

Prepared by

ABT ASSOCIATES INC. 14 Concord Lane Cambridge, Massachusette



A Study For

THE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGONCY The Pentagon Washington, D.C.

Contract Number DA-49-083 OSA-3 52 Project AGILE ARPA Order Number 681

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October, 1966

COCON-COUNTERCONSPIRACY

(POLITICA)

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SIMULATION OF INTERNAL NATIONAL CONFLICT UNDER REVOLUTIONARY CONFLICT CONDITIONS

APPENDICES

VOLUME II

Prepared by

ABT ASSOCIATES INC. 14 Concord Lane Cambridge, Massachusetts

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THE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY The Pentagon Washington, D.C.

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COCON-COUNTERCONSPIRACY (POLITICA)

Page

Table of Contents

APPENDIX I	INERTIA	
	Personality Profiles Summary of Economic Transactions	I-1 I-54
APPENDIX II	PATRIA	
	Personality Profiles Summary of Economic Transactions	II-1 II-38
APPENDIX III -	- GRENADILLA	
	Personality Profiles Summary of Economic Transactions	III- 1 III- 37
	CURVEN OF CRIMOUE RECEONCES	

APPENDIX IV -- SURVEY OF CRITIQUE RESPONSES

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APPENDIX I

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INERTIA PLAYER MATERIALS

Personality Profiles Summary of Economic Transaction Records

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COLUMN STATE

"EL CAUDILLO" -- FIELD MARSHALL DON ERNESTO RODOLFO SIGISMUNDO ANDRES DE SUBALLA Y LOS RIOS

Since 1939 you have been the Supreme and Benevolent Military Leader (read dictator) of the Inertian nation. You are a shrewd judge of character and, in the words of the American Ambassador, "A damn good fellow." During the early period of your reign you ruthlessly eradicated all who opposed you; and, while your present position is so secure that you have become more moderate (much in the tradition of Brazil's Getulio Vargas, at whose funeral you were a pall-bearer), you would still take swift and permanent action against any person or organization you perceived to be a real threat to your position.

The country runs very smoothly in the capable hands of Generals Moreno, Medina and Navarro who work well together yet are of sufficiently diverse character to preclude their ever combining against you. You consciously balance the three of them off and scrupulously avoid showing any favoritism.

You delight in projecting a father-like image, and it is not unusual for the newspapers to carry a front page picture of you signing the papers granting a poor peasant woman a pension for the rest of her life after the tragic death of her son in a machete fight. The exception to your benevolent image lies in your implacable hatred of the Sarakhanese peasantry. This hatred is rooted in unpleasant memories of childhood.

You have amassed an enormous fortune some of which you keep in Swiss banks although you don't feel you will ever have to use it. You even feel sufficiently confident to allow the Americans to persuade you to let Giannelli, the RDP leader, return on parole. You have ordered F.A.N.G. to keep Giannelli under surveillance, but not to move against him without ironclad evidence of political agitation. At the same time, you resent American pressures on Giannelli's behalf--you are not one to view opposition kindly. Meanwhile, General Navarro of F.A.N.G. has reported that the Communist Saladio might indeed be back in the country. (Your suggestions to President Johnson about the FLN were groundless when made.) You have ordered Navarro to find Saladio at once, if not before. If you could produce Saladio, or even prove the existence of a clandestine FLN, American pressures on you for democratic gestures might very well ease.

You have a power rating of 500, much superior to that of any individual or group which might challenge you--though challenge of any major proportion is highly unlikely. Your power, then, is unlimited for all practical purposes.

Power Rating: 500

MAJOR-GENERAL MORENO -- ARMY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

As one of the three generals directly under Suballa, you have spent almost your entire military career under the prevailing stability and are very thankful for it. As Army Commander-in-Chief for the past thirty years, there has been absolutely nothing to challenge whatever training and talents you have. Hence, for relaxation (and to keep in shape) you have taken to playing polo every afternoon, and there are standing orders that nothing less than a revolution should disturb your game.

Your main ambition for the past two years has been to replace General Medina when he retires as chief military governor as you feel he really has the softest job. You would not be greatly opposed to hastening his departure if it did not upset the stability of the regime. Your primary fear is that General Navarro, the cleverest man in the capitol, will use his secret police to uncover the problems which you know exist in the army. On occasion you have attempted to uncover his agents, and you would not hesitate to do so again. Nonetheless, you would never do anything against the wishes of Field Marshal Suballa to whom you are extremely loyal.

You permit your three subordinates to handle their commands as they wish, but this is no challenge to your authority as all three men were selected for their unfailing lack of initiative and unswerving loyalty to El Caudillo, and, of course, to yourself.

Power Rating: 70

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BRIGADIER-GENERAL NAVARRO

You are the head of F. A. N. G., the dreaded secret police, much feared in Inertia. You are completely loyal to Field Marshall Suballa who has always given you a free hand to set up your informant network. You consider the army chief, Major-General Mareno, a polo-playing bonehead with no appreciation of tactics which do not involve several hundred men and a howitzer. He despises you equally and never tires of contrasting the simple honest soldier that he perceives himself to be with your devious Machiavellian image. You are not much more enthusiastic about Brig. Gen. Manuel Mediva who is in charge of the administrative side but have more respect for his intelligence.

You have hand-picked agents in each province--Madame Dulcinea Cervantes in Santa Filomena, Pancho Vargas in Marinara and Choi Oi Sao in Lucretia. You do not want any of these three to find out that the others are also working for you as you prefer that they have no opportunity to ally against you. You have a hold over all three of them. Senora Cervantes has a more-than-professional interest in you personally; Pancho Vargas is indebted to you for your longstanding but clandestine support for his artistic endeavors; and Choi Oi Sao owes his position as neo-Delphic oracle to you in that the whole idea of Mithraism was yours, designed to give the Sarakhanese an other-worldly outlet for their potentially explosive frustrations. These agents would be very difficult to replace, so you must be prepared to take care not to expose them. They each know there must be other agents working for you, but each are prima donna types who prefer to believe that they are, if not the only agent, quite the most important.

The only threat to your preeminent and comfortable position lies in the overthrow of the system. El Caudillo is too well aware of your abilities to let you go because of complaints from Moreno or Medina. Any democratic or popular parties like the RDP or the FLN are potentially dangerous for you, and you are particularly concerned to find Saladio who, you are informed by a foreign source, has actually retired to the country. You have also reason to believe that the FLN have some kind of party structure already set up and you would dearly love to find their agents. You are not so concerned about the RDP but are concerned to prevent them getting any kind of popular support.

You do not like the Americans, particularly the military attache, and you are aware that they don't like you, your methods and your organization. You are quite unscrupulous and will use any means to gain your ends. You are loyal only to El Caudillo and yourself.

Power Rating: 80

BRIGADIER-GENERAL MEDINA

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You are the head of the administrative side of the government, which you run through three military governors, Lt. Col. Torremolinos in Santa Filomena, Lt. Col. Albeniz in Mari nara and Lt. Col. Sanza in Lucretia province. All three are able officers. You are conscientious and an excellent administrator, as Suballa well knew when he appointed you. You are utterly loyal to El Caudillo whom you greatly admire.

You regard Moreno, the military commander, as idle, inefficient and unintelligent and feel that anyone who has time to play polo every afternoon cannot be doing a good job. At the same time you envy him his troops--you have hardly any of your own. You dislike but rather admire Brig. Gen. Navarro, the head of the secret police, and would be very interested to know who his agents are, something you have never managed to discover.

You genuinely feel that the democratic method is an inefficient way to run a country. You feel that Giannelli should not have been allowed back into the country and that the U.S.A. should not be allowed to influence your country's decisions. You are particularly keen to find Saladio or any of the FLN group and crush them once and for all before the Communist menace gets a chance to grow.

You get on well with the American contingent although you resent their interference about Giannelli. You have a good relationship with Colonel Y. F. Bill, the military attache who has expressed admiration for the efficiency of your administration.

All your three administratives are loyal to you but Sanza has told you that he disagrees with the government policy towards the Sarakhanese minority in Lucretia. Government policy, formulated by El Caudillo is that the Sarakhanese should be kept in a ghetto-type existence and given no political or other rights. You told Sanza at the time that government policy was government policy. He accepted this but he might bear watching.

Power Rating: 70

CARLOS ARMENDARIZ

In reality, you are the famous Communist Saladio, returned secretly from exile. Your cover name is Carlos Armendariz and your well-documented cover story is that you are an observer for the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (the man from UNEC LA in short). Your ostensible duty is to go around the country taking down complaints about development projects. The major flaw in this cover is that the paroled head of the RDP party, Prof. Giannelli knows you and if he meets you, will recognize you (for game purposes the player playing Giannelli knows what cover story Saladio will be using). Giannelli would not be likely to betray you as he needs you to succeed in his aims.

You have the makings of a revolutionary party in the country who are not known to each other. Being Russian-trained, you have organized them on the cell principle. You have Pedro Lefevre, who is ostensibly one of the travel development people in Santa Filomena, Fulgencio Jimenez supposedly an economist in San Tomas and Truong Van Dong, who has been setting up schools among the Sarakhanese minority in Lucretia. They know you but do not know each other. You are aware that the RDP also have some kind of political structure set up. You despise the RDP but they are at the moment useful to you. While the military government is as monolithic and as effective as it is at the moment, you and Giannelli need each other but you naturally prefer to be able to take Giannelli over should you reach power.

You respect and fear Gen. Navarro, the secret police head and should proceed very carefully as his agents are also secret and unknown to you and probably to anyone else but Navarro. The army administrators are also fairly sharp and you should be careful with them.

You are a dedicated hard-nose Communist of lower middle class background. Truong Van Dong was trained in Albania, is pro-Chinese and his aims for the country may differ slightly from yours. Jimenez and Lefevre are native Inertians and Jimenez, at least, might well harbor Titorist tendencies. Lefevre is an orthodox pro-Soviet Communist. These divisions are not likely to matter unless the FLN party should succeed in taking over the whole country.

You will use any means available to achieve your end. You are not a humanitarian in any sense and would not hesitate to sacrifice even your own supporters for the furtherance of your ideological aims.

Power Rating: 90

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PROFESSOR GIANELLI

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You are the head of the RDP party, returned on parole to Inertia at the explicit request of the Kennedy administration. You are not allowed to engage in political activity but nonetheless you are determined to create a democratic party with sufficient popular support to eventually overthrow the military government. While the military government remains monolithic, you will need all the help you can get and so you might even be prepared to cooperate with the Communist FLN. You know that Saladio has returned to the country and that he is using as cover a job with the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. You are the only person in the country outside the FLN who knows this and therefore at the moment the only person who is able to betray Saladio to the government. You would not want to betray him at this stage, however, as you might eventually need him and his FLN guerillas.

You should also be aware that Saladio would take you over if he got the chance and that you must therefore develop personal popular support separate from any Popular Front which you and Saladio might develop. You feel that the divergence of interests between you and Saladio need not be too much of a problem while you are both out of power.

You have the makings of a party structure: Jaime Garcia, a professor at the University of Santa Filomena, Fernando Marico, a hotel-owner in Marinara, and Wang Ba-dan, a respected elder of the Sarakhanese community in Lucretia province. Saladio is aware that you have some organizational structure but he probably does not know the people and it is your choice whether or not to tell him who they are. Saladio also has some organizational structure but you do not know how much or where.

You have to tread very carefully with the government as they are obviously watching you. They are also very keen to find Saladio and you should be careful not to betray him unintentionally, though at the same time you

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must be careful not to frighten the Americans, who are rather sympathetic to your cause but are adamantly opposed to Saladio and the FLN. Also, there are presumably secret police agents about, whose identities are not known to you.

Power Rating: 90

JAIME GARCIA

As Professor of Economics at the University of Santa Filomena, you are engaged in a study of the capital's emerging social problems. Secretly, you are also the RDP representative in Santa Filomena and liable to instant arrest if perceived as such.

You are a local boy, educated at the University of Santa Filomena. You have engaged secretly in pro-democratic activities for some time, but your efforts have been given impetus by the return of Professor Gianelli. He is your accepted leader and you are loyal to him and take his orders. You should remember that the terms of his parole are that he does not engage in political activity, and that therefore the government and the secret police organization (F. A. N. G.) will be watching him closely. You should be careful neither to get him into trouble now, by too close contact with him, nor betray your RDP standing. The Americans are of course sympathetic to the RDP but cannot give much help as the principle of American policy is not to intefere in the government of other countries. There are other RDP people in the country -- Wang Ba-dan in Lucretia Province and Fernando Marico in Marinara. F. A. N. G. would dearly love to have information on membership, so you should be careful not to expose your fellow RDP members.

There are also FLN people in the country under the leadership of Saladio who, rumor has it, returned secretly to the country some time ago. You are anti-Communist and anti-Fascist but you do appreciate that it may be necessary to use FLN help in overthrowing the military dictatorship. You should also be alive to the danger of being taken over by the FLN and treat any FLN you may meet with some reserve. Remember also that socret police agents are scattered over the country and you should be careful about speaking freely even in private. Gianelli of course knows all the RDP people and you can check any suspicions with him.

Your students are pro-democratic but possibly unreliable and of course possibly infiltrated by the secret police.

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Power Rating: 40

PEDRO LEFEVRE

You are the FLN man in Santa Filomena. You belong to an illegal party and will be arrested if you are ever discovered. You are a native-born Inertian, middle class, educated at the University of Santa Filomena where you first became interested in Communism. You are a pro-Soviet hardcore Communist and your aims are obviously the total overthrow of the military regime. Saladio has recently returned to the country, disguised as an agent of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, by name Carlos Armendariz. He is your leader and you are loyal to him. You have been informed, from Cuba, that you will be the agent for the receipt of money subsidies from Havana, for which your ostensible activity as a member of the Inertian Tourist Board is ideally suited.

The chief danger to you is the Secret Police organization, F.A.N.G., whose agents are everywhere. The governors and the army commanders are also on the look-out for you, but F.A.N.G., being covert, is the main threat. There are other FLN agents in the country, but the group is deliberately organised in the cell principle and you do not know who they are. There is also Professor Gianelli, the paroled head of the R.D.P. party, whose policies and whose affiliations with the U.S.A. you despise, but who could be useful to you. You should not approach him yourself without Saladio's orders, and naturally, if the FLN were to make any alliance with him, you would hope to be able to take him over when the party reached power. The FLN at the moment needs all the friends it can get. In this, as in any other negotiation, you should follow Saladio's lead as you are in complete accord with his policies.

You might give some time to thinking out a thoroughly convincing scheme for improving Inertian tourism just in case anyone asks you.

You may obviously move freely around the country but you must be very careful not to expose your cover. If you do move around the country you must decide whether or not to take your small but dedicated guerilla band or to leave them behind. Take Saladio's orders on this, but read the section in the rules headed Troop Movements carefully.

Power Rating: 30 With your troops: 60 I-9

COL. DE PRANO --- COMMANDER OF GARRISON IN SANTA FILOMENA

You and your men are stationed five blocks from the palace and are specifically responsible for the safety of El Caudillo and his entourage as you have been since 1934. In those 32 years, there have been no uprisings. In fact, you have had very little work as a military commander. The situation is entirely satisfactory, and you fully expect it to continue.

Unfortunately your bureaucracy is rather inefficient -- orders, requisitions, requests and the like often get misplaced. Unless an order from Gen. Moreno is extremely important, therefore, it automatically becomes lost unless repeated twice from above. This has not caused any serious consequences, however. As long as the situation remains as it has been for the last 32 years, you remain in control.

At times, though, you have been somewhat jealous of the administrative jobs under Gen. Medina. The foreign-educated officers under Medina sometimes annoy you with their pretensions to superiority and with their belittling remarks about your commander, Gen. Moreno, to whom you are extremely loyal. You are well aware, however, that what really matters in the army is command of the troops. Either you or Lt. Col. Torremolinos must be in Santa Filomena at all times, or anarchy might follow. You suspect that if you temporarily assigned your a pops to Torremolinos, he might try to keep them permanently.

You have established a hands-off attitude towards Gen. Navarro and F.A.N.G. and are very happy to keep it that way. You are on good terms with Col. Y.F.Bill, the U.S. military attache, who seems to be impressed with your command of the situation.

Power Rating: 30 With troops: 60

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LT COL TORREMOLINOS

You are the military governor for the city and district of Santa Filomena. You report directly to Brig-Gen Medina and are of marginally higher status than the other two military governors, Lt. Col. Albeniz in Marinara and Lt. Col. Sanza in Lucretia inasmuch as you have the prize station--the capital city. They are of course your rivals, but you all get on well. You are an excellent administrator and an ambitious career officer. You personally like your superior Gen. Medina and admire his abilities. You dislike but have a sneaking admiration for the head of the secret police organization (F. A. N. G.), Brig. Gen. Navarro. You also like your job and feel that a military government is the best way to win a country as only the army has the necessary organizational structure. You tolerate the presence of Giannelli the paroled RDP leader because you are under orders to leave him alone unless you could produce unquestionable evidence that he had been engaging in political activity. You are not concerned yourself to watch Giannelli all the time as the secret police can be relied upon to do this. You are also under orders to look out for Saladio, the FLN leader, who is reputed to have returned to the country, and to try to discover the identities of his contacts.

You rather despise the stupid men who command the army garrisons, Col. de Prano in Santa Filomena, Col. Madeira in Marinara and Col. Morgan in Lucretia. At the same time you envy them their troop commands as well as their superior rank and often feel that you would like to trade in your long hours and bulging files for the open-air army life. You also sometimes feel that the way to the top in the army is not through the administrative side. You note that the troop commanders are full colonels while you and your fellow administrators are Lt. Cols. You rather like Gen. Moreno, although you do not have a high opinion of his intelligence. You are however an army officer, utterly loyal to Suballa and basically contented with your set up.

You are, although ambitious, a patriot and a man of honor, not given to opportunism. You consider human relationships are initially beneficial and are exploitative and genuinely feel the present system of government is the best way to raise standards of living among workers and peasants.

You get on well with the American contingent in the country, as you and they share a high interest in the stability of Inertian politics. You get on particularly well with Col. Y.F. Bill the military attache in whom you recognize a fellow career officer.

You may move around freely but some members of the government will always be in Santa Filomena or anarchy ensues. Effectively you have no men of your own, and therefore no potential for violence unless you should require troops. Without troops you must rely on Col. DePrano to retain law and order. Since De Prano is a bumbler, you feel that you could work more effectively if you had command of his troops.

Power Rating: 40

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ELIOT GREENOUGH -- U.S. AMBASSADOR TO INERTIA

You are a career diplomat in the style set by the Kennedy administration, and not a political appointee. The policy of the U.S. government is to lead Inertia gently into the twentieth century; to introduce at least the possibility of a democratic government. You would therefore oppose any attempt by the government to interfere with the liberty of Gianelli, unless they could prove to you beyond any possibility of argument on your part that he had been politicking. You would of course be disinclined to back Gianelli if you found out that he was cooperating with the FLN as it is against American government policy to support the Communists, directly or indirectly. Apart from this one point you should follow the traditional pattern of non-intervention in the affairs of Inertia. You get on well with El Caudillo although you rarely see him and also reasonably well with General Medina. You hardly know the mysterious General Navarro and are fairly indifferent to General Moreno. You get on very well with Lauterpacht and use him as a channel of communication to the government.

You are a little skeptical of the existence of the alleged FLN/Communist threat, and are not at all sure that Saladio really is in the country. If you were to become convinced of his presence, you would be inclined to be more tolerant of the dictatorial methods of the local regime.

Power Rating: 40

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HARVEY LOWELL RICHARDSON -- A.I.D. REPRESENTATIVE IN SANTA FILOMENA.

Since your graduation from Iowa State in 1952 and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1954, you have been vigorously concerned with the economics and politics of underdeveloped nations, Latin America in particular. You spent one year studying in Venezeula and have since had other assignments abroad. You are the first in your family to have voted Democratic, and were inspired to join A. I. D. by Kennedy. You feel that A. I. D. can really get to the heart of things by helping the peasantry and thereby striking at the roots of the Communist influence.

Your basic goals in Inertia are to make sure that money gets where it will do the most good. The problem is to get it to the peasants and the workers who might otherwise be attracted by the now-weak FLN movement and keep it away from the FLN itself. You are also concerned that the Sarakhanese minority who are oppressed, disenfranchised, and (you feel) potentially revolutionary should get some of the money and you try and pressure Sanza to allow it. By getting the money to projects that will help the peasantry establish some sort of reasonable social-political base, you believe that you are thinking ahead to the day when Suballa will be gone and a reasonable chance for democracy might emerge.

You feel that Major Bill, the Military Attache, may not be in sympathy with you. You suspect him of supporting the present regime, and think that he would support one of the generals to succeed Suballa. Fortunately, the Ambassador is much more on your side and because of the country team concept in the State Department, Bill is constrained to follow the Ambassador's lead.

You are on good terms with Gianelli and, with the Ambassador, prepared to protect him to the limit of your powers from harassment. You are also on good terms with Carlos Armendariz the representative of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America.

Power Rating: 20

COLONEL Y.F. BILL. U.S. MILITARY ATTACHE.

You are a sharp and highly ambitious career officer. You want to do a conspicuously good job in Inertia, not merely to get by. You do not exactly approve of the present dictatorial system, but Inertia is, after all, stable and working on its economic problems. not in the terrible mess common to far too many Latin American countries. You were originally an undifferentiated supporter of the democracy along U.S. lines, but your experience in Asia and Latin America has tended to convince you that this point of view is unsophisticated and unhelpful. At the same time, you feel that after Field Marshall Suballa goes, there is really no one else who could quite fill his place as dictator, and that none of the three generals, Moreno, Navarro, or Medina, would be able to take over without engaging in a war with the other two. You are therefore on the look-out for some system that the U.S.A. could support after El Caudillo's ultimate demise. You tentatively think that some form of democracy supported by a strong Army on the pattern that obtained in Brazil before May 1965 might meet the case and are looking around for the ingredients. You essentially do not want to meddle with the government or the internal politics and indeed would lose a great many points should anyone complain to the State Department. The Ambassador has tacitly given you the go-ahead but could not support you if you were caught.

You also have to be careful not to get Professor Gianelli into conspicuous trouble. He is on parole, not to engage in political activity, and the military government is just waiting for him to start.

You are on good terms with all the military people, armed forces and administrative, including General Navarro, head of F.A.N.G., whose abilities you respect. Still, the idea of a secret police force does not strike a responsive chord in you. Further, you are always careful to express your admiration equally for the armed forces and for the administration so as not to be caught in the verbal cross-fire between the two factions.

You have reason to believe that Suballa's stated fears of FLN activities are trumped up in order to get U.S. military aid, but you are nonetheless very concerned with possible Communist intrigues. If Saladio is really in the country, you should use your influence with the government to urge that he and his infrastructure be rooted out.

Power Rating: 20

MR. ALEXANDER J. PIPPIN----UNITED FISH CO., REP., IN SAN FILOMENA

You are the Inertia representive for the United Fish Company of Boston, a key employer of the people of Inertia.... Most of the activities of the company are centered in the port city of San Tomas, but you maintain your office in the capital city of Santa Filomena in order to deal with government officials.

Your relations and your company's relations with Field Marshall Suballa have been excellent over the past thirty years. He supports private enterprise and is a staunch anti-Communist; he supports United Fish as it provides jobs for some of the people at the same time as it provides a steady amount of income for the state, most of which finds its way to Suballa's own pocket. You think it is too bad that El Caudillo has had to institute repressive policies from time to time, but you feel he is doing the best he can under the circumstances. You are also on good terms with the American Embassy.

You have a high interest in stability. You tend to use forceful persuasion, not violence, in dealing with others, and tend to opportunism, not honor. You are a firm believer in the American way of industry, free enterprise, no creeping socialism, etc.

Your direct representative in the fishing port of San Tomas is Mr. Arthur Caulfield, a fellow American. You deal with him mostly in the capital city or on the telephone, flying out to San Tomas only in cases of emergency. While you are capable of moving out of the capital, you will in fact lose points for doing so. You should therefore be sure that this loss will be outweighted by any benefits you expect to gain by moving.

Power Rating: 40

H. JON LAUTERPACHT

Yeu are probably the country's richest man with substantial interests in the Santa Filomena hotels, two new beach clubs, and several night clubs and theaters. For this reason, you are very well in with the existing power structure, most of whom owe you favors. At the same time, you are inclined to believe in the democratic experiment, and hope that in due course it may be possible for Inertia to be democratically governed. You would never be inclined to start any action towards this end but would certainly be prepared to support a pro-democratic leader. However, in the present state of Inertian government, with the democratic party outlawed, you would be very cautious about giving any support at all to any democratic representative who might approach you, as you have your own interests to consider.

