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Guidelines for Measuring Success in Counterinsurgency

by

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
RESEARCH ANALYSIS CORPORATION

MCLEAN, VIRGINIA

FOREWORD

This paper is one of a group that were given in the Special Warfare and Incipient Insurgency Working Groups at the XVIII MORS, which was held at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, Ft Bragg, N.C., on 19-21 October 1966. The Unconventional Warfare Department has selected three of these for publication; as a rule, papers presented in the Working Groups are not published in the MORS Proceedings. It is believed that because of the interests of the Defense Community in low-intensity warfare, it is appropriate that they be given timely circulation.

The author, S. N. Bjelajac, is Civilian Advisor to the Director of Special Operations, DCSOPS. This paper represents part of an effort that is now underway in the Defense Community to adjust planning to the current realities of insurgent operations and to the massive task ahead in organizing a total assessment of countersubversive activities.



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GUIDELINES FOR MEASURING SUCCESS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY*

INTRODUCTION

For many years, military experts and scholars have struggled with the knotty problem of trying to measure the course of the war in Vietnam. The difficulty is that the nature of the conflict itself is only vaguely perceived by many whose experience has conditioned them to see Vietnam largely in terms of a series of World War II or Korean-type conventional battles. The stereotyped formulae derived from these traditional wars are largely irrelevant to the situation in Vietnam, and their attempted application there by "analysts" has resulted in inaccurate and misleading conclusions regarding this new yet ancient form of warfare.

Among the consequences of such amateurishness has been the fact that in Vietnam neither the US nor the Republic of Vietnam authorities receive proper credit for the work they are doing. Consequently, US gains have been underrated and those of a leftist or pacifist bent have been encouraged to wage a vigorous campaign against US policy in Southeast Asia. Unfortunately their efforts have borne much more fruit than can be justified by the facts.

The question of casualties, for example, is erroneously considered by many as the prime or even the sole indicator of success or failure. The fact is that, in a strategic sense, casualty rates have only a limited effect on the final outcome on the kind of war typified by the situation in Vietnam. Casualties may indicate the success or failure of one battle, but they are far overshadowed by political, psychological, educational, informational, economic, and other factors bearing on human behavior. For obvious reasons the American public is greatly concerned with casualties. The loss of American lives can never be

*The views here expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official views of the US Department of the Army or government.

taken lightly. Nor do comparisons between the casualties of American soldiers as opposed to those suffered by their Vietnamese allies pass unnoticed. Reports indicating that the US forces in Vietnam sometimes suffer more casualties during a period of time than do the South Vietnamese cause considerable anxiety in the United States. The implication is that the Vietnamese may be shirking and letting the Americans do the main job. Actually the situation may not be so simple as it might appear at first glance. One must consider many factors such as the number of troops engaged in operations against the Viet Cong, the weather and terrain (which are not uniform throughout Vietnam), the strength and skill of the enemy encountered in a particular battle, the time frame within which an operation or series of operations took place, and the character and temperament of the US and Vietnamese soldiers, with particular regard to their relative degrees of aggressiveness when in contact with the enemy. Any or all of these factors can serve to influence or even distort casualty statistics over the short run. Such statistics do not necessarily convey a true picture of what is happening over a longer period of time.

This study represents an attempt to establish valid guidelines for measuring the progress of the war in South Vietnam as well as in similar situations of insurgency and revolutionary warfare that may arise elsewhere in the future. As far as it is known, this is the first, and it is believed a successful, attempt to spell out a series of steps by which reasoned conclusions may be drawn regarding this special kind of situation. Although the war in Vietnam has been used as the primary source of inputs for this study (and many references will be case specific to Vietnam), the level of generalization extends far beyond the borders of Vietnam. The individual evaluations necessary to apply the guidelines to a specific case will vary widely according to the cultural setting. But the guidelines themselves are generic to insurgency and revolutionary warfare and should be of considerable aid to those faced with the daily task of knowing whether we are winning or losing, and by how much. (R

Limitations

In drawing on the situation in Vietnam for information used in this study the effects of the bombing of North Vietnam are considered only within the frame and scope of the reflexive criteria or guidelines by which one may measure his own and the enemy's capabilities in various situations. Since the bombing of North Vietnam has had not only a tremendous psychological but also a material effect on the whole war, a separate study would be required to evaluate the contribution of this bombing to success in the South. Such a study would require a major effort in terms of time and money and extensive field research. It would require the constant measurement of popular reaction to the bombing and of any changes in attitudes brought about by it.

Finally, although the guidelines presented below are couched in general terms, the analyst should never forget that the factors that make up any guidelines vary from culture to culture. The relative weight of any guideline thus changes accordingly. This is as true of some guidelines devised by Westerners for measuring success in Southeast Asia as it would be with guidelines used by Asians to measure values in the West. Thus all guidelines set forth in this paper, with the exception of some of a technical military nature, are valid only within the context of a sound understanding and appreciation of the applicable culture. Admittedly, the concern is primarily with Vietnam and although these guidelines are felt to be applicable in principle elsewhere, the reader is reminded that the thinking has been influenced by the culture, philosophy of life, traditions, ways, and standards of value held by the South Vietnamese.

Basic Notes Regarding the Guidelines

Both reflexive and interactive guidelines must be taken into account for any valid estimate of progress or failure in counterinsurgency. Too, all factors must be viewed in terms of both qualitative and quantitative values. Exclusive reliance on quantified or quantifiable data is a gross error. The weighing of quantities and statistics alone, while ignoring the quality of the factors involved, i.e., the relative values of these factors in a given situation, leads to incomplete, false, and misleading conclusions.

