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From the perspective of policy-oriented research, halfway between the world of the scientific study of politics and the world of government as an applied art, I see something happening in both worlds that gives me anxiety. Both worlds may be missing one of their most important opportunities in recent history to influence one another. And, I would contend, both now need one another.

The most creative field in the discipline of political science during the past decade and the most innovating policymaking arena in the early days of the New Frontier almost got together, almost began to speak the same language, in 1961.

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*This essay is based on a talk to the faculty seminar of the Department of Government at Wesleyan University, May 11, 1967. It benefits from the reactions of Reginald Bartholomew, Fred Greenstein, and Nelson Polsby of Wesleyan, and from criticisms by Frank Denton, Alexander George, Paul Kecskemeti, and Constantine Menges of The RAND Corporation. None of these political scientists, however, should be identified as members of the counter-revolutionary movement herein advocated.

The incoming Administration was seriously interested in the processes of social, economic, and political change in the so-called Third World. The Cold War was perceived to be shifting in locale and mode. The shift was away from competition for the control of Europe and toward competition for influence over the lesser developed nations, away from the mode of coercion through military power and toward influence through assistance in modernization. The premises underlying the new emphasis were given budgetary, institutional, and rhetorical expression in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the creation of the Agency for International Development (AID), and the Alliance for Progress.

In political science at this time the "behavioral" movement was in full swing; and there was great interest in the proliferation of new studies by scholars who had done their field work in the new nations, particularly of South Asia and Africa. This generational revolution in political science took as target not only the legal-institutional emphasis of their academic elders, but also the Anglo-American/Western European culturo-centrism which had been the normative bias of the discipline. The new nations were a fertile field in which to study the cultural and socio-psychological bases of institutions, for showing that legal-constitutional forms were results, more than causes, of behavioral variations, and for challenging thereby the presumption that Western, particularly Anglo-American, forms were the prism through which to view the political life of other countries.

But the new policy-level appreciation of third-world nationalisms, the toleration of neutralism, and the ideology of a pluralistic world -- in short, the mood of greater

cultural (or ideological) relativism -- was still an insufficient basis for rapport with the new political science.

The New Frontier's official tolerance for varied social forms existed within certain intellectual boundaries: 1) the premise that the drive on the part of the new nations for material betterment, the so-called "revolution of rising expectations," was the dominant engine of politics in the less developed countries; and 2) the premise that the grand power struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States would be won or lost ultimately on the basis of the respective capabilities of the giants to influence the modernization styles of the LDCs.

Disclaiming any desire to export our system to others -- i.e., affirming our belief in true "self-determination" -- we nevertheless designed our foreign policies toward the Third World to service two broad normative objectives: development of technologically-oriented economies patterned after the industrialized nations of the northern hemisphere; and development of national decision-making systems able to function on the basis of popular choice and voluntary compliance rather than coercion from above. We would give assistance to the less developed countries to help themselves in these directions. The policy-level assumption was that such development, with our tutelage, would serve the international power interests of the United States in that it would reduce the appeal of Soviet- or Chinese-oriented political groups in these countries, render the regimes of the LDCs less susceptible to Soviet and Chinese models for economic planning, and lessen their need to become dependent on the Communist nations for assistance.

For an influential group of development economists, these normative policy motives were perfectly acceptable as intellectual boundary conditions. These were the Kennedy advisers who formulated the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Many of these same academics and former Marshall Plan officials went on to assume key positions in the new Agency for International Development or in U.S. embassies in the countries who would be major beneficiaries of the new assistance strategy.

But the development political scientists, if we can use such a label, were, with few exceptions, not at all ready to go normative. If anything, they were now at the peak of their iconoclastic attack against what they conceived to be the normative biases of the previous generation of political scientists. For this new generation of scholars, research directed toward the formulation of policies conducive to social, economic, and political development along the lines of the models implicit in the rhetoric of our top foreign policy officials was tantamount in a restoration of the culturo-centric academic idols of the past.

Among the more radical relativists the term "development" itself came under attack as suggesting (perish the thought) "higher" and "lower" forms of social organization. Comparisons among countries were encouraged, but only so long as there was no suggestion of ranking according to criteria of social progress. One might ask what differing social structures in the various nations performed similar functions, but questions of comparative functional effectiveness were, for the most part, frowned upon. The only allowable questions with normative implications were of the "system maintenance" variety. Presumably, it was not in

violation of the relativistic code to evaluate alternative structural arrangements in terms of the likelihood, within particular cultural contexts, of their contributing to the continuation or collapse of the ability of the society's political system to function.