You are a man of honor, not inclined to opportunism, as you feel you have all the money and power you could want. You abhor violence as a means to your ends. You are on good terms with Gianelli whom you previously supported when the RDP was legal, and also on good terms with Lt. Col. Albeniz, the governor of Lucretia, whose efficiency and intelligence you admire. You regard the military commander, Gen. Moreno, as a knothead, and dislike, ideologically and personally, Gen. Navarro, the head of F.A.N.G.

You are a patriot and hope that Inertia can someday have its place with the more progressive Latin American countries. You get on well with the Americans and should take pains to do so, as you have been able to negotiate considerable economic aid from them. Despite your interest in progress, you are much concerned with stability and are quite prepared to live with a repressive but stable military government rather than a democratic but unstable government. This is not only to further your interests; you have seen the disastrous effects of revolution on the economy and people of the Latin American countries and wish to avoid these effects for Inertia.

Power Rating: 60

SENORA DULCINEA CERVANTES

Your husband, Don Carlos de Velasquez Cervantes, is the Inertian Ambassador to the U.S.A. You voluntarily remained behind in Inertia, ostensibly to look after the vast Cervantes family holdings and to pursue your studies of Inertia's piratical past. In fact, you stayed because you are in the employ of Brig. Gen. Navarro, the head of F.A.N.G., the secret police, and are one of his most trusted and loyal employees. You were recruited by Navarro himself after the Second World War. He is an extremely charming man.

You are ruthless and extremely ambitious. An attractive woman, you fought your way from a lower middle class background via the stage to being the wife of one of the country's richest men. Your husband, however, has disappointed you because he is something of a playboy with no taste for power. He does not know, and would be shocked to hear, that you are in any way connected with Navarro, whom he despises but fears.

Although you are a s nob with a real distaste for the unwashed peasantry, you are in F. A. N. G. primarily because of the power and excitement it brings -- and because of Navarro. You are loyal to Navarro and always seek to impress him. You know, obviously, that he uses other agents, but you do not know who they are; you are aware that some kind of FLN structure exists and you suspect that the FLN leader, Saladio, has returned to the country. It would be a considerable coup if you were to find him for Navarro. You know also that the RDP party is organised to some extent but you despise their leader, Professor Gianel.¹ whom you perceive to be a weak-kneed, harmless liberal. Your orders are not to move against Gianelli unless you can prove that he has been engaging in political activity. You may, however, try to root out his real or suspected agents. One of your main preoccupations is to conceal your membership in F. A. N. G. Were it known that you are an agent, your usefulness to Navarro would be at an end, and the connection abruptly severed. Also, it is possible

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that your husband might divorce you and thereby ruin your social standing. At the same time, if you are not entirely loyal to Navarro, you are sure that he would not hesitate to betray you as an employee, in which case you would only be safe if you could insinuate yourself into power some other way.

You have no hesitation in using violent means if they will serve your purposes, and no loyalties except to yourself and to Navarro. You perceive society as exploitative and wish to remain on the exploiting end.

Power Rating: 50

ALFREDO LIBERTINO CREDENZA -- Absentee Landowner -- Santa Filomena

You own sugar plantations in the agricultural province of Lucretia.

Your local agents, Fulgencio Pascual and Guillermo "El Tigre" Guzman, handle day-to-day management of the estates, Pascual dealing with the native Inertian sugar workers (by far the largest group), while Guzman has been retained to deal with the Sarakhanese minority sugar workers. Pascual and Guzman collect the rents and forward them to you in the capital city, Santa Filomena, to support your rather conspicuous spending habits. Should the peasants refuse to pay you, you can attempt to have your agents force them off the land, but of course you do need enough peasants to get in the harvest or you are defeating your own purposes.

You reside in the capital, visiting Lucretia but once a year, at Christmastime, to distribute candy to the Inertian (but not the Sarakhanese) peasants. You may thus make one free trip to the province. For any additional trips to Lucretia, you will lose points. You may go, however, if you think it is really worth it, i.e., if you would lose even more heavily by not going. You may use the telephone or messages for other discussions.

You oppose any social change among the peasants, as your hold over them, apart from the economic aspect, is based on their illiteracy and internal disorganisation. You oppose social equality not only because it would be inconvenient, but out of conviction that you are innately superior to the peasants.

You enthusiastically support the Suballa regime for running the country efficiently and without danger of social revolution.

Power Rating: 40

MIDDLE CLASS --- SANTA FILOMENA

Study the scenario, particularly the section on the social and economic background of the country.

Objective: to keep earning a living.

As long as there continues to be stability in Inertia, you are able to earn your normal income from your small shops, stores and white collar jobs, and gain points for doing so.

You, like most Inertians, respect and revere Field Marshall Suballa. Although you recognize that he has used harsh means on occasion, you support his ends and feel that on the whole his presence is essential to preserve a stable and modestly prosperous order. You are not likely to take major risks.

You are most responsive to any appeals that offer you economic and material benefits. You feel strongly about the sanctity of private property, and oppose what little FLN activity there has been in Inertia.

Your people are: highly cohesive bound by common economic circumstances in a common outlook highly interested in bettering their material advantages admirers and supporters of El Caudillo of moderate income of high school education literate

You oppose the improvement in the lot of the slums and workers (one of them might want to marry your daughter!).

Since you are a group, you are immobile and may not leave Santa Filomena. Population: 70,000 Power Rating: 50

I-21

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URBAN WORKERS ---SANTA FILOMENA

Study the scenario, particularly the social and economic background section.

You are wage earners in the capital city of Santa Filomena employed in light industry, service occupations and the like. You are happy with your jobs and are much better paid than you were once were. You oppose anything which would threaten your security. Like most Inertians, you revere, respect and admire President Suballa. In your opinion, he has accomplished a great deal for Inertia, putting things on a stable basis which has enabled the industries which support your present jobs to thrive. You do not worry about Suballa's use of violent means unless such means are against you, a rather unlikely event. Your acknowledgement of any obligation to take an active part in the political system is low. You tend to look upon government and politics as somewhat unpredictable and threatening forces, taking the attitude "Let El Caudillo take care of it; he knows what's best for Inertia." You have hardly any membership in political organisations and there is little union activity among the group. You are sketchily informed of political facts and are oriented more as passive subjects than as participant citizens. You are little concerned with the welfare of the slums or other groups in the city. You would perhaps like to copy the life-style of the middle class, but they look down upon you.

You may not travel.

Population: 300,000

Power Rating: 60

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SLUMS -- SANTA FILOMENA

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Read the scenario, particularly the section on Inertia's economic and social background.

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You constitute the slum dwellers in the capital city of Santa Filomena. What little unemployment there is in the city may be found in your ranks. In large part you are uprooted native Inertian peasants from Lucretia province who have come to the capital seeking work. Although your lot is a miserable one, you are suspicious of change -- you realize that although things at present are bad, they could still get worse. However, like most Inertians, you revere, respect, and admire Field Marshall Suballa and regard him as the benefactor of the country. It has never really occurred to you to use violence and demonstrate, for you realize that this sort of thing is just not done in Inertia, except against the Sarakhanese minority. You roundly despise these Asian intruders.

You sense a low degree of obligation to work through any political system, preferring the attitude "Let El Caudillo handle it; he knows what's best for Inertia." You do not participate in any voluntary political organisations. Although American aid has helped build a clinic and a school in the slum, you are not pro-American. You have heard some people accuse the Americans of draining money out of Grenadilla for their own purposes and are half -convinced that this must be how they get big cars and the money to put up the clinics.

Your people typically have families of seven or more children, many deserted by the fathers. Almost all of you are illiterate, the crime rate is astronomical and disease is common. Your diet is mostly fish and beans. Your ambition is to obtain jobs like those presently held by the urban workers. You see some hope in this area as you know that the government has sent Professor Garcia to study your problems -- an evidence of El Caudillo's concern for your welfare. Population: 80,000

Power Rating: 50

STUDENTS -- FILOMENA UNIVERSITY

You represent the university students in the capital city, a group which has never been noted for its intellectual or political zeal. Since the Inertian elite usually send their children abroad to be educated, and since very few peasants and workers have received any schooling, the local student body derives mainly from families of cautious middle class businessmen and lower-ranking military officers. Most find employment upon completion of their studies, but lucrative jobs are few in Inertia and so there is considerable competition for grades and for recognition among the students. It is of prime importance to all students that the university remain open and that they be allowed to continue their studies.

Ir politics, you are mildly pro-democratic but view the Suballa regime as one of the natural features of Inertian life. You have long been indoctrinated in love and respect for El Caudillo, both at home and in school, and are not likely to engage in any plots to overthrow him. (You also realize that controls are tight, that F.A.N.G. is probably watching you, and that unauthorized political behavior on your part would probably result in the university being closed.)

Nonetheless you are not particularly fond of any of the generals -- your loyalty does not extend beyond El Caudillo. You are also rather critical of the Americans and feel that United Fish is far too influential in Inertian affairs. You tend to respond well to nation alistic appeals but are not prone to violence unless your direct interests are threatened.

Power Rating: 40 Number: 4,000

I-24

COL. MORGAN -- COMMANDER IN LUCRETIA

You are the commander of the military garrison at Lucretia. Basically, you are happy with this job, as it involves a minimum of important decisionmaking on your part. As a native of Lucretia, you are well aware of the problems caused by the immigration of the Sarakhanese with their peculiar ways. You are quite able to handle the occasional incidents between the Sarakhanese and the native Inertian peasantry in accordance with the official government policy that the Sarakhanese are always wrong.

Your attitude towards the peasantry is based on the idea that since you rose to your present position through hard work and recognition by General Moreno (to whom you are unquestionably loyal), any peasant could do the same. Although you were from the middle class, you do not believe that there is any giant barrier to any of the workers in the sugar fields to do as you did, as you are fond of telling them whenever you inspect the garrison on the plantations.

What you would like now is to move over to the governmental administrative post held by Lt. Col. Sanza, Gen. Medina's man in Lucretia as you feel he really has the soft job without your responsibilities. The American military attache, Major Bill, whom you have met on your trips to Santa Filomena, is a friend of yours. You resent Lt. Col. Sanza particularly as he does not hide the fact that he thinks you are a fool and you suspect that the U.S. AID man, Richardson, concurs. You suspect that there are F.A. N.G. agents in Lucretia but you have no idea who they are, and you are somewhat afraid of what they might do to your position.

Either you or Sanza must remain in the province at all times or anarchy will ensue and El Caudillo will be displeased. Your military forces are rather inefficient and nothing can be accomplished until orders are repeated twice from above. Still you are cautious about leaving your troops in Sanza's hands as he might not give them back.

Power Rating: 30 With troops: 60

LT. COL. SANZA

You are the military governor in the province of Lucretia. Your fellow governors are Lt. Col. Torremolinos in Santa Filomena and Lt. Col. Albeniz in Marinara. Lt. Col. Torremolinos probably has the prized ob --Santa Filomena--but you feel that you are the only one of the three who could handle the complex administrative problems of Lucretia. You have the Sarakhanese minority to deal with, who are a problem. They have not received acceptance from the Inertian peasantry but they are easily offended and keep to themselves. The Inertian peasantry feel themselves superior to the Sarakhanese and vice-versa. Incidents are common between these communities. Government policy towards the Sarakhanese, as dictated by Field Marshall Subalk is to keep them apart and suppressed and to back the native Inertians against them in any dispute. You are loyal to Suballa, and to your immediate superior Brigadier Gen. Medina but you feel that the official attitude towards the Sarakhanese is misguided. You feel that they should be assimilated and for this reason, you get on well with Wang Ba-dan, a respected elder among the Sarakhanese.

You are unusual in the army in that while you feel that stability is the more important thing for Inertia you have some feeling that a military government is not a final answer. You once cautiously expressed your feelings on this and on the Sarakhanese problem to General Medina who received it with no favor at all. You are therefore very hesitant about expressing such convictions, the more especially since you have seen the chaos into which other Latin American countries have been plunged by the democratic experiment.

You dislike Col. Morgan the army commander in the province as he follows government policy towards the Sarakhanese to the letter and is in your opinion, a clod anyway. You do rather envy him his troop command as you sometimes feel that all your life will be spent walled up in an office with the files. You have to rely on Morgan to provide forces to maintain law and order and feel that your job could be done more effectively if you commanded the troops yourself. You may move freely through the country, but either you or Col. Morgan must be present in Lucretia at all times or anarchy will ensure.

You get on well with the Americans, especially Richardson who is always at you to give more help to the Sarakhanese peasants. You do agree with him but you have been hitherto inhibited about saying so as your primary loyalties are of course to your own government. You have rarely met Gen. Navarro but dislike the idea of a secret police force very much.

Power Rating: 40

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GUILLERMO "EL TIGRE" GUZMAN -- Landowner's agent -- Lucretia province

You are one of the provincial agents for Alfredo Libertino Credenza, who, together with his large family, owns most of the land in Lucretia province.

It is your job to handle the day to day management of that portion of the estates on which the immigrant Sarakhanese minority sugar workers live and work. The much larger portion of the sugar estates on which the native Inertian sugar workers work is managed by Fulgencio Pascual. However, you have been hired by Credenza specifically for the purpose of dealing with the potentially troublesome Sarakhanese, who seem to feel they have some minimal right to express grievances about their lot.

You are extremely tough in your dealings with the Sarakhanese, tending toward violence, not persuasion. You dislike them intensely and are quite aware that they hate you in return. This latter does not concern you in the slightest, as Suballa's anti-Sarakhanese policy means that it should not be difficult for you to get government support in the event of any dispute.

It is your job to collect the rents and forward them to Credenza in the capital city. He does not ordinarily visit your province except in case of emergency, so your only usual contact with him is by telephone or mail.

Your objectives are to keep the Sarakhanese in line and to keep them working, so that you can keep the rents (out of which your wages are paid) rolling in. Your relations with Credenza are good as long as you can accomplish these objectives. Your relations with Pascual are often strained, as you approach your jobs differently, but so far you tolerate each other.

You are suspicious of Richardson, the U.S. A.I.D. man, whose activities might arouse undue expectations among your charges. You are obviously against the opposition parties and therefore keep an eye open for RDP or FLN organizers, whom you would not hesitate to report to the authorities.

Power Rating: 20

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FULGENCIO PASCUAL -- Landowner's agent -- Lucretia province

You are one of the agents for Alfredo Libertino Credenza, who, with his large family, owns most of the land in Lucretia province.

Your job is to handle the day to day management of the estates on which the native Inertian sugar workers live and work. A smaller portion of the estates, that tilled by the itinerant Sarakhanese sugar workers, is managed by your counterpart, Guillermo "El Tigre" Guzman.

Your objective is to collect the rents and forward them to Credenza in the capital. Credenza visits you but once a year, at Christmastime, when he distributes candy to the children of the native (but not the Sarakhanese) peasants. Otherwise your contact with him is chiefly by telephone or mail.

You are firm but fair in your dealings with the Inertian sugar workers, tending toward persuasion, not violence. It is your feeling that treating them less harshly will lead to better results --- but this philosophy is helped by the fact that the peasants are for the most part thankful to retain their jobs and are not prone to violence themselves.

Your goal is to keep the peasants in line and keep them working, so that you can keep the rents (out of which your wages are paid) rolling in. Your relations with Credenza are good as long as you can accomplish these objectives. Your relations with Guzman are tolerable, although you approach your jobs rather differently. You oppose anything that might stir up your peasants and thus cut production.

Power Rating: 20

I-28

INERTIAN SUGAR WORKERS (Lucretia Province)

Read the scenario, particularly the section on the economic and social background of the country.

You are native-born Inertians, fully employed only during the three months of the year when the sugar crop is harvested. You must try to make your meager income last for the remainder of the year. This you rarely succeed in doing, even though you do try to get odd jobs to help tide you over.

You work in the agricultural province of Lucretia on land owned by Alfredo Libertino Credenza who spends most of his time in the capital. In fact you see him only once a year, at Christmas time, when he makes a journey to Lucretia to distribute candy to your children. Otherwise, the land is managed by Credenza's agent, Fulgencio Pascual. Your attitude towards Pascual is one of resigned tolerance. You dislike him, but he does try to be fair. He means well, but exploits you nonetheless. You are, after all, thankful for the privilege of keeping your jobs, since you are constantly reminded of the much worse lot of the immigrant Sarakhanese sugar workers who are frequently unemployed, in poor years even at harvest time, and whose land agent, Guillermo "El Tigre" Guzman, is very harsh. You approve of Guzman's harshness enthusiastically.

You have grown accustomed to Suballa and because you see him as a protector against cheap Sarakhanese labor, you revere him. You are likely to have his picture on your wall and to turn out en masse to cheer him on the rare occasions he visits the province. You are not very self-aware politically -- except as regards the Sarakhanese -- and are almost 100% illiterate. Your grievances and burdens have been great. No doubt you would support land reform if someone advocated it, but for the past 30 years no one has and you are extremely unlikely to do so on your own initiative.

You may not leave the province.

Your attitude toward the Sarakhanese workers is one of resentment and dislike. You disapprove of their "invasion" of the country which threatens your economic position. Besides, you see them as a filthy, strange lot whose customs are totally different from yours and who tend to stick together in their refusal to become totally assimilated into Inertian national life.

You are slow to anger and not politically active, but once sufficiently aroused, you tend toward violence, not persuasion, in the settlement of disputes. Whatever you do, you always do as a group --- there is no internal dissent among you. You generally have a submissive attitude toward authority and tend to react favorably to authoritarian tactics. Average family size is seven. Crime rate is high, particularly in the off-season.

You feel absolutely no obligation to play an active role in the political system and tend to regard government and politics as somewhat unpredictable and threatening forces. You have formed no voluntary associations or clubs -- when a Peace Corps worker once tried to organise you into a development league to build a new school, you failed totally to understand what he meant and he left in disgust.

Population: 1,164,000

Power Rating: 60

SARAKHANESE MINORITY SUGAR WORKERS (Lucretia province)

Read the scenario, particularly the section on the economic and social background of the country.

You are second-generation Sarakhan Inertians whose ancestors were shipped from Sarakhan to help with sugar harvesting. With the inevitable growth of the native Inertian population over the years -- combined with fluctuations in the world price for sugar -- your usefulness has declined and is now sometimes marginal in poor sugar seasons. Your only chance for employment is during the three months of the year when the sugar is harvested, and even then you are migrants, journeying from hacienda to hacienda in search of one which needs additional labor for the harvest. Currently you are living on land owned by Alfredo Libertino Credenza who spends most of his time in the capital. The hacienda is managed on a day to day basis by Guillermo "El Tigre" Guzman, who is very tough in his dealings with you, and whom you utterly despise. You feel like leaping at him if you got the chance, but refrain from doing so because this would mean you would lose your jobs and starve. He further infuriates you by occasionally getting drunk and proceeding to insult the dignity of Sarakhanese womanhood.

You do not know a great deal about the activities of El Caudillo but realize that as long as he is power, the present intolerable situation will continue. However, you have no means to unseat him as his controls over the population, both overt and covert, are uncompromisingly strict. No dissent is tolerated, as you found out when one of the more outspoken of your group mysteriously disappeared during a private camping expedition. He was said to have been eaten by piranha fish.

You are becoming increasingly self-aware politically but are almost 100% illiterate. Your burdens and grievances against the regime have been great. Your attitude toward the native Inertian workers is one of

I-31

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envy mixed with resentment. You realize that they are getting all the good sugar jobs merely because they are Inertians, and you therefore feel discriminated against. Despite your flirtations with politics, you tend to regard government in general as exploitative and as a somewhat unpredictable and threatening for ce. Representatives of the government appear to be against you, not for you. Should you become sufficiently aroused, you tend toward violence, not persuasion... but you must needs be very careful as the Inertians would suppress you ruthlessly.

You may travel within Lucretia province but may not leave it.

A recent development in your ranks has been the appearance of the neo-Mithraic religious group led by the bonze Choi Oi Sao, whom you respect and admire. Your cultural leader, however, remains the respected elder Wang Ba -dan. The Sarakhanese teacher, Truong Van Dong, also achieved a good deal of respect within your community. You are predisposed toward authoritarian systems of government and not democracy; you tend to react favorably to authoritarian tactics.

Average family size is seven; education (except religion) is very poor. The crime rate is high, especially in the off-season for sugar.

Population: 582,000

Power Rating: 60
WONG BA-DAN

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You are a member of the illegal RDP party in Lucretia and could be imprisoned or worse if this were found out. You are a respected elder of the Sarakhanese community, and an educated man. You are opposed totally to the military government because of Field Marshall Suballa's policy towards your people. The only member of the government you can stand at all is Lt. Col. Sanza, the military governor of the province, whom you know to have opposed official policy on the Sarakhanese question. He is at the same time a loyal army officer and, as matters now stand, would be duty-bound to jail you should you try to persuade him to go against government policy. You fæl however that he is a much more liberal and cultivated man than anyone else in the army. You report of course to Gianelli, the RDP leader, but should be very discreet in order not to get him in trouble -- he is closely watched. r a

You believe that the Sarakhanese should be integrated with the rest of the population and fight equally against prejudice on the part of the Inertian peasantry against your people, and your people's own prejudice against the locals. You feel that Inertia must be one nation with all nationalities working together. In this, your major opponent is Choi Oi Sao, neo-Delphic oracle of the Mithraic religious sect. You also believe in democracy along U.S. lines.

You should remember that these views are unacceptable to the regime and that secret police agents (members of F. A. N. G.) are scattered all over the country. Also in the country are members of the FLN party, supposedly under the leadership of Saladio. You are opposed to any form of totalitarian state and consider communism no improvement on a military government, but you should be prepared to use FLN against the existing government, while being careful that FLN do not take you over. FLN agents are also secret to you but Gianelli may know some of them. There are other members of the RDP in the country -- Fernando Marico

in Marinara and Professor Garcia in Santa Filomena, and you must be careful to protect their identities from F.A.N.G.

You also get on well with the AID man Richardson who is trying to bring pressure to bear on the government to change its behavior towards the Sarakhanese minority.

Power Rating: 40

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CHOI OI SAO

You are the neo-Delphic oracle of the Mithraic sect, which has recently grown up among the Sarakhanese sugar workers in Lucretia province. You are in reality a member of F.A.N.G., the secret police organisation headed by Brig-Gen. Navarro, and one of your major preoccupations is to conceal your membership in this much hated and greatly feared group. You were recruited by General Navarro on the basis of your fanatical anti-Communism to work in secret against the FLN organisation. A Sarakhanese elder, you have considerable power in the Sarakhanese community which, though largely Buddhist, venerates your alleged piety. You are opposed to any idea of integrating the Sarkhanese community with the Inertian peasantry whom you despise and regard as a lower form of life. You are of course threatened by the very existence of the Communist ideology as personified by the FLN group and would have no hesitation in using violent methods against the FLN if you could find them. At the same time, it is important for your standing in the Sarkhanese community that you be not revealed as a member of the secret police as the Sarkhanese might turn to your rival for their loyalty, the much respected, Wang Ba-dan. Wang Ba-dan is your rival in every possible way as he advocates the assimilation of the Sarakhanese and the peasants which would not suit your purposes.

You are loyal to yourself and to no one else except Navarro, a loyalty bred purely of fear.

Power Rating: 50

TRUONG VAN DONG

You are a Sarakhanese schoolteacher, ostensibly working to develop a literacy program among your backward and oppressed people. In reality, you are a hard-core Communist on the Chinese model and representative of the illegal FLN in Lucretia Province. As such, you are liable to immediate arrest and imprisonment if detected.

As befits your type of Communist, you are ruthless and do not mind terrorizing wavering supporters. You report to the distinguished FLN leader. Saladio, who has returned to the country in the last few months. You are aware that he is disguised as Carlos Armendariz, an observer for the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. There are other FLN members in the country but the group is organized in the cell principle so that you do not know who they are. There are also various representatives of the RDP party in the country; aside from their paroled leader Gianelli, these are also unknown to you. You despise the RDP ideology with its wavering democratic structure but you will probably have to work with them as the military government is extremely powerful and effectively organized. You have also certain reservations about Saladio in view of the Sino-Soviet split in the international movement, but you should not let this influence you unless and until a revolution succeeds. In that case, you would be primarily concerned with eliminating all U.S. influence, isolating Inertia from the West, and driving it totally into the Socialist camp.

You have little contact with the military commander Col. Morgan but you know the U.S. AID man, Richardson, and the military governor, Lt. Col. Sanza, whom you find, although representatives of imperialism and of the hated military regime, sympathetic to your people. Remember that the regime is trying to find Saladio or any member of the FLN. Your real problem, however, is with the secret police organization, F.A.N.G. who have agents scattered around the country.

I-36

You get along reasonably well with Wang Ba-dan the respected assimilationist but you are of course opposed to him as peaceful assimilation would not suit you. You do not know the priest of the neo-Mithraic sect, Choi Oi Sao, well, but are interested in his success with your people.

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You have a small but dedicated band of troops which you can leave behind if you want to travel round the country. Take Saladio's orders before moving your troops around and in any case read the sections on Troop Movement and Violence in the rules very carefully.

