exception of those to West Germany—nor even customs statistics would be able to give the full story of the extent of arms traffic for which the United States is responsible.

The Defense Department's interest in the potential of the export market has prompted a number of appeals to the American armament industry to go "international." In a speech before the American

Ordnance Association in October of 1966, Mr. Kuss had this comment about the companies who were reluctant to go "international."

This tendency of American companies to refrain from entering into the international arms market is a serious one and affects our entire international posture in a military, economic, and political way.

From the military point of view we stand to lose all of the major international relationships paid for with grant aid money unless we can establish professional military relationships through the sales media. \* \* \*

From the economic point of view the stability of the dollar in the world market is dependent on our ability to resolve balance of payments problems. Failure to resolve these balance of payments problems creates economic pressures in the international and in the domestic spheres. The solution to balance of payments is principally in more trade. All other solutions merely temporize the problem.

From the political point of view international trade is the "staff of life" of a peaceful world. With it comes understanding; the lack of it eliminates communications and creates misunderstandings.<sup>5</sup>

Of particular interest to the Defense Department as a means of furthering its international sales is the eventual creation of a NATO Defense Common Market. Secretary McNamara first proposed the Defense Common Market in May of 1965. Such a common market for defense materials in NATO is also appealing because of the stimulus it would give to the standardization of military weapons and the development of common production facilities. The Department seems most impressed, however with arms sales potential in such a common market area. Mr. Kuss has said that "the highly competitive approach that has been taken here in the United States, particularly as a result of Secretary McNamara's cost reduction programs, places U.S. industries in fit condition for competition throughout the world." ILN estimates that over the next 10 years U.S. allies "may purchase a minimum of \$10 to \$15 billion of their requirements from the United States by sheer virtue of the fact that most of these items will be a minimum of 30% to 40% cheaper and will be highly competitive from a technical point of view \* \* \*".<sup>6</sup> An important objective of American military export policies is to break down what ILN has termed "protectionists interests in Europe." For as Mr. Kuss has put it:

We must establish by our actions in Government and industry that there is merit in an orientation toward the United States. We must sell the benefits of collaboration in defense matters with competition. We must demonstrate that the free world has more to gain from the U.S. model of defense competition than it has from the temptation to allocate the market and build little, safe, high-cost arrangements across national borders.

As an example of this temptation, Mr. Kuss cites the recommendations of the Plowden report on the British aircraft industry as "\* \* \* indicative of the frustrations and consequent protectionism that is arising in Europe."<sup>7</sup>

### III. THE MILITARY EXPORT MARKETS

For all the excitement generated in the American press over arms sales to Latin America and other developing regions of the world,

<sup>5</sup> Speech before the American Ordnance Association on Oct. 20, 1966.

<sup>6</sup> Remarks of Henry J. Kuss before the National Security Industrial Association on Oct. 8, 1965.

<sup>7</sup> Speech before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on Mar. 24, 1966.

the fact is that only a small percentage of total U.S. arms sales is involved. During the period fiscal years 1962-66, \$9.85 billion of \$11.1 billion in orders and commitments went to developed countries in Europe and Asia. This is 88 percent of the total, with \$8.7 of the \$9.85 billion going to Europe alone. (How much of this equipment is eventually transshipped as surplus to the underdeveloped world is another matter.) By way of contrast, during the same period the United States sold some \$45 million to Africa and \$162.7 million to Latin America (mainly to Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela). In the Middle East and south Asia the 1962-66 total was some \$972 million or 8 percent of the grand total (half of this amount went to Iran alone.)

Again, these figures do not include grant aid shipments or sales to which the U.S. Government was not a party.

In the case of Latin America, for example, total sales of U.S. military equipment, including commercial sales, may be 10 or 15 percent higher than the \$162 million. The problem of compilation of total sales is complicated, if not made impossible, by the absence of any public or even Government sources that give totals of all U.S. military exports to countries or regions.

The fact that sales to underdeveloped countries amount to only 12 percent of the total military sales handled by the Department of Defense is important for a number of reasons. These figures on sales to underdeveloped countries lead to the conclusion that the U.S. motives in arranging such sales simply cannot be rooted in balance of payments considerations. If the United States were to lose its entire arms market to the underdeveloped world the impact on our overall balance-of-payments accounts would be small. Therefore, our justification for such sales must be based on the other considerations, such as influencing the development of the local military elites or helping a country resist the threat of external aggressions. Preventing the influx of military equipment of other nations, a sort of preemptive selling, has also been a strong U.S. motive in the underdeveloped areas of the world.

#### IV. FINANCING MILITARY EXPORTS

Almost two-thirds of all military sales abroad over the past few years have been for cash. The largest cash customer is West Germany, although other industrial nations such as Australia, Canada, and United Kingdom (with the major exception of the billion dollar F-111 deal) have also normally paid cash. Conversely, sales to the underdeveloped regions of the world have been mainly credit financed. For example, of the roughly \$56 million in arms sold to Latin America through the Department of Defense in fiscal year 1966 only \$8 million was for cash. This 7-to-1 ratio of credit to cash probably is common throughout the underdeveloped world.

The International Logistics Negotiations Office, not AID or the Export-Import Bank, has acquired the responsibility of negotiating the terms of the credit extended for military purchases. The sources of this credit are the Eximbank, private banking facilities, and a military assistance account available for the use of the Defense

Department under the authority of section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act.<sup>a</sup>

#### *Export-Import Bank*

The Eximbank has taken an active interest in the financing of military export sales only since 1963 when the Defense Department was given authority to insure credits.

The Eximbank role is one of providing a service function for the Department of Defense and bringing to military sales on credit the advantages of the Bank's experience in the international credit field. These loans are usually on a medium-term basis, or 5 to 7 years, at an interest rate that now stands around 5½ percent. Eximbank makes direct loans for military equipment only to industrial nations such as Great Britain, Australia, etc.

In addition, Eximbank makes so-called "country-x loans." Such loans are the result of Eximbank establishing what amounts to an accounts receivable fund for the use of the Department of Defense in arranging loans to underdeveloped countries. The Eximbank does not know or want to know where this money goes. The Department of Defense guarantees these funds through the military assistance account described below. The bank therefore avoids the problem of directly financing military sales to underdeveloped countries.

#### *Private Banking Facilities*

It is not clear how large a role private banking facilities play in the financing of U.S. military exports. According to the *Military Export Reporter*, a trade journal for U.S. contractors in the arms business, during the period of fiscal years 1962-65 approximately \$2 billion, or 40 percent of total arms sales, were financed by private banks or the Export-Import Bank. Since the Eximbank only entered the field in 1963 and carried only a very small amount of direct credit until fiscal year 1966, it can be roughly estimated that private banks extended some 90 percent or \$1.8 billion of the funds during that period. But these figures are most tentative. It is safe to say, however, that private banks do not participate in such loans, particularly to underdeveloped countries, without a full guarantee of repayment. In the case of underdeveloped countries, the military assistance credit account serves as the primary source of credit guarantees.

#### *The Military Assistance Credit Account*

The military assistance credit account is the most useful instrument at the disposal of the International Logistics Negotiations (ILN) office for use in providing credit for arms sales to areas where commercial and direct Eximbank credits are unavailable.

The idea that the Department of Defense should have funds available to arrange credit terms for arms sales was initiated with the Mutual Security Act of 1957 when a fund of \$15 million was authorized for this purpose. This account officially became a "revolving account" to finance additional sales when the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961

<sup>a</sup> *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961*, p. 1281.

(sec. 508) authorized that repayments from such sales [were] to "be available until expended solely for the purpose of furnishing military assistance on cash credit terms." Consequently, this fund, through yearly appropriations ranging from \$21 to \$83 million, has grown to over \$300 million. An important amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act came in 1964 when the Defense Department asked for, and received from the Congress, the authority to allow the Department of Defense to guarantee 100 percent of the credit extended by U.S. banks for arms sales while only obligating 25 percent of the amount from the military assistance credit account as a reserve to back up the guarantees in the event of a default.<sup>9</sup> In other words, the \$300 million in the ever-increasing "revolving account" now allows the Department of Defense to put the full guarantee of the U.S. Government behind over a billion dollars in military credits.

This provision permits ILN to guarantee loans the Export-Import Bank might make available through the "country-x" accounts or to back a loan made by a private bank.

Another option provided for ILN by the Foreign Assistance Act is the use of the military assistance credit account to extend direct credit for foreign purchases. The terms of such credit are at the discretion of the Defense Department and range from commercial rates to as low as a zero interest charge. A low interest charge from the military assistance credit account would normally be used in a package loan, which might include credit funds from a commercial bank and the Export-Import Bank, in order to bring down the overall interest charge to the customer. If the extension of credit were to underdeveloped countries, ILN would probably guarantee the other pieces of the loan package as well.

#### V. POLICY CONTROL OF ARMS SALES

The magnitude and complexity of the arms sales program would seem to demand a well developed system of interagency supervision and complete statistics on what is being sold to whom under what terms. In large measure because of the phenomenal growth of the arms sale programs, neither the administrative resources of the executive nor the legislative attention of the Congress have kept pace with the problems these military exports have brought in their wake.

Under the provisions of the post-World War II legislation concerned with the regulation of arms sales (the Export Control Act of 1949, as amended, and the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended) the Department of State and the Treasury Department share the responsibility for establishing policy and for enforcing regulations with regard to the sale of arms. As for the obvious connection between arms sales and arms control, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was given the responsibility of Public Law 87-297 in 1961 to:

\* \* \* serve as the principal adviser to the Secretary of State and the President on arms control and disarmament matters. In carrying out his duties under this act the Director shall, under the direction of the Secretary of State, have primary responsibility within the Government for arms control and disarmament matters. \* \* \*

<sup>9</sup> See amendment to sec. 509 of the act (*ibid.*, 1964, p. 1271).

<sup>10</sup> *Documents on Disarmament*, 1961, p. 484.

In order to insure that arms exports procedures are consistent with the security of the United States and U.S. foreign policy, the Secretary of State, under the statutory authority of the 1954 Mutual Security Act, established an Office of Munitions Control to control the export licenses of items on the U.S. munitions list. That is, items the United States considers "arms, ammunition, and implements of war." As a further safeguard the Secretary of State in 1966 established a special interdepartmental committee to make certain that any disclosure of classified military information brought about by military exports would be consistent with national security requirements. This Committee, the successor to the Military Information Committee, is called the National Military Information Disclosure Policy Committee.

In theory, then, the interdepartmental machinery seems adequate to the task of coordinating a national policy of arms sales which would take into full account the military, political, economic, and arms control implications of our expanding sales programs. In practice, the mechanism appears unequal to the task. First of all, the Office of Munitions Control, which should serve as a general clearinghouse for all arms sales, does not have responsibility for handling, or even cataloging, government-to-government military sales—thus it has no influence over the greatest exporter of all, the Department of Defense. Moreover, since 1962 the Office of Munitions Control has not issued a report on just what commercial military items were exported. The problem seems to be a budgetary one of inadequate funding for the necessary staff to compile such a report. As a result, however, there is no way, short of a special request, for Congress or the Secretary of State to know just what is being exported to where by commercial firms. Since the Defense Department submits no composite reports to the Congress on what it sells abroad or even how the military assistance credit account is used, legislative oversight in the arms sales field is haphazard and generally ineffectual.

How and by whom the major decisions on arms sales are made is something of a mystery. There is reported to be a State-Defense Coordinating Committee for arms sales policy consisting of members of Treasury, the State Department, the Defense Department, and presumably the Arms Control Agency and AID. Whether the full Committee actually meets is uncertain. One thing is clear, however, from testimony the Foreign Relations Committee has already heard: the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, despite its charter, does not sit at the high table when decisions on the sale of arms are made. Another open question is whether the Agency for International Development or the Bureau of the Budget actually participate in the process of making a decision to sell, for example, A-4B's to Argentina or have only the option of attempting to overturn a promise of arms sales already made to another country.

#### VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ARMS SALES

The burgeoning arms sales program raises a number of major and intertwined policy concerns: First, what is the effect of U.S. current military export policy on our European alliance relationships; second, what is the effect of these arms exports on the external indebtedness and general financial circumstances of the underdeveloped countries;

and third, what are the prospects for arms control in the developing regions of the world given the present pace and pattern of the international traffic in arms?

On the question of the arms sales and U.S. relations with its European allies, the central fact is that while the financial success of the U.S. military sales is beyond dispute, there is ample reason for concern as to the side effects of the vigorous sales campaigns. American sales efforts have become a source of great irritation in Europe, particularly in West Germany and Great Britain, and may also be a major cause of the increasing interest of Europeans in competing for arms markets in developing regions of the world.

Some of the European resentment over U.S. arms sales efforts has found its way into the European press. In 1965 Britain's *Daily Telegraph* began a bitter article on American sales by charging:

Growing resentment is being expressed by British defense experts at the effects of ruthless American high pressure salesmanship of arms and aircraft. This has already cost Britain a £40 million tank order from Italy.

American efforts to become the monopoly producer of major arms are seen to be producing not only a form of "cold war" within NATO, but an actual weakening of its frontline strength by foisting inferior weapons on it.<sup>11</sup>

Such charges, which have been mirrored less bluntly in the French and Swedish press, are almost certainly overblown; and this particular charge came chiefly as the result of British unhappiness over Italy's decision to buy American M60 tanks instead of the British Chieftain battle tank. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Wilson himself complained to a NATO meeting of the high-pressure salesmanship of the United States in the arms field. In July of 1965 Prime Minister Wilson announced to Parliament that his Government had decided to follow the American lead in arm sales, and would therefore establish its own office of International Logistics Negotiations. Mr. Kuss' counterpart, Mr. Raymond Brown, is called the Head of Defense Sales. In reporting this action, Mr. Wilson explained:

There is a strong desire that we should make more effective arrangements in placing British arms, particularly with our allies, because, as I said in my speech to the NATO conference, one of the things that have unbalanced the situation in the alliance was the high-pressure salesmanship of the Americans—as we found when trying to sell arms to France and Italy.<sup>12</sup>

As for the implications of Britain's new emphasis on arms sales for the worldwide arms control problem, Mr. Denis Healey, the Secretary of State for Defense, told Parliament in January of 1966:

While the Government attach the highest importance to making progress in the field of arms control and disarmament, we must also take what practical steps we can to ensure that this country does not fail to secure its rightful share of this valuable commercial market.<sup>13</sup>

If Mr. Wilson's program of increasing British sales actually resulted in an upturn in sales to the industrial nations, the effect on the arms control problem would be marginal. But the fact is that under present

<sup>11</sup> *Daily Telegraph*, Apr. 5, 1965.

<sup>12</sup> *The Times* (London), July 14, 1965, p. 8.

<sup>13</sup> Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons*, fifth series, vol. 723, col. 64.

conditions neither Britain, France, nor any other of the industrial nations can compete with the United States in the "Common Defense Market."

Without preferential treatment, Britain cannot even sell enough military equipment to West Germany to offset the small cost of maintaining some 55,000 British troops in the Federal Republic. A combination of technological skills, a high rate of government investment in defense industries, flexible credit arrangements, and the vigorous salesmanship of ILN have virtually put the rest of the Western World out of the sophisticated arms export market. The defense common market is little more than an arena for arms competition between resentful pygmies and an affable giant.

If the increasing arms competition between the United States and the Europeans in the "third" world is an indication of a trend, however, Europeans must feel that in Latin America, the Middle East, and in time, Africa, they can compete on equal terms. At a moment when the United States is attempting to slow the pace of military aircraft sales to Latin America, France has been actively pushing in the area its Dassault Mirage 3, Sweden the Saab J35 Draken, and Britain the Hawker Hunter and the Lightning Mark 3.

Deprived of markets in the industrial countries, the Europeans are anxious to win the next round of jet aircraft competition in Latin America. Most Latin American countries have until recently been content with American surplus F-51 Mustangs and F-80's, the earliest operational U.S. jet, or the equivalent British Meteor or Vampire. Now they want the subsonic jets such as the A-4. Britain has threatened to increase the pace by offering the supersonic Lightning.

In West Germany the situation is somewhat different. The United States has insisted that the West Germans buy approximately \$775 million in arms per year in order to offset the cost of maintaining U.S. troops there in the Federal Republic. The problem is that the West Germans, primarily for financial reasons, have become increasingly unhappy and difficult about these purchases; U.S. pressure on the West German Government to meet this commitment has been intense and reportedly injurious to German-American relations.

Chancellor Erhard's failure to gain some relief from the commitment during his last trip to the United States may have contributed to his political downfall.

Over the long run, it is almost certain that this use of arms sales will have to be modified. The cost of maintaining U.S. troops in Germany is rising--it may be as high as \$900 million per year by 1970--while West Germany's willingness to purchase the equipment and, equally important, her ability to absorb such equipment is rapidly declining. There are already signs that West Germany is sending surplus military equipment of American origin to areas where the United States would like to prevent the spread of such arms. There are "end use" agreements between the United States and West Germany governing the disposition of surplus equipment. But how long these agreements can be enforced given the present levels of sales is a difficult question.

This problem of the spread of surplus weapons throughout the world is not limited to West Germany and will require increasingly

careful consideration by the U.S. Government. Total U.S. arms sales have now reached something over the \$2 billion per year level—not including grant aid. The problem of the disposal of surplus military equipment is certain to grow with this increase in sales. The surplus arms of the industrial nations may provide the ingredients of an arms race in the underdeveloped regions of the world. It should also be noted that some of the arms used by Latin American guerrillas today were exported by the U.S.—for quite different reasons—yesterday.

The question of what effect American arms sales have on the debt servicing difficulties of underdeveloped nations cannot be answered here. According to the Development Assistance Committee (the DAC) of the OECD, external debts of the most underdeveloped nations "has increased at a considerably higher percentage rate than exports of goods and services, gross national product, or savings."

In Latin America, for example, the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) estimates suggest that two-thirds of Latin America's foreign exchange deficit is caused by external debt service payments.

Credits for military purchases are usually hard loans with high interest rates and a short repayment period. Development loans are normally just the opposite. Unless all credits to a particular country—both development and military sales—are subject to a comprehensive review how can we know enough about the total economic circumstances of a country to make the right decisions? At the moment there seems to be very little coordination between the right hand of military export credit policy and the left hand of development loans.

Finally, there is the question of the compatibility of our present arms sales policies with the United States' expressed desire to control arms races in the developing regions of the world. The Congress has fully supported the efforts of the executive agencies to administer military assistance and sales with the goal of arms control in mind at all times. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1966, for example, states:

Programs for the sale or exchange of defense articles shall be administered so as to encourage regional arms control and disarmament agreements and so as to discourage arms races.<sup>14</sup>

In addition, there has been growing concern by individual Senators over the role U.S. arms are playing in a series of international crises—Kashmir, the Middle East, and in time, perhaps in Latin America. Senator Bourke Hickenlooper expressed such a concern before the American Management Association when he remarked:

The United States did not cause the Indian-Pakistan war but we did supply most of the rocks and brickbats. I hope we have learned from this experience that foreign military aid must be appraised in the wisest possible context with particular emphasis on what effect this aid will have on regional problems.

What seems to be lacking in the U.S. approach to the arms sales issue is a boldness of policy often demanded of a great power. It is a commonplace to hear discussions on whether the United States should or should not sell military equipment to this or that country end with

<sup>14</sup> 80 Stat. 803.

"\* \* \* but if we don't sell it to them the Russians (or the British, or the French, etc.) will." Fully aware of this flaw in the U.S. armor, many countries have exploited it in order to acquire equipment we don't really want to sell them. Consequently, the United States often ends up selling, say, the Iranians supersonic F-4 aircraft for defense primarily because the Shah says he will go to the Russians if we don't give him the equipment he wants. When this sort of compelling argument is added to the glint of a balance-of-payments success, a momentum is created which tends to divorce the process from its appropriate overall foreign policy context.

It seems imperative that at some point the United States take the risk that great powers must take and simply say "No—go to the Russians or the British if you must." Furthermore, the risks of such a policy of denial may not be [as] high as advertised. In considering whether to sell or not we should not ignore the problems of our "competitors." As Prof. John Kenneth Galbraith told the Foreign Relations Committee last year:

(10) Let me take note in passing of the recurring argument that if we do not provide arms to a country it will get them from the Soviets or possibly China. This is another example of that curious obtuseness which excessive preoccupation with cold war strategy produces in otherwise excellent minds. It was Soviet tanks that surrounded Ben Bella's palace in Algiers when that Soviet-supported leader was thrown out. It was a Soviet and Chinese equipped army which deposed the Indonesian Communists, destroyed the Communist Party in that ruthlessness on which one hesitates to dwell and which left Sukarno's vision of an Asian socialism in shambles. It was [a] Soviet-trained praetorian guard which was expected to supply the ultimate protection to the government of President Nkrumah and which did not. One can only conclude that those who worry about Soviet arm-wish to keep the Russians out of trouble. This could be carrying friendship too far.<sup>15</sup>

Surely such a policy of denial will have its dangers; but an effort must be made to slow the seemingly relentless pace of arms competition throughout the underdeveloped world. If Professor Galbraith is correct in suggesting that our competitors may have their own problems with arms assistance and sales, then it may be possible for all the major arms suppliers—including the Soviet Union—to begin to work together to restrict the flow of arms into the underdeveloped regions of the world.

#### VII. CONCLUDING COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Over the past 4 years there has been a basic change in the composition of American military assistance. The sale of arms has now replaced the giving of arms as the predominant form of U.S. military assistance. While dramatic in character and of major importance in its implications for alliance relationships and for the problem of arms control in the developing regions of the world, the significance of this change has not been fully appreciated by the hierarchy of the American executive branch or the Congress. In Europe, American

<sup>15</sup> *Foreign Assistance, 1966: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-ninth Congress, Second Session, on S. 2859, a Bill To Amend Further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, and for Other Purposes, and S. 2861, a Bill To Promote the Foreign Policy, Security, and General Welfare of the United States by Assisting Peoples of the World in Their Efforts Toward Internal and External Security*, pp. 234-235.

arms salesmanship has often been zealous to the point of irritation, and overpowering to the point of encouraging Europeans to compete more aggressively for the arms markets in the underdeveloped regions of the world. In some underdeveloped regions of the world—notably Latin America and the Middle East—where there are no significant balance of payment incentives, the United States, when faced with tough decisions as in Iran and Argentina, seems to be drifting into a policy of preemptive selling rather than the more difficult alternative of arms denial.

It is the general conclusion of this study that it is incumbent on the United States to reappraise the adequacy of the present machinery of policy control and legislative oversight governing the sale of arms. On the basis of the available evidence, there is sufficient justification for tentatively concluding that the adjustments in policy and administrative procedure necessitated by the change in the composition of military aid have been marred by a lack of information, by weaknesses in interdepartmental coordination at the highest levels, and, finally, by a lack of serious attention to the problem of reconciling an active arms control policy with an arms sales program.

The specific recommendations of this study are as follows:

(1) In order to provide an adequate informational base upon which to judge the scope of U.S. arms exports, the Munitions Control Office should be directed to compile on a quarterly basis a complete list of all arms exports both commercial and governmental. This report—with a classified annex if required—should be submitted at least to the Secretary of State and the Congress.

(2) The Department of Defense should be required to give a full account of the annual use of public funds in the military assistance credit account.

(3) The role of the Export-Import Bank in the financing of military exports should be carefully examined by the Congress.

(4) Congress should consider making all military export credits and guarantees the subject of a simultaneous review with development loans. Both involve a charge on the resources of the recipient country and both involve the use of U.S. public funds.

(5) Congress should examine the decision-making process of the military sales program to determine whether the Arms Control Agency and Agency for International Development are meeting their responsibilities as defined by law.

(6) The United States should take the initiative in organizing regional conventional weapons "free zones": zones that would be free of sophisticated offensive and defensive weapons—missiles, jet aircraft other than subsonic fighters, tanks, etc. Latin America, and perhaps north and sub-Saharan Africa, offer possibilities for such zones. For example, the heads of governments of the Americas meeting now scheduled for the early spring of 1967 could provide the occasion for the United States to take the lead in calling for agreements among the Latin American countries for a Latin American conventional weapons "free zone." Conceivably, the OAS could contribute to the maintenance of such a zone by the creation of an arms inspectorate comparable to the Western European Union's Agency for the Control of Armaments.

**Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, January 27, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man's entry into outer space,

Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientific development,

Desiring to contribute to broad international co-operation in the scientific as well as the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Believing that such co-operation will contribute to the development of mutual understanding and to the strengthening of friendly relations between States and peoples,

Recalling resolution 1962 (XVIII), entitled "Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space," which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on 13 December 1963,<sup>2</sup>

Recalling resolution 1884 (XVIII), calling upon States to refrain from placing in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction or from installing such weapons on celestial bodies, which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on 17 October 1963,<sup>3</sup>

Taking account of United Nations General Assembly resolution 110(II) of 3 November 1947, which condemned propaganda designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression,<sup>4</sup> and considering that the aforementioned resolution is applicable to outer space,

Convinced that a Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, will further the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Have agreed on the following:

**ARTICLE I**

The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the

<sup>1</sup> *Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, First Session, on Executive D, 90th Congress, First Session (hereafter cited as Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings)*, pp. 119-123. The U.S. Senate approved the treaty on Apr. 25, by a vote of 88 to 0. The treaty was ratified by the U.S. on May 24, by the U.S.S.R. on May 18, and by the U.K. on June 5. It entered into force on Oct. 10, 1967.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 644-646.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 538.

<sup>4</sup> *General Assembly Official Records: Second Session, Resolutions, 16 September-29 November 1947*, p. 14.

interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.

Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.

There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage international co-operation in such investigation.

#### ARTICLE II

Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.

#### ARTICLE III

States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding.

#### ARTICLE IV

States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.

#### ARTICLE V

States Parties to the Treaty shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space and shall render to them all possible assistance in the event of accident, distress, or emergency landing on the territory of another State Party or on the high seas. When astronauts make such a landing, they shall be safely and promptly returned to the State of registry of their space vehicle.

In carrying on activities in outer space and on celestial bodies, the astronauts of one State Party shall render all possible assistance to the astronauts of other States Parties.

States Parties to the Treaty shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the Treaty or the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any phenomena they discover in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, which could constitute a danger to the life or health of astronauts.

#### ARTICLE VI

States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty. When activities are carried on in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, by an international organization, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by the international organization and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in such organization.

#### ARTICLE VII

Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object into outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies.

#### ARTICLE VIII

A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body. Ownership of objects launched into outer space, including objects landed or constructed on a celestial body, and of their component parts, is not affected by their presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by their return to the Earth. Such objects or component parts found beyond the limits of the State Party to the Treaty on whose registry they are carried shall be returned to that State Party, which shall, upon request, furnish identifying data prior to their return.

#### ARTICLE IX

In the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty. States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the moon and other celestial

bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose. If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the activity or experiment.

#### ARTICLE X

In order to promote international co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in conformity with the purposes of this Treaty, the States Parties to the Treaty shall consider on a basis of equality any requests by other States Parties to the Treaty to be afforded an opportunity to observe the flight of space objects launched by those States.

The nature of such an opportunity for observation and the conditions under which it could be afforded shall be determined by agreement between the States concerned.

#### ARTICLE XI

In order to promote international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, States Parties to the Treaty conducting activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, agree to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the public and the international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and results of such activities. On receiving the said information, the Secretary-General of the United Nations should be prepared to disseminate it immediately and effectively.

#### ARTICLE XII

All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. Such representatives shall give reasonable advance notice of a projected visit, in order that appropriate consultations may be held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited.

#### ARTICLE XIII

The provisions of this Treaty shall apply to the activities of States Parties to the Treaty in the exploration and use of outer space, in-

Judging the moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by a single State Party to the Treaty or jointly with other States, including cases where they are carried on within the framework of international inter-governmental organizations.

Any practical questions arising in connection with activities carried on by international inter-governmental organization in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be resolved by the States Parties to the Treaty either with the appropriate international organization or with one or more States members of that international organization, which are Parties to this Treaty.

#### ARTICLE XIV

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by five Governments including the Governments designated as Depositary Governments under this Treaty.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force and other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

#### ARTICLE XV

Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Treaty accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each remaining State Party to the Treaty on the date of acceptance by it.

#### ARTICLE XVI

Any State Party to the Treaty may give notice of its withdrawal from the Treaty one year after its entry into force by written notification to the Depositary Governments. Such withdrawal shall take effect one year from the date of receipt of this notification.

#### ARTICLE XVII

This Treaty, of which the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives

of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this twenty-seventh day of January one thousand nine hundred sixty-seven.

### Statement by President Johnson on the Signing of the Outer-Space Treaty, January 27, 1967<sup>1</sup>

*Secretary Rusk, Mr. Vice President, Mr. Chief Justice, Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen:*

This is an inspiring moment in the history of the human race.

We are taking the first firm step toward keeping outer space free forever from the implements of war.

It was more than 400 years ago when Martin Luther said:

Cannons and firearms are cruel and damnable machines. I believe them to have been the direct suggestion of the devil. If Adam had seen in a vision the horrible instruments that his children were to invent, he would have died of grief.

Well, I wonder what he would have thought of the far more terrible weapons that we have today.

We have never succeeded in freeing our planet from the implements of war. But if we cannot yet achieve this goal here on earth, we can at least keep the virus from spreading.

We can keep the ugly and wasteful weapons of mass destruction from contaminating space. And that is just exactly what this treaty does.

This treaty means that the moon and our sister planets will serve only the purposes of peace and not of war.

In space we are settling man-made problems will remain free of nuclear weapons.

It means that astronaut and cosmonaut will meet some day on the surface of the moon as brothers and not as warriors for competing nationalities or ideologies.

It holds promise that the same wisdom and good will which gave us this space treaty will continue to guide us as we seek solutions to the many problems that we have here on this earth.

It is a hopeful and a very promising sign.

We are so pleased that we could be joined here today by the representatives of so many of the other nations of the world.

I now take great pleasure in presenting to you our distinguished Secretary of State—Mr. Dean Rusk.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Feb. 6, 1967, p. 126. The treaty is printed *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> Secretary Rusk's remarks appear in the *Department of State Bulletin*, Feb. 20, 1967, pp. 266-267.

### Report by Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson on the Outer-Space Treaty, January 27, 1967<sup>1</sup>

THE PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you, with the recommendation that it be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, a copy of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on January 27, 1967, on behalf of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.<sup>2</sup> A number of other states have also signed the treaty in one or more of the three capitals.

This treaty is the result of intensive effort by many men and many nations to set up reasonable rules and procedures for the exploration of space—rules and procedures that will contribute to the peace and security of all mankind because they will be mutually beneficial and therefore mutually acceptable. It embodies all the essential elements proposed in your statement of May 7, 1966:

Freedom for all in the exploration and use of outer space;

International cooperation in scientific activities relating to celestial bodies;

Recognition of the need to avoid harmful contamination of space;

Assurance that man's activities on the moon and on other celestial bodies will be peaceful activities and that they will help to solve, rather than complicate, the problems we face here on earth.<sup>3</sup>

The treaty we have just signed is part of a historic progression of outstanding international agreements designed to prevent the extension of conflicts into new realms. First was the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, which reserved that area for exclusively peaceful activity and provided for cooperation in scientific endeavors.<sup>4</sup> The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 was second.<sup>5</sup> And third is the present treaty—a milestone for the new age of space exploration.

The treaty consists of a preamble and 17 articles.

The preamble recognizes that the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes is of common interest to all mankind and should be carried out for the benefit of all peoples. It expresses the desire of the states parties to further international cooperation in the scientific and the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

Article I of the treaty requires that the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit of all mankind and in the interest of all countries. It provides for freedom of access to all areas of celestial bodies and freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the moon

<sup>1</sup> *Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings*, pp. 109-112.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 38-43.

<sup>3</sup> See *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 275-276.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 1945-1959, vol. II, pp. 1550-1556.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

and other celestial bodies, and states agree to facilitate and encourage international cooperation in such investigation.

These free access provisions are reinforced in article II, which prohibits national appropriation of outer space, including the moon or other celestial bodies, by claim of sovereignty, by use, or by any other means.

Article III extends to the exploration and use of outer space the rule of law among nations by requiring all parties to carry on such activities "in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations."

You aptly described the intent of article IV when you welcomed this treaty as "the most important arms control development since the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963."<sup>6</sup> Article IV restricts military activities in two ways. The parties agreed that they will not place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, and that they will not install such weapons on celestial bodies or otherwise station them in outer space. The parties also agree that the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes; they forbid the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies. However, neither the use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes nor the use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies is to be prohibited.

Article V applies to astronauts in outer space the universal respect for life and limb that has been traditional among mariners at sea for many centuries. If an astronaut lands elsewhere than planned, the appropriate party is obliged to return him safely and promptly. In all outer space activities and on celestial bodies the astronauts of each state party to the treaty are required to render all possible assistance to the astronauts of other states parties. Any party to the treaty discovering any conditions in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, that would endanger the life or health of astronauts is required immediately to inform all the other parties or the Secretary General of the United Nations.

Under the terms of article VI each state party is internationally responsible for all its national activities in outer space, whether they are carried on by governmental or nongovernmental entities, and for assuring that such activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions of the treaty. Authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate state party is required with respect to activities of nongovernmental entities in outer space. Where international activities in outer space are carried on by an international organization, both that organization and the states parties to this treaty participating in that organization are responsible for compliance with the treaty.

Article VII further defines the responsibilities of states parties to the treaty by making the launching state internationally liable to another state party to the treaty or any of its persons for damage caused by an object launched or its component parts on the earth, in

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, p. 808.

airspace or in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies.

Article VIII provides that a state party to the treaty shall retain jurisdiction over any object launched into outer space which is carried on its registry and over any personnel thereof while they are in outer space or on a celestial body. Ownership of objects launched into outer space, including objects landed or constructed on a celestial body, is not affected by their presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by their return to earth. When such objects or their component parts are found beyond the limits of the state party to the treaty on whose register they are carried, they are required to be returned to that state upon the furnishing of identifying data.

In article IX the states parties to the treaty agree to conduct their outer space activities in a spirit of cooperation and mutual assistance with "due regard to the corresponding interests of all other states parties to the treaty." Each state party is required to pursue its studies and exploration in such a manner as to avoid the harmful contamination of outer space and celestial bodies and guard against adverse changes in the environment of the earth that might result from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter. If a state party has reason to believe that any activity it plans to undertake in outer space might cause harmful interference with peaceful outer space activities of other states parties, it is required to undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding. At the same time, if a state considers that an outer space activity or experiment planned by another state party would cause potentially harmful interference with peaceful exploration and use of outer space, it may request consultation concerning the activity or experiment.

Article X requires that a state party to the treaty shall consider on an equal basis requests for tracking facilities by other states parties. The nature of such an opportunity for tracking facilities and the conditions under which it could be afforded are to be determined by agreement between the states concerned. While article X requires a state party to consider requests for tracking facilities on an equal basis, a host country remains free, for whatever reasons it considers appropriate, to grant or deny a request. This subject was discussed in detail by Ambassador Goldberg in the General Assembly's Political Committee on December 17, 1966. A copy of his statement is attached.<sup>1</sup>

The provisions of article XI embody a principle that the United States of America has voluntarily observed since the beginning of the space age—the maximum possible reporting of outer space activities. States parties to the treaty agree to inform the United Nations, as well as the public and the international scientific community, "to the greatest extent feasible and practicable," of the nature, conduct, locations, and results of their activities in outer space and on celestial bodies. The information reported is to be disseminated immediately and effectively to all the world.

Article XII, like articles I and II, assures free access to all celestial bodies and provides means for assuring each party that the other parties are living up to the provisions of the treaty. It requires that

<sup>1</sup> The statement appears in *Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings*, pp. 113-118.

all stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles of one or more parties on celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of all other states parties to the treaty on a basis of reciprocity. The provision on access does not incorporate any right of power of veto. The words "on a basis of reciprocity" were the subject of a full analysis by Ambassador Goldberg in the statement of December 17, referred to above.

Article XIII provides that the treaty shall apply to outer space activities of states parties to the treaty whether such activities are carried out by a single state or jointly with other states, including cases where those activities are carried on within the framework of intergovernmental organizations. Provision is also made for resolving practical questions arising in connection with outer space activities of intergovernmental organizations.

The broad signature and accession clauses contained in article XIV specify that the treaty shall be open to all states for signature and that states which do not sign the treaty before its entry into force may accede to it. These provisions were adopted in view of the exceptional circumstances favoring a very wide geographical coverage for the treaty. Naturally, signature or accession by a regime which the United States does not recognize would not in any way alter the status of the regime so far as the United States is concerned. Under international law and practice, recognition of a government or of the existence of a state is effected by a deliberate decision and a course of conduct on the part of the government intending to accord recognition. Recognition of a regime or acknowledgment of an entity as a state cannot be inferred from the signature or ratification of a multilateral agreement, or from accession thereto.

The treaty is subject to ratification by signatory states and will come into force when instruments of ratification have been deposited by five governments, including the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Article XV permits any state party to the treaty to propose amendments to it and provides that those amendments shall enter into force for each state accepting them upon their acceptance by a majority of the states party to the treaty.

In accordance with article XVI any state may give notice of withdrawal from the treaty 1 year after its entry into force by written notification to the depositary governments. The withdrawal will take effect 1 year after the date of receipt of such notification.

Article XVII provides that the English, Russian, French, Spanish, and Chinese texts of the treaty are equally authentic and that the treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the three depositary governments, which shall transmit certified copies to the governments of the signatory and acceding states.

I consider the negotiation of this treaty to be a significant achievement. The treaty is an outstanding example of how the law and political arrangements can keep pace with science and technology.

We hope by this treaty to establish an open and rational regime for outer space which will permit the greatest benefit to be derived from man's exploits there. It is important that this be done now before

the vesting of any interest which could be a likely source of conflict. And we should act now to provide against the extension of the nuclear arms race to this new environment.

It is my sincere hope that the United States will promptly ratify the treaty.

Respectfully submitted.

DEAN RUSK.

**Statement by Foreign Minister Brandt to the Bundestag:  
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons [Extracts],  
February 1, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

*Question:* Dr. Schulze-Vorberg asks: Does the Federal Government share apprehensions that the nonproliferation treaty now being negotiated in Geneva might bring renunciations and restrictions also in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy for such countries that thus far do not possess nuclear weapons? What is the Federal Government going to do in order to avoid the apparent detrimental effects that the matter mentioned in the above question may have for German science and economy?

*Reply:* Mr. Deputy, the Federal Government is currently examining the status of efforts toward a nonproliferation treaty through an intensive exchange of views with its allies and through contacts with other non-nuclear states. At the present time most of these discussions are of a confidential nature. I will have another opportunity tomorrow to inform the foreign affairs committee of the Bundestag, in a confidential and private discussion, to which I attach great importance, of the current status of the efforts toward a nonproliferation treaty.

A special problem of the nonproliferation treaty, which—if it should come about—aims at preventing a proliferation of nuclear weapons, is the fact that a line must be drawn between the use of nuclear energy for military and for civilian purposes. I may mention in this connection the problem of nuclear explosions for such peaceful purposes as the building of canals and dams and of caverns for the exploitation of natural gas and other raw material deposits. At the meeting in Geneva in August of last year of the 18 Nation Disarmament Conference, the American delegate, Adrian Fisher, made noteworthy statements about this problem. As it is not possible, he said, to distinguish between nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes and nuclear explosives for military purposes, and as nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes could easily be reconstructed into nuclear weapons, it would be necessary to prohibit the production of all nuclear explosives irrespective of their purpose.<sup>2</sup> Since the nonproliferation treaty, with provisions for revision, probably will be concluded for an unlimited period of time, such a prohibition would probably result,

<sup>1</sup> Department of State files.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 525-528.

at least in the long run, in a considerable impairment of the civilian nuclear industry of the non-nuclear countries, and this would be especially true if the prohibited provisions were to cover the respective technology, too.

Apart from the question of the ban, the question remains to be answered whether and to what extent a renunciation of the military utilization of nuclear energy may unduly restrict civilian activity in the nuclear field. The more general the nonproliferation treaty is formulated, the greater will be the danger of undue restrictions under the pretext that a certain research project or certain industrial activity in the nuclear field might also be used for military purposes, if only in a preparatory or indirect way. . . .

In fact, Mr. Deputy, this government and others are also seeking to insure that the nonproliferation treaty does not further widen the already existing technological gap between the nuclear powers and the non-nuclear countries. The nuclear powers have been able in the past to draw from military nuclear programs considerable benefit for the civilian sphere of nuclear research. It is a decisive question how negative repercussions of the nonproliferation treaty on the civilian sphere of nuclear research can be prevented.

We are seeking adequate solutions in cooperation with allied and other friendly powers. . . .

As far as question 5 (second half of Schulze-Vorberg's question) is concerned, I should like to make the following reply: The Federal Government is making efforts in the different ways at its disposal to insure that the nonproliferation treaty is concentrated on its essential purpose, that is, on the prevention of a proliferation of nuclear weapons. The peaceful utilization of nuclear energy should not be unduly hampered by the treaty but wider possibilities should be opened to it.

As far as nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes are concerned, the offer of the United States to undertake such explosions for non-nuclear countries under adequate security provisions is of great interest. An international solution might also be considered, for example by entrusting an international agency with such a project. Finally, the non-nuclear countries must insist on the inclusion of provisions enabling them, under appropriate conditions, to participate in the experience and know-how gained by the nuclear powers from military work with nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

*Question:* Deputy Dr. Schulze-Vorberg asks whether the non-proliferation treaty has anything to do with disarmament or arms control since the nuclear powers are not willing to accept any restriction of their own nuclear armament.

*Reply:* Mr. Deputy, I can't accept this in this way. I have the impression that the two powers have not yet concluded their discussion of the subject to which your question refers. After having reached an agreement, they would report it to Geneva, that is, to the other 15 countries participating in the Geneva deliberations and present their draft. There are 2 plus 15 countries; France is not taking part. The matter at issue is the problem of control. The question whether and how the interconnection between nonproliferation and arms control, between arms limitation and disarmament is to be made plain would

not yet be answered, if a draft of the two major nuclear powers did not deal with this matter. For there would be no doubt then—as we know from the consultations we have had so far—that this question would play a decisive role, be it in the discussion of a preamble, be it in a discussion of a “declaration of intent” of the powers submitting the draft or of the powers that are to approve it.

*Question:* Deputy Dr. Schulze-Vorberg asks whether reports are correct that the non-nuclear countries are to be prohibited even from setting up such nuclear systems of their own that are exclusively designed for defense for warding off nuclear attacks.

*Reply:* I think it is in the interest of the matter at hand—and I ask you to appreciate my position—that I refrain from anticipating here the discussions in the Federal Defense Council and the subsequent discussions in the responsible Bundestag committee. (*The government parties applauded.*)

*Question:* Deputy Dr. Schulze-Vorberg asks for the Federal Government's evaluation of the fact that the USSR is setting up an anti-ICBM system, or has already done so as Marshal Malinovsky has repeatedly declared in speeches, and that the US is considering this question while Western Europe is unprotected and is to remain unprotected if the available reports are correct.

*Reply:* Mr. Deputy, I depend upon very incomplete reports about the anti-rocket system about which you are thinking. However even if we must rely on such sources of information as are generally available, we have all been in a position to read what the President of the United States said about this subject and what his defense minister said about it.<sup>3</sup> Everyone must feel what it would mean if this were to become the starting point for a second wave of the arms race between the world powers. I do not doubt that this aspect could have repercussions upon the discussion and our opinion about a treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

*Question:* Deputy Dr. Schulze-Vorberg (CDU/CSU) asks whether the Federal Government has discussed the feared disadvantages of the treaty with German scientists and economists, and whether it has taken into account similar concerns in other countries, especially in Sweden and Switzerland.

*Reply:* Yes, it has.

*Question:* Deputy Dr. Kliesing (CDU/CSU) asks whether the Federal Government would be willing to indicate that it would be highly desirable to accompany the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty by supplementing the nuclear test-ban agreement to the effect that it will also prohibit underground tests, since such tests with relatively small quantities of fissionable material are well suited to widen further the technological gap.

*Reply:* Mr. Deputy, we are aware of this interconnection, and since Deputy Schulze-Vorberg has just referred to Sweden, I may

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, pp. 5-24.

point out that in our consultations with countries not belonging to the alliance from our point of view, as for example with Sweden, we very carefully dealt with this problem to which you are referring. In the course of these conversations this interconnection was pointed out to us even more strongly than we, or some of us, had realized before.

*Question:* Deputy Dr. Martin (CDU, CSU) asks whether a serious scientific cooperation with France will still be possible after the signing of the non-proliferation treaty, which asserts that one can neither transfer nor receive and one cannot differentiate between military and civil development in science.

*Reply:* Mr. Deputy, permit me to make a few things even more plain, and what I say now also refers to the replies I have already given. It would be a mistake to act as if a treaty already existed and as if there were no possibility of disagreeing at the point where vital interests of the concerned powers are involved. We must see to this. In the light of the discussions we have so far had, and in the light of the interpretations given us by the major power of the Western camp, I believe that there is no foundation for such fears as were voiced here.

*Question:* Deputy Moersch (FDP) asks whether the production of plutonium in Germany would not be hindered. In other words, the production of energy, and what consequences might result from the fact that one of the Euratom powers did not sign the nonproliferation treaty.

*Reply:* Your question contains two questions. As far as the first part of your question is concerned, I must say that from studying the available reports on the nonproliferation treaty, I know nothing that would have the effect of hampering such production. The second part of the question concerns future controls in the field of civilian work with nuclear energy. Within the framework of Euratom, we have a very effective system in this respect. The interesting question will be, though, what new system will be introduced and what the relationship between one and the other will be. This question will concern us even more than the internal situation within Euratom between one power disposing of nuclear weapons and the others.

*Question:* Deputy Moersch asks whether Brandt is of the opinion that a German signature under the nonproliferation treaty is less problematical because we have in the form of Euratom a supra-national connection for the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

*Reply:* Mr. Deputy, permit me to say that I don't consider a discussion of our signing or not signing the treaty to be very helpful for our cause. In the last few days I read a report to the effect that a member of this distinguished House whom I hold in great esteem said that Germany would be unconditionally in favor of a nonproliferation treaty. Well, I do not go along with this (*the government parties applaud*). I have to know what's in it (*more applause from the government parties*). In any case, I would argue that the government support a nonproliferation treaty that does not discriminate against us (*Very good. the center of the House*) and that does not expect the non-nuclear countries to accept a further widening of the tech-

nological gap between them and the world powers in the fields mentioned earlier in this discussion. (*Very good! in the center of the House.*) This is not all, but I think this is a decisive point. (*Applause from the government parties.*)

*Question:* Deputy Schultz (FDP) asks whether the federal government knows to what extent the development of the French nuclear force has contributed to France's making good the technological, scientific, and economic gap in comparison with the nuclear powers.

*Reply:* I can't say to what extent this is the case. In this respect, Mr. Deputy, I must rely on the judgement of people who know more about this than I do. But even if the assumption involved in your question were true, we would not directly profit from it since we could not arrive at the conclusion—which would also not be in keeping with the guidelines of the policy of this government—that Germany ought to aspire to work with nuclear energy in the military field. But as I said before, Mr. Deputy, with respect to this important branch of science, I as a layman have not the slightest doubt that the countries doing military work with nuclear energy profit from it in the civilian fields too.

This is true for the world powers, and this is also true of our French neighbor. This is why, if a nonproliferation treaty is concluded and if the present situation with respect to nuclear weapons should be fixed, the question will have to be considered whether and how non-nuclear powers will be able to acquire from nuclear powers know-how and licenses under appropriate conditions. This would not be all that new, this would not be a completely new "discovery" as there already exist some examples in the field of space research.

*Question:* Dr. Woerner (CDU/CSU) asks whether it would not be illusory to expect the big nuclear powers to agree to such arrangements.

*Reply:* Mr. Deputy, with all respect for your question: You expect too much of me if you are expecting me to declare myself an illusionist by giving you an affirmative reply (*laughter*). I must admit, though, that this very question has already come up when we discussed the matter with the representatives of other governments. I would not say "unrealistic". I would say instead that it is difficult and that it also is a challenge because it is a matter of vital importance for such industrial countries as the FRG. This problem must be solved; its solution is of infinite importance to our industrial future (*Applause from the SPD*).

*Question:* Dr. Mommer (SPD) asks whether the Federal Government supports efforts to convene in the near future a conference of non-nuclear countries in order to discuss the common security and technological interests of these countries.

*Reply:* Mr. Deputy, I don't have the impression that such a conference can be convened in the immediate future, if it can be convened at all, and that it will be in a position to exercise real influence upon the process that will possibly begin in Geneva in the second half of

February. It is for this reason that I prefer the procedure that we, as well as others, have adopted, in that we discuss various important questions brought up by the treaty with those governments that are in a similar situation. This is true for some major principles, this is true for some questions within the Atlantic alliance, and this is likewise true for some questions in the European field. I think that by following this procedure we will get further than by fixing our attention on a conference now. Moreover, we all know that from a procedural point of view, we are at a disadvantage since we are not a member of the United Nations and could exercise only a limited influence upon the procedure if such a conference came about.

*Question:* Deputy Dr. Diemer-Nicolaus (FDP) referring to Brandt's earlier remark that the nonproliferation treaty must not discriminate against Germany, wants to know at what point Brandt would say that discrimination existed.

*Reply:* Mrs. Deputy, I am very grateful to you for this additional question as it offers me an opportunity to say once again that I do not wish only that Germany not be discriminated against: I also wish that the legitimate interests of all states are protected (*applause from the government parties*) and I wish that the non-nuclear countries not be discriminated against with respect to the nuclear powers, as for example in the technological field that was discussed here.

*Question:* Deputy Dr. Diemer-Nicolaus asks what Brandt understands by discrimination. (*Oh! from the government parties.*)

*Reply:* I think that I have already given some indications in my discussion of this point (*applause from the government parties*). I will say it quite openly now that even what we have just discussed would be objectively a discrimination: If some powers—I say it quite consciously—were to begin now to monopolize technological progress by using for their own civilian production alone what they learned from their military work with nuclear energy. (*Applause from the government parties.*)

*Question:* Deputy Ertl (FDP) wants to know whether Brandt is in agreement with the French government regarding possible accession to a future nuclear test-ban treaty (*laughter*).

*Reply:* I think it would be more appropriate to say that this question must be considered as a matter that has so far been excluded.

*Question:* Deputy Ertl asks whether Brandt considers the recent Paris talks so successful because such problems were excluded.

*Reply:* By no means! I think the French side is familiar with our views and appreciates them.

*Question:* Deputy Scheel (FDP) wants to know whether Brandt by limiting his discussion of the discrimination problem to the civilian sector has changed his view toward possible participation of the Federal Republic in an international solution in the nuclear arms field.

*Reply:* Mr. Deputy, the discussion of this matter in today's question time started from the civilian side of the matter, and I think this was very sensible. I think that the defense aspects of this problem should first be discussed on other levels, in the cabinet and on the parliamentary level. In this process, the result does not have to be a mere repetition of all previously stated positions. (*Applause from the SPD.*)

**Statement by Dr. John S. Foster to the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Antiballistic Missile Systems, February 6, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

I am pleased to be here today. I understand that you have requested a discussion of the technical status of the U.S. ballistic missile defense program.

In discussing the general subject, let me first say that every system we have ever seriously considered for deployment involves the use of radars to detect and track the incoming targets, and the use of these same or different radars to guide ground-to-air interceptor missiles to the vicinity of the targets. There a command from the ground causes the interceptor warhead to detonate and destroy the target. It is clear that such a defense system does not provide a shield which makes a nation impervious to attack, since the interceptors can always be avoided or outnumbered—provided always that the enemy is willing to pay the price in decreased fatalities or increased cost to his offensive effort.

In reviewing the history of ballistic missile defense over the past 10 years, it seems there has always been controversy over its value or lack of value. Of course, if the defense had been a true shield, there would have been no controversy, and we would have made a deployment decision long ago.

The first controversy arose around the question, "Could a bullet hit a bullet?" This phase passed, first when calculations showed the feasibility of such an intercept and later and most definitely when successful intercepts of actual ICBM targets fired from Vandenberg Air Force Base were accomplished by the old Nike-Zeus system in 1962-63. We had 10 out of 14 successful intercepts.

After this "simple" problem was solved, it was realized that the offense would replace the relatively easy-to-intercept single warhead with clouds of objects, or take other deceptive measures. Examples of these objects were decoys designed to look like warheads to the radar, and chaff designed to conceal the warhead in a cloud of light objects. Against those more sophisticated targets there was a necessity for the defense to discriminate among them so as to know which objects to take under fire. Hence many objects might have to be tracked and observed simultaneously. Also, it might be necessary for the defense to wait for atmospheric reentry of the targets and rely on slowdown and burnup of

<sup>1</sup> *Status of the Development of the Antiballistic Missile Systems in the United States* (S. Com. print, 90th Cong., 1st sess.).

the lighter objects before this discrimination could be accomplished.

The old Nike-Zeus system, when confronted with these more sophisticated targets, had two fatal defects. One was that it used what are now considered to be old-fashioned mechanical radars, which had to be mechanically slewed or pointed at each target in turn—a matter of seconds. One practically had to have a radar for each target. And the Zeus missile could not be delayed in firing until atmospheric reentry of the targets took place, because it was too slow. Hence discrimination could not be aided by atmospheric filtering.

Because of these defects the Nike X concept was born. First, the mechanical radars of Nike-Zeus were replaced by phased array radars, which by varying the electrical phase of the power over the face of a fixed antenna array could change the direction of the radar beam in a matter of microseconds. This imparted a capability of tracking many objects simultaneously, and thus removed one of the Zeus defects. Second, a very high-performance, short-range-interceptor missile, the Sprint, was introduced. It was smaller, cheaper, and had much higher acceleration than Zeus, and thus could afford to wait until reentry of the targets before being committed to fire. Atmospheric filtering was now feasible and the remaining targets could be attacked with the high firepower Sprints.

The old Zeus interceptor was retained in the system for long-range attacks on simple targets. We now had two interceptors—the Zeus and the Sprint.

The Nike X development, initiated in 1963, was thus much more effective than the old Zeus system. It must be noted, however, that it was essentially a "terminal defense" system. The Sprint could only defend cities or selected sites. Hence, since it is obviously impractical to deploy terminal defenses at every small city or village in the United States, it was subject to bypass attack. An enemy could always target the undefended cities and obtain high casualties. This option was available even to unsophisticated opponents. The sophisticated opponent, by concentrating his firepower, could overwhelm the defense at any selected defended site. The value of ballistic missile defense was therefore questioned.

The next important development in defense effectiveness came with the introduction of "area defense" in the period 1964-65. I would like to define the term "area defense."

The detection sensor is the perimeter acquisition radar (PAR) which detects ballistic missiles at long ranges. The PAR radar tracks the incoming missile and predicts its future path. To intercept the incoming missile, we employ the Spartan missile which is a long-range interceptor developed from the old Nike-Zeus. Once the PAR radar has predicted the future path of the missile a Spartan missile is fired so as to intercept it. This interceptor intercepts the incoming missile well above the atmosphere. Because of its long range the Spartan can intercept incoming missiles directed at targets several hundred miles from the Spartan battery location. The Spartan missile is guided by a missile site radar (MSR) which is associated with each battery.

With the introduction of Spartan, the Zeus interceptor was no longer required—in effect, the Spartan replaced the Zeus.

Comparatively few Spartan batteries can defend the whole United States from simple attacks.

You will note I said "simple attacks." It is still possible for a sophisticated opponent to confuse the defense and make the firepower demands on Spartan too high. In this case, terminal defense Sprints must be relied upon if we are to furnish a defense. The Spartan thus functions in two ways. It can provide a very effective defense over extended areas against simple threats. Against not so simple threats, it provides a defense in depth and is complementary to Sprint. In any case it forces the enemy, if he wishes to penetrate, to pay the price demanded by a sophisticated penetration aids program.

You will note that I have described a flexible set of building blocks consisting of PAR and MSR radars and two types of interceptor missiles, Spartan and Sprint. We also have a very large, sophisticated radar called TACMAR, designed specifically against sophisticated attacks. They can be put together in various ways to provide varying levels of defense against different threats.

For example, if we wished to defend the United States against a large Soviet attack, we would provide an overlay of an area defense such as I have described. As I mentioned earlier, however, it would be necessary to depend primarily on terminal Sprint defense, including TACMARs, at selected cities. A selected city defense (including the area component) would cost about \$10 or \$20 billion depending on the number of cities defended.

As a matter of technical judgment, I believe that these larger deployments carry with them technical risks. The likelihood of large and sophisticated attacks with the deployment of significant U.S. defenses increases the technical uncertainty of the defensive system. Even with an ABM deployment we would have to expect that in an all-out exchange, dozens of their warheads would likely explode in our cities.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that sums up the technical assessment of ballistic-missile defense. It has changed greatly in recent years and no doubt will continue to change. That is why, even in the absence of a deployment decision, a high-priority research and development program is so necessary.

### Message From President Johnson to the Senate on the Outer-Space Treaty, February 7, 1967<sup>1</sup>

I am today transmitting to the Senate, for your advice and consent, the first Treaty on Outer Space.<sup>2</sup>

The provisions of this treaty reflect the will and desire of the signatory states, already numbering more than half the nations of the world, that the realms of space should forever remain realms of peace.

The privilege of transmitting this milestone agreement to you before the end of the first decade of space exploration is especially gratifying for me.

<sup>1</sup> *Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings*, pp. 105-108.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 38-43.

Only 10 years ago, as a Senator, I chaired the first congressional hearings called to determine what response our national policy should make to the challenges of the exploration of outer space. The hearings and the events of those times seem now a world away for us all. Yet I remember—as I know you do—the climate of great awe and greater anxiety in which Senators addressed themselves to their responsibilities. At that time—

No American satellite had yet been orbited.

The readiness of our rockets was much in question.

There was no NASA, no vast complex at what is now Cape Kennedy, no manned spaceflight center at Houston. The very word, "astronaut," was not in our vocabulary.

Men questioned the capacity of our educational system to yield up the incalculably valuable resource of minds trained for the great tasks of the space age.

The stature of our advanced technology and our ability to participate as leaders in the explorations of the universe was far from being established with certainty.

In that uncertain climate, our concerns about space were quite different from now. We were rightly concerned for the safety of our Nation and for the survival of humankind. We directed our concern to the organization of our society and to the priority of our values as freemen.

In November 1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower asked me to appear before the United Nations to present the U.S. resolution urging that the exploration of outer space be undertaken for peaceful purposes, as an enterprise of international cooperation among all member nations.

On that occasion, speaking for the United States, I said :

Today, outer space is free. It is unscarred by conflict. No nation holds a concession there. It must remain this way. We of the United States do not acknowledge that there are landlords of outer space who can presume to bargain with the nations of the Earth on the price of access to this domain. We must not—and we need not—corrupt this great opportunity by bringing to it the very antagonisms which we may, by courage, overcome and leave behind forever if we proceed with this joint adventure into this new realm.

We know the gains of cooperation. We know the losses of the failure to cooperate. If we fail now to apply the lessons we have learned, or even if we delay their application, we know that the advances into space may only mean adding a new dimension to warfare. If, however, we proceed along the orderly course of full cooperation we shall, by the very fact of cooperation, make the most substantial contribution toward perfecting peace.

Men who have worked together to reach the stars are not likely to descend together into the depths of war and desolation.<sup>3</sup>

I believe those words remain valid today.

The "very fact of cooperation" in the evolution of this treaty is to be taken as a "substantial contribution toward perfecting peace." As long ago as 1958, President Eisenhower initiated an exchange of letters with the leadership of the Soviet Union, seeking agreements binding the uses of outer space to peaceful purposes.<sup>4</sup> President Kennedy repeatedly reaffirmed our willingness to cooperate toward these ends.

<sup>3</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, Dec. 15, 1958, p. 977-979.

<sup>4</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. 11, pp. 938-939, 973-977, 984-985, 1001-1002, 1006-1007.

In October 1963, the General Assembly of the United Nations called on nations of the world not to station nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction in outer space.<sup>5</sup> Two months later the Assembly adopted a declaration of legal principles to govern activities in space.<sup>6</sup> On May 7, last year, I repeated,<sup>7</sup> and Ambassador Goldberg reiterated many times thereafter, our view of the urgency of doing all that we could to assure that exploration of outer space would take place in peace, for peaceful ends.

In July 1966, negotiations on the treaty were formally begun at Geneva in the 28-member United Nations Outer Space Committee. Accord was subsequently reached at renewed negotiations in New York. The treaty was unanimously endorsed by the 21st session of the General Assembly just over a month ago.<sup>8</sup>

On January 27, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, was opened for signature in Washington, London, and Moscow. The United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union were among the 60 countries signing the treaty in Washington. Other nations are expected to add their signatures in the near future.

The climate in which such accord has been reached is clearly an encouraging omen for continuing in other realms our constant quest for understandings that will strengthen the chances for peace.

In the diplomacy of space, as in the technology of space, it is essential always that interim achievements not be mistaken for final success. This treaty I transmit to the Senate today is such an interim achievement—a significant, but not a final step forward.

It carries forward the thrust of the past decade to enlarge the perimeters of peace by shrinking the arenas of potential conflict. This is a thrust to which the Senate has given its support by ratifying the four Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea in 1958,<sup>9</sup> the Antarctic Treaty of 1959,<sup>10</sup> and the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.<sup>11</sup>

As we have dealt with the sea, the atmosphere and the vast unpopulated continent of Antarctica, now in this treaty we extend reason to the activities of nations in the endless realm of outer space.

The treaty lays down fundamental principles:

No nation can claim sovereignty to outer space, to the moon or to other celestial bodies.

All nations have the right to conduct space activities.

No one may use outer space or celestial bodies to begin a war. The rules of the United Nations Charter apply to space activities.

No country may station in space or orbit around the earth nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, p. 528.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 644-646.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 275-276.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 809 ff.

<sup>9</sup> Conventions on the high seas (13 UST 2312), continental shelf (15 UST 471), territorial seas and contiguous zone (15 UST 1606), and fishery and conservation of the living resources of the high seas (17 UST 138).

<sup>10</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 1550-1556.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 201-203.

No country may install such weapons on a celestial body.

No nation may establish military bases, installations or fortifications, on a celestial body. Nor may any weapons be tested or military maneuvers be conducted there. The right to visit another country's installations and space vehicles on a celestial body is guaranteed.

Astronauts are "envoys of mankind." If an astronaut lands on another country's soil, he must be returned safely, promptly, and unconditionally.

Space activities and their results are to be reported for the benefit of all.

Each country is to avoid harmfully contaminating outer space and adversely changing the environment of the earth by introducing extra-terrestrial matter.

These and other provisions of the treaty are described in detail in the accompanying report of the Secretary of State.

Space exploration has become an intimate part of our lives. The exploits of men and machines in outer space excite and thrill us all. The valiant young men who have become symbolic of our national effort as astronauts are close to every American family. The deaths in line of duty of Lt. Col. Virgil Grissom, Lt. Col. Edward White, and Lt. Comdr. Roger Chaffee touched every American home and heart.

Yet, we must remember that these are only primitive years in the epoch of space exploration and utilization—an epoch that will run to the end of time. In the next decade and in all the decades to come, the capabilities of nations in space will multiply far beyond our comprehension today. If we should flag or falter in our support of this great extension of human knowledge, the concern and anxiety we felt so keenly a decade ago would be known again to other Americans in future times.

When we ask what this Nation or any nation expects to find from exploration in space, the answer is one word: "knowledge"—knowledge we shall need to maintain earth as a habitable environment for man.

The resources of this planet are already taxed to support human existence. Now and even more each day, as the family of man increases so rapidly, fertile soil, clear water, clean air, and a safe atmosphere all become more precious to men and nations than the metals and jewels of ages past.

The quest for gold and silver, and diamonds and rubies, once led men to explore the earth seeking enrichment for themselves and their nations. So now the realities of this and future ages require that nations pursue together the exploration of space within this galaxy, seeking new knowledge and new capabilities to enrich the life of all mankind.

The future leaves no option. Responsible men must push forward in the exploration of space, near and far. Their voyages must be made in peace for purposes of peace on earth. This treaty is a step—a first step, but a long step—toward assuring the peace essential for the longer journey.

I strongly recommend—in appropriate commemoration of the Senate's own role in charting the course that the world now seems willing

to follow—that the Senate act promptly in giving consent to the ratification of this treaty. I hope that I may be able to affirm as President of the United States, what I said as a Senator to the United Nations in 1958:

On the goal of dedicating outer space to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind, there are no differences within our Government, between our parties, or among our people.<sup>12</sup>

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

### Remarks by Premier Kosygin at London News Conference [Extract], February 9, 1967<sup>1</sup>

*Representative of the British Institute of Strategic Research:* Do you not share the opinion that the development of the Soviet anti-missile defense system is a new step in the arms race?

*UPI correspondent:* Do you consider it possible to agree on a moratorium on the development of antimissile defense systems and, if so, on what conditions?

*A. N. Kosygin:* This is an important question in the military sphere. I should not like to answer it directly, but want in turn to ask the person who submitted this question—I understand that he represents the British Institute of Strategic Research—the following: Which weapons should be regarded as a tension factor—offensive or defensive weapons? I think that a defensive system, which prevents attack, is not a cause of the arms race but represents a factor preventing the death of people. Some persons reason thus: Which is cheaper, to have offensive weapons that can destroy cities and entire states or to have defensive weapons that can prevent this destruction? At present the theory is current in some places that one should develop whichever system is cheaper. Such “theoreticians” argue also about how much it costs to kill a person, \$500,000 or \$100,000. An antimissile system may cost more than an offensive one, but it is intended not for killing people but for saving human lives. I understand that I am not answering the question that was put to me, but you can draw appropriate conclusions yourselves.

There are other, far more dependable, ways of solving the security problem, ways that really could suit mankind. You know that we advocate discontinuing nuclear arming altogether and destroying reserves of nuclear weapons. We are ready for this, and not because we have few such weapons, but precisely because we have many, and mankind does not need nuclear weapons. And if the representatives of the press, those who influence the minds of people, treated this question along such lines, it seems to me that there would be far greater results than from talk about which weaponry is cheaper, offensive or de-

<sup>12</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, Dec. 15, 1958, p. 977.

<sup>1</sup> *Pravda*, Feb. 11, 1967, pp. 1, 3; *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XIX, No. 6 (Mar. 1, 1967), pp. 3-4.

fensive. The best thing is to seek renunciation of nuclear armament and the destruction of nuclear weapons.

*Correspondent of West German magazine Der Spiegel:* First, is the signing of a treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons expected in the near future and, second, is the position of the F.R.G. an important factor in this connection?

*A. N. Kosygin:* We stand for nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and firmly hold that the time has come when the further spread of such weapons must be banned. We take this position not because we fear the appearance of new competitors in this sphere. We consider that nuclear weapons are undesirable for mankind if it wishes to go on existing. The course of the discussion of the question of nonproliferation indicates that there is a possibility of attaining its solution soon. As for the F.R.G., I must say that it will have to join the agreement on nonproliferation, whether it wants to or not. We will not allow the F.R.G. to have nuclear weapons and will take all measures to prevent it from obtaining the possibility of possessing these weapons. We say this with full determination.

*Representative of the Bern Newspaper Der Bund and the West German Rheinischer Merkur:* What actions of the West German government would be considered concrete and positive proof of Bonn's sincere striving for peace and European security?

*A. N. Kosygin:* We proceed from the fact that the results of the second world war cannot be reviewed. An end must be put to the ideas of revanchism once and for all. I would put it this way in Russian: These ideas must be buried and the stake must be driven through their grave. An attempt to carry out the ideas of revanchism would mean war. This is well known to all the European countries, including the F.R.G. itself. There will be no revision of the frontiers that were formed in Europe after the second world war. Therefore it is easy to understand what contribution the F.R.G. could make to the cause of strengthening peace and European security. The ruling circles of this country must renounce revanchist ideas once and for all, they must forget the thought that these ideas might be carried out. They must renounce the thought that West Germany will ever obtain nuclear weapons. It will not get them. In the F.R.G. they must realize that the frontiers existing in Europe are inviolable. A realistic stand by the F.R.G. on these questions would be a big contribution to the relaxation of tension in Europe, and not only in Europe, but all over the world. We are confident that the F.R.G. sooner or later will have to recognize the real situation in Europe. There is no getting away from this.

### News Conference Remarks by Secretary of State Rusk [Extract], February 9, 1967<sup>1</sup>

*Q. Mr. Secretary, may I change the subject for a minute? Did the visit of Minister Brandt eliminate some of the differences which*

<sup>1</sup> Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 27, 1967, pp. 320-321.

*apparently exist between the two countries on the interpretation of the nonproliferation treaty?*

A. Well, I very much welcomed the visit of the Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic. Mr. Brandt and I have met each other many times before, but this was my second meeting with him in his new capacity; and, as you would suppose, when the two of us get together, we range pretty widely over a good many subjects of international importance.

I think it will be possible to meet some of the particular points that have been raised in the Federal Republic on the nonproliferation treaty. For example, on the industrial impact of a nonproliferation treaty, the fact is that the nonproliferation treaty has nothing to do whatever with the use of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes, and that includes a wide range of industrial application. The actual industrial spin-off from so-called weaponry, that is, those items which are limited to the gadgetry of weapons, is very small, indeed, infinitesimal. And I think exchanges on the technical level will clarify that point.

But it was a legitimate point to raise, and I hope that further exchanges will clarify it to everybody's satisfaction.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in his news conference this morning, Premier Kosygin defended—apparently defended—the Soviet construction of an ABM system.<sup>2</sup> I wondered what you thought of this, in the light of efforts on our side to get a freeze?*

A. Well, I think that we might note that Prime Minister Kosygin referred both to offensive and defensive weapons in his press conference.

We have placed before the Geneva conference, some time ago, proposals for a freeze in both these fields.<sup>3</sup> And we are prepared to discuss both offensive and defensive weapons with the Soviet Union.

I would not myself interpret what he said this morning as their last word on this subject.

### Television Interview With Secretary of State Rusk [Extracts], February 10, 1967<sup>1</sup>

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if—should the nonproliferation treaty be controlled by EURATOM, or by the international agency in Vienna? In*

<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 8, 17–21, 157–162, 367–373; *ibid.*, 1965, pp. 172, 435; *ibid.*, 1966, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, Mar. 6, 1967, pp. 300–302. The interview was videotaped in Washington on Feb. 10 and broadcast on German television on Feb. 12.

*February 1966 you said before a Senate committee that both systems are equivalent and effective.<sup>2</sup> Is that still your opinion?*

A. Well, this is a troublesome question, because if a nonproliferation treaty becomes general throughout the world, there may be a good many who would sign that treaty who would not be completely happy about relying upon the safeguards which EURATOM has adopted internally. Further than that, there could be other groupings in other parts of the world who might wish to put together a little family group which would inspect itself and deny outside inspection on the grounds that it is up to each regional group to provide its own inspection.

Now, this suggests to some of us that the IAEA in Vienna might be able to work out arrangements with national governments as well as groups so that there could be general assurances to all of those who signed the treaty that the activities are in fact peaceful and that weapons are not being made within those limitations.

I have no doubt at all that the safeguards in EURATOM insure that the activities of EURATOM will not be abused. I have no problem about that myself.

The problem is, How do you persuade 120 other nations that that is the case? We have not found an answer to this question yet.

*Q. The Minister for all German Affairs, Mr. Herbert Wehner, has suggested that a four-power conference could discuss the relations between the parts of Germany. Do you consider this a possibility?*

A. Well, I believe that other ministers have also commented on that particular problem. There is now no active proposal before the four governments that there be a four-power conference.

I think that one would want to consider what a conference would accomplish, whether there was a reasonable chance that it could succeed, and whether there might not be certain dangers in calling a four-power conference which could not agree.

We are perfectly prepared to examine this question, but it is not my impression that we are moving very rapidly toward a four-power conference at the moment.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if the United States and the Soviet Union were to agree about the armaments race in connection with an antiballistic-missiles system, which security would then be offered European states?*

A. Well, it is a little hard to answer the second part of your question, because we are a long way yet from the first part of your question.

The essential problem is that if both sides go down the path of establishing a network of defensive antiballistic missiles and then necessarily multiply their offensive missiles for the purpose of saturating those defensive missiles, then we have an arms race which lifts us all into new plateaus of expenditure—tens upon tens of billions of dollars on both sides—with no great change in the underlying strategic situation.

<sup>2</sup> Documents on Disarmament, 1965, p. 47.

So we would hope that ways and means could be found to bring this under control.

Whatever the possibilities are, you can be sure that we will be in very close consultation with our allies on this problem, because we understand fully that our allies have a big interest in it, too.

*Q. In Bonn there is much question of an opening toward the East. Does that mean that, in connection with an atom-free zone in Central Europe, the Rapacki Plan<sup>3</sup> could become actual again?*

A. Well, this plan, this type of plan, has had a very important difficulty in it from the very beginning.

One could imagine that the continent of South America could be atom free in the sense that there would be no nuclear weapons there and South America might not then become the target of nuclear weapons. In other words, it might be removed from the military aspects of nuclear war.

But Central Europe is the target of many nuclear weapons and would remain the target of nuclear weapons so long, for example, as the Soviet Union has MRBM's and IRBM's in its own territory aimed at Central Europe.

Technology has made a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe very difficult to imagine. I would suppose that in that respect the solution lies in the general field of the reduction of nuclear weapons themselves, because in these East-West relations that is crucial. And we would hope that we could make some progress toward the reduction of nuclear weapons. But a nuclear-free zone is not really nuclear free if in fact it is the bull's-eye of hundreds of nuclear weapons.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, President Johnson said on 7 October in New York<sup>4</sup> that there is a considerable change in the U.S. policy concerning the reunification of Germany, which would come at the end of a long process of détente. Do you consider that it is really an important change in United States policies?*

A. Well, I am not at all sure that he designated that as a change at the time that he made his speech.

I think we have had now 20 years of rather harsh confrontation between East and West Europe. And during those 20 years we have not moved one inch toward the reunification of Germany. I think one of the reasons for that is that an attempt to solve that problem by force would mean general war and probably general nuclear war.

So the question arises as to whether the German people might not strengthen their ties and move perceptibly closer to the possibilities of reunification if the general relations between Western Europe and Eastern Europe were improved.

I would think that it is worth finding out, because we know that 20 years of harsh confrontation has not solved the problem. So let's find out.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 1962, vol. I, pp. 201-205.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 649-655.

**Statement by the United States Observer (Freeman) to the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, February 13, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

The United States Government has followed with interest the deliberations of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, particularly with respect to the question of peaceful nuclear explosions.

It is our understanding of the text of the treaty that, based on present and foreseeable technology, contracting parties are prohibited from acquiring nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes, as well as devices identified as nuclear weapons. This follows from the provisions of articles 1 and 5 of the treaty.

We understand article 18 to permit the carrying out of peaceful nuclear explosions by contracting parties themselves only if and when future advances in technology permit the development of devices for peaceful explosions which are not susceptible of use for weapons purposes. This is shown by the concluding proviso in paragraph 1 of article 18.

However, we understand article 18 permits, as of the present time, the carrying out of peaceful nuclear explosions through appropriate international arrangements with countries now possessing nuclear explosive devices. This is shown by paragraph 4 of article 18.

The foregoing understanding of the effect of the treaty is fundamental to the United States Government's position concerning it. The United States considers the conclusion of this first international instrument establishing a nuclear free zone to be an event of unique significance, and the U.S. will study the detailed provisions of the treaty with great interest. We hope that the treaty will constitute a milestone on the road to general and complete disarmament and in particular that it will lead in the near future to the conclusion of a worldwide treaty prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We therefore wish to extend to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the representatives of the nations participating in the Preparatory Commission, the congratulations of the United States Government on the achievement of the treaty.

In view of the restrictions that the members of the Preparatory Commission have agreed to accept on the development of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes—and which we hope other non-nuclear-weapon countries will eventually also accept—the United States believes that at such time as nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes may become technologically feasible and economically practical, their possible benefits should be made available on an equitable basis to all countries, regardless of the stage of their technological achievement. Appropriate international arrangements to this end will, of course, have to be considered in a wider context than the Preparatory Commission affords.

<sup>1</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, Mar. 13, 1967, pp. 436-437. The statement was submitted to the Chairman of the Commission and read at a plenary meeting of Feb. 13. The treaty is printed *infra*.

## Joint Communiqué by Premier Kosygin and Prime Minister Wilson [Extracts], February 13, 1967<sup>1</sup>

At the invitation of Her Majesty's Government, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. A. N. Kosygin, made an official visit to the United Kingdom from 6 to 13 February, 1967. Mr. Kosygin was accompanied by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, Mr. C. D. Djavakhishvili, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, Mr. V. I. Klauson, and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Mr. A. A. Soldatov.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. had talks with the Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. George Brown, and other British Ministers. Taking part in these talks were those accompanying Mr. Kosygin and the Ambassador of the U.S.S.R. in the United Kingdom, Mr. M. N. Smirnovsky.

The discussions included a detailed exchange of views on major international questions and on the further development of Anglo-Soviet relations.

### *Section I*

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the British Prime Minister reviewed the present international situation and expressed the views of their governments about possible ways of erasing international tension. The two sides recognized a common interest in the peaceful settlement of outstanding international problems. They declared their conviction that states with different social systems can and must cooperate in peace, observing the principles of independence and national sovereignty, equality, and non-interference in the internal affairs of others, and renouncing the use or threat of force in settling disputes between states.

Particular attention was paid to Europe. The two sides agreed that the strengthening of peace and security in Europe was of prime importance to the peoples of both countries and to world peace. They confirmed their determination to work for detente in Europe and the development of peaceful cooperation on an all-European basis. The growth of bilateral contacts and cooperation between European countries was noted with satisfaction, and it was agreed that the encouragement of such cooperation between all the countries of Eastern and Western Europe on the basis of respect for their sovereign equality and territorial integrity should continue to be a major aim of both governments.

The two sides considered the question of convening a conference to discuss the problem of safeguarding security and developing cooperation in Europe. They agreed that such a conference could be valuable, subject to the necessary preparation. They decided to continue the

<sup>1</sup> British Information Services release, Feb. 13, 1967.

exchange of views on this matter. They also regarded it as essential that all the countries of Europe should be among the participants at such a conference.

In line with their efforts to reduce international tension, the two sides reaffirmed their interest in achieving progress towards disarmament. They stressed their desire to reach an understanding on general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament and the banning of nuclear weapons, under effective international control. The release of manpower and resources which would result from effective measures of disarmament would not only be to the benefit of the populations of the countries carrying out these measures, but would also make it possible to increase economic and technical assistance to those large areas of the world which are in need of it.

The Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of the United Kingdom noted with satisfaction the progress that had been made towards the conclusion of a non-proliferation agreement and re-emphasized the pressing need, in the interests of all nations, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They reaffirmed that the conclusion of an appropriate international treaty to this effect was urgent and they would use every effort to achieve this major objective. They hoped that a non-proliferation agreement would be concluded with the least possible delay. It would be a great contribution towards averting the danger of nuclear war. They welcomed the resolution of the 21st Session of the United Nations General Assembly which called upon all states to refrain from actions which would facilitate the dissemination of nuclear weapons and which could hinder the achievement of agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup> They declared their intention strictly to observe the provisions of that resolution. They were confident that the nations of the world would succeed in the effort to solve the problems of nuclear and other forms of disarmament and thus remove mankind from the threat that hangs over it.

The two Heads of Government recognized the importance of extending the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear tests in three environments to include underground tests.<sup>3</sup>

The two sides pronounced themselves ready to attend a world disarmament conference, to which all countries would be invited, when such a conference is convened in accordance with the General Assembly resolution.<sup>4</sup>

There was a prolonged exchange of views between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the British Prime Minister concerning events in South East Asia. Both Governments deeply regretted that the war in Vietnam continues with the loss of more human lives. They agreed that these events were a danger to neighboring states and to the peace and stability of the region and that it was essential to achieve the earliest possible end of the Vietnam war.

Both Governments confirmed their adherence to the principles of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 which were signed by both

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 630-687.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, p. 585.

the Soviet Union and Great Britain.<sup>5</sup> They set forth their respective views on the ways to bring about peace in Vietnam. The two Governments will continue to make a close study of the situation and will make every possible effort with a view to achieving a settlement of the Vietnam problem, and will maintain contact to this end.

The two sides exchanged views on the activities of the United Nations which is called upon to play an important role in safeguarding and consolidating peace throughout the world. Both Governments confirmed their interest in strengthening the United Nations and enhancing its effectiveness on the basis of strict observance of its Charter, and they expressed themselves in favor of an active and constructive cooperation of states within the framework of the Organization.

The two sides welcomed the conclusion of the treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, which was approved by the Twenty-First Session of the United Nations General Assembly and which the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and other countries had now signed.<sup>6</sup>

Recognizing the importance and usefulness of contacts at the government level, the sides agreed to establish a direct teletype communications line between the Kremlin and No. 10 Downing Street.

The two Governments agreed that while important differences remained in their assessments of some major international problems, the discussions and personal meetings which took place during the visit of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to the United Kingdom were useful in promoting a better understanding of their respective views. The discussions also led to progress in bilateral relations. The two Governments would continue their efforts to enlarge the area of common ground between them. They reiterated their desire to continue to hold periodic meetings and discussions in order further to improve relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom, and to contribute to the relaxation of international tensions and to the consolidation of peace.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. extended an invitation to the British Prime Minister to make an official visit to the Soviet Union. This invitation was gratefully accepted. The date of the visit would be decided later.

The British Foreign Secretary, Mr. George Brown, will be paying his official visit to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Government from 19 to 25 May.

<sup>5</sup> *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, pp. 750-788; *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 1075-1083.

<sup>6</sup> The treaty appears *ante*, pp. 38-43. For the G.A. action, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 800 ff.

## Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, February 14, 1967<sup>1</sup>

### *Preamble*

In the name of their peoples and faithfully interpreting their desires and aspirations, the Governments of the States which sign the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, *Desiring* to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending the armaments race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards strengthening a world at peace, based on the sovereign equality of States, mutual respect and good neighbourliness,

*Recalling* that the United Nations General Assembly, in its Resolution 808 (IX), adopted unanimously as one of the three points of a coordinated programme of disarmament "the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type",<sup>2</sup>

*Recalling* that militarily denuclearized zones are not an end in themselves but rather a means for achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage,

*Recalling* United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1911 (XVIII), which established that the measures that should be agreed upon for the denuclearization of Latin America should be taken "in the light of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of regional agreements",<sup>3</sup>

*Recalling* United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX), which established the principle of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and duties for the nuclear and non-nuclear powers,<sup>4</sup> and

*Recalling* that the Charter of the Organization of American States proclaims that it is an essential purpose of the Organization to strengthen the peace and security of the hemisphere,<sup>5</sup>

### *Convinced:*

That the incalculable destructive power of nuclear weapons has made it imperative that the legal prohibition of war should be strictly observed in practice if the survival of civilization and of mankind itself is to be assured,

That nuclear weapons, whose terrible effects are suffered, indiscriminately and inexorably, by military forces and civilian population alike, constitute, through the persistence of the radioactivity they release, an attack on the integrity of the human species and ultimately may even render the whole earth uninhabitable,

<sup>1</sup> Department of State files.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, p. 445.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, p. 629.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 532-534.

<sup>5</sup> Art. 4 of the O.A.S. Charter (Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49* [S. doc. 123, 81st Cong., 1st sess.], pp. 428-429).

That general and complete disarmament under effective international control is a vital matter which all the peoples of the world equally demand,

That the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which seems inevitable unless States, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, impose restrictions on themselves in order to prevent it, would make any agreement on disarmament enormously difficult and would increase the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear conflagration,

That the establishment of militarily denuclearized zones is closely linked with the maintenance of peace and security in the respective regions,

That the military denuclearization of vast geographical zones, adopted by the sovereign decisions of the States comprised therein, will exercise a beneficial influence on other regions where similar conditions exist,

That the privileged situation of the signatory States, whose territories are wholly free from nuclear weapons, imposes upon them the inescapable duty of preserving that situation both in their own interests and for the good of mankind,

That the existence of nuclear weapons in any country of Latin America would make it a target for possible nuclear attacks and would inevitably set off, throughout the region, a ruinous race in nuclear weapons which would involve the unjustifiable diversion, for warlike purposes, of the limited resources required for economic and social development,

That the foregoing reasons, together with the traditional peace-loving outlook of Latin America, give rise to an inescapable necessity that nuclear energy should be used in that region exclusively for peaceful purposes, and that the Latin American countries should use their right to the greatest and most equitable possible access to this new source of energy in order to expedite the economic and social development of their peoples,

*Convinced finally:*

That military denuclearization of Latin America—being understood to mean the undertaking entered into internationally in this Treaty to keep their territories forever free from nuclear weapons—will constitute a measure which will spare their peoples from the squandering of their limited resources on nuclear armaments and will protect them against possible nuclear attacks on their territories, and will also constitute a significant contribution towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and a powerful factor for general and complete disarmament, and

That Latin America, faithful to its tradition of universality, must not only endeavour to banish from its homelands the scourge of a nuclear war, but must also strive to promote the well-being and advancement of its peoples, at the same time co-operating in the fulfilment of the ideals of mankind, that is to say, in the consolidation of a permanent peace based on equal rights, economic fairness and social justice for all, in accordance with the principles and purposes set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Charter of the Organization of American States,

*Have agreed as follows:*

*Obligations*

ARTICLE 1

1. The Contracting Parties hereby undertake to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction, and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories:

(a) The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the Parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way, and

(b) The receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, by the Parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way.

2. The Contracting Parties also undertake to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon.

*Definition of the Contracting Parties*

ARTICLE 2

For the purposes of this Treaty, the Contracting Parties are those for whom the Treaty is in force.

*Definition of territory*

ARTICLE 3

For the purposes of this Treaty, the term "territory" shall include the territorial sea, air space and any other space over which the State exercises sovereignty in accordance with its own legislation.

*Zone of application*

ARTICLE 4

1. The zone of application of this Treaty is the whole of the territories for which the Treaty is in force.

2. Upon fulfilment of the requirements of article 28, paragraph 1, the zone of application of this Treaty shall also be that which is situated in the western hemisphere within the following limits (except the continental part of the territory of the United States of America and its territorial waters): starting at a point located at 35° north latitude, 75° west longitude; from this point directly southward to a point at 30° north latitude, 75° west longitude; from there, directly eastward to a point at 30° north latitude, 50° west longitude; from there, along a loxodromic line to a point at 5° north latitude, 20° west longitude; from there, directly southward to a point at 60° south latitude, 20° west longitude; from there, directly westward to a point at 60° south latitude, 115° west longitude; from there, directly northward to a point at 0 latitude, 115° west longitude; from there, along a loxodromic line to a point at 35° north latitude, 150° west

longitude; from there, directly eastward to a point at 35° north latitude, 75° west longitude.

*Definition of nuclear weapons*

ARTICLE 5

For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear weapon is any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes. An instrument that may be used for the transport or propulsion of the device is not included in this definition if it is separable from the device and not an indivisible part thereof.

*Meeting of signatories*

ARTICLE 6

At the request of any of the signatory States or if the Agency established by article 7 should so decide, a meeting of all the signatories may be convoked to consider in common questions which may affect the very essence of this instrument, including possible amendments to it. In either case, the meeting will be convoked by the General Secretary.

*Organization*

ARTICLE 7

1. In order to ensure compliance with the obligations of this Treaty, the Contracting Parties hereby establish an international organization to be known as the "Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America", hereinafter referred to as "the Agency". Only the Contracting Parties shall be affected by its decisions.

2. The Agency shall be responsible for the holding of periodic or extraordinary consultations among Member States on matters relating to the purposes, measures and procedures set forth in this Treaty and to the supervision of compliance with the obligations arising therefrom.

3. The Contracting Parties agree to extend to the Agency full and prompt co-operation in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, of any agreements they may conclude with the Agency and of any agreements the Agency may conclude with any other international organization or body.

4. The headquarters of the Agency shall be in Mexico City.

*Organs*

ARTICLE 8

1. There are hereby established as principal organs of the Agency a General Conference, a Council and a Secretariat.

2. Such subsidiary organs as are considered necessary by the General Conference may be established within the purview of this Treaty.

*The General Conference*

ARTICLE 9

1. The General Conference, the supreme organ of the Agency, shall be composed of all the Contracting Parties; it shall hold regular ses-

sions every two years, and may also hold special sessions whenever this Treaty so provides or, in the opinion of the Council, the circumstances so require.

2. The General Conference :

(a) May consider and decide on any matters or questions covered by this Treaty, within the limits thereof, including those referring to powers and functions of any organ provided for in this Treaty.

(b) Shall establish procedures for the control system to ensure observance of this Treaty in accordance with its provisions.

(c) Shall elect the Members of the Council and the General Secretary.

(d) May remove the General Secretary from office if the proper functioning of the Agency so requires.

(e) Shall receive and consider the biennial and special reports submitted by the Council and the General Secretary.

(f) Shall initiate and consider studies designed to facilitate the optimum fulfilment of the aims of this Treaty, without prejudice to the power of the General Secretary independently to carry out similar studies for submission to and consideration by the Conference.

(g) Shall be the organ competent to authorize the conclusion of agreements with Governments and other international organizations and bodies.

3. The General Conference shall adopt the Agency's budget and fix the scale of financial contributions to be paid by Member States, taking into account the systems and criteria used for the same purpose by the United Nations.

4. The General Conference shall elect its officers for each session and may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

5. Each Member of the Agency shall have one vote. The decisions of the General Conference shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting in the case of matters relating to the control system and measures referred to in article 20, the admission of new Members, the election or removal of the General Secretary, adoption of the budget and matters related thereto. Decisions on other matters, as well as procedural questions and also determination of which questions must be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be taken by a simple majority of the Members present and voting.

6. The General Conference shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

*The Council*

ARTICLE 10

1. The Council shall be composed of five Members of the Agency elected by the General Conference from among the Contracting Parties, due account being taken of equitable geographic distribution.

2. The Members of the Council shall be elected for a term of four years. However, in the first election three will be elected for two years. Outgoing Members may not be re-elected for the following period unless the limited number of States for which the Treaty is in force so requires.

3. Each Member of the Council shall have one representative.

4. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously.

5. In addition to the functions conferred upon it by this Treaty and to those which may be assigned to it by the General Conference, the Council shall, through the General Secretary, ensure the proper operation of the control system in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and with the decisions adopted by the General Conference.

6. The Council shall submit an annual report on its work to the General Conference as well as such special reports as it deems necessary or which the General Conference requests of it.

7. The Council shall elect its officers for each session.

8. The decisions of the Council shall be taken by a simple majority of its Members present and voting.

9. The Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

#### *The Secretariat*

#### ARTICLE 11

1. The Secretariat shall consist of a General Secretary, who shall be the chief administrative officer of the Agency, and of such staff as the Agency may require. The term of office of the General Secretary shall be four years and he may be re-elected for a single additional term. The General Secretary may not be a national of the country in which the Agency has its headquarters. In case the office of General Secretary becomes vacant, a new election shall be held to fill the office for the remainder of the term.

2. The staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the General Secretary, in accordance with rules laid down by the General Conference.

3. In addition to the functions conferred upon him by this Treaty and to those which may be assigned to him by the General Conference,—the General Secretary shall ensure, as provided by article 10, paragraph 5, the proper operation of the control system established by this Treaty, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the decisions taken by the General Conference.

4. The General Secretary shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Conference and of the Council and shall make an annual report to both bodies on the work of the Agency and any special reports requested by the General Conference or the Council or which the General Secretary may deem desirable.

5. The General Secretary shall establish the procedures for distributing to all Contracting Parties information received by the Agency from governmental sources and such information from non-governmental sources as may be of interest to the Agency.

6. In the performance of their duties the General Secretary and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other authority external to the Agency and shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Agency; subject to their responsibility to the Agency, they shall not disclose any industrial secrets or other confidential information coming to their knowledge by reason of their official duties in the Agency.

7. Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the General Secretary and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

*Control system*

ARTICLE 12

1. For the purpose of verifying compliance with the obligations entered into by the Contracting Parties in accordance with article 1, a control system shall be established which shall be put into effect in accordance with the provisions of articles 13-18 of this Treaty.

2. The control system shall be used in particular for the purpose of verifying.

(a) That devices, services and facilities intended for peaceful uses of nuclear energy are not used in the testing or manufacture of nuclear weapons,

(b) That none of the activities prohibited in article 1 of this Treaty are carried out in the territory of the Contracting Parties with nuclear materials or weapons introduced from abroad, and

(c) That explosions for peaceful purposes are compatible with article 18 of this Treaty.

*IAEA safeguards*

ARTICLE 13

Each Contracting Party shall negotiate multilateral or bilateral agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of its safeguards to its nuclear activities.<sup>6</sup> Each Contracting Party shall initiate negotiations within a period of 180 days after the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification of this Treaty. These agreements shall enter into force, for each Party, not later than eighteen months after the date of the initiation of such negotiations except in case of unforeseen circumstances or *force majeure*.

*Reports of the Parties*

ARTICLE 14

1. The Contracting Parties shall submit to the Agency and to the International Atomic Energy Agency, for their information, semi-annual reports stating that no activity prohibited under this Treaty has occurred in their respective territories.

2. The Contracting Parties shall simultaneously transmit to the Agency a copy of any report they may submit to the International Atomic Energy Agency which relates to matters that are the subject of this Treaty and to the application of safeguards.

3. The Contracting Parties shall also transmit to the Organization of American States, for its information, any reports that may be of interest to it, in accordance with the obligations established by the Inter-American System.

<sup>6</sup> For the I.A.E.A. safeguards system, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 446-460.

*Special reports requested by the General Secretary*

## ARTICLE 15

1. With the authorization of the Council, the General Secretary may request any of the Contracting Parties to provide the Agency with complementary or supplementary information regarding any event or circumstance connected with compliance with this Treaty, explaining his reasons. The Contracting Parties undertake to cooperate promptly and fully with the General Secretary.

2. The General Secretary shall inform the Council and the Contracting Parties forthwith of such requests and of the respective replies.

*Special inspections*

## ARTICLE 16

1. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Council established by this Treaty have the power of carrying out special inspections in the following cases:

(a) In the case of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in accordance with the agreements referred to in article 13 of this Treaty;

(b) In the case of the Council:

(i) When so requested, the reasons for the request being stated, by any Party which suspects that some activity prohibited by this Treaty has been carried out or is about to be carried out, either in the territory of any other Party or in any other place on such latter Party's behalf, the Council shall immediately arrange for such an inspection in accordance with article 10, paragraph 5.

(ii) When requested by any Party which has been suspected of or charged with having violated this Treaty, the Council shall immediately arrange for the special inspection requested in accordance with article 10, paragraph 5.

The above requests will be made to the Council through the General Secretary.

2. The costs and expenses of any special inspection carried out under paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b), sections (i) and (ii) of this article shall be borne by the requesting Party or Parties, except where the Council concludes on the basis of the report on the special inspection that, in view of the circumstances existing in the case, such costs and expenses should be borne by the Agency.

3. The General Conference shall formulate the procedures for the organization and execution of the special inspections carried out in accordance with paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b), sections (i) and (ii) of this article.

4. The Contracting Parties undertake to grant the inspectors carrying out such special inspections full and free access to all places and all information which may be necessary for the performance of their duties and which are directly and intimately connected with the sus-

pcion of violation of this Treaty. If so requested by the authorities of the Contracting Party in whose territory the inspection is carried out, the inspectors designated by the General Conference shall be accompanied by representatives of said authorities, provided that this does not in any way delay or hinder the work of the inspectors.

5. The Council shall immediately transmit to all the Parties, through the General Secretary, a copy of any report resulting from special inspections.

6. Similarly, the Council shall send through the General Secretary to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for transmission to the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, and to the Council of the Organization of American States, for its information, a copy of any report resulting from any special inspection carried out in accordance with paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b), sections (i) and (ii) of this article.

7. The Council may decide, or any Contracting Party may request, the convening of a special session of the General Conference for the purpose of considering the reports resulting from any special inspection. In such a case, the General Secretary shall take immediate steps to convene the special session requested.

8. The General Conference, convened in special session under this article, may make recommendations to the Contracting Parties and submit reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to be transmitted to the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly.

*Use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes*

ARTICLE 17

Nothing in the provisions of this Treaty shall prejudice the rights of the Contracting Parties, in conformity with this Treaty, to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in particular for their economic development and social progress.

*Explosions for peaceful purposes*

ARTICLE 18

1. The Contracting Parties may carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes—including explosions which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons—or collaborate with third parties for the same purpose, provided that they do so in accordance with the provisions of this article and the other articles of the Treaty, particularly articles 1 and 5.

2. Contracting Parties intending to carry out, or to co-operate in carrying out, such an explosion shall notify the Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as far in advance as the circumstances require, of the date of the explosion and shall at the same time provide the following information:

(a) The nature of the nuclear device and the source from which it was obtained.

(b) The place and purpose of the planned explosion,

(c) The procedures which will be followed in order to comply with paragraph 3 of this article,

(d) The expected force of the device, and

(e) The fullest possible information on any possible radioactive fall-out that may result from the explosion or explosions, and measures which will be taken to avoid danger to the population, flora, fauna and territories of any other Party or Parties.

3. The General Secretary and the technical personnel designated by the Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency may observe all the preparations, including the explosion of the device, and shall have unrestricted access to any area in the vicinity of the site of the explosion in order to ascertain whether the device and the procedures followed during the explosion are in conformity with the information supplied under paragraph 2 of this article and the other provisions of this Treaty.

4. The Contracting Parties may accept the collaboration of third parties for the purpose set forth in paragraph 1 of the present article, in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof.

*Relations with other international organizations*

ARTICLE 19

1. The Agency may conclude such agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency as are authorized by the General Conference and as it considers likely to facilitate the efficient operation of the control system established by this Treaty.

2. The Agency may also enter into relations with any international organization or body, especially any which may be established in the future to supervise disarmament or measures for the control of armaments in any part of the world.

3. The Contracting Parties may, if they see fit, request the advice of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission on all technical matters connected with the application of this Treaty with which the Commission is competent to deal under its Statute.

*Measures in the event of violation of the Treaty*

ARTICLE 20

1. The General Conference shall take note of all cases in which, in its opinion, any Contracting Party is not complying fully with its obligations under this Treaty and shall draw the matter to the attention of the Party concerned, making such recommendations as it deems appropriate.

2. If, in its opinion, such non-compliance constitutes a violation of this Treaty which might endanger peace and security, the General Conference shall report thereon simultaneously to the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to the Council of the Organization of American States. The General Conference shall likewise report to the International Atomic Energy Agency for such purposes as are relevant in accordance with its Statute.

*United Nations and Organization of American States*

## ARTICLE 21

None of the provisions of this Treaty shall be construed as impairing the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of States Members of the Organization of American States, under existing regional treaties.

*Privileges and immunities*

## ARTICLE 22

1. The Agency shall enjoy in the territory of each of the Contracting Parties such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes.

2. Representatives of the Contracting Parties accredited to the Agency and officials of the Agency shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the performance of their functions.

3. The Agency may conclude agreements with the Contracting Parties with a view to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.

*Notification of other agreements*

## ARTICLE 23

Once this Treaty has entered into force, the Secretariat shall be notified immediately of any international agreement concluded by any of the Contracting Parties on matters with which this Treaty is concerned; the Secretariat shall register it and notify the other Contracting Parties.

*Settlement of disputes*

## ARTICLE 24

Unless the Parties concerned agree on another mode of peaceful settlement, any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty which is not settled shall be referred to the International Court of Justice with the prior consent of the Parties to the controversy.

*Signature*

## ARTICLE 25

1. This Treaty shall be open indefinitely for signature by:

- (a) All the Latin American Republics, and
- (b) All other sovereign States situated in their entirety south of latitude 35° north in the western hemisphere; and, except as provided in paragraph 2 of this article, all such States which become sovereign, when they have been admitted by the General Conference.

2. The General Conference shall not take any decision regarding the admission of a political entity part or all of whose territory is the

subject, prior to the date when this Treaty is opened for signature, of a dispute or claim between an extra-continental country and one or more Latin American States, so long as the dispute has not been settled by peaceful means.

*Ratification and deposit*

ARTICLE 26

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.

2. This Treaty and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Mexican United States, which is hereby designated the Depositary Government.

3. The Depositary Government shall send certified copies of this Treaty to the Governments of signatory States and shall notify them of the deposit of each instrument of ratification.

*Reservations*

ARTICLE 27

This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.

*Entry into force*

ARTICLE 28

1. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article, this Treaty shall enter into force among the States that have ratified it as soon as the following requirements have been met:

(a) Deposit of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty with the Depositary Government by the Governments of the States mentioned in article 25 which are in existence on the date when this Treaty is opened for signature and which are not affected by the provisions of article 25, paragraph 2;

(b) Signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I annexed to this Treaty by all extra-continental or continental States having *de jure* or *de facto* international responsibility for territories situated in the zone of application of the Treaty;

(c) Signature and ratification of the Additional Protocol II annexed to this Treaty by all powers possessing nuclear weapons;

(d) Conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements on the application of the Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with article 13 of this Treaty.

2. All signatory States shall have the imprescriptible right to waive, wholly or in part, the requirements laid down in the preceding paragraph. They may do so by means of a declaration which shall be annexed to their respective instrument of ratification and which may be formulated at the time of deposit of the instrument or subsequently. For those States which exercise this right, this Treaty shall enter into force upon deposit of the declaration, or as soon as those requirements have been met which have not been expressly waived.

3. As soon as this Treaty has entered into force in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 for eleven States, the Depositary Gov-

ernment shall convene a preliminary meeting of those States in order that the Agency may be set up and commence its work.

4. After the entry into force of this Treaty for all the countries of the zone, the rise of a new power possessing nuclear weapons shall have the effect of suspending the execution of this Treaty for those countries which have ratified it without waiving requirements of paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (c) of this article, and which request such suspension; the Treaty shall remain suspended until the new power, on its own initiative or upon request by the General Conference, ratifies the annexed Additional Protocol II.

#### *Amendments*

#### ARTICLE 29

1. Any Contracting Party may propose amendments to this Treaty and shall submit its proposals to the Council through the General Secretary, who shall transmit them to all the other Contracting Parties and, in addition, to all other signatories in accordance with article 6. The Council, through the General Secretary, shall immediately following the meeting of signatories convene a special session of the General Conference to examine the proposals made, for the adoption of which a two-thirds majority of the Contracting Parties present and voting shall be required.

2. Amendments adopted shall enter into force as soon as the requirements set forth in article 28 of this Treaty have been complied with.

#### *Duration and denunciation*

#### ARTICLE 30

1. This Treaty shall be of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, but any Party may denounce it by notifying the General Secretary of the Agency if, in the opinion of the denouncing State, there have arisen or may arise circumstances connected with the content of this Treaty or of the annexed Additional Protocols I and II which affect its supreme interests or the peace and security of one or more Contracting Parties.

2. The denunciation shall take effect three months after the delivery to the General Secretary of the Agency of the notification by the Government of the signatory State concerned. The General Secretary shall immediately communicate such notification to the other Contracting Parties and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the information of the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly. He shall also communicate it to the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States.

#### *Authentic texts and registration*

#### ARTICLE 31

This Treaty, of which the Spanish, Chinese, English, French, Portuguese and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be registered by the Depositary Government in accordance with article 102 of the United Nations Charter. The Depositary Government shall notify the

Secretary-General of the United Nations of the signatures, ratifications and amendments relating to this Treaty and shall communicate them to the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States for its information.

*Transitional Article*

Denunciation of the declaration referred to in article 28, paragraph 2, shall be subject to the same procedures as the denunciation of this Treaty, except that it will take effect on the date of delivery of the respective notification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full powers, found in good and due form, sign this Treaty on behalf of their respective Governments.

DONE at Mexico, Distrito Federal, on the Fourteenth day of February, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-seven.

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, furnished with full powers by their respective Governments,

*Convinced* that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, negotiated and signed in accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly of the United Nations in Resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, represents an important step towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

*Aware* that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself but, rather, a means of achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage, and

*Desiring* to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending the armaments race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards strengthening a world at peace, based on mutual respect and sovereign equality of States,

*Have agreed as follows:*

*Article 1.* To undertake to apply the statute [*status?*] of denuclearization in respect of warlike purposes as defined in articles 1, 3, 5 and 13 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America in territories for which, *de jure* or *de facto*, they are internationally responsible and which lie within the limits of the geographical zone established in that Treaty.

*Article 2.* The duration of this Protocol shall be the same as that of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this Protocol is an annex, and the provisions regarding ratification and denunciation contained in the Treaty shall be applicable to it.

*Article 3.* This Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have ratified it, on the date of the deposit of their respective instruments of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full powers, found in good and due form, sign this Protocol on behalf of their respective Governments.

## ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, furnished with full powers by their respective Governments,

*Convinced* that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, negotiated and signed in accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly of the United Nations in Resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, represents an important step towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

*Aware* that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself but, rather, a means of achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage, and

*Desiring* to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending the armaments race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards promoting and strengthening a world at peace, based on mutual respect and sovereign equality of States,

*Have agreed as follows:*

*Article 1.* The statute [*status?*] of denuclearization of Latin America in respect of warlike purposes, as defined, delimited and set forth in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this instrument is an annex, shall be fully respected by the Parties to this Protocol in all its express aims and provisions.

*Article 2.* The Governments represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries undertake, therefore, not to contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a violation of the obligations of article 1 of the Treaty in the territories to which the Treaty applies in accordance with article 4 thereof.

*Article 3.* The Governments represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries also undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

*Article 4.* The duration of this Protocol shall be the same as that of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this Protocol is an annex, and the definitions of territory and nuclear weapons set forth in articles 3 and 5 of the Treaty shall be applicable to this Protocol, as well as the provisions regarding ratification, reservations, denunciation, authentic texts and registration contained in articles 26, 27, 30 and 31 of the Treaty.

*Article 5.* This Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have ratified it, on the date of the deposit of their respective instruments of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full powers, found to be in good and due form, hereby sign this Additional Protocol on behalf of their respective Governments.

Television Interview With Secretary of Defense  
McNamara: Antiballistic Missile Systems, February 15,  
1967<sup>1</sup>

*Q. Mr. McNamara, is it your opinion the introduction of an ABM system in America and Russia would destabilize the nuclear relationship?*

A. No, certainly not. I don't believe it would have any significant effect on the nuclear balance of power. I don't believe that either nation, if it has the technical and financial capability to prevent such an effect, could tolerate that effect. And therefore I don't believe it would be destabilizing.

*Q. Well, why do you oppose its implementation then?*

A. Because I think that it would require a very large investment, that it would not significantly change the balance of power; it would not protect our people, and therefore it would be wasteful. That's my primary reason for objecting to it.

But beyond that, I believe it would actually increase the risk to both of the parties were they to deploy anti-ballistic-missile systems. And I say that, paradoxical though it may sound, because of my strong feeling that each of us, the Soviets and the West, must, to the extent it is technically and financially capable of doing so, erect a deterrent against a potential strike by the other.

We have that deterrent capability today; in a very real sense the Soviets have it as well. We feel we must keep it. I don't know of any reason why they should think differently than we in this point. The question is, Would the deployment of an anti-ballistic-missile system make it impossible to keep it? and I think the answer is "No."

Were the other side to fail to react to the deployment of an anti-ballistic-missile system, the deterrent balance would be changed. But if the other side has the necessity to react and the capability of reacting, one must assume it will. And I think it would.

*Q. But you're saying—*

A. But therein lies the problem of additional risk and a paradox. Because each of us is operating with uncertain knowledge of the other, and, hence, when we react, we react on the basis of uncertain knowledge. Because we know our knowledge is uncertain, in effect we over-react, because we forecast the most extreme set of circumstances. We credit the other side with a much greater capability than in all likelihood it has. We react to that much greater capability than exists, and, hence, after the deployment, we are in effect worse off than we were before. And the world is facing a greater risk.

*Q. Did either side—if either side starts deploying ABM's, the other side will then step up its offensive capacity?*

<sup>1</sup> Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 20, 1967, pp. 442-447. The interview was videotaped on Feb. 15 and broadcast on Feb. 20.

A. Yes, yes—

Q. *And both sides will do this?*

A. —yes, exactly. And, in effect, this has happened already.

Q. *You've responded to them?*

A. We have started to respond to them. We knew a year or two or three ago that they were beginning to move toward deployment of ABM's, and last year we presented to the Congress a program of reaction; and because our knowledge of the Soviet ABM deployment was uncertain and incomplete, I estimated the worst possible set of circumstances, circumstances almost surely beyond what we will actually face. We reacted to that greater-than-expected threat—if you will, greater-than-probable threat—and therefore the Soviets in a very literal sense are worse off today and will be worse off in the future than had they never started to deploy an anti-ballistic-missile system.

#### BALANCE OF OFFENSIVE-DEFENSIVE ACTIONS

Q. *You would prefer to react by building up the offensive side of your capacity and not by competing in the defensive?*

A. Why yes, because if their action is to protect their people, it reduces our deterrent unless we build up our offensive force to have the power to penetrate that defense. So it isn't an either/or situation. It isn't we either build our offense or we build a defense to protect our people. The only logical and rational reaction to a Soviet defensive move is for us to strengthen our offense. Now, that doesn't mean we shouldn't also consider a defensive move. But if we do so consider it, it's for reasons other than as a reaction to their defensive move.

Q. *Well, what would those reasons be then?*

A. We might wish to protect our own people and reduce the loss to this nation in the event deterrence fails. We must have, or must try to have, two capabilities in our nuclear forces. One is a capability to deter a Soviet attack on the West and the other is a capability to limit damage to the West in the event deterrence fails. It's this second capability which we might seek to obtain by deploying an anti-ballistic-missile system.

Q. *Do you think—*

A. I say, "seek to obtain" because I don't believe we can attain it.

Q. *If one did deploy that system, do you think it would make people, in a sort of ghastly sense, prepared for a war which they might overcome. Hence, endanger—accelerating the possibility—*

A. No. No, I don't think so. And the reason I say that is I don't believe any responsible group of people in this country or any responsible leader, scientific or political or military, believes that any anti-ballistic-missile defense we could presently contemplate would so reduce damage to this nation as to make nuclear war acceptable—

*Q. Do you think the Russians—*

*A.—or desirable.*

*Q. Do you think the Russians believe their system would work?*

*A. No, I—I think they believe it would work in the sense of being to their advantage to deploy it, reducing the damage to their people in the event of war, but I don't believe they think it would work to the extent of making nuclear war acceptable. The reason I say that is that they have been almost fanatical on the subject of defense for years; over the past decade or decade and a half they have spent perhaps 2½ times as much as we have spent on air defense. And yet, they must know that that air defense was sievelike, and I mean literally sievelike, because we always had the capability to penetrate it. There was never any doubt in our minds, and I don't believe there was any doubt in their minds.*

*At no time during that decade and a half, when they were spending 2½ times as much as we, did they ever indicate that they thought we lacked a capability to deter their strike against us. And if we had that capability to deter it, it simply meant that we could penetrate their defenses. So they were in effect by their action admitting we could penetrate their defense.*

*Q. Why did they make this tremendous defensive buildup? Is that just their own nature?*

*A. It's their psychology. It's their strong emotional reaction to the need to defend Mother Russia.*

*Q. Mr. Kosygin said in London that it is better to build defense weapons than offensive ones.<sup>2</sup> Is that a valid distinction?*

*A. No. No. They're not alternatives. As I mentioned a moment ago, we must build more offense because he's building more defense.*

#### NATURE OF BARGAINING FACTOR

*Q. Oh, yes, I see that. I'm very confused by this distinction. I must say that I think you're made it pretty clear. I have been told by supporters of the ABM system here that it will give you a strong bargaining factor with the Russians if you started one now to low level before negotiations.*

*A. Well, it depends on how rational they are. If they really believe that a move to deploy a defense is in no way a warlike move, they probably would not react adversely to our deployment of a defense, and in that event our statement, "We would deploy if they deployed," would not give us a bargaining lever to move them to restrict their deployment.*

*If they believe that our reaction will be, as it will be, to increase our offensive force and that, because we have uncertain knowledge of the power of their defense, we must in effect overreact, then I would think that's the strongest—*

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 60.

*Q. Stronger bargaining factor—*

A. —bargaining position from which we may negotiate. And that's exactly the fact. That's what we're doing, and that's what we're going to continue to do, and the risk is great to them; the risk of loss to their people will be greater as a result of this action than it would be otherwise, and the cost to them of financial—in financial terms of diversion of resources will be very high indeed.

*Q. If you look at the world through the Russian eyes for a moment, they're building up a defensive system. They say you have a vastly superior striking force. Doesn't that make sense if you say you fear that they may even believe that this thing would be effective to some extent? Aren't they in fact literally responding to what appears to be a vastly superior offensive force?*

A. Well, if they are, they are responding in an erroneous way. I—in a sense, if I were they, I wouldn't consider our force vastly superior. It is superior in numbers for reasons we needn't go into, but we're quite prepared to say, and I've stated publicly, that we with our force, superior as it is in numbers, do not have sufficient power to destroy them without in effect destroying ourselves in the process. So what we are really saying is that they have power to deter large-scale nuclear attack initiated by the U.S., and we have power to deter large-scale nuclear attack initiated by the Soviet Union.

*Q. This is the plateau you want to freeze?*

A. Well, no, no, I'm not suggesting I want to freeze it; I'm just saying that is a fact, and technically it's a relationship that's very difficult for either of us to move out of unless the other simply fails to act in a rational fashion.

*Q. In your testimony, Mr. McNamara, you seem to hint that the story wasn't always in terms of numerical superiority. Were you hinting that their payloads might be bigger than yours, that—*

A. No, no, no. Certainly not, because I don't think a difference in payload is of great significance here. No, I was simply saying that numerical superiority today in these weapons does not bring with it the political advantage that numerical superiority in military forces brought with it over the past two or three centuries.

*Q. Would your talks with the Russians on disarmament be limited to the ABM?*

A. Perhaps not. I think it would depend on their interest in other subjects. It might very well move into offensive weapons as well.

*Q. Can I ask if, as part of an arrangement, you would expect them to dismantle an ABM system if you weren't going to build one yourself?*

A. Well, it's much too early to—

*Q. Well, let me put it this way: Hypothetically, if the Russians pushed on with an ABM system, you couldn't afford not to do the same?*

A. No, I won't even state that hypothetically. Our position at present is that we believe it's disadvantageous to the parties to engage in deployment of ABM's against each other.

We do wish to engage in conversations with the Soviets to seek to limit ABM deployments. We are anxious to avoid any arms race in strategic nuclear weapons. We do recognize the talks may be unsuccessful, however. We have provided, therefore, in our new financial program, now lying before our Congress, for the appropriation of \$577 million as a small initial payment on the deployment of an ABM system in this country, should that later prove desirable.

I've said publicly I don't believe it would be desirable, if its purpose were the defense of our cities against Soviet attacks. But it might be desirable for other reasons. For example, the protection of our offensive weapons. Because we can strengthen our offensive weapons force which move is required as an offset to their defensive move by either adding weapons or protecting the weapons we have in it. And for the latter purpose, we might wish to deploy an anti-ballistic-missile system.

#### QUESTION OF CHINESE NUCLEAR THREAT

*Q. Is there any logic in having an ABM—anti-ballistic-missile system—at a low level both for you and Russia, perhaps to counter a Chinese nuclear threat in the seventies?*

A. There may be. Yes, there may well be. We haven't made a decision on that yet; it isn't necessary for us to do so, because the lead time required by the Chinese to develop and produce and deploy any substantial offensive force is greater than the lead time we require to deploy a defensive force. So this is a matter for the future.

*Q. Some of the military men seem to be rather aghast about your cool assumption that you have a lot of time to decide these things.*

A. Well, we don't have perhaps a lot of time, but we have more time than requires the forces of decision this year.

*Q. Would you say that an ABM system would make your ability to protect your allies more credible, as also is being argued?*

A. No, no. No, because we would have to say what was the truth, and that is that an ABM system, assuming the Soviets react to it, as I believe they must, will not protect either our population or our allies' population.

*Q. When you worked with President Kennedy, Mr. McNamara, you—between you—created a much wider set of options for offensive possibilities; you opened up a lot of options. Now, wouldn't the ABM system just be adding another option?*

A. Not if it's—not if it's reacted to by one's opponent.

*C. You must think I'm very stupid, but I'm getting the point.*

A. No, this is exactly the point. You see, we start with the assumption that the U.S. must be able to deter a large-scale Soviet attack on Western Europe or the continental U.S. I think everyone would agree

that this is the foundation of our security. We must have that capability.

But if we accept that, I think we're forced to accept that the Soviets must have a similar requirement. They must be capable of deterring a large-scale Western or U.S. attack—NATO attack, if you will—upon the Soviet Union. I don't know anyone who would really disagree with that, as being to them a requirement.

Do they have the technical and financial capability to achieve that requirement? I think they do. If we deploy an anti-ballistic-missile system and give, as you call it, protection to our allies and/or ourselves, to the extent that they don't react they have lost a part of their deterrent. They're failing to meet this requirement which is absolutely essential to their security. And therefore, I think we must assume they will react to our defensive move if they have the technical and financial capability to do so. And we believe they have.

#### EFFECT ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

*Q. Do you think the deployment with an ABM system either here or in Russia and both places would encourage a proliferation of nuclear weapons elsewhere in the world? This is also said—*

A. Well, I don't think so. I've read comments made by the political leaders of some of the neutral states and some of the—particularly some of the states that have no nuclear weapons of their own—which say in effect they're going to cut off their nose to spite their face, because they're not going to sign any nonproliferation treaty unless particularly the Soviet and the U.S. agree not to deploy any antiballistic missiles, for example. Completely non sequitur—no relationship whatsoever to the problem of the nonnuclear states—

*Q. Do you have a—*

A. —and I don't believe that when it comes down to the point of actually accepting the treaty, this will be an important factor. In fact I'm very sympathetic to their desire to see what they consider to be a nuclear arms race brought to a halt. But I don't believe that failure to sign a nonproliferation treaty—or refusal to sign a nonproliferation treaty—is a move toward deescalating the nuclear arms race. Quite the contrary.

*Q. One is in the midst of a great arms race, really, isn't one?*

A. Yes, but it's not between the two nuclear powers. It's the potential arms race between the nonnuclear powers, a race to obtain nuclear weapons. And this is the race that must be called to a halt, in the interest of all of us, not just in the interest of the nuclear powers but particularly in the interest of the nonnuclear powers.

*Q. How do you effectively try in the future to stop the—you say it isn't an arms race between you and the Russians, but how do you try to deescalate your position?*

A. Well, I think we try to do so by the kind of discussion you and I are having right now—to try to make clear to our own people that

beyond a certain point there is no gain from increasing the size of one's nuclear forces; to try to make it clear there's no gain by deploying antiballistic missiles; and to try to make it clear, not only to one's own people but also to one's opponents—and that of course, is the reason why we're so very interested in engaging in a discussion on this subject with the Soviets.

*Q. But, do you think there's any realistic possibility of having a sort of rollback which would give public parity to you and the Russians, literal parity?*

A. Well, I don't want to speculate on—

*Q. Do you think it's possible—*

A. —on what's possible. We haven't engaged in substantive discussions of this ABM subject and associated subjects as yet with the Soviets. We're very anxious to do so, but I don't want to predict how the discussions will evolve—

*Q. I'm not thinking of your specific discussions. I'm just thinking of the general psychological truth. Wouldn't it be a more stable relationship?*

A. Well, it depends on how they react. If they react in an unfavorable fashion, it wouldn't be more stable.

*Q. I've got one more personal question. Do you find it extremely difficult to walk a tightrope between all the different pressure groups over an issue like this—the pros and cons? Is your job very difficult?*

A. No. I don't—

*Q. —or do you say what should be done?*

A. No, I don't find it difficult, but I don't mean to say there aren't pressure groups either. There are very strong pressure groups, but perhaps the word "pressure group" is the wrong designation for them. Emotions run high on this subject, and for that reason the argument is fierce. But I don't find it difficult to argue fiercely when I believe in what I'm doing.

*Q. Thank you very much.*

### Television Interview With Chancellor Kiesinger: Non-proliferation Negotiations [Extract], February 17, 1967<sup>1</sup>

*Question: Aside from EEC problems, the nonproliferation issue was obviously discussed. The British are formulating this treaty with the Russians and the Americans. Now that you have talked to the*

<sup>1</sup> Hamburg television broadcast, Feb. 17, 1967.

*British what about your strong reservations against the Federal Republic joining this treaty?*

Answer: I am somewhat embarrassed here. You speak of a non-proliferation treaty. I wonder how many of the listeners know what that means. It is a matter of trying to control the masses of nuclear fuel produced in many reactors so that no nuclear bombs are built, and of banning proliferation by nuclear powers so that no new atomic powers are created. This must be clearly said. Moreover, the treaty does not exist; I therefore cannot voice reservations against it. I can only voice reservations against possible regulations of this treaty. There are drafts; the two main negotiating partners, the United States and the Soviet Union, have prepared some drafts. Of course there are very grave reservations, primarily concerning our security and economic development.

We have been addressed very rudely by Mr. Kosygin. I do not want to go into detail on what he actually said, but I have replied that whether we sign such a treaty depends only on our own sensibility and conscience. It is an extraordinary matter, a most important decision which is demanded of us and other people. Some parties secure for themselves possession of nuclear weapons, excluding others from this possession, either through their own production or by taking over from others. This is a very important objective because it is frightening to think what would happen if possession of nuclear weapons were spread chaotically throughout the world, if some adventurous state were one day irresponsibly to use such a weapon. But there are, of course, very important problems. For example, we must not be hindered in the peaceful development and peaceful use of nuclear energy. Neither our research nor the benefit which our economy derives from such peaceful development of nuclear energy must be obstructed.

There is another important problem. Development of nuclear weapons and everything connected with it, including carrier rocket systems, produces many scientific-technological findings which may benefit the rest of the economy. The Americans call this side effects. These findings which are gained as a byproduct are very important, and it is essential for the nonnuclear powers, including us, to know that we can participate in these findings, in this technological progress.

*Question: In other words, we do not want nuclear weapons but we want a guarantee that as an industrial nation we will continue to rank among the leaders in this field.*

Answer: Very definitely. It is a matter not only of being assured that we are among the leaders; it is also one of preventing a drastic retrogression in our technological-scientific and economic development, retrogressing far behind the nuclear powers, that is. Then, of course, there is the very important problem of control and the question of who exercises it. All this is very important. But perhaps we can discuss one more aspect. I am occasionally asked what is new in all this. After all, we have already renounced nuclear weapons.

The matter is this: Under the WEU treaty, we renounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons on our own territory.<sup>2</sup> This is the renuncia-

<sup>2</sup> See *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, pp. 979 ff.

tion within the framework of the WEU treaty. This new treaty which we would have to sign renounces much more—for instance, the somewhat theoretical case of one country manufacturing nuclear weapons on the territory of others or together with others. Treaty signatories also renounce acceptance of any nuclear weapons which a nuclear power might be prepared to give them. Nor can the fact be disregarded that legal obligations under this new treaty go much farther. Thus far we have undertaken commitments within the framework of our allies, within WEU and, as it were, tied to the existence of WEU. Now we would undertake a commitment toward the Soviet Union.

*Question: All these problems must still be considered, and the Federal Government will certainly make a decision only when information is available from all sides concerning the interpretation of the treaty provisions.*

*Answer: That is right; for example, interpretation of views regarding a future united Europe. This united Europe must, after all, be in a position to defend itself with modern means. All these are questions on which we need clarification. We have had many discussions on these questions, of course. During his visit to America, my colleague, Foreign Minister Brandt, discussed these problems. We have had many talks about them here, and I hope that we can be satisfied with the answers, the interpretations we get, interpretations which both sides will accept.*

### **Interview of Foreign Minister Brandt With *Die Welt*: Nonproliferation Negotiations, February 18, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

*Question: Is it true that you were unable to bring back binding U.S. promises which might have dispelled serious German misgivings about the nonproliferation treaty?*

*Answer: This is not true. The U.S. Government declared its willingness to explain to us, in binding form, how the essential provisions of the planned agreement should be interpreted. This promise dispels any doubt. The American side also promised that the wishes of the nonnuclear states would be met in order that there would be clarity on nonproliferation and disarmament and that any impairment of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would be averted. It was agreed to clarify the details in conversations between German and American experts.*

*That not all misgivings have yet been dispelled is also evident from the fact that no binding text of the draft treaty yet exists. Everything is still in the stage of clarifying questions of principle. Thus far no one knows what text will be submitted by the two world powers to the Geneva conference, which will meet on Monday, when such a proposal will be made, or how it will appear as a result of the conference negotiations.*

<sup>1</sup> Hamburg radio broadcast, Feb. 18, 1967.

*Question: Have the Russians adopted the American concept regarding a united Europe? Must this concept not become part of the treaty?*

Answer: As for the second part of your question, the answer is no. The answer to the first part is that such a treaty would involve a united Europe. According to international law, it would not automatically become a member of such a treaty. A federal European state would instead inherit what its members possess. This too was clarified during my Washington talks.

The difficulties which European unification faces on the road to common foreign and defense policies cannot be attributed to a nonproliferation treaty. Past omissions cannot be excused by this, and possible future omissions cannot be justified by citing the bogey of a nonproliferation treaty.

*Question: Is the nonproliferation treaty not political discrimination against all nonnuclear states? Would the nuclear powers not be compelled to conclude at least simultaneous binding agreements that would put a stop to their new race to develop antimissile systems? Would not nuclear disarmament measures then also have to be negotiated?*

Answer: The Federal German Republic is in a special political and geographical situation because years ago we contractually pledged to our allies to renounce the use of nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup> The same also applies to others inasmuch as, despite all differences, there is one point on which the nuclear states agree, namely, not to give nuclear weapons to nonnuclear states. In this respect, the nonproliferation treaty would establish the fact.

I, myself, feel that the moral and political justification of a nonproliferation treaty follows only if the nuclear states regard it as a step toward restrictions on their own armaments and toward disarmament and clearly state that they are willing to act accordingly. We agree with many other nonnuclear states in this regard.

You and I would regret any new arms race by the nuclear powers and would welcome an agreement between the two world powers which would thwart the development of antimissile systems. The vicious circle which threatens the balance of power and increases the danger to peace must be disrupted and stopped at long last.

*Question: Development of an antimissile system by the two world powers would not remain without repercussions on other states. Particularly for Europe, an "extraordinary situation" might develop which would also affect a nonproliferation treaty. Would conclusion of the treaty be a violation of the NATO pact by the United States?*

Answer: In my view, we cannot speak of a violation of the pact. Naturally, such an extensive treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons would have its consequences. Already groups of the same or similar interests have organized themselves in this field. They are not absolutely identical with the state groups that we know in East-West

<sup>2</sup> *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, pp. 979 ff.

relations. I wish to point out that we will, to an increasing extent, have to deal with the fact that elements of the policies of alliance and detente overlap or supplement each other. However, it is too early to objectively engage in further speculation. We should first wait and see what the treaty and accompanying agreements will look like.

*Question: Do you share the view of German Euratom committee member Robert Margulies that acceptance of control by the International Atomic Energy Agency would be a violation of the Euratom agreement,<sup>3</sup> which might then lead to the collapse of Euratom and the entire EEC?*

**Answer:** The control question is particularly difficult. In this respect, the negotiations seem to have made the least progress. The Federal Government sides with Euratom out of conviction and will meet the obligations that it assumed with the other members. This includes the competencies of Euratom organs. We must now discuss questions raised in the Council of Ministers since the Euratom commission has obviously failed to insure French concurrence with its declaration.

Perhaps it is still possible to link the control systems of the International Atomic Energy Agency and Euratom. In any event, discrimination against or any other disadvantage accruing to the nonnuclear powers in the nonmilitary sphere must be prevented.

*Question: Could control be misused for industrial espionage in Germany? How can we protect ourselves against this?*

**Answer:** This is one of the really important questions. I left no doubts about this in Washington and other places. This has been understood. Since we do not intend to become a nuclear military power, we have no objections to respective controls, which are already being applied by Euratom. However, we must resolutely object to the misuse of a control that might result in the disclosure of industrial secrets. Briefly, controls must not lead to industrial espionage. The Russians will certainly appreciate this point.

However, I do not have the impression that Sweden or other countries have had any bad experiences with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The United States and Britain, too, have permitted such controls in their nonmilitary spheres. The International Atomic Energy Agency had developed control measures which offer the possibility of influencing the composition of the control delegation. It is evident that controllers will only be accepted from countries which subject themselves to control. Perhaps in principle those who have already embarked on the road of nuclear arming should in principle be excluded from the role of nuclear chaperon.

*Question: Scientists and industrialists voice warnings about the damage that will be inflicted on German research and industry by the treaty. Do you share this view? What should be done to prevent such damage?*

<sup>3</sup> For the Euratom agreement, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957*, pp. 421-420.

Answer: There must be no doubt that a non-proliferation treaty must not frustrate the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by science and industry. I have repeatedly expressed this view, and I reconfirm it. We must insist on and are willing to cooperate in insuring this point in the text of a treaty and the accompanying agreements. The Federal Government is being advised on this point by prominent representatives of German science.

By concluding a treaty on a nuclear-free Latin America, our Latin American friends showed how such demands can be satisfied by a treaty.<sup>4</sup> In other words, I believe that some of the expressed fears are justified, although public discussion was perhaps too much concerned with past omissions. The Federal Government—and I speak as its foreign minister—will naturally insure that the vital interests we share with other nonmilitary nuclear powers are protected.

I attach special significance to the following point: There should be controls, but these should be unequivocal and exclude any doubt about safeguards against the misuse of nuclear power for military purposes. This is so very important because the excessive suspicion cast on the Federal Republic without justification would thus be without foundation, and because, in accordance with our policy of detente, we would be one step further toward the normalization of our relations with the Soviet Union. Here there is clearly an interrelation between our East European policy and a sound nonproliferation treaty.

*Question: What about the disadvantages resulting for the non-nuclear powers from the fact that they could not use nuclear explosives for such peaceful purposes as canal construction?*

Answer: This point does not or will hardly affect the Federal Republic, which is densely populated. Moreover, it is well known that satisfactory detonation charges for nonmilitary uses do not yet exist. Other countries, especially the Latin American nations, are interested in this problem. The United States is willing, should it develop such charges, to make them available for nonmilitary use under international control.

*Question: What is the real political purpose of the nonproliferation treaty? Is it, for the Americans, a U.S.-Soviet alliance against China based on common interests and, for the Russians, an instrument for the military and thus political suppression of Germany?*

Answer: We should first of all be concerned with our interests, which means that we agree to any move aimed at insuring peace. The unrestricted proliferation of nuclear weapons is undoubtedly dangerous. The United Nations voted almost unanimously in favor of a nonproliferation treaty. I think we share this view.

It is in our interests that other countries also enact the "nonproliferation" which the Federal Republic enacted in advance. I do not want to indulge in speculation about China, but I realize full well that the two world powers may be mutually concerned about those countries which regard the atomic bomb as a further development of artillery.

<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, pp. 69-83.

As for the Soviet Union and its relations with Germany, I do not regard this time as opportune to make predictions about Soviet intentions. On the other hand, I can see the possibility of increasing our political freedom of action through a sound nonproliferation treaty.

We, or the majority of us, have in these years assumed that Germany is no longer a major military power. Germany's role and its future influence will be determined by whether or not we shall succeed in holding the frontline economically and scientifically in matters of technology and quality, or even reaching the top. In this matter, a nonproliferation treaty must not be an obstacle—and this is a really vital matter.

*Question: What prerequisites must exist for the Federal Government to sign the treaty?*

*Answer:* I have just mentioned the most important prerequisite. In addition, the treaty must be part of a general disarmament policy. Furthermore, countries with nuclear weapons must renounce the misuse of their positions to apply pressure, threats, or blackmail, and our legitimate security interests must be safeguarded.

*Question: Would it not be appropriate for Bonn to refrain from signing until the treaty is signed by India, Pakistan, Japan, Italy, and Sweden?*

*Answer:* The question of signing is not yet under discussion. As the Federal Chancellor said, we shall decide on the basis of insight and conscience. The countries mentioned by you are—like us—industrialized, nonmilitary nuclear countries or in the process of developing. We are in contact with them and others regarding questions which the nonnuclear countries are addressing to the nuclear powers. I do not want to exclude the possibility that this attitude will also be valid for the phase of accession to the treaty. We are in no way under any pressure of time.

### Statement by the Department of State on Nonproliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Activities, February 20, 1967<sup>1</sup>

*Q: Under a non-proliferation treaty, would it be possible for the United States to sell plutonium to EURATOM and the FRG?*

*A:* Yes. As you know, the United States has been selling plutonium to EURATOM for developing improved nuclear reactors to produce electric power. This plutonium is, of course, safeguarded against diversion to military purposes. There is no reason why such sales could not take place under a non-proliferation treaty to which EURATOM members subscribe: in fact, it may well facilitate such transactions in the future.

<sup>1</sup> Department of State files. The replies were made by a Department of State spokesman.

*Q: Can you cite any area of peaceful nuclear development which would be precluded by the non-proliferation treaty other than the development of peaceful explosive devices?*

*A: No. And here we should like to emphasize that it is only the development of peaceful explosive devices which would be precluded in a non-proliferation treaty. The United States believes that any benefits which may emerge from the development of peaceful nuclear explosive devices should be made available to the world. As for the actual use of these devices, the United States has said that this service ought to be performed by the nuclear-weapon powers without discrimination for the non-nuclear-weapon powers.<sup>2</sup>*

*Q: Will it be possible for countries like the FRG to proceed with the development of a fast-breeder reactor?*

*A: Of course. There is no reason why such development should be affected in any way by a non-proliferation treaty.*

*Q: There have been questions raised in European newspapers as to whether a non-proliferation treaty might expose a country to industrial espionage, or other hindrances to civilian nuclear industry. Is there any real basis for such fears?*

*A: Any such fears are without foundation. The experience of the United States with the International Atomic Energy Agency has some relevance on this point. That Agency has not only inspected U.S. Government reactors but has regularly inspected the giant privately-owned power reactor at Rowe, Massachusetts--this was done, as a matter of fact, on February 16 of this year. This experience has indicated that so-called "industrial espionage" is not a problem.*

*There are presently two international safeguards systems in existence, the Euratom system in Western Europe and the system of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. The technical procedures of the two systems are very similar, and the United States considers both systems to be effective. All peaceful nuclear facilities in Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and the Federal Republic of Germany are presently safeguarded under the Euratom system. The IAEA is now safeguarding more than 50 reactors in 26 countries, including the United States. On February 14, fourteen Latin American states signed a nuclear-free zone treaty which calls for IAEA safeguards on their nuclear activities.<sup>3</sup>*

*Neither safeguard system hampers peaceful nuclear activities. It is important to note that safeguards inspectors have no power to interfere with the construction or operation of any nuclear facility. They are limited to such activities as auditing records, verifying inventories, and observing operations.*

*As an additional protection in the case of the IAEA the inspected state may reject in advance the designation of a particular IAEA inspector (for example, because he is a national of a hostile country) and*

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966, p. 527.*

<sup>3</sup> *See ante, pp. 69-83.*

request that a different inspector be sent. Moreover, the appointment of each IAEA inspector must be approved by the IAEA Board of Governors, which consists of representatives of 25 countries.

### Message From President Johnson to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, February 21, 1967<sup>1</sup>

The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee reconvenes today in a time of renewed hope. Conclusion of a treaty banning weapons of mass destruction in outer space,<sup>2</sup> and a treaty for a Latin American nuclear free zone,<sup>3</sup> give new impetus to the effort to bring the arms race under control.

The Disarmament Committee now faces a great opportunity—a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. I earnestly hope that it will soon be possible to recommend draft provisions of a non-proliferation treaty for the consideration of the Committee.

As I pointed out to the Congress in my State of the Union Message, the world is “in the midst of a great transition, a transition from narrow nationalism to international partnership; from the harsh spirit of the cold war to the hopeful spirit of common humanity on a troubled and threatened planet.”<sup>4</sup>

Our deepest obligation to ourselves and to our children is to bring nuclear weapons under control. We have already made considerable progress. The next step is to prevent the further spread of these weapons. If we fail to act now, nation after nation will be driven to use valuable resources to acquire them. Even local conflicts will involve the danger of nuclear war. Nuclear arms will spread to potentially unstable areas where open warfare has taken place during the last decade. Indeed, all the progress of the past few years toward a less dangerous world may well be undone.

A non-proliferation treaty must be equitable as between the nuclear and the non-nuclear-weapons powers. I am confident that we can achieve such equity and that the security of all nations will be enhanced.

Such a treaty will help free the non-nuclear nations from the agonizing decision of whether to pursue a search for security through nuclear arms. Freed from the fear that non-nuclear neighbors may develop such weapons, nations can devote their efforts in the field of atomic energy to developing strong, peaceful programs.

I have instructed our negotiators to exercise the greatest care that the treaty not hinder the non-nuclear powers in their development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We believe in sharing the benefits of scientific progress and we will continue to act accordingly. Through IAEA, through EURATOM, and through other international channels, we have shared—and will continue to share—the

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/187, Feb. 21, 1967.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 33-43.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 63-83.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 3.

knowledge we have gained about nuclear energy. There will be no barrier to effective co-operation among the signatory nations.

I am sure we all agree that a non-proliferation treaty should not contain any provisions that would defeat its major purpose. The treaty must, therefore, cover nuclear explosive devices for peaceful as well as military purposes. The technology is the same. A peaceful nuclear explosive device would, in effect, also be a highly sophisticated weapon.

However, this will not impose any technological penalty on the participating nations. The United States is prepared to make available nuclear explosive services for peaceful purposes on a non-discriminatory basis under appropriate international safeguards. We are prepared to join other nuclear states in a commitment to do this.

More generally, we recommend that the treaty clearly state the intention of its signatories to make available the full benefits of peaceful nuclear technology—including any benefits that are the by-product of weapons research.

To assure that the peaceful atom remains peaceful, we must work toward a broad international system of safeguards satisfactory to all concerned. The treaty provides a unique opportunity for progress to this end.

Agreement on a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons will be an historic turning point in the long effort to bring the atom to heel. It will, I am confident, permit further co-operative steps to reduce nuclear armaments. Plain sanity calls for a halt to the competition in nuclear arms.

There is nothing to choose here between the interests of the nuclear and the non-nuclear nations; there is a terrible and inescapable equity in our common danger. I wish you Godspeed in your work.

**Statement by the Mexican Representative (Garcia Robles)  
to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Latin  
American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty [Extract], Febru-  
ary 21, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

59. Let me now deal briefly with the Treaty itself. As the full text has already been circulated, I will merely make a few comments on eight of its main subjects: the Preamble; obligations of member States; definition of nuclear weapons; explosions for peaceful purposes; organization; control system; entry into force, and undertakings required of States possessing nuclear weapons.

60. The Preamble, I consider without either boasting or false modesty, easily stands comparison both in substance and in form with any other similar text yet drafted. Its opening paragraph and the two concluding ones, which I propose to read to you, amply illustrate the lofty principles on which the Treaty is based and the noble aims it pursues:

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.287, pp. 23-28. The treaty appears *ante*, pp. 60-83.

In the name of their peoples and faithfully interpreting their desires and aspirations, the Governments of the States which have signed the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,

*Desiring* to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending the armaments race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards strengthening a world at peace, based on the sovereign equality of States, mutual respect and good neighbourliness . . .

61. The Preamble ends by expressing the Latin-American States' Conviction—

That the military denuclearization of Latin America—being understood to mean the undertaking entered into internationally in this Treaty to keep their territories forever free from nuclear weapons—will constitute a measure which will spare their peoples from the squandering of their limited resources on nuclear armaments and will protect them against possible nuclear attacks on their territories, and will also constitute a significant contribution towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and a powerful factor for general and complete disarmament, and

That Latin America, faithful to its tradition of universality, must not only endeavour to banish from its homelands the scourge of a nuclear war, but must also strive to promote the well-being and advancement of its peoples, at the same time co-operating in the fulfilment of the ideals of mankind, that is to say, in the consolidation of a permanent peace based on equal rights, economic fairness and social justice for all, in accordance with the principles and purposes set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Charter of the Organization of American States.

62. In regard to obligations, the Latin-American States have devised a definition which is undoubtedly one of the most comprehensive ever to have been drafted at world or regional level and certainly does not appear to contain any loophole. In article 1 of the Treaty the Contracting Parties undertake "to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction, and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories" both "the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons" and "the receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapon, directly or indirectly, by the Parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way". The Contracting Parties also undertake "to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon."

63. Furthermore, the definition of nuclear weapons contained in Article 5 of the Treaty is also, in my opinion, one of the most precise ever formulated and one which corresponds most closely to the latest technological developments. It states that, for the purposes of the Treaty, a nuclear weapon is "any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for war-like purposes." It adds the proviso: "An instrument that may be used for the transport or propulsion of the device is not included in this definition if it is separable from the device and not an indivisible part thereof."

64. Concerning the "explosions for peaceful purposes" referred to in Article 18 of the Treaty, it should be pointed out that the Contracting Parties may only carry out such explosions "provided that they do so in accordance with the provisions" of that article and "the other

articles of the Treaty, particularly articles 1 and 5" to which I have just referred.

65. Moreover, Article 18 establishes quite clearly the obligation of Contracting Parties intending to carry out or co-operate in the carrying out of such an explosion to notify both the Latin-American Agency set up under the Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as far in advance as the circumstances require, of the date of the explosion and at the same time to provide certain relevant information specified in the article. It also establishes their duty to allow observation of all the preparations, including the explosion of the device, and unrestricted access to any area in the vicinity of the site of the explosion in order to ascertain whether the device and the procedures followed during the explosion are in conformity with the information supplied.

66. In referring to this question at the signing ceremony on 14 February I used words which I think I might appropriately repeat on this occasion:

The effectiveness of the undertakings entered into under the Treaty to prohibit all nuclear weapons in our territories will depend not so much on the wording of its provisions as on the good faith with which they are observed. In this connexion I should like to make a few comments which I consider justified and objective.

One of the main problems with which the Commission had to contend in order to draft the Treaty was undoubtedly that of reconciling certain important aspects of the right of member States of the future Latin-American organization to use the atom for peaceful purposes with the absolute and unqualified prohibition of nuclear weapons. In all probability, apart from the merit of the texts which, finally obtained general approval, this problem will never arise in practice in such a way as to imply an option. But if it did, and if unfortunately it were necessary to choose between the manufacture of nuclear devices which, though intended for peaceful purposes, were basically identical with nuclear weapons, and the renunciation of all nuclear explosions as the only means of avoiding the proliferation of those terrible weapons of mass destruction, the spirit which pervades the Treaty and is expressed in the Preamble clearly indicates which of those two alternative courses would be chosen by the States members of the Preparatory Commission.

Unless technological progress one day makes it possible to distinguish clearly between nuclear explosives for peaceful and for warlike purposes, it will be necessary to seek a solution which precludes the spread of nuclear weapons and at the same time ensures that States which, like all the Latin-American countries, do not possess them are not deprived of the immense benefits which their economic development might derive from the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

As an immediate remedy, we believe that the possibility should be explored of creating at world level, within one of the existing international organizations such as the United Nations or the International Atomic Energy Agency or independently, a special programme similar to that which already exists for economic development, with the specific aim of helping all States in need of such assistance to carry out on their territories nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It has been shown, of course, that absolutely no danger is involved with such help those countries would not have to squander their limited resources unnecessarily in themselves manufacturing the essential explosives.

The Mexican Government will study this matter with all the attention it deserves, in order to submit in due course to the appropriate international gatherings any conclusions or proposals which may result.<sup>4</sup>

67. That concludes the statement which I made one week ago at the closing meeting of the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America.

<sup>4</sup> COPREVAL/S/Inf. 55.

## 68. Concerning organization :

"In order to ensure compliance with the obligations" of the Treaty, Articles 7 to 11 provide for the establishment of a Latin-American autonomous organization to be known as the "Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America". The Agency's headquarters will be in Mexico City and it will have three principal organs: the General Conference, the supreme organ, which will hold regular sessions every two years and may also hold special sessions whenever the Treaty so provides or the circumstances so require; the Council, composed of five members elected by the General Conference; and the Secretariat, headed by the General Secretary, who, like the rest of the staff, will have an exclusively international position.

69. For the purpose of verifying compliance with the obligations entered into under the Treaty, Article 12 establishes a control system which is defined at length in Articles 13 to 18. In the system's application a pre-eminent role is assigned to the International Atomic Energy Agency and its system of safeguards. Provision is also made for the submission of periodic and special reports by the Contracting Parties, for special inspections in certain events, and for the transmission of reports on the results to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

70. The entry of the Treaty into force was the main problem left unsolved at the Preparatory Commission's third session, held from 19 April to 4 May 1966. The Proposals adopted on that occasion included two alternative texts on this subject.<sup>3</sup> According to the first the Treaty, like any other, would come into force among the ratifying States on the date of deposit of their respective instruments of ratification; while according to the second it could not enter into force for any State until a number of requirements had been met.

71. To solve this problem the Co-ordinating Committee suggested in its report of 28 December 1966—to which I have already referred—a compromise solution which might prove acceptable to all the member States of the Commission without prejudicing in any way their respective positions on the substance of the question, as reflected in the two alternative texts included in the Proposals. This is the formula which, with certain modifications, was finally adopted and incorporated in Article 28 of the Treaty. It provides that the Treaty shall enter into force for all signatory States only when they have met the four requirements specified in paragraph 1 of the article. Nevertheless, paragraph 2 goes on to say:

All signatory States shall have the imprescriptible right to waive, wholly or in part, the requirements laid down in the preceding paragraph. They may do so by means of a declaration which shall be annexed to their respective instruments of ratification and which may be formulated at the time of deposit of the instrument or subsequently. For those States which exercise this right, this Treaty shall enter into force upon deposit of the declaration, or as soon as those requirements have been met which have not been expressly waived.

## Paragraph 3 of the same article provides:

As soon as this Treaty has entered into force in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 for eleven States, the Depositary Government—that is, the Mexican Government—shall convene a preliminary meeting of those States in order that the Agency may be set up and commence its work.

<sup>3</sup> See *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 268-269.

Thus an eclectic system has been adopted which, while respecting the points of view of all the signatory States, prevents any one of them from vetoing the entry into force of the Treaty for those States which wish to abide voluntarily by the status of denuclearization which it defines and sets forth.

72. Incidentally, on the day that the Treaty was opened for signature the President of Mexico made it known through me that when the Executive, of which he is head, sends the Senate the text of the Treaty for approval, it will also send the text of the declaration provided for in Article 28, paragraph 2, whereby the Government of Mexico will waive all the requirements set forth in paragraph 1 of that article so that the Treaty may enter into force for Mexico from the time of deposit of its instrument of ratification.

73. The eighth and last question on which I should like to say a few words is the co-operation of the nuclear Powers. On this co-operation, which the United Nations General Assembly was already urging in 1963 in its resolution 1911 (XVIII),<sup>4</sup> the Treaty contains an Additional Protocol II whereby States in possession of nuclear weapons which sign and ratify it undertake to respect it "in all its express aims and provisions". In particular they undertake not to contribute in any way, in the territories to which the Treaty applies, "to the performance of acts involving a violation of the obligations of article 1 of the Treaty", nor "to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty".

74. In the light of this brief review of some of the main provisions of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, and especially in the light of a more detailed analysis of the Treaty, there will certainly not be wanting persons who will say—and of course quite rightly—that this is not a perfect treaty, that it suffers from defects and could be better. Still, I do not think that need worry us, because it applies to all products of human efforts, which are essentially open to improvement. My own conviction is that the Treaty, despite its limitations, is destined to exercise a moral influence of incalculable value.

. . . . .

### Statement by the Swedish Representative (Myrdal) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, February 23, 1967<sup>1</sup>

29. In raising my voice today for the first time after the resumption of our work in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, I wish to start by joining those who have expressed their great satisfaction with the signs of rapprochement which we are so eagerly registering these days. This session undoubtedly opens with great expectations that we shall reap some harvest from that spirit of co-operation which became

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 628-629.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.288, pp. 11-13.

apparent during the debate on disarmament at the General Assembly of the United Nations.

30. The considerable number of resolutions on disarmament tabled at the Assembly and the importance of those adopted, give further proof of the enormous interest in disarmament prevailing throughout the world. Most of those resolutions refer directly to efforts to be made within this Committee, several times stressing that it is "imperative to make further efforts". We are now under the obligation to live up to those expectations and to present to the world some concrete results of our labours, some definite promise of beginning disarmament in our time.

31. In order to expedite our work, we must establish an agenda which will offer a sufficiently wide framework for our discussions. The work schedule should also provide sufficient time margins for negotiations on all the issues that have been referred to us by the United Nations. In the foreground of our deliberations there should be at least the following:

To bring to a conclusion a treaty preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons;<sup>2</sup>

To elaborate without delay a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests;<sup>3</sup>

To achieve substantial progress in regard to general and complete disarmament under effective international control;<sup>4</sup> and in this connexion—and this is somewhat newer—

To seek an agreement on cessation of the development and production of chemical and bacteriological weapons.<sup>5</sup>

32. In addition to those items, expressly referred to the Committee by the United Nations, my delegation assumes that such a question as that of the halting of the production of fissile materials for weapon purposes can also be discussed under one of them.

33. My Government requests that, in order to make the best possible use of our time during this session, negotiations should proceed simultaneously along several lines. One reason for this is that there is greater hope of achieving success if several tracks are followed jointly: we must have a kind of real grid system for incessant crosschecking of our arguments and their consequences. This should preferably consist of draft treaty texts on each of the important issues in the field of nuclear disarmament; because these issues are indeed technically interdependent.

34. The most important reason for our request, however, is that such parallel negotiations would, in our view, enhance the possibilities of obtaining political results; because, precisely when we are about to enter what seems to be a period of serious negotiations, the Committee must constantly view the measures in this field in a broad perspective. In order to get our final positions clarified, it would consequently seem far less promising to concentrate on one issue only at a time, expecting that the other issues will be pursued in a later sequence.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 686-687, 748-749.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 802-803.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 799-800.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 798-799.

35. It is of crucial importance to the non-nuclear weapon States, and particularly to the non-aligned ones, that there be firm assurances that other concrete measures will be forthcoming, resulting in definite curtailment of the nuclear armaments race which is continuing both in the qualitative and the quantitative directions. Such assurances are, of course, most definitely measurable if progress is being made on specific issues, such as a comprehensive test ban which would imply disarmament undertakings on the part also of nuclear weapon States.

36. This request for parallel consideration of several nuclear disarmament issues mandated to us by the United Nations is certainly not intended to delay progress.

On the contrary, my delegation feels that the line of parallel efforts is indeed a constructive one in order to facilitate a universal acceptance of non-proliferation. This may become even clearer if we return to the technical links between that issue and the other ones mentioned. I will take but two examples where our negotiations now may otherwise encounter some hurdles.

37. One is the question of the peaceful use of nuclear explosions, which Lord Chalfont has also spoken of today. Evidently the problems raised in this respect belong especially to the context of considerations in connexion with a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Particularly to those of us who agree—on the basis of expert advice—with the view of the nuclear weapon Powers that the process for production of nuclear explosives is, at least for the present, in practice one and the same whether the explosives are to be used for peaceful purposes or not, it becomes necessary that some international order be instituted to control both the production and the use of peaceful nuclear explosives.

38. To make such international control of the latter—that is of the explosions—world-wide and thus both effective and truly equitable, for instance, by some form of international licensing for each and all of such undertakings, would however be a subject that would most logically be treated in connexion with discussions on a test ban, even if in the final instance a special agreement for this purpose be entered into. The control of peaceful nuclear explosions made by nuclear-weapon States cannot very well be discussed under the heading of non-proliferation. Therefore, treaty texts must be seen in juxtaposition and compared.

39. The case is similar to the other example also at present under debate: namely the form of international control of peaceful nuclear activities of the "controlled" kind, to borrow a phrase just used by Lord Chalfont. When discussing how such safeguards should be imposed on certain activities and/or on certain groups of countries, we must be able to perceive the pattern of their universal application. Only then can we judge rationally how far in the direction of universality to proceed at the first step. The substance falling under this heading is thus definitely connected with both non-proliferation and a cut-off of production of fissile material for weapon purposes. It must be discussed here, not only outside the Committee, and discussed in this prospective context.

40. In order to study the issues indicated thoroughly and effectively, so that we can see a pattern emerging for the future, we need to follow a procedure of simultaneous negotiations. That is my plea to-day.

Address by Chancellor Kiesinger to Christian Democratic  
Editors: Nonproliferation Negotiations [Extract], Feb-  
ruary 27, 1967<sup>1</sup>

I do not want to speak at length about other aspects of our foreign policy, because I do not want to detain you too long. Only a few points. It is with concern that I view the relationship with our Western Allies, especially with the United States of America.

I have told my American visitors repeatedly in recent days: It cannot go on this way. We talk with each other only about points of controversy. We no longer speak about common policies. What we have once built up and what was filled with an immense desire for the peace of the world, this threatens to become an empty shell, a mere structure: NATO, the spirit of the NATO Alliance.

Naturally I know that this has to do with the changes which have happened in the world. General de Gaulle complained that we Germans were—he put it politely—too obedient with regard to the Americans, all of us, even Adenauer. Now, I answered him: I cannot accept that for my Government. Naturally we also know that American policy in Europe serves exclusively American interests. There are Germans who believe that there is in this respect a kind of friendship or friendly services. This always leads later to bitter disappointments. Politics between nations is determined by interests. Thus American policy pursues American interests. It is our task to find out how far American interests coincide with our own, with German and with European interests, and how far they do not or do no longer coincide. At the height of the cold war these interests were naturally largely identical. Since then, however, this curious, almost paradoxical situation has developed, which apparently has not been correctly grasped by any diplomacy. The Alliance continues on. The antagonisms continue. But on top of this, a form of nuclear complicity or of a common nuclear responsibility has taken shape which forces these antagonists ever closer and closer together. And to put all this into diplomatic language, to bear this in mind in all debates and put it into the proper words is extremely difficult. For example, the non-proliferation treaty. For my taste much too much noise has been made here about it. I would have preferred it if we for once quietly in all firmness would have waited to see what other people had to say about it because other nations have a great deal to say about it and in fact are now saying it. It is by no means that our press should not have spoken up about this important problem. This was indeed a help also for the Government's negotiating position. It is a very difficult decision which we are expected to make, a very difficult decision. But, here again, one should see the entire picture. There are doubtless points in this Treaty which we must absolutely insist upon, which unless clarified would make it impossible for us in good conscience to sign the Treaty. These

<sup>1</sup> Department of State files.

points concern, above all, the question of the unimpaired scientific research in the area of peaceful development of atomic energy and the utilization of these findings by our industry. This is the decisive point. In addition, there is the question, which, in my opinion, has been presented somewhat overdramatically, that there is also a technological spinoff for the Powers which develop nuclear weapons, and our participation in this. And next comes the question of controls, first of all the controls must not be exercised precisely by those who have the nuclear monopoly. They should not at the same time be allowed to be the police and the controllers. And secondly, the controls must be very precisely regulated; that means, one must know precisely what the controllers are allowed to do and what not.

Recently there have been indications that the controls on which the Americans above all have insisted would be perhaps entirely taken out of the Treaty on account of Russian hesitations, which naturally would produce a very interesting perspective.

It would be wonderful if it were possible—Sweden tends somewhat in this direction—to achieve through this goal of non-proliferation, in which we also have a vital interest, real progress toward disarmament or, for example, the question of now also banning underground tests. This would be very much easier to carry through in a world in which no Chinese atom bomb existed or in which there was no possibility for the Chinese to develop this bomb further, than at present. Thus, we see that just there lies one of the very big difficulties.

I said in Oberhausen with regard to the unqualified attacks of Herr Kosygin, that for us the question whether we sign this Treaty or not is exclusively a matter of our own opinion and of our own conscience, and it is going to stay that way.

We will pursue this path in all calmness and firmness to the end. I hope that in the end a really satisfactory solution can be found, which on the one hand—I stress this now once more—assures a solution of the very important problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, on the other hand, will also ensure all the vital interests of our own nation and the vital interests of the non-nuclear powers.

However, I must frankly admit I would have wished that before we were confronted with such a difficult and far-reaching decision that all aspects which are connected with this, among others, also security considerations, had been considered in depth by the Allies, and that is exactly what has not occurred. And I have made it clear to my American visitors, with whom I have spoken about this problem, that in the future we will insist upon such a comprehensive and thorough consultation regarding the political interrelations, not only in our own interest, but also in the interest of the preservation and the revitalization of the North Atlantic Alliance, which still in our opinion remains essential.

**News Conference Remarks by President Johnson: Discussions With the Soviet Union. [Extracts], March 2, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

I have a brief announcement to make. I have received a reply from Chairman Kosygin to my letter of January 27.<sup>2</sup> This reply confirmed the willingness of the Soviet Government to discuss means of limiting the arms race in offensive and defensive nuclear missiles.

This exchange of views is expected to lead to further discussions of this subject in Moscow and with our allies. It is my hope that a means can be found to achieve constructive results.

I will be glad to take any questions in the time allotted to me.

Q. Mr. President, this applies, did I understand correctly, to offensive weapons as well as the establishment of an antimissile system?

THE PRESIDENT. Offensive and defensive.

Q. Mr. President, on what level will these discussions be?

THE PRESIDENT. They will be in Moscow with Ambassador Thompson. Then we will see how they progress.

Q. Mr. President, will these Moscow discussions be concurrent with the ones going on in the 18-nation disarmament conference going on in Geneva?

THE PRESIDENT. Not necessarily. They are not timed in connection with any other conferences.

As you know, I sent Chairman Kosygin a letter and asked him to consider the desirability of an exchange of views in this regard. He has responded. We would assume that the discussions would be initiated with Ambassador Thompson. I wouldn't go further than that at this time.

Q. Mr. President, do you see an interconnection between Senate passage of the consular treaty,<sup>3</sup> the space treaty,<sup>4</sup> East-West trade, and a nonproliferation treaty? Do you see these as kind of one movement?

THE PRESIDENT. I think they are all very desirable moves in the national interest of the United States.

When I became President, one of the first steps I took in the first few weeks I was President was to communicate with Chairman Khrushchev and suggest that we explore together certain agreements that would be beneficial to both nations in promoting peace in the world.

Exchanges between our two countries resulted in: the signing of the civil air agreement; the signing of the new cultural agreement; the signing of the consular agreement, which I devoutly hope will be ratified by the Senate, and about which I have had innumerable conversa-

<sup>1</sup> *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Mar. 6, 1967, pp. 353-355.

<sup>2</sup> Neither letter was published.

<sup>3</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, June 22, 1964, pp. 979-985.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 38-43.

\* TIAS 6135.

\* TIAS 6149.

tions with the leaders of this Congress of both parties; the progress that has been made in the nonproliferation agreement—although we have not come to a complete meeting of the minds with all of the individuals involved, we have made progress; the space agreement, which we hope the Senate will act favorably upon; the East-West trade, which is being considered.

We have recommended all of those. We hope that the Congress will confirm our judgment that they are in the best interests of the United States. They were not made as a package move. They were made as individual recommendations.

But I do think that what your question implies is: Does that reflect a policy on the part of this Government of attempting to find areas of agreement with the Soviet Union?

The answer is, yes. We are exploring, with every means at our command, every possible way of relieving tensions in the world and promoting peace in the world.

Q. Mr. President, may I go back to your statement on the Soviet willingness to limit the arms race? Is it your understanding from Chairman Kosygin's letter that they will now cease the construction of antiballistic missile systems while we discuss the problem?

THE PRESIDENT. My understanding of his letter is reflected in seven simple sentences. There will be a transcript available to you. I wouldn't go beyond that.

I don't think there is any implication that is not made clear.

Q. Mr. President, if you have told us this, I missed it: Can you give us some idea as to when the conversations are going to start?

THE PRESIDENT. We don't have a date on that. It will be at a mutually satisfactory time. We will be very glad for them to start at the earliest possible date.

Q. Mr. President, can you give us the date on the Kosygin letter?

THE PRESIDENT. My letter was January 27, and I don't have the date of his at the moment.

Q. Mr. President, Chairman Kosygin's letter refers to offensive and defensive nuclear missiles. Did your letter go so far or was your proposal limited to defensive?

THE PRESIDENT. My letter was prompted by the desire to raise the question of defensive weapons. We had previously raised the question of offensive weapons.

The Chairman's reply to us is agreeable to us. We are very glad to have the opportunity to discuss both, as we had indicated previously, although not in the same channels.

Q. Mr. President, was your January 27 letter prompted primarily by the Soviet antimissile system being deployed around Moscow, the one you mentioned recently?

THE PRESIDENT. The January 27 letter was prompted by two primary reasons. First, the desire to have a discussion involving the limitation of arms, whenever possible, that might lead to an agreement. We are constantly pursuing any courses that might lead to an agreement that would be in the interest of the people of the world.

Second, before reaching a final decision on the course this Government would follow in connection with a defensive system, I think we would like to explore an agreement.

In any event, we would like to have some discussions and be sure we couldn't get an agreement before we made a very basic decision that was far-reaching, comprehensive, and one on which we could not turn back.

Q. Mr. President, during the discussion, what will be the status of the research and development on the antiballistic missile? Will it continue or be suspended?

THE PRESIDENT. I assume both countries will continue with whatever efforts they think are desirable. I would see no reason for us to suspend work that we have underway.

Q. Mr. President, I didn't understand what you said earlier, referring to six sentences about the transcript. Could we have the texts of the exchange of the two leaders?

THE PRESIDENT. I think at this time I will limit you to my statement on the subject. That will be in the transcript. I will read it again, if you have the time and if I have the time. If not, it will be in the transcript.

Q. Sir, can you tell us exactly when you received the letter?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't have that.

Q. Not when it was dated, when you received it.

THE PRESIDENT. I don't have the date of the letter or the time it was received.

Q. Mr. President, is there any possibility of you and Mr. Kosygin meeting in the near future?

THE PRESIDENT. I see nothing in this that would indicate that now.

MERRIMAN SMITH (UPI). Thank you, Mr. President.

### Statement by Secretary of State Rusk to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Outer-Space Treaty, March 7, 1967<sup>1</sup>

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen.

It gives me very great pleasure to be here today to discuss with you the recently signed Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.<sup>2</sup>

I am especially delighted to be associated today with my Cabinet colleague, our distinguished Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg. Ambassador Goldberg handled our side of the negotiation of this treaty with great skill and dedication and is eminently qualified to go over its contents with you in detail. Since my remarks are in the nature of an introduction of Ambassador Goldberg, I shall make them brief.

<sup>1</sup> *Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings*, pp. 1-4.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 38-43.

In my view, the interests and security of the United States would be advanced by its ratification. Perhaps of greatest significance is the fact that there is a treaty at all. Negotiations were proposed only last May, when President Johnson urged that steps be taken to negotiate a treaty on celestial bodies.<sup>3</sup> On the proposal of the Soviet Union, negotiations were expanded to draw on previous United Nations resolutions and to include all of outer space as well as celestial bodies within the scope of the treaty. We welcomed that proposal as forthcoming and responsive to the problems that confront mankind.

The negotiations proceeded in a businesslike fashion, with a minimum of polemics, and were successfully concluded in a remarkably short time, considering the treaty's comprehensive nature. The conclusion of this treaty, we feel, augurs well for the possibility of finding areas of common interest and agreement with the Soviet Union on other significant issues—especially in those fields in which there are genuine common interests affecting all mankind.

The Antarctic Treaty<sup>4</sup> and the Limited Test Ban Treaty<sup>5</sup> are examples of a congruence of common interests among the United States, the Soviet Union, and almost all other countries. The Outer Space Treaty is the most recent example of a successful identification of common interests and their expression in a mutually acceptable legal instrument.

#### REDUCING DANGERS OF CONFLICT

It is our earnest desire and our basic policy to continue to explore with the Soviet Union and others additional ways of reducing the danger of conflict and of promoting stability and security in the world. Progress in achieving this aim may not be rapid, and it is not inevitable. But it is possible and it is more urgent than many think. A task of prime importance at this time is the conclusion, for example, of a treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. We are working hard on that treaty. Similarly, we should like to make progress on an agreement to limit the prospective race in offensive and defensive missiles, and are pleased that the Soviet Union has indicated its willingness to participate in serious discussions.

The Outer Space Treaty now before this committee emerged from the processes of the United Nations and its General Assembly. The treaty is a positive result of the political process which the General Assembly has developed over the course of years. It indicates the manner in which standards of behavior and, indeed, rules of international law can result from the deliberations of the General Assembly.

#### ANTECEDENTS OF OUTER SPACE TREATY

The antecedents of the Outer Space Treaty are, I believe, generally familiar to you. They are the Antarctic Treaty of 1959; the United Nations Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1963<sup>6</sup>; and the resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1963 that calls upon states not

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 275-276

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 1945-1959, vol. II, pp. 1550-1556

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293

<sup>6</sup> For the U.N. declaration, see *ibid.*, pp. 644-646

to station weapons of mass destruction in space—whether in orbit around the earth, on celestial bodies, or otherwise.<sup>7</sup>

So this treaty represents a synthesis of the experience of nations since the beginning of the space age. There has been for almost eight years, an earnest effort to articulate and define the general standards of behavior that should govern states in the use of outer space and celestial bodies. The standards developed in the Outer Space Treaty represent a balance of rights and obligations between nations who are conducting space activities and those who do not. The treaty contains provisions of immediate applicability, and others that will assume greater importance as the activities of states develop in outer space. Finally, the treaty provides for arms control measures that will promote our security today and will be of increasing importance in years to come.

#### BALANCE BETWEEN RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN NATIONS

Establishing a balance between rights and obligations was of particular concern to the treaty negotiators. It was recognized that, while only a limited number of states might enter outer space, such activities could affect the well-being of all on this planet and in the earth's environment. Further, it was recognized that when man extends his activities beyond this earth, he ought to do so as more than just the representative of a single nation state. Thus the treaty speaks of astronauts as "envoys of mankind" and considers the exploration and use of space and celestial bodies to be for the benefit of all mankind. Knowledge derived from space will be made available to scientists of all nations. The importance of avoiding harmful contamination of the earth as well as of celestial bodies is dealt with in the treaty. The provisions on liability, interference with other countries' space activities, and assistance to and return of astronauts are part of the balance of rights and obligations which are characteristic of any successful negotiating effort.

The treaty is balanced, as well, between principles having immediate application and others whose usefulness will be in future years. Among the principles of immediate importance are the provisions on liability, the obligation unconditionally to assist and to return astronauts, and the obligation to report any findings that bear on the safety of astronauts. These can be of direct importance in the carrying forward of our space program. Among the broad principles that will grow in significance are those applying international law and the United Nations Charter to the activities of states in outer space, insuring freedom of exploration, and barring national appropriation of outer space and celestial bodies.

#### ARMS CONTROL PROVISIONS

Finally, the treaty's arms-control provisions are of immediate and particular importance to our national security. Parties to the treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 538.

outer space in any other manner. Parties to the treaty undertake as well to use the moon and other celestial bodies exclusively for peaceful purposes. They undertake not to establish military bases, installations or fortifications and to abstain from testing any types of weapons or conducting military maneuvers on celestial bodies. There is, of course, no prohibition on the use of military personnel and equipment for peaceful purposes.

#### PROVISIONS FOR VERIFICATION OF TREATY OBSERVATION

Concomitant with these arms control measures, the treaty contains provisions which, together with our own developing national capabilities, will permit adequate verification that the treaty is being observed. Article I permits free access to all areas of celestial bodies. Article XII provides that all stations, installations, equipment, and space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other parties to the treaty. In addition, outer space and celestial bodies are declared free for exploration and use by all states and the treaty provides that outer space is not subject to national appropriation. Under the treaty, space vehicles of the United States will be free to go anywhere in outer space, on the moon or other celestial bodies. The problems of military security, Mr. Chairman, which are related to this treaty have been examined with great care. The conclusion of the executive branch, including those with special responsibility for military and defense matters, is that the treaty will contribute to this Nation's security.

#### TREATY ESTABLISHES LEGAL BASIS TO GOVERN OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES

To conclude, the attempt to develop law and a peaceful world order constitutes a necessary element in U.S. policy. These are essential goals of the United Nations as well. The Outer Space Treaty establishes the basis for a legal regime to govern the activities of states in outer space.

The treaty is not complete in all possible details. It does not deal with all problems that may develop. But it is responsible to those problems that can be described and forecast today.

This treaty demonstrates that man's skill at making law can keep pace with his technological prowess. The treaty succeeds in substantial measure in establishing the necessary standards for reducing the dangers of military conflict in outer space and for encouraging its peaceful exploration.

I venture to hope that this treaty may serve as an impressive model for further cooperation among the nations—a cooperation that is essential if the world is going to escape destruction by conflict and if it is going to make headway in conquering disease and poverty, in relating population rationally to means of decent livelihood, and in offering all men proper scope for their talents and energies.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope the committee would now hear from Ambassador Goldberg.

## Statement by Ambassador Goldberg to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Outer-Space Treaty, March 7, 1967<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I welcome this opportunity to give testimony to the Committee on Foreign Relations on the Outer Space Treaty. In this statement I shall first briefly sum up the most important provisions of the Treaty; then indicate what seem to me its main points of significance to our national interest and security; and, finally discuss in somewhat more detail the history of our negotiations.

### I. MAJOR PROVISIONS

In sum, the Treaty's most important provisions can be stated as follows:

1. In the area of *arms control*, it forbids the orbiting or stationing in outer space or on celestial bodies of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. It specifies that the moon and other celestial bodies are to be used only for peaceful purposes and forbids certain military activities on celestial bodies. Further, it guarantees access, without veto, by each party to the installations and vehicles of other parties on celestial bodies. It insures, as well, freedom of movement anywhere in outer space and on celestial bodies.

2. The Treaty declares outer space to be the "province of all mankind," and *forbids claims of sovereignty* to outer space or the moon or any other celestial body. It explicitly extends the rule of international law, including the Charter, into the newly entered realm of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies.

3. The Treaty furthers *peaceful cooperation* in a number of ways. It assures freedom of scientific investigation in outer space and commits the parties to promote international cooperation to this end. It guarantees freedom of access to all parts of celestial bodies. It requires the fullest practicable reporting by all states on the nature, conduct, locations, and results of their space activities. It calls for avoidance of space activities that would contaminate celestial bodies or do harm to the earth's environment. It forbids harmful interference with another's space activities and calls for appropriate consultation. And it declares as a general principle that the exploration and use of outer space "shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries."

4. Finally, the Treaty affords important protections to *astronauts*. They are to be regarded "as envoys of all mankind." In outer space, astronauts of different nations are required to assist one another. If an astronaut makes an emergency landing on foreign territory he must be given all possible assistance and must be returned home safely and promptly. And any hazard to astronauts that is discovered in outer space must be made known immediately by the party making the discovery.

<sup>1</sup> *Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings*, pp. 148-156. The treaty appears *ante*, pp. 38-43.

That is not intended to be a complete list of the Treaty's provisions, but I believe it covers those that are most significant.

## II. ADVANTAGES TO THE UNITED STATES

The Outer Space Treaty contributes substantially not only to the fabric of common interests and peace in the community of nations, but also, and particularly, to the national interest and security of the United States. Many of its provisions, indeed, have been objectives of our diplomacy since the earliest years of the space age. Some are of immediate and concrete value; others are very broad principles whose ultimate value may not be fully realized for many years, until mankind has greatly multiplied its present activity in the new realm of outer space.

The advantages to the United States are, as I see them, of four kinds:

### 1. ARMS CONTROL

President Johnson has called this Treaty "the most important arms control development since the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963."<sup>1</sup> Unlike the nuclear tests which were outlawed by the 1963 Treaty,<sup>2</sup> the military measures in outer space which this Treaty will outlaw are measures that have never been taken. But nobody can say with confidence that they might not be taken, and this Treaty forbids such measures. Surely it is much better and infinitely easier to close the door to the arms race before it enters a new dimension, than to attempt to root it out once it has become established.

Moreover, beyond its intrinsic value as an arms control measure, this Treaty raises hopes for further steps along this road. In writing the arms control provisions of the Outer Space Treaty we drew inspiration and guidance from the corresponding provisions of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959,<sup>3</sup> as well as from the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Thus this is, in a very real sense, the third in a historic succession of treaties limiting the arms race. It is our hope that this success will, in turn, help to smooth the way for the next major step which we now urgently seek to take in agreement with the Soviet Union and any other powers concerned: namely, the treaty against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Each of these steps will give the United States—and the community of nations—more security at less cost.

### 2. INTERNATIONAL ORDER

The entire Outer Space Treaty will help to strengthen international order and promote habits of peaceful cooperation—not only in the new realm of outer space itself but in the many space-related activities here on earth.

The Treaty promotes these ends, first, by seeking to remove both the means and the causes of conflict in outer space. The arms control provisions operate in this sense. So do those provisions which extend international law into the realm of outer space and forbid claims of sovereignty in that realm. By thus seeking to minimize the hazards of human

<sup>1</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, p. 808.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 1945-1959, vol. II, pp. 1550-1556.

conflict in outer space, we hope to free our astronauts to concentrate on the natural hazards and challenges of this new environment—and to work together in overcoming them.

The Treaty also contains provisions to promote international cooperation in the conquest of space for common benefit. Although we are still in an early stage of growth in space science and technology, we already know that in such major fields as communications, weather forecasting and navigation, no nation can reap the full benefits of space technology except by joining in international cooperative ventures. In this sense the Outer Space Treaty is in the same line of historical development as the many treaties and agreements which govern the day-to-day essentials of modern life—which assure that international mail is delivered, that ships do not collide in the night, that epidemic diseases do not cross frontiers, and so on. All these instruments have a double value. Not only do they bring their various practical benefits; they also, when taken together, make up the very strong fabric of community life among the nations—binding nations together by their practical common interests and constituting a powerful, though little-noticed discouragement to war and incentive to peace.

### 3. UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS

All these considerations have a special importance in their bearing on our evolving relations with the Soviet Union. It is significant that the country which has for many years been our major adversary and a major source of danger to our security has also emerged as the only other nation with a space program comparable in size and scope to our own. Moreover, this has happened at a time when some of the sharp edges of Soviet hostility against the non-communist world have begun to wear down, enabling them perhaps to see their own true interests in a somewhat different light and to discuss with non-communist nations, including ourselves, new areas of common interests.

This Treaty, following on the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, is one further step in translating some of these common interests into concrete and enduring agreements. We should not exaggerate the impact on history of any one of these treaties in isolation; but it would be hard indeed to overstate the general tendency to which they all contribute—that of a growth of peace and tolerance and openness among the Soviet Union, the other nations associated with it in Eastern Europe, and the non-communist nations. I believe that this long-term trend will be advanced by this Treaty.

### 4. INTERESTS OF NON-LAUNCHING POWERS

I believe this Treaty is helpful to the interests of the United States in that it also serves and protects the interests of the non-launching powers. While we have cooperative programs of space research with a large number of countries, many nations have little or no space program of their own; yet their cooperation in the conquest of space is important in a number of ways, and it was essential to a meaningful treaty that it make equitable provision for the protection of their interests rather than concentrate too narrowly on the particular concerns of the major space powers. Moreover, all countries, whether space

powers or not, have a great stake in peace and in measures of arms control to enhance the security of all.

In this connection we were fortunate in having as our negotiating framework the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. This body was created by the General Assembly in 1961,<sup>5</sup> at the joint initiative of the United States and the U.S.S.R., to deal with both the legal and the scientific and technical implications of this new activity. Understandably, the major negotiating issues, which I shall discuss in a moment, arose between the leading space powers. But the delegates of other powers also took an active part in the writing of the Treaty.

As a result, these other powers can have confidence that the obligations which they assume under the Treaty—such as the return of astronauts or space vehicles landing on their soil—are fully balanced by provisions protecting their rights and providing them with concrete benefits. Among the most important of these are the hope expressed that space will be explored and used “for the benefit and in the interest of all countries”; and the explicit assurance of the right of all states, without discrimination and on a basis of equality, to explore freely and use outer space and celestial bodies. These areas thus cannot become the exclusive preserve of the big powers or the first arrivals.

Numerous other provisions of the Treaty, such as those on liability and contamination, protect the interests of the smaller powers. As a matter of principle as well as of pragmatism, I believe it is very much in the interest of the United States that the non-launching powers, whose cooperation and friendship are of great importance to us, should have such protections and assurances.

### III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TREATY

Let me now give the Committee some highlights of the history of this Treaty, both within the United States Government and in the negotiating phase.

As far as the United States Government is concerned, this Treaty is the result, over the years, of a broadly based consensus and of wide consultation and collaboration. This has been true as between political parties, as between the Executive and the Congress and as between the Executive departments.

The bipartisan origins of the Treaty, as well as the early Congressional interest in it, are attested to by the fact that the earliest initiatives toward international agreement in this area taken by President Eisenhower and by the then Majority leader of the Senate, Lyndon B. Johnson—who was also at that time the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Ever since that time the successive steps toward this Treaty have been taken on a bipartisan basis and in the closest consultation between the Executive and the concerned Committees of Congress. This was true during the negotiation in Geneva last July and August, when two of our Congressional advisers, Chairman George Miller of the Committee on Science and

<sup>5</sup> The U.N. Committee was established by the G.A. res. of Dec. 12, 1959 (*ibid.*, pp. 1556-1557) and enlarged by the G.A. res. of Dec. 20, 1961 (*ibid.*, 1961, pp. 738-741).

Astronautics and Representative James Fulton came to Geneva. The advice and counsel provided by members of the Senate in Washington and New York at various stages of the negotiations were likewise deeply appreciated.

As for the Executive Branch, the nature of the subject made necessary the close collaboration of a number of Executive departments and agencies. This collaboration was evidenced by the composition of my negotiating delegation which included representatives of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, NASA, the AEC, AECDA and the Department of State. From my standpoint as a negotiator this collaboration has been most successful and I cannot speak too highly of the participation and advice we received from all parts of the Government during the negotiating phase.

I am not going to go into the whole history of the work on this Treaty within the Government, which started almost with the beginning of the space age. A recent stimulus for these preparations was the developing pace of United States and Soviet activities directed towards the landing of astronauts on the moon. In October of 1965, the State Department circulated the text of a proposed treaty to other Executive agencies including the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Aeronautics and Space Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the National Aeronautics and Space Council. Subsequent inter-departmental consultations proceeded into the early months of 1966 and resulted in a number of changes in the proposed text.

On May 7, 1966, President Johnson made an announcement drawing attention to the need for a treaty laying down rules and procedures for the exploration of celestial bodies, and calling for early international discussions to this end. He pointed out that the United States wanted to do what it could to see that serious political conflicts did not arise as a result of space activities and to ensure that astronauts would be able freely to conduct scientific investigations of the moon.

The President's announcement proposed six elements of such a treaty: (1) freedom of exploration, (2) prohibition of claims of sovereignty, (3) freedom of scientific investigation and international cooperation, (4) studies to avoid harmful contamination, (5) mutual assistance among astronauts in case of need, and (6) a ban on the stationing of weapons of mass destruction, weapons tests and military maneuvers on celestial bodies.<sup>6</sup>

Mr. Chairman, each and every one of these six elements is included in the Treaty now before the Committee.

On May 9 I informed the Chairman of the United Nations Outer Space Committee, Ambassador Kurt Waldheim of Austria, of the President's statement and requested an early session of the 28-member Legal Subcommittee to prepare a treaty for submission to the General Assembly in the fall.<sup>7</sup> On May 11 I gave the Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union at the United Nations an outline of our points for inclusion in the proposed treaty.<sup>8</sup> We also consulted widely with other members of the Legal Subcommittee.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 275-276.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 276-277.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 304.

The first response from the U.S.S.R. came on May 30 in the form of a letter from Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary-General U Thant. This letter asked that the matter of a celestial bodies treaty be taken up by the General Assembly in the fall.<sup>9</sup> It was very encouraging to us, because not only did we and the Soviets apparently have in mind the same subject for a treaty—namely activities on celestial bodies—but, in addition, the principles that they proposed for inclusion in the treaty were extremely close to ours. I therefore wrote to Ambassador Waldheim on June 16 proposing that the Outer Space Legal Subcommittee be convened on July 12 so as to begin work without delay.<sup>10</sup> This proposal was quickly agreed to.

Meanwhile, on June 16, both we and the Soviet Union made public proposed treaty texts.<sup>11</sup> With regard to the scope of the drafts, both texts dealt with activities on celestial bodies. The Soviet text also included provisions on the regulation of activities in outer space generally. These were drawn from two major resolutions of the General Assembly: The "no bombs in orbit" resolution<sup>12</sup> and the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space.<sup>13</sup> Both these resolutions had been unanimously adopted by the Assembly in 1963 as a result of United States initiatives. The principles they contained are among the most important in the Treaty.

It should be recalled, however, that the Outer Space Treaty embodies major provisions that were not in the 1963 resolutions. Of prime importance among these are the prohibition on use of celestial bodies for specified military activities; the guarantee of open and veto-free access by space powers to each other's installations on celestial bodies; and the provision for full reporting of space activities.

The treaty negotiations in the Legal Subcommittee opened at the European Headquarters of the United Nations in Geneva on the agreed date, July 12. They ran until August 4 and, after a brief adjournment, resumed in New York from September 12 through September 16. Great progress had been made but the treaty was still some distance from completion. During September, October and November the U.S. Delegation held detailed private consultations with many members of the Legal Subcommittee including, of course, the Soviet Union. As a result of these consultations, agreement on the treaty text was finally reached in early December.

In accordance with United Nations procedures, the completed Space Treaty then made its appearance in the Political Committee of the General Assembly in a resolution co-sponsored by forty-three Members of the United Nations, among them many members of the Outer Space Committee including the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union. The resolution commended the Treaty, requested the depositary governments to open it for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date, and expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 320-329.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 350-351.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 347-350, 352-355.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, p. 538.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 644-646.

which our access language was drawn were not in all respects appropriate for the Outer Space Treaty. This was especially true in view of the far greater difficulties and hazards of lunar exploration in contrast to Antarctic exploration—the extreme importance of unimpaired oxygen supply, the need for careful conservation of life-supporting systems, and the difficulty of surface travel. We would not want to receive a visit from the Soviets or any other party if that visit would jeopardize the lives of our astronauts. We also bore in mind the practical fact that for the foreseeable future it would be immensely difficult to engage in forbidden activities on the moon without detection.

Article XII of the Outer Space Treaty thus embodies the practical solution that "reasonable advance notice of a prospective visit" shall be given "in order that appropriate consultations may be held and that maximum provision may be taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited." There is no veto. I made this clear in a statement on the record on August 3 in the Legal Subcommittee in Geneva and on December 17 in the General Assembly's Political Committee in New York. Again, no country dissented.

Before leaving this matter of verification, let me make clear that the access provisions I have been discussing apply only to celestial bodies and are a safeguard against Treaty violations in that context. The prohibition against placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit has no related provision dealing specifically with verification. The Treaty leaves it open to individual countries to employ their own national means of verification. I understand that in his testimony General Wheeler will state why, from the viewpoint of our armed services, the prohibition on orbiting nuclear weapons is desirable.<sup>17</sup> Accordingly, I do not propose to go into this matter. But speaking for the Administration, after close consultation with the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and NASA, I want to stress that the Executive Branch is agreed that our national interest is served by this provision.

To this I might add that, if we had no Treaty prohibition against orbiting nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union would have no legal inhibition in this area of any kind whatever. Our situation could therefore only be worsened if the Treaty failed to include this prohibition. It is our judgment that the existence of the prohibition will tend to limit the arms race, help make the problem of nuclear weapons more manageable, and thereby assist the growth of international security. It will help avoid a costly and dangerous new area of weapons deployment.

## 2. LIMITATIONS ON SPECIFIED MILITARY ACTIVITIES ON CELESTIAL BODIES

In developing our position as to permissible activities on celestial bodies, we drew heavily on the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. The prohibitions on specified types of military activities in that Treaty have stood the test of time. Interestingly enough, the first Soviet proposal also reflected shared Antarctic experience.

<sup>17</sup> See *Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings*, pp. 82 ff.

The United States, following closely the Antarctic Treaty, proposed that the establishment of military fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, and the testing of weapons on celestial bodies be prohibited; and that the Treaty should also state the matter affirmatively by calling for celestial bodies to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Now, in offering these proposals we clearly and candidly recognized that military personnel and military equipment, as such, should not and could not be prohibited from celestial bodies. Most of our astronauts are members of the armed services. Our rocketry has been developed in important measure with funds appropriated by the Congress as part of defense budgets. The United States treaty draft of June 16 therefore added a saving clause as follows: "The use of military personnel, facilities or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose shall not be prohibited." Here, too, we followed the pattern of the Antarctic Treaty.

This matter, which is dealt with in Article IV, paragraph 2, of the Outer Space Treaty created two problems of considerable difficulty. Part of the problem appears to have been semantic.

First, the U.S.S.R. asserted that our proposal to ban "military fortifications" was inadequate and that we should agree as well to forbid "military bases and installations". Now, we had no problem in accepting a ban on "military bases". The Antarctic Treaty contains a ban on military bases, and no one has ever charged that, for example, the Navy-supported facilities on McMurdo Sound were a military base in violation of the Antarctic Treaty. But we were doubtful about accepting a ban on "military installations" because it seemed too sweeping. Any construction on the moon, if built or used by astronauts belonging to a military service, could conceivably be labeled a "military installation" even though its character and purpose were entirely peaceful. I pointed out to the Soviet Delegation on a number of occasions that a lunar barracks built to house astronauts who might be drawn from the military services of their country might be said to be a "military installation"—or at least, could be alleged to be such—regardless of the fact of its peaceful and research-supporting character. I made it clear that the U.S. could not accept a prohibition whose apparent scope might be so broad as to defy meaningful definition.

Our proposed saving clause raised much the same issue in a different form. At first the Soviets professed to see no need for such a clause. They took the position that the employment by them of Soviet military personnel for activities on celestial bodies would not violate the Treaty. We pointed out that unless there were such a saving clause as to astronauts having military rank, a party might later charge that employment of such astronauts was prohibited. Eventually, without too much difficulty, the U.S.S.R. came around to accepting the saving clause which now appears as the penultimate sentence of Article IV and states that "The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited."

But it was only towards the very end of our negotiations that the Soviets agreed to a saving clause regarding military *equipment*. We were able to agree on such a clause, contained in the last sentence of Article IV, stating that "The use of any equipment or facility neces-

sary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited."

Agreement on this saving clause, in turn, made it possible for us to accept the inclusion of "military installations" among the prohibitions applying to celestial bodies. To return to the example of the barracks, such a facility would be in conformity with the Treaty because it would be necessary for peaceful exploration.

### 3. TRACKING FACILITIES

A third difficulty in the negotiations involved earth-based tracking stations. This subject was raised by the U.S.S.R. but for some time it was not clear what they wanted. Their first treaty proposal, on June 16, read as follows: "The Parties to the Treaty undertake to accord equal conditions to States engaged in the exploration of outer space." When it became apparent that many members of the Legal Subcommittee did not understand what this language meant, the U.S.S.R. made a second proposal, on July 20, that "States Parties to the Treaty will accord other States Parties to the Treaty conducting activities relating to the exploration and use of outer space equal conditions for observing the flight of space objects launched by these States."<sup>18</sup>

The Subcommittee took some time to consider this proposal. The Soviet Delegate portrayed it as a limited obligation. He said that it merely required that State A, if it had granted a tracking facility to State B, must also grant tracking facilities on request to State C. This explanation seemed to suggest that the Soviets might be seeking a "free ride" by applying the most-favored-nation principle to the granting of tracking facilities. Under their proposal, the countries with whom the U.S. has carefully negotiated bilateral space agreements over a period of years would have been obliged to let the Soviets construct installations on their soil. As you know, the United States has agreements for tracking facilities with a large number of countries including Argentina, Australia, Chile, Ecuador, Madagascar, Mexico, Spain and the United Kingdom.

The representatives of a number of these countries made clear that they could not agree to such an obligation. They pointed out, as we also did, that arrangements for the establishment of a space tracking facility is a bilateral matter. Not only is it related to the desire of nations to cooperate with one another in space research but there are also practical considerations which might impel a country to grant a facility to one space power while finding it undesirable to make a like grant to another space power. The Soviet proposal to place an absolute obligation upon host countries was therefore unacceptable.

Further discussions led to further revisions. Eventually, a solution to this problem was found in the provision which appears as Article X of the Treaty. This Article provides that "\* \* \* the States Parties to the Treaty shall consider on the basis of equality any requests by other States Parties to the Treaty to be afforded any opportunity to observe the flight of space objects launched by those States. The nature of such an opportunity for observation and the conditions under which it could be afforded shall be determined by agreement between the States concerned."

<sup>18</sup> A/6431, annex III, p. 36.

We consulted closely with a number of the countries who have granted tracking facilities to us before agreeing to this proposal. We also considered our own obligations in view of the fact that, as you know, the United States has entered into an agreement with the European Space Research Organization authorizing it to construct a tracking facility at Fairbanks, Alaska. Our friends said that they could agree to the text of Article X on the understanding that an authoritative statement would be made as to the scope and limitations of the obligations which that Article imposes.

Accordingly, after extensive consultations with a number of members, including the Soviet Union, I decided to place upon the record an authoritative interpretation of what this obligation entails. On December 17, speaking to the General Assembly's Political Committee, I said: "It is quite clear from the text of the Article, however, that there must be agreement between the parties concerned for the establishment of a tracking facility. The Article as thus revised recognizes that the elements of mutual benefit and acceptability are natural and necessary parts of the decision whether to enter into an agreement concerning such a facility, and it appropriately incorporates the principle that a State which is asked to cooperate has the right to consider its legitimate interest in reaching its decision." No objection was recorded to this statement and this put the matter to rest.

#### 4. LIABILITY

The 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles adopted by the General Assembly contains a provision on liability which is carried over into the Space Treaty without change. Article VII of the Treaty codifies the International legal rule that a country which launches a space vehicle, or from whose territory an object is launched into outer space, is "internationally liable for damage to another State Party . . . or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies."

Article VII is indeed desirable. But a separate agreement on liability for damages caused by space vehicles is a necessity, and we hope to continue work in the Outer Space Legal Subcommittee toward that end. Such an agreement should lay down rules and procedures governing liability and the presentation of international claims. Work of this character has been undertaken in the Legal Subcommittee since 1962, but the issues are complex and redoubled efforts are required. A number of basic issues remain. These include how costs should be shared when damages are caused by a space project in which more than one country participates; how to measure the damage applicable to loss of life, bodily injury and destruction of property; and agreement on a tribunal to adjudicate disputed claims.

The Legal Subcommittee has on its agenda a separate agreement on liability and we will want to prepare our position for future deliberations on this subject. What is most satisfactory is that the Outer Space Treaty contains an optimum fundamental rule on this subject.

#### 5. RETURN OF ASTRONAUTS

Finally, I would like to comment on the obligation, contained in Article V of the Space Treaty, that when astronauts land on foreign

territory or on the high seas "they shall be safely and promptly returned to the State of registry of their space vehicle." The 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles stated this rule in the same manner.

However in the Outer Space Legal Subcommittee discussions of 1964 and 1965 concerning a detailed agreement on the return of astronauts and space vehicles, the U.S.S.R. had not proved as forthcoming. The Soviets had at various times appeared to insist on language that might be taken to limit the humanitarian obligation to return an astronaut. We thought it incompatible with the spirit of the Treaty, which describes astronauts as "envoys of mankind", to suggest in any manner that detention could be envisaged or tolerated. We thus continued to insist that the duty to return must be absolute and unconditional. It is a particular source of satisfaction to us that agreement was reached on this basis.

On a related matter, we were also able to reach agreement on the unconditional obligation to report to other parties, or the Secretary-General of the United Nations, "any phenomena they discover in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, which could constitute a danger to the life or health of astronauts."

#### CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, I commend to this Committee the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. I believe it meets the essential test of any international agreement which the President submits to the Senate. It will further the national interest and the security of the United States and will encourage the cause of peace in the world. I earnestly hope the Senate will advise and consent to its ratification.

#### Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone [Extract], March 7, 1967<sup>1</sup>

20. If I may continue, I should like, as I have indicated, to touch on another point which is of concern to the Committee. I do this in the light of the discussion on the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America<sup>2</sup> and its relationship to a non-proliferation treaty. My delegation would like to make its views known on one point in connexion with that Treaty.

21. The United States considers the conclusion of the first international instrument establishing a nuclear-free zone to be of unique significance. It is an excellent example of an arms control measure brought about through a regional initiative. The countries responsible deserve great praise for their initiative and their persistence in seeing it through to a successful conclusion.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.291, pp. 14-16.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 69-83.

22. We have not yet had time to give thorough study to the Final Act, including the Treaty text, and cannot therefore comment on every aspect of the Treaty. I do, however, want to state the view of my Government on one of the important elements of the Treaty, because it has considerable significance for the negotiation of the non-proliferation treaty with which we are concerned. That is the manner in which the nuclear-free zone Treaty deals with the problem of peaceful nuclear explosives. We interpret it as prohibiting contracting parties from acquiring or testing nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes.

23. Let me explain how we draw this interpretation from the Treaty. Article 1 prohibits contracting parties from the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition of any "nuclear weapons" by any means whatsoever. If the phrase "nuclear weapon", for the purposes of this Treaty, includes a nuclear explosive device intended for peaceful purposes, the contracting parties would clearly be prohibited from acquiring or testing such a device. Whether the device is "peaceful" or not could be said to be only a matter of intent; since in so far as technology is concerned there is no difference between a nuclear explosive device which would have only peaceful applications and one which could also be employed as a weapon.

24. Members will recall the statement made by the United States representative to this Committee on this point on 9 August 1966. He said that a nuclear explosive device intended for peaceful purposes could be used as a nuclear weapon, or easily adapted to such use—no matter what the intention of its maker was.<sup>3</sup> There has been general acceptance of this technological fact by the delegations of Canada,<sup>4</sup> Sweden<sup>5</sup> and the United Kingdom.<sup>6</sup> We understand the important statement made at our meeting on 21 February 1967 by the representative of Mexico to be in accord also.<sup>7</sup> The Soviet Union indicated its agreement in a statement to the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America on 12 February 1967. I believe Lord Chalfont expressed the point most graphically when he said: "A device which moves a million tons of earth to dig a canal or create an oil deposit can just as easily pulverize a city of a million people".<sup>8</sup>

25. In recognition of this fact, Article 5 of the Latin-American nuclear-free zone Treaty defines a nuclear weapon as—

... any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes.

The plain language of that definition includes any nuclear device which can be used as a weapon. As I have indicated, there seems to be general agreement on the part of those who have expressed themselves on the subject that devices intended for peaceful purposes can also be used as weapons. To my knowledge, no one contends that they cannot. The definition seems therefore clearly to encompass such devices.

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 525-528.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 595-596.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, p. 105.

<sup>6</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 560-562.

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, pp. 99-103.

<sup>8</sup> ENDC/PV.288, p. 7.

26. The negotiating history of the definition at Mexico City reinforces this view. A prior draft of the definition had included a requirement that, to constitute a nuclear weapon, the explosive must be intended for use for purposes of war. If it was not so intended, it would not have been a nuclear weapon under this definition. The words concerning intention were, however, omitted in the final language. This history was confirmed by Ambassador Garcia Robles, Chairman of the Preparatory Commission and, more than any other one man, the draftsman of this Treaty. I call attention again to his statement at our meeting of 21 February in which he repeated his interpretation of the Treaty on this point. This history makes clear that intention is not the test of whether a nuclear explosive is a weapon or not.

27. Our view is also reinforced by the overall purpose of the Treaty: to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to Latin America, with all the tensions and dangers which would follow in their path. In view of the technical facts which I have set forth, it seems clear that a country which acquired or tested a nuclear explosive device would find it exceedingly difficult to reassure its neighbours or rivals by a statement that the device was only intended for peaceful purposes. Clearly the treaty must prohibit the acquisition or testing of any nuclear explosive device by contracting parties, or it will contain a large loophole. In our view, Articles 1 and 5 of the Treaty contain such a prohibition.

28. Article 18 of the Treaty, which deals specifically with nuclear devices for peaceful purposes, does not detract from the force of Articles 1 and 5. Indeed, it makes clear that such explosions may be carried out only "in accordance with the provisions of this article and the other articles of the Treaty, particularly articles 1 and 5." Thus, unless someone can some day invent a nuclear explosive which cannot be used as a nuclear weapon—and as an engineer I do not see how that could ever be possible—the treaty will prohibit contracting parties from carrying out such explosions.

29. That is not, however, to say that we believe that contracting parties should be denied the benefits of such explosions. Indeed, the contrary is true. As the United States representative made clear to this Committee in August of last year, the United States believes that explosive services of this kind should be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States under appropriate international procedures if and when peaceful nuclear explosives that are permissible under test-ban Treaty limitations<sup>9</sup> become economically and technologically feasible. This would, of course, have to be on a non-discriminatory basis.

30. In conclusion, I refer again to our statement of last summer on nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes, and I quote its basic conclusion:

It seems to us . . . that the development of nuclear explosives for peaceful applications by a State not already possessing nuclear weapons could hardly be accepted by the world as involving peaceful purposes only. Such a development would not be consistent with the purposes of a Treaty designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Therefore the restrictions of any non-proliferation treaty which is negotiated should be applicable equally to nuclear weapons and to nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, p. 526.

