

TECHNICAL REPORT 3485

==

RESPONSE OF EXPLOSIVE TO FRAGMENT IMPACT

ΒY

RICHARD M. RINDNER

DECEMBER 1966

AMMUNITION ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE PICATINNY ARSENAL DOVER, NEW JERSEY

I

### TABLE OF CONTENTS

...

---- -

·\_\_ ...

-

Se	ection	Page
	SUMMARY	1
	RESPONSE OF EXPLOSIVE TO FRAGMENT IMPACT	3
	REFERENCES	13
	APPENDIX	
	A. Figures	15
	TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION	33
	ABSTRACT DATA	35

(i)

- --

### SUMMARY

This phase of the Safety Design Criteria Program conducted by the Ammunition Engineering Directorate's Process Engineering Laboratory deals with the analytical and experimental determination of the sensitivity of high explosives and high energy propellants to impact by primary and secondary fragments.

This material was the subject of a presentation made at the New York Academy of Sciences "Conference on Prevention of and Protection Against Accidental Explosion of Munitions, Fuels and other Hazardous Mixtures" held in New York City 10-13 October 1966.

1

Ł

### RESPONSE OF EXPLOSIVE TO FRAGMENT IMPACT

This phase of the overall Safety Design Criteria Program conducted by Picatinny Arsenal deals with the analytical and experimental determination of the sensitivity of high explosives and high energy propellants to impact by primary and secondary fragments.

By definition, primary fragments are those fragments which result from break-up of explosive casing at detonation. Usually these fragments are characterized by having high velocity (in the order of several thousands fps) and being comparatively small in size.

The analytical work performed at Picatinny Arsenal resulted in the establishment of:

- 1. A method of predicting the vulnerability to high order detonation of an explosive system in terms of geometry of the system and explosive properties.
- 2. A method for calculation of safe distances for any assumed degree of risk.

These methods are based on a correlation of various relationships developed by British and American investigators as a result of theoretical studies, confirmatory tests and a tual experience (Reference 1 and 2).

The general relationships are in Figure 1. These equations permit prediction of the gross mass detonability characteristics of explosive systems. Shown are the factors which must be considered for any explosive system in either donor or acceptor role. Values of the output constant (E') Equation (1) for several explosives are in Reference 3. For other explosives the values (E') could be established experimentally by conducting small-scale tests in which cased samples of various explosiveto-casing (E/C) ratios are detonated and corresponding fragment velocities measured. The output constant is then obtained from a plot of (Vo) vs. (E/C) in accordance with Equation (1).

Equation (2) was developed for calculation of the number of fragments in any particular weight range produced by detonation of a cased charge (Reference 3).

A relationship between fragment weight, the casing thickness and boundary velocity (the minimum velocity at which a fragment of a given mass and acceptor casing thickness will cause detonation for a given explosive) is shown in Equation (3). Sensitivity constant (K<sub>f</sub>) included in this equation must be established for the acceptor explosive. Values of this constant are available for some well-known explosives such as TNT and Composition B (Reference 4). For other explosives this constant could be established from a plot of V<sub>b</sub> v<sub>s</sub>  $e^{5.37ta/m 1/3}$  in accordance with Equation (3).

Once the sensitivity of an explosive to fragment impact is established, the next step is the establishment of relationships for calculation of safe distance in terms c' probability of high order detonation occurrence or risk of propagation of detonation by fragment impact at these distances. For the sake of simplicity and convenience, a graphical representation of these relationships is in Figures 2-5.

The plot in Figure 2 (based on Equation (4)) relates fragment striking velocity (Vs) with fragment mass at any distance from the detonation source (d) for a single value of initial velocity (Vo). Constant (k) which is a part of Equation (4) is a function of the presented area to fragment mass ratio, density of air and air drag coefficient (Reference 5 and 6). The plot shown in Figure 3 (for Composition B) -- a typical representation of Equation (3) -relates the boundary velocity (Vb) with fragment mass (m) and acceptor casing thickness (ta).

When the plots from Figure 2 and 3 are combined as in Figure 4, a relationship is obtained for the striking velocity (or boundary velocity) of a fragment with fragment mass at various distances (d) and acceptor casing thicknesses (ta). If boundary velocity of a fragment is now equated to its striking velocity, it becomes possible to find the minimum effective mass of a fragment produced by the donor explosive causing a high order detonation in the acceptor under the prevailing conditions. The number of such effective fragments produced at any distance from the donor charge can then be calculated from Equation (2) in Figure 1.