Power Rating: 30 With your troops: 60

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LT. COL. ALBENIZ

You are the military governor in Marinara, equal in status with the other two governors, Torremolinos in Santa Filomena and Sanza in Lucretia. Of the three of you, Torremolinos has the best job -- in Santa Filomena -for which you rather envy him. You report to Brig. Gen. Medina whom you admire and to whom you are loyal. You like your job and are an excellent, efficient administrator. You sometimes hanker after a job in command of troops, which you feel you could do very much better than Col. Madeira whom you consider the laziest and most inefficient commander in the army. Apart from your liking for the active army life you sometimes wonder if you are on the right side of the army to achieve the more rapid advancement. You are ambitious and do not want to be stuck as a desk-bound Lt. Col. for the rest of your career. You are, however, a military officer and obey orders . You revere Field Marshall Suballa -- El Caudillo.

Essentially you believe that a military government is the best way to run Inertia. You are a patriot and a man of honor; you also see society as cooperative, not exploitative, and are sincere in your desire to improve the material lot of the workers. But you are not interested in increasing their political power -- yours is essentially a soup kitchen approach.

You get on well with the Americans, both government and United Fish, and you and Harvey Richardson, the AID man, work together on the AID program in Marinara. You are also on good terms with Major Y.F. Bill, the U.S. military attache whom you recognize as a sharp and capable officer and the sort of man you liked in your year at Fort Benning.

You may move freely outside the province but either you or Col. Madeira must be in the province at all times or anarchy ensues. You have effectively no men of your own, and have to rely on Col. Madeira to provide forces to maintain law and order. You feel that you could do a much better job were his troops under your command.

Power Rating: 40

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COLONEL MADEIRA -- COMMANDER IN MARINARA

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You are the commander of the military garrison located in the fishing province of Marinara. You were born in the capital, however, and at every possible excuse, you return there for rest, recuperation, and the company of the American Military Attache, Col. Bill. Your trips tend to be frequent.

Most of your men were born in and around the small fishing villages in Marinara and have very close contact with the fishermen. You prefer to let the troops maintain this relationship, since imposing controls would be a great deal of bother. Evidently, it would also be unnecessary, as there has been absolutely no trouble since Field Marshall Suballa came into power 32 years ago. You find being in charge of 11,000 men somewhat of a burden, however, and you would like to replace Lt. Col. Albeniz as military governor in Marinara. You believe that Albeniz constantly attempts to belittle you and your job just because he went to the United States to study at Fort Benning, but your loyalty to Field Marshall Suballa and to Major Gen. Moreno have precluded you any overt attempts to replace him. You are certain that Gen. Navarro's secret police have operatives in Marinara but you do not know who they are, and to date, they have not given you any trouble. In the past, you have attempted to lay traps for F. A. N. G. agents in order to learn their identities, but the traps have always failed.

Your troops tend to be rather lazy and, for that reason, orders from Gen. Morenc will not be carried out until repeated twice, unless, of course, the orders are of great importance.

Either you or Lt. Col. Albeniz must be present in the province at all times or anarchy will ensue. You are torn, therefore, between your desire to go to Santa Filomena as often as possible and your extreme distrust of Albeniz's intentions were you to give him command of the troops. You fear that he might not give them back to you.

Power Rating: 30 With troops: 60

FULGENCIO JIMENEZ

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You are ostensibly an economic planner doing a development survey, but in reality, you are the FLN man in Marinara and are liable to instant arrest if you are identified as such. You are a native-born Inertian of the wealthy upper class and had your college education in Paris where you first encountered Communism. You are relatively unimpressed by ideological differences among your fellow Communists and aim to make Inertia a free and independent Communist country along Yugoslav lines. You are something of an idealist, sickened by the inhuma nities occasionally perpetrated by Field Marshall Suballa and appalled by the corruption and brutishness of the army commanders. You use a good deal of your own money to further FLN purposes, but at the same time, you have certain vague reservations about FLN methods.

You also hate the Americans whom you perceive to be exploiting the workers for United Fish and feel that they are quite as bad as the military government. Their attempts to introduce some kind of democracy by insisting that Gianelli, the RDP leader, be allowed to return impress you not at all. You feel that the Americans have merely done this as an opiate for the masses and that in fact they are in some kind of cynical alliance with the military government against the people. You despise Gianelli's policies and his apparent willingness to be a tool of the Americans, but you should be quite prepared to use him too.

Great impetus was given to the Inertian FLN movement with the return of Saladio a few months ago. He is using the name of Carlos Ar mendariz and is ostensibly the man from the United Nations Economic Commision for Latin America. You are aware that Saladio is Russian-trained, and that money for the FLN is coming into Santa Filomena from Cuba, but you are quite prepared to take money to free Inertia from any source at all and are confident that you will be able to maneuver Inertia away from undue Soviet and/or Chinese influence when the revolution has succeeded. There

are other FLN agents in the country but you have been deliberately kept in ignorance of who they are (the cell system operates). Saladio is accepted as your leader -- he has the prestige and the experience, and no matter what your reservations are about him you should be prepared to obey him absolutely until the revolution is under way.

You should be on your guard for secret police agents, who are everywhere, all with good cover stories. There are also RDP members and other FLN members who will also have cover stories. The army commanders and the military governor are also looking out for FLN members but the real danger comes from the secret police.

You have a small but dedicated terrorist army. You should take Saladio's orders before you move them around the country

Power Rating: 30 With your troops 60

MR. ARTHUR CAULFIELD

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Objective: Keep the fisheries and cannery open and the money coming in.

You are the local manager of United Fish Company in the port city of San Tomas. You take orders from and report directly to Alexander J. Pippin, chief representative of United Fish, who maintains his headquarters in the capital city of Santa Filomena.

When the fishermen are not on strike (as they rarely are) and the canneries are open and functioning, you earn money for the company and thus assure your own position. You will receive an amount from control equal to the value of the fish produced. (See transaction sheet). From this, you meet your expenses and forward the rest to Pippin.

Since the stability of the country is prerequisite to the income from the fisheries coming in, you support the stability of the country and Suballa, tending to ignore his suppressive policies when you can.

As a foreigner you do not vote, nor do you individually pay taxes. You may, however, try to exert pressure on the government by requesting Pippin to work through the U.S. Embassy and through his personal contacts.

In your dealings with others, you tend to persuasion, not violence; towards opportunism, not honor; towards caution and reliability.

Power Rating: 20

Read the scenario, particularly the section on the economic and social background of the country.

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You are a group of Inertian fishermen who make your living from the sea. Each morning you set sail from the harbor of San Tomas in search of the elusive uribu fish, known world-wide for its salty taste and pungent odor. You then sell the uribu to the local canneries where it is processed for export. Evenings are spent with your families or in dockside cafes. Since the uribu is in fairly steady supply about 20 miles off the Inertian coast, you have a steady source of income unless world taste for uribu changes suddenly. You are quite content to continue this form of existence. You are not well-off, but you do have jobs in a country with a high rate of unemployment, and you would oppose anything which would upset this arrangement. Your well-being is tied to the continuance of the present system. You are more concerned about your own welfare than you are with the welfare of the others in Marinara. You tend to be absorbed in your own daily activities, and are rather unconcerned about the interests of the San Tomas slums and middle class.

When you think of the Suballa government at all, it is with approval, for you favor stability at the cost of democracy. There has been an authoritarian government in Inertia for as long as you can remember. You trust El Caudillo.

Your rate of illiteracy is high, approaching 100%.

Like most other Inertians, you revere El Caudillo and tend to rely on him to get things done. You sense little obligation to take an active role in the political system and in fact tend to regard all government and politics as somewhat unpredictable and threateng forces.

Since you are a group, you are immobile and may not leave Marinara

province (except to fish offshore).

You get on reasonably well with the local manager, Caulfield, although you suspect the Americans of exploiting you.

Power Rating: 70

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PANCHO VARGAS

You are a painter of international renown - "the Inertian Mondrian" as <u>Time</u> magazine called you last year, and have made your your home in San Tomas for the last five years. You are also a member of F. A. N. G., the dreaded secret police organisation, which fact you are obviously at pains to conceal. You report to General Navarro, and while obviously you are not the only major agent he uses, you have never found out who the others are.

Your main concern is to root out all political opposition such as the FLN and the RDP who are rumored to be starting some kind of party organisation. Your orders are, however, that Gianelli must not be arrested or even bothered unless you have cast-iron proof that he is engaging in political activity. The only other political personality you know of is Saladio whom you understand to be in the country somewhere. You are personally loyal to Navarro because you are a sincere believer in the Inertian form of dictatorship. You admire greatly Field Marshall Suballa and feel that if more Latin American countries followed the Inertian example, much faster progress could be made. Intellectually arrogant to a degree, you despise the stupid and unwashed Inertian workers, particularly the backward and superstitious Sarakhanese minority.

You have no hesitation in using violent means if these will accomplish your ends. Apart from Navarro and El Caudillo the only person who has your loyalty is you.

Power Rating: 50

GETULIO DE BRUEGEL MARTINEZ ---SAN TOMAS

You are head of the aristocratic establishment in the port city of San Tomas. You are very wealthy by Inertian standards and extremely conservative. You support the Suballa regime, as you have been doing for many years, despite El Caudillo's questionable family origins. You are on excellent terms with him, one of the very few Inertians allowed to speak with him freely.

You do not like foreigners in general and you particularly loathe the filthy Sarakhanese minority. You feel the poor are poor because they deserve to be so in view of their innate inferiority. Thus, you look down not only upon the San Tomas slum dwellers but also upon the fishermen, cannery workers, and even the middle classes. You reside in a private villa, Cholombey des deux Eglises, on the hilltop overlooking San Tomas harbor.

You may travel anywhere in the country, but are not particularly inclined to political activity except for your high interest in stability. You would be quite happy to use violence if it would achieve your objective, but are also lazy.

You have a certain respect for Gen. Medina, the head of the administration, and for General Navarro, head of F.A.N.G. You also get on well with the army commander, Gen. Moreno, but consider him a bit too crude and brutish for your taste. Obviously you have no use for Gianelli, and are appalled by the FLN.

Power Rating: 20

FERNANDO MARICO

You are a member of the RDP party and liable to instant arrest if perceived as such by the government. You are a small businessman and own two scruffy hotels and a fishermen's cafe in San Tomas. Your leader is of course Professor Gianelli, returned on parole to Inertia. You take your orders from him even if you do not always agree with his policy. Remember that he is on parole and not allowed to engage in political activity. Make a serious effort not to get him in trouble. There are other members of the RDP party in the country: Wang Ba-dan in Lucretia and Professor Garcia in Santa Filomena. Their identities are not known to the government. There are also members of the Communist FLN party in the country, possibly including Saladio, who is rumored to have returned secretly to the country some time ago. You are anti-Communist and feel that the FLN would be quite as bad for Inertia as the present repressive regime, but you should appreciate the fact that it may be necessary to use the FLN against the military. You should, however, make sure that your image and support is different from that of the FLN. You are a patriot, and not inclined to violence as you feel that this might runagainst the democratic society you are trying to build. You do not want to plunge Inertia into civil war.

You are on cordial terms with both the army and military commanders Madeira and Albeniz. You also get on well with Caulfield, United Fish's local agent, although you feel that he and the Americans are exploiting the workers. You are, however, appreciative of the pressure that the U.S. Embassy put on Field Marshall Suballa to allow Gianelli back into the country. Remember that the Americans, although sympathetic to you, cannot really give you any assistance. Also remember that secret police agents are scattered through out the country and that you should beware of them.

You have friends among the fishermen and cannery workers, but again, you should be careful what you say and to whom you say it.

Power Rating: 40

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Study the scenario, particularly the social and economic background section.

You are workers in the fish canneries of the port city of San Tomas. The canneries are owned by United Fish Co. of Boston. Your plant manager is Mr. Arthur Caulfield, from whom you receive your wages.

Like most Inertians, you revere, respect, and admire "El Caudillo". He has done a great deal for Inertia. You have good jobs, are much better paid than you used to be, and are quite happy. You oppose anything which would change this system.

Your acknowledgment of any obligation to take an active part in the political system is low. You tend to look upon government and politics as somewhat unpredictable and threatening forces--"Let El Caudillo take care of it; he knows what's best for Inertia." You have hardly any membership in political organizations, and there is little union activity among the group. You are sketchily informed of facts and are oriented more as passive subjects than as participant citizens.

You may not travel.

You are little concerned with the welfare of the slums or other groups in the city. You would perhaps like to copy the life-style of the middle class but they look down on you.

Power Rating: 70

MIDDLE CLASS---- SAN TOMAS

Study the scenario, particularly the section on the economic and social background of the country.

Objective: to keep earning a living.

As long as there continues to be stability in Inertia, you are able to earn your normal income from your shops, stores, and jobs, and gain points for doing so.

You, like most other Inertians, respect and revere El Caudillo. Although sometimes you realize he has used harsh means, you feel that on the whole his presence is essential to preserve the stable and profitable order.

You are most responsive to any appeals that promise you economic and material benefits. You feel strongly about the sanctity of private property, and strongly oppose what little FLN activity there has been in Inertia.

Your people are: highly cohesive bound through common economic circumstances in a common outlook highly interested in the stability of Inertian politics highly interested in bettering your material advantages admirers and supporters of El Caudillo of moderate income bracket of high school education literate

You tend to regard yourselves as cut above the fishermen and cannery workers of San Tomas; however, they pose no threat to you. You emulate the aristocratic conservative upper class families of San Tomas and are peeved that you have difficulty gaining access to their closed circle. Since you are a group, you are immobile and may not leave Marinara province.

Power Rating: 50 Population: 30,000

PORT SLUMS---SAN TOMAS

Read the scenario, particularly the section on Inertia's economic and social background.

You constitute the slum dwellers of the port city of San Tomas. What little unemployment there is in Marinara Province is to be found in your ranks. You are uprooted and often transients. Your grievances and burdens are many and various.

Although your lot is a miserable one, you are suspicious of change ---you realize that though things are bad now, they could be worse.

Like most other Inertians, you revere, respect, and admire "El Caudillo" and regard him as the benefactor of the country. It has never really occurred to you to use violence and demonstrate, for you realize that this sort of thing is never done in Inertia.

You sense a low degree of obligation to work through any political system and do not participate in any voluntary political associations. Although American aid has helped build a clinic and a school in the slum, you are not pro-American, as you consider them a sinfully rich nation who should be doing ever more for the country. You have heard some people accuse the Americans of draining money out of Grenadilla for their own purposes and are half-convinced, reasoning that that must be how they get big cars and the money to put up clinics.

Your people typically have families of seven or more children, many deserted by the fathers. Almost all of you are illiterate, the crime rate is astronomical, and disease common. Your diet is mostly fish and beans.

You may not travel.

Power Rating: 50 Population: 20,000

DON DIEGO DE VELASQUEZ CERVANTES

Your family is one of the oldest in Inertia, and in the eighteenth century, was one of the richest. Even at that date, the family fortunes were being decimated by the family passion for gambling. Spectacular losses by your nineteenth and early twentieth century predecessors forced you into the position where, in 1947, you gave a check for a gambling debt that you knew your bank would not honor. You were saved from the predicament by the intervention of General Navarro, head of the secret police, who lent you the money. You realized shortly afterwards when he asked you for information on the political activities of one of your closest friends that he had been waiting for some years for a moment when you would be financially embarrassed, and you have to do what he wanted. Although your financial situation has improved (your strong willed heiress wife does not allow you to gamble), you are still in Navarro's power. If it ever came out that you gave information, however trifling, to the hated secret police chief, social ruin would follow. Your friends, the aristocratic community, despise and fear Navarro and were your connection with him ever to become public, you would be unable to live in Inertia.

You therefore do whatever Navarro wants you to do, albeit reluctantly. You would like to get rid of Navarro but you have no idea what records he keeps, or who else also knows of your affiliation with Navarro. Any overt move against Navarro or any show of independence on your part might well bring exposure.

You have no particular loyalties to anyone but yourself and your family. You would have no hesitation in engaging in violence if that would help.

Power Rating: 50

BRIGADIER-GENERAL NAVARRO

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You are the head of F. A. N. G., the dreaded secret police, much feared in Inertia. You are completely loyal to Field Marshall Suballa who has always given you a free hand to set up your informant network. You consider the army chief, Major-General Mareno, a polo-playing bonehead with no appreciation of tactics which do not involve several hundred men and a howitzer. He despises you equally and never tires of contrasting the simple honest soldier that he perceives himself to be with your devious Machiavellian image.

You have hand-picked agents in each province--Don Diego de Velasquez Cervantes in Santa Filomena, Pancho Vargas in Marinara and Choi Oi Sao in Lucretia. You do not want any of these three to find out that the others are also working for you as you prefer that they have no opportunity to ally against you. You have a hold over all three of them. You paid a gambling debt for Cervantes in 1947, and in exchange, made him give you a trifling piece of information about one of his aristocratic friends. You have extracted similar trifling pieces of information over the years which have served to bind Cervantes to you. Should he balk at anything you ask him to do, you have only to threaten to expose his connection with you, which would be social ruin for him and his family. You rather enjoy your position of power over one of the aristocrats you despise and envy. Pancho Vargas is indebted to you for your longstanding but clandestine support for his artistic endeavors; and Choi Oi Sao owes his position as neo-Delphic oracle to you in that the whole idea of Mithraism was yours, designed to give the Sarakhanese an other-worldly outlet for their potentially explosive frustrations. These agents would be very difficult to replace, so you must be prepared to take care not to expose them. They each know there must be other agents working for you, but do not know who they are.

The only threat to your preeminent and comfortable position lies in the overthrow of the system. El Caudillo is too well aware of your abilities to let you go because of complaints from Moreno or Medina. Any democratic or popular parties like the RDP or the FLN are potentially dangerous for you, and you

are particularly concerned to find Saladio who, you are informed by a foreign source, has actually retired to the country. You have also reason to believe that the FLN have some kind of party structure already set up and you would dearly love to find their agents. You are not so concerned about the RDP but are concerned to prevent them getting any kind of popular support.

You do not like Americans, particularly the military attache, and you are aware that they don't like you, your methods and your organization. You are quite unscrupulous and will use any means to gain your ends. You are loyal only to El Caudillo and yourself.

Power Rating: 80

Income Source Purpose Amount	nnt nut	Ex _i Recipient	Expenses t Durpose	Amount	Surplus Income - Expenses	Prior Savings \$ '000	Total Resources \$ '000
Moreno Budget		Control	Expenses	\$ 10,000	\$ 1,000	\$ 3,000	\$ 4,000
Medina Tax Recepts Richardson AID	57, 750 1 4, 250 1	Navarro Moreno	FANG Budgt Military	11,200 43,000	27, 800	89,400	119, 200
Pippin UFCO 2 Profits 8	22, 000 84, 000			54,200			
Suballa Military 43 Budget	43,000	DePrano Madeira Morgan	Expenses Expenses Expenses	11,000 11,000 11,000 33,000	10, 000	30, 000	40, 000
Suballa FANG Buogt 11	1,200	Vargas Choi Oi Sad S Various	Salary Salary Expenses	100 100 1,000 1,200	10,000	30, J00	40, 000
Sanza Tax Receipts 30, Torremolinos Tax Receipts 50, Albeniz Tax Receipts 35, 115,	0000	Suballa Students Control	Salary Univ.Budg't Govt Budgt	57, 750 2, 500 42, 250 102, 500	12, 500	37, 500	50, 000
Lauterpacht Support	250	Various]	Expenses	200	50	150	200
Control U.S.S.R. Support Lefevre Cuba Support	100 300 400	Jimenez Truong Van Dong Various	Expenses Expenses Expenses	100 100 200 400			
You consume all of your salary.	·			1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997			

Prior	it Expenses \$ '000 \$ '000	300 150	450	00 \$ 1,000 \$ 3,000 \$ 4,000	00 00 9,400 28,200 37,600		00		50	00		00 3, 000 9, 000 12, 000	00 2,550 7,650 10,200	00000	<u>.</u>
S	ose Amount \$ 1000	<u>+</u>	••••••	ises 10,000	Tax Receipts 50,000 Gov ¹ t Exp. 40,000		90,000	х х х	Proj. 4, 250 Proj. 4, 250	8, 500		UFCO Consh 22,000 Repatriated 15,000 Profits 37,000		Support 250 Consumpt ¹ n 1,200 2,450	
Expenses	Recipient Purpose	Saladio Support Various Expenses		Control Expenses	Medina Tax Re Control Gov ¹ t			68 . C 6	Suballa AID P Various AID P			Suballa UFCOC Control Repatri	Torremol- Taxes	inos Gianelli Support Control Consum	
	Amount \$ 1000	0.0	**************************************	11,000 C	72,000 C	1, 300 1, 300	99,400		8, 500	total budge.	y and allowances.	40, 000 S	5,000	-00	
, Încome	Purpose	Cuban Support		Budget	Taxes Taxes Taxes	s laxes ?))Taxes Taxes		You consume all salary and	AID Funds	You must expend your total budge	me all ŝalary	UFCO Profits	Investment	Profits	
	Source	Control	,	Moreno		MIGGLE CLASS LAYES (S.F.) Workers (S.F.) Taxes Slums (S.F.) Taxes		You consun	Control	You must e	You consume	Caulfield	Control	-	
	Name	Lefevre	Total	ĎePrano	Torremolinos		Total		Richardson	Total	Bill	Pippin	Lauterpacht	Total	

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l		0	1			,					1		` O	
Total	Kesources \$ 1000	\$		288, 000		24,000		4, 000		800		400	800	
Prior	Savings \$ '000	\$ 600	į	216, 0 00		18, ÕÕO		3, 000		600		300	009	
1 /6.	Income - Expenses	\$ 200		72, 000	~	é , 0 00		1,000	7	200		100	200	
1.200	Amount \$ 1000	\$ 200 100	300	72,000 216,000	288,000	60, 000 19, 000	79, 000	23, 000 6, 000	29, 000	5, 000 1, 300	6, 300	2,400	200	300
Expenses	Purpose	Consumpt'n Taxes	,	Taxes Consumpt ¹ n		Consumpt'n Taxes	, ,	Consumpt ¹ n Taxes	~ .	Consumpt'n Taxes	~	University Operation	Consumpt'n Taxes	
Ex	Recipient	Control Torremol- inos		160,000 Torremol- 200,000 inos	TOTITO	Control Torřemol- inos		Control Torremol- inos		Control Torremol- inos		Control	Control Torremol- inos	
	Amount \$ 1000	\$	Ţ	Y	360,000 CONIEU	85,000		30, 000		6, 500	· · ·	2,500	500	
Income	Purpose	Return on Husband's Investments		Rent Rec'ts Rent Rec'ts		Income		Wages		Wages		Budget	Return on Investment	
I	Source	Control		Guzman Pascual		Control		Control		Control		Medina	Contrŏl	- <u>100.000.000</u>
	Name	Senora Cervantes	Total	Credenaz	Total	Middle Class (Santa Filo- mena)	Total	Workers (Santa Filo- mena)	Total	Slums (Santa Filo- mena)	Total	Students	Cervantes	Total

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					Expenses		Surplus Income -	S	Total Resources
Sou	Source	Purpose	Amount \$ 1000	Recipient	Purpose	Amount \$ '000	Expeñses		000; \$
Guzman Pascual Sarakha Inertian	Guzman Pascual Sarakhanese Inertian	Taxes Taxes Taxes	\$ 9,000 9,000 8,000	Medina	Tax receipta\$30,000	\$30°000	\$ 6,000	\$ 18,000	\$ 24,000
,			\$36,000			\$30,000	:		
Sara	Sarakhanese	Rent	205, 000	Credenza Sanza Control	Rent Receipts Taxes Consumption	160,000 9,000 18,000	18,000	54, 000	72, 000
Iner Pe	Inertian Peasants	Rent	245, 000	Credenza Sanza Control	Ret Receipts 200, 000 Taxes 9, 000 Consumption 18, 000	200,000 '9,000 18,000	18, 000	54, 000	72,000
Control	trol	Produce	303, 000	Sanza Pascual Contrôl	Taxes Rent Consumption	10,000 245,000 47,500 302,500	500	1,500	2, 000
Control	rol	Produce	237,000	Sanza Guzman Control	Taxes Rent Consumption	8,000 205,000 23,750 236,750	250	750	1, 000
You	are given bare	bare subsisten	ence by	he Sarakhanese	ese peasants	. You have	ve no mone	r of your	own.
Nav	Navarro	Sajary	100	Various	Expenses	20	30	96	120
Sal	Saladio	Expenses	100	Various	Expenses	95	S	15	20

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	I	Income		Ex	Expenses			Prior	Total
Name	Source	Purpose	Amount 3 \$ 1000	Recipient	Purpose	Amount \$ '000	Income - Expenses	\$ 1000 \$	kesources \$ 1000
Albeniz	Marico	Taxes	\$ 5	Medina	Tax Receipts	\$35,000	\$ 7,505	\$ 22, 515	\$ 30,020
	Slums (S. T.)	Taxes Taxes							
	Fishermen	Taxes	17,500						
	Workers Workers Martinez	Taxes Taxes	17,500		11	ar			
Total		Ň	42, 505	**			Ň	Ţ	
Madeira	Moreño	Budget	11,000	Control	Expenses	10,000	1,000	3, 000	4, 000
Jimènez	Saladio	Expenses	. 100	Various	Expenses	95	5	15	20
Caulfield	Control	UFCO Cross 205	205,000	en	UFCO Profi Wages	40,000 80,000	5, 000	15,000	20,000
Total				Cannery Workers	Wages	80,000 200,000	;		~
Fishermen (Marinara) Total	Caulfield	Wages	80, 000	Albeniz Control	Taxes Consumption	17,500 59,250 76,750	3, 250	9, 750	13, 000
Vargas	Navarro	Salary	100	Various	Expenses	70	30	06	120
Martinez	Control	Income	500	Albeniz Control	Taxes Consumption	100 200	500	99	800
Total					~	300			-
Marico	Control	Income	80	Albeniz Various	Taxes Expenses	60 60	12	45	60
Total						é5 ,	-		• • •
		· ·							

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Total	Kesources \$ 1000	\$ 22 , 400	;	13, 000	120		
	Savings \$ 1000	\$ 16, 800		9, 750	06		· · · ·
~	Income - Expenses	\$ `5, 600		3 , 250	30		
	Amount \$:000	\$ 7,000 22,400		17,500 59,250 76,750	400 1,570	2	х х
Expenses	Purpose	Taxes Consumption		Taxes Consumption	Taxes Consumption		
Ēx	Recipient	Albeniz Control		Albeniz Control	000 Albeniz Control		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	Amount \$ 1000	\$35, 000		80,000	2,000	2.	
Income	Purpose	Incomé	t	Wages	Wages		······································
	Source	Control	· · ·	Caulfield	Çontrol	د م	
;	Name	Middle Class (San Tomás)	Total	Cannery Workers (Marinara) Total	Slums (San Tomas) Totel		

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APPENDIX II

1

PATRIA PLAYER MATERIALS

Personality Profiles Summary of Economic Transaction Records

FIELD MARSHALL ALBERTO GARCIA-O'BRIEN

Femiliarize yourself with the scenario, particularly part III---military. The information given below is in addition to the facts generally known about you from the scenario.