Address by C.P.S.U. General Secretary Brezhnev at  
Moscow Election Rally [Extract], March 10, 1967<sup>1</sup>

Permit me to discuss briefly some of the principal problems of the international situation and of our present foreign policy.

I shall first talk about Europe. In recent years the desire of most European countries for a relaxation of tension and the establishment of peaceful, good-neighborly relations with each other has definitely increased. There is a growing understanding of the fact that Europe can and must solve the problem of its security by its own efforts. As far as our country is concerned, we are not only vitally interested in a durable peace on the European continent, but, as is well known, we are also carrying out an active policy in that direction.

What are the goals of the Soviet Union's European policy? First, to strengthen and consolidate the gains achieved by nations as a result of the most savage war in the history of mankind, as well as the fundamental social and class changes in Europe which followed that war; second, to isolate the forces of imperialist aggression, to keep the West German militarists and revanchists from casting aside all restraints and above all to prevent them from obtaining nuclear weapons; third, on this basis to strengthen the security of our western borders and the borders of the socialist countries allied with us, and to create conditions favoring extensive and fruitful cooperation in Europe between countries with different social systems. We can confidently state that these goals are understood by other European nations, inasmuch as our struggle for peace and for the security of the socialist countries is also, at one and the same time, a struggle for the peace and the security of all of Europe.

The confident and consistent efforts of the socialist States are yielding tangible results in the European area. Today we can say that not a single West European State shares the revanchist demands of the ruling circles of the FRG for revision of the post-war borders in Europe. In fact, they all proceed from the premise that the borders which have come into being must remain unchanged; but, regrettably, many of these countries are not consistent and avoid public expression of their views in this respect. Broad identity of views has also been achieved between Europe's East and West with respect to such an important question as barring the FRG from nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever.

The favorable influence of our peace-loving policy upon the entire situation in Europe is recognized today even by those politicians in the West who just a couple of years ago thought only in terms of "Cold War" concepts and passed up no opportunity to speculate on a certain "threat from the East."

We, Communists, think that to ensure European security it is not enough to show good will, to call for cooperation and even manifest a readiness to develop such cooperation between the socialist and capitalist countries of Europe in accordance with the principles of peaceful coexistence. It is just as necessary to carry on an active,

<sup>1</sup> *Pravda*, Mar. 11, 1967 (Department of State translation).

relentless and persistent struggle against everything which threatens the peace in Europe.

The more the idea of ensuring durable peace, security and peaceful cooperation in Europe spreads throughout the European countries, the clearer it becomes that the main obstacle on the road to the solution of this most important problem is the aggressive policy of West German imperialism, the policy of the FRG.

The principal reasons for the political bankruptcy of Erhard's government were his hostility to any steps leading to a lessening of tension, his stubborn refusal to take account of the actually existing situation and his frank devotion to revanchist and militaristic goals.

It would seem that the leaders of the new Government of the FRG should have drawn appropriate conclusions from the lessons that life taught its predecessors. What, however, is actually taking place? Three months have passed since the new Government of the FRG has been in power. During that period of time it has managed to publicize its program statement, define its position on many international and domestic questions and also, to a certain extent, reveal its true nature through its actions.

Of course, we do not intend by any means to maintain automatically, by inertia as it were, the same attitude toward Kiesinger's government that we had toward the former government of the FRG. But, no one can expect the Soviet people to judge the new Government of the FRG on the basis of its statements alone. The West German ruling circles erected a wall of alienation, which separated the FRG from the peace-loving States of Europe and the world. If they want the world to believe in Bonn's abandonment of its revanchist, aggressive course, they would have to take that wall apart with their own hands, would have to prove in deeds that West Germany's political face and particularly its foreign policy had really changed.

Whoever supposes that it will be enough to package the former revanchist and militaristic concepts in new, more flexible phraseology, to issue several general assurances about a desire for peaceful cooperation, assurances which do not obligate anyone to anything specific, and that such a policy will be regarded as a certain constructive contribution to the cause of peaceful construction in Europe, is obviously in error.

So far, regrettably, the actions of the Government of the FRG clearly show that there have been no real changes in Bonn's political course.

We cannot fail to note that the forces of Nazism and militarism have raised their heads in the FRG particularly in recent times, that the Federal Government has not retreated a single step from its revanchist position with respect to the question of the existing European borders or from its claims to West Berlin. It is intensifying its subversive activities against the German Democratic Republic, which stands as a firm barrier in the way of the aggressive designs of West German imperialism.

The Government of the FRG attempts, through every single foreign policy action, to reassert its absurd claims to the right to speak in the name of all Germans. These claims themselves are sufficient evidence of the aggressive nature of West Germany's policies. To proceed from:

such positions is to encroach upon the sovereign rights of another German State, the German Democratic Republic; it represents an attempt to wipe out the fundamental social and political changes which have taken place in Europe during the post-war years.

The aggressive and reactionary nature of the FRG's position on this question is emphasized even more by the stubbornness with which Bonn clings to the notorious "Hallstein Doctrine." The goal of this "doctrine," as is well known, is to prevent the recognition of the German Democratic Republic by other countries; it expresses the hostile attitude of the ruling circles of the FRG not only toward the GDR, but also toward all its friends. The "Hallstein Doctrine" is an expression of Bonn's policy of interference in the affairs of other States, and above all in the affairs of the countries of Asia and Africa; it is a policy of international blackmail and threats.

To those who determine the present foreign policy of the FRG we would like to say directly: if you want to win the confidence of the European nations, if you are indeed striving to ensure a peaceful future for your country, give up your illusion that you can really speak in the name of the whole German people, recognize the true situation that has come into being in Europe, including the fact that two German States exist, and renounce, clearly and unequivocally, your ambitions to have access to nuclear weapons.

Or, take such a question as the conclusion of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. For a long time the nations have been waiting for this treaty, which is intended to protect the world from the further spread of nuclear weapons, thereby reducing the danger of nuclear war and contributing to the cause of disarmament. Yet, among the ruling circles of the FRG it seems that the prospect of this treaty being concluded is viewed as a veritable disaster, as the wrecking of their most cherished hopes and expectations. All sorts of objections began to pour out of Bonn, all sorts of preliminary conditions and reservations; backstage maneuvers were initiated, designed to create all sorts of new complications standing in the way of the conclusion of such a treaty.

The real character of the policy of the FRG's present Government is also conclusively revealed by the following facts. As is well known, in West Germany, following the example of such fascist European countries as Spain and Portugal, the Communist Party, the party of the courageous fighters against reaction and fascism, the champions of the vital interests of the workers and peace between nations, is prohibited. And even though a number of ministerial posts in Bonn are now occupied by Social Democrats, the new Government has already hastened to announce its intention of continuing the banning of the party of the German working class. At the same time, parties and organizations of a semi-fascist character, or even frankly fascist parties, are given every opportunity in the FRG to expand their activities.

One would have to be very naive to regard all of these manifestations of Bonn's present policies as indications of a change in its foreign policy. In any case, we in the Soviet Union will not be among those who are so naive.

We have said repeatedly that we would like to see a substantial improvement in the relations between the Soviet Union and the FRG. But, for this to come about, the revanchist and militaristic policy being pursued by this German State would have to give way to a really peace-loving policy. This has not happened to date.

In German affairs, as in all other important European questions, the unity of the principles and actions of the socialist countries of Europe exerts an enormous influence upon the entire course of events. The unanimity and brotherly solidarity of the socialist countries is a time-tested weapon in the struggle against the aggressive forces of imperialism and for the preservation and strengthening of peace.

### Analysis by the Department of State of Articles I and VII of the Outer-Space Treaty, March 13, 1967<sup>1</sup>

#### ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE I

Article I of the Outer Space Treaty comprises three main elements.  
1. The first paragraph states that:

The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.

This provision is based on a declaration by the Congress in Section 102(a) of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. That section states:

The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of the United States that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind.<sup>2</sup>

In 1963 the United Nations General Assembly incorporated the substance of this policy statement in the Assembly's Declaration on Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space.<sup>3</sup> Paragraph 1 of the Declaration provides:

The exploration and use of outer space shall be carried on for the benefit and in the interests of all mankind.

This statement was carried over into the first paragraph of Article I of the Outer Space Treaty with two additions. First, the statement refers to the moon and other celestial bodies as being included in outer space, in order to conform to expressions elsewhere in the Treaty. Second, the phrase "irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development" was added on the suggestion of Brazil, to emphasize the universal reach of the phrase "all countries" and the hope that space technology can accelerate the pace of economic development.

<sup>1</sup> *Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings*, pp. 52-54. The treaty is printed *ante*, pp. 88-43.

<sup>2</sup> 76 Stat. 419.

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 644-646.

The first paragraph of Article I serves as a guide for space powers in developing their programs and conducting their activities in space. The United States has long been the leading proponent and practitioner of international cooperation. We have pressed ahead in cooperative programs designed to bring benefits to all, as through scientific research in space and the provision of weather data from satellites, to cite two examples. Moreover, our programs have comprised the element of education and training in space science and technology for personnel of other countries. We wished, through Article I, to give support in the Treaty to this approach toward space activities.

Article I, paragraph 1 is quite general in character. The specific obligations regarding exploration and use of outer space that the Treaty imposes are set forth in succeeding provisions.

Article I, paragraph 1 does not undertake to set any terms and conditions on which international cooperation would take place. It was recognized that a limited number of countries were now in a position to conduct space activities. It was understood that the arrangements by which they would associate others in those activities and the arrangements for sharing benefits would need to be worked out in agreements among those concerned. For example, the Space Treaty was drafted in full knowledge of the two agreements setting up what is now INTELSAT, the Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Communications Satellite System, signed by 55 countries,<sup>4</sup> and the accompanying Special Agreement signed by their communications entities.<sup>5</sup> It was recognized that participation in and use of the global satellite system would be governed by the provisions of these two Agreements. Thus, Article I, paragraph 1 of the Space Treaty does not alter these provisions, nor does it create legal obligations with respect to the terms of international cooperation on any existing or future space projects.

Where it was the intention of the Treaty drafters to provide specific legal obligations relating to benefits to be derived from space activity, this was clearly expressed. For example, Article V, paragraph 3 provides unconditionally that:

"States Parties to the Treaty shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the Treaty or the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any phenomena they discover in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, which could constitute a danger to the life or health of astronauts."

The more general Treaty provision on providing information is set forth in Article XI, where it is specified that information on the nature, conduct, locations, and results of space activities are to be made available "to the greatest extent feasible and practicable".

2. The second paragraph in Article I of the Treaty contains two elements as follows:

Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.

<sup>4</sup> 16 UST 1705.

<sup>5</sup> 15 UST 1745.

The first part of this statement sets forth the rule of freedom in space for exploration and use by all States on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law. This fundamental principle was included in the General Assembly's 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles.

The last clause of the paragraph provides for free access to all areas of celestial bodies. This right is a corollary of the right of free exploration and of the prohibition on claims of sovereignty or other national appropriation of celestial bodies; this latter is set forth in Article II. The application of the free access principle to stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on a celestial body is spelled out in a subsequent provision, Article XII.

3. The third paragraph of Article I provides:

There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage international co-operation in such investigation.

This provision is drawn from Article II of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 which states:

Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward that end, as applied during the International Geophysical Year, shall continue, subject to the provisions of the present Treaty.<sup>6</sup>

The first clause of Article I, paragraph 3 follows from the rule on freedom of space that is contained in paragraph 2. The second clause is designed to stimulate and support international cooperation in scientific investigation. The United States has been leading the way in practicing such cooperation, and we felt it appropriate to include in the space treaty a general provision calling on all parties to facilitate and encourage cooperation.

#### ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE VII

1. Article VII provides:

Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object into outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies.

This provision states the responsibility of a launching State for physical damage that its space activities may cause. It encompasses loss of life, personal injury, and damage to or destruction of property. Just as the United States would expect any physical harm to our citizens or property caused by a foreign space activity to be made good by the State responsible for the launching, so, under the Treaty, the United States will be responsible for physical damage that our launchings may cause. Thus far our launchings have not caused any such damage.

2. Article VII does not encompass damage other than that caused by the impact of a space vehicle or object. For example, electronic

<sup>6</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 1550-1556.

interference by one spacecraft with another—whether the interference is intentional or not—falls outside the scope of Article VII.

There is another Treaty provision dealing with interference. Article IX requires a party to conduct its space activities “with due regard to the corresponding interests of other States Parties to the Treaty” and to engage in “appropriate international consultation” if it “has reason to believe that an experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space . . . would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.” In the event that interference occurs, the States concerned would have to deal with it, apart from the Treaty, in the same way they would deal with other kinds of interference, whether caused by a space object or not.

Here it should be observed that electronic jamming of transmission by satellite, for example, is at least as likely to be undertaken from ground facilities as from space. Article VII plainly does not cover liability for any ground-based activities.

3. The rule set forth in Article VII is that physical damage by a space object gives rise to an international claim. The Treaty provision does not determine how such a claim should be presented or settled. Under the Treaty, a liability claim may be presented in diplomatic channels. Alternatively, any available remedies under a national legal system may be pursued. In the case of the United States, Article VII does not affect national legislation on government liability, such as the Federal Tort Claims Act. Nor does the Treaty vest jurisdiction over liability claims in any international tribunal. To do this would require a separate legal instrument, such as the convention on liability which is still under consideration in the United Nations Outer Space Committee.

### Statement by the Brazilian Representative (Azeredo da Silveira) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, March 14, 1967<sup>1</sup>

20. A series of resolutions adopted by the twenty-first session of the General Assembly make up the agenda of our current session. Those resolutions pertain to a number of issues which fall under the heading of disarmament, and spell out what the United Nations wishes the Eighteen-Nation Committee to do here at this time. Unequivocal stress is placed on the question of signing a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: appearing in more than one resolution, this question provides the dominant theme of the deliberations in New York.

21. It is significant that the General Assembly recommendations were in almost all cases carried by an overwhelming majority of votes. To our mind, this quasi-unanimity is a token of the by now very clear and very deep awareness of the international community of the problems to be tackled and of the measures to be taken with a view to halt-

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.293, pp. 8-18.

in; the nuclear arms race and paving the way to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. And it is with gratification that we note that the delegations from the group of eight nations lent their joint inspiration and endeavours to bring about the near-consensus which made possible the adoption of those decisions.

22. The atmosphere which prevailed in New York is perhaps the best answer to the qualms that periodically beset a few sectors of world public opinion with regard to the alleged sterility of the disarmament debates in Geneva. Those who allege that too often seem to forget that it is easier to watch and to criticize than to participate and to try. Indeed, we believe that the discussions held in this form for the past few years have been instrumental in clarifying and in defining the questions under our scrutiny, thereby enabling the Conference itself and the General Assembly to have a more learned, and therefore more realistic, vision of the nature and scope of the solutions to be sought.

23. The question of signing an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons comes before us again with the highest priority, amply and variously urged upon us by the General Assembly. Resolution 2153 (XXI) explicitly calls upon the Conference to give priority to this matter;<sup>2</sup> resolution 2162 (XXI), concerned with the question of general and complete disarmament, makes it clear that the new efforts to be exerted by the Committee should above all concentrate on the preparation of an international treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons;<sup>3</sup> resolution 2149 (XXI) urgently appeals to all States to do everything they can to facilitate the conclusion of such a treaty at the earliest possible time, and to refrain from any actions conducive to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or which might hamper the signing of the agreement.<sup>4</sup> This of course does not detract from the importance of the other items on our agenda, especially the completion of the test-ban Treaty<sup>5</sup> so that it covers underground nuclear weapons tests, an issue mentioned by the General Assembly along with that of non-proliferation.<sup>6</sup> But the tenor of the resolutions and the records of the debates in New York will show that the Conference is expected to accord the matter of non-proliferation a degree of urgency somewhat higher than that accorded to the others.

24. We cannot fail to notice that the present session of the Conference will in a way resume the negotiations which have been under way for some time with a view to the preparation of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This circumstance gives additional weight to the task we are asked to discharge. As I am sure all the other members of the Committee hope, my delegation hopes that those negotiations will yield substantial results. Brazil is willing and ready to study and discuss such results when they are submitted to the Conference by the Powers which have been taking part in those consultations. While it would, of course, be impossible for my delegation to commit itself to a course of action before the outcome of those talks is made known, there is nothing negative in our approach to them. On the

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 748-750.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 798-809.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 686-687.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 802-803.

contrary, it is our steadfast hope that any such results may prove acceptable to all of us here and to the world at large. It is in that spirit that we are prepared to contribute to this goal through a candid and, we trust, constructive discussion of any forthcoming draft formulations that might become the text of a treaty.

25. In this connexion, allow me to return briefly to Brazil's stand on the structure and contents of a treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. We remain firmly convinced that an agreement to this end should take into account the principles laid down in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX).<sup>7</sup> That has been the constant view of my delegation, and only last year, speaking before the General Assembly, the Brazilian representative once more underlined our attitude towards resolution 2028 (XX) in the following words:

All these principles are of paramount political importance and . . . no lasting agreement could be arrived at without the strictest observance of such principles.<sup>8</sup>

26. Those principles are well known and there is no need for me to read them out. Let me just add that the Brazilian delegation, along with the seven other delegations of the group of eight, has—and rightly so—consistently singled out principle (b), which speaks of the “acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers”; it is in this light that we maintain that the treaty “should be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery”. Moreover, the Conference will recall that, besides fully subscribing to the terms of the joint memoranda on non-proliferation presented by the eight nations,<sup>9</sup> Brazil has expressed some further views on what we described as a programme of related measures which would include the treaty we are contemplating. These views were put on record by my predecessor in this seat when, on 1 March 1966, he said that—

An objective and politically valid treaty on non-proliferation should reflect not only the reality of the power relations between the great nuclear Powers, but also the reality of the power relations between these countries and the non-nuclear world.

In the view of the Brazilian delegation, the treaty should be conceived and outlined as part of a programme. Such a programme should be designed to bring about a first and important step towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control and, at the same time, to further the process of the social and economic development of the less-developed countries.

The idea of linking the treaty to a comprehensive programme may be traced back to resolution DC/225, adopted by the Disarmament Commission on 15 June 1965. Indeed, subparagraph (c) of operative paragraph 2 of the resolution reads:

“ . . . also accord special priority to the consideration of the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, giving close attention to the various suggestions that agreement could be facilitated by adopting a programme of certain related measures”.<sup>10</sup>

I am quite aware that, in view of the dramatic urgency of our task, it would not be possible to establish an immediate link between the signature of the treaty and the implementation of a programme of related measures. But if the non-nuclear Powers show their willingness, here and now, to give up the pro-

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 532-534.

<sup>8</sup> A/C.1/P.V. 1437, p. 7.

<sup>9</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 424-425; *ibid.*, 1966, pp. 576-579.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 280-282.

duction and the use of nuclear weapons, for the benefit of mankind—and thus for the benefit of the nuclear Powers themselves—why, I ask myself, cannot the latter show their readiness to offer a counterpart to the signing of the treaty by the non-nuclear Powers?

Why do not the nuclear Powers, along with the treaty, commit themselves, through a declaration of intention, to carrying out a programme based on the following points: first, to take "tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery";<sup>11</sup> second, to stop all nuclear weapons tests—both measures to be taken under adequate international control; third, to increase co-operation with the non-nuclear Powers with a view to accelerating their utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; and fourth, to channel to the developing countries at least part of the savings effected by the aforementioned disarmament steps?<sup>12</sup>

27. It may be prudent to acknowledge at this point that, however far-reaching in its intentions, however positive in its language, however effective in its implementation, an agreement on non-proliferation would not furnish the world with a cure-all for its political ills. It can be assumed that when the agreement is completed it will not include all the nuclear-weapon Powers. It would of course be ideally desirable that the pact be signed by all countries, nuclear and non-nuclear alike. But it appears that the goal will prove unattainable, at least in the immediate future. There are indications that in the Far East and in Europe two nuclear-weapon States do not contemplate becoming parties to such an agreement; and to the extent that they would not do so, the political and military territory covered by the agreement would be correspondingly diminished. To deplore this situation is not enough. More than that, the negotiators of the treaty must face its implications and devise ways and means to neutralize the effects of any partial failure of the "nuclear club" to come into the fold of the treaty.

28. This leads us to the question of guarantees. To our mind, the question of guarantees is essentially linked with the principle of the "acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations". Time and again my delegation has stated that we deem it a necessity that the nuclear-weapon Powers contemplate a system of guarantees aimed at ensuring the security of the non-nuclear-weapon countries against nuclear attack or the threat thereof. The same point was pressed at our last meeting by the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Kolo.<sup>13</sup> By signing a non-proliferation treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon States will be surrendering the most important means they might otherwise have at their disposal to counter possible aggression. The nuclear-weapon Powers themselves are cognizant of this fact, the logic of which is the same as that underlying their own strategy of deterrence. That a future treaty on non-proliferation might not be signed by all States is a prospect which makes imperative the need for this system of guarantees.

29. Still in the light of the principle of the "acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations", let me turn now to a topic very much in the public eye and one which has often, and for some time now, been raised by my delegation in the Committee and elsewhere—the transfer to the developing countries of nuclear technology for peaceful pursuits. It is abundantly clear that the present non-nuclear

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 424-425.

<sup>12</sup> ENDC/PV, 244, pp. 16-17.

<sup>13</sup> ENDC/PV, 202, pp. 4-5.

countries want to be certain that by binding themselves to the clauses of a non-proliferation treaty they will not be precluding their own access to the nuclear age for purposes of peace. This concern was underlined a few days ago by the representative of Italy, Ambassador Cavalletti, whose very apt words I should like to quote:

*(Spoke in French)*

Clearly it would be inadmissible for a non-proliferation treaty, through technical limitations or the unfair influence of discriminatory controls, to delay or hamper scientific, technical or social progress in non-nuclear weapon countries. Each country must remain free to develop its industrial facilities through the use of all forms of atomic energy.<sup>11</sup>

*(Continued in English)*

30. The anxiety of the non-nuclear States in this connexion reflects utterly legitimate national interests which cannot be heeded by all concerned. On this line of reasoning the world would have a lot to gain if the treaty were made to reach beyond its political boundaries and become a bold step forward and across the threshold of the utilization of nuclear energy for the promotion of social and economic progress. Peace and widespread poverty are not easily reconcilable in the long-range perspective of international affairs. Should the treaty succeed at the same time in being a true disarmament measure and in helping to bridge the gap between the wealthy and the have-nots, then it would be recorded in history as an achievement commensurate with the responsibilities falling to our generation.

31. Lest this notion be considered far-fetched or romantic, may I venture to offer some remarks by way of illustration of our thought? We are told, for instance, that a growing number of European politicians, scientists and businessmen already begin to view with apprehension the opening up of a "technological gap" between their countries and the countries outside the area. We are not in a position to comment on this in detail. There is one question, however, which we may in all fairness ask ourselves: if responsible personalities in some of the highly-industrialized States of Europe seem to fear that, owing to a gap in technology, their economies risk falling behind—thereby condemning them to a future role which one newspaper defined as being that of "an atomic proletariat"—what of the genuine alarm with which the truly poor nations of the developing world look at the possibility of being permanently barred from the advantages of nuclear progress in the economic and industrial fields?

32. In the same context we have already heard that the less-developed nations would be the unsung victims of the end of the cold war, that the interest of the highly-industrialized Powers in assisting them in their efforts towards social and economic progress tends to diminish in proportion to the reduction of the political tensions which have prevailed since the Second World War, and that this trend is apparent in the fact that the flow of funds from the rich nations to the poor nations, which doubled between 1956 and 1961, has since remained practically unchanged. We will not subscribe to this contention, although we think it is a comment not wholly unrelated to the dangers of things to come.

<sup>11</sup> ENDC-DV, 289, p. 8.

All the more reason, in any case, to seize the occasion provided by the negotiation and eventual adoption of a non-proliferation treaty to refute emphatically this pessimistic outlook.

33. At this point it is appropriate to mention the very significant step towards peace and disarmament taken a month ago by the countries of Latin America. My delegation listened with pleasure to the praise bestowed here upon the Treaty which prohibits nuclear weapons in that vast geographical zone,<sup>15</sup> and joins the previous speakers in commending the contribution of the representative of Mexico, my close friend Ambassador Garcia Robles, to the approval of that pioneer international instrument.

34. The banning of nuclear weapons in Latin America has been a steadfast concern of my country. As early as in 1962 a proposal to that end was submitted by Brazil to the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly.<sup>16</sup> That an agreement on the subject has now been concluded fills us with justified pride. The regional Treaty is indeed a milestone on the path of the negotiations towards non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on a universal scale—a milestone which brings us nearer the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Today, without presuming to add to the presentation of the treaty so ably made on our opening day by Ambassador Garcia Robles,<sup>17</sup> I should like to refer to one aspect of the agreement—the question of peaceful nuclear explosives. My Government attaches particular importance to this question, whose bearing on the present negotiations on non-proliferation is well known. We also feel that it is opportune for us to touch on this issue, in view of the fact that a few days ago the representative of the United States, Ambassador William Foster, presented to the Conference an interpretation of that element of the Treaty which is not borne out by the text of the Treaty.<sup>18</sup>

35. Brazil is fully and unequivocally committed to banning nuclear weapons in its territory. At the same time, Brazil maintains with no less firmness its right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in particular for its economic development and social progress. These two stands are embodied in the Latin American Treaty, the relevant provisions of which spell out in detail the obligations of the contracting parties with respect to the first, and explicitly acknowledge the latter. The determination of the countries of Latin America that nothing in the Treaty shall prejudice their right, as contracting parties, to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is expressed in article 17; by the same token, article 18 permits the contracting parties to the Treaty to carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes—including explosions which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons—or to collaborate with third parties for the same purpose.

36. As representatives know, this permission is accorded subject to a thorough system of control; article 18 itself and other provisions of the Treaty, particularly articles 1 and 5, establish the conditions to be

<sup>15</sup> *Ante*, pp. 69–83.

<sup>16</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. II, pp. 1056–1057.

<sup>17</sup> *Ante*, pp. 99–103.

<sup>18</sup> Mr. Foster's remarks appear *ante*, pp. 126–128.

fulfilled by the contracting parties to carry out such explosions, and stipulate elaborate procedures which include advance notification to the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the International Atomic Energy Agency; supply of detailed information on the planned explosion; and physical observation of the preparations and of the explosion itself by those two agencies in order to ascertain whether the device and the procedures followed during the explosion are in conformity with the Treaty.

37. As we have seen, the Treaty draws a clear-cut distinction between peaceful nuclear explosions and explosions for nuclear-weapon purposes. It leaves no room for confusion between one and the other. Peaceful nuclear explosions clearly pertain to the domain of nuclear technology for pursuits of peace, and to this extent are of interest to both developing countries and non-nuclear countries. Let me just summarize the views which my delegation has put forward on previous occasions in this connexion:

—There is no difference at the present time between nuclear weapon technology and technology for peaceful purposes;

—The development of research in the field of nuclear energy inevitably includes, at a certain stage, the use of explosions; to bar access to explosions would amount to hindering the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

—Banning nuclear explosions would not be an absolute means of checking the spread of nuclear weapons for, at the present level of technology, nuclear weapons can be manufactured without resort to nuclear explosions;

—Even after attaining capability to carry out explosions for peaceful purposes, non-nuclear weapon States would still have to take several additional steps to embark on the manufacture of nuclear weapons;

—To contend that non-nuclear weapon countries ought to relinquish the possibility of developing by national means nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is, *grosso modo*, tantamount to requiring that peaceful countries refrain from producing conventional explosives for industrial purposes;

—Peaceful nuclear explosions may provide a solution to many of the serious problems which confront Latin American countries and developing countries in general in the economic field, such as the digging of canals, the connexion of hydrographic basins, the recovery of oil fields, the release of natural gas, etc.

38. A number of recent developments contrast oddly with the auspicious atmosphere so many discern for the negotiations on non-proliferation and for the work of the Conference. My delegation has followed with concern successive items of news on the possible deployment by the super-Powers of anti-ballistic defensive systems; on the conducting of extensive series of underground tests; on the feasibility of muffling underground tests to escape detection; on new nuclear-weapon engines, such as the spectacular contraption which goes by the name of "multiple individually-targetable re-entry vehicle". And this list is by no means exhaustive. We are sorry to see that our words before this Committee in July 1966 have so soon acquired a dismal

tinge of prophecy. Speaking on the prospects for an early agreement banning underground tests, we said then:

sudden change—a break-through on one side or on the other—might suddenly offset the balance of wills which could have made an agreement possible. Let us suppose, for instance, that one of the super-Powers decides to embark upon the setting-up of what has been called the “anti-missile ballistic defense system” and that for that purpose it will need to carry out an extensive series of underground tests. In order to keep the present balance of power, the other super-Power will immediately embark upon the same path. Therefore the present chances of reaching an agreement on underground tests will vanish, perhaps for a long time.<sup>19</sup>

39. We must derive what encouragement we can from the widespread feeling that nuclear developments of the kind mentioned above will be illusory as a route to security—a feeling that should lead to the abandonment of such systems and devices. In his State of the Union Message last January, the President of the United States bore witness to this when he pointed out that “any additional race would impose on our peoples, and on all mankind for that matter, an additional waste of resources with no gain in security for either side”.<sup>20</sup> Thus an intensified nuclear weapon rivalry would benefit no one and bring damage to all. Besides heightening the danger of a clash through miscalculation, lifting the arms race to a new level would be likely to corrode the will of the nuclear-weapon Powers to enter into agreements, foreclosing disarmament efforts for years to come. Hence it is our duty to co-operate in this Conference to prevent a new and even more dangerous spiral of competition between the nuclear-weapon States.

40. In trying to support the cause of restraint and peace, perhaps the Conference would find it desirable to devote some of its time and attention to a suggestion Brazil put forward last year to the General Assembly on what might be called, broadly speaking, the disarmament of science. Commenting upon the revolutionary vertical proliferation—that is, the ceaseless development of new super-weapons or system of weapons—the Brazilian representative in the First Committee suggested the freezing of nuclear war technology, pointing out that—

It is a well-known fact that, in view of the very nature of modern technology, arms control agreements—and the Moscow Test Ban Treaty<sup>21</sup> is a very good example—can only be reached in the brief moments of evenness in the scientific search or race for new weapon developments. These moments are infrequent, as scientific advances in the highly developed industrialized societies occur in a parallel but irregular way. Thus, a halt in man's power to conceive new weapons in the long run might constitute the single most important collateral disarmament measure. The freeze on nuclear war technology would not be tantamount to a freeze in the technological revolution. On the contrary, it would entail a political decision to give new shape to the technological revolution, to transform it into a powerful instrument for political stability and for the social and economic betterment of the whole world. This prospect is clearly within our reach.<sup>22</sup>

Suffice it to say that the new weapon developments touched upon

<sup>19</sup> ENDC/PV. 276, p. 10.

<sup>20</sup> *Ante*, pp. 3-4.

<sup>21</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 291-293.

<sup>22</sup> A/C. 1/PV. 1437, p. 13.

above strengthen the validity and the timeliness of the Brazilian suggestion on the freeze of nuclear war technology.

41. My delegation has spoken at some length today on non-proliferation because we wanted to put first things first and to reaffirm at this juncture the principles and ideas which in our opinion should orientate the Conference in discussing the question. This does not mean that we hold rigid views about the order of our work, or that we should be inclined to forego the consideration of the other items before the Committee. When the occasion arises we will devote no less attention to the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and to the other collateral measures at hand. In keeping with its record in the Committee, the Brazilian delegation will continue to exert every effort to help in the common search for solutions to the disarmament problems.

### Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, March 14, 1967<sup>1</sup>

42. During the general debate in the Eighteen-Nation Committee some important problems relating to disarmament and the relaxation of international tension have been raised and many interesting observations have been made. As the exchange of views has shown, the main attention of the delegations has been devoted to the question of banning the spread of nuclear weapons. The discussion which has taken place since our Conference resumed its work has shown very convincingly that, practically speaking, the delegations of all the countries represented on our Committee agree that effective measures should be taken to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world.

43. As the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, said on 23 February:

This session undoubtedly opens with great expectations that we shall reap some harvest from that spirit of co-operation which became apparent during the debate on disarmament at the General Assembly of the United Nations.<sup>2</sup>

44. May I also draw your attention to the remarks of the representative of Mexico, Mr. Garcia Robles, who, speaking on 21 February about the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,<sup>3</sup> said:

I venture to hope that it will provide the necessary stimulus to enable this Committee successfully to conclude at this session the task which has been entrusted to it: to draft a universal treaty to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever.<sup>4</sup>

45. All the delegations that have spoken here have declared themselves in favour of the earliest possible conclusion of a treaty on the

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV. 293, pp. 18-28.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 103.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 60-83.

<sup>4</sup> ENDC/PV. 287, p. 19.

non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and have expressed the hope that at the present time there are sufficient grounds to count on solving this topical international problem. We welcome certain changes for the better which have recently emerged in the question of non-proliferation and which bring us closer to the long-desired aim, namely to set up a barrier against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and thereby a barrier against the growing threat of nuclear war connected with such proliferation.

46. It would be wrong, however, to overlook certain difficulties which are being created in the way of the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by circles that are not interested in the solution of this problem. These difficulties, which the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, mildly described at the 287th meeting as "public expression of doubts about adherence to a non-proliferation treaty",<sup>5</sup> stem mainly from West Germany.

47. Speaking at a pre-electoral meeting in Moscow on 10 March 1967, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Brezhnev, said in regard to the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty:

The peoples of the world have long been awaiting this treaty, which is destined to protect the world from the further spread of nuclear weapons and thus reduce the danger of a nuclear war and help the cause of disarmament. And yet in the ruling circles of the Federal Republic of Germany, the possibility of the conclusion of such a treaty has, it seems, been interpreted as a veritable calamity and the collapse of their most cherished aspirations and hopes. From Bonn we hear all sorts of objections, pre-conditions and reservations, and manoeuvres behind the scenes have been started with the aim of creating more and more difficulties for the conclusion of such a treaty.<sup>6</sup>

48. The participants in the negotiations are aware that the former West German Chancellor, Dr. Adenauer, stated to representatives of the press in Madrid on the eve of the resumption of the work of our Committee that he regarded a non-proliferation treaty as a "Morgenthau plan raised to the second power". In an interview with the Milan newspaper *Corriere Della Sera*, published on 10 March 1967, Dr. Adenauer said that he would never have signed a non-proliferation treaty. He declared that if the Federal Republic of Germany adhered to such a treaty it would be signing its own "death warrant".

49. *The Guardian*, in its issue of 10 March 1967, commenting on Dr. Adenauer's statement against a non-proliferation treaty, wrote:

Even Adenauer has joined in this campaign of those who appear to favour the cold war and evince a certain distrust of the non-proliferation treaty largely because the Russians are in favour of it.

50. The Finance Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Herr Strauss, has also joined actively in the campaign against a non-proliferation treaty, emphatically opposing the conclusion of such a treaty and adherence to it by the Federal Republic of Germany, and saying that it would be a "super Versailles", thus recalling the peace treaty imposed upon Germany after the First World War. He even threatened to resign if West Germany signed the treaty. According

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>6</sup> *An'tc.* p. 131 (variant translation).

to the London *Times* of 20 February 1967, he sent a sharp letter to Chancellor Kiesinger in which he described his position in regard to a non-proliferation treaty. The West German Finance Minister leaves no doubt at all why he is so strongly opposed to the treaty. In an interview published in *Der Spiegel* of 2 January 1967, Herr Strauss stated: "I have never doubted that it would be desirable in the long run for us to join in a European atomic force." As you see, it all comes back to one and the same thing: the striving to prevent the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty so as to leave open for West Germany the possibility of obtaining access to nuclear weapons in one form or another.

51. Along the same lines are the remarks of the president of the Federal Board of the West German Industries Union, Fritz Berg, who according to the *Bild Zeitung* declared before the resumption of our negotiations in Geneva: "We Germans shall be totally excluded from research, and we shall be reduced to the level of an agricultural State, of a developing country."

52. *Der Stern* of 5 March 1967 published an article by a West German journalist, Sebastian Haffner. In this article, which gives an idea of the atmosphere created in the Federal Republic of Germany on the subject of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, we read:

The agitation against a non-proliferation treaty reminds us of the manner in which such campaigns were conducted in Goebbels' time. First a few individual voices take up the main theme; then more and more other instruments join in; and finally the whole orchestra plays the same theme in unison and rises to a wild, hysterical furioso: "super Versailles", "Diktat", "Morgenthau plan", "signing one's own death warrant", etc.

53. The statements in West Germany against a non-proliferation treaty along the lines of those made by Dr. Adenauer, Herr Strauss and other prominent statements of the Federal Republic of Germany are of course completely unjustified. It is quite obvious that the future of any country, its economic development, cannot in any way be linked with possession of nuclear weapons. The solution of the non-proliferation problem is directed against the spread of nuclear weapons and not at all against the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

54. On the contrary, the conclusion of an international non-proliferation treaty will enable countries which do not possess nuclear weapons to utilize to a greater extent their scientific personnel and material resources for the needs of peaceful development, whereas otherwise the scientific personnel and vast resources would be assigned to less beneficial purposes. One cannot fail to agree with the assertion of the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, who stated on 23 February 1967 that the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty would not cause any harm to civil industry.<sup>7</sup>

55. This whole campaign which is being conducted by certain circles in the Federal Republic of Germany against the non-proliferation treaty, conceals behind all the alleged concern about economic needs the well-known policy of the militarist and revanchist forces in the Federal Republic of Germany aimed at obtaining access to nuclear weapons. This campaign is in sharp contradiction with resolution

<sup>7</sup> ENDC/PV. 288, pp. 6-7.

2149 adopted at the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, which appeals to all States—

To refrain from any actions conducive to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or which might hamper the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>9</sup>

56. At the pre-electoral meeting on 10 March Mr. Brezhnev said:

To those who today determine the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany we should like to say quite frankly: if you wish to gain the confidence of the European peoples, and if you are indeed striving to ensure the peaceful future of your country, give up the illusion that you can speak on behalf of the whole German people, recognize the situation that has actually come about in Europe, including the fact of the existence of two German States, renounce clearly and unambiguously any claim to have access to nuclear weapons.<sup>9</sup>

57. In direct contrast to the campaign carried on in the Federal Republic of Germany against a non-proliferation treaty is the attitude of the other German State—the German Democratic Republic. The statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic addressed to the Eighteen-Nation Committee which we read out at the meeting on 7 March 1967,<sup>10</sup> provides convincing evidence of the German Democratic Republic's peace-loving policy and deep interest in solving the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other disarmament questions. We draw the particular attention of the participants in the negotiations to the appeal of the Government of the German Democratic Republic —

that the Government of the West German Federal Republic should join the readiness repeatedly declared by the Government of the German Democratic Republic to accede without any conditions and reservations to a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons . . . .<sup>11</sup>

58. We should like to hope that in regard to a non-proliferation treaty there will prevail also in the Federal Republic of Germany reasonable, sound principles which will make it possible to remove the obstacles which are being placed in the way of a solution to this problem. Nuclear weapons cannot be allowed to fall into the hands of those forces that are calling for a revision of the results of the Second World War and are doing their utmost to increase tension on the continent of Europe and throughout the world.

59. In examining the question of the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty in its correct perspective, one cannot fail to reach the conclusion that all countries are interested in solving this problem. From time to time we hear the question raised: will not the security of the non-nuclear countries suffer under such a treaty? To that question we can reply quite definitely that such a treaty will but strengthen the security of all countries without exception. In our world today the security of each individual country is inseparable from universal security, and it is precisely the solution of the problem of non-proliferation that would help to ensure international security and reduce the

<sup>9</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 686-687.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 131 (variant translation).

<sup>10</sup> ENDC/PV. 201, pp. 5 ff.

<sup>11</sup> ENDC/189.

threat of a nuclear war. Would the appearance of new nuclear Powers, if the spread of nuclear weapons were to be allowed, strengthen world stability or be a guarantee of security? Of course not. That is precisely why we regard the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a priority task in the disarmament negotiations. The lack of a solution to this problem will lead to an increase in the number of nuclear Powers and create such a situation in the world that the threat to universal security will be many times greater.

60. A treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons will undoubtedly be in the interests of all countries, nuclear and non-nuclear, because it will create a more reliable degree of universal security and lead to an easing of international tension and a strengthening of confidence among States.

61. Likewise we often hear the question raised of how to reconcile the solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with the use of nuclear explosions by non-nuclear Powers for peaceful purposes. Strictly speaking, at the present stage the question of the use of peaceful nuclear explosions is not a practical issue, and, according to available information, it is hardly likely to be of any great practical importance in the foreseeable future. The problem of the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is being intensively spread abroad by the very same circles in West Germany that would like to discover new obstacles to the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty.

62. It is known that a device for carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is no different in principle from devices serving a military purpose. Therefore our attitude to the carrying-out of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes by non-nuclear countries is determined by our position of principle in regard to non-proliferation in general and, above all, by the premise that a treaty on this question must close all loopholes for the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form. Such a position is fully in keeping with the well-known resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly adopted unanimously at its last session.

63. The Soviet Union understands the interest of the non-nuclear countries in the use of nuclear energy in the future for implementing such major projects in the field of economic development as may require the carrying-out of nuclear explosions. We firmly maintain the position that an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons cannot and should not prevent non-nuclear countries from using nuclear energy for the purposes of peaceful economic development. In doing so we bear in mind that the question of the procedure and conditions governing the carrying-out of nuclear explosions is a separate question that can be settled only on the basis of a separate international agreement.

64. We are firmly convinced that the solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would correspond to the interests of all peoples and all States, whether nuclear or non-nuclear. Of course it would be a good thing to carry out immediately a complete programme of nuclear disarmament or, better still, to solve the problem of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Union is a consistent advocate of the solution of these questions and has repeatedly made appropriate proposals in this regard. The participants in the negotia-

tions should be well aware that it is not through our fault that these problems have not so far been solved.

65. But would it be right to put off the drafting and conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, where there are prospects of success, on the pretext that it is necessary to reach agreement simultaneously on steps in the direction of eliminating the nuclear potential of the nuclear Powers? Obviously the path indicated by the United Nations General Assembly is the right one and offers the best chance of solving the questions before the Committee. The participants in the negotiations know that paragraph 6 of resolution 2153 adopted at the 21st session of the United Nations General Assembly--

*Calls upon* the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to give high priority to the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with the mandate contained in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX);<sup>12</sup>

66. It is altogether obvious that the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty will create favourable conditions for progress in the solution of other disarmament questions. The Soviet delegation has repeatedly stressed that it regards the solution of the problem of non-proliferation not as an end in itself or a single isolated measure, but as a link in a chain of other disarmament measures leading to the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war. The Soviet Union bases itself on the promise [promise?] that the solution of the problem of non-proliferation will help towards reaching agreement also on other questions in the field of nuclear disarmament. Our task consists, not in perpetuating indefinitely the existing number of members of the "nuclear club", but in eliminating that club altogether, by banning and ultimately by destroying nuclear weapons.

67. In concluding this examination of the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, I should like once more to emphasize that the Soviet Union stands wholeheartedly for a positive solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union considers in this connexion that the conclusion of an appropriate treaty is an important pressing task of our time.

68. In the course of the general debate one other important question has been touched on, or rather a group of questions, the solution of which would help to strengthen security and to relax international tension: I refer to the problem of establishing denuclearized zones in various parts of the world. This problem has long been ripe for solution. The vital significance and importance of proposals for the establishment of denuclearized zones are confirmed by the example of a number of Latin-American countries, whose efforts for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America have resulted in the elaboration and signing of an appropriate Treaty. The members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee are no doubt studying with great interest this important document, namely the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> For res. 2153, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 748-750. Res. 2028 appears *ibid.*, 1965, pp. 532-534.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 69-83.

69. The representative of Mexico, Mr. Garcia Robles, whose contribution to the drafting of the Latin-American Treaty is well known, has commented to us upon some of what he called its major provisions,<sup>14</sup> and the Soviet delegation attached great importance to the analysis that he made. We noted in particular the remarks of the representative of Mexico concerning nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, and also the statement made by the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, on this same question on 7 March.<sup>15</sup> We listened with great interest to their interpretation of article 18 on explosions for peaceful purposes, in relation to the organic link between this article and the provisions of articles 1 and 5, which forbid "The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever" of any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner, and also "The receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession" of such a device.

70. The connexion between the aforesaid provisions of the Latin American Treaty has the significance that devices for the carrying-out of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, as I have already stated, are no different in principle from the devices used in nuclear weapons. This circumstance closely links the question of the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes with the question of preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, so we understand, is to be directed against such proliferation.

71. We have also heard today an interpretation of article 18 of the Treaty by the representative of Brazil.<sup>16</sup> We shall examine this interpretation with the attention that this question merits. We shall make our comments in this connexion, if the need arises, at one of the later meetings of the Committee.

72. The position of principle of the Soviet Union is to support the establishment of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world. The Soviet Government has, as you know, repeatedly expressed its readiness to undertake to respect the status of denuclearized zones, provided that the other nuclear Powers will enter into similar undertakings. Obviously a more specific attitude towards any particular denuclearized zone can be stated after studying the agreement concluded by the respective countries for the establishment of such a zone, and taking into consideration the positions of the other nuclear Powers.

73. The participants in the negotiations are no doubt well acquainted with the proposals for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in Central Europe,<sup>17</sup> the Mediterranean Basin,<sup>18</sup> the Balkan Peninsula and Adriatic region,<sup>19</sup> Scandinavia,<sup>20</sup> the Near and Middle East, the Pacific Basin<sup>21</sup> and elsewhere. We all know the Declaration concerning

<sup>14</sup> *Ante*, pp. 99-103.

<sup>15</sup> *Ante*, pp. 126-128.

<sup>16</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>17</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. I, pp. 201-205.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 187-193.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 1945-1979, vol. II, pp. 1423-1426.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1436-1439.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 943.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1345-1346.

Africa into a denuclearized zone that was adopted at the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly.<sup>23</sup> In the present circumstances, when we are witnessing practical progress in establishing denuclearized zones, it would be extremely desirable that the countries concerned should without undue delay start negotiations with a view to carrying out this idea in specific regions and succeed in giving practical effect to the existing proposals.

74. In our opinion—and this point of view is shared by many Powers—it would be particularly important to establish a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, the area of the greatest tension in the European continent. It is there that the armed forces of the NATO Powers and the Warsaw Treaty Powers confront one another; it is there that colossal stocks of nuclear weapons and missiles are concentrated. As reported in the United States press, there are now more than 7,000 nuclear warheads in Western Europe. The Soviet Government considers that the implementation of the proposal of the Polish People's Republic for the establishment in Central Europe of a zone free of nuclear weapons and missiles would be of great importance for the relaxation of international tension and the establishment of security in Europe. We also whole-heartedly support the Polish proposal on the freezing of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons in this region.<sup>24</sup> An important contribution to the cause of disarmament and the relaxation of international tension would be made by implementing the proposals of the German Democratic Republic contained in the Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic set out in Committee document ENDC/189.

75. Before concluding our statement we should like to mention the question which you, Mr. Chairman, raised today in your statement. Five years have elapsed since the Committee first met to occupy itself with the solution of one of the most important of international problems of these times, the problem of halting the arms race and of bringing about general and complete disarmament. In assessing the work of the Committee in the intervening period, we should like to note that the negotiations on disarmament have not been a waste of time. During the discussions that have taken place, however heated they may have been at times, the positions of the sides have been made clear and there has been a search for agreement on the questions under consideration by the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

76. We may note in this connexion that the work of the Committee contributed to the conclusion in 1963 of the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty,<sup>25</sup> to the reaching of agreement not to put objects carrying nuclear weapons into orbit<sup>26</sup> and to progress in solving some other questions relating to disarmament. The negotiations which have been conducted throughout these years in the Eighteen-Nation Committee have helped to draw the attention of all countries and of world public opinion to the problem of disarmament as one of the most important problems of international life.

77. At the same time it has to be noted with regret that the nego-

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 624-626.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 1964, pp. 53-55.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 538.

tiations in the Committee have still not yielded the results that were expected of its work. Today, as at the start of the work of the Geneva Conference, we are still far from reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament and on many questions relating to partial measures of disarmament and the relaxation of international tension. In speaking of the reasons for the failure of the Committee to solve the problems before it, it is impossible to disregard the existing international situation, which has a direct effect and influence on the course of our negotiations. In this connexion it is necessary above all to point to the war unleashed by the United States in Viet-Nam. Likewise the solution of the problems of disarmament is not facilitated by the arms race policy that is being pursued by some of the Western Powers, and to which they give priority over the cause of disarmament.

78. The Soviet Union, true to its policy of defending peace and ensuring international security, has done and is continuing to do all that it can so that the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee may be fruitful and lead to the adoption of effective measures in the field of disarmament and the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war. As we enter the sixth year of negotiations on disarmament, we express the hope that the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee will result in progress being made in fulfilling the tasks entrusted to it by the resolutions of the General Assembly and by the hopes of all mankind.

### Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Fifth Anniversary of the Committee, March 14, 1967<sup>1</sup>

79. As the Committee begins its sixth year the temptation is to list the accomplishments of the past rather than the challenges of the future. Our accomplishments, real as they may be, are small compared to our true potential now that a firm foundation for negotiations has been laid and forward movement has finally begun. So, after we pause briefly to review what has gone before, let us turn our attention to what can be achieved tomorrow.

80. True it is that the Committee's long efforts have been rewarded with some success. Our deliberations have included the specific proposals which form the basis for three important forward steps to reduce the danger and the destruction of war. I refer, of course, to the limited test-ban Treaty,<sup>2</sup> the General Assembly resolution against nuclear weapons in space<sup>3</sup> which has now been incorporated into the Space Treaty,<sup>4</sup> and to the first "hot line" agreement.<sup>5</sup> True it is that we are succeeding in developing an integrated and expert attack on the complicated problems we face. This and the progress which has finally begun have convinced my Government that much more can be

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.293, pp. 28-30.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 538.

<sup>4</sup> *Antc.*, pp. 38-43.

<sup>5</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 236-238.

accomplished in the future. Despite the magnitude and the complexity of today's armaments, the intricate balances of power they have produced all around the world and the rivalries, suspicions and conflicts which still remain, our problems are capable of solution. But, if we have cause for satisfaction today, it should be what we can achieve tomorrow rather than what we did achieve yesterday.

81. What lies within our immediate grasp is a non-proliferation treaty, a goal for which we have all voted in General Assembly resolutions year after year since 1961. Pointing to the progress made towards such an agreement in 1966, President Johnson said recently "Our hopes are high that this long effort will soon be crowned with success".<sup>6</sup> In an attempt to achieve this hope at the earliest possible date, I have been visiting the capitals of several nations allied to the United States. As the 1966 Eight-Nation Joint Memorandum on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons makes clear, a main obstacle to agreement on non-proliferation has been "mainly discussed between the major Powers and their allies".<sup>7</sup>

82. In the discussions with our allies we have also sought to clarify a number of questions which all governments must consider when they examine a treaty of this nature—as must freely-elected government officials directly responsible for the security and the progress of their countries. These are legitimate questions to which we believe there are reasonable answers. It is for this reason that I have been gone from Geneva and shall be going again this week. It is our intention to exert every effort we can on our side to expedite the tabling of a draft treaty so that discussion of a concrete text can begin here soon.

83. On this fifth anniversary we are on the eve of reaching one of the most significant agreements on arms control in the twentieth century—an agreement so heavily weighted in favour of humanity that we cannot ignore our responsibility to present it to the nations of the world for their signature. This would indeed be an anniversary gift of incalculable value.

84. If our hopes for success in this treaty are realized, our chances for further steps will clearly be enhanced. In the case of strategic nuclear carriers, for example, the United States and the Soviet Union have a unique opportunity for achieving a major arms limitation—a limitation which would bring reassurance to the whole world. We are, to quote President Johnson again, "at a watershed in the dispiriting history of our arms competition. Decisions may be made on both sides which will trigger another upward spiral".<sup>8</sup> We are determined to prevent a further build-up of this kind if we can. We are convinced that the achievement of a non-proliferation agreement will greatly assist towards that end by helping to reduce the tensions which make agreement on major weapons limitations so difficult. The steps we have already taken, and the one we are about to take, both lead us further down the road towards the safer, more peaceful world which we all seek.

85. Before concluding, I should like to join in the welcome to Ambassador U Maung Maung. It is good to see him here again with us.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, p. 821.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 576-579.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 822-823.

Address by the Japanese Foreign Minister (Miki) to the  
Diet: Nonproliferation Negotiations [Extract],  
March 14, 1967<sup>1</sup>

Since it is quite clear that the proliferation of nuclear weapons will increase the danger of a nuclear war and pose a grave menace to world peace, the government supports the objective of the proposed treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, that is, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In order for this treaty to fully achieve its objective, however, it is necessary that as many countries as possible, both those countries which possess nuclear weapons and those which do not, participate in the treaty. For this purpose, full consideration should be given in the treaty to the security of the countries which do not possess nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, so long as the purpose of this treaty lies in the elimination of anxiety which would be cast upon mankind by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it is not enough that the treaty prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons among the countries which do not possess them, but it should go further to make clear the sincere intention on the part of the countries which possess nuclear weapons to make efforts toward nuclear disarmament, leading ultimately to general disarmament. It is true that disarmament cannot be achieved at once, but concrete measures should be taken with a view to realizing step by step the fervent desire of mankind that nuclear weapons should be abolished. Otherwise the treaty would lose its moral foundation.

This treaty should not hinder in any way the utilization of atomic power for peaceful purposes as well as its research and development.

Furthermore, the treaty should not discriminate between the countries which possess nuclear weapons and those which do not in the utilization of atomic power for peaceful purposes. When it becomes possible in the future for energy produced by nuclear explosions to be practically utilized for peaceful purposes the opportunity for the utilization of the energy for peaceful purposes on a non-discriminatory and equal basis will have to be secured for countries which do not possess nuclear weapons at present. I would like to state that the government has no intention at this time to develop nuclear explosive devices. What I wish to say here is that our future generations should not be deprived of the opportunity to take part in the progress of atomic science toward the utilization of its fruits for peaceful purposes.

The government is determined to make further efforts to have its views fully reflected in the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is our sincere wish that a just treaty will come into being.

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<sup>1</sup> Department of State files.

Statement by the U.A.R. Representative (Khallaf) to the  
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nonprolif-  
eration of Nuclear Weapons, March 16, 1967<sup>1</sup>

2. The agenda of the present session contains a number of important disarmament questions, to which [my] delegation expects to revert later in our work. Since attention is being concentrated for the time on the question of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, I shall, if I may, speak about that today.

3. The mandate entrusted to us again by the United Nations urgently to conclude a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons<sup>2</sup> imposes on us all, collectively and individually, a heavy responsibility before history. It is for history to pass judgment—and how severe that will be, alas!—on the nuclear arms race which has been going on before our eyes for more than thirty years; but it is for us, at the crossroads where we stand today, to make this choice that is so vital to the very existence of mankind: either the world finally sets out to propagate the nuclear evil, with all the dangers and risks that entails, or it decides immediately and resolutely to halt and to reduce and eliminate the danger of nuclear suicide.

4. As the Committee knows, ever since the United Nations adopted its resolution on non-proliferation in 1959<sup>3</sup>—that is, long before the problem of dissemination assumed its present proportions—the United Arab Republic has taken a categorical stand in favour of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a measure which could and should help substantially towards reducing the danger of the nuclear threat. In this regard I venture to remark that my country's efforts to solve this problem constructively have been made in all international bodies and in many countries: both in New York and in Geneva in the United Nations;<sup>4</sup> and in Belgrade and in Cairo at the Conferences of the non-aligned countries.

5. By way of illustration, it is sufficient to recall that the General Assembly adopted at its last session resolution 2149 (XXI)—a most important and almost decisive resolution—on the renunciation by States of any actions which might hamper the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>5</sup> We are happy to note that that resolution was prompted to a large extent by an idea put forward in this regard by the delegation of the United Arab Republic at the meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in Geneva on 13 August 1964.<sup>6</sup> This idea was subsequently taken up by the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held in Cairo in October 1964,<sup>7</sup> and was embodied two years later in the General Assembly resolution which I have just mentioned.

6. Many other delegations have not failed and will not fail, here or

<sup>1</sup> UNDC/PV.204, pp. 4-12.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 748-750.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 1945-1959, vol. II, p. 1547.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, 1964, pp. 425-426.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 686-687.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 1964, pp. 327-333.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 423 ff.

elsewhere, to make their valuable contribution to the solution of this vital problem, thus bringing us closer to the aim which we are all pursuing here. Already, through the stream of debates and discussions which have taken place since last year, we have been able to dispel misunderstandings, clear up confusions and overcome serious obstacles. In short, the treaty has made considerable progress.

7. The phase upon which we are about to enter is a true phase of negotiations which, in accordance with the decision of the General Assembly, must take place within this Committee. We should all like these negotiations to be free and open, because we want to be fruitful. Each of us must make his contribution and do his utmost to reconcile his own interests with the common interest. By the nature of things, our debates and our dialogue concerning certain important aspects of the subject we are discussing must take place between nuclear and non-nuclear, between aligned and non-aligned countries. It is undeniable that in regard to the treaty the non-aligned and non-nuclear countries have equitable claims to put forward which must be taken into account in our negotiations.

8. But representatives will agree with me that our common cause will best be served if we counter from the outset the tendency to represent our debates as a mere indecisive duel between nuclear or non-nuclear aligned countries and non-nuclear non-aligned countries. We must likewise counter the tendency to represent these debates as nothing but a struggle between certain regional interests and the general interest of the international community, which is being deliberately sacrificed to the former. This indecisive duel and this blind struggle can and must be avoided at all costs if we wish to save the treaty from certain failure either now or in the future. That is why a spirit of mutual understanding and collaboration must prevail among us. In other words, there must be a common desire, a common will, to make this treaty an instrument of progress in international life. But how is that to be achieved?

9. Fortunately we have some useful and effective guidelines. Above all, we have resolution 2028 (XX),<sup>8</sup> which lays down in broad outline the form and content of the non-proliferation treaty, and we have the memoranda submitted by the eight non-aligned delegations.<sup>9</sup> Basing itself on the letter and on the spirit of that important resolution of the General Assembly, my delegation endeavoured in its statement of 3 March 1966 to specify five features which we think the treaty should possess.<sup>10</sup>

10. These features may be summed up as follows: the treaty must be able to stop proliferation completely and finally; it must be effective, viable and lasting, clear and precise. In other words, it must be given concrete reality and sufficient vitality. To our knowledge, no one has questioned the value of these features. Indeed, on the contrary we find them supported in one way or another by various delegations here present.

11. I have ventured to refer to these features because at this stage in our negotiations they can be extremely useful when we settle the

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 532-534.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 424-425; *ibid.*, 1966, pp. 576-579.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 58-62.

stipulations and provisions that a genuine non-proliferation treaty should contain, and the wording appropriate to these. To disregard these features, or even some of them, might make the treaty either meaningless or so anaemic that it would die—slowly perhaps, but surely.

12. In neither case could the delegation of the United Arab Republic associate itself with such an undertaking. In our view the treaty will be made real if its provisions can change the present state of the risks, dangers and hazards of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We all know that at the present time there are risks of proliferation, and that even the voluntary and precarious embargo practised at present is liable to break down at any moment. Therefore the treaty, in its final wording, must considerably improve this state of affairs and constitute a sounder basis for stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A treaty which did not pass this test would be merely a mirage with nothing real about it.

13. In the opinion of the delegation of the United Arab Republic, a treaty possessing this reality must reflect in its provisions the following principles:

(a) As has been unanimously agreed, the provisions of the treaty must be so drafted as to leave no loophole of any kind.

14. My delegation notes with satisfaction this year a growing tendency to respect this principle more strictly; and we hope that all the serious and unacceptable loopholes of the previous texts will finally disappear. Among those loopholes let me merely mention once more that which might result, not from governments, but from individuals, companies, or private, public or semi-public undertakings or bodies engaged in nuclear activities. A treaty which left the risk of such a loophole would not much alter the dangers of the present situation.

(b) The treaty must contain provisions clearly stipulating compulsory and uniform application of the single system of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency<sup>11</sup> to all non-nuclear States parties to the treaty. Moreover, the control system must be extended to the transfer of nuclear material and to all nuclear activities, past and present.

15. In such a treaty the only inspection system acceptable in this respect is compulsory and not voluntary, international and not regional, effective and not fictitious.

(c) In order that the treaty may achieve a real advance over the present situation in a field so dangerous to peace, it must constitute an effective and permanent brake on the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

16. That is why we support the principle of the indefinite duration of the treaty. However, that principle will be weakened if each party is allowed discretionary and too absolute power to withdraw from the treaty if it considers that its higher interests are threatened. In our view repudiation of such a treaty must depend on a non-fulfilment of

<sup>11</sup> See *ibid.*, 1965, pp. 446-460.

its obligations agreed on by either nuclear or non-nuclear contracting Powers, or on an act of dissemination committed by a third party.

17. Furthermore, the treaty must provide that any case of violation shall be referred to the competent organs of the United Nations, which is held to be responsible for international peace and security.

18. Provisions which took account of all these considerations would represent a considerable advance over the present situation because they would contribute to the stability of the treaty and obviate any facile temptation to set the world going along the disastrous path of the nuclear arms race through a rash and irresponsible act by any State. Such an act might well set off a chain reaction in many other States, thus inciting them to free themselves in their turn from the treaty even if perhaps they did not wish to do so. There would then be a political escalation towards successive nuclear claims which might profoundly affect the treaty.

19. As you see, all the provisions which we have just advocated are aimed at enabling the treaty really and effectively to bar the way to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But the treaty must also be made vital, so that it can yield its natural fruit and at the same time fulfill the desire of the General Assembly to see it mark a step towards general disarmament, and nuclear disarmament in particular. In other words, we must not allow the treaty to be fragile, vulnerable, unsteady or likely—even from the state [*start?*]  
—to founder at the slightest political storm.

20. To this end, in our view, we must include in [it] two provisions as a sort of built-in insurance guaranteeing it a reasonable and necessary durability. I should like to say a few words about those two provisions.

21. The first concerns the link between the treaty and nuclear disarmament in general, and the balance which must be achieved between the obligations of the nuclear and of the non-nuclear parties to the treaty. Opinions may differ on the form and scope of the means of meeting this need. Very interesting and fruitful proposals have been made both here and in New York by the delegations of the non-aligned countries. We are always prepared to discuss in our Committee any specific nuclear disarmament measure which might be included in, accompany or follow a treaty on non-proliferation.

22. In any event, one point seems to have been already settled. The need to embody in the treaty the principle of the responsibility of the nuclear countries in respect of nuclear disarmament is now recognized. I venture to recall on this occasion what I said in the statement I made in this Committee on 3 March 1966:

The non-nuclear countries will in law renounce their right to nuclear weapons, but nuclear stockpiles and the threat of a nuclear confrontation will in fact continue to exist indefinitely, even if one or all of the foregoing proposals are adopted. . . .

These proposals related to the different nuclear disarmament measures which had been proposed by various delegations of the non-aligned countries. I continue the quotation:

. . . This *de facto* situation could always constitute an incitement to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. To diminish this risk still further it will be necessary, pending the complete elimination by radical measures of nuclear

stockpiles and the nuclear threat, to include in the treaty a formal and definite indication of what the nuclear Powers propose to do with the existing nuclear armament.<sup>13</sup>

23. In my delegation's view it has always been and still is necessary that the treaty should contain a separate article under which the nuclear Powers would assume a legal obligation in respect of nuclear disarmament. My delegation notes with satisfaction that the idea of including in the treaty special mention of the responsibility of the nuclear Powers has since gained ground. That is how we understand the following statement made by Lord Chalfont at our meeting on 23 February:

This is not to suggest that a non-proliferation treaty can ignore the responsibilities of the nuclear Powers in this respect. Its drafting must clearly reflect their intention to move rapidly towards agreement on measures to halt and reverse what has been expressively called "vertical proliferation"; and its terms must provide the means of redress for the non-nuclear Powers if the nuclear States are unreasonably slow in translating their intentions into action.<sup>14</sup>

24. The statement by Mr. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, which was read out by Mr. Burns at our meeting on 28 February, is explicit in this respect:

It is neither unnatural nor unreasonable that countries forgoing their option to produce nuclear weapons should wish to ensure that their act of self-denial should in turn lead the nuclear weapon Powers to undertake tangible steps to reduce and eliminate their vast stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. We are therefore of the opinion that nuclear-weapon States signatories to a treaty should be party to a clear and compelling declaration of intent to embark on the process of nuclear arms control.<sup>15</sup>

25. So far as the United Arab Republic is concerned, we shall urge that this mention of the responsibility of the nuclear Powers, the content of which has still to be determined, be embodied not in the preamble to the treaty but in a separate article, so as to give it its full legal effect and that incontestably compelling character of which Mr. Paul Martin spoke. My delegation will in due course submit to the Committee a draft article on this subject.

26. A treaty which did not contain such an article would be an uneven and unbalanced treaty perpetuating the monopoly of the nuclear Powers and preserving indefinitely the division of the world into nuclear States and non-nuclear States, thus strangely recalling other treaties of the same kind which at a certain phase of history held vast areas of the world in bondage. All this would be far from the requirements of modern international society based on the equality of States and peoples and built up on unquestionable solidarity.

27. I now come to the second provision concerning the viability of the treaty which in my delegation's views should be included in the treaty. This provision was expressly mentioned in paragraph 4 of the operative part of the General Assembly resolution which—

Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to consider urgently the proposal that the nuclear-weapon Powers should give an

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, p. 77.

<sup>14</sup> ENDC/PV. 288, p. 10.

<sup>15</sup> ENDC/PV. 289, p. 16.

assurance that they will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States without nuclear weapons on their territories . . .<sup>15</sup>

28. The usefulness, indeed the legal and moral necessity, of a text of this nature is obvious. Without any doubt my delegation rejects any provision in the treaty or elsewhere that would hamper our independence or prejudice our position as a non-aligned country; but in fact it is inconceivable that the non-nuclear States which under the treaty would renounce nuclear weapons would quite simply agree by the same act to reserve to nuclear Powers the privilege of threatening them or attacking them with those same weapons.

29. Moreover, the non-nuclear States which by virtue of the treaty would legally renounce nuclear weapons would have greater interest in respecting and maintaining a treaty if it contained an obligation incumbent upon the nuclear Powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States. On the other hand, a non-proliferation treaty which excluded the obligation of the nuclear Powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States would not only "enshrine" the monopoly of nuclear attack of the nuclear Powers but would also—and this is a serious matter—increase the striking power of the existing nuclear members. This would in no way correspond either to the spirit or to the purpose of a non-proliferation treaty.

30. That is why my delegation urges that an appropriate text on this subject should be included in the treaty and that the nuclear Powers should have a legal and moral obligation to respect it.

31. I should now like to deal with a further problem relating to the effect which a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would have on the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. For the solution of this problem we propose three principal rules:

(a) A non-proliferation treaty must not preserve in the hands of the nuclear Powers the monopoly of the development of atomic energy for exclusively peaceful purposes;

(b) A non-proliferation treaty must not, broadly speaking, constitute an obstacle to such development of nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes as the non-nuclear countries would wish to carry out;

(c) The development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes must not in any way be an excuse or a device for creating loopholes for the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The non-proliferation treaty must reflect these three considerations.

32. In regard to the use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes, the delegation of the United Arab Republic proposes that this question be settled in the following manner. The non-proliferation treaty must—

(a) Empower the International Atomic Energy Agency to deal with this question in order to ensure, under its control and on a non-discriminatory and objective basis, the use of nuclear explosives for the development of the non-nuclear States;

<sup>15</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, p. 749.

(b) Require the nuclear States to supply these explosives without political conditions to non-nuclear States which request them and to do so through the Vienna Agency.

33. Since the non-nuclear countries are not always sure that their affairs will be as successful as the Aswan High Dam, it is natural that they should prefer not to incur any risk in regard to the satisfaction of their nuclear needs for peaceful purposes.

34. I should like to say a few words about what has been called "spin-off"—that is, the immediate technical advantage in the civil field that could be obtained during the implementation of a military programme by a nuclear Power. My delegation feels that, even if military programmes gave rise to such an advantage, that would not be sufficient to justify its mention in any form in a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, for the starting-point of such a mention would rest on an implicit and gratuitous blessing by us of the military nuclear programmes which the treaty is intended to help to eliminate. The only concern we should have in regard to these military nuclear programmes is purely and simply to abolish them and to transfer the resources assigned to them to civil and practical fields.

35. Another point which my delegation would like to see included in the treaty is paragraph (e) of the operative part of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) concerning denuclearized zones.<sup>10</sup>

36. In conclusion, I wish to reserve my delegation's right to revert to the aspects of the treaty which I have touched upon in this intervention, and to other aspects which I have not yet mentioned. We welcome the possibility of the submission of a new draft treaty in the near future, but reserve the right to express our point of view on that occasion.

### Interview of Chancellor Kiesinger With *Der Spiegel*: Non-proliferation Negotiations [Extract], March 20, 1967<sup>1</sup>

*Question: Mr. Federal Chancellor, it has generally been confirmed that your first 100 days in office have been what we call a good start. But obviously you are now also acquainted with the hardships of governing and are about to enter difficult waters with respect to foreign policy. There is the question of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. You told the press in Bonn that control should not be exercised necessarily by those who exercise nuclear monopoly. Do you regard this as a condition sine qua non?*

*Answer: We must prevent control from being exercised in this manner. Moreover, we know from the prevailing practice of the Vienna control agency, which already controls part of the nuclear energy serving peaceful purposes also in the United States and Great Britain, that controllers coming from the other side are rejected.*

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, p. 534.

<sup>1</sup> Hamburg radio broadcast, Mar. 20, 1967.

*Question: Since there were uncertainties concerning these control paragraphs, would it not have been logical also to ask Moscow for an interpretation, which, under certain circumstances, might also have become a basis for desired better relations?*

Answer: First of all, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty was presented to us by the United States, and this always as an American text. Naturally we were told that contacts with Moscow were to [take place]. In this situation it would not have been expedient for us to address Moscow. I have certainly taken such a step into consideration because, in the decisive questions of the treaty, we must also be certain of Soviet interpretation. But I reiterate, we have not considered such a step expedient.

*Question: There also are elements in your government coalition who place much value upon keeping open a European option, who believe that, in the case of closer unification of this continent or of the western continent, the Federal Republic might have a share in nuclear power after all. Are you tending to insist that this point be clarified in the draft treaty, or do you think it is sufficient if the current text does not exclude this condition?*

Answer: This again depends on how the two big nuclear powers interpret the treaty. The American side says that, if a new subject emerges under international law, this subject will not be bound by the treaty. But this is an important point which must be defined unequivocally, because we must not let a situation occur in which Europe may become politically united but unable to decide freely how it shall establish its security.

*Question: Now we could argue that, if this welcome and, according to current criteria, surprising development were actually to come soon, the withdrawal clause would be applicable, particularly because in this case there would be backing not only from France but also from Britain.*

Answer: Perhaps we must clarify this question. But on this point people must not get the impression that the Federal Republic wants to create an opening to access to atomic weapons. Such worries are absolutely unjustified.

*Question: Such worries, however, have been fed by a number of drastic statements in Germany, not from the side of the chief of government. It struck us that, although you reprimanded the views expressed by Deputy Adenauer, you failed to reprimand the views expressed by Minister Strauss, which were not less drastic. What is more, he is a member of your government, so that you actually have more right to interfere as far as he is concerned than you would have regarding the more liberal deputy.*

Answer: This was a coincidence. I was asked to comment on the statements of the former Federal Chancellor and I replied. However, I have naturally stated my view to all colleagues and political friends who made statements regarding these questions.

*Question: Nevertheless, Mr. Federal Chancellor, it is true that, with respect to some members of your government, people know exactly how strong misgivings are—and that not only as regards Mr. Strauss. Among the SPD, in Mr. Wehner and Mr. Brandt, we suspect a very far-reaching willingness to join the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, and the Federal Chancellor stands in the middle, somewhat like a sphinx?*

*Answer: I must naturally always keep an eye on the desirable and also attainable result. I must bring the people and views together. This is part of the task of a government chief.*

**Statement by the Mexican Representative (Garcia Robles)  
to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Latin  
American Nuclear-Free Zone and Nonproliferation of  
Nuclear Weapons, March 21, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

2. At the beginning of my first intervention in the Committee on Disarmament at the opening meeting of its 1967 session on 21 February<sup>2</sup> I ventured to explain that I proposed to put before the Committee, for the information of the representatives of member States, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America which was adopted unanimously in Mexico City on 12 February.<sup>3</sup>

3. Today I should like to begin by expressing my sincere appreciation to all the members of the Committee who have spoken for their kind references in their statements to the modest contribution which, as Chairman of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, I was able to make to that noble Latin-American collective enterprise which culminated so happily in the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

4. I would add that as representative of Mexico, whose Government was appointed Depository Government of the Treaty, I was particularly gratified to note that among the representatives who voiced the greatest praise for that instrument were the representatives of the three nuclear States participating in the work of the Disarmament Committee. This gives me reason to hope that Additional Protocol II of the Treaty will be signed in the not too distant future by representatives of their Governments.

5. Concerning the content of the Treaty, I shall make only a few general observations on one aspect which I consider fundamental. These observations, I repeat, will be general and strictly objective, since the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been transmitted to us in accordance with a resolution of the Preparatory Commission purely for information because, as is stated in the resolution itself—adopted on 12 February and appearing in the Final Act as 23 (IV)—, it was considered

<sup>1</sup> DND/PC/PV.295, pp. 4-11.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 99-103.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 69-83.

to constitute "a distinguished contribution by the signatory States to the international community's effort to avert the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons."<sup>4</sup>

6. Therefore I do not think that this is either the time or the appropriate forum for a discussion of the significance and scope of the articles of the Treaty. The position of the Government of Mexico in this regard was clearly and adequately indicated in the official documents of the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission. As for the interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty: in the event of any differences of opinion concerning them between the Contracting Parties—that is, between the States for which the Treaty will enter into force—the instrument itself recognizes in its article 24 the competence of the International Court of Justice, which, should it some day be called upon to decide such a case, would certainly apply the rule it has already enunciated, that—

It is a fundamental principle of interpretation that words must be interpreted according to the meaning they would normally bear within their context unless such an interpretation would have ridiculous or absurd results.

7. I shall therefore merely repeat that in my view the chief merit of the Tlatelolco Treaty is as I had occasion to point out in my previous intervention, that it reconciles the comprehensive and absolute prohibition of nuclear weapons, without any exception or reservation, with the rights of States members of the future Latin-American organization to peaceful use of the atom for their economic and social development. Both principles—that of the prohibition and that of the use—are embodied in the Treaty. However, whereas the prohibition (article 1) is absolute and unconditional, the use—and this could not be otherwise—is subject under articles 17 and 18 to the condition that it may not involve a violation or breach of that unrestricted prohibition.

8. A system of effective international control (articles 12-16, article 18, paragraphs 2 and 3) and an objective definition (article 5), for the purpose of the Treaty, of "nuclear weapons"—from which the Preparatory Commission deleted at its fourth session the subjective element of intention which had been included in the draft prepared at its third session—guarantees effectively and adequately that the relevant provisions of the Treaty may not be overtly or covertly violated and in particular that it will be impossible, under the pretext of carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, to attempt to test or manufacture nuclear weapons.

9. I shall now put forward some considerations concerning the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which the Committee has been instructed to prepare. They likewise will be very general since my delegation feels that at the present stage of our work, before any new draft has been put before us, such considerations are better justified and may perhaps prove more constructive.

10. I shall begin by asserting that we consider it essential to endeavour to prevent our close scrutiny of the trees from making us lose sight of the wood. In other words, we must endeavour at all times to have in mind the essential and immediate objectives of the treaty we are to draw up. We believe it can be maintained that basically there

<sup>4</sup> ENDC/186, p. 34.

is only one objective, although it has two different facets: avoidance of any form of proliferation or dissemination of nuclear weapons, and at the same time protection of the right of non-nuclear States to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes and to participate fully in the progress and benefits which may be derived from nuclear technology.

11. Starting from the foregoing premise, my delegation considers it essential that the obligations which are to be undertaken by the contracting parties and which, according to the order followed in the two drafts considered by the Committee last year,<sup>5</sup> will constitute the first two articles of the treaty should be as broad and precise as necessary, so that the treaty, in accordance with the first of the five principles approved by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 2028 (XX), may—

. . . be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form.<sup>6</sup>

My delegation, which has in past years maintained that this is a problem to be solved in the first instance by the two so-called nuclear super-Powers and their allies, has been gratified to see that apparently the time is near when a formula better than that contained in earlier drafts will be devised and, we venture to hope, generally accepted.

12. Regarding the provisions on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy that should be included in the treaty, we think the appropriate place for these is an article, not the preamble. Perhaps an adequate form for such an article would be a general declaration that no provision of the treaty should be interpreted as detracting from the right of the contracting parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in any manner not contrary to the obligations assumed under the treaty itself.

13. This negative declaration might be followed by another enunciating a number of positive points and indicating that the foregoing general principle would imply in particular an undertaking that the repeated declarations we have heard in the Committee from representatives of the nuclear Powers should be put into full effect: for instance, that (a) the benefits resulting from the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes shall be available to all parties on a basis of absolute equality and equity; (b) the parties must share all the knowledge and benefits that may be derived from future progress in nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and may continue in their respective territories to develop that technology; (c) the nuclear States shall make their effective co-operation available to the non-nuclear States without any discrimination for the promotion of that development.

14. In regard to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, we maintain the view expressed in my previous intervention: that unless technological progress one day makes it possible to distinguish clearly between nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes and nuclear explosives for warlike purposes—which in the opinion of all the experts whom we have been able to consult so far, and in the opinion of the highly-qualified experts who in this hall informally exchanged views with members of the Committee a few days ago, does not appear to

<sup>5</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 347-349, 443-446; *ibid.*, 1966, pp. 158-160.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 532-534.

be definitely possible at present—, it will be necessary to seek a solution which precludes the spread of nuclear weapons and at the same time enables the non-nuclear States to obtain without difficulty and without discrimination the incalculable benefits which their economic development might derive from such explosions.

15. In this connexion let me repeat what I said on 21 February:

As an immediate remedy, we believe that the possibility should be explored of creating at world level, within one of the existing international organizations such as the United Nations or the International Atomic Energy Agency or independently, a special programme similar to that which already exists for economic development, with the specific aim of helping all States in need of such assistance to carry out on their territories nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes—once it has been shown, of course, that absolutely no danger is involved. With such help those countries would not have to squander their limited resources unnecessarily in themselves manufacturing the essential explosive.<sup>1</sup>

We are confident that such a provision can be included without difficulty in the future treaty, either in a special article or in one of the paragraphs of the general article dealing with the peaceful uses of the atom.

16. We also consider that inclusion in the non-proliferation treaty of the fifth of the principles enunciated in resolution 2028 (XX) will help to facilitate the achievement of that dual fundamental and immediate purpose to which I have been referring. Indeed, the establishment of demilitarized zones with a legal status designed to keep them free forever of nuclear weapons, as the recent Latin-American Treaty does, undoubtedly constitutes the most radical form of non-proliferation. We therefore consider that the future non-proliferation treaty should contain an article along the lines of the one proposed by the Mexican delegation last year, clearly stipulating that the treaty shall not detract from or limit in any way the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to guarantee the complete absence of nuclear weapons from their territories.

17. I should also like to mention specifically, because of the decisive importance it will have for the good operation of the treaty, the need to establish an international control system offering the most ample guarantees of efficacy and absolute impartiality.

18. Another point which must not be omitted, even in so general a statement as the present one, is that concerning the principle, reiterated a number of times by the United Nations General Assembly, that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should not be considered as an end in itself but as "a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and more especially of nuclear disarmament". We believe that that principle should be adequately reflected in the treaty. Thus, for instance, during the recent debates on non-proliferation in the First Committee of the General Assembly, my delegation ventured to suggest as a possible solution the incorporation in the treaty of a declaration of intention of the nuclear Powers to negotiate agreements designed to bring about the implementation of tangible measures to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce and limit progressively the stockpiles of such weapons and their delivery vehicles, with a view to their ultimate elimination.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 101.

19. On the problem of security, my delegation considers that the Committee should give the greatest attention to the express request made to it by the General Assembly in operative paragraph 4 of resolution 2153 (XXI) to—

... consider urgently the proposal that the nuclear-weapon Powers should give an assurance that they will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States without nuclear weapons on their territories, and any other proposals that have been or may be made for the solution of this problem.\*

20. I have almost come to the end of this intervention, since rather than presuming to make it exhaustive I have deliberately limited it, for the reasons which I indicated at its beginning, to an account of the points that my delegation considers to deserve special attention by the Committee because their appropriate solution will determine in the final analysis the success of any treaty we draw up here. I should not like, however, to end this statement without outlining some general conclusions which in our opinion emerge from the objective analysis of the work connected with disarmament and so-called related disarmament measures—done in this Committee and in the bodies which have preceded it, in the United Nations General Assembly, and in the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America. Those conclusions are the following:

(1) the aphorism which reminds us that “the best is the enemy of the good” applies with especial force to work such as that which has been entrusted the Committee;

(2) Where the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is concerned, we must remember that the United Nations General Assembly urged in its resolution 2153 (XXI) “the earliest conclusion” of such a treaty, and stressed in the same resolution and in resolution 2149 (XXI) that the absence of an effective brake on the proliferation of nuclear weapons “would endanger the security of all States” and “may lead to the aggravation of tensions between States and the risk of a nuclear war.”<sup>8</sup>

(3) The conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty, however imperfect, seems infinitely better in relation to the basic objective we pursue than no treaty at all.

(4) Experience shows that the imperfections and lacunae from which a treaty may suffer theoretically very often do not impair its effective and beneficial operation in practice. For instance, I am certain that many technical criticisms could be applied to the content of the Antarctic Treaty,<sup>9</sup> the Moscow Treaty on nuclear tests<sup>10</sup> and the Treaty on the denuclearization of outer space.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, I am equally certain that all of us will agree that the first two treaties I have mentioned have worked completely satisfactorily and that there is no reason to believe that the third treaty would not do so too.

(5) If it were claimed that the non-proliferation treaty should be as comprehensive and detailed as the Treaty for the Prohibition of

\* *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, p. 749.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 686–687.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 1945–1959, vol. II, pp. 1550–1556.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291–293.

<sup>11</sup> *Ante*, pp. 38–43.

Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the work of our Committee would almost certainly be doomed to failure in advance. The privileged conditions which fortunately prevail in Latin America in regard to nuclear armaments are very different from the conditions in other areas of the world. A treaty of universal scope therefore encounters difficulties and problems immeasurably greater than those—by no means negligible—which had to be overcome in order to conclude the Tlatelolco Treaty.

(6) In order to facilitate the general acceptance of a universal treaty on non-proliferation, perhaps the main difficulty to be overcome is to reconcile the position of those States which wish the treaty to include the largest possible number of clear-cut provisions on all the points which they consider related to its subject matter, with the position of those which, on the contrary, maintain that it should contain the fewest possible articles worded in general terms.

(7) My delegation considers that if it should prove impossible to reconcile completely those two divergent points of view despite the mutual concessions that we hope will be forthcoming, it will be advisable to find the solution elsewhere. We do not believe that any State could feel that its national interests are harmed because a non-proliferation treaty is given an opportunity of undergoing the decisive test of its confrontation with reality and its practical application over a reasonable period of time. Consequently, the disagreement of some States with certain aspects of the treaty which the Committee succeeds in drafting might be reduced or even dispelled completely—subject to the need to make the contractual obligations sufficiently stable—if sufficient flexibility were given to the clauses of the treaty governing revision, amendment and withdrawal.

21. To illustrate this assertion by a concrete example, I will say that my delegation considers that the article to be incorporated in the treaty concerning the holding of a conference of the parties to examine the operation of the treaty and also, if necessary, any amendments that might seem advisable in the light of that study, might also provide that the conference should be convened before the date appointed by the article whenever one-third of the States parties to the treaty consider that there has come about in the development of nuclear technology some new fact or situation important enough to justify revision of the treaty.

22. The Mexican delegation will always be ready to do all it can to enable the various points of view already expressed or still to be expressed in our Committee to be brought together in a treaty most likely to obtain the spontaneous accession of all the peoples and governments of the world.

23. The attitude of Mexico towards disarmament in general, and more particularly to collateral matters such as denuclearization and non-proliferation, is well known. I need only recall that on 22 March 1962, scarcely one week after the beginning of the work of this Committee whose fifth anniversary we have just commemorated, the representative of my country announced in this same hall, at the Committee's seventh meeting, that the Mexican Government had already resolved at that time "neither to possess nor to admit to its

national territory nuclear weapons of any sort . . .".<sup>18</sup> The recent signing by the Government of Mexico of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, and the forthcoming unconditional ratification of the Treaty, will transform into an international commitment what was previously only a unilateral declaration.

24. We hope that the Disarmament Committee's work on non-proliferation will in the not too distant future enable all States, both nuclear and non-nuclear, to join in Mexico's irrevocable decision—which President Diaz Ordaz has emphasized particularly on various occasions—that the impendable force of the atom shall be used solely "for life, not for death".

**Statement by the British Disarmament Minister (Chalfont)  
to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Non-  
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, March 21, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

25. I am very glad to be back with the Committee today. As some of my colleagues will know, I have come back, and come back invigorated, from a visit to one of the most fascinating and exciting of all the countries represented at this Conference. Although the purpose of my journey was not connected directly with the subjects we are discussing here, I must say that it was for me a most impressive experience to see the great new capital, Brasilia, on the occasion of the inauguration of President Costa e Silva. It was heartening, too, to reflect that that great city is rising up in the heart of a continent which, God willing, will never know the presence of nuclear weapons.

26. Before taking up the main subject before the Committee, I should like to let my colleagues know of a change in the British delegation. My deputy on my left, Mr. Bernard Garnett, is leaving us for other duties, and his place is being taken by Mr. Ivor Porter, to whom I am sure all members of the Committee will extend the same co-operation that we have enjoyed in the past.

27. But to return to the business before us. I have read with very great interest the statements made by my colleagues while I was away. It is heartening to see that at this awkward moment in our negotiations it has still been possible to maintain a constructive tone, and to avoid exaggerated demands or the expression of policies which might be right in an ideal world but which can serve no useful purpose at this time. The only exceptions, I regret to say, have been a series of intemperate attacks on the Federal Republic of Germany, backed up with a ragbag of quotations from assorted public figures of more or less importance—usually less. And the technique of selective quotation has been worked up into a fine art which, from an aesthetic point of view, I suppose one has to admire however unreal the final picture may be.

28. This time, of course, there has been plenty of material for the artists to work on, since in Germany, as in many other countries all

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV. 7, p. 8.

<sup>2</sup> ENDC/PV. 205, pp. 12-16.

over the world, the imminence—as I hope—of a non-proliferation treaty has led to a lively debate. I see nothing wrong in that. It is true that successive resolutions of the General Assembly have invited this Committee to draw up a treaty on non-proliferation, and the main substantive discussions have been and will be centred in this Committee. But that does not and cannot take away the right of public opinion in countries not represented in this Committee to express views on the treaty, nor can it take away the right of consultation within alliances.

29. I hope that no one here will think that this kind of debate and this kind of consultation derogates from the special position of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. On the contrary, in my view it will help to clarify the issues to be discussed in the Committee and make the negotiations here, which will deal with world-wide rather than regional considerations, that much less difficult.

30. The main arguments put forward in this public debate that has been going on in criticism of the text as it stands, or as many people believe it to stand, relate to the treaty's impact on peaceful nuclear activities. I see nothing sinister in that, though it is true that there have been a number of misunderstandings. Some of the arguments—not, I may say, the ones put forward by the Federal German Government but some of those raised in public discussion in Germany and in other countries—are without foundation. No non-proliferation treaty is meant to impede civil nuclear development, and no treaty must be allowed to do so.

31. I think the Soviet Government must accept at least a part of the blame for some of the misunderstanding, since it was that Government which in January alleged that the German Government—the only Government, I remind the Committee again, which has already undertaken an obligation not to manufacture nuclear weapons—had been using its peaceful nuclear activities as a cloak for military preparations. No one seriously believes that charge. But what could be more calculated to arouse suspicions in Germany that the non-proliferation treaty would be used to prevent that country's legitimate peaceful nuclear development? And a charge like that makes it more rather than less difficult to achieve a treaty. It brings the debate back into the narrow, sterile area of the cold war—narrow geographically because the scope of this treaty is far wider than Central Europe, and certainly narrow and outdated ideologically. It makes it much more difficult to get a text tabled for this Committee to examine; and that is clearly the next step and a step which should not long be delayed.

32. As the representative of the United Arab Republic pointed out on 16 March, we already know the general lines which a non-proliferation treaty must follow.<sup>2</sup> With, as we hope, a text before us, recommended for our examination by the two co-Chairmen, it will be possible for proper and effective multilateral negotiations to begin where they should begin—within the framework of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. I should like to suggest to the Committee very briefly one or two general considerations concerning that stage of the negotiations, the stage which we all hope will begin soon.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 154-160.

33. First, the discussions only have any meaning as long as the common ground between the two main alliances—or, to put it more precisely, between the two most powerful States—remains common ground. That sort of bilateral agreement is by no means all that we need for a non-proliferation treaty, but it is an essential condition of such a treaty.

34. There are two ways in which that common ground might be eroded. The first is by inordinate delay, either before or after the tabling of a draft text of a treaty. The representative of the United Arab Republic, in the speech to which I have just referred, said that we must avoid a treaty which would founder at the first political storm. My delegation would entirely agree with that. But even more precarious than a fragile treaty of that sort is the situation we have at the moment. There are plenty of potential political storms which, if they broke loose, could destroy the present precarious and limited understanding between the great Powers.

35. Another way in which that understanding might be broken is by insistent demands from the non-nuclear Powers for measures of arms control to be effected in conjunction with a non-proliferation treaty, measures on which the two sides cannot, at this time at least, agree. To press for such measures at this stage in the negotiations would throw the whole non-proliferation issue back to what one pessimistic journalist has called "square nought"—that is, back to the bilateral stage of the negotiations from which we are, I hope, just emerging with a sense of considerable relief. It is encouraging that members of this Committee seem generally to have recognized that danger, and I think we have avoided it during this session.

36. On 14 March the representative of Canada recalled the first meeting of this Committee five years ago,<sup>3</sup> and if these five years of negotiations had served no other purpose they would still be valuable as showing the limits of the positions held by the two alliances in which most of the world's arms are concentrated. They show the sticking-points of each side, particularly over the central problem of the verification of arms control agreements. Even more important, to anyone who studies the records of these meetings they show the slow and painful pace at which those positions have shifted, to draw closer together. No one can pretend to hope for a sudden shift overnight, or for a sudden agreement on drastic and detailed reductions of nuclear arms achieved from one day to the next.

37. I believe that that shift will come once we have achieved a non-proliferation treaty. As I said last time I spoke, I do not believe a treaty would last long anyway if measures of disarmament by the nuclear Powers did not follow within a reasonable time.<sup>4</sup> The bilateral talks which it is hoped will take place soon, dealing with the defensive and offensive missiles of the two great Powers, are a very good augury. But I think we must be clear that any long delay now in getting a non-proliferation treaty may mean no treaty at all. Members of this Committee have dwelt in the past on the risk of nuclear weapons spreading if we do not succeed in getting a treaty, and of the threats

<sup>3</sup> ENDC/PV. 293, p. 4.

<sup>4</sup> ENDC/PV. 288, p. 10.

to stability and peace in a proliferated world. But an even more immediate and dangerous consequence of our failure might be a loss of faith in the policy of *détente*, and a step backwards towards the cold war.

38. Here perhaps I may say a word about one of the European aspects of this problem of non-proliferation. As a representative of a Government whose declared intention it is to seek membership of the European Communities provided the conditions are right, I am fully conscious of the regional considerations that we must take account of in examining the text of a treaty. In Europe we have a region that has already, in less than fifteen years, developed a remarkably high degree of civil nuclear collaboration. This collaboration, besides, is subjected by the countries concerned to the most elaborate and rigid controls that exist in the world today. Operated as it is between equal and sovereign States, it is necessarily a delicate mechanism. Nobody's interest—and certainly not that of my Government as a potential member of it—would be served by throwing it overboard in a thoughtless or cavalier way.

39. Those of the European Community therefore have a legitimate concern that a treaty to which they are generally anxious to adhere should not do damage to the instrument that they have created in the interests of peace as well as of their own economic betterment. I do not believe that any such damage is necessary. For obvious reasons, any provision for safeguards in a worldwide non-proliferation treaty must be fitted into a worldwide framework. But I see no reason why an effective and successful compromise cannot be brought about, especially if we are prepared to allow time for the necessary transition to take place.

40. Other countries in other parts of the world will have to take account of similar considerations appropriate to their own areas. But I am above all conscious, both as a European and as a delegate to this Conference, that if we fail now here there is, as I have said, a grave risk that the present move towards a *détente* will be halted and turned back and, should that happen, that the immediate damage to the political situation in Europe, in Asia, in America and in Africa will far outweigh any sacrifice of regional interests which may be needed to achieve a treaty. And I am not convinced that any real sacrifices of this kind are needed.

41. If, on the other hand, one looks at the positive possibilities in the situation, it is evident that even from the political angle the prizes are considerable. For the first time since the partial nuclear test ban of 1963 we have virtual agreement among the nuclear Powers represented at this Conference. The degree of co-operation between them inherent in this agreement, if we get a non-proliferation treaty, will be much greater than in the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty. It is not too much to hope that in this situation the absurdity of piling up enormously expensive weapons suitable only for use against each other will become too obvious to be tolerated, and that the main obstacle to real nuclear disarmament—mutual suspicion—will begin to recede.

42. I have tried to strike this very rough balance of what we have to lose and what we have to gain in the immediate political sphere in

\* *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

order to provide some kind of background for our detailed debates and for the detailed negotiations on a draft treaty which I hope will begin soon.

42. I should like to conclude by referring once again very briefly to the continent from which I have just returned. The agreement to form a nuclear-free zone in Latin America<sup>6</sup> has rightly been acclaimed as a remarkable achievement. It has been the result of intricate negotiation and hard bargaining. As has been made apparent in this Committee, one or two of its provisions are still the subject of controversy. The Treaty has not yet come fully into effect, but the main lines are complete. In this context I should like to wish *bon voyage* to Mr. Garcia Robles, one of the Treaty's chief architects, as I understand he is leaving the Committee temporarily in a few days' time. In doing this may I express the hope that in the coming months we here can achieve an equal degree of success in our even harder task?

#### Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, March 21, 1967<sup>1</sup>

67. We have listened today with interest to the important statements made by the representatives of Mexico, the United Kingdom and Burma. We shall study those statements carefully, and may have comments to make on certain points in them at subsequent meetings.

68. Today I should like to discuss briefly the thinking of my Government on how the benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes might be shared with non-nuclear-weapon countries without thus contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

69. There should be no disagreement with the basic technological facts stated for my delegation by Mr. Fisher on 9 August 1966 as follows:

... a nuclear explosive device intended for peaceful purposes can be used as a weapon or can be easily adapted for such use. Moreover, the technology of making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is essentially indistinguishable from the technology of making nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup>

We have read carefully the statements of a number of delegations on this point, and I do not believe any delegation has expressed disagreement with these basic facts. If we accept these facts, then a non-proliferation treaty which allowed the widespread acquisition of peaceful nuclear explosive devices would have the effect of permitting the proliferation of contrivances useful as nuclear weapons. Such a treaty would have a loophole so large that the treaty would be illusory. Yet, as we all know, the General Assembly has requested us to draft a non-proliferation treaty with no loopholes at all.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *Arctic*, pp. 69-83.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV. 295, pp. 23-26.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament*, 1966, p. 225.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 532-534.

70. The United States realizes that this poses a problem for our Committee. On the one hand we wish to ensure an effective treaty without loopholes. On the other hand we wish to ensure that all States may share to the fullest extent in any possible future benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions. A business-like way to resolve this dilemma would be to share these benefits without sharing the explosive devices themselves.

71. President Johnson, in his message to this session of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, touched on this matter when he said:

The United States is prepared to make available nuclear explosive services for peaceful purposes on a non-discriminatory basis under appropriate international safeguards. We are prepared to join other nuclear States in a commitment to do this.<sup>5</sup>

In this connexion we noted with interest the statement by Mr. Roshchin, the Soviet representative, at our meeting on 14 March. He said that the Soviet Union firmly maintains—

... the position that an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons cannot and should not prevent non-nuclear countries from using nuclear energy for the purposes of peaceful economic development. In doing so we bear in mind that the question of the procedure and conditions governing the carrying-out of nuclear explosions is a separate question that can be settled only on the basis of a separate international agreement.<sup>6</sup>

72. My delegation agrees that this is a separate issue to be settled by a separate agreement. The purpose of my remarks today is to outline briefly the present thinking of the United States on how the sharing of any potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions might be organized. We propose the following general principles to deal with this problem.

73. First, if and when peaceful applications of nuclear explosives that are permissible under the test-ban Treaty<sup>6</sup> prove technically and economically feasible, nuclear-weapon States should make available to other States nuclear explosive services for peaceful applications. Such a service would consist of performing the desired nuclear detonation under appropriate international observation with the nuclear device remaining under the custody and control of the State which performed the service.

74. Second, there should be a means provided for non-nuclear-weapon States wishing to do so to request nuclear explosive services from the nuclear-weapon States through an international body in which the non-nuclear-weapon States would participate. The international body might consider such matters as the feasibility of requested projects, priority among such requests, and necessary safety precautions. The purpose of these arrangements would be to make clear that, once the participating nuclear Powers are prepared to undertake practical applications of peaceful nuclear explosives, they will not withhold nuclear detonation services to others because of extraneous considerations.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 99.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 147.

<sup>6</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

75. We recognize the concern on this score of non-nuclear-weapon States, a concern expressed most recently by Ambassador Khallaf at our last meeting.<sup>1</sup> One possibility is that the International Atomic Energy Agency might be the international organization through which such requests could be made and such matters considered as are mentioned above—that is, the feasibility, priority and safety of projects. However, if this should prove impractical, we would be willing to consider alternative international mechanisms.

76. Third, costs to non-nuclear-weapon States for peaceful-purpose detonations by nuclear States would be kept as low as possible. They should not, for example, include the costs of research and development.

77. Fourth, there should be full consultation among nuclear and non-nuclear Parties to the limited test-ban Treaty about any amendment of that Treaty required in order to carry out feasible projects.

78. And fifth, the conditions and procedures for international collaboration in accomplishing peaceful nuclear explosive projects would be developed in full consultation with the non-nuclear-weapon States.

79. My delegation feels that these five principles represent the best way to resolve the dilemma to which I referred earlier and to which reference has been made by several representatives here. That dilemma is between the need for a treaty without loopholes and the need to share any potential benefits which may one day come from the utilization of peaceful nuclear explosives. These principles represent suggestions which we feel could be useful guidelines. We offer them in hope that they will make clear once again the strong determination of my country to ensure the broadest possible sharing of the benefits accruing to mankind from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

80. Before concluding, I should like to join Lord Chalfont in wishing Ambassador Garcia Robles farewell and Godspeed on his return to his native country. His proven talents as a negotiator can well be used in Geneva when we reach the discussion of a concrete draft of the non-proliferation treaty.

#### Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, March 23, 1967<sup>1</sup>

24. My delegation would like to make a few comments on the work of the Committee in general.

25. The past five weeks have been largely devoted to the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is quite understandable. Exceedingly important interests of all the countries of the world, and the interests of security, are linked with the solution of this problem. Whatever the attitude of any particular State, whether a member of the Eighteen-Nation Committee or not, to individual aspects of the non-proliferation problem, there is not and there cannot be a

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, pp. 154-160.

<sup>2</sup> ENDC/PV. 290, pp. 8-10.

single country or people whose interests would not be served by the solution of this problem, which is one of the most urgent problems of our time. A refusal to solve the non-proliferation problem, or inability of the representatives of States to reach agreement on its solution, would be fraught with the gravest consequences for all the countries of the world and for the whole of mankind. Such a development of events would lead to a dangerous increase in the threat of nuclear war, with very grave consequences which at present are hard to foresee.

26. At the meeting of the Committee on 21 March the representative of Burma, U Maung Maung, speaking about a non-proliferation treaty, very rightly declared that—

... the halting and de-escalation of the armaments race would contribute substantially to the lowering and elimination of international tensions. This would benefit all nations, and the developing nations most of all. It would provide the necessary security and tranquillity in the international atmosphere to enable them to build healthy and beneficial societies which, after all, constitute an important factor for the continued maintenance of peace in the world.<sup>2</sup>

27. At the twenty-first session of the General Assembly and here in the Committee stress has been laid on the urgent and inescapable need to solve the problem of non-proliferation. As was rightly pointed out here by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Garcia Robles, we must endeavor to prevent the details and particulars from blinding us to our fundamental, principal aim, the solution of the non-proliferation problem—or, as he put it, from losing sight of the wood for the trees.<sup>3</sup> Attempts to solve many other questions within the framework of the non-proliferation problem will only protract our work, whereas we cannot defer the solution of the non-proliferation problem.

28. Nevertheless, we are obliged to note that there are influential circles in the world which are having a very negative influence on, or rather are hampering, solution of the non-proliferation problem. Those circles are acting in various ways: either they openly object to the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, or they take roundabout ways and try to cause confusion and complications and to create all kinds of difficulties and obstacles in the way of a solution of the non-proliferation problem.

29. Of course we do not share the opinion expressed by the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, who at the last meeting of the Committee voiced dissatisfaction that this matter had been given due attention in the Committee and that those forces, circles and very influential persons in the Federal Republic of Germany that were manifestly obstructing and preventing the solution of the non-proliferation problem had been openly named.<sup>4</sup> These questions are of too great importance to the peoples and States, and therefore they cannot be passed over in silence. It is therefore necessary to stress again and again that the difficulties in solving the problem of non-proliferation stem on the whole precisely from the Federal Republic of Germany, where influential circles have been carrying on an active campaign against the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. In

<sup>2</sup> ENDC/PV. 295, p. 20.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 163.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 168-172.

this connexion we should like to observe that the attempts of the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, to shield those who are preventing the achievement of an agreement on non-proliferation do not at all contribute to our progress towards the solution of this problem. The position taken by certain circles in the Federal Republic of Germany and in some countries is precisely to hamper solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

30. The situation that has come about compels us to interrupt the meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee for a while. The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that this forced recess will be used to ensure the future completion of the work on the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty without further delay. We should like to declare here once again that the Soviet Union is in favour of the earliest conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty that would reliably close all ways of access, direct or indirect, to nuclear weapons. We stand for a treaty that would serve as a step towards the implementation of other measures in the field of disarmament, especially in regard to the limitation of the nuclear arms race and the elimination of nuclear weapons.

31. In earlier statements we have pointed out that the arguments put forward against the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty on the ground that such a treaty would hinder the peaceful use of nuclear energy were devoid of any foundation. We stressed and continue to stress that the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty would in no way be an obstacle to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. On the contrary, the vast resources which would be saved by States as a result of refraining from the manufacture of nuclear weapons would be assigned to the peaceful utilization of scientific discoveries in the field of nuclear energy, to the expansion of peaceful branches of industry and peaceful economy, and to the development of science, culture and education.

32. We therefore share the view expressed by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Khallaf, when he said that—

(b) A non-proliferation treaty must not, broadly speaking, constitute an obstacle to such development of nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes as the non-nuclear countries would wish to carry out.

(c) The development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes must not in any way be an excuse or a device for creating loopholes for the proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>5</sup>

33. The Soviet Union is firmly convinced of the need to conclude a non-proliferation treaty as soon as possible. The representatives of the Soviet Union are always prepared to go on making persistent efforts, both inside and outside the Committee, to solve the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, p. 159.

Statement by the Indian External Affairs Minister (Chagla)  
to Parliament: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons,  
March 27, 1967<sup>1</sup>

The General Assembly by its Resolution 1722 (XVI)<sup>2</sup> appointed an Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, of which India is a member. The General Assembly recommended that the Committee should undertake negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

2. As the Honourable Members are aware, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), which in reality is a Seventeen-Nation Committee because of the absence of France, has been meeting in Geneva since 1962. Various measures collateral to the question of disarmament have been discussed in the Committee, and one of these is non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The ENDC has been giving particular attention to this subject since 1964, as it is recognized as a matter of some urgency.

3. Discussions in the Committee have revealed important differences of opinion, firstly, among the nuclear weapon powers themselves, and, secondly, between the nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon powers. The latter differences relate mostly to the question of mutuality and balance of responsibilities and obligations between the nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon powers.

4. The General Assembly in its Resolution No. 2028 (XX) of November 19, 1965, laid down the following as the main principles on the basis of which the Committee was to negotiate an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons:

(a) The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form;

(b) The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear powers;

(c) The treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, the nuclear disarmament;

(d) There should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty;

(e) Nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.<sup>3</sup>

In elaboration of these principles, the views of the eight non-aligned non-nuclear weapon countries who are members of the ENDC were submitted in a Joint Memorandum to the Committee on August 19, 1966.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Department of State files.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 741-742.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 532-534.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 576-579.

5. After prolonged discussions lasting several months, the United States and USSR are reported to have reached a considerable measure of agreement as to the terms of a non-proliferation treaty. An agreed text of a draft treaty has not yet been presented to the ENDC, and, evidently, the two Powers have yet to reach agreement on some points. Neither of the Big Powers has formally handed to us the text of the draft treaty. They have, however, informally indicated to us the likely content of the draft treaty. There has been no occasion for us formally to take a stand on its reported provisions.

6. Our views on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons have been stated from time to time in the ENDC and at the forum of the United Nations. These views remain unchanged. We shall examine the text of any draft treaty submitted to the Committee in the light of the principles enunciated in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 2028 (XX).

7. The Government of India share with the international community the anxiety arising from the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They favour an early agreement on such a treaty and will be willing to sign one which fulfills the basic principles laid down by the United Nations. They are of the view that any such treaty should be a significant step towards general and complete, and particularly nuclear, disarmament, and must meet the points of view of both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon powers. A non-proliferation treaty should not be a discriminatory or an unequal treaty. It is also the view of the Government of India that the non-proliferation treaty should be such as not to impede the growth of nuclear science and technology in the developing countries, where the need for such development is great.

8. While welcoming a meeting of minds between the USA and USSR, which in itself is a good augury, the Government of India hope that after the draft treaty on nuclear non-proliferation is presented to the ENDC it will be thoroughly discussed and that the treaty as finally agreed would take a shape and form acceptable to all countries which are represented on the Committee, and, subsequently, to the international community in general. A satisfactory agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will have to take into account the peculiar circumstances in which certain countries are placed. So far as India is concerned, aside from its anxiety to see the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty as a step towards achievement of general and complete disarmament and more particularly nuclear disarmament, India has a special problem of security against nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail. This aspect, which hardly needs elaboration, must necessarily be taken into full account before our final attitude to a non-proliferation treaty is determined.

## Memorandum From the Federal Republic of Germany to Other Governments: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 7, 1967<sup>1</sup>

### A.

The German people share the wish of all nations for a lasting peace. They fear the suicidal effects of modern mass destruction weapons and abhor any policy of force.

The Federal Republic of Germany has not only solemnly repudiated the use of force as a means of achieving its policy, but as early as 3 October 1954 it renounced once and for all the production of nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical weapons and subjected itself to the appropriate controls.<sup>2</sup> It has thus contributed substantively to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to armaments restriction. No other nations have so far followed this example by taking similar steps. The Federal Republic of Germany would welcome a reduction of the hazards arising out of nuclear weapons by means of a universally acceptable agreement.

In the past two decades, the world has had to live through periods of tension during which nuclear weapons while, on the one hand acting as a deterrent, on the other hand, nevertheless dangerously influenced the causes and the course of the various crises.

The devastating effect of nuclear weapons obliges the Governments of the world not merely to end the nuclear arms race; the interests of mankind demand the beginning of nuclear disarmament. That is the only way to establish a peaceful international order guaranteeing all nations, large and small alike, prosperous development in freedom, independence, and human dignity. Germany will continue in her resolve to strike jointly with other countries to achieve this aim.

The disarmament negotiations of the big nuclear-weapon powers have been partially successful in the sphere of armament control, but have not by any means put an end to the nuclear arms race. The necessity for genuine disarmament remains all the more urgent. An international arrangement for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons could prove to be the preliminary step towards the effective safeguarding of peace, if disarmament measures were to follow.

Nuclear weapons give power; but the possession of them is not—at least not for the Federal Republic of Germany—a privilege worth striving for. Nuclear weapons place a grave responsibility on the powers which have them: but their possession must not become the criterion for still greater inequality between the members of the community of nations. This applies especially to the sphere of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

### B.

Regarding the problems, at present the centre of interest, which are inherent in an international arrangement for the non-proliferation of

<sup>1</sup> ACDA files. German Embassy translation. The memorandum was sent to ENDC members, other governments, the U.N. Secretary-General, and the Vatican.

<sup>2</sup> *London and Paris Agreements (September-October 1954)* (Department of State publication 5059, 1954), p. 13.

nuclear weapons, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is guided by the following considerations.

### I. *Essential Disarmament Measures*

The aim of all peace-loving nations is the renunciation by all countries of the development, production, transfer and reception of nuclear weapons.

At present a treaty is under discussion whereby the non-nuclear-weapon powers alone would be accepting substantial self-restrictions and obligations, i.e., initially just a partial solution of the actual problem. This constructive contribution by the non-nuclear-weapon powers towards consolidating peace would be made easier and more effective if it were the preliminary step towards a comprehensive arrangement. The world cannot stop at a limited non-proliferation treaty. It needs more comprehensive solutions. It is incumbent on the nuclear-weapon powers to stop the further development of increasingly more dangerous weapons, not to increase existing stocks, including the means of their delivery, to begin reducing them, to stop the production of fissionable material for military purposes, and to aim at a comprehensive test ban.

When the nuclear-weapon powers explicitly announce their willingness to take their own steps to restrict and reduce armaments, a limited non-proliferation treaty would be the beginning of international co-operation for a genuine guarantee of peace in the nuclear age. Clarity should be achieved as regards ways and means of ensuring that co-operation in the further phases of development. It is only in this way that a fair balance can be established of the rights and obligations of the nuclear-weapon and the non-nuclear-weapon powers in accordance with Resolution No. 2028 of the XXth General Assembly of the United Nations.<sup>3</sup> The execution of the promised disarmament measures could be checked by an international authority at each further stage of the disarmament process in the light of the joint aims.

### II. *Détente in Relations between the Participating States*

The arrangements for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons ought to reduce existing international tensions and create one of the prerequisites for an improvement in relations between all States parties to the treaty. In the sphere of application of the treaty the participating States should consider their relations with each other to be cleared and should refrain from mutual accusations in that sphere and seek to attain the common aim of comprehensive, general, and controlled disarmament.

No nuclear-weapon power should use its potential for purposes of political threats, political pressure or political blackmail against non-nuclear-weapon powers. This promise would have to be incorporated in a non-proliferation arrangement. In renouncing the nuclear option, the non-nuclear powers make a positive contribution to easing tension. They justifiably expect that the nuclear-weapon powers will undertake to act towards them with constructive courtesy. The keeping of this

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 532-534.

promise on the part of the nuclear-weapon powers could be supervised by an international authority.

### III. *Security Problems of Non-Nuclear-Weapon Powers*

The renunciation by non-nuclear-weapon powers of the nuclear option within a non-proliferation arrangement raises numerous security problems for them, although in various ways. The aim of these countries to safeguard themselves as far as possible against existing or potential security risks, deserves understanding and sympathy. The renunciation of nuclear weapons should be so arranged that it does not become a source of particular danger but an advance on the way to a more stable, peaceful order. Those who are the first to contribute have the right to expect the community of nations to rectify any resultant one-sidedness.

### IV. *Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy*

A proper solution to the problem of non-proliferation could contribute towards developing existing scientific, technical, industrial, and economic capacities of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and securing them once and for all for the civil sphere. Regulations, on the other hand, which do not clearly define the limits of the military and civil spheres, would impede the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and obstruct progress. The free use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must therefore be guaranteed without restriction to all participating States. This point should be explicitly stipulated.

Bilateral and international co-operation in the fields of scientific research and development and of the industrial and commercial use of nuclear energy should be promoted. This applies particularly to the developing countries, who must not be denied the advantages of the use of nuclear energy.

Nuclear charges for peaceful purposes should be made available to the non-nuclear-weapon States on the basis of an international arrangement and under control, as soon as technical developments allow and as long as a distinction between explosions for military and civilian purposes is not possible on technical grounds.

The nuclear-weapon powers should undertake to let the non-nuclear-weapon powers participate in the discoveries and results achieved by them from military activities in the nuclear field, in as far as they are of importance for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This obligation on the part of the nuclear-weapon States is important in order to ensure that the technological gap between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States does not widen but can gradually be bridged.

### V. *Controls*

The Federal Republic of Germany advocates a general control system to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy for weapon purposes. The controls should fulfil their purpose as effective checks on the non-proliferation arrangement, but should not have an obstructive or discriminatory influence. The efficiency of reliable control systems already

existing should not be impaired. Universal acceptability is a criterion which must also govern the methods of the control system. Equal treatment for all parties to the treaty would considerably facilitate its world-wide negotiation.

VI. *Equality in the Co-operation of all Participating States in the Realization of all the Aims of Non-Proliferation*

On account of the disparities in the armaments of the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon powers, a forward-looking arrangement regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is only feasible on the basis of equality in principle of the members of the community of nations and of close co-operation among all participating States to achieve the agreed aims.

In a limited non-proliferation treaty the non-nuclear-weapon powers, in contrast to the nuclear-weapon powers, would be giving up something specific, and agreeing to restrictions in the cause of the universal aim of disarmament. Initially, the nuclear-weapon powers would not balance the preliminary contributions by the non-nuclear-weapon powers with far-reaching restrictions of their own. The existing mass-destruction weapons would continue to threaten humanity.

A non-proliferation treaty must not institutionalize and thereby possibly perpetuate these actual inequalities to the detriment of the non-nuclear-weapon powers. Thus, the provisions regarding procedure should clearly define from the start that the realization of the aims of non-proliferation is binding on all the participating States. The non-nuclear countries are not States with lesser rights, but pioneers of a progressive policy of peace. Their renunciation is made in the hope that it will lead to a balance between contribution and counter-contribution within the entire sphere of nuclear disarmament. The nuclear-weapon powers are called upon to take the next steps. The aim is, and will remain, the liberation of mankind from the fear for its very existence.

C.

The Federal Republic of Germany hopes that with this memorandum it is making a positive contribution to the forthcoming negotiations for a universally acceptable non-proliferation treaty.

**Memorandum of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State (Meeker) on the Outer Space Treaty, April 13, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

At the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings yesterday, Senator Gore asked the following question:

Would we be by this treaty prohibited from laying hands upon, from entering into, or otherwise making a necessary inspection of an orbiting satellite to determine if nuclear weapons should be aboard?<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings*, pp. 99-100. The Treaty is printed *ante*, pp. 38-43.

<sup>2</sup> *Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings*, p. 99.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance suggested that this question be referred to the Department of State.

Briefly stated, the answer is that the Treaty does not dispose of the question of inspection of orbiting satellites. The Treaty leaves this to be determined under international law apart from the Treaty.

Article XII provides for access and visits to "All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies". There is no comparable provision regarding space vehicles in orbit.

Under the Treaty, *observation* of space vehicles is permitted. More difficult questions are raised if the issue is physical entry into a space vehicle. For example, Article IX contains provisions against interference with lawful activities in the exploration and use of space.

However, the Treaty does not contain any provision prohibiting steps to ascertain whether there has been a violation of the Article IV prohibition against orbiting nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. If any presumption against a right of inspection is raised by the presence of Article IX and the absence of a provision authorizing inspection in space (comparable to Article XII which applies to celestial bodies), this would be overcome if there were strong reason to believe that an orbiting space vehicle was carrying a prohibited weapon.

Thus, in regard to verification of compliance, the Treaty leaves the parties essentially with the rights they have under international law apart from the Treaty. A State having real reason to suspect violation would be entitled to challenge the suspected State and, if its reasonable doubts were not removed, to take appropriate steps to protect itself against the effects of a Treaty violation. The extent of these rights would, of necessity, depend upon the facts of the particular situation.

## Report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Outer Space Treaty, April 18, 1967<sup>1</sup>

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on January 27, 1967, on behalf of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without reservation and recommends that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification thereof.

### I. PURPOSES OF THE TREATY

The purpose of the treaty is to establish general principles for the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. The signatories agree that the exploration and

<sup>1</sup> S. Ex. Rept. 8, 90th Cong., 1st sess. The outer space treaty is printed *ante*, pp. 38-43.

use of outer space and other celestial bodies shall be for the benefit of all mankind without discrimination; neither outer space nor celestial bodies shall be subject to appropriation by claim of sovereignty; the establishment of military installations and the conduct of maneuvers is prohibited on celestial bodies; and the right to inspect installations and space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies is assured.

## II. BACKGROUND

On January 27, 1967, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Treaty on Outer Space) was opened for signature in Washington, London, and Moscow. The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union were among the 60 countries signing the treaty in Washington. The January 27 ceremony followed the unanimous endorsement of the treaty by the United Nations General Assembly on December 19, 1966.<sup>2</sup> The Senate was asked by the President of the United States on February 7, 1967, to give its advice and consent to ratification of the treaty.<sup>3</sup>

The treaty itself is basically a blending of the language of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959<sup>4</sup> and the substance of two United Nations General Assembly resolutions.

The Antarctic Treaty was designed to assure international cooperation in the exploration of Antarctica and to reserve the continent exclusively for peaceful activity. To guarantee fulfillment of these objectives, the Antarctic Treaty granted inspection rights to all states party to the treaty.

In October of 1963, the General Assembly of the United Nations, recognizing the potential for international competition and conflict in outer space, acknowledged the statement of the United States and U.S.S.R. that they would not orbit nuclear weapons and called upon all states to follow suit.<sup>5</sup> This resolution was followed 2 months later by the General Assembly's Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. Paragraph 1 of this declaration established the principle, now carried over into the Treaty on Outer Space, that "\* \* \* the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried on for the benefit and in the interest of all mankind."<sup>6</sup>

Building on the record of international interest in the peaceful exploration of outer space, President Johnson, on May 7, 1966, proposed that discussion of a space treaty begin.<sup>7</sup>

In July of 1966, treaty negotiations were undertaken at Geneva by the United Nations Outer Space Legal Subcommittee. After consideration of United States and Soviet draft treaties, agreement on the provisions of the present treaty was reached in December of 1966, and endorsed by the 21st session of the General Assembly on December 19, 1966.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 800 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 56-60.

<sup>4</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 1550-1556.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, p. 538.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 644-646.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 275-276.

## III. PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY

The Outer Space Treaty consists of a preamble and 17 articles. The preamble sets forth the objectives of the parties and recognizes the common interest of all mankind in the peaceful exploration of outer space.

The first three articles are general in nature. They stress the importance of freedom in the scientific investigation of outer space, guarantee free access to all areas of celestial bodies, and prohibit claims of sovereignty. The treaty also states the desirability that the parties share the benefits of space exploration, irrespective of their degree of scientific or economic development.

Article IV deals with the difficult and sensitive question of the obligation not to place in orbit around the earth vehicles carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, or to place such weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. The inspection provisions of the treaty, as defined in articles I and XII, do not apply to orbiting objects.

Article V provides for the safe, unconditional, and prompt return of astronauts in the event of accident or other emergency. This article also obliges the parties to the treaty to report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and other appropriate international bodies, any condition in outer space that might endanger the life or health of astronauts. Article VI makes each state party to the treaty responsible for all its national space activities—whether conducted by governmental or nongovernmental entities. Article VII provides that the states party to the treaty are internationally liable for damage that space activities may cause. Under the terms of article VIII each state party to the treaty shall retain ownership of, and jurisdiction over, any object and personnel launched into outer space while they are in outer space or on a celestial body.

Article IX calls upon parties to the treaty to conduct their space activities in a spirit of international cooperation and to take steps to avoid the contamination of outer space and celestial bodies. Any state party may request appropriate international consultation if it has reason to suspect that any activity may cause harmful interference with the peaceful exploration of outer space.

Article X provides that a state party to the treaty shall consider on an equal basis all requests for space tracking facilities. The conditions under which such facilities may be made available are to be determined by agreement between the states concerned.

Article XI obligates the parties to inform the United Nations and the international scientific community "to the greatest extent feasible and practicable" of the results of national space activities.

Article XII defines inspection rights. These inspection privileges insure free access to installations and space vehicles on celestial bodies. It has been already noted that these inspection rights are limited to celestial bodies and do not apply to objects in orbit.

Article XIII provides that the treaty shall apply to all space activities the signatory countries may undertake even where these activities are carried on within the framework of international organizations.

The remaining four articles of the treaty provide that the duration of the treaty is open ended, and that an amendment enters into force *for consenting states* when a majority of the parties have accepted it. Any state may give notice of withdrawal from the treaty any time after the treaty has been in force for 1 year. Such a withdrawal would take effect 1 year after notification. Finally, the treaty enters into force after five ratifications, have been deposited, necessarily including those of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain.

#### IV. COMMITTEE ACTION

On February 7 the treaty, the President's message, and accompanying papers were referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. The committee held public hearings on March 7, at which time the administration witnesses were The Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, and Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. representative to the United Nations. Ambassador Goldberg also testified in executive session on March 13. The administration's testimony in support of the treaty was continued by The Honorable Cyrus S. Vance, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a public hearing on March 13.

In executive session on April 14, the committee, without a dissenting vote, ordered the treaty favorably reported to the Senate.

#### V. CONCLUSIONS

The Committee on Foreign Relations considers that the Treaty on Outer Space is a sound approach to the complex problem of fostering the habit of peaceful international cooperation in outer space.

The committee notes that the treaty builds on the precedent of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. The Antarctic Treaty tested the underlying theory of the outer space agreement—that an agreement establishing international standards of behavior in a new area of human endeavor can be carried out in good faith. It is, therefore, significant that the Secretary of Defense in his statement supporting the Treaty on Outer Space submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee spoke of the “outstanding success of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959” and the fact that “since the Antarctic Treaty became effective there has been no hint, no suggestion, that any party was not living up to the terms of that treaty in all respects.”<sup>8</sup>

In its consideration of the Outer Space Treaty the committee was concerned over the possibility of a misunderstanding of some broad principles embodied in the treaty, and the implications of this treaty for national security.

During the course of the hearings, the committee raised questions with regard to the nature of the treaty obligations in article I and article VII.

Article I of the treaty provides that “the exploration and use of outer space \* \* \* shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.” The

<sup>8</sup> *Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings*, p. 80.

committee raised the question whether the language of this general principle might imply a fixed treaty obligation on the part of the United States to share the benefits and results of its space activities, particularly in the communications satellite field.

After a full discussion of this point with administration witnesses, the committee was assured that no such specific treaty obligations would result.\* Nevertheless, the committee wishes to make its position clear on its understanding of the obligations the United States will accept under article I, paragraph 1 of the treaty. It is the understanding of the Committee on Foreign Relations that nothing in article I, paragraph 1 of the treaty diminishes or alters the right of the United States to determine how it shares the benefits and results of its space activities.

Questions were also raised about the nature and extent of the international liability assumed by a signatory state under article VII. That article provides in part that each state party to the treaty "from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another state party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts. \* \* \*"

Administration witnesses assured the committee that a treaty on international liability in outer space is in the process of negotiation and will, if successfully negotiated, in due course be submitted to the Senate. Nevertheless, the committee concluded that a preliminary clarification of the liability provision was necessary. The question was raised during the testimony whether the liability provision of article VII includes nonphysical damage, such as electronic jamming and interference. In the course of the testimony, administration witnesses informed the committee that electronic interference by one spacecraft with another is not covered by the treaty. The committee wishes to record its understanding that article VII pertains only to physical, nonelectronic damage that space activities may cause to the citizens or property of a signatory state. Article VII establishes the general proposition of international liability for damage caused by space vehicles. A separate convention devoted wholly to liability is needed to establish detailed rules. Such a convention is now under negotiation in the United Nations Outer Space Legal Subcommittee. The convention would provide procedures for determining liability and a mechanism for effectively resolving any differences. It would have to fix a limitation on liability, if there is to be one, and provide for allocation of liability among participants in a joint space venture causing damage.

Another prime concern to the committee was the implications for American security of the first sentence of article IV: "States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner." Because the inspection privileges, as defined in article XII, do not apply to objects in orbit, the possibility existed that the United States, for the first time, was committing itself to an arms control measure that was not

\* See *ante*, pp. 132-134.

safeguarded from violation by either the right of physical inspection or an effective national detection system.

During the public hearing on March 7 Secretary Rusk, in referring to the detection problem, said: "We have no doubt we can monitor effectively a weapons system placed in outer space."<sup>10</sup> In their statements presented on April 12, Secretary McNamara and Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, strongly endorsed, without reservation, the Treaty on Outer Space. For example, Secretary McNamara's statement read: "We have looked at the implications for weapons development programs and at verification considerations, and we have concluded that this treaty will enhance our national security."

Secretary McNamara added, however, that while space vehicles can be "effectively monitored" \* \* \* this is not to say that one or two or some very small number of weapons could not be clandestinely orbited without being identified."<sup>11</sup>

In his statement before the committee, General Wheeler said:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff remain concerned about the assured verification capability with regard to "weapons in orbit" \* \* \* Weapons in orbit could become a matter of grave consequence, particularly when utilized in conjunction with other strategic systems.

General Wheeler went on to say that

this threat can be answered only through intensified U.S. efforts to develop capabilities to detect and verify the orbiting of nuclear weapons or those threatening mass destruction.<sup>12</sup>

General Wheeler testified that with a strong research and development program designed to improve our national detection system, U.S. security will not be endangered by this treaty. Most significant was General Wheeler's statement that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not seek mutual inspection privileges for orbiting bodies. Speaking for the Joint Chiefs, General Wheeler testified that "the language [of the treaty] as now drafted would be preferable from our point of view. We would prefer to depend upon national verification of bodies in orbit."<sup>13</sup> The endorsement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Treaty on Outer Space is, therefore, total.

With this assurance added to the support for the treaty given by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the committee concludes that the United States interests would be advanced by approval of the Treaty on Outer Space. Moreover, if for any reason the treaty should prove unworkable, the United States may withdraw from the treaty 1 year after notification.

In ratifying this treaty the United States will give up nothing; but we stand to gain much from this commendable effort to allow law and common sense to precede power and competition into outer space. The committee therefore recommends that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty on Outer Space.

<sup>10</sup> *Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings*, p. 20.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 80-81.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 84-85.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 91.

Address by C.P.S.U. General Secretary Brezhnev at  
Karlovy Vary Conference of European Communist  
Parties [Extract], April 24, 1967<sup>1</sup>

In evaluating the present situation in Europe, we are proceeding, first of all, on the basis of the changes that have taken place here since the second world war. One of the most important social-political factors of the post war period is the fact that precisely in Europe—that is, the part of the world where capitalism was born and where it was transformed into a social system that for centuries determined the course of all world development—capitalism's positions have been enormously weakened.

This has been reflected in the downfall of capitalism and the victory of socialist revolutions in eight states of Eastern and Central Europe. It has also been reflected in the fact that to a substantial extent the bourgeoisie was able to maintain its domination in the rest of Europe only by relying on the U.S.A. for military, political and economic aid.

Western European capitalism, by resting on American support, making use of the opportunities afforded by the combined strength of monopolies and state power and the achievements of the scientific-technical revolution, and widely resorting to circumvention in the field of social relations and political life, later succeeded in emerging from the acute crisis in which it found itself immediately following the second world war. Needless to say, this by no means signifies the restoration of the bygone political might of European capital. Its fundamental weaknesses remain.

The new correlation of social-political forces on the continent has been reflected in the foreign policies of the major capitalist powers of Europe. The chief detachments of European capitalism, whose interests are frequently in sharp conflict, are doing their utmost to avoid methods and forms of struggle with one another that could threaten the foundations of capitalism with new shocks.

Some capitalist countries of Europe, having restored their economic potentials, are now endeavoring to pursue an increasingly independent policy. The intensifying contradictions between the interests of European and American magnates are playing a considerable role in this. Pro-American policy concepts are being increasingly supplanted by concepts that set goals of transforming capitalist Europe into a force independent of the U.S.A. and capable of playing an autonomous role in the world arena.

It is entirely obvious to us Communists that such plans are designed to strengthen European capitalism and its international positions. But something else is also obvious. These plans are at the same time shattering the united front of world capital, and this opens up new opportunities for the European and world workers' movement to develop the struggle for peace and security in Europe and throughout the world.

<sup>1</sup> *Pravda*, Apr. 25, 1967; *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XIX, no. 17 (May 17, 1967), pp. 7-9.

Comrades! The draft statement under discussion at our conference emphasizes that the problem of European security is not simply a regional problem, not an internal matter of the European peoples that is isolated from the rest of the world. What are the grounds for this conclusion? We cannot forget that it was precisely in Europe that the conflagration of world war twice broke out and that on this continent even today an extremely grave hotbed of international tension exists. If a new war broke out in Europe, it could become thermonuclear and envelop the whole world. European security is an important condition for preventing a nuclear conflict.

But this is not the only point. The struggle for peace in Europe today is to a certain extent tying the hands of the imperialists' aggressive forces and is hindering them from participating in the suppression of the liberation movement in other parts of the world. After all, it is a fact, comrades, that despite persistent efforts, the U.S.A. has failed to draw its European NATO allies into the Vietnam adventure as they drew them into the war in Korea. This is the result of the struggle of Communist Parties, the working class of the entire world and all peace-loving forces.

To tie the hands of imperialism's forces and foil their aggressive plans does not mean simply to narrow the range of operations of the aggressive policy of imperialism—although this in itself is important—but to inflict a defeat on it that would be felt everywhere. This would also constitute real aid to the liberation struggle of peoples of all the other continents.

I think, comrades, I voice the general opinion when I say that, in showing concern for the interests of European security, we are doing our internationalist duty for peoples the world over!

2. *American and West German Imperialism Is the Major Threat to European Peace.*—It can be asked why we are putting the question of the danger of war in Europe so sharply today. Is the threat really so grave?

Yes, comrades, there are grounds for doing this. We do not want to overestimate the danger of war, but neither do we want to underestimate it.

Where and in what do we see today a threat to security in Europe?

We reply: The aggressive forces of American and West German imperialism pose a threat to peace in Europe. What is the foundation for the increasingly close partnership of these forces? For American imperialism, collusion with F.R.G. ruling circles is the chief means—inconvenient for the U.S.A. and not too expensive—of maintaining its strategic military positions in Europe. It provides the U.S.A. with levers of pressure on the policies and economies of the Western European countries. As for the West German politicians, by their reckoning the partnership with the U.S.A. will open up practical opportunities for them to carry out their revanchist schemes.

German imperialism's aggressive policy inflicted enormous calamities on many countries of Europe. This is well known not only to the peoples of the Soviet Union but also to the peoples of Poland, Yugo-

<sup>1</sup> The final statement is printed *infra*.

slavia, Czechoslovakia, France, England, Belgium, The Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and other European states.

Soviet people have not forgotten and shall never forget that 20,000,000 citizens of our country gave their lives in the name of victory over fascism. We had to expend tremendous efforts to heal the wounds of the war and to restore thousands of demolished cities and villages.

The Soviet people, engaged today in peaceful creative work, refuse to allow their gains or those of the other fraternal countries to be threatened again. We call the lessons of the war to mind today not because we seek atonement for the past but because we are concerned about the future. The vital interests of all the peoples of Europe demand that aggression on the part of German imperialism—either alone or in alliance with anyone—be forever precluded.

The foundations of the postwar setup in Europe were defined in the Potsdam Agreement.<sup>9</sup> Its most important provision was the requirement that militarism and Nazism be eradicated so that Germany would never again threaten its neighbors or world peace. This requirement is still in effect both now and for the future.

The Potsdam principles have been fully implemented in the German Democratic Republic. But they are ignored in the F.R.G., where German militarism is alive and German Nazism is being galvanized. The fact that the bacillus of Nazism has not been exterminated in West Germany, as was required by the Potsdam Agreement, is no news to anyone. But now, when the neo-Nazis have openly emerged into the political arena, the matter becomes more serious.

Danger is mounting especially because F.R.G. ruling circles have made revanchist demands the core of their official state policy. It is not some irresponsible loudmouths and extremists from soldiers' unions or refugee organizations but the government of West Germany that is making absurd claims to its right to speak on behalf of the entire German people, refuses to recognize the borders that have taken shape in Europe, advances claims on West Berlin and seeks loopholes for the nuclear armament of the F.R.G. If one adds to all this that the Bonn authorities ban the Communist Party and suppress other progressive forces, then a whole set of political and ideological devices for preparing revenge becomes evident.

The present government of the F.R.G. speaks eagerly of its peace-loving disposition. But, characteristically, it simultaneously seeks out every possible elastic formula so as to evade renouncing revanchist aims. In view of this, how can one believe in the sincerity of the peace-loving statements made by F.R.G. ruling circles? Is it not clear that the new government is using this means merely to delude European public opinion, in order to escape isolation and thereby assure itself a firmer position for achieving its designs?

By no means does the Soviet Union maintain that the European peoples must shun West Germany; the path to international cooperation based on equal rights and to participation in European affairs is

<sup>9</sup> Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49* (S. doc. 123, 81st Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 34 ff.

open to it, as to all other states. We know that there are considerable forces in the F.R.G. that oppose the aggressive, reactionary policy of West German imperialism. The miners of the Ruhr, the metalworkers of Stuttgart and the chemical workers of Mannheim have demonstrated in class collisions that in West Germany itself the movement against militarism and fascism is growing. Peace marches and protest rallies, many thousands strong, against the war in Vietnam attest to the fact that peace is dear to the West German working people, as it is to all peoples.

For our part we have stated more than once and we state again: The Soviet Union is not against improving relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and is prepared to do everything necessary to that end. If the present F.R.G. government takes a sensible approach to the situation that has taken shape in Europe, if it refrains from infringing on the interests of other countries and peoples and if it demonstrates in deeds its desire to strengthen peace on our continent, then we shall be among those who support such a policy.

However, for us, as for everyone to whom peace and the security of peoples are dear, compromise at the expense of peace and the security of peoples has been and continues to be impossible. The longer the leaders of the F.R.G. cling to revanchist doctrines, the stronger will be the rebuff of the Soviet Union and all the European peoples. The facts show that the threat of war posed today by German imperialism is an indisputable reality.

In the past ten years one of Western Europe's largest armies has been created in the F.R.G.; it numbers almost 500,000 soldiers and an amount of command cadres that will enable it to launch large armed forces within a short period, as was done on the eve of the second world war.

Of course, the West German imperialists lack the strength to attain their revanchist aims. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have at their disposal enough military might to deal a crushing blow to an aggressor if it dares unleash a war. But the revanchists can plunge the European countries, and the whole world after them, into the miseries of a new war. It is necessary to see this danger clearly.

The military presence of the U.S.A. in Europe encourages West German imperialism and magnifies the threat to European peace. Hundreds of thousands of American soldiers on European soil, U.S. military bases, its aircraft carriers and atomic submarines, which plow the seas washing the shores of the continent, and their bombers, which fly in the European sky with nuclear cargo—all this creates a constant and real threat to the security of the peoples of Europe.

The NATO bloc has been and remains the chief instrument of the U.S.A.'s European policy. From the very beginning this pact was bolstered up by the artificially fabricated myth of "the danger of communist aggression" and "the threat from the East." The peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and the entire course of events in Europe and in the world have dispelled this myth. Now everyone sees that "the arm of Moscow," with which imperialist propaganda slanderously intimidated peoples, has held and firmly holds the banner of peace, peaceful coexistence and the friendship of peoples.

More favorable conditions are now being created for a normalization of the situation in Europe and for the establishment of mutually advantageous cooperation among European states. And this means that more favorable conditions have been created for the activities of Communist Parties and for the unification of all forces standing for general peace and security in Europe. This, comrades, is our joint success.

In this situation a question arises particularly sharply before the peoples of the countries belonging to NATO and before their governments: In the name of what does this bloc exist and what is the price of participating in it?

During NATO's existence the European member-states of this bloc have expended over \$300,000,000,000 on military preparations. These expenditures sorely injure the interests of the working people, obstruct economic development and harm the progress of science and culture.

Capitalizing on the situation that has taken shape, the United States brings across the ocean many talented scientists from Western Europe. In a number of countries this phenomenon has been aptly termed "the brain drain."

We do not conceal the fact that the buildup of military efforts by the NATO countries compels the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries to increase their military preparedness and allocate considerable funds for defense needs.

American tutelage over the political and economic development and the armed forces of a number of West European countries and the penetration of "Americanism" into every pore of public, scientific and cultural life are becoming increasingly intolerable for everyone to whom national dignity and the interests of peace are dear.

The Western European peoples do not want to resign themselves forever to the fact that extensive areas on their soil are allotted to quarters for American expeditionary forces. The U.S. military, economic and political presence in Western Europe, now dragging into its third decade, is becoming onerous even for certain monopolist circles, which have mustered their forces to compete with their overseas rivals. To solve European problems without interference from the overseas power and with the energies and minds of the Europeans themselves—this demand is acquiring a growing number of adherents everywhere in Europe.

In recent years drafts for a so-called "modernization" of NATO have been vigorously advanced in the West, and artificial arguments are being sought out to save this "holy alliance" of American and European reaction at any price. The matter has reached the point of allegations to the effect that NATO is capable of playing a positive role in the development of contacts between the West and East. It would be difficult to find a more preposterous argument! An organization that was specially created to combat socialist countries and that imposes on its members thousands of prohibitions and restrictions on the development of economic and commercial ties with socialist countries is designed, it turns out, to be an instrument of peaceful relations and cooperation between West and East. Who will believe that?

Experience shows that the process of expanding political, commercial-economic and cultural ties among European socialist and

capitalist countries proceeds more rapidly when our Western partners put their national interests first and act in defiance of the recommendations of the NATO Council, to evade the discriminatory measures it introduced with respect to the socialist countries.

In such conditions, comrades, Communists consider it their duty to propose to the peoples and governments of Europe constructive measures that could, from our viewpoint, lead to elimination of the threat of war, radically improve the situation on the European continent and pave the way to developing broad, mutually advantageous cooperation among the states.

3. *The Path to Security in Europe.*—In the present international situation practical opportunities exist for implementing such measures. We are convinced that it is possible and necessary to create a Europe in which security for each state, for each people, would be at the same time security for all. Our certainty of this rests not only on an understanding of the deepest aspirations of the European peoples but also on a real evaluation of the forces opposing the policy of military adventures and preparation for aggression.

An extremely important factor in postwar Europe has been the commonwealth of socialist states. The strength of their foreign policy consists in the fact that their fundamental goals coincide with the vital interests of the broadest masses of the people in all the countries on our continent.

As is known, at the Bucharest conference the socialist states joined by the Warsaw Treaty Organization set forth a program of security and peaceful cooperation in Europe.<sup>4</sup> This program is finding a growing number of adherents both in European and in world public opinion.

The countries of the Warsaw Pact placed on the agenda, among other things, the idea of calling a general European conference of states to discuss questions of ensuring security in Europe and establishing general European cooperation. This proposal has received a favorable response from many Western European states.

The central question of European security is the stability of the borders of European countries in the same form established as a result of and after the second world war. Any attempt to alter these borders would inflict countless misfortunes on the peoples. This applies in full measure to the borders of the F.R.G. on the east and the west, the north and the south.

An extremely important precondition for European security is recognition of the de facto existence of two German states with different social systems. The shortsighted policy of "nonrecognition" of the German Democratic Republic, which is essentially in the interests only of the West German revanchists, is in irreconcilable conflict with European reality and serves as a major source of international tension. The German Democratic Republic has lived and thrived for almost two decades now. Both the Soviet Union and the other socialist states see an important goal of their policy to lie in contributing in every possible way to strengthening the international position of the G.D.R.

In the atom and rocket age new problems have arisen that are linked

<sup>4</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 407-420.

to the ensuring of European security. The peoples of Europe have a good idea of what it would mean if nuclear weapons appeared in the hands of a state fighting for the recarving of European borders. Therefore preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons is not only a worldwide problem but also one of the main questions of European security.

At present negotiations are taking place regarding an international treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are pressing to have this work successfully completed and the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons available for all the states of the world to sign it.

In weighing the opportunities opened up by developments in Europe, we cannot bypass the fact that within two years the governments of the NATO countries are to decide whether or not the North Atlantic Treaty is to be extended. In our opinion it is very right that Communists and all progressive forces are endeavoring to make use of this circumstance in order to develop on an ever wider scale the struggle against preserving this aggressive bloc.

Some time ago the socialist countries of Europe, in order to ensure their security, were compelled to create the Warsaw Treaty Organization in reply to the creation of the NATO bloc. This organization, which is not only a military but also a political alliance of several socialist states, has successfully fulfilled its role for many years now. The aggressive aspirations of the West German imperialists and their American patrons force us to show constant concern for thoroughly strengthening cooperation among the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty. Nevertheless, socialist countries never supported the division of Europe into military blocs. We have offered our alternative to this policy. At the Bucharest conference the participants again stated that if the North Atlantic Alliance ceases operations, the Warsaw Treaty will become invalid and a system of European security must take their place. Taking into account the fact that the governments of the NATO states had not yet reached such a radical decision, the participants in the Bucharest conference advanced a new proposal: to reach agreement now on liquidation of the military organizations of these groupings. For a host of countries, including those in Northern Europe, neutrality could be an alternative to their participation in the powers' military-political groupings. The C.P.S.U. proceeds on the basis of the fact that a great deal depends on the initiative of neutral states, on their good offices in the cause of consolidating European peace. The Soviet Union would be prepared to meet halfway any undertakings serving this purpose.

Overcoming the split of the world and Europe into military blocs and alliances is part of the overall struggle of peoples to curtail and put a complete halt to the arms race, to hold militarism in check and to cleanse the political atmosphere in Europe and throughout the world. From this viewpoint partial measures toward a military detente—from creating non-nuclear zones in certain areas of the continent to liquidating foreign military bases—would have considerable importance.

There is no justification for the permanent presence of the U.S. Navy in waters washing the shores of Southern Europe. One wonders what

grounds exist, 20 years after the end of the second world war, for the U.S. Sixth Fleet to ply the Mediterranean Sea and use military bases, ports and refueling stations in a number of Mediterranean countries.

After all, this entails a serious threat to the independence of every coastal country. The time has come for the demand that the U.S. Sixth Fleet be withdrawn from the Mediterranean to ring out at full strength.

In Europe there are not only U.S. military bases, but also bases of a different sort. These are subversive espionage and sabotage centers, radio stations and various organizations the Americans have created in the F.R.G. and other Western European states for conducting slanderous propaganda against the socialist countries. It is time to raise the question of halting the activities on European soil of all venomous hotbeds that poison relations among peoples.

The development of bilateral relations among the countries of our continent could serve as an important precondition for the strengthening of European security. The currently existing tendencies toward a detente on the European continent are largely the result of an improvement in the bilateral relations among the states of Eastern and Western Europe.

As for the Soviet Union, our policy will continue to be aimed at developing mutually advantageous relations with the capitalist countries of Europe on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence and in the interests of firm peace and the security of peoples. The Soviet Union is prepared to enter into an exchange of opinions on the preparation of bilateral treaties and agreements with the governments of European states that want to develop relations with our country.

There is still another important and promising current of efforts on the part of European peoples and states that has a direct bearing on the solution of the tasks of strengthening European peace. I am referring to cooperation in economics, science, technology and culture both on a bilateral and on an all-European basis.

The groundwork for this has already been laid. We believe it is only the groundwork. The advancing scientific-technical revolution and the strengthening desire to consolidate national independence and to be freed from the dictation of the dollar suggest to the European states many paths and undertakings in the most diverse fields—from the construction of a gas pipeline intersecting the continent to the introduction of a color television system common to all Europe.

The area of peaceful use of atomic energy also evokes the interest of many countries. We are prepared to reach an agreement with the other European states on assistance in conducting nuclear research and using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Realization of this proposal will enable states that have forgone the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons to share all the advantages placed in mankind's hands by the peaceful energy of the split atom.

## Statement on European Security by European Communist Parties, April 26, 1967<sup>1</sup>

We representatives of European communist and workers parties who gathered in Karlovy Vary realize our responsibility for the future of our peoples and the cause of the international working class and believe that preservation of peace is the most important question for all the peoples of our continent. We met to discuss the present situation, to exchange experience, and jointly work out ways and means to help unite all forces of peace and progress in the struggle for European security.

The experience of the past few years has borne out the correctness of the communist thesis that world war is not inevitable and that it can be averted by the joint efforts of the world socialist community, the international working class, the national liberation movement, and all states opposed to war—all peace forces. These forces have grown considerably, but the aggressiveness of American imperialism has also increased.

The United States, the main force of aggression and reaction, is trying to reverse the march of history and wipe out the right of the peoples to decide their own destinies. It is grossly interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa and is extending its war of aggression against the Vietnamese people, a war which today represents the most serious danger to world peace.

In this situation the struggle against the imperialist forces assumes special significance in Europe. Every success in this struggle means not only a step toward a stable peace in this part of the world, but also a new blow at the policy of strength and the system of interconnected aggressive military pacts with which imperialism has girdled the globe.

Europe, which lived through two world wars, remains a troubled region where the main forces of the imperialist camp and the socialist community confront each other. An armed conflict between them would threaten to grow into a total nuclear war. This danger hangs over the entire life of the European peoples, retards social and economic progress, vitiates international relations, and involves tremendous loss of material means in the course of the arms race. Military intervention by certain European states to suppress the national liberation movements also creates hotbeds of tension and imperils peace.

Following World War II, the imperialist nations headed by the United States concluded the North Atlantic pact, spearheaded against the socialist states and against democratic movements in the capitalist countries. This brought about the division of Europe into counterposed military blocs.

Having remilitarized the Federal Republic of Germany and supported its unlawful claims to represent all of Germany, the imperialists assigned it the role of an advanced anticommunist bastion, which became a seat of tension and which threatens peace and security in

<sup>1</sup> Moscow broadcast, Apr. 26, 1967. The statement was issued at the European Communist conference held at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia.

Europe as a whole. The Bonn state, where revanchist and militarist forces have come to power, has turned into the mainstay of U.S. global strategy in Europe.

The growing strength of the Bundeswehr, which is commanded by former Hitlerite officers, testifies to an increasing scope of military preparations. Activities of the Communist Party of Germany have been banned in the German Federal Republic, while other democratic and peace-loving organizations are being subjected to repressions. Broad scope is being given at the same time to the activities of extremely reactionary and neofascist forces. Their growing influence greatly alarms the European people, who know from painful experience that fascism is always accompanied by aggressive militarism.

The cold war has become for the monopolies of all the European capitalist states an instrument for waging an offensive against democracy, a tool for exerting pressure on the working people with the aim of suppressing their struggle for better living conditions, of restricting their social gains—a means of shifting the growing burden of armaments onto the popular masses.

The cold war conceptions, the myth of the menace of "communist aggression" used by the United States to justify its hegemony in Europe, have failed. The aggressive course of imperialism has been undermined by the active foreign policy of the socialist states, which are consistently implementing the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, a policy being carried through on an ever greater scale—especially since the 20th CPSU Congress. This course was also undermined by the struggle of communist and workers parties, the actions of the masses, the activity of broad sections of the West European people. The joint defensive might of the socialist states, which relies above all on the technical and scientific achievements of the Soviet Union, constitutes an obstacle on the path to war.

The Atlantic bloc has entered a stage of open crisis. The ruling circles of some Western countries challenge the value and expediency of the policy of military alliance with the United States or participation in the NATO joint armed forces, which threatens to draw their states into war and has nothing in common with their national interests. Tendencies toward emancipation from political and military trusteeship by the United States are growing in the European capitalist countries. At the same time, anxiety is growing over the intensified penetration by American capital.

The contradictions have also been aggravated between the national interests of West European states and the expansionist aims of the German Federal Republic—its desire to occupy a dominating position in NATO, the "Common Market," and Euratom.

The German Democratic Republic, which has carried out the Potsdam agreements,<sup>2</sup> has strengthened its sovereignty as a state and its international prestige. Its growing strength and constructive peace policy raise a barrier to the plans of West German imperialism. Recognition of the GDR and defense of its sovereign rights have become one

<sup>2</sup> Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49* (S. doc. 123, 81st Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 34-48.

of the main tasks in the struggle for European security. The existence and development of a peaceable socialist German state has great implications not only for the German people but also for peace all over Europe.

The crisis of the cold war policy has opened up new opportunities for the democratic and progressive forces of West Germany, forces that sincerely demand radical changes of the foreign policy and which deserve every support. Replacement of the Bonn government was brought about precisely by this crisis. However, there are no signs that the new government of the so-called grand coalition has abandoned the imperialist goals of its predecessors. On the contrary, despite assurances of peaceful designs, it maintains its claim to represent all of Germany, continues to strive to swallow up the GDR, to restore Germany within the frontiers of 1937, refuses to recognize the unlawfulness of the Munich diktat, continues to advance provocative claims to West Berlin, and strives to gain access to nuclear arms.

Serious changes are now taking place in public opinion. The awareness of the fruitlessness and danger of the imperialist policy of splitting Europe is constantly growing. Ties of cooperation, specifically in the fields of economy and culture, are developing between countries with different social systems. In the course of establishing relations, representatives of government and public circles of socialist and capitalist countries carry out a useful exchange of views on problems of European security.

The constructive proposals for the strengthening of security and peaceful cooperation in Europe, set forth by the socialist countries in the Bucharest declaration of the Warsaw Pact states,<sup>3</sup> and the proposals of the communist parties of capitalist countries advanced at their meetings and in their decisions, provide a realistic basis for the strengthening of peace and security in Europe.

New and positive trends toward international detente and cooperation with communists are appearing in the socialist and social democratic movements in some West European countries. New trends are emerging in Christian circles regarding problems of progress and peace. New possibilities have arisen for contacts and cooperation between various trade union and other democratic organizations. Cooperation of communists with socialists and those who believe in the question of European security can promote the cause of peace on our continent.

The people of Europe want no further war! They want neither a cold war nor a "balance of fear" leading to a still more intense arms race and increasing the risk of a deliberate or accidental conflict.

It is high time to achieve the establishment of new relations in Europe based on a genuine relaxation of tension and mutual confidence.

We communists, acting under different national conditions, will spare no effort to build a system of collective security, to establish relations between states which will preclude any possibility of aggression and insure an enduring peace in Europe and throughout the world. This is a difficult but feasible task.

The communist and workers' parties of Europe submit for the con-

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 407-420.

sideration of public opinion and of all political and public forces concerned a program for actions in the interests of creating a system of collective security based on principles of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems. This requires, primarily, that all states recognize the existing situation as it has developed in Europe in the postwar period.

This means: Recognition of the inviolability of existing frontiers in Europe, particularly on the Oder and the Neisse, and also of the borders between both German states; recognition of the existence of two sovereign and equal German states, the GDR and the German Federal Republic, which requires of the latter the renunciation of its claim to represent all of Germany; preclusion of any opportunity for the German Federal Republic to gain access to nuclear arms in any form, either European, multilateral, or Atlantic; and recognition of the Munich treaty as invalid from the moment of its conclusion.

The European and working class movement and all democratic peace forces now face the task of insuring the development of peaceful relations and cooperation among all European states on the basis of respect for their sovereignty and equality. With these aims in view, it is necessary to fight for the realization of a number of aims which can be achieved in a new situation, namely:

Conclusion by all European states of a treaty renouncing the use of force or threat of force in their relations and interference in internal affairs; a treaty guaranteeing the solution of all disputes by peaceful means only, in accordance with the principles of the U.N. Charter; normalization of relations between all states and the GDR, and between both German states and between the GDR and West Berlin as a separate political entity; consistent defense and development of democracy in the German Federal Republic—the right to demand this is given to the peoples by law, the experience of history, and postwar international agreements. This envisages universal support for the struggle of progressive forces in the German Federal Republic for the banning of neo-Nazi organizations and all revanchist propaganda, annulment of the emergency legislation, freedom of activity of the democratic and peace-loving forces, lifting of the ban on the Communist Party of Germany; and conclusion of a nonproliferation treaty as an important step toward halting the arms race.

The system of European security must contain a recognition of the principles of neutrality and unconditional respect for the inviolability of neutral states. A more active peace-loving policy of these countries and their contribution to the cause of disarmament would help to establish such a system.

Liquidation of artificially created barriers in economic relations between the socialist and capitalist states of Europe would be of particular importance for all states and would be conducive to the establishment of fruitful cooperation, including broad agreements in the sphere of production and scientific research.

Striving to open the road to European security and cooperation, we resolutely advocate the conclusion of agreements on partial solutions, above all in the sphere of disarmament, which would create a favorable climate for more far-reaching treaties. All proposals in this field, advanced by governments, parties, public organizations, political lead-

ers, and scientists, deserve thorough examination. Particularly topical among these proposals are those which deal with the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of European states, liquidation of foreign war bases, establishment of denuclearized zones in central Europe, in the Balkans, the territory of Danubian countries, in the Mediterranean, and in northern Europe, and also zones of thinned-out or frozen armaments, and in general zones of peace and cooperation in various regions of the continent. These, just as other steps, would check the tendency toward intensification of the arms race.

The 20-year period of the validity of the Atlantic pact expires in 1969, and this makes possible a clear alternative: a Europe without military blocs. This alternative must be put on the agenda with all earnestness.

No effort should be spared in order to develop a broad movement of the peace-loving forces of our continent against the extension or any modification of the Atlantic pact. This movement is favored by the constructive attitude of the Warsaw Pact states which have repeatedly stated and solemnly confirmed in the Bucharest declaration their readiness for a simultaneous liquidation of both military alliances. We second the moves of these states regarding an immediate agreement on the liquidation of the military organizations of the Atlantic pact and the Warsaw Pact.

We express readiness to support any initiatives or proposals pursuing the purpose of achieving a *détente* and strengthening the security of the peoples of our continent.

We fully support the proposal to call a conference of all European states on the question of security and peaceful cooperation in Europe. The proposal to call a conference of representatives of all European parliaments also deserves support.

Consolidation of security and peace will open up before the peoples of our continent new prospects for progress and prosperity. The peoples of Europe are faced with important social, economic, and cultural problems. A Europe rid of the arms race, which consumes tremendous economic resources and the fruits of the labor of workers, engineers, and scientists, will be able not only to insure higher living standards for its people but also to make a valuable contribution to the development of all mankind.

The struggle for such a Europe is closely associated with the struggle for genuine national independence, for democracy, against reactionary and fascist dictatorships such as exist in Spain, Portugal, and Greece. The fact that the governments of Spain, Portugal, and Greece assist American imperialism in building atomic bases in exchange for U.S. support for these discredited regimes shows what a great danger they are to Europe. European communist and workers parties express complete solidarity with and provide support to the important struggle now being waged by the united front of Spanish workers and democratic forces, and to all the peoples fighting against reactionary regimes, for freedom and democracy.

The communist and workers parties of Europe are ready to dedicate all their forces to the realization of these tasks, serving the cause of peace, progress, and democracy.

Our movement, which this year marks the 50th anniversary of its

great victory—the Great October Socialist Revolution—has become a mighty political force, exerting a decisive influence on the development of all of mankind.

Each of the communist parties, in the specific conditions in which it is fighting, bears responsibility for its policy to its working class and working people, to the people in general. At the same time, each party is aware of its international responsibility for safeguarding peace, for forming new international relations conforming to the needs of our time.

This sense of responsibility requires of us communist parties of Europe the pooling of our efforts for the solving of these problems. The stronger the unity and solidarity of the communist and workers parties in Europe and all over the world, the more effective our struggle shall be.

This sense of responsibility obliges us to address, primarily, all the working class, which is the main producer of material values, the most conscientious and progressive class of modern society. We address the closest ally of the working class, the peasantry, and also the middle strata, which are vitally interested in peace and prosperity. The workers and all the working people of Europe, combining patriotism with international fraternal solidarity, are capable of playing a decisive role in the struggle for peace and European security, for democracy and social progress in our continent.

We address the socialist and social democratic parties, which have a broad influence among the European working class and participate in the governments of a number of European countries. The experience of decades has shown that joint actions by communists and socialists enable the working class to exert a decisive influence on political life and rally around themselves public sections interested in maintaining peace and implementing democratic social changes.

We address the trade unions of Europe, which for 100 years now have been the biggest mass organization of the working class, defending its material and social interests. We call upon the trade union organizations to use their authority and influence in the struggle for a peaceful Europe.

We address scientists, writers, artists, all European intellectuals, whose fine representatives have always defended human rights and freedoms, independence of the peoples, international cooperation, and peace.

We address the Christian forces, the Catholics and Protestants, the believers of all religious denominations who motivate their striving for peace and social justice with religious convictions.

We address the younger generation of Europe, whose future is inseparably linked with victory for the idea of collective security and peace. The place of the youth is in the front ranks of the fighters against the policy of war, against reaction and fascism, for freedom and progress, for friendship of the peoples.

We address the women whose role in social life is increasing all the time and whose participation in the defense of peace and the security of mankind is so important.

We address the bourgeois groups which display a realistic approach to modern reality, realize the danger of a nuclear war, wish to rid

their countries of dependence on the United States, and are ready to support the policy of European security.

We call upon all peace-loving forces to rally and launch a broad campaign in their countries and on a continental scale to expand direct actions for collective security. We urge support in every possible way for the proposal to call a conference of European nations.

The communists of European countries are deeply convinced that by defending peace and security on their continent against the forces of aggression and war they are acting in the interests of democracy, social progress, and national liberation, in the interests of the peoples of all the world.

The present historic period requires courage and initiative. We address all the people of good will, irrespective of their political convictions and party membership, nationality or religion, with a call to use all their influence and exert every effort to achieve our common goal—peace. By overcoming all that divides us, we shall be able to create a mighty force, capable of triumphing over war and the uncertainty of tomorrow, of paving the way to a lasting peace and prosperity of the peoples.

The European people are capable of deciding themselves the questions of peace and security on their continent. May they take the destinies of Europe into their own hands!

### Remarks by President Johnson on Discussions With Chancellor Kiesinger [Extract], April 26, 1967<sup>1</sup>

It was more than two decades ago that I first came to Europe. It is astonishing to observe the great progress that has been made since I first came here.

That progress is a great tribute to the leadership of the great man that we laid to rest yesterday and whose passing we all mourn.<sup>2</sup>

He would want us to do what we have done today and that is to reaffirm the friendship that exists between the Federal Republic of Germany and its peoples and the peoples of the United States of America.

We have not made any hard and fast decisions today, although we have explored many of the interests of our respective people. We talked about, first, that the people in America hoped that it may be possible for the Chancellor and his lady to visit our country at an early date. We will both be in touch with each other about that date and a new announcement will be forthcoming.

At that time, we will review in depth and perhaps have more announcements for you concerning the various subjects that are in the public mind and of great interest to the two nations; the nonprolifera-

<sup>1</sup> *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, May 1, 1967, p. 660. The remarks were made at Bonn.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Konrad Adenauer.

tion treaty, the trade and monetary matters, the troop deployments, the security of the two nations, and the prosperity of our people.

The Chancellor reviewed the viewpoint of his people in connection with all of those subjects. I attempted to tell him how we felt about them.

It is clear from our discussions that the friendship that has existed and the close relationship that has existed between our two countries for more than the past two decades will be continued; that there will be constant, complete, and full consultation between us before decisions by either of us.

Both of us believe that those consultations will not only be friendly but will be understanding, and will result in the agreement and the approval of the peoples of both nations.

True, there will be differences of opinion, there will be decisions to be made and adjustments to be entered into, but we both know that in unity there is strength and we both expect strength for our respective peoples.

We want, more than anything else, peace in the world and prosperity for all of its peoples. By working together, we believe we can best make our contributions to that end.

#### Extract From News Conference Remarks by the Indian External Affairs Minister (Chagla), April 27, 1967<sup>1</sup>

The foreign minister said that if India is asked not to explode the bomb and become a nuclear power, "we must be satisfied that we have what I might call a credible guarantee for our security." He explained that apart from the question of security, the treaty has other aspects, like reciprocity, research, discrimination, and disarmament.

In reply to a question, he said he does not think that India would find itself alone in its opposition to the treaty in its present form. He had discussed in Geneva many problems concerning the treaty, and the majority of those with whom he had exchanged views "not only appreciated India's position but felt that India's stand should be supported."

The foreign minister said he was happy to find that most of the countries represented at the disarmament committee appreciated India's peculiar position with regard to the nonproliferation treaty. The peculiar position of India is that it is a nonaligned country, not in military alliance with any country nor under the nuclear umbrella of any country. Secondly, India is far advanced in nuclear research, and third, it is under the continuing threat and menace of China, which has already become a nuclear power.

Chagla enumerated the main objections India has to the provisions of the draft treaty. It seeks to impose obligations upon nonnuclear countries without undertaking any obligations on the part of the nuclear countries. It contains no mutual obligations, nor is it really a step in the direction of disarmament, because while it seeks to prevent horizontal proliferation it takes no steps to prevent vertical increase

<sup>1</sup> Delhi broadcast, Apr. 27, 1967.

to nuclear armament. Chagla added: "There is not even a suggestion in the treaty that nuclear powers should reduce their stockpiles or even freeze stockpiles at existing levels."

Chagla said the treaty is therefore discriminatory as between nuclear and nonnuclear powers. It seeks to maintain the monopoly of the nuclear powers while attempting to prevent nonnuclear powers from becoming nuclear powers.

Chagla said it is worth noting that under the provisions of the treaty China would be a nuclear state which would not be called upon to undertake any obligations. India could have become a nuclear country if it had exploded the bomb as China did. But because India had shown restraint, a desire for peace, and opposition to the spread of nuclear armaments, under this treaty it would find itself in a much worse position than China.

Elaborating the point, Chagla said: "We have shown great restraint in our love of peace and our opposition to nuclear weapons by not exploding a nuclear device. China has exploded the bomb. The result of our restraint is that we are a nonnuclear power which will have to suffer all the disadvantages. On the other hand, China, which has shown no restraint, will not suffer from any disadvantage even if it signs the treaty, as it is already a nuclear power."

Chagla said India's other objection to the provisions of this treaty is that it might seriously hamper and impede nuclear research for the purpose of peaceful uses of atomic energy. One of the provisions would prevent nonnuclear countries from undertaking underground explosions for the purpose of carrying out nuclear research. It is noteworthy, Chagla said, that the Moscow test ban treaty, which India signed, banned explosions in the atmosphere, but in the preamble to the treaty it was clearly provided that the nuclear powers would take early action to stop all explosions whether in the atmosphere or underground.<sup>2</sup> While no action had been taken by nuclear powers to stop underground explosions, this draft treaty imposes no obligations on the nuclear powers to stop underground explosions. But nonnuclear powers under the treaty would be prevented from having underground explosions. This again is another instance of discrimination between nuclear and nonnuclear powers.

Chagla said it is [the] same with the question of control and safeguards. While the nonnuclear powers would have to subject themselves to strict control and supervision, the nuclear powers would accept no such obligation.

The foreign minister said: "We are not opposed to preventing the proliferation of nuclear power for the purpose of war and offensive, and we would be very happy to sign any nonproliferation treaty which is in conformity with the U.N. resolution to which we are a party." He said: "Our feeling is that this treaty does not conform to the U.N. resolution, and our attempt, therefore—and I hope other members of the 18-nation committee will join in that—will be to improve the provisions of the treaty so as to bring them in conformity with the U.N. resolution."

He continued: "We can only take a final decision as to whether we

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 201-203.

will sign or not when we have seen the final shape it takes after it is discussed and debated in an ensuing meeting of the disarmament committee."

Chagla said that today the Soviet Union and the United States have sufficient nuclear weapons to destroy the world fifty times, or, to use the American expression, "overkill." "What we are suggesting is a gradual reduction of the stockpile held by the United States and the Soviet Union."

He said it would be a "utopian dream" to expect China to sign the nonproliferation treaty. Even if China signs, it would sign it as a nuclear power, because under the provisions of the draft treaty, having exploded the bomb, China would become a nuclear power.

Asked whether, if India secured a satisfactory nuclear guarantee from the Soviet Union and United States, it would still stand by its reservations to sign the treaty, Chagla said: "We have to distinguish between the question of security and the provisions of this treaty. Security is a matter apart from the question of whether the provisions of the treaty are satisfactory or not and are in conformity with the U.N. resolution or not. We need security, because if we are asked not to explode the bomb and become a nuclear power, we must be satisfied that we have what I might call a credible guarantee for our security. It does not concern the discussion of this nonproliferation treaty."

Chagla said that other countries like Sweden which are highly advanced in the field of nuclear research also feel that nuclear energy would give the most important sources of power in the future, and they do not want to deny themselves the advantages of nuclear energy. He therefore believes that nonnuclear states are interested in provisions of this treaty apart from the question of China's threat to India.

### Statement by Foreign Minister Brandt to the Bundestag on Proposed Nonproliferation Treaty, April 27, 1967<sup>1</sup>

The Federal Government welcomes the formal inquiry of the coalition parties as an opportunity for giving the German Bundestag as comprehensive a survey as possible. The Government will also state its attitude here in regard to the four points contained in the motion made by the Free Democratic Party.

A world-wide treaty regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons raises an extraordinary number of questions of a political, economic, technical-scientific and military nature. Every statement runs the risk of not taking into proper account all the aspects of the question. I also ask the indulgence of this illustrious House because of the following reason: we cannot yet speak of a completed draft of the treaty because such a text does not yet exist. It lies also in German interests to treat to a certain extent as confidential the questions which

<sup>1</sup> *News From the German Embassy, May 5, 1967, pp. 1-8.*

we have discussed with friendly states. We would not be justified in giving out details today regarding these questions.

In view of this situation, it is also not possible for the Federal Government at this time to present a definitive statement of its position.

The Federal Government must naturally reserve its final position until it can study a completed text. In any case, no one should be unclear in regard to our fundamental attitude: we are not only in favor of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but we are also in favor of additional measures in regard to the limitations of armaments, and in the control of armaments. This is in line with the policy of peace of the Federal Government, pursued with the agreement of the Bundestag.

The idea of a non-proliferation treaty has aroused particularly strong attention in German public opinion and has led to some extent to lively discussions. This is not surprising. The projected treaty can have world-wide consequences. The future of Germany can be strongly influenced by the treaty. It contains incalculable elements and presents a project in which the technical-scientific element plays a significant role. The breath-taking tempo of the progress of the natural sciences confronts us inevitably with the problem of harnessing this progress, that is, to see to it that it does not work against mankind but makes itself serviceable to mankind.

This treaty confronts us in this form for the first time with the problem of finding a political solution to the mass of information and knowledge brought to us by science and technique, knowledge which we can no longer remove from our world. This makes the help and the counsel of science indispensable in the political field. But it also raises the problem to a new and somewhat unsure level, that of insuring the primacy of the political. The political requires the helping partnership of the scientific, but the responsibility of the final determination—even in regard to important detailed decisions—cannot be taken away from the political leadership.

## II.

Before I, in the name of the Federal Government, answer the questions in their order, I should like to say something concerning the evolution of the treaty proposal. For it is not true that this project has been discussed only during the recent months.

After the end of the second World War, the efforts to bring nuclear energy under international control remained without success. Instead of this control there began a nuclear armament race between the United States and the Soviet Union; also Great Britain, France and the People's Republic of China produced and tested nuclear weapons. In the disarmament negotiations of the United Nations the conviction arose that the proliferation of nuclear weapons could best be prevented by a universal treaty prohibiting such weapons.

Since the unanimously adopted Irish resolution of December 4, 1961,<sup>2</sup> the full Assembly of the United Nations passed additional resolutions which urged the states to conclude a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons and which emphasized the pressing nature of a solution. Particularly worth noting is resolution 2028 of November 1965, because it contained special fundamentals to be included in the treaty, and which,

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, p. 694.

therefore, in a stronger manner than hitherto, made clear the obligation of the nuclear powers.<sup>9</sup>

The eighteen-power Disarmament Conference in Geneva came to a dead-end in its efforts toward a general and complete disarmament. It occupied itself for years with the non-proliferation problem, without any apparent rapprochement of the divergent points of view. The Soviet Union and the other communist states in these discussions placed the collective defense questions of the Western Alliance in the foreground.

Bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union also remained for years without result. During the meeting of the full Assembly of the United Nations last autumn, however, representatives of these two world powers came to a tentative understanding in regard to certain formulas for a non-proliferation treaty. We were informed of this in the middle of December by the Secretary of State of the United States. The Federal Government immediately held discussions with the United States and other friendly powers. On the occasion of my visit to Washington at the beginning of February, 1967, I outlined the German attitude and obtained a series of satisfactory assurances. The details were to be worked out in agreed-upon talks between the experts.

Such talks, but also political discussions on the highest level, have been carried on right up to the moment. Simultaneously, the Federal Government has fostered an exchange of ideas with other powers using nuclear energy for civilian purposes, and has taken part in consultations over some important aspects of the problem within the framework of EURATOM and NATO. Because there was lacking a text of the treaty, the Geneva Conference in its meetings from February 21 to March 23 could deal with the open questions only in a general manner. The adjournment, proposed by the United States, proved useful, in order to go more deeply into the problems of the treaty through bilateral and multilateral discussions. The NATO Council, on the 20th of this month, took note of the American intention, through further talks with the Soviet Union, to attempt to arrive at a joint text and to present this as the draft of the treaty on May 9 at the reopening of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. It is impossible today to predict the outcome of the Soviet-American talks, which, in the meantime, have been renewed.

For judging the outcome it will also be important to note for how long the treaty is to remain in effect; how the treaty is going to be put into effect; and how it is going to be fitted into further international developments.

### III.

The first question directed to the Federal Government runs as follows:

*"Does the Federal Government consider it fundamentally as a part of its policy of insuring peace, to support the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty?"*

This question is, as I made plain in my introduction, to be answered positively. The German people know that it is united with all peoples

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 532-534.

who wish for a lasting peace. The assuring and anchoring of peace is the primary motivation of our policy. We reject any sort of policy of force and we are ready to sign a treaty renouncing the use of force. We wish, particularly in the European area, for a lasting detente and a peaceful order, in which the German people can overcome the division and live with its neighbors in freedom and harmony. It is our firm purpose to cooperate actively and constructively in the development of such a policy of peace.

We support, therefore, all appropriate steps along the road to an international limitation of armaments, armaments controls, and disarmament. In this regard, the mass-annihilation weapons, above all, the nuclear weapons, stand in the foreground.

The Federal Republic of Germany, already in 1954, in connection with her acceptance into the Western European Union and into the North Atlantic Pact, renounced the production of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and subjected itself to corresponding international controls.<sup>4</sup> We would have welcomed it if other States had submitted themselves to similar obligations and in so doing, the dangers which arise from the proliferation of nuclear weapons would have been lessened.

The Federal Republic of Germany has also ratified the Test-Stop Treaty of August 5, 1963.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, the Federal Government has repeatedly stated its renunciation of any right of disposition over nuclear weapons. She partook of the wish expressed by the resolution of the United Nations calling for the prompt conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty.<sup>6</sup>

I may be permitted here, also in connection with the first point in the FDP motion, to recall, that the Federal Government in the Government Declaration of December 13, 1966, made clear: "We strive for no national right of disposition over nuclear weapons and for no national possession of such weapons."

We wish, therefore, the successful continuation of the current negotiations, with the goal of obtaining a possibly universal acceptance of the non-proliferation treaty. In doing this, we assume that a treaty will be drafted which will not have an adverse effect on the vital interests of the Federal Republic.

The second question is:

*"What have been the results of the talks which the Federal Government has had with the interested civilian and military nuclear powers in regard to the contents of a non-proliferation treaty?"*

As I have already mentioned, we have been occupied with the partial draft of a text since the middle of December of last year. It developed that this draft was in need of changes and additional elaboration. We have tried to set certain standards by which we can evaluate a universal non-proliferation treaty. In doing this, we found that there are essentially four types of problems involved:

A. The unhindered use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

<sup>4</sup> *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, pp. 979 ff.

<sup>5</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 748 ff.

- B. A clear tie to general disarmament.
- C. Guarantee of security.
- D. No adverse effect on regional—in our case: European—efforts toward unification.

These four sets of considerations lead to numerous single questions which will have to be carefully examined, with the help of scientists.

It also developed that in none of these considerations was it a question of German interests which only affected the Federal Republic of Germany and concerned no other state. The Federal Republic found and finds itself, so far as its interests are concerned, largely in agreement with other mostly civilian nuclear powers, and also in many areas with those who do not belong to any defense alliance.

In this context, too, are laid to rest the complaints on the Soviet side that with our wishes and efforts it is just a question of preparing positions which serve as a disguise for our alleged ambitions for nuclear weapons. We have no such ambition. The political weight of Germany in the world will be determined in the future by its achievements in the service of peace, science, economics, technics, and culture.

It lies in the nature of things, that the civilian nuclear states have made contact with each other in order to determine how they should evaluate the effects of such a treaty upon their present national and regional interests, and to what extent these interests coincide with those of the others. It lies in the nature of things, because the civilian nuclear states in this context represent the counterpart to the nuclear powers. In the circle of the civilian nuclear states, some are protected by alliances, others not; some are members of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, others are not.

The Federal Government has established, that in spite of the quite different situation of these countries, as just shown, they have similar interests arising from the factual contents of the treaty, which ought to be taken into consideration in such a treaty.

This sounding out is not yet at an end. It has clearly shown that the Federal Republic of Germany so far does not stand alone.

I ask your indulgence again for the fact that the Federal Government at this time cannot give information concerning detailed results. In any case, she has been able to establish with the states affected a large measure of agreement in the evaluation of the essential aspects of the non-proliferation treaty.

During the negotiations of the recent months, we have found a large measure of understanding for our considerations on the part of our American allies. There are a whole series of questions in which we can consider our consultations with the United States as having ended with a positive result. In a series of other questions, we shall have to carry on our consultations further, in part when the results of the American-Soviet talks are at hand, in part after the resumption of the negotiations in Geneva.

The resolution of questions which are still open depends upon the results of the contacts between the United States and the Soviet Union, between the world powers and their allies, between the allies with each other, and finally, between the non-nuclear states with similar interests.

The third question is:

*"To what extent has the Federal Government succeeded in removing the fears that the present draft of the non-proliferation treaty could hinder civilian research, development and utilization of nuclear energy and the export of reactors?"*

The unhindered civilian utilization of the atom is a vital interest of the Federal Republic. The development in the civilian sector will proceed further. The energy requirements of the world will be taken care of increasingly through nuclear power. In the reactors providing this energy is produced plutonium, which can be used also for producing weapons. With the spread of nuclear technology there will also increase not only the number of civilian nuclear powers but inevitably also the number of states which have the objective capacity of producing nuclear weapons.

It is a duty of our generation to prevent the military misuse of nuclear energy and to foster its peaceful utilization. The Federal Republic of Germany is ready to support everything that prevents misuse. She is not ready to accept anything at all which hinders its peaceful utilization.

The future of the Federal Republic of Germany as a modern industrial state depends on this principle. Upon the enforcement of this principle also depends what the Federal Republic can do for the peaceful progress of mankind.

It is known that German scientists are working with prospects of success on the development of the second generation of reactors, the so-called fast breeders. Our industry has good prospects of achieving a high degree of efficiency in this field. We have striven for a maximum protection of the peaceful use of nuclear energy through binding treaty obligations and have included in this complex the long-range assurance of nuclear fuel supplies. With reservation of the limitations made above, it can be said today: The Federal Government, in the sense of the question asked can say, that civilian utilization will not be hindered, if the treaty takes the form which, through our cooperation, it presumably will take.

Non-hindrances must also apply obviously to the exchange of nuclear material and nuclear equipment, of scientific information and the bilateral and multilateral cooperation of states with each other or with international organizations in the civilian area. It must prevail for research, industrial activity and with this, to exports. We are of the opinion, that the treaty should expressly set as a goal the fostering of civilian utilization.

The nuclear weapon states have devoted enormous financial means to the military utilization of nuclear energy. In any case, they profit in the civilian area a great deal from their military experiences. The civilian "spin-off" products from military research are becoming steadily less important, it is true,—as the experts say, so far as it is a question of individual discoveries. But in any case, the large size of the plants growing out of military requirements provides the nuclear armed states with a monopoly position in regard to special kinds of fissionable material and low production costs. We can presume that the non-nuclear states could share in the results of the military utiliza-

tion of nuclear energy by the nuclear weapon states, including information and discoveries.

Through the prospective treaty, "atomic weapons and other nuclear explosives" will be forbidden. This is justified on the ground that up to now there is no way of distinguishing between military and civilian nuclear explosives. The problem of using nuclear explosives for civilian purposes has scarcely any real significance for us in Germany in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, we welcome the fact that the United States, which has not yet completed its research work, has declared itself ready to provide a nuclear explosive service with the bringing in of an international authority and without calculating the research and development costs.<sup>7</sup>

The question of controls is extremely important. Disarmament with controls is a traditional Western demand. It is not a new question for the Federal Republic. As is well known, she has already subjected herself to international security controls. The treaty would result in extending such controls to other states as well.

We go on the assumption that the placing into effect of controls does not interfere with the economic operations of factories, does not lead to the loss of production secrets, but counters the dangers of misuse. For this purpose it is adequate to control the end-product and the fissionable material, the flow of fuel at definite strategic points, and to have a control which possibly could be exercised by automated instruments. These instruments do not yet exist. The Federal Republic of Germany will make every effort, in cooperation with allies and in international organizations, to develop and inaugurate modern instruments of control. Through such an automated control, it would also be possible to hold down the costs of a security control system.

In any case, in regard to this subject, attention is called to the fact that during the last months while the basis for a draft treaty was being discussed, no provision was projected for any control of the nuclear-armed states. Up to now, the Soviet Union has refused to allow such controls on its own territory. It is all the more important that also in the West there should be no unnecessary and unjustified differences of procedure. Therefore, the possibility is to be considered of great importance that the United States and Great Britain also place their civilian sectors under international controls.

Summing up may I say—and at the same time state our position in regard to the third point of the FDP motion:

The fears regarding the hindering of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes arose primarily from the earlier drafts of the non-proliferation treaty. In the draft of the treaty now being considered, it is made certain that the treaty is to have no adverse effects on the peaceful use of nuclear energy for research, industry and commerce. The Federal Government is concerned not only in making certain that through the treaty the peaceful use of nuclear energy will not only not be hindered, but, so far as possible, be fostered.

The fourth question is:

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 525-538; *ante*, pp. 172-174.

*"On adhering to the non-proliferation treaty, will the Federal Republic of Germany be able to insure its supply of fuel and fissionable material for peaceful purposes?"*

The supplying of the Federal Republic of Germany with end-products and nuclear fuel is arranged for through bilateral pacts with the United States and Canada and through the long-range agreement between the United States and EURATOM.<sup>8</sup> The bilateral German-American agreement expires in the middle of this year.<sup>9</sup> After that time the supplying with American material is to come exclusively through EURATOM. In accordance with written assurances of the American Government, the agreement between EURATOM and the United States will not be affected by the non-proliferation treaty, and additional agreements regarding adequate supplies are possible.

The Federal Government is convinced that, through the assurances and agreements in connection with the non-proliferation treaty, its supplies of material and nuclear fuel can be insured.

The fifth question is:

*"Does the Federal Government consider a cooperation of EURATOM and IAEA, particularly in the area of controls, as desirable and possible?"*

The Federal Government considers a cooperation between EURATOM and IAEA as desirable, necessary and possible. Already before the non-proliferation treaty went into the critical stage of the negotiations, steps were taken on the German side to bring about an agreement arranging for this cooperation. Furthermore, the control statute of the IAEA makes express provision for the acceptance of other control systems (Article 28 D of the "Agency's Safeguards System" of 1965).<sup>10</sup>

The Federal Government goes on the assumption that the IAEA and other international control systems take over the supervision of the provisions of the non-proliferation treaty in regard to the use of fissionable materials. The IAEA should be able to convince itself of the effectiveness of the other control systems. In regard to this question, it would be in order, when the occasion arises, to conclude a verification treaty between the Vienna authorities and the other control organizations involved. The Federal Government considers the conclusion of such a verification treaty as possible also if the members of the organizations taking part request such a treaty.

The sixth question is:

*"Will a non-proliferation treaty make impossible or burden important internal regulations of the Atlantic Alliance in the nuclear area?"*

The treaty— as it is being considered—formulates that which is forbidden; everything else is, and remains permitted. Questions of the

<sup>8</sup> Agreement of Nov. 8, 1958 (10 UST 75), as amended May 21-22, 1962 (13 UST 1403), and additional agreement of June 11, 1960 (11 UST 2589), as amended May 21-22, 1960 (13 UST 1439) and Aug. 22 and 27, 1963 (14 UST 1459).

<sup>9</sup> Agreement of July 3, 1957 (8 UST 1265), as amended July 22, 1959 (10 UST 1659) and July 5, 1962 (13 UST 1770).

<sup>10</sup> Documents on Disarmament, 1965, p. 452.

Western defense alliance are not dealt with in the text of the treaty. In spite of this there are connections. The interpretation, therefore, will play an important role. We are striving for a high degree of certainty in regard to content and form.

In accordance with the assurances given to us and the other alliance partners from the American side, I can answer both parts of the question, the way things look at present, with "no". The difficulty of the subject raised here lies in keeping open future defense possibilities in the Atlantic as well as in the European framework. Therefore, this is also a question which concerns all the partners of the Alliance. The renunciation by Germany of having any jurisdiction of its own over nuclear weapons, which is a firm component of our policy, is considered by us as a German contribution to detente and not as discrimination.

In regard to the fourth point in the FDP motion, I should like to take the following position:

On December 14, 1966, it became known that inside NATO there would be established a standing "Committee for Nuclear Defense Affairs" (NDAC), and under this Committee, a "Nuclear Planning Group" (NPG).<sup>11</sup> The Federal Republic of Germany is represented in both bodies and in the Military Committee of NATO, and because of this, she has the possibility, through her political and military leadership organs, of having influence on the nuclear planning in the Alliance.

At the deliberations in the new organizations, the Federal Republic considers her particular task to be, in the framework of joint defense planning, to represent the interests of our people. At the first meeting of the NPG in Washington on April 6 and 7, 1967, she already brought into the discussion in this sense the role of the host state in allied agreements regarding the planning and using of nuclear weapons.

The seventh question is:

*"Does the Federal Republic see in the draft of a non-proliferation treaty being discussed at the present, or in a preamble to such a treaty, statements which put a brake on the competition in nuclear armaments, and which could lead to a balanced reduction in armaments in the atomic area?"*

Without any doubt, the treaty must contain statements for checking the competition in nuclear armaments. In what form this will take place, I cannot for the moment, or not yet, answer.

But at this point, the following is established: the expansion of knowledge regarding the use of nuclear power cannot be prevented through any sort of checks. The manufacture of the bomb is today less a question of knowledge than of political will. The civilian nuclear powers, without doubt, render a real service, if they adhere to the planned non-proliferation treaty, for the essential point really is their adherence.

In principle, they are ready to do this because of the realization that an increase in the number of states, who independently have nuclear weapons at their disposal, means an increase of the danger for man-

<sup>11</sup> See *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 9, 1967, pp. 50-51.

kind. One fears that the coming into being of even only one additional nuclear power would start a chain reaction which would be difficult to control. For these reasons comes the readiness of the civilian powers to make a contribution.

But this contribution should not remain without a reciprocal contribution. Only the nuclear-armed powers can make this reciprocal contribution, for there is not only the danger of a horizontal, there is also the danger of a vertical extension of nuclear armament.

If only the horizontal extension of nuclear weapons is prevented, this is indeed an important step, but it does not solve the problem of making peace more certain, and it can eventually place all the others in an exceptional position in the face of the nuclear giants. The world must therefore expect that also the nuclear-armed states, in the interest of the deliberate obligations of the treaty, be prepared to accept it as a step toward comprehensive solutions. That is: the world cannot stand still with a limited non-proliferation treaty. It is incumbent upon the nuclear-armed powers to cease the further development of ever more dangerous weapons; not to increase the present supply on hand, including the carriers; to begin their destruction; to stop producing fissionable materials for military purposes and achieve a complete test stop.

If the nuclear-armed powers clearly made known their readiness to take such steps, the non-proliferation treaty would be the beginning of international cooperation for the securing of peace in the nuclear age. It should be clarified, how this goal can be insured, and indeed, in the sense of the resolution adopted almost unanimously and mentioned in the introduction, resolution No. 2028 of the full Assembly of the United Nations.<sup>12</sup> These considerations and expectations are today the hope of the people in the whole world.

A declaration of intent along the lines mentioned above is planned for the preamble of the treaty. The Federal Republic believes it important that this declaration be not only of a Platonic character.

At this point I should like to emphasize that the United States in principle agrees to the necessity of joining together non-proliferation and concrete measures for stopping armaments and for disarming. Whether and to what extent the nuclear powers actually give binding assurances, in any case cannot yet be foreseen. If it comes to a presentation at Geneva of a joint Soviet-American treaty draft, this question certainly will be a key topic to be included in the negotiations there.

How seriously the Federal Government considers precisely this aspect of the problem is shown by the fact that it devoted a memorandum to this theme and associated questions under the date of April 7.<sup>13</sup> I should like to call attention to this memorandum in connection with the second point of the FDP motion.

In regard to the negotiations of the Geneva disarmament conference, the Federal Government directed this memorandum to the participants of this conference and to France. It was also concerned—in the context of the discussions regarding a non-proliferation treaty—with the theme of disarmament. Outside of the powers represented in Geneva,

<sup>12</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 532-534.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 179-182.

we brought this memorandum to the attention of several other interested governments, the Vatican, the Secretary General of the United Nations and all the missions at the United Nations. In the memorandum it says literally:

The devastating effect of nuclear weapons obliges the governments of the world not only to end the nuclear armament race; the interest of mankind demands that a beginning be made to nuclear disarmament. Only in this way can an international peaceful order be established, which guarantees a successful development in freedom, independence and dignity. Furthermore, Germany is determined to work toward this goal, together with other countries. The disarmament negotiations of the great nuclear armed powers have indeed achieved partial success in regard to the control of armaments, but however, have in no way ended the competition in nuclear armaments. All the more pressing remains the necessity of a real disarmament. An international regulation of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons could prove itself to be the first step in an effective insuring of peace, if it were followed by steps toward disarmament.

The Federal Government does not consider it suitable for the moment to propose a special treaty concerning a general prohibition of the production of nuclear weapons and the step by step destruction of the existing nuclear weapon arsenals, but wishes to present the goals of a stop in armaments, and disarmament in agreement with numerous other states within the framework of the treaty being discussed at the moment regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Federal Government concentrates her efforts toward disarmament on a connection between these goals of hers with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty presently being discussed.

The positive reaction to the memorandum encourages the Federal Government to continue to attach the greatest importance to tying together non-proliferation and disarmament.

#### IV.

As a further answer to the questions placed, I should like to note only the following: In the event the United States and the Soviet Union present a joint draft, the treaty will be examined with complete thoroughness.

We shall make our decision in accordance with our judgment and our conscience, if the basis for a decision is clear.

To promote further development along the road to detente, to the insuring of peace and toward the progress of mankind, will be determinate in judging the non-proliferation treaty, in our cooperation in it and for our decision.

### News Conference Remarks by President Johnson: Non-proliferation Treaty [Extract], May 18, 1967<sup>1</sup>

*Q. Mr. President, the Geneva talks on the nonproliferation treaty are getting started again now. How far apart or how close together are we and the Soviets on an agreement on that and what about the problems with our allies?*

<sup>1</sup> *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, May 22, 1967, p. 752.

THE PRESIDENT. We are carrying on exchanges of views with all concerned—as we have been for many months. I don't think that one can accurately predict what the outcome will be. I would prefer to wait until things jell a little more before speculating on what and when.

I have, all along, very much hoped that after we got the tripartite talks out of the way, the consular treaty,<sup>2</sup> the space treaty,<sup>3</sup> and the Kennedy Round, that we could make some progress in the ABM and the nonproliferation field.

I still have hopes in those fields. I am very grateful for the progress that has been made in space, in the consular, tripartite, and Kennedy Round. I would hope for equally good results in the other two, but I don't know. I don't want to paint a rosy picture only to have you remind me about it at the next meeting. I am hopeful. I see no insurmountable barriers to the nonproliferation at this time, if that gives you a feel of it.

#### Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 18, 1967<sup>1</sup>

The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is resuming its work in a complicated situation. International tension not only is not decreasing but on the contrary, as a result of the further escalation by the United States of the war of aggression in Viet-Nam, it is continuing to increase. Attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of States, to nullify the right of peoples to decide their own future themselves, represent a serious threat to the cause of peace throughout the world. The situation also remains disquieting on the continent of Europe, where certain circles still count on acquiring nuclear weapons.

4. In these circumstances the solution of the problem of disarmament, and in the first place of the problem of preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, becomes a matter of particular urgency. The need to solve this problem, as an important step towards stopping the arms race, was stressed by the Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties on problems of security in Europe, which was held at Karlovy Vary at the end of April this year.<sup>2</sup>

5. The attitude of the Soviet Union towards the problem of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is well known. The Soviet Union regards it as one of the key problems of European and international security, and is striving to reach agreement on a draft non-proliferation treaty that would meet the purpose of strengthening peace and eliminating the threat of nuclear war.

<sup>1</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, June 22, 1964, pp. 979-985.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 38-43.

<sup>3</sup> ENDC/PV. 207, pp. 4-12.

<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, pp. 197-203.

6. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Brezhnev, speaking of the attitude of the USSR in relation to a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, stated in his speech of 24 April at the Conference in Karlovy Vary:

At present negotiations are taking place for the conclusion of an international treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are directing their efforts so that this work may be successfully concluded and a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons be open for signature by all the States of the world.<sup>3</sup>

7. The main problem which the treaty is intended to solve is to preclude completely and reliably any possibility of any proliferation whatsoever of nuclear weapons. It is precisely on that requirement that the Soviet Union has based itself in consistently advocating the closing of all channels leading to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That basic principle of the treaty was clearly and specifically formulated in resolution 2028 (XX) adopted by the twentieth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations:

The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form.<sup>4</sup>

8. To satisfy those requirements a non-proliferation treaty must first of all prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons by nuclear Powers, and do so in such a manner as to cover all possible ways and means of such transfer. In short, the treaty must prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to anybody, whether directly or indirectly. But, in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it is also necessary to prohibit the transfer of control over nuclear weapons; that would be in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1665 (XVI) of the United Nations General Assembly.<sup>5</sup>

9. It is also necessary that the treaty should prohibit nuclear Powers from rendering assistance to non-nuclear Powers or encouraging or inciting them to produce nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or to acquire them by any other means, or to acquire control over such weapons or explosive devices. In their turn, the non-nuclear Powers should renounce the production or acquisition of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and should also not accept the transfer of such weapons or explosive devices from anybody.

10. A treaty based on such provisions would close all chinks and loop-holes through which proliferation of nuclear weapons could take place. The conclusion of such a treaty would be an important contribution to the cause of strengthening international security and preserving world peace. It is hardly possible to dispute the fact that an increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons or given access to them would greatly increase tension in international relations and would increase the probability of the use of nuclear weapons.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 195 (variant translation).

<sup>4</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 532-534.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 1961, p. 694.

11. It is important to note in that connexion that the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a universal one. The proliferation of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to the great Powers. They face an increased risk of being dragged into a nuclear war as a result of conflicts in one or another part of the world. The proliferation of nuclear weapons equally constitutes a threat to small countries. For them, as for all countries in the world, a nuclear war would be truly catastrophic.

12. In resolution 2153 (XXI) of the General Assembly it is noted with complete justification that an increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons "may lead to the aggravation of tension between States and the risk of a nuclear war".<sup>6</sup> In this connexion there is a particular danger in access to nuclear weapons being acquired by forces that are making revanchist demands. That is why the conclusion without delay of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would be the very measure dictated by life itself, which would help to create a more reliable degree of security for all States and which would contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of confidence among States.

13. The conclusion of an international treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would undoubtedly help to ensure the security of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear. It would be in the interests of all peoples reliably to link their future, not to participation in the nuclear arms race, but to measures aimed at reducing the danger of nuclear war, at disarmament.

14. In its approach to a solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Government has taken into consideration the wishes of the non-nuclear Powers in regard to ensuring their security. Taking those wishes into account, the Soviet Union proposed in 1966 that a provision be inserted in the non-proliferation treaty stipulating that nuclear weapons should not be used against non-nuclear States not having nuclear weapons on their territory.<sup>7</sup> The Soviet side confirms its willingness to include a special article containing such a provision in the draft treaty if the other parties to the negotiations agree to this.

15. An important aspect of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is the effect that it would have on the peaceful development of nuclear energy. In this connexion a number of misgivings have been voiced to the effect that the treaty might prevent the non-nuclear countries from enjoying the benefits that are inherent in the peaceful potentialities of the atom. We fully realize the importance of this problem and we understand the desire of the non-nuclear countries to avail themselves of all the achievements of present-day science and technology, including nuclear energy, for the purpose of their own development and to raise their standards of living. Our point of view in that regard is that the solution of the non-proliferation problem is one of the most important conditions that would ensure for the non-nuclear countries the most rapid and successful development of their peaceful atomic industry.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, p. 748.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

16. Renunciation by the non-nuclear countries of military ways of using atomic energy would enable them to concentrate all their scientific, technical and material resources on the peaceful utilization of the achievements of nuclear physics, which would undoubtedly widen their potentialities in that field. Indeed, it is well known what huge efforts and material resources are required for the development of nuclear weapons. The great material expenditures and the diversion of the efforts and energy of scientists from peaceful to military problems would all hinder the peaceful development of atomic energy.

17. Another important aspect of the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty would be that, as a result of that treaty, more favourable conditions would be created for the development of broad international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In our opinion the treaty could contribute to the further expansion of such co-operation. The Soviet Union has advocated, and continues to advocate, the principle of general access to the benefits of the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, both for nuclear and for non-nuclear countries.

18. An important condition that would ensure for the non-nuclear countries the possibility of enjoying the benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear energy is the acquisition by those countries of the appropriate technological information and their participation in the exchange of scientific information in that field. Thereby they would not only derive benefit for themselves, but would also contribute individually or in co-operation with other States to the further development of the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, which would be in accordance with the interests of all mankind. Nuclear energy is a great achievement of human genius; it should be not a weapon of destruction and death, but a mighty means of improving the standard of living of the peoples of all countries in the world. It is this noble purpose that the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is intended to meet.

19. During the last session of our Committee the representatives of a number of non-aligned States raised the question of how to reconcile solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with the use of nuclear explosions by non-nuclear countries for peaceful purposes. We well understand the motives that underlay the statements of the non-aligned countries on this problem, and we consider that it should be solved in such a way as not to cause any prejudice to the interests of the non-nuclear States. It is necessary, however, to bear in mind that in certain countries there are circles which are seeking to find in the problem of the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes a pretext for delaying and frustrating the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

20. In that connexion we should like to recall once again our attitude towards the problem of the carrying out of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in non-nuclear States. It cannot be denied that any device for the carrying out of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in no way differs in principle from devices having a military purpose. Starting from that premise, we define our attitude towards the carrying out of such explosions by non-nuclear States on the basis of our position of principle in regard to non-proliferation in general; and, above all, we are guided by the consideration that a treaty on this subject should

close all loop-holes for the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form.

21. The Soviet Union understands the interest of non-nuclear States in the use of nuclear energy in the future in order to carry out such major projects in the field of economic development as may require nuclear explosions. We firmly maintain the position that an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons cannot and should not prevent non-nuclear countries from using nuclear energy for the purposes of peaceful economic development. In this connexion we bear in mind that the question of the procedure and conditions governing the carrying out of nuclear explosions is a particular question which can be settled only on the basis of a separate international agreement.

22. In discussing the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at sessions of the General Assembly and here in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, many delegations have devoted considerable attention to the question of the measures which should be taken to ensure effective implementation of the treaty. Moreover, the representatives of a whole number of States have stressed that the parties to the treaty should work out and adopt reliable measures, acceptable to all, for verifying how the obligation to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons or manufacturing them independently is complied with by States.

23. Such a provision was also laid down in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) as one of the basic principles with which a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should comply. The Soviet Union attaches great importance to that provision and considers that the treaty should contain reliable safeguards to ensure its consistent implementation.

24. In what form and how should those safeguards be applied? Many countries have expressed the view that in the implementation of a non-proliferation treaty the system of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has been approved by the overwhelming majority of States, should be used. Thus, at the meeting of our Committee held on 16 March, the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Khallaf, said in this connexion:

The treaty must contain provisions clearly stipulating compulsory and uniform application of the single system of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency to all non-nuclear States parties to the treaty. Moreover, the control system must be extended to the transfer of nuclear material and to all nuclear activities, past and present.