Almost every individual aspect of the phenomenon of insurgency and revolutionary warfare bears directly on how each guideline is used to estimate the progress of the whole war in a counterinsurgency situation. The use of too few guidelines will lead to incomplete and misleading analysis. For example, casualty figures alone may not only be inadequate as a basis for judgment but may be very deceiving, for the following reasons:

1. Success in insurgency/counterinsurgency does not, as in conventional war, depend solely on one or two major power factors such as Atomic superiority, air superiority, delivery capability, and the like.
2. The outcome of an insurgency is seldom decided by a few decisive battles.
3. Most insurgencies do not end with a clearcut conventional victory or defeat characterized by the capitulation of the enemy and the surrender of his instruments of war.

Despite the foregoing, if it is considered useful to evaluate the outcome of a limited event (e.g., a single battle against the insurgent military forces), casualty figures might well depict the actual situation. If other factors, such as the loss of weapons, prisoners, etc., are added, the picture becomes even more complete.

The struggle in an insurgency situation involves a variety of interrelated military, social, political, psychological, economic, and other operations and activities. It involves not only the guerrillas but also the insurgent underground and support elements plus the whole of the ambient population. Too, since the general populace is the ultimate target of both sides, since mass opinion changes take time, since a whole country is usually involved, since the struggle usually involves fundamental changes in the society, and since the use of conventional power is usually seriously limited, the conflicts of insurgency are long and complicated. Their solutions may involve decades.

Another distinguishing feature of revolutionary conflict is the fact that it is more important what the people believe than what may actually be factual. Thus the psychological consequences of any actions taken become of great importance and may well affect the balance of the support given by and sympathy received from the people.

It has already been pointed out that criteria valid for measuring success on the conventional battlefield may often be inapplicable to situations in a revolutionary context. It is a truism that the insurgent enemy does not usually perceive the situation in terms of concepts taught at West Point, at the Ecole Superieure de Guerre, or by the German General Staff. The enemy may be illiterate, but his strategy and tactics may be based on sound logic within his own cultural perceptions. Thus he often makes "illogical," unexpected, and therefore successful moves to the discomfiture of the professional and schooled soldier. The enemy is political, first and foremost. He operates in the political, psychological, and military contexts intermittently or in concert. His army (of guerrillas) is a political army, although it may have a high degree of military skills. Each of his soldiers is supported by 10, 15, or more people operating in the shadows of the underground. Everything is tailored to the political goal. Thus the enemy's values are different from those of the professional soldier, and his standards of success and failure are equally different.

The manner in which guidelines of success are interpreted and the validity they may have change through time. Many changes in a situation, including changes in the phases of development of the conflict, affect the guidelines. For example, the insurgents may, for political or

strategic reasons, decide either to exert an all-out military effort or to reduce the existing effort to a needed minimum. Thus an increase in the incident rates or the casualty figures may indicate only a change in the intensity of conflict, not in its outcome. (There is no necessary relation between intensity of conflict and the probable outcome unless one side can maintain a very prolonged high intensity of operations and inflict much greater casualties than the enemy can replace.)

It must also be kept in mind that all guidelines or criteria are reciprocal to a considerable degree with regard to the evaluation of successes and failures by either side. This is especially true of interactive guidelines, although it also applies to guidelines of a reflexive nature. All guidelines which are valid for one side become valid also for the enemy.

The ultimate objective in any insurgency/counterinsurgency situation is the allegiance of the majority of the population within the country. These people include all the antagonists on both sides as well as the uncommitted masses. And, since what people believe to be true is often more important than what actually is true, it follows that effective propaganda and information policy and implementation are crucial factors for success by either side. In many cases, good propaganda has offset poor operations. This has certainly been proven by the communists many times.

Summary

Good counterinsurgency analysis, then, requires first, a set of realistic guidelines to success; second, a realistic determination of the relative weight to be given each guideline chosen; and, third, a determination of the absolute validity of each guideline in terms of the cultural conditions at hand. This selecting and weighing process will place all guidelines in their proper and realistic frames of reference.

Armed with such an analytical tool, the analyst is then in a position to forecast the probable impact of alternative courses of action taken by either side upon the target population. One should also be able to compare his forecast with actual results, based upon measurement of attitudes of population groups accessible to him. A warning is appropriate here. It is essential to measure the reactions of the people rather than the scope of operations undertaken to bring about those reactions.

Reflexive Guidelines

A vital point of departure in the detailed process of counterinsurgency analysis is a preliminary estimate of the situation based

upon the sets of reflexive guidelines listed below. These permit the measurement first of one's capabilities for action and those of the enemy. But they also contribute to any subsequent evaluations of progress or lack of progress in their use. The reflexive guidelines we suggest are not intended to be either all-inclusive or static. New reflexive guidelines should be added in accordance with any change in circumstances such as an increase or decrease in a particular capability. By the same token obsolete guidelines should be discarded as, for example, when both sides have developed an equal reconnaissance capability. The following list of reflexive guidelines are derived from a study of the immediate situation in South Vietnam:

For the Republic of Vietnam and its Allies:

- (a) The existing airpower for attacking VC targets; any increase or decrease in this capability; and the determination to use it;
- (b) Air mobility for tactical and strategic lift of troops and supplies; any increase or decrease in this capability; and the determination to use it;
- (c) The capability to bring troops directly into combat by air; any increase or decrease in this capability; and the determination to use it;
- (d) The strategic and the tactical element of surprise owing to the capabilities in (a), (b) and (c); and the determination to use it;
- (e) Logistic supply capability for all weapons and equipment needed;
- (f) Evacuation capability of personnel and wounded from combat and other dangerous areas; any increase or decrease in this capability; and the determination to use it;
- (g) Air reconnaissance capability; any increase or decrease in this capability; and the determination to use it;
- (h) Firepower at the disposal of ground forces and close support from the air; any increase or decrease in this capability; and the determination to use it;
- (i) Strategic and tactical communication capability; any increase or decrease in this capability; and the determination to use it;

(j) The capability to drop leaflets and give messages from the air; any increase or decrease in this capability; and the determination to use it;

(k) Initiative and aggressiveness, which at this point exceeds the enemy's; any change in the degree of these two;

(l) The existing airpower for attacking targets in North Vietnam; any increase or decrease in this capability; and the determination to use it;

(m) The existing capability for controlling the North Vietnam Sea coast or for blockading that coast; any increase or decrease in this capability; and the determination to use it;

(n) Any other existing or newly created (or lost or abandoned) capability which would be of use against the enemy.