YOUR OBJECTIVES:

In you rests the responsibility for the continued democratic development of Patria. Your importance to the political and economic functioning of the nation is crucial, a fact of which you are well aware. You will receive points for successfully excluding all anti-democratic forces from power, and additional points if you can accomplish this without having to take over the government yourself.

ORIENTATION AND STYLE:

Your officers are bound by personal loyalty and allegiance to you and your philosophy, although it is rumored that there may be a few dissidents somewhere in your ranks. Your control over other Patrians outside the armed forces is by virtue of your position as Field Marshall of the Army.

As mentioned in the scenario, you have a high interest in stability and are reluctant to assume political power unless necessary. However, there are no real structural limitations as to what you could do should you decide to act. Your primary goals are stability, nationalism, democracy, and moderation. These coincide with the goals of the majority of the Patrian people.

You tend to act alone, rather than in coalition. The most frequently consulted interest partners are your military organization, Sebastiano, and Rodriguez, although you may deal with any groups trying to elect a candidate.

In the past, you have tended to stress persuasion, not violence; honor, not opportunism; individualism, not a need for consensus; caution, not daring; reliability, not unreliability. You see human relations as mutually beneficial, not exploitative, and recognize the need for patience in human activities. You have made intermittent use of the national radio broadcasting network in the past.

RESOURCES:

Military

Velasquez garrison	5,000
San Cristobal "	11,000
Fertilidad l	11,000
Fertilidad 2	11,000
Fertilidad 3	11,000
Cupria	1,000
•	50,000

Economic.

\$60,000,000 military budget of which \$50,000,000 is distributed proportionally among the garrisons (see attached transaction sheet). \$10,000,000 yearly surplus added to \$20,000,000 previous savings gives \$30,000,000 resources available for any use

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Power Rating: 150

II-1

JULIO LOPEZ-----Former Minister of the Interior (twice)

(The following information is <u>in addition</u> to what is generally known about you and your activities from the scenario)

OBJECTIVE:

Most points for taking over the government Next most points for gaining a seat in a CD cabinet Next most points for enhancing your power in any way

POSSIBLE STRATEGIC ORIENTATION:

You are an "arch conservative," expected to make a major bid to regain the power which has twice slipped through your fingers, thanks to Field Marshall O'Brien. Play on fears of a "leftist takeover," be it FLN or APRA. Your natural allies might be landowners everywhere; Del Solar; foreign capitalists; government officials. Sr. Arana in San Cristobal is one of your most ardent supporters, having contributed \$200,000 to your cause last year. In addition, you have been able to obtain the support of an influential segment of disgruntled military officers in the 102nd infantry in Fertilidad, who are fearful of APRA coming to power.

You can freely interact in the political process. You are highly nationalistic, clever, and unpredictable; you operate both independently and in coalition with others; you oppose change and social equality.

You:

tend toward violence, not persuasion tend toward opportunism, not honor tend toward daring, not caution tend toward unreliability and unpredictability tend to act in an authoritarian manner tend not to react negatively to the authoritarian tactics of others tend to consider oursiders as hostile, but potentially cooperative tend to consider human relations as exploitative not mutually beneficial tend to desire dominance in your relations with others

NOTE: The Postmaster General, who has nominal government authority over telecommunications (radio and telephones), is secretly loyal to you. Since control over communications may be important to you in a take-over, it will pay to foster that loyalty.

You are extremely anti-communist and would probably take punitive action against the FLN should you gain power. In addition, you regard Valdez as a communist and would like to see him behind bars.

Power Rating: 70

II-2

POSTMASTER GENERAL --- VELASQUEZ CITY.

Unbeknownst to everyone, you secretly support Lopez. Your objective is to deal with Lopez and gain him support wherever you can.

You are byal to Patria, active, and have become very wealthy through political extra-governmental payoffs and connections. Through skillful accounting, you now control \$75,000,000 in government funds which you may use to further your cause. Most Patrians would not support your goals if they knew about them, although a handful of your rich and powerful friends well might if they could be persuaded.

You tend toward:

violence not persuasion opportunism not honor daring not caution unreliability not predictability acting in an authoritarian manner

You have partial control over the radio station of Patria

You may block the use of the telephone system by other players in the game by informing an Umpire. Seizure of the radio network may meet with Arvakian's objections. You may have to defend your ability to control communications against other players who may try to take it away from you. Particularly, you lose it if Sebastiano, or whoever is in power fires you.

Power Rating: 60

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II-3

PRESIDENT JUAN MANUEL SEBASTIANO Y VARGAS ("Sebastiano")

First, study your role in the scenario. The information given below is in <u>addition</u> to what is told about you in the scenario.

YOUR OBJECTIVES:

To stay in power To be re-elected To nullify all opposition To gain as much support as you can

ORIENTATION:

Your 1961 election victory (see scenario) was a close one. Since some say you did not in fact win at all, you in effect control Patria at the good graces of the army. You now need a solid election victory or else sufficient power to control the government in the event of your election defeat.

STYLE:

In the past, you have tended to stress persuasion, not violence; honor, not opportunism; unity, not individualism. You tend to act in coalitions rather than alone. You are for: moderation, conservatism, private property; defense of middle- and upper-class interests; stability; unity.

RESOURCES:

You have a Postmaster-General and a Minister of Justice in Velasquez, but you are not sure if you can rely on their support. You have governors in each of the other provinces. You can always call for the support of the army, but are dependent on their decision whether or not to obey your orders. Fast interest partners, among others, have been Del Solar, and the landowners.

Your main power, however, lies in the fact that you control the government budget. (See attached transaction sheet).

Power Rating: 100

FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ ("Rodriguez") --- APRA Leader

OBJECTIVES:

To be elected the new President of Patria

To gain as much support as possible without compromising ideology

ORIENTATION:

You are the leader of the APRA Party, on the threshold of gaining power in Patria legitimately and constitutionally. In fact, you believe that you did win the 1961 elections but that election falsifications by the present government obscured this outcome. Since 1961, there has been a rising groundswell of support for your candidacy, and you are now trying to gain as much support as you can in order to obtain a decisive, unquestionable victory. (SEE SCENARIO).

Your support is mainly ideological (not charismatic), coming from those many Patrians who, like yourself, support liberal, moderate reform. Past allies have been landlords who practice the philosophy of enlightened self-interest; the middle classes everywhere; young professionals such as Obregon; students; slum dwellers; industrial workers; the fabulously wealthy Getulio Arvakian (who contributed \$600,000 to your cause last year); Jackson of the Anaconda Co; and many others whose support must be maintained or recruited anew. Valdez is your party leader in Fertilidad province. His wild-eyed unpredictable fanaticism causes many potential supporters to shy away from APRA; but since Valdez has the ability to deliver the substantial votes of the Fertilidad peasantry, you are reluctant to read him out of the party movement at present . What you decide to do about Valdez in the future is, of course, up to you---your principal objective is to get elected.

Your principal means of obtaining support has been political promises of social benefits when you gain power. You encourage social change while at the same time trying to minimize its dislocating effects for individuals. You have tended toward persuasion, not violence; honor, not opportunism; unity, not individualism; caution, not daring. You regard most other players as potentially cooperative. You have in the past made frequent use of the national radio network, which Sr. Arvakian has kindly consented to permit you to do, for political appeals.

Power Rating: 80

IBARBOURU -- FLN LEADER

1,000 men; no votes.

People loyal to you:

Law students at Velasquez University South End Slum in Velasquez Miners in the lower pit

You know what to do; go to it.

Power Rating: 40

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COMMANDER OF MILITARY GARRISON -- VELASQUEZ CITY

YOU ARE:

equal to all other garrison leaders in terms of rank subordinate and loyal to Field Marshall O'Brien paid through the government budget

highly nationalistic

likelier to act on orders from O'Brien than independently, except on local matters which require quick decision

not very tolerant of social or revolutionary change well paid

against any policy that will put Patria in such chaos that your men will not get paid and equipped

eager to prevent national conditions from becoming such that you will have to fight

YOUR MEN ARE:

highly cohesive under all pressures bound through a common outlook highly self-aware as a group of homogeneous background 11,000 strong non-political reliable -- can be relied upon to obey the orders of their commander

You will be scored for acting according to these traits.

Both you and your men may not vote.

You may be deployed or re-assigned to another province, with or without your men, and may not refuse the assignment, unless you wish to declare yourself in a state of mutiny.

MINISTER OF JUSTICE-----VELASQUEZ CITY

A government administrator and cabinet member, you are loyal to the present government of Sebastiano y Vargas but open to listen to anyone's persuasive attempts. You can act either alone or in coalition. Past sources of your information have been the governmental representatives in the outlying provinces and the military in Velasquez. You tend toward persuasion, not violence; toward caution; reliability; passivity; anti-authoritarianism. You trust the present government and act in its behalf; that's how you got your post in the first place.

You control a fabulous sum of money, having managed to siphon from the government budget a total of \$195,000,000 which you may now use in accordance with your own objectives. (see attached transaction record)

In addition, you serve as governor of Velasquez City. Either you or the commander of the Velasquez military garrison must be present in the city at all times.

Power Rating: 80

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MR. ALEXANDER JACKSON-----ANACONDA CO. REPRESENTATIVE IN VELASQUEZ

OBJECTIVE: keep the mines open, keep the money coming in keep anyone who might nationalize the mines from gaining power

You are free to associate with anyone. Possible interest partners might be: landowners, mineworkers, Sebastiano's CD, Lopez, Rodriguez, or others.

Your style:

high interest in stability not nationalistic active tend to use forceful persuasion, but not violence tend toward opportunism, not honor tend toward individualism, not trying to obtain consensus before acting typical American businessman overseas high standard of living

Your direct representative in Cupria province is Mr. Arthur Hamilton. You deal with him on most matters concerning Cupria, flying out to the mines only in case of special need. You spend most of your time in the capital dealing with government and economic personalities.

For your economic resources, see the attached transaction sheet. Study your role as it is presented in the scenario.

SENOR GETULIO ARVAKIAN

First, study the information which has been presented about you in the scenario.

Objective: continue to amass wealth convince other factions in the country of the need for moderate reform to avert a later revolution sympathize with Rodriguez

Although one of the hundred richest men in the world, you have not completely forgotten your university liberalism. Consequently, although you now support Sebastiano and the CD, you are quite willing to consider the candidacy of Rodriguez, the APRA leader, provided that he guarantees you non-nationalization of industry. Your enlightened self-interest tells you that, although someone like Lopez might well protect your own interests in the short run, the only sensible course for long run protection is to satisfy the grievances of the masses at as little cost to your enterprises as possible.

You tend toward persuasion, not violence; honor, not opportunism; individualism; and imaginative activity and coalitions.

RESOURCES:

Last year you amassed 10 million dollars profit, 2.4 million of which you spent on personal consumption,; 2,000,000 of which went to the government as taxes; and \$600,000 of which you gave as a political contribution to Rodriguez (unknown to most of the country). Your surplus of 5 million added to your past savings of 10 million gives you fifteen million dollars to use as you please (see transaction sheet).

You own the country's television station.

You may deny access to your broadcasting station to any player. They may, however, try to take it over by force. In particular, the Postmaster General, who has governmental authority over communications, may wish to seize control of broadcasting, in whole or in part.

SENOR EDUARDO DEL SOLAR ("Del Solar")

First, learn about yourself and your mining interests from the scenario, p. 2.

Objective: gain as much money and economic power as you can. This can most easily be accomplished by keeping the mines open, which can in turn be best accomplished in an atmosphere of Patrian stability.

Orientation: Since FLN and APRA, if in power, might nationalize the mines, you support the present Sebastiano government. However, you are free to consider any scheme which might increase your wealth.

You have accumulated \$600,000 after taxes to use as you see fit. (see attached transaction record). You have powerful but numerically very few supporters; are highly nationalistic; and oppose equality and social change.



ABSENTEE LANDOWNERS-----VELASQUEZ CITY

You own heaps of land in Fertilidad. The peasants pay your local agent. He, in turn, forwards the money to you in the capital city to support your conspicuous consumption habits. If the peasants should refuse to pay, you can attempt to have your agents force them off the land. However, your dependency on them to get the crops in to assure your income is almost as great as their dependency on you for a livelihood, and you are not sure if you could easily get new peasants to replace the old ones once the story of your abrupt dismissal made the rounds in the Fertilidad villages.

You support anyone who will maintain the present system which guarantees your present level of income as a minimum. Therefore you have a high interest in any candidates or parties who can promise stability. Stability is best guaranteed by the continued illiteracy and disorganization of the peasantry, in your opinion, so you actively oppose the efforts of Valdez and have instructed your agents to do the same. Your political interests lead you to support either Sebastiano, the present President, or Lopez, the challenger from the right wing, but presently you support Sebastiano because of your fear that a Lopecista government without the support of the military might provoke a military reaction or a left-wing reaction, either of which might tend to damage the present stable order. Sebastiano has given you his personal informal assurances that he will try to maintain the status quo.

You are not influenced by appeals to nationalism nearly as much as by appeals to your personal interests. You oppose social equality and believe that you hold your present position by virtue of your innate superiority to the common peasant. You are expecially sensitive about the issue of land reform and take an immediate dislike to those who promise it. If the possibility of land reform seems imminent, you are ready to join in a coalition with the right wing if Sebastiano can give you no further satisfaction.

For your resources, see the attached transaction sheet.

You are free to travel throughout the country.

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MIDDLE CLASS ----- VELASQUEZ CITY

Your 75,000 votes should be wooed by almost all political factions. You have the potential power to determine the outcome of the forthcoming election. Act according to your middle class interests. In 1961, you went heavily CD, but APRA strength has been growing since that time. Study the scenario. You may communicate with other middle classes in other cities but may not travel.

Your voters are:

highly cohesive under all pressures (may not split your votes) bound through your common economic circumstances in a common ideology not too highly self-aware as a group higly interested in the stability of Patrian politics highly interested in bettering your material advantages moderately nationalistic for moderate poltical change predominantly shopkeepers and wage-earners frequent listeners to the national radio-tv network moderate income bracket

Population: 170,000

Votes: 75,000

Power Rating: 50



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VELASQUEZ------URBAN PROLETARIAT

Population : 600, 000

Votes: 260,000

Initial Loyalty: CD

Attitudes: You are wage earners and your present small income is tied to the existing economic system. Therefore, you have tended to support the CD party although the general tendency toward APRA's coming to power has begun to make some inroads among your ranks.

You tend toward using persuasion, not violence; toward opportunism, not principle; toward acting as a group; toward caution; toward reliability.

Your objective is to continue earning a living and to oppose the election of any government which would radically change the existing economic system.

Your acknowledgment of any obligation to take an active part in the political system is low. You tend to look upon government and politics as unpredictable and threatening forces. You view the present political system as exploitative rather than representative, and have hardly any membership in voluntary political associations. Your people are very sketchily informed of political facts and are oriented more as passive subjects than as participant citizens.

Your voters are:

highly cohesive under all pressures bound through common economic circumstances in a common outlook not very highly self-awage as a group highly interested in bettering your material advantages only moderately interested in the stability of Patrian politics moderately nationalistic predominantly factory workers of low income bracket of poor education

II-14

VKLASQUEZ ---- NORTH END SLUM

VOTES: 60,000

POPULATION: 120,000

LOYALTY: APRA

OBJECTIVES: Social reform Betterment of living conditions

Your group has:

high social cohesion, resulting from your common economic plight a low interest in stability low conception of self-worth seek material comforts enjoyed by Velasquez middle class and promised by Rodriguez 1

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Your initial loyalty to APRA does not mean that you cannot be persuaded to change your loyalty to some other party if it can satisfy your interests better.

Power Rating: 20



VELASQUEZ----SOUTH END SLUM

Initial loyalty: FLN

Population: 10,000

Votes: 4,000

Your grievances and burdens have been great. Your people have been exploited and there is much unemployment. You support anything which will promise the quickest change in the status quo, including violence and terror. You tend toward opportunism, but not at the cost of perverting your ideology. Highly cohesive. In unity there is strength. Possible allies: the Law School students. Try to persuade the North End Slum and the Industrial workers that it is foolish to wait for the slow reforms promised by APRA.

SCHOOL OF LAW

Loyalty: FLN

Enrollment: 2500

Votes: 1,000

Objectives: Keep the university open so that you can get a degree, yet simultaneously try to help the FLN as much as you can, supporting maximum disruption, violence, and terror. You may agitate for the FLN among the miners and the slums. Points gained for keeping the university open---extra points if open long enough to graduate. Points lost if university is shut down.

Attitudes: Your commitment to left-wing philosophy is more ideological, based on Marxism-Leninism, than it is based on personal loyalty to Ibarbouru. However, you support Ibarbouru and his cause because he is "objectively progressive". You are very much against foreign capital and oppose Hamilton and Jackson as lackeys of the imperialist Anaconda Co., which, like the snake it is, grasps the Patrian economy and squeezes it dry. Since O'Brien has from time to time threatened to arrest some of you to teach you a lesson, you are unalterably opposed to him and his creeping militarism.

> If the government should close the university you will be very angry, because you don't feel that your ideology should prevent you from getting your degree.

If it should become impossible to support Ibarbouru, you would then support Valdez but only to use him. You are opposed to Rodriguez as a collaborator with the conservatives who is selling out the interests of the working class.

You are disgusted with the present political system and are looking forward to an alternative one.

Your group has high social cohesion; is self-aware as a group; is activist; is homogenous in terms of ideology, expectation from association in the group, and means of expression. These means of expression are likely to be highly unconventional or unpredictable. Your interest in stability is therefore low, and it takes very little to move you to action. Your extreme views are not representative of the feelings of the large majority of Patrians, yet you feel they will make for a better Patria. You take a cynical attitude toward the present political system and feel you must look elsewhere for satisfaction.

You may try to get the support of the APRA-ite social sciences students by making appeals on the basis of university solidarity.

SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

Loyalty: APRA

Enrollment: 2500

Votes: 1000

Objective: Keep the university open so that you can get your degree. Support APRA whenever you can. A good idea might be getting in touch with the young, liberal professional man, Obrégon, who lives in the port city of San Cristobal. Other possible interest partners include Rodriguez, Arvakian, the military, the miners, Anaconda Co. representatives, the middle and lower classes.

Attitudes: You are worried that you might get thrown-out of school if you become too violently left-wing. This would prevent you from getting your degree, which you want very badly for reasons of professional advancement. You are liberals partly because you're young, partly because it's fashionable, partly because of the illusion that you believe in it.

> You tend to shy away from violent activity, tend to have a high degree of participation in student organizations, are interested in moderately rapid social change without severe dislocating effects for individuals if possible. You respond easily to appeals to nationalism. You view the present political system as representative, not exploitative, and seek to work through it to effect social change and liberalism.

Points gained if university is not shut down; additional points gained for graduating. Points gained for acting and persuading others to act according to your interests.

Read the scenario.

For your economic activity, see the transaction sheet.

You regard the FLN-oriented law school students as too extreme but are willing to listen to them should they approach you. At the same time, you would like to get them to support APRA by saying that APRA, unlike FLN, has at least a chance to win and needs every vote it can get, so that if the FLN students are sincerely interested in reforms, they had best not throw their votes away by giving them to the FLN but should throw in with APRA.

COMMANDER OF MILITARY GARRISON (42nd armored division)

FERTILIDAD

YÔU ARE:

equal to all other garrison leaders in terms of rank subordinate and loyal to Field Marshall O'Brien paid through the government budget highly nationalistic likelier to act on orders from O'Brien than independently, except on local matters which require quick decision not very tolerant of social or revolutionary change well paid against any policy that will put Patria in such chaos that your men will not get paid and equipped eager to prevent national conditions from becoming such that you will

eager to prevent national conditions from becoming such that you will have to fight

YOUR MEN ARE:

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" ** [] ... but ? highly cohesive under all pressures bound through a common allegiance to you and through you to O'Brien highly self-aware as a group of homogeneous background 11,000 strong non-political reliable -----can be relied upon to obey your orders

You will be scored for acting according to these traits.

Both you and your men may not vote.

You may be deployed or reassigned to another province, with or without your men, and may not refuse the assignment.

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COMMANDER OF MILITARY GARRISON

FERTILIDAD-----l02nd infantry

Loyalty: LOPECISTA (Lopez)

Unlike most other military men in the country, you support the right wing contender for power, Lopez, who has been chafing in retirement walting for the chance to make his third bid for power. You are a disgruntled senior officer as described in the scenario at the top of page six. O'Brien, your commander knows that somewhere in Fertilidad, one of his officers may be supporting Lopez, but he does not know that it is you, the commander of the 102nd. You feel that O'Brien in his old age has become blind to the dangers of communism posed by the free-roving activities of Valdez in Fertilidad. You now feel that the time has come for the military to begin to take a stand in the face of the leftist threat. You are equal to all other garrison leaders in terms of rank, highly nationalistic, and paid through O'Brien, who in turn is paid through the government budget.

Objective: Try to get Lopez back in power. Additional points if you can do this without having to formally rebel against O'Brien. Look for support in logical places: big capitalists, conservatives, etc., ask Lopez where his other friends are.

Your men are:

highly cohesive under all pressures bound through a common outlook of homogeneous background well paid 11,000 strong non-political

You will be scored for acting according to these traits

Both you and your men may not vote.

You may be deployed or reassigned to another province, with or without your men.

Refusal of the assignment would mean mutiny.

GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE -----FERTILIDAD PROVINCE

Objective: "govern"---represent the interests of the Sebastiano (CD) government in Fertilidad province

Attitudes:

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You report regularly to Sebastiano and are loyal to him. You depend on the present government for your income and your job and thus tend to favor continuing to support it. You are responsible for collecting taxes from the citizens of Fertilidad, primarily from the peasants and the landlords and landowners' agents, although for a price you have agreed to let them pay less in taxes than they really should.

Your relations with the big military establishment in Fertilidad are good since you both have an interest in maintaining the present stable order and both support the present CD government.

Your relations with Valdez are very strained since Valdez is ready to expose your goings on to the peasants and you perceive him as a threat to you.

You are moderately nationalistic and tend toward using persuasion, not violence; toward opportunism; and toward caution.

LANDOWNERS AGENTS IN FERTILIDAD

Objective: keep the peasants working; keep the money coming in

You are responsible for collecting the rents from the peasants and sending the profits, after keeping some for yourself, to the actual landowners who reside in Velasquez. Your primary objective is thus to get the rents collected.

You are more interested in keeping the landowners happy than in keeping the peasants happy.