As expressed by Equation (5), Figure 5 is a plot relating the probability of detonation occurrence as a function of distance (between donor and acceptor charges) or shielding.

This plot relates the distance between the donor and acceptor charges (d), shielding (ta) and probability of high order detonation occurrence (E). The zero probability curve (Po) indicates a relationship between the distance (d) and shielding (ta) beyond which no high order detonation is possible.

The higher the probability level tolerated, the lower the distance/shielding combination necessary. This relationship permits a prediction of the necessary separation or shielding between two explosive systems at any degree of probability of high order detonation occurrence. To compose such a relationship for a specific situation all that is necessary is knowledge of the geometry of the system and the explosive properties relating the sensitivity and output.

> A limited test program for experimental determination of the boundary velocities for bare pentolite and cyclotol charges was conducted at the A.D. Little Test Facility in Hinsdale, New Hampshire (Reference 7).

The experimental work in this program utilized an explosive technique for projecting rectangular fragment against explosive charges. Non-spinning rectangular fragments of 0.2 to 3.0 ozs. were projected at the acceptor charges at velocities both above and below required for detonation. Fragment velocities were measured by screens and high-speed photography.

The explosive launching technique consists of the placement of a fragment, its metallic surround and an attenuating or buffer sheet of lucite on the forward flat face of cylindrical explosive donor. The lucite spacer or buffer plate provides the means for controlling the launch velocity. The fragment is surrounded by four pieces of steel of equal thickness that prevent deformation at the edges of the fragment during the early stages of launch (Figure 6).

The cylindrical charge is initiated on the rear flat face of the explosive donor. On detonation, the fragment is propelled along predictable path and impacts the target (acceptor charge) at a distance of about six feet. The velocity of the impacting fragments is measured by accurately positioned timing sensors and in most cases confirmed by high-speed photographs of its flight. Fragment velocity is controlled by the size and composition of the donor charge and the buffer plate thickness. The maximum velocities attained in these tests with fragments intact were 5, 200, 3, 500 and 2, 500 fps for 0.2, 0.9 and 2.85 oz. fragments, respectively.

. .. ..

\_ .

The instrumentation consisted of time-measuring devices (recorded on Model 7260 Beckman Time Interval Meters) and Dynafax Drum Cameras with a framing rate to 25,000 frames per second which photographed the fragment in flight. A typical film series is in Figure 7. The timing devices were an ionization probe taped to the donor charge and a pair of thin aluminum screens separated by a thin piece of polyethylene film. Two of these screens -- one located on the forward face of the acceptor charge and the other located at a specified distance above the acceptor charge -- were used in most firings. Fragment travel time between each of these sensors was recorded in microseconds. The Dynafax camera (located about 20 feet from the flight path) viewed about the last four feet of travel including target impact. Figure 8 shows schematically the camera layout.

The fragment aiming procedure is depicted in Figure 9 which assured that the fragment would impact the center of the acceptor charge. The donor charge assembly was placed at the top of the seven-foot-high stand and the acceptor charge was centered vertically below. The telescope and 45° angle mirror assembly were then located with the mirror over the desired impact point and the brass plate perpendicular to the axis of the acceptor charge. While sighting through the scope, the donor charge assembly was positioned so that the fragment could be clearly seen. Another mirror was then placed on the fragment (held by a magnet) parallel to the surface of the fragment. While sighting through the scope, the donor charge was shimmed until the reflected image of the telescope end was centered in the eyepiece.

6

It was demonstrated in subsequent tests that this aiming procedure is reliable and can be car and out in a relatively short time. Once the aiming was compared, the mirror and scope assembly were removed, velocity screens located and all final electrical connections made, the test set-up was ready to fire. Figure 10 shows the test set-up assembly before firing.