(Note: In re to l, m and n above, one must consider not only the material effect of these activities upon the situation in South Vietnam but also the psychological effects upon both sides.)

For the Viet Cong

(a) Capability of the VC to use terrain, inclement weather conditions, and darkness of night to his advantage; and any increase or decrease in this;

(b) Capability for small-scale tactical surprise and better foot mobility; and any increase or decrease in this capability;

(c) Capability, inherent in the nature of guerrilla warfare, to inflict in certain situations a relatively much greater loss to conventional forces; any increase or decrease in this capability;

(d) Closer familiarity with the terrain and fuller rapport with the people; and any decrease or increase in this capability;

(e) Greater tolerance of climatic and sanitary conditions; and any decrease or increase in this capability;

(f) Different morality and freedom to use lies, deceptions, and terror in order to gain support from the people and to keep the people under control. (These are, however, a short term advantage.)

(g) Fanaticism and disregard for life; and any decrease or increase in this capability.

Since the ultimate objective of the Viet Cong is to impose complete control over South Vietnam and since the South Vietnam government's objective is the same, the ability and power to control various situations more and more efficiently are of crucial importance. Success is expressed by being able to control operations and actions, and to influence the people. The one who is able to extend his control over uncontrolled areas (territory/people) and/or is able to gain complete control over something he only partially or occasionally controlled before is enjoying success. The interactive guidelines listed in Tabs A-K are devised and organized to fit the purpose of this study. They are grouped in these sets in order to measure the following:

- Political Control (TAB A)
- Control of Intelligence (TAB B)
- Public Opinion and Propaganda (TAB C)
- Political Aspects of Education (TAB D)
- Control of the Legal System (TAB E)
- Community Services and Civic Action (TAB F)
- Control of Transportation and Communications (TAB G)
- Control of Recruitment (TAB H)
- Economic Controls (TAB I)
- Control of Terrorism and Sabotage (TAB J)
- Military and Paramilitary Operations and Activities (TAB K)

These are not necessarily listed in the order of their priority, since their significance may and usually does change according to the situation at hand as well as with the purpose and intent in the specific use of individual sets of guidelines.

Conclusions

A record of success or failure in every operation in counterinsurgency should be made a matter of daily routine. Trends in the progress of the war, however, require at least two or three months of analysis of all operations for a reliable initial estimate. Too, since the principal factors indicating ultimate success or failure are the almost intangible changes in the attitudes of the people, and since such changes

occur very slowly, even three months may be inadequate for a realistic assessment of the entire war effort. Mechanisms such as opinion polls or their equivalent must be devised to measure attitudinal change. All results must be tempered with a considerable amount of patience, especially if the insurgency is of such magnitude as the one in South Vietnam.

It is recognized that much additional study and work will be required to render these suggested guidelines fully operational. More research will need to be done to determine, for example, the degree of their applicability to situations other than Vietnam. On the other hand, it is felt that the considerations outlined in this paper do provide practical and workable guidance to the analysis of the degree of success or failure with which our efforts in Vietnam are being met.

POLITICAL CONTROL

The degree of political control exercised over the administrative subdivisions of a given area can be measured in terms of control of the many individual institutions through which political and governmental activities are manifested. The control of these institutions can be determined by observation of both the efficiency with which a given institution performs its assigned function and the attitudes and activities of the individuals belonging to it. Several examples follow:

1. Support of the government's counterinsurgency programs by village and/or town councils is an important indicator. This support is reflected by the degree to which functionaries work on behalf of the program, encourage the populace to cooperate, and the alacrity with which local personages accept appointments to positions of responsibility.

2. Police units are particularly important in view of their specialized role in counterinsurgency operations. The degree of police support of the civil administration, the trend toward greater or lesser support, and the willingness of civilians to work on the police force are significant factors.

3. The degree of success enjoyed by the insurgents in attempts to penetrate or subvert police and/or other organs of local government can be gauged by tallying the number of attempts, successes, and failures on the part of the enemy, and the incidence of voluntary disclosure by citizens of these attempts.

4. Conversely, the degree of success enjoyed by the government in discovering and thwarting insurgent agitators, propagandists, and underground cells should be tallied with special attention to the role played by citizens in cooperation with government agents.

5. The general effectiveness of the insurgent underground can be estimated in terms of key attitudes of the populace in individual villages or towns: Is the populace reacting to a greater or lesser degree than before to themes of defeatism, or anti-government agitation? Are there identifiable changes in attitude toward the insurgents vs. the government by political, religious, labor, student, peasant, or other interest

groups? Are expressions of opinion open and public? Are the public expressions of opinion increasing or decreasing in either number or intensity? In which direction? How effectively are the insurgents selling their thesis that they are national and patriotic?

6. Effectiveness of the government line can be estimated along similar lines. What evidence is there of popular understanding of the link (if any) between the insurgents and international communism? How well are government or allied policy objectives perceived and understood? Is such understanding and acceptance increasing or decreasing, and to what degree?