You are not in a position to determine what the rents shall be, except within a range of \pm 10%. For more than this you need the consent of the landowner.

You in addition control the votes of 20,000 peasants who are not actors in the game, so that these are, in effect, your votes to use at election time.

Since your own personal revenue is tied to the rents, you are violently opposed to land reform. This makes you extremely opposed to Valdez, the major proponent of land reform in Fertilidad province.

You are on fairly good terms with the army and with the government representative in Fertilidad.

Votes: 20,000

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Your political loyalty follows the instructions of the landowners----ask them whether you should deliver your votes for the CD or for Lopez. Population: 3,000,000 Votes: 355,000

Basically, your personal loyalty is to the person of Valdez rather than to APRA as such. Poor; exploited by the landlords and their agents; relatively passive; immobile; not very self-aware politically; can talk to, among others, Valdez, and the landowners' agent. Others who may try to solicit your support may include any of the politicians, the FLN, or any student groups.

You listen to these people but have a tendency not to act except upon the instructions of Valdez.

Valdez promises you ownership of the land you've been tilling; his radical position on land reform makes you extremely devoted to him.

If firmly convinced that, however, Valdez is acting against your interests, you may look for another leader. But you must have a leader, and cannot take any individual initiative.

Power Rating: 60

II-23

VALDEZ -- Peasant Leader (Fertilidad)

You are the rur al fanatic peasant leader described in the scenario. You are highly unpredictable and ready to use violence if necessary, but there is no telling what form this make take. You are the leader of the APRA party in Fertilidad and share in ARPA's general successes or failures unless you have specifically been read out of the party.

Your relations with Rodriguez, the national leader of the APRA party, have never been good and may be deteriorating. Rodriguez views your wild-eyed fanaticism as keeping many good solid Patrians from joining APRA for fear that you may have influence in the party. Nevertheless, Rodriguez tolerates you, mainly because you have the ability to deliver the votes of practically all the Fertilidad peasants into the APRA column.

Your hold over Rodriguez can be tightened by your threatening to defect to the FLN, with which you flirt from time to time. However, "you are not now and have never been" a member of the FLN. You are willing to use the FLN if APRA for some reason fails to give you satisfaction, but you realize that the FLN would, at the same time, be trying to use you.

Your peasants are almost religiously loyal to you and view you as a kind of saviour. Their faith is based on your charismatic appeal.

You oppose the landowners and their agents and insist that a condition for giving APRA your support must be that APRA promises to implement a sweeping program of land reform immediately upon gaining power. The hold of the landowners must be broken. If APRA doesn't grant this, there is always the danger that you will throw in with the FLN.

You tend toward violence, not persuasion; toward honor, not opportunism; toward daring, not caution. You sometimes tend to act in an authoritarian manner over the peasants because you can afford to, and you also feel that you know better than they do what is good for them.

If it seems as if Rodriguez will gain power, you will try for a post -- perhaps minister of agriculture == in his government. If the CD stays in power, you will be angry and may lead peasant revolts. If Lopez gets in power, there is the danger that he will throw you in jail, as he believes you are a communist.

The military in Fertilidad is keeping an intelligence eye on your activities and your relations with them are poor.

Since you are aware of the corruption of the government representative in Fertilidad and are threatening to expose him, your relations with him are poor as well.

GOVERNOR -- CUPRIA PROVINCE

Objective: "govern" -- represent the interest of the Sebastiano (CD) government in Cupria province.

Attitudes: You report regularly to Sebastiano and are loyal to him. You depend on the present government for your income and your job and thus tend to favor continuing to support it. You are responsible for collecting taxes from the citizens of Cupria, mainly miners and their families, and have built up a considerable private fortune through graft and the sales of tax exemptions. You tend toward using perusasion, not violence; but tend toward opportunism more than toward honor, since you are not above taking bribes. ÷,

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Your relations with the military leader in Cupria are good since you both have an interest in stability in Cupria which means more money for you and less work for the military leader.

Although initially loyal to Sebastiano, you resent being given duty way out in Cupria. You are willing to deal with Hamilton or the miners. Communicate with Sebastiano in the capital in the event of any activity he should know about.

Your isolation makes you vulnerable to joining any kind of movement or changign sides if the price is right. You are highly unpredictable and may play an imaginative role within the framework of your basic attitudes as presented above.

MILITARY GARRISON-----GUPRIA

strength- 1,000 men

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monetary resources: see transaction sheet

loyalty: initially, to O'Brien, and through him to whatever government he supports---currently the present CD government

Your garrison is:

equal to all other garrisons in terms of rank

in terms of size, the smallest in the country

unable to act decisively to put down a riot or a strike without calling in reinforcements from the main Fertilidad camp, one day's travel time away

relatively isolated from what's happening in the rest of the country likely to act on the basis of rumors or insufficient information not too tightly bound to the present government, although you initially are

loyal to O'Brien and through him to the government not particularly happy about being all the way out in Cupria not particularly anxious to take major military action against the FLN tired of being always being called upon to do the actual fighting not very cohesive as a group

Power Rating: 40

<u>N %</u>

MR. ARTHUR HAMILTON ---- CUPRIA MANAGER OF PATRIA MINERALES S. A. (mines)

OBJECTIVE: Keep the mines open, keep the money coming in, keep anyone who might nationalize the mines from gaining power.

Your personal income depends on the mines staying open and producing for Anaconda. You take orders from Alexander Jackson, who is Anaconda's man in Velesquez City. You may also have some contact with Eduardo Del Solar, who has a minority interest in the mining company, but you tend not to pay too much attention to him.

When the mines are open, you are paid (by the umpire) an amount equal to the value of the copper produced. After paying off the miners and keeping out your own salary (it may seem large, but it represents a rather large establishment), you send the rest to Jackson. You may not raise wages without Jackson's permission, but you may lower them at your own discretion, unless given express orders to the contrary by Jackson.

Your principal problem is political agitation among the miners, both for APRA and for the FLN. This agitation against the Company may lead to strikes and/or sabotage which will, of course, cut into production. A worse threat, but a longer range one, is that of nationalization of the mines if APRA takes power. You are not above politicking among the miners for CD, and you might well favor Lopez if the mines get too disorderly. The FLN terrorists are also active in the area. You tend to be dissatisfied with the army garrison's reluctance to pursue the FLN with vigor, and you resent the government's failure to reinforce the garrison.

As a foreigner, you do not, of course, have a vote in the election. At the same time, however, you do not have to pay any income tax, since taxation without representation is tyranny.

When the mines are not working effectively, due to a strike or for some other reasons, the company does not earn any money, and unless you correct the problem speedily, neither will you.

Power Rating: 20

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II-27

CUPRIAN MINERS-----NORTH SHAFT

Loyalty: - CD

Size: 230,000

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Votes: 115,000

You believe that the Patria Minerales Company is giving you as good a deal as you are likely to get if the mines are nationalized; therefore you are motivated by personal self-interest to keep supporting the present system. You feel that any proceeds from a nationalization of the mines would be spent in the other provinces rather than on you, so you oppose nationalization. You are highly cohesive and may not split your votes.

You tend toward persuasion, not violence; toward opportunism; toward unity; toward caution.

You may from time to time be visited by other groups who may try to persuade you but you may not travel yourselves.

If it for some reason became impossible for the CD to win, you might consider supporting Rodriguez if he gave a firm pledge of non-nationalization.

You are in favor of stability in Patria, to assure your present means of income, and are therefore strongly anti-communist. You also tend to shy away from supporting Lopez because you remember that his coming to power would not mean stability either, as the army might step in to unseat him. However, a Lopez in power would not hurt your material well being, which you are highly interested in.

Your objective is to continue earning a living and to oppose the election of any government which would radically change the exisiting economic system, and you will be scored accordingly. However, you may decide to strike to prevent any change you feel would be against your best interests. Of course while on strike you would lose your income.

CUPRIAN MINERS -- MIDDLE SHAFT

Loyalty: APRA

Size: 230,000

Votes: 115,000

You are highly nationalistic, but feel that the earnings of the mines should be spent in Patria rather than being taken out of the country. As long as you feel that you won't do significantly worse under government ownership of the mines, you are in favor of APRA. In addition, several built-up grievances against the company have led you to desire that the mines be nationalized. 4.7

You are free to strike, riot or disrupt production except that if you do so, you of course lose your wages.

Your primary support tends to go to Rodriguez; after Rodriguez, it is not certâin whether you would support the FLN or the CD, although you agree with the nationalization and anti-capitalist tendencies of the FLN.

Your fortune is tied to APRA's fortune -- you gain points if APRA wins and lose points if APRA loses. You may work together with other APRA people. You may be visited by other groups and are ready to listen to their point of view.

You are cohesive, self-aware as a group, homogeneous in terms of ideology, expectation from association, and means of expression.

You are active in the political system mainly through the cohesion you gain from your union membership and through your political party.

Although striking means you lose your wages, which is bad, it also means Hamilton and Anaconda Company lose their income, which is good.

You regard the FLN miners as a bunch of rowdy and unclean radicals but are willing to listen to them.

II-29

CUPRIAN MINERS -- LOWER PIT

Loyalty: FLN

Size: 40,000

Votes: 20,000

Repeated injustices and intolerable working conditions have made you desperate; you have been exploited and are prepared to support any scheme which will enable you to better your lot, no matter what means are necessary. Since you have nowhere to go but up, you have nothing to lose by terrorist activity or wildcat strikes or riots. You are happy to have the chance to support the FLN (see Scenario); and the FLN, in turn, is happy that it has you under its control.

You are predisposed toward extreme activity; toward daring. You are highly unpredictable and play a very active role. You are bitter not only toward the present government but even towards a moderate leftist government such as Rodriguez's APRA, which you consider lacks militancy and is equivalent to selling out your interests to the capitalists. You approve of Valdez and his general political stance but being purely a local Fertilian figure, he has no hold over you personally and is not likely to gain your support unless he at least visits the province or unless Ibarbouru tells you to support him. You must stay in the mines, except while on strike or other nefarious activity. However, you may not leave Cupria province.

You regard the CD supporters among the miners as bourgeois and having sold out. They are probably beyond being persuaded to your cause, so you oppose them. However, since the APRA supporters among the miners make a claim towards opposing, if only slightly, the present system, you regard them with even more contempt than you do the CD supporters. However, you are not above trying to persuade them to join you in your cause or to join you in a strike if it meets their objectives as well as yours. Both you and the APRA supporters, for example, favor nationalization.

You will be given points for striking and for disrupting activity in accordance with your general interests. However, if the strike fails, you lose points and are worse off than before you started. Your fortunes are tied to those of the FLN and you gain many points should the FLN substantially improve its position. Like the other groups, you lose wages when you strike, but since many of you are unemployed to begin with, this loss is no deterrent to forceful action. You are also expected to support Ibarbouru and receive points for doing so. DON SILVIO ARANA-MAQUILLAJE ("Arana")-

First, study your role as presented in the scenario.

Objective: Support Julio Lopez actively as much as you can

Resources: see transaction sheet

Attitudes: You are:

and prove a first and as some

a powerful, wealthy conservative merchant from the port city of San Cristobal

а 1 1

a staunch supporter of Julio Lopez

a long-time crusader against communists and left-wing Apristas against foreign investors unless they enhance your wealth pro-momed interests and propoerty holders in general

a supporter of the army in that it, like you, is against Valdez and the FLN, yet somewhat disturbed that the army does

not support Sopez and has in fact twice removed him very sensitive to appeal based on anti-communism

likely to believe human relations are exploitative, not mutually beneficial

likely to try to seek allies among the landowners, other wealthy Patrian businessmen, the military, and the bureaucracy

Your first objective is to gain support for Lopez wherever you can. Should Sebastiano gain power, you would be inclined to support Lopecista attempts to dislodge him. However, should Rodriguez gain power, you would then support the CD attempts to dislodge Rodriguez should any be made.

GUILLEN FANARTU OBREGON

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First, study your role as presented to all in the scenario.

<u>Attitudes</u>: Your loyalty is to Rodriguez. Support his candidacy. Get in touch with him. Other likely interest partners would be the social science students, the middle and merchant classes in San Cristobal, perhaps Valdez, Aryakian, and other liberals.

Try to get support for a program of basic land and tax reform but not at the expense of violence.

You are a moderate reformer, just to the left of center but a little to the right of Rodriguez. You favor land reform but are disturbed at the extremism of Valdez's approach to it.

As the head of BARES (the organization for social reform) you are a highly nationalistic young professional who is for the welfare of greater Patria and makes sophisticated appeals based on it. You believe in the utility of persuasion, not violence, and have a basic trust in the goodwill of men.

of persuasion, not violence, and have a basic trust in the goodwill of men. You tend to define all outsiders as potentially cooperative. Human relations are regarded by you as mutually beneficial, not exploitative. You are gullible and always dismayed at betrayals of confidence. You are a highly literate university graduate.

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MIDDLE CLASS---SAN CRISTOBAL

Population: 55,000 Votes: 35,000 Initial loyalty: CD

Your 35,000 votes have the potential power to determine the outcome of the forthcoming election. Act according to your own middle class interests. In 1961, you went heavily CD. Study the scenario.

You may communicate with other middle classes in other cities but should not travel.

Your voters are:

highly cohesive under all pressures

bound through common economic circumstances in a common idelogy likely to all vote as a bloc

highly interested in private property

" " in the stability of Patrain politics

" " in bettering your material advantages moderately nationalistic

for moderate political change at no cost to them predominantly merchants and wage-earners frequent listeners to the national radio network moderate income bracket

Power Rating: 60

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SAN GRISTOBAL----INDUSTRIAL WORKERS

Initial loyalty: CD Population: 230,000 Votes: 45,000

You are well-paid wage earners and have consistently supported the CD party. However, the general tendency toward APRA's coming to power has made some inroads among your ranks. Possible allies: industrial workers elsewhere; the middle classes.

You tend toward using persuasion, not violence; toward opportunism; toward acting as a group; toward caution; toward reliability:

Power Rating: 30

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PORT SLUM -- SAN CRISTOBAL

Votes: 20,000

Population: 40,000

Initial loyalty: APRA

<u>Objectives</u>: Elect a candidate who can assure you betterment of living conditions and who can implement social reform.

The North End Slum has:

a low interest in stability

a low conception of self-worth

little social organization

a low degree of acknowledgment to take an active role in the political system

a tendency to regard all government and politics as somewhat unpredictable and threatening forces

a low degree of membership in voluntary associations such as trade unions

a tendency to regard itself as a passive subject in the political process rather than participant citizens

an average family size of seven, with the father often not in evidence

- a low rate of literacy
- a high rate of crime
- little interest in nationalism and appeals based on it

a high interest in economic appeals

Attitudes: Your initial loyalty to APRA does not mean that you cannot be persuaded to change your loyalty to some other party if it can satisfy your interests better. If Rodriguez gains power, however, you are likely to support him. If Valdez should gain power, you would probably support him but tend to prefer Rodriguez to Valdez. However, you would prefer Valdez to Obregon, should he become a candidate, because you have difficulty responding to Obregon's urbane and sophisticated appeals. You are unlikely to entertain proposals from the CD unless there is something in them for you. Should Lopez gain power you would be very angry and there is no telling what you might do.

You are uprooted, transients, and often exploited. You would like to have someone you could blame for your plight. In your voting you are likely to be swayed more by charismatic and personalistic appeals rather than by ideology. If you all went on strike, it would have a major dislocating effect on the economy but you have difficulty getting organized.

You may not travel and may not use the phones to communicate with other cities but, like everyone else, you may listen to national radio appeals and be influenced by them according to your interests and attitudes. Then you may cast your votes as a bloc in the national elections. Points are given for your responding to appeals according to you attitudes. For your economic resources, see the attached transaction sheet.

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II-35

GOVERNOR-----SAN CRISTOBAL

Objective: "Govern"----represent the interests of the Sebastiano (CD) government in the city.

Attitudes: You report regularly to Sebastiano and are loyal to him. You are moderately wealthy by virtue of your position and friendship with Sebastiano. You depend or the present government for your income and your job and would not like to see it displaced unless you could get a better deal elsewhere, which you doubt. You tend toward persuasion, not violence; toward opportunism more than toward honor; toward caution; toward reliability. You are responsible for collecting the taxes in San Cristobal and for using them for provincial expenditures, although you receive some additional support from Sebastiano (see transaction sheet).

> You tend to regard Rodriguez as a threat to your position but you might support him if you could see no alternative and it became a question of either supporting him or losing his support. You regard Lopez as a lesser evil than Valdez.

Points are gained if Sebastiano is re-elècted. He has asked you to give campaign speeches supporting him. Try to have enough projects to promise the people of San Cristobal to keep them happy. This being a conservative city, you should not have too much trouble doing this and will lose many points should San Cristobal go for Rodriguez, not to mention anyone to the left of Rodriguez. Obregon, with his support of the same principles espoused by Rodriguez, must be dealt with. You are at this point on cordial but respectfully distant terms with him.

You have a high interest in stability and take an active role in the political system. You belong to various San Cristobal betterment and philanthropic associations and sit on the board of directors of several San Cristobal companies and the Banco Nationale San Cristobal branch.

LEADER OF MILITARY GARRISON-----SAN CRISTOBAL

You are:

equal to all other garrison leaders in terms of rank subordinate to Field Marshall Garcia-O'Brien paid through the government budget

highly nationalistic

likelier to act on orders from O'Brien than independently, except

on local matters which require quick decision steadfastly loyal to O'Brien, being one of his original band (your loyalty is the reason you were given the plum post of San Cristobal, where there is little violence and plenty of entertainment)

not very tolerant of social or revolutionary change well paid

against any policy that will put Patria in such chaos that your men will not get paid and equipped

eager to prevent national conditions from becoming such that you have to fight

Your men are:

highly cohesive under all pressures bound through a common allegiance to O'Brien highly self-aware as a group of homogeneous background 11,000 strong non-political reliable---can be relied upon to obey your orders

You will be scored for acting according to these traits.

Both you and your men may not vote.

You may be reassigned to another province, with or without your men, and may not refuse the assignment.

II-37°

Total	Resources \$ '000	30, 000		909	75,000	60, 000 870
Prior	Savings \$ '000	20, 000		400	50,000	40,000
Surplus	Income - Expenses	10, 000		200	25,000	20, 000 290
	Amount \$ 1000		11,000 11,000 11,000 11,000 50,000		25,000	60,000 50,000 5,000 5,000 130,000 130,000 250,000 250,200
Experses	Purpose	Equipment/ Pay	= = = =		Operating Costs	Military Budget Ministry Budget Operating Budget Operating Expenses of Gov ¹ t. Subvention Political Subvention Political
EX.	Recipient	Velasquez Gar. San Crist.	Gar. Fert. Garl Fert. Gar 2 Fert. Gar 3 Cupriá Gar.		Control	Garcia Garcia O'Brien Postmaster General Law School Soc. Sc. School Control Soc. Sc. Students Obregon Valdez
	Amount \$ 1000	·60, 000		200	50, 000	100,000 40,000 60,000 55,000 15,000 270,000 600
Income	Purpose	Military Budget		Political Contribu- tion	Ministry Budget	Tax Receipts 50% Mine Profits Tax Receipts Tax Receipts Receipts Support Support
Γ	Source	Sebastiano		Arana	Sebastiano	Minister of Justice Jackson Governor of Fertilidad Governor of Governor of San Cristobal Arvakian
-	Name	Garcia- O'Brien	Total	Ļopęz	Postmaster General	Sebastiano Total Rodriguez Total
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SUMMARY OF TRANSACTION RECORDS

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Tota	Kesources \$ 100			60			17				JŞ	,		
Prior	Savings	200	2, 000	40,000			11, 800				10, 000	-	400	
	Income Expenses	100	1,000	20, 000		<	5, 900				5, 000		200	
	Amount \$ 1000	100	4, 000	100, 000 79, 400		179,400	30,000	40,000	4,000	74,000	2,400 2,000 600	2,000	1 3,000 800	3, 800
Expenses	Purpose	Political Subvertion	Operating Costs	Tax Necessary Expense d			Repatriated	50% Profit	Local Inter- est (10%)		Consumption Taxes Political Support		Consumption Taxes	
Ex	Recipient	Law Sdml	Control	Sebastiano Contrôl			Control	Sebastiano	Del Solar		Control Min.Justice Rodriguez		Control Mn. Justice	
	Amount \$ 1000	\$ 200	5, 000	800 2,000	38,000 144,000 2,400 12,000	199 , 4 00	006.62				10,000		4,000	、
Income	Purpose	Foreign Donors	Equipment/ Pay	Taxes Taxes	Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes		Mine Profits				Income		Mine Profits	
	Source	Control	O'Brien	Del Solar Àrvakian	Middle Class Landowners North Slum South Slum Ini. Prodariat	2	Hamilton				Control		Jackson	:
	'Name	.Ibarbouru	Velasquez Garrison	Minister of Justice		Total	Jacksón			Total	Arvakian	Total	Del Solar	Total

SUMMARY OF TRANSACTION RECORDS

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II-39

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Nome		Income	1.	Ēx	Expenses	-	Surplus	Prior	Total
JUALITE	Source	Purpose	Amount \$ 1000	Recipient	Purpose	Amount \$ '1000	Income - Expenses	Savings \$ '000	Resources \$ '000
Absentee Landowner	Agents in Fertilidad	Rent I ncome	720,000	Côntrol	Consumption	্য হ	\$ 144,000	\$288, 000	\$ 432,000
Totäl				Min Justice	Taxes	144,000 576,000	~	~	
Velasquez Núd: Class Total	Control	Income	190,000	Control Min. Jusțice	Consumption 120,000 Taxes 38,000	120,000 38,000 158,000	32, 000	64,000	96, 000
Velasquez Industrial Workers Total	Control	Income	60,000	Control Min. Justice	Consumption Taxes	45, 600 12, 000 57, 600	2,400	4 ,800	7, 200
Velasquez North End Slum Total	Control	Íncome	12, 000	Control Min. Justice	Consumption Taxes	9,400 2,400 11,800	500 50	400	9 9
Velasquez South End Slum Total	Control	Income	1, 000	Control Min.Justice	Consumption Laxes	785 200 985	- Q	30	7 2
Law School Total	Sébastiano Ibarbouru	Operating Budget Subvention	5, 100 5, 100	Control	Running Costs	5,000	00	200	- <u>0</u> 0-
Soc. Sc. School Total	Sebastiano Rodriguez	Operating Budget Subvention	5, 050	Control	Running Costs	5,000	50	100	Č I I I

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SUMMARY OF TRANSACTION RECORDS

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· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		Income		EX	Expenses				Tótal
Name	Source	Purpose	Amount \$ 1000	Recipient	Purpose	Amount. \$ 1000	Expenses	Savings \$ '000	Resources \$ 1000
Fertilidad Garrison l (42nd)	Ó'Brien	Equipmht/ Pay	11,000	Control	Operating Costs	10,000	1,000	2,000	3, 000
Fertilidad Garrison 3 (73rd)	O'Brien	Equipmht/ Pay	11,000	Control	Operating Costs	1Ő, ÖÖ0	1,000	2,000	3,000
Fertilidad Garrison 2 (102nd)	Ó'Brien	Équipmht/ Pay	1' 1, 000	Control	Operating Çosts	10,000	1,000	2, 000	3, 000
Gevernor of Fertilidad	Agents of Landowners	1 7 7	36,000	Sebastiano	Ta x Receipts	ę0, 000 -	12,,000	24,000	36, 600
Total	Colonos		36, 000 72, 000						-
Fertillidad Agents of Landowners Total	Colonos	Rents	000,000	Control Gov. Fertibad Landowners in Velasquez	Consumption Taxes Rents Due	72,000 36,000 720,000 828,000	72, 000	144,000	216, 000
Fertilidad Colonos Total	Control		1,000,000	Control Cov.Fertikad Agents of Landowne	Consumption Taxes Rents	142,500 36,000 900,000 1,078,000	Ĩ , 500	3, 000	4 , 500
Valdez	Rodriguez	Political Support	200 2		1		500	1 00	009

SUMMARY OF TRANSACTION RECORDS

II-41

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		Income	- 2 ,72 , -2	Ex.	Expenses	: <u></u>		Prior	Total
	Source	Purpose	Amount \$ 1000	Recipient	Purpose	Amount \$ 1000	Income - Expenses	Savings \$ 1000	kesources \$ 1000
Governor of Cupria	Miners: North Shaft Middle Shaft Lower Pit	Taxes Taxes Taxes	32,200 32,200 32,600	Sebastiano	Tax Receipts	55, 000	15,000	30, 000	40,000
Total		t.	70, 000	1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1		, , , ,			-
Cupria Garrison	O'Brien	Equipment. Pay	1,000	Control	Operating Costa	006	100	200	300
Hamilton Total	Control	Mine Production	400,000	Jackson Miners Miners	Profits Wages Wages	79, 900 147, 200 147, 200 25, 600 399, 900	100	200	300
Miners North Shaft Total	Hamilton	Wages	147, 200 Centrol Gov. Cup	tia	Consumption Taxes	109,000 32,200 141,200	6, 000	12, 000	18,000
Miners Middle Shaft Total	Hamilton	Wages	147, 200 Control Cor. Cup	ria	mption	109,000 32,200 141,200	6, 000	12,000	18, 000
Miners Lower Pit Total	Hamilton	Wages	25,600	5,600 Control Gav. Cupria	Consumption Taxes	19,000 5,600 24,600	1,000	2, 000	3, 000
Total	Control	Income		Control Gov. San Cristobal Lopez	Consumption Taxes Political Support	8 5 00 8	500	400	000 9

SUMMARY OF TRANSACTION RECORDS

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		Incomé		ĒX	Expenses		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	Prior	Total
Name	Source	Purpose	Amount \$ 1000	Recipient	Purpose	Amount \$ 1000 S	Expenses	54 VINES	resources \$ 1000
Obregon	Rodriguez	Political Support	\$09 }	, , ,		<u>,</u> ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	60	120	180
San Cristobal Middle Clas	Control	Income	70, 000	Control Gov. San Cristobal	Consumption Taxes	44, 800 14, 000	11, 200	22,400	33,600
Total	-				5 	58, 800			рания 1997 — 1997 — 1997 — 1997 — 1997 — 1997 — 1997 — 1997 — 1997 — 1997 — 1997 — 1997 — 1997 — 1997 — 1997 — 1997 —
San Cristobal Workers	Control	Income	23, 000	Control Gov. San Cristobal	Consumption Taxes	17, 500 4, 600	006	1, 800	2, 700
Total		• • • •				22,100		n	
San Cristobal Slum	Control	Income	4, 000	Control Gov. San Cristobal	Consumption Taxes	3, 140	60	120	180
Total				:		3,940	-	-	
Governor of San Cristobal Total	Middle Class Workers Sium Arana	Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes	14, 000 4,600 800 200	Sebastiano	Tax Receipts	15,000	4, 600	9, 200	13, 800
San Cristobal O'Brien Garrison	-	Equipmht/ Pay	11,000	Control	Operating Costs Costs	10,000	1,000	2,000	3° 000 3° 000
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II-43

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APPENDIX III

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1:

GRENADILLA PLAYER MATERIALS

Personality Profiles Summary of Economic Transaction Records

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GENERAL MIGUEL DE FREITAS -- ARMY COMMANDER IN CHIEF FANDANGO CITY

Read about yourself, and your activities to date in the scenario.