Results of the firings against the bare cyclotol and pentolite charges are presented graphically in Figures 11 and 12. Predicted boundary velocity curves developed analytically (and discussed previously) also are shown for both explosives.

in general, the data conforms to relationships developed analytically for small and intermediate fragments while the detonation velocity for heavy fragments fired into the bare cyclotol charges was higher than predicted. This would indicate that the massvelocity relationship may have to be adjusted for a more accurate prediction of sensitivity to impact by heavy fragments. However, the current predicted values for the boundary velocity tend to be conservative and hence are satisfactory for design purposes where safety is the prime consideration.

More tests must be conducted to establish a definite trend with increase in fragment size as well as to investigate the effect of other variables (such as degree of casing, sensitivity of explosives) on the detonation velocity.

As noted, the large-scale cubicle tests conducted under the auspices of the Armed Services Explosive Safety Board clearly indicate -- after careful investigation of the high speed film records -- that the secondary fragments are the main cause of propagation of explosion into the acceptor charge (Reference 8). By definition, secondary fragments are those fragments other than primary fragments which result from the detonation of explosive charges, such as wall break-up, pieces of equipment, etc. These secondary fragments are usually characterized by having lower velocity than the primary fragments (seldom exceeding 1,000 fps) and being fairly large.

Since there was no analytical data on the quantitative behavior of these fragments, an extensive experimental program was initiated to determine threshold velocity of fragment (or fragments) that would cause detonation in the explosive charge.

Two experimental methods were chosen among several investigated. The first method consisted of a rocket-powered sled (track method) designed to throw a collection of concrete and aggregate fragments (usually produced from concrete wall break-up caused by a detonation) at an explosive charge at velocities within the range of those occurring in full-scale cubicle tests (Reference 9 and 10).

The main feature of the rocket-powered sled was a test vehicle and fragment container attached to the top of the motor (Figure 13). Water-breaking action was supplied by partially filled polyethylene water bags fastened to the last 10 to 15 feet of track. Sled deceleration was accomplished when the wedge on the front of the sled hit the water-filled bags fastened to the track. A standard two-inch steel deflector plate placed six feet from the end of the track at a  $5^{\circ}$  angle from the track center line was used to deflect the test vehicle to keep it from striking the target (Figure 14). Fragment specimens used weighed a total of about 70 lbs. and contained about 50 lbs. of broken-up concrete and 20 lbs of aggregate.

The target, placed on a wooden stand about 30 feet from the track, consisted of 100 lbs. Composition B charge in light aluminum casing.

The operation of the test vehicle consisted of acceleration of the rocket-propelled vehicle to a predicted velocity followed by release of the fragments through the frangible cover of the container by water-brake deceleration of the vehicle. The velocity of the vehicle was controlled by the number of rocket motors used by changing the distance of the ignition point from the point of water-brake activation and by varying the weight of the sled. The track method -- although reliable for generating and measuring fragment velocities -- proved to be expensive. Its velocity range could be extended above 1,000 fps but as the test results indicated (at least for Composition B) this was unnecessary in most cases.

The second method, the ground mortar facility, was developed to provide a less expensive and less complex test set-up to produce a large quantity of fragment data (Reference 11).

<u>المتحديث فيرون بالمحمد المحمد الم</u>

ŧ. .

The fragment mortar was a muzzle loading shotgun developed by the U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California, and manufactured from standard thick-walled seamless steel tubing (Figure 15). A thick breech plate was welded to the tube at the breech sealing that end. A saucer-shaped steel recoil plate was fastened near the muzzle to transfer recoil energy to the ground. Running down the length of the tube was an air hose that ported air (or nitrogen) through the plate to the bottom side of a breech cup. The elevator mechanism or breech cup was a heavy steel cup containing propellant. It is raised by air pressure for loading and then lowered into firing position by bleeding air from under it. The fast-burning 4.2-inch mortar shell double-base propellant was stocked in 20-sheet packs and was suited for variation of loading to provide desired velocities. The follower and sabot were designed to ride down on top of the elevator. The follower, an inverted cup-shaped unitmade of vermiculite-filled resin-epoxy for optimum strength and flexibility, carried the ignition charge. The flexible skirt of the cup acted as a chamber sealant at the instant of propellant ignition. The sabot was a bucket made of cardboard or polyurethane foam and contained the payload (rubble) that was propelled from the mortar (Figure 16). After the propellant, follower and sabot were lowered to the bottom of the mercar tube, firing was initiated from a remote firing point by an electrical squib in the ignition charge.