7. What concrete uses are being made of civic and political interest groups by the government or the insurgents? To what extent and degree are either the government or the insurgents using these groups for:

- bringing effective administration to the village level;
- tapping the village information reservoir for knowledge of the people;
- measuring public opinion in government and insurgent-controlled areas as well as the gray areas;
- generating public support of government or insurgent policies;
- countering enemy (insurgent or government) propaganda;
- countering enemy (insurgent or government) intelligence or other covert activities.

CONTROL OF INTELLIGENCE

The pattern of the flow of intelligence is an excellent general barometer of progress in insurgency/counterinsurgency. The details of this pattern must be analyzed systematically, for the conclusions to be drawn vary widely with such factors as the quantity and quality of intelligence, its subject orientation, its method of acquisition, and its sources.

In general, effective government intelligence indicates progress in the counterinsurgency. Following are some specifics indicating the type and degree of progress to be gleaned from intelligence analysis:

1. Probably the most significant general indicator of progress has to do with the sources of intelligence. If the bulk of government intelligence is acquired as a result of volunteered support from the civilian populace, this indicates strong support for the government and a lack of support for the insurgents. Conversely, if the bulk of government intelligence is gathered from military activities such as patrols, aerial reconnaissance, etc., the government programs are making little progress in winning popular support and the counterinsurgent effort is probably stagnating. The lesson here is that the increase or decrease in the flow of intelligence given to the government by volunteer civilians is more significant for measuring success than is the validity or usefulness of the intelligence received.

2. The type of information gathered is significant. If, for example, the government's collection effort is successful primarily in the field of tactical military intelligence, this is an indication of weakness in government rapport with the people and a possible indication of strength of the insurgents in that regard. It also suggests relatively poor organization of the government effort and a correspondingly better organization of the insurgent underground effort.

3. Another important indicator of progress is the scope of government intelligence coverage along with the depth and durability of established collection activities. Is, for example, the government able to collect intelligence on minor as well as major insurgent plans? How effective is government intelligence coverage of both gray and enemy-controlled areas? Do government nets endure, or are they frequently disrupted by the insurgents?

From the insurgent point of view, the situation is similar:

4. How does the insurgent net compare with the government in its sources, its type of information, and the scope, depth, and durability of its coverage?

5. Do the insurgents often succeed in obtaining advance warning of government plans and operations? Is insurgent intelligence relatively more, or less, efficient than the government counterpart? What is the trend?

6. How successful and how frequent are insurgent attempts to penetrate government agencies or to influence officials and citizens by bribery or other subversive tactics? Statistics on the success rate should be kept separately from those on the attempt rate, however, inasmuch as the two are indicators of different values.

PUBLIC OPINION AND PROPAGANDA

Since the primary objective in an insurgency/counterinsurgency situation is the allegiance of the people, the sentiments and attitudes of the people are what count. Popular allegiance and support--not geographic areas under control--are the ultimate measures of success for either side.

The extent of popular support for either side will vary from village to village, town to town, and province to province, and from time to time. Moreover, such support may be expressed in many ways. It is the presence or absence of either moral or material support which is significant--not the manner in which that support is given. Support by a majority of the population, even if that support is only moral or intangible, is of greater importance to either side than even the greatest material sacrifices given by some individuals or by a very small minority.

It is important to note that attitudes of passive acquiescence, neutrality, or apathy help the insurgents. Although insurgent support from a strong underground or system of front organization does indicate enemy popularity, changes in the extent of this support indicate changes in the relative power relationship between the insurgents and the counterinsurgents. As a note of caution, it should be further noted that in the case of communist insurgencies, the insurgents are usually very vocal and given to gross exaggeration of the strength of their organizations and the esteem in which they are held by the people. Communist or communist-influenced sources of information must, therefore, be evaluated with great care.

When attitudes need to be changed, the professional propagandist normally bases his appeals both on sentiment and logic. Each of these are in themselves composed of many factors. Either may predominate; however, more often appeals to sentiment carry the greater weight.

There are several approaches to estimating the extent to which the insurgents or the counterinsurgents are successful in disseminating their information policies and the degree to which these disseminations appear to influence public opinion:

1. Of fundamental importance is the degree to which the government controls the normal, overt, public information media. These include the press, radio, movies, television, theater, the arts, and so forth.

2. One important indicator of support for the government is the degree to which government policies receive unsolicited, voluntary support and publicity from the press and other public media. The extent, intensity, sincerity, and consistency of such voluntary support are critical factors.

3. Another indicator of support for the government is the extent to which government-sponsored information penetrates into villages and the countryside; the masses in urban areas; intellectual and student groups; labor, religious, and other interest groups. Although the effect of information programs upon public opinion is difficult to quantify, the very fact of extensive penetration of information is in itself an indicator of favorable trends.

4. Public manifestation of support for government programs can be estimated in part by voluntary public attendance at government-sponsored patriotic and political rallies.

5. The degree to which the government is able to advance its programs by exerting influence within non-governmental public and private organizations, including business organizations, is an indicator of strength or weakness.

6. Movement of the population from insurgent-controlled to government-controlled areas is likewise an indicator of the popular attitude toward the insurgency. (An important exception may occur in the case of population movements instigated by the insurgents in order to rid themselves of persons they cannot exploit or feed. Such groups may also be heavily infiltrated with insurgent agents in order to penetrate new areas.)

The above six general indicators are stated so as to apply primarily to the evaluation of government programs. They are, however, largely reciprocal in nature, i.e., evidence of government failure can be taken to indicate a degree of insurgent success. In addition:

7. It is important to measure the extent to which the insurgent underground and its constituent groups are successful in the dissemination of propaganda in its various forms.