In such a treaty the only inspection system acceptable in this respect is compulsory and not voluntary, international and not regional, effective and not fictitious.\*

It seems to us that that viewpoint deserves the most serious attention, and it is hardly likely that any weighty arguments will be found to refute the validity of the extremely important points put forward by the representative of the United Arab Republic.

25. The conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is important not only in itself. In General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), which lays down the basic principles of the treaty

\* *Ante*, p. 156.

on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it is pointed out that "The treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament, and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament."<sup>9</sup> The Soviet delegation, in stating the position of the Soviet Union in regard to a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, has repeatedly stressed that we regard a solution to this problem not as an end in itself or as a single, isolated measure, but as a link in a chain of other disarmament measures designed to eliminate the threat of nuclear war. In this connexion may I remind you of the statement made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Kosygin, on 9 February?

... we regard the solution of the problem of non-proliferation as an important step towards the subsequent nuclear disarmament of States. Non-proliferation is not a means of consolidating the particular status of the present nuclear Powers, but an important stage in the struggle for nuclear disarmament, for banning the use of nuclear weapons, for their complete removal from the armaments of States and their destruction, and the struggle to end the production of such weapons. We are confident that in the end it will be possible to solve all these problems and thus rid mankind of the threat hanging over it.<sup>10</sup>

26. The Soviet Union has always advocated, and continues to advocate, that the problem of disarmament should be solved in the most radical way: all nuclear weapons should be eliminated once and for all and agreement should be reached on the complete dismantling of the military machine of all States. That is the aim of the proposals which have been advocated for so long by the Soviet Union in conducting negotiations on disarmament. You are aware what great difficulties are encountered in negotiating a solution to the problem of nuclear disarmament and other problems relating to the elimination of armaments. For this reason the course recommended by the General Assembly, which has given priority to the question of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, is absolutely right.

27. The conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty would create more favourable conditions for ensuring the solution of other disarmament questions in regard to which it is at present proving difficult to reach a mutually-acceptable agreement. Furthermore, we consider that the draft treaty should contain provisions which would encourage States to intensify their efforts to solve the problems of disarmament and especially those relating to the elimination of nuclear weapons. It is important, in particular, that the treaty should state the intention of the States parties to the treaty to bring about the cessation of the nuclear arms race as quickly as possible, calling upon all States to cooperate in achieving this aim. The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should open up a clear prospect in regard to the problem of disarmament as a whole, by confirming the intention of all the parties to the treaty to struggle for the elimination from national and international arsenals of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.

28. Furthermore, as the Soviet delegation has already pointed out, we agree with the proposal put forward by the non-aligned States to include in the draft treaty a provision to the effect that nothing in

<sup>9</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, p. 533.

<sup>10</sup> Quoted in *ENDO/PV. 287*, p. 15.

the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.<sup>11</sup> That is in accordance with the general policy of the Soviet Union, which advocates the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. The Soviet Union regards the struggle for disarmament as one of the most important orientations of its foreign policy. As the Soviet Government has repeatedly stated, it will do everything in its power to put a speedy end to the arms race and to achieve a solution of the disarmament problem.

29. If the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is to constitute a really solid basis for further steps in the field of disarmament, it must be durable and reliable and must give assurance to all the parties to it that it will be implemented strictly and without fail. The durability of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is an important factor ensuring the vitality and effectiveness of the agreement on which we are working. It is precisely with this aim in view that the corresponding provisions of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be drafted.

30. Since we have been conducting negotiations regarding a non-proliferation treaty, although a considerable amount of work has been done we still have not achieved such a result as would enable us to solve the most urgent problem of our times—the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The forces opposing such a treaty and striving by every means to delay and prevent its conclusion are becoming more active. That places upon all the States Members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament a great and serious responsibility. Every effort must be exerted to ensure the achievement of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with due regard to the interests of all States. Thereby an important step would be taken towards ensuring international security and the elimination of the threat of nuclear war.

31. Before concluding my statement I should like to take this opportunity to welcome the newly-arrived Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Ambassador da Costa. We should like to wish him every success in his work both within and outside the Committee.

32. We likewise welcome among us the head of the Mexican delegation, Ambassador Castañeda. We should like to wish him also every success in his activities both here in the Committee, in the struggle for disarmament and for the solution of the problems confronting the Committee, and in regard to the solution of the other problems with which he has to deal in his international and other activities.

<sup>11</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, p. 557.

**Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 18, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

33. I should like to join in the warm welcome extended by you, Mr. Chairman, and my co-Chairman to Ambassador Corrêa da Costa of Brazil and Ambassador Castañeda of Mexico. I, too, hope that their presence here will be most useful, and I am sure it will be.

34. The first objective of the United States at this Conference is a non-proliferation treaty. We want to negotiate a fair and effective treaty, one that can be accepted by all and one that will endure. For half a decade there have been international discussions regarding a non-proliferation treaty. United Nations resolutions have been proposed, debated and passed. Draft treaties have been offered. Extended public debates have taken place. In addition, lengthy private negotiations have been carried on. It is time now for the results to be submitted to a waiting world.

35. President Johnson's message, which I read at our first meeting this year, expressed the hope that it would "soon be possible to recommend draft provisions of a non-proliferation treaty for the consideration of the Committee".<sup>2</sup> Just before our recess in March, my delegation made clear our continuing desire to submit draft treaty language to the Committee. I then pledged every effort to achieve a draft that could be placed before the Committee as the joint recommendation of the two co-Chairmen. With the greatest possible energy my Government undertook immediately a new phase of consultations with our allies; and from the latter part of April until today the co-Chairmen have continued their discussions.

36. In my judgment, a great deal of progress has been made towards a text which could be accepted by all those governments which wish to support a non-proliferation treaty. The co-Chairmen are continuing their active discussions to produce such a text, and it is my hope that my fellow co-Chairman and I will be in a position to make a joint recommendation to the Committee very soon.

37. The United States continues to believe that there is no more important problem before the world than to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. We are determined to submit to the Eighteen-Nation Committee and to all the countries of the world a draft non-proliferation treaty which, after further negotiation here and consideration by all governments, can be accepted by all governments which wish to take realistic steps to eliminate the possibility of nuclear war. Because this treaty must be a benefit to all and a detriment to none, its negotiation is extraordinarily complicated. The co-Chairmen's work is therefore not yet done. But my hope is that we can present our recommendations on what we have accomplished to the Committee in the near future.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.201, p. 13.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 98-99.

**Statement by the Brazilian Representative (Corrêa da Costa) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, May 18, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

38. First of all, allow me to say how deeply honoured I feel to participate today in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Throughout five years of discussions some progress has been achieved; and I pay tribute to this Committee, which has been instrumental in arriving at some positive results in the common effort to reduce world tension and ensure the maintenance of peace in the world. My country has been constantly engaged during this period in the task of co-operating to find constructive ways of avoiding nuclear war forever so that the forces of the atom are utilized solely for the benefit of mankind. My personal gratification is enhanced by the fact that the problems of disarmament, for some time now, have been foremost in my thoughts, both as a member of the Brazilian delegation to a number of sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations and as the head of my country's delegation to the negotiations which led to the Treaty which was recently signed in Mexico City.<sup>2</sup> I thank you very sincerely, Mr. Chairman, for your kind words, and I also wish to express my gratitude to Ambassador Roshchin and to Ambassador Foster for their kind words of welcome.

39. We are about to resume a difficult process of negotiation. Before us lies the arduous task of drafting an effective treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons—an issue that has been under discussion at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee since 1965. At the start the main obstacle was the lack of agreement between the two super-Powers; today there are auspicious signs that a basic agreement is in the process of being reached. It remains now to bring it into line with the legitimate interests of the non-nuclear-weapon countries of the world.

40. Brazil has earnestly participated in the work of this Committee in its search for formulations that might be conducive to general and complete disarmament. We have supported for this very reason all the efforts that have been made here to check the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to halt nuclear tests in outer space, in the atmosphere and in the ocean, as well as proposals regarding the creation of denuclearized zones. Brazil is already a party to the Moscow Treaty,<sup>3</sup> and my Government has just signed, in Mexico City, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. This attitude reflects our secular tradition of pacifism. Quite recently, on 5 April, President Costa e Silva solemnly reaffirmed Brazil's historical stand when he outlined the foreign policy of the new Government:

We repudiate nuclear armament and we are aware of the serious risk that the dissemination of nuclear weapons would bring upon mankind. It is imperative, however, that no actual or potential hindrances prejudice the full utilization by our countries of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Otherwise we should be

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.297, pp. 14-17.

<sup>2</sup> *Antc.*, pp. 69-83.

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

accepting a new form of dependence which is certainly inconsistent with our aspirations for development.

41. Our signing of the Latin-American Treaty is a direct outcome of this policy, the main objective of which is to speed up the peaceful nuclearization of Brazil while securing at the same time complete renunciation of nuclear armaments. In signing the regional Treaty we have also wished to mark our adherence to an initiative which sets an example and provides a basis for efforts towards non-proliferation on a world-wide scale.

42. In sending a special envoy to Geneva, the Brazilian Government wished to underline the purposes which inspire its position and to affirm unequivocally the distinction that exists between peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy, since my Government is determined to put the atom at the service of the economic and social development of Brazil and of Latin America. The Treaty of Mexico draws a neat distinction between those two antinomic aspects of the utilization of the new source of energy. Thus, the message it conveys is that it is not enough to prohibit nuclear weapons; it is imperative that every nation retain the right to mobilize, without any restriction whatsoever, the whole range of modern technological resources required to eliminate poverty and underdevelopment, which generate grave international tensions.

43. Nuclear energy plays a decisive role in this mobilization of resources. We must develop and utilize it in every form, including the explosives that make possible not only great civil engineering projects but also an ever-increasing variety of applications that may prove essential to speed up the progress of our peoples. To accept the self-limitation requested from us in order to secure the monopoly of the present nuclear-weapon Powers would amount to renouncing in advance boundless prospects in the field of peaceful activities. In fact, the new discoveries and breakthroughs that continuously enrich technology cannot remain the privilege of a few without establishing within the international community an irreparable relationship of dependence.

44. For the developing countries the only way to shorten the road in the race against backwardness lies precisely in the technological leap that full utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes can provide. Otherwise such countries will have let the scientific revolution of our time pass them by, even before having themselves completed the cycle of the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century. With the authority of a country that has never embarked on a war of conquest, and also as a signatory of the only existing Treaty that prohibits nuclear weapons, Brazil will exert its best efforts to see that an agreement on non-proliferation is arrived at in this forum, so that the basic principles established in our continent may be extended to the whole world.

45. For this reason Brazil, which together with Mexico represents Latin America in this Committee, does not wish there to be any confusion here between non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the free utilization of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Nor would we accept that, in the name of disarmament, the right of nations to progress and economic development should be curtailed.

46. It is unquestionable that the super-Powers have at their disposal a capacity for nuclear strike many times superior to their security needs—the “overkill” in the disarmament jargon. Why then could we not examine the possibility of converting at least part of those tremendous surpluses of energy to purposes of development? Why should we not transfer to the nuclear and spatial age the biblical appeal to “beat swords into ploughshares”? A programme of that kind would be far more effective than a prohibition inserted in a treaty. Such a programme would certainly discourage national initiatives which the nuclear-weapon Powers consider conducive to proliferation. Moreover, it would constitute a concrete measure towards disarmament, which is the ultimate goal of our efforts.

47. The proscription of nuclear weapons must certainly be effected, but in a way that will not limit the right to the full utilization of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The nations that possess such armament maintain that formal recognition of their monopoly is an indispensable requisite for world peace; besides, they advocate limitations on peaceful activities, since they claim it is impossible to distinguish nuclear technology for peaceful use from nuclear technology for military purposes. We acknowledge that that is a polemic point; but its solution must not be sought in the renunciation of the sovereign right of unrestricted development of the new source of energy.

48. Brazil does not intend to acquire nuclear weapons either by receiving or manufacturing them; but we shall not waive the right to conduct research without limitation and eventually to manufacture or receive nuclear explosives that will enable us to perform great engineering works, such as the connexion of hydrographic basins, the digging of canals or ports—in a word, the reshaping of geography, if necessary, to ensure the economic development and the welfare of the Brazilian people.

49. No doubt we shall accept such international co-operation as may be offered to us for the conduct of those undertakings. In this context we envisage several forms of collaboration, starting with the creation of a Latin-American atom community, as proposed by President Costa e Silva at the recent meeting of Heads of State of our Continent in Punta del Este. We do not exclude but rather look forward to the co-operation of the nuclear Powers—military or not—in technical assistance, in contracts for actual detonation services, or in the manufacture of explosive devices. Such co-operation could even be institutionalized by the establishment of a new international agency or the reorganization of existing ones.

50. To sum up, the Brazilian Government considers that the risks arising from the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and from the free application of pacific nuclear technology should be eliminated through adequate systems of control that do not hinder scientific development or entail industrial espionage. What we cannot accept is the adoption of measures that might involve the imposition upon our countries of the permanent status of technological underdevelopment.

Statement by the Mexican Representative (Castañeda) to  
the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Latin  
American Nuclear-Free Zone, May 18, 1967<sup>1</sup>

51. First I should like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your kind words of welcome to the new representatives who are participating in the work of the Committee for the first time and one of whom I have the honour to be. Secondly, I should like to make a brief statement.

52. My delegation feels that this is not the proper forum nor the time to interpret in an authoritative manner the scope of the obligations of the States parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, called the Tlatelolco Treaty.<sup>2</sup> Normally it will be for the Parties themselves and the bodies set up under the Treaty to interpret it in putting it into effect, in conformity with precedent and with the other relevant elements of interpretation. However, as representative of a State which is a co-author of that Treaty, I cannot neglect to make a clarification in regard to the interpretation given by the representative of Brazil, Mr. Corrêa da Costa,<sup>3</sup> concerning the scope of the right of the States parties to the Treaty to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

53. The Tlatelolco Treaty permits the peaceful use of atomic energy and even stimulates its use, as was rightly stressed by the representative of Brazil, for the benefit of the Latin-American peoples. Article 18 of the Treaty defines the limits of that right: it indicates that "explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes" are allowed provided that they do not contravene article 18 and "the other articles of the Treaty, particularly articles 1 and 5". The provisions of article 18, to which reference is made, deal with the information which must be given by a State intending to carry out an explosion, and with the way in which supervision and control are to be implemented.

54. Article 1, whose provisions must be complied with, as I have indicated, contains the essential obligation of the Treaty "to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon". Article 5, in its turn, defines what is meant by a nuclear weapon for the purpose of the Treaty: "any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes". In other words, under the Tlatelolco Treaty those explosions for peaceful purposes are permitted which do not constitute an explosion of a nuclear weapon, as defined in the Treaty.

55. The consequences and implications which may derive from this authorization and the corresponding prohibition mentioned in article 18, as well as the possibilities which remain open, such as the possibility of obtaining international co-operation through an organi-

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV. 297, pp. 17-18.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 69-83.

<sup>3</sup> See *supra*.

zation, have already been examined here in the past by my delegation and I shall not deal with them again. I merely wished to clarify and define the scope of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in that respect by recalling its provisions.

### Statement by the Indian Representative (Trivedi) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 23, 1967<sup>1</sup>

2. At the outset, Mr. Chairman, I should like on behalf of the Indian delegation to offer its warm welcome to you. We have the most pleasant and rewarding memories of working in close co-operation with you during the sessions of the General Assembly, and we are happy that the Indian delegation will again have the privilege in the Eighteen-Nation Committee of continuing that co-operation with the delegation of Mexico under your distinguished leadership.

3. Apart from making a few short comments on some emergent matters, the Indian delegation has not spoken at length during the meetings of the Committee this year. Its only regret on that score has been its inability so far to express formally its welcome to the distinguished leaders and alternates of the delegations of Bulgaria, Burma, Czechoslovakia and Nigeria who have joined us in our task. I should therefore like to take this opportunity of my first intervention in this Committee to convey to them and to their delegations the warm welcome of the Indian delegation and its pledge to full co-operation with them.

4. The Indian delegation is happy that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has now resumed its work after a long and extended recess. In addition to its continuing responsibility to conduct negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, for which it has been established, the Committee's mandate was further reinforced by the twenty-first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which made specific recommendations for its programme of work. We have therefore before us a heavy agenda and a heavier responsibility.

5. Since the historic session of the Disarmament Commission in April-June 1965, the United Nations has reaffirmed through unanimous and near-unanimous resolutions that the task of the Committee remains unchanged. The General Assembly has asked us once again to pursue new efforts towards achieving substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament<sup>2</sup> and on collateral measures, and in particular on two such measures: an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,<sup>3</sup> and the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests.<sup>4</sup> More

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV. 298, pp. 4-17.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 799-800.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 748-749.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 802-803.

specifically, the Committee has been called upon to give high priority to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the mandate contained in resolution 2028 (XX).<sup>5</sup> On tests, among other things, the Assembly asked the Committee to elaborate without any further delay a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. That was nearly six months ago.

6. The Indian delegation is distressed to find that, despite the continuing exhortations of the United Nations over the years, our Committee has not been able to pursue any special efforts, old or new, in achieving progress, small or substantial, towards a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The delegations of Sweden, the United Arab Republic and India have offered some constructive ideas in this behalf. Those ideas have not been pursued, nor have they led to any alternative suggestions. The Committee has also made no serious efforts to elaborate a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests underground, despite the demand made of it by the General Assembly to do so without any further delay. It seems to have been forgotten that the partial test-ban Treaty<sup>6</sup> is an extremely fragile instrument and cannot endure for long if it is not universally adhered to and if its five-year-old pre-ambular commitment for disarmament and for prohibiting underground weapon tests remains only a platitude.

7. The delegation of India does not propose to deal this morning with the issues of general and complete disarmament, or with the high-priority problem of suspension by all countries of all tests in all environments, or with several other related and collateral measures of arms restraint, limitation and control. In its first intervention in the Committee this session it would like to concentrate on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which has dominated our discussions for a long time.

8. At the same time the Indian delegation would emphasize, as it has done in the past, that an international treaty preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons can be a purposeful instrument only if this negotiating Committee of ours conceives of that measure in the over-all and universal concept of disarmament and not as a simple exercise in imposed non-armament of unarmed countries. Progress in evolving a treaty on general and complete disarmament, measures of disarmament of a collateral nature and, above all, cessation of all nuclear weapon tests by all countries—those are of the utmost urgency, not only because the United Nations has been demanding them, not only because they have their intrinsic benefit in the reduction of tension and strengthening of international peace and security, but also because, as was pointed out by the Disarmament Commission two years ago, they are of crucial value in facilitating agreement on a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>7</sup>

9. What is particularly fundamental is that a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will be much easier to negotiate and draft if it is taken not as an isolated measure but as one which forms an integral and co-existent pattern with measures of nuclear

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 532-534.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, p. 260-262.

restraint and disarmament such as the nuclear weapon test ban and a freeze on all nuclear delivery vehicles. We are all unhappy that there has not been more rapid progress in negotiating a non-proliferation treaty which can be acceptable to all concerned, and particularly to non-aligned non-nuclear nations. As many commentators have emphasized, however, that is due in no small measure to the fact that there is no progress in reaching agreement on such related measures as the nuclear weapon test ban and a freeze on nuclear delivery vehicles.

10. The United Nations General Assembly has laid down categorically as one of the vital principles on which an acceptable treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be based the principle that that treaty "should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament".<sup>8</sup> That was meant not merely as a pious preambular platitude, not just as an insubstantial incantation to be repeated occasionally as a simple magic charm, but as envisaging a concrete programme of specific action. It has to be a real and meaningful principle, one which has to form the foundation, the very basis of a non-proliferation treaty.

11. Fairly early during the last session of the General Assembly of the United Nations we were all informed that the two super-Powers had come closer together on a matter which concerned them intimately within the context of a non-proliferation treaty: namely, the question of nuclear-sharing arrangements within a military alliance; and we expressed our gratification at that welcome rapprochement. It is the understanding of the Indian delegation that agreement was in fact reached at the beginning of this year between the major Powers and their allies on that particular issue. The Indian delegation would have been happy if, soon after the settlement of that alliance obstacle, the Committee as a whole, consisting of the members of the two alliances and the eight non-aligned delegations, had been able to negotiate the drafting of an adequate and acceptable treaty. If necessary they could have had a drafting committee—a committee of the whole if you will, for after all that is the mandate of the Committee.

12. The super-Powers and their allies, however, continued to undertake further negotiations among themselves on other matters concerning the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, told us at the first meeting after we reconvened that he hoped that the delegations of the United States and the USSR would soon be able to make a joint recommendation to the Committee.<sup>9</sup>

13. Any progress in the direction of agreement between the United States and the USSR gives us great pleasure. It was during the memorable session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1960 that Jawaharlal Nehru moved a draft resolution on behalf of the delegations of Ghana, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and India, which were then led by the Heads of State or

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 533.

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, p. 224.

Government of those countries, suggesting a meeting between the leaders of those two great nations.<sup>10</sup> As Nehru said:

Our idea in sponsoring the resolution was not that the USA and the USSR should discuss international problems or solve them, but that it would help to bring about an element of flexibility in the situation which could be taken advantage of at a later stage.<sup>11</sup>

14. The Indian delegation sets great store by this element of flexibility and hopes that after this extended period of inter-allied consultations and accommodation the Committee will now revert to the considerations expressed in the memoranda of the non-aligned delegations and in the resolutions of the General Assembly. Without that we shall be unable to fulfil the responsibility entrusted to us, that of negotiating an acceptable and satisfactory international treaty in accordance with the mandate contained in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX).

15. Our urgent task is thus to prepare a draft non-proliferation treaty which the General Assembly would consider as adhering strictly to the principles laid down by it. The draft treaties which are formally before us are the United States draft treaty of August 1965 as amended<sup>12</sup> and the USSR draft treaty of September 1965.<sup>13</sup> The non-aligned delegations have commented on those drafts in the Committee and in the General Assembly. Several non-aligned delegations have also offered constructive comments and specific suggestions during the meetings of the Committee this year.

16. The Indian delegation believes that it is useful at this stage to quote some relevant observations on those draft treaties from the non-aligned memorandum of August 1966. The memorandum states:

The eight delegations . . . recognize that the two draft treaties were submitted before the adoption of resolution 2028 (XX) and, therefore, could not pay full attention to the principles laid down in it.

The eight delegations regret that it has not so far been possible to arrive at an agreement on a treaty acceptable to all concerned. They are deeply conscious of the danger inherent in a situation without an agreement that prevents proliferation of nuclear weapons. They view with apprehension the possibility that such a situation may lead not only to an increase of nuclear arsenals and to a spread of nuclear weapons over the world, but also to an increase in the number of nuclear weapon Powers, thus aggravating the tensions between States and the risk of nuclear war.<sup>14</sup>

17. The Indian delegation trusts that the joint recommendation promised by Mr. Foster will remedy the lacunae of the earlier drafts and adhere strictly to the principles laid down by resolution 2028 (XX), in particular principles (b) and (c), namely, that the treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, and that it should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, of nuclear disarmament.

<sup>10</sup> General Assembly Official Records: Fifteenth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 9.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 882d Plenary Meeting, pp. 328-329.

<sup>12</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 347-349; *ibid.*, 1966, pp. 159-160.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 443-446.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 576-579.

18. The Government of India has long maintained that prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons—the real prevention of all proliferation of nuclear weapons—is one of the most urgent and important tasks facing humanity ever since the unfortunate advent of this evil weapon of terror and blackmail. Discussions and negotiations on this and allied subjects have gone on since the days of the Baruch plan<sup>15</sup> and the Gromyko plan<sup>16</sup> in 1946. The relevant issues have been explored in depth in various forums of the United Nations in the past, particularly in the United Nations Sub-Committee on Disarmament in the 'fifties. Then, as today, the emphasis—to quote the significant phrase in the historic resolution 2028 (XX)—was on a “balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers”. What was then advocated by a few is now being held to be essential by all of us.

19. The Indian delegation has elaborated in detail on many occasions the elements that should be embodied in a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in compliance with the principle of balance and mutuality. It is a treaty of this nature which, in the words of the non-aligned memorandum and the General Assembly resolution, can be “acceptable to all concerned and satisfactory to the international community” and would prevent three facets of proliferation: (i) an increase in nuclear arsenals; (ii) a spread of nuclear weapons over the world; and (iii) an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon Powers. An acceptable and effective treaty, therefore, is one which prohibits existing proliferation among nuclear-weapon Powers, the dissemination of nuclear weapons and weapon technology from one country to another, and further or possible proliferation among hitherto non-nuclear weapon Powers.

20. The delegation of India is happy that the problem of dissemination now presents no difficulty and that we may soon have an agreed formulation in regard to transfer and receipt of weapons and weapon technology—a formulation which is balanced and mutual—providing that no State will transfer nuclear weapons and weapon technology to any other State and that no State will receive weapons and weapon technology from any other State. One hopes at the same time that that joint formulation will deal only with weapons and will not prohibit pursuits of peace.

21. At this stage I should like to say a word or two on the peaceful uses of atomic energy and particularly on the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. The Foreign Minister of India stated in our Parliament on 17 [27] March:

It is the view of the Indian Government that the non-proliferation treaty should be such as not to impede the growth of nuclear science and technology in the developing countries where the need for such development is great.<sup>17</sup>

On the question of peaceful nuclear explosions the Indian delegation expressed its views fully in the First Committee of the General Assembly on 31 October last year.<sup>18</sup> As it said then, it agrees with

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 1945-1959, vol. I, pp. 7-16.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 17-24.

<sup>17</sup> *Antc.*, p. 178.

<sup>18</sup> *Documents on Disarmament*, 1966, pp. 676-686.

President Truman that "no nation could long maintain or morally defend a monopoly of the peaceful benefits of atomic energy".<sup>19</sup> The civil nuclear Powers can tolerate a nuclear weapons apartheid, but not an atomic apartheid in their economic and peaceful development.

22. The Indian delegation agrees entirely with what the representative of Brazil said at our last meeting:

Nuclear energy plays a decisive role in this mobilization of resources. We must develop and utilize it in every form, including the explosives that make possible not only great civil engineering projects but also an ever-increasing variety of applications that may prove essential to speed up the progress of our peoples. To accept the self-limitation requested from us in order to secure the monopoly of the present nuclear-weapon Powers would amount to renouncing in advance boundless prospects in the field of peaceful activities.<sup>20</sup>

23. To us this is a matter of vital principle. The Indian delegation does not deny that the technology involved in the production of a nuclear weapon is the same as the technology which produces a peaceful explosive device, although a weapon has many characteristics which are not present in a peaceful device. Moreover, as far as fission technology is concerned, it is known to a large number of countries. But that, in any case, is not the issue. As the Indian delegation pointed out in the United Nations last year, technology in itself is not evil. Dynamite was originally meant for military use. Aeronautics, electronics, even steel fabrication—those are technologies which can be used for weapons as well as for economic development. That does not mean, therefore, that only the poor and developing nations should be denied all technology for fear that they may use it for military purposes.

24. Centuries of history have proved to us that the use that people make of their skills is entirely a matter of will. It is completely wrong to deduce that what is evil is science and technology, skill and progress. Jawaharlal Nehru said in the Indian Parliament as early as in May 1954:

In the last generation or two there have been certain explorations of the remotest frontiers of human knowledge which are leading us to many strange discoveries and strange consequences. Max Planck's Quantum Theory and, later on, Albert Einstein's Theory of Relativity changed the whole conception of the universe. Soon came the atom bomb with its power to kill. The human mind and human efforts are unleashing tremendous powers without quite knowing how to control them. They cannot be controlled by a mere desire or demand for banning them. One of the political problems of the day is how to approach this problem of control which is of vital consequence. Such an approach presupposes some measure of lessening of tension in the world, some measure of mutual confidence on the part of great nations, some agreement to allow each country to live its life.

Referring specifically to the question of control he said:

Let us understand, without using vague phrases and language, what it means. Certainly we would be entitled to object to any control which is not exercised to our advantage.

He added that India accepted control in common with other countries—

<sup>19</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, vol. XIII, no. 328 (Oct. 7, 1945), p. 514.

<sup>20</sup> *Ante*, p. 220.

... provided we are assured that it is for the common good of the world and not exercised in a partial way and not dominated over by certain countries, however good their motives.<sup>21</sup>

25. In other words, to quote a phrase which a great Power used twenty years ago in the context of a comprehensive plan for the control of atomic energy, we are not interested in the establishment of an atomic commercial super-monopoly.

26. As the Indian delegation stated in the United Nations General Assembly last year, it recognizes that such explosions must be adequately safeguarded. The safeguards must apply equally to all nations, and the Indian delegation is prepared to work with others in evolving a system of regulation which could be accepted by all States. As Ambassador Corrêa da Costa pointed out at our meeting on 18 May, the solution of the problem must not be sought in the renunciation of the sovereign right of unrestricted development of the new source of energy by some countries only, and mainly by the developing countries.<sup>22</sup> We must not throw the baby away with the bath-water.

27. Coming back to the question of the treaty, the two other facets of proliferation are equally amenable to a balanced and mutual solution similar to that of the problem of dissemination—a solution which provides for obligations and responsibilities of nuclear-weapon Powers and non-nuclear-weapon Powers alike, as repeatedly demanded by the United Nations. An article in the treaty stipulating that no country should henceforth manufacture nuclear weapons would not only satisfy the criterion of balance and mutuality and of the assumption of responsibilities and obligations by both the nuclear and the non-nuclear-weapon Powers, but also solve the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons correctly and comprehensively. It would also obviate other pitfalls, both political and mechanical, particularly those relating to control, which would be bound to arise in a discriminatory and unbalanced treaty.

28. The Indian delegation has stressed repeatedly that future proliferation or further proliferation is only the consequence of existing or continuing proliferation of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapon Powers. Disregard to this self-evident truth led to proliferation in the past, and we can disregard it now only at our peril.

29. History tells us that what is described as further proliferation or further spread of nuclear weapons took place in the past only among a few countries belonging to military alliances. Those countries have indicated the reasons which led to their decision to embark on a nuclear weapons programme. It is our duty as members of a group of experts to investigate those reasons and to ensure that in the solution we propose we eliminate them as far as possible.

30. The powerful members of military alliances which went in for further proliferation in the past have given two reasons for their action—status or prestige, and national security. First, they wanted to be at the top table. They felt somehow or other that possession of nuclear weapons gave them prestige and power, authority and in-

<sup>21</sup> Indian Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches* (Calcutta and Delhi, 1958), vol. III, pp. 254-257.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 225-227.

fluence. Secondly, they said that they could best safeguard their security by an independent nuclear deterrent. If, therefore, any serious efforts are to be made by this Committee to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons they must be directed towards meeting those two considerations of prestige and security.

31. Unfortunately, no real or effective effort is being made to deny prestige to possession of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, reports indicate that the nuclear-weapon Powers are being given an overwhelmingly privileged position in the propositions which are being elaborated these days. As time goes on, the nuclear-weapon Powers are apparently contemplating ever-increasing provisions of discrimination. The unbalanced aspects of the earlier draft treaties are being embellished further, and attempts are being made to construct the most perfect structure of imperfection. The nuclear-weapon Powers now want comprehensive controls over the peaceful activities of civil nuclear Powers, without, of course, any control whatsoever over their own activities, peaceful or warlike. They even want to prohibit the civil nuclear Powers from undertaking peaceful explosions purely for their economic development even if such peaceful pursuits take place under international supervision.

32. All these projects will, however, have just the opposite effect. A discriminatory treaty which gives a privileged licence to the existing nuclear-weapon Powers to proliferate at will and which heaps ever-increasing prohibitions on non-nuclear Powers will in itself be the strongest incentive to a new country to embark on a nuclear weapons programme.

33. The second consideration, that of security, which was advanced by the existing nuclear-weapon Powers to explain why they embarked on a nuclear-weapons programme, is even more germane. As far as the question of prestige is concerned, countries like India would be happier with the prestige of a civil nuclear Power. However, security is a much more vital consideration.

34. To be sure, this is not a matter which concerns only the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The terms of reference of our Committee stipulate that all measures that we negotiate "should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all".<sup>23</sup> Even apart from measures of disarmament, however, the very facts of political life of today demand that nations, and particularly a nation like India which is exposed to nuclear blackmail, take full account of the needs of national security. The question of security is a much wider issue and is relevant irrespective of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

35. The great Powers, which possess in their ever-expanding armouries the most destructive power ever known to mankind, have not yet, however, given any effective and credible consideration to the security needs of the non-nuclear countries, and particularly the non-aligned countries. Referring specifically to the question of a non-proliferation treaty, these powerful nuclear-weapon nations say that the non-nuclear nations would safeguard their security by forswearing nu-

<sup>23</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, p. 441.

clear weapons for ever in the midst of mushrooming proliferation by the nuclear-weapon Powers themselves.

36. This is, however, not the precept which they have themselves followed, and in fact they rejected it for themselves when it was time for them to decide. Moreover, as we know, various disarmament forums have been discussing questions of disarmament, and particularly of nuclear disarmament, since 1946. To divers proposals put forward on the subject from time to time, either by one side or the other or by non-aligned nations like India, the answer given by the great Powers has been that they cannot accept this or that proposal of nuclear restraint or reduction because it would adversely affect their security. But when they address themselves to non-nuclear Powers, the nuclear-weapon Powers argue that nuclear weapons provide no security and that the best way the non-nuclear nations can safeguard their security is to sign a discriminatory treaty—a treaty which will at the same time give unfettered licence to five Powers to proliferate.

37. On the other hand, the General Assembly of the United Nations has advocated the right approach and has laid down two basic principles: namely, that the treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers and should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament, more particularly nuclear disarmament.<sup>24</sup> As the Indian delegation has pointed out before, this can be achieved by adequate and effective provisions in an appropriate treaty, and I should like to recapitulate them at the risk of repetition.

38. On the question of dissemination, a balanced provision would require that no State shall transfer nuclear weapons or weapon technology to another State, and that no State shall receive such weapons or technology from another State. Similarly, on the question of proliferation, a balanced article would stipulate that no State shall henceforth manufacture nuclear weapons. This would incidentally obviate all invidious distinctions of prestige between States possessing nuclear weapons and those not possessing them, and curious concepts like the setting of dates for the duration of the nuclear-weapon era or for the closing of the list of membership of an exclusive club.

39. That still leaves the problem of what the representative of Brazil described as the possession in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon Powers of "a capacity for nuclear strike many times superior to their security needs—the 'overkill' . . ." <sup>25</sup> It is a matter of vital concern to India that one of the lesser nuclear Powers, in particular, is feverishly building up its arsenal of weapons and developing its delivery capability.

40. Those immense stockpiles of mass destruction in the possession of nuclear-weapon Powers pose a real threat to the security of nations, and a non-proliferation treaty of universal arms restraint cannot in itself reduce that threat or its potentiality for blackmail unless it also embodies a provision dealing with those menacing stockpiles. It is for that reason that the General Assembly has maintained that one of the basic principles of a non-proliferation treaty is that it is

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 532-534.

<sup>25</sup> *Ante*, p. 227.

a step towards nuclear disarmament. As has been pointed out by many non-aligned delegations, a non-proliferation treaty must accordingly embody an article of solemn obligation under which the State possessing nuclear weapons would negotiate a meaningful programme of reduction of existing stockpiles of weapons and their delivery systems. This provision cannot be merely a pious preambular platitude like the unfulfilled "determination" in the four-year-old partial test-ban treaty.

41. Increasingly references are being made these days to the question of control and means of safeguarding observance of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The delegation of India agrees with the principle of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) that there should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty. These provisions must necessarily be balanced and mutual and should apply to the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers alike.

42. As the Committee is aware, the question of control has been debated right from the beginning of international discussions on matters concerning atomic energy and disarmament. The problem then debated is as relevant today as it was at that time. The Government of India has always believed that control and disarmament must go together. There can never be a question of one coming before the other, particularly if it is to be genuine disarmament and genuine control.

43. The second consideration that the Government of India has continued to advance throughout is that the control should be universal and that it should be exercised in a non-discriminatory and objective manner; otherwise, as the Indian representative stated in the Preparatory Commission of the International Atomic Energy Agency, it would be tantamount to a new form of economic colonialism.

44. It is in the context of those two considerations that we have to view the question of a control provision in a non-proliferation treaty. One thing is certain: control can never be used merely as an instrument for imposing non-armament on unarmed countries nor, as the leader of the Indian delegation to the International Atomic Energy Agency said in the General Conference last year, "as a lever for achieving the political objectives of non-proliferation".

45. I should like to quote in this context one of the greatest living experts on disarmament matters, the Nobel Peace Prize winner Mr. Philip Noel-Baker. He said:

In any case the Western Governments cannot leave things where they are today. Either the "safeguards" of IAEA inspection will become the instrument of control over nuclear disarmament for the world at large; or it may soon become a farce. It cannot be used to keep the non-nuclear Powers disarmed, while the nuclear Powers continue to pile up or to retain great stocks of atomic and hydrogen weapons, large and "small". The purpose of IAEA, and the purpose of the cut-off which the western governments propose, is to demilitarize atomic energy; either that purpose must be fully and speedily achieved, or IAEA and the hopes built upon it will all fail.\*

46. The Indian delegation realizes that control is a complex problem. Many of the complexities need not arise, however, in the context of a genuine treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. If all of

\* Philip Noel-Baker, *The Arms Race* (London, 1958), pp. 284-285.

us, and particularly the big Powers, agree that there should be a provision in the treaty dealing with safeguards and control, we must eschew all notions of discrimination and provide for objective measures which apply equally to all. An adequate treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will prohibit the manufacture of nuclear weapons by all States. Whatever provisions are necessary, therefore, to ensure that the production of all fissile material by all States is used henceforth only for peaceful purposes will thus be in full conformity with General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). What is more, we should have fulfilled one of the terms of reference of the very first resolution of the United Nations, resolution 1 (I), namely "control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes".<sup>21</sup>

47. We are a negotiating Committee and the Indian delegation trusts that the views expressed by it will be considered fully by all delegations, and particularly by the Great Powers, during these negotiations. Earlier I quoted a statement made by our Foreign Minister in the Indian Parliament on 17 [27] March. I should like to continue that quotation. Mr. Chagla went on to say :

While welcoming a meeting of minds between the United States and the USSR, which in itself is a good augury, the Government of India hope that after the draft treaty on nuclear non-proliferation is presented to the ENDC it will be thoroughly discussed and that the treaty as finally agreed would take a shape and form acceptable to all countries which are represented on the Committee, and, subsequently, to the international community in general. A satisfactory agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will have to take into account the peculiar circumstances in which certain countries are placed.<sup>22</sup>

### Statement by the Swedish Representative (Myrdal) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 30, 1967<sup>1</sup>

2. It is with considerable hesitation that I take the floor today. More than three months of precious time has elapsed since our session began with many optimistic statements from all quarters that this would be *the* ENDC session of success. A formidable agenda was before us in the form of a number of resolutions adopted by large majorities of Member States at the United Nations General Assembly and clamouring for urgent action.

3. Now that half the time which is normally at the disposal of the Committee for its yearly session has passed there is regrettably very little progress, if any at all, to register. No draft text of a non-proliferation treaty, which was supposed to be our main working document, has been presented. Nor has any discussion even begun yet on the other important items mandated to the Conference by the General Assembly. Worse still, I think that while our work has lingered the political climate seems to have become less and not more favourable.

<sup>1</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 6-7.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 178.

<sup>3</sup> ENDC/PV. 300, pp. 4-15.

4. In these circumstances I feel compelled to add the voice of my delegation to the voices of those here who have already aired their disappointment and misgivings. The justification for this is that my Government, I believe like all others represented here, ardently desires progress with regard to nuclear disarmament and definitely favours a containment of the spread of nuclear weapons by an internationally binding treaty.

5. My delegation is so positively interested, indeed, that we could not conceal a certain disappointment about the long period of non-consultation within the Eighteen Nation Committee, which is after all the main negotiating body for disarmament. I refer to our statement at the last meeting before the recess.<sup>2</sup> We are all in this Committee, whether classified as aligned or as non-aligned States, the trust of the United Nations, with the task of finding solutions to disarmament issues which are beneficial to all and acceptable to all. So at this stage we should not be solipsistically confined to the national considerations which ultimately will decide whether our Governments adhere or not to specific treaty formulations.

We are here joined in a collective responsibility to find a constructive outline for a treaty which might be acceptable to all States. But now the non-aligned Members of this Committee run the extra risk that because they can only submit their amendments—which are of course legitimate—at a relatively advanced stage they might then be accused of delaying the negotiations.

6. There are three issues in particular on which some rather fundamental differences of approach remain and on which it will be necessary to express our views: the general question of assurances about tangible steps of nuclear disarmament to be coupled with or to follow a non-proliferation treaty; further, the specialized problems of so-called nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and of control measures—that is, international safeguards. A solution of these issues, and perhaps most crucially the issue of what control system to apply, could only be furthered by the give-and-take in an open debate, unfettered by positions locked in advance. As a contribution to such a debate I want today to devote some attention to the control issue, leaving the newer and very exciting subject of nuclear explosions for civilian uses to be examined at a subsequent meeting.

7. The question of control in connexion with non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of truly universal concern. During the recent recess this issue was apparently in the focus of intense discussions outside the framework of this Committee, and more particularly in one of the regional groupings. Fears were expressed in some quarters, public and private, that unbalanced control measures could cause severe drawbacks for non-nuclear-weapon States in the way of technological underdevelopment, industrial espionage and commercial discrimination.

8. I think it would be very useful if we in this Committee made a comprehensive review of the problems involved and disposed once and for all of the worries or reduced them to reasonable proportions. Let us then start by recognizing that the methods of controlling nu-

<sup>2</sup> ENDC/PV.296, p. 5.

clear activities must always be subject to two separate sets of considerations: one, their value for achieving the goal of facilitating disarmament; second, their obligation not to hurt unnecessarily interests of economic development and fair competition in commerce. "Not to hurt unnecessarily" is a key phrase in this latter connexion because if there should be intrinsic conflict between the two sets of interests I take it we would agree that disarmament should be given supremacy by all of us. But first we are in duty bound to study such control arrangements as might satisfy both criteria.

9. It should have become evident already from statements made in this Committee, and based on qualified expert advice, that the fears in relation to "spin-off" and "industrial espionage" have been exaggerated. Relying on our own experience, my delegation is convinced that research, development and production in reactor technology and similar fields would not have to be hampered by lack of the knowledge obtained through manufacture of nuclear weapons. Twenty years ago that may have been the case, but since then nuclear technology has been widely disseminated to and further developed by many non-nuclear-weapon States.

10. There remains, however—besides the use of nuclear explosives for civil engineering projects, about which I intend to speak at a forthcoming meeting—the demand that control measures should not hurt equal opportunities for trade or, to use the more negative expression, preserve or increase the risk of commercial discrimination. Some such risks exist in the world today. It must be the function of a non-proliferation treaty to eliminate them or at least reduce them—certainly not to aggravate them.

11. Long before any serious negotiations on non-proliferation started, the major countries exporting atomic fuel and equipment individually assumed the responsibility that their contribution to the internationalization of the peaceful atom should not at the same time lead to a promotion of the spread of nuclear weapons. Exclusively peaceful use has thus usually been made a condition for the sale of such products. A structure of agreements providing for bilateral, regional or international safeguards has indeed been built up over the years, and now covers such a large part of the plutonium production in non-nuclear-weapon countries that a considerable arms control effect has, in fact, been achieved. This control machinery has been established within the context of international trade and co-operation, without any plan for how it should be fitted into a disarmament measure such as a non-proliferation treaty.

12. Obviously, transition from this complicated network of rights and obligations to a straightforward control formula contained in a non-proliferation treaty will give rise to many problems on the bilateral and regional level. Such transition will necessarily take some time, and that is a consideration which ought to be incorporated in the treaty in some way and made applicable to all signatories, not only those of the European regional system of co-operation. A similar stipulation for arranging the transition is contained in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 75.

13. Many bilateral arrangements recently have been or are in the process of being replaced by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, thus providing in effect a certain amount of streamlining. This by the way refers to my country, as the Swedish Government has expressed itself in favour of placing all its present nuclear activities—those hitherto governed by bilateral safeguards agreements and those hitherto not covered—under IAEA control. The increasing use of IAEA safeguards is an important element when it comes to choosing the method of control, because it should be beyond discussion that the application of *one* system of safeguards to the activities of *all* countries would be the perfect solution. The interests of disarmament and, at the same time, fair and equal opportunities would thus be simultaneously protected.

14. When the control measures for a treaty on non-proliferation are to be prescribed one must bear in mind at least three very different situations which might entail rather stark imperfections—as some of them already do. This of course amounts to saying that we are confronted with at least three types of challenges to be surmounted. The most dangerous and intractable one is, of course, that of non-signatory States, where there is a latent risk that they might turn towards nuclear-weapon production and a probably more definite risk that they would profit in the commercial field by not being tied to common rules. A second category is that of nuclear-weapon States, which would, if not bound by the same obligations as others, evidently be free not to participate in the disarmament undertaking and also left to continue only voluntarily to apply safeguard rules to their exports. The third situation is met with in regard to closed regional systems such as the one operated within the European Economic Community, if controls should continue to consist of inspection by themselves of the peaceful nuclear activities within their countries and if the universal system of control obligations should not be specifically prescribed for their exports. Since each of these groups comprises the technologically and commercially strongest nations in regard to nuclear activities, the problems confronting us are of no small dimensions.

15. The emphasis has here been on control through a safeguard system. In addition, however, supplier nations in the nuclear field have applied a variety of policies in order to diminish the consequences of possible non-compliance with agreed obligations. Stipulations as to a first option for buying back surplus plutonium produced with fuel supplied, and further, requests for specifications of any project involved before a fuel delivery is approved, and reservations as to approval beforehand of any resale of fuel supplied and equipment to third countries are some examples of these policies.

16. It seems reasonable to assume that these policies will continue as part of the trade treaty structure even after a non-proliferation treaty has been signed. But after the conclusion of a treaty, with its general prohibition of the use of nuclear material for weapons production and its special control rules, the need for rigidity in applying rules of this other kind would decrease.

17. The question of safeguards should, of course, not be confused with this question of other restrictive policies by supplier nations. The fears of commercial discrimination under a non-proliferation

treaty expressed in the public debate seem to a large extent to have been connected with these policies rather than with the question of safeguards as such. On the other hand, it must be admitted that the present confused situation with regard to various safeguards systems may also be detrimental to trade in the nuclear field. In fact, commercial policy-makers now appear to be postponing further action in the hope that the Committee will provide a streamlined framework for international safeguards by using the agency set up *inter alia* for this purpose, the International Atomic Energy Agency.

18. When arriving at the stage where we should be formulating the principles on controls, the work must be governed by four criteria: effectiveness of coverage, credibility of safeguards, balance of obligations and commercial equity. I shall deal briefly with some alternatives of control formulae, trying to show how these criteria would work out in practice. I should have liked to do this in the tabular form or graphic form, but I have had to do it in words, although it is quite complicated. There is indeed a wide difference in value and hence in acceptability between the top and the bottom in such a list of formulae of decreasing ambition.

(1) The most effective and the most balanced solution would be a universal and obligatory submission to safeguards of all nuclear industry of all parties to a treaty and of all transfers of nuclear material, principal nuclear facilities and certain specialized equipment for all purposes from, to and between all parties.

19. The effectiveness of the measure where accepted is striking. It would mean a real cut-off, thus showing the interrelation existing between horizontal and vertical proliferation and also the inherent value of safeguards as a tool for disarmament. This formula would further assure equity in relation to industrial development and commercial opportunities. The only remaining inequity would be caused by the existence of non-signatories. However, they also would have to accept some control, unless they preferred completely to avoid imports from the treaty area.

(2) A second but weaker formula would be the compulsory submission to safeguards of all peaceful nuclear activities—I stress: only the peaceful activities—of all parties and of all transfers from, to and between all parties.

20. This formula of control would mean a complete stop to all horizontal proliferation, including additions from abroad to nuclear weapon Powers. Their weapon manufacture would be isolated from foreign supply and from any connexion with peaceful activities. The formula would, however, have no disarmament effect on the independent production of nuclear weapons among those countries which engage in such production. Balance would be achieved as far as the controls are concerned with the exception—which I have just mentioned—of military activities. The formula would assure complete commercial equity except in relation to transfers to non-signatories in cases of competition between a signatory and a non-signatory State. That would of course constitute a serious disadvantage.

(3) If in a third example the specific provision for safeguards on

all peaceful nuclear activities within the nuclear-weapon countries is dropped from this last formula, controls will still remain on all their activities relying on foreign supplies because all transfers will be controlled. The complete stop for all horizontal proliferation will, as in the previous alternative, remain unchanged. A not inconsiderable amount of imbalance would however be introduced, creating in addition to the imbalance in relation to disarmament also the possibility of discrimination in regard to commercial markets within the nuclear weapon States between domestic and foreign suppliers. In addition, the deficiencies in regard to non-signatories would remain as in earlier examples.

(4) I now come to possibility No. 4. At our meeting on 11 August 1966 my delegation proposed—as the earliest and easiest step on an agreed three-rung ladder towards a cut-off agreement—the application of safeguards initially simplified so as to cover, not all activities within countries, but all transfers for all purposes between all States.<sup>4</sup> We continue to regard that as an important and urgent measure, but would, it goes without saying, prefer those mentioned earlier. This later formula, of course, enters as an element in all of them. It is in a way a balanced measure, but is clearly somewhat deficient in effectiveness with regard to disarmament. It would leave only partly covered some States which are self-supporting both in uranium and in nuclear technology. That same effect on the nuclear weapon States was already accounted for in my formula No. 3. But it would strike at and stop all foreign supply for co-operation in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

21. Any limitation of this measure to transfers for peaceful activities only cannot be accepted, as it would provide an opportunity for unsound discrimination within the market of countries producing nuclear weapons. A nuclear-weapon country could then assign any project as a military one, thus avoiding controls on it.

(5) The current debate has also provided us with some completely unbalanced formulae—for instance the one whereby safeguards would be applied to all peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear weapon States only, and to all transfers to those States only. Such a formula is very unsatisfactory. It is unbalanced in all respects. From a commercial point of view it does not even fit the actual situation in the world, where many important suppliers request safeguards also on exports to nuclear weapon States. Whether safeguards on such transfers are stipulated in a treaty or not, suppliers who want to avoid any military utilization of their products would of course be free to continue, voluntarily and unilaterally, to request safeguards on those transfers, or use other prohibitory policies including safeguards on the sale of natural uranium to States producing nuclear weapons. But that policy will probably put them in an awkward position of commercial discrimination, making precisely those States which are the most ambitious in terms of disarmament also the most discriminated against commercially.

(6) Finally, we must complete the list of alternatives by mentioning the zero formula: no safeguards clause at all. If recourse were had

<sup>4</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 547-554.

to that solution as the outcome of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on a non-proliferation treaty the credibility of adherence to the treaty would be severely damaged. In addition, such a treaty would then inherit the present complicated structure of control systems with all the risks for commercial compromise and discrimination at the expense of disarmament interests and with inequities between countries which would become more glaring as technological and industrial development proceeds in the nuclear field. We hope that such will not be the outcome of our endeavours.

22. Thus reviewing the existing situation and the various possibilities to satisfy the demands, first of disarmament, but also of equity and balance between nations in regard to prospects of development in the nuclear energy field, we can only come to the conclusion that a very strong code of ethics, applicable to all States, has to be built into the control clause of a non-proliferation treaty. Such a reliable and durable system of control has to be implemented through one single safeguard system, universally accepted and universally applicable, as is that of the International Atomic Energy Agency. I have, however, already argued for some leeway in regard to time-limited transitional arrangements. But the sooner the International Atomic Energy Agency is given the over-all responsibility for verification the better—both for the sake of equity and, first and foremost, for the sake of credibility of non-proliferation pledges.

23. May I, in a second and final section, touch on the major policy question which has so prominently preoccupied participants in the international debate on non-proliferation, namely the insistence that assurance be given by the nuclear-weapon Powers that a treaty for this purpose should be "coupled with or followed by related measures for nuclear disarmament".<sup>5</sup> I have sought not to lengthen my statement today by inserting quotations, but I cannot refrain from repeating the warnings uttered by Lord Chalfont and General Burns at our last meeting.

24. In his farewell address Lord Chalfont said :

... the principle must be accepted and clearly understood that if a non-proliferation treaty is not followed by serious attempts amongst the nuclear Powers to dismantle some of their own vast nuclear armory, then the treaty will not last, however precise its language may be. There is in my mind no doubt that if the non-nuclear Powers are to be asked to sign a binding non-proliferation treaty it must contain the necessary provisions and machinery to ensure that the nuclear Powers too take their proper share of the balance of obligations.<sup>6</sup>

25. Just as lucidly the representative of Canada said :

There is one prediction about this treaty which, in the Canadian view, can be made with assurance; it is that if there is no progress towards real disarmament an agreement on non-proliferation will not endure for more than relatively few years. This, we believe, is the reality of the situation . . . .<sup>7</sup>

26. The non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament have throughout the discussion on non-proliferation

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 424-425.

<sup>6</sup> ENDC/PV.208, pp. 7-8.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

formulated this as a demand that a treaty must contain an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear-weapon countries and the non-nuclear-weapon countries. That this opinion is shared by the wide majority of States has been amply demonstrated during the debates over the last years at the United Nations General Assembly. Its most pregnant form is found of course in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), quoted so often by us all in this Committee.<sup>5</sup>

27. When there is repeated reference to that insistence on balanced obligations, it certainly does not stem from any desire to cause unnecessary difficulties in the already complicated negotiations on the non-proliferation issue. On the contrary, it is intended to try to make it clear that any draft treaty text that would not reflect this prospect for effective nuclear disarmament could hardly fulfil its purpose, namely, to induce all the non-nuclear-weapon States of importance in this connexion to come forward and accept their share of the obligations. What the world needs are trustworthy signals of a definitive change of direction, a turn downwards of the whole nuclear race. When I insist on such signs I am not defending any interest of any country in having nuclear weapons. But I am, I frankly admit, engaging in a campaign for nuclear disarmament for the sake of the world.

28. The delegation of Sweden has for long maintained that that general aim, as well as a guarantee for the effectiveness of the immediate treaty on non-proliferation, could best be obtained through simultaneous discussions intended for planning, in a coherent way, decisions on the items most closely related.

29. With your forbearance, Mr. Chairman, I shall emphasize once again the logical interdependence of the three elements which we have chosen to include in a "package", realizing of course that other items might be substituted: (1) Besides the non-proliferation treaty—which is intended to achieve a blocking of what has now come to be labelled horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons to the present non-nuclear-weapon countries—there is an urgent need for (2) a treaty banning underground nuclear tests. That is intended to hamper the race between nuclear-weapon Powers to increase the quality and refinement of their nuclear arms. (3) There is also a need for a cut-off agreement, implying the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes in all States, a measure directed against vertical proliferation as it would effectively prevent the nuclear-weapon Powers from increasing in the quantitative sense their present nuclear arms stocks. Both those latter agreements would also act as effective checks to proliferation by manufacture in presently non-nuclear-weapon States. Thus they tighten and reinforce each other.

30. We, the delegation of Sweden, have to recognize with regret, however, that at the present juncture the more or less simultaneous acceptance of this "package" is not immediately attainable. But what we must uphold is the demand that we should not—within the framework of the agreement which is now foremost in our minds, the non-proliferation treaty—cease to press for recognition of the necessity for

<sup>5</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 532-534.

rapid progress towards effective freezing and reversal of the present situation in the nuclear armament field.

31. That recognition might in the context of a non-proliferation treaty be obtained through various means. One method might be the one which has already been presented by other representatives of the non-aligned delegations, notably by the representative of the United Arab Republic in his eloquent address to the Committee on 16 March.<sup>9</sup> This would consist of a formal link to be established between on the one hand, the obligations in the treaty of the non-nuclear-weapon countries not to acquire or produce nuclear weapons, and, on the other hand, an obligation by the nuclear-weapon countries to commit themselves to genuine disarmament measures in the nuclear weapon field. Mr. Khallaf, in the statement I have just referred to, said that that responsibility of the nuclear Powers should be embodied not in the preamble to the treaty but in a separate article, so as to endow it with full legal effect and an incontestably compelling character.

32. Without taking a final stand on this question before we have seen any treaty text, I must intimate that just to insert in a preamble some vague reference to an intention to proceed with further disarmament steps can hardly be enough in the eyes of the non-nuclear-weapon States. Nearly four years ago the preamble of the Moscow Treaty said that the nuclear weapon States as "Original Parties" were "Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end . . ."<sup>10</sup> But instead of signs of any advanced preparation for a comprehensive test-ban we find underground tests proceeding in a relentless crescendo in regard both to tempo and to yield. What was meant to be a temporary exemption from prohibitory rules seems instead to have been interpreted as a legitimization of underground testing.

33. As I said, without pronouncing myself on the formalities by which non-proliferation should be bound up with the pledge to proceed to real disarmament in the nuclear field, I want to explain that our worries are most concerned with the realities of the world today. The actual trends give no reassuring signs. The psychological climate would become different if the non-nuclear-weapon majority of States were given to understand, for example, real preparations were under way to dismantle test laboratories, that planning for an underground test ban was proceeding among experts, or that opinion-building was under way in public and parliamentary circles. A similar increase in confidence would be gained, for instance, if we were informed that an agreement between the super-Powers to halt the anti-ballistic-missile race was nearing completion.

34. To conclude: any offer to forgo a nuclear option on the part of the nuclear-weapon States would serve as a reassurance to the have-nots that this first treaty would be effective and viable, and that it would truly initiate the process of nuclear disarmament. There is a deep worry and anxiety prevailing in the world today. Perhaps it already amounts to a lack of confidence in promises about disarmament. So many more

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, pp. 154-160.

<sup>10</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, p. 291.

signs point in the opposite direction—towards continued escalation everywhere, and not least in the nuclear armaments race. How shall we be able to muster the optimism needed.

### Statement by the Swedish Representative (Myrdal) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, June 6, 1967<sup>1</sup>

1. I declare open the 302nd plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. I have on my list of speakers for this morning the names of the representatives of Sweden and Poland, and in order to follow that order I shall speak first as representative of Sweden.

2. Today I want to make some comments on an issue which has lately become quite topical. I refer to the issue of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. In the two existing, but now quite old, drafts of a non-proliferation treaty<sup>2</sup> no reference was made to this subject. Recently, however, the introduction into the debate of this new element—evidently with the intention of prohibiting, through the non-proliferation treaty, the manufacture or procurement in other ways by non-nuclear-weapon States of any nuclear explosive devices, for whatever purpose—has caused some apprehension and even called forth some opposition. It would be highly desirable if, through an open debate in this Committee, we could disperse such fears and agree on a solution satisfactory to all parties.

3. I wish to take as my point of departure the indisputable fact that any nuclear explosive device might be used as a nuclear weapon. The technology is identical and the material structure of the device is very similar. The only difference of importance becomes manifest in regard to where and how the charge would be applied. The technology is the same whether nuclear energy is harnessed, as Lord Chalfont put it at the meeting of 23 February, for moving a million tons of earth to dig a canal or create an oil deposit, or for pulverizing a city of a million people.<sup>3</sup>

4. There could be no two views on the necessity for submitting such a dangerous object to international regulation. Mankind could not feel safe if it were left to the discretionary power of a growing number of nations to decide whether they should or should not cross the hair's breadth that divides peaceful and military uses of such objects.

5. Now my analysis turns away from those gloomy aspects to an evaluation of the positive aspects of the use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. Even if today we have an incomplete knowledge of the economic value of using nuclear explosives for various engineering undertakings, this lack of knowledge will certainly not be permanent. When contemplating international agreements it is in the

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.302, pp. 4-8.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 347-349, 443-446; *ibid.*, 1966, pp. 159-160.

<sup>3</sup> ENDC/PV.288, p. 7.

nature of things to prepare for the future, because if we wait until the future, which is uncertain today, becomes the present, it will most probably be too late to regulate the situation. This is, alas, an experience often repeated in the history of disarmament efforts.

6. Viewing the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions as one of economic and political realities, my delegation has been struck by the strength of the arguments brought forward on behalf of the countries which, for historical reasons, have remained economically less developed. We must in all fairness admit that if operations of the kind envisaged became economically advantageous and at the same time devoid of health hazards they might serve to release enormous new resources. Though it might be playing with fire, we must strive to find acceptable regulations for such undertakings which would be both safe and equitable.

7. We then face a dilemma: how to design the rules so as to prohibit the manufacture but permit the use of nuclear explosives. But—and this is intended to be my contribution to a fair and reliable compromise—this very distinction between regulations governing manufacture and regulations governing use may be helping us out of the dilemma.

8. When some of our colleagues, and particularly the distinguished representatives of Brazil<sup>4</sup> and India,<sup>5</sup> have examined these problems they have rendered a great service to us all. Their arguments, eloquently and forcefully presented, have hinged on the value of being allowed to use such devices of potential benefit and, more specifically, of being able to benefit from their use in a non-discriminatory manner. As far as I can see nobody has argued for the necessity *per se* of independent manufacture of them. If assurances of these rights of equitable use—I repeat, rights of equitable use—could be given and codified, a prohibition in a non-proliferation treaty, or for that matter in a cut-off treaty, which said, in these or similar words, that “to manufacture nuclear devices which might be used as nuclear weapons” was forbidden ought to be acceptable to all. It would seem to be quite sufficient that the ban in this way implicitly covers all manufacture.

9. We might then proceed to examine how the equitable access to “use” of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes may be assured to the whole international community. At this juncture we find a very valuable point of departure in the statements made in this Committee recently by the representatives of the United States<sup>6</sup> and the Soviet Union<sup>7</sup> suggesting solutions to this problem. Both Mr. Foster and Mr. Roshchin indicated certain procedural arrangements to this effect.

10. Mr. Foster outlined in certain detail an international regulation for having nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes made available by the nuclear Powers to non-nuclear-weapon States on economically advantageous terms. Safety precautions, studies of the feasibility of requested projects and questions of priority would be handled

<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, pp. 135-143.

<sup>5</sup> See *ante*, pp. 220-230.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, pp. 172-174.

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, pp. 220-221.

by an international body. In this context, we should like to put forward the additional idea that nuclear devices might be committed to a formal "pool" for allocation, by this body, to interested customers. Such an arrangement should help solve the problem of equity, to which I shall return in a while.

11. Mr. Roshchin did not amplify his suggestions to the same degree as Mr. Foster amplified his, but he clearly held out the comparable promise that

... an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons cannot and should not prevent non-nuclear countries from using nuclear energy for the purposes of peaceful economic development. In this connexion we bear in mind that the question of the procedure and conditions governing the carrying out of nuclear explosions is a particular question which can be settled only on the basis of a separate international agreement.<sup>9</sup>

12. Many might say, however, that there is still a deficiency in this approach. It can be argued that it would unbalance the future in favour of the rich and mighty nations—a category in which the nuclear-weapon Powers anyway are already.

13. When the issue of peaceful nuclear explosives has become a politically heated one it has been, of course, on account of the news stories telling us that an economic breakthrough in this field might be approaching. If I take some quotations from United States sources only, this is a consequence of the openness of the discussions in that country; it is only to be expected that similar preparations are under way in other nuclear-weapon countries.

14. According to these news stories the development in the United States under what is known as project Plowshare, in which huge sums have already been invested, is "beginning to attract some serious American business interests." I will not enumerate all the different projects under study. I will choose only one example of special interest due to the numerous references recently made to new methods for extracting oil, a commodity of such great interest to the world market. One of the popular United States weeklies mentions, as it were in passing, that:

A different process for extracting oil from shale is being studied by the Colorado School of Mines with backing from six oil companies. And 25 firms, including the Oil Shale Corporation, are working on a plan to use a deep atomic blast to melt the shale and permit the oil to be pumped from conventional wells.

15. This and many similar news items obviously function as eye-openers, particularly to countries as yet tragically underprivileged economically but with oil or mineral resources that might possibly be tapped. This is why we must, by way of an international regulation, seek a solution which is both economically interesting for these countries and politically balanced and equitable. At the same time such a solution must of course serve as a guarantee against the proliferation of nuclear arms.

16. How should this be achieved? May I offer the following suggestions for constructive thinking? The first is that we seriously consider the advisability of taking the heat out of this issue in connexion with the non-proliferation treaty by simultaneously assuring its place in

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, p. 147.

another set of agreements. Of course, the manufacture of explosive devices would be covered by a non-proliferation treaty. But for the wider purpose, the use of such devices, we must do two things: (a) find a formula for prohibiting nuclear explosions in the context where we think it rightly belongs, in a comprehensive test-ban, and (b) work out a separate agreement for allowing exemptions from this ban for peaceful explosions under specific rules as to international management and control.

17. We think this is a better method than trying to dispose of the whole matter in connexion with the non-proliferation treaty. A general prohibition of nuclear explosions, whether for testing or engineering purposes, would be an effective means of arms control. All nuclear explosions, except those undertaken as war measures, would thus come under international regulations. There would be a complete balance and equity if such explosions in all countries were prohibited—as some very important ones already are by the Moscow Treaty.<sup>9</sup>

18. Another reason for treating the explosions outside the non-proliferation issue is that the controls needed for surveillance of them are not of the same kind as those needed for the purpose of ensuring non-production.

19. The main argument is, however, the one with regard to establishing a balanced disarmament system and equitable economic possibilities. This would be achieved by obtaining simultaneously the agreement on separate arrangements for international licensing of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, and a comprehensive test-ban treaty debarring all parties from undertaking any nuclear explosions without proper licensing.

20. The right of decision to allow explosions for peaceful purposes should be granted to an international organ. This would assure the equitable use of such explosions. Perhaps the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) might be given this right, as suggested by Mr. Foster in the statement I have already cited.<sup>10</sup> Out of concern for the disarmament effect, i.e. to avoid any risk of proliferation of nuclear arms, the stocks of explosives will have to remain with the nuclear-weapon Powers. But for economic reasons, as well as for health reasons, no private or national discretionary power should be allowed to give the final permission for the employment of explosives. Thus, their use by the nuclear-weapon Powers also should be the object of a licensing procedure. This is the ideal situation that I would like us to strive for.

21. Such a permissive separate agreement must be coupled with a prohibitory general one, as I have said. The place to achieve this is, in our opinion, in a treaty banning underground explosions. Now the prospective usefulness of such explosions for civilian purposes will come to constitute a pressure on all of us, and not least the nuclear weapon States, to proceed without further delay towards the conclusion of an underground-test-ban agreement.

22. Such a treaty would take the form of a general undertaking to prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out any underground nuclear

<sup>9</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963* pp. 291-293.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 171.

weapon test explosion, or, subject to a specially listed exemption, any other underground nuclear explosion. The special exemption should refer to the criteria under which peaceful explosions would be permissible and would ensure full international control.

23. What is here pictured in terms of bans, prohibitions, licensing, etc. is in reality a great challenge to creative international co-operation. It is an attempt to help reconcile disarmament interests with economic development interests, and, in a world where the young generation is not ridiculing science fiction but on the contrary very seriously talking in terms of "*des futuribles*," we should be farsighted enough to grasp this magnificent opportunity. In all sincerity, I believe we have no right to place unnecessary obstacles on the way to a richer future. But time is of the essence.

#### Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, June 8, 1967<sup>1</sup>

2. Today I wish to speak about a problem which must be resolved if a non-proliferation treaty is to be effective as a genuine instrument of non-proliferation. The problem referred to concerns the use of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful projects.

3. In view of the statements which have been made in our Committee, it did not seem possible for us to remain silent on this issue any longer. We refer specifically to the statement of Ambassador da Costa, the representative of Brazil, at our meeting of 18 May<sup>2</sup> and the statement of Ambassador Trivedi, the representative of India, at our meeting of 23 May.<sup>3</sup> Those statements contain some sentiments with which my Government is in complete sympathy. They also contain many ideas which we are convinced are unrealistic.

4. Unfortunately, we have not yet had time to analyse fully the important statement of Mrs. Myrdal at our meeting of 6 June. Clearly it was a statement warranting careful study by all of us because of its wealth of important suggestions aimed at constructive solution to our problems. I will therefore wish to return to it at a later meeting. In the meantime, I should like to express as an initial comment our agreement with two basic elements of Mrs. Myrdal's presentation. First, we were reassured to hear explicit recognition of the "indisputable fact that any nuclear explosive device might be used as a nuclear weapon,"<sup>4</sup> and the resulting necessity of prohibiting manufacture of such devices in a non-proliferation treaty. Second, we share completely the Swedish delegation's desire to concentrate on the positive and creative aspects of the problem: the challenge of creating international procedures so that—and here I use Mrs. Myrdal's words—"the equitable access to the 'use' of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes may be assured

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.303, pp. 4-11.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 225-227.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 220-230.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 248.

to the whole international community."<sup>5</sup> The statement of our colleague from Sweden represents for us a significant contribution to our work in meeting this challenge and we will therefore study it, and return to it, with this objective in mind.

5. The position of the United States in regard to nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes is dictated—let me repeat, dictated—by what Mrs. Myrdal referred to as "an indisputable fact." This is that a nuclear explosive device capable of moving vast quantities of earth in an uninhabited area is also a nuclear explosive capable of destroying a city and its inhabitants. No amount of argumentation can obscure this fact or its implications.

6. In his statement at our meeting of 23 May Mr. Trivedi said:

The Indian delegation does not deny that the technology involved in the production of a nuclear weapon is the same as the technology which produces a peaceful explosive device, although a weapon has many characteristics which are not present in a peaceful device.<sup>6</sup>

7. We welcome the recognition that the technology involved in the production of a nuclear weapon is the same as the technology which produces a peaceful device. However, we believe it misleading to assert that a weapon has many characteristics which are not present in a peaceful device. The relevant question is not whether a peaceful nuclear explosive device has a set of characteristics completely identical with those of a nuclear weapon. Obviously, every single characteristic of a peaceful nuclear device may not be the same as every one of a weapon. For one thing, as we have stated earlier, a nuclear explosive device for peaceful purposes may be a more sophisticated device than many nuclear weapons, because in order to be practical for some applications it must be relatively free of radioactive debris. This means that a nation producing nuclear explosives suitable for civil engineering projects will have to acquire technology even more sophisticated than that required to produce usable nuclear weapons. The implications of this should be clear to all who are anxious to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

8. But all nuclear weapons have one characteristic in common. This is the characteristic that upon activation of a prearranged trigger mechanism they can release large quantities of energy in a very short period of time from sources of relatively small volume and light weight. They are enormously concentrated sources of explosive energy. This is precisely the relevant characteristic of a nuclear explosive device for peaceful purposes, and it is this characteristic which makes peaceful nuclear explosive devices readily adaptable for use as weapons. Appropriately packaged and fused, they could be employed as weapons in a large variety of modes. For example, a nuclear explosive device for peaceful purposes could be dropped by many types of military and commercial aircraft, and fused in a manner so as to explode on or above a target. In addition, any nuclear explosive useful for peaceful application could be transported by other means to a target area and used as a military demolition munition.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, p. 249.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, p. 234.

9. So we must return to that one indisputable fact. A nuclear explosive device for peaceful purposes could be used as a nuclear weapon. Both have one significant, relevant characteristic so far as a non-proliferation treaty is concerned. Both can be used to threaten, to attack, to destroy.

10. I wish to refer again to Mr. Trivedi's speech. He stated that aeronautics, electronics, even steel fabrication are technologies which can be used for weapons as well as economic development. He then concluded, "That does not mean, therefore, that only the poor and developing nations should be denied all technology for fear they may use it for military purposes."<sup>7</sup> No one is proposing that the developing nations should be denied all technologies. No one is proposing that the developing nations should be denied even some technologies. We are proposing that the non-nuclear-weapon nations deny themselves one technology, without denying themselves the benefits of that technology. That one technology is the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices—which, whatever their original purpose, can be used for war. Certainly, no one here really believes that this technology of nuclear explosives is to be equated with that of aeronautics, electronics, and steel fabrication.

11. The United States has made a proposal, supported by many countries at this Conference, for dealing with nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes in a manner designed to achieve an effective non-proliferation treaty.<sup>8</sup> We have joined to that proposal suggestions for ensuring that when there are benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions they can be shared on a non-discriminatory basis by all.<sup>9</sup> These, surely, are not proposals which raise the spectre of denying the developing countries all technology for fear they may use it for military purposes.

12. If I may speak for a moment on a personal basis, I should like to express to the Committee my own dislike of the inference that we seek to exploit a non-proliferation treaty to restrict the flow of peaceful technology. Having been a representative of the United States involved in the administration of international economic co-operation, I have spent many years working on projects in which the United States has contributed, in every possible way, financial or other resources which other countries in less favourable circumstances have needed for mutual assistance. As early as 1954, several of us through a private foundation and with the full co-operation of the United States Atomic Energy Commission initiated the dissemination to many countries of a substantial amount of information on nuclear physics with particular reference to research reactors and isotopes for medical purposes.

13. The record of the United States with regard to international nuclear co-operation is, I believe, unparalleled in international relations. Need I remind anyone that through the Atoms for Peace Programme the United States Government has made available to all nations vast quantities of valuable and vital technological information. For example, the United States, as well as some other advanced civil

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, p. 234.

<sup>8</sup> See *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 525-528.

<sup>9</sup> See *ante*, pp. 172-174.

nuclear Powers, have made available materials and technology for the building of nuclear reactors. The fact that these reactors produce plutonium that can be used in weapons has not prevented us from supplying these materials and technology under adequate safeguards. Nuclear reactor technology has been encouraged among all States, and not denied to any that are willing to accept adequate safeguards. Thus, the benefits of this new and vital technology can be realized by those States through their own efforts as well as through assistance from those countries with longer experience in nuclear affairs.

14. The non-proliferation treaty will not impede peaceful uses of atomic energy by the developing countries. In fact it should further stimulate the full development of the peaceful uses of the atom. That point was fully explained by you, Mr. Chairman, at our meeting on 18 May, and I should therefore like to quote from your statement:

Our point of view in that regard is that the solution of the non-proliferation problem is one of the most important conditions that would ensure for the non-nuclear countries the most rapid and successful development of their peaceful atomic industry.

Renunciation by the non-nuclear countries of military ways of using atomic energy would enable them to concentrate all their scientific, technical and material resources on the peaceful utilization of the achievements of nuclear physics, which would undoubtedly widen their potentialities in that field. Indeed, it is well known what huge efforts and material resources are required for the development of nuclear weapons. The great material expenditure and the diversion of the efforts and energy of scientists from peaceful to military problems would all hinder the peaceful development of atomic energy.<sup>10</sup>

The United States is in full agreement with that statement.

15. At the outset of my remarks I said that there was much with which my Government could sympathize in the speeches of Mr. da Costa and Mr. Trivedi. What we sympathize with is the desire, not only expressed in those two statements but shared by many other countries around the world, to utilize the most modern technology for the benefit of their peoples. Because of our full sympathy with such aspirations the position of the United States has been that when benefits from peaceful nuclear explosive devices can be realized then they should be shared on a non-discriminatory basis. In order to move forward with the consideration of how non-nuclear countries can be assured of receiving benefits without fear of their being granted or withheld for extraneous reasons, I elaborated at our meeting of 21 March the thinking of the United States on five principles to guide our work.<sup>11</sup> I should like at this time to stress that the procedures for international co-operation in accomplishing peaceful nuclear explosive projects should be developed in full consultation with the non-nuclear-weapon States. We have not had to be prodded in order to initiate discussion of these procedures. For our part, we welcome exploration and comment by others. Finally, we would envisage, as suggested by Mr. Roshchin at our meeting of 18 May, that the conditions for carrying out nuclear explosions could be resolved through separate international agreement.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup> *Ante*, pp. 219-220.

<sup>11</sup> *Ante*, pp. 172-174.

<sup>12</sup> *Ante*, p. 221.

16. The type of international procedures we have in mind would permit countries to perform their own engineering work, utilizing nuclear explosives detonated under the control of a nuclear weapon State. We were disappointed therefore to hear Mr. da Costa state, also on 18 May, that Brazil will not waive the right to conduct research without limitation and eventually to manufacture or receive nuclear explosives that will enable Brazil to perform great engineering works.<sup>17</sup> Under the international procedures which the United States is committed to seek, Brazil would not find it necessary to manufacture or receive—that is, to possess—nuclear explosives to be able to perform great engineering works.

17. Since this is a most important point, I should like to elaborate further on it. There has been some concern that the prohibition of the acquisition of peaceful nuclear explosives would render the non-nuclear-weapon States dependent upon a monopoly exercised by the nuclear-weapon States in carrying out nuclear explosive projects. Such concern is without foundation. Under the provisions which the United States contemplates, nuclear-weapon States would merely provide nuclear explosive services, and the country in which the project was conducted would be responsible for the remainder of the project, if that was its choice. In essence, this would not be different from a situation in which conventional explosives or other equipment are purchased abroad. The main difference is that the Government, not a commercial concern, would be supplying the nuclear explosive and would maintain custody and control of the explosive until detonation.

18. Information on the technology of applying peaceful nuclear explosives is unclassified. Such information is readily available to any nation. Accordingly, there is nothing to prevent governments of non-nuclear-weapon countries, or companies in those countries, from developing the same engineering capabilities which will be available to the United States or to United States companies. Permit me to stress this point: a non-proliferation treaty which prohibits the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosives would not restrict the dissemination of application technology in any fashion. Accordingly, we must vigorously reject the implication suggested in this Committee that somehow what we have in mind might be the establishment of "an atomic super-commercial monopoly."

19. What is important is that all may be assured of having full and equal availability of peaceful nuclear explosive services when they are needed for peaceful projects. It is not beyond our ingenuity and our good will to design and bring into force international procedures in which all may have confidence and which will ensure the complete and fair sharing of those services. It is not necessary, desirable or economical for all nations to be self-sufficient in the development and ownership of nuclear explosives as long as the services are readily available for application by all countries.

20. I should like next to dwell for a moment on a phrase which has often been used in our statements about the provision of peaceful nuclear explosive services. We have often said that these will be available "if and when" projects become technologically feasible. It is possible

<sup>17</sup> *Ante*, p. 227.

that peaceful nuclear explosives will, some time, some day, contribute greatly to man's welfare. But we cannot be certain of that now. In fact, the United States programme is still in an "if and when" status, as we stated in this Committee on 9 August 1966<sup>14</sup> and 21 March 1967.<sup>15</sup> It is a fact that the United States has not yet demonstrated that the technology for any—I repeat, any—specific peaceful application of nuclear explosions is technically and economically feasible. Some private companies in the United States and elsewhere and some foreign governments have evaluated certain applications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and have made assessments that the technology, if successfully developed, would have economic potential in certain applications. Whether those evaluations will be confirmed requires further development, such as additional experiments with nuclear explosives.

21. Like all great projects, our work for the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty must involve choices. Initially, the States here involved in these negotiations will have to choose whether they wish to formulate and support a non-proliferation treaty which will be an effective treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.

22. There can be many factors which validly enter into this choice. Each State making its decision will have to decide for itself whether its security interests are better served by choosing to support such a treaty or by not accepting it. No State can possibly make such a choice for any other State. We recognize this. But every State can rest assured that its choice will be viewed by other States as one which has been made with ample opportunity to become cognizant of the realities of what constitutes the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The proliferation of nuclear weapons includes the proliferation of nuclear explosive devices. From the point of view of the United States, should a State decide that it does not wish to accept a treaty which prohibits the spread of nuclear explosive devices we will have to conclude that it does not wish to accept a treaty which prevents the spread of nuclear weapons.

23. As I said earlier, facts can have inevitable and unalterable consequences; and that is also true of choices. For those States which determine that they want to support a non-proliferation treaty which prevents proliferation, a choice will have been made not only to stop nuclear proliferation but to participate in the expanding international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities. Those activities will be facilitated, not impeded, by the conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty.

24. Participating States will have made the choice of accepting the offer to share in the potential benefits of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. They will be sharing, at minimal cost to them, in the progress which has been feasible because of the investment of billions of dollars expended on nuclear weapons development over a twenty-year period. Participating States will be choosing to make possible for their peoples the potential economic gains which they could not realistically have hoped to achieve on their own, unless they had in-

<sup>14</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, p. 520.

<sup>15</sup> *Ante.* p. 173.

vested the immense human and financial resources to develop and manufacture advanced thermonuclear weapons.

25. There can thus be no economic justification for the independent development of nuclear explosive devices by non-nuclear weapon countries for their potential domestic applications. The cost at which the United States will be able to provide nuclear explosive services will be much lower for the non-nuclear-weapon States than the cost if those countries were to develop their own nuclear devices solely for peaceful purposes. Specifically, as I made clear at our meeting of 21 March, costs would be kept as low as possible and they would not, for example, include the cost expended over the years for research and development.<sup>16</sup>

26. We do need to negotiate and formulate a treaty which prevents proliferation. We also need to explore further the means of assuring to all that peaceful nuclear explosives will be available on a non-discriminatory basis, and at as low a cost as possible, when those devices can be used for practical projects. I feel confident, on the basis of Mr. Roshchin's statement at our 297th meeting,<sup>17</sup> that the Government of the Soviet Union shares these views.

27. We cannot close our eyes and pretend that facts which exist do not exist. The United States cannot accept argumentation that flies in the face of fact. But despite everything that has been said, I cannot help but hope that facts will be recognized. I cannot help but hope that all will finally agree that the proposals which we have suggested for sharing the benefits from peaceful nuclear explosives can and will redound to the advantage of all participating States.

### Statement by the Indian Representative (Trivedi) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, June 8, 1967<sup>1</sup>

28. We are indeed gratified at the very weighty and well-considered statement made this morning by the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster.<sup>2</sup> As he so rightly pointed out, we must all recognize facts. I should have thought, most humbly, that when the Secretary-General of the Brazilian Foreign Office and I spoke here in the Committee we mentioned facts. What we do not like is wrong conclusions drawn from facts, the fallacious reasoning arising from facts.

29. The Indian delegation is in complete agreement with what Mr. Foster said towards the end of his statement—which we shall study with great care and to which we will revert, if necessary, at a later stage. I refer to his remarks regarding the urgent necessity for a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is no doubt on that score in the mind of anybody, at least around this table. That is what we were saying long before many of the recent converts to non-prolif-

<sup>16</sup> *Ante*, p. 174.

<sup>17</sup> *Ante*, pp. 217-223.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV. 303, pp. 11-14.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

eration began shouting about it. All that we have said is that the treaty should be a real one, a treaty which solves the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons.

30. The Indian delegation agrees with Mr. Foster also that what we should avoid is proliferation of nuclear weapon devices. I shall develop that point a little later, but we agree entirely with that. As I have just said, we have not Mr. Foster's statement before us at the moment, and we shall deal with it later if necessary, but I thought I would make one or two comments on some of the points he made.

31. I think it is wrong to say that no nation can develop peaceful nuclear explosive devices unless it develops very sophisticated technology for thermonuclear devices. As I have said, there are many uses of peaceful explosions. There are uses of peaceful explosives underground for extracting oil from deep deposits, for which purpose certainly conventional methods are not at present available. These technologies will, we hope, soon be feasible through nuclear energy. We do not say, for example, that a developing nation should not develop steel technology unless it has the full sophistication, the entire gamut of steel technology. We in India started our own steel industry somewhere about 1914. We still have not some of the sophisticated technology for steel. That does not mean that we should not have developed our steel technology in 1914 or that we should not develop it today. And fission devices are important. In fact, underground fission devices today are to some extent, particularly for many countries, better because they avoid many problems of radioactivity.

32. Mr. Foster said, I was very happy to note, that in the proposition that is being put forward it is not the intention to deny to the developing and poor nations all technology for fear they may use it for military purposes. He added that all the nuclear-weapon Powers want to do is to deny them technology for manufacturing nuclear devices for fear they may use them for military purposes. We all hope that we shall soon have an adequate and equitable treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. After that, we shall no doubt discuss the question of conventional arms, and I presume the super-Powers will say that the developing nations should be denied the technology of steel for conventional weapons. Of course they can proliferate them. Just as they want to proliferate nuclear weapons, they can by analogy proliferate conventional weapons as well.

33. It is a question of what a country would like to do in its economic interests. In this country, Switzerland, for example, which is a very developed country, they do not manufacture motor-cars. It is their sovereign decision. They do not think it is desirable to manufacture motor-cars; they would much rather import them. That does not mean that Switzerland would like to sign away the right to manufacture motor-cars if it is considered economically desirable for Switzerland. Well, we would much rather import peaceful nuclear devices. But that would be our own decision and not because of any prohibition.

34. As I said earlier, we agree entirely that we should avoid proliferation of nuclear weapons, both vertical and horizontal. We should avoid the possible, problematic proliferation to new countries, and the

existing, the real proliferation among the nuclear-weapon Powers. We should avoid both. And, as I have said, we also agree that we should avoid proliferation of nuclear-weapon devices. We have never maintained—I cannot speak for others, although I know that Brazil does not maintain—that there should be proliferation of nuclear weapon devices. We, in fact, have suggested complete regulation, complete control over the process, which is not at the moment something which the nuclear-weapon Powers want for their own nuclear weapons. We do not want any proliferation. We want to regulate. We do not want a stockpiling of nuclear devices. We want peaceful nuclear devices controlled, regulated—before manufacture, during manufacture and after manufacture. Their use should be controlled and a proper system should be devised which would ensure that a particular peaceful nuclear explosive device is used for peaceful explosive purposes.

35. That is where the difference lies. I am reminded of an apocryphal story. During the last war, when the United States was launching one ship a day, the launching was costing a lot of bottles of champagne—one bottle of champagne for each launching. Of course when we launch our ships we do it with coconuts. That proves the point. We have for many years had the technology not only for nuclear explosive devices but for nuclear weapons, but we have not used it for weapons. Anyway, to continue the story, this particular practice was not liked by the Women's Temperance League in the United States. They thought it immoral that so much champagne, alcohol, should be used in that way, and so they went in a deputation to President Roosevelt and said, "Mr. President, you are very sinful; all this champagne, all this alcohol, is very sinful." The President, with a twinkle in his eye, said, "Madam, you are mistaken. Do you know that when we launch a ship with a bottle of champagne that ship takes to water for the rest of her life?" That is exactly what we are saying about nuclear explosive devices. They are manufactured only for destruction and not for stockpiling.

36. We also want the weapons to be destroyed—something we have not yet been able to achieve as far as the nuclear-weapon Powers are concerned. We are not prodding anyone else; we want this to happen. When we talk about nuclear explosive devices, we want them for peaceful purposes, we want them fully regulated before, during and after manufacture. All that we say is, let them be regulated, let them be internationally controlled, let it be seen that all countries accept this regulation and this control. This is not a new argument; it has been going on since 1946. "Super commercial atomic monopoly" was not my expression; it was used in 1946. At any rate, I do not want to develop that point further.

37. As I said, I just wanted to make a few comments, and if necessary I shall revert to the matter later.

**News Conference Remarks by the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson): Talks on Antiballistic Missiles [Extracts], June 13, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

*Q. Mr. Ambassador, have there been any talks on the ABM?*

AMBASSADOR THOMPSON. No, not yet.

*Q. Do you know when they will be?*

AMBASSADOR THOMPSON. We told the Soviets we are ready for talks. We haven't yet heard from them when they will be ready.

*Q. Didn't they tell the President they were ready to talk at one time?*

AMBASSADOR THOMPSON. They have agreed, in principle, to talk. It was a question of time and place. We haven't heard from them on that.

*Q. Mr. Ambassador, the fact that there were these contacts—the "hot line" and the rest of it—is that not an encouraging sign of continuing communication between the two governments?*

AMBASSADOR THOMPSON. I think it is always useful that we do discuss problems together, but this was—as everyone knows—a very dangerous situation. I think it was quite natural that the President and Mr. Kosygin would have been in contact about it.

*Q. Mr. Ambassador, there have been suggestions in Soviet quarters here in Washington that the ABM talks are hung up because the United States has not put forward specific proposals.*

*Do I infer correctly from your opening comment on it that it is the position of this Government that we should set up a time and place, a framework, so to speak, for talks before proposals are exchanged?*

AMBASSADOR THOMPSON. I think that is right.

*Q. Mr. Ambassador, are the Russians continuing to set up this missile system which, apparently, there was evidence of last fall?<sup>2</sup>*

AMBASSADOR THOMPSON. I have no way of knowing anything about that.

**Chinese Communist Communique on First Hydrogen Bomb Test, June 17, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

Chairman Mao Tso-tung pointed out as far back as June 1958: I think it is entirely possible for some atom bombs and hydrogen bombs to be made in ten years' time.

<sup>1</sup> *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, June 10, 1967, p. 873.

<sup>2</sup> See *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 728-733.

<sup>3</sup> *Peking Review*, June 23, 1967, pp. 6-7.

Amidst the song of decisive victory of the great proletarian cultural revolution of our country, we solemnly announce to the people of China and the whole world that this brilliant prediction, this great call, of Chairman Mao's has been realized. Today, on June 17, 1967, after the five nuclear tests in two years and eight months, China successfully exploded her first hydrogen bomb over the western region of the country.

The success of this hydrogen bomb test represents another leap in the development of China's nuclear weapons. It marks the entry of the development of China's nuclear weapons into an entirely new stage. The Chinese people are proud of this, and the revolutionary people the world over will also take it as a matter of pride. With happiness and exultation, we hail this fresh great victory of Mao Tse-tung's thought, this fresh splendid achievement of the great proletarian cultural revolution.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the State Council, the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Party and the Cultural Revolution Group Under the Central Committee extend the warmest congratulations to all the commanders and fighters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, the workers, engineers, technicians and scientists and the other personnel who have been engaged in the research, manufacture and testing of the nuclear weapons. Under the correct leadership of the Party's Central Committee, Chairman Mao and his close comrade-in-arms Comrade Lin Biao, they have held high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought, kept proletarian politics in the fore, creatively studied and applied Chairman Mao's works, firmly upheld the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao, resolutely opposed the revisionist line of the handful of top Party persons in authority taking the capitalist road, grasped revolution and promoted production, given play to their collective wisdom and strength, co-operated closely with each other, surmounted all difficulties in the revolutionary spirit of "seize the day, seize the hour" and, opening up a path of their own, have ensured the smooth success of this hydrogen bomb test.

Chairman Mao has said: "In the fields of the struggle for production and scientific experiment, mankind makes constant progress and nature undergoes constant change; they never remain at the same level. Therefore, man has constantly to sum up experience and go on discovering, inventing, creating and advancing."<sup>2</sup> It is hoped that the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the broad masses of the revolutionary workers and staff and the scientific and technical personnel—following these teachings of Chairman Mao and responding to the call of Comrade Lin Biao to "strengthen the revolutionary spirit, scientific approach and sense of organization and discipline"—will guard against conceit and impetuosity, continue to exert themselves and win new and still greater merit in accelerating the development of our country's national defence science and technology and the modernization of our national defence.

China has got atom bombs and guided missiles, and she now has the

<sup>2</sup> *Quotations From Chairman Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1966), pp. 203-204.

hydrogen bomb. This greatly heightens the morale of the revolutionary people throughout the world and greatly deflates the arrogance of imperialism, modern revisionism and all reactionaries. The success of China's hydrogen bomb test has further broken the nuclear monopoly of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism and dealt a telling blow at their policy of nuclear blackmail. It is a very great encouragement and support to the Vietnamese people in their heroic war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, to the Arab people in their resistance to aggression by the U.S. and British imperialists and their tool Israel and to the revolutionary people of the whole world.

Man is the factor that decides victory or defeat in war. The conducting of necessary and limited nuclear tests and the development of nuclear weapons by China are entirely for the purpose of defence, with the ultimate aim of abolishing nuclear weapons. We solemnly declare once again that at no time and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons. We always mean what we say. As in the past, the Chinese people and Government will continue to make common efforts and carry on an unswerving struggle together with all the other peace-loving people and countries of the world for the noble aim of completely prohibiting and thoroughly destroying nuclear weapons.

### Address by President Johnson to the Foreign Policy Conference for Educators: Middle Eastern Developments [Extract], June 19, 1967<sup>1</sup>

Now, finally, let me turn to the Middle East--and to the tumultuous events of the past months.

Those events have proved the wisdom of five great principles of peace in the region.

The first and the greatest principle is that every nation in the area has a fundamental right to live, and to have this right respected by its neighbors.

For the people of the Middle East, the path to hope does not lie in threats to end the life of any nation. Such threats have become a burden to the peace, not only of that region but a burden to the peace of the entire world.

In the same way, no nation would be true to the United Nations Charter, or to its own true interests, if it should permit military success to blind it to the fact that its neighbors have rights and its neighbors have interests of their own. Each nation, therefore, must accept the right of others to live.

Second, this last month, I think, shows us another basic requirement for settlement. It is a human requirement: justice for the refugees.

<sup>1</sup> *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, June 26, 1967, pp. 808-809.

A new conflict has brought new homelessness. The nations of the Middle East must at last address themselves to the plight of those who have been displaced by wars. In the past, both sides have resisted the best efforts of outside mediators to restore the victims of conflict to their homes, or to find them other proper places to live and work. There will be no peace for any party in the Middle East unless this problem is attacked with new energy by all, and, certainly, primarily by those who are immediately concerned.

A third lesson from this last month is that maritime rights must be respected. Our Nation has long been committed to free maritime passage through international waterways, and we, along with other nations, were taking the necessary steps to implement this principle when hostilities exploded. If a single act of folly was more responsible for this explosion than any other, I think it was the arbitrary and dangerous announced decision that the Straits of Tiran would be closed. The right of innocent maritime passage must be preserved for all nations.

Fourth, this last conflict has demonstrated the danger of the Middle Eastern arms race of the last 12 years. Here the responsibility must rest not only on those in the area—but upon the larger states outside the area. We believe that scarce resources could be used much better for technical and economic development. We have always opposed this arms race, and our own military shipments to the area have consequently been severely limited.

Now the waste and futility of the arms race must be apparent to all the peoples of the world. And now there is another moment of choice. The United States of America, for its part, will use every resource of diplomacy, and every counsel of reason and prudence, to try to find a better course.

As a beginning, I should like to propose that the United Nations immediately call upon all of its members to report all shipments of all military arms into this area, and to keep those shipments on file for all the peoples of the world to observe.

Fifth, the crisis underlines the importance of respect for political independence and territorial integrity of all the states of the area. We reaffirmed that principle at the height of this crisis. We reaffirm it again today on behalf of all.

This principle can be effective in the Middle East only on the basis of peace between the parties. The nations of the region have had only fragile and violated truce lines for 20 years. What they now need are recognized boundaries and other arrangements that will give them security against terror, destruction, and war. Further, there just must be adequate recognition of the special interest of three great religions in the Holy Places of Jerusalem.

These five principles are not new, but we do think they are fundamental. Taken together, they point the way from uncertain armistice to durable peace. We believe there must be progress toward all of them if there is to be progress toward any.

**Statement by the Indian Defense Minister (Singh) to Parliament: Chinese Communist Nuclear Test, June 21, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

On the 17th June, China announced the explosion of its first Hydrogen Bomb.<sup>2</sup> This was the 6th nuclear explosion by China in defiance of world public opinion. When the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1963,<sup>3</sup> it was recognized that further conduct of nuclear tests in the atmosphere would pose grave danger to the health of human beings through increased radioactive fall-out. China did not sign this treaty. This repeated violation by China of the collective will of the international community has naturally evoked strong criticism, and great concern, especially among China's neighbors. The latest explosion of the Hydrogen Bomb is further evidence of China's callous indifference to the opinion of the rest of the world. The Government of India view this development with grave concern.

The nuclear policy of China and its impact on our security has been under study by our concerned authorities from time to time and it will continue to engage our most careful attention. I would like to assure the House that all practicable ways and means of ensuring our security are constantly under examination.

We have steadfastly adhered to the policy of developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The effect of this policy on our security is also kept under constant review.

As Honorable Members are aware, there exists today the serious problem of ensuring the security of non-aligned and non-nuclear weapon countries against nuclear attack or threat of such attack. This problem, situated as we are, is of vital importance from our point of view. It acquires a fresh sense of urgency as a result of the latest Chinese Hydrogen Bomb explosion.

The question of security of non-nuclear countries, who are also non-aligned, is under the consideration of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva. The Government of India have been exchanging views on this subject with the leading nuclear weapon Powers and also with some non-nuclear non-aligned countries and we shall continue these consultations.

**Toast by President Johnson at Glassboro Luncheon,  
June 23, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

Mr. Chairman, distinguished guests, Mr. Foreign Minister [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko], Mr. Ambassador [Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin]: We are delighted that you have had

<sup>1</sup> Department of State files. Mr. Singh made the statement on behalf of External Affairs Minister Chagla, who was attending the General Assembly at New York.

<sup>2</sup> *Aate*, pp. 261-263.

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp 291-293.

<sup>4</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, July 10, 1967, pp. 35-36.

a chance to even briefly visit our country, and we are especially pleased that you have come here today for a meeting with us.

We both have special responsibilities for the security of our families, and over and beyond all our families is the security of the entire human family inhabiting this earth. We must never forget that there are many peoples in this world, many different nations, each with its own history and ambitions. There is a special place, however, in this world and a special responsibility placed upon our two countries because of our strength and our resources.

This demands that the relations between our two countries be as reasonable and as constructive as we know how to make them. It is also our obligation that we make it possible for other countries to live in peace with each other if this can be done. And that is why today we have here discussed with you some questions affecting the peace of the entire human family of 3 billion people.

I want to inform Secretary Rusk, Minister Gromyko, and Secretary McNamara and the other distinguished guests present here that you and I have discussed various aspects and possibilities for strengthening peace in the world, such as the nonproliferation agreement, and certain questions arising out of the Middle East situation.

We also agreed that both of us, as well as our two nations, made some small contribution to bringing about a cease-fire in the Middle East. We only regret that this contribution between us had not made it possible to prevent the outbreak of hostilities—although we tried.

I want to emphasize that the results of today's meeting will be judged by what we can achieve in the future in order to achieve peace.

I quoted to the Chairman the story about the author, Charles Lamb, who threw down in disgust a book he had been reading. To his sister's question of whether he knew the author, he said, "No, because if I did, I would like him."

And by the same spirit, Mr. Chairman, I hope that today's meeting has contributed to getting us to know each other better, and therefore to like each other better, just as our Ambassadors in Moscow and Washington have become more acquainted and liked by the people they deal with. And so, Mr. Chairman, I should like to thank you for coming here. We thank you for coming. We want very much to resolve some of these questions.

We would like to have the opportunity to sit down further and discuss some aspects of the antiballistic missile system, nonproliferation, perhaps some questions arising out of the Middle East situation, and at least explore the situation in Southeast Asia, as well as questions of mutual interest in Europe and the Western Hemisphere.

And now I would like to ask each of you to stand and raise your glass to the health of the Chairman, the Soviet Union, and to peace in the world.

### Statement by President Johnson on Glassboro Meeting, June 23, 1967<sup>1</sup>

The Chairman and I have met since we arrived here a little after 11:00 today.

Our meeting gave us an opportunity to get acquainted with each other. We have exchanged views on a number of international questions. Among these problems were the Middle East, Viet-Nam, and the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

We agreed that it is now very important to reach international agreement on a nonproliferation treaty.

We also exchanged views on the questions of direct bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

Finally, we agreed that discussions on these questions should be continued in New York between Secretary Rusk and Mr. Gromyko during next week.

This meeting today was a very good and very useful meeting. We are in the debt of the great Governor of New Jersey for his hospitality.

We are inviting ourselves to return here again at 1:30 on Sunday afternoon. We will continue our discussions here then. Those of you who have Sunday afternoon off, we will be glad to have you come, too.

### Report by President Johnson on the Glassboro Meeting, June 25, 1967<sup>2</sup>

On my return tonight to the White House after 2 days of talks at Hollybush, I want to make this brief report to the American people.

We continued our discussions today in the same spirit in which we began them on Friday—a spirit of direct face-to-face exchanges between leaders with very heavy responsibilities.

We wanted to meet again because the issues before us are so large and so difficult that one meeting together was not nearly enough. The two meetings have been better than one, and at least we learned—I know I did—from each hour of our talks.

You will not be surprised to know that these two meetings have not solved all of our problems. On some, we have made progress—great progress in reducing misunderstanding, I think, and in reaffirming our common commitment to seek agreement.

I think we made that kind of progress, for example, on the question of arms limitation. We have agreed this afternoon that Secretary of State Rusk and Mr. Gromyko will pursue this subject further in New York in the days ahead.

I must report that no agreement is readily in sight on the Middle Eastern crisis and that our well-known differences over Viet-Nam continue. Yet even on these issues, I was very glad to hear the Chair-

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38.

man's views face to face and to have a chance to tell him directly and in detail just what our purposes and our policies are—and are not—in these particular areas.

The Chairman, I believe, made a similar effort with me.

When nations have deeply different positions, as we do on these issues, they do not come to agreement merely by improving their understanding of each other's views. But such improvement helps. Sometimes in such discussions you can find elements—beginnings—useful fractions—of common ground, even within a general agreement.

It was so in the Middle East 2 weeks ago when we agreed on the need for a prompt cease-fire. And it is so today in respect to such simple propositions as that every state has a right to live, that there should be an end to the war in the Middle East, and that in the right circumstances there should be withdrawal of troops. This is a long way from agreement, but it is a long way also from total difference.

On Viet-Nam, the area of agreement is smaller. It is defined by the fact that the dangers and the difficulties of any one area must never be allowed to become a cause of wider conflict. Yet even in Viet-Nam, I was able to make it very clear, with no third party between us, that we will match and we will outmatch every step to peace that others may be ready to take.

As I warned on Friday<sup>2</sup>—and as I just must warn again on this Sunday afternoon—meetings like these do not themselves make peace in the world. We must all remember that there have been many meetings before and they have not ended all of our troubles or all of our dangers.

But I can also report on this Sunday afternoon another thing that I said on last Friday: That it does help a lot to sit down and look at a man right in the eye and try to reason with him, particularly if he is trying to reason with you.

We may have differences and difficulties ahead, but I think they will be lessened, and not increased, by our new knowledge of each other.

Chairman Kosygin and I have agreed that the leaders of our two countries will keep in touch in the future, through our able secretaries and ambassadors, and also keep in touch directly.

I said on Friday that the world is very small and very dangerous. Tonight I believe that it is fair to say that these days at Hollybush have made it a little smaller still—but also a little less dangerous.

### News Conference Remarks by Premier Kosygin on the Glassboro Meeting, June 25, 1967<sup>1</sup>

On June 25 a second meeting between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., Mr. Kosygin, and President Johnson

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 38.

of the United States, was held in the town of Glassboro, not far from New York. At the second meeting, as at the first, which took place on June 23, the exchange of views touched upon several international problems.

In connection with the situation in the Middle East, the two sides set forth their respective positions. It was stated on the Soviet side that the main thing now is to achieve the prompt withdrawal behind the armistice lines of the forces of Israel, which has committed aggression against the Arab states. This question is of signal importance for the restoration of peace in the Middle East, and it is in the center of the attention of the emergency special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and it must be positively resolved without delay.

The exchange of views on the Viet-Nam problem once again revealed profound differences in the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States. It was emphasized on the Soviet side that settlement of the Viet-Nam problem is possible only on the condition of an end to the bombing of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the withdrawal of American forces from South Viet-Nam.

Both sides reaffirmed that they believe it important to promptly achieve understanding on the conclusion of an international treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

In the course of the talks, a general review was made of the state of bilateral Soviet and American relations. On the whole, the meetings offered the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States an opportunity to compare their positions on the matters discussed, an opportunity both sides believe to have been useful.

### Remarks by Premier Kosygin at United Nations News Conference [Extracts], June 25, 1967<sup>1</sup>

#### NON-AGGRESSION PACT

*Q. Do you expect in the near future a pact of nonaggression between the Warsaw and NATO countries?*

*A. You know our views on that. We did propose the conclusion of a nonaggression treaty of that kind.<sup>2</sup> In fact, we even suggested that we might go further and disband the two military blocs and thus help eliminate international tensions.<sup>3</sup> However, NATO did not accept our proposals and therefore I have nothing new to add to what you already know. I cannot say that any progress has been reached in that field.*

<sup>1</sup> *The Washington Post*, June 26, 1967, pp. A10-A11.

<sup>2</sup> See *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 57-58.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, 1966, pp. 407-420.

## MIDDLE EAST

*Q. Do you think it is possible and desirable to have international agreements among the major powers limiting arms shipments to the Middle East, guaranteeing the existence of all states and ensuring freedom of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran, Akaba, and Suez?*

A. Regarding the limitation of arms shipments to the Middle East areas, this is a question that should be resolved after the withdrawal of forces behind the armistice lines. The first step should be the withdrawal of forces behind the armistice lines and then there could be a consideration of all the questions that arise in this connection, questions the solution of which could bring about a stronger peace in the area.

As regards the question of guarantees of existence and the right of free passage, these two are questions that should be considered after the withdrawal of troops.

## ANTI-MISSILE SYSTEMS

*Q. What are the prospects of an agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on limiting the development of anti-ballistic missile systems? Is there any hope of resolving the problem of safeguards of the proposed treaty banning the spread of nuclear weapons?*

A. As regards an anti-missile system, our position is well known. We believe that the discussions should center not on merely the problem of an anti-missile defense system. Because, after all, the anti-missile system is not a weapon of aggression, of attack; it is a defensive system. And we feel therefore that what should be considered is the entire complex of armaments and disarmament questions.

Because, otherwise, if—instead of building and deploying an anti-ballistic missile system—the money is used to build up offensive missile systems, mankind will not stand to gain anything. It will, on the contrary, face a still greater menace and will come still closer to war. And we therefore are in favor of considering the whole range of questions relating to arms and disarmament, and we're ready to discuss that question—the general question of disarmament.

As regards the second question, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, we believe that there is . . . there has been a significant move forward in that respect. And, as I noted in my statement, we are continuing our efforts aimed at finding the solution to this problem.

I want to say that the Soviet Union is interested in achieving a situation where there is to be no dissemination of nuclear weapons and we believe the U.S. is seeking the same goals, as are the majority of the nations of the world.

## GERMAN QUESTION

*Q. What is the position of the Soviet government now on the access of West Germany to nuclear weapons? Was this subject discussed in*

*Glassboro? What can be done to normalize the relations between the two German states?*

A. This question was not discussed at Glassboro. It didn't arise but our position is plain. We are categorically opposed to West Germany obtaining access to nuclear weapons. We shall do all in our power to prevent West Germany from ever having such weapons and we shall indeed do everything to prevent West Germany from gaining access to nuclear weapons because we feel that this runs counter to all the agreements reached at Potsdam<sup>4</sup> and indeed it is in contradiction with the general situation in Europe.

#### WARS OF LIBERATION

*Q. It has been Soviet doctrine to support wars of national liberation. Have you changed your thinking in any way on this point as the result of your talks with President Johnson and do you believe such support should include military force?*

A. If wars of national liberation are waged, wars where a people strive to free themselves from a colonial dependence and cast off colonialism, we do support and will support that war and our support, our sympathies will clearly lie with the peoples fighting for their freedom and independence.

#### U.S.-SOVIET ACCORD

*Q. There is some suggestion in certain Western quarters about a peaceful world order promoted by the two super-powers—the United States and the Soviet Union. What do you think about it, and what impact would it have on the aspirations of the smaller nations, especially in Africa and Asia?*

A. Well sometimes there do appear in the press various views or rumors to the effect that the two super-powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, could or should dictate their conditions to the world. They should end wars and generally take command of the whole world. We believe that that is completely erroneous and it certainly runs entirely counter to our outlook, to our general philosophy. And we believe that all nations big and small can and do participate and should participate in the solutions of all the problems facing the world, through their participation here, in the United Nations, and certainly we will never share the view that there can be any kind of dictatorship of the two super-powers over the world.

And there is also the Security Council of the United Nations which bears the responsibility for peace and is responsible to all the nations of the world. The Security Council is, we feel, the main body which should take the decisions in the event of any conflict arising in the world.

<sup>4</sup> Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Department of State. *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49* (S. doc. 123, 81st Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 34 ff.

Statement by the Swedish Representative (Myrdal) to the  
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Verification  
of Underground Test Ban, June 29, 1967<sup>1</sup>

2. I wish to speak today about one of the most important tasks on our agenda, to which however practically no attention has been paid so far during this session of the Committee. I am referring to the "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests"—to use the exact wording of the heading of last year's General Assembly resolution 2163 (XXI). In that resolution the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is requested "to elaborate without any further delay a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests."<sup>2</sup>

3. We have all given due recognition to the priority of the non-proliferation issue. But this Committee cannot ignore that other important items also have been entrusted to it by the supreme organ of the United Nations. As repeatedly stressed by my delegation, an agreement prohibiting underground tests as well as a cut-off agreement should be treated, together with the non-proliferation issue, as parts of one comprehensive pattern. Of those other agreements the test-ban agreement is placed in the foreground by the United Nations. We should not be the cause once again of keen disappointment in the General Assembly, which has repeatedly sought to dispose of this matter once and for all.

4. I wish to recall at the outset in brief terms the history of the test-ban issue. By the way, I have used, as a valuable instrument to help me recall this history, the study prepared by the Secretariat under the title of *The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-1966*. Its chapter 7 deals in a very clear way with the question of discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests. It reminds us that already thirteen years ago, in 1954, suggestions were first made for an independent agreement to ban the testing of nuclear weapons. It is natural for me to make a special point of recalling that that proposal was submitted by the then Prime Minister of India, the late Jawaharlal Nehru.<sup>3</sup>

5. Since that time the matter has been the subject of lengthy international negotiations, and in those negotiations the question of control has always had the most prominent role. But we should take encouragement from the fact that when this Committee came into being one of its immediate achievements was to sweep away some of the most elaborate and most costly control arrangements which had previously been tentatively agreed upon by the three nuclear-weapon Powers. We should also recall what a relief the whole world felt when a first positive result was reached and the Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water was signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963.<sup>4</sup>

6. That treaty was rightly hailed by all of us as an important step—but just one step—on the road towards nuclear disarmament.

<sup>1</sup> DND/0/PV.309, pp. 4-12.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 802-803.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 1945-1959, vol. I, pp. 408-411.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 201-203.

We all know that it was not complete: underground explosions had to be left outside its scope because of a lack of agreement between the main Powers just on the methods for monitoring a ban on the underground tests. But an assurance that a complete treaty would soon be forthcoming was supposed by the world community to be contained in the preamble of the Treaty, as the "original Parties" had formulated a vow that they were "Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end . . .".

7. This reassurance was the more crucial as at the end of 1962 the General Assembly had already, by adopting its resolution 1762 (XVII) by a vast majority, condemned all nuclear test explosions.<sup>5</sup> That condemnation was followed up a year later by the virtually unanimously approved resolution 1910 (XVIII), which requested our Committee "to continue with a sense of urgency" negotiations to achieve this discontinuance of all test explosions.<sup>6</sup>

8. No fulfilment of those resolutions and assurances has however taken place. During its last two regular sessions the General Assembly has, as we all know, repeated its appeal, adopting resolutions not only requesting the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to work out an agreement banning effectively all nuclear weapon tests in all environments, but also urging an immediate suspension of all nuclear weapon tests. I may refer here to resolutions 2032 (XX)<sup>7</sup> and 2163 (XXI).<sup>8</sup> The latter was approved virtually without any dissent from Members of the United Nations.

9. To demonstrate the insistence of the General Assembly on this vital matter, I wish to recall also the debate which took place last autumn in the First Committee of the General Assembly. Every speaker urged the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. If I quote only from statements by representatives of nuclear-weapon Powers this is due, of course, to their special responsibility when it comes to transforming into reality this unanimous clamour of the General Assembly to obtain a discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests.

10. In his intervention in the First Committee on 14 November 1966 the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, said:

It is also extremely important to solve the problem of prohibiting all tests of nuclear weapons, which would be a significant obstacle to the further perfecting of nuclear weapons; it would prevent the appearance in the arsenals of States of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction. The prohibition of underground nuclear tests would create propitious conditions for the solution of other disarmament problems.

The position of the Soviet Union on this important question is well known; it has often been presented to the General Assembly and to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament. The Soviet Union has always come out in favour of the full prohibition of all tests of nuclear weapons including underground nuclear tests.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 1962, vol. II, pp. 1023-1033.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, p. 627.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 623-624.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 802-803.

<sup>9</sup> A/C.1/PV.1452, pp. 27-30.

11. The representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, said in the First Committee on 22 November 1966:

An effective comprehensive test-ban agreement would help put an end to the nuclear arms race and would be a major step in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. It would, perhaps, be the most significant step we could take to supplement such a non-proliferation treaty.<sup>10</sup>

On the same day the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, gave several reasons why a test-ban treaty was "a crucial element in an effective non-proliferation policy", and went on to say of it:

Indeed, of the measures listed in the memorandum presented in Geneva last August by the eight non-aligned countries, it is, in my view, the most important and possibly the closest to agreement. And it would be wrong to underrate the importance of a test ban in itself as a measure of arms control.<sup>11</sup>

12. Consistently with these statements, the nuclear-weapon Powers supported and voted for the aforementioned resolution of the General Assembly (2163 (XXI)) calling for the suspension of all nuclear weapon tests.

13. Against these statements and this record of voting, however, there have to be put the performances of the nuclear-weapon Powers as they appear in reality. Tests have not ceased. On the contrary, testing is continuing at an ever-accelerating tempo. According to figures I have available, nuclear explosions in the world numbered 36 in 1964—that is, after the Moscow Treaty—40 in 1965 and 60 in 1966. Thus in the last year nuclear explosions have been shaking the earth at an average rate of more than once a week. The great majority of those explosions were underground tests performed by the nuclear-weapon Powers represented here in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The yields, which earlier were low, have been extended into the megaton range.

14. It is evident that the exemption of underground nuclear explosions in the Moscow Treaty was intended to be temporary. Nevertheless, that exemption has been used by the nuclear-weapon Powers as permission for—indeed a legitimization of—the holding of such tests. The number of explosions in the atmosphere carried out by countries not parties to the Moscow Treaty is still low; but the trend is one of acceleration, and recently the yields have reached the megaton range with resulting widespread radioactive contamination of the atmosphere.

15. But let me return to the problem of how to reach a treaty banning underground tests. The obstacle is proclaimed to lie in the issue of control—or, more precisely, in a lack of agreement among the nuclear-weapon Powers on the verification system needed for monitoring such a treaty. One side is upholding the thesis that on-site inspections are necessary to ensure that no violations occur; while the other side reiterates that national means of detection and verification are satisfactory and that no on-site inspections should be prescribed.

16. The non-nuclear-weapon Powers have not taken sides on this issue. Instead, we—and I have in mind particularly the non-aligned

<sup>10</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, p. 751.

<sup>11</sup> A/C.1/PV.1460, p. 32.

members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament—have continuously endeavoured to bridge the difference of views about the specific needs for verification. Let me make yet another try today.

17. It is high time that we in this Committee re-examined the question of verification, and particularly inspections, in a new light, taking account of recent developments in fact-finding machinery. The Swedish delegation is convinced that it has now become possible to reduce the divergencies of positions to a level so low that for practical purposes they could be written off. From the material available to my delegation I have drawn the conclusion, tentative in form but firm in conviction, that the scientific and technical difficulties that have prevented a generally-acceptable verification procedure to monitor an underground test-ban treaty have been steadily diminished and that they should now be quite small. This opinion is based on several reports about—

(a) The development of increasingly sensitive teleseismic instruments and the establishment of large arrays of such instruments, significantly increasing the effectiveness of each individual instrument;

(b) The interest that has been manifested, in the General Assembly and elsewhere, in international co-operation for the exchange of seismic data, bringing further enhancement of the usefulness of national seismic stations;

(c) The impressive scientific research which has been done in several countries to improve methods for interpreting the data obtained and in particular the elaboration of several effective methods of identifying underground explosions and separating them from earthquakes;

(d) The facilities for surveillance from satellites, providing a capability to recognize and to understand patterns of human activity on the earth's surface.

18. The progress just mentioned is the result of extended and costly research and technical development undertaken mostly by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, which in later years have been joined in their efforts by other countries.

19. In Sweden we have been actively interested in the two first-mentioned developments, but we have also devoted scientific investigations to ascertaining how to evaluate the effectiveness of different identification methods for verification purposes—the item I mentioned under (c).

20. We started from the assumption that there were certain political requirements for a convincing control system:

(1) it should provide sufficient deterrence against violations by making the probability of discovery sufficiently high;

(2) it should contain adequate assurance against the risk that "freaks of nature", in the form of earthquakes which would be similar in appearance to explosions, might induce unwarranted political accusations.

With these assumptions in mind, we have studied the effectiveness of published seismological identification methods in relation both to a system of verification with on-site inspection and to a system without such inspection. I will confine myself here to our general conclusions.

We should be prepared to make available particulars of the probability methods employed.

21. Some United States experience with the British so-called "complexity" method of identification from long distances indicates that in the system with inspection sufficient deterrence should be attainable with only one inspection in two years. Similarly, experience with another method, elaborated in the United States and requiring local or regional data such as might be obtained through a data exchange, indicates equal effectiveness. If both methods were combined, a further increase in effectiveness would result. Finally, still somewhat incomplete data on another British identification method, involving measurements of both long and short period waves, holds promise of still greater effectiveness.

22. These identification methods are indeed so effective that it now seems to have become meaningful to discuss verification without on-site inspection. In this second case the full guarantee against mistakes in the final evaluation of suspicious events, which in the first case was provided by inspection, would not exist; it is replaced by a procedure providing an extremely low statistical probability of mistaking an earthquake for an explosion. It can be shown that also in this non-inspection case the identification methods referred to earlier would provide sufficient deterrence: earthquakes would be mistaken for explosions only once in fifteen or more years.

23. These results of our study may seem optimistic. They may have to be adjusted when more extensive observational data are made available. But even with this reservation we are convinced that the situation is ripe for a renewed and thorough discussion of the political sufficiency of the seismological verification potential now at hand.

24. In this connexion I want to raise another, related, technical point. The estimates which I have just mentioned were made on the assumption of 200 detected shallow earthquakes per year in any politically-interesting region. A large part of these happen in seismologically-complicated island areas such as the Aleutians and the Kuriles. Considerable special studies have been made by the United States and the Soviet Union in order to obtain improved epicentre determinations of events in those localities. Of course, events deep in the earth or under the ocean would not be suspicious. This decreases the number of seismic events that have to be further scrutinized for identification purposes, and hence improves further the situation I was describing earlier. Last year I dealt in some detail with this issue,<sup>12</sup> and the United States delegation submitted an explanatory Conference document presenting the results of project Longshot. In that document reference was made to further experiments.<sup>13</sup> I should therefore like to ask the United States representative to be good enough to add to his earlier contribution a description of later results.

25. By these perhaps rather lengthy remarks on technical control matters I have tried to show that the whole concept of control in relation to a ban on underground nuclear explosions has to be looked at anew; to our mind, the control issue can no longer be used as a convenient reason for holding up an agreement in this field. The opinion

<sup>12</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 509-511.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 593-595.

has also become more widespread lately that there must perhaps be other reasons which underlie the political hesitation of the nuclear-weapon Powers to come to an agreement. It has been said publicly by a leading official of one of the main nuclear-weapon Powers that the underground testing programme is a very vital part of maintaining the effectiveness of the offensive force to provide a sure destruction.

26. With such statements in mind, I would think that the representatives of non-nuclear-weapon countries here would appreciate frank declarations from the representatives of the nuclear-weapon Powers on whether their Governments are really ready to stop nuclear weapon testing or, if they are not ready to do so, on whether it is for reasons of national security or for other reasons. The answer to this question is the more eagerly awaited by the non-nuclear-weapon countries as they will be asked to sign away for ever in the non-proliferation treaty their right to test as well as to manufacture any nuclear devices.

27. A further complication here seems to make its appearance in connexion with the discussion on the use of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful projects. When speaking on this problem at our meeting of 8 June the representative of the United States said:

It is a fact that the United States has not yet demonstrated that the technology for any—I repeat, any—specific peaceful application of nuclear explosions is technically and economically feasible. Some private companies in the United States and elsewhere and some foreign governments have evaluated certain applications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and have made assessments that the technology, if successfully developed, would have economic potential in certain applications. Whether those evaluations will be confirmed requires further development, such as additional experiments with nuclear explosives.<sup>14</sup>

28. Can this be interpreted as a new argument against a comprehensive test ban? Surely it should not be so. To our mind the problem could easily be handled within the framework of international regulation of the use of nuclear explosive devices presented in my last statement.<sup>15</sup> "Use" ought to cover also "experiments" and be exclusively undertaken under international responsibility. This ought to be the obvious logic of the case, as otherwise explosions might be suspected to function in reality as weapon tests—and this in whatever country they were nationally undertaken.

29. I wish to deal, finally, with one more important argument in favour of a rapid end to all testing which, to my mind, has not been given enough attention in the international debate. I am thinking of the release of valuable brain-power for civilian purposes which would be obtained. As a test-ban treaty would more or less stop research and development work for nuclear weapons, highly-qualified scientists and technicians would become available for other tasks.

30. In this connexion I should like to quote a statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, at our meeting of 18 May, which related to the non-proliferation treaty but which seems to me equally valid for the test-ban treaty:

An important aspect of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is the effect that it would have on the peaceful development of nuclear energy.

<sup>14</sup> *Ante*, p. 257.

<sup>15</sup> *Ante*, pp. 248-252.

Mr. Roshchin later went on to say :

Renunciation by the non-nuclear countries of military ways of using atomic energy would enable them to concentrate all their scientific, technical and material resources on the peaceful utilization of the achievements of nuclear physics, which would undoubtedly widen their potentialities in that field.<sup>10</sup>

Surely this argument can be applied with the same amount of force and conviction to the nuclear-weapon Powers themselves.

31. It is well known that what constitutes the heaviest drain on highly-specialized personnel is the further development of nuclear and other special military devices. The production stage is much more a routine matter of industrial application. In most developed countries a very important part of total scientific research is being directed and financed through the defence authorities. Of course, a significant side effect of these tremendous efforts also furthers peaceful purposes. But the main occupation of hundreds of thousands of qualified persons is directed towards war purposes. To these resources in personnel are in turn coupled large and highly-advanced laboratory resources. It certainly challenges our imagination to estimate what these people who are specialists in the delivery of solutions to complicated technical problems would achieve if directed towards such fields as medicine, urban planning or increased food production. A considerable part of their capacities could be so redirected already in connexion with a comprehensive test ban.

32. I wish to underline specifically in this context the needs of the less-developed countries. There can be no question about how important it would be if a rapid increase could be made—by all our countries—in the scientific and technical output for their benefit. To my mind by far the most important contribution—far more important than any budget figures in financial terms would indicate—which could be transferred from activities for military purposes to the benefit of the under-developed countries lies in the research and development sector. The difference in research capacity between countries is perhaps, in the final analysis, the most fatal gap of all.

### Report of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy: Impact of Chinese Communist Nuclear Weapons Progress on United States National Security, July 1967<sup>1</sup>

#### INTRODUCTION

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is charged under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 with making continuing studies of problems relating to the development, use and control of atomic energy. In recognition of the important responsibility assigned to the Joint Committee, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 imposes upon the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense a mandatory

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 220.

<sup>1</sup> Jt. Com. print, 90th Cong., 1st sess.

obligation to "keep the Joint Committee fully and currently informed" on atomic energy matters. All other Government agencies are required by law to furnish any information requested by the Joint Committee with respect to the activities or responsibilities of that agency in the field of atomic energy.<sup>2</sup>

One of the crucial matters affecting U.S. national security is the development by foreign nations of nuclear weapons and the accompanying delivery systems. The present nuclear threat to the United States and the free world comes from the Soviet Union and Communist China. In order properly to understand the scope and magnitude of this threat, the Joint Committee has over the years held executive hearings at which nuclear weapons experts have charted the progress of foreign nations as they developed and refined their nuclear arsenals.

The emergence of a serious threat from the Chinese Communists began in 1964. In a brief span of less than 3 years, Red China has had six nuclear tests. The last one on June 17, 1967, was in the megaton range and indicated that they were making rapid progress in thermonuclear design. They are also making progress in the development of delivery vehicles for megaton weapons. The internal strife in Red China appears to have had little, if any, effect on their nuclear weapons program to date.

The trends in nuclear weapons development by foreign nations have been followed closely by the Joint Committee. These trends have been borne out by subsequent events. Progress, particularly by Red China, has been more rapid and surprisingly more effective than had been expected or indeed predicted.

The nuclear and thermonuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union are generally well known and understood by the American public. The Joint Committee's intention in this report is to bring into perspective the accomplishments and possible future trends in the development of Red China's nuclear offensive force.

#### BACKGROUND

As the nuclear threat posed by the Chinese Communists became more pronounced, Chairman Pastore decided to conduct a special inquiry regarding Chinese Communist nuclear weapons development. This probe began on January 11, 1967, and was formally announced at the Joint Committee's first public hearing of the 90th Congress on January 25, 1967.

In connection with this study the Joint Committee received the following testimony in executive session:

JANUARY 11, 1967: Richard Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

FEBRUARY 1, 1967: Dr. Norris Bradbury, Director, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, and Dr. Michael May, Director, Livermore Radiation Laboratory.

MAR. 13, 1967: Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

<sup>2</sup> See secs. 201-202 of the act (*American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. II, pp. 2876-2877).

JULY 13, 1967: Representatives of the Department of Defense, CIA, and AEC.

These witnesses presented testimony concerning advances being made by Communist China in developing nuclear weapons as well as their progress in developing the capability to deliver these weapons against neighboring countries or the United States.

Detailed technical presentations were heard concerning each individual Chinese Communist nuclear test and an assessment was made of future developments by Red China in the field of nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems.

An analysis of the impact of the emergence of Red China as a nuclear power on U.S. foreign policy with particular emphasis on the proposed nonproliferation treaty was also presented.

Information concerning French and Soviet nuclear weapons and delivery methods were also discussed but principal emphasis was on Red China.

#### CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of various hearings we have had and studies made by the Joint Committee, the following committee conclusions have been developed:

##### 1. *Chinese Nuclear Weapons Capabilities*

The Chinese Communist test of June 17, 1967, at the Lop Nor Nuclear Test Site was her sixth nuclear test in the atmosphere and her first in the megaton range. Such a test was expected because of the success of the preceding thermonuclear experiment conducted on December 28, 1966. The Chinese purposely may have limited the yield of that test—their fifth test—to keep the fallout in China at an acceptable level. The fifth test indicated that the Chinese had taken a major step toward a thermonuclear weapon.

There is evidence that the sixth test device—with a yield of a few megatons—was dropped from an aircraft.

Analysis of the debris indicates use of  $U^{235}$ ,  $U^{238}$ , and thermonuclear material. As in the other tests, there is no evidence that plutonium was used. The preliminary indication is that a considerable improvement accompanied the increase in yield. A large amount of  $U^{238}$  was used in the device.

The sixth Chinese nuclear test has confirmed the conclusion reached from the analysis of the fifth Chinese nuclear test that they are making excellent progress in thermonuclear design. They now have the capability to design a multimegaton thermonuclear device suitable for delivery by aircraft.

We believe that the Chinese will continue to place a high priority on thermonuclear weapon development. With continued testing we believe they will be able to develop a thermonuclear warhead in the ICBM weight class with a yield in the megaton range by about 1970. We believe that the Chinese can have an ICBM system ready for deployment in the early 1970's. On the basis of our present knowledge, we believe that the Chinese probably will achieve an operational ICBM capability before 1972. Conceivably, it could be ready as early as 1970-1971. But this would be a tight schedule and makes allowance for only minor difficulties and delays. We believe that the Chinese

have already completed the development of a medium range ballistic missile. We have no indication of any deployment.

We also believe that by about 1970 the Chinese Communists could develop a thermonuclear warhead with a yield in the few hundreds of kilotons in the MRBM class and that they could develop an MRBM warhead with a megaton yield about a couple of years later. Meanwhile, should they desire a thermonuclear bomb for delivery by bomber, they could probably begin weaponizing the design employed in the sixth test.

The missile-delivered fourth Chinese test demonstrated that the Chinese now have the capability to design a low yield fission warhead compatible in size and weight with a missile. With a few tests, the Chinese could probably design an improved fission weapon for MRBM or bomber delivery. However, they may forego extensive fission weapon production in order to have materials and facilities available for thermonuclear weapon systems.

The Chinese bomber forces consist of a few hundred short-range jet bombers and a handful of somewhat longer range bombers. We have no knowledge of a Chinese plan to develop heavy intercontinental range bombers.

Earlier, the Communist Chinese conducted four other nuclear detonations:

OCTOBER 16, 1964: Low yield (up to 20 kilotons).

MAY 13, 1965: Low intermediate (20 to 200 kilotons).

MAY 9, 1966: Intermediate (lower end of 200 to 1,000 kiloton range).

OCTOBER 27, 1966: Low intermediate (20 to 200 kilotons).

The Chinese were able to continue their nuclear program after the Soviets apparently ceased technical assistance in this area by 1960, and detonated a uranium device in October 1964.

All of the Chinese detonations have utilized enriched uranium ( $U^{235}$ ) as the primary fissionable material. Uranium-238 was also present in all tests. The detonation of any device which also contains  $U^{238}$  results in some fissioning of the  $U^{238}$ . The debris from their third and fifth tests indicated some thermonuclear reactions had involved lithium-6 in those devices.

We believe that the Chinese are interested in the development of submarines equipped with suitable relatively long-range missiles; at this time we have not determined the exact nature or status of the program.

## 2. French Nuclear Test Program

Turning to the French nuclear test program, in February 1960 the French tested their first atomic device. In 1966 the French conducted five nuclear tests. In 1967 they held a short series of three tests. Another series of tests is planned for next summer. All of the 1966 tests were plutonium fission devices. The last two tests in 1966 were experiments aimed at the thermonuclear development.

The year's tests were conducted on June 5, June 27, and July 2. They were suspended by balloons, above the Mururoa Lagoon. The tests all had low yields. The French announced that all of the tests

were to be of triggers for thermonuclear devices which the French still have not tested.

Although French officials continue to state publicly that France will detonate her first thermonuclear device in 1968 when enriched uranium becomes available, there have been hints in the press that France is having difficulties with its program. Should this be true, the first generation of both the land-based and submarine-launched missile systems might have to use warheads developed in the 1966 series.

To recapitulate, the Chinese are well ahead of the French in thermonuclear weapon design. In 2½ years and six tests the Chinese have successfully tested a multimegaton thermonuclear device. The French, on the other hand, have conducted many more tests over a 7-year period and have not yet tested a true thermonuclear device or achieved a megaton size yield.

The French have developed higher yield fission weapons than the Chinese. The French have achieved yields of up to 250 kilotons while the Chinese fission devices have had lower yields.

The French now have an operational strategic force of about 60 Mirage IV aircraft with a stockpile of 60 to 70 KT nuclear weapons. At this time the Chinese do not have such an operational strategic force.

#### SUMMARY

The Joint Committee believes that the American public needs to know the threat that is posed by Red China. Communist China has emerged with a fledgling, but effective, nuclear weapons capability. This capability has and will continue to have a great effect on U.S. foreign policy in the Far East. It will have an effect on our relations with the South East Asia Treaty Organization. It will have an effect on the nonproliferation treaty principally because of the close connection between Chinese nuclear power and the national security of India. Its effect will also be felt by Japan. Moreover, the Chinese Communists could use nuclear blackmail to assert their position not only broadly in Asia, but specifically in Southeast Asia.

Perhaps most significant for the United States is the fact that a low order of magnitude attack could possibly be launched by the Chinese Communists against the United States by the early 1970's. At present we do not have an effective anti-ballistic-missile system which could repel such a suicidal (for the Chinese) but nevertheless possible strike.

It is for these reasons that the Joint Committee feels the assessment it has made, based upon information received in executive sessions, should be brought before the American public—not to overemphasize or to underplay but to state clearly and concisely with due regard for the protection of intelligence sources where we stand in relation to this emerging threat to our national security.

## Report of the United States Observers on Inspection of Antarctic Stations, July 1967<sup>1</sup>

### Section I—GENERAL

Pursuant to the provisions of Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty,<sup>2</sup> the stations tabulated below were inspected during the 1966-67 austral summer by designated United States Observers. Stations visited are also shown on the map (Figure 1) where the voyage of the Observers from New Zealand to Chile is traced chronologically.

<i>Stations Inspected</i>	<i>Date Inspected</i>
ARGENTINA	
Orcaidas	March 2, 1967
AUSTRALIA	
Wilkes	February 8-9, 1967
Mawson	February 14, 1967
FRANCE	
Dumont d'Urville	February 1, 1967
JAPAN	
Showa	February 19, 1967
SOUTH AFRICA	
SANAE	February 25, 1967
UNITED KINGDOM	
Signy	March 2, 1967
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	
Molodezhnava	February 17, 1967

In addition, the Danish ship *Thala Dan*, under charter to the French and Australian expeditions, was inspected on February 8, 1967, while unloading cargo at Wilkes Station.

### OBSERVER PERSONNEL

Inspections were accomplished by a team of five persons selected from a list of U.S. Observers designated by the Secretary of State. In accordance with Article VII of the Treaty, the names of all U.S. Observers were communicated to the other Parties.

The persons listed below served as Observers for this inspection:

Mr. Frank G. Siscoe	Mr. Karl W. Kenyon
Mr. Merton E. Davies	Mr. Cyril Muromcew
Col. Ernest F. Dukes, USAF	

<sup>1</sup> *Report of United States Observers on Inspection of Antarctic Stations, 1966-67 Austral Summer Season* (unnumbered Department of State publication, 1967), pp. 1-6. The photographs are not published here.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, p. 1552.

Other designated Observers who did not participate in the inspections:

Mr. Malcolm Toon  
Mr. Arthur I. Wortzel

Col. Richard P. Gingland, USAF  
Mr. Carl J. Sindermann

#### LOGISTICS

Observers made the trip around Antarctica on board an icebreaker, the United States Coast Guard Cutter *Eastwind*. As a result the Observer team was logistically self-sufficient; such items as food, shelter and survival equipment were provided by the ice-breaker, and the ship's boats and helicopters were used for local transportation. Consequently, no burden was imposed on the facilities of host stations.

#### PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF INSPECTION

The purpose of these inspections was to promote the objectives and to insure the observance of the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty. Accordingly, the examination of each station was quite comprehensive, and the activities at each were compared with the information furnished under Article VII (5) of the Treaty. Equipment and scientific instruments were viewed in sufficient detail to determine general utility and intended purpose. Only a few areas were not entered due to practical considerations. However, in those cases the nature of work in progress could be readily ascertained from a distance, without risk of disruption to either working personnel or sensitive instruments.

Station leaders and other key personnel provided explanations of the nature of the logistic and scientific activities of their stations. Ground inspections were supplemented by aerial observations of the terrain surrounding each station.

### Section II—SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

#### SUMMARY

The Observers were cordially welcomed at each station and full cooperation was extended to them. The spirit of cordiality and cooperation, which the Treaty fosters, was evident throughout. All buildings, installations and equipment were made available for inspection without reservation.

Observations disclosed a wide variety of scientific programs and supporting logistic operations. All were regarded as peaceful activities; nowhere was there any evidence of military or other activity prohibited by the Treaty.

There was no evidence to indicate Antarctica has been used for nuclear explosions or for disposal of radioactive waste material.

The only weapons sighted were a few small arms used to obtain animal specimens, either in support of biological programs or as food for sledge dogs.

The scientific programs, equipment and arms observed were found to be in close agreement with advance information provided by Treaty parties.

In general, personnel encountered in Antarctica were observing sound practices for preserving and conserving living resources. Never-

theless, extensive variations in such practice continue to exist as was noted in the last U.S. inspection report (1963-64).'

#### CONCLUSIONS

There was no evidence to indicate any violations of either the provisions or the spirit of the Antarctic Treaty. All the information obtained at these stations indicates Antarctica is being used solely for peaceful purposes.

### Section III—OBSERVATIONS

#### ARGENTINE STATION

##### ORCADAS

A number of scientific studies are undertaken from time to time. Since Orcadas is traditionally a meteorological station, activity is focused on a full and continuing program of surface meteorological and climatological observations. Geomagnetic observations of the earth's field are also recorded regularly.

Scientific work programs, equipment, and arms observed were found to be consistent with advance information provided by the Argentine Government. All scientific equipment examined was of a standard type and typical of that used for the environmental science programs described above.

The station commander was aware of the approved conservation guidelines and stated that the station personnel were under instructions to conform to them. There were no indications of wildlife disturbance.

There was no indication that equipment or installations were being used for military purposes or in any military activity. A few small arms were the only weapons observed. Personnel from the Argentine Naval Detachment appeared to be assigned solely in a support capacity.

There was no evidence of the use of nuclear energy in any form.

#### AUSTRALIAN STATIONS

##### WILKES


Scientific work conducted at this station is primarily synoptic in nature. The program consists of meteorological observations; auroral observations; micropulsation recordings; ionospheric soundings; riometer recordings; magnetometer monitoring of the earth's field; solar radiation observations; cosmic ray measurements; cold adaption by humans; and glaciological measurements.

Scientific work programs, equipment and arms observed were found to be consistent with advance information provided by the Australian Government. All equipment examined was of a standard type and typical of that used for the science programs described above.

Careful conservation of wildlife and wildlife habitats appeared to be practiced. Expedition members are required to observe all sanctuary

\* See *ibid.*, 1964, pp. 195-203.

APPENDIX  
**TRACK OF USCGC EASTWIND  
 DURING THE  
 1967 U.S. INSPECTION  
 OF ANTARCTIC STATIONS**



**Figure 1**

regulations. They are enjoined not to kill, harm or disturb animals except for those seals taken, under quota, to feed sledge dogs. The dogs are kept chained.

There was no indication that equipment or installations were being used for military purposes or in any military activity. A few small arms are the only weapons at this station.

There was no evidence of the use of nuclear energy in any form.

The inspection reported above also included structures at the replacement station now partially constructed about two miles south of Wilkes. The Wilkes Ice Cap Station (55 miles south) was not visited due to inclement weather conditions.

#### MAWSON

The scientific program at Mawson was similar to that at Wilkes. Mawson is situated more favorably for observing auroral activity; thus greater emphasis is placed on the auroral program there. Synoptic observations were being made of events in the upper atmosphere, meteorology, seismology and geomagnetism. The station physician was conducting a study of physiological adaptation to the cold environment. An extensive tellurometer traverse was made during 1966.

Scientific work programs, equipment and arms observed were found to be consistent with advance information provided by the Australian Government. All equipment examined was of a standard type and typical of that used for the science programs described above.

Careful conservation of wildlife and wildlife habitats appeared to be practiced. Expedition members are required to observe all sanctuary regulations. They are enjoined not to kill, harm or disturb animals except for those seals taken, under quota, to feed sledge dogs. The dogs are kept chained.

There was no indication that equipment or installations were being used for military purposes or in any military activity. A few small arms are the only weapons at this station.

There was no evidence of the use of nuclear energy in any form.

#### FRENCH STATION

##### DUMONT D'URVILLE

The scientific program emphasizes data acquisition in the fields of geophysics; observations are made in seismology, terrestrial magnetism, ionospheric studies, meteorology, radioactivity measurements, and cosmic radiation. The biological program is focused on the study of birds, especially penguins, skuas and petrels, in which anatomy, physiology and banding are stressed. A rocket firing program was completed three days before this inspection. The firings were designed to study the anomalies of the upper atmosphere centered on the local magnetic noon.

Scientific work programs, equipment and instruments observed were found to be consistent with advance information provided by the French Government. All equipment examined was of a standard type and typical of that used for the science programs described above.

Station personnel were adhering to conservation practices, and conservation guidelines appeared to be followed. Although penguins

abound at and about the station, there was no evidence that they were being disturbed or molested. A restricted number are taken for research purposes. There are no dogs or other alien forms of fauna or flora.

There was no indication that equipment or installations were being used for military purposes or in any military activity.

There was no evidence of the use of nuclear energy in any form.

#### JAPANESE STATION

##### SHOWA

Great activity was noted in refurbishing old structures and building new ones. The station was reopened in 1965. Structures in the central area are connected with semi-circular, corrugated steel passageways permitting movement between the buildings without exposure to the elements. A helicopter pad with a traffic control building has been established adjacent to the central complex.

Scientific studies encompass cosmic rays; aurora and airglow; atmospheric emissions over a wide range of radio frequencies; upper air ozone and radiation measurements; geomagnetic and seismic observations. The biology program emphasizes the study of marine invertebrates and microbiology.

Scientific work programs, equipment and instruments observed were found to be consistent with advance information provided by the Japanese Government. All equipment examined was of a standard type and typical of that used for the science programs described above.

Conservation guidelines appeared to be observed. There is a natural dearth of birds and mammals in the vicinity of Showa.

There was no indication that equipment or installations were being used for military purposes or in any military activity.

There was no evidence of the use of nuclear energy in any form.

#### SOUTH AFRICAN STATION

##### SANAE<sup>4</sup>

This station is located on a floating ice shelf and buildings are now about 30 feet beneath the snow. Most instruments and antennas used in the scientific program are on the surface, but many of them are serviced by remote reading and recording devices having terminals located below.

Observational and research programs are under way in auroral and airglow observation; cosmic rays; meteorology; geodesy and cartography; geology; geomagnetism; gravimetry; glaciology; and seismology. The program of medicine and biology is primarily directed toward evaluation of man's adaptation to a cold environment.

Scientific work programs, equipment and arms observed were found to be consistent with advance information provided by the South African Government. All equipment examined was of a standard type and typical of that used for the science programs described above.

Guidelines for conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora appear to be followed. Generally, there is a lack of birds and mammals near this

<sup>4</sup> South African National Antarctic Expedition.

station. Some seals are taken, under quota, to provide food for sledge dogs. The dogs are kept chained.

There was no indication that equipment or installations were being used for military purposes or in any military activity. A few small arms are retained in the station leader's custody.

There was no evidence of the use of nuclear energy in any form.

#### UNITED KINGDOM STATION

##### SIGNY

Scientific work is concentrated on biological studies. Ornithological research includes studies of feeding habits and continuation of a bird marking program begun in 1947-48. A study of fish physiology is in progress. Other biological programs are examining soil bacteria; algae; the ecology of lichens, and community analyses of mosses. A routine synoptic program of meteorological surface observations is also carried out.

Scientific work programs, equipment and arms observed were found to be consistent with advance information provided by the United Kingdom. All equipment examined was of a standard type and typical of that used for the science programs described above.

Guidelines for the conservation of fauna and flora appear to be followed. The living resources in and near Signy station have been the subjects of extensive research and all of the personnel there are well indoctrinated in the following of sound conservation practices. The relationship between conservation practice and the biological orientation of the scientific program was quite evident.

There was no indication that equipment or installations were being used for military purposes or in any military activity. A few small arms are retained in the custody of the station leader.

There was no evidence of the use of nuclear energy in any form.

#### UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS STATION

##### MOLODEZHINAYA

Observers were informed that extensive additional construction was planned in order to complete the station in another two or three years. Several new buildings were finished within the past year and a tank farm for storage of aviation and diesel fuel was recently completed. A new power house was under construction.

The scientific program is concentrated on meteorological and geophysical research. It includes the usual meteorological recordings plus radiosonde measurements. Actinometric and ozonometric information is collected. There is a program of visual auroral observation. Other studies encompass geology, glaciology and hydrology.

Scientific work programs, equipment and instruments observed were found to be consistent with advance information provided by the Soviet Government. All equipment examined was of a standard type and typical of that used for the science programs described above.

Guidelines for the conservation of living resources appear to be followed. There are few seals in the area and bird colonies are remote from the station.

There was no indication that equipment or installations were being used for military purposes or in any military activity.

There was no evidence of the use of nuclear energy in any form.

#### DANISH SHIP

##### M/S THALA DAN

The Motor Ship *Thala Dan* was under charter from J. Lauritzen, Copenhagen to Expeditions Polaires Francaises, Paris. The ship was subchartered by the Antarctic Division, Department of External Affairs, Melbourne, Australia, for a portion of its voyage, and was unloading cargo at Wilkes station when the inspection was conducted.

The ship was being unloaded with great urgency as it was behind schedule after having been stuck for two weeks in the pack ice. For this reason, Observers limited their examination to the hold then being emptied, some interior compartments, and a tour of all weather decks.

Cargo sighted consisted of equipment for the annual resupply of Wilkes, or for construction of the replacement station being erected nearby. The material in this cargo was typical for the activity described.

The ship was commercially configured and unarmed.

There was no indication of any Treaty violations.

#### Interview of Foreign Minister Brandt With *Deutschlandfunk* [Extracts], July 2, 1967<sup>1</sup>

*Question: Mr. Minister, since the government statement at the beginning of the grand coalition you have been trying to achieve what you call "regulated coexistence." Would you agree that you and the government have not succeeded significantly in this respect?*

*Answer: I certainly understand the impatience of people in both parts of Germany who are awaiting practical results. I have less understanding for the argument that all the time and effort spent have been in vain, that nothing has come of it. You may recall that I coined the term "regulated coexistence" more than a year ago at the Dortmund SPD congress. An equivalent foreign term would be "modus vivendi," or the elimination of political and legal positions on which agreement cannot be achieved. It now appears that Ulbricht and his adherents prefer isolation. If so, there will not be immediate progress, but the position itself will not become incorrect for that reason. Moreover, the small CDU/CSU-FDP coalition had many years to pursue its policy. And let us not forget that it was the basic thesis of this other policy to become militarily strong so that the Soviet Union would realize the uselessness of its policy. Reunification was to be achieved as a byproduct, so to speak. No one wants to be reminded of*

<sup>1</sup> Cologne radio broadcast, July 2, 1967.

the things that had been foretold and promised at great cost. For seven months we had been trying to develop a different policy, but we have promised no miracles.

*Question: Mr. Brandt, is it not true that at some point a balance sheet must be drawn to determine whether the new road can be used?*

Answer: No, I cannot be dissuaded from the road that I have recognized as proper, regardless of setbacks and disappointments. We must continue to pursue reconciliation with our Eastern neighbors; otherwise a lasting peace cannot be achieved. On the other hand we must not regard inter-German relations, relations with East Berlin, separately. In reality all this affects our Eastern policy as regards improved relations with the East European states, as regards what I have described as the *modus vivendi* between the two parts of Germany. All this will or will not take place naturally, or it will be promoted or endangered through all-European and worldwide developments.

We must state, of course, that public statements of the Soviet Union are not friendly. It is maintained that the new Federal Government also pursues a revanchist policy, or whatever they may call it. On the other hand we must not ignore the fact that there are other phenomena under the propagandistic surface. I am sure that the Soviet leadership is not thinking as schematically and immoderately as statements indicate.

We should not underestimate the establishment of diplomatic relations with Romania. Considerations along this line are continuing in other countries. A competent Czechoslovak stated, for example, that his country cannot ignore the fact that the Federal Government's policy has shown new ways of thinking. Rapid and spectacular results cannot be achieved. Our policy must be formulated for a long-range period. Above all, much distrust must be eliminated.

*Question: Mr. Minister, do I understand that in the long run you are trying to eliminate—to stick to this figure of speech—the heap of distrust which still exists by again pursuing a European peace order? What do you expect of this? Could this not also mean that in the long run we will have to pay the entire mortgage of World War II?*

Answer: If I have understood you correctly, Mr. Barsig, you are citing the arguments of people who are saying perhaps: Keep your hands off. This means sealing Germany's division, recognizing not only the Oder-Neisse line but also the border from Luebeck via Helmsedt to Hof, and possibly incurring great financial burdens. This is how people are arguing, but I feel this is a dangerous oversimplification. We need an orientation which includes the German question as it interrelates with the rest of Europe. For it, we need a concept which includes the basic aspects of a European peace order. The present situation in Europe will not continue forever. East-West relations in Europe are changing; conditions of European security are also changing. It is wrong, for instance, to think that the present stationing of troops will exist for another 20 years.

*Question: Mr. Brandt, I do not expect a detailed answer from you now, but when you speak of and demand a European peace order you must have a basic concept. Can you say something about this?*

**Answer:** First, let me clarify some concepts. What is important is a European security system and beyond this a European peace order; that is, an order which actually eliminates the cold war and political tensions. Now, Mr. Barsig, you wish to know the substance of these basic concepts. Well, I shall begin with three German contributions. First, we favor declarations on the renunciation of force in our relations with the Soviet Union and the East European states. These should be binding under international law, and we are willing to include questions resulting from Germany's division in these declarations. Second, we favor the renunciation of nuclear weapons. Third, we favor a well-balanced and equal reduction of troops in East and West.

At the most recent NATO meeting it was agreed at my suggestion that the activities of the so-called Harmel Committee, named after the Belgian foreign minister, on the subject of a European security system and a European peace order should be accelerated. This, too, is an accomplishment of the new government policy. A European security system in principle is possible in two ways: It could be based on the continued existence of the present pacts, which might be brought into a specific relationship to one another; or the NATO and Warsaw Pacts in Europe could be dissolved and replaced with something new.

To avoid misinterpretations I wish to add here that neither solution need be accompanied by an actual loss of security. No matter what the solution is we will have to proceed from the fact that a European security system cannot be completely isolated from the world powers. This means that it could be interrelated with the rights and obligations of the United States and the Soviet Union. At any rate, all these considerations assume a sterile status quo, which, after all, includes the confrontation of armies and armaments.

We should also not think that a European peace order must confirm the legacy of World War II in Europe. A European peace order should adjust borders and enable new forms of cooperation. For example, it also should include a European ethnical statute. It must not merely declare human rights; it must implement them in a meaningful way. Finally, a European peace order would be an economic union; that is, beyond bilateral trade contacts between East and West, EEC and CEMA would have to be sensibly linked together.

*Question: Let us go from long-range plans to present realistic policy. The NATO Council meeting in Luxembourg, with your consent, again advocated detente and arms limitations or troop reductions in central Europe. The West, primarily for financial reasons, has made certain concessions in advance with the rotation system. British Foreign Secretary Brown learned in Moscow, however, that the Soviet Union is not about to reciprocate. How do you expect to get things moving?*

**Answer:** Well, in our talks I did not get the impression that Mr.

Brown's Moscow talks were absolutely negative. However, as far as this matter is concerned I must make myself clear. After all, Moscow authorities read the papers. Considering that for months and months it has been publicly discussed that Allied troops in the Federal Republic will be reduced, no one can expect the Soviet Union to see any reason to consider a similar move. When this is discussed in Moscow the military leaders will naturally say: Why should we make concessions in return for something that we can receive without them?

*Question: When you argue this way, however, nothing at all will be achieved in this field within the foreseeable future. After all, the foreign exchange agreement is valid only for one year. You or your diplomats will have to conduct new negotiations in the near future.*

Answer: No. In the American case a model has been found, namely, to operate outside the budget, which I believe we can apply in the future. We have, of course, in general the urgent desire to obtain long-term agreements. The Soviet Union will be more interested in negotiations in this respect when the order of priorities in the West has been established for a longer period of time. One must realize that this does not concern only foreign exchange. I believe in a policy which tries to accomplish regional arms limitations simultaneously and in equal amounts. However, I am also telling the Soviet Union that it should not overlook the positive long-term opportunity for a coordinated although not formally negotiated position.

*Question: But is it not so that the chance of finding even political solutions in the agreement on arms limitations has become considerably smaller in the course of time? I am thinking, for example, of a Soviet note which is now 11 years old—that of 27 April 1957, in which the Soviet Union argued against the alleged nuclear arming of the Bundeswehr and related this to the national unity of Germany.<sup>2</sup> The current situation with regard to the nonproliferation treaty, or the treaty for which we are striving, is that no attempt has been made to connect this treaty with political problems.*

Answer: This certainly would have been an attempt on an unsuitable subject. You yourself pointed out that the Soviet note is 10 years old, and what has been missed is gone forever. Whoever believes, with respect to our problems, that more could be achieved now in connection with the nuclear nonproliferation treaty than just the treaty itself is deluding himself. The treaty is significant just by itself. Our objections are known, but they were never directed against the principle of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons but rather against undesired consequences for the economy and research. On the other hand, we favor a clear connection with further steps toward armament limitation and control.

*Question: What could now be done concretely in the military field since you have made so many reservations?*

Answer: As I have already said our aim should be a European security system. In preliminary phases one should discuss, for example,

<sup>2</sup> *The New York Times*, Apr. 28, 1957, p. 27.

the contents of the peace note, which was strongly influenced by the SPD, although the latter was in the opposition at the time. In a number of sectors, however, matters have developed further, and different emphases are required today. Therefore, as soon as we have found a common basis with our Western allies these questions can be discussed. I have already named the most important ones: equal troop reductions, renunciation of force, inspection zones, exchange of maneuver observers, and other things.

### Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Verification of Underground Test Ban, July 11, 1967<sup>1</sup>

2. The United States Government is convinced that the forces of science and technology should be applied as earnestly to the task of controlling and eliminating nuclear weapons as they have been to creating them. For this reason, in particular, we welcome the important statement made by the representative of Sweden at our 309th meeting setting forth the Swedish scientific analysis concerning verification of a comprehensive test ban.

3. Mrs. Myrdal was correct in anticipating that the results of the Swedish study may seem optimistic. They do seem so to us. However, optimism is a spirit indispensable to us here in this Committee—it sustains our search for realistic and practical solutions to the problems we must face.

4. My Government is giving careful attention to Mrs. Myrdal's report. In my statement today I shall have some of the answers Mrs. Myrdal requested. We shall also have several questions of our own, asking for further information which the United States Government needs for its study of some of the points the Swedish representative has raised.

5. Most importantly, Mrs. Myrdal asked whether the Governments of nuclear-weapon Powers represented here are "really ready to stop nuclear weapon testing, or, if they are not ready to do so, whether it is for reasons of national security or for other reasons." This is indeed an important question and Mrs. Myrdal has asked for a frank answer. I should therefore like to state clearly that the United States does continue to desire, and does continue to seek, an adequately-verified comprehensive test-ban treaty.

6. Mrs. Myrdal's question seems to suggest that verification of a comprehensive test ban is no longer a difficult problem because of advances in seismology and that therefore, if countries permit verification to stand in the way, it must be because they do not want a test ban. In fact, Mrs. Myrdal concludes that "the control issue can no longer be used as a convenient reason for holding up an agreement in this field."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.312, pp. 4-9.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 276.

7. The verification analysis presented by Mrs. Myrdal, however, needs considerable clarification. I am convinced that the questions we have to ask about this analysis will make evident that the verification issue remains a complex one, and that one set of computations alone cannot suffice to resolve the political and practical problems.

8. First of all, however, I should like to discuss the relationship between national security and arms control measures in general.

9. The appeal of arms control measures must rest on whether they enhance the security of the nations agreeing to them. In our deliberations on the non-proliferation treaty, for example, I have made clear my Government's conviction that no nation should be asked to sign this treaty if it does not promote its national security within the world community as well as meet the world-wide concern over the growing threat of nuclear war. We believe that the non-proliferation treaty which we envisage will serve this purpose for its parties. We seek no more than this in a comprehensive test ban—that is, that it serve the security interests of those States agreeing to it.

10. Thus, in my Government's view, national security considerations are not an obstacle to agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty but must rather be the foundation of agreement. To be consonant with security, a comprehensive test-ban treaty must afford a means for verifying that each party is fulfilling its obligations. That is to say, one of two parties cannot be expected to cease an activity in which both are engaged and which is an important factor in their strategic relationship unless it is convinced that the other party also is ending that activity.

11. We are ready today, as in the past, to negotiate an effective treaty. Moreover, we have made clear that it is modern science which will determine our position on the verification procedures needed to establish that such a treaty is being fully observed. This is not merely rhetoric. We are matching our words with a programme of scientific research and development which I believe is internationally unprecedented and unequalled. In particular, we are devoting scientific manpower and materials to research aimed at improving techniques for seismic detection and identification. We are endeavouring to gain new insights into possible procedures for identifying a greater number of seismic events of lower magnitude by instruments alone, thus minimizing the number of inspections needed for verifying a comprehensive test ban. In addition, the United States Government's work in this field has also contributed to important research and analysis by other nations interested in solving the verification problem, as Mrs. Myrdal indicated in the statement to which I have been referring.

12. Mrs. Myrdal also expressed concern that the need to develop the technology of peaceful nuclear explosive devices might be adduced as a new argument against a comprehensive test ban. I can assure the Committee that we have no intention of doing this. At our meeting of 21 March I proposed a series of principles for dealing with the problem of sharing any potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions.<sup>3</sup> One of those principles was that there should be full consultation among nuclear and non-nuclear parties to the limited test-ban Treaty

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 172-174.

about any amendments of that treaty required in order to carry out feasible projects. My Government believes that this principle should be applied to the same effect in the case of an extension of the treaty to cover underground tests and to the establishment thereunder of agreed procedures for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

13. As I indicated at the outset of my remarks, I am in a position today to respond to only some of the questions raised by the Swedish representative at our 309th meeting. Our study of Mrs. Myrdal's important statement on that occasion is continuing and would benefit from the further information which the representative of Sweden indicated may be forthcoming about the probability methods the Swedish scientists employed in their investigation of verification systems. From a preliminary examination of Mrs. Myrdal's report we judge that there are a number of technical points that will need to be clarified and elaborated before we can confidently evaluate it.

14. Mrs. Myrdal stated that the Swedish scientists proceeded from the assumption of two political requirements for a convincing control system. The first of these is that it should provide sufficient deterrence against violations by making the probability of detection sufficiently high. We agree that this is an important consideration. The second assumed requirement Mrs. Myrdal referred to was that the control system contain adequate assurance against the risk that earthquakes might be mistaken for explosions and induce unwarranted political accusations.

15. Later in her statement the Swedish representative cited verification methods which she said would provide sufficient deterrence in that earthquakes would be mistaken for explosions only once in fifteen or more years. This, too, is an important requirement. A comprehensive test ban, to be stable, should prevent situations giving rise to unwarranted suspicions which might lead to a breakdown of the agreement. Since we last made a detailed presentation on the subject a little more than a year ago,<sup>4</sup> we have continued to make improvements in our instrumentation and analytical techniques for the seismic detection and identification of underground events. Since then, in addition to improving our ability to determine the depth at which the seismic event occurs, we have developed instruments and analytical methods for increasing our capability to differentiate between earthquakes and underground explosions by observation of the long-period surface waves.

16. However, despite these improvements, the exploitation of which is still going forward, there still occur each year in many countries which have the potential for nuclear testing natural seismic events that are indistinguishable from explosions. No data that we have or have ever seen presented support anything like the small number of only one earthquake being mistaken for an explosion every fifteen years which was referred to by Mrs. Myrdal. Only by supplementing seismic methods with on-site inspections can we hope to reduce the number of unidentified events to such a level. We should therefore be particularly interested in studying the data on which Mrs. Myrdal's statement is based.

<sup>4</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 190-199.

17. This problem, however, should not be confused with another—in fact reverse—problem which is more vital to the national security of the parties. That reverse problem is the question of how likely it is that an underground nuclear explosion will be indistinguishable from an earthquake, and thus pass unnoticed. We should be interested to know how this was considered by the Swedish scientists in reaching their conclusions about the sufficiency of deterrence afforded by particular verification methods. Obviously, if a verification system affords a potential violator sufficient probability that his nuclear explosion will be mistaken abroad for an earthquake—and thus pass unnoticed—that system must remain unacceptable.

18. In another section of her statement, the Swedish representative reports the scientific investigators' conclusion that with the so-called complexity method of identification from long distances sufficient deterrence should be attainable with only one inspection in two years. While this method has applicability to the identification of the larger events, we do not know the basis for concluding that it would reduce the need for inspection to such a low level.

19. We understand that the Swedish scientists assumed in their investigations that on-site inspections would be 50 per cent effective. Now, in estimating the effectiveness of such inspections one must evaluate first the ability to locate an unidentified seismic event. Secondly, one must know or hypothesize the particular inspection methods authorized by a test ban providing for on-site inspection. The procedures prescribed by the parties for assuring themselves of the nature of an unidentified event will, of course, be most important to those who wish to be confident that the exercise of the right of inspection will in fact provide a meaningful opportunity to verify compliance with the treaty. In this connexion we should appreciate Mrs. Myrdal's providing this Committee with further information about the significance of the recent developments in fact-finding machinery to which she referred.

20. Mrs. Myrdal stated also that the Swedish scientists' estimates were made on the assumption of 200 detected shallow earthquakes per year in any politically-interesting area that would have to be scrutinized for identification purposes. In this connexion we should like to know whether and how the Swedish scientists have taken into consideration the magnitude of the seismic events being considered. This is important because militarily-significant underground tests can be of yields generating low-magnitude seismic signals, and we know that all discrimination criteria become less effective at lower magnitudes because of interfering effects of seismic noise. We should be interested to know, therefore, whether any variation of the discrimination capabilities of the verification system with the magnitude of the seismic event has been considered.

21. Mrs. Myrdal commented that the results of the Swedish study may have to be adjusted when more extensive observational data are made available. In this connexion she called upon the United States Government to add to its earlier contributions a description of our latest scientific investigations.

22. Mrs. Myrdal requested information on any experiments to follow up the Longshot experiment on which we have reported to this

Committee.<sup>6</sup> Last autumn we conducted a series of high-explosive tests in the Kuriles, the results of which will be published very shortly. Further experiments of this type will be conducted near the site of the Longshot experiment this summer. This programme is aimed at reducing biases in the location of seismic events in these highly seismic island chains. While we are still continuing our analyses in this area we should be glad, as we have in the past, to make our information available to this Committee.

23. To assist in evaluating inherent technical problems associated with verification the United States would certainly be receptive to any Swedish or other proposals that would serve to enlarge international understanding in these problem areas. In this connexion it must be emphasized that these problems cannot be solved by the United States alone. They also require the co-operation of other nations. My Government is convinced, however, that a solution can be found provided there is patience, determination and good will. These are the sentiments with which the United States looks forward to carrying out this task.

24. If I may take another moment, I should like to refer to the fact that one of the charter members of our Committee, General Burns of Canada, has just been signally honoured by his country. He has been named a Companion of the Order of Canada, which is the highest honour the Canadian Government can bestow on one of its citizens. General Burns is one of only thirty-five persons to be so honoured. I am sure that all the members of this Committee will join me in congratulating the General on this new and further recognition of his services as a soldier, a peace-keeper and a disarmar.

### Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, July 13, 1967<sup>1</sup>

2. The Soviet delegation has asked for the floor in order to make some observations in connexion with the exchange of views which has taken place in recent weeks in our Committee on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and on some other questions which have been touched upon in the course of the debate.

3. In fact, all the delegations that have spoken in the Eighteen-Nation Committee have expressed themselves in favour of concluding an effective international treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The work which we are carrying on in the Committee and the exchange of views which is taking place both in the official meetings of our Conference and outside it are a positive contribution to the accomplishment of this important task entrusted to us by the United Nations General Assembly.

4. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Alexei Nikolaevich Kosygin, speaking at

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 503-595.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.313, pp. 4-8.

a press conference in New York on 25 June, stated with regard to the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons:

... we consider that in this direction there has been a great change for the better, and ... we are continuing to work in order to carry the solution of this problem through to the end.<sup>2</sup>

5. During the current session we have heard a number of interesting statements on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The discussion taking place in the Committee gives a definite idea of the points of view of the delegations and contributes to the achievement of agreements acceptable to all parties. We should like to observe in this connexion that the Soviet side gives due attention to the idea that, when the provisions of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are being worked out, the considerations put forward by the representatives of the various countries should be taken into account.

6. The present state of the exchange of views makes it possible to note the obvious fact that the countries participating in the work of the Committee have declared their resolve to support the main principle which should constitute the fundamental content of a non-proliferation treaty: namely the principle that the treaty must provide for effective obligations under international law which reliably close any ways to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Whatever the nuances and shades of meaning in the positions of the various delegations that have spoken during the past debates, all agree that a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with resolution 2028 (XX) should be void of any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form.<sup>3</sup>

7. The representative of Mexico, Mr. Castañeda, speaking in favour of an effective non-proliferation treaty, declared at our meeting of 13 June:

It is acknowledged that one of the greatest dangers to peace—even greater perhaps than a direct confrontation between the big nuclear Powers—would be that other smaller countries, if they came to have nuclear potential, however small, would be able to undertake an action which very soon would inevitably involve the great Powers and unleash a general atomic war.<sup>4</sup>

8. In the exchange of views which is taking place in the Committee on the subject of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, a great place is given to the question of what influence this treaty might have on the peaceful development of nuclear energy. This question was dealt with, in particular, by the representative of India, Mr. Trivedi, at the 298th meeting<sup>5</sup> and by the representative of Brazil, Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, at the 310th meeting,<sup>6</sup> as well as by the representatives of some other countries taking part in the work of the Committee. In some of those statements the opinion was expressed

<sup>2</sup> *Antc.* p. 270 (variant translation).

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 532-534.

<sup>4</sup> ENDC/PV.304, p. 5.

<sup>5</sup> *Antc.* pp. 229-230.

<sup>6</sup> ENDC/PV.310, pp. 4-13.

that a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons might to some extent prevent non-nuclear countries from using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

9. The Soviet delegation has already set forth its point of view on this question. We note with satisfaction that many delegations have expressed their agreement with the argument adduced by us at the meeting of 18 May to the effect that the solution of the non-proliferation problem is one of the most important conditions that would ensure for the non-nuclear countries the most rapid and successful development of their peaceful atomic industry.<sup>7</sup>

10. Thus at our meeting of 23 May the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Winkler, stated the following:

The treaty would not limit the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in any way. It would not be a strait-jacket for them. No activity in the field of peaceful research, or in industrial and commercial uses of nuclear energy on a national or international scale, would be affected in any way by the non-proliferation treaty. On the contrary, we think that the treaty would open new avenues to broad international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses.<sup>8</sup>

Statements in the same sense have been made at our meetings by the representatives of Poland, Bulgaria, Mexico, Sweden and some other countries.

11. It is quite obvious that the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would enable non-nuclear countries to concentrate all their scientific, technical and material resources on the peaceful utilization of the achievements of nuclear physics and would create the most favourable conditions for the development of broad international co-operation in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

12. During the debate the representatives of a number of non-aligned countries also raised the question of how to reconcile the solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with the use of nuclear explosions by non-nuclear countries for peaceful purposes. We think that the solution of this question should be based on the principle that, on the one hand, the non-proliferation treaty should not deprive non-nuclear countries of the possibilities that are connected with nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes: on the other hand, the concrete solution of this question should not nullify the main objective of the treaty—the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The crux of the problem lies in the fact that any device for carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in no way differs in principle from devices having military importance. This fact is beyond dispute.

13. Therefore, if we wish to have a really effective treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, one which would leave no loopholes or chinks for States that wished to get hold of nuclear weapons, it is indispensable that this treaty should also cover the non-proliferation of any nuclear explosive devices. Obviously, in doing so, it should not infringe upon the interests of States which would wish in the future to use nuclear explosive devices in order to carry out some

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, p. 219.

<sup>8</sup> ENDC/PV.298, pp. 20-1.

particular project in the field of economic development. We consider that this problem, including the procedure and conditions for carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, could be settled on the basis of a separate international agreement. Thus the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should not be an obstacle to the achievement of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

14. The statements of the representatives of non-aligned countries—particularly those of the representatives of India, Brazil and Sweden—touched upon the consideration that the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should contain an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of both the nuclear and the non-nuclear States. We fully understand that point of view.

15. The Soviet Union, as is known, has always advocated, and continues to advocate, effective nuclear disarmament. Guided by our position of principle, we regard the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a first step towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race, towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. In our opinion the conclusion of such a treaty, by bringing about a higher degree of confidence in relations between States, would open up more favourable possibilities for achieving agreement on other disarmament questions and in the first place on questions of nuclear disarmament.

16. For the Soviet Union there is no question of whether or not to accept provisions obliging the nuclear Powers to act in the direction of nuclear disarmament. We consider that the draft treaty on non-proliferation should contain provisions testifying to the willingness of the parties to it to endeavour to solve the problems of disarmament and, above all, the problem of nuclear disarmament. In our opinion the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should provide a clear perspective in regard to the problem of disarmament as a whole, by confirming the will of all the parties to the treaty to strive for the exclusion of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles from the arsenals of States.

17. One of the most important steps towards nuclear disarmament would be the discontinuation by the nuclear Powers of all tests of nuclear weapons, including underground nuclear explosions. This question was touched upon in the statements made by some representatives in the Committee. We have considered attentively the well-thought-out statement, based on modern scientific data, which was made on this question at the 309th meeting of the Committee by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal. In her statement Mrs. Myrdal put forward some considerations concerning the practical possibilities of solving this important problem.

18. The conclusion drawn by Mrs. Myrdal in regard to ways of putting an end to underground tests of nuclear weapons is of great importance for the solution of this problem. We should like to draw particular attention to the passage in the statement of the representative of Sweden in which she declared that—

... the whole concept of control in relation to a ban on underground nuclear

\* *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 576-579.

explosions has to be looked at anew; to our mind, the control issue can no longer be used as a convenient reason for holding up an agreement in this field.<sup>10</sup>

In her statement the representative of Sweden stressed the idea that with the contemporary level of development of science and technology the means of control existing in many countries are adequate for keeping an effective check on the fulfilment of an agreement to ban underground nuclear tests.

19. The representative of Sweden put a direct question to the nuclear Powers asking if their Governments were really ready to stop nuclear weapon testing. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, as we have already stated on more than one occasion, the Soviet side is prepared to agree without delay to the prohibition of all underground tests of nuclear weapons, using national means of detection for control over this prohibition.

20. In our statement we have been able to set forth some of our considerations only in regard to a few questions and views that have been put forward here in the Committee recently. In doing so we should like to emphasize that the Soviet side will endeavour to ensure that the fullest use is made of all constructive ideas and considerations put forward in our Conference and aimed at solving the problems set before us and particularly at solving the problem of nuclear disarmament. We express the hope that the exchange of views in the Committee during the current session on disarmament questions will prove fruitful for the accomplishment of the important aim set before us.

21. In limiting our statement today to the exposition of a few considerations connected with the discussion taking place in the Committee, the Soviet delegation intends to make a detailed statement on the problem of non-proliferation as a whole at the appropriate time.

### News Conference Remarks by Secretary of State Rusk [Extracts], July 19, 1967<sup>1</sup>

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the fact that the Soviet Union is continuing to ship arms into the Middle East and in view of the fact that the logic of American policy in this area has always been to maintain a relative equilibrium on arms, does this place a great pressure and burden on the United States to perhaps lift its arms embargo?*

*A. Well, in the first place, we very much regret this neighborhood arms race in the Middle East.*

*In 1962, when I appeared at the Geneva disarmament conference, I pressed the conference to give attention not just to the overriding arms race, say, between the United States and the Soviet Union, but also to give its attention to the lesser arms races in different parts of*

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 276.

<sup>1</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, Aug. 7, 1967, pp. 160-161, 164-166.

the world.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, we encountered considerable indifference to these neighborhood arms races.

Now, the intrusion of major arms into the Middle East by the Soviet Union in such countries as Egypt and Syria and Algeria raised problems not only affecting the security of Israel but also affecting the security of neighboring Arab countries.

We have ourselves tried not to become a principal supplier of arms in that region. But we are committed to the political independence and the territorial integrity of the states of the Middle East. And when imbalances of a major proportion occurred, we felt it was necessary for us to supply some limited military assistance to certain of the Arab countries and to Israel.

Now, the answer to this ought to be some understanding among the arms recipients and the arms suppliers to put some sort of ceiling on the arms race in the Middle East. Because whatever one thinks about it otherwise, these burgeoning military establishments do divert important resources and scarce resources away from the economic and social development of the countries of that area. President Johnson has emphasized this point among his five principles with respect to a permanent settlement in the Middle East.<sup>3</sup> We would like very much to see some arrangement by which defense establishments in the Middle East are kept within reasonable bounds in order that there not be that diversion of resources and in order that arms themselves not be a major source of tension which could set off additional hostilities.

We will continue to work at this in the United Nations and in capitals. I would not be able to say today that I am encouraged about the prospects, because the resupply of certain of the countries by the Soviet Union has been going on apace, and this will raise security questions for not only Israel but also certain of the Arab countries.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you view the continuing Soviet arms shipments to the Arab countries at this time? Do you look at it as a decision to try and replace most of the Soviet arms that were lost or destroyed during the war? Or do you look on it as more or less a stopgap move by the Soviet Union?*

A. Well, I can't really interpret what has happened thus far. There has been some significant resupply of arms to certain of the countries there following the recent hostilities.

What the long-range purpose of the Soviet Union would be in this matter, I am not in a position to say.

What we would like to see is some understanding, perhaps through the United Nations, about the supply of arms. We would be glad to make our own arms shipments to that area public—to register them in some suitable fashion if others would do the same. We, as a matter of fact, don't keep these things secret ourselves on a unilateral basis, so that these matters become known.

What we would like to have is some sort of understanding—whether in general or in detail (because details are difficult to work out)—that the arms-supplying nations will not themselves be responsible for a

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. I, p. 142.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 263-264.

major renewal of an arms race in the Middle East. Because down that trail lies a possible catastrophe.

*Q. Understandably, since the explosion of this latest nuclear bomb, there has been considerable discussion in India and elsewhere about the consequences which arise. And there is also growing fear. So what is your thinking on this, particularly in view of the fact that India is now seeking apparently, both from you and the Soviet Union, some amount of guarantees?*

A. Well, I think no one would think that the development of nuclear power in mainland China is a contribution toward peace. As far as we are concerned, one nuclear power was too many, and I think history will record that the rejection of the Baruch proposals in 1946<sup>4</sup> was a great tragedy for all of mankind, because had they been accepted, there would have been no nuclear powers.

This question of guarantees is a matter of considerable importance, because empty guarantees are of no particular value. Real guarantees are very serious and solemn questions for the governments concerned. I have no doubt this question will come up in Geneva in the discussions of the nonproliferation treaty and perhaps in the Security Council of the United Nations. But there are no conclusions drawn by governments so far that I know of. That is a matter that we are continuing to give thought to.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been many months since you raised the subject with the Soviet Union about talks on a freeze on strategic missiles. Lacking any agreement by the Russians actually to talk with the United States, do you think perhaps the administration should go ahead with a decision to deploy at least a small system?*

A. Well, first, we have in our defense budget for the next fiscal year funds to support those steps which we would in any event be taking, so that we are not diverting or slowing down our own plans in that regard.

Secondly, we do not have yet a definitive answer from the Soviet Union which would let us make any judgment as to whether some understanding can be reached on this point. They told us a little more than 3 months ago that they were prepared to discuss this subject.

Now, this is a very complex subject, but it's a very important one, and we would like to initiate these discussions just as soon as the Soviet Union is prepared to do so.

I noted that Mr. Kosygin, in his press conference at the United Nations following the Glassboro talks, referred to our interest solely in defensive missiles.<sup>5</sup> Now, this is not the case. We are prepared to talk about both offensive and defensive missiles, because at the heart of this is a very simple problem.

<sup>4</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 7-16.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, p. 270.

If both sides deploy ABM's in any significant way, then both sides will be compelled to multiply their offensive missiles for the purpose of saturating such defenses, because neither side can accept the consequences of unilateral incapability of inflicting very great damage upon the other.

Now, the effect of all this is that we could take two paths. We could, without any understandings and without any joint action in this field—we could go down the road of deploying ABM systems and multiplying offensive missile systems at the cost of tens upon tens of billions of dollars and come out strategically about where we are today. Or we could find some understanding which would avoid that course and save those tens upon tens of billions of dollars.

Now, we think the second course is the course of prudence and is a course which is more in keeping with our obligations to our own peoples in both countries to prevent a radical escalation of the levels of defense budgets and to save those resources for the unfinished business which both we and the Russian people have in our own societies.

## Swedish Memorandum Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Control of an Underground Test Ban Treaty, July 19, 1967<sup>1</sup>

### 1. Purpose

The purpose of this document is to provide a more detailed explanation of the scientific background to some of the statements on the problems of underground test ban control, made by the Representative of Sweden in the ENDC on June 29, 1967.<sup>2</sup> To make it more generally accessible, descriptive language has been used. To be fully understandable some of the points would, however, require an explanation in mathematical terms.

As stated in the speech, the Swedish investigations have been concentrated on the question of how to use seismological methods of identification to distinguish underground explosions among earthquakes for the purpose of verifying an underground test ban treaty.

### 2. Analytical method used

The statistical method of evaluation employed constitutes an application of decision theory and is a further development of the method described in a report from the National Defence Research Institute in Stockholm.<sup>3</sup> It has been used to evaluate both the case of control with inspection and the case of such control without inspection.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/191, July 19, 1967. Gloss in original.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 272-278.

<sup>3</sup> National Defence Research Institute, *Approaches to Some Test Ban Control Problems* (Stockholm Rept. C 4286-20(23) 1967).

The basic assumption made was that a convincing control system would have to satisfy two political requirements:

(1) It should provide sufficient deterrence against violations by making the probability for discovery sufficiently high;

(2) It should contain adequate assurance against the risk that "freaks of nature", in the form of earthquakes similar in appearance to explosions, should induce unwarranted political accusations.

These political requirements were put into mathematical form together with the statistical properties of the identification method investigated. The quantities obtained were then used in a mathematical model of control procedures which takes into account the always present risks of mistaking explosions for earthquakes and vice versa. (The appearance now and then of explosions looking like earthquakes is covered in this way). This model then provides a procedure by which to determine the level of earthquake similarity below which an event is regarded as an explosion. This level is selected in such a way as to provide the required deterrence against violations and at the same time providing sufficient assurance against mistakes concerning earthquakes. An essential feature of the method employed is that it also permits the determination of the most efficient level of earthquake-similarity, efficient in the sense that the required deterrent is maintained at the same time as—in the non-inspection case—the risk for mistakes concerning earthquakes is made as small as possible. Likewise, in the inspection case, the number of inspections required is minimized.

In conclusion, the method employed provides a procedure to determine whether a particular identification method, exploited in the most efficient way, meets a particular political control requirement or not.

3. *Specific assumptions*

The method involves eight basic quantities. These are described more fully in the following. In order to be able to make the calculations, specific numerical values have been assigned to some of them. This is also explained below.

For three of the eight quantities the numerical values are determined by nature and by the observational techniques available.

For the purpose of calculation, the number of earthquakes per year in the area to be monitored was taken as 200. According to an official statement in the United States<sup>4</sup> this corresponds to the yearly number of shallow earthquakes in the Soviet Union, of magnitudes larger than 4. This number has also been said to be not

<sup>4</sup> See *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 86 ff.

far from the corresponding number of earthquakes in the United States. The particular magnitude level of 4 was selected as being close to the level of routine detection by the powerful seismological LASA station in Montana. Events of magnitudes just above this detection level will, because of the sophisticated post detection processing possible with data from this station, have a signal to noise ratio which is helpful to identification analysis also of these weak events. The magnitude corresponds to underground explosions in hard rock of nuclear devices with yields of approximately one kiloton.

Two statistical quantities were employed to describe the particular identification methods considered. One of them is determined by the physical properties of earthquakes and the other by the corresponding properties of explosions. Both are influenced by the particular method of measurement employed. In all, five identification methods were studied. The statistical properties of these various methods were obtained from published reports or from articles in scientific journals. Three of them<sup>5</sup> make use of local or regional data, measured within approximately 1000 km from the event. (For the purpose of test ban control such regional data could be obtained through a proper international data exchange.) The two other identification methods considered<sup>6</sup> employ teleseismic data, obtained at distances between 2000 and 10000 km from the event. (These can thus be used over intercontinental distances.)

The remaining five quantities involved in our analysis express the political requirements of the control procedure. Their numerical determination is largely a matter of political and technical judgement and should be considered as a major step in the definition of a control system.

The sufficient deterrence against violations is defined by two quantities: the number of explosions per year in violation of a treaty and a sufficiently high probability of disclosure of such violations. In our calculations the number of these explosions was chosen to be one per year. The disclosure probability level was put at 10 per cent, meaning that a prospective violator would have to face one chance in ten of being disclosed. This level was estimated to be high enough to deter

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<sup>5</sup>J. Brune, A. Espinosa and J. Oliver in *Journal of Geophysical Research*, June 1, 1963, pp. 3501-3513; E. Jebe and D. Willis, *Earthquake Notes*, Sept.-Oct. 1964, pp. 28-40; A. Booker and W. Mitronovas, *Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America*, vol. 54 (1964), pp. 961-971.

<sup>6</sup>E. J. Kelly, *Semiannual Technical Summary Report on Seismic Discrimination*, Dec. 31, 1966, Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, Mass.; P. D. Marshall, E. W. Carpenter, A. Douglas and J. B. Young, Atomic Weapons Research Establishment rept. No. 0-67/66, Aldermaston, Berks, U.K., Oct. 1966.

from violations in view of the high political costs involved in a disclosure. As a matter of fact, this figure seems to have been used in similar calculations in the United States. It should not be confused with the higher levels of disclosure desirable in intelligence activities, where one, of course, wants to find out as much as possible.

The second political requirement of the control system, as outlined in the Swedish speech, concerns the adequate assurance against the risk that earthquakes, similar in appearance to explosions, could lead to unwarranted political accusations.

In the case of control with inspection the process of verification contains two steps. In the first one mistakes concerning earthquakes on the basis of seismological and collateral evidence are of limited importance as the final political decision will be made only after the second step, that of inspection, has given conclusive evidence of a violation. The case of control with on-site inspection therefore has to take into account the number of such inspections required or permitted. At the outset of our calculations this number was left open as a quantity to be determined by the calculation. In the inspection case the efficiency of inspections also has to be taken into account. This will depend on the inspection procedure provided in the treaty (in past test ban discussions referred to as inspection modalities) and on available techniques for event localization and on-site inspection. This inspection efficiency was taken into account in terms of the probability that inspections of violations will be successful. This probability was put at 50 per cent, being an estimate of what event location capabilities and modalities could provide, taken together.

In the case of control without on-site inspections, the guarantee given by the inspections against mistaking in the final assessment earthquakes for explosions does not exist and has to be replaced by an extremely low probability for making such mistakes. This probability is measured by the expected number of years between such mistakes. In our calculations this number was left open as a quantity to be determined. In assessing the results, we assumed that control systems, where such mistakes are expected to occur only once in a hundred years, are acceptable and that systems with one mistake in ten years are worth being discussed.

#### 4. Results

Using the assumptions described above the calculations showed that some of the identification methods that have been published are of rather limited efficiency. However, data on the British teleseismic or long dis-

tance method of identification by complexity, as presented by Kelly in the report referred to in an earlier footnote and obtained with the LASA station in Montana, indicate the possibility of a control system with no more than one on-site inspection in two years. A similar number of on-site inspections would be sufficient if regional data, proper to the identification method developed in the United States by Booker and Mitronovas and also referred to above, could be obtained, for instance, through an international data exchange. If combined, these two methods should result in a further decrease in the number of on-site inspections required. This constitutes considerable progress if compared with the requirement of several inspections per year stated in the past.

The efficiency of the published identification methods has indeed improved so much during the last years that it has become meaningful to discuss the possibilities for control without inspection. The data on identification by complexity, already referred to, indicate the possibility of an inspection-free control system with the required ten per cent deterrence level and limiting mistakes concerning earthquakes to once in 15 years. This might constitute an acceptable system in itself. It would be further improved if regional data for the Booker and Mitronovas identification method were made available through an international data exchange.

The most promising of the published identification methods is, however, one which makes use of certain simultaneous measurements, from long distances, of long period and short period waves. The value of this method was recognized at an early stage by British scientists and the data on this method, published by Marshall et al. in the British report referred to earlier, indicate the possibility of an inspection-free system operating at a deterrence level of more than 10 per cent and limiting mistakes concerning earthquakes to one in a hundred years. This would be a very impressive system but in this case our estimates rest on rather few observations and one should be cautious in using our conclusions until more data have been made available. To include in its practical application sufficiently low magnitudes this short period/long period method of identification requires that the sensitive short period array stations are combined with arrays of very sensitive long period instruments and powerful computers.

Statement by the Swedish Representative (Edelstam) to the  
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Verification  
of Underground Test Ban, July 20, 1967<sup>1</sup>

3. In a statement made before the Committee on 29 June the head of the Swedish delegation, Mrs. Alva Myrdal, dealt with the subject of a treaty banning underground nuclear tests.<sup>2</sup> She put forward *inter alia* some findings and suggestions of a technical nature intended as a contribution to end if possible the present deadlock on the question of control methods to be employed to monitor such a treaty. With that statement the Swedish delegation wanted to start a new discussion in the Committee on this subject in order to find out if the time was not now ripe to bring the matter of a comprehensive test-ban treaty to a successful end.

4. We have since been gratified to note that other delegations are similarly preoccupied with this subject. I have in mind, of course, the important statements made by the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, at the meeting of 11 July,<sup>3</sup> and by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, at the meeting of 13 July.<sup>4</sup>

5. Mr. Foster put a number of questions to this delegation asking for further information which, he said, the United States Government needed for its study of some of the points made in Mrs. Myrdal's speech. We hope that satisfactory answers to Mr. Foster's questions will be found in the Swedish delegation's document entitled "Memorandum on the control of an underground test ban treaty", which was distributed yesterday and is available to representatives here today.<sup>5</sup> The remarks which I am about to make with specific reference to these questions should be studied together with that document to become meaningful.

6. I have to add, however, that some of the questions put to us by the United States delegation cannot be satisfactorily answered by words alone. The answers would have to be put into mathematical language to be complete. We have not attempted to do this in our memorandum; it would have made the paper inaccessible to most of us around this table. Some of the mathematical descriptions are, however, already available to specialists in the technical document referred to in footnote 1 of the memorandum. With this important reservation, I will now treat Mr. Foster's questions one by one.

7. The first one deals with our statement that only one earthquake will be mistaken for an explosion in fifteen years. The method of calculation used to obtain these numbers is described in general terms in our memorandum. The data that were used are also defined in the text.

8. The second question deals with the sufficiency of deterrence afforded by particular verification methods. Here I wish to emphasize

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV. 315, pp. 4-7.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 272-278.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 294-298.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 298-302.

<sup>5</sup> *Supra*.

that the purpose of the control system, as we see it, should be to deter from violations of the treaty. Its purpose would not be to provide intelligence facts. We hope that our document contains a satisfactory description of how we came to consider the particular deterrence level of 10 per cent to be sufficient. I wish to refer to page 4, outlining our evaluation on this point. I may add that, to our knowledge, the same percentage figure has been used in the past in corresponding calculations by United States scientists.

9. The third question deals with the inspection case. Mr. Foster questioned our statement that the British "complexity" method of identification from long distance could reduce the need for inspections to one in two years. Once again, this was the result of the calculations made by using the method that we have tried to describe in general terms in our memorandum.

10. We have also in our document explained how we arrived at the particular level of on-site inspection efficiency used in our calculations. In this connexion we look forward to the further technical information of the event location problems connected with this issue which was promised by Mr. Foster in his statement.

11. Finally, in answer to the question on the magnitude of seismic events considered, we hope that it has been made clear in our document how this particular point was treated.

12. Let me add as a further explanation to readers of our memorandum that our assessment of the control capabilities depends, of course, on the data used and on the political requirements we put into our calculations. Other investigators might well want to use another set of political requirements on deterrence against violations and assurance against mistakes about earthquakes. These would in turn lead to other results.

13. Mr. Foster, in his statement, also dealt with the relationship between national security and arms control measures. "The appeal of arms control measures must rest on whether they enhance the security of the nations agreeing to them", he said. He went on to say:

To be consonant with security, a comprehensive test-ban treaty must afford a means for verifying that each party is fulfilling its obligations. That is to say, one of two parties cannot be expected to cease an activity in which both are engaged and which is an important factor in their strategic relationship unless it is convinced that the other party also is ending that activity.\*

14. We should not wish to dispute this thesis. But we are confident that by using a deterring system of control in conformity with the ideas which we have put forward, a treaty banning all nuclear tests would serve the purpose of national security.

15. Mr. Roshchin pointed out that the non-proliferation treaty should be considered—

... as a first step towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race, towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. In our opinion the conclusion of such a treaty, by bringing about a higher degree of confidence in relations between States, would open up more favorable possibilities for achieving agreement on other disarmament questions and in the first place on questions of nuclear disarmament.

\* *AUTC*, p. 295.

He went on to say :

One of the most important steps towards nuclear disarmament would be the discontinuation by the nuclear Powers of all tests of nuclear weapons, including underground nuclear explosions.<sup>7</sup>

16. It is indeed the opinion of the whole world that a treaty to this effect would constitute a real proof of the good will of the nuclear-weapon Powers to put an end to the constant refinement of their enormous nuclear stockpiles. I will not reiterate once again what was said in our earlier statement on this score. I only wish to remind the Committee of the general framework in which we have placed the ideas of a technical nature which we advanced in our earlier statement and which we are bringing forward again today.

17. Finally, let me say that we have noted with appreciation the statements by both the United States and the Soviet representatives that their Governments do desire to seek an effective comprehensive test-ban treaty. We view the discussion which the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has now engaged upon as a further proof of this political will. This spirit should make it possible for the Committee to work out during its current session a draft text of a treaty banning all nuclear tests.

**Statement by the Italian Foreign Minister (Fanfani) to the  
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nonpro-  
liferation of Nuclear Weapons [Extract], August 1,  
1967<sup>1</sup>**

10. The Italian Government wishes to recall once again that it is resolutely favourable to the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This attitude has been reaffirmed on several occasions before the Italian Parliament and during bilateral meetings, as well as in this very forum. With a view to such an agreement, the Italian Government has pledged itself to bring to the attention of the Parliament the concrete draft treaty that will be submitted to this Committee. During the discussions and contacts established with a view to elaborating drafts for a non-proliferation treaty, the Italian Government has endeavoured to harmonize its ideas and suggestions with the resolutions approved by the United Nations. The policy of the Italian Government in this field is, furthermore, well known to the Eighteen-Nation Committee. It has favoured unremittingly for years the conclusion of a treaty that would be as perfect as possible and based on a balance of obligations and responsibilities without any discriminations other than those inherent in the present situation.

11. An ideal non-proliferation treaty should meet, among others, the following conditions: that of safeguarding the security of countries

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, p. 301.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV. 318, pp. 6-9.

which voluntarily renounce nuclear weapons; that of recognizing the legitimate aspirations—which they cannot renounce—of all countries to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to the technical and industrial progress resulting therefrom; that of not thwarting the efforts carried on by Europe with a view to attaining the objectives of unification and consolidation of existing common institutions; that of not hindering the as yet unknown possibilities of progress in science, technology and the economy of States through too rigid legal formulas of unlimited duration; and lastly, that of directing the nuclear countries towards practical and concrete measures of nuclear disarmament.

12. I wished to sketch the broad outline of an ideal non-proliferation treaty, first to enable further improvements to be made in the existing drafts, secondly to renew an ardent appeal to reason and understanding, and lastly to recall that our moratorium proposal of 1965<sup>2</sup> was inspired in its simplicity by the aforementioned aims.

13. When on 29 July 1965 in this very room I explained the ideas which were subsequently to be embodied in the moratorium proposal,<sup>3</sup> we were on the eve of the submission of a draft treaty. Indeed, the latter was submitted some twenty days later.<sup>4</sup> Today it seems—and it is to be hoped—that we are on the eve of the submission of another draft treaty.<sup>5</sup> We are waiting for it. We are all waiting for it in the hope that, particularly in the present international situation, it may contribute effectively to progress on the road to disarmament, to the relaxation of tension, and to peace.

14. In the same spirit which led me two years ago to put forward the idea of a moratorium, I should like to tell you today that, precisely because of the importance we attribute to a well-balanced and effective treaty, no effort should be spared to make progress with other collateral disarmament measures, especially if they are likely to encourage adherence to the draft treaty. I therefore wonder whether it would not be possible to imagine some proposal which, while linked up with measures examined in the past, might respond to certain imperatives important for all of us and more particularly for the non-nuclear Powers that have undertaken the negotiation of the treaty.

15. This proposal could be independent of the treaty, linked with or even incorporated in it according to circumstances: it could consist of an agreement under which the nuclear Powers would transmit periodically to the non-nuclear States signatories to the treaty an agreed quantity of the fissile materials they produce. The principle motivating such an agreement has already met with the approval of the United States and the Soviet Union when they examined in 1964 the well-known proposal for a "cut-off"—that is, a discontinuance of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons<sup>6</sup>—but it was not followed up because of the difficulties encountered in connexion with the question of control. It represented, however, an expression of the will to achieve disarmament, an expression of will to which it would perhaps be opportune to revert today.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 411-412.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Fanfani's statement appears *ibid.*, pp. 288-289.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 347-349.

<sup>5</sup> See *post*, pp. 338-341.

<sup>6</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, p. 8.

16. An agreement of this kind would indirectly subject the production of nuclear weapons by the militarily-nuclear States to a brake consisting in the necessity of allocating part of their fissile materials to non-nuclear countries for peaceful uses.

17. Within the same context, the non-nuclear countries to which the fissile materials transferred by the nuclear Powers would be assigned should pay a reduced price compared to the market value. Whereas part of this price would go to the nuclear producing Powers, the other part could be paid into the United Nations funds for the progress of the developing countries.

18. The agreement thus proposed could also lay down the principles of the distribution of fissile materials among the beneficiary countries. As for control, one could refer to the provisions of the non-proliferation treaty. I wish to stress the link that exists in this proposal between the brake on nuclear armament, the encouragement of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and the aid given to the social and economic progress of the developing countries.

19. This initiative, of which I have sketched the broad outline, would also be a gesture of goodwill made by the nuclear Powers to prove their willingness to give up part of their fissile materials and to put a brake, even a modest one, on the continuous growth of their military nuclear potential. This initiative would provide them with the means of counterbalancing renunciation by the non-nuclear countries, which would not fail to encourage concrete measures to fill the technological gap, such as those that were envisaged in an Italian proposal put forward last year. The initiative which we suggest would enable the nuclear countries to establish an ideal link between disarmament measures and the progress of developing areas, in conformity with the appeal of His Holiness Pope Paul VI<sup>1</sup> and the Italian proposal made in 1965 at the United Nations General Assembly and renewed at Geneva in this Committee.

20. Lastly, if the transfer of fissile materials would benefit only the non-nuclear countries signatories to the non-proliferation treaty, the idea which I have just explained to you would favour the accession to this treaty of the greatest possible number of non-nuclear countries by providing an appreciable material and moral compensation for their renunciation of nuclear weapons.

21. If the Committee agrees that this idea is interesting, the Italian delegation could easily develop it for the purposes of the Conference in a document which might prove useful in expectation of a draft treaty, or even in its preparation, or in supplementing it. The important need is to spare no effort in the search for ideas, formulas and solutions that will enable progress to be made in the specific field of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as in the other more general but no less important field of collateral measures. In about a month and a half from now the meetings of the United Nations General Assembly will be resumed in New York. It is necessary and timely that the General Assembly should be in a position, thanks to the work of this

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 4-5.

Committee, to give its directives for the achievement of the fruitful and constructive progress for which we hope in all fields of disarmament.

**Statement by the Canadian Representative (Burns) to the  
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nonpro-  
liferation of Nuclear Weapons, August 3, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

25. Today I am going to speak about the non-proliferation treaty, the draft of which we all hope to see very soon.<sup>2</sup> I shall be speaking, more particularly, of certain conditions which the Canadian delegation believes should be attached to that treaty, or certain agreements which should be made collateral to it. What I shall be saying, of course, will be more or less a repetition of what my delegation has already said at various times. However, other delegations here have gone through a somewhat similar exercise; and, as a long time has gone by while the Conference has been waiting for the draft treaty to appear, it may be that reviews of positions are not superfluous.

26. I think that all delegations here are aware that the Canadian Government has always accepted that a non-proliferation treaty in its essence must be to some degree discriminatory. However, it is the only alternative to allowing the continued spread of nuclear weapons, the coming into being of more military nuclear Powers—and such a process in the end would have no other result than nuclear war, and probably nuclear war eventually on the greatest scale. It is the main purpose of all of us here to stop such a catastrophe from occurring.

27. Nevertheless, while Canada realizes that there is bound to be some discrimination in a non-proliferation treaty, we have always urged that such discrimination should be limited as far as possible; and we believe that it is possible for the nuclear Powers to agree to measures which will lessen the discrimination in certain aspects.

28. Another point which we have made in common with other delegations here, and also in the United Nations General Assembly, is that a non-proliferation treaty should be only the first step in a series of measures which would further limit the danger of a nuclear war and in the end lead to the abolition of nuclear weaponry. If the treaty is to be accepted by all countries which are concerned, particularly by those countries which have the capacity to make nuclear weapons for themselves, then it must be seen to be a step in the disarmament process and not merely something which, after being achieved, is left to stand by itself. Furthermore, this Committee must be concerned that the draft treaty will contain such provisions or be accompanied by collateral arrangements on the points I shall mention which will make it negotiable with all the countries in the category of potential military nuclear Powers.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.319, pp. 11-16.

<sup>2</sup> See *post*, pp. 338-341.

29. When we talk of the balance of obligations and responsibilities, referring to General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX),<sup>3</sup> what do we have in mind? One particular point is the provision of guarantees for the security of certain countries which are not allied to any great nuclear Powers and which may be in a situation at some time or other where they may face the threat of having nuclear weapons used against them—may be subject, as the expression has it, to “nuclear blackmail”. To make any such guarantee of security effective or credible, of course, presents considerable difficulties. It would have to be stated in terms which would be very difficult, if not impossible, to include within the non-proliferation treaty itself. Perhaps the most that could be expressed in the treaty itself would be a statement in general terms that the nuclear Powers bear a responsibility for safeguarding the nuclear peace, if I may put it that way.