The fragments used in this test series, in addition to the 70 lbs. rubble used in the track tests, consisted of dry plaster sand and gravel (aggregate) of the same weight. This was done to compare the detonation velocities using different fragments against identical explosive charges.

The test procedure consisted of suspending the acceptor charge above the mortar muzzle and firing the fragment at selected velocities vertically at the charge by varying the amount of the propellant in the steel cup at the breach end of mortar (Figure 17).

To measure fragment velocities (in both the track and ground mortar method) high-speed cameras as well as carbon rods were used. Using the camera technique, velocity measurements were made by counts of time of frames and reference distances of mass travel.

12 12 2

> The carbon rod technique used two sets of carbon rods placed five feet apart above the muzzle of the ground mortar. The projected fragment broke both sets of carbon rods giving a measurement of its velocity (Figure 18).

For the track method, the rods were installed across the track 30 feet apart. A bolt projecting down from the center of water-brake edge on the steel broke the rods when the sled passed. The pulse was then transmitted to the telemetering station and recorded on calibration tape -providing a record of sled travel time between the two points.

The two systems (camera and rod technique) provided a check and back-up for each other.

More than 100 tests were performed using both methods. All track tests were conducted using 70 lbs. concrete rubble as an impacting fragment. The ground mortar, in addition to the 70 lbs. rubble, used 70 lbs. of gravel (concrete aggregate), 70 lbs. dry plaster sand and 35 lbs. rubble. The fragment velocities chosen for investigation corresponded to those that were recorded during the destruction of walls in full-scale propagation tests.

A tabulation of selected test results is in Table 1. The fragment velocities indicate the highest velocities at which detonation did not occur and the lowest velocities at which detonation occurred for both track and ground mortar tests and for different types of fragments. In the tests conducted by track method, the spread amounted to only 44 fps (Table1). In the tests conducted with the ground mortar the spread between the highest and lowest velocities of occurrence and nonoccurrence of detonation was appreciably greater. The difference in this spread can be attributed to such factors as greater variety of acceptor types used, larger number of tests conducted by ground mortar, different methods of firing fragment. Included in the table are selected velocities from

### TABLE 1

### SELECTED TEST RESULTS

Method of				
	r ragmen	nt Velocities	Fragment	Accentor
Testing	Carbon Rod	Fastax Camera		Dozotion
			2462	DEACTUR
Track				
47011	1	416	170 lh ruhhle	>
I Track		078		<
		400	70 lb. rubble	0
Uround Mortar	462	401	70 lb ""bbl"	•
Ground Mortar	620			Y
		507	70 lb. rubble	0
Uround Mortar	1 7	913		• •
Ground Mortar	381	001	ULAVE!	×
	100	077	Sand	×
Cround Mortar	433	406	Cand	; (
Ground Mortar	280	30.2		C
		206	Job ID. Gravel	0
T ALL DCALE LESIS	1	430	Concrete	\$
Full Scale Tests	:	C		×
	1	007	Concrete	0

the film records of large-scale cubicle tests for the purpose of comparing the fragment detonation velocities recorded in large-scale tests. The lowest recorded velocity in those tests was 430 fps which compares favorably with the threshold velocities in the track and ground mortar tests.

The tests to date positively point to secondary fragments as the main cause of detonation propagation. The threshold detonation velocity for conditions investigated was approximately 400 fps. Because of insufficient number of rounds fired, the effect of varying fragment mass and shape on threshold detonation velocity has not yet been established.

Tests conducted to date have been limited in scope since their purpose was to develop a useful and inexpensive method of firing fragments at velocities that could cause detonation in the acceptor and to establish the threshold detonation velocity for standard explosive for both primary and secondary fragments. This has been to a large extent accomplished.

An extensive experimental program for a quantitative determination of various parameters (such as acceptor sensitivity, casing and size, rigidity of support, fragment size and shape) on the threshold detonation velocity will be the next step in our overall program of establishment of Safety Design Criteria for storage and processing of explosive materials.