8. An important guideline in propaganda analysis is the intensity of dissemination at a given time and circumstance. In this connection,

it should be noted that at times a sudden increase in the insurgent propaganda effort may indicate some weakness such as a loss of popular support.

9. Another possible sign of insurgent weakness may be the degree of control and censorship of the insurgent propaganda apparatus. Enforcement of increasingly strict controls may reflect some increased government successes.

POLITICAL ASPECTS OF EDUCATION

The term political aspects of education is, for the sake of this discussion, intended to embrace those aspects of ideological indoctrination carried out within the institutional framework of the public educational system. From the government's point of view, it includes such concepts as:

a. The general nature of the conflict taking place; enemy concepts of strategy and subversion; and the outlook in case of an insurgent victory.

b. Positive measures to instruct youth and students how to avoid becoming ensnared by enemy propaganda or other action and thus being exploited for subversive purposes.

1. The general effectiveness of the educational system, government or insurgent, can be measured in terms of the number of schools active within the system, the size of student bodies, the number of variety of subjects taught, competence of the teaching and administrative staff, and the degree of willingness with which the students attend classes and lectures.

2. The specific political effectiveness of the educational system can be estimated from the proportion of educational effort devoted to systematic political education and/or reeducation and attitude with which this effort appears to be received by the students.

3. In cases wherein the school system has been disrupted by military, guerrilla, or terrorist activities, the alacrity with which the populace cooperates in reestablishment of the system is a significant indicator of success for the sponsor.

4. The attendance rate is also important. Absenteeism is a negative indicator for the sponsor. Even under circumstances where the general public level of interest in education is low, mere attendance at school favors the sponsor of the school in that it brings the student under his influence.

5. In the case of government-sponsored schools, the degree of open and enthusiastic teacher support of the counterinsurgency effort is an important measure of progress for the government programs.

6. Teacher casualties are not in themselves indicators of general success or failure on the government's part. The responsiveness of the public to the government's efforts to recruit replacements is, however, of great significance. An adequate and continuing supply of voluntary replacements is a sure sign of public confidence in the counter-insurgency effort.

7. Response of the student body to insurgent recruitment drives is another indicator of trends. The number of recruitment attempts, and the degree to which these attempts are voluntarily reported by the students, is as important an indicator as the response of the students to the drive itself.

CONTROL OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM

The following indicators suggest the status of respect for the courts, laws, and other legal instruments of government by the public, as opposed to acquiescence to insurgent attempts to establish their own shadow government.

1. Are government supporters and sympathizers adequately protected, or are they threatened or punished successfully by the insurgents? What is the trend?

2. How effective is government detection and prosecution of crime? Are the laws adequately enforced? Is law enforcement supported by the civil population, or is the government ineffective in attacking the insurgent effort to impose their own shadow laws on the public? How effective is the government in suppressing political crimes?

3. How does the public feel toward law enforcement agencies? Does it supply them freely with information about crime and criminals? Is the recruitment of personnel for law enforcement agencies becoming more or less difficult? What is the civilian attitude toward those who do law enforcement work?

4. What attitude does the public manifest toward the severe punishment of those convicted of political, economic, or other crimes against the security of the country? What is the trend of opinion?

5. What is the trend in public opinion regarding such insurgent activities as riots, work stoppages or slowdowns, sabotage, and terrorism?

COMMUNITY SERVICES AND CIVIC ACTION

The question of who effectively controls civic functions in an area and thereby plays the role of social reformer is in itself one indicator of the trend of political control within the area. Each area must, of course, be evaluated in the light of its actual political, psychological and military situation, taking into account the fact that some areas are of greater strategic importance than others. Political trends within the country as a whole may be derived from a careful and weighted analysis of such trends within individual areas.

1. Mere performance of civic functions by the government is not alone an indicator of government success. In some cases, civic action programs and related activities are not interfered with by the insurgents for reasons of their own; i.e., the insurgents may themselves be reaping tangible benefits from certain types of improvement programs. Each case requires individual study and analysis.

2. On the other hand, repeated insurgent attacks upon or destruction of the material results of successful government programs (schools, dispensaries, bridges, roads, hamlets, etc.) do not in themselves necessarily connote government weakness. Persistence by the government in rebuilding its programs in the face of attack is an indicator of success. Repeated attack upon these programs by the insurgents may reflect the fact that government programs are seriously hurting the course of the insurgency.

3. Division of opinion among the population as to whether the government or the insurgents are primarily responsible for the maintenance of community services indicates a trend favorable to the insurgents. Progressive crystallization of opinion in favor of the government reflects growing confidence in the government and hence progress by the government in the minds of the people.

4. Any evaluation of the impact of civic action and other community service programs must, however, take into account the fact that activities which do not contribute directly to the welfare of the people have little or no bearing upon popular attitudes. For example, the construction of airfields and ports for military use may be valuable for the military effort but remain largely ignored or unappreciated by the people. Even highway construction, in the absence of significant non-military needs, may in fact provide the insurgents with opportunities for propagandistic exploitation to the detriment of the government program.

CONTROL OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

There are essentially three sets of factors used in the evaluation of the control of communications and transportation facilities which must be taken into account in any valid analysis of trends from either the government or the insurgent point of view. One set of factors indicates relative strength of the government; another, relative strength of the insurgents; and a third, certain situations rather ambiguous and prone to misleading or superficial interpretation:

Factors Indicating Relative Government Strength:

1. The degree to which the government feels free to transport its materials in unarmed or less-armed convoys is a clear indication of firm government control of the facilities in the area.
2. The voluntary reporting by the people of information about insurgent ambushes, sabotage, or other disruptive tactics is a sign of growing government influence..
3. The possession by the government of effective warning nets and systems is an indicator of strength.
4. The degree of government independence from overland communications routes indicates an advantage over the insurgents and hence a degree of success.