30. One way to state the right to security against attack by nuclear weapons for those countries which are willing to forgo the right to make these themselves might be by way of a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly; but that probably would have to be reinforced by other assurances. We would call to mind again the fact that the nuclear Powers are also the permanent members of the Security Council; and I think it is reasonable to say that in both those capacities they have a particular responsibility for seeing that the peace is kept and that the less powerful countries within the United Nations can live without the fear of being “atomized”, so to speak.

31. We also note that an essential part of the treaty will be that those countries signatories of it which do not possess nuclear weapons accept inspection or control of their nuclear installations by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This is for the purpose of seeing that plutonium or other explosive fissile material is not diverted, allowing nuclear weapons to be made from it. It is quite clearly necessary that the countries which do not possess nuclear weapons should accept such a provision. However, so far it does not appear that the nuclear Powers themselves are also willing to accept IAEA control. Canada is of the opinion that this particular kind of discrimination is not necessary in the treaty and that the nuclear Powers, as well as the nuclearly-armed States, should accept control over their peaceful nuclear activities.

32. The nuclear Powers have told the States which do not possess nuclear weapons that inspection by IAEA will not inhibit their development of nuclear energy or expose them to the possibility of commercial espionage. If they take this stand, why do they reject such safeguards for themselves? We have heard it stated that inspection of the kind that is contemplated for a non-proliferation treaty, and indeed for other measures we have been discussing, holds such danger of military espionage that it should be rejected. Members of the Committee may recall that at our meeting on 20 June last I argued against such a concept.<sup>4</sup> Is it alleged that such danger of military espionage would be attached to inspection by IAEA of the peaceful nuclear activities of all the signatories of the treaty? The Canadian delegation does not

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 532-534.

<sup>4</sup> ENDO/PV.306, p 10.

believe that there would be any real danger to the national security of any State if such inspection were accepted.

33. We have heard a great deal about "peaceful nuclear explosions" and the desire of those countries which have a developing nuclear industry to preserve the right to be able to make use of the technology of nuclear explosions for civil engineering and other purposes when and if it becomes practicable and safe. The studies and experiments relating to such use of nuclear explosives have not been developed to the point where a practicable and economical technology exists. However, it is expected that some day practical means of using such nuclear explosives may become available. Canada, among other countries, wishes to be assured that if that happens it will not be handicapped in their use because it has signed a non-proliferation treaty. We have repeatedly made it clear, however, that there is no difference between a nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes and a nuclear explosion for war purposes. We contend that the solution to this problem is that there should be a firm commitment on the part of the nuclear Powers to act, so to speak, as contractors for nuclear explosions and to provide at low cost the nuclear explosive devices—which are really weapons—which would be required for use in civil engineering or for other peaceful purposes.

34. We recall that in his statement at our meeting on 13 July the representative of the Soviet Union said the following:

We consider that this problem, including the procedure and conditions for carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, could be settled on the basis of a separate international agreement. Thus the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should not be an obstacle to the achievement of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>5</sup>

That was an elaboration of a previous statement of the same sort made by Mr. Roshchin at the meeting of 18 May.<sup>6</sup> At the meeting of 8 June Mr. Foster commented on that statement as follows:

... we would envisage, as suggested by Mr. Roshchin at our meeting of 18 May, that the conditions for carrying out nuclear explosions could be resolved through separate international agreement.<sup>7</sup>

35. It seems, therefore, that there is agreement among the great nuclear Powers that this right to participate in the technology of peaceful nuclear explosions for engineering purposes and the like could be ensured in a separate agreement. Canada would like to see some reference to this undertaking contained in the draft treaty; and we should also like to see a draft of a convention or declaration of the nuclear Powers which would commit them to supplying nuclear explosive devices for this purpose. Of course, any such arrangements should be under proper international safeguards. It might be advisable for the whole procedure to be carried out under the direction and control of the International Atomic Energy Agency, unless it should be found better to set up some other international agency for that specific purpose.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, pp. 301.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, p. 221.

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, p. 255.

36. We all recall the words of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) to the effect that the non-proliferation treaty should be accompanied by or followed by other measures of disarmament which would reduce the danger of nuclear war. We have heard also various delegations here express their views concerning what such measures might be. First priority seems to be given to an agreement on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests, already prohibited by the Moscow Treaty,<sup>8</sup> in three environments, to which should be added the fourth environment, "underground". United Nations General Assembly resolution 2163 (XXI) requests us to "elaborate without any further delay a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests".<sup>9</sup>

37. We have heard today the very thoughtful statement of the representative of the United Kingdom analysing the present position with regard to agreement on an underground test ban. Previously we heard the discussion, to which Mr. Mulley referred, between the Swedish delegation and the United States delegation<sup>10</sup> in regard to the degree to which the art and science of detecting and identifying nuclear tests underground by distant means has progressed. It is the Canadian delegation's opinion that this exchange of views could be further developed, and that eventually some agreement could be reached between the nuclear Powers enabling the Moscow Treaty to be completed by the prohibition of underground testing. However, I shall have something to say later in my statement about what may be a reason for the lack of progress in agreement between the nuclear Powers. We know that the overt cause is disagreement over what would be adequate control to ensure that obligations not to test underground are observed.

38. Another measure concerning which I spoke at length previously and which has also been suggested by the non-aligned nations represented here in their manifesto on non-proliferation is the stopping of the production of fissile material for weapon purposes.<sup>11</sup> At our 306th meeting I elaborated on that proposal, and naturally I do not want to go into it again at length. However, it does seem to Canada that that would be one of the measures which could be applied by the nuclear Powers to demonstrate their firm intention to halt the arms race, to halt the piling-up of armaments and to start reducing them.

39. In the opinion of the Canadian delegation there is another measure which the nuclear Powers should be considering. That measure is to halt the development and production of ballistic missiles, both offensive and defensive. We know that an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union authorities to discuss that matter was reached some months ago, but we have heard of no further development. We have heard about the desirability of not starting another turn of the spiral of the nuclear arms race by introducing a new factor: that is to say, the introduction of anti-ballistic-missile systems in the Soviet Union and in the United States.

40. I think the arguments against this new escalation are quite well known to everyone around this table. At first sight it may seem

<sup>8</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 802-803.

<sup>10</sup> For the Swedish-American discussion, see *ante*, pp. 272-278, 294-298, 310-312.

<sup>11</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 576-579.

reasonable for any country to try to protect itself against the threat of nuclear destruction by installing anti-ballistic-missile systems; but in fact such protection would not be attainable without enormous expenditure, and, furthermore, the balance of deterrence might be upset, with results that are incalculable. The most likely result would be another round in the arms race in which not only would anti-ballistic missiles be introduced but offensive ballistic missiles would be perfected and increased in power, thus making them more destructive and dangerous than those which now exist. The result would be an enormous and wasteful expenditure of money and resources which would produce no additional security to the nations engaging in this super-heated competition in destructive power.

41. Furthermore, we hear the view advanced that while the development of anti-missile missiles is in prospect the need for underground testing will continue, and that this is the real reason for the lack of interest of the nuclear Powers in trying to lessen the difference between their positions on verification. We have seen the even more disturbing suggestion that to perfect an anti-missile defence system it may be necessary to carry out tests in the atmosphere, thus destroying the Moscow test-ban treaty. We hope that no consideration is being given in governmental quarters anywhere to such a dangerous idea. But that the idea exists indicates the possible extent of the "spin-off" or "fall-out"—to use terms popular in other contexts—from a decision to go ahead with the production and extension of anti-missile defences.

42. We hope, therefore, that the nuclear Powers will manage soon to meet to discuss the possibility of freezing the arms race, freezing the production and development of these enormously costly and enormously dangerous weapons, and then proceed to reduce their number.

**Statement by the Romanian Representative (Ecobesco) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [Extract], August 8, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

22. The ambivalent character of nuclear energy—a destructive force and the same time a force for human progress—requires as the only logical and rational solution the banning of the use of atomic weapons, the cessation of their manufacture and the total liquidation of existing stocks. Romania has declared itself, and continues to declare itself, most resolutely in favour of that rational solution.

23. The road leading to that objective could be smoothed by a whole series of transitional partial measures designed to contribute to the effective reduction of the nuclear danger. In the opinion of the Romanian delegation, a particularly important measure would be the

<sup>1</sup> ENDC PV. 320, pp. 9-12.

banning of the proliferation of nuclear weapons—a problem on which the attention of public opinion is focused at present and in regard to which our Committee has been instructed by the United Nations General Assembly to negotiate a draft treaty.

24. It is not my intention to quote all the resolutions of the General Assembly which determine the mandate given to our Committee in that regard. Nevertheless, two of them particularly call for our attention, namely, resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965<sup>2</sup> and 2153-A (XXI) of 17 November 1966.<sup>3</sup> The first lays down the framework and stipulates clearly the essential co-ordinates for a treaty on non-proliferation. The second includes not only a reaffirmation but also a necessary complement to the first. The principles embodied in resolution 2028 (XX), seen as a whole, should constantly guide our negotiations, in which all of us are called upon to participate. Conformity with those principles constitutes, according to the profound conviction of the Romanian delegation, the fundamental criterion for estimating the value of any text, any draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

25. As those principles have often been adduced in this forum—either as a whole or separately—we wish only to mention two of them which in our view are of particular interest.

26. First, the postulate contained in paragraph 2(c), under the terms of which the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons “should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament”. That means—as indeed several delegations have often stressed in this Committee, and not only in this Committee—that non-proliferation should not be conceived of as an end in itself. On the contrary, it should be envisaged as a step in a precise direction, namely general disarmament and, above all, nuclear disarmament.

27. The other principle, embodied in paragraph 2(b), stipulates that the treaty “should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers”. That implies, and in a very precise way, the character of equivalence of the responsibilities and obligations assumed by the parties to the treaty, the symmetry of the legal relations which this treaty would create. This is an altogether normal consequence, because any treaty which would unilaterally impose obligations solely on the States not possessing nuclear weapons would not meet the legitimate requirement of the peoples for a guarantee of their equal right to peace and security.

28. In order to conform to these requirements, which are of fundamental importance, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be part of a whole series of measures whose final objective—which is both logical and necessary—would be nuclear disarmament.

29. Non-proliferation, unless accompanied by precise, firm and effective measures taken by all States to halt the manufacture of nuclear weapons, ban underground tests for military purposes, and reduce and finally liquidate existing stocks of nuclear weapons, would

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 532-534.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 748-749.

not only fail to ensure progress along the road to the elimination of the danger of the thermonuclear war but would perpetuate that danger indefinitely. In our opinion non-dissemination, if not accompanied by such measures, would only legalize the division of the world into nuclear and non-nuclear States, and would only permit the nuclear Powers to increase their atomic arsenal further and to continue to improve the technology of nuclear weapons.

30. The long-term consequences of such a situation will, I believe, escape nobody. That is precisely why it is essential that, side by side with the obligation assumed by the non-nuclear Powers to renounce atomic weapons, the non-proliferation treaty should contain precise obligations binding the States possessing nuclear weapons to adopt measures for the banning and destruction of these weapons.

31. If one also remembers that non-proliferation implies the obligation of the States not possessing nuclear weapons not to acquire them, it is altogether legitimate and necessary that, until the existing nuclear weapons are completely eliminated, those States should enjoy guarantees of security. That presupposes above all the firm obligation of the nuclear Powers not to use such weapons against States which do not possess any, and not in any case or in any circumstance to threaten them with their use. It is beyond dispute that the effectiveness and power of attraction of a non-proliferation treaty depend upon the extent to which it will offer to all the signatory States an enhanced degree of security.

32. Another aspect which must be taken into account in negotiating the non-proliferation treaty is that of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. At present no country in the world is unaware of the grandiose possibilities for its economy opened by the application of nuclear energy in various sectors of production or research. This is only natural because in our era, which is characterized by an all-round scientific and technical revolution and by an irreversible movement of mankind towards progress and civilization, the influence exercised by science and technology—and above all by the conquests of nuclear science and technology—on the economic and social development of a country is continually increasing.

33. It is a generally valid truth that science and technology constitute the driving force of economic prosperity. Prosperity and the well-being of peoples are, like peace, indivisible. Hence the imperative necessity that the non-proliferation agreement should ensure unlimited rights and opportunities, for all countries without any discrimination, to undertake scientific research in nuclear energy and to utilize the conquests of science for their peaceful development. Any formula designed to hinder access to the peaceful use of atomic energy would condemn non-nuclear countries to scientific and industrial backwardness and seriously prejudice the right of all peoples to benefit fully from the great achievements of modern civilization. No nation could accept a situation which would be tantamount to curbing its progress in this dominating field of science and technology.

34. Lastly, an important condition of the non-proliferation agreement is that it should not institute forms of international control which would encroach upon the sovereignty and national independence of

States, or establish relations of dependence of non-nuclear on nuclear countries.

35. To sum up the foregoing, the position of Romania towards a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is expressed by the requirement that it should fulfill four principal conditions:

--The treaty must be regarded as an integral part of a system of measures designed to lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons;

--The treaty must provide equal guarantees for the security of all States, large or small, nuclear or non-nuclear;

--The treaty must not limit the use, by all, of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; it must on the contrary ensure unlimited rights and opportunities for all States to undertake research in this field and to utilize the conquests of nuclear science for their peaceful development;

--The treaty must establish a precise and equitable control system, based on the principle of equality among States, to which all countries must be subjected to the same extent and which opens no loop-holes for interference in the internal affairs of other States.

### Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Verification of Underground Test Ban, August 8, 1967<sup>1</sup>

50. Today I should like to comment further on the subject of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests. As we have stated repeatedly, the United States Government believes that an adequately-verified treaty in this area would enhance the security of all nations. As far as my Government is concerned, the prime obstacle preventing the achievement of a treaty is lack of agreement concerning what constitutes adequate verification. On the basis of information available to us, we have concluded that national means by themselves would not provide effective assurance that treaty obligations were being observed. We should, of course, welcome any data which indicated that national means are effective or which pointed out a possibly rewarding line of research.

51. We welcome particularly the document and statements recently presented by the Swedish delegation as a significant contribution to our discussion.<sup>2</sup> Our study of this material continues. We agree in principle that the approach outlined by the Swedish delegation is a useful one. We are also pleased that the representative of the Soviet Union has apparently endorsed this general method of analysis,<sup>3</sup> since we too believe that the problem of determining the required number of on-site inspections is one that is susceptible of technical analysis.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV. 320, pp. 16-20.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, pp. 272-278, 305-312.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 302.

52. However, as Mr. Edelstam noted, the conclusions which he reached concerning verification requirements depend upon the numerical values which are assigned to the parameters appearing in the formula.<sup>5</sup> Other investigators might assign other values which would lead to other results. For example, the question of whether a 10 per cent chance of detection provides a sufficient deterrent to a violator will be dependent on the gains which might accrue from the tests and the penalties for being apprehended in a violation. Moreover, we might assign different values to the parameters describing the number of tests and yields which might provide a violator with an important improvement in his strategic capabilities.

53. I should now like to comment in some detail on the memorandum submitted by the Swedish delegation on 19 July 1967<sup>6</sup> and on the report to which it refers, entitled *Approaches to some test ban control problems* (National Defence Research Institute, Stockholm, Report C 4286-20(23) 1967). One conclusion of the Swedish scientists was that the utility of the so-called complexity criterion was sufficient to indicate the possibility of a control system with no more than one on-site inspection in two years. For the "no inspection" case it was suggested that the data on identification by complexity indicated the possibility of an inspection-free control system with the required 10 per cent deterrence level and limiting mistakes concerning earthquakes to once in fifteen years.

54. The theory developed in the Swedish papers requires the use of "Two statistical quantities . . . to describe the . . . identification methods".<sup>6</sup> In order to be applicable, any of the identification criteria, in this case the complexity, must have a statistical distribution independent of the location of the event. In other words, an event of given magnitude which occurs in one area should have the same probability of having a given complexity as would an event of the same magnitude which occurs in any other area. We have studied the complexity of the seismic signals from tens of explosions and hundreds of earthquakes. Clearly the complexity of seismic signals from explosions is dependent on the location of the explosion.

55. In order to demonstrate the problem which this presents in trying to apply this Swedish theory of verification of the comprehensive test ban, we note that during recent years three large seismic events have occurred in the vicinity of Novaya Zemlya. The Soviet Union has provided information that one of those events, that of 27 October 1966, was an underground nuclear explosion. While we cannot confirm that the other two events—that is, those of 18 September 1964 and 25 October 1964—were nuclear explosions, it may nevertheless be presumed that they were, since that is a Soviet nuclear test site and an area in which natural earthquakes are exceptionally rare. The complexity values measured for all these Novaya Zemlya events were larger than almost half the shallow earthquakes in that magnitude range which occurred in the Soviet Union. In such a situation the methodology and conclusions of the Swedish report are invalid, and the number of on-site inspections required must be determined by some other method.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 311.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 305-309.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 307.

56. What this means is that we already know of one area in the Soviet Union, and that happens to be a well-established Soviet testing area, in which all explosions will provide signals more complex than a significant fraction of the earthquakes with which they will be compared. Every single contained underground explosion conducted in that area would be mis-identified as an earthquake if complexity were used as a criterion in the manner proposed in the Swedish report. There would, under those conditions, be no deterrent to unlimited violations. Furthermore, it is virtually certain that Novaya Zemlya is not unique in that respect. Thus there will be other areas in addition to that known test site at which all explosions would be mis-identified by that complexity criterion. If the complexity criteria were changed in order to identify correctly those explosions as explosions, then there would be many tens of earthquakes each year mis-identified as being suspicious, not one in every fifteen years as stated by our Swedish colleagues.

57. An additional point on complexity should be mentioned. Available data show clearly that the complexity values for earthquakes and explosions decrease with decreasing magnitude and that small earthquakes have simpler signatures than do larger explosions. Therefore, a useful definition of the complexity criterion at magnitude 4 requires a capability to record such small events as [at?] improved signal-to-noise levels.

58. Moreover, there is very little information on the effectiveness of any of the identification criteria at magnitudes as low as magnitude 4, which is considered by the Swedish delegation to be the threshold for magnitudes of interest. Our current studies of various criteria indicate that they are effective at teleseismic distances at magnitude 4.5 and above; but, as also noted by Mr. Mulley at our meeting on 3 August, their effectiveness decreases below magnitude 4.5.<sup>7</sup> In the region between magnitude 4 and 4.5, studies of the identification criteria are sharply inhibited because of the low signal-to-noise levels on teleseismic recordings of events in this magnitude range. The problem is further compounded by the number of earthquakes; and the number of events requiring identification increases sharply with decreasing magnitude. The prime reason why we are devoting an extensive effort to the construction of large seismometer arrays is to provide ourselves with high signal-to-noise data at low magnitudes. It then will be possible to determine the efficacy of the various identification criteria when they are applied to events with magnitudes of 4 or less.

59. We agree with our Swedish colleagues that regional or national data could be of considerable assistance in assessing the nature of events. The question here is one of how many regional stations would be available and what their quality and reliability would be. The United States data indicating the utility of regional stations were obtained from an extensive network of high-quality facilities. If a comprehensive treaty were achieved we should, on a regular basis, be willing to make our regional data available to other parties. We should like to hear from others concerning the quantity and quality of data which they would make available, and the arrangements they are willing to make to ensure that the data are reliable as well as freely and promptly available.

<sup>7</sup> ENDC/PV. 319, p. 6.

60. I should like to conclude by reiterating that the United States is applying large scientific and economic resources to the solution of the verification problem. We have repeated the results of our research to this Conference on many occasions and also published them in scientific reports. If it appears that progress is slow, it should be clear that this is not because of lack of effort. Slow progress results from the difficulty of the problem combined with the vital need that verification requirements and capabilities be assessed accurately. We are continuing to expand our research and data collection and analysis activities.

61. As you know, for the past three years we have been conducting a series of experiments to improve our capabilities for accurately locating seismic events in the Aleutian-Kurile island chains. The analysis of the results of last year's Kurile experiments will be available in technical reports shortly. The improvements in our ability to locate seismic events in those areas as a result of those continuing experiments will help in eliminating from the potentially suspicious category those seismic events which can be shown to have occurred under the water rather than under land areas. Furthermore, as a result of the success of the large seismic array which has been operating for two years in Montana, and which some of the representatives here have seen, we are now proposing as a co-operative enterprise to install in Norway a second large array which will advance still further the state of the art.

62. Thus I believe that the United States has shown that it takes seriously its responsibilities for attempting to solve the verification problems attendant to the achievements of a comprehensive test ban. Reports such as those recently submitted by the Swedish delegation, and the ensuing technical discussions, contribute substantially to our mutual understanding of the problem. Other work carried out and reported on by our United Kingdom colleagues has also been of crucial importance. If all parties conducting work in this area from whom we have not yet heard discussion of the technical issues were to make available their conclusions, we might reach more rapidly our goal of an adequately-verified comprehensive test-ban treaty.

### News Conference Remarks by ACDA Director Foster, August 11, 1967<sup>1</sup>

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. Gentlemen, I have a very brief statement.

As you have just learned, I have been discussing with the President the progress on the negotiation of a nonproliferation treaty at Geneva. In particular, I have been discussing with him the fact that I have been advised that it is possible we may very soon be able to table a draft nonproliferation treaty for the consideration of the 18-nation Disarmament Committee now meeting in Geneva.

<sup>1</sup> *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Aug. 14, 1967, pp. 1126-1128. The draft nonproliferation treaty was tabled Aug. 24 (*post*, pp. 338-341).

For that reason, I am returning to Geneva in the hope that we can work out the final solution of the problems concerning the tabling of a draft nonproliferation treaty before the committee.

I will be happy to answer questions.

*Q. What do you mean by "tabling"? What is the meaning of the term?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. The tabling in this sense is not in the legislative sense. It means that hopefully the draft treaty will be presented before the plenary meeting of the 18-nation Disarmament Committee by the two cochairmen of the committee, namely, the Soviet representative and myself.

*Q. Does it mean when you table—you must have tabled 15 drafts by now—that you have worked the bugs out and you are coming in with a common agreed treaty on which the other nations are now invited to vote?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. No. They are invited to consider, negotiate, and present their ideas, because this draft has not yet been shown to anyone other than the allies of the two cochairmen.

*Q. And the bugs of the two cochairmen have been worked out?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. Yes.

*Q. You say you just learned. Is this sort of a rush trip back? Is something new happening?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. I came back for some other reason. I am testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee this afternoon in order to attempt to get money to continue the operations of my agency. But during my visit here I got a message that I should return urgently to Geneva.

*Q. From the Soviet Union?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. Yes.

*Q. Mr. Ambassador, is this, then, the first time that the Soviet Union and the United States have finally reached agreement on this treaty?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. We are in the process of the final solution of the problems. I hope very soon, as stated in the statement, that this will be tabled as an agreed draft for consideration by the 18-nation Disarmament Committee.

*Q. Like the provision for inspection, which was the principal stumbling block, as I understand it. What are you going to do about that?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. That would not necessarily be the major stumbling block. It is probable that the committee will not have concluded that full discussion when it is tabled.

*Q. I didn't quite understand. You will not have concluded on inspection?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. No, sir. I doubt that. I think that will be a blank.

*Q. The problem is still unresolved as to whether the inspection will be done as the Russians want it, by the Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, or as the Western powers want it, through the EURATOM; is that right?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. That is still a matter of debate and discussion.

*Q. It has been my understanding that the United States and the Soviet Union were fairly close to agreement on this. The problem has been with our allies, the West Germans. Can you tell us anything about what our situation with the West Germans is?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. I will let you speculate on that, sir. We are now near to the U.S.-U.S.S.R. tabling of the proposed nonproliferation treaty.

*Q. You have to leave a major section blank. Why is this such a step forward?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. It is a step forward to get another 10, 12, or 15 points.

*Q. Are there any other blanks?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. The most important things are to (1) limit the further spread by the nuclear powers of nuclear weapons to others; and the second would be the agreement of the nonnuclear powers not to acquire. Safeguards are important collaterally but they aren't the key items on this discussion.

*Q. Mr. Ambassador, I am not quite clear on what happens with a treaty that has blanks on it. Does this mean that the other 18 nations will be allowed to fill in that blank?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. We will suggest a continued discussion by the cochairmen of that point.

*Q. You say that agreement has been reached on two points, to limit the further spread by nuclear powers and the agreement of non-nuclear powers not to acquire.*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. I am saying that these are provisions of the treaty. I am not saying there is an agreement. No agreement has been reached by the nonnuclear nations. The point is to get this before the nonnuclear nations so they will have their chance to consider and negotiate.

*Q. You say this has only been seen by the Soviet Union and the United States and their allies. How many of the 18 nations does this leave that have not seen this yet?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. Eight nonaligned, representing all the non-aligned of the world, and they were chosen because they represented the great geographic areas—Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and nonaligned Western Europe.

*Q. Are you at liberty to say what has changed since you came here that brought about this call for you to go back?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. This has been a development process which appears to be nearing its conclusion. I left Geneva on Wednesday to come back to testify. I stated that I would probably be in the United States some time unless something developed, in which case I would return promptly. I am returning promptly after word from the Soviet Union.

*Q. Can you tell us what that development was, sir?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. I don't think this is a development. I think this is a continuous process.

*Q. Is it a concession?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. No, I don't say it is a concession. We are nearing an agreement after many months of discussion between the Soviet Union and the United States.

*Q. You said you were returning after word from the Soviet Union.*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. That is correct.

*Q. Isn't it correct, sir, that the Soviet Union was not in agreement when you left Geneva on submitting a draft treaty with this inspection provision?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. They had not yet advised us that they were prepared to discuss this final tabling.

*Q. What prevents you now, sir, from saying that you will table this resolution in Geneva?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. I am here. He is there. Before we can do this, I must be together with him.

*Q. It is only a question of form?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. I will just leave it at my statement.

*Q. Mr. Ambassador, what is the status of the discussion about on-site inspection versus the claim of some scientists like the Swedish scientist saying it is not needed?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. That is a comprehensive test ban. That would follow on, hopefully. You see, we have always said that the achievement of a nonproliferation treaty would form a base on which other measures might take place, one of which certainly would be the comprehensive test ban which we have been pushing now for many years.

*Q. Mr. Ambassador, there was a question, I believe India in particular was concerned about getting some kind of assurances of protection in case she signs this agreement. She is concerned about the Communist Chinese nuclear development. What sort of assurances are going to be put into the treaty for countries like India? Have you crossed that bridge yet?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. We have stated in our presentations at the plenary conferences that we believe assurances are too complicated a subject since each nation has a different problem to be included in the nonproliferation treaty but we are quite willing to discuss that as a separate project. In fact, we have said this at the General Assembly and have said it for 2 or 3 years.

We have also reiterated the fact that there is on the table or there is in existence—I won't use that word "table" again because that is confusing—an assurance by the President of the United States which he set forth in October of 1964 within 48 hours of the first Chinese explosion that the United States would provide immediate assistance to those nonnuclear nations threatened by nuclear blackmail that asked for this assistance from the United States.<sup>2</sup>

We have said further at the U.N. that we would be very happy to broaden that assurance by an appropriate U.N. resolution which reiterates the U.N. obligations.<sup>3</sup> To put this however into a treaty becomes too complicated and both we and the Soviet Union have agreed that this is an additional discussion which should take place after the treaty is tabled.

*Q. Mr. Ambassador, what are the mechanics after the resolution is tabled?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. The first mechanics will be to let the rest of the world make comments on what is in the treaty since as I said only the allies of the two cochairmen have seen the actual draft. There have been many speculations which have taken place, many of which have been misdirected or misinformed.

This for the first time will give an opportunity for these other nations to see whether the provisions of the treaty are such that they are consistent with their security and their principles.

So that the first thing will be an opportunity to explore, explain, develop, and consider and hopefully to get broad agreement on such a treaty. Then I would hope that the committee itself, the 18-nation committee, in which only 17 nations are present, would recommend this treaty to the General Assembly—that is the first committee of the General Assembly—with the view to getting the broad signatures which would be required before the treaty comes into effect.

*Q. But the treaty would be possibly recommended and even signed with this provision blank?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. I wouldn't say signed. I would hope that before it goes to the General Assembly the blank would be filled. I am quite optimistic that it will be.

*Q. That is the blank on the inspection?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. We call it safeguard rather than inspection.

*Q. Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned a cochairman. Who is the cochairman?*

<sup>2</sup> Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 468.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 1965, p. 434.

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. Ambassador Alexei Roshchin.

*Q. Mr. Ambassador, I want to be sure that I understood you right. Did you say that when you left Geneva the Soviet Union at that point had not yet advised you that they were willing to table a treaty with the inspection provision left blank and that since then you have been advised that they are willing to do that now?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. No, that is not quite precise. I said that when I left they were not able at that point to say they were authorized to table a draft treaty. That did not include the other addition which you made, because there are other questions in addition to the question of the blank articles.

*Q. Can you tell us what those other questions were that they have now satisfied themselves on?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. No, this is part of the negotiating process.

*Q. But the inspection provision would be one of the things?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. Yes.

*Q. There was also quite a deal of speculation earlier this year about the attitude of the West German government and the problem it was having with some of its own people who were reluctant to see it join in such a treaty. They were concerned about Germany abandoning its right to have international power. You know the people in Germany who took that attitude.*

*Do you have any feeling now on what the prospects are for the Kiesinger government accepting this?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. As you are aware this whole process has been discussed extensively with all of our allies individually and also collectively at the North Atlantic Council in Paris and now will be in Brussels.

This present draft which I hope will be agreed on and presented very soon is one that they are thoroughly conversant with and as expressed by the various members of the North Atlantic Council we had a green light to table this type of document.

*Q. Mr. Ambassador, when will you be back in Geneva?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. Sunday at noon.

*Q. Are you going to appear before the Senate committee first?*

AMBASSADOR FOSTER. I am appearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee this afternoon. That is the subcommittee.

Reporter: Thank you.

## Joint Communique by President Johnson and Chancellor Kiesinger, August 16, 1967<sup>1</sup>

We continued the exchange of views which we began in Bonn on the occasion of the funeral of Konrad Adenauer in April of this year. We are convinced that these regular, frank and far-reaching discussions of the international situation as well as of questions which are of particular concern to our two countries will solidify and strengthen the friendly relationship and trust that exists between us and between our two nations.

Our most important common goal is the maintenance of peace. The North Atlantic Alliance serves this goal. We agree fully that it must continue and indeed it must be strengthened.

We share the view that a policy of relaxation of tensions can help avoid conflicts. Such a policy can remove the causes of existing tensions, can overcome differences and in this way lead to mutual understanding and trust among peoples. It is only by following such a policy that the division of Europe and the division of Germany can be ended and a just and permanent peace be established in Europe.

We are fully convinced that the unification of Western Europe will mark a significant contribution to world peace and to the welfare of all peoples. This requires continued cooperation and lasting friendship among the nations of Europe. Such a united Europe will be a friend and partner to the United States.

We agree fully that Europe and the United States are dependent upon one another for their security. The planning of the common defense in the years to come must remain in the hands of NATO. We are in complete agreement that a one-sided weakening in the ability of the West to assure its security will not promote the relaxation of tensions, which is desired by both of us. Both countries must sustain their defense efforts.

We are fully in accord that both countries also bear a responsibility to help other peoples in the world to attain economic growth and prosperity.

We agreed on the great importance of reaching international agreement at the September meeting of the International Monetary Fund in Rio de Janeiro on a meaningful plan to assure adequate additions to international liquidity, as and when needed, by a supplement to existing reserve assets.

We also had a full exchange of views on the general international situation, including the Middle East, Southeast Asia and recent developments in the field of disarmament.

We concluded that personal meetings and consultations between us make a significant contribution to the friendship and mutual understanding of our two countries. We agreed that we would stay in close touch with each other.

<sup>1</sup> *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Aug. 21, 1967, pp. 1160-1161. The communique was issued at the conclusion of a visit to Washington by Chancellor Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Brandt (Aug. 15-16, 1967).

**Note Verbale From the Maltese Mission to the United Nations Secretary-General: Reservation of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor for Peaceful Purposes. August 17, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

The Permanent Mission of Malta to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to propose under rule 14 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly the inclusion of the following item in the agenda of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly: "Declaration and treaty concerning the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and of the ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the use of their resources in the interests of mankind".

An explanatory memorandum is attached in accordance with rule 20 of the rules of procedure.

**MEMORANDUM**

1. The sea-bed and the ocean floor are estimated to constitute approximately five-sevenths of the world's area. The sea-bed and ocean floor, underlying the seas outside present territorial waters and on the continental shelves, are the only areas of our planet which have not yet been appropriated for national use, because they have been relatively inaccessible and their use for defence purposes or the economic exploitation of their resources was not technologically feasible.

2. In view of rapid progress in the development of new techniques by technologically advanced countries, it is feared that the situation will change and that the sea-bed and the ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond present national jurisdiction, will become progressively and competitively subject to national appropriation and use. This is likely to result in the militarization of the accessible ocean floor through the establishment of fixed military installations and in the exploitation and depletion of resources of immense potential benefit to the world, for the national advantage of technologically developed countries.

3. It is, therefore, considered that the time has come to declare the sea-bed and the ocean floor a common heritage of mankind and that immediate steps should be taken to draft a treaty embodying, *inter alia*, the following principles:

(a) The sea-bed and the ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, are not subject to national appropriation in any manner whatsoever;

(b) The exploration of the sea-bed and of the ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, shall be undertaken in a manner consistent with the Principles and Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations;

(c) The use of the sea-bed and of the ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and their economic exploitation shall be undertaken with the aim of safeguarding

<sup>1</sup> A/6605, Aug. 17, 1967.

the interests of mankind. The net financial benefits derived from the use and exploitation of the sea-bed and of the ocean floor shall be used primarily to promote the development of poor countries;

(d) The sea-bed and the ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, shall be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes in perpetuity.

4. It is believed that the proposed treaty should envisage the creation of an international agency (a) to assume jurisdiction, as a trustee for all countries, over the sea-bed and the ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction; (b) to regulate, supervise and control all activities thereon; and (c) to ensure that the activities undertaken conform to the principles and provisions of the proposed treaty.

### Statement by the Swedish Representative (Myrdal) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Verification of Underground Test Ban, August 17, 1967<sup>1</sup>

2. Encouraging reports are now reaching us, increasing every day our expectation that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will not, after all, have to face the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly empty-handed. My delegation greets these prospects with satisfaction, and we hope ardently that the Committee will be able to make a unanimous recommendation to the General Assembly on the important question of a non-proliferation treaty.

3. That matter will not, however, be the theme of my intervention today. Rather—and, I think, more appropriately—I shall use the intervening time given us to take the floor once again on another issue which my delegation considers to be just as important: namely, the efforts to arrive speedily at a treaty prohibiting all nuclear tests.

4. Since my delegation last spoke on this matter on 20 July,<sup>2</sup> presenting a memorandum<sup>3</sup> worked out in the delegation on the possibilities for control of an underground test-ban treaty, new comments have been made on the political and technical aspects of the matter. I am referring particularly to the interventions made by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Mulley, on 3 August<sup>4</sup> and by the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, on 8 August.<sup>5</sup> At the outset I wish to express our appreciation of the interest thus shown by those two delegations in the ideas we put forward. Even greater, of course, is the satisfaction that renewed discussion on this topic is having a real impact in moving the negotiations forward. It should enhance the possibilities of arriving at an agreement, now or after some delay—but not too long a delay again—on a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.323, pp. 4-10.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 310-312.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 305-309.

<sup>4</sup> ENDC/PV.319, pp. 4-10.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, pp. 322-325.

5. Today, first, I shall attempt to comment on technical points raised in the two statements; but at the end of my intervention I want also to offer some comments concerning the political and procedural aspects of our task. Under the technical heading I will first deal with some specific points made by other representatives, and then deal more generally with some essential, although perhaps unconventional, aspects of our ideas. For obvious reasons my replies cannot be exhaustive. To explain our reasoning and calculations in detail would require using the language of mathematics; and such presentation must be made elsewhere.

6. Mr. Foster at the meeting of 8 August said:

In order to be applicable, any of the identification criteria, in this case the complexity, must have a statistical distribution independent of the location of the event.<sup>a</sup>

He referred also to a striking example where that was not the case: three specified events in Novaya Zemlya, in the Soviet Union. However, in that specific case we have an area where very few or no earthquakes are expected. A test could not be hidden among earthquakes there, and an event there would certainly be suspicious enough to justify further action by the observing party.

7. Despite that aspect of the particular example, however, Mr. Foster has pointed out a serious general weakness of the seismological control method: for most places in the world we do not know what the seismological signature of an explosion will be. But neither can we expect to obtain complete empirical knowledge; for nobody, I think, would suggest that one should proceed to a calibration by nuclear explosions of all possible test sites over the globe. We shall have to be content with limited empirical knowledge about some places and with what theoretical inference can contribute as regards all other locations. This general weakness of the seismological control method is, however, reduced by the fact—which is very important in our system—that neither will a prospective violator have that knowledge.

8. Both Mr. Foster and Mr. Mulley referred to the diminished effectiveness of identification criteria applied to events in the magnitude range just above 4. We think that effective application of the array technique to long-period as well as short-period waves should be quite helpful and that the simultaneous use of several identification methods would further increase effectiveness.

9. Mr. Mulley also raised the point of how a suspicious user of foreign regional data can be convinced that they are trustworthy. That could, of course, be done by using safeguarded regional stations, so-called "black boxes"; but I think that those of us around this table who remember the difficulties connected with that issue will agree with me that one should in the first instance try other approaches. One fitting our "detection club" concept would be that larger States would undertake to run, on a round-the-clock basis, regional networks of seismological stations of specified minimum standards on agreed locations in their territories. Data from such networks could be checked

<sup>a</sup> *Ante*, p. 323.

to some extent if the amount of data available for any time were large enough to provide redundancy in coverage. In any case the parties have reason to use very similar networks to deal properly with the problems of predicting earthquake damage. That would further enhance the trustworthiness of the data because of the involvement of the scientific integrity of the research institutes responsible for the networks.

10. Both Mr. Foster and Mr. Mulley raised questions relating to the consequences of mistaking explosions for earthquakes, a problem referred to by Mr. Foster as the problem dealt with in the Swedish paper in reverse, since our paper centred mainly on mistaking earthquakes for explosions. My explanation of this question will take us into the central part of our suggestion that control may be based on deterrence created by a risk of disclosure for the violator rather than on a supposed certainty about the nature of all underground events.

11. I wish to start with the problem situation facing an observer looking at seismograms of events from a specified area—and I hope my pedagogical talents will be sufficient for the task of explaining this intricate matter. The observer will analyse a flow of seismic events. He will apply certain identification criteria to them, and some of them will look more like explosions than others. The problem for the party to a treaty then is to find such rules for his own actions on that information from the observer that any prospective violator will feel deterred from introducing real nuclear explosions into that flow of events. Such rules are provided by decision theory.

12. For that purpose it must be decided above what level of explosion-likeness or suspiciousness a party will take such action as the treaty may permit. This decision level, which will have to be stated in numerical terms, tells him how to act in a predetermined fashion in all cases: when to act as if a violation had occurred, and when to act as if an earthquake had occurred. The actions are then initiated, independently of whether or not a violation has really occurred. Thus, doubts do not arise about how to act, even if doubts could arise about what really happened. That is really the central point. If the deterrence exercised in that way by the observers is high enough to be efficient, then their security problem is solved. The probability—to which Mr. Mulley referred—of mistaking explosions for earthquakes when using a certain decision level has been an important element already in the calculations that determine what an observing party would choose as his decision level, but after that it does not enter into the decision-making process.

13. The other possibility—that of mistaking earthquakes for explosions—has also been used in the basic calculations. Its role is particularly relevant in determining the expected number of unwarranted initiations of political action in the case of control without obligatory inspections.

14. In our evaluation of lately-published identification methods we have found that the data permit a system of deterrent control through obligatory inspection at a very low rate. The data also indicate the possibility of a system of deterrent control without such inspection; but then one would have to accept the risk of having unwarranted but

infrequent political action on some earthquakes. In our previous statements we did not, however, deal with the remaining problem of possible follow-up action; and I will now turn to that problem.

15. In his speech Mr. Mulley referred to our idea of verification by challenge, calling it "superimposing a political procedure on the technical situation"; and he asked why the Swedish delegation had not returned to that idea in our recent exposés of the technical aspects of the control problem.<sup>7</sup> The reason was simply one of time economy. We wanted to limit our earlier interventions this year to the more technical aspects of the control question. We have by no means abandoned that idea of verification by challenge; on the contrary, we think that it will become a very important part of a treaty banning underground tests if the deterrence system of control is adopted in the form of control without obligatory inspection.

16. Against that background one could easily visualize, I think, a comprehensive control system containing several stages. The parties to a test-ban treaty would, to begin with, undertake to co-operate in good faith in an effective international exchange of seismological data in order to facilitate the detection, location and identification of underground events. Such an obligation would correspond to the proposal for a "detection club" which we have put forward on several occasions in recent years in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and which has been endorsed repeatedly by the United Nations General Assembly.

17. It may be fitting to recall here what the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, said on this matter at the General Assembly last year:

The Soviet delegation has also indicated that it considers the Swedish proposal of a "detection club" worthy of attention, if this would contribute to the reaching of an agreement on the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapons tests without inspection.<sup>8</sup>

At that time it had still to be shown that data accumulated by exchange through a "detection club" would permit clarification of the overwhelming majority of events. I hope we have managed to demonstrate this by our previous statements, in which we have drawn so much from recent developments in seismological science and technology.

18. To continue my description of the outlines of the control system we have in mind: the next part of the system would be an undertaking by all parties to the treaty to co-operate in good faith also for the clarification of any seismic event. The parties would thus have the right to make enquiries and to receive information and additional data as a result of such enquiries. Further, the parties would be able to invite inspection on their territories, the inspection to be carried out in the manner prescribed by the inviting party. Finally, if it found the information available or made available under some or all of the earlier-mentioned procedures to be inadequate, a party could make proposals for other suitable methods of clarification. It thus becomes obvious that it is inherent in the procedure we have outlined that a party might directly propose inspection on another party's territory.

<sup>7</sup> ENDC/PV. 319, p. 9.

<sup>8</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, p. 704.

If such a proposal were not accepted, the party would have to determine, in the light of that negative reaction and all available evidence, what conclusions should be drawn and what course of action should be followed.

19. That procedure and those proposals amount to what has been labelled the verification-by-challenge method. However, it has been claimed that this method is unworkable and would soon lead to a collapse of the whole treaty because it would only postpone the solution of the problem of on-site inspection to a rather remote future<sup>9</sup> and because some countries might risk being challenged almost continuously. But if the idea were accepted that deterrence should be the basis for the trustworthiness of a comprehensive test ban, we are convinced that, with the present possibilities of seismic identification and with the help of the "detection club", any test-ban signatory would be supplied with seismic data rapidly enough and in sufficient number for analysis as regards the origin of a specific event. Therefore, an erroneous challenge carried to such a stage as to endanger the treaty would be a rare occurrence indeed.

20. We are convinced that recent studies justify the opinion that seismological observations by national stations circulated through the "detection club", plus further refined methods of analysis and, in addition, the verification-by-challenge procedure, would together form a comprehensive control system for a comprehensive test ban. Therefore we have refrained on purpose from discussing whether a right to make use of a certain number of on-site inspections should be provided. That is a matter left open. However, even if such a right were to be provided, the verification-by-challenge procedure might well prove to be useful in certain situations.

21. I wish to close these remarks of an explanatory technical nature by paying tribute once again to the vast efforts in the science of seismology that are now being undertaken, particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom. We agree with Mr. Foster and Mr. Mulley that continued efforts in this field are of great importance for the solution of the problem of test-ban control. We wish especially to endorse their statements to the effect that if all parties conducting work in this area were to make their conclusions internationally available, we might reach more rapidly our goal of an adequate verification system for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. A good omen is the promise made by Mr. Foster:

If a comprehensive treaty were achieved we should, on a regular basis, be willing to make our regional data available to other parties.<sup>10</sup>

22. A mutual understanding of the scientific problems involved is of the essence for achieving a comprehensive ban on all testing of nuclear weapons. The compromises which still have to be reached, and which are *per se* political in nature, should be easier to attain when the uncertainties in the scientific field have been reduced to a minimum. It is our firm conviction that, while a hundred-per-cent certainty can never be achieved by any system, so many of the necessary elements of

<sup>9</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 190 ff.

<sup>10</sup> *Ante*, p. 324.

knowledge are now at hand, or it could be brought out into the clear daylight by international discussion, that nobody would have reason to go against the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban through sheer mistrust.

23. The road along which to proceed from here is for this Committee to choose. Either we should, even at this late hour, alongside the negotiations on the non-proliferation treaty, embark on a study of a text for such a test-ban treaty or—and for reasons of time this might be more practical—we should use the interval between now and our renewed meetings in the New Year to organize in one way or another—and this is exactly the idea launched by Mr. Mulley in his statement—meetings of scientists from various interested States in order that they may iron out any technical crinkles which might still affect the control issue. Only one road can we not afford to choose; the one of inaction.

24. In conclusion, let me remind everyone here of the statement in last year's joint memorandum of the non-aligned member States of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament that continued nuclear-weapon testing underground—

... imparts a renewed impetus to the arms race, bringing about unforeseeable consequences in regard to imbalance and mistrust in the relationship between States and causing immense and increasing diversion of human and material resources for purposes of war.<sup>1</sup>

### Draft Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, August 24, 1967<sup>1</sup>

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of

<sup>1</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, p. 575.

<sup>2</sup> Submitted to the ENDC by the U.S. delegation as ENDC/102 and by the Soviet delegation as ENDC/133. The documents are identical.

nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States.

Convinced that in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to this Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should be available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Noting that nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,

Have agreed as follows:

#### ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

#### ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

#### ARTICLE III

(International Control)

## ARTICLE IV

Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty, as well as the right of the Parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

## ARTICLE V

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

## ARTICLE VI

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of \_\_\_\_\_, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear-weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and \_\_\_\_\_ other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall

enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

#### ARTICLE VII

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

#### ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ this \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_.

### Statement by President Johnson on Submission of the Draft Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, August 24, 1967<sup>1</sup>

Today at Geneva the United States and the Soviet Union as Co-chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee are submitting to the Committee a draft treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup>

For more than 20 years, the world has watched with growing fear as nuclear weapons have spread.

Since 1945, five nations have come into possession of these dreadful weapons. We believe now—as we did then—that even one such nation is too many. But the issue now is not whether some have nuclear weapons while others do not. The issue is whether the nations will agree to prevent a bad situation from becoming worse.

<sup>1</sup> *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Aug. 28, 1967, pp. 1204-1205.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

Today, for the first time, we have within our reach an instrument which permits us to make a choice.

The submission of a draft treaty brings us to the final and most critical stage of this effort. The draft will be available for consideration by all governments, and for negotiation by the Conference.

The treaty must reconcile the interests of nations with our interest as a community of human beings on a small planet. The treaty must be responsive to the needs and problems of all the nations of the world—great and small, aligned and nonaligned, nuclear and nonnuclear.

It must add to the security of all.

It must encourage the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

It must provide adequate protection against the corruption of the peaceful atom to its use for weapons of war.

I am convinced that we are today offering an instrument that will meet these requirements.

If we now go forward to completion of a worldwide agreement, we will pass on a great gift to those who follow us.

We shall demonstrate that—despite all his problems, quarrels, and distractions—man still retains a capacity to design his fate, rather than be engulfed by it.

Failure to complete our work will be interpreted by our children and grandchildren as a betrayal of conscience, in a world that needs all of its resources and talents to serve life, not death.

I have given instructions to the United States representative, William C. Foster, which reflect our determination to ensure that a fair and effective treaty is concluded.

The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament now has before it the opportunity to make a cardinal contribution to man's safety and peace.

### Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, August 24, 1967<sup>1</sup>

2. I have a statement of today's date by President Lyndon B. Johnson, which reads as follows:

[The President's statement appears *supra*.]

I request that that statement be circulated as a Conference document.

3. A major milestone on the path towards achievement of a nonproliferation treaty is marked today.

4. An important initial milestone was the unanimous adoption in 1961 of General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI), the "Irish resolution".<sup>2</sup> Public debate here and in New York, private negotiations and

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV. 325, pp. 4-11.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, p. 694.

additional action by the General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament Commission followed in the succeeding years.

5. The year 1965 was marked by the public presentation of concrete treaty texts, by the submission of an eight-nation joint memorandum on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons<sup>3</sup> and by the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX).<sup>4</sup> As a result, multilateral negotiations in this Committee and in the General Assembly took on new meaning.

6. Given this new direction and impetus, the 1966 negotiations in this Committee succeeded in identifying with greater clarity the major obstacles to agreement. At the end of the session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament that year, the following comment appeared in another eight-nation joint memorandum:

The eight delegations regret that it has not so far been possible to arrive at an agreement on a treaty acceptable to all concerned. They are deeply conscious of the danger inherent in a situation without an agreement that prevents proliferation of nuclear weapons. They view with apprehension the possibility that such a situation may lead not only to an increase of nuclear arsenals and to a spread of nuclear weapons over the world, but also to an increase in the number of nuclear weapon Powers, thus aggravating the tensions between States and the risk of nuclear war.

The eight delegations are aware that a main obstacle to an agreement has so far been constituted by differences concerning nuclear armaments within alliances, a problem mainly discussed between the major Powers and their allies.<sup>5</sup>

7. Today, for the first time, conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty is within reach. The members of this Committee, all of whom have helped to bring the negotiations to this point, share in the achievement we mark today. As will be seen from a careful examination, the draft is based upon the principles enunciated in the joint memoranda and resolution 2028 (XX).

8. The draft non-proliferation treaty we are presenting today is a recommendation for discussion and negotiation in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and for the consideration of all governments. We have worked long and hard over it. We have sought to take into account the interests of all potential adherents. This draft reflects constructive suggestions made by other delegations here and by other governments. We could not, of course, expect governments to be committed to this draft at this point; since all governments would want to be able to consider improvements which might be suggested here.

9. We recognize the interest of governments not represented on this Committee to have their views on the draft non-proliferation treaty made known during this next and crucial stage in the elaboration of the treaty. A procedure already exists for the circulation within the Committee of the views of non-members.

10. Now let me present a brief explanation of the provisions of the draft. I submit the draft treaty with the request that it be circulated as a Conference document.<sup>6</sup>

11. Article I deals with the obligations of nuclear-weapon States. First, they cannot transfer nuclear weapons, or control over them, to

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 424-425.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 532-534.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 576-579.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, pp. 338-341.

any recipient whatsoever. Second, they cannot assist non-nuclear-weapon States to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. Third, these prohibitions are applicable not only to nuclear weapons but also to other nuclear explosive devices.

12. Article II deals with the obligations of non-nuclear-weapon States and is the obverse of article I. First, such States cannot receive the transfer of nuclear weapons, or control over them, from any transferor whatsoever. Second, they cannot manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or seek or receive assistance for such manufacture. Third, these prohibitions are applicable not only to nuclear weapons but also to other nuclear explosive devices.

13. We have already made clear the reasons for including such devices in the prohibitions of the treaty. These devices could be used as nuclear weapons, and the technology for making them is essentially indistinguishable from that of nuclear weapons.

14. The United States recognizes that the benefits which may some day be realized from nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should be available to the non-nuclear States. In his message of 21 February to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, President Johnson stated:

The United States is prepared to make available nuclear explosive services for peaceful purposes on a non-discriminatory basis under appropriate international safeguards. We are prepared to join other nuclear States in a commitment to do this.<sup>7</sup>

My delegation elaborated on this proposal in interventions at our meetings on 21 March<sup>8</sup> and 8 June.<sup>9</sup>

15. We are pleased that the preamble of the draft non-proliferation treaty contains a forthright provision on peaceful nuclear explosions. It states that—

... potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should be available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development.

16. Article III, the safeguards article, has been left blank, although there are several references to safeguards in the preamble. The article is blank because the co-Chairmen have not yet been able to work out a formula which would be acceptable to all States that wish to support the treaty. The co-Chairmen are continuing their consultations with a view to drafting an agreed text for this article. In the meantime, I hope that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee plenary discussion will focus on the provisions which have been submitted today and that discussion of safeguards will be deferred for the time being while the co-Chairmen work on the problem.

17. Article IV results from many suggestions by non-nuclear-weapon countries that the treaty contain an article on peaceful uses of atomic energy. Indeed, the idea for such an article was originally de-

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, p. 99.

<sup>8</sup> *Ante*, pp. 172-174.

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, pp. 252-258.

fivea from the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Mexico.<sup>10</sup> The article describes two recognized rights of parties with respect to peaceful uses. First, it makes clear that nothing in the draft treaty interferes with the right of the parties to develop their research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in compliance with articles I and II, which, of course, include provisions on peaceful nuclear explosive devices. Second, it recognizes the right of the parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of information for and to contribute, alone or in co-operation with other States, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. These two rights are specific elaborations of the principle stated in the preamble "that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology . . . should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties . . . , whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States." As the preamble also makes clear, this principle includes not only modern reactor technology and the like but also "any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices."

18. These provisions make it clear that the treaty would promote, not discourage, national development and international co-operation with respect to peaceful application of atomic energy. This applies to research, production and use as well as to information, equipment and materials.

19. Article V deals with amendments and review. Paragraph 1 states how amendments may be initiated and is derived from the test-ban Treaty.<sup>11</sup> Paragraph 2 describes how amendments enter into force. It provides that an amendment must be approved by a majority of the parties, including the nuclear-weapon parties and all other parties that are members of the Board of Governors [of the] International Atomic Energy Agency.

20. The last paragraph of article V provides for a conference after five years to review the treaty's operation with a view to assuring that its purposes and provisions are being realized. This will provide an opportunity for non-nuclear and nuclear-weapon States alike to assess whether the treaty is accomplishing its primary purpose of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and also its purposes of easing international tensions and facilitating agreement on cessation of the nuclear arms race and on disarmament. The review conference is thus relevant to the question of further measures of disarmament, a question which has been of such interest to many members of this Committee.

21. The draft also contains preambular provisions on arms control and disarmament, including a declaration of intention to achieve a cessation of the nuclear arms race at the earliest possible date. The "declaration of intention" form was, of course, suggested in the eight-nation joint memorandum on non-proliferation of last August. In a similar vein, a later preambular paragraph calls for the cessation of production of nuclear weapons and the elimination of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles from national arsenals, pursuant to a treaty on

<sup>10</sup> *Id.*, pp. 68-83.

<sup>11</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

22. Those preambular provisions state the purposes of the treaty. Steps towards achievement of these purposes would be reviewed by the review conference to which I have referred. Thus, while no specific obligation to nuclear disarmament would appear, the preambular provisions combined with the review paragraph in article V would provide the most realistic approach to this problem.

23. We share the general desire for early progress to halt the nuclear arms race and to begin the process of reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons from national arsenals. The United States has proposed, and will continue to pursue, various measures to achieve these objectives. But we all know why it would not be feasible to incorporate specific obligations to that end in the treaty itself. The differences that have prevented agreement on these measures have not yet been resolved. Any attempt to incorporate specific nuclear arms limitation obligations in the treaty would inevitably also inject these differences into the consideration of the treaty itself and could only jeopardize its prospects.

24. Let us therefore agree to pursue these nuclear arms limitation measures with a greater sense of urgency and, I would hope, in a spirit of greater co-operation. Let us also all agree that this treaty must be regarded as a step towards the achievement of these other necessary measures. We are convinced that the treaty will create a more favourable environment for agreement on them. That is why we believe we must concentrate now on ways to expedite and facilitate the conclusion of this treaty and avoid actions which would delay or jeopardize it. The situation requires that our efforts be focussed on achieving a realistic agreement as soon as possible.

25. Article VI contains signature and entry-into-force provisions derived from those of the test-ban treaty. It would require that a certain number of non-nuclear-weapon States in addition to the nuclear-weapon signatories would have to ratify before the treaty would enter into force. We have not expressed a view on the precise number. The United States believes it should be sufficiently large so that the treaty will begin to achieve its purpose when it enters into force.

26. Article VII states that the treaty shall be of unlimited duration. It contains a withdrawal clause similar to that of the test-ban treaty, with one significant improvement. The notice of withdrawal, together with a statement of the reasons therefor, would be submitted to the United Nations Security Council as well as to the parties. The withdrawal provision is central to this treaty. States will adhere to the treaty if they believe it is consistent with their security interests. Under the proposed clause, a party can cease to be bound by the treaty if it decides that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty.

27. Article VIII provides depositary procedures for the treaty text. It also states that the treaty will be equally authentic in each of the five official languages of the United Nations.

28. We recognize that the problem of security assurances, which is of concern to some non-aligned countries, remains to be considered. The United States maintains the view that this is a matter which, because

of its complexity and the divergent interests involved, cannot be dealt with in the treaty itself. We are, however, exploring various possible solutions, including action which could be taken in the context of the United Nations, whose primary purpose is the maintenance of peace and security. We expect that the co-Chairmen will be exploring this problem further with a view to presenting recommendations to this Committee in the course of our consideration of the treaty.

29. If the draft presented today leads to a generally-accepted treaty, our generation will pass on a gift of great benefit to future generations. Such a treaty will lessen the danger of nuclear war. It will stimulate widespread peaceful development of nuclear energy. It will improve the chance for nuclear disarmament. It will help reduce tensions. Like the test-ban treaty and the outer space treaty,<sup>12</sup> it will constitute a major step towards a more peaceful world. It will be a treaty for all of us, but most of all for our children and our grandchildren.

30. The future safety of mankind requires prompt action to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. An unprecedented opportunity to do so now awaits us. Let us seize this opportunity while we can.

### Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft Non-proliferation Treaty, August 24, 1967<sup>1</sup>

31. The Soviet delegation is today submitting for the consideration of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup> This draft expresses the policy line of the Soviet Union, aimed at solving the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and is the result of the persistent political struggle carried on by the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and all peace-loving peoples in seeking to reduce international tension and to eliminate the threat of nuclear war.

32. The Soviet Union together with the other socialist countries, acting from the position of peaceful co-existence, together with all the peace-loving States has for many years been pressing for real and effective measures which would set up a reliable barrier in the way of the further spread of nuclear weapons. The Soviet side regards this problem as one of the key questions of European and international security and, in working out the draft treaty on non-proliferation, has sought and is seeking to ensure that the treaty will serve the cause of strengthening peace and the interests of all peoples. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Kosygin, speaking at the emergency special session of the United Nations General Assembly on 19 June, emphasized that—

The nuclear age has created a new reality in questions of war and peace. It has vested in the States a far greater responsibility in all that pertains to these problems.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>12</sup> For the outer space treaty, see *ante*, pp. 38-43.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV. 325, pp. 11-17.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 338-341.

<sup>3</sup> A/PV 1526 (prov.), p. 6.

33. The draft treaty submitted to the Committee is the result of the negotiations and discussions that have been going on for many years among States at sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and, within its framework, between the two co-Chairmen. It is the result of the collective efforts of many countries, aimed at halting the nuclear arms race and reversing the growth of the threat of nuclear war. It contains the ideas and propositions put forward in the course of the negotiations by the representatives of many countries that seek to ensure the effective prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons.

34. The international and legal obligations which are contained in the draft treaty and which are placed on both the nuclear and the non-nuclear States are intended fully to ensure the fulfilment of the basic purpose which the treaty is designed to achieve: namely, to preclude any possibility of any proliferation whatsoever of such weapons throughout the world. Under the provisions of the draft treaty the nuclear Powers are prohibited from transferring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to anyone whatsoever, directly or indirectly. In order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the nuclear Powers are also prohibited from transferring control over nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices to anyone whatsoever.

35. Lastly, it has been provided that the nuclear States shall not in any way assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear States to manufacture or acquire by any means nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices. In their turn, the non-nuclear countries are invited to undertake not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to receive the transfer of such weapons or nuclear explosive devices from anyone whatsoever.

36. These provisions of the draft treaty, which are fully in accord with the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, are of extremely great importance for preserving peace and safeguarding international security. In the circumstances of acute international crises and the existence of dangerous hotbeds of conflict, the spread of nuclear weapons to further areas would make the situation in the world still more unstable and tense and would increase many times over the threat of an outbreak of nuclear war. Contrariwise, the conclusion of a treaty that would firmly block all ways and channels leading to the proliferation of nuclear weapons would make it possible to ensure a more reliable degree of general security for States and would bring about such an international situation as would be favourable to the strengthening of peace. All countries, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, would stand to gain, because with the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty an important step would be taken towards the relaxation of international tension and the creation of conditions of greater trust between States.

37. In submitting to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union regards this document not only from the point of view of the contribution which the treaty will make to the cause of averting the threat of a nuclear war but also from the point of view of the

positive influence which the solution of the problem of non-proliferation will have on the development of peaceful ways of using atomic energy in the non-nuclear countries. Atomic energy, which is a great achievement of human genius, must be a powerful means of improving the well-being of the peoples of all the countries of the world and not an instrument of destruction and death.

38. The Soviet side has assumed and continues to assume that a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is destined to open up before the non-nuclear States favourable prospects in regard to the development of their atomic industry, in regard to utilizing the great potentialities of the peaceful atom. This position of the Soviet Union is determined by the basic principles of the foreign policy of our State, which consistently advocates the equality and independence of all States and respect for their sovereignty and is giving wide support to many countries which have taken the path of independence, in the development of their national economies.

39. The draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons definitely and clearly confirms the inalienable right of all the parties to the treaty to develop research and the production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without any discrimination. The draft treaty also confirms the right of States to participate in the fullest possible exchange of information and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to the further development of the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

40. It is our profound conviction that renunciation by the non-nuclear countries of military ways of using atomic energy will stimulate the development of wide international co-operation in the field of research and improvement of the peaceful forms of the nuclear activities of States, which would be in keeping with the interests of the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes on both the national and the international scale.

41. In advocating the general availability of the benefits of the peaceful use of the atom, the Soviet Union adheres to this principle also in regard to the use of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes. We consider that in solving this question no channels or loop-holes should be opened for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and on the other hand that the interests of the non-nuclear States which would desire to use nuclear explosive devices for carrying out some particular project in the field of peaceful development in the future should not be infringed.

42. The potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should be available through appropriate international procedures to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty on a non-discriminatory basis. As laid down in the text of the draft treaty, the charge for nuclear explosive devices intended for peaceful purposes should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and the development of such explosive devices. Thus the proposed solution of the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, in our view, corresponds fully to the political and economic interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States, as well as to the fundamental idea of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

43. While attaching great importance to the elaboration and conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union at the same time has always based itself on the premise that this treaty is not an end in itself but is only one of the preliminary steps towards restricting and stopping the nuclear arms race. The policy of the Soviet Union is aimed at achieving an agreement on the cessation of the arms race and on the complete disarmament of all States. It is precisely from the point of view of this wide perspective that we regard a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which will to a considerable extent facilitate further joint actions by States in the field of nuclear and general disarmament.

44. Basing itself on its policy in the field of disarmament, the Soviet Union has advocated that in the draft non-proliferation treaty it should be clearly stipulated that the parties to the treaty will undertake efforts to help bring about the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles from the national arsenals of States in accordance with an agreement on general and complete disarmament. Thus, by an international instrument as constituted by the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it is proposed to indicate the fundamental objective towards which States will and must strive in their efforts to bring about the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the accomplishment of general disarmament. The Soviet Union regards the struggle for disarmament as one of the most important directions of its foreign policy activities and will do everything necessary on its part to ensure progress in solving the disarmament problems that are ripe for solution.

45. In submitting to the Eighteen-Nation Committee a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Soviet delegation would also like to emphasize that the draft treaty includes a provision, put forward by the non-nuclear countries, to the effect that the non-proliferation treaty should not have an adverse effect on the right of any group of States to conclude regional agreements in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. This provision is in keeping with the aim of strengthening peace and with the objectives of the policy of the Soviet Union which advocates the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world.

46. In working out the draft non-proliferation treaty we have endeavoured to ensure the reliability and stability of the future treaty, to give to all the parties to it the assurance that this treaty will be a viable and effective instrument for consolidating world peace. It is precisely in this spirit that the provisions on the procedure relating to the submission of amendments to the treaty, to its signature and to its entry into force and so on have been formulated.

47. For the time being the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is being submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee without the article on international control, in regard to which the exchange of views between the two co-Chairmen is being continued for the purpose of elaborating an agreed text. The Soviet Union bases itself firmly on the premise that in order to keep watch on the fulfilment of the treaty effective international control should be established, which would provide reliable guarantees of the consistent

implementation of this international agreement. We consider that such control should serve exclusively the purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by States under the treaty to renounce the manufacture of nuclear weapons without interference in the internal affairs of States. The Soviet Union has exerted and will continue to exert efforts to ensure, as stated in the preamble to the treaty, the establishment of international control through the International Atomic Agency, whose safeguards system is universally recognized and accepted by the overwhelming majority of States.<sup>4</sup>

48. The Soviet Union also attaches great importance to the question of security guarantees for the non-nuclear countries which will assume under the non-proliferation treaty the obligation not to manufacture and not to acquire nuclear weapons. It is well known that as long ago as 1966 the USSR proposed to include in the treaty a provision to the effect that the nuclear Powers should undertake not to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear States which have no nuclear weapons on their territories.<sup>5</sup> In submitting the draft treaty the Soviet delegation bases itself on the understanding reached between the co-Chairmen to continue the exchange of views on security guarantees for the non-nuclear countries in order to find a positive solution to this urgent and important problem.

49. The struggle of the Soviet Union for the solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is closely connected with the general foreign policy of the Soviet State, which stands for averting the threat of nuclear war, eliminating the centres of tension and aggression and safeguarding the security of all peoples. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Brezhnev, speaking at a reception in the Kremlin on 5 July, said:

The Soviet Union will continue to go along the road of an unflagging struggle against the aggressive forces of imperialism, for the strengthening of universal peace and the relaxation of international tension.<sup>6</sup>

50. Together with other socialist countries and all peace-loving States, the Soviet Union resolutely calls for the cessation of the imperialist aggression of the United States in Viet-Nam, which is assuming an ever wider scale and becoming more and more dangerous to peace, and demands the immediate cessation of the bombing of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam by United States aircraft—an action condemned by the peoples of the world.

51. The USSR and other socialist countries demand the elimination of all the consequences of the Israeli aggression against the Arab States and, above all, the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories. It cannot be tolerated that the aggressor should be allowed to remain unpunished and to derive advantages from his treacherous attack.

<sup>4</sup> For the I.A.E.A. safeguards system, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 446-460.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, p. 11.

<sup>6</sup> *Pravda*, July 6, 1967; *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. LIX, no. 27 (July 26, 1967), p. 5 (variant translation).

52. In Europe the Soviet Union advocates the establishment of an effective system of collective security, the ensuring of such conditions as would prevent the forces of imperialism and revanchism from threatening once again the peace and security of the peoples of Europe.

53. Faithful to the policy of peace and the prevention of a new world war, the Soviet Union is doing its utmost to reverse the arms race and to ensure, on the basis of disarmament, reliable security for all peoples. The conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would be an important step in this direction. It would open up for all States that are concerned to avert the threat of a new world war favourable prospects in their struggle for the improvement of the present international situation and for safeguarding the security of all peoples.

### Statement by the Swedish Government on the Draft Non-proliferation Treaty, August 24, 1967<sup>1</sup>

The Swedish Government greets with the greatest satisfaction that the United States and the Soviet Union have been able to put forward in Geneva today identical drafts of a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons,<sup>2</sup> even if a text of the article on controls is not yet available. Behind these drafts lies a long and difficult period of preparatory work. Since the conclusion of the test-ban treaty in 1963,<sup>3</sup> the presentation of these drafts represents the most positive action in the field of political *détente*.

It is now our hope that the member States of the Disarmament Conference shall be able to reach agreement on a final draft text, intended primarily as a recommendation to be presented to the coming session of the United Nations General Assembly. As a participant in the disarmament negotiations in Geneva, Sweden is naturally ready to contribute in a constructive way, so that the final treaty proposal will be effective and acceptable to the greatest number of States.

As late as yesterday, after meeting in Helsinki in Finland, the Foreign Ministers of the five Nordic countries said that a non-proliferation treaty with as universal an adherence as possible would imply an important step forward towards international relaxation of tension and increased security. They further drew attention to the importance of arriving as speedily as possible at an agreement banning underground nuclear tests.

It is the hope of the Swedish Government that a non-proliferation agreement will be a step on the road towards further successful disarmament work in the field of nuclear arms.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.325, pp. 19-20.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 338-341.

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

## Address by Senator Pastore to the Senate: Draft Nonproliferation Treaty [Extracts], August 24, 1967<sup>1</sup>

Mr. President, as Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy as well as congressional adviser to the U.S. delegation to the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference, I have been following very closely the detailed negotiations that have been transpiring in Geneva, as well as the discussions our representatives have been having with our allies and with representatives of the U.S.S.R. in connection with the development of a nonproliferation treaty.

I am pleased, therefore, to inform you that at 10 a.m. eastern standard time this morning, Ambassador Foster officially introduced a proposed treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. I am informed that Ambassador Roshchin of the U.S.S.R. also introduced a proposed treaty on behalf of his country. It was hoped that the United States and the U.S.S.R. would jointly table identical language. Although the language is believed to be identical, the U.S.S.R. preferred to introduce their treaty separately. This in no way, however, detracts from what I believe to be a milestone in world history.

The fact that the most powerful Communist nation in the world—the Soviet Union—and the most powerful nation in the free world—the United States—recognize that the safety of the world requires responsible nations to work together in the control of nuclear weapons is a major step forward.

The safety of nations behind the Iron Curtain, as well as the safety of nations outside the Iron Curtain, depends upon the effective control of the most devastating weapons known to man.

Mr. President, I commend Ambassador Foster and the other members of the U.S. delegation that have worked so diligently in the development of this proposed treaty. It is my understanding that with the exception of article III all portions of the proposed treaty are agreeable to the U.S.S.R. and others participating in the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference. Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. do recognize that some form of international inspection and verification is required. To date, however, we have not successfully developed wording acceptable to both the U.S.S.R. and ourselves. Together with our allies and other participants at the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference, it is hoped that we will, during the upcoming sessions, reach agreement on an effective international control system which will be incorporated in the treaty as finally adopted.

The language that is agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union reflects this country's longstanding nonproliferation policy and helps clear the air on the nature of that policy in one important respect. During the course of past negotiations on this treaty, the Soviets have feared—without cause I might add—that under nonproliferation treaty language previously proposed by us we could relinquish control over our nuclear weapons to some of our NATO allies.

<sup>1</sup> *Congressional Record* (daily version), Aug. 24, 1967, pp. S12193-S12194. The draft treaty appears *ante*, pp. 338-341.

Our efforts to allay these fears gave rise here at home to a view expressed by a few that, in our anxiety to get a nonproliferation treaty, we were, in effect, putting the Soviets in a position where they could dictate to NATO what kind of nuclear arrangements they will permit and what kind they will not stand for. The reasoning behind this seemed to be that the Soviet price for agreement to a treaty was to deprive the NATO Alliance of the nuclear weapons which they want and which we would, lacking Soviet objection, give them.

As far as the United States is concerned, the Soviets are not going to have any voice in nuclear arrangements in NATO, with or without a nonproliferation treaty. We are not going to relinquish control over our nuclear weapons—offensive or defensive—to anybody, not in Europe or anywhere else on earth. For one thing, there is a law against it. Section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act prohibits the "transfer" of nuclear weapons to another nation.<sup>2</sup> And, as was made evident at last year's hearings of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, the executive branch neither intends to ask that this law be amended, nor does the legislative intend to amend it.<sup>3</sup>

Article I of the new draft treaty is patterned after this provision in the Atomic Energy Act. The treaty is therefore in furtherance of American policy long ago articulated by Congress. It does not prohibit us from doing anything that wasn't already prohibited by our own legislation.

The Senate has specifically endorsed the concept of preventing nuclear weapon spread without a single dissenting vote. It did this last year when Senate Resolution 179, sponsored by me and cosponsored by 58 other Senators, was passed by a bipartisan vote of 84 to 0, with none of the absent Senators declaring themselves opposed.<sup>4</sup>

This endorsement did not, of course, constitute approval in advance of just any treaty language. During the hearings and floor debates on the resolution, views of Senators on various proposed treaty provisions were expressed. The new draft article I, patterned after section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act, avoids criticism previously leveled on the earlier draft of that article.

One problem which I have addressed on a number of occasions is still with us—a solution to the impasse over a safeguards article.

In discussing, on the floor of the Senate this year, the specific language I recommended, I noted that what I was saying—pure and simple—was "that any nation that gives fissionable material for civilian use shall make sure that the recipient of such material agrees to international inspection and all those who receive it in turn agree that they will subscribe to international inspection."<sup>5</sup> The purpose of such safeguards is to prevent the diversion to weapons use of fissionable materials from peaceful nuclear activities.

As I understand it, the Soviet Union does not disagree with the

<sup>2</sup> *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, p. 1440.

<sup>3</sup> See *Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States, Eighty-ninth Congress, Second Session, on S. Res. 179*.

<sup>4</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 306-307.

<sup>5</sup> *Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Hearings*, p. 148.

concept of international inspection to provide assurance that non-nuclear-weapon countries are not diverting such materials. Where, then, does the trouble lie?

The safeguards problem derives from the existence of two international safeguards systems—one of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, headquartered in Vienna,<sup>6</sup> and the other a system set [up] by the European Atomic Energy Community of the six Common Market Countries. The latter is known as Euratom.<sup>7</sup> The IAEA was established as a result of a proposal in former President Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace plan.<sup>8</sup>

I want to say at this juncture that, in my opinion, international inspection is absolutely necessary and that without it, of course, no treaty will be worth the paper it is written on.

As I have proposed on occasions in the past, I believe international control is sufficiently important that we should utilize all competent organizations that are capable of assuring special nuclear material will be used for civilian purposes and not diverted to military uses. I believe that we should utilize the existing Euratom inspection system as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency. I would hope that the Warsaw Pact nations would also develop an international safeguards system similar to Euratom and that other regional groups will do likewise.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has developed certain safeguard procedures and standards and is in the process of developing additional standards. I hope the IAEA will give the utmost attention to this responsibility.

Any and all international regional safeguard systems that may develop should be under the overall umbrella of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA should assure through personal verification that proposed safeguard standards are being maintained amongst those nations that become signatories to the nonproliferation treaty including regional organizations. I would hope the technical experts of IAEA and Euratom can successfully work out safeguard procedures acceptable to both.

Mr. Adrian Fisher, Deputy Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, recently stressed the weight which we must place on a safeguards article. He noted that in recent months there were times when it appeared that negotiations might deadlock because of dissension over a safeguards clause for the treaty. Why, then, did we not abandon it? Mr. Fisher gave a cogent explanation:

The answer is that it has become increasingly evident that controls over civil nuclear activities are important in preventing proliferation. A treaty which embodied international safeguards over such activities would at one stroke accomplish what it would otherwise take much time to bring about—maybe more time than we can afford. There is good reason to believe that the Soviets too have become increasingly aware of this. It has therefore become worthwhile to try very hard to achieve a treaty which contains this important element of assurance.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> For the I.A.E.A. safeguards system, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 446-460.

<sup>7</sup> See *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957*, pp. 518 ff.

<sup>8</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 401-407.

<sup>9</sup> Address before the Canadian-American Assembly on Nuclear Weapons, Scarborough, Canada, June 16, 1967.

I associate myself with these comments. I am convinced that the United States and the Soviet Union, along with the other nations of the world, realize the imperative need to conclude a nonproliferation pact. We cannot let the safeguards problem lay waste to all the constructive efforts that have been made toward that agreement. I call upon all involved to utilize their legal, diplomatic, and political acumen in renewed, vigorous effort to achieve a consensus on this vital topic.

The potential for nuclear weapons development exists in the Middle East, as in some other of the world's hotspots. Israel has an advanced technological base in its small, peaceful nuclear program. There is nothing to arouse suspicion either that Israel or the United Arab Republic is presently using their nuclear facilities to make their own nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, international safeguards on all nuclear facilities in Israel, Egypt, and the other Near Eastern states would make a major contribution to the reduction of suspicion and tension in that strife-ridden area. It would supplement the assurance provided by the fact that both Israel and Egypt are signatories to the limited test ban treaty.

It thus becomes clear why we must pursue a meaningful safeguards article. Besides serving as a key part of the nonproliferation treaty it will perform an indispensable role in quelling apprehension about the intentions of potential nuclear weapon states.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I would like to quote from the statement of Ambassador William C. Foster when he introduced the U.S. proposed treaty this morning in Geneva and when he stated:

If a draft presented today leads to a generally accepted treaty, our generation will pass on a gift to future generations. Such a treaty will lessen the danger of nuclear war. It will stimulate widespread, peaceful development of nuclear energy. It will improve the chance for nuclear disarmament. It will help reduce tensions. Like the test ban and outer space treaties, it will constitute a major step toward a more peaceful world. It will be a treaty for all of us—but most of all for our children and our grandchildren.<sup>10</sup>

To paraphrase the very prophetic statement which was made by our late President, the beloved John F. Kennedy, we live in a very sensitive and dangerous world. These developments will occur step by step. And this is another step in that direction, a small step, to be sure, but it is a promising one, a hopeful one; and I hope that now that we have proceeded to formal discussions of a nonproliferation treaty, we will end up with a sound treaty that will give assurances, not only to ourselves but to the rest of the world, against the peril of a nuclear holocaust.

<sup>10</sup> *Ante*, p. 347.

Statement by the Canadian External Affairs Secretary  
(Martin) on the Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, August  
24, 1967<sup>11</sup>

On August 11, I welcomed the news that the United States and the Soviet Union might shortly be tabling a joint draft nuclear non-proliferation treaty in the Geneva Disarmament Committee. It is good that this has now taken place, for we attach high priority to such a treaty. Unless preventive steps are soon taken, the world may be plunged into a general nuclear arms race, the dire consequences of which I need hardly dwell upon. The members of the Geneva Committee, of which Canada is one, will now be turning their attention to the specific provisions of the draft treaty.

We consider the draft to provide a valuable basis for negotiation. Its basic provisions would prevent the emergence of new military nuclear powers. We are confident that these provisions would impose no restrictions on the right of signatories to participate in defensive alliances, or to exploit nuclear energy for legitimate peaceful purposes. The draft treaty is, however, not yet complete; it lacks an important verification article, which would apply international safeguards to the peaceful nuclear activities of signatories. We hope the co-sponsors of the draft treaty will soon reach agreement on a generally acceptable provision for international safeguards.

Some non-nuclear countries have expressed concern that the draft treaty has a "discriminatory" aspect. Some element of discrimination is, of course, unavoidable by virtue of the very nature of the treaty which seeks to prevent additional military nuclear powers from developing. I nevertheless hope that the nuclear powers will be able to compensate non-nuclear signatories for their voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons by offering them reasonable assurances in respect of both their national security and the prospects of controlling and reducing existing stocks of nuclear weapons.

At all events, a non-proliferation treaty is vital and urgent and the time is short. In the weeks ahead Canada will strive with other countries to bring negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion and to make the treaty a working reality.

Interview of Ambassador Roshchin With *L'Unità*, August  
26, 1967<sup>1</sup>

*Q. Mr. Ambassador, what is your opinion of the draft treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons that you have submitted to the Committee of Eighteen on Disarmament?*

<sup>11</sup> Canadian Department of External Affairs press release 40, Aug. 24, 1967. The draft treaty is printed *ante*, pp. 333-341.

<sup>1</sup> *L'Unità*, Aug. 27, 1967, pp. 1-2. Department of State translation.

A. First of all it is to be noted that the draft nonproliferation treaty does not concern only the nuclear powers but all countries in the world. In fact, everyone's security depends very much on the solution of the nonproliferation problem. For this reason the Soviet Union, all the socialist countries, and all the countries that are interested in the preservation of peace have worked together for several months, indeed several years, seeking a solution to that problem. As a result of this work, our delegation has submitted separately the draft treaty without Article 3 on controls and guarantees. The value of such a draft is that it fortifies international security, enhances mutual trust among nations and limits the race to nuclear armaments.

*Q. What is the reason for your omitting Art. 3 in your draft?*

A. The reason is that the EURATOM countries, namely Italy, Benelux and particularly West Germany, insist that the controls of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of Vienna<sup>2</sup> shall not apply to them. But we cannot allow a situation wherein a country, any country, is granted a privileged status. We favor one single system, recognized and accepted by all. We cannot and do not want to destroy EURATOM, but we do not want to create a situation of exceptions by making it possible for a country to evade the universal controls. In fact, all the EURATOM countries would have the benefit of a different control. We shall continue our negotiations on the basis of the IAEA.

*Q. In your opinion, why did it take so long to present this draft?*

A. On the one hand the United States had to consult with the NATO countries, and that took quite some time. For our part, we had to consult with our friends, the socialist countries. Besides, last spring the United States proposed some new stipulations, thereby creating new obstacles, particularly with regard to amendments. The United States proposed a formula that would have substantially weakened the contents of the treaty. It was only after lengthy talks with a number of countries that we reached an acceptable solution which cannot lessen the value and the strength of the treaty.

*Q. How would you sum up the objections to such a treaty raised by the other countries represented in the Committee of Eighteen?*

A. It is too early yet to say. We may say something in a week or two. But we know already, from the press reports, that there are some objections. For instance, as I have already mentioned, the Federal Republic of Germany is against the IAEA system of control and wants the EURATOM control. We know also that some countries, especially those that have no nuclear weapons, are against banning nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. But since there are no differences between peaceful and nonpeaceful explosions, the treaty provides for the prohibition of explosions for peaceful purposes. We (the nuclear powers--ed. note in *L'Unità*) are trying to overcome these difficulties by promising to carry out these peaceful-purpose explosions

<sup>2</sup> For the I.A.E.A. safeguards, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 446-460.

for the non-nuclear countries, for a small price and without charging them for the cost of research and testing.

*Q. What are the prospects after presentation of the draft?*

A. We want the draft to be discussed here at Geneva. We do not want to limit the discussion, so that it will be as fruitful as possible. It is our intention to have the treaty signed as soon as possible, because, as the number of nuclear countries increases, the difficulties to be overcome become greater. We feel that this treaty is the concern of all countries and that all of them are interested in bringing about conditions of greater security.

*Q. In your estimation, what is the position of the USSR and that of the USA with regard to the guarantees sought by the non-nuclear countries?*

A. In so far as guaranteeing that atomic weapons will not be used against non-nuclear countries, the USSR is ready right now to give such guarantees to non-nuclear members, but the USA is not yet ready to settle this question. We are continuing to work on a formula that will be as acceptable as possible to the Western as well as the Communist countries. On the matter of controls, the United States is not favorable to the EURATOM but is forced to insist that the point of view of the Federal Republic of Germany be taken into consideration. Anyway, we are patient and must find a solution. Actually, this is an artificially magnified problem that could be solved quite easily. In fact, the IAEA system of control was accepted unanimously by one hundred countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, which is a member. Its representatives took part in the establishment of the Agency. And they took part in the elaboration of the control systems. Therefore, we hope that under the influence of world public opinion, the Federal Republic of Germany will be forced into accepting a control system which has already been accepted by almost every other country.

### Statement by the Italian Representative (Caracciolo) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, August 29, 1967<sup>1</sup>

24. After the submission by the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union of a draft treaty to which all of us here have looked forward for so long,<sup>2</sup> and shortly after the general statement made in the Committee by our Minister for Foreign Affairs,<sup>3</sup> my delegation considers it opportu. to take the floor once again in order to make a few preliminary comments. We should like first of all to express our gratitude to the Washington and Moscow Governments for the efforts

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.326, pp. 9-12.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 338-341.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 312-315.

made to answer the general expectations. We should like also to express our sincere congratulations to the representatives of those two great Powers on this first success which has crowned their personal activities. I am convinced that all these joint efforts will not fail to bear fruit and to influence in a positive way the future work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee aimed at the objectives common to all peace-loving peoples.

25. The drafts before us are indeed new texts if compared to the earlier ones, for they differ in several points from both the United States draft of 17 August 1965<sup>4</sup> and the Soviet draft of 24 September 1965.<sup>5</sup> To understand this difference the present text has to be seen as the result of collective efforts and of numerous contacts between the governments concerned. That work of consultation, in which my country took an active part, reveals today all its usefulness, since it enabled several points of fundamental importance to be clarified.

26. This applies, for example, to the problem of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The importance of this problem is clearly seen from the fact that it has become the subject of a specific article in the new draft treaty—an inclusion of which, for the moment, I shall only stress the importance without wishing to comment on the actual content of the article. The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should, in fact, be all the more encouraged and safeguarded since its place is in the context of the ever-growing technological gap. Moreover, it is in order to check this danger that my country has been led to put forward concrete proposals within the relevant institutions. Therefore the Italian delegation expresses its warmest appreciation to the authors of the draft treaty for the awareness and clear-sightedness which they have shown in this regard.

27. Other positive results of the joint activities in recent months can be found in the provisions of the preamble concerning both progress toward disarmament and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Lastly, and still refraining from any comments on the various provisions of the text, I wish to stress also the existence of a new article on revision of the treaty which leaves the door open for possible future amendments.

28. Nevertheless, it seems to me that some of our suggestions have not yet found a place in the text of the treaty. That applies to non-discrimination between the two categories of signatory countries, and to the problem of the security of the non-nuclear countries on which depends a more general adherence to the treaty. It also applies to the means to be adopted in order to avoid discouraging the development of European unity.

29. Quite obviously, however, the drafting of this text presented a number of difficulties. This is shown by the fact that the co-Chairmen have not yet succeeded in formulating article III on international controls. It is therefore natural to ask, in the most sincere spirit of co-operation and while seeking for a solution to this problem, whether, all things considered, it would not be wiser to defer this question to a later date. Indeed, if the difficulty of finding a satisfactory formula

<sup>4</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 347-349; *ibid.*, 1966, pp. 159-160.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 443-446.

would prevent rapid progress in the negotiations, the decision to defer this difficulty might perhaps facilitate the conclusion of a treaty.

30. Moreover, while fully realizing the importance of the article on controls, we cannot help thinking that in September 1965, when the Soviet Union submitted a draft treaty, the possibility of not proposing the immediate application of this article had already been envisaged. Therefore it seems that an agreement even without the control clause would nevertheless be an event of fundamental importance, a real advance along the road to disarmament. The Italian delegation does not intend to put forward any specific proposals on this subject; it wishes merely to suggest a subject for reflection in order to quicken the procedure for the conclusion of a treaty.

31. Nevertheless, we believe that it is premature at the moment to undertake a thorough analysis of the text. On the one hand, the treaty presupposes and provides for an article III of which we do not yet know the content; and this makes an overall assessment difficult. On the other hand, the Italian Government has undertaken to bring the draft submitted to us here to the attention of our Parliament. We shall therefore be unable to state precisely the Italian position on the whole of the treaty until this procedure has been completed. The Italian delegation will nevertheless continue, as in the past, to co-operate fully in the search for the best solutions likely to ensure the widest possible adherence to this treaty.

32. It was for this purpose that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, in his statement of 1 August in our Committee, alluded to a new measure aimed at increasing the interest of the non-nuclear countries in the treaty and at the same time at allaying some of their misgivings.<sup>6</sup> Having now read the new text, we feel that the suggestion put forward by Mr. Fanfani remains fully valid. Indeed, some of the misgivings of the non-nuclear States towards the problem of the balance of obligations and that of the peaceful use of nuclear energy would undoubtedly be allayed if the nuclear countries considered the suggestion to make available to the non-nuclear countries which sign the treaty, periodically and in accordance with the suggested procedures, a part, even a modest one, of their fissile material to be used for peaceful purposes. It would thus be possible to foresee acceptance of the treaty by a greater number of States, to facilitate technological progress, and to make an effective contribution to the economic and social progress of the least-favoured section of mankind.

33. Since we now have before us a concrete draft treaty, a link between nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy could be sought. This link could be found either by including the Italian suggestion in a provision of the treaty in words which, if necessary, we should be prepared to submit, or by converting it into a further draft agreement which would testify to the common will to advance along the road towards disarmament and the development of nuclear research for peaceful purposes.

34. Another way of facilitating acceptance of the treaty by the greatest number of States would perhaps be to give it a certain flexibility in either its duration or the machinery of its amendment. Such flexibility,

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, pp. 312-315.

provided that it did not hinder the successful conclusion of the negotiations, would make it possible to take account of the unpredictable results of technical progress and to adapt the treaty, without clashing, to the changing realities of the international community.

35. With the submission of the present draft our work enters a new phase. We hope that it may lead to positive results without further need to revert to the proposal put forward by Italy during the summer of 1965 at a difficult period of our work.<sup>7</sup> The Italian Government hopes that the interval until the end of this session may be employed in the most effective way to provide bearings for the forthcoming debates in the General Assembly so as to achieve the aim of resolution 2153/A (XXI): "to bring to a conclusion a treaty . . . which is acceptable to all concerned and satisfactory to the international community".<sup>8</sup> No other phrase could better express the hope and even the need of success in harmonizing the particular interests of States with those of all mankind.

36. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity to make these few preliminary observations on the draft treaty which has been submitted to us.

### Statement by the British Disarmament Minister (Mulley) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, August 29, 1967<sup>1</sup>

37. It is a privilege to follow the representatives of Poland and Italy, and I should like to thank them for their thoughtful and valuable contributions to our discussion. I shall try to take up in my own remarks some of the points they have made.

38. I should, however, like to begin by joining them and other representatives who have spoken previously in extending congratulations to our co-Chairmen on their achievement in submitting to us texts of the draft non-proliferation treaty,<sup>2</sup> and to thank the co-Chairmen for their dedicated efforts which have made this extremely important development possible. Much time and thought and very many speeches and resolutions have been directed to this end over several years; and I confess, as my colleagues will know, to having been impatient at our seeming lack of progress. Thus it is extremely satisfactory to be able to say now with conviction that the speedy conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty is now within our grasp, with the great benefit which, I believe, it will bring to all the nations of the world. The successful outcome of our deliberations can have a wider significance for the future of mankind than the subject-matter of the treaty itself, vitally important though that is, since it may put us back on the path to general disarmament on which we seemed

<sup>1</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 411-412.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 748-749.

<sup>3</sup> ENDC/PV. 326, pp. 12-19.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 338-341.

to have made a promising start with the partial test-ban Treaty<sup>3</sup> but from which we seem to have been diverted in the last two or three years into a morass of indecision.

39. First of all, I should like to follow the examples of the representatives of India and Czechoslovakia at previous meetings and the representative of Poland today and look back at the antecedents to this measure of arms control.

40. At the meeting of the Committee on 25 July the representatives of India and Czechoslovakia set out the historical background to the non-proliferation treaty as each saw that background.<sup>4</sup> It is useful to look back, as Mr. Trivedi did, to the Baruch plan<sup>5</sup> and to the discussions of the 1950s before the emergence of the idea of a non-proliferation treaty as a separate collateral measure of arms control. It was resolution 1665 (XVI) of December 1961, generally known as the Irish resolution<sup>6</sup>—to which the representative of Poland has drawn our attention again today—which gave that idea its classical expression. That resolution, which the General Assembly adopted unanimously, gave a new impetus to the efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It implied a general acceptance of the view that, however desirable it would be to make progress on a broader front by associating non-proliferation in the sense of that resolution with other proposals, the difficulties in the way of such a package were too great, and it was more practical to isolate that one particular and obviously urgent measure and to obtain agreement on it.

41. It must have been tempting for the non-nuclear Government which sponsored that resolution, and its non-nuclear supporters, to include in the proposal a provision banning any further increase in the stockpiles of nuclear weapons—that is, a provision forbidding any further production of them—; but they knew very well that previous attempts to do so had run aground on the rock of verification. They hoped, as we hope now, that once the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries had been stopped it would be easier to tackle the problem of further production on which the attention of the world would then be focussed. They may well have feared, as my Government fears now, that if the spread were not stopped by a separate non-proliferation treaty there would be no chance of stopping the nuclear arms race.

42. Our two co-Chairmen, in introducing the draft treaty, have explained the purpose of the preamble and the seven articles so far submitted. I will not follow them today in a systematic study of the text but will discuss it briefly under three aspects only: its effect on the security of all States, its effect on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the place of the treaty in the scheme of nuclear disarmament.

43. First, with regard to security, I think I cannot do better than recall the arguments put forward by the representative of Poland at

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

<sup>4</sup> For the Indian statement, see ENIC/PV.316, pp. 9-12. For the Czechoslovak statement, see *ibid.*, pp. 4-9.

<sup>5</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 7-16.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 1961, p. 694.

our meeting of 1 August.<sup>7</sup> Mr. Goldblat pointed out that the present nuclear-weapon States, and particularly the two most powerful, need fear no direct military threat to their security from a further spread of nuclear weapons. He then examined the effect of such a spread on the non-nuclear States in general and showed convincingly that the increased instability would reduce their security; that even a State which acquired nuclear weapons might well find that by doing so it had not increased but had actually diminished its security.

44. I find myself in substantial agreement with that analysis, since the military evaluation of nuclear capability goes much beyond the capacity to produce a nuclear bomb and includes a consideration of the character of the nuclear weapons available to a State as well as the means of delivery at its disposal. As we know, the problems in terms of sophistication and cost of the delivery system are as great as, or greater than, the problems of military nuclear technology itself.

45. Mr. Goldblat made the further point that it would be wrong to expect this particular treaty to solve completely the security problem of signatories. As long as weapons exist, especially nuclear weapons, there is the danger that they will be used in conditions of crisis and mutual suspicion. Spoken or unspoken, the threat of the use of nuclear weapons remains as long as the weapons themselves remain. As has already been said, the treaty is a vital step on the way to real disarmament. However, it is and must be only a first step forward, and it would be wrong to expect it to offer a final solution of the problem.

46. On the other hand, for any nation, the problem of its security is properly a vital consideration. In this context some non-nuclear Powers may feel that the loss of the option to make nuclear weapons may prove a source of weakness. Others may judge such fears to be groundless; but it is only right that everything possible should be done to set them at rest.

47. Both the co-Chairmen referred to that real problem in their speeches at our last meeting,<sup>8</sup> and it is clearly very much in their minds. I hope that their continued study of that aspect of the treaty will lead to a solution which will prove generally acceptable. If it is not possible to provide assurances to enhance the security of non-nuclear signatories within the treaty itself—and I understand the difficulties—I hope it may be possible to do so, as the representative of the United States mentioned, within the framework of the United Nations.

48. At this point I should also mention the outstanding problem of safeguards. Both co-Chairmen explained that they were at present unable to place a draft of article III before us for consideration but that they were continuing their efforts to that end. In the meantime, I agree that there is no advantage in discussing that aspect of the matter *in vacuo*, and I hope very much that they will shortly succeed in presenting us with a text while in the Committee we hammer out the articles placed before us and, I trust, reach general agreement upon them. Time is not on our side. In the constructive atmosphere which prevails I am optimistic and believe a satisfactory safeguard

<sup>7</sup> ENDC/PV.318, pp. 11 ff.

<sup>8</sup> *Ante*, pp. 342-352.

formulation can be found. If I or my delegation can be of assistance to the co-Chairmen on that or any other matter, I hope they will not hesitate to call upon us.

49. Fears have also been expressed in recent months, both in our discussions and in the Press, that this treaty, which is designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, will also have the effect of inhibiting the spread and the development of peaceful nuclear technology. No one ever intended at any stage that the treaty should have this secondary effect, which would clearly be irrelevant to its purpose. However, I believe that the discussions have served a useful purpose. They have shown that many of the particular fears were exaggerated or without foundation. The assurances which have been expressed by each of the nuclear-weapon States represented on this Committee should make it impossible for any of those States to adopt a restrictive attitude once a treaty comes into force, even if they wished to do so; and on past form, if I may say so, that would not appear to be their intention. I can say categorically, as the representative of one of the nuclear-weapon States, that it is certainly not our intention. We now have in article IV of the draft before us, and in the preamble, clear and categorical language on that point. These provisions, as the representative of Italy has just pointed out, had no counterpart in either of the drafts which we considered last year,<sup>9</sup> and their appearance now is a tribute to the value of the exchanges which have taken place here in the intervening period.

50. There remains the quite distinct problem of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The arguments on that have been presented and thoroughly discussed from both points of view. I do not think there is any difference of opinion on the basic fact that the technology of a device exploded, or designed to be exploded, for peaceful purposes is virtually identical with the technology of a weapon test. For that reason a treaty which permitted the unrestricted use of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes would contain a serious loop-hole, which could fatally undermine its stability. To insist on such a provision would be to go against the considered and expert opinions of the great majority of States.

51. Such insistence, moreover, would amount to asking that a political advance of great importance, which could be made consistently with the full right of all States to participate in all benefits of peaceful nuclear technology, should be jeopardized for what is at present a hypothetical benefit. The expert opinions made available informally to members of delegations in the spring seemed rather sceptical about the practical prospects for peaceful explosions in the foreseeable future. We must not forget the enormous expenditure which a country embarking on its own programme would have to face. Nor has a way yet been suggested for reconciling some of the uses to which this technique might hypothetically be applied with the provisions of the partial test-ban Treaty.

52. It might also be suggested that the diversion of scarce resources of material and skilled manpower to a limited, costly and possibly fruit-

<sup>9</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 347-349, 443-446; *ibid.*, 1966, pp. 159-160. The Italian statement appears *supra*.

less endeavour, when the vast possibilities of reactor technology are there to be developed, does not at present seem likely to be an attractive option to any but the most wealthy Powers.

53. It has, moreover, been made abundantly clear by the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States that there is no question of any State being deprived of the benefits—if it turns out that there are benefits—of peaceful explosions. As a result of the arrangements, the establishment of which could be agreed in response to the legitimate concern of non-nuclear States, those States would probably be better off economically than they could hope to be without such an agreement.

54. Finally, I should like to deal very briefly with the relevance of the treaty to the general question of disarmament. We all agree that the non-proliferation treaty is not an end in itself. We all share the intention that it should lead on to other measures to stop the nuclear arms race and to limit and reduce existing stockpiles. I believe the draft before us serves that purpose in three ways. First, a treaty concluded on this basis would contribute to that reduction in tension between the two most powerful nuclear-weapon States and their allies which is an essential prerequisite to any significant measure of arms control and disarmament. Second, the preamble makes it clear that this is not an isolated, final measure but is meant to lead to other agreements. Third, there is in article V the provision for a review conference which after a comparatively short time will give all signatories an opportunity to examine whether the purposes and provisions of the treaty are being realized.

55. We meet against a background of a world in tension, at a time when the development of anti-ballistic missiles threatens an increased impetus to the nuclear arms race and not its cessation. It is a responsibility for all of us to do what we can to abate the temperature; but it is, of course, particularly a responsibility for the two major nuclear Powers, represented here by our two co-Chairmen. I believe that they recognize their special responsibilities and that this draft treaty is a manifestation of their concern to do something positive to reduce the dangers of nuclear war.

56. The Soviet representative recalled at our last meeting the words of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Kosygin, speaking at the United Nations General Assembly on 19 June, when he said:

The nuclear age has created a new reality in questions of war and peace. It has vested in the States a far greater responsibility in all that pertains to these problems.<sup>19</sup>

57. The President of the United States, in his moving statement circulated to us last Thursday, placed the issue clearly before us. He said:

For more than twenty years, the world has watched with growing fear as nuclear weapons have spread.

Since 1945, five nations have come into possession of these dreadful weapons.

<sup>19</sup> A/PV. 1526 (prov.), p. 6.

We believe now—as we did then—that even one such nation is too many. But the issue now is not whether some have nuclear weapons while others do not. The issue is whether the nations will agree to prevent a bad situation from becoming worse.

Today, for the first time, we have within our reach an Instrument which permits us to make a choice.<sup>11</sup>

58. This treaty must be followed by further measures if we are, as the President said, to retain a capacity to design our fate rather than be engulfed by it. In this connexion I should again make clear the position of my own Government towards further measures of disarmament, which I confirmed in my previous speeches here. We stand for general and comprehensive disarmament. The Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and my predecessor here, Lord Chalfont, have all made clear my Government's desire for and determination to work for agreements of the kind advocated so often in our discussions: for a freeze of nuclear delivery vehicles, for a cut-off of fissile material production, for a reduction of existing stocks, and for a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

59. My Government supports those measures as part of the general non-proliferation strategy and as a means of halting the arms race and reducing the stocks of weapons. We see this non-proliferation treaty as a first step in that process. We should, of course, be happy if all those measures could be embodied in simultaneous agreements and implemented together; but there is no one with any experience in this field, certainly no one around this table, who thinks that that is within the realm of practical possibility. To ask, therefore, for those additional steps to be taken now, or to delay the non-proliferation treaty because this or that desirable provision is not included, would in my judgement be to make the best the enemy of the good.

60. The treaty we are working on will not of course solve all problems of arms control or all problems of security; but it is a vitally important and indispensable step on the road to real disarmament. The achievement of the treaty will also be a just return for the skill and patience of our co-Chairmen and all the representatives who have laboured here for so long to take a positive result to the First Committee in New York—and, moreover, an augury of fruitful and, I trust, faster progress in the work at our future sessions.

61. I believe I can best summarize what I have been trying to say by asking all who desire to advance towards the effective control of nuclear armaments—and that, I am confident, includes everyone around this table—to consider which situation would offer them the greater hope: one in which the negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty had broken down or run into the sand; or one in which the conclusion of a treaty, however limited and however imperfect, had opened the way, and pointed the way, to further effort in this field.

<sup>11</sup> *Ante*, pp. 341-342.

### Swedish Proposal Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft Article III of the Nonproliferation Treaty, August 30, 1967<sup>12</sup>

For the purpose of providing assurance that source or special fissionable material, covered by this article, shall not be diverted to nuclear weapons:

1. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes
  - (a) not to allow source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to be transferred to any other State unless such material and equipment are subject to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and
  - (b) to apply the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency on all such material and equipment, transferred to its territory or territory under its jurisdiction after the entry into force of the Treaty.
2. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes, in addition, to accept the full application of the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency on all nuclear energy activities within its territory or territory under its jurisdiction.
3. Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes, in addition, to co-operate in facilitating the gradual application of the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the peaceful nuclear energy activities within its territory or territory under its jurisdiction.
4. For such transfers referred to in paragraph 1 of this article, or such nuclear energy activities referred to in paragraph 2 of this article, as are regulated by bilateral or multilateral arrangements entered into before the date of the original entry into force of this Treaty, the obligations stipulated in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be implemented as soon as practicable, but not later than three years from the date of the original entry into force of the Treaty.

### Statement by the Brazilian Representative (Azeredo da Silveira) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, August 31, 1967<sup>1</sup>

2. The work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has reached a very important stage, one which might constitute a turning point in the disarmament negotiations that have been going on now for slightly more than five years. The tabling of two identical draft

<sup>12</sup> ENDC/195, Aug. 30, 1967.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.327, pp. 4-8.

texts on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons<sup>2</sup> sums up the efforts deployed by their authors—the United States and the Soviet Union—during many months of negotiations between themselves. The final objective of such a commendable effort, namely to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, has always been supported by my country, which has already, through the regional Latin-American treaty renounced the possession and manufacture of such weapons.<sup>3</sup>

3. Disarmament is a universal aspiration of mankind, and the effectiveness of any measure of disarmament is directly linked to its general acceptability and consequently to the universality of its application. That is all the more true of measures aimed at checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons, for obvious reasons on which I need not dwell here. Unfortunately, however, the texts that have been submitted by the United States and Soviet delegations do not encourage wide adherence by the maximum number of countries, as would be desirable. In my comments today I shall explain some of the reasons why, in the view of my country, the two drafts seem not to take into account the concerns of a large number of countries, as a result of which the prospects of their universal adoption are diminished.

4. Brazil has already stated in clear and unequivocal terms the necessity for what General Assembly resolution 2028(XX) called “an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations”.<sup>4</sup> Even a preliminary glance at the two drafts is enough to enable one to determine that they contain practically only obligations for the non-nuclear nations, while none of the commitments for the nuclear Powers suggested by the non-nuclear nations have been taken into account. My delegation has never agreed with those who believe that a non-proliferation treaty should necessarily be one-sided and discriminatory.

5. Owing to the diametrically different natures of the parties concerned—nuclear-weapon Powers on the one hand and non-nuclear-weapon countries on the other—complete symmetry in the substance of the obligations for both sets of parties, although desirable, could not of course be achieved in the context of a treaty such as that under consideration by this Committee. We are not questioning whether or not the nuclear Powers should stay nuclear until a final solution can be brought to the question of nuclear disarmament; but it seems to us imperative that the obligations imposed on the non-nuclear nations should be met on the other side by significant commitments related to the subject matter of the treaty. The manifest imbalance of obligations as set out in the two drafts can hardly enhance the prospect of universal acceptance and final adherence by the great majority of nations.

6. We notice also that the two drafts contain provisions which, directly or indirectly, prevent the non-nuclear countries from developing their own technology for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices intended for peaceful purposes. The Brazilian stand on this important question has been explained several times here and elsewhere. Suffice it to say, for the moment, that such a prohibition goes well be-

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 338–341.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 69–83.

<sup>4</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 532–534.

yond the objectives of the treaty and gives rise to serious and unnecessary problems.

7. Another important consideration which was contained in resolution 2028 (XX) and which does not seem to be properly reflected in the two drafts is a clear characterization of the agreement on non-proliferation as a definite step towards general and complete disarmament. Nations that do not possess nuclear armaments are asked to sign a binding commitment never to acquire them, while nations that already have at their disposal the most impressive arsenals ever assembled by human ingenuity will be legally free to increase at will the number and the destructive potential of such weapons.

8. In the view of my Government, the ultimate answer to the question of checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the creation and maintenance of conditions of world security so that no nation can have a motive for producing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons. With regard to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it may rightly be asserted that its full acceptability, and thus its effectiveness, rests on the pre-existence of such security conditions. Nevertheless the treaty must and can provide for the strengthening and institutionalization of those conditions of peace by establishing precise legal obligations in that regard.

9. To place the security issue in its proper perspective, it must be said in all frankness that it is not only the fact that some nations might produce nuclear weapons which causes concern for security; such concern is caused also by the fact that a few nations have already produced and keep producing those weapons in increasing numbers and, so to speak, of better and better quality; and, furthermore, by the fact that some of these few nations do not seem inclined to enter into any agreement restricting their nuclear-weapon capability.

10. Thus it is the possession of nuclear weapons which provides justification for yet another kind of obligation on the nuclear Powers, of which we find no mention whatsoever in the draft texts. I am referring to the need for appropriate guarantees against nuclear aggression or its threat on the part of nuclear Powers not parties to the treaty, as well as clear assurances that those nuclear Powers which are parties to the treaty will not utilize nuclear weapons against the nations which have renounced the utilization of such weapons as a means of ensuring the security of their own people.

11. Defence is an imperative concern of any government. If a country renounces the procurement or production by its own national means of effective deterrents against nuclear attack or the threat thereof, it must be assured that that renunciation—a step taken because of higher considerations of the interests of mankind—will not entail irreparable danger to its own people. The public could never be made to understand why a government, in forswearing its defence capability, had not at the same time provided reasonable and lasting assurances that the nation would not be, directly or indirectly, the object of total destruction or of nuclear blackmail. Nor would the congresses or the legal representatives of the people be able to ratify any international agreement which failed to take into account the minimal requirements of national security.

12. Let me recall at this point a passage from the speech delivered

by the representative of the United States on 11 July. Mr. Foster, speaking in the context of a comprehensive test ban agreement, discussed the relationship between national security and arms control measures in general, and said :

The appeal of arms control measures must rest on whether they enhance the security of the nations agreeing to them. In our deliberations on the non-proliferation treaty, for example, I have made clear my Government's conviction that no nation should be asked to sign this treaty if it does not promote its national security within the world community as well as meet the world-wide concern over the growing threat of nuclear war.<sup>6</sup>

13. The conditions of world security and peace to which I have been referring would also be greatly enhanced if the universal application of safeguards concerning fissionable material were made compulsory for all parties to the treaty. By the same token, the legal commitment to take definite measures of disarmament could include outright several of these measures: the conversion for peaceful uses of part of the military stocks of fissionable material, the obligation to co-operate in the maximum diffusion of the benefits of scientific and technological progress in favour of developing countries, the channelling to those countries of at least part of the financial resources freed by disarmament measures, and so on.

14. It must not be forgotten that, in order to consolidate the achievement of the security conditions I have mentioned, it is necessary also to ensure the continuance of the process of disarmament, and particularly of nuclear disarmament, by means of the specific obligation to pursue the negotiation of parallel agreements on other important aspects of disarmament.

15. In the light of the foregoing considerations regarding the complex problems connected with preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons—problems to which we must find universally acceptable solutions—, let me return to a point with which my Government is deeply concerned.

16. In our view, the countries that are willing to renounce nuclear weapons should not be forced, as seems to be the purpose of the draft texts, into yet another renunciation which would have incalculable adverse consequences and would be totally alien to the objectives of a non-proliferation treaty. In fact, no convincing argument of a purely technical nature can be raised in favour of the imposition of restrictions on the application by national means, under effective international control, of nuclear energy in the form of explosive devices intended for peaceful purposes, such as engineering works, mining activities and other civil uses. Whatever the cost of such ventures, the foreclosing of any country's possibility to accelerate its economic development in such an important field of knowledge and thus to achieve a technological breakthrough that might be of vital significance for its industrial development would be so damaging to its future in the community of nations that no government would feel entitled to impose such limitations on future generations.

17. The most developed nations in today's world are those which invested heavily in the most advanced industrial techniques of a given

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, p. 295.

historical period and were thus able to reap a thousandfold the benefits of the mastery of such techniques. The developing nations of today are the nations which most desperately need the tools with which to shorten the road in the race against backwardness. We cannot understand why precisely those nations should be denied them when it has been demonstrated, first that they have no motive for acquiring nuclear weapons; second, that they are willing to accept the obligation not to obtain such weapons; and third, that they are willing to submit to a thorough system of international inspection which can objectively verify their good faith.

18. Brazil is a signatory of the only international agreement which prohibits nuclear weapons in an inhabited region of the world. The Latin-American Treaty, the purposes of which we have always supported, encourages peaceful nuclearization and fully allows its parties to conduct research and to utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including the manufacture of explosive devices for uses other than military.<sup>5</sup> In Latin America—within a homogeneous international community where special favourable conditions prevail—we have made it clear that the renunciation of nuclear armament does not entail the abandonment of our inalienable right to economic and social development through the preservation of our freedom of scientific research and technological advancement. There can certainly be no reason, in a broader context, to adhere to a treaty imposing greater restrictions—and restrictions which, in our view are both unjust and unnecessary.

**Statement by the Swedish Representative (Myrdal) to the  
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft  
Article III of Nonproliferation Treaty, August 31,  
1967<sup>1</sup>**

19. Last Thursday, when identical drafts of a non-proliferation treaty were presented to this Committee by the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union,<sup>2</sup> my delegation had the opportunity to welcome that fact.<sup>3</sup> As was said in the statement issued that day by my Government and read to the Committee by Mr. Edelstam, the Swedish Government considers the presentation of these drafts to be the most positive action in the field of political *détente* since the conclusion of the Moscow test-ban Treaty in 1963.<sup>4</sup> We are convinced that this very gesture of common endeavour on the part of the two super-Powers will help to reduce the tension in the political climate reigning in the world today. We hope ardently that the phase of the

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, pp. 69-83.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.327, pp. 8-11, and Corr. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 338-341.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 352.

<sup>4</sup> For the limited test-ban treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament which we have now entered will lead to a joint recommendation on the complete text of a non-proliferation treaty to be placed before the coming session of the United Nations General Assembly.

20. My intervention today is not intended to cover the whole draft treaty text as presented by the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union. I reserve our right to speak at a later date on the contents of the preamble and the main articles. I can assure the Committee, however, that our main preoccupation now and in the coming weeks will be to endeavour to contribute to the achievement of such compromises as may prove necessary in order to make the treaty acceptable to as many as possible of the States which are important in this connexion. I will not hide the fact that one of our preoccupations concerns the desire to see inscribed in the treaty more binding obligations on the main Powers to regard this treaty as only a first step on the road towards nuclear disarmament, soon to be followed by others, notably a treaty banning underground nuclear tests and a cut-off agreement. The non-proliferation treaty has to be seen as a part, and only a part, of an integrated whole of partial disarmament measures in the field of nuclear arms.

21. I will now turn to the purpose of my intervention today, which is to help speed up our negotiations. I think all delegations around this table are preoccupied by the fact that the Committee is not yet in a position to discuss a complete draft treaty. This is the more deplorable as all parts of such an important engagement as a non-proliferation treaty are dependent on one another and complementary to one another. This is particularly the case with the relationship between the main articles and such a complementary provision as the one on international control. In order to facilitate the further debate and also to bring forward some thoughts and suggestions to be made use of, we hope, by the co-Chairmen in their continuing bilateral negotiations on this point, the Swedish Government has considered it useful to present to the Committee today a preliminary and tentative text<sup>6</sup> of an article on international controls: the article III left blank in the drafts before us. This presentation in no way, of course, reduces the possibility of my delegation's supporting any other text on this item which other delegations may put forward, should we consider such proposal better and more likely to gain general approval in the Committee than our own. I wish to emphasize that procedural aspect of our draft. That implies that my Government is not committed to the exact wordings used. Those have, as you will find, been most often borrowed from earlier proposals. In order to simplify the presentation and as an example, I may mention that such a matter as the extent to which equipment should be involved in the safeguard obligations is one for further penetration, here or within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

22. The Swedish text to which I have just referred, which is available to delegations here today is naturally closely connected with the two main articles, I and II, of the draft text put forward by the United States and the Soviet Union. I think that it also represents

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, p. 368.

fairly closely the thinking of those two delegations with regard to the control measures necessary for verifying in a proper way the full observation by all parties of the obligations contained in the main articles. Only in one respect, to which I shall shortly revert, does our proposal contain an additional element, and that is aimed at promoting further the cause of nuclear disarmament, albeit by a modest beginning.

23. I will now give a brief description of our proposal as contained in document ENDC/195.<sup>6</sup> Its main feature is the general application of one universal safeguard system, that of IAEA in Vienna.<sup>7</sup> Nothing but such an equitable and non-discriminatory system would be tenable in the long run and in all relations between States in different parts of the world. For practical reasons, however, we suggest that there should be a transitional period—perhaps up to three years, to choose as an example a figure previously mentioned—to allow for the integration of existing bilateral as well as regional safeguard arrangements into the uniform system of IAEA. I reiterate that this suggestion is justified on practical grounds: my own country has bilateral control arrangements which cannot be altered overnight.

24. Our proposal further contains a unilateral obligation on the part of the non-nuclear-weapon States to accept safeguards on all their nuclear-energy activities, whereas, as you will see, the nuclear-weapon States would be allowed to be their own judges concerning when to apply safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities. This asymmetry is a concession on our part, hesitatingly made, in order to facilitate the political acceptance of our proposal.

25. In one respect, however, we suggest that international controls should be symmetrically applicable to all parties. This concerns transfers of nuclear material from one State to another. All such transfers should thus be safeguarded in the same manner for all States parties to the treaty, intended as they should be for use in peaceful activities only. This suggestion may seem to go somewhat beyond what has been suggested up to now in the bilateral and regional discussions on a control article, namely that international controls will apply to material which is imported not only by non-nuclear-weapon States but by all parties to the treaty. This provision, is, however, in full conformity with the general principle behind articles I and II of the draft treaty, aiming at stopping transfers of nuclear weapons and assistance and encouragement in producing them. That is a salient feature of our proposal.

26. I wish to emphasize what should be self-evident: that it is of the utmost importance and in conformity with the whole spirit of the proposed treaty that States which renounce the possibility of manufacturing their own nuclear weapons should not contribute to the development of nuclear-weapon arsenals in other countries. Outright exclusion of such a possibility, in the form we suggest in the article on international controls, would in addition be of practical importance as an obstacle to deliveries of special nuclear material to such nuclear-weapon States as may not subscribe to the treaty.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, p. 368.

<sup>7</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 416-400.

27. In conclusion, I wish to stress once more that the Swedish delegation is not proffering its proposal in order to place any difficulties in the way of the speedy conclusion of a treaty. The contrary is the case. We have deemed it useful, for the bilateral discussions between the co-Chairman and for the further discussions within the Committee as a whole, to see to it that a complete text is available, thus including a suggestion for solving the control issue. Our suggestions may not be acceptable to all delegations. In that case the further negotiations in the Committee will undoubtedly bring into the open whatever disagreements may exist and we may try, in a common effort, to arrive at a solution of this problem—as of other outstanding problems—which will be acceptable to all. It is in such a spirit of constructive compromise that we have drafted and today tabled our proposal.

**Statement by the Nigerian Representative (Sule Kolo) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, August 31, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

49. I should like first of all to welcome on behalf of the Nigerian Government the tabling of identical treaty texts on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup> The event is significant in itself because the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has now been provided with a structure on which to build a balanced treaty. In particular, without in any way derogating from the importance of the present achievement, my delegation wishes to stress the point here that as far as we are concerned we believe that our main task is only just beginning. The consultations that have gone on hitherto have been in the main between the two super-Powers and their allies. We hope that the present situation provides an opportunity for the views and aspirations of the non-aligned countries to receive consideration for inclusion in the draft treaty text.

50. In pursuing our task in this Committee we should bear in mind at every stage that our aim is to produce a treaty which will be acceptable to the world community. We must endeavour to produce something that will earn this Committee not only the praise of the majority of mankind today but also the respect of posterity.

51. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is not a sovereign organ; it is dependent on the United Nations. Its mandates to negotiate various measures of disarmament were given by resolutions of the United Nations. Although that Organization correctly gave top priority to the elaboration of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, certain principles on which the treaty should be based have been clearly stipulated. It may be that blind adherence to the letter of those principles could prevent any agreement whatsoever, but we strongly believe that a treaty produced in utter disregard

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV. 327, pp. 18-25.

<sup>2</sup> *Antc.*, pp. 338-341.

of them could hardly be equitable. For that reason the Nigerian delegation sincerely hopes that no one here will take the view that the draft texts now before this Committee are near what can be considered adequate; and we hope that all efforts will be directed to finding solutions in this Committee which will meet the anxieties of the world community and the fears of all States.

52. As I said in my brief statement earlier this year<sup>3</sup>—and this is clearly stipulated by the United Nations General Assembly in its historic resolution 2028(XX)<sup>4</sup>—the treaty which we eventually produce should be void of any loop-holes which could permit, directly or indirectly, the proliferation of nuclear weapons by nuclear or non-nuclear-weapon States. In this connexion our attention is naturally drawn to the controversy over nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes.

53. The Nigerian delegation is in full agreement with what the representative of Brazil said on 18 May:

... it is imperative that every nation retain the right to mobilize, without any restriction whatsoever, the whole range of modern technological resources required to eliminate poverty and underdevelopment, which generate grave international tensions.

The representative of Brazil went on to say:

We must develop and utilize it [nuclear energy] in every form, including the explosives that make possible not only great civil engineering projects but also an ever-increasing variety of applications that may prove essential to speed up the progress of our peoples.<sup>5</sup>

54. On the other hand, we have no reason to disbelieve the opinion of the majority of speakers here that the technology required for the production of a nuclear explosive device is the same as that required for the production of a nuclear weapon. The representative of India conceded that point in his statement of 23 May. He said:

The Indian delegation does not deny that the technology involved in the production of a nuclear weapon is the same as the technology which produces a peaceful explosive device, although a weapon has many characteristics which are not present in a peaceful device.<sup>6</sup>

We agree further with the Indian representative that there are many fields of industrial development which are now considered indispensable for economic progress but which can also be used as weapons of destruction.

55. The Nigerian delegation none the less feels that nuclear weapons are in a special category. While aeronautics, dynamite and steel fabrication can do great damage in war, they do not have that dreadful element present in nuclear weapons, the ability to destroy civilization as we know it today and cripple humanity at its source. The Nigerian delegation believes that it is because of that crucial difference that the United Nations General Assembly has urged this Committee to give a non-proliferation treaty top priority. So far no delegation has con-

<sup>3</sup> ENDC/PV. 292, pp. 4-5.

<sup>4</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 529-531.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, p. 226.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, p. 234.

tested the statement made by the United Kingdom delegation on 23 February:

A device which moves a million tons of earth to dig a canal or create an oil deposit can just as easily pulverize a city of a million people.<sup>7</sup>

56. As we see it, the problem of peaceful nuclear explosives is that of reconciling a situation which can give rise to indirect proliferation by non-nuclear-weapon States with the right to provide all peoples and generations yet unborn with the most effective methods of enhancing their social, economic and cultural well-being. It seems to us that emphasis must be placed on technology rather than on the device itself. We believe that, if non-nuclear-weapon countries were sure that they would have unrestricted access to all the peaceful techniques discovered from the development of weapon technology, the present impasse would be more amenable to solution.

57. The Nigerian delegation doubts very much whether the non-nuclear Powers should—nor would it be correct to ask them to—accept a treaty which would place them in a position of perpetual inferiority in any field of knowledge. Consequently, if a treaty is to be lasting it should provide, among other things, guarantees that non-nuclear-weapon Powers would not only have nuclear explosives, through an international organization, for their peaceful projects but also have opportunities for their scientists to develop to the full their intellectual capabilities in all fields, including that of nuclear-explosive technology. One way of ensuring that would be a regular arrangement which would permit scientists from non-nuclear-weapon States to work in close collaboration with scientists working on nuclear-explosive technology in nuclear-weapon States. Such an arrangement would go a long way towards meeting the legitimate aspiration of every State not to be left behind in the application of new techniques to the accelerating of human progress.

58. I have been talking about how to prevent loop-holes as regards non-nuclear-weapon States. Now I should like to take a look at the problem of proliferation by nuclear-weapon States. The Nigerian delegation believes that nuclear-weapon Powers must give adequate weight to the anxieties of humanity about its survival. We have been told in very plain language that if there were to be a nuclear war there would not remain untouched any country on the surface of the earth. That is a frightful thought. The nuclear-weapon Powers must concede that if there were to be a nuclear war everyone, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, would be faced with the danger of extermination. The non-nuclear-weapon Powers, therefore, have the right to demand that the nuclear-weapon Powers should begin the process of nuclear disarmament.

59. The first action in that direction would be, in our opinion, an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests underground and the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes. The Nigerian delegation thinks that these are fields in which agreement is not only necessary but possible at the present time. It also believes that all the arguments advanced for urging the non-

<sup>7</sup> ENDC/PV 288, p. 7.

proliferation of nuclear weapons among non-nuclear-weapon States are valid for urging the nuclear-weapon States to conclude an agreement on the two measures I have just mentioned.

60. As the Polish representative pointed out recently:

It is common knowledge that these Powers—the nuclear-weapon States—have accumulated such enormous stockpiles of nuclear weapons and have reached such levels of sophistication in these that the emergence of a new nuclear-weapon State could not constitute a threat to them. It would even seem unthinkable to compete with them in this field; first, because they were the first to embark upon the manufacture of nuclear bombs and have thus acquired an edge of more than twenty years over other countries; secondly, because they possess unrivalled economic, technical and scientific resources; and last but not least, because geography is on their side.<sup>8</sup>

In addition to the incontrovertible facts to which the Polish representative has appropriately drawn our attention, the super-Powers have openly contributed to the general belief that each side has enough nuclear power to destroy the other several times over in the event of a nuclear war. I believe that is the basis of the so-called "deterrent".

61. Thus the Nigerian delegation does not see any reason whatsoever why the nuclear-weapon Powers cannot agree to stop the quantitative and qualitative development of more weapons for, say, ten years—that is, only half the period by which, according to our Polish colleague, they are ahead of newly emerged nuclear-weapon States—during which period they would devote their energies to the task of reducing international tension and achieving universal nuclear disarmament. In this connexion the Nigerian delegation has carefully studied the statements made by the representatives of Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom on the verification of the observance of a comprehensive test ban treaty, and it believes that the problem can be solved by a combination of measures. First the Swedish idea of a "nuclear detection club"<sup>9</sup> should be given a trial; secondly, an agreement should be reached to ban underground tests of all magnitudes that all sides agree are detectable by national seismographic stations; and thirdly, there should be a moratorium for at least one year on underground tests of lower magnitudes, automatically renewed at the end of every year unless one party believed the agreement had been violated.

62. Let me now direct attention briefly to the problem of security. We agree wholeheartedly with the following statement made by the United States representative at one of our recent meetings:

The appeal of arms control measures must rest on whether they enhance the security of the nations agreeing to them. In our deliberations on the non-proliferation treaty, for example, I have made clear my Government's conviction that no nation should be asked to sign this treaty if it does not promote its national security within the world community as well as meet the world-wide concern over the growing threat of nuclear war.<sup>10</sup>

63. That principle, which is basic to all international agreements,

<sup>8</sup> ENDO/PV. 318, p. 11.

<sup>9</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 390–393.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 295.

applies with equal force to what Mr. Burns, the representative of Canada, has described as measures of non-armament in conventional weapons of the developing countries.<sup>11</sup>

I think that the Canadian idea, like the ideal aim of general and complete disarmament, is laudable, and my delegation stands today by what the Nigerian representative said on 15 August 1966<sup>12</sup> in support of the United States proposal that—

... countries, on a regional basis, explore ways to limit competition among themselves for costly weapons often sought for reasons of illusory prestige.<sup>13</sup>

What the Nigerian representative said was, however, not without reservations. In the passage quoted by Mr. Burns, my predecessor made it quite clear that President Johnson's proposals would be valuable for Africa, and we think that is applicable to all other continents.

64. The Nigerian delegation believes that the problem of limiting arms in developing countries is no less complicated than that of universal disarmament. Developing regions are not worlds apart. They live in a mixed, strange world, a world of poverty and avarice, of meekness and modernized savagery, of grandeur and meanness, a world in which, I am afraid, power is taking over from reason. This is the world we live in, developed or less developed.

65. We do not have to look too far back to see glaring illustrations of the traits I have just enumerated. Recently the situation has degenerated even to the extent that foreign soldiers now constitute themselves into pirate groups to loot, pillage and undermine the security of developing countries. It is extremely important to realize that no agreement reached among developing countries to limit armament in their regions could last if developed countries did nothing to stop their nationals from shipping arms to dissident groups in developing countries to be used against governments. The situation is serious and, as my predecessor said, creates fear and anxiety.

66. It should be clear that, with developed neighbours arming furiously, developing countries cannot be expected to manifest perfect serenity. What is more, the question is not purely regional, for wars are fought not only between developing countries but also between developed and developing countries. Consequently any measures of conventional disarmament or non-armament must be general. On the other hand, we agree with the Canadian representative when he says:

... we must all concede that it is likely to be some time before agreement is reached on a treaty of general disarmament, or even on a treaty of world-wide application providing for the reduction of conventional arms.<sup>14</sup>

What we do not agree with, however, is the logic that the problem should lead us into making the less developed regions the "sitting duck" in a world armed to the teeth. I believe that, whatever we do, we should not do anything that will make it impossible for States to guarantee their security to the maximum extent.

<sup>11</sup> ENDC/PV. 311, pp. 5-8.

<sup>12</sup> ENDC/PV. 283, pp. 12-13.

<sup>13</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 7-8.

<sup>14</sup> ENDO/PV. 311, pp. 8-9.

67. However, returning to non-proliferation, I believe sincerely that the majority of countries— and I think I am speaking for all the non-aligned members of this Committee—would want to sign a non-proliferation treaty. At the same time the non-nuclear Powers, I think, are mature enough to realize that by signing such a treaty they would be depriving themselves of one weapon which could today or tomorrow be crucial for their self-defence. It is incumbent on the international community, therefore, to ensure that no country which accepts its responsibility in this regard should become the victim of wanton acts of destruction. I think we should here borrow a leaf from the Charter of the United Nations, which, while denouncing war as a means of foreign policy, took pains to devise a collective security system which could be useful.

68. In the light of the foregoing, we believe that the treaty should contain firm assurances that the world community would come to the aid of a non-nuclear-weapon Power if threatened or attacked by a nuclear-weapon State. That is no less essential to a non-proliferation treaty than the collective security system is to the Charter of the United Nations. If we failed to provide such an assurance, we should have no moral right to criticize those who found themselves unable to sign the treaty because their national security needs had not been considered in it—a situation which might be fatal to the treaty.

69. Finally, the Nigerian delegation would like to express its deep regret that the draft treaty texts before this Committee have not dealt at all with one of the most important aspects of a non-proliferation treaty: that of verification. In this regard, my delegation would like to welcome the initiative of the representative of Sweden this morning, because we must emphasize that a treaty without a thorough-going control system would not be acceptable generally. We doubt that it would be acceptable to anybody. What is more, we believe that a control system, to be reliable and useful, should be conducted by an international agency. However, existing regional arrangements should not be hampered by the international agency. The latter should be able to collaborate with the regional agencies in the control effort. What is essential is that the international agency should decide the rules to be applied by regional organs to enable it to carry out its duties efficaciously.

70. The urgency of the task before us cannot be over-emphasized. As I said in my earlier statement, this Committee has a duty to humanity which it should perform. We must go about it with sincerity of purpose, justice and a sense of equity.

### Chinese Communist Comment on Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, September 3, 1967<sup>1</sup>

The so-called draft treaty on the "non-proliferation of nuclear weapons," concocted by Washington and Moscow, was finally served

<sup>1</sup> *Renmin Ribao*, Sept. 3, 1967; *Peking Review*, Sept. 8, 1967, p. 34.

up at the disarmament conference in Geneva.<sup>2</sup> It is one of the concrete results of the secret talks in Glassboro between the chieftains of U.S. imperialism and Soviet modern revisionism. It is a major step in their counter-revolutionary collaboration on a worldwide scale and is another treacherous crime committed by the Brezhnev-Kosygin renegade clique in betraying the interests of the people of the world.

Because the international class struggle today is increasing in intensity and the people's revolutionary movement of the world is gaining ever greater momentum, the going grows tougher and tougher for the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists. This prompted them to hurriedly put forward the draft treaty and play it up with much fanfare, in order to promote the atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet collaboration and facilitate their global collusion. Especially in the case of Vietnam, the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists are intensely working out new manoeuvres to force Vietnam to enter into "peace talks" by more extensive bombing, and trying to create conditions for a dirty deal over Vietnam as the next step. Obviously, Washington and Moscow are hoping to use the draft treaty as a means of pushing their criminal activity against communism, against the people, against revolution and against China, in an attempt to stem the revolutionary tide in the world.

The United States and the Soviet Union worked on the treaty for several years. Previously, they mainly wanted to bind China hand and foot and prevent it from possessing nuclear weapons. But atom bombs, guided missiles and hydrogen bombs were possessed by the Chinese people before their treaty was drawn up. This magnificent achievement of the Chinese people dealt a death-blow to the U.S.-Soviet policy of nuclear monopoly and nuclear blackmail and has encouraged the revolutionary people of the world tremendously. Thus, Washington and Moscow had to come up with the treaty in the hope of using it as a means of agitation against China and to contain socialist China's influence abroad.

The U.S.-Soviet draft treaty stipulates that non-nuclear countries should not develop and possess nuclear weapons, nor should they even develop nuclear explosion devices in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Thus, the United States and the Soviet Union are to be given the privilege of carrying out nuclear blackmail for aggression, while the non-nuclear countries subjected to threats and aggression will not only be deprived of their right to develop nuclear weapons to resist U.S.-Soviet nuclear threats, but their development of nuclear industry for peaceful purposes will also be subjected to the insolent intervention and control by the United States and the Soviet Union. Obviously, the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists concocted the treaty to put all non-nuclear countries in a subordinate position, that of being "protectorates," so that they may maintain their special status as big nuclear powers and remain "nuclear overlords."

Washington and Moscow loudly advertise that the conclusion of the "nuclear non-proliferation" treaty can bring about "nuclear disarmament" and will "contribute to preventing the threat of nuclear war." Is this really the case?

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 338-341.

It is common knowledge that U.S.-led imperialism and its lackeys are the source of contemporary wars. The menace of nuclear war comes from U.S. imperialism and its accomplices. The so-called "nuclear non-proliferation" treaty cannot prevent the United States and the Soviet Union from manufacturing and stockpiling nuclear weapons, nor can it prevent them from using nuclear weapons in any war. Moreover, the United States long ago set up many nuclear bases all over the world; U.S. aircraft carrying nuclear warheads have been flying over various continents and U.S. submarines carrying nuclear warheads have been prowling the oceans. U.S. nuclear weapons have been proliferated all over the world. Nor does the draft treaty prevent the West German militarists from laying their hands on nuclear weapons through the NATO "Nuclear Defence" Committee. Is there any inkling of "nuclear disarmament" in the draft? What has it got to do with "preventing the threat of nuclear war"? If the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists really want to prevent nuclear war, why then don't they propose the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons?

The U.S.-Soviet treaty is an outright hoax. They want to use this scrap of paper to lull the people's vigilance so that under cover of this treaty they can have a free hand to vigorously carry out their nuclear blackmail and nuclear threat, control and bully other countries, sabotage the revolutionary movement of the people of the world and realize their fond hope of being the overlords of the world.

Our great leader Chairman Mao has pointed out: "Those who refuse to be enslaved will never be cowed by the atom bombs and hydrogen bombs in the hands of the U.S. imperialists."<sup>2</sup> The Soviet revisionist clique and the U.S. imperialists are today working hand in glove to try and salvage their already bankrupt nuclear monopoly positions through the "nuclear non-proliferation" treaty and also to oppose the world's revolutionary people with their atom and hydrogen bombs. However, their nuclear hoax can no longer help them, and atom and hydrogen bombs cannot save them. Because they have made themselves the enemy of the world's people, they cannot escape their inevitable doom.

### Address by Secretary of Defense McNamara to United Press International Editors and Publishers, September 18, 1967<sup>1</sup>

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

I want to discuss with you this afternoon the gravest problem that an American Secretary of Defense must face: the planning, preparation, and policy governing the possibility of thermonuclear war.

It is a prospect most of mankind would prefer not to contemplate.

<sup>2</sup> *Peking Review*, Jan. 17, 1964, p. 5.

<sup>1</sup> Department of Defense press release 808-67, Sept. 18, 1967. The address was delivered in San Francisco.

That is understandable. For technology has now circumscribed us all with a conceivable horizon of horror that could dwarf any catastrophe that has befallen man in his more than a million years on earth.

Man has lived now for more than twenty years in what we have come to call the Atomic Age.

What we sometimes overlook is that every future age of man will be an atomic age.

If, then, man is to have a future at all, it will have to be a future overshadowed with the permanent possibility of thermonuclear holocaust.

About that fact, we are no longer free.

Our freedom in this question consists rather in facing the matter rationally and realistically and discussing actions to minimize the danger.

No sane citizen; no sane political leader; no sane nation wants thermonuclear war.

But merely not wanting it is not enough.

We must understand the difference between actions which increase its risk, those which reduce it, and those which, while costly, have little influence one way or another.

Now this whole subject matter tends to be psychologically unpleasant. But there is an even greater difficulty standing in the way of constructive and profitable debate over the issues.

And that is that nuclear strategy is exceptionally complex in its technical aspects. Unless these complexities are well understood, rational discussion and decision making are simply not possible.

What I want to do this afternoon is deal with these complexities and clarify them with as much precision and detail as time and security permit.

One must begin with precise definitions.

The cornerstone of our strategic policy continues to be to deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States, or its allies, by maintaining a highly reliable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single aggressor, or combination of aggressors, at any time during the course of a strategic nuclear exchange—even after our absorbing a surprise first strike.

This can be defined as our "assured destruction capability."

Now it is imperative to understand that assured destruction is the very essence of the whole deterrence concept.

We must possess an actual assured destruction capability. And that actual assured destruction capability must also be credible. Conceivably, our assured destruction capability could be actual, without being credible—in which case, it might fail to deter an aggressor.

The point is that a potential aggressor must himself believe that our assured destruction capability is in fact actual, and that our will to use it in retaliation to an attack is in fact unwaivering.

The conclusion, then, is clear: if the United States is to deter a nuclear attack on itself or on our allies, it must possess an actual, and a credible assured destruction capability.

When calculating the force we require, we must be "conservative" in all our estimates of both a potential aggressor's capabilities, and his

intentions. Security depends upon taking a "worst plausible case"—and having the ability to cope with that eventuality.

In that eventuality, we must be able to absorb the total weight of nuclear attack on our country—on our strike-back forces; on our command and control apparatus; on our industrial capacity; on our cities; and on our population—and still be fully capable of destroying the aggressor to the point that his society is simply no longer viable in any meaningful twentieth-century sense.

That is what deterrence to nuclear aggression means. It means the certainty of suicide to the aggressor—not merely to his military forces, but to his society as a whole.

Now let us consider another term: "first-strike capability." This, in itself, is an ambiguous term, since it could mean simply the ability of one nation to attack another nation with nuclear forces first. But as it is normally used, it connotes much more: the substantial elimination of the attacked nation's retaliatory second-strike forces.

This is the sense in which "first-strike capability" should be understood.

Now, clearly, such a first-strike capability is an important strategic concept. The United States cannot—and will not—ever permit itself to get into the position in which another nation, or combination of nations, would possess such a first-strike capability, which could be effectively used against it.

To get into such a position vis-a-vis any other nation or nations would not only constitute an intolerable threat to our security, but it would obviously remove our ability to deter nuclear aggression—both against ourselves and against our allies.

Now, we are not in that position today—and there is no foreseeable danger of our ever getting into that position.

Our strategic offensive forces are immense: 1000 Minutemen missile launchers, carefully protected below ground; 41 Polaris submarines, carrying 656 missile launchers—with the majority of these hidden beneath the seas at all times; and about 600 long-range bombers, approximately forty percent of which are kept always in a high state of alert.

Our alert forces alone carry more than 2200 weapons, averaging more than one megaton each. A mere 400 one-megaton weapons, if delivered on the Soviet Union, would be sufficient to destroy over one-third of her population, and one-half of her industry.

And all of these flexible and highly reliable forces are equipped with devices that insure their penetration of Soviet defenses.

Now what about the Soviet Union?

Does it today possess a powerful nuclear arsenal?

The answer is that it does.

Does it possess a first-strike capability against the United States?

The answer is that it does not.

Can the Soviet Union, in the foreseeable future, acquire such a first-strike capability against the United States?

The answer is that it cannot.

It cannot because we are determined to remain fully alert, and we will never permit our own assured destruction capability to be at a point where a Soviet first-strike capability is even remotely feasible.

Is the Soviet Union seriously attempting to acquire a first-strike capability against the United States?

Although this is a question we cannot answer with absolute certainty, we believe the answer is no. In any event, the question itself is—in a sense—irrelevant. It is irrelevant since the United States will so continue to maintain—and where necessary strengthen—our retaliatory forces, that whatever the Soviet Union's intentions or actions, we will continue to have an assured destruction capability vis-a-vis their society in which we are completely confident.

But there is another question that is most relevant.

And that is, do we—the United States—possess a first-strike capability against the Soviet Union?

The answer is that we do not.

And we do not, not because we have neglected our nuclear strength. On the contrary, we have increased it to the point that we possess a clear superiority over the Soviet Union.

We do not possess first-strike capability against the Soviet Union for precisely the same reason that they do not possess it against us.

And that is that we have both built up our "second-strike capability"<sup>2</sup> to the point that a first-strike capability on either side has become unattainable.

There is, of course, no way in which the United States could have prevented the Soviet Union from acquiring its present second-strike capability—short of a massive pre-emptive first strike on the Soviet Union in the 1950s.

The blunt fact is, then, that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States can attack the other without being destroyed in retaliation; nor can either of us attain a first-strike capability in the foreseeable future.

The further fact is that both the Soviet Union and the United States presently possess an actual and credible second-strike capability against one another—and it is precisely this mutual capability that provides us both with the strongest possible motive to avoid a nuclear war.

The more frequent question that arises in this connection is whether or not the United States possesses nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union.

The answer is that we do.

But the answer is—like everything else in this matter—technically complex.

The complexity arises in part out of what measurement of superiority is most meaningful and realistic.

Many commentators on the matter tend to define nuclear superiority in terms of gross megatonnage, or in terms of the number of missile launchers available.

Now, by both these two standards of measurement, the United States does have a substantial superiority over the Soviet Union in the weapons targeted against each other.

<sup>2</sup> A "second-strike capability" is the capability to absorb a surprise nuclear attack, and survive with sufficient power to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor [footnote in original].

But it is precisely these two standards of measurement that are themselves misleading.

For the most meaningful and realistic measurement of nuclear capability is neither gross megatonnage, nor the number of available missile launchers; but rather the number of separate warheads that are capable of being *delivered* with accuracy on individual high-priority targets with sufficient power to destroy them.

Gross megatonnage in itself is an inadequate indicator of assured destruction capability, since it is unrelated to survivability, accuracy, or penetrability, and poorly related to effective elimination of multiple high-priority targets. There is manifestly no advantage in over-destroying one target, at the expense of leaving undamaged other targets of equal importance.

Further, the number of missile launchers available is also an inadequate indicator of assured destruction capability, since the fact is that many of our launchers will carry multiple warheads.

But by using the realistic measurement of the number of warheads available, capable of being reliably delivered with accuracy and effectiveness on the appropriate targets in the United States or Soviet Union, I can tell you that the United States currently possesses a superiority over the Soviet Union of at least three or four to one.

Furthermore, we will maintain a superiority—by these same realistic criteria—over the Soviet Union for as far ahead in the future as we can realistically plan.

I want, however, to make one point patently clear: our current numerical superiority over the Soviet Union in reliable, accurate, and effective warheads is both greater than we had originally planned, and is in fact more than we require.

Moreover, in the larger equation of security, our "superiority" is of limited significance—since even with our current superiority, or indeed with any numerical superiority realistically attainable, the blunt, inescapable fact remains that the Soviet Union could still—with its present forces—effectively destroy the United States, even after absorbing the full weight of an American first strike.

I have noted that our present superiority is greater than we had planned. Let me explain to you how this came about, for I think it is a significant illustration of the intrinsic dynamics of the nuclear arms race.

In 1961, when I became Secretary of Defense, the Soviet Union possessed a very small operational arsenal of intercontinental missiles. However, they did possess the technological and industrial capacity to enlarge that arsenal very substantially over the succeeding several years.

Now, we had no evidence that the Soviets did in fact plan to fully use that capability.

But as I have pointed out, a strategic planner must be "conservative" in his calculations; that is, he must prepare for the worst plausible case and not be content to hope and prepare merely for the most probable.

Since we could not be certain of Soviet intentions—since we could not be sure that they would not undertake a massive build-up—we

had to insure against such an eventuality by undertaking ourselves a major build-up of the Minuteman and Polaris forces.

Thus, in the course of hedging against what was then only a theoretically possible Soviet build-up, we took decisions which have resulted in our current superiority in numbers of warheads and deliverable megatons.

But the blunt fact remains that if we had had more accurate information about planned Soviet strategic forces, we simply would not have needed to build as large a nuclear arsenal as we have today.

Now let me be absolutely clear. I am not saying that our decision in 1961 was unjustified. I am simply saying that it was necessitated by a lack of accurate information.

Furthermore, that decision in itself—as justified as it was—in the end, could not possibly have left unaffected the Soviet Union's future nuclear plans.

What is essential to understand here is that the Soviet Union and the United States mutually influence one another's strategic plans.

Whatever be their intentions, whatever be our intentions, actions— or even realistically potential actions—on either side relating to the build-up of nuclear forces, be they either offensive or defensive weapons, necessarily trigger reactions on the other side.

It is precisely this action-reaction phenomenon that fuels an arms race.

Now, in strategic nuclear weaponry, the arms race involves a particular irony. Unlike any other era in military history, today a substantial numerical superiority of weapons does not effectively translate into political control, or diplomatic leverage.

While thermonuclear power is almost inconceivably awesome, and represents virtually unlimited potential destructiveness, it has proven to be a limited diplomatic instrument. Its uniqueness lies in the fact that it is at one and the same time, an all powerful weapon—and a very inadequate weapon.

The fact that the Soviet Union and the United States can mutually destroy one another—regardless of who strikes first—narrows the range of Soviet aggression which our nuclear forces can effectively deter.

Even with our nuclear monopoly in the early postwar period, we were unable to deter the Soviet pressures against Berlin, or their support of aggression in Korea.

Today, our nuclear superiority does not deter all forms of Soviet support of communist insurgency in Southeast Asia.

What all of this has meant is that we, and our allies as well, require substantial non-nuclear forces in order to cope with levels of aggression that massive strategic forces do not in fact deter.

This has been a difficult lesson both for us and for our allies to accept, since there is a strong psychological tendency to regard superior nuclear forces as a simple and unfailing solution to security, and an assurance of victory under any set of circumstances.

What is important to understand is that our nuclear strategic forces play a vital and absolutely necessary role in our security and that of our allies, but it is an intrinsically limited role.

Thus, we and our allies must maintain substantial conventional

forces, fully capable of dealing with a wide spectrum of lesser forms of political and military aggression—a level of aggression against which the use of strategic nuclear forces would not be to our advantage, and thus a level of aggression which these strategic nuclear forces by themselves cannot effectively deter. One cannot fashion a credible deterrent out of an incredible action. Therefore security for the United States and its allies can only arise from the possession of a whole range of graduated deterrents, each of them fully credible in its own context.

Now I have pointed out that in strategic nuclear matters, the Soviet Union and the United States mutually influence one another's plans.

In recent years the Soviets have substantially increased their offensive forces. We have, of course, been watching and evaluating this very carefully.

Clearly, the Soviet build-up is in part a reaction to our own build-up since the beginning of this decade.

Soviet strategic planners undoubtedly reasoned that if our build-up were to continue at its accelerated pace, we might conceivably reach, in time, a credible first-strike capability against the Soviet Union.

That was not in fact our intention. Our intention was to assure that they—with their theoretical capacity to reach such a first-strike capability—would not in fact outdistance us.

But they could not read our intentions with any greater accuracy than we could read theirs. And thus the result has been that we have both built up our forces to a point that far exceeds a credible second-strike capability against the forces we each started with.

In doing so, neither of us has reached a first-strike capability. And the realities of the situation being what they are—whatever we believe their intentions to be, and whatever they believe our intentions to be—each of us can deny the other a first-strike capability in the foreseeable future.

Now, how can we be so confident that this is the case?

How can we be so certain that the Soviets cannot gradually outdistance us—either by some dramatic technological break-through, or simply through our imperceptively lagging behind, for whatever reason: reluctance to spend the requisite funds; distraction with military problems elsewhere; faulty intelligence; or simple negligence and naiveté?

All of these reasons—and others—have been suggested by some commentators in this country, who fear that we are in fact falling behind to a dangerous degree.

The answer to all of this is simple and straight forward.

We are not going to permit the Soviets to outdistance us, because to do so would be to jeopardize our very viability as a nation.

No President, no Secretary of Defense, no Congress of the United States—of whatever political party, and of whatever political persuasion—is going to permit this nation to take that risk.

We do not want a nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union—primarily because the action-reaction phenomenon makes it foolish and futile. But if the only way to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining first-strike capability over us is to engage in such a race, the United

States possesses in ample abundance the resources, the technology, and the will to run faster in that race for whatever distance is required.

But what we would much prefer to do is to come to a realistic and reasonably riskless agreement with the Soviet Union, which would effectively prevent such an arms race. We both have strategic nuclear arsenals greatly in excess of a credible assured destruction capability. These arsenals have reached that point of excess in each case for precisely the same reason: we each have reacted to the other's build-up with very conservative calculations. We have, that is, each built a greater arsenal than either of us needed for a second-strike capability, simply because we each wanted to be able to cope with the "worst plausible case."

But since we now each possess a deterrent in excess of our individual needs, both of our nations would benefit from a properly safe-guarded agreement first to limit, and later to reduce, both our offensive and defensive strategic nuclear forces.

We may, or we may not, be able to achieve such an agreement. We hope we can. And we believe such an agreement is fully feasible, since it is clearly in both our nations' interests.

But reach the formal agreement or not, we can be sure that neither the Soviets nor we are going to risk the other obtaining a first-strike capability.

On the contrary, we can be sure that we are both going to maintain a maximum effort to preserve an assured destruction capability.

It would not be sensible for either side to launch a maximum effort to achieve a first-strike capability. It would not be sensible because the intelligence-gathering capability of each side being what it is, and the realities of lead-time from technological break-through to operational readiness being what they are, neither of us would be able to acquire a first-strike capability in secret.

Now, let me take a specific case in point.

The Soviets are now deploying an anti-ballistic missile system. If we react to this deployment intelligently, we have no reason for alarm.

The system does not impose any threat to our ability to penetrate and inflict massive and unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union. In other words, it does not presently affect in any significant manner our assured destruction capability.

It does not impose such a threat because we have already taken the steps necessary to assure that our land-based Minuteman missiles, our nuclear submarine-launched new Poseidon missiles, and our strategic bomber forces have the requisite penetration aids—and in the sum, constitute a force of such magnitude, that they guarantee us a force strong enough to survive a Soviet attack and penetrate the Soviet ABM deployment.

Now let me come to the issue that has received so much attention recently: the question of whether or not we should deploy an ABM system against the Soviet nuclear threat.

To begin with, this is not in any sense a new issue. We have had both the technical possibility and the strategic desirability of an American ABM deployment under constant review since the late 1950s.

While we have substantially improved our technology in the field, it is important to understand that none of the systems at the present or

foreseeable state of the art would provide an impenetrable shield over the United States. Were such a shield possible, we would certainly want it—and we would certainly build it.

And at this point, let me dispose of an objection that is totally irrelevant to this issue.

It has been alleged that we are opposed to deploying a large-scale ABM system because it would carry the heavy price tag of \$40 billion.

Let me make it very clear that the \$40 billion is not the issue.

If we could build and deploy a genuinely impenetrable shield over the United States, we would be willing to spend not \$40 billion, but any reasonable multiple of that amount that was necessary.

The money in itself is not the problem: the penetrability of the proposed shield is the problem.

There is clearly no point, however, in spending \$40 billion if it is not going to buy us a significant improvement in our security. If it is not, then we should use the substantial resources it represents on something that will.

Every ABM system that is now feasible involves firing defensive missiles at incoming offensive warheads in an effort to destroy them.

But what many commentators on this issue overlook is that any such system can rather obviously be defeated by an enemy simply sending more offensive warheads, or dummy warheads, than there are defensive missiles capable of disposing of them.

And this is the whole crux of the nuclear action-reaction phenomenon.

Were we to deploy a heavy ABM system throughout the United States, the Soviets would clearly be strongly motivated to so increase their offensive capability as to cancel out our defensive advantage.

It is futile for each of us to spend \$4 billion, \$40 billion, or \$400 billion—and at the end of all the spending, and at the end of all the deployment, and at the end of all the effort, to be relatively at the same point of balance on the security scale that we are now.

In point of fact, we have already initiated offensive weapons programs costing several billions in order to offset the small present Soviet ABM deployment, and the possibly more extensive future Soviet ABM deployments.

That is money well spent; and it is necessary.

But we should bear in mind that it is money spent because of the action-reaction phenomenon.

If we in turn opt for heavy ABM deployment—at whatever price—we can be certain that the Soviets will react to offset the advantage we would hope to gain.

It is precisely because of this certainty of a corresponding Soviet reaction that the four prominent scientists—men who have served with distinction as the Science Advisors to Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, and the three outstanding men who have served as Directors of Research and Engineering to three Secretaries of Defense—have unanimously recommended against the deployment of an ABM system designed to protect our population against a Soviet attack.

These men are Doctors Killian, Kistiakowsky, Wiesner, Hornig, York, Brown, and Foster.

The plain fact of the matter is that we are now facing a situation analogous to the one we faced in 1961: we are uncertain of the Soviets' intentions.

At that time we were concerned about their potential offensive capabilities; now we are concerned about their potential defensive capabilities.

But the dynamics of the concern are the same.

We must continue to be cautious and conservative in our estimates—leaving no room in our calculations for unnecessary risk. And at the same time, we must measure our own response in such a manner that it does not trigger a senseless spiral upward of nuclear arms.

Now, as I have emphasized, we have already taken the necessary steps to guarantee that our offensive strategic weapons will be able to penetrate future, more advanced, Soviet defenses.

Keeping in mind the careful clockwork of lead-time, we will be forced to continue that effort over the next few years if the evidence is that the Soviets intend to turn what is now a light and modest ABM deployment into a massive one.

Should they elect to do so, we have both the lead-time and the technology available to so increase both the quality and quantity of our offensive strategic forces—with particular attention to highly reliable penetration aids—that their expensive defensive efforts will give them no edge in the nuclear balance whatever.

But we would prefer not to have to do that. For it is a profitless waste of resources, provided we and the Soviets can come to a realistic strategic arms-limitation agreement.

As you know, we have proposed U.S.-Soviet talks on this matter. Should these talks fail, we are fully prepared to take the appropriate measures that such a failure would make necessary.

The point for us to keep in mind is that should the talks fail—and the Soviets decide to expand their present modest ABM deployment into a massive one—our response must be realistic. There is no point whatever in our responding by going to a massive ABM deployment to protect our population, when such a system would be ineffective against a sophisticated Soviet offense.

Instead, realism dictates that if the Soviets elect to deploy a heavy ABM system, we must further expand our sophisticated offensive forces, and thus preserve our overwhelming assured destruction capability.

But the intractable fact is that should the talks fail, both the Soviets and ourselves would be forced to continue on a foolish and feckless course.

It would be foolish and feckless because—in the end—it would provide neither the Soviets, nor us, with any greater relative nuclear capability.

The time has come for us both to realize that, and to act reasonably. It is clearly in our own mutual interest to do so.

Having said that, it is important to distinguish between an ABM system designed to protect against a Soviet attack on our cities, and ABM systems which have other objectives.

One of the other uses of an ABM system which we should seriously consider is the greater protection of our strategic offensive forces.

Another is in relation to the emerging nuclear capability of Communist China.

There is evidence that the Chinese are devoting very substantial resources to the development of both nuclear warheads, and missile delivery systems. As I stated last January, indications are that they will have medium-range ballistic missiles within a year or so, an initial intercontinental ballistic missile capability in the early 1970s, and a modest force in the mid-70s.

Up to now, the lead-time factor has allowed us to postpone a decision on whether or not a light ABM deployment might be advantageous as a countermeasure to Communist China's nuclear development.

But the time will shortly be right for us to initiate production if we desire such a system.

China at the moment is caught up in internal strife, but it seems likely that her basic motivation in developing a strategic nuclear capability is an attempt to provide a basis for threatening her neighbors, and to clothe herself with the dubious prestige that the world pays to nuclear weaponry.

We deplore her development of these weapons, just as we deplore it in other countries. We oppose nuclear proliferation because we believe that in the end it only increases the risk of a common and cataclysmic holocaust.

President Johnson has made it clear that the United States will oppose any efforts of China to employ nuclear blackmail against her neighbors.<sup>2</sup>

We possess now, and will continue to possess for as far ahead as we can foresee, an overwhelming first-strike capability with respect to China. And despite the shrill and raucous propaganda directed at her own people that "the atomic bomb is a paper tiger," there is ample evidence that China well appreciates the destructive power of nuclear weapons.

China has been cautious to avoid any action that might end in a nuclear clash with the United States—however wild her words—and understandably so. We have the power not only to destroy completely her entire nuclear offensive forces, but to devastate her society as well.

Is there any possibility, then, that by the mid-1970s China might become so incautious as to attempt a nuclear attack on the United States or our allies?

It would be insane and suicidal for her to do so, but one can conceive conditions under which China might miscalculate. We wish to reduce such possibilities to a minimum.

And since, as I have noted, our strategic planning must always be conservative, and take into consideration even the possible irrational behavior of potential adversaries, there are marginal grounds for concluding that a light deployment of U.S. ABMs against this possibility is prudent.

The system would be relatively inexpensive—preliminary estimates place the cost at about \$5 billion—and would have a much higher degree of reliability against a Chinese attack, than the much more

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, p. 468.

massive and complicated system that some have recommended against a possible Soviet attack.

Moreover, such an ABM deployment designed against a possible Chinese attack would have a number of other advantages. It would provide an additional indication to Asians that we intend to deter China from nuclear blackmail, and thus would contribute toward our goal of discouraging nuclear weapon proliferation among the present non-nuclear countries.

Further, the Chinese-oriented ABM deployment would enable us to add—as a concurrent benefit—a further defense of our Minuteman sites against Soviet attack, which means that at modest cost we would in fact be adding even greater effectiveness to our offensive missile force and avoiding a much more costly expansion of that force.

Finally, such a reasonably reliable ABM system would add protection of our population against the improbable but possible accidental launch of an intercontinental missile by any one of the nuclear powers.

After a detailed review of all these considerations, we have decided to go forward with this Chinese-oriented ABM deployment, and we will begin actual production of such a system at the end of this year.

In reaching this decision, I want to emphasize that it contains two possible dangers—and we should guard carefully against each.

The first danger is that we may psychologically lapse into the old over-simplification about the adequacy of nuclear power. The simple truth is that nuclear weapons can serve to deter only a narrow range of threats. This ABM deployment will strengthen our defensive posture—and will enhance the effectiveness of our land-based ICBM offensive forces. But the independent nations of Asia must realize that these benefits are no substitute for their maintaining, and where necessary strengthening, their own conventional forces in order to deal with the more likely threats to the security of the region.

The second danger is also psychological. There is a kind of mad momentum intrinsic to the development of all new nuclear weaponry. If a weapon system works—and works well—there is strong pressure from many directions to procure and deploy the weapon out of all proportion to the prudent level required.

The danger in deploying this relatively light and reliable Chinese-oriented ABM system is going to be that pressures will develop to expand it into a heavy Soviet-oriented ABM system.

We must resist that temptation firmly—not because we can for a moment afford to relax our vigilance against a possible Soviet first-strike—but precisely because our greatest deterrent against such a strike is not a massive, costly, but highly penetrable ABM shield, but rather a fully credible offensive assured destruction capability.

The so-called heavy ABM shield—at the present state of technology—would in effect be no adequate shield at all against a Soviet attack, but rather a strong inducement for the Soviets to vastly increase their own offensive forces. That, as I have pointed out, would make it necessary for us to respond in turn—and so the arms race would rush hopelessly on to no sensible purpose on either side.

Let me emphasize—and I cannot do so too strongly—that our decision to go ahead with a *limited* ABM deployment in no way indicates that we feel an agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of

strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces is any the less urgent or desirable.

The road leading from the stone axe to the ICBM—though it may have been more than a million years in the building—seems to have run in a single direction.

If one is inclined to be cynical, one might conclude that man's history seems to be characterized not so much by consistent periods of peace, occasionally punctuated by warfare; but rather by persistent outbreaks of warfare, wearily put aside from time to time by periods of exhaustion and recovery—that parade under the name of peace.

I do not view man's history with that degree of cynicism, but I do believe that man's wisdom in avoiding war is often surpassed by his folly in promoting it.

However foolish unlimited war may have been in the past, it is now no longer merely foolish, but suicidal as well.

It is said that nothing can prevent a man from suicide, if he is sufficiently determined to commit it.

The question is what is our determination in an era when unlimited war will mean the death of hundreds of millions—and the possible genetic impairment of a million generations to follow?

Man is clearly a compound of folly and wisdom—and history is clearly a consequence of the admixture of those two contradictory traits.

History has placed our particular lives in an era when the consequences of human folly are waxing more and more catastrophic in the matters of war and peace.

In the end, the root of man's security does not lie in his weaponry.

In the end, the root of man's security lies in his mind.

What the world requires in its 22nd Year of the Atomic Age is not a new race towards armament.

What the world requires in its 22nd Year of the Atomic Age is a new race towards reasonableness.

We had better all run that race.

Not merely we the administrators. But we the people.

Thank you, and good afternoon.

### Mexican Working Paper Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Suggested Additions to Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, September 19, 1967<sup>1</sup>

#### ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/196, Sept. 19, 1967. The draft treaty appears *ante*, pp. 338-341.

2. All the Parties to this Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Those Parties that are in a position to do so, have the duty to contribute, according to their ability, alone or in cooperation with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the production, industries, and other applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States.

#### ARTICLE IV-A

1. Nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty shall provide adequate means and facilities to make available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty the potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions.

2. Such assistance shall be requested and channeled through appropriate international bodies with adequate representation of non-nuclear weapon States, subject to procedures to be established in a special agreement; it shall be provided on a non-discriminatory basis and shall not be withheld because of extraneous considerations. The charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development.

#### ARTICLE IV-B

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

#### ARTICLE IV-C

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith, with all speed and perseverance, to arrive at further agreements regarding the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, as well as to reach agreement on a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under strict and effective international control.

### Statement by the Mexican Representative (Castañeda) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, September 19, 1967<sup>1</sup>

2. The Mexican delegation wishes to express its deep satisfaction at the submission of the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup> Its congratulations are extended in the first place to the

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV. 331, pp. 4-11.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 338-341.

two co-Chairmen, the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union, who are the main co-authors of the joint draft, and then to all those who throughout these long negotiations have contributed by their suggestions and in other ways to its preparation.

3. After a careful though still incomplete study of the draft treaty, my Government considers it on the whole clearly satisfactory. Its main objective, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, is adequately ensured by the prohibitions in articles I and II. These are the cornerstone of the system. They are a firm one in our view, because they are so drafted as to preclude any proliferation of nuclear weapons, direct or indirect. However, as has been stated repeatedly, the various parts of the treaty must be indissolubly linked with each other; for the actual prohibitions of transfer and receipt of nuclear weapons will be effective, and even viable, only to the extent that the treaty satisfies other related requirements—those laid down by the General Assembly in one of its most constructive and balanced resolutions, resolution 2028 (XX).<sup>3</sup>

4. My delegation believes that, broadly speaking, the draft treaty basically satisfies those requirements. Its general features are appropriate. Indeed, they could hardly be other than they are, at least so long as we live with present-day political realities. In regard to those points on which the treaty does not, in our view, fully satisfy the requirements of the acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, or any of the other requirements in resolution 2028 (XX), we propose to submit a few suggestions. Let me say at once that the amendments we have in mind do not conflict with the treaty's essential features. On the contrary, they are clearly in harmony with its objectives as spelt out in the preamble. Moreover, we believe they will contribute towards the achievement of those objectives. Our aim is, above all, to strengthen some of its provisions without essentially altering its substance, by expressing as true legal obligations what the preamble now sets forth either as a statement of intention or as the proclamation of a general principle.

5. I will examine only those points which are the subject of our suggestions. On other points, either my country's position has already been indicated in an earlier session<sup>4</sup> or we propose to make it known in the near future, when my Government has reached a final conclusion. I have in mind, for instance, the special safeguards and guarantees desired by the non-nuclear States, or at any rate by some of them. That question, as you are aware, is not dealt with in the treaty.

6. Our first suggestion, though not necessarily the most important, concerns the peaceful use of nuclear energy in general. Article IV of the draft treaty refers to this matter. First of all, I should like to express our satisfaction that the co-Chairmen have placed this article in the body of the treaty, thus deferring to a wish of the non-nuclear States. As Mr. Foster pointed out,<sup>5</sup> the first part of that provision is

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 532-534.

<sup>4</sup> ENDC/PV.304, pp. 4-11.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, pp. 344-345; ENDC/PV.330, p. 7.

based on article 17 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.<sup>6</sup>

7. Article IV of the draft treaty enunciates two rights. The first is the right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy. To preclude an interpretation by which the non-proliferation treaty might conflict with such acts, this right is expressed in a negative form, which amounts simply to a legal interpretation of the provisions of the treaty as a whole: nothing in the Treaty may be interpreted as affecting this right, which is called inalienable. The second part of the sentence refers, however, to the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of information on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This right need not be expressed negatively. On the contrary, to stress it by adopting a positive form of words seems preferable: "All the Parties shall have the right . . .". Furthermore, the two rights are so very different that it would be better to devote a separate paragraph to each.

8. But that is not the most important matter. In our opinion, and in line with the views which we expressed in an earlier statement,<sup>7</sup> it is essential to establish the legal obligation of the nuclear Powers—the most advanced countries—to contribute to the technological development of the others, and to transfer and place at the disposal of those countries their scientific and technological knowledge of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We believe that the provision of such technical assistance should be made a legally-binding obligation and that the right of some countries to receive and the duty of others to share their scientific and technological knowledge should be proclaimed. We believe that if, as a contribution to international peace and security, the non-nuclear Powers renounce for all time certain activities and experiments which, but for the Treaty, they might carry out, it is only fair that they should receive in return as their authentic right any scientific and technological benefits derived from the experiments and activities they renounce.

9. Accordingly we have prepared a variant of article IV which takes account of those considerations. The first paragraph is identical with the first sentence of article IV of the draft treaty:

Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

10. A second paragraph, separate from the first, enunciates both the right of the parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of information, and the duty of those States to contribute that are in a position to do so. This paragraph reads:

All the Parties to this Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Those Parties that are in a position to do so, have the duty to contribute, according to their ability, alone or in cooperation with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the production.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante.* pp. 69-83.

<sup>7</sup> ENDC/PV. 304, pp. 9-10.

industries, and other applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapons States.<sup>8</sup>

11. We believe that this duty can and should be enunciated as a true legal obligation, although the obligation is imperfect and general and its practical significance will continue to depend ultimately on the will of the nuclear Powers. What matters at this stage is to establish the actual principle of the obligation. The phrase "according to their ability" refers not only to the parties' financial and technical ability but also to their legal ability, since much of this knowledge is covered by patents owned by private persons. The last sentence emphasizes the primary importance for the non-nuclear countries that the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes shall take place above all in their territories.

12. Our second suggestion relates to a new article on the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. Nearly all its components are taken from the preamble of the joint draft treaty; but they are so combined and presented that the clear and categorical offers made by the nuclear Powers do not appear as mere declarations of intention in the preamble but as an express obligation in the body of the treaty, even though only in very general terms. This is undoubtedly the question which causes the non-nuclear-weapon countries the greatest concern. Renunciation of a nuclear arsenal must not import renunciation of the use of the enormous economic potential which peaceful nuclear explosions may come to mean in the future, for instance in the execution of vast engineering projects. If the non-nuclear countries have to undertake not to develop or explode nuclear devices—since such devices, despite their peaceful purpose, are nothing other than nuclear bombs—they must be assured in return, categorically and unequivocally, that they will not thereby be deprived of the possible benefits of such explosions. Therefore, although the details of this complex problem must be regulated in a separate agreement, the actual right to enjoy the benefits of peaceful explosions must be recognized and enunciated in the non-proliferation treaty itself, at least in its essential details. There is an indissoluble link between renunciation of the right actually to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions, and the right not to be deprived of their benefits. Renunciation of the former right is predicated on the enjoyment of the latter.

13. Broadly speaking, we are in agreement with the suggestions made by the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, for the settlement of this question.<sup>9</sup> However, as I said before, that will have to be the subject of a separate agreement. The article which, for the reasons I have given, we consider should be written into the body of the non-proliferation treaty should in our view contain the following provisions. First, it should lay down in general terms the obligation of the nuclear Powers to provide the necessary means and facilities to make available to non-nuclear-weapon Powers the potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. Secondly, it should indicate the general principle that assistance shall be requested and, where necessary, channeled through an appropriate international body. The debates have shown that, although nuclear explosions will have to

<sup>8</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>9</sup> BNDC/PV.329, p. 9.

be so carried out as not to entail proliferation in regard to non-nuclear-weapon States, these are quite rightly reluctant to be subject to the good will of the nuclear Powers for the performance of that service. Hence the essential function and part which must be assumed for this purpose by some competent international body, presumably the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), either alone or in association with other bodies. Here we merely propose to indicate the duties of an appropriate body— in which, we would add, the non-nuclear countries must be adequately represented. We then state, naturally, that the functions of the international body will be subject to procedures previously laid down in a special and separate agreement. The other provisions of this article are nearly all taken from the preamble: that assistance shall be non-discriminatory and that the charge shall be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. The additional requirement we have included, that assistance shall not be withheld because of extraneous considerations, is taken from the suggestions offered by the United States representative, Mr. Foster, on 21 March.<sup>10</sup>

14. The new article would read as follows:

1. Nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty shall provide adequate means and facilities to make available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty the potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions.

2. Such assistance shall be requested and channeled through appropriate international bodies with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States subject to procedures to be established in a special agreement; it shall be provided on a non-discriminatory basis and shall not be withheld because of extraneous considerations. The charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development.<sup>11</sup>

15. Our third proposal would transfer from the preamble to the body of the treaty the principle that

nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.<sup>12</sup>

This question is of special importance for the Latin-American countries that have already concluded a regional treaty of this kind. I am happy to be able to announce that the Treaty of Tlatelolco has just been approved by the Mexican Senate, so that it may be ratified shortly, with a declaration of waiver of the requirements for its entry into force laid down in article 28.

16. We should like to see this principle incorporated in the body of the treaty, not only because it would thus gain in importance but also because, by its nature, that is its proper place. It is, in fact, an authoritative and mandatory interpretation of the scope of all the other provisions of the Treaty: its object is to determine what the treaty permits or prohibits, and it therefore has obvious legal effects. In other words, it is an authentic legal provision which as such does not belong in the preamble. The text of the new article would be the same as that of the

<sup>10</sup> *Ante*, p. 173.

<sup>11</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>12</sup> *Ante*, p. 339.

last paragraph of the preamble, which I have quoted, except for the consequential omission of the introductory words "Noting that".

17. Our last suggestion refers to the nuclear disarmament of the nuclear Powers, and is of course bound up with the principle of the acceptable balance of responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers.

18. Very important statements of intention have been included in the preamble of the treaty concerning the disarmament negotiations between the nuclear Powers. This seems to us a considerable step forward. Furthermore, we are fully conscious of the obvious limits to the obligations which the nuclear Powers can assume in this respect in the present treaty. We are well aware, as we said in an earlier statement<sup>19</sup> that to stipulate that the non-proliferation treaty should include specific disarmament measures to be implemented by the nuclear Powers in the immediate future, would be tantamount to opposing the very existence of a non-proliferation treaty. This fact is obvious and needs no proof or further comment. But recognition of this fact, recognition of the very limited scope of the obligations that the major Powers can assume under this treaty, is perfectly reconcilable with the desire that such obligations should be formulated more clearly and precisely, without extending their scope.

19. In short, the nuclear Powers cannot actually undertake to conclude future disarmament agreements among themselves; but they certainly can undertake to endeavour to do so; that is, they can certainly undertake to initiate and pursue negotiations in good faith in order to conclude such agreements. That is precisely the content we should like to give to this obligation, which should be written into the body of the treaty. Doubtless it would be an imperfect obligation, since it would not be accompanied by sanctions, but it would be more than a statement of intention. It would be a solemn recognition of the special responsibility of the nuclear Powers to adopt and implement a programme for the early reduction and possible elimination of nuclear weapons. We believe that this would have deep political significance.

20. In indicating the disarmament or related measures on which we say agreements should be negotiated, we have closely followed the preamble of the treaty, with two exceptions. First, we have added to the list of measures the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Secondly, reference is made in the preamble to the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of existing stockpiles, and so forth "pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament". We believe that the effect of this wording is to make an agreement on each of the measures listed entirely conditional upon its conclusion within the framework of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

21. In our opinion the article might be drafted as follows:

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith, with all speed and perseverance, to arrive at further agreements regarding the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of

<sup>19</sup> ENDC/PV. 304, p. 6.

their delivery, as well as to reach agreement on a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under strict and effective international control.<sup>14</sup>

22. With reference to article VI, we have two minor suggestions to make. Since the main obligation of the treaty devolves upon the non-nuclear States, and in order to emphasize its importance within the treaty's operating machinery, we believe that a large number of ratifications should be required to bring the treaty into force. These would obviously be nearly all by non-nuclear States. Perhaps sixty, or a little less than half the members of the United Nations, would be a suitable number. We also consider, for similar reasons, that the Depositary States should be two nuclear and two non-nuclear Powers.

23. In conclusion, I should like to say a few words on the still pending problem of the control or supervision of compliance with the obligations of the treaty. We believe that, if the future treaty is to function satisfactorily, an international control system will be required which offers the maximum guarantees of efficiency and absolute impartiality. The formula proposed by Sweden for article III seems to us highly attractive.<sup>15</sup> We hope it will provide useful points for the negotiations now being conducted by the two co-Chairmen and the other countries concerned. We also believe that, as Mr. Burns has pointed out, it will be difficult to arrive at an agreement on article III without a certain amount of give and take on all sides.<sup>16</sup> Accordingly we shall maintain a flexible position on this question pending submission of proposals to us by our two co-Chairmen.

24. It might perhaps be useful to recall briefly some aspects of the control system for verifying compliance with the obligations entered into by the Parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. Article 7 of the Treaty provides for the establishment of an international organization which shall be generally responsible for ensuring compliance with the obligations arising from the Treaty. This agency will commence its work when the Treaty has entered into force for eleven States. Furthermore, article 13 provides that

Each Contracting Party shall negotiate multilateral or bilateral agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of its safeguards to its nuclear activities.<sup>17</sup>

25. The problem of the period which may elapse between the ratification by a State and application of the IAEA safeguards is solved by article 13 in the following manner:

Each Contracting Party shall initiate negotiations within a period of 180 days after the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification of this Treaty. These agreements shall enter into force, for each Party, not later than eighteen months after the date of the initiation of such negotiations except in case of unforeseen circumstances or *force majeure*.

26. It only remains for me to add that I have handed to the Secretariat a working paper<sup>18</sup> which summarizes the suggestions I have made in this statement.

<sup>14</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>15</sup> *Ante*, p. 368.

<sup>16</sup> ENDC/PV.29, p. 5

<sup>17</sup> *Ante*, p. 75.

<sup>18</sup> *Supra*.

Statement by ACDA Deputy Director Fisher to the  
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Limited  
Antiballistic Missile Deployment, September 19,  
1967<sup>1</sup>

27. I listened with interest to the statement made by the representative of Mexico, and I will study its various aspects carefully. Of course, I was glad, as I am sure we all were, to hear of the action of the Mexican Senate in approving the Treaty of Tlateloleo.<sup>2</sup> That is good news for all of us.

28. I should like today to discuss the character and purpose of the planned United States limited anti-ballistic-missile deployment announced by the Secretary of Defense of the United States, Mr. McNamara, on Monday 18 September in his speech analyzing the status of the strategic arms race.<sup>3</sup> I should particularly like to discuss the relation between this deployment decision and the efforts on which all of us here are engaged to bring the arms race under control. By way of summary, I wish to stress at the outset that it is my very strong belief that, while the United States anti-ballistic-missile deployment in no way poses technical or political impediments to arms control, the fact that the United States found it necessary to make this decision emphasizes the importance and urgency of our work, especially in regard to non-proliferation and the control of strategic nuclear armaments.

29. First of all, it is well to emphasize the very limited nature of the proposed United States anti-ballistic-missile deployment, even upon its completion, and our intention to keep the deployment limited. The deployment will consist of an "area" defense of the United States and a "terminal" defense of some of our Minuteman sites. The United States deployment will comprise no terminal defence of urban areas and will not attempt to provide defence for those areas against a large-scale strategic missile attack of the kind the Soviet Union is capable of launching. We do not believe that it is feasible for either the United States or the Soviet Union to provide real protection for our populated areas against the strategic striking power of the other.

30. What, then, is the purpose of the deployment? While the United States, through long public debate and deferment of a decision, has demonstrated its reluctance to initiate anti-ballistic-missile deployment, this decision was considered to be the prudent course of action in the face of an emerging Communist Chinese intercontinental-ballistic-missile threat. Concurrently, such a system will have the effect of protecting our retaliatory forces against any threat which might result from a continued build-up of offensive missiles on the part of the Soviet Union.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV. 331, pp. 12-16.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 60-63.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 382-394.

31. The United States anti ballistic missile deployment will provide area protection of United States urban areas against unsophisticated ballistic-missile attacks, such as conceivably could be launched by Communist China in the next decade. It is clear that the Chinese are placing a high priority on the development of an intercontinental missile force capable of delivering nuclear weapons. We now believe that China could have an initial intercontinental ballistic missile operational capability, albeit crude and vulnerable, by the early 1970s. Thus a significant purpose of the planned limited anti ballistic missile deployment is to provide some prudential protection of the United States population against Chinese nuclear missile attacks.

32. For the foreseeable future we view a Chinese nuclear attack upon the United States or its allies and friends as highly unlikely indeed—particularly in face of our overwhelming strategic retaliatory capabilities. These capabilities should provide a deterrent to any such irrational move on their part. We believe it prudent, however, to invest in a system which will effectively neutralize that possibility. An important reason for our decision is the belief that our limited anti-ballistic missile deployment, designed against such a possible Chinese attack, will provide an additional indication that we intend to make concerted efforts to deter nuclear blackmail.

33. In so far as this decision relates to the current Soviet build-up and any threat to our assured destruction deterrent capability, the United States limited anti-ballistic-missile system will also have the effect of providing added protection for United States retaliatory forces. In this mode, it is not different from the hardening and dispersion of the United States offensive missile forces. Indeed, of all the ways in which the United States could guard against a possible future threat to our deterrent capability, the deployment of a hard-point anti-ballistic-missile defence for the United States Minuteman must be considered to be among the least provocative moves the United States could take under the circumstances, since it permits restraint in further United States offensive missile deployment.

34. These, then, are the main objectives of our anti-ballistic-missile deployment. I should also like to draw attention to a result which will not be achieved by this deployment. That is the protection, in the event of nuclear war, of our population against a major sophisticated attack, such as could be launched by an advanced nuclear-weapon State. The deployment will not have such capability but instead will help to deter nuclear war by affording additional protection for our assured retaliatory capability.

35. We have not abstained from a decision to deploy large urban anti-ballistic-missile defences in the United States because it is not good to protect one's people from nuclear missile attack. We have done so because it does not seem feasible to provide such defences against a major sophisticated attack which could be launched by an advanced nuclear-weapon State such as the Soviet Union. Such a State has the technical and financial resources to offset any such defences and would probably respond to any significant threat to its deterrent capability by increasing its offensive missile capability. As Secretary McNamara has said:

If we in turn opt for heavy anti-ballistic-missile deployment—at whatever price—we can be certain that the Soviets will react to offset the advantage we would hope to gain.<sup>4</sup>

The countervailing offensive capabilities which would follow from such a deployment on our part, by thus driving the arms race to still higher plateaux, would have rendered ineffective the very defence of our cities which we had sought to achieve. The deployment now being undertaken by the United States warrants no such response; and we have no plans which should have the result of stimulating any further Soviet offensive force build-up.

36. Despite the limited character and purpose of the proposed United States anti-ballistic-missile system, we may properly inquire concerning its effect on arms control efforts, both here and in other forums. Indeed, we must be alert that misconceptions about the nature of the United States anti-ballistic-missile deployment, willful or otherwise, be not used to impede progress on important arms-control measures.

37. As I indicated earlier, the limited United States anti-ballistic-missile deployment decision does not represent an acceleration of the United States-Soviet strategic arms race. The Soviet Union, which has already initiated an anti-ballistic-missile deployment, has never indicated that a limited United States anti-ballistic-missile deployment would be provocative to it, and we would assume that that view remains unchanged. We think it has now become vital that the United States and the Soviet Union be able to assure each other of the limited purpose of both offensive and defensive forces and be able to reach some agreement on controlling the nuclear strategic arms race.

38. Secretary McNamara made the position of the United States quite clear when he stated:

Let me emphasize—and I cannot do so too strongly—that our decision to go ahead with a limited anti-ballistic-missile deployment in no way indicates that we feel that an agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces is any the less urgent or desirable.<sup>5</sup>

Mr. McNamara said more. He said:

We do not want a nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union—primarily because the action-reaction phenomenon makes it foolish and futile. But if the only way to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining first-strike capability over us is to engage in such a race, the United States possesses in ample abundance the resources, the technology, and the will to run faster in that race for whatever distance is required.

But what we would much prefer to do is to come to a realistic and reasonably riskless agreement with the Soviet Union which would effectively prevent such an arms race. We both have strategic nuclear arsenals greatly in excess of a credible assured destruction capability. These arsenals have reached that point of excess in each case for precisely the same reason: we each have reacted to the other's build-up with very conservative calculations. We have, that is, each built a greater arsenal than either of us needed for a second-strike capability, simply because we each wanted to be able to cope with the worst plausible case.

But since we now each possess a deterrent in excess of our individual needs, both of our nations would benefit from a properly-safeguarded agreement first to limit, and later to reduce, both our offensive and defensive strategic nuclear forces.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 390.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, pp. 393-394.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, pp. 388-389.

39. I need hardly repeat that the United States is firmly committed to achieving an equitable non-proliferation treaty and does not consider that this limited anti-ballistic-missile deployment decision should in any way decrease the desirability of a non-proliferation treaty to other nations. To the extent that our anti-ballistic-missile deployment will affect the security considerations of other countries, I believe it will favour non-proliferation. The deployment will foreclose any possibility of a successful Chinese nuclear attack on the United States and will thereby provide further assurance of our determination to support our Asian friends against Chinese nuclear blackmail.

40. Finally, my Government wishes me to emphasize today that the United States limited anti-ballistic-missile deployment decision will in no way interfere with continued United States adherence to existing arms-control agreements, such as the limited test-ban Treaty<sup>7</sup> and the outer space Treaty;<sup>8</sup> and it will in no way interfere with our efforts to achieve progress on other important arms-control objectives. We will continue to work towards the achievement of the measures which we have presented to this Conference.

## Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, September 19, 1967<sup>1</sup>

### I. TERMS OF REFERENCE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMITTEE'S WORK

1. By resolution 2153 B (XXI) of 17 November 1966, the General Assembly decided to convene a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States (hereafter referred to as the Conference) to meet not later than July 1968 to consider the following and other related questions: "(a) How can the security of the non-nuclear States best be assured? (b) How may non-nuclear Powers co-operate among themselves in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons? (c) How can nuclear devices be used for exclusively peaceful purposes?" By the same resolution, the General Assembly requested its President immediately to set up a preparatory committee (hereafter referred to as the Committee), widely representative of the non-nuclear-weapon States, to make appropriate arrangements for convening the Conference and to consider the question of associating nuclear-weapon States with the work of the Conference, and report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session.<sup>2</sup>

2. In accordance with the resolution, the President of the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, after extensive consultations with all sections of the membership, announced on 20 December 1966 (1500th plenary meeting of the General Assembly) that the Committee would be composed of: Chile, Dahomey, Kenya, Kuwait, Malaysia, Malta, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Spain, United Republic of Tanzania.

3. The Committee held ten meetings at United Nations Headquar-

<sup>1</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 38-43.

<sup>3</sup> A/6817, Sept. 13, 1967.

<sup>4</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 749-750.

ters, on 2 February, 9 March, 5 and 6 July, 17, 22 and 28 August, 7 and 15 September 1967 (A/CONF.35/PC/SR.1-10).

4. At its first meeting, on 2 February 1967, the Committee unanimously elected its officers, as follows:

*Chairman:* Mr. Burudi Nabwera (Kenya)  
*Vice-Chairman:* Mr. Manuel Aznar (Spain)  
*Rapporteur:* Mr. Peter S. Lai (Malaysia)

5. The members of the Committee were represented as follows:

<i>Chile</i>	Mr. José Piñera Mr. Javier Illanes Mr. Uldaricio Figueroa
<i>Dahomey</i>	Mr. Maxime-Léopold Zollner Mr. Virgile-Octave Tevoedjre
<i>Kenya</i>	Mr. Burudi Nabwera Mr. O. A. Fakihi El Kindy Mr. Peter Maragia Nyamweya Mr. Japhet Gideon Kiti
<i>Kuwait</i>	Mr. Rashid Al-Rashid Mr. Soubhi J. Khanachet Mr. Sami Jaccub Shammas Mr. Zaim Imam
<i>Malaysia</i>	Mr. Raja Aznam Mr. Peter S. Lai
<i>Malta</i>	Mr. Arvid Pardo Mr. Victor J. Gauci
<i>Nigeria</i>	Mr. J. T. F. Iyalla Mr. A. A. Mohammed Mr. E. N. Eyo
<i>Pakistan</i>	Mr. Syed Amjad Ali Mr. Agha Shahi Mr. S. A. Pasha Mr. Naseem Mirza
<i>Peru</i>	Mr. Carlos Mackehenie Mr. Jaime Cáceres Mr. Manuel F. Boza
<i>Spain</i>	Mr. Manuel Aznar Mr. Jaime de Piniés Mr. Pedro Temboursy Mr. Fernando Arias Salgado
<i>United Republic of Tanzania</i>	Mr. John W. S. Malecela Mr. Idi Hamisis Mtingwa Mr. M. A. Fom

6. Mr. Aleksei E. Nesterenko, Under-Secretary of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, and, in his absence, Mr. M. A. Vellodi, Deputy to the Under-Secretary, represented the Sec-

retary-General. Mr. O. Frey, Associate Chief of the Disarmament Affairs Division, acted as Secretary of the Committee.

7. In the course of its meetings, the Committee, in conformity with its mandate to make appropriate arrangements for convening the Conference and to examine the question of associating nuclear-weapon States with the work of the Conference, considered the following substantive matters:

- (a) Provisional agenda for the Conference.
- (b) Question of associating nuclear-weapon States with the work of the Conference.
- (c) Draft rules of procedure for the Conference.
- (d) Place and time of the Conference.
- (e) Documentation for the Conference.
- (f) Cost estimates.
- (g) Adoption of the report.

## II. PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR THE CONFERENCE

8. The Committee devoted a considerable part of its time to the drafting of a provisional agenda for the Conference that would reflect and, at the same time, develop the questions raised in the first operative paragraph of General Assembly resolution 2153 B (XXI)

9. At its third and fourth meetings, on 5 and 6 July 1967, the Committee discussed an outline, informally submitted by its officers, pertaining to an agenda for the Conference. As a result of this discussion, it adopted a tentative outline, subject to subsequent review by the Committee.

10. On 17 August, Pakistan submitted a Working Paper (A/CONF.35/PC/L.6) which took into consideration the previous outline as well as other suggestions, and put it forward as a basis for further discussion by the Committee. The latter, after considering the Working Paper, decided that the Chairman should appoint a number of representatives to form, together with the other officers of the Committee, a Working Group to prepare a draft provisional agenda for the Conference, taking as a basis the existing outlines before the Committee. The Chairman appointed the representatives of Chile, Nigeria and Pakistan to join the officers as members of the Working Group.

11. On 28 August, the Working Group submitted a draft provisional agenda for the Conference (A/CONF.35/PC/L.9), which was adopted by the Committee with minor changes.

12. For record purposes, on 1 September a revised text of the Working Paper by Pakistan (A/CONF.35/PC/L.6/Rev.1) was submitted by the delegation of Pakistan.

13. The provisional agenda for the Conference, as recommended by the Committee (A/CONF.35/PC/L.11), is annexed to this report (annex I).

14. At the ninth meeting, the Rapporteur submitted, in relation to the work of the Committee, two papers, "Security guarantees in the context of measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons" and "The peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the context of measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons", issued as documents A/CONF.35/

PC/L.14 and A/CONF.35/PC/L.15, respectively (see annexes IV and V).

### III. QUESTION OF ASSOCIATING NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES WITH THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

15. Under paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 2153 B (XXI), the Committee was to consider the question of associating "nuclear States" with the work of the Conference.

16. The question was raised by some representatives at the second meeting and again discussed by the Committee at its fifth meeting. Representatives appreciated the importance of the co-operation of nuclear-weapon States for the success of the Conference, and the Committee agreed that nuclear-weapon States should be invited to attend from the outset with full rights of participation except the right to vote. This voting rule results from the specific nature of the Conference.

17. Consequently, the Committee decided to recommend that nuclear-weapon States should be invited to participate in the Conference with full rights except the right to vote.

### IV. DRAFT RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE CONFERENCE

18. At the request of the Committee, draft rules of procedure were prepared by the Secretariat (A/CONF.35/PC/L.8), on the basis of those used by similar United Nations conferences. While these draft rules derive essentially from the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, they incorporate changes made to reflect the differences between the General Assembly, which meets annually and has very wide terms of reference covering many fields, and a conference of the nature here concerned, which is not a continuing body and which is convened to consider only one specific field: to provide the greatest possible flexibility, clarity and simplicity; and to take account of certain practices which have developed in giving actual effect to particular rules.

19. The Committee decided to recommend the rules prepared by the Secretariat, as amended during the debate. Certain points arising out of the draft rules received particular attention.

20. Concerning voting rights (rule 33), the Committee, after due consideration of this important question, and mindful of its previous decision on associating nuclear-weapon States with the work of the Conference, decided to recommend a draft rule specifying that each non-nuclear-weapon State represented at the Conference should have one vote; and nuclear-weapon States participating in the Conference should have all rights, except that of voting.

21. The Committee agreed that, in addition to a general committee and a credentials committee, the Conference should establish "two or more" main committees, as it deemed necessary for the performance of its functions (rule 45).

22. Regarding the official and working languages of the Conference, the Committee, in view of the participants in the Conference, agreed that (a) Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish should be the official languages of the Conference, while English, French, Russian and Spanish should be the working languages (rule 52); (b)

speeches made in any of the official languages should be interpreted into the other official languages (rule 53); (c) important documents of the Conference should be made available in the official languages, while other documents and summary records should be made available in the working languages of the Conference (rule 56).

23. The Committee also agreed (rule 60) that observers from the competent specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency might participate, without the right to vote, in the deliberations of the Conference and its main committees, on questions within the scope of their activities.

24. The draft rules of procedure for the Conference, as recommended by the Committee (A/CONF.35/PC/L.12), are annexed to this report (annex II).<sup>3</sup>

#### V. PLACE AND TIME OF THE CONFERENCE

25. The Committee was bound by the time-limit fixed in General Assembly resolution 2153 B (XXI), according to which the Conference was to meet not later than July 1968. As to the place of the Conference, the Committee, after considering various issues involved, decided to recommend Geneva as the venue of the Conference as being the most suitable.

26. As to the duration of the Conference, the prevailing view was that at least four to five weeks would be needed if it was to fulfil its task as set out in the provisional agenda.

27. The Secretariat, after consulting the United Nations Office at Geneva, informed the Committee that, taking into account the schedule of other United Nations conferences planned for the first part of 1968, the only suitable date for holding the Conference in Geneva, was from 11 March to 10 April 1968. The Committee, in the circumstances, accepted the dates and recommends that the Conference be held at the United Nations Office in Geneva from 11 March to 10 April 1968.

#### VI. DOCUMENTATION FOR THE CONFERENCE

28. The Committee discussed documentation at several meetings and agreed that adequate pre-Conference documentation, closely related to the draft agenda, would be needed, especially as the Conference would be dealing with complex subjects and would be attended by some countries not having first-hand experience of all the implications of nuclear technology.

29. It was felt that some papers should be prepared by the Secretariat with the help of consultants, if necessary.

30. The Committee considered, at first, the possibility of making specific recommendations to the General Assembly as to the subjects on which papers should be prepared prior to the Conference. Following a suggestion by the Rapporteur, it then decided to recommend that, upon the adoption of the provisional agenda for the Conference, the General Assembly should ask the Secretary-General to provide adequate and comprehensive documentation on the various items on the agenda of the Conference.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed here.

## VII. COST ESTIMATES

31. In considering the cost of the Conference, the Committee had before it tentative cost estimates prepared by the Secretariat on the basis of various assumptions concerning the duration of the Conference, the number of meetings per day, the number of official and working languages and the extent of the documentation (A/CONF.35/PC/L.4 and Add. 1 and 2).

32. At the Committee's request, further estimates (A/CONF.35/PC/L.4/Rev. 1) were submitted by the Secretariat after the Committee had taken decisions on the foregoing questions.

33. Based on the assumptions made throughout this report, and summarized in paragraph 1 of document A/CONF.35/PC/L.4/Rev.1 (annexed to this report as annex III),<sup>4</sup> the revised estimates deal with the following main categories of expenditures: temporary substantive and secretarial staff and consultants; pre-Conference documentation; Conference servicing costs; and preparation and reproduction of the final report of the Conference.

34. The Committee was at all times conscious of its responsibility to ensure strict economy in the arrangements for the Conference, even though it felt that the effectiveness of the Conference must be the overriding concern.

## VIII. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

35. At its tenth meeting, held on 15 September 1967, the Committee adopted its report, as revised and amended during the discussion.

## ANNEX I

## PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR THE CONFERENCE OF NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES RECOMMENDED BY THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

1. Methods of assuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon States
  - (a) Conclusion of an international convention under which nuclear-weapon States undertake not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against States which have unconditionally renounced the production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons
  - (b) Security guarantees through international agreements against a threat or use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon State which has renounced the production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons
  - (c) Establishment of nuclear-free zones
  - (d) Declaration by nuclear-weapon States, jointly or severally, to protect the non-nuclear-weapon States which have renounced the production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons against threat or use of nuclear weapons
  - (e) Other methods
  - (f) Procedure for implementing these measures and invoking such guarantees

<sup>4</sup> Not printed here.

2. Implications of production and acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon States
  - (a) Security implications
  - (b) Economic implications
3. Prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons through co-operation among non-nuclear-weapon States
  - (a) The question of the renunciation of the production, acquisition and/or use of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon States in the context of non-proliferation
  - (b) Co-operation among non-nuclear-weapon States in avoiding the presence of nuclear weapons on their territory, including the establishment of nuclear-free zones
  - (c) Consideration of an international convention by non-nuclear-weapon States to undertake the prevention of the production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons
  - (d) Reciprocal inspections on a bilateral basis and multilateral inspections by an international agency, of nuclear establishments for peaceful purposes, in the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States and safeguards against industrial espionage through such inspections
  - (e) The question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes by non-nuclear-weapon States and the possibility of misuse of such technology for the production of nuclear weapons
  - (f) Submission of periodic reports by countries, to an international agency, on the nature and the extent of nuclear technical assistance and fissionable material supplied by them to non-nuclear-weapon States for peaceful purposes
4. Programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
  - (a) Access for non-nuclear-weapon States which have renounced the production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons to technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy
  - (b) Assistance to non-nuclear-weapon States which have renounced the production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons in the implementation of programmes of peaceful uses of nuclear energy
  - (c) The question of peaceful explosions for the benefit of non-nuclear-weapon States
5. Implementation of Conference decisions

**Address by Ambassador Goldberg to the General Assembly [Extract], September 21, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

I turn now to a third momentous problem: the search for reliable programmes of international disarmament and arms control, particularly in the field of nuclear weapons.

<sup>1</sup> A/PV. 1502 (prov.), pp. 27-32.

Step-by-step progress in this field, which seemed out of reach for so many years, has more recently become a reality. Significant limitations regarding nuclear weapons have been accepted by the nuclear Powers in the Antarctic Treaty of 1959,<sup>2</sup> in the Partial Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty of 1963,<sup>3</sup> and only last year in the Outer Space Treaty.<sup>4</sup>

These successive steps have encouraged us to tackle one of the most basic aspects of the nuclear dilemma: the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons to more and more nations. This poses one of the greatest dangers to peace and, indeed, to the survival of mankind. The longer this problem remains, the graver the danger becomes.

My Government has long been very much alive to this danger. In response to it we have given the highest priority in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the objective of a non-proliferation treaty. Last month this long effort culminated in the simultaneous tabling by the United States and the Soviet Union of identical drafts of a non-proliferation treaty, complete in all except its safeguard provisions.<sup>5</sup> The texts of these drafts will be available in document form to all Members of the General Assembly.

I must frankly state that complex problems still remain. But we are hopeful that a complete treaty draft, including a generally acceptable safeguard provision, will be presented to this session in time to allow for consideration and action by the Assembly, under whose general direction and guidance this treaty is being negotiated.

But I should also say that the presentation of such a completed draft will, of course, not be the end of the process. There will remain the understandable desire of certain non-nuclear countries for assurances against nuclear blackmail. The Assembly, in addition to endorsing the treaty as we hope it will, can make a significant contribution to the treaty's objective of non-proliferation by helping to develop a solution to this important and related problem.

We fully understand that the drafts which have been tabled in Geneva are far too important to admit of hurried consideration by prospective signatories. But neither does this urgent matter admit of procrastination. All concerned Powers, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, should press forward with all practical speed to the conclusion of a final treaty. Indeed, the General Assembly itself spoke to all of us last year when it unanimously declared, in resolution 2149 (XXI):

First, that States take all necessary steps to facilitate and achieve at the earliest possible time the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty; and

Second, that all States refrain from any actions conducive to proliferation or which might hamper the conclusion of an agreement.<sup>6</sup>

Our preoccupation with the non-proliferation treaty has not diminished my Government's concern over other major problems in the arms-control field. High on the list of these problems is the growing arsenal of strategic offensive and defensive missiles. Some time ago

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 1550-1556.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 38-43.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, pp. 333-341.

<sup>6</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 686-687.

we expressed to the Soviet Union our interest in an understanding which would limit the deployment of such missiles.

In the interim, we in the United States have been obliged to review carefully our strategic position. Our conclusion from this review was that our security, including particularly security against the threat of a possible missile attack by mainland China, required us to embark upon the construction of a limited antiballistic missile system—and emphasize the word “limited”.