### REFERENCES

- R.M. Rindner, Establishment of Safety Design Criteria for Use in Engineering of Explosive Facilities and Operations, Report No. 2, Detonation by Fragment Impact, Applications Engineering Laboratory Report DB-6-59, Picatinny Arsenal, 1959.
- R.M. Rindner, S. Wachtell, Establishment of Safety Design Criteria for Use in Engineering of Explosive Facilities and Operations, Report No. 3, Safe Distances and Shielding for Prevention of Propagation of Detonation by Fragment Impact, Applications Engineering Laboratory Report DB-6-60, Picatinny Arsenal, 1960.
- 3. R.I. Mott, <u>A Theory of Fragmentation</u>, Army Operational Research Group Memo 113-AC-6427, Great Britain, 1943.
- 4. A.V. Feist, The Sensitivity of High Explosives to Attack by Steel Fragments, AED Technical Note T/2/L9/AVF, Great Britain,
- 5. Explosion Effects Data Sheets, U.S. Naval Ordnance Laboratory Report 2986, White Oak, Silver Spring., Maryland, 1955.
- 6. L.H. Thomas, Computing the Effects of Distance on Damage by Fragments, Ballistics Research Laboratories Report 468, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, 1946.
- D.G. McLean, D.S. Allan, <u>Ar Experimental Program to</u> Determine the Sensitivity of Explosive Materials to Impact by Regular Fragments, Contract DA-19-020-ORD-5617, A.D. Little Co. Hinsdale, New Hampshire, 1965.
- 8. R.M. Rindner et al, Summary Armed Services Explosives Safety Board Dividing Wall Cubicle Tests, April 1960-1962, Picatinny Arsenal Technical Report 3292, October 1965.
- L. M. Patton, Investigation of Explosive Sensitivity to Multiple Fragment Impact, (Track Tests E-7101), U. S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California, 1962.

- L. M. Patton, <u>Investigation of Explosives Sensitivity to</u> <u>Multiple Fragment Impact</u>, (Track Tests 7380), U. S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California, 1963.
- C. M. Reinholt, <u>Dividing Wall Acceptor Sensitivity Tests</u>, (IDP 1975), U. S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California, 1963

. . . . .

### APPENDIX

I

\_ . \_

.

-

. .

.

-

.

APPENDIX A

Figures







•••



Figure 3. Boundary Velocity as a Function of Fragment Weight and Acceptor Shielding for 50/40 Cyclotol.





والمتكفر وراوريك

. \_....

. . . . . .

Figure 5. Probability of Detonation Occurrance as a Function of Distance and Shielding for 4.5 in Rocket Head M32.



### FIGURE 6 FRAGMENT ARRANGEMENT WITH METAL SURROUND

1.41.444



# FIGURE 7 - HIGH SFEED PHOTOGRAPH FRAGMENT IN FLIGHT

21 - 21





### FIGURE 9 SCHEMATIC: FRAGMENT AIMING TECHNIQUE

23

· 2. · 2 :=







FIGURE 12 - BOUNDARY VELOCITY CURVE OF CYCLOTOL. SHOWING FRAGMENT IMPACT VELOCITY VERSUS FRAGMENT WEIGHT





## AND FIGURE 14 - TEST SET UP DETAILS (WATER BRAKE, DEFLECTOR FLATE, ACCEPTOR-CHARGE TARGET)



and a second second second second

. - -

. . . . . . . . . . .

1

Ξ.

FIGURE 15 - GROUND MORTAR DEVICE ASSEMBLY







FIGURE 18 - GROUND MORTAR TEST SET UP WITH CARBON RODS IN POSITION

(Security classification of fitts - hade of share	UMENT CONTROL DATA - RED				
Picatinny Arsenal	UNCLASSIFIED				
Dover, New Jersey	26 GROUP				
RESPONSE OF EXPLOSE	ZE TO FRAGMENT IMPACT				
DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Prope of report and inclus	(m detee)				
RINDNER, Richard M.					
DECEMBER 1966	74. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 74. NO. OF REFS 36 11				
CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	Se. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)				
PROJECT NO.	Technical Report 3485				
	96. OTHER REPORT NO(5) (Any other numbers that may be east this report)				
Distribution of this document SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES	18 unlimited.				
Distribution of this document SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES	is unlimited. 12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY Picatinny Arsenal U. S. Army Munitions Command Dover, New Jersey				
Distribution of this document SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ABSTRACT This phase of the Safet Ammunition Engineering I deals with the analytical a of high explosives and high and secondary fragments. This material was the	is unlimited.				
Distribution of this document SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ASSTRACT This phase of the Safet Ammunition Engineering I deals with the analytical a of high explosives and high and secondary fragments. This material was the York Academy of Sciences Against Accidential Exploi Mixtures held in New York	is unlimited.				

• •

. . . . .

÷

### UNCLASSIFIED

14.	KEY WORDS	LINK A		LINKB		LINKC		
		ROLE	τ₩	ROLE	WT	ROLE	Ŵ Ť	
	Safety Design Criteria Program Fragment Impact Study Sensitivity of high explosive and high en Primary fragment Secondary fragment New York Academy of Science Explosive Prevention and Protection Se	ergy ( ninar	ropel	lants				
	INSTRUCTIONS	,						

. . . . . . . . .

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY: Enter the name and address of the contractor, subcontractor, grantee, Department of Defense activity or other organization (corporate author) issuing the report.

2e. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: Enter the overall security classification of the report. Indicate whether "Restricted Data" is included. Marking is to be in accordance with appropriate security regulations.

25. GROUP: Automatic downgrading is specified in DoD Directive \$200.10 and Armed Forces Industrial Manual. Enter the group number. Also, when applicable, show that optional markings have been used for Group 3 and Group 4 as authorized.

3. REPORT TITLE: Enter the complete report title in all capital letters. Titles in all cases should be unclassified. If a meaningful title cannot be selected without classification, show title classification in all capitals in parenthesis immediately following the title.

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES: If appropriate, enter the type of report, e.g., interim, progress, summary, annual, or final. Give the inclusive dates when a specific reporting period is covered.

5. AUTHOR(S): Enter the name(s) of author(s) as shown on or in the report. Enter last name, first name, middle initial. If military, show rank and branch of service. The name of the principal author is an absolute minimum requirement.

6. REPORT DATE: Enter the date of the report as day, month, year, or month, year. If more than one date appears on the report, use date of publication.

7e. TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES: The total page count should follow normal pagination procedures, i.e., enter the number of pages containing information.

75. NUMBER OF REFERENCES: Enter the total number of references cited in the report.

8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER: If appropriate, enter the applicable number of the contract of grant under which the report was written.

8b, 8c, 6c 8d. PROJECT NUMBER: Enter the appropriate military department identification, such as project number, subproject number, system numbers, task number, etc.

9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S): Enter the official report number by which the document will be identified and controlled by the originating activity. This number must be unque to this report.

9b. OTHER REPORT NUMBER(S): If the report has been assigned any other report numbers (either by the originator or by the sponsor), also enter this number(s).

10. AVAILABILITY/LIMITATION NOTICES: Enter any limitations on further dissemination of the report. other than those imposed by security classification, using standard statements such as:

(1) "Qualified requesters may obtain copies of this report from DDC."

... . ..

.....

- (2) "Foreign announcement and dissemination of this report by DDC is not authorized."
- (3) "U. S. Government agencies may obtain copies of this report directly from DDC. Other qualified DDC users shall request through
- (4) "U. S. military agencies may obtain copies of this report directly from DDC. Other qualified users shall request through
- (5) "All distribution of this report is controlled. Qualified DDC users shall request through

. ...

If the report has been furnished to the Office of Technical Services, Department of Commerce, for sale to the public, indicate this fact and enter the price, if known.

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES: Use for additional explanatory notes.

12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY: Enter the name of the departmental project office or laboratory sponsoring (paying for) the research and development. Include address.

13. ABSTRACT: Enter an abstract giving a brief and factual summary of the document indicative of the report, even though it may also appear elsewhere in the body of the technical report. If additional space is required, a continuation sheet shall be attached.

It is highly desirable that the abstract of classified reports be unclassified. Each paragraph of the abstract shall end with an indication of the military security classification of the information in the paragraph, represented as (TS), (S), (C), or (U).

There is no limitation on the length of the abstract. However, the suggested length is from 150 to 225 words.

14. KEY WORDS: Key words are technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a report and may be used as index entries for cataloging the report. Key words must be selected so that no security classification is required. Idenfiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location, may be used as key words but will be followed by an indication of technical context. The assignment of links, rules, and weights is optional.

> UNCLASSIFIED Security Classification