Your objectives are to keep the army in its present position, where it gets half the national budget, and also if possible to keep a democratic form of government as you feel that military governments are unlikely to have much future in Latin America. However your main objective is to keep up the army strength. You are very concerned about the FLN menace, as you have a high interest in the stability of the economy and of Grenadillan politics. You are also aware that your chief of staff Porfirio Bruno and probably some of the older officers feel that you should be putting pressure on Guedalla to do something about the FLN which is a step you have hitherto been very reluctant to take. Army unity is very important to you, but it is also important to Bruno, and he is unlikely to waver in his loyalty to you unless he feels he has a very good reason.

You work largely by persuasion, and are influenced by honor not opportunism. You nearly finished your army career in 1958 by insisting on speaking at General Menez's funeral oration, but this possibility did not deter you. It is possible that you would resort to violence should stability be threatened, or industrial and urban sabotage reach a point where the army budget would be substantially cut. You mistrust Guedalla slightly because you have heard the pervasive rumours that he is considering cutting the army budget in order to pay for some social welfare schemes, but basically you want to keep the status quo, and hope that the FLN can be contained by ordinary police methods short of a guerrilla war.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL PORFIRIO BRUNO -- FANDANGO CITY

You are General de Freitas' Chief of Staff. You are slightly older than de Freitas who has had a fantastically successful career, but you do not grudge him his success and have always been a personal friend of his. You are his own choice for Chief of Staff.

Your views however differ from de Freitas' inasmuch as you are less inclined to tolerate FLN activity, and cannot understand why it has been allowed to continue. You know that de Freitas has been reluctant to put pressure on Guedalla to deal with the FLN, but you really cannot see why. You regard the FLN as traitors, and agents of revolutionary foreign powers, and feel that an all out military action should be mounted to deal with them. You do not share de Freitas' feeling for democratic forms, and are inclined to hark back to the great days of the Mendez regime when the army was all-powerful, the FLN did not exist, and everybody was a good deal better off. You do not understand the nature of the economic troubles at all, and feel that the country's present inflation problem has been caused by governmental mis-management.

At the same time you have a great admiration for de Freitas, and he has always been the leader in your relationship. Although you know that there are other officers who feel as you do, you will not listen to direct criticism of de Freitas unless you should feel that he was really losing his grip. Should FLN activity increase and go unchecked you would probably feel you must do something, but you would probably attempt to reason with de Freitas first.

You are extremely nationalistic, but you quite like the Americans whom you do not regard as a threat to your country's independence. You would love to jail de Zulueta, the Havana trained FLN representative in Fandango, and to root out all Cuban influence but you can never find de Zulueta.

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You have no men of your own.

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EX-PRESIDENT HERNANDEZ -- LEADER OF THE CD PARTY FANDANGO CITY

Read about your self, and your political history in the scenario.

Your objectives are to get the CD party back in power, or within striking distance of power. You lost heavily in the 1963 elections, being supported by the middle and upper classes the Petrolia oil workers. To win, you would have to sway the support of the urban proletariat from APRA which would give you a reasonable majority, although you would lose heavily in Verdia, and lose in Marque unless you could persuade the Grese oil workers to support you. In any case APRA does not have to allow elections unless you can push them to it until 1968. One other alternative would be to stage a right wing coup, but you reckon that you would need army support, and remember that the last time you called in army support in 1948 they took over the government.

The FLN are useful to you, as they are making things very difficult for the APRA government. Remember that the FLN and you both want support among the urban proletariat, but you could possibly outsmart the FLN by appealing to the innate conservatism of the wage earner. You fear de Zulueta however, as you have appreciated that his aims are to make Grenadilla into a Cuban satellite, which would alarm you, as you are anti-Communist in the extreme.

You want power again, and are tired of being an ex-president, so that if Guedalla approached you to join his government you would be inclined to accept this time.

PRESIDENT GUEDALLA -- FANDANGO-CITY --

You have now been leader of the APRA party, and President of the countrysince 1958, when you led the revolution against General Membra. Read the scenario for the history of that revolution, and of the party since 1958.

Your objective is to stay in power. You will have to do something rather than stand still to stay in power. You may try to achieve this in any way you choose, including calling a snap election if you feel you could get a fresh mandate from the country. Since elections must constitutionally be held every five years you need not hold another election ordinarily until 1968, but it might be one answer to your problems. You won the 1963 elections handsomely, the peasants in Verdia, the slum dwellers and the urban proletariat in Santa Maria and Fandango, and the Petrolia oil workers all voted for you, and if you can retain that support you can be elected again. However, as you know from your reading of the scenario, a lot of that support has been disaffected by your ineffectual reform program. Bear in mind that the army have been in power before, and that although de Freitas is clear that the democratic experiment should be given a chance, it is highly probable that he would intervene, and possible that he would then stay on in government, should there be widespread disorder in the country.

You and de Freitas are old friends, and so are you and Von Pontz, who is that rare combination, a liberal industrialist. He has control of most of the country's communications and is a powerful ally. You do not get on so well with de Freitas' right hand man Bruno, nor with the American contingent in the country, although both nominally support you. Bunuel, the FLN leader and you fought together in the 1958 revolution, and although you quarrelled bitterly when you decided to yield to the army's demands that Bunuel be not included in the government, it is possible that you could come to some arrangement with him. You fear and deslike however the FLN man in Fandango, de Zulueta, as you suspect him of being controlled by Cuba, and are inclined to resent foreign interference in Grenadilla, since you are a patriot first and a career politician second.

Within your own government Carreras is something of a problem. He was, and to some extent still is, the "favorite son" of the Verdia peasants, and he has frequently promised them sweeping land reforms in the name of APRA. You yourself have never promised nationalization of industry, nor compulsory acquisition of land, but Carreras has made this sort of promise in your name to the peasants, and it would be dangerous to contradict him openly as the peasants might then go over to the FLN. Your governors, and your Minister of Justice, are all basically loyal to you, but are having a very difficult time with the FLN and continually have appealed to you for army help with the FLN menace.

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LUIS BUNUEL -- VERDIA

Objectives: To take over the country in order to get your program of social and political reform under way. You run an illegal party, and in any case do not have a broad enough political base to win an election - you have never been able to make inroads into the APRA support of the urban proletariat in the two cities, and many of the Verdia peasants are still loyal Carreras/APRA supporters, although you have good support in the slums, in one of the oil fields and among some peasants. Should you infiltrate into government and get a major land reform bill passed you will be taken to have won, but should you get into the APRA government and no substantial reforms are passed you have lost. You will score points for disruption, strikes, uprisings, burnings and general trouble.

Read about yourself and the history of the FLN in the scenario under the section on the FLN. You have a complete working structure, yourself and Infidel in Verdia, Enerves in Santa Maria, Castango in Marque, and de Zulueta in Fandango. Infidel, Castango and Enerves are absolutely loyal to you to the best of your knowledge, but de Zulueta was after all at school in Havana, and you suspect has specific instructions from Havana that may conflict with your instructions to him. At the same time you cannot risk alienating de Zulueta because it is through him that a great deal of your money and arms come from Cuba. It is possible that de Zulueta is not passing all the money on to you, but it would be difficult to challenge him on this. Other than the FLN people you have no formal allies in Grenadilla, but the School of Law in the University of Fandango, the slums in the big cities and many of the Verdia peasants are your spheres of influence.

You are the leader of a para-military structure and run your group as such. You should not allow your lieutenants to move round the country on their own initiative unless they have an excellent explanation. You yourself may move freely round the country and so may your lieutenants. If you wish to move troops (Infidel, Castango, de Zulueta and Enerves each have between 700-1000 men in their bands) it takes move time (see rules).

RODRIGO DE ZULUETA -- FLN LEADER IN FANDANGO-CITY

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You are now just under 30, a graduate of the School of Law and the University of Havana. You were active in the FLN movement under Caballo while an undergraduate at Fandango, and were offered a scholarship to Havana through a member of a trade delegation from an iron curtain country. You took the scholarship, and lived for two years in Havana engaged on intensive political studies and training in infiltration and guerrilla methods. You were instructed and carried out your instructions to get rid of Bunuel's man in Fandango. Bunuel did not apparently suspect you, and, as he was intended to, made you the main FLN leader in the vitally important capital city.

Your objectives differ from the rest of the FLN. Your instructions and your intentions are to isolate Grenadilla politically from all but the Communist countries-to make another Cuba in fact. A free and independent Grenadilla, playing off East against West would not suit your plans or those of your instructors. To achieve your object you have all kinds of money and assistance available via Havana (see your transaction sheet). Much of this money you pass on to Bunuel, but you may use the rest as you wish unless for any reason it would be more convenient for you to pass it on to Bunuel. Bunuel knows that you are probably not passing on all your funds, and also appreciates that your aims possibly differ from the main FLN party, but he reckons to be able to use you.

You are however primarily concerned that the FLN movement sweep the country. You are not at all likely to make any more against Bunuel or to split the party unless and until you feel the FLN has gained the ascendancy in the whole country and is moving in a direction that will not suit your convictions.

You have a band of 1000 men. You may move with or without them (see rules) but your power rating is halved if you are without them. You should also take Bunuel's orders before moving your forces or have a good reason why you did not take his orders, unless you wish to make a break with him.

III-6

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MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR -- FANDANGO CITY

Objective: Govern, collect taxes so that the country can be kept running.

You are absolutely loyal to Guedalla whom you greatly admire. Your fortunes are absolutely bound up with the fate of APRA. You are able to get on with nearly all factions in Fandango, but are unlikely to listen to anyone seeking to seduce your loyalties from Guedalla. You are of course very worried by the FLN depredations, and are seeking some way of dealing with them. You are unlikely to use violent means and are not an opportunist. You have a high interest in stability as your fortunes depend on it.

You control communications and may monitor the telephones and take over Radio Grenadilla should you wish. You may travel anywhere you wish but you should not be out of the province at the same time as the army garrison, or anarchy could ensue.

WINTHROP LEVERETT TOWERS III -- U.S. AMBASSADOR FANDANGO CITY

You are a career foreign service type, and not a political pay off in accordance with the new regime instituted by the late President Kennedy. You are a liberal, with considerable experience in various countries in Latin America.

As there is a democratic regime, freely elected, in power, your basic view is that any change would be for the worst. You want no one to tamper with the status quo, and would oppose, inasmuch as you were able to, anyone who tried to do so. You get on only moderately well with Guedalla, and very well with de Freitas.

The FLN have been causing you heartburn. You were hissed when you went to speak on American Political Institutions at the University of Fandango, and you have had to advise various fact finding teams that they had better postpone their visits to Verdia until FLM activity dies down. You would not be prepared to put pressure on Guedalla to deal with the FLN but you have frequently voiced your concern. Aside from the upset they are causing in the country, and their interference with industry and the AID agricultural program you have good reason to believe that some FLN are working to Cuban orders, and it does not seem to you ridiculous to assume that a communist take-over might be a long term prospect. You and the American industrial representatives are concerned over this possiblity, and if you see any legitimate method of persuading someone to do something about the FLN you would be inclined to use it. In the meantime you are hoping to keep up investment and welfare work in the country and hope to ride out the storm.



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JOHN B. GOODE -- CHIEF A.I.D. REPRESENTATIVE IN FANDANGO CITY

Read about yourself and some of the problems you face in the scenario.

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You administer the aid program by distributing half of the money and goods yourself and giving the other half to Guedalla to be administered by the government: Your aims are to improve the country's economic position since it is an article of faith for you that the alleviation of the economic ills of a country will also cure any political ills. You expect that the FLN will be unable to make any headway if the economy can only be got onto a stable basis, and people shown how to help themselves. It has come as a shock to you to find that much of the money and supplies are simply not reaching their destination. The FLN are confiscating food parcels, chemical fertilizers and anything else that strikes them as useful from the peasants and slum dwellers. You suspect either mismanagement or downright dishonesty in the administration of the program by the government, and are seriously considering cutting off all aid until you can ensure that it reaches the proper destination. However if you did this the FLN would find it all too easy to tell the peasants that the Americans were fair weather friends, quite prepared to let their erstwhile friends starve if it did not suit their book to feed them. You also have little faith in the Grenadillan economy without American help, and fear that by cutting off aid you might be throwing the country into the arms of international communism. You are fully aware that de Zulueta is attempting to isolate Grenadilla as a Cuban satellite.

Points will be gained if you can find an appropriate channel for the distribution of aid in such a way that it will neither stick to administrative fingers nor be commandeered by the FLN. You must not, however, be seen to interfere with the internal running of the country, as this is unfashionable and unAmerican.

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MR, ALEXANDER MACLEOD -- PYTHON OIL REPRESENTATIVE IN FANDANGO

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Object ive: Keep the mines open and the money flowing in, and so maneuver that you frustrate any proposal to nationalize the mines.

You are on good terms with the local industrialists and the American embassy, and you rather like Guedalla, although you think he can't last much longer. Your major problem is the FLN who are disrupting oil production in the Jello section and probably infiltrating the unionized Grese and Petrolia sections. You do not take too seriously their policy of nationalization; as you do not reckon that the party is likely to have the strength to run an effective revolution, but you still feel that they should be stopped now, before, heaven forbid, another Cuba.

You have a high interest in stability, and are an active campaigner. You tend to use forceful persuasion rather than violence, and tend to opportunism not honor. You are a firm believer in the American Way of Industry, free enterprise, no creeping socialism, and are convinced that all nationalized industries are inefficiently run.

Your direct représentative in Marque is Gordon Clark, à fellow American. You deal with him mostly in the capital city or on the telephone, flying out to Petrolia only in cases of emérgency. You spend most of your time in the capital city dealing with government personalities and local industry.

You do not vote.

TEX REAGAN -- LOCAL MANAGER OF GUMMICOLA OF NORTH CAROLINA INC. FANDANGO CITY

You have spent most of your working life in Latin America in various industries before joining Gummicola Inc. Your wife comes originally from Fandango although you met her at school in Texas. You speak fluent Spanish and like most Latin Americans, and find yourself more at home anywhere in the subcontinent than in the U.S.A. Unlike any other American you genuinely enjoy the confidence of the local industrialists and the wealthy landowners, and are a popular figure in Fandangoan society. You know everybody, and like Guedalla and de Freitas, but probably your best friend is Yon Pontz who is godfather to your youngest boy.

Your aims are to keep the Gummicola factory working, not merely because your personal income depends on it, as you could readily get another job somewhere else or with Von Pontz, but because you believe that foreign investment and the building up of the industrial side is the only hope for Grenadilla. You are inclined to believe that a nationalized industry cannot be run as efficiently as a privately managed one, and believe that the incentive system is vital to any organization. You point out that even in Russia the top people are having to be given extras to keep on producing. You therefore oppose the FLN, as you feel that they would make the country another Cuba, and you point out Cuba's economic problems. You also hate the idea of communism as you believe in individual freedom.

You tend to persuasion rather than violence, and honor rather than opportunism. You have all the money you reckon you need. You have a high interest in the stability of Grenadillan politics, and if you felt that Guedalla could not keep stability you would be inclined to support someone who could. You believe in democracy and would prefer Hernandez, if he were freely elected, to an army government.

SR. DIEGO VON PONTZ -- FANDANGO CITY

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First study the information which has been presented about you in the scenario.

Your objectives are to maintain a climate in the country in which you can continue to amass wealth. You are one of the hundred richest men in the world, but rather an exceptional example of the type. You have not altogether forgotten your university liberalism, and are also politically sophisticated enough to realize that in Grenadilla, with its unbalanced social system, reforms now may be the only way to avoid revolution later. You have therefore supported Guedalla with money and advice since 1956, although at your own request you have never been given any credit for your revolutionary activities between 1956 and 1958. You tend in any case towards persuasion not violence, honor not opportunism, and imaginative individual activity. You own the country's teles vision station, and a small share in the APRA newspaper "El Panico" which gives you effective control of the country's communications. In the event of your clashing with APRA, should you decide that some other party would best suit your purposes, the Minister of the Interior, who has governmental control over communications, may wish to seize control of broad casting in whole or in part:

Obviously FLN activity disconcerts you, as the last thing you want is a revolution, and nationalization of industry. If FLN activity continues unchecked it is possible that you and the foreign investors like Tex Reagan of Gummicola, and Alexander Macleod of Python Oil might be inclined to get together and act in unison.

III-12

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SR. EDUARDO COLLIDAR -- FANDANGO CITY

First learn about yourself and your oil interests from the scenario.

Your objectives are to gain as much money and economic power as you can. You need to keep the oil fields working, and this can best be achieved if Grenadilla politica are stabilized under a strong government. You voted CD in 1963 but were neither surprised nor unduly upset when APRA got in again. You are however beginning to have reservations about the APRA government's ability to maintain a stable government, and you are very worried by the FLN acitivity, particularly FLN activity in the oil fields. You are also a little nervous about an APRA government as you always suspect they might nationalize the mines, although this is not part of Guedalla's stated policy.

You are highly nationalistic, and oppose equality and social change. Your opposition to the FLN is not only on economic grounds, but you really feel that the presumptuous peasantry should be cut down to size. You feel that all the Americans are probably of peasant birth too, and find it difficult to deal with a country that has no aristocracy and apparently no proper rules for the order of precedence at table (your last dinner at the Embassy was a wounding experience, as you found yourself sitting below a mere city mayor of some small place in Massachusetts).

MIDDLE CLASS -- FANDANGO CITY

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Study the scenario, particularly the sectionson the economic and social background of the country.

Objective -- To keep earning a living.

In the event of an election, to elect the CD party.

Points are won where there is stability in Grenadilla. Points are lost when there is disruption, and you are taken to be unable to earn your normal living when the country is in an uproar.

Attitudes -- You voted CD in the 1963 election, and were disappointed when APRA won with a handsome majority, but settled down to live with it. Since then however, you have become increasingly unhappy about the country's rocky economic position, and find your standard of living threatened by the increasing rate of inflation. You are most responsive to any appeals which promise you economic and material benefits, and you oppose mationalization, and feel strongly about the sanctity of private property. Your interests have, up to now, coincided with those of the landowners and the industrialists. You oppose social welfare programs to improve the lot of the peasants or the slum dwellers as you fear they will threaten your social position. One of them might marry your daughter, and servants might become harder to get. You are terrified of the FLN because of their violent methods and uncompromising policy. You fear destruction of your own property and begin to feel that no decent person will soon be safe walking the streets of Santa Maria. You are quite convinced that the FER supported d.controlled International Communist Movement and you are unable to under by the stand why the authorities do not do something about them. The fact that Guedalla has done nothing about them leads you to feel that your views of the esscatial unsoundness of a left-wing administration are estirely justified.

Likely Actions -- You are most likely to engage in writin persuasion or verbal expression of support or non-support according to your attitudes. You are also fairly likely to join with other groups. You may refuse to pay times, in drastic cases, but are most unlikely to strike or nist. You may phone the middle classes in the other city but you may not travel ented the province.

Population - 155,000

Votes -- 75,000

Your voters are:

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Highly cohesive under all pressures (may not will when); Bound through common economic circumstance in common when Not very highly self-aware as a group; Highly interested in the stability of Grennik an politice;; Highly interested in bettering your material advantages; Moderately nationalistic; Predominantly shopkeepers and wage earners; Frequent listerners to the national radio and TV metworks; Of moderate income bracket; and Of high school education.

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URBAN PROLETARIAT == FANDANGO

Read the scenario, particularly the social and economic background section.

You voted APRA in the 1963 elections, partly because they are the party of your natural affiliation and partly because they promised many reforms, motably in education, health and working conditions, without promising mationalization of industry. None of these reforms has been carried out, taxes have gone up, and your wages are being eroded by inflation faster than you can negotiate pay rises. You are quite unsympathetic to Geudalla's excuses for the delayed reform program. You do not understand why the economy is in such a mess and vary between suspecting an international plot and government mismangement as the reasons. At the same time you are wage earners in a country with a 60% rate of unemployment and your present income is tild to the country's economic system. You therefore fear the FLN, despite their promises of economic reform, as you see that they work by destructive methods, and you fear the loss of your jobs. You could be intimidated by violence, as you are fairly defenseless. If you became sufficiently desperate you might overcome your scruples and misgivings about FLN policy and join them.

Your acknowledgment of any obligation to take an active part in the political system is low. You tend to look on government and politics as unpredictable and threatening forces ("them"). You have hardly any membership in voluntary political associations, and there is little union activity among the group. Your people are very sketchily informed of political facts and are oriented more as passive subjects than as participant citizens. You are generally anti-American largely out of jealousy at the material well-being of the Americans you see.

Your voters are:

bound through common economic circumstances in a centron outlook not very highly self aware as a group highly interested in bettering your material circumstances only moderately interested in the stability of Patrian politics moderately nationalistic predominantly factory workers of low income bracket of poor education

Population: 600,000

Votes: 260,000

You may not travel or use the telephones but like everyone else you waith the television.

Ш-15

OUTER SLUMS -- FANDANGO CITY

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Read the scenario, particularly the section on the country's social and economic background.

Attitudes You are uprooted, and often transients. Your grievances and burdens are many and various. Unemployment is almost 100% and yet you have to scrape together every week the ridiculously high rent for the dirty shack you live in which is owned by a wealthy landloro in the city. You would like to have some one you can blame for your plight, and the FLN have been eager to supply you with objects of calumny. Those of you who voted in the 1963 elections voted APRA, but there were a significant number of write-in votes for the FLN. You feel that APRA has let you down, that none of the promised reforms have been forthcoming, and do not begin to understand the reasons offered by the government for the delay in these reforms.

You therefore support anything which promises change in the status quo, and would be prepared to throw your support behind the APRA government again if they were able to convince you that the promised reforms would materialize. You are prone to violence and demonstrations. You sense a low degree of obligation to work through the existing political system, and have a low degree of participation in any voluntary political organization. Although the Americans have built both the clinics and one of the schools in the slum, and staff entirely one of the clinics, you are not pro-America, as you consider them a sinfully rich nation who should be doing even more for the country. You see them in their big cars in the city, and are bitterly jealous. You have heard the FLN propaganda which accuses the Americans of draining money out of Grenadilla for their own purposes and are half convinced, reasoning that that must be how they get the big cars and the money to put up clinics.

Your people have typically families of seven or more children, many described by the fathers. Almost all the slum dwellers are illiterate, the crime rate is astronomical, and disease common. Your diet is mostly beans, quite inadequate instritionally.