A strict functionalism, of course, would even have to reject the broad notion of political dysfunction. However the political function were defined -- say, as the authoritative allocation of values -- it would, over time, be performed, through might or consent, through orderly or disorderly processes, but performed it would be. The only scientific question was: how? Revealingly, most of our development political scientists resisted final immersion in such an uncompromising functionalism -- hanging on, rather, to the slim and slippery normative reed of the concept of "legitimacy."

Most of the prominent development political scientists attach significance to the extent of voluntary compliance within a society to the rules for selecting top decision-makers and voluntary compliance with their decisions. A high degree of voluntary compliance would be indicative of a widespread belief that the political system is legitimate. Some political scientists would add positive identification with rules and regime as among the hallmarks of legitimacy. Apart from the difficulties of identifying the behavioral properties of voluntary compliance and positive identification, the concept of legitimacy is weak as an indicator of development, since it would give a high ranking to many primitive societies pervaded by superstition and ritual, which, intuitively, at least, are regarded to be politically underdeveloped.

Some other general preferences can be read into the corpus of recent analysis of the politics of the LDCs. Some of the literature seems to accord a high value to widespread popular participation in the governing processes of a society. Some of it seem to be championing Western as opposed to non-Western bureaucratic styles in staffing and substantive decision-making.

More often than not those who stress popular participation -- the "input" functions -- are not the same individuals as those who stress rational governmental decision-making -- the "output" functions. Some grand reconcilers have come forward to claim that true efficiency by a government will reduce popular alienation, and that increased activity by all of a society's segments in determining government policy will produce more viable government decisions. In other terms, governmental effectiveness may be measured by the degree of civic mindedness within a society; and civic mindedness itself (or low signs of alienation) is a function of the ability of the government to achieve its purposes. At worst, this is only a definitional reconciliation of the observable tension between a government's need to be responsive to popular demands and a government's need to allocate resources in a manner that will displease some groups. At best, it is a long-term prediction that vox populi (assuming we can ascertain its mandate) will turn out to be vox Dei.

Political systems analysts who rate development according to the effective processing of demand or the viable implementation of decisions are one step removed from strict system-maintenance functionalism and, consequently, are even less convincing in their non-normative stance.

Try as they might, they are unable to conceal their preferences. They may protest that they are concerned only with assessing the effectiveness of certain social processes, and not with evaluating the substantive content of social decisions. But then, what are their criteria of effectiveness for evaluating the process performance?

Other escapes from having to admit normative criteria into the concept of political development have been sought in the notions of organizational complexity or institutionalization. Presumably a society whose various functions for its members are provided by specialized organizations with role holders performing functionally specific tasks is more developed politically than a society in which, say, economic allocations, the adjudication of legal disputes, the apprehension of criminals, and the dispensation of religious sanctions are all performed by the same elite group. Or alternatively, a nation is highly developed politically when the governmental functions (possibly including popular representation) are highly institutionalized in structures that are non-vulnerable to socio-economic stress. But if the measure of political development is the extent to which a society is organized on functionally specific lines, we might have to concede that India is more politically developed than Canada. Similarly, if the viability of political structures were the standard, the USSR would be more politically developed than France, and Portugal more than Turkey.

Obviously it is the definition of political development that conditions our comparisons; and for this reason the development political scientists have spilled a good deal of ink in definitional essays in recent years and

often have conducted their field work, or at least written it up, as partisans for or against certain definitions.

Comparison among nations along various quantitative scales have characterized the work of an influential segment of development political scientists; but the measuring here too is supposed to be neutral; and often the selection of what to measure appears to be made on grounds of accessibility of a class of phenomena to the counting method rather than on grounds of any particular theory of political development. Some of the correlation studies, such as between various economic and technological characteristics and the frequency of various types of domestic violence are suggestive of a pre-theory of sorts, and possibly even some normative preferences on the part of the researchers; but this can only be supposed by the reader of such studies. Certainly there is nothing explicit or necessarily implicit in their design to warrant an allegation that the data bankers are either for economic growth or against domestic violence.

In contrast to the don't-contaminate-me posture of many political scientists, the development economists seem to have become more and more policy oriented. This, I would contend, has increased their established preeminence in the larger field of human behavioral science.