No nation, nuclear or non-nuclear, should feel that its security is endangered by this decision. On the contrary, to the extent that the United States will be better able to meet its international defensive responsibilities and to respond to appeals from States threatened by nuclear blackmail, the present safety of many other countries may in fact be enhanced.

However, we have no illusions that the construction and deployment of missiles of any kind is the preferred road to security. It is not. The events which led to our decision simply underscore the urgent importance of pursuing negotiations on a limitation of strategic offensive and defensive missiles. Despite our lack of success thus far, the United States remains ready to open talks on this subject at any time.

These developments, moreover, once again demonstrate the urgent need not only for a non-proliferation treaty, but for all the necessary steps toward general and complete disarmament. Let no one imagine that the building or acquisition of a nuclear bomb buys cheap security. True security for all Powers, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, lies in progress in the entire range of arms control and disarmament measures, including control of the strategic arms race, a verifiable comprehensive test-ban, and a cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. The sum of such acts will help to build a more secure world for all and perhaps ensure our very survival.

### Address by the Japanese Foreign Minister (Miki) to the General Assembly [Extract]: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, September 22, 1967<sup>1</sup>

I should now like to dwell a moment on the question of the prevention of nuclear war. In order to prevent a nuclear disaster, there is a compelling need for all of us, realizing that we are citizens of this shrinking world and sharing a common stake, to eliminate the danger of nuclear weapons' ever being used, by promoting better mutual trust and understanding among nations, and by thus bringing about an easing of world tensions.

In this regard, it is of the utmost importance to control nuclear weapons themselves. My Government thus subscribes to the spirit of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, now attracting the attention of the world. It is quite clear that the further spread of

<sup>1</sup> A/PV.1503 (prov.), pp. 23-27.

these weapons would only increase the danger of nuclear wars and jeopardize world peace.

I am very glad to note that, after long and assiduous efforts by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has finally been submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva for concrete deliberations.<sup>2</sup>

To attain the objective of this treaty, it is most important to ensure the participation of as many countries as possible, in particular all the nuclear-weapon and all non-nuclear-weapon States with nuclear capabilities. I also consider it necessary for both the nuclear-weapon and the non-nuclear-weapon States to share equally and in a co-operative spirit the responsibilities and obligations involved.

From this point of view, I earnestly hope that some measures, which might be set forth, for example, in the form of a United Nations resolution, will be taken by the nuclear States to guarantee the non-nuclear States—especially those pursuing a policy of non-alignment—against attack or threat of attack by nuclear weapons.

Also of paramount importance is the question of nuclear disarmament. Inasmuch as the non-proliferation treaty aims at a world without nuclear wars and the furtherance of human security and welfare, it is not enough merely to curb the increase in number of the nuclear weapon States. Upon the conclusion of that treaty, the nuclear States themselves should clearly express their intention to start taking concrete measures, beginning with whatever is feasible, for the realization of nuclear disarmament, the ultimate aim being the demolition of all nuclear weapons. Should that treaty end up as a mere device to establish a nuclear monopoly by the present nuclear States, then it would completely lose its moral basis.

Furthermore, the total prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests is also an important aspect of the nuclear disarmament question. It would not only contribute to nuclear disarmament as such, but it would also be an effective measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In all efforts to prevent nuclear weapon tests, including the so-called "detection club", my Government is prepared to extend positive support and co-operation.

Meanwhile, I strongly hope that both the People's Republic of China and France will heed and respond to the common desire of humanity by showing a co-operative attitude towards the partial test-ban treaty and the non-proliferation treaty.

There should be no loop-holes in the treaty. However, the peaceful use of nuclear energy offers limitless possibilities for future human welfare. The treaty, therefore, should not obstruct the sharing by all parties of equal opportunities to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, nor should it hamper research and development of nuclear energy for such purposes. There must be assurance that the non-nuclear States will not be placed at a disadvantage regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy. At the same time, I strongly hope that the nuclear States, which have greater advantages in research and development, will be forthcoming in making their knowledge available

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 338-341.

to other States so that the treaty would serve as a prime mover of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. I hope the Member States of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will pay serious attention to the various observations which will no doubt be expressed by many delegations in the present session of the General Assembly, and that they will make further efforts for the realization of a just and equitable treaty. My Government is ready to co-operate fully and in a constructive spirit in international endeavours to achieve disarmament. That we may contribute more effectively to this purpose, my Government desires an opportunity to join other nations as an active participant in international organizations dealing with disarmament questions.

### Address by Foreign Minister Gromyko to the General Assembly [Extract], September 22, 1967<sup>1</sup>

Aims of conquest in foreign policy are organically alien to the Soviet Union and the socialist commonwealth of States. Therefore, we have no need for armaments other than for the purpose of defending our sovereignty and territorial inviolability and the gains of the socialist system, for the protection of our allies and friends and the peaceful life of peoples. Nor are there in socialist society any such social groups which would derive material advantages from the armaments race.

That is why, ever since the time of the Genoa Conference in 1922, where for the first time representatives of the socialist and the capitalist systems met at the table of international negotiations,<sup>2</sup> our country has invariably been espousing general disarmament.

That is why, from the very first days of the appearance of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union has been firmly advocating their prohibition and elimination.

That is why we are also raising our voice in favour of the prompt implementation of such measures to curtail the arms race as the banning of all nuclear weapons tests, the elimination of foreign military bases in alien territories, and the establishment of denuclearized zones in various regions of the world.

We mention this today not because on the eve of a great jubilee we should like once again to demonstrate the humaneness of the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union. We are in duty bound to raise anew the pressing questions of disarmament at the session of the General Assembly of the United Nations by awareness of the fact that unless we intervene in a most determined way in the field from which there originates immense danger for the destinies of all mankind—the field of the nuclear armaments race—all pledges of dedication to the ideals

<sup>1</sup> A/PV.1563 (prov.), pp. 62-67.

<sup>2</sup> Jane Degras (ed.), *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy* (London, 1951), vol. I, pp. 298-301.

of peace proclaimed in the United Nations Charter will remain a dead letter.

Either we follow the Charter of the United Nations, which embodies the experience of the peoples that sustained the brunt of World War II—in which case all States must display a high sense of responsibility and find ways to eliminate the most destructive of all weapons, nuclear arms—or else the Governments will prove incapable of bearing such responsibility and the entire affair will for the umpteenth time boil down to a repetition of solemn words, the adoption of resolutions ostensibly well-meaning but actually useless. The world has reached the point where no State can dodge this choice.

Of all the measures which could today contribute to curtailing the nuclear armaments race we believe a pressing one to be the conclusion of an international treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. We are gratified to note that at present some progress has been registered in the solution of the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would not only place no encumbrance in the way of the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes by non-nuclear nations; it would, indeed, open up before them, too, new opportunities in this respect.

There is no doubt that not only our contemporaries but our descendants, too, will duly appreciate the conclusion of a treaty ending the spread of nuclear weapons—if this important matter is brought to a conclusion—as an act of great realism and of far-sighted solicitude for the vital interests of the peoples of the world.

Six years ago the United Nations adopted a decision which declared nuclear war to be a crime against humanity, the Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Weapons.<sup>3</sup> Reflected in that decision by the United Nations was the natural desire of the overwhelming majority of States to mitigate the threat of nuclear war and to ban what runs counter to the very nature of man and to the principles of humanism. But, unfortunately, the provisions of that Declaration have not been formalized into a treaty.

Why is this so? Would not all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, and all peoples stand to gain from the adoption of international obligations never to use nuclear weapons? The vast difference between the situation where nuclear bombs actually bear the inscription “ready for use” or “fit for launching” and the situation where prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would become an international law formulated into a treaty is far too obvious.

History is familiar with examples when certain types of weapons were not put into action because their use had been banned by international conventions or agreements. Poison gases and toxic agents took a toll of tens of thousands of human lives in World War I; yet they were not used in World War II, when there already existed the Geneva Agreement banning the use of chemical and biological weapons.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 648-650.

<sup>4</sup> Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents, 1919-55* (S. Com. print, 84th Cong., 2d sess.), pp. 169-170.

Who today objects to banning the use of nuclear weapons? Perhaps those who display concern for peace? No, it is only those who believe world wars to be mankind's inescapable companion who are calling for the legalization of nuclear weapons.

It is they, and they alone, who are doing their best to hypnotize people by all sorts of magic formulas, such as the one that it is better not even to try to ban the use of nuclear weapons since this question is much too serious, much too complex and almost hopeless. As if it were not the other way around; the more formidable the problem, the more profoundly it agitates the peoples, the greater is the need to muster the utmost effort so as to achieve its solution.

The peoples of the world curse war and those who by their actions and their policies have twice already plunged them into a world slaughter-house. In Europe there is probably not a single square metre to be found where the bones of the killed are not turning into dust and where the soil is not soaked with the blood of those who have perished in the wars. Many times have million-strong armies swept from one country into another, from West to East and from East to West. This has happened in other continents as well. So if we make a special mention of Europe, it is only because the decisive battles of World War II were played out on its vast reaches and because it is there that the flaming chariot of war was given full rein—although the tongues of flame scorched not just Europe alone.

Unless there is a desire to hold the world in a state of war fever, when the machinery of destruction is perfected from day to day and from year to year, one cannot fail to agree on the need without further delay to reach understanding on the complete and final prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The presence in the world of immense stockpiles of such weapons, which are continuing to grow, and the incessant aggravations and military conflicts in various regions of the world emphasize still more the urgency of the solution of this task.

Proceeding from a desire to strengthen the feeling of security amongst the peoples and confidence in the future, the Soviet Government is submitting for consideration by the twenty-second session of the General Assembly of the United Nations the important and urgent item: "Conclusion of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear weapons". At the same time we are submitting a draft of such a convention.<sup>5</sup> The Soviet Government suggests that each State signing the convention should undertake not to use nuclear weapons, not to threaten their use and not to induce other States to use such weapons. We are also proposing that each State party to the convention should undertake to exert the utmost effort with a view to the prompt achievement of agreement to end the production and to destroy all accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons under a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

These are the key provisions of the draft convention which the Soviet Government is submitting for the attention of all States Members of the United Nations. Their essence may be expressed still more

<sup>5</sup> *Infra.*

succinctly: the Soviet Union is proposing that nuclear weapons be done away with politically and that the road further, towards their physical scrapping, be sought now.

Sometimes the question is posed: would it not be preferable right away to agree to eliminate nuclear weapons completely? That would indeed be much better. And our country is willing to take this step. It is not we who are afraid of radical solutions ensuring the complete removal of the threat of nuclear war. The Soviet Union has repeatedly advanced proposals for complete nuclear disarmament, and we are prepared to accept it this very moment. It is others who fear such decisions and their address is well known.

In these conditions to link prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons with their complete elimination would be tantamount factually to renouncing both the one and the other. To take an "all or nothing" stand is nothing short of pseudo-radicalism which in effect boils down to reluctance to move ahead in the solution of the problem of nuclear disarmament.

We can foresee that attempts will be made by hook or by crook to shy away from our proposal to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. In the past such personalities in the League of Nations as Lloyd-George and Tardieu, Simon and Politis devised ingenious procedures in order to drown any viable disarmament proposal. The chief secret was to establish all sorts of useless committees and sub-committees and to cast them adrift without any instructions or clear-cut directives. The result was that their activities merely echoed the discordance in the League of Nations itself. The history of post-war disarmament negotiations shows that there is still no lack of lovers of such stratagems, which look more like the funeral of a reasonable proposal according to all the rules of diplomatic protocol.

All the greater is the responsibility that rests with the Governments that are aware of how events may develop unless the race of nuclear armaments is checked. And the more important it is for the twenty-second session of the General Assembly to adopt a clear decision which would approve the proposal to conclude a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons and emphasize the urgency of this task.

The Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water<sup>6</sup> was followed by the Treaty on the Principles and the Activities of States in Outer Space which closed outer space and celestial bodies for nuclear weapons.<sup>7</sup> Today there is an opportunity to conclude a treaty on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. If yet another step is taken and an international convention prohibits the use of nuclear weapons, the possibility to raise to a practical level the question of completely purging our planet from weapons of mass destruction would come palpably closer.

The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that all States represented at the General Assembly will give due attention to the consideration of our proposal.

<sup>6</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 201-203.

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, pp. 38-43.

## Letter From Foreign Minister Gromyko to General Assembly President Manescu: Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, September 22, 1967<sup>1</sup>

On instructions from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I request the inclusion in the agenda of the twenty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly, as an important and urgent matter, of an item entitled "Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons".

Ever since nuclear weapons made their appearance, the Soviet Union, guided by the interests of strengthening the peace and security of peoples, has consistently advocated the prohibition and the complete elimination of these weapons of mass destruction. The conclusion of an international agreement on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would be an important step towards solving this problem and removing the threat of nuclear war.

As far back as 1961, the United Nations General Assembly, in adopting the Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, declared that the use of nuclear weapons was contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations, to the rules of international law, and was a crime against mankind and civilization.<sup>2</sup>

It is well known that, with a view to putting in treaty form the provisions of the Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, consideration has been given to the possibility of concluding a convention on the subject. However, in spite of the positive attitude of many Governments towards such a step, it has so far not been taken.

Now, with the accumulation of huge stocks of nuclear weapons in the world and the complication of the international situation as a result of the aggressive actions of certain States, the solution of the problem of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons acquires special urgency.

Desiring to promote a speedy solution of this problem, the Government of the USSR calls on the Governments of all States Members of the United Nations to give due consideration at the twenty-second session of the General Assembly to the item "Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons." The Soviet Government is introducing a draft of such a convention for the General Assembly's consideration.<sup>3</sup> The Soviet Government is convinced that the examination of this item and the adoption of a clear decision by the General Assembly in favour of the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons will serve the cause of peace and the relaxation of international tension and will be in keeping with the interests of all peoples.

I should be grateful if you would regard this letter as the explanatory memorandum provided for by rule 29 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and if you would circulate it, and the attached

<sup>1</sup> A/6834, Sept. 22, 1967.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 648-650.

<sup>3</sup> *Infra*.

draft Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, as official documents of the General Assembly.

### Soviet Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, September 22, 1967<sup>1</sup>

The Parties to the present Convention,  
*Desiring* to further international peace and security of peoples,  
Aware of the exceedingly serious consequences for all mankind of a nuclear war,

*Confirming* the Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, adopted by the General Assembly in 1961,<sup>2</sup>

*Considering* that the conclusion of a Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would significantly contribute to the solution of other disarmament questions,

*Have agreed as follows:*

#### *Article 1*

Each Party to this Convention gives the solemn undertaking to refrain from using nuclear weapons, from threatening to use them and from inciting other States to use them.

#### *Article 2*

Each Party to this Convention undertakes to make every effort to arrive as soon as possible at agreement on the cessation of production and the destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons in conformity with a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

#### *Article 3*

1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature.
2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States.
3. This Convention shall be open to any State for accession.
4. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of . . . , which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
5. This Convention shall enter into force after its ratification by all the Parties to the Convention possessing nuclear weapons.
6. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
7. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of

<sup>1</sup> A/6834, Sept. 22, 1967. Foreign Minister Gromyko submitted the draft convention to the President of the General Assembly with a letter of the same date (*supra*).

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 648-650.

deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of any other notification.

*Article 4*

This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

*Article 5*

This Convention, the Russian, English, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

**Statement by the U.A.R. Representative (Khalaf) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee. Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, September 26, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

2. At the outset of my intervention today I should like to state that the attitude of my country in favour of the principle of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is too well known to require reiteration here. That attitude is dictated not only by considerations of national interest but also by other considerations concerning the general interest of mankind. That is why we welcome the identical draft treaties presented by the Soviet Union and the United States of America,<sup>2</sup> which we regard as an important step in that direction and on which we warmly congratulate the co-Chairmen.

3. The two draft treaties contain several important points to their credit. It is to be noted that the mere fact of the presentation of an identical text by the two great nuclear Powers will greatly facilitate our task and save us the trouble of having to reconcile points of view which are not always identical or similar. Moreover, the two great nuclear Powers have given the new text greater clarity and precision and have eliminated some of the objections that have been made to their earlier draft treaties.

4. Furthermore, it is to be noted that this change in the attitude of the nuclear Powers is to a large extent the result of the observations put forward by a number of States, in particular by non-nuclear-weapon States, both at this Conference and outside it. That shows the important role of the non-aligned countries, which have insisted on assuming their responsibility in that regard with faith, sincerity and perseverance.

5. While my delegation thus reiterates its support for the principle of non-proliferation and the conclusion of a treaty on the subject, and while we are pleased to state that we consider—in principle—the draft presented to be a valid basis for negotiation, that will not prevent us, of course, from putting forward certain rather general comments on

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.333, pp. 4-13.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 338-341.

the draft and also on certain aspects of the treaty for which no solution has yet been found. We hope that these comments will be taken into consideration, so that the treaty may be made more acceptable and effective.

6. In submitting these comments the delegation of the United Arab Republic is motivated, as are all the members of this Committee, by an earnest desire to adopt in this regard a positive and constructive attitude. Moreover, my delegation feels that it would perhaps be appropriate for a drafting committee to meet—while the Conference continues its present general debate—in order to examine the suggestions and proposals submitted to it.

7. I now come to articles I and II of the treaty. The principle which governs these articles is that they must not contain any loop-holes. My delegation notes with satisfaction that certain loop-holes which constituted a major obstacle to our negotiations have been eliminated from the new text. Unfortunately the new wording, in spite of this improvement, calls for some comments to which we should like to draw the attention of the Committee in order that it may put the matter right, because the wording may open certain loop-holes.

8. The first loop-hole is to be found in article II, which speaks of the obligations of the non-nuclear-weapon States and mentions the obligation they assume not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. My delegation notes that this text contains a gap. Indeed, it makes no mention of the obligation of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty to refrain in their turn from assisting, encouraging or inducing in any way another non-nuclear-weapon State, whether a party to the treaty, or not, to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It is quite obvious that therein lies a possibility of the proliferation of nuclear weapons which must and can easily be eliminated by including this prohibition in the text of article II of the draft before us.

9. The second loop-hole is to be found in article I, the object of which is to prohibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons by governments of nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty. That is perfectly natural. But it is not enough, in the question with which we are concerned, for the governments and official organs engaged in nuclear activities to respect the provisions of the treaty in all good faith. It is also necessary that each nuclear-weapon State should take appropriate measures to ensure that no private, public or semi-public person, company, enterprise or body subject to its jurisdiction and engaged in nuclear activities participates in any act prohibited by this article.

10. A third comment on a provision which might open a loop-hole likewise applies to article I. Indeed, that article imposes on the nuclear Powers two principal obligations. One of them which is of interest to us here is the obligation not to transfer nuclear weapons or other explosive devices or control over those to any recipient whatsoever. The text has expressly prohibited such transfer, whether directly or indirectly, but has not made clear that all forms of transfer would be prohibited. Indeed, transfer may take a great variety of forms. It may be gratuitous, in the form of a gift, or may be made against payment. It may result in full ownership or perhaps in only certain at-

tributes of ownership; it may be definitive or temporary, and so on. We consider that the text must make clear that all forms of transfer are prohibited.

11. Before concluding my remarks on articles I and II I should like to refer to a comment on these two articles made by Mr. Burns at our meeting of 12 September, when he said:

At the same time, we find nothing in these articles which would inhibit the right of parties to participate in collective defence arrangements; nor would they impede movement towards regional arrangements for political union.<sup>3</sup>

It is indeed true that these two articles do not affect collective defence arrangements, or movements aimed at achieving certain political unions. But my delegation would like to stress here that it is clearly understood that these arrangements for collective defence or possible political union must in no way give rise to proliferation of nuclear weapons. Otherwise the problem of access of different types of political unions or military alliances to nuclear weapons would again arise. Indeed, the texts have been specifically amended in order to eliminate that possibility altogether.

12. I should now like to speak of the provision on international control to be inserted in article III in the new draft treaty. Whereas the preamble to the treaty has devoted two paragraphs to this subject providing for the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to peaceful nuclear activities, the two drafts have left article III blank. The two co-Chairmen have promised to go on working in order to reach agreement on the contents of that article. We await with great interest the result of their efforts.

13. Pending the presentation of that text, the delegation of the United Arab Republic would like to take this opportunity to reiterate its fundamental position in that connexion. Without an appropriate article on control, the treaty would not make any great change in the existing state of affairs. In my intervention on 16 March I stated:

(b) The treaty must contain provisions clearly stipulating compulsory and uniform application of the single system of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency to all non-nuclear-States parties to the treaty. Moreover, the control system must be extended to the transfer of nuclear material and to all nuclear activities, past and present.

I added:

In such a treaty the only inspection system acceptable in this respect is compulsory and not voluntary, international and not regional, effective and not fictitious.<sup>4</sup>

14. That principle must be expressly stipulated in the treaty right from the start. However, if in certain cases the total application of the Vienna safeguards would require some time in order completely to replace certain bilateral or multilateral control arrangements which are in force, it would perhaps be possible to lay down the time which is strictly necessary to permit the total application of the Vienna control system to all the parties to the treaty.

<sup>3</sup> ENDC/PV. 320, p. 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 156.

15. I now come to the draft article III submitted by the Swedish delegation.<sup>6</sup> Here I should like to congratulate the Swedish delegation most warmly on the contribution it has made in submitting a draft of this article with the object of bringing about an exchange of views which might lead us to an acceptable text. Indeed, several aspects of the draft of article III as formulated by Sweden reflect the wishes and the points of view expressed by my delegation.

16. One of the most interesting aspects of the Swedish draft is the way in which it has attempted in its paragraphs 1 and 3 to extend the Vienna safeguards to nuclear-weapon States. My delegation would like to hear the views of the nuclear Powers on this point. Though we regard the Swedish draft as a useful starting-point for a formulation of article III, we consider a transitional period of three years too long. In any case my delegation wishes to reserve its right to speak on this subject when the two co-Chairmen present their text of article III.

17. In vigorously stressing the principle of a general application of the Vienna control system, we do not mean to oppose any particular system of regional co-operation in the use of atomic energy; we merely wish to set up a control system capable of protecting the international community against any diversion of fissile material for military purposes. In our view the very nature of nuclear weapons, not subjective considerations or political or commercial expediency, call for this measure.

18. Before leaving the question of control, we deem it appropriate to mention that the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the new draft treaty reads:

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points.

My delegation would be grateful to the two sponsors of the draft if they would give us some explanations and clarifications of this text, so as to enlighten us about its true meaning, its reasons and its implications.

19. The United Arab Republic, together with the other non-nuclear-weapon countries, attaches paramount importance to the free, untrammelled and nondiscriminatory development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Thus the United Arab Republic considers that the insertion of article IV in the treaty makes considerable progress towards the establishment of a solid basis of confidence and mutual co-operation between the non-nuclear-weapon countries and the nuclear-weapon countries.

20. However, I must say quite frankly that this positive step must be supplemented by two others, the purport of which I am glad to observe is already reflected in the preamble to the draft treaty. The first relates to the desire to have article IV strengthened so as to establish in a more positive manner the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States towards the non-nuclear-weapon States, in respect of their scientific and technical contributions to the peaceful utilization

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, p. 368.

of nuclear energy. On this point my delegation appreciates the initiative and arguments of the representative of Mexico in his recent statement made on 19 September,<sup>6</sup> with which my delegation is in full agreement. We consider that the ideas contained in article IV of the Mexican working paper<sup>7</sup> form a solid basis for the achievement of this aim.

21. The second step which my delegation would like the Conference to take for this purpose relates to the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. We have noted with satisfaction that the actual principle of such uses is now laid down in the preamble to the draft treaty. However, in common with other delegations we do not quite see the reasons which led the two sponsors of the draft treaty to present this principle in the form of a declaration of intention instead of including it as a formal obligation in the actual provisions of the treaty.

22. In fact, my delegation considers that the obligation of the non-nuclear-weapon States unequivocally to renounce the production of nuclear explosives for peaceful purpose should be counterbalanced by another obligation, equally legal and categorical, requiring the nuclear-weapon States to make available to the non-nuclear-weapon countries on a non-discriminatory and objective basis, and without any political or other conditions, all the advantages of such explosives.

23. My delegation has therefore studied with very special attention the remarks made in this Conference by the delegation of Canada at our 329th meeting concerning the conclusion outside the treaty of a convention or agreement regulating peaceful nuclear explosions, and the various provisions which it should contain. The delegation of the United Arab Republic realizes the convenience of dealing with this question in detail in an independent international instrument. At the same time, however, it considers that the treaty should also spell out the actual principle of the obligation of the nuclear-weapon States to enable the non-nuclear-weapon States to enjoy the benefits of such explosions. I suggest that that could be done on the lines of the Mexican proposal contained in article IV-A of document EXDC/196. The United Arab Republic would then be glad to see the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna placed in control of this activity.

24. Throughout our negotiations the link between a non-proliferation treaty and nuclear disarmament has been referred to and discussed and its importance recognized by us all. But when it comes to giving the nature, scope and form of this link a precise and acceptable definition, differences of opinion begin to appear and suggested formulas multiply.

25. The most radical formula would include in the non-proliferation treaty certain substantial and specific measures of nuclear disarmament. In contrast to this formula the nuclear-weapon Powers were content, in regard to their original drafts, to express the hope that the conclusion of the treaty would facilitate a start of the process of nuclear disarmament and thus excuse us from making any mention of such a link in the treaty.

26. However, the non-nuclear-weapon Powers asked for something more solid, more specific than this act of faith pure and simple, so the

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, pp. 396-399.

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, pp. 384-385.

nuclear-weapon Powers are endeavouring in their new text to meet the preoccupations of the non-nuclear-weapon States and proposing a declaration of intention on nuclear disarmament. To strengthen this declaration of intention they advocate the convening of a conference of the parties to the treaty five years after its entry into force. This new formula rests therefore on a threefold basis:

- (1) A mention of nuclear disarmament in the preamble to the treaty;
- (2) An offer of hope that certain measures of disarmament will be taken during the next five years;
- (3) Inclusion of nuclear disarmament among the points to be discussed by the treaty review conference.

27. It is true that in this formulation the hope has a time limit. That already is an advance on the original drafts, which did not contemplate any link between nuclear disarmament and the treaty except a psychological link based on a mental assumption that things would move in the desired direction. In other words, in the new text we have a certain organic link between nuclear disarmament and the treaty. But is that sufficient? Ought not the declaration of intention to be made firmer becoming a distinct provision in the body of the treaty?

28. That was the line which the delegation of the United Arab Republic took in its statement of 3 March 1966,<sup>a</sup> and which the delegation of Mexico has taken in the wording which it suggests for such an article in document ENDC/196. The merit of that formula is that it gives nuclear disarmament from the outset a more solid and more specific base: the process will thus rest on a legal base which has the merit of reflecting the general feeling of the international community.

29. The treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons also raises the important question of the assurance to be given to non-nuclear-weapon States against any use or any threat of the use of nuclear weapons against them.

30. This problem has already been commented upon both here and in New York and has been the subject of deep concern, especially on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States which are not allied to any nuclear-weapon Power. The General Assembly, in its resolution 2153A (XXI), paragraph 4, requested this Conference—

... to consider urgently the proposal that the nuclear-weapon Powers should give an assurance that they will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States without nuclear weapons on their territories, and any other proposals that have been or may be made for the solution of this problem . . .

We welcome the latest statements made by each of the two co-Chairmen according to which they will continue their exchanges of views with the object of finding a positive solution to this problem.

31. If I confine myself for the time being to the negative aspect of these assurances which is reflected in paragraph 4 of the resolution of the General Assembly I have just mentioned, I would point out that my delegation amply explained in its intervention at our 294th meeting the legal, political and moral considerations in favour of the insertion in the text of the treaty of an article concerning this aspect of the assur-

<sup>a</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, p. 77.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 749.

ances. We continue to believe that such a text would undoubtedly be useful and important and would allay the apprehensions of a very large number of non-nuclear-weapon countries. That is why we submit to the Committee a wording which might help us in that regard.<sup>10</sup> It will be noted that this wording is mainly based upon the text of General Assembly resolution 2153 (XXI).

32. On articles V to VIII of the draft treaty, my delegation will confine itself at this stage to saying that we are very glad that the question of amendments to the treaty and that of the review of its clauses have been successfully combined in the provisions of article V of the draft before us. The Conference will doubtless recall that on 3 March 1966 my delegation proposed the adoption of such a solution.<sup>11</sup>

33. With respect to paragraph 3 of article VI of the draft treaty, I should like to make it clear that, in our opinion, the definition of a nuclear-weapon State mentioned at the end of that paragraph applies to the five existing nuclear-weapon Powers.

34. In their recent statements to our Committee the delegations of the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria were kind enough to express a point of view that was both just and in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations when they referred to the recent events in the Middle East. They concluded that the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab territories was essential, I should like to express to them here our sincere thanks for their noble and equitable attitude. I have no intention of taking up or commenting upon the recent Israeli aggression against the Arab countries. The competent organs of the United Nations in New York have the matter before them at present. Nevertheless, we cannot overlook here the significance for our negotiations on a non-proliferation treaty of the constructive attitude adopted by one nuclear super-Power—the Soviet Union—in regard to this flagrant aggression against three countries Members of the United Nations. Indeed, the Soviet Union has insisted, in regard to that aggression, on the strict application of the collective security system laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, which implies the immediate withdrawal of the aggressor.

35. Unfortunately, other Powers have endeavoured to weaken the collective security system of the Charter by linking the withdrawal of the aggressor with considerations alien to that system. Such an attitude, if maintained, will certainly weaken the confidence of the small and medium-sized countries in the system laid down in the Charter. We all agree that such confidence is essential to the success of the treaty which we are now considering. In this connexion I feel bound to quote some words used by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in the introduction to his annual report to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly of the United Nations:

When unbridled use of force is accepted and intimidation and threats go unchallenged, the hopes of a world order such as the one outlined in the Charter become dim and hollow.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup> *Infra*.

<sup>11</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, p. 74.

<sup>12</sup> *General Assembly Official Records: Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 1A (A/6701/Add. 1)*, p. 18.

36. A non-proliferation treaty is envisaged as, among other things, a means of reducing international tension. That in itself is highly desirable in a world tormented by a series of aggressions the chosen field of which is at present, unfortunately, Africa and Asia. However, the reign of force and violence must cease, aggression must be condemned and opposed and its aftermath eliminated. In a world where expansionist and imperialist conquest is again honoured and the obsolete principle of annexation is resuscitated, a world where might is right, agreements on disarmament would not only soon become ineffective but would also very quickly lose all real sense.

37. To facilitate the task of the Conference my delegation has considered it appropriate to set down certain suggestions that I have made today in a working paper which I shall submit to the Secretariat for circulation, with the permission of the Committee, as a Conference document.<sup>13</sup>

38. In conclusion, I should like to reserve the right of my delegation to speak again if necessary.

### **U.A.R. Working Paper Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Suggestions for Incorporation in Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, September 26, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

#### **ARTICLE I**

(1) Second line—after the words “any recipient whatsoever” add: “in any form whatsoever”.

(2) At the end of article I, add the following new paragraph:

“Each nuclear-weapon State undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that no person, company, enterprise or private, public or semi-public body that is subject to its jurisdiction and is engaged in nuclear activities participates in any act which is prohibited by this article.”

#### **ARTICLE II**

Insert the following at the end of the last sentence:

“... and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices”.

#### **ARTICLE IV-A:**

“Each nuclear-weapon State undertakes not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty which has no nuclear weapons on its territory”.

<sup>13</sup> *Infra*.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/197, Sept. 26, 1967. The draft treaty appears *ante*, pp. 338-341.

## Address by President Bourguiba of Tunisia to the General Assembly [Extract], September 27, 1967<sup>1</sup>

I should like now to turn to the question of disarmament. Here is a field where, in spite of all, we may be relatively optimistic. Indeed, regardless of how well founded are the reservations and apprehensions which any of us may have, the presentation of a draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is an act of considerable significance.<sup>2</sup> There are still some obstacles and opposition to overcome. We are of course aware of the imperfections and flaws in the text, but nevertheless it remains a fact that the drawing up of this text by the United States and the Soviet Union marks a success that does honour to those two countries and to the Committee on Disarmament.

We understand the concern shown by the non-aligned nations which are not happy about renouncing their right to acquire nuclear weapons, those who do not wish to be protected by anyone. But nothing would be more ludicrous and more unacceptable than seeing an under-developed country—and this is the case of the non-aligned countries—possessing the means of destroying millions of people by nuclear weapons, but unable to protect its millions of citizens against hunger and poverty. Only a very few Powers—and certainly not our developing countries—can hope to carry out nuclear research without doing so at the cost of the main task, namely the fight against under-development. To convince oneself of this argument, suffice it to measure what has happened in Africa, Asia and elsewhere because of the burden of the conventional weapons race. This is one aspect of disarmament on which we seem to agree today to dwell more seriously than previously. It is also in the light of the recent events in the Middle East that we must examine this problem of the conventional armaments race between the small countries.

If indeed the United Nations were in one way or another to accept the consequences of the use of arms, certain small countries might be tempted, by rapid and effective aggressions, to obtain political concessions from their neighbours or even to obtain territorial gains. Perhaps our Assembly should try to make a study of the resources devoted to armaments in the developing countries and compare them, for example, with the allocation to national education or public health and, in general, to truly productive investments, namely, those tending to improve the lot of man. Moreover, this question could be linked to another item on our agenda, namely, that of foreign military bases. It is in fact obvious that when we see a progressive disappearance of the conventional type of bases we see appearing in a more subtle and more discreet way other bases of a new nature that take the form of the massive presence of hundreds, sometimes thousands, of so-called foreign instructors, or alleged instructors. The difference between the so-called instruction base and the base pure and simple is, in our view, one of terminology only, and it is clear that one cannot cover up the

<sup>1</sup> A/PV.1570 (prov.), pp. 37-41.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 338-341.

other. Surely this gives us not only food for thought but stimulus for action—speedy action to ensure that the fatal and usual process of the arms race shall not get irrevocably under way in countries whose total resources even are not sufficient to enable them to join the ranks of the developed countries and emerge from the endless spiral of economic, social and intellectual under-development, and, quite simply, human under-development.

### Statement by the Indian Representative (Trivedi) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, September 28, 1967<sup>1</sup>

The delegations of the United States and the USSR have presented their ideas on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the form of a revised text of a draft treaty in documents ENDC/192 and ENDC/193.<sup>2</sup> As both delegations have explained, the presentation of these documents should assist the members of the Committee in pursuing their task of negotiating an adequate and acceptable treaty with greater precision. In his statement of 24 August, the day the draft treaty was presented to us here, President Johnson also stressed that point and posed the problem very clearly. He said:

The draft will be available for consideration by all governments, and for negotiation by the Conference.

The President went on to say:

The treaty must be responsive to the needs and problems of all the nations of the world—great and small, aligned and non-aligned, nuclear and non-nuclear. It must add to the security of all.<sup>3</sup>

This, then, is the present task of the Committee—to make the draft responsive to the needs of all nations and to ensure that it adds to the security of all people.

3. The two super-Powers and their allies have been discussing and negotiating among themselves for about a year with a view to elaborating a draft recommendation which would essentially meet their requirements and the requirements of their alliances. It would be helpful to the Committee, therefore, if the non-aligned delegations were now to indicate in what way this draft document needs improvement and alteration. The mandate given to us by the United Nations demands that as a result of our negotiations the Committee should evolve a final draft which is acceptable to all concerned and satisfactory to the international community.

4. We are fortunate that in this field we are not working in a vacuum. We have the tragic history of past proliferation to warn us of spurious remedies, and we have the historic principles enshrined in United Na-

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.334, pp. 4-16.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 338-341.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 342.

tions resolutions 2028 (XX)<sup>4</sup> to direct us to the right solutions. The United Nations has also given us as our terms of reference and as our basic guide the Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations formulated in September 1961.<sup>5</sup> The success of our endeavours will depend upon the extent to which we give full and unequivocal consideration to those examples and those precepts.

5. Efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons have a long history, dating more or less from the time these weapons of terror and destruction became part of a nation's armoury. When the United States was the only nuclear-weapon Power and when it presented the Baruch Plan,<sup>6</sup> the Soviet Union pointed out that two of the fundamental components of an international instrument in that regard were the prohibition of the production of nuclear weapons and the destruction within a period of three months of the bombs then in stock.<sup>7</sup> Incidentally, it should also be remembered that one of the reasons why the Baruch Plan was found unacceptable was that, like the draft treaty before us, it sought to prohibit national research and development in atomic energy production.

6. The Indian delegation has had occasion in the past to quote the representatives of the United Kingdom and France on the question of preventing further proliferation. Those representatives had stated categorically and logically in the discussions in the Disarmament Sub-Committee that the only way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries was for the existing nuclear-weapon Powers to stop further production of nuclear weapons themselves.<sup>8</sup> The Government of India then repeatedly urged a cessation of nuclear weapon tests and an "armament truce" among the big Powers. The United States had also been proposing that prohibition of the dissemination of nuclear weapons should depend upon and follow the cessation of production of fissile material for weapon purposes. In fact, until recently the United States advocated the cut-off as a first step in a series of measures of nuclear disarmament. Thus it has been the firm international thesis all along that the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapon purposes is the basis of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

7. It has been argued in the Committee that the cessation of production of nuclear weapons by all countries may have been the right solution for the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons, that it may have been recommended by all nations during the history of negotiations, but that it has, unfortunately, not so far resulted in an international treaty. In view of that, it is further argued, we should discard that solution and adopt some other way of obtaining a treaty.

8. That argument does not appeal to the Indian delegation. In the first instance, it does not stand to reason that the correct solution should be discarded in favour of an incorrect one because success has not been achieved so far or a particular treaty has not so far been signed. Perseverance is an essential requisite in all negotiations on

<sup>4</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 532-534.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 1961, pp. 430-442.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 1945-1959, vol. I, pp. 7-16.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 17-24.

<sup>8</sup> See DC/SC.1/PV.74, pp. 47-48, and DC/SC.1/PV.116, pp. 6-7.

arms control and disarmament. We have not yet been able to obtain any treaty on disarmament, partial or otherwise. That does not mean we should discard the concept of general and complete disarmament under effective international control—and that too in favour of a discriminatory concept of monopolistic armament—or that we should discard the concepts underlying various partial measures of disarmament in favour of concepts of graduated and responsive armament.

9. Secondly, although it is true that we have had no treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons so far, there is no reason to believe that we shall have a genuine and abiding treaty on the basis of any but the right concept. What is important is to have, not just any treaty, but a treaty which truly prevents the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom and French representatives in the Disarmament Sub-Committee warned the international community that additional countries would manufacture nuclear weapons, that there would be what is called further proliferation of nuclear weapons, unless the existing nuclear-weapon Powers stopped further production of those weapons themselves; and that is exactly what happened in 1952, in 1960 and in 1964.

10. It has been argued that, although the weight of history and the wisdom of principles require that a satisfactory and adequate treaty should be non-discriminatory and should prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by all nations, nuclear as well as non-nuclear, big as well as small, powerful as well as weak, developed as well as underdeveloped, one has to be realistic. Surely realism should be a criterion to be applied to all States. If it is unrealistic to believe that the nuclear-weapon Powers will agree to a treaty which prevents the proliferation of their own weapons, it is equally unrealistic to assume that the non-nuclear nations, and particularly the non-aligned nations which are facing the threat of nuclear weapons, will be enthusiastic about a discriminatory and ineffective treaty, a treaty which not only does not add to their security but in fact increases their insecurity. Jawaharlal Nehru said this in the Indian Parliament ten years ago:

... It is a strange way to ensure security by adding to every conceivable danger. In the name of security atomic tests should go on; in the name of security hydrogen bombs should be flown all over the place; in the name of security all kinds of terrible weapons should be evolved; and in the name of security each party slings the other and thereby creates an atmosphere where the danger becomes more acute. Of course, everyone must recognize the argument for security. No country and no government can risk its future, or can accept a position when another country can impose its will upon it. But if, in order to ensure security, measures are to be taken which really endanger it still further, then we fail in getting that security.\*

11. The Indian delegation has stressed repeatedly that further proliferation is only the consequence of past and present proliferation and that, unless we halt the actual and current proliferation of nuclear weapons, it will not be possible to deal effectively with the problematic danger of further proliferation among additional countries. In the language of United Nations resolution 2153 A (XXI), an interna-

\* Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961* (Delhi, 1961), p. 204.

tional treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons should achieve three objects: (1) prevention of an increase of nuclear arsenals, (2) prevention of a spread of nuclear weapons over the world and (3) prevention of an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon Powers.<sup>10</sup>

12. As the resolution further points out, that can be done only by adhering strictly to the principles laid down in resolution 2028 (XX). The principles enunciated in resolution 2028 (XX) take into account the historical verities of the situation and stipulate how a treaty should be drafted so as to be acceptable and satisfactory to all concerned. They are not merely a set of principles set forth in a United Nations resolution; they are in fact the essential components of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>11</sup>

13. The Indian delegation has often analysed these principles and indicated how they should be given practical shape in an international instrument. The first principle has stipulated, *inter alia*, that the treaty should not permit nuclear or non-nuclear-weapon Powers to proliferate. The second principle has stated explicitly that the treaty should have within its body a balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of both the nuclear- and the non-nuclear-weapon Powers. The third principle requires that the treaty should be a step towards disarmament and, more particularly nuclear disarmament. The fourth principle has asked us to ensure that the provisions in the treaty based on these principles and incorporating this balance should be effective and not remain merely an expression of intention or good will.

14. The non-aligned delegations have placed special emphasis on the principle of balance and on the principle that the treaty should be a step towards nuclear disarmament. There is no balance, however, between a platitude on the one hand and a prohibition on the other. Again, nuclear disarmament is not achieved by retrograde steps taken in the direction of the retaining of exclusive rights, privileges and options by certain armed and powerful countries, by acts of omission or commission and by the imposing of prohibitions on the rest—the threatened and the unarmed.

15. Earlier I referred to the basic terms of reference of our Committee—the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations formulated by the United States and the USSR in September 1961. They provide general as well as specific guidance in respect of all negotiations on matters of disarmament and arms control.

16. The eighth principle of the Statement stipulates:

... efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form a part of that programme.

The fifth principle states:

All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all.

Any measure which gives a tacit license to a small group of States to develop and augment its nuclear weaponry is in fundamental contra-

<sup>10</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 748-749.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 532-534.

diction of those principles and purposes. When at the same time that particular measure imposes selective prohibitions only on the unarmed States, it certainly does not ensure equal security for all.

17. As the Joint Statement has rightly emphasized, the supreme consideration is security. Some nations may feel that their military pacts and alliances provide them with protection from nuclear threats or attacks. Others may feel that their geographical location or political affiliation gives them the requisite security. Even if they are right, our negotiations must ensure that security is safeguarded equally for all—for the aligned as well as the non-aligned, for those far away from hostile nuclear arsenals as well as those in the neighbourhood of them; otherwise the disarmament or arms-control measure in question ceases to be meaningful.

18. There has been some discussion, in this context, of security assurances to be given to non-nuclear nations. Theoretically speaking, such assurances or guarantees have been regarded as a means of ensuring security, the belief being expressed that it is possible or feasible to have unconditional, automatic, obligatory, credible and effective response from the super-Powers in case of nuclear threat or attack against the non-nuclear-weapon States. We should not, however, confuse the means with the end. Security assurances or guarantees are not the same thing as security. The threat to the security of non-nuclear-weapon countries comes from the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon countries; and the correct way of dealing with that threat is to ensure in the first instance that no international treaty gives a license to the possessors of these weapons to continue increasing the instruments of their threat: their nuclear weapons. The question of credible assurances against the use or threat of the weapons already in the armouries of the nuclear-weapon Powers is only the second and subsequent step.

19. All measures of disarmament and arms control have thus to be viewed in the context of security for all. The nations which believed that security was ensured by the possession of nuclear weapons have already acquired them; and they continue to act in terms of increasing the area of their security by embarking on wider, newer and more ominous systems of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. That is not, however, the approach of a large number of nations, despite their technological and material endowments. India, in particular, believes that international security lies not in armament but in restraints on armament and in disarmament. That belief, in fact, is the basic philosophy underlying all discussions on disarmament, whether in our Committee or elsewhere.

20. It is in that context of history, as well as of fundamental principles, that we have to view the revised draft treaty before us; and it is in that context that we have to examine how it can be improved and made responsive to the needs and problems of all nations. History has taught us that proliferation cannot be ended unless nuclear-weapon stocks are frozen at their present level and all further manufacture is prohibited. The principles worked out by the super-Powers, as well as by the United Nations, tell us that proliferation can be prevented if the appropriate treaty embodies a balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon Powers not to proliferate. That balance has also been defined. It should be such that at no

stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage, the supreme requirement being that security is ensured equally for all.

21. In their revised draft<sup>12</sup> the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union have adopted the same framework as in their earlier draft treaties.<sup>13</sup> The non-aligned delegations in the Committee commented on those drafts in their memorandum of August 1966<sup>14</sup> and said that the drafts did not pay full attention to the principles laid down in United Nations resolution 2028 (XX).<sup>15</sup> If the draftsmen of the revised text had followed the correct approach and, in the language of United Nations resolution 2153A (XXI),<sup>16</sup> adhered strictly to those principles, they would have been able to draft a more satisfactory document and our task would have been comparatively easier. At the same time, it would not be too difficult, given the will and the effort, to improve the present draft treaty so that it would conform to the mandate given to us by the United Nations General Assembly.

22. As I said earlier, the United States-USSR draft is the result of exhaustive negotiations among the aligned nations for a period of nearly a year. The non-aligned members of the Committee have just seen the full and final text and will now need to examine it carefully. To them the matter is extremely vital, for they are the non-possessors of nuclear weapons and wish to remain so. Their cities and populations, their industry and economy, are increasingly menaced by mega-destruction even today, not to speak of the 1970s. At the same time, they are in no position to spend countless millions in perfecting either a defensive nuclear system or a deterrent offensive capability. Above all, they do not believe in nuclear weapons.

23. While this examination of the United States-USSR draft by delegations and governments is a continuing process, it will be helpful for the purposes of our negotiations and improvement of the draft if I make some preliminary comments on the documents before us. A negotiating committee is also a drafting committee, particularly when its negotiations relate to a draft. We are still at a drafting stage, and my comments are of the nature of those one makes in a drafting committee.

24. I do not propose at this stage to comment comprehensively on the preamble or on all the articles of the United States-USSR draft; I shall refer only to some of its basic provisions. The preamble could be altered, added to or subtracted from very easily to conform to the changes in the basic articles of the treaty. I shall therefore not refer to it in these preliminary comments. I shall not refer either, for the time being, to the unwelcome idea of a veto—a double veto—on amendments, the inadequacy of the review provisions, or the shortcomings of the withdrawal clause. I shall confine myself this morning to the basic

<sup>12</sup> See *ante*, pp. 338-341.

<sup>13</sup> The U.S. draft treaty appears in *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 347-349, and *ibid.*, 1966, pp. 150-160. For the Soviet draft treaty, see *ibid.*, 1965, pp. 443-446.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 576-579.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 532-534.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 748-749.

articles of the treaty. Once they are improved, other improvements should present little difficulty.

25. The Indian delegation has stated in the past that there are two facets of the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons: the first is that of dissemination, that is of transfer and receipt of weapons and weapon technology; and the second that of proliferation proper—that is, of manufacture of nuclear weapons. It is appropriate that the first two articles of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should deal with those two aspects of the problem.

26. Articles I and II of the draft before us purport to deal with those two facets of the problem. When commenting on the earlier drafts the Indian delegation pointed out that there was general agreement among nuclear—as well as non-nuclear-weapon Powers on the basic components of an article dealing with the question of dissemination of weapons. There was only some disagreement in that regard between the two super-Powers on the question of nuclear armament within alliances; and that has now been happily resolved.

27. No attempt appears to have been made, however, to deal with the question of the transfer of nuclear weapons to and their stationing in the territories of other countries, or with that of the training of the armed personnel of non-nuclear nations in the use of nuclear weapons. It should be remembered that India and other countries raised these points in recording their reservations at the time of the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI) (the "Irish" resolution) in 1961.<sup>17</sup> That matter represents one of the important features of the problem of dissemination.

28. Article I of the United States-USSR draft has another lacuna. That article says, *inter alia*, that nuclear-weapon States undertake not to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or control over such weapons. Does it mean that one nuclear-weapon State can assist, encourage and induce another nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or acquire or control nuclear weapons? Surely that cannot be permitted. That may perhaps be only a drafting error or oversight which can be corrected easily. In any case it will need to be corrected.

29. There is, however, a third objection, which is much more serious. The old drafts submitted by the United States and the USSR, however faulty in some respects, had one advantage. They dealt with nuclear weapons and their partial proliferation but not with other matters. That, regrettably, has been changed in the new draft, and an effort is now being made to deny development of peaceful technology to non-nuclear-weapon States in the field of nuclear explosions. Proposals are also being advanced for the establishment of a super-commercial monopoly of the nuclear-weapon Powers in this field. An appropriate draft on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will have to deal only with the proliferation of nuclear weapons and not with explosive devices for peaceful purposes. Accordingly all references to such devices should be deleted from the treaty.

30. India is devoutly in favour of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons but is equally in favour of proliferation of nuclear tech-

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 1961, p. 604.

nology for peaceful purposes. There have been debates over the years in various forums on the question of freedom of national research and development of atomic energy of the dangerous kind or the non-dangerous kind, as it was once called. Along with other nations, India has long maintained that there should be no fetters of any kind on the development of atomic energy for the purposes of economic and non-military development. At the same time, India is willing to agree to international regulation under a non-discriminatory and universal system of safeguards to ensure that no country manufactures or stockpiles nuclear weapons while undertaking research and development of peaceful nuclear explosives. As I said once before, however, India does not believe in throwing the baby away with the bath-water.

31. Those, then, are the three important drawbacks in article I as it is now drafted in documents ENDC/192 and ENDC/193.<sup>18</sup>

32. Article II of the recommended draft is much more unsatisfactory. Unlike article I, which deals only with dissemination, this article mixes up the issues of dissemination and the manufacture of weapons. That is not because of any inadequacy in drafting but because the draft treaty in general, and this article in particular, does not adhere strictly to the principles of United Nations resolution 2028 (XX); nor does it take into account the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of September 1961. It fails to heed the advice of Mr. Stassen, Mr. Jules Moch, Mr. Nutting and others and ignores the tragic lessons of the history of past proliferation. In effect, that article imposes discriminatory prohibition only on the non-nuclear-weapon States, and gives a licence to the nuclear-weapon Powers to continue their production and proliferation of nuclear weapons.

33. As I said earlier, article II does not deal only with the manufacture of nuclear weapons; it also incorporates a provision concerning dissemination—that is, receipt of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon Powers. All provisions concerning dissemination should appropriately be in article I. If necessary, that article can have two parts. Article II can then be confined to manufacture and will provide that each State party to the treaty undertakes henceforth not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.

34. I should now like to refer to the two missing articles of the treaty, one relating to control and the other relating to obligations towards nuclear disarmament. The delegations of Sweden<sup>19</sup> and Mexico<sup>20</sup> have already taken welcome initiatives to fill in those gaps.

35. An article on control in a treaty on arms control and disarmament is a corollary to the basic articles of that treaty. An appropriate system of control in a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be related, therefore, to the twin facets of dissemination and manufacture of nuclear weapons—that is, to the provisions of articles I and II.

36. There is much talk these days of loop-holes in a treaty on non-proliferation—and that, curiously enough, in the context of peaceful

<sup>18</sup> *Ante*, pp. 338–341.

<sup>19</sup> *Ante*, p. 368.

<sup>20</sup> *Ante*, pp. 395–401.

development of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapon nations. There will in fact be a real and dangerous loop-hole if there is no satisfactory control to ensure observance of the provisions in the present draft that the nuclear-weapon Powers should not transfer nuclear weapons or control over such weapons directly or indirectly, and that non-nuclear-weapon Powers should not receive such weapons or assistance in their manufacture. The situation becomes particularly dangerous when it is universally known that one nuclear-weapon Power believes that it is desirable and even necessary for a large number of countries to possess nuclear weapons, and describes those weapons as providing "encouragement to all the revolutionary peoples of the world who are now engaged in heroic struggles."

37. When there is so much talk of loop-holes and of stringent provisions of control of manufacture of weapons, and that also in a discriminatory manner, it is worth remembering that there is equal, if not greater, justification for effective provisions to ensure that there is no dissemination of weapons or weapon technology from a nuclear-weapon Power to any other country. The concern of the Indian delegation is all the greater in that respect as the People's Republic of China has already expressed its complete opposition to signing any treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. While the other nuclear-weapon Powers are against the actual transfer of nuclear weapons to other nations as well as against the training of personnel belonging to non-nuclear-weapon States in the use of these weapons as such, the same cannot be said of the People's Republic of China. To a country like India, that is vital.

38. Then there is the question of control over the production of nuclear weapons. The basic provision in an appropriate treaty will stipulate that all States undertake henceforth not to manufacture nuclear weapons. That will entail control over weapon grade fissile material and the facilities which fabricate weapon-grade fissile material.

39. The Indian delegation believes, therefore, that the control provisions should deal with the transfer and receipt of fissile material, the transfer and receipt of weapons and weapon technology, and the facilities for production of weapon-grade fissile material. This should be adequate and should provide a reasonable solution to the problem of control. It has been pointed out that uranium mines, plants for fabrication of fuel elements and the reactors are not in themselves a military danger. They do not promote any military purpose unless they are coupled with plant and facilities for the fabrication of the fissile material into weapons. It is the gaseous-diffusion plants, the chemical-separation plants and the centrifuge plants, if any nation is developing them, which have to be controlled.

40. The fundamental requirement that the Indian delegation puts forward in this context is that control should be universal, objective and non-discriminatory. The extent of the comprehensiveness of coverage of control provisions depends upon the mistrust and suspicion the negotiators have in regard to the parties to a treaty. Normally it is unreasonable and unprofitable to base an international instrument on the extreme threshold of unmitigated suspicion. There is, however, no cure for suspicion or mistrust. If it is generally proposed that con-

troil should be more comprehensive than what I have just outlined. India will have no objection, as long as it is universal and objective and applies in a non-discriminatory manner to all nations, big and small, nuclear and non-nuclear. It would be entirely unjustified to direct the suspicions only towards the weak, the unarmed and the unpossessed. If there are to be any suspicions at all, it is the proclivities of the powerful, the armed and the possessors of weapons which should evoke greater suspicion. The control provisions should also cover all aspects of the problem and not only those which cause concern to the nuclear-weapon Powers and their allies.

41. On the basis of these criteria and considerations, the question of amending the text of article III, when it is presented to us, will not be difficult. All that will be necessary will be to omit the words "non-nuclear-weapon States", if the draft discriminates against that group of States. The extent and comprehensiveness of the control provisions will depend upon what the nuclear-weapon Powers are prepared to accept for themselves.

42. Finally, there is the missing article on obligations for disarmament. United Nations resolution 2023 (XX) stipulates that a satisfactory treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons has to be based on that principle. That requirement cannot be fulfilled by a mere mention of intentions and desires in the preamble to the treaty. Four years ago, more than a hundred nations subscribed to a Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.<sup>21</sup> That treaty also had preambular paragraphs, one proclaiming its principal aim to be the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament, and the other testifying to the search by the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union for achievement of the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, to their determination to continue negotiations to that end, and to their desire to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances. After four long years the international community is further away from the discontinuance of all test explosions than it was at that time.

43. The draft now before us is even more halting and hesitant than the Moscow test-ban Treaty. Its preamble declares only the intention of achieving the cessation of the nuclear arms race. When it comes to specific measures, the preamble only expresses the desire to ease international tension, which, when achieved, would have the result of facilitating the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all existing stockpiles and so on—and that also as part of a comprehensive treaty on general and complete disarmament. That is hardly the fulfilment of a principle which, according to the United Nations, should form the basis on which a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is to be constructed.

44. As the Indian delegation and others have pointed out, the threat to the security of nations is posed by the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of nuclear-weapon Powers. Although the draft treaty on non-proliferation that the Indian delegation urges for acceptance

<sup>21</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

by the international community will freeze that threat quantitatively at the existing level, the threat as such will still remain. The nuclear-weapon Powers of the world already have in their possession more than enough weapons to destroy all civilization as we know it. Our treaty would therefore have to deal in a much more specific manner with the threat which the nuclear weapons pose to the security of nations.

45. The ideal solution would be to envisage a specific programme of disarmament in the treaty. The Indian delegation recognizes at the same time that the nuclear-weapon Powers are not at present prepared to consider this proposition. In view of that, the Indian delegation would suggest the incorporation of a separate article in the treaty affirming the solemn resolve of the nuclear-weapon Powers to undertake meaningful measures of disarmament, particularly of nuclear disarmament. Such a provision would also need to be related specifically to the article dealing with the review conference.

46. Those are some of the preliminary comments and suggestions that the Indian delegation wished to make at this stage in the context of our negotiations. All of us have a common objective, and that objective is to eradicate the nuclear menace as soon as possible and to ensure security for all. We also believe that prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which would halt the arms race even if it did not encompass a reduction of nuclear arms, is the first step that we must take in our quest for that objective.

### Statement by the Swedish Representative (Myrdal) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, October 3, 1967<sup>1</sup>

2. By now the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should have not only entered but also concluded the decisive negotiating stage as far as a text for a non-proliferation treaty is concerned. However, the time left for this Committee to complete its work on such a draft treaty is precariously short; in fact it may be running out within a week or two. The other Member States of the United Nations will be clamouring to receive the report of this Committee very soon in order to make their contribution under General Assembly agenda item 28, which deals with the same subject and which is expected to usher in the deliberations in the First Committee, where also other important disarmament issues on the agenda of the Assembly are pressing for attention.

3. The Swedish delegation must voice its regret that the method of work this year has resulted in such an unfortunate time-table. We now find ourselves with an avalanche of suggestions and amendments worthy of profound scrutiny. At the time when the decision was taken last spring that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should interrupt its session, the Swedish delegation expressed its

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.335, pp. 4-11.

concern that this Committee and particularly its non-aligned members were not given an opportunity to be directly consulted, a role reserved for those belonging to either of the two European military alliances.

4. Since the waiting period for the main parts of a treaty draft ended on 24 August—an occasion which was hailed with enthusiasm as a fact of great political impact—the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee have had just the time to present a first round of their suggestions; there seems to be no time available to go into a second round after the responses by the co-Chairmen as authors and initiators of this important proposal<sup>2</sup> have been heard and studied. Even further rounds ought to have been envisaged in view of the importance of our negotiating task, because, as you, Mr. Chairman, in your capacity as representative of Romania, stated at our last meeting, the identical drafts are to be considered not as submitted on a “take it or leave it” basis but as points of departure for discussion and negotiation,<sup>3</sup> as was also indicated by Mr. Foster in his presentation speech,<sup>4</sup> in which he foresaw suggestions which would lead to improvements.

5. We also note with deep regret and considerable apprehension the prolonged delay in the co-Chairmen's submission of a joint proposal in regard to article III, on international control. It would seem indispensable that the period of consultations among allies on the control issue be utilized also for parallel discussions in this Committee. Such a procedure would not only save precious time; it would conceivably also be beneficial to the further negotiations between the two co-Chairmen and to their consultations with allies to have all suggestions on the table as early as possible.

6. Suggestions, amendments and considerations are being and may continue to be presented in relation to all the different parts of the treaty. That is only to be expected as normal and natural in international negotiations, particularly those of great and immediate concern to many governments. Political reality requires that their varying interests be expressed; thereafter the act of political compromise consists of achieving what might be likened to an orchestration—and no wonder, if it needs many rehearsals.

7. In speaking today I thus feel confronted with an *embarras de choix*. The Swedish delegation has studied most carefully the identical draft texts of a non-proliferation agreement presented by the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the numerous interventions and suggestions which have been coming forward since then. I particularly want to state our appreciation of the interest expressed and comments made in regard to my speech on 31 August,<sup>5</sup> when I introduced our suggested text of a control article,<sup>6</sup> article III in the treaty document.

8. My statement today will deal with some selected points which we consider to be of special importance and on which we feel that progress towards a reasonable meeting of minds should be possible. In so doing I am mindful of the fact that we have not yet reached the stage where our Governments must finally take positions with regard to the treaty

<sup>2</sup> *Antc.*, pp. 338-341.

<sup>3</sup> ENDC/PV. 334, p. 17.

<sup>4</sup> *Antc.*, p. 343.

<sup>5</sup> *Antc.*, pp. 368-372.

<sup>6</sup> *Antc.*, p. 368.

as a whole. We are in a preliminary stage, doing collective work as a kind of drafting committee whose duty it is to arrive at a text which is coherent and seems to stand a chance of being accepted by the vast majority of countries. Obviously this kind of drafting requires not only penmanship but also a conspectus of political considerations of a many-sided kind. When the governments have to decide whether to sign or not to sign a treaty, they should have at hand the product of our best labour. We are not yet there; that is a reservation which I have always maintained but want to mention again today explicitly on behalf of my own Government.

9. In regard to the main articles, I and II, the Swedish delegation does not at the present juncture want to express an opinion on the suggestions for amendments made by the delegation of the United Arab Republic on 26 September.<sup>7</sup> Although we are in sympathy with the purport of those amendments, we should first wish to hear the views on them of other delegations and particularly of the two delegations responsible for the original drafting of the treaty text. The same applies to the suggestions proffered by the representative of India at our last meeting.<sup>8</sup>

10. For the time being, I wish to emphasize that for the main purposes of the treaty these major articles must be made fully trust worthy by means of an effective safeguard system. We naturally consider that the control article put forward by the Swedish delegation in document ENDC/195 fulfils the objective of being effective and at the same time to a certain extent non-discriminatory. We definitely hope that the draft text of an article III which the co-Chairman will ultimately present to the Committee will contain such elements as are included in our text.

11. I want to give notice now, however, that in regard to details—for instance, the prescribed length of any transitional period, the prices of wording borrowed from earlier presentations of the same ideas, and such matters—we ourselves intend to suggest revisions when we encounter other formulae which can be agreed upon. However, the one element aiming at less discrimination, by suggesting that all transfers of material between all countries should be accompanied by safeguards ensuring its use in peaceful activities only, is one that should be revised in one direction only: towards more comprehensive control, not less. That is a claim which has been supported by several speakers during the past few weeks.

12. However, there is another matter in relation to articles I and II, as well as to pertinent parts of the preamble, which calls for attention. One of the points where considerable clarification has occurred and where the negotiations obviously have inched forward towards a potentially positive conclusion concerns the delicate issue of so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. A large number of interventions have dealt with that matter. Some of them were offered before the draft texts were submitted. I myself devoted one speech to that question on 6 June.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, pp. 421–428.

<sup>8</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, pp. 248–252.

13. Some of the viewpoints expressed by members of this Committee and by delegations in the United Nations have obviously found coverage in the formulae in the draft preamble about non-discriminatory access for all countries to the potential benefits of such undertakings. The interventions of the representatives of Canada on 12 September<sup>10</sup> and of Mexico on 19 September<sup>11</sup> have brought that thinking further forward by stressing the need for a separate convention covering the implementation of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. My delegation finds the formal proposal by the Mexican delegation<sup>12</sup> a very useful one: in it the elements at present in the draft preamble pertaining to explosions have been arranged, with some changes, to form an article called provisionally article IV-A.

14. However, we should still need an explicit assurance from the Chairmen that the arrangements now envisaged would be truly non-discriminatory—that is, would apply to all States irrespective of whether or not they possess nuclear weapons. Thus they would not stand in the way of a better solution of this problem. That would be linked to a comprehensive test-ban treaty, as I suggested in the statement to which I have just referred.<sup>13</sup> While the non-proliferation treaty would prohibit the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices which could be used as nuclear weapons and would also provide for control of such manufacture, the test-ban treaty should prohibit all nuclear explosions, also covering them in their entirety with its system of control.

15. Simultaneously a fully equitable access to the use of nuclear explosive devices—that is, explosions for peaceful purposes by nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon countries alike—ought to be ensured by the separate agreement providing for a licensing arrangement carried out through an international body. Such a solution would even have made it possible—on the condition that we almost immediately proceeded to an agreement on the banning of underground nuclear explosions—to remove this controversial part of the matter from the context of the non-proliferation treaty. However, as matters now stand the Mexican suggestion might suffice for the time being, provided that there is a positive reply to the question of interpretation of the word “non-discriminatory”, which I have just raised.

16. Another proposal by the representative of Mexico deals with the present article IV of the treaty as submitted in the main drafts. The way in which it deals with the development of research, production and use of nuclear energy, as well as with the exchange of information on the further development of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, is in line with the thinking of my Government on this important matter. We have no objections to the proposal made by Mr. Castañeda that the article should be split up into two paragraphs, with an increased emphasis being put on the duty of the technically most developed countries to contribute actively to a process of developing in all countries the capacity for using the important, and in many cases vital, future source of energy which nu-

<sup>10</sup> ENDC/PV. 329, pp. 6 ff.

<sup>11</sup> *Ante*, pp. 395-401.

<sup>12</sup> *Ante*, pp. 394-395.

<sup>13</sup> *Ante*, pp. 250-252.

clear power constitutes. Again, it is a suggestion on which we should welcome comments from the co-Chairmen.

17. Further debate on this matter must centre particularly on what might be a moot point: the interpretation of the expression in the suggested paragraph 2 "according to their ability". Mr. Castañeda said that that phrase—

... refers not only to the parties' financial and technical ability but also to their legal ability, since much of this knowledge is covered by patents owned by private persons.<sup>14</sup>

That is in fact a very important distinction. The "duty" to co-operate of which the new draft paragraph speaks cannot, of course, go beyond what is possible according to the internal legal structure of each member State, or cut into rights or contracts belonging to individuals or companies. It is therefore, as Mr. Castañeda himself characterized it, "an imperfect obligation"; but it might nevertheless be of certain importance as an inspiration for further initiatives in the field of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

18. One point—the most important of all—on which many, if not all, non-nuclear-weapon States have stressed their need to be reassured concerns the degree of enforceable linking of the non-proliferation treaty to an urgent continuation of the process of disarmament. I have already pointed out in my last intervention—as I have done on several earlier occasions—

... that one of our preoccupations concerns the desire to see inscribed in the treaty more binding obligations on the main Powers to regard this treaty as only a first step on the road towards nuclear disarmament, soon to be followed by others, notably a treaty banning underground nuclear tests and a cut-off agreement. The non-proliferation treaty has to be seen as a part, and only a part, of an integrated whole or partial disarmament measures in the field of nuclear arms.<sup>15</sup>

19. That aspect of the treaty before us cannot be emphasized strongly enough. Can we, the smaller and more defenceless nations, which are asked to forswear the most powerful weaponry that has ever been produced by man, feel certain that the main Powers will continue negotiations in order to arrive rapidly at international agreements on other partial disarmament matters which would also inhibit to some extent their own freedom of action in the nuclear field and thus inhibit the nuclear arms race? I repeat—and I know I can easily be accused of being very repetitive—that foremost are two such disarmament measures which have been well prepared and on which the technical possibilities for agreement seem at hand: namely, a comprehensive test ban and a cut-off agreement.

20. Naturally the delegations of non-nuclear-weapon States have been studying the proposed treaty text with particular keenness, in order to see whether and to what extent assurances for a continued disarmament process could be found in the text. Many have surely been disappointed at the absence from the operative part of the treaty of an article containing such assurances. The declaration of

<sup>14</sup> *Ante*, p. 398.

<sup>15</sup> *Ante*, p. 373.

intention in the preamble "to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race" is, of course, welcome in itself; but it is understandable if we—who have repeatedly recommended a "package of measures" or at least "simultaneous negotiations" about such measures, or, to use the terminology of the joint memoranda of 1965 and 1966 of the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, measures "coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race"<sup>16</sup>—feel the need for firmer reassurances.

21. The representative of Mexico has taken an important step forward in that direction. In his proposed article IV-C there is included a straightforward commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon Powers to pursue negotiations in good faith and with speed and perseverance to arrive at further agreements, among them notably a comprehensive test ban and a cut-off agreement. My delegation agrees fully with the understanding of the legal character of such an undertaking expressed by Mr. Castañeda when he presented the Mexican proposal:

... the nuclear Powers cannot actually undertake to conclude future disarmament agreements among themselves; but they certainly can undertake to endeavour to do so; that is, they can certainly undertake to initiate and pursue negotiations in good faith in order to conclude such agreements.<sup>17</sup>

22. The reply to that proposal is most crucial. The whole problem is also connected with the system of amendments, review and withdrawal embodied in the draft treaty. As a matter of fact any obligation to proceed with further disarmament measures has only that tenuous link with the treaty. There could, of course, be no outright sanctions prescribed; but there is the provision that, although at quite a distant date, the pledge could be scrutinized at the review conference proposed in article V, paragraph 3, a clause in which it is said that five years after the entry into force of the treaty a conference of the parties shall be held with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of treaty are being realized.

23. I emphasize "purposes" and not only "provisions". The representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, strongly implied in his statement on 14 September that the review conference would be competent to pass judgment on that vital character of the treaty:

... We have embodied in the text a declaration of intention to halt the nuclear arms race. The text also contains a provision for a review conference to make more effective this and other statements of purpose.<sup>18</sup>

The proposal made by the Mexican delegation would serve to formalize that obligation. We must consider such a provision to be a critically necessary element in the treaty in order to ensure—as the representative of Romania put it in his statement at our last meeting—

The effectiveness, stability and power of attraction of an agreement designed to prevent ... proliferation. ...<sup>19</sup>

<sup>16</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 424-425; *ibid.*, 1966, pp. 576-579.

<sup>17</sup> *Ante* p. 400.

<sup>18</sup> ENDC/PV.330, p. 6.

<sup>19</sup> ENDC/PV. 334, p. 20.

24. As an assurance that the supreme interests of a party will not be injured by its adherence to the treaty, there is further the withdrawal clause contained in article VII, according to which each party has the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the treaty, have jeopardized its supreme interests. That is also a provision which many countries will consider of great importance when making the final judgment on the value of the treaty as a whole.

25. In keeping with the spirit of the purpose which prompted me to make these remarks, I would suggest that the preamble would give a much greater emphasis to the sequence of the disarmament negotiations and to their urgency if a new paragraph were introduced, in connection with the declaration of intent, to the following effect:

Recalling in particular the pledge made by the original parties to the partial test-ban Treaty in its preamble of seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, and determined to continue negotiations to this end.<sup>20</sup>

26. If I sound worried about the prospects for disarmament in the future, it is because I am worried. I believe the greater part of mankind is deeply worried, and more so today than when we began our session this spring. This is very much a question of a psychological climate within our peoples: can they trust that the future will be marked by more and more disarmament and not by more and more armaments? The recent news about the escalating of the deployment of anti-ballistic-missile systems, and the lack of any sign of mutual agreement on a moratorium on such deployment, undoubtedly lead us in a pessimistic direction—very pessimistic indeed.

27. However, even against this bleak background I wish to state once more the importance which my Government attaches to this endeavour of ours to reach agreement on a non-proliferation treaty. We must all realize that the text which will, we hope, eventually be recommended cannot be a perfect one. All delegations will have to make compromises between the desired and the possible. On the other hand, the ideas for improvements that have been and may still be put forward in this Committee must be given the same careful study by everybody as the original draft treaty text presented by the United States and the Soviet Union. Only by working together in a co-operative spirit of give and take can the Committee achieve the desired result and recommend with good conscience to the General Assembly the adoption of a final text. Let us hope that there is still enough time and good will on all sides to enable us to accomplish this task.

**Statement by the Ethiopian Representative (Zelleke) to  
the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Non-  
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, October 5, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

35. The non-proliferation treaty which has consumed so much of our Committee's time last year, and especially this year, is at long

<sup>20</sup> For the test-ban treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 201-203.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV. 336, pp. 12-19.

last taking definite shape in the form of the identical text of a draft treaty submitted to us by the delegations of the United States and of the Soviet Union in documents ENDC/192 and ENDC/193 respectively.<sup>2</sup> The Ethiopian delegation is happy to welcome this important step forward in the annals of disarmament negotiations. Though the present draft treaty can by no means be described as the final step towards the attainment of the long-standing objective of checking the spread of atomic energy for weapon purposes, the stage of negotiations at which this Committee finds itself at present is undeniably a crucial stage, not only for the question under consideration but also for all negotiations on general and complete disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament, upon which the survival of our planet so heavily depends.

36. This leads me to the often repeated and emphasized responsibilities of this Committee. What we are asked to do here is to reduce and eliminate the possibilities of war, especially of nuclear war, with all its dreadful consequences. What we negotiate and agree upon here may well decide the destiny of the world. That being so, we cannot afford to ignore the views and concerns of nations large or small, nuclear or non-nuclear, inside as well as outside this Committee.

37. Ideally a non-proliferation treaty should be one which not only deals with the multiplication of nuclear-weapon Powers but also endeavours to prevent the existing multiplication of nuclear weapons in the nuclear arsenals of the present nuclear Powers. That point of view has been amply dealt with by other delegations in this Committee. In particular the Indian delegation has repeatedly reminded us of that fact. In one of his recent speeches Mr. Trivedi, the leader of the Indian delegation stated:

The Indian delegation has stressed repeatedly that further proliferation is only the consequence of past and present proliferation and that, unless we halt the actual and current proliferation of nuclear weapons, it will not be possible to deal effectively with the problematic danger of further proliferation among additional countries.<sup>3</sup>

38. That is as clear as it is undeniable. My delegation would have liked to see a draft treaty which aimed to do no less than that. For reasons which have already been expounded by the nuclear Powers in this Committee, the draft treaty upon which we are asked to comment falls far short of that objective. I have no intention at this juncture of going into the merits or demerits of that reasoning. Suffice it to say here and now that what we are asked to negotiate at present are the ways and means by which the non-nuclear-weapon nations will continue to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons directly or indirectly. That being so, my delegation considers this task of ours to be a partial measure designed to maintain the *status quo* of the present world in the field of nuclear weaponry. In itself that is no mean achievement.

39. It is argued that weapons not only serve the visions and aspirations of nations but quite often also create them. The failure to stop the spread of nuclear weapons early in the disarmament negotiations and the succession of five nuclear Powers one after another should

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 338-341.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 432.

serve as a stimulus to negotiations now. We have reason to believe that failure to achieve now what should have been done long before now will not only result in double or treble the number of nuclear-weapon Powers, thus making the danger of nuclear devastation ever more imminent, but also render disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, an unattainable mirage.

40. This does not mean, however, that any treaty that has for its goal the perpetuation of existing nuclear power structure and the creation of nuclear monopoly can truly be called a non-proliferation treaty, even in its limited sense. Nor can we say that any treaty that fails to take into consideration the legitimate views of all the parties concerned can be said to be acceptable. It has already been pointed out here that the mandate of our Committee emanates from the United Nations General Assembly, which saw fit to create this Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.<sup>4</sup> In doing so the world community spelled out clearly in its resolution 2028 (XX) the basic principles from which this Committee should proceed to negotiate a workable and acceptable treaty of non-proliferation.<sup>5</sup> In the course of our deliberations here those principles have been so clearly enunciated that they have already formed an integral part of the non-aligned nations' memorandum of August 1966,<sup>6</sup> and it would be superfluous to repeat them here. Suffice it to say that the Ethiopian delegation's view on the draft treaty before us will be guided primarily by those cardinal principles.

41. The identical texts of a draft treaty submitted by the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union are the result of almost two years' concentrated effort, not only of this Committee but also of the United Nations General Assembly, which has encouraged and urged us to continue negotiations despite an apparent impasse that threatened to paralyse our work in this Committee. In the end, however, it must be admitted that the draft treaty before us is largely the fruit of more than a year's intensive negotiations between the two super-Powers and their allies within the framework of this Committee and outside it.

42. It is undeniable that this Committee has had enough time to deliberate on the question of a non-proliferation treaty of which the main provisions had already been stipulated in the previous draft treaties of the United States<sup>7</sup> and the Soviet Union.<sup>8</sup> Consequent changes and variations in the conceptual framework of these draft treaties either have been spelt out in this Committee by the two super-Powers or have been made known through other media. Nevertheless, this Committee cannot be expected to work seriously on rumours and newspaper clippings. In effect, therefore, the main task of this Committee must be considered to have begun with the recent formal presentation of the draft treaty. The Ethiopian delegation is happy to note that the authors of the draft treaty recognize that fact and have welcomed further comments and amendments.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 741-742.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 532-534.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 576-579.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 347-349; *ibid.*, 1966, pp. 159-160.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 443-446.

43. The provisions of the draft treaty that is now before us are so interdependent that it must first of all be looked at as a single whole. Looked at as such, the present draft treaty, like its forerunners—the previous draft treaties presented by the Soviet Union and the United States—is seen to be in the main designed to meet the requirements of the nuclear Powers and their allies. The only welcome change, one upon which we do not fail to congratulate the authors of the present draft treaty, is the successful solution they were able to find for one of the most important questions: that of the nuclear sharing arrangements within the alliance system. The non-aligned delegations, in their individual statements and in their joint memorandum of last year, have urged the nuclear powers and their allies to work out a mutually-acceptable solution to that problem, which at one time was regarded as the main obstacle to an agreement. It is gratifying to see that the new text has successfully avoided that important question. Apart from that, and possibly the addition of the new and vexing issue of the peaceful nuclear explosives, to which I shall revert shortly, the text of the new draft remains essentially the same.

44. Again, when we look at the draft treaty as a whole we notice a certain discrepancy between the preambular paragraphs and the main articles. Many of the principles that are enunciated in the preamble lack counter-articles in the body of the draft treaty. It is a well-known fact that the non-aligned delegations, taking their lead from resolution 2028 (XX), which stipulates in one of its principles that the treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations, have all along been insisting on the embodiment of certain provisions in the main articles of the treaty. The linking of the present non-proliferation treaty to the question of general and complete disarmament has, for example, such unanimous support that it can hardly be expected to be enunciated in the preambular paragraph as a mere declaration of intention. It is our considered view that it should form part of the main articles of the draft.

45. We are in that respect fortunate to have the clear and well thought-out suggestions of the Mexican delegation contained in document ENDC/196.<sup>9</sup> The nature of those amendments was correctly described by Mr. Castañeda, leader of the Mexican delegation, when he introduced the working paper at our meeting of 19 September, as follows:

Let me say at once that the amendments we have in mind do not conflict with the treaty's essential features. On the contrary, they are clearly in harmony with its objectives as spelt out in the preamble. Moreover, we believe they will contribute towards the achievement of those objectives. Our aim is, above all, to strengthen some of its provisions without essentially altering its substance, by expressing as true legal obligations what the preamble now sets forth either as a statement of intention or as the proclamation of a general principle.<sup>10</sup>

46. The Ethiopian delegation feels it essential to give its full support to those important amendments, and earnestly hopes that the co-Chairmen will give their most serious consideration to them. We feel that the adoption of those suggestions will greatly improve the text of the draft treaty.

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, pp. 394-395.

<sup>10</sup> *Ante*, p. 396.

47. The Ethiopian delegation has already expressed in its previous interventions its worries and apprehensions with regard to the inclusion of peaceful nuclear explosions, which now form part of the highly sensitive and delicate articles I and II of the draft treaty under consideration. The issue involved here has been so exhaustively dealt with by this Committee in the course of its present session that it hardly needs to be repeated again. What we are faced with here is a double-horned dilemma, if I may use the term. On the one hand, as the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Mr. Correa da Costa, stated at our meeting of 18 May:

Nuclear energy plays a decisive role in this mobilization of resources. We must develop and utilize it in every form, including the explosives that make possible not only great civil engineering projects but also an ever-increasing variety of applications that may prove essential to speed up the progress of our peoples. To accept the self-limitation requested from us in order to secure the monopoly of the present nuclear-weapon Powers would amount to renouncing in advance boundless prospects in the field of peaceful activities. In fact, the new discoveries and breaks-through that continuously enrich technology cannot remain the privilege of a few without establishing within the international community an irreparable relationship of dependence.<sup>11</sup>

48. On the other hand, we are convinced of the fact, and so far it has not been challenged, that the technology required for the production of peaceful nuclear explosive devices is the same as that required for nuclear weapons, and also that the same peaceful devices can serve to wage a war with a consequential devastation equal in magnitude to that of nuclear weapons. It cannot be denied that the exclusion from the draft treaty of appropriate provisions would constitute an important loop-hole, which this Committee has laboured so hard to avoid.

49. Be that as it may, no nation dedicated to the accelerated development of its economy and progress of its people through the application of such sophisticated technology as that of peaceful nuclear explosives can be expected to forgo forever an important technology of such a nature without an adequate assurance that its sacrifice will be compensated through other measures. We are in full agreement with what the leader of the Nigerian delegation, Alhaji Sule Kolo, stated at our meeting of 31 August:

The Nigerian delegation doubts very much whether the non-nuclear Powers should—nor would it be correct to ask them to—accept a treaty which would place them in a position of perpetual inferiority in any field of knowledge. Consequently, if a treaty is to be lasting it should provide, among other things, guarantees that non-nuclear-weapon Powers would not only have nuclear explosives, through an international organization, for their peaceful projects but also have opportunities for their scientists to develop to the full their intellectual capabilities in all fields, including that of nuclear-explosive technology.<sup>12</sup>

50. In this respect it is pertinent to mention article V of the draft treaty, which contains the review and amendment clause, the purpose of which, we understand, is to consider amendments as well as to review from time to time whether or not the provisions and purpose of the treaty are fully realized. Among other things, the assurance that nuclear Powers give that they will make available to non-nuclear

<sup>11</sup> *Ante*, p. 226.

<sup>12</sup> *Ante*, p. 377.

Powers nuclear explosives and the benefits of their technology through the medium of an appropriate international organization entirely depends on that clause.

51. Finally, the draft treaty before us leaves out one or two important provisions. I am referring first to article III, which deals with safeguards. The Ethiopian delegation has already in the course of its previous interventions, intimated its preference for International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.<sup>13</sup> In principle my delegation, like many other delegations, deems it essential to have a universal and non-discriminatory safeguard system. We realize, of course, that the existing diverse systems of safeguards need a period of time to be adjusted or to be absorbed into a single universal system. In that regard the Ethiopian delegation has great sympathy for the Swedish suggestion for article III contained in document ENDC/195.<sup>14</sup> We hope it will be accorded the serious consideration it deserves.

52. The next important item we feel to be omitted from the draft treaty presented to us is security guarantees. Ever since the discussion of a non-proliferation treaty has been accentuated in the disarmament negotiations the question of security assurances has been uppermost in the thinking of governments, in particular governments of non-aligned non-nuclear nations. Almost at the beginning of our session last year the important messages of President Johnson<sup>15</sup> and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union<sup>16</sup> recognized the importance of security assurances for non-aligned non-nuclear-weapon Powers and pledged the working out of an acceptable system of security guarantees. The Ethiopian delegation is happy to note that the same pledge was repeated by the delegations of the United States<sup>17</sup> and the Soviet Union<sup>18</sup> when they introduced the draft treaty in this Committee. We hold that to be a minimum requirement for a non-aligned nation which forswears the production of nuclear weapons to enhance its national security.

53. As I have already said, the draft treaty we are considering now is the result of no less than a full year's intensive negotiations inside and outside the framework of this Committee. Obviously, a document that has taken so long to draft cannot easily and exhaustively be analysed in as short a time as we have at our disposal now. What we have attempted to do today should therefore be regarded as our preliminary view on the draft treaty as a whole. We hope to give more specific views on specific issues when the need arises.

54. I should like to conclude this statement with a passage from one of the Ethiopian delegation's statements in the past. Speaking at our meeting of 22 February 1966, the leader of the Ethiopian delegation, Dejaz Amha Aberra, stated the following:

This Committee has been asked to solve the problem of the security of nations and in particular to check the outbreak of war, especially nuclear war.

<sup>13</sup> See *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 446-480.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 368.

<sup>15</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, p. 6.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 346-347.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 351.

We have the destiny of millions of people in our hands, people at war or on its brink, whose life and death depend on the measures we may be party to undertaking at this table. We are, in fact, beset with Solomonic problems: To whom should selective security be given? Who are the mothers of adversity and who are the fathers of aggression? All the ideological, social and economic differences that have led to the outbreak of conflicts will be affected by the sweeping measures of a non-proliferation treaty.<sup>19</sup>

### Statement by ACDA Deputy Director Fisher to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, October 5, 1967<sup>1</sup>

55. I believe that all of us around this table are familiar with the impact on the work of this Conference of the Pastore resolution on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, during an earlier session Mr. Foster read into the record of our proceedings a letter from President Johnson to Senator Pastore congratulating him on the passage of that resolution by the United States Senate without a single dissenting vote.<sup>3</sup> Senator Pastore, the author and sponsor of that resolution, has been officially designated as a Congressional adviser to the United States delegation; and I am happy that he is able to be with us to participate in our deliberations today.

56. During the past few meetings we have heard a number of interesting and thoughtful statements as various representatives have expressed their views concerning the draft non-proliferation treaty now before us. We have heard two such statements this morning. A number of suggestions have been offered to amend the draft. These deserve the most careful consideration, and I shall want to share my delegation's views on them with the Committee after all delegations have had an opportunity to make their suggestion, and after my fellow co-Chairman and I have had an opportunity to complete our consultation on them.

57. Today, however, I should like to address myself to one aspect of the statement made by the representative of India last Thursday, in which he rested much of his argument on the assertion that a halt in the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes—what we have called here the “cut-off”—is the only correct basis on which to seek a non-proliferation treaty.

58. I should like to deal with that aspect of our colleague's statement today—in advance of replying to the suggestions which have been made by other representatives and in advance of replying to some of the other, more detailed, suggestions that he has made—primarily because he has, in part, based a justification of his approach upon the position of the United States. In this connexion he observed:

In fact, until recently the United States advocated the cut-off as a first step in a series of measures of nuclear disarmament.

<sup>19</sup> ENDC/PV.242, p. 22.

<sup>2</sup> ENDC/PV. 336, pp. 19-22.

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 329-330.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 394.

This statement apparently provided at least part of the basis for his assertion, in the next sentence, that—

Thus it has been the firm international thesis all along that the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapon purposes is the basis of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>4</sup>

59. The United States has not only supported a cut-off until recently; we support it now as a desirable step in our continuing effort to bring the nuclear arms race to a halt. However, in advocating a cut-off on about a dozen separate occasions in this Committee from 1964 through 1966, and in presenting four working papers on the verification of a cut-off during that period,<sup>5</sup> the United States delegation has repeatedly sought to make clear why it would not be possible or advisable to try to link such a measure to the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. I submit that the reason is by now patently clear to every member of this Committee. It is that an attempt to establish such a link would result in achieving neither a cut-off nor a non-proliferation treaty.

60. In presenting the draft treaty, we have explicitly recognized that one of its purposes is to facilitate further measures of nuclear disarmament. There have been some suggestions that the language of the treaty dealing with the relationship between non-proliferation and further measures of nuclear disarmament should be strengthened. These suggestions are under active consideration at the present time.

61. However, what I am addressing myself to now is the apparent suggestion that there should be a definitive link between two particular measures, the non-proliferation treaty and the cut-off. I submit for the consideration of this Conference, and particularly for the consideration of our Indian colleague, that we should reject this link. If we were to insist on it, and to insist that we must resolve all the difficulties which have plagued us in considering the cut-off before we can agree on a non-proliferation treaty, we shall succeed only in producing two results: first, we shall have lost an opportunity to achieve a non-proliferation treaty, an opportunity which may never come again; and, secondly, we shall certainly reduce—indeed we may well strike a fatal blow at—our chances for further measures of nuclear disarmament, including the cut-off. By insisting that two worthy objectives be obtained at the same time, we might well fail to obtain either.

62. I found a ray of hope in the observations of the representative of India when in the penultimate paragraph of his statement he indicated that, although he would consider a specific programme of disarmament incorporated in the treaty to be an ideal solution, he recognized that that might not be practicable at the present time. He went on to recommend instead a provision in the treaty

affirming the solemn resolve of the nuclear-weapon Powers to undertake meaningful measures of disarmament, particularly of nuclear disarmament.

If our colleague is prepared to recognize that, as a general proposition, the necessity for making progress where we can outweighs the

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 431.

<sup>5</sup> For the U.S. working papers, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 235-239; *ibid.*, 1966, pp. 103-104, 224-226, 538-540.

desirability of specifying a programme of individual measures of disarmament as part of a non-proliferation treaty, I hope he can see his way clear to applying that line of reasoning to the cut-off as well as to other measures. If he could do so, we should be in a position to make progress in the direction he indicated, when in his conclusion he so eloquently reminded us that we

have a common objective, and that objective is to eradicate the nuclear menace as soon as possible and to ensure security for all.<sup>6</sup>

64. But, as we share a common objective, we share also common problems and common limitations on our ability to reach that objective in one leap. Our immediate objective lies before us at this moment in the form of a draft treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.<sup>7</sup> We should not now, I submit, alter our course to a direction that will put the treaty further from our grasp.

#### Address by Assistant Secretary of Defense Warnke to the Detroit Advocates Club [Extract], October 6, 1967<sup>1</sup>

I have frequently been asked, over the last several weeks, whether our deployment of an ABM system oriented against mainland China does not represent a step backward from our stated desire to try and build bridges to China. Some have suggested that the decision represents an exaggerated view of the actual threat which China poses to the United States and our friends and allies in Asia. I believe that close examination of our motivation in deploying a Chinese-oriented ABM system shows these views to be incorrect. A basic element in our approach to relations with the people of mainland China remains that stated in the President's State-of-the-Union Message. There he said:

We shall continue to hope for a reconciliation between the people of mainland China and the world community—including cooperation in all the tasks of arms control, security, and progress on which the fate of the Chinese people, like the rest of us, depends.

We would be the first to welcome a China which had decided to respect her neighbors' rights. We would be the first to applaud were she to concentrate her great energies and intelligence on improving the welfare of her own people. And we have no intention of trying to deny her legitimate needs for security and friendly relations with neighboring countries.<sup>2</sup>

Our ABM deployment will in no way interfere with these efforts. We continue to hope that China will evolve in a way which will make better relations with the leaders in Peking possible, not only on arms control matters but on a broad range of issues.

While hoping for changes in Chinese behavior, we have sought to analyze Peking's current views and attitudes which might affect their use of their developing nuclear capability. We see no reason to con-

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, p. 440.

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, pp. 338-341.

<sup>1</sup> *Congressional Record* (daily version), Oct. 26, 1967, pp. H 14117-H 14118.

<sup>2</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 30, 1967, p. 102.

clude that the Chinese are any less cautious than the rulers of other nations that have nuclear weapons. Nor do we believe that Peking is at all ignorant of the effects of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, we believe that the Chinese leaders understand the devastation which the use of nuclear weapons by China could bring to the mainland of China itself. Indeed the Chinese have shown a disposition to act cautiously, and to avoid any military clash with the United States that could lead to nuclear war.

In light of this view of China, then, why did we conclude that a Chinese-oriented ABM system makes sense?

I think one way to approach this question is to consider a hypothetical world without the Soviet Union. In that case, I believe that few would think our decision required much in the way of explanation. Hostile action by China is, unfortunately, not totally inconceivable; and nations have always deployed those defensive systems which could blunt an offensive attack from a possible enemy. If we can create, for a sum well within our means, a system which will greatly reduce if not eliminate the casualties we might receive from a Chinese attack, logic and prudence require that we do so.

Of course the Soviet nuclear force does exist; and, as Mr. McNamara pointed out in San Francisco, one of our major concerns in proceeding with this deployment was that it not trigger an acceleration of the strategic arms race with the Soviet Union.<sup>3</sup> Because of this possible danger—which I wish to return to briefly at the end of my talk—we might well have concluded not to proceed with the deployment without some more specific reason to believe that it would enhance our own security and that of our friends and allies in Asia.

What then is the specific reason that led us to go ahead?

My answer to this question might begin by reemphasizing that the cornerstone of our efforts to maintain the security of Asia is our ability to deter aggression. Our fundamental strategy remains deterrence and I want to make it clear that our decision to deploy a China-oriented ABM system is wholly consonant with this strategy. The obligations of the United States in Asia stem most specifically and most importantly from our treaty commitments with a number of Asian nations. In addition, at the time of the first Chinese nuclear detonation in 1963, President Johnson declared that: "Nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that, if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it."<sup>4</sup>

I have no doubt that the United States would honor these assurances, whether or not we deployed an ABM system. Our European allies have come to understand that the United States has both the will and the capability to deter Soviet aggression in Europe, even though the United States cannot achieve a credible first-strike capability that would prevent Soviet response, and even though American society—but not US strategic forces—would be destroyed in a Soviet attack. Against the much reduced Chinese capability, there should be no doubt as to the credibility of our deterrent.

But despite this, some speculation had developed in Asia, and perhaps also in Peking, as to whether, when Chinese ICBM's were targeted

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 388-389.

<sup>4</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, p. 408.

on American cities, the United States would shirk its responsibilities in Asia. Some asked, for example, if the United States would really be willing to risk Detroit to save a small Asian nation. Similar questions had been asked by our European allies as the Soviet nuclear delivery capability grew. As we have learned in Europe, we must be prepared to run risks if our assurances are to have any credibility. But doubts did exist and we concluded that a Chinese-oriented ABM system could serve a valuable role in removing these doubts. In deploying this system, we seek to emphasize the present unique disparity in strategic nuclear capability and technology between the US and China and to extend well into the future the credibility of our option for a nuclear response.

Our deployment will substantially reduce the Chinese Communist capability to threaten American cities and should leave, neither Asia in general nor the Chinese in particular, with any uncertainty as to whether or not the United States would act to prevent the Chinese from gaining any political or military advantage from their nuclear forces. We recognize that this deployment by itself would not be sufficient. The United States will continue to need to act in ways which make clear the credibility of our deterrent. And both we and Asian nations have to continue to maintain the necessary conventional forces to deal with lesser threats. But we believe our ABM deployment is an important, useful step. Hopefully the China-oriented ABM system will also help buy the time within which other political, economic, and social forces can be at work to bring China into responsible participation in an international community. We fully intend to help these forces do their work.

This, then, is how we believe the deployment of the Chinese-oriented ABM system will impact upon our efforts to maintain the security of Asia. What about the physical security of the United States itself?

Secretary McNamara referred, in his speech, to the possibility of Chinese miscalculation, and in a later interview with *Life Magazine* he made clear that his concern is with the situation in which there is the danger of a pre-emptive attack.<sup>6</sup> Let me explain briefly what our concern is. In a crisis which they had brought on, if the Chinese came to believe that the United States might attack, they might be tempted to launch a pre-emptive strike, hoping to bring down at least a part of the American house in the face of the total destruction, or even only the destruction of their nuclear forces, which at the moment of crisis they feared we were about to wreak upon them. No matter how miscalculating or irrational such an act might seem—and I did say earlier we believe the Chinese leaders to be no less cautious than the rulers of other nations that possess nuclear weapons—under the current circumstances it is not impossible. This danger will pass when China develops, as the Soviets have done, a secure second strike capability. In the interim, we decided that as long as it was within our technical capability to provide an effective defense against this danger, prudence seemed to dictate that we deploy that defense which would further deter the Chinese from pre-empting, and eliminate or greatly reduce our casualties should they engage in such an act.

<sup>6</sup> *Life*, vol. 63, no. 13 (Sept. 29, 1967), pp. 28A-28C.

I am sometimes asked whether China could not nullify our defense by smuggling a bomb into the United States in a suitcase, or blowing up a junk off the California coast. Such activity is, unfortunately, technically feasible, although the magnitude of the potential destruction is not comparable to a missile attack. Moreover, we believe such action is extremely unlikely. As I have suggested, we do not view the Chinese as basically irrational. The suitcase bomb would require the Chinese, in the absence of an immediate crisis, to decide in advance that they wish to destroy an American city, knowing full well the retaliation which would follow. Such behavior seems to us totally unlikely. What our defense is directed toward, as I have said, is the possibility that at the height of a crisis the Chinese leadership might panic and press the button. Our ABM deployment will guard against that contingency, improbable though it too may be.

Of all the possible implications of our ABM deployment, none concerned me more than its impact on our efforts to negotiate a nonproliferation treaty—or NPT—designed to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. We analyzed very carefully the likely impact of a deployment on the on-going negotiations relating to the NPT. We came to the conclusion that our Chinese-oriented ABM deployment should make it easier, and not harder, for countries in Asia to sign the NPT. The increased credibility of the United States deterrent, which we expect to result from our deployment, should make even clearer the lack of any need for independent national nuclear forces in Asia. If any country in the area has been tempted to develop a nuclear capability because of a fear that we would cease to deter China, our actions should have removed these uncertainties.

One concern in regard to the NPT has related to the question of equality in obligation. The non-nuclear nations have been asserting, quite understandably, that the United States and the Soviet Union should demonstrate a willingness to move toward nuclear disarmament if they are asking the other nations of the world to forego the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Both we and the Soviets have accepted this obligation, and the language of the draft treaty reflects that commitment.<sup>6</sup> However, that commitment does not mean, and I do not believe that other countries would want it to mean, that the United States would refrain from taking all steps that might improve our deterrent against China until China, herself, is prepared to enter into satisfactory arms limitation agreements. I believe our Chinese-oriented ABM deployment meets this criteria.

An additional cardinal point is that this ABM deployment does not signify in any way a change in our attitude toward the Soviet Union. Our view of that relation can be briefly summarized.

The relationship between any two great powers whose interests and activities are as far-reaching as those of the United States and the Soviet Union must necessarily be complex, a mixture of cooperation and conflict. During the first decade after World War II, the U.S.-Soviet relationship was primarily one of conflict. But in recent years, despite areas of deep disagreement—Vietnam and Germany are some ex-

<sup>6</sup> See *ante*, pp. 338-341.

amples—the necessity of co-existing in a highly armed world has led us to cooperate where we have interests in common.

Most important of these common interests is the need to prevent nuclear war. Each of us now has the ability to destroy the other's society. This is the most awesome power that men have ever possessed. We do not fear that the present leaders in the Kremlin, or any foreseeable successors, will employ recklessly or irresponsibly the vast resources of destructive capability which they possess. Similarly, we think that we have given them ample evidence that they need fear no such behavior on our part. The costs of nuclear irresponsibility would be too great.

For this reason, another interest we share with them is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. This interest is not wholly altruistic: we are concerned not only that new possessors of nuclear weapons may employ them against each other, or against a non-nuclear state; we see an even greater danger in the possibility that the use of nuclear weapons by a third country could precipitate a war which would end in a nuclear exchange between the two so-called Superpowers. In our view, and I would think in that of the Soviet Union as well, each additional nuclear power increases the possibility of nuclear war, by design, by miscalculation, or even by accident.

The U.S. and the USSR have a third related interest: that of reducing the vast amounts of resources which each of us now devotes to military forces and to military hardware. That other and more rewarding uses can be made of these resources is so self-evident, despite the over-all prosperity of American society, that it demands no elaboration. The same is true, to an even greater degree, in the Soviet Union. Similarly, for the health of the world we inhabit, both we and the Russians should be devoting more of our national wealth to improving conditions of life within the less-developed countries.

Our decision to deploy a Chinese-oriented ABM system reflects no lack of concern about what Secretary McNamara called the "mad momentum" of the nuclear arms race.<sup>7</sup> But because our proposed deployment poses no possible threat to the Soviet deterrent, it need lead to no acceleration of the Soviet-American strategic arms race.

We will continue to seek cooperation and agreement with the Soviets whenever our interests converge. In particular, we will continue to hope that by parallel actions, or by formal agreement, the two countries can undertake to limit their strategic offensive and defensive forces. There is no reason to believe that our deployment decision makes them any less willing to enter into talks, or to take parallel actions. In fact, although we cannot be sure, the contrary may well be the case. Moreover, should these talks occur, we hope to avoid bogging down in the perennially difficult issue of international inspection.

Since the end of the second world war, the United States has sought an international agreement to end, or at least slow down, the nuclear arms race. The United States has always insisted, and will continue to insist, on adequate verification of any arms control agreement with our potential adversaries. In deciding whether we need an agreed international inspection system, we assess very carefully the capa-

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, p. 393.

bility of our own unilateral verification systems. As you know, the United States agreed to the three environment test ban treaty,<sup>8</sup> with the full concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the consent of the United States Senate, despite the lack of provisions for international inspection. We did so because we were confident, and remain confident, that we can detect any violations of the treaty by the Soviet Union or any other signer. We have, in fact, accurately detected Chinese and French atmospheric nuclear tests.

In considering any possible agreement with the Soviet Union to level off or reduce strategic offensive and defensive systems, or even the possibility for parallel action on the part of the two countries, we may have to depend on our own unilateral capability for verification. We believe a number of possibilities for parallel action and even for formal agreement with the Soviets would permit our reliance on unilateral means of verification. Other more far-reaching agreements, particularly any involving substantial reductions, would require agreed international inspection. You may be sure that we would not accept any agreement unless we had high confidence in our ability to monitor Soviet compliance, either by unilateral means or by agreed inspection procedures. But you may be sure, also, that we will pursue, with diligence and determination, our efforts to bring the nuclear arms race under control.

For we do not believe that continuation of that nuclear competition is without risk, and that risk lies only in seeking agreement with our potential enemies. We now have lived with danger throughout most or all of our adult years. We recognize that all courses have risks and that it is folly, not prudence, to continue on the path that the world has been following without seeking a better way. The U.S. is fully prepared for an end to the nuclear arms race. For the sake of our own and future generations, we can only hope that neither the attitudes of our adversaries nor the gulf of suspicion which separates us will prevent attainment of the objective which is in our common interest.

It is my belief that the decision to go ahead with an ABM system directed against potential Chinese threat will not retard, but rather will advance our progress toward that objective.

**Statement by the Burmese Representative (Maung Maung) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, October 10, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

3. The delegation of Burma would like to extend sincere congratulations to the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union on their presentation to our Committee of identical texts of a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. I refer here to documents

<sup>8</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-298.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.337, pp. 4-12.

ENDC/192 and ENDC/193.<sup>2</sup> Although we naturally have certain views on some aspects of the drafts, which will be set forth later in my present intervention, we welcome them as representing a notable achievement by these two great Powers, and their submission as an event of great promise and far-reaching potentialities for the international community. I may here reiterate unequivocally that my Government shares the general concern and anxiety to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons and that it has consistently supported all efforts made in that direction, both at the United Nations General Assembly and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

4. After more than five years of what at times must have appeared to some as unrewarding labours, the Eighteen-Nation Committee now has before it specific proposals which by further perseverance it may fashion into the fundamental step leading unmistakably to that long-awaited and long-overdue process which could eventually free innocent mankind from the tyranny of armaments and especially from the never-ending nightmare of a sudden and terrible end in a nuclear holocaust. In the opinion of my delegation, the two draft texts which are now available for negotiation by our Committee and by all interested parties do offer such an opportunity. Though they are yet incomplete and the result of restricted negotiations, the area of agreement expressed is nevertheless important; because among the States which it embraces are two on whose decisions and mutual accommodation largely depend the nature and extent of the nuclear disarmament measures that could be achieved.

5. Having arrived at this important stage, we feel that the negotiations for the treaty should now assume the form of broad-based multi-party dialogues. If as a result of these further collective efforts, conscientiously pursued in a spirit of good faith, equity and realism on all sides, we should succeed in achieving a non-proliferation treaty such as could set in motion a train of events leading successively to further meaningful steps towards general and complete disarmament, a new era of peace, co-operation and widening prosperity in the world would surely no longer remain just a visionary dream. In the view of my delegation, the immediate task facing this Committee is to evolve precisely that kind of treaty out of the draft laid before it—no more and no less. This places a heavy responsibility on all nations, both nuclear and non-nuclear, to ensure that the non-proliferation treaty now being negotiated will be not only a viable, effective and equitable treaty but one that will assuredly lead to further tangible steps towards nuclear disarmament.

6. My delegation finds much that is positive and constructive in the two drafts now before us, as well as in the statements made by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union in introducing them to our Committee.<sup>3</sup> We also see in the drafts evidence of a conscious attempt by the authors to fulfill the mandatory guiding principles laid down in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX),<sup>4</sup> which, it is worth recalling, represents the first tangible area of agree-

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 338-341.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 342-347, 347-352.

<sup>4</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 532-534.

ment achieved specifically in regard to the question of nuclear-weapon proliferation. We appreciate the sincerity of purpose with which the authors have endeavoured to fulfill those principles. I should, however, be less than truthful if I were to say that the drafts as they now stand fully satisfy those basic requirements. I am aware also that we should view what has so far been achieved in the light of the realities of the present-day world.

7. Permit me to digress a little so that we may examine one pertinent aspect of these realities. In spite of expectations that most nations would make efforts to possess these terrible nuclear weapons, over twenty years have elapsed from the time they were discovered—that is, from the time the first atomic bomb was used in the service of war—and there are still but five nuclear-weapon States. This although several nations have acquired during that time not only the necessary scientific knowledge but also the broad technological and economic bases for making such weapons on their own.

8. There are several factors which act against nuclear weapon proliferation in the "horizontal" sense. Put in a somewhat generalized and simplified form, they are: first, lack of adequate economic resources; second, lack of sufficient scientific and technological knowledge and means; third, the control exercised by the nuclear-weapon Powers through alliances and agreements, multilateral and bilateral, which is still effective; fourth, the firm conviction that the advantages to be gained from trying to acquire a national nuclear deterrence system are not worth the effort and sacrifice which developing such a system would entail; and, fifth, a genuine devotion to the cause of international peace and security.

9. Because those inhibitory factors act in various combinations rather than singly, there is considerable assurance that a large number of States will for some time in the conceivable future remain non-nuclear-weapon States. Of course, no one would say that those factors will continue to act with similar effectiveness for all time; but then no one can deny that they are still exerting the necessary restraint as regards any marked increase in the number of nuclear-weapon countries.

10. My delegation has not alluded to the situation actually prevailing with any intention of questioning the need or the urgency of concluding a non-proliferation treaty; on the contrary, we feel there is urgent need for such a treaty, as indeed there is for treaties in the other areas of arms control and disarmament. We have called attention to the situation with a twofold purpose: first, to warn against such haste in our negotiations as would amount to sacrificing vital principles; and, second, to bring out the relevance of the situation to what the basic character and orientation of the treaty ought logically to be.

11. I think I can say with assurance that a non-proliferation treaty which curbs only the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries, standing by itself and set quite apart from the over-all problem of nuclear disarmament, will have no intrinsic disarmament value. In its arms-control function it will serve only to formalize a prevailing situation; and even in this respect it can at best serve as another passive element that would mainly reinforce only one of the factors inhib-

iting proliferation that I have just mentioned. Obviously such a treaty will have no effect in practice on a country lacking the means to manufacture nuclear weapons or one which has taken a political decision not to cross the nuclear threshold. Similarly—and here I am speaking in purely hypothetical terms—it will still not prove sufficiently compelling morally or provide security and other corollary inducements to a nation which possesses the means and is tempted, for various reasons, to retain its options in that respect.

12. It is vital that the treaty should have the necessary appeal to States in that category. Otherwise the world might find itself in the peculiar situation of being saddled with a non-proliferation treaty signed only by those unable or unwilling to proliferate—or both. The treaty as a whole would thus, through inadvertence, acquire the character of one big loop-hole for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This gap cannot be closed by merely tightening further the prohibitions contained in articles I and II of the present drafts. Only a treaty that can inspire great confidence in the context of the natural concern for national security, by its wide applicability, by the democratic foundation of its intrinsic disarmament potential and by unrestrictive and assured benefits from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, could close this yawning gap. The wisdom of General Assembly resolutions 2028 (XX) and 2153 (XXI)<sup>5</sup> here becomes very clear.

13. My delegation has not overlooked in this connexion the tenth, eleventh and twelfth preambular paragraphs of the present drafts, containing a declaration of intention by the nuclear-weapon Powers regarding subsequent nuclear arms control and disarmament measures. Nor have we overlooked the review clause contained in article V, paragraph 3, of the drafts, which is designed to ensure that the purposes and provisions of the treaty are being realized. My delegation has no hesitation in acknowledging that these constitute important improvements on the previous draft treaties submitted to the Committee<sup>6</sup> nor have we hesitation in commending the motivation underlying them. We do realize that one document cannot be expected to solve all the problems. Hence we appreciate the assurances reiterated by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union that the non-proliferation treaty must be merely one of the initial steps towards the achievement of other necessary measures aimed at reducing and stopping the nuclear arms race.

14. However, we cannot help feeling that the declaration of intention and the review clause, to which I have referred, fall considerably short of what is reasonably expected for making the non-proliferation treaty viable, effective and equitable and investing it with an intrinsic disarmament value. It must be logical that the non-proliferation treaty should not be limited merely to stopping additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons—for, as I have pointed out earlier, this is a situation which does in reality exist to a wide extent. It should also restrain the nuclear-weapon Powers from increasing and developing

<sup>5</sup> For resolution 2153 (XXI), see *ibid.*, 1966, pp. 748-750.

<sup>6</sup> I.e., the U.S. draft treaty of Aug. 17, 1965 (*ibid.*, 1965, pp. 347-349), as amended (*ibid.*, 1966, pp. 159-169) and the Soviet draft treaty of Sept. 24, 1965 (*ibid.*, pp. 443-446).

their existing nuclear arsenals, if the correct spirit of the treaty is to be upheld.

15. In the same way, since the nuclear-weapon Powers themselves have repeatedly acknowledged that the non-proliferation treaty is not an end in itself but merely a step towards total nuclear disarmament, it follows that, if the non-nuclear-weapon States constituting the vast majority of the international community are to forswear nuclear weapons, it should be equally incumbent on the present nuclear-weapon Powers to take tangible steps within a reasonable time limit to liquidate progressively their nuclear-weapon status.

16. On the other hand, we do not believe that anyone would gainsay that considerations of security are basic to the problem of arms control and that a non-proliferation treaty should take into account the undeniable security needs of all signatories. One should not be unmindful that, in the context of present and prospective realities, security needs will impose certain limitations on the will of the signatory nuclear-weapon Powers to undertake unreservedly obligations in regard to nuclear disarmament.

17. If, therefore, a specific provision for a specific nuclear arms-control measure could not be embodied in the treaty, we feel an article should be formulated, in clear-cut and precise terms, under which the nuclear-weapon Powers would assume a definite obligation to take tangible steps towards nuclear disarmament. Those steps should be explicitly defined. One would envisage them to include the concluding of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which my delegation considers is valid also as a measure of balance, since the non-proliferation treaty will have additionally a comprehensive test-ban effect on the non-nuclear-weapon States; an agreement on the cut-off of all production of fissile materials for weapon purposes and on their diversion to peaceful uses; a halt to production of nuclear weapons themselves; a verified freeze of the production of nuclear delivery vehicles; and progressive reduction and final destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and carriers.

18. Given such undertakings by the nuclear-weapon Powers, the modalities for their implementation may be worked out in separate instruments, with the non-proliferation treaty serving as the basic document from which those measures would flow.

19. My delegation believes that, by including such an article, we shall be building into the treaty the essence of the two-way, mutual obligation required by General Assembly resolution 2029 (XX). It will act also as an indirect curb on the option which remains open to the nuclear-weapon Powers to manufacture nuclear weapons. Nevertheless an element of impulsion would still be required to provide a reasonable assurance that the obligations so assumed and undertakings so given, albeit in all good faith, would indeed be translated into reality. The article I have mentioned, like the other basic articles of the treaty, would of course be subject to review under the provisions of article V, paragraph 3, of the present draft treaty. I have already commended that provision, which represents a positive approach and cannot fail to add dynamism to an otherwise passive treaty and to inspire greater trust and confidence among all its signatories concerning one another's good faith and intentions.

20. One feels, however, that the element of impulsion inherent in that provision should be strengthened in two ways. The first way is to make mandatory the holding of periodic review conferences in order to assess the progress achieved in implementing the purposes and provisions of the treaty. Periodic review is both necessary and desirable, since the treaty is intended as an initial step towards nuclear disarmament and also because it is to be of unlimited duration. The second way is to revise the draft article VII so as to make failure to fulfil in good faith the provisions of the article on nuclear disarmament an additional basis for withdrawal.

21. My delegation firmly believes that any disarmament or arms-control measure must provide for an effective and universally-trusted safeguard system to ensure strict compliance by all parties. Only then would it inspire confidence and therefore be viable. Although the promised draft text of the crucial article III has not yet been made available to the Committee, it is clear, from what is foreseen in the fifth and sixth preambular paragraphs and from the explanations contained in the statements by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union, that the system envisaged will be universal and uniform in character but will not be completely universal and uniform in application. It would seem that the treaty would thus be handicapped with an avoidable weakness.

22. It can be reasonably assumed that an essential element in any leads towards steps in the process of nuclear disarmament—and the non-proliferation treaty is avowedly such a lead—is the application of international controls to all the nuclear activities of all signatory countries. Although such an approach to international control of nuclear activities will impose great responsibilities and require complicated negotiations, we feel that it deserves inclusive consideration in any attempt at the formulation of article III. One is strongly persuaded that the form and content which this article will eventually assume will be indicative of the earnestness and resolve with which initiatives are to be taken towards nuclear disarmament.

23. My delegation is gratified to find in the drafts of the treaty three preambular paragraphs and one article with commendable aims and assurances on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this connexion also we have the extremely vexing question of nuclear explosions for peaceful applications which do not violate the aims and purposes of the treaty. We feel that the non-nuclear-weapon States should be completely assured of non-discriminatory, free and direct access to such nuclear technology as does not have significance exclusively for weapons. It is vital that they shall not suffer, directly or indirectly, from undue disadvantages because nuclear explosions have such a connotation at present. Satisfactory and practical arrangements should be devised that would genuinely offer to them the benefits of such knowledge and application.

24. To continue on the general aspect of the wider dissemination of the knowledge, technology and application of nuclear power for peaceful purposes: we feel that, while the seventh, eighth and ninth preambular paragraphs, reinforced by article IV, do constitute considerable assurance of the availability of such benefits to all signatory States, nevertheless they are somewhat less explicit and precise than formula-

tions such as would appeal to the lesser-developed States. As I have mentioned earlier in connexion with the inhibitions to the spread of nuclear weapons, there exists in the form of the "means barrier" a real impediment to the application of nuclear science to an acceleration of the development of the underdeveloped nations. Opportunity and freedom of access do not constitute the actual enjoyment of these benefits of modern science. It would be indeed unfortunate if it should turn out that the inhibitions imposed by the "means barrier" on the development of peaceful nuclear programmes in these countries were reinforced by those that might possibly arise from the international control system adopted for the non-proliferation treaty and by others growing normally out of involved bilateral negotiations.

25. In order to ensure the enjoyment by these countries of the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy, a wider and more far-reaching international co-operation than is foreseen in the present draft treaty is required. In the case of the lesser-developed countries, it is not enough simply to offer peaceful nuclear technology and its benefits; the necessary substantial resources to develop peaceful programmes of their own should be offered through a suitable international institution by the co-operative efforts of the nuclear-weapon Powers.

26. Permit me to make a few comments on the complex question of security. As I have already said in another context, security is one of the essential elements for the success of the non-proliferation treaty. After all, arms-control or disarmament measures are predicated on and dominated by the natural concern for security of all participants, whether nuclear or non-nuclear. Operative paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 2153A (XXI) has drawn specific attention to the security aspect of the non-proliferation treaty.

27. In my opinion, a positive approach to the problem of the security of all States would be to strive for the twin objectives of disarmament and an effective institution for international co-operation. It is clear that the latter should be an international system for the democratic and peaceful settlement of disputes among nations, for equitable resolution of conflicts of interests, operating on the basis of recognition of the sovereign equality and political and territorial integrity of nations, irrespective of their size and power.

28. The United Nations has provided a firm foundation in that respect, but much still remains to be done to enable it fully to realize the noble aims set down in the Charter. Admittedly, that is a far more difficult and higher objective than we have set for ourselves in the limited attempts towards disarmament. Nevertheless we are in the process of evolving a desirable system and, in spite of disappointments, we feel that progress in that direction is not inconsiderable.

29. While a satisfactory international system of peaceful co-operation is in the process of being evolved, we must of necessity adopt a series of disarmament measures with associated security guarantees. The security assurances are all the more important in the context of the non-proliferation treaty. My delegation has noted from the statements of the sponsors of the drafts that they are giving continued consideration to the matter. We ourselves feel that the political and military facts of a world situation dominated by the nuclear-weapon Powers impose on those Powers a moral obligation to guarantee the

security of the non-nuclear-weapon community from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against the latter. Therefore we feel that the nuclear-weapon Powers should provide, in positive and clear-cut terms, the necessary assurances in the treaty itself.

30. I have in my present intervention offered my delegation's preliminary comments and observations on some of the more important aspects of the two drafts of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons laid before our Committee by the United States and Soviet delegations. We are not as yet expressing our views on other procedural articles, especially on the provisions for amendments and the coming into force of the treaty. We feel that they are matters for serious consideration, and we realize that their present form may well be dictated by a concern for strengthening the treaty. However, we are persuaded that their final nature would be essentially dependent upon the eventual form and content of the key articles to which I have devoted much of my present intervention.

31. Finally, I should like to assure the Committee, and the authors of the draft treaty, that we have offered our views in this statement today in a constructive spirit, keeping the larger interests of disarmament and of world peace above everything else. Certain suggestions which I have thought it necessary to make have been put forward with no motivation other than an earnest desire to see concluded a viable, effective and equitable non-proliferation treaty which would be acceptable to the vast majority of States and could usher in further concrete measures of nuclear and conventional disarmament.

32. I trust that the delegations sponsoring the identical drafts, which have clearly laboured with great patience and perseverance to produce them, will receive our comments and suggestions in the same spirit as that in which they have been offered. These are necessarily preliminary and, on the whole, general comments, because our Committee is still at the negotiating stage. When our work enters the more advanced phase of consideration by governments, my delegation may offer some further comments.

**Statement by the British Disarmament Minister (Mulley)  
to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee:  
Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, October 10, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

33. It is a great pleasure to follow the representative of Burma. We have listened with interest to the positive and constructive statement he has made on behalf of his country. In my remarks today I shall try to touch on some of the important points he has made. Before I proceed, however, I should like to associate myself and, I am sure, all delegations with the welcome which you, Mr. Chairman, gave to our new colleague, the representative of Poland, Mr. Czarkowski. We are glad that he has joined us, and I am sure that he will make a very valuable contribution to our work.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.337, pp. 12-21.

34. In his latest annual report to the United Nations the Secretary-General said

The members of the [Eighteen Nation] Committee are on the whole cautiously hopeful of early agreement on a treaty. I am convinced that if the spread of nuclear weapons is to be prevented, this can only be done by treaty. No other way can be effective for any length of time.

He said also:

... it is difficult to conceive of any agreement in the foreseeable future on any other measure of disarmament if it is not possible to reach agreement on a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup>

I believe that both those statements are true. I believe also that we can negotiate a non-proliferation treaty and that when concluded the treaty will serve to put us back on the path to general disarmament. That path is a long one, and the sooner we can get back on to it the better.

35. You may recall that those points were the theme of my last observations, on 29 August, when I also reiterated my Government's commitment to proceed as far and as fast down the road to disarmament as we could persuade others to come.<sup>3</sup> However, the non-proliferation treaty must come first. As the representative of Ethiopia said at our meeting on 5 October:

... failure to achieve now what should have been done long before now will not only result in double or treble the number of nuclear-weapon Powers, thus making the danger of nuclear devastation ever more imminent, but also render disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, an unattainable mirage.<sup>4</sup>

36. Over the past few weeks this Committee has given careful consideration to the texts placed before us by the two co-Chairmen on 24 August.<sup>5</sup> Time is, however, running out. The limited flexibility of the United Nations calendar requires that this session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament must soon come to an end so that the debate in the United Nations can begin. I trust that in the short time that remains to us in Geneva we shall be able to bring matters much nearer to a conclusion, since it is difficult to see the General Assembly succeeding if we fail. We are, after all, the experts. We understand the intricacies of the problem we have been grappling with over the years as no others do, and we are the body best equipped to solve them. If we want the best treaty we can get, we must do the work ourselves and do it quickly. Moreover, if we fail to do the job, there is a clear danger that the Eighteen-Nation Committee itself will be discredited; and it will then be difficult to justify the claim that this Committee should play a central part in the even more important disarmament negotiations that lie ahead once the non-proliferation treaty has been concluded.

37. I think it was clear from my remarks on 29 August that my Government regards the draft text submitted by the co-Chairmen as

<sup>2</sup> General Assembly Official Records: Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 1A (A/6701/Add. 1), p. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Ante, pp. 362-363, 367 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Ante, p. 448.

<sup>5</sup> Ante, pp. 333-341.

a sound basis for our negotiations. It is a text which has tried to take into account the interests of many countries, aligned and non-aligned, and if it falls short of perfection, if it does not satisfy everyone, that is because the nature of this subject does not admit of a perfect solution. In spite of the work already put into it, the draft may admit of improvement; and this morning I should like to consider some of the suggestions and amendments which have been put forward in this Committee, in particular the thoughtful contributions of the representatives of Mexico and the United Arab Republic. The Committee will recall that it was in fact the representative of the United Arab Republic who suggested as long ago as last March that some of the provisions of the preamble should be transferred to the operative part of the treaty.<sup>6</sup>

38. The first subject I should like to consider is that of co-operation in the applications of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes—and I will come later to the separate topic of peaceful explosions. The subject is dealt with both in the preamble and in article IV of the draft text. The United Kingdom delegation has made the point repeatedly that we cannot support a treaty which impedes the civil development of nuclear energy. We believe in the absolute right and the absolute need for free and untrammelled co-operation in this field; and we are convinced that the other nuclear-weapon States represented on this Committee share this point of view. I said last time I spoke that the assurances expressed by each of the nuclear-weapon States in this Committee on this subject should make it impossible for any of them to adopt a restrictive attitude once a treaty comes into force, even if they wished to, which on past form would not appear to be the case.

39. The provisions in article IV and in the preamble are adequate testimony to that attitude; and the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, outlined on 8 June the impressive record of his country in co-operation in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.<sup>7</sup> Not only do these provisions not inhibit co-operation—a fear which had been expressed—but they facilitate such co-operation. The representative of Mexico said on 19 September, in connexion with his proposed revision of article IV:

We believe that if . . . the non-nuclear Powers renounce for all time certain activities and experiments which, but for the Treaty, they might carry out, it is only fair that they should receive in return as their authentic right any scientific and technological benefits derived from the experiments and activities they renounce.<sup>8</sup>

40. I entirely agree with that statement. My Government is prepared, as we have already made clear, to make available to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to this treaty any "spin-off" into the field of civil nuclear technology that might be derived from our research on nuclear weapons. It is this research that non-nuclear-weapon States will be asked to forgo in the interests of all; and the principle that they should, as a compensation, share in its fruits is rightly embodied in the sixth preambular paragraph of the draft treaty before us.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, pp. 154–160.

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, pp. 254–255.

<sup>8</sup> *Ante*, p. 307.

41. Paragraph 2 of the draft article IV submitted by the representative of Mexico goes rather further than that in imposing on all parties—

... the duty to contribute, according to their ability, ... to the further development of the production, industries, and other applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States.<sup>9</sup>

That would cover not only spin-off but also the fruits of purely peaceful nuclear research and development, which is being denied to no one; and it would impose an open-ended obligation on civil as well as military nuclear Powers that is not called for by strict reciprocity.

42. The question of what such an obligation might entail was discussed by the representative of Canada at our last meeting on 5 October.<sup>10</sup> I share the misgivings that he expressed. The United Kingdom has always made major contributions in this field from the very beginning of nuclear physics. However, this wording could lead some countries to expect to receive for nothing what other countries have worked hard to produce. That is clearly not intended, and some modification of the wording would be desirable to avoid the danger of possible unwarranted expectations.

43. On the separate but related problem of the availability of the benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, the conflict seems to be between understandable aspirations on the one hand and brutal facts of reality on the other. It would be very agreeable if a State could conduct its own nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes without any hazard to the health and safety of its neighbours and without affecting their tranquillity by the military and political implications of those explosions. Unfortunately, the facts of life are simply not consistent with that aspiration. Any State that has made such a nuclear device has made a potential nuclear weapon and can make more of them. One cannot distinguish between them. In addition, the concern for economic development which prompts the interest of many States in the use of nuclear explosions for these peaceful purposes also suggests that a better use could be made of resources than on the enormous research and development costs of perfecting unilaterally the use of such devices. Recognizing these facts, yet believing also that if peaceful nuclear explosions are to become useful for economic progress—which has still to be proved—their benefits should be denied to none, we supported the preambular provisions incorporated in the drafts presented by the co-Chairmen on 24 August.

44. We share the view which has been put forward in this Committee that the details and arrangements by which the benefits of the application of nuclear explosives to peaceful purposes should be made available to all should be considered separately outside the non-proliferation treaty. We are much indebted to the representative of Canada for the valuable ideas that he put forward in his statement of 12 September about the lines on which this problem might be tackled.<sup>11</sup> I agree with the representative of Mexico that the non-proliferation

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, p. 395.

<sup>10</sup> BNDC/PV. 336, p. 6.

<sup>11</sup> BNDC/PV. 329, pp. 9-10.

treaty should formally commit its signatories to make available any benefits that may eventually arise from the peaceful application of nuclear explosions; and we should be happy to see such a commitment written into the body of the treaty. That would also meet the point made on this subject by the representative of Burma this morning.

45. This is perhaps as good a place as any at which to make clear the position of my Government as regards the provision of any potential benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions. The geography and population density of Great Britain make it uncertain whether peaceful nuclear explosives will be an industrially-useful technique in our own islands in the foreseeable future. We have not so far pursued any extensive programme in this field, and are simply not in a position to make the means and facilities for the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions available to others. We should therefore have difficulty with any language such as that proposed in article IV-A of the Mexican amendment in document ENDC/196.<sup>13</sup>

46. In our view, the first sentence of the proposed article IV-A could be interpreted as obliging nuclear-weapon States to develop a peaceful explosives technology and service for the benefit of others even if they had neither the desire nor the resources to develop such a service. I must stress that this is a question, not of unwillingness to share with others something which we have, but simply of an inability to share something which we do not have and a consequent inability to undertake a treaty obligation which we cannot at this time fulfil.

47. Before leaving this subject, I should also like to express our interest in the suggestion made by the representative of Nigeria on 31 August.<sup>13</sup> He suggested that scientists from non-nuclear-weapon States be given the opportunity of working in close collaboration with scientists in nuclear-weapon States working on the technology of applying nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. We should like to associate ourselves with the favourable comments made on that suggestion on 14 September by the United States representative, Mr. Foster.<sup>14</sup>

48. I should like next to deal with the link between this treaty and further measures of nuclear disarmament. It has been the consistent view of my Government that this treaty should and would lead to further measures of nuclear disarmament, but that without such progress the treaty would not last. That view was put clearly as recently as 26 September by the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Mr. George Brown, in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly. He said:

A non-proliferation treaty is, of course, not an end in itself. Apart from its intrinsic value, it will open the way to negotiations on the central problem of controlling and stopping the nuclear arms race. Unless it is followed by progress in that direction, there is a risk that the treaty will not long endure. But equally that progress is dependent on the successful conclusion of the treaty.<sup>15</sup>

49. When I last spoke to this Committee I reaffirmed our determination to work towards further measures of disarmament. Knowing the frustrating history of disarmament negotiations since the war, I find

<sup>13</sup> *Ante*, p. 395.

<sup>14</sup> *Ante*, p. 377.

<sup>15</sup> ENDC/PV.330, p. 7.

<sup>16</sup> A/PV. 1567 (prov.), pp. 54-55.

myself in sympathy with what I think is the intention of the Mexican proposal to strengthen the obligation on the nuclear Powers to pursue these negotiations by strengthening the preambular language and putting it into the operative part of the treaty.

50. I should, however, like to offer one or two comments on that proposal. The first is that the most logical measure to embody in the operative part of the treaty would be that relating to the achievement of the cessation of the nuclear arms race, which at present appears in the ninth preambular paragraph. The treaty will, in article II, impose arms limitations on the non-nuclear signatories; and the next logical step seems to me to call for the cessation of the nuclear arms race by the nuclear Powers.

51. My second comment is that some of the measures listed in the eleventh preambular paragraph of the draft texts—liquidation of existing stockpiles and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery—can only be dealt with effectively in the framework of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. That treaty is, unfortunately, still far from our grasp, and its achievement has not the same immediate urgency as the cessation of the nuclear arms race. We must stop adding to the level of armaments before we can move forward in the other direction.

52. An alternative way of moving towards that effect might be to retain the existing preambular paragraphs and to amend paragraph 3 of article V of the treaty to read:

Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and provisions of the Treaty are being realized.<sup>16</sup>

I put forward that suggestion for consideration and to make clear that I welcome the initiative of the representative of Mexico and share his objective of seeking to secure firmer commitments from the nuclear Powers to follow this treaty with immediate and meaningful negotiations to secure further measures of arms control and disarmament.

53. Before leaving this subject, I should like to say that my Government strongly supports the proposal made by the United States Government to the Government of the Soviet Union for bilateral talks on the limitation of defensive and offensive weapons. We hope very much that the Soviet Union will agree to such talks, which should be an important step in the right direction. If it be later proposed to hold such talks in a wider forum, the United Kingdom would be ready and willing to join in.

54. Proposals have been made by the representative of the United Arab Republic for amendments to articles I and II of the treaty.<sup>17</sup> I do not propose to discuss those amendments in detail, but there are two general points I should like to make about those articles, which form the core of the draft treaty. The first is that, as we all know, they are the results of long discussion on the part of the co-Chairmen. The second is that, to my mind and to the minds of most representatives who have spoken on them, they effectively provide for the closing of

<sup>16</sup> Later submitted as an amendment to the draft treaty (*post*, p. 595).

<sup>17</sup> *Ante*, pp. 421-428.

all loop-holes of practical significance for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Most of us here have participated in long debates over several years on the provisions which these two vital articles should incorporate. We know that earlier drafts of these articles were much longer and much more complicated, and we know that the path towards eventual agreement between the co-Chairmen on these articles lay in finding simplified language. To add to these articles now, to add further complications, would be to reverse the process. That seems to me a dangerous course. I hope that we can steer clear of it.

55. I cannot conclude without a reference to the missing article III. Indeed, it is very difficult to make a constructive speech about the treaty without saying anything at all about article III. Equally, it is almost impossible to say anything constructive about article III until there is a text before us. The Swedish representative has tabled a draft article III to stimulate discussion,<sup>18</sup> and ideas have been contributed by other representatives. However, we still await anxiously the text promised by our co-Chairmen. We know that they are doing their utmost to reach agreement on a draft text and that they are making progress. Moreover, I do not think I am revealing any secrets if I say that part of their difficulty lies in the fact that it is not only a matter of discussion between themselves and that inevitably wider consultations are involved.

56. I should like to compliment our co-Chairmen on the efforts they are making to produce a text which is generally acceptable and which will provide a safeguard system adequate to the needs of the treaty. At the same time, I hope they will not take it amiss if I urge upon them the need to impress upon all their colleagues the very great importance of having a draft article III tabled, discussed and, I hope, generally accepted here before the end of this month.

57. Finally, I should like to refer briefly to the speech made by the representative of India on 28 September.<sup>19</sup> When I read it I was greatly impressed with its logical structure and progression; but as I continued to read I was more and more struck with the idea that he seemed to be talking about a different treaty from the one the rest of us talk about. He was talking about a treaty which would, amongst other things, halt the production of nuclear weapons. His contention was—and he has expressed it on many occasions—that the proliferation of nuclear weapons includes the further production of nuclear weapons anywhere, and that therefore a treaty to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons must halt the production of nuclear weapons by the existing nuclear Powers.

58. That has consistently been the view of the Indian delegation, and it is a view which I respect. Where I must join issue with my Indian colleague is in his assertion that that view is embodied in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). On 25 July Mr. Trivedi said:

A non-proliferation treaty should therefore have mutual obligations and responsibilities; and in parenthesis I might add that this is also spelt out in principle (a)—this provision that the treaty should embody mutual obligations and

<sup>18</sup> *Ante*, p. 368.

<sup>19</sup> *Ante*, pp. 430-440.

responsibilities for nuclear and non-nuclear Powers—where it is said that neither of them should proliferate, that proliferation should be denied to both of them.<sup>20</sup>

On 31 August the representative of India said:

What is pertinent is that proliferation has to be prevented; and, as General Assembly resolution 2025 (XX) points out, proliferation by both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear-weapon Powers has to be prevented.<sup>21</sup>

59. At the risk of wearying the Committee, I would recall that principle (a) of resolution 2028 (XX) states:

The treaty shall be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form.<sup>22</sup>

We all remember the context in which that text was discussed and adopted; and I do not understand how it can be argued that its intention was to cut off the production of nuclear weapons by the nuclear Powers. The principle discussed, and unanimously endorsed, was that non-nuclear Powers should not acquire nuclear weapons, and nuclear Powers should not help them to do so by any means whatsoever. Indeed, the whole debate on non-proliferation has proceeded on the basis that to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is to prevent an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons. The language of what I might term our base resolution, the Irish resolution, makes that point absolutely clear.<sup>23</sup> The reservation to that resolution entered by the representative of India on 30 November 1961 in the First Committee<sup>24</sup> made it equally clear that, while the Government of India did not subscribe to that principle, it recognized that that was the principle embodied in the resolution.

60. Resolution 2028 (XX), an admirably balanced and constructed one, was sponsored by the eight non-aligned delegations to this Committee. The views of those delegations have been of great help in reaching the hopeful stage we have now reached in our negotiations. That resolution, in my view, does not admit of the interpretation which the representative of India seeks to give it.

61. When I concluded my remarks on 29 August I asked that we should all consider which situation would offer us the greater hope: one in which the negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty had broken down or run into the sand; or one in which the conclusion of a treaty had opened the way, and pointed the way, to further effort in the field of arms control and disarmament.<sup>25</sup> There is no doubt in my mind which is the better course, the course which will lead more quickly to a safer and saner world. We cannot afford to slip backwards.

62. As I said at the beginning of my remarks, the next month will be crucial for the work of this Committee. Much remains still to be done if we are to go to New York able to report to the General Assembly that we have a draft treaty which we believe to be acceptable to both nu-

<sup>20</sup> ENDC/PV. 316, p. 12.

<sup>21</sup> ENDC/PV. 327, p. 20.

<sup>22</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, p. 535.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 1961, p. 694.

<sup>24</sup> A/C.1/SR. 1209, pars. 9 ff.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 807.

clear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. I believe we can and must complete this task, and I pledge all the efforts of my delegation to doing so.

### Remarks by President Johnson on the Entry Into Force of the Outer Space Treaty, October 10, 1967<sup>1</sup>

*Mr. Secretary of State, Ambassador Dobrynin, Ambassador Dean, Excellencies, distinguished Members of the Cabinet, of the Congress, and of the Supreme Court, ladies and gentlemen:*

The Age of Space began just 10 years ago last Wednesday. I am sure Ambassador Dobrynin does not have to be reminded of that date—nor do any of us.

The world will never forget the intelligence, the determination, and the courage that placed Sputnik into orbit, and launched man's great adventure into space.

That adventure has unfolded, during the past decade, with miraculous speed and scope. Man has probed the moon; he has reached out to other planets in the solar system. And he has done all of this in the spirit of peaceful exploration.

We are here today in the East Room to proclaim the intention of 84 nations that this exploration shall remain peaceful. By adding this treaty to the law of nations, we are forging a permanent disarmament agreement for outer space.

- It outlaws the weapons of mass destruction from man's newest frontier.
- It forbids military bases and fortifications on the moon and other celestial bodies.
- It prohibits the testing of weapons in space.
- It means that when man reaches the moon, he will land in a field of peace—not a new theater of war.

The spirit of international cooperation that has achieved this agreement is a beacon of hope for the future. It is a credit to all peoples. If we had sought for excuses to postpone agreement, we could have found them, I assure you, with the greatest of ease. Instead, we expended our efforts in achieving agreement—and we have succeeded.

The treaty was negotiated in less than 6 short months. For this, I gratefully thank our distinguished Ambassador Arthur Goldberg—who represented our country—and all the wise and constructive statesmen of the other lands who shared in that accomplishment.

The Senate of the United States gave its unanimous consent—and I can assure all of our distinguished friends from abroad that this is not something that happens here every day.

That unanimous action testifies to the depth and sincerity of the American people's support for the purposes outlined in this treaty.

<sup>1</sup> *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Oct. 16, 1967, pp. 1425-1426. The treaty appears *ante*, pp. 38-43.

This unity is not new. As the Secretary of State remarked, it was 9 years ago, when I was serving in the Senate, I appeared at the request of our very able then President. President Eisenhower, before the General Assembly of the United Nations. And upon that occasion, among other things, I had this to say:

... Until now our strivings toward peace have been heavily burdened by legacies of distrust and fear and ignorance and injury.

Those legacies do not exist in space. They will not appear there unless we send them on ahead.

To keep space as man has found it, and to harvest the yield of peace which it promises, we of the United States see one course—and only one—which the nations of earth may intelligently pursue. That is the course of full and complete and immediate cooperation to make the exploration of outer space a joint adventure.<sup>1</sup>

That was our position 9 years ago. It is our position now. I want to renew, therefore, today, America's offer to cooperate fully with any nation that may wish to join forces in this last—and greatest—journey of human exploration. Space is a frontier common to all mankind and it should be explored and conquered by humanity acting in concert.

We have urged cooperation

- in exploring the planets, or any portion of the solar system
- in the use of tracking facilities, so that our brave astronauts and cosmonauts may fly with much greater safety
- in mapping the earth
- in exchanging bioscientific information, and
- in international satellite communications.

We again renew these offers today. They are only the beginnings of what should be a long, cooperative endeavor in exploring the heavens together.

Whatever our disagreements here on earth, however long it may take to resolve our conflicts whose roots are buried centuries-deep in history, let us try to agree on this. Let us determine that the great space armadas of the future will go forth on voyages of peace—and will go forth in a spirit, not of national rivalry, but of peaceful cooperation and understanding.

The first decade of the Space Age has witnessed a kind of contest. We have been engaged in competitive spacemanship. We have accomplished much, but we have also wasted much energy and resources in duplicated or overlapping effort.

The next decade should increasingly become a partnership—not only between the Soviet Union and America, but among all nations under the sun and stars. I have directed the distinguished Secretary of State and the distinguished Director of NASA to bear this in mind every day in connection with their labors.

The hard business of foreign relations requires a certain optimism. One must be convinced that, in time, men and nations can direct their affairs toward constructive ends.

And it is with this optimism this morning that, here with you, I greet this treaty. I see it as a hopeful sign that mankind is learning,

<sup>1</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, Dec. 15, 1958, p. 978.

however slowly, that wars are not inevitable; that national rivalry is not a permanent barrier to international understanding; and that a world of hostility and hate need not be the abiding condition of mankind.

Thank you very much.

### **Report of Secretary-General Thant on the Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and on the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of These Weapons, October 10, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

1. By General Assembly resolution 2162 A (XXI) of 5 December 1966, the Secretary-General was requested to prepare, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, a report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons.<sup>2</sup>

2. In pursuance of this resolution, I appointed a group of consultant experts whose members were: Wilhelm Billig, Chairman of the State Council for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Poland; Alfonso León de Garay, Director of the Genetics and Radiobiology Programme, National Nuclear Energy Commission, Mexico; Vasily S. Emelyanov, Chairman of the Commission on the Scientific Problems of Disarmament of the Academy of Sciences of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Martin Fehrm, Director General of the Research Institute of Swedish National Defence; Bertrand Goldschmidt, Director of External Relations and Planning, Atomic Energy Commission, France; W. Bennett Lewis, Senior Vice-President, Science, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited; Takashi Mukaibo, Professor, Faculty of Engineering, University of Tokyo, Japan; H. M. A. Onitiri, Director, Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of Ibadan, Nigeria; John G. Palfrey, Professor of Law, Columbia University, New York, United States of America; Gunnar Randers, Managing Director, Norwegian Institute for Atomic Energy; Vikram A. Sarabhai, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission of India; Sir Solly Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Adviser to Her Majesty's Government, United Kingdom. Mr. Mullath A. Vellodi, Deputy to the Under-Secretary, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, served as Chairman. He was assisted by members of the Secretariat.

3. The consultant experts, in their personal capacities, have submitted to me a report containing their considered and unanimous views on the various and complex aspects of the subject matter of this report. The consultant experts have approached their task in the spirit of the resolution of the General Assembly and it gives me very great satisfaction that they were able through co-operation and understanding to

<sup>1</sup> A/6858, Oct. 10, 1967. The annexes are not printed here.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, p. 798.

come up with a unanimous report. What makes the report particularly valuable is the fact that, in trying to reach unanimity, the expert consultants have not avoided sensitive or even controversial issues. This is extremely significant because the value of the report lies in its clear and fair exposition of the problem. I am very pleased to be able to endorse their findings. I wish also to record my most sincere appreciation for their invaluable assistance in carrying out an important and delicate task.

4. I have therefore decided to transmit their report in full to the General Assembly as the report called for by resolution 2162 A (XXI). It is with a sense of gratification that I submit this report. As I wrote last year in the Introduction to the Annual Report on the Work of the Organization, "I believe that the time has come for an appropriate body of the United Nations to explore and weigh the impact and implications of all aspects of nuclear weapons . . . To know the true nature of the danger we face may be a most important first step towards averting it".<sup>8</sup> It is my hope that this report, and the ensuing debate by the General Assembly, will not only provide a deeper and clearer understanding of the effects of the nuclear arms race but also positively contribute to the search for ways to bring it to an end.

## REPORT OF THE GROUP OF CONSULTANT EXPERTS

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### LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

6 October 1967

We have the honour to submit herewith a unanimous report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons which we were invited to prepare in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 2162 A (XXI).

The report was drafted during meetings held in Geneva between 6 and 10 March and between 26 June and 5 July, and finalized at meetings held in New York between 2 and 6 October 1967. Mr. M. A. Vellodi, Deputy to the Under-Secretary, Department of Political and

<sup>8</sup> General Assembly *Official Records: Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 1A* (A/0301/Add. 1), p. 4.

Security Council Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, served as Chairman at all the sessions.

The Group of Consultant Experts wish to express their gratitude for the valuable assistance they received from the members of the Secretariat.

(Signed) WILHELM BILLIG	TAKASHI MUKAIDO
ALFONSO LEÓN DE GARAY	H. M. A. ONITIRI
VASILY S. EMEL'YANOV	JOHN G. PALFREY
MARTIN FEHRM	GUNNAR RANDERS
BERTHOLD GOLDSCHMIDT	VIKRAM A. SARABHAI
W. ANNETT LEWIS	Sir SOLLY ZUCKERMAN

The Secretary-General  
United Nations  
New York

## I. EFFECTS OF THE POSSIBLE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

### INTRODUCTION

1. The enormity of the shadow which is cast over mankind by the possibility of nuclear war makes it essential that its effects be clearly and widely understood. It is not enough to know that nuclear weapons add a completely new dimension to man's powers of destruction. Published estimates of the effects of nuclear weapons range all the way from the concept of the total destruction of humanity to the belief that a nuclear war would differ from a conventional conflict, not in kind, but only in scale. The situation, however, is not as arbitrary as opposing generalizations such as these might suggest. There is one inescapable and basic fact. It is that the nuclear armouries which are in being already contain large megaton weapons every one of which has a destructive power greater than that of all the conventional explosive that has ever been used in warfare since the day gunpowder was discovered. Were such weapons ever to be used in numbers, hundreds of millions of people might be killed, and civilization as we know it, as well as organized community life, would inevitably come to an end in the countries involved in the conflict. Many of those who survived the immediate destruction as well as others in countries outside the area of conflict, would be exposed to widely-spreading radio-active contamination, and would suffer from long-term effects of irradiation and transmit, to their offspring, a genetic burden which would become manifest in the disabilities of later generations.

2. These general propositions, whether set out dispassionately in scientific studies or directed as propaganda, have been proclaimed so often that their force has all but been lost through repetition. But their reality is none the less so stark that, unless the facts on which they are based are clearly set out, it will not be possible to realize the peril in which mankind now stands.

3. The purpose of the first section of this report is to provide a picture of the destructive power of nuclear weapons and of the conse-

quences of their use. It gives a brief account of the destruction wrought in Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the explosion of single and relatively small nuclear weapons. These two disasters are the only examples of the actual use of nuclear weapons in war, and they provide direct information about the kind of casualties caused by nuclear explosions. The first section also outlines some theoretical studies of the physical effects of much larger nuclear weapons on centres of population and on the civilian economy, as well as the effect such weapons would have on major military targets. It deals too with the implications of so-called tactical nuclear warfare, that is to say of field warfare in which nuclear weapons are used. To achieve a measure of realism, most of these studies were related to actual, as opposed to hypothetical geographical areas, towns or cities, that is to say cities with a particular pattern of public services, communications and food supply. In a widespread exchange of strategic nuclear weapons many cities would suffer devastation similar to that of the examples studied, with a cumulative interacting effect which would greatly exceed the simple addition of the direct results of individual attacks. Accepting that an attacker could always have the advantage over a defender in terms of surprise and weight of attack, no attempt has been made to complicate the general story by analysing the extent to which an ABM defense, together with civil defence measures, might reduce the scale of damage and the number of casualties which would result from a nuclear attack. It is enough to note that there is no active defence system in sight which would prevent all nuclear weapons from reaching their selected targets.

4. Some technical details and general characteristics of nuclear explosions are set out in annex I to this section. The genetic effects of nuclear radiation are discussed in annex II.

#### HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI

##### *Physical effects*

5. The first atomic bomb to be used in warfare had a yield of nearly twenty kilotons, that is to say it had an explosive force equivalent to nearly 20,000 tons of conventional chemical explosive (e.g., TNT). It was detonated at approximately 550 metres above Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. On 9 August a second atomic device, with a similar yield, was detonated at about the same height over Nagasaki. In Hiroshima, destruction was concentric around the centre of a spreading city whose population was about 300,000. Within seconds, a rapidly growing fire-ball developed into a mushroom-like cloud, supported, as it were, on a column of black smoke, and the heat radiating from the fire-ball caused thousands of fires.

6. By comparison with Hiroshima, Nagasaki was a narrow city surrounded by hills and open to the sea in only one direction, with a population of about 87,000 people living within three kilometres from the centre. The immediate effects of the explosion were the same, but the area of destruction and fire differed in accordance with the different layout of the cities. In both cases the heat of the explosion was so intense that, up to a distance of about a half kilometre from the centre of the disaster, the surface of domestic ceramic roof tiles melted and

firing of domestic wooden houses, by direct radiation, was observed up to one and a half kilometres.

7. There are varying estimates of the casualties<sup>4</sup> in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and it has proved difficult to estimate the exact numbers of exposed people who may have died after escaping from the city. Available estimates are that 78,000 were killed and 84,000 injured in Hiroshima, and that 27,000 were killed and 41,000 injured in Nagasaki. In addition, there were thousands missing in both towns. Most of the immediate fatal casualties were caused by the violent disruption of residential and office buildings. In Hiroshima, 60,000 houses were completely or partially destroyed. Wooden houses within two and a half kilometres radius were carried away, while brick buildings were turned into heaps of rubble. Severe damage to houses occurred as far out as eight kilometres. Walls, doors, bricks, glass, furniture and other debris hurtled through the air, crushing or damaging everything in their way. Moderately close to "ground-zero", by which is meant the point on the ground directly below the explosion, buildings were pushed over bodily, and at greater distances were leaning away from the source of the blast.

8. No exact information is available concerning the relative importance of blast, burns and nuclear radiation as the causes of fatalities in these bombings. Burn injuries constituted the major problem in medical care. People exposed in the open had been severely burned, injuries from direct radiation being incurred as far out as about two kilometres from the centre of the zone of destruction. From the day after the bombing, burns accounted for about one half of all the deaths. At the Kameyama Hospital in Hiroshima 53 per cent of the patients who received burns at one kilometre died within the first week and 75 per cent within two weeks. The peak mortality occurred on the fourth day. Another peak in deaths occurred in the third and the fourth week, when complications, especially those associated with radiation injury, set in. Twenty days after the attack it was found that, among burned survivors, the great majority (80-90 per cent) had suffered "flash" burns from the immediate absorption of the thermal radiation of the explosion on the exposed skin; some 5-15 per cent had suffered both flash and flame burns; a very few (2-3 per cent) had suffered flame burns only.

9. The explosion over Hiroshima rapidly led to a firestorm<sup>5</sup> which lasted for about six hours and which burned out an area of twelve square kilometres of the town. Within about two to three hours a wind, which started twenty minutes after the detonation of the bomb, reached a velocity of fifty to sixty kilometres per hour, blowing towards the burning city from all directions. Seventy per cent of the fire-fighting machines in Fire Brigade stations were rendered unus-

<sup>4</sup>The population and casualty figures referred to are taken from public announcements of local governments in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, six months after the explosions, based on reports by the survey mission of the National Research Council, Japan.

<sup>5</sup>A firestorm is not a special characteristic of nuclear explosion. It may be a consequence of a forest fire or an incendiary bomb attack, with high inward winds produced largely by the updraft of the heated air over an extensive burning area. The incidence of firestorms is dependent on conditions at the time of the attack, including the local availability of fuel.

able, and 80 per cent of the fire-fighting personnel were unable to respond to the emergency. The loss of water pressure through the breaking of pipes, mainly due to the collapse of buildings, contributed greatly to the additional destruction by fire. But even if men and machines had survived the blast, many fires would have been inaccessible within one and a half kilometres from ground-zero.

10. About 45,000 of the fatal casualties in Hiroshima died on the day of the explosion, and some 20,000 during the following four months, as a result of traumatic wounds, burns and radiation effects. There are no estimates of the numbers who may have died from the effects of induced radio-activity experienced during rescue work in the city. Most of the medical facilities in Hiroshima were in the devastated area of the city, and the methods adopted for treating casualties were consequently far below standard. Difficulties were aggravated by shortage of supplies and equipment, and by the extraordinary demands made on crippled medical staffs. Next to immediate medical problems, the most serious challenge to those who had survived the direct effects of the explosion, were problems of water supply, housing and food. Electrical distribution systems suffered severely, first by damage to overhead lines, and secondly by damage to switch gear and transformers caused by collapse of the structures in which they were located. To people who were not immediate casualties these difficulties compounded the profound psychological effects of the disaster of which they were part. Even twenty years after the bombings there is an excessive sensitivity of the people to the thought of radiation hazard, leading to difficulties in obtaining agreement about the siting of nuclear power plants.

#### *Long-term radiation effects*

11. Apart from the effects which ionizing radiation had on the immediate victims of the explosions, the survivors were also exposed to the hazards of the radiation both in terms of latent disease occurring in the individual (somatic effects) and of changes in hereditary material (genetic effects). It had been suspected for some time that exposure to repeated moderate doses of nuclear radiation is conducive to leukaemia, a disease which is associated with a malignant overproduction of white blood cells. A study of the survivors of the two nuclear explosions, over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, shows that the disease can undoubtedly result from a large single (acute) dose of radiation. The incidence of leukaemia in the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was observed to be increasing in 1948. It reached a peak in 1950-52. Although it seems to have decreased somewhat since then, it still remains much higher than in the unexposed population of the rest of Japan. While the incidence of the disease increased in all age groups, it did so rather more sharply in young people. The incidence in survivors was up to fifty times greater in those within about one kilometre of the explosion than in people who were further away. It was ten times greater for those within one and one half kilometres than for those between two and ten kilometres from ground-zero.

12. A continuing study of the survivors of the two Japanese disasters has also suggested an increased incidence for other kinds of

malignant cancer, particularly cancer of the thyroid, and not just leukaemia, which has a much shorter latent interval. There is also a hint, but as yet no more than a hint, that the average expectation of life is less in the survivors of the exposed population whether or not they suffered malignant disease. This is an effect of radiation which has been proved in experimental animals. The indications are stronger that a significantly high proportion of the babies born to women who were pregnant when exposed to the explosion, and who survived, had heads smaller than average size, and that some of these suffered severe mental retardation.

13. Insufficient time has passed since these two nuclear disasters to determine what genetic changes, if any, were induced in the survivors. In any case, although long-term genetic effects would indeed be consequences of radiation in nuclear warfare, such effects are of prime concern only where the acute effects can be disregarded, i.e., in areas far removed from the immediate target areas in a nuclear war or under conditions of intense testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. Hence for the purpose of this report, it has not been thought necessary to discuss fully the present state of knowledge about the genetic effects of ionizing radiation. Some facts concerning these effects are given in annex II. All that need be noted here is that radiation from nuclear explosions can cause genetic mutations and chromosome anomalies which may lead to serious physical and mental disabilities in future generations. These effects may arise either from the radiation released in the first few instants after a nuclear explosion or from that released through the later radio-active decay of the substances contained in "fall-out" from the explosion. In this connexion it should be noted that there was no significant local fall-out in either Hiroshima or Nagasaki since, in both cases, the explosions occurred fairly high in the atmosphere.

#### THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE POSSIBLE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN FUTURE WARS

14. In all wars, advancing armies have sought to capture vital enemy objectives, such as cities, industrial zones and food producing areas, as well as to command the transport system linking them. Air warfare has made it possible to attack and destroy such targets without first defeating the defending armies. The obliteration of the distinction between the "front" or the "rear" of a war zone, which came about as a result of the air offensives of the Second World War, has now been compounded by the advent of nuclear weapons. Those who defined the two Japanese targets for the first and only atomic bombs yet used in war, held that the bombs should be used so as to create the maximum psychological effect, and thus break the will of the Japanese people to continue the fight. Some present-day military theorists who write about nuclear war, speak of attacks on cities taking place simultaneously with, or even before, attacks on armed forces and specific military targets.

15. It is therefore necessary to build up a picture of what would happen if a large city were attacked not with kiloton weapons of the kind used on the two Japanese cities but with the much more powerful hydrogen bombs or fusion bombs which are available now and whose


yield is usually expressed in megatons, i.e., unit yields equivalent to one million tons of chemical explosive. Because of the nature of nuclear weapons all their separate destructive effects, whether immediate or delayed, could never be maximized in a single explosion. For example, the areas affected by blast, thermal radiation and initial nuclear radiation would be appreciably smaller for a ground burst than an air burst of the same energy yield. On the other hand, a ground-burst would be accompanied by early radio-active fall-out, which would be much less for an air-burst. With air-bursts, the relative importance of the various effects would depend on the height of the burst.

16. Since every city has its own individuality, its own pattern of services, communications and food supplies, a realistic picture of what would happen cannot be derived unless one considers a real city, and analyses the effects zone by zone, taking into account differences between them in population density, function and so on. One such study was made of a city, with a population of just over one million people, which extended in all directions for about eight to ten kilometres (i.e., with a surface area of some 250 sq. km or about 100 sq. miles), and attacked, it was assumed, with a single one megaton nuclear weapon, burst at ground level. Using the experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and estimating also on the basis of the results of carefully designed weapons effects experiments, the following figures of casualties emerged:

Killed by blast and fire	270,000	
Killed by radio- active fall-out	90,000	
Injured	90,000	(of whom 15,000 were in the area of fall-out and thus ex- posed to the effects of radiation)
Uninjured	710,000	(of whom 115,000 were in the area of fall-out)

17. Approximately one-third of all the inhabitants would have been killed as a result of blast and fire or from a radiation dose received in the first two days. One-third of a million dead, is approximately the same number of civilians who were killed by air raids both in Germany and in Japan during the whole of the Second World War. Practically all the inhabitants of the central area of the city, an area of about six by five kilometres, would have been killed, mainly as a result of the destruction caused by blast and fire. Any who were not immediately killed in the central area would have died from nuclear radiation. At the outer boundary of the central area (hatched area, figure I) the proportion of casualties in the population would fall to 75 per cent, and would then continue to fall as the distance from the burst increased. Most of the 90,000 of the city's population who would have suffered non-lethal injuries would have been serious casualties, and, for 15 to 20 per cent of these, rescue operations would have been greatly impeded by radio-active fall-out. In the part of the population who, on this particular analysis, were not counted as casualties, 20 per cent would have

Figure 1  
Casualties  
(within city boundary)




Distribution of casualties

- A. Encloses central area 6 x 5 km where practically the whole population would have been killed.
- B. Is a line through a point 2-1/2 km west of bomb-burst marking limit of fall-out.
- C. Marks area inside which a person would have received a lethal dose from fall-out in 48 hours if he had stayed in the open.

Figure II

Effect of a ground-burst megaton bomb on the 1,160,000 inhabitants




been subject to radio-active fall-out hazards. Only half of the total population in the city would have been both uninjured and unaffected by fall-out (figure II).

18. The scale of the physical destruction which would be associated with casualties of this order of magnitude is so great that there is no basis of experience which could serve to help describe the instantaneous transformation of a vast living city into a sea of blazing rubble. Every house or building would be damaged; about one third would be completely wrecked, i.e., with damage ranging from utter and complete obliteration, to buildings with more than half their walls down; another one third would be severely damaged, i.e., wrecked for all practical purposes, but perhaps providing some temporary shelter if nothing else were available. Only about one third of the original houses would be in any way serviceable, although they would have lost a great part of their roofs, doors and windows (figure III). In many areas, water and gas mains, sewers, and power supplies would have been destroyed. Not a single area would have retained all its essential serv-

Figure III


Effect of a ground-burst megaton bomb  
on accommodation



ices (figure IV). Roads would have been erased and even the lightly damaged peripheral areas would very likely be deprived of their water supplies and sources of food supply. It is all but impossible to conceive of the amount of improvisation and reorganization which would be demanded from the shocked survivors in the period immediately following the attack, even though every possible plan had been made to deal with the anticipated results of a possible strike.

19. Against this background of death, injury, destruction and fire, one can see the whole life of a great city being completely disrupted by the explosion of a single megaton bomb. As an organized unit, capable of contributing to a war effort, it would cease to have any meaning. The survivors in different parts of the city would either be in a state of shocked immobility or would be wandering about trying to find some place better than the one where they happened to be when the bomb went off, searching for food, for better shelter, for relatives, for help of any kind. The problems confronting the community would be immeasurably greater than any experience of the Second World War. In hostile circumstances of the kind we are assuming, it would be unrealistic to suppose that only one city would be struck. With many in the same desperate plight, there could be no question of any substantial help being brought to the survivors from outside. In brief, a big city of the size that has been described, a city in which more than a million people lived in an area of about 250 sq. km would for all

Figure IV Services destroyed



practical purposes be eliminated by a single one-megaton weapon ground-burst near its centre. One-megaton bombs are small units in the megaton spectrum; larger weapons, much larger ones, are now stockpiled.

#### *Radio-active contamination*

20. Close to the explosion the lethal effects of radiation would be instantaneous. But nuclear weapon explosions also give rise to radio-active fission products and, in the case of a ground-burst, these become mixed with earth particles sucked into the atmosphere. The heavier particles of soil and weapon debris fall back to the ground and settle in the vicinity of the explosion, giving rise to delayed radiation hazards. These particles constitute local radio-active fall-out. For a ground-burst of the type assumed in the foregoing paragraphs, the area of intense fall-out could cover hundreds of square kilometres. Within such an area, people who were not adequately sheltered and who did not remain under cover until the radio-activity of the fall-out had decayed substantially, would be exposed to intensities of radiation sufficient to produce very serious hazards to health. Figure V illustrates a fall-out pattern in the amount of nuclear radiation which an individual would receive in rads per hour for an idealized case of one particular wind speed, in a given direction, following a one-megaton




Figure V. Idealized unit-time reference dose-rate pattern for early fall-out from a 1-megaton fission yield surface-burst (24 km/hr effective wind speed).

explosion at ground level. Beyond the area of intense fall-out there would be a very much larger zone where significant intensities of radiation would be experienced and where a proportion of the people who were exposed would still be at risk. (For significance of irradiation doses, see annex I, table 4.)

21. The picture painted in paragraphs 16-19 was derived, as already observed, from a detailed analysis of an actual city, taking into account its true layout, and the differential distribution of its population. If, instead, one assumes the general case of a single megaton explosion at a height of about 3,000 metres rather than at ground level, over a hypothetical city having a population of one million people who are evenly distributed in a built up area of twenty by twenty kilometres, the following general conclusions emerge:

(a) Within a radius of about three kilometres from the explosion, all buildings would be destroyed and 90 per cent of those inhabiting the area would be casualties (dead and seriously injured):

(b) Within a radius of three to six kilometres there would be partial or complete destruction of buildings, and 50 per cent of those inhabiting the area would be casualties. The survivors would have to be evacuated;

(c) Within a radius of between six and nine kilometres there would still be heavy destruction to buildings and about 35 per cent of the inhabitants would be casualties.

22. It is estimated that 40 per cent of the total population of such a city would be casualties as a result of blast and fire alone, and that 60 per cent of the entire city would be destroyed. In addition, direct thermal radiation might cause burn casualties and fires as far as ten to fifteen kilometres from ground-zero.

23. For a ten-megaton explosion over such a hypothetical city, the area of complete or serious destruction would cover between 300 and 500 sq. kilometres, that is to say the area of the entire city. Moreover the effects of blast and direct radiation would extend well beyond its boundaries, with heath and forest fires raging up to twenty kilometres from the ground-zero of the explosion. Half of the entire population over an area of radius of some twenty-five kilometres could be expected to die within the first few days as a result of radio-active contamination, even after allowing for some shelter provision.

24. In the case of an air-burst of a twenty-megaton bomb the heat which would result would be intense enough to start fires as far as thirty kilometres from a point of detonation, depending on how clear the atmosphere was at the time, and could endanger the lives of people in an area with a radius of nearly sixty kilometres. It has been estimated that such a device, if exploded over Manhattan, would, in the absence of shelter or evacuation programmes, probably kill 6 million out of New York City's 8 million inhabitants, and lead to an additional one million deaths beyond the city limits. The surface explosion of a twenty-megaton bomb would result in the formation of a crater 75-90 metres deep and 800 metres in diameter. (See reference 3 in annex III.)

## ESTIMATE OF EFFECTS OF A NUCLEAR ATTACK ON A REGION OF A COUNTRY

25. A study was made of the likely results of a nuclear attack on a hypothetical industrial region, consisting of nine cities each with populations of over 50,000 inhabitants (some well over), and also containing 140 smaller towns of fewer than 50,000 inhabitants (about sixty of which contained elements of key industry). Assuming that a one-megaton bomb burst at ground level in each of the nine cities, the study showed that cumulative estimates of casualties provided a very inadequate measure of the over-all effects of the attack. The estimates showed that 20 per cent of the total population, or 30 per cent of the urban population, or 35 per cent of the key-industrial population would be killed. The houses destroyed would be 30 per cent of total or 40 per cent of urban, or 50 per cent of those occupied by key-industrial population. But cities are not isolated entities; they are linked in a variety of functional ways, being dependent on each other for raw materials of different kinds, as well as for semi-finished and finished manufactured goods. Taking the interaction of effects into account, the study showed that the percentage of key industry in the whole region, (i.e., industry with more than local significance) which would be brought to a stop would be between 70 per cent and 90 per cent of the whole. The lower figure of 70 per cent takes account of everything directly destroyed or completely disrupted inside the target cities; the higher figure of 90 per cent includes the areas surrounding the city which would also be indirectly "knocked out" through, for example, failure of communications or supplies of raw materials and food. The more interdependent they are, the larger is the multiplying factor one has to bear in mind when estimating the cumulative effects of the destruction of single cities.

26. Another more general study envisaged a nuclear attack on a small country, extending about 1,000 km. in one direction and 500 km. in the other, i.e., with an area 500,000 sq. km. and a population density of 100 people per square km. It was assumed that one part of the country was attacked with four nuclear weapons each of twenty megatons. Such an attack would affect about 100,000 square kilometres, or some 20 per cent of the country's total expanse by blast, radiation and radio-active contamination. The over-all consequences of the devastation would vary according to the nature of the particular area attacked, e.g., according to whether it contained key cities, sources of electric power, raw materials or whether it was a prime food producing area. But in every case, economic life would be completely disrupted and the general devastation, including radio-active contamination from low bursts would be such as to prevent any immediate assistance being brought to the devastated areas from outside. In hypothetical studies of this kind it has also been estimated that in the absence of special protection, blast-induced deaths alone resulting from high level 400 ten-megaton bombs aimed at United States metropolitan areas, would eliminate more than half of the total American population of some 200 million people. Even if they were all in substantial fall-out shelters the same proportion would be killed if the weapons were burst at ground level.


27. A Swedish study of the consequences of nuclear attacks against Swedish cities showed that an attack carried out with about 200 weapons, ranging from 20 kilotons to 200 kilotons in yield, would result in 2 to 3 million casualties, i.e., 30 to 40 per cent of the total population of about 7 million people. It also showed that between 30 to 70 per cent of Swedish industry would be destroyed, and that about two thirds of the industrial workers would receive fatal or severe injuries. The weight of attack assumed in this particular study is relatively heavy, but none the less it corresponds to only a small fraction of the nuclear weapons that are already stockpiled in nuclear arsenals.

28. Swedish studies have also shown that the degree of protection against radio-active fall-out which might be provided by existing buildings in urban and rural areas in Sweden varies greatly. In no region would existing buildings provide adequate protection against the higher levels of radiation which could be experienced in the intense part of the fall-out area. But effective protection might be provided over the greater part of the fall-out area, given there had been time to construct shelters, and to stock them with food and other necessities of life. Even ordinary buildings, if they remain standing, do provide some protection from the radiation caused by fall-out.

29. In addition to a need to protect against external residual nuclear radiation, i.e., radiation emitted later than one minute after a nuclear explosion, there is the further hazard of internal radiation resulting from the ingestion of any radio-active fall-out material that had contaminated food, particularly vegetable food, and in some cases open water supplies. The amount of radio-active material which could be taken into the body by way of contaminated food would exceed that from the inhalation of contaminated air or absorption of contaminated water. The radio-activity of this absorbed material would decay by the emission of damaging nuclear radiation.

30. Urbanization clearly increases the hazard of radio-active contamination because of the concentration of increasing numbers of inhabitants in comparatively small areas. This applies particularly in Europe. An analysis of about 100 European cities showed that while the larger cities are on average about thirty to fifty kilometres from each other, the smaller cities are on average no more than ten to fifteen kilometres apart. In Germany villages are on average only from one to two kilometres apart. Radio-active contamination, despite a continuous decrease in intensity, would persist for years following a heavy nuclear attack, and would create continuing problems in food producing areas and to water supplies. Figure VI illustrates the possible far-ranging effect of radio-active fall-out from a twenty-megaton explosion on Hamburg, while figure VII illustrates the similar consequences of a fifteen-megaton explosion on London (see annex I, table 4, for clinical effects of radiation doses). It has been calculated that a twenty-megaton explosion on the American city of Boston would cause such a degree of fall-out over an area with a radius of nearly fifty kilometres that half of the unsheltered people on the fringe of this area would die within forty-eight hours. Even if shelters were provided, high doses of radiation might be received which, even if not fatal, could still produce extensive radiation sickness, as well as long-term somatic and genetic effects.

Figure VI




Estimated fall-out contamination area after 20-megaton nuclear explosion on Hamburg. Radiation dose is given for 48 hours after detonation.

#### EFFECTS ARISING FROM THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN FIELD WARFARE

31. In certain quarters it is still military doctrine that any disparity in the conventional strength of opposing forces could be redressed by using nuclear weapons in the zone of battle. This proposition needs to be considered first in the context that both sides possess these weapons, and second when the situation is asymmetrical and only one side is a nuclear weapons Power. Section III of this report deals with the latter case. In the former, where the situation is symmetrical, carefully conducted and dispassionate theoretical studies of the use of nuclear weapons in field war, including analyses of an extensive series of "war games" relating to the European theatre, have led to the clear conclusion that this military doctrine could lead to the use of hundreds, and not of tens, of so-called tactical nuclear weapons in the battle-field area, given that both sides resort to their use. Without going into the details of these studies, it can be firmly stated that, were nuclear weapons to be used in this way, they could lead to the devastation of the whole battle zone. Almost everything would be destroyed; forests

Figure VII



Estimated fall-out contamination area after a 15-megaton nuclear explosion on London. Radiation dose is given for 36 hours after detonation.

would be razed to the ground and only the strongest buildings would escape total destruction. Fires would be raging everywhere. Circumstances such as these, would be incompatible with the continued conduct of military operations within the zones of devastation.

32. An offensive on the scale to which all these studies point, over a land battle area with a front of, say, 250 km and 50 km deep, would render hundreds of thousands, even millions, homeless. Such a level of destruction could be achieved with only 100 small nuclear weapons in a European battle area chosen because it did not contain any large towns. With 400 weapons, which is not an unreasonably large number if both sides used nuclear weapons in a battle zone, the physical damage caused would correspond to something like six times that caused by all the bombing of the Second World War—and all sustained in a few days rather than a few years. If one sets aside the profound, even if unquantifiable psychological effects of such an exchange, the resulting chaos would still be beyond imagination.

33. The estimates show that with 100 weapons having an average yield of thirty kilotons (range 5 to 50 kilotons) about one tenth of the assumed typical European battle area would be completely devastated, and about one quarter severely damaged. With 200 weapons about one fifth would be devastated and half of it severely damaged; and with 400 weapons about one third of the area would be devastated and all severely damaged. Even for only 100 strikes, this represents

destruction on an unimaginable scale over an area of about 12,500 sq. km. In another European "war-game" study, a battle was envisaged in which the two opposing sides together used weapons whose total yield was between twenty and twenty-five megatons, in not fewer than 500 and in not more than 1,000 strikes. The nuclear weapons were supposed to have been used against military targets only, in an area of about 25,000 sq. km. In this engagement about 3.5 million people would have had their homes destroyed if the weapons had been air-burst, and 1.5 million if the weapons had been ground-burst. In the former case, at least half of the people concerned would have been fatally or seriously injured. In the case of ground-burst weapons, 1.5 million would have been exposed to lethal doses of radiation and a further 5 million to the hazard of considerable although non-lethal doses of radiation.

34. A question which immediately poses itself is whether military operations would be compatible with destruction of the scale indicated by estimates such as these. A vast civilian population would be involved unless the battle took place in desert conditions. The number of casualties, civilian and military, cannot be easily related, in any precise way, to the population actually in the area at the time of the battle. Because the need to reduce the level of military casualties would dictate tactics of dispersal, the number of nuclear strikes necessary to produce assumed military results would go up very rapidly. Fear and terror, both in the civil and military population, might overwhelm the situation.

35. Military planners have no past experience on which to call for any guide as to how military operations could proceed in circumstances such as these. When such levels of physical destruction are reached, one might well ask what would determine the course of a nuclear battle? Would it be the number of enemy casualties? Would it be the violent psychological reaction, fear and terror, to the horror of widespread instantaneous destruction? Would the chaos immediately bring all military operations to a halt? Whatever the answer to these questions, it is clear enough that the destruction and disruption which would result from so-called tactical nuclear war would hardly differ from the effects of strategic war in the area concerned. The concept of escalation from tactical to strategic nuclear war could have no possible meaning in an area within which field warfare was being waged with nuclear weapons.

36. This picture is not altered if one postulates so-called "clean" nuclear weapons, in place of those which formed the basis of the foregoing studies. Claims have been made about the possibilities of providing for battlefield use, low yield weapons (say 1 to 10 kilotons) which would release an abnormally high proportion of their energy in blast and nuclear radiation, while producing virtually no radioactive fall-out. "Clean", in this context, is a matter of degree. These suggested weapons would basically rely on a fission reaction so that radio-active fall-out could never be completely avoided.<sup>6</sup> In any case,

<sup>6</sup>The same would apply to larger so-called "clean" weapons used in a strategic role. In this case there would in addition be considerable induced radio-activity caused by the capture of neutrons in atmospheric carbon, thus producing very long-lived radio-active carbon-14. So far as long-range and long-term fall-out

the foregoing studies postulated nuclear explosions which yielded minimal radio-active contamination from normal fission weapons. The resulting chaos in the battlefield area was brought about, not by fall-out, but primarily through blast effects. Thus, if "clean" weapons were available for battlefield use it is difficult to believe that similar chaos would not ultimately be produced. Sooner or later the battlefield situation must be expected to become similar to that which the foregoing studies have indicated.

#### *Interdiction targets*

37. Were such weapons ever to be used in a war it is also quite certain that they would not be restricted to the battle zone itself— even if it were assumed that there would not be what is usually referred to as a strategic exchange. It is part of the concept of tactical nuclear warfare that in a purely military campaign they would also be used outside the area of contact in order to impede the movement of enemy forces, the operation of air forces and so on. The objectives which would be attacked in order to achieve these effects are generally called interdiction targets. Theoretical studies of operations of this kind provide a picture of "deep" nuclear strikes whose effects would be hardly distinguishable from a strategic nuclear exchange in which both sides set out from the start to destroy each other's major centres of population. To illustrate what is implied, reference can be made to a single strike in one such study on which it was assumed that the railway installations in a major transport centre were attacked by a single twenty-kiloton bomb, or a single 100-kiloton bomb, in order to make the centre impassable to troops and supplies, and thereby to assist the land battle elsewhere. The railway centre chosen for this study was a city with 70,000 inhabitants living in 23,000 houses in an area of some fifty sq. kms. The bomb was assumed to be burst at ground level so as to maximize the effects on the railway lines. This mode of attack, unlike that used against the Japanese cities, would at the same time also maximize local fall-out damage. With the twenty-kiloton bomb, railway tracks would be demolished over a length of about 100 metres, a large amount of spoil from the crater would cover all lines in the vicinity, blockage would be caused by the collapse of road bridges, rail flyovers and buildings out to about one-half of a mile from the burst. All fuel depots and servicing sheds would be destroyed. With a 100-kiloton bomb the scale of damage would, of course, be greater; about one mile of track would be destroyed or blocked by heavy debris, and the main roads through the town would be completely blocked. The problem of reopening a road or railway would be hampered by a vast amount of radio-active debris. It would indeed be so great that it would almost certainly be easier to build a new by-pass round the town. If such attacks formed part of a general "interdiction" programme of bombing, it stands to reason that the transport communication system of a country could be totally wrecked in a very short time, and with it much more as well.

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is concerned, this radio-active hazard from so-called "clean" weapons is comparable in importance to that from less "clean" weapons.

38. The estimated inescapable collateral effects of bombing a single railway centre in such a programme of attacks indicate that most of the industrial and commercial property in the middle of the town would have been destroyed. Fire would have consumed not only houses but also the larger buildings and factories not immediately destroyed by the explosion. A twenty-kiloton bomb in an "interdiction" attack on a town which was a communications centre—and few, if any communication centres are not towns—would kill about a quarter of the 70,000 inhabitants, while a 100-kiloton attack would kill about half. The survivors would have to contend with the same kind of situation as has been depicted in the case of the two Japanese cities bombed in 1945, or the larger city attacked by a one-megaton weapon which has been described above. A programme of "interdiction" attacks on targets behind the zone of contact of opposing armies, if such a programme included communication centres as well as airfields, supply depots, armament factories and so on, would be no different in its effects from those of a widespread so-called strategic nuclear exchange between two opposing Powers.

#### DETERRENCE OR WAR

39. Nuclear weapons constitute one of the dominant facts of modern world politics. They are at present deployed in thousands by the nuclear weapon Powers, with warheads ranging from kilotons to megatons. We have already witnessed the experimental explosion of a fifty to sixty-megaton bomb, i.e. of a weapon with about 3,000 times the power of the bomb used in 1945 against Japan. Hundred-megaton devices, weapons about 3,000 times the size of those used in 1945, are no more difficult to devise. They could be exploded just outside the atmosphere of any country, in order utterly to destroy hundreds, even thousands, of square kilometres by means of blast and spreading fire. It has been suggested on good authority that in certain geographical circumstances multi-megaton weapons could also be exploded in ships near coastlines in order to create enormous tidal waves which would engulf the coastal belt.

40. The effects of all-out nuclear war, regardless of where it started, could not be confined to the Powers engaged in that war. They themselves would have to suffer the immediate kind of destruction and the immediate and more enduring lethal fall-out whose effects have already been described. But neighbouring countries, and even countries in parts of the world remote from the actual conflict, could soon become exposed to the hazards of radio-active fall-out precipitated at great distances from the explosion, after moving through the atmosphere as a vast cloud. Thus, at least within the same hemisphere, an enduring radio-active hazard could exist for distant as well as close human populations, through the ingestion of foods derived from contaminated vegetation, and the external irradiation due to fall-out particles deposited on the ground. The extent and nature of the hazard would depend upon the numbers and type of bombs exploded. Given a sufficient number, no part of the world would escape exposure to biologically significant levels of radiation. To a greater or lesser degree, a legacy of genetic damage could be incurred by the world's population.

41. It is to be expected that no major nuclear Power could attack another without provoking a nuclear counter-attack. It is even possible that an aggressor could suffer more in retaliation than the nuclear Power it first attacked. In this lies the concept of deterrence by the threat of nuclear destruction. Far from an all-out nuclear exchange being a rational action which could ever be justified by any set of conceivable political gains, it may be that no country would, in the pursuit of its political objectives, deliberately risk the total destruction of its own capital city, leave alone the destruction of all its major centres of population; or risk the resultant chaos which would leave in doubt a government's ability to remain in control of its people. But the fact that a state of mutual nuclear deterrence prevails between the Super Powers does not, as we know all too well, prevent the outbreak of wars with conventional weapons involving both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon nations; the risk of nuclear war remains as long as there are nuclear weapons.

42. The basic facts about the nuclear bomb and its use are harsh and terrifying for civilization; they have become lost in a mass of theoretical verbiage. It has been claimed that the world has learnt to live with the bomb; it is also said there is no need for it to drift unnecessarily into the position that it is prepared to die for it. The ultimate question for the world to decide in our nuclear age—and this applies both to nuclear and non-nuclear Powers—is what short-term interests it is prepared to sacrifice in exchange for an assurance of survival and security.

## II. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACQUISITION AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

### *General considerations*

43. Concern about the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons stems not only from the calamitous effects of possible use but from the consciousness that the immense resources devoted to their production could instead be used, according to the expressed aim of the United Nations, "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom".<sup>7</sup>

44. To understand the economic implications of embarking on the development of a nuclear armoury it is necessary to become clear about the volume and kind of resources such a step demands. The evaluation needs to be in terms not only of the physical and financial resources absorbed but of the opportunities foregone through devoting these resources to destructive weapons. It is not easy to come by some of the relevant information, and no estimates can be better than illustrative.

45. Any given size of effort will have economic implications which differ according to the nuclear and industrial base from which the programme starts. Moreover, a penalty of the arms race is that no size of programme ever satisfies. Even if it became possible to set a limit to an arsenal of nuclear warheads, their delivery systems and the defence of their bases can absorb effort indefinitely.

<sup>7</sup> Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations.

46. The magnitude and timing of any programme depends on the base of the country's scientific, technical and industrial capability.

47. Scientific and technical capability determines the country's ability to undertake the problems of:

- (a) Production of fissile and other material to meet the necessary strict specifications;
- (b) Warhead assembly and testing;
- (c) Development and control of the delivery vehicles, weather missile or aircraft units in an effective operating system.

It involves personnel represented by physicists, chemists, metallurgists, mathematicians, engineers, skilled machine tool operators, electricians, pipefitters, welders, sheet-metal workers, furnace and chemical plant operators, instrument makers and fabricators, who are essential for manufacture and assembly of components to the scientific specifications.

48. Industrial capability is measured by the country's established experience in fields of advanced technology, such as nuclear energy, aviation, electronics and space technology.

49. In arriving at the cost figures presented below, countries possessing the above capabilities have been used as a basis, and it is therefore to be expected that costs would be considerably higher for countries which are less developed and have to devote major efforts to establishing these basic prerequisites. It should also be remembered that whereas the development of nuclear armament by an industrially developed country may mean diverting resources from work that improves a standard of life already rather high, the same development on the part of an industrially developing country may have to be done at the expense of the basic economic needs of a substantial fraction of the population.

50. The estimated costs, supported by some actual figures, for a first generation of simple nuclear warheads together with an unsophisticated delivery-vehicle system indicate that the acquisition of such a system may be within the reach of a number of nations. These cost figures, however, bear hardly any credibility as representing a limit lasting for any significant time, even for an industrialized country. The reasoning is that after having acquired the initial unsophisticated nuclear weapons system, the need to develop less vulnerable and more sophisticated delivery systems seems certain to be felt in order to secure the military and political objectives of the force. It thus seems that the total costs of acquiring a nuclear weapons system over, say, ten years are liable under certain circumstances to be closer to the costs given for the French and United Kingdom systems up to 1969, namely, \$8,000 to \$9,000 million (EMU dollars = US dollars) than to the \$1,700 to \$2,000 million derived below for an unsophisticated system. (Any system employing unorthodox means of delivery, such as a ship or commercial aircraft, has been ruled out as not a viable course for any nation to pursue.)

51. The detail that follows, supported by annex IV shows, on the one hand, that the cost of producing the weapons can probably be

estimated with fair accuracy, at least in countries with developed peaceful nuclear activities. On the other hand, experience has shown that the major part of the cost of a nuclear force is that of the delivery systems and, in particular, of the missiles, and these are liable to very large overruns and continuing costly development.

52. The indigenous development of a nuclear weapon capability is thus seen to demand not only major financial resources but very highly specialized human resources that are liable to be even more significant.

#### *Basic costs of nuclear warheads*

53. The three fissile materials suitable for use as nuclear explosives are uranium-235, plutonium-239 and uranium-233. Uranium-233 is still rare, so its cost has not been considered here. A kilogramme of natural uranium contains seven grammes of uranium-235, while the main component is uranium-238. For use as a nuclear explosive the uranium-235 has to be separated and concentrated or "enriched" to 90-95 per cent of total uranium. The five nuclear weapons Powers have each established a capability for producing highly enriched uranium-235. So far as is known only one process for uranium-235 isotope separation has been put into large-scale use. It is known as the gaseous diffusion process and is applied to gaseous uranium-hexafluoride (UF<sub>6</sub>). This process requires large and costly plants based on an advanced technology which has not been fully disclosed. The total cost of the three United States plants was around \$2,300 million, and the annual operating costs were estimated at from \$500 to \$600 million, resulting in a cost of \$11,000 to \$12,000 per kilogramme of weapons-grade uranium. Some twenty-five kilogrammes of this material would be required for the production of one nuclear warhead with a yield in the twenty-kiloton range. Uranium-235 is preferred over plutonium for the production of thermonuclear weapons (H-bombs).

54. Plutonium-239 results from exposing uranium-238 to neutrons in a nuclear reactor. It is estimated that some eight kilogrammes of 95 per cent plutonium-239 would be needed for a nuclear warhead yielding a twenty-kiloton explosion.

55. A complete plutonium-239 production complex would require plants for concentrating uranium ore, refining the uranium to high purity, and probably reducing it to metal ingot, and for fabricating reactor fuel, a nuclear reactor, a chemical plant for plutonium extraction and one for reducing plutonium to metal, together with numerous service facilities. For production complexes with capacities in the range of 8-160 kilogrammes of weapons-grade plutonium per year, the capital costs would be in the range of \$22-\$87 million, and the annual operating costs \$5-\$10 million, resulting in a cost of \$900,000 per kilogramme of plutonium for the small complex and \$120,000 per kilogramme for the larger complex over the ten-year programme.

56. Considering the high cost of the gaseous diffusion plant for uranium-235, it would seem that a country planning to make only a small number of nuclear warheads per year would go to the plutonium type. This is particularly so if it has an established activity in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, since plutonium is produced as a by-product in most nuclear reactors.

*Designing, manufacturing and testing*

57. The amount of published information relating to warhead assembly and testing is severely limited by military secrecy.

58. According to a Swedish study made for the purpose of this report the capital investments in a factory for assembling ten warheads per year would be about \$8 million and annual operating costs about \$1 million.

59. According to the same Swedish study the total costs of testing one twenty-kiloton device underground would amount to \$12 million, and the costs of testing four such devices would amount to \$15 million.

## COSTS FOR VARIOUS WARHEADS PRODUCTION PROGRAMMES

*Plutonium warheads production programme*

60. Based on the estimated cost figures given for plutonium production and warhead design, manufacturing and testing, the total estimated costs of a small programme (one twenty-kiloton warhead per year over ten years) and a moderate programme (ten twenty-kiloton warheads per year over ten years) are shown below in table 1. The small programme would cost \$11 million per year, i.e. \$11 million per warhead, whereas the moderate programme would cost \$19 million per year, resulting in a warhead unit price of \$1.9 million. If the small programme could be combined with plutonium production in a large power reactor, the annual costs might be reduced to \$6 million and consequently the warhead unit costs to \$6 million.

Table 1

Estimated costs for various plutonium-based warhead production programmes

	Small programme (10×20-kiloton devices over ten years)	Moderate programme (100×20-kiloton devices over ten years)
	\$ (in millions)	\$ (in millions)
Fissile material	70.0	154.0
Design and manufacture	18.0	18.0
Testing	12.0	15.0
Storage, maintenance	4.0	4.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>104.0</b>	<b>188.0</b>
<b>Annual average</b>	<b>11.0</b>	<b>19.0</b>
<b>Cost per warhead</b>	<b>11.0</b>	<b>1.9</b>

*Production programme including thermonuclear warheads*

61. The escalation of the total warheads production costs resulting from the construction and operation of a diffusion plant for enriching uranium-235 and the development and testing of thermonuclear weapons is well demonstrated by the French example shown in table 2. The gaseous diffusion plant was built after 1960.

Table 2  
Costs of total French nuclear warheads programme

	Missile material production	Design and manufacture	Testing	Total
	\$( in millions)	\$( in millions)	\$( in millions)	\$( in millions)
To 1960	160	40	40	240
1960-1964	880	460	300	1,640
1965-1970				3,180
Grand Total	1,040 (to 1964)	500 (to 1964)	340 (to 1964)	5,060

### *Cost of delivery vehicles*

62. Table 3 gives a summary of the reported procurement and operation costs for a variety of delivery vehicles, ranging from elementary to sophisticated systems. The table indicates that the total delivery vehicle costs in most circumstances will be greater than the nuclear weapons costs.

63. The accuracy with which delivery vehicle costs were predicted has been notoriously poor. Heavy overruns of expenditures have been the rule rather than the exception and have been concurrent with lengthy delays in the projected time-tables. Many instances exist of the deployment of extremely costly but already obsolescent weapons systems, which were withdrawn a very short time after their initial deployment. Furthermore, while it is not always correct, it can be generally assumed that the accuracy of cost and time estimates for both the development and production of delivery vehicles is a function of prior related experience. Overruns are therefore more likely to be incurred when a country embarks on its first-generation development.

64. The time needed to develop a delivery system depends on the existing industrial base and related experience and would, in most cases, take at least ten years for reasonably industrialized nations. Costs can be spread over time, but peaks occur at certain points. Obsolescence and countermeasures costs are related to the time factor.

65. Monetary costs do not, by themselves, give a realistic picture of the necessary effort in terms of over-all resources. A sizable technological base is needed to create and maintain a force of delivery vehicles.

66. Included here are the necessary skilled workers, engineers, scientists and managers, fabricating facilities, experimental facilities, test ranges, etc. Even if major components can be purchased abroad, the delivery system must be integrated into a workable whole, and this process requires the skills of a number of qualified persons, which may even exceed the number needed for warhead production.

### PROCUREMENT COSTS SUMMARY

#### *Modest nuclear capacity*

67. It will be assumed that a modest but significant nuclear armament would be represented by a force of from thirty to fifty jet bomber aircraft (table 3), together with fifty medium-range missiles of the

Table 3

Summary of delivery vehicle procurement and operations costs

System category	System description	Procurement costs (\$ in millions)	Annual operating costs (\$ in millions)
Aircraft, elementary	30-50 bombers (Canberra, B-57)	180	25
Missile, elementary	50 missiles in soft emplacement, 1,000-km range	440-540	5
	50 missiles in soft emplacement, 3,000-km range	800-900	10
	13 US Atlas squadrons (140 missiles)	4,900	2 (per missile)
Aircraft, medium-level	50-60 French Mirage IV bombers	940	100
	300 British V-bombers with air-to-surface missiles	1,800	120
Missile, medium-level	50 Minuteman I, in hard emplacements, 10,000-km range	1,250	5
	25 French SSBS in hard emplacements, 4,000-km range	700	not available
	14 US Titan squadrons (140 missiles)	4,900	not available
Aircraft, sophisticated	210 US FB-111 with SRAM air-to-surface missiles	2,200	340 (total to 1971)
Missile, sophisticated	3 French missile launching nuclear submarines, each with 16 missiles of 3,000-km range	1,000	20
	41 US Polaris launching submarines, each with 16 missiles	13,000	not available

3,000-kilometre range in soft emplacements and 100 plutonium war-heads. The sum of the costs estimated above for such a system acquired and deployed over ten years would be at least \$1,700 million, averaging \$170 million per year.

*Small, high-quality nuclear force*

68. A Polish study has been made for the purpose of this report to estimate the costs of a small, high-quality nuclear force. A hypothetical programme comprising two stages each of five years' duration has been envisaged. By the end of the first stage (1968-1972) a nuclear force of from ten to fifteen bombers and from fifteen to twenty nuclear weapons would be established, and during the second stage (1973-1977) the force would be extended to include from twenty to thirty thermonuclear weapons, 100 intermediate range missiles and

two missile launching nuclear submarines. The total costs of such a programme based on domestic industry and resources would amount to \$5,600 million, corresponding to an average annual cost of \$560 million for ten years. This hypothetical programme could be considered as a scaled-down version of the French programme. The cost estimate is considerably lower than the expenditures in France and the United Kingdom. Both are in the course of establishing high-quality nuclear forces of moderate size. French costs for their military nuclear programme to 1969 have been estimated at \$8,400 million, and the United Kingdom costs to 1969 are a similar amount. Annual outlays of \$50 million were representative of the early French programme, but outlays later rose to as much as \$1,000 million in a single year.

69. The actual annual costs of the nuclear forces in some countries are shown in table 4. The costs are also given relative to the annual defence budgets and the gross national product (GNP).

70. Comparison of the figures given in table 4 should be made with caution, partly because they refer to countries at different stages of nuclear weapons development, and partly because the size of the respective nuclear forces is not known.

#### ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

71. What has been defined as a modest nuclear armament requires not only a ten-year programme costing the equivalent of \$US170 million per year but resources of special kinds and quality. The basic ingredients would be raw materials, a corps of skilled engineers and expert scientists and a modern industrial base. A study of the number of scientific and technical personnel required by a nation to build installations in which nuclear warheads could be produced on a continuous basis has estimated that approximately 1,300 engineers and 500 scientists would be needed. Sophisticated delivery systems are equally demanding of high-quality materials and skills. For production of the

Table 4  
Actual costs of nuclear forces

Country	Period of time	Total costs \$ (in millions)	Annual cost as % of	
			Military budget	GNP
France	1960-1964	2,400	13.0	0.7
	1965-1970	5,200	18.0	0.9
United Kingdom	1962-1963	480	10.0	0.7
	1965-1966	350	6.0	0.4
	1966-1967	300	5.0	0.3
USA	1962	13,200	26.4	2.4
	1963	12,100	23.3	2.1
	1964	11,200	21.1	1.8
	1965	8,200	16.8	1.3
	1966	8,200	14.6	1.2
	1967	8,400	12.1	1.2

intermediate range ballistic missiles, estimates suggest that manpower requirements for technical and skilled personnel would rise higher than those for nuclear weapons. To produce over ten years and deploy fifty such missiles, it is estimated that a peak labour force of 19,000 men directly applied would be needed, over 5,000 of them scientists and engineers with access to high-speed electronic computers. Skilled personnel would include physicists, aerodynamic, mechanical, and other engineers and large numbers of production workers, including machine operators and welders. The suggested fleet of fifty bombers would require a minimum of from 1 to 2 million man-hours of skilled and unskilled labour just to assemble. The design and development stage would absorb an additional 2 million or more engineering man-hours, which would involve highly skilled efforts in aerodynamics, stress analysis, design work and flight testing.

72. To compare the hypothetical nuclear armament costs with other major national expenditures, reference has been made to statistical information available to the United Nations and published in several editions of the *Statistical Yearbook*. At this time most of such information is available for the year 1964. Expenditures are always expressed in units of the national currency. The largest uncertainties in making comparisons arise when a variety of exchange rates are quoted for the currency under different circumstances and when currencies become unstable. Further differences arise because nations operate under different economic systems and because accounts are kept on differing bases. Because of all these differences it is possible to make only rough comparisons, such as illustrated in figure VIII.

73. Fifty countries which on the basis of population and total expenditures, were seen to be the largest, were selected. Expenditures for 1964 on defence, education and health are reported in the United Nations *Statistical Yearbook 1965* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 66.XVII.1), tables 192 and 185, for most but not all of the fifty. The graph in figure VIII shows these reported expenditures and the number of countries with that or a higher expenditure for each of the three fields, defence, education and health.


74. Horizontal lines are drawn corresponding to the two illustrative expenditures of \$170 million (US equivalent) per year for a modest nuclear force, and of \$560 million per year for a small high-quality force. The graph shows that these levels would represent a very large component of the total defence expenditure for all except about the ten largest countries, that is, six countries in addition to the existing nuclear weapons Powers included in the paragraph. About twenty countries have higher total defence expenditures than that for the modest nuclear armament of \$170 million per year.

75. It thus appears that there are only about six countries in the world, other than the five nuclear weapons Powers, that could contemplate an added expenditure of \$170 million a year to develop a modest nuclear armament without reallocating a major part of their technical resources from constructive activities. For the small nuclear capability suggested, costing \$560 million a year, only the six appear capable of finding the necessary resources.

76. What may be derived correctly from the graph is an appreciation of the relative magnitude of the expenditure on a nuclear force

Figure VIII

Comparison of hypothetical nuclear armament expenditures with reported national expenditures on defence, education and health



compared with other government expenditures on defence, education and health. Any further deductions from the graph should be made with caution, for it must be remembered that accounts are not kept in the same way and rates of currency exchange vary. Moreover, what are reported are central and regional government expenditures, and in many countries education and health are to a considerable extent financed otherwise.

#### IMPLICATIONS OF EXPECTED GROWTH OF PLUTONIUM RESOURCES

77. There are two observations that we can make. First, that the cost of development of simple nuclear warheads is progressively decreasing as the technology involved is increasingly becoming public knowledge, and a new country can avoid the unprofitable directions which the countries that pioneered had to discover through costly experience. Second, that the large-scale development of nuclear power projects, resulting from a break-through in capital as well as operating costs, compared to conventional power stations, will make available a very large capacity of potential producers of weapons-grade plutonium. It is estimated that by 1980 there would be in the world more than  $3 \times 10^5$  megawatts of nuclear power production. This would involve the production of plutonium sufficient for thousands of bombs each year. This illustrates the enormity of the problem that the world faces, a problem coupled with the peaceful application of atomic energy.

### III. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACQUISITION AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

#### INTRODUCTION

78. In concluding this report, it is necessary to discuss the implications to security of the acquisition and further development of nuclear weapons. The task is not an easy one. This particular issue, whether viewed in a national or an international context, constitutes one of the major subjects of present-day political and strategic debate. It is one which is perhaps best approached historically.

#### HISTORY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

79. As recalled in section I, it was in 1945, at the end of the Second World War, that the world learnt that a nuclear weapon of mass destruction had been developed by the United States of America. In the realization that this development could imply dire consequences for mankind, the unanimous first resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations was that atomic energy should be placed under international control and that atomic weapons should be eliminated from national arsenals.<sup>8</sup> The attempt failed. A nuclear arms race then began. In 1949, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics revealed that it, too, possessed nuclear weapons. The race acquired new dimensions when both Powers developed the H-bomb with an explosive power of megatons and when it was also demonstrated that nuclear war-

<sup>8</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, p. 6.

heads could be delivered accurately not only by aircraft but, over practically limitless ranges, by means of intercontinental rockets. From this grew the realization that were one side to attack with nuclear weapons, the other could instantly retaliate in kind, whether or not there were any differences in the numbers of bombs they possessed. So it was that the concept of strategic nuclear deterrence evolved. The reality of this concept is indicated by the fact that whatever the political conflicts between the two Super Powers over the past fifteen years, they have not engaged in any direct military conflict. Fear of the disastrous consequences of the explosion of even a few nuclear bombs has so far contributed towards inhibiting any action which might have triggered their use.

80. The effort to maintain a state of nuclear deterrence has demanded the expenditure of vast resources and, paradoxically, far from increasing the sense of security, has at times engendered a sense of insecurity. The opposing sides have taken, and continue to take, major steps to assure themselves that their nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles are proof against whatever countermeasures might be undertaken by the other side. These countermeasures are essentially designed to increase the chances of a nuclear armoury surviving a pre-emptive nuclear assault by the other side and of nuclear weapons being able to penetrate whatever defences the other might deploy. The reciprocal technological development and sophistication of nuclear warheads and their associated weapons systems which thus results constitute a spiralling nuclear arms race. Short of mutual agreement, it is a race which has no end, and one which leads not to a uniform state of security but, as has been said, to phases of major insecurity which alternate with periods in which relative security seems assured. The pace of this race cannot be expected to slow down until concrete steps are taken which lead to disarmament and which promote the security of all nations.