Population: 130,000

Votes: 64,000

III-116:

SCHOOL OF LAW -- UNIVERSITY OF FANDANGO

You are the sort of radical student body the newspapers play up. You are highly political, and expect to be the government of tomorrow to the extent that you are not too interested in whether you get your degrees or not. You are making such good contacts that a degree is comparatively unimportant. Your aims are to make yourselves felt in the country's government, and the most promising vehicle is the FLN whose aims also accord with yours. You believe in a meritocracy, where men are born equal, in nationalization of all industry and land, and feel that the APRA party aims do not go far enough. You rather despise Guedalla whom you feel to have sold out to the vested interests in the country. You are all budding political scientists, and bored with your formal legal studies. The FLN aura of guerrilla fighting, plotting in cellars, striking by night appeals to you greatly as a splendid game, and you feel the FLN are the only people who are doing anything worthwhile in the country.

You rather dislike the army, because of the authoritarian tradition it represents and are unlikely to respond to any appeals from military circles. Your fathers are always saying that a spell in service would do you a great deal of good. Hernandez is similarly lacking in appeal to you, as representing the boring conservative right.

You despise but should try and convert the upper class liberals in the school of Social Science. They are APRA supporters but will presumably listen to you as you are all students and many of you were at prep school together.

Enrollment: 2,500

Votes: 5,000

SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

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Objective: Keep the university open so you can get your degree. You are APRA supporters, and on occasion have given the FLN a hand with a street demonstration or picketing, but these activities are strictly secondary for you to the business of getting a degree. You are strictly occupational liberals; it's fashionable, and you do realize that Grenadilla's social system is miserably unjust even though most of you are the beneficiaries of the injustices.

You tend to shy away from really violent activity, have a high degree of participation in student organizations and are interested in social change provided it does not dislocate individuals too much. You are fashionably anti-American, but also anti-Communist and respond easily to nationalistic appeals. You view the political system as representative not exploitive, and would prefer to work through the system as you don't really see the need to work against it.

You regard the FLN oriented law students as too extreme but are willing to listen to them should they approach you. At the same time you would like to persuade them to work through and support the existing APRA government. You are sufficiently sophisticated to see that violent attacks from the left of APRA will harden a lot of inchoate opposition among the rightists possibly to APRA's detriment.

Enrollment: 2, 500

Votes: 100



COMMANDER OF MILITARY GARRISON -- VERDIA - 73rd Infantry

Read carefully the section on the Army in the scenario.

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You and your regiment have been in the province for several years and have developed close local contacts. You joined the army, and so did most of your men, because it is a soft comfortable job. You are extremely resistant to any activity which makes your job less cushy. You are very reluctant to move round the country and even more unwilling to fight. You would be prepared to deal with any local disturbance that you perceived as threatening your comfortable position on your own initiative if you were really convinced that your intervention was necessary.

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You yourself may move around freely but you and the Governor may not both be out of the province at the same time. You may travel with or without your men but your men take five minutes in real time to get from province to province. You may go ahead and leave your men to follow (see rules)but without your men your power rating is halved.

Should there be an election neither you nor your 11,000 men may vote.

III-19

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COMMANDER OF MILITARY GARRISON -- VERDIA - 102nd Armored Division

Read carefully the section on the Army in the scenario.

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You and your regiment were assigned by General de Freitas to help deal with the FLN menace to the province last year, having previously been stationed in Fandango. You dislike being way out in the boondocks with nowhere to go instead of being in a smart, comfortable station like Fandango.

The reason you joined the army is because it is a cushy job. You are peeved at being transferred, and very disinclined to move around any more or take any action which would involve you in a fight. You would however be prepared to intervene on your own initiative if you were really convinced that your intervention was necessary for the maintenance of your position.

III-20

GOVERNOR == VERDIA

Objective: Govern, represent the interests of the APRA government in the province.

Attitudes You report regularly to Guedalla and are loyal to him. You are moderately wealthy by virtue of your position and friendship with Guedalla. You depend on the present government for your income and your job and would not like to see it deplaced unless you could get a better deal elsewhere which you doubt. You are not a hard core APRA member, but saw the light soon enough in 1957 to give some aid to the Revolutionary party, and received your governorship as a pay off. You have good friends among the old wealthy aristocracy, and whenever they try and discuss APRA policy with you you have hitherto gently changed the subject, remarking the while that of course Guedalla is one of your oldest friends.

You tend towards persuasion, not violence, opportunism rather than honor, caution, reliability, You are responsible for collecting the taxes in the province and forwarding the balance to Guedalla after you have taken your income.

You get on well with the army commander and with the Americans whom you regard with some amusement but with liking. You have a high interest in stability and fear and hate the FLN as your comfortable position is dependent on the continuance of the present system. Your only reservation about Guedalla is that you cannot understand why he is reluctant to deal violently with the FLN. You sometimes think in terms of getting next to Hernandez, so that should power change hands your position would still be secure, but you do not want to come out into the open until you are sure this will be necessary, as you do prefer Guedalla of the two, and yourself of the three of you.

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PEASANTS -- VERDIA

Read the scenario, particularly the section on the economic and social background of the country.

You are not very self-aware politically, and almost 100% illiterate. You hate the landowners agents who have been exploiting you over and above the demands of the absentee landlords for so long. At the same time you have to eat, and fear to be thrown off the hacienda to starve. Those of you who voted in 1963 mostly voted APRA, as Carreras, the Minister of Agriculture, is a local boy, and you feel that he alone in the government really understands your problems. You feel that someone somehow has let you down over the promised land reforms, as you see from the scenario nothing has come of them, or seems likely to come of them. You are still inclined to believe somehow that Carreras will see you through and will get the necessary legislation, but your faith has been shaken, and you are becoming increasingly inclined to listen to the FLN people, Bunuel and Infidel, who are telling you that you will never get any results from supporting APRA as they have become the tool of the Americans, the landlords and the foreign capitalists. You quite like the Americans you have seen who come bringing A.I.D. materials, but you do not normally get the benefit of these materials as the FLN tend to take them. You are sufficiently frightened of the FLN and their record of terrorism and violence not to betray them to government forces and not to disagree with them openly, even if you do not at any moment wish to be involved with their schemes. For any action you must have a leader, and cannot take any individual initiative.

Population: 3,000,000

Votes: 355,000

III-22

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CARRERAS - FANDANGO-CITY

You are the Minister for Agriculture, and have been since 1958. You are of peasant birth from Verdia, and, with Bunuel, organized the preparations for the 1958 coup in Verdia. You have great influence with the peasants, who regard you with reverence and faith. You repeated in campaign speeches in Verdia your assurances that APRA would give the land to the peasants, which, apart from not being APRA policy, has not proved in any way possible. Even a modest bill to give each peasant family quarter of an acre is likely to prove quite unworkable as the landowners have instructed their agents to throw any peasant who tried to claim his portion off the hacienda to starve. Your policy conflicts with Guedalla's on this point--you believe that the land should go to the peasants and tend to brush aside the difficulties of achieving this. At the same time the peasants are losing faith in you, since no extensive land reforms have been mooted, and there is a very real danger that they will listen increasingly to the FLN propaganda, which says that there is no way to achieve land reform but violent revolution culminating in an FLN government. You still have considerable credit with the peasants, but the FLN menace will bear watching.

You are loyal to Guedalla, although you consider his land policy limp. Your loyalty would only change if you really felt that Guedalla had sold out to the landed interests, and was about to sacrifice your people in Verdia. You rather dislike the Americans who have the American tendency to see poverty as somehow a vice cultivated by idle people, and talk a lot about free enterprise being the foundation of the American economy, but you admire their technology, and the help to agriculture that AID has been able to give. You find yourself unable to take Americans quite seriously apart from their technology.



PEDRO INFIDEL -- VERDIA FLN TERRORIST

You are Bunuel's lieutenant in Verdia, and absolutely loyal to him. You have worked with him since 1956 when you were only a boy and worshipped Bunuel. You are not particularly intellectually gifted and Bunuel does your thinking for you. You are absolutely fearless and a very effective terrorist. You have been in jail once in 1958 and are determined never to repeat the experience.

You nearly always use violence unless otherwise instructed as peaceful persuasion takes too long. You are violently nationalistic, however, and distrust both Enerves and de Zulueta because of their foreign education. In your dealings with them however you take orders from Bunuel and report faithfully to him anything you think he should know. You have absorbed the idea that wicked foreign capitalists are ruining the country, and therefore hate all foreigners, and have been running a campaign to sabotage the AID agricultural program. The only thing that stops you from gunning down any AID people you should see is Bunuel's express orders to the contrary, as he fears American "police action!" if this should happen.

You have charge of the FLN band of around 1100 men, as Bunuel is often out of the province. You and your equally dedicated, tightly disciplined, not very bright band do not leave the province unless Bunuel so orders you. You always take Bunuel's instructions unless an emergency arises and Bunuel cannot get back to the province when you use your initiative. At all costs you avoid a direct confrontation with the army, as they outnumber you about 30 to 1.

GOVERNOR -- MARQUE PROVINCE

Objective -- "govern"--represent the interests of the Guedalla (APRA) government in Marque province.

Attitudes:

You report regularly to Guedalla and are loyal to him. You depend on the present government for your income and your job and thus tend to favor continuing to support it. You are responsible for collecting taxes from the citizens of Marque, mainly miners and their families, and have built up a considerable private fortune through graft and the sales of tax exemptions. You tend toward using persuasion, not violence; but tend toward opportunism more than toward honor, since you are not above taking bribes. きましたい というちょう

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Your relations with the military leader in Marque are good since you both have an interest in stability in Marque which means more money for you and less work for the military leader.

Although initially loyal to Guedalla, you resent being given duty way out in Marque. Communicate with Guedalla in the capital in the event of any activity he should know about.

Your isolation makes you vulnerable to joining any kind of movement or changing sides if the price is right. You are highly unpredictable and may play an imaginative role within the framework of your basic attitudes as presented above. You have accepted some help from Macleod, but nothing that need bind your actions.

JUAN CASTANGO -- FIAN TERRORIST MARQUE

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You are Bunuel's lieutenant in Marque and absolutely loyal to him. You have been placed in Marque because you were yourself once an oil worker; and have brothers in the Jello section. You have a smallish force of a ound 500 men who live in the hills, getting provisions through the FLN in Fandango and Verdia. You have had great success with the Jello section which has the worst working conditions, and have hopes of success with the Grese section which contains the APRA union and most of the APRA supporters.

Your methods are not subtle, and you take your orders from Bunuel who does most of your thinking for you. You work by strikes, riots, industrial sabotage, and general disruption of production. You hope that if the oil fields prove sufficiently difficult to exploit that the Americans will be more prepared to let them go, as you are firmly convinced that the Americans are always prepared to bring in troops to protect their national interests. You are violently nationalistic, and hate the Americans simply because they are foreigners in your country.

Your methods are violent, as peaceful persuasion takes too long, unless otherwise ordered by Bunuel. The army has not interfered much with your activities, but if it should, you would avoid a direct confrontation at all costs as they outnumber you 20 to 1. Gordon Clark and Macleod have not been able to interfere with you to any great extent, but they are rumored to be planning to improve working conditions in the Jello section which might not suit you.

GORDON CLARK -- MARQUE MANAGER OF GRENADILLA MINERALES S. A.

Objective -- Keep the oil fields open and the money coming in.

Your personal income depends on the oil fields staying open and producing for Python. You take orders from Alexander Macleod, Python's man in Fandango. You may also have some contact with Sr. Collidar, the minority owner of Grenadilla Minerales, but you tend to ignore him as much as you dare, although always listening to him with every appearance of keen attention. When the mines are open you receive an amount from Control equal to the value of the oil produced (see transaction sheet). You should then send the rest to Macleod. You may not raise wages without consulting Macleod, but if you can get away with it you may lower them unless given express orders to the contrary by Macleod.

Your principal problem is the FLN activity which is strongest in the Jello section. FLN activities have already led to strikes and acts of industrial sabotage, and may well do so again. Productivity is down this year, and it seems clear that the FLN aim is to lower it yet further. You are dissatisfied with the army who do not seem to be prosecuting the chase of the terrorists with sufficient vigor, and find a sympathizer in the governor who feels that the terrorists should not be allowed to run wild. The governor has accepted a certain amount of financial help from you in the past--not bribes, and not documented, just help, and you have some reason to feel he might help you in any scheme you propose.

As a foreigner you do not vote, nor do you individually pay taxes.

III-27

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OIL WORKERS -- PETROLIA SECTION MARQUE

Size: 230,000

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Votes: 115,000)

You believe that the Grenadilla Minerales Company is giving you as good a deal as you are likely to get if the oil fields are nationalized; therefore you are motivated by personal self-interest to keep supporting the present system. You feel that any proceeds from a nationalization of the oil fields would be spent in the other provinces of rather than on you, so you oppose nationalization. You are highly cohesive and may not split your votes.

You tend toward persuasion, not violence; toward opportunism; toward unity; toward caution.

You may from time to time be visited by other groups who may try to persuade you but you may not travel yourselves.

You are in favor of stability in Grenadilla to assure your present means of income, and are therefore strongly anti-communist. You are also frightened of the FLN because of their violent methods and could be intimidated by them.

Your objective is to continue earning a living and to oppose any system which would radically change the existing economic system, and you will be scored accordingly. However, you may decide to strike to prevent any change you feel would be against your best interests. Of course while on strike you would lose your income.

III-28

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OIL WORKERS -- GRESE SECTION MARQUE

Size: 230,000

Votes: 115,000

You are highly nationalistic, but feel that the earnings of the oil fields should be spent in Grenadilla rather than being taken out of the country. As long as you feel that you won't do significantly worse under government ownership of the oil fields, you are infavor of APRA. In addition several built-up grievances against the company have led you to desire that the oil fields be nationalized.

You are free to strike, riot or disrupt production except that if you do so you of course lose your wages.

Your primary support tends to go to Guedalla, but after him, it is not certain whether you would support the FLN or the CD, although you agree with the nationalization and anti-capitalist tendencies of the FLN.

You are cohesive, self-aware as a group, homogeneous in terms of ideology, expectation from association, and means of expression.

You are active in the political system mainly through the cohesion you gain from your union membership and through your political party.

Although striking means you lose your wages, which is bad, it also means Macleod and Python lose their income, which is good.

You regard the FLN workers as a bunch of rowdy and unclean radicals but are willing to listen to them.

JELLO-OIL WORKERS -- MARQUE

Size: 40,000

3.8

Votes: 20,000°

Repeated injustices and intolerable working conditions have made you desperate; you have been exploited and are prepared to support any scheme which will enable you to better your lot, no matter what means are necessary. Since you have nowhere to go but up, you have nothing to lose by terrorist activity or wildcat strikes or riots. You are happy to have the chance to support the FLN (see scenario); and the FLN, in turn, is happy that it has you under its control.

You are predisposed toward extreme activity; toward daring. You are highly unpredictable and play a very active role. You are bitter toward the present government, which you consider lacks militancy and has sold out your interests to the capitalists. You must stay in the mines, except while on strike or other nefarious activity. However, you may not leave Marque province.

You regard the CD supporters among the miners as bourgeois and having sold out. They are probably beyond being persuaded to your cause, so you oppose them. However, since the APRA supporters among the miners make a claim towards reform, you regard them with even more contempt than you do the CD supporters. However, you are not above trying to persuade them to join you in your cause or to join you in a strike if it meets their objectives as well as yours. Both you and the APRA supporters, for example, favor nationalization.

You will be given points for striking and for disrupting activity in accordance with your general interests. However, if the strike fails, you lose points and are worse off than before you started. Your fortunes are tied to those of the FLN and you gain many points should the FLN substantially improve its position. Like the other groups, you lose wages when you strike, but since many of you are unemployed to begin with, this loss is no deterrent to forceful action.

DON JORGE SALIVAR -- SANTA MARIA

You are one of the old hard core merchant aristocracy, collosally rich and extremely conservative. Naturally you voted CD in 1963, but you are not really in favor of the democratic experiment at all, and would much rather have continued with a military government. You do understand that this is unfashionable these days, and therefore tend to support the CD openly with campaign contributions. You do not like foreigners in general and Americans in particular, and have done your best to discourage foreign investment in Santa Maria (see scenario). You are amazed and horrified by the activities of the FLN, and see them as a bunch of filthy agitators stirring up the lower classes with ridiculous appeals. You feel the lower classes are poor because they deserve to be in view of their innate inferiority.

You know Hernandez and feel that he is reliable. You dislike Guedalla whom you feel is unsound and feel's into the bargain. Another of your friends is Porfirio Bruno, de Freitas' Chief of Staff, who is a distant cousin. De Freitas you know less well, but have your doubts about him as, after all, he was one of the prime movers in the 1958 revolution.

You may travel anywhere in the country, but are not particularly inclined to political activity, despite your high interest in stability. You would be quite happy to use violence if it would achieve your object, but are also lazy.

III-31

MIDDLE CLASS -- SANTA MARIA (PETRIFIDAD)

Study the scenario, particularly the section on the economic and social background of the country.

Objective -- To keep earning a living In the event of an election, to elect the CD party

Points are won when there is stability in Grenadilla. Points are lost when there is disruption, and you are taken to be unable to earn your normal living when the country is in an uproar.

Attitudes -- You voted CD in the 1963 election, and were disappointed when APRA won with a handsome majority, but settled down to live with it. Since then however, you have become increasingly inhappy about the country's rocky economic position, and find your standard of living threatened by the increasing rate of inflations. You are most responsive to any appeals which promise you economic and material benefits, and you oppose nationalization, and feel strongly about the sanctity of private property. Your interests have up to now coincided with those of the landowners and the industrialists. You oppose social welfare programs to improve the lot of the peasants or the slum dwellers as you fear they will threaten your social position. One of them might marry your daughter, and servants might become harder to get. You are terrified of the FLN because of their violent methods and uncompromising policy. You fear destruction of your own property and begin to feel that no decent person will soon be safe walking the streets of Santa Maria. You are quite convinced that the FLN is supported and controlled by the International Communist Movement and you are unable to understand why the authorities do not do something about them. The fact that Guedalla has done nothing about them leads you to feel that your views of the essential unsoundness of a left wing administration are entirely justified.

<u>Likely actions</u>:-- You are most likely to engage in verbal persuasion or verbal expression of support or non-support according to your attitudes. You are also fairly likely to join with other groups. You may refuse to pay taxes, in drastic cases, but are most unlikely to strike or riot. You may phone the middle classes in the other city but you may not travel outside the province.

Population -- 55,000

Votes -- 35,000

Your voters áre:

Highly cohesive under all pressures (may not split votes) Bound through common economic circumstances in a common outlook Not very highly self-aware as a group Highly interested in the stability of Grenadillan politics Highly interested in bettering your material advantages Moderately nationalistic Predominantly shopkeepers and wage earners Frequent listeners to the national radio and TV network Of moderate income bracket Of high school education

III-32

URBAN PROLETARIAT -- SANTA MARIA (PETRIFIDAD)

Read the scenario, particularly the social and economic background section.

You voted APRA in the 1963 elections, partly because they are the party of your natural affiliation and partly because they promised many reforms, notably in education, health and working conditions, without promising nationalization of industry. None of these reforms has been carried out, taxes have gone up, and your wages are being eroded by inflation faster than you can negotiate pay rises. You are quite unsympathetic to Guedalla's excuses for the delayed reform program. You do not understand why the economy is in such a mess and vary between suspecting an international plot and government mismanagement as the reasons. At the same time you are wage earners in a country with a high rate of unemployment and your present income is tied to the country's economic system. You therefore fear the FLN, despite their promises of economic reform, as you see that they work by destructive methods, and you fear the loss of your jobs. You could be intimidated by violence, as you are fairly defenseless. If you became sufficiently desperate you might overcome your scruples and misgivings about FLN policy and join them.

Your acknowledgment of any obligation to take an active part in the political system is low. You tend to look on government and politics as unpredictable and threatening forces ("them"). You have hardly any membership in voluntary political associations, and there is little union activity among the group. Your people are very sketchily informed of political facts and are oriented more as passive subjects than as participant citizens. You are generally anti-American largely out of jealousy at the material well-being of the Americans you see.

bound through common economic circumstances in a common outlook not very highly self aware as a group highly interested in bettering your material circumstances only moderately interested in the stability of Patrian politics moderately nationalistic predominantly factory workers of low income bracket of poor education

You may not travel or communicate on the telephones.

Population -- 230,000

Votes -- 45,000

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OUTER SLUMS -- SANTA MARIA (PETRIFIDAD)

Read the scenario, particularly the section on the country's social and econo= mic background.

Attitudez You are uprooted, and often transients. Your grievances and burdens are many and various. Unemployment is almost 100% and yet you have to scrape together every week the ridiculously high rent for the dirty shack you live in, which is owned by a wealthy landlord in the city. You would like to have someone you can blame for your plight, and the FLN has been eager to supply you with objects of calumny. Those of you who voted in the 1963 elections voted APRA, but there were a significant number of write-in votes for the FLN. You feel that APRA has let you down, that none of the promised reforms have been forthcoming, and do not begin to understand the reasons offered by the government for the delay in these reforms.

You therefore support anything which promises change in the <u>status quo</u>, and would be prepared to throw your support behind the APRA government again if they were able to convince you that the promised reforms would materialize. You are prone to violence and demonstrations. You sense a low degree of obligations to work through the existing political system, and have a low degree of participation in any voluntary political organization. Although the Americans have built both the clinics and one of the schools in the slum, and staff entirely one of the clinics, you are not pro-America, as you consider them a sinfully rich nation who should be doing even more for the country. You see them in their big cars in the city, and are bitterly jealous. You have heard the FLN propaganda which accuses the Americans of draining money out of Grenadilla for their own purposes and are half convinced, reasoning that that must be how they get the big cars and the money to put up clinics.

Your people have typically families of seven or more children, many deserted by the fathers. Almost all the slum dwellers are illiterate, the crime rate is astronomical, and disease common. Your diet is mostly beans and quite inadequate nutritionally.

Population --40,000

13

Votes -- 20,000

You may not travel or communicate on the telephones.

GOVERNOR -- SANTA MARIA

Objective: Govern, represent the interests of the APRA government in the city.

Attitudes You report regularly to Guedalla and are loyal to him. You are moderately wealthy by virtue of your position and friendship with Guedalla. You depend on the present government for your income and your job and would not like to see it deplaced unless you could get a better deal elsewhere which you doubt. You are not a hard core APRA member, but saw the light soon enough in 1957 to give some aid to the revolutionary party, and received your governorship as a pay off. You have good friends among the old wealthy aristocracy, and whenever they try and discuss APRA policy with you, you have have hitherto gently changed the subject, remarking the while that of course Guedalla is one of your oldest friends.

You tend towards persuasion, not violence, opportunism rather than honor, caution, reliability. You are responsible for collecting the taxes in the province and forwarding the balance to Guedalla after you have taken your income.

You get on well with the army commander and with the Americans whom you regard with some amusement but with liking. You have a high interest in stability and fear and hate the FLN as your comfortable position is dependent on the continuance of the present system. Your only reservation about Guedalla is that you cannot understand why he is reluctant to deal violently with the FLN. You sometimes think in terms of getting next to Hernandez, so that should power change hands your position would still be secure, but you do not want to come out into the open until you are sure this will be necessary, as you do prefer Guedalla of the two, and yourself of the three of you.

III-35

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LUIS DE ENERVES - FLN REPRESENTATIVE IN SANTA MARIA

Read the scenario for some facts about yourself and the FLN movement. You are the son of a wealthy Santa Maria family who have disowned you. You came back from America full of the idea of democracy, and the equality of every man, and were met with apopletic fury from your father and weeping from your mother when you propounded these ideas. The spell in the army which you did to please your father was a disaster; you loathed it; thought the officers were brutes; and were finally discharged after a year's unsatisfactory service.

Your objective is a free and independent Grenadilla, wherein all men are born equal and free, and there is social justice for all. Despite your admiration for America you do not wish Grenadilla to be within the American sphere of influence, but an equal among equal states. You despair of achieving your object through the APRA party, and see Guedalla as a tired man who has compromised with the wealthy and influential sections of the country, and betrayed his ideals. You prefer Carreras, but consider he has compromised himself by staying in office in the present government. The FLN is the only party that has proved both ideologically and practically satisfying, and you are totally committed to them. You admire Bunuel, but admire the charismatic de Zulueta more, although you realize that it is possible that a Cuban-trained FLN member may not have quite the same aims for the country as you yourself do. Any agitation you can stir up is to the good and you have already had success with the port slum, though little success with the urban proletariat. You have a band of 700 men. While you fight at a great advantage against the army you should at all costs avoid direct conflict as they outnumber you 12 to 1. You should not leave the province; not take any major actions without getting orders from Bunuel unless you have an excellent reason, or wish to make a break with Bunuel. You are not inclined however to disobey Bunuel's orders, as the FLN see themselves as a tightly knit band of brothers, all utterly loyal to each other.