The policy orientation provides a common discipline for a variety of economic schools. They are all asking: What socio-economic conditions within a particular country, a special class of countries, the LDCs generally, or any large social system, correlate most highly with (or produce) the greatest rate of economic growth -- defined as increasing per capita income, or by other standard indicators. There

is vigorous dispute among the development economists on the evidence and its meaning with respect to any of the social systems studied, but they do at least share a common analytical frame of reference. They also deal with a common set of public policy or planning options: various systems of taxation, export controls, capital transfers, various capital or infrastructure investments, etc.

The fact that the major questions tackled by the academic development economists seem to correspond to the policy questions asked by AID officials is not at all embarrassing to their self concept as scientists. It is not thought to degrade the objective character of their investigations.

In general, this liaison between the major assistance agency and the development economists has produced an enrichment in the premises governing our relations with the LDCs, as compared with the pre-1961 period. Now, internal socio-economic progress rather than external alignment has become the dominant operational objective of our assistance programs. My complaint is with the narrow definition of socio-economic progress that has informed our foreign assistance policy. Third World development has become synonomous with good performance on the economic indicators, and a pseudo-theory has taken hold which says that from such good economic performance will flow the other goods in which we are interested: political stability, democratization, law and order, social justice, and the avoidance of aggression against other states.

The pseudo-theory, apart from the social science questions it raises, has turned out to be bad politics. It has set up an expectation that progress on the economic

scales would be accompanied by progress on the socio-political scales. It has also set up an expectation that assistance to, or manipulation of, key economic factors of production in the LDCs would result in significant increases in per capita product. Neither the hoped-for results, nor the assumed developmental process, have met the expectations created by the attempt to translate elegant economic models into language that would be politically meaningful to the Congress. In no small part, Congressional sourness on foreign aid is the product of the fact that the abstract economic determinism in AID's public rationale just has not conformed to the reality of increased chaos in the LDCs that every Congressman sees.

The economists have a word for the reasons why increases in available investment capital do not necessarily show up in increased gross product, let alone increased per capita product. The word is "roadblocks," a catchall for obstacles to the development process, whether they be economic, cultural, intellectual, or political variables. Some of these, it is just not the business of an economist to understand or try to manipulate, and the economists will tell you so. It's just not their fault.

The growing pessimism in the Congress concerning the accomplishments of foreign assistance and the analytical passing of the buck by the development economists is beginning to produce a counterreaction on the part of a still small minority in the policy community. There is talk in the air, not heard since the heady days of the formulation of the Alliance for Progress, of "political development." The voices are few, but they are beginning to speak more clearly to the point, advancing the proposition

that the overriding objective of U.S. policy toward the Third World should be to assist the development of social systems capable of planning and managing social and economic change in response to the freely expressed will of their populations.

The notion that governmental decisions must be "legitimized" by popular authorization is, perhaps, turning out to be more than a liberal cliché. It may yet emerge as a first principle of a viable modernization policy toward the LDCs.

The subordinate analytical question -- namely, by which means can a government be made more responsive to and representative of the population of an entire society? -- was, of course, one of the major subjects of Anglo-American political theory and political science before the recent behavioral revolution. The concept of political legitimacy underlying the question does permeate with a normative bias the research designed to answer it. Furthermore, to evaluate existing models and proposed models for representative and responsive government is to focus rather heavily on institutions and constitutional forms.

However, just when such normatively defined, institutionally oriented research may be most needed by the policy community, the anti-normative non-institutional orientation among our development political scientists, indeed within the whole field of political science, seems to be the dominating approach.*

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*I am aware that I write this concurrently with re-evaluations underway in the discipline of political science concerning the analytical function of normative judgments and concerning the relative neglect of constitutional/institutional studies by American students of the new states. See especially Gabriel Almond's presidential address to the

It's time for a counterrevolution!

However, counterrevolutions fail if they only promise a return to the status quo ante. They must convincingly demonstrate that they represent progress beyond the current status quo.

If we were to write a manifesto for the counterrevolution, what would it attack? What would it affirm?

It would, first of all, attack the dangerous philosophy that government is the dependent variable, that it is the handmaiden of economics, or sociology, or social psychology, or psychoanalysis, or physiology, or phrenology, or gastroenterology.

It would turn behavioralism upside down (meaning, in effect, putting the science of politics right side up) by reaffirming, in analytical premise as well as research design, that the institutions, the structures, the constitutions, if you will, are the terms of reference; that the flow is from them to the social system -- meaning:

> We reassert the importance of the decision rules, of the formal authority structure, of the legally legitimized norms, of the officially practiced patterns of inducing popular compliance to formally rendered decisions. We reassert their importance scientifically. We treat them as the starting points of our analyses, as the independent variables. We define our scientific

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American Political Science Association, September 6, 1966, reprinted in the American Political Science Review, December 1966. Robert Dahl and his students have been for a few years already on the vanguard of the reassertion of historical-institutional data and theory in the study of American politics. See Dahl's Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1967).

> investigations as principally investigations of the effects upon society that flow from perturbations in these structures. We reassert their importance in social policy. That is, given certain social objectives, we take it upon ourselves as a prime professional obligation to ask: what perturbations in the political/governmental/constitutional structures are most conducive to the attainment of these objectives?

Secondly, the manifesto would affirm the primacy of certain minimum social objectives which the political system ought to serve -- namely:

> The protection of individual life, possessions, and freedom of activity on the basis of the standard of justice that all men are entitled to equal protection and non-discriminatory treatment.
>
> The provision for society-wide allocation decisions on the basis of the uncoerced choice of the majority of the adult population.
>
> A minimization of physical coercion, or other personality-harming means of resolving interpersonal or intergroup conflict, including conflict between officials and the citizens of society.

We can affirm these objectives without ignoring the considerable obstacles to their attainment in most of the LDCs. But the fact that we can now talk of obstacles to political development is an improvement. These obstacles can serve as targets for our development-assistance strategies. Nor does the affirmation of such political objectives ignore the other side of development -- economic growth -- and the fact that the requirements of political development may sometimes conflict with the requirements of economic development. It only makes the real policy dilemmas more explicit.

What would this mean for the character of the field of development political science? It would not mean the discarding of all the valuable tools of precision borrowed from the other social sciences. In investigating the social effects of changes in governmental structure we would have no reason not to define our hypotheses operationally -- so they could be confirmed or disconfirmed by hard data. There would be no reason to close down all of our data banks or to fire the tellers. Polling of attitudes, statistical analyses of the content of messages, Rorschach tests, electroencephalograms, all of the accoutrements of the science of human behavior would still be useful. Behavioral scientists, your investments of time and money in developing these skills will not have been wasted.

On the other hand, to the degree that the curriculum for political science training has neglected history, constitutional law, the study of federalism, and the formal legally sanctioned systems by which society's rules and decisions are made -- i.e., what some behavioralists call the structures for conversion of social inputs into policy outputs -- we may have to retool.

Moreover, if we have neglected that branch of philosophy called ethics, we will be unable to comment on the central scientific questions (such as the requisites and the correlates of political development) and the most pertinent policy questions (such as what political structures ought to be favored in various countries).

The determination of the costs and benefits of alternative development options presumes a valuation of anticipated social effects. If this valuation of social effects is to be made on the basis of some set of preferences for

political system design and output, such as those stated above, it will be necessary to deal with the problem of competing social values in a social system. The requirements for freedom, majority rule, and non-coercive behavior may at times conflict, and it will be necessary to determine the priorities and weights to be given to each, through precise definition of their properties in specific situations and by the analysis of alternative tradeoffs among these properties in situational terms.

Certain "great issues" of public policy will again begin to occupy a central place in the literature, although they may be phased differently, reflecting the enrichment of the vocabulary of political science during the last decade. For example, there should be a lot of research and writing on:

- the comparative advantages of various institutional arrangements for selecting and replacing top executive authorities of a political system.
- the most effective constitutional designs for allocating and separating the responsibilities and powers of rule making and rule implementation among central and local official structures.
- the most effective scope of official governmental power over a society's human and material investment and utilization patterns.
- the types and kinds of decisions that ought to be subject to popular determinations -- including the desirability of various kinds of referenda and popular initiative petitions,

and what administrative and judicial roles should be exempted from popular selection procedures.

The foreign assistance agencies need to be able to plan and program for this "political" side of the modernization process when decisions from among alternative foreign assistance programs and projects are called for. The White House and the Congress have indicated to AID that they are not satisfied with program evaluations stated almost exclusively in terms of economic indicators of development. And they are beginning to call for political indicators more meaningful than the way a country votes in the United Nations on East-West issues or its formal alliance memberships.

The profession of political science will be expected to render advice to the policymaker on the essential political questions of constitutionalism, regime, the representative system, center-local relationships, civil liberties. It is time we refurbished our competence.

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