Factors Indicating Relative Insurgent Strength:

5. A decrease in enemy attacks on civilian vehicles does not necessarily mean that the government's position is strengthening. Rather it may also mean such things as a secret or tacit agreement between the insurgents and the people to the profit of the insurgents. Too, this may also mean an increase in the rapport between the insurgents and the population.
6. More open use of the roads or other public facilities by the insurgents is a clear indication of insurgent strength.

Ambiguous Factors Requiring Careful Analysis:

7. Insurgent success in forcing the government to rely heavily upon air transport may indicate insurgent strength. On the other hand, it may equally indicate simply a change in insurgent strategy. The insurgents may be attributing more importance to the harassment of land lines of communication than to other types of activity.

8. An increase in the mining of roads by the insurgents may raise the question that the insurgents lack the resources to plan and implement operations of greater precision and reliability.

9. Concentration upon the destruction of open parts of telephone and telegraph lines by the insurgents may also reflect primarily the economical use of fairly meager resources rather than strength. Clearly, a few insurgent agents can cut more lines in one night than a battalion of signal personnel can repair.

10. Nor does concentration upon the mining or cutting of railroad lines necessarily reflect insurgent strength. It may again be an expression of lack of greater resources or merely a change in tactics.

11. The derailment and attack of military supply trains is often an effective method of harassment and a means of psychological intimidation of the population. On the other hand, such tactics may in fact reflect the insurgent's growing desperation over his supply problem. The same can be said of tactics involving day ambushes in unsuitable terrain, and from which the insurgents consistently suffer unreasonable losses.

12. The interdiction by insurgents of road and railroad links, telephone and telegraph lines, and waterways, is often interpreted as a sign of insurgent success. However, this action may equally reflect insurgent concern to reduce the government's influence in an area wherein the population may be distrusted by the insurgents.

13. By the same token, the fact that roads and railroads may largely be denied to the government at night may indicate neither insurgent strength nor government weakness. It should be noted that the insurgents can interdict the roads at night by use of only a relatively few men, yet the government cannot protect them totally no matter how many troops might be at its disposal.

CONTROL OF RECRUITMENT

1. In general, the degree of success in the insurgent recruitment program is an indication of the degree of favorable progress of the insurgency, and vice-versa. When analyzing and evaluating the situation, however, one must take into account the total picture. This includes not only the recruitment of guerrillas, but also, and at times even more importantly, the recruitment of members of the underground. The emphasis should be upon the degree of voluntarism in the recruitment effort. Insurgent recruitment by use of force should not be considered a factor in favor of the insurgents.

2. Likewise, government success can be measured by the degree of voluntary cooperation it receives from the public in its recruitment campaigns.

3. A negative indicator is the degree to which government or insurgent recruitment efforts are successfully evaded. Involvement of the potential recruit's family in either a positive or negative sense, and the trend in this regard, are additional factors which must be considered.

4. Another negative indicator is the degree to which either the government or the insurgents must use political controls, or other coercive forms of persuasion or social pressure to garner adequate recruits.

ECONOMIC CONTROLS

1. The degree to which the government is able to collect its taxes successfully and without undue difficulty indicates public confidence in and respect for the government. Lack of confidence and respect will be reflected in increased difficulty for the government in raising its tax revenues.

2. By the same token, the relative safety in which government tax collectors work in the field also indicates the degree of public respect for the government.

Factors by which the relative economic strength of the insurgents may be measured include:

3. The degree to which the insurgents, including the underground organization, are able to collect food, medicines, clothing, and money, and to send these to insurgent bases. Both the number of incidents as well as the total quantities of supplies affect the final evaluation.

4. Do the insurgents confiscate food and other supplies by force? (The size of the insurgent unit entrusted with the confiscation, the ruthlessness by which its assignment is carried out, and the extent to which the population is deprived of essential supplies are factors indicating the degree to which the insurgent ignores the needs of the people and hence of his desperation.)

5. The overall insurgent financial picture may be measured in terms of whether the insurgents are reducing or increasing the amount of taxes they seek to collect. Either an increase in the tax rate, or greater demands for resistance to insurgent tax collections is a clear indication of a lessening of popular support for the insurgent cause as well as a lack of confidence in an insurgent victory.

6. The degree to which the insurgent logistic and taxation system is relatively open as opposed to covert indicates the degree to which the insurgency is progressing in a given area. A change from an open to a covert system is a clear indication that the insurgency is losing ground.

CONTROL OF TERRORISM AND SABOTAGE

1. Acts of terrorism are generally a sign of insurgent weakness and serve primarily to compensate (psychologically, and in the eyes of the people) for the lack of success by guerrillas. Occasionally, however, they are also used for diversionary purposes.

2. The assassination of village chiefs, government officials, and civilian notables is usually a symptom of the insurgent's loss of self-confidence. In the case of communist insurgencies, however, some assassinations are looked upon as routine operations necessary for the liquidation of socio-political enemies.

3. Acts of sabotage of government installations, factories, and facilities, unlike other forms of terrorism, are not in themselves signs of insurgent weakness, desperation, or lack of self-confidence. They have to be evaluated in case-specific terms, with due regard for their effects upon public opinion at the time.

4. As is so often the case, the degree to which the population voluntarily supplies information to the government about insurgent plans and intentions for terroristic activities is an indication of progress for the government's programs. (It is, however, well-nigh impossible for the government to prevent all acts of terrorism, assassination, and sabotage.)

5. Although undue reliance upon terrorism by the insurgents is an act of desperation and hence of weakness, a subsequent decrease in the use of terror is, when unaccompanied by an increase in other phases of insurgent activities, a sign of loss in even that strength and self-confidence originally held by the insurgents.

MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES

1. Bases for understanding of the casualty problem

a. Unlike a conventional war, the casualties in insurgency/counterinsurgency are the result of a greater variety of operations and activities such as:

(1) Military skirmishes (including patrolling, air and land reconnaissance, guard duty, etc.) and the military battles including air attacks.

(2) Actions taken to penetrate the other side with agents and counteractions against such penetration.

(3) Air and land actions taken to destroy property (e.g., camps, supplies, communication centers, redoubts, roads, railroads, bridges), organizational functioning, or programs of the other side.

(4) Actions taken to bring about defections by members of the other side.

(5) Actions taken to kill, kidnap, sabotage, terrorize, etc.

(6) Actions taken to recruit, collect taxes, deport the population.

(7) Actions taken to disseminate propaganda, create confusion and civil disorder, and win supporters.

(8) Supply and resupply operations.

b. Personnel casualties include those killed, wounded, captured, kidnapped and defected. In insurgency/counterinsurgency all casualties, not only military casualties, have bearing on the measure of success or lack of success. Thus:

(1) Insurgent personnel casualties include casualties of all types of insurgent troops (local guerrilla units, village defense units, etc.), political heads, party members, members of undergrounds, terrorists, agents, front groups, and all other insurgent supporters.

(2) Counterinsurgent casualties include all internal and/or external forces (regulars and all types of paramilitary forces such as civil guards and self defense units), province and village chiefs, village councils, members of civic action teams, key personnel in the economic and political life, police forces, and others.

c. Equipment, both military and nonmilitary (farm machinery, means of transport, public utilities, key elements of economy), can be rendered inoperable, lost in battle, or destroyed by the enemy, all these losses must be taken into consideration when evaluating the progress or lack of it. One must also consider the relative values of these losses, because that value is not the same for both sides. For example, the loss of a truck or of a gun will usually hurt the insurgent more than the counterinsurgent because of the replacement factor. In measuring the government's gains, one should include all equipment which the enemy used for military purposes, but of which it was deprived when a territory or a part of it was liberated by the government.

d. Personnel casualties of the counterinsurgent forces are always expected to be greater than those of the insurgent. Normally, the ratio is 10-20 counterinsurgent losses to one insurgent loss in some phases of counterinsurgency. (The ratio in South Vietnam is substantially lower thanks primarily to the US air strategic and tactical mobility and fire power. On the other hand, and logically indeed, the US losses in helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft have been appreciable.)

e. Casualties of counterinsurgent forces increase depending on the following:

(1) The amount of insurgent resistance and intensity of fighting.

(2) The aggressiveness (initiative and offensive operations) of the counterinsurgents.

(3) The number of counterinsurgent forces engaged in operations (deployment of larger forces guarantees success of an operation but should, and usually does, result in a larger amount of casualties).

f. Counterinsurgent casualties will further increase:

(1) With the phases of insurgency, specifically starting from the reversal (which is the case now in South Vietnam) and will increase almost to the end. Only at some point, shortly before the end, will the casualty curve start decreasing.

(2) Whenever insurgents attempt to reverse the tide in their favor.

g. Civilian casualties will increase very rapidly in case the insurgents are successful in the third phase and expect a victory. (These casualties will include liquidation of the class enemies.)

h. A decline in the number of political casualties, if these occurred under the same or similar conditions as when such earlier casualties were higher, may cause concern. Such a decline may indicate that the political personnel have accommodated the insurgents in order to save their lives. But in considering such a case, one should evaluate it from the point of view of which side is accruing the most benefit from such an accommodation.

i. The government paramilitary units (village guards, self-defense forces, and the like) usually suffer in the earlier phases of insurgency relatively greater casualties than the regular army personnel. This may be the case in the later phases also if the army units are located or deployed far away from the paramilitary unit's posts. A decline in casualties of these paramilitary units may occur under these conditions:

- (1) Improved support by the people.
- (2) Improved intelligence, reconnaissance, and security.
- (3) Improved defense of the posts.
- (4) Greater combat experience.
- (5) Accommodation with the enemy.

j. The casualty measure may be inaccurate for the following reasons:

- (1) Tendency to overestimate the casualties of the enemy.
- (2) Policy of the insurgent to remove their dead and wounded and to salvage weapons.

(Note: Whenever an underground is close, it has the responsibility for removing and hiding those who were not removed by the insurgent combat forces.)

(3) For psychological and propaganda purposes, the insurgent never reveals the real number of casualties to the public. Their policy is to minimize the casualties.

k. Capability for filling gaps created by attrition and to train replacements are the factors to be considered in the evaluation of either

side's capability and of success or lack of success. In order to diminish the insurgents military potential, the counterinsurgent forces must destroy insurgent forces faster than the insurgents can replace or regenerate.

1. The following comparison of casualties may be considered:

(1) Casualties of regular army units versus casualties of paramilitary forces.

(2) Casualties to officers versus soldiers.

(3) Killed and wounded in battle versus surrenders and defectors.

(4) Political versus military casualties.

m. Personnel casualty statistics may be presented in the following forms:

(1) All personnel casualties for both sides summed (this must take account of number of forces on each side).

(2) Casualties to either side.

(3) Casualty ratio between sides.

(4) Casualty ratio rates.

(5) Casualty to either side by category, and

(6) Casualties per battle, per air-attack, per skirmish, per 100 man hours of patrolling and reconnaissance, per ton-mile over roads subject to the enemy attack and ambush, etc.

2. Criteria

a. Personnel casualties include the following: *

* In addition to the proper military personnel the following personnel should be included: civilian supply personnel such as porters, cooks, guides, trackers, personnel of warning nets, drivers, repairmen, medics and other civilian personnel which are directly supporting the insurgent or counterinsurgent troops in combat;

In addition to the flow of replacements the quality of replacements should also be considered. It is important to find out if the flow of trained replacements for the insurgent does or does not exceed their monthly casualty rate.