You usually make use of violence rather than persuasion, and are an opportunist except where the long term welfare of Grenadilla seems to you to be a concern.
		Income	- """ -	XII	Expenses		~	Prior	Total
Name	Source	Purpose	Amount \$	Recipient	Purpose	Amount \$.'000	Income - Expenses	Savings \$ '000	Kescurces \$ '000
General Mgel	Guedella	Military	60 , 000	,000 Fandango	Equipment	5,000	10,000	20,000	30, 000
ue rrentas Fandango		naget		Santa Maria	and ray	11,000		• • • • • • • • •	
				Garr.	=				•
			C.871.1	73rd Garr.	=				
				42nd Garr. Marque Garr	= =	11,000			
Total				4	0	50,000	•-		~ ~~ ~
Bruno Randango	You have your salary and some Effectively you have no income	salary and 1 have no in	inh or	arited money expenses.	, but you	spend it all	every year		4
Hernandez	Gonzalez	Political	500	500 Various	с ,	400	200	400	600
	Diaz	n n	100			×			
Total			9009		;				
Guedalla	Min. of Herior Verdia Gov.	Tax Receipts 11 11 11 11	100,000 60,000	0,000 De Freitas 0,000 Carreras	24	60, 000 50, 000	28, 500	57,000	85, 500
	Marque Gov. Santa Maria Go Macleod	Ö - %	15,000	,000 Law School 000 School of	Duaget	5,000 5,000			
		Profits							
	John B. Goode'A. I. D.	A. I. D.	8, 500	Control	Expenses of Gov ¹ t.	138,500			***
Totals			278,500			258,500		,	~ ~ ~ ₹
Bunuel Verdia	ا عرا		200	200 Infidel	~	200	200	400	6 00
	be Zulueta		, 90 9	600 Castango Enerves		200 200			
Total			800			900			

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		Income		EX	Expenses		Surplus Income -	Prior Savings	Total Resources
	Source	Purpose	Amount \$ 1000	Recipient	Purpose	Amount \$!000		\$ 1000	2000, \$
	Foreign Sources		006	Bunuel Various		600	100	200	300
- j - 👻	de Freitas	Equipmnt/	5, 000	Control	Operating	800 4,000	1,000	2,000	3,000
		Pay	000		Costs				
	Von Pontz	1 axes	200	Control	Necessary	100,000 79,400	20,000	40,000	
	Gonzalez Middle Clana		144,000 38,000		Expenses of Admini				-
	Workers	<u></u>	12,000		stration				
	BUINTO		2, 600 199, 400			179,400			-
	You spend your	ur salary and	d allowances		to the hilt and have no money	no money	effectively.	Э	
	Aid Budget	Economic	17, 000	Guedalla		8, 500	ه ا	t for this	yéar is also
			*	Variously Distributed	T	8, 500	17 m. You spend your	are comj whole but	pelled to get every
		-	-		1	17,000	1001		·
	Clark	OI Profits	79,900	Control	Profit		5, 900	11,800	17,700
	,			Guedalla	(Repatriated 50% Profit	<u> </u>			
				Collidar	Local Int.	4,000			
					· · · · ·	74,000			
	Control	Income	10,000	Control Min. of Interior	Consumption Taxes	n 2,400 2,000	5, 600	11,200	16,800
		<u></u>				4,400			

SUMMARY OF TRANSACTION

III-38

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		Income		ធ	Expenses			Prior	Total
Name	Source	Purpose	Armount \$ 1000	Recipient	Purposé	Amount \$ 1000	Income - Expenses:	Savings \$ 1000	Resources \$ 1000
Collidar	Macleod	Oil Prófits	4, 000	Control Min. of Interior	Consumption Taxes	3 , 000 800	200	4 0Ó	6009
Total					-	3,800			
Fandango Gonzalez	Diaz	Rent income 720,000	1	Control Min. of Interior	Consumption Taxes	144,	143, 500	287,000	430, 500
Total	; Santjunu	,	5	Hernandez	Political Support	500 576 , 500	•		
Fandango Middle Class	Control	Income	000 , 001	Control Min. of Interior	Consumption Taxes	120, 000 38,000	32, 000	64,000	96, 000
Total						158, 000	,		
Fandango Workers	Control	Income	60, 000	Control Min. of Interior	Consumption Taxes	45, 600 12, 000	2,400	4, 800	~ 7, 200°
Total			, , ,			57,600	×		
Fandango Slums	Control	Income	13,000	Control Min. of Interior	Consumption Taxes	10,185 2,600	215	430	645
Total		, ,				12, 785	Y	,	
School of Law Fandango	Guedalla	Operating Budget	5,000	Control	Running Costs	4, 900	100	200	300
Fandango School of Soc. Science	Guedalla	Operating Budget	5, 000	Control	Running Costs	4, 900	100	200	300
Verdia 42nd	De Freitas	Equipment/	11,000	Control	Operating Costs	10,000	1,000	2,000	3, 000

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SUMMARY-OF-TRANSAGTION-RECORDS-

NameSourcePurposeAmountRecipientPurposeVerdiaDe FreitasEquipmint/11,000ControlOperating73rdDe FreitasEquipmint/11,000ControlOperating73rdDe FreitasEquipmint/11,000ControlCostsVerdiaDe FreitasEquipmint/11,000ControlCosts102ndDianTaxes36,000GuedallaTaxVerdiaDianTaxes36,000GontrolCostsVerdiaPeasantsTaxes36,000GontrolCostsVerdiaPeasantsRents36,000GontrolCostsVerdiaPeasantsRents36,000GontrolCostsVerdiaControlI.080,000ControlConsumptionVerdiaControlI.080,000ControlConsumptionVerdiaControlI.080,000ControlConsumptionVerdiaControlDiazIand-RentsVerdiaBunuelMinistry50,000ControlOperatingCarrerasGuedallaTaxes32,200GuedallaTaxesJoinaPetroliaTaxes32,200GuedallaTaxMarquePetroliaTaxes5,600ControlOperatingJoinaJoinaTaxes5,600ControlOperatingJoinaPetroliaTaxes32,200GuedallaTaxJoinaPetreiasFaves5			T	Income		Â	Expenses		Surplus	Prior	Total
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VerdiaDe FreitasEquipmint/11,000ControlOperating102ndDiasTaxes36,000GuedallaTaxVerdiaPeasantsTaxes36,000GuedallaTaxGovernorPeasantsRents36,000GovernorTaxesVerdiaPeasantsRents90°. 0°0GovernorTaxesTotalPeasantsRents90°. 0°0GovernorTaxesTotalRentsRentsBalance ofRentsTotalControlI.080,000GovernorTaxesTotalControlI.080,000GovernorTaxesTotalControlI.080,000GovernorTaxesVerdiaControlDiazLand-RentsVerdiaBunuelBudget50,000ControlCostsMarquePetroliaTaxes32,200GuedallaTaxMarqueVorkersTaxes32,200GuedallaTaxJelloWorkersTaxes5,600MortolOperatingTotalDeFreitasEquipment/1,000ControlOperating		Verdia 73rd	De Freitas	Equipmht/ Pay	11,000	Control	Operating Costs	10, 000	1,000	2, 000	3,000
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VerdiaControl1,080,000ControlConsumptionPeasantsControlGovernorTaxesTotalTaxesDiaz (Land-RentsTotalGuedallaMinistry50,000ControlCarrerasGuedallaMinistry50,000ControlOperatingCarrerasGuedallaMinistry50,000ControlOperatingVerdiaBunuel200VariousCostsCostsMarquePetroliaTaxes32,200GuedallaTaxReceiptsMarquePetroliaTaxes32,200GuedallaTaxReceiptsJelloWorkersTaxes5,600MarqueOperatingMarqueDeFreitasEquipmht/1,000ControlOperating		Verdia Diaz Treel	Peasants	Rents	C.20- 206	Control Governor Gonzalez	Consumption Taxes Balance of Rents		72,000	144,000	216, 000
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al Guedalla Ministry 50,000 Control Operating Bunuel Budget 50,000 Control Operating Costs Bunuel Taxes 32,200 Guedalla TaxReceipts Workers Taxes 32,200 Guedalla TaxReceipts Jello Vorkers Taxes 32,200 Workers Taxes 5,600 DeFreitas Equipmint/ 1,000 Control Operating	III-40	Verdia Peasants	Control			Control Governor Diaz (Land- ownets age	Consumption Taxes Rents t)	142,500 36,000 900,000	1,500	3, 000	4, 500
usGuedallaMinistry Budget50,000ControlOperating Costs45,BunuelBudget200VariousCosts45,Bunuel200Various200755,norPetroliaTaxes32,200GuedallaTaxRecipts55,norGreseTaxes32,200GuedallaTaxRecipts55,norWorkersTaxes5,60070,0001,000JelloWorkersFauipmint/1,000ControlOperating	k	Total		* 3 •			+ ,	1,078,000			
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DorPetroliaTaxes32, 200GuedallaTax Receipts55,NorkersTaxes32, 200GuedallaTax Receipts55,VorkersTaxes5, 60091JelloWorkers5, 60070,000UDeFreitasEquipment1, 000ControlDeFreitasEquipment1, 000ControlOperating		Verdia Infidel	Bunuel		20Ò	Various		ŢġŎ	10	20	30
DeFreitas Equiprrhit/ 1,000 Control Operating		Marque	Petrolia	Taxes	32, 200	Guedalla	Tax Receipts	55,000	15,000	30, 000	45,000
JelloTaxes5,600Workers70,000DeFreitasEquipment1,000Control	er gríse	COVETHOF	Grese	Тахез	32,200	<u></u>					
1 DeFreitas Equiprrht/ 1,000 Control Operating			workers Jello Workers	Taxes	5, 600					1	
DeFreitas Equipmut/ 1,000 Control Operating		Total		2	70, 000				1		
Pay	لنحبب	Marque Garrison	DeFreitas	Equipmint/ Pay	1, 000		Operating Costs	006	100	200	300

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SUMMARY OF TRANSACTION RECORDS

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	Name		Income	Ţ	Ξ.	Expenses		Surplus Income -		Prior Savings
!		Source	Purpose	Amount \$ 1000	Recipient	Purpôse	Amount \$ 1000	Expenses		0001 \$
ت جندي من	Castango Marque	Bunuel		200	Various		190	10		20
Å	Marque	Control	Mine 4	400,000	Macleod	Profits	79, 900	100	-	200
	4 18 1			1	Petrolia Workere	Wages	147,200			
					Grese	Wages	147,200			
					Workers Jello Workers	Wages	25,600			
	Total						399, 900			
Ļ	Marque Petrolia Workers	Clark	Wages	147,200	Control Governor	Consumption Taxes	32,200	6, 000	12,000	000
T A 1	Total	, , ,					141,200	4		
	Marque Grese Workers	Clark	Wages	147,200	Control Governor	Consumption Taxes	32,200	6, 000	12,000	000
	Total			ŷ			141,200			
	Marque Jellc Workers Total	Clark B	Wages	25, 600	Control Governor	Consumption Taxes	19,000 5,600 24,600	1,000	2,000	00
	Salivar Santa Maria Total	Control	Income	1,000	Control Governor Hernandez	Consumption Taxes Political Support	400 200 100	300	0	600
_	Santa Maria	Control	Income	70, 000	ļ	Consumption	44,800	1.1,200	22, 400	8
	Total			2	Governor	Taxes	14,000 58,800			

SUMMARY OF TRANSACTION RECORDS

Barrison Barrison II and a comment

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	Name	Santa Maria Workers Total	Santa Maria C Slum Total	Governor Santa Mari a V Santa Mari a V S Total	re E s	Enerves Santa Maria	
n H	Source	Control	Control	Slum Workers Middle Class Salivar	De Freitas	'Bunuel	
income	Purpose	Income	Income	Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes	Equipmnt /		
*******	Amount \$	23, 000	4,000	4, 600 14, 000 19, 600	11,000	, 200	
	Recipient	Control Governor	Control Governor	Guedalla	Control	Various	
Expenses	Purpose	Consumption Taxes	Consumption Taxes	Tax Receipts	Operating Costs	-	
ža ser	Amount \$ '000	n 17,500 4,600 22,100	n 3, 140 800 3, 940	15,000	10,000	1,90	
	Expenses	006	9	4, 600	1, ŎÔ <u>Ô</u>	10	
Prior	Savings	1, 800	120	9, 200	2,000	5	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Total	Kesources \$ 1000	2,700	180	13, 800	3, 000	30	

SUMMARY OF TRANSACTION RECORDS

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SURVEY OF CRITIQUE RESPONSES

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1. Introduction

The following data was compiled from player critique forms submitted by players after POLITICA II (Patria), POLITICA V (Grenadilla) and POLITICA VI (Inertia) - a total of 101 respondents. These criticisms proved valuable in correcting operational difficulties during the development of the games. Responses show considerable variations from scenario to scenario, but certain common patterns seem to have emerged with regard to play ability and the extent to which player behavior was guided by game constraints. 7 1

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The largest number of respondents for all of the three scenarios saw interactions among players as the most realistic aspect of the game, though the percentage of players giving this answer was higher for <u>Patria</u> and <u>Inertia</u> than for <u>Grenadilla</u>. Since the basic objective of the POLITICA development was to simulate realistically the interactions among groups and individuals, this response speaks well for the achievement of this objective. The next largest number of players considered communications difficulties the games most realistic aspect, followed closely by role delineations. This latter aspect of the game was the one found most difficult by the developers to implement.

On the other hand, a large number of participants felt that players acting out of character with their roles was the major source of unreality in the exercises. Since, however, most players felt their own best play was motivated by the personality profile, this response indicates primarily that players tended to perceive their own role constraints as realistic, but others as not. From a teaching point of view, this discrepancy suggests that the players could learn a good deal by objective consideration of other people's play of the various roles. Unfortunately, most players did not see it that way, preferring to conclude rather that other players were simply "out of character" when their behavior did not match preconceptions concerning the real world. This argues strongly for a detailed debriefing of the players in terms of these differential perceptions. Mechanisms for power plays and violence were perceived as unrealistic by players in all three games, as was the limited time allowed for player interactions. These factors, the fundamental compression of time and space are, of course, inherent in the simulation concept. The mechanics of power plays and violence have been refined as a result of these criticisms in an attempt to minimize this problem.

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> Only 29 of the 101 respondents mentioned problems brought out in the game of which they were not previously aware, although the responses concerning role perception mentioned above suggest that there may be much more to be learned. Of these, nine--all responding to the <u>Inertia</u> scenario which had an unusually large number of clandestine roles--pointed to the difficulties which exist in determining the real loyalties of the other players. Six players mentioned the difficulties of decision-making under pressure on the basis of incomplete evidence, while six more realized the difficulties of maintaining control of people and using power. Recognition of the constraints on accomplishing objectives within group interactions was another relatively frequent new learning output from the games. The communication of all of these problems is an important part of the POLITICA objective.

Personality profiles seem to have had an important impact on player behavior in that one third of the players felt that the personality profile motivated them to take actions they considered effective. The general scenario and actions of other players ranked next as motivators for effective action. Actions of other players were thought to be by far the most common cause of players taking action which proved injurious to their interests. Personality profiles ranked second as the source of actions players considered to have harmed their interests, apparently an indication that game contraints were indeed effective in determining player behavior. Prior knowledge of Latin America was the least common source for contention that POLITICA can be played effectively by personnel without specific area expertise.

By far the largest number of players listed personal interaction, bargaining and negotiating as the most enjoyable aspect of the game, followed by power plays and violence. The slow pace of things, particularly for some of the population players; proved most boring for the largest number, although it is interesting to note that an equal number indicated that no aspects of the

IV-2

games bored them. Most players, however, stated that they became moderately, not deeply, involved in the exercises. Most thought the game length was about right and most were satisfied with their role assignments. Opinions on whether or not the outcome was realistic were divided, though half of those who thought the butcome was unrealistic were reporting on the <u>Inertia</u> play. Much of this feeling may have been a reaction to Control's "intervention" in the death of El Caudillo. Most were also satisfied with roles assigned to other players and a majority thought the personality constraints in the profiles were reasonable. Areas of confusion were frequently traced to artificial aspects of the games. A substantial majority of respondents indicated a desire to play again.

In brief, it appears that player behavior was in fact sufficiently influenced by the game structure to provide a relatively realistic set of responses. Role identification seems to have run fairly high and most players seem to have been substantially influenced by the scenario, profiles and rules.

A tabulațion of critique form data follows.

2. Sample Critique Form

POLITICA

Role Played

Name

CRITIQUE

1.	What do	you	believe	was th	e most	realistic	aspect of	of the	game?
----	---------	-----	---------	--------	--------	-----------	-----------	--------	-------

2. What do you believe was the most unrealistic aspect of the game?

3. What problem did the game bring out that you were not previously aware of (if any)?

4. What action of yours did you think was most effective?

5. What motivated you to take this action:

- a. your own knowledge of Latin America?
- b. the scenario?
- c. the personality profile if so, which factor?
- d. economic constraints?
- e. actions of another player in the game if so, specify.
- 6. What was your worst mistake in playing the game?
- 7. What motivated you to take this action:
 - a. your own knowledge of Latin America?
 - b. the scenario?
 - c. the personality profile if so, which factor?
 - d. economic constraints?
 - e. actions of another player in the game if so, specify.

	What aspect of the game did vou enjoy most?	
9.	What aspect of the game bored you?	
10.	Do you believe that games like this would be useful for research into socio-political processes in the real world?	ς.
11.	If so, what hypotheses do you think could be tested?	
1 [,] 2.	What do you suggest be done to improve the game?	1
13.	How involved in the game did you become? (Please check one.) Slightly? Moderately? Deeply?	
14.	Do you believe that the game outcome was realistic? If not, why not?	, , ,
15.	What was the most significant action in determining the outcome of the game?	: ; ;
16.	Do you believe this action was reasonable in terms of the scenario?	
17.	What role would you like to play in another, similar game?	, ,
18.	Do you think the game was too short, about the right length, or too long?	2 1 1 1
19.	Were you satisfied with your own role assignment?	
.20.	Were you satisfied with the roles assigned to other players? If not, why not?	-ventur Arranginger / Min
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- 21. Do you think the personality constraints were:
 - a. reasonable

- b. too confining
- c. insufficiently explicit?
- 22. What was the most confusing aspect of the game?
- 23. Do you believe this confusion to be the result of realistic or artificial aspects?

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- 24. Were communications realistically simulated?
- 25. Would you like to play again?



3. Critique Data Tabulation

Sample size = 101

1. Most realistic aspect of game

			•		
	-	POLITICA II	POLITICA V	POLITICA VI	TOTAL
a)	role delineations	5	6	6	16
b)	physical set-up (provinces)		2.		2
c)	power ratings and: structure	0	4	3	7
' d)	Communications - information or lack of information available during game.	4.	5	9	18
e) ,	interactions among players	8	13	20	41
f)	time factors	0	2	0	2

2. Most unrealistic aspect of game

-	POLITICA II	POLITICA V	POLITICA VI	TOTAL
a) lack of information (about other roles, about other interactions)	1	4	4	9
b) time allowed for interactions	3	9	3	15
c) physical set-up 1. speed of movement among provinces	3	1	3	7
2. communications	· 1	3	2	6
d) power plays, violence	1	\$6	5	12
e) players acting out of character with roles	3	11	5	19
f) groups represented by one person	Ž	3	2	7

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· · · · ·	POLITICA II	POLITICA V	POLITICA VI	TOTAL
a) difficulties of decision- making under pressure with incomplete information	2 on	3	Ì	6
b) determining loyalties	Ó	0	9	9
c) accomplishing objectives in group interactions	1	3	1	5
d) maintaining control of people, situation; use of power	2	2	2	6
e) communications	1	2	0	3

Problems brought out that player now aware of previously

4. Action believed most effective

3.

These answers vary widely with the roles. Generally, the following three types of action were listed as being most effective.

a) taking an action which was considered by player as being in character with his assigned role.

b) participating in or initiating a power play which improved a player's relative position.

c) supporting in one way or another the person whom the player thought could do the most good for him.

.5. Motivations for ta	Motivations for taking actions considered effective			
	POLITICA II	POLITICA V	POLITICA VI	TOTAL*
a) knowledge of Latin Americ	a 2	2	4	8
b) scenario	7	12	5	24

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É vations for taking actions considered effe

*More than one factor listed per questionnaire.

c) personality profile

e) actions of another

player

d) economic constraints

IV-8

6. Worst mistake_during_game____

Again, the answers here vary with roles. Generally, the mistake was in the area of:

. .

a) making an error in judgment - choosing the wrong side or person to support

b) not taking enough positive action and consolidating of power. Examples:

Arana (POLITICA II): "Probably backing a coup that didn't have the army to back it."

Workers - San Cristobol (POLITICA II): "Not getting the workers, slum dwellers and students together earlier in game."

Armenduriz (POLITICA VI): "Not enough concrete action on my part."

Pascual (POLITICA VI): "Not getting 'in' with Morgan when he had great power."

7. Motivation for taking action considered worst mistake

	POLITICA II	POLITICA V	POLITICA VI	TOTAL
a) knowledge of Latin America	a 3	0	1	4
b) scenario	5	3	2	10
c) personality profile	5	7	4	<u>1</u> 6
d) economic constraints	2	3	3	8
e) actions of other player	3	16	11	30
f). confusion, fast action	0	3	1	4 [.]

8. Aspect of game enjoyed most

	POLITICA II	POLITICA V	POLITICA VI	TOTAL
a) personal interaction, bargaining, negotiating	10	14	14	38
b) power plays & violence	2	5	11	18
c) observing development of game	2	2	0	4
d) fast-moving action	1	2	1	4
e) role playing self & others	1	3	1	5

IV-9

9. Most boring aspect of game

	POLITICA II	POLITICA V	POLITICA VI	TOTAL
a) dragginess	2	8	7	17
b) confusion, aimlessness	0.	6	6	12
c) small part in action	3	3	3	9
d) no mobility	2	4	2	8
e) ineffectiveness of actions	4	4	0	8
f) none	3	6	8	17

10. Are games like this useful for research into socio-political processes in the real world

	POLITICA II	POLITICA V		TOTAL
a) Yes	8	23	13	44
b) No	3	6	14	23
c) Uncertain	6	7	5	18

12. Suggestions for improving the game

The suggestion mentioned the most by far was that the pace be slowed down, allowing more time for assessing the situation and planning further action.

Other suggestions were to use more experienced players, have more orderly power plays, to have more knowledge about other players:

13. How involved did player become in game?

-	POLITICA H	POLITICA V	POLITICA VI	TOTAL
a) Slightly	Ŝ	7	4	16
b) Moderately	10	22	21	53
c) Deeply	3	į .3	13	29

1 4 .	Was-outcome of	game realistic		-	
		<u> POLITICA II</u>	POLITICA V	POLITICA VI	TOTAL
a) [,] Yes		9	24	9	42
b) No		6	14	20	40

18. <u>Was the le</u>	ngth of the game too POLITICA II	POLITICA V	POLITICA V	I TOTAL
a) Short	<u></u>	<u>1.0141104 v</u> 8	101111()	26
b) Right length		1.7	17	43
c) Long	3	11	- - 4	18
	IV-	10		-

	POLITICA II	POLITICA	فالتشيب المترجبين فالمترجب والمتحد	TOTAL
a) Yes b) No	<u>15</u> 2,	<u>29</u> 11	<u>24</u> 10	<u>68</u> 23 [°]
20. Were you satisfi	.ed with the role	s assigned to of	ther players?	
	POLITICA II	POLITICA V	POLITICA VI	TOTAL
a) Yes	16	25	25	- 66
b) No	2	1.	5	8
21. Were the person insufficiently ex		reasonable, co	onfining,	-
	POLITICA	POLITICA V	POLITICA VI	TOTA
a) reasonable	**************************************	POLITICA V 30	POLITICA VI 21	<u>TOTA</u> 52
	POLITICA			

19. Were you satisfied with your own role assignment?

22. What was the most confusing aspect of game?

These answers corresponded closely with the replies as to the most unrealistic aspect of the game. They included factors such as too many power plays, lack of time to assimilate information, communications, difficulty in determining loyalties.

23. <u>Was</u>	23. Was the confusion a result of realistic or artificial aspects?					
	POLITICA II	POLITICA V	POLITICA VI	TOTAL		
a) realistic	7	4	6	17		
b) artificial	⁸	22	17	47		

24.	Were communications realistically simulated?					
		POLITICA II	POLITICA V	POLITICA VI	TOTAL	
a) Yes	-	<u>8</u>	24	11	43	
b). No	- -	9	14	16	39*	

*Most stated communications unrealistically confusing and difficult. A few stated they were too easy.

	25.	Would you like to	play again?			-	
			POLITICA II	POLITICA V	POLITICA VI	TOTAL	
-	a) Yes				27	66	_
	b) Nò		4	. 6	2	12	

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