81. The United Kingdom, which had been associated with the United States during the Second World War in the early development of nuclear weapons, subsequently developed, on its own, a smaller nuclear armoury, and, at the start, delivery systems as well. Canada, which had co-operated with the United Kingdom during the war in the development of nuclear technology, decided not to embark on the manufacture of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, France, some of whose scientists had also taken part with the United Kingdom and Canada in the wartime collaborative effort in nuclear technology, began the development of its own nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles in the 1950's. The People's Republic of China has recently become the fifth State to follow the same course. The exact number of nuclear warheads which may now exist in the world is not known, but it is quite certain that the arms race between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics alone, has resulted in the production of weapons whose cumulative destructive power is certainly more than sufficient to eliminate all mankind.

#### THE CURRENT PROSPECT

82. So far as international security is concerned, it is highly probable that any further increase in the number of nuclear weapons States or

any further elaboration of existing nuclear arsenals would lead to greater tension and greater instability in the world at large. Both these aspects of the nuclear arms race are significant to world peace. The mounting concern about the spread and development of nuclear weapons is a clear manifestation of the fear which now besets the world. Additional nuclear Powers accentuating regional tensions could only add to the complexity of the problem of assuring peace. Furthermore, it is impossible to deny the proposition that the danger of nuclear war breaking out through accident or miscalculation becomes greater, the larger the number of countries which deploy such weapons and the larger the stockpiles and the more diversified the weapons they hold. If a nuclear conflict were to erupt, however it started, not a single State could feel itself secure. Even if a State were not subjected to direct attack, and even if it should not experience any immediate consequences of such an attack, it could nevertheless suffer as a result of later radio-active fall-out. It was largely because the whole world was concerned about the fall-out from the nuclear tests of the 1950's and early 1960's that the principal international agreement so far concluded to limit the spread of nuclear weapons—the partial ban on nuclear tests—was signed in 1963.<sup>9</sup>

83. Every one of the five nations known to have nuclear weapons describes its motives for developing a nuclear arsenal as purely tactical-defensive and/or defensive by deterrence. Not one would claim that it had developed the weapons because of their value as weapons of offence. But the transformations which have occurred over the past twenty years in the balance of strategic power in the world, as well as what is implied by nuclear war, have produced a vastly different scene from the one which existed at the start of the Second World War. It is also plain from the history of the past twenty years that the possession of a nuclear arsenal does not, and cannot, signify the same thing to different countries, either in terms of military power or of political security. Correspondingly, it stands to reason that countries which have not embarked upon the development of nuclear weapons will have refrained from so doing because of a variety of differing views about the advantages and disadvantages of such a step.

84. The possibility of an increase in the number of countries acquiring a nuclear arsenal is attributable to different sets of motives. In some quarters the fact that the existing nuclear weapons Powers have so far failed to reach agreement either about stopping the further development or of freezing or reducing their own nuclear arsenals is regarded as an argument for the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other nations. In searching for greater security, some may also believe that if a state of mutual deterrence has been generated between the existing nuclear weapons Powers, a corresponding situation could be created between any other Powers who already possess the industrial and technological background necessary to make bombs and, in future, between countries which do not as yet do so. But against such views, it is worth noting that nowhere has the development of nuclear weapons made it possible to dispense either with troops on the ground or with conventional arms. Any new country which embarked on the

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

production of nuclear weapons would soon find that it had entered a new arms race without having provided itself with the option of abandoning the old. Thus, the burden of an arms race with conventional weapons is compounded as soon as a nation embarks upon the path of acquiring nuclear weapons. Moreover, the insecurity which would be brought about by entering the nuclear arms race would make it imperative to improve continuously the sophistication of the nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, as well as measures for providing an early warning of an impending attack. The nuclear arms race demands immense technological and other resources and, of itself, creates conditions under which the economic progress of a nation could stagnate. The internal insecurity engendered by the diversion of resources can be quite as serious as the external threat to the nation. Again, the acquisition by any nation of nuclear weapons could also trigger a change in its international relations. Non-nuclear neighbours could be tempted to acquire nuclear weapons, or they might perhaps undertake immediate preventive military action. Having nuclear weapons on one's own territory might bring with it the penalty of becoming a direct target for nuclear attack. A nuclear capability intended to deter or offset another on a bilateral basis would be confronted with changing alliances and changing balances of power. What had been intended to be a military answer to one set of threats might then appear inadequate, subject to quick neutralization or elimination in the event of an outbreak of nuclear hostilities. Similarly, the existing nuclear Powers might react by countermeasures and/or attempts to strengthen their own position in the region and thereby intensify their own arms race. Nuclear weapons nations are also faced with the problems of establishing systems of control of nuclear weapons within their own borders. Not only must there be protection against misuse; the tensions which would exist if serious civil strife were to occur in a nation that possessed nuclear weapons would be greatly intensified. If these problems are not adequately solved, there are added risks to the security of that nation and to the world as a whole. It is presumably for reasons such as these that the emergence of a fourth and then a fifth nuclear weapons Power has not stimulated further proliferation over the past three years. But the situation remains far from stable. Even the world-wide concern about proliferation, which the major Powers clearly share, has not as yet led to any measures of nuclear disarmament.

85. Clearly any arms race absorbs resources which might otherwise be used to improve standards of living. The struggle to improve living conditions is most effectively pursued when advanced technological products are freely exchanged between countries. This process is hindered by the mutual fears and suspicions associated with an arms race. The peaceful uses of atomic energy, now still on a small scale, are expected in the years ahead to become a major significance to world prosperity. Most nations are member States of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which was established "to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world".<sup>10</sup> In recent years they have agreed

<sup>10</sup> Art. II of the I.A.E.A. Statute (*American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956*, p. 915).

about the need to develop a system of safeguards involving inspections to assure that materials and facilities acquired to assist a programme of peaceful uses are not diverted to any military purpose. In no case does the Agency assist any trade leading to nuclear weapons. The achievement of the Agency's mission is of considerable importance to the peaceful development of the whole world.

#### THE ISSUE OF TACTICAL WEAPONS

86. A second motive additional to the search for "security through deterrence" which might encourage proliferation is the view that nuclear weapons constitute a form of armament superior to conventional weapons in field warfare. Some military commentators assume that armies could use such weapons against each other within the zone of contact of a battle area. If only one side to a dispute possessed and deployed nuclear weapons and was known to be ready to use them so as to achieve its objectives, regardless of any international repercussions, the possibility exists that it might gain an advantage either from the threat of using them—that is to say, the threat itself would deter the military actions of its opponent—or from the results of their actual use. It is also just credible that if both sides were to possess such weapons, whatever their actual nature, and one, two or even a few were to be exploded, the two sides would disengage because of the realization, having observed the consequences of their use, that the conflict might escalate into an uncontrollable conflagration. These things are possible. But the contrary is far more likely. It is hardly likely that a non-nuclear-weapons country, living in a state of hostility with a neighbour, could start to furnish itself with a nuclear arsenal without either driving its neighbour to do the same or to seek protection in some form or other, explicit or implicit, from an existing nuclear weapons Power or Powers. Equally, if in the pursuit of its political objectives, one of two sides, both of which possessed and deployed nuclear weapons, were to have the will to initiate the use of its weapons, it is difficult to see how a nuclear engagement could be stopped once it had started. The speed of military reaction and experience of past military operations do not encourage any opposite conclusion. From what has been said in section I of the report, it is clear that, given that both sides to a conflict deploy nuclear weapons, it is highly debatable whether there are any circumstances of land warfare in which such weapons could be used as battlefield weapons or, if they were so used, would confer any military advantage to either side in the zone of contact. Whatever significance can be attributed to tactical nuclear weapons is to be found essentially in the concept of deterrence.

#### NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

87. The third argument which is sometimes advanced in favour of the acquisition of nuclear weapons is that doing so promotes political independence, enhances national prestige and thus a country's influence on the international scene. A contrary view is that the influence of certain Powers in international affairs would be the same it is whether or not they possessed nuclear weapons. The issue of prestige is equally debatable. Undoubtedly there may for a short time be some imponder-

able element of prestige in the manifestation of the technological prowess which is implied by the development of nuclear weapons. But this prestige is a mixed blessing and could rapidly generate those deleterious reactions on the part of neighbouring States to which reference has been made in a preceding paragraph.

88. When one asks whether or not the acquisition and further development of nuclear weapons increases security, one thus ends up with two very simple questions. The first is what, in fact, have nuclear weapons contributed so far to military power? Insofar as this question can be answered, the reply can only be that while the nuclear weapons Powers have never suffered aggression on their own territories, and while the state of mutual deterrence which prevails between the two Super Powers has helped to avert any head-on conflict between them and has indeed imposed a new kind of restraint in their political actions with respect to each other, it has not made it possible for either to reduce its military expenditures in general or to neglect the effectiveness of its conventional armoury in particular. In a smaller way, the same conclusion applies to both the United Kingdom and France.

89. At the same time, profound limitations clearly exist in the possible use of these weapons. The consequences of their employment either in all-out war or in field warfare would be so disastrous to both sides that it is very difficult to conceive of circumstances in which they could be used. Where two sides possess such weapons, it is totally unrealistic to suppose that one could use them in a military conflict without provoking retaliation by the other. Once retaliation had occurred, it is also difficult to suppose that a nuclear conflict would not escalate in intensity. The possibility that it might not cannot be excluded; but the chances are much greater that it would. The situation might, of course, be totally different if only one side to a localized conflict possessed nuclear weapons. But here one needs to observe that views about the value of nuclear weapons as actual instruments of military power vary just as much in States that do not possess nuclear weapons as in those that do. For example, over the past twenty years non-nuclear-weapons countries have not been deterred from engaging in battle on or near their own ground with States possessing nuclear weapons. In these encounters, the latter have not found that their possession of nuclear weapons, and their deployment in the theatre of operations has made the course of conventional war any easier. Indeed, since the end of World War II, no nuclear weapons State has been able to derive any immediate military advantage from the possession of nuclear weapons, let alone use them to gain an easy victory.

90. The second question is in what way, if at all, does the possession of nuclear weapons strengthen power; or what quality, if any, do such weapons impart to it? This is a much more difficult question. National security and political power are tenuous concepts. There are countries which enjoy a high measure of both, regardless of the fact that they do not count among the military Powers of the world. Equally, while the nuclear Powers have at times been able to exercise immense political power and economic influence in world affairs, there have also been moments in recent history where this has not been so, regardless of the great nuclear forces of which they dispose. Correspondingly, the possession of nuclear forces does not necessarily prevent a decline in

political influence. Were the acquisition and maintenance of a nuclear arsenal to impose a major economic and technological burden on a country, it is possible that possession of such an arsenal would be associated with a reduction, and not with an increase, in both the national security and political influence of the country concerned.

#### CONCLUSION

91. Since the sense of insecurity on the part of nations is the cause of the arms race, which in turn enhances that very insecurity, and insofar as nuclear armaments are the end of a spectrum which begins with conventional weapons, the problem of reversing the trend of a rapidly worsening world situation calls for a basic reappraisal of all inter-related factors. The solution of the problem of ensuring security cannot be found in an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons or, indeed, in the retention of nuclear weapons by the Powers currently possessing them. An agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons as recommended by the United Nations, freely negotiated and genuinely observed, would therefore be a powerful step in the right direction, as would also an agreement on the reduction of existing nuclear arsenals. Security for all countries of the world must be sought through the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the banning of their use, by way of general and complete disarmament.

92. A comprehensive test ban treaty, prohibiting the underground testing of nuclear devices, would also contribute to the objectives of non-proliferation and would clearly help to slow down the nuclear arms race. So would effective measures safeguarding the security of non-nuclear countries. Nuclear-weapon-free zones additional to those of Antarctica and Latin America, covering the maximum geographical extent possible and taking into account other measures of arms control and disarmament, would equally be of major assistance.

93. These measures are mentioned neither to argue the case for them nor to set them in any order of priority. What the analysis of the whole problem shows is that any one of them, or any combination of them, could help inhibit the further multiplication of nuclear weapons Powers or the further elaboration of existing nuclear arsenals and so help to ensure national and world security. But it must be realized that these measures of arms limitation, however desirable, cannot of themselves eliminate the threat of nuclear conflict. They should be regarded not as ends sufficient in themselves but only as measures which could lead to the reduction of the level of nuclear armaments and the lessening of tension in the world and the eventual elimination of nuclear armaments. All countries have a clear interest in the evolution of a world which allows of peaceful and stable coexistence. Non-nuclear weapon countries, as well as those which possess nuclear weapons, need to work in concert, creating conditions in which there should be free access to materials, equipment and information for achieving all the peaceful benefits of atomic energy, and for promoting international security.

94. This report gives the bare outline of the disasters which could be associated with the use of nuclear weapons. It discusses the nature and variety of the economic burden they impose. And it unhesitatingly

concludes from the considerations that have been set out that whatever the path to national and international security in the future, it is certainly not to be found in the further spread and elaboration of nuclear weapons. The threat of the immeasurable disaster which could befall mankind were nuclear war ever to erupt, whether by miscalculation or by mad intent, is so real that informed people the world over understandably become impatient for measures of disarmament additional to the few measures of arms limitation that have already been agreed to—the limited ban on testing, the prohibition of nuclear weapons in outer space,<sup>11</sup> and the nuclear-free zone of Latin America.<sup>12</sup> International agreement against the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and agreements on measures of arms control and disarmament will promote the security of all countries. The United Nations has the overriding responsibility in this field. The more effective it becomes in action, the more powerful its authority, the greater becomes the assurance for man's future. And the longer the world waits, the more nuclear arsenals grow, the greater and more difficult becomes the eventual task.

Statement by ACDA Deputy Director Fisher to the  
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Mexican  
Amendments to Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, October  
12, 1967<sup>1</sup>

13. We have reached the stage in our discussions at which each delegation has expressed its views on the draft non-proliferation treaty<sup>2</sup> on at least one occasion. I have asked to speak today, therefore, in order to provide the members of this Committee with some views on certain of the amendments which have been proposed to the non-proliferation treaty. In the last several weeks the co-Chairmen have met many times to discuss all the suggestions which have been made. I should like today to talk about the proposals made by the representative of Mexico<sup>3</sup> and possible alternative formulations to meet the points he has raised. We very much appreciate the constructive aim of the suggestions he has made, as well as the many helpful and serious comments offered by other delegations.

14. I regret that it is not possible for me at this time to give a definitive response regarding the Mexican proposals. As I am sure the representative of Mexico and other representatives here will understand and appreciate, those suggestions raise a number of important and complex problems. Moreover, not only do we have before us the texts proposed by Mexico, but we must also take into account the comments of other delegations regarding those suggestions.

<sup>11</sup> *Ante*, pp. 38-43.

<sup>12</sup> *Ante*, pp. 60-83.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.338, pp. 7-10.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 338-341.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 394-395.

15. The first proposal submitted by the Mexican delegation consists of a rearrangement of article IV on the protection of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This question has been the subject of intense interest, particularly among the non-aligned. The representative of Mexico has proposed amendments to the present language in an effort to bring it closer to what several members of the Committee would like to see in the treaty. He has suggested the recasting of part of the article in stronger and more positive terms.

16. The United States delegation shares the objectives sought to be advanced by the Mexican suggestion. It is indisputable that all countries in a position to do so should co-operate in contributing to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty. However, it has been pointed out by some delegations that the precise terms of the Mexican formulation may in some respects create too sweeping and too general an obligation. Accordingly consideration is being given to other possible formulations; and it is hoped that in the reasonably near future a positive recommendation on that subject can be made to this Committee.

17. The second Mexican suggestion calls for an operative article in the non-proliferation treaty concerning the sharing of potential benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosive devices. Here it has been the intention of the United States that benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions should be available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty on a non-discriminatory basis, and that the charge for these nuclear explosive devices should be as low as possible. In fact, if the draft treaty were to be adopted even in its present form, we should consider ourselves committed to carrying out the declaration of intention now contained in the preamble. In view of that, consideration is being given to alternative formulations whereby such a commitment might possibly be stated in even more definite terms. However, since our discussions have not been concluded on this subject, the United States is not able now to say what sort of recommendation we hope will be made shortly to the Committee.

18. Our Mexican colleague has suggested also that the following pre-ambular paragraph be transferred to an operative article of the treaty.

... nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

The United States delegation has stated its view that, on balance, such a paragraph belongs in the preamble to the treaty; but we must agree that our colleague has put forth some very strong arguments for a contrary view and we are looking with sympathy at the Mexican suggestion on that point.

19. Finally, the delegation of Mexico has suggested for our consideration a draft article in which nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty would undertake to pursue negotiations regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament. The United States delegation fully appreciates the great importance which so many delegations have attached to ensuring that the non-proliferation treaty will lead to

progress in disarmament. There is no difference between the two co-Chairmen on that point. We are determined that that view will be fully taken into account. It is one that we share ourselves.

20. However, as all members of the Committee are aware, the path to agreement on arms-control measures has not been an easy one. We all know that long and arduous negotiations preceded the limited test-ban Treaty.<sup>4</sup> Our negotiations regarding non-proliferation have been lengthy and difficult. Without doubt, negotiations on other measures also, no matter how much good will and perseverance is brought to bear, will be arduous and complex. It is for those reasons that we must be careful regarding the manner of stating any undertakings concerning subsequent disarmament negotiations. Clearly the purpose of the Mexican proposal is to facilitate, not to complicate, subsequent negotiations. With those considerations in mind, the Mexican suggestion and possible alternative formulations to deal with the question are being studied.

21. It is my hope that it will be possible in the very near future for the two co-Chairmen to recommend for the consideration of this Committee a number of positive suggestions for satisfying the basic concerns reflected in the Mexican amendments. In the meantime I can assure all members of the Committee that we are mindful of the need to proceed as rapidly as possible, in view of the relative shortness of the time remaining to us, so that the members of this Committee may in turn have adequate opportunity to consider our recommendations.

### Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, October 17, 1967<sup>1</sup>

2. The negotiations now taking place in the Eighteen-Nation Committee in regard to a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons<sup>2</sup> have entered an important phase. We have to finish the elaboration of a draft treaty in order to ensure the solution of a great problem which has been discussed over a long period both in the Committee and at sessions of the General Assembly.

3. During the period which has elapsed since the draft treaty on non-proliferation was presented to the Committee, all delegations of the countries represented here have had an opportunity to state their attitude towards this document. The discussion that has taken place shows that practically all the States members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, whatever the differences in their positions in regard to individual treaty questions, regard this draft as an important step in the disarmament negotiations, a step which brings the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons closer to a solution. The debate has revealed quite clearly a basic trend in the evaluation of the draft treaty by many delegations in the Committee, namely, that this

<sup>4</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.339, pp. 4-12.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 338-341.

draft constitutes a basis for the achievement of an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

4. We highly appreciate the statements made by the representatives of countries members of the Committee who have spoken with approval of the draft treaty and have put forward their comments, considerations and suggestions aimed at solving the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as speedily as possible.

5. In this connexion we should like to note that the Head of the Bulgarian delegation, Mr. Christov, stated at the meeting of the Committee held on 5 September that his delegation approved the draft treaty.<sup>3</sup> A positive attitude towards the draft treaty was also expressed by the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Winkler, in his statement at our meeting of 31 August, in which he evaluated this draft as an important contribution to the solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>4</sup>

6. The representative of Poland, Mr. Goldblat, in expounding the position of the Polish People's Republic in connexion with the submission of a draft treaty on non-proliferation to the Committee, stated at the meeting of 29 August the following:

The event marks a turning-point in the six years of efforts aimed at stopping the spread of the most deadly instruments of war ever devised by man. Its significance, therefore, cannot be over-estimated.<sup>5</sup>

7. In giving a general evaluation of the draft treaty at the meeting of the Committee held on 19 September, the representative of Mexico, Mr. Castañeda, remarked:

... my Government considers it on the whole clearly satisfactory. Its main objective, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, is adequately ensured by the prohibitions in articles I and II. These are the cornerstone of the system.<sup>6</sup>

8. The leader of the delegation of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Khallaf, stated at the meeting held on 26 September that the Government of the United Arab Republic supported in principle the draft treaty on non-proliferation. He said:

... we are pleased to state that we consider—in principle—the draft presented to be a valid basis for negotiation, . . .<sup>7</sup>

9. Many other delegations members of this Committee have also expressed a positive attitude towards the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and towards the main obligations contained in it.

10. During the debate that has taken place since the draft treaty was submitted to the Committee there have been put forward a number of constructive and useful considerations relating to one or another aspect of the solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Working papers containing proposals by Mexico<sup>8</sup>

<sup>3</sup> ENDC/PV. 328, p. 8.

<sup>4</sup> ENDC/PV. 327, p. 14.

<sup>5</sup> ENDC/PV. 326, p. 4.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, p. 306.

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, p. 421.

<sup>8</sup> *Ante*, pp. 304-305.

and the United Arab Republic<sup>9</sup> have been submitted to the members of the Committee for consideration. These proposals, which contain several amendments and additions to the text of the draft treaty, have been made in a spirit of sincere desire to contribute to the elaboration and conclusion of a treaty that would correspond to the interests of as great a number of countries as possible. The Soviet side is studying with all due attention the proposals of Mexico and the United Arab Republic, as well as the considerations put forward by all other delegations, and intends in due course to make a detailed statement on this matter.

11. In our statement today we should like to make some preliminary comments on questions that have been raised in the Committee during the discussion of the draft treaty on non-proliferation. Great attention has been given during the debate to the problem of the peaceful development and use of nuclear energy. We note in this connexion the statements made by many delegations expressing satisfaction at the inclusion in the draft treaty of a special article concerning research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes by all parties to the treaty.

12. At the same time, a number of delegations have put forward proposals to include in the treaty additional articles regarding the peaceful development of nuclear energy; in particular this has been formulated in the proposals of Mexico, which has submitted an amended text for article IV of the draft treaty.

13. The Soviet delegation is giving due attention to that proposal and is still studying it at present. In doing so we base ourselves on the assumption that a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should enable all countries, both nuclear and non-nuclear, to develop their peaceful atomic industries and all forms of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We for our part will do everything necessary to ensure that such a treaty shall correspond as far as possible to the interests of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, both on a national and an international scale.

14. During the discussion in the Committee great attention has also been given to the question of peaceful nuclear explosions as part of the problem of the use of nuclear energy. This is an important question which is of fundamental significance for the solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, I would say, for the fate of the future treaty.

15. The representative of Brazil, Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, speaking at the meeting of 31 August, asked why, under the non-proliferation treaty, the non-nuclear countries must also refrain from manufacturing nuclear explosive devices intended for peaceful purposes.<sup>10</sup> We therefore deem it necessary to state once again our considerations concerning the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions.

16. In preparing the text of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, we cannot disregard the fact that in the world today there are forces that are striving by every means to pave a way to nuclear weapons for themselves. Exclusion of the manufacture and

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 428.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 372.

acquisition of nuclear explosive devices from the scope of the treaty would open up a wide loop-hole for violation of the treaty. Indeed, it is well known that the technology of the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices in no way differs essentially from the technology of the manufacture of nuclear weapons. These nuclear explosive devices could be used without any particular difficulty as nuclear weapons. Thus the representative of Ethiopia, Mr. Zelleke, speaking on this subject at the meeting of the Committee held on 5 October, stated with complete justification:

... we are convinced of the fact, and so far it has not been challenged, that the technology required for the production of peaceful nuclear explosive devices is the same as that required for nuclear weapons, and also that the same peaceful devices can serve to wage a war with a consequential devastation equal in magnitude to that of nuclear weapons.<sup>11</sup>

17. In order that the non-proliferation treaty may become a really effective and reliable instrument for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, it must cover all nuclear explosive devices without exception, as is provided for in the existing draft treaty. Any other solution of this problem would be contrary to the very idea of non-proliferation and at variance with the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, which has laid down as the main basis for a non-proliferation treaty the principle that all ways and loop-holes for the direct or indirect proliferation of nuclear weapons must be closed.

18. Of course, renunciation by the non-nuclear countries of the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear explosive devices should in no way cause any detriment to those countries, if the need should arise for them to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions for the implementation of some particular economic development project.

19. We consider that this question, including the procedure and conditions for carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, could be settled on the basis of a separate international agreement. It is from these positions that the Soviet Union approaches a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and examines the considerations put forward by a number of delegations concerning the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions. We assume that specific proposals in this regard will be submitted to the Committee after all-round consultations on the question.

20. In discussing the draft treaty on non-proliferation, many delegations have put forward considerations concerning the link between non-proliferation and other measures of nuclear disarmament. This question was also reflected in the draft article IV-C proposed by Mexico.

21. The preamble to the draft treaty before the Committee contains provisions expressing the intention of the parties to the treaty to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race. But, as is evident from the statements made by many delegations, the link between the problem of non-proliferation and other disarmament measures should, in their opinion, be expressed more directly in the draft treaty, and a separate article devoted to this subject should be inserted into it.

<sup>11</sup> *Annex*, p. 450.

22. Moreover, some delegations have expressed the view that the non-proliferation treaty should impose direct obligations on the parties to it to carry out other measures of nuclear disarmament. The position of the Soviet Union in regard to the problem of nuclear disarmament is well known. We have asserted and continue to assert the need for agreement on a wide range of measures relating to nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union is ready to enter into negotiations immediately on various disarmament measures.

23. But is it justifiable, from the point of view of achieving agreement on non-proliferation, to adopt the position of tying up in a single package problems of non-proliferation and other measures in the field of nuclear disarmament? Is it realistic at the present stage to strive, within the framework of a single treaty on non-proliferation, to solve several problems at the same time? The treaty on which we are working is intended to solve a definite and specific question—prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons. The simultaneous solution of any other problem would, of course, require time, a considerable length of time, and would at the same time give rise to further questions. If we postpone the solution of the non-proliferation problem until we have reached agreement on other disarmament measures, the right moment may be irretrievably missed. It is better to settle the various measures in the field of disarmament one by one, that is, separately, without tying them up in a single package which would be difficult to untie.

24. As is stated in the resolutions of the General Assembly, the non-proliferation treaty should be a first step towards the achievement of other measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. As for the proposals put forward during the discussion for the inclusion in the treaty of a special article on disarmament matters, and the specific text for such an article submitted by the delegation of Mexico, that question has to be given careful study. The Soviet delegation, which attaches great importance to this problem, will consider with due attention all the proposals in this regard and will submit appropriate recommendations to the Committee.

25. In the discussion of the draft treaty on non-proliferation, the delegation of Mexico also put forward a proposal to embody in the treaty in the form of a separate article (IV-B) the provision contained in the preamble that nothing in the treaty should affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. The Soviet Union, as is well known, consistently advocates the establishment of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world and regards the establishment of such zones as one of the most important means of averting the threat of nuclear war. In this connexion the Soviet delegation would like to state that the proposal of Mexico is in keeping with the position of the Soviet Union on this question.

26. As we have already mentioned, some very important proposals by the United Arab Republic have also been submitted to the Committee for consideration. Those proposals, which, as we have already pointed out, are imbued with a constructive spirit and a desire for the best possible solution of the problem of non-proliferation and of safeguarding the security of all countries, will be studied by us with due

attention. After all-round consultations on the questions raised in these proposals, we shall put appropriate considerations before the Committee.

27. During the discussion of the draft treaty many delegations have touched upon the question of control over compliance with the treaty. We note with satisfaction that the overwhelming opinion expressed in the Committee is that such control should be carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Khallaf, confirming the position of his country in favour of establishing control over compliance with the treaty by means of IAEA, stated:

In such a treaty the only inspection system acceptable . . . is compulsory and not voluntary, international and not regional, effective and not fictitious.<sup>11</sup>

28. The Soviet Union has maintained and continues to maintain the position that control over compliance with a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The main difficulties existing at the present time in connexion with the preparation of a draft article on control are due to the fact that there are influential circles which are doing their utmost to frustrate the drafting of that article and thus to sabotage the solution of the non-proliferation problem, which hinders their revanchist, militaristic plans.

29. It is well known that West Germany is creating an obstacle in this matter. Influential circles in the Federal Republic of Germany have in the past used any pretext to hamper progress in solving the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Now they have decided to use the question of control as a pretext for hindering the drafting and conclusion of a treaty by opposing the establishment of a single system of IAEA safeguards for control over the implementation of a non-proliferation treaty. In contrast to the overwhelming majority of States of the world, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany would like to put West Germany in a position which would exclude it from the scope of international control by limiting control over it to EURATOM, which would be tantamount to self-control.

30. The question arises: why does the Federal Republic of Germany adopt such a negative position in regard to control over compliance with a non-proliferation treaty by IAEA, whose system of safeguards is recognized by almost one hundred States of the world and has been tested in practice? That position of the Federal Republic of Germany cannot fail to give rise to caution in regard to the true intentions and aims of the policy of West Germany in the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

31. The Committee is now considering one of the most important problems of the present time, the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which is directly connected with the aim of reducing the danger of nuclear war. The solution of this problem will promote not only progress in the whole field of disarmament, but also the strengthening of the peace and security of all countries. In solving this

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 156.

problem the interests of disarmament clash with the interests of militarization, those of security with those of revanchism, those of peace with those of war.

32. On the achievement of agreement on non-proliferation will depend to a considerable extent the development of subsequent international relations, whether they will be directed towards peaceful co-operation among the peoples and utilization of the great scientific discoveries of our times for the benefit of mankind, or whether they will involve humanity in a new, even wider arms race with all its horrifying consequences for the peoples of all countries, large and small, developing and developed, nuclear and non-nuclear.

33. The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that, despite the difficulties and obstacles which we are encountering in working out the final text of a draft treaty on non-proliferation, the forces opposing that treaty will be overcome. All those who are interested in the relaxation of international tension are hopefully awaiting the completion of our work and the earliest conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. To men of good will this is a means of safeguarding life and well-being not only for our generation but for generations to come. They reject the policy of procrastination—in fact of sabotage—which is being pursued by certain circles in connexion with the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. For our part, we should like to express the assurance that the Soviet Union will do its utmost to bring this important task to a successful conclusion in order to strengthen the peace and security of all peoples.<sup>13</sup>

### Statement by the Romanian Representative (Ecobesco) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft Nonproliferation Treaty [Extracts], October 19, 1967<sup>1</sup>

22. The Romanian delegation, upon instructions from the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania, has the honour to submit officially a working paper containing amendments and additions to the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup> I shall now

<sup>13</sup> ACDA Deputy Director Fisher made the following comment on the Soviet statement:

... I found it on the whole a most thoughtful and in large part constructive speech. Only in respect of one part do I find myself called upon to express a somewhat different view. The problem of article III on which we are still working and on which the co-Chairmen are still negotiating is, it is true, a difficult one; but I do not feel that the situation is quite as dismal as the representative of the Soviet Union seemed to describe it in his remarks. In particular, I believe that in working out the difficult problems before us it is not fair to characterize the position of any country whose interests are affected, whether it is at this table or not at this table, as that of a saboteur. This is a problem that can be solved, and I think it will be solved with the co-operation of all those who sincerely wish to halt proliferation (ENDC, PV, 339, p. 12).

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV, 340, pp. 9-16.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 338-341.

read out this document. I should like to explain that, in order to make it easier to understand this text, we have in numbering the paragraphs of the preamble regarded as the first paragraph the one beginning with the words: "The States concluding this Treaty . . .".

[The document is printed *infra*.]

23. It is not my intention to make today a detailed presentation of the working paper I have just read out. We propose to fulfil that pleasant duty during our later interventions. However, we should like to take this opportunity to explain the main ideas contained in our document, and also the reasons for the Romanian proposals and the foundations on which they rest. Here, first of all, are the main ideas to which the document gives expression.

24. The first category relates to the inclusion, in the preamble to the non-proliferation treaty, of the fundamental requirements laid down by the United Nations General Assembly in its well-known resolution 2028 (XX).<sup>3</sup> These co-ordinates, which relate to the very essence of the treaty, are reproduced word for word in our proposals.

25. A second category has the purpose of placing the treaty in the complex framework of measures designed to lead to the accomplishment of nuclear disarmament. We should like in this connexion to point more particularly to the proposal which defines the duty of the nuclear Powers to undertake specific disarmament measures and is intended to give the non-proliferation treaty substance, vigour and durability.

26. Then there are provisions intimately linked with the question of the guarantees to be given to States not possessing nuclear weapons. When we speak of "guarantees", we are guided essentially by the legitimate concern of all countries and all peoples to enjoy an enhanced degree of security. That is the noble purpose pursued by the Romanian proposal under which the countries possessing nuclear weapons will have to assume through the non-proliferation treaty the formal undertaking never, in any circumstances, to use nuclear weapons against States which do not possess and will not acquire nuclear weapons, and not to threaten them with the use of thermonuclear weapons.

27. Another group of provisions which we wish to see incorporated in the treaty relates to the need to assure access for all States, on a basis of equality and without any discrimination, to the achievements of science and nuclear technology. Every State has an incontestable right to undertake research and to carry out programmes designed to place nuclear energy at the service of its progress and many-sided development. Restrictive or ambiguous forms of words concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes would merely raise grave doubts and justified misgivings in the non-nuclear countries. At the same time it seems quite natural that the non-nuclear countries should also consider the usefulness of the non-proliferation treaty in the light of the prospects which it would open up for real international co-operation in this field.

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 532-534.

28. Lastly, the document submitted by our delegation contains proposals designed to improve the text of the draft treaty in order to ensure an effective verification of the manner in which the obligations assumed by States parties to the treaty are fulfilled, the procedure for amending the treaty, and the modalities for withdrawal from the treaty. The convening of periodic conferences to consider whether and how the parties to the treaty fulfil their obligations constitutes a factor stipulating the fulfilment without fail of the letter and spirit of the treaty by both nuclear and non-nuclear States. Our proposals concerning amendment of the treaty and the conditions for withdrawal reflect a specific application of the principles governing the whole law of treaties and, above all, the principles of the sovereignty and equality of States.

29. That is all we wish to say for the present about the main ideas contained in our document. I should now like to deal with the reasons on which the Romanian proposals are based.

30. We should like to stress, first of all, that the proposals which we have submitted today to the Eighteen-Nation Committee spring from the unshakable desire and resolve of the Romanian Government and people to fight actively for the strengthening of peace and international security and to contribute to the solution of the international problems at present confronting mankind, including those of disarmament. In that spirit we consider that it is the duty of all States, whatever their size and strength, to persevere in efforts to tackle constructively and solve, with patience and an enhanced sense of their responsibility, the many complex problems of disarmament and above all of nuclear disarmament.

31. We are convinced that in searching for workable solutions to international problems, and indeed to any other question in any activity at all, it is necessary to start from the facts, from the fundamental realities of life. That is a truth which also applies with full force to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. If we wish to draw up a lasting document, and if we are determined not to establish a fragile instrument which might easily become unsteady or collapse, we must at all costs powerfully anchor it in reality. That being so, we could not even tackle, let alone solve, the problem of non-proliferation in isolation from the setting of which it is an integral part: the process of general disarmament and, more particularly, of nuclear disarmament.

32. Those are the reasons why we continue to maintain that the non-proliferation treaty must form part of a chain of measures designed to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, to stop their manufacture and completely to eliminate their existing stockpiles. In short, all this action must represent a prefiguration of the ultimate aim: the liberation of mankind from the spectre of a nuclear holocaust.

33. We are certain that the Romanian proposals, if incorporated in the non-proliferation treaty, would close serious gaps in the draft before us — implicitly bring the non-proliferation treaty into complete concordance with the main objective — nuclear disarmament.

34. Since the non-proliferation treaty faithfully reflects the realities of the world of today, it not only cannot disregard the fundamental

principles governing relations between States but must necessarily be based on them. The fundamental postulates of strict respect for national sovereignty, equality of rights and non-intervention in the affairs of other States must be the foundation of this treaty. One does not sacrifice principles; they cannot be sacrificed. They must be respected and defended.

35. Equal security for all States, large or small, nuclear or non-nuclear; equitable mutual obligations for all without any exception; advantages for all countries based on equality and non-discrimination; exclusion of any element which might constitute a pretext for interference in the internal affairs of States; respect for the interests of all States and consideration for the positions which they defend—those are the commandments deriving, for the non-proliferation treaty, from the paramount principles of law and justice.

36. The problem of non-proliferation, which is now the subject of advanced negotiations in the Committee, affects both the vital interests of States and those of the whole international community. Would unjustified haste or insufficient study of the views expressed by various delegations make it possible to arrive more easily at the positive results which, we do not doubt, all the States represented here desire? That is a question which calls for profound reflection.

37. The Romanian delegation considers that now, more than ever, the views of all participants must be taken into account, so that our negotiating body may be a true crucible blending together the positions and interests of all States. Only thus can an effective, equitable, non-discriminatory and stable treaty be drafted, a treaty which can meet the legitimate preoccupations of each and all. For, according to an old saying, no one ever sees so clearly into the affairs of others as the person whom they affect the most.

38. The non-proliferation treaty, which we conceive as an instrument for improving the international situation and for prompting peace, should in no way establish privileges on one side and overload the other side with obligations. On the contrary, it should satisfy the aspirations and interests of all countries.

39. Mr. Nicolae Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, said in a statement on the foreign policy of the Socialist Republic of Romania that he made in the Grand National Assembly on 24 July:

The non-proliferation of atomic weapons should lead to the elimination of the division of the world into nuclear and non-nuclear countries, to the strengthening of equality among States, and to a real diminution of the danger of war. If the non-proliferation treaty meets these basic requirements, it may in fact constitute an instrument for strengthening international peace and security and defending the lives of the peoples. Since this concerns all peoples and all anti-imperialist forces, all the countries of the world should take part in the debates on such measures, and the absence of certain countries—especially of some possessing nuclear weapons—is likely to hazard the success of non-proliferation. Romania considers that the efforts to prepare a non-proliferation treaty meeting the interests of the general progress of mankind and of international peace must be continued.

**Romanian Working Paper Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Amendments and Additions to the Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, October 19, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

PREAMBLE

1. After the third paragraph, introduce a new paragraph :

"Recognizing that the danger of a nuclear war can be eliminated only by the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and the destruction of all existing stockpiles of such weapons and of the means of their delivery".

2. At the end of the fourth paragraph, add the following provisions:

"... based on the following principles:

(a) The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly nuclear weapons in any form;

(b) The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers;

(c) The treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament;

(d) There should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty;

(e) Nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories".

3. Replace the present fifth preambular paragraph by the following text:

"Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities in accordance with the bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded by them".

4. After the sixth paragraph insert a new paragraph:

"Affirming the absolute right of all States, whether they possess nuclear weapons or not, to undertake research on the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, both now and in the future, on the basis of equality and without any discrimination".

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/199, Oct. 19, 1967. The draft treaty appears *ante*, pp. 338-341.

5. In the ninth paragraph:

Replace the words "declaring their intention" by the words "expressing their determination".

After the words "through appropriate international procedures", add the words: "accepted by all States signatories to the Treaty".

6. In the twelfth preambular paragraph, after the words "in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons", amend the text to read: "the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, and to achieve eventually the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

ARTICLE III A

1. "The nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty undertake to adopt specific measures to bring about as soon as possible the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the reduction and destruction of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery".

2. "If five years after the entry into force of this Treaty such measures have not been adopted, the Parties shall consider the situation created and decide on the measures to be taken".

ARTICLE III B

"Nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty solemnly undertake never in any circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which undertake not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons".

ARTICLE IV

After the words "use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes", add the words "on a basis of equality".

ARTICLE V

Delete the second sentence of paragraph 2 and replace it by the following text:

"The amendment shall enter into force, for every Party having deposited its instruments of ratification thereof, upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governor of the International Atomic Energy Agency".

2. After paragraph 3, insert a new paragraph:

Such conferences shall be convened thereafter periodically every five years, to review the manner in which the obligations assumed by all Parties to this Treaty are carried out.

ARTICLE VII

Delete the last sentence of this article, beginning with the words "Such notice shall include . . .".

## Statement by the Italian Representative (Caracciolo) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft Non-proliferation Treaty, October 24, 1967<sup>1</sup>

2. In its statement of 1 August,<sup>2</sup> and later in that of 29 August,<sup>3</sup> the Italian delegation informed the Committee of the reasons which prevented it from taking up a position in regard to the non-proliferation treaty<sup>4</sup> before the procedure prescribed for the consultation of its parliament was completed. At the same time it gave an implied assurance that that procedure would be started as soon as possible.

3. That pledge has been scrupulously kept, and in a vote last Thursday the Italian Senate approved the aims pursued by the Government, which are first, the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty, and secondly the improvement of the text before us along the lines already set forth in the Committee by the Italian delegation in its previously-mentioned statements. Those improvements, which were listed by the Italian Foreign Minister in his statement in the Senate, relate in brief to the following points:

The balance of obligations and responsibilities between nuclear Powers and non-nuclear Powers:

Specific undertakings concerning nuclear disarmament by the nuclear Powers, over against the unconditional and absolute renunciation of atomic weapons which the non-nuclear countries are called upon to make;

A certain flexibility in the provisions of the treaty relating to duration, amendments and the right of withdrawal:

The formulation of a text which could not in any circumstances become an obstacle to the development of European unity.

4. In my statement today I do not intend to dwell on all the problems I have just mentioned. Several speakers in the debates have already dealt with many of these questions and put forward specific and constructive proposals for improving the draft treaty. Moreover, we know from the statements made at the meetings of 12 and 17 October<sup>5</sup> that the co-Chairmen are carefully studying the suggestions and amendments which have been submitted here and intend to inform the Committee of their own reactions as soon as possible. I am certain that the spirit of co-operation shown so far by the sponsors of the treaty will lead them to take these legitimate concerns into account, either by incorporating the necessary provisions in the text or by improving certain preambular and operative paragraphs of the treaty.

5. I shall also refrain today from any comment on article III, which is still left blank in the text, in order not to hinder the intensive and, I hope, fruitful work of the co-Chairmen and, at the same time, the consultations which are taking place outside this Committee. Italy, as a non-nuclear but highly-industrialized country using nuclear en-

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV. 341, pp. 4-7.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 312-315.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 359-362.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 338-341.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, pp. 513-515, 515-521.

ergy for peaceful purposes, attaches the greatest importance to a balanced formulation of that article.

6. For my part I should merely like to recall today two principles which appear to us essential and which I should like to emphasize: first, that controls should relate strictly to verification of the commitments which are to be undertaken by nuclear and by non-nuclear countries; secondly, that they should not conflict with the commitments already undertaken by some countries which, like my own, form part of a regional community deeply devoted to international co-operation. My delegation may make comments after the presentation of a text which, we hope, will meet the concerns and requirements to which I have referred.

7. Nor shall I dwell on article V of the treaty; because I think that, in expressing at the meeting of 12 October my support for the suggestion put forward by the United Kingdom delegation that the duties of the revision conference should be widened to include assurance that the purposes of the preamble were being realized, and I stressed clearly enough the Italian position in that regard.<sup>6</sup> We believe in the need to give a legal value to the declarations of intent contained in the preamble concerning the link to be established between this treaty and other specific disarmament measures.

8. From the beginning of our negotiations my delegation has always held that the non-proliferation treaty, in order to comply with its aims, should be so conceived and constructed as to eliminate any element which could render it inoperative. For that reason I wish to focus my statement on a part of article VII of the draft treaty which has so far not been considered in depth.

9. The first paragraph of that article states that the treaty shall be of unlimited duration. That is a very far-reaching statement, because it is not the lot of man to pledge eternity. Moreover, if we look back across our thousands of years of history, we see very few non-institutional treaties that have simply survived the vicissitudes of one generation, let alone achieved immortality. Therefore we fear that to affirm a principle so remote from reality may introduce into the treaty an element of weakness rather than of strength.

10. The advocates of unlimited duration have asserted that too short a duration would not give the non-nuclear countries time to become truly converted to the idea of nuclear disarmament, because the date of expiry of the treaty would be so close. I must confess quite frankly that I am not convinced by that argument. Whereas too short a duration may have those drawbacks, the other extreme solution, that of unlimited duration, seems to me to have equally serious drawbacks, because it would deprive the treaty of the credibility which, on the contrary, should constitute its strength.

11. We all know that future generations will have to live, even on a strictly technological level, in a setting very different from the present one. To imprison them in an iron corset, which could not be adjusted to the changing conditions of history, would in our opinion expose that corset to the danger of bursting. We therefore prefer a

<sup>6</sup> For Ambassador Caracciolo's statement, see ENDO/PV.338, pp. 10-11. The U.K. proposal appears *ante*, p. 47.

steel corset which, being more flexible, could more effectively assure the continuation of the treaty. Furthermore, in strict law some countries might, when they came to sign a treaty of unlimited duration, find themselves in constitutional difficulties.

12. In order, therefore, to increase the force of this treaty and at the same time to remove potential obstacles to its conclusion, the Italian delegation desires today to submit to the Committee the following amendment intended to replace the first paragraph of article VII:

This treaty shall have a duration of X years and shall be renewed automatically for any party which shall not have given, six months before the date of expiry of the treaty, notice of its intention to cease to be party to the treaty.<sup>7</sup>

We have preferred for the time being to leave an X in our amendment in place of a figure, in order to give the various delegations an opportunity to express their views on this subject. But we think that in any case this period should not exceed that of most of the non-institutional international treaties. It also seems to us that the proposed amendment could be regarded as an acceptable compromise between the idea of unlimited duration and that of a fixed term. It provides that the treaty shall always remain in force for those who do not denounce it, and at the same time allows those who are not satisfied with its operation to withdraw after a certain number of years.

13. In conclusion, permit me to recall the words spoken by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs on the non-proliferation treaty at the end of his statement in the Italian Senate:

The line followed so far by Italy aims at encouraging the conclusion of the negotiations without sparing any effort. We are indeed convinced that the aim to be pursued is not solely to solve the problem of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but is also to enable us to facilitate through its achievement the solution of the other problems which threaten the peace of the world.

### Italian Amendment to Article VII of the Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, October 24, 1967<sup>8</sup>

1. This treaty shall have a duration of X years and shall be renewed automatically for any party which shall not have given, six months before the date of expiry of the treaty, notice of its intention to cease to be party to the treaty.

### News Conference Remarks by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State McCloskey: Arms Sales to Israel and Arab States, October 24, 1967<sup>1</sup>

*Mr. McCloskey:* I have a statement on arms for the Near East.

First, let me recall that our policy with respect to the arms sales has always been one of maximum restraint. And that remains our policy today.

<sup>7</sup> *Infra.*

<sup>8</sup> ENDC/200/Rev. 1, Oct. 26, 1967. The draft treaty appears *ante*, pp. 338-341.

<sup>1</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, Nov. 13, 1967, p. 652.

We have under continuing review the question of what actions we should take, consistent with that spirit of restraint, to support United States interests in the Near East. As part of this review process, we have now decided to release selected items of military materiel to Israel and certain Arab states.

I want to emphasize the word "selected," to make clear that this is not in any sense an open-ended decision nor an opening of the floodgates.

Virtually all of this materiel was ordered from military or commercial sources before the 6-day war in June and has been held up since that time.

Now, the decision here was taken a short time ago. And for the last week we have been engaged in consultation with appropriate Members and committees of the Congress.

So far as the materiel is concerned it includes repair parts, components, and related items without which repair facilities would shut down and equipment could not be maintained in Israel and certain Arab states, countries which traditionally have looked to the United States and other Western countries as suppliers of their armed forces.

We are also releasing a number of end items ordered and in some cases paid for before June 5.

The countries that we are discussing here are Israel, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia.

*Q. No Jordan?*

A. No decision has been arrived at with respect to Jordan at the present time.

The materiel for Israel includes aircraft we promised earlier, as well as parts, repair equipment, and components for such things as, for example, radios, which are assembled in Israel and which are ordered on a continuing basis from commercial and military sources.

The materiel for the various Arab countries is largely communications equipment, trucks, repair parts, construction materials. A small number of aircraft, agreed to before the war, are included for Libya and Morocco.

*Q. Can you give a rationale for this decision?*

A. Well, I think it's pretty much implied in our—in the first statement I made: the need for, in many cases, these spare parts so that industry at the other end doesn't have to close down, that defense inventories can be maintained, and clearly, the rationale that if these countries are unable to obtain these committed deliveries from the United States they turn to other sources of supply.

The Soviets, as I'm sure most of you in this room are aware, have maintained a substantial high level of delivery to other countries in the area, specifically the U.A.R., Syria, and Iraq, and have made no secret of the fact that they are also prepared to provide arms to other countries which, at least until now, have not equipped their forces from Soviet sources.

Statement by the Netherlands Representative (Eschauzier)  
to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Latin  
American Denuclearization Treaty, October 25, 1967<sup>1</sup>

My delegation wishes to express its great satisfaction that the concerted and unrelenting efforts of the Latin American States have culminated in an agreed text of a treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America.<sup>2</sup>

Thus the unprecedented initiative to actually create the legal framework for the effective denuclearization of a specific region—apart from Africa, which has certain characteristics of its own—has been brought to a successful conclusion.

During previous sessions of the General Assembly and also of this Committee, my delegation has repeatedly stated that the Netherlands Government favours the establishment of denuclearized zones in those areas where there are no overriding obstacles of a political or military nature.

It is therefore most gratifying that this Committee is able—at such an early stage of its deliberations—to take note of and to discuss the first complete blueprint for a denuclearized zone.

At this point, I would like to assure the distinguished representative of Mexico that I am fully aware that the term “denuclearization” refers only to “the prohibition of nuclear weapons” and that peaceful activities are in no way inhibited. I hope, however, that for the sake of brevity he will bear me no grudge for occasionally using a familiar term which has gained currency in our arms control jargon.

Mr. Garcia-Robles also underlined the fact that the present item of our agenda is *sui generis* in the sense that it is purely informative in character. I wish to assure you that I do not intend to dwell extensively on the principal elements of the treaty now before us. But since the treaty is of immediate concern to the Kingdom of the Netherlands I shall, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, make some brief comments on those major aspects which seem of particular importance to me.

Firstly, the provisions of the Treaty relating to the Control System and to IAEA safeguards constitute a dual precedent. In fact, they are no less than a real “break-through” in the question of international verification of arms control measures.

The Latin American States are the first regional group of countries to accept the safeguards of the Agency in Vienna, in accordance with article III, A.5 of its Statute.<sup>3</sup> Thus the obligation not to produce nuclear weapons by diverting nuclear materials to warlike purposes will be subject to verification and control by the proper United Nations organ which is expressly designed to exercise such functions. This might be called the “non-production clause” in the treaty.

In this connexion, I think it is worth mentioning that *de facto* article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco has already been complied with, in

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV.1506, pp. 27-30.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 69-83.

<sup>3</sup> *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956*, pp. 915-916.

anticipation of its entry into force. To my knowledge, all existing nuclear facilities in Latin America are already covered by safeguards agreements of the IAEA, with the possible exception of one or two which are in the process of being covered by such agreements.

Furthermore, a unique feature of the Treaty is that it establishes its own Control System, which also covers activities which do not fall within the competence of the IAEA, such as the "non-acquisition" of any nuclear weapons. From this it will be clear that the relevant articles, taken as a whole, constitute a comprehensive and efficient system of controls for the Contracting Parties to the Treaty.

On the other hand, nothing in the Treaty seems to hinder in any way the promotion and expansion of peaceful activities furthering the economic and social development of the nations concerned.

This brings me to my second point: I note with interest Mr. Garcia-Robles' exposition of the implications of article 18, setting forth the circumstances under which explosions for peaceful purposes may be carried out by the parties to the Treaty. From the text of article 18 it follows that peaceful explosions are permitted only if certain conditions are fulfilled, *inter alia*, that in accordance with article 5, the device used shall not have "a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes".

At this juncture I shall not pursue this question any further, since it appears to me more appropriate to comment on this matter when we have reached the relevant item on our agenda, i.e. the conclusion of a Treaty preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. But I do wish to express the hope, here and now, that it will prove possible to devise satisfactory and generally acceptable procedures for carrying out peaceful explosions in the context of such a treaty.

From the very beginning, the Netherlands Government has been represented by an observer at the sessions of the Preparatory Commission. Moreover, it has on several occasions declared its willingness to become a contracting party to the Treaty and to assume on an equal footing with the other signatories all the rights and obligations on behalf of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles. I am in duty bound to say that it is a matter of regret for the Government of the Kingdom that the faculty to become a party to the Treaty has been denied to it. In response to the hope expressed by the representatives of Brazil and of Chile, I am pleased to state that the Netherlands Government remains prepared to accept the status of denuclearization on behalf of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, provided the Treaty stands a reasonable chance of becoming binding upon a sufficient number of Latin American countries. I sincerely hope that this will soon prove to be the case.

In conclusion, I should like to draw attention to the fact that Protocol II does not carry any provisions concerning a guarantee by the nuclear Powers to the signatories of Protocol I. The Netherlands Government confidently expects that the nuclear Powers which agree to sign Protocol I will be prepared to extend the guarantees embodied therein also to Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, after the Kingdom of the Netherlands has decided to sign Protocol I.

Statement by the British Representative (Caradon) to the  
First Committee of the General Assembly: Latin  
American Denuclearization Treaty, October 26,  
1967<sup>1</sup>

Today I come to welcome the Treaty. I wish to pay most sincere tribute to those who laboured so thoroughly and so persistently and so successfully to produce it. I wish also to announce the intentions of my Government on the Treaty, and on the question of signature of its two Additional Protocols. I shall refer briefly to some of the considerations and interpretations which my Government has in mind in the matter of this Treaty, but I do not wish today to go into complicated technical or legal details. Such matters are important, but they are not part of my purpose today.

I am sure that I speak for all of us present when I say that it is a matter of great satisfaction to welcome the conclusion of the Treaty. When, over the years, this Committee has repeatedly turned its attention to debating questions of disarmament, all too often we have had to express concern at lack of progress. It is a happy contrast, therefore, to be able to turn from frustration to success. No one can doubt that the Treaty represents a most important advance in disarmament negotiations. No one can question the far-reaching consequence of provisions which, when they enter into force, can have the effect of excluding a great continent from the nuclear arms race.

It is said that nothing succeeds like success, and my Government has no doubt that the conclusion at the beginning of this year of a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America greatly encouraged the efforts of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva to bring the nuclear arms race under control. The conclusion of this Treaty was a spur and an encouragement to the continuing and difficult and protracted negotiation of a general non-proliferation treaty. That effort goes forward, and we all devoutly hope that it will also be crowned with success.

I am happy that I can respond to the pleas addressed earlier this week to my delegation and to others by many previous speakers in this Committee. I am authorized to announce that my Government has now completed its examination of the text of the Treaty and that the United Kingdom is willing to sign both Additional Protocols to the Treaty. It is our earnest hope that this response by the United Kingdom in becoming the first Government to announce its willingness to sign both Protocols will soon be followed by similar statements by the Governments of the other States which possess nuclear weapons or which have territories within the area covered by the Treaty for which they are internationally responsible.

In stating the willingness of my Government to accept the obligations under Additional Protocol I of the Treaty, I make it clear that we are still in the process of consulting the Governments of the territories concerned in respect of which the United Kingdom concludes

<sup>1</sup> A.C.I.F.V. 1508, pp. 7-12. The treaty and protocols are printed *ibid.*, pp. 10-13.

treaties and remains responsible. We do not, however, anticipate any objection from them.

In the case of Additional Protocol II, Her Majesty's Government accept the obligation set out in this Protocol not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties to the Treaty. Like all other Members of the United Nations, we have accepted the obligation imposed on us by the Charter to refrain from the threat or use of force, and I repeat once more that my country will not use any weapons at its disposal, either nuclear or otherwise, for the purpose of aggression. My Government would, of course, have to examine its commitment under this Protocol in the unlikely event of any aggression by a Contracting Party in which it was supported by a nuclear weapon State.

I am also glad to be able to reassure the representative of the Netherlands that, although it is not committed to do so under the Treaty, my Government will extend the scope of its undertaking not to use, or to threaten to use, nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties to cover also the Territories within the zone of application of the Treaty which become associated with the Treaty under Protocol I.

As a further demonstration of its support for the Treaty, my Government will, after signature and the deposit of its instrument of ratification, consider sympathetically any request that inspections similar to those that will be carried out in the territories of the Contracting Parties should also be carried out in the territories within the geographical zone established by the Treaty for which the United Kingdom is internationally responsible.

My Government will arrange to sign the Protocols to the Treaty shortly in Mexico City, and it intends thereafter to deposit its instrument of ratification when the regulatory organizations of the Agency come into existence.<sup>2</sup>

This is not the place to go into the details of our interpretation of certain articles of the Treaty. But I would emphasize one point. My Government supports the lucid interpretation of those articles of the Treaty which concern nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes which was given by the representative of Mexico. That is, that the Treaty does not permit the Contracting Parties to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions unless and until future advances in technology permit the development of devices for peaceful explosions which are not capable of being used as weapons.

My Government was represented by an observer at the negotiations in Mexico City which led to the conclusion of the Treaty. We are, therefore, well aware that these negotiations were of great difficulty and complexity. We know of the efforts which were made to overcome and to reconcile differences of view and to find acceptable compromises on points where full agreement proved unobtainable. With that knowledge in mind, we salute the nations of Latin America. We pay a tribute to them in that they have given an example to the rest of us. They have blazed a trail further into the untried, little known, but desperately important world of disarmament.

We congratulate those who worked in the Preparatory Commission and in the Chancelleries of Latin America to make possible the conclusion of this Treaty. Particularly, we echo the sentiments expressed

<sup>2</sup> The U.K. signed the protocols on Dec. 20, 1967.

by several other delegations, and we take the opportunity of his presence here to congratulate the Chairman of the delegation of Mexico, Mr. García Robles, upon the role which he played in the work of the Preparatory Commission and in the elaboration of the Treaty.

My Government has supported and encouraged the efforts of the Latin American countries throughout the negotiations and has publicly recognized the Treaty as a valuable arms control measure. We very much hope that steps will soon be taken so that the Treaty may enter into force. In that connexion we attach great importance to the establishment of the Agency for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America. We note from article 28 of the Treaty that the Agency may be set up and can commence its work as soon as eleven States have ratified the Treaty and allowed its provisions to enter into force. I congratulate the representative of Mexico on the action taken by his Government on 20 September in becoming the first country to ratify the Treaty. By waiving the requirements in paragraph 1 of article 28 Mexico has taken the decisive step of allowing the Treaty to enter into force as far as the Territory of Mexico is concerned. Now that all the twenty-one Latin American States concerned have signed the Treaty we respectfully hope that as many as possible of those States will follow the example of Mexico. We welcome particularly the statement made by Jamaica here this morning. We look forward to the time when the Treaty has entered into force throughout the area.

I should like to end by emphasizing again, I hope on behalf of us all, our welcome for the Latin American initiative. Earlier this year I was privileged to visit several of the countries of Latin America. I could not fail to mark the deeply felt concern in those countries to speed the economic development of their great continent. The Treaty which we are now discussing is further evidence of the concern of Latin America that resources should be used to that purpose, rather than in pursuing the dangerous and costly development of nuclear weapons, and at the same time I confirm that my country stands ready to do all that it can to assist the countries of Latin America in the civil development of nuclear energy.

It is in a spirit of respectful admiration and a desire for further fruitful co-operation that I make this statement on behalf of my country here today.

**Statement by the United States Representative (Garcia)  
to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Latin  
American Denuclearization Treaty, October 26, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

Mr. Chairman, my Government warmly welcomes the conclusion on February 14, 1967, of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. At that time, my Government declared

<sup>1</sup> U.S. delegation press release USUN-168, Oct. 26, 1967. The treaty and protocols are printed *ante*, pp. 68-83.

that "it considered the conclusion of this first international instrument establishing a nuclear-free zone to be an event of unique significance . . . We hope that the Treaty will constitute a milestone on the road to general and complete disarmament, and in particular, that it will lead in the near future to the conclusion of a world-wide treaty prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons."<sup>2</sup> It is with pleasure that my delegation extends congratulations to the twenty Latin American nations who are already signatories to the Treaty, and particularly to the Government of Mexico which has already ratified. In this connection, I wish to express my delegation's appreciation for the outstanding work of Senor Garcia Robles, Chairman of the Preparatory Commission and the members of that Commission who negotiated the drafting of the Treaty.

It is indeed fitting that Latin America is the first area of the world which has produced a detailed treaty embodying the nuclear-free zone concept, with provision for verifying compliance by the Parties. Latin America has traditionally been an area where solutions to problems have been sought through the development of law and regional cooperation. Latin America has provided world leadership in the development of international political organization. The OAS is the oldest regional organization devoted to problems of peace and security. Latin American statesmanship and optimism made a significant contribution to the development of the United Nations Charter. Latin American faith in the reasonableness of man has triumphed in the Treaty before us today. My Government supports the determination of the countries of the region to maintain the high level of international comity which has served as an example to other areas of the world. The outstanding leadership displayed by Latin America has established a historical landmark pointing the way to further arms control measures.

The Treaty in basic terms prohibits the contracting parties from producing, testing or possessing nuclear weapons in their respective territories. It also forbids the receipt or installation of any nuclear weapons. An agency is provided to ensure compliance with the purposes and procedures set forth in the Treaty. The principal means for verifying compliance will be through the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on the nuclear activities of each signatory and through special inspections. These provisions are aimed at ensuring compliance with the prohibition on nuclear weapons while at the same time fostering the peaceful application of nuclear technology.

My Government has been engaged with other nations over the past several years in discussions designed to preclude the spread of nuclear weapons to countries and areas which do not possess them. We have maintained that a prohibition on deployment, possession or manufacture of nuclear weapons in areas where they have not been introduced, under appropriate circumstances, could constitute a fundamental step toward universal agreement on this non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 65.

On a number of occasions, my Government has set forth four basic requirements which it believes should characterize nuclear-free zones. These requirements were succinctly set forth by Mr. Foster in a letter dated December 10, 1965, to the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission, Senor Garcia Robles, which states, "The United States supports the creation of nuclear-free zones such as a Latin American nuclear-free zone, where the initiative for such zones originates within the area concerned; where the zone includes all states in the area whose participation is deemed important; where the creation of a zone would not disturb necessary security arrangements; and where provisions are included for following up on alleged violations in order to give reasonable assurance of compliance with the zone."<sup>3</sup>

The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America meets these basic requirements. First, the effort has been totally Latin American in character. The initiative for creation of the zone stems from a joint declaration by the Presidents of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico proposing the Denuclearization of Latin America on April 29, 1963.<sup>4</sup> In response to this proposal on the initiatives of Brazil, the General Assembly unanimously passed resolution 1911 (XVIII) which expressed the hope that the Latin American states would initiate studies leading to such a zone.<sup>5</sup> Second, virtually all the countries located within the zone have either signed, or indicated their intention to sign, the Treaty or approval of the principles of the Treaty. This offers promise that the agreement will be effective. It is to be noted that Cuba is the sole exception.

Third, the security balance within the area will not be affected. Fourth, the Treaty contains provisions for verifying compliance with its obligations and for investigation to determine violations of the Treaty and for measures to be taken in the event that a violation should occur. We welcome the intention to apply the IAEA safeguards to the nuclear activities of each country.

Protocol II of the Treaty provides that nuclear weapon states would undertake to respect the obligations set forth in the Treaty; would not contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a violation of obligations undertaken by the contracting parties; and would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the contracting parties. My Government is giving very careful and sympathetic consideration to the signing of Protocol II, in the light of our overall security arrangements and the important obligations of Protocol II. We urge the other nuclear-weapon powers to give their urgent attention to this Protocol and to the possibility of subscribing to it.

Although the Treaty is a Latin American effort, the UN played an important role as a stimulus and catalyst for regional action. The IAEA is an organization with competence and experience in which the Latin American countries can place confidence for verification of the peaceful nature of their nuclear production and scientific activities.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I wish to emphasize once again the importance which my Government attaches to this Treaty. As this

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 626-627.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 182-183.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 628-629.

Committee knows full well, each disarmament step represents long and hard negotiations. We consider the Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty as another valuable step, along with the Antarctic Treaty,<sup>6</sup> the Limited Test Ban Treaty<sup>7</sup> and the Outer Space Treaty,<sup>8</sup> toward the goal of General and Complete Disarmament. We believe that this Treaty should be unanimously commended by this Committee.

Statement by the Cuban Representative (Alarcón de Quesada) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone, October 26, 1967<sup>1</sup>

I have asked for the floor to reiterate the position of my country regarding the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.<sup>2</sup> My delegation made known its views from the outset of the first negotiations that led to the adoption of this text.

First and foremost the Revolutionary Government of Cuba wishes to repeat its peaceful mission and its sympathy towards all measures that will free the world from a nuclear holocaust. We also wish to express our appreciation of the intentions that guided the Government of Mexico in the preparation for and achievement of this Treaty. We also wish to welcome the many efforts made along those lines by the Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico and the head of the delegation of Mexico to the United Nations, Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles.

We believe that it is imperative that these measures tending to disarmament must effectively contribute to achieving the aims for which they were originally propounded. In the case of the Western hemisphere we must however first take into account the imperative need to include in the establishment of the zone the only nuclear Power of the region, namely the Government of the United States of America. This is even more important since we must bear in mind the aggressive policy pursued by the Government of the United States against all the countries of the world, a policy whose most eloquent expression is the barbarous aggression against Viet-Nam. The United States keeps under its direct domination very important portions of the continent. It still possesses, subject to colonialism, the sister republic of Puerto Rico, and has set up a number of military bases there, particularly those still equipped with nuclear weapons. The United States also possesses a number of nuclear bases in a number of Latin American countries, including the Guantanamo Naval Base illegally set up on Cuban soil and maintained against the express will of the Cuban people and Government. We must also point out that by using such bases and other machinery of a different nature the imperialist Government of the United States from 1959 to the present

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 1945-1959, vol. II, pp. 1550-1556.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

<sup>8</sup> *Ante*, pp. 38-43.

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV. 1503, pp. 26-27.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 69-83.

day has followed a constant policy of harassment, provocations, pressures, threats and aggression against Cuba with the declared intent of trying to stop the revolutionary course of our people. For all the above reasons my Government did not feel it pertinent or necessary to join in the work of Copredal nor to join the Treaty that was the result of that work. May I quote what the Foreign Minister of Cuba said in the general debate during the twenty-first regular session of the General Assembly:

In questions, referring to the use, control, elimination and prohibition of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, the Cuban delegation made known its point of view at previous sessions, particularly with regard to the proposal to denuclearize Latin America. Our Government declared more than once that we would only consider this idea if it included the denuclearization of the only nuclear Power in our Hemisphere and thus the abolition of its military bases in Panama and Puerto Rico and its naval base at Guantanamo which has been planted on Cuban soil.

My delegation considers that we must reaffirm the fact that the people and revolutionary Government of Cuba reserve the right to use what weapons we require to preserve our defence, regardless of the nature of those weapons. We have never committed ourselves, nor will we do so, to anything that will limit our defensive capacity, even if only potential.<sup>2</sup>

### Statement by the Soviet Representative (Mendelevich) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Latin American Denuclearization Treaty, October 27, 1967<sup>1</sup>

The Soviet delegation has listened carefully to the statements made by representatives of various countries which have participated in the debate on the Treaty for the denuclearization of Latin America, giving their interpretations of its various provisions and commenting upon its importance. During the discussion we have also noted the viewpoint of those States not signatories of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

The Soviet Union considers the question of the creation of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world to be extremely important. As has often been stated by the Soviet Government, we are in favour of the creation of zones free from nuclear weapons, because the creation of such zones would lead to territorial limitation of the stationing and the possible use of nuclear weapons; it would contribute to the relaxation of international tensions and the limitation of the nuclear armaments race. The creation of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world could become a serious step towards the achievement of the main goal, that of general and complete disarmament.

In that connexion we support firmly the proposal of the Government of Poland concerning the creation of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe,<sup>3</sup> the idea of the President of Finland for a denuclearized

<sup>1</sup> A/PV.1446, p. 62.

<sup>2</sup> A/C.1/PV.1509, pp. 22-42. The Latin American treaty appears *ante*, pp. 69-83.

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. I, pp. 201-205.

status for Northern Europe,<sup>3</sup> the proposal of various States for the denuclearization of the Balkans,<sup>4</sup> the plans of African States relating to the proclamation of a denuclearized zone in the whole of the African continent,<sup>5</sup> and other similar proposals.

Generally speaking, we do not consider that there are parts of the earth where denuclearized zones can be established and others where they cannot be established. With regard to our practical attempts to create denuclearized zones in various parts of the world, in determining our attitude towards such attempts we are guided by two main considerations: first, how complete the obligations of the contracting parties are and to what extent they ensure the zone's denuclearized status; and secondly, whether other nuclear Powers are ready to respect the denuclearized status of that area. In showing an interest in the creation of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world, it is logical that we should have studied the plan to create such a zone in Latin America at a time when negotiations on this question between Latin American States had barely begun. How were those plans carried out? What was the course of events? It was apparent from the beginning that various States of Latin America—first we must mention Mexico—sincerely wished to transform Latin America into a truly atom-free zone. That intention could only be welcomed. However, at the same time another thing was quite clear: that that trend was meeting serious obstacles in the opposition of certain States. The only nuclear Power situated in proximity to Latin America, the United States, refused to agree to the inclusion in the atom-free zone of the territories of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the Panama Canal—that is, territories which are part of Latin America. The United States also refused to liquidate its military and naval base in Guantanamo, which it maintains illegally on Cuban territory, despite the clear demands of the Cuban Government for the liquidation of that base, as well as of other military bases in Latin America. The United States refused to take such a step towards normalizing the political situation in the Caribbean and thus in the whole of Latin America; it refused to end its aggressive policies against the Republic of Cuba.

Further, it is well known that recently the United States of America has increased its hostility towards the Republic of Cuba. Therefore, we fully understand and share the position of the Republic of Cuba concerning the plan to create an atom-free zone in Latin America—a position which has often been set forth in the General Assembly of the United Nations and which was again confirmed yesterday by the representative of Cuba, Ambassador Alarcón de Quesada.<sup>6</sup> We consider that the Revolutionary Government of Cuba has every right to adopt such a position. In conditions when the Republic of Cuba was not able to take part in negotiations for the transformation of Latin America into a atom-free zone, those negotiations, as is well known, were carried out among part of the Latin American States.

<sup>3</sup> Finnish Embassy, *Finland in the News*, no. 4/63.

<sup>4</sup> See BNDC/PV.168, p. 15, and *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 1423-1426.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 1961, pp. 647-648; *ibid.*, 1964, pp. 294-295; *ibid.*, 1965, pp. 624-626.

<sup>6</sup> *Supra*.

At a certain time the participants, through the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, contacted the Soviet Union asking about our attitude towards that plan and asking whether the Soviet Union was prepared to undertake to respect the status of the atom-free zone in Latin America. As we understand it, similar communications were addressed to the other nuclear Powers. On 20 January 1967 the Soviet Union gave the following answer to that question:

The Soviet Union is in favour of the creation of atom-free zones in various parts of the world, seeing in it a step towards effective limitation of the sphere of stationing and use of nuclear weapons. The creation of atom-free zones is also of great importance for doing away with the danger of a nuclear war and the limitation of the armaments race.

The Soviet Government considers that in order to strengthen peace and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the undertaking to create nuclear-free zones can be made not only by groups of States representing whole continents or important geographic entities, but also by more limited groups of States and even by individual countries. For its part, the Soviet Government is prepared to undertake to respect the status of all atom-free zones to be created if similar obligations are accepted by the other nuclear Powers.

The Soviet Government will be able more concretely to determine its position towards the status of an atom-free zone in Latin America after the States directly concerned have concluded the corresponding treaty on the creation of such a zone and also after the position of other nuclear Powers becomes known.<sup>7</sup>

It is easy to see that the Soviet Government, giving this preliminary answer, was guided by the two positions of principle which determined our attitude towards practical attempts to create atom-free zones: the two principles mentioned above. Confirming our generally positive attitude towards the creation of atom-free zones in various parts of the world, the Soviet Government in its answer pointed to the main factors which will govern its final position towards the concrete plan creating a denuclearized zone in Latin America: first, the contents of the future treaty; and secondly, the position taken by the other nuclear Powers.

The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, or, as it is called, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, has been concluded, and its contents are known. Now we are able to examine in substance the question whether the provisions of that Treaty ensure the transformation of Latin America, or at least of the territories of those Latin American States which are participants in the Treaty, into an area free from nuclear weapons.

A study of the Treaty shows that it does contain provisions—and these were stressed by the representatives of Member States, Parties to the Treaty, especially the representatives of Mexico, Chile, and today Ecuador—which certainly are directed towards that goal. This applies especially to article 1 of the Treaty which contains an obligation to prohibit nuclear weapons in Latin America, as well as other provisions of the Treaty—among others articles concerning control of various aspects of those provisions. However, at the same time the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America contains other provisions which, to say the least, introduce an element of ambiguity in the Treaty. That impression is strengthened when one

<sup>7</sup> COPREDAL/60, Jan. 23, 1967.

has heard the various interpretations of provisions of the Treaty given by the participants themselves, for instance, in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. We are thinking, first of all, of article 18 of the Treaty, which states:

1. The Contracting Parties may carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes—including explosions which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons . . .

How can one conciliate the desire to create an atom-free zone with the continuing right for its participants to carry out nuclear explosions using practically the same devices as those used in nuclear weaponry? Those two elements are incompatible. It may be that in non-nuclear countries one does not quite fully understand the essence of the matter. In countries having nuclear weapons there is absolutely reliable knowledge of the fact that between devices for peaceful nuclear explosions and devices for military explosions there are no distinctions in principle. To affirm that there can be a technical differentiation between explosions of nuclear devices for military and peaceful purposes is unfounded. If a State has carried out a nuclear explosion, even for peaceful purposes, that means it does have the ability to explode a device for military purposes—that is to say, it possesses nuclear weapons. That is an incontrovertible fact which has already been underlined by various delegations here.

Taking into account the great importance of this question, the Soviet Government, as early as the negotiation stage of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, thought it necessary to inform the participants of its point of view on this matter. On 12 February 1967 the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, Mr. García Robles, was informed of a communication from the Soviet Government stating the following on this problem:

The Soviet Government has just learned that the Preparatory Committee is examining, *inter alia*, the question of including in the Treaty on an atom freeze in Latin America provisions which would allow member States of that zone to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The Soviet Government would like to note that this question is indissolubly linked to the question of preventing further dissemination of nuclear weapons, since installations for the production or carrying-out of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes are, in principle, in no way different from installations used for nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Government has always firmly been in favour of a speedy solution of the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and has many times stressed that it deems it necessary to find a solution to this problem which would close any loop-holes allowing for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This position is in full conformity with well-known decisions of the United Nations General Assembly adopted with the active support of Latin American States. That is why the Soviet Government deems it necessary and timely to express the view that the inclusion in the Treaty for the creation of a denuclearized zone in Latin America of a provision allowing nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes could complicate the solution of the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Since the speedy solution of the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is in conformity with the interests of maintaining peace, the Soviet Government expresses the hope that these considerations will be taken into account by the members of the Preparatory Committee in the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. Bringing its point of view on this matter to the attention of the Preparatory Committee, the Soviet Government would also like to stress that it understands the interest of Latin American countries, as well as of many other States, in the future use of nuclear energy for carrying out

important projects in the field of economic development which may require nuclear explosions. However, this is a special matter; it can be solved only on the basis of a separate international agreement<sup>\*</sup>

As can be seen in this communication the Soviet Government took a very definite position concerning the possibility of including in the Treaty on the creation of a denuclearized zone in Latin America a provision allowing for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, and the Soviet Government expressed the hope that its ideas would be taken into account by the participants in negotiations aimed at the conclusion of a Treaty on a nuclear-free zone in Latin America.

At the same time, the Soviet Government clearly declared that it understood the importance to the Latin American countries, as well as to many others, of the future use of the energy derived from peaceful nuclear explosions for the carrying out of important projects in the field of economic development. It considers it possible to settle this matter on the basis of a separate agreement.

It also goes without saying that our position on so-called peaceful nuclear explosions was in no way, and is in no way, linked to the question of the peaceful uses of atomic energy by all States, including members of the denuclearized zones.

The Soviet Union has always been in favour of the widest possible use of atomic energy by all States for the development of their economy and culture. Now that the Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America has been concluded and published, it appears that it still contains provisions allowing, though with some reservation, the carrying out of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes by the contracting parties. But how can we then reach the main objective of the Treaty—to exclude the possibility of the appearance in Latin America of nuclear weapons? That question remains open.

The Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America contains another element of ambiguity. Although the Treaty bars its participants from manufacturing or obtaining or acquiring nuclear weapons, or storing or deploying them in their territories, it none the less contains no provision preventing or prohibiting the transporting of nuclear weapons through the territories of contracting parties.

At the same time this is a very important question. It is all the more important that we be well aware of the practice of United States military ships, with nuclear weapons aboard, systematically going through the Panama Canal. Despite the intention of the Latin American States to create a denuclearized zone in Latin America the United States has refused to put an end to the transportation of nuclear weapons. It may be that United States nuclear weapons are also transported over the territory of other States participating in the Treaty; we do not know.

But let us take only one aspect of the matter, the Panama Canal. We do not understand the situation. Panama is a participant in the Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America. At the same time the intention is to continue to transport nuclear weapons through the Panama Canal, which runs through Panamanian territory and, if United States military authorities so wish, probably to station those weapons there. This means that United States nuclear weapons will literally remain in Puerto Rico and in other Latin America areas

<sup>\*</sup> COPREDAL AR 47 (prov.), pp. 1-3.

which the United States does not wish to include in the denuclearized zone, and they will also continue to appear inside the atom-free zone in the Panama Canal.

How can one understand that? How can that be considered compatible with the objectives of the Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America?

I should like to refer to another aspect of the Treaty. Article 4 of the Treaty speaks of the zone of application of the Treaty in such a manner that under certain conditions it will encompass huge areas of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, hundreds of kilometres beyond the territorial waters of States signing the Treaty. This is something unusual in international practice—as was noted, by the way, by the delegation of Mexico in its analysis of the main provisions of the Treaty. This question naturally arises: what is the meaning in practice of the attempt to apply to international waters, the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, the Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America? What limitations does one intend to apply especially to States that are non-signatories of the Treaty and on what grounds does a group of States thus attempt to change the status of international waters, the high seas, which can certainly not be changed in a unilateral manner?

These questions give rise to other questions. What does one wish to achieve by applying to international waters provisions of the Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America? Is there not a trend here to complicate normal relations between States that are non-signatories of the Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America, over this question of international waters?

Those were some of the views which came to our mind in connexion with the Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America. We have made those remarks because the participants in the Treaty have expressed the wish that nuclear weapons Powers, among them the Soviet Union, adopt a certain position concerning this Treaty, that they undertake to respect the status of the atom-free zone in Latin America. For reasons which we have just explained we are still not quite clear concerning the real aspects of this zone. We understand that many States of Latin America truly wish to deflect from their continent the threat of a nuclear war by the creation of a nuclear-free zone. We duly respect that desire, and we take special note of a fact such as the decision of Mexico to ratify and, without any further conditions, to implement on its territory the treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America. But this makes it even more imperative to delve deeper into the substance of the Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America.

The statements of representatives of States which signed the Treaty in the discussion in the First Committee did not cast any light on this matter.

The second aspect of the problem is the position of other nuclear Powers towards the Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America. This position is still unclear although some of those Powers, especially the United States, are not only closer to the Latin American area than the Soviet Union, but also have territories there under their jurisdiction. The statement made by the representative of the United States in the First Committee on 26 October did not throw any new

light on the position of the United States concerning the undertaking to respect the status of the nuclear-free zone in Latin America.<sup>9</sup> The statement of the representative of the United Kingdom purported to answer that question and even purported to furnish a positive answer.<sup>10</sup> However, there was a small detail in that statement which apparently revealed the true essence of the British answer. The representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Caradon, declared yesterday that under certain conditions Great Britain would unilaterally review the obligations which it is now ready to undertake towards parties to the Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America; that is to say, under certain conditions Great Britain would renounce such obligations. Simple, is it not? Today one undertakes to do something and tomorrow one renounces that undertaking.

The Soviet Union, in the case of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, as in the case of any other international treaty or question, assumes a most serious and responsible position. The way in which a given international problem is resolved can have very grave repercussions on the lives of peoples. It is for this reason that the Soviet delegation, in the present case also, has frankly and openly stated its views and opinions and indicated why we are not quite clear as to the content of the Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America or what happens around that Treaty.

I could have concluded this statement on this note, but I consider it necessary to make still one more observation.

As you probably noticed, the Soviet delegation made its statements concerning this question in Russian, the language of our country and the one usually used by our delegations in international organizations and conferences. We spoke in Russian not because we could not find anyone who could speak Spanish. Of course we could find someone who could, especially for a very short period of time. It was for other reasons. In the first place, it was because we did not have the same motivation as the representative of the United States, a motivation to which he himself alluded. He drew attention to the fact that the population of about twenty states in the United States speaks Spanish. But in the territories making up the Soviet Union we have no such areas, and we have none because throughout our history we have never taken one square inch of territory from a Latin American country. Nor have we ever fought against Latin Americans; on the contrary, we were allied with many Latin American countries in the Second World War, the war against the fascist aggressors, and we have never forgotten that alliance.

Secondly, in speaking in the First Committee, we have not sought, through unusual gestures, to divert attention from the substance and content of our statement; on the contrary, we wish to draw attention to the essence of our statement, to draw the attention of all of our colleagues to it, and particularly, of course, the attention of the representatives of the Latin American States. It may be that in our statement we shall not, on all points, immediately satisfy our colleagues from Latin America, but if they carefully peruse it they will become convinced that we spoke from the bottom of our hearts, we said what

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, pp. 535-538.

<sup>10</sup> See *ante*, pp. 533-535.

we meant, we spoke the truth. This, in our opinion, is the main thing. We are convinced that it will be understood as it should be. For these reasons, we spoke in our language, the Russian language, the language of Pushkin and Lenin, though we have the greatest respect for the language of Cervantes and Bolívar, and for the language of Shakespeare and Abraham Lincoln as well.

### Brazilian Amendments to the Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, October 31, 1967<sup>1</sup>

1. Article I shall be amended to read as follows:

Article I. Each nuclear weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or control over such weapons directly or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or control over such weapons. Each nuclear weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes the obligation to channel, through a special United Nations fund, for the benefit of the economic development of developing countries, in particular for their scientific and technological progress, a substantial part of the resources freed by the measures of nuclear disarmament.

2. Article II shall be amended to read as follows:

Article II. Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or the control over such weapons directly or indirectly, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture, acquisition or control of nuclear weapons.

3. A new article, provisionally numbered II-A, shall be included and formulated as follows:

Article II-a. Each nuclear weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes the obligation to negotiate at the earliest possible date a Treaty for the cessation of nuclear arms race and for the eventual reduction and elimination of their nuclear arsenals and the means of delivery of their nuclear weapons.

4. Article IV shall be amended to read as follows:

Article IV. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop, alone or in cooperation with other States, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including nuclear explosive devices for civil uses, without discrimination, as well as the right of the Parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

5. Paragraph 2 of article V shall be amended to read as follows:

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force upon the deposit of the instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear weapon States Party to this Treaty, and all

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/201, Oct. 31, 1967. The draft treaty appears *ante*, pp. 338-341.

other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

6. Paragraph 3 of article V shall be amended to read as follows:

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty, with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized, in particular the provisions of articles I and II-A.

7. Paragraph 3 of article VI shall be amended to read as follows:

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and \_\_\_\_\_ other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is the one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon prior to January 1, 1967.

8. A new paragraph to article VI, provisionally numbered paragraph 7, shall be included and formulated as follows:

7. Nothing in this Treaty affects nor shall be interpreted as affecting, in any way, the rights or obligations of signatory States under regional treaties on the proscription of nuclear weapons or the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties, consistent with the objectives of this Treaty.

9. Article VII shall be amended to read as follows:

Article VII. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that there have arisen or may arise circumstances related with the subject matter of this Treaty which may affect the supreme interest of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary Governments, three months in advance.

### Statements by the Maltese Representative (Pardo) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor [Extracts], November 1, 1967<sup>1</sup>

... Finally there are grave considerations of a security and defence nature that impel the major Powers to appropriate areas of the ocean floor for their own exclusive use.

The latter is somewhat sensitive subject which I would have preferred to avoid, but my silence would not prevent security considerations from weighing heavily, and perhaps decisively, on the attitude that will be taken by different countries on the proposals which we shall make. My delegation must, therefore, show some awareness of the difficult problems that some countries face. I shall not attempt a strategic analysis but I will limit myself to describing briefly some of the developments we anticipate if the United Nations does not take urgent action.

We are all aware of the importance of the sea for defence purposes: from the sea the vastest land masses can be dominated, and the sea in

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV.1515, pp. 31-36, 66-68; A/C.1/PV.1516, pp. 2-7.

turn is dominated, and can be dominated from the sea floor. The importance of the sea increases rather than decreases in the age of the nuclear submarine. The development of a technology that permits the physical occupation and military use of large areas of the sea-bed beyond the continental shelf drastically alters traditional constraints on the use of the sea with consequences which even experts may find difficulty fully to assess at the present time; in any case a new dimension is added to strategy.

We all know that extremely powerful and sophisticated land-based nuclear missile systems have been developed and are being constantly refined, but the very technology that has made the development of these systems possible, has also provided the means for their destruction. What could be more attractive in the era of multiple war-head ballistic missiles, capable of overwhelming defences and destroying land-based hardened missile sites, than to transfer offensive and defensive capability to the seas, an environment highly resistant to the overpressures of nuclear attack. This indeed has already occurred to some extent with the development of nuclear-powered submarines equipped with nuclear missiles: the present inestimable advantage of these vessels is that they can maintain the balance of terror by guaranteeing a measure of second strike capability since they are almost immune to detection. This immunity and hence this second strike capability could, however, be seriously impaired were tracking devices (which incidentally are already available) installed in suitable areas of the deep seas and of the ocean floor. Such devices can be used, of course, for scientific and commercial purposes, for instance as aids to navigation and for the charting of fish migrations, but they can also be used to detect and to trail possible hostile submersibles.

Deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system on suitable areas of the ocean floor, such as on the oceanic mountain ranges, could prove an effective counter to multiple war-head missiles aimed at land targets. The advantages of such a system are obvious: more than one strike at incoming missiles would be possible; secondly, incoming multiple war-head missiles could be attacked before the several war-heads separate.

Mobile near bottom nuclear missile systems can be conceived which, while immune from any presently conceivable form of detection, would provide immense offensive capability.

Establishment of fixed military installations on the ocean floor might also be found useful for many purposes.

A high degree of self-sufficiency could be obtained for the various military installations hypothetically envisaged by the construction of nuclear power plants providing oxygen by the electrolysis of sea-water while sufficient nutrients exist in the sea to provide ample supplies of food.

Thus the advantages of proceeding to utilize the deep seas and the ocean floor for military purposes might at first sight appear compelling to the country or countries possessing the requisite technology. Yet there are disadvantages to such course of action.

Since more than one country is able to utilize the deep seas and the ocean floor for military purposes, we can expect an immediate and

rapid escalation of the arms race in the seas, if any of the hypothetical developments that I have mentioned were known to have taken place beyond the limits of the geophysical continental shelf. There would certainly be a race to occupy accessible strategic areas on the ocean floor without much regard to the claims that other nations, not having the capability to occupy these areas, might put forward. Military installations on or near the ocean floor require protection against spying or harassment, this would almost inevitably lead to unilaterally proclaimed jurisdiction over large areas of the surrounding and superjacent sea; and the consequent curtailment of lawful traditional activities on the high seas would be bitterly resented by many countries. We can only speculate also on what counter-measures would be taken against any specific action to militarize any area of the deep seas or of the ocean floor beyond the continental shelf. It is certain that effective counter-measures are possible: thus the effectiveness of acoustic detection and surveillance devices installed in the oceans could be destroyed by insonifying parts of the oceans themselves. This would be effective militarily but it would also render near bottom navigation for all purposes, including scientific purposes, extremely hazardous and would render fishing sonar virtually unusable.

In conclusion I would submit that the utilization for military purposes of the deep seas and of the accessible ocean floor, while perhaps attractive at first sight, might provoke political, military and economic complications of such magnitude as to compel very careful assessment of the probable consequences by the Powers concerned. I would respectfully urge upon the major Powers the utter futility of attempting to obtain a temporary military advantage by using the ocean floor, beyond the geophysical continental shelf for military purpose. Legitimate defence needs and the balance of terror as well as the interests of all countries, can far better be safeguarded by developing within an international framework credible assurances that the sea-bed and the ocean floor will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. This has already been done with respect to outer space. We trust it will also be possible to do so with respect to the ocean floor.

From what I have stated I believe it can be reasonably deduced that while the specialized agencies and the United Nations itself may be doing valuable technical work in the fields within their competence, their activities have no prospect in any way of diminishing the pressures making for the competitive appropriation for national purposes of the sea-bed and ocean floor, nor do their activities give much prospect of coping effectively with massive problems of world-wide scope such as the problem of the pollution of the marine environment, since there is a complete lack of a general institutional framework which can provide focus and efficient direction to the fragmented activities that are now going on. Furthermore, reliance by some agencies on the universal and spontaneous implementation by States of recommendations, however desirable, made by technical bodies may perhaps, we submit, be a little optimistic. We also note that the basic political problem has been carefully avoided in all the activities going on so far, and

even in General Assembly resolution 2172 (XXI),<sup>2</sup> which is the basic General Assembly resolution, everything is mentioned except the basic political problem. The only result that we can hope for from the study which is now being carried out by the Panel of Experts, which will meet again next year, is a long study and a long discussion of the scientific and engineering aspects of the question.

In the circumstances, it is not surprising that increasing concern has been expressed in unofficial quarters over the apparent lack of awareness in the international community of the implications of recent developments in technology in the context of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.<sup>3</sup> Increasingly numerous voices have been raised stressing the urgency of considering the vital political questions involved and urging that clear legal provision be made for an international régime, administered by an efficient international authority over the sea-beds and the ocean floor beyond a variously defined continental shelf. I should like to pay a tribute in this connexion both to the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace and to the International Law Association for their excellent work in alerting public opinion and I would commend for careful study the documentation produced by them on the question we are considering. The latest proposal in favour of an international régime was put forward in July this year by the World Peace Through Law Conference which was attended by over 2,000 lawyers and judges from over 100 countries. That proposal was contained in resolution 15 which deserves to be cited:

*Whereas* new technology and oceanography have revealed the possibility of exploitation of untold resources of the high seas and of the bed thereof beyond the continental shelf and more than half of mankind finds itself underprivileged, underfed and underdeveloped, and the high seas are the common heritage of all mankind,

*Resolved* that the World Peace Through Law Center:

(1) *Recommend* to the General Assembly of the United Nations the issuance of a proclamation declaring that the non-fishery resources of the high seas, outside the territorial waters of any State, and the bed of the sea beyond the continental shelf, appertain to the United Nations and are subject to its jurisdiction and control.

Among the supporters of an international régime for the sea-beds and the ocean floor there are two main currents of opinion. One favours the creation of a new agency responsible for all oceanographic activities, including those concerning mineral resources of the sea. The other prefers to entrust all responsibility to the United Nations.

As an illustration of the former current of opinion I will cite the recommendation of the Joint ACMRR/SCOR/WMO Working Group to the effect that:

member governments of the United Nations family and the various United Nations agencies give early and thorough consideration to the advisability and feasibility of establishing a Central Inter-governmental Oceanic Organization to deal with all aspects of ocean investigation and uses of the sea.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> General Assembly Official Records: Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16 (A/6316), p. 32.

<sup>3</sup> 15 UST 471.

<sup>4</sup> Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research, International Council of Scientific Unions, *International Ocean Affairs: A Special Report* (La Jolla, Calif., 1967), p. 21

That recommendation is contained in the records of the Joint Meeting of the Working Group held on 17-21 July 1967.

On the other hand, other experts believe, like Christy, that an effective international régime can best be developed under the auspices of the United Nations since this:

... is the one public international body ... that comes closest to meeting the requirements ... to achieve an international régime. The United Nations authority must acquire jurisdiction of the resources on and under the sea floor. This jurisdiction must permit it to part and protect exclusive rights of entrepreneurs ... and must also have the ability to tax or extract rent or royalty payments for the use of the resources and it must be given the ability to utilize or distribute these revenues in an acceptable manner.

[Mr. Pardo made the following statement at the 1516th meeting of the First Committee.]

From what I said this morning, I think it is clear that there can be no doubt that an effective international régime over the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond a clearly defined national jurisdiction is the only alternative by which we can hope to avoid the escalating tensions that will be inevitable if the present situation is allowed to continue. It is the only alternative by which we can hope to escape the immense hazards of a permanent impairment of the marine environment. It is, finally, the only alternative that gives assurance that the immense resources on and under the ocean floor will be exploited with harm to none and benefit to all.

Finally, a properly established international régime contains all the necessary elements which should make it acceptable to all of us here: rich and poor countries, strong and weak, coastal and landlocked States. Through an international régime all can receive assurance that at least the deep sea floor will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that there will be orderly exploitation of its resources.

You will note, however, that all proposals put forward up to now for an international régime have avoided facing the defence aspects of the question before us. Those aspects, in our opinion, are crucial for an enduring international solution of the problem. Appropriation for national purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond the geographical continental shelf has already started. My Government believes that the international community has no alternative in these circumstances but to aim consciously and with a sense of urgency towards the creation of an international régime, beyond, I repeat, reasonably defined national jurisdiction. In creating such a régime, we must face squarely the vital issues of legitimate national security together with the economic, scientific and other implications.

Our general objective must be to create conditions in the marine environment that will be of benefit to all countries. We do not believe that it would be wise to make the United Nations itself responsible for administering an international régime. We say this not because we have any objections of principle, but for practical reasons.

I shall not take your time to list them here. I would only observe that it is hardly likely that those countries that have already developed a technical capability to exploit the ocean floor would agree to an international régime if it were administered by a body where small countries, such as mine, had the same voting power as the United States or the Soviet Union.

Hence, our long-term objective is the creation of a special agency with adequate powers to administer in the interests of mankind the oceans and the ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction. We envisage such an agency as assuming jurisdiction, not as a sovereign, but as a trustee for all countries over the oceans and the ocean floor. The agency should be endowed with wide powers to regulate, supervise and control all activities on or under the oceans and the ocean floor. It would be premature for me to elaborate on the provisions which could be incorporated in the charter of the suggested agency to ensure that the ocean floor be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Perhaps, it will suffice at this stage to assure you that we have examined the question carefully and my Government is satisfied that it is feasible to give credible assurance to all countries that through the agency the ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction will in fact be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

In our view the agency should have the power effectively to regulate the commercial exploitation of the ocean floor. We would envisage exploration rights and leases being granted in respect of mineral, petroleum and other resources lying in the area within its jurisdiction. We have made some hasty calculations on the amount of revenue which the agency could be expected to receive from such activities. On the assumption that an agency would be created in the year 1970, that technology will continue to advance, that exploitation will be commensurate with the presently known resources of the ocean floor, that exploration rights and leases will be granted at rates comparable to those existing at present under national jurisdiction and that the continental shelf under national jurisdiction will be defined approximately at the 200 metres isobath or at twelve miles from the nearest coast, we believe that by 1975, that is, five years after an agency is established, gross annual income will reach a level which we conservatively estimate at around \$6 billion. After deducting administration expenses and all other legitimate expenses including support to oceanographic research, the agency would, in our view, still be left with at least \$5 billion to be used to further either directly or through the United Nations Development Programme the development of poor countries. The sum which I have mentioned is a conservative estimate. I would recall, in this respect, that the United States Government alone has received only from petroleum leases on its continental shelf in the last fifteen years the sum of \$3.6 billion. That is one country in respect of one product alone. Should the international agency be established and should revenues be approximately at the level which we estimate, the international aid picture will be completely transformed.

We also envisage the agency as the body with overall responsibility for keeping the problem of ocean pollution under control. The useful work of existing specialized bodies such as the International Atomic

Energy Agency, the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization and others would not be jeopardized. Their collaboration would be solicited and their advice, if endorsed by the agency, could be incorporated in an enforceable code of law for the accepted use of the deep seas and of the ocean floor. We believe that the existence and powers of the suggested agency should be founded on a treaty clearly defining the outer limits of the continental shelf subject to national jurisdiction, and establishing generally acceptable principles with regard to the use of the deep seas and of the ocean floor. We are strongly of the opinion that the following, among other principles, should be incorporated in the proposed treaty:

1. The sea-bed and the ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction as defined in the treaty, are not subject to national appropriation in any manner whatsoever.
2. The sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction shall be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes.
3. Scientific research with regard to the deep seas and ocean floor, not directly connected with defence, shall be freely permissible and its results available to all.
4. The resources of the sea-bed and ocean floor, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, shall be exploited primarily in the interests of mankind, with particular regard to the needs of poor countries.
5. The exploration and exploitation of the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter and in a manner not causing unnecessary obstruction of the high seas or serious impairment of the marine environment.

There are other important principles which we could mention, but here again I am aware that time presses.

These are our long-term objectives. We realize that they cannot be achieved either quickly or easily. We hope, however, that the General Assembly will at its present session adopt a resolution embodying the following concepts:

1. The sea-bed and the ocean floor are a common heritage of mankind and should be used and exploited for peaceful purposes and for the exclusive benefit of mankind as a whole. The needs of poor countries, representing that part of mankind which is most in need of assistance, should receive preferential consideration in the event of financial benefits being derived from the exploitation of the sea-bed and ocean floor for commercial purposes.
2. Claims to sovereignty over the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond present national jurisdiction, as presently claimed, should be frozen until a clear definition of the continental shelf is formulated.
3. A widely representative but not too numerous body should be established in the first place to consider the security, economic and other implications of the establishment of an international regime over the deep seas and ocean floor beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction; in the second place, to draft a comprehensive treaty to safeguard the international character of the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond present national jurisdiction; and in the third place to provide for the establishment of an international agency which will ensure that national activities undertaken in the deep seas and on the ocean floor will conform to the principles and provisions incorporated in the proposed treaty.

We have prepared a draft resolution embodying the points I have mentioned. We are reluctant, however, to submit it officially for consideration by this Committee. The question of the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond present national jurisdiction is of a vital importance to all of us. It is also a matter in which the concurrence of all is essential. We are not anxious, therefore, to engage publicly in the usual controversy which often precedes the adoption of a resolution. We do not wish to divide this Committee. We propose instead to appeal to moral concepts, to reason and to well-understood national interest. I would accordingly formally request you, Mr. Chairman, to appoint a small but widely representative group to consult together and to elaborate a draft resolution which, we would hope, may be acceptable to all, or at least to the great majority of Member States.

**Statement by the Nigerian Representative (Sule Kolo) to  
the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft  
Nonproliferation Treaty [Extract], November 2,  
1967<sup>1</sup>**

2. Since the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union tabled their draft treaty texts in this Committee,<sup>2</sup> many other delegations, including my own, have made certain comments and presented specific proposals aimed at making the final draft treaty acceptable to the overwhelming majority of States.

3. The Nigerian delegation believes that we should aim at a balanced treaty because anything less is unlikely to receive the support of the majority of States. We believe that the delegations which have made concrete proposals since 24 August have done so in good faith, with the aim of safeguarding essential national and international interest and principles. There is no doubt that the achievement of a non-proliferation treaty is an urgent task. The urgency arises from the importance of the treaty, which also demands that we should pursue our task with perseverance and tolerance. In this connexion I should like to welcome the statements of representatives of the United States at our recent meetings in which they assured the Committee that the various proposals that have been made by delegations were being studied for the purpose of including them in the final draft treaty.

4. The Nigerian delegation is aware of the problem of reconciling the various views that have been presented in this Committee and is appreciative of the leading roles of the co-Chairmen in that regard. On the other hand, the Soviet and United States texts remain uncompleted, article III not having been introduced. Although the rest of the treaty will certainly be affected by the substance of that article on international control and safeguards, we thought that while waiting for the successful conclusion of negotiations on that article this

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.344, pp. 4-8.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 338-341.

Committee could move ahead and complete work on the other parts of the treaty.

5. As part of that pursuit, the Nigerian delegation would like to take a little further the preliminary comments it made soon after the submission of the United States and USSR drafts.<sup>3</sup> We are gratified to note that some of the ideas contained in our speech coincide with the views of other delegations, which have presented some of them in the form of amendments and working papers. We do not intend here to go over formulations with which we agree in the original drafts or in the working papers presented by other delegations since 24 August; but we feel it is our duty and every member of this Committee has a similar duty—to present our ideas in treaty language where we believe that a change in the wording or emphasis of existing formulations would serve our purpose better.

6. The Nigerian delegation, conscious that a non-proliferation treaty of necessity imposes restrictions on a class of States, is anxious that the restrictions should not be such as to interfere with the legitimate activities and aspirations of peoples. For that reason the Nigerian delegation wishes to give its unqualified support to the principle embodied in the various proposals that have been advanced to strengthen article IV of the United States and Soviet draft.

7. It seems to us that the guiding principles behind the articles dealing with the prohibition of nuclear explosive devices on the one hand and the encouragement of development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes on the other must be fully understood. Articles I and II, which deal with non-dissemination, will if they stand in their present formulations impose extraordinary restrictions on non-nuclear-weapon States in the development of the science and technology of nuclear explosives. Consequently, if the articles are accepted by non-nuclear-weapon States, it will be at a price which, I dare say, no one can yet correctly estimate. As the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, rightly observed at our meeting of 23 February, there is the risk that the negative prophecies about the peaceful potentialities of nuclear explosions may be as short-sighted as the views of the distinguished members of the British Post Office who thought that, "owing to the abundant supply of messenger boys, the telephone would never be needed in England".<sup>4</sup> I wonder how amused the representatives would have been today if the British Postmaster-General at that time had actually banned the introduction of telephones in Britain in order to maintain the full employment of messenger boys.

8. The Nigerian delegation believes that, in pursuing the task before us, we must not make the mistake of the British Post Office official. The article dealing with the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should therefore be as positive and precise as that dealing with the prohibition of nuclear explosive devices. The responsibility which will fall on the nuclear-weapon Powers in that regard is a direct consequence of the privilege conferred on them by articles I and II of the United States and USSR drafts. I think justice demands that those who retain the privilege to develop nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes should clearly undertake to make

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, pp. 375-380.

<sup>4</sup> ENDC/PV. 288, p. 8.

available to those who have renounced the privilege full details of the results of their research which could be useful for peaceful purposes in any area of the world.

9. In that connexion the Nigerian delegation wishes to make a clear difference between availability of the potential peaceful benefits of nuclear explosives and the technology which gives rise to those benefits. I think the aim of the non-privileged is not merely to receive benefits but also to acquire the technical know-how which will produce those benefits. We realize that research into peaceful uses of nuclear explosives is an expensive undertaking; but perhaps it is not so much more expensive than the undertaking not to conduct research at all in that direction. For the foregoing reasons the Nigerian delegation believes that article IV should be redrafted along the lines that I shall propose at the end of this statement.

10. In the meantime I should like to turn to the question of security. The Nigerian delegation has consistently emphasized the need to provide a "nuclear umbrella" for the signatories of a non-proliferation treaty until such time as nuclear weapons are eliminated from the arsenals of all countries. I must say that I have not been convinced by any arguments that have so far been advanced in this Committee against the introduction of that idea into a non-proliferation treaty. As I said in my last intervention, collective security arrangements in respect of nuclear threat or attack are as essential to a non-proliferation treaty as the collective security system is to the Charter of the United Nations.<sup>6</sup> If the principle could be accepted for the Charter, I do not see why it cannot be accepted for a non-proliferation treaty.

11. It has been said that the Security Council already provides a universal guarantee against aggression. That is true in a general way, but we also know that it is not at all certain that all the nuclear Powers in the Security Council will sign this treaty. Furthermore, we should be over-stretching the Charter of the United Nations if we invested the Security Council with responsibilities which it was certainly not intended, or in a position, to shoulder. We have all seen wars fought with conventional weapons since the Security Council came into being, without its being able to define the aggressor or, what is more, to repel his attack. Such a situation is bearable when the devastation can still be measured in terms of men and material, but not when the result will be the end of civilization and the disappearance of man from vast areas of the globe.

12. The use of nuclear weapons against anyone has been declared a crime against humanity (General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI)) because of the terrible damage it can cause to humanity.<sup>7</sup> Indeed the aim of the treaty we are negotiating is to reduce the danger of nuclear war. By it some countries will be called upon to forswear the weapons for the security of the whole world. On the other hand, some will be allowed the privilege of keeping the deadly weapons until such time as an agreement can be reached on their general elimination. The argument for retaining that privilege is that nuclear weapons have a value as a deterrent against potential aggressors. The Nigerian dele-

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, p. 330.

<sup>7</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 648-650.

gation cannot see how that deterrent value can justly be denied to those who are being asked not to produce the weapons themselves.

13. Thus it seems to us indispensable that non-nuclear-weapon Powers signatory to a non-proliferation treaty be provided with guarantees by nuclear-weapon States against nuclear blackmail. We do not believe that that should entail membership of any alliance, for in any case a nuclear war will know no alliance. For that reason the Nigerian delegation will propose a paragraph for inclusion in the non-proliferation treaty along the lines shown in article IIA of the working paper which I will present at the end of this intervention.<sup>7</sup>

14. Now I should like to refer briefly to the question of amendments. It seems to us undemocratic that sovereign States voluntarily adhering to a treaty should have amendments imposed on them by what would amount to a minority of signatories—which is what the veto would amount to for about thirty States. What is more, we believe that the subject matter of the treaty is too important and its ramifications too obscure for a State to commit itself in advance. In any case, if the votes of nuclear-weapon Powers and members of the Governing Board of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were all that were important, there would be no need to impose such amendments on those not belonging to that category. For those reasons I should like to support the idea already placed before the Committee by the representative of Romania that amendments to the treaty should come into force for all parties that have deposited their instruments of ratification.<sup>8</sup>

15. Finally, the Nigerian delegation would like to make an important addition to the article on withdrawal. The article speaks of "extraordinary events, related to the subject matter" of the treaty. I have the impression that the "extraordinary events" would be those that could not have been foreseen at the time of signature. On the other hand, the Nigerian delegation foresees many difficulties which could arise on substantive matters after signature. Consequently we would suggest that non-fulfilment and non-adherence, along the lines of article VII proposed in our working paper, should be explicitly declared to be grounds for withdrawal.

. . . . .

### Nigerian Working Paper Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Additions and Amendments to the Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, November 2, 1967<sup>1</sup>

#### ARTICLE IIA:

Each nuclear weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes, if requested, to come to the aid of any non-nuclear weapon State which is threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons.

<sup>7</sup> *Infra.*

<sup>8</sup> *Ante.*, p. 526.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/202, Nov. 2, 1967. The draft treaty appears *ante.*, pp. 339-341.

## ARTICLE IVA:

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to cooperate directly or through the IAEA, in good faith and according to its technological and/or material resources, with any other State or group of States Party to this Treaty in the development and advancement of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The nuclear weapon States Party to this Treaty shall make available, through the IAEA, to all non-nuclear weapon Parties, full scientific and technological information on the peaceful applications of nuclear energy accruing from research on nuclear explosive devices.

The nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty shall also provide facilities for scientists from non-nuclear weapon countries Party to the Treaty to collaborate with their scientists working on nuclear explosive devices, in order to narrow the intellectual gap which will be created in that field as a result of restrictions imposed by this Treaty on non-nuclear weapon States.

## ARTICLE IVB:

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to communicate annually to the IAEA, full information on the nature, extent and results of its cooperation with any other Party or group of Parties, in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Reports so received by the IAEA shall be circulated by the Agency to all the Parties to the Treaty.

## ARTICLE IVC:

Each Party to this Treaty shall take necessary legal and administrative steps to ensure that all organisations working on the development of nuclear energy in territory under its jurisdiction do so in conformity with the aims and provisions of the Treaty.

## ARTICLE VI:

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides:

- (a) that the aims of the Treaty are being frustrated;
- (b) that the failure by a State or group of States to adhere to the Treaty jeopardizes the existing or potential balance of power in its area, thereby threatening its security;
- (c) any other extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.

It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of reasons for withdrawal.

## Statement by Secretary of Defense McNamara on Soviet Orbital Bomb, November 3, 1967<sup>1</sup>

I would like today to discuss with you certain intelligence information we have collected on a series of space system flight tests being conducted by the Soviet Union. These relate to the possible development by the Soviet of something we have called a fractional orbital bombardment system, or FOBS.

Let me distinguish such a system from the traditional intercontinental ballistic missile. An ICBM normally does not go into orbit, but rather follows a ballistic trajectory from launch point to impact point. On this trajectory it reaches a peak altitude of perhaps 800 miles.

Unlike the ICBM and its ballistic trajectory, the vehicle launched in a FOBS mode is fired into a very low orbit about 100 miles above the earth. At a given point—generally before the first orbit is complete—a rocket engine is fired which slows down the payload and causes it to drop out of orbit. The payload then follows a re-entry path similar to the re-entry of a ballistic missile.

Even now it is impossible to be certain of what these tests represent. It is conceivable that the Soviet Union has been testing space vehicles for some re-entry program. But we suspect that the Russians are pursuing the research and development of a FOBS. If this turns out to be true, it is conceivable that they could achieve an initial operational capability during 1968.

Some years ago we ourselves examined the desirability of the FOBS and there was agreement among civilian and military leaders that there was no need for our country to develop any such system. While development of it could be initiated at any time for relatively rapid deployment, our analyses conclude that it would not improve our strategic offensive posture and consequently we have no intention of revising the decision made years ago.

Like other possible variations, the FOBS offers some characteristics of the FOBS system which differ from traditional ICBM's. In our opinion the disadvantages are overriding.

Because of the low altitude of their orbits, some trajectories of a FOBS would avoid detection by some early warning radars, including our BMEWS. Also, the impact point cannot be determined until ignition of the rocket engine that deboosts the payload out of orbit—roughly three minutes and 500 miles from the target. And the flight path can be as much as 10 minutes shorter than an ICBM.

For these characteristics, severe penalties are paid in two critical areas—accuracy and payload. The accuracy of the Soviet ICBM modified to a FOBS weapon would be significantly less and the payload of the FOBS vehicle would be but a fraction of the ICBM.

The FOBS weapon would not be accurate enough for a satisfactory attack upon United States Minutemen missiles, protected in their silos. Perhaps the Soviets might feel it could provide a surprise nuclear strike against United States' soft land targets such as bomber bases.

<sup>1</sup> *New York Times*, Nov. 4, 1967.

However, several years ago, anticipating such a capability, we initiated the deployment of equipment to deny them that capability. For example, already we are beginning to use operationally over-the-horizon radars which possess a greater capability of detecting FOBS than do the BMEWS. These will give us more warning time against a full-scale attack using FOBS missiles than BMEWS does against the ICBM launch.

As you know, our deterrent rests upon our ability to absorb any surprise nuclear attack and to retaliate with sufficient strength to destroy the attacking nation as a viable society. With three-minute warning, 15-minute warning or no warning at all, we could still absorb a surprise attack and strike back with sufficient power to destroy the attacker. We have that capability today; we will continue to have it in the future.

**Address by C.P.S.U. General Secretary Brezhnev on the  
Fiftieth Anniversary of the October Revolution [Ex-  
tract], November 3, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

Our strength is great, but we will never use it for selfish egotistic ends. The colossal might of the world's first state to be building communism serves the interests of the just cause of struggle against aggression and oppression, for freedom, democracy and peace. The growth of this might and the increasing influence of the U.S.S.R. on world developments accord with the vital interests of the masses of all countries.

Our foreign policy is a socialist policy and consistently revolutionary in all its content. But Marxist-Leninists have always understood that socialism cannot be carried from one country to another by military force, but is an outcome of the internal development of each given society. They firmly believe in the righteousness of their cause and in the advantages of the socialist system and are convinced that for it to be victorious there is no need to resort to wars between states.

Lenin taught that in foreign policy it is necessary to take into account both the designs of the imperialist adventurers and the stand of sober-minded representatives of the bourgeoisie. We remember these instructions, and today, when the Soviet Union has attained unprecedented might, it continues to advocate renunciation of attempts to settle questions of relations between the two social systems by military means. We call upon the governments of bourgeois countries to heed the voice of the peoples, who demand peace and lasting security. (*Prolonged applause.*)

The Soviet Union considers it its duty to do everything in its power so that these aspirations may be realized. That is why it is waging a struggle, and will continue to do so with unabated energy, for universal

<sup>1</sup> *Pravda*, Nov. 4, 1967; *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Nov. 22, 1967, p. 17. The address was delivered at a ceremonial session of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, the R.S.F.S.R. Supreme Soviet, and the C.P.S.U. Central Committee.

and complete disarmament. We also consider useful such partial steps in this direction as the agreements on banning nuclear weapons tests, on nuclear nonproliferation and on banning the use of nuclear weapons.

We attach serious significance to the United Nations and will strive together with other freedom-loving and peaceable states to turn it into an effective organ of international cooperation in the interests of defending peace and the rights of peoples. Jointly with its allies the U.S.S.R. will persistently continue the struggle for a stable peace in Europe, and against everything that threatens the security of the European peoples; it will support mutually advantageous cooperation of states with different social systems on the basis of well-known principles of peaceful coexistence.

The Soviet Union's struggle for peace and friendship among peoples has completely smashed the lying fable of "the aggressiveness of Moscow" and "the Communist menace," a fable with whose help international reaction, headed by the U.S. imperialists and misleading the peoples, knocked together their NATO, SEATO and other aggressive military blocs. By creating these blocs they hoped to encircle us and prevent the consolidation of the world system of socialism and the development of the national-liberation revolution of the oppressed peoples.

But things turned out altogether different from the calculations in Washington and other capitals of the capitalist world. The positions of socialism and its allies are growing steadily stronger. The aggressive forces of imperialism find themselves in a position of growing isolation and the blocs they created are shaky and clearly cracking up. The peoples and even some governments of bourgeois countries are more and more overtly evincing a desire to cast off the fetters that had been imposed on them and to dissociate themselves from the dangerous adventurist policy of the organizers and ringleaders of the imperialist blocs. In all this there is, undoubtedly, the influence of the Soviet Union's principled and consistent peaceful foreign policy.

### Statement by the British Representative (Glass) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor [Extract], November 8, 1967<sup>1</sup>

I believe . . . that the Maltese item before us is not only imaginative and instructive but timely. If I understand Dr. Pardo's intention aright, his main objective is to focus attention on the subject and to get us all started. Dr. Pardo has himself recognized the immense complications of the many issues he has raised and he is realistic enough to know that the long-term objectives of his Government in establishing an international régime for the sea-bed and ocean floor are not likely to be achieved either quickly or easily. That, I am afraid, is

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV.1524, pp. 11-16.

inevitable with a subject of this importance and I would ask the representative of Malta not to be disappointed if that estimate should prove to be correct. However, my Government gives its full support to a thorough study of the Maltese proposals, and it hopes that the committee which it has been proposed should be established can be set up and can commence its work as soon as possible.

Let us hope that our response to this initiative will meet the challenge which has been offered and that our efforts in this field will eventually be crowned with success. We have recently seen the agreement of a widely acceptable Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.<sup>2</sup> Now we have turned our attention to the "inner space" of our planet—the "silent world". There are, in fact, many similarities between these two apparently diverse subjects. Scientific developments in the exploration of outer space and of the deep ocean bed have made it possible for man to make brief visits into these alien environments. Those excursions have been hazardous and have been carried out in vehicles which have severely limited man's capacity to carry out useful work in his new surroundings. But we have seen the enormous progress achieved in space by the two major Powers in the last few years and, by analogy, it seems more than probable that, as Dr. Pardo has suggested, similar progress will also be made during the coming decade in the exploration and use of the resources of the sea-bed. We do not yet know the full extent of these resources except that they are likely to be very great. But the fact that they will become available for use within the foreseeable future should make us consider very carefully indeed what controls and international obligations will be necessary to regulate those developments. It must by now be clear to all that what is finally agreed upon in the United Nations on this subject may turn out in the future to be of vital importance with implications which concern every country. Those developments may well affect many countries much earlier than the more publicized achievements in outer space. The existence of exploitable resources on the ocean floor is firmly established. They are accessible and their extraction will impinge directly on many aspects of national sovereignty and on national economies.

I should now like to explain in more detail my Government's reaction to the proposals before us. We, too, are greatly concerned at the prospect of the possible unilateral exploitation of the resources of the ocean bed without regard to the interests of the international community. Such exploration and use, should, we believe, be carried out in a manner consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations. Similarly, we see the case for a study of the arms control implications of measures to restrict the use of the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction to peaceful purposes. My country, perhaps more than any other, has always regarded the sea as its first line of defence and vital to its national security. We must therefore, of necessity, examine very carefully any proposals which might affect our ability to protect those shores. However, having said that, I would emphasize that my Government's policy, as is well known, is to work to achieve general and complete disarmament, and we welcome

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 38-43.

this proposal as a step in that direction. It may be that, after preliminary discussion of the arms control problems in the proposed specialized committee, there will be a useful role for the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to play in studying the disarmament implications.

It may be helpful to the Committee if I set out what my Government considers are the major problems to be faced. Firstly, there are the legal implications. There is a relative absence of international law with respect to the use of the ocean bed and the existing conventions on the law of the sea do not deal generally with the sea-bed outside certain limits. There is therefore no clear-cut boundary to the rights of nations with coastal waters to the resources of the sea-bed beyond those limits. It seems to us that it will be necessary to reach agreement on the legal status of the ocean bed before we can go much further.

Secondly, we believe that it will be necessary to examine the principles which should govern the economic development of the sea-bed. It is clearly vital that the economic interest in the development of the resources of the sea-bed of all nations represented here should be recognized and protected. But at the same time there is no doubt that the establishment of the industries necessary to develop the resources of the sea-bed will require the investment of very large amounts of capital and that considerable thought will have to be given as to how those installations and investments should be protected. We must avoid action which would in any way hamper the rapid development of the techniques which will be necessary for the exploration and use of the sea-bed.

Another, and perhaps more immediate, problem is to agree [on] principles which can form a basis for improved international co-operation in scientific research into the sea-bed and to examine how scientific information on this subject might be made more readily available.

We believe that these principles have complex and far-reaching implications and need to be studied carefully before it will be possible to decide how they can best be incorporated in an international régime for the sea-bed. We believe that this thorough examination should be completed before the General Assembly is asked to make recommendations which could have far-reaching effects on the rate of advance in this field.

To sum up, my Government supports the proposal that a specialized Committee should be established to examine the need for co-operation in, and regulation of, the exploration and use of the resources of the ocean bed and to examine the scientific, technical, economic, legal and arms control problems involved. It might also be instructed to carry out a study as to how international co-operation in research and the dissemination of scientific information on the sea bed might be improved. As I have already mentioned, it will be necessary for such a Committee to co-operate closely with existing organizations whose work may affect this subject, to avoid duplication of the work already in hand. For this reason, and because of the wide scope of the investigations which will be necessary, we believe it would be a mistake to make the terms of reference of the proposed Committee so wide that they would encompass all marine problems.

I would like to conclude, Mr. Chairman, by restating the importance

which my Government attaches to this subject and our thanks to the representative of Malta for placing this item before the General Assembly. We hope that the welcome we have given to this proposal will be followed by similar expressions of support by other countries, particularly those who also possess an advanced technological capability and experience in this field.

**Statement by the United States Representative (Goldberg)  
to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Sea-  
Bed and Ocean Floor, November 8, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

Mr. Chairman, this is my first opportunity to speak before the First Committee at this session and I wish to commence by expressing the pleasure and satisfaction of the United States delegation that you were elected by a unanimous vote as our presiding officer. From time to time in the past you have served as Chairman in an acting capacity. On those occasions my delegation, and indeed the entire Committee, have been impressed by the objectivity, ability, decisiveness and integrity you brought to your work. We are grateful, but hardly surprised, that you have continued to display the same qualities since your election this year and we are confident that you will continue to guide the Committee's work in the same spirit throughout this session.

With its consideration of the Maltese item concerning the sea-beds and ocean floor, the General Assembly has responded to the increasing awareness that one of man's oldest environments, the ocean, is also his newest and perhaps most valuable frontier. I would like to express my delegation's gratitude to Ambassador Pardo for bringing this important question to the attention of the General Assembly.

My delegation profoundly believes that mankind's expanding activities in the ocean depths call for new efforts for international co-operation, both in promoting the exploration and use of the deep ocean and its floor, and in the development of the general principles which might usefully guide man's activities in this new realm.

The premise on which the United States bases its position concerning a future legal régime for the deep ocean floor is straightforward. It was stated by President Johnson on 13 July 1966:

... under no circumstances, we believe, must we ever allow the prospects of rich harvest and mineral wealth to create a new form of colonial competition among the maritime nations. We must be careful to avoid a race to grab and to hold the lands under the high seas. We must ensure that the deep seas and the ocean bottoms are, and remain, the legacy of all human beings.<sup>2</sup>

This means, in our view, that the deep ocean floor should not be a stage for competing claims of national sovereignty. Whatever legal régime for the use of the deep ocean floor may eventually be agreed upon, it should ensure that the deep ocean floor will be open to exploration and use by all States, without discrimination.

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV.1524, pp. 17-22. Ambassador Fahmy was Chairman of the First Committee.

<sup>2</sup> *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, July 18, 1966, p. 931.

United Nations interest in the problems of the sea is not new: we are not writing on a clean slate in considering how the General Assembly can best deal with the question which has been brought before us. In the fifties, after extended work by the United Nations International Law Commission, a number of important Law of the Sea Conventions were adopted at a conference held in Geneva in 1958. One of these, the Convention on the Continental Shelf,<sup>3</sup> is of particular interest to us in considering legal arrangements which might apply to the deep ocean floor. Under these Conventions, the General Assembly was assigned the responsibility of deciding what steps should be taken with respect to requests for revision of the conventions.

A number of bodies in the United Nations, as other speakers have pointed out, have also given careful attention to other marine problems. Through the Inter-governmental Oceanographic Commission, UNESCO has actively encouraged scientific activities in the field of oceanography; the Food and Agriculture Organization has been concerned with the development and conservation of fisheries; the World Meteorological Organization is studying the influence of the oceans on weather; and the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization has done invaluable work in safety at sea.

The General Assembly last December endorsed a study of the present state of knowledge of marine resources requested by the Economic and Social Council, and asked the Secretary-General to undertake, in addition, a survey of activities in marine science and technology. The Secretary-General was also directed, as part of this study, to formulate proposals for expanding international co-operation and for improved marine education and training. In recognition of the complexity of the subject, the Secretary-General was given until 1968 to report the results of his study and his recommendations.<sup>4</sup>

Through its past activities, the United Nations has already built a solid record of accomplishment in dealing with questions concerning the oceans. It has been responsive to the needs of nations and has dealt effectively with problems as they arose.

The immediate question before the Committee and the Assembly today is this: how can the General Assembly, in the light of the continuing advance of marine technology, best act to encourage the exploration and use of the ocean and its floor for the benefit of all mankind?

This is a very complex matter, as has been pointed out, and any decisions we make must recognize the full complexity of the problems involved. Any hasty approach would indeed be imprudent, when all deliberate speed, not indefinite delay is called for.

What this Assembly needs is an instrument which would enable it to deal with both the scientific and the legal questions involved. Recalling the work and accomplishments of the Outer Space Committee, which has been adverted to by several participants in this debate, my delegation makes the specific proposal that the General Assembly

<sup>3</sup> 15 UST 1606.

<sup>4</sup> General Assembly *Official Records: Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16* (A/6316), p. 32.

this General Assembly—take action to establish a committee on the oceans. This committee would:

- act as a servant of the General Assembly in considering all proposals placed before the Assembly on marine questions, and make recommendations on such proposals to the Assembly for action;
- assist the General Assembly in promoting long-term international co-operation in marine science; and,
- assist the General Assembly in considering questions of law, including such matters as rights of use and exploration, arms control, and problems of pollution.

Such a committee would work with existing United Nations agencies and the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, as appropriate, drawing upon their experience and their resources. The General Assembly, in our view, should ask the Committee, as part of its initial work programme, to make recommendations for action by the twenty-third and subsequent sessions to stimulate and support international co-operation and exchange in the exploration of the ocean floor.

Any extensive programme for international co-operation in the exploration of the ocean floor—as we know from our experience in space—would necessarily be a long-term effort and would require the careful harmonization of national programmes and of the efforts of the specialized agencies. Under the Marine Resources Act of 1966,<sup>5</sup> the United States has already begun to establish a co-ordinated long-range programme in marine science, and we stand ready to do our share in developing a comprehensive programme in international co-operation in this important area, as we have been doing and are continuing to do in outer space.

As part of its first report, the committee might provide the Assembly with its views on the recommendations developed by the Secretary-General in his study requested by last year's session concerning activities in marine science and technology.

Finally, my delegation believes that the General Assembly, through the new committee on oceans, should begin immediately to develop general standards and principles to guide States and their nationals in the exploration and use of the deep ocean floor. All of our knowledge about the deep ocean floor and all of our technological skill in exploiting its resources could prove of little value if man's law-making faculty did not keep pace with the march of science.

Acting as the servant of the General Assembly, the new committee could study how States might best conduct their activities on the deep ocean floor so as to maintain international peace and security and promote international co-operation, scientific knowledge and economic development. It could also consider the principles that might be agreed upon to help to conserve the living resources of the seas, to prevent pollution, and to avoid disturbance of the biological, chemical and physical balances of the seas.

I do not wish to imply that the task of developing legal principles

<sup>5</sup>80 Stat. 203.

for the deep ocean floor will be simple. The question of definition of the deep ocean floor will have to be considered. The work will have to take into account existing treaties, including the Convention on the Continental Shelf and various treaties governing fishing rights, as well as others. These treaties confer rights which are valued and retained by the signatories.

Questions of arms control must also be an essential part of our consideration of the ocean. Complex as these questions are, they must be taken into consideration if we are to develop meaningful principles to govern future State behaviour. The United States delegation believes that we must seek effective arms control measures as part of the evolving law of the deep ocean floor, and that their development should also come under the mandate of the oceans committee.

But we should not be deterred by these difficulties and their complexities. We must recognize them, and at the same time, remind ourselves that we have not been impeded in making progress towards developing a legal régime for space by equal difficulties that confronted us when the General Assembly first embarked upon that important task. While my delegation believes that it is too early to take any final decisions on proposals for a comprehensive legal régime for the deep ocean floor, such as suggested by Ambassador Pardo, we would participate energetically in the studies which will be needed before such decisions can be made.

The programme which I have suggested would represent a great and ambitious undertaking for the Assembly. The problems ahead are vast; yet the opportunities are equally vast, and perhaps if we act on the proposal that we have made—in which several other delegations have indicated similar interest—this may be one of the most constructive results to come out of this session.

A committee on oceans, building on the present efforts of Member States and the United Nations, could serve as the focal point within the General Assembly for study and development of the next steps which the nations must take together in this field. By creating this committee and directing it towards the tasks ahead, we would take effective action to enhance our knowledge of the ocean and its floor, and to use it for the long-term benefit of the human family.

### Statement by the French Representative (Palewski) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor, November 13, 1967<sup>1</sup>

The French delegation is happy to welcome the initiative which gave rise to the inscription on the agenda of the General Assembly of item 92, and we wish to congratulate the Government of Malta on that proposal.

How could we fail to be interested in a study, the economic, scientific and military implications of which are considerable and the fundamental elements of which, as mentioned by Mr. Pardo in his explana-

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV.1520, pp. 7-20.

tory memorandum,<sup>2</sup> are in keeping with the opinions of many concerning the freedom of the high seas? In addition, recalling that principle, which my delegation wanted to stress, we see obvious advantages in the study of a question which will compel us to think and to define. We shall have to circumscribe precisely the problem under discussion. That task, which I intend to undertake briefly today, will probably reveal many differences in approach and many difficulties, but it was good—indeed, it was necessary—that it should be undertaken in a field which, as is well known is, since it is essentially the field of the law of the sea, far from being established.

In that connexion, I should like, before doing anything else, to express a view which I ask the Committee to consider as the very foundation of my delegation's position. We have stressed sufficiently the value which we attach to the discussion of item 92 to warn the Committee against the temptation to confuse the interest of this matter with its complete newness.

The problems raised by item 92 are not, indeed, so new that we can, at the risk of an analogy which may look tempting but is illusory, discuss them with the freedom of judgment and creative spirit which marked, without doubt, the study of outer space. These problems are, on the contrary, linked in various ways to the field of disarmament and to the law of the sea.

The Committee will therefore have to take account of the work already done and the laws already established in these various fields. It is the very existence of this political and legal environment which will impose upon the Committee a preliminary effort at clarification which I shall refer to later and which will undoubtedly justify, when divergencies of views become too apparent, inevitable reservations.

I should like to add that, fortunately, we are assisted in this attempt at defining the problems raised by item 92 by the clear-cut definition of them given by the General Assembly at its 1583rd meeting. The final wording of item 92, as it is presented to us, in its order and its logical development, raises two problems.

The first problem is that of the exclusively peaceful use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, as well as the sub-soil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction. The second problem is that of the exploitation of their resources in the common interest of the whole of mankind.

The first problem, that of the peaceful uses of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, requires no preliminary observation from me. Its consideration, which raises the whole gamut of matters relating to the regulation of armaments, must be undertaken with great care. Indeed, any definition of the field to which the principle of the peaceful uses would apply presupposes the solution of the difficulties posed by certain gaps and ambiguities in the law of the sea. They are numerous, as will be seen. I think, from the study of the exploitation of the resources of the sea-bed, the sub-soil of the sea and oceans beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.

In addition, such technical progress as we can guess at is likely very soon to modify completely current approaches to the matter.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 332-333.

In the view of the French delegation, this question, that is to say the second problem to be considered can be divided into three series of problems which must be identified. First, the scope of implementation, which is tantamount to defining the sea-space which is beyond present national jurisdiction. Secondly, its objective, and we must define which resources are to be exploited and under what legal conditions. Thirdly, the means, since we shall have to determine how and by whom that exploitation can be put at the service of the interest of mankind.

These are the three points on which I shall touch.

First, the scope of item 92, as has clearly been shown by preliminary discussions in the Bureau, raises the essential principle of the limits of national jurisdiction over the sea and the sea-floor. In other words, and this will show the complexity of the problems which will confront us, this involves a reconsideration of the work of the Geneva Conference of 1958-1960 on the extent of the territorial sea and the continental shelf.

By giving a very complete title to that question, the General Assembly has prevented us from evading this need to rework legal texts.

The General Assembly did not limit itself, indeed, to speaking of the exploitation of the sea-bed underlying the high seas, which already supposes the existence of clear-cut rules concerning the territorial sea. It is well known that, while the 1958 Convention<sup>3</sup> did not determine the extent of the territorial sea and, therefore, the scope of the sovereignty of the States concerned, one can consider that by establishing the contiguous zone at twelve miles, the Geneva Conference, on the contrary, limited the control of States and condemned any extension of the territorial sea beyond twelve miles. Some States, however, think that the discussion is not closed; they will be encouraged in this feeling by the additional precision of the General Assembly which, after having indicated that the scope of our studies comprised the sea-bed and ocean floor, as well as the sub-soil underlying the high seas, nevertheless thought it necessary to specify "beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction". This precision raises the fundamental problems of the limits of the continental shelf, since it is admitted that national jurisdictions apply to it.

The Committee knows that a definition was adopted by the Geneva Convention of 29 April 1958, according to which the continental shelf means:

... the sea-bed and sub-soil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast, but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres, or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas.<sup>4</sup>

However, I should like to remind the Committee that this definition gave rise to rather lively controversies. France, among others, expressed its reservations towards the second phrase and asked that it be adopted or rejected by a separate vote. The representative of Malta has sufficiently dwelt on this problem of the continental shelf in his remarkable statement and there is no need for me to insist on it. But

<sup>3</sup> 15 UST 1006.

<sup>4</sup> 15 UST 471.

it is obvious that a problem arises. How could the resources of the sea-bed serve the interests of mankind if the mere exploitation of those resources, whatever their distance from the coast, created, for States able to undertake such exploitation, exclusive rights of expropriation on such deposits, and therefore on the continental shelf?

I think there is also a fundamental contradiction which the experts will have to solve, and we are especially happy that the very title of item 92 should enable them to do so.

Other difficulties will unavoidably occur when, for instance, a legal system has to be devised to bring the exploitation of the sub-soil into line with the principle of the freedom of the high seas. This leads me now to the second important problem which has to be defined, that of the exact and precise scope and objective of item 92.

The title of the item tells us that it is a matter of the exploitation of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the sub-soil thereof. This definition seems quite sufficient since there seems to be a distinction between the sea as such, the maritime environment—which has already been dealt with in rather complex regulations and is not raised—and the new field of the ocean floor.

I shall endeavour to show that these distinctions are not quite as simple as that, that law is not completely absent from the field of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and that therefore we shall have to take into account some rules which are already in existence.

As far as the sea-bed is concerned may I perhaps mention two examples: one relates to the laying of cables or pipelines, whose freedom has already been recognized by article 26 of the Convention on the High Seas of 1958.<sup>5</sup> The second example is that of stationary fishing installations, some of which use posts set in the sea floor, and thus occupy the sub-jacent sea-bed.

Some international agreements, such as the Convention Between France and Argentina of 23 June 1843 and the Franco-British Settlement of 29 September 1923,<sup>6</sup> sought to codify customs established by usage. The Convention on Fishing on the High Seas of 29 April 1958 contains useful clarification concerning fishing from fixed installations in areas of the high seas adjacent to the territorial sea of a State.<sup>7</sup>

Generally speaking, anything that has to do with the exploitation of the biological resources of the sea which are linked permanently to the pelagic soil can be examined in the light of the legal solutions determined by the Conference on the Law of the Sea of 1958, with due respect for the principles which guided its work: a guarantee for the freedom of the seas and protection of marine resources.

As far as the sea-bed is concerned, the need for codification was much less apparent up to now, in so far as it was adjudged that legal problems would arise only when the work done might have genuine repercussions on the freedom of the seas. But the appearance of completely new techniques of exploitation different from the well-known technique

<sup>5</sup> 15 UST 2312.

<sup>6</sup> 21 LNTS 137.

<sup>7</sup> 17 UST 138.

of the underwater tunnel, and the discovery of new pelagic resources, are already likely to multiply these problems and must necessarily give rise to development of law. But if it is good that there be a study of joint exploitation, who will not agree that the fundamental principle of the freedom of the seas must be safeguarded above all? That, of course, implies an international solution, and the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization could usefully take part in the search for such a solution.

May I add that other problems, linked to the very progress of techniques, will arise very soon indeed and that we shall have to take them into account.

I have thus come to the third and last problem that we have to deal with in this draft definition, that of the exploitation of marine resources in the interests of mankind. This may sound paradoxical, but my observations will be as simple and brief as the question itself is vast and complex; because while it is easy and pleasant for all to acknowledge the generosity of the ideas which have led to the drafting of this problem, we are in duty bound to admit that here we have to do, really, with a truly new field where difficulties will appear only as and when we move forward in our work. The summary description I have given of the field of law, where there are many gaps and contradictions, forewarns us of the complexity of these fascinating and difficult tasks.

Therefore, the French delegation thinks that the best framework for a serene and precise discussion of these questions would be a preparatory working group, and our Committee might recommend the creation of such an organ to the General Assembly. This Committee should have sufficient time at its disposal to undertake a detailed study of the problems and difficulties to which in these few minutes I merely wanted to allude. As far as possible, it should also make a study and summary of the existing documentation. It should also take into account all the information which the various Governments, the Secretariat, UNESCO and other international organizations can and should put at its disposal.

In the light of the information which this working group might transmit to it at its next session, the General Assembly would then be able to take a decision on the creation of an inter-governmental committee of experts and to define its terms of reference in a precise manner.

These are the main points which the United Nations will have to consider, in the opinion of the French delegation. To describe them, albeit briefly, seems to pinpoint and underline the great delicacy of our task. At least we will be better informed of the very exciting prospects opened up for mankind by the development of techniques of undersea exploitation. We shall have to be more precise in our legal criteria: we shall have to reaffirm the essential principle of the freedom of the high seas; we shall have to reconsider the very controversial definition of the extent of the continental shelf.

It can easily be imagined that this is an ambitious, difficult and lengthy endeavour. But the task is so valuable that I must therefore conclude by thanking once again the representative of Malta for having invited us to undertake this task and, if possible, solve it.

### Swiss Aide-Memoire to the Co-Chairmen of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, November 17, 1967<sup>1</sup>

Switzerland is paying the greatest attention to the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It is convinced that the interest of the community of nations requires that the spread and proliferation of nuclear weapons should be checked. Hence it hopes very much that a satisfactory non-proliferation treaty will be concluded.

The present draft treaty<sup>2</sup> cannot yet give rise to the adoption of a definitive position by the Swiss Government, since the text is subject to amendment and one of its main articles is missing. Nevertheless, the draft calls for some comments which it is to be hoped that the negotiators will be able to take into account.

(1) Articles I and II of the draft treaty contain some ideas which should be defined more accurately in order to clarify the commitments which they entail.

(a) The two articles prohibit the direct or indirect transfer of any nuclear explosive device. The Swiss authorities consider that the term "indirect" concerns the supply of arms, explosives or technical assistance for military purposes through the agency of a third State whether a Party to the treaty or not.

(b) The phrase "to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" does not cover, according to the interpretation of the Swiss authorities, exploitation of uranium deposits, enrichment of uranium, extraction of plutonium from nuclear fuels, or manufacture of fuel elements or heavy water, when these processes are carried out for civil purposes.

The Swiss authorities would like these interpretations to be confirmed formally.

(2) The future article III on control should express in particular the following principles:

(a) Control should be limited to the flow of source and special fissionable materials, as indeed the fifth paragraph of the preamble provides. It should not go beyond its objective, which is to prevent these products from being used for the manufacture of weapons.

Consequently there should be an accurate description of what can be controlled in accordance with the rules of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of 3 December 1965.<sup>3</sup>

(b) There should not be any double control.

(c) The costs of control should be borne by the control organ in order to avoid commercial discrimination against peaceful exports of nuclear material from non-nuclear-weapon States for the benefit of nuclear-weapon States not subject to control or of non-signatory non-nuclear-weapon States.

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/204, Nov. 24, 1967.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 338-341.

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 446-460.

(d) Each State should be entitled to object to particular inspectors, and to have inspectors accompanied during control by its own officials.

(e) To maintain equality in the conditions of competition between States, it would be desirable that control should extend also to the civil nuclear installations of nuclear-weapon States.

(3) Article IV on freedom to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should be supplemented:

(a) The sixth paragraph of the preamble expresses the intention of the nuclear-weapon States to make available to all Parties to the treaty the knowledge and benefits of applications of nuclear technology derived from the development of nuclear explosive devices and capable of civil use. This intention should be transformed into a juridical commitment in the body of the treaty, without however implying that the communication of such information would be free of charge.

(b) In regard to atomic explosions for peaceful purposes, the Swiss authorities consider that the intentions expressed in the eighth paragraph of the preamble should also constitute an article of the treaty: this article could provide for the establishment of a special body, in which the non-nuclear-weapon States would be represented, to determine the conditions in which nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes could take place.

(4) For the treaty to fulfil its aim, it should come near to universality. It would be desirable that article VI, paragraph 3, should stipulate that the entry into force of the treaty shall be subject to ratification by as large a number of States as possible, including all the signatory nuclear-weapon States. Switzerland could only be a party to the treaty if most of the Powers likely to possess nuclear weapons acceded to it. So long as that condition is not fulfilled, the treaty will contain a gap endangering the security of the small States on which it would be binding. Moreover, the non-accession of important industrial Powers might be economically prejudicial to the competitive capacity of the atomic industry of the signatory States.

(5) Article VII stipulates that the treaty shall be of unlimited duration. To subscribe to such a commitment seems hardly conceivable in a field where development is as rapid and unpredictable as that of nuclear science and its technical, economic, political and military implications. Consequently it would be preferable that the treaty should be concluded for a definite period, at the end of which a review conference would decide about its renewal. During that interval the nuclear-weapon States could adopt specific measures aimed at a limitation of armaments. The non-nuclear-weapon States certainly cannot take the responsibility of tying their hands indefinitely if the nuclear-weapon States fail to arrive at positive results in that direction.

(6) The Treaty will establish a lasting juridical discrimination between States according to whether they possess nuclear weapons or not. To consent to this would represent for the non-nuclear-weapon States a heavy sacrifice which is inconceivable unless something is given in return. Since their security is what the arms race chiefly endangers, some progress should be made in limiting this.

The provisions on that subject in the preamble are not sufficient because they do not constitute a commitment but a mere declaration

of intent. They should not only be given a place in the body of the treaty but should also comprise more precise obligations, such as the stabilization of atomic armaments at their present level. Furthermore, the nuclear-weapon States should solemnly and formally undertake never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty.

Such provisions would to some extent meet the security requirements of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

(7) It would be desirable that the treaty should provide a mandatory arbitration procedure for all disputes over its interpretation and application.

### Address by Under Secretary of State Katzenbach to the Institute of International Relations: U.S. Arms for the Developing World [Extract], November 17, 1967<sup>1</sup>

#### ARMS BUILDUP WASTEFUL AND DANGEROUS

I think the best way to drive home what I am saying is to take a concrete example. I have chosen what I think is a particularly striking one: the difficult question of if, how, and when we should supply arms to developing countries.

What we would like to see happen is simple enough. We would like to see these countries spend their scarce resources on domestic development and economic progress rather than frittering them away on expensive military equipment. In President Johnson's words, the resources being put into arms all around the world "might better be spent on feeding the hungry, healing the sick, and teaching the uneducated."<sup>2</sup>

There are other reasons I can cite why we should, in principle, oppose the acquisition of arms by developing countries:

Any arms buildup, once begun, takes on its own dynamic, shape, and logic. It gets easily out of hand. The acquisition of new arms in one country leads to demands for new equipment by its neighbors, whether for reasons of prestige, national pride, or simply to maintain what they see as a satisfactory military balance.

Second, the arms made available to developing countries, with their fragile political institutions, may undermine democratic governments, may encourage military coups, or may shore up military dictatorships.

Third, the tension resulting from an arms race in an area may increase the power, stature, or belligerency of a nation's military leadership.

Having laid out all these neat principles and arguments, however, we are still forced to examine how they can be usefully and responsibly applied in given instances.

<sup>1</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, Dec. 11, 1967, pp. 795-798. The address was delivered at Stanford University.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament*, 1966, p. 7.

Let us take three areas of the world, the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East, and Latin America, as case studies and see where we come out.

#### NO EASY ANSWERS IN SOUTH ASIA

Case number 1: The Indian subcontinent. Few areas of the world exist where the case for arms limitation seems more compelling. Arms escalation by either India or Pakistan is considered a threat to its security by the other.

Relations between the two countries are made more difficult by the facts of geography. Their territories are intertwined and isolated from the rest of Asia by the world's most formidable chain of mountains. Until Communist China's forays over the border in 1962, India had virtually discounted any threat to its security other than that from Pakistan.

United States military assistance to the subcontinent dates back to the mid-1950's. Initially, it was confined to Pakistan—as part of a worldwide strategy of support for non-Communist countries on the perimeter of the Soviet Union and mainland China.

After 1962, when India was attacked by Red China, we acceded to Indian requests for limited military assistance, taking care to limit our aid to equipment required for defense of its northern frontier.

When the longstanding feud over Kashmir burst into open war 2 years ago, we ended all deliveries of military equipment. We have not resumed grant materiel assistance to either country. We have, in fact, terminated our Military Assistance Advisory Group in Pakistan and our Military Supply Mission in India. We have not sold, and do not plan to sell, lethal military equipment—fighter aircraft, tanks, or artillery, for example. Furthermore, we have tried to induce major arms suppliers—the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and Western Germany—to follow similar restraints.

On the other hand, we have agreed to resume the sale of spare parts on equipment previously furnished by the United States—on a carefully restricted case-by-case basis when we are convinced that doing so will reduce military budgets. This may seem a paradox, but it is a very important factor to keep in mind.

The truth is that we cannot prevent these countries from acquiring equipment they consider essential to their own defense. If we refuse to provide spare parts for such equipment we have furnished them at some point in the past, they have two choices open to them: to buy these spare parts through unofficial channels—there exists a black market for arms and spare parts—or to scrap the United States equipment altogether and buy new equipment from some other source—Europe, Communist China, or the Soviet Union. Thus, either way they will spend many times what they would have spent in buying from the United States. And should we bow out entirely as supplier, by even refusing spare parts for what they consider equipment vital to their security, our ability to exercise restraint would be greatly reduced.

What does the future hold for an arms limitation agreement on the Indian subcontinent?

Despite our efforts, major obstacles still stand in the way of agreement. Tension over Kashmir continues. After the Tashkent declaration of January 1966, with both India and Pakistan forswearing the use of force in future dealings,<sup>3</sup> we expected an improvement in relations and a settlement of outstanding political differences. Hopes on both counts have not so far been fulfilled.

Secondly, both India and Pakistan view the acceptable force levels of the other power very differently. India believes it must be strong enough to hold off both incursions by Communist China and an attack by Pakistan. Pakistan, on the other hand, does not take Indian claims of a Chinese military threat very seriously and is therefore unwilling to see India's military strength, already numerically superior, further increased.

Third, other nations have resumed delivery of military supplies: the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom to India; Communist China and various European countries to Pakistan.

Clearly then, the problems of arms control on the Indian subcontinent are not given to easy answers. And equally clearly, our own policy is not the determining factor in this situation.

Nevertheless, we will continue to search for ways to prevent an arms spiral in South Asia. We will continue to use all the sanction and leverage at our command to this end. And we will also continue to give our full support to the United Nations effort serving this same purpose. And if that sounds pretty routine, you tell me the easy answer.

#### ARMS POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST

Case number 2: At times, withholding arms serves neither the cause of peace nor of stability. This is demonstrated by the Middle East.

In this troubled area our historic purpose has also been to search for arms limitations. Our efforts to establish an international framework toward this end began in 1948, after the first Arab-Israeli war. In 1950 this effort bore fruit in a tripartite declaration by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France,<sup>4</sup> and a Near East Arms Coordinating Committee was established to monitor arms shipments. Western efforts were brought to a halt, however, when the Soviet Union began large-scale arms shipments to the area in 1955.

The Soviet Union has remained the single major factor in the Middle-eastern arms scene ever since. Our several efforts in recent years to revitalize the Coordinating Committee did not meet with success.

Over the past 12 years, the U.S.S.R. has provided well over 2 billion dollars' worth of military equipment to countries of the Mideast. It was first to introduce heavy tanks and bombers into the area.

The military imbalance threatened by these Soviet deliveries caused the other countries in the area to seek military aid in the West. Even so, most Western arms going to the Middle East, both to Israel and moderate Arab states, came from European nations, not the United States. Only in a few cases have we provided United States equipment—where it seemed essential to do so to help friendly governments provide for their own defense.

<sup>3</sup> *New York Times*, Jan. 11, 1965, p. 15.

<sup>4</sup> *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. II, p. 2237.

The Arab-Israeli war in June made matters worse. We immediately suspended shipments to both Israel and the Arab states, hoping that other countries would match our restraint. Once again our hopes were disappointed.

The Soviets not only replaced a major part of the arms lost by the Arab states; they also began offering arms to those Arab states with which we have had long and friendly ties. This development forced us to resume limited and selective arms deliveries to the area under agreements concluded prior to the hostilities.

Our future arms policy toward the Middle East will rest on two factors: the willingness of the Soviet Union and other countries to exercise restraint, and the principle of disclosure. On June 19, the President proposed that the United Nations ask its members to report all shipments of arms to the area.<sup>5</sup> Unfortunately, this proposal has not yet been accepted. But it is essential that adequate information be available—both to countries within the area and to the major powers without—to preclude the risk of miscalculation that could add fuel to an arms race and lead to renewal of hostilities.

#### LATIN AMERICAN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES

I now come to case number 3: Latin America. Obviously the need for expensive arms by Latin American countries is not great. They are protected against conventional military threat by wide oceans and the security arrangements under the Rio Treaty. There are a few national rivalries and boundary disputes, to be sure, but they hardly justify large-scale defense forces. No significant incident has occurred in the hemisphere in a quarter of a century that was not quietly controlled by inter-American peace-keeping machinery.

The principal threat to the nations of this continent is not external but internal: Castro-sponsored and supported subversion and insurgency. But the proper response to this threat is essentially quicker and better economic development.

Actually, the Latin American record on arms is a good one. Viewed in relation to total budgetary expenditures or GNP, Latin American defense expenditures are among the lowest in the world. In relative terms, hemispheric defense budgets have declined by some 50 percent over the last 20 years.

The rate of modernization of Latin American armed forces has also been far lower than that of other regions. Few warships have been added by Latin American navies in recent years. The number of operational fighter squadrons has declined from 29 to 19. And Latin America's total annual outlays for military equipment are less than \$200 million—which, for those of you who enjoy comparisons, is about half the annual cost of the New York police department.

At Punta del Este last spring, the Latin American Presidents pledged themselves to seek further reductions in defense expenditures.<sup>6</sup> Recently, Chile's President, Eduardo Frei, proposed renewed efforts to achieve an arms limitation agreement for all of Latin America.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, pp. 263-264.

<sup>6</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, May 8, 1967, p. 713.

<sup>7</sup> ENDC/PV, 200/Rev. 1, Dec. 15, 1967.

We have encouraged this trend; and by any reasonable standard, our policy of limiting arms in Latin America has been a great success. We have been able to convince Latin American leaders that their external threat was minimal and that they should give their major attention to internal security and economic and social development.

As elsewhere, however, our power to influence the decisions of sovereign nations has its limits. We cannot, even if we would like to, dictate to them what their policy should be. Our influence is limited to our power to persuade; and our ability to persuade is dependent upon the good will, the confidence and trust we enjoy with the leaders, governments, and people of these countries.

If a country is convinced that its security is threatened and judges its arms requirements differently than we do, our ability to affect its decisions is very limited.

A case in point is the controversial sale of fighter aircraft to Latin America.

Most fighter aircraft now in Latin America are over 10 years old. Because these countries have followed a conservative reequipment policy at our urging, they now face a problem of obsolescence and deterioration which they regard as acute. The choice they face is to forgo fighter aircraft altogether or to replace them with available aircraft of a more advanced sophisticated type.

Several Latin American governments are now considering whether to purchase new, more advanced fighter aircraft. Their military commands are concerned about maintaining professional standards and training. They believe they require aircraft for counterinsurgency operations. And they are troubled, as well, by the problem of keeping abreast of a rapidly advancing field of technology, a technology which also has civilian applications.

We are still considering the situation that would arise should these countries decide to acquire aircraft.

Some Congressmen feel we should refuse to authorize the commercial sale of sophisticated fighter aircraft to Latin America. They believe that we should not take part in any program which diverts the scarce resources of these countries from pressing social needs.

On the other hand, it may well prove that the sale of United States aircraft on commercial terms is the preferable alternative in light of our overall objectives. For the question is not susceptible to any simple or obvious solution.

It may be impossible for us to prevent the Latin American Governments from acquiring sophisticated aircraft they have decided to buy. If we refuse to sell, they can buy in Western Europe. Furthermore, the United States has an aircraft, the Northrop F-5, which meets their needs. The alternative to the F-5 are planes of far more advanced design and far greater expense. Their introduction into Latin America would escalate arms spending in that region to a new and much higher level.

In these three cases then, you have the dilemma of foreign-policy making neatly presented. Adhering too rigidly and unswervingly to what is our basic policy—to avoid the supply of expensive and sophisticated military equipment to developing countries—might, in fact, help

to defeat the aims of our policy. This is the paradox - but one example of the paradoxes and complexities we daily face.

Each of the three situations I have dealt with has its own problems, its own requirements, its own constraints.

Such is the manner in which foreign policy is made. Few foreign policy principles hold their validity in all instances. How could they possibly, in a world as diverse and complex as this one? So each problem must be considered separately, yet every one must be related to every other.

Unthinking adherence to any principle or doctrine, no matter how noble, not only can be self-defeating, it can defeat the underlying ultimate purpose of the principle itself.

I ask that you ponder these matters when you consider these problems yourselves. Take a hard look at the dilemmas. Don't adhere too easily or too doggedly to an abstraction. For it is only when the abstraction is applied to specific situations of choice that it is put to the test.

This, in essence, is the ethical problem I tried to draw for you at the beginning, when I talked about the color gray. We may all get a bit grayer as we get older. Perhaps it is because we have had the opportunity to see how often the issues take on that hue.

### Statement by Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, November 20, 1967<sup>1</sup>

The First Committee is embarking upon its consideration of the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Our proposal that this matter be debated in the General Assembly was guided by the general position of principle and the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the struggle to dispel the danger of a nuclear war. This policy has been followed by my country from the days when the nuclear weapons were born.

As early as 1949, the Soviet Government presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission a draft international convention prohibiting the production and use of nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, this proposal was not adopted. Our country continued to come out firmly in favour of total destruction of nuclear weapons. Within the interests of our security and the security of our friends and allies,

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV.1532, pp. 6-21.

<sup>2</sup> On Feb. 25, 1949, the Soviet representative introduced a draft resolution (AEC/37) calling on the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission to prepare a draft convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons and a draft convention for the control of atomic energy. During the discussion, the Soviet representative asked the Commission's Working Committee to consider as a basis for the two conventions the Soviet proposals of June 19, 1946, and July 11, 1947 (*Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 20-22, 85-88). The Commission rejected the Soviet proposal and instead adopted the resolutions of July 29, 1949 (*ibid.*, pp. 198-200). The 1949 debate is summarized in General Assembly *Official Records: Fourth Session, Supplement No. 2* (A/945), pp. 68 ff., and *ibid.*, *Fifth Session, Supplement No. 2* (A/1361), pp. 30 ff.

we are compelled to create our own nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union still adheres to this position now. It possesses powerful nuclear weapons, but it will readily agree to their destruction if other nuclear Powers act in the same manner. The Soviet Union proposes to go even further: that is to say, to agree on general and complete disarmament under strict international control.

The proposals of the Soviet Union on this matter are well known. The experience of disarmament negotiations, especially in recent years, has shown, however, that the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament is in fact not moving forward. It is not the Soviet Union which is responsible for this.

In these conditions, continuing its struggle for general and complete disarmament, it considers that we must move forward: adopt partial collateral measures which could limit the nuclear arms race, decrease the threat of a nuclear war, and then lead to further results towards doing away with it. One can express satisfaction at the fact that the first steps of this nature have already been taken. A Treaty has been concluded prohibiting nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, a Treaty has been signed on principles governing the activities of States in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies.<sup>4</sup> Now, the possibility exists of successfully concluding negotiations on another important step forward: conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Each one of these measures has great positive importance. It is also characteristic of them that the adoption of one does not depend on the adoption of another, or on the solution of any other disarmament matter. This has facilitated negotiations leading to their signature as well as to their implementation. At the same time, all these measures go in one direction. From various directions they converge and limit the nuclear armaments race. Among these measures, we consider that the solution of the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the conclusion of an international convention to this effect must be considered of special importance in this field.

Why would the conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons be an especially important step? First, because if States undertook not to use nuclear weapons, this would decrease the threat of a nuclear war and would bring us closer to the possibilities of destroying nuclear weapons. The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would paralyse this weapon politically. It would be a serious restraining factor for those who might count on obtaining some advantages from their possession of these weapons. In these conditions, it would be easier to find ways and means physically to destroy these weapons, and also because the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, having dispelled the suspicion of some States concerning the intentions of others with regard to the possible use of nuclear weapons, would contribute to an easing of international tensions and to creating a sounder international climate and greater confidence among States.

The conclusion of an international convention would be an important step towards the establishment of humanitarian principles in inter-

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 38-43.

national relations. This would also have great importance in our view. We would like to draw attention to the fact that the solution of the problem of the use of nuclear weapons should not present any difficult practical problems. The goodwill of all States possessing nuclear weapons would be sufficient. No serious collateral problems would arise, such as the establishment of control, verification, and so on.

Stressing the importance of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, we deem it necessary to point to the fact that international events in recent times make it specially important and urgent to settle this problem. We are thinking first of all of the danger of war which has appeared in the world as a result of the aggressive actions of certain well-known States. Military conflicts, whose flames engulf one or other area of the world, can at any time lead to the use of nuclear weapons. At present there is no guarantee at all against this. The urgent and timely nature of a solution to the problem of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is better understood with every passing day since more and more people in the world understand the consequences that could follow from the use of these weapons.

The present session of the General Assembly has received the Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons, which has been compiled by scientists from various countries of the world. That report gives complete scientific examples of something that was already known, that in present conditions a world war with the use of rockets and nuclear weapons could lead to the death of hundreds of millions of men and to a poisoning of the surface and the atmosphere of our planet. May I quote a part of this report:

The effects of all-out nuclear war, regardless of where it started, could not be confined to the Powers engaged in that war. They themselves would have to suffer the immediate kind of destruction and the immediate and more enduring lethal fall-out whose effects have already been described. But neighbouring countries, and even countries in parts of the world remote from the actual conflict, could soon become exposed to the hazards of radio-active fall-out precipitated at great distances from the explosion, after moving through the atmosphere as a vast cloud. Thus, at least within the same hemisphere, an enduring radio-active hazard could exist for distant as well as close human populations, through the ingestion of foods derived from contaminated vegetation, and the external irradiation due to fall-out particles deposited on the ground. The extent and nature of the hazard would depend upon the numbers and type of bombs exploded. Given a sufficient number, no part of the world would escape exposure to biologically significant levels of radiation. To a greater or lesser degree, a legacy of genetic damage could be incurred by the world's population.<sup>5</sup>

We dwell particularly on the analysis of the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons in the report of the Secretary-General because there are those who, although declaring themselves in favour of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, resort to allegations that the use of nuclear weapons in certain conditions does not at all represent any grave danger and that in principle it is not essentially different from the use of conventional weapons. To this end mention is made of the so-called tactical use of nuclear weapons as distinct from strategic weapons and one hears talk of local nuclear wars as

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 496.

distinct from global nuclear wars. The report of the Secretary-General says that the completely unfounded nature of these allegations can only conceal plans to destroy whole peoples. I should like to quote another passage from this report:

... the destruction and disruption which would result from so-called tactical nuclear war would hardly differ from the effects of strategic war in the area concerned. The concept of escalation from tactical to strategic nuclear war could have no possible meaning in an area within which field warfare was being waged with nuclear weapons.<sup>8</sup>

The report of the Secretary-General, therefore, shows the need, without any further ado, to settle the problem of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Of course, when such an important decision is taken one must examine carefully the question of the effects of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the position of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear. All States without exception would have much to gain from the conclusion of a Convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, above all because this would be a step towards dispelling the threat of a nuclear war and towards promoting international peace and security. That is the fundamental importance of the solution of the problem of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

For non-nuclear States, which represent the overwhelming majority of States in the world, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would mean that they would cease to feel that they are the objectives of nuclear blows and therefore the victims of nuclear blackmail on the part of certain nuclear Powers. The position of non-nuclear States would also change to their advantage in the political field. The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would be a serious step towards the liquidation of the so-called nuclear club and would do away with differences between States predicated upon the position of non-nuclear and nuclear weapons.

What about the nuclear Powers? Would they not feel deprived, as a result of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, of something that they cannot renounce, be it only their own security? Would it not restrict their right of self-defence? The answer to those questions is obviously negative. Their undertaking not to use nuclear weapons would be mutual, and therefore in conditions of a mutual, reciprocal prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and not to engage in a nuclear attack, the question of nuclear retaliation would become completely irrelevant.

We deem it necessary to state categorically that no State can claim to take the initiative of unleashing a nuclear war against nuclear or non-nuclear countries. There is no such right and there can be no such right for any country. One cannot legalize the right to draw mankind into untold suffering. There must be strict condemnation of any unwillingness to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. That position can only be interpreted in one way: it expresses the desire to claim the right to unleash a nuclear war. But such a claim can have no justification.

One must also take into the account the important fact that in the

<sup>8</sup> *Ante*, p. 494.

case of two weapons of mass destruction, chemical and bacteriological, the question of the prohibition of their use was settled by the Geneva Agreement of 1925.<sup>7</sup> That was reaffirmed by the General Assembly<sup>8</sup> and it must be pointed out that the Geneva Agreement of 1925 successfully stood the test in the crucible of the Second World War.

There is and there can be no justification for adopting a different position towards this powerful means of mass destruction, nuclear weapons. Only an aggressor nurturing plans of conquest can try to reserve for himself under various guises the right to resort to nuclear war.

The question of the conclusion of a convention prohibiting nuclear weapons must also be viewed from another angle, that of the effectiveness of such a convention. It is said sometimes that a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons could not be effective since it would only have moral force, and therefore nuclear Powers would not respect it. But this is a fallacious argument. One could affirm with just as much foundation that it is no use concluding any international treaty or convention on any question. We think that the right answer to such statements is the one given by the Government of Ethiopia in its letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 20 March 1963. The Ethiopian Government, whose contribution to the solution of the problem of the prohibition of nuclear weapons is well known, in its letter pointed out that :

Some [Governments] doubted the effectiveness of the type of convention advocated since, in their view, the convention would be only morally binding. In this connexion, it is necessary to observe that, short of war, the binding force of all international agreements does, in fact, rest partly on moral compulsion and partly on vicarious interests. And since the Charter of the United Nations itself is basically and rightly founded on moral compulsion, and since the substance of the contemplated convention will be subject to the same rules for effectiveness, it is hard to detect wherein the weakness of the latter lies.<sup>9</sup>

The thesis on the ineffectiveness of a convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons is artificial. It only serves to conceal the true motives of those who do not wish to see the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

Thus, whatever approach one takes towards the prohibition of nuclear weapons, everything speaks in favour of the speediest possible solution of the problem and in favour of the conclusion of an international convention to this end.

In proposing that a convention be signed prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union is guided by the fact that such a measure would be consonant with the vital interests of the peoples of the world. The solution of this problem, in our view, is made easier by the fact that the majority of the Member States of the United Nations have already, in principle, spoken out in favour of prohibiting nuclear weapons. The first practical decision of the United Nations in this matter, as is known, was taken in 1961. I have in mind the Declara-

<sup>7</sup> Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Disarmament, *Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents, 1919-55* (Com. print, 84th Cong., 2d sess.), pp. 160-170.

<sup>8</sup> See pt. B of G.A. resolution 2162 (XXI) in *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 798-799.

<sup>9</sup> General Assembly *Official Records: Eighteenth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 27*, p. 3.

tion on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, resolution 1653 (XVI), which declared that the use of such weapons was contrary to the spirit, letter and aim of the United Nations, the rules of international law, and was a crime against mankind and civilization.<sup>10</sup>

At that time, that is at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, the question arose of a treaty to consolidate the provision of the Declaration prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. In other words, mention was made of the need, to transform this prohibition into international law. At the time, many States came out in favour of concluding an international convention.

The need to take such a further step was recognized to an ever-increasing extent and last year, in resolution 2161 (XXI), almost unanimously adopted, the General Assembly expressed its conviction that:

... the signing of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons would greatly facilitate negotiations on general and complete disarmament under effective international control and give further impetus to the search for the solution of the urgent problem of nuclear disarmament . . . .<sup>11</sup>

Now in the view of the Soviet Government, the time has come to speed up the solution of this problem, and this is why my delegation has presented a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons to the General Assembly of the United Nations.<sup>12</sup>

In the preamble to our draft convention we propose, first of all, to stress the main objective of the parties to the convention, in other words, to further international peace and security of peoples. To go into more detail on the object of the convention, we deemed it necessary to say in it that this convention should protect mankind from the exceedingly serious consequences of a nuclear war.

The draft convention that we propose is intimately linked to the Declaration of the United Nations on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. Therefore in the preamble there is a provision confirming this Declaration. Since in treaties the main objectives of the parties are usually set out in the preamble, we consider it necessary to stress:

... that the conclusion of a Convention . . . would significantly contribute to the solution of other disarmament questions.

Article 1 of the Soviet draft convention contains the solemn undertaking of Member States:

to refrain from using nuclear weapons, from threatening to use them and from inciting other States to use them.

According to the convention, these obligations apply to nuclear and non-nuclear States. It goes without saying that the obligation not to use nuclear weapons applies only to States possessing such weapons. However, the obligation not to incite other States to use them applies to all parties, including those States which do not possess nuclear weapons.

<sup>10</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 648-650.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 803-804.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 420-421.

Guided by our general policy—our desire to move step by step towards the total liquidation of nuclear weapons—we included article 2 in the draft convention by which:

Each Party to this Convention undertakes to make every effort to arrive as soon as possible at agreement on the cessation of production and the destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons in conformity with a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons must, of course, be open to all States. This will be found in article 3 of our draft convention, which also stipulates that it shall enter into force after its ratification by all parties to the convention possessing nuclear weapons.

The need to include such a provision flows from the very objective of the convention. If the convention came into force without being ratified by a nuclear Power signing it, a situation would be created whereby this Power would be free from all obligations, whereas other parties would already be obligated under the treaty to refrain from using nuclear weapons.

It is further proposed that the convention be of unlimited duration, and we think that in the case of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons there cannot be any other attitude. The draft convention proposed by the Soviet Union is in full conformity with the spirit and objectives of the United Nations Charter, the need to free succeeding generations from the sufferings which would be wreaked on them by a nuclear war.

The Soviet Union is ready to undertake negotiations concerning the draft convention it has presented, is ready to hear other views and to discuss any proposals on the various terms used in the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. We expect the First Committee will pay due attention to the draft convention proposed by the Soviet Union and that the General Assembly will take a decision which will rapidly lead to the practical implementation of the main ideas contained in this draft.

We address an appeal to all delegations of Member States of the United Nations to take a constructive step at the present session of the General Assembly, which would greatly decrease the threat of a nuclear war by making possible the speedy conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Such a decision on the part of the General Assembly would undoubtedly serve the cause of peace.

### **Statement by ACDA Deputy Director Fisher to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, November 20, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

The Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union has proposed for the consideration of this General Assembly an item entitled "Conclusion of a

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV.1532, pp. 22-37.

convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons". Moreover, when he inscribed this item on our agenda he offered a draft of such a convention.<sup>2</sup> We are now debating the issues which this draft convention raises, and this debate has been started by the thoughtful remarks of the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union which we have just heard.<sup>3</sup>

Before I put forward our views on the merits of the convention, which are quite different, I should like to submit to this Committee that my delegation, for its part, will approach the subject with the seriousness it deserves.

I should also like to indicate that after having the opportunity to study the remarks we have just heard, I may also find it necessary to make some further reply.

By way of preface to my own remarks, I should like to point out that no nation has tried harder than the United States to deal with the threat to all of us posed by the development of the atomic bomb and the growing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Indeed, when there was only one nuclear Power, and that Power was the United States, we tried to remove nuclear weapons wholly from the military arena. Thus it was that the United States introduced the Baruch Plan to the United Nations in 1946.<sup>4</sup> To the great misfortune of all mankind, this proposal was not accepted, for reasons which I am sure are known or remembered by all of us here today. Following the initiative of the United States, first reflected in the Baruch Plan, the United Nations has continued to study various measures by which man can use his mind to prevent the nuclear holocaust which his weaponry has made possible. But unfortunately it is clear that thus far man's development of nuclear weapons has out-paced his ability to reach agreement on such measures.

The United States therefore continues earnestly to seek meaningful measures which will subject these weapons of mass destruction to the kind of effective control that will prevent their use. It is in this spirit that my delegation offers the following comments on the Soviet proposal.

The concept of an unqualified agreement not to use nuclear weapons is not new to this Committee. We have discussed it intermittently for about twenty years. Last year, as I am sure you well remember, the General Assembly approved a resolution requesting the then proposed World Disarmament Conference to give serious consideration to this subject.<sup>5</sup> Before that time, in 1963, the question of the convening of a special conference to conclude a convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons had been referred to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee for study.<sup>6</sup> Still earlier, the Secretary-General had been requested to poll Member Governments as to their attitudes towards the conclusion of such a convention.<sup>7</sup> We must note that no agreements have evolved from these efforts.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 420-421.

<sup>3</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>4</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 7-16.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 803-804.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, p. 626.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 1961, pp. 648-650.

It is not surprising that we appear unable to make any progress on an unqualified agreement not to use nuclear weapons, since throughout the history of the consideration of this concept the basic issues have remained substantially unaltered—and these are most contentious issues. The United States position on these issues has been set forth many times. Secretary Rusk explained the views of the United States in his letter to the Secretary-General dated 30 June 1962,<sup>8</sup> and Mr. Foster restated them at the eighty-second meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1965.<sup>9</sup>

A review of these issues is essential in considering the Soviet draft. There are two substantive articles in the proposed draft convention contained in the attachment to the letter inscribing the Soviet item now under consideration. The first involves as its principal part an undertaking by each party to the convention not to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

At first glance this seems like a very direct and sensible approach to the problem. Any nation whose leadership retains its sanity wants to avoid nuclear war. It is therefore understandable that there should be a certain attraction to a draft convention which gives the impression that it will prevent nuclear war by the simple expedient of requiring the parties to it not to use nuclear weapons should they become involved in military conflict.

But merely wanting to avoid nuclear war—merely seeking an agreement to outlaw it—is not enough. Instead, what we must do is to embark on a course of conduct which decreases the possibility of such a nuclear war ever happening. We must do so in the light of the realities of the dangerous age in which we live—an age in which there already exist enormous nuclear weapons stockpiles and rapid means of delivery.

It is against this hard test of reality that we should examine the first article in the Soviet draft convention.

That article involves an unqualified undertaking by the parties to the convention not to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

Such an obligation would be applicable whether or not all the States involved in a conflict had accepted the same obligation; it would prohibit the use of nuclear weapons against a nuclear weapon State which had itself expressly refused to accept such an obligation by refusing to sign the convention, even if such a State was threatening a nuclear attack.

Its protection would extend to a non-nuclear weapon State, even if it were engaged in an act of aggression in which it was supported by a nuclear weapon State.

Such an obligation would be applicable to prevent nuclear weapon States signatory to the convention from using their nuclear power to assist a State that had forsworn nuclear weapons which was the victim of nuclear aggression by a State which had refused to sign the convention.

Such an obligation would be applicable to a conflict between nuclear weapon States, regardless of the circumstances surrounding the initiation of the conflict. Its terms would prohibit the use of nuclear weapons

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 1962, vol. I, pp. 628-631.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 174-175.

in self-defence against the forces of another nuclear weapon State engaged in an act of aggression. That would be the case even if the use of those weapons in self-defence was confined to their very use on or over the territory of the State using them, or the territory of a non-nuclear weapon State that it was defending.

In considering this item and this serious question, we must consider the role that the present nuclear forces play in the relatively stable strategic balance which now exists between the major nuclear Powers in the world and the effect on that balance of an obligation not to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

So long as a situation exists under which those major nuclear Powers have massive stockpiles of nuclear armaments arrayed against each other, as well as massive conventional forces, so long as there is the possibility that a massive attack might threaten a country's national survival or the integrity of all or a substantial part of its armed forces, the most effective way of minimizing the risk of nuclear war will be through the maintenance of this mutual deterrence. Inherent in the preservation of that deterrence is the existence of offsetting postures of deterrence under which a nation, even after having absorbed a surprise nuclear first strike, would have a reliable ability to inflict in turn an unacceptable degree of damage on an aggressor. It is this retaliatory capability which deters aggression.

As long as such a posture continues, an agreement not to use nuclear weapons, even in self-defence or in retaliation, would be, at worst, deceptive—and therefore dangerous—and, at best, unrealistic.

In the worst case, it would be deceptive, and therefore dangerous, if potential aggressors were to believe that nuclear stockpiles would not be used for their designed purpose of deterrence or defence. Such a deception would be dangerous if it were to lead to a miscalculation by one Power concerning another's deterrent posture—a type of miscalculation which represents the greatest danger of nuclear war ever occurring.

Such a deception would be equally dangerous if it were to lead a nuclear weapon State which had not signed the treaty to believe that it could engage in acts or threats of aggression against a State which had forsworn nuclear weapons, without other nuclear weapon States using their nuclear power to counter any such blackmail or aggression.

Almost as unsatisfactory would be the case in which States would regard as unrealistic a convention under which it was agreed that powerful nuclear forces created and maintained for deterrence were not to be used for the purpose for which they were created. The presentation of a treaty which was artificial and lacking in credibility would debase the currency of international treaty-making and create a sense of false security among nations regarding the risks of nuclear war.

In the present balance which now maintains the peace, we cannot afford either deception or unreality. The emphasis must be on credibility—credibility of intentions and capabilities. Each major nuclear Power must have no doubt as to precisely where the others stand. It is this growing credibility of effective mutual deterrence and the maturing sense of responsibility on the part of the major Powers in recent years which tends to reduce the risk of a nuclear holocaust.

If we are to further reduce this risk, rather than increase it we must find some way to work out properly safeguarded agreements first to limit, and later to reduce, and finally, in the context of general and complete disarmament, to eliminate these weapons from national arsenals.

With this in mind the United States delegation noted with interest the second article of the draft convention offered by the Soviet Union. Under this article, each party would undertake to make every effort to arrive as soon as possible at agreement on the cessation of the production and destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons in conformity with the treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

In putting forth this language, the USSR appears to have tacitly recognized at least two important points: first, that its non-use proposal would not be a meaningful document unless something were done about nuclear stockpiles; second, that the elimination of nuclear weapons from national arsenals could only be accomplished in the context of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

As I believe is apparent from these remarks, the United States disagrees with the priority which the Soviet text assigns to these two tasks. We believe that prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons and then doing something about nuclear stockpiles in the context of general and complete disarmament puts the cart before the horse, so to speak, or the plough in front of the ox.

But, the fact that there appears to be agreement that the two subjects are related does afford a foundation upon which something might be built.

I would, therefore, like to dwell for a moment on the second point of the Soviet draft convention, that the elimination of nuclear weapons from national arsenals should be accomplished pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control. This is a point with which we are familiar. It has been explicit in both the United States outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world<sup>10</sup> and the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control, as that treaty had been amended by the provision for retention of a limited number of strategic delivery vehicles.<sup>11</sup>

Let me speak first of the United States draft treaty outline. It provides that in the first stage the parties to the treaty would halt the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons and would transfer agreed quantities of weapons grade fissionable material from weapons use to peaceful purposes. During the first stage the parties would also examine questions relating to the means of accomplishing, during stages II and III, the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons from national stockpiles. This elimination would not take place until the end of stage III.

Let me now discuss the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. The initial Soviet draft provided for the destruction of

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 111-140.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 77-102.

the means of delivery of nuclear weapons during the first stage of disarmament and the destroying of the nuclear weapons themselves during the second stage.<sup>12</sup> Later, the Soviet Union indicated its willingness to amend its treaty and finally offered a formal amendment providing for the retention, until the completion of the process of general and complete disarmament, of an "umbrella" of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and ground-to-air anti-aircraft missiles, together with the nuclear warhead launching devices and guidance systems for these various missile systems.<sup>13</sup>

I do not now propose to deal with the difficulties which the United States has had with the Soviet proposed strategic umbrella. I think we will all remember that our difficulties have been based on our feeling that this proposal was not consistent with paragraph 5 of the joint statement of agreed principles<sup>14</sup> for disarmament negotiations that all measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security must be ensured equally for all.

What I do propose to point out, however, is that even the Soviet proposal for a strategic umbrella recognizes that the elimination of nuclear warheads could take place realistically only in the context of general and complete disarmament, and then only at the completion of that process. If we were to agree that nuclear forces were to remain in existence until the completion of the disarmament process, whether as proposed by the United States, or as proposed in the Soviet proposed strategic umbrella, we would be doing so in recognition of the fact that these forces had come to serve an indispensable function—the function of mutual deterrence. No one would believe us and we would have debased the currency of international negotiations if we were, at the same time, to agree that they would never be used even for this purpose. The reasons for the fact that under both disarmament plans nuclear weapons are not eliminated from national arsenals until the end of the disarmament process is not hard to find. It is, of course, due to the problem of verification. A nuclear weapon need not be very large. There have been public announcements that one has been manufactured that will fit into a 155 millimetre artillery piece. That is not a very large weapon. It is quite simple to hide. A great many nuclear weapons have been introduced by the nuclear weapon Powers. It would be very hard to satisfy all countries to a disarmament agreement that they had all been destroyed—that they had all been accounted for, found and destroyed.

In this connexion the possibilities of successful evasion are substantial. It would not take very many nuclear weapons secreted in the caves of an evading country to threaten completely the security of another country which had destroyed its nuclear stockpiles. A covert nuclear stockpile coupled with adequate delivery means which might seem today quite insignificant in relation to the present nuclear arsenals, could threaten the world if all other nuclear countries had destroyed their stockpiles. As the epigrammist once put it: "In the world of the blind, the one-eyed man is king." I need not labour further the point

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 1962, vol. I, pp. 103 ff.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 1964, p. 22.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 1961, pp. 439–442.

that verified elimination of nuclear stockpiles by all nuclear States is a *sine qua non* for a world free of the threat of nuclear holocaust.

The United States has presented to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament realistic measures for the reduction of the national arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons; we have presented measures which can be put into effect before the completion of the processes of general and complete disarmament.

With specific reference to the problem of producing fissionable material for weapons purposes, Mr. Foster made a comprehensive statement to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 13 February 1964 in which he indicated that the United States was prepared to agree either to a complete halt in the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons or to a reciprocal plant-by-plant shut-down. In addition, the United States has stated that it is prepared to transfer 60,000 kilogrammes of weapons grade U-235 to peaceful uses if the USSR will transfer 40,000 kilogrammes for such purposes.<sup>15</sup> We have also indicated that we are prepared to negotiate on the problem of ratios. This material would be obtained by the demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons by each party.

The United States has also put forth workable measures dealing with the reduction of delivery systems for nuclear weapons. President Johnson in his message to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in January 1964 proposed that :

The United States, the Soviet Union and their respective Allies should agree to explore a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles.<sup>16</sup>

The President pointed out that this would open the path to reductions in all types of forces. More recently, the President, last March, reconfirmed our willingness to discuss with the Soviet Government means of limiting the arms race in such missiles.<sup>17</sup> And as recently as September of this year Secretary McNamara reiterated our willingness to enter into safeguarded agreements first to limit, and later to reduce, both offensive and defensive strategic nuclear forces.<sup>18</sup> As Assistant Secretary of Defense, Mr. Warnke, has pointed out :

We believe a number of possibilities for parallel action and even for formal agreement with the Soviets would permit our reliance on unilateral means of verification.

Mr. Warnke added that :

Other more far-reaching agreements, particularly any involving substantial reductions, would require agreed international inspection.<sup>19</sup>

Agreement on these various proposals dealing with the material to make nuclear weapons, the weapons themselves and the means of their delivery is, we believe, the best way to start the process towards the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons and the means of their de-

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 1964, pp. 44-48.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>17</sup> *Ante*, pp. 108-110.

<sup>18</sup> *Ante*, p. 389.

<sup>19</sup> *Ante*, p. 459.

livery pursuant to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. When we reach that point, we will have reached the stage where we will have provided mankind with lasting security against the threat of a nuclear holocaust.

However, it seems premature to speak of a sweeping and unqualified agreement not to use nuclear weapons that is not a part of a comprehensive programme leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In conclusion, I have raised these issues connected with the Soviet draft convention not in any contentious spirit; but I have done so because the problems that are associated with them are matters of vital concern to the security of all of us.

The United States believes that the best way to get on with the work of disarmament—all aspects of disarmament—is to continue, through the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, to discuss and arrive at agreement on the serious measures that have been proposed there and elsewhere to limit and later reduce and eliminate our nuclear forces.

These are the considerations my delegation will have in mind in considering any proposal which may come forward in this debate.

#### Statement by the Soviet Representative (Mendelevich) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, November 20, 1967<sup>1</sup>

This is not really a right of reply, because in the statement of the representative of the United States of America—there was not anything that usually gives rise to a right of reply: violent statements, distortion of the facts and of the truth, and so on. Therefore, I do not in the least intend to take the floor in a polemical mood, but I should like to make several clarifications concerning our draft convention.<sup>2</sup> I think that it is necessary to do it now.

We draw attention to the fact that the representative of the United States started his statement by expressing readiness and a desire seriously to consider the question raised in the General Assembly by the Soviet Union: the question of the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

The representative of the United States also expressed willingness to consider carefully all the proposals, considerations and arguments presented this morning by the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kuznetsov.<sup>3</sup> In our statement there were indeed many new arguments and new elements, including information put at the disposal of all Member States of the United Nations by the Secretary-General on the report concerning the possible effects of a nuclear

<sup>1</sup> A/C.I./PV.1532, pp. 35-45.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 420-421.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 576-585.

war.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, we are very happy that the delegation of the United States intends carefully to study the arguments and considerations put forward by the Soviet delegation. But we must express our regret that at this early stage of the discussion, before the statement made by the Soviet delegation this morning has been studied, the delegation of the United States, without examining our arguments, thought it necessary to repeat the position of the United States which, as is well known, is a negative position as far as concluding a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons is concerned.

In expressing this negative view of the United States, the representative of the United States referred to many historical facts, including the history of the disarmament negotiations. In fact, those elements have a strong influence on the position of the United States in the matter of the prohibition of nuclear weapons, because the history of nuclear weapons started with the use of those weapons by the United States at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That is probably what created a sort of complex about the use of nuclear weapons which prevents the United States from adopting a more constructive attitude towards proposals to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. The desire—which has already been expressed—to reserve the right to use these weapons determines the position of the United States of America, but in today's statement by the Soviet delegation there was a detailed analysis of why both nuclear and non-nuclear States would stand to gain if the use of nuclear weapons were prohibited by an international convention.

Despite the fact that the representative of the United States put it forward today, the deterrent argument is not relevant if the use of nuclear weapons is prohibited. The element of response to nuclear attack does not arise because there is no nuclear attack. As concerns the possibility of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States, that can only be viewed in the context of the continuation of a policy which started in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is that policy which we ask the United States to abandon, a policy which admits the possibility of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States—the policy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That is why, once again, we ask the delegation of the United States carefully to study the arguments put forward by the Soviet delegation, as well as the content of the report of the Secretary-General on the possible consequences of a nuclear war and all other facts and arguments which have appeared in recent times.

There are two small matters of clarification. As the representative of the United States, in explaining the negative position of his Government on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, twice tried to found his arguments on our position, we consider that clarification is necessary. First, the representative of the United States referred to article 2 of the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and interpreted it as meaning that the Soviet Union does not consider the conclusion of such a convention as a final solution of the problem, and links the value of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons to large-scale disarmament measures, including general and complete disarmament. In the Soviet statement this morning, we said clearly enough that the prohibition of the use of nuclear

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 476-513.

weapons was one important measure which is of independent significance—that was stated at length in the Soviet statement—which, among other measures already taken or which can be taken—for instance, a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons—will bring us ever closer to a radical solution of the disarmament problem, general and complete disarmament and strict effective international control, which would indeed create conditions of complete security. Therefore, I repeat, we consider that this measure is of independent importance and is at the same time a step towards further progress. Therefore, our article 2 does not confirm the suggestion of adopting a negative attitude towards the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, it points to further prospects and makes it mandatory upon parties to the convention to go on working in the direction of general and complete disarmament.

With regard to the second clarification, the representative of the United States spoke of the so-called strategic umbrella proposed by the Soviet Union in the programme of general and complete disarmament, which we agreed to retain until the end of the process of general and complete disarmament. The representative of the United States also mentioned that to justify the refusal of the United States rapidly to abandon all nuclear weapons and its desire to keep them until the end of the disarmament process. That is wrong. It is not an accurate description of the position of the Soviet Union. The whole concept of the nuclear strategic umbrella before the end of the process of general and complete disarmament was put forward by the Soviet Union in response to appeals by the United States and certain other partners in the negotiations. It was a step forward to try to come together on this problem. We put forward the concept of the strategic umbrella not because it was our conception, but merely to take a step forward towards the other party and facilitate an agreement on general and complete disarmament. That was the only reason. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it is prepared to agree to general and complete disarmament without any strategic umbrella. That is what we proposed in the beginning. The concept of a strategic umbrella was merely an indication of our desire to come to an agreement.<sup>6</sup> We regret that nevertheless we have been unable to agree and that no real progress has been achieved in the field of general and complete disarmament, but that is another matter and we do not intend to dwell on it at length now.

I would merely wish to conclude by saying that neither article 2 of our draft convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons nor our proposals on the negotiations on general and complete disarmament, dictated by our desire to find a compromise solution of complex problems on which there are great differences of views, can serve as grounds for opposing a conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. We should like once again to express the hope that the delegation of the United States, after having carefully studied the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union and those that we are sure will be put forward by many other States, will

<sup>6</sup> For the Soviet draft treaty and the changes in its provisions on nuclear delivery vehicles, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. I, pp. 103 ff.; *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 904-905, 913-933; *ibid.*, 1963, pp. 515-516; *ibid.*, 1964, p. 22.

find it possible to cross the threshold away from the policy which led to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and that the United States will find it possible to co-operate in solving a very important and urgent question, that of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and of the conclusion of an international convention to that effect.

### British Amendment to Article V of the Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, November 22, 1967<sup>7</sup>

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised.

### Statement by the British Representative (Hope) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, November 29, 1967<sup>1</sup>

My Government fully understands the deep concern of all countries, including especially those which do not possess nuclear weapons, with the need to avoid the horrors of a nuclear war. We also fully understand the support by countries, which do not possess nuclear weapons, of proposals aimed at the total prohibition of the use and the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Indeed, we support the objectives in the second operative article of the draft convention which has been placed before us by the representative of the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup> This sets out the need to arrive, as soon as possible at agreement on the cessation of production and the destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons in conformity with a treaty of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. This is also the aim of my Government, and we are glad to see that similar wording is included in the draft non-proliferation treaty at present under discussion in Geneva.<sup>3</sup>

I would now like to turn to the first article in the proposed convention which refers to a solemn undertaking by each party to refrain from using nuclear weapons, from threatening to use them and from inciting other States to use them.

You will recall that during the debate on item 91 concerning the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, my delegation had the pleasure of declaring the willingness of the United Kingdom Government to accept the obligations in Additional

<sup>7</sup> ENDC/203, Nov. 22, 1967. The draft treaty appears *ante*, pp. 338-341. For a previous British statement on this proposal, see *ante*, p. 471.

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV.1539, pp. 23-30.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 420-421.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 338-341.

Protocol II of the Treaty not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against contracting parties to the Treaty. As we said then, it is our hope that other nuclear Powers will do likewise. We have said, on previous occasions when this subject has been debated, that we welcome the creation of nuclear-free zones where geographical and other conditions are suitable, as useful steps towards non-proliferation and the establishment of international confidence. These conditions are that any nuclear-free zone should be created by the free and voluntary decision of the States to be included in the zone; that the existing military balance in the area should not be disturbed; that there should be arrangements for impartial international verification adequate to the circumstances of the region concerned; and that the zone should include all the militarily significant States, and preferably all the States, in the region.<sup>4</sup> The Treaty of Tlatelolco meets these basic requirements. We would be willing to consider similar obligations not to use nuclear weapons against other zones where States have followed the example of the Latin American countries in combining together to establish viable nuclear-free zones and where these conditions are met.

But our willingness to accept these commitments and our wish to support fully the widely expressed demand for measures to end the armaments race and reduce the danger of nuclear conflict does not mean that we should accept proposals which we believe could weaken, rather than strengthen, international security.

The precarious freedom from nuclear war we have enjoyed for the past twenty years stems from what has become known as the philosophy of deterrence. One of the tenets of this philosophy is that the height of the nuclear threshold should be incalculable for any aggressor, who should always be kept fully aware of the risk that large-scale non-nuclear aggression might provoke a nuclear response. When we spoke in this Committee about the Treaty of Tlatelolco we drew attention to the fact that, like all other Members of the United Nations, the United Kingdom is obliged under the United Nations Charter to refrain from the threat or use of force. And I take this opportunity to repeat once more that my Government will not use any weapons at its disposal, either nuclear or conventional, for purposes of aggression.

My Government strongly sympathizes with all efforts to remove the danger of nuclear war and we understand the motives of those who have supported resolutions of this type in the past and their natural and justified desire to free the world of this peril.

Unfortunately, however, we do not believe that this danger can be eliminated by a simple and sweeping prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. We have studied with care the arguments in the statements by those delegates whose Governments support the item of a convention. But these arguments do not seem to us to take sufficient account of the nuclear facts of life, which are that as long as these weapons exist and as long as the danger of war exists the danger of nuclear war will exist also.

Several delegations have drawn attention to the excellent report by

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<sup>4</sup> The Latin American treaty and the additional protocols appear *ante*, pp. 60-93. For the British statement, see *ante*, pp. 533-535.

the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons, circulated as document A/6858 and Corr.1 of 10 October.

The report makes it very clear that the greatest risk to those countries which do not possess nuclear weapons comes not from an open attack by a nuclear Power, as has been suggested by some previous speakers, but from a war between nuclear Powers in which nuclear weapons were used.

One of the conclusions of the report is, and I quote:

... Security for all countries of the world must be sought through the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the banning of their use, by way of general and complete disarmament.<sup>6</sup>

This is also the view of my Government.

If there were to be a war between nuclear Powers, what security could any of us derive from some previously concluded agreement to refrain from the use of such weapons? Indeed, the existence of an unenforceable prohibition on the use of these weapons would not contribute to security but might even impair it by breeding the false impression that aggressive action using conventional forces could be undertaken without risking nuclear war.

For these reasons my Government is convinced that the only way to remove the danger of nuclear war is by general and complete disarmament under effective international control with the aim of eliminating all means of waging war, both nuclear and conventional, and by the establishment of international machinery to keep the peace in a disarmed world.

We are, of course, willing to examine thoroughly every measure which will help to build international confidence and serve as a step towards general and complete disarmament. But for the reasons I have already given, my Government believes that the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, such as that proposed in the draft convention before us, cannot be effective while nuclear weapons still exist. Moreover, we believe that the very real problems with which this convention purports to deal can most suitably be examined by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee which reports regularly to the General Assembly on the whole field of disarmament which has been committed to its charge. We therefore believe that this proposal should be remitted to the Geneva Committee for further consideration.

### Statement by ACDA Deputy Director Fisher to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, November 29, 1967<sup>1</sup>

I should like to exercise my right of reply to some of the comments made upon or in relation to my statement before this body on 20 November (1532nd meeting).<sup>2</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *Ante.* p. 512.

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV.1530, pp. 38-50.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante.* pp. 585-592.

I should like to start by pointing out that many of the arguments advanced in support of the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, which is offered in connexion with the Soviet item,<sup>3</sup> appear to be directed towards a much more limited undertaking than is contained in the draft convention, they are arguments that support a quite different treaty. This draft convention itself involves the unqualified obligation not to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

As I pointed out earlier, the obligation in this draft convention would be applicable whether or not all parties involved in a conflict had accepted the same obligation. Its protections would extend even to a nuclear weapon State engaged in armed attack, or to a non-nuclear weapon State engaged in such an attack and assisted by a nuclear weapon State. Its obligation would prevent nuclear weapon States signatory to the convention from using their nuclear power to assist a State that had foresworn nuclear weapons and was the victim of nuclear aggression. And finally, its terms would be applicable to prevent nuclear weapons from being used in self-defence or in retaliation in a conflict between nuclear weapon States.

As I review the debate that has gone on so far on the item now under consideration, it seems to me that two principal issues emerge in considering such a draft convention. The first is whether, prior to the elimination of nuclear weapons from national arsenals, an unqualified agreement not to use these weapons is a meaningful commitment or a dangerous deception.

That leads us to the second question, which is, at what stage in the disarmament process can we realistically expect the elimination of nuclear weapons from national arsenals to occur?

On the first of these issues the United States believes that the problem is one which has been created by the development of the atomic bomb and the creation of vast arsenals of nuclear weapons with very rapid means of delivery. The problem of the possible use of nuclear weapons arose when the first nuclear weapon was developed.

I make this statement in full recognition of the fact that it was the United States that first developed a nuclear weapon. The United States embarked on its programme to develop nuclear weapons at a time when the United States, the Soviet Union and other allies were fighting shoulder to shoulder against a common foe. We did so at a time when there was serious concern that if we did not proceed promptly, our common foe might be the first to develop this awesome weapon. I need not speculate on what the results of such a development would have been. The war against this common foe was successfully ended before the nuclear weapon was actually developed. The weapon was used, as has been pointed out, over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But are we naive enough to believe that if the United States had not developed the weapon, it would never have been developed? Are we to infer that, in the heat of World War II, any other developer of the weapon would not have used it, as did the United States, to bring that war to a speedy conclusion?

It is precisely because of its responsibility for the development and

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 420-421.

use of nuclear weapons that the United States has been so active in its efforts to bring them under control. Indeed, planning for these efforts was under way before the work on the weapon had been completed. And it is because of the insight into the nature of nuclear weapons which its work in their development had given it that the United States, when it had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, sought to remove them wholly from the military field through the principles of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report<sup>4</sup> and the Baruch Plan.<sup>5</sup> We have recently heard a characterization of the Baruch Plan, with which—it will not surprise any delegation here to hear me say—I do not agree. I do not wish to take the time of this body to explain precisely the many points on which I think that this characterization is in error, but merely to say that I believe the record will speak for itself. The record speaks for itself in another way.

Unfortunately, these efforts based on the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and the Baruch Plan have not been successful. We have seen the problem aggravated by the growth of stockpiles and rapid means of delivery. We have seen the problem compounded when one nuclear Power became two, then three, and now five.

This observation leads me to a point which I can best demonstrate by asking an almost rhetorical question. But before asking this almost rhetorical question, I should note that the Soviet draft convention does not require all the nuclear Powers to sign before it becomes effective; it merely requires those that do sign to ratify before it goes into effect. But for the purposes of discussion, let us assume that even if all the nuclear Powers were to sign and ratify this convention, then my almost rhetorical question is, would the nuclear Powers themselves, or the non-nuclear Powers, really believe that nuclear weapons would never be used, no matter under what circumstances, as long as stockpiles of nuclear weapons were maintained?

I submit that it is unrealistic to believe that nuclear Powers, under any and all circumstances, and even when their very national existence is at stake, will abstain from the use of the nuclear weapons in their arsenals simply because they have signed a convention prohibiting such use. As long as nuclear stockpiles exist, it is clearly a dangerous game to contrive international agreements which may lead nations to believe otherwise. Not only may it prove to be a collective venture in self-delusion, but more importantly and more dangerously, it may create an illusion of security and divert attention from the main task: that is, the task of nuclear disarmament.

Until that task is completed, we must not be afraid to face the fact that the risk of nuclear war is being minimized by maintaining a position of mutual deterrence. Here, in the friendliest and, I hope, most constructive spirit, I should like to differ with the observation of the Soviet representative that the Soviet draft convention would make deterrence irrelevant because nuclear weapons having been prohibited, there is nothing to be deterred against or nothing to deter.<sup>6</sup> And I should like, again in a friendly spirit, to ask the question, does anyone

<sup>4</sup> *A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, Mar. 16, 1946* (Department of State pub. 2498, 1946).

<sup>5</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 7-16.

<sup>6</sup> See *ante*, p. 593.

really believe that the nuclear Powers would feel free to dismantle their nuclear forces for deterrence or defence merely because a convention to outlaw their use had gone into effect? If this were indeed true, we should wonder why the draft convention did not contain a proposal, as a minimum, for an immediate halt, under effective international control, of the production of fissionable material for use in such weapons, not merely providing that later on we would make the best efforts to do something about this problem.

I shall not labour the next point in my reply, which has been dealt with by others; that is, the repeatedly made analogy to the Geneva Convention on the prohibition of the use of gas and bacteriological weapons.<sup>7</sup> I shall merely say that we cannot share the view expressed here by several delegations that it was respect for this Convention that prevented the use of poison gas in World War II. Simply, we believe that gas was not used in the Second World War because there would have been retaliation in kind. The capability of one side deterred the use by the other. And so it is with nuclear weapons. Mutual nuclear dependence is the most realistic assurance against the use of those weapons until they have been eliminated.

I have studied with care the thoughtful observations of the representative of Sudan, in which he disagreed with the position of the United States that prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons and then doing something about nuclear stockpiles was in effect putting the cart before the horse, or the plough before the ox.<sup>8</sup> As I understand those observations, he seemed to be indicating in those thoughtful remarks that there was nothing to be gained by a reversal of those priorities, since even if it were to be agreed that the elimination of stockpiles from national arsenals should take place, difficulties as to who should be parties or difficulties as to whether States which were parties were in fact complying, would still be with us and might prevent any such agreement from being effective. It is just for that reason that the United States position is that the elimination of national nuclear stockpiles should take place in the context of the completion of the process of general and complete disarmament.

At that stage—that is the completion of the process of general and complete disarmament—the problem of the necessary parties will have to have been resolved, strict and effective measures of international control will have been developed to provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations and progress in disarmament will have been accompanied by the strengthening of institutions for maintaining peace, including the development of an international peace force which can ensure that the United Nations can effectively curtail or suppress any threat or act of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

I am aware that that seems to be a pretty large order and it may seem pretty far away, a place that is hard to get to but it is an order given to us by the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union establishing the Joint Statement of agreed principles for dis-

<sup>7</sup> *Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents, 1919-55*, pp. 160-170.

<sup>8</sup> For the Sudanese comments, see A/C. I/PV. 1537, pp. 21-31.

armament negotiations<sup>9</sup> and that agreement was not only agreed to by the United States and the Soviet Union but both welcomed and recommended by this body and by the General Assembly of the United Nations.<sup>10</sup> It is a delusion to think that we could eliminate nuclear weapons from national arsenals in any other context.

In conclusion, I should like to add the voice of my delegation to the discussion, in this context, of the report prepared for the Secretary-General by a distinguished group of consultants on the effects of the possible uses of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of those weapons. That report is certainly a useful document and it should be of great value in helping us to take those difficult steps which we must take towards reducing the dangers inherent in all nuclear weapons. The United States hopes, of course, to comment on that report at much greater length: at the appropriate point in our agenda, but at this stage we would merely like to comment that it has been relied on by the supporters of the item now under consideration to prove two points.

The first is that all mankind has an interest in avoiding thermo-nuclear war. That point is indeed sustained by the report. It is a point on which we can all agree. The second point for which it is quoted, however, is in support of the Soviet draft convention and the approach contained in it that the way to handle this problem would be to agree that nuclear weapons should not be used and then to do something about the reduction of nuclear stockpiles.

With the greatest respect I submit that the report does not support the Soviet approach. We have already heard quoted to us in previous meetings, and today, the only sentence in the report which deals with the subject matter now under consideration. That sentence has already been read, but I shall read it again.

... Security for all countries of the world must be sought through the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the banning of their use, by way of general and complete disarmament.<sup>11</sup>

I would merely point out that the report sustains the two points which are crucial to the United States position. First, it points out that it does not recommend an unqualified non-use proposal as a meaningful document unless it provides for the elimination of nuclear weapons from national arsenals. Indeed, it links the two together and refers to "the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons" before referring to "the banning of their use". Secondly, it indicates that that process can only be accomplished by way of general and complete disarmament.

The United States is, of course, sympathetic to the arguments which have been advanced that it will take us a great deal of time to reach our ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under strict international control, and the argument which follows that, that we should therefore do what we can now in the field of arms limitation

<sup>9</sup> *Document on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 430-442.

<sup>10</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 741-742.

<sup>11</sup> *Ante*, p. 512.

to work out measures to reduce international tension and the risk of war and bring us closer to our ultimate objective.

We are sympathetic to and agree with that position and to prove that, as an indication of our sincerity in this respect, we have offered, as I indicated in my earlier remarks on this item, a variety of proposals for properly safeguarded agreements, first to limit and then to reduce both the material for making the nuclear weapons themselves and then the means of their delivery.

The question which faces us here is whether or not the draft convention is a proper item, or one that could precede general and complete disarmament, or whether there could be other proper items. We have submitted that there could be other proper items and that this is not one which serves those purposes.

The Secretary-General's report considers measures short of general and complete disarmament measures which the experts considered feasible and which could lead to the reduction of the level of nuclear arms, the lessening of tension in the world and the eventual elimination of nuclear arms. It mentions a variety of them. It mentions an agreement on the reduction of nuclear arsenals, it mentions a comprehensive test ban treaty, but nowhere in the report is an unqualified non-use agreement mentioned as a possible limited and separable measure which could be taken in advance of general and complete disarmament. Such a non-use agreement is mentioned only once, and then in the section that I have just quoted, as part of the process of elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons by way of general and complete disarmament. That shows, I submit, that the considerations of credibility and verifiability to which I have pointed were just as persuasive to those twelve experts as they have been to the United States.

**Statement by the French Representative (Dejammet) to  
the First Committee of the General Assembly: Prohibition  
of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, November 30,  
1967<sup>1</sup>**

The number and the quality of the speeches that have been made in this debate, where everyone stresses calm and the importance of the problem, makes it imperative that we be brief and relieve us of the need to go into the matter at great length. The French Government has made known its views a number of times on the problems that we are discussing here. We want to express our sympathy to those who, quite justifiably, concern themselves over the importance and the urgency of the solutions sought. We also weigh carefully the provisions of the principles contained in the convention. These may be extremely valuable at a certain moment in nuclear disarmament and also within a more general context. But we believe it neither realistic nor desirable to undertake the road of disarmament by starting with provisions

<sup>1</sup> A.C.I.PV.1510, p. 16.

which, although of essential importance for the security and self-defence of States, cannot by their very nature be surrounded by controls and effective guarantees.

In the troubled world in which we live, we are afraid that solemnly proclaimed moral prohibitions, though uncontrolled, would allow mistrust to continue and might even increase it. According to the view that the French delegation has very often expressed, it is through genuine measures of disarmament, the application of which could be carefully guaranteed and controlled, that we ought to undertake disarmament on a very urgent basis, and primarily, and essentially nuclear disarmament.

**Statement by the Soviet Representative (Mendelevich) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, November 30, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

The discussion on the item on the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, inscribed in the agenda of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly on the initiative of the Soviet Union, has come to an end. In our view, this was a very active, detailed and interesting discussion which, to a large extent, has enriched us all.

We note with satisfaction that the great majority of delegations which took part in the debate supported the need to conclude an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet delegation would like to express its gratitude to all those delegations which spoke with great warmth of the Soviet initiative and which spoke kindly of the Soviet Union in connexion with this initiative.

As the discussion has shown, most speakers in the debate approved not only the idea itself: that it is necessary to conclude an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, but also the essential ideas put forward by the Soviet delegation in its introductory statement. We said then that, in our view, the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons would to a certain extent weaken the threat of a nuclear war. And this idea has been reflected in many other statements here.

We said at the time that the conclusion of such a convention, in our conviction, would contribute to limiting the nuclear armaments race. This idea has also been echoed in the statements of many other delegations. The Soviet delegation stated that the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons would be a step forward and would to a large extent, like other measures, facilitate a future agreement on general and complete disarmament. This idea was also expressed in the statements of many representatives. Finally, the idea was expressed that both nuclear and non-nuclear Powers would stand to

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 13-35.

gain from the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. We note with satisfaction that this idea also has been supported by many delegations.

Most of those who spoke agree that the state of affairs in the world requires a speedy solution of the problem of the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. Many delegations supported outright the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons presented to the General Assembly by the Government of the USSR.<sup>2</sup>

All these, in our opinion, are happy portents of future progress in this important and major question. All peoples stand to gain from the solution of this problem. At the same time, some delegations put forward various arguments against our proposal. We carefully listened to the statements of the representatives of the United States of America,<sup>3</sup> the United Kingdom<sup>4</sup> and some other States among their allies. We studied their arguments against proposals put forward by the Soviet Union. We must say that these arguments did not appear to us to be of a convincing nature. They did not convince us that our proposals were untimely or unrealistic.

Speaking at this time, the Soviet delegation would like to examine those arguments. The main arguments of the opponents of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons are threefold. The first argument can be expressed as follows: the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would be useless and even harmful from the point of view of the need to ensure the security of States. The question legitimately arises: the security of what States would not be served by the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons? The security of non-nuclear States? Why? Would it not be to their advantage to cease being targets for possible nuclear strikes?

The statements made by the representatives of the non-nuclear Powers in this Committee did not bear out the arguments put forward by the United States and its allies. Indeed, all the socialist and non-nuclear countries which spoke here, all non-aligned, non-nuclear countries, whether from Africa or Asia or other parts of the world, came out in favour of the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

Only the allies of the United States were against those proposals—and not all of them; I mean those among the non-nuclear Powers. Thus, it seems that non-nuclear socialist and non-aligned countries agree with the idea of concluding a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. They see advantages for themselves in the solution of this question. Only some non-nuclear allies of the United States adhere to a different view and they are in the minority.

Let us delve further into the argument that the convention would be useless or even harmful. Could it be that it would be useless or even harmful for nuclear Powers? The Soviet Union is a nuclear Power and, being a nuclear Power, we consider that it would be in the interest of

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 420-421.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 585-592, 597-602.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 595-597.

all nuclear Powers to conclude such a convention. May I remind you that the Soviet Union is not the only nuclear Power holding that view. But it is a fact that the United States and the United Kingdom consider that the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons is not in their interests. Why?

We have given some thought to the arguments submitted by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom. If one were to summarize their arguments to prove that the convention would not be in their interests or in the interests of their allies, one could say that that position is based on the concept of deterrence.

They submit the following idea. In the nuclear age, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the only guarantee or the only possibility that those weapons will not be used is precisely that the possibility to use them exists. This is the concept of the balance of terror. In a simplified way this is what it means if both sides possess nuclear weapons, most probably neither side would dare to use them. What is more, those States consider that the convention for the prohibition of nuclear weapons would to a certain extent limit their possibilities of basing themselves on this concept of a deterrent. We think that this cannot be accepted if one is thinking of the interests of peace. First of all, mutual deterrence is not a true guarantee of peace. On the contrary, it is a very dangerous situation which can lead at any time to extremely dangerous consequences for the whole of mankind. It can lead to a catastrophe. This is very convincingly set out in the report of the Secretary-General on the possible effects of the use of nuclear weapons.

Secondly, this reliance on the concept of mutual deterrence is based on a very unilateral approach which considers weapons as the only possible instrument for the development of international relations. It is a sort of military, technological concept of world history. It is the great-nuclear-Power approach, if I may use that expression. To base oneself on this concept would mean that the whole development of affairs in the world depends upon weapons and those possessing them. That is a point of view which we do not share. We recognize of course the great role of military power in international relations today. As was recently stated by the Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, Mr. Brezhnev, at ceremonies commemorating the anniversary of the great October Socialist Revolution:

We recognize that the power of the Soviet socialist State was and is the main bastion of peace in the world, the main obstacle in the path of the imperialist warmongers.<sup>5</sup>

But when we speak of the power of our State, we do not mean only our military power. We are thinking of the power of our social and economic system, of our socialist way of life, and many other factors. Generally speaking, we consider that weapons alone do not predetermine the course of world events and achievements and success in the struggle against war. There are also important social, national, political and legal factors. We consider that it is wrong merely to oppose the weapons of one side to the weapons of the other.

<sup>5</sup> *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Nov. 22, 1967, p. 17 (variant translation).

The social factor is the influence of social changes resulting from the process of the liberation of mankind, the effect of this influence on the balance of power. The national factor is the birth of the Governments of new, independent States that desire peace and that contribute to the cause of peace despite the fact that they do not possess nuclear weapons. These States indeed make a signal contribution to the consolidation of peace even though they have no nuclear weapons and are therefore not component parts of the mutual-deterrence system. They are not mere pawns in world history, as might readily be thought if one is accustomed to think only in terms of deterrence. They participate in what goes on in the world; they are equal Members of the United Nations.

The political factors that play an important role in the fight for the consolidation of peace and against war are to be found in the existing line-up of forces on important international questions such as eliminating the consequences of Israeli aggression in the Middle East, putting an end to United States aggression in Viet-Nam, the question of European security, and many other international problems. And finally, the legal factors are to be found in the whole system of international treaties and in the rules of international law.

Every one of these principles represents an achievement by the forces for peace and has great importance as far as preventing a new world war is concerned. Thanks to the efforts of a very large number of States of all the continents—Asia, Europe, Africa, Latin America—the number of such instrumentalities is constantly increasing. And this is a very good thing. This is progress. We consider that the interaction of all these factors is what determines the course of events in the world, and that, while among these factors there are military ones, they are not the only factors.

When the delegations opposing the conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons speak of mutual deterrence as the main, even the only, factor for peace, there can be felt in their statements the philosophy of the military-industrial complex, whose influence on policy was recently described in alarming terms by an ex-President of the United States of America.<sup>6</sup> The influence of the military-industrial complex must be overcome, so that progress may be made in reducing the threat of nuclear war.

In submitting to the General Assembly the proposal that the Assembly consider a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union addressed an appeal to the Government of the United States and to the Governments of those allies of the United States that share its position: to get rid of the influence of the military-industrial complex: Set your course on peace. Try to view the world in all its variety, in all its aspects, as it is—a world that includes many different elements the interaction of which makes it what it is. Then it will be easier for you to move on towards the solution of a problem which is of concern to all: the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

<sup>6</sup> *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961*, p. 5.

Furthermore, if we wish to speak of mutual deterrence, may I point out that, even given the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, what is called "mutual deterrence" would not disappear; it would still remain. Nuclear weapons would not disappear; they would still remain even if a convention were signed prohibiting the use of such weapons. Thus the possibility of a counter-blow—the very foundation of the concept of mutual deterrence—remains so long as general and complete disarmament is not achieved. In this connexion we cannot agree with the representatives of the United States and Italy, who yesterday stated that during the Second World War no use was made of chemical and bacteriological weapons, not because of the existence of the Geneva Protocol,<sup>7</sup> but because there existed the possibility of reprisal with the same weapons. We do not deny this. After all, the same applies in the case of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. Of course, one Geneva Protocol or one convention does not by itself settle everything; but they are an advance, each in its own domain, and they are useful.

When the United States delegation and those of some of its allies assert that the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons would have an adverse effect on mutual deterrence, it would seem that by "mutual deterrence" they mean something different. They are probably thinking not merely of a balance of forces in the military and technological sense—that is to say, the ability of either side to inflict a counter-blow—but rather of the possibility of being the first to be able to use nuclear weapons. This is something that in one of our previous statements we called "the Hiroshima-Nagasaki complex". Yes, the United States did employ nuclear weapons once, and ever since then it would appear that the possibility of using them again is something that they simply cannot renounce—that is, the possibility of using them against non-nuclear Powers; nuclear weapons were used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki against Japan, a non-nuclear State both then and now. It is this clinging to the possibility of using nuclear weapons at some time against a non-nuclear State—the Hiroshima-Nagasaki complex—that seems to be the second element in addition to the influence of the military-industrial complex, the second factor determining the position of the United States when it alleges its inability to accept a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. We ask the United States to overcome that complex too. If it succeeds in overcoming it, if it succeeds in solving this problem and deciding never to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear State, then it will come to assume the same position as that taken by the majority of States at the present time and it will, we do not doubt, agree to the conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

This, then, is the first argument according to which the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons supposedly would be something useless or even dangerous. We say that this argument is not convincing.

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<sup>7</sup> *Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents, 1919-55*, pp. 169-170.

The second argument put forward by certain delegations, a minority of them, is that the conclusion of such a convention would be unrealistic. They say that it would not be respected in any case. This nihilistic approach is rendered nugatory by the fact that in the world today there are many international conventions which, of course, are based above all on moral and political factors. Almost all these treaties were concluded because the States took a decision to conclude a given treaty. They thought it was useful, and they concluded these treaties and they respect them. If one considers that a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons would be unrealistic, then almost any international treaty is unrealistic.

Of course, history contains cases where international treaties have been violated, but the world knows that this always leads to dangerous consequences. But this fact itself can certainly not be taken to be an argument against the conclusion of new international treaties and against the desire to respect them. Let us take the Treaty on principles governing the activities of States in the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space which was recently signed and which has recently come into force.<sup>8</sup> Will that Treaty be carried out? We hope so, and we believe that everyone hopes it will be carried out. But is there any 100 per cent guarantee that it will be? Of course not, such is the very nature of international treaties. Their force comes from the fact that they are supported by the peoples. We do not doubt that a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons would enjoy the widest possible support by the peoples of all countries and continents.

Of course, one could adopt such a nihilistic approach, but what would remain of the United Nations then? What would remain of the system of world relations? We appeal to the United States to adopt a more positive attitude in this question of the value of treaties, since nihilism is not the wisest counsellor in international relations. We think this would be in everybody's interest.

Finally, there is a third argument which has been put forward against the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Some representatives said that what one should do is not sign a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, but rather a treaty on general and complete disarmament. They said that this would be much better, that this would be the right thing to do, and that this would be in everybody's interest. Of course, it would be much better to conclude right now a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The Soviet Union is in favour of that. The Soviet Union has initiated a proposal on general and complete disarmament, and has prepared a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament,<sup>9</sup> but no progress has been made in this field. Everybody knows that.

May I remind the committee that at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly in 1961—and I would also recall this to the memory of my friend, General Burns, that the Canadian delegation voted against

<sup>8</sup> *Ante*, pp. 38-43.

<sup>9</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 77-102.

a declaration prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, putting forward the argument that at that time there was agreement on principles of general and complete disarmament, the so-called McCloy-Zorin principles, and that the road was open to general and complete disarmament.<sup>10</sup> The Canadian delegation said at the time that it would not make any sense to adopt such a relatively limited declaration as a declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. We expressed our doubts about this approach of the delegation of Canada being reasonable, and history has confirmed that we were right. Six years have passed, and the negotiations on general and complete disarmament have not moved forward significantly, and we do not now have any clear-cut reason to hope that this progress will soon be made.

We regret this, but this is so, and this being so, the choice which we have to make is not between a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Our option now is between the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the maintenance of the present state of affairs, in which there is no such convention and there is no realistic hope of significant progress being made in the field of general and complete disarmament. But in making this choice, we must realise that the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons will facilitate progress in the field of general and complete disarmament, although, of course, this would not be the last step in the solution of the problem, but merely one of the steps. The peoples of the world have many such steps to take, and every one of those steps will be hard to pick. It will be a hard struggle, but it is necessary to take every such step, otherwise we will not attain general and complete disarmament. We shall not reach that goal if we oppose partial measures such as the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons to the whole programme of general and complete disarmament. They are not contradictory. As events have shown, every such measure is an important step forward on the road which we all fondly hope will lead to general and complete disarmament.

Thus, not one of the arguments of those who do not support the proposal to conclude an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is really solid. They do not pass the acid test, and all these reservations fall by the wayside. They are not convincing because they are not consonant with the true requirements of life. This has been said here by many delegations.

To conclude my statement, may I say that the Soviet delegation wishes once again to express its satisfaction that on this question of the conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons a useful and detailed discussion has been held in this Committee, and we hope that this discussion will be crowned by the adoption of a positive and forward-looking resolution.

<sup>10</sup> For the McCloy-Zorin principles, see *ibid.*, 1961, pp. 439-442. The Canadian statements on the Ethiopian resolution (*ibid.*, pp. 648-650) may be found in A/C.1/PV.1195, pp. 66-67, and in General Assembly *Official Records: 1063rd Plenary Meeting*, p. 797. Canada abstained from voting on the resolution in the First Committee but opposed it in the plenary vote.

May I give the Committee the assurance that such a draft resolution will be presented in the shortest possible time.

**Statement by ACDA Deputy Director Fisher to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, November 30, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

I have asked to be allowed to exercise my right of reply in order to deal with only one portion of my Soviet colleague's observations.<sup>2</sup> Many of them dealt with points that have been discussed not in excessive detail but in proper detail during the course of this discussion, and I do not want to plough over old ground. However, for the first time in the discussion the notion of a military industrial complex has been introduced and apparently with the thought that somehow it is only that military industrial complex which is said to exist that prevents the United States from agreeing to this item. I am as aware as anyone in this room of the speech made by a former President of the United States<sup>3</sup> warning us against permitting such a complex to exist or to have any impact on political thought in this country, but I think the record speaks for itself in this regard.

If the remarks about a political military industrial complex have any relevance in this context, I assume they mean that there is somehow a political military industrial complex that has a vested interest in the continued production of bombs and the continued production of means of delivery. If that were the case it would be surprising indeed that it is the United States which has proposed the complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons use. The United States has proposed that if we cannot agree on a complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes we might agree on a plant by plant shut-down. It is the United States which has agreed that we should freeze the level of offensive and defensive strategic systems,<sup>4</sup> and as recently as last September the Secretary of Defense of the United States reiterated our willingness to enter into safeguarded agreements first to limit and later to reduce the level of both offensive and defensive strategic nuclear forces.<sup>5</sup> Those are proposals made by the United States to stop the production of those weapons and to reduce their levels. Those are not proposals made by a country which has a so-called military industrial complex which is interested in continuing that production. We have made those proposals: it is our Soviet colleagues who have rejected them.

From this, some might think that I should be justified in pointing the argument of the military industrial complex back at my good friend. I am not doing so. I assume that our friends in the Soviet Union would rather spend the money they are spending on armaments on something else. So would we.

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV.1540, pp. 36-37.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1951*, p. 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, p. 8.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 382-394.

## ACDA Report on Worldwide Defense Expenditures and Related Data for Calendar Year 1965 [Extract], December 1967<sup>1</sup>

### HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DATA

#### *Military Expenditures*

*World-wide.* The rise in global military expenditures continued in 1965, bringing the total for all countries close to \$140 billion. This represented an increase of approximately \$20 billion in the three years since a world total of \$120 billion was estimated by an international panel of experts reporting to the United Nations in 1962. Country data available to ACDA suggest that the rate of increase in 1965 may have been somewhat smaller, overall, than in the years immediately preceding.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, the 1965 total was a new peak in world spending on military programs. It represented an average annual outlay of more than \$40 per capita, accounting for 6 to 7 per cent of the gross product of all countries.

*1966 Preliminary Estimate.* Preliminary data for 1966 indicate an accelerated rise in military spending to a new all-time high figure of \$155-160 billion. Expressed in terms of some of the comparatives shown in the report, the indicated increase of \$15 to 20 billion in the level of military expenditures in 1966 is more than twice the current annual total of foreign economic assistance extended by all countries to the less developed areas of the world, and is at least equivalent to a year's expenditures by less developed countries for public education and public health programs for a population of more than two billion.

*Major Powers and Military Alliances.* The geographic distribution of military expenditures in 1965 continued to show a heavy concentration in the member states of the two major military alliances. Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact accounted for the bulk (84 per cent) of world total expenditures. The two major military powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, spent an estimated \$92 billion, or over 64 per cent of the total.

Indicative of the heavy costs associated with the development and maintenance of nuclear weapons, a ranking of states according to amounts spent on military programs shows that the five powers possessing nuclear weapons also have the highest total military expenditures.

*Less Developed Countries.* Military spending by the less developed countries, which have an average per capita GNP of less than \$130 per year, reached a new high of \$18 billion in 1965. The estimated increase of \$2 billion in one year again indicated that the trend of defense expenditures among the poorer nations was rising at a faster

<sup>1</sup> ACDA Research Report 87-8 (Dec. 1967), pp. 2-8. For a preceding report for the year 1965, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 1-3.

<sup>2</sup> Revised estimates for some countries since issuance of the compilation for 1964 suggest a global total in that year above \$135 billion, rather than the \$130 billion first estimated.

rate than the world average. These countries, unlike the developed states, currently spend more on arms than on public health and education combined.

#### *Economic Cost of Defense*

*Gross National Product.* One measure of the economic cost of military programs is the proportion of GNP devoted to these expenditures, and the trend of this ratio. On the average, military expenditures account for 6 to 7 per cent of the gross product, but the showing by country is extremely irregular, ranging up to 20 per cent of annual GNP. In at least half a dozen of the less developed countries the proportion exceeds 10 per cent.

The burden of arms programs on development in the poorer nations becomes evident upon consideration of the total resource base available to meet basic needs of their economies. For the less developed nations an average expenditure of \$8 per capita on military programs in 1965 came out of an average per capita GNP of \$159. As a per cent of annual GNP, this was slightly lower than the ratio of defense to product in developed countries; the latter, however, enjoyed an average per capita product of \$1,351, so that the economic burden represented by their per capita expenditures of \$129 on defense appeared to be significantly less.

*Foreign Economic Aid.* In 1965 net official economic aid to developing countries was approximately \$7 billion. This compares with their military outlays of \$18 billion.

For the developed, or donor, countries, foreign economic aid averaged out to less than one-half of one per cent of their GNP, and to about 6 per cent of their military expenditures.

*Public Education and Public Health.* Expenditures by national governments on public education and public health are illustrative of the requirements which compete with military expenditures for a portion of national resources and tax income. Expenditures worldwide on public education are estimated at \$116 billion and on public health at \$46 billion. Neither category of expenditures takes as large a share of GNP as does defense.

The disparity between military and health and education expenditures is sharpest in the developing countries. Expressed in terms of the world total, developing countries account for 10 per cent of world expenditures for public education, 9 per cent of the world total for public health, and 13 per cent of the total for defense. Developing countries have 18 per cent of the world's total GNP but 71 per cent of the world's population.

*Armed Forces and Population.* In 1965 about 21 million men, or 6 out of every thousand persons in the world were serving in active-duty armed forces. The proportion was significantly higher than average in the major military states. The NATO and Warsaw Pact countries with 25 per cent of the world's population accounted for almost half its armed forces.

Developing countries were using a relatively smaller proportion of their populations in military forces (4 persons in 1,000). However, because of their huge manpower resources, the developing countries had almost half, over 10 million, of the total armed forces of the world.

## Statement by President Johnson on IAEA Safeguards and the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the First Nuclear Reactor, December 2, 1967<sup>1</sup>

I believe history will record that on this day 25 years ago, mankind reached the turning point of his destiny.

The Book of Genesis tells us that, in the beginning, God directed man to:

Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it.

But only in our lifetime have we acquired the ultimate power to fulfill all of that command. Throughout history, man has struggled to find enough power—to find enough energy—to do his work in the world. He domesticated animals, he sold his brother into slavery, and he enslaved himself to the machine—all in a desperate search for energy.

Desperation ended in the experiment conducted in Chicago, 25 years ago, by Enrico Fermi and his fellow scientists. In a single stroke, they increased man's available energy more than a thousand-fold.

They placed in our hands the power of the universe itself.

Nothing could have been more appropriate than the words used by Dr. Arthur Compton to describe what happened on that day:

The Italian navigator has just landed in the new world.

This modern Italian navigator was a great man of science. But he was also something more. He was one of millions who, in the long history of the world, have been compelled to leave a beloved native land to escape the forces of tyranny. And like millions before him, Enrico Fermi found here a new home, among free men, in a new world. His life and his career have a very special meaning to all who love freedom.

There are today millions of young Americans with an Italian heritage who feel a deep, personal pride in Enrico Fermi. America was born out of the voyages of a great Italian navigator. In a time of greatest danger, another—equally willing to pursue his dream beyond existing charts—took us again into a new epoch.

Today we commemorate our debt to him. And in doing so, we also honor the historic bond between the old world and the new world.

In a short time, we will be dedicating, in the great State of Illinois, a new national accelerator laboratory. This laboratory, with its 200 billion electron volt accelerator, will maintain our country's position in the forefront of nuclear research.

I suggest that we dedicate this great new laboratory to the memory of the modern-day "Italian navigator."

In so honoring Enrico Fermi, we will also honor the immeasurable contributions that have been made, over the centuries, by the people of Italy to the people of the United States.

Much has already happened in that new world which just began 25 years ago.

Giant nuclear reactors, direct descendants of Fermi's first atomic

<sup>1</sup> *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Dec. 11, 1967, pp. 1650-1651. The statement was also distributed as ENDC 206, Dec. 5, 1967.

pile, are now producing millions of kilowatts of power for peaceful purposes. Other reactors are powering nuclear submarines under the seas of the earth. They are our first line of defense against tyranny, whatever its contemporary doctrine or disguise, which Enrico Fermi dedicated himself to resist.

But it is really the peaceful uses of atomic energy about which Fermi would have wished us to speak—and there are many peaceful uses.

When I became President, nuclear energy was generating about 1 million kilowatts of electric power in the United States.

Today, the atom is giving us more than 2,800,000 kilowatts—almost three times as much. And more than 70 additional nuclear powerplants are already planned or are now under construction.

This will equal about 20 percent of the whole electric generating capacity in the United States today. It is enough to meet the total requirements of 45 million people. All this from what was, 25 years ago—before the success of Fermi's experiment—only a scientist's dream.

The dream has been realized. By learning the secret of the atom, we have given mankind—for the first time in history—all the energy that mankind can possibly use.

It took the genius of countless generations of dedicated scientists to find the secret. It remains for us to use that secret wisely.

What began as the most terrible instrument of war that man has ever seen can become the key to a golden age of mankind. But this will not happen unless we make it happen.

We cannot forget that another, darker future also opened on this day 25 years ago.

The power to achieve the promise of Genesis is also the power to fulfill the prophecy of Armageddon. We can either remake life on earth—or we can end it forever.

Let me be specific.

If Enrico Fermi's reactor had operated 10,000 years, it would not have produced enough plutonium for one atomic bomb.

Today, a single reactor can, while generating electricity, produce enough plutonium to make dozens of bombs every year. And scores of these reactors are now being built—and they are being built—all over the world.

Their purpose is peaceful. Yet the fact remains that the secret diversion of even a small part of the plutonium that they create could soon give every nation—every nation—the power to destroy civilization—if not life on this earth.

We just cannot permit this to happen.

Nor can mankind be denied the unlimited benefits of the peaceful atom.

We must, some way, somehow, find a way to remove the threat while preserving the promise.

The American people have made their own desires crystal clear when their representatives in the United States Senate voted unanimously to support an effective nonproliferation treaty for nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 206-207.

We are now engaged in a major effort to achieve such a treaty, in a form acceptable to all nations.

We are trying so hard to assure that the peaceful benefits of the atom will be shared by all mankind—without increasing, at the same time, the threat of nuclear destruction.

We do not believe that the safeguards we propose in that treaty will interfere with the peaceful activities of any country.

And I want to make it clear, very clear, to all the world that we in the United States are not asking any country to accept safeguards that we are unwilling to accept ourselves.

So I am, today, announcing that when such safeguards are applied under the treaty, the United States will permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in the United States—excluding only those with direct national security significance.<sup>3</sup>

Under this offer, the agency will then be able to inspect a broad range of United States nuclear activities, both governmental and private, including the fuel in nuclear-powered reactors owned by utilities for generating electricity, and the fabrication and the chemical reprocessing of such fuel.

This pledge maintains the consistent policy of the United States since the very beginning of the nuclear age.

It was just 14 years ago that a President of the United States appeared before the General Assembly of the United Nations to urge the peaceful use of the atom. President Dwight D. Eisenhower said on that occasion:

... the United States pledges . . . before the world . . . its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma—to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.<sup>4</sup>

We renew that pledge today. We reaffirm our determination to dedicate the miraculous power of the atom, not to death, but to life.

We invite the world's nations to join with us.

Let us use this historic anniversary to deepen and to reaffirm the search for peace.

Let us so conduct ourselves that future generations will look back upon December 2, 1942— not as the origin of sorrow and despair—but as the beginning of the brightest and the most inspiring chapter in the long history of man.

### Television Statement by President Saragat on IAEA Safeguards [Extract], December 2, 1967<sup>1</sup>

Mr. President, the statement you made in your message, to the effect that the United States of America is willing to submit to the

<sup>3</sup> For the IAEA safeguards, see *ibid.*, 1965, pp. 446-460.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 1947-1950, vol. I, p. 400.

<sup>1</sup> *Il Popolo*, Dec. 3, 1967.

same control measures that the nonproliferation treaty will provide for nonnuclear countries,<sup>2</sup> complies with one of the requests made by Italy in the course of the recent talks. I am certain that all men of good will will consider your statement a contribution to the cause of peace, a contribution which will become decisive if all the other nuclear powers will—as is to be hoped—pledge to do likewise.

**Statement by the British Disarmament Minister (Mulley)  
to the House of Commons: International Safeguards  
on Peaceful Nuclear Programs, December 4, 1967<sup>3</sup>**

As the House will know, a key issue in the negotiations at present taking place in Geneva to secure a Non-proliferation Treaty has been the safeguards to be applied in order to ensure that there is no diversion by the non-nuclear weapon signatories of the Treaty of materials from their civil nuclear programmes to nuclear weapon purposes.

In order to assist these negotiations Her Majesty's Government have decided that, at such time as international safeguards are put into effect in the non-nuclear weapon states in implementation of the provisions of a Treaty, they will be prepared to offer an opportunity for the application of similar safeguards in the United Kingdom subject to exclusions for national security reasons only. Her Majesty's Government welcome the similar decision announced by President Johnson on behalf of the United States.

**Statement by ACDA Deputy Director Fisher to the First  
Committee of the General Assembly: Prohibition of  
the Use of Nuclear Weapons, December 4, 1967<sup>4</sup>**

Mr. Chairman, before explaining my vote, allow me to add my voice to yours and to the others who have expressed their condolences over the loss suffered by our Byelorussian colleagues in this Committee.<sup>5</sup>

The United States delegation wishes to explain why it will abstain on the resolution disposing of item 96, entitled "Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons".<sup>6</sup> It is not necessary at this stage for the United States to state again the reasons why it believes the draft convention attached to the Soviet item would not be a useful step in the effort in which we are all engaged, the effort to avoid the dread spectre of nuclear war.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> ENDC/207, Dec. 5, 1967.

<sup>4</sup> A/C.1/PV.1541, p. 22.

<sup>5</sup> I.e., the death of V. I. Kazlov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Byelorussian Supreme Soviet.

<sup>6</sup> The Soviet item appears *ante*, pp. 420-421. The resolution is printed *post*, pp. 626-627.

However, the United States, as a matter of policy, does not refuse to consider, to study and to discuss honest proposals put forward by any nation in good faith. Thus, although we cannot agree that the Soviet proposal has merit, we shall not oppose further consideration of this subject matter in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, if this is the wish of the General Assembly.

We note in this connexion that the resolution on which the vote is being taken does not endorse *per se* the proposed convention on prohibition, but only remands it, together with such other proposals as may be made on this subject for further study and negotiation in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, or in an international conference, or between States.

Finally, I believe that this body can be proud of the statesmanlike debate on this item manifested by most delegations. It is the hope of my delegation that other measures—measures that we consider far more meaningful relating to the problems of nuclear weapons—will be accorded similar treatment in this, as well as in other disarmament forums.

### Statement by Assistant Secretary of State Sisco to the General Assembly: Work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, December 5, 1967<sup>1</sup>

Within the last few days we have passed the 25th anniversary of the first atomic chain reaction, an event which placed in man's hands the awesome power of the universe and the awesome responsibility of using this power for the benefit of all mankind.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has played an important part in the continuing development of the power of the atom for peaceful purposes. The United States expresses its appreciation to Dr. Eklund for the statement he has made to us today and for the able leadership he has exercised in the International Atomic Energy Agency. The United States supports the draft resolution submitted by Argentina, Bulgaria, and Indonesia.<sup>2</sup>

The history of man is in many ways the history of his search for the energy he needs to build a better life. Today he stands close to realizing his age-old dream of having at his service all the energy he can use. Already, the atom is being used by man:

—to produce the energy which illuminates our cities, drives the machines of industry, and may increasingly be used to convert sea water into fresh water;

—to improve and increase the supply of food through new methods of processing and preserving food, of combating plant and animal disease, and of carrying out research on the more effective use of fertilizer and the use and conservation of water.

<sup>1</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 8, 1968, pp. 63-65.

<sup>2</sup> A/L.534. The General Assembly approved the resolution on Dec. 5, 1967 (*General Assembly Official Records: Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 16* (A/6716), vol. I, p. 2).

—to guard and improve human health through the use of radiation and radioisotopes and techniques for the diagnosis and treatment of disease.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has contributed to the practical application of knowledge in each of these areas. It has carried out important programs for the exchange of information and has provided technical assistance and training to scientists and technicians from all parts of the world. The United States congratulates the IAEA on the continuing work it has done in these fields during the past year.

In response to man's increasing knowledge of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, nuclear reactors are today being built in almost all parts of the world. More than 70 additional nuclear powerplants are planned or under construction in the United States alone. The total electric output of these plants will equal about 20 percent of all electrical power produced in the United States today—enough to meet the requirements of 45 million people. Other nuclear reactors are being planned and built on almost every continent of the earth. Although the purpose of these plants is peaceful, the fact remains that if only a small part of the plutonium they create was diverted to the making of weapons, the dangers of a new arms race throughout the world would be greatly increased.

By 1970 about a dozen countries will be producing quantities of plutonium which could be used by them for nuclear weapons.

As has been noted by Dr. Eklund, by 1980 the world will be producing plutonium at a rate of several hundred kilograms a day—enough to produce thousands of bombs per year.

The original drafters of the statute of the IAEA had the wisdom and foresight to couple two objectives: The first was to promote and enlarge the peaceful uses of atomic energy; the second was to assure that the nuclear materials under its safeguards system are used only for peaceful purposes. One of the greatest achievements of the Agency has been its progress in developing the means to fulfill this mandate.

During the past year, the Agency's program for the development of safeguards has continued to shift from theoretical studies to the development of practical equipment and techniques.

The Agency has also extended its system by development of practical procedures for the application of safeguards to chemical reprocessing plants. The first inspection of a chemical reprocessing plant was carried out during August and September of this year at the Nuclear Fuel Services plant near Buffalo, New York. The inspection demonstrated that the procedures developed are fully satisfactory and that the Agency can safeguard fuel reprocessing facilities effectively.

We note with satisfaction that the Board of the IAEA approved last September our request to apply Agency safeguards to bilateral transfer agreements between the United States and Colombia, Korea, and Venezuela. There are now 29 countries which have nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. As the Agency's report indicates, all existing peaceful nuclear facilities in Agency member states in Latin America, the Far East, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific are or will soon come under Agency safeguards.

For its part the United States strongly favors the application of

international safeguards to all nuclear activities dedicated to peaceful purposes. This would be a meaningful contribution to the security of the world and to the continued development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

As a country with nuclear projects under IAEA safeguards, the United States can testify that these safeguards are fairly and competently administered, with no interference with the normal operation of the facility, and that the safeguards do not involve undue burdens or risks to the host country.

In a speech last Saturday, on the 25th anniversary of the first atomic reaction, President Johnson spoke of the promise of the atom and of the importance that the United States places on the successful conclusion of an effective nonproliferation treaty for nuclear weapons. On that occasion President Johnson said:

We are trying so hard to assure that the peaceful benefits of the atom will be shared by all mankind—without increasing, at the same time, the threat of nuclear destruction.

We do not believe that the safeguards we propose in that treaty will interfere with the peaceful activities of any country.

And I want to make it clear, very clear, to all the world that we in the United States are not asking any country to accept safeguards that we are unwilling to accept ourselves.<sup>1</sup>

My own country's experience with the IAEA safeguards has involved both our own nuclear facilities and our bilateral programs for the supply of nuclear fuel to other countries for peaceful purposes. The most tangible evidence of our satisfaction that the IAEA safeguards have not hindered our peaceful nuclear programs is indicated by President Johnson's announcement last week. The President announced that the United States will permit the IAEA to apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in the United States, excluding only those with direct national security significance, when safeguards are applied under an effective nonproliferation treaty.

The plants opened to IAEA inspection and safeguards under this offer will cover a broad range of United States nuclear activities, both governmental and private, including the fuel in nuclear-power reactors owned by utilities for generating electricity, and the fabrication and chemical reprocessing of such fuel. The facilities opened to inspection will include many which are among the most advanced and complex of their kind in the world.

Mr. President, there is no greater challenge faced by our generation than the challenge to devote the power of the atom to the benefit of man and not to his destruction. The International Atomic Energy Agency, through its system of safeguards, has developed valuable means to help insure that the atom will indeed be a blessing and not a curse—and that the new plants which are now being designed and built for the peaceful use of the atom will not be diverted from the purposes of peace for which they are intended.

I reaffirm here today the determination of the United States that the power of the atom will be dedicated not to death but to life.

And—as President Johnson has said—we invite the world's nations to join with us.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 615.

General Assembly Resolution 2286 (XXII): Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, December 5, 1967<sup>1</sup>

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* that in its resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963 it expressed the hope that the States of Latin America would carry out studies and take appropriate measures to conclude a treaty that would prohibit nuclear weapons in Latin America,<sup>2</sup>

*Recalling also* that in the same resolution it voiced its confidence that, once such a treaty was concluded, all States, and particularly the nuclear Powers, would lend it their full co-operation for the effective realization of its peaceful aims,

*Considering* that in its resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965 it established the principle of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers,<sup>3</sup>

*Bearing in mind* that in its resolution 2153 A (XXI) of 17 November 1966 it expressly called upon all nuclear-weapon Powers to refrain from the use, or the threat of use, of nuclear weapons against States which might conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,<sup>4</sup>

*Noting* that that is precisely the object of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America signed at Tlatelolco, Mexico, by twenty-one Latin American States,<sup>5</sup> which are convinced that the Treaty will constitute a measure that will spare their peoples the squandering of their limited resources on nuclear armaments and will protect them against possible nuclear attacks on their territories, that it will be a stimulus to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the promotion of economic and social development and that it will act as a significant contribution towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and as a powerful factor for general and complete disarmament,

*Noting* that it is the intent of the signatory States that all existing States within the zone defined in the Treaty may become parties to the Treaty without any restriction,

*Taking note* of the fact that the Treaty contains two additional protocols open, respectively, to the signature of States which, *de jure* or *de facto*, are internationally responsible for territories which lie within the limits of the geographical zone established in the Treaty.

<sup>1</sup> A/RES/2286 (XXII), Dec. 8, 1967. The resolution was approved by a vote of 82 to 0, with 28 abstentions. The following countries abstained: Algeria, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian S.S.R., Cameroon, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, Ghana, Guyana, Hungary, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Poland, Syria, Togo, Uganda, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Zambia.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 628-629.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 532-534.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 748-749.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, pp. 38-43.

and to the signature of States possessing nuclear weapons, and convinced that the co-operation of such States is necessary for the greater effectiveness of the Treaty,

1. *Welcomes with special satisfaction* the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which constitutes an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security and which at the same time establishes the right of Latin American countries to use nuclear energy for demonstrated peaceful purposes in order to accelerate the economic and social development of their peoples;

2. *Calls upon* all States to give their full co-operation to ensure that the régime laid down in the Treaty enjoys the universal observance to which its lofty principles and noble aims entitle it;

3. *Recommends* States which are or may become signatories of the Treaty and those contemplated in Additional Protocol I of the Treaty to strive to take all the measures within their power to ensure that the Treaty speedily obtains the widest possible application among them;

4. *Invites* Powers possessing nuclear weapons to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty as soon as possible.

### Interview of Foreign Minister Couve de Murville With *France-Soir* [Extract], December 6, 1967<sup>1</sup>

[*Question:*] And the other initiative that the Government took seven years ago in favor of atomic disarmament,<sup>2</sup> has not the moment come to renew it?

[*Couve de Murville:*] At that time, he replied, there was talk for the first time of detente, it had even been decided to have a summit conference in Paris. Things turned out differently. One can speak of disarmament only if the atmosphere is favorable.

[*Question:*] And the Moscow Treaty on the cessation of certain nuclear tests?<sup>3</sup> And the draft non-proliferation treaty?<sup>4</sup>

[*Couve de Murville:*] Those are not disarmament agreements. Those are agreements among the Big Powers to take care of the others. No, we will be able to speak seriously when the international context lends itself to it. That means that the war in Viet-Nam must end. That is the basic thing. If that war stops, everything will become possible again, and you can be sure that we will be the first—then—to talk about disarmament.

<sup>1</sup> *France-Soir*, Dec. 6, 1967. Informal U.S. Embassy translation.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, pp. 80-81.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 338-341.

### Interim Report of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee to the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission, December 7, 1967<sup>1</sup>

1. The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament submits to the United Nations General Assembly and to the United Nations Disarmament Commission an interim report of the Committee's deliberations on the questions before it for the period from 21 February to 7 December 1967.

2. Representatives of the following States continued their participation in the work of the Committee: Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

3. Upon the recommendation of the Co-Chairmen, members of the Committee reconvened the Conference on 21 February 1967 and have held two sessions. The first session recessed on 23 March 1967 and the second reconvened on 18 May 1967.

4. In view of the approaching adjournment of the twenty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly and the need for the Eighteen-Nation Committee to remain in session in order to expedite its work on a draft non-proliferation treaty, the Committee has decided to submit this interim status report to the General Assembly and to the Disarmament Commission.

5. Pursuant to the recommendations of the General Assembly in resolution 2153 A (XXI),<sup>2</sup> the Eighteen-Nation Committee has undertaken intensive consideration of a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Representatives participating in the work of the Committee have made valuable contributions towards the achievement of a treaty which would be in conformity with that resolution. These contributions are contained in the public records of the Committee. The Committee has already made substantial progress, although a final draft has not as yet been achieved. Since the Committee has concentrated its major efforts on the elaboration of a non-proliferation treaty, it reports regarding the item "Question of general and complete disarmament" (General Assembly resolution 2162 C (XXI))<sup>3</sup> and the item "Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America" (General Assembly resolution 2165 (XXI)),<sup>4</sup> that it has not been able to devote sufficient time to the consideration of these matters. With respect to the item "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests" (General Assembly resolution 2163 (XXI)),<sup>5</sup> the Committee reports that it has held a valuable discussion regarding this matter in which several delegations made important contributions.

<sup>1</sup> A/6951 and DC/220, Dec. 7, 1967. The report was also distributed as ENDC/208.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 748-749.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 799-800.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 804.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 802-803.

6. Since the Eighteen-Nation Committee is continuing its work with a view to negotiating a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it is unable at this time to provide a report on this question for the consideration of the United Nations General Assembly or the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The Committee intends to submit a full report, including all relevant documents, as soon as possible.

7. This report is submitted by the Co-Chairmen on behalf of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) A. A. ROZHICHIN (Signed) WILLIAM C. FOSTER  
(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (United States of America)

### Statement by Foreign Minister Brandt to the Bundestag [Extract], December 7, 1967<sup>1</sup>

As far as worldwide measures toward armament limitation and nuclear armament are concerned we all know that in the current year the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) figured in the center of international interest. Alternative proposals were generally not considered desirable, and some quarters would even have considered these a hindrance to the efforts toward the NPT, quite apart from the fact that there exists a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of November 4, 1966, that forbids such hindrance.<sup>2</sup>

The Federal Government's attitude toward an NPT was outlined to the High House in April.<sup>3</sup> In a preceding aide memoire of April 7 of this year we had also developed some ideas of our own regarding the association of a possible NPT with further-reaching measures for armament limitation.<sup>4</sup> Like other countries we took up, for example, the idea of a complete test ban.

While discussing nuclear matters I would like to recall an earlier German proposal that suggested a gradual reduction of the nuclear weapons in all of Europe on a reciprocal basis and under effective control.<sup>5</sup> Although we are not a member of the Geneva Disarmament Conference, we exercised a fairly important influence on the present draft of an NPT,<sup>6</sup> especially where the purpose was and is to make clear—or at least clearer—the connection with further measures of disarmament and peace keeping. In view of the erroneous notions frequently prevailing abroad I deem it important to state at this point that we did neither obstruct nor voice negative criticism. Instead we cooperated constructively and looked after three vital interests: the non-

<sup>1</sup> Department of State files. U.S. Embassy translation.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 686-687.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 206-216.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 179-182.

<sup>5</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 168-174.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 338-341.

impairment of the peaceful use of the atom (which is vital for an industrial country like the Federal Republic of Germany) the preservation of a common energy market in a growing Europe (which is vital for this growing Europe), and our legitimate security interest within the Alliance.

The work on the NPT has not yet been concluded, and an overall assessment will only be possible when the final text is available. Nevertheless, I would like to refer to the important announcement President Johnson made last Saturday when he declared his readiness to submit the American non-military nuclear installations to controls within the framework of the NPT.<sup>7</sup> The British Government, as it told us in the spring, is ready to do the same.<sup>8</sup> From our point of view these are good steps in current efforts toward a satisfactory settlement of the control problem on the basis of equality and reciprocity.

In view of my responsibility as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in view of the fact that we meet with distrust not only in Eastern countries (a fact that is frequently overlooked), I deem it very important to emphasize once again the fourfold self-restriction exercised by the Federal Republic of Germany in the nuclear field: Renunciation of the production of nuclear weapons; renunciation of the power of control over nuclear weapons or, more precisely said: Nuclear explosives; submitting the peaceful uses of the atom to control of EURATOM; and supporting the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In his speech yesterday the Minister of Defense made it plain once again that it is the goal of German policy to help create a peace order in and for Europe that insures all European countries a sufficient measure of stability and also provides for a just and lasting solution of the German question. This means that a European peace order is more than a security system. A peace order must be conceived which not only reduces the accumulation of military power, but more importantly reduces political tensions, reconciles conflicting interests, and promotes understanding among the nations and the cooperation among the states in order to create a solid foundation for a good European future.

Such a peace order presupposes that the military confrontation is reduced and finally overcome, that the justified security interests of the European nations are duly considered, and that armaments are reduced and control mechanisms strengthened by agreement or, prior to agreements, by parallel, adequate action. I recall, for example, the German proposal regarding the exchange of maneuver observers about which bilateral agreements might be concluded.<sup>9</sup>

I don't think it would be realistic to expect a grand solution of the European problems today or in the immediate future. It is also for this reason that we do not consider it meaningful to chase after the idea of a European security conference which, in accordance with the pattern we are familiar with, would merely serve the specific aims of a particular group of European countries. A conference about questions of European security and the European peace order will certainly come

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, pp. 613-616.

<sup>8</sup> *Ante*, p. 616.

<sup>9</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, p. 173

about one day. It must be well prepared, however, and the time must be ripe for it.

In the meantime we shall advocate and seek to insure that the alliance—and when I say alliance I mean the alliance including its American pillar—considers the question and works on the problem of what the elements of European security and a European peace order are to resemble. This certainly can no longer be done for the benefit of archives and expert committees, for our people want to know, just like all the other peoples of Europe, what the plan looks like by which the big common European house can be built.

### Maltese Draft Resolution Introduced in the First Committee of the General Assembly: Use of Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Weapons, December 7, 1967<sup>1</sup>

#### *The General Assembly,*

*Considering* that the use of some of the chemical, biological and radiological weapons which have been or are being developed may constitute a great threat to mankind,

*Believing* that people of the world should be made aware of this threat,

*Noting* that the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare dated 17 June 1925<sup>2</sup> could usefully be reviewed with the purpose of revision, updating or replacement,

1. *Recommends* that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee consider as a matter of urgency the problems relating to the use of chemical, biological and radiological weapons with a view to revision, updating or replacement of the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of Use in War of Asphyxiating Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session;

2. *Invites* the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, if it believes it would facilitate such consideration, to establish a sub-committee for the above purpose;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare a concise report on the nature and probable effects of existing chemical, biological and radiological weapons and on the economic and health implications of the possible use of such weapons with particular reference to States that are not in a position to establish comprehensive methods of protection;

4. *Recommends* that the report be based on accessible material and prepared with the assistance of qualified consultant experts appointed by the Secretary-General;

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/L.411, Dec. 7, 1967. Replaced by the revised draft resolution of Dec. 13 (post, p. 670).

<sup>2</sup> *Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents, 1919-55*, pp. 169-170.

5. *Requests* further that the report be transmitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and to Governments of Member States in time to permit its consideration at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly.

### General Assembly Resolution 2289 (XXII): Conclusion of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, December 8, 1967<sup>1</sup>

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* the Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons contained in resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961;<sup>2</sup>

*Reaffirming its conviction*, expressed in resolution 2164 (XXI) of 5 December 1966, that the signing of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would greatly facilitate negotiations on general and complete disarmament under effective international control and give further impetus to the search for a solution of the urgent problem of nuclear disarmament;<sup>3</sup>

*Considering* that it is necessary, in view of the present international situation, to make new efforts aimed at expediting the solution of the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons,

1. *Expresses its conviction* that it is essential to continue urgently the examination of the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and of the conclusion of an appropriate international convention;

2. *Urges* all States, in this connexion, to examine in the light of the Declaration adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 1653 (XVI) the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics<sup>4</sup> and such other proposals as may be made on this question and to undertake negotiations concerning the conclusion of an appropriate convention through the convening of an international conference, by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, or directly between States;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the records of the meetings of the First Committee relating to the discussion of the item entitled "Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weap-

<sup>1</sup> A/RES/2289 (XXII), Dec. 11, 1967. The resolution was approved by a vote of 77 to 0, with 29 abstentions. The following countries abstained: Australia, Belgium, Burma, Canada, China, Cuba, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, U.K., U.S.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 648-650.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 863-804.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 420-421.

ons" to all States Members of the United Nations and to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

### Statement by First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov to the First Committee of the General Assembly: General and Complete Disarmament, December 11, 1967<sup>1</sup>

The Soviet Government has always attached the utmost importance to the problem of disarmament. It considers the achievement of disarmament to be a factor of great importance for world peace. In its statement today the Soviet delegation intends to dwell primarily on the question of general and complete disarmament.

In 1959 we stated that general and complete disarmament was the most important question facing the world, and we invited Governments to bend every effort to arrive at a constructive solution, expressing the hope that an agreement on measures leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control would be prepared in full detail and would lead to an agreement as soon as possible.<sup>2</sup> The decision of the General Assembly, which was adopted on the initiative of the Soviet Union,<sup>3</sup> was intended to encourage States to put an end to the arms race, to stop squandering immense amounts of money in manufacturing weapons of mass destruction, to reduce progressively their existing armed forces and ultimately to do away with them altogether, as well as to liquidate the stockpiles of all weapons, including nuclear weapons.

Millions of human beings, since the beginning of history, have wished to achieve that objective and today, when the threat of a nuclear war of annihilation is more than ever possible, millions of people who have lived through and know the effects of war and the suffering and destruction that it brings are hoping for lasting and stable peace and, therefore, want disarmament.

However, although eight years have passed since the United Nations declared that the question of general and complete disarmament was the most important question facing the world, we have come no nearer to the practical solution of that problem. It is true that in 1961, 1962, 1963, 1965 and 1966 the General Assembly stressed again and again the immense importance of the question of general and complete disarmament and the need to find a speedy solution to that problem.<sup>4</sup> In the course of those eight years the question of general and complete disarmament has been a constant subject of negotiations among States, yet no agreement has as yet been achieved.

According to the interim report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which we received a few days ago, we know that this year, in accordance with a decision of the twenty-first session of

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV.1546, pp. 11-26.

<sup>2</sup> See *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 1452 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1545.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, 1961, pp. 741-742; *ibid.*, 1962, vol. II, pp. 1072-1073; *ibid.*, 1963, pp. 624-625; *ibid.*, 1965, pp. 622-623; *ibid.*, 1966, pp. 799-800.

the General Assembly, it has dealt primarily with the problem of drafting a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and attached the greatest importance to that work.<sup>5</sup> Taking into account the present situation in the world, and in particular the threat of the acquisition of nuclear arms by certain circles which follow policies which are particularly dangerous, it was quite logical for the Eighteen-Nation Committee to concentrate its efforts on the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Accordingly we note with satisfaction that in its interim report the Committee indicates that progress has already been made although a final draft has not yet been achieved.

It would probably be opportune for this twenty-second session of the General Assembly, taking note of the work already done, to ask the Eighteen-Nation Committee to reach agreement as soon as possible on the text of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In view of the fact that it has been dealing primarily with the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons this year, the Eighteen-Nation Committee, as can be seen from its report, has not been able to devote sufficient time to examining the question of general and complete disarmament. That fact emphasizes even more the necessity for the General Assembly to make strenuous efforts in the near future in order to solve the problem of general and complete disarmament.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it has systematically bent every effort to achieve progress in concessions and negotiations towards general and complete disarmament. Our country sincerely wishes to see this problem solved, and this is not a tactical or temporary manoeuvre in the international arena but the expression of the very nature of the socialist society and the socialist State. In our country there are no social groups which pursue goals of conquest or which seek any material or other interests in the armaments race and in militaristic policies. If we seek to strengthen our defences in conditions when no progress is being achieved in disarmament negotiations, and when certain Powers are intensifying the armaments race and pursuing a policy of aggression in the international arena, we do so solely in order to ensure the security of our country and that of our friends and allies.

Allow me to remind the Committee of the main facts of the struggle of the Soviet Union for general and complete disarmament in recent years.

On 18 December [19 September] 1959 the Soviet delegation to the fourteenth session of the General Assembly submitted a draft Declaration on general and complete disarmament which explained the urgent need for radical measures, and presented to all Members of the United Nations the first draft of a programme of general and complete disarmament.<sup>6</sup> Following that the Soviet Government worked out and presented in 1960, first in the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament<sup>7</sup> and then at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly,<sup>8</sup> the funda-

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 622-623.

<sup>6</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 1460-1474.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 1960, pp. 100-111.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 241-248.

mental provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. In those proposals there was a concrete plan for general and complete disarmament, which had been drawn up in the light of the views of many other States expressed after the adoption by the fourteenth session of the General Assembly of a resolution on general and complete disarmament.<sup>9</sup>

The main characteristic of our plan for general and complete disarmament from the very beginning consisted in carrying out from the very first stage of general and complete disarmament fundamental measures which would in practice deprive States of the possibility of waging large-scale war, especially a nuclear war. We are convinced that only such an approach can ensure true security for all States during the disarmament process when there is a progressive liquidation of armed forces.

In conformity with that approach, which we have been advocating during the whole course of negotiations on general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union, in its proposals of 1960, put forward as a most important measure during the first stage of disarmament the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, that is to say, of military rockets, military planes and submarines that were capable of carrying rockets with nuclear warheads, as well as all other means of delivery of nuclear charges, bombs and shells.

Having put forward those proposals, the Soviet Union took up a firm line in order to obtain as a result of negotiations the working out of an agreement on general and complete disarmament acceptable to all parties.

In 1961, following our initiative, there were bilateral Soviet-American negotiations which led to an agreement on certain principles for disarmament negotiations that was presented to the sixteenth session of the General Assembly.<sup>10</sup> The question of the creation of a new negotiating organ was settled then, an organ composed of representatives of socialist countries, States members of Western military blocs and non-aligned countries, which was called the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. In a resolution adopted at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, again on our initiative, a provision was included that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee should immediately start negotiations in order to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.<sup>11</sup>

As soon as the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee met on 15 March 1962, the Soviet delegation submitted a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament.<sup>12</sup> That draft contained a detailed programme for carrying out general and complete disarmament in three stages over a period of three or four years. Our draft was presented as a basis for negotiations. Later on we demonstrated in practice that we wanted to find agreed solutions for all concrete questions arising as a result of negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

In subsequent months, at the first sessions of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, the Soviet Union, in order to bring various

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 1945-1959, vol. II, p. 1545.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 1961, pp. 439-442.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 741-742.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 1962, vol. I, pp. 103-127.

positions closer, expressed its willingness to accept the proposal of Western countries concerning the order for the reduction of conventional weapons,<sup>13</sup> made concessions in the field of the levels of armed forces at various stages of general and complete disarmament,<sup>14</sup> and agreed to prolong somewhat the time period for the carrying out of the disarmament programme.<sup>15</sup>

During the negotiations, the United States and other Western Powers proposed that a certain amount of nuclear weapons and means of delivery should be kept until the very end of the disarmament process.<sup>16</sup> The Soviet Union decided again to meet its partners half way on this important question. The Soviet Union declared itself ready to agree to allowing the nuclear Powers to keep a kind of nuclear umbrella until the very end of the disarmament process if the other party considered it necessary to keep it during the disarmament process.<sup>17</sup>

That action was universally greeted as an expression of the goodwill of the Soviet Union and of its interest in seeing the negotiations succeed. It provoked a large-scale positive reaction on the part of the overwhelming majority of States, including the members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Many of the participating States in the negotiations made constant efforts to use to the utmost the new favourable possibilities resulting from that proposal of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, all that was in vain.

The question arises: Why is it that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in recent years has not moved forward and has not achieved any progress in negotiations towards general and complete disarmament? We can say in clear conscience that it is not the Soviet Union which is responsible; it is not our country which is responsible for the sterility of those negotiations.

Who placed obstacles on the road to progress in those negotiations? To answer that question, let us look at the facts. The facts show that responsibility for the absence of progress in negotiations on general and complete disarmament belongs to the Western Powers, and especially to the United States. From the very beginning of those negotiations it proclaimed that general and complete disarmament was tantamount to general and complete chaos. It was compelled, under the pressure of public opinion, to recognize in words that general and complete disarmament would be a desirable goal: in deeds, it has always looked for pretexts in order to evade agreement, even when the other party met it half-way and accepted its own proposals. It put forward new proposals which would not lead to disarmament, but which would perpetuate the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and legalize the maintenance of foreign bases.

In point of fact, our Western partners in the disarmament negotiations do not start from the premise that there will be agreement on general and complete disarmament, but rather that the armaments race will increase in pace. The United States during the past three

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 638 ff.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 685.

<sup>15</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 684-685.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 351-392.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 515-516; *ibid.*, 1964, p. 22.

years has increased its military expenditures by more than \$30,000 million. The United States is now waging on an ever-larger scale an aggressive war in Viet-Nam, using means of mass destruction, such as gas and chemical weapons, which are prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The United States encourages Israeli aggression against the Arab States, threatens the security of socialist Cuba and supports in various parts of the world military-reactionary régimes which oppress the popular movements towards freedom and independence. All this leads to a worsening of the international situation, increases the danger of a world conflict and, of course, cannot but compel peace-loving States to take measures to ensure their security.

It must be said that in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee there are States that are obstructing agreement on general and complete disarmament, but there are also such States outside that Committee. We have in mind, above all, the Federal Republic of Germany. The political situation in that State can now be described as one of unbridled propaganda for revenge and militarism. Tens of millions of marks are again being devoted to armaments.

The divisions of the *Bundeswehr* are marching up and down again, and they differ from the *Wehrmacht* divisions only in that their armaments and equipment are more modern. In West Germany we hear ever more insolent voices demanding changes in boundaries created as a result of the Second World War in Europe. Irredentist threats are heard against neighbouring States.

In this connexion, we wish to draw attention to the note of the Soviet Government to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, dated 8 December of this year.<sup>18</sup> Of course, there are now forces in the world which will not allow the revenge-seekers of West Germany to carry out their criminal plans. But the danger to peace emanating from West Germany does not detract from this fact.

There is no question linked to disarmament which people in Bonn do not try to sabotage. There is no proposal to strengthen peace which the revenge-seekers of West Germany do not try to undermine and subvert.

The absence of progress in negotiations for general and complete disarmament cannot but cause alarm among all those States interested in a lasting peace and all peace-loving forces. The report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the implications and possible effects of the use of nuclear weapons is full of this sense of alarm. It has been drafted by a group of leading scientists and experts from various countries: Poland, Mexico, the Soviet Union, Sweden, France, Canada, Japan, Nigeria, the United States of America, Norway, India and the United Kingdom.

Examining the question of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, the Soviet delegation and others already quoted some passages from the report of the Secretary-General put forward in order to justify the need to take urgent measures to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the nuclear armaments race and disarmament. We should now like to draw the attention of representa-

<sup>18</sup> *Pravda*, Dec. 9, 1967, pp. 1-2; *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Dec. 27, 1967, pp. 20-23.

tives of Member States of the United Nations to the conclusions contained in the report of the Secretary-General. These conclusions are most eloquent and specific:

... The solution of the problem of ensuring security cannot be found in an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons or, indeed, in the retention of nuclear weapons by the Powers currently possessing them. . . . Security for all countries of the world must be sought through the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the banning of their use, by way of general and complete disarmament.

The Secretary-General continues:

... whatever the path to national and international security in the future, it is certainly not to be found in the further spread and elaboration of nuclear weapons. The threat of the immeasurable disaster which could befall mankind were nuclear war ever to erupt, whether by miscalculation or by mad intent, is so real that informed people the world over understandably become impatient for measures of disarmament additional to the few measures of arms limitation that have already been agreed to. . . . International agreement against the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and agreements on measures of arms control and disarmament will promote the security of all countries. The United Nations has the overriding responsibility in this field. The more effective it becomes in action, the more powerful its authority, the greater becomes the assurance for man's future. And the longer the world waits, the more nuclear arsenals grow, the greater and more difficult becomes the eventual task.<sup>19</sup>

These quotations are most eloquent. Disarmament questions—the problem of general and complete disarmament—must be settled in a practical manner. All the peoples of the world have an interest and a stake in this. This is in the true national interest of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, large and small, economically developed or developing. This is in the common interest of the whole of mankind. That is why the Soviet Union is constantly pursuing a policy of peace in the international arena, a policy of repelling aggression, of decreasing international tension; the Soviet Union considers it necessary to redouble efforts now in the fight for general and complete disarmament.

We do not consider that disarmament negotiations have no future. We cannot agree to the assertion that the world is unable to take care of the armaments race. Such an approach is convenient only for those who wish to conceal their policy on the armaments race. Our country is guided by the fact that the united efforts of all peace-loving forces can lead to success in this complex area of international relations.

Further, we consider that the measures which have already been achieved in the field of limiting the armaments race, that is to say, the Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, the Treaty on principles governing the activities of States in outer space, exert a favourable influence on disarmament negotiations. We note with satisfaction the constructive decision of the present session of the General Assembly on the question of the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. We attach special importance to negotiations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which are now in the most responsible stage.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 512-513.

Therefore, the Soviet delegation would like to appeal to all delegations to make their contribution to help to achieve progress in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament with particular energy, because we are convinced of the justice of this common struggle for disarmament. We shall be able to move ahead through the efforts of all. Because of this, the Soviet Union is prepared to participate most actively and to co-operate with all States. It will examine any constructive proposals whose objective is to settle the problem of general and complete disarmament. In his recent report on the fiftieth anniversary of the Great October Revolution, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, stressed:

Now, when the Soviet Union has achieved unparalleled power, it continues to come out in favour of refraining from any attempts to settle relations between two social systems by force. We appeal to the Governments of the bourgeois countries to hearken to the voice of the peoples demanding peace and lasting security. Further, the Soviet Union deems its duty to do anything in its power to translate into deeds these aspirations of the peoples of the world. That is why it will continue, with unflagging energy, to strive for general and complete disarmament.

We consider partial measures towards this objective—such as an agreement on the prohibition of tests of nuclear weapons, on the inadmissibility of their further dissemination, on the prohibition of their use—to be useful.<sup>20</sup>

Stressing its position on general and complete disarmament, the Soviet delegation reserves its right at subsequent stages of this discussion to speak out also on other items which are now under consideration in the First Committee: the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the prohibition of underground nuclear tests, and other questions relating to partial measures which would limit the armaments race.

### **Hungarian Draft Resolution Introduced in the First Committee of the General Assembly: Use of Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons, December 11, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

*The General Assembly.*

*Guided by the principles of the United Nations Charter and the generally recognized rules of contemporary international law,*

*Considering that weapons of mass destruction constitute a danger for all mankind,*

*Reaffirming the validity of the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 17 June 1925,<sup>2</sup>*

*Recalling its resolution 2162 B (XXI) adopted on 5 December 1966,<sup>3</sup>*

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 560-561 (variant translation).

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/L.412, Dec. 11, 1967. The draft resolution was also cosponsored by Madagascar and Mali (A/C.1/L.412/Add. 1-2). It was not put to a vote (see *post.*, p. 670, n. 1).

<sup>2</sup> *Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents, 1919-55*, pp. 169-170.

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 768-799.

*Regretting* that there are States which still did not accede to the Geneva Protocol of June 1925,

1. *Demands* strict and absolute compliance by all States with the principles and norms established by the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925;

2. *Declares* that the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons for the purpose of destroying human beings and the means of their existence constitutes a crime against humanity;

3. *Appeals* to those States, which have not done so, to accede to the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 17 June 1925.

### Statement by the Maltese Representative (Pardo) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons, December 12, 1967<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Chairman, last year the representative of Hungary submitted for consideration by the General Assembly a draft resolution, concerning chemical and bacteriological weapons, the text of which is to be found in document A/C.1/L.374.<sup>2</sup>

In presenting this draft resolution the representative of Hungary stated:

While striving for the final abolition of arms, including nuclear arms, it would be a mistake to forget to fight against the use of such other weapons of mass destruction as asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases and against bacteriological and biological methods of warfare which are being or could be used . . . That is why the Hungarian delegation is of the opinion that the question of weapons of mass destruction, apart from that of nuclear weapons, should be given more attention than has been the case in recent decades.<sup>3</sup>

Nearly all delegations, including my delegation, which intervened in the debate on the Hungarian draft resolution last year concurred in this view. Opinions, however, differed on the substance of the Hungarian proposals. Several delegations, including my delegation, were distressed by the polemical presentation of the draft resolution and by its lack of constructive proposals for dealing seriously with a very grave problem which must be of vital concern to all countries, particularly to those that do not possess an advanced technology.

The Hungarian proposals, in fact, in their revised form were limited to (a) demanding "strict and absolute compliance by all States with the principles and norms established by the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 which prohibits the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons" (b) inviting all States to accede to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and (c) deploring the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons for

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV.1547, pp. 2-33.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 694-695.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 734.

the purpose of destroying human beings and the means for their existence.<sup>4</sup>

From these proposals it can only be assumed that the delegation of Hungary, and those delegations that co-sponsored the revised draft last year, believe that the Geneva Protocol does in fact prohibit chemical and bacteriological weapons and that compliance with its "principles and norms" would be an effective restraint on the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Unfortunately reality is quite different.

The 1925 Geneva Protocol confirms the prohibition of "the use in war"—I repeat, in war—"of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices" and extends this prohibition to "bacteriological methods of warfare." I shall try to demonstrate that reference to the Geneva Protocol in contemporary circumstances can have little more than a symbolic significance.

In the first place the Geneva Protocol refers only to asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases and to analogous—that is asphyxiating and poisonous—liquids, materials and devices. As far as contemporary chemical warfare is concerned this prohibition is scarcely more than marginally relevant. Toxic chemical agents, which may be used in modern warfare, are not necessarily either gases or liquids. Furthermore the most dangerous are neither asphyxiating nor poisonous.

In the second place, the Geneva Protocol forbids only bacteriological methods of warfare, but this covers only relatively few, and not the most dangerous, of the micro-organic agents that may be used in modern biological warfare.

Finally, the prohibition in the Geneva Protocol extends only to the use in war of certain gases, analogous liquids—whatever those may be held to be—and bacteria. Their use for hostile purposes in peace time is not prohibited. That is a fatal omission in contemporary conditions. I do not refer so much to the fact that nowadays wars are seldom declared, but rather to the fact that some of the most dangerous chemical and biological weapons in the arsenals of States are eminently suited for use in circumstances in which no overt conflict exists. In a situation in which nuclear warfare offers unacceptable risks and overt warfare of any kind creates strong unfavourable international reactions, the supreme advantage of certain modern chemical and biological weapons is that they can be used to constrain the will and change the political goals and priorities of States without either the international community or the attacked party being aware of the fact. Thus, some modern chemical and especially biological weapons may represent, particularly for technologically less advanced countries which do not possess modern detection and protection capability, a danger equal to if not greater than that of nuclear weapons.

The 1925 Geneva Protocol is thus in contemporary circumstances largely irrelevant and totally inadequate. It is also excessively vague. While it is certain that the use in war of many modern chemical and biological weapons is not covered by the Geneva Protocol, it is not clear, also, which weapons precisely are covered. There is a wide grey area, owing to the very nature of the weapons with which we are deal-

<sup>4</sup>The revised Hungarian resolution appears *ibid.*, pp. 758-759. For the Geneva protocol see *Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents, 1919-55*, pp. 169-170.

ing, on the extent of which there may be sincere disagreement. The representative of Australia called attention to this fact last year when objecting to the use of the words "chemical and bacteriological" in the Hungarian draft resolution. He said:

What are chemical weapons? I suppose that at one extreme you could say that gunpowder is a chemical weapon. At the other extreme, of course, we have various forms of gas, which each of us agrees should be stopped . . .

It is not enough to say that we all know what "chemical weapons" mean. I am afraid that, if we say that, what it will turn out to be in practice is that each set of military forces will interpret it to mean that what it wants to use is permissible and what the other man wants to use is not permissible.<sup>5</sup>

The point is well taken. It is indeed surprising that there has been no attempt at the international level to reach an agreed definition of the weapons that excite our unanimous condemnation. It is evident that an adequate and internationally recognized definition of chemical and biological weapons is necessary if the worldwide restraints on their use are to be maintained. In order to make it quite clear that we recognize this need, we have informed the Secretariat that we wish to amend our draft resolution by the insertion of the words "definition and" in the second line of operative paragraph 1. Thus the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament would be invited to:

. . . consider as a matter of urgency the problems relating to the definition and use of chemical, biological and radiological weapons.<sup>6</sup>

It may be useful also to state now that in the present statement and in the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.411 the term "chemical weapons" is used to signify "toxic chemical agents used for hostile purposes which produce their effects directly as a result of their chemical properties rather than as a result of blast, heat or other physical effects of a chemical reaction"; while the term "biological weapons" is used to signify "all micro-organisms including viruses, or their toxic products intentionally used for hostile purposes". I am aware of the fact that these definitions are not entirely satisfactory, but I trust that they will outline sufficiently in your minds the general scope of the terms "chemical weapons" and "biological weapons" employed in our draft resolution, and thus facilitate its discussion.

I have referred to the dangerous nature of some chemical and biological weapons and to the possibility of their covert use in peacetime. Is this a fact? I am glad to say that we are not alone in recognizing the danger of chemical and biological weapons. As long ago as 1954, Mr. Jules Moch of France, addressing the Disarmament Subcommittee, stated:

Some forms of bacteriological warfare now already devised are infinitely more dangerous . . . than the atomic bomb.<sup>7</sup>

And the Soviet representative agreed. He said:

<sup>5</sup> A/C.1/PV. 1461, pp. 23-20.

<sup>6</sup> The original Maltese resolution appears *ante*, pp. 625-626. The words "definition and" were later added to it, but the reference to radiological weapons was dropped (*post*, p. 670).

<sup>7</sup> DC/SC.1/PV.13, p. 24.

Mr. Moch states that bacteriological weapons at their present stage of development are more destructive and more terrible than the hydrogen bomb . . . I grant this to be the case.<sup>8</sup>

That was fourteen years ago. Not only has nothing been done since, but nothing has even been studied on this subject within the framework of the United Nations.

I do not intend to overburden you with an endless list of quotations from military experts and scientists. I shall not repeat the conclusions on this matter of the 1965 Pugwash Conference which were quoted by the representative of Cyprus last year.<sup>9</sup> However, I cannot refrain from bringing to your attention a paragraph in a petition to President Johnson dated 14 February 1967 and signed by seventeen United States Nobel Prize laureates in chemistry, biochemistry and physics, no less than 127 members of the United States Academy of Sciences and some 5,000 other United States scientists. The paragraph is as follows:

Chemical and biological weapons have the potential of inflicting, especially on civilians, enormous devastation and death which may be unpredictable in scope and intensity; they could become far cheaper and easier to produce than nuclear weapons, thereby placing great mass destructive power within the reach of nations not now possessing it; they lend themselves to use by leadership that may be desperate, irresponsible or unscrupulous.<sup>10</sup>

I do not know of a single responsible expert, whether military or civilian, who would disagree with that sober, indeed understated, assessment of the potential of some of the present chemical and biological weapons.

It is incontrovertible that some of those weapons are extremely dangerous. However, it is contended in some quarters outside the United Nations that they are more humane than conventional or nuclear weapons: they do not destroy property, such as houses or factories; they are useful in controlling civil disturbances without loss of life or permanent injury; lethal chemical weapons can kill almost instantaneously, while biological weapons do no more than reinforce the action of nature. There is considerable truth in those arguments. It must be admitted that the revulsion of public opinion against the use of chemicals and biological weapons is in part irrational and due perhaps to vague memories of the terrible injuries inflicted by mustard gas during the First World War and to the unwise and excessive secrecy in which Governments have chosen to shroud this subject, thus giving credit to the most fantastic notions as to the nature, characteristics and potential of those weapons. Substantially, however, the revulsion of public opinion and that expressed by so many delegations here in the United Nations against the use of chemical and biological weapons are well founded.

There is something revolting in witnessing so many sciences that have contributed and can still contribute so much to our civilization and to the welfare of mankind being harnessed for purposes that are a perversion of their noble aims. Chemistry is being used not to find compounds that will contribute to the common welfare but to find those

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37.

<sup>9</sup> For the Pugwash statement, see *Pugwash Newsletter*, vol. II, no. 4 (Apr. 1965), p. 65.

<sup>10</sup> *Washington Post*, Feb. 15, 1967, p. A13.

that inflict death or injury. Medicine is not used to heal but to bring disease. Meteorology is not used to forecast the approach of storms but to plot air currents which will bring strange animal, plant or human diseases to unsuspecting countries. We can only watch those things, carefully planned in the sacred cause of security and the protection of national interests, with the same horror which we would experience at discovering that our family doctor was in fact planning our murder.

It has been affirmed that chemical and biological weapons, apart from certain well-publicized instances, have not been used since the end of the First World War. It would be more accurate to say that we do not know whether such weapons have been used. We do not know because the very nature of some of those weapons and some of the means that can be used for their employment is such that detection is virtually impossible.

While very many delegations have condemned the use of chemical and biological weapons no delegation, to the best of my knowledge, has referred in the United Nations to their nature and capabilities. That is most unfortunate, since it is now incumbent upon me to prove the statement which I have just made, together with the carefully factual nature of the preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution submitted by my delegation. If I can do that I am sure that the urgency of the United Nations' taking the action suggested in operative paragraphs 1 and 3 of our draft resolution will not be contested. I shall therefore rapidly outline, with due regard to brevity and to the fact that we are not an expert group, some of the characteristics of chemical and biological weapons, sketch some of their effects and draw certain unavoidable conclusions.

Any country possessing chemical factories has some potential for chemical warfare. Biological warfare is within the reach of any country which can produce vaccines. "Chemical and biological weapons" is a term which covers a vast number of individual weapons, each with its individual characteristics, uses, limitations and hazards. Effects may be fleeting or long-lasting. They may range from mild discomfort to agonizing death. Used under optimum conditions they could cause world-wide disaster and incalculable impairment of man's environment. I have used the word "incalculable" advisedly and in its strict etymological sense. Chemical and biological weapons may be used for legitimate or criminal purposes; they may be used against individuals, against groups or for the mass extermination of entire populations. They may be used to eradicate individual animals or plants, or certain species of animals or plants, or all species, from a small or from a vast area.

Some of them are most suited for use in war; others lend themselves to covert use in peace time. The use of some can easily be detected; others are virtually impossible to detect. They can be used against plants, animals or human beings. They can be gaseous, liquid, or solid. They can be disseminated as gases, liquids or solids, or as aerosols, by conventional military means—shells, missiles and so on—by water, through the atmosphere, or, in the case of biological weapons, by utilizing natural vectors.

In short, the term "chemical and bacteriological weapons" covers a bewilderingly broad and varied spectrum from which it is possible to select the weapon most suited to the attainment of a specific goal.

Chemical and biological weapons are comparatively cheap to produce. Any State with sufficient industrial and scientific infrastructure can acquire significant chemical and biological warfare capability with an annual expenditure of a few tens of millions of dollars. Annual expenditures by even the largest countries, despite substantial increases in the last few years, still appear to be below \$200 million.

While significant chemical and biological warfare capability is easy to acquire, the capability to utilize effectively selected chemical and biological weapons undetected requires a highly sophisticated technology, the possession of which is restricted to a handful of countries.

An essential element in the effective use of chemical and biological weapons is surprise—surprise not only with regard to the area attacked but also with regard to the specific agent employed—thus making timely detection and protection very difficult, if not impossible.

While chemical and biological weapons share certain general similarities, they are also dissimilar in nature and capability, in many ways. I shall therefore now deal separately with chemical and then with biological weapons.

Chemical weapons may be used against plants, animals or human beings. They may be variously classified. I shall adopt here an empirical classification, first distinguishing between weapons that may be used against plants and those that may be used against man, and then classifying anti-personnel chemical warfare agents into seven rather arbitrary and overlapping categories to form a spectrum from the most mild to the most lethal, as follows: irritants, psychochemicals, skin necrotizers, vesicants, lung irritants, oxidizing enzyme inhibitors and anticholinesterases. Chemical weapons used against plants are usually called herbicides. They include substances such as 2,4-D, 2,4,5-T and cacodylic acid. Herbicides can be used as defoliants against plants or as agents for crop destruction. The duration of action lasts from weeks to months, depending on the type of agent used, atmospheric and environmental conditions and the species of plant attacked. Although cacodylic acid—or, to give it its scientific name, dynoethyl arsenic—is poisonous, many other herbicides have relatively low toxicity for man and animals.

Irritants are quite generally known as anti-personnel chemical agents. They include tear and nausea gases, sternutators and lacrimators. They have long been used in nearly all countries to quell civil disturbances. Their effects include eye irritation, cough, nausea and vomiting. Duration of action varies, according to the type of irritant used, from seconds to a couple of hours.

Psychochemicals are agents that cause abnormal behaviour. They include psilocybin, probably B and also certain well-known hallucinogens such as mescaline and LSD-25. The latter is a tasteless, odourless, colourless compound, effective in extremely small doses, approximately  $\frac{1}{6}$  millionth of an ounce, when inhaled or taken orally. The effects of LSD-25 on any particular person are impossible to predict and may take the form of a wide range of psychopathologic reactions and psychoses. Duration of action varies from hours to days followed usually by spontaneous recovery. An experiment with troops exposed to a psychochemical agent demonstrated that, although not able to follow simple commands or perform normal tasks with accept-

able accuracy, the men were not conscious of their abnormal condition. Only an outsider not exposed and coming upon them would recognize their behaviour as eccentric. It has been suggested that psychochemicals could be effectively used to disorganize high-level political and military leadership; such use, however, might be counter-operative if detected, and would probably be hazardous, since its effects are not predictable.

Skin necrotizers, such as phosgene oxime, are incapacitating agents that cause necrotic skin. They are of comparatively minor importance in the general framework of chemical weapons.

Vesicants include a variety of agents among which is the infamous and terrible mustard gas used during the First World War. The shocking effects of this gas produced a deep revulsion in world opinion against the use in warfare of all types of gases and this in turn was probably an important factor in shaping the events leading to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Mustard gas in its gaseous, liquid or solid phase, is still considered an effective agent against inadequately prepared or protected troops or population.

Lung irritants include gases used in the First World War such as chlorine and phosgene, which, although easy and cheap to manufacture, are now considered obsolete owing to their comparatively low toxicity, limited effectiveness, in relation to concentration, ease of detection and delay in producing pathological effects. Oxidizing enzyme inhibitors, an example of which is hydrocyanic acid, are rapidly acting poisons that have been found useful in individual or mass executions.

The first anticholinesterases or nerve agents were developed, stock-piled but never used, by the Germans during the Second World War. The German names for the volatile agents of this type were Tabun, Sarin and Soman; their scientific names are as long as modern life is complex, for instance, tabun is properly called dimethylamidoethoxylphosphocyclicianide. Nerve agents, whether of the volatile or less volatile type, have been exhaustively studied and further developed and diversified in several countries since the end of the Second World War. Nerve agents, whether as liquids or as vapours are considered to possess, if lethal effects are desired, many of the qualities required of good chemical warfare agents by contemporary technological and humanitarian imperatives. From a technical point of view they are very efficient since they act rapidly, are odourless, colourless and thus give no warning; if appropriate concentrations and suitable methods of dissemination are chosen, very high casualties can be inflicted in minutes on target personnel, thus relieving such personnel of the necessity of donning masks and protective clothing; they are equally effective inhaled or absorbed through the unbroken skin; a tiny droplet, less than one milligram of a less volatile nerve agent on the unbroken skin, will cause death if not instantly removed. Finally, some types of nerve agents do not evaporate readily: thus droplets scattered on the ground, on foliage, in buildings, on food, and equipment remain a serious hazard to human beings for a long time. From a humanitarian point of view their advantage is said to be that the process of absorption is painless, symptoms are neither dramatic nor particularly distressing and death can occur in as little as a few seconds. A further

humanitarian point has been argued. It has apparently been established that in the rare cases when an affected person does not die, he will recover completely within a few days with no apparent after-effects.

Nerve agents do not necessarily represent the ultimate in chemical weapons development. The search for excellence is one of the most admirable qualities in man. This quality has been applied—successfully, the Committee will be happy to know—to the search for compounds altogether superior to nerve agents and which, it is claimed, when fully developed, will give the lucky possessor a weapon with greater toxicity than anticholinesterases, which are known, with the ability to penetrate protective masks and clothing, and even, so it is said, capable of defeating all contemporary warning and detection methods. Thus it is possible that within a few years the feared nerve gases of the present may become as obsolete as phosgene.

I have outlined briefly and in general terms the major types of known chemical weapons. It will be noted that the prohibitions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 apply only to certain of these types: generally speaking, although not exclusively, to the most outdated and least insidious, such as irritants, lung irritants, skin necrotizers and vesicants. It is arguable whether oxidizing enzyme inhibitors are covered. On the other hand, it is highly doubtful that the newer types of anti-personnel chemical agents can be covered by the language of the Geneva Protocol. Psycho-chemicals and anticholinesterases are neither asphyxiating, nor poisonous, nor necessarily gases. This is evident in the case of psycho-chemicals. As for so-called nerve agents, they operate by inhibiting the action of an enzyme, called cholinesterase, and thus permitting the release and uncontrolled increase of acetylcholine; this produces fibrillation in the involuntary muscles controlling the internal organs of the body: since the respiratory and other muscles cannot operate in co-ordinated fashion, their failure results in death.

I should add that the meaning of the Geneva Protocol cannot be stretched to include herbicides, that have low toxicity to man and animals, although their use can have seriously damaging effects on food supplies; nor are insecticides covered. Some insecticides belong to the same class as nerve agents, have comparable toxicities and are extremely hazardous, as numerous accidental deaths to their users in many countries have demonstrated.

I shall now deal briefly with biological weapons. The general aim of biological warfare is to invert the achievements of medicine, veterinary science and agriculture in order deliberately to cause plant, animal or human epidemics capable of producing, through mortality, morbidity or economic and social disruption, major strategic effects in peace or war.

Public health tries to control or prevent disease; biological warfare is the intentional dissemination of disease; it aims to hurt, to cripple, to kill. Even when the immediate targets are animals or plants, the final one is always people.

It is difficult clearly to distinguish biological warfare from chemical warfare. Many toxic chemical agents, such as toxins—which are the poisonous proteins produced by certain micro-organisms—are sometimes considered biological agents by the military. I shall follow this

lead and empirically distinguish two groups of biological agents: first, micro-organisms, comprising five classes: bacteria, viruses, rickettsiae, fungi and protozoa; and secondly, toxins.

It is impossible for me to deal in a general statement such as the present one with the nature and characteristics of each of the classes of biological agents which I have just enumerated. I shall limit myself to making the fundamental distinction between true biological agents and toxic chemical agents. The former have the property of reproducing and multiplying, while the effects of the latter, however powerful they may be, remain limited. Thus biological warfare is more suited than chemical warfare for massive and indiscriminate attack on large numbers of people dispersed over large areas or on the means for their subsistence. The basic ability of biological agents to multiply means that they can be produced in quantity in the laboratory: micro-organisms can be cultivated on nutrient materials that are both abundant and cheap. Many proliferate fast so that, in a day or so, a few seed microbes can develop into concentrations in fluid of the order of a billion or more per millilitre. By removing part of the fluid, microbes can be further concentrated to attain concentrations of  $10^{12}$  bacteria per millilitre. Mass production methods are used. Suspensions, for instance, of *Brucella* containing 10 trillion organisms per litre have been made at the rate of half a litre every few hours in the laboratory. The product has then been further concentrated into paste containing as many as 25 trillion *Brucella* bacteria per ounce.

Growing viruses is somewhat more complicated, but the difficulties of working with large volumes are compensated for by the higher attainable concentrations since viruses are smaller than bacteria.

Not all micro-organisms are suitable as effective biologic warfare agents. The most important criterion for selection is effectiveness in very small quantities. This in turn largely depends upon the agent's infectivity, virulence and stability. Despite these requirements more good potential agents have been identified than can be conveniently developed by even the largest Powers.

As I have indicated, biological agents have been developed and many are awaiting at this very moment their employment in cold storage, ready to be used effectively against man by causing incapacitating or fatal diseases, or against man's means of subsistence—plants and domestic animals. An appropriate biological agent can be selected to cause almost any desired effect against plants, animals or man. Having selected the agent believed to be the most suited for the achievement of the specific result desired, appropriate means of dissemination must be considered. Possible means of dissemination are numerous: shells, missiles, clouds, aerosols carried by air currents or other means, spraying, water supply or natural vectors, such as insects, birds or animals—but not all these means are suitable to all biological agents.

Selection of a means of dissemination inadapted to the agent will usually result in failure of the attack; on the other hand, combination of a suitably effective agent, appropriate means of delivery and optimum conditions could produce truly incalculable effects. As was stated at the fifth Pugwash Conference:

The possible consequences of large scale biological warfare range unpredictably from something close to zero—a fiasco—to something close to infinity.

As an illustration let us assume that it has been decided to conduct a biological warfare assault against human population using as means of dissemination an aeroplane. What could be the consequences? We shall assume that the aeroplane has a pay load of ten tons. We know that we can obtain concentrations of bacteria of at least  $10^{12}$  per millilitre. From a simple calculation we can deduce that the aeroplane is capable of carrying about  $10^{19}$  bacteria. If this figure is divided by an assumed infecting dose of 100 bacteria per person and assuming that only one bacterium in every thousand remains potent at the moment of delivery, we are left with  $10^{14}$  infecting doses, or more than 10,000 times as many as are required to infect the whole human population of the earth. Even making greater allowance for limiting factors, such as a lesser concentration of the liquid and greater losses on delivery, it would still be possible to infect every person in the world with one aeroplane. This is quite an improvement by modern science over natural epidemics of the past such as the post World War I influenza epidemic or the black death that shattered medieval social structures in Europe. Of course an aeroplane has certain limitations as a method of delivery. It has, for instance, been calculated in technical military journals that one aeroplane could not blanket more than 6,000 square kilometres with a cloud at a concentration such as to guarantee that every person in the area would inhale 1.5 to 1,500 times the infecting dose. This, it appears, is not sufficient to satisfy modern technical requirements since it would only be comparable in terms of human casualties to the short term effects of a 20 megaton fusion bomb. Therefore military experts now think rather more in terms of seeding winds prevailing over the area which it is desired to attack. This method would permit easy, effective and undetected assault of a continent. Such an assault could be undertaken in peacetime without violating international law regarding national air space and with negligible chances of detection.

Capability of the order of magnitude which I have mentioned is confirmed by authoritative British, French, Russian and United States technical opinion. I shall cite only one quotation from a substantial field of technical literature. The authoritative author of the article entitled "Soviets speed production of germ warfare weapons" in the Army, Navy and Air Force Register of some years ago, after describing field trials of certain germ dissemination methods in the Soviet Union, stated: "These tests . . . proved that coverage up to several thousand square miles could be achieved with the population being wholly unaware that the attack had occurred." Since publication of this article, of course, the position has improved, or, if you wish, has deteriorated.

Major strategic effects in terms of changing political goals and economic and social priorities of the attacked country can thus confidently be expected from attacks such as those I have described. In technical journals it has also been suggested that a biological warfare assault could be useful in cases when it is desirable quickly to change antagonistic political attitudes of a State, and it has been argued that in certain well-defined circumstances even nuclear war could be averted by a well-timed massive biological warfare attack.

Of course the use of biological weapons presents certain hazards. It is not unknown for even well-protected laboratory workers who normally take extraordinary precautions to contract strange diseases. It seems that in the last few years, in three countries at least twelve research workers have died and several hundred more have been incapacitated for a greater or lesser period of time as a result of contracting one or another disease in the course of their duties.

An elementary precaution is, therefore, to select for use biological agents against the effects of which the population of the attacking country has been reasonably immunized in order to avoid unforeseen major accidents, and at the same time select for use agents against which the population of the attacked area is not immunized, in order to enhance the effectivity of the attack. In order to avoid indelicate suspicions, it has also been recommended that, as far as possible, a micro-organism should be selected which causes a disease that is endemic or at least known to occur in the area which is to be attacked.

There are many other factors that must be taken into account when planning a large-scale biological warfare attack, and I need not go into them now. It may, however, be of some interest to mention that major ethnic groups would appear to be, in varying degrees, more or less susceptible to certain diseases and that proper conclusions have been drawn from this fact as far as biological warfare is concerned.

Tables exist showing the main diseases considered suitable for biological warfare against man, ensuring also methods for the dissemination of the diseases and possible effects. The tables I have consulted do not agree in all particulars, but it is not necessary for me to go into certain details at the present time. It may, however, be useful to mention some of the diseases included in one such table. Among well-known bacterial disease, mention is made of anthrax, brucellosis, cholera, diphtheria, plague, tularemia, typhoid fever. Among lesser known bacterial diseases melioidosis is worthy of note. This is a rare, highly lethal disease caused by the *pseudomonas pseudomallei*, which has been rescued from unmerited obscurity by gallant, contemporary biological warriors.

Rickettsial diseases mentioned include epidemic typhus, murine typhus and Q fever. Among fungal diseases suitable for use there are coccidioidomycosis, histoplasmosis and nocardiosis. Viral diseases mentioned are very numerous. The better known include dengue, several forms of encephalitis, smallpox and yellow fever. Among toxins, the *clostridium botulinum* toxin causing botulism is apparently highly regarded. Many of the causative agents of these diseases are being mass manufactured in various countries at this very moment. As for the etiology, symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis and treatment of the diseases which I have mentioned, I will refer you to the Merck Manual, an indispensable book to have in the home library.

I have suggested that biological warfare is more suited to mass and indiscriminate attacks on population than chemical warfare. It is also far more suited to attacks on domestic animals. Indeed, a large-scale attack on domestic animals with chemical weapons is scarcely conceivable; it would easily be detected; it would be inconvenient and wasteful of time and money. But domestic animals are highly susceptible to disease and a well prepared and delivered biological attack

can decimate an animal species without the victim being able in most cases to detect the intentional nature of the epizootic.

I shall not go into details as to methods of delivery. A pale example of the type of emergency that could be caused by biological warfare against domestic animals is the foot and mouth epidemic now raging in parts of Europe: nearly 274,000 cattle have been slaughtered in England, according to the *London Times* of 9 December. Hundreds of thousands of cattle have been infected in the Soviet Union. The EEC has established a \$4 million emergency fund to create buffer zones in eastern Europe. Ireland has banned field sports. I said a "pale example" because the O-1 and A-22 strains of virus responsible for the present emergency are known; vaccines have been developed. But if a massive attack with a new virulent strain of virus were launched, the effects could be truly shattering and could substantially eliminate a domestic species from a vast area before vaccines could be developed. Among potentially good anti-animal biological agents mentioned in the technical literature are the causative agents of rinderpest, foot and mouth disease, anthrax, glanders, brucellosis, Rift Valley fever, hog cholera, fowl plague and others.

Biological agents are also often more suited than chemical agents for attack against plants when strategic rather than tactical effects are desired. Chemical anti-crop agents are not self-propagating and must make contact with each plant which it is desired to affect. Thus, coverage of large areas is time consuming and requires substantial quantities of material. Furthermore, chemical agents, as I have already mentioned, have largely the same damaging effects on all plants with which they come in contact. Biological crop agents, on the other hand, are selective and since they are living, reproducing organisms, very small quantities are quite capable of starting a disastrous epiphytotic. Fungi, such as cereal rusts and rice blast, are considered important potential biological agents. Spores can rapidly be spread great distances by wind, rain, insects, animals or man.

Stem rust of wheat is an example of cereal rusts. This is caused by a fungus: each rust lesion may contain up to 400,000 spores; new generations of spores are produced every ten to fourteen days. There is no known economic chemical treatment of affected wheat and the main control resides in developing resistant wheat varieties. Natural mutations, however, occur among fungi capable of attacking previously resistant varieties of wheat. This happened, for instance, in the United States in 1953 and in 1954, causing the loss of nearly 10 million tons of wheat. Against rice blast also, the growing of resistant varieties is the only economic means of protection, and strains of rice blast fungus can be developed against which no known existing variety of rice is resistant.

I shall not mention the possibilities of potato blight, responsible for the great Irish potato famine of 1845, or other excellent potential fungal agents. I am also sure that the Committee will readily perceive the vast potential of new cereal rust or rice blast mutants developed intentionally as anti-crop agents and inoculated in fields on the windward edge of wheat or rice-growing areas. This potential is sufficiently frightening to have me dispense with giving details of bacterial and viral diseases of plants, which may also be used in biological warfare—or of the splendid prospectives in the context of this type of warfare.

The raising of crops in all countries is a constant battle against the weather, insects, weeds and diseases. Anti-crop biological warfare, as useful in peace as it is in war, does no more than reinforce the natural role of diseases and is, therefore, virtually undetectable, barring gross blunders.

I apologize for my superficial treatment of a vast and very complex subject, many aspects of which, including the very important aspect of detection and protection, I have not even mentioned. I trust, however, that I have been able to clarify a little the general outline of perhaps the most serious and most neglected area of arms control which exists. It is a problem which for a country like mine is more serious even than the question of the control of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons, we hope, will never be used; we rely on mutual deterrence and the self-interest of the nuclear Powers; if, unhappily, nuclear weapons were used, no measures that we can take would make very much difference. But chemical, and particularly biological, weapons are highly flexible; they can be used in many ways to achieve a variety of goals. They can be used in war certainly, but they can also be used in peace without fear of detection but with devastating effects against a technologically less advanced country. Those weapons exist; they are being mass manufactured now; they are stored; they are carefully selected for use at any time against any place, against any people.

I submit that the meagre facts which we have presented point to certain unavoidable conclusions.

The first is the carefully factual wording of the preambular paragraphs of our draft resolution.

The second is the vital need for publicity.

Chemical and biological weapons have been shrouded in official secrecy for too long. Their nature, potential effects and the frightening hazards involved in their possible use are not well known. Technologically less advanced countries in particular are helpless as things are at present, even to detect the possible use of many of the more dangerous and insidious chemical and biological weapons in existence; hence the Governments of those countries have no hope of protecting their population. We have sought to meet this vital need for publicity in operative paragraph 3 of our draft resolution. We seek to do no more than what was done last year in respect of nuclear weapons.<sup>11</sup>

The third conclusion, which I trust no one will dispute, is that the 1925 Geneva Protocol is hopelessly out of date and should be either radically revised or a new international agreement negotiated. I do not deny that the Geneva Protocol may be useful as a point of reference for the beating of propaganda drums, but it scarcely serves many other practical purposes. The principles it contains are vague and their interpretation is strongly controverted. It contains no rational norms in the context of modern technology; thus widely used irritants such as tear gases are banned, although relatively benign in their effects, while the lethal nerve agents are not banned; bacteriological methods of warfare are forbidden, but not viral or fungal. In effect, there exists no effective international legal restraint on the use in war or in peace of the more modern chemical or biological

<sup>11</sup> See *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, p. 798.

weapons. This is an intolerable situation. We believe that as a matter of urgency the existing situation in the world with regard to chemical and biological weapons should be studied with the aim of forging either a radically revised or a new international instrument which will establish an agreed standard of conduct for States in this area. We are only too well aware of the many issues and difficult problems which must be solved in this connexion. We cannot, unfortunately, expect immediate positive results. But we demand that the problem be studied systematically starting from basic definitions. This is all we ask and this is all that is requested in operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution sponsored by my delegation. The grave problem of chemical and biological weapons, which threatens all of us at any time has, I am sure you will agree, been too long neglected.

It has been unofficially suggested to us that even preliminary consideration by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at the present time of the problem of chemical and biological weapons would delay negotiations for a non-proliferation treaty. My delegation does not share those fears. The representatives who participate in the work of the ENDC meet at most twice a week, often less. Sometimes no meetings occur for long periods. Taking into full account the need of representatives for study, for meditation, for consultation and informal negotiation, it is difficult to imagine that they do not have some time available to initiate preliminary consideration of a problem as serious for many countries, and perhaps more serious, than the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Some delegations may have doubts with regard to operative paragraph 2 in document A/C.1/L.411. I should like to make clear that my delegation is not wedded to this paragraph which was included in the draft resolution only because we thought it might facilitate the work of the ENDC. We believed that some representatives on this body who may have great knowledge of the problems and ramifications of the problems of nuclear proliferation may not be equally familiar with the special problems presented by chemical and biological weapons. We thought that if this were the case a sub-committee might be useful. In any case, our draft resolution allows the members of the ENDC themselves to decide whether establishment of a sub-committee would facilitate the consideration of the question of the definition and use of chemical and biological weapons. However, as I have just stated, we would have no objection to seeing operative paragraph 2 deleted if such were the wish of some delegations.

### Statement by ACDA Deputy Director Fisher to the First Committee of the General Assembly, December 12, 1967<sup>1</sup>

I listened with great interest to the studious remarks of the representative of Malta and would like to have the opportunity of studying

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV.1547, pp. 33-45.

them.<sup>2</sup> Far from being superficial, they seem to me to be thoughtful and in great depth. I should like to comment on them at a later period.

What I should like to present today to this Committee is the view of the United States on the question of general and complete disarmament. These views represent an altogether different approach to the subject from those we have heard from several previous speakers, and notably those incorporated in the statement of the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, whom we had the privilege of hearing yesterday.<sup>3</sup>

Before elaborating on the differences in these views I should like to take this opportunity to comment on certain allegations which have been made that the Federal Republic of Germany is the main obstacle to the acceptance by the Western Alliance of the disarmament proposals presented by the Soviet Union and its allies, and that this Government, the Federal Republic of Germany, is furthermore opposed to all disarmament measures.

Nothing could be further from the truth. The Federal Republic of Germany is the first European nation which through solemn treaty obligation has renounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons.<sup>4</sup> It is the only nation of a major alliance that has committed all of its forces, to the military command of that Alliance and which, as a result, has no military forces under its own independent military command. It is now a nation which is actively seeking to build bridges between Eastern and Western Europe, and being rebuffed in its effort by those very nations in the Eastern bloc which impugn its motives.

Contrary to the allegations that have been made, the difficulty is not with the Federal Republic of Germany and its Western allies—for we act together in these matters; as I hope to make clear in my remarks, the difficulty lies in the faulty nature of the disarmament proposals put forward by the Soviet Union.

False allegations made in this body will serve no useful purpose; they will only make more difficult the achievement of a lasting European security arrangement based on mutual accord. The United States delegation believes it is its duty to speak on behalf of its ally, which has itself no representation in this body.

Turning now to the principal subject, the difference between the approach of the United States to the question of general and complete disarmament and that of the Soviet Union can be ascertained by comparing the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World,<sup>5</sup> with the Soviet Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament Under Strict International Control.<sup>6</sup> Both of these documents provide for a gradual process of general and complete disarmament to take place in three stages.

The United States programme for general and complete disarmament provides for a freezing of levels of armed forces and armaments at an agreed time, and then, progressively, over three stages, for the

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 627-633.

<sup>4</sup> See *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, pp. 980 ff.

<sup>5</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 111-140.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 77-102.

reduction of national military establishments to levels required for the maintenance of internal order and for supporting a United Nations peace force. In the United States proposal provisions are made for the creation, during the process of disarmament, of adequate machinery for verification to ensure that the terms of the agreement are being carried out, as well as for the strengthening of peace-keeping forces to maintain peace and security for all.

The Soviet proposal, on the other hand, emphasizes the almost total reductions of selected categories of armaments at the very outset of the disarmament process. It seeks drastic reduction of nuclear-weapon carriers at the very beginning of the disarmament process, in the first stage, before it provides for the establishment of adequate machinery for verification. That proposal not only fails, in the first stage of the disarmament process, to inspire the confidence and trust upon which subsequent phases can and must be built, but would also materially alter the military balance in favour of the Soviet Union.

I might point out also that at no time has the Soviet Government ever indicated how, by what progressive steps, those reductions would take place. And this presents us with a difficulty which, I fear, is not new to us. The Soviet proposals dealing with general and complete disarmament do not really deal with the steps that can actually be taken now to halt the arms race and begin the process of disarmament. They appear to require agreement on how to proceed almost to the end of the road to general and complete disarmament before we can take any action.

This difference in approach—the United States believing we should take the steps we can take now to get us moving down the road to general and complete disarmament, and our Soviet colleagues apparently believing that we should not do so until we have agreement as to how to proceed to the end of the road, or almost to the end of the road—has been reflected in the attitudes of our disarmament negotiators both at the conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and elsewhere. For example, the United States has proposed a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes. This proposal was rejected as not involving disarmament. The United States indicated that it was prepared to transfer 60,000 kilogrammes of weapon-grade U-235 to peaceful uses if the USSR would agree to transfer 40,000 kilogrammes for that same purpose.<sup>7</sup> This proposal was also rejected, as not involving the destruction of a single nuclear weapon.<sup>8</sup> The United States indicated that it would obtain the material through the demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons.<sup>9</sup> This proposal was ignored.

The United States has made similar proposals for workable measures dealing with the reduction of the delivery systems for nuclear weapons. In January of 1964 the United States proposed that we explore a verified freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic offensive and defensive vehicles, an agreement which would open the path to reduction in all types of arms.<sup>10</sup> This proposal was character-

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 330-333.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 335-336.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, p. 435.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 1964, p. 8.

ized by our Soviet friends as one involving inspection without disarmament.<sup>11</sup> As recently as September of this year, Secretary McNamara reiterated the willingness of the United States to enter into agreement not only to limit, but then to reduce both offensive and defensive strategic nuclear forces.<sup>12</sup> In connexion with a possible agreement levelling off or reducing strategic offensive and defensive systems, our Assistant Secretary of Defense, Mr. Paul Warnke, pointed out that, although agreements involving substantial reductions would require international inspection, "a number of possibilities for parallel action, and even for formal agreement . . . would permit our reliance on unilateral means of verification". These statements would appear to take care of the point of "inspection without disarmament".<sup>13</sup> These statements have, unfortunately, gone unanswered.

Here too it seems we have been continuously faced with an approach which requires agreement on how to proceed almost to the end of the road to general and complete disarmament before any first steps can be taken. This is quite contrary to the philosophy which motivates our efforts to obtain a non-proliferation treaty which recognizes the need for step-by-step progress even in the absence of agreement on the final elimination of nuclear weapons. I might point out that in this connexion it is fortunate that the position of our Soviet friends on immediately practical partial measures to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons has not been reflected in our efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries and new environments. If it had been, we would not today have the limited test-ban treaty<sup>14</sup> or the outer-space treaty<sup>15</sup>; we would not today be on the threshold of a non-proliferation treaty.

It is in this context that I should like to refer to the report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons.<sup>16</sup> It goes without saying that my delegation commends the Secretary-General for his efforts in the preparation of a most useful and timely document. My delegation also commends the expert consultants who were able, through co-operation and mutual understanding, to agree on a unanimous report dealing with many sensitive and controversial issues. This report contains many conclusions which will be helpful to us in our consideration of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

For example, it clearly dissipates the illusion that a non-proliferation treaty is something which primarily benefits the nuclear Powers at the expense of the non-nuclear Powers. It makes it quite clear that new nuclear Powers would endanger themselves—or the remaining non-nuclear Powers—far more than they would endanger the existing nuclear weapon Powers.

It points up the unavoidable economic costs involved, which are a curse to any nuclear weapons State, and notes that no nuclear weapons

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 71-73.

<sup>12</sup> *Ante*, pp. 2-2, 3-4.

<sup>13</sup> *Ante*, p. 47.

<sup>14</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

<sup>15</sup> *Ante*, pp. 38-43.

<sup>16</sup> *Ante*, pp. 476-513.

programme could be undertaken unless the States so doing reallocate "a major portion of their technical resources from constructive activities".

It also indicates that time is running out for mankind if it is to control and eventually abolish the threat or risk of nuclear war. The frightening fact, as the report indicates, that the widespread installation of nuclear power stations will by 1980 yield plutonium sufficient for the construction of thousands of nuclear weapons each year must be recognized as an imperative for immediate action. The prospect of the widespread distribution of even primitive nuclear devices, with a consequent probability that present exacting procedures for command and control of these weapons could not be maintained under such conditions, presents a threat many times greater than that which exists today.

But this report also deals with the subject on which the United States and our friends in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have differed in their approach to general and complete disarmament. It deals, insofar as nuclear weapons are concerned, with the issue of what we can agree to now that will put us in motion on the road to general and complete disarmament. I think it is a fair characterization of that report to say that it rejects the Soviet approach that we must have agreement on how to proceed to the end of the road, or very nearly to the end of the road, before we can agree to any steps on how to start down that road.

As I pointed out in my earlier remarks, the Secretary-General's report does conclude that the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the banning of their use should be by way of general and complete disarmament. But it also recommends consideration of a range of immediate initial measures of arms limitations—measures which could lead to the reduction of the level of nuclear armament and the lessening of tension in the world and "the eventual elimination of nuclear armaments".

In its concluding paragraphs this report points out that the problem of reversing the trend of a rapidly worsening world situation calls for a basic reappraisal of all interrelated factors. It mentions a variety of measures of arms limitation which could immediately be considered and which, taken together or in combination, could help to inhibit the further multiplication of nuclear weapons or the further elaboration of nuclear arsenals, and so help ensure national and world security.

Among the measures that it mentions are an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, an agreement on the reduction of nuclear arsenals, a comprehensive test ban treaty, measures safeguarding the security of non-nuclear States, and nuclear free zones.

The report recommends consideration of these measures of arms limitations in full recognition of the fact that they cannot of themselves eliminate the threat of nuclear conflict. It recommends that they be taken, however, not as ends in themselves but as measures which would facilitate further steps and could lead to the reduction of the level of nuclear arsenals and the lessening of tensions in the world and the eventual elimination of nuclear arsenals.

This report lends no support to a position that we should not now take one or a combination of the various immediate measures until we

have come to an agreement on the eventual elimination of nuclear arsenals or a reduction to extremely low levels.

In considering the approaches of the various countries to the problem of general and complete disarmament, this Committee should have in mind that, for almost four years, the United States has had on the table workable measures, first to prevent increases in, and later to reduce, the material used to make nuclear weapons, the weapons themselves, and the means of their delivery. It is the Soviet Union which has rejected these measures. It has done so on the ground that we must first agree to their proposal for the drastic reduction of nuclear weapons carriers in the first stage of disarmament, before adequate machinery has been established for verification. In the absence of agreement on this point, they have been unwilling to agree to these workable measures which I have outlined to prevent the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery systems from growing ever and ever larger.

Because of this position, the nuclear arsenals have grown ever and ever larger. They have grown so on both sides. The United States does not believe that this course of conduct, which has been forced upon us by the attitude of our colleagues of the Soviet Union, is a wise one. The Secretary-General's report speaks out concerning the dangers of such a course far more eloquently than could I. I shall conclude these remarks by quoting it. It says:

... And the longer the world waits, the more nuclear arsenals grow, the greater and more difficult becomes the eventual task.<sup>17</sup>

### Statement by the Swedish Representative (Myrdal) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Cessation of Nuclear Tests, December 12, 1967<sup>1</sup>

I will not conceal that it is with a sense of considerable frustration that I am taking the floor to develop some ideas on the important matter before the Committee—"The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests". The feeling of frustration stems from the fact that whatever we keep saying or doing in this or other organs of the United Nations, urging the nuclear-weapon Powers to stop further testing of nuclear weapons, seems to have no effect whatsoever. We are no closer to an international treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests than we were last year, when this item was discussed here in the First Committee of the Assembly.

I need not specifically recall the important and urgent appeal which was made almost unanimously by the General Assembly when passing, on 5 December of last year, resolution 2163 (XXI) to the effect that all States which have not done so should adhere to the Partial Test-Ban Treaty and that all nuclear weapon States should suspend nuclear tests in all environments. The Assembly in that same resolution further

<sup>17</sup> *Ante*, p. 513.

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV.1547, pp. 45-56.

expressed the hope that States would contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data and it requested the ENDC to elaborate, without any further delay, a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests.<sup>2</sup>

Not one of those important appeals has met in reality with any positive reaction on the part of the States most concerned—that is, the ones possessing nuclear weapons—during the year which is now coming to an end. On the contrary, the situation seems even bleaker than it appeared to be a year ago. Tests have not ceased. According to figures available to my delegation, the nuclear explosions in the world numbered at least thirty-six in the year 1964, forty in 1965 and sixty in 1966. During the present year, announced or recorded tests have numbered at least forty-four. Of those, the great majority were underground tests carried out by the nuclear weapon States which have adhered to the Moscow Treaty prohibiting tests in the atmosphere, in outer space or under water.<sup>3</sup> It is clear even from the preamble to that Treaty that the exemption of underground nuclear explosions was intended to be temporary. Nevertheless, that exemption has been used by the nuclear-weapon Powers as permission for—yes, a legitimization of—such tests.

Also, the yields of explosions in the atmosphere carried out by countries not parties to the Moscow Treaty are increasing and some of these have reached the megaton range, resulting in widespread radioactive contamination of the atmosphere.

On the question of the establishment of an organized, effective, international exchange of seismic data—the so-called “detection club” idea—there has been little progress. Delegations may recall that a technical conference on the subject, assembling experts from eight countries, took place in Stockholm in May 1966. A further conference was planned to take place during this year. It would have included also experts from the main nuclear-weapon States. So far, however, it has not been deemed possible to hold that conference owing to lack of information from all those main Powers as to their willingness to take part in such a meeting.

As far as the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is concerned, its long session this year has been concerned mainly with the issue of non-proliferation. It was recognized by all the members of the ENDC that the subject of non-proliferation had priority. What my delegation, and others with it, did not accept, however, was that the Committee should practically by-pass the other important items that had been entrusted to it by the General Assembly. On several occasions, my delegation stressed the fact that the question of an agreement prohibiting underground tests could well be treated simultaneously with the non-proliferation issue. Preliminary negotiations might well have proceeded in parallel even if one treaty was to be made ready for signature prior to the other.

We have always considered, and continue to maintain, that a non-proliferation treaty, important as it is in itself, cannot stand alone. It has to be—and I use a familiar phrase—coupled with or followed by other international disarmament agreements covering the nuclear

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 802-803.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

weapon field. It has been generally recognized that two such measures are of great imminent urgency, politically speaking, and particularly ripe for decision technically--namely, a comprehensive test ban and an agreement to cut off production of fissile material for weapon purposes.

During this year's session of the ENDC my delegation has devoted considerable attention to the question of how to push the matter of a comprehensive test-ban treaty forward. The records of the proceedings in the ENDC are available, of course, to all my fellow representatives here. For convenience I might, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, restate briefly some of the considerations we presented in the ENDC this summer. I shall not go into details: those are available to interested parties in the ENDC documentation, and I am referring to documents ENDC/PV. 309,<sup>4</sup> PV. 315<sup>5</sup> and PV. 323,<sup>6</sup> as well as working document ENDC/191.<sup>7</sup>

The main problem in reaching agreement on a treaty banning underground nuclear tests is proclaimed to lie in the issue of control; or, more precisely, in a lack of agreement among the nuclear-weapon Powers as to the verification system needed for monitoring such a treaty. On one side the thesis is being upheld that on-site inspections are necessary to ensure that no violations occur, while the other side claims that national means of detection and verification are satisfactory and that no on-site inspections should be prescribed.

The non-aligned and non-nuclear-weapon States which are members of the ENDC have not taken sides on this issue. Instead, they have tried continuously to bridge the difference of views as to the specific needs for verification. A new attempt in this direction was made by my delegation in Geneva this summer.

We drew the attention of the other delegations, and especially those of the nuclear-weapon Powers, to recent developments as regards improved possibilities for verification of an underground test-ban treaty. We pointed to the development of increasingly sensitive teleseismic instruments and to the establishment of large arrays of such instruments, which significantly increases the effectiveness of each individual instrument. We drew attention also to the possibilities which international co-operation for the exchange of seismic data would give of further increasing the usefulness of national seismic stations. Such co-operation was strongly endorsed, as everyone may recall, by the General Assembly in last year's resolution on the test-ban issue. We also pointed to the impressive scientific research which is being undertaken in several countries and which is, of course, particularly well known to the major Powers themselves, in order to improve the methods of interpreting data obtained from seismic stations, and in particular to the elaboration of several effective methods of identifying underground explosions and separating them from earthquakes.

In my country we have undertaken some independent research using those new identification methods. We think that the results have been very encouraging. In short, we used statistical methods of evaluation

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 272-278.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, pp. 310-312.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, pp. 333-338.

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, pp. 305-309.

of data to form a basis for the application of decision theory to the problem of verification of an underground test-ban treaty.

As a result of our investigations, we found that those identification methods would permit a control system with a sufficient degree of reliability to deter parties to a treaty from committing violations. One could foresee such a system, allowing for some on-site inspections at a very low rate. However, it seems to us that one could contemplate also a system without such obligatory inspections, but then one would have to accept the risk of having unwarranted, but in reality very infrequent, political action on some events which would prove subsequently to be not violations but natural earthquakes with similar characteristics.

In view of those findings and conclusions, the Swedish delegation requested in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament that the question of verification, and particularly of inspections, should be re-examined in a new light, taking into account recent scientific and technical developments. We were convinced, and are still convinced, that it should now be possible to reduce the divergences of position as to the feasibility of a control system, if the case were rested on our ideas of deterrence against violations, rather than on establishing certainty after each and every event. The situation is ripe for such a renewed and thorough discussion. The experts in our various countries now have more knowledge than has been brought to bear on this issue. The political sufficiency of the seismological verification potential at hand should be judged afresh.

I consequently maintained in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and I maintain again here, that the control issue can no longer be used as a convenient reason for holding up an agreement prohibiting underground nuclear tests.

The system we have in mind should have, in order to be able to function in a satisfactory way, as an independent part, organized, voluntary co-operation for the exchange of such seismic data as are deemed necessary for the monitoring of a treaty. The "detection club" should therefore be organized without further delay and its potentiality put to use as soon as possible.

In the outline regarding the control of a comprehensive test-ban treaty which our delegation presented to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the idea of "verification by challenge" played an important role. That expression implies a system whereby a party suspected of testing underground, in violation of a treaty, would find it to be in its own interest to provide all available reassuring information. In the usual case that would certainly suffice, but for some unusual cases the possibility would, of course, be open to extend an invitation for inspection, such inspection to be carried out in the manner prescribed by the inviting party. Under that system a suspicious party could also make proposals, if it found the information available to be inadequate, as to other suitable methods of clarification. Again, such suggestions might mention inspection on another party's territory. If such proposals should not be accepted, the demanding party would have to determine, in the light of all available evidence and also of that negative reaction, what conclusions should be drawn and what course of action should be taken.

We have become convinced that a reliable international data exchange, coupled with the utilization of the refined methods of analysing the data now at hand, and, in addition, the verification by challenge procedure, would form a useful control system for a comprehensive test ban treaty which would not encroach on any nation's sovereign integrity.

I must mention that some of the scientific and technical methods, and particularly the extent to which we applied those methods, as well as some of our conclusions, were challenged by some delegations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. That is only natural. We do not claim to have established the absolute truth. In fact we welcomed having such a dialogue within the Committee, a dialogue which was, unfortunately, only too brief and too one-sided.

I want to make, therefore, here and now, a new plea for a serious discussion and negotiation on the test-ban issue. The elements of a treaty exist. It should not be difficult, if the political will is present on all sides, to piece them together into a treaty text.

When consideration of such a treaty begins, even in preliminary draft form, it will become obvious that it would also be of direct help for solving another issue of some importance in present disarmament discussions, namely, the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful uses.

It is being proposed, and discussed, that the manufacture or acquisition of all nuclear explosive devices, including those intended for peaceful purposes, should be prohibited in the non-proliferation treaty. Non-nuclear-weapon countries would be furnished with such devices for peaceful purposes, once their application became feasible, by the nuclear-weapon countries through some non-discriminatory international procedure laid down in a special agreement.

My delegation suggested in the Eighteen-Nation Committee that in reality a comprehensive test-ban treaty was the right place to prohibit all nuclear explosions, by all nations, also covering them in their entirety within its system of control.<sup>8</sup> Simultaneously, fully equitable access to the use of nuclear explosive devices by nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon countries alike should be ensured by a separate agreement providing for a licensing arrangement to be carried out through an international body. The right of decision to allow any explosion for peaceful purposes by any State should thus be granted to an international organ. That would assure the equitable use of such explosions, which might become very important economically. Perhaps the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna (IAEA) should be given that charge. The stocks of explosives would have to remain in the custody of the nuclear-weapon Powers, but the final permission to allow any employment of them would be made international in character.

The news which has reached us recently that a spectacular step forward has been taken by the so-called "Project Gas-Buggy" in New Mexico ought to call for congratulations on this new technological achievement. Considering, however, the world-wide implications of such new uses of nuclear explosives, particularly as they are being discussed within the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, I am afraid that expressions of congratulations must be somewhat tempered

<sup>8</sup> *Ante*, p. 251.

by caution as long as such undertakings remain exclusively unilateral, instead of being internationally regulated.

As I had the honour to state yesterday in this Committee, the premonitions are sombre. The new turn upwards of the spiral of the nuclear arms race may well lead to further postponement of any real negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. The nuclear-weapons Powers seem to find it advantageous that to test the new nuclear devices they can utilize the freedom of action still left open for underground testing. It has been argued that even the Moscow Partial Test Ban Treaty is in danger, because of the supposed need to conduct life-like tests of missiles, anti-missiles and warheads in the atmosphere.

The world is consequently placed before new risks in the armaments field. But this should not inhibit us, who are interested in and working for international disarmament, from continuing our efforts to press for agreements. The nuclear-weapons field is the most urgent one in this respect. The comprehensive test ban seems to us to be, besides the non-proliferation treaty, the most urgent and most attainable of the possible measures for nuclear self-discipline on the part of nations.

Before concluding this intervention, I should like to introduce formally, on behalf of the following sponsors: Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, the draft resolution on the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, contained in document A/C.1/L.414.<sup>2</sup> This draft resolution is mainly a reaffirmation of last year's resolution 2163 (XXI), however, with stronger emphasis on the urgency of the elaboration of a treaty banning all nuclear and thermonuclear tests.

**Statement by the Hungarian Representative (Csatorday)  
to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Chemical and Biological Weapons [Extract], December 12, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

The Hungarian delegation has carefully studied the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Malta on the matter of general and complete disarmament contained in document A/C.1/L.411. That proposal, unfortunately, narrows down the problem against the danger of the use of weapons of mass destruction as we have outlined it. The first preambular paragraph of the draft mentions chemical, biological and radiological weapons, without explaining what should be meant by these terms. However, I recognize that the very learned representative of Malta has explained this problem this afternoon with much circumspection.<sup>3</sup> We certainly shall not fail to study his statement very carefully. Nevertheless, the Hungarian delegation wishes to make

<sup>2</sup> Identical with G.A. resolution 2343 (XXII), *post*, p. 731.

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV.1547, pp. 71-82.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 625-626.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 634-647.

a few observations regarding the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.411.

Reference to radiological weapons in the draft resolution is a new and foreign element if we take into consideration the Geneva Protocol.<sup>4</sup> It is illogical because experiments with these weapons are a matter of nuclear physics and quantum mechanics, so they belong to an entirely different group of weaponry. It is particularly disturbing, however, that the draft regards the use of only some varieties of chemical, biological and radiological weapons as dangerous to mankind. Why only a few such weapons? Which of them are dangerous and which are not? By making exceptions, it makes it possible for some persons to interpret to their liking which chemical weapon is dangerous to mankind and which is not. This approach does not promote the cause of the fight against the use of weapons of mass destruction, but it is rather a step backward from the point already reached by the Geneva Protocol. This provision does not extend the area of the field of weaponry, but, on the contrary, reduces it.

What should be meant by updating the Geneva Protocol? The types of chemical, biological and radiological weapons are proliferating. Their manufacture is covered up by a conspiracy of silence. Experiments are conducted in secret on an ever-larger scale. Developing countries cannot afford to use their resources for the purpose of such research. I say that it is fortunate that they are not using their resources for such purposes. Moreover, they may occasionally fall victim to such experiments, especially those peoples who are fighting for their independence, for the self-determination of their country, the peoples of former or actual colonial territories.

Thus, these weapons are directed mainly against Asian and African peoples. What is needed in this situation is not to update the Geneva Protocol, which prohibits categorically the use of different weapons of mass destruction, but to give a strong effect to its prohibitive clauses.

The preamble of the Maltese draft resolution gets around the real facts. It speaks of "weapons which have been or are being developed" but makes no mention of the destructive effect of such weapons which have already been put to use and says not a word about the practical experience available to all.

The draft resolution speaks of biological weapons, but, as the representative of Malta has himself explained, biological weapons include means to affect the development, growing, multiplying or existence of living organisms in a detrimental way; to change their environment, destroy their means of existence, change their life cycle. To the kinds of weapons that influence the biological processes belong equally nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, bacteriological weapons and even conventional weapons, depending on the circumstances.

Furthermore, the draft resolution proposes that the Secretary-General's report should examine the probable effects of the use of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. To all intents and purposes that might refer only to radiological weapons which have not yet been used or are not yet in existence, since the effects of the use of chemical and

<sup>4</sup> *Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents, 1919-55*, pp. 160-170.

bacteriological weapons are, unfortunately, already widely known. Let us take the example of the chemical anti-crop compounds used in Viet-Nam between 1961 and 1967. In 1961, in the so-called operation "Ranch Hand", two transport planes made altogether sixty spray sorties against the vegetation of Viet-Nameese soil. By the end of 1967, this kind of chemical warfare had reached enormous proportions. The Defense Supply Agency gave orders for the delivery of chemical agents for defoliation and crop destruction to the sum of \$57,690,000. This meant the use of about six to seven million gallons of chemical substances.

What are these chemicals? They are very well known. One of them is called 2,4-D, another 2,4,5-T. Again, another such agent is cacodylic acid, which is most poisonous to human beings since it contains 54.29 per cent of arsenic. Seventy grammes of it kills a man of average weight. According to Professor Arthur Galtson of Yale University, a professor of biology, smaller doses of it—and here I quote from his article—

... could result in nausea, diarrhea, headache, weak pulse and coma . . . In view of the persistence of this material and the cumulative nature of arsenic toxicity, its wide use certainly may pose dangers for the civilian population of Viet-Nam. It may be accumulated by plants which would be eaten by man.<sup>5</sup>

Biologists have demonstrated, for example, that the chemical agents used in Viet-Nam upset the ecological balance of areas exposed to chemical raids. The rhythm of crop rotation becomes upset; the chemicals, washed into the streams, decimate or even kill off the entire fish population. By breaking the biological chain in plant life, they have a tremendous effect upon human existence in the areas concerned. We have been witnessing in Viet-Nam a strange phenomenon: well-planted areas, under heavy cultivation, have been transformed by these chemicals into deserts; while scientists and other people elsewhere are trying to fight the desert and recover such areas little by little for purposes of cultivation, the opposite is going on in South-East Asia in a part of the world where, because of the lack of an adequate food supply, hunger is constant, through the creation of new desert areas in those parts of Viet-Nam, an adequate food supply is being denied to the population for generations to come.

These facts were demonstrated by experts long ago. In the matter of chemical warfare and crop destruction, 5,000 American scientists gave their opinion—a much larger number of experts than the United Nations could ever have enlisted for the preparation of a report by the Secretary-General. A similar expert opinion has been given in the name of 2,000 Japanese biochemists. Thus, as far as the assistance of experts is concerned, it is no longer needed; their opinion has already been given and is available to anyone.

The Maltese draft proposes a revision or a replacement of the Geneva Protocol. The Hungarian delegation fails to see in what sense such a revision would mean progress in respect of the Geneva Protocol. The draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Malta advances no concrete argument to prove the timeliness of any revision. We think that revision of the Geneva Protocol is entirely unwarranted.

<sup>5</sup> *The New Republic*, Nov. 25, 1967, p. 20.

In its possession of the Geneva Protocol the international community has an excellent legal means which exists without any special committee or any report of the Secretary-General. It would be wrong, both politically and psychologically, to discard this legal means or to create, by its revision, loopholes for those who want to avoid signing that instrument.

The draft invites us to vote the establishment of a sub-committee and the preparation of a report by the Secretary-General. This would mean only more red-tape, would imply further expenses and would increase the burden on the Secretariat, instead of bringing nearer the substantial solution—observance of the already-existing Geneva Protocol.

Even over the expanse of forty-two years, the Geneva Protocol unmistakably refers to all kinds of chemical and biological weapons by condemning “. . . the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices. . . .”. It is beyond dispute that this wording accurately covers not only any one of the existing chemical and bacteriological weapons, but also those that are now being developed.

The types of weapons indicated in the Geneva Protocol have been developed to a tremendous extent; a large number of varieties have been added to the chemical-bacteriological arsenal. Specialization and new methods of scientific research have developed new varieties of more effective chemical and bacteriological weapons. All this only underlines the timeliness of the Geneva Protocol. But it seems to be difficult to ensure world-wide application of that highly important instrument. The assistance of the community of the United Nations is required to achieve this aim. Lately an additional group of States have acceded to the Geneva Protocol, thus recognizing its importance, partly in response to the appeal contained in General Assembly resolution 2162 (XXI),<sup>6</sup> and setting a good example to those States that have not acceded to it so far. The States that have recently deposited their instruments of accession are Cyprus, Sierra Leone, Maldives Islands, Niger, Ghana, Tunisia, Madagascar and—here I mention a significant accession—the Vatican.

The Hungarian delegation has not for a moment doubted that the Maltese draft resolution was dictated by good intentions. Nevertheless, that draft seeks to raise doubts about the Geneva Protocol and proposes a time-consuming procedure of revision—the establishment of a sub-committee and the preparation of a report by the Secretary-General—while at the same time providing for no prohibition and not even referring to compliance with the accepted norms of international law. This formulation of the Maltese draft is of help to those that have not yet signed the Geneva Protocol and that have no intention of signing it in the future either. Its mistaken starting-point justifies those that wish to disregard the Geneva Protocol.

It must be recognized that the Maltese draft introduces a new element, that of radiological weapons, which go unmentioned in the Geneva Protocol. We believe it is feasible to refer this matter to the

<sup>6</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 798-799.

Disarmament Committee, even though the use of radiological weapons does not seem realistic for the time being.

Even in a difficult period like this we have to find a road that can be travelled in making effective progress towards the realization of general and complete disarmament. The present session of the General Assembly has already taken a realistic step in this regard by its adoption of the resolution on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. During the short time available to us we can take a further effective measure if, by reaffirming resolution 2162 (XXI), we declare the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons to be a crime against humanity and mobilize all Members of the United Nations for their accession to the Geneva Protocol.

The representative of Malta said in his earlier statement that polemics might have prevented more effective and wide-scale accession to the Geneva Protocol, but the Hungarian delegation will not fail to give expression to its concern about world affairs, even if it is not to the liking of one or several delegations in the Organization if we mention these examples, facts and concrete events.

We are not chemists, physicists, physicians or military experts here in this Committee to deal with very minute details of this problem, although we are grateful that the representative of Malta has supplied us with many interesting examples. In the view of the Hungarian delegation, our duty in this Committee is to make political decisions to promote the cause of peace among nations, to prevent destruction and war, and to reduce the dangers confronting all mankind. If this is considered polemics, we take the responsibility for it. In this activity, we regret to find some who are opposed to these ideas and objectives. We realize that not all the Members of our Organization are like-minded, and such divergent views necessarily will appear in our debates. However, that is no reason to reject a proposal aiming at the protection of the peaceful development of nations, without outside military pressure exercised or threatened by the most abominable means of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and bacteriological weapons.

I should like to emphasize that the Hungarian delegation is not beating the drum, but is making responsible statements when it advances the ideas contained in our draft resolution<sup>1</sup> and when it invites all States to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The Hungarian draft resolution is very clear in its intention to try to save mankind from the horrors of these mass destruction weapons. The wording is resolute. It does not waver and it does not try to comfort those who are responsible for applying chemical and bacteriological weapons for destruction, not only in experiments, but in daily practice.

The Hungarian draft resolution and the Geneva Protocol are of a very general character, covering all weapons falling in the category of chemical and bacteriological weapons, not just some of them. All kinds of weapons, no matter how slight their effect is planned, might become lethal and be used with the intention of defeating human beings in smaller or larger groups or, for that matter, a whole people of a whole country. The Hungarian draft resolution's suggestion of accession to the Geneva Protocol is based on a sound understanding of inter-

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, pp. 633-634.

national law that prohibits war as a means of settling disputes and condemns the use of weapons of mass destruction as a means of genocide, a crime against humanity. Thus, the Hungarian draft resolution deals with a very timely problem placed before us by the international situation, notably by the aggressive war waged by the United States against the people of Viet-Nam.

These weapons endanger, first of all, the peoples of Africa and Asia who are fighting for their independence. Those people are the first subjects of such experiments. The other side of the picture is that they have not got the means to retaliate in kind, and that makes the use of those weapons most immoral, most inhuman and most horribly criminal.

The Hungarian draft resolution contains an appeal in general to all States, without any exception, to accede to the Geneva Protocol for the benefit of all mankind. Accession to the Geneva Protocol is the duty of all States. Hungary is fulfilling its international obligations by presenting this draft resolution, and invites all Members to act in the only justified and legal way by implementing the Geneva Protocol.

In the view of the Hungarian delegation, in interpreting the provisions of the Geneva Protocol it is equally the duty of the countries which are parties to the Geneva Protocol to launch a similar appeal to all the other States which have not done so to accede to the Geneva Protocol. If some representatives, like the representative of Malta, claim that the Geneva Protocol has no effective legal restraint and that that is an intolerable situation, I fully agree with them, but I would add that the limits of the Geneva Protocol are given by the number of States which accede to it. Had all the States Members of this Organization, and all States outside the Organization, acceded to the Geneva Protocol, we would have had an effective legal restraint and the Protocol would have been more than sufficient to prevent the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

The Hungarian delegation recommends the Committee to adopt the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.412.<sup>5</sup>

### Statement by the Soviet Representative (Shevchenko) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons, December 13, 1967<sup>1</sup>

The Soviet delegation would like today to express its views on the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons. This question, which is raised in the draft resolutions submitted by the delegation of Hungary in document A/C.1/L.412,<sup>2</sup> and the delegation of Malta, in document A/C.1/L.411,<sup>3</sup> is of tremendous importance and should be considered by the First Committee with the utmost seriousness and sense of responsibility.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 633-634.

<sup>2</sup> A/C.1/PV.1548, pp. 61-72.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 633-634.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 625-626.

At the last session of the General Assembly, as is well known, a resolution was unanimously adopted, resolution 2162 B (XXI) of 5 December 1966,<sup>4</sup> which included an appeal for the strict observance by all States of the objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons,<sup>5</sup> and condemned all actions contrary to those objectives, at the same time inviting all States to adhere to the Geneva Protocol. As we all know, more than a year has passed since that resolution was adopted. What is the situation now with regard to the implementation of that resolution of the Assembly?

Unfortunately, we are compelled to note that that important decision of the General Assembly which reflects the concern felt by all peoples of the world because of the peril to mankind threatened by the use of chemical and biological weapons, is not being obeyed by some Powers; not only this, but those same Powers give no sign even of any willingness to undertake the measures necessary for implementing that resolution. It should be immediately pointed out that certain States that have not ratified or acceded to the Geneva Protocol of 1925—and first among them, we should point out, is the United States, a Power which possesses great potential for the waging of chemical and bacteriological warfare—have given no response whatsoever to the appeal addressed to them by the General Assembly.

Now, what is this? Is it obliviousness on their part, or just open disregard of the opinion of the overwhelming majority of States in the world? We think that in the case of the United States, what is involved here is a deliberate disregard of the Assembly's resolution; that what we are faced with here is a stubborn refusal to adhere to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Such actions, such conduct, must surely be condemned.

The United States has not only failed to honor the General Assembly's resolution on this important matter, but has continued, in violation of the resolution, its inhumane activities and expanded the use of chemical means of warfare against the Viet-Nameese people. As far back as several years ago, United States military circles began to use certain chemical substances in Viet-Nam for the purpose of destroying crops and defoliating jungles. At the beginning of 1965 the whole world learned of a new crime committed by the United States interventionists in Viet-Nam: the use by the United States armed forces of poisonous gases against the people of South Viet-Nam. United States helicopters and fighter-bombers, equipped with special devices, sprayed populated areas in South Viet-Nam with chemical-warfare substances that affect the respiratory organs, the organs of sight and the gastro-intestinal tract. People living in Viet-Nameese villages, including old men, women and children, fell victims to these gas attacks. The official representatives of the United States stated at that time that the poisonous gases being used in Viet-Nam were being used with the approval of the State Department and the Department of Defense. A representative of the White House supplemented these statements with the information that the United States Command, for its part, had the

<sup>4</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 798-799.

<sup>5</sup> *Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents, 1919-55*, pp. 169-170.

right to use its own discretion in deciding whether or not to use such means of warfare. According to figures furnished by the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam, in the course of the year 1965 gas and other poisonous substances in Viet-Nam were the cause of 46,000 human casualties and the loss of thousands of heads of cattle. Further, despite the decision of the General Assembly, the United States continued to commit acts of flagrant lawlessness, relying more and more on the use of poisonous gas and other poisonous substances against the people of South Viet-Nam, against the patriots fighting in arms for their freedom and independence, using them particularly for the poisoning of underground shelters, tunnels and other places used by the military units of the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam, and even using them on hospitals.

In scientific publications, for example *Chemical Week* of 28 March 1966, we find the information that for these purposes, irritant poisonous substances are being used, such as chloracetophenone (CN), diphenylamine, and a new poisonous phosphorous substance: CS. According to *The New Scientist* of 21 January 1967, in the very near future it is intended further to expand the use of chemical substances in Viet-Nam to include destruction of the rice crop, which, as everyone knows, provides the Viet-Namese people with their staple diet. Plans are being reported in particular for the poisoning of from one-third to one-half of the rice crop in the northern part of South Viet-Nam. Even according to official United States data, the United States forces have used in Viet-Nam chemical substances over an area of about half a million acres of jungle and over an area of more than 150,000 acres of cultivated land. According to information furnished by the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam, in 1965 alone 700,000 hectares of fields in Viet-Nam were poisoned.

The expenditures by the Pentagon, according to the Press, on herbicides, chemical substances for destroying vegetation, amounted in 1966 to \$10 million; in 1967 the Pentagon's purchases of chemical substances rose to \$32 million; and it is expected that in 1968 this figure will amount to \$50 million.

The facts contained in official communications issued by the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam and material issued by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, facts which are confirmed by well-known scientists, and also the large number of cases of mortality from the use by American military forces of poisonous substances, irrefutably show that the United States has been waging chemical warfare in Viet-Nam and has by no means confined itself solely to the use of so-called police gases. Viet-Nam is being transformed more and more into an area for the use by the United States on an ever-increasing scale of chemical means of mass destruction, which are prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and by other international agreements.

The Soviet Government has repeatedly drawn the attention of the peoples of the world to this and has indicated that the use of chemical weapons against the people of South Viet-Nam is a most flagrant violation of the universal norms of international law and a flouting of the elementary principles of human morality and humanitarianism. It has stressed that the American aggressors have brought to the land of Viet-Nam the worst excesses of colonialism, compounded by the

destructive power of contemporary methods. Thus, the United States which, without any military need, at one time subjected to atomic bombardment the Japanese people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is now viewing another Asian country as a target for experiments in barbarous methods of mass destruction.

Additional light on the refusal of the United States to ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 is also shed by the fact that the American Press and, indeed, official representatives of the United States make no secret of the fact that the United States is conducting a broadly-based and intensive campaign of training in the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. It is significant that in the United States military code it is laid down that "the United States is not a party to any treaty now in force that prohibits or restricts the use in warfare of toxic or non-toxic gases".<sup>6</sup> Similarly, the suggestion is put forward that the hands of the American military are free and not bound by anything. However, there are some people in the United States who obviously are indulging in wishful thinking.

We should point out that during the Second World War the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain condemned the preparations in Hitler's Germany for chemical warfare, and warned Germany of all the dangerous consequences that would flow from such a step. On 8 June 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated:

I have been loath to believe that any nation, even our present enemies, could or would be willing to loose upon mankind such terrible and inhuman weapons . . .

Use of such weapons is acknowledged to be illegal by the general opinion of civilized mankind. This country has not used them, and I hope that we never will [be compelled to] use them. I state categorically that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies.<sup>7</sup>

Those are the words of a President of the United States. The warnings of the members of the anti-Hitler coalition played their part and Hitler and his Generals did not dare to use such inhuman weapons.

Nevertheless, after the Second World War, when a proposal was put before the United States Congress to adopt a resolution concerning this statement by President Roosevelt, the Pentagon opposed the proposal.<sup>8</sup>

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 was the result of many years of work designed to bring about the prohibition of inhuman chemical and bacteriological weapons. It summarized and confirmed, as is stated in the text of the Protocol, as part of universally acknowledged international law those principles which mankind had observed long before. Basing itself upon the previous development of international law, the Geneva Protocol became a universally acknowledged norm of contemporary international law binding on all Powers—and we

<sup>6</sup> Department of the Army Field Manual FM 27-10 (July 1956), pp. 18-19.

<sup>7</sup> Department of State Bulletin, June 12, 1943, p. 507.

<sup>8</sup> See *Chemical-Biological-Radiological (CBR) Warfare and Its Disarmament Aspects: A Study Prepared by the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate* (Com. print, 86th Cong., 2d sess.), pp. 20-22.

should like to stress "all Powers"—including the United States, no matter what interpretation the Pentagon may place upon it.

The Soviet Government, in a note addressed to the United States Government on 26 March 1965, indicated that "the use against the people of South Viet-Nam of poisonous substances evokes universal indignation and condemnation".<sup>9</sup> The United States Government, it was pointed out in this note, should realize what a heavy responsibility it bears for the crimes committed against the Viet-Nameese people and the consequences this would lead to.

No State should base its policy and its conduct in international affairs on the idea that it is entitled to do what other Governments are not entitled to do. Surely it is clear what serious consequences would occur in the world if this principle was not observed and if everyone was able to do what he liked.

The Soviet Union categorically supported, at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, the initiative of Hungary which led to the adoption of the resolution which marked a positive step forward by the United Nations in the struggle for the prevention of chemical and bacteriological warfare. We similarly welcome and categorically support the draft resolution presented by Hungary for the consideration of the First Committee this year. The Hungarian draft resolution quite rightly stresses the most important thing, that is, the urgent need for strict and total observance by all States of the principles and norms laid down by the Geneva Protocol. It also notes that the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons is a crime against humanity. The Hungarian draft resolution renews the appeal to all States which have not yet done so to adhere to the Geneva Protocol.

This is of great practical significance, and it is not a coincidence that not only the General Assembly, but world public opinion too, and this includes distinguished scientists and specialists, demand that all States, without exception, become signatories of the Geneva Protocol. The Soviet delegation shares these views, which were expressed in a very detailed, thoroughly argued and well justified statement by the representative of Hungary.

We have also considered with attention the draft resolution presented by the delegation of Malta and the statement made by the representative of Malta, but we must state, with all candour, that if the draft resolution gave rise to serious doubts on our part, the statement of Ambassador Pardo has convinced the Soviet delegation to an even greater degree that the Maltese proposal cannot bring advantage, but only harm, and unjustified harm. The Maltese representative attempted to convince the members of the First Committee that the Geneva Protocol has become out-moded and could only serve for propaganda purposes. He alleged that it does not contain rational norms imposing effective, internationally legal limitations on the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and so on.

He tried to show that the Geneva Protocol is nebulous, cloudy, unclear and inadequate and that it did not cover all possible means of

<sup>9</sup>This Soviet note was rejected by the U.S. Embassy at Moscow but later distributed to the Security Council (S/6260). For comments by Ambassador Stevenson, see *Department of State Bulletin*, May 3, 1965, p. 688.

waging chemical and bacteriological warfare, especially the latest means. We have a question in connexion with this. Whom does all this argumentation help, those who are trying to strengthen a clearly-laid down international law prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, or those who are looking for loop-holes for further intensification of research and preparation for chemical and bacteriological warfare? Who would like to undermine the Geneva Convention, abolish it, and act in any way they want to? There is no need to make clear in whose interest it would be to decide it was necessary to replace the Geneva Protocol, especially when confirmation of the validity of this treaty is proposed in the Maltese draft resolution. Arguments that the Geneva Protocol is limited in content and does not cover all forms of chemical and bacteriological warfare are very dangerous and unfounded.

The Protocol provides unambiguously—

“. . . a prohibition of the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all”—I stress the word “all”—“other similar liquids, substances and processes.”

Thus the Geneva Protocol establishes a prohibition not only of gases but of all chemical liquids, substances and processes—I stress that, processes: all methods of waging bacteriological warfare.

Of course, anyone who wants to can disagree about any kind of formula; it is possible to quarrel about what biology is, what chemistry is and what should be understood by “substances” or “processes”. One can question everything from the ground up—definitions, and what constitutes chemical and bacteriological weapons—but does that not really confuse the clear question and only help those who want to bury the Geneva Protocol, which by no means limits itself to banning particular individual means or methods of waging chemical or bacteriological warfare but condemns and bans the use of all means, without any exception?

Therefore the Soviet delegation objects categorically to the recommendations designed to revise the provisions of the Geneva Protocol on the pretext of modernizing it, bringing it up to date or replacing it by a new treaty. Such a policy of replacement or revision would lead only to the undermining of most important and universally acknowledged legal standards, which are a very important and fundamental restraint on chemical and bacteriological warfare.

We regret that in his lengthy statement the representative of Malta found it appropriate to refer to certain authoritative sources—he did not make clear, of course, exactly what those were—which said that the Soviet Union was accelerating the development of chemical and bacteriological weapons, while at the same time passing over in silence the ample testimony to the very active preparation in the United States of chemical and bacteriological weapons; not to mention the fact that he did not refer to the use by United States forces in Viet-Nam of chemical weapons. We consider it necessary to draw the attention of the representative of Malta to the fact that he is addressing his remarks incorrectly. It is precisely the Soviet Union which is the most categorical and consistent opponent of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. The Soviet Union has long since ratified the

Geneva Protocol and calls upon all countries to follow its example. It is precisely the Soviet Union which is trying to obtain a strengthening and not a weakening of the ban contained in the Geneva Protocol. This can and must be obtained by pressure on those who persist in their refusal to acknowledge its force and significance.

The Soviet delegation calls urgently upon all members of the Committee to support the proposal of Hungary. The Soviet delegation appeals to all members of the Committee not to permit the elimination of universally acknowledged standards of international law concerning the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and not to allow the decision of the twenty-first session of the General Assembly on this question to be deposited in the archives and thus make easier the task of those forces which are making every effort to speed up and intensify the arms race and to use barbarous means of mass destruction. We call upon the delegation of Malta not to insist on its proposal but to associate itself with the common efforts designed to free the peoples from the scourge of chemical and bacteriological warfare.

**Statement by the Netherlands Representative (Eschauzier)  
to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Chem-  
ical and Biological Weapons, December 13, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

Mr. Chairman, with your permission I should like to address myself to the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Malta concerning the use of chemical and biological weapons.<sup>2</sup>

During the last session of the General Assembly my delegation had already stated that in its view the Geneva Protocol<sup>3</sup> was outdated and that the time had come for its review and revision. In fact, it was our opinion that that was already long overdue. Therefore, I wholeheartedly concur with the purport and intent of the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Malta, but I should like to make two suggestions.

It appears to me that, although outdated, nevertheless, the Geneva Protocol remains the only instrument of its kind and it is therefore important that, while the study recommended by the representative of Malta is being undertaken, such restraining influences as the Geneva Protocol may have should not be lost. This requirement could in my opinion be met by calling attention to last year's resolution 2162 B (XXI).<sup>4</sup> By inserting a reference to that resolution in the preamble of the Maltese draft resolution, we would reaffirm that the General Assembly:

1. Calls for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol . . . .
2. Invites all States to accede to the General Protocol . . . .

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV.1549, pp. 2-6.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 625-626.

<sup>3</sup> *Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents, 1949-55*, pp. 169-170.

<sup>4</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 798-799.

I suggest that the relevant sentence might best be inserted between the second and third paragraphs of the preamble. It would thus become a new third paragraph:

Reaffirming its resolution 2162 B (XXI), adopted on 5 December 1966. . . .

I hope that by this insertion the representative of Hungary would, at least to a certain extent, be satisfied and feel that one of the omissions in the Maltese draft, which he had pointed out, has been adequately dealt with.

Under these circumstances, I respectfully ask the representative of Hungary whether he would be willing to reconsider his own draft resolution<sup>6</sup> and not press for a vote on it. It appears to me that if, on the one hand, we adopt unanimously—as I hope—the draft resolution put forward by the representative of Malta calling for a study—and I would like to underscore, for a study—on the definition and the use of chemical and biological weapons, it would, on the other hand, be inconsistent and untimely also to adopt a resolution containing principles or a declaration on a matter of great complexity, the study of which has as yet to be undertaken and on which the Secretary-General is to make a report.

I have one further point. Yesterday's discussion centered also on the exact meaning of the words "radiological weapons". It would seem to me that these words could best be deleted since it is not quite clear to me what the meaning of radiological weapons is in the present context. It might therefore be better to speak simply of "chemical and biological weapons".

That was the amendment I wished to put forward formally.

### Netherlands Amendments to the Maltese Draft Resolution on the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, December 13, 1967<sup>1</sup>

1. Insert a new second preambular paragraph reading as follows:

"Reaffirming its resolution 2162 B (XXI) adopted on 5 December 1966,"<sup>2</sup>

2. In the first preambular paragraph and in operative paragraphs 1 and 3, the phrase "chemical, biological and radiological weapons" should be amended to read: "chemical and biological weapons".

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, pp. 633-634.

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/L.415, Dec. 13, 1967. The Maltese draft resolution appears *ante*, pp. 625-626.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 798-799.

## Revised Maltese Draft Resolution Introduced in the First Committee of the General Assembly: Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, December 13, 1967<sup>1</sup>

*The General Assembly,*

*Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law,*

*Considering that weapons of mass destruction constitute a danger to all mankind and are incompatible with the accepted norms of civilization,*

*Considering further that the use of many of the chemical and biological weapons which have been or are being developed may constitute a great threat to mankind and that the peoples of the world should be made fully aware of this threat,*

*Reaffirming its resolution 2162 B (XXI) adopted on 5 December 1966,<sup>2</sup>*

*Noting that the interpretation of the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, dated 17 June 1925,<sup>3</sup> is contraverted and that some of its provisions could usefully be reviewed for the purpose of revision, updating or replacement,*

1. *Recommends* that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament consider as a matter of urgency the problems relating to the definition and use of chemical and biological weapons with a view to revision, updating or replacement of the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare a concise report on the nature and probable effects of existing chemical and biological weapons and on the economic and health implications of the possible use of such weapons, with particular reference to States that are not in a position to establish comprehensive methods of protection;

3. *Recommends* that the report be based on accessible material and prepared with the assistance of qualified consultant experts appointed by the Secretary-General;

4. *Requests* further that the report be transmitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and to Governments of Member States in time to permit its consideration at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly.

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/L.411/Rev. 1, Dec. 13, 1967. On Dec. 15 the Maltese representative informed the First Committee that he would not insist on a vote on his revised draft resolution if no vote was requested on the Hungarian draft resolution (*ante*, pp. 633-634). The Hungarian representative announced that his draft resolution would not be pressed to a vote, and neither resolution was voted on.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 798-799.

<sup>3</sup> *Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents, 1919-55*, pp. 169-170.

Statement by the Pakistani Representative (Shahi) to the  
First Committee of the General Assembly, December 13,  
1967<sup>1</sup>

Our debate this year on disarmament questions is limited in scope and depth. This is so primarily because of the nature of the report submitted by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in document A/6591.<sup>2</sup> That report makes it clear that the Eighteen-Nation Committee has concentrated its major efforts on the elaboration of a non-proliferation treaty, and consequently has not been able to devote sufficient time to consideration of the question of a comprehensive test ban and other questions of general and complete disarmament.

My delegation fully appreciates the reasons for this concentration of effort. We were among those who stressed repeatedly the top priority of the question of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. We also suggested that the problem be isolated from other disarmament questions and negotiated as a single item. In agreement with the overwhelming majority of the United Nations membership we emphasized that the emergence of a sixth nuclear Power would inevitably provoke a chain reaction which would totally transform power relationships in the world, and indeed lead to a nuclear free-for-all.

Our demand for the early completion of a non-proliferation treaty has been greatly fortified by the findings contained in the Secretary-General's report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons.<sup>3</sup> That report makes it clear that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by any country in addition to the present nuclear weapon Powers would have far-reaching political implications not only for that country but for its neighbours, and indeed the whole region. As our colleague from Finland, Ambassador Jakobson, stated a short while ago:

The risk of becoming part of the potential target area in a nuclear war would be shared by the neighbouring countries as well.<sup>4</sup>

Addressing the 1584th meeting of the General Assembly during the general debate this year, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan stated:

Pakistan has welcomed the identical drafts of a non-proliferation treaty submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee by the Soviet Union and the United States. It is our fervent hope that the differences on the inspection clause will soon be overcome and that the views of the non-aligned countries relating to the balance of mutual obligations and responsibilities on the part of both nuclear and non-nuclear countries will be accommodated to the greatest practicable extent. Certainly, no Member of the United Nations would wish that, while the non-nuclear States are required to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the nuclear Powers should not even begin the process of nuclear disarmament. At the same time Pakistan would hope that, while striving for the articulation of the principle of balance in responsibilities and obligations, the non-nuclear countries will not make their acceptance of a non-proliferation treaty conditional or contingent on an agreement between the nuclear Powers on measures of nuclear disarmament. Insistence on such measures in the light

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV.1548, pp. 36-47.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 622-623.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 476-513.

<sup>4</sup> A/C.1/PV.1548, p. 6.

of our experience of disarmament negotiations would delay and even prejudice the conclusion of a treaty and defeat the end that all of us seek to achieve—namely, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The value of the treaty will largely depend on how soon it is concluded and on the extent of the unqualified adherence that it commands.<sup>5</sup>

My delegation fully understands that the delay in finalizing the draft of a non-proliferation treaty is not due to any lack of effort by the Eighteen-Nation Committee, and particularly its two co-Chairmen. Their energetic pursuit of the goal of non-proliferation has earned them a measure of gratitude from the entire world community.

Nevertheless, when we consider the working of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament the thought expressed by many delegations in this Committee during several previous sessions cannot be suppressed altogether in our minds. It pertains to the representative character of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament as the main agency for disarmament negotiations. The Eighteen-Nation Committee was constituted as the negotiating organ for disarmament on the basis of a three-fold division of the world into Western, Socialist and non-aligned countries. We have only to look at present international realities to ask whether the world can be so neatly divided any longer and whether political developments have not rendered that division obsolete.

Moreover, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament does not have the benefit of the participation of two nuclear Powers. Nor does it include many non-nuclear States which are militarily significant in the regions to which they belong or are responsible for the defence of large populations. The issues of disarmament are of vital and urgent concern to a large number of States—certainly no less so than they are to the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. At the same time, they do not lend themselves to bilateral negotiations. The Disarmament Commission as at present constituted does not meet every year. In these circumstances, the practice of channelling significant proposals regarding disarmament through the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament cannot but produce a degree of frustration among those who do not participate in active negotiations on the subject.

The question therefore arises, has not the time arrived when the United Nations needs to take a fresh look at the present disarmament machinery? Developments since the time when the Eighteen-Nation Committee was constituted demand that that machinery be brought into a closer relationship with political realities. Unless that is done we fear that, except for sporadic progress, like the achievement of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty in 1963<sup>6</sup> and the non-proliferation treaty the achievement of which is now considered likely, disarmament negotiations will continue to present a picture of sterility and stalemate.

The present bleak picture with regard to disarmament is exemplified by the complete lack of progress regarding the cessation of tests in all environments. My delegation cannot but express its concern that the failure to end underground testing not only has permitted the arms race in nuclear weapons to continue but may even undermine the

<sup>5</sup> A/PV.1584 (prov.), pp. 61-62.

<sup>6</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

stability of the Moscow Test-Ban Treaty. At the rate that underground testing is going on, one side or the other may sooner or later achieve a breakthrough in the development of new weapons, which may in turn require the other to neutralize the advantage so gained. Such a contingency is bound to bring the Test-Ban Treaty under intense strain.

In this context, my delegation commends the concrete suggestions made by Mrs. Myrdal, the representative of Sweden, in her statement yesterday.<sup>7</sup> There is urgent need for the question of verification, and particularly of inspection, to be re-examined in a new light, taking into account recent scientific and technological developments.

When one considers the problem of the cessation of tests, as indeed the larger problem of general and complete disarmament, may not one wonder whether the continued exclusion from our deliberations of a major Power is not turning out to be far too costly for all mankind—apart from all other considerations of a political and legal nature?

On the subject of general and complete disarmament we have heard the statements of the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union<sup>8</sup> and the representative of the United States.<sup>9</sup> As I mentioned earlier, this year the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has not been able to devote sufficient time to examining the question of general and complete disarmament because of the need to give priority to the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. Nevertheless we cannot but express some regret that, despite the fact that eight years have passed since the Soviet Union put forward its revolutionary proposal for general and complete disarmament,<sup>10</sup> no agreement, even of a partial nature, has yet been achieved. It was our hope that agreement on at least partial measures of disarmament would be reached by the super-Powers during this time and that the savings which would be effected in their military budgets could be diverted, at least in part, to the amelioration of the conditions of life in the developing countries.

Ten years ago the delegations of Costa Rica and Pakistan moved an amendment in this Committee to a resolution on disarmament, to the effect that part of the savings that would result from the reduction of armaments should be earmarked for the purposes of developing the underdeveloped countries. The General Assembly adopted that amendment. However, the promise remains as far from fulfilment as ever.

Our observations in this debate would have been unrelievedly pessimistic if we did not have before us two documents of capital importance. The first is the report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons.<sup>11</sup> The other is the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.<sup>12</sup> I shall not deal with the substantive aspects at this stage of the debate. It is the view of my delegation that, although by them-

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, pp. 652-657.

<sup>8</sup> *Ante*, pp. 627-633.

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, pp. 647-652.

<sup>10</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 1480-1474.

<sup>11</sup> *Ante*, pp. 476-513.

<sup>12</sup> *Ante*, pp. 405-411.

selves those reports do not record any progress towards disarmament, each opens fresh perspectives for such progress in the near future.

As regards the Secretary-General's report, we feel that the Organization is indebted to the Member States whose initiative led to General Assembly resolution 2162 A (XXI).<sup>12</sup> We are also indebted to the consultant experts who devoted their time and energy to the completion of that report and to the Secretary-General himself for his suggestions last year which inspired that effort. It is a fact of no negligible importance that, for the first time, the United Nations has been able independently to weigh and explore the implications of nuclear weapons.

It seems to us that the parts of the report which concern the economic and security implications of the acquisition and further development of nuclear weapons will have a significant impact on present-day political and strategic debates. That being so, we are happy to co-sponsor the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1, which recommends the widest dissemination of the contents of that report throughout the world.<sup>14</sup>

Commenting on the report the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, remarked how such positive and consequently creative co-operation came naturally to experts. She added:

That in itself is a fact of which we have as yet not taken full account. It indicates that when the debate unfolds on the level of reason, differences in national outlook do not function as obstacles, however sensitive and controversial the issue.<sup>13</sup>

I am reminded here of the suggestion which the delegation of Pakistan made during the eighty-sixth meeting of the Disarmament Commission on 21 May 1965. In our statement at that meeting my delegation pointed out that one of the major factors responsible for the lack of progress in disarmament was that the United Nations did not have directly at its disposal such independent scientific expertise as would help to resolve controversies on the many complicated technical issues which were, more and more, bound to arise in the field of disarmament. We noted with regret that the United Nations had not even made a beginning towards enlisting the services of that body of the scientific community which was capable of seeing and serving the interests of humanity as they transcend national power interests. We observed that there was a large volume of technical studies available to the world scientific community from which suitable conclusions could be drawn which would furnish a basis for the appraisal of different proposals for disarmament as they came along. We suggested, therefore, that the time might not be far distant when the enlisting of impartial scientific advice in the service of disarmament would become a feasible proposition.<sup>16</sup>

My delegation is now happy to see, in the Secretary-General's valuable report, the first example of how the results of the arms race and of the explosions to which that race might lead can be authoritatively and impartially estimated for us by experts with unquestioned knowl-

<sup>12</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, p. 798.

<sup>13</sup> Identical with pt. A of G.A. resolution 2342 (XXII), *post*, pp. 729-730.

<sup>14</sup> A/C.1/PV.1545, p. 22.

<sup>16</sup> See *Disarmament Commission Official Records: 86th Meeting*, p. 6.

edge of the subject. Even though the facts marshalled in this particular report can be said to have been assimilated in the general public awareness, they still needed to be presented with precision and authority. I say that because there has not been a lack of academicians who, combining a modicum of scientific talent with a total absence of human compassion, have been trying to persuade us that the effects of a thermonuclear war could be made manageable—in other words, that we could live with the bomb. Doubts have thus been sown about the necessity for nuclear disarmament for the survival of the human race. Those doubts have now been finally set aside in a document like the Secretary-General's report.

There are other subjects on which authentic advice of this type would be of immense benefit. As an example we have only to remind ourselves of the controversies regarding the necessity for on-site inspections which hampered negotiations on the Partial Test-Ban Treaty<sup>17</sup> and still hamper the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban agreement. Surely if impartial technical knowledge were harnessed in the service of the United Nations, those controversies would lose much of their obstructive character.

Here I would refer again to the statement made yesterday by the representative of Sweden.<sup>18</sup> She informed us that as a result of independent research, using new identification methods, it had been found that those identification methods would permit a control system of underground tests with a sufficient degree of reliability to deter parties to a treaty from committing violations.

It, however, has been the contention of some nuclear Powers that such methods are not foolproof. Now, it is precisely in situations such as these that independent scientific expertise, in the service of the United Nations, could relieve us from utter helplessness and passivity in the face of technological controversies.

For these reasons, we sometimes wonder whether it would not be necessary to have an independent disarmament agency at the service of the United Nations which would be staffed by scientific, economic and legal experts of unquestioned calibre. I am not in a position to make a formal proposal to this effect, but I would suggest that this is a thought which needs to be kept in mind in the years to come.

As regards the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States,<sup>19</sup> my delegation will make its comments during the debate on agenda item 28, which is scheduled later this week. However, a general reference to the question of security assurances is in order here because it illuminates one of the avenues along which we can make some solid progress towards disarmament.

May I here quote from the statement of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan at the 1584th meeting of the General Assembly. He stated:

Last year the General Assembly, in resolution 2153-B (XXI), decided to convene a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States to consider how best their security can be guaranteed . . .<sup>20</sup> Pakistan had made it clear that the proposal was conceived to complement, not duplicate; to supplement, and not compete with,

<sup>17</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 452-457.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 405-411.

<sup>20</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 749-750.

the work of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on the non-proliferation treaty.

It was in that spirit that the Preparatory Committee established by resolution 2153-B (XXI) decided to await developments in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee as long as possible before commencing its task. . . . It is apparent from the report of the Preparatory Committee that it has tried its best to ensure that the non-nuclear-weapon States Conference will deliberate essentially on those questions which arise directly from the conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty but are outside the scope of the treaty.<sup>21</sup>

My delegation considers that the Conference envisaged in this report is necessary for the following reasons.

First, the draft non-proliferation treaty under discussion in the ENDC<sup>22</sup> requires to be supplemented by the provisions of security guarantees to establish a non-proliferation régime. In this context we would like to take note with appreciation of the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union, and also the United Kingdom, attach great importance to the question of security assurances for non-nuclear States.

Second, the approach of the nuclear Powers in the ENDC, based on the concept of assurances through the existing machinery of the United Nations, needs to be considered by the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Third, such consideration can best be given in a forum where the non-nuclear-weapon States can reconcile their differences of approach and can exchange views with the nuclear Powers in regard to the assurances that the latter may be prepared to offer outside the context of alliances.

Fourth, there is need to make special preparation and to afford adequate time for the consideration of the subject of security guarantees in order to facilitate a consensus on the nature and the form of guarantees to be provided by the nuclear Powers.

Fifth, the interests of the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States require to be harmonized in order to achieve universal adherence to the non-proliferation treaty by the non-nuclear Powers.

As my Foreign Minister said in the statement from which I quoted before:

We would hope that the United States and the Soviet Union, and also the other nuclear Powers, would give favourable consideration to the conference of non-nuclear weapon States as the appropriate forum for the continuation of a substantive and full consideration of the problem of security guarantees.<sup>23</sup>

### North Atlantic Council Communique, December 14, 1967<sup>1</sup>

The first Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council to be held at the new Brussels headquarters ended on 14th December, 1967.

2. Ministers approved the report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance, prepared in conformity with the decisions taken on 16th De-

<sup>21</sup> A/PV.1584 (prov.), p. 62.

<sup>22</sup> *Ante*, pp. 338-341.

<sup>23</sup> A/PV.1594 (prov.), p. 63.

<sup>1</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 8, 1968, pp. 40-52.

ember, 1966 on the initiative of the Belgian Foreign Minister.<sup>2</sup> The report is annexed to this communiqué.<sup>3</sup>

3. The Council examined developments in the international situation since their last meeting. Ministers reviewed the efforts made by their governments to improve East/West relations and noted the extensive bilateral contacts made in recent months. They expressed the hope that these efforts might lead to progress in the settlement of outstanding European problems. Ministers also discussed long-range policy questions, especially those covered in the report on Future Tasks of the Alliance.

4. The Council discussed proposals presented by the "North Atlantic Assembly" of Parliamentarians at their recent meeting for closer co-operation between themselves and the Council. The Secretary General was authorised to study ways and means for this purpose and to submit suggestions to the Council.

5. Ministers emphasised the importance of promoting progress in disarmament and arms control, including concrete measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They reaffirmed their view that, if conditions permit, a balanced reduction of forces on both sides could constitute a significant step towards security in Europe.

6. The Council recalled the views expressed in the declaration on Germany issued on 16th December, 1966. Ministers emphasised that the peaceful settlement of the German question on a basis which would take account of the German people's fundamental right to re-unification was an essential factor for a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. In reviewing the present state of the German question, Ministers were informed by their German colleague about his Government's increased efforts to improve relations with Eastern European countries and to promote East/West détente. He emphasised that it was in this spirit that his Government was also trying to handle the problems arising from the division of Germany. Considering the difficulties of reaching an early solution, Ministers agreed that at present the only realistic possibility for progress remained the step-by-step approach advocated and applied by the Federal Government. With regard to Berlin, the Ministers confirmed their declaration of 16th December, 1958.<sup>4</sup>

7. Ministers noted the Secretary General's report on his "Watching Brief" and invited him to continue his activities in this sphere. They expressed their appreciation of the important rôle played by the Secretary General in reducing the recent crisis concerning Cyprus and Greek-Turkish relations. They expressed satisfaction with the agreement between Turkey and Greece on the steps being taken to resolve the crisis, taking advantage, as appropriate, of the actions of the United Nations. They reaffirmed their conviction that Turkey and Greece should, in the spirit of the solidarity of the Alliance, continue their efforts to facilitate a peaceful and rapid solution of the Cyprus problem.

8. Ministers considered the report on Technological Co-operation prepared in response to the Resolution adopted on 14th June, 1967 on

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 9, 1967, p. 49.

<sup>3</sup> *Infra.*

<sup>4</sup> *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pp. 602-603.

the initiative of the Foreign Minister of Italy.<sup>5</sup> They invited the Council in Permanent Session assisted by competent organs of the Alliance to continue its studies on the Alliance's role in the field of technology, including the possibilities for applying defence technology to civil needs. The aim is to encourage co-operation between member countries and to contribute towards narrowing the technological disparities which may exist between these countries. Ministers also invited the Council in Permanent Session to develop the most efficient and economical ways for co-ordinating the various activities of the Alliance in the field of defence technology.

9. Ministers considered and approved a report on Civil Emergency Planning. Stressing the vital importance of such planning, they noted the progress which had been achieved and the tasks which remained to be accomplished.

10. Ministers met as the Defence Planning Committee on 12th December 1967, to review the work accomplished since their previous meeting on 9th May 1967, and to give directions for future work.

11. They agreed that one of the foundations for achieving an improvement in East/West relations and a peaceful settlement in Europe must be NATO's continuing military strength and capability to deter aggression. In this connection they noted that the Soviet Union continues to expend increasing resources upon its powerful military forces and is developing types of forces designed to enable it to achieve a significant military presence in other parts of the world. They also observed that during the past year there has been a marked expansion in Soviet forces in the Mediterranean.

12. Ministers recalled that at their previous meeting they had given political, strategic, and economic guidance to the NATO Military Authorities for the development of an up-to-date strategic concept and an up-to-date five-year force plan covering the period up to the end of 1972. They adopted the revised strategic concept submitted by the Military Committee following the first comprehensive review of NATO's strategy since 1956. This concept, which adapts NATO's strategy to current political, military, and technological developments, is based upon a flexible and balanced range of appropriate responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression or threats of aggression. These responses, subject to appropriate political control, are designed, first to deter aggression and thus preserve peace; but, should aggression unhappily occur, to maintain the security and integrity of the North Atlantic Treaty area within the concept of forward defence.

13. Ministers also noted the force commitments undertaken by member nations for the year 1968, and for the first time adopted a five-year NATO force plan, covering the period 1968-1972. They gave directions for the development in 1968 of a force plan for the period 1969-1973 in accordance with the procedures for five-year rolling planning adopted in December 1966.

14. Ministers devoted particular attention to the security of the flank regions of Allied Command Europe.

15. They decided to transform the "Matchmaker" Naval Training

<sup>5</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, July 3, 1967, p. 15.

Squadron into a Standing Naval Force Atlantic of destroyer-type ships. This force, continuously operational, will enhance existing co-operation between the naval forces of member countries.

16. France did not take part in the discussions referred to in paragraphs 10 to 15 and did not associate herself with the corresponding decisions.

17. The regular Spring Ministerial Meeting for 1968 will be held in Reykjavik.

ANNEX TO COMMUNIQUE

FUTURE TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE

Report of the Council

A year ago, on the initiative of the Foreign Minister of Belgium, the governments of the fifteen nations of the Alliance resolved to "study the future tasks which face the Alliance, and its procedures for fulfilling them in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for durable peace". The present report sets forth the general tenor and main principles emerging from this examination of the future tasks of the Alliance.

2. Studies were undertaken by Messers. Schütz, Watson, Spaak, Kohler and Patijn. The Council wishes to express its appreciation and thanks to these eminent personalities for their efforts and for the analyses they produced.

3. The exercise has shown that the Alliance is a dynamic and vigorous organization which is constantly adapting itself to changing conditions. It also has shown that its future tasks can be handled within the terms of the Treaty by building on the methods and procedures which have proved their value over many years.

4. Since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 the international situation has changed significantly and the political tasks of the Alliance have assumed a new dimension. Amongst other developments, the Alliance has played a major part in stopping Communist expansion in Europe; the USSR has become one of the two world super powers but the Communist world is no longer monolithic; the Soviet doctrine of "peaceful co-existence" has changed the nature of the confrontation with the West but not the basic problems. Although the disparity between the power of the United States and that of the European states remains, Europe has recovered and is on its way towards unity. The process of decolonisation has transformed European relations with the rest of the world; at the same time, major problems have arisen in the relations between developed and developing countries.

5. The Atlantic Alliance has two main functions. Its first function is to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur. Since its inception, the Alliance has successfully fulfilled this task. But the possibility of a crisis cannot be excluded as long as the central political issues in Europe, first and foremost the German question, remain unsolved. Moreover, the situation of instability and uncertainty still precludes

a balanced reduction of military forces. Under these conditions, the Allies will maintain as necessary, a suitable military capability to assure the balance of forces, thereby creating a climate of stability, security and confidence.

In this climate the Alliance can carry out its second function, to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved. Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary. Collective defense is a stabilizing factor in world politics. It is the necessary condition for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions. The way to peace and stability in Europe rests in particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of détente. The participation of the USSR and the USA will be necessary to achieve a settlement of the political problems in Europe.

6. From the beginning the Atlantic Alliance has been a co-operative grouping of states sharing the same ideals and with a high degree of common interest. Their cohesion and solidarity provide an element of stability within the Atlantic area.

7. As sovereign states the Allies are not obliged to subordinate their policies to collective decision. The Alliance affords an effective forum and clearing house for the exchange of information and views; thus, each of the Allies can decide his policy in the light of close knowledge of each others' problems and objectives. To this end the practice of frank and timely consultations needs to be deepened and improved. Each Ally should play its full part in promoting an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, bearing in mind that the pursuit of détente must not be allowed to split the Alliance. The chances of success will clearly be greatest if the Allies remain on parallel courses, especially in matters of close concern to them all: their actions will thus be all the more effective.

8. No peaceful order in Europe is possible without a major effort by all concerned. The evolution of Soviet and East European policies gives ground for hope that those governments may eventually come to recognise the advantages to them of collaborating in working towards a peaceful settlement. But no final and stable settlement in Europe is possible without a solution of the German question which lies at the heart of present tensions in Europe. Any such settlement must end the unnatural barriers between Eastern and Western Europe, which are most clearly and cruelly manifested in the division of Germany.

9. Accordingly the Allies are resolved to direct their energies to this purpose by realistic measures designed to further a détente in East-West relations. The relaxation of tensions is not the final goal but is part of a long-term process to promote better relations and to foster a European settlement. The ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees.

10. Currently, the development of contacts between the countries of Western and Eastern Europe is now mainly on a bilateral basis. Certain subjects, of course, require by their very nature, a multilateral solution.

11. The problem of German reunification and its relationship to a European settlement has normally been dealt with in exchanges be-

tween the Soviet Union and the three Western powers having special responsibilities in this field. In the preparation of such exchanges the Federal Republic of Germany has regularly joined the three Western powers in order to reach a common position. The other Allies will continue to have their views considered in timely discussions among the Allies about Western policy on this subject, without in any way impairing the special responsibilities in question.

12. The Allies will examine and review suitable policies designed to achieve a just and stable order in Europe, to overcome the division of Germany and to foster European security. This will be part of a process of active and constant preparation for the time when fruitful discussions of these complex questions may be possible bilaterally or multilaterally between Eastern and Western nations.

13. The Allies are studying disarmament and practical arms control measures, including the possibility of balanced force reductions. These studies will be intensified. Their active pursuit reflects the will of the Allies to work for an effective détente with the East.

14. The Allies will examine with particular attention the defence problems of the exposed areas e.g. the South-Eastern flank. In this respect the current situation in the Mediterranean presents special problems, bearing in mind that the current crisis in the Middle-East falls within the responsibilities of the United Nations.

15. The North Atlantic Treaty area cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of the world. Crises and conflicts arising outside the area may impair its security either directly or by affecting the global balance. Allied countries contribute individually within the United Nations and other international organisations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the solution of important international problems. In accordance with established usage the Allies or such of them as wish to do so will also continue to consult on such problems without commitment and as the case may demand.

16. In the light of these findings, the Ministers directed the Council in permanent session to carry out, in the years ahead, the detailed follow-up resulting from this study. This will be done either by intensifying work already in hand or by activating highly specialized studies by more systematic use of experts and officials sent from capitals.

17. Ministers found that the study by the Special Group confirmed the importance of the role which the Alliance is called upon to play during the coming years in the promotion of détente and the strengthening of peace. Since significant problems have not yet been examined in all their aspects, and other problems of no less significance which have arisen from the latest political and strategic developments have still to be examined, the Ministers have directed the Permanent Representatives to put in hand the study of these problems without delay, following such procedures as shall be deemed most appropriate by the Council in permanent session, in order to enable further reports to be subsequently submitted to the Council in Ministerial Session.

**Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the  
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nonprolif-  
eration of Nuclear Weapons, December 14, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

2. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is today holding its last meeting this year. After a long session, which has continued virtually throughout the year, the Committee is interrupting its meetings for the Christmas holidays and will meet again early next year to continue and complete the task on which it has been engaged.

3. In reviewing the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee at its current session, work which has mainly consisted of the examination, discussion and preparation of a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the consideration of matters connected with this treaty, it should be noted that, although the preparation of such a draft treaty has not yet been completed, considerable work has nevertheless been done and definite progress made towards the solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Draft treaties on non-proliferation were submitted for the Committee's consideration by the Soviet Union and the United States.<sup>2</sup> Although these two drafts were submitted without a clause on control, the very fact that they were laid before the Committee, that they contain clear-cut provisions for a non-proliferation treaty, defining the basic obligations of parties to that treaty, and that they were fully discussed in the Committee is evidence of definite progress towards the solution of the extremely important problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

4. During the discussion of the draft treaty in the Committee, a number of extremely important observations were made and several proposals were put forward concerning additions and amendments to the draft treaty and the solution of the non-proliferation problem as a whole.

5. Much attention was paid during the debate to matters relating to the peaceful application of nuclear energy. Many members of the Committee, in discussing the problem of non-proliferation and the corresponding draft treaty designed to solve it, expressed concern that the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty might hamper the development of the peaceful application of the great scientific discoveries in the field of nuclear energy. In this connexion, a number of important observations and proposals deserving careful study were made in the Committee. These observations and proposals were considered in detail both during the Committee's meetings and during unofficial exchanges of views among its members.

6. The Soviet Union firmly adheres to the view that the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, far from being any obstacle to the peaceful utilization of the atom, should be of direct and substantial assistance to all non-nuclear countries in developing the various peaceful applications of atomic energy at the national and international levels. We accordingly believe that the task is to incorpo-

<sup>1</sup> ENDC, PV.356, pp. 4-9.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 338-341.

rate in the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons now under consideration by the Committee such additions and amendments as would create the most favourable conditions for the utilization of the atom for peaceful purposes and for wide international co-operation in this field.

7. During the Committee's discussion of matters relating to the peaceful utilization of the atom, much attention was given to the important problem of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The importance of this problem and its bearing on the non-proliferation treaty are explained by the fact that the processes involved in the production of explosive devices for peaceful purposes are essentially the same as those involved in the production of nuclear weapons, and that explosive devices for peaceful nuclear explosions can be used for military purposes. The transfer to non-nuclear countries or the production by these countries of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful nuclear explosions would thus mean the direct proliferation of nuclear weapons, and should be prohibited in accordance with the objectives of the treaty on the non-proliferation of such weapons we are preparing.

8. At the same time, the potential importance of the use of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes cannot be denied. The conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty, far from preventing or hampering parties to that treaty from enjoying the advantages of the peaceful utilization of such explosions, should guarantee the establishment of conditions enabling them to enjoy, without discrimination, all the benefits associated with peaceful nuclear explosions. In this connexion, members of the Committee made many comments which deserve attention and submitted specific proposals for the amplification of the draft non-proliferation treaty by provisions designed to solve problems relating to peaceful nuclear explosions. These proposals and comments received thorough consideration both at the Committee's meetings and during unofficial consultations between its members. We hope a solution will be found to the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions that will not create loopholes for the proliferation of nuclear weapons and will at the same time ensure that non-nuclear countries can enjoy the advantages which may be derived from such explosions.

9. Much attention has been given in the Committee to the problem of ensuring that, after the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, measures are taken with a view to the implementation of further steps towards nuclear disarmament. A number of comments were made on this subject, which reflected the general desire of members of the Committee and their firm intention to regard the non-proliferation treaty, not as a separate, isolated measure in the field of partial disarmament measures, but as one stage on the road towards the accomplishment of the task of nuclear as well as of general and complete disarmament.

10. This is precisely how the Soviet side believes this problem should be solved and it regards the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty merely as a step in this direction. We base ourselves on the assumption that the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty should create more favourable conditions for the attainment of agreement on other urgent measures of disarmament and particularly, of nuclear disarmament. We realize, however, that the inclusion in a non-proliferation treaty

of specific commitments in respect of other nuclear disarmament measures would cause very serious difficulties in the solution of the problem to which we are now devoting our attention. Attempts to associate the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with the solution of other complex problems of nuclear disarmament would hamper the non-proliferation negotiations and impede the attainment of agreement on this matter without facilitating the implementation of other disarmament measures.

11. The proposals and views put forward by members of the Committee on this question are receiving careful and detailed consideration by the Soviet side, and we hope that specific comments and proposals will be submitted for the Committee's consideration which take account of the results of the Committee's discussion on this important matter.

12. In addition to the matters I have just mentioned, the Committee also considered other problems relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Cogent arguments and important proposals were put forward on these problems too. We will not deal with them in this statement, but intend to give our views on them at future meetings of the Committee.

13. Our general attitude to the submission of additions and amendments to the draft treaty is that the treaty should provide a solution to the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that it should be a strong and lasting international instrument, closing all openings and loopholes for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and should make an important contribution to disarmament and the consolidation of peace and security.

14. In speaking of the important work done by the Committee in its examination, discussion and preparation of a draft treaty on non-proliferation, reference must be made to the difficulties which we encountered in this connexion and which compel us to admit that, despite lengthy negotiations connected with the examination and discussion of the non-proliferation problem in the Committee, we still do not have a complete draft of a non-proliferation treaty. One important reason for this situation is, as you know, the lack of agreement and understanding on the question of control over the implementation of such a treaty. In the time during which this question has been under discussion, a satisfactory agreement could long since have been reached and an agreed text of an article on control submitted to the Committee. Unfortunately, the solution of this problem is being impeded by the negative position adopted by certain circles which, in connexion with the article on control, are laying down conditions essentially intended to hamper and prevent a solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the conclusion of a treaty on the subject, the draft of which is being prepared here in the Committee. The negative effects of the opposition of certain circles to the adoption of an appropriate system of control over the implementation of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are, of course, obvious.

15. In referring to the problem of control, we would re-emphasize that the Soviet side firmly insists that there should be a single system of control for all non-nuclear States parties to the non-proliferation treaty. The Soviet Union, as we have already repeatedly stated believes

that control over the implementation of the treaty should be exercised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose system of guarantees is generally recognized, has been tested by time, and works in practice.<sup>3</sup> All the non-nuclear States which, under the non-proliferation treaty, would undertake not to manufacture nuclear weapons or to receive them from anyone whatsoever must be placed on an equal footing; in this matter there should be no privileges for some non-nuclear countries.

16. We note with satisfaction that, during the discussion in the Committee, many delegations expressed themselves in favour of establishing a single system of IAEA guarantees for control over the implementation of the treaty in order to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes to the production of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Outside this Committee, a clear majority of the countries of the world also support this particular solution to the problem of control. We consider that agreement on this matter is vital and must be achieved if progress is to be made towards the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

17. The Soviet delegation would like to express the hope that the obstacles being raised to the preparation of acceptable provisions for a clause on control over the non-proliferation treaty will eventually be removed, and that a satisfactory solution will be found to this problem in the near future.

18. During the Committee's current session, many delegations made very important observations concerning security guarantees for non-nuclear States parties to the non-proliferation treaty. An adequate solution has not yet been found to this problem. The Soviet Union supports a positive solution to this vital international problem, and hopes that it will be solved in accordance with the interests of the maintenance of peace and security throughout the world.

19. Now that we are suspending the meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee for a short period, we should like to express the hope that members of the Committee will take advantage of the recess to ponder the issues connected with the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to seek solutions to those of them that stand in the way of the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. This is precisely how the Soviet delegation views the utilization of the Committee's recess. In 1968 the Soviet side will, as it has done during the current year, endeavour to promote a solution of all outstanding problems connected with the non-proliferation treaty as rapidly as possible. We hope that the other participants in the Committee's deliberations will do everything in their power to bring about the speediest possible agreement on unresolved problems and to complete the preparation of a non-proliferation treaty. The time available for the solution of these problems is now a vital factor. We are therefore bound to take this factor into account and must not overlook a single opportunity for the immediate solution of the non-proliferation problem in the interest of the peoples of all the countries of the world.

20. In conclusion, we should like to express the hope that you will all spend the forthcoming recess and holidays enjoyably; we also wish

<sup>3</sup> For the I.A.E.A. safeguards system, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 446-480.

you a Happy New Year and renewed strength to continue the important work we are called upon to do here. In this connexion, we should like to thank Mr. Protitch, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, for all the help which he and his colleagues have given us. We are also grateful to all the staff who have serviced our Committee and who have been of great assistance in all aspects of our work, including interpretation and translation, which is of vital importance to the technical side of our proceedings.

21. We should also like to extend our best wishes to one of the Committee's members, Ambassador Trivedi, the representative of India who, we understand, is leaving the Committee to take up another important diplomatic post to which he has been appointed by his Government. We wish him every success in the new functions he is about to assume and should like to express our appreciation of the active part he has played in the Committee's work, of the contribution he has made to our discussions and of the friendly relations he has consistently maintained with the members of the Committee.

22. These remarks conclude my statement, Mr. Chairman.

### Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, December 14, 1967<sup>1</sup>

23. As we come to the end of this session of our Conference, I am particularly aware of the difficulty all of us will have in pointing to tangible evidence of actual progress made in our task of preparing a draft treaty to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons. To a casual observer it may seem that our long deliberations this year have produced only identical partial drafts of a treaty, submitted by the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States,<sup>2</sup> and various proposals and suggestions by other members for changes and additions to those draft texts, which have not yet been acted upon.

24. Members of this Committee are aware, however, that those documents fail to give an adequate picture of the actual status of this important project. That is the main reason why we felt it inadvisable to include the documents in our interim report to the General Assembly.<sup>3</sup> The documents do not give an adequate picture, because they reveal only those suggestions and understandings which have surfaced for public view. They do not indicate the degree to which many of the remaining differences are in the process of being resolved. Nor do they reveal the extent to which the co-Chairmen are already prepared, at least in principle, to accommodate numerous suggestions by other members of this Committee, in amendments which they plan to submit at an appropriate time to their own drafts of the treaty.

25. That is why, although we share the general disappointment over the lack of greater progress, the United States delegation is definitely

<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.356, pp. 9-12.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 338-341.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 622.

not pessimistic regarding prospects for the treaty. On the contrary, we maintain our view that a successful treaty will emerge from our deliberations. We also expect that the treaty will prove widely acceptable to other countries.

26. Even in the case of the troublesome question of safeguards, I believe it reasonable to say that the remaining differences have been narrowed down to the point where it seems inconceivable that a mutually satisfactory agreement could not soon be achieved. I am convinced that the road to final agreement on this article will be found through the application of the same process of reasoning as that which made possible a solution to articles I and II. As was the case with those articles, we have, after lengthy and sometimes difficult discussions, now come to the heart of the matter. What is needed now is agreement on a realistic formulation which deals unambiguously with the substance of the matter, leaving precise arrangements to be settled in the particular agreements that will have to be concluded with IAEA to carry out the obligations laid down by this article.

27. It is our intention, and I feel that it is also that of my distinguished co-Chairman, to use the proposed brief recess for what we hope will be a final round of intensive consultations looking toward the tabling of a complete and revised draft treaty when we resume our session. It is also our intention that the complete draft be discussed fully in this Committee during our resumed session before we send our final report to the United Nations General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission.

28. Apart from our desire to conclude a non-proliferation treaty as soon as possible, we are also anxious to move on to the consideration of other arms control and disarmament measures. The treaty itself will provide new impetus for such measures, but the essential impetus comes from our realization of the urgency of halting the nuclear arms race before it is too late.

29. The co-Chairmen propose that we adjourn this session after today's meeting and that we reconvene at 3 p.m. on 18 January. We believe this brief recess should allow sufficient time to complete necessary consultations on remaining issues concerning the non-proliferation treaty. We realize that for personal and other reasons some members would probably welcome a slightly longer recess. But I hope they share our view that we cannot risk a delay which might cause this project to lose momentum. The recess period we have recommended seems to us to be about right in the circumstances.

30. Mr. Chairman, I would not want to take leave of our colleagues here, even temporarily, without expressing my deep appreciation for the great understanding they have shown in the course of the past long months of slow progress. Their patience is testimony to their realistic understanding of the nature of the difficulties that confront us and of their desire to see this project completed in a form which will gain the widest possible acceptance. I also wish to express the appreciation of the United States delegation for the invaluable assistance we have received from Mr. Protitch, Mr. Epstein, the members of the Secretariat and the interpreters, as has also been so well stated by my fellow co-Chairman.

31. For its part, the United States delegation believes that it is now

incumbent on the co-Chairmen to justify the great consideration they have received from this Committee. I can assure the Committee of our intention to make every effort to return to the Conference on 18 January with a progress report which will in some measure repay the Committee for its patience and its consideration.

32. Difficult as some of the problems have proved to be, nothing has transpired in our recent discussions to shake our conviction that a non-proliferation treaty is urgently required, that it will enhance the security of all nations and that it can be concluded successfully. All that is needed now is that we make the final effort which the world community expects of us. We are too close to success even to contemplate failure, and the achievement which is now clearly within our grasp will be a great victory for reason and order in international affairs, a victory for mankind.

33. Let me express the sincere desire of the United States delegation that you may all have a happy holiday and a successful New Year.

34. Now permit me to take a moment to bid farewell to our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Trivedi, the representative of India, who today is attending his last meeting as a member of this Committee. We have all come to appreciate Mr. Trivedi as a very articulate and forceful advocate of his country's views. His statements, whether prepared in advance or extemporaneous, have enlivened and assisted this Committee's work. His grasp of the complexities of our business is unsurpassed. Indeed, he has put his stamp on a number of General Assembly resolutions and documents of this Committee. During his stay in Switzerland Mr. Trivedi has worn several hats: among other things, he has been Ambassador to Berne and representative on the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. In his new and important assignment in Vienna he will wear at least two hats. It is good to know that one of them will be as representative in IAEA, a body whose work is closely related to our own. I hope that on taking up his new tasks he will look back kindly on his years with this Committee. I feel sure he will find opportunities in future to promote the work of arms control and disarmament. Meanwhile he carries with him our best wishes and warmest regards.

### Statement by the British Representative (Hope) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, December 14, 1967<sup>1</sup>

During this debate several delegations have expressed their disappointment that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee has found little time since the last session of the Assembly to discuss the three items which are now before us. But it is clearly right that attention in Geneva should have been concentrated, in the recent period, more on the negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty as an essential preliminary to progress in other fields of disarmament.

The representative of Sweden has also chided us for the optimism

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV.1551, pp. 2-10.

expressed during the last session about the prospects of an early conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. It is true that the hopes which were then expressed have not been fulfilled during the last twelve months. But we believe that the records of the ENDC demonstrate the significant advances which have been achieved, in which all nations represented at Geneva have played their part. And we have good reason to hope that the Disarmament Committee will soon be able to report that the text of a draft treaty has been agreed. We hope that at the conclusion of our debate this week their efforts will be endorsed and that the ENDC will be given a new stimulus to complete the draft treaty with dispatch, and then, without delay, proceed with the many other important and pressing measures of disarmament which have been remitted to it for study by the General Assembly.

I should now, with your permission, Sir, like to deal briefly with each of the items before us. I say "briefly", not because of any lack of recognition of their significance, but because the position of my Government, and the importance which we attach to progress in the field of disarmament has been stated many times before in this Committee.

Firstly, I should like to welcome warmly the valuable and, indeed, impressive report by the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of those weapons.<sup>2</sup>

I think most of us here were already familiar with the literature dealing with the appalling effects of the use of nuclear weapons. But, even so, the stark and explicit portrayal in this report of the death, destruction and suffering which the use of those weapons would inevitably bring about should lend added emphasis—if any were needed—to the importance and urgency of the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. We hope that the report will be pondered by all whose work involves them in the consideration of these problems.

Another feature of the report, which we believe of particular value, is the sections dealing with the security and economic implications of the acquisition of nuclear weapons. These implications are at least as important as the physical effects, but have hitherto received comparatively little attention. They underline the heavy economic cost of developing and producing nuclear weapons and—what is often overlooked—the appalling cost of continuously improving and updating the complicated delivery systems involved, which is essential if the nuclear force is to remain a credible deterrent to potential enemies.

My Government believes that the conclusions of this thorough and impartial study should receive the widest possible attention. The main lesson perhaps to be drawn from the report is that, whatever the path to national and international security in the future, it is most certainly not the further spread of nuclear weapons.

My delegation supports fully the conclusions in the report, and draft resolution A/C.1/L.413,<sup>3</sup> and congratulates the Secretary-General, his staff, and the panel of experts on their work.

I will, if I may, now turn to draft resolution A/C.1/L.411, which has

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 476-513.

<sup>3</sup> Identical with pt. A. of G.A. resolution 2342 (XXII), *post*, pp. 729-730.

been placed before us by the representative of Malta about the use of chemical and biological weapons.<sup>4</sup> We welcome the Maltese initiative in raising this subject. There is growing concern in the international community about the dangerous potentialities of these particularly horrible and repulsive weapons. We share that concern and, of course, we are a party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which forbids the use of bacteriological and chemical weapons in war.<sup>5</sup>

My delegation supported the resolution adopted by the last General Assembly calling for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol.

As was made clear in the comprehensive and, indeed, compelling statement by the representative of Malta, from the point of view of controlling these weapons in the context of disarmament, the ease and cheapness with which they can be made—and, more important, perhaps, the ease with which they can be concealed—raises particularly difficult practical problems. Secrecy and obscurity surround this whole subject, and it is clear that, although essential, adequate verification of any arms control agreement in this field presents a major difficulty.

However this does not mean that this is a problem which we can allow to be side-tracked just because of the difficulties involved in tackling it; on the contrary. We therefore welcome and support the Maltese resolution as a hopeful way to proceed. However, I would hesitate to agree, in spite of the arguments used by the representative of Malta, that there have been recent developments in the bacteriological and chemical weapons field which are of such magnitude as to make it necessary for the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to give absolute priority to this item. Nevertheless we naturally hope that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee will soon have completed its work on the non-proliferation treaty and will then be able to devote itself to these other important matters.

I listened this morning with respect and close attention to the speech by the representative of Hungary.<sup>6</sup> But, nevertheless, I feel that I must say that I regret that the Hungarian delegation should have used the opportunity afforded by the helpful and constructive Maltese proposal to table a resolution which is clearly aimed more at gaining a propaganda advantage than in finding a solution to the problem. It is the view of my delegation that the Hungarian resolution in document A/C.1/L.412<sup>7</sup> adds nothing to the serious and forward-looking proposals tabled by Malta, particularly since the tabling of the amended version of the Maltese resolution in document A/C.1.L.411/Rev.1,<sup>8</sup> which is now before us. I recall that the Hungarian delegation put forward a similar proposal at the start of last year's debate on disarmament.<sup>9</sup> The Committee will remember that it had to be substantially amended before the majority of the States represented here were willing to adopt it. Looking again at the present text submitted by the Hungarian delegation, I for my part do not believe

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 625-626.

<sup>5</sup> *Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents, 1919-55*, pp. 169-170.

<sup>6</sup> A/C.1/PV.1550, pp. 22-37.

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, pp. 633-634.

<sup>8</sup> *Ante*, p. 670.

<sup>9</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 604-605.

that there is something called "contemporary international law" which is distinct from international law in the normal understanding of this expression. I do not accept that the use of one particular category of weapons rather than any other category for the purposes described is a crime against humanity. This term "a crime against humanity" has a technical and legal significance and as we all know the Third Committee has been working on aspects of this problem in recent weeks and months. In the view of my delegation it is not right to attempt in another Committee and in another connexion to adopt "on the nod" a view on the question of what is and what is not correctly described as a crime against humanity. I hope therefore that the Committee will agree with me that the proposals put forward by the representative of Malta deal with this matter in a serious and objective manner and that our attention should be directed to his draft resolution rather than the text introduced by the Hungarian delegation. Nevertheless, we note that the representative of Hungary has today suggested further consultations on this matter.

I would now like to speak briefly on the urgent need for the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. We profoundly hope that when the non-proliferation treaty is signed the resulting improvement in the political atmosphere will allow a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and other measures, to be negotiated as soon as possible. We agree with the distinguished and expert representative of Sweden, and other delegations too, that this is one of the most urgent and important of the disarmament measures which are currently under consideration. My Government continues to support fully all efforts to reach a treaty which, when agreed, we would sign with the greatest satisfaction. This continues to be a major aim of our policy. We also hope that all countries will find it possible to become signatories to such a treaty. I need hardly add, after what has been said in this, and earlier debates, that for such a treaty to be enduring and to be a significant step on the way towards nuclear disarmament it is essential that each party to it can be satisfied that the provisions of the treaty are being strictly observed by all the other signatories.

I would like to emphasize again the importance which my Government attaches to the need to capitalize on the decrease in mutual suspicion which we confidently expect to result from the signing of a non-proliferation treaty in order to follow up this success with progress on other disarmament issues, and particularly a comprehensive test-ban treaty to which I have referred. We believe that the General Assembly should urge the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to continue to work for this treaty and to ensure that it contains provision for adequate and effective verification.

I cannot conclude without referring to some of the more extreme statements which have been made in this Committee in the course of this debate on the question of the elimination of foreign military bases. We have heard these tired arguments many times before, and I fear that we shall hear them again too. But this does not mean that we should not refrain from refuting them each time that they are made. It is not my purpose here to repeat all the familiar counter-arguments about the rights of sovereign States to defend themselves or to enter into collective agreements for their security. The United Nations

Charter is explicit on this point. I will, however, recall one point which my Government has made many times: namely that we do not believe it is either possible or desirable to keep military bases in a territory against the wishes of the inhabitants.

The General Assembly agreed at its last session to transmit this question to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee for further consultation and report.<sup>10</sup> If the original sponsors of this draft resolution<sup>11</sup> have nothing further to contribute I suggest that, instead of wasting the extremely limited time of this Committee in further discussion of the item, we invite the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to carry out this examination as soon as practicable.

You, Sir, have advised us that our debate this week need not be strictly confined to the three items before us, and perhaps, Sir, with your permission, I might end by referring to two recent initiatives which my Government has taken in the field of disarmament.

On 4 December the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mulley, announced in the House of Commons that in order to assist the negotiations at present taking place in Geneva to secure a non-proliferation treaty, Her Majesty's Government had decided that, at such time as international safeguards are put into effect in the non-nuclear weapon States in implementation of the provisions of a treaty, it will be prepared for its part to offer an opportunity for the application of similar safeguards in the United Kingdom, subject only to exclusions for national security reasons.<sup>12</sup> He also welcomed the parallel announcement of President Johnson on behalf of the United States.<sup>13</sup>

Secondly, during the debate last month on item 91 "The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America", my delegation announced that Her Majesty's Government would shortly arrange to sign both additional protocols of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.<sup>14</sup> I am pleased to be able to announce that these protocols will be signed in Mexico City in the very near future.<sup>15</sup>

### Statement by the Indian Representative (Dhar) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, Decem- ber 14, 1967<sup>1</sup>

It is a matter of regret that, in the last week of this session of the General Assembly, the Committee has been obliged to start consideration of the disarmament questions, which have a great bearing on the future of mankind. We would have wished that the ENDC had sub-

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 804.

<sup>11</sup> Identical with G.A. resolution 2344 (XXII), *post*, p. 732.

<sup>12</sup> *Ante*, p. 610.

<sup>13</sup> *Ante*, pp. 613-615.

<sup>14</sup> The British statement appears *ante*, pp. 533-535. For the additional protocols, see *ante*, pp. 82-83.

<sup>15</sup> The U.K. signed both protocols on Dec. 20, 1967.

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV.1551, pp. 44-53.

mitted its report<sup>2</sup> in good time to enable us to examine in depth all disarmament items before us.

We are disappointed at the lack of progress in the field of disarmament, but we are considerably more concerned and apprehensive that the arms race is spiralling upwards, taking an ever-increasing share of the world's wealth and causing a sense of helplessness and gloom everywhere. The continuing sophistication and stockpiling of nuclear and other weapons, while consuming the scarce resources of the world, is increasing fear and tension and is also bringing us nearer to the danger of nuclear war. This arms race has not ensured the security of States. On the contrary, it threatens humanity with the grave and unprecedented danger of total destruction.

There are disquieting reports regarding development of the fractional orbital bombing system capable of sudden attack from relatively low altitude and the further development of anti-ballistic missile systems. Today we have seen reports in the newspapers regarding the latest addition to the list of deadly and formidable weapons—the “space bus”—a further sophistication of MIR vehicles, that is, multiple, independently targeted, re-entry vehicles. We are told that a “space bus” fired by a single missile, could carry “many individual re-entry vehicles with thermonuclear warheads”. Each warhead could be delivered to “a different city, or if desired, all can be delivered within one city”, that is, what has been explained as “multi-city bombardment by a single missile”. We are deeply concerned by the fact that the Powers concerned have not been able to come to an understanding to initiate steps to contain this unfortunate and totally undesirable increase in the level of “terror weapons” which is acting as a spur for further increase and perfection of such weapons, and thus considerably increasing the danger of a nuclear holocaust, by accident or design. This, in our view, is a suicidal course to adopt for the super-Powers. Nevertheless, we feel sure that the collective wisdom of the international community should enable us to work out measures which would call on the States particularly involved in this continuing arms race to put an end to it.

In this context my delegation would like to refer to the admirable report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of those weapons. My delegation joins others in congratulating the consultants for their valuable contribution to this study.

The report has brought out in a telling manner that the effort to maintain a state of nuclear deterrence has demanded the expenditure of vast resources and, paradoxically, far from increasing the sense of security, has at times engendered a sense of insecurity. It has been stated in the report that:

Short of mutual agreement, it is a race which has no end, and one which leads not to a uniform state of security but, as has been said, to phases of major insecurity which alternate with periods in which relative security seems assured.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Ante, pp. 622-623.

<sup>3</sup> Ante, p. 507.

The message is quite clear. The sense of insecurity and fear will increase and not abate unless serious steps are taken to change the present drift towards the arms race.

The report has thus indicated to us, with clarity and precision, that the so-called balance of nuclear deterrence is unstable and does not give any sense of real security. The report has stated that :

... Security for all countries of the world must be sought through the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons.<sup>4</sup> . . .

We firmly believe that the only and sane course open to us is to seek security which is lasting and real and which is not dependent on the concept of deterrence.

The report makes out most logically and unmistakably the case for putting an immediate halt to the nuclear arms race which, because of the prevailing mistrust among nations and the action-reaction phenomenon, seems to be completely getting out of hand. The catastrophic effects of the use of such lethal weapons are more and more widely realized. The report has made a signal contribution by highlighting the grim consequences of the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons, including the somatic and genetic effects. The report refers to the horrifying experience of the first ever use of nuclear weapons in war in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and makes projections on the basis of available knowledge of the possible use of nuclear weapons in future wars.

Without any effort at exaggerating the peril in which mankind now stands in the face of a possible outbreak of nuclear war, the report brings out the most basic elements in the situation. It states :

... There is one inescapable and basic fact. It is that the nuclear armories which are in being already contain large megaton weapons every one of which has a destructive power greater than that of all the conventional explosive that has ever been used in warfare since the day gun-powder was discovered. Were such weapons ever to be used in numbers, hundreds of millions of people might be killed, and civilization as we know it, as well as organized community life, would inevitably come to an end in the countries involved in the conflict.<sup>5</sup>

The report goes on to say that the survivors either in countries affected by the conflict or outside the area of conflict would suffer from long-term effects of irradiation and transmit to their offspring a genetic burden which would become manifest in the disabilities of later generations. The report notes that there is no real defence against nuclear weapons.

It is ironic that economic and material resources which could be used for relieving the evils of poverty and distress all over the world are now being harnessed to the further development of deadly nuclear arsenals. The report has convincingly underlined what the developing countries have all along been urging, that :

... the immense resources devoted to their production could instead be used, according to the expressed aim of the United Nations, "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom".<sup>6</sup>

The report also most eloquently points out how in the nuclear arms

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 512.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, p. 478.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, p. 497.

race the fear of obsolescence alone is leading rival countries to spend increasingly large sums of money, costing mankind vast resources which it can ill afford to waste.

I would now like to make a brief mention of the question of general and complete disarmament. The consistent position which India has taken on the question of disarmament over the last twenty years would make it clear that India firmly believes that agreement on general and complete disarmament, under effective international control, should be concluded as expeditiously as possible. In our view, disarmament must extend to the prohibition of the manufacture, storage and use of nuclear, thermonuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and must also bring about the progressive elimination of conventional weapons. India has always attached great importance to the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles and made a proposal to this effect as early as 1957,<sup>7</sup> as in our view it was simpler to deal with carriers than with nuclear weapons, and also because, if delivery vehicles were eliminated, the nuclear weapon's capacity for harm would be greatly reduced. It is, however, obvious that complete disarmament cannot be achieved at one stroke. It can only be realized in regulated and balanced stages so as to ensure that during the progress of disarmament neither side gains military advantage over the other.

I should now like to turn to an important item on our agenda, namely, the question of the "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests". We are unhappy to note that in spite of the fact that last year's resolution, 2163 (XXI), asked the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to elaborate without further delay a treaty banning underground tests,<sup>8</sup> the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee has not been able to give this question the consideration it deserves. Since the signing of the Moscow Test-Ban Treaty in 1963<sup>9</sup> it had been the fervent hope of India that the Treaty would be adhered to by all States, but unfortunately this has not materialized. It is a matter of concern that nuclear tests are being conducted in the atmosphere by the two non-signatories to the Treaty. It seems to have been forgotten that the partial test ban Treaty is an extremely fragile arrangement and cannot endure for long if it is not universally adhered to and if its five-year old commitment for disarmament and for prohibiting underground tests remains only a platitude.

India has always attached the greatest importance to the banning of nuclear tests in all environments. Apart from the nuclear tests being conducted in the atmosphere by the two non-signatories to the Treaty, underground tests are continuing at a greater tempo in spite of the historic resolution 1762 (XVII) which condemned all nuclear weapon tests.<sup>10</sup> As the Secretary-General has stated in the introduction to his annual report:

The Soviet Union and the United States seem to have accelerated the rate of underground testing.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Disarmament Commission *Official Records: 55th Meeting*, p. 14, and A/C.1/PV.829, pp. 27, 42.

<sup>8</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 802-803.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 291-293.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 1962, vol. II, pp. 1029-1033.

<sup>11</sup> General Assembly *Official Records: Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 1.A (A/6701/Add. 1)*, p. 3.

Such underground tests are obviously conducted in order to seek new and improved offensive and defensive missiles, thus adding momentum to the nuclear arms race.

While India has maintained that a comprehensive test-ban treaty should be concluded as a matter of urgency, it is also of the view that, pending the conclusion of such a treaty, nuclear Powers should agree to discontinue nuclear weapon tests. It had therefore, supported suggestions for a formal treaty banning underground tests above an agreed seismic level. It was contemplated that the threshold would subsequently be lowered as progress was made in techniques of detection and identification. We have also supported the Swedish proposal for ratification by challenge, as well as the proposal regarding improvement of detection techniques through international co-operation in seismic detection.<sup>12</sup>

We are happy to note that the Secretary-General in his report, to which I have referred frequently, has stated:

A comprehensive test-ban treaty, prohibiting the underground testing of nuclear devices, would also contribute to the objectives of non-proliferation and would clearly help to slow down the nuclear arms race.<sup>13</sup>

Resolution 2032 (XX) also pointed out the crucial importance of a comprehensive test-ban to the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>14</sup> This view has been consistently advocated by us.

To focus attention on this urgent and important matter, my delegation has co-sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/L.414.<sup>15</sup> We hope that it will get the unanimous support of the membership of the Committee.

Before concluding, I should like to refer again to the Secretary-General's report and to stress that it has underlined the dangers posed by the nuclear arms race, without making any artificial distinction as is done by some Powers, between the existing and further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The report has neither minimized the dangers from one aspect of the nuclear arms race nor has it exaggerated those flowing from the other aspect. It has dealt with the problem of the nuclear arms race as a single whole. It has talked of both the aspects of this arms race together—that is vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. It has been stated in the report that:

... The solution of the problem of ensuring security cannot be found in an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons or, indeed, in the retention of nuclear weapons by the Powers currently possessing them. An agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons as recommended by the United Nations, freely negotiated and genuinely observed, would therefore be a powerful step in the right direction, as would also an agreement on the reduction of existing nuclear arsenals.<sup>16</sup>

It is the firm view of the Indian delegation that a treaty on non-proliferation should reflect these views and, more particularly, it should be in conformity with the principles laid down in resolution

<sup>12</sup> See *ante*, pp. 652-657.

<sup>13</sup> *Ante*, p. 512.

<sup>14</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 623-624.

<sup>15</sup> Identical with G.A. resolution 2343 (XXII), *post*, p. 731.

<sup>16</sup> *Ante*, p. 512.

2028 (XX),<sup>17</sup> which was reaffirmed in resolution 2153 A (XXI),<sup>18</sup> so that the treaty is acceptable to all concerned and satisfactory to the international community.

The position of the Indian delegation on this question has been stated in this Committee on a number of occasions: for example, at the 1436th<sup>19</sup> and 1443rd meetings,<sup>20</sup> among others. Therefore, we do not propose to put forward at any length our views and suggestions in this regard at this juncture, particularly as the full report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, including all relevant documents, has not yet come before the Committee. Never the less, we should like to emphasize again that an acceptable and satisfactory treaty on non-proliferation should prevent three aspects of proliferation: first, an increase in nuclear arsenals; second, a spread of nuclear weapons over the world, and, third, an increase in the number of nuclear weapon Powers. An acceptable and effective treaty, therefore, is one which prohibits existing proliferation among nuclear-weapon Powers, the dissemination of nuclear weapons and weapon technology from one country to another, and further or possible proliferation among hitherto non-nuclear weapon Powers.

The Indian delegation has referred to the principles mentioned in resolution 2028 (XX) and indicated how they should be given practical shape in an international instrument. Even at the risk of repetition, I should like to recapitulate the main features of resolution 2028 (XX).

The first principle has stipulated, *inter alia*, that the treaty should not permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate. The second principle has stated explicitly that the treaty should have within its body a balance of mutual responsibility and obligations on both the nuclear and the non-nuclear weapon Powers. The third principle requires that the treaty should be a step towards disarmament, and more particularly nuclear disarmament. The fourth principle has asked us to ensure that the provisions in the treaty based on these principles and incorporating them should be effective and not remain merely an expression of intent or goodwill. In parentheses, I should like to mention that the non-aligned delegations have placed special emphasis on the principle of balance and on the principle that the treaty should be a step towards nuclear disarmament. The fifth principle lays down that all measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain a military advantage, and security is ensured for all.

It is our firm conviction that any measure which gives tacit license to a small group of States to develop and augment its nuclear weapons is in fundamental contradiction with these principles and purposes.

We have stated previously that a treaty on non-proliferation should not deny development of technology to non-nuclear weapon States in the field of nuclear explosions for peaceful objectives. The benefits of science and technology should be available to the developing coun-

<sup>17</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 532-534.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 748-749.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 678-684.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 690-705.

tries, and any proposal for the establishment of a super-commercial monopoly by nuclear weapon Powers in this field would be unacceptable. In this connexion we have read with attention and interest the news of the world's first commercial thermonuclear explosion—called "Project Gasbuggy"—a mile underground in New Mexico. Thus a beginning has been made and we should expect progressive improvement in the techniques used and results obtained by such experiments. It is our view that non-nuclear weapon States should not be denied the legitimate right to conduct such explosions, exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Finally, I should like to conclude by making again a reference to the Secretary-General's report. In our view, the report has made a most serious contribution to the efforts now being made to bring the nuclear arms race to heel and deserves to be studied not only by Governments and experts, but by people all over the world. With this in view, we have co-sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/L.413, which we hope will meet with the wholehearted approval of the Committee.<sup>21</sup>

#### Statement by the Soviet Representative (Fedorenko) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, December 14, 1967<sup>1</sup>

The question of military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America becomes ever more urgent and requires a solution ever more insistently. That can be seen from numerous events and facts. According to the latest information in the American Press, for instance, the number of United States troops in Viet-Nam has gone beyond the number of United States troops in Korea during the Korean war. If one takes into account the fact that, in addition to units directly stationed in Viet-Nam, the United States keeps important forces in other countries of South East Asia at numerous bases, and if one adds to that the United States navy, active in South East Asian waters, it will become clear that the scope of the war waged by the United States against the people of Viet-Nam is even wider.

American armed forces committing an open aggression in Viet-Nam are waging a cruel and barbarous war. From American bases in Thailand, Okinawa and other parts of South East Asia, from the Pacific and the Far East, this aggression is waged against the people of Viet-Nam. Everybody knows the facts; they are obvious. They are sufficient in themselves to justify the demand put forward by the peace-loving peoples of the world for the elimination of foreign military bases. At the same time, these facts cast light on the reason for which military bases are being set up or exist on the soil of foreign countries. The network of American military bases abroad is not limited to South East Asia. The United States of America has over 2,000 military strongpoints on foreign soil. Among them there are huge military in-

<sup>21</sup> Identical with pt. A of G.A. resolution 2342 (XXII), *post*, pp. 729-730.

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV.1551, pp. 57-72.

stallations; bases in direct proximity to Viet-Nam or in Viet-Nam itself, help in the blood-letting of which the people of Viet-Nam are victims. There are bases all over the world where guns and machine-guns are silent for the time being, but they also play a very dangerous role. They are all links in one single chain and serve the same goals. The position of the Soviet Union on the question of the elimination of foreign military bases is one of principle, and it is a consistent position. Together with all peace-loving States, we have asked for the speediest elimination of the bases set up by some Western countries. The Soviet Union has often proposed in the General Assembly, in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and elsewhere, that foreign military bases be eliminated wherever they are. As a first step towards the solution of the whole problem of foreign military bases, the Soviet Government proposed the elimination of foreign military bases on the territories of States of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

This compels the Soviet Union to fight for the elimination of foreign military bases. Why? First, because foreign military bases are a source of international tension and war danger. In other words, each such base can give rise to war, can ignite the flames of war which are now raging in South-East Asia.

Who is setting up these military bases abroad and for what purpose? They are being set up by those who are guided by military solutions to various problems, those who want to impose their will on other peoples by force, those for whom the force of arms is the highest argument, triumphing over right and common sense. It is clear that foreign military bases are set up in order to impose their will on other peoples, not only on the people of the country where the bases are located, which is the victim of direct pressure but also, sometimes, on the people of neighbouring States, for they have to take the presence of these military bases into account.

All this creates serious threat for the maintenance of international peace and security and poses a serious threat to the national independence of States, to their sovereignty and territorial integrity. The presence of military bases abroad is, therefore, incompatible with normal relations between States, with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The foreign bases in Africa, Asia and Latin America are at the same time one of the most important instruments in the hands of colonialist and neo-colonialist forces. In many cases they are the direct consequence and direct heir of the colonial empires. The role now played by these bases now is not much different from that played by them during the heyday of colonialism. These bases are the strongpoints of those who would like to impose from abroad their will upon the newly liberated peoples, who want to dictate a policy to these people.

It is sufficient to recall the ceaseless provocations and the detrimental role played by military bases in the liberation struggle of the African peoples and the attempts of these peoples to attain their independence. For instance it is sufficient to recall the struggle for independence of the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the struggle of the people of the Portuguese colonies and so on.

Together with all peace-loving States, the Soviet Union has often proclaimed in the most categorical way that it supported the demands

of the Republic of Cuba concerning the immediate elimination of the American base at Guantánamo. What is the objective of that base if not to constantly threaten the Cuban people? Does it not exist in order to prevent the enjoyment by the Cuban people of their sovereign rights enshrined in the United Nations Charter? Is not the maintenance of that base an instrument for constant interference in the internal affairs of Cuba?

The proposal of the Soviet Union concerning the elimination of foreign military bases in Asia, Africa and Latin America is dictated by our wish to strengthen international peace and the security of peoples and our desire to ensure the national sovereignty of peoples fighting for their independence. No nation can remain indifferent to this if it sincerely wishes lasting peace and security in the world.

Further, independently of these high objectives, the peoples of the world are interested in the elimination of these foreign bases for considerations of their own security. Recent facts undoubtedly show that military conflicts as a rule occur in countries where there are military bases. Any conflict, even a local conflict in the beginning, can easily be transformed into a war, in which many people, including those thousands of miles away from the original point of conflict, would be victims. For the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of all foreign troops is an important international problem. This was stressed in the Declaration adopted at the Bucharest Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact countries in July 1966.<sup>2</sup> The European communist parties that took part in the Karlovy Vary conference in April 1967 came out in favour of such a measure: in their statement on peace and security in Europe they came out precisely in favour of the elimination of foreign military bases as an important step to normalize the international situation and to maintain peace in Europe and the world.<sup>3</sup> It is known to all that the countries of the Warsaw Pact are ready to accept the simultaneous liquidation of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Warsaw Pact created as a counter-vailing influence. If the Western Powers are not ready to accept such a solution, as a first step there should be agreement on the liquidation of the military organizations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact; this has been mentioned many times. To this day the Western Powers have not given a positive answer.

The position of socialist and peace-loving forces on the question of the elimination of foreign military bases is shared by the overwhelming majority of States in the world and has the support of all countries wishing to see foreign bases dismantled on their territory. The Heads of African States and the Heads of States and Governments of the non-aligned countries came out in favour of this and the General Assembly in its resolution 2105 (XX) asked all colonial Powers to eliminate military bases in colonial territories and to refrain from setting up new ones there.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 407-420.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 189-196.

<sup>4</sup> General Assembly *Official Records: Twentieth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/6014), pp. 3-4.

The Soviet delegation draws the attention of the Members of the United Nations to the question of these bases because to this day, despite the fact that the question is clear and has to be settled, there has been no progress, first of all, and above all, because of the refusal of the United States of America and other Western Powers. Those who are interested in the maintenance of foreign military bases probably think that they can sit it out, that they can sit out and weather the pressure of world public opinion of the peoples of the world who demand that there be a solution to this question of elimination of foreign military bases, as a first step, in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The Soviet delegation asks States Members of the United Nations to bend every effort to achieve this objective.

Today the Soviet delegation would like to speak on another item that is now under discussion, that is the prohibition of all nuclear weapons tests, including underground tests. The solution of this problem would be a significant obstacle to the further perfecting of nuclear weapons and would prevent the appearance of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

The position of the Soviet Union on this important question is well known. Not only has it been set out in the General Assembly, but it has often been put forward in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva. We would like to declare here and now that this position remains fully valid at present.

The Soviet Union has always come out in favour of the full prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests. We are ready at any time to agree that the Moscow Treaty of 1963 on the prohibition of nuclear tests in three environments<sup>5</sup>—the atmosphere, outer space and underwater—be extended to underground nuclear tests, thus making that Treaty comprehensive.

In this connexion, the Soviet Union is guided by the fact that to control the prohibition of underground nuclear tests national means of detection are sufficient—the means at the disposal of States.

Our position is based on the present-day knowledge in the field of seismology and the verification and observance of seismic phenomena. The Soviet Union has shown that it is ready to compromise.

We declare that we accept the proposal of the United Arab Republic on the prohibition of underground tests of nuclear weapons above a certain power with a moratorium on all other tests<sup>6</sup> until there is an agreement on the general prohibition of all tests of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union has also said that the proposal of Sweden concerning a detection club too deserves attention,<sup>7</sup> if it is conducive to an agreement on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests without any inspection.

We have stressed that the presentation of seismic data can be done on a voluntary basis and that the evaluation of data should not be carried out by an international organ but by each State for itself.

Unfortunately a solution of the problem of the prohibition of underground nuclear tests has been delayed for no reason. Since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty prohibiting nuclear tests in the

<sup>5</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

<sup>6</sup> See *ibid.*, 1965, pp. 344-345.

<sup>7</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 390-393.

atmosphere, outer space and underwater, four years have elapsed. In the last category of nuclear tests, underground tests are still not outlawed. What is the reason for this state of affairs? Who is preventing an agreement on this very important matter?

The only obstacle to an agreement on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests is the position of the United States, and the Western Powers which support it. They put forward unfounded demands concerning an international control system to verify observance of this agreement, including the despatch of foreign inspectors to the territory of other States.

May we remind the Committee that conversations on the banning of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater were sterile for a very long time because of the position of the Western Powers, which insisted on the creation of this same international control system. A political and businesslike approach was necessary to bring into being the Moscow Treaty. Four and a half years after its signing nobody, of course, can have the slightest doubt concerning the effectiveness of national means of detection of the observance of that Treaty.

The situation is the same now in regard to the question of underground nuclear tests. It is well known that at present many States, including the United States, have reliable technical means for detecting underground nuclear tests which would enable them to control the observance of the prohibition of such tests without any international inspection. This is confirmed by the scientists of many countries and can be seen from the statements of many delegations during consideration of the question of the prohibition of underground nuclear tests in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.

It is enough to remind the Committee of the statement made by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on 29 June of this year. Speaking of the observance of the prohibition of underground nuclear tests, Mrs. Myrdal said:

From the material available to my delegation I have drawn the conclusion, tentative in form but firm in conviction, that the scientific and technical difficulties that have prevented a generally acceptable verification procedure to monitor an underground test-ban treaty have been steadily diminished and that they should now be quite small.\*

Speaking later about concrete methods of identification, Mrs. Myrdal said:

These identification methods are indeed so effective that it now seems to have become meaningful to discuss verification without on-site inspection . . . It can be shown that also in this non-inspection case the identification methods referred to earlier would provide sufficient deterrence; earthquakes would be mistaken for explosions only once in fifteen or more years.†

All that shows why there is no progress in the prohibition of underground nuclear tests. It is not because the necessary control measures are absent but only because of an unwillingness of the United States and other Western countries supporting it to apply the Moscow Treaty

\* *Ante*, p. 275.

† *Ante*, p. 276.

to underground nuclear tests. The position to which the United States still clings shows that it is not interested at all in ceasing underground nuclear tests. On the contrary, it intends to intensify such tests to continue to perfect its atomic weapons underground.

In this connexion, may we draw the attention of members of the Committee to information recently published in the United States Press. According to this information, since 1963—that is since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty—the United States of America has carried out 117 underground nuclear tests, and the pace of these explosions constantly increases. Thus in 1963 there were twelve underground nuclear explosions: in 1966 the number was forty. In the next two years the United States Atomic Energy Commission plans ever more intensive programmes of underground nuclear explosions. The American Press does not conceal the goals of these experiments. Information was recently made public that, as a result of a large-scale series of underground nuclear tests in Nevada, the United States had made progress in working out “a radically new type of atomic weapon”. This information in the American Press is very symptomatic. This shows eloquently why the United States opposes the prohibition of underground nuclear tests, why the United States, in order to conceal its true objective resorts to all kinds of artificial and completely unfounded pretexts. Since the position of the United States is contrary to the interests of peace and disarmament, contrary to the opinions often expressed in the General Assembly, an end must be put immediately to underground nuclear tests.

To solve the problems of the prohibition of underground nuclear tests a political approach at State level is required such as that which made possible the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty a few years ago. The United States must adopt a realistic attitude and not adhere to unfounded demands, such as international control and inspection. This would make it possible to settle this question rapidly and effectively. The Soviet delegation considers that the speedy conclusion of an agreement on the total prohibition of all nuclear tests is a very important problem which can and must be settled without further delay.

We intend to vote in favour of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.414.<sup>10</sup> The Soviet delegation has already stated its views concerning the other draft resolutions tabled in the Committee concerning chemical and bacteriological weapons. We decisively support the draft resolution submitted by Hungary<sup>11</sup> which is very important for the future struggle to prohibit chemical and bacteriological warfare. The position of Hungary is fully shared by the Soviet Union and, we are certain, by the majority of Member States here. Our position was fully outlined in the statement of our friend and colleague, Mr. Csatorday.<sup>12</sup>

At the same time we consider it necessary to stress once again that the draft resolution submitted by Malta,<sup>13</sup> far from being beneficial,

<sup>10</sup> Identical with G.A. resolution 2343 (XXII), *post.*, p. 731.

<sup>11</sup> *Ante.*, pp. 633-634.

<sup>12</sup> *Ante.*, pp. 657-662.

<sup>13</sup> *Ante.*, pp. 625-626.

can have very negative effects. We shall categorically oppose any attempt to revise the Geneva Protocol of 1925<sup>14</sup> and any attempt to undermine the generally recognized principles of international law concerning chemical and bacteriological weapons. In this respect it is our duty to stress again the necessity for all States to accede to the Geneva Protocol. The United States, which continues to use barbarous chemical weapons in Viet-Nam, must put an end to this practice immediately; it must put an end to this inhuman and mad behaviour. We ask the representative of Malta, Mr. Pardo, to show goodwill and to join in efforts which would enable us to take a decision that would really be conducive to freeing the peoples of the world from the dangers of chemical and bacteriological warfare.

We would also like to speak on the draft resolution concerning the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons.<sup>15</sup> This report is a very important and significant document and deserves the most careful scrutiny. The Soviet delegation adopts a positive attitude towards the draft resolution concerning this report<sup>16</sup> and will vote in favour of it.

### Sixteen-Power Draft Resolution Introduced in the First Committee of the General Assembly: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, December 14, 1967<sup>1</sup>

*The General Assembly,*

*Having received* the interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,<sup>2</sup>

*Noting* the progress the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has made towards preparing a draft international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

*Noting further* that it has not been possible to complete the text of an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

*Reaffirming* that it is imperative to make further efforts to conclude such a treaty at the earliest possible date,

*Expressing* its hope that the remaining differences between all States concerned can be resolved quickly,

*Taking account* of the fact that the Eighteen-Nation Committee is continuing its work with a view to negotiating a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and intends to submit a full report for the consideration of the United Nations General Assembly as soon as possible,

<sup>14</sup> *Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents, 1919-55*, pp. 160-170.

<sup>15</sup> *Ante*, pp. 476-513.

<sup>16</sup> Identical with pt. A of G.A. resolution 2342 (XXII), *post*, pp. 729-730.

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/L.416, Dec. 14, 1967. The draft resolution was cosponsored by Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, India, Iraq, Libya, Mexico, Poland, U.S.S.R., U.A.R., U.K., U.S., Yugoslavia. A revised version, also cosponsored by Italy, was approved by the General Assembly as pt. A of the resolution of Dec. 19 (*post*, pp. 729-730).

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 622-623.

1. *Reaffirms* resolutions 2028 (XX),<sup>3</sup> 2149 (XXI)<sup>4</sup> and 2153 A (XXI);<sup>5</sup>

2. *Calls upon* the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament urgently to continue its work and to submit to the General Assembly on or before 15 March 1968 a full report on the negotiations on a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, together with pertinent documents and records;

3. *Recommends* that upon receipt of such report appropriate consultations be initiated in accordance with the rules of procedure on the setting of an early date after 15 March for the resumption of the twenty-second session to consider the item "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons".

### Statement by ACDA Deputy Director Fisher to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, December 15, 1967<sup>1</sup>

I should like to speak on the draft resolution which has been circulated in document A/C.1/L.416 under agenda item 28, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,<sup>2</sup> and dealing with the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.<sup>3</sup> This draft resolution was initially sponsored by sixteen members of this body; since its introduction, other countries, of course, have also become its sponsors. I should like to speak on the reasons which led the United States to join in sponsoring this draft resolution.

Stated quite simply, the United States joined in sponsoring this draft resolution for the purpose of ensuring that all the members of this body would have an opportunity to participate, on a timely basis, in the discussion of the problems of non-proliferation and, in particular, the question of the non-proliferation treaty, which we hope and anticipate will be completed by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament during the quite early months of 1968.

Our purpose in sponsoring this draft resolution was to avoid any possible concern that the nuclear weapon Powers might be attempting to achieve a non-proliferation treaty by forcing it on the non-nuclear weapon Powers. We proposed to avoid such concern by proposing a draft resolution, or joining in the sponsorship of a draft resolution, which held open the possibility of the resumption of the twenty-second session to consider the item on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The draft resolution will afford an opportunity for such a session to take place at an early date after 15 March if, as the result of appropriate consultations held in accordance with our rules of procedure, that is a wise thing to do. That decision would be made in the light of

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 532-534.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 686-687.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 748-749.

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/P.V.1553, pp. 41-50.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 622-623.

the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament which the draft resolution calls for by 15 March 1968, which seems to me to be a realistic date.

In this connexion, my delegation has studied the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States.<sup>4</sup> We have studied that report with the care which such a thoughtful and thorough report deserves; and I listened with great interest to the observations of the representative of Kenya in describing it this morning, as well as to the others who talked about it.

As I say, this report is a thorough and thoughtful document; it covers all aspects of the problem that a non-proliferation treaty will present, both to the nuclear weapon States and to the non-nuclear weapon States. But I think, almost without exception, all of the subject-matter which it covers is material which should be discussed at our resumed session of the twenty-second General Assembly, when we are discussing the question of a non-proliferation treaty.

If time had permitted, if this were an earlier stage in our session, I would have demonstrated this point by analysing all of the items contained in annex I of the report—that is, the provisional agenda for the Conference of the Non-Nuclear Weapon States. In view of the limited time available to the Committee, however, I think it is advisable to concentrate on two items on which special papers were prepared by the Rapporteur—two very useful, interesting and scholarly papers. These are item 1, Method of assuring the security of non-nuclear weapon States, and item 4, Programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.<sup>5</sup>

Let me deal first with the problem of peaceful uses. Turning to item 4 of annex I of the report of the Preparatory Committee, we see that this item breaks the problem of peaceful uses down into three sub-items: (a) Access for non-nuclear weapon States which have renounced the production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons to technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy; (b) Assistance to non-nuclear weapon States which have renounced the production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons in the implementation of programmes of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; (c) the question of peaceful explosions for the benefit of non-nuclear weapon States.

The texts of the identical non-proliferation treaties which were submitted by the two co-Chairmen on 24 August at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament<sup>6</sup> deal with all three of these subjects. These texts—first, dealing with item (a)—make it clear that nothing in that proposed treaty will have any adverse effect on the production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Dealing with item (b), the nuclear weapon States participating in the discussion at Geneva have made it clear that they will co-operate with non-nuclear weapon States party to the treaty in the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Dealing with item (c), nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes: such explosions are a part, but only a part, of the total spectrum of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; they are a part whose economic

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 405-411.

<sup>5</sup> Annexes IV and V to the report (not printed here).

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, pp. 338-341.

feasibility is still under study. But, even in this area, the identical drafts of the non-proliferation treaty make it clear that the potential benefits from nuclear explosive services will be made available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear weapon States party to the treaty, on a non-discriminatory basis. It also provides that the charges for these nuclear explosive services should be as low as possible, even excluding any charge for nuclear research and development—and those charges, I assure you, would be great, but they are excluded under Treaty commitments.

I am aware that suggestions have been made at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by many countries participating in the work of that Conference to strengthen and in some ways to restructure the provisions in the draft Treaty to which I have just referred. These proposals have been given serious consideration and they will be discussed by the co-Chairmen during the Christmas recess. They will be considered again when the Conference reconvenes after Christmas. I do not think, in view of the fact that these matters are still under active negotiation, that it would be helpful to reaching agreement for me to discuss the issues in detail now.

But the point I am making now is that if and when the efforts at Geneva are successful and when we are discussing non-proliferation in a resumed session, all three of these points under item 4 of annex I of the Provisional Agenda—and it is a very well worked out agenda—will be before us, this Committee and this body, for consideration. I would hope that we would not take any action which would prejudice that consideration or prevent all of us—nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike—from participating in that discussion on an equal basis.

The same point that I just made can be made with respect to the item on the Provisional Agenda dealing with the methods of assuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. This problem, as I indicated earlier, is also covered by a scholarly paper prepared by the Rapporteur in annex IV of the report, entitled "Security Guarantees in the Context of Measures to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons". This subject is also the subject of the most intense discussions going on between the co-Chairmen at Geneva, and if and when success at Geneva brings us to a resumed session here, I would hope that this problem would be the subject of the most intense discussion in the United Nations. We will then have to deal with the delicate problems which this issue presents. But surely we should not take any action here which would inhibit, or in any way prejudice, the discussion of this problem in the United Nations where those States which are being asked to give nuclear assurances will have an equal voice.

I note, parenthetically, that both in annex I and in annex IV of the report of the Preparatory Committee of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States the question of nuclear-free zones is dealt with as a special aspect of the problem of assuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. As is pointed out on pages 11 and 12 of annex IV of the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference on Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, the identical draft treaties tabled by the United States and the USSR both contain a preambulatory provision that nothing in the treaty affects the rights of a group of States to con-

clude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

I am aware that here also the representative of Mexico at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has made certain suggestions for an amendment placing this provision as an operative article rather than in the preamble.<sup>7</sup> This suggestion, which is being given the most thoughtful consideration, is still under negotiation at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, but again the issue will be placed before this body if and when the issue of non-proliferation is being considered at a resumed session. Here again, we should do nothing that would prejudice our deliberations at such a session.

I have dealt, as I said earlier, only with two out of the four items under annex I, the Provisional Agenda for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States recommended by the Preparatory Committee, and I will not discuss the others in great detail but merely point out that there is nothing in there that would not be appropriate for discussion at the resumed session. I note with interest—and perhaps it would not be considered inappropriate to pay a compliment to the author of this report on item III, which deals in a quite scholarly way, basically with the problem of safeguards, a problem with which we had discussions in other forums and I assure him that the matter will be subject to discussion when this matter comes up to a resumed session, and we should do nothing which would prejudice or inhibit that discussion between all Members of the United Nations.

In hearing some of the statements today, and in informal discussions with representatives, I have detected a feeling on the part of some that in considering the issues involved in a non-proliferation treaty, we are considering two antagonistic sets of interests: those of the present nuclear Powers on the one hand and those of the rest of the world on the other hand.

My delegation cannot accept this view and I would like to urge its rejection by others. I would like to do so by quoting a statement made by one of the representatives to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 5 September of this year. This representative put forth his view that there were not two groups of States but three groups of States that had varying interests in the subject matter of a non-proliferation treaty. This representative stated as follows:

Let me add that, in the present state of science, technology and economic development, not everyone becomes an atomic Power that wishes to do so; only ten or fifteen countries will be in a position to equip themselves with atomic weapons, if they so desire, in the next few years. The other countries—and they are the great majority of the States Members of the United Nations, that is, at least a hundred—will only be in a position to manufacture atomic weapons in the more remote future.

The representative then went on to ask the question:

What will happen to their security? Let us recall again that certain non-nuclear countries possessing a sufficient economic and industrial potential scarcely conceal their desire to equip themselves with nuclear weapons for reasons which have nothing to do with their security, for clearly aggressive purposes. What will happen to the security of a large number of countries if such countries became possessors of nuclear weapons? The proliferation of nuclear weapons is incom-

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 394-395, 399-400.

patible with national and international security. The mere prospect of an increase in the number of nuclear countries has the result of raising new problems and creating general complexes of insecurity.

This representative, therefore, saw that there were three groups of States: the existing nuclear-weapon States, the relatively small number of States in a position to manufacture nuclear weapons in the immediate future, and the hundred or so States represented in this body who are not in a position to do so.

I think members of this Committee may be interested to know that I was quoting from Ambassador Christov of Bulgaria, found on page 8 of ENDC/PV.328. I have not always agreed with the statements of my colleague from Bulgaria at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and I am not wholly sure I agree completely with this, for reasons I will indicate in a moment, but I am happy to commend this statement to the consideration of this Committee. I think the Committee would be interested also in knowing that in an earlier intervention on 24 February 1966 the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, had pointed out that there might be as many as four categories of States.<sup>8</sup> Others have made other types of classification.

Without wishing to argue this point on classifications or categorizations, I think the Secretary-General's report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons makes one point abundantly clear—that is, that all countries have an interest in the prompt negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty because nuclear proliferation will have an adverse effect on the security of all States.

It is in this spirit that the United States joined as a sponsor of resolution A/C.1/L.416. It is in this spirit that we would hope to participate in the discussion of non-proliferation in a resumed session of the twenty-second General Assembly.

### Statement by the Soviet Representative (Cheprov) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, December 15, 1967<sup>1</sup>

The Soviet delegation has already drawn attention to the need to speed up work on the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We have stated that we attach great importance to negotiations on this subject which are now in their most important stage. It is difficult to overestimate the timeliness and the importance of this task to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons, as one of the important questions touching upon European and international security. Any increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons or obtaining access to them would greatly increase tension in international relations and also increase the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons.

<sup>8</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 49-59.

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV.1553, pp. 63-75.

The danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons threatens all States. It threatens the nuclear Powers which can be drawn into a nuclear war as a result of conflict in some part of the world. They threaten just as much the small countries, as was recently convincingly proved by the report of the Secretary-General<sup>2</sup> on the effect of the possible use of nuclear weapons from which all people, without exception, would suffer. To the peoples of Africa the significance of the treaty on non-proliferation is determined, for instance, by the fact that this would create an obstacle to the nuclear arming of the South African racists, who in alliance with the West German revenge seekers work to create nuclear weapons. The Arab countries cannot forget the State which is their neighbour and whose aggressive intentions are well known, and which certainly does not turn its back upon the possibility of nuclear armament. The conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty would be extremely important for Europe which has already known two world wars. It is no secret that in the Federal Republic of Germany there are aggressive revenge-seeking forces which are receiving support.

The key to this objective is to obtain access to the most terrifying weapons of our time. More briefly, general interest in a speedy solution of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is obvious. All this was confirmed last year by the General Assembly which justifiably noted that an increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons "may lead to the aggravation of tensions between States and the risk of a nuclear war".<sup>3</sup>

The conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would strengthen general security and contribute to the creation of propitious conditions for the solution of other disarmament problems, above all, nuclear disarmament. The Soviet delegation has often underlined its opinion that a solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not a goal in itself but a link in a chain of other measures designed to do away with the threat of a nuclear war.

In this connexion, may I recall the statement made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Kosygin, on 9 February this year:

We consider that a solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is an important step towards the subsequent nuclear disarmament of States. Non-proliferation is not a means for the present nuclear-weapon States to keep their special status but is an important stage in the fight for nuclear disarmament, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the complete elimination of them from the arsenals of States and their destruction and the fight for the cessation of the production of those weapons. We are convinced that, in the final analysis, it will be possible to find a solution to these problems and thus free mankind from the threat hanging over it.<sup>4</sup>

The First Committee is seized of a draft resolution sponsored by fifteen States from various continents, various groups of States, including the Soviet Union.<sup>5</sup> This draft resolution confirms a decision previously taken by the General Assembly on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This draft resolution would speed

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 470-513.

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, p. 748.

<sup>4</sup> ENDC/PV.287, p. 15 (variant translation).

<sup>5</sup> *Ante* pp. 704-705.

up the solution of this question in present conditions and contribute to the achievement of a treaty on non-proliferation. We ask members of the Committee to support such a decision.

Last year the United Nations General Assembly adopted a decision noting that, with a view to continuing international negotiations on a treaty for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it is necessary for all States to abstain from taking steps which could prevent agreement on this problem. At that time the General Assembly also asked all countries of the world to take the necessary steps to facilitate the speediest achievement of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly called upon States to abstain from any measures which would make it more difficult to conclude such a treaty.<sup>6</sup> That appeal retains its significance today. Negotiations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons continued in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in the most intensive manner, until yesterday in fact, and as we are told in the interim report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, substantial progress has been made.<sup>7</sup> This progress is the result of intensive efforts made over several years. It redounds to the credit not only of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament but also of the General Assembly which has discussed the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at many sessions and adopted many important decisions in this connexion.

It was those resolutions of the General Assembly which guided the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and the members of the Committee representing various continents and groups of countries took into account the desires and viewpoints presented by non-nuclear countries in the Assembly concerning the solution of the problems of non-proliferation.

Of all measures which could contribute now to a breaking of the nuclear armaments race, a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is closest to achievement. There is no doubt that not only present but future generations will value highly the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons if this measure, which is important for international peace and security, is carried to a successful conclusion. A treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would also open up new horizons in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the interests of mankind. In these conditions, it is extremely important, as provided in the draft resolution of the fifteen States, that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should be enabled to conclude its work on a draft treaty and that States should not do anything which could prevent the Committee from carrying out its responsible task. In the draft resolution there is a clear-cut deadline, that is to say, 15 March 1968, for a full report on this problem from the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Without such a report it would be senseless to try under present conditions to examine the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are convinced that Members of the United Nations will show a wise and statesmanlike attitude in their approach to this draft resolution by supporting it. Such a position would be in

<sup>6</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 686-687.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 622-623.

the interests of a solution to the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and therefore of interest to all the peoples of the world.

In connexion with the agenda item entitled "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", we have also received the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.<sup>9</sup> Our position concerning the convening of this conference is well known and we do not intend to repeat it. However, we would like to stress once more that in our opinion the solution of the problem of guaranteeing the security of non-nuclear countries must be achieved by the common efforts of nuclear and non-nuclear States.

We ask that this question be seriously studied because the opposition of non-nuclear Powers to nuclear Powers concerning the solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will not ensure the success of that Conference, and an invitation to nuclear Powers to attend this Conference without the right to vote would not change anything in this connexion.

We noted the concept of the objectives of the Conference of non-nuclear States given by those who initiated it. May I, in this connexion, quote part of the statement made by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Pirzada, during the general debate at the present session of the General Assembly :

Last year the General Assembly, in resolution 2153 B (XXI), decided to convene a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States to consider how best their security can be guaranteed against nuclear threat or blackmail. Pakistan has made it clear that the proposal was conceived to complement, not duplicate; to supplement and not compete with, the work of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on the non-proliferation treaty.

It was in that spirit that the Preparatory Committee established by resolution 2153 B (XXI) decided to await developments in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee as long as possible before commencing its task.

Further, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan said :

It is apparent from the report of the Preparatory Committee that it has tried its best to ensure that the non-nuclear-weapon States Conference will deliberate essentially on those questions which arise directly from the conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty but are outside the scope of the treaty.<sup>9</sup>

At this morning's meeting of the First Committee, the representatives of Kenya, Pakistan, Malaysia and Ethiopia—if we understood them correctly—again expressed the same conception of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States as that put forward by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan.

Thus, it appears quite clear to us that the States which show particular initiative in the matter of convening a Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States do not consider it possible for this Conference to work concurrently with the Committee of Eighteen or in competition with it, on the treaty of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, or for it to become an obstacle on the way to the conclusion of such a treaty. Therefore, if it were decided to convene a conference of non-nuclear weapons States in March 1968, as suggested by the report of the Preparatory Committee, such a step would give rise to serious difficulties concerning the conclusion of work on the treaty

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, pp. 405-411.

<sup>9</sup> A/PV. 1584 (prov.), p. 62.

on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This would run counter to the concept of the objectives of the conference of non-nuclear-weapons States put forward by those who themselves took the initiative in this matter. It would run counter to the decisions of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Regarding the convening of this conference in March 1968—something which the Soviet Union categorically opposes—the advocates of such a decision probably do not stop to think of the extremely unfavourable consequences which could flow from such a decision.

Indeed, as a result of this, everything that has already been achieved through the arduous negotiations in Geneva could be lost. The Soviet delegation hopes that States which hold dear the cause of the strengthening of international peace and security will not embark on such a course.

In connexion with this conference, we consider it necessary to stress that the Soviet Union has great understanding and sympathy with the point of view of non-nuclear States in disarmament matters, including nuclear disarmament. Our readiness to take these interests into account can be seen, for instance, in the proposal put forward by the Soviet Union at this session concerning the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

The decisions of the General Assembly in this matter must result in nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction, being totally and finally prohibited.

Is there any need to explain in this room the importance which we have attached to this question in the Soviet Union or the efforts we have made to accelerate it? All of you have witnessed this. The non-nuclear countries are the countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America—our fraternal socialist countries—and many European States with which the Soviet Union has good and friendly relations. The majority of these States are States which recently cast off the chains of colonial enslavement, States which fight imperialism and neo-colonialism.

Co-operation with, and support for, these countries and peoples who are engaged in a national liberation struggle are keystones of the policy of the Soviet Union. Together with these countries, we fight for peace against aggression, against the designs of colonialism and in support of the speediest possible liquidation of the shameful colonial system, the eradication of the horrible evil of racism, for progress, freedom and independence. The fight for disarmament and for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is part of our common effort for international peace and security, and those who try to introduce an element of discord between the Soviet Union and our friends in Africa and Asia are motivated by bad intentions; they are guided by selfish interests, and their position is grist to the mill of imperialism and colonialism.

To conclude, may we again express our conviction that our friends will have full understanding for the position of the Soviet Union and that all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, will increase their efforts to reach the objectives which are so important for the whole of mankind. A treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a step towards disarmament, towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, towards freeing the peoples from the horrors of a nuclear war.

**Twenty-one Power Draft Resolution Introduced in the  
First Committee of the General Assembly: Conference  
of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, December 15, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 2153 B (XXI) of 17 November 1966 by which it decided that a Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States be convened not later than July 1968,<sup>2</sup>

*Having considered with appreciation* the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (A/6817),<sup>3</sup>

1. *Approves* the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (A/6817);
2. *Decides* to convene the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in Geneva from 11 March 1968 to 10 April 1968;
3. *Decides* to invite non-nuclear-weapon States to the Conference;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make appropriate arrangements for convening the Conference and for participation in it by nuclear weapon States, if they so desire, and by the specialized agencies concerned, as well as by the IAEA, in accordance with the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (A/6817).

**Statement by the Soviet Representative (Shevchenko) to  
the First Committee of the General Assembly, Decem-  
ber 18, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

Today the Soviet Union delegation would like to state briefly its position on the draft resolutions relating to disarmament problems which will be voted on very shortly.

First of all, we deem it necessary once again to refer to the draft resolution on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons of which our delegation is a co-sponsor.<sup>2</sup> Our delegation has already had opportunity to stress that it is difficult to overemphasize the practicality and importance of the prevention of further proliferation as one of the key problems of European and international security. It is obvious that an increase in the number of countries disposing of nuclear weapons, or the access to them by new States would not only increase tension

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/L.420, Dec. 15, 1967. The draft resolution was cosponsored by Burundi, Chile, Ghana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, and Zambia. A revised version of the resolution was approved as pt. B of G.A. resolution 2346 (XXII), *post*, p. 733. Italy became a cosponsor of the revised resolution.

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 749-750.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 405-411.

<sup>4</sup> A/C.1/PV.1554, pp. 38-43.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, pp. 704-705.

in international relations but would also greatly increase the threat of a nuclear war.

The truth is that further proliferation of nuclear weapons will create threats for all States—both for the nuclear Powers and, to no less an extent, for all other countries. And as far as the result of a nuclear war is concerned, as is authoritatively stressed once again in the report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons, all countries, without exception, would suffer. The peoples of Africa are concerned about impeding access to nuclear weapons by the South African racists; the Arabs cannot fail to take into account the fact that Israel, which has continued its aggression against its neighbours, is not relinquishing the possibility of access to nuclear weapons. The great importance of agreement on non-proliferation for Europe, whose people have twice in this century experienced the horrors of world war, is obvious. In the Federal Republic of Germany, aggressive and revanchist forces are seeking access to this most threatening weapon.

As we have already pointed out, the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would reduce international tension and contribute to the establishment of favourable conditions for the solution of other problems of disarmament, first and foremost nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union has repeatedly stressed that it regards the solution of the problem of non-proliferation, not as an end in itself, but as a link in a chain of measures designed to eliminate the threat of nuclear war. That is why we support and will vote in favour of the draft resolution which calls upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee not to lose sight of the need to move forward towards the final goal: general and complete disarmament.<sup>3</sup>

The need for all States Members of the United Nations to bend their efforts in order to achieve general and complete disarmament follows from many General Assembly resolutions; it is also determined by the requirements of international law, of which the principle of disarmament has become one of the cornerstones. The Committee must also speed up its examination of such matters as the elimination of foreign military bases and the banning of underground tests. Our delegation will therefore vote in favour of the draft resolutions.<sup>4</sup> We, as is well known, have sought with all our energies a solution to the problem of the use of nuclear weapons—this means of mass destruction—the use of which, as pointed out in the General Assembly Declaration adopted in 1961,<sup>5</sup> would be contrary to the standards and principles of contemporary international law and a crime against mankind and civilization.

The General Assembly this year, at the initiative of the Soviet Union, has already adopted an important resolution in which the conviction is expressed of the need to speed up the solution of the problem of the banning of the use of nuclear weapons and the conclusion of an appropriate convention.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Pt. B of G.A. resolution 2342 (XXII), *post*, pp. 730-731.

<sup>4</sup> I.e., G.A. resolutions 2343 (XXII) and 2344 (XXII), *post*, pp. 731-732.

<sup>5</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 648-650.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, pp. 026-027.

But it is clear to all—as we have already pointed out—that, among the measures that could contribute at this point to slowing down the arms race, the non-proliferation treaty is the closest to implementation. That is why not only our generation but future generations will highly appreciate the conclusion of this non-proliferation treaty. This important step will be rapidly—and I stress the word rapidly—brought to a successful conclusion, if all States—nuclear and non-nuclear—will join in the efforts for an early achievement of this aim. That is why it is important, as is provided for in the draft resolution of which the Soviet Union is a co-sponsor, to enable the Eighteen-Nation Committee to complete the drafting of this treaty.

In this resolution a deadline is set—15 March 1968—for the submission by the Committee of a comprehensive report. This is a deadline which we regard as reasonable and realistic. Of course, it will be necessary to intensify the talks in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, in order to meet this deadline.

Then, the report of the Committee, under this resolution, will have to be examined at the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly which is the broadest forum of the United Nations Organization.

As regards the question of the calling of a conference of non-nuclear Powers, the Soviet delegation would like to express its appreciation to the co-sponsors of the resolution on this subject<sup>7</sup> for the understanding they have shown, their goodwill and their desire to contribute to a solution of the problem of non-proliferation. The Soviet delegation, for its part, is prepared to meet halfway the wishes of the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America and to support the resolution, if it is envisaged that this Conference will be called in August or September 1968.

As the Soviet delegation has already stated, we note with great satisfaction that the initiative of Poland—our brother socialist country—has produced positive results, and that the draft resolution approving the report of the Secretary-General on the consequences of the possible use of nuclear weapons gathered such impressive support.<sup>8</sup> We support and will vote in favour of this draft.

In conclusion, may I say a few words regarding chemical and bacteriological weapons. This question is of considerable political importance and that is why we are very grateful to the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Csatorday, for the great efforts made in order to reach a consensus in the Committee. We welcome the fact that the representative of Malta is not pressing his draft.<sup>9</sup> This is right, this is a correct step which corresponds to the interests of all peoples.

In this connexion, we deem it our duty to recall that the General Assembly in resolution 2162 B (XXI) called upon all States which had not done so to date to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons.<sup>10</sup> This call

<sup>7</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>8</sup> The draft resolution was identical with pt. A of G.A. resolution 2342 (XXII), *post*, pp. 729-730.

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, pp. 625-626.

<sup>10</sup> The resolution appears in *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 798-799. For the Geneva protocol, see *Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents, 1919-55*, pp. 169-170.

remains in force and we hope that it will be hearkened to. We are not afraid to mention the fact that a number of African countries—for instance, Madagascar, Ghana, Niger, Sierra Leone, Tunisia—have reacted to the call of the General Assembly and in 1967 acceded to the Geneva Protocol.

Now, what about others? What about those States which have not done this yet? I think that they too should not—they are not entitled to—ignore the decisions of the General Assembly on this subject.

It is obvious that one must with all energy struggle against the use of all means of mass destruction, nuclear weapons—as well as chemical and bacteriological weapons—which nowadays are being used against the people of Viet Nam.

In these final stages of discussion in the Committee on Disarmament, the Soviet delegation would like to call upon all States to speak up with even greater energy against the armaments race and for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, for an early solution of the problems of disarmament, which are ripe, so that atomic energy, biology and chemistry may serve not war, but peace and the welfare of peoples.

### Statement by ACDA Deputy Director Fisher to the First Committee of the General Assembly, December 18, 1967<sup>1</sup>

I should like, at the outset, to identify the United States delegation with the statements that have been made both by you and other members of the Committee over the tragic and untimely death of the Prime Minister of Australia. I can do no more than say that we have lost a friend, and we feel that everyone in this room has lost a friend.

I am intervening now, reserving my right to intervene later on draft resolution A/C.1/L.416<sup>2</sup> and L. 420,<sup>3</sup> but I thought, in view of the relatively early nature of the hour—I have some explanations of vote to make on some other resolutions—that I might make those now.

We have also before us draft resolutions A/C.1/L.413 and L.419, both under the item "Question of general and complete disarmament". I think the remarks that have already been made in the plenary cover the positions, at least on those resolutions. However, I should like to comment briefly on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.414, relating to a comprehensive test-ban.<sup>4</sup> My delegation supported resolution 2163 (XXI) at last year's session,<sup>5</sup> and we will, of course, vote in favour of the present draft resolution, which we find a constructive approach to the problem.

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV.1554, pp. 53-57.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 704-705.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 714.

<sup>4</sup> G.A. resolution 2343 (XXII), *post*, p. 731.

<sup>5</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 802-803.

As the members of this Committee all know, the United States strongly supports the conclusion of an adequately verified comprehensive test ban. But, while we agree with the representative of Sweden that the debate this year in Geneva on the comprehensive test-ban was useful and constructive, we regret that it does not appear to us that a comprehensive test-ban would be a sufficiently stable instrument unless it included a provision allowing a certain number of on-site inspections.

In this connexion, however, I should like to point out that every time we debate the question of extending the limited test-ban 'Treaty' to cover underground tests, we find ourselves in this chamber confronted with assertions and counter-assertions about whether national means of detection and identification are adequate to verify compliance without on-site inspection. The weight of scientific opinion in the United States is that national means alone are not adequate for this purpose and that on-site inspections are necessary. Other nations apparently have a different view. We have heard different views expressed in this chamber in the last two weeks.

It would seem to us that the obvious and simple solution to a problem, when we are debating a scientific fact, would be to get the scientists of our various countries together, in order that they could come to some consensus by which we might all be guided. I do not wish to belabour the point, but merely to remind the Committee that on numerous occasions the United States has proposed this very course of action. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union has repeatedly rejected this proposal. It is the view of my delegation, nevertheless, that until there is a consensus in the scientific community, the world-wide scientific community, concerning this question: whether national capabilities to verify compliance with a comprehensive test ban are satisfactory or whether they are not satisfactory--and this is a scientific question on which it should be possible to exchange views--until we obtain such a consensus, we will continue to argue profitlessly here and in other forums on how to achieve a complete ban--notwithstanding our common desire to obtain one.

Now, we continue to support efforts towards improved verification by seismic means: we continue to find useful the Swedish initiative for the nuclear detection club.<sup>7</sup> This concept has received mention in operative paragraph 3 of the present resolution and my Government will be happy to make whatever contributions it can toward improving our knowledge of the techniques of seismic detection through the exchange of information.

It of course goes without saying that my delegation supports the call in operative paragraph 2 for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests in all environments, but I wish to make clear that in the light of my Government's position on this matter we must take this call to mean the suspension of tests pursuant to an adequately verified treaty banning the testing of nuclear weapons in all environments.

I would like to comment quite briefly on draft resolution A/C.1/L.418 relating to the elimination of foreign military bases in the coun-

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, p. 390-393.

tries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.<sup>8</sup> Quite briefly, the United States will abstain on this draft resolution. Although, as a matter of policy, the United States does not reject the consideration of any serious arms control and disarmament proposal put forth by any nation, it does not consider this proposal a useful subject for discussion in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on an urgent basis. It is not an arms control measure as such and, as we have seen time and time again, a resolution of this nature does nothing more than provide a basis for profitless polemics and propaganda exchanges which consume time badly needed in both the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and this body for important and serious proposals.

### Statement by the Pakistani Representative (Shahi) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, December 18, 1967<sup>1</sup>

Before I speak on draft resolutions A/C.1/L.416<sup>2</sup> and L.420,<sup>3</sup> may I express my delegation's deepest sympathy and condolences to the distinguished representative of Australia and the Australian delegation on the great and tragic loss they have suffered through the death of Prime Minister Harold Holt. As a fellow member of the Commonwealth and as a country situated in the region of South Asia, Pakistan has developed close relations with Australia. In particular, co-operation between our two countries for economic development has made us partners in the promotion of the objectives of the United Nations in the economic field. Hence, we follow with close interest developments and events in Australia. Australia's loss in the death of Prime Minister Harold Holt is also felt in Pakistan.

In my statement on item 28 (a) and (b) of our agenda, I said to this Committee on 15 December that:

The situation facing the General Assembly is that the nuclear Powers in the ENDC consider that they should be given more time to reach agreement on a non-proliferation treaty. It would appear they are confident of being able to reach accord among themselves by 15 March and would therefore prefer that discussions on security guarantees and other subjects on the provisional agenda of the non-nuclear-weapon States conference should not take place before the final draft of the treaty is presented to the General Assembly. On the other hand, there is great weight behind the view that the conference should be held in March-April as recommended by the Preparatory Committee.

Several delegations, including my own, are at present engaged in intensive consultations to try to bridge the gulf, if possible. We wish to avoid any unnecessary conflict of views or interests. Any objective connected with disarmament cannot be achieved except with good will.<sup>4</sup>

Since that time we have been continuing intensive consultations. As a result of the constructive initiative of Ambassador Vinci of Italy, meetings have been held between the negotiating group con-

<sup>8</sup> *I.e.*, G.A. resolution 2344 (XXII), *post.*, p. 732.

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV. 1555, pp. 16-20.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante.*, pp. 704-705.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante.*, p. 714.

<sup>4</sup> A/C.1/PV. 1552, pp. 33-35.

sisting of Kenya, Nigeria, Chile and Pakistan, designated by the twenty-one co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.420 and the two co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and also a representative group of the ENDC, namely, Italy, Brazil, Mexico, India and Romania.

It is indeed a matter of gratification that, as a result of the exchanges of views, which have been taking place in a spirit of good will, understanding, sincerity and candour, as reported by the representative of Kenya, it has been possible to reach complete agreement on a "package deal" under which the Soviet Union and the United States, together with the other co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.416, will support draft resolution A/C.1/L.420, which calls for a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States and, in turn, the co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.420 will support draft resolution A/C.1/L.416.

In order to make this "package deal" possible, it has become necessary for both sides to agree to revise their respective resolutions on a basis of mutual accommodation. Let me briefly comment on the changes that have been made in the two draft resolutions.

The co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, namely, the Soviet Union and the United States, have extended a categorical undertaking to the twenty-one co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.420 that they will support the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States regardless of the results of the negotiations in the ENDC which are to be resumed in January next year, and regardless of the outcome of the resumed session of the General Assembly soon after the ENDC report is presented.

In return, the co-sponsors of draft resolution L.420 have agreed to reschedule the timing of the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States originally fixed for 11 March to 10 April 1968, as stipulated in draft resolution L.420, to August/September 1968. The exact dates for the Conference will need to be fixed in consultation with the Secretariat. For this purpose, the negotiating group of the twenty-one sponsors of draft resolution L.420 would like the Secretariat to indicate the precise dates in August/September 1968 which may be inserted in draft resolution A/C.1/L.420/Rev.1 by the time the General Assembly is prepared to act on the report of this Committee on the disarmament question.<sup>5</sup>

In the negotiations, it was made clear to the two co-Chairmen, and the representative group of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, by the negotiating group on behalf of the co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.420, that if the sequence of conferences insisted upon by the nuclear Powers—namely, negotiations in the ENDC, resumed session of the General Assembly, Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and the twenty-third regular session of the General Assembly—if this sequence of conferences is to be maintained, it is imperative that a deadline should be fixed in draft resolution A/C.1/L.416 for the submission of the report of the ENDC so that

<sup>5</sup> In its revised form, this draft resolution was approved as pt. B of G.A. resolution 2346 (XXII), *post*, p. 733.

the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly may be called well before August-September 1968, when the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States is due to convene.

It was also pointed out on behalf of the twenty-one co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.420 that if the date mentioned in operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.416, namely, 15 March 1968, for the submission of a full report on the negotiations on a draft treaty was deleted it could lead to a situation in which the ENDC might not submit its report until much later, thereby necessitating a delay in convening a resumed session. The delay could conceivably be so long as to prevent consideration of the non-proliferation treaty in the resumed session, before the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States is convened in August-September 1968.

It is indeed a matter of satisfaction that this consideration urged by the negotiating group, weighed with the co-Chairmen of the Conference of the ENDC and that they have agreed in the revised version of their draft resolution (A/C.1/L.416) to maintain the deadline, namely 15 March, for the submission of the report of the ENDC.<sup>9</sup>

In this context, it is our duty to express our deep appreciation to the representatives of Italy, Brazil and the other members of the ENDC, and to Chile, who have agreed not to insist on the deletion of 15 March as the deadline for the submission of the report of the ENDC on the non-proliferation treaty.

Turning to the other changes that have been agreed upon by the two sides, it may also be mentioned that the last paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/L.416 has been so amended as to make it clear beyond any possible doubt that the resumed session of the General Assembly, will consider only the report of the ENDC. The resumed session will not consider the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States<sup>7</sup> as part of its agenda. Hence, the General Assembly's adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/L.420/Rev.1 would mean that all action on the Preparatory Committee's report to convene the Conference has been completed at this session, and that the Conference will be convened in August-September 1968, regardless of the outcome of negotiations on the non-proliferation treaty in the ENDC, and regardless of the discussions on that outcome in the resumed session of the General Assembly.

Now, I would like to give my delegation's comments on paragraphs 3 and 4 of revised draft resolution A/C.1/L.420.

In regard to paragraph 3, we consider that the original version, namely "Decides to invite non-nuclear-weapon States to the Conference", reflects more faithfully the concept of the composition of the Conference as conceived by my delegation when it initiated a proposal last year to bring together all the non-nuclear-weapon countries, so that they may harmonize their views and concert their efforts to safeguard their vital security and other interests in the context of the imperative need to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the language in the original version of draft resolution A/C.1/L.420, conforms to the spirit of resolution 2030 (XX) adopted

<sup>9</sup> In its revised form, this draft resolution was approved as pt. A of G.A. resolution 2346 (XXII), *post*, pp. 732-733.

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, pp. 405-411.

at the twentieth regular session of the General Assembly on 29 November 1965, to convene a conference of all countries of the world to discuss disarmament. Operative paragraph 1 of that resolution reads as follows:

Endorses the proposal adopted at the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo, in 1964, on the convening of a world disarmament conference to which all countries would be invited.

That is the text of operative paragraph 1 of resolution 2030 (XX) adopted at the twentieth session by the General Assembly.<sup>3</sup>

However, majority opinion among the twenty-one sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.420 favours the revised version of operative paragraph 3 which reads:

Decides to invite non-nuclear weapon States Members of the United Nations, the specialized agencies and the IAEA, to the Conference.

While the Pakistan delegation has every desire to defer to the view of the majority on this question especially in view of the agreement on the "package deal", based on mutually acceptable amendments to draft resolutions A/C.1/L.416 and L.420, my delegation is constrained by the implications of the revised text of operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.420/Rev.1, to maintain its position that the proposed Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be convened on a universal basis, as envisaged in the original text of draft resolution A/C.1/L.420 and not a restrictive one as sought by draft resolution L.420/Rev.1.

We shall therefore vote on operative paragraph 3 accordingly.

Turning now to operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution L.420/Rev.1, we consider, speaking again on behalf of my own delegation, that the revised text which is an abridged version of the original paragraph, in effect means exactly the same as the original one. We firmly maintain that no kind of onus should be placed on a nuclear-weapon Power to participate in the Conference if it does not desire to do so.

On the question of the representation of China in the United Nations and all international conferences, Pakistan must once again reiterate its firm view that only the Government of the People's Republic of China is entitled to represent China in all international organizations, conferences and meetings.

The Pakistan delegation is happy that draft resolution A/C.1/L.420/Rev.1 has gained the support of all sections of opinion in this Committee. Ever since Pakistan first proposed the idea of a conference of non-nuclear-weapon countries, and through all the doubts and hesitations that we noticed and the opposition that we encountered along the way, my delegation remained confident that the tremendous stake of the non-nuclear-weapon States in questions affecting their security would win recognition in the end. To the extent that the recognition will be accorded in the Committee's proceedings today—in particular, by the Soviet Union and the United States—we feel gratified. Their categorical declaration of support, regardless of negotiations in the

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, p. 585. For the Cairo proposal, see *ibid.*, 1964, p. 445.

ENDC and regardless of the discussions in the resumed session, for the Conference, brings great accession of strength to the efforts of the non-nuclear-weapon States to hold the Conference and to make its deliberations fruitful and constructive.

This result cannot but give the greatest satisfaction to Pakistan. Last year, in pursuance of President Ayub Khan's objective of safeguarding the security interests of non-nuclear-weapon States, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan proposed in the General Assembly the convening of a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States. A resolution was adopted last year by 48 votes in favour, 1 against and 59 abstentions.<sup>9</sup> The Soviet Union and the United States abstained. The number of abstentions last year made us redouble our efforts to secure greater support for the Conference at this session of the General Assembly. The fact that the Soviet Union and the United States are now supporters of the Conference is profoundly welcome to Pakistan, as is the massive fact that there will be unanimous support from all Member States for the Conference.

It only remains for my delegation to record our debt of gratitude to the Chairman and members of the Preparatory Committee for their valuable report, to the two co-Chairmen of the ENDC, namely the United States and the Soviet Union, in particular, Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and Justice Goldberg; to the members of the ENDC, to the co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.416 and draft resolution A/C.1/L.420, and to the representative of Italy, Ambassador Vinci, for promoting meetings between the negotiating group of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.420 and the co-Chairmen and members of the ENDC. And finally, we extend our grateful thanks to all those delegations who, from the very first hour, had faith in a Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and gave steadfast support to the delegation of Pakistan.

### Statement by Ambassador Goldberg to the First Committee of the General Assembly, December 18, 1967<sup>1</sup>

I take particular pleasure in appearing before the Committee today to express the full and wholehearted support of my delegation for both draft resolutions which are before the Committee: draft resolution A/C.1/L.416 as revised,<sup>2</sup> and draft resolution A/C.1/L.420 as revised.<sup>3</sup>

I should like to take this occasion to express the appreciation of my delegation to all who have participated in the consultations that have taken place over the last week-end to arrive at a broad consensus of views concerning both draft resolutions. All who participated in these consultations are entitled to great credit for the constructive results which have flowed from these consultations, and if I name only a few

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 749-750.

<sup>1</sup> A/C.1/PV.1555, pp. 26-31.

<sup>2</sup> Pt. A of G.A. resolution 2346 (XXII), *post*, pp. 732-733.

<sup>3</sup> Pt. B of G.A. resolution 2346 (XXII), *post*, p. 733.

it is not to omit by name the others who participated, but merely to indicate in their persons the co-operation of all.

I should like to express the appreciation of my delegation to Ambassador Nabwera, the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, to Ambassador Shahi, to Ambassador Vinci, to our co-Chairman of ENDC, to Deputy Prime Minister Kuznetsov and to the other members of ENDC—both nuclear and non-nuclear—who participated in the discussions, and the other members of the Preparatory Committee. These were prolonged and serious discussions. In the course of them, as many of you know, Minister Garcia Robles of Mexico played a constructive and very important part.

In those discussions, on behalf of my Government, I stated that we would categorically support the calling of a Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States at a time to be set in the period August–September 1968, regardless of what action is taken at the ENDC, and regardless of what may or may not be done at a resumed session of the twenty-second General Assembly. I wish in this Committee to repeat that categorical assurance, and to say that this is our understanding of the meaning of draft resolution A/C.1/L.420/Rev.1 which is before this Committee.

In general, as has been stated by Ambassador Shahi correctly, this is a “package deal” on the part of those who participated in the discussions, and I understand it to be such, and regard it to be so. The relationship between the resumed session, provided for in document A/C.1/L.416/Rev.1, and the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, decided upon in document A/C.1/L.420/Rev.1, is apparent from the two drafts. As the two drafts provide, A/C.1/L.416/Rev.1 calls for a full report from the ENDC to the General Assembly on or before 15 March. Following receipt of this report, “appropriate consultations”, as the draft resolution explicitly states, will be initiated in accordance with our rules of procedure on the setting of an early date after 15 March 1968 for the resumption of the twenty-second session to consider item 28(a): “Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament”. I think that we should say quite explicitly here, in deference to our colleagues from India and that delegation, that it at least would not be our intention—and we hope it would not be the intention of any delegation—that any resumed session should interfere with the very important Conference that will take place in New Delhi in the month of March.

Now, any resumed session of the Assembly is, of course, the master of its own destiny in deciding what action it will or will not take when it considers any item on its agenda; in this case item 28(a). But, I repeat, regardless of what the Assembly may or may not decide to do—and that is up to the Assembly—our assurance is categorical that the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should take place at the time specified in the resolution.

One of the things that was apparent from our private consultations—to me—is the depth and sincerity of the desire and interest of the non-nuclear Powers represented in our consultations, and I am sure generally in this Committee and Assembly, in effective action to

prevent nuclear proliferation. There never was, I think, any intimation in our discussions, at any stage or under any draft of the resolution, of any lack of interest or desire on their part, and we fully—in our Government and delegation—respect and appreciate their legitimate interest in this important subject, and their right to have their point of view fully presented and considered and heard in the ENDC sessions which will resume early in January. Indeed, one of the substantial improvements in the text of the resolutions is to make clear that this should be the case.

It is therefore with considerable pleasure that I advise this important Committee of the Assembly that my delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution L.420/Rev.1. We cannot, of course, speak for the other co-sponsors of draft resolution L.416/Rev.1, but we express the hope that, in the same spirit, they will do as we have.

The United States expects, hopes and looks for positive results in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, and at a resumed session, and we likewise look for positive results from the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. But, as I have stated, our vote on draft resolution L.420/Rev.1 involves support for calling the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in August or September—come what may in the further deliberations of the ENDC and of the Assembly.

I close by saying that, on the part of my delegation, as a co-Chairman of the ENDC Conference, we shall work unstintingly in Geneva, when that Conference resumes, so that a constructive report, meeting the hopes of the world community for a fair and equitable treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and consistent with the rights and interests of all countries, can indeed be delivered to the Assembly for its appropriate consideration.

### Statement by Ambassador Goldberg to the General Assembly: Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor, December 18, 1967<sup>1</sup>

The draft resolution before us<sup>2</sup> marks the first major step by the United Nations in a realm of great significance to all Members of the Organization. I should like to take this opportunity to re-emphasize the position of my country on this very important matter.

First, we believe that the prospects of rich harvests and mineral wealth in the deep oceans and on the deep ocean floors must not be allowed to create a new form of competition among marine nations.

Secondly, my nation believes that the nations of the world should take steps to assure that there will be no race among nations to grab and hold the lands under the high seas. The deep ocean floor should not be allowed to become a stage for competing claims of national sovereignty.

<sup>1</sup> A/PV.1639, pp. 3-7.

<sup>2</sup> Identical with G.A. resolution 2340 (XXII), *infra*.

Thirdly, we must ensure that the oceans and the deep ocean bottoms remain as they are, the legacy of all human beings, and that the deep ocean floor will be open to exploration and use by all States without discrimination.

Fourthly, my nation stands ready to join with all other nations to achieve these objectives in peace and under law.

My country supports the draft resolution to establish an *ad hoc* committee as a first step in this direction. We believe that the study which the committee is asked to prepare will constitute a most useful basis for future decisions of the General Assembly. We particularly hope that the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, as the result of the work of this *ad hoc* committee, will be in a position to establish a committee on the oceans with a broad mandate to develop law and to promote international co-operation with respect to the ocean and ocean floor.

There is no question that there are many complex and difficult problems—political, legal, scientific and economic—which are involved in this matter. But I want to make it clear to the General Assembly that I believe and am confident that the Members of the United Nations, working together, can overcome these problems just as they have overcome equally complex problems in similar areas in the past.

When my country made our first proposal for an Outer Space Committee in 1958,<sup>3</sup> there were also many complexities involved. But we now have an important Treaty in this area, the Outer Space Treaty,<sup>4</sup> which is the result of the work of the Outer Space Committee and the acts of this Assembly during the last session. And we have now before us, in this very Assembly, the report of the Outer Space Committee recommending a second important agreement to this Assembly for approval—the Agreement on Assistance to and Return of Astronauts and Space Vehicles.

This agreement is another major accomplishment, and a testimonial to what the Members of the United Nations can achieve, working together, on even the most difficult problems.

In reviewing the debate leading to the draft resolution calling for an *ad hoc* committee to study matters relating to the sea bed and ocean floor, I should like to note several points which emerged from the extensive discussions of the matter in the First Committee.

There is a common appreciation of the complexity of this question and of the importance of the General Assembly proceeding with care in addressing the scientific, technical, legal, economic and arms control issues involved. There is also a general appreciation of the importance of advancing international co-operation in the exploration and use of the ocean and ocean-floor. These realizations should permit us to move ahead, carefully but with all deliberate speed—just as we moved ahead carefully but surely in our consideration of outer space.

Finally, because it marks the first step by the General Assembly in a highly complex field, and because the question of the future régime of the ocean floor is a matter of great concern to all nations, we believe it is generally agreed that the principle of consensus be established

<sup>3</sup> General Assembly *Official Records: Thirteenth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 60.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 38-43.

from the outset. I am sure all Members will recall that this was the procedure followed by the Outer Space Committee, and that this procedure has not precluded steady progress, important agreement, and beneficial results.

In mentioning the achievements of the Outer Space Committee, I would not wish to imply that the problems and opportunities of the oceans and of outer space are perfectly analogous. Obviously, they are not. The oceans are close at hand; outer space extends beyond us to infinity. Man has travelled and fished on the surface of the oceans since the earliest days of history; outer space, until recently, has remained totally unexplored. And the oceans, which are already being used commercially by man, with rich prospects of food and mineral wealth awaiting further exploration and development, are far more valuable economically than outer space, in so far as we presently know.

Yet both outer space and the sea, through science and technology, promise much to mankind; and both require, for the fulfilment of that promise, that we the nations of this world, through this Organization, address ourselves to our tasks in peaceful co-operation and not in conflict or competition.

For this reason, my delegation strongly supports the resolution to establish this *ad hoc* committee, as the first major step by the United Nations—a step of historical importance—to help mankind develop and make full use of the great benefits which lie in and under the great oceans of the earth.

In closing, my delegation would like to pay tribute to the Government of Malta and to its distinguished representative, Ambassador Pardo, whose initiative brought this important matter to the attention of the Assembly.<sup>5</sup> This is a profound illustration that it is not the size of the country but the dedication and skill and ability that it and its representatives bring to our tasks that illuminate the work of this Organization.

### General Assembly Resolution 2340 (XXII): Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor, December 18, 1967<sup>1</sup>

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the item entitled "Examination of the question of the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the uses of their resources in the interests of mankind",<sup>2</sup>

*Noting* that developing technology is making the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, accessible and exploitable for scientific, economic, military and other purposes,

<sup>5</sup> See *ante*, pp. 332-333, 517-554.

<sup>1</sup> A/RES/2340 (XXII), Dec. 28, 1967. The resolution was approved by a vote of 99 to 0, with no abstentions.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 332-333.

*Recognizing* the common interest of mankind in the sea-bed and the ocean floor, which constitute the major portion of the area of this planet,

*Recognizing further* that the exploration and use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, as contemplated in the title of the item, should be conducted in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and for the benefit of all mankind,

*Mindful* of the provisions and practice of the law of the sea relating to this question,

*Mindful also* of the importance of preserving the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, as contemplated in the title of the item, from actions and uses which might be detrimental to the common interests of mankind,

*Desiring* to foster greater international co-operation and co-ordination in the further peaceful exploration and use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, as contemplated in the title of the item,

*Recalling* the past and continuing valuable work on questions relating to this matter carried out by the competent organs of the United Nations, the specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other intergovernmental organizations,

*Recalling further* that surveys are being prepared by the Secretary-General in response to General Assembly resolution 2172 (XXI) of 6 December 1966<sup>3</sup> and Economic and Social Council resolution 1112 (XL) of 7 March 1966,<sup>4</sup>

1. *Decides* to establish an *Ad Hoc* Committee, composed of Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Malta, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Somalia, Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United Republic of Tanzania, the United States of America and Yugoslavia, to study the scope and various aspects of this item;

2. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee, in co-operation with the Secretary-General, to prepare, for consideration by the General Assembly at its twenty-third session, a study which would include:

(a) A survey of the past and present activities of the United Nations, the specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other intergovernmental bodies with regard to the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and of existing international agreements concerning these areas;

(b) An account of the scientific, technical, economic, legal and other aspects of this item;

(c) An indication regarding practical means to promote international co-operation in the exploration, conservation and use of the

<sup>3</sup> General Assembly *Official Records: Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16* (A/6316), p. 22.

<sup>4</sup> Economic and Social Council *Official Records: Fortieth Session, Resolutions, Supplement No. 1* (E/4176), p. 3.

sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, as contemplated in the title of the item, and of their resources, having regard to the views expressed and the suggestions put forward by Member States during the consideration of this item at the twenty-second session of the General Assembly;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General:

(a) To transmit the text of the present resolution to the Governments of all Member States in order to seek their views on the subject;

(b) To transmit to the *Ad Hoc* Committee the records of the First Committee relating to the discussion of this item;

(c) To render all appropriate assistance to the *Ad Hoc* Committee, including the submission thereto of the results of the studies being undertaken in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 2172 (XXI) and Economic and Social Council resolution 1112 (XL), and such documentation pertinent to this item as may be provided by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and its Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Meteorological Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other intergovernmental bodies;

4. *Invites* the specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other intergovernmental bodies to co-operate fully with the *Ad Hoc* Committee in the implementation of the present resolution.

## General Assembly Resolution 2342 (XXII): Question of General and Complete Disarmament, December 19, 1967<sup>1</sup>

A

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 2162 A (XXI) of 5 December 1966,<sup>2</sup> in which the Secretary-General was requested to prepare a concise report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons,

*Noting* that the report has been completed and is available,<sup>3</sup>

*Convinced* that the wide dissemination of the report would contribute to a better understanding of the threat presented by nuclear weapons and encourage speedy progress in the prevention of their spread, as well as in other measures of nuclear disarmament,

1. *Takes note with satisfaction* of the Secretary-General's report as an authoritative statement on the effects of nuclear weapons and on the implications of their acquisition and further development:

<sup>1</sup> A/RES/2342 (XXII), Jan. 4, 1968. The General Assembly adopted part A of the resolution by a vote of 113 to 0, with 1 abstention (Cuba). It approved part B by a vote of 113 to 0, with 3 abstentions (Cuba, France, Gabon).

<sup>2</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, p. 798.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 476-513.

2. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Secretary-General and to the consultant experts who assisted him for the prompt and effective manner in which the report was prepared;

3. *Notes* the conclusions of the report and expresses the hope that all the parties concerned will consider them carefully;

4. *Recommends* that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should take into account the report and the conclusions thereof in its efforts towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to arrange for the reproduction of the full report as a United Nations publication and, making full use of all the facilities of the United Nations Office of Public Information, to publicize the report in as many languages as is considered desirable and practicable;

6. *Recommends* to all Governments the wide distribution of the report and its publication in their respective languages, as appropriate, so as to acquaint public opinion with its contents;

7. *Invites* regional intergovernmental organizations, the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and national and international non-governmental organizations to use all the facilities available to them to make the report widely known.

B

*The General Assembly,*

*Having received* the interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,<sup>4</sup>

*Recalling* its resolutions 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959,<sup>5</sup> 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961,<sup>6</sup> 1767 (XVII) of 21 November 1962,<sup>7</sup> 1908 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963,<sup>8</sup> 2031 (XX) of 3 December 1965<sup>9</sup> and 2162 C (XXI) of 5 December 1966,<sup>10</sup>

*Noting* that since then the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has not been able to devote sufficient time to the consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament,

*Reaffirming* its conviction of the necessity to continue to exert new effort, for the purpose of ensuring tangible progress towards the achievement of an agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament,

1. *Requests* the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume at the earliest possible date consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2162 C (XXI);

2. *Decides* to transmit to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament all the documents and records of the meetings of the First Committee, as well as those of the plenary meetings of the General Assembly pertaining to this item;

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 622-623.

<sup>5</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, p. 1545.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 1961, pp. 741-742.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 1962, vol. II, pp. 1072-1073.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 624-625.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 622-623.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 799-800.

3. *Requests* the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to report on the progress achieved on the question of general and complete disarmament to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session.

### General Assembly Resolution 2343 (XXII): Urgent Need for Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests, December 19, 1967<sup>1</sup>

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the question of the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and the interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,<sup>2</sup>

*Recalling* its resolutions 1762 (XVII) of 6 November 1962,<sup>3</sup> 1910 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963,<sup>4</sup> 2032 (XX) of 3 December 1965<sup>5</sup> and 2163 (XXI) of 5 December 1966,<sup>6</sup>

*Noting with regret* the fact that all States have not yet adhered to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963,<sup>7</sup>

*Noting with increasing concern* that nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere and underground are continuing,

*Taking into account* the existing possibilities of establishing, through international co-operation, an exchange of seismic data so as to create a better scientific basis for national evaluation of seismic events,

*Recognizing* the importance of seismology in the verification of the observance of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests,

*Realizing* that such a treaty would also constitute an effective measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

1. *Urges* all States which have not done so to adhere without further delay to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water;

2. *Calls upon* all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments;

3. *Expresses the hope* that States will contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data;

4. *Requests* the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests and to report to the General Assembly on this matter at its twenty-third session.

<sup>1</sup> A/RES/2343 (XXII), Jan. 4, 1968. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 103 to 1, with 7 abstentions. Albania voted against it, and the following countries abstained: Algeria, Cuba, France, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, and Mauritania.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 622-623.

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. II, pp. 1029-1033.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, p. 627.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 623-624.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 802-803.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

**General Assembly Resolution 2344 (XXII): Elimination of Foreign Military Bases in the Countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, December 19, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

*The General Assembly.*

*Having received the interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,<sup>2</sup>*

*Recalling its resolution 2165 (XXI) of 5 December 1966,<sup>3</sup>*

*Noting that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has not been able to give sufficient consideration to the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America,*

1. *Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume consideration of the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2165 (XXI);*

2. *Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session on the progress achieved on the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.*

**General Assembly Resolution 2346 (XXII): Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, December 19, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

A

*The General Assembly.*

*Having received the interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,<sup>2</sup>*

*Noting the progress that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has made towards preparing a draft international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.*

*Noting further that it has not been possible to complete the text of an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,*

*Reaffirming that it is imperative to make further efforts to conclude such a treaty at the earliest possible date,*

<sup>1</sup> A/RES/2344 (XXII), Jan. 4, 1968. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 105 to 0, with 13 abstentions. The following countries abstained: China, Cuba, France, Gabon, Haiti, Mali, Malta, Nigeria, Portugal, South Africa, Thailand, U.S., and Uruguay.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 622-623.

*Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, p. 804.

<sup>3</sup> A/RES/2346 (XXII), Jan. 5, 1968. The General Assembly adopted part A of the resolution by a vote of 112 to 1, with 4 abstentions: Albania voted against it, and Cuba, France, Gabon, and Guinea abstained. Part B was approved by a vote of 110 to 0, with 8 abstentions (Afghanistan, Burma, Cuba, Cyprus, France, Gabon, Guinea, India).

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 622-623.

*Expressing the hope* that the remaining differences between all the States concerned can be quickly resolved,

*Taking into account* the fact that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is continuing its work with a view to negotiating a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and intends to submit a full report for the consideration of the General Assembly as soon as possible,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965,<sup>3</sup> 2149 (XXI) of 4 November 1966<sup>4</sup> and 2153 A (XXI) of 17 November 1966;<sup>5</sup>

2. *Calls upon* the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament urgently to continue its work, giving all due consideration to all proposals submitted to the Committee and to the views expressed by Member States during the twenty-second session of the General Assembly;

3. *Requests* the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to submit to the General Assembly on or before 15 March 1968 a full report on the negotiations regarding a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, together with the pertinent documents and records;

4. *Recommends* that upon the receipt of that report appropriate consultations should be initiated, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, on the setting of an early date after 15 March 1968 for the resumption of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly to consider item 28 (a) entitled "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament".

B

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 2153 B (XXI) of 17 November 1966, by which it decided that a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States should be convened not later than July 1968,<sup>6</sup>

*Having considered with appreciation* the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States,<sup>7</sup>

1. *Approves* the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, subject to paragraph 2 below;

2. *Decides* to convene the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States at Geneva from 29 August to 28 September 1968;

3. *Decides* to invite to the Conference non-nuclear-weapon States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies and of the International Atomic Energy Agency;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make appropriate arrangements for convening the Conference in accordance with the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee.

<sup>3</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 532-534.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 686-687.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 748-749.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 749-750.

<sup>7</sup> *Annex*, pp. 405-411.

## Seventh Annual Report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, January 30, 1968<sup>1</sup>

### LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

*To the Congress of the United States:*

I am transmitting herewith the Seventh Annual Report of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Two weeks ago, on January 18, this Agency reported to me, and to the world, that agreement had at last been reached with the Soviet Union on a complete draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup> The draft treaty, which has been submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva for consideration by other nations, is the most significant achievement of the Agency since its establishment 7 years ago.

On January 24, I forwarded to the Congress a request that the life of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency be extended for an additional 3 years. At that time I noted the role of the Agency in bringing us close to the final conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty, and pointed out that the treaty "is not a creation of the United States. It is not a creation of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is the creation of all nations, large and small \* \* \*."<sup>3</sup>

While the United States and the Soviet Union, as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, have had the responsibility for preparing the draft treaty, a reading of this report will make plain the extent to which the draft has been responsive to interests and views of the nations which do not now have nuclear weapons.

In the course of a long and arduous negotiation, we have learned much of the concerns and desires of these nations. We have learned that it is not nuclear weapons they want, but security; not the destructiveness of the atom, but its benefits. We have been made aware of the depth of worldwide concern about the nuclear arms race.

The non-nuclear states have wanted their renunciation of nuclear weapons to be matched with a binding pledge by the nuclear powers to negotiate a halt in the arms race. They have not asked that the treaty require us to stop making nuclear weapons, or to divest ourselves of those now in our arsenals.

But they have asked us to pledge ourselves to move towards that ultimate goal. They feel the restraints they will voluntarily accept give them the right to such a pledge.

In drafting the nonproliferation treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union have acknowledged that right.

Under article VI of the draft now before the Disarmament Committee, the nuclear nations will assume a solemn treaty obligation

<sup>1</sup> H. doc. 256, 90th Cong., 2d sess.

<sup>2</sup> For the draft treaty, see ENDC/192/Rev.1 and ENDC/193/Rev.1.

<sup>3</sup> *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Jan. 29, 1968, pp. 122-123.

"to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament \* \* \*." It is an obligation the United States will undertake with the utmost seriousness—for it continues a policy begun in 1946, when the Nation offered to place its nuclear weapons under international control.<sup>4</sup> We reaffirmed that obligation at Geneva when the Disarmament Conference convened there 6 years ago.<sup>5</sup>

A reading of this report shows clearly that the United States is pursuing a broad program of research and negotiation in fulfillment of its commitment to disarmament. The non-proliferation treaty now under consideration is another step in that direction, as the hotline and the limited test ban treaty and the outer space agreement were before it.

No nation is more aware of the perils in the increasingly expert destructiveness of our time than the United States. I believe the Soviet Union shares this awareness.

This is why we have jointly pledged our nations to negotiate towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race.

This is why the United States urgently desires to begin discussions with the Soviet Union about the buildup of offensive and defensive missiles on both sides. Such discussions—and it is important to note that the Soviet Union has agreed to them, in principle at least—will aim at finding ways to avoid another costly and futile escalation of the arms race.

Our hopes that talks will soon begin reside in our conviction that the same mutual interest reflected in earlier agreements is present here—a mutual interest in stopping the rapid accumulation and refinement of these munitions.

The obligations of the non-proliferation treaty will reinforce our will to bring an end to the nuclear arms race. The world will judge us by our performance.

The report I am forwarding today is testimony to the skill and determination with which the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, under the leadership of Mr. William C. Foster, is supporting this Nation's effort to keep the somber and grim elements of the nuclear present from obliterating the promise of the future.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *February 12, 1968.*

LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY,  
*Washington, January 30, 1968.*

THE PRESIDENT,  
*The White House.*

MR. PRESIDENT: I submit herewith to you for transmittal to the Congress, as required by the Arms Control and Disarmament Act,

<sup>4</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 7-16.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 1962, vol. I, pp. 142 ff.

the seventh annual report concerning the activities of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, for the period January 1, 1967, to the end of the calendar year.

Respectfully,

WILLIAM C. FOSTER.

#### INTRODUCTION

Since 1961 the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has pursued its statutory mandate to develop, recommend, and negotiate measures to lessen the threat of war and bring the arms race under control. This effort, which has involved such measures as the direct communications link between Washington and Moscow,<sup>6</sup> the limited test ban treaty,<sup>7</sup> the outer space treaty,<sup>8</sup> and the treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, has been carried out by the Agency through research and action. ACDA's responsibility includes the management of international negotiations of arms control measures, as well as the related program of research into the myriad problems of disarmament.

During 1967 ACDA's mission was influenced by two events of major significance: the effort to bring the long negotiations for a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to a successful conclusion, and the decision to embark on the limited deployment of a system of anti-ballistic missile defense against the emerging threat of Mainland China's nuclear capability. These events are connected by more than their obvious relation to the world's attempt to stave off nuclear annihilation. For the decision to deploy ABMs in the United States is a direct outgrowth of the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the Chinese—a foreshadowing of the increasing complexity and danger of a world of more and more nuclear powers.

It has become a cliché to say that time is running out; but the fact is that since 1962, the atom—in all its promise and with all its perils—has come to maturity.

In 1962 the world looked into the nuclear abyss in the Cuban Missile crisis. A year later a breakthrough in the technology of nuclear reactors for the generation of cheap electric power gave powerful impetus to the use of nuclear energy to supplement conventional fuels on a worldwide scale—"the beginning of the age of nuclear power." The meaning of these events, and their relation to one another, has become increasingly clear to a world aware that it must find a way to survive the first if it is to enjoy the benefits of the second.

The breakthrough in the technology of reactors means that nuclear power stations may be supplying almost half the world's electric energy needs within the next thirty years. The spectacular promise of this development is marred, however, by the fact that nuclear reactors produce not only power, but also plutonium, which can be used in weapons. Civilian nuclear power reactors are spreading throughout the world at a rate that will produce enough plutonium to make 20

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 236-238.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 291-293.

<sup>8</sup> *Ante*, pp. 38-43.

bombs a day by 1985. Uncontrolled, this material would soon be freely available on a worldwide basis for potential weapons use, thus making it all but impossible to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.

In 1965, in an effort to remove the temptation to divert plutonium from peaceful channels, the President ordered a stepped-up effort to achieve a worldwide treaty to stop the further spread of nuclear weapons. On August 17 of that year the United States came forward with a draft non-proliferation treaty.<sup>9</sup> This was followed a month later by a Soviet version.<sup>10</sup> These were presented to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and the United Nations in New York. Negotiations during much of 1966 were unsuccessful, however, with the two nations at an impasse over the relationship of a treaty to existing and future allied nuclear defense arrangements. In the late fall of 1966 this impasse was broken, following a meeting between President Johnson and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who then continued discussions with the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, William C. Foster, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. By the end of the year, bilateral discussions between the Geneva Co-Chairmen had revealed the outlines of possible agreement sufficiently to allow the United States to solicit the detailed views and desires of its allies, particularly in Western Europe. These consultations, which paralleled the step-by-step negotiation of treaty provisions with the Soviets at Geneva, very early exposed difficulties sufficiently serious to prevent completion of the treaty draft and its final negotiation during the remainder of 1967.

The main source of the difficulty turned around provisions of the treaty governing safeguards over peaceful nuclear activities. While the United States and the Soviet Union succeeded in getting a partial draft text before the Geneva conference on August 24,<sup>11</sup> agreement on the control provisions was not arrived at among the United States, its Western European allies, and the Soviet Union until early in 1968.

While the 1967 efforts to complete the treaty draft went on, that part of it which was available to the Geneva negotiating committee was redrafted. Eight of the seventeen conference participants offered formal amendments,<sup>12</sup> and all had comments and suggestions; by the end of the year the U.S. and Soviet co-drafters had made substantial progress in their work of incorporating, so far as possible, the amendments into a revised draft. The new draft, on which they were agreed in principle, was not made available to the Committee until the revised draft was complete.

The complexity of the negotiation was reflected in the "avalanche of amendments" put forward at Geneva by the non-nuclear weapon states represented at the Conference. The August 24 draft was regarded by many as "discriminatory" as between the nuclear powers and those who are being asked to renounce that status. The amendments offered all pointed toward some adjustment of the equilibrium, a "balance of obligations"; assurances that the treaty not introduce

<sup>9</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 347-349.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 443-445.

<sup>11</sup> *Ante*, pp. 338-341.

<sup>12</sup> See *ante*, pp. 368, 394-395, 428, 525-526, 529, 546-547, 557-558, 595.

unfair restrictions on the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes; assurances against nuclear blackmail; assurances that the nuclear powers would bind themselves to get on with the business of disarming.

The failure to complete the treaty draft at Geneva in 1967 meant that the 22nd General Assembly was unable to take up consideration of non-proliferation at New York; before it adjourned, however, a resolution was adopted which called on the Eighteen-Nation Committee to resume its work on an urgent basis and report to the Assembly on or before March 15, 1968.<sup>13</sup>

At 4:25 a.m. on the morning of January 18, 1968, Adrian S. Fisher, the United States delegate at Geneva, informed the White House that the Co-Chairmen had reached final agreement, and that a complete draft treaty was to be submitted to the Disarmament Committee later that day. In announcing the news, President Johnson commented:

We have worked long and hard in an effort to draft a text that reflects the views of other nations. I believe the draft presented today represents a major accomplishment in meeting these legitimate interests.

The text submitted today must now be considered further by all governments. Following its review by the Conference in Geneva, it will be considered by the General Assembly in the spring. It is my fervent hope that I will be able to submit it to the Senate of the United States for its advice and consent this year.<sup>14</sup>

The long negotiation of the non-proliferation treaty moved almost in parallel with the Communist Chinese nuclear development. During 1967, as the effort to stop the further spread of nuclear weapons drew near a successful conclusion, the United States took steps to guard against the growing Chinese capability, announcing its intention to deploy a limited anti-ballistic missile system.

The ABM decision was one of agonizing difficulty from the standpoint of hopes for arms control, because of the built-in danger described by Secretary McNamara as the "kind of mad momentum intrinsic to the development of all new nuclear weaponry. If a weapons system works—and works well—there is strong pressure from many directions to procure and deploy the weapon out of all proportion to the prudent level required. The danger \* \* \* is going to be that pressures will develop to expand it [the limited ABM system] into a heavy Soviet-oriented ABM system." And this, it is agreed, would be "no adequate shield at all against a Soviet attack, but rather a strong inducement for the Soviets to vastly increase their own offensive forces \* \* \* and so the arms race would rush hopelessly on to no sensible purpose on either side."<sup>15</sup>

The Administration is determined to hold the line; to make clear that the purpose of the ABM deployment is limited, as the nuclear facts of life dictate that it must be; to convince the Soviet Union that it will not alter the present strategic balance; to reassure our Asian friends of our intention and ability to protect them against nuclear aggression; to close the door once and for all against still further proliferation of nuclear weapons; and to persuade the Soviet

<sup>13</sup> *Ante*, pp. 732-733.

<sup>14</sup> ENDC/212, Jan. 19, 1968.

<sup>15</sup> *Ante*, p. 393.

Union that the only alternative to an uncontrollable escalation of the missile race is a mutual endeavor to hold it back.

The magnitude and complexity of today's arsenals present immense difficulties in control. The Secretary of Defense has given the world the numbing figures; their very immensity tends to drain them of meaning, to place them beyond the imagination: 1,000 Minutemen missile launchers, "carefully protected below ground"; 41 Polaris submarines, carrying 656 missile launchers \* \* \* "hidden beneath the seas \* \* \*"; and about 600 long-range bombers, "approximately forty percent of which are kept always in a high state of alert," these equipped with "2,200 weapons, averaging more than one megaton each."<sup>16</sup>

The question for arms control thus becomes: how avoid lifting the arms competition between the two countries to a new plateau? Over 3 years ago, in 1964, the United States proposed to the Geneva disarmament conference that the possibility of a missile freeze be explored; ABM systems were included in the measure on the grounds that a freeze on offensive missiles alone might lead one side to turn to bigger and better defensive systems, shifting the military balance and thus forcing the other side to counter-action. The resulting arms race, it was argued, would spiral upwards through parallel deployment of ABM systems, increased offensive deployment, improved offensive missiles designed to penetrate ABM defenses, to end in higher and higher destructive levels and no perceptible change in the total strategic situation.

In 1965, the United States attempted to stimulate interest by offering to explore significant reductions in delivery vehicles if progress were made on the missile freeze.<sup>17</sup> When this proposal failed to evoke a positive response the President tried to involve the Soviet Union in a dialogue over the missile race, and early in 1967 Premier Kosygin agreed to consider discussing limitations on offensive and defensive missiles.<sup>18</sup> These discussions have not yet materialized, but neither has the door to them been closed, and the United States is continuing to press for action and to prepare for talks in the hope their urgency will soon be recognized by the Soviet Union.

The U.S. effort to bring the arms race under control is being carried out under the direction of William C. Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He has led the negotiations for a non-proliferation treaty from the beginning. During 1967, the Agency divided its full complement of 237 persons among Washington, New York and Geneva. The negotiations at the Disarmament Conference were conducted with the assistance of a delegation of 18 people when at full strength, and at something less than that when Mr. Foster and various officers travelled to the major European capitals—and as far away as Japan—in pursuit of consensus on the treaty.

In addition to those backing up the negotiators at Geneva, ACDA officers in Washington continued work on the problems of the missile race, the emerging Chinese nuclear threat, the negotiation (completed during the year) of the Latin American nuclear free zone treaty.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>16</sup> *Antc.*, p. 384.

<sup>17</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, p. 172.

<sup>18</sup> See *antc.*, pp. 108-110.

<sup>19</sup> *Antc.*, pp. 69-83.

the control of conventional arms transfers, the crisis of the Middle East war, preparations for the second U.S. inspection of scientific stations under the Antarctic treaty,<sup>20</sup> problems of control over chemical and biological weapons, the myriad questions arising out of a galloping technology in space, plans for an international troop verification exercise in Great Britain, and the novel problem of reserving the seabed and ocean floor to exclusively peaceful purposes. They continued to measure the potential impact of arms control measures on the national economy, and to keep watch on the alarming effects of the build-up in the world's arsenals of conventional as well as nuclear weapons. In this work ACDA's staff shares President Johnson's belief "that despite the magnitude and complexity of armament imposed in the world by the cold war, the problem can be made to yield to imagination and determination \* \* \*".<sup>21</sup>

#### NONPROLIFERATION

The Disarmament Committee now faces a great opportunity—a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons \* \* \* Such a treaty will help free the non-nuclear nations from the agonizing decision of whether to pursue a search for security through nuclear arms. Freed from the fear that non-nuclear neighbors may develop such weapons, nations can devote their efforts in the field of atomic energy to developing strong, peaceful programs.<sup>22</sup>

On January 18, 1968, the United States and the Soviet Union presented to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva a revised text of the draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.<sup>23</sup> With this new and complete version of the partial draft tabled at the Conference four months earlier, the arduous effort of many years moved towards a successful conclusion at last. The text now before the Committee was characterized by President Johnson as a "landmark in the effort of mankind to avoid nuclear disaster while ensuring that all will benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy."<sup>24</sup>

The effort to devise an instrument satisfying these requirements and acceptable on a worldwide basis occupied the Geneva Conference during the longest session in its six year history. The course of that year's work reveals much about the essential complexity of the task and the magnitude of the achievement.

The 1967 session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) reconvened on February 21 in high expectation that a draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons would at last crown their four-year effort. At that time the U.S. delegation hoped to present to the Conference those portions of the text on which the U.S. and Soviet Co-Chairmen had reached agreement. The Soviets, however, were unwilling to put forward an incomplete treaty draft, and the attempt to fill in the missing pieces continued until March 23, when the Conference recessed for a short period.

<sup>20</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 1550-1556.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 1966, p. 822.

<sup>22</sup> *Ante*, p. 98.

<sup>23</sup> ENDC/192/Rev.1; ENDC/193/Rev.1.

<sup>24</sup> ENDC/212.

Work was resumed on May 18 and continued for the remainder of the year. On August 24, the U.S. and Soviet Union tabled identical draft treaties.<sup>20</sup> Essentially, the treaty would bind nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states and the latter not to manufacture or otherwise acquire them. These undertakings also apply to "other nuclear explosive devices," prohibited because such devices and the technology of their development are essentially indistinguishable from nuclear weapons. Article III, covering safeguards over peaceful nuclear activities, was left blank. The Committee worked for another three months in an unsuccessful attempt to complete the draft and recessed on December 14, 1967, setting their return date at January 18, 1968.

The difficulties in achieving final agreement lay in two directions: first in the problem of arriving at a widely acceptable scheme for safeguards against the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful to weapons uses; and second in the complaint voiced by certain of the non-nuclear states that the August 24 draft was discriminatory in that it might place them at a permanent disadvantage, having to renounce nuclear weapons without compensating gain to their security.

#### *Safeguards*

The safeguards problem arose largely out of the existence of two international safeguards systems—one administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at Vienna, and the other a system set up earlier by the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) of the six Common Market countries. EURATOM was established in 1957 as a pool for research and development in nuclear energy, and as such has been regarded as an important element in the development of political and economic unity in Western Europe. While it has been U.S. policy to work towards a single, worldwide system of safeguards, the United States has accepted EURATOM safeguards as effective for nuclear materials which it has sold to the Community. The Common Market countries were unwilling to relinquish their safeguards system to IAEA because of the unfavorable effects they felt this would have on progress toward European integration.

The Soviet attitude was that if the treaty were to impose mandatory safeguards on its non-nuclear signatories, those safeguards should be administered by the Vienna agency. They oppose the idea that the EURATOM system be considered as equivalent to the 98-member IAEA for purposes of the non-proliferation treaty, on the grounds that EURATOM safeguards amount to self-inspection among six NATO allies.

This situation resulted in a complex, triangular negotiation between the United States, its allies of the North Atlantic Alliance, and the Soviet Union. The search for a way out of the seeming impasse focussed on some kind of arrangement which would preserve and utilize the safeguards of the regional EURATOM system while at the same time bringing its activities under the wing of the worldwide IAEA, through a process of verification. This approach, which was the key to

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 338-341.

the final agreement, was advocated by Senator John O. Pastore, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, in a speech before the Senate in March.<sup>26</sup> The United States persisted in its search for a solution in the belief that safeguards on civil nuclear activities were vital if the treaty were to close the door to proliferation.

In order to remove any lingering concerns among non-nuclear states that, by accepting IAEA safeguards they might incur commercial disadvantages in peaceful nuclear programs, President Johnson announced on December 2 that when safeguards are applied under the treaty, the United States will permit the IAEA to apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in this country except those with direct national security significance. Among other facilities this would involve 16 nuclear power plants now in operation and 70 on order; by 1980 they will generate 150 million kilowatts of electric energy, and 700 million by the year 2000. With the American electric power and nuclear industry squarely behind him, President Johnson said, "I want to make it clear . . . to all the world that we in the United States are not asking any country to accept safeguards that we are unwilling to accept ourselves."<sup>27</sup> A similar offer was made by the United Kingdom.<sup>28</sup> The Soviet Union, however, has refused to accept any safeguards on the ground that safeguards on peaceful reactors in nuclear states would not serve any purpose under the treaty.

Because of the role international safeguards are expected to play in a non-proliferation treaty, the U.S. Government—and particularly ACDA and the Atomic Energy Commission—intensified its scientific research on safeguards during 1967. ACDA's program was concerned principally with investigating and developing techniques for making safeguards more effective and efficient, as well as less intrusive and costly.

In addition to research, ACDA met with scientists of other nations and in international organizations to coordinate the work in process and to tailor it more specifically to present-day and future international safeguarding requirements. In June, the Agency participated in the AEC-sponsored Symposium on Safeguards, Research, and Development at the Argonne National Laboratory, where leading U.S. figures in atomic energy gathered to learn the latest developments in this field and to identify further research needs. In August, ACDA scientists joined the U.S. team in Vienna to work with an IAEA panel on Safeguards, Research, and Development. This meeting provided a basis for coordinating safeguards research and development work throughout the world.

#### *Non-nuclear concern.*

"There is nothing to choose here between the interests of the nuclear and the nonnuclear nations," President Johnson told the Geneva negotiators as the 1967 session opened, "there is a terrible and inescapable equity in our common danger."<sup>29</sup> But an agreement between the United

<sup>26</sup> *Congressional Record* (daily version), Mar. 6, 1967, pp. S3452-3453.

<sup>27</sup> *Ante*, p. 615.

<sup>28</sup> *Ante*, p. 616.

<sup>29</sup> *Ante*, p. 99.

States and the Soviet Union on a treaty draft moved closer, many of the non-nuclear nations began a searching examination of its political, security, and economic implications.

A variety of questions arose. Would the security of non nuclear states be assured if they renounced nuclear weapons? Would the treaty relegate non-nuclear states permanently to a second-class status? Would safeguards inspection result in industrial espionage? Would the nuclear powers match the non-nuclear renunciation of nuclear weapons with at least some move toward reduction in their own nuclear arsenals? Would the prohibition against the development of peaceful nuclear explosives by non-nuclear states foreclose the benefits of this growing technology? Would civilian applications resulting from weapons research—"spinoff"—be denied to non-nuclear signatories to the treaty?

From the outset, the United States made a determined effort at reassurance. As early as February, for example, an attempt was made to put fears of "industrial espionage" or the loss of "spinoff" advantages to rest. In a statement issued on February 20, the State Department addressed the question of industrial espionage, pointing out that safeguards inspectors have no authority to interfere with the construction or operation of any nuclear facility; that in addition IAEA safeguards regulations provided any state with the privilege of rejecting inspectors in advance so as to bar nationals of a hostile country.<sup>30</sup> Assurance was also given to EURATOM and to the Federal Republic of Germany that it would be possible for the United States to sell nuclear fuel to them under a non-proliferation treaty, and that the development in the FRG and other countries of fast-breeder reactors would in no way be hindered. On the question of "spinoff" the Secretary of State told a news conference:

\* \* \* the fact is that the non-proliferation treaty has nothing to do whatever with the use of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes, and that includes a wide range of industrial application. The actual industrial spinoff from so-called weaponry, that is, those items which are limited to the gadgetry of weapons, is very small, indeed infinitesimal. And I think exchanges on the technical level will clarify that point.<sup>31</sup>

During March, William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and leader of the U.S. negotiating team at Geneva, traveled to Bonn, Rome, The Hague, and Brussels to explain and clarify the U.S. position on the non-proliferation treaty as these governments continued their assessment of its effects. Lengthy consultations were carried out in the North Atlantic Council.

At the same time, bilateral consultations took place in Washington, between ACDA and State Department officials and the diplomatic representatives of many nations.

During the 8-week recess between March 23 and May 18 the United States carried out an exhaustive program of negotiation, exposition and persuasion. The North Atlantic Council continued its consultations during April, receiving individual viewpoints of NATO members. Consultations continued in Washington, and in the NATO

<sup>30</sup> *Ante*, pp. 96-98.

<sup>31</sup> *Ante*, p. 62.

capitals as well as other interested countries. Officials of the Federal Republic of Germany met with ACDA officials for week-long talks on various aspects of the treaty, particularly safeguards. ACDA officials met with special envoys sent to Washington by the Japanese and Indian Governments.

In early May, Mr. Foster traveled to Tokyo to consult with Japanese officials on the treaty draft. Additional technical discussions were held in Japan during November.

Nevertheless, difficulties persisted. They were summed up by the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic in a Bundestag debate on April 27. Noting that the concerns he expressed were "in agreement with the views of various nations, including those of some nations that possess atomic power but not atomic weapons, and in some cases with countries that do not belong to any defense alliance," Mr. Brandt summarized the standards by which the Federal Republic of Germany—and presumably "various" other nations—would judge the draft of a non-proliferation treaty:

1. Will the draft treaty permit the unhindered use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes?

2. Will the pact be linked with a clear commitment to general disarmament?

3. Will it guarantee the security of all?

4. Will it permit future fostering of regional associations—in Germany's case, approaches towards closer European association?<sup>32</sup>

The ENDC reconvened on May 18. The immediate problem, given the growing pressure of discussion and argument, was to get a treaty draft before the Committee. However, the Soviets were not prepared to accept the formulations for the safeguards article which the United States had worked out with its allies during the recess consultations, and were still unwilling to submit an incomplete draft. Three weeks later war broke out in the Middle East, and it was not until mid-August that the Soviet Union yielded to the urging of the United States and the impatience of the other members of the Conference.

On August 24 the United States and the Soviet Union tabled separate but identical texts for a draft treaty. Article III was left blank. This event, taking place in the aftermath of the dramatic Arab-Israeli conflict, was greeted with worldwide interest. "Today, for the first time," Mr. Foster told the Conference, "conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty is within reach."<sup>33</sup>

Sweden moved promptly in an attempt to fill in the missing Article III on international controls. The Swedish delegate offered a draft Article which provided for the integration of all existing safeguards arrangements into the uniform system of the IAEA, allowing a transition period of up to three years to accomplish this purpose. While the article did not require safeguards on the peaceful nuclear activities of the nuclear-weapon states, it did impose international controls on all transfers of fissionable material—regardless of the use to which it was put—from one state to another. In addition, it obliged the nuclear-

<sup>32</sup> *Ante*, pp. 209–210.

<sup>33</sup> *Ante*, p. 243.

weapon states "to cooperate in facilitating the gradual application" of IAEA safeguards on their own territory.<sup>34</sup>

Reserving substantive comment on the suggested Article III, the Co-Chairmen expressed the hope that members would concentrate on the other provisions of the August 24 draft and leave the safeguards article to the co-drafters to work out.

The Committee then proceeded with detailed recommendations and amendments. For the most part these reflected three areas of concern among the non-nuclear states: the treaty's relationship to the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; the need for positive steps by the nuclear powers toward disarmament; and the desire for assurances against nuclear intimidation. As the negotiations continued into the fall months, proposals were also made for amending the draft to limit the treaty's duration; to provide for its periodic review; to fix the number of parties required to ratify; and a number of other alterations to the draft.

#### *The peaceful uses of nuclear energy*

One of the earliest expressions of concern about the treaty's effect on the development of the peaceful atom came from Mexico's delegate, Ambassador Castañeda. He offered an amendment designed to strengthen Article IV, by placing an obligation on nations advanced in nuclear technology to assist others in the development of peaceful applications.<sup>35</sup> While supporting the treaty's prohibition against the manufacture or acquisition of peaceful nuclear explosives by non-nuclear weapon states, he characterized it as being "without doubt the question of the greatest concern to the countries not possessing nuclear weapons."

"Renunciation of a nuclear arsenal," he pointed out, "cannot mean the renunciation of the use of the enormous economic potential that may be represented in the future by peaceful nuclear explosions for carrying out, for example, gigantic engineering works. If the non-nuclear countries are to assume the undertaking not to develop or explode nuclear devices, since these devices are merely nuclear bombs despite their peaceful purposes, it will be essential in turn for them to have the categorical and undoubted assurance that they shall not therefore be deprived of the benefits which may be derived from such explosions."

He suggested such "categorical and undoubted assurance" would best be supplied by a new article explicitly obligating nuclear-weapon states to provide services of peaceful nuclear explosive devices, channeled through "appropriate international bodies," to replace the declaration of an intention to do so in the Preamble of the August 24 draft.<sup>36</sup>

Support for the Mexican idea came from Canada, Sweden, UAR, United Kingdom, Burma, Nigeria, and Ethiopia. It was submitted in the draft presented January 18. India and Brazil continued to hold to the position that the development of nuclear devices for peaceful explosions should be permitted to all under the treaty.

<sup>34</sup> *Ante*, p. 308.

<sup>35</sup> *Ante*, pp. 304-305, 395-401.

<sup>36</sup> *Ante*, pp. 338-341.

*Balanced obligations*

Throughout the negotiations for a non-proliferation treaty, most of the non-nuclear-weapon states have stated their belief that the major powers should balance the commitment on the part of the non-nuclear-weapon states not to acquire nuclear weapons with a corollary obligation to reduce their own nuclear arsenals. This view was put forward by the non-aligned members of the ENDC in their Memoranda to the Conference in both the 1965 and 1966 sessions, when they urged that a balanced treaty must be coupled with or followed by such obligations.<sup>57</sup> The August 24 draft text contained two preambular paragraphs in response to this concern.

It soon became clear that such an "expression of intent" did not satisfy the non-nuclear countries, and pressure built up among the delegates to make the disarmament obligation more specific and binding on the nuclear powers. With general support in the Committee, the Mexican delegate called for a new article to be added to the operative section of the treaty. While recognizing that "to demand the inclusion in the treaty on non-proliferation of specific disarmament measures for the nuclear powers, to be enforced immediately, would be tantamount to acting against" any hope of concluding the treaty, he nevertheless insisted that the obligation to negotiate, "in good faith, with all speed and perseverance, to arrive at further agreements" be formulated in more clear and precise terms.

Britain and Canada both made the point that unless the nuclear-weapon powers moved, in the words of the British delegate, "within the next few years" to stop the buildup of "their stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery and begin to reduce their nuclear armories" a non-proliferation treaty would not last long, and some of the signatories to the treaty might decide to withdraw on the grounds that their supreme interests were being jeopardized.

By the time the ENDC recessed on December 14, the United States and Soviet Co-Chairmen had agreed in principle on a number of modifications to be made to the August 24 draft of the treaty. These modifications were intended to meet, insofar as possible, the points pressed by other delegations. The agreed modifications were not submitted to the Conference, however, until January 18, when the Co-Chairmen finally agreed on ways to deal with their differences over Article III.

*Security assurances*

The prospect of a non-proliferation treaty gave rise to concern about security among the non-nuclear nations. The debate in the ENDC revealed the measure of this concern. The Nigerian representative told the conference that it would be unfair to ask any responsible government to adhere to the treaty without guarantees. He argued that some provision should be made for an international deterrent system against nuclear blackmail.<sup>58</sup> The Brazilian representative agreed, contending that in signing a non-proliferation treaty non-

<sup>57</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 424-425; *ibid.*, 1966, pp. 576-579.

<sup>58</sup> ENFC/IV.292, pp. 4-5; *ante*, pp. 380, 556-557.

nuclear states would be surrendering "the most important means they might otherwise have at their disposal to counter possible aggression."<sup>39</sup>

The Indian delegate complained that the great powers had not yet given "any effective and credible consideration to the security needs of the non-nuclear countries, and particularly the non-aligned countries."<sup>40</sup>

U.S. representatives have stressed many times that a non-proliferation treaty would, in itself, enhance the security of all countries, and particularly that of non-nuclear states. This view was echoed by Soviet Ambassador Roshchin when he told the delegates:

\* \* \* In our world today the security of each individual country is inseparable from universal security, and it is precisely the solution of the problem of non-proliferation that would help to ensure international security and reduce the threat of nuclear war.<sup>41</sup>

Both Co-Chairmen addressed themselves to the question of assurances on August 24, when the partial draft text was tabled at the ENDC. Mr. Foster said, "We recognize the problem of security assurances, which is of concern to some non-aligned countries, remains to be considered. The United States maintains the view that this is a matter which, because of its complexity and the divergent interests involved, cannot be dealt within the treaty itself." He reminded the Committee that the United States was exploring various possible solutions, including action which could be taken in the context of the United Nations.<sup>42</sup>

The Co-Chairmen assured the Committee that they attached great importance to the question of assurances, and would continue to work toward "a positive solution," with a view to presenting recommendations to the Geneva Conference in the course of the consideration of the treaty. This assurance was reiterated on January 18.

Soon after the August 24 tabling, the United Arab Republic offered an amendment to the draft to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear state party to the treaty having no nuclear weapons on its territory.<sup>43</sup> This amendment is similar to the suggestion made to the ENDC by Premier Kosygin in 1966; "no revision to this effect, however, was formally presented by the Soviet Union then or in 1967.

A few days after the UAR proposal, the Canadian representative told the Conference, "\* \* \* to include in the treaty itself an article on security assurances satisfactory to all non-nuclear states would be extremely difficult and might well have the effect of unacceptably prolonging and complicating the successful negotiation of the treaty."<sup>45</sup> Nevertheless, the representatives of the nonaligned countries at the Conference, as well as Romania, continued to favor inclusion of a provision along the lines of the Mexican suggestion.

<sup>39</sup> *Ante*, p. 138.

<sup>40</sup> *Ante*, p. 236.

<sup>41</sup> *Ante*, p. 146.

<sup>42</sup> *Ante*, pp. 346-347.

<sup>43</sup> *Ante*, pp. 426-427, 428.

<sup>44</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, p. 11.

<sup>45</sup> ENDC/PV. 338, p. 6.

*Status of negotiations*

On December 7, the Geneva Conference delivered an Interim Report to the United Nations General Assembly, transmitting the Committee's decision to remain in session in order to expedite its work on the still incomplete draft non-proliferation treaty, and its intention to submit a full report "as soon as possible."<sup>46</sup>

Just before adjourning its 22d session, on December 19, the General Assembly passed a resolution calling on the ENDC "urgently to continue its work" and requesting "a full report" on the negotiations to the Assembly "on or before March 15."<sup>47</sup>

The 1968 session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee reconvened on January 18 to be greeted with the revised text of the draft treaty, complete with Article III, several amended articles and three new articles. These latter deal with the peaceful applications of nuclear energy (Article IV), access to the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions (Article V), and obligations to pursue negotiations on disarmament measures (Article VI). The amendments clause had been redrafted to provide that amendments enter into force only for those parties that accept them (Article VIII). The number of ratifications necessary to bring the treaty into force had been fixed at forty in addition to the nuclear weapon state signatories (Article IX). In response to the desires of many non-nuclear countries, the codrafters had provided for a review of the treaty 25 years after its entry into force "to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely" (Article X).<sup>48</sup>

The revised draft does not deal with security assurances. The U.S. Delegate, Adrian S. Fisher, noted that this remaining area of concern was still being studied by the Co-Chairmen, who "remain mindful of their pledge to provide the Committee with a recommendation for dealing with this complex and difficult problem."<sup>49</sup>

The newly agreed Article III was designed to provide a practical and effective safeguards article which takes into account the interests of all countries desiring to adhere to the treaty. The safeguards are intended solely to verify the treaty obligation that nuclear material not be diverted to weapons. Safeguards will be those set forth in agreements to be negotiated between the International Atomic Energy Agency and signatory states. These agreements must be negotiated in accordance with the IAEA Statute and its safeguards system.<sup>50</sup> As Mr. Fisher explained to the Conference, three principles guided the formulation of the draft Article III: First, safeguards should be of such a nature that all parties can have confidence in their effectiveness. This means that agreements negotiated by the IAEA must enable that international agency to carry out its responsibility of providing assurance that no diversion of nuclear material is taking place. Second, safeguards agreements can be negotiated with the IAEA individually

<sup>46</sup> *Ante*, pp. 622-623.

<sup>47</sup> *Ante*, pp. 732-733.

<sup>48</sup> ENDC/192/Rev.1; ENDC/193/Rev.1.

<sup>49</sup> ENDC/PV.357, p. 15.

<sup>50</sup> The IAEA Statute appears in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956*, pp. 924-928. For the IAEA safeguards system, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 446-460.

or together with other parties. In other words, agreements can be entered into with "another international organization" whose work is related to the IAEA's, such as a regional safeguards system. Third, the IAEA should make use of existing records and safeguards, so as to avoid unnecessary duplication "provided that under such mutually agreed arrangements the IAEA can satisfy itself that nuclear material is not diverted."

In presenting the revised draft, the U.S. Delegate told the Conference, "The incorporation of the many new treaty provisions which we are recommending today marks another major milestone on the path toward achievement of a widely acceptable non-proliferation treaty. For this progress, we are indebted to the members of this Committee whose constructive comments contributed so significantly to the formulations recommended today. I trust that the revised text will be found to meet the essential concerns they have expressed and that as a result, we can proceed to the next phase of our work—the preparation of a complete and definitive text for the consideration of the General Assembly—a text which can command the widest possible support."<sup>51</sup>

#### NUCLEAR ARMS RACE

What we sometimes overlook is that every future age of man will be an atomic age. If, then, man is to have a future at all, it will have to be a future overshadowed with the permanent possibility of a thermonuclear holocaust. About that fact, we are no longer free. Our freedom in this question consists rather in facing the matter rationally and realistically and discussing actions to minimize the danger."

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has engaged in a major effort to study the complexities of the strategic arms race in an effort to determine whether controls are possible within the requirements of our security, and if so what form they should take.

A formal attempt to control the accelerating missile race was made, in 1964, through a U.S. proposal to explore the possibility of a "freeze" on the numbers and characteristics of both offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles—both bombers and missiles.<sup>52</sup> This measure would have included anti-ballistic missiles (ABM's). If this proposal had been adopted in 1964, it would have resulted in approximately 55 percent fewer strategic delivery vehicles in today's nuclear arsenals, and the saving of billions on the U.S. side alone.

The intensive study in ACDA which led to the development of the "freeze" concept made clear that both offensive and defensive strategic nuclear capabilities had to be controlled together if the balance between the United States and the Soviet Union were to be maintained under a freeze or actual reduction in numbers. Without rejecting the general idea, the Soviet Union has shown little interest in this particular proposal, claiming it was a scheme for inspection without actual disarmament, as well as an attempt on the part of the United States to perpetuate an advantage in nuclear weapons.

The idea of involving the Soviets in the search for ways to bring the missile race under control was kept alive by President Johnson,

<sup>51</sup> ENDC/PV.357, pp. 14-21.

<sup>52</sup> *Antc.*, p. 383.

<sup>53</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 7-9, 157-162, 367-373.

who has persisted in his efforts to begin discussions of the mutual dangers of an accelerating buildup. Early in 1967 he informed the Congress of increased Soviet activity in its strategic forces and of their deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow, warning that decisions on both sides were imminent which might trigger another upward spiral.<sup>64</sup>

On March 2, 1967, after an exchange of communications with Soviet leaders, the President announced that Premier Kosygin had indicated a willingness to consider discussing limitations on offensive and defensive nuclear missiles.<sup>65</sup> These discussions did not materialize during 1967, however, and the pressures resulting from the emerging Chinese nuclear capability led the United States to a decision to deploy a "light" ABM system. At the time of the decision, the Administration took great care to emphasize that the deployment was aimed primarily at the Chinese threat, at reinforcing our deterrent in such a way as to underscore U.S. security assurances to our Asian friends, and at adding protection against "the improbable but possible accidental launch of an intercontinental missile by any one of the nuclear powers."<sup>66</sup>

Shortly before the decision was announced on September 18, another attempt was made to get talks underway with the Soviets, in the hope of getting agreement—formal or informal—on some form of limitation that would apply to both strategic offensive and defensive weapons. The United States believes that such talks are essential to prevent another mutually-defeating offensive-defensive spiral.

Thus, in making his announcement of the U.S. decision, Secretary McNamara said, "Let me emphasize—and I cannot do so too strongly—that our decision to go ahead with a limited ABM deployment in no way indicates that we feel an agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces is in any way less urgent or desirable."<sup>67</sup>

The possibility that discussions with the Soviets on the missile race might proceed at any moment, combined with the U.S. consideration of whether to go ahead with a limited ABM deployment, made 1967 a period of intensive activity for ACDA's technical and political experts. Years of involvement with these problems, through research and the development and negotiation of earlier arms control measures, combined to give the Agency the opportunity of making sure the arms control implications of the ABM decision were clearly represented to those charged with the final decision.

It is the Agency's responsibility to identify and assess immediate and long-range implications for arms control of U.S. policy. ACDA staff has put together detailed analytical studies, drawing on the results of its contract research program, as well as on the research efforts of other agencies. Extensive use has been made of the multi-level channels of coordination which have developed during ACDA's 6-year existence; its senior officials have brought arms control considerations to the policy-making level in inter-agency working groups and in regular

<sup>64</sup> *Ante*, pp. 7-9.

<sup>65</sup> *Ante*, pp. 108-110.

<sup>66</sup> *Ante*, p. 393.

<sup>67</sup> *Ante*, pp. 393-394.

meetings with their counterparts from other departments and agencies involved in formulating national security policy.

During 1967, ACDA devoted considerable staff effort to the problem of incorporating "limited" ABM systems into possible strategic arms control agreements. These studies were undertaken before the United States announced its decision to initiate deployment of a limited ABM system and are continuing in the aftermath of that decision; they are aimed at developing the specifications of agreed limitations on ABM systems for the United States and the Soviet Union, the effect on the strategic balance of alternative agreements to limit offensive and defensive missiles, and the verification requirements of various control measures.

Modern computer techniques are used to analyze the extraordinary complexity of the strategic balance. The Academy for Interscience Methodology, in Chicago, has constructed for ACDA a computer model which employs data on many elements which must be taken into account. Literally hundreds of variables enter into the calculations—numbers and deployment of ICBMs, degree of hardening of the emplacements, accuracy, reliability, and warhead yield. Programmed data on these capability factors are fed into the computer, which then forecasts the impact of a nuclear exchange by estimating probable damage and casualties as well as counterforce and second strike capability. The object is to find formulae which will insure that U.S. national security is fully protected under measures to limit the levels of strategic forces on an agreed basis. ACDA has contracted for computer time on a privately-owned computer, and Agency staff members are engaged in running computations, utilizing the AIM model. Arrangements have now been made for use of a National Security Agency computer at Fort Meade, Md., which will result in a cost savings to the Government.

### *Verification*

In the arms control context "verification" is a term used to describe the process by which a nation assures itself that any agreement—whether formal or informal—is being adequately complied with. "Verification" is not necessarily synonymous with inspection; it can take three forms—assurance based on unilateral capabilities, or agreed inspection, or a combination of both. Verification requirements vary with each arms control measure. The limited test ban treaty does not provide for physical inspection because our unilateral capabilities are adequate to detect violations which might affect our security. The same is true of the outer space treaty, and may be of even wider applicability. As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Paul Warnke said in Detroit on October 6:

In considering any possible agreement with the Soviet Union to level off or reduce strategic offensive and defensive systems, or even the possibility for parallel action on the part of the two countries, we may have to depend on our own unilateral capability for verification. We believe a number of possibilities for parallel action and even for formal agreement with the Soviets would permit our reliance on unilateral means of verification.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>68</sup> *Ante*, p. 459.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency sees adequate verification of agreements as a key element in any arms control measure. At worst, inadequate assurance that agreements are being observed may jeopardize national security; at the least, it can lead to mutual uncertainty and suspicion with a resulting failure of the agreement. In addition, the existence of good verification capabilities acts as a deterrent to violations, with all their accompanying political ramifications. It should be noted that the present state of the art indicates that the more far-reaching agreements, particularly those involving system characteristics, may require agreed international inspection.

One of the thorniest problems in arms control is posed by physical inspection because it involves intrusion on another nation's territory, often on sensitive installations. Research aims at developing techniques to minimize intrusiveness. Many elements enter into the formulation of a control measure, and the question of what is practical or politically realistic in terms of verification must be balanced against its security advantages to each side. For example, if an agreement were concluded to limit to 1,000 the number of ICBMs on each side and the verification scheme were unable to account for 5 or 10, this would not necessarily present a significant risk; verification does not have to be one hundred percent foolproof to be effective. On the other hand, if an agreement were to limit the number of ICBMs on each side to 100, and 10 were unaccounted for, this would present a significant problem.

Disagreement over the effectiveness of unilateral capabilities and the attendant necessity for physical inspection has blocked agreement on arms control measures in a number of instances; one of the most noted of these is the Comprehensive Test Ban. In this case the Soviets have continued to maintain that unilateral capabilities are adequate for verification, while the United States has insisted (and has presented data to demonstrate) that technical development has not yet advanced to the state where unilateral capabilities alone can give adequate assurance against violations. Offers to hold technical discussions in this area have elicited no response from the Soviets. In the meantime, U.S. research efforts are continuing to refine instrumentation and techniques in an effort to expand our unilateral capabilities.

ACDA has expended a large percentage of its external research budget, beginning with its first year's research program in 1962, in seeking effective methods and techniques for monitoring possible strategic arms-limitation arrangements. The problem has been approached on a broad front to include technical, economic, legal, military and political aspects. On the technical side research and development continues on unintrusive unmanned inspection devices and instruments,—advanced chemical and physical sensors—and acoustic, photographic and spectroscopic techniques.

Block Engineering, Inc., under an ACDA contract, is developing portable instrumentation employing advanced optical-infrared sensors, which could, under an arms control agreement, enable certain critical characteristics of a rocket vehicle to be estimated by relatively unintrusive monitoring in the vicinity of the test launch. The prototype equipment is now being tested against U.S. vehicle launches at the

Eastern Test Range at Cape Kennedy, the Western Test Range at Vandenberg, and at the White Sands Missile Range.

The Aerojet General Corp. has completed a contract study to see whether evidence of production activity going on inside a missile engine production plant can be detected externally. Some of the tell-tale signs investigated were rail and truck shipments, waste disposal, and multi-sensor observation of static test firings. Although this contract was aimed at identifying for ACDA the "observability" of clandestine missile engine production, it unexpectedly yielded data which may result in considerable savings to the U.S. Government. These data, when combined with previous Aerojet findings, have prompted a recommendation by that company to the U.S. Air Force that can result in cost savings in excess of six million dollars—a figure greater than the cost of ACDA's entire external research program for 1967.

Soon to be completed is the sixth in a series of major contracts concerned with the problems of physical inspection of missile production facilities. A primary technical purpose is to ascertain what missile system components are critical, their susceptibility to arms control measures restricting their production or improvement, and the feasibility of their being produced in other than their normal environment or configuration. In performing the study, specific technical analyses have been applied to the question of an adversary's evading missile production restrictions in "declared" facilities with resident inspectors, as well as to the issue of producing missiles clandestinely in "undeclared" facilities subject to spot inspections. As a result of its extensive inhouse and external research effort in this area over the past five years, along with field tests, the Agency has accumulated enough information to provide confidence in the essential requirements for defining realistic restrictions on missile production. The outlines of feasible inspection procedures are now understood; this contract represents a concluding effort in the series. The problem now becomes one of keeping the information up to date as adaptations in missile technology occur.

A related contract study involves Soviet technical capabilities for rapid deployment of additional ICBMs in the event an arms control agreement restricting missile production should be abrogated. (A complementary study was performed by the same company, TRW Systems, under a contract sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense, making a similar analysis of U.S. ICBM lead times, in order to assess U.S. "spring-back" capabilities.) The problem was approached from four levels of industrial preparedness from which production activities could be initiated. From these analyses basic techniques, such as stockpiling parts and assemblies, were evaluated to determine their feasibility and utility in reducing lead times.

However highly developed verification techniques become, the prospects for successful arms control agreements are dependent upon political acceptance. ACDA is continuing its research into the factors which influence Soviet decisions on the strategic arms race and possibilities for bringing it under control.

In April of 1967, the Agency contracted with Columbia University's Russian Institute to hold a cross-disciplinary conference of Soviet experts. This group assessed developments in the Soviet Union since Khrushchev in an effort to gauge Soviet attitudes towards a range of arms control proposals and the extent to which—along with other national policies—they are based more in pragmatic national interest than in Marxist-Leninist ideology. A report has been written on the conference discussions and will be published early in 1968.

#### *Cutoff of fissionable-materials production*

The United States has proposed a verified cutoff of fissionable-materials production for use in weapons, to be accompanied by the transfer of agreed quantities of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes.<sup>59</sup> In 1965, this offer was expanded to provide that the materials for transfer be obtained by the demonstrated destruction of several thousand nuclear weapons.<sup>60</sup>

One of the problems inherent in the proposed destruction of nuclear weapons is the extent to which the destruction can be demonstrated without revealing sensitive information on the design and fabrication of the weapon. A field test to evaluate the procedures contemplated for demonstrating such destruction was carried out during 1967.

The operational phase of the exercise was successfully completed in three months at four Atomic Energy Commission facilities. To ensure complete realism, actual weapons of mixed types and complexity were used. Teams of "inspectors" conducted the test under specified circumstances, reflecting varying degrees of access and other variables designed to provide a broad range of data on possible procedures.

#### CONVENTIONAL ARMS

Now the waste and futility of the arms race must be apparent to all the peoples of the world \* \* \* The United States of America, for its part will use every resource of diplomacy, and every counsel of reason and prudence, to try to find a better course.<sup>61</sup>

#### *Regional arms races*

The 1967 war in the Middle East drew the world's attention back to one of the most troubling elements in this perennially flammable region—the role of the big powers as arms suppliers. In the United States, it added to a growing sense of national unease about the responsibilities of the larger states in supplying military equipment on a global scale to the developing nations. It led to a proposal by President Johnson that UN member nations report "all shipments of all military arms" into the Middle East and that a record of those shipments be kept on file "for all the peoples of the world to observe."<sup>62</sup> This move was followed by intensive diplomatic activity

<sup>59</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. I, pp. 146-147; *ibid.*, 1963, pp. 330-333; *ibid.*, 1964, pp. 8, 165-168.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 1965, p. 435.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 264.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 263-264.

aimed at restraint on the major arms suppliers to the region, particularly the Soviet Union.

The 12-years of tension in the Middle East, culminating in the Arab-Israeli war, dramatized the difficult question of whether, how, and when the United States should supply arms abroad. Since the end of World War II, the United States has done so, through military assistance programs or sales, for two general categories of countries—our allies in mutual defense arrangements, and less developed nations. In the latter case, arms have been supplied as a shield against expansionist neighbors or internal subversion behind which economic and political growth could go forward.

In the case of our military alliances, the United States has made arms available to develop defense programs to a level commensurate with the economic strength and mutual defense obligations of our allies. During the 1960's cash receipts from this type of sale have come to offset almost 40 percent of the dollar costs of maintaining U.S. forces abroad.<sup>53</sup>

The serious problem in arms control, however, arises in the second category—the less developed countries. Neighborhood arms races are an ever-present danger among the nations which have not yet met the minimum needs of their people for social and economic progress but who nonetheless are inclined to divert an unreasonable share of their scarce human and materiel resources to defense. Here, the Secretary of Defense has pointed out, "our first objective is to use the influence that we gain through the military assistance programs and occasionally through the military export sales programs to work with them to reduce the share of their resources devoted to defense and to increase the portion of their human and material capital that is allocated to economic and social programs."<sup>54</sup>

Despite this objective, there is disturbing evidence to indicate that in recent years defense expenditures among the less developed countries have risen at a much faster rate than those of industrialized countries. Military spending in countries which have an average per capita GNP of less than \$160 per year reached a new high of \$18 billion in 1965. An estimated increase of \$2 billion in one year indicated that the trend of defense expenditures among the poorer nations was rising at a faster rate than the world average. Many of these countries, unlike the developed states, currently spend more on arms than on public health and education combined.<sup>55</sup>

The implications of this situation were clearly recognized in 1966 by the President and the Congress. "These resources," the President told the Geneva disarmament conference, "might better be spent on feeding the hungry, healing the sick, and teaching the uneducated." In a seven-point message, he warned the 18-Nation Committee that the growing worldwide problem of conventional arms races should not be ignored and pledged U.S. backing for regional efforts at control.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>53</sup> Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, *Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts* (May 1967).

<sup>54</sup> News conference, Sept. 18, 1965.

<sup>55</sup> See *ante*, pp. 611-612.

<sup>56</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 7-8.

That same year Congress wrote section 514(a) into the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966, stipulating that "programs for the sale or exchange of defense articles or services shall be administered so as to encourage regional arms control and discourage arms races."<sup>67</sup> This action has since been supplemented by important amendments to legislation enacted by the 90th Congress.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency moved promptly to broaden the nature and extent of its involvement in the total U.S. government effort to limit the proliferation of conventional arms. On November 25, 1966 ACDA Director Foster established an inter-bureau working group to maintain liaison with other departments and agencies on arms transfers and related export control, in order "to insure that the Agency is kept fully and currently informed of significant policy questions in this field as they arise; that the Agency's views are made known and taken into account in deciding such policy questions; that the policies decided upon are in fact carried out; and that the Agency's suggestions for initiatives in this field are given due consideration." The Arms Transfer Coordinating Group was also charged with planning, direction and utilization of relevant research and with the development of Agency initiatives for control measures.

They have now established extensive background and policy data and are set up to react quickly to immediate as well as long range questions. Contacts with other government agencies and private research groups were extended in order to tap into existing capabilities and pertinent data collections. Close coordination, on a day-to-day basis, has been established with key offices in the Departments of State and Defense dealing with arms transfer matters. The Agency is now represented at a wide variety of interdepartmental meetings, such as the regular meetings of the State/Defense Coordinating Committee at which U.S. sales of weaponry are discussed, sessions of the regional and senior interdepartmental groups, and interagency deliberations on the spread of missile technology and the related question of facilitating international space cooperation.

The Agency's current and potential contribution to the Administration's effort to restrain unnecessary and expensive arms races in the developing world has been reinforced by research in the problems of conventional arms transfers over the years. Substantive input continues to be made to a broad range of policy issues, as well as to Munitions Control cases; it involves such questions as military supply policy for India and Pakistan, regional security for Latin America, arms policy for the Middle East and North Africa. In addition to the daily grist of policy implementation, work is done in planning ahead for such specific events as the 1967 Latin American Summit meeting at Punta del Este, or in quick response on the arms control elements in such crises as the Middle East war.

At Punta del Este, Uruguay, on April 12-14, the Chiefs of State of 20 member nations of the Organization of American States met and took the first steps towards a Latin American common market. The relationship of their economic situation to defense spending was clearly recognized by the Presidents of the American states, who

<sup>67</sup> 50 Stat. 503.

included in their seven-point Declaration a pledge to eliminate unnecessary military expenditures.<sup>65</sup>

ACDA participated in the preparation for this move in the direction of regional arms control, just as it has been involved throughout the year in the determination of basic U.S. policy for arms in Latin America. Backing up the Agency's in-house research was external research on the political role of the military and on prospects for arms control in the hemisphere. A reimbursable arrangement with the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research has been made to analyze and study the organization, composition and environment of the Latin American armed forces and their role and changing functions. Particular attention is being given to possible arms control and disarmament measures in Latin America, including studies of costs and expenditures. A final report, with an evaluation of arms control possibilities in the region will be available for internal use early in 1968.

In addition, the Agency has joined, over a period of many months, in the review of specific arms transfer questions, such as that arising out of the controversy over whether to permit the purchase of F-5 jet aircraft by the larger South American countries.

While the overall record on defense spending in Latin America is a good one compared to other regions of the world, and the U.S. policy of restraint on the introduction of costly sophisticated military equipment into the area has met with a certain amount of success, time and technology are beginning to undermine that policy. For the fact is that weapons are becoming available for transfer which will tend increasingly to fall into the category of what are now considered the "fast strike" weapons (such as jet aircraft)—the very type of advanced equipment the U.S. is reluctant to make available. Nevertheless, it is argued that rapidly advancing technology in modern weapons—a technology which sometimes has civilian applications—presents the governments of these less developed countries (even those wishing to hold down military spending) with a dilemma: to go forward beyond current need or find themselves with inadequate or obsolete defenses in the future. The U.S. effort to hold the line involves consideration on an almost case-by-case basis. Arms control expertise in these difficult questions of policy is essential to reducing the dangers inherent in the build-up of conventional armaments.

Prior to the 1967 Middle East crisis, the Agency produced a series of in-house studies on arms shipments to that area, existing weapons inventories, missile proliferation problems, and arms control possibilities. In addition, selected regional background material was provided by ACDA contractors. This combination of reports backed up overall U.S. considerations of ways of limiting the Middle East arms race, including arms publication and registration possibilities.

During the crisis, as well as in its aftermath, ACDA participated in the preparation of material for top-level interagency groups, including the Special Committee of the National Security Council set up by the President. Contributions were made to the question of restraints on arms shipments into the area, to development of the

<sup>65</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, May 8, 1967, p. 721.

President's registration proposal, to an examination of the problems of missile proliferation, and to development of the diplomatic effort to hold down a renewed arms build-up.

In such periods of intensive activity, the reservoir of talent and knowledge built up over the years by ACDA's internal and external research program pays off. The Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which in the past has provided a valuable body of information directly related to the problems of arms transfer and conflict control, was asked on a crash basis to provide material on the Middle East; its first input was delivered to ACDA when the conflict was two days old.

Much Agency research in arms traffic—economic, political, legal, scientific and technological—is of worldwide application. The Census Bureau, for example, is compiling data for the Agency under a reimbursement agreement on U.S. exports of military items and of commodities with potential military use.

This project has resulted in a series of periodic reports on *U.S. Exports of Military Items and Commodities of Potential Military Use* covering calendar years 1965, 1966 and the first quarter of 1967. In addition, the Agency has published *World-Wide Defense Expenditures and Selected Economic Data* for 1964 and 1965, covering more than 120 countries.<sup>68</sup> The reports are widely distributed in the State, Defense, and Commerce Departments; these agencies have primary responsibility for implementing arms transfer policy, and this type of information in this form, has not heretofore been available.

A determination of the exact nature and extent of international arms trading is a vital step in the search for workable controls. The policy of export by the United States of conventional weapons in fulfillment of its global defense commitments, for example, can lead indirectly to the flow of arms to the less developed countries. Existing restrictions on the disposition of U.S. arms sold to our allies and eventually made surplus through obsolescence in turn create problems for those who are reluctant to let marketable equipment go to the scrap heap. But if the United States did not impose restrictions on the resale of arms, the resulting free-for-all would undermine our policy of limiting arms transfers to less developed countries. The Agency expects to play a significant role in the implementation of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 on this subject. Continuing research is being conducted on retransfer of military equipment of U.S. origin, in the hopes of developing additional ways of avoiding its turn-around sale in regions where the military equilibrium is delicately balanced at best, and where countries may end up fighting each other with second-hand American weapons. Also under study are growing indigenous arms production capabilities and the accompanying problem of industrialized nations teaching smaller countries how to make their own weapons.

The elements of effective regional controls, particularly in relation to local conflict in developing areas, are being examined by MIT. This contract should also provide further insights into the extent to which

<sup>68</sup> For the reports on defense expenditures, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 1-3, and *ante*, pp. 611-612.

arms diffusions from any source have actually tended to stimulate local conflict.

The Arms Transfer Coordinating Group has completed an internal research project on the complex of factors contributing to an arms race in the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya). The study was directed particularly toward the development of actions which the United States might take alone or in cooperation with other nations to bring about the control of the conventional arms flow into the area. This region was selected for study because the conflict there contained elements of a larger neighborhood arms race in microcosm, including the involvement of major powers as arms suppliers and the costly diversion of resources from the economic and social development. The resulting detailed analysis was made available to the Departments of State and Defense, and may shed some light on ways to control such situations in other more dangerous parts of the world.

#### *The European military confrontation*

Twenty-two years after the end of World War II, armies of over a million men face each other across the political line dividing the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Approximately 200,000 of these are U.S. forces. On October 7, 1966 in New York, President Johnson spoke to the Editorial Writers' Conference on East-West Relations in Europe of the possibility of a "gradual and a balanced revision of force levels on both sides." He placed this possibility in the context of a "stable military situation in Europe, one in which we hope that tensions can be lowered."<sup>70</sup>

The costs of the confrontation have become increasingly irksome within the alliance over the past several years, and this, combined with the rise and fall of the East-West political temperature, has produced pressures for re-examination of the military situation in Central Europe.

In 1967, Senators Mansfield and Javits introduced resolutions calling for a troop cutback in Europe.<sup>71</sup> A total of 56 Senators joined in co-sponsoring these resolutions. During this period, also, the United States, Great Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany negotiated new agreements on the offset of troop costs that will result in redeployment of some United States and British troops from Germany. The Communique of the NATO Ministers meeting in Luxembourg in June noted that "If conditions permit, a balanced reduction of forces by the East and West could be a significant step toward security in Europe."<sup>72</sup> In December the Ministers "reviewed the efforts made by their governments to improve East/West relations \* \* \* emphasized the importance of promoting progress in disarmament and arms control" and reaffirmed the view expressed in June on balanced reduction of forces in Europe.<sup>73</sup>

Against the time when political conditions may permit a balanced revision in force levels, the Agency has continued to study the impli-

<sup>70</sup> *Documents on Disarmament*, 1966, p. 654.

<sup>71</sup> S. Res. 49 and 53, 90th Cong., 1st sess.

<sup>72</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, July 3, 1967, pp. 14-15.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 676-681.

ications for Western security of possible mutual reductions in force levels.

During the past year, an analysis was completed of the arms control implications of alternative military postures, based on broad strategic concepts, to which trends already in evidence may lead over the next five years. The results should provide analytical support for contingency arms control and disarmament planning under evolving conditions within the Western Alliance.

ACDA has contracted with the Research Analysis Corp. of McLean, Va., to assess West European interests and possible initiatives in arms control, in the context of developing trends towards more independent security and defense policies. In the light of this assessment the contractor will evaluate possible arms control measures affecting the military forces in Central Europe. While political and economic considerations must be taken into account, they will be examined primarily to determine their effect on military factors.

ACDA is participating in a Defense Department study by the Institute for Defense Analyses on the political, socio-economic and strategic trends in Eastern Europe as well. The ACDA supplementary funds will make an additional analysis of the implications of these trends for arms control possible. The results will contribute to further studies of possible European security arrangements involving such arms control measures as mutual force reductions.

Compliance with international agreements governing mutual limitations on armed forces will have to be verified by agreed inspection procedures. ACDA's research into the implications of arms control measures on ground force capabilities will take it in the summer of 1968 to the plain of Salisbury, England.

There, near mysterious Stonehenge, "a battleground on which archaeologists have fought with assumptions their only weapons," United States and British forces will carry out the first international arms inspection exercise of its kind to field test methods of policing agreed force reductions.

"First Look," as the exercise is called, will be conducted during June, July, and August in an area in which a large number of British Army and Air Force installations and units are located, and will involve 30,000 troops and associated air support.

The test exercise, jointly financed by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defense, will combine two monitoring schemes—air surveillance and inspection teams on the ground. These inspection teams will look at major military units deployed in the area, personnel, barracks, motor pools, storage, messing and maintenance facilities. Among other techniques, they will employ such equipment as "sensing" packages containing infrared, seismic, and acoustical devices and a computer to decipher their information. The sensor packages will be placed on the ground at points where significant symptoms associated with the presence of military units can be expected to appear—tanks, armored personnel carriers, major weapons, vehicles, light aircraft, and other equipment characteristic of combat and troop support. Sensors will operate around the clock, seven days a week. The information they record will be collected daily and taken to field headquarters on Greenham Com-

mon, an old R.A.F. base, where the computer—built for this purpose by a member of the U.S. team—will help determine whether unusual military activity is taking place. These tools are of course not new; what is new is the way in which they will be used in combination and for the specific purpose of this test—infra-red to document the presence of aircraft and ground engines; seismic to register weight and frequency in the passage of various kind of equipment; acoustical to distinguish types and direction of flight of aircraft.

"First Look" is expected to provide much practical information on monitoring mutual force limitations, whether they take place at some time in the future in the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation or in areas which have been subject to regional arms races. The NATO governments have been briefed on the field test and are being invited to send observers.

While "First Look" is the first such international exercise, it is the sequel to a series of field tests previously carried out under Project Cloud Gap, a joint ACDA/DOD organization. Beginning in fiscal year 1968 ACDA assumed full responsibility for the U.S. testing program.

#### COMMUNIST CHINA AND ARMS CONTROL

We would hope that in China there would emerge a generation of leadership that would think seriously about what is called "peaceful coexistence" that would recognize the pragmatic necessity for human beings to live together in peace, rather than on a basis of continuing warfare.<sup>54</sup>

The successful detonation of a thermonuclear device by Communist China, plus evidence of a developing missile delivery capability, have prompted grave questions about the efficacy of possible international arms control agreements if Mainland China continues to isolate itself from the rest of the world. Communist China's domestic and foreign policies, economic development, military capabilities and intentions, and especially its attitudes towards arms control and disarmament questions are of increasing interest and study in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

ACDA's International Relations Bureau has contracted with the Hoover Institution on War, Peace and Revolution, at Stanford University, to conduct a series of research studies on factors which have an important bearing on opportunities for and obstacles to arms control arrangements in the Far East region.

The first of these, begun in 1964, considered those nations located in an arc from India around to Japan and South Korea, not including the Chinese mainland, North Vietnam and North Korea. The purpose was to evaluate the relevance for these countries of arms control and disarmament proposals advanced by the United States and other nations. A country-by-country appraisal was made of political stability, territorial ambitions, levels and quality of armaments and their sources of supply, economic strengths and weaknesses, and foreign policy relations with other nations of the region as well as with the Soviet Union, the United States, and Communist China.

Not surprisingly, the study bears out that prevailing threats to security and stability in the Far East region have reduced the accept-

<sup>54</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, Oct. 30, 1967, p. 563.

ability of arms control arrangements affecting armed forces, deployment, advanced conventional armaments and military expenditures. However, the research does provide some grounds for hope that arrangements can be worked out among the nations of the Far East region, independent of Communist China, in such areas as non-proliferation, arms transfers, mutual defense alliances, peaceful nuclear energy development, technical and scientific exchanges, and peace-keeping efforts.

The second Hoover Institution study focused on the arms control implications of Communist China's domestic and foreign policies. It surveyed public attitudes toward arms control and disarmament in the context of its self-proclaimed role of promulgating Communist doctrine outside its own borders and its concept of essential national security measures. This study emphasized the crucial importance of the nations on Communist China's periphery to its short and long range national security, and concluded that the Chinese regime sees Japan as its principal rival in the Far East. The research indicated that Communist China may take initiatives of its own to promote non-aggression pacts, no-first-use pledges, denuclearized zones, agreements with other nations of the region to reduce conventional armaments, although it is most unlikely that the present regime will consider seriously arms control arrangements requiring restraints on its nuclear weapons program in the foreseeable future.

In an effort to calculate possibilities for future alterations in Communist China's attitudes toward arms control, the Agency contracted with the Hoover Institution for a third contingency study projecting possible changes in that country's leadership, military capabilities, economic and technological potential, and foreign policy positions over the next decade. Now in the final stages of completion, the study contains three different scenarios which reflect possible outcomes of the evolution within Communist China. The scenarios are based importantly on varying leadership possibilities, ranging from the continuation of Maoism, to a more moderate and less ideologically motivated leadership disposed toward a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, to a fragmentation of China and the decentralization of authority analogous to the old mandarin system. Although the last circumstance is judged extremely unlikely in the light of present evidence, the Far East specialists at the Hoover Institution regard such a violent swing in national political direction as possible and an alternative which should be included in the study.

The question of significant differences among Mainland China's leadership groups is also being studied under an ACDA contract by Columbia University. This research is under the guidance of Prof. John Lindbeck, director of Columbia's East Asian Institute. The internal divisions among various elite groups, now amply documented, are being examined with a view to assessing attitudes on arms control and disarmament.

What is not amply documented—and in fact nowhere exists in our growing store of knowledge about the Chinese People's Republic—is a comprehensive analysis of its doctrine and practice in international law. ACDA has contracted with Harvard University to fill this gap, particularly on questions relevant to arms control negotiations. A study

is now in process which will consider Chinese interpretation of treaties as well as their record of adherence to international agreements; doctrine relating to international organizations; and views on such questions of international law as recognition, state succession, and belligerency and civil war.

ACDA's Economics Bureau has contracted with the University of Michigan to research the competition between defense requirements and economic development for Communist China's limited economic resources. The study is constructing a statistical base from which intensive analysis of Chinese investment in defense and other economic sectors can proceed. The kind and volume of resources being devoted to military programs—as compared with needs for consumers and national growth—will be identified in order to assess the economic factors which might influence Chinese decisions with respect to defense and arms control.

Over the past 4 years, ACDA has established a close working association with many of the leading China scholars in the United States. The Agency brought together 20 top specialists in Chinese affairs for a 10-day conference on *Communist China and Arms Control* in the summer of 1964, and again in 1965 for *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control*. Both conferences were conducted jointly by Harvard's East Asian Research Center and the Center for International Affairs under ACDA sponsorship. In the spring of 1966, a group of academicians visited Japan to meet with scholars, journalists, and government officials in a series of informal discussions, based on the conclusions of the 1965 Summer Study. The Harvard group is still providing the Agency with material based on these studies, and a publication containing a report of the group who visited Japan will be published early in 1968.

#### NONARMAMENT

The United States has anticipated the future by putting all of Antarctica, and more recently outer space, off limits to weapons of mass destruction. Non-armament is easier than disarmament, and in these terms alone, the value of these latter treaties cannot be over-estimated. In addition, however, we should not overlook the significance of this approach to the problems in arms control we face right now.<sup>75</sup>

In 1967 the space treaty entered into force,<sup>76</sup> and the United States welcomed the addition of still another measure of non-armament to the growing list of actions designed to short-circuit potential arms control problems—the Treaty of Tlatelolco, making Latin America a nuclear free zone.<sup>77</sup>

It is self-evident, particularly in a time when technology has enabled man to place instruments on the Moon and Venus, that the preventive approach to control over the destructive elements in scientific advances must receive increasing attention. This approach has already resulted in agreements to exclude nuclear weapons from Antarctica and Latin America and to prohibit their being placed in orbit around the earth: it has led to near agreement to stop the further

<sup>75</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, p. 822.

<sup>76</sup> *Antc.*, pp. 38-43.

<sup>77</sup> *Antc.*, pp. 69-83.

spread of nuclear weapons; it has stimulated interest in the seabed and ocean floor; it has continued to act as a restraint on the use of chemical and biological weapons in war while the search for controls goes on. As the complexity and destructiveness of established arsenals grows, so does the difficulty of limiting or dismantling them. If the element of danger in modern technology is understood in advance, nations can "anticipate, negotiate and agree upon a system of law to regulate their activities."

#### *Latin-American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty*

On February 14, 1967, 14 independent nations signed a treaty in Tlatelolco, Mexico, culminating a 5-year effort to draft a treaty, designed to insure that Latin America would be free of nuclear weapons. Since that date seven additional countries have signed. Of the countries within the zone, only Cuba has stated that it will not sign.

In 1963, with the Cuban crisis and the specter of the introduction of nuclear weapons into still another region of the world still vivid, five Latin American Presidents joined in proposing a nuclear free zone in the region,<sup>78</sup> and with the blessing of the 18th United Nations General Assembly<sup>79</sup> a Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America was established. The Commission worked diligently, in the face of serious differences in the positions of some of the governments concerned, and succeeded in drawing up a draft treaty for presentation at Tlatelolco.

The basic obligations of the treaty are contained in Article 1:

1. The Contracting Parties hereby undertake to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction, and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories:

(a) The testing, use, manufacture, production, or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the Parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way; and

(b) The receipt, storage, installation, deployment, and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, by the Parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way.

2. The Contracting Parties also undertake to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon.

A most important provision of the treaty is Article 13, which places all peaceful nuclear activities in the zone under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system.

With respect to explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes the United States understands the treaty to permit such explosions only when detonated by nuclear-weapon states upon request.

<sup>78</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, op. 182-183.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 628-629.

The treaty text is accompanied by two Protocols. Protocol I calls on nations outside the treaty zone which have territories in the zone to place them under the same restrictions as treaty parties. Protocol II calls upon nuclear-weapon states to respect the status of denuclearization of the zone, not to contribute to acts involving violation of obligations of the parties and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the contracting parties.

The United States sent a message to the Preparatory Commission on the occasion of the conclusion of the Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons in Latin America in which it said it considers "this first international instrument establishing a nuclear free zone to be an event of unique significance." The message expressed the hope that the treaty "will constitute a milestone on the road to general and complete disarmament, and in particular that it will lead in the near future to the conclusion of a worldwide treaty prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons."<sup>50</sup>

The United States has held the position for many years that a prohibition on the deployment, possession or manufacture of nuclear weapons in areas where they have not been introduced could, under appropriate circumstances, contribute greatly towards universal agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In a letter dated December 10, 1965 to the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission, ACDA Director Foster outlined the general requirements which the United States believes should characterize nuclear-free zones: that the initiative originate within the area concerned, that the zone include all states in the area whose participation is deemed important, that the creation of a zone would not disturb necessary security arrangements, and that provisions are included for following up on alleged violations in order to give reasonable assurance of compliance for the zone.<sup>51</sup>

The U.S. Government has the Protocols to the treaty under consideration. Signatories to the treaty have expressed the belief that adherence to the Protocols (by nations assuming obligations under them) would greatly strengthen the treaty. The Protocols present certain problems for the United States, however, which must be given the most careful scrutiny: For example, the United States advised the Preparatory Commission that we did not wish to have included in the proposed nuclear free zone the Virgin Islands or Puerto Rico because of their special relationship to the United States; any commitment concerning the existence of nuclear weapons on any part of our own territory would raise complex questions about our security arrangements. Another matter, which is not addressed directly in the Treaty text, is that of "transit" through Latin American territories en route to other destinations. The Preparatory Commission has formally recognized that the Treaty and Protocol II have no effect on U.S. transit.<sup>52</sup>

At the request of the Permanent Representatives of 20 Latin American members to the United Nations, the Treaty for the Prohibi-

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 65.

<sup>51</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 626-627.

<sup>52</sup> See COPREDAL/76 (Spanish version), pp. 10-11.

tion of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was placed on the agenda of the 22d General Assembly.

The resulting resolution "Welcomes with special satisfaction the Treaty \* \* \* which constitutes an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promote international peace and security and which at the same time establishes the right of Latin American countries to use nuclear energy for demonstrated peaceful purposes in order to accelerate the economic and social development of their peoples." The Resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on December 5 by a vote of 82 to 0 with 28 abstentions. The United States voted in favor.<sup>83</sup>

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has worked closely with the Department of State throughout these 5 years, to lend support to the Latin American states in their efforts. ACDA staff have participated in the preparation of policy memoranda and position papers. An ACDA political officer was present at Tlatelolco as an observer. In addition to the benefits inherent in the treaty for members of the zone and for the Western Hemisphere, this positive step toward curbing the spread of nuclear weapons is a significant expression of support for the negotiations to obtain a universal non-proliferation treaty. The implications for the conclusion of a non-proliferation Treaty have been followed with close interest by ACDA.

#### *Antarctic Treaty*

An earlier example of placing a geographic area "off-limits" to nuclear weapons was the Antarctic Treaty, signed in 1959.<sup>84</sup> Although this agreement cannot claim to free a large inhabited area from the dangers and burdens of nuclear weapons, as does the Latin American Treaty, it is significant because it was the first international agreement which ruled out in a specified area "any measures of a military nature." It also prohibits any nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material. More than 10 years ago the International Geophysical Year was responsible for greatly increasing the tempo of exploration and research in Antarctica, and more than eight years have passed since the 12 countries then engaged in Antarctic operations devised a "code of conduct" and voluntarily bound themselves to it by a solemn treaty. Although many changes in governments and in the international political climate have occurred during the intervening years, the spirit of Antarctic cooperation has continued under the aegis of the Treaty.

Article VII provides that any signatory can send observers to the area at any time, and that all stations, installations and equipment, and all ship and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes shall be open at all times to inspection. During 1967, the second U.S. inspection took place. (The first was in 1964.) By agreement with the Department of State, which has overall responsibility for Antarctic affairs, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency takes the lead in planning, managing and evaluating inspections by U.S. observers. An

<sup>83</sup> *Antc.* pp. 620-621.

<sup>84</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 1550-1556.

interdepartmental planning committee is chaired by an officer from the Agency's International Relations Bureau.

The 1967 inspection team consisted of five persons, selected for their diplomatic, scientific, technological, and linguistic skills. One of the team members was an ACDA staff officer; another was an ACDA consultant. Arrangements were made for the team to be transported on the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter *Eastwind*, which was already scheduled for a voyage to obtain information on ice conditions and the coastal terrain. The *Eastwind* provided the base of operations as well as transportation and its helicopters and boats permitted ship-to-shore movements under a wide variety of weather and terrain conditions. Eight stations operated by seven nations were visited and inspected during the 5-week, 8,500-mile voyage. In addition, a Danish ship under charter to the French and Australian expeditions was inspected while unloading cargo.

*The Report of United States Observers on Inspection of Antarctic Stations, 1966-67 Austral Summer Season*, was issued in July 1967. The observers reported that they were cordially welcomed at each station and full cooperation was extended to them. The spirit of cordiality and cooperation, which the Treaty fosters, was evident throughout. The report concluded, "There was no evidence to indicate any violations of either the provisions or the spirit of the Antarctic Treaty. All the information obtained at these stations indicates Antarctica is being used solely for peaceful purposes."<sup>55</sup>

#### *Outer Space Treaty*

On October 10 a ceremony was held in the White House marking the entry into force of the Outer Space Treaty. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, British Ambassador Dean, and Secretary of State Rusk deposited the instruments of ratification for their respective governments. On that occasion, President Johnson said, "by adding this treaty to the law of nations, we are forging a permanent disarmament agreement for outer space. The spirit of international cooperation that has achieved this agreement is a beacon of hope for the future."<sup>56</sup>

The treaty prohibits the installation of military bases, installations, and fortifications, the testing of weapons, and the conduct of maneuvers on the moon and other celestial bodies with inspection rights to check compliance with the treaty. Of more immediate importance, it prohibits the placing in orbit around the earth, stationing on celestial bodies, or otherwise stationing in outer space weapons of mass destruction.

ACDA's research program—both internal and contract—provided useful support during negotiations of this treaty. The Agency's Deputy Assistant Director for Science and Technology served as a member of the technical staff to advise and assist in the negotiations, which took place in Geneva and at the United Nations.

The Outer Space Treaty has been characterized as the most significant arms control agreement since the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. The President has predicted, "Its significance will grow as

<sup>55</sup> *Ante*, pp. 283-290.

<sup>56</sup> *Ante*, pp. 474-476.

our mastery of space grows, and our children will remark the wisdom of this agreement to a greater degree than the present state of our own knowledge quite permits today."<sup>87</sup>

*Arms control measures for the seabed*

Interest is mounting in the vast, virtually untapped resources of the ocean floor, and this environment may well be the world's newest frontier for exploration and exploitation. The promise of untold benefits which will come from technological advances in oceanography is shadowed by the threat of complications flowing from a lack of an applicable legal framework under which orderly exploitation could be undertaken. There exists also the specter of possible threats to our security. President Johnson has said, we must never "allow the prospects of rich harvest and mineral wealth to create a new form of colonial competition among the maritime nations \* \* \* We must ensure that the deep seas and the ocean bottoms are, and remain, the legacy of all human beings."<sup>88</sup> Serious thought is already being given to measures to extend the rule of law to the deep ocean floor.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has closely followed various proposals for international control of the resources of the seabed, such as those advanced in 1966 in the Seventeenth Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, in resolutions introduced in both houses of Congress in 1967, and by U.N. Resolution 2340, adopted by the General Assembly on December 18, 1967. The U.N. Resolution recognizes "that the exploration and use of the seabed and the ocean floor should be conducted in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and for the benefit of all mankind." It establishes an ad hoc committee to study the scope and various aspects of the question of reserving the seabed and ocean floor exclusively for peaceful purposes. The resolution was adopted by 99 affirmative votes, with no dissenting votes or abstentions.<sup>89</sup>

These developments are of great interest to the Agency. Any arrangements which would permit the orderly and peaceful exploitation of the wealth of the seabed would tend to create a general atmosphere which would facilitate the negotiation of practicable arms control measures affecting the seabed.

The Agency has been studying such arms control measures; in particular, whether it would be possible to recommend international negotiation of an arms control measure which, if adopted, would prohibit the emplacement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed.

It is apparent that the problems involved in the concept of a nuclear-free seabed are numerous, complex, and difficult of solution. But if a practicable arms control measure can be devised which would preserve a large area of this globe, an area as yet scarcely touched by man, from the deployment of weapons of mass destruction, then a giant step can be taken to enhance the security of all nations.

<sup>87</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, p. 821.

<sup>88</sup> *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, July 18, 1966, p. 931.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 727-729.

*Chemical and biological weapons*

One of the most vexing problems in arms control is how to prevent the introduction of chemical and biological weapons into the world's arsenals as standard equipment. International revulsion against the use of such weapons in warfare led to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of such weapons in warfare.<sup>20</sup> Since that time nations have continued to condemn their use; during World War II President Roosevelt issued a warning to the Axis powers against resort to gas warfare, declaring the use of inhumane devices to be outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind.<sup>21</sup> It is this opinion which has kept chemical and biological weapons under control over the years, since agreements involving effective control measures are so difficult of achievement. The development and production of such weapons is so relatively easy that the design of a practical verification system has presented almost intractable problems.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has nevertheless been seriously concerned to solve these problems in order to find ways to reinforce international political restraints. The need to do so was amply demonstrated by the fact that lethal gas was employed in 1967.

On June 2 the International Committee of the Red Cross at Geneva issued a statement confirming the use of poison gas in the Yemen. At that time the ICRC transmitted to authorities involved in the Yemen conflict a report on its investigation of the use of poison gas. The text of this report was published in the New York Times on July 28, 1967. The United States condemned the use of lethal gas as "clearly contrary to international law," and called on the authorities concerned in Yemen to heed the request of the ICRC not to resort in any circumstances whatsoever to their use.<sup>22</sup>

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has completed three external research projects in its search for a basis for possible proposals on the control of chemical and biological weapons; three more are in progress. Complementing this effort is internal research on the implications for U.S. policy of various proposals for CBW control. One important problem involves verification, particularly of comprehensive agreements. While preliminary findings indicate some reason for optimism about the chances of devising effective CBW control measures, results thus far are not sufficiently complete to allow a valid determination of the feasibility of such measures and work is continuing in the Agency.

#### IMPACT OF REDUCED DEFENSE EXPENDITURE ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY

The Committee registers its conviction that the increasing interest on the part of the public and the Congress in the problems associated with defense adjustment has created a new awareness and concern throughout the Federal Government \* \* \*.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>20</sup> *Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents, 1919-55*, pp. 169-170.

<sup>21</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, June 12, 1943, p. 507.

<sup>22</sup> See letter of July 24, 1967, from Ambassador Goldberg to Congressman Wolff (*Congressional Record*, July 27, 1967, pp. A3840-A3841).

<sup>23</sup> *Report of the Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament*, July 1965, p. 3.

Between the fiscal years of 1965 and 1967 the proportion of total public and private employment attributable to expenditures by the Department of Defense rose from about 8.6 percent to about 10.3 percent. The impact of these defense expenditures is distributed unevenly among industries, occupations, and regions. Three industries—representing only 4 percent of total U.S. industry—contributed almost one-third of defense-generated employment in fiscal year 1967. Approximately three out of every five aeronautical engineers and two out of every five airplane mechanics and physicists in the United States currently owe their jobs to military spending. In many states, counties, and communities throughout the country, the percentage of jobs which are defense-related is much higher than the percentage for the country as a whole.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is enjoined by its statute to assess the effect of arms control and disarmament measures on the American economy. Studies have been conducted of possible economic adjustment problems in these circumstances for certain industries, manpower, and regions and communities. These studies, while oriented toward situations resulting from the implementation of arms control measures, are extremely useful in assessing the effects of any substantial reductions in the rate of defense spending, such as may occur following the cessation of hostilities in Viet Nam. In the conduct of these economic studies, the Agency works closely with other agencies of the federal government, through joint sponsorship or research and data-gathering efforts of mutual interest. ACDA's economic staff participates in formal and informal interagency work on the economic impact of defense and disarmament. The Agency is, for example, a member of two of the nine working groups reporting to the Cabinet-level Coordinating Committee on Post-Viet Nam Planning, established by the President in March. Information was supplied to the working groups from ACDA-sponsored studies of actual experience in mass layoffs of defense contractor personnel and community adjustment to the closing of military installations. In revealing the extent of the effort already made toward solutions to the problem, this body of information has been of considerable assistance in initial surveys of the dimensions of the problem.

A project in which these working groups have expressed interest is a study of the impact on Parsons, Kans., of the reactivation, operation, and eventual deactivation of the Kansas Army Ammunition Plant. Parsons is a community of about 14,000 persons and the plant, which produced ammunition during World War II and the Korean war, is being reactivated and will require a work force of over 3,000 at peak employment. The situation of Parsons is not unlike that of a number of other small and relatively isolated communities, particularly in the western part of the country, which are being affected by the reactivation or operation of ammunition plants for the war in Viet Nam. The Midwest Research Institute, which is conducting the project, first performed a design study to make sure that the necessary data could be collected and the cooperation of the community and plant obtained. The Parsons study represents a unique opportunity to trace local impact as it occurs.

Another ACDA study of economic adjustment in defense plants—*Pensions, Severance Pay, and Related Fringe Benefits For Laid Off Defense Workers*—is now underway. Available information tends to indicate that defense workers by and large have a higher turnover rate, given the uncertainties of defense contracts, than other industry workers, and thus the lack of opportunity to meet length-of-service requirements for pensions imposes special hardship after layoff. This study, which is being performed by the University of Illinois, is designed to determine what kind of policies, if any, should be sought to offset this disadvantage.

The Agency continued during the year to support various efforts being made within the Government to trace the impact of defense expenditures by industry and region. Financial support was provided the Department of Defense in connection with its work on developing semiannual data on defense expenditure impact by region, state, and metropolitan area through contractor plant surveys. The Agency also provided support for the survey of *Shipments of Defense-Oriented Industries* for 1966 made by the Census Bureau, supplementing surveys made for 1963 and 1965. Support also is being furnished the Office of Business Economics of the Department of Commerce for revising and updating the "input-output" model of the U.S. economy. The revised model will not only cover many more industry sectors but also the industry effects of Government purchases for defense as distinguished from other Government purchases.

During the year, a number of research projects were completed and the reports widely distributed to industry and labor leaders, editors and publishers, public officials and so on. Among these was a study by the National Planning Association, which devised a system of economic indicators to help communities determine the strengths and weaknesses in their capacity to carry out successful readjustment to reduced defense spending.

There has been considerable speculation about and interest in alternative markets for specialized defense firms in the event of defense cutbacks. Much of the interest has centered upon the possibility that the unique abilities of these firms in systems design, engineering, and management could be used to assist in the solution of such public problems as air and water pollution, crime prevention, waste disposal, rapid transit, and the complex of other urban difficulties. The Denver Research Institute completed a study for the Agency which concluded that many institutional obstacles, both within the firms and among the public agencies, would have to be overcome before a large civil demand for systems resources could be envisaged.

Because of the great emphasis upon reliability and performance factors in defense engineering, there has been concern that there might be problems of adaptation to commercial jobs for engineers in defense-related work. The Stanford Research Institute has just completed a study of these problems which indicates that they are not quite as serious as was originally supposed.

Economic research sponsored by the Agency thus far has concentrated heavily on identifying where the defense dollar goes, what kind of employment is generated, and what kind of adjustment problems for industries, communities, and manpower would be created by defense

reductions. The Agency's Economic Bureau is now moving ahead from this "problem identification" research to contingency planning research. Under the new approach, now in the planning stage, studies will be developed addressed to measures which might be taken in advance or which might be prepared for implementation following a defense cutback.

#### AGENCY OPERATIONS

##### *Committee of Principals*

The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is principal adviser to the President and Secretary of State on arms control and disarmament, and as such he has a primary responsibility for policy recommendations in these matters. In fulfilling this responsibility, the Agency works in close coordination with other Government agencies.

Policy recommendations are made to the President by the Agency's Director through the "Committee of Principals" whose members in addition to the Director of ACDA are the highest ranking officials of each interested Government agency—the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency. As a committee these officials review and coordinate arms control recommendations for the President. It is the President who must give final approval for any measures to be set forth in negotiations. In 1967 this approval resulted in the tabling on August 24 of a new partial Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.<sup>94</sup>

##### *General Advisory Committee*

This advisory group is made up of prominent citizens appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. They come from private life, from the business, labor, academic, military, and scientific fields. The group met four times in 1967, each time for a two-day session (Jan. 19-20, Apr. 21-22, July 18-19, Oct. 9-10). As in previous years, the timing of the meetings permitted the Agency to benefit from the advice and counsel of this influential group in the preparation and conduct of the international negotiations. The January meeting came shortly before the convening of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva on February 21. The April meeting came during an ENDC recess during which intensive consultations were being held with our Allies. The July and October meetings, held while the ENDC was in progress, enabled the Committee to conduct an up-to-the-minute review of the progress of non-proliferation negotiations in the long session of the ENDC (May 18-Dec. 14). In addition the October meeting, held when the U.N. General Assembly session had just started, enabled a review of U.S. positions on the disarmament items slated for discussion in New York.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 338-341.

Officials of the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency joined ACDA officials in thoroughly briefing the Committee on the latest information bearing on the arms race and on U.S. arms control policies and objectives. The sessions are characterized by a free and lively exchange of comment and opinion. The assistance of this group is an invaluable contribution to the formulation of policy in arms control and disarmament and in planning for its execution.

#### *Social Science Advisory Board*

The ACDA Social Science Advisory Board was established in March 1964 by the Director under his statutory authority, to advise on the social science aspects of the Agency's programs. In 1967 it held two meetings, on March 22-23 and September 28-29. During these sessions the members of the Board were briefed on current arms control and disarmament programs and on the status of the Agency's social science research programs.

In the intervals between meetings individuals of the Board were frequently called upon for advice and assistance with regard to specific research projects underway in ACDA or with regard to new proposals under consideration.

Members of the Board represent an important channel of communication between the Agency and the academic community. Through them universities and individual scholars can be acquainted with ACDA's plans for new research, and with the results of completed studies. By virtue of the Board's intimate knowledge of research being pursued in universities and colleges as well as work being done by individual scholars, it is of invaluable assistance in suggesting the names of qualified contractors and grantees to be considered for particular research projects.

Since its inception the Board had benefitted greatly from the wise counsel and guidance of its Chairman, Dean Griswold, who resigned from the Board shortly after its last meeting, upon his appointment as Solicitor General of the United States.

#### *Public information*

Public concern about the problem of controlling armaments increases from year to year, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is a natural focus for those who seek information or who wish to express an opinion or advocate a course of action. The Arms Control and Disarmament Act gives the Agency responsibility for "the dissemination and coordination of information concerning arms control and disarmament,"<sup>95</sup> and the entire Agency is eager to listen to viewpoints and to provide services to facilitate informed study and discussion.

In carrying out this responsibility to inform, the Agency has responded to requests from individuals, organizations, schools, churches and institutions located in the United States and abroad—for pamphlet material, for speakers and conference participants, and for advice

<sup>95</sup> Sec. 2 of the Act (*Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, p. 483).

on curriculums, research projects, and study programs. ACDA officers have also accepted invitations to sit in with committees of national organizations, serving as resources of factual material, to help in the consideration of issues in the field of arms control and disarmament.

During the course of the year, in response to invitations, officers of the Agency addressed audiences in the United States and abroad at meetings sponsored by organizations, luncheon groups, universities, labor unions and business associations.

The Agency also welcomes touring groups from schools and churches to its offices in the State Department buildings, and arranges briefings for them on the Government's activities and positions in arms control and disarmament.

The Agency regards these speaking engagements, conferences, and briefings not only as an opportunity to inform, but also as an opportunity to learn. Ideas generated in the course of discussion at public meetings are carefully reported, and are given staff consideration. Each contact with the public provides an opportunity to open new and wider channels for ideas and opinions from outside the Agency, and these are warmly welcomed and attentively studied.

ACDA literature, presenting basic information on United States positions at disarmament conferences, is distributed by the Agency itself, by the State Department and by the Government Printing Office. It is under particularly heavy demand from students. Unclassified research reports prepared by Agency staff or by contractors are mailed to companies, academic institutions, libraries, and individuals, who have asked to be placed on the distribution list or who are known by the Agency to be particularly interested and concerned with the subject matter covered in the various reports. When limited Agency stock of this material is depleted, it may be obtained in most instances at moderate cost from the Department of Commerce Clearing House for Scientific and Technical Information in Springfield, Va., or (in the case of some economic studies) from the Government Printing Office. In addition, all unclassified research reports are maintained in 48 depository libraries listed in appendix XIII to this report.

Many universities now include the study of arms control in their curriculums, either as separate courses or as part of courses on national security, international relations, political science or history. When requested to do so, the Agency provides assistance in planning such courses, and its officers have on many occasions delivered lectures to such classes.

#### *Planning and coordination*

In 1965 President Johnson directed the Bureau of the Budget to institute an integrated planning-programming-budgeting system in the executive branch. Major agencies were instructed to delineate their goals and objectives and to examine alternative methods to assure the most effective performance at the least cost. ACDA is complying with this directive.

Because of its relatively small size, ACDA's policy formulation and program planning has been under the close supervision of the top officials of the Agency since it was established in 1961. The Research Council, which reviews and makes recommendations to the Director

on all proposed research projects, is made up of the Assistant Directors who head the four Bureaus, the General Counsel, and the Executive Director.

To comply with the President's directive, a Program Planning Staff (PPS) was established in 1965 to formalize the management processes of the Agency's activities. The Chairman of the PPS also functions as non-voting Chairman of the Research Council.

In considering prospective research projects for Agency support, the Council is guided by the Agency objectives developed through the efforts of the Program Planning Staff as follows: (1) To limit and reduce armed forces, armaments, and military expenditures through arms control and disarmament measures; (2) to prevent the proliferation among nations of nuclear weapons, nuclear delivery vehicles, and conventional armaments; (3) to reduce the risk of outbreak of armed conflict, to inhibit its escalation, and to limit its destructiveness and duration through arms control and disarmament measures; (4) to avert harmful economic consequences of reduced defense spending resulting from arms control and disarmament measures, and to study the most constructive use of the resources thus released; (5) to assist in achieving an international environment conducive to arms control and disarmament negotiations.

At the time ACDA was established, responsibility for one or another aspect of arms control research was lodged in several different Federal agencies. Some aspects of the problem were either being studied in several places at once or not being examined at all. The Congress, in an effort to eliminate this problem, charged the new Agency with the responsibility "to coordinate the research, development, and other studies conducted in the field of arms control and disarmament by or for other Government agencies." ACDA has continued in its efforts to improve the level of coordination. Since 1962 a continuing inventory of research underway or completed by the various participating agencies has been kept. This inventory, in accordance with a Presidential directive, has been reported to the Bureau of the Budget on an annual basis.

In addition to reports to the Bureau of the Budget, reports covering the key research targets and programing structure were submitted to other Federal Government agencies having arms control and disarmament research projects, as an aid to interagency coordination and the establishment of a comprehensive balanced U.S. arms control research program.

ACDA research in foreign attitudes towards arms control problems is coordinated closely with the Foreign Area Research Coordination Group (FAR) of the State Department, which is charged with the systematic coordination of all government-sponsored research in the social sciences. ACDA sits on the main committee of FAR and also participates in a number of the sub-committees concerned with the interchange of research data and discussion of future plans.

The interagency relationship on a day-to-day basis between ACDA staff personnel and their working-level counterparts in agencies—such as the Departments of Defense and State, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Labor—with which ACDA shares mutual interests and problems, continues to be a most valuable means of coordination.

## APPENDIX XI

## THE GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

*Chairman*

John J. McCloy of New York, former adviser on disarmament to President Kennedy, is Chairman of the Committee. Mr. McCloy is a member of the law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy; member of the board, Chase Manhattan Bank; and former High Commissioner for Germany.

*Members*

Roger M. Blough of Hawley, Pa., Chairman of the Board of Directors of the U.S. Steel Company.

John Cowles of Minneapolis, Minn., Newspaper Publisher, Editor, and President of *The Minneapolis Star and Tribune Company*.

Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther of Washington, D.C., former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and former President of the American Red Cross.

George Bogdan Kistinkowsky of Cambridge, Mass., Professor of Chemistry at Harvard University and former Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

Dean Anderson McGee of Oklahoma City, Okla., President of Kerr-McGee Oil Industries.

Ralph E. McGill of Atlanta, Ga., Editor of *The Atlanta Constitution* and recipient of the Pulitzer Prize for editorial writing.

George Meany of Bethesda, Md., President of the AFL-CIO.

Maurine Neuberger of Cambridge, Mass., former Senator from Oregon, Professor of Government, Radcliffe Institute and Boston University, Consultant to Food and Drug Administration and National Chairman of the Advisory Council on the Status of Women.

James A. Perkins of Ithaca, N.Y., President of Cornell University.

Herman Phleger of Redwood City, Calif., a partner in the San Francisco Law firm of Brobeck, Phleger and Harrison and former legal adviser to the State Department.

Troy V. Post of Dallas, Tex., President and Chairman of the Board, the Greatamerica Corporation.

Isidor Isaac Rabi of New York, N.Y., Professor of Physics at Columbia University; recipient of the Nobel Prize for Physics; former Chairman of the President's Science Advisory Committee (Office of Defense Mobilization).

Stephen J. Wright of New York, N.Y., Executive Director, United Negro College Fund, Inc., and former President of Fisk University.

Herbert Frank York of San Diego, Calif., Professor of Physics at the University of California; former Chief Scientist of the Advanced Research Project Agency, Department of Defense; former member of the President's Science Advisory Committee; and former Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense.

## APPENDIX XII

## THE SOCIAL SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD

*Chairman*

Erwin N. Griswold, Dean of the Law School of Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

*Members*

Abram Bergson, Professor of Economics at Harvard University and Director of the Harvard University Russian Research Center, Cambridge, Mass.

Urie Bronfenbrenner, Professor of Psychology at Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.

Gordon Craig, Professor of History at Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.

W. Phillips Davison, Specialist in Public Opinion and International Communication and Visiting Professor of Sociology at the Graduate School of Journalism, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.

Alexander Heard, Chancellor of Vanderbilt University and Professor of Political Science, Nashville, Tenn.

Alice Hsieh, Specialist on China, Social Science Department, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.

Morris Janowitz, Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

Philip Mosely, Professor of International Relations and Director of the European Institute at Columbia University, New York, N.Y.

## APPENDIX XIII

## ACDA DEPOSITORY LIBRARIES

*California*

Documents Department (ACDA), Honnold Library, Claremont Colleges, Claremont, Calif. 91711.

Los Angeles Public Library, 630 West Fifth Street, Los Angeles, Calif. 90017, Publication in Social Sciences Department.

Goof Publications Services, University of California Library, 405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, Calif. 90024.

San Francisco Public Library, Civic Center, San Francisco, Calif. 94102, Publications in Reference Room.

Library—Documents Department, San Jose State College, 250 South Fourth Street, San Jose, Calif. 95114.

Librarian, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif. 94305.

Mrs. Ruth Hall, Serials Department, Law Library, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.

*Colorado*

Denver Public Library, 1357 Broadway, Denver, Colo. 80203, Publications in Sociology and Business Department.

*Connecticut*

Olin College, Library, Middletown, Conn. 06457.  
Documents Room, Yale University Library, 1603A Yale Station, New Haven, Conn. 06520.

*District of Columbia*

The Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540, Publications in Government, Publications Reading Room.  
ACDA Bibliography Section, General Reference and Bibliography Division, Reference Department, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540.

*Florida*

Librarian, Architectural and Engineering Development Information Center for Civil Defense, University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla. 32601.

*Illinois*

Chicago Public Library, 78 East Washington Street, Chicago, Ill. 60602, Publications in Social Sciences and Business Department.  
The University of Chicago Library, Serial Records Department, Chicago, Ill. 60637.

*Kentucky*

Margaret I. King Library, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Ky. 40506.  
Louisville Free Public Library, Fourth and York Streets, Louisville, Ky. 40203, Publications in Reference Collection.

*Louisiana*

New Orleans Public Library, 219 Loyola Avenue, New Orleans, La. 70140, Publications in Business and Science Department.

*Maryland*

Enoch Pratt Free Library, 400 Cathedral Street, Baltimore, Md. 20201, Publications in Civics and Sociology Department.  
Sarah D. Jones, Goucher College Library, Goucher College, Towson, Baltimore, Md. 21204.

*Massachusetts*

Boston Public Library, Copley Square, Boston, Mass. 02117, Publications in Government Documents Department.  
Harvard University, Center for International Affairs Library, 6 Divinity Avenue, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MIT Libraries, Serials and Journals 14E-210, Cambridge, Mass. 02139.

*Michigan*

Serials and Documents Section, Acquisitions Department, University of Michigan General Library, Ann Arbor, Mich. 48104.  
Detroit Public Library, 5201 Woodward Avenue, Detroit, Mich. 48202, Publications in Sociology and Economics Department.  
G. Flint Purdy, Director of Libraries, Wayne State University, Detroit, Mich. 48202.  
Miss Eleanor Boyles, Documents Librarian, Michigan State University Library, East Lansing, Mich.

*Minnesota*

Minneapolis Public Library, 300 Nicollet Avenue, Minneapolis, Minn. 55401, Publications in Document Collection.

*Missouri*

St. Louis Public Library, Olive, 13th and 14th Streets, St. Louis, Mo. 63103, Publications in Reference Department.

*New Jersey*

Documents Division, Princeton University Library, Princeton, N.J. 08504.

*New York*

Central Serial Record Department, Cornell University Library, Ithaca, N.Y. 14850.  
The New York Public Library, Fifth Avenue and 42d Street, New York, N.Y. 10017, Publications in Economics Division.

*North Carolina*

Public Documents Department, William Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, N.C. 27706.

*Ohio*

Cleveland Public Library, 325 Superior Avenue, NE., Cleveland, Ohio.  
Documents Librarian, Oberlin College Library, Oberlin, Ohio 44074.

*Oregon*

University of Oregon, Office of Federal Government Relations, Eugene, Oreg., attention Mary Jo Hall.

*Pennsylvania*

Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pa. 19010.  
Free Library of Philadelphia, Logan Square, Philadelphia, Pa. 19103, Publications in Public Documents Department.  
Serials Department, University of Pennsylvania Library, 3420 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19104.  
University of Pittsburgh Library, Documents Department 341 CL, 5th Avenue and Bigelow Boulevard, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15213.

*Rhode Island*

Miss Helen G. Kurtz, Documents Librarian, Brown University Library, Providence, R.I. 02912.

*Tennessee*

Acquisitions Department, Joint University Libraries, Nashville, Tenn. 37203.

*Texas*

University of Texas Library, Documents Acquisition, Austin, Tex. 78712.

Dallas Public Library, 1954 Commerce Street, Dallas, Tex. 75201, Publications in Documents Division.

Gifts and Exchanges, Fondren Library, Rice University, Post Office Box 1892, Houston, Tex. 77001.

*United Nations*

Library, Palais des Nations, United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland.  
United Nations Library, L-221, United Nations, New York, N.Y. 10017.

*United States Mission*

U.S. Mission to Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference, Geneva, Switzerland.

United States Mission to the United Nations Library, 799 U.N. Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017, attention: Mr. Richard F. Pederson.

*Washington*

Seattle Public Library, Fourth and Madison, Seattle, Wash. 98104, Publications in History Department.

*Wisconsin*

Milwaukee Public Library, 814 West Wisconsin Avenue, Milwaukee, Wis. 53233, Publications in Humanities Area.

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**APPENDIX XIV****OFFICIALS OF THE AGENCY**

Director: William C. Foster.

Deputy Director: Adrian S. Fisher.

Assistant Director, International Relations Bureau: Samuel DePalma.

Assistant Director, Science and Technology Bureau: Herbert Scoville, Jr.

Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau: John J. Davis, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army.

Assistant Director, Economics Bureau: Archibald S. Alexander.

General Counsel: George Bunn.

Public Affairs Adviser: Nedville E. Nordness.

Executive Director: John George Bacon.  
 Special Assistant to the Director and Executive Secretary: Clement E. Conger.

Disarmament Adviser: Lawrence D. Weiler.  
 Disarmament Adviser: Alton J. Wadman (Acting).

### Parties to the Limited Test-Ban Treaty, January 1, 1968<sup>1</sup>

Ratification, accession or notification of succession deposited by:

Afghanistan <sup>2</sup>	Honduras <sup>3</sup>	Panama <sup>6</sup>
Australia <sup>2</sup>	Hungary <sup>2</sup>	Peru <sup>7</sup>
Austria <sup>2</sup>	Iceland <sup>2</sup>	Philippines <sup>2, 11</sup>
Belgium <sup>2</sup>	India <sup>2</sup>	Poland <sup>2</sup>
Bolivia <sup>2</sup>	Indonesia <sup>2</sup>	Romania <sup>2</sup>
Brazil <sup>2</sup>	Iran <sup>2</sup>	Rwanda <sup>16</sup>
Bulgaria <sup>2</sup>	Iraq <sup>2</sup>	San Marino <sup>2</sup>
Burma <sup>2</sup>	Ireland <sup>2</sup>	Senegal <sup>2</sup>
[Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic] <sup>4</sup>	Israel <sup>2</sup>	Sierra Leone <sup>2</sup>
Canada <sup>2</sup>	Italy <sup>2</sup>	South Africa <sup>17</sup>
Central African Republic <sup>5</sup>	Ivory Coast <sup>6</sup>	Spain <sup>3</sup>
Ceylon <sup>2</sup>	Japan <sup>2</sup>	Sudan <sup>2</sup>
Chad <sup>3</sup>	Jordan <sup>2</sup>	Sweden <sup>2</sup>
Chile <sup>7</sup>	Kenya <sup>8</sup>	Switzerland <sup>2</sup>
China <sup>6</sup>	Korea <sup>2, 11</sup>	Syrian Arab Republic <sup>2</sup>
Congo (Kinshasa) <sup>8</sup>	Kuwait <sup>2, 11</sup>	Tanganyika <sup>7</sup>
Costa Rica <sup>4</sup>	Laos <sup>2</sup>	Thailand <sup>2</sup>
Cyprus <sup>2</sup>	Lebanon <sup>2</sup>	Togo <sup>6</sup>
Czechoslovakia <sup>2</sup>	Liberia <sup>2</sup>	Trinidad and Tobago <sup>2</sup>
Dahomey <sup>2</sup>	Luxembourg <sup>2</sup>	Tunisia <sup>2</sup>
Denmark <sup>2</sup>	Madagascar <sup>4</sup>	Turkey <sup>2</sup>
Dominican Republic <sup>2</sup>	Malawi <sup>12</sup>	Uganda <sup>3</sup>
Ecuador <sup>2</sup>	Malaysia <sup>2</sup>	[Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic] <sup>4</sup>
El Salvador <sup>2</sup>	Malta <sup>12</sup>	Union of Soviet Socialist Reps. <sup>2, 11</sup>
Finland <sup>3</sup>	Mauritania <sup>2</sup>	United Arab Rep. <sup>2, 11</sup>
Gabon <sup>2</sup>	Mexico <sup>2</sup>	United Kingdom <sup>2, 15</sup>
Gambia <sup>8</sup>	Mongolia <sup>13</sup>	United States <sup>2, 16</sup>
[German Democratic Republic] <sup>9</sup>	Morocco <sup>2</sup>	Venezuela <sup>2</sup>
Germany, Fed. Rep. <sup>3, 10</sup>	Nepal <sup>2</sup>	Western Samoa <sup>2</sup>
Ghana <sup>1</sup>	Netherlands <sup>2, 11</sup>	Yugoslavia <sup>2</sup>
Greece <sup>2</sup>	New Zealand <sup>2</sup>	Zambia <sup>12</sup>
Guatemala <sup>6, 11</sup>	Nicaragua <sup>2</sup>	
	Niger <sup>2</sup>	
	Nigeria <sup>15</sup>	
	Norway <sup>2</sup>	

<sup>1</sup> *Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 1968* (Department of State pub. 8355, 1968), p. 305. The treaty is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 291-293.

<sup>2</sup> Ratification deposited at Washington, London, and Moscow.

<sup>3</sup> Ratification deposited at Washington and London.

<sup>4</sup> With reference to the reported signature and deposit of ratification at Moscow by the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Government of the United States considers those two constituent republics as already covered by the signature and deposit of ratification of the treaty by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

<sup>5</sup> Accession deposited at Washington, London, and Moscow.

<sup>6</sup> Ratification deposited at Washington.

Footnotes continued on following page.

Parties to the Outer-Space Treaty, January 1, 1968<sup>1</sup>

## States which are parties:

Australia <sup>2</sup>	Hungary <sup>3</sup>	Sweden <sup>2</sup>
Bulgaria <sup>4</sup>	Japan <sup>2</sup>	[Ukrainian Soviet
[Byelorussian Soviet	Korea <sup>5</sup>	Socialist Rep.] <sup>3</sup>
Socialist Rep.] <sup>3</sup>	Mongolia <sup>6</sup>	Union of Soviet
Canada <sup>2</sup>	Morocco <sup>7</sup>	Socialist Reps. <sup>8</sup>
Czechoslovakia <sup>4</sup>	Nepal <sup>6</sup>	United Arab Rep. <sup>9</sup>
Denmark <sup>2</sup>	Niger <sup>8</sup>	United Kingdom <sup>2</sup>
Finland <sup>8</sup>	Sierra Leone <sup>2</sup>	United States <sup>2</sup>
[German Democratic		
Republic] <sup>4</sup>		

<sup>1</sup> *Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 1968* (Department of State pub. 8355, 1968), p. 331. The treaty is printed *ante*, pp. 38-43.

<sup>2</sup> Ratification deposited at Washington, London and Moscow.

<sup>3</sup> With reference to the reported signature and deposit of ratification at Moscow by the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Government of the United States considers those two constituent republics as already covered by the signature and deposit of ratification of the treaty by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

<sup>4</sup> With reference to the reported signature and deposit of ratification at Moscow by the "German Democratic Republic", attention is called to the following statement in a note of Feb. 25, 1967, from the Government of the United States to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: "Inasmuch as the Government of the United States of America does not recognize the 'German Democratic Republic' as a State or as an entity possessing national sovereignty, it does not accept notice of signature in behalf thereof. Bearing in mind, however, the purposes of the Treaty, the Government of the United States of America notes that the East German regime has signified its intention with respect to the matters dealt with in the Treaty."

<sup>5</sup> Ratification deposited at Washington.

<sup>6</sup> Ratification deposited at Moscow.

<sup>7</sup> Accession deposited at Washington and Moscow.

<sup>8</sup> Ratification deposited at Washington and London.

## Footnotes continued from previous page.

<sup>9</sup> Ratification deposited at London.

<sup>10</sup> Notification of succession deposited at Washington and London.

<sup>11</sup> With reference to the reported signature and deposit of ratification at Moscow by the "German Democratic Republic", attention is called to the following statement in a note of August 16, 1963 from the Government of the United States to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: "In as much as the Government of the United States of America does not recognize the 'German Democratic Republic' as a State or as an entity possessing national sovereignty, it does not accept notice of signature in behalf thereof. Bearing in mind, however, the purpose of the treaty, the Government of the United States of America notes that the East German regime has signified its intention with respect to the matters dealt with in the treaty". That view was reaffirmed by the Government of the United States in a note of January 24, 1964 to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in connection with reported deposit of ratification.

<sup>12</sup> Including Land Berlin.

<sup>13</sup> With a statement.

<sup>14</sup> Notification of succession deposited at Washington, London, and Moscow.

<sup>15</sup> Ratification deposited at London and Moscow.

<sup>16</sup> Including Surinam and Netherlands Antilles.

<sup>17</sup> Ratification deposited at Washington and Moscow.

<sup>18</sup> Ratification deposited at Washington; accession deposited at London.

<sup>19</sup> Accession deposited at Washington and London.

<sup>20</sup> Original Party.

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<sup>3</sup> Extract printed *ante*, pp. 611-612.

<sup>4</sup> Reprinted *ante*, pp. 283 ff.

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