- (1) Killed in action.
- (2) Wounded in action.
- (3) Missing in action.
- (4) Captured.
- (5) Kidnapped.
- (6) Defected.

b. Material losses include the following items destroyed by ground and air-fire, and otherwise lost in combat:

- (1) Weapons.
- (2) Motor and nonmotor vehicles (wagons, bicycles, other).
- (3) Human porters, pack animals (horses, buffaloes, elephants, and the like).
- (4) Equipment.
- (5) Clothing.
- (6) Ammunition.
- (7) Medicines.
- (8) Explosives and mines.
- (9) Stores and dumps.
- (10) Repair shops
- (11) Railroad stock (locomotives, wagons, platforms, rails, etc.)

c. Military operations:*

* It is important to consider and evaluate for every operation and activity, the following: The size of the operation (number of troops deployed and size of territory covered); The conditions under which the operation was undertaken, particularly the extent of penetration into the enemy's territory; If such operation is undertaken for the first time or is repeated; The type of terrain, particularly the type of terrain in which the superiority of firepower cannot be utilized to advantage; The experience gained; The objectives achieved; The impression made upon the local population; The impression made upon the enemy; Other side-effects, particularly psychological effects of an operation; A listing of casualties in personnel and materiel without considering the conditions under which these have occurred will give a misleading and inaccurate picture.

- (1) Patrolling.
- (2) Air reconnaissance missions.
- (3) Land attacks.
- (4) Attacks undertaken on the initiative of lower elements.
- (5) Air attacks.
- (6) Close air support operations.
- (7) Land rescue operations.
- (8) Air rescue operations.
- (9) Water rescue operations.
- (10) Military medical and other assistance to the population.
- (11) Day and night contacts with the enemy.
- (12) Supply and resupply operations.
- (13) Attacks and infiltrations repulsed.

d. Non-military operations:

- (1) Number of successful and thwarter actions to kill, sabotage, kidnap and terrorize;
- (2) Number of successful and thwarter actions to collect taxes, recruit, deport population; punish collaborators, etc.;
- (3) Number of successful or thwarter actions to destroy government and civilian property;
- (4) Other.

e. Fighting morale

- (1) Number of decimated units which must recuperate and be restored to their strength before they could again be used in combat;
- (2) Number of units which have been over-used and thus have become tired and without elan;
- (3) Number of troops whose morale has declined for such reasons as: inferior leadership and equipment; lack of ammunition; lack of proper

diet; losses in combat; evaluation of dead and wounded has become more difficult and unsuccessful; lack of belief in victory; lack of contact with their families, other.

(4) Improvement in the morale owing to combat experience, improved tactics and techniques and gained self-confidence.

(5) Confidence in own weapons and in quick reaction by the higher echelons in case reinforcements and air strikes are requested.

f. Security of the area:*

(1) Freedom of work in the fields by the people;

(2) Freedom of movement in general, and freedom of cross country movement by the paramilitary forces and civilian population in particular;

(3) Increase of the area in size in the terms of the control of population.

g. Civic action activities:

(1) Medical assistance to the civilian population;

(2) Civic action projects and material, morale and other assistance to the population;

(3) Eagerness of the population to accept and support civic action projects; material and moral support they are giving to these projects;

* In this type of war there is no absolute security of an area. No matter how an area may be considered secure the enemy will be able, depending on his will, to disturb the peace, to sabotage, to terrorize, kill, kidnap, destroy, and the like. The question is one of the degree, and success or lack of success should be considered within this frame.

Control of the people and not of the land is important. Thus the degree of control of a sector, or province (or for example, in the whole of South Vietnam), is expressed in the number of people being controlled and not in the number of square miles.

There are some villages, sectors, and the like, in which either the counterinsurgent or insurgent can exercise influence. This depends on the situation and must be considered in any evaluation of the progress or lack of progress. The counterinsurgent must try to exercise its influence on uncontrolled populace, or be ready to exercise it when an opportune moment comes.

- (4) Number of volunteers for civic action projects;
- (5) Stabilization of local markets and prices;
- (6) Stabilization process (political, ideological, economic security, and otherwise) within strategic hamlets and villages in liberated territories;
- (7) Eagerness and willingness of the population to identify themselves openly with counterinsurgent civic action projects.

h. Public relations;

- (1) Number of military contacts with the people such as: gatherings in public places, talks, concerts, movies, and plays; and other everyday contacts by which the people can be influenced;
- (2) Friendliness of the people toward the counterinsurgents. Eagerness and willingness to start conversation, freedom of exchange of opinions; other;
- (3) Treatment of the civilian population by the counterinsurgents;
- (4) Treatment of refugees, political defectors, and POWs;
- (5) Amnesty (change in their thinking and attitude; confidence in government victory; other);
- (6) Degree of improvement of the counterinsurgent's situation;
- (7) Eagerness of the population to support the counterinsurgents, in the government controlled sectors, in the preparation and carrying out of local and national elections; extent of collaboration and support;
- (8) Responsiveness of the people to advice and demand given to them by the counterinsurgent and government officials.

i. Psychological operations:*

- (1) Effects on the population and insurgents from the counterinsurgent military and paramilitary operations, activities;

* Every military operation and activity must be so planned and executed as to result in the most beneficial psychological effects on the insurgent and the population.

(2) Effects on the population and insurgents from the counter-insurgent civic action and other military programs;

(3) Effects produced by air bombings by the counterinsurgents and by their successful operations on the sea, on land, and on waterways;

(4